A Christological Approach to Virtue: Augustine and Humility

Boston College

The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Department of Theology

A CHRISTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VIRTUE: AUGUSTINE AND HUMILITY a dissertation

by DEBORAH WALLACE RUDDY

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2001

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The thesis of: entitled:

Deborah Wallace Ruddy A Christological Approach to Virtue: Augustine and Humility

submitted to the Department of: ___T.....h..... eo ....l....o"'-'!g"""y_ _ _ _ _ __ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of:

Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences has been read and

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Date:

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A CHRISTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VIRTUE: AUGUSTINE AND HUMILITY Abstract by Deborah Wallace Ruddy Advisor: Rev. Michael Himes

Humility has become an unpopular, even forgotten, virtue in contemporary Western culture. Central throughout most of Christian history, its value today has changed dramatically. Within Christian circles, the world-affirming and liberating dimensions of the gospel have led to questions about whether humility frustrates human flourishing and fosters a passive acceptance of injustice. Several feminist scholars have argued that humility can exacerbate women' s struggle for self-identity and empowerment. At this time, St. Augustine's work is worth exploring because he both places humility at the center of Christian life and provides a Christo logical hermeneutic for distinguishing between true and false humility. According to Augustine. all Christian virtues are rooted in this foundational Christian attribute revealed in Jesus Christ. The first and last chapters respectively introduce contemporary criticism of humility and then evaluate it in light of Augustine's thought. Chapters two and three explore Augustine's claim that humility is at the heart of who Christ is and what his disciples are to become (Matthew 11:29). The way that God saves us is inseparable from salvation itself: "our very salvation in Christ consists in the humility of Christ." (Serm. 285.4). In other words, humility is more than simply moral; it is soteriological. for it

describes the very logic of our reconciliation with God in Jesus Christ. Through humility, Christ confronts our pride, mediates between humanity and divinity, and empties himself in love for our sake. Chapter four examines how Johann Baptist Metz offers resources for a contemporary renewal of humility through his historically and politically conscious account of "poverty of spirit," relating it to modem forms of alienation and exploitation. In a mutually corrective reading of Augustine and Metz. humility emerges as the source of both a Christian anthropology and a more radical, active love that calls us out of ourselves into solidarity and communion. The twofold shape of Christ-like humility, as true self-knowledge and self-emptying (Philippians 2), reveals the expansive and liberating nature of this virtue too often aligned with a privatized and somber Christianity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS lNTRODUCTION 1. 2. 3.

The Problematic Situation St. Augustine: Teacher of Christ's Humility Method and Structure

1

7 Ll

CHAPTER 1 HUMILITY AND ITS CRITICS Introduction 1.1.

1.2.

14

Various Uses of the Term Humility a. Humility in the Classical World b. Humility in the Judeo-Christian Tradition

15 19

Modem Critiques of Humility Introduction a. Karl Marx: Humility as a Tool for Oppressors b. Nietzsche: Humility as Egoism c. Feminist Critiques of Humility

24 24 26 33

Conclusion

46

CHAPTER 2 CHRIST: THE FOUNDATION AND EXEMPLAR OF HUMILITY Introduction 2.1.

2.2.

Preliminary Notes on Augustine's Christology and Related Topics a. Augustine's Christo logy b. Humility in the Order of Redemption c. Clarifying the term: "Humble God" d. The Distinctiveness of Divine Humility

48 54 58 62 66

Soteriological Dimensions of Christ's Humility A. Augustine's Antithetical Christo logy as Salvific a. The Sin of Pride b. Christ's Humility: the Antidote to Pride and Despair

69

B. The Humility of Christ the Mediator a. Mediation Through Christ's Humble Humanity

90 93

73 80

99

b. The Way to Divinization C. Christ's Humility as Kenosis

101

Conclusion

107

CHAPTER 3 HUMILITY OF THE DISCIPLE Introduction

109

3.1.

Imitation of the Humble Christ

III

3.2.

Augustine's Conversion to the Humble Christ Introduction a. The Confessions b. The Humble Bishop

118 119

3.3.

Humility as True Self-Knowledge a. Divine and Human Humility b. Humility and Self-Love c. The Personal Dimension of False Humility d. The Eschatological Motivation of Humility

141 147 148 151 156 160

3.4. The Humility of Service a. Two Levels of Humility b. Humility and Christian Citizenry c. Humility and Charity d. The Social Dimension of False Humility e. Humility and the Body of Christ

164 164

Conclusion

178

166 170 174 175

CHAPTER 4 A THEOLOGICAL EXPANSION OF AUGUSTINIAN HUMILITY: 'POVERTY OF SPIRIT' IN THE THEOLOGY OF lB. METZ Introduction

180

4.1.

184

Metz's Theology

11

4.2.

Poverty of Spirit in Metz's Theology A. Poverty of Spirit in Poverty of Spirit

186

B. Poverty of Spirit in Followers of Christ Introduction a. Poverty and Following Christ b. Chastity and Following Christ c. Obedience and Following Christ

192 194 196 197

C. Poverty of Spirit in A Passion for God Introduction a. Poverty of Spirit and "Suffering unto God" b. Shattering Mythology and Discovering Personhood c. Metz and the Masters of Suspicion d. Memory

203 205 2lO

215 217 218

Conclusion CHAPTERS AUGUSTINIAN HUMILITY TODAY

223

Introduction

5.1. a. b. c. d.

5.2.

5.3.

Overview of Augustine's Doctrine of Humility Humility as rooted in the person and work of Jesus Christ Humility as foundational for discipleship Humility as truthful self-knowledge in Christ Humility as social and keno tic

225 227 229 231

Revisiting the Feminist Criticism Introduction a. The Feminist Critique

234 238

An Augustinian Response to the Feminist Critiques A. Preliminary Observations

240

B. Humility and Personal Identity a. Women's pride b. Women's despair c. The Recovery of Self

245 246 248

C. Humility and Social Justice

250 iii

250 254

u. Humble Authority and Obedience b. Humility and Solidarity 5.4. Humility and the Catholic University

Introduction a. Humility and Institutional Leadership b. Humility and Faculty c. Humility and Students d. Humility and Pluralism

257 260 264 272

278

Conclusion

284

CONCLUSION

287

SELECTED BIBUOGRAPHY

293

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am especially grateful to my husband, Christopher, whose faith and love sustained me during the most arduous moments of writing. Thanks also to my dearest friend, Anna Bonta Moreland, who walked with me during every stage of doctoral study. Kathleen Wallace Silver, always an attentive listener, offered real sisterly companionship throughout this project. A special thank you to Sister Elizabeth White, R.S.C.1 .. who meticulously proofread and gave needed counsel and support all along the way. Maryann McLaughlin, my spiritual director, has been an anchor to me throughout the past seven years. I am grateful. of course, to my committee. Fr. Michael Himes offered encouragement and enthusiasm throughout. An invaluable mentor and friend, Fr. Robert Imbelli has helped me to appreciate the Christ-centeredness of theology. At the very start, Fr. Brian Daley, S.1., helped to formulate the subject of my research and guided me through the proposal. His insights on Augustine and humility have been an ongoing source of inspiration. Also, thanks to Gretchen Shively for her patience and diligence in proofreading the footnotes. Finally, I am indebted to many friends at Boston College who made graduate study a time of discovering real community life: Joe Curran, Steve Miles. Cara Anthony and Andy Singer, Peggy Preston, Rosario and Brian Hughes. Fritz Monsma. Tiffany and Damien Israel-Shiner, David Williams, Mike Hirota. Tom and Lisa Kelly. Joe Samosky. Khaled Anatolios. Michelle MacAtee, John Hardt. Michael and Anne-Marie Gorman, Michael Terranova, Angela Senander, Mariana and Rich Miller, Grant Kaplan. Nathan Munsch. O.S.B .• Fr. Michael Buckley, S.1., Fr. David Hollenbach. S.1., Fr. Bill Neenan, S.1., and all those in the Thursday night prayer group.

v

DEDICATION

To Mom and Dad, my first teachers of faith

vi

INTRODUCIlON 1. The Problematic Situation

It is often observed that '"[h]umility is the orphaned virtue of our age."1 In a culture psychologically attuned to the problem of low self-esteem and preoccupied with selfpromotion, humility has become an unpopular, if not forgotten. virtue. While it has been a central virtue throughout most of Christian history, its value in the contemporary world has shifted dramatically. Once regarded as the Christian attribute. found in an authentic sense of creature hood and a willing dependence on God, humility is now looked upon by many as a weakness or character tlaw. 1 Humility goes against a deeply imbedded impulse in contemporary American culture to overcome or simply deny the frailty, imperfection, and incompletion of our lives. Moreover, in our image-conscious, control-oriented world, it is often associated with passivity and a fawning deference to those in power. Where success is defined in terms of productivity and self-sufficiency, humility just does not "fit." Retlecting on the loss of humility in our time, David Baily Harned remarks: In its conventional form humility seems the least fashionable of virtues, for ours is the era of advertising, and self-advertising is among the age's most powerful and persuasive styles. What is deemed important is perception Ilonathan Sacks. "Endangered Virtues 3: Humility," The Tablet 254 (April 2000). ~51. 1 The following is a sampling of authors who discuss the marginal condition of humility in modem society. in teday's Christian community, and in contemporary scholarship: Matthew Baasten. "Humility and Modem Ethics." Reformed Review Spring 38 (1985), 3: Roberta C. Bondi. "Humility: A Meditation on An Ancient Virtue For Modem Christians." Quarterly Review (1983); lohn Casey. Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 199-200.211: Brian E. Daley. "To Be More Like Christ: The Background and Implications of Three Kinds of Humility .... Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits 27 (1995); lames F. Keenan. Virtues for Ordinary Christians (Kansas City. MO: Sheed and Ward, 1996). 7071: lay Newman. "Humility and Self-Realization." Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (1982); lonathan Sacks. "Endangered Virtues 3: Humility." The Tablet 254 (April 2000). ~51: Norvin Richards. Humility (Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1992); Alexander Schmemann, Great Lent (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974). 18-21: Nancy Snow. "Humility." The Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1995).203216. 1995; lohn M. Templeton. The Humble Approach: Scientists Discover God (New York: The Seabury Press. 1981).

1

and not reality. Little seems more socially dysfunctional than everyday humility.3 Humility has come to signify something quite distinct from what it had represented in its theological context, where it principally described God's way of intimate communion with humanity. In a society increasingly shaped by 'the triumph of the

therapeutic:~

humility

evokes images of a self-deprecating person with little sense of his or her own self-worth. Popularized psychology can shun traditional Christian notions of self-effacement and selfsacriticing love. These are often considered threatening to an individual's freedom and self-wonh. Thus, the modern person tends to associate humility with an unhealthy selfimage and a world-renouncing mentality that contributes to a retreat from serious engagement in the struggle for justice. Within Christianity. a new emphasis has been given to the imponance of human dignity and social engagement. For example, in the Roman Catholic church. since the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). the "world-affirming"5 and liberating dimensions of Christian spirituality have been emphasized more than other-worldly and ascetical elements that came to be associated with humility. In 1965. The Pastoral Constitlllion on the Church in the Modem World (Gaudium et spes) proclaims: She [the church] serves as a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society as it is to be renewed in Christ and transformed in God's family ... This she does most of all by her healing and elevating impact on the dignity of the person. by the way in which she strengthens the seams of human society and imbues the everyday activity of [human beings I with a deeper meaning and imponance. Thus, through her individual members and her

3 David Baily Hamed. Patience: How We Wait Upon the World (Cambridge. MA: Cowley Publications

(997). 168. ~ Phillip Rieff. The Triumph of the Therapeutic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (966).

5 Daley. "To Be More Like Christ." 3.

2

whole community, the Church believes she can contribute greatly toward making the family of [humankind] and its history more human.6 Moving away from a more austere spirituality, the Council invited Christians to renew hope in God's transforming work in the world. In a similar vein, the Presbyterian church's Confession of 1967 urged Christians to apply their gifts to the "advancement of the

common welfare."7 Generally, focusing on the mission aspects of Christian spirituality. preachers of the Gospel today stress the wonh of each human being and the imponance of action in shaping a more just society.s Attention is given to the power of our human capacities and each person's responsibility for shaping his or her identity and social context. Those on the margins of society and of the church are encouraged to stand up and be counted, and those in subservient positions are urged to confront the structures of domination. Contemporary Christian observers wonder whether humility is really an imponant Christian vinue. James Keenan. a virtue ethicist, concludes that the word itself. "humility." is "so laden with negative connotations that it seems irredeemable."q In light of this crucial turn to the dignity of the individual and the imponance of human rights, it is now necessary for the church to ask if humility frustrates the affirmation of human dignity and fosters a passive acceptance of injustice. Are these more empowering and socially conscious Christian values really in tension with a humble disposition'?

6 Gaudium et spes (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World) eds .. David J. O'Brien

and Thomas A. Shannon. Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll. N.Y.: Orbis Books. 1992). 191-195; National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB). Catholic Social Teaching aki the U.S. Economy (Washington. D.C.: United States Catholic Conference. 1984). sect. 40. 7 The Book of Confessions (Philadelphia. The General Assembly of The United Presbyterian Church in the

United States of America. 1967).9A6. 8 Dieter T. Hessel. Social Ministry (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1982); The Church's Public

Role: Retrospect and Prospect. ed.• Dieter T. Hessel (Grand Rapids. MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1993). q James F. Keenan. Virtue for Ordinary Christians (Kansas City. MO: Sheed and Ward. 1996).70-71.

3

Liberation theologians, for example, call into question a spirituality that fosters detachment and resignation, thereby softening the response to oppression. and legitimating grave injustices. 1O Do resignation and escapism in the face of injustice go hand-in-hand with the Christian virtue of humility? Perhaps virtues, like humility, often pursued in relation to an individualistic conception of spiritual perfection need to be re-understood in relation to the Gospel call to serve one another. Making a more general observation, the Onhodox theologian, Alexander Schmemann. notes the absence of humility in our contemporary culture and the reflection of this in Christian churches: If there is a moral quality almost completely disregarded and even denied today, it is indeed humility. The culture in which we live constantly instills in us the sense of pride, of self-glorification, and of self-righteousness. It is built on the assumption that man can achieve anything by himself and it even pictures God as the One who all the time 'gives credit' for man's achievements and good deeds. Humility-be it individual or corporate. ethnic or national-is viewed as a sign of weakness. as something unbecoming a real man. Even our churches-are they not imbued with that same spirit of the Pharisee? Do we not want our every contribution. every 'good deed,' all that we do 'for the Church' to be acknowledged. praised. publicized? 11 Observing the tendency toward self-promotion within the Christian churches today, Schmemann sees a pressing need for humility. In addition to the neglect of humility in the culture, as well as the church's shift of attention away from humility. the academy is currently calling this virtue into question. Some feminists, for example. point out that traditional Christian virtues. such as humility,

10 Leonardo Boff. Faith on the Edge: Religion and Margi1Ulli:.ed Existence. trans. Robert R. Barr (San Francisco: Harper and Row. 1989).59-107; [gnacio Ellacuria. "A Latin American Reading of the Spiritual Exercises of SI. [gnatius: trans. 1. Matthew Ashley "Lectura Latinoamerican de los Ejercicios Espirituales de san [gnacio," Revista LatinoamericafUl de Teologia (199111). 15-17; Gustavo Gutierrez. We Drink From Our Own Wells (Maryknoll. NY: Orbis. 1984); Ion Sabrina. Jesus the Liberator (Maryknoll. NY: Orbis. 1993). II

Alexander Schmemann. Great Lent (Crestwood, NY: SI. Vladimir's Seminary Press. 1974). 19.

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can impede women's struggle for self-realization and personal responsibility. I! These virtues intensify the feeling of powerlessness among women. Humility. then. is associated with submission to a male-dominated culture and church. which expect women to give of themselves in ways that compromise their own integrity. 13

[n

her now classic article. "The

Human Situation: A Feminine View."I-l Valerie Saiving Goldstein (now Valerie Saiving) argues that traditional Christian exhortations to self-sacrifice serve to correct the male temptation to pride. but are less applicable to the moral problems that most women face. For women. she argues. the primary temptation is failing to develop a centered self. ls This discussion has led feminists to ask whether upholding humility as a central virtue favors a male-oriented approach to virtue and perpetuates a patriarchal framework for ethics. 16 Many modem and post-modem scholars suspect that humility either cultivates weakness or serves as a tool for the weak to assert power and undermine

true

human

greatness. 17 According to Karl Marx. humility is a religious disposition that encourages weakness and social passivity. Friedrich Nietzsche. however. insists that humility is a cover for those who are already weak. The "humble" are driven by ressentiment (or I!

Valerie Saiving Goldstein. "The Human Situation: A Feminine View. Journal of Religion 40 (1960).

100-112: Anne E. Patrick. Liberating Conscience: Feminist Etplorations in Catholic Moral Theology (New York: Continuum. (996): Judith Plaskow. Sex. Sin and Grace. (Lanham. MD: University Press of America. (980). 13 Roberta C. Bondi. To Love As God Loves: Conversations with the Early Church (Philadelphia: Fortress. (987).46-56: Karen Jo Torjesen. When Women Were Priests: Women's LecuJership in the Early Church and the Scandal of their Subordination in the Rise of Christianity (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco. 1993). l-l Goldstein.

100-112.

15 Ibid .• 109. 16 Anne Patrick. "Narrative and The Social Dynamics of Virtue." Changing Values and Vinues. eds. Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (987).77-78.

17 Jean Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. trans. Willmoore Kendall (Chicago. Illinois: Henry Regnery Company. (954). 204-223: Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals. trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House. Vintage books edition 1989). 110. 142-148.

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repressed vengefulness)IS and a covert search for power.19

More recently. in a paper

addressed to an assembly of Flemish and Dutch-speaking abbots and abbesses at Westmalle. Belgium in 1976. Antoine Vergote. professor of Psychology at the University of Leuven. remarks: The word "humility" rubs us the wrong way and irritates us a bit today. Not because in fact one is not humble. but because of the pejorative connotation attached to the word. . . I think that today the term connotes a preoccupation with the self which is too narcissistic. It suggests concerns about one' s virtue. preoccupation with a personal ideal of perfection. A second connotation of humility is that a person is seeking in religion some consolation for weakness. Nietzsche is the byword for this critical tendency in our culture. . . The charge against our culture. which, as everyone knows. is formed by Christianity. is that we pursue a kind of unconscious cult of weakness along with a compensating search for consolation in religious emotion. a kind of comforting experience. It seems to me that this is the idea which the word "humility" suggests to many. especially when one stresses the search for voluntary humiliation. One gives the impression of cultivating weakness so as to experience an artificial paradise sought in religious intimacy. It is a kind of religious illusion which has its roots in the cult of personal weakness.:!o In view of the fact that the status of humility has dramatically shifted from that of a central Christian virtue to what is widely regarded as a "problem virtue." this dissertation proposes to examine a theology that places humility at the center of a fully human and Christian existence. While many of the church Fathers speak of humility as the Christian virtue.:!1 no one is more insistent about its primacy in the Christian life than St. Augustine. (354-430) whose views bear directly on these twentieth century concerns. IS Craig Beam. "Hume and Nietzsche: Naturalists. Ethicists. Anti-Christians: Hume 5wdies 22. no. 2 (Nov. 1996). 312. 19 Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals. 38. 44-48: Max Scheler. Ressentiment (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 1994).63-89.91-117. 20 Antoine Vergote. "Une approche psychologique de I'humilite dans la Regie de saint Benoit" in

Collectanea Cisterciensia 42:2 (1980) 112-135. (editor of ABR Dec. 1988) trans.: "A Psychological Approach to Humility in the Rule of St. Benedict," The American Benedictine Review 39:4 (1988). 426427. 21 Clement of Alexandria. Origen. Gregory of Nyssa. St. Basil. Hilary of Poitiers. St. Ambrose. St. John Chrysostom cited in P. Adnes. "Humilite" Dictionnaire de spiritualiti [=DS] 7 (1969). 1153.

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2. St. Augustine: Teacher of Christ's Humility Augustine's teaching on humility deeply influenced the understanding of Christian discipleship in the Western church. 22 Writing in Latin-speaking North Africa in the late fourth century and early fifth, Augustine consistently presents humility as a central notion for understanding Christ and the Christian way of life.23 [n reference to the various moral systems of his day, Augustine writes: "Everywhere are to be found excellent precepts concerning morals and discipline, but this humility is not to be found.

This way of

humility comes from another source; it comes from Christ. .. What else did he teach but this humility?''1'; All other Christian virtues are built upon and sustained by this foundational Christian attribute that grows out of God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. The theological basis for Augustine's doctrine of humility is christo logical for he derives his understanding of humility from the Gospel narratives of the life. death. and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 25 Augustine upholds Christ as the archetype of Christian humility so that a truly compelling, transforming, and comprehensive account of this virtue must derive from an understanding of Christ who grounds and animates true humility. 22 Daley. "To Be More like Christ." 13.

23

Over the last thirty years. there has been no systematic study of Augustine's teaching on humility. However. two noteworthy 20th century works prior to Vatican U on the topic include a thesis by I. Musinsky. The Humility of Christ In The Thought of St. Augustine. Gregorian University. Rome. 1947 (unpublished) and Pierre Adnes. La Doctrine de l'humilite che: S. Augustin (Toulouse. France. (953). Cited in OJ. MacQueen. in "Contemptus Dei: St. Augustine on the Disorder of Pride in Society. and its Remedies;" Recherches Augustiniennes 9 (1973). 237-259. 2'; Enarrationes in psalmos 31.2.18 (Basil Studer. The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of

Hippo: Christocentrism or Theocentrism? trans. Matthew I. O'Connell (Collegeville. MN: Liturgical Press. (997), 52. Vbicumque etiam inueniunrur optima praecepta morum et disciplinae. humilitas ramen ista non inuenitur. Via humilitatis huius aliunde manat; a Christo uenit... Quid aliud docuit nisi hanc humilitatem? (CCL 38:239). 25 £narrationes in psalmos 31.2.18: "Via humiliteltis huius aliunde manat; a Christo venit. Haec via ab ilIo est. qui cum esset elltus. humilis venit. .. " (CCL 38: 239).

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Augustine's wonder at the "humble God" Chumilis deus)26 of Jesus Christ reverberates throughout his works. In Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, divine love is revealed "in the form of a servant" (Phil 2:7).

The self-emptying (kenosis) of the Word-the divine

descent into human history-is the paradigmatic form and source of humility in Christian discipleship.17 Christian humility is thus more than a virtue that God urges upon us: it is the very way God's Word comes to us and invites us to pattern our lives. 28 The way of humility, then, is primarily God's way. Only by extension is it our way, insofar as we imitate the divine through Christian discipleship. In a famous letter to Dioscorus. a young Greek scholar and physician, Augustine insists that humility stands as the most fundamental disposition necessary for all who seek to follow in Christ's footsteps: To Him [Christ] ... I wish you to submit with complete devotion. and to construct no other way for yourself of grasping and holding the truth than the way constructed by Him who, as God, saw how faltering were our steps. This way is first humility, second humility, third humility, and however often you should ask me I would say the same. not because there are no other precepts to be explained, but if humility does not precede and accompany and follow every good work we do, and if it is not set before us to look upon, and beside us to lean upon. and behind us to fence us in, pride will wrest from our hand any good deed we do while we are in the very act of taking pleasure in it. 19

16 On the Catechising of the Uninstructed 4.8 trans. S.D.F. Salmond in Nicene and Past-Nicene Fathers of

the Christian Church (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917).287. (PL 40:316). 17 Serm. 92.2 (WSA llIJ3:467) trans .. Edmund Hill. Sermons. in The Works of Saint ..\ugustine: A

Translation for the 21st Century. ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn. NY: New City Press. 1990). Hereafter cited as "WSA" followed by Pan. then Volume. then page.

Augustine often discusses humility in connection with the exhortation of Matthew's Gospel: "Learn from me; for I am gentle and humble of heart." (11:29) New Revised Slandani Version (NRSV). All biblical citations will be from the NRSV unless otherwise indicated. Confessions 7.9.14: Tractates on the Gospel of St. John 25.18: City of God 14:13.

28

29 Letter 118. The Fathers of the Church 18 trans. Wilfred Parsons (New York: The Fathers of the Church.

1953).282.

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Here. with rhetorical playfulness. Augustine insists upon humility as the beginning, middle, and end of Christian discipleship. He maintains that humility is more than a virtue or an antidote to pride; it is a fundamentally Christian orientation that prepares the way for all Christian virtues. T.J. van Bavel explains. "For Augustine. humility is not simply one among many virtues; it is the first movement of love. because it alone renders one open to and aware of what is not oneself. and pulls one out from withdrawal into one's self."30 Allowing God to be the Lord of one's life renders one open to the other in total generosity. Van Bavel notices that Augustine conceives of humility as a form of Christian love characterized by other-directedness. It helps one to see the folly of being turned inward and it calls for a giving of one's life in total trust to God. Augustine insists that Christ's followers must pattern their existence on the giving and receiving dynamic of his self-emptying love and his receptivity to the Father.

The

unique way that God's Word comes to humanity sets the pattern for each person's return to God. Jesus Christ's "receiving and giving away" is not just the means by which divine love is revealed to humanity, it is also the way that humanity itself is transformed and ultimately enfolded in divine love. At its most basic level. humility entails an honesty about one's proper place in the divine ordering of creation. Is it about being at peace with one's God-given nature. It does not insist upon self-degradation but seeks true self-knowledge. "You are not being told. "Be something less than you are." But "Understand what you are. Understand that you're weak. understand that you are merely human. understand that you are a sinner:' 31 Rather

30 T.1. van Bavel. "De la Raison a la Foi." La Conversion d'Augustin. Augustiniana 86:1-2:13. 1986 (trans. Christopher I. Ruddy)."Pour Augustin. l'humilite n'est pas une vertu parmi tant d'aurres; elle est Ie premier mouvement de l'amour, car elle seule rend I'homme ouvert et sensible ci ce qui n'est pas lui. et l'arrache ainsi au repliement sur lui-mime." 31 Serm. 137.4 (WSA IIII4:374).

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than being a mask for pride, humility is the antidote to pride and its many forms of selfaggrandizement. Humility holds in check the perverse desire to "play God. "32 It begins with the grace to surrender joyfully to God's primacy and to accept one's own creaturely dependence upon God's grace. Before God's grandeur. the humble know their own smallness: they know that without God they are nothing; their existence. goodness. and freedom are a sheer gift of God. Consequently. the only thing that is truly our own is our sin. 33 Humility. then. entails a confession of sin (disordered loving). and of the need for God's grace to heal that rupture of God's created order. Integral to humility is the transformation of egocentric love into theocentric love. which turns grasping. exploitative. and possessive impulses into an authentic love of self and a true solidarity with others. for the sake of God. 3'; Consequently. humility has a radically social dimension whereby its deepest expression is in service to others and in radical self-giving modeled on the kenosis or outpouring of the divine Word. Because humility and Christ are so intimately related in Augustine's work. he regarded humility as foreign to the classical pagan world. Although Christians today may afftrm (in contrast to Augustine) that various forms of humility exist among non-Christians. the question of whether there are non-Christian analogues to Christian humility was not one that Augustine wrestled with in any detail.

Moreover. such a question is beyond the scope of this

dissertation. for my aim here is to draw upon Augustine for an understanding of humility in its full theological context and to consider its implications for the Christian community today.35 32 Ibid.

33 Serm. 142.4 (WSA IIII4:41S).

~ Serm. 250.S (WSA IIIn:181).

35 Due to Augustine's claim that humility is a distinctively Christian virtue. this study naturally leads to questions about the tensions between the classical and Christian understanding of the good life. It is my

to

3. Method and Structure In this dissertation, I will proceed dialectically presenting Augustine's doctrine of humility in light of current criticism of humility.J6 The first and last chapters frame this study by introducing and then re-examining contemporary concerns about humility. The middle three chapters will primarily examine Augustine's treatment of humility. Beginning with a consideration of humility's critics, chapter one part one will look briefly at the classical view of humility and its transformation within the Judeo-Christian tradition. Then rurning to the modem period. two principal sources of criticism. Karl Marx 0818-1883) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), will be considered. I will then rum to more contemporary criticism in the writings of feminist scholars and theologians, such as Valerie Saiving. Judith Plaskow. Anne Carr. Karen Jo Torjesen, and Roberta Bondi. all of whom offer incisive, yet varied. challenges to traditional virtues from within contemporary ethical concerns about empowerment and liberation. With these critiques in mind, I will rum to Augustine. in order to consider the resources he provides for thinking about this virtue today.

Chapter two will focus

primarily on Augustine's account of Christ's humility. specifically as presented in his theology of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ.

Following Augustine's practice of

developing an understanding of Christian humility from Christ's humility. I will move from a consideration of the humility of Christ, the subject of chapter two. to the humility of the Christian in chapter three. Chapter four will rum to the theology of Johann Baptist Metz hope that this study will pave the way for subsequent work that will explore humility in light of the differences between ancient and Christian accounts of the vinues. 36 Although Augustine occasionally refers to humility as a vinue. I have tried to minimize my use of the tenn "vinue" in reference to humility. This is because for Augustine humility is more fundamental ;md comprehensive a tenn. It describes a graced state of being that properly grounds all virtue.

11

who offers a contemporary understanding of discipleship shaped by poverty of spirit. In this elaboration of humility, I hope to illumine further Augustine's own teaching on the imitation of the humble Christ and point the way toward a contemporary understanding of humility. Finally, chapter five will return to the concerns and criticisms presented in chapter one. In response to the current tendency to look askance at humility, I will analyze Augustine's insights in order to assess the limits and possibilities of his thought for Christian discipleship today. This chapter will evaluate to what extent Augustine can enliven our imagination and provide a Christo logical foundation for a renewed appreciation of humility. The hope is that this frequently neglected virtue can be re-conceived and reappropriated today through a critical renewal of Augustine's thought. It is my contention that Augustine's doctrine of humility can be a resource for a more comprehensive and compelling account of humility-one that exposes and corrects its false forms and provides a standard for distinguishing between true and false humility. Augustine's account of humility implies that a proper understanding of Christ is pivotal for making such distinctions. Thus, I will consider the extent to which Augustine can provide a Christocentric basis upon which to differentiate between manipulative or coerced selfabnegation, on the one hand, and a true giving of self to others modeled on the kenosis or outpouring of divine love, on the other. While Augustine's Christo logy has itself been a relatively unstudied topic in theological scholarship over the last century,37 it is the 37 Although Augustine's Christology has been largely

neglected in twentieth century scholarship, there are a growing number of recent studies which include: a survey of the literature by loanne McWilliam. ''The Study of Augustine's Christo logy in the Twentieth Century," in Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian (Waterloo. Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), 183-205: Brian E. Daley, "A Humble Mediator: The Distinctive Elements in Saint Augustine's Christology," Word and Spirit 9 (1987): idem. "The Giant's Twin Substances: Ambrose and the Christology of Augustine's Contra Sermonem Arianorum." in Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum. eds. loseph T. Lienhard. Earl C. Muller. Roland 1. Teske (New York: Peter Lang. 1993),477-495; Tl. Van Savel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin (Paradosis 10; Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1954); Basil Studer. "The Revelation of the Love of the Humble God According to Augustine," in Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church, ed. Andrew Louth (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1993), 167-185: loanne McWilliam Dewart. "The Christo logy of the Pelagian Controversy," Studia Parrisrica XVIII3, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters, 1993), 1221-1244; Gerald Bonner, "Christ. God and Man in the Thought of S1.

l2

marginal status of humility in the Christian community today that is the principal impetus for this dissertation. Aware of the lacuna in theological scholarship in drawing the connections between Christ and Christian virtue,38 this dissertation sets out to thoroughly examine one virtue-namely, humility-under the instruction of St. Augustine. One might say that, for Augustine, Christ's humility is the way and the truth. Methodologically, Augustine demonstrates a way to derive an understanding of virtues from an understanding of Christ. Substantively, Augustine illumines the distinctively Christian dimensions of humility by showing that it is fundamentally rooted in the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation of Jesus Christ. It is my hope that a more Christologically shaped presentation of humility will encourage a reconsideration of this forgonen virtue within the contemporary church and the wider culture.

Augustine." Angelicum 61 (1984). 268-294: Albert Verwilghen. "Christologie et spiritualite selon Saint Augustin: L'hymne ault philippiens," Theoiogie historique 72 (Paris: Beauchesne. 1985).

38 The growing privatization of religion in Western culture. the increasing specialization of ethics. and the all-too-comrnon compartmentalization of faith from daily life. all contribute to a disconnection between ethics and faith or Christian virtue and ChrisL Yet. Christian virtues are directly and intimately connected to the mysteries of God. This dissertation implies that if an understanding of humility remains only looselv connected to Christ. then something substantive is lost. Nonetheless. the debate over the distin~tiveness of Christian ethics remains outside the aim of this dissertation.

13

CHAPTER 1 HUMILITY AND ITS CRITICS Introduction The word "humility" has many different meanings and connotations. The more negative ancient and modern views of humility stand in sharp contrast to the more positive Jewish and Christian understandings of humility. Thus classical and conventional notions of humility can lead us astray when we are seeking to understand Augustine's use of the term. For even among both the Greek and Latin Fathers, Augustine is unique in emphasizing humility as an original, specifically Christian attribute, foreign to the pagan worId. 39 It was inconceivable to Augustine that humility could be valued apan from a belief in the Incarnation. Only the grace of believing in this divine descent could generate an appreciation of humility as central to human perfection..!o [n this chapter on humility's critics, I will consider, in pan one. its use within ancient Greek literature and pre-Christian Roman literature, as well as its re-defining in the Judea-Christian context. I will then. in pan two, examine its contemporary resonances which harken back to its largely pejorative use among the ancients. Pan one is not a chronological re-tracing of the various uses of the term humility: rather. its aim is to give some background for understanding how the more negative ancient and modern views of

39 Edward Schillebeeck.'t. "Secular Criticism of Christian Obedience and the Christian Reaction to that Criticism." Concilillm 139 (1980). 13: OJ. MacQueen, "Contemptus Dei." 180.

Enarrationes in Psalmos 31.18: Haec aqua con/essionis peccatornm. haec aqua humilationis cordis. haec aqua vitae sall/taris, abicientis se. nihil de se praesumentis. nihil suae potentiae superbe tribl/entis. Haec aqua in nl/llis alienigenarnm libris est. non in Epicureis. non in Stoic is. non in Manichaeis. non in

.\0

Platonicis. Ubicl/mqlle etiam inveniuntur optima praecepta mornm et disciplinae. humilitas tamen ista non invenitllr. Via humilitatis huius aliunde manat: a Christo venit. Haec via ab ilia est. qui cum esset altus. humilis venit. (PL 36:270). Cf. Conf. 7.18.24 (PL:32:745-746). Cited in MacQueen. "Contemptus Dei.180.

14

humility overlap and stand in contrast to the more positive Judeo-Christian uses of the term.

1.l. Various Uses of the Term Humility

a. Humility in the Classical World In Greek. the term tapeinotes

(tU1tElVOt)

and its cognates refer to the various

meanings associated with ancient notions of humility.

By drawing upon the work of

various poets and philosophers. Liddell and Scott's Greek-English

Lexicon~l

shows the

array of meanings given to this multivalent term. These include tapeinos as physically low or low-lying (Herodotus). socially or politically of a low standing (Aeschylus). a low spirit (Thucydides). or morally base and vile (Plato). A lowly or humble person is one who looks up to others from a position of weakness and need. Generally. Greek culture considered humility a vice and regarded it with disdain.-12 It was associated with lowliness. ignorance. or weakness and it was rarely considered a desirable character trait.-13 In Pagan Vinue (1990). John Casey reports that humility is rarely used in Greek literature but. when mentioned. it often falls within the more anemic or "monkish" character traits akin to the Greek notion of "pusillanimity" or smallness of soul.+l Contrary to the classical Greek ideal of excellence (areee). humility is often connected with a mistaken assessment of one's capabilities. This faulty self-assessment ~l Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 197:2).

~2 Alasdair Macintyre. After Vinue: A Study in Moral Theory 2d ed. (Notre Dame. Indiana: University of

Nome Dame Press. 1984). 177. ~3 Daniel H. Frank. "Humility as a Virtue: A Maimonidean Critique of Aristotle's Ethics." in Moses

Maimonides and His Time. ed. Eric L. Ormsby (Washington. D,C.: Catholic University of America Press.

1989).90-93.

+l John Casey. Pagan Vinue. 211. The term "monkish" comes from David Hume's description of humility, Cf. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 9.1.

15

could result in the tragedy of a great-souled man not knowing his true self-worth and submitting to what is common and base. Certainly, there is more overlap in the Greek and Christian notions of selfknowledge than it may appear from the use of the term ·'humility."

For ancient

Mediterranean culture it was important to have a true sense of one's own abilities in order to achieve a certain level of self-sufficiency. Boastfulness and arrogance were looked down upon as hindering the quest for excellence. Christian humility is similarly opposed to vanity and it is identified with the aspiration to know the truth about one's abilities. However, Christian humility, as we will see, extends into a much wider vision and entails a new understanding of God. self, and neighbor. In any case, the term "humility" among Greek ethical writers was more or less contemptible. In his dialogue the

Statesman;~s

Plato mentions humility in an exchange between

Socrates the younger and the EIeatic Stranger. In seeking to define the responsibilities of the statesman. the EIeatic Stranger describes the humble as "groveling," ignorant. and suitable for slavery; he contrasts them with the courageous and educated who possess a "nobility of character."J(j Here the EIeatic Stranger expresses the commonplace view that the humble are not fit for citizenry but are closely linked with slaves who hold the lowest position in the Greek city-state. Along similar lines. Aristotle shows a certain scorn for the humble person, who "does not think he is worthy of great or of moderate things; and even if he is worthy of

Plato. Statesman. trans. J. B. Skemp in The Collected Dialogues of Plato. eels. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1985). The term Plato uses here is rapeinoteros which means "humble" or "subservient."

.lS

J(j Plato. Statesman. 309a. Cited in Joseph Tadie. "Humility in St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa theologiae" unpublished paper presented at the Boston College Philosophy Forum. February 1999.

16

little, he thinks he is worthy of still less than that."47 In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents a schema for understanding moral virtue and vice, wherein. among other things, he discusses his doctrine of the mean (II. 6) and moral responsibility (Ill. 1-5). Starting in III. 6-V. Aristotle analyzes particular virtues. such as. courage. temperance. liberality. good temper. friendliness. and pride. Consistent with his teaching that virtue resides in the mean. Aristotle explains that the virtue of magnanimity (megaiopsychia) is the mean between the excess of vanity or arrogance and the defect of humility (mikropsychia. literally "small-souledness" or pusillanimity). The great-souled or "magnanimous

man"~

is the paradigmatic embodiment of pride.49 He knows himself. he has a sense of ··class." and he correctly deems himself worthy of great things. demonstrating a proportionate amount of pride in his actions, character. and relationships. The vain (c/zaunos) man considers himself "worthy of great things"50 but in truth he is not.

The humbles I

(mikropsychos) man considers himself worthy of less than his true worth. He lacks proper self-respect. The humble or "pusillanimous person is worthy of goods. but deprives

47

Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. 1123b 10-15. trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis. IN: Hacken Publishing Company. 1985). 98: D. S. Hutchinson. Ethics. in Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. ed. 10nathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995).227. ~ Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics II23b 5-II25a 30.

49

In a relatively recent book. Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches write: "Ancient pagan pride. Olympian pride. may be better understood as different from the sin Christians call pride (as Aquinas describes it). for it is developed in ignorance of God. not so much in aversion. [n another way. however. it is as serious an error. since it constructs an almost impenetrable defense against conversion by hardening a self or community against voices from the outside and so against any retelling of the story of the self or community in relation to the God Christians call the one true God."Christians Among the Vinues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modem Ethics (Notre Dame. IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 1997). 199. so [bid.. 1l23b 5-10. 5 I [bid.. II23b 10-20: Schi IIe beech. "Secular Criticism of Christian Obedience and the Christian Reaction

to that Criticism." II.

17

himself of the goods he is worthy of ... "52 Aristotle concludes that the defect of humility is worse than the excess of vanity, for humility is more opposed to the virtue of magnanimity than is vanity. 53 In his study of the semantic history of the word humilicas. Erich Auerbach reports that the Latin word, Izumilis, derives from humus, the soil or earth, and "literally means low, low lying, of small

stature."5~

The classical usage of humilitas usually included a

wide range of tigurative meanings. It became associated with things that are insignificant, "trifling," "paltry." of poor quality. or worthless. 55

Socially, the humble were poor.

lacking in education. power. and prestige. Humiliores referred to those in the lower classes who performed lowly and dirty tasks (izumiles et sordidas cllras).56 Ethically. a humble person was cowardly and slavish. And yet. Auerbach and other scholars note that

Illlmilitas did not always have pejorative connotations. Summarizing his research of the term in the Greco-Roman tradition. Klaus Wengst writes:

52 Aristotle. Nicomachectn Ethics. I I 25a20-25. 53 [bid.. ll25a 30-35. In his Summa Theologiae. Aquinas integrates the Augustinian emphasis upon

humility and the Aristotelian emphasis upon magnanimity. For Aquinas. humility and magnanimity are both "means" between exaggerated self-esteem (vanity) and low self-esteem (despair). Magnanimity and humility are virtues that work together. Humility curbs hope which can reach beyond reason toward arrogance. Magnanimity keeps hope from sinking below reason into despair. For Aquinas. humility and magnanimity are not opposing traits but are complementary virtues. One aims to curb the appetite while the other impels a person to live up to one's full human capacities. Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. ITa ITae. Q. 160. vol. 44. "Well-Tempered Passions." trans. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge. Blackfriars. 1972). 155-170. For Augustine there was not question of a synthesis between Christian humility and pagan magnanimity. Humility corrects pride but also despair as we will see in chapters two and three. ~ Erich Auerbach. Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity

cmci in the Middle Ages. trans. by R. Manheim (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1965). 39 [Auerbach's account of humility draws primarily from material in the Thesaurus linguae latinael. 55 Ibid.• 39. 56 Klaus Wengst. Humility: Solidarity of the Humiliated. trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia. Fortress

Press. 1988). 6: Gillian Clark. Augustine: The Confessions (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1993).59.

18

'Humility' is used positively in only a very few passages of ancient literature. Its context here is a man's attitude towards the gods ... Only in this context of the punishing of the evildoer who is to be given a sense of wrongness are humility and fear given a positive significance. 57 Auerbach adds: "Seneca used it (humilitas) several times to indicate the insignificance of earthly life in comparison with immortality after death."58 Auerbach then concludes that "From the first its range of meaning included modesty. wise moderation. obedience. pious submissiveness: but in non-Christian classical literature the pejorative use is strongly predominant. "59

b. Humility in the Judeo-Christian Tradition Generally speaking. in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Izumilitas acquired a distinctively religious meaning whose principal referent is the divine-human relationship. The use of 'humility' in the Hebrew scriptures and in traditional Judaism is quite distinct from its Greek and Roman usage for it is based on the idea of knowing oneself as a creature radically dependent on the Creator. [t was through faith in a personal. transcendent. and creator God that humility came to be seen in a new light. 60 [n this religious context. humility shifts from a derided character trait to a disposition essential to the good person. Moreover. in the paradoxes of God. the lowly are lifted up and those who are considered inferior are given a place of honor.

In his article. "Jewish Ethics and the Virtue of Humility." Ronald Green argues that humility is a central virtue within traditional Judaism. In the Talmud. for example. Green

57 Ibid.• 14-15.

58 Auerbach • .to. 59 Ibid.• 39-tO. 60

P. Adnes. "Humilite." Dictionnaire de Spiritualite 7 (1969). 1142.

19

reports that "humility is frequently spoken of as the chief virtue of all."61 Tracing the different facets of humility in Jewish thought. Green writes: To be humble (Zenua) or meek (Anav) in the eyes of Jewish piety is to recognize one's subordinate position before God and His Law. The humble man is necessarily God-fearing. However.... humility is believed important in other relations than that between man and God. It is an attitude held necessary to orient the self in all moral relations. and in some rabbinic discussions it is compared to salt in being required to lend savor to all moral deeds and dispositions.62 Green notes that "humility and meekness" are given special anention because their opposites. "pride and arrogance," are believed to pose the most serious threat to the moral life. Beyond its moral significance, Green argues that humility is a central feature of God's holiness. "God's humility" is shown in his special concern for "human welfare," particularly among the poor and disadvantaged. Green argues that God's "solicitousness" toward the vulnerable is the principal sign of divine humility. Finally. Green observes that God's mercy, even to evildoers, gives further evidence of divine humility. It is because he is humble that God dwells with the poor and downtrodden, the victims of other men's pride and arrogance. But it is also because he is humble that God forbears in his punishment of the wicked and opens the way for their repentance.63 In other words. humility can be seen as the foundation of God's justice and mercy. The Hebrew scriptures speak positively of those in a low social position who are often deemed humble or lowly (anawim). The humble rely on God to take action against evildoers. They await God's vindication when the pompous will be brought low and the "linIe ones" will be lifted up. By not countering the unjust and powerful on their own 61 Ronald Green. "Jewish Ethics and the Virtue of Humility."

Journal of Religious Eillics 111 (1973), 54. (references to the Talmudic tractates include: 'Abodah Zarah: 20b; A. Cohen. 1965. Kallah Rabbathi: 52a).

62 Ibid.. 54; Meyer Wa;'(man. ·'Judaism." Religion and £lllics (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1958).264.

63 Ibid .. 56-57.

20

terms (i.e. with force), the humble show their righteousness and trust in

Yahweh.~

In

sum, Green argues that in the Jewish context, humility is less identified with obedient subservience than with a steady trust in God's promises. In the New Testament, God is not only the one who vindicates the lowly, God's very self is lowly in the person of Jesus Christ. Jesus is the exemplar and source of humility as he chooses freely to be poor, despised, and humiliated.

In Jesus. God's

humility is fully dramatized from his lowly birth ("divinity in a manger")65 to his death on a cross. In a central synoptic passage, Jesus uses the term humility to describe himself ("for I am meek and humble of heart" Matt. 1l:25) and those he calls to himself ("For all who exalt themselves will be humbled. and those who humble themselves will be exalted." Luke 1'4:11. 18:14: Matt. 18:1-5: 23:(2).

Jesus' free acceptance of his own rejection and

condemnation to death is a new revelation of how we are to serve others and surrender to God. Loving "unto death" becomes the paramount form of discipleship. Within Christianity. Auerbach reports that "humiLis became the most important adjective characterizing the [ncamation; in all Christian literature written in Latin it came to express the atmosphere and level of Christ's life and suffering. "66 In other words. the reevaluation of its pejorative connotations in pre-Christian Greek culture culminates when the term refers directly to Christ himself. the archetypal embodiment of humility. The full force of the Christian paradox expresses itself in the contrast between Christ's lowly humanity and his sublime divinity. In contrast to the Greek moral value of magnanimity, Christian humility de-centers the self and re-inforces a theocentric perspective where selfunderstanding develops in light of God and culminates in a "strength in weakness" ~

Klaus Wengst. 39'

6S

Barbara Fiand. "An Appreciation of ScheIer's Essay on Humility ... Aletheia 2 (1981).203.

66

Auerbach. 40.

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discovered in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is the principal standard for discerning true humility. The religious meaning of humility persisted into its early modern English usage but. over time. its theocentric focus began to fade. Through the deism of the 17th century. humility retained its basic association with those who acknowledge their lowliness before God's grandeur. In 1639. the Oxford English Dictionary quotes W. Whateley who observes that a truly humble person has "a meane esteeme of himself out of a true apprehension of God's greatness."67 By the 18th century. however. its theocentric orientation and reference had dropped from its official definition. The Oxford English Dictionary cites David Hume's definition of humility. given in 1757. This definition omits the reference to God and states that humility is "a dissatisfaction with ourselves on account of some defect or infirmity."611

In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

(1751). one of the most influential works of modern moral philosophy. David Hume describes humility as a "monkish virtue." He had nothing but derision for the Christian practices of "celibacy. fasting, penance. mortification. self-denial. humility. silence. solitude:' He explains: For what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world. nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company. nor increase his power of selfemployment.69 This secularized and pejorative understanding of humility was reinforced in the Oxford English Dictionary's companion definition of the word "humble" as "having a low estimate

67

Oxford English Dictionary. s.v. "humility." (1639). W. Whaleley. Prototypes I xi. 482.

68

OED. 482.

David Hume. ..\n Enquiry Conceming the Principles of Morals. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford. 1902). 9.1.

69

22

of one's importance, worthiness, or merits; marked by the absence of self-assertion or selfexaltation; lowly: the opposite of proud."70 Here humility is not integrally related to God's self-disclosure, which is the precondition for understanding humility in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Without its integral relation to God, the term humility refers principally to measuring oneself against the greatness of other human beings, rather than against the supreme greatness of God.71 In this context, social opinion dominates and humility becomes linked with a self-depreciating modesty and a low estimation of one's own abilities before the accomplishments and talents of others. Preoccupied with such comparisons, a "humble" person cultivates self-disparagement7:! and an unduly negative self-perception. Several contemporary philosophers

(lilY

Newman. Nancy Snow. Norvin

Richards) have attempted to re-define humility in more psychologically healthy terms. Generally, the humility they propose aims at accurate self-evaluation and reasonable selfregard for the purpose of more effective self-determination. This may correct the selfdisparagement in conventional notions of humility but it still remains within the context of self-centeredness, which is fundamentally at odds with the theocentric view that is the basis for Judeo-Christian understandings of humility. In the Judeo-Christian understanding of humility, truthful self-knowledge emerges out of an understanding of the divine-human relationship.

70 David Baily Harned. Patience: How We Wait Upon the World.

168.

71 Augustine considered it prideful. not humble. to compare oneself with others. He urges his congregation

to avoid this habit of measuring one's worth against other human beings. "Don't compare yourselves with one another... and compete with each other in arrogance." Serm. 68.10. l WSA III/3 :230).

7:!

Jay Newman. "Humility and Self-Realization." Journal of Value Inquiry16 ([982); Norvin Richards. Humility (Philadelphia: Temple University Press. (992); Nancy Snow. "Humility," The Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1995). 203-216.

23

1.2. Modem Critiques of Humility Introduction In this section I will begin with a summary of the critiques of humility put forward by Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. These accounts are limited in scope and I do not intend to set up Marx and Nietzsche as opponents for Augustine to refute. Rather I draw upon their profound challenge to Christianity in order to provide the background that informs many modem readers who are suspicious of humility as a vinue. Marx sees humility as a tool used by the powerful to pacify the oppressed. Nietzsche. on the other hand. sees humility as a tool used by the weak to assen their "will to power." Representing two poles of concern about how humility can serve ignoble or evil ends. these two major figures set the background for the concerns raised by contemporary feminists who argue that humility contributes to patriarchy. With this brief look at these two intluential thinkers as well as contemporary feminist arguments. [ hope to prepare the ground for a study of Augustine's treatment of humility.

a. Karl Marx: Humility as a Tool for Oppressors As a shrewd critic of advanced industrial societies. Karl Marx believed that

productive activity is the distinctively human activity. As a "toolmaking animal" the human person actively shapes his environment and changes what is given in his or her natural and social setting. Rather than submitting to the givenness of reality. the humble person changes his or her environment and thereby changes him or her self.

In productive

activity. a worker produces and uses tools to make his or her mark on what is given. Molding the environment to oneself is the way to develop an identity and reach human fulfillment. Consequently, Marx expresses grave concern about the new ways of working created by the Industrial Revolution. Under capitalism. commodity production becomes the dominant mode of economic activity. Amassing wealth and making a profit are ends in 24

themselves. In his Communist Manifesto. he writes: "Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character." 73 Instead of being toolmakers, workers become tools-extensions of a machine that cultivates a passive relationship to the environment. The worker no longer gives meaning and value to raw material but submits to the given task of a machine. Rather than being a maker of things, the worker becomes the thing that is made. Without distinctively human modes of work, workers are crippled in their basic human capacity to make things. Mindless, compartmentalized work cuts people off from the end product of their labor, stunts human development. and degrades human beings. Moreover. without control over their labor, modem workers lose their active and productive self-understanding. They become defined by the machine or system that controls their labor and thus. their identity. In tracing the causes of this alienation and passivity. Marx turned to religion. which he saw primarily as an expression of the bourgeoisie and their desire to retain power and control over the proletariat.

Religion, he believed, fosters a false consciousness that

focuses on illusions about the next world instead of the hard facts of this world. Under the influence of religion, workers surrender to those in power, rather than asserting themselves and taking responsibility for their life and its conditions. Christianity, in particular, detracts from earthly concerns for justice because it promises that the next life will reward the oppressed and punish the oppressors. Marx thought of Christian humility as a tool used by those in power to reinforce the reigning ideologies and systems of the day, particularly capitalism. It is a stumbling block to the aims of the proletariat and quells the fervor for revolution and change. Regarding humility, he wrote: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. English translation. ed. Frederick Engels (New York: lnternational Publishers. reprinting, 1997). 15-16.

73

25

The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt. humiliation, subservience, humility, in short all the properties of the canaille, and the proletariat, which does not want to be treated as the canaille, needs its courage, its own feelings, its pride and its independence far more than its bread. The social principles of Christianity are lily livered, and the proletariat is revolutionary.7~ Here humility is perceived as a social principle used to soften people's drive for liberation. Rather than humility. Marx believed workers need pride to reclaim responsibility for their lives and shed their false consciousness. In his article, "Sin as Pride and Sin as Sloth," John C. Raines decribes the false consciousness that. according to Marx. religion fosters: Man flees from the exposure of his active, productive self-understanding and existence into the passivity of religious awe and taboo. He does not stand his ground and assert himself over against the given realities but drifts into an opiate. dream-like self-surrendering to the world. He becomes humble at the very place where with more pride he might rediscover and recapture himself and thus once again take over responsibility for his life.1 5 In sum. for Marx. humility. used by those in power. reinforces a degrading way of life for the oppressed. Pride. on the other hand. fosters revolution and true human liberation. b. Nietzsche: Humility as Egoism Though humility is mentioned in several of Nietzsche's works. I will focus primarily on Nietzsche's most systematic and influential work in ethics. On the Genealogy

of Morals (1887). In these essays. Nietzsche describes humility as an outgrowth of JudeoChristian ressentiment.16 In the first essay, he offers a sustained reflection on the contrast between "slave morality" and "master morality."77 He also discusses humility as one of the 7~ Karl Marx. The Communism of the Rheinischer Beobachter: Marx-Engels Werke 4 (Sept. (847). 191-

203. 75 lohn C. Raines. "Sin as Pride and Sin as Sloth." Christianity and Crisis 29 ( (969). 6. 76 "Ressentiment" is a tenn introduced by Friedrich Nietzsche to describe the redefining of certain values as

a result of feeling oppressed. humilitated. and impotent.

77 Friedrich Nietzsche.

On the Genealogy of Morals. trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.1. Hollingdale. (New York: Random House. (967). 34-56. References in parentheses in these notes are to pages in Kaufmann's translation.

26

principal virtues of slave morality. which he finds dominant among the modern bourgeoisie. To begin. I will layout Nietzsche's criticism of slave morality as deceitful. unnatural. and fundamentally destructive of human greatness. I will then examine how Nietzsche finds these repulsive qualities of slave morality in those deemed "humble." In showing the culturally constructed nature of morality. Nietzsche's Genealogy discusses the shift from the ancient contrast between "good and bad" to the 1ewish/Christian contrast between "good and evil." The "master morality" of the classical world identifies "the good" with the Homeric hero who is strong. noble. and masterful. It promotes heroic virtues like courage, ambition, and pride. Without advocating a return to this master morality. Nietzsche seems to find inspiration in its straightforward and bold expression. While master morality is active. "herd" or slave morality is re-active.

It is the

response of the weak. miserable. and base sections of society who feel envy and malice toward the fortunate and powerful. The weak resent the strong and secretly crave their power. Out of this resentment. virtues like humility are born. Nietzsche explains: When the oppressed, downtrodden. outraged exhort one another with the vengeful cunning of impotence: 'let us be different from evil. namely good! And he is good who does not outrage. who harms nobody. who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient. humble, and just'-this, listened to calmly and without previous bias. really amounts to no more than: 'we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing for which we are not strong enough'; but this dry maner of fact. this prudence of the lowest order which even insects possess (posing as dead, when in great danger. so as not to do 'too much'). has. thanks to the counterfeit and self-deception of impotence. clad itself in the ostentatious garb of the virtue of quiet. calm resignation. just as if the weakness of the weak-that is to say. their essence. their effects, their sole ineluctable. irremovable reality-were a voluntary achievement, willed. chosen. a deed. a meritorious act. 78

78

Nietzsche. Genealogy 1.13 (46).

27

Beginning within Judaism and culminating in Christianity. herd morality manufactures values for revenge. The weak invert noble or "heroic" values by deeming "good" the person who is timid, incapable. and impotent. Those who are masterful, superior, and dominating, they call "bad." According to herd morality. pride is a sin and humility, identified with servility and self-denial, is a virtue.

In this way, slave morality turns

weakness into strength. While Nietzsche demonstrates a certain admiration for the clever deception involved in the transposition of values, his genealogy remains intent upon exposing Christianity as a lie, which he demonstrates by unmasking the timid ways of the humble. He finds their "virtue" to be a cowardly cover for the will to power. Thus, Nietzsche guides his readers toward the realization that Christianity gains power by sanctifying the weak and demonizing the strong. The weak de-value the strong by turning their "good" into evil. What is interesting. creative. and ambitious is considered threatening and derided as arrogant.

According to Nietzsche, this transposition involves a desperate twisting of

human greatness into "sin" or "evil." Feigning selt1essness. the weak delight in the belief that God will punish the proud while rewarding their humility.79 According to Nietzsche, slave morality is life-denying and unnatural. Through its transposition of meek resignation and mortification into "good," it saps the energy that produces creative, superior human beings. Nietzsche is concerned principally with these exceptional individuals. Thus, he laments that those with superior creativity are "pushed down" under the influence of the herd who cultivate a weakened and homogeneous humanity. He observes that through the glorification of weakness, the human race has become increasingly enervated, mediocre, and decadent, anticipating that Christianity will

79 Nietzsche. Genealogy 1.15 (48-49).

28

give way eventually to "the last men,"so those diminished human beings who lack the incentive to do or feel anything. They are even more depraved than the herd of Christianity because they do not even exert a will to power. Having lost the will to will anything, these "last men" reveal the primal distortion of Christianity and its gradual destruction of human greatness. Humility, a moral value rooted in ressentiment, is a virtue that is deceitful and tries to restrain and deny the basic human desire for domination. Contrasting the "noble man" with the "man of ressentiment," Nietzsche writes: While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself, the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naive nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints: his spirit loves hiding places. secret paths and back doors. everything covert entices him as his world. his security, his refreshment: he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. s1 The humility described here is manipulative and cowardly. Resenting their inferiority, the weak uphold virtues like humility to encourage self-denial. self-hatred. and guilt among themselves and their enemies.

By inflicting punishment on themselves. the humble

internalize their inclination toward violence. The humble "keep silent." they wait. they desire little. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche's parable of the "workshop" provides a powerful illustration of how the "herd." depicted as "cellar rodents."s:! manipulates power and reverses the norms of the master morality so that weakness becomes something meritorious and admirable. In this parable, humility evolves out of the disempowerment and anxiety of

80 Nietzsche.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra. trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books. 1978). 18.

l.lO (38). italics mine. Note: Nietzsche's "noble man" is an egoist who sees himself as the standard and creator of all value and meaning. See John Casey. Pagan Virtue: ..\n Essay in Ethics. 81.

81 Nietzsche. Gl!nealogy

S2 Ibid.• 1.14 (47-48).

29

the moral agent who seeks to dignify incompetence. failure. and small-mindedness. Nietzsche explains that "impotence" is turned into "goodness of heart" and "anxious lowliness" into "humility; subjection to those one hates into 'obedience' ... inability for revenge is called unwillingness to revenge, perhaps even forgiveness."s3 Here humility is the virtuous label used by fearful. anxious human beings seeking to transform their weakness into strength. In the Third Essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche seeks to explain the transvaluation of virtues like humility. He derides the "ascetic ideal" that is dominant in slave morality. Suspecting the norion that poverty, humility, and chastity are "virtues." Nietzsche points out that one may see traces of each in "the lives of all the great, fruitful. inventive

spirits."~

He writes: The three great slogans of the ascetic ideal are familiar: poverty, humility, chastity. Now take a close look at the lives of all the great, fruitful. inventive spirits: you will always encounter all three to a certain degree. Not, it goes without saying, as though these constituted their "virtues"what has this kind of man to do with virtues!-but as the most appropriate and natural conditions of their best existence, their fairest fruitfulness. It is quite possible that their dominating spirituality had first to put a check on an unrestrained and irritable pride or a wanton sensuality. or that it perhaps had a hard job to maintain its will to the "desert" against a love of lUXUry and retinement or an excessive liberality of heart and hand. But it did it. precisely because it was the dominating instinct whose demands prevailed against those of all the other instincts-it continues to do it; if it did not do it. it would not dominate. There is thus nothing of "virtue" in thiS.85 Here Nietzsche remarks that poverty, humility, and chastity are dispositions adopted for their usefulness in achieving power. They evolve to serve the natural human instinct to dominate, but they are ultimately destructive. Thus, to call these qualities, employed for power, "virtues," is mistaken. In humility, Nietzsche sees power cleverly exerted by the 83

Ibid.

~ Ibid.• 3.8 (108). 8S Ibid.. 3.8 (109).

30

negation of the will. The self-contradiction of the ascetic ideal lies in the fact that its attempt to protect life by denial. ultimately. becomes an assault upon life itself. 86 Nietzsche scorns the inclination to be safe and argues for greater risk-taking and boldness. To uncover the self-contradiction and hypocrisy of humility. Nietzsche describes the presumption of the humble in the New Testament: [n the New one [the New Testament]. . . I find nothing but petty sectarianism. mere rococco of the soul. mere involutions. nooks. queer things. the mawkishness that belongs to the epoch (and to the Roman province) and is not so much lewish as Hellenistic. Humility and selfimportance cheek-by-jowl; a garrulousness of feeling that almost stupefies; impassioned vehemence. not passion; embarrassing gesticulation; it is plain that there is no trace of good breeding. How can one make such a fuss about one's little lapses as these pious little men do! Who gives a damn? Certainly not God. Finally. they even want "the crown of eternal life." these little provincial people; but for what? to what purpose? Presumption can go no further. 87 Here Nietzsche shows the ironic way that the "selfless" and the humble mask an egoism of the highest order. The humble presume that their "little lapses" have grand importance before God. Furthermore. as a reward for their non-heroic lives these "little men" want nothing less than eternal life. Here Nietzsche delights in stripping humility of its supposed self-sacrifice and surrender to reveal its unsurpassed self-aggrandizement. For Nietzsche. virtues like humility corrupt noble. courageous. and risk-taking instincts. They protect the cowardly. who become small to avoid being overcome. In the midst of guarding against suffering and aggression. the humble accept mistreatment and refuse to put themselves forward in opposition to their enemies. They harbor ill-will toward the powerful and indirectly promote their own egoism by sanctifying unegotistical ways. Thus. Nietzsche proposes a less deceptive understanding of Luke 18:14 which ends

86 Ibid.. 3.13 (120). 87

Ibid.• 3.22 (144).

31

the parable of the Pharisee and the publican. In place of "... he who humbles himself will be exalted" Nietzsche introduces: "He that humbleth himself wishes to be exalted."88 In sum. virtues like humility express what most disturb Nietzsche about Christianity. They are a peculiarly insidious and perverse kind of contradiction that hinders the rise of superior human beings and exalts the commonplace person who lacks selfinitiative and individual creativity. For Nietzsche. a virtue like humility is unnatural and destructive of human potential. Edward Schillebeeckx summarizes Nietzsche's view as follows: Nietzsche condemned humility as the product of Judaism and Christianity and a complex of deep resentment. The good news that Jesus proclaimed to slaves became bad news for the powerful. Nietzsche regarded Christian humility as a servile and vindictive distortion of a plebian consciousness that denies itself in the expectation of eschatological revenge.~L) Humility subdues the human spirit and makes human beings submissive and herd-like. It is one form of "giving up" or surrendering what is distinctively one's own to the herd. Representing two opposing ends of criticism. Marx and Nietzsche raise the question about whether humility is more properly a tool for the powerful. as Marx would have it. or. the powerless. as Nietzsche would have it. Are their criticisms essentially cynical reductions of religion and moral ideals to political and economic self-promotion? It is my observation that their criticisms of humility are most helpful in identifying certain forms of false humility and "pulling the cover" off of these perversions of virtue that distort the Christian message. If this is so. then. can perceptions be helpful in distinguishing between true and false humility? Loosely following in the Marxist and Nietzschean traditions of suspecting moralities and advocating for greater human creativity and 88 Nietzsche. Human All Too Human.

1.87. Collected Works 6 (London 1909),88.

Edward Schillebeeckx. "Secular Criticism of Christian Obedience and the Christian Reaction to that Criticism." 19.

89

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responsibility, feminists today have considered critically the traditional pridelhumility dichotomy embedded in the Western Christian tradition. The following authors re-consider the relevance of pride and humility to women's experience of sin and grace. c. Feminist Critiques of Humility Many feminist theologians contend that Christian theology has been overly int1uenced by a distinctly male experience. By neglecting some aspects of the female experience, Christian moral teachings have sometimes been detrimental to women' s development as faithful and responsible human beings. Applying the liberating themes of the biblical and Christian tradition. many women scholars have sorted through various aspects of the Christian tradition, offering a revisionist reading of old texts and traditions in order to promote the full humanity of women. Their work on the meaning of sin and grace presents a serious challenge to traditional understandings of God and Christian discipleship. For example, some feminist theologians are critical of the emphasis on selfsacrifice in traditional Christian doctrines of sin and grace insofar as these doctrines have been too narrowly representative of the male experience.90 [n 1960. Valerie Saiving wrote a revolutionary article. "The Human Situation: A Feminine View."91 which laid the groundwork for a series of studies on male-centeredness in Christian theology. She calls for a critical re-evaluation of theologies that rely on traditional understandings of sin and grace. Saiving begins her critical examination by affirming that sin and grace are mutually interdependent concepts. [f Christian theology understands sin principally in terms of pride manifest in self-centeredness and int1ated selflove, then grace finds expression in selt1essness. These doctrines, she argues. are partial

90

Daphne Hampson. Theology and Feminism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1990). ISS.

91 Valerie Saiving Goldstein.

"The Human Situation: A Feminine View." Journal of Religion 40 (1960).

100-112.

33

to the male experience and do not account adequately for the distinctive experience of women who find self-abnegation a more serious temptation than self-aggrandizement, that is, women tend to compromise their own integrity through excessive self-surrender. Saiving accounts for the different ways that the two sexes are tempted to sin92 by considering their psychological differences and how these grow out of the physiological differences between the sexes. For example, she observes that through motherhood and other nurturing roles, women. more than men, readily know self-sacrifice and selftranscending love. But. in giving themselves to others, they tend

to

lose themselves and

are more inclined to sin by neglecting their own development as persons. Due to nature and cultural conditioning, women adopt other-centered, chameleon-like tendencies and merge their own individual identity into the identity of others. Saiving writes: For the temptations of woman as woman are not the same as the temptations of man as man. and the specifically feminine forms of sin--"feminine" not because they are cor.fined to women or because women are incapable of sinning in other ways but because they are outgrowths of the basic feminine character structure-have a quality which can never be encompassed by such terms as "pride" and "will-to-power." They are better suggested by such items as triviality, distractability. and diffuseness: lack of an organizing center or focus: dependence on others for one's own self-definition: tolerance at the expense of standards of excellence: inability to respect the boundaries of privacy: sentimentality, gossipy sociability, and mistrust of reason-in short, underdevelopment or negation of the self.93 Women. then. should be encouraged toward virtues that foster greater autonomy and selfdefinition. Saiving's challenge to the prominence of pride as the sin. implicitly challenges the prominence of humility as the vinue of a redeemed humanity. Given that women's

A point raised by many feminists whose work follows upon the initial insights of Saiving. e.g. Judith Plaskow. Sex. Sin and Grace: Women's £rperience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. (Lanham. MD: University Press of America. (980); Anne Patrick. "Narrative and The Social Dynamics of Virtue:' in Changing Values and Vinues, eds. Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier. (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark. 1987), 77.

92

93

Valerie Saiving Goldstein. "The Human Situation: A Feminine View." 109.

34

excessive selflessness tends to have damaging and destructive effects upon their development as persons, Saiving urges theologians to consider virtues that stress selfdevelopment and individual responsibility. As subsequent women scholars take up her argument, the problematic nature of humility comes more sharply into focus. 94 Twenty years later, in her dissertation Sex. Sin and Grace: Women's £rperience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul TiLlich, Judith Plaskow carries forward Saiving's work by taking issue with Niebuhr and Tillich insofar as they inadequately "address 'women's sin' of self-abnegation" and fail to "fully explain how grace relates to the reconstitution of the self-denying self."95 Niebuhr's theology, for example. upholds the traditional view of pride as the primary form of sin and sacrificial love as "the primary fruit of grace."96 Agreeing with Saiving, Plaskow argues that these definitions of sin and grace have been more applicable to men, particularly men with status and power in societies that define masculinity in terms of domination. Niebuhr and Tillich. she contends. fail to recognize that self-abnegation can be just as dangerous to the human spirit as selfexaltation.97 Commenting on the need to move beyond understanding sin principally as pride, Plaskow writes:

In her article, "Agape in Feminist Ethics," Barbara Hilkert Andolsen points out that Saiving's criticism of Christian virtues is not unique to twentieth-century American feminists. She cites several nineteenthcentury American feminists who criticize the centrality of self-sacrifice in the Christian tradition. Among the critics. she cites Anna Howard Shaw, a Methodist minister and suffragist orator. who wrote: ''The greatest defect in the religious teaching to and accepted by women is the dogma that self-abnegation. selfeffacement and excessive humility were ideal feminine virtues" (Shaw. n.d.:B22. F492). Lois K. Daly. ed.. Feminist Theological Ethics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox. (994). 146-159. Also. other virtues criticized by Christian feminists include the virtue of generosity as discussed in "'The Virtuous Woman: New Wine and Old Wineskins." Elizabeth A. Dreyer. The Way 35 (1995). 342-349.

94

95 Judith Plaskow. Sex. Sin and Grace. 96

Ibid.• 51.

97

Ibid.• 154.

149.

35

· . .[nhe inadequacy of understanding sin solely as pride has become almost a commonplace. Women's sin,' it is implied again and again, is not self-centeredness but what have historically been considered the Christian virtues. Self-sacrifice, obedience, etc., while perhaps necessary counterweights to the behavioral excesses of a stereotypically male culture, have been preached to and taken to heart by women, for whom they are already a way of life. Practiced in excess, they undennine the self's relationship to itself and ultimately to God.98 While Saiving focuses on the biological and psychological differences between men and women, Plaskow aims to show that typically female patterns of behavior derive primarily from societal expectations of women. According to Plaskow, these expectations encourage women to neglect the freedom and responsibility entrusted to them as creatures made in God's image. Women's "sin" has more to do with self-forgetfulness than self-absorption. By failing to actively choose to give of self, women fail to live up to the obligations of freedom, a phenomenon Plaskow terms "the refusal of self-transcendence."'l'} "Refusal of self-transcendence ought to be . . . no less a sin than pride, a sin against oneself, against other persons, and against God."IOO Failing to take responsibility for their own lifechoices, women allow important decisions to be made by others. lUI For women, the focus on the sin of pride tends to be stifling, and, at worst, destructive insofar as it exacerbates women's moral struggles and hinders their selfidentity. Today, Elizabeth Johnson echoes this view: [f pride be the primary block on the path to God, then indeed decentering the rapacious self is the work of grace. But the situation is quite different when this language is applied to persons already relegated to the margins of significance and excluded from the exercise of self-definition. For such persons, language of conversion as loss of self, turning from amor sui, functions in an ideological way to rob them of power, maintaining them in a 98

Ibid., 2.

'l'} Ibid.• 68. 100 Ibid.• 109. 101 Ibid .• 63.

36

subordinate position to the benefit of those who rule. . . Analysis of women's experience is replete with the realization that within partriarchal systems women's primordial temptation is not to pride and self-assertion but rather to the lack of it. to diffuseness of personal center, overdependence on others for self-identity, drifting, and fear of recognizing one's own competence. 100 Though Plaskow is more intent on diagnosing a problem than proposing a detailed solution, she maintains that a woman needs a definite self in order to give authentically to God and others. Whether this self can be found through self-giving or if it is necessarily prior to self-giving remains unclear. Nonetheless. given this need for a defined self. Plaskow contends that virtues such as patience. chastity. and humility-the marks of traditional Christian piety--