Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time

Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time

by

Keith Wylie Faulkner

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 0

degree for the of requirements Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy I

le

.0., '-. 0

February 20ý4

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Table of Contents: Abstract

4 pg.

Key to Abbreviations

5 pg.

Introduction

pg. 6

Chapter 1: The Synthesesof Signs

21 pg.

Worldly Signs a)

pg. 22

b) Signs of Love

31 pg.

Signs Art c) of

pg. 45

Chapter 2: The Synthesesof Series

pg. 56

The Connective Series a)

pg. 56

b) The Conjunctive Series

pg. 67

c) The Disjunctive Series

83 pg.

Chapter 3: The Synthesesof Energetics

102 pg.

a) The Energetics of the Id

103 pg.

b) The Energetics of the Ego

pg. 118

The Energetics Superego the c) of

pg. 145

Chapter 4: The Static Genesisof Time

pg. 169

in Static Repetition Freud a)

170 pg.

b) Static Repetition in Rosenberg and Cyclic History

190 pg.

The Eternal Return Repetition Static and c)

pg. 211

Conclusion

232 pg.

Bibliography

239 pg.

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Table of Tables: Summary of Section on Worldly Signs

31 pg.

Summary of Section on Signs of Love

44 pg.

Summary of Section on Signs of Art

pg. 55

Summary of Section on The Connective Series

67 pg.

Summary of Section on The Coni unctive Series

82 pg.

Summary of Section on The Disjunctive Series

102 pg.

Summary of Section on The Energetics of the Id

117 pg.

Summary of Section on The Energetics of the Ego

145 pg.

Summary of Section on The Energetics of the Superego

pg. 169

Summary of Section on Static repetition in Freud

pg. 189

Summary of Section on Static repetition in Rosenberg...

pg. 211

Summary of Section on Static repetition and the Eternal Return pg. 231

Declaration of Material: I declare that the following is all my own work and has not been for degree submitted another at any time. Keith Wylie Faulkner

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Abstract / Summary: The three synthesesof time are Deleuze's response to Kant's belief that time is synthesized by the unity of the "I think. " Deleuze believes that there is a prior synthesisof time in the unconscious. He calls this a "passive" synthesisof time. My thesis will seek to clarify Deleuze's theory of the three syntheses of time by providing the background from which he derived his concepts.In chapter one I argue that the systemof "signs" presentedin Proust and Signs is the precursor to Deleuze's three synthesesof time. I conclude that Worldly Signs correspond to synthesisof habit, Signs of Love correspond to the synthesis of memory, and Signs of Art correspond to the synthesisof the future. In chapter two I argue that the system of "series" presented in the second half of The Logic of Sense illustrates Deleuze's conceptions of "resonance" and "forced movement" that are critical to understanding the three synthesesof time. I conclude that Deleuze's conception of connective, conjunctive and disjunctive series are derived from Freud's reading of libidinal in his Three Essayson The Theory of Sexuality. In chapter three I argue that stages chapter two of Difference and Repetition is based upon concepts derived from Freud's Projectfor a Scientific Psychology. I conclude that the concepts of the Id, Ego and Superegoeach correspond to a synthesisof time and that theseagenciesare primarily based upon neurological processes.In chapter four I argue that the static in by the time the three themselves repetitions are synthesesof means which manifest forbids I Superego that the our actions. conclude presentsand actions that constitute a "pure event" and that the psyche reacts by repetitive behaviors that correspond to the three static dimensions of time: the before, the during, and the after.

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Key to abbreviations

in this thesis: used

For the works of Gilles Deleuze: [DR] = Difference and Repetition [LS] = The Logic of Sense [PS] = Proust and Signs The Complete Text [NP] = Nietzsche and Philosophy [CC] = Coldnessand Cruelty For the works of Sigmund Freud: [I Freud] = Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and Unpublished Drafts. [7Freud] = On Sexuality: Three Essayson the Theory ofSexuality and Other Works [I I Freud] = On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis

For the works of Friedrich Nietzsche: [WP] = The Will to Power [Z] = Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a Bookfor None andAll For the work of Harold Rosenberg: [TN] = The Tradition of the New

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Introduction:

This thesis is about the three synthesesof time as they are presented in the work of Gilles Deleuze. What are the three synthesesof time? The three synthesesof time are not reducible to our conscious senseof time. It is true that we have a sense of time that is divided into a senseof the past, present,and future. But the problem of the three synthesesof time does not addressthe consciousphenomenaof our senseof time; rather, it addressesthe unconsciousand preconsciousconditions that produce our senseof time. For example, our senseof duration within the passageof time is dependent upon our biological needsand expectations.Each organ in the body may have its own duration that is determined by its own contractions of need and satisfactions. Deleuze calls this a "passive" synthesis of time becausewe are not directly conscious of these processesthat condition our sense of time. Another found in When Deleuze is be the to our senseof past. example of a passivesynthesis he is ing is he "pure" to to the a process of memory; rather, past not referr refers

is Once is dimension this that to time to again any content. of prior referring an entire form by is determined because the "passive" of a past our general senseof synthesis a libidinal investment as we shall see. The "passive" synthesisof the future is even form be future to the of expectation. cannot reduced a more problematic: our senseof Expectation is a conscious and active form of the future. Deleuze investigatesthe "passive" synthesisof the future that is not reducible to the conscious expectation of found in be future the the This "passive" the of concept can synthesisof an event. "problem. " A problem, as Deleuze usesthe term, is a divergent event that centerson future is it To the the the of put simply, passive synthesis a complex image of action.

7 play of a divergent series of actions that is constantly at work in the unconscious.In the pagesthat follow all of this will be explained in detail. For now what is important to keep in mind is that the three synthesesof time are not reducible to our conscious senseof time. It is incumbent upon the writer of this thesis to give the reader a senseof the purpose and style of the work he is about to read. To this end the following warnings and guidelines may be helpful. This is not a work that intends to re-produce or represent the concepts of the author it intends to study. Instead, this thesis is a meditation upon problems. As such, it need not directly concern itself with what the author of the original text (Gilles Deleuze) actually had in mind when he wrote about the three synthesesof time. But neither does it intend to depart from, or be critical of, Deleuze's position. Because this thesis is not a meditation on any one philosopher or

disciplines divergent it types of philosophies. thought and school of will cut across For example, this thesis is just as much about the works of Freud, Proust and Nietzsche as it is about Deleuze. Because I am in pursuit of a philosophical "problem" I am not concernedwith what any of thesephilosophersmay have thought ideology, leave I In their themselves of all questions own positions. short, and about background and philosophical persuasionaside for the duration of this thesis.To put it another way, I de-center the philosopher in favor of the potentialities of the juxtaposed to take their with on new meaningswhen ability concepts themselvesand does less Deleuze is This than nothing problems and conceptsof another philosopher. in his own work. As such I am following the precedent laid out in Deleuze's ideas "problems" than the normal conception of philosophical rather as of conception "concepts" as the intended expressionof a philosopher. Here is the procedure that I lead This to Each in follow thesis: will question section will ask a question. my will

8 various concepts found in the works of different thinkers. What will unify them into a coherent whole is the persistenceof the question being asked. In reading this thesis it is very important to keep in mind the question being asked. If the reader fails to do this then there will be no comprehensionof the series of problems being dealt with. It is also very important that the reader remain focused upon the immediate problem being dealt with and not try to find a totalizing thesis that would sum up Deleuze's position. This is always a danger: philosophers often seek to find a formula that would describe the total philosophy of a thinker. Deleuze's work is difficult to classify becauseDeleuze only works upon a multiplicity of small problems and small questions. There is not "one" overriding problem or question that would sum up the three synthesesof time. The three synthesesof time have no "meaning"; therefore it is impossible to state the meaning of something that is not about meaning. Instead, the three synthesesof time are about "functioning." Becauseof this, this thesiswill be how function the three time about synthesesof and not about what they mean. Here is yet another warning to the reader: do not look for "meaning" in this thesis; instead it instruction booklet; how it functions. In read as one would read a mechanical see keep function in do the this thesis to this one must questionsof order when reading foremost of one's thoughts such as: "What makesus experiencetime as duration?" or "What makes us believe that there is a past?" or "How are we aware of the future?" The main function of this thesis is to make the reader aware of these questionsand the problems that animate them. Now let us consider Deleuze's texts themselves. The actual phrase "three first for in Repetition is Difference the time time" and more and named synthesesof it is book: for-itself" But in "Repetition two this my of chapter specifically is be foreshadowing "three to time" this that of official synthesesof a contention

9 found in his work written four years previously, namely Proust and Signs. In the first chapter of this thesis I will show how the systemof signs in Proust and Signs implies three synthesesof time. This is, perhaps, the easiest chapter of my thesis to read becausethe conceptsthat are drawn from the work of Proust are straight-forward and easy to understand even if one has not read Proust's work. This first chapter will focus upon three types of signs: worldly signs, signs love of and signs of art. I will show how each of thesetypes of signshelps to illuminate a relation to time. Worldly signs relate to our senseof time passing. Signs of love refer to our senseof the past lost time, and signs of art relate to the future or time regained.This first chapter is or intended to give the reader a general senseof the three synthesesof time and their various modes of operation. The secondchapter, however, is more difficult: it begins to delve into the details of synthesis.This secondchapter of my thesisdeals with the secondhalf of Deleuze's book The Logic ofSense. The important secondaryreferent for this chapter is Freud, and more specifically, his Three Essayson the Theory of Sexuality in which he puts forward his theory of libidinal stagesor series:pre-genital, oedipal, and post-oedipal. The connection and disconnection between these stages be will extremely important to our passive synthesesof time. By this time we will have seen that Deleuze discovers the three synthesesof time in the work of Proust. Now in this second chapter we will

discover how Deleuze deepens this

understandingof the three synthesesusing the work of Freud. Essentiallythis second deal chapter will with the "disguises" and "displacements"that take place through time and in the unconscious. Again, I must warn the reader that the transition from the first chapter to the second chapter of this thesis is abrupt and requires a shift in thinking. What must be kept in mind when reading the secondchapter of this thesis is the conception of a "stage"or a "series" and how one stage in our libidinal evolution

10

interacts with and transforms itself into another stage. We must ask ourselves:"what effect does this overlapping and resonanceof stageshave on our senseof time?" This is the overriding question of the second chapter. The third chapter is thesis of my even more difficult. It deals with chapter two of Difference and Repetition in connection with Freud's book Projectfor a Scientific Psychology. The theme of this third chapter is "energetics" or the neurological transformation in the brain and the organism that constitutes the "passive" nature of synthesis. The importance of this

chapter is to give the reader the sensethat the three synthesesof time has nothing to do with the purely "spiritual" or conscioussenseof time, but rather, it hasmore to do with the physical and neurological transformations in the brain. Deleuze, himself, refers to Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology in his book Difference and Repetition. It is my belief that the concepts of "larval selves"and "passivesynthesis" is derived from important by Freud. This this third are partially chapter the work it begins difficult because on the edge of philosophy and neurology. most chapter However, it is one of the most important aspectsof my thesis becauseit shows that the conceptsthat Deleuze usesare not abstractmetaphysicalentities; but rather, they brain. in Deleuze tells that the the sometimes us physical activities are concrete literally: We is thesis the third this take chapter of my must unconscious mechanical. In to the this the order a machine. as of unconscious of reading possibility opens up in is it terms think that the third this of causality: reader necessary chapter understand begins " The happens B leads U "if A then B "A causes that to chapter must result. or

from lead that traces one a growing seriesof complexities with simple organismsand "genesis" This the the third to time of show will chapter another. passive synthesisof in inherent time than a static and pregiven matrix of synthesis of time rather in four he When the reader reacheschapter will notice another shift consciousness.

II

style and form. Chapter four is not arranged in the format of the previous chaptersin which there are three sections, each section devoted to a synthesisof time. Chapter four is about the "static" genesis of time as it is presented in chapter two of Difference and Repetition. The static genesisof time is deeply involved in Deleuze's theory of the "pure event." This last chapter is also divided into three parts- The first part deals with Freud and the concept of the event. Two things are of particular importance in this section: first, Freud's conception of the unconscious archetype (phylogenesis) and the three modes of repetition (before, during and after). Each of these repetitions is the manner in which the unconscious repeats in relation to a problematic "event." It is very important that the reader does not confusethesethree "repetitions" with the three synthesesof time. If these three repetitions must be in placed a synthesis of time, then they belong to the third synthesisof time that ldcomprehends" the previous two. The second section of chapter four deals with the

cyclic conceptions of time. The three cyclic conceptionsof history also demonstrate the three modes of repetition of before, during and after. The first: expiation of faults by karmic repetition. The second: dramatic repetition of roles in history from the itself This The third: the exposition on repetition of chance point of view of analogy. from by Harold followed history is immediately a close reading of a chapter cyclic Rosenberg's book The Tradition of the New of which Deleuze makes extensive use Rosenberg is in It in Repetition. Difference that the example of this of reading and of illustrates in by Shakespeare Hamlet through the the passage play character changeof the three stagesof repetition: before, during and after. The third section of chapter four turns to Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra in order to illustrate the three In Difference in "pure to the the eternal return. event" of repetitions again relation he Deleuze that two the that Repetition three spoke of are of states repetitions and

12 present in this work by Nietzsche. In this section I will show how Zarathustra passes from denial of the eternal return to acceptanceand also examine Deleuze's premise that there is an unfinished third part to the eternal return. This is immediately followed by another exposition of the eternal return as it is presentedin Deleuze's book Nietzsche and Philosophy. It is in this last part that I will examine the eternal return as an "ethical" and "selective" doctrine. I will also explain why Deleuze calls the eternal return a return of "difference." None of this fourth chapter is incidental to my thesis. The "static" synthesisof time is still part of the three synthesesof time. It is the manner in which the three synthesesare "comprehended"or how they make themselvesfelt in our repetitive activities. This last chapter allows us to question the manifestations of the synthesesof time in our fears, our vices, and in our hopes. In this way, the last chapter is a "practical" application of the synthesesof time. The danger the reader must avoid, however, is to reduce the three repetitions to the three disconnect to them so that they appear incidental to the synthesesor completely whole thesis of three synthesesof time. One must, therefore, think of the three "repetitions" as the otherface of the three syntheses of time. This is the other face

that is manifested in action. To repeat the warning to the reader given above: it is be important that each chapter read as a new approachto the three synthesisof very time. Imagine this thesis as a story told from multiple perspectives.The first "story" is about signs, the second is about series, and the third is about energetics. If the disappointed. be he then to may reader expects one chapter expand upon another Each chapter must be a new start. However, this does not mean that each "story" or be fact In themes, there and of repetitions will another. with not resonate chapter may On from different the the theme whole, perspective. a a approach each chapter will

13 use of different strategiesor perspective is intended to give a more complete picture of Deleuze's theory of the three synthesesof time. Before we can begin to examine the details of the three synthesesof time we must first ask ourselves: what is its importance? Why should we spend our time thinking about the three synthesesof time? What does it do? What is the problem it addresses?The thesis itself will deal with the details and the workings of the three syntheses,but before we delve into them I will set aside part of my introduction to addressthe question of the "importance" of the three synthesesof time. What tradition of philosophy is Deleuze attacking or working againstwhen he postulates the three syntheses of time? Although there are many examples of "abstract" synthesisin traditional philosophy, in Difference and Repetition Deleuze names Kant as his adversary: "It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation. Here synthesisis understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the 1, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis." [DR 87] Kant

believed that the synthesesof time depended wholly on the active synthesesof the abstract logical subject of thought. For every representationwe could have, there is doing it it By "I to think" that the an can accompany and relate one and samesubject. this Kant made the synthesisof time wholly dependenton the activity of the subject. He even went so far as to say that if the subject disappearsthen time and spacewill disappear too: "... if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective in constitution of our senses general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even spaceand time themselvesdisappear;and that these, as in in but in This "' themselves, that short, exist only means, cannot us. phenomena, "I that the think" those are capable of representation of are able active subjects only

14 to synthesizethe manifold appearancesof time into a whole. Does the ameba say "I thinky' or have any power of synthesis?If we think of all the various speciesof life and reserve the power of synthesisof time only to those who are capable of abstract representation,we then encounter an absurdity. For Deleuzethis Kantian synthesisof time is an abstract synthesisof time. He does not deny that Kant has discovered a valid synthesisof time. However, Deleuze does not rest content with making active synthesis the only basis of the synthesisof time. Instead he seeksout the possibility of a passive synthesis that takes place both on an organic level and an unconscious level. In this way he will free synthesisfrom "representation"and the subject. Deleuze does not deny that there is an active synthesis.He only believes that it comes afterwards. In Proust and Signs Deleuze demarcatestwo distinct ideas about the order of intelligence. A traditional view of the faculty of intelligence states that it comes before: "There is one aspect... of logos, by means of which the Intelligence always comes before, by which the whole is already present, the law known before it already what applies to: this is the dialectical trick by which we discover only what we already have given ourselves,by which we derive from things have is [PS 105-106] This Deleuze " there. already put calls the only what we what "totalizing impulse" [PS 105] by which we try to representto ourselves all of our knowledge as if it formed a pregiven unity. Kant is guilty of this when he tells us that is "Different times are merely parts of one time a already given as whole: space and 0 is is "necessary For Kant Y92 this time time. the representation and a same and is his but time to ourselves: only argument, we must ask according valid undoubtedly its but in is As "representation" time synthesis given as a whole, a representation? time is not given as a whole. This leadsto Deleuze's secondconception of the faculty logical Proust: he "He the intelligence; counters or conjoined use of all our of says of

15 faculties--preceded by the intelligence that brings them

all together in the fiction of a

'total soul'--by a nonlogical and disjunct use, which shows that we never command all our faculties at once and their intelligence always comesafter. " [PS 106] Given this second vision of the use of the intelligence, the possibility of a passive synthesis becomes evident. In short, every "representation"of time

or spacethat we have must

be produced by a prior passivesynthesisof time and space.Therefore, even though we conceive time as a whole in our representationalconsciousness,this does not mean that time is a "whole" outside of representation.In fact, the "power of sickness, forgetting, fragments disjunct" the [PS 129] according to Deleuze. age, and afFwm as It is in those statesthat the powers of "representation"fall apart and time appearsas fragmented and disjointed. This testifies to the necessityof a passivesynthesisprior to the activity of the intellect. For this reasonDeleuze'sthree synthesesof time are an attempt to construct a new "Trancendental Aesthetic" that, according to Deleuze, "appears more profound to us than that of Kant. " [DR 98] Deleuze names two reasonsfor reconfiguring the transcendentalaesthetic:Kant rules out "the possibility of composing space step by step" [DR 98], and he deprives "this passiveself of all power of synthesis(synthesisbeing reserved for activity). " [DR 98] Therefore, the focus of Deleuze's three syntheses of time will be to restore the power of synthesis to

the passive or unconscious selves and to restore the possibility of composing time is because Deleuze's by It this that new transcendentalaesthetic must of step. step into the unconscious. pass If Kant began the era of "representational" or active synthesisthen Freud began the era of passiveor unconscioussynthesis.After Freud it becomespossibleto faculty Kant. to that the as an autonomous was unavailable unconscious speak of Because of this Deleuze makes extensive use of Freud in his construction of a new

16 transcendental aesthetic of passive synthesis. Although Freud himself was not primarily concerned with the philosophical problem of time, there are aspectsof his lend that themselvesto an analysisof time. Deleuze selectsthree work main aspects that form the basis of his three syntheses.First there is the theory of displacement and disguise in Freud. Freud discovered that memories or fantasies masked one another and displaced certain elements acrosstime. Conceptslike "deferred action" fall into this category of displacement and disguise. For Deleuze this forms the basis for his theory of the second synthesisof time. The remarkable aspectof this theory of disguise and displacement is that it accounts for memory but treats memory as an effect of a preconsciousor unconsciousprocessand not the voluntary exerciseof an active faculty. As such, the passive synthesisof memory is prior to the active or conscious activity of remembering. Second, in Freud we find a complex theory of neurology. In The Projectfor a Scientific Psychology Freud lays out a systematic account of how quantities of excitation passthrough neuronsand are synthesizedinto perceptions. It is this aspect of Freud that Deleuze relies upon to formulate thefirst synthesis of time. In the work of Deleuze such concepts as the "larval subject"')and

the contraction of habits are also to be found in the work of Freud. All of these in neurological synthesesare unconscious or non-conscious activities the brain. As by be the they to the such are considered a passive synthesis of present or means discover is in Freud by "duration" Third, the the we synthesized organism. which theory of phylogenesis.Although Deleuze doesnot agreewith Freud about the origin he does his them to these archetypes own theory of see as essential unconscious of the "pure event." For Deleuze these archetypal events are "problematic" insofar as they have no clear subj ect or object. Being ambiguous, theseproblematic events are future is by the the means synthesized.To put it simply, the synthesisof the which

17 future is the simultaneousaffirmation of all possible outcomes.The pure event, being an expression of all possible divergent series of outcomes, brings the dimension of the future under the realm of unconscious "problems." Because these events are unconsciousor preconsciousthey too must be considereda thirdpassive synthesisof time. It is from this third passive synthesis of time, as a relation of the ego to a problematic event, that our preconscious senseof time arises. It is at this point that Deleuze talks about the "three repetitions" [DR 91] of a pure static order of time. The "static order of time" is different from the three synthesesof time. This static order only concerns the presentation of the third synthesisof time in the preconscious. Consider an archetypal event that we find in the work of Freud: "to kill the father." The ego is placed in time, not by the order of real events,but by its relation to these pure "timeless" archetypal events. In the case of the tragedy of Oedipus, there is a in the play before the realization of the act of "killing the father," a point of point realization of the act or the during, and a point of self-destruction after the act. Deleuze extends the third synthesisof time into the static repetition of time to show that our concept of before, during and after in time are products of passivesynthesis forms and not a priori of the understanding.The passivenature of thesethree static be found four in Freud. In I this thesis the repetitions can work of chapter of extract from the work of Freud the three repetitions of before, during and after. These are: the repetition of the neurotic, the repetition of the child who plays destructive games, forces These the that to the superego seeks negate object-cathexis. repetition of and forces because fall Freud "demonic" to they outside are what referred as of repetition the will or volition of the subject. As such, they expose the priority of passive or involuntary synthesisover the active synthesesof the faculties of representation.For

18 all the reasonsabove Freud is an important part of this thesis on the three syntheses of time. Proust is also an important point of reference in this thesis. In chapter one I deal with Deleuze's Proust and Signs. It is in this work that the three synthesesof time are discovered although the terminology "three synthesesof time" does not in this book. Instead, in this book, Deleuze deals with "signs" and their appear temporal character. There are three basic types of signs that each correspond to a synthesisof time: worldly signs, signs of love, and signsof art. Each type of sign has a temporal characteristic: time wasted, time lost, and time regained. What does this have to do with passive synthesis?A sign is not a symbol or a sign that has intelligible meaning. The intellect does not interpret these "signs" of which Deleuze speaks.Signs are primarily the involuntary emissionsof signals.Their interpretation is involuntary and unconscious. In the work of Proust a pain is the "result" of an unconscious interpretation of signs. The episode of the boot in the work of Proust is the result of an emission of signs that awaken the memory of the hero's dead hero At is the grandmother. no point of the novel consciously aware of thesesigns. He is only aware of their effect by sensationsof pleasureand pain. The synthesisof time in Proust's great novel is a wholly passive and involuntary activity of the

faculties. Proust testifies to the priority of the involuntary synthesesof time over the by involuntary Proust is intellect: "truth" their their the nature. signified activity of Deleuze's important transcendental to to a new construct quest element an provides function in "signs" His temporal the testifies to the of our synthesis of work aesthetic. duration, in literary form, investigates, Proust the the pure past a of nature existence. into into future. introduction Proust death The this the the of reaching of process and thesis, I hope, will give the reader a general sense of the three synthesesof time

19 presented in a non-technical manner. This is why the first chapter is devoted to Proust. It is necessary to recognize the effect of the three synthesesof time in practical situations before we delve into the unconsciousmechanicsof Freud. It is my hope that the first chapter will provide a concrete example of temporal synthesis so that the later discussionof unconsciousprocesseswill have a proper context. No presentation of the three synthesesof time would be complete without mention of Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return. I end my thesis with this important concept because it is the summation and ethical end Deleuze's three of synthesesof time. This "ethical" doctrine of eternal return is essentialto Deleuze's reading of the Event. Deleuze conceives of three possible relations to the event: experiencing it as "too much for me" or becoming-equal or becoming equal to the unequal. In his analysis of Thus Spoke Zarathustra Deleuze documentsthese three approachesto the "event" of the eternal return. The last chapter of this thesis ends with an examination of the extreme consequencesof "becoming equal to the unequal." Implicated in this last "extreme" affirmation of the eternal return are the concept of the "overman" and the disappearance of the subject. Why is this important? Because,the total affirmation of the eternal return would imply the total distraction of the "active" faculties of judgment and the affirmation of the passive in-themselves. is fmal This Deleuze's time condemnation of syntheses of "representational" philosophy. The destruction of the active faculties of judgment in describes Proust Deleuze imply to and signs as an extreme sensitivity would Signs: "Though endowed with an extreme sensibility and a prodigious memory, the insofar he is deprived has as of any voluntary and organizeduse of no organs narrator faculties The [PS 182] " faculties. active ofjudgment and voluntary control are such by is because "resentment" Deleuze. This they to according organized essentially

20 cannot affirm "chaos" as the fundamental law of the universe. They seek to impose order and "justice" upon every passive and involuntary activity of the organism. In short, they organize the body and the world according to a transcendentprinciple of the unity of the self. This is the completion of Deleuze's alternative "transcendental aesthetic" that sought to establishtwo things: to return the power of synthesisto the passive self and to give 'lime" itself the power of synthesis.The doctrine of the eternal return does these two things. This is why it deservesa special place in this thesis. What does this thesis attempt to do? The primary aim is to show how the three synthesesof time actually work. This has not been done before. All of the secondary literature on Deleuze devotes very little attention to the three synthesesof time. None of them give a systematicaccount of the workings and interconnections best Deleuze's At the three they paraphrase own words without adding of syntheses. his This thesis seeksto add somethingnew to the account to account. anything new difficulty in Deleuze's The the the three of conception understanding syntheses. of is information background deal is he that three syntheses already of assumesa great be for is There to by the applied a senseof context a pressingneed reader. understood to Deleuze's own presentation. What this thesis seeksto do is to return to the main it link to inspired Deleuze's up with conception of synthesis and sources that Deleuze's own words so that the reader may seethe whole picture. Also, this thesis dealing this be of matter a subject with to as systematic as possible when attempts do into is divided that For thesis the main repeat one this not parts reason complexity. In this from to the three but another. syntheses aspect of one thesis; rather, progress hope I In the theory. the end, hope I to a complex of main components all cover way time three the the of syntheses passive of workings that the reader will get a senseof

21 and their viability as an alternative to the "transcendental aesthetic" of Kant. However, at no point in my thesis do I argue directly against Kant's aesthetic.This thesis is meant to provide a positive alternative and not to refute any other The philosophy. argument will seekto demonstratethe conceptual rigor of the three synthesesof time so that it may be adopted as a doctrine and applied to practical ends. Its value as a doctrine is to be decided by its applicability and not someabstract logical proof As such, all conceptual refutation of Deleuze's doctrine is placed to for the moment so that the readers may get an adequate senseof the one side components of the doctrine and may then decide for themselves.My task will be successful only if this thesis leaves the readers with a better understandingof the three synthesesof time than they had before they read it. Of coursethis short work is doctrine. draw There are still many to the this consequencesof unable out all of it is by However, that that this thesis my will remain unsolved. questions are raised hope that it will be the most complete text available on this important subject.

Chapter 1: The Synthesesof Signs

At first sight Deleuze's discussion of signs in his book Proust and Signs would in he that do time little have three the explicates to synthesesof with seem to books. between link is two these However, Repetition. there Difference and a secret "To Deleuze's becomes take each This link statement: seriously evident when we kind of sign there doubtless correspondsa privileged line of time." [PS 24] There are it Although time. types three not explicitly stated, seems of three types of signs and follows I In for time. the three will what of these syntheses prototypes though are as This three between the that these two show will works. show the correspondences

22 synthesesof time are drawn from the work of Proust and that it is the main source of inspiration for Deleuze's analysis of time.

a) Worldly signs

1.1

What is a sign? A sign is not something that refers to an object or a meaning.

When Deleuze refers to signs he is not speakingof the artificial signsof languagebut rather of natural signs. This becomes evident when we consider Deleuze's example of signs: "One becomesa carpenter only by becoming sensitiveto the signsof wood, a physician by becoming sensitiveto the signs of disease." [PS 4] Above all a sign is a form sensationthat acts as a signal to the organism. BecauseDeleuze is concerned with the passive synthesisof sensationshe treats signs as a part of a nervous system that acts independently of reflective thought. For example, if the organism has a need, the only way it can know if that need is satisfied is if the organism receives a signal telling it that certain conditions have been met. After a meal one receives a is full. is A that one sign sign the means by which the organism "interprets" its environment. When we read Deleuze we must keep in mind that when he speaksof interpretation of signs he is using this term to designate the passive synthesisof intelligence. in In the to think terms of active synthesisof order sensationsand not faculty to the the side our assumptions about of passive synthesis we must put intelligence as being the center of interpretation and focus insteadupon the meansby itself interprets. First, Deleuze's the system consider explanation of nervous which in is future form "Need the this the manner which appears, as organic of need: level is Need food, [DR 73] " this the that on not or unlike mouth expects expectation. the beloved's body that anticipates a caress. At this level "need" is the means by

23 which the organism reaches out to its environment and questions its surroundings. The sign, put simply, is the answer to the question that the organism puts to its surroundings. Either there is a signal of satisfaction or there is a negativeresponseof dissatisfaction. By negotiating with the environment the organism leams, by means of signs, to anticipate and predict responses.In short, it builds up perceptual habits. These habits, in turn, inform our faculty of intelligence. But becausethis faculty of forming habits comes first, it is more primary than the faculty of intelligence. When the intelligence comes into play the passive synthesis has already conditioned the filtered it habit. This is why Deleuze says: "Each through the sign and guise of contraction, each passive synthesis, constitutes a sign which is interpreted or deployed in active syntheses." [DR 73] In short, signsare caught up in the activity of before intelligence. habit in they the the even nervous system reach expectation and By the time they have reached the intelligence all the activity of learning has already been set down in the neural pathways. The intelligence is just the pale reflection of interpretation of signs. an unconscious processof 1.2

For Deleuze duration is not a simple given. Duration is the product of a

from is It is built the This time. need. organic upon synthesis passive synthesis of is This duration become bodies the that we of existence. aware of very rhythm of our form fundamental Deleuze the of repetition: calls what

it, depends The repetition of need, and of everything which upon expresses intratemporal belongs time, the the to characterof synthesisof the time which in inscribed is Repetition need, since need rests essentially that synthesis. forforms involves the instance repetition: which which essentially upon an itself of repetition and the for-itself of a certain duration. [DR 77]

24

Duration is not an effect of the active synthesis intelligence; but it is the of rather, passive longings and needsof an organism. Our conscious desiresare the reflection of a more fundamental dimension of organic need. Our longings and anticipations that make time seem to pass much slower than it does are the result of the delay involved in the transmission of signs. Once again, Deleuze draws this lesson about duration partially from the work of Proust. Proust sees duration as essentially problematic. This is because, at the moments in which we are most aware of duration, we are also most aware of our unsatisfied needs. When he speaksof the successionof moments that form the hours of his waiting, Proust's hero experiences them as painful:

Those inaccessible and excruciating hours during which she was about to enjoy unknown pleasures - now, through an unhoped-for breach, we are in have them; the entering now, one of moments which, succession,would hours, those a moment as real as the others, perhapseven more composed important to us, becauseour mistressis more involved in it, we can picture to have it in it, it, taking created ahnost: are part we ourselves, we possess we the moment in which he will tell her we are here, downstairs.

It is important to note that Proust saysthat we have composedthose hours and that is This Deleuze that have tells temporal the a signs are us moment. why created we because to to the teaches and contract expectation of signs us wait apprenticeship, it become has Whereas to together. say clichd almost a phenomenological moments future into this the the another, and are all one the past extended and that present

25 account leaves out the important role of signs in the production of duration. No one has a "natural" disposition to experience time as a foundational experience; some pathological conditions prevent some people from living within a normal duration. It is the ability to form habits in the organism that makes this possible. There are as durations many as there are organic needs.One part may have a different degree of contraction than another. By the time that the various durations and rhythms of the organism make themselves felt in consciousnesswe confuse them with the duration of the changing of the external world. This, however, is not a mistake. Signs are not in the body. They are in the world; however, it is the various contractions of the interpret that these signs. The active faculty of intelligence is only aware of organism the signs and not the processby which they become synthesizedin the unconscious. 1.3

When Deleuze speaksof "worldly signs" in Proust and Signs he is referring

to the habitual use of responsesand clichdd remarks that fill up the conversationsin habitual funny is life. 'Nothing Deleuze this everyday remarks upon use of mimicry: laugh; but does Cottard Verdurin Mme Verdurins', the makes a sign not and said at that he is saying something funny, Mme Verdurin makes a sign that she is laughing, in his be A Verdurin, is her to that outdone, seeks not sign so perfectly emitted and because first 6] At " [PS the this for strange seems turn sight an appropriate mimicry. if But we critically characters are not really communicating with one another. find time the that we are of the most we will majority of our conversations appraise form the information. This that masks politeness of social not really conveying is is incidental. It that is an essentialpart of signaling vacuity of conversation not friendship. However these mimicry of scenes to vacuous of expressions endemic Deleuze in According deal Proust's to the space novel. of seem, they take up a great duration. in into "wasted terms, time" other or, they represent the apprenticeship

26 However, there is a certain pleasure associatedwith

wasting time in this way. Proust

describesthis idle chatter: "... idle chatter, which would have absorbednothing of the nervous pleasure,the fleeting emotion of the experience,and which would have been reminiscent in this respect of the impression of lassitude and regret that follow the first warm days of spring. "5 These society people seek each other out in order to be

"elegant" and charming. It is the lightness of conversations in which nothing is communicated, in which roles are played and expectations instantly met. But not communicating is not an objection to worldly signs. Signs are not meant to convey information. Their role is to have a direct, pleasurableor unpleasant,effect upon the nervous system itself In an interview Deleuze stated that he liked this aspect of Proust: "This is why he has always liked and still likes Proust so much, for the life [mondanite], the social relations [rapports mondains].This is the fantastic society emission of signs, for example, what's known as a 'gaffe. ' This is a non-

comprehension of a sign, signs that people don't understand.Society life exists as a but it's the of empty signs, also the speedof their emission, milieu of proliferation ,, 6

the nature of their emission. This form of elegant conversation is pleasantbecause into lassitude. into Nothing the the enters simple unexpected a present it contracts the the therefore the anxiety about predictable, and are signs, responses exchange of future is laid to rest. This use of signs is meant to negatethe unpleasantaspectsof duration by speeding along the transitions of signs so that the presentcan be reduced to its minimum. This is why we form habits of speaking:to minimize the uncertainty tension the of organic expectation. and signs of 1.4

Our habits of thinking are a direct result of our habits of speaking. Deleuze

discovers in the work of Proust both a critique of friendship and a critique of friends like Proust, "According to that are well-disposed are minds philosophy:

27 explicitly in agreement as to the signification of things, words, and ideas; but the philosopher too is a thinker who presupposesin himself the benevolenceof thought, who attributes to thought the natural love of truth and to truth the explicit determination of what is naturally worked out by thought." [PS 30] Philosophy is, then, the natural extension of friendship: one goes from the agreementbetween two people to the presupposition of a universal agreementsignified by "truth. " The values derived from this idea of a universal friendship, however, only attain a possible value and not a necessaryone. This is becauseit presupposesthe identity of reasonto be a universal attribute and the benevolenceof all people who engagein discourse."In all its forms, intelligence attains by itself, and makes us attain, only those abstract and conventional truths that have merely a possible value." [PS 30] They are only possible becausethere is always the possibility of the malevolent thinker who says that 2+2=5. Like polite conversation, an unexpected sign that brings displeasureto the harmonious accord of like-minded people can always disrupt agreement. We shall seethat this form of "truth" is not endorsedby Deleuze or Proust. In the section "signs love" on of we will seethat there is another form of truth that is generatedby discord. For now it is enough to oppose it to this placid form of truth. 1.5

For Deleuze a sign is always a sign of the present. The organism only knows

the presence or absence of sensation. The active faculty of the intelligence can future but in the and a of a past, passive synthesis the unconsciouscan only conceive indicate fact. fact indicate However, that this a present present may experience signs in is For "A the the present. example, scar: scar the sign not of a a past state enduring fact but 'the having been it is that the present of of wounded': we can say past wound it from it instants the that the of wound, contracts separate all which us contemplation into the living present." [DR 77] In short, the passive synthesis only deals with

28 sensationsthat are signs of the present. The scar may hurt, and all that the passive synthesesregister is the present fact. The active synthesiscarried out in the faculty of the intellect may attribute a past and a future to this sign. In the example of the scar. the scar carries the past into the present by the physical persistenceof the wound. However, the sign knows nothing of the history of the scar, only its duration extending into the present. Deleuze derives this theory of the sign from the stoics. The stoic argument is as follows: A sign is always a sign of a thing; if the thing is not present then the sign is not present.A past thing is not present;therefore it cannot be indicated by a sign; the same with a future thing. Sextus Empiricus makes the following argument: "For some people make a mistake and want a presentthing to be for instance, 'If this man has a scar, this man has had a thing, a sign of a past as wound. ' For 'He has a scar' is something present, since it is evident, but his having had a wound is past, since there is no longer a wound. [ ] the wound has already ... happenedand is past, but 'This man has a wound', which is a proposition, is present, 7 ,,

though it is said about something which has happened. The stoics were forced into this logical position because their propositional "truth" requires that some state of be because is This in truth the cannot verified a necessary present. affairs subsists directly in the present unless there is a present fact. The organism only knows the level directly. Therefore, it the facts that of passive synthesis, at can sense present Further, that this immediate means the registered. are of affairs states most only is first time trace of previous events subsumedwithin every synthesisof within the have long Therefore, that traces an past will are of events the present state of affairs. Further, being that there past event. any memory of effect on the present without is it is if level; total there this time is a amnesia at every as at there no passageof

29 instant. The first synthesis of time is a machine that registers the present state of affairs without any retention of previous events. 1.6

Deleuze calls the work of Proust an "apprenticeship to signs." [PS 4] By this

he means that we learn by an encounter with signs. But what kind of learning are we talking about here? In the case of learning through signs, the outcome is not necessarily knowledge. We must conceive of leaming with signs as something that takes place on an unconsciouslevel. To illustrate this Deleuze gives this us example:

A well known test in psychology involves a monkey who is supposedto find food in boxes of one particular colour amidst others of various colours: there comes a paradoxical period during which the number of 'errors' diminishes even though the monkey does not yet possessthe 'knowledge' or 'truth' of a solution in each case: propitious moment in which the philosopher-monkey opens up to truth, himself producing the true, but only to the extent that he begins to penetratethe coloured thicknessof a problem. [DR 164-165]

It is this paradoxical moment in which we are learning without having explicit knowledge that fascinates Deleuze. The colors and the appearanceof food in this example act as signs that, through an act of repetition, form a paradoxical form of learning. The signs are subliminal insofar as they are not objects of knowledge; but Signs have that trial to repetition require of and error sort out. a rather, problems temporal character becausethey are not given in a single instance. They require the form in habits. has learning Proust's to the structure of order great novel repetition of fonn basis into "research" The long that the time. of signs of of repetitions a series a hero of the novel contemplates these strange recurrences in his life in order to

30 discover their message,or meaning. He learns by drawing off a theme or archetype that is repeated in each era of his life. The exploration of time is also the exploration of the unconscious. "As a result, 'leaming' always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishingthe bond of a profound complicity betweennature and mind. " [DR 165] Unlike the theory of learning in which "knowledge" is the correspondence between an image in the mind and an object in nature, Deleuze's theory of learning places signs at the frontier between the mind and nature, so that inside is just The the to that a sensitivity signs are neither one engenders other. mind but in-between. Deleuze the transversal calls this space the space nor outside within distinctive is field: learn "To to the to points of our conjugate swim problematic bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. " [DR 165] The problematic field, in this case, is the inertia of the water, the body to the the to the the of movements attempt coordinate waves and resistanceof learned formed is loop the feedback the A fit these elements. waves are signsof and by the responseof the body. Given this theory of signs we seewhy these signsmust If future in this of model be in wave. or the a past swims never one present: always logic follow his the is because it Proust of learning fits well with the works of novels learning through a sensitivity to signs. The signs in Proust are the encounterswith he to that love, the wished art the of work trials of the question of people, society logic follow the that of is solutions There and problems a gradual unfolding of create. it is is This signs. of work a why apprenticeship.

31 1.1 Signs are the interpretations

1.3 Worldly signs are habits of

1.5 Signs only register the present

speaking that reduce the present

state of affairs without any

to a minimum.

retention of past events.

1.2 Duration is an effect of the

1.4 These signs give rise to the

1.6 Learning is the encounter

delay in the transmission of signs.

illusion of universal truth based

with signs through the

upon friendship.

unconscious.

of organic needs.

b) Signs of Love

2.1

With the introduction of signs of love we encounter a transition from the first

because This takes time. transition time to the place second synthesisof synthesisof deceptive: love "They is, That the these the are are signs of signs. nature of of deceptive signsthat can be addressedto us only by concealingwhat they express:the them that thoughts a give and actions of unknown worlds, of unknown origin "all invalidate does that form the 9] This [PS " signs rule not sign of new meaning. in love the because is " This the are encountered the of signs present. are signs of in it in their that meaning the seeks they a way such mind activate present, and yet, is Proust in that illustrates the ofjealousy. this The that of work the past. example Consider this quote from Proust that describesthe action ofjealousy:

it his in the it he in touch whole of was tried to memories, And whatever point in island dined the had Verdurins so often on that season,during which the badly the him him. Hurt that hurt curiosity which Bois, gradually that so the fear his by the in him new of kePt jealousy his was neutralized Provoking it. by himself inflict he satisfýýing on torments would

32 Jealousy is a form of involuntary memory that is provoked by signs that are deceptive.9 They are deceptive because there is a contradiction between them. In order to be deceptive signs must contain a mixture of truth and falsehood in such a way that the two do not logically cohere. A perfect lie would not excite the intelligence. These signs are simulacra insofar as they resemblethe truth while at the sametime they hide it:

Swann immediately recognized this statement as one of those fragments of true facts which liars, when caught unprepared, console themselves by introducing into the composition of the falsehood they are inventing, believing they can accommodate it there and steal away its resemblance to the

'o Truth.

Because the passive synthesis is unable to reconcile the contradiction in signs, the intelligence is activated. This is the faculty for determining the the active synthesisof truth of signs. This is where the contradiction that we saw above plays its part: there is a pleasureassociatedwith the searchfor truth that directly contradictsthe pleasures love. love depend beloved, The the the complete presenceof of pleasuresof upon for in beloved the truth the the search place a possible world pleasures of whereas that excludes us. What is hidden is the past of the beloved. Here we have reachedthe in love: they the present. traces are of past events subsisting essenceof signs of These traces refer to a dimension of time that is wholly distinct from the present:the have lived but is, That that that through, past we could ever a past not a past priori a had before her. have it is imaginary dimension As beloved the we met such, an may

33 of the past and not a factual dimension of past-presents.This is what Deleuze refers to as the "pure past." This is the essentialelement in the secondsynthesisof time. 2.2

The second synthesis of time is activated by the disappointment in the

objective nature of signs. Deleuze tells us that the present as an objective plurality of is signs often tinged with this fundamental disappointment: "Disappointment is a fundamental moment of the search or of apprenticeship:in each realm of signs, we disappointed are when the object does not give us the secretwe were expecting." [PS 34] We have seen that on the level of organic need the nervous system learns by expecting certain outcomes. But becauseof the chaotic nature of the environmentthe is be immediately Nowhere the this more apparent of cannot met. needs organism than in the example of the nursing child given in Difference and Repetition:

On the one hand, the child goes beyond the bound excitations towards the the the the goal mother, as such as of an object, or intentionality supposition in 'in be to to the which and relation reality' actively reached end of an effort, hand But be failure the the same at and on other measured. may successand kind different itself for of another object, a quite time, the child constructs then is governs and and which centre or a virtual object object which it its failures for the real activity: puts several of progressesand compensates fingers in its mouth, wraps the other arm around this virtual centre, and from this the mother. virtual of the of view point situation whole appraises [DR 991

It for disappointment the the action. of real child The virtual object compensates it discords But that, than buffer the more of reality. and shocks against a provides

34 also provides the child with a point of view that is not in the immediate present.The child is able to revive past situations of satisfaction and transposethem upon the present dissatisfying failure. This is a radical temporal shift in the psyche of the child: from the present of the first synthesisto a different synthesisof the past. This transposition of the virtual dimension of the past upon the present also provides memory with the ability to embellish events with an aura or a significance that they did not have at the time. Deleuze notices a pattern in the work of Proust of a disappointment in the hero of the novel when he is undergoing an experiencefor the first time: "There are few things that are not disappointing the first time they are seen. For the first time is the time of inexperience; we are not yet capable of distinguishing the sign from the object, and the object interposesand confusesthe Disappointment signs. on the first hearing Vinteuil, on first meeting Bergotte, on first seeing the Balbec church." [PS 34] The first encounter only presents us with a problem of confused signs that do not yet have a coherence.This is why the virtual dimension is so important: it gives order to the present by the imposition of fragrnents of memory (and fantasy) onto the chaos of first encounters.However, there is a paradox: there is a delay in this superimposition of the virtual dimension; that is, it only comes after the event. This effect of delayed reaction can best be seen in the example of the trip to the theatre to seethe actressBerma: "A touch of genius in the acting of La Berma is revealed to us by the reviews a week after we have seen 1 from back difficulty by "' The Proust's her on stage, or that the cheers the stalls. hero has in perceiving the genius of the actresswas causedby the misplaced notion that genius and beauty can be found in the objects themselves.As Deleuze points out:

35 Those signs we had not been able to relish or to interpret so long as we linked them to Berma's person - perhapstheir meaning was to be sought elsewhere: in associations that were neither in Phedre nor in Berma. Thus Bergotte teaches the hero that a certain gesture of Berma's evokes that of an archaic statuette the actress could never have seen, but which Racine himself had never certainly thought of either. [PS 35]

The compensations for the disappointing nature of objects can be found in the subjective compensation of the association of ideas. This is why the hero only gains insight into the event after it is over: "My interest in La Berma's acting, being no longer subject to the compression and constraints of reality, had gone on growing 12 " since the end of the performance. Normally, the chain of associationsis blocked by our attention to the signs that we are perceiving in the present. It is necessary to

for before former the to that wait moment pass now moment can gain significance. That now former moment then takes on a reality that it did not have at the time of our first encountering it. This is why Deleuze believes that the past is more than an it Memory than transforms the conserves past more accumulation of past moments.

it. This is why the past is more virtual than actual: the aura of memory is different in kind from perception in the present.This is why Proust discoversthe contradiction of it is in is "... find in to to trying search what a contradiction virtual: reality what have to them that for the comes charm never would which pictures, memory's reality 13 " This meansthat from memory itself and from not being perceived by the senses. in the that past, purely virtual were perceived never elements contains memory As be the the to of see, that shall effect past perceptions. we reduced cannot elements

36 pure past (that was never present) is produced by the mechanismof the associationof ideas. 2.3

In the first synthesis of signs (the worldly signs) we encountered signs that

were bathed in the sensibility of encounters.But Deleuze tells us that signsare more profound than the objects we encounter them in: "It is becausethe sign is doubtless more profound than the object emitting it, but it is still attached to that object, it is still half sheathedin it." [PS 36] The first synthesisonly gave us half of the nature of the sign (as an encounter) the other half is the subjective seriesof associations.The is both in in in the sign mind and nature and neither of them. The sign has an actual side and a virtual side: the first is the encounter with the sign in perception, the second is the association of that sign with other signs in the mind. As Deleuze says: "We proceed from one to the other; we leap from one to the other; we overcome the disappointment of the object by a compensation of the subject." [PS 36] This is directed, love: love to the not to the actual woman signs of movement is essential before us, but rather to the virtual woman of subjective association.Proust illustrates in Swann for love Odette Swann's in his fact love this which narrative of of by Botticelli: Odette a painting with associates

in her face in her fresco fragment her; looked the He and appeared of a at he her it in find he from to try body and again, whether then on would always he her, though Odette, thinking probably even and of only or was with was her, in found it he because Florentine again the only masterpiece valued her her beauty too, made on neverthelessthat resemblanceconferred a certain 14

more precious.

37 We cannot say that the beauty is in the painting or in Odette; rather, we say that it is in-between them, in the effect of resonance that is produced by their association. Therefore we can conclude that the virtual element is not in the objective recall of a memory but in the effect of signs that are associatedacross time. The intellect can find objective resemblances between objects but this intellectual lacks the act resonant effect of love. The association of ideas that Deleuze is working with in his work on Proust is that of the heart and not of the head. This is why we must distinguish love from jealousy: love follows the passivesynthesisthat makesthe past resonate with the present, while jealousy follows the active and constrained use of the intellect that makes the past disjointed with the present. The jealous lover associatesthe beloved with various imagined past scenariosand is unable to make a connection between them. The other lover associatesthe beloved with imagesin the past and makes a transversal connection between them. These two modes of love represent two different approaches to the virtual past: one of accord the other of discord. The first forms associationsof ideasand the secondbreaks them. 2.4

In the work of Proust we encounter only a narcissisticform of love. Deleuze

defmes this form of love by the following: "to love without being loved, becauselove implicates the seizure of the possible worlds in the beloved, worlds that expel me as homosexual in in draw that the they and culminate unknowable me much as love is form The 142] " [PS the existence this of great secret of narcissistic world... draw in In this "possible to that strange expel order understand us and us. worlds" of form of love we must turn to Freud's description of narcissism:

For it seems very evident that another person's narcissism has a great have for their those renounced part of who own narcissismand are attraction

38 in search of object-love. [. ] The great charm of has, narcissistic women .. however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover's dissatisfaction, his of doubts of the woman's love, or his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its roots in this incongruity between the types of object-choice. [I I Freud 82-83]

The heroes of Proust's novel only fall in love with narcissisticwomen becauseof the senseof mystery that they envelop. The women they fall in love with are vain, stupid and self-serving. And yet, they are the perfect vehicles of the fantasiesof the lover. Only in them is it possible to dream of other possibleworlds that are not reducible to the here and now. The problem ofpossible worlds is the key to understandingof the for the association of ideas. It is also the key to understandingwhy we seek motive resonanceswithin the past. The key that Freud provides to this puzzle is to be found in instinctual renunciation. In the theory of narcissism our first love as infants is direct later learn However, to this our give up self-love and we always ourselves. love towards others. But there is always a core longing to return to this narcissistic longing beloved. This into longing So, this our our object-choice or state. we project is called Eros. This is why Deleuze gives it the role as a motivator of memory: "ft is in itself, this this to Eros, the past pure penetrate us nournenon, who allows always The " [DR 85] the is takes Mnemosyne. woman narcissistic virginal repetition which happens This to invested the according the phallus. object: narcissistically place of being its has "it because the Deleuze place, not paradoxical property of changing do have by beingpossessed have 'penis', those by not who a yet possessed those who " [DR 103] In that this who men means short, theme the shows. castration of as one, for (castration) their their have renounced substitute narcissistic women narcissism does is Deleuze interesting is Now, loss. with this psychoanalytical what what

39 insight. He applies it to the second synthesisof time and discovers the link between the castration complex and the constitution of a pure past. He links sexual drives to memory, thereby making the force that drives the association of ideas erotic: "The symbolic phallus signifies no less the erotic mode of the pure past than the immemorial of sexuality. The symbol is the always-displaced fragment, standing for a past which was never present:the object = x. " [DR 103] To put it simply, we follow the chain of associations in search of the missing phallus or the lost sense of wholeness to be found in narcissism. This "always-displaced fragment" is the possible world that the beloved expresses.What links the associationsof ideasin the work of Proust is a sublimated sexuality that drives the imagination. Proust tells us that: "Our curiosity about the woman we love, the roots of which lie far beyond our 15 far beyond her reasoning mind, reaches character." It extends into worlds that we can never be a part of because of our renunciation of our own narcissism. This inspires the ambivalent attitude that Proust's hero has towards his beloved. Deleuze speaks of an original Hermaphrodite: "The original Hermaphrodite continuously love is divergent " [PS 80] For Freud the two narcissistic essentially series. produces homosexual. The lover of narcissistic woman loves "what he himself was" [I I Freud 84] in the women he choosesand is therefore displacing his own homosexuality onto the beloved. This is the motivation for jealousy in Proust's novel: the lover suspects the beloved is committing the "original sin" [PS 140] that he himself is repressing. "Homosexuality is the truth of love." [PS 81] The whole dynamic of the possible beloved this the essentialsecret. conceals worlds of 2.5

It would be too easy to conceive of the "possible world" as an origin of the

dimension it itself because is tempting This an originary presents as mistake series. is in illusion the But the term the this of of an original series effect the pure past. of

40 series itself. Deleuze calls this necessary illusion the originary phantasm: "the phantasm returns easily to its own origin and, as an 'originary phantasm,' it integrates effortlessly the origin of the phantasm (that is, a question, the origin of birth, of sexuality, of the difference of the sexes,or of death ). This is becauseit is ... inseparable from the displacement, an unfolding, and a developmentwithin which it carries along its own origin. " [LS 217] We could take any one of the phantasmsthat haunt repetition, the mother, the phallus, and the castrationcomplex... but we would not be unmasking an original term in the series.Thesephantasmsare the result of the between in its If terms the the resonance origin multiple series. phantasm carries it, is because it lure draws into this that along with acts as a us an infinite temporal first loves because Deleuze According the to not even our mothers are our regression. temporal series is not limited to our personal history: "by loving his mother the hero love for Odette. The Swann's Lost Time In Search parental characters repeats of of but individual terms the terms the of an middle subject of not ultimate are intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguisefrom one seriesto another for different subjects..." [DR 105-106] In psychoanalysisthere is a tendencyto treat the is because loves. later This for love of the mother as the original archetype all distributed a on time of events series objectively as an of conceives psychoanalysis linear has for Deleuze, the unconscious line of time. However, no conception of a form of time; instead the unconscious has no first event that acts as an origin. the have heard has events as reality much that as Fantasies,myths, stories read or one Swann inserts Proust the for is It that of this narrative has reason experienced. one He this hero treats the first memory the largely novel. of into the person narrative of love learned, had "I it if affair a about memory: a personal were of another person as is detail bom, I that before which sometimes precision of with was Swann had had

41 easier to obtain for the lives of people who died centuriesago than for the lives of our best friends... " 16The theme of Swann's love appears again and again in the novel.

Each time disguised in a different jealousy: the jealousy of the hero, the jealousy of Saint-Loup, the jealousy of Charlus for Morel, etc. Each repetition forms a complex theme that acts as the law of the disguise. It is as if all these people sharedthe same memories, or as Proust says:"All thesememories addedto one anothernow formed a single mass... and then those that were only memories belonging to another person from whom I had learned them...

17 ,,

When we make the effort to remember we

it but deploy line "mass" this time, of memory and on a of we should not untangle it is in by the the time stored manner which with confuse means which we conceive in the unconscious.The notion of "origins" is a secondaryrevision of memory by the deep a structure of the unconscious. and not conscious mind 2.6

We have seen how the subjective associationof ideas determinesa seriesof

is There However, the the the this is not secondsynthesis. story of end of memories. Idea the for the foundation further this or of associations: chain subjective objective a Theme. From a series of associative links it is possible to extract a generality or a but do We theme; this them. not choose repetitive theme that runs through all of by laid is follow that desires Our out it pattern a actions and us. chooses rather, free-association Freud's Even method of themes of which we are unconscious. free. The the free of subject discovered that associationsare not always completely by determined is that ideas a superior images as act archetypes and conjunction of Deleuze locus that is It this unconscious within repetitions. our upon viewpoint love: places the essenceof

42 But, in love, the difference has passedinto the unconscious: it becomes in a sense generic or specific and determines a repetition whose terms are no longer to be distinguished except by infinitesimal differences and subtle contrasts. In short, essencehasassumedthe generality of a Theme or an Idea, which servesas a law for the seriesof our loves. [PS 75]

The repetitions of the loves in Proust's work testify to the sorrows of jealousy and betrayal. During the moments when the hero is undergoing the trials and tribulations love he is saddenedby the painful duration of time. However, of when he is free of the constraints of love he is able to look back and discover the "idea" that is incarnated in that repetition and in it he discovers a newfound joy. This is the objective element that coordinates the series. This is also, according to Proust, the means by which time can be redeemed:

Ideas are substitutesfor sorrows; the moment they changeinto ideasthey lose a part of their power to hurt our hearts and, for a brief moment, the transformation even releasessomejoy. Substitutesonly in the order of time, though, becauseit seemsthat the primary element is actually the idea, and the '8 in ideas first sorrow merely the mode which certain enter our minds.

It is a mistake, on the part of Freud, to believe in the universal theme of the Oedipus is is It The theme not a pre-given nucleus of our psychological states. complex. According Deleuze by to the associations. subjective chain of of choice our selected it: is indeed "It Idea theme that the the that will govern objective associationsselects determines the series of our subjective states, but also it is the accidents of our

43 subjective relations that determine the choice of the Idea." [PS 76] In Flroustýsnovel the initiator of the series of loves is not the relationship to the mother (although the novel begins with this), but rather, it is the story of Swann's love that is activated by the associative chain. Deleuze compares this "choice" of the Idea to Leibnizian possibilities that lay dormant until they were selectedto be actualized:

Swann is the great unconsciousinitiator, the point of departure for the series; but how can we help regretting the themessacrificed, the essenceseliminated, like the Leibnizian possibilities that do not pass into existence and would have given rise to other series in other circumstancesand other conditions? [PS 75-76]

This selection of themes from the accidental combinations in the series of loves does detertnine loves. The the that theme shows seriesof choices not our choice of is being it is disguises fundamental theme that the repeated; rather, of some are not haunt Deleuze determines that the that the preconscious mind. phantasms repetition been if had Albertine is full that that not of contingency and repetition recognizes been have "Albertine therefore the the theme then modified: would of novel selected from is because but loves the the all a group, with selected she only of series enters follows " [PS 77] If theme this to that a repetition selection. corresponds contmgency does However, is this the not make then this theme projected onto seriesafterwards. being beingpresent, is ideal It less abstract. without the theme any real without real. It is not reducible to the subjective chain of association becauseit breaks with the is is in itself is This that the conserved not reducible pure past why subjective chain.

44 to the subjective. Deleuze distinguishes between the objective and subjective conditions for resonance:

But if the resonance has both objective and subjective conditions, what it produces is of an altogether different nature: the Essence, the spiritual Equivalent, the Combray that was never seen and that breaks with the subjective chain. This is why producing is different from discovering and creating and why the entire Searchturns successivelyfrom the observationof things and from the subj ective imagination. [PS 154]

This shows that the pure past as a virtual dimension of time is not reducible to the imagination. The psychological association of two moments in time is subjective produced by the imagination, but the pure past that mediatesthese two moments is discovered as an impersonal reality.

2.1 The signs of love are

2.3 The effect of resonanceis

2.5 The phantasmis not an

deceptive and activate the mind

produced by the association of

original memory but a complex

to seek their meaning in the

images that is driven by Eros

theme that links memories.

past.

and broken by Thanatos.

2.2 The virtual past

2.4 The effect of possible worlds

2.6 The "theme" that

compensatesfor the chaos of

is causedby projected

determinesthe seriesof loves is

the present. This past gives

narcissism. Homosexuality is

selectedby chance. The theme

meaning to the present only

the secret of lost worlds.

is the objective element of

afterwards.

association.

45 C) Signs of Art

3.1 We have discovered the beginning of the signs of art in the resonant effect of memory. The idea of an objective "theme" of our repetitions is the beginning of art. In the work of Proust thesethemes are discovered through the seriesof loves that all repeat the narrative of Swann's love with minor variations. Proust made the great discovery that thesethemescan become the essenceof a work of art. As Deleuzetells us: "The real theme of a work is therefore not the subject the words designate,but the unconscious themes, the involuntary archetypes in which the words, but also the colors and sounds, assumetheir meaning and their life. " [PS 47] Proust discovers in the last volume of his work the essential element of the work of art in a form of idealism of themes. From the apprenticeship of observing patterns of behavior the hero of the novel is able to extract a general idea from the various substitutionsof his past loves:

These substitutions add something disinterested,somethingmore general,to the work, something which at the sametime is an austere lessonthat it is not to individuals that we must attach ourselves, that it is not individuals who 19 ideas. but being expressed, really exist and are capable of

in is for Time things Lost Search for the the The subject matter not people, places or it, but rather, the themes that are repeated in each section and the ideasthey express. 3.2

However, this vision of the work of art as expressing 'ideas' comes

have Platonism fon-n the to accused dangerously close of which many readers of from ideas Platonic distinguish Proustian is to ones. Proust. Deleuze very careful

46 Deleuze tells us that the ideas are the effect of difference and repetition and not their cause: 44aOne and a Whole that would not be the principle but, on the contrary, *the effect' of the multiplicity and of its disconnectedparts." [PS 163] The key difference between Platonic ideas and Proustian ideas is that the Proustian ideascome afier the series of repetitions that they explicate. Deleuze gives the example of Balzac's great work that unfolds in a seriesthat explores the unity of its fragments.It is a mistaketo think that this unity was preordained in the mind of Balzac: "For it is the same he had incomprehension Balzac's that the genius, makesus suppose of same mistake, beforehand Comedy Human idea this logical that the the or even of of unity a vague Actually, the the unity results and advances. work as constituted organically is unity is discovered by Balzac as an effect of his books." [PS 164] Proust himself is very by is design the have that transcendent artist that envisioned this; a works clear about before or during the writing of the work are weaker and lessenduring than thosethat foresee: did the that not author take upon themselvesa vital unity

have it Otherwise but would This unity was an afterthought, not artificial. by like mediocre dust, constructions systematic many so crumbled into if it look they to try as by lavish make titles and subtitles, use of writers who, the Not design. all perhaps artificial, have followed a single, transcendent it in born when enthusiasm being of for a moment an afterthought, more real is discovered between parts which only need to come together, a unity which logic, bom is of itself, therefore not and vital which and was unaware of 20 damper execution. on has a put or out variety not ruled which

47 Two things make this unity strikingly different from Platonic unity: first, the unity is not bom of logic becausethe unity is to be found in the "style" of the work that is grasped by an aesthetic senseand not a logical one; and second,the unity that results does not reduce the variety of differences within the work to one overriding concept. Above all the unity is more real for being an afterthought; that is, the is unity discovered and not created in the mind of the reader. This is the decisive point at which the third synthesisof time differs from the second synthesisof time that we discovered in the resonanceof series.The subjective associationsthat the hero of the between the present event and past events were wholly contingent and novel made needed to be created by him. The themes that are repeated are not the subjective creations of the imagination: they are the fully objective means by which repetition explicates itself We may choosethe content of our daydreamsbut we are chosenby the themes that map out our destiny. Deleuze recognizes that the repetitions that make up our life are not the mere creationsof the imagination but rather an objective force that individualizes our fate: "We shall not ask who chooses.Certainly no self, becausewe ourselvesare chosen,becausea certain self is choseneachtime that 'we' is less love, to time this to self no a suffering experience, and each choose a person delay. " [PS 127live the to the to to call, whatever or relive, and answer surprised 128] It is this objectivity of the theme or unifýring idea that is controversial. Most in "style" that an author or a repetition of a we notice when people would say from in the series of generality extracting a are merely a we series occurrences intelligence if to It are our analyze a work of art and we using as seems singularities. inventing the theme in our individual imaginations. But Deleuze denies this. He have "As Leibniz Leibnizian they to neither monad: says, a compares a work of art doors nor windows: the viewpoint being the difference itself, viewpoints towards a

48 world supposedly the same are as different as the most remote worlds. [

...

] Essence

does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is expressedas the essence not of the subject but of Being, or the region of Being that is revealedto the subject."" [PS 41-42 & 43] Therefore the illusion that "style" is an illusion in the imagination is false for Deleuze. Style is a point of view upon the world the same way that the is monad. a "point of view on the world"; that is, by expressinga clear and distinct difference is that of explicated through the work of art. This point of view is region not identical to the point of view of the author; rather, it is the point of view that the author tries to attain, his ideal and not his reality. 3.3

If signs of art can be distinguished from signs of love and worldly signs it is

becausethese signs of art can communicate something to the reader that the others cannot. The worldly signs were steepedin habitual patterns of conversation,and the from beloved is from love divorced the as one another. world signs of were silent and But if the signs of art can bridge this gap between people it is becauseof its violent Proust habitual the showsus that the use of the world. manner of seeing effect on our but immediately is to the recognizable, reader something give not work of art different: something

This labour of the artist, this attempt to see something different beneaththe is is beneath beneath the exact inverse of what words, experience, material, heedless lives live from to our minute minute, as we accomplished within us habit, intellect they by our overlay and when passion, vanity, of ourselves, from hide the them impressions, to repertoire of completely, with us true as so 21 life. the practical airns, which we wrongly call and words,

49 The signs of art are essentially violent; that is, they do violence to habitual our manner of perceiving the world. After viewing a Monet or a Turner we then leavethe museum only to encounter the landscapeand the sky again but this time in a different way than we have ever viewed it before. This is becausesomething new has been added to our perception and our manner of perceiving is forever altered by our confrontation with signs of art. When Proust speaksof the fictional painter Elstir in his novel he gives him the genius of being able to transform the world. Here are his words on the subject:

If one tries to define what it is that the art lovers mean by the adjective, it can generally be seen to apply to some unfamiliar image of a familiar thing, an image that is different from the ones we are in the habit of noticing, unusual for true, that reason seemsdoubly striking, since it surprisesus and which yet habits, and shakes us out of our while at the same time it turns us in on 22 ourselves by recalling an impression.

What is even more important than the ability of art to communicatethis difference in is Deleuze between This is its to why worlds. act as a mediator ability perception Of " [PS 42] intersubjectivity is "there course we except an artistic one. no says, is is is Art This into the not not what art about. mind of another person. cannot see identical with the point of view of the artist. If it were it would be uninteresting; like Rembrandt itself Proust According to it is or artists great a world unto rather, Vermeer are names for "styles" or modes of perceiving the world more than they are "ideas" As "feelings" they the the are or of artist. such about reports subjective The independent the that them. of artist most created completely and eternal

50 important effect of art is that it allows the present to pass into the future by modifying our perception. In short, we pass from the present world to a new world that is modified by the signsof art. The presentpassesaway becausethere are always new and multiple worlds for us to pass into. Proust best expressesthe objectivity and eternal nature of art in the following passage:

Thanks to art, instead of seeing only a single world, our own, we see it multiplied, and have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists, all the more different one from another than those which revolve in infinity and which, centuries after the fire from which their rays emanatedhas gone out, whether it was called Rembrandt or Vermeer, still send us their special light.

23

We can now seewhy the signs of art belong to the third synthesisof time. It satisfies three criteria that Deleuze attributes to the third synthesis: 1) It constitutesthe autonomy of the product, the independenceofthe work. [DR

90] 2) It is itself the new, complete novelty. [DR 90] 3) It is by itself the third time in the series,the future as such. [DR 90] In short, the signs of art are independent from the artist who creates them. They future by the they the open up world, and expressa completely novel viewpoint upon for to us enter. worlds possible creating 3.4

Signs of art cannot be "eternal" if they are mere creationsof an artist. Deleuze

Being to to to explain why signs of art of art and not relate ontology whole a employs is "it but He the the tells imagination. expressed as essence us not of subject of the

51 Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject." [PS 431 Deleuze uses a Neoplatonic word to describe this ontology of art and time: complication. In order to understand this form of "complicated" time it is necessarythat we put to the side our notions of time as a series of events that follow one another on a line of time. Instead we must imagine all possible events taking place at one unique moment outside of chronology. A complicated state of time is the unity of all time in an undeveloped state. Deleuze says of this state: "it does not yet have the distinct dimensions according to which it can unfold, nor even the separateseriesin which it is distributed according to different rhythms." [PS 451 Deleuze also uses the word "explication" to describe the means by which this complicated state differentiated and unfolded to generatethe seriesof time we can experience.The complicated state is "eternal" insofar as it subsistsadjacent to chronological time. It is not changeless, but rather the source of all change. For Deleuze time is organized "according to degrees of immanent complications and following an order of descending by developing "explicate" Signs " [PS 45] time a perpetual of art explications. by it "implicates" But time also recreation of the primordial elements of nature. fact, In the divergent between things. explicates art and events producing accords does it the To divergent the implicating by art of work put simply, elements. world disparate by it do: dreams combining that combinations thing new creates same is This images and thereby expandsperception. processof combining and expanding it beyond is to like "But, appeals thought: memory; Deleuze sleep,art calls pure what by is Whereas the 46] " [PS faculty ruled memory of essences. pure thought as a base ideas, to this complication. of ontological art appeals of associations subjective discovery but is the the the of a region of subject creation of Because of this, art not by The time, recomposing past not signs of art synthesize Being by the artist.

52 instancesof life, but by drawing upon an original complicated state of time. This is why art has nothing to do with the resonancesof involuntary memory. Art unfolds time itseýfby recreating the world at each moment. 3.5

Style is essentially metaphor. But what Deleuze and Proust mean by

metaphor is different from its normal interpretation: "metaphor is essentially metamorphosis and indicates how two objects exchange their determinations, exchange even the names that designatethem, in the new medium that confers the common quality upon them." [PS 48] Proust gives the example of the paintings by Elstir: "One of the metaphors which recurred most often in the sea-pictureswhich surrounded him then was one which compares the land to the sea, blurring all distinction between them

5.)24

.

What Proust calls metaphor Deleuze also calls

"implication". He gives the following definition of this term: " 'Implication' is what we called the state of intensive series in so far as these communicate through their differences and resonate in forming fields of individuation. " [DR 280-281] In the from Proust above we see that in the painting the land and the sea example communicate through their difference, thereby forming a new individual that is key function implication is differences land The to of neither nor sea. make disturb between "unstable that the two an opposition" will problematic once again so land In habits turn this enfolding of contraries the the sea. or of perceiving either our When Deleuze the time. speaksof essence complicated state of original reproduces he is referring to this complicated form of time, and style or metaphor is the means by which the explicated objects in time lose their individuality and make the return journey to their intrinsic beginnings. "This is because style, in order to spiritualize it the to the opposition, essence, reproduces unstable adequate render and substance that the the and exchange struggle of primordial elements original complication,

53 constitute essence itself" [PS 48] What the artist does, to put it simply, is to introduce the quality of dreams into the waking world of things. We notice that in dreams time seems to stop and when dream effects are introduced into art they produce a similar effect upon us. According to Proust this procedure protects the metaphor from the contingencies of time: "Indeed, just as in life, it begins at the moment when, by bringing together a quality sharedby two sensations,he draws out their common essenceby uniting them with each other, in order to protect them from the contingenciesof time, in a metaphor.).)25This effect is important for the following implication is from it the them to reason: of elementsreturns a problematic state,and this unstable opposition that time is forced to explicate itself again. In a paradoxical twist, the movement of time dependson thesecenters ofenvelopment to conservethe "The temporal the series: centres of envelopmentstill testify problem and continues to the persistenceof the values of implication in the movement which explicatesand because that [DR 281] In the " the them. of ambiguities passes present short, solves found in becoming the i. that haunt those we the of paradoxes present; e., always becoming land the sea. painting of 3.6

Where do the powers of difference and repetition come from? The artist

towards his themes life an his striving and repeating craft, perfecting whole spends ideal that is never met. Like "Monet's first water lily which repeats all the others" infinitesimal in differing is do to [DR 1] the only thing the artist can repeat, while it's thing, the "About same the say: life's we his artist, great of a work work. ways, kind Proust a 49] [PS worship, " of a level. as creation artistic different of speaks on a quest of perfection:

54 I realized that, in a certain ideal pattern, the few outlines and arabesquesof which could be seen to recur in his work over and over again, in a certain model of beauty, he had once seen something almost divine, since all of his time, the whole intellectual effort of which he was capable, in short the whole of his life, was devoted to the task of seeingthose outlines more clearly and reproducing them more accurately. This ideal had become a form of worship, 26 demanding, he be that could never content of such solemnity, and so ...

This is the progressive power of difference and repetition that Deleuze finds so important to the synthesis of time. But this power would never begin without the sublimation that the ideal inspires in the artist. Once again Freud's theory of important in inspiring narcissism plays an role repetition. Freud describesthis ideal displaced its displaced "The as a narcissism: subjects narcissismmakes appearance infantile finds itself ideal like the to this ego, possessedof every ego, which, on new form 88] This is " [I lFreud that of thought that the obsessional of value. perfection described by is heart This is the obsession of repetition. very artist expresses at Deleuze as a fatal affection:

It is all in this samemovement that there is a reflux of Eros on to the ego, that displacements disguises itself the takes which characterize the ego and upon loses libido fatal its that the in all affection, the objects order to construct own in its loses to Time a assume order shape circular and content mnemic form, merciless and straight

instinct death that the appears, and

indistinguishable from that pure form, the clesexualized energy of that 113] [DR libido. narcissistic

55

By the "death instinct" Deleuze is referring to the repetition compulsion that inspires the obsessional repetitions of an artist. Sublimation is clesexualizedlibido that has turned the sexual energy of the libido back onto the ego itself, thus making the ego follow a line of repetitions without end. In short, the death instinct splits the ego between itself and its ideal towards which it forever strives. This guarantees a continual production of differences from out of that split in the ego. It is within this continua repetition that the artist lives his life until he exhaustshimself in his old age. In old age, and the exhaustion of his powers, the artist losesthe ability to find continual novelty in repetition; he ends by lapsing into the comfort of ready-made images. Or as Proust saysthere is a point "when his creative genius would begin to dissipate, gradually giving way to idolatry, mere worship of the forms which had once nourished it and to the beguiling temptations of inertia.

9927 It

is only at this point

that the repetitions fail to be productive and instead become mechanical. Or as Deleuze puts it: "repetitions that have become mechanicalbecausethey are external, frozen differences that revert to a substancethat they can no longer make light and spiritual." [PS 49-50] It is the Idea that fuels productive repetition. 3.1 The subject matter of the

3.3 The signs of art

3.5 The artist reproduces

is "themes" and not art work of

communicate "violently" by

"complication" by implicating

people.

changing perceptions. This

diverse elements.This

allows us to pass into the future.

envelopmentanimates "becoming."

3.2 Proustian ideas are different

3.4 Art appealsto the

3.6 The progressive force of

from Platonic ideas because

ontological baseof

repetition is motivated by the

they come afterwards. They are

"complication. " It explicates a

"ideal" of the artist. This "death

"points of view" produced by

region of Being.

instinct" brings difference to

style.

repetition.

56

Chapter 2: The Synthesesof Series

In this chapter we will be investigating what Deleuze calls "series." The main sources for the argument of this section can be found in Deleuze's The Logic of Sense, in particular series 32 and 34. It is in these chaptersthat Deleuze lays out his theory of connective, conjunctive and disjunctive series. It is also here that he distinguishes between depth, physical surfaces, sexual surfaces and metaphysical forced important he But theory gives a coherent surfaces. of resonanceand more between be It that takes these place made clear that these movement surfaces. will three series and the effects they have on each other will be essentialto a deeper is in by It Deleuze time. the three also this synthesesof means understandingof what in important Freud investigate the theories the that will play of role we will section Deleuze's construction of series and syntheses.The series and their interaction directly mirror the processesof sublimation and fixation that can be found in the dynamic is become it in that time All Freud. an effect of a clear all, will work of different between forced of series operating movement and of resonance process psychical structures.

The connective series a)

1.1

its In birth begins the the child. of The story of connective series with

Neural disorganized. is infant development the almost completely of state primitive its infant is brain; to in trying forming the the coordinate still still connections are is birth developed is the that ability thing About at the completely only movements. drives basic functions Freud the these of selfcalls to feed excrete. to and

57 preservation. In the beginning the mouth and the anus function to preservethe life of the infant. However, becauseof the complete dependenceof the infant upon external sources of nourishment, needswill not always be satisfied in a timely fashion. When this happens an excess of intensity builds up in these zones. Here is where the emergence of another sort of relationship with reality emerges.We have all noticed the phenomenon of thumb sucking in small children. It is at the moment that the has breast finds in thumb the than the that the organism small child satisfaction rather Freud from dependence "auto-erotic" to an relationship. on external stimuli switched tells us that this is the birth of the erotogenic zone:

The child does not make use of an extraneous body for his sucking, but it because it is because his makes more convenient, own skin prefers a part of him independent of the external world, which he is not yet able to control, it himself, he in because a second with were, that as provides way and 98] kind. [7Freud inferior though one of an erotogenic zone,

immediate beyond has the The real important gone For Deleuze this is an child step. himself for "the another in constructs child to object: objects order activate a virtual is which and kind centre or different object a virtual which of object object, a quite " its failures for activity... real of the and progresses then governs and compensates has There by Klein. discovered [DR 99] The virtual object is also the partial object For our purposeswe will the nature of partial objects. been a lot of confusion about in drive image that is it a satisfy will following an of action in an it define the way: is thumb; his that thumb sucking The notjust sucks who child an auto-erotic manner. breastfeeding took that image drive a satisfying of the an with is he also providing

58 place in the past and transposing it upon the present situation. The virtual/partial object allows the child to evade the present by conflating the present situation with a past one that was more satisfying. On a micro level this is the very beginning of sexuality. An important shift has taken place: the drives of self-preservation have been co-opted by the sexual drives. Drives of self-preservation depend upon real objects of satisfaction, whereas sexual drives only depend upon virtual objects. A zone of the body moves from one drive to the other when it acquires a memory for itself and begins to replay satisfying scenarios rather than waiting for real satisfaction. 1.2

It may seem strange at first to say that a zone of the body has a "memory."

But this is easily rectified if we consider what form this memory takes. Each zone has a degree of intensity. Normally the zone only needsenough intensity or energyto keep it functioning. However, as we have seen,the continual dissatisfactionof needs causedthe zone to become invested with more intensity that it could use for normal for is important Deleuze's "Consider, This to theory the of example, purposes. zone: becomes images Each the one coextensiveto the of oral zone. objects of sucking or field it, it its traverses the of as explores orifice and partial surface and entire range of intensity, from the maximum to the minimum and vice versa." [LS 225] The drives follow drives intensity. These have the range of a narrow range of self-preservation between the need of hunger to the satisfaction of feeding. On the other hand, the becomes the drives this repetition of satisfaction narrow range: exceed sexual detached from any actual need of the organism and instead repeats its activity from detached becomes When itself drive becauseofa to attain pleasure repetition in focuses the the tension the it system. of excess on reduction instead need

59 Therefore the difference between the drives of self-preservation and the drives of sexuality is one of a difference in amplitude according to Freud:

But apart from these sourcesthere are present in the organism contrivances which brings it about that in the case of a great number of internal processes sexual excitation arises as a concomitant effect, as soon as the intensity of those processespassesbeyond certain quantitative limits. [7Freud 124]

Another great difference between the repetition of need in the drives of selfpreservation and the repetition of pleasure in the sexual drives is that the sexual drives leave a trace whereas the drives of preservation do not. The newly developed drives do two things: they seek to mitigate the unpleasure of partial sexual in habitual by imaginary the they a pattern and register compensation an expectation has intensity For Freud, form habit-memory. in the a every of a neural-system is in intensity the tension The the erotogenic zone of source source and an aim. difference late. The by too that comesalways created the expectation of a satisfaction between the self-preservative drive and the sexual ones is the difference in aim. The The the is drive to of sexual aim need. the organic an satisfy preservative aim of drive is to satisfy a pleasure.An object can only satisfy the first while the secondcan its "At is is how Freud According this to be satisfied with an image. a zone produced: it has functions; itself sexual the no as yet it to somatic vital of one origin attaches by is dominated its is an erologenetic thus aim sexual and auto-erotic; object, and is function drive to This so 99] a somatic [7Freud of an auto-erotic attachment zone-,, depth from first the it the transition because the of Deleuze marks important to is is the "It to that images: release say, with sexuality, with the of to surface organic

60 of the sexual drives, that the series begins-because the serial form is a surface organization." [LS 2241 Deleuze derives his terms "surface" and "depth" from a Stoic distinction between things that have bodies and things that do not. The drives of self-preservation belong to the "depths" becausethey depend upon an incorporation of objects for their satisfaction. The drives of sexuality belong to the "surface" becausethey repeat a seriesof imagesthat provide a substitutive satisfaction. 1.3

The sexual surfaces and the images that populate them should not be

confused with the faculty of the imagination and the imagesthat are encounteredin consciousness.The images in the conscious imagination reproduce imagesthat were by the senses.At this primitive level, the partial zones do not have any perceived perceptual conception of complete objects that act as an aim of desire. It has often been thought that the infant imagines a picture of the mother's breast when sucking imagination This thumb. treats the partial object as if it were a its conception of is different For A than whole a real object. partial object radically whole object. from the whole and act as wholes of a that there are subtractable are parts objects is Deleuze However, to not part of a whole: a partial object according part. "Whatever the reality in which the virtual object is incorporated, it does not become integrated: it remains planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object the half which completes it, but rather testifies to the other virtual half which the real kinds better 10 1] If [DR lack. " to of of what understanding to a gain are we continues better be it to think of them as then images partial or virtual objects represent, would The to and refer actions partial objects movement-memories. or ages movement-ffn be best images. The this can that of example forms visual up make outlines and not beings: human Freud the perceptionsof other found in an early work of concerning

61 Then the perceptual complexes

proceeding from this fellow human-beingwill

in part be new and non-comparable-h isfeatures, for instance, in the visual sphere; but other visual perceptions--e. g. those of the movements of his hands-will

coincide in the subject with memories of quite similar visual

impressionsof his own, of his own body, memories which are associatedwith memories of movements experiencedby himself. [I Freud 331]

It must be kept in mind that, at this stage,the infant has no conception of a whole other person. The locus of the other person is, instead, made up of memories of actions such as feeding, or bathing, or cleaning, or stroking, any of the actions that the infant undergoes without understanding their source. The source of misunderstanding about partial objects is our own retrospective projection of our current mode of perception back upon the infant. When we, as adults, think of satisfying objects we think of body parts that act in the erotic imagination. The infant, however, has little understanding of objects and afar greater intuition of actions. When he sucks his thumb, it is not the breast as an object he recalls; but rather, the action that brought satisfaction in the past. It is quite natural that the first form of memory that the infant develops is a habit-memory. The survival of the child depends more on being able to repeat actions than it does on recognizing objects. This also follows from the scientific discovery that the first year of life is mostly devoted to coordinating movements and forming habits. 1.4

Habits give birth to a series of pleasureseach connectedto a partial zone that

is homogeneouswith itself Of the three major zones (anal, oral, urethral) eachhas its is, has image That that each an of action and contraction. succession of own rhythm because its And each zone pursues own conditions its synthesis of pleasures.

62 synthesis there is no global senseof duration. If we are to conceptualize the time specific to partial objects and their synthesiswe must look for it in dreams. Deleuze tells us that in dreams we return to that stateof fragmentary consciousness:

The persons we dream of lose their total character and are treated as partial objects, either becausea part of them is isolated by our dream or becausethey function altogether as such objects. Now this was precisely what the worldly raw material offered us: the possibility of isolating, as in a frivolous dream, a in in the the movement of shoulders one person and a movement of neck from but in to totalize them, to them another. partition one another, not order [PS 150-151]

In dreams we are no longer confronted with whole-persons but only those fragmentary movementsthat are combined in them. This is becausedreaming is a in the person partitions to each zone which of sexuality state primitive a regression do have does the interest. What to its this into dream with zones of of whom we is distorted. It is duration eliminated, dreams In completely not of sense our series? is This fragmented. it future: into the past and but rather it does not extend remains its based duration its determines own rhythm of on because each zone own durations, is dreams in and What conflicting of chaos a we encounter contraction. is is It there that time. an not do to of passage coherent that a up not add rhythms This but dreams, confused in order. of sense a confused rather absenceof presence Other. known the the as due is the object to whole of absence sense of passage Other: ideas to the function of transition of object and Deleuze gives the

63 The first effect of Others is that around each object that I perceive or each idea that I think there is an organization of a marginal world, a mantle or background, where other objects and other ideas may come forth in accordance with laws of transition which regulate the passagefrom one to another. [LS 305]

In dreams we experiencethe synthesisof time that we call thepresent but without the senseof transition of passagefrom one moment to the next that we experience in waking. The difference betweenthesetwo experiencesof the presentcan be found in the integrations of the partial zones. In dreams we experience only the local integrations of larval egos or partial zones that determine a living present.According to Deleuze this is the form of time that we fmd in the Id: "The Id is populated by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of the living present there where the binding integrations are carried out." [DR 97] fn the Id there is an instead, from they all subsist to the eternal present without passage one present next; in a complicated state of co-presence. It is only with the global integration of be that recognized and the present takes on a senseof sexuality whole persons can Deleuze According from this global to the to next. one moment succession integration is carried out by the active and unified ego: "The passive egos were integrations, local the but integrations, say; whereas as mathematicians only already between difference [DR 98] The integration. " the is at global active self an attempt is the that the passive egos are wholly auto-erotic and one active and passive egos have no aim outside themselves,whereasthe active ego takes the Other asthe aim of its desires.

64 1.5

The final stage of the pre-genital series and the first stage of the following

seriescomes with the coordination activity of the phallus. The function of the phallus at this stage is to bring all the competing instincts and the imagesthey form into one integration Deleuze this the line of the surface: "This line, coordinated surface. calls emanating from the genital zone, is the line which ties together all the erogenous zones, thus ensuring their connection or 'interfacing' (doublure), and bringing all the into body the together the one and same partial surfaces surfaceon of the child. " [LS 20 1] The phallus, in this case, is not just another partial object among others; rather, it is the unity of the whole series of virtual objects. The question now arises: how does the phallus unify the series of virtual objects? Deleuze gives the following it (such is "He that to the the to this concept of phallus extension able give answer: because the the the comprises concept effectively objects) all virtual subsumes being itself its to testifying to past, as own absenceand preceding characteristics: being lost, found itself, being in displaced to possessedof only as relation essentially 103] [DR double... " in its identity loses identity the fragmentary which an always is "lost" is the that the The short answer to this question phallus character of the Genital by and sexuality pre-genital sexuality represses repression. explained " Freud "object-choice. by is the sexuality of narcissismof auto-eroticism suppressed summarizesthis process:

finds it been hitherto has a instinct The sexual predominantly auto-erotic; now from derived been hitherto has separate Its of a number activity sexual object. have independently of one another, instincts and erotogenic zones, which, however, Now, their a sexual aim. sole as pleasure of sort pursued a certain it, instincts to the attain combine component all and appears, aim new sexual

65 while the erotogenic zones become subordinatedto the primacy of the genital zone. [7Freud 1271

If the phallus is split into two parts, as Deleuze claims, is it becausethe new found genital sexuality does two things: a) it determines a choice of a real object as a new aim of sexuality and b) it repressesthe narcissisticauto-erotic drives. The auto-erotic drives, from the side of post-pubescent sexuality, appear as a "paradise lost" of complete unity before the repression of the phallus. Of course this is a retrospective is the there phallus: no real primordial unity, only the appearanceof one effect of from the side of separation. Deleuze comparesthis illusion of lost unity to the unity is Good Platonism: "... the reachedonly as the object of a reminiscence,uncovered of it is have, it does One to the superior since what not gives only essentially veiled; as it flees idea, 'it Plato into its heights; it the or said of and as what gives, withdrawn by determined is Thus, 191-192] the ...... [LS the a past unity of perishes for has The the this consequence transcendent unity of withdrawal and repression. that is dramatic: we time passes the a present time given are we same at of synthesis found is, That the genital that new past. never was a past are also given pure becomes libido to be the a "global attached to the and activated ego" sexuality allows however, the time the "real" in prerepressed the same at world; series of objects lost. that was the unity takes a past of appearance on genital series 1.6

fmal in-itself is "It the time the ground of as Deleuze saysof the pure past, of

how the just have We the 82] of [DR " effect causes phallus seen time. the passageof how the Now this causes same phallus see will we that present. was never past a pure invests "active have that the The ego" activates seen, we as to phallus, present pass. in "samples" in the This tum extemal world a series ego in real objects in the world.

66 of cathexes according to Freud: "The ego periodically sendsout small amounts of cathexes into the perceptual system, by means of which it samples the external stimuli; and then after every such tentative advance it draws back again." [I I Freud 44 1] However, the ego is never a complete agency unto itself It operatesin a field of tension between the Id and the super-ego. The passageof time is dependentupon a passageof cycles of judgment. This "judgment" should not be thought of as the judgments conscious we make through language. Thesejudgments operate on the level of desire between Eros and Thanatos.In Freud's paper on negation he describes this polarity of judgment: "The polarity of judgment appearsto correspond to the opposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation - as a substitute for uniting - belongs to Eros; negation the successor to expulsion - belongs to the instinct of destruction." [I I Freud 441] The Id acts as an attractor of objects; it was separatedfrom the ego by the repressionof the pre-genital The Super-ego Eros. the acts as a repulser of sexuality and now acts as source of from id. it is In each that the the the separated ego objects; agency of repression its investment it has "active the the either reactswith objects of ego" with encounter the desire to draw that object in or it reacts by repulsing that object away. In either judgment forms the (of to the the as a preconscious past) pure repressedseries case desirability of that object. In this way the passing present slides acrossthe repressed in is When an object recognized, as we say our everyday series of the pure past. language, there is a resonance between the repressed series of the past and the it is Freud As is Eros. in This the says, effect of passing series of objects perception. However, brief for the to time moment. a seems stop a positive judgment, and in investment libidinal itself that the and withdraw reassert superego will always indicative Several this to the of phenomena are pass. present object allowing

67 veritable speedof time's passage:lovers experiencethe seeming slownessof time as it actually passesquickly in romantic situations, and those who are bored experience the drawing out of duration that seemsto prolong in waiting for somethingto happen. We will take up this distinction between resonance and forced movement later in another section. 1.1 The virtual object is

1.3 The "partial" objects are

1.5 The "repressed" pre-genital

attached to the self-preservative

movement-imagesthat have no

series becomesthe pure past at

drive by "auto-eroticism. " This

form. This is the basis of habit-

the same time that the phallus

replaces an imaginary

memory.

causesthe ego to relate to whole

satisfaction for a "real"

objects that make the present

satisfaction.

pass.

1.2 When a "zone" exceedsa

1.4 Each zone has its own

1.6 The "active" ego now

certain intensity it becomes

duration. We experiencethis in

samples the external world.

"auto-erotic. " This splits the

dreams. The coherenceof

Attraction and repulsion are

aim of the zone between surface

is passage due to the "whole"

determined by the pre-genital

images and objects of the

object.

drives. The speedof passageis

depths.

thus determined.

b) The conjunctive series.

2.1

Freud tells us that object-choice takes place in two waves or two series:

It may be regarded as typical of the choice of an object that the process is diphasic, that is, that it occurs in two waves. The first of thesebegins between halt by latency is five, brought the to to two a or a retreat the ages of and and by infantile The is it the the nature of sexual aims. characterized period;

68 second wave sets in with puberty and determinesthe final outcome of sexual life. [7Freud 119]

These two seriesare separatedby a period of time called "latency" which is a period of extreme repression.The repressedperiod allows the first seriesto be pushed back into time; in fact, into a time before memory. The first seriesis subject to what Freud infantile calls amnesia. The effect of this is that the first series, of pre-genital is sexuality, completely wiped out of memory at the sametime it becomesthe basis for memory. However, we should not think that the first series is completely destroyed: instead it is partially sublimated. According to Freud: "The resultantsof infantile object-choice are carried over into the later period. They either persist as such or are revived at the actual time of puberty. But as a consequenceof the " between has developed two they the prove unutilizable. phases repression which [7Freud 119] Under the influence of the phallus the pre-genital seriesis carried over into the second series in puberty and transformed into an Oedipal phantasy.This is from is based Oedipal Deleuze the tells us that upon a repressedseries series why into Oedipal "Moreover, its images: these this it series enter or extracts which them, images to the and the correspond which with series, pregenital with relation [LS 226] " images these were extracted. even with groups and persons wherefrom fixation. The is This process, whereby one series resonates with another, called by is a previous predetermined the object-choice external as an mother choice of We formation the the that should not confuse ego. of internal object-choice predates to "internal" an between the a resemblance with object-choice the relationship in image is that internal the The an sense an not object 44 external" object-choice.

69 external object is an image. Rather, according to Freud, the pre-genital series is an intensity that becomes attached to the caregiver:

A child's intercourse with anyone responsible for his care affords him an unending source of sexual excitation and satisfaction from his erotogenic zones. [ ... ]A mother would probably be horrified if she were made aware that her marks of affection were rousing her child's sexual instinct and preparing for its later intensity. [7Freud 145-146]

Of course no one remembers the pre-genital excitation that took place during caregiving but the intensity of that first seriesbecomesthe basis for the resonanteffect that appearsin the second series.The attachmentto the mother in the Oedipal series is foreshadowed by the intensity experienced in the pre-genital series. 2.2

The conjunctive synthesisis different from the previous connective synthesis

insofar as the conjunctive synthesisis the connection between divergent series that between Freud by infantile makes a strong connection amnesia. are separated hysterical amnesiathat is associatedwith trauma and infantile amnesiathat effects us all:

Hysterical amnesia, which occurs at the bidding of repression, is only in is fact by that the the subject already possessionof a store of explicable disposal, from been have and conscious withdrawn which memory-traces link, the by to themselves material attracting an associative which are now, It in from forces consciousness. repelling the are engaged of repression which

70 may be said that without infantile amnesia there would be no hysterical amnesia. [7Freud 91]

Here we see Freud approaching the repressed memories as a store of traces in the unconsciousthat both attract the present seriesof conscious ideasand repel them by the forces of repression. The trauma of hysterical amnesia is not a special case of infantile amnesiabut only a casewhere the tension betweenthe intensity of

attraction

is stronger than the counter-force of repression. Hysterical amnesia gives the appearanceof some "event" that happened in the past that cannot be made present through recall. However, as we have discovered,the previous seriesof excitationsdo have the structure that can be called an "event." The pre-genital series only not contains excitations of zones. Freud tells us that the excitations in one of thesepregenital zones is responsible for the effect of deferred action: "Deferred action of this kind occurs as well in connection with memories of excitations of the abandoned sexual zones." [lFreud 269] He stressesthe word "abandoned" because these be into translated post-genital sexuality and are therefore excitations cannot is faced hysterical "event" Instead the person of a memory of a previous repressed. follows: defines " Freud "screen screen-memoryas memory. with a

One is thus forced by various considerationsto suspectthat in the so-called but the a genuine memory-trace earliest childhood memories we possessnot later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the 28 influences of a variety of later psychical forceS.

71 There has been a lot of confusion about the notion of deferred action in Freud. This is because Freud held two different views on this phenomenon. The first was that hysterical amnesia was caused by an actual scene of seduction in childhood. However, he later gave up this idea of actual traumatic events for the theory of the psychical reality of traumatic fantasies.In the following passagefrom a letter Freud explains why he gave up the theory of actual traumatic seductions:

Then came surprise at the fact that in every casethe father, not excluding my own, had to be blamed as a pervert-the

realization of the unexpected

frequency of hysteria, in which the same determinant is invariably established, though such a widespread extent of perversity towards children is, after all, not very probable. [I Freud 259]

This admission makes the proposition that the "cure" for hysterical amnesia is to is first If the there remember no event then the "event" itself must repressedevent. first in be in the series or the second series;but rather, it must take place not either between them. 2.3

For Deleuze the comprehension of the event is the effect of resonanceitself.

"In our terminology, it is therefore not a question of events properly speaking,but disengaged is images, Event independent the two only whereby series of rather of through resonance of the series in the phantasm." [LS 226] It is the difference in kind between these two types of imagesthat determines the resonancebetween the differently for for infant the than the Freud that tells stored are memories us series. 29 infantile , the type "Visual preserves of memory. memory accordingly adult mind: but "visual" also the memories of sensation and Not only are memories stored,

72 intensities. As such, these images must remain unconscious becausethey lack the criteria that would allow them to become conscious. According to Deleuze, "sexuality does not have the conditions which would render possible its being maintained in consciousness(namely, the possibility of being denoted, manifested, and signified by linguistic elements corresponding to it). " [LS 244] In short, the infant's mind stores only qualitative memories, and because it does not have a language, these memories do not carry over to the second series.The difference is one of organization of memory. Deleuze tells us that verbal representationsbelong to the incorporeal surface effects, and object representationsbelong to the sexualdepths of bodies: "Verbal representation must be carefully distinguished from 'object representation,' becauseit concernsan incorporeal event and not a body, an action, a passion,or a quality of bodies." [LS 245] If there is a repressionof infantile imagesit is becauseit is incompatible with the linguistic structures of consciousness.But this difference is also the means by which the two series resonate. If recollection of in the adult series is determined by designation, signification, and memory manifestation, then the repressedinfantile series must act as a generalized "sense" that pervades language as an allusion. The attempt of the conscious mind is to language its "sense" that can maintain pragmatic as much as possible so neutralize (rather than poetic) uses.Deleuze indicatesthis in the following quote:

This is why when another surface is developed with different effects which at last found denotations, manifestations,and significations as ordered linguistic like phonemes,morphemes,and semantemesseemto turn up units, elements lose but This their to this sexual resonance. sexual seem plane, new on basic the series are swept aside resonance is repressedor neutralized, while

73 by the new series of amplitude. Sexuality exists only as an allusion, as vapor or dust, showing a path along which language has passed, but which it continues to jolt and to erase like so many extremely disturbing childhood memories. [LS 242]

With regard to the last part of the above quote, the disturbing childhood memories, Freud has mapped out disturbancesof languagein his book The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. This work exposes the resonance of pre-genital sexuality in the everyday slips of the tongue. The fact is that these phenomenaare not accidental; rather, they reveal the strange "emotions" that some people feel when uttering a phrase that is not explainable by the content of the sentence.Deleuze's book, The Logic of Sense, is primarily about the effect of languageknown as sensethat is not reducible to the meaning of words. "Sense" is the effect of resonanceof the repressed depths of pre-genital sexuality upon the surface effect of language.In an extreme form of this phenomena, known as "hysteria", the person in question undergoesa is "memory" date back that to to early childhood. In this case revival of a supposed the "memory" in question is activated by a linguistic and propositional structure that into "object to translate qualitative representations" a narrative structure of attempts between The "event" is in the two the translation question a product of an event. fonns of representation. What the hysterical person understandsis not a distorted form of an original event, but the linguistic and narrative reconstruction of a is Freud An This example of calls a screen-memory. what qualitative object-memory. in in Proust found be the the the episode madeleine: work of of can a screen-memory "Undoubtedly what is fluttering this way deep inside me must be the image, the 30 is Even follow is this taste to trying to and me attached visual memory which .,,

74 Proust recognizes that "visual memory" or the qualitative essence of things is stored deep in the unconscious and repressed regions of the psyche. This is why reactivation of involuntary memory always follows from an association of "qualitative" images rather than associations of linguistic units that appeal to the faculty of the intellect.

The qualitative image only becomesa screen-memorywhen it becomes attachedto a name: Combray. It is this screen-memory of Combray that Deleuze calls the pure past:

Combray as it is in itseýf, as a fragment of the pure past, in its double irreducibility to the present that it has been (perception) and to the present present in which it might reappear or be reconstituted (voluntary memory). This Combray in itself is defmed by its own essential difference, that 4qualitative difference' which, according to Proust, does not exist 'on the surface of the earth', but only at a particular depth. [DR 122]

It is here that Deleuze makes it clear that the form of screen-memorywhich we have been examining is not the recollection of a real event (a past perception or a recalled difference "objectis (the it but pre-genital a qualitative event) rather, by in depth the repressedseriesof the that constituted only subsists representation') infantile memories. 2.4

Of the screen-memories,or phantasmsas Deleuze calls thern, none are more

half The Oedipal In life the in the than the the of second series. psyche of evident Logic of SenseDeleuze makes great use of the Oedipus complex as a seriesthat is between first draws He the series of prea comparison typical of the phantasm. Oedipus Oedipal "... these the the complex: of series pubescent genital sexuality and

75 series enter into relation with the pregenital series,with the imageswhich correspond to them, and even with groups and personswherefrom these imagesare extracted." [LS 226] The question arises: how are the pre-genital series converted into the phantasms of the Oedipal series? We have seen that the pre-genital series comes under repression by the institution of language, but what is the source of this language? For Deleuze, language is inspired by the "voice from above." To put it simply, the infant experiencesthe voices around him as a voice from above that is pre-signi

ng. Deleuze equatesthe voice with the formation of the superegoin the

following quote:

Freud himself stressedthe acoustic origin of the superego.For the child, the first approach to language consists in grasping it as the model of that which preexists, as referring to the entire domain of what is already there, and to the familial voice which conveys tradition, it affects the child as a bearer of a name and demands his insertion even before the child begins to understand. [LS 193]

The child does not understandthe significance of the voices of adults that it hearsbut it understands the scolding nature and rewarding nature of the voice. It is this is infant. It leaves hating loving this the that on a mark and voice opposition of "mark" that inspires the repression of "object representations" in favor of verbal in infantile is But the the that this, than experienced voice more representations. "mother" into the the the the is and as phantasms of adult series translated series "father" in the Oedipal series. In this case the "father" image resonates with the from image loving "mother" from the the voice with above, and scolding voice

76 above. The two images form the component parts of the superego:the part that one identifies with as an "ego-ideal" and the part that forbids that constitutesthe proper form of the superego.The ego-ideal attracts the drives of the depthsby prompting the image of a healed and unified surface in which the destructive drives of the depths are neutralized. However, in order to bring about this unification the superegomust fragment the that the surface. It is at this point that the repress pre-genital zones illusion of narcissism that we examined above comes into play. The "phallus" becomes the privileged object that the phantasms of the Oedipal series revolve around. The phallus becomes the ideal of re-unification: it seeks to make the transcendentunity of the ego-ideal immanent and the fragmentedseriesof pre-genital zones unified. Deleuze addressesthis problem of the phallus:

And when it deten-ninesparental images, it is again by dissociating its own distributing by the them alternating supply which as alternatives aspects, terms of the Oedipal series, and by arranging them around the image of the father (withdrawn image healed), be the (wounded the to of and and mother be left the Only then be the of agent as to would phallus present). made and in involved it itself is that gets convergence and coordination; the problem Oedipal dissociations. [LS 227]

in involved Oedipus an ongoing The phantasms of the complex are already by is the this In represented the phantasm Castration complex. pre-genital series its is feces. This the breast gets the phallus where of the excretion or withdrawal of both being lack, and both absent and present being a and presence a qualities of because, do its It this as the place. can to shifting from without other one series going

77 a representative of the primary narcissismof the child it subsistsin the pure past that has its unity by its transcendent and withdrawn nature, and as a problem in the present Oedipal series it can represent the lack the child feels in relation to the parental images. 2.5

The whole problem with the second series of resonance is that it is an

incomplete sublimation of the pre-genital drives. It creates a traurnatism in the phantasm becausethe "comprehension" of the seriesremains incomplete. There are two things dangerously wrong with the second synthesis of time: a) it sets up a feeling of nostalgia for a lost unity that never existed and b) it sealsoff the psyche in a repeating loop that prevents any progress being made (a repetition of the same). According to Deleuze the whole "intermediary" surface of sexuality is complicated failures of comprehension: with symptoms and

Melanie Klein remarks that between symptoms and sublimations there must be an intermediary series corresponding to cases of less successful is 'less in its But the a successful' own right, whole of sexuality, sublimation. depth between intermediary it is the and symptoms of corporeal sublimation: it is intermediary in incorporeal this the state the sublimations of surface; and [LS 224] intermediary its in surface. organized serieson own

force his Eros in the disparages Deleuze of resonance is as This why work. sexuality in Oedipus failures by is beset the typified time complex. in the second synthesisof The is failed the the event. vision of sexual surface a For Deleuze the phantasm of later. This time that belongs third to the we will examine of synthesis ý16 pure event" difference" is "of brings that a repetition about a repetition third synthesis of time

78 and is progressive and creative in its productions. This must be contrasted with the repetition of Eros and sexuality that repeats the "same" and entraps the thinker in repetitive games of guilt and castration. Deleuze's contempt for this form of thought about sexuality can be seenin the following passage:

The risk is obviously that the phantasmfalls back on the poorestthought, on a puerile and redundant diurnal reverie 'about' sexuality, each time that it its misses mark and falls short, that is, each time it falls back in the 'inbetween' of the two surfaces.[LS 220]

It is true that Deleuze is already anti-Oedipal in The Logic of Sense.However, he does affwm the Oedipal and the second synthesisof time of which it is a part to be a stage in transition to the third synthesisof time. The remarkable accomplishmentin this work is that Deleuze has succeeded in overturning the common assumptions is is, idea Oedipus "nuclear Freudianism: that the that the complex" complex a about that lies at the heart of each person. Instead Deleuze shows how it is an effect of the divergent the series of the pre-genital and pubescent sexualities. resonance of Further, he shows how the cure for this "neurosis" does not consist in remembering the but to radical of synthesis a new progressing rather, event; some original in discover time. third the "desexualization" that of synthesis we will sublimation of Whereas the Freudian project was to stop repetition through remembering, the Deleuzian project is to extend repetition beyond remembering:

We are not, therefore, healed by simple anamnesis,any more than we are little. for becoming Here by ill counts conscious elsewhere, as amnesia. made

79 [... ] If repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchainsand destroysus, it frees in its both 'demonic' testifying to also us, cases power. All cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetition. [DR 19]

In essence,Deleuze departs from Freud in his re-evaluation of the Death instinct as a repetition compulsion. Whereas Freud only saw it as a problematic condition it from Deleuze to the attached neurosis, sees as a possible means of escape fixations. regressiverepetitions of neurotic and erotic 2.6

Deleuze names transference as the mechanismby which one is set free from

the Oedipus complex: "The more theatrical and dramatic operation by which healing is Now has does transference transference. takes place - or a name: not take place Deleuze [DR 19] In " this to sentence a note still repetition: above all repetition.

interested "Those Rank: Ferenczi most are who and recommends the work of in it libratory aspect of repetition as appears profoundly upon the therapeutic and 307] " [DR Rank... Ferenczi transference were and

In their short work, The

Development of Psychoanalysis, they set out to explain the technique of but the patient the of a weaning of patient, of psychoanalysis,not as an education In their libidinal her his words: from own attachments. or away

does however, intervention, in not consist the analytical The essential thing in Complex', the 'Oedipus repetition simple the or in the of verification either free in but in the to setting the rather analyst, Oedipus relation situation of the 31 first its fixation its from libido infantile objects. on the detachment of and

80 Essentially, in the analytic practice the patient becomesattachedto the analyst. This process is called "positive transference." In this phase the neurotic will repeat his Oedipal fantasies in the therapeutic session.In these sessionsthe psychoanalystwill have, projected onto him, all the libidinal and erotic attachmentsthat the neurotic patient has not resolved. Here is the crucial role of the analyst: not to interpret or confirm the neurotic'sfantasies, but to disappoint them.There comesa point in every love the the patient feels for the analyst turns to hate: this is "negative analysis when transference." The difference between positive and negative transference is the difference between Eros and the Death Instinct. One seeksresonancesbetween the analyst and libidinal attachments in the pre-genital series. The other breaks with libidinal attachments,and the result is that, for the first time, the patient comprehends the "truth" of his attachment to the analyst. He was just replaying a pattern of a demand for love from his own internal Other, his own superego,that could never be satisfied in reality. Ferenczi and Rank explain this in the following quote:

For this phasethe problem is to get the patient, with the help of the love for the analyst, to give up this love. [ ... ] After the patient has become convinced that he cannot obtain the love of the analyst in reality-and that such is the last in he the phase of the cure-he very only admits case

recognizes,

demands fulfilling impossibility the the of consciously as well as emotionally, life himself libido things the infantile his which other with and contents of from itself frees libido, it haste the is the It as with what remarkable offers. in life. We interests the see processof sublimation which new out cure, seeks in ordinary life requires years of education, take place before our eyes in time... the the the shortest space of cure of towards end

32

81

Before one can give up one's Oedipus complex one must first regressto the first series; that is, to set up a resonancebetween the pre-genital series and the present series of transference. This is why the second series of time, the pure past, is an important step in the path to progressive repetition. In the work of Proust, the hero must fall in love with Albertine, re-play all the games of deception and separations, and then resolve himself to finally break with Albertine. In Proust's work we seethe whole series of positive and negative transferenceat work in the opposition of love and jealousy. It is only at the moment that the Oedipal seriesof resonanceis broken in The Search that the hero fmds his libidinal energiesfree to createthe work of art. But before the final break, the hero must pass into the pure past, and examine the it that resonances produces and experience the pain of unfulfilled wishes. Deleuze bottom "remembering" Freud's theory to the of as a voyage of repetition, reinterprets it is Deleuze For bringing to the to the past a crisis point. erotic connection and of living directly into to install the to connection make a pure past oneself necessary

disappointment frustration full that this resonance the to and range of and experience causes:

Freud noted from the beginning that in order to stop repeating it was not in form (without in to the a concept affect), nor abstract enough to remember it its in the repressedevent all particularity: was general, nor even to represent install it to there the oneself to was, where memory out seek necessary directly in the past in order to accomplish a living connection between the blockage. [DR 18the the knowledge and the resistance, representationand

19]

82

This installing oneself directly in the past that Deleuze recommends is identical to what Proust called involuntary memory and Ferenczi and Rank called positive transference. Deleuze tells us that this movement into the past in itself is only the initial movement of a pendular structure: "It has a pendular structure: the basic series traversed by the movement of the object = x, the resonance, and the forced movement of an amplitude greater than the initial movement." [LS 239] In short, the second synthesis of time and the resonance of its initial movement, is only the forced to the precursor movement of the third synthesisof time.

2.1 The intensities of the

2.3 The "comprehension" of the

2.5 The Oedipus complex is a

repressedpre-genital series

event is an effect of qualitative

"less successfulsublimation"

resonate with the post-genital

excitations from one series

that is only an effect of

series. This is how two

being "translated" into verbal

resonanceand not a "nucleus."

divergent series are conjoined.

representationsin another

The way beyond Oedipus is not

series. The qualitative series is

remembering but

the "sense" of language.

"desexualization."

2.2 "Traumatic" events are not

2.4 The parental images in the

2.6 The way beyond Oedipus is

real events but rather a result of

Oedipus complex are extracted

into "erotic" the regression an

the translation of repressed

from the "voice from above."

by followed a "crisis" pure past

fantasy into called a excitations

These two images form the two

that breaks with the erotic

44screen memory."

functions of the phallus:

is This the of past. synthesis

presenceand lack.

called "transference."

83 c) The disjunctive series.

3.1

Whereas the series of resonance between the partial zones and the sexual

surface was a less successfulsublimation, theforced movementbetweenthe original depths and the metaphysical surface is described by Deleuze as being

more extreme:

"But the forced movement which represents desexualization is Thanatos and ýcompulsion'; it operates between the two extremes of the original depth and the metaphysical surface,the destructive cannibalistic drives of depth and the speculative death instinct." [LS 239] Both Freud and Deleuze call this new amplitude or range between series"sublimation. " The first major difference betweensublimation and the Oedipus complex is that the Oedipus complex represses unutilizable pre-genital in this the amnesia and resonance of that series. zones, and repression results According to Freud, in sublimation the pre-genital zones are no longer repressed,or least longer at no useless:

We know of a far more expedient process of development, called 'sublimation', in which the energy of the infantile wishful impulses is not cut impulses for the but various use-the unserviceableaim of off remains ready " being replaced by one that is higher, and perhapsno longer sexual.

Resonancewas caused by the screen-memoriesthat were investedwith the energyof into desexualized that turned Now those energy and zones are the pre-genital zone. describes Deleuze this for greater thought. as movement be new creative used can directly impeded Oedipal because the wishes series of than that of resonance

84 intellectual capacity. According to Freud, this impediment to thought is brought about by the great libidinal energy that is absorbed in maintaining a fixation:

A certain psychical inertia, a sluggishnessof the libido, which is unwilling to abandon its fixations, cannot be welcome to us; the patient's capacity for sublimating his instincts plays a large part and so does his capacity for rising above the crude life of the instincts; so, too, does the relative power of his 34

intellectual functions.

But what are these intellectual functions that Freud is speaking of? When Freud is speaking of sublimation and its intellectual functions he seemsto be referring to particularly creative endeavorsof the mind and not to the mundanetasksof thought. It is in the creative aspect of thought that we see the functional necessity for a transition from fixation to creation. Becausethe fixations of the Oedipus complex imaginative the to the capacity of the mind conflicts, psyche great eventually expose Because in in be the to these conflicts a way. solve creative expanded order must it in "reality" to the recreate,or counter-actualize, seeks conflict solve psyche cannot it is Freud, intellectual According image the in to the real world one. of an an leads frustrations to the that the psyche to conflicts of psychical avoid attempt

sublimate:

The task here is that of shifting the instinctual aims in such a way that they In from frustration this, the external world. cannot come up against if its One lends instincts the can the one gains most assistance. of sublimation from the heighten the and sources psychical pleasure of of yield sufficiently

85 intellectual work. When that is so, fate can do little againstone. A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist's joy in creating, in giving his phantasiesbody, or a scientist's in solving problems or discovering truths...

35

What the artist essentially does is to take the conflicting drives that we discovered in the pre-genital series and re-organize them so that they can be translated into linguistic or expressivephenomena in literature or art. Becauseof this translation of pre-genital sexuality, the aims that were incompatible with consciousnessnow enter in desexualized form. In this way, the polymorphous-perverse consciousness a by disguised finds the mask expression,although phenomena of repressedsexuality format. in If language, to these the express appear of sublimation works artistic of into it is because Freud, they translate to new phantasies new truths, according realities:

he because from is turns cannot An artist reality away originally a man who

first it instinctual at the which satisfaction terms to of renunciation with come life in full the his play demands, and who allows erotic and ambitious wishes from however, this back his finds of to world He reality, way of phantasy. into his truths of to by phantasies mould gifts of special phantasy making use by reality. of kind, reflections precious as men valued which are a new [I I Freud 41-42]

" In this "counter-actualization. this Deleuze Sense process calls In The Logic of describes Deleuze the body depths as the in what the of the actions process life in instincts themselves selfthat as manifest destructive and cannibalistic

86 destructive behavior

is literary form, given in which the person who a or artistic -

undergoes the destructive events is depersonalized, as if it being was acted out on a stage as a representation of the event. According to Deleuze, action takes place on two stages;one in which it is undergone in reality, and the other where it is mimed by the sublimated and artistic representation of the event: "... to be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actualization with a counter-actualization, the identification with distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization." [LS 161] We can see in this quote from Deleuze the sameprocessthat Freud talked about when he spoke of turning "phantasies into truths of a new kind" through the activity of sublimation. 3.2

Does sublimation go far enough? In the work of Freud it seems as if

sublimation only goes as far as making the end of the Oedipus complex possible.

Freud's ideal for the termination of treatment is to turn the conflicts of sexual investment in an Oedipal complex into a sort of "affection" for the parents that is only partially sublimated:

The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated (a thing which happens with

every

transformation into an identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and into impulses [7Freud 319] of affection. changed

Freud's plan for the dissolution of the Oedipus complex involves a transformation from the child's fear of castration to an identification with the parental figure that is known is is This identification It the threat. the as what with aggressor. carries out

87 also the internalization of the prohibition; this means that repression is partially released from direct suppressionof the instincts and the prohibition is internalized in the form of a superego.This is a compromise. The aggressionthat was turned against the child in the form of a threat can now, becauseof identification with the aggressor, be turned outwards towards an instinct ofmastery. The child who has undergonethis form of sublimation now feels compelled to turn the repressiveaggressionoutwards into constructive projects. While it is true that the libidinal energy that was used to repress the child is now turned towards productive ends, it still "compromises" with the Oedipus complex and carries it out in another form. The ideal for dissolution of the Oedipus complex is the drive to become a father of one's own children and repeat the cycle of repression on a new generation. So, the conflict with the father is turned into an affection and identification with the father so that the same pattern can be repeated in a new cycle. Freud favors sublimation because it is socially useful: it drive through the the to createnew structuresand guarantees continuation of culture to passdown values to new generations.It representsthe value that the superegohas for the maintenance of culture over the hedonistic impulses of the pre-genital instincts. But there is a problem with Freud's argument. The structures of the built are upon the perversions of the pre-genital series and are a superego foundation built In them. of vice upon a short, our virtues are continuation of disposition "The Freud: to of childhood can multifariously perverse sexual according in far through be the as number of our virtues, so of a source as regarded accordingly [7Freud divides " 164] Freud it their arbitrarily virtues. reaction-formation stimulates he For by the from their usefulness. example, shows social perversions sublimations derived: "Thus, from thrift thrift are obstinacy, and ambition which sublimated vices is from of anal eroticism, ambition exploitation while an arise orderliness and

88 determined by strong urethral-erotic disposition." [7Freud 164] Further, Freud tells us that sublimation is, "employed for effectively holding in check perverse impulses which have been recognized as being unutilizable." [7Freud 164] The only difference between perversion and sublimation is the social usefulnessof the outcome. Perhaps perversion is the truth of sublimation and not its opposite. For Deleuze perversion is the natural extension of sublitnation. All thought is based on a prior perversion that mo iva es it. 3.3

In place of simple sublimation Deleuze proposes the more radical

Deleuze desexualization tells that that the clesexualization of perversion. us inspire sublimations provide the ego with only two alternatives:

Desexualization has two possible effects on the workings of the pleasure disturbances functional introduces the it affect which principle: either instincts it the application of the principle, or else promotes a sublimation of kind. different in favor is of gratifications of a whereby pleasure transcended [CC 116]

in indulge their he Narcissism" "On In Freud's paper explains why some people "We can the take shameful: desireswithout any shamewhile others sameactivities as his he by himself in ideal actual has measures which the an up that set one man say has The 88] [I I Freud " ideal. formed who has person such the no other ego, while he himself' "better it through or to sublimation, and ideal submit can either such an ideal The depression. an projects sublimates who person and can suffer self-disgust is his it, Deleuze " actions of and each calls "metaphysical as surface, onto the is here But that ideal. the makes problem by this counter-actualized measured

89 Deleuze dissatisfied with this solution: the ego ideal that the superego sets up is completely subordinated to the repressive forces of society. This is why he asksthe following question:

Is there no other solution besidesthe functional disturbance of neurosisand the spiritual outlet of sublimation? Could there not be a third alternative which would be related not to the functional interdependenceof the ego and the superego,but to the structural split betweenthem? [CC 117]

This alternative that Deleuze seekswould disengagethe ego from a subordinationto the ego ideal that enslaves it and forces it into conformity. If we are to truly break fathers is Oedipal it the the cycle and not repeat mistakes of our necessaryto with delve into perversion. Perversion is defmed by "the splitting of the ego" as it is described by Freud and the same process that is called "the fracture in the I" by Deleuze. In order to understandwhy there is a splitting of the ego it is first necessary to replay the drama that initiated the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Freud describes the choice that the child has to make between following the Oedipus following in facing the quote: castration complex or

But doubt had that had he to far So women possesseda penis. no occasion his that his the recognition of castration, possibility acceptance of now both of obtaining ways of possible end an made castrated, were women loss both For Oedipus the them from of the of entailed complex. satisfaction feminine the one his penis - the masculine one as a resulting punishment and Oedipus love in field If the the the of of satisfaction precondition. as a

90 complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal cathexis of his parental objects. In this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: the child's ego tums away from the Oedipus complex. [7Freud 318]

The child that is enthralled in this drama is forced to choosebetween an instinctual demand and a threat that is perceived in reality. The choice is love or death:the child who sublimates chooseslife at the expenseof love (the instinctual demand). But the perverse individual changesthe rules of this drama. Freud presentsus with a case where the child takes both options:

It must now decide either to recognize the real danger, give way to it and renounce the instinctual satisfaction, or to disavow reality and make itself believe that there is no reason for fear, so that it may be able to retain the between demand instinct is Thus the the there and conflict of a satisfaction. the prohibition by reality. But in fact the child takes neither course, or rather he takes both simultaneously,which comes to the samething. [II Freud 46 1]

It is within this drama that the ego splits: one side is orientated towards reality and divided has instinct. Freud the options that the is the towards the other orientated dilemma in this take of castration: neurosis, psychosis, or perversion. psyche can Freud explains the distinction between neurosis and psychosis: "I arrived at the in between difference that the neurosis and psychosis was essential proposition that in id, the in the whereas a service of reality, suppressesa piece of the former the ego, induced by the id to detach itself from a piece of reality." be itself lets it psychosis

91 [7Freud 355] The neurotic follows the path of "reality" in which the ego is turned outwards towards the seriesof real events that fail to satisfy him. The psychotic, on the other hand, finds only hallucinations that arise from the instincts and blocks out reality. The pervert does both at the same time: he operates on two planes, one directed towards reality and the other towards the instincts. Freud

makesthis clear in

the following quote:

On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanismshe rejects reality and refuses to accept any prohibition; on the other hand, in the same breath he recognizes the danger of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as a pathological symptom and tries subsequentlyto divest himself of the fear. [I I Freud 461-462]

It is in perversion that Deleuze finds the ideal solution to his theory of the two ideal half does is What the the of ego sets up an plane of pervert simple: surfaces. thought where castration is disavowed and another half of the ego recognizes the half disavowed The constitutes the metaphysical surface of reality of castration. thought and the other half constitutesthe actions and passionsof bodies. The pervert Deleuze: disavowal. According by to from the to the process of other one moves "The famous mechanism of 'denegation' (that's not what I wanted... ), with all its importance with respect to the formation of thought, must be interpreted as 208] On " [LS from the to metaphysical the another. one surface passage expressing by it by "neutral" denied is any and not willed making the castration of action surface ideal "in by the is the ideal serves The which mother-image ego, replaced ego person. ideal 'ideal the of ego' as a narcissistic to produce even and reflect as a mirror

92 omnipotence... " [CC 129] In this idealization the traumatic drama of the castration complex is denied reality. At the sametime the other half of the ego recognizesthis same reality that is denied in the other. Deleuze tells us that this is possible because all action is divided in two by disavowal:

it takes the totality of every possible action and divides it into two, projects it on to two screens,as it determines each side according to the necessary exigencies of each screen. On one hand, the entire image of action is projected on a physical surface, where the action itself appearsas willed and is found determined in the forms of restoration and evocation; on the other, the entire result of the action is projected on a metaphysical surface, where the action itself appearsas produced and not willed, determined by the forms of murder and castration. [LS 207-208]

The split in the ego becomes the split between the superegoand the ego. Whereas before the ego was subordinated to the superego as a determining factor, with the in becomes internal is the the the that the representative of split ego superego world in direct contact with the archetypesin the Id. Freud recognizesthis dual relationship in the split between the ego and superego: "Whereas the ego is essentially the it in to the the super-ego stands contrast external world, of reality, representative of id. 376] We internal " [I I Freud that the the the shall see of of world, representative as this split is extremely important for Deleuze's theory of the "pure event." The world in for that time. Id pass all real events the archetypes contains of 3.4

Why does Deleuze associatethe "fractured P with the empty form of time?

into halves: is directed is two that towards the have one split As we ego seen, just

93 reality and the other towards the metaphysical surfaceof pure thought. Or, to

put it in

Freudian terms, one part of the ego has become "narcissistic" and the other is directed towards investment in objects. According to Deleuze the first becomesthe locus of the passive ego and the second as an activity of thought: "For while the passiveego becomes narcissistic,the activity must be thought. This can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that the narcissisticego passively experiences on its own account." [DR I 10] Let us be clear about our terminology. The "narcissistic" ego withdraws its attention away from objects in 66reality"in order to replace them by presentationsfrom the Id. The narcissisticpart of the ego concerns itself only with what Deleuze calls "pure thought," or the archetypical presentationsof the instincts. Let us be clear, the "narcissistic" aspectof the ego is only the attempt of the ego to take itselfas a loved object. Whereasobjects in the "real" world are subject to time, the ego-as-loved-objectis not subjectto time; rather it takes itself as a pure and empty form. According to Deleuze: "The narcissistic ego indeed appears in time, but does not constitute a temporal content: the narcissistic libido, the reflux of the libido into the ego, abstractsfrom all content." [DR I 10] As we saw above, when the ego splits there is a desexualizationof the libido; or, it ignores the reality of castration to set up, inside itself, a compensatory is direct libido into If the to the external world of phantasy. ego normally used objects, according to Freud, then the contrary movement representsa reversal of instinctual impulses:

By this getting hold of the libido from the object-cathexes,setting itself up as the sole love-object, and desexualizingor sublimating the libido of the id, the Eros in itself is to the the purposes of and opposition placing at working ego

94 impulses. has It instinctual in to the acquiesce some of service of opposing the other object-cathexesof the id; it has, so to speak,to participate in them. [I I Freud 386-387]

When Deleuze refers to the "death instinct" he is primarily referring to this process by which the ego replaces object-cathexesfor a cathexis of instinctual objects in the Id. When the ego turns away from external objects it focuses its attention towards have happened in These but that to the are not events ego pure events. question timeless events that seem to predate the ego. Consider the following statementby Deleuze:

Totem and Taboo is the great theory of the event, and psychoanalysisin be is that the the the not event should condition scienceof events, on general treated as something whose senseis to be sought and disentangled.The event is senseitself, insofar as it is disengagedor distinguished from the statesof 211] [LS it is in it actualized. affairs which produce and which

him, father kill in the the eat and The great theory of the totem meal, which children Freud However, in is a pure event that was never actualized states of affairs. by id in to for foundation the the appeal an to archetypes mistakenly continues seeka phylogenesis:

but, for inheritance; lost be first to when The experiences of the ego seem at in many been strength with sufficient and have enough often repeated they to themselves, transform they say, so in generations individuals successive

95 into experiencesof the id, the impressionsof which are preservedby heredity. [I I Freud 378]

For Deleuze, for the "event" to be a pure event it must be completely free of any form of memory, even a phylogenetic one. The Freudian theory of the events in the id is too reminiscent of Plato's idea of reminisces, in which, forms that have been forgotten in a previous life are recovered in this life and recognizedas true. In order to evade this platonic trap that Freud fell into, Deleuze provides another explanation for these events. 3.5

Deleuze distinguishesthe actions and passions that subsistin the id from the

"result" that is projected on the metaphysical surface.But what is this distinction and does it from? In the pre-genital phase of sexuality the organism was where come divided into separateaims and instincts. Each instinct is designatedby an action that it undertakes.We saw that in the oral zone the mouth had as its auto-erotic imagethe feeding). have (breast Other their own actions action and passion of sucking zones instincts. in Oedipal However, the phase, none of these passionsof the partial and into be translated post-genital sexuality. There was, therefore, a zones could form in in These the turn the of returned zones repression of pre-genital zones. Oedipus dissolution in But Oedipal the the the of phase. now with screen-memories into the the the use pre-genital zones are put narcissistic ego rise of complex and in Oedipal that The the that these phase was were repressed zones reason once more. by is into language. Language the to translate them means which there was no means "object-representations" in the unconsciousare linked to the "verbal-representations" its Oedipal because But the in consciousness. phasewas only concernedwith objects "phonemes, focused morphemes, and or more correctly upon nouns, translations

96 semantemes"[LS 247-248] that correspond to the partial objects. However, language is impossible without a means to connect the various partial fragments and provide them with a sense.This is where the metaphysical surface of pure thought becomes important. At this stagethe actions and passions of the component instinctsbecome the basis for the "infinitive verb." What is unique about the infinitive fori-n of the is verb that it cannot be designatedas an object or signified by any concept. Instead, the infinitive form of the verb provides the partial fragments (nouns, etc.) with a in infinitive However, the to a one another meaningful way. means connect with form of the verb always remains silent as Deleuze explains: "The verb, however, is instinct is death literally idea Eros the the that take sonorous and silent; and we must is siience. In the verb, the secondary organization is brought about, and from this infinitive 24 1] The " [LS language the verb proceeds. entire ordering of organization is the means by which the pre-genital drives can expressthemselvesin languageby "translating" action into sense on the other surface. But let us be careful: the infinitive verb is not in consciousness.It is pre-conscious, or the pure surface of Certainly by designated be can we words. or objects that or signified cannot meaning is form infinitive the but this "to verb the of infinitive of meaning the eat" verb say by the in of act nor in found eating, of be concept the a nor eat, we to objects not by be "infinitive"' cannot exhausted any demonstration of eating. The meaning of the is infinitive Instead, the the only verb of limited sense thinkable examples. or of these infinitive id. The from the that in come found events be the pure of archetypes to is it the Deleuze this verb According of to aspect these forms events. the core of verb for or events: actions it possible all symbolic that makes unique and

97 In this case, the verb is inscribed on this surface-that is, the glorious event enters a symbolic relation with a state of affairs, rather than merging with it; the shining, noematic attribute, rather than being confused with a quality, sublimates it; the proud Result, rather than being confused with an action or passion, extracts an eternal truth from them. [LS 240]

Instead of Freud's theory of phylogenesis, Deleuze explains pure events by sublimation; that is, by linking the partial drives with the verbal-representationon the metaphysical surface: "This is the verb which, in its univocity, conjugatesdevouring and thinking: it projects eating on the metaphysicalsurfaceand sketchesout thinking on it. [ ... ] The verb is the 'verbal representation' in its entirety, as well as the highest affirmative power of disjunction (univocity, with respect to that which diverges)." [LS240 & 24 1] To put it simply, the impulse to action in the body is translatedinto a thought ahout action in the mind. For example: if we see a horse carrying a heavy weight and a man carrying a heavy weight, we can sense that heavinessand the lifting in bodies (any child knows this sympathyresponse),but this power of our own senseof sympathy in the body is translated into a power of thinking about this action by the thing that unites them for thought, namely the infinitive verb. Everybody hasa infinitive by bodies The verb allows sympathy response which affect one another. this universal commonality of affects to be expressedby a single verb: for example, to-carry (in the case of the horse and the man). The event allows us to expressthe is This Being. by the univocity of verb. one commonality of every action 3.6

How does the pure event express the unity of divergent series?in order to

divergent Deleuze first the takes series are. what clarify this must we question answer divergent illustrate from Borges to series: following quote

98

In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives he choosesone at the expense of the others. In the almost unfathomable Ts'ui Pen, he choosessimultaneously - all of them. He thus creates various futures, various times which start others that will in their turn branch out and bifurcate in other times. This is the cause of the contradictions in the novel. 'Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at his door. Fang makes up his mind to kill him. Naturally there are various possibleoutcomes.Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved,both can die and so on and so being In Ts'ui Pen's the the possible solutions occur, each one on. work, all for bifurcations. [DR 6] departure It other point of

Each of these possible events has one thing in common: the verb to-kill. The subjects here: is incidental. There the true in this at work a reversal story are and objects but the transformation, that undergo subject of events are not the subjectsor objects divergent A infinitive by is itself the series that verb. the transformation represented is, then, the contradictory outcomes that circulate around each verb. In the work of Leibniz we learn of the incompossible worlds that cannot communicate with each logical there has where God to world because completely chosen make only a other Deleuze happening time. the same at is no chance of two contradictory events it is that the God the chooses is event pure it event; chooses who this: not reverses Freud's the theory the of unconscious. is of advent itself This truth rediscoveredwith divergent but that events does events not contain coherent The unconscious fascinating The the thing them. about that expresses verb a around crystallize

99 infinitive form of the verb is that it is completely neutral. Deleuze explains this neutrality of the phantasm:

This neutrality, that is to say, this movement by which singularities are emitted... belongs essentially to the phantasm.This is the case in A Child Is Being Beaten (or better, "A Father Is Seducing His Daughter," following the example invoked by Laplanche and Pontalis). Thus, the individuality of the ego mergeswith the event of the phantasmitself, even if that which the event representsin the phantasm is understood as another individual, or rather as a series of other individuals through which the dissolved ego passes.[LS 213214]

Laplanche and Pontalis note that in original fantasy, or the phantasm,the subject is not always the object of the action or even one of the componentsof the event: "But the original fantasy, on the other hand, is characterized by the absence of is for instance, is one in the the the subjectivization, and subject present scene: child, in fantasy is beaten'. 'a 506In the phantasy the the child character amongst many is because feature is dissolved itself the the only constant of the action subject beating friend, father is being father is it, In the the a sometimes sometimes phantasy. beaten, sometimes he is beating a brother or a sister, and sometimesit is the mother be interpreted for "subject" This beating the is as a mask should not someone. who being beaten. The subject is unimportant; only the action is essentialto the phantasy. Laplanche and Pontalis recognize the structure of phantasy as having multiple entries:

100

'A father seducesa daughter' might perhapsbe the summarizedversion of the seduction fantasy. The indication here of the primary process is not the absenceof organization, as is sometimessuggested,but the peculiar character of the structure, in that it is a scenariowith multiple entries, in which nothing shows whether the subject will immediately be located as daughter; it can as 37 fixed be in well asfather, or even the term seduces.

This scenario shows remarkable similarity to the story by Borges in which multiple possibilities are simultaneously affirmed. This is because the pure event is not a singular event, but an event that can be expressedin divergent outcomes.This is why Deleuze can claim that the pure event is difference itself The pure event, Deleuze tells us, unifies all contraries: "Nothing other than the Events subsist, the Event its itself for through Eventum tantum all contraries, which communicateswith alone, is " 176] The its disjuncts. [LS the distance event all of across and resonates own determined it does because for take time the whole of place at any not symbol is Deleuze This tells it haunts times. us also why and moments all rather, moment; in Being, it in language it the "between verb as subsists the verb as appears and that!, in is the infmitive of play up caught not yet which an of conceive we must but independent infinitive of determinations-an persons of all only not grammatical 214] " [LS (active, or reflective). passive, voice every time, and mood every of all It time. acts, of The third synthesis of time excludes all persons and all moments This is to form that not reducible any ordered chronology. instead, as a pure of time the Between L" the "fractured ego and and narcissistic passive is the truth of the in-between the infinitive them) there the subsists, verb, with that us presents superego from fractured to the I the other: one end "It though were as time: is intuition of

101

fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive se that appears in time. " [DR 86] Put simply, the intuition of pure and empty time is generated in the tension between contraries found in the phantasm. Chronological time is perceived as a successionof chance actualizationsthat do not contradict each other. The pure intuition of time involves the phantasm in an essential way: it involves the affimnation of all divergent possibilities in the same event. Deleuze calls this the system of the future: "The system of the future, by contrast, must be called the divine game, since there is no pre-existing rule... Not limiting restrictive or affirmations, but affirmations coextensive with the questions posed and with the decisions from which they emanate..." [DR 116] To simplify this, there are two modes of the future: one in which we anticipate the wished for in is there the other which no we, no I, and no anticipated outcome of events, and is involves It but the that the possible outcomes at once. all event only phantasy impossible for the subject to make such an affirmation becauseour will always seeks be is future in to its Instead, the the a not considered phantasy, preference. out future. Deleuze becoming that tells but the us of as an unlimited present-to-come, but that is future to is represents that an event come, there also a not a state-of-affairs is hand, "But limitation: there the happen other on without any everything that can itself, in future the sidesteppingeach present, the the event considered past of and being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, have We 15 1] [LS the " seen tantum... neutral, neither general nor particular, eventum form that in the Deleuze the phantasm "Pure of that of speaks this event" of reality by Freud. discovered was

102 3.1 "Forced movement," instead

3.3 Perversion sets up a

3.5 Instead of "phylogenesis"

of repressing pre-genital zones,

"metaphysical surface" by

the "infinitive verb" becomes

sublimates them and uses their

splitting the ego, one side

the nucleus for ý,,, erbal

energies for creative endeavors.

turned to external reality, the

representationof pre-genital

other turned to internal reality.

excitations from the Id. It

"Disavowal" suspendsthe "pure

provides a "sense" for a]I

event" that is extracted from the

actions in a "univocal" manner.

Id by the superego. 3.2 "Sublimation" does not go

3.4 The "narcissistic ego" takes

3.6 The infinitive verb is

far enough in destroying the

itself as a loved object and

neutral, therefore it can express

"values" of Oedipus.

thereby eliminates its temporal

divergent events. It is also the

"Perversion" goes further in

content. It turns to timeless

symbol for the whole of time,

destroying these values and

"events" extracted from the Id.

simultaneously affirming all

creating new ones.

possible outcomes.

Chapter 3: The Synthesesof Energetics

In the second chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze introduces Freud's celebrated work called Projectfor a Scientific Psychology. It is in reference form in is life "biophysical the Deleuze of such an presented to this work that says, intensive field in which differences determinable as excitations, and differences of is It [DR 118] " to distributed. determinable reference differences as cleared paths, are Repetition Difference haunts the by Freud that and whole section of this work field implies life "Biopsychical Deleuze 96 of a says: where starting at page is Deleuze individuation field that The 96] [DR " of speaks of individuation... This in his Project. Freud that presents the than neurology of system other nothing it in Project Freud's individuation" "field relate and will the of chapter will examine forms. First, This the take three will to rkleuze's own project of passive synthesis. L^ý

103 field of individuation known as the Id will constitute the passivesynthesisof habit or duration. Second, the synthesis of the Ego will constitute the passive synthesisof memory. Third and last, the phantasmsof the Superego will constitute the passive synthesisof the future. This entire chapter will be about theprocess of individuation. Therefore, it will start with the most basic functions of the nervous systemand show how they go beyond themselvestowards the constitution of the objects of perception. This will be a journey from organic basis of the unconsciousto the genesisof time for consciousness. It will end in a discussion of the transcendental basis for consciousness:the object = x.

Id. Energetics The the of a)

1.1

In Deleuze's book on Bergson he lists five aspects of subjectivity. He

identifies the first two as belonging to the "objective" aspectof the subject: "Of the line, belong the first to since two obviously five aspectsof subjectivity, the objective itself from the the itself secondconfines to abstracting object, and the first confines ,, 38

indetennination. to establishing a zone of

These first two aspectsare objective

do is, That they time. not enter because they concern only the passive synthesis of Let intentionality us subject. do of a the they and will on rely consciousness,nor do they rely on: consider what

in hole (need the a makes the moment of negation (1) need-subjectivity, it interests the back that holds about everything things and of continuity interval brain-subjectivity, the (2) by); or of moment letting the rest go object, "choosing" that brain the which (the of means us gives indetermination of

104 corresponds to our needs in the object; introducing an interval between received and executed movement...

39

Let us consider the proposition that we evolved from simple organisms.If this is so then those simple functions are the first and primary functions of the organism. A simple organism reachesout into the world in order to discover an object that will nourish it. In order to do this it must be able to (1) distinguish what is food from what is not and (2) maintain the perception of the presence of that object long enough to it. If the various stimuli coming from the sensory organs are assimilate discontinuous, it is becausethe external world is changing from moment to moment. On the side of the organism, in order to identify and confirm the presence of the neededobject, the data from the sensesmust be synthesizedinto a durational schema in which the object that is needed can be confirmed to be still there. This is the first developmental stageof our nervous systemand therefore its most basic function. The in is Deleuze that time speaks of a very real process the passive synthesis of organism. 1.2

While rocks just passively sit and erode with time, organisms actively

Consider by their their their a simple contemplations. contractions and unity maintain information it light to designed is like It to the on as and pass gather not eye. organ by function it that in brain. Rather, theories the a series of the of evolution gains by determined to the the These of organism needs repetitions are repetitions. form habits determines 78] life" [DR the the "urgency The eye will of maintain itself Once the intention to itself again, sight possible. forming make in and not an its is that the the organism maintains unity organism difference between the rock and into itself by thing and of external elements contractions evolving and as a growing

105 the concomitant faculty of contemplating those elements that the organism needs. Deleuze asks the question: "What organism is not made of elements and casesof repetition, of contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby intertwining all the habits of which it is composedT [DR 75] Some might accuseDeleuze of anthropornorphizing simple organismsby sayingthat they contemplate and contract habits. This is not at all the case.Passivesynthesisis as old as Aristotle who noticed that all living things maintain a senseof purpose in their will to survive. Deleuze is not sayingthat living things have a will or an aim. He is merely pointing out that the mechanical repetitions of organisms, in a sense 44choose"the way they will respond to stimuli. Unlike a rock that is tosseda number of times and always falls the same, an organism can adapt to situationsand create a difference in the way it will respond. The eye developed as a "seeing" organism becauseof its adaptation to stimuli and the repetition of needof its greaterorganism. In order to hold itself together as a functioning organism it needsto "contemplate" the elements in the external world that it needs in order to maintain itself Again, do draw in they do therefore themselves; to to not substances maintain not need rocks its "needs" has to Only to that the structure maintain needs organism contemplate. lacks. its (and the therefore elements contemplate) absorb 1.3

Freud tells us that pleasure is a state of reduction of tensions in which

discharge "This the far is primary represents possible: as as reduced stimulus function of the nervous system. Here is room for the development of a secondary function. For among the paths of discharge those are preferred and retained which be Let 296] " [I Freud flightfirom the stimulus. us involve a cessationof the stimulus: in (a develops tension the contraction) a this organism means: to what clear as be is tension the this met can need when only and need, a of expectation

106 "discharged" and the organism lapse into a sense of pleasure. Therefore, can according to Freud, the organism learns strategiesto deal with excessstimulus and "leams" to react to the external world by finding the best way to interact with it that will, at the same time, limit the tension that it demandson the organism. In this way the organism learns to meets its organic needswith the minimum of effort or strain. This is an ingenious plan that is motivated by the pleasure principle. But Deleuze does not agree with this: "Whether pleasure is itself a contraction or a tension, or whether it is always tied to a process of relaxation, is not a well-formed question Pleasure is a principle in so far as it is the emotion of a fulfilling contemplation which contracts in itself cases of relaxation and contraction." [DR 741 In essence, Deleuze argues that pleasure is the principle that guides organic needsinsofar as it maintains the organism by fulfilling its unity through time. Deleuze's argument is that "habits" of contracting come before the principle of pleasurethat is supposedto is how "chicken In the this them. a and egg" question: could the motivate short, have idea first if it did form itself in the an of the not already place organism if is beginning? Or: tensions, in the tensions the of reduction pleasure of reduction first If in form the did the the the the tension place? of organism of unity why is is born? it Deleuze's that there "death" an answer why was ever organism seeks "Eros" of passive synthesis that finds pleasure in its own activity and not in the in finds In the maintains pleasure whatever organism short, satisfaction. of outcome important? is The it. Why in this its existence and, only secondarily, what satisfies (in (in future the the past and for reduction) seeking concerns pleasure search is if Deleuze However, but the correct, present. not to relaxation) of a state returning its immediate is of the organism only a secondaryeffect then the future and past of Deleuze, Therefore, the to itspresent need according unity. maintaining concern with

107 to "bind" the organism is pleasurable in itself and not as an "intention" to master excitations: "Binding synthesiscannot be explained by the intention or the effort to master an excitation, even though it may have that effect." [DR 97] In short, pleasure is whatever allows the organism to maintain its larval unities, and unpleasureis that which disrupts this unity. An excess of excitation can disrupt and even destroy the organism; therefore (as a secondary effect) the organism must work to stave off exci ations. 1.4

Freud, in his work Projectfor a Scientific Psychology, makes a remarkable

he it In the postulatesthe existenceof a group of neurons of nervous system. study that he symbolizes by the figure q/. The V neurons are those neurons that act as a barriers is, have "doors" that can only transmit their signal to the that they or sieve: In (Qý) is this degree if way exceeded. energy of neural quantity of next neuron a they can leave behind "traces" of past perceptions.Freud usesthe word "facilitation" [Bahnung] to signify the traces left behind in the neural pathways. Now, the important thing about these pathways is that they do not maintain an identity of the Rather, the past through. of of retention that effect passed previous perception between degrees in differences a by is permeability the of pure perceptions caused Freud's In own words: multiplicity of neurons.

If we were to suppose that all the V contact-barriers were equally well the then is thing) resistance, (what equal the offered facilitated, or same in For, the to relation emerge. not evidently would memory of characteristics is the which powers of one evidently memory passage of an excitation, it facilitation if its were everywhereequal, determine and direct pathway, and, We be can preferred. should to be pathway one why see possible not would

108 therefore say still more correctly that memory is represented by the differences in thefacilitations betweenthe V neurones. [I Freud 300]

The "facilitations" preserve past excitations in the form of a chain or a code that is the effect of the pure differences between the neurons in the sameway that words are the effect of differences between letters. If all the "letters" or neurons were the "same" then there would be no retention or messageto be retained.This difference is ingrained into the neurons in one instant of excitation; but rather, acrossa whole not multiplicity of instances:'Tacilitation depends on the Qý which passesthrough the in neuron the excitatory processon the number of repetitionsofthe process." [I Freud 300] The differences become more pronounced and fixated after a great number of differences become fixated When "habits" these repetitions of similar excitations. or then there is a process called "binding" [Bindung] in which the charge of excitation in Freud is tells us that the through the trapped complex of V nerves. passing neurons the nervous system storesthis energy in thesepathways:

Under the compulsion of the exigencies of life, the nervous system was in increase Qý. This the lay number of to an necessitated up a store of obliged least, It impermeable. be had to now avoids, partly at its neurones and these beingfilledwith

Qý (cathexis), by setting upfacilitations. [IFreud 301]

by discharge the their "decide" to energy when In short, the neurons themselves For facilitated example: between neurons. difference neurons and un-facilitated it that In the is elements encountered past nourishment. seeking the organism suppose left These the a experiences need. organic "excitation" of satisfaction of lead to the

109 trace on the neurons. Now when the organism encounters a similar set of circumstances it will "discharge" its energy only when the perception matches the pattern laid down in the neurons. It acquires this "habit" by repeating the excitation that fits the pattern, and the pattern is reinforced by each repetition. In this way it contracts each of the past instancesinto the present,one thereby forming an extended duration. The delay in recognition forms the tension of the organism in its expectation, and the facilitation forms the past of the organism by retention. This is Deleuze why says: "Need is the manner in which this future appears,as the organic form of expectation. The retained past appearsin the form of cellular heredity." [DR 73] Because all this takes place on a passive level of the organism none of these processesare conscious. For example: when we hear the "tick-tock" of a clock we do not actively try to remember past instanceswhen we heard a clock; instead, we involuntarily hear the two instancesof "tick" and "tock" as a case or a set that we intuitively expect to follow one another. This is because"facilitations" in the brain laid down pathways that contract thesetwo instancesinto one-anotherautomatically. In this way our whole life is a contraction of habits: each of our habits of movement into by the an extended contracting chains of cases present and action act upon duration. When Hume tells us that we expect that the sun will rise tomorrow even by future, this knowledge have the our though we we necessarily expect of no "expectation" that the present pattern of existencewill continue. We have seenthat by the force the past to extending "facilitations" of patterns continuation us expect "it Deleuze As future saysof passivesynthesis, into the around a continuous present. 'it' the that living, that habit of one continue, will expectation our of our constitutes the thereby the our of perpetuation assuring other, after appear two elements will forming the "habit" This or 74] of urgency present a sense gives [DR cases of " case.

110

tension centered around the always present question: might things not turn out differently? The delay that we feel in the present is the persistent "problem" of existence: chance. We feel Pleasure when our expectations are fulfilled and a duration of tension or "waiting" that opens up the possibility that facilitations might be not met. In this way, our conscious experience of duration is basedupon a prior passive contraction of facilitations in the nervous system. 1.5

There is a common phenomenon that is encountered by most people when

reading: one will be reading a phraseand, in the process,misread one of the words in the phrase because it was unexpected. This phenomenon can be explained by the theory of facilitation. We expect a certain pattern to reality, so that, when an unexpected combination arises, our expectation is so strong we will hallucinate the expected "case." This may seemto be an exception, but in fact most of the time we hallucinate reality. When we walk into a room that we know well, the arrangementof things is hallucinated as being the same as it always was unless there is some immediate indication to the contrary. This leads us to the second effect of "facilitation": it structures perception into habitual patterns, or, it makes order and follows: In is This the V neurons excessive as explained regularity out of chaos. blocked (in thereby the generatinga sense pathways) amounts of energy are stored up in itself "discharge" find immediately to The tension cannot a a means of tension. by does It hallucinates. the it this instead energy accumulated sending so perception, by Freud this facilitated appealing explains perception. a the without pathway along it it if is that that were a a memory as activates so strong to the senseof urgency perception:

III

Thus, as a result of the experience of satisfaction, a facilitation comes about between two mnemic and the nuclear neuronswhich are cathectedin the state of urgency. No doubt, along with the discharge of satisfactionthe Q?7'flows images the out of mnemic as well. Now, when the stateof urgency or wishing re-appears, the cathexis will also pass over onto the two memories and will [IFreud 319] them. activate

Freud calls this a "wishful activation" [I Freud 319] of a mnemic image. It is this wishful activation that Freud will also call the "primary process." The primary instead for process, of waiting an actual object to satisfy its need, will instead hallucinate that object. Freud tells us that these hallucinations are what causeus to dream: "It is an important fact the V primary processes, such as have been biologically suppressedin the course of V development, are daily presentedto us during sleep." [IFreud 336] However, they are not limited to dreams.In waking life is by fill-out hallucinations the what these supplementing outlines of reality face is For the of someone example: when we see perceived with what remembered. face; instead, her details the have do the know, of most to of all re-notice not we we don't is This by hallucinated the alwaysnotice details are why we primary processes. fact The becomes that it has too know our apparent. aged until that someone we interaction is dream half there that half an us show and reality perceptions are " Deleuze that "virtual tells Deleuze us objects. calls between real objects and what but "it into integrated the remains rather, object real not are the virtual objects half in find the does the completes which object real there, not and planted or stuck [DR lack. " half to the real continues which it, but rather testifies to the other virtual far the to j tries too object real replace if and goes the ect ob However, virtual 101]

112 then a real hallucination is present. Like a man who reaches for a hallucinated sandwich, it will lead to the shock of disappointment. Freud tells us as much: I do not doubt that in the first instancethis wishful activation will produce the samething as a perception-namely a hallucination. If reflex action is thereupon introduced, disappointment cannot fail to occur." [IFreud 319] At the level of the y/ neuronsall the objects of satisfaction are hallucinated. Deleuze tells us that, in the Id, the larval egos that form in the neurons of facilitation do not have real objects as their aim. Instead, they tell the brain what would count as a satisfying object. Every "binding" of neurons centers around a hallucinatory object: "This is why the satisfactionwhich flows from binding is necessarilya 'hallucinatory' satisfactionof the ego itself, even though hallucination here in no way contradicts the effectivity of the binding." [DR 97] In short, the binding process in the Id constitutes a "drive" that centersaround a These [DR 97] bound " "Drives than excitations. are nothing more wished-for object: drive later the that for active will synthesis of passive objects are creations wished in for in its Ego the search an equivalent object reality. synthesisof 1.6

is However, there dealt have Heretofore we with external stimuli. only

in by is the radically a that system nervous processed of stimuli source another different way than external stimuli. Freud explains:

With an increasing complexity of the interior of the organism, the nervous itself--endogenous from the element somatic stimuli receives system stimuli-which

have equally to be discharged.These have their origin in the

hunger, the to body respiration, needs: major the rise give and cells of from it does external the From as these withdraw cannot organism sexuality. They from flight for Q the cease only their stimulus. employ stimuli; it cannot

113 subject to particular conditions, which must be realized in the external world. [I Freud 2971

Whereas external stimuli are intermittent, the source of endogenousexcitation is constant and unavoidable. This raises several important questions for Freud. First if the source of excitation is constant then why is it felt only intermittently in moments of hunger, lust, or anxiety? Here is the problem:

We cannot avoid the idea that there is an accumulation; and the intermittent character of their psychical effect necessitatesthe view that on their path of conduction to V they come up against resistanceswhich are overcome only when there is an increasein quantity. [I Freud 316]

The cells of the body may lack substancesthat it needs, but we do not become immediately aware of this becausemost of our internal needs remain unnoticeable interests Freud. Freud is It that this threshold threshold. they reach a certain until borrows a concept from Fechner:that an intensity will not become perceptible unless it reachesa certain threshold, and when it does, it will emerge in a stateof confusion in is from "Thus is Freud: " Here "complication. the expressed quantity (p quote called limits from back Q is held By in this the by complication yf, within certain means v. in law, Fechner's this is This might least. which conditions of of reminiscent very at has In 315] this [lFreud " a localized. of concept be complication philosophy way idea Leibnizian here, into the to I of point out except long history, which will not go is Leibniz the According the to of ali up sound of wave made wave. a the sound of is Deleuze, According drop to this the admission of water. little each of the sounds

114 from Freud that the unconscious is differential: "The unconscious is differential., involving little perceptions, and as such it is different in kind from consciousness. " [DR 108] Freud pays "homage to the Leibnizian Fechner" [DR 1081becausethe somatic sources of drives are pulsations from all the little cells of the body that are summed up in the pathways of the nervous system.Here is how: excitation builds up in the nervous system,thereby flooding all the pathwaysof the V neuronsuntil one of the contact-barriers is permeated and the excitation is discharged.To put it simply, for least looks in the endogenous excitation point of resistance the nervous system. Freud tell us this in the following quote:

Above a certain Q, however, they (the endogenous excitations) act as a increase is increase Q of perceived as an of stimulus continuously, and every in is follows, It that there therefore, the y/ stimulus. a state which the path of further, the Experience that, become has after shows, permeable. conduction its discharged, been has the resistance resumes of conduction path V stimulus 316] [IFreud once more.

is the through buildup released of energy Like a balloon bursting, all of the previous in invested is image that the therefore, is mnemic and that permeable, most pathway discharge by is this of If activated is object partial that pathway activated. a virtual or that the make is image the excitations of because summation the is it mnemic energy little the "Partial of Deleuze elements is tells are objects This us: image. why the up instinctual is the When the mnemic pathway permeated 108] [DR " perceptions. energy

"A is This process image. in summation: called that process becomes invested

its 316] This Freud and " [I excitation of summation is termed kind summation. this of

115 investment in an image gives the psyche an aim or a will. Freud recognizesthat this is the impulsion that drives the psyche to act: "Here V is at the mercy of Q, and it is thus that in the interior of the system there arises the impulsion which sustainsall psychical activity. We know this power as the will-the derivative of the instincts.[IFreud 317] Let us set up a simple example this of process:The cells of an infant's body send signals to the brain. These signals are summed up and invested in the mnemic image of the breast. Then the sensationof hunger becomesassociatedwith the partial object, and the infant experiencesthe instinct to breast-feed.This instinct haunt the psyche until a specific action is carried out in reality that will satisfy will the organism and bring the levels of endogenousexcitation down to a level where it longer will no permeate the mnemic pathways. Freud sees this as the natural conclusion or aim of the instinct:

The removal of the stimulus is only made possible here by an intervention in interior for being Qý the the the time of the gets rid of release of which body; and this intervention calls for an alteration in the external world (supply of nourishment, proximity of the sexual object) which, as a specific action, [I 317-318] in definite Freud be brought ways. about can only

its by The in (Eros) life-instincts Here we see the organism maintains unity action. incorporating those elements that it needs by the process of summation and life instincts With is the there this. However, there drives. a problem with instinctual have in We by that, the that instinct seen same process. operates is also a death summation,

is the that most permeable pathway the endogenousexcitations seekout

if But its "most image the invests excitation. what that it with mnemic that and

116 permeable" pathway is connected with a painful mnemic image? Freud recognizes that the irruption of pain can causepermanent facilitations in the V neurons:

We see in this a manifestation of the primary trend against a rising of Qý tension, and we infer that pain consists in the irruption of large Qs into V. The two trends are in that case a single one. Pain setsthe (pas well as the yf system in motion, there is no obstacle to its conduction, it is the most imperative of all processes. Thus the y/ neurons seem permeable to it; it therefore consists in the action of Qs of a comparatively high order. [I Freud 307]

Let us consider the kind of pain that we are talking about. The excitations coming from the external world through ýpneurons have a shield that prevents the over body, from inside However, the the the the of pain coming y/ neurons. excitation of is Freud have This does this why when mechanism. not namely emotional pain, Even it is trauma sexual excitation. usually associatedwith an excessive speaks of the trauma of war that he investigated is investedwith the endogenousexcitations of This that libido the the all means world. of real the external excitations and not have in As the libidinal seenabove, real world. we traumas are events and not events is This in is image the then invests that no instinct external world. enacted an the instincts. life The for it is instinct death the than for repetition the different by is internal taking by the a is relieved excitation the which means compulsion because the Painful in mnemic are repeated the actions world. real specific action following This the by the raises same action. a return of image is only satisfied (more than facilitations permeable) pleasurable stronger If are painful question:

117 facilitations, then why are not all our instincts death instincts?This question can only be answered by the mechanism of repression. Freud sums up the basic function of repression as follows: "The wishful state results in a positive attraction towards the object wished-for, or, more precisely, towards its mnemic image; the experienceof pain leads to a repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemic image cathected." [I Freud 322] In order to keep all of the repetitions inspired by instincts from being painful ones it is necessarythat the pathwaysthat are painful be drained of their excitation. In the next section we will seethat it is the function of the Ego to affect this repression. 1.1 There are completely

1.3 The "habit" of maintaining

1.5 "Facilitations" that

passive or involuntary processes

unity in the present comes

spontaneouslyactivate invade

that select objects and maintain

before the pleasure principle

perception and fill-out the

their presencein attention.

that concernsthe immediate

outlines. Virtual objects seekto

past and future.

manifest themselvesin perception in this way.

1.2 Unlike inorganic matter,

1.4 Retention of habit is due to

1.6 Endogenousexcitations

organisms can develop creative

coded differences in permeable

exert a constant pressureon the

responsesto stimuli. Difference

neurons. Duration is

psyche that is only felt at a

is drawn from repetitions called

"contracted" between organic

"threshold." This summation of

"contemplation. "

need and cellular coding.

excitation is called "instinct. " Painful facilitations (death instinct) are repressedby the Ego.

118 b) The Energetics of the Ego.

2.1

First, it is important that the Ego be distinguished from consciousness.The

ego is not the self. The Ego, as we speakof it here, is a bundle of neuronsthat effects a change in the direction of investment in the psyche.Therefore it is better to think of the Ego in terms of Freud's other name for it: side-cathexis.Freud tells us that the function of side-cathexis is to inhibit the flow of endogenousexcitation in the neural system:"A side-cathexis thus acts as an inhibition ofthe course ofQý. " [I Freud 323] Why is this inhibition so important? We have seenthat, in primary processes,energy naturally flows from one mnemic image to another without impediment. In dreams hyper-associational the we experience connection of mnemic images. It is also in dreams that we are most likely to encounter a traumatic repetition of painful images. This is becausethe fteely flowing energy of the instinct naturally investsitself in the In Those the most painful. waking pathways are always most permeable pathways. life these pathways are avoided becauseof the side-cathexisof the Ego that prevents inhibit how Freud being from the images tells can these side-cathexis us activated. these hostile mnemic images:

Let decided however, to kind is, us suppose this Inhibition of advantage q/. a if Then, ba key-neuron image to hostile a unpleasure. and that a is a mnemic be released, which would then is awakened, primary unpleasure would full its With if in to is be amount. released case any so and pointless perhaps turn from the out very slight will inhibitory of unpleasure release a action an discharge development be the and of spared will the system nervous and 324] [I Freud damage. without any

119

The following illustration of this process may be helpful in visualizing this: suppose that Q energy flows from point a to point b where "b" is a hostile mnemic image. Now, if between point a and point b another pathway is interjected that will "draw off'the energy flowing from one point to the other, then the energy reaching point b be far less than it would have been if there was no side-pathwaybetweenthem will . The energy that is drawn off from the circuit of neurons is stored in the side-cathexis in the same way as a transistor "traps" energy into an endless loop. It is as if the newly cathected.Ego acts as a battery that takes up energy that would be used by primary processes and redirects its aim. Freud describesthis:

This organization is called the 'ego'. It can easily be depicted if we consider the regularly repeated reception of endogenousQý in certain neurons(of the facilitating the effect proceedingthence will produce a group of nucleus) and is neurons which constantly cathected and thus correspondsto the vehicle of ] 323 function. [I Freud by the the store required secondary

it, in is the turn, that highly is this powers What storage of energy significant about "real" to to the actions upon effect system to muscular signals out send system neural

instinctual that the is towards It this real world aims of re-direction the envirom-nent. between dynamic two the This the mutually enacts Freud calls secondary processes. The processes. functions the secondary and primary system: nervous of exclusive Freud favor in first the inhibits the second as clearly of Ego is that mechanism that " it inhibit if primary processes. psychical must exists, "Therefore, ego an states:

120 [IFreud 324] The Ego is, as we shall see, not consciousnessbut that which makes consciousnesspossible. 2.2

The secondstep in this processis the 'lest of reality." Before we can say what

the test of reality is we must first say what it is not. First, Deleuze tells "It us: would be completely wrong to consider the positing of

reality to be an effect induced by the

external world... " [DR 98] This would assumethat there is an object already in the world that has a stable identity and that the psyche merely has to take cognizanceof this thing. To assumethis would be to neglect the dictum that the external world is nothing to the psyche other than sensation and energy. Many psychologists have postulated the "mother" as the first whole-object for the infant. However, they assumethe pre-establishmentof a "reality" of the mother in the actual body of the mother. If this were the case the test of reality would not "create" the reality of the object but only discover it. Second, Deleuze tells us that it is wrong to see the failures by "the " [DR of positing reality as, result of encountered passive syntheses.

98] Freud tells us that primary process(passivesynthesis)introduceshallucinations in responseto organic needsbut when these hallucinations fail to satisfy the organic if dream [lFreud 319] For I fail " "disappointment to example, occur. cannot need, that I am eating a sandwich this dream cannot satisfy my hunger; therefore I will I dreaming, I I then that will actually eat a sandwich. will wake up and am realize This is a powerful argument. However, the unity of the object of satisfactioncannot be wholly explained by biological need. The failure of primary processdetermines Third, for but for the the thing acted upon. nature of the need not specific action Deleuze tells us that the test of reality does not take the form of "a negative judgement" [DR 98] or an existentialjudgment. Freud saysof this form ofjudgment: it by thing disaffirms the and of a particular attribute; "It affirms or possession a

121 asserts or disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality." [I lFreud 4391 Judgment only applies to the empirical existenceof the thing. However, as we will see later, the Freudian thing is not identical to the empirical object that we find in perception. In short, negation only applies to attributes, and the Freudian thing is not an attribute but a substantive. Fourth, Deleuze tells us: "It would be wrong to supposethat the reality principle is opposed to the pleasureprinciple, limiting it and imposing renunciations upon it." [DR 98] In the above example of the dream of the sandwich, there was not so much a renunciation of the pleasure of dreaming the sandwich as a delay in the pleasure until specific action could be taken to eat a in sandwich reality. In primary process (dreams) the satisfaction or pleasure is "immediate" whereas in the active synthesisof reality the pleasure is delayed or anticipated in the future. The pleasure-principle is not "renounced" but extended implicit immediate Deleuze: "The to renunciationsof pleasureare already according in the role of principle which pleasure assumes,in the role that the idea of pleasure it is delayed future. " [DR 98-99] Pleasure in that to so assumes relation a past and a in than be a partial and rather or global manner resolved a systematic manner can fragmentary manner. This leads us to the positive defmition of reality-testing for Deleuze. Deleuze tells us that, "the test of reality mobilises, drives and inspires all direction in binding beyond in the the of a the activity of the ego... moving 6substantive' which serves as a support for the connection." [DR 98] By reading Freud carefully we find out that the test of reality is not a perception of the empirical Freud has this indication taken that but calls place. the a action specific rather object indication a discharge:

122 It is probably the (o neurons which furnish this indication: the indication of reality. In the caseof every external perception a qualitative excitation occurs in oj, which in the first instance, however, has no significance for V. It must be added that the oj excitation leads to discharge, information the a) and of this, as of every discharge, reachesy/. The information of the dischargefrom (o is thus the indication ofquality of realityfor y/. [I Freud 325]

This correspondsto what Deleuze hasto say about recognizedobjects: "An object is recognized, however, when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another, or rather when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselvesto a form of identity in the object." [DR 133] This means that there is no pre-existing .J-

identity in the object and that the unity of the object is produced by an indication of "discharge" coming from each of the faculties. For example: if I see an apple and it it, but to reach out grab and eat when I touch the image there is no indication of hands, is indication in then there the of reality the psyche, and the no pressure on if feel it, is hallucination. However, I taste the apple and and the organism object a is discharge. hunger In then there the short, we are a satisfaction of registers from by "object-like" the senses the thing the neural-feedback nature of conscious of that follows a coherent pattern that can be logically comprehendedby consciousness. However, the "intentionality" that we have towards the object is within the psyche itself; that is, both the "object" and its thing-like nature are products of an indication itself in "real" the "discharge" object and not a pre-establishedunity of 2.3

We have just seen what an indication of reality is. Now we must carefully

between ingenious is. Deleuze Freudian thing the an connection makes consider what (or Kant's the Freudian object = x). object-in-general thing and conception of the

123 First, let us consider how Freud usesthe term "thing. " In the following quote Freud exposeshis conception of a thing by using the example of a fellow human being:

Thus the complex of the fellow human-being falls into two components, of which one makes an impression by its constant structure and staystogether as a thing, while the other can be understood by the activity of memory-that is, can be traced back to information from the subject's own body. [I Freud 331]

What we can derive from this quote is as follows: the thing is the structure of a substantivethat is without attributes, while the attributes are the meansby which we understand the object through mnemic traces in the psyche. For example, the attribute of "screaming" is determined in the fellow human being by memories of one9s own screaming: "Other perceptions of the object too-if,

for instance, he

screams-will awaken the memory of his (the subject's) own screamingand at the his " [I Freud 331] The time experiences of pain. attributes of the object same of own have body. based However, they the thing the with our own are upon sympathy value like nature of the object is not immediately reducible to our own memories.Rather, it is the locus or structure that brings these attributes together in one-and-the-same Freudian important is Here the thing: whereaswe the aspectof most external object. in the thing things the encounter we never consciousness of attributes encounter only in itself as a structure in our perceptions. Therefore, the Freudian thing has a "transcendental" relation to consciousness.Here is where the similarity to Kant's let idea becomes First, transcendental the us consider what evident. conception of Deleuze has to say about this object = x:

124 The double series of the conditioned, that is, of the empirical consciousness and its objects, must therefore be founded on an originary instance which retains the pure form of objectivity (object =- x) and the pure form of consciousness,and that which constitutesthe former on the basisof the latter. [LS 1051

This "double series" is divided into an empirical half, that is the collection of attributes that we perceive, and a transcendental half, that is the structure of the object that staystogether as a thing through all the changesin attributes. But what is this structure of the thing itselP It is completely indeterminate insofar as consciousnessis concerned becauseit has no meanstojudge the thing itself. Freud tells us that judgment "affirms or disaffirms the possessionby a thing of a particular attribute... " [I I Freud 439] If a thing-in-itself cannot be judged in consciousnessit is because it is completely positive. According to Deleuze: "Kant shows how the idea of a sum total of all possibility excludes all but 'originary' predicatesand in this way constitutes the completely determined concept of an individual Being... " [LS 345] This means that the thing in-itself or object =x

contains all possible attributes

becausethe activity ofjudgment has not yet deducted anything from it. And because it contains all the divergent and contradictory attributes it cannot be brought into light intermixed, Like that contains, all the colors of the rainbow, pure consciousness. it cannot be distinguished. This strangeproposition about the content of perceptions Critique Reason: from directly the ofPure comes

This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing in itself, determined; and the conception of an ens realissimum regarded as completely

125 is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory predicates,which indicatesand belongs to being. It is therefore a transcendentalideal which forms the basis of the complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest material condition of its possibility-a

condition on which must rest the cognition of 40

all objects with respectto their content.

This meansthat the basis of the "content" of perception is radically different from the "attributes" of the perceived thing. So, when Deleuze usesthe term "object = x" he is in-itself is imperative It idea that we to this transcendental thing referring of a its difference between the transcendental the thing and empirical maintain radical determine "The Deleuze: According the to to error of all efforts counterpart. transcendentalas consciousnessis that they think of the transcendentalin the image This " [LS 105] is it in to to, that can the supposed ground. which resemblance of, and faculty dictum the Kant's heed if be done that the to provides of reason we pay easily "thing" to perception: of a unity

Reason,therefore, has an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, latter far the in indeed the ground of possible experience contains as so not but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of which the into is to has the an collect of which aim and conception, no understanding 41 the the understanding. of acts all absolute whole

is for Kant, the is discovery the that, world external The result of this remarkable if themselves. we function of objects unity a natural not and reason of product of a

126 refer back to Freud we will also see this insight at work. He tells us that the indication of quality (which is actually an indication of unity) makes us distinguish between memory and perception:

For the difference is that the indication ofquality follows, if it comes from the outside, whatever the intensity of the cathexis, if it comes from V/,it does so only when there are large intensities. It is accordingly inhibition by the ego for distinguishing betweenperception and which makespossible a criterion memory. [IFreud 326]

Along the lines of a primary and a secondaryprocessthere is also a split betweenthe images In is distinction there subjective world of mnemic and perceptions. short, a between the internal world of thought (memory) and the external world of has This contrast a remarkable effect on the psyche: at the same time perceptions.

that the external world becomesunified, so too does the internal world. Kant makes this distinction clear:

I distinguish my own existence,as that of a thinking being, from that of other is This is body to also things external me-among which my also reckoned. I for think those things as which exactly are other proposition, an analytical 42 different or distinguished from mysel 1

by becomes Ego the Freud, in the have the We suppressing that, unified work of seen Because its this "attention" directing the towards of object. real primary process and becomes the identical is to conscious rather, psyche consciousness; the Ego not

127 because the Ego affects a split betweenthe internal and external world. In short, the think" of consciousnessbecomes possible because of the transcendental unity conferred upon the "external" object by the faculty of reason. Whereasthoughts are "predicates" of perceptions, the objects are the meansby which these predicatesare unified for the ego by being connectedby the structure of objectivity. The "effect" of unity in the external object has a reflective "effect" upon consciousness:that of imposing unity upon the "I" that thinks: "By this 1, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is representedthan a transcendentalsubject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. -A3Next we will seethat thesetwo poles of "unity" produce a reciprocal effect upon each other. 2.4

Along with the split between the "I" that does nothing but think and the

"object" that does nothing but maintain a unity for predicates,there is, in the work of Freud, a corresponding split in the Ego itself In the following quote Freud describes this split:

Just as the pleasure-egocan do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, for is but do the strive what reality-ego need nothing and avoid unpleasure,so ] damage. [I Freud 40-41 I itself against useful and guard

One Ego strives to unify the object of wishes and the other Ego strives to unify the between Freud finds Deleuze Once and a correspondence again object ofperceptions. Kant in the split between thesetwo Egos:

128 Drives, which are defined only as bound excitation, now appear in differentiated form: as self-preservative drives following the active line of reality, as sexual drives in this new passive extension. If the first passive synthesisconstitutes an 'aesthetic', the secondmay properly be defined asthe equivalent of an 'analytic'. [DR 1091

The extended passive synthesis concerns only the present; as such, it involves the synthesis of sensationsthat Kant referred to as "aesthetic." However, the second extension of passive synthesisconcernsthe past and, in Deleuze's senseof the term, these fragments of the "pure past" must be equivalent to an a priori conception become Kant "transcendental " This to the clear similar called analytic. will what "perceptual-identity" between Freud the calls what relationship when we examine distinction Freud " In The Interpretation "thought-identity. of a makes ofDreams and two types or aims of thought: one that seeksto build up an image of a satisfying first image image link that this to that in the an with seeks other and object memory is first (perceptual-identity) The first in image what this perception. satisfy will

Deleuze calls a "synthesis of reproduction" [DR 98] and the second (thoughtis first 98] The " [DR "synthesis he called identity) synthesis recognition. of a calls For in image it because "reproduction" of a satisfying object memory. reproduces an its satisfaction thumb a past of a memory the reproduces sucks who child example, "perceptualThis imagination. the it and attaches to the present autoerotic activity of identity" becomes the a priori image that constitutes a region of the transcendental in Kant is like the understanding The of conception pure a object virtual analytic. Kant these judgments. that tells a priori us insofar as they are predicates of possible "But of as predicates conceptions, to objects: undetermined conceptions relate

129 possible judgments, relate to some representationof a yet undetermined object. ,44 For Deleuze these a priori conceptions belong to the past; not a past of "past perceptions" because then the conceptions would not be "analytic," but rather, an auto-erotic "virtual" past. The second synthesis is called "recognition" because it links the a priori conception of a "perceptual-identity" or virtual object to an object in the present. If we were to examine this relationship in Freudian economic terms we could say the "binding" stabilizes the virtual object (perceptual-identity) and it relates to an external aim in reality by the inhibition of the Ego. Freud describes this transition from perceptual-identity to thought identity:

The primary process endeavors to bring about a discharge of excitation in help it that, the the thus order with of amount of excitation accumulated, may identity' The 'perceptual the of with experience satisfaction. establish a intention has however, this and taken on abandoned secondary process, identity' 'thought in its the with that a establishment of place another from is the All than thinking memory circuitous path a no more experience. idea) has been to (a an a purposive adopted as memory which of a satisfaction identical cathexis of the same memory which it is hoped to attain once more 45 through an intermediate stageof motor experiences.

dreams by "when is best the between two come the The connection phrase: expressed between is the an correspondence true." Essentially the synthesis of recognition is How (primary dreams this accomplished? those processes). our of and event actual identity between difference the of primary process the Freud tells us that essential ideas. When in intensity difference is those the a wishedof process and secondary

130 for idea in perceptual-identity has some of its intensity "discharged" then its image becomes a thought-identity. Freud tells us: "Thinking must concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the intensities of those 46 , ideas.

The virtual objects in primary process are so interlinked closely with other

virtual objects that they are not distinguishable. However, when an image is selected from the series of virtual objects it becomes attachedto an actual object and clearly distinguished from all the other images. According to Freud this is the main difference between primary and secondaryprocess:

But it is obvious that condensation of ideas, as well as intermediate and compromise structures, must obstruct the attainment of identity aimed at. Since they substitute one idea for another, they cause a deviation from the path which would have led on from the first idea. Processesof this kind are therefore scrupulously avoided in secondarythinking.47

When an idea is extracted from "the condensation of ideas" it appears in a less intense form of an actualized or recognized idea in perception. In short, the idea in definite from the that to circulate pleasure-ego attribute a attributes passes by Or, it "substantive" the to object reality-ego. put simply, an conferred onto a in is found in thought that now previously appearedonly a real perception. attribute When this happens something remarkable occurs: the reality-ego is able to "think" in just in fragmentary in their things than terms connection part rather of attributes it did it have before: This that that gains power memory a second not means objects. This function fulfills through time. the as persisting objects aim of recognize now can is Freud the this that tell to airn of reality-testing us establishan object reality-testing.

131 that can persist in time: "The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not tofind an object in real perception which correspondsto the one presented,but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there." [I I Freud 440] This form of memory is radically different than the habit-memory that we found in the first synthesisof time. For the first time memory is extended to objects themselves just than to their attributes (or partial objects) as they were in the first passive rather synthesis. For the first time the reflective memory recognizes objects as the same through time because of the "object = x" that mediates between them. As we saw above, the object =x has no deteryninatepredicates(or all predicates),therefore it has no discemable place in time. If I may use an analogy: it is like the word "it" that has no predicates and can take on all possible predicates.As such, this "it" can both be in is. in it both "it "it " As the the presentas an such, can exist past as an was" and is Deleuze tells that this that which the time. object =x us present and past at same between between the the presentand makesrecognition past and constantly circulates two seriespossibie:

Repetition is constituted not from one presentto another,but betweenthe two function form in these that of the virtual object presents coexistent series (object = x). It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in

it determines itself, transformationsof terms and modifications that to relation it in imaginary two the real series which appears, and relations within of therefore between the two presents.[DR 105]

is It for this the the Both the real object and support connection. virtual object are Not both the time. is the the a "object = x" that same virtual object at real object and

132 "perceived" real object or a "remembered" virtual object, but a transcendentalunity of the present and a transcendentalunity of the past. For example: in the work of Proust the name of the place "Combray" is not the real place that it names,nor is it a place that one can remember; rather, it is the transcendentalunity of a pure past. To it put simply, Combray is the pure -it" that can refer both to a totality of perception in the present and a totality of memory in the past. This is why Deleuze says of Combray: "And if the two series succeedone another, they neverthelesscoexist in relation to Combray in itself as an object =x that causesthem to resonate." [DR 122] My analogy of the word "it" is confirmed by Deleuze in his use of the "there is" that remains indeterminate: "There is no doubt that there is an identity belonging to the precursor, and a resemblancebetween the series which it causesto communicate. This 'there is', however, remains perfectly indeterminate." [DR 119] The object =x is a "floating signifier" that is, "in itself void of senseand thus susceptibleof taking on any sense..." [LS 50] and thus it can appear both in the seriesof real objects in the present and in the series of virtual objects in the past without contradiction. In short, the Kantian transcendental idea provides the link between memory and perception and supportsthe synthesisof recognition. 2.5

In philosophy the phenomenon of "intentionality" is often taken for granted.

It is assumedthat the subject, self, or ego "naturally" projects itself towards objects in the world as its aim. To the merit of Freud he does not simply state that the Ego happens. by Freud He this the also explains process which seeksout object-cathexis. begins his investigation into the nature of judgment (intentionality) from the dream between dream fn difference the states statesand waking states. standpoint of (primary process) imagesare chaotic; that is, many contradictory predicatesconnect that could not co-exist in a waking state. Further, there is no set place or time in

133 dreams: one moment is not clearly distinguishable from another. One place is confused with another. What dream phenomena shows is that there is a lack of judgment in dreams. Judgment belongs to the waking state that Freud calls "secondary process." Freud explains the difference between these two states in economic terms:

Thusiudging is aV processwhich is only made possible by inhibition by the ego and is evoked by the dissimilarity between the wishful cathexis of a memory and a perceptual cathexis that is similar to it. It can be inferred from this that coincidence between the two cathexesbecomesthe biological signal for ending the act of thought and for allowing discharge to begin. [I Freud 328]

We have seen that in the neural system, according to Freud, mnemic traces in the form of "pathways" are activated by freely flowing energy that activates a multiplicity of contradictory images. What the Ego (side-cathexis)does is to "bind" this freely flowing energy so that a perceptual signal can be distinguished from a is derived from let form "negation. " Now, In this ofjudgment wishful signal. effect, "will" is has First, Freud the to of negation not say about negation. us examine what instinct: but types two the of effect of a subject

The polarity of judgment appears to correspond to the opposition of two Affirmation have instincts to exist. supposed which we groups of - as a belongs Eros; for to to the expulsion negation successor uniting substitute instinct of destruction. [I I Freud 441] belongs the to -

134

Second, negation frees the psyche from the pressureof repression and from a strict compulsion from the pleasure principle:

But the performance of the function of judgment is not made possible until the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with the first measureof freedom from the consequencesof repressionand with it, from the compulsion of the pleasureprinciple. [I I Freud 44 1]

Repression, as we have seen, is the effect of side-cathexis: the energy flowing between memory neurons is inhibited so that painful memories are not activated. Painful memories, according to Freud, leave behind permanent "facilitations" (a crack) and if left unimpeded, this crack in the neural systemwill causea repetition instinct. death Now, Freud the the process of that compulsion associates with "binding" is the solution to this problem: how to avoid the devastating effects of destructive quantities of energy from destroying the nervous system?Freud's answer is what he calls the "fusion" of the instincts: "The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the task by diverting that instinct to a is 4 [I 18] This " I Freud in the towards external world. objects great extent outwards... the beginning of "intentionality" or object-cathexis. The nervous system"binds" the diverted is then from this traumatic energy mnemic, pathways and excess energy bind fact, Freud to In the the excitations ego towards objects. strengthof explains, as (Thanatos): from the energy unpleasantamplitude of neural comes

135 Indeed, if we supposethat the original Q1 releaseof unpleasureis taken by up the ego itself, we shall have in it itself the source of the expenditure which is required by the inhibiting side-cathexis from the ego. In that case, the stronger the unpleasure,the stronger the primary defense.[I Freud 324]

In this way the destructive potential of excessiveexcitations in the neural system is diverted to help in the unification of side-cathexis.In short, the destructive instinct is placed at the service of the constructive instinct (Eros). Now, we have seenthat pure Eros at work in the primary processthat seeksto bring together all the contradictory images difference The is that to this mnemic side-cathexismakes at once. process as follows: the ego makes use of "destructive energy" to negate some of the images image is that contradictory so a stable and coherent produced. This "image" is then tested against "reality" and if the feedback loop of signals in the muscular be it becomes This image "intended" the this object. would not system confirm be happening first: "destructive the things two used energy"' must possible without in immediate to towards tendency the satisfaction a move system's natural against hallucinated image, thereby delaying the effect of the pleasure principle and the "destructive energy" must be turned towards the part of the nervous system that diverted is instinctfOr discharge the towards that this energy so controls muscular instincts, destructive they Instead the are sublimated andjused repressing of mastery. instincts fusion is "Intentionality" (Eros). this instincts the life of effect of with the intentionality have determined Now the that we of their nature we sublimation. and field the transcendental Deleuze's the object =x and conceptions of can return to Sartre's Sense The Logic Deleuze In criticizes of with a greater sense of clarity. it because field transcendental stops at consciousness: notion of the

136

This field can not be determined as that of a consciousness.Despite Sartre's attempt, we cannot retain consciousnessas a milieu while at the sametime we object to the form of the person and the point of view of individuation. [LS 102]

The argument that Sartre puts forth, reproduced here in an extremely simplified manner, is as follows: when we are engagedin action in the world, such as chasinga tram, we are not reflecting on the "I" that is engaged in this action. Only the pure field of intentionality appearswithout the self-consciousnessof the personengagedin the action. Deleuze's criticism of this is that, while it eliminatesthe "I" from the field it of consciousness, still maintains consciousnessas a ground of individuation of the if Deleuze "even that, world. objects we define this impersonal consciousnessby means of pure intentionalities and retentions, [they] still presuppose centers of individuation. " [LS105] There is still the problem of the object =x

or the

itself by be in that consciousness cannot grounded undetermined object- -general becausean object without pre&cates never appearsin consciousness.To understand the nature of the object =x Deleuze turns to Leibniz's theory of incompossible in incompossible has the Leibniz theory which same worlds about a strange worlds. This different in in predicates. another world with one world would exist person despite in is be "vague" the that there world that object same each a must means Deleuze: be different. According him define to that the may predicates some or all of "There is thus a 'vague Adam, ' that is, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam =x common is In Fang is Sextus just there the there end, = x. a =x or a to several worlds, as " [LS H 4-115] The these thing to about striking all worlds. something =x common

137 "vague" objects is that they are indeterminate. They possessall possible predicates across all the possible worlds andyet remain the same object in each world. When this indeterminate object becomes individualized in only one world it becomesfixed to a set of predicates that define it for consciousness.This use of Leibniz is not so strange as it might seem. Of course the theory of possible worlds is metaphysical speculation, but if we return to Freud's theory of the unconscious we encounter something that is based upon observation. In dreams the object =x can take on incompossible predicates! I can dream of a man that is also a woman at the sametime or someonewho is both dead and alive at the sametime. It is the test-of-reality that determines the object =x

with fixated predicates only upon awakening.

Individualization takes place only in conscious statesbut the object =x transcends Deleuze "singularities" dreams In that are not calls what we encounter consciousness. being Instead the individuated to ground consciousness of whole-object. attached any for individuation, the unconsciousprimary processes,as emissionsof singularities, is "What Deleuze: According individuation. for to neither are the pre-conditions individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissionsof singularitiesinsofar as they immanent of autoprinciple mobile, a possess and surface occur on an unconscious fixed from distinct distribution, and through radically a nomadic unification [LS 102] " distributions the synthesisof consciousness. of conditions as sedentary is due here to the Deleuze side-cathexis that The synthesisof consciousness of speaks from incompossible the stabilizes and Ego object =x that predicates the negates of individuated Therefore, that the we perceive are objects the perception of the object. but by the the unconsciousprocessof by negations, not of reflective understanding, inhibition of libidinal energy.

138 2.6

At the heart of "prim ary-process" is something that Deleuze calls "essence."

At the heart of "secondary-process"is what Deleuze calls the "object = x. " To prove this first point we need go no further than to look at the revealing comment that Deleuze makes in Proust and Signs: "Nonetheless, if we look for something in life that correspondsto the situation of the original essences,we shall not find it in this or that character, but rather in a certain profound state. This stateof steep." [PS 45] In the state of sleep we fmd the free play of "predicates" or "singularities" without definite obj ects. They subsist in a "complicated"

state that Freud calls

"condensation." According to Freud: "The construction of collective and composite figures is one of the chief methods by which condensationoperatesin dreams."48In short, in dreams there is no respect of person, place or thing. Qualities that would, in be into different in dreams things, waking consciousness, separated people or are in do is It they this state of affairs that to confused such a way not cohere an object. that both Deleuze and Proust call a "qualitative difference." [PS 41] Because in belong to this stateof complication the psychethey are not objective, and qualities is "It As Deleuze tells to the they not reducible to a us: subject. yet are not reducible form to to of even some a psychological subjectivity, nor psychological state, nor higher subjectivity." [PS 43] These "qualities" are signs that operate between the he Freud in be the This the the of speaks of when work can seen world. psyche and "sympathy-value" images have the the that and on mnemic primary processes effects and "imitation-value" that they provoke:

While one is perceiving the perception, one copies the movement oneselfis image innervates the is, which motor of one's own that so strongly one is the the that movement carried perception, aroused towards coinciding with

139 out. Hence one can speak of a perception having an imitation-value. Or the perception may arousethe mnemic image of a sensationof pain of one's own, so that one feels the corresponding unpleasure and repeats the appropriate defensive movement. Here we have the sympathy-value of a perception. In these two cases we must no doubt see the primary process in respect of judging, and we may assume that all secondaryjudging has come about through a mitigation of thesepurely associativeprocesses. [IFreud333-334]

For example: if we see someone cut by a knife in the arm we may feel a cringe of pain and may spontaneouslygrab our own arm. This is becausewefeel the quality as between in in However, that the the the a sign operates perception psyche and world. dreams we encounter these signs detachedfrom any external object and we react to them as if they were real. These signs are "predicates" or "singularities". In Deleuze's senseof the term a quality like "to be cut" is like a "motor image" insofar but describes in it is in in the the the manner which the neither object nor subject as in have just how We is individuated that seen qualities subsist a moment. at world determine how Now in thesequalities we must complicated state primary processes. its in In the turns attention psyche objects. secondary-processes are explicated have its As is both the that actions. we airn of real and outwards and posits an object in found images for based it this then wishfulobject upon seen, selects predicates find is in It that the (perceptual-identity). that this object =x we process cathexis it To for the connection of qualities or singularities. put servesas an objective support fulfill its in for looks the that those the needs. object will attributes psyche simply, First, this means that the psyche will seek to recognize attributes in the object that is in In images. the the it link to only short, what we perceive object mnemic will

140 signs or attributes that fulfill

the expectations of wishful-cathexis. Freud

distinguishes between the transcendental thing and the perceptual qualities in the object:

As a consequence,the perceptual complexes are divided into a constant,nonunderstood, part-the

thing-and

a changing, understandable, one-the

attribute or movement of the thing. Since the thing-complex recurs linked with a number of attribute-complexes, and these recur linked with a number of thing-complexes, a possibility arises of working out the pathways of thought leading from these two kinds of complex to the wished-for state of the thing... [IFreud 383-384]

What is crucial in this passageis that the thing is not an object forjudgment; only the signs or attributes make up the perceptual qualities of the world before us. This is because the attributes or signs are the individuating factors of the object. The primary processeshave no conception of "objects," and our memory cannot store 4go ects" or "ident ies" but only qualitative differences. When we perceive differences linked in that the something, qualitative are stored memory are with the does but The images ofobjects only the qualities perceptual signs. memory not store that individuate objects. According to Freud: "What we call things are residues finds judged. " [I 334] is Deleuze being Freud This the that object =x so which evade important. This is the undetermined thing that is beyond perception and memory. It determination. individuation Kant because be thought thought requires and cannot basis it being Deleuze " On "the it Idea the calls of sensible. what of reason. calls an is locus for individuation is transcendental that the there thing that and a can we say

141 yet remains undetermined in itselP In order to justify this thing Deleuze relies on concepts taken from the work of Leibniz. In particular: the Monad. Deleuze is fascinated with the idea of a monad as a "viewpoint" upon the world. In Proust and Signs he makes it the center of envelopment in which qualities can converge in one object:

What is essential occurs when the sentenceachieves a Viewpoint proper to each of the two objects, but precisely a viewpoint that we must call proper to the object becausethe object is already dislocated by it, as if the viewpoint were divided into a thousand various noncommunicating viewpoints, so that, the same operation being performed for the other object, the viewpoints can be set within each other, setting up resonanceamong themselves... [PS 166167]

For example: the taste of tea in a past moment and the taste of tea in the present is, in Proust. That the two until work of moment are non-communicating qualities they are combined in a "viewpoint" upon the world called "Combray" that is like a is "region" insofar it the that not reducible to of world as expressesa unique monad The "viewpoint" is the to of a subject. a perception either a subjective memory or object =x

that envelops two divergent moments in time. Moreover, these two

hero Proust's in the the novel, of present perceptions of moments neither converge Combray but in happened, in that of a a phantasm actually nor a rememberedpast for Leibniz If to the that never existed. we return a moment we can seethat work of be "compossible" This is "Combray" made a world. will the example an example of in his book Deleuze Leibniz. In Deleuze's this if to on work comments clear we turn

142 reproduces an example from Leibniz of "Adam. " He lists the singularities that individuate this monad called Adam: "Here, for example, are three singularities: to be the first man, to live in a garden of paradise, to have a wife created from one's own rib. And then a fourth: sinning."49AII of thesesingularitiesor attributes resonate becausethey cohere in a single "viewpoint" upon the world. But what if a singularity appearsthat does not cohere?Deleuze describesthis:

But then a fifth singularity appears: resistance to temptation. It is not simply

that it contradicts the fourth, 'sinning,' such that a choice has to be made between the two. It is that the lines of prolongation that go from this fifth to the three others are not convergent, in other words, they do notpass through 50

common values.

This is a "divergence" in viewpoints becausethe attributes "sinning" and "resistance to temptation" cannot cohere in one monad. But still there is this Adam =x that can take on both the qualities of "sinning" and "resistance to temptation." This is the undetermined object =x

that transcends all possible worlds and all possible

divergences is in It Deleuze's that there of one are viewpoints contention viewpoints. from to that the another one monad or viewpoint pass meaning we same world and within time:

Only when something is identified between divergent series or between incompossible worlds, an object =x

individuated transcending appears

it individuals, Ego transcends thinks the giving worldly which worlds, and

143 thereby to the world a new value in view of the new value of the subject which is being established.[LS 113]

Resonance is defmed by the convergence of attributes in one viewpoint andforced movement is defined by the divergence between two viewpoints. "This convergence defines 'compossiblity' as the rule of a world synthesis. Where the series diverge, another world begins, incompossible with the first." [LS II I] If we are to speakof a second "synthesis" of time it must be in terms of this "resonance" of qualities into one and the sameobject = x. It is this synthesisthat is responsiblefor the progressive determinations of objects by constructing a viewpoint that is common to "compossible" singulailties. As the object =x becomesdetermined as a viewpoint that envelops qualities that would normally be found in two different objects, one loses sight of the problematic nature of the object = x. The question arises:if we only how do itselP the then the thing qualities of objects, perceive we ever conceive of Along with the progressive determination of compossible worlds there is also a breaks Thanatos that the resonanteffect and exposesproblems. counter-movement of As we saw above in the example of Adam who both sinnedand resistedtemptation, there are points of indecision in the progressive determination of worlds. These infinitive by Ideal Events indecision the that are expressible center around points of in indecision is locus " The in "to the the the this of verb sin. neutrality of case verb: Ideal Event. When two fragments or singularities fail to cohere this "verb" or Event become is It the this that thing apart aware of moment we at remains problematic. from its predicates as an "indeterminate" element. Deleuze describesthis as the two faces of the Idea:

144 It is as though every Idea hastwo faces,which are like love and anger: love in the search for fragments, the progressive determination and linking of the ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of singularities which, by dint of ideal events, defines the concentration of a 'revolutionary situation' that causesthe Idea to explode into the actual. [DR 190]

The first movement of Eros (love) links the fragments (qualities) into a convergent determines that the object = x. The second movement of the death instinct series (anger) counter-actualizes the object =x and causesthe psyche to turn back upon itself and question the order of events. Deleuze gives the example of the modem work of art that uses divergence and decentering to create an effect: "Perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions, with their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective displacementsand disguises, their divergences and decenterings..." [DR 293] Deleuze gives an example of a "Last Year Marienbad, remarkable movie: which shows the particular techniques at invent. divergent deploy " 294] In [DR this movie or of repetition which cinema can is to the the overall effect order of events are questioned and series are played out, fracture the viewpoint so that incompossibilities appear in one and the sameworld. The movie, as a modem work of art, is no longer about viewpoints or stories with divergences ideal it is but that the thought the events and about rather, characters; focus from it the In and qualities on enveloped a moves us short, provoke. Ideas insistence they the the to that expose. of problems and resonate singularities While the envelopment of qualities into convergent series belongs to the second divergence they the the time, actualize and problems of singularities synthesis of

145 belong to the third synthesisof time. It is this third synthesisof time that we will turn to next.

2.1 Side-cathexis inhibits the

2.3 The Freudian "thing" is like

2.5 "Intentionality" is the

connection of ideas by

Kant's object = x, it is the

directing of destructive energy

inhibiting the excitation that

undetermined locus for the

outwards by the processof

passesbetween neurons. It

connection of predicates or

"fusion. " It constitutes the

stores this energy to later signal

qualities. The structure of

object =x as an indeterminate

motor discharge.

objectivity is the basis for

unity that envelops singularities.

reflective subjectivity. 2.2 Reality-testing delays

2.4 The ego is divided between

2.6 Complication of qualities

pleasure in order to integrate it

"perceptual-identity" and

and indeterminate object = x.

into a "substantial" object. The

"thought-identity. " The object

The secondis a viewpoint or

is this object reality of

x enablesthe object in memory

monad. The modem work of art

confirmed by feedback from all

to link with the object in

explores divergent possible

the senses.

perception.

worlds.

Superego Energetics The the of c)

3.1

In Difference and Repetition Deleuze tells us: "Repetition is thus in essence

is What 106] " [DR logical. intersubjective of monado or and spiritual, symbolic, last first the terms: importance the this to symbolic and and point are us at particular is The is let First the a strange monad the monad. question: what a monad? us ask body it identify We has it because embodied or an a with cannot no place. concept it is Deleuze to body: have that tells because according us a soul. no monads subject higher but is itself in body in is "the point and of a Leibniz: a point, a soul not the point of view. with corresponds which nature, another

1 -)-)5

At first sight this does

However, have the to reduce point-of-view. a all not seem so strange; after all we

146 monad down to the point-of-view of a soul or subject would be a terrible oversimplification of the monad. There is a double ambiguity as to what subject has the predicates that constitute the point-of-view. Consider the following example that Deleuze draws from the work of Leibniz: "On the one hand, the world in which Adam committed sin exists only in Adam the sinner (and in all other subjectswho make up this world). On the other hand, God createsnot only Adam the sinner but is in in has if Adam In the the also committed sin. other words, world world which the subject, the subject is no lessfor the world. "52 Since Leibniz clearly statesthat God produces the world before creating the souls that populate this world it seems that the "subject" is a secondaryeffect of the monad. Above all, the monad is a pointis "subject" in in that the the point-ofelement only one which world of-view on have in "point back We to this a moment after we of view" will come view. illustrated it in the following story. Deleuze takes a special interest in Lacan's This is by Poe in Letter Purloined The story recounted. which a story seminar on 'police'king-queen-minister', "first second series: series: consists of two series: in it three the [DR 316] one to characters of each simply, put or, minister-Dupin"' fixed have do However, they in the not other series. series mirrors the three "letter" in that drama in the is which the characters caught up a characters: each of intersubjective the first the in of relation the series structures was purloined far "In Lacan Or in as so different the says: than as series. second way characters ma letter, they the to into the into have the peculiar movement they necessity, entered in different to functionally in relation become, the course of successivescenes, each in the is [ ] that it to that point each at say the essentialreality which constitutes. ... ... is the In 9953 becomes this where them story else. someone of each circuit, symbolic has letter the that first the queen In a the notices minister series point-of-view?

147 written and has kept from the king by hiding it in the open. The minister notices this and takes the letter. In the secondseriesDupin notices the letter that the minister has stolen and is hiding from the police by hiding it in the open and Dupin takes the letter. There is a transposition of viewpoints: the police replace the king (letter hidden from x), the minister replaces the queen (y who hides the letter in the open) Dupin and replaces the minister (z who stealsthe letter). Let us supposethat each of the two series is a monad.and x, y and z are predicatesthat inhere in the three subjects in each monad. In each casethe charactersare individualized by their predicatesx, y in But the two monadseach of the charactersparticipate in a different point-ofand z. depending view on their relationship to the letter. In fact, their point-of-view is determined by their symbolic relations with the letter. This meansthat subjectsare distributed in "monads" by their symbolic relationship that is a point-of-view. The is letter (object = x) that has no that the the transcends two only object monads fact, individuation bind it In 44 to thus that only one monad. predication" and no would the letter as object =x is the point of divergence between the two possible worlds. And the displacement of the letter from one seriesto the other (or from one monad to is disguises. This is their the to why masksor actors exchange another) what causes Deleuze says:

It is becausethis object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to it determines transformations of terms and modifications of that itself11 imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and therefore between the two presents.[DR 105]

148 In describing divergent series and the symbolic communications between series Deleuze is making a radical departure from Leibniz. WhereasLeibniz postulated only one actual world upon which all the monads converge. Deleuze postulates a multiplicity of monads that resonate across a divergent series of "worlds. " Deleuze derives this conclusion from the work of Proust in which time is fragmented into closed-off vesselsthat occasionally communicate with one another. For Proust the "One and Whole... would function as effect, effect of machines, instead of principles." [PS 163] We will seenext how the symbolic relation producesthe effects of resonance andforced movement. 3.2

Freud tells us that a symbol takes the place of a thing. But what does this

mean? A thing, in this case, is not an object. If we pay close attention to the mechanism of "displacement" that symbols affect we will seethat "the thing" is not something in the consciousnessof the reflective mind. First, let us consider the distinguishes Freud between hysterical passagewhere symbol-formation and normal symbol-formation:

But a hysterical symbol behaves differently. The knight who fights for his lady's glove knows, in the first place, that the glove owes its importance to the lady; and, secondly, he is in no way prevented by his adoration of the lady her in The from thinking the and serving other respects. of glove hysteric, who weeps at A, is quite unaware that he is doing so on account of the associationA-B, and B itself plays no part at all in his psychical life. The [I 349] Freud in has the the taken thing this place of entirely. case symbol

149 The particular importance of the last phrasebecomesimmediately is there a apparent: radical difference between a "thing" and a "symbol. " The "glove, " in the above example, is the symbol for the "lady. " But the "lady" is also a symbol for the objectcathexis of the man. In short, there is a displacement from one signifier to another signifier, but not a displacement from a "thing" to a "symbol." In the case of hysterical symbol-formation we come closer to the "thing" that is symbolized: the thing is not an object but an "affect" that is repressed.The "thing" that is repressedis an excessively intense idea that has been repressed.Freud gives this excessively intense "affect" the ability to detach itself from one idea and displace that energy on to another idea:

The term 'excessively intense' points to quantitative characteristics.[ ] If ... so, only the distribution has changed. Something has been added to A which has been subtracted from B. The pathological processis one of displacement, know in dreams-a have to primary process therefore. come such as we [IFreud 350]

In short, displacement allows one signifier to replace another signifier. However, the first signifier is not the repressed "thing" but becomes repressed because it is fetish hysteric The an object of out the a will make affect. unpleasant with associated becauseit has become the "symbol" that replacesthe repressedor forgotten signifier idea). from had "affect" the (has the "de-cathected" uncoupled that has been displaced but is by is the the that object symbol not an signified Therefore the thing "affect" This from to the floated has other. excessive signifier one that 66 affect" (object This that the displacement-effect causes = energy symbol x). of the causes

150 displacement is called "forced movement" by Deleuze. Freud calls this "forced movement" a repetition compulsion. Freud tells us that every repetition compulsion is accompanied by a repressed or forgotten idea-affect: "Analysis has led to the surprising conclusion: that for every compulsion there is a correspondingrepression, that for every excessive intrusion into consciousnessthere is a corresponding amnesia." [I Freud 350] It is on the nature of this "amnesia" that Deleuze and Freud disagree. Freud believes (at first) that the disguise of repression refers to a "real" event in te hysteric's past. If this is the case then a simple "remembering" of the repressed idea would bring about a cure. However, in Freud's text of the case of Emma there is an ambiguity that could lead to another interpretation. Without recounting the whole case history it is enough to point out the major terms of the repression in the caseof Emma. In summary there are two seriesin this casehistory: a) the sexual assaultby the shopkeeperin the first series,b) theftight at the laughter in the of shop assistants the second series.First, Freud saysof the secondseriesthat Emma experiencedfright at the laughter about her clothes by the two shopassistants: "She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-assistants(one of whom ") in kind laughing together, of affect offright. and ran away some she can remember) [lFreud 353] The two terms here are "laughter" and "clothes." According to Freud the laughter resonated with the repressedidea of the shopkeeperin the first series: "In the shop the two assistantswere laughing; this laughing aroused(unconsciously) hysterical is 354] Now, " [I Freud the the memory of what strangeabout shopkeeper. displacement is that the affect of fright should be attached to "clothes" which is a because irrational fright is Freud idea. According this to caused perfectly neutral "clothes" has become the symbol for the fright experienced during the assault: "In is it that the however, precisely element which enters noticeable our example,

151 consciousness is not the one that arouses interest (assault) but another one, as a symbol (clothes)." [I Freud 356] Now the question arises: is it the ftight that is the repressed "thing" or the idea of assault that is repressed?They are not identical becausethe assault is an excitation coming from external sources, whereastheftight is an endogenousexcitation that is linked with timeless unconsciousprocesses.This means that the fright at the assault can also be a fright from an earlier period. This has led some psychoanalystssuch as Otto Rank to observethat all trauma refers back to "birth-trauma. " This means that all the displacements of "affect" across all traumatic ideasrefer to one and the sameevent. However, neither Freud nor Deleuze idea this agreeswith of a primal trauma. WhereasFreud continuesto humor notions of traumatic events to some degree, Deleuze rejects placing the "origin" of forced movement or repressedaffect to any actual occurrence in the real world. Deleuze displacement for What Freud the completely rethinks situation of and repression. was by for becomes, Deleuze, a repression of one real series a another real series in in Why? between the the present and a virtual series past. relationship a real series Becausewhen the affect is displaced from one idea in the past to another idea in the In image in becomes idea the the the the short, event. of present mirror past present, the idea that is repressed is integrated into the present scene as a kind of ghostly impression describes it is Freud that the this though uncanny as absent. presenceeven the past facilitations of memory have on our actions in the present. This only happens,according to Freud, when we are under the influence of affects or emotions for following Freud this: the disturb the explanation that gives present. of our sense

The recent pathway succumbed in the affective state:facilitation-that

is,

involves hand. forgetting This the upper what was old-established-gained

152 the disappearanceof the power of selection, of efficiency and of logic in the passageof thought, very much as happensin dreams.Secondly,affect inhibits thought in that without forgetting, pathwaysare followed which are ordinarily avoided: in particular, pathways leading to discharge, such as actions performed in the affective state. [I Freud 357]

Freud discovered this effect becauseof a personal experienceof forgetting: "Thus, for instance, it happenedto me during the agitation causedby a great anxiety that I forgot to make use of the telephone, which had been introduced into my house a short time before." [I Freud 357] This forgetting is actually what Proust describedas "involuntary memory." It is as if we were transported back into a past, and we began to react to the present reality as if it were a past reality. This meansthat an "affect" is responsible for the process of involuntary memory just as this same "affect" is responsible for our repetition compulsions. The difference between these two "affects" is not a difference in kind but a difference in degree. The effect offorcedfrom is "image" that an or virtual object movement comes repressedalong with the has been de-cathected de-invested from In this the the virtual case affect affect. or series and has been re-cathected or invested in an actual series. The result is that knowledge. In the case of patterns of activity are repeated without conscious is displaced involuntary "affect" the on the virtual seriesand memory, resonance, or the cathexis (or investment) in the actual series is neglected in favor of a past or is The that patterns of activity are repeated with conscious result virtual series. knowledge. 3.3

Strong emotions can have one of two effects: they can strengthen the

If the the they they reality-principle. strengthen can strengthen or pleasure-principle

153 pleasure principle then memory is enhanced. If they strengthenthe reality principle then action is enhanced. This distinction is based upon a single principle: "'Reflecting' is a time-consuming activity of the ego's, which cannot occur when there are strong Qýs in the level of affect." [lFreud 358] As we have seen, the activity of side-cathexisbinds excessexcitation so that the psyche has time to reflect on what action to take in reality. However, if the side-cathexisof the ego fails to do its job then the psyche will regress into the virtual series of mnemic-images. According to Freud, a sudden rush of excitation can suspendthe attention to reality or reality principle:

By that means the releaseof unpleasurewas quantitatively restricted, and its start was precisely a signal for the ego to set normal defense in action; this facilitations, developing fresh their of guarded against experiences pain, with harder Nevertheless, the the the was of stronger release unpleasure, so easily. the task for the ego, which, with its side-cathexes,can after all only provide a bound limit, is Qýs to permit a thus to to the and up a certain counterweight 35 8] [I Freud to occur. primary passage of quantity

If there is not enough side-cathexisthen the passageof mnemic-images erupts into if However, "affect" the that the siderepressed. was consciousnessalong with be the "affect" is the mnemic-image and with along repressed will cathexis stronger, in If find its the instance case recall we the repressed expression action. will hysteric the thing last in the with a symbol, we the replaces section, where presented difference between instinct. The death the discover normal the of aspect positive will formation "normal" is hysterical the that symbol-formation symbol-formation and

154 involves a firm grasp of the "thing" being symbolized. However, in the repetition compulsion there is no "thing" that the psychecan remember. In this casethe psyche is faced with a problematic symbol that cannot be reduced to a signifier in some virtual series of memories. If the symbol is not directed to a memory then it must take as its object the "actual series" that follows the reality principle. But as we have seen, the reality-principle normally relates the psyche to external objects in the How then can it relate to a symbol that is not real? In order to relate to the world. symbol the reality principle must constitute another reality: the reality of thought. This second reality is that of language.We have seen,previously, that the indication of reality is accompanied by a psychical discharge. In the case of "eating," the discharge that signaled the reality of the food was the action of the mouth and the however, "speaking, " is discharge in In the there the case of stomach. a physical is being This basis This the the thoughts. of mouth of words spoken. reality of hysterical the process of symbol-formation process of symbol-formation resembles because, in both cases, the symbol completely replaces the thing. Words are not things and things are not words, but the principle of reality applies to them both as if "affect" if To the things. of excitations excessive sum up: words are as real as iple (side-cathexis) to ity-princ then this the reality attention excessive real reinforce in b) find behavior in find an outlet or compulsive an outlet can either a) instinct death in Deleuze language. the this of afternative confirms symbolization and thought: and or selection compulsive repetition

It seemsthat the idea of a death instinct must be understood in terms of the three paradoxical and complementary requirements: to give repetition an disguising but and power; an autonomous also principle, positive original,

155 fmally, to give it an immanent meaning in which terror is closely mingled with the movement of selection and freedom. [DR 19]

Deleuze explains the compulsive repetition as a symptom of the destructive drives to be found in the un-binding movement of the psyche. These drives are turned outwards by the reality principle and seek to be symbolized in either action or thought. The death instinct inspires the formation of thought which gives an immanent meaning to the terror ofendogenous excitations. In short,the "therapeutic" effect of the "talking-cure" discovered by Freud is to translate emotions into words and, ultimately, into a narrative structure that createsa meaning for them. In short, verbalization createsa "metaphysical" surface upon which the "affects" of the body into in turned thoughts the mind. Deleuze takes this process of "verb "-alization are seriously by making the verb the center for thought: "Speaking, in the complete sense of the word, presupposesthe verb and passesthrough the verb, which projects the " filling it ideal this the the surface. events of onto metaphysical surface, with mouth [LS 241] If we were to describe the transformation from repetition compulsion to thought then we must see it in the translation of actions into pure "verbs." Next we for in locus function "verbs" how the thought the these unconscious. as pure see will 3.4

Freud defines repressionas a failure in translation: "A failure of translation-

is 235] But " [lFreud 'repression'. known is is what this clinically as what translation? Translation is a process whereby unconscious thing-presentationsare linked with preconsciousword-presentations.According to Freud, preconsciousness "is the third transcription, attached to word-presentationsand corresponding to our in is important? Because Why 234-235] the this " [lFreud of work ego. official Deleuze the difference between "thought" (Thanatos) and involuntary "memory"

156 (Eros) is the difference between the second and third syntheses of time. In involuntary memory we discover the effect of resonance in the Freudian concept of the screen-memory. The screen-memory is an effect of repression that seeks a symbol of the past "in general" and substitutes mnemic-images for perception. However, with verbalization a new relationship to the unconsciousis achieved:rather than activate mnemic-imagesthe psychecreatesword-images of the represseddrives. This is why "translation" is so important: rather than producing an "erotic" mask of beyond the sexual resonanceof memory and producesa translation memory, moves desexualized thought-image. Deleuze establishes the difference between forced in The Logic Sense: movement and resonance or

At any rate, the forced movement is not establishedbetweenthe basic sexual infinitely larger between but the two series-eating, on the new series, rather [LS 240] hand, the thinking, other... on and one

The difference between the second synthesisand the third synthesisof time is to be found in the difference in degree ofsublimation or translation of the drives. Deleuze is 224] This " [LS "less Eros describes the synthesisof successful sublimation. as a becauseinvoluntary memory, at best, gives us a fleeting image of object-imagesthat hand, these On thought translate be the object-images can other maintained. cannot find Proust In in the them we into word-images and maintain work of consciousness. into images highly in "tea pass charged the episode of the and madeleine" which involves This brief the for of mechanisms process moment. a only consciousness forces fully do the that of disPiacement overcome not screen-memory and regression, in "allows Eros this to that Deleuze past pure If us penetrate suggests repression.

157 itself' [DR 85] he is not speaking metaphorically. He actually means that the mechanisms of repression and sexuality account for the movement of memory. But Deleuze also tells us that the "status of sexuality accounts for repression." [LS 243] When Deleuze is speaking of memory we must distinguish it from the simple recalling of mundane facts as I have a doctors appointment." These are former presentsthat "may be representedbeyond forgetting by active synthesis,in so far as forgetting is overcome." [DR 851Deleuze is referring, instead,to a passivesynthesis of memory that is bound up with sexuality and repression.This is why Deleuze says, "it is within Forgetting, as though immemorial, that Combray reappearsin the form of a past which was never present: the in-itself of Combray." [DR 85] However, we must still consider this "forgetting" as a failed sublimation or a failed translation.The translation into word-images representsa triumph of the third synthesisof time over the second synthesisof time. It is in this synthesisthat the pre-consciouscan reach down directly into the unconscious and extract pure Events. It is at this point that Freud's theory of phylogenesismakes an important distinction betweenmemory and thought. Freud discovered certain events or fantasiesthat were common amongst historical fact in be back their personal traced to not any many people and yet could from is derived Oedipus For the mythical occurrence the complex memory. example, father him. kill Freud in "Totem" tells the their the and eat us children which meal of that these pure "events" that cannot be traced back to any occurrenceform the basis hypothesis, "The to the actually originated our super-ego, according superego: of from the experience that led to totemism." [I lFreud 378] He reasons that this because from have the the external world ego mediates come occurrence cannot between the world and the id: "Reflection at once shows us that no external by id, by the be the of ego, undergone except way or experienced can vicissitudes

158 which is the representative of the external world to the id." [I IFreud 378] If the "events" represented in the preconscious did not originate from the external world then they must have been preserved in the id itself However, as we have seen,the impulses in the id remain unconscious as long as they remain as object-images. Deleuze's important contribution to the theory of sublimation is his introduction of the verb into the superego. Of the verb Deleuze says: "It representsthe event as brings it to exist in the elements of language,and, conversely,confers on expressed, these elements an expressive value and function as 'representatives' which they did have themselves." [LS 245] Again, he tells us that the "event" is expressedby a not synthesisof elements in language that would not be possible without the infinitive form of the verb that gives "sense" to language. In short, it representsaction in languagethat, in turn, makesfantasiessuch as the "totem meal" possible:to eat/to be eaten or to kill/to be killed. The verb representsthe nucleus of the primal fantasies transmitted to the superegofrom the id. Again, the superegopresentsus with a pure image of action that never occurred in actual events. Deleuze calls this image of in image for is "The the time the of gathered whole of action a symbol whole oftime: the formidable action as this is simultaneouslypresented,forbidden and predicted by the superego: the action = x. " [DR I 10] Why is this important? The importance of Deleuze's theory of the verb is that it provides an alternative explanation to Freud's theory of phylogenesis.WhereasFreud believed that the id storesthe experiencesof in "events" believes the Deleuze the that superego are expressed our ancestors, into drives destructive translated the the word-presentations. expressionsof actually This interpretation is supported by the following passagein Freud: "The struggle by brought deepest in the to the mind, and was not an end strata of which once raged is in higher " identification, now continued region... a rapid sublimation and

159 [I I Freud 379] Are not then the strugglesthat are waged in the unconscious now the objects of thought on some metaphysical surface? And is not the "verb" the representativeof all actions and passionsin the depths of bodies?Deleuze thinks so: "... it is the necessaryresult of actions and passions,although of an entirely different nature, and itself neither action nor passion: event, pure event, Eventum tantum (to kill the father and castratethe mother, to be castratedand to die)." [LS 207] To sum up: the effect of language is to put the inner life of the id on the same level as perception, so that, speech-dischargemanifestsour inner desiresin the form of pure 44events. " 3.5

We should not think of the "pure" events of thought as analogous to the

occurrences that we encounter in actual life. Events are logical entities. Becauseof this we must investigate the root of logic which is reason. Freud finds the roots of in reason the superego: "Reason and Necessity... arouse a suspicion that they still look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as a parental couple, in a mythological sense,and believe themselves linked to them by libidinal ties." [I I Freud 423] It is from links by "... Deleuze the to the negativeas that also superego reason: not chance idea destruction to of as an absolute endlesslyreiterated, negation a partial processof for in is indeed this It the the account superego sadism which of vicissitudes reason. faculty "natural" is This " [CC 126] the of question: reason a raises progression. thought or is it the product of "identification" with parental figures, as Freud thinks, history is There this Deleuze to force thinks? the certainly a of negation, as and be idea Deleuze's First, that can reason as a pure negation conception of reason. found in Kant's conception of the "constraint" of reason.In the Critique ofPractical Reason Kant describeshis constraint as both a pain and something elevating:

160 As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command (announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains in it no pleasure,but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On the other hand, however, asthis constraint is exercised merely by the legislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating, and this subjective effect on feeling... may be 54 in this called respectseýflqpprobation...

There is, then, a negative constraint of reason that seems to come from within. Second, this process of the internalization of prohibition is caused by identification and introjection of aspectsof authority figures. According to Freud: "The super-ego retained essential features of the introjected persons- their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and punish." [IlFreud

422] This process of

internalization of prohibitions can be seen in the development of children. At first a child will not restrain his natural desire to satisfy his needs despite their consequences.However, through the processof education the child is given a sense of "logical" consequencesof his actions; in short, he learnsthe logic of causality. He be learns he if he desire for immediate that the rewarded also will restrains satisfaction and considers alternatives. The child thereby delays the pleasure of in favor intellectual However, the of and satisfaction of pleasures reason constraint. developed father have "no" the the of without upon which the reason would not is is based. Freud "Kant's Categorical Imperative is This thus claims: why superego the direct heir of the Oedipus complex." [I I Freud 422] The Oedipus complex is dissolved, according to Freud, when the child internalizes the prohibition of the father. This prohibition is the source of the "negative" function in logic. The deduction is logical logically "events" be imperative of a what would categorical

161 consistent. Deleuze gives the example of "lying" in his book on Kant: "For example, if everyone told lies, promises would destroy themselves since it be would ,, 55

contradictory for anyone to believe them .

This is a great example of a "pure"

event: it is not reducible to an actual event; rather, it is an ideal event that is suspendedby the activity of logic. Further, it is derived by a double negation: a lie would negate itself because it would contradict itself (this is a lie: I am lying."). Critical reason is based upon the "sense" of the coherenceof events,and as such its object is not the objects or subjectsthat predicate events;rather, it is the copula of the subject and object. To demonstrate the total reversibility of the subject and the predicate around the verb (or pure event) Deleuze cites the following examplesfrom the work of Lewis Carroll:

Hence the innumerable examplesdotting Carroll's work, where one finds that "cats eat bats" and "bats eat cats," "I say what I mean" and "I mean what I breathe I like, " I I I like I " I sleep" when and what get" and get what say, 33] [LS have breathe, " I I the same sense. one and and sleep when

In each casethe verbs "to-eat," "to-say," "to-get, " and "to-breathe" remain the same despite the change in the order of subject and predicate. Deleuze even tells us that does because [LS 33] have is the samesense" God is' and 'God not' must negation Therefore in "is" the two the the propositions. each of verb meaning of not change the the events not and of events that predicates effects only negation we can say do their in of However, outside not exist events occurrences actual themselves. the the (for cat and mat on a mat, cat sits a example: predicates subjects and becomes domain "reason" in is that the It the "sitting"). of verb determine the only

162 the nucleus for all logical events. Now let us return to the aspect of "constraint" in reason. The fact is that "constraint" or negation tries to limit propositions to a coherent order; that is, so that they only travel in one direction. Deleuze calls this constraint of reason "good sense." Deleuze says of good sense:"It first determines the principle of a unique sense or direction in general, ready to show that this principle, once given, forces us to chooseone direction over the other." [LS 76-77] In other words, when we encounter paradoxes like the kind we examined above (I breathe when I sleep and I sleep when I breathe, or, God is and God is not) we are faced with a senseof uneasiness.We react with laughter or confusion; we are not biological Freud both this to take the time. a explains reaction as able sensesat same bring follow in to thought to an end as soon as possible: that order reasonmust rule

Stated briefly, in the non-observanceof the biological rules for the passageof be is is to it lay down the that These cathexisof attention thought. where rules directed each time and when the thought-processis to come to a stop. They from derived by they and experience, threats are of unpleasure, are protected be have logic-which to into directly the rules of will they can be transposed intellectual Thus at which detail. in the of contradiction, unpleasure proved is the than to other thought nothing testing a stop, comes the passageof is biological for the the which rules, of protection unpleasure accumulated 386] [IFreud incorrect by thought-process. an stirred up

development is Freud, to an evolutionary The activity of critical reason, according long judgment to alternatives. consider to enough suspend the organism that allows

163 However, it cannot do this without a certain amount of unpleasureor constraint. In fact, unpleasure and constraint are the same for Freud: the organism will seek to bring critical reflective thought to an end as soon as possible so that action can take the place of contemplation. If it is unpleasantto think then why do we do it? Freud's is answer the same as Descartes:suspensionof judgment is necessaryto confirm the (or Once the perception reality of perceptions. order of events)is confirmed to be real then critical thought should naturally come to an end. However, this is not alwaysthe for Next the reasons this. case. we will examine 3.6

Along with the logical force of negation there is anotherforce of negationthat

form is This the called second of negation of reason. counteracts effects "Verleugnung" in German and is in the English translation of the work of Freud as "disavowal. " This is also an important concept for Deleuze. Here is Deleuze's interpretation of this term:

For if Verleugnung is a question of maintaining the image of the phallus in in this the operation the of women, case absence of a penis, spite of but desexualization the also a consequenceof castration, as presupposesa by is it insofar of means the sexual as object sexual of reinvestment but hallucination, is Verleugnung rather an desexualized energy: not an 243] [LS knowledge. esoteric

it, image that the presence of an This operation whereby the psyche maintains brings that in be a contradiction knows about to absent perception nevertheless, between the fact The the logic. by contradiction be of painful resolved cannot One into leads two to the part parts. the split ego penis of presence and absence

164 maintains the perception of absence,and the other part maintains the imagination of presence. This split maintains two agenciesof the psyche in complete isolation from each other: the superego and the ideal ego. Deleuze tells us that disavowal is a reaction to the negation of intellect and maintains its independencefrom the superego by constituting an "imagination" that suspendsjudgment: "Disavowal is a reaction of the imagination, as negation is an operation of the intellect or of thought. Disavowal challenges the superego and entrusts the mother with the power to give birth to an 'ideal ego' which is pure, autonomous and independentof the superego." [CC 127] Much of Deleuze's book Coldness and Cruelty is devoted to the idea of an imagination that suspends judgment as to the reality of its objects. This "imagination" has its roots in Freud. In his essay"Splitting of the Ego in the Process Defense" Freud explains that, "there is a conflict between the demand by the of instinct and the prohibition by reality." [I I Freud 461] In short, the heavily invested organ of sexuality (the phallus) comes acrossthe question: is it possible to lack the leads This to a paradox within critical reason:either there is or there is not a phallus? lack. This contradiction leads to the unpleasurethat we saw above in the "biological rule" of critical reflection. The solution to this "unpleasure" of logical contradiction is the creation of a new faculty that is completely independent from reason: the imagination. Reason can still turn towards the objects of "reality" while the imagination can maintain the mental reality of objects of "phantasy." The result is that the imagination maintains pure "presentations" that are not subjectto the laws of logic: negation, reversibility or location. It is within these pure "presentations" that the "Pure event" can be maintained apart from any actualization. Ideal eventssuch as the totem meal, the castration complex, incest, the phallus, etc. can be maintained from judgment However, the when or repression superego. without any critical

165 Deleuze usesthe term "imagination" in this sense,he is not referring to the conscious imagination that we encounter in everyday life. Rather, he is referring to what Freud would call the pre-conscious. The imagination, in the ordinary senseof the term, presents us with representations.On the other hand, the preconscious imagination presents us with only pure "presentations." These presentations give "sense" or meaning to rational propositions, but at the same time (becausethey are split-off from the ego) they cannot enter rational thought. This is why Deleuze tells us that they are not reducible to any mental state: "If there is, sense, or that which is expressed by the proposition, would be irreducible to individual states of affairs, image, particular personal beliefs, and universal or generalconcepts." [LS 19] To put it simply, in every use of language what is expressedby our "propositions" is a desire or a demand of somethingthat cannot be found amongstreal and representable objects. The suspended"presentations" of the transcendentalimagination acts as a locus for this desire. However, this requires a closer examination. The key to this form of "presentation" can be found in Difference and Repetition. It is in this work that Deleuze posesthe complex nature ofproblems. Theseare not problemsthat have like 2+2=4, solutions real

but problems for which no "representation" in thought

could answer. Deleuze namesthese problems:

It would be naYveto think that the problems of life and death, love and the difference between the sexes are amenable to their scientific solutions and positings, even though such positings and solutions necessarilyarise without in they though must necessarilyemerge at a certain moment warning, even the unfolding processof the development of these problems. [DR 107]

166 If we remember that the "splitting of the ego" causedthe transcendentalimagination to become a "metaphysical surface" upon which pure events would be present, then it becomes clear that the "problems" that the faculty of reasonposesabout them are not solvable by logic. This is why they remain "problematic" and un-presentablein logical propositions, while, at the sametime, they give "sense" to these propositions. The answer to this paradox can be found in the work of Lacan. In his essay"The Signification of the Phallus" Lacan defines the nature of "demand" as being different from any empirical "need" that could actually be satisfied:

For the unconditional element of demand, desire substitutesthe 'absolute' condition: this condition unties the knot of that element in the proof of love that is resistantto the satisfactionof a need. Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second,the phenomenonof their splitting (Spaltung).

56

A "demand" of this sort is not a demand to someonefor somethingthat they can give it however, it does demand is The the not express to proposition expresses; us. what is "metaphysical Demand to the surface" or the transcendental addressed anyone. imagination that is split off from the ego and acts upon the ego as an a priori Other. Our desires are not addresseddirectly towards other people, but to our "ideal ego" that takes the place of others. The disavowed object becomes"sublimated" and gains i is in imagination. It that this the transcendental ect suspended ob objectivity a becomes the ideal to which all demand is addressed:"Disavowal and suspenseare ideal. determine " imagination, its the the and specific object: thus the very essenceof

167 [CC 128] To put this simply, despite our "intentions" of what we would like to expressto another person, the very fact of our speakingis a demandtowards an ideal. The meaning of what we are saying (the denotation, signification and manifestation) may be understood as the "intention" of our speechby another, but the "sense" of what causes us to talk is the attempt to make the pure event present.For example: in poetic language, one can read the words as intending a specific meaning, but this is not the "sense" of the poem; rather, the senseis in what cannot be said in words. fn short, the poem attempts to evoke pure "presentations" in the preconsciousmind. Now, if we return to the original point of this discussionwe can seewhy disavowal creates "problems" that cannot be resolved by critical reason. We have seen that Freud shares Descartes theory that "doubt" serves to suspend judgment until be perceptions can confirmed. But this form of critical reason is only a temporary positing of questions that immediately receive concrete answers(Descartesand his clear and distinct ideas). There is, however, another form of doubt that is not intended to be closed down by clear and distinct ideas. According to Deleuze keep neurotics questions and problems open at the price of their suffering: "Neuropaths and psychopaths perhaps explore this original ultimate ground, at the latter how former the to the the their where to asking problem, shift suffering, cost of in Rat Man, 107] Freud, " [DR this the the the also expresses case of pose question. doubt keeping have that and questioning open at all costs: of need neurotics

Another mental need... is the need for uncertainty in their life, or for doubt. []

The creation of uncertainty is one of the methods employed by the

him from isolating from drawing the for the away and patient reality neurosis world-which

57 disorder. is among the objects of every psychoneurotic

168

There is obvious displeasure in doubt, but there is also a pleasureto be gained from this suspensionof reality. Suspensionof reality is not identical to "fantasy" because fantasy belongs to the series of imaginary objects. According to Deleuze: 'The masochist experiencesthe symbolic order as an intermatemal order... " [CC 63] Or, in other words, the suspension of reality is not "daydreaming" but an esoteric knowledge (one knows and is not conscious of knowing). As such, there is no sense in The "lack" the the phallic-mother. whole point of disavowal was to of phantasmof despite in lack in With the the the this of phallus apparent maintain reality. presence in better "intellectual" the to a position understand pleasuresthat are to mind we are be gained by keeping "problernsý' and "questions" open. It is clear that Deleuze believes that one is led to think by an "obsessional" path: "There is nothing comical (or sad) in the obsessionalpaths by which a thinker passes." [LS 220] But is there not "obsessional it Is dimension the the than to thought not psychological? also another Difference In difference? Deleuze to think leads to so. seems ontological path" that keep it to Deleuze Repetition problems and questions questions what means and 44open":

Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being ofthe negative; rather, [] being being the it is the of problem and question. of the problematic, illusion the is the the epiphenomenon, appearanceor only contradiction and by open the remains which the a question of shadow problem, projected 64] [DR to that being question... as such coffesponds which a of

169 As we have seen the "being of the problematic" is maintained by the process of disavowal that forces the question to remain "open" and doubtful. The non-being is the being of the pure event that remains neutral and un-representable in the preconscious psyche because the metaphysical surface "is not at all identical to a consciousness." [LS 244] To sum up: we are led to philosophical "wonder," in spite of the displeasureof doubt, by another pleasure of a "suspension" of reality and the affirmation of pure and neutral "events" that are entities of logic and not actual occurrences. The third synthesisof time is the pure event that is able to represent everything that can happen without being reducible to anything that has happened.

3.1 The symbolic is

3.3 The "affect" (object = x) is

3.5 Events are logical entities.

Monadological. The object =x

either "acted out" or

Negation by reasontries to give

determines the connection

representedin language by the

direction to events.The pre-

between series becauseit is

production of sense.(The

logical nature of pure events

common to two monads.

talking cure.)

suspendsj udgment.

3.2 A repressed"affect" that is

3.4 "Translation" carried out by

3.6 Disavowal forms the ideal

displaced from one idea to

the verb completes sublimation

ego and is the preconscious

another is resonanceor forced

and forms the basis of pure

imagination that gives meaning

movement.

events.

to speechand desire.

Chapter 4: The Static Genesisof Time

In this last chapter we will shift our attention away from the three syntheses discussion "static Deleuze's Deleuze time. the towards time genesis" of calls what of Repetition in Difference in found be two this and particularly of and chapter can of Repetitions. " [DR 91 ] Three In short, the static "Note the on the section called in "pure the that to the psyche are reacts which events" manner repetition concerns

170 by The first forbidden the superego. presentedand part of this chapter deals with the in manner which the psyche reacts to the prohibition of these "pure events." Freud discovers three types of repetition that correspond to three static dimensionsof time or the before, during and after. In the second part we turn to Harold Rosenberg's book The Tradition of the New of which Deleuze makes use in his Difference and Repetition. Rosenbergdiscussesthe principles of characterchange,dramatic mimesis Each the and unintended results of action. of thesethree things will correspondto the three static dimensions of time. In this section we will also briefly cover Deleuze's history his to objections cyclic and claim that the "eternal return" is not reducible to traditional conceptions of cycles in time. The last section of this chapter will cover the doctrine of the "eternal return." This part will show the three static dimensionsof time at work in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It will also conclude with a discussion of the eternal return as an ethical and selectivedoctrine.

in Freud Static Repetition a)

1.1

For Deleuze the transition from a dynamic synthesis of time to a static

hand, " On the by "narcissistic there is determined the are one ego. synthesis but displacing (one the in time side of static that on another), pass empirical objects "When Deleuze in the time. that explains: there pass are no objects synthesis it the the assumes the takes objects, when virtual and real place of narcissistic ego displacement of the former and the disguise of the latter, it does not replace one the I] By II " [DR content, empirical all eliminating content of time with another. " form "empty Deleuze time. the of calls what with us presents ego narcissistic first for form time must ask: the a we moment of empty Postponing the question of

171 what causesthe ego to become narcissistic?The answer lies in the Freudian concept of "Verarbeitung" or, as it is translated, "working over." The purpose of workingover is to integrate excitations into the psyche by establishing associative links between them. In essence,its job is to displace cathexis (investment) from one idea to another so that one idea is disguised by another. However, if this strategy for dealing with excitation fails, then the ego employs another: it replaces itself for the lost object or the virtual object. To put it simply, the ego saysto itself "I am like the loved object," it thereby internalizes the loved object and also preservesit from the contingencies of presenceand absence.Freud describesthe failure of working-over and its replacement by megalomania:

We have recognized our mental apparatusas being first and foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as distressingor would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in the mind helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of excitations which are incapable of discharge outwards, or for which such a discharge is for the it is however, first instance, In the a matter of moment undesirable. indifference whether this internal processof working-over is carried out upon later if does difference the The till imaginary appear not objects. real or its being has led (introversion) to libido to turning of the on unreal objects dammed up. In paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal 79] [I lFreud has libido the to ego... returned which working-over of the

distressing in be it however dense a) This is a can worked out several steps: passage; it (displacement), idea to with another and replace the one repress mind cause affects

172 b) because one cannot act upon the traumatic idea, one instead discharges the cathexis from that idea to another (disguise), c) real objects are replaced by imaginary objects so that the psyche reacts to them both alike (interiorizing the difference between the two), d) the ego takes the place of both the real and imagined objects, thereby forcing libido to return to the ego itself (narcissism), e) the ego undergoes delusions of grandeur believing itself to be everything (megalomania). In because the ego cannot find satisfaction in the virtual object, because it is short, it its takes always absent, place as an always-presentobject. According to Deleuze, this is the "powerful" motivation for narcissism:

The essentially lost character of virtual objects and the essentiallydisguised it However, character of real objects are powerful motivations of narcissism. is by interiorising the difference between the two lines and by experiencing itself as perpetually displaced in the one, perpetually disguised in the other, that the libido returns or flows back into the ego and the passiveego becomes 110] [DR entirely narcissistic.

However this is not the end of the story. The question now becomes:what causedthe displacement of the virtual object in the first place?According to Deleuze they come from "The a from the narcissistic wound: narcissistic ego is inseparablenot only from displacements disguises from but the woven which are and wound constitutive "wound" I 10] The " [DR that its the modification. other, and constitute one side to direct is, the That to threat the is here threat the Deleuze speaks of of castration. disturbance the to describes Freud the this invested as original organ. narcissisticallY child's primary narcissism:

173

The disturbances to which a child's original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeksto protect himself from them and the paths into which he is forced in doing so... The most significant portion of it, however, be can singled out in the shape of the 'castration complex'... and treated in connection with the effect of early deterrencefrom sexual activity. [I I Freud 86]

It is because of this threat, according to Freud, that one compensates for the perceived threat (the girls' lack) by producing a fetish object that will displace the anxiety. As Freud says: "He created a substitute for the penis which he missed in females - that is to say, a fetish. In so doing, it is true that he had disavowed reality, but he had saved his own penis." [II Freud 463] Ultimately, aswe havejust seen,the fetish object is replaced by the narcissistic ego. In short, it takes itself as a fetish so that the risk of foreclosure is evacuated. This does not mean that the fetish is overcome. Instead it meansthat the fetish has become internalized and is no longer projected onto real objects: it is projected onto the "metaphysical surface" as we have seenabove. 1.2

When the ego becomesnarcissisticthe libidinal energy that would have been

invested in objects is instead returned to the ego itself It is this reversal of libido desexualization: "The Freud from that towards the ego calls objects and away transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place desexualization implies aims, a of sexual an abandorument obviously -a

kind of

libido is Concomitant 369] lFreud [I " to this there therefore. reflux of sublimation, into The thought-energy. major also a sublimation, or a conversion of sexual energy

174 difference between thought-libido and sexual-libido is that the latter binds the destructive nature of libido while the former does not. This "defusion" of the instinct causes thought to take on an aggressive nature in the form of a superego. Freud formed: how is this explains superego

The super-egoarises,as we know, from an identification with the father taken as a model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualizationor It even sublimation. now seemsas though when a transformation of this kind takes place, an instinctual defusion occurs at the sametime. After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructivenessthat was combined with it, and this is releasedin the form of be destruction. defusion This inclination the to would aggression and an by ideal harshness the the and cruelty exhibited general character of source of 396] [I lFreud dictatorial 'Thou shalt'. its -

Therefore, at the same time that the ego becomes narcissistic, the energy that is desexualized becomes the basis of the superegothat operatesupon the narcissistic forces the that harshness the is It Other. the superego and cruelty of very ego as an Freud that tells its towards us "sublitnate" to turn activities. creative energy or ego to "sublimation however; into remains a "prompts" the sublimation, the superego ego is but ideal by the be the of which execution prompted may which special process it To 89] the lFreud " [I simply, put independent of any such promptings. entirely becomes of acting capable to one only the action: creative ego superego prompts be Again, the narcissisticego may "heroically " becauseof the ideal ofthe superego. is Deleuze is This tells us: why active. but thought superego the provoking passive

175 "For while the passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity must be thought. This can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that the narcissistic ego passively experienceson its own account." [DR I 10] As we shall soon see,this modification will be the a priori form of the present,i.e. the moment of action. However, for now our question is: what does it mean for a superegoto think? This form of "thought" is a special form of unconsciousor preconsciousthought that is particular to the superego. The superego, according to Freud, is able to revive thoughts of former "egos" of its predecessors.Freud says, "when the ego forms its super-egoout of the id, it may perhapsonly be reviving shapesof former egosand be bringing them to resurrection." [I IFreud 378] To put it simply, the superegothinks according to mythical archetypes of quasi-historical past. For example: the "totem be meal" would one of the archetypesthat are not reducible to a historical event. Why is this thought? Because when the narcissistic ego is faced with this pure "event" it is forced to react to it in one of three ways: forbidden, presented and depending different in "repeats" The three on ways predicted. passivenarcissisticego its relation to this pure event. 1.3

Deleuze tells us that the "I" is fractured. What does this mean?It is directly

have " We Defense. in Process Ego "Splitting Freud's the the of of essay related to Now in to this ready we are the previous chapter. essay a meaning of already covered define the two halves of the ego. We have already defined the narcissisticego. Now is ideal ideal (ego the "ideal" The is ideal? the ego) or we ask the question: what in be "ideal" The is the identity to used the form of can that given word person. imitating be like. In like to having a model of someoneyou would everyday senseof having There two the the of are ways model. actions of the ideal one naturally repeats in idolization (as the for two, some way an as ideal: and action, model a one, as an

176 men idolize a woman). In the first casethere is an identification with the ideal, and in the second casethere is an idealization of that model. The first is what one imitates; the second is what one contemplates. In Coldness and Cruelty Deleuze associates these two ideals with sadism and masochism:

Either the ego undertakes a mythical operation of idealization, in which the mother-image servesas a mirror to reflect and even produce the "ideal ego" as a narcissistic ideal of omnipotence, or else it launches into speculative identification and usesthe father-image to produce a superegowhich in turn appoints an "ego-ideal" as an ideal of authority which brings into play forces from outside the subject's narcissisticego. [CC 130]

Either way the narcissistic ego tends to approach its ideal, the main function of the idea remains the same to give a coherenceto the ego. In itself the narcissisticego is indeterminate. it is the fon-n of the "I" that is the ideal (or a priori Other) that gives determination of that ego. For example: the question "am Ia man or a woman?" can be only answered by the "ideal" that is chosen; in itself the narcissistic ego is indeterminate as to this difference. The two mannersof relating to the "ideal" above are not mutually exclusive. According to Deleuze they form a structural whole in most psyches:

Of course, the polarity of ego and superego, ideal ego and ego ideal and the types of desexualization corresponding to them may occur together in a forms to they not only a great give rise variety of of structural whole, where

177 sublimation, but equally to the most serious functional disturbances... [CC 130]

This meansthat we can both identify with one part of the ideal and idealizethe other. However, at some time one or the other gains the upper hand depending upon our identification "Action" towards tends state of mind. and "contemplation" tends towards idealization. The first uses the defusion of the death instinct and turns it drive The defused death into form-giving to the mastery. second uses outwards a instinct against the ego itself and reduces it to a state of ideal emptiness.Either way the defusion of the death instinct is the basis of the "I" or ideal that operates upon the narcissistic ego as an Other. 1.4

Deleuze asksthe question: "What does this mean: the empty form of time or

is Traditionally the time We 88] this " [DR too must ask third synthesis? question. He Deleuze 88] the [DR "number of movement" meaning of number. plays with and Latin is the is derived from 88] [DR "cardo" also and cardinal the which word uses Deleuze, Hence, to turn. things "hinge" for "joint" according which around or a root in that things make a pass through motion which there are cardinal points hour" that "ten pass will one For means per miles time. example: measurement of there that This are time in time. that presupposes of vision through ten mile points form time the let Now of in empty "passed" time. what us consider "things" that are (and itself is its libido the the becomes of object When be. the narcissistic ego would do in time. As these pass by not objects the such, superego). archetypes explored time of all content: the empties that ego Deleuze tells us narcissistic

178 We saw above that the fracture of the I was no more than the pure and empty form of time, separatedfrom its content. The narcissisticego indeed appears in time, but does not constitute a temporal content: the narcissisticlibido, the reflux of the libido into the ego, abstracts from all content. The narcissistic is, ego rather, the phenomenonwhich correspondsto the empty form of time without filling it... [DR 110]

This is becausethe unconsciousis timelessand nothing passesaway in it. Therefore the time of the narcissistic ego cannot be measured by the passing of moments. Further, our intuition into the a priori form of empty time must be given to the is As Deleuze "The tells synthesis necessarilystatic, sincetime is us: narcissistic ego. is longer " [DR 89] Someone to that this subordinated movement... might object no here is is describing However Deleuze time. that an answerto this: and not etemity there are still "events" in this empty form of time but they do not correspond to by. Instead, happen to the then that pure ego relates narcissistic passed and are events " We by "caesura. determined this in the time pure examine will events a mode of division of time next. 1.5

In The Logic of SenseDeleuze has high praise for Freud's book Totem and

Taboo: "Totem and Taboo is the great theory of the event... " [LS 211] The theory of in division the is "event" the book that the to static this marks that the event refers in Deleuze After. this During Before, into clear makes division of time and Difference and Repetition:

The determines in I a series. the an order, a whole and The form of time division the during the before, of after marks and formal static order of

179 narcissistic ego in time, or the conditions of its contemplation. The whole of time is gathered in the image of the formidable action as this is simultaneously presented,forbidden and predicted by the superego:the action = x. The temporal series designates the confrontation of the divided narcissistic ego with the whole of time or the image of action. [DR I 10]

In order to make sense of this we must first ask ourselves: what the "formidable action" or "image of action" is and what effect it has on the ego? Freud provides an interesting answer in his book Totem and Taboo. In short, he tells us that the "event" that is forbidden is also desired:

Since taboos are mainly expressedin prohibitions, the underlying presenceof apositive current of desire may occur to us as somethingquite obvious... For, after all, there is no need to prohibit somethingthat no one desiresto do, and be is forbidden is thing that the that thing a greatest emphasismust with a 58

desired.

Again we see that the "event" is both desired and feared. This conflict expresses itself in two forms: repression and the return of the repressed. Because it is Freud, But, in to "event" the according question remains unconscious. contradictory dreams in its because the "event" know of normal this the effects of we see effects we people:

by findings into the take to at arrived Suppose that we were account ... that to the dreams from ourselves effect we people, normal of psycho-analysis

180 are subject, more strongly and more often than we suspect,to a temptation to kill someone and that temptation produces psychical effects even though it 59 remains out of sight of our consciousneSS.

This means the effect of the pure event is often felt in the lives of normal people and yet we are not consciously aware of it. For example: we may take an instantdislike to someone and immediately have hostile feelings for him for no apparent reason. However, the reasonfor this reaction can be found in the similarity they bear to some repressed desire. Perhaps that person reminds us of a persecuting father figure be in dreams. This encountered only our would an effect of the unconsciousevent that both presentsus with a desire and a prohibition. It is this effect that Deleuze calls the "Before" or the act that "is too big for me." The static genesisof the "Before" is form behavior. This indecisions than of static and self-defeating our nothing more " "fate described "failure felt in Freud itself time makes neurosis. neurosis" or as what Freud describes this neurosis as events that recur in our lifetimes and that appearto be the same:

have human the have Thus we relationships all of whose come acrosspeople in time is benefactor a after anger abandoned who same outcome: such as a from differ however they one by each of his protigis, may otherwise much ingratitude; bitterness doomed the taste to of thus all seems who another, and friend; by his in betrayal the friendships man who or end all the man whose or into life his in a position of raises someoneelse time after time the course of himself interval, then, certain a after and authority public or great private lover by him the each or, again, one; a new replaces that authority and upsets

181 of whose love affairs with a woman passesthrough the same phasesand reachesthe sameconclusion. [I I Freud 292]

This is the mode of repetition that Deleuze describes as the repetition the of static genesisof the "Before. " In this repetition one unique event in the unconsciousplays itself out in actuality again and again without the person undergoing the repetition knowing its source. Deleuze describesthis as a comic repetition becauseof the twin themes of "misrecognition" and "disguise" (a comedy of errors). Like king Oedipus who questions "Who killed the king?" or Hamlet's question, "Should I kill the king?", both of them are struggling with an unconsciousevent that they do notfeel equal to. Becauseof the contradiction between desire and prohibition the pure event fate if the the effects of person even there is no consciousnessof this event. The is in unconsciousevent played out action, according to Freud: "Suppose,again, that we were to recognize the compulsive observancesof certain neurotics as being guaranteesagainst an intensified impulse to murder or as being self-punishmentson account

of

it., Yý60

In short, a repetition compulsion is the result of the "image of

in first for " Deleuze being big "too the the three this of repetitions makes me. action" the static genesisof time:

The narcissistic ego repeatsonce in the form of the before or lack, in the foryn form in for big is the time (this Id too of an me); a second action of the infinite becoming-equal appropriate to the ego ideal; a third time in the form id (the the the the ego, and of superego the prediction after which realizes of 10-111] be [DRI themselves the annihilated)! agent, will the condition and

182 We have examined the first "repetition" of the Before; now let us examine the repetition of becoming-equal. Becoming-equal is simply a matter of "identification" with the ego ideal. In Totem and Taboo Freud identifies "identification" with the totem meal: "The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion What is clear from this passageis that one only gains the strength of his strength.1-)61 to carry out action by identifying with the aggressiveand prohibiting father. This is known in psychoanalytic terms as "identification with the aggressor." process Freud briefly talks about this phenomenon in Beyond the Pleasure Principle:

If the doctor looks down a child's throat or carries out some small operation on him, we may be quite sure that these frightening experienceswill be the but in the subject of next game; we must not that connection overlook the fact that there is a yield of pleasure from another source. As the child passesover from the passivity of the experience to the activity of the game, he handson the disagreeableexperienceto one of his playmates and in this way revenges himself on a substitute. [I lFreud 286]

In this example we see the repetition of the "During, " as Deleuze calls it. The difference between this repetition and the previous repetition of the "Before" is that is longer The is both no pure event this new repetition active and conscious. The "play" in the but " 44 mechanism of suspends action. realized rather, repressed, dramatic that the to by express allows child mimesis a up setting prohibition Notice in that people will gladly forbidden and painful events a neutral environment.

183 accept all sorts of violent and repulsive acts as "entertainment" that they would not accept in reality. This is becausemimesisallows for the suspensionof all "reality" of the situation by placing the action within the frame of "drama." This is why Deleuze tells us we must become the actor of our own events:

Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengagesfrom it an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events-a counter-actualization. [LS 150]

This is also why Deleuze is so fascinatedwith sadism and masochism:becausethey take the unconsciouseventsthat are prohibited and repeat them in a dramatic setting of the masochistic contract or the sadistic suspensionof scenesof cruelty. In short, they suspend the prohibition of the superego by placing them in an amoral framework of mimesis. This is possible becauseof the fracture of the "I, " in which, the identity of the agent is the ego ideal and not the ego itself The ego takes on the role of the Other, or the identity of the ideal (the father or mother, king Oedipus, Hamlet, etc.). By suspendingaction in the repetition of a role the action takes on a timeless character. For example: Hamlet is a timeless character that is manifested each time the play is produced, and yet the action is superficial and ideal insofar as feels "Hamlet. " in The to the each performance refers archetype actor no remorse because he is detached from (as the the role. part of a murderer a person) playing However, as we will see next, there is a third repetition of the future that eliminates the previous two. 1.6

In Difference and Repetition Deleuze makes the remarkable statement:"For

form itself law than that other empty signifies nothing the practical of time." [DR

184 II I] Our task is now to make senseof this. Deleuze conceivesof the repetition of the future as being one of "annihilation. " This annihilation is carried out by the death instinct but not in the way that Freud thought it did. Our desire is not to die because this is contradictory to the death instinct's purpose as a drive of self-preservation. Instead Deleuze identifies the function of the death instinct and the superego (the moral law) as eliminating introjection or projection. In short, they seekto make us a "body without organs." Deleuze explains that the purposeof the body without organs is to be complete by eliminating all introjection or projection: "What is opposed is body rather an organism without parts, a without organs, with neither mouth nor anus, having given up all introjection or projection, and being complete, at this is The " [LS 188] This psychoanalyst not a completely unfounded proposition. price. Andre Green makes a similar observation in his book Life Narcissism Death Narcissism:

This is the quest of non-desire for the Other, of non-existence,non-being; immortal is than The immortality. to more never ego another way of acceding

is body. Such has the longer it it of case that or organs any no claims when bodily her) his (or dependent be needs and to on the anorexic who refuses die, himself letting inhibition, drastic by as these a of means appetites reduces one saysso aptly.

62

They incidental. are essential Green's observations about the anorexic are not for desire to objects (although exaggerated)aims of the superego:namely, reduce our but death the does the organism of physical the seek In not superego to zero. effect,

185 only the psychical death of the desiring subject. Andre Green explains this negative narcissism as a desire to make oneself free from sexual desires:

Instead of sustaining the aim of unifying the ego through the activity of the sexual drives, negative narcissism, under the influence of the Nirvana principle, representing the death drives, tends towards lowering all libido to 63

the level zero, aspiring for psychical death .

In short, if the organism eliminates tension it will not have to seek out objects to from its it. be independent It It sensualneeds. will neither project satisfy will wholly desire (such feel introject desires into to the the as of need object others nor sexual food) into itself. In part, Freud recognizes this effect of the superego as a pure is, it in holding is death "What the instinct: as the super-ego sway now culture of in it in fact instinct, death the often enough succeeds and were, a pure culture of driving the ego into death... " [I I Freud 394] The repetition of the "future" seeksto Deleuze id. Thus fi7om impulses the can say: any ego and an of any need eliminate " be themselves the id annihilated)! "(the agent, will and the ego, the condition and law? In the do have the does to What 111] moral this 10or [DR I practical with law describes the Kant the as moral effects of Critique of Practical Reason one of desire for to This or a perfection moral being a desire for moral perfection. quest demands the the to inclinations of that from adhere can free oneself one so sensible categorical imperative -

beyond duration that our even extends requires an endless

life. In Kant's own words:

186 All that can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this participation would be the consciousnessof his tried character, by which, from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the better, morally and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same,however long his existence may last, even beyond this life, and thus he may hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future existence, but only in the endlessnessof his duration (which God alone can survey) to be perfectly adequateto his will ...

64

This "endless duration" is the straight line of time according to Deleuze. Commenting on this text by Kant, Deleuze explains how this infinite quest for moral debt" is "infinite that one owes to the superego: perfection an

from the viewpoint of a progress that continues to infinity in its ever increasing conformity with the law (sanctification as the consciousnessof limits This the in of our path, which exceeds perseverance moral progress). life and requires the soul's immortality, follows the straight line of time, inexorable and incessant,upon which we remain in constantcontact with the law.

When time is out ofjoint, we have to renounce the ancient cycle of

death, infinite the follow in the to faults and expiations order route of slow 65 deferred judgment, or the infinite debt.

for in traditional cultures acted as a payment As we will see, the cycles of time be be the grant and appeased would gods and made in " could ('sins, which, a sacrifice

187 reprieve. But with the vision of an infinite straight line of time there is only the ideal of total death of the ego, that end of the line that never arrives. As such, it is the pure "event" of the future. The repetitions of self-denial and continued adherence to rational "law" have the pure event of death as its goal. Notice, that this is not physical death as Freud believed, but an "impersonal death" that never happensto anyone. Deleuze distinguishes between two types of "events" called death in Difference and Repetition:

One is personal, concernedwith I or the ego, somethingwhich I can confront in a struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which causeseverything to pass.The other is strangely impersonal,with no relation to 'me', neither present nor past but always coming, the source of an incessantmultiple adventure in a persistentquestion... [DR 112]

I can think of my physical death as a disappearanceof my animated body from the world. I can have anxiety about it, or I can think of a world in which others will see dead. is But is thinkable the radical absenceof thepsychical desiresand me what not impulses that make up the ego. This radical impossibility led Kant to postulate an infinite progress beyond life in which this "impersonal" death of non-desire can forever be postponed. Like the "false" ending of The Trial by Kalka, that Deleuze do justice because it does "indefinite Guattari to tries postponement" not protest, and 66 to make impersonal death coincide with personal death. We must imagine Joseph K. as continuing the trial even after his death. The infinite straight line of time demands that there be an "ideal" event of death that motivates the repetition of death in the unconscious. This "death" that is repeated in life is recognized by Freud as

188 forming the basis of the reality principle. He explains that the repetition of our renunciat on of pleasure in the present is centered around a mythical future event:

A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time. But the impression by endopsychic made this substitution hasbeen so powerful that it is reflected in a special religious myth. The doctrine of reward in the after-life for the - voluntary or enforced - renunciation of earthly pleasuresis nothing in 41] [I I Freud this the than mind. revolution other a mythical projection of

What is heaven if not the extinction of all desire and the concomitant sense of death impersonal death is it? Psychical the that as a pure comes with completeness it More in inspires the astonishingly, the repetition of renunciation present. event that is "the source of problems and questions" [DR 112] becausethe reality principle immediate immediate and allows the solutions to of satisfaction postpone us allows death (heaven), ideal then If there keep were no questions andproblems open. us to "repetition forms the of Myth of repetition think! also are religion and we would not he There Repetition. in Difference and faith. " Deleuze is quite humorous about this line limit infinite does it the straight that the not "faith" condition only on will allow a that time existence to all of give would by placing a redeeming end of time 95] faith" [DR "the truth of " Instead, he proposes the eternal return as 44meaning. limits the indefinite on idea setting without postponement becauseit maintains the of the the "grace" idea atheist and motivates the still of line of time. He tells us that the ever grace of possibility has about the pessimism atheist's believer who still arriving:

189

We have too often been invited to judge the atheist from the viewpoint of the belief or faith that we supposestill drives him in from the short, viewpoint of grace; not to be tempted by the inverse operation -to judge the believer by the violent atheist by which he is inhabited, the Antichrist eternally given ýonceand for all' within grace. [DR 96]

If we are to call the repetition of the future a "faith in the future" it must be on account of the pure event of "grace" (non-desire) that will never arrive in the 44present. " Instead, this pure event of the future inspires the repetition of our questioning, that is, of leaving questions etemally open. (Not even in our physical death will the question be closed.)

1.1 The ego becomes

1.3 The "ideal" comes from the

1.5 The repetition of the

narcissistic when it takes itself

deftision of the instincts. Two

"before" (failure neurosis) in an

for a fetish that compensatesfor

forms: identification (sadism) or

image of prohibited action. The

castration anxieties.

idealization (masochism).

repetition of the "'during" (sadism) in identification with the aggressor.

1.2 When the ego becomes

1.4 Two types of time:

1.6 The body without organs is

desexualized the narcissistic

empirical time in which events

non-desire not death. This

libido defuses and becomesthe

in time and unconscious pass

requires an infinite time to

superego. This motivates

which events are static.

achieve the moral law. This is

sublimation and thought.

the third repetition of selfannihilation.

190 b) Static Repetition in Rosenbergand Cyclic History

2.1

We must keep in mind that in the "static" genesisof time the "before" is not

the past. The "before" is defmed by the ego's relation to the event and not its place in time. In short, if one has notyet acted, then - even though we always empirically live in the present - we are living in the a priofi past. Deleuze makesthis clear:

In effect, there is always a time at which the imagined act is supposed'too big for me'. This defines a priori the past or the before. It matters little whether or not the event itself occurs, or whether the act has been performed or not: past, present and future are not distributed according to this empirical has done has Hamlet Oedipus the so, not yet already carried out act, criterion. but in either case the first part of the symbol is lived in the past, they are in the past and live themselvesas such so long as they experiencethe image of the act as too big for them. [DR 89]

He uses the examples of Hamlet and Oedipus in an astute way: Hamlet has not yet in "before" is living he the fwst king in the kill the had the nerve to the play so part of had he father, his killed had Oedipus not Yet already moment, and even though just is the "before" factor distinguishing the it. So accomplishing not the of realized it. In being to it to being to it is understand order realize able or equal also action; The by Rosenberg book Harold to the turn to Hamlet act we must able not was why "Character the did. In Deleuze just the New and change chapter Tradition of the as his by "character" changes drama" Harold Rosenbergconsidersthe process which a but by towards all at once. enlightenment, a slow progress "identity" in a drama, not

191 To investigate how this happensRosenbergturns to the example of the law and how it recognizes individuals:

The law is not a recognizer of persons;its judgments are applied at the end of a series of acts. With regard to individuals the law thus createsa fiction, that of a person who is identified by the coherenceof his acts with a fact in which they have terminated (the crime or the contract) and by nothing else. [TN 136]

An "individual" is not a "person" but rather, the individual is a drama or seriesof actions that leads to ajudgment of character. In short, the law converts personsinto "symbols" that representthe whole of their lifetime and the coherenceof the actions life. difference between Rosenberg that tells that the the person and the within us individual is the difference between action and being:

So that dealing with identities rather than with personalities, the law is into histories by do willfully converting persons with so only enabled to its law, like In the emblems of unified actions of a given order. other words, failure being between discrepancy from the of the and action, victims, suffers his [TN 138] in to individual to role. the confonn every respect

is impulses full that is thing not at all The "person" of contradictory a concrete before has "unity" the ideal is that "individual" The an an abstraction unified. individual These law. two and are the sameas the aspectsof person judgment of the impulses; its is the On the " on "I. the contradictory ego with one side ftacture in the

192 other side is the ego-ideal with its idealized image of unity. Now, if we consider how a character in a drama can undergo identity change, it is clear that the "person" does not change but only the "ego-ideal" or the means by which judgment identifies the character. Rosenberg gives the example of a criminal who is suddenly found innocent:

To begin with the legal instance:the fact of the crime organized... the acts of the criminal and interpreted them. For the law he lived by that fact alone. Were it suddenly discoveredthat no crime had beencommitted, the coherence of his actions would collapse and the prisoner, having been converted in an instant into the hypothetical and undefined figure of an innocent man, would no longer exist under the eye of the court. [TN 143]

The criminal is now divided into before and after. The change is a "caesura" or identity divides by the time that of the character in one changing sudden reversal blow. We have seenhow identities changeaccording to a static order oftime; now let into is divided Hamlet. The "Hamlet" two this to the play character of us apply distinct sections: before the sea voyage (a Hamlet in self doubt) and after the sea him happens What is to (a Hamlet capable of make who capable of acting). voyage identity he lacks because is "before" Hamlet The the an self-doubting of action? is he "event" to is he that to the accomplish. called upon not equal structure: Rosenberg argues that Hamlet does not think becausehe is an intellectual, rather he identity: lacks he because an thinks too much

193 The argumentative, self-analytical Hamlet of "non-action," describing himself in every speech, and using speechas a substitute for deed, is very much the figure of a personality, of a being insufficient for, becauseirrelevant to, the dramatic role offered to him. Hamlet has all the qualities required for action; he fit lacks is identity him the to be a character in what structure which would a drama, a one-nesswith his role originating in and respondingto the laws of his dramatic world. [TN 146-147]

Hamlet, in short, is incapable of saying I am... " or he is not able to seehimself as having an identity. His persistentquestion is "am IT or "to be or not to be?" Because he does not know his "role" in the order of things he questions why he was bom. This is a typical neurotic reaction: "who am 17' All the person who is not defined by "I impulses filled he is is knows identity as that such with conflicting structure an forsakes he Hamlet it. " Moral to fear I desire this and yet when clarity only comes his himself fully to his role. impulses over gives the conflicting personality and of he because the described act over be replays hesitation Hamlet's a as repetition can describes Deleuze this it in he because his in action. cannot repeat speech and over kind of repetition as the repetition of the "Before":

in default by defined is Before a or At a first level, the repetition of the does because know, does because one not one repeats one manner: negative the is action because performing of capable not one not remember, etc: or [DR is be performed or already performed). (whether this action remains to 295]

194 But where is this repetition coming from? It is Hamlet's not will that repeatsbecause his repetition is involuntary or obsessive. According to Deleuze it is the Id that repeats:...One' therefore signifies here the unconsciousof the Id as the first power of repetition. " [DR 295] This obsessionof the Id causesthe whole sceneof the play to become "haunted" with the image of action to be accomplished.The theme of death and murder keep appearingbecauseHamlet is unable to makethe "event " conscious. As Deleuze tells us: "this unknown knowledge must be representedas bathing the whole scene, impregnating all the elements of the play... at the sametime the hero cannot represent it to himsetf - on the contrary, he must enact it, play it and repeat it until the acute moment that Aristotle called 'recognition'. " [DR 15] The whole play is full of disguises and false starts. For example, the murder of Polonius is mistaken for the murder of the king. This is described as a "comic" repetition by Deleuze becauserepetition with a lack of knowledge can only result in mistaken identity: "At in dream first, level, hero Before, the that the the though and a of as repeats another in a bare, mechanical and stereotypical manner which constitutesthe comic... " [DR 296] When he murders the wrong person Hamlet is in a "dream" state, totally (or influence he is doing: he is the compulsion of a repetition under unaware of what is identity His the to fate too repetition compulsions overcome weak neurosis). a from the Id. Therefore he is not yet equal to the event. 2.2

To become equal to the event meansto engagein a dramatic mimesis. As we

identity. In he lacks because to is the to Hamlet order an act unequal saw above, identity. Deleuze he to become equal to the action must succumb a suddenchangeof in identity the takes that of present place of this change sudden calls the 64 caesura: metamorphosis"

195 The second time, which relates to the caesura itself, is thus the present of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act (this is marked by Hamlet's sea voyage and by the outcome of Oedipus's enquiry: the hero becomes 'capable' of the act). [DR 89]

In the play Hamlet becomes equal to the event by facing death at sea. It is realizing his own mortality that makes him aware of himself as an identity. Deleuze usesthis quote from Henry Miller: ...I realized that I was free, that the death I had gone through had liberated me."' [DR 19] This "caesura" also has its roots in religious Rosenberg talks about religious rituals like "baptism and eucharist" [TN 144] rituals. that involve a symbolic death and rebirth with a different identity. These rituals are rather mundane today but their original meaning of death and sacrifice were very finds in in drama: Rosenberg these themes real. also operating characterchange

To present identity-replacement in a credible manner the dramatist must imitate the experience of religion and subject his character to the ordeal of death. [

] In a word, dramatic death and regenerationneed not be involved ...

in faith; there is the death-laden incident; then occurs a transfer of identities [TN 145] faces behind figure, the the mask. a changeof single within

In the play, Hamlet is invested with "this 'dangerous' new ability to act" [TN 148] let dangerous, in have I thy "Yet his by is which something me that signified words: his is longer Hamlet 1] In to 5, " [Act fear. no acting according short, scene wisdom Next for dramatic his has he instead will desires; we a role. will exchanged own

196 investigate this "something dangerous" that Hamlet spoke of To understand "becoming capable of action" in Deleuze's senseof the term it is necessaryto turn to the chapter in Harold Rosenberg's Book entitled "The ResurrectedRomans." In this chapter he examines the nature of the French Revolution, particularly the manner in which the bourgeoisie used the myths of the Roman Revolution to carry out their own revolution. The question that Rosenberg's theory answers:why do revolutions break out when they do? Often the social conditions for revolution are there long before the moment of its outbreak. What are the essential conditions that make people capable of heroic actions?Rosenberg's answer is that, whether they know it or not, the historical actors are replaying themes of history. Rosenbergsays of the in actors the French revolution:

They imagined they were performing the part set down for them by eventsof their own lives-their action became a spontaneousrepetition of an old role. They imagined they were playing themselves-they were but mimicking the [TN 155] history's hero old on one of playbills. engraving of a

This is the repetition of the "During" according to Deleuze:

The repetition of the During is defined by a becoming-similar or a becomingbecomes to becomes the equal one action, of performing capable equal: one Ego, 'one' the the image the the of the unconscious now signifying action, of its metamorphosis, its projection in an I or ego ideal in the form of the second 295] [DR power of repetition.

197 For the bourgeois in the French revolution the "ego ideal" that they preconsciously identifying were with was the "heroic" ideal of the Romans.They saw the Romansas embodying strength and courage in a timeless fashion. Neither Rosenberg nor Deleuze is suggesting that the bourgeois were consciously planning to imitate the Romans; rather the imitation was "spontaneous" and not planned.Deleuze even says that, "Repetition is a condition for action before it is a concept of reflection." [DR 90] This means that historians may afterwards draw comparisons with the French but Romans, the and at the time of the revolution there was no intended imitation. The Roman revolution was an unconscious archetype for those who imitated it. It image provided an of action that would give meaning to their actions in the present. However there is a problem with this: it appearsas if "identification" with the past is Platonic in inspiration. Mimesis is the means by which "identity" is imposed on historical actions. Rosenberg's theory is similar to Platonic reminiscence in this identification following Deleuze the this the criticism of nature of makes respect. with the originary identity:

However, since to become similar or equal is always to become similar or is itself, identical in be is to to that to supposed or supposed equal something image it identity, the that the of the appears originary of an privilege enjoy identity for here becomes the only similar or equal stands action to which one [DR 295-296] 1. in the the concept general, or of of

identity imposing interpretation is this upon to Rosenberg not adverse of mimesis as is fact, the In and certainty possible action makes what actions. persons and historical identity imposition the the actors. that provides of of ambiguity curtailment

198 According to Rosenberg the "hero" is dead even before he mounts the historical stage. His actions appear as already accomplished in the eternal ideal:

That the hero is "dead" means that he moves entirely in the completed, that the contingencies of his existencewere ended before he mounted the stage. Hence he is totally defined and at one with his deed-unlike the living with their vacillations of desire and their dilemmas. Men recognize in him not themselves but the embodiment of a part which they shall have to play as if they were wholly given to it. [TN 157]

The whole point of mimesis is to stop "becoming" and to freeze action in an eternal instant that becomes the symbol for the whole of time. Defeuze uses these words (equal to the whole of time) to signify that the historical actor is not just repeating something in his own personal memory, but rather something that he never lived is in The "cosmic" touch through. memory that purports actor with a personally to gather all of time together in a single heroic act. When he does this he is forsaking his own will for a historical will, or what he believes to be a destiny. This is why Deleuze saysthat the repetition of the "during" is a repetition of the whole of history in a single act:

This second repetition of the During is one in which the hero himself him disguise the on a and assumes metamorphosiswhich re-places embraces depths his inner identity, his the memory and that of of tragic plane, with own he become having in that, purports action, capable of the whole world, order [DR 296] time. be the to of to whole equal

199

This means that when the historical actor is actually undergoing the action he is not aware of anything actually happening. He is aware of the eternal drama that he is participating in only in an abstract manner. We must consider this stateas the kind of state the Mircea Eliade described as a reenactmentof mythical archetypes:

For traditional man, the imitation of an archetypical model is a reactualization of the mythical moment when the archetype was revealed for the first time. Consequently, these ceremonies too... suspendthe flow of profane time, of duration, and project the celebrant into a mythical time, in No tempore.67

If we consider the historical actor caught up in the enthusiasm of mimesis as a in insistence Deleuze's that this then celebrant a ritual, we can easily understand 44event"is a symbol of the whole of time. Even Rosenberg recognized that the in "absolute" to order to throw themselvesoutside of revolutionaries appealed an

time:

Action required the absolute ("ideals and art forms") and passion,and these had bourgeoisie To to throw from the their the revolution make past. came did This historical through they their themselves out of situation. actual the to time two that and coalesce of segments caused spontaneousrepetition [TN 165-166] in the to eternal. present vanish

200 Indeed this mimesis is a "repetition, " but it is a repetition of a model. Becauseof this, it cannot for Deleuze be the ultimate form of repetition. Next we will see how this repetition o the "identical" has an unexpectedresult. 2.3

In the third "repetition of the future" Deleuze tells us that the self and its

identity are swept away by a resurgence of multiplicity. In the tragic or heroic found itself image (its equal) but in the course of undergoing the mimesis ego an of metamorphosisthe ego losesthe very identity that it sought. Deleuze explains:

As for the third time in which the future appears,this signifies that the act possessesa secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smashit to pieces,as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersedby the become it birth: has the the to gives self shock of multiplicity which what is fractured itself in I In is this the to the which manner, unequal equal divided is Self the to time the according to the which and order of according temporal series corresponding and finds a common descent in the man 1, family, the or self without qualities, without without name, without 'plebeian' guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered 89-90] image. [DR the sublime members gravitate around

What is significant in this passageis that Deleuze tells us that it is as if the ego, that is "the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersedby the shock of the hero is if it through birth. In " the went who to as short, which it gives multiplicity is that identical to the is that one a result not with tragic metamorphosis confronted he intended. The whole point of mimesis is to "reverse" the order of time so that an

201 4coriginal"state of things can be brought about. This is true of traditional cultures that bring "renew to to time" perform rituals and about the return to a perfect beginning. They have a cyclical conception of time and seethe ritual asthe meansto bring about a reversal of misfortune. However, the "tragic" metamorphosis is now confronted in "straight line time" of which nothing can be reversed. Harold Rosenberg with a has from that the ancient Greek notion of "static" recognizes something changed dialectics and that, from the attempt to "reverse" time, springsan entirely new event:

Operating through the tragic mechanics of mistake and recognition, the historical drama of "the resurrected Romans" does not break down into a Reversal but results in the creation of "something entirely new," bourgeois has dialectics Greek Into tragedy the enteredthe principle of of static society. evolution with its "leap" of the emergentevent. [TN 160]

Along with the caesurabetweenthe non-action of the first repetition and the mimesis is that the the which repeated: existenceof second repetition, we must recognize of is "new" Deleuze the "new" that the tells product the absolutely us event. emergent of all repetition:

in that We produce something new only on condition we repeat - once the in the of present the more once and past, constitutes which mode in is itself, is the Moreover, absolutely new what produced, metamorphosis. by the time this but third excess, the repetition, turn nothing repetition: 90] [DR future the as eternal return. repetition of

202 The third repetition is the excessiveor the unintended result of repetition. In this case it is no longer the "subject" or the ego that repeats; rather, it is now time itsetf that repeats. Rosenbergarguesthat there is no true repetition in time itself, that repetition only appears in the imagination of the hero that thinks he is repeating a past event:

Through the effect of time, represented in action by the continuity of class struggle, upon the historical plot, the hero's repetition of the past becomesa repetition in appearanceonly; the permanentoperation of changepermits no true repetition, as it permits no Reversal. [TN 160-161]

However, Deleuze's senseof the term "repetition" necessarilyincludes difference. For Deleuze the so-called repetition of an archetype in platonic mimesis is only repetition in appearanceonly because"identity" does not allow for repetition. For example: if something is exactly identical how can we say that it can reoccur a second time? Archetypes take place "once and for all" or one time only, and all apparent repetition is false becausesomething "identical" can never leave itself to be repeated.Another example: if everyday we awoke and all the eventsof the previous day and the day before were repeated identically, how would we know that we were it experiencing a second or third time? We would have no basisto saythat there was because is difference "second" time there that would allow us to make that no a judgment. Therefore repetition necessarily implies difference. This is why the identical historical The intends in the the the actor mind of actor. mimesis only exists is because difference. This but the of the nature repetition of necessary enacts object, Rosenberg: According to time. of

203 While the heroes keep repeating the past as if they were acting out an eternal in form drama has into the their time plot, of a continual modification entered of the situation. And this subterraneanchange in the historical situation determines what the outcome of the action and its meaning shall be. [TN 160]

This means that the intention of the historical actor does not determine the form or is irruption It the this meaning of resulting action. of multiplicity of becoming, which is inherent in time itseýf which shattersthe image of the action that the ego identified itself with. Deleuze notices this samephenomenonin The Logic ofSense in the series "Good Intentions are Inevitably Punished." It is here that he describesthe Oedipus impulse or complex as a well-intentioned action that has unexpectedresults. It is in this series that Deleuze marks the split between the becoming of the depth and the "intention" as being a surface projection: "It is in this sensethat Oedipus can be depths, being from Far Semblance... the the tragedy an agency of of understood as intention is the phenomenon of the entire surface, or the phenomenon which So, 207] " [LS the to the physical surfaces. coordination of adequately corresponds depths the the the two ego of surface where screens:one on action takes place on identifies with an "ideal" action that will unify its fragmentary existence and the becoming of actions that have unexpected results in the depths. From this we must destroy the of "third" surface must the genesis that static of repetition conclude "the implies has third this man Deleuze that told us repetition "good" intentions. 90] " [DR I, the family, and or self without qualities, without without name, without What force the the to result. of unintended way the give must ego-ideal surface of form: fmal "the in its is in the the denial event pure ego-ideal the reality of replaces Between [LS 213] " the the the event. or effect surface passions, and actions result of

204 second and third static genesisof time there is always a tension betweenthe intention and the result. The result opens up the world without subjects,where actions appear to produce themselves despite our intentions. Deleuze describes this as, "the movement by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal, and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned." [LS 213] Mimesis is proved to be ineffective in the straight line of time because the irreversible nature of time always intrudes upon the intentionality of the ego. The ego is confronted by its actions as if they were alienated labors: all products of the will take on a life of their own. It is when we are confronted with the uncanny nature of the product that we tend to seethem as "signs" or symptoms insteadof products of the will. It is at that moment that time itself usurps the role of creator of the new: no longer is it the "artist" that is expressedbut only the independenceof artwork itself. 2.4

Deleuze criticizes the notions of temporal repetition that are found in cyclic

theories of history. The first of the cyclic repetitions that he critiques in Difference involves intracyclic intracyclic: "An is the Repetition the repetition, which and the first in the two one and repeat or rather, one another ages repeat manner which in implies form [DR 93] This that " 'thing', to of cycle come. act or event yet same

form This is is "thing" that there of repeated. some each of the series of repetitions in between is based an event one cycle and upon a series of correspondences cycle belongs lives" "past this type to The in theory of of cycle. another event another life by in is life in "sin" is belief debt a Kannic that another repaid a past a a cycle. is the than the one the rather victim one where event of a repetition or punishment in This which a universe the presupposes of repetition notion act. who commits by be debts " a repetition "just, that repaid can and partial are meaning everything is

205 of the same. This form of traditional repetition gives meaning to suffering and thereby transforms the meaning of history. According to Mircea Eliade:

The sufferings of one's present life are not only deserved-since they are in fact the fatal effect of crimes and faults committed in previous lives-they are also welcome, for it is only in this way that it is possible to absorb and liquidate part of the karmic debt that burdens the individual and determines 68 his future the cycle of existenceS.

In this vision of cyclic history, pain is meaningful becauseeverything is equal; in this is in is is However, this way nothing pointless existence,and guilt unnecessary. all of based upon analogy. The "payment" of debt is never a personal repayment to the form but only an abstract of payment to an abstract metaphysical person wronged, debt In the and the cycle of payment remain external to cycle of system. conclusion, first between Only "idea" the the of payment establishesa resemblance one another. time (of contracting the debt) and the second time. Furthermore this "first time" is debt: for idea based it is there hypothetical the that a every pain upon since remains in short, every pain is a motivation to find a repetition. This is not, in fact, a debt imagined into in but the an presentcycle a projection of the pain repetition at all is There ideal The in a previous cycle. and abstract. resemblance,therefore, remains is debt idea The repeated the and of punishment cycle. previous of no memory This in fault knowledge becausethere is no a previous cycle. or no consciousnessof form of cycle correspondsto the first repetition that Deleuze spoke of- the repetition is because in karma believer haunts there debts image The the no before. the of of the previous cycle. of recollection

206 2.5

The second type of cycle that Deleuze examines is the cycle of historý

discovered by Vico: "A cyclic repetition in which it is supposedthat, at the end of the third age and at the end of a processof dissolution, everything recommenceswith the first age: here, the analogiesare drawn between two cycles (Vico). " [DR 93] Vico's conception of history is based upon a detailed analysisof the ascentsof civilizations and their downfalls. In this case there is a historical record of the previous cycles. According to Vico there are three ages:the age of gods, the age of heroesand the age of men. Ultimately, after the last age the civilization would destroy itself (or be destroyed) and the cycle would start again. The trouble with Vico's theory, from Deleuze's standpoint, is that in the searchto supply order to history Vico neglectsthe differences between civilizations. Therefore, all of his "cycles" are based upon drawn analogies only in the mind of Vico about the course of history. It is easyto set up a structure and to make history conform to it; it is another thing altogetherto say that history itselffollows a pattern or a law. According to Deleuzethe repetitionsthat historians notice are those repetitions that do not actually belong to history itself-

The first time being regarded as the Same,the question is askedwhether the be identified first displays the to the as with resemblance sufficient second Same again: a question which can be answeredonly by the establishmentof in into judgment, the taking variations account relations of analogy within French Paul, (is Luther the the analogue of empirical circumstances Revolution the analogue of the Roman republic?). [DR 294-295]

Who decides if one event is sufficiently "similar" to another event to determine if historical between difference is There the actor's is a clear there an actual repetition?

207 conception of his own actions and the historian's conception. The historical actor is unaware of the repetition as being identical; it is only the historian that places the judgment of identity upon it. What the historical actor is aware of is the "heroic" symbols and archetypesthat haunt his imagination. It is not history that repeats.It is the judgment of historians that draw resemblancesbetweenhistorical events.There is difference between mimesis and historical resemblance.In mimesis the "once a and for all" nature of the heroic symbol is not reducible to some event that happenedin the past; rather, it is a timeless image that haunts the sceneof action. The historian, however, looks at two separateactual occurrencesand draws analogies.This is why Deleuze says:"The question whether the first time escapesrepetition (in which case it is referred to as 'once and for all'), or, on the contrary, is repeatedwithin a cycle or from one cycle to another, dependsentirely upon the reflection of an observer." [DR 294] If the observer is within the action, then it will appear differently than if it is from the historian's armchair. To conclude, the cyclic repetition of Vico observed corresponds to the "tragic" repetition of the "during. " It differs from it insofar as reflection differs from action. History is never written from the point of view of those undergoing the action; rather, history is an afterthought. 2.6

Nietzsche's conception of the eternal return cannot be reduced to either of

the above cyclic conceptions of history. First, the karmic conception of cycles history karmic debt is that then presupposes when all paid, will come to an end and final into "Nirvana" This that a state of or nothingness. means a state of vanish be denied Nietzsche this possibility: achieved. expressly equilibrium would

That a state of equilibrium is never reachedproves that it is not possible.But in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached. Likewise in a

208 spherical space.The shape of spacemust be the cause of etemal movement, and ultimately of all "imperfection. " [WP # 1064]

The karmic notion of the repayment of debts is a notion that presupposesa process balanced. Then when the reactionary is the whereby world made perfect or conception of "justice" is placed within a cyclic history it seeksto bring an end to future Nietzsche's suffering at some point of equilibrium. conception of the eternal fact "moral" In the moral progress excludes possibility of or a purpose. return Nietzsche tells us that, in order to endure the thought of the eternal return, we need "freedom from morality" [WP # 1060] and an "abolition of the 'will"' [WP # 1060] so that all notions of personal fault and expiation must be eliminated. As for Vico's "same" it history, the the or eternal recurrence of presupposes conception of "similar" occurrences within tiume.Vico is attempting to impose a "law of nature" becoming. "being" is imposing history. He becoming the on the characterof of upon Moreover, he is proposing to evaluate two different occurrences in history and how Nietzsche following In the "equivalence" impose an shows passage upon them. his idea of the etemal return is opposedto this type of thinking:

is to being-that the becoming will the impose supreme To characterof upon to the the falsification, spirit, of the Twofold sensesand part of on power. That is is, etc. equivalent, that which abides, which which of preserve a world becoming to is a of the world a of closest approximation everything recurs to From the attributed being: the values mediation. of Point world of --high becoming, discontent after such with being proceed the condemnation of and

209 a world of being had first been invented. The metamorphosis of what has being (body, God, ideas, laws of nature, formulas, etc.) [WP #617]

Vico's conception of cyclical history has the character of placing "being" or identity upon becoming. First of all, it is a formula of analogy between cycles. Second,it is postulated as a law of nature, and third, it stabilizes the nature of things by postulating an identity of that which retums. Nietzsche's vision of eternal return, on the other hand, is the closest approximation that we have to this world of becoming. Why? First of all the eternal return is not a historical proposition: Nietzsche never tries to prove his hypothesis by appealing to "similar" recurrencesin the history of mankind. His is a cosmological theory about the tendency of energiesto re-form themselves in a series of combinations: "The law of the conservation of energy demands eternal recurrence." [WP #1063] Since it is basedupon "conservation of energy" his theory wholly concerns the ability of that energy to re-create "combinations" [WP # 1066] that will recur again and again. Therefore it is not based "similarities" between upon occurrences in the mind of any historian. Nor is it theories of "equilibrium" in which differences cancel each other out (karma). He specifically calls it "the great dice game of existence" [WP # 1066] in order to illustrate its difference from the classical notions of cyclic history. Deleuze hypotheses do in tells that these two specifically cyclic of recurrence not return the us eternal return:

This superior repetition, understood as an eternal return in the third state, is hypothesis intracyclic is both the to and to needed correct precisely what in hand, hypothesis. In the the the one repetition cyclical effect, on contradict

210 the first two moments no longer expressesanalogies of reflection, but the conditions under which eternal return is effectively produced by means of some action or other; on the other hand, these first two moments do not return,) being on the contrary eliminated by the reproduction of the eternal return in the third. [DR 93]

To make this clear we must distinguish the two different levels that the divergent conceptions of eternal return and cyclic history are on. Cyclic history presupposes two things: analogy in judgment (the recognition of identical occurrences)and the concept of a personal "will" (the notion that ill will is balanced by punishment in another cycle). On the other hand, the etemal retum, as Deleuzeconceivesof it, does not include the return of "judgment" or the "will. " For Deleuze, the eternal return is an "energetic" hypothesis about the return of "differences" or the pre-individual for conditions perceptions. If I may use an example drawn from Leibniz: the soundof a wave is made up of many little sounds of each drop of water. Now, according to Deleuze's hypothesis, what returns in the eternal return is the sound of each little drop of water and not the sound of the wave itself In us, what returns is all the little in impulses the organism and not the "will" of the person. What returns contradictory in the mind is all the contradictory "presentations" in the preconsciousand not the imperceptible is " "molecular" In "judgment. the and short, what returns negation of differences that make up our world and not the "molar" or recognizable forms of in islands is " The is "returns. This things. of order a eternal return a seriesof what seaof chaos: the combinations return, not the thing.

211 2.1 The difference between the

2.3 Mimesis only exists in the

2.5 The cycle of Vico is based

"before" and the "during":

His the actions actor. of mind

upon the analogiesofjudgment.

having an identity rather than a

take on an unintended meaning.

This is basedupon the mimesis

personality.

This is the autonomy of the

of the "during. "

result. 2.2 The "during" is dramatic

2.4 The cycle of finite debt is

2.6 The eternal return opposes

mimesis in which the actor

basedupon the idea of justice. It

both a final state ofjustice and

plays an "eternal" role.

remains an abstract repetition of

the identities of analogy. Only

the "before."

the petite perceptionsreturn.

Eternal Return Static The Repetition and c)

3.1

Deleuze also finds examples of these three static repetitions of time in

Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The static genesis of the before, during and doctrine the the be in Zarathustra's to the of return eternal of reaction seen after can Zarathustra's Deleuze first that tells by Let the us reaction. us start considering same. first reaction to the news of the eternal return is one of disgust and loathing and that before: "repetition" the the this constitutes of static

in before, the is book the mode of a taken largest The the with up part of 'criminal idea for (compare big is the of defect of the past: this act too me fear Zarathustra's God, death or blame', or the whole comic story of the of but fruits 'your you are are ripe before the revelation of the eternal return 92] [DR fruits'). for your not ripe

Such hear the is the to case was news. This is the reaction of someonewho not ready death God. Nietzsche the that the says of in the story of the madman who announced

212 news has come too early even though the event of the death of God has already happened:

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment... I have come too early... my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men.69

The news of a terrifying event that implies a complete nihilism (or the destruction of all meaning) is either greeted with laughter or anger. The "eternal return" deserves the title of tremendous "event" because it is always shocking to those who first consider it seriously. BecauseZarathustra takes the news seriously he has problems coming to grips with the news. At first he misconceives of the eternal return as a return of the "same" things. This is his "most abysmal thought": the idea that all the things that annoy him, all the petty and stupid frustrations of existencewill come again. Deleuze explains this first conception of the eternal return as being one of the 46same')') or the "similar":

As he explains later in interpreting his nightmare: he fears that eternal return means the return of Everything, of the Same and the Similar, including the dwarf and including the smallest of men... He particularly fears that be by default: that one only negative and will occur will only repetition is deaf, lame dwarf, because and one a perched on the shoulders repeatsonly is incapable because (the death God), of an one act even of of others; or though the act has already occurred. [DR 298]

213

In short, Zarathustra conceives of the eternal return in "moral" terms. All the bad things that happened in his life will happen again and again for an infinite number of times. Who could affwm this? Even if one wanted to affirm this, one's biological principle that seeks only pleasure would revolt against this. One could only halfheartily affirm such a "return. " This is Zarathustra's reaction: "'Eternally recurs the man of whom you are weary, the small man'-thus yawned my sadnessand dragged its feet and could not go to sleep." [Z 219] He is haunted by the possibility of the "small man" and the petty annoyancesof life returning (he could not go to sleep). It like "the him small man will return... the small a nightmare: repeating weighs upon by his inability Deleuze he himself " to this. accept sick man will return... and makes is Zarathustra the the that eternal return problem of with confronted when notices it is denies he that a circle: again,

That is why Zarathustra denies that time is a circle, and replies to the dwarfholds he '. By do too 'Spirit of Gravity, contrast much! not simplify matters 298] [DR directions. in line is two that time a straight opposing

describes Zarathustra have few actually This is a surprising fact that noticed. people the directions different in present. at meet only two and time as two paths that go off different two Zarathustra Riddle" eternities of speaksof In "On the Vision and the time: line time) (as of future circle a and not of a straight the past and the

214 Behold the gateway, dwarP [ ] It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no ... its has followed to end. This long lane stretches back for one either yet long lane is And there, that the out eternity. another etemity. [Z 157]

It is at this point that the dwarf interjects "all that is straight lies... All truth is is itself is " [Z 158] It time crooked; a circle. at this point that Zarathustragetsangry with the dwarf and accuseshim of making things too simple. Why does Zarathustra is the that time get angry at statement a circle? Is it becausehe fears the return of the "same thingT No. Becausehe goes on to say that "whatever can walk-in this long lane out there too, it must walk once more." [Z 158] It is becausehe is beginning to understand the eternal return as the return of the "path" and not the return of the dwarf who "cannot" walk becausehe is lame. Therefore the path returns, but only that which can walk (that is, affirm the retum) will retum. 3.2

Deleuze defines the moment when Zarathustra becomes capable: "Then

Sign', 'The the the when the metamorphosis, caesura or moment of comes Zarathustra becomescapable." [DR 92] At the end of the book Zarathustralooks up for him is ideal that ideal) are (an that this others and alone and realizes ego at a star happiness, deep ideal): "You do eye of great star... you not realize the sleeping (they if And they for had be those happiness shine? you whom you not what would your had and given and come in and awakened their you after even chambers stayed he "sign" that He 324-235] this " [Z as a sees distributed, how angry would you be! Zarathustra's This " his that previous "go of in all to follow to means work. order can hesitations are at

his time with He the after wasting again mountain ascends an end.

he his that must true and He they that companions below. not are realizes the people higher these "Well they then, by sleep, still himself taking action: to strive overcome

215 I men, while am awake: theseare not my proper companions. [

]I want to go to my ...

work, to my day: but they do not understand the signs Of MY morning; my stride is for them no summons to awaken." V 325] Deleuze compares this moment to Hamlet's sea voyage. Zarathustra forsakes the "comic" misunderstandingsof his encounters with different characters in a drama of misrecognition and takes on a heroic role. This is why Zarathustra is like Hamlet according to Deleuze: "Zarathustra is like Hamlet; the sea voyage has made him capable, he has reached the becoming-similar or the becoming-equal of the heroic metamorphosis;yet he feels that the hour has not come... " [DR 298] The heroic metamorphosisis only the beginning. Zarathustra feels that he must struggle and that his struggleshave not yet come to an end. He speaksof his "most abysmalthought," namely the eternalreturn, that he does not have yet the strength to summon:

Alas, abysmal thought that is my thought... Your gravity was alwaysterrible lion's for day find but I the the voice to and one shall yet strength enough me; far, I have And I then that also want to overcome myself once summon you. in is overcome myself what still greater; and victory shall seal my perfection. []

As yet the hour of my fmal struggle has not come to me--or is it coming

just now? Verily, with treacherous beauty sea and life look at me. [Z 162163]

But what does it mean to overcome oneselP In order to answerthis questionwe must lists the he Power Will in The endure his us make to can what where turn to notes thought of the etemal retum:

216 To endure the idea of the recurrence one needs:freedom from morality; new fact the means against of pain (pain conceived as a tool, as the father of is there pleasure; no cumulative consciousnessof displeasure);the enjoyment of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism, as a counterweight to this fatalism; extreme abolition of the concept of necessity;abolition of the "will"; abolition of "knowledge-in-itself " The elevation of the consciousnessof in strength man, as he createsthe overman. [WP # 1060]

This is the answer to "what would give us the strength to think the eternal return?" First, eliminate the idea that "events" are good and bad: this means that we must reevaluate pain and pleasure,thereby making pain an affirmation of life. Second,we must not seekto plan our lives according to a set and intended path: we should have no idea what our life will turn out to be, no goal or aim. Third, we must abandonour faith in the "identity" of things: this means that all logic of identity and abstract differences. Recall by be conceptions of reality must replaced a concrete synthesisof the quote above: "Verily, with treacherousbeauty seaand life look at me." [Z 163] Life is the treacherous beauty of the sea: it is under no control of the will. It is indifferent to our pleasure or pain, and it is unknowable in itself If we can acceptthe by drops that then (like beauty the the of water) treacherous of multiplicity sea of But this the thought have the to retum. the etemal of strength affirm means we can in to "heroic from our overcome seek we the which struggle" of stage shift means a dissolved. At the stage these are already to weaknesses where stage a own weakness becomes that "overman" we becoming-equal the ego-idea an "during" the the or of by but dissolved, is is "overman" the is the who one But this paradox: to a seek copy. is This for identity. it is why an mistaken being an ideal for the heroic mimesis,

217 Deleuze says: "Nevertheless, the becoming-equal or becoming-capable of the metamorphosis has only brought him to supposedoriginary identity: he has not yet banished the apparent positivity of the identical." [DR 298] In order to overcome oneself one must also overcome the "overman" as an aim to be achieved. For as long as the heroic metamorphosis takes place in the repetition of the "during, " it will always have an aim that is "identical" in itself The paradox is: the aim of be metamorphosismust to overcome the "aim. " 3.3

Deleuze tells us that the "third moment" of the "after" is missing from Thus

Spoke Zarathustra because Nietzsche did not finish this work. Looking at Nietzsche's outlines for the work Deleuze concludes that he planned it but never it: "The third moment remains absent: this is the moment of the actually wrote revelation and affirmation of eternal return, and implies the death of Zarathustra." [DR 92] We have seen,in ThusSpokeZarathustra, the moment of the "before" when he has nightmares about the return of the small man and the secondmoment of the "during" when he affirms the straight line of time where not everything returns, but "selective" is lacking is is "after" the the a eternal return presentedas where what doctrine. What do we mean by calling the eternal return a "selective" doctrine? On by it, have to level, the strength affirm gained we mean that only those who one be the have as that selected the can seen above, we weaknesses eliminating 46overmen.,,On another level, we must see the process of "combinations" as a This "select" itself. return. elements which the combinations of repetition selection in is why Deleuze says: "The highest test is to understand the eternal return as a It [DR 298] " being. in the as selective return eternal thought, repetition and selective into being. To the third repetition of move is both a selective thought and a selective being by be the of selective replaced the must return "after" thought etemal the of the

218 the eternal return. In short, it is no longer a question of having the strength to affirm the "thought"' of the eternal return. Now that one has the strengththe thought is no longer important. What is important is the experienceof the return as an impersonal process. It is in the moment of the afTirmation of the "return" that the whole thought of the eternal return is rendered uselessand absurd. This is why Deleuze says"it is doctrine but the simulacrum of every doctrine... " [DR 95] Having a belief or a not a faith in a doctrine only makes senseif one has an "aim, " as one does in a heroic metamorphosis.In this "third" stageall doctrines are treated superficially and are not taken seriously. In this last stage there is a realization that all doctrines and beliefs dice "great that the only game of existence" are only symptoms of weakness and [WP # 1066] has any importance. This is why Deleuze describesthe "comedy" of the Overman asjoyfully nihilistic: "The eternal return is only for the third time: the time is drama defined (the the drama, the tragic the the when after comic and after of " [DR Overman). becomes the joyful becomes the the tragic comedy of comic and They idols his treats "tragic" are The 298-299] very seriously. man of metamorphosis Nietzsche himself But he is transform by the means able to take action and which "last "small " The "go or man" lists him as among those who must perish and under. (the the is incapable he because of repetition is of action man" the one who repeats is the "one to one the heroic perish" wants who before); the great or man active and during) (the the and become-equal of to the in repetition to action who repeats order do they Deleuze that tells not in time. third us the both these must perish of yet indicates the "(Nietzsche carefully the "selective" test return: eternal the of survive last and man, the or test: the do man small passive distinct types who not survive two 'who to become has the wants man the great heroic active man, the one who that Nietzsche's man keeping in sentiment is with This 299] [DR " perfectly perish').

219 is something to be overcome: "What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an is he is in be ioved that an overture and a going under."' [Z 15] end: what can man The heroic man of metamorphosis is just a stage on the way to the overman. But keeps from "man" what achieving the stageof the overman is his vanity. The heroic metamorphosis demandsthat the ego maintain an "ideal" of itself by which it unifies its "identity" in the image of action. The hero is like Narcissuswho falls in love with image he in is the a mirror and what sees mirror the sublime image of himself In the chapter "On those who are Sublime", Nietzsche tells us what the "soul's secret" is:

Indeed, you that are sublime shall yet becomebeautiful one day and hold up a beauty. Then desires, to mirror your own your soul will shutter with godlike is be in For this the soul's secret: there and adoration even your vanity. will in dream by her, is hero has the the she approached a abandoned only when overhero. [Z 118-119]

The secret is: only when one has abandonedher (the sublime image) will the image be opposed by the "overhero." In short, Nietzsche is telling us that heroic mimesis by being "selected" from the keep liabilities eternal idol that us will and worship are it is because does ideal image a it To return the not ourselves of put simply, retum. fiction of our imagination. Only the "real" returns, only the multiplicities of "idea" form, " .. "image of a the or that not return, make up sensations singularities ... is "the (or future a not the after") this Deleuze that of tells new repetition thing. us 'one' "For impersonal eternally, but repeats "someone" repetition: an repetition of individualities impersonal and pre-individual but 'one' now refers to the world of is the individualities the impersonal of world This 299] [DR " of world singularities.

220 44unequal"or the dice game of existencethat has no final aim. There are images no of this "dice game" only a continuous metamorphosis of energy. The heroic metamorphosis was mistaken as to what its aim was. It sought to be equal to an image; insteadwhat Deleuze tells us is that we must become-equalto the "unequal." This is what Deleuze says must happen to Zarathustra: "Zarathustra-hero became equal, but what he became equal to was the unequal, at the cost of losing the sham identity of the hero." [DR 299] Essentially, this involves a replacing of the "idol" of mimesis with the "being of the sensible." What does this mean? According to Nietzsche it is a "monster of energy" [VvT # 1067] that is "a seaof forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendousyears of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms... " [WP 41067] and this is also the world that Deleuze calls the innocence of becoming upon which no blame can be cast and no guilt accrued. Becoming-equal to the unequal means that we make first But to this ourselves strong enough affirm chaos. requires our giving up our ego-

ideal. 3.4

The repetition of the "before" is essentiallya triumph of "reactive forces" as

Deleuze usesthis term in Nietzscheand Philosophy. What are the "reactive" forces? They are the forces that seek to preserve the self and its organism at the price of forsaking all will to overcome the self In The Will to Power Nietzschequestionsthe instincts: the self-preservative supremacy of

be individual life long for the is might the E.g., that which of useful individual the its that which preserves to splendor; and strength unfavorable hand, On its the halt a other time evolution. the and arrest same might at

221 deficiency, a degeneration, can be of the highest utility in so far as it acts as a #647] [WP to stimulant other organs.

The drive for self-preservation is an "incomplete nihilism" becauseit seeksonly to eliminate those things that threaten the survival of the organism and the self This is "before" be the the why repetition of must considered as a reactive force of selfpreservation. For example: the repetitions of king Oedipus's questioningis due to the drive to preservehimself from the "traumatic" realization that he is the murderer he Another Hamlet his the seeks. example: questions meaningof existencebecausehe is his life kill king. Thesetwo examplesare "reactive" because to to the unwilling risk they turn the energy that should be used for action against the will to power and instead seek to silence the will so that the action will become unnecessary.In short, Hamlet seeksto "talk" himself out of action and thereby turns his active forces(those that seek to kill the king) into reactive forces (those that contemplatesuicide). As a "before" hesitant the that in is the Hamlet seeks trapped of repetition a result discharge of action but at the sametime turns that impulse to action into a reactive According to doth Thus all! of us make cowards conscience obsessional thought. Deleuze what Nietzsche hatesabove all is this hesitant obsessionalthought:

little the Nietzsche: disheartens the in compensations, One thing the world is joys that little one granted once, only little pleasures, the and everything day the done be condition the on only next Everything that again can once. it the I whole before: day up tomorrow give be it will the that said like permit those who And women old are the we obsessed. ceremonial of 68-69] [NP like them. think themselvesan excessonly once, we act and

222

Hamlet keeps saying to himself- I will do the deed tomorrow but he never does. The "test" of eternal return is a means by which this obsessionalhesitation is put to an end. Deleuze seesthe test of the eternal return as a reformulation of the categorical imperative: "what ever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal " [NP 68] An obsessivethinker who hesitatesto act, when he askshimself the retum. question whether he would like to live that moment of indecision an infinite number of times, brings his self doubt to a point of crisis. Given the choice of an eternity of doubt or an eternity of action, the obsessiveperson will chooseaction (even if it self his life) bear burden than the of an eternity of hesitation.The test of the risks rather "eternal return" gives him an image of his own action under the light of eternity, and thereby promotes the vision of an ego-ideal upon which he can become-equal.In become-equal Hamlet "eternal" his to by can a action, as an action short, envisioning the role that destiny has set out for him. He would have exchangedthe "no" of judgment that has kept him from action for the "no" of the deed that drives him to from to is nihilism. For Nietzsche active transition this an nihilism passive a action. it find do those not He says: "It is the condition of strong spirits and wills, and deed. " No demands the the Judgment': No of their the nature to of possible stop with has that the to negation happens another #24] When the [WP this will act negation of "self-destruction" describes this of Deleuze hesitation. a as "negation" of negatesthe "Only the complete from can return keep eternal forces that acting: us the reactive By themselves. and because it of reactiveforces makesnegation a negation nihilism itself the and longer conservation as expresses in the eternal return nihilism no In 70] " [NP short, destruction, their but their self-destruction. as victory of the weak by is and active an destroyed is Hamlet replaced hesitating and a weak and

223 determined Hamlet. Hamlet's words: "My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth! " [Act 4, scene4] According to Nietzsche all attempts to escapethe passivenihilism of weak values cannot be achieved without the active and nihilistic destruction of those values that make us weak: "Attempts to escape nihilism without reevaluating our far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute." [WP #28] so values Deleuze believes that the answerto incomplete or passivenihilism is the complete or active nihilism of the eternal return:

And if the eternal return is the most extreme form of nihilism, nihilism itself (separated or abstracted from the eternal return) is always an "incomplete it is. far it however Only however the eternal goes, powerful nihilism"... 69] [NP the nihilistic will whole and complete. return makes

for it the because is "incomplete" to tries incomplete An compensate nihilism it. For justifications ideals, by upon aims, and placing aimlessnessof existence "false "hell" fears because king kill the hesitates and the to of of example: Hamlet his "source" These king. the killing of are values a the against prohibition spirits" and like Hamlet if However, hesitation. someone incomplete of nihilism relative and he hesitation, turn doubt would that "eternal and of the think recurrence" to of were image follow instead the from him keep and that action from those values weak away When infinite times. "return" of number to he an that will would of the action "prohibitions" are those of values denuded meaning and aim all of is existence the function thought the of is the of Nietzsche this main According to suspended. is, it form: its as in teffible existence thought most this "Let think us return: eternal 'the finale nothing: of any without inevitably recurring yet aim, or without meaning

224 eternal recurrence. "' [WP #55] In this phaseof the thought of the etemal retum, only the image of an "action" being accomplished for an "infinite" number of times remains. This is a powerful motivation for the second static repetition that Deleuze describes:the repetition of the "during. " 3.5

The essential point of transition from the repetition of the "before" to the

repetition of the "during" is the displacement of the negative and destructive forces away from the self and towards an external object. The becoming-active of forces means that the forces that were turned against the ego are now transmuted into the will to mastery and the will to power. Freud was clearly inspired by Nietzschewhen he wrote the following lines:

The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfills the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards soon help the of a special organic system,the muscular apparatus- towards with destructive instinct is in The then the the called external world. objects instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to power. [I I Freud 418]

Freud's interpretation of the "will to power' correspondswith Deleuze's conception in is the " The "during. moment secondmoment of repetition of the repetition of the in forces that neurotic symptoms are were manifested which self-destructive the in takes kind "acting-out" into the of place object external transmuted which of a doubt. ) Freud himself killing instead king kills (Hamlet the with of slowly the ego. This 418] lFreud [I " is "This identifies this movement with sadism: sadism proper. in " One "absolute. is rejoices is an as the affirmed negation whereby process sadism In the the world. over the destruction of objects as an affirmation of one's own power

225 eternal return one "affirms" the eternal return of one's sense of mastery over things through active negation. The thought of the eternal return intensifiesthis experience of mastery: not only does one master the object, but one also thinks of oneself mastering the object an infinite number of times. This constitutesthe "repetition" of the during. According to Deleuze this is the affirmation of negation itself. "In and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutesitself into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomesa power of affirming, an affirmative power." [NP 71] What is striking in this repetition of the during is that all thought of the previous repetition of the "before" is eliminated. When mastering the object in a negating action, the whole thought of hesitation, haunted the consciencebefore, is completelyforgotten. It is as if there were no which "before" or no hesitation before the act: the affirmation of one's masterybecomesthe only repetition that is affirmed in the thought of the eternal return. (One imagines oneself accomplishing the "image of action" an infinite number of times at the same time that one forgets that one ever hesitatedto act.) This is why Deleuze claims that the "reactive forces" of self-doubt and self-destruction do not return: "The second following: is in thus the the the eternal return produces eternal return selection becoming-active. It is sufficient to relate the will to nothingnessto the eternal return in order to realize that reactive forces do not return." [NP 71] Essentially,when the it hated it forces its destructive things that the takes turns about all outwards ego itself before and projects them onto the object to be destroyed. In Coldness and Cruelty Deleuze tells us that the superegoprojects the ego onto its victims: "the faced it is its it into the always victims, ego and projects sadistic superego expels In " [CC 126] itself destroying again and again... something outside with the task of

226 Difference and Repetition Deleuze describesthe confrontation with "stupidity" that reachesa point of crisis:

madness arises at the point at which the individual contemplatesitself in this free ground - and, as a result, stupidity in stupidity and cruelty in cruelty it longer to the itself. that 'A facility point can no stand then emerges pitiful in their minds, that of being able to seestupidity and no longer tolerate [DR 152]

It is the test of the eternal return that throws a light on our stupidity, so that we come to a point at which we can no longer stand it. At that point we project our own stupidity onto the other and destroy them at the sametime that we destroy stupidity in ourselves. This is why Deleuze tells us that: "Laziness, stupidity, baseness, longer be its that own eternal return would no would will cowardice or spitefulness the same laziness,stupidity etc." [NP 69] When the thought of thesedespisedthings it did Zarathustra) (like haunts infinite times we expel us number of returning an "stupidity" This in destroy from "ego" them things these an other. and actively our does not return as "affirmed. " What returns as affirmed is the feeling of masterythat Nietzsche Gay Science The In "negating" these have stupidities. when we are we Christian the his sermon Socrates over stupidity against sermon and champions diametrically the They selfishness against sermon opposed: are against selfishness. beyond the to be go "everyone strive equal" and no one should must says that that taught our the stupidity the against 44 sermon normal; while ground" of "equality" our with the from of opinions accepting our mindlessly misfortunes come belongs the to of "weak" is that repetition first The values sermon one of neighbor.

227 the "before" in which we cannot act becauseof our consciencewhich is really the mindless acceptanceof the values of others. The second sermon of Socratesagainst stupi ty as the source of our misfortunes belongs to the repetition of the "during" in which stupidity becomessomethingshameful (the acceptanceof "common" valuesis shameful) and we are enjoined to overcome these stupid values. This is the opposition of philosophy to common sense.Nietzsche tells us that philosophy does harm to stupidity: "What is certain, however, is that it deprived stupidity of its good 70 hanned conscience; these philosophers stupidity.,, This is what Deleuze tells us is at the basis of becoming-active: we turn againstthe "reactive" forces of stupidity and bring shame to them. We turn our negative and destructive energies towards destroying or doing hann to these "stupid" values. The activity of thought is, therefore, essentially destructive and negative for Deleuze. Deleuze describesthis stupidity as the "transcendent element" that cannot be thought. He takes up Heidegger's proclamation that what I most thought provoking is that we are not yet has "this Deleuze is that, this the thinking: unthought says essenceof stupidity. become the necessary empirical form in which... thought at last thinks the be thought in the transcendent can only element which words, other cogitandum; ('the act that we do not yet think' or 'What is stupidity?'). " [DR 153] In short, does not return. stupidity 3.6

lead third to the "stupidity" the destruction The of all values revaluation or of

in the destroyed is the " What of "after. repetition static essentially repetition of the "equality" herd The and universal of is values "during" the ego-ideal. common by is the Having " "self. means which common values "truths" support the idea of the by human the An which means are rights example: people recognize one another. (such the against his to prohibition as act power own each person gives up some of

228 stealing) in exchange for being recognized as having "rights" as a person. These 44values"are laws of exchange: one person "contracts" a debt to another if they violate the other's "rights" and this debt must be paid by a punishment.Theseare the basis that prohibitions serve as a of "neurosis" in the field of sexuality in which human "rights" and individualities are ill defmed. If this were the case, then one would spend most of one's life worrying about the "debts" that one has contracted first half In the of Shakespeare'splay, Hamlet worries about the debts against others. that he owes to his dead father and the debts that he owes to his new king. The second repetition of the "during" suspendsthese worries about debts to others and but Sadism is in "law" the the manner: sadism. not an unequal and unjust acts becoming-active it implies. For Deleuze law the the that the and values suspensionof law. In "ironic" implies the twist, the thought powers of an of suspension sadistic of itself "law" it law features the turn the the against thought take on and of aggressive Thought is essentially unjust, aggressive,and unequal. From the point of view of the is "thought" to constitute But this the instinct" "herd thought must appearevil. aim of is The becoming. thinker innocence at all not or the sadist of a new innocence: because this in delight he does retransgression would "evil" nor concerned with "energy he the Instead destroy. of he to contemplates that seeks affirm the values Deleuze Cruelty Coldness In saysof one and destruction" and its impersonal nature. in but the in delights transgression he Saint-Fond, that not Sade's characters of lies the in Saint-Fond's value of punishment "Again, system, destructive molecules: destructive the through of agency infinite for its in reproduction capacity solely be law transcended the that he must Moreover, 119] says [CC " also molecules. law fact the that only can the "Sade stresses often towards a pure vision of anarchy: Such 87] [CC " a vision intuitional anarchy. model of be transcended towards an

229 excludes the roles of a punisher and someonewho is punished,just it as excludesthe Law as a payment of debts. It mirrors the activity of nature insofar as, in nature,there are no debts and payments but only perpetual destruction and reformation. This is the vision that pure thought tends towards: a purely mechanicalor molecular conception of transformations. The repetition of the "after" is then a purely cosmological conception of the eternal return. For Nietzsche,the cosmological vision of the eternal return is essential to understanding why it is a repetition of differences or "combinations. " It is worthwhile to reproduce here the whole passagein which Nietzsche comparesthe cosmological doctrine of the eternal return to a gameof dice:

If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force-and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless-it follows that, in the great dice it game of existence, must passthrough a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at sometime or anotherbe infinite And be it times. of since number realized an realized; more: would between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible have these to take combinations of and each place, combinations would in the the same series,a circular combinations of entire sequence conditions demonstrated: is the identical thus world as a series movement of absolutely infinitely itself has plays and that often repeated already circular movement its game in infinitum. [WP # 1066]

is the To summarize the important aspectsof this passage: universe an absolutechaos force this that limited can however, there forces; of combinations number are a of

230 take on; therefore, there must be some instancesof "repetition" in this chaos.Further. have been time must at some actual: this meansthat all every possible combination &vergent series of possible outcomes of each action must have been actualized.This is why the eternal return is not a determinism the way Leibniz's theory of monads is be. There to no God that orders the world into the "best""possibleworld; appears instead, every world is simultaneously actual. The determination as to which world in is become determined by the the chance throw of the actual present series will dice. Chance does not negate chaos the way Leibniz's God negatesincompossible is in "world" is balanced Leibniz's or monad one which everything and there worlds. is a "justice" to the fmal order of things. (Small injustices are necessaryfor the ) Nietzsche's the vision of chaos eliminates all world. compossable overall good of is This in from the the why eternal return. start: only anarchy reigns notion of justice

Deleuze saysthat the etemal return is the systemof the future in which all possible outcomes are affirmed simultaneously:

The system of the future, by contrast, must be called a divine game, since its bears already upon own rules there is no pre-existing rule, since the game being each affirmed chance of all the win, only can child-player and since but limiting Not affirmations, for times. restrictive or time and all decisions the with the and posed questions with coextensive affirmations the the necessary of repetition from which they emanate: such a game entails rules and by it combinations possible all embracing wins since move, winnmg 116] [DR its in the system of own return.

231 This is why the repetition of the future or the 44after" cannot be expressedas an 44 anticipation of the future." To anticipate the future is to place limits upon chance:to envision, in advance, what would count as a winning move. The phenomenological explanation of the structure of "expectation" has no place in Deleuze's conceptionof the future as a static repetition of time. The repetition of the future or the "after" is always the affirmation of all possible outcomes and the vision of chaos or injustice. Thought of the future embraces injustice as a principle. That is why political is philosophy antagonistic to this form of "thought." The vision of the eternal return as a cosmological doctrine eliminates all conceptions of human rights, values of humanity, the dignity of persons, and the sanctity of doctrines. This is why the institution of active thought, according to Deleuze, involves a "complete" nihilism.

3.3 The "third" stage is the

3.5 In "becoming active"

disgust at the thought that the

eternal return as a selective

destructive (sadistic) forces are

"same" things return (all the

doctrine. It is "being" that

turned outwards towards

he But soon annoyances). petty

selects by chance, therefore one

stupidity. Stupidity is a

realizes that only the affirming

must give up the power of

symptomof common values of

returns. (Not the dwarf)

judgment to realize it.

equality.

3.2 Zarathustra's second

3.4 The repetition of the

3.6 In the"afterwards" of the

reaction: The courage to

"before" are the reactive forces

is there a vision of overman

idea. This the to struggle affirm

The test incomplete nihilism. of

is This the pure anarchy.

"heroic" struggle of the

brings the the eternal return of

cosmological doctrine of the

be itself must overtnan

forces to a crisis point, reactive

eternal return that eliminates

eliminates values.

"human" values.

3.1 Zarathustra's first reaction:

overcome.

232 Conclusion

How is one to conclude a thesis such as this? There is no senseof a central point. There can be no proper conclusion to a thesis that does not seek to solve a problem. This thesis offered no final solutions. Instead it sought to expose the full complexity of the three synthesesof time. As such, it must raise more problems than it solves. In short, this thesis sought to make a systematic and full study of the details of the three synthesesof time. Becauseof the detailed nature of this study it is not possible to summarize it in a conclusion. Instead, at the end of this work we must instead ask ourselves a series of pointed questionsabout the importance the topic of of time. It is best to end such a "problematic" thesis by asking what the significance is of the major problems that it raises. The proper place of such a conclusion is to give the readers a senseof the importance of a work they have just read. Further, because each section ends with a table that summarizesthe main points of that section, there is no need to give an overall summary here. This work has progressed by addressing problems as they arose in each section. As such it may appear to be fragmented into a series of unrelated theories. However, if the main problematic is kept in mind at each step, the reader may then seea pattern and a progressionfrom instill hope I this senseof a pattern or this the to ending will next. one problem for in the reader. this work progression Deleuze devotes much of his work to the problem of time. But why should immediate do Often the time? be the see people not problem of concerned with we faces. is Here the in that my sense of time philosophy problems other significance of is First, Deleuze in there the the time of raises. theory work the that of problems is themes " This the ethics "recognition. of epistemology, major of one problem of

233 and other branches of philosophy that seek to ground knowledge and establish a system of truth. For Deleuze the problems of "representation" are addressedin his theory of memory. Much of what we saw in this thesis was Deleuze's attempt to in redefine memory such a way that it would not be reducible to recognition. To do this he found an alternative to the Platonic system of reminiscences.Therefore, his main object of attack is the notion that memory reproducesactual eventsthat took in the past. Because of this he seeks to expose those instancesof "false" place memory, not as mistakes of memory, but as essentialcomponentsof memory itself. Here is the problem: if memory is merely "recognition," then the active faculties of the intelligence would synthesizetime. But, the rational intellect has no motivation to recall any images from the past. Therefore, what makesus remember?There must be some involuntary force that cannot be explained by the faculty of recognition. Deleuze's answer. as we have seen,is that there is an "erotic99componentto memory ) that essentially disguises the past and brings the "false" images into the heart of " Many "perception. take is itself Second, the there philosophers problem of memory these to in objects the relationship our complex world as a given and reduce objects does Deleuze However, not simply reduceour object relations as one of recognition. duration his takes Instead, theory of to this over simPlifled version of recognition. He relations. object of complexities the psychological and complex into account all fully level biological not are we which of "need" organic or on a addresses for in that "expectation" is waits self of a sense duration a simple Our not conscious. body. The in the of cell every tiny need of there syntheses desired are object; rather, a from durations but of sense duration our which "one" is many is there that not result the organism the of signs: material very These are derivedmicro-durations time is perceives signs

These the the in of signs are that never are registered consciousness.

234 present. As a result, our duration is not fully subjective as Kant thought; but rather, it is organic or pre-personal. Time is composed step by step as a synthesisof many organic rhythms of need and satisfaction. Third, there is the problem of "ideas." For traditional philosophers "ideas" are the entities of reason. Not so for Deleuze. For him ideas are essentially problems. What does he mean by a problem? He meansthe system of pure events that have neither subject nor object, nor a senseof order or a place in time. Such ideas are never the products of reason.Instead,they give rise to reason that seeks to negate contrary possibilities. Leibnitz's God was such a contemplator of ideas (in Deleuze's sense) when he sought to eliminate the incompossible divergent series from the best possible world. Our own attempts at reasonare also a denial of problems and ideas.For Deleuzeideasasproblemsare the future because future is just "open" the the system of as are the and positive is idea by What Deleuze the rival the this conception of problems. challenges ideas distinct ideas. distinct " Clear "clear are the ultimate and and conception of it in to denial the the the order and will expresses universe: chance of of expression by idea the Deleuze However, this exposing vision of corrects mastery over chaos.

In before there are any clear conceptions. the prior condition of chance and chaos divergent ideas the distinct possibilities of negation after only come and short, clear by possible other God negating world Leibniz's coherent and clear a created just as is dimension future time on an attack also discussion the of a as Deleuze's of worlds. Deleuze's Because ideas. the of conception distinct above, of the ground of clear and If history the are we his philosophy. in of implicated of is critique overall time also the thought, consider also must we foundations philosophical the of about concerned Deleuze's foundations. theory of in these time each of importance of the theory of his predecessors. the of to weaknesses time seeksalso expose

235

I

Immanual Kant Critique ofPure Reason Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. New York: Prometheus Books,

1990.pg. 35. 2 Ibid,

pg. 28.

3 Ibid.

4

Marcel Proust The Way By Swann's Trans. Lydia Davis. New York: Penguin Press,2002. pg. 34.

5

Marcel Proust The Guermanties Way Trans. Mark Treharne. New York: Penguin Press,2002. pg.

546. 6 Gilles Deleuze LAbecedaire de Gilles Deleuze Trans. Charles J. Stivale. in section entitled (style) 7 A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the principle sources with philosophical commentary London: Cambridge University Press,2001. pg. 306. 8

The Way By Swann's pg. 370.

9 Strictly

speaking Jealousy is not a form of involuntary "memory" but rather a form of involuntary

intelligence. In the caseof jealousy the mind is provoked by pain to seekout signs fi-omthe past that would explain the present problem. The "memory" is voluntary becauseit is provoked by the intelligence; however, the faculty of intelligence is involuntary becausethe painful and deceptive signs of love provoke it. '0 The Way By Swann's pg. 280. ]1 Marcel Proust In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower Trans. JamesGrieve. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 3 1. 12 bid

pg. 3 1.

13The Way By Swann's pg. 43 0. 14 bid. pg. 227.

" In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower. pg. 472. 16The Way By Swann's pg. 186. 17

ibid.

215. 2002. Press, Penguin York: New Patterson. Ian pg. Trans. " Marcel Proust Finding Time Again 19Finding Time Again. pg, 217

236 20Marcel Proust The Prisoner and The Fugitive Trans. Carol Clark and Peter Collier. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 144. 21Finding Time Again. pgs. 204-205. 22In The Shadow Young Girls in Flower. of pgs. 417-418. 23Finding Time Again. pg. 204. 24In The Shadow Young Girls in Flower. of pg. 415. 25Finding Time Again. pg. 198. 26In The Shadow Young Girls in Flower. of pg. 429. 27In The Shadow Young Girls in Flower of pg. 43 1. 28Sigmund Freud The Psychopathology Everyday Life Trans. Alan Tyson. London: Penguin Books, of 1991. pg. 88. 29The Psychopathology Everydqy Life Trans. Alan Tyson. London: Penguin Books, 1991. pg. 88. of 30The Way By Swann's pgs. 48-49. 31Sdndor Ferenczi and Otto Rank The Development of PsychoanalysisTrans. Catoline Newton. Connecticut: International Universities Press, 1986. pg. 54. 32

bid pg. 20.

33Sigmund Freud Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis Trans. JamesStranchey.New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1949. pg. 60. 34Sigmund Freud An Outline of Psycho-analysis Trans. JamesStranchey.New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1949. pg. 61. 35Sigmund Freud Civilization and its Discontents Trans. JamesStranchey.New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961. pgs. 29-30. 36Victor Burgin Formations of Fantasy London: Routledge, 1986. pg. 22. 37Ibid, 22-23.

38 Gilles Deleuze Bergsonism Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habbedam.New York: Zone Books, 1991. pg. 53. 39

Ibid, pg. 52.

40Critique ofPure Reason, pg. 323. 41 bid, pg. 205. 42

Ibid, pg. 219.

237 41

44

Ibid, pg. 216. Ibid, pg. 55.

45 The Interpretation

of Dreams, pgs. 761-762.

46Ibid, pg. 762. 47

48

Ibid Ibid, pg. 400.

49

Gilles Deleuze The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1993. pg. 60. 50Ibid, pg. 61. " Ibid, pg. 23. 52Ibid, 25.

53JacquesLacan The Seminar of JacquesLacan: Book H, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1988. pgs. 196-197. 54Immanual Kant Critique of Practical Reason Trans. T. K. Abbott. New York: PrometheusBooks, 1996. pg. 101. 55 Gilles Deleuze Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties Trans. Hugh Tomlinson 33. 1996. Press, Minnesota University Minneapolis: pg. of and Barbara Habbedam. 56

1977. Co., & ýcrits W. Norton W. York: New Sheridan. pg. Alan Selection Trans. A JacquesLacan,

287. 57Sigmund Freud Three Case Histories Trans. Philip Rieff. New York: Touchstone, 1963. pg. 67. Company, & Norton W. 58 Sigmund Freud Totem W. York: New Stranchey. James and Taboo Trans. 1950. pg. 69. 59

60

61

Ibid, pg. 70.

Ibid lbid, pg. 142.

Association Free London: Weller. Andrew Trans. 62Andr6 Green Life Narcissism Death Narcissism Press, 2001. pg. 222. 63

Ibid

238 ' Critique of Practical Reason, pgs. 149-150. 65 Gilles Deleuze Essays Critical and Clinical Trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. pg. 33. 66Deleuze and Guattari tell us that the very form of the novel demandsan infinite seriesthat can never is by K's direction bý idea the "The the execution contradicted with ending whole of of novel and end: The Trial. " Kajka, Towards a Minor Literature 'unlimited that regulates the quality of postponement' Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. pg. 44. 67Mircea Eliade The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmosand History Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. pg. 76. 68Ibid, pgs. 98-99. 69

Friedrich Nietzsche The Gay Science Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.

Fragment #182. 70Ibid, Fragment 4328.

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