Deep Mexico, silent Mexico: an anthropology of nationalism

PUBLIC WORLDS

Dilip Gaonkar and Benjamin Lee, Series Editors

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VOLUME 9 Claudio Lomnitz, Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism VOLUME 8

Greg Urban, Metaadture.- How Culture Moves tbrough the World VOLUME 7*

Patricia Seed , American Pentimento , Tbe Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches

De ep Me xico

VOLUME 6

Si len t Mexi co

Radhika Mohanram , Black Body : Women, Colonialism , and Space VOLUME 5 May Joseph , Nomadic Identities Tbe Performance of Citizenship VOLUME 4

Mayfair Mei - hui Yang, Spaces of Their Own. Womens Public Sphere in Transnational-China

An Anthropolog)r

VOLUME 3

of Nati onal isni Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity On 'zapan"and Cultural Nationalism VOLUME 2 Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance VOLUME 1

Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization

M IN

PUBLIC WORLDS VOLUME 9

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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS

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MINNEAPOLIS LONDON

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ttibí:oteca S^axaleí a csio ra/R cur

-Copyright 2001 by the Regents oí the Llniveisny of A1lnnesota

Every effort was made ro obtain permission lo reproduce rhe illustations in this book. If any proper acknowledgment has not buen nade, we encourage copyright holders to notify us. The University of Minnesota Press gra te fulh aeknusrledges permission to reprint the following An earlier version of chapter 1 appeared as Nationalism as a practica] System: A Critique of Benedict Andersons 1 hcory of Natiu nolism from a Spanish American Perspeetive," in The Odre Minor Gmnd Theory tbrou96 Ele Lens of Latin America, edited by .Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lúpez-Alves (Princeton, N. 1= Princeton Universiny Presa, 2000), 329-59; copyright 2000 Princeton University Presa, reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press An earlier version of chapter 3 appeared as "Mudes oí Cltizenship in Mexico.° Pab1i1 )apure 1 1no 1 (1999. 209-93; copyright 1999 Duke University Press. An earlier version of rv has made bis or her mother-

was the troubling fact that socialist countries were fighting nationalist

tongue-is to the patrios Throsigh rhat language, encountered at mother's

wars, showing that nationalism could provide a kind of comradery that

knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are

ran deeper than the solidarities of shared class interese This led Anderson

imagined, and futuros dreamed. í 154)'

to investigate nationalism's secret potency, its capacity to generate personal sacrifice. Correspondingly, the question of sacrifice is, for Anderson,

In short, Anderson explains the rise of Spanish-American nationalisms

the telltale sigo of nationalism, a fact that leads him to view nationalism

(Chilean, Peruvian, Bolivian) as the result of (a) a general distinction be-

as a substitute for religious community. Let us pause to consider this defi-

tween Creoles and Peninsulars, (b) a Creole political-territorial imaginary

nition before moving on to Anderson's historical thesis on the genesis of

that was shaped by the provincial character of the careers of Creole offi-

nationalism.

cialdom, and (c) a consciousness of national specificity that was shaped by

The first difficulty that must be faced is that Anderson's definition oí

newspapers that were at once provincial and conscious of parallel states.

nation does not always coincide with the historical usage of the term,

Once these early Creole nationalisms succeeded in forging sovereign

even in the place and time that Anderson identifies as the Bite of its inven-

states, they became models for other nations.t

tion (i.e., Spanish America, ca. 1760-1830; Anderson 1994, 65).

Definitions

The subtleties in the usage of the term nación can perhaps be introduced through an example. In 1784, Don Joaquín Velásquez de León, director of Mexico City's School of Mining, writes in La Gazeta de México that

In order tu decide whether this theory of rhe rise of nationalism is an acceptable account , we need tu understand precisely what Anderson means by nationalism , and whether bis definition corresponds in a useful way to the historical phenomena that are being explained. For Anderson , tire nation " is an iniagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign ( 6) "Nationalism" is the N a ^ : o n .i i l s m . , , P r o . l : c : , l

1 said in my letter of the year 71 that the Machine that is calied of tire was easy to use and to conserve: but one year later, that is in 72,- the Excellent mister Don Jorge Juan, honor and ornament of our Nation in all sciences and mathematics, devoted himself to building that Machine in the Royal Seminary of Nobles of Madrid- (September 8, p. 13; my emphasis)

Nata as a Practica) System

System

6

_

7

=

In chis instance, Velásquez, who is writing to a predominantly Creole audience in the context oí a debate with Father J. Antonio Alzare, a famous Creole scientist and proronationalist, writes oí Jorge Juan that he is "an honor to our nation." The ambiguity of this formulation helps us understand the process of transformation that the semantic field oí the term nation was undergoing_ In the early cighteenth century, nación was defined strictu sensu as "the collection of inhabitants of a province, country, or kingdom."4 This definition is already quite ambiguous New Spain, for example, was a province (or several provinces), a country (or several countries), and a kingdom, just as Castile was a kingdom that encompassed several provinces and countries Thus, returning tu out example, the Castilian scientist Jorge Juan might not be oí the same nación as most oí the readers oí the Gazeta de Mexico- However, two further ambiguities in fact make this identification possible. First, the term nacional referred to "that which is characteristic oí or originares from a nation." Thus, Mexican Creoles could be oí the Spanish nation because they had their roots in Spain, were characteristic (propios) oí Spain, and so on_ A second ambiguity of the semantic field oí nación stems from the movement oí administrative reforms that Spain's enlightened despots set in motion around the middle oí the cighteenth century (the "Bourbon Reforms")_ Among other things, there was a concerted effort to streamline the territorial organization oí the empire, doing away with the idea oí the Spanish Empire as being composed oí a series oí kingdoms and substituting this notion with that oí a unified empireThus, from che viewpoint of Spain's colonies oí the late eighteenth century, the term nación could be used to pit peninsulares against Americans,

fueros enjoyed by its nobility and its citizens. It is important to note that in both oí these cases, sovereignty is not absolute -- popular sovereignty, but rather a limited form oí sovereignty comparable to that oí pater potestas or to arenas oí individual sovereignty granted by the doctrine oí free will.5 Thus, whereas Anderson's definition oí nationhood involves a sense oí the sovereignty oí a state over a territory, the Spanish definition vacillated between an increasingly unified but nonetheless ambiguous territorial definition and a definition around descent Both oí these forms involved specific fueros, in other words, access to limited forms oí sovereignty. It is pertinent to note that this notion survived the American independence movements, for example, in the usage oí the term Indian nations to refer to nomadic tribes in northern Mexico, or in the ambiguous referente oí the term república.Because oí the ambiguity in the ties between nation and blood, Spanish usage oí the term nación could be distinguished from a second term, patria (or fatherland), in such a way that a single land could be the patria oí more than one nación. This was, indeed, the case in most oí the Americas, which were conceived as plurinational patrias. This tense coexistente between a discourse oí loyalty to the land and one oí filiation through descent is visible in colonial political symbolism.' Common loyalty to the land was a concept that was available in Spanish political discourse at least since the sixteenth century but it was nonetheless not directly assimilable to the notion oí "nation." This ambiguity is at the basis oí the category oí "Creole" itself, which, as a number oí historians have shown, emerged in the midsixteenth century, but maintained an ambiguous relationship to Spanishness throughout the colonial periods The move to associate nation with Common subjection to the king was promoted by Charles III, who sought to diminish differences oí caste in

as Anderson has suggested. However, ir could also be used to emphasize the extension oí national identity by way oí lines oí descent and thus be

tial identification between nation and sovereignty was being buílt up by abso-

made into a synonym oí blood or Gaste and thereby provide a rationale for interna) divisions within colonial societies. Finally, the concept oí nación

Anderson's attention ("in the future the aborigines shall not be called

could be used as a sign oí panimperial identty. to its conneccion to territory and to bloodlines, it also had complex connections to sovereignty, and this was particularly so in the Americas. So, for instance, if someone took che "hloodline" definition oí nación, they might point to the varyingluieros inviolable legal privileges) attached to the Spanish and Indian republics as separate estates_ If, on the other hand, they identified nación with a kingdom or province, they could cite the .,, ['ra.ticnl

lutist monarchs, a fact that makes San Martín's dictum that so claimed Indians or natives, they are children and citizens oí Pero and they shall be

Moreover, if the referent oí the term nación was ambiguous with respect

Nnl^ona1 1 ,

favor oí a broad and homogenized category oí "subjects." Thus a tenden-

System

known as Peruvians" [Anderson 1994: 49-50]) iess oí a Creole invention than Anderson supposed9

A second significant problem for applying Anderson's definition to the Latin American case is that belonging to an imagined national community does not necessarily imply "deep horizontal comradery." The idea oí nation was originally tied to that oí lineage; members oí a nation could be linked by vertical ties oí loyalty as much as by horizontal ties oí equality. Na tlonallsm as a

Practica1 System 9

Thts is most obviously relevant \1 11111 aimidering the way in which age

appeal to community is as misleading as the idea that nationalism is neces-

and sex elit( r the picwreo¡ nauunal identity V'omen and ehildren eould

sarily a conimunal ideology of "deep horizontal comradery"; for, in order

and can very much ide ntity widh therr nations oven thotigh they are usual hí

to comprehend what nationalism is and has heen about, one must place it

not therr natlons represcnmtivc siihiccn Snnilarly a master and a seivant

in its context of use. The capacity to generate personal sacrifice in the

cuuld he parí I che lamo nanun sc nhuut having tu construct Chis tic as a

name of the nation is usually not a simple function ut communitarian

horizontal link based on fraterniw This is a fundamental pomt lur Spanish-rAmciican nationalism in che

imaginings ot comradery Ideological appeals to nationhood are most

nineteenth century, whcn ourpurations uich as indigenous communities

relationships, including the appeal no che defense of hearth and heme, or

often coupled with the coercive, moral, or economic force oí other social

haciendas inri guilds werc ovcn m,nc salicnt than thcy are today None-

the economic or coercive pressure ol a local community, or the coercive

theless, the point also has hruader signiticancc. Jürgcn Habermas (1991]

apparatus of che state itself

pointed out that the hourgeois publi( sphere in eighteenth century north-

Moreover, there are plenty oí examples oí nationalism spreading mosdy as a currency that allows a local community or subject to interpellate a state office in order to make claims based on rights oí citizenship.'t It is misleading to privilege sacrifice in the study oí nationalism, because the spread oí this ideology is more often associated with the formulation oí various sorts oí claims vis-á-vis the state or tward actors froni other communities. In sum, 1 have raised three objections to Anderson's definition oí nation and nationalism: first, the definition does not always correspond to historical usage; second, Anderson's emphasis on horizontal comradery covers only certain aspects oí nationalism, ignoring che fact that nationalism always involves articulating discourses oí fraternity with hierarchical relationships, a fact that allows for the formulation oí different kinds oí national imaginarles; third, Anderson makes sacrifice appear as a consequence oí the national communitarian imagining, when it is most often che result oí the subjecds position in a web oí relationships, some oí which are characterized by coercion, while others have a moral appeal that is not directly that oí nationalism.

ern Europe which was tied inextricably to che development of nationalism) was made up ideally of private cinzens. Nonetheless, the citizen's "private sphere encompassed his family, making the citizen at once an equal to other citizens (Andersons fraternal bond") and the head oí a household in which he might he the only full citizen. It would be a mistake, however, tu presuppose that nationalism was embraced only by che citizen and not by his wife and children. In more general terms, the horizontal relationship oí comradery that Anderson wants to make the exclusive trait of the nacional community occurred in societies with corporations, and the symbolism oí encompassment between citizens and these corporations is critica) to understanding the nation's capacity to generate personal sacrifices. Nationalists have fought battles to protect "therr" womcn, to gala )and for "therr" villages, to defend "their" towns, lt is just as true, however, that women, servants, family members, and, more generally, the members oí corporate communities or republics could send "therr" cinzens to war. In other words, citizens could represent various corporate bodies to che state, and they could represent the power of the state in there corporate bodies. In Spanish America che complexines of these relationships oí encom-

Toward an Alternative Perspective

passment (between che national state, cirizen, and various corporations)

in one oí his most brilliant moments, Anderson suggests that nationalism

have been widely recognized in analyses of conflicts between various lib-

should not be analyzed as a species oí "ideology" but rather as a cultural

eral and conservative factions in thc nineteenth century, and in the role of

construct that has affinity with "kinship" or "religion" (1994, 5). Anderson's

local communities in che wars uf independence themselves.1 1 The rela-

selection oí `decía horizontal comradery° as the defining element oí na-

tionship between the modern ideal oí sovereignty and citizenship and the

tionalism is his attempt to give meaning to this proposition. The essence

legitimate claims oí che corporations is indeed a central theme in nine-

oí nationalism for Anderson is that it provides an idiom oí identiry and

teenth and twentieth-century Laun American history.

brotherhood around a progressive polity ("the nation"). Following Victor

The third, and final, difliculry with Anderson's definition of national-

Turner, Anderson looks for the production oí this fraternity in moments

ism is his insistente on sacrifice as its quintessential symptom. The image

oí communitas such as state pilgrimages. He also explores the conditioris

oí nationalism as causing a lemminglike impulse to sacrifice because oí its

of possibility oí national identity, arguing that nationalism depends on a

Na t, on., rn , a Pr u, l ca l Sysleni

Natio nalisni as a Practica) Syst,.

10 =

t1 =

secular understanding oí time as empry" and oí the world as being made up oí nations whose progress unfolds simultaneously and differentially through Chis empry time Thus, for Anderson, che compelling aspect oí nationalism is its promise oí fraternity, and chis is, 1 believe, che most fundamental problem oí the definition. 1 suggested earlier that nationalism is an idiom that articulates citizens to a number oí communities, ranging froni family, to corporate groups, to villages and towns, to che nacional state. Thc connections between these communities are often themselves che suhstance oí nationalist discourse and struggle. It follows that che imagery that is used to build nacional sentiment cannot so readily be reduced to che brotherhood among citizens. In order ro define the nature of nationalist imaginings, we must ask questions such as: When and how is nationalism invoked in a man's relationship with his wife7 How is it depleved in the dealings between a small-cown schoolteacher and his villagers, or between an Indian cacique and a president7 For, in all of these cases, the ideology oí fraternity invoked by Anderson is being used to articulare hierarchies into che polity. The protection oí che nation then becomes the protection oí che family, or oí che village, or oí the race. My first amendment to Anderson's theory is thus that nationalism does not ideologically form a single fraternal communiry, because it systematically disti nguishes full citizens from parí citizens or strong citizens from weak ones children, women, Indians, the ignorant). Because these distinctions are by nature heterogeneous, we cannot conclude that nationalism's power stems primarily trom the fraternal bond that it promises to all citizens. The fraternal bond is critical, hut so are what one might cal] che bonds of dependence that are intrinsically a pare oí any nationalism. This leads to a second, chough mino' and derivative, amendment. The pride oí place that Anderson gives to sacrilice in his view oí nationalism is misleading, for if we accept that che national community is not strictly about equality and fraterniry, but rather about an idiom for articulating

nationalism can even be deployed by a peasant who resists induction roto the army. Finally, the very nature oí patriotic sacrifica is easily misconstrued if we do not pay close attention to the bonds oí dependence that are central to the national communiry-for citizens enlisted to go die in World War 1 not only because oí their fraternal ties with other volunteers or conscripts, but also because their families might reject them if they did not, or their communities might reject their families, and so on. In short, instead oí saying, as Anderson does, that che nation is a community `because, regardless oí the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, che nation is always conceived as a deep comradeship," 1 define the nation as a communiry that is conceived oí as deep comradeship among full citizens, each oí whom is a potential broker between che national state and weak, embryonic, or pare citizens whom he or she can construe as dependents. This brings us to a final question concerning the concept oí nationalism, which regards che relationship between the analytic definition oí nationalism and actual usage oí the tercos nation or nationalism. Although my revised definition would still exclude any form oí ethnic identification that did not strive for some degree oí political sovereigncy, 1 helieve that it has a greater capacity to include and distinguish between historical varieties oí nationalism. For instante, che ambiguity between a racial and a politicalterritorial definition oí nación that 1 cited earlier for the late-eighteenthcentury Spanish world is a refiection oí a specific moment in nation building that should not simply be called "prenational," because it involves a territorially finite state and a sovereign people, even though it tolerated significant differences between stations and even estates. Similarly, the peasant who has never seen a map or aided a census taker, and who has no notion oí why, say, "Germana' and "Guadalajara" are incommensurate categories, can still be a nationalist because he makes an appeal as a Mexican, or because he comes home to his wife late and drunk on che nght oí September 15 (Mexican Independence Day).

ties oí dependence to the state chrough cicizenship (fraternity), then the defense of che fraternal bond becomes one possible symptom oí nacionalism among severa¡ others.

In other words, che power ol nationalism is as evident in che gesture oí a Niño héroe who wraps himself in tire flag and dies for his country as it is in the gesture oí che peasant who invokes his cicizenship when petitioning for ¡and, or che small-town notable who claims that his villagers and himself descend from Aztec ancestors when he petitions for a school. In fact, Nat^anali.m ns a Yrariira1 System 12 =

Revised General Historical Thesis The fundamental thing about nationalism is that it is a productive discourse that allows subjects co rework various connections between social institutions, including, prominently, the relationship between state institutions and other social organizacional forms. As such, the power oí nationalism lies not so much in as hold en che souls oí individuals (though Chis is not insignificant) as in che fact that it provides interactive frames in Nationalism as

a Pract-iba¡ System 13 =

which the relattonship between ctao institnions and various and diverse

the case: national consciousness emerges as an offshoot of religious ex-

social reiationships r family relacion.h;pc. cite organization of work, the

pansionism_ 1 cite from Anderson once again to elarify what is at stake

detinition oI lorms of pr(>perty. nnd che regulation ot publie spaee) can he negotiated Thus one cotild 'erice a history ut nationalism that would Nave two bookcnds. one in sr hieh suc ,tic. vete not sulficiently dynamic and states were insulficiendy potent lor nationalism co emerge as a useful ,pace ol negotiation and contention and another in which states are no longer sullieiently potent and coniplex to he clic key actors ni che process of regulating what ,Nliehel foueault called biopower.' that is, che power tu administer a "population° and to regulate ns habits. Capitalism traverses

In che cocarse of the sixteenth ccntury , Enrope's "discovery' of grandiose eivllizations hitherto only dimly rumored in China, Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent-ur completely unknown-Aztec Mexico and Incan Peru-suggested an irremediable human pluralism- Most of these civilizations had developed quite sepaiate from che known history ot Europe, Chriscendom, Antiquity, indeed man their genealogics ]ay outside oí and were unassimdable co Eden. ! Only homogeneous, empty time would offer them aceommodation.) (69)

this history from end to end. It is therefore misleading to begin che history ot nationalism at the end of che eighreenth century, and not at che beginning of the sixteenth centuryInstead oí positing che notion that nationalism emerged first in the Americas around the time ot independence, with the rise oí print capitalism, and that it is therefore scareely two hundred years old, the Spanish and Spanish-American cases suggest that nationalism developed in stages, beginning with European colonization in the sixteenth century or perhaps in the Reconquista. In fact, nationalisms developed along different, though interrelated, tracks, such that, as in che analogy between nationalism and kinship, one might locate diverse nationalist systems. 1 shall outline what Chis alternative perspective reveals for the SpanishAmerican case. 1 will argue for several moments in the development oí nationalism, each oí which involved a distinct interconnection between fraternity and dependency. This reinterpretation oí the history oí SpanishAmerican nationalism leads me identi f theoretical mistakes in Anderson's

This point of view is perhaps a true reflection oí the ways in which expansion was assimilated in England and the Netherlands, but it was not che cultural form that expansion took in Spain (or in Spain's strongest early competitor: the Ottoman Empire)." On che contrary, both the Spanish Reconquista and subsequent expansion into Africa and to America were narrated very much in the framework oí what Anderson describes in shorthand as "Eden." It is well known that Columbus and other explorers speculated on their proximity specifically to Eden, and to other biblical sites, when they reached che New World. That they attributed their success to God's design is evident in the ways in which they christened che land: islands and mainland being named alternatively for roya) and for spiritual sponsors (Isla Juana, Filipinas, and Fernandina alternating with San Salvador, Veracruz, Santo Domingo, etc.). Neither was this identity between conquest and the broader teleology oí Christendom abandoned once colonization set in.

general argument, including (1) false conclusions concerning the histori-

Franciscan missionaries interpreted their evangelizing mission in

cal connections between "racism" and nationalism, as well as between lan-

Mexico in terms that were consonant with the messianic scholastic phi-

guage and nationalism; (2) a misleading emphasis on che idiom oí frater-

losopher Joachim de Fiore (see Phelan 1970); the priest Mendieta, an

nity as the only available languagc oI nacional identity; (3) an incorrect or

apologist oí Hernán Cortés, derived many a moral from the marvelous

successional view oí the relationship between religion and nationalism

fact that Cortés had been born in the same year as Martin Luther, the one

(nationalism, for Anderson, replaces the universalistic claims oí religion,

to work for God in extending che true faith, che other tu work for the

yet Spanish nationalism was in fact hased on che national appropriation oí

devil.'^ In fact, the whule oí the conquistadoís "discourse oí the mar-

the true faith)

velous" was evenly peppered with elements oí popular literature (Marco Polo, Mandeville, Virgil, chivalry novels) and with biblical stories. Cine might argue, contrary to Anderson, that the success oí Charles V gave

FirstMoment in Spanish National Fonnation: Colonization

new lile and plausibility to a narrative oí Eden that had been much weaker

A fundamental error in Anderson's account of che history oí nationalism is

in che days oí Mandeville and Marco Polo, when the idea oí taking

his insistente un associating it with secularization. In the case of Spain,

Jerusalem and oí achieving the Universal Catholic Monarchy was beyond

whose formation as a nation is cercainly one of the earliest, the opposite is

any realistic expectation.

i\'' ,c tionali •,,

,, a P,a.l,ca1 Sys

N a ticnalisn, as a Practica 1 Sysle,n 15 =

But even after Spanish expansionism was waning, by the 1570s, the reIationship between the true faith and the ways oí local heathens was still told as parí oí the Christian eschatology, as is obvious both in narratives oí indigenous intellectuals such as Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala and in those oí seventeenth-century C:reole patriots, such as Mexico's Carlos

vacos] during their time oí arrival to those provinces, or any that may become unoccupied, to the Spaniards [ españoles ] living in them ... so that they may have them, enjoy their tribute, and give them the good treatment that is mandated in our laws."

national idea. The earliest formulation oí this occurred in the days oí the

Similarly, another law (1608) orders that "Oí the people in aid that the Viceroy might send from New Spain to the Philippines, he not allow in any way that mestizos or mulattos go or be admitted, because oí the inconveniences that have occurred" (book 3, title 4, law 15). Law 14, title 5, book 3 orders that arms builders cannot teach their art to Indians ; title 10, law 7 oí the same book prohibits military captains from naming slaves as standard-bearers in the army, while law 12 (1643) oí the same book and title orders army officials not to give " mulattos, dark ones [morenos], mestizos" the job oí soldier. Book 3, title 15, law 33 orders that the wives oí the members oí the Audiencia (high court) hear Mass in a specific part oí the chapel in the company oí their families, civil authorities , or women oí rank "and not Indian women, black women, or mulatas ." On the other

Spanish Reconquista, with the legal codification oí so-called blood purity (limpieza de sangre). Certificares oí blood purity, guaranteeing that the holder

hand, the king ordered that when viceroys and judges named a "protector oí Indians" (a kind oí free lawyer for Indians), "they should not elect

was an old Christian, were necessary in order ro hold office, to enter the church, or to enter certain guilds. Although the holders oí these certifi-

mestizos, because this is importan[ for their defense, and otherwise the Indians can suffer injuries and prejudice" (book 6, title 6, law 7); in other

cates were not identified as "Spaniards," but rather as "Old Christians,"

words, Spaniards, not mestizos, are the best and most appropriate defenders oí Indians. Examples can be multiplied.15

de Sigüenza y Góngora. Both oí these argued (in different ways) that the Aztecs and the Incas had been evangelized before the arrival oí the Spaniards, and had subsequently been led astray by the devil, only to be brought back into the fold by an alliance between the remaining loyal Indians (such as the Texcocans or rhe Tlaxcalans in Mexico, or Guamán Poma's own family in Peru) and the Spaniards. The significance oí this point for the history oí Creole patriotism has been extensively argued by both David Brading andjacques Lafaye. Not only was Spanish expansion told as part oí Christian eschatology, but the social organization oí the state that was being built during this expansion innovatively identified the church and church history with a

they were thought oí as a communiry oí blood and oí belief that had privileged access to the state.

In short, a concept oí "Spanish" emerged quickly for the colonization

This nationalization oí the church became much more significant with expansion to America. The whole oí the first chapter oí the Laws of the Indies

oí the Americas, and Spaniards were expected to take up a position oí spiritual , civil, and military leadership, The notion of Spanishness was for-

is in fact devoted to justifying Spanish expansion to the Indies as a divine grace extended to the king so that he might bring the trae faith to those lands. Moreover, holding political office or belonging to the privileged classes is also seen in relation to faithfulness to the church, as is evident in a law that threatens any nobleman or holder oí office with the loss oí all privileges if he takes the narre oí God in vain (libro 1, título 1, ley 25).

mally and legally understood as a question oí descent, and it therefore included "Creoles," even though contexts oí differentiation and discrimination between American-boro Spaniards and Peninsulars did exist from the mid-sixteenth century onward.16 This process oí differentiation was predi-

Leaning heavily on these formulas, the concept oí "Spanish" was created as a legal category oí identity in order to organize political lile in the Indies. Spanish authority involved moral and religious tutelage over other social caregories oí persons, including "Indians," "blacks," " mulattos," and "mestizos," and also served as a category differentiated from other European "foreigners" (extranjeros). For example, law 60, chapter 3, book 3 oí the Laws of the Indies (first written in 1558) grants "the Viceroys oí Peru the faculty to entrust (encomendar ) any Indians rhat may be unoccupied [indios que hubiere Na1,onalism as a

Prac t,c at Sys lem 16 =

cated not en blood, but rather on ideas concerning the influence oí the land en the character, makeup, and physionomy oí those borra in the Indies.17 The term criollo had, in fact, a derogatory slant, in that it tended to assimilate American-born Spaniards with other American-born castes, such as slaves or mestizos (Lavallé 1993, 20). Thus patriotism (in the sense oí exaltation oí the land oí birth) became central te the Creoles, because it was through a vindication oí the true worth oí the land that they could fully claim the inheritance of their blood.18 This tension between a nationalism based en communiry oí descent, and a patriotism based on a clear, delimited idea oí "Spain' (as opposed both to the Indies and to other NationaIismas

aPracticalSystem

= 17 =

Lampean holdings nl thc Spanish monarcli srould iemain important in Spain and in che Anaeucrs even altri indepen deneu The degrce to which Spaniards Spanish ncu and che Spanish language viere identiticd widt lile crac lailh and si ith inlizatton comes through ¡e lile test ul lile lollov, ing las' 1 -0 Having malle a dese examinaron U inccniiTl schethcr thc mysteries of our Holy Catholic Faith can be prohcrlc asplained in cvcn in che post perfect language n1 thc Indians it has ñeco r,, ng nizect thet chis is not possible witlrout i,icurring great dissonances and impenccuons - - So, having resolved that it would he huir to inruducc lile Gostil,an language, we order that tcachers he nade available to Indians s, Iio wish volu n taxi ly to ¡caro, and we have thought that diese may he lile e,icristrines.

In short, the Spanish language was not leen in the colonies as merely a convenient and profane vernacular, hut rather as a language that was closer lo Godao Language thusreflected lile process oí nationalization ojtbe charca, which líes at the center oí the history of Spanish (and Spanish-American) nationalisms, a point oí depai-wre that is at che opposite end oí the spectrum posited by Anderson, who inaagined that secularization was in every case at che root oí nacional ism. The civil Ieadership of Spaniards over Indians and others is laid out in a number oí laws and practices, including in laws concerning the layout oí Spanish towns and streets; in tire superiority oí Spanish courts to Indian courts (Indian magistrates ceuld )al] mestizos or blacks, but not Spaniards); and, more fundamentally, in that the laws oí Castile served as the blueprint for those oí che Indies and for every other realm in che Spanish domain (book 2, title 1, law 2 115301 , "That che Laws oí Castile be kept in any matter not decided in those of che Indies"). In sum, che concept oí español, as a community oí blood, asseciared wlth a religion, a language, a civilization, and a territory, emerged rather quickly in tire course oí che sixteenth century.

Second Moment of Spanish Nalionalisni Decline in the European Theater The first moment oí Spanish national construction was, tiren, quite different in spirit and content from that posited by Anderson; Spanishness was built out oí an idea oí a privileged connection te the church, Spaniards were a chosen peeple, led by monarchs that had been singled out by che

Figure 1.1. Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, patrona de la Nueva España, anonymous

pope with the tale of "Catholic" As Old Christians, they were the true

eighteenth-century painting. Collection oí the Museum of che Basilica of

keepers of lile faith and theretore lile only viable polirical, moral, and

Guadalupe. In chis painting, Guadalupe, patroness of Mexico, is bridging Europe and New Spain. For Hidalgo, that bridge crumbled with tse Napoleonic inva-

li1t ,s , r.,.:^ca, System lh

sien of Spain, and divine grave, embodied in this apparition, is rooted entirely in Mexican sesil.

economic elite .2' The conquistadores were thus instantly a kind oí nobility in the Indies and "Spaniards" were che dominant caste. In short, Spanish nationality was built on religious militancy: descent and language al¡ rolled into a notion oí a nacional calling to spiritual tutelage in the Americas and throughout che world. The Spanish language in che Indies was not simply an arbitrary tongue among others, it was the suitable language in which to communicate che mysteries oí che Catholic faith. Even today in Mexico, hablaren cristiano ("to speak in Christian") is synonymous with speaking in Spanish. Similarly, che Spanish bloodline-for Spanishness usually included American-born Spaniards-had a special destiny with regard to che true faith. Relativism was not at the origin oí Spanish nationalism, nor did che discovery oí the Indies dislocate Christian eschatology in any fundamental way. "Eden," as Anderson calls it, was maintained as the framework for histories that explained and situated Aztecs, Incas, and the rest of them.22 Spain's precocious consolidation as a state allowed for the rise oí a form oí national consciousness that was distinct from the relativist vocation oí Britain and the Netherlands, whose entry to che game oí (early) modero state and empire as underdogs made them fertile ground for the development oí liberalism and, eventually, oí truly modero forms oí nationalism that are more akin to those described by Anderson.23 On che other hand, Spain's rapid decadence in the European theater both consolidated and exacerbated national consciousness in peculiar ways. Horst Pietschmann (1996, 18-24) has summarized the development oí Spanish economic thinking oí the ¡ate sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, arguing that thc administrative reforms oí the Bourbons in che eighteenth century were not a simple importation oí French administrative ideas, but rather that they combined che latter with a native body oí economic and administrative theories and projects devoted to finding remedies for che economic decline oí Spain. Aniong these, Pietschmann's

J aL A A, n:.. ..

Figure 12_ La virgen de Guadalupe escudo de oilud coruva l a epidetn(a del Matlazahuail de 1716-1738, a nonymous engraving , 1743. Col¡ ccti on uf the Museum oí the Basilica oí Guadalupe - Here che patroness ot iSMcxico is protecting the city's inhabi tants against the plague.

summary and discussion oí che influential work oí Luis Ortiz (1558) is pertinent for my argument here

Ortiz argued that Spain was poor because it only exported raw materials and then reimported rhem in che form oí manufactured goods. The Spaniards' disdain for manual labor contributed to the underdevelopment of industry, as did che progressive depopulation oí che countryside. As a partial remedy, Ortiz urged that laws enhance ehe prestige of manual labor: "these should he extended even to che extreme that the state force al] young men (including che nobles) to learn a trade, with che penalty that they would otherwise lose their nationality" (Pietschmann 1996, 19). Na tionalism

as a Practica! 21

System

Thesc rcconimcndations and othurs like them, hecome a staple of seventeenth-century econonnc prt,iccts and studies, call loe the strengthening el the Crown for the pcopling ,,l thc country and for leveling sume differences bctv, een the variou, ,tations.',uch recommen da ti ons are concived as a matter ol natioiial lit, t_,1 and in Urtizs case, proposed pena¡ [Les for tailure tu comply induje lo,s uf nationalityThree points concernimg thi, intd lectual tradinon are pertinent for

trouhles of the country had a truly wide audience [ in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centurias j . since thc majority of thcir projects were printed, and we even find their ideas repearedly in the works oí writers like Cervantes" (1996, 23 Thus , competition betwccn states , and a consciousncss of relative decline were required tu promote and justtty programs of economic and admi nistrative reform . As a resulr, this mode oí

understanding the history ot nationalism Ti the Spanish world: hrst, a na-

imagining time liad long been available tu the cures , and cannot oí i tselt explain the risa oí Spanish-American nationalism , although it does suggcst

tional consciou,ness seas exaccrhatcd hv thc pcrccption of Spain's me cas-

an earlier son oí Spanish collectivc c onsciousncss"

ing backwardness vis-) vis rts cunq>etltors econd, the solutions that were

A final citation from Pietsehmann who is my principal authority in this

proposed l policies concerning track populaticn. education, work, admin-

matter, summarizes my point concerning Chis second phase : "[T]ogether

istrative rationalization, etc. i also callad systcntatically [oí a diminution oí

with the affirmation oí the Catholic religion (the Spanish Enlighten-

regional differences and policy reforms that involved conceptualizing a

ment was qualified as being specifically Christian , and it had its reformist

people in a finite territory, under a more streamlined and tendentially

current in Jansenism), we find also the patriotism oí the Enlightened

more equal izi ng admi nistrati on, third, the idea of re lative decline and oí

thinkers, a fact that differentiates them from the cosmopolitanism oí

competition involved a keen sense of °empty time" (that is, of secular com-

Enlightenment thinkers in France and other European countries. This

petition between states progressing through time) before the advent oí "print capitalism," a fact that is obvious not only in the economic litera-

patriotism , that gave the Spanish Enlightenment a strongly political character, was expressed in the desire that Spain reconquer its earlier eco-

ture, but in al] manner oí military and contra e reial policy.

nomic florescence and its política] position as a power oí the first order"

There is in fact sonie confusion in Andersons analysis oí empty time. Following Walter Benjamín, Anderson defines homogeneous or empty time as "an idea ... in which simultanelty is, as it were, transverse, crosstime, marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence" (1991, 24). The novel and the newspaper are artifacts that popularre this conception oí time, in that their protagonista can act independently oí one another and still have a meaningful relationship to each other only because the characters belong to the lame sodety and are being connectcd in the mind oí the same reader Thc question that this analysls poses to a historian oí the Iberian world is whether the novel and the newspaper were the first cultural artifacts that frame events and ates in "empty time-" The answer is that they were not.

Government policy making in the Spanish world was running en empty time long before the industrialization of print media, and elites, Creole and Spanish, were well aware oí this. Plans and programs for streamlining administration, disciplining thc workforce, rationalizing tariffs, and improving transportation systems were discussed and predicated un the recognition of the parallel and sinwltancous development oí the great European powers- titorcovcr there discussions were widely known and debared, as Pietschmann reminds us: "[1 deas concerning the economic Nat'o',alism

a , „ P , . ', t' al Sys1rrn

(1996, 25).

In the eighteenth century , under the Bourbons , the discussions oí the prior century and a half were reanimated , and they generated a series oí administrative reforms. These reforms were , once again , built on the patriotic and national consciente that had developed since the Conquest, a consciente that simultaneously produced a clearly delimited image oí "Spaió" as a land , and oí "Spaniards" as a nation (even though there was no isomorphism between the nation and Spain).'s As an example oí the Spanish imagined community that was being constructed through these reforms , 1 offer the following vignette, taken from the Careta de México ( November 3, 1784 ), describing the celebration oí the birth oí royal twins and the signing oí a peace treaty with France and the United States in Madrid : " Rarely shall there be a motive for greater complacency, nor more worthy oí the jubilation oí the Spaniards, than the happy birth oí the two twin infantes, and the conclusion oí a peace so advantageous to the national interests " ( my emphasis). Having identified both the subjects oí the ritual as Spaniards and the interests being served by the twin birth and by the peace treaty as "national ," the Gazeta de México goas on to narrare the public festivities that marked the event, especially the content oí a series of allegorical floats (carros alegóricos): Nati on d liara as a Practica1 System 23 =

1 st Floao Adanes Holding die Sky The first float is preceded by drums, trumpets, pages, heralds, and eight couples oí both sexes, six oí artisans, one of farmers [hortelanos], and one oí field hands [labradores], each with che instrument oí its profession. They are followed by che orchestra and irnmediacely thereafter by a super float, pulled like che rest by six horses, in which the stacue oí Atlantis, character. ized with severa) mottos, holds che sky. Our August Monarch Charles 111 holds with his heroic virtues and happy government che Spanish Monarchy. The love o[ che Spaniards venerares in os glorious Monarch che Princes and the Royal Family, so worthy also of che )ove that is bestowed to chem by tbe Nation.

Here we have, in an officially sanctioned bulletin published in Mexico City, the portrayal oí a Spanish nation-a nation, represented by farmers, agricultura] workers, and artisans, protected by a nacional monarch, who holds up the sky over their heads like Atlas. Both che monarchy and the people are called "Spanish" here, and che publication oí this in Mexico is clearly meant te make this national celebration inclusive at the very least co a Creole audience. Yet che terricory of "Spain is clearly limited in che ritual, in a way that diverges from the inclusive term nación: 5th Floao Spain Jubilan[ because of che Birth oí che Infantes The las[ float . is preceded by eight couples on horseback, armed with lance and shleld. Then two pagos, and vine couples that indicare the different provinces oí Spain, whose costumes they wear. They are accompanied by an orchestra, to which they respond with dances of their respective provinces.

The description oí a series oí allegories portraying Spain goes en in detail and is summed up in che following analysis:

At the same time, che inclusiveness oí che category oí "Nation" appears to be a bit broader ehan che Spanish terricory that is so clearly delimited, because it includes the readers oí che Gazeta de México, who are fully expected co share in the joy oí the occasion. Around the time oí this festivity, Charles 111 would try te implement administrative reforms that would more clearly make the territorial image oí Spain inclusive oí the Indies in a way that paralleled the inclusive potencial oí the concept oí the Spanish nation.

Third Moment: Bourbon Reforms and Independence The high point oí chis reformist movement, in the late eighteenth century under Charles III, involved trying to make Spain and its colonies into a closed economic space, with a relatively streamlined administration, an active financial and economic policy, a decentralized administration and army. This imperial unity was known as the Cuerpo unido de Nación (Unified body oí nation; Pietschmann 1996, 302), and its administrative organization was clearly the precursor oí the state organizations that were generated with independence,

Interestingly, however, these reforms were promoted not only as a response lo a feeling oí backwardness and oí nostalgia for past nacional glories, but also te face che political threats posed both by the British navy and che American Revolution. The former threat in particular made the decentralization oí administration an importan[ strategy for the fortification oí the empire. This system oí decentralization and administrative rationalization also involved promoting a view oí industry and oí public interest that is significant in the formation oí a modern form oí nationalism, based en individual property, a skilled and well-policed workforce, and a bourgeois public sphere.

The interpretation of chis float is easy. Spain is represented in che greatest surge oí its happiness as a resulr oí che birth ol the two SERENE INFANTES, by

Two divergent tendencies are produced with these administrative, religious, and educacional reforms. On the one hand, the formation oí the idea

[newly signed peace], by its producrs, by its main rivers, by its Sciences,

oí a Gran España, made up oí Iberia and the Indies together, with a population oí subjects Lending toward greater internal homogenization under

Arts, Navy, Commerce, and Agriarlture, all of which e; fomented by our august sovereign, facilitating for Chis Illuscrious Nation che abundante and opulence that is promised by its fernlc soi] and che constancy oí ics loyal and energetic inhabitants.

In short, a clear image oí Spain, represented by a modero idea oí the public good (wich great prominence given co arts and industry, natural resources, and the customs oí che various folk), is present in this state ritual. Naiionalism as a

Praci ical

24 =

System

increasingly bourgeois forms of political identity, en che other, the consolidation oí the various administrative units-the viceroyalties and the new "intendancies"_as viable state units, each with its own internal financia] administration and permanenc army. These contradictory tendencies are in fact incimately related: en the one hand, the administrative consolidation oí transatlantic political units was che only logical means te shape a strong Gran España; en the other, Natioualism as a Practica1 System =25=

political crisis Froni the seventeenth century on, the armada from Spain liad to struggle to ntake successful voyages to the Americas, and there were moments when the armada was entirely incapable oí managing Spanish-American trade Creater administrative and military autonomy would provide another line ol imperial detense. Thus, at the lame time that the "political viability" and the "emotional plausibility" oí the viceroyalties were strengthened pollncally by the new system oí intendancies and deologically through a new emphasis on the public good through industiy and education, so too was the notion oí a truly panimperial idenriry closer at hand than ever hefore.

These contradictory tendencies are in evidente at the time oí independence: first, in the parallels between tire American War oí Independence and the "war of independence" oí Spain against the French invaders; second, in the fact that the liberal Constitution oí Cádiz (1812) defined "Spaniards" as all oí the people who were born in the Spanish territories, with no differences made between Iberia and the Indies. Figure 1. . Ex-oolo gining Ibanks lo tbe oi rg is: of Cuadal upe f o r a successful medica¡ opera tion, anonymous, 1960. Re¡ornier of the c[ghLeen th century were convinced that divine protection and Interjecti on were not i n conlbct aith modernizat, t i a and modern technologies. This has been a persutent [heme in Mexican nationalism In this ex-voto of 1960, the Virgin of Cuadalupes llght shines in the operating room.

the very process oí consolidating their viability made independence al] the easier to imagine . Alexandcr von Humboldt's voyage and writings en Spanish America are a good example of this conundrum. Whereas in the Laves of tbe Indies, which is a compilation made in 1680, printed materials about the Indies were banned frota [hose lands , and foreigners were outlawed from going beyond the ports of the Indies, Humboldt received a roya) commission to travel thcre, and authorities were asked to give him all oí their statistics and any in formation he might find useful. Humboldt's publications on the political economy oí the Indies followed the spirit oí the Bourbon reforms, as well as Cerman cameralist administrative theory, by treating each principal administrative unit (mainly viceroyalties) as a coherent whole, with a population, an economy, a map, and so on. The administrative consolidation of viceroyalties, intendancies, and other political units was occurring not as a ploy to keep Creoles boxed into their administrative unas, but ratheu to strengthen the general state oí the empire, and tu give each segment a greater capacity to respond to a N a t i o n a l i s m gis

e p roo i ,cal S y s t e m 26 =

Fourtb Moment. The Rocky Road to Modera Nationalism (Mexico 181o-29) In Latin America, the road ter national modernity was particularly cumbersome. This was owing to the early date of independence movements, a fact that resulted not so much from the force oí nationalist feeling in the region as from the decadente oí Spain in the European forum.36 As a result oí this, the new countries faced stiff interna¡ and foreign- relations problems, and it is in the context oí [hese problems that a functioning nationalism developed. The fourth moment in the evolution oí Spanish-American nationalism can best be understood as one in which the dynamics of independent postcolonial statehood forced deep ideological changes, including a sharp change in who was considered a national and who a foreigner, a redefinition oí the extension oí the fraternal bond through the idea oí citizenship, and of the relationship between religion and nationality and between race and nation. This process oí radical transformation occurred alongside the emergence oí a new form oí popular politics, in which social movements cut across the boundaries oí villages and castes, regions and guilds. The Spanish-American revolutions may seem "socially thin" to some contemporary observers (Anderson 1991, 49), but they were by far the most "dense" social and political movements that Spanish America had had since the Conquest. In this section, 1 explore the dynamics of [hese Nationalism as

a e-ractica1 System

Mexican independence, Hidalgo and Morelos, who were secular priests, claimed to be fighting for the sake of religion. Here, for instante, is a formulation by Morelos: Know that when kings go missing Sovereignry resides only in the Nation,7 know also that every nation is free and is authorized ro form the class of government that ir chooses and not te be the slave oí anothcr; know also (for you undoubtedly have hcard rell of rhis) that we are so far from heresy that our srruggle comes down to defending and protecring in all oí its rights our holy religion, whlch is rhe aim of our sights, and ro extend the culr of Our Lady the Virgin Islary. (Morelos 1812, 199)

Morelos and Hidalgo accused rhe Spaniards oí betraying their trae Christian mission and using Chrisrianity as a subterfuge for the exploitation of the Americans.27 To uphold the true Christian faith was also to drive out al] Spaniards who had milked the Mexicans of their native wealth and who had driven rhem to abjection. These early movements failed. Morelos and Hidalgo were executed, and alrhough their followers continued rhe fight, independence was not to be achieved under the leadership of this particular ideological wing_ Instead, an alliance was captained by Agustín Iturbide, who had been a loyalist army officer and who enjoyed the backing of a sizable fraction oí New Spain's elite. lturbide's Plan de Iguala gave Spaniards ample guarantees of full inclusion in the new republic. _ The backers oí Morelos (including pardos, Indian village communlties, local artisans and merchants) were led by Vicente Guerrero and backed a political program that would eventually gel roto what Peter Guardino has called "popular federalism" (1996, 120-27; 179-86). The popular radicals oí the 1 820s were interested in lowering taxes and broad electoral enfranFigure 1 4_Sa1or Reina de la Arnérrc, L? ion hy Gonzalo Carrasco (1859-1936), n. d.

chisement. They favored the formation oí municipal boundaries and institutions that would help villagers defend their lands, gave free rein to anti-

Collection oí die Muscum of thc Basílica of Guadalupe. Guadalupe here is the

Spanish sentiment, and sought to implement a liberal system modeled en

patroness of Spanish-American sovercignty Th, image also underscores Mexicos

that of the United States. The elite of this group carne to be associated

presumptive role at the head ol the Spanish-Anierican con federati on.

with rhe Freemasons of the rite of York, and they supported a movement to expel the Spaniards from Mexico_

transformations through a discussion of certain key events in early independent Mexico (18 10-29). As Andiony Pagden has shown, Creole patriotism was predicated on Spanish political philosophy. In the Iberian world, sovereignry was granted by ((>d to the people, who in furo ceded it to thc monarch. It is therefore nos surprising that the early fathers of

In 1828 a yorquino-backed coup led ro the looting oí the market oí the Parián in Mexico Ciry, where wealthy Spanish merchants had their shops, and the expulsion of the Spaniards from Mexico followed shortly afrer.21 Thus Mexican nationalism went from excluding Spaniards in rhe early independence movement, to including rhem at independence, to excluding rhem again, all in a very short lapso of time.

Narionn lien^ .i^ Pear..al Sys tea 28

Natioriui 5,n

,rn a Iractlcal 29

Systea

Thc very viulence Di the iti, ologieal transionn a ti ora of early Mexican

dent, Guadalupe Victoria --so much so that when US. ambassador Joel

nationalism suggests that a general Ti absti,ict "nationalism" does not help

Poinsett arrived can che sccnc in 1825 , he saw gaining some oí the terrain

in undcrstanding thc speciiio ot tts eontcnu or as dynamics of propaga-

that tire United States liad already ceded to che British as his most formi-

tion In fact jusc as che noticio of kinshils s in abstraction of such a gen-

dable cask."' Poinsett naakcs a sustained cffort to huild a pro-Ameriean

eral leve) that it can obtuscate clic natura d thc practicas that are being

party to councer British intluence in Mexico Part ol Poinsetts well-

summed up ¡Ti the ealegory, so tus, can see say that Anderso«s cultural ist

calibered strategy included aid in che organization of Masonic lodges co

reading oí nationalism is to such a (legrar general and abstract thar it fails

counter those affiliated ro che Scottish rite, arad he attached these Masons

to clarify che polities ot cono uunitt przxluecion.

co che rite oí York (chartercd by che lodge in Philadelphia). These two

lile speciiio fonnulations ut thc natura ol clic nation and of who was included and who was excluded undcnvent dramatic. shifts that cannot be attributed ro changes in conaciousness gained by new naaps or censuses

Masonic organizations t, ould funccion as political parciies" in Chis early period.' Both che Scottish and che Yorkish Masons tried to monopolize as many

(Humboldt was still the maro scuice chal people drew en in this period).

government posts as they could. As the competition between the escoceses

Nor do these shifts respond lo ara intensification oí travel or oí che

and the yorquinos became embittered, che Ameriean causé' (oí York) be-

strength oí bureaucratic networks acioss che territory. The formation oí

gins to identify the Masons oí the Scottish rite with imperialist European

Mexican nationalism can be understood in rciation to the political condi-

interests, especially with Spanish interests. This allowed the yorquinos to

tions oí its production_ These condi Horas mere determined as muela by the

distract attention from tire US-British rivalry, and it promised co yield

new nation's position in an international order as by the fact that it did not

juicy dividends co yorquinos in che form oí Spanish property, because the

have a national ruling class-

Spaniards were still che most prosperous sector oí Mexico's population.

This latter point requires elaboration. At che time oí independence, Spanish-Ameriean countries did not hace a Creole bourgeoisie that could serve as a nacional dominant class. Domestic regional economies were not

The escoseses, for their pare, because they were losing che contest for national power, denounced the role of Joel Poinsett as a foreigner creating che parry oí yorquinos and the very existente oí "secret societies."

well articulated Yo each other; much of che transatlantic merchant elite

Thus, it is in che competition between two secret societies for full con-

was Spanish; mining capital often required foreign partnerships. Thus che

trol over che apparatus of che state that two critical aspects oí Mexican na-

Creole elite was a regional elite, and not a national bourgeoisie. Only two

tionalism get consolidated: nationalism as an excluding ideology (even as

institutions could conceivably serve co articulare the national space: the

a xenophobic ideology)-seen both in che move co expel the Spaniards

church and che military. The milicary, however, was not a unified body, be-

and in che move to expel Poinsett; and nationalism as an ideology that

cause it was led precisely by regional caudillos, many oí whom controlled

makes public access to the state bureaucracy a cornerstone oí its ideology.

their own milicias. The church, on che other hand, articulated the national

These aspects oí nationalism reinforce one another because neither of che

space in ternas oí credit to some extent, and also ideologically, but it could

two Masonic parties can afford the luxury oí identifying entirely with for-

not serve as a national dominant class

eign interests (because each needs to attack a different foreign powerthe yorquinos want to attack British and Spanish interests, che escoseses are

In Chis context, uniting regional leaders inco national factions was necessary. In che early years after Mexico's independence, Freemasonry had Chis

opposed to U.S. interests), and neither can openly admit that it merely

role.co It was through Masonry that regional elites forged interregional net-

wishes to control the bureaucratic apparatus.

works that con Id prefigure the national burcaucracy after independence.

and political concessions Froni (lit govcrnnaent of Mexico's first presi-

Finally, the links between religion and nationalism should not be taken as constant. Although early Mexican patriotism was identified with a superior loyalty to che Catholic faith, arad Mexican nationalists vehemently excluded other faiths from che national order, both the British and the Americans coincide in their interest in propagating freedom oí religion. Consequently, some degree oí religious tolerance was necessary to maintain trade with England and che United States, and che polarization oí the

.A4^ ,0ra clic., Sys trm

N a t i o,t a l i s m a s a Pra ctica 1 S y s t e m

When independence was anained, nnich oí Mexico's political elite helonged to Masonic lodges organized in the Scottish rice. These elites were well disposed co Britain and, indeed, Great Britain was che first great power to recognize Mexico Not surprisingly, George Ward, who was Britain's first anthassador co ixlexico was able to reap nunaerous economic

311

31 =

political spectrum ended up producing a jacobin camp that was absent in the early postindependent period. Eventually, church properties would be to jacobins what Spanish properties had been to yorquinos in 1829: a source oí wealth that could be the spoils for political expansion in a period oí little economic growth. In chis fashion, Mexico consolidated a nacional state with a nationalism built on three principies: che defense against foreigners, the defense oí open political parties instead of secret societies (and oí an understanding oí the state as a normative order rather than as a governing caaes), and the (uneven) extension oí the beneflts oí nationalism to popular levels (whether througb the abolition oí tribute, oí guild restrictions, oí church tithes, oí distribution oí nacional lands, che distribution oí spoils from the Spaniards, the distribution oí goods oí new technologies). These three pillars are in part rhe unintended result ol the contest oí the secret societies, supported by two imperialist states, for control over the state apparatus. These secret societies, in turn, functioned thanks to the cleavages oí economic and political interests that cut across nacional lines or that did not reach "up" to the nacional leve) at all. In short, the bases oí communitarian feeling, criteria oí inclusion and exclusion in the nation, the imagination oí a territory, and the very conceptualization oí nacional fraterniry were shaped in the political fray.

Conclusion The cultural density oí the phenomenon oí nationalism líes in the politics oí its production and deployment Nationalism combines the use of transnationally generated formulas, ranging from legal formulations to state pageantry, with a politics that is inextricably local. A dense or thick description oí nationalism is therefore a necessary step for understanding its cultural characteristics.

The Spanish-American and Mexican cases present a significant historical problem for Anderson's conceptualization because in Spain nacional construction began with an appropriation oí the church, and not with a relativization of "Eden." Spanish was seen as a modern form oí Latin, and therefore was more appropriate for communicating the faith than indigenous languages. In a related vein, "yace" was central to early modern Spanish nationalism, insofar as descent from Old Christians was seen as a sigo oí a historical tie to the faith, a sigo that gave its owners control over the bureaucratic apparatus of both church and state. Moreover, the concept oí "empty time" was present in the Spanish Nat,Onallsm

n,: a Prac^,cal System

world long before print capitalism, beginning with the decline oí empire and Spains failure to attain a universal monarchy. Thus, Spanish economic thought formulated the notion oí a national economy beginning in the mid-sixteenth century. The administrative constructs that allowed for the imaginings oí a people tied to a territory can be dated back to the sixteenth century, when both colonial expansion and the defense oí the empire against European powers led to the consolidation oí the notion oí "Spain' and oí "Spanards." As Spain continued to decline in the European forum, state reforms tended to target political middlemen in an attempt to substitute regional political classes with a bureaucracy, to consolidare an idea oí a nacional territory, and to shape a Greater Spanish Nation made up oí subjects that tended increasingly toward an internal uniformity visó-vis the Crown. Finally, independence itself, as Anderson recognized, was not the product oí cultural nationalism, but rather oí the decline oí Spain's capacity to run its overseas territories. As a result, much oí the specific content oí modern nationalist ideology, such as the notion that politics should be public, or that religion should not be a criterion for choosing a trading partner, or that a Spaniard is not a Mexican even if he sympathizes with the Mexican cause, was the cultural product oí independence, and not its precondition. On the theoretical front, the Latin American case leads me to modify Anderson's definition oí nationalism in order to stress botín fraternal tres and bonds oí dependence in the imagined community. It is in the articulation between citizenship and nationality that various nationalisms derive their power. As a result, sacrifice is not the quintessential feature oí nationalism, but rather one oí a number oí possible signs and manifestations. In addition, because Anderson's ideas concerning the necessiry oí cultural relativism as a precondition for nationalism are incorrect, it follows that his theoretical emphasis on the centrality oí language over race in nationalism can also be questioned. In the case oí Spain, at least, "racial" identity (in the dense oí a bloodline) was coupled with linguistic identity for the formation oí an opposition between "Spaniards" and "lndians," and it was descent from Oid Christians who had fought holy wars that made Spaniards a chosen people. Like kínship and religion, nationalism has come in various strands. In the early modern period, we must distinguish between the nationalism oí a chosen people, such as that oí Spain, and the defensive nationalism oí the British or the Dutch, who created nationalist ideals in order to affirm their right to maintain and sanctify their own traditions. Both oí these Nat,onai,sm as a Practical System 33 =

fornis contia, t with the highly unsiablc nati unalist tomula ti ons of early postcolonial Spanish America AdUtmallants tamily free reaches baek to the very birth of the modem w01 ¡TI and ideas cl political community that lave emerged sincc then are buth muro and Icss than a cultural suecessor ot che rellgious community

2

Communitarian Ideologies and Nationalism

This chapter, first published in 1993, is the earliest of the essays in this book. It iras written for a wide audience, with the aim of províding very general historical parameters for the study of Mexican communitarian ideologies.

The territory now known as Mexico has always been occupied by diverse human groups that speak different languages and have significant variations in belief and customs. Mexican nationality is not a historically transcendent entity. On the contrary, it is the historical product of the peoples who have inhabited those lands. The goal of this chapter is to identify communitarian ideologies that have played salient roles in the formation and transformation of national ideology in Mexico. Today it is common to assert that nationalism is a communitarian fiction. However, the nation is a kind of community that coexists with others, either as a complementary form oras a competing form of community, and strategies for identifying the communitarian ideologies that are pertinent for the study of nationality are a matter that requires attention. Max Weber defined communal relations as a type of social relationship wherein action is'based on the subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together."i Thus al] communal relations, N a l i o n a l i, ni ., , e

P r,, , i i c a l

Syste^

35 =

including family relations, are hased on subjective feeling and en fictions regarding the social whole, and who "we" are In this chapter, 1 analyze communitarian ideologies by identifying the goods that each community marks as inalienable- This strategy is based en Annette Weiner's discussion oí exchange- In contrast to classical (Maussian) models of exchange, which inspected the role of the reciprocal exchange oí goods for building ties of solidarity, Weiner focused en the goods that people decide that they cannot exchange: inalienable goods.2 In so doing, she showed that reciprocal exchanges not only assert solidarity; they also chape systems oí social differentiation. The objects that are exchanged in relations oí reciprocity also underline by omission or by implication the resources that will not be exchanged. The relationship between the various things that each exchange partner withholds and keeps out oí circulation objectifies a system oí social differentiation. This idea is useful for describing how communitarian ideologies are constructed. The totalizing visions that underlie communitarian relationships are always based en definitions of goods or rights that are common and inalienable te al]. The relationships oí differentiation that are later constructed within and between communities are defined with reference to the series of goods that are inalienable ro the group. In out case, examining the nation's inalienable goods clarifies how Mexicanness has been formed. National feelings are presented as inherited "primordial loyalties." One is burn and dies with them and they are passed un: children must also inherit them- This characteristic oí nationaliry-its ideology oí transcendence-can be grasped by studying the communitarian goods and rights that are considered inalienable because they embody the material transcendence Oí the community. My aim in this chapter is to use che inalienable communitarian possessions to identify the principal types of communitarian ideologies that facilitated or blocked the formation of the feeling oí Mexican nationaliry .

and (4) ancient Nahua notions correspond at many points with those oí other Mesoamerican groups. My aim in considering the Aztecs is not to affirm the precepts oí traditional Mexican nationalism, which always saw the grandeur oí the Aztec city as the founding moment oí Mexican nationality. Rather, it is to understand the nature oí Aztec communitarianism so that we may better identify its potential for modern nationalist thought. When discussing Aztec notions oí community, it is necessary to consider kinship, territory, cultural formulations oí subordination and domination, and ideas about civilization and barbarism. In the Aztec period, indigenous states' areas oí influence did not correspond to the limits oí a single linguistic or territorial community. The great cities oí Tenochtitlán, Texcoco, and Azcapotzalco housed migrants from many areas, including speakers oí various languages. The great tlatoani oí Tenochtitlán was the lord not only oí the Nahuatl speakers oí Tenochtitlán, but also oí Otomis, Mazahuas, Zapotecs, and many others, some oí whom had been forcibly brought to the city as slaves, while others were migrants, members of guilds, and merchants. Pre-Hispanic states were thus not meant to represent a cultural community in the contemporary sense oí the term, although communitarian ideas certainly existed. These notions developed around a discourse el kinship (that is, oí alliance and descent) between living and dead people, as well as between kin groups and land. The cornerstone oí the sense oí community in the Aztec period was the institution oí the calpulli- The communitarian ideology of the calpulli was manifested in a series oí inalienable goods and rights: (1) the land el the calpulli belonged to a lineage, not an individual, so individuals could even sell themselves as slaves but they could not freely dispose oí calpulli lands; (2) the lineage and land were sponsored by a deity (calpulteotl), and the link with that deity could not be broken by individual will; (3) the calpulli's links with other calpultin were manifested and symbolized in kinship links among their chiefs and among the gods in the cycle oí suns, a

The Aztecs

myth that legitimated the preeminente oí a single people (the Aztecs) and

The Aztecs are notan obligatory starting point for the analysis oí Mexican communitarian ideologies. 1 begin with them for four reasons: (1) understanding the communitarian ideologies of pre-Hispanic states helps us to visualize the full gamut oí ideological sources oí modern Mexican nationalism; (2) some features oí pre-Hispanic communitarian ideologies have persisted, albeit in a very transformed way, (3) many Mexican nationalist movements have tried to take up the polirical forros oí ancient Mexico; Communi !oran = 36 =

1dologies

their tutelary god over en entire era.3 This series of kinship relationships was also used to claim Aztec filiation with the Toltec line, which was the source oí civilization, and was also seen asan inalienable legacy.

In Chis sense, in the pre-Hispanic period the "national" question did not depend en "ethnicity" as we understand iq nationaliry did not depend en membership in the same Iinguistic, racial, or cultural group. The important thing was to belong to one oí a set oí landed communities. Belonging to these communities determined a relationship to a series of inalienable Coromu,o arias = 37 =

Ideologies

,,oods summcd up in tire dilterent dinx nsic, ns ot tire caipulli comnion land

political licld- Sacrifice and slavery were interpreted as an affirmation of

'Lid a kinship idiom tying all maniera ol a..iÍpuiG togethet; filiati on with a

the greater cosmology-tic period or reigning son in which it was thought

local deiq^ ca ipu!leoil;. and a reccrved set ol ilb,nces between calpultin (ex-

that they were livinig--through che expansion of sorne communities at che

pressed in genealogical forn) hctwc^n tamiheso t chi eis and between their

expense oí others

tutelary gods These relationsh, s t,crc ^spressed very powertuliy in che

In tima sense, although the aalpnlli was the primordial communitarian

words that according to Fray lfui nardi no de Sahagúm) Aztec priests di-

unir, riere was also a leve) of social identi fication related Lo the Aztec

rected to che Franciscana whu cure to convert them

state. The feclings of belonging to this greater political unir were built on a numher ol relationshi ps. Wc have already mentioned tbe importance of

They out progen noi e,ak]ri ue

the system of kinship alliance between nobles. Marriage between nobles

all thcir 'caes of wo^+hip,

was so important in che ideological construction of the empire that is al-

their ways of reveriog l che goda

most impossible to imagine chis system without polygamy, because Aztec

Thus, before them we bn ng carde to our mou ths ]we swear],

lords formed alliances with subordinated peoples by accepting their noble-

so do we bleed,

women in marriage6

we pay our debts,

These kinship networks among allied, subordinated communities and imperial centers also had an ideological counterpart in religion. Here, the Aztecs' tutelary god, Huitzilopochtli, ruled the era-the'Pifth Sud'-as a whole. Thus, che calpultin' s communitarian worship could also find a subor-

we burn incense, we offer sacrifices Ttey [our progenitora] said that they, the gods, are for whom one leves, that they deserved us

How? Wherer When it was still night And they [our ancestors raid, that they give os our sustenance, our food. everything one drinks, one eats, that which is our flesh, maize, beans, amaranth, chía. They are who we ask for water, ramo, which is why che things of dte land are produeed.'

This vision oí community also hclps Lis Lo understand certain features of che Aztecs' characteristic sense ol honran hfe. These features are expressed in che ideologies oí sacrifico and slavery. When an individual was captured in war, he was taken by the hair on the crown oí his head. This act represented che appropriation of his tonalli, his vital force, and the separation oí that vital force from che captive's original community.s Thus, sacrifice and slavery were one naton's or community's way oí liberating and expending the human energy and vitality that had been separated from anorher nation or community_ This strengthened che alliance between the appropriating nation and che different gods that shaped its Communii ir, ,n Id,olo 38

dinate place in a religious cosmology that included and favored the empire, with the Aztecs' Huitzilopochtli presiding over che whole era. Imperial society also had mechanisms for attracting individuals who did not come as slaves or victims. Aztec expansion depended en military and commercial domination. In turn, Chis domination required powerful armies, and the Aztecs permitted non-Aztecs to join them and rise in rank through battlefield accomplishments. In this way, the Aztec empire developed mechanisms for absorbing and assimilating individuals even though they did not belong to their primordial community oí origin.7 In conclusion , one can say that in pre-Hispanic society there was a vision oí the human individual as an energy that had a value in itself. This energy (figured in the tonalli) had Lo be linked to a series of inalienable possessions that every qualified individual inherited. He or she had to be linked to a piece of land, Lo a kin group, to a configuration oí tutelary gods, and to the political acate. The Aztecs' imperial policies were to some degree oriented Lo channeling these various communal loyalties toward them through a complex system oí alliances and threats. They also had the capacity to absorb individuals into the group in return for services rendered, especially on the battlefield. Basically, one can say that, in the Aztec period, belonging to a landed community that was figured as a kindred was the only truly honored way oí life, and to be separated from that state oí community, the ancient Nahua was destined Lo serve orto dic. Con,sunita rian Idealagies 39=

The Colonial Period and indigenous barrio was generally imperfect, it did reproduce the tenNotions of communiry in colonial society, can also be explored through an

dency te organize kinship relationships en the leve) oí the barrio and the

analysis oí the inalienable possessions that each attributed to itself. New

community. The indigenous barrios oí the colonial period were generally

Spain was a caste society that recognized different types oí communities

composed oí two or three great patrilineages_ Even more important, as

that maintained hierarchical relationships with each other. I shall briefly

James Lockhart has shown, colonial indigenous jurisdictions tended to coincide with the pre-Columbian units (altepetl), in such a way that the

review indigenous, Spanish and mestizo communitarian ideologies. Indigenous communities partially maintained some oí the calpulli's

combination oí barrios formed a single political community.

communal attributes: the communiry remained legally and officially land-

On the ritual plane, each village adopted one or several saints, and the

ed through its "primordial titles," which were decrees from a Spanish

Christian tradition oí revelation articulated with the shamanism oí pre-

monarch that granted a series of lands and goods to a village, sometimes

Columbian peoples. This permitted personalized relationships between

in recognition oí tribute paid or to confirm lands that had belonged to those villages in antiquity.

saints and individuals (and, by association, between saints and the groups

Clearly, one oí the colonial indigenous communitys inalienable goods

maintained inalienable links with land, family, and gods, albeit in a transformed way.

was land, despite the fact that communal lands could be rented for long periods or lose through illicit sales. Correspondingly, the primordial titles were converted into almost sacred documenis guarded by the most venerable elders and displayed only in special occasions. Knowledge oí the content oí those titles was a central theme oí local oral traditions. As in pre-Columbian times, this collective relationship with the land was reflected ar the ritual, religious, and political levels. Thus, indigenous communities instituted their own ofhces-alcaldes, jueces, gobernadores, mandones, and alguaciles-that circulated, in theory at least, among the village principales, the descendants oí the old indigenous nobility. This political organization oí the indigenous communiry had the double purpose oí guarding village intereses, imparting local justice, and responding to Spanish demands on the community, including tribute, the organization oí labor groups, and the enforcement oí Christian worship. A good part oí the territorial, political, and religious organization oí indigenous communities also tended to coincide with kin groups in the mode oí the calpulli, but in general the indigenous quarters and communities of the colonial period were not direct continuations oí the calpultin. In the first decades after the Conquest, many ot the indigenous quarters (barrios) that were organized were in fact calpultin However, this correspondence often broke down because oí the enormous Indian mortality throughout the sixteenth century and the population movements that responded to new Spanish economic demands. Moreover, to resolve the difficulties in controlling the dispersed indigenous population the Spanish "concentrated" it in larger population centers (aboye all in the late sixteenth and eariy seventeenth centuries). Still, although thc physical continuity between calpulli

to which individuals belonged). Thus, the indigenous communitarian spirit

In addition to al] this, colonial indigenous communities were nations in a racial sense, and this radically differentiated colonial indigenous nationality from pre-Columbian nationalities. Like the calpulli, each community identified its limits on the basis oí a relationship with a series oí inalienable objects-the land, an oral tradition about the land, a series oí political relationships within comniunities, and a series oí relationships between communities and deities. However, it is also clear that in the colonial period this form oí constituting communiry was exclusive to Indians and that Indian was a "racial" and a legal category oí persons: legally, Indians were those people who could aspire tu belong to an Indian republic and who were obligated to vender tribute, labor, and obediente to the Spaniards. Racially, they were descendants oí the original settlers.a Thus, although the indigenous colonial community's interna] world partially resembled and perpetuated the calpulli's characteristics, the colonial criteria oí inclusion diverged widely from those oí the pre-Hispanic period. This is because, instead oí belonging to a world composed oí dominating and dominated peoples (who remained connected through relationships oí kinship, political alliance, and social mobility), all indigenous communities found themselves subordinated to a caste with which they could not easily meld; that is, as a group, indigenous communities formed a caste or subordinated nationality in a social hierarchy that sought to maintain stable distinctions, however unsuccessfully. On the other hand, the relationship between indigenous individuals and their community also changed. After evangelization, Indians were thought to be subjects with free will, who would be judged by the moral choices made by each person. In part because oí this, Indians who separated

1drologies 40 =

Com »''hita rian 1deologies 41

thcroselve, Iront their conununities acre ns, [coger simply a nmss ot ener-

pological interest becausc ir liiiked two important leaatres oí "honor'

gy that could be appropiated he anothei group through sacrifice or servi-

(1 i the individual's rily, and o nes own honor), and

izad rel a ti onship with die saini, and c aire In s;,th their lives in a world of

(2! the cbasüty of the women ot the group Be, ause honor was mcasured

ineipient social daacs In that aro r ld, indio ,dual energy mas libera sed in

through the blood, bi ologi cal paterniry and ma tern i ty were c ri ti cal, thus

forming une s iamily and in ,carch, n;; tor svagcs, leisure, vices, and cere-

reinforcing thc links between honor, control over virginiry, and women's sexual lidelity alter marriage.

monics ot social gruups that had no inalienable possessions acide from their smil, and [he color ot L[)( 11 ,kin,. For there dislocated Indians thr orle asailablc sources ot collective

The notion that "hlood prcdicted and redactad an individual', reliability became the hasis bar the Spanish idea of nation," understood as a

identity were those creoted by thc racial or racist 1 organization oí the

people that emanated from the lame blood Bclonging to a similar lineage

regime and by the experienee ot sharcd living in an urban quarter, mining

or ro a common nation was important in a numher of contexts; however,

community, hacienda houschold, nr in a lactory or port. On the other

Spanish ideas of character, honor, and right also admitted the possibility

hand, the inalienability oí the soul allowed these Indians to receive the

oí assimilation, and sometimes emphasized the effects oí che milieu on

sacramenta of the church and to choose tlicir spo ices without strict racial

inheritance.

determination. The ideology of free matrinionial choice was especially re-

The idea oí patria, or "homeland," recognized the importance oí the place where one was boro and raised. This is the original sense oí the word Creole, which comes from the verb criar, torear or raise. When a black slave was boro in Veracruz, it was said that he or she was a "Veracruz Creole." For this reason, people of Spanish nationality boro in Mexico were sometimes known as "Creoles' (oí Mexico). The importance given to land complicates the scheme oí identity through blood and honor. Being boro and growing up in a certain place influenced the development of the individual. Thus, for example, there were Spaniards who commented on the "degeneration" oí heredity that took place in America: after two generations a green pepper became a chili pepper, and a Spanish worker had Creole sons who became lazy bums.'o This New World influence was not always conceived in terms oí acculturation (i.e., learning); aboye all, it was thought oí in terms oí the physical influences that emanated from different places' climatic and chemical qualities. Air, humidity, heat, cold, and drinking water all affected the development oí human qualities just as one's heredity did. Consequently, there were widely opposed appreciations oí che nature or effects oí any particular land: one oí the important points in the dispute between Creoles and Iberians was the relative nobility or ignominy oí American versus Iberian lands. In sum, land and blood were central componente oí the person and, by extension, oí the nation in Spanish ideologyThe third important factor in the conception oí the social group was acculturation through learning. Here the word ladino provides a useful key. This word was used to denote a person oí a barbarous or pagan nation that

spected by the clergy ¡Ti the first hall of ihe colonial period (see Seed 1988), but even in the late colonial period, the only serious obstacle to interracial marriage was paternal opp(>sitton. For Chis reason, marriages between members of the sane c lass leven though not of tire same lineage or color) or between prosperous people of color and poor whites were common.' Among títere new mestizo groups, two new factors in the process oí social identification began to assert themselves, money and Hispanic acculturation. These were interrelated in tercos oí their role in constructing ideas about community, so 1 treat them jointly. The Spaniards oí the colonial period had a genealogical concept of tire nation_ its members were descended from tire same blood. The ideological role oí "blood" in Spain is subtle and at the same time crucial for understanding how Mexican nationality seas formed. The importance oí "blood ,n the Spanish regime dates co the Reconquista oí Spain (immediately hefore the discovery oí America), when there were movements to separate "Old Christians' from Jewish and Moorish converts. This was parí of a broader tendency in Spain to nationalize the Catholic church and to make Spaniards the delending knights oí the faith (as well as the principal beneficiaries oí the taith's expansion). Thus, beginning in the fourteenth century "eertificates of blood purity" were required forjoining the clergy, holding publlc office, or belonging to certain guilds. These certificates were intended to show that a individual descended from many generations of Christians_ The concept is ofspecial anthroCo n, ni„n^ta^i..n I.,,olodas 12

Con, n, u ni Carian

Ideologies

43 =

had been at ¡casi parthr civilized Por example, it was said that an Indian was ladino when he or she had a good grasp of Spanish- The same usage applied te slaves: recently arrived Alricans were bozales, bozales torpes (clumsy bozales), or bozalones, but those who now spoke Spanish and knew local customs were ladinos-" A ladino slave was worth more money than a bozal, and a ladino Indian was considerad more qualihed to assume public office in a república de indios tiran a nonaccul turated one A ladino slave was also more dangerous than a bozal, because the tenn was most often used to refer te Moorish slaves." On tire other hand, it is indispensable to note the ambivalente felt toward acculturation or "ladinization', Jews and Muslims were considered members oí especially dangerous nations because they were ladinas; that is, they could imítate Spaniards and subvert their order froni within. This was why Jews and Moors were prohibited from entering the New Worldeven if they were converts. The meaning of ladino as an able but truculent, two-faced person has survived into our times. It is the main meaning that this word has today, but in thc past it was part oí a far more complex semantic field. With these considerations iri mirad we can now reconsider the Indians who separated themselves from their communities and whose only inalienable possessions were their souls and skin color. We have said that these individuals could aspire te a place within a new community through money and skills. In light oí the concepts oí free will, blood, homeland, and ladinization, we can better understand these people's strategies and alternarives. First, although Indian émigrés no longer had inalienable tres to land through primordial titles, oral traditnons, and so on, they did have ties to a more abstract "homeland", thev were "Indians." Second, through their participation in the market economy, sorne oí these migrants could learn Spanish ways. Thus they had certain advantages over the monolingual village Indian (alrhough here it is crucial to remember the ambivalente toward ladinization. these Indians were at once superior to and more dangerous than those still tied te their villages). Third, if a man managed te make a little money, he could invest in the transgenerational path oí honor, for example, by marrying a mestiza or Creole ("improving the race") and by acquiring possessions with which he could assert a certain honor. Successful Indians who separated from their local communities could begin te identify with a larger homeland and aspire to win a small measure oí honor and progress

The problems of Creole collective identities were simpler in some C o,, rn u u' 1 a r l., n 1Jro logres 44

sense. When Creoles identifled or were identified as a group (which they often did not), they were distinguished from Peninsulars not by "nationality," but rather by the influences oí their respective homelands. This occasionally served to discriminate against some oí them in the fields oí business, matrimony, religion, the army, and the bureaucracy. Because oí this, one cannot speak oí Creole nationalism (against the Spaniards), but oí Creole patriotism: an ideology that extolled the benign influence Mexico, Pero, and other countries. On the other hand, beyond European nationals boro in Mexico, this Creole patriotism also found support among ladinoized Indians who no longer belonged te an indigenous community and for whom a highly valued homeland could be important. Finally, it is interesting to note African slaves' position with respect te these issues oí homeland, nationality, and community. Unlike Indians, slaves had no inalienable possessions; al¡ their goods were alienated. Moreover, the very legitimation for slavery was to undo peoples who resisted evangelization. In principie, slaves were captives oí "just wars" against unbelievers who refused even to listen te the missionaries. In Chis context, it was-legitimare te take slaves and oblige them to receive Christian instruction in hopes that they would go en to a better world after passing through all the sufferings oí a life dedicated to servitude. Thus, unlike the Indians, slaves were not redeemable as a nation, but only as individuals, and this only aher the bitterness oí slavery. Because oí this, black communities were regularly watched or flatly banned: the as$ociation of more than two blacks and all corporate bodies except the military companies of Pardos y Morenos oí the eighteenth century and religious sodalities were prohibited, and even sodalities were Ilegal at times because oí their subversive potential.'3 However, there was an important contradiction with respect to the collective nature oí slaves: despite all the efforts against the formation oí a slave society parallel to indigenous society, slaves were brought from Africa and nowhere else precisely because they could not be confused with either Europeans or Indians. Undoubtedly, this confluence oí factors heles us understand the fear that the idea oí Afro-American kingdoms inspired in Spaniards. However, the tendency to form Afro-Mexican collectivities was limited to the groups oí maroons who succeeded in establishing themselves in coastal arcas. Meanwhile, most slaves were marrying free people and contributing te the formation oí the colonial plebe that constituted the popular classes in cities, mines, and ports.

These considerations about indigenous, Creole, and black nationality and patriotism are fundamental for understanding the development oí IIomn !uuiln rían

=45=

Ideologías

Mexican nationality properly spcal.ing. Pelote passing to that topie, however it is lmportant co mention lene tino t i-itional pohtical etfect of the colonial regimc ti is c leal from all thc evidente that Pie predominant ideo logical, legal. and eeonomie se,l,... in th, eulnnial period helped forge a multinational society in which d,tlcrc nt national groups could share interests in their homelands Uno must add to this, however, that the colonial pollucal system in itsclt helpecl lo produce images of politieal sovereignty that pcople werc trylnp lo entulate alter independence_ in the colonial period:.Mexico nv sea, the seas ot a c iceroyalq, presided oven by a viceroy. sebo conccived ol himselt as Pie kings alter ego. His court seas composed of nobles, the high clergy. Icarned men, merehants, and miners. The viceroy vas ultimately responsible for all branches oí government-admjnistrative, ecclesiastical, and mihtary . The existente oí this pinnacle oí state power in Neve Spain undoubtedly helped the Créeles and their various alijes to imagine a new state with its capital ni Mexico City, ruled by Mexican patriots and not by Iberians.

canos. thc silvei extracted from the homelands "belly," and the pyramids and other grandeurs of the pie-Hispanic indigenotis cultures, the material remains ol which now tornad part of Pie land and gave che landscape its osen narre: Mexico. not New Spain_ This set of symbols, which werc of the homeland and not strictly national, had first been developed by Creole patriots beginning in the late sixteenth centuey By the time oí independence, these symbols had already become part oí a well-known repertoire, ,he artworks that extolled the producís and landscopes of che New World, Pie presentation of preColumbian civilizations as panllel to those ol Greek and Reman classical antiquity, the assertion oí Mexican Christianity's legitimacy and autonomy through the cult oí the Virgin oí Guadalupe, the search for a pre-Hispanic Christianity in such figures as Quetzalcoatl, and so en. i4 The novelty oí independence patriotism in the face of this Creole tradition was that, given the Mexican state, ene could proceed to grant official status to these symbols. Thus, Hidalgo flew the standard oí the Virgjn oí Guadalupe; José María Morelos used a flag with an eagle on a nopal cactus and the inscription "VVM" (IViva la Virgen María[); Iturbide also

Nationality affer Independenc One oí the central ideological problems olí the independence period was how to transfonn Creole patriotism roto a new nationalism ehat could include social groups that had beca horn in Mexico but did not belong to the "Hispano-Mexican lace." This was a practical question even belore ll became a theoretical one: how to give the homeland enough stature so that patriotic concerns would eclipse class and cante questions At a purely logical leve) there were only two solutions ti) this problem. the first was to redefine the ideas oí nation and nationality so that belonging to a common homeland determjned and dcfined belonging lo che nation; tire second was to maintain the multinational system with a kuropean elite, but in a context where everyone benefited from the fact that Chis elite was as attached and loyal to the same homeland as the lndians and blacks. On a practical level, there were obviously different, extremely complex ways oí blending these two options, which need to be expía roed. Regardless oí which option was adopted, any independence ideology had to nave a common patriotic oasis; it seas much simpler co share a love for the homeland than to agree en the characteristics of the nation. Because of this, the írst fornuilations of Mexicos sacred and inalienable goods werc very direccly linked wldh symbols of tire (home)land: jis "sacred sojl." tire central mesa', Jeep bine skies, die Aztec eagle, the vol-

adopted the Aztec eagle (albeit with a crown), and in 1821 he formed the Order oí Guadalupe for soldiers, insurgents, teachers, and distinguished clergymen. The first coros were minted with figures oí the Aztec eagle. From 1821 to 1 853, various national anthems were composed until the patriotic song oí González Bocanegra was adopted. One cannot say that it is nationalistic. it is almost exclusively about the importante oí sacrificing for the homeland, and its most representative stanza is the one that proclaims, "No longer shall the blood oí your sons / be spilled in contention between brothers / only may he who insults your sacred name / encounter the steel in your hands." However, the speed with which the sacred signs and objects oí the homeland were formed did not nave such a simple counterpart in the way the nation was defined. In fato, the national question properly speaking has been polemical ever sincc

The ways in which the homeland was identified with the nation were evolving in interesting ways. In tire first years oí jndependence, one oí the legacies uniformly claimed for the nation was the Catholic religion. This nationalization oí the church can be partially understood as an extension oí the appropriation oí the faith that was the ideological cornerstone oí Spanish imperialism. The church was considered a fundamental and inalienable legacy oí the Mexican nation in all the principal laws and docunients oí the early independence period, from the appropiation oí the t a x i i ,i I d e o i o j i e s = 47=

Virgin of Guadalupe by Father Hidalgo to che political programs of

This political position was contrary lo che central precept of liberalism, however, which was becoming the dominant ideology of the independence movement. An indigenismo that attempted to maintain and strengthen indigenous communities within a pluriracial national order threatened to divide che nation. Don José María Luis Mora summed up che liberal stance toward Chis indigenismo:

Morelos, Iturbide, and che 1824 constitution. The Seven Laws (1835) stipulated that Mexicans had che obligation to profess the Catholic religion, and not even the anticlerical laws proanoted by José María Luis Mora in 1833 undermined che official status of Catholicism. The essennalized link between che nation and religion was not broken until che 1857 constitution, and che process of denanonalizing religion was never fully achieved.

The real reason for Chis opposition was that che new arrangement of public

On che other hand, regardless of clic support that nationality eould

instruction was in open conflict with Mr. Rodríguez Puebla's desires, goals,

find in religion, che difficulty in detining che nation was reflectad in che

and objectives with respect to che destiny oí che remains of che Aztec cace

fluctuating ways in which citizenship was defined. Although there was a

that still exist in Mexico- This gentleman, who pretends to belong to che

more or less uniform movement to make tics co che homeland che defini-

said race, is one of che country's notables because oí his good moral and

tive criterion of nationality, che definition of which individuais were citi-

política] qualities, in theory, his is che parry of progress and personally he is a

zens properly speaking was much more restricted. Thus, for example, in

yorkino; but, unlike the men who labor in Chis together, Mr. Rodríguez does

che Seven Laws-which were valid from 1835 until che Reform laws-

not limit his scope to winning liberty, but extends it to exalting che Aztec

only men of legal age with an annual income more than one hundred

race, and therefore his first objective is to maintain it in society with its

pesos could vote. In 1846, these men were also required lo know how to

own existente. To that end he has supported and continues to support che

read and write. In order to be a congressional deputy, one needed a mío¡-

Indians' ancient civil and religious privileges, che status quo oí che goods

mal annual income of 1,500 pesos, to he a senator, 2,000, and to be president, 4,000.

that they possessed in community, che poorhouses intended to attend co them, and che coilege in which they exclusively received their education;

Thus nationalist ideology in che firsr hallof che nineteenth century per-

in a word, without an explicit confession, his principies, goals, and objec-

mitted che de facto retention of colonial social hierarchies: distinction

tives tend te visibly establish a purely Lidian system.

through money could strengthen systems of discrimination by "race" given

The Farías administration, like all che ones that preceded it, thought

the fact that che majority oí Indians and other people of color were poor.

differently; it was persuaded that che existente of different races in che

However, there were also great differences between che system established alter independence, which lavored che rich, and che explicitly

lame society was and had to be an eternal principie of discord. Not only

caste-based system of che colonial period. One of che central differences is

did he [Farías] ignore these distinctions oí past years that were proscribed

that supposedly bclonging to a contmon nation (defined on the basis of a

in constitucional law, but he applied aH his efforts toward forcing the fusion

common homeland) made it possible for peasant villages and other poor

oí che Aztec race with che general masses; thus he did not recognize che

contingents to make their political claims in terms of citizens' rights and

distinction between Indians and non-Indians in government acts, but instead he replaced it with that between che poor and che rich, extending to al] che

not in terms of che subordinated complementarity of caste. But chis trans-

benefits of society)'

formation could also mean the loss of certain special rights for subaltern groups, aboye al] Indians. The ideological, legal, and physical assault en

The conflict over che place of indigenous communities in the new

communal village lands and other indigenous community instiitutions such

national society did not end with these squabbles in the country's high

as hospitals, public political offices, schools, and che management of com-

political spheres: aboye all, it translated floto regional conflicts in which

munity chests began in che tirst years of independence. The counterparts

indigenous groups sought to construct their own nacional autonomies.

lo chis assault were che indigenisr movements that sought co identify che

These movements were called "caste wars" by the nation's political classes,

nation with che indigenous race_ Thesc carly indigenista movements ex-

but they must also be understood as nacional movements in the sense that

pressed themselves in nacional political spheres through such figures as

they sought congruency among indigenous nations, management of terri-

che congressional deputy Rodríguez Puebla, who in che first congresses

tory, and appropiation of religion.

fought co keep indigenous community institutions (except tribute) intact. Co a m un: i a r: a n

1.iro

Many Indians' nostalgia for their own states, a land with one blood

logi

48

es

Co,n m uniiarian

49

=

Ideo)ogies

undcr thc role of their oven w ,e roen and thc mande of an indigenous

tribute as well as racial classificati ons in baptismal certillcates were prohib-

Christianity, translated Inl„ vn ial movcmcnts di various points in the

ited. However thc manipulation of racial identity continuad, aboye all in

eightecndt. ninetecnih and evcn tcrcnticth ec intries For example, during

che struggle for status Only in this way can we understand why Porfirio

che lamous coste iras" ot Yucacin lhv Indians liad their capital in Chan-

Díaz powdered his lace svhite and why politicians and rich men with dark

Santa Cruz and euostruc sed thcir leadership around a cross that spoke di-

skin liad an exaggerated preferente for white wives-

reedy to che priests ficho direcicel che ichellious odian movement. Among

On che other hand, alter independence, che ideas oí granting the

other structurally similar. mcii einents wc re those that took place in the

mestizo a certain racial digoiiv and of making the mestizo into a national

Chiapas highlands 1865.. thc haqui (lcxrt et Sonora 1885-1909), the

mace pegan to gain currcncy In the beginning, this tendency was limited

Huasrcca 01 San Luis I'otosí 1588 and thl enasta] Misteea region i- 1911 U.

simply to recognizing che greatness of hoth che indigenous and the

There weic also a numher of nimviuIent niovcnients oí chis type, some of

Spanish sources of nationality. However, this recognition of the central

theni allied with note urbanized clases. In thc very capital oí che country,

importante oí mestizaje for Mexican nationality could not be easily translat-

diere are currently pro-Nahua[I groups ol mlxed social origins that seek

ed finto an ideology in which the mestizo was equal to che Mexican, for

the return of Moctezumas heacidress and che installation oí a new indige-

two reasons, liberalisms attempt to rid che definition oí nation of any links

nous empire

with yace and the ever-greater influence of pseudoscientific racist thought.

On the other hand, given che tact that nineteenth-century liberalism

Thus, che liberalism oí Juárez and his generation-which had great po-

was against upholding a "multiracial nation, racist ideas that had existed

litical and intellectual figures oí indigenous origin-was completely dis-

since che colonial period could persist and hecome increasingly pernicious.

tinct from che indigenismo oí Rodríguez Puebla. Whereas Rodríguez sought

The ideologist who most intluenced educated racist thought in Mexico

to maintain indigenous communities within a pluralistic nacional frame-

was Herheri Spencer, who beGeved in che fundamental importance of so-

work, Juárez showed that Indians were perfectly capable oí "ascending" to

cial evolution and in che inheritance oí acquired characteristies. This com-

che Europeans' cultural leve] if given che opportunity and resources.

bination of doctrines, applied to Mexico, led to the conclusion that che

Juárez's generation oí liberals sought to redeem che Indians by giving

Indians had been suhsidized by che colonial state for centuries, and that

them access to the goods of citizenship: education, universal rights, and

che negative characteristics that had been acquired would continue to

equality.

plague national evolution if the proportion oí fit individuals (Europeans) did not increase.16

Juárez sought to forro a nationality composed of a citizenry (defined by common birth in a homelanci) that had a truer equality of access to

On the ocho hand, Spanish forros still dominated racist thought in

state protection and representation. One can say that, in che 1857 consti-

Mexico even alter the imporcation of northern European ideas. According

tution, che nation had three inalienable legacies: national territory, state

to the dominant ideologies of che colonial period, the indigenous race was

sovereignry, and a set oí inviolable individual rights. This is also why lib-

inferior to che Spanish race, but it was also redeemable through Christian

erals of chis generation broke che privileged link that che church had

faith and procreation with Spaniards. There salas a well-known formula ac-

maintained with Mexican nationality until then: they no longer needed a

cording to which the child of a Spaniard and an Incitan was a mestizo, the

national church to legitimize the country because che freedom and equality

child of a mestizo and a Spaniard was a castizo; and the child oí a castizo and

of Mexicans under che rulo of law and in the framework oí the homeland

a Spaniard was a Spaniard; that is, an individual's indigenous origins could

were sufficient. On che other hand, the dark-skinnedJuárez was himself

be "erased" through a couple gcnerations oí intermarriage with Europeans.

living proof that these ideals were attainable.

This is why, in che colonial period, racial identity was manipulated: birth certificares were altered so that children could he classified as Creoles and not as some inferior casto; mestizos bought access to indigenous communities; rights to dress as Spaniards vide horses, and bear arms were conceded ro certain Indians. With independence, che definitions and legal guarantees of caste were abandonad, thc claves were freed, and indigenous

C o 111 11. 11 1.. I d i i.1

It was easier to denationalize che church, however, than it was to construct a national citizenry The laws promoted by Juárez helped erode che indigenous communities that had mantained the calpulli's transformed communitarian legacy, but the proletarianized masses continued to be principally dark-skinned and under the economic yoke of foreigners. The majority of Mexico's poor continued to be excluded from che Comnia,ifariao 51 =

[ drologies

henefits oí nationality (citizens equality, public education, and the right

Manuel Gamio, who is frequently considered che "father" oí Mexican an-

oí representation in the state) because che nacional bureaucracy's resources

thropology because oí his role in che construction oí revolutionary na-

were meager and, worse yes, those resources were primarily utilized for

tionalism. Gamio relied on che authority oí bis teacher, Franz Boas, in

paving che way for capitalist investmenc Fnr Chis reason, in the nineteenth

claiming both the equality of al] races and the validity oí all cultures.

century che term Indian gained a new acceptance, fusing racial and class

Based en chis, Gamio developed an indigenismo that dignified Mexican

factors: for che urban middle ancf uppen classes any poor peasant was an

Indian features and blood, thereby paving the way for che mestizo to

"lndian", that is, che category "Indian" carne to mean those who were nos

emerge as che protagonist of nacional history.

complete citizens.

The principal ideologists of Mexican nationalism (Luis Cabrera,

This also explains why Spencer's racist thought gained some influence

Andrés Molina Enríquez, Manuel Gamio) imagined che mestizo as che

in offfcial cireles. Social Darwinism permiued certain official groups to

product oí a Spanish father andan indigenous mochen- This very particular

blame the victims for the negative results et post independence social de-

formula had a twofold importante. First, it made che Spanish Conquesc

velopmenc Mexico had not attained che social leve] oí the United States

che origin oí che nacional yace and culture. This point oí origin was fertile

because oí che Indians' negative intluencc [-he only way to achieve politi-

for the production oí a national mythology, a task that captured the atten-

cal evolution was by importing E unopcans and dominating Indians through

tion oí prominent artists and intellectuals, including Diego Rivera, Samuel

education or, in more recalcitrant cases, cmeler disciplinary forms. in this

Ramos, and Octavio Paz. Second, and even more important, che identifi-

period, indigenous slavery was revived and massacres of Indians were per-

cation oí che European with che male and che feminization oí che Indian fit

petrated in Sonora and Yucatán.

well with che formulation oí a nacionalism that was at once modernizing and procectionist.

The power and class strtxggles of chis period also became a nacional struggle in some seccors because che progress achieved by Porfirio Díaz

We can better understand Chis by analyzing Andrés Molina Enríquez's

was largely based on concessions co foreign capital, and the social sectors

cose discussion oí the master (1909), which was influential in che formu-

chat were negatively affected by those concessions allied themselves with

lation oí revolutionary nationalism. According to Molina, who leaned en

political groups that had been excluded Irom che monopoly that Don

Darwin, and en Mexican luminaries such as Vicente Riva Palacio and

Porfiriós group exercised oven the bureaucratic apparatus. These alliances

Francisco Pimentel, for crucial aspects oí his argument, "[t]he mestizo ele-

gave rise to che revolution.

ment, formed by che cross oí che Spanish element and che indigenous element, is nos a new yace, it is che indigenous yace, defined as che totality

Tbe Redefinilion of Mationality in che Revolution

oí indigenous yaces oí our land, modified by Spanish blood."17 Mestizos were thus a fortified version oí che indigenous race,'a and the modifica-

From che point oí view of nationality, the Mexican Revolution was a

tions brought about by Chis mixture oí Spanish and Indian races would,

watershed at least as imporrant as che luáruz reforms. Here 1 focos en two

eventually, creare a population chas would finally be capable of holding its own against che United States. 'y

features, che reval uati on of che mestizo a^ qui ntessentially nacional and che redefinition of the inalienable goods oí che nation. As already mentioned, che placement oí che mestizo as a central personage has a history that began with independence, but che revolution broke tics with two doctrines that liad inhibited che adoption oí che mestizo as che nacional yace. On che one hand, Juárez's classical liberalism was complemented with a procectionist state cha[ was seilling to cake special measures and dispositions for speciflc national groups sucli as Indians, peasants, and workers. On che other hand, che racist ideas of social Darwinism were overturned. These two ruptures were complententary and went hand in hand. The most important figure in clic balde against pscudoscientific racism was Comen nn., aii.in 52

dl

In Molina, as in practically every pro-mestizo nationalist, che Spanish race carne to Mexico through men, and che indigenous element was associated with che feminine- This was true both literally (che mestizo was imagined, in his origin, as che child oí a Spanish man and an Indian wornan) and more abstractly, in che characteristics of each yace. "lf che white yaces can be considered superior to che Indian yaces because oí the greater efficacy oí their action (which is a logical consequence oí their superior evolution), che indigenous yaces can be considered superior to che white caces because of their greater resistance (which is a consequence oí their higher degree of selection)"10 Action, which is highly masculine in C o,,,'non,Harian Ideologies 53 =

Chis contevt and o si,tanee chic ti is Icniinine. arc ti, erebv embodied in

A chain of reforms tliat besan under President Miguel de la Madrid has

che Spaniard and thc I n d i a n . reshcc t n v c l y -1 i i c onthina ti on of action and

tended co revive some fcacures oí che nineteenth-ccntury liberal niode1,

resictancc in thc hodv ol the is I,uvccrlul. lot it combines che besa

including che redehnition of what constitutes che inalienable wealth of che

q tialities ol cac1, racc. but with che I odian i Icntent. that is. che maternal

nation a decline oí che so-called social rights of (he revolution and greater

clement, preduminating. Thc resina arc dc,ttned to lead che nation to

emphasis on individual iight,. Foi this reason, nationalists of the old

;uccess aga'uut origen aggression and ncoct,Ionial cxploitation.

school have compared che sale of scate enterprises and che privatization of

Mestizo nationalism dws implicitiv snpportcd che creation ol a protec-

the ejido with che sale ol che family jewels. The legal and economic

tionist and modernizing statu. It ,ra, io hc a nindernizing tate because thc

clianges carried out since 1 982 represent a profound trae stormat ion in che

mestizo, like bis Furopean lathei 11,111 a hropcn,ity for action. lor hi torv.

very definicion of che nation and of che things and rclationships that be-

It seas protectionist because thc mestizo si'ught tu protect bis maternal

long to ir.

legacy from exploitabon by Europcan,, Sebo tela no loyalty whatsoever to

The contemporary nationalist discourse appears co be reverting to che

che land orto che Indian, and whoni Molina Enríquez saw as che dominant

patriotic formulas of che nineteenth century: it is long on praising che

class that needed to be assimilated or pushed out.

patria and past glories oí our "millennial cultura," but it is very short on

The nationalization oí che mestizo also rcpresented a break with some

defining what the nation and its legacy currently are. There have only

features of laissez-faire liberalism and introduced a new version oí che na-

been two historical moments when the relationship between homeland

cional patrimony. There was no longer che notion that progress and mo-

and nation has been congruently and explicitly defined. The first was the

dernity emanated simply from freemarket (orces and respect for che

universalist liberalism promoted by Benito Juárez, when the nation was

rights of man, instead, there emerged che idea that progress could only

separated from its bonds with yace and the church, This was tremendously

occur under che jealous protectlon ot a nationalist state.

influential in nacional history, although it was never realized as a practical

Thus, in acidition to guaranteeing citizens rights, che sanctity oí demo-

project. The second moment was revolutionary nationalism, which is in-

cratie institutions, and nacional sovercignty, the 1917 constitution claims

ternally more contradictory than Juárez's formula because it adopted some

che states right to permit oí prohibir the free action oí foreigners in the

elements oí democratic liberalism at the same time that it constructed a

country and to watch over che public interesa The latter includes public

corporativist and protectionist scate, This model tied nationality to race

education, labor conditions, che right co expropiare any land for reasons

and "mestizo" culture, and it adopted a modernizing, protectionist, corpo-

oí public utility, che regulation of foreign investment and oí the amount oí

rativist, one-party regime.

land that can be legally possessed, preferencial contracting oí Mexicans

The current regime has been abandoning the now rusty or fossilized

over foreigners, and so on. This consutulion explicitly siaces that all the

precepts oí revolutionary nationalism, but it has been slow to embrace

land oí Mexico is an inalienable possession oí che nation that may be

Juárez's universalist liberalism because unpopular economic reforms have

bought and sold but can always be returned ro public use when so needed-

required a strong, authoritarian state like those that arose from the revolu-

Under che watchful eye of che postrevolutionary state, a regime that

tion. On the other hand, universalist liberalism was a more potent ideology

fostered class-based corporacions as an integral portion oí a ore-party

in che hands oí Juárez because he was proving with his own flesh that

system, Mexico went from being predominandy rural and agrieultural to

Indians could gaita access to che benefits oí civilization that were in the

having an urban majority, and the population grew from about 20 million

hands oí ata economic elite that did not identify with che bulk oí che popu-

in 1950 to about 80 million in 1990. This urbanization and che generally

lation. For all these reasons, che current regime has needed revolutionary

growing complexity oí national soeiety besan co complicate che manage-

nationalism even to destroy che regime that created it.

ment of state representation through che sectors" oí che ruling party and

Current tastes reflect weariness with the epic visions oí revolutionary nationalism: today the intimare world oí Frida Kahlo is oí greater interese than the epic grandiloquence oí Diego Rivera; even when they distill nationalism, as with the narratives oí Poniatowska or Monsiváis, intimate chronicles are consumed with more interest than che comprehensive

the policies oí che one-party state_ At che same time, the mechanisms oí state bureaucratic administration could not avoid che country's bankruptcy in 1982, which meant that foreign economic deniands liad to be attended to.

('ora n. un ita ri an Id eol ogies 55 =

1 national epics oí a Carlos Fuentes. This situation is symptomatic oí the crisis oí old nationalism: the longing for community and an inheritance continues, but the state definitions oí those communities are almost as weak as they were in the nineteenth century. Conclusion The development oí the communitai ian ideologies that 1 have tracked in this chapter permits us to systematize certain considerations with respect to the future. As this is a moment of profound changes in the national question, it appears to me to be pertinent to conclude with some ideas in this regard, even if they are not necessarily novel. 1 hope at least that the foregoing discussion permits us to understand the known options with greater clarity. Currently there are at least thrre logical alternatives for national ideology insofar as it is manifested in the definition oí inalienable goods: The first option is to consolidate democracy in the way desired by Juárez's generation. This option would mean giving priority to the inalienable rights defended by Juárez, including human rights and democratic representation. The second option is to reanímate revolutionary nationalism. This option would mean maintaining the "tutelage oí the state" over some

and "neoliberalism" because it seeks to broaden the definition oí the human right to defend certain general social interests against the "natural" tendencies oí the market (for example, defending child nutrition or the right to inhabit unpolluted spaces). This direction also entails a recodification oí civil society. This new civil society would rid itself oí the sectorial organization that developed under revolutionary statism, and it would create new forms oí state protection for the new human rights. The principal ideological adversary oí this option will be the current nationalist mythology. This mythology tends to demand a state with tutelage over the entire national interest and includes many oí the prior bases for the definition oí national communities, such as the reification oí nationality in racial terms, Also, behind this líes the proposition that the state's central role is to direct the "modernizing" process. It will be necessary to impose limits on the reign oí the ideology oí modernization, to avoid modernizing at any cost. It appears to me that the third path is the only really desirable and viable one in the long run_ But to move in that direction, one must be ready to question both revolutionary nationalism and neoliberalism. It will also be necessary to create images oí nationality and modernity that are separate from the teleology oí the muralista and the "Fathers oí the Country."

goods considered central to nationality and the public interest, such as ]and, the subsoil, the communications industries, and educational and cultura] services, and industries This option could keep mestizo nationalism unscathed but it has the problem oí being championed principally by the leftist opposition, which also needs tu sustain che value oí democracy "in the style of Juárez" to win power. For that reason, it would have to design a kind oí state that does not fall into the same antidemocratic vices that revolutionary nationalism fe]] into when it was in power. The concrete way in which revolutionary nationalism mixes with liberal ideals has always been a central probieni for Chis kind oí nationalism, and, if this ideology returns te power, ir: will again have to confront this problem.

The third option is less clearly delineated but would have to try Lo build a social dernocracy based on a recodification of human rights. This formula would diffcr from the second because it would not depend on a racial metaphor ("the mestizo") io define nationality, but would center its efforts in defining the rights of pcrsons ir would not put "the nation" ahead oí the rights oí persons, and therefore it would distante itself from rhe populist and authoritarian formulas that have predominated in Mexico. On the other hand, Chis option separates itself from liberalism C o m n: u ... ^:.: e n 56 =

!deol09fe Communiiarian Ideolog,es = 57

gain exceptional status and tu rice aboye die degradation reserved for all nobodies Thus, for instante a lady cuts in fiont ol a inc to enter a parking lot; che attcndant prottst5 ancl points to che lino but she says "Do you

3

know sebo you are talkino to- 1 am the wile of so and so, member of thc eabinet.' and so on_

A similar dynamic has characterized modera iNiexican citizenship For instance, it has long beca noted that in ;Mexico much of the censorship of thc press has boga ''sellcensorship,' and not direct govern mental censor ship.' Spcaking tu a journalist about chis phenomenon, hc remarked that much el chis se]¡-censorship resulted frota the fact that journalists, like all members oí Mexican middle classes, depend to an unpredictable degree en their social relations. Reliance on personal relations generates a kind oí sociability that avoids open attacks, except when corporate interests are involved. Thus, the censorship of che press is in part also a product oí the overall dynamics oí DaMatta's degraded citizenship_ The logic that DaMarta outlined for understanding the degradation oí

Modes of Mexican Citizenship

Brazilian citizenship could easily be used to guide an ethnography oí civic culture and sociability in Mexico. The ease oí application stems from similarities at both che cultural and structural levels familia) idioms used to shape a "discourse of the honré' have common Iberian elements in these

One oí the frsi cultural accounts of citizenship in Latin America was Roberto DaMatta's effort to understand the specificity oí Brazilian nacional culture. DaMatta identified the coexistente oí two broad discourses in Brazilian urban society, and he called theta the discourse oí the home and the discourse oí the street.' According to bis description, the discourse that he called "oí the honré' is a hierarchical and familia) register, where the subjects are "persons" in the Maussian sensc, that is, they assume specific, differentiared, and complementary social roles. The discourse "oí the street," by contrast, is the discourse of liberal citizenship: subjects are individuals who are meant to be equal to one another and equal before the law. The interesting twist in DaMatta's analysis regards the relationship between these two discourses, a relationship that he synthesizes with the Brazilian adage'Por my friends, everything, for my enemies, the law."z For DaMatta, Brazilian society can be describcd as having "citizenship" as a degraded baseline, or zero degree, of relationship, a fact that is visible in the day-to-day management of social relations.

two countries, the result not only of related concepts and ideas oí family and friendship, but also similar colonial discourses for the social whole. In chis chapter, I develop a historical discussion oí the cultural dynamics oí Mexican citizenship. 1 begin with a series of vignettes that explore what the application oí DaMatta's perspective to Mexico might revea). 1 argue that the notion that citizenship is the baseline, or zero degree, oí relationship needs to be complemented by a historical view oí changes in the definition and political salience oí citizenship. Without such a perspective en the changing definition oí citizenship, a critica) aspect oí the politics oí citizenship is lost The bulk oí chis chapter is devoted to interpreting the dynamics oí citizenship in modern Mexico, as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and argues against narratives oí Mexican modernity that tell contemporary history as a simple "transition to democracy."

Cultural Logic and Hsstory

Specifically, DaMatta focuses en an Liban ritual that he called the "Voge sabe coro queni esta talando' (Do you know who you are talking

Mexico City is a place of elaborate politeness, a quality that is epitomized

tu?), a phrase that is used tu intcrropt the universal application oí a role,

by the people whose job is to mediate (for instante, secretaries and wait-

that is, tu interrupt what he calls tire discourse oí the street, in order to

ers), but that is generally visible in che socializaron of children and in the Modos of Al exiean Cit;zen sh;p

?A =

59

existente of elaborare registeis of ohscquiousness, attentiveness, and respect_ AII of [hese registers tiisappcar in tire anonymity of the crowd, however, where people will push pulí, shove, pinch, cut in front oí you, and so un_ There is no social connact tor che crosvd; there are only gentleman's pacts antong persons Drivers in iylcsico ( itv, lor instante, tend tu drive with thcir evos pointed straight ahcad and casi slightly downward, much like a waiter's. This way they need no( make concessions and can drive with presocial Hobhesian rules dona give awap an inch. If, however, the driver's eye wanders even juct a 1irti, ir ntav catch another driver's eye, who gently and smilingly asks to Inc let into the flow of traftlc At this point, the world of personal relations Often takes huid of the driver who had been trving to keep things anunymous and he may gallantly let the other car th rou gil. This dynamic contrasta wilh ncc culturc of socieries that have strong civic traditions, in which citizenship is che place where the social pact is manifested (making a queue being a sac rosanct rite of citizenship in a place like Fngland, for instaures but where personal relationships do not extend as lar out_ Thus, a British traer-lcr to iMexlco may be scandalized at lhe greedy and impolitic attwde ot ncc people en the street, whereas a Mexican tvill complain that no pica or personal interjection was ever able to move al] Englisi' bureaucrat to sv mpathy What are the mechanisms ot sucralization finto Chis forro oí courtesy7 Access ro in alleged right, or lo a p overn nt e otal service, in Mexico is very ofeen no( universal. Education, Inr instante is mean[ to be available lo ale, but it is oteen dllücult tu register a eh1ld 111 a nearby school, orto get finto a school at ale, public medicine exista. bite it is alwavs insufhcienq moving through Mexico C:ity, trafiie in an ordene fashion is oteen niade difficult by ncotoveruse ol public space_ ln short ilexicn has never had a state that was strong enough to provide servios tll IVCrsally_ In this context, corruption and other ntarket mechanisnn casily emerge as selecriun en tersa: if you pay money, the bureaucrat will scc vou tirst_ The systeni has also generated forros oí sociability that help shape a pracural oricntation that is well suited to tire discretionmy power that s( arcity ygives tu bureaucrats and other gatekce pers. One notable examp le ot ibis is summed up in the very Mexican proverb "Whoever gets mad lirst, loses" i`El que se enoja, pierde"). According tu this priori pie, a [,ne person shall never explode out oí exasperation, because he or she can oil, lose by such an outburst. A service provider will only claro up tebeo Paced with an angry user and, since nce service is a scarcc resource. he or she \s 111 use politeness as a selection criterion.

Socialization into politeness, pariente, and self-censorship thus has at least two significant social conditions. The first is a strong reliance on personal relations in order to activare, operate, and rely on any bureaucratic apparatus, che second is the reliance on personal relations lo achieve positions in society_ Both of [hese conditions would appear lo support DaMatta's claim that citizenship is the zero degree of relationship, There is, however, a difhculty in the argumenr that can be exposed by focusing closely on the implications oí the saving "For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law." The saying is clearly a model for political action, yet it contains significant ambiguities in the proponed categories ("friends," "enemies,"'law," and "everything"), partieularly if the saying is a recipe for a bureaucrat or a nieniber oí the political class, In many, if not most, situations, a bureaucrat will be dealing with neither personal friends nor personal enemies, but principally with people to whom he or she is unrelated and initially indifferent_ The saying is useful, however, because sume of these people will not receive the full service that the gatekeeper controls, whereas others will. Thus, an initially undifferentiated public needs to be shaped luto "frtends" and "enemies_" Money (bribes) and prior personal connections are two routes tu receiving excepcional treatment (as "friends"), but patience and politeness may at least keep you in che game, whereas a breach oí politeness or an outburst oí anger will in ale likelihood place you in the "enemy" camp_ The application oí "the law" as a criterion oí exclusion in each oí these cases is simply the use of bureaucratic procedure as a fundamental mechanism oí exclusion. We have, then, a logre that favors the development oí personal relations, the elaboration oí fonos oí obsequiousness and politeness, the cultural routinization oí briberv, and che use of bureaucratic rules and procedure as mechanisms oí exclusion. This logic is undergirded by structural conditions, oí which 1 have stressed two: a relatively weak state, and a large poor population. Because [hese conditions have existed throughout Mexican history, one might expect that bribery, politeness, and a highly developed system oí informal relationships have been equally constant practices, and that they have been elaborated according to cultural idioms that apply a "discourse of the honre" in order to create distinetions between potential users of a service. This is true at a general level. However, although the cultural logic that we have outlined shows that citizenship is a degraded category, ir also gives a false sense oí continuity and constancy. We noted that the category oí "friends" and "enemies" can be constructed in che very process oí applying a bureaucratic role, and that most oí che population that is being classified in this way is initially Mojes o f hleslcnr,

ho =

= 61

indiflercnt tu the bureaucrat R1,1 thc de!initiun of the pool that che burcaucrai is aeting on o not dctermincd h^ ihc cultural logie of social discance from che barrauarat oi ;;atek eche i. fo ribo words the gatekeeper is not aetually ruling oven e pre cc i - 1 t roaj' „t 1 nentls and enemies, but 'u inste ad culturally construc ti, in tnends and cnemie5 out of a pool of Acople who are presclceced not hv h;;n but by theii thcoretícal relationship lo a right. As a result. i1thuugli it is corlee t„ sas that-- ,ivcn a bureaucral, a set ul rulos. and a pool ot citisns-uti:-.cnship 111311 be che zero degree of rel ationship that needs to he complemen ted by a prior personal claim, by a bribe, or bv sympathy, tic haselme of utizenship is not determined by this cultural logic, and it valles historically in important ways- These variations are not trivial, for thcy define che potencial pool of users oí a service that is heing offered, an issue that also has critica) significante for a longue-durée history of cultural forms of sociability in connection to citizenship. A comprehensive view of modero Mexican citizenship therefore requires an interpretation of the cclationship between legal and institutional definitions of citizenship and its cultural claboiauon in social intetaction. 1 ,hall atrempt to sketch key elemcnts ti¡ such a com pre hensive view.

stem from che class of bis lineage; thc sane shall he observed with regard to those who represent che rank of captain and aboye, or who render any special service to the countiv" (article 25, The only fundamental exclusionary clause in tliis constitution, as in all early Mexican eonstitutions until that of 1857, regards the role oí religion, '1 he Catholic religion shall be the only one, with no toleratice for any other" (article 1) In addition to a comnion movement to broaden che base oí citizenship such that lineage and race were abolished as (explicit) criteria of inclusion or exclusion, early procl ama ti ons and eonstitutions did tend to speeify that only Mexicans-and otten only .Mexicans who had not betrayed the nation-could hold public positions (articles 27 and 28 oí López Rayón's constitutional project).5 Thus, from che very beginning, che idea was to create an ample citizenry and a social hierarchy based on merit: "The American people, forgotten by some, pitied by others, and disdained by the majority, shall appear with che splendor and dignity that it has earned through the unique fashion in which it has broken the chains oí despotism. Cowardice and slothfulness shall be che only causes oí infamy for the citizen, and the temple oí honor shall open its doors indiscriminately to merit and virtue` (article 38) 6 Despite che general identification between early Mexican nationalism and the extension oí citizenship rights in such a way as to include (forme[)

Farly Republieanisnt and che Risc of ibe ideal Uitizen The debates of Mexico's Junta Instituyente between independence (1821) and the publication oí the first federal constitution (1824) gave little sustained attention to citizenship. (.ates about who was a Mexican national and who was a Mexican citizen were vaguely inclusive, with attention lavished only on the question oí patiiotic inclusion or exclusion and very little said about che qualiues and ciaractensties oí che citizen. Nevertheless, the process of independence hall a critical role in shaping a field for a politics oí citizenship_ For instante, Miguel Hidalgo, tathcr ot Mexican independence, proclaimed che emancipation of slaves, thc end to al] forms oí tribute and taxation that were targeted to Indians and castes;' and the end oí certain guilds monopolies over specihc activities 4 Of course, Hidalgo's revolt failed, but his nieve to create a broad base for citizenship and to leve) differences between castes was preserved by leaders oí subsequent movements- For exaniple Ignacio López Rayún's falso failed) project oí a Mexican constitution (1811) also abolished slavery )article 24) and stated that "[w]hoever is to he boro alter thc happy independence oí our nation will find no ohstacle other than bis personal defects- No opposition can

slaves, Indians, and castes, there were a number oí ambiguities and differences regarding the meaning of this extension. Article 16 oí the Mexican empire's first provisional legal code, for instante, states, tellingly, that "[t]he various classes oí che state shall be preserved with their respective distinction, but without piejudice to public employment, which is common to all citizens. Virtues, services, talents, and capability are the only medium for achieving public employment oí any kind".7 On the other hand, the federal constitution oí 1824 does not oven specify who is to be considered a citizen. Instead, it leaves to the individual states oí che federation the definition oí who shall be allowed to vote for their representatives in Congress (article 9), and the selection oí the president and vice president was Ieft to Congress. Thus citizenship was to be determined by regional elites in conjunction with whomsoever they felt they needed to pay attention to, and access to federal power was mediated by a Congress that represented these citizens.

It is worth noting that most oí the distinctions between who was a Mexican citizen and who was merely a Mexican national are similar to the formulation found in the Spanish liberal constitution that was promulgated in Cádiz in 1812. Some oí the early independent constitutions are Mudes oJ AA exilan Ci1izensbip

= o2=

63 =

a bit harsher than that oí Cádiz on matters oí religion (e.g., Father Morelos's Apatzingán constitution sanctioned the Holy Office-that is, the Inquisition-and it upheld heresy and apostasy as crimes that led to los oí citizenship). In one matter, however, the constitution oí Cádiz narrows citizenship beyond what is explicit in the earliest Mexican constitutions: debtors, domestic servants, vagrants, the unemployed, and the illiterate al] forfeited their rights as citizcns (article 25). This move was not explieltly embraced in the first Mexican constitutional projects, but neither was it entirely avoided: Iturbides Plan de Iguala, which was the first effective political charter oí independent Mexico, specified that until a constitution was formed, Mexico would operate according to the laws oí tire Spanish Cortes- The federal constitution of 1824 left the dotar open for these mechanisms oí exclusion by delegating the decision regarding who would be a citizen to thc individual states- Finally, the centralist and conservative legal code oí 1836 rcasserted the points of exclusion oí Cádiz and added much greater restrictions, the rights oí citizenship were suspended for al] minors, domestic servants, criminals, and illiterates, they were lost definitively to al] traitors and debtors ro the public coffers. All citizens had to have an annual income of one hundred pesos, and substantially more if they wanted to be elected to offlce. In short, early Mexican constittnions displayed tensions between the elimination oí criteria oí casto and oí slavery in order to create a broadly based nationality and the restriction of access to public office and to the public sphere to independent malo property holders who could read and write. The category "citizen" was (and still is) not identical to that oí "national" in legal discourse, though tiro two were tellingly conflated in political discourse: in fact, the relationship between the two was one oí hierarchical encompassment. The Mexican citizen had the capaeity to encompass Mexican nationals and te) represent the whole oí the nation in public.

ever, Florencia Mallon has shown that in the unstable context oí midnineteenth-century Mexico, the need to mobilize popular constituencies, and the space that was available for spontaneous popular mobilization, led to the development oí forras of liberalism that catered to popular groups.s It was in part the challenge that universal citizenship at times posed to these local patricians and chieftains that fanned the development oí a negative discourse about "tire masses" in nineteenth-century Mexico: la chusma, el populacho, la canalla, la plebe, and other epithets portrayed masses as both dangerous and insufficiently civilized to manage political life. Alongside damning imagen of the plebe, a series oí positive words referred to popular classes who were seco as ordered and civilized: el pueblo, los ciudadanos, la gente buena. To a large degree, the difference between positive and negative portrayals oí the pueblo corresponded to whether the people in question were acting as dependents or whether they were difficult to control, Like the difference between the lumpenproletariat and the proletariat, the distinction between a canalla and a ciudadano was that the latter was a notable, or at least depended on the same system as the notables who made the distinction, whereas the fornter had only loose connections oí dependency to "good society." In political speeches oí the nineteenth century, for instance, there are differences drawn between a lower class that might be described as "abject" and as an obstacle to progress, but that is also perceived as unthreatening and in need oí state proteccion, and a lower class rhat is potentially or in fact violent and dangerous to civilization. In a chronicle oí his voyage tú the United States, published in 1834, Lorenzo de Zavala, a liberal from Yucatán who had been governor of tiro state oí Mexico, congressman, and apologist for the U.S. colonization oí Texas, asks his readers to [c]ompare the moral condition oí tiro people oí the United States with that oí one or two os our [federated states and you will undcrstand the true rea-

Inclusion and Exclusion in the Era of Nalional Vulnerability

son why it is impossible for us to raise our institutions to the leve) oí our neighbor's, especially in ceriain states In the orate oí Mexico and in that oí

At first glance , these early citizenship laws developed in a contested field in which the pressure to broaden the basis of citizenship coexisted with pressures to maintain political control in tiro hands oí local notables. Historian Frangois Xavier Guerra has argued that the urban patricians who had controlled the bureaucratic apparatus during the colonial period usually kept control over government despite these changes, relying un their power to materially control local election processes.s HowAlodes

of Nicv,cnn 64 =

C'1'zensbip

Yucatán, which are tiro ones that 1 know best, of rhe 1,200,000 inhabitants oí tiro former and thc seven hundred thousand inhabitants oí tiro latter, there is a proportion of, at tiro most, one in twenty f who know how te read and write]. [Oí these,] two-fifths do not know arithmetic, three-fifths do not even know che meaning ot thc words geography, history, astronomy, etc., and four-fifths do not know what tiro Bible is . To this we must add that at least one-third oí the inhabitants oí Yucatán do not speak Spanish, and

M odes of ;Mexican Ci lizenybip 65 =

une-lifth of 11)e star, ul Nesita, ' in tbt sano tondino n. I hose who do not

Moreos el

take finto atoount tic d, i,, „I sic ill;_at,on o1 dite mnsses whcn thcy make II we desceud, sir. from riese philosophieal and moral considerations to search for material transcendt-ntal ev,ls m socieiy. we sha11 be confronted

'Tus tito natlve population ir pa rtit_dar m•as ac rhe bottom of rhe hcap , and In need ut eles ation

by die degradation oi that dase thai heeaux ol its ignorante. is called the

.A simil;u sentimelit is echoed three

lowl,est class ¿dese 5ifrou i. aud that has been indelibly inoculated with a

dotados lato , alter tito brench intcrc entiun. s, ben rhe 1857 constitution

propensity te bl oody iris 1 li s elass. which has beeo sus' o bented from

seas reinstated There in a sessit'n iii ( iiigress . representative Julio Zárate

die benchts ot enligh tenm ent. does not know tbc guodncss of vinue exeept

presented a propusal to proh.bi1 privaic ia,is in haciendas and, more

bv tito harnt it recervcs lor being criminal; in it tic noble sentiments that

generally del uiitlase all punishmcnt that sr:s meted unt in [hese private in-

inhere in tire human hect[ degenerme, beceusc die government and rhe

stitutions He described the cunditiom ul the Indian ni the following

clergy, publicists and speakers tny to show th an in abstntct tire matrers of

tercos.

religion and of polities that thei r unenltivated intel1 igence cannot compre-

In rhe states of Mexico, Puebla. Tlaxcala, Guerrero, and Querétaro, where the bulk el the indigenous population is t oncentrated, there is slavery, there is abjection, riere is misci v susiaincd by rhe great landowners. And this abject conditlon coni prises clos e to 4 ni,ilion roen It has been eleven years sincc tire constitution was ratificd. private trials were prohibited; flogging and other degrading punishments were abolished,; and authorities were given die right ro establish jails for crimes .. . nonetheiess, there are jails in rhe haciendas and stocks where the workers

hend. AII rhe while, the attmctlons of vice and tito emotions that are produced by certain spectacles excite and move their passions- Since it is not possible to establish schools everywhere where this class can be well taught, remove at leas[ [hose other [schools] where they learn evil, where the sight of blood easily fosrers rhe savage instincts to which they have, by nature, a propensity - If we want good citizens, if we wanr brave soldiers who are animared in combat and humane in triumph, prohibir specrades thar inflare sentiments and that dull [embrutecen] reason."

are sunk, and rhe foreman gives lashes to tic Indians, and debts are passed

Readers would be incorrect, roo, to rhink that rhe dangerous'lowliest"

from father to son, ereating slavery, a succession of sold generations

classes referred to itere are strictly urban and that all rural Indians were

(February 15, 1868). ''

thought to be sale for state or hacendado patronage. Rebellious Indians,

This view of the proto-cirizen who needed to be elevated to true citizenship through state protection, miscegenation, or education, and whose condition was abject but not direetly threatening to truca nd effective citizens, contrasts with other portrayals of popular tolk who are more difficult to redeem and more menacing 1 will oler two examples from the same congressional sessions that 1 havc fusr ciredOn January 9, 1868, representativo Jesús López brought tu Congress a proposed law to banish bulllighting This iniriative was one of severa) attempts to locate the causes of incivility and to transforni the habits of a people who would not conform m tic ideal of dtizenship that the constitution granted them

usually labeled "savages," were known to be highly dangerous. Thus, for instante, in his campaign against Indian rebels and a few remaining proHapsburg imperialists in Yucatán (1868), Presiden Juárez asked Congress to suspend a series of individual guarantees in Yucatán in order to carry out a military campaign riere. One of the suspended rights was article 5 of rhe constitution, which reads: No one can be forced to render personal services without a fair retribution and without their full consent. The law cannot authorize any contract rhat has as its object the loss or irrevocable sacrifice of a man's liberty-" In other words, slavery and corvée labor were authorized for rhe duration of the Yucatecan campaign, which was fought principally against the Indians." Thus, a discourse of the sort that DaMatta called "discourse of the

The benelits of a democratic constitution, which raise the Mexican from

street,' thar is, an egalitarian and universalistic discourse of citizenship,

rhe conditiou of slavery to tic rank of the cir!zen, aunounce that Mexico

could be applied to rhe "good pueblo-" At the same time, the fact that in

marches tnward greatness under rhe auspices o1 liberty. In contrast ro this,

some nineteenth-century constitunons servants were not allowed to vote

asan obstarle that block, Mexie,,s match tosvard prosperity, there exists in

because they were dependents,and therefore did not have control over

each eommunity a place dsat svinhol,0e barbansiii

their will, was indicative of the fact rhat most of the good pueblo was made

Al ' ,3''u l Al us.

M o ci e s o l

A l e x i c a n C i t, z e n s 1, i p 67 =

up oí a kind of citizenry that veas guarded not so much by the constitu-

deadly influence. Unleashed from che abysmal depths where it resides, it

cional rights of individuals as by thc clainis that loyalty and dependency

flung itself furiously in che midst of our newly boro sociery and destroyed it

liad on clic consciente oí Christian patriardis-

in ics crib .. There in che shadows oí that frighcful darkness we can hear

Nevertheless , che image ot a good pueblo veas not simply that oí the dependen[ masses either, because [hese could bc figured as a harmonious and

che ruar oí the monster that spilled in Padilla che blood oí General Iturbide:

progressive co] lecriviry or ! as we have seco as abject slaves . In order to comprehend ideological dynamies withln chis field better , two further elements need no be introduced: the nations position in a world oí competing predatory powers , and che question of national unity. A sharp consciousness oí national decline and oí uncontrollable dangers for che nation can he found among .Mexican political men almost from che time of the toppling ol Iturbide 1822 ). Referentes to decline and to danger abound both in clic press and in discussions in Congress. For instante , Depury Hernández Chico elauned that thc nations situation was "deplorable" because of lack of public funds (Juno 14 , 1824).14 On une 12 oí that sin-te yeai , Deputy Cañedo svarned oí che need to guard

che blood oí che pero who hnished che work oí Hidalgo and Morelos. There, roo, you can hear che horrible cry oí that maGdous and treacherous spirit chat sold the life oí che great (benemérito] and innocenc General Guerrero to che firing squad.15

The heroes who had iniriated the revolution (Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, Morelos) liad al] been marryred by Spaniards, but che two who actually achieved independence (Iturbide and Guerrero) were both murdered by fractious Mexicans. This was to stand symbolically in a position analogous to original sin: Mexicans are denied their entry to national happiness because oí their internal vices and divisions: Woe is you, unfortunate Mexicot Woe is you because, not having yet fully

against a In]] civil war, in light of seecssionist movements in che state oí

entered the age oí infancy, you decline in a precocious decrepitude chau

Jalisco. The image oí che republic being split apara by rival factions is al-

brings you close to che grave! Woe is you because you are like che female of

most always seen as the cause oí chis decline or imminent disaster, as in

[hose venomous insects that thrive in our dimate, and oí whom it is said

the case of a speech read in Con-,res, by che minister of war against a proIturbide uprising in Jalisco on June 8, 1824

thar it gives birch to its children only to be caten by theml16

Yes, sir, there are vehement indicatiuns that ibese two generals are plotting against che repuhlie that thev des re irs ruin , that it is they who move chose

Decline was caused by personal ambition and foily among leaders and would-be leaders oí government, so much so that Arellano begins his remarkable speech distancing himself from any sort oí political activity:

implacable assassins that aflljet thc staies al Puebla and Mexieo , they who propagate that dcadly division that ron hnnta oon berween parties, they who are behind Clic conspirators 'e llo cause our unease and who make life

1 have not yet traveled-and God spare me from ever raking-che murky paths of che poliucs that dominare us, oí that science whose principies are che whim of [hose who protess it, where che most obvious truths are put in

so difficult

doubt, and where he who is bes[ at cheating and who is bes[ at disguising This feeling oí pending or actual disnstcr caused bv lack oí union in-

his deceptions is considered wise_iz

creased and became pervasive in political discourse as che country indeed became unsrable, eeonomically ruinous and suhjected to humiliations by

The ultimare results oí vice selfishness, and ambition have been the ruination oí Mexico, irs decline, irs inability to reap the benefits oí freedom

foreign powers

In a remarkahly irank, but not entirely extraordinary, "civic oration" proffered on che anniversarv ol independence in the city of Durango in

and independence. For sonie speakers, [hese vices were typical oí one parcy: monarchical interesas of conservatives, for instante; or Catholic fa-

1841, Licenciado Jestis Arellano reeapped che history oí political divisions

naticism that led to blocking che doors to colonization from northern

and fraternal struggle in che lollowing tenor.

Europe and che United States, or to federalist folly in delegating too much power and autonomy to states. For all, they reflected a lack oí virtue

Lets go hack in time to Sepecmber 27, 1x21 That day, my fellow

and che fall oí public morality. To quote again froni Arellano: "We must

cicizens che very day of our greatest Iortune. also initiates che era oí our

acknowledge that our vices have grown and that public morality is every

greatest wocs_ It is Irom that dar that a hon-Ible discord began tú exert as

day extenuated, that our country has been a constan[ prey oí ambition, oí

1 i _,ii' bip

Madr, nf hlexi can Ci lizesship = 69=

tealousy. il Írrtncidel tuulc nclcs ^,I aiti)ct vis ve nde tras ol insatiable

and sacrifice; and a thtrd hetween citizens who strived to open the way for

usuty Ol lamttcism and up rstti nn ol incptiuide and pe vetsity. and ol

the extension of citizenship nghrs and those who blocked them in order

chimsy and inhumano mandarins

to cnhancc their own tyrannical authority.

In sum it is nnstaken tu imagine 1 1.11 in rts ongi ns. tito discourse ol citi-

In some con tesas, th ese vi, ws could be arti Gula ted to one another; for

^enship vas in am simple clac nbl t.[i se'.tl ine. a zero degrec oí relation-

example, the situation of thu bad puehlo was compared to citar of a young

ship" ()n thc cotlitar v carls epc ocies had quite signiticant strictures re-

woman who was not under ihe tutelage of a roan, it was fodder for "sedue-

garding who could bc a citizen l liese restrictions rcadily allowed for the

tion" by bandits or by iactious aspiring politicians. In other words, ihe bad

t-inergence ol une spedlic dise nurse about tito gooci and ihe had pueblo:

pueblo was fodder ¡oí rhe vicious po hi tici an, as much as it was ihe principal

,>00d va, thc prctla that cr_n Icecheeii tito porcion of Mexican ca-

challenge ¡oí enlightened li bcral governments sello sought te) expand pub-

tionals svho allowed thcnuchcs p( aselullq to be represenred by tNiexican

lic education, eliminare ihe obscurantist intluence of tire church, prohibir

citizens; had pueblo was thc [uebi-.> thar seas not governed by the class of

bullfights, cockfights, and other forms oí barbarie diversions, and so on

local notables, and this included rchellious Indians (like those cited in

The description olí citizenship as a zero degree oí relationship is misleading , then, because it emphasizes only one aspect oí tito phenomenon, which is the fact that familial discourses have always been used to supersede tito universalism oí tito legal order. Moreover, ihe notion oí ihe citizen as tito baseline of all political relationships is historically incorrect, because in tito early national period it was clearly a sigo oí distinction no be a citizen, and even alter ihe constitution oí 1857 and tito revolutionary constitution oí 1917, it still excluded minors and women. Having established this general point, let us return to our evolutionary panorama oí rhe development oí citizenship in Mexico.

Yucatán or in Durango) as much as the feared dcaes 6vitnas that were notas siniilable through puhlic education. At ihe same time, che ten de nev to con tia te vatio nalíty arad citizenship, at least as a utopian idea, existed hom (he very beginning, and this allowed for another kind of distinction between good and bad citizens. This distinction focused on "petty tyrants" Some ni three were perceived, particularly alter rhe constitution of 1857, as local caciques or hacendados who kept 1odians in a siavelilee position and separated from their rights as Mexicans, as was rhe case in tito spccch, cited carlier, against jails in haciendas. Others, and this was particularly prevalent in the earlier period, were tyrants in their selfish appropriation of what was public.

The Demise of Early Liberal Cítizenship -

This latter forro oí dividing between virtuous and vicious elites readily allowed for rhe consolidation of a discourse oí messianism around a virtu-

The first truly liberal constitution of Mexico (1857) develops an inclusive and relatively unproblematic identification between citizenship and nationality: in order to be a citizen, al] that one needed was to be a Mexican over eighteen (if one was married, over twenty-one if one was not), and to caen an honest living (article 34). Simplicity, however, is sometimes misleading. Because in theory everyone was a citizen if they were oí age (the article does not even specify that one needed to be male to be a citizen, though this apparently went without saying, because female suffrage was not to be allowed for another hundred years), the constitution and the congresses that met aher its ratification were very much concerned with giving moral shape to the citizen. Fernando Escalante ends his pathbreaking book on politics and citizenship in Mexico in ihe nineteenth century arguing that "[t]here were no citizens because diere were no individuals. Security, business, and politics were collective affairs. But never, or only very rarely, could they be resolved by a general formula that seas at once efficacious, convincing, and

ous caudillo, as is illustrated in another patrioric speech, pronounced en September 1 1, 1842 (anniversary of rhe triuntph against rhe Spanish invasion of 1829) in the city oí Orizaba, The political regeneration ci Anahuac [.mexico] seas rescrved ab initio to a singular Vctacruzano_ an encrepreneurial gcnius an animated soldier, a keen statesmart a profound poli tician, or, in sum, to Santa Anna tito great, who, llke another Alcides and Tesco, wi II purtiy ihe precious ground of the Aztecs and tid it oí that disgusting and criminal riftraff [canalla] oí tyrants of all species and conditions-19

In short, ihe political field around ihe delinition oí citizenship involved three kinds of distinetions- one hetween a pueblo that would be encompassed by a group of notables anda pueblo that would not; another between selfish and falso citizens who suught private gana from their public position as citizens and thosc who cquamd citizenship with public service ,Ate les o] ,ü s,_,i

1

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0

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il'

Modrs

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of

Adcxi c an C.fizeeship

71

presentable ' ' [lis book demonstrates lhar diere was a high degree of pragmatic accord berween liberals asid conservatives on che matter of laws and institutions not beir.g applicable in a systematic fashion because consolidating state power was more tundaniental and urgent, and neither group couId adequately resolve che contradicriun between creating an effective and exclusive group oí citizens and tlie actual politics oí inclusion and exclusion demanded by che sor iety numerous corporations Despire this pragmatic agrecment regarding the priority that consolidating state power had over citizenship rights, the ideal of citizenship was about as obsessively pervasive in Mexican political discourse as was che rejection oí politics as a site of vice. Part of this obsession was a result oí the fact thar, until Juárez's triumph over t`9aximilian in 1867, political instability and economic decline raised fears that Mexico could be swallowed up by foreign powers or split apart by interna¡ rifts. Collective mobilization seemed che only way forward, and diere is a sense in which Mexican history between independence and die French intervention (1821-67) can be seen as a process oí increasing polarizarion. In che end, it was this process, in conjunction with emerging capitalist development and the construction of che first railroads in che 1 870s that allowed the first successful centralized governments of Juárez and, especially, oí Díaz, to operate. Escalante has argued convincingly thar the old idea, championed by Cosío Villegas, that Juárez's restored repuhlic was a genuine experiment in liberal democracy is simply wrttng, and rhat che consolidation oí the central state unde-Juárez and Lerdo needed to sidestep che legal order and te create informal networks of power as much as che Díaz dictatorship that followed it. I have no space here to go finto detail coneerning che evolution of citizenship under che Díaz regime ( 1876-1910), but a few remarks are necessary_ First, che achievement of governmental stability and material progress pushed earlier recurrent obsession over citizenship into the back-

Thus, during che Porfirian dictatorship, it was the state, and its power to arrange space and to regiment an order, that was the subject oí political ritual and myth; the masses, it was hoped, might eventually catch up to progress or-if they opposed che nacional state, as the Yaqui, Apache, and Maya Indians did-be eliminated. In short, whereas the law and the citizen were the ultimate fetishes of the era oí national instability," progress, urban boulevards, railroads, and the mounted police (rurales) were the key fetishes oí a Porfirian era that upheld the state as the promoter oí that progress, and che vehicle for [he ultimate improvement of Mexico's abject rural masses."

Contemporary Transformations If chis were the end of che story, however, how could we come to terms with che fact that in the 1 930s Samuel Ramos, the famous founder of a philosophy about che Mexican as a social subject, identified che pelado, that is, the subject who had been considered beyond the pale of citizenship since independence, as che quintessential Mexicana Ramos argued that Mexican national character was marked by a collective inferiority complex, This inferiority complex was exemplified in the attitude of the pelado (urban scoundrel), who is so wounded by the other's gaze that he replies to it aggressively with che challenge of "¿Qué me ves?" (What are you looking at?).24 Thus, where che driver oí our earlier Mexico City example seeks anonymity in order te act like a wolf, but becomes a gentleman with eye contact, the pelado rejects eye contact with a threat oí violence. But whereas the nineteenth-century politician would not have hesitated in identifying the trae citizen with che (unconstantly) amiable driver and the pelado asan enemy oí al] good society andan individual lacking in ¡ove and respect for his patria, postrevolutionary intellectuals such as Ramos made the urban rabble foto che Ur-Mexicans, Why che change?

ground. A plausible hypothesis is that a strong unified state and the con-

Before che revolutionary constitution of 1917, Mexican citizens had

comitant process of economic growth led hy foreign investment was a

individual rights, but very few social rights. The right oí education existed

more valued goal for the political ciasses than citizenship. In fact, the ear-

in theory but, as historical studies oí education have shown (Vaughan 1994), public education during che porfiriato was controlled to a large extent by urban notables, a fact that was reflectad in extremely low literacy

lier fixation on citizenship was in large parí che resulr oí the fact that regional elites needed ro appcal to altruistic patriotism in order to try to hold che state together; once thc state could hold its own, this motivation disappeared21 A discourse on "order and progress" quickly superseded earlier emphasis on citizenship and che universal application oí laws as the only way to progress, and a strong state tbat could guarantee foreign investment was [he key to rhat progress. A111d s oJ

Ales. , , ( i iiz en sl,ip 72 =

rates. Moreover, as 1 mentioned carlier, che right to vote was often nullified by che machinery of local bosses, who controlled voting as a matter oí routine.

The 1917 constitution and che regimes following the revolution changed chis in severa) significant ways. First, under che leadership oí José Modas of Mexican 73

Ci ti zen sbip

Cl OS ¡n che 920s arel in an cllon u, wrench che tormation of eiti -

urgent and supremo ideal to being a long terco goal that con Id be achieved

zens from the hands of che chute h h.iblic cdueation ,test on a crusade to

only alter che enlighte sed, scientific state liad done its job. This perspec-

reaeh out us che popular clases Tito etioit successful to a significan[

tive was, in its turn, transformad by clic postrevolutionary state, which

degrce and sc houls wcrc built cn ir rrmi,tc agrarias communities

co nc ple roen ted ir with the o rganiza t ion of che pueblo ¡Tito corporati o ns that

tiecond che 1` 17 constituínm cstaislichcd che iight ot access to land tor

wcrc regulated and protec tt d bv che tate

agricultura) workers_ The )and, ,,,or,ling t, th¡s constitution, belonged to

These broad shifts have liad their correspondi ng counterparts in (he

che nation, as did che subsoil and territorial waters Cirizens had rights to

history of the privare sphe re1 be priva te sphere of citizens in Mexico has

poitions of that national wcaltb incie] cenain concht¡ons Third, che 1917

rever been very fully guaranteed. In clic early republican period, liberals

constitution spee¡lied a series ^,1 „' ,rkci s rights. ¡nduding minimum

identiticd corporate toinis of property as a central obsiacle co citizenship_

,caces, che prr,liib¡cion ot chilcl labor thu prohibioon ot debt peonage.

specifically, they targeted Clic property of Indian communities and of the

maxTmum working hours, and clic filie. Thus, bcing a citizen promised

church. However, che expropriation of both communal and ecclesiastieal

ñghts of access to certain forros oí protection against che predatory prac-

corporate holdings in 1856 did not lead to the desired end, which was

tices of capitalists, who, signihcantly, werc often identihed as foreign in

to creare a propertied citizenry, but instead to even greater concencration

constitucional debates.

oí landed wealth in che hands of an oligarchy. As a result, wide layers oí

ldentifying members oí che urban rabble as the prototypical Mexicans

the population lacked a secure base oí privacy and lived either as depend-

was, in this context, consonant with die state's expansive project. The

ents or as members oí communities whose rights could only be defended

modal citizen should, indeed, be clic a!lahlc and reasonable member oí the

collectively.

middle classes-and Ramoss portraval oí Ihe pelado was in no way lauda-

Alter the 1910 revolution, the state sought to protect individuals from slavelike dependence on the oligarchy, but che relations oí production that it fostered were equally problematic from the point oí view oí the consolidation oí a private sphere. Agrarian reform failed to build a Lockean citizenry in the countryside because ejidatarios (land grantees) are not legal owners oí their land, Moreover, they depend on local governmental support for many aspects of production, and so are feeble participants in the construction oí a bourgeois public sphere. Similarly, the numerous indigent peoples oí Mexico lack a secure private sphere, as ethnographies oí che "informal economy" have amply attested: people working in the informal sector lead lives that are largely outside oí che law. As a result, they need to negotiate with state institutions in order to keep tapping into 11legal sources oí electricity, to keep vending in restricted zones, to keep living in property that is not formally theirs, and so on.2' Thus, although incorporation into a modern sector was one oí the critical goals oí postrevolutionary governments, che modalities oí incorporation retained significan[ sectors oí the population that not only did not benefit from access to a privase sphere that was immune froni governmental intervention, but in fact depended on governmental intervention in order to eke out a living in a legally insecure environment. Oí che three sectors that made up Mexico's state parry, two-the peasant sector and the popular sector-had no sacrosanct privare sphere from which to criticize che state, and therefore no protected basis for liberal citizenship.

tory; however, Mexicos backwardness and che challenge of its present made it useful to identify the typical subjccr as bcing off center from that ideal.

At the same time, the revolutiionary stare, like the Porfirian state, did not concern itself so much with producing citizens. Instead, the goal was to creare and to harness corporate groups and sectors finto the state apparatus. Although presidents Obregón and Calles upheld the ideal oí the privare farmer in the 1920s and thought it a much more desirable goal rhan thar oí che communitarian peasant, the task oí building up the state was more important to them rhan building up the citizenThe principal shift between thc Portirian and che postrevolutionary state is that che latter consolidated a political idiom oí inclusive corporativism that could be used to con, plemenc che Porfirian (but still current and useful) [heme of the enliglitened and progressive state. By che time President Cárdenas nationalized che oil industry (1938), political discourse in the Mexican press by and large lacked any referente to the ideal citizen and portrayed,instead,a harmoniousinterconnection between popular classes under che protection of the revolutionary state. In short, early republican obsession wirh citizeriship was primarily owing to che extreme vulnerabilicy of .Mexicds central state. It was not produced by an existing equality among citizens, bur rather by existing divisions among che elites and by clic pressure of popular groups. As soon as a central state was consolidated. citizenship went from being sean as an xi., n t i.. z, nslri p 74

Malles

o f ,A9exi,.i..

=75=

Ci i ize,isbi p

This situation complicates the vision ofcitizenship asa debased category, for it is through claims of citizenship that the peasantry and the informal sector have negotiated with the postrcvolutionary state-exchanging votes and participation in revolutionary national discourse for access to lands, credirs, electricity, or urban services At the same time, Chis citizenship belongs to a faceless mass, not to a collection oí private individuals The pelado who, in Ramos's account felt wounded by the mere gaze oí the erstwhile modal citizen, and who asserted his right tu nationality by his involvement in revolutionary violence, is harnessed back into nationality not through patron-client tics tu privare elites, but through a series oí exchangos with state agencies through which he receives the status oí massified citizen. Let me illustrate what the shape of official citizenry was like in the era oí single-party rule- In the 1988 presidencial campaign oí che Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which was in many respects che last traditional PRI campaign, public rallies and events were divided into severa] types.s` There were, tirst, events targered tu specific portions oí the party's tripartite sectorial organization peasarit sector; labor sector, and popular sector), second, there were meetings with regional and national groups oí experts, who organized problem-focused discussions with the candidate and an audience (CEPES [Centros de Estudios Políticos y Sociales] and IEPES [Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Sociales], both oí the PRI), third, there were massive public rallies that were meant to show the party's muscle by uniting the whole pueblo in a single square; and finally (chis was an innovation for che 1988 campaign), there were talk-show-like events where the candidate lielded questions from callers who were not identified as members of a party sector.

This situation has been identified by Mexican democrats as a lack oí a civil society, and [hese same democrats have been building a narrative oí Mexican democracy that has the heyday oí the corporate party (the 1940s and 1950s) as che historical low point in Mexican citizenship. According to this view, che corporate state effectively funneled Mexican society into its mass party until the 1960s, when certain groups, especially middleclass groups-but also some peasants and urban poor-no longer found a comfortable spot in the state's mechanisms oí representation and resource management, producing the 1968 student movement.27 The violent suppression of this movement, and che expansion oí state intervention in the economy in the 1970s, gave a second wind to the corporatist state. However, an unencompassable civil society would keep growing during chis period and would reemerge politically in the mid1980s, when the state's fiscal crisis weakened its hold on society. This situa-

The image oí the nation as it was generated in the massive public rallies was thar of a corporate organism. Iike public displays oí che social whole since che colonial period, che public oí these rallies was divided internally by sectors, each of which signaled its corporate presence with electoral paraphernalia (sheets painted with the candidate's name and the name oí the supporting sector: flags, T-shirts, tags, or hats that had the candidate's initials and those oí che party or sector), but also with a certain uniformity of look, peasants in their hats and sandals, railroad workers in their bloc hats schoolteachers in their modest, lower-middle-class garb, and so on. Alongside this hierarchical and organic image of che nation as being made up of complementary, uncqual, and interdependent masses, however, campaign rituals also presented certain modal images oí the citizenry. AAod,, oJ

This is apparent in the use oí dress in the various rallies, for although the presidential candidate dressed up as member oí the sector that he was visiting (as a rancher when in a rally oí the peasant sector, as a well-dressed worker in a rally oí the labor sector, or in a suit in a discussion with experts), the relationship between "the suit" and other costumes is not one oí equality. Rather, the suit is the highest formal garb, the one that the candidate will use on a daily basis when he is in the presidency, and the one that he has daily used as a government official prior to becoming a presidential candidate. The suit is the modal uniform oí the public sphere. Public sessions devoted to the discussion oí regional and national problems are attended almost exclusively by suits, even when their inhabitants are representing interests associated with labor or agriculture. Thus, the image oí the citizen with a voice stands in contrast to the massified citizen.

AI, , r: : (:I:zenslip

tion has been leading inexorably to the end oí the one-party system and che rise oí Mexican democracy

During the period oí state party pile, political classes in Mexico had a pretty clear mission, which was to tap into resources by mediating between state institutions and local constituencies. It was in this period that a clever politician coined che phrase "vivir fuera del presupuesto es vivir en el error" (to live outside oí the state budget is to live in error). The expansion oí che state for severa] decades was a process oí always incorporating political middlemen as new social movements emerged- Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, positions were created for leaders oí squatters' movements, for leaders oí urban gangs, for student movement leaders, for teachers' movement leaders, and others. The fiscal crisis oí che state that began in 1982 severely limited its ModosofMexicanCitizensbtp

possibility ol cngaging in thn , , -uptivc stratcgy, and so rhe numbers oí

isted in Iberoamerica However, bis strategy is hest suited to highlight rhe

nongovernmental organizations in artive service roce dramadeally, as did

micropolitics of access to state institutions and does not elarify rhe specihe

oppositioti pa r'ties l here has undoubtc(1h buen an intensification ot eiti-

ways in which citizenship is filled and emptied ol contents. It therefore

zen activity in Chis period s. ith sast numhcrs ol people rejecting massífied

misses in important dimension of rhe eulture ot atizenship, including

corporate forros oi political )ar tiupatton that are no longer providing real

how, when, and by whorn it is politicized.

beneflts, and ctrong voten partir ipation as well as a huge increase in partici-

In Chis chapter, 1 have presented a rough outline oí rhe politics sur-

pation in political rallies, dem onsoatiom. and rhe like The press roo, has

rounding citizenship in modern Mexico. 1 argued that there have been

broken with rhe unspoken rulo ol prescning rhe figure of rhe national

two periods when discussions of citizenship Nave been truly central to

presiden[ irom direct attack and ts crit11 '5m of government has become

political discourse The first period which 1 analyzed in sume detail, is rhe

much loe der.

era oí political instabibty and economic decline that followed Mexican in-

Ar the sane time, howevcr, rhe lact that many political leaders and me-

dependence; the second is the contemporary, post- I982 debt crisis period

diators are now living outside of the fiscal budget may also mean that a

oí privatization and rhe end of single-party hegemony The view that 1 de-

new forro of massified citizenship is beiog constructed. The economic

veloped suggests that the intensity oí discussions surrounding citizenship

costs oí democracy and democranzation are so far very high in Mexico,

in the first five decades alter independence reflected both the complex

and a lot oí money is going to al¡ political parties, as well as to running

politics oí including or excluding popular classes from the political field

electoral processes Elections and electoral processes have become a

and the fact that national unity seemed unattainable by any means other

source oí revenue in their own right, and the jockeying between party

than through unity among citizens, and violence against traitors (be these

leaderships could beeome divorced irom rhe ever-growing needs oí rhe

indigenous groups or fractious "tyrants" with their clientele of canallas). In

country's poorest, particularly because the middle and proletarian classes

other words, citizenship was continually invoked as the foremost need oí

are now large enough to sustaln such an apparatus. This situation is illus-

the nation ata time when rhe country had no effective central state, a de-

trated in Are fact that today, although there is undoubtedly more democ-

clining economy, and was threatened both by imperial powers and by in-

racy in Mexico than at any time in recent memory, rhe extent oí urban in-

ternal regional dissidents.

security, the numbers of fences and walls, and the presente oí the military and oí privare security guards are also rhe highest in recent memory.

Beginning with Preside n[ Juárez, but especially under Díaz, the national state was consolidated and a national economy was shaped thanks to

At this juncture, as in rhe posrrevolutionary years in which Ramos was

the state's capacity to guarantee foreign investment and national sover-

writing, there is an increasing number oí pcople who are tinprotected by

eignty. As a result, the "bad pueblo" was slowly neutralized and substituted

relations oí privare patronage, unprotected by rhe state, and who have in-

only by rhe growth and expansion oí what 1 have called the "abject pueblo,"

sufficient private possessions to participare as reliable citizens. On the

or the people who were not fit for citizenship (not knowing how to read

other hand, as in the unstable years oí rhe early and mid-nineteenth cen-

or write, not speaking Spanish, or living in conditions oí servitude that ef-

tury, there is an increasingly large class ot lumpenpohticians who seek

fectively precluded full participation as independent citizens). In rhe pro-

to funnel die "bad pueblo" finto "factious movements. And the passage

cess, rhe national obsession with citizenship diminished even as the cele-

from unruly anonymity to amicable personal contact may beeome more

bration and fetishization oí the state as the depositary oí rationality, order,

strained as the capacity to claint that "whoever gets mad first, loses" itself

and progress grew. The combination oí national consolidation, rapid

loses credibility

modernization, and rhe extension oí a degraded form oí citizenship to the vast majority is par[ oí the backdrop oí rhe Mexican Revolution oí 1910.

Conclus-ion DaMaua's analysis of thc relationship hetween liberal and Catholichierarchical discourses in the negotiation of citizenship is a useful entry point for rhe descriprion oí debased torno of citizenship as they have ex-

The constitutional order that emerged from rhe revolution allowed Mexicans access to a series of benefits, including land and protection against employers. Nevertheless, the postrevolutionary orden did not achieve rhe liberal goal oí turning rhe majority oí the population into property holders. In fact, the fragility oí rhe privare sphere for large sections Modes of Mex ican Citrzensf 79

D

oí the population has been one of the constante in modcrn Mexican history. As a result, the revolutionary state combined the Porfirian cult oí enlightened, state-led progress with an organicist construction oí the people. This revolution gave citizenship another kind oí valence. Inscead oí attacking communal lands and trying to transtorm every Mexican into a prívate owner, postrevolutionary governments gave out land and protection

4

as forms of citizenship, out they retained ultimate control over those resources. As a result, citizenship in the postrevolutionary era (up to the mid- or late 1 980s) can be thought of in parí as massified and sectorialized, because peasants and workers of the so-called informal sector received beneHts en the force of their citizenship, and yet lacked independence froni the state. Thus, the debased citizen that DaMatta speaks of is different in the prerevolutionary and the postrevolutionary periods, because, in the latter, "nobodies" coulcl make daims for state beneHts on the oasis oí their collective identity as part oí a revolutionary pueblo, whereas in the former they could not.

Passion and Banality in Mexican History:

Part of the current difficulty in MMexican citizenship is that social critics acknowledge that state paternalism and control over production led to un-

The Presidential Persona

acceptably undemocratic forros oí rule and, indeed, lo policies that led to the bankruptcy of the country. However, at least the 1917 constitution envisaged parceling out some benefrts tu people by virtue oí the fact that they were citizens. The contraction oí che state has produced massive social movements and a very strong push aruund democratizaban and the category oí che citizen, out the current emphasis on electoral rights risks emptying the category oí iis social ccntents once again, and, given the fact that Mexico still has a large mass of poor people with little legal private property or stable and legally sanctioned work, and given too that Mexico's state is still incapable oí extending rights universally, we may yet see the reemergence a pernicious dialectic between the good pueblo and the bad pueblo.

In Mexico, theories about nacional destiny have often eclipsed broader concerns with human history. Development in Mexico has been national development, history has been national history, and theories of history have been theories oí national history. This phenomenon is not caused by isolation. It is instead the result oí a pervasive peripheral cosmopolitanism, of an acute conscience oí wanting to catch up, to reach "the level" oí the great world powers, The need to explain the dynamics oí national history stems from the nacional project's failure to deliver its promise, its failure to free Mexico from subservience and to make the nation an equal oí every great nation. Curiously, however, theories oí Mexican history do not usually begin by inspecting the impact oí national independence en the sense of disjointedness that generates national self-obsession. Instead, they always want to reach further back in an attempt to force a national subject who can then be liberated through the sovereignty oí a national community. My argument in this chapter takes an alternative route. Ideally, sovereignty may indeed coincide with the liberation oí the nacional subject, out this has never been a realistic expectation. Instead, real sovereignty, independence as it has actually existed, has generated a dynamic oí cultural production that shapes Mexican obsessions with national teleology because

Moler

of Mrx, :.r,, Cirrzevsbi Jr

81

=

it creares a systanatic divide ben,cen nati],cal ideolugy and actual power

projects is i cself used to construct che nacional subject that is meant to be

relatiuns 1-his chasm is espcdalls cvident In Clic states tense relationship

liberated by the nacional scatc, and by che next set oí reforms.

io modernizati on and to che ],roed prole, t „I cultural modernity.

1 Nave argued that che limitations oí various modero projects in

Al] nacional state, can be th,caccned b, modcrnlzation. After al], eapi-

Mexico Nave reflected che highly segmented quality of che public spherc

talist development has thnved mi clic inahility ot srates fully to encompass

there. This segmentation can be properly understood through a geog-

che economies of their peoplc lhe tcchmcal social organizacional, and

raphy of mediations. My rescarch agenda has been to develop such a ge-

cultural Innovacions that are linkcd io indu,tnal growth (i e, moderniza tion) can thrcaren boch che interests and che teehnical hasis of state

ography by focusing boch on agents oí mediation, such as intellectuals

power. Cultural modernity tor: is en esl,ansive projeer thac has challenged specihc state instiitu tions hv shaping and upholding a series of rights aiound che category oí che citlzcn, by insisting on a degree of autonomy fui artistic and scientilic production, and by fostering a "public sphere" froni which state policiies and institutions can be evaluated and criticized.

and politicians, and en che public enactment of nacional unity and artnculation in political ritual In Chis chapter 1 will focos on che secular process through which che ideal oí nacional sovereignty was incarnated; 1 mean che shaping oí che public persona oí che president of the republic. 1 will argue that the rocky process by which presidential power became routinized affords a glimpse of che way in which the state has brokered Mexico's modernity.

In Mexico, che scates active role in propitialing and channeling development and modernization has depended en institucional forms that often contradice democratic ideals of dnzenship, freedom of expression, artistic

First Time as Farce?

and scientiflc autonomy, and other ideals of cultural modernity. This fact

Disturbed perceptions oí che disjunction between the central tenets of na-

is manifested in che resilience o1 che category ancien régime' in Mexican

cional ideology and actual political practice are visible in Mexico as early

political and historical texts Eighleenth- century modernizing reforms

as the independence movement itself. For instante, José María Luis Mora,

introduced by the Bourbons are correctly casi against a classical ancien régime, which is described as corporatist and premodern, but corporatism, che ownership oí political office, and the primary importance of personal negotiation with a sovereign did not die with these reforms. Historian Frangois Xavier Guerra discusses che 1910 Mexican Revolution against the backdrop oí a still-crumbling "ancien régime," despite che fact that Porfirio

a man who worked tirelessly and to a large extent unsuccessfully at creating the persona of the liberal citizen, complained that his contemporaries believed that "[t[he constitution and che laws are here to place limits en a power that already existed and was invested with omnimodal power, and not that they are here to create and form that power."' In other words, the presidency alter independence saw its power as preceding the roles and

Díaz was indisputably a modernizing dictator and that Mexico had been

laws of the constitution, which might limit it in some ways, but not shape

independent for nearly ninety yeais when che revolution broke out.' Even

it ex nihilo. State power was not boro of a formal social contract, but the nation allegedly was.

today, political writers have resurrected che ancien régime label, but Chis time to refer to the postrevolutionarv one- party system that is in the process oí collapsing. The persistente oí che epithet ancien régime' is a manifestation of the perceived divide between che nacional ideal wherein che law has universal extension and application, and real state power, which is seco as making decisions on a self-serving and ad hoc basis. This chasm has been che declared cause of revolutions and reforms. However, reforms have failed to redress che gulf between che real and che normacive order, modern and tradicional "hybrids" proliferare, and chis process usually ends up being interpreted as a manifestation of che resihence of a nacional culture- The cycle of nationalist angst is therehy closed, because the failure of modernizing P,:,, ion and Bi,:nliiv in Al r:!; ca,: Hi, ,ory

Despite the persistente oí chis ideological disjunction, liberal theories regarding social contract, political representation, and citizenship flotar-. ished. This fact can be understood in part as a mimetic strategy for che state's survival: che adoption oí the great powers' own idiom of statehood was necessary for navigating a weak state in international waters. The temptation to cloak local struggles for national power in a language that enjoyed a degree of international prestige, a temptation that was provoked at once by imperial pressures and by che strategic utility of foreign ideas for internal self-legicimation, produced political habits that Nave been described since che early moments oí Mexican nacional independence and up until che present day as a grotesque penchant for imitation-imitation Yassian nnd Banality in Al rxiran 83 =

History

flor only oí liberal idcals, hut of everv kind of glorious foreign practice. 1 quote again froni Mora,

[i]nsulting the faith and our sovereign, Ferdinand VII, painted en his hanner (he image of our august patroness, our Lady of Guadalupe, and wrote

The raen who arroganlly chist '],al 'comtimnons are sheets of paper that

the following inscriptiom. "Long Live the Faith. Long Live Our Holiest

Nave no value other than ihar wlnch die governmcnt wishes tú give them"

Mother of Guadalupe- Long Live Ferdinand VII_ Long Live America, and

are deludcd That expression vhidt seas in some v.ay tolerable coming

Death to I3ad Government.'o

from thc hero oI Marring of jcna aod ol Austcrlitz, ro ni the inan who

Abad y Queipo subsequendy excommunicated Hidalgo and threatened to

saved Franco a thuusand timos and Icd its armies vietoriously 111 YO Russia,

do the lame to any person who persisted in fighting on Hidalgos side or in aiding him in any way.

has been repeated not lar hnm mis bv pygmics without mera, service, or presti ge s

This edict, which was soon endorsed by the archbishop oí Mexico,

Here, Mexican politicians are tiny AGicans, aping Europeans in their

caused great indignation and rape with Hidalgo, Morelos, and other mem-

banana repuhlic. But, as historian Fernando Escalante has demonstrated,

bers oí the insurgent clergy. Hidalgo made a formal reply, in which he

the citizen that was meant to monlmr these politicians was an equally fie-

swore his loyalty to the Catholic faith: "1 have never doubted any oí its

titious character, hecause the power oI die 'tate was never sufficient to de-

truths, I have always been intimarely convinced oí the infallibility oí its

lend the property and the rights of Mexlcans who enjoyed formal citizenship.° ln this context the office ol ihe presidency became a vehicle for

dogmas.`7 Hidalgo then vehemently deplored his excommunication as a partisan act: "Open your eyes, Americans. Do not allow yourselves to be

imagining sovcrcignty, and presidente built ibeir authoriry by shaping and embodying these images.

god is money, and their acts have our oppression as their only object." s He

seduced by our enemies: they are not Catholics, except tú politici their then called for ehe establishment oí a representative parliament that,

Excommunication ani) Primary Piocess"iiice Jodependence

saving as its principal object la maintain our boly religion, will promete benign laws

Once Miguel Hidalgos (1810) movement lar independence had ravaged

[leyes suaves], useful and well suited to the circumstances oí each pueblo. They shall then govern with the tenderness oí parents, they shall treat os as

severa) towns oí the Bajío regios, thc bishop oí Michoacán and erstwhile Iriend of Hidalgo, Manuel Abad y Queipo, decreed the excommunication of the priest and oí his followers.' This act, and some oí the insurgent clergy's reactlons, set the tope for l ater meraphors of national unity and

brothers, banish poverty, moderare the devastation oí ihe kingdom and the extraction oí its moneys, fonient the arts, liven up industry , . _ and, after a few years, our inhabitants shall enjoy al¡ of the delicacies that the Sovereign Author oí nature has spilled en this vast continente

apostasy.

The bishop began his edict with a citation from Luke-"Every kingtlom that is divided finto factions c11,11 he dcstruycd and ruined"-and then

In sum, Hidalgo warns against tire use oí the trae faith for the enrichment oí foreign oppressors. He identifies national sovereignty with rule oí

proceeded tu review ihe ravagcs of die wars in French Saint-Domingue JHaiti), which were caused, he reminded bis dock, by the revolution in

the Catholic faith, a rule that is to be paternalistic fin that it shall recognize the specific needs and circumstances oí each pueblo, and he imagines a

the metropole. The result of that revolt was not only the assassination of

nation guided by a single true faith that will quickly become a kind oí

all Euro pean' and Creoles, but also the des truction of four-fifths of the

Christian paradise in which poverty is eradicated by the fraternal senti-

island's black and mulatto population and a legacy oí perpetua] hatred

ment and benign intentions that exist between true coreligionists. Thus

between blacks and mulattos. No good could come from a falce division between Europeans and Americans.

Hidalgo performed a kind of counterexcommunication oí European imperialista who used Catholicism in order lo "seduce" those whom they

Abad then expressed particular chagrin regarding the fact that the cal] of disloya]ry and arras carne from a priest, ^tiligucl Hidalgo of the parish oí Dolores, who not only killed and injured Europeans and used his robes to 'seduce a portion oí innocent laborcrs,' but aleo,

sought to oppress and exploit.

Hidalgo's position found concrete jurídica] expression in the edicts oí bus follower, the priest José María Morelos. In his first edict abolishing slavery and Indian tribute (1810), Morelos proclaimed that "[a]ny American

P.+s=ion and Bnn.iy r ,. Jlex,can

Hisiory 8.l

=

Pas 'ion nnd 13ruia1ily in Mexican 85

liistory

who owes monee Lo a European is not oblit;ed Lo pav it- It, on the con-

by Morelos's declaration oí a elean siate for all, would be impossible to up-

ti-are, it is thc 1 uropean who owes. hc shall rigonxisly pay his debt Lo the

hold. They were ill suited to serve as the hasis for consolidating a huge

.Ameriean" Moreover ¡e vete lanwner sha bc set ¡ice wlth che knowl-

territory peopled by a weakly integrated nation that gained its indepen-

dge tirar il he eomni its thc satine dime nt air c othei that eontradicts a

dence at a montent oí iotense imperial competition.

mans honeste, lic- '11,111 be mmh, ti

These Iaws portrayed Turopeans as uuirious'y living oí¡ oí "Amen ca os such that there was no possihle Anacrican debt to the Europeans that liad

Dead Presidents

not been hanclsomeIv paid lor bcl„rehand and that the judgment oí

The consolidation oí a central authority has been a eomplex problem in

e rimes unid el thc Spa¡lis h reginn rs a. ses tematically unlair. In sum, che

Mexican history, for although such an authority existed during the colo-

c ountcrexcommunieation ot INC Spanish clergy by Hidalgo and Morelos

nial era in the figure of the king and his surrogate, che viceroy, establish-

tuses the nacional ideal with a Christian utopia. Paternalistic beneficence

ing a central state and authoriry after independence proved to be highly

and brotherhood would be achieved in an independent Mexico ruled by

problematic.

true Catholics, instead of by oppressors who used Catholicism to pursue

Monarchical solutions to this quandary were consonant with the ideology oí Mexican independence, which leaned heavily en traditional Spanish legal thought to legitimate itself. The dream of a smooth transition between the colonial and che independent order was simply not to be. On one side, radical insurgents were not keen to see the precolonial status quo upheld to such a perfect degree. On another, Spain did not immediately relinquish its claims over the new Mexican empire and attempted to reestablish a foothold on the continent for ten more years, sufficient time for an anti-Spanish sentiment that had been growing along with the construction oí Mexican nationalism to become virulent. Moreover, the United States was clearly and loudly opposed to che establishment of a monarchy in Mexico." As a result, monarchists were forced to set their hearts en acquiring a European monarch with che simultaneous backing oí al] or most European powers, a solution that was tried and failed in che 1860s. Thus the early fractures among the nascent national elite were connected ab initio to che contest between the United States, France, Spain, and Britain. It was not until 1867, after the French departed and Maximilían was shot, that Mexico finally earned its "right" to exist as a nation. Until that time, no strong central state had existed, and the country's sovereignty was severely limited. In the words oí a Porfirian commentator,

their unchristian aims: the cxtraction oí money and che oppression oí a nation. Morelos's political spirit would perdure because che defense oí nationals against foreign extortion and the dispensation oí Christian justice proved impossible to achieve after independence. Thus, Hidalgo s image al sovereignty as the Christian adm i n ist ration of plenty remained a utopia, and Mexican governments alter independence were just as subject to the polities oí religious appropriation/excommunication as their Spanish predecessors. A similar formulation oí national ideals can be found a hundred years aker Hidalgos cry in Dolores, issuing from the pen oí that foremost ideologue oí the Mexican Revolution, Luis Cabrera, who blasted the official celebration oí the centenary oí independence just two months prior to che first revolutionary outburst oí November 20, 1910: The celebration of our glories and the commemoration of our heroes is a cult, but those who suffer and work cannot arrive togerher at the altar oí che fatherland with [hose who dominare and benefit because they do not share the lame religion- Just as the Ch ristian's plea to pardon all debts cannot fit in the same prayer as the lew s plea tor daily bread exacted from profits, neither can títere be a unilied hnmage te our fathers by those with an insaciable thirst for power and hy the noble desire for justice that moves che hearts of the pueblo that suffers and wnrks11

[before che wars oí intervention] being a foreigner came to mean being the natural-born master oí all Mexicans. It was enough, as a few oí the excep-

This significant, indeed foundational, strain of,Mexican nationalism there-

tionally rare honest diplomats acknowledged, for a foreigner to be impris-

fore lees the national state as the ideal medium for achieving a Christian

oned for three days en poor behavior or intrigue for that person to become

community- In fact, however, the standards lar sovereignty that were set

a creditor for fifty or one hundred thousand pesos to the Mexican national

by Hidalgo, wherebv poverty would be bar'shed "in just a few years," or

budget as a result oí a diplomatic agreement. °

Ya ssi o n und Ira n „l r d.l. , nn n 1listo ty 80 =

Passion u,d Bana1,ty in Mexican = 87

History

The state had become the guarantor oí foreign interests against its own people. The bullet that killed Maximilian effectively ended the possibility oí ever establishing a European-backed monarchy, while making a highly visible international statement about the sovereignty oí Mexico and oí its

persona: the strategy oí the martyr, the strategy oí the exemplary citizen, and the strategy of the modernizer. In discussing selected aspects oí these three presidential repertoires, 1 hope to clarify one aspect oí the distante between legal forms and actual political practice.

laws. Until that time, Mexico had been routinely "Africanized" in foreign oyes. In the years between 1 821 and 1867, Mexican leaders had tried a series oí strategies for constructing central power, combining varying forms oí messianism, aspects of monarchic power, republicanism, and liberalism, in a large number oí short-lived presidencies Civen the nonexistence oí a successful hegemonic block among early postindependence elites, and given a number oí foreign pressuies that were not fully comprehended by these elites until half the country's territory had been lost, the difficulty in constructing an image oí national sovereignty and authority in the office oí the president became a major cultural challenge, for whereas political ritual and the stability oí office in the colonial period reveal a clear-cut ideology oí dependency-that is, of a combination oí subordination, complementarity, and mutual reliance-this cense oí reliance and encompassment between the centers oí empire and Mexico was decidedly shaken, and sometimes completely shattered, alter independence.

The difficulty in shaping presidential power was increased, too, by the weakness, and at times nonexistence, oí modern political parties. Political organization around che time oí independence flowed to a large extent through Masonic lodges. In the early independence period, there was only one Masonic rite, the Scottish rite, which had been imported by Mexico's representativas at che Cortes oí Cádiz in 1812. A second lodge, oí York, was established in Mexico by the first U.S. ambassador, Joel Poinsett, with the explicit ami oí consolidacing a federalist, republican, and more Jacobin organization finto Mexico's political arena, In neither case, however, were these lodges open to public scrutiny, as political parties are, and political power was taken in the name oí ideologies, such as federalism, centralism, liberalism, or conservatism, with no party structure tu back them. As a result, the construction oí the persona oí the president as the personification oí sovereignty was both important and highly problematic. It involved creating an iniage that could risa ahoye and reconcile a regionally fragmented society, an image that could also be manipulated in order to seduce orto frighten off imperial power-contradictory uses that are surely parí oí the famous distante hetween the p,?ís real and the país legal. 1 shall explore three significant strategies in the evolution of the presidential Passion nnd 13 1 '1y ,n 88

t`í CXJC11 11

11 isiory

An Arm and a Leg The saliente oí martyrdom in politics has often been noted in popular commentary in Mexico. Mexico has a large pantheon oí national leaders who were shot or martyred, including Hidalgo, Morelos, Allende, Aldama, Iturbide, Guerrero, Mina, Matamoros, Maximilian, Madero, Villa, Carranza, Obregón, and Zapata, to name only the most prominent ones. The first martyrs oí independence were Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Santa María, whose heads were severed by Spanish authorities and displayed in the four corners oí the Alhóndiga de Granaditas, where Hidalgos army had massacred a number oí Spantards and Creoles. Many other leaders oí independence were also executed in later periods. When it carne to insurgent priests, Spanish authorities tried to degrade the leaders before and after execution. The subjects were defrocked in ecclesiastical courts and then turned over to the civil authorities, who dictated their sentences. In cases where military officers had to take justice into their own hands, some officers "reconciled their duties as Christians with their obligations as soldiers" by undressing the rebel priest, shooting him, and then redressing him with his robes for burial.10. Despite these and other degradations, [hese dead became the martyred "fathers" oí the nation. The use oí messianic imagery was significant en two levels: it was a way oí identifying the presidential body with the land, and it cast the people as being collectively in debí to the caudillo for his sacrifices. The relationship to kingly ideology is clear. Because Mexico was unable to enshrine its own king, in whom a positiva relationship between personal welfare and national welfare could be state dogma ("The King and the Land are One"), its national leaders had to create this relationship negatively, through sacrifice. Thus, it was through personal sacrifice that the president could attempt to convince people oí his capacity to represent the entire nation. The most successful example oí a president who relied primarily en this strategy for fashioning his persona was Antonio López de Santa Anna, who dominated Mexican politics during the first half oí the nineteenth century Santa Anna was called to the presidency eleven times, alternatively as a liberal, a conservative, and a moderate. Ideological purity was Passion and Banality in 89

Mexiean

HisIory

clearly not che way to estahlish onesdl as a durable alternatve for the presidencv in carly nineceentli ,, ntury ,Vlcxico_ Instead, historian John Lynch observes chat Santa Anua sale El ini e l as a preserven of order, not as an ideologically Inconsisccnt opporuinist 1 -he fault !,aceording to Santa Anua] las with the political par ti,, ss bici, dlvidcd Mexico and created a need for reconciliation" : 1992, 3s6

Aboye the political fray hetwee n nothing remained in the rhetoiic of the period but the fachciland ,p.nna. itsell, and so Santa Anna cultivated bis repuiation as a war heru He led clic defense against the Spanish in 1829, bis leg was amputated alter wounds acquired in cine "Pastry War against the French in 1839 (offsetting, somewhat, bis humiliating defeat in Texas), and he organized the defense against the U.S. invasion ata time oí political disarray. In 1842, Santa Anna was once again called to power, and at that point he attempted co build the rudiments oí a political geography that would have him at its center. He had a luxurious municipal theater built (the Teatro Santa Anna), with a statue of himself in front oí it. A solemn and much-actended ceremony was cnacted to inaugurare a third monument, which was a mausoleum in which bis left leg was reinterred. The significante oí Santa Anna's Icg-a limb that linked him to Hidalgo, Morelos, and all the dead heroes whose ]ove for the patria at that point was the only ideology capable of unifying the country-is best appreciated in Santa Anna's own words: The infamous words the messenger read me are repeated hete: "The majority oí Congress openly favor the Paredes revolution . . The rioters imprisoned President Canalizo and extended their aversion to the president, Santa Anna. They tore down a bronze hust erected in bis honor in the Plaza del Mercado. They stripped bis narre from the Santa Anna Theater, substituting for it the National Theater. Furthermore, they have taken bis amputated foot from the cemetery ot Santa Paula and proceeded to drag it through the streets to che sounds of savage laughter and regaling ..." 1 interrupted the narrator, exclaiming savagely, Stop' 1 don't wish to hear any more! Almighty Codi. A member ot my hody, lose in che service of my country, dragged from the funeral urn, broken into bits to be made sport of in such a barbarie mannert' In that moment ot grief and frenzy, 1 decided to leave my native country, objeet of my dreams and oí my disillusions, for all time 15

Figure 4.1. Vlceroy don Juan Vicente Guemes Pacheco y Padilla, segundo Conde de Revillagigedo, anonymous painter, eighteenth century. Oil on canas, 52 x 41. Collection of Banco Nacional de México. This is a usual representation oí a viceroy's arrival in New Spain- The viceroy is assisted on one side by the power oí arms, and en the other by che power of justice, the same two powers that caudillos claimed for themselves when they claimed to stand aboye all parties.

Civen Mexico's ideological rifes, the dilflculcies in creating a national center in the face oí interna] divisions and international pressure, the only Pa, sion nnd Daneii1 y .u Xlexican Hirirry 90

1 ieure 4.2 hnagni de iura Len releen de Frmm,nlo VII ;monymous painter, ninereenth century. Oil cn canvas, 1-40 x 98 cm_ Collcetion ui !Museo Regional de Guadalajara. 1-he message on the painCing reads. leluved Fernando, Spain and the Indies placed on your head this [imago oí the croes n 1 the bottom reads,'This ¡ion, which is the Spanish nation, will rever lel gu Ironu i¢ lit,hes rhe teso worlds of Ferdinand VII" The representation of the king oo Str ikinglq ,imitar ti) portraits of Iturhide and Santa Anna_

1 igure 4.3. Santa Anna as presiden[-

,,ood president could be a seltkss one The dead insurgents beeame ex

created equal, has been a place that only the dead can inhabit, which is

acoples ol this ideal, and the ea' licsi viable examples oí the presidential

why we sometimes fight over their remainsls

persona wcre built around the ligare ot the martyr-presidents who did not reecive salaries, whu saeriheecl theii iniilics who abandoned their lamily l'artene. who gavc [Ti' their health iris tbctr country.

Unconventional Conventionalists, or the Fetishism of the Lau,

Santa Anna lost his leg and it beeame the focus oí contention. Alvaro

It fell to Benito Juárez to create the first strong image oí the presidency as

Obregón caudillo of the Mexican Revolution, president from 1920 te

an institution oí power that seas truly aboye the fray, and his strategy was to

1924, reelected for office in 1928. and murdered on the day of his elee -

present himself as a complex embodiment oí rhe meeting between the na-

tion, lost an arni in the battle el (elava against Pancho Villa- This arre was

tion and the law. As an Indian, Juárez could stand for rhe nation; as an im-

preserved in alcohol and it hecame tlie centcrpicce of a monument built in

penetrable magistrate and keeper of the law, he attempted to create an

his trame by the man who created thc Partido Revolucionario Institucional

image oí the presidency as being aboye ambitious self-aggrandizement.19

that ruled the country for seventy-one ycars. Obregón's martyrdom was

Francisco Bulnes provides a biting creole perspective on Juárez 's distinct public image:

thus used to funnel charisma finto a hureaucracy that has insistently called itself revolutionary.

Juárez had a distinctively Indian temperameny he had the calm oí an

Two less well known and curious stories are the ends met by the bodies oí Guadalupe Victoria and of General Francisco (Pancho) Villa. Guadalupe Victoria, Mexico's first president, died in 1842. During the U.S. invasion of Mexico in 1848, American soldiers violated the tomb where his mummy and preserved innards were kept. According to one hagiographer, two U.S. soldiers drank the alcohol in which Victorias innards were preserved and died-the remains oí Guadalupe Victoria were still powerful in the

obelisk-that reserved nature that slavery promotes to the state oí comatoseness in the coldly resigned races. He was characterized by the secular silente oí the vanquished who know that every word that is not the miasma oí degradation is punished, by that indifference that apparently allows no seduction but that exasperates .. Juárez did not make speeches; he did not write books, use the press, or write letters; he did not have intimate conversation , nor did he have esprit, an element that makes thought

were placed at the foot oí the Angel oí Independence in Mexico City by

penetrating, like perfume . Nor was he subtle or expressive in his gestures, his movement, or his gaze. His only language was official, severe , sober, irreproachable, fastidious , unbearable. His only posture that oí a judge

President Calles in the 1920s.16

hearing a case . His only expression the absence oí all expression . The physi-

struggle for sovereignty. In 1862, just before the French invasion, Victoria's remains were transferred to Puebla by General Alejandro García, and they

Pancho Villa, whose tonib was desecrated and whose head allegedly

cal and moral appearance of Juárez was not that oí the apostle , or the martyr, or the statesman ; it was instead that oí a god in a teocalli, inexpressive en the

ended up in the Skull and Bones Society at Yale University, a secret society

humid and reddish rock oí sacrifices.30

U.S. patriots apparently also had a bone to pick (so to speak) with

oí which George Bush was a member-1' It would appear that Villa, who was initially portrayed by the U.S media as a great popular hero and then demonized as the bandit who had the gall oí invading Columbus, New Mexico, and getting away with it, beeame die object oí "scientific interest" by patriots in the United States, whlle Villas invasion oí Columbus is still a source oí pleasure for Mexican revnncbis les.

The politics around these remains reveals the degree to which the nation's inalienable possessions llave been vulnerable to foreign appropriatien, as well as to interna] desecration- It suggests that martyrdom has been fundamentally linked to an elten unworkable ideal oí sovereignty in modern Mexico Sovereignty, that ideal locatien where al! Mexicans are 1,e1 1 1 as 1 11 .1 B .1 ➢ .I!. ', Vrxrcan v4

His1ory

Juárez created a lasting image oí what the relationship oí the president to the nation should be: he had no need oí the kind oí martyrdom that Santa Anna utilized because his yace already proved his links to the land. Nor, as Bulnes says, was he an apostle , in that his role was to remind Mexicans and foreigners oí the role oí the law. The result appears at first as an impossible combination: the legalistic bureaucrat as national fetish. Juárez's construction oí the presidential persona as the embodiment oí the law depended on a racial element for its success. Mexican presidents who belonged to the local aristocracy could only achieve full identification with the land through the theater oí messianism and martyrdom. Juárez, on the other hand, relied on the mythology oí the Aztec past that P a s s o n a n d B a n a 1 i 1 y i ,i M e x i c a n H , t , , = 95 =

was important in Mexican nationalism as a way of establishing a credible relationship to the land without relying on messianism . When he relied on hiblical imagery, Juárez usually turned to Moses, the lawgiver and liberator, and not to Jesus and the martyrs . This was because Juárez's challenge was not to demonstrate loyalty to the land, but rather to show that he could 'rise aboye his yace." The law resolved this problem to some extent. The Indian, who indisputably was connected to the land , could identify so fully with the law that he would become faceless: a national Fetish of the law, an idol in a teocalli, as Bulnes says . This contrasts with the role of the law in the persona of the messianic president , whose actitudes in this regard were usually inspired by Napoleon. Juárez was aided in this project by the fact that he presided over the definitive defeat of European powers , the execution of a prestigious European monarch, the defeat of the clergy, and an alliance with the United States . He succeeded in identifying himself with the land not through the greatness of his individual acts ( as Bulnes would have liked), but rather through his sober image as the inexorable instrument of the law. After Juárez , two alternative images of that national fetish that is the president had been rudimentarily established : the presiden [ as messianic leader- overflowing with personality , ideologically inconsistent, and abandoning his fortune for the sake of the nation - and the expressionless leader who claims the rule of law in the narre of the nation . The fact that the two could not easily be combined is evident in a satirical verse directed to León de la Barra , interim president of Mexico alter General Dfaz's fall in 1910:

El gobernar con el frac Governing with a tuxedo y ser presidente blanco Being a white president es tan sólo un pasaporte Is only just a passport de destierro limpio y franco 21 7o certain banishment.

One could use a tuxedo like Juárez if it underlined a fusion between the Indian and the law, but if one were white and sought to be president, one could not cake on the persona of the bourgeois or the bureaucrat; instead, one needed the force of arms and a messianic language. After Juárez, the image of saving che law in che narre of the nation becarne a powerful way of claiming the presidency and of shaping the presidencial persona, and this despite che fact that Juárez's self-serving use of the law was no different from either his predecessors nor his successors.22 During ehe Mexican Revolution, Madero revolted against Díaz in the name P

,S510n

and

B,nnlity in Alrx,can

96

Hisfory

Figure 4.4. Tlahuicole, by Manucl Vilar. Collection of Museo Nacional de Arte; photograph by Agustín Estrada. This exemplar of indigenista art from che time of Juárez has the Indian embody the classical ideal of strength and beauty. The discrepancy between che potential of the Indian race in its moments of sovereignty and its degeneration, caused by foreign subjugation, was implicit in the representation itself.

Figure 4.5 I,idios carboneros y labradores de Li vecindad de México, lithograph by Carlos Nebel (1850)- This re presentati o o ol eoniempoi ary Indians is characteristic of the period and contrasta wlrh the ideal cmbodied in Tlabnicole-

of the 1857 constitution and he was punctilious in setting himself up as a law-abiding citizen. In fact, Madero combined the messianic image with that oí the law provider in his "apostle oí democracy" persona. Carranza's army called itself the "Constitutionalist Army" when it organized against the usurper Huerta; Villa and Zapata called themselves "Conventionalists" and claimed to be fighting Carranza out of respect for the resolutions oí the Aguascalientes Convention- Finally, and perhaps most important, Mexico's dominant party, established in 1929, saw itself as the institutionalized heir of the revolution, which was interpreted as the fount oí nacional comunitas whose spirit was embodied in tire constitution oí 1917. In each oí these cases, including juárez's, the nationalization oí che law was a way to construct a viable presidential authority whose actual policies often had no more than a casual or after-the-facr relationship tu the law.

Figure 4.6- President Juárez, anonymous engraving autographed by Presiden[ Juárez. Juárez, the Indian who studied law and who made Europe pay for its intervention by ordering Maximilian's execution in conformiry with that law, is the modero

Inventos del hombre blanco: Modernizalion and Presidencial Fetishism 1 have outlined two ways in which thc presidenr's persona was shaped: che messianic strategy and che indigenized-legalist strategy. These alternatives were developed at difterent moments. though hoth are components P.iseion and

Oa salii> ,, v8

;blexicnn

Hislory

reconciliation between che idealized pre-Hispanic Indian and che promise held out by national sovereignry- Juárezs identity as a civilian demonstrates the porential of Mexican society ro back this ideal, while simultaneously affirming that national liberation would not be attained by "caste wars "

IGNACIO M. ALTAMIRANO. Figure 4.7. Allanurano, lhe Indian Gmlor, anonymoiu engraving published in Evans (1870)_ Ignacio Manuel Altamirano seas, on che cultural plane, a symbol quite similar co Juárez. The Indian body elothed in European high culture was a reclamation oí what had been due te che Indiati yace. It was a consequence of sovercignry and hecame its fitting symbol_ Figure 4.8. Presidente Benito Juárez, by Hermenegildo Bulstos. Collection of che

of contemporary Mexican "presidentialism The messianic strategy was

Senado de la República (Mexico). This contemporary portrait oí a green-eyed

che first successful option because [here was no way that the presidency

Juárez hangs today in Mexico's Senate. The mestizaje of Juárez is here embodied

could feign ideological consistency in che first half oí che nineteenth cen-

in che whitening of his face, a strategy that made sense while Juárez lived.

tury. The fetishization oí che law occurred in coniunction with the consolidation oí Mexico's position in the international system and as a result oí

[In che early and mid-nineteenth century] [w]e have two theses correspon-

the polarization oí che country to a degree that only one party could con-

ding to two tendencies [che liberal and che conservative tendency], which

ceivably emerge as che victor_

struggle against each ocher because oí their respective aims and because

The third strategy that 1 will discuss concerns che nationalization oí modernization as a presidencial stracegy. According co historian Edmundo O'Gormam

ever, [hese two theses end up postulating the same thing, co wit, they both

) i i. 100

A:,'xi:nn History

they are founded on two different visions of che direction oí history. Howwish to acquire che prospedty of che United States without abandoning Passion and Bnnulity in 101 =

Mexican History

u'aditional ways of being, because these were judged tu be the very essence of the nation. Both comenta wanted thc benehts oí moderniry, but neither wanted modernity itsclf"

In other words, the contest ter nm oderniza tion (niaterial and technological progress) asas a high aim of the national struggle that was claimed by all factions, while cultural modernity was, in different ways, rejected This tendency was clearly expressed at the muro oí the twentieth century-when the contest herween liberals and co nserva tives had been transcended-in irielisnm, an ideology that posited the spiritual supcriority of Latin America over the United States and envisioned modernizing Latin American countries without absorbing the spiritual debasement created by the all-pervasive materialism that was attributed to U.S. society. Although Enrique Rodó's Ariel ties Latin spirituality to a Hellenic inheritance, the fundamental tenet oí arielismo (greater spirituality that is nonetheless compatible with selective modernization) has multiple manifestations, some oí which are present even today in the forro of indigenismo, and in nationalistic forms of socialism. Taken at this leve) of generality, arielismo presupposed a certain cosmopolitanism and a high degree of education (at least at the leve) oí the elites), combined with the maintenance oí hierarchical and paternalistic relationships within society. The cosmopolitanism and spiritual education oí the elite were required, in fact, in order to guarantee a well-reasoned selection oí modere implementa and practices to import. In other words, arielismo was an ideology that was well adapted to the circumstances oí Mexican political and intellectual elites from the end of the nineteenth century to the end oí the era oí impon substitution industrialization ( 1982), because it cast Mexicans as consumers oí modern products that retained an unaltered "spiritual" essence, an essence that was embodied in specific-unmodern-relations at the leve) oí family organization, clientelism, corporate organization, and so on.

figrtre 4.9a. Caballero Águila. Sculpturc

Figure 49b Un caballero español del siglo

lrom the Mexican pavilion of the

XVI Sculpture from the Mexican pavil-

Exposición Iberoamericana de Sevilla 1929)- These twin statues, adorning Mexico's con tribu(ion te che Ibero american Exhibition in Seville, makc

ion et the Exposición Iberoamericana de Ser dla ! 1929)

Moreover, arielismo, indigenismo, and other avatars oí this posture implicitly fostered a defensive cultural role for the state and its statesmen_ to guard Latin societies against the base materialism oí U.S. society. Given this mediating position, the state was meant to be savvy about the consumption oí modern produces. Its knowledge was derived from the humanistic education of its leaders and the spirituality of communal relations in Latin America. This mediating position allowed the appropriation of modernization as part oí the presidential manna. "Los inventos del hombre blanco' (the white man's inventions) were a third critica) prop in creating

the Spanish and Indian nobles equis a ents- Mestizo power is die logisal consequence of this vision

Pns sian arad E)aueliiy ir. Mexican His to ry 103 =

a stable view of sovereignty and of presidential power in the history oí ideological uncertainty.

In the cal ¡y nineteenth century, there are relatively few examples oí this political usage oí modernization by the presidential figure. One parcial exception is the use of statistics, to show that, morally, Mexico City was the equal of Paris, with lower percentages oí prostitutes, higher educational levels, and other illusionsr' Early efforts were usually cultural rather than technological-Santa Auras choice to build a theater as his most public work is an example. However, rhese never had the nationalist power oí the later technological imports. The image oí the state presiding over or introducing some major technological innovation or material henefit has been critica) to the construction oí the persona oí the presidenr since Porfirio Díaz's regime (1876-1910), whose introduction of the railroad did much to lend verisimilitude ro Díaz's studied resemblance of Kaiser Wilhelm. Recent examples oí the nationalization of modernization include the construction oí the Mexico City subway under President Díaz Ordaz (1964-70), Che construction of the National University's modernist campus and the development oí Acapulco under Miguel Alemán (1946-52), the development oí Cuernavaca under Calles (1929-34), the construction oí the Pan American Highway and the naUOnalization oí the oil industry under Cárdenas (1934-40), and the electrification oí the Mexican countryside under Echeverría (1970-76)_ The identification oí the president with modernization has at times been used against the more racialist imagen of the presidency as the embodiment oí national law and oí the nation's martyrs. This has especially been the case in times oí great economic growth, when presidenta usually show ideological eclecticism . The father oí this eclectic style is Porfirio Díaz, who nonetheless concentrated in his persona much oí the two earlier coniponents oí Mexican presidentialism (idenrity as racially Mexican, and idenrity as war hero)_ Dfazs unparallcled personal success in combining all rhree strands of thc presidential persona seems to have received divine sanction: the day of his namesake, San Porfirio, coincided with Mexican Independence Day; the birth oí the pero and of the nation were thus celebrated on the same day.

This almost ideal overlap between a modernizing image (gained only by presiding over the country in a moment of economic growth) and an image of personal sacrifice and racial legitimacy has only rarely coincided lince. To a cenan degree, Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) had it: his pickled arm, which was bluwn off at the I3attle of Celaya, linked him to the earth, Pas^ioe

^^nd

13anniii^ .^. Alrxisan 104 =

Figure 4.10 . Excursión al puente de Metlac, photograph by C. B. Waite (early 1900s). Feats of engineering , such as the bridge over the ravine oí Metlac, became emblematic of Porfirio Díaz and his accomplishments as president.

while his modernizing policies eventually gave him popularity with Mexico's industrial classes. Arguably Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) also had a credible mix of these ingredients. At any rate, since World War II, with peace in the land and sustained economic growth for a couple of decades, the image oí the modernizing president became more and more significant. Moreover, with the exhaustion of models oí industrialization organized around the national market through import substitution industralization, variants oí arielismo as an official ideology have become increasingly untenable . Therefore, modernizing presidents lince the 1982 debt crisis have gambled everything on a successful bid to be like the United States-materialism and all. As a result, the Mexican presidential image has suffered greatly, especially to the extent that presidents have failed to achieve the promised goal.

Conclusion The idea oí sovereignty was firmly entrenched in New Spain before independence, but it became an elusive ideal afterwards. The source oí this insecurity was the weakness oí Mexico's position in the contest between imperial powers and Mexicos internal economic and cultural fragmentation, a situation that made the construction of a central power difficult.

His^ory Passion and BanaIlty n Mexican 105 =

fíistory

Although tli e unccrtaingV ot o,eic pntr vaa, mast keenly telt in the periods bctwccn 1821 and 18c and h,-neern 1910 and 1939, the cultural dy-

UNA LECCION DE PINTURA. EL BUEN MODELO.

1 - I il I'll Ili'llll'llllili^Pl

11I!1llf'Ii ^ ^ ^ l ]Lhl

camics ehat wcrc unleash ed hv thca: tuxemirGes h ave bcen releva nt for

„.:.

tire whol,> nl ,slexicos independent pistan

The thrcc strategics lar utn stnicct n:; thc presldcnt.al figure chas 1 have discussed originare and culminare in ditferent moments-all three were routinlzed roto the presidencial otlice in che postrevolutionary era

- E. erta eec proteXO enmendar mi esftlo.

Figure 4 .12. A Painting Lesson, El hijo del Ahuizote, July 31, 1887; Benson Collection, University of Texas. A newspaper portrays the young President Díaz modeling himself after Juárez . The virtues associated with Juárez are civilian (constitutionalism, civism , respect for che law, firm principies , intelligence , patriotism) and Figure 4.11. General Porfirio Díaz presideole de la República para el período 1877-1880,

Indian ( abnegation, modesty, constancy, discretion, and honesty). Díaz the war

Gustavo Casasola Collection. Díaz as n war pero--a representaron reminiscent

hero had co copy some of these.

of Santa Arenas self-fashioning strategy.

,,,\1,,,,a, History

(1974) called "primary process" in his classical essay on Hidalgo's revolt. These are moments in which the original idea oí sovereignty as a moment in which the Mexican nation would be free to construct its own destiny and to ]¡ve in fraternal bliss are revived. Nevertheless, these moments oí communitarianism are always betrayed because the popular ideal oí sovereignty has been a structural impossibility for Mexico. As a result, Mexican history generates a characteristic combination oí passion and banality, with long periods oí modernizing innovation being perceived, despite their novelty, as facade or farce, and short bursts oí unrealizable communitarian nationalísms as the manifestations oí the true feelings oí the nation. The martyrs that are generated in these moments oí primary process are subsequently harnessed and appeals to their image are routinely made by aspiring presidents and used as che blueprint by which to build a more stable political geography. At the same time, this very strategy oí constructing a national center by brokering modernity through the presidential office, and by nationalizing it through the cult oí martyrs and through the racialization oí the law, is what has helped generate a national self-obsession. This obsession was fostered to a large degree by che aspiration oí liberals and conservatives, oí arielistas and indigenistas, to modernize selectively and to attain the promFigure 4.13. Arc of Triumpb Erected in Honor of Porfirio Díaz Here miliitarism, indigenism, and modernization are rolled into one. the construction of the are is a feat of engineering and architecture, a sign of rhe wealth produced by modernization, a nod toward Europe, andan identifcation of Díaz as a savior, a soldier, and an Indian.

ised modernity within a national framework. Arielista cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitanism oí che statesman as the nations official internacional taster. is at the heart oí the preponderante oí the nation as an intellectual object in Mexico. This cosmopolitanism, which sometimes conceives of itself as provincial, has forged sagas oí national history that reach to che

Nonetheless, representing the nation internally while maintaining an adequate externa) facade has been a chronic difficulty. The importante oí the nation's self -presentation to the externa] world, and the conflicts between che states needs in this regard and its connections to interna ) social

Aztecs or to the Conquest for an understanding oí che qualities and properties oí the Mexican nation, but it is Mexico's persistent dismodernity that generates this form oí self-knowledge.

groups, led to the invention oí a state theatcr that was often divorced from the quotidian practices of state rulo. As a result oí this structural prob]em, moments oí governmental selfpresentation before foreign powers have buen vulnerable targets oí public protest, as occurred during Díaz's centenary independence eelebrations in 1910, before che Olympic Carnes in 1968, and on the day oí the inauguration oí che North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enJanuary 1, 1994. Clashes between communitarian revivas oí che idea] oí sovereignty and stiff and self-serving international presentations oí the state have often been understood by analysts as manifestations oí what Victor Turner Pnssion

oid

13ana.ily in iltesican History 108 =

Pa ssion and Baxality in Mexican 109 =

History

such unlikely democrais as iMexico's longtinte state party (the PRI) and Mexicos traditional left. In the sphere of scientiflc and aeademie production, the government has !mil, m cnted e1rae onian measures for niodernization, doggedly promoting standards o1 production and productivity

5

that are mcant to put Mexican science in liase with an international standard." Finally, in the economic realm, the idea of competing in global markets has gained enormous autliority, and it has ser-ved to justify the transformation ot state en terp ri set that were run on a red istti butive ideology of ''national interest' and "social justice" into privately owned, competitive, and, yes, "modern" businesses-

The confluente oí al] oí these changes and themes of public discussion reflects, undoubtedly, the fact that Mexico entered yet a new phase of dismodernity in the past two decades. The 1982 debt crisis dealt a terrible blow to the regime oí state-fostered national development, and the economic arrangement that has emerged provoked an intense struggle for supremacy between diverse modernizing formulas. Those involved in this contest continuously make appeals to various idealized national audiences, but those audiences have themselves changed-

Fissures in Contemporary Mexican Nationalism

In this chapter, 1 explore one aspect oí this transformation, which is the relationship between national culture and modernity. Specifically, 1 disMexicans have been tormented with recurring modernizing fantasies and

cuss the ways in which national identity has changed from being a tool for

aspirations ever since independence Dreanis of the nation wrestling with

achieving modernity to being a marker of dismodernity and a form oí pro-

the angel of progress have been especially haunting in moments oí pro-

test against the most recent reorganization oí capitalist production. In the

found social change, such as those that are transpiring in Mexico today.

process, both the substance and the social implications oí nationalism have been deeply transformed.

Worrisome symptoms of epochal cultural and social transformation first carne to the attention oí the reading public in the mid-1980s. At that tinte, many a social diagnostician thought that Mexico had contracted

The Telltale Naco

"posttnodernity" and that its twisted historical trajecrory might at last have hrought it to that vanguard that ends all vanguards (albeit in a disheveled

One phenomenon that helps to capture the changed relationship between

state). Nevertheless, Chis notion was soon corrected by Roger Bartra

nationality, cultural modernity and modernization is the way in which the

(1987) who, having carefully analyzed Mexio's symptoms, came to the sohering conclusion that, although indeed strange things were happening

connotations oí the term naco have changed in the past decades. Until sometime in the mid-1970s, the terco naco, which is allegedly a contrac-

regarding modernity in Mexico, diese might more aptly be described as

tion oí Totonaco, was used as a slur against Indians or, more generally,

a particular form of dismodernity or, more playfully, as "dis-mothernism":

against peasants or anyone who stood for the provincial backwardness

a mixture of a quite postmodern drsn odre (chaos) and continuing aspira-

that Mexico was trying so hard to emerge out of. In the 1950s, Carlos

tions to an unachieved modernity. Unsatisfied with this state ot aflairs, M(xicos political parties and the

Fuentes described the nacos counterparts as "little Mexican girls .. blonde, sheathed in black and sure they were giving international tono to

press soon nade the issue of modernity finto their central theme- In the

the saddest unhappiest flea-bitten land in the world."' The naco, then, was

political realm, lor instante, democracy has received obsessive attention. It

the uncultured and uncouth Indian who could only be redeemed through

has become a hegentonie idealogy. bringing rogether all parties, including

an international culture

FI Sf U ICS

110

=

=

111

in

,tl osica n

=

Na ti on a i,

In the past twenty years, however, the connotations oí naco began breaking out oí their rustic conhnement to such a degree that naquismo carne to be recognized as a characteristically urban aesthetic. Similar processes have occurred elsewhere in Latin America, with tercos such as cholo in Peru and Bolivia, and mono in Ecuador. Resonating with the imagery oí colonial castas, che aestheiics of the uaco denote impurity, hybridity, and bricolage, but, aboye all, the more recent usage oí naco designates a special kind of kitsch. The naco's kitsch is consideren vulgar because it incorporates aspirations te progress and the material culture of modernity in imperfect and partial ways. We recognize a form oí kitsch here because the naco is supposed te feel moved by his own modernized image. So, for example, the Haca is moved by the sopas in her living room and she seeks to preserve their modernizing impact by coating them with plastic. It is worth noting, however, that in defining naco in this new sense, the category can no longer be confined or reduced to a single social sector or class, because the kitsch oí modernization affects upper classes quite noticeably, and 1 have in mind not only such outstanding naco monuments as former Mexico City Chief oí Police Arturo Durazo's weekend house that is known as "The Parthenon," but also many of the attitudes oí Mexico's bourgeoisie, whose self-conscious fantasies are easily perceived in the domestic architecture oí any rich post-[ 960 neighborhood. The category of naco as modern kitsch is thus directly connected to an idiom of distinction that appears to have lost its moorings in the indigenous and peasant world: it now targets that whole sector oí society that silently sheds a tear oí delight while witnessing its own modernity. And it is this self-consciousness, this unnaturalness oí the modern, that explains the persistence oí a (derogatory) Indian brand, for, like the colonial Indians, today's nacos have not fully internalized their redemption; they are therefore unreliable moderns in the same way that Indians were unreliable Christians, and so the whole country is dyed with Indianness. In addition to marking a kind oí kitsch, che epithet naco also connotes a certain lack oí distinction, or at least a lack oí hierarchy, between "high culture" and its popular imitations. Specifically, naco can be used te designate an overassimilation oí television and oí the world oí capitalist commodities. It is an assimilation oí the imitation with no special regard for the original. For example, forcign-sounding names such as "Velvet," "Christianson," and "Yuri" have proliferated in the past decades. One unusual but telling example is 'Madeinusa,' a name that was inspired by the label "Made in USA" and that is used in Panama. Broadly speaking, these

names come from comic books, magazines , and soap operas, and they are rejected by anti-naco sectors, who are increasingly inclined to use names from the Spanish Siglo de Oro (e.g., Rodrigo, María Fernanda) or from the Aztec and Maya pantheons (e.g., Cuauhtémoc, Itzamnah, Xicoténcatl). This latter group sees the former as nacos, but one could also argue that the distinction is rather one between closet nacos (modernizers who are nevertheless worried about erasing historical distinctions between high and low, foreign and national culture) and open or "popular" nacos, who couldn't care less. This is recognized playfully by some in the distinction between "Art-Naqueau," which is a more elite naco, and "Nac-Art," which is based en commercial North American culture, a distinction that flags an elitization oí history. Whereas the popular naco hreaks with the weight oí tradition (the mother is called Petra, the daughter is named Velvet), traditionalists try to appropriate History with its Rodrigos and Cuauhtémocs. Thus we can distinguish between nacos who try to affiliate to the modern vía the great national or Western narratives, and those who erase history and simply luxuriate in modernization. The popular nacos move toward the diminution oí the weight oí national and Western history brings some problems to those non- or closet nacos who depend to some degree on those histories. For example, in politics certain new populist styles have debunked long-standing política¡ forms in Latín America, In La Paz, Bolivia, a highly "cholified" city, "El compadre Mendoza" and his sidekick, "La Cholita Remedios," DJs of a popular radio station, have won important political posts. In Ecuador, former president Abdala Bucaram identified simultaneously with Batman, Jesus, and Hitler, while in Brasília, Mexico City , Buenos Aires, and Lima presidents and ministers have protagonized intense melodramasconfrontations between spouses, rivalries between brothers, leve affairs between cabinet members-that generate sympathies and antipathies that threaten to overshadow the significance oí the great narratives oí national power. Thus the new vulgarity is at times a threat to traditional political forms, just as it can threaten traditional mechanisms oí class distinction, reducing the old elite to ever-narrower and culturally obsolete circles oí "oligarchs." These threats to civilization are complemented by a growing horror toward the masses, a situation that is attributable to the combined effects of the lack oí respect for "distinction" involved in the new naquismo and the tremendous growth oí urban unemployment and crime. The fear oí looting and oí armed robbery has a counterpoint at the leve] oí distinction: fear oí proletarianization and oí blending in with the "vulgar classes."

Fissu res in Alex,can ; Valionaiism

F,s,ures in Mexican Nationai,sm 112

113 =

Political seientists are scanmsi. Luis Cabrera, who

purity Controlling rhe "border zone" proved to he impossible for rhe

svould he one c,d the principal idcr...,gucs ^l tic ,Mexican Revolution, de-

.Mexican govern ni ent. however and the incorpora tico ot ever-greater pro-

scribed bote tic Purlirian elite ccrganized a spcctaeular celebiation of the

portions ot Mexico into rhe backstage" of US economic interests has

independence centennial tor tire bunetit mainly oí toreign investors. The

been an inexorable process. Peasant villages from al] over the country

tesdvities wcrc so concemad w.th managin tic national image thai when

have been turned into rhe seasonal equivalent of dormitory com mun ities

a ragged group o( women s.orkeis orgamzed ihcirown eelebratory mareh,

whose inhahitants traed to work in inferior conditions. as 'illegal mi-

it was brutally dispersad be the police. fhc natumal image is diftlcult ro

grants,' in the United States, while rnagtiiladora assembly plants can now

control, not only because it is difficult to keep the ragged workers from

set up shop un any porrion ol rhe territory Cultural impurity can no

the view oí the investors, but also because rhe very occasion of a national

longer be contained at tic border, and the dark sido of modernization is

show is a tempting occasion for union leaders tu display them. A better-

harderto hide than ever.

known exampie oí a similar polirical conrext is the violente oí the Mexican '68, which was ried to upholding rhe national image during rhe Olympics.

The Scientific Horizon as a Contad Frante

Indeed, President Díaz Ordaz and ihe antisrudent social sectors spoke insistently of evil foreign infiuences that goaded rhe innocent Mexican student: only a foreigner would seek to sully Nlexicos public image before rhe world Other cases, such as the bordee cides oi norrhern Mexico, present the lame probleni in a more toutinc fashion- These cities are all part of bicephalous urban sets often calied "twins," though if they are twins they are clearly of rhe fraternal kind, because, even though they develop in tandem with one another, they are not ideorical one parí oí the urban zone is located in the United States and rhe other in Mexico. The relationship between rhe Mexican and U5. parts of the urban border zone has not been symmetrical, but rather symbioric and in many senses rhe cides en the Mexican side have generally been a "backstage" for rhe U.S. cides. The Mexican border town's prosperity has depended en abortion clinies, di-

The final type oí contact exists because nation-states are supposed to march togetber toward progress Without this ideal, there would be no obsession with national history, because modero history as we know it is only understood in tercos of rhe dogma oí progress. The universal importance that al] nation-states atcribute to progress implies that there is always a civilizing horizon or vanguard oí progress on the international level. This civilizing horizon is identified in tercos oí technological development, scientific advances, and rhe techniques used to govern the population. The civilizing horizon serves tu measure a country's individual progress as well as different countries' relative progress The parameters used tend to be produced in countries with robust cultural and scientific infrastructures. Therefore, science, art, and fashion can destabilize the nation's dominant models.

vorce lawyers, judges, bars, prostitutas, sweatshops, garbage dumps, and

The recent work oí Alexandra Stern en Mexican eugenics provides a

so ora. The fact that Mexican cides constirute the backstage oí U.S. cities

good example oí the ways in which scientific development constitutes

threatens nationalism's fou idational credo: nioderniry is for the nation's

a zone oí contact.20 Between 1920 and 1950, a number oí medical doctors

own benefit and not for foreign outsiders.

and anthropologists participated in international eugenics congresses,

The Trames of contact created he the entropy of modernization can generare extreme nationalist reacrions. 'l la was rhe case in Cuba, where rhe image of Havana as a brothd seas ara important morivation for many revoludonaries to risa against die Batista regime. In rhe case oí Mexico's northern border, rhe very conLept u( a °border zone," whieh for many years occupied a marginal position tr'ith res peer to the rest oí rhe country, was supposed to resolve the contradictions of this contact zonc. The in-

read international journals in that discipline, and formulated ideas about the Mexican racial and genetic inheritance. Their work served two ends: un rhe one hand, it strengthened the "mestizophilic" Mexican Revolution's antiracist argumenta; ora rhe other hand, it tended to characterize Mexico's various poor populations (from rural Indians to urban workers) as comparatively dehcient. Eugenics' racial relativism (each race was supposed to be adapted to a specific environment and so was in some respects superior, N a l i o , i a li> ni

,

Uir1y Linen

139 =

and in others inferior, to the restl and its simultaneous characterization of the Mexican majority in terms of a series of relative lacks offered hope for eventual equality between Mexico and European peoples. It also offered ample justification for a kind oí "interna] colonialism" Eugenics offered a way to objecrify and quantify dilterences between poor Mexicans and ideal nornis represented by clic elite This in turra permitted the state's development mission to be detined, while clic peor national majority could remain scientifically deva]ued. Ar rhe same time, the potential uses oí race science to undercut che imagined potential of Mexico's "halfbreed" race is well known and was always a potential liabi]ity for the nationalists. The introduction oí new ideas and theories ahvays presents challenges and opportunities to governments and Yo processes oí national identity formation. The ideas oí "scientihc socialism" allowed opposition movements like the guerrilla movenient led by Genaro Vázquez in southern Mexico in clic 1960s to refer ro die Mexican governnient as the "disgovernment' and to propose a series of demands to che state in name not on]y oí Marx and Lenin, but also in that oí thc heroes oí national independence. The monetarist ideas oí clic Chicago school oí economics allowed a group oí technicians ro take control of che Mexican state, accuse the previous governing elite oí backwardness, and describe the Mexican state as "obese." The scientific ideas of Darwin Freud, and Marx were at the center oí a schism in the Mexican educacional establishment in che 1920s and 1930s, and they were used tu rethink nationality. The Lamarckian notion that acquired characrerisrics are inherited Ied some members oí the Porfirian elite ro advoeate an aggressive policy of European immigration before reforming che Indian rhrough education. Each oí these movements has liad implications for national identity and the precepts of nationalism_ The scientific contact frame produced by the international civilizing horizon destabilizes dominant formulas oí nationality and good government, it presents growth opportunities for certain sectors and threatens others.

or interna] political facuonalism that can profit from assimilating economic competitors to foreignness.

The second and third types of contact zones are produced by the difficulties that weak nations Nave in managing the national image. The second emerges as a result oí the comparative weakness oí these nation's modern sector. This situation al]ows foreigners or opponents to the dominant nationalist scheme to attribute greater value to the "backward" than to che "modern" sector, and even to portray che modero sector as antagonistic to tradition, and therefore as failing to develop a trae or successful nationalism. The third type oí contact zones emerges as a result oí the difficulty that these same governments face in controlling clic modernization process, and in successfully sweeping the adverse aspects oí modernization under the carpet. The fourth type oí contact zone is produced by the instability that is generated by che (international) civilizing horizon. This contact zone, which is produced through che mediation oí scientists, professionals, and artists, can destabilize the national image by portraying it as old-fashioned and out oí tune with modernization. Conversely, nationalists can try to reject a deve]opment in these fields by portraying it as alien to che national interest, to che national aesthetic, or to custom, Like each oí the other contact zones, this fourth type lends itself to shrewd political usage and can respond equally to interna] factionalism and to important changes emerging from abroad. 1 have extended Mary Louise Pratt's term contact zone to refer to transnacional spaces oí national identity formation." As we have seen, however, the concept oí "zone" implies a geography oí regions: a zone is a kind oí place within a system oí functionally related places. What position do these contact zones occupy in a broader geographyz The Trames oí contact that we have analyzed are relationships that emerge from che tension between che nation-state as a certain type oí political and cultural community and the fact that modernization neither begins nor ends in such a community. This fact is problematic for nationalism because nation-states

Reflections ora the Four Types of Coni acl Zoiies

are erected as forms oí social organization for coordinating moderniza-

1 have identified four types oí contact zones AII are related to the nexos between modernization and nationalism as it develops in weak or peripheral nations . In che first case, there is a contact zone created by the instances in which foreign business concerns or imports unsettle local arrangements or mores , This is a zone that may appear whenever there are technological innovations , changes in che inrensity of foreign investment, A'a ti ona l., m ,

Di r;y

Li raen

tion: zones oí contact with che rransnational dimension oí capitalism and progress can therefore cali roto question sorne oí che basic precepts oí any particular nationalism. Moreover, che very process oí shaping and extending nationalism opens a country up to foreign interesas and forms oí consumption that can undermine che nationalism that made room for them.

This is the case with frames oí contact that open up because oí the relationship that nationalism postulares between tradition and modernity. This Na t,o,a1,sm 's Dirty Line

140 141 =

rel aci onship rxisted becau,c co, h t ountrv tones part of in interna ti onal

For example, when che Mexican state assigned iisclf clic task oí mod-

avstem antl sn must inain a sensc ('1 ,pccilit it, tAlorcover, in che case ot

cinizing, national elites unniediately took on thc cosinopolitan role par

poste olonial ur b ❑ ckwartI c ountrics nacional mingo)ante is ni ore readily builc out of their tndittonai „^ tuna thar their modera sector,. In che

excellence they were clic Quicial agcnts oí forcign contact hecause their

Mexican case it has proved ca,ier ttu t unstn.ct a nacional singularity on the

access te thc civilizing honzun. 11111, clic comprador elites" oí Mexicos

oasis of pulque ¡ol k dancing wov en or;tpc. and bce1 tacos than on the hasis oí whiskey, rock rol], tuxedos and French aiisine even when the latter may

nineteenth ccntury inhabited a contact zone that ideally served to dis-

alto be local producís At the sanie ti;ne thc dencificatlon of che nations

that were undesirable co che naton_ l heir maturity and special role gave them license to fashions and affectations that thcy would then try to bar

sutil with che traditional world and its bode seith che macicen world is an un-

patriotism, their resourccs and their educated tate gave them greater

criminare hetween the aspccts oí modernity that were desirable and those

stable formularon because cho seorld callctl traditional" persists as under-

from general consumptton in their countries C )nly a strong cultural elite

devclopment and in a series of relationships of domination that are gener-

could design the ticket that a weak and backward country needed to be

ally understood te) be continuotis with colonial domination. Foreigners pursue their own relationships witIi those modcrn and traditional worlds,

allowed into the "concert of nations"

creating a zone of contact that can challenge nationalist narratives.

leged position in the arca oí foreign contacts. The migrant who manages

However, Mexican elites have not aIways been able to maintain a privi-

In addition, 1 showed that the scenic prescntation oí national achieve-

to become the owner oí an auto-repair shop in Los Angeles can return to

nients mobilizes resources that can ¡Ti tara spoil the presentation. Just as Brasilia, the model city of Brazilian modernity, provided the material con-

bis village with more money, prestige, and knowIedge oí the modero than

ditions for che growth of shantytowns that could never enibody che

converse more extensively and gain more information from an American

supreme rationality of nationality, so were al] che great tourist projects and

anthropologist than the mestizo rancher who oppresses him. Moreover,

grand international macroprojccts boro with their own dirty twins, On

the spectacular growth oí the middle class in che second half oí the twen-

che other hand, even che most avant-gardc example oí national modernity

tieth century also made che political brokerage oí the "civilizing horizon"

ages , thus creating new challenges to national identity and the state.22 In each oí tírese cases, contact tones frame relationships in which che

increasingly difficult to sustain. Thus, neither che government nor the po-

logic of national development clashes with che transttational logic oí modernization, and they exist because che production and consumption oí

che old political boss there. An Indian from Zinacantán, Chiapas, may

litical claes has full control over the national image. Here, it seems to me, is a key to understanding the interna) dynamic oí the frontiers oí social distinction, and even oí violente. A social move-

commodities is a transnational process, because people can cross national borders for work or recreation, and because there is an international hori-

ment that can cast doubts en che national image may become the object

zon oí scientific and technological progress. Therefore, contact zones are border arcas between the logic oí the nation-state and capitalist progress

bers had been designated as part oí che nation's traditional residue prefers to shape its own separate political community and paths to progress.

that exist within che national space.

Violente also erupts when che state insists on controlling spaces where

oí state violence. At times, violente explodes when a group whose mem-

there is little possibility of establishing the ideal order in a permanent

Condusion

fashion but where the ideal order must nonetheless be asserted. This is the case oí violence against itinerant commerce or against Ilegal housing set-

1 conclude with some thoughts on che iniplications that diese Trames oí

tlements. It is also occasionally deployed against social movements that

contact have for che construction of interna] frontiers between social

governments cannot assimilate as properly national because they conspire

groups in che national framework. It is clear enough that frames oí contact

against the country's public image. This is the case oí much oí che repres-

created by commercial and tourist relationships, labor migration, and sci-

sion against youth subcultures.

entific and artistic production produce instabiIity in che interna] forms oí

We cannot conclude from these examples, however, that patrolling the national image is only che contera oí the government, oí political classes, or oí other elites, for these sanre contact zones are also used to denounce

social distincrion. This instability is rcilecccd both in fashion cycles and in the reeonfiguration and reproduction of social classes. Nntiun.i Ii t Si

I)uity Lite,; 142 =

Nn oci a alisen ',

1)irty

143 =

Linera

sectors oí these very elites as strangers to the national community. Thus, elite-directed attempts to change mores and social practice can be targeted and ridiculed as Americanized, Francophile, Jewish, or Oriental. Attempts to professionalize che state bureaucracy have ar times been portrayed as "technocratic" reforms, and therefore as Aniericanizing. Criticism oí new forms of consumption, such as lasr-food chains or brand fetishism, are other common examples.

7

On the political plane, rhe Porfirian cultural elite, the científicos who had such a key historical role in shaping Mexico's nacional image, was portrayed by Mexico's revolutionaries as foreign. Marxist parties during the Cold War portrayed the Mexican government as a pawn oí US. interests, Harvard-trained President Carlos Salinas was often compared to the national traitor Santa Anna alter che tal¡ oí che peso in 1995. These denunciations are thus used both in che construction oí difference and in the organization of political opposition_ Nation builders try to fashion che national image the same way that

Ritual , Rumor, and Corruption

people build a house. Starting with che most modero materials and designs at their disposal, they want to have diverse, functionally and hierarchical-

in the Formation of Mexican Polities

ly organized interior spaces, including spaces for exhibition to whoever comes in from outside AII this is ideally governed by the political equivalent oí a paterfamilias who seeks rhe entire lamily's orderly modernization and regulares contacts between his home and the outside world, However, national architecture and space do not have che stability oí a house and che government lacks a patriarch's security because the nation's internal order is always warped by transfcrmations in the conditions oí production, consumption, and communication Therefore, nationalism's dirty finen can be exposed by the exploited stepdaughter, the disinherited son, or che affronted mother if there is a window-a contact frame-that permits them to do so. This relative openness and permeability oí national space becomes a dynamic facror in che production oí fashions and distinctions, but iris also the roor oí xenophuhia and violente.

This chapter provides a perspective en the connections between ritual and polity in Mexico. Evidently, constructing even the roughest map oí this relationship is a daunting task, both empirically and conceptually. Nevertheless, as che number oí historical and anthropological studies oí ritual and politics grows, so roo does the peed to construct various organizing perspectives.' 1 shall propuse such a vantage point here by exploring the historical connections between various sorts oí rituals and che development oí a nationally articulated public sphere. My ultimate goal is to clarify the connection between political ritual and che constitution of political communities in che national space. In order to carry out chis aim, 1 propuse a fine oí historical and spatial inquiry that is driven by a set oí methodological and theoretical innovations that may be summarized as follows, First, 1 hypothesize a complex relationship between che existente oí aneas oí free political discussion and the centrality oí political ritual as an arena where political decisions are negotiated and enacted. At any given local level, the relationship between public discussion and ritual is negative: ritual substitutes for discussion and vice versa. However, when une sees the relationship in an integrated national space, che relationship can be complementary: localized political rituals become che stuff from which a (restricted) nationally relevant public

Naiionnli^u

,

Diriy

Line

144 =

145 =

sphere dcnves t6 legitimar ^ Sea ond. 1 p i ipocc a few chava, teristi es of the gcographs ot public sphcies 'in tht plural cmphasizing thc fact that

a remarkable , continuous , prívate correspondence with all of Iris governors and some jefes políticas and local notables In this corres pondenee, regional

mes. and that thc sonso idation 'a: national puhlic opinion has always

issues were frankly discussed , instructions were received, and suggestions were provided _ Governo rs would in their tu rn , ineet with representatives

hcen an pruhlcmatimis, xvi-xx; identifica-

Corrido. 279

power, 270-7 1, professional healers and

cor. ut 35. i ndigenous , 40, mestizo, 40.

Corruption, 120-22.145213.214

witches 271 ; Yautepec, 270

,11,d mtdupartisanship, 119; relations, xv,

appropnation ofstate machinery.

psnlsh 40

haeobo de lc rera. 153 loas o1 ritual

and Tepoztlán, 173 (_irnlíf, , 1-14, 21(1, 241, 246

application for Mexico, 59; "discourse

1, rt.l,lendozn. El, 113 ....

function of, 1 19, as a market mccho

ot the honre," 58; "discourse ot the

o,¡anr 1) 161, 188, 189

nism, 60; and politieal control, 119,

(.nnur Augusto, 230, 241

and public opinion, xxir asid public

163, 204 censornhgt nl che pres.

( npres 150,1553

ritual, 146, 155, 162, and redislnbu-

debates durmg Indepeadencc. 62: dv-

t,on, 119;sas ,,Ti indivldualistic 1211.

cGning importante al, s8, dclinunon

(1 1rroµlistadores. 21 Com. rvauves. 10 , 133, 268, 269, 280;

of, 70-71, as degraded haseline 58-62. discourscs of, xx; dynamlcs of, 59; and

pragmal e accord w,th 1iberals, 72 Consf,tutional Assembly oí the Depart-

Citi zenship 11.27, 60. 61 62. G0.

ment ol Quéretaro, 243

carly constitutions, 63, carly legal code,, 62, 70, historieal diseusslon of, 59, ideal

Constitution of Cádiz, 27, 63, 64, 88; artiele 25, 64, definition oí "Spaniards,"

oí citizenship rights, 72; importante oí political discourse, 79; Indians under Benito Juárez, 51; invoked after indcpendence, 79,- and nationalism, I1, 48 politics in modero Mexico, 79; rejection

27 Constitution oí Mexico ( 1811), 62-63 Constitution oí Mexico ( 1824), 48, 62, 63, 64; abolition oí slavery , 204; article 9,63, and eitizenship, 62

oí corporate forms, 78, social critics ol.

Constituir n oí Mexico ( 1857), 48, 51,

80; social pact, 60; tied so weakness oí the state, 74; transformatton of, xx

66 70, 71, 98, 164, citizenship and

under postrevolutionary governments,

nationality, 71, and denationalization

80 Civilizing horizon, 139

of religion , 48, female suffrage, 71;

Civil society, 57

for citizenship, 71

Cockfights, 71, 162 Cofradías, 147, 149, 150 Colegio de México, FI, xii; and Daniel

264, nationalism of, 264 De eso que llaman antropología mexicana, 231,

Cortés, Martín, 218 Cosío Villegas , Daniel , 218, 219, 221; criticism oí Luis Echeverría , 222, "fac-

232, 261 Democracy, xiv, 156, costs of, 78 ; history of, xx; lack of, 156, representation of,

tory oí Mexican history , " 218, 220, as "intelleetual caudillo ," 224; mentor to

203-4 Department of Anthropology oí the Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento,

Enrique Krauze, 222 Cosmopolitanism , 103, and Enlightenment thinkers, 23

250, 251, 252; mission of, 252; as national symbol , 251; promotion oí civi-

Counter- Reformation, 154 Creole, 5, 6, 9, 17, 44, 275, discrimina-

47; as propios , Si in Quéretaro , 243-44,

Desmadre, 110

from the word criar, 43

Díaz, Por6rio , xii, 51, 223, 241 ; birthday en Mexican Independence Day, 104; centralization oí che state , 205-6, concessions to foreign capital , 52; consolida-

134

Contact zones, 125, 132, 136, 143; definition of , 130; emergente oí national identity , xxii , first type, 140; fourth type, 141; history oí anthropology, 135; and nationalism, 1411 second type , 141, third rype, 141; and transnational process , 142, types

blamed for economic backwardness, 114; Catholic fanatieism blamed for lack of colonists, 69

of, 130

Communitarian ideologies, xx, 35, 36, 56,

Corporate forms of property . as obstarles

and Aztecs, 36-37; considerations for

reise oí opposition parties, 77-78 Deep Mexico, 122, 286, versus invented,

Tepoztlán, 169

rights , 74; protection against foreign

entitic study, 134, 139-40; and tourism,

letarian , 151, in rural arcas, 147 Colonia Tepozteca, 179, 181 Colonization, xx, 14, 15, 184, 185, 186.

national devclopment, 111, reise o1 nongovernmental organizations , 77-78,

shared with Martín Luther, 15, Martín Cortés, 218; Moctezuma , 218, and

73, 89, 98; description of, 54; land

Contact trames. concept of , 129, and sei-

nition of, 147, discussion of agrarian. 149, historical overview, 147-53, pro-

sin educational sv,tem, 219; elfeets on

in Tepoztlán. 267; three leve;; 160 Cortés, Hernán, 15, 153, 167 birthday

Constitution oí Mexico (1917), 54, 71,

capitallsts , 74; workers rights, 74

Collége de France, 197 Collective actors and cofradías, 147: defi-

1,10

Deht crisis (1982`. 105, 116, 215, effect

lization, 251 Department oí Soconusco in Chiapas: races of , 244, statistics, 244

Consumptiore fashion industry and "dumping ," 118; piracy, 118

Cosío Villegas, 218; inspired by

street," 58, usefulness of analysis, 78 Darwin, Charles. and Mexican education,

tion of, 17 , 45, emergente oí term, 9, national identity of, 5, and nationalism, 45, patriotism and philosophy , 28, 45,

Madero s use of , 96, 98, requirements

Clio, 220 Coatsworth, John, 220

DaMatta Roberto xx 58, 59, 61, 67, 80:

160 asa "cargo systen;.' 161: and cho church, 160-61, and liesra 162-63

C.omnntorl. Ignacio. 241

funaio m. 151, and «preso nta uon it;

Curandero . 270, 273, 275, and politieal

muno ot, 36; In torntation of national

to citizenship, 75

che future, 56; construction uf, 36 tacll,

Critique of tbe Pyramid, The, 226 CROM (Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos), 151, 179, 180, and Zapa-

tren oí political representation , 206, correspondence of, 146; creation oí rurales, 205; embodiment oí three presidencial

tistas, 179 CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos ), 119, 151 Cuahtémoc , xiii, 239 Cuautla, 266 Cuernavaca , 167, 175, 178, 184 , 187, as a

personas , 104; interpretation oí Frantiois Xavier Guerra, 221; labor repression, 206, legacy oí regime, 206 , portrait of, 106; rehabilirarion of, 220; trains, 133

tourist destination, 137 Cuerpo unido de nación, 25

Díaz Cadena, Ismael , 172-73

Cult oí the Virgin oí Guadalupe, 47 Cultural modernity , 82; challenge to state

Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 104, 135, 138, 223,

Cultural production, 215; production of image, 136

attempt to censor hippies , 131; construction oí Mexico City subway, 104,

institutions , 82, and corruption, 214

133, diary of, 220; and foreign influences, 138, maintenance oí national

In 3 ex

1r,dex

338

= 339 =

image , 138; Olympics , 133, 135 138,

Lsrrada, Agustín, 97

ugliness of, 226

I-strasia luan, 242

Discourse of the homo , 58, 59 , 61, according to DaMatta , 58; applied lo the good pueblo , 67; familial idioms, 59

Ethnographic state definition of, 136

Goffman, Erving, 136, 157

Eurnpeans, 50 Evans, Colonel Albert, 234

González Casanova, Pablo, 232

Friedlander, Judith, 192-93

Governmental institutions, 197

Front state: maintenance oí public image, 137

Governmental intervention: dependence on, 75

Fuentes, Carlos, xi, 56, 218, 227, descrip-

Governmentality, xxii, 198, 202, 203; im-

Exposición Iberoamericana de Sevilla, 102 Expropr,at,on: failurc lo create propertied cinzcnry, 75

Dolcefar mente ( 1880), 239 Dumont , Louis, 166 Durazo, Arturo, 1 12

Ex-,rola giving thank, lo che Virgen of Guadalupe Jora a,¢essful med,cal operador, 26

Earthquake of1985, xi Echeverría, Luis, 104, 222, 227; and

FamiLal idioms, 59

Cosío Villegas, 222; electr,hcat,on of

Felipe Don, 272, 273, 285, Fiesta de

thc counrryside, 104; highways, 133 Education, 60, 205 Ejidos; failurc to create propertied citizen-

Querzaleoatl, 273, and national Mexican anthem, 273 Fernando VIL portrait of, 92

ry, 75

Fieras 150, 156, 161, 190, and campaign

Election of July 2, 2000, xxi

cuero, 162, and conuption, 162; Fiesta

Electiori, as souices of revenue 78 Eley, Geoff. definition oí public sphere, 265-66

de Quetzaleoatl, 273, 285; and patriotisni, !Si, and use of sports, 155 Filipinas, 15

Elites, 143, 200, construction of public opinion, 147 , corruption of, 213, Creolc

Film,. 118, 126, dismbution of, 1 18 Flore, Joachim de, 15

30, discourse oí messianism , 70; forros

Five Fe rr,il;es. reviews of, 258

ot discussion, 148, lack oí public torum,

Flores Magón, Ricardo, 151

148; Masonie lodge membership, 30,

Fondo de Cultura Economica, 219, 259 Foucault, Michel, xxii, 202, 210; defini-

portrayed as foreign , 144; and public opinion , 147, Tepoztecan, 174; v;rtuous

tion ol hiopower, 14; definition oí gov-

and vieious, 70

ernmentaliry, 198, governmentality,

El pueblo, 155

xxii, history from rhe presenta' 2 13

El que se enoja , pierde. 60, 78, meaning ,l,

anthropology, 229, and nacional anthropology, 229

Freud, Sigmund. and Mexican education, 140

Exansi&, al puente de Mrtlac, 105

Dismodernity , 110 122

Globalization. effects on "metropolitari'

French intervention, 133, 241, increased polarization, 72

Eugen,cs: and postrevolutionary government, 139

Discourse of the street , 58, according tu DaMatta , 58, as discourse of liberal en; zenship. 58

30-31, as secret societies, 31-32; Scottish rite, 30, 31

Foreigncrs, 16, 134, 140-41, attraction

60

to indigenous peoples, 135; business,

ENAH (Naconal School oí Anthro-

1 31 -32, 140, challenge to nationalists,

pology and History), 231, 254, expulsien oí G. Bonhl, 232

140-42, destabilization of, 135, European.134,- investments, 140, 252;

Encomendar, 16

nadowlisr reactions to, 135; North

England, 15. 21

A mcrica n. 134

Enlightenment, 4, 154

Francl,can,nissionaries, 15

Escalante, Fernando, 84, 249; arguments

Freemasonry, 29, 30, 31, 146, masons,

Gómez, Juan José, 279

tion oí nacos counterpart, 1 11 Fueras, 8, 9

portance of idea, 210-11; instrumenta of, 211; and nongovernmental intellectuals, 211; state culture of, 204 Gran España, 25, 27, 33

Gage , Thomas, 239 Gallo, Joaquín, 169, 171 Gamboa , Manuel, 276 Gamio , Manuel , 53, 253 , 254, 257, 258, 262; art oí governing , 252, and Franz Boas, 53 , 250, building oí facilities, 252,

Grano de Arena, El, 282 Great Nacional Problems, xvi, xviii, xix, and civilizational horizon, xviii, definition of, xviii, fetishism of, xvi, for public interese, xix

and Chavero, 252, construction oí revolutionary narionalism , 53; development oí indigenismo , 53; differences with Porfirians, 252 , 254; director oí INI, 260,

Grounded theory, xix, definition of, 127 Gruzinski, Serge. attack on Indian learning, 154 Guamán Poma de Ayala, Felipe, 16 Guardino, Peter, 29

doctoral work at Columbia University, 250, and eugenics movement , 252, as "father" oí Mexican anthropology, 53,

Güemes Pacheco y Padilla, Viceroy don Juan Vicente, 91, 198-99

250, founder oí Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas , 260; Indigenismo , 53; in-

Guerra, Fran4ois Xavier, 64, 82, 221, argument oí Porhrio Díaz, 221; descrip-

digenous aesthetic , 250; instructions to researchers, 251-52, and ISAAE, 238, land distribution lo peasants , 252; L. población del valle de Teotihuacán , 251, and

tion oí "collective actora," 147, description oí postindependence Mexico, 146; discussion oí che Mexican Revolution, 82 Guerrero, Vicente, 29; murdered by fractious Mexicans, 69

Pimentel , 252, as pro - mestizo nationalist, 53 ; and pseudoscientific racism, 52-53, role in local society , 25; role oí anrhropology, 251, shaping uf national

Haber, Stephen, 221 Habennas, Jürgen, 10; definition oí repre-

image , 252; support from Venustiano Carranza , 250; undersecre t ary oí edu-

sentativa publicity, 148

Hacendados, 146, 147, 155

caron , 260, vision of anthropology, 251

Heifetz, Hank, 222 Hernández, Deputy Chico, 68

García , General Alejandro, 94 GATT ( General Agreement en Tariffs and

Hidalgo, Miguel, 29, 47, 48, 62, 84, 241; accusations against Spaniards, 29, appropriation of the Virgen de

on cidzensh,p, 71-72^ hctitious charco-

31; Masonic lodges as networks, 30,

ter of che ci lizcn, 84; oppositiun lo

Masonic organizations, 31; and Mexi-

Daniel Cavo Villegas, 72

Gazeta de Lima, 200

can narionalism 31, Joel Poinsett, 31;

Guadalupe, 48, Catholic faith as national

Gazeta de México , La, 7, 8 , 23, 25, 148, 200, 206, discussion oí "rhe public ," 201, and

sovereignty 85, counterexcommunica-

Español, 17 18, 33, 44, 50, 154; dominan[ Gaste , 21,-as "Old Christians," 18

as pulitical parties, 31, rite oí York, 30, 31, 32; role following independence,

Trade), xxi

tion oí European imperialists, 85-86;

the'scientifically marvelous ," 201-2

counterexcommunication oí Spanish

1,, ,rx

dex 340

= 341

clcrgy. 86; destruciiun ol towns. .84, emancipador ul claves, 62; end u,

political organizaton of, 40, purpose oí

nd musu_o. 50 , monarch,sts, 87; naII,,,u' comauusncss, xiv: national,za-

]SI (Impon Substitution Industrializacion 1,

40, subordination ro Baste, 41, trbute,

103, 264; Arirlismo as an ideology, 103,

40

corn;pti on, 120; crisis of national ism,

tribute, 62 ess,q' by VIUVr Ttll nar,

56,n,t thu chuteh. 47 notions si caste,

104 cxcommun¢aUOn endotscd h3

+a p ar 1 1 nmcerns ol nationalism,

Indio, 192; as"forcedidennty, 192-93

1 14, cultural rcgions durtng, 1 17, ex-

Archbishop ul A1cx,co. 8S. crcornmm1s

41, tv,u e.. ol. 62. and public sphcre.

Individual rights, 146

baustion of, 105, and nationalism, 121,

canon ol. Ievel dltfcrenres he

1Su. endica! ,nsurge nts, 87, rehance on

tween Gastes . 62, martyred bs

Spanlsh legal thought, 87, role of eom-

tr

period of urban growth, 115, teachings

Informal eeonomy ethnoglaphies ol,

of the revolution, 121

75, negotiation with state institunons,

Spaniards, 69. tASexico: Biogrnhby ol Pmi,

numwcs, 10, role ot Frcemasonry, 30;

224; response u, rxeommumeaaan n

Spnln a4a,nsr French nvaders. 27;

75 INI (Instituto Nacional 1rá,,i vista', 231. 232,

tate

Inquisition, 241, and census. 198 as svni-

ippie muvcnuu Ii4--75, CI. 16 H ispanicized, 171 1 üstorians Latir Amcrica visto, 4, reac-

adoption of Aztec eagle, 47, creation oí

254

as scicntihcalh ;ndincd. 202 parriot-

ism56 vicw ol Anderson 4 Indian 5 16 33,36.37,44,46.48,50,

Isla Juana, 15 Imrbide Agustín, 29, 47, 68, 241, 284, Order ol Guadalupe, 47, murdered hy fractious Mexicano, 69, Plan de Iguala,

bol oí state vigilance, 115 Intellectuals, xii, 146, 158, 199, 206, 218,

29, 64

52. 55, 63. 153, 191, 263, 267; and citi-

272, 281, and autonomy, 199-200; as

Holisen: definition nf, 228-29

zenship,5l;collectiveidentity of, 42,

beneficiarles oí decentralization, 117,

Jaguaribe, Beatriz, 213

]la,, - William Setvard Traveling in Adexlco, 238 1 forre and Ibe Zapilotes, Tbe, 234

communities, 267, conversion of, 153;

curanderos, 275; debates in the Gazeta de

Jalisco, secessionist movements in, 68

descrihed as rencos, 11 I-112, 114; dis-

huerta, Victoriano, 98

location of, 42; governors, 274-75;

México, 202, dependence en corporate investors, 116; differences with U.S.,

Huitzilopochdi, 39 Human rights , 56 57; recodification ot, 56

ladinolzation, 45, 275; legal category

197; and European model, 197, Ricardo

ol. 41; as les, likely m commit crimes,

Flores Magón, 151, geography oí muteness, 284; and governmentality, 202;

James, Edward, 214 Jefes Politices , 147, 155 Jordán, Fernando : Miguel Alemán, 256; explanation oí Robert Redfield, 255-56;

tion to Bencdiet Anderson, 4

244; and niarriage, 42, massacres of, 52,

Iberians, 46 Identity producron, 128 TEPES (Instituto de Estudios Políticas y JocinlrsJ. 76 Illegal immigrants, 139 Imagen de Jura con retrato de Fernando VII,

Nacional School oí Anthropology, 256

40; in Querétaro, 243; racial category

government subsidies, 208-9, and interpassivity, 208-9; interpreters of national

of, 41, republics, 8, rulers, 168; and

sentiment, 114, Enrique Krauze, 215,

Joseph, Gilbert, 220 Journalists : as middle daos, 59

thcft. 244; tribute, 85; women, 17- See

language oí respect, 285, and Oscar

Juan, Jorge, 7, 8

also Aztees, Inca, Mazabuas, Otomt

Lewis, 259, list oí, xi; local level, 266,

Juárez, Benito , 5 1, 52, 55, 56, 95, 129, 206, 241, biblical imagery, 96; Bulnes,

mortalty o1, 40, population movements,

Indianness, 112, 170, 172, 192

275; and Mexican Americans, xii, and national space, 266; as nation builders,

description oí, 95, as civil servant, 225,

anos of, 232; as atomizing, 262; a de-

xxii; and patronage, 116; Porfirian intel-

consolidation oí national econoeny, 79;

fense against U.S society, 103; deserip-

lectuals, 249; José Guadalupe Posada,

construction oí presidential persona, 95;

IMF (Internacional Monetary Fund ), 129

tion uf, 231, distinct from liberalism,

151; postcolonial critics, 126; priests,

embodiment between nation and law,

immigratiom. as critica) perspectiva xni INAH (Instituto Nacional de Antropología

51; against foreign aggression, 54; incorporation oí the Indian, 232; mainte-

276; and public sphere, 283; representation oí national sentiment, 197-98, 269,

95-96; with green eyes, 101, identification with che )and , 96, image oí the presi-

nance oí indigenous communities, 49; against neocolonial exploitation, 54;

sources oí legitimation, 197; as spiritualisto, 207; and state formation, 198; oí

dency, 95, impact tan national history, 55, and Indian citizenship , 51, Indian-

and Tepoztán, 170, 179

Tepoztlán, 277, 280, 282, Max Webers

ness oí, 95; liberalism oí, 51; mestizaje oí,

92 Imagined Communities and Anderson, 3; critique of, 3. Ser also Benedict Anderson

Historia), 231, 254 Inca, 16,21 Independence, xiv, 5, 1 3 , 1 4 , 2 9 , 33, 86 149, 202; and American War of Independence, 27; and Bourbon refonns. 25: and Cathol,cism, 47, and citizenship. 62, Constitution ol Cádiz, 27, Creole

b;digeni;nm, 49, 51, 53, 103, 109, 231, 232,

7ndigerazta, 97, 134, art, 97, expon oí national anthropology, 254; Rodríguez Puebla, 48, 51 Indigenous communities, 40, 146, adop'

101, Mexico: Biography of Power, 222; mili-

definition of, 266

tary campaign against Hapsburg imperi-

Interna) colonialism, 128, 140, 191-92,

alists, 67, mythology oí Aztec past, 95;

232, 264

portrait oí, 99, 101, presidency as an institution oí power, 95 , railroads, 72; re-

International system, 128 Interpassivity, definition of, 208; and in-

symbols, 47, cuerpo unido de nación, 25;

non uf saints, 41, Christian worship, 40;

European influences of, 4, 83-84, failure

as corporate structures, 204, dislocated

to centralize, 87; and governmentality,

Indiano, 41-42; and Benito Juárez, 51;

Intimate cultures: definition oí, 116

oí individual guarantees in Yucatán, 67;

198, 203, and governmental state, 198,

links with lamily, 40, links with gods,

Intruder, The: asan allegory, 168-71, story

triumph over Maximilian , 72, universal-

199, hlsroriography of, 4, and indige-

40, link, wirh land, 40, loso oí legal

nous communities, 48, lack of Creole

protection, 150; organization of labor

bourgeoi sic, 30, lack oi stability, 233-3-1

groups. 40; organized by race, 41;

ligiosity and purity oí , 226; suspension

tellectual production, 208

ist liberalism of, 55

oí, 169-71 ISAAE (International School of American Archeology and Ethnology), 250

Junta Instituyente : and citizenship, 62 Juntas de mejoras, 149

1 n d rx

342 =

343 -

Kahlo, Frida, 55

Laves oi Castille, 18

Kaiser, Wilhelm - compared with Porfina Díaz, 104

constitution, 96-97, messianic image of, Mexican anthropology: challenges to

I.aves of che Indies encomendar, 16, justih-

98; as a spiritualist, 207, toppling oí foreigners, 255, eontemporary crisis

caiion of Spanish expansion, 16

Knight, Alan, 220

Díaz, 206-7 oí, 230; final phase of, 262; and Great Madrid, Miguel de la , 55, 223, and educaNational Problems, 260; historical detional system , 215; election of, 222, velopment of, 230, 233, indigenismo, 231; Mexico: Btograpby of Power, 222, nationalinstitucional infrastructure, 230; modern ist reaction to, 55; refornis of , 55; subsiaesrhetics, 231, and nationalism, 231; dies to inrellectual groups , 219; as welland 1968 student movement, 231, 261, meaning democrat, xxi process uf, 230-31; romanticization oí Magníficos ("Magnificent Severa "), 231, Indians, 259, Bernardino de Sahagún, 232, 261 238; stabilization of national image, 242, Mallon, Florencia, 65 220-21 state absorption of, 232, 260, strategies Maps, 3, 199 of government, 242 Maquiladoras, 139 Mexican democrats critique oí corporate Maroons, 45 state, 77, rise of democracy Martyrdom, 89, 95, 109, degradation of Mexican history: and public sphere, 157; insurgent priests, 89, images used by astheories of, 81

I-egal code of 1836 and citizenship, 64 Leonard, Irving, 154

Krauze , E nrique , xi, 215; career of 21 a and cha risma tic power , 225; com panson

Lerda de Tejada, Sebastián, 129

with Cosío Villegas and Oetavio Paz

1e1¢ 05e11 , 166, 175, 180, 257, 258, 260 270, 275; Cbildrea ofSánchez, 258, 259 260 critique of Sociedad Mexicana de

219, co - awnerul Cho , 220; critique of, xxii , critique oí p-esidenrialum 213; "democracy without adjectives' 222.

Groy,, fía y Estadística, 258; descri ption of

exceptionallsn ; of Mexico , 217-I8,

barrios, 180, as FBI spy, 259, Five Families,

"factory of h;stmy ' 220and Fran4ois Xavier Guerra , 22 1, as a historian ot na-

25s 259, letter tu Vera Rubín, 258-59; and Mexican intelligentsia, 259; Ricardo Pozas, 259

tion building , xxii; and histoncal soap operas , 220, 223 ; interpretarion ol

Liberal,sm, 4, 10, 49, 50, 133, 150, prag-

Mexican history , 216, 223 ; Juárez as authenric , 226,- Krauzometcr , 222-23

nRüic accord w,th conservatives, 72, and tacist ideas, 50

and Miguel de la Madrid, 219; mcnrors

Libro kajo El- history oí civil violente,

of, 222 , and national history , 217; as nationalist i niel lectual , xxii; and 1968 5tu-

piring presidents, 109, linked te ideal of

239, as shared history of suffering, 241

dent movement, 212-1 3, 218-19, and

Limón José, xii

presidencial biograph i es , 2 17, Antonio López de Santa Atina , 226; and lclevisa, 219-20 ; and Tlateloleo massacre 216,

1.ockharr James, 4 1

Lion's Club, 149

López, Jesús. proposal to ban bullkghting, 66-u7

and use oí sources, 221 ; use of state patronage, 226 ; and Vuelta, 218

95, amputated leg, 90; illustration of,

Pastrv Wat, 90, as preserver of order,

Ladino , 43, 44, 275; Jews, 44; Muslim,, 44,

90. pmblems with political parties, 90,

as pardy civilized, 44; Spanishspeaking

1 33: n Texas, 90, theatrieality of, 226, uses of sacrl fiee, 89-90

Land- importante of for i dentiry, 43 La Paz , Bolivia, 113, 129

127; and antipolitical discourse, 210,

Luther Martín, 15

Western ," xvii; polities and an tipo B tics,

Lynch John, 90

Lavallé, Bernard, 17

Macfi iavellianism, 154

tia

344

democracy, 216, goals of, 216, ideologues oí, 86, indigenista anthropology, 231, indigenistas, 231; and indigenous world, 134, "intellectual caudillos," 218,, Mexico: l3iograpby of Power, 223-24, and

,

x

_

dence, 51, masculine arguments for,

peasant organizations, 151, popular

53-54; nationalization of, 54, as nation-

public spheres, 279-80; projectforna-

al yace, 52, protagonist oí national history, 53, revaluation of, 52

"aposde ol democracy," 98; and 1857

I

139,178,183,199,205,216,218; degradation oí citizenship, 79, and

ments for, 53-54, as fortified version oí

Madero, Francisco 1., 96, 216, 224, as

1aw oí 1608, 17

Mexican proverbs, 60, 78, 118, 176 Mexican Revolution, xi, xxi, 52, 75, 86,

che indigenous yace, 53, and indepen-

Mecebu.;les, 173, 174

anthropology, 229

52, during pre-Hispanic period, 35 Mexicanness, 224

Mestizo, 16, 50, 53, 263, feminine argu-

210, portrayed as backward , 127 sovereignty and citizenship , 10, tradition ol

tizaje, 51, after independence, 46; and liberals, 51; and Mexican Revolution,

Mestizaje, 51

tion o l 181 1, 62

left and imperialism , 129, as "non-

ideologies, 35, historical product oí Mexican peoples, 35, importante of mes-

Merchants, 146, 147, 168, 200

1_ópcz Rayón, Ignacio, 62, 63; constitu-

clama ru Europe , xvii, Latin American

Mexican nationality, and communitarian

Medical doctora' movement, 151-52, 214 Mendieta, Gerónimo, 15

López Portillo, José inauguration of research facility, 213

Latín America , xviii, amhiguiry off status,

Enríquez, 53, principal ideologists, 53, as protectionist, 53-54; as revolutionary nationalism, 53

Media, 117, 152, 157, 158, 284, and social persona, 159

López Marcos, Adolfo, National Museum of Anthropology, 133

Lara, Agustín, 206

Manuel Gamio, 53, and mestizo, 54, as modernizing, 53-54; Andrés Molina

killing of, 87-88, and Tepoztlán, 176 Mayas: sold as claves, 235 Mazabuas, 37

canc( of eg, 90; Teatro Santa Atina, 90,

1afaye, Jacques, 16 La .Malinche, 218

persona, 94, proof oí cleanliness, 280, Guadalupe Victoria, 94, Pancho Villa, 94

Maximilian, 87, 241, boulevards of, 133,

as scrvant of the nation, 225, signih-

Africans, 44

55, under current regime, 55, formulacien of, 53; foundational strain, 86;

Masses: as obstacles to progress, 65; insufficiently civilized, 65 Más vale cabeza de ratón que cola de león, 1 18

93 iVlexieo Biograpby ofPawer, 226, in

Labor Day parado, 1 19

Cabrera, 53, contemporary discourse of,

ers, 89, martyrs oí independence, 89, Alvaro Obregón, 94, and presidencial

Marx, Karl: and Mexican education, 140

López de Santa Arma, Antonio, 89, 93,

Krugman , Paul, xxi

Mexican nationalism, 53, 86, 87; Luis

sovereignty, 94, marryred national lead-

Mexican Americana, xü

tionality and modernity, 114, and proletarian organizations, 151, rapid modernization, 79; and role oí intellectuals,

1

j

Index = 345 =

114 and role.¡ intellcctuals, 210; teachings nl 121 and Tepuztld .o spherc , 46, and 52 14: seat ut viceroyalty . 178, watershed lor natinnal,ty :Alexicoo-. ambigwty ol smms , 127: um- frpu,: tlán 167. 186 , 241, 243, 244, sciousness ol backward coodiuun. xc,i AI.x!:o It, b adal Evolut," desrc ol nanunahry , .XIS Imellectual 24 ;Vlfxim i'rofio;do. 263 and artistic production . 210, labe1cd "developing narco." xvül , narrat;ves ul Meycr Lorenzo, 213 Mezican pcrople . xv;i; nationalism ol 4. ,Abur.... .,', 129 ALgants. 9,. 142, 143 , 188, 190, 192, source of nat;o nalnv . xlv: serte paN17 I fl. ,O ( anuda . 187, irom Guerrero, 75 usage of s mb Is cuino. 1811, migiatory proeess , xii; nationalist Méx co a Irave , .ir pos , 245 50

121; to Tepoztlán, tionary scheme of, 245, interpretation hacklash against , 186; to the United States, 187 of pre Columbian past , 245, Nahoa , 246, Otomis , 245-46 Milenio. 212, 213 146, 147 Mexico at tbe World', Falo , 241 Mllitary leaders , 146, 147, 149 , absence of citaMinera Biograpby of Powee Mexico . Moctezuma , 218, 241 tions, 221 ; Alemán , 223; Ávila Camacho , ;\4odemidad indiana . Nación y mediación en 223; Emilio Azcárraga , 224; comparison México, xix, xx to National Museum oí Anthropology , 214, 215, and 226; composition of, 215-16 ; Cosío Modernist ruins, 213 , 223, Tlatelolco massacre, 214 Villegas , 221, 224 ; Porfirio Díaz , xv, xx, 57 , 82, 111, 122, , election ol de Modernization 222, 223 , Díaz Ordaz , , 131; critila Madrid, 222- 23; Hidalgo , 224; and 163 , and corruption of morals indigenized, ; 222, intellectual cal m national state, 136 historical evidence , , 138, and production , 215; Krauzometer , 222, xxi, and nationalist reactions postrevolutionary government, 214; , 222; de la Madrid Solilude , of Labyrinth 223; metaphors for power, 224 , Mexi- principies oí, 128; relationship with the brote, 82, reproduction oí social dasses, can history as a ztruggle for democracy , 118-19; threats tu nation states , 82, use 216-17, Mezican Revolubon , 223-24 ; asa mirror oí presidencial power , 220, of nationality, 114 Andres, xvi, 53, 54, °acnationalist myth , 226, O' Gorman , 221, Molina Enríquez , argument opinions stated as historical facts . 222, [ion ' and "resístante ;' 53-54 , 53, mestizo ideology of, 223, Paz , 221, readings of, 218; sources for mestizos ,

Morelos (atare), 167, 266. 267 271. 273 279, constmction, 18 industr,al,zavon 183, migration to the United Stales 183 postrevoluti onary eco nom ic organiza-

National culture as dismodernity, 1 14 National history 81. 139 failure to deliver, 81 National identiry, xx, xxi, 14, 128, 132,

tion 183; regional space 182 siate

adoption of foreign techniques, 130;

governor, 182, tourism, 183

changing aspecrs of, 1 I I, formation ol. 141, formed in transnational networks,

Morenos, 45 t`lorrow, Dwight. 1 37

126- Trames of contact, 130, interna[

Mularros, 16 17

business

132, narratives oí identity,

125; and neo),beral ism. 129, production

Nación, 7, 9 13, and lienedict Anderson. 8, distinguished from puma, 9; extension of national identity , 8, and panimperial identiry , 8, and sovereignty , 8; usage of, 7, 8

of, 125, production oí "Mexico," 126; sociology oí, 127, topography of, 130, women and children, 10

National image , 143, implementation of, 126, management of, 141

Naco, 120, Art-Naqueau , 11 3; categorical

Nationalism, xxiii , xv, 5, 10, 11, 13, 54, 55,

transformation of, 114, changing con-

120, 122, 191 , alternatives for Mezican, 56, 83 ; and Benedict Anderson, xx, 3, 30, 200, bonds oí dependence, 12; citi-

notaGOns of, 111, closet nacos , 113; as colonial imagery, 112; definition oí nacos kitsch , 112, description of, 1 1f, foreign-sounding names, 1 12-13; as

zenship, 10 , 11; and communitarianism,

lack oí distinction , 113, lumpenpolitics of, 113; as mark oí Indian , 114; and

sumption , 121, connected to work, 121;

modernization , 113; Nac -Art, 113,

tionalism, 6 , crisis of, xxi, 114; defini-

naquismo, 112 , 113; as sigo oí provincial

tion of , 6-7, 33, development of, 27;

backwardness , 111, similar process in

discourse of, 13i evolution of, 27, exclu-

Latin America , 112; threat to tradicional political forms , 113; as urban aesthetic,

sion oí Spaniards, 29; failure to refor-

112

xvi, xx, 3, 33, 34; connected to concontradictory claims of, 126; Creole na-

mulate, 122 ; formation of, 30; and fraternity, 12, freemasonry , 31, ideological

NAFTA ( North American Free Trade

construction , 132, as invented nature,

Agreement), xxi, 108; backlash of,

4, 7, under ISI, 121, and language, 14,

121

229, and linguistic identification, 5; and

Nahoa, 246

Mezican anthropology, xxiii, mytholo-

53; as pro mestizo nationalist, 53 of, 220, Spanish versus English transla , Carlos , xi, 55, 205 treatment of 1968 student Monsiváis nion, 222 ; , 49, 83 , 84, crimovement , 221, José Vasconcelos , 224, Mora , José María Luis, 48 , 49, and indi223. Se, als,, tique oí Rodríguez Puebla Zapata , 224, Zedillo , Enrique Krauze ger;ismo, 49, interpretation oí the consti-

Nahuad, 37 , 172, 173, 192 , 272, 273,

gy, 151, 279; myths of, xüi, origins (anthropolog.cal stories), 233, polemical

Mexico Ciry , xii, 158, 171 , 175, 178 ; as tution, 83 85, 227; "baicony of the republic ,' xii; crowds , ,Morelos, José María , 29, 47 , 85; accusations , 184; abolshment oí slavery , 60; drivers , 60; earthquake of 1985 29, Apatzingán con, 184; growth of, against Spaniards , freeway to Tepozdán stitution , 64, edict oí 1810, 85-86; mar152; lack oí services , 60; mediated move 205, tyred by Spaniards , 69, national ideal ments , 59, and national sat'atics , uf, 8o; persistente oí política) spirit, 86, , periodicals , 200, politeness of, 59-60 senuments oí the nation ;' 158, 227; , " 206, prosti ruti un during Che Porfiriato , 137, and public opinion , xii; and pubis servant, of thc nation, 225

ship, 48 , as community, 13, 35, 146,

ary nationalism , 56, sacrifice , 7, 11; as a

identification with homeland , 47; ini-

sigo oí modernity , 128; and sovereignty,

portance oí blood, 43 ; importante of

xiv; standardization of, 125; and subject-

274, 278 , 285, national anthem, 177; speakers, 174 Nation, xiii; 48; appeals to nationhood, 11, as Christian utopia , 86, and citizen-

nature oí che national question, 47; politics of, 122, power of , 12-13, and racism, 14 ; and religion , 14; revolution-

land, 43 , intellectuals and nation build-

formation, 3; substitute for religious

ing, 212 ; local proeess oí state forma-

community, 7; successor to religion, 3,

cien, xv, myths of, xiii; nationalization

thick description, 32, and transnational

oí the church, 47; and race , 27, redefini-

relations , 125; uniry and the intelli-

[ion of, 46; and sacrifice , 1 1, symbols

gentsia , 209; violente of, 30; oí weak

of, xiii, transformation oí semantics, 7

nations, 126

l r, :l e x 1 e d ex = 346 = ea 347 =

Narionalist ideology, 48, alternatives ol, 56, social hierarchies, 48

74; Ioss ol arm, 94; monument built co honor lost arm, 94, martyrdom of, 94;

Narionalist movenients: adoption oí ancient political forros, 36; caste wars, 49 Nationalists, 13, adoption oí ancient political forros, 36; bardes of, l0, discoursc of, 12, and nationalistic scienGsts, 202, and ven Humboldt, 199 Narionality, xiv-xv, 286

overlap ol presidential personas, 104-5, and Zapatistas, 179 Ocampo, Melchor 214 O'Corman Edmundo, xviii, disapproval of K;auze's biographies oí power, 221, ídem ahout che invention oí America, xvui

National Museum oí Anthropology 226. 231,242,254

Oil indusery, 104, nationalization under Cárdenas, 104

National Polytechnlc Instituto, 214 National Preparalory School, The, 243

Olympie Carnes in 1968, 108, 259 Opposition parties. PRD, 117

Nacional sentimenr, 197, 207, census

Ortega Y Gasset, José, 209

198; concentrated in Mexico City, xii

Ortiz, Luis 2 I, 22

and Agustín Iturbide, 284; and opinions,

Oswald, Felix L, 239

158; and ritual, 156, 158, and starislin,

Otnm,, 245, 246

198, techniques for interpreting,208; use oí quesrion naires, 198

Oteoman Empire, 15

National sovereignty, 83, 88, secular process of, 83 National space, xv, xxiü, 265, conceptual challenge of, 264; cultural gcography of, xxi, developmenr of, xv; histodcal sociology of, xix Neocolonial exploitation, 54

Ouweneel, Arij, 275

Pagden, Anthony, 28, 172, 220 Parda 45 Parián Market, 131 París World's Fair oí 1889, 250 Paseo de la Reforma, 206 Pastrv War, 90 Patience, 61

Neoliberalism, foreignization of, 129; intplementau,an of, 129

Patria, 5, 9, 43

Nerherlands, 15, 21

Pa triotic deaths, 3

New Lawsof 1542, 174

Parriotic sacrifice, 13

New Spain, 8; as cante society, 40, hierarchical relationships, 40, as a kingdoni ot Spain, 8

Payno, Manuel, 239

Newspapers, 5, 6, 156; and "empry time," 22-23, limits of public discussion, 148, as pdvileged inedia, 159. Seealso Print capitalisno

Neu, York Times, xxi Nexos, 219, 226 Nolahles, Los 276, 277, 278, 279 Novo, Salvador, xi Nuestra señora de Guadalupe, palro,w dr la Nueva España, 19 O, Genovevo de la, 179 Obregón, Alvaro, 94, 104, Barde ol Celaya, 104-5; building oí the state,

Paz, ( ctavio, xi, 53, 55, 218, 219, 221, 222 227, critique of National Museum of Authropology, 226; The Critique of tbe Pyruruid, 226, mentor to Krauze, 222, en xlesican nacional culture, xiv, Mexico: Riog¢iphy of Pou,er, 222 Pcasant communiti es, 152; forums for discisson, 149, gendered forms for discussion 149; and public sphere, 149 Peasants,52,151,191,232,266,281; claims of citizenship, 76, exchange oí votes 76; parfieipation in national discoune, 76 Peña Guillermo de la, xix, 161 Poimseln res, 5, 8, 17, 45, 199 Peo¡les Cuide to Mexico, 134

Phelan, John Leddy, 15

Postmodernity, 110

Pietschmann, Horst, 21, 22, 23, 25

Pozas Horcasitas, Ricardo, 151; medical students strike, 214

Pimentel, Francisco, 53, 252; high official in Maximilian's court, 260 Plan de Ayala, 278

Pratt, Mary Louise, 141 PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) use oí celebrities, 117

Plan de Iguala, 29, 64 población del valle de Teotihuacán, La, 253, national dimensinns of, 251 Pocho, 139

Prefectura del Ceniro 242 Prensa Graffca, La, 255

Presidency, 84, 96, construction oí nacional image , 88, identification with

Poinsett, Joel, 31, 88, effort to build proAmerican parry, 31, establishment of

modernization, 104; Juárez as strong image , 95, messianic imagery, 89, dur-

Masonie lodges, 88, organizarion of Masonic lodges, 31

ing the nineteenth century, 104, presidenttalism, 213; sacrifice as ideology, 89, 225, statistics, 104

Political elites, developmenr oí distinct forms, 118; parasitism, 120-22, portrayed as out oí touch, 120; as predators, 120

President, 83, 99; development oí image, xxi; figure of, 106, 108, 115; inaugurations of, 213, Mexico.. Biography of Power,

Political rallies, 177, as expression of public sentiment, 160; theatrical element, 159

216; since 1982, 105; as servant, 225, shaping of public persona, 83 Presidential authority, 98: nationalization oí the law, 98

Political ritual, 146, 159; appropriarion of corruption, 146, and corruption 162, substitution for discussion, 164

Presidential candidate: relationship with che suit, 77, use of costumes, 77

Politics: connections with ritual, 145 Polis, 204 Poniatowska, Elena, xi, 55 Population, oí 1950, 54, of 1990, 54 Porfirian elite: and European immigration, 140 Porfirians: and internacional arena, 252

Presidential persona, 81, 96; importante oí technological innovations, 104, shaped by 83, 98-99, uses oí martyrdom, 94 Presidential power, 88; and política) parties, 88

Presidential repertoires, 89

Porfiriato, xx, 180, 206, 218, 250; consoli-

Press, 59, 146, 150; censorship of, 59,

dation oí nacional economy, 79, elite,

during colonial period, 115; eritieism

140, 180, 210; evolution oí citizenship,

oí the government , 78; and government

72, economic growth, 72, futuros for subsidies, 209, and narcotice trade, 131; discussion, 149, government institutons, and self-clnsorship, 59 197; "order" and "progress" superseded PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), 82, citizenship, 72, and Political ritual, 73, 111, asan Ancien Régime, 82; and de and positive seienee, 210,, progress as la Madrid, 222; and democracy , 216 ; fetish, 73; and public education, 73, and idiom oí village uniry, 1 19; institutionalpublic opinion, 147; schools and festi- ized heir of che revolution, 98; and vals, 155, 156; state theater, 205, and local villages, 119, monument for Alvaro Tepoztlán, 170, 178 Obregón, 94, 1988 campaign, 76, poPosada, José Guadalupe, 151 litical campaigns, 222; as a refashioning Posrcolonial, 142; challenges ro nacional- of colonial system, 115, use oí public ism, 128, elements of postcolonial theo- rallies, 76, use of relevision stars, 114 ry, 125, identity production 128 Pues,, 168, 241, as inrellectuals, 275-76

IuJr^ 348 =

Indrx 349 =

Prieto . Gmllern;u,. xi 25U-51 Prlmordiahst nacional lsm. 265 Primordial loy albas, 36. 49 Primordial tules. ti

Kan;o, Samuel . 53. 74 78; on ^tilexiean pan==nal charactcr , 73; pelado as enemy

Pr ; pales. 174 I'nnc capitalism

Ra;ln,ads . en;raliza tion of thc goverm roen; 72. under Juárez 72; and public ,pi,', 295

3.5.6, 14.22..43

Private sphere 268 Progrerisfw , 268. 169. 280

Guy. 73; pelado as massihed

.n good

,,trzen , 70; use of thc pelado, 73 Ranchos 155

14, 15, importance af blood.

Progress, 54

Praletar;an ; zanun. 1

1 r;pi )e ni;;re , 16, nationalization

Pranundam ;m;tm 299 Protochronisnt xix; definition of nx

oi ;ha church, 42

Puebla , Rodríguez, 48, 51

Puebla (state), 155 Pueblo , El, 78, 79, 80, bad pueblo as todder for politicians , 71, discourse oí good and bad pueblo , 70; portrayals of, 65 positive and negative , 65; substiituted by progress, 79 Public opinion , xxii, 146 , 156, 157, 159, 206, 208 , 210, 266; concentrated in Mexico Ciry, xü; and intel lectuals, 197; lack of, 284, mechantsms of, xxii; and social movements , 152, subsidized hy Che state, 233 Public rallies as corporate organisin, 76; divided by sectors , 76; increase in participation , 78; 1988 PRI campaign, 76; use oí dress , 76, 77, use oí television stars, 117 Public sphere , xv, xxii , 10, 25, 82, 102, 145, 147 , 149, 153, 159, 233 ; and collective actors , 150; definition of, 265; development of, 149; geography of, 146, and independence , 150; and local imelleetuals , 283; media of , 266, obstarles

Rccyclmg. detinuion ol, I I8 Rcdticld Robert 166, 175 , 182, 270; correcto,, 192 , 275; and orientalize, 166; radio interview , 255-56; tontos, 275 ture of , 115; dependence en commodities, 117; and telephone , 117; and tele1 Religious fesrivittes : and collective actors, 147, 150 ; slave and black, 147 Represertlante de bienes communales, 268 Republica de indios, 44

Respeta 270-71, when doing ethnographie work , 270-71 Restorcd Republie, xx Reto del Tepozteeo , El, 281, 282 Revolutionary nationalism , 55-57; model o¡, 55; reanimation of, 56 Revolutionary state : and the church, 156; creation oí corporate groups , 74-75; differences between Porfirian state, 74; forros of cltizenship, 80 Revol utions , 207, 208 Reyes Los, 189 Ritual. 151 , 153, 159 ; appropriation

for creation ol, 163, and popular will 156; preferente for gossip , 158; and proletariat , 151; scgmented quality of, 83

constitution oí polity, 159-60 ; and cor-

ture , 155, connection with politics, 145;

ruption , 155; domination and subordination , 153; expansion oí state institution. 157 ; importance during colonial

Race , 27, 33, 48, 55; 'Old Christians 32 Racial identity ; manipulation of, 51 Racial ideolugies - during colonial pe; i ;d. 50, and Indians , 50, and procreauon 50; Spanish forros ol, 50

Rivera, Diego, 53. 55

change of carnival signs, 189, and intel-

Rodó, Enrique. Ariel. 103, ideology ol

lectuals, 269, political factions, 260; symbolism of names, 189-90, tecolotes,

103 Rojas, José Guadalupe, 277. 279 289,

269 ertunes, 269

dlaries of, 278; and Nahuad, 278, and

Secretary of Agravian Reform, 232

nationalist mythology, 278-79

Seed, Patricia, 42 Schools, 155, 156. 177; festivals, 155; fol-

Rojas, Mariano, 277-78 Rojas, Simón, 278

lowing che Mexican Revolution, 155;

Rojas, Vicente, 277

and i nstitution oí discipline, 155, and ritual, 155; schoolteachers, 155. 168

Rojas (family), 174. 274. 280 Rumor, 157, 159, as chisme de viejas, 157, as

Science, under protectionist state, 1 15

cowardly, 157; as feminized, 157; and

Scientifically marvclous, 201, 202; exaniples of, 201-2, as propaganda, 201

public opinion, xxii; and public sphcre,

Scientific socialism, 140

155, 158; and ritual, 155

Scott, James, 178 Scottish rite, 88. See also Freemasonry

Regional cultures composed of, 116, cul-

ot corruption , 146; and common cul-

Quetzalcoatl , 47, 272

Santo Domingo 15, 173, 174, 266, 270,

Riva Palacio, Vicente, 53, 239

Sacrifice , 5, 10, 1 I, 12, 42, association with nationalism , 7; Aztec ideology of,

Sahlins, Marshall, 166 Salinas , Carlos, 223 , 227; and Héctor Aguilar Camín , 219, campaign of, 206;

Slavery, 38-45, 50, 63, 64, 85, 147, 218; abolition of, 62, 85, African, 45, 241 ;

subsidies to intellectual groups, 219; use

Aztec ideology of, 38; captives oí "just

oí television stars during campaign, 117;

wats," 45; constitution oí 1824, 204; indigenous, 52, as liberation oí human

and Anuro Warman, 232 , 233; as a well-

energy, 38; prohibition against ¡odian

meaning democrat, xxi Salve Reina de la América (atina, 28

nobles, 174; prohibition of, 204 Social Darwinism, 52, 53, Mexican view

San Andrés , 173, 266 San José, 189 ; change oí carnival signs,

oí Indians, 52 Social democracy, 56

189; symbolism oí names, 189-90 San Juan Teotihuacán , 250; description

Socialization: oí children, 59-60; as mechanism oí courtesy, 60; and per-

of, 250

sonal relations, 61

San juanico, 173

Social movements, 27, 50, 80, 149, 171,

San Martín, 9 San Miguel, 173

199, 208, challenge to nacional image,

San Salvador, 15

143, and conditions oí reproduction, 152, and fiscal crisis oí 1982, 77; as ges-

San Sebastián , 189; change oí carnival signs, 189; symbolism oí names,

tures oí revolt, 159, incorporation of

189-90

the state, 77, and national media, 159;

154; production of, 146; and public

Santa Cruz Teypaca ; change oí carnival

,ehools , 155-56

evolution, 245 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 16

Sahagún, Bernardino de, 38, 238

period , 153; and political discourse,

145. 160 ; and ruptor , 154-55; and

gion, 48 Sierra, Justo, 243, 244, vision oí national

13; and nationalism, 7, 12

Santa Catalina, 173

opinion , xxii, 160 ; and public sphere,

Serdán, Aquiles, 206 Seven Laws (1835); and Catholic reli-

38, 39, coercive pressures of, 11, ideological appeals te, 1 I, and misconstrued,

and public opinion, 158-59; violente against, 143

signs, 189 , symbolism oí names , 189-90

Social sciences, xvi, xvü; part oí inter-

Santa María, 173

national horizon, xvi; tied to national

Santísima Trinidad , La, 173

development, xvi

In dex 351 =

Sonora, 52

254 and Mexican anthropology, 231, 232

Sovereignry, xiv, 81, dynamic of cultural produerion, 81; and fueros, 9, as paler

Supc;hnrrio, 158

potestas. 9; as poini of referente, xv Spain, 14, 1 5 , Bourbon reforms, 21, 23. 82

Tacuhaya, 179

8 pan i ards, i ntellcctua l represen tati ,,n, 27[

laxco, 266

Spanish cOncept ot, 17, legal category of, 16, legal notion of, 17

Tatro S.tnla Anua, 90

Spanish America, 5 administrativo colonial practicas, 5 enlightened munarchs, 200; following independence, 199,- ,larle ,ensota, 200, 202 and nauonalism, xx 4, nacional symbols ol, xiii; presidencial power, 225; revolutions, 27; upper cIases, 200; and Alexander van Hwnholdt. 199

lecoloto 269

l elephone, 116 117 Televisa and high culture, 1161 and Enrique Krauze, 200, Iinks to intellectual groups, 1 16, and ' transition to democracv' 220 TclevIsion 116, 117 122 156, 219 Tenorio= Trillo, Mauricio, 241, 249

tional race 53, as a "war of imagos," s3 Spanish Cortes, 64

Tcpoztccan mythology, 168;centerpcripltery ntythology, 168-69, story of El Fepoztecátl, 168-69

Spanish Enlightenmenc. and patrcotism. 23

Tepozrecád El, 168-69.181 Rpozteco. 6l, 181, 282; pseudonym oí El

Spanish invason of 1829, 70

Tepo'ztecát1, 181

Spanish language, 21, 32, 172, language of, 18; as modero fono of Latín, 32 notionalizabon of the church, 18

lepoztlán, xxii, 159, 161, 188, 189, 265, 266. 279, 285; antiprogressive disconOC . 184, artificial flowers st,ategy,

Spanish lasr names, 174, 274

170, 181, 192; brujos, 270 ; calpuflis of,

Spanish nationalism, 18, 21; built un religious militancy, 21; developmeni of, 27

173 ampesinos, 280; carnival , 188-91; and (áth,he church, 169; and cidzem

Spanishness, 9, 18; and civil izarion. 18

286; Colonio Tepozteca, 179; and

and connection with church, 18-19;

colonization , 184, consdmtion of, 167;

and language, 18, nacional consrruction

cunsuuacd as peri pheral , xxü; con-

of, 18-and eelig;on, 18; and territory, 18

struuion uf che center, 169, and corrup-

Spencei, Herbert, 50, 52

in,n 207; and cultural mediation, 283;

Sports; and fiestas, 156

uva n,ieros , 270-71; education, 186,

State formatiom. and,ntellectuals 198,

elites. 174, 180; employment, 186, fies-

and population information , 198,- ro[, in

tas 148 -90;1540 censos ,173;foreign-

crcating nacional ci tizcnry, 1 17

ers 185; as " I ndian ," 170; intellectuals,

Sratistics, 136, 204; in Chiapas, 244, as

169, 272, 277, 280, 282, The intruder,

a mcasu,, of common good, 198, and

169-71, lack ol cominunal voice, 276;

mystique of modernity 205, in Yucatán,

land ;,,cc, 184, 185; location of, 167,

244

mokanp oí jurisd iction, 173, Mexican

Slatue of Ibe ;blrxtsan Goddess of War í or of dealh] Teoyaomiqui, 240

Ihevaluriun, 178; migrants , 171-72,

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, 232

col rural 1511'

Stern, Alexandra, 139.252

Ccnovevo de la O, 179; Orne Tochdi,

St ident movenient ( 1968), x1, 77, 214.

173; and orientalizatfon, 166; peasants,

216, 221, 226, 259; and indlgcnistas, 232,

oí Mexico, 239; and Mexican intellectu-

Tepoztecátl, 181; rebellion, 276-80;

als, 238; types oí Mexican lndians, 245

pology, 238-39; and French occupation

Robert Redfield, 175; Relación de Tepoztldn, 173; road to Cuernavaca, 184; Rojas Family, 174, 277, El Tepozteco, 181, 282;

UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México), xviii, 210, 214, 215, 231; pre-

Tepoztizos, 185; tourism , 170-72, 281, -

Columbian urban design, xviii; scientific output, 115

tribute, 167; Unión de Campesinos Te-

Te ancho ti ln, 37

Spanish eonquesr, 250; as origin of na-

41

groups, 269, 274, 282; principales, 277; and progress , 184, pseudonym of El

1 85 186, 187, 190, 192-93; rnulti186; los notables , 276, 277;

167, perlpheral status of, 167; politieal

poztecos (UCT) 179, 180, 182; Valley of Arongo, 184; Villa de Tepoztlán,

Universal Catholic Monarchy, 15 United States of America, 87, 131, 138, 171; alliance with Juárez, 96, fetishism

173, 267; Che vulgar class , 276, Zapatismo, 280, Zapatistas, 178, 179

with "Rationality," xvi; fetishism with

Tertulias, 146

"Western tradition," xvi, immigration

Testera Jacobo, 153, conversion oí lndians , 153; use oí icons, 153

control, 122, migration from Morelos,

Texcocans, 16 Texcoco, 37

183; opposition to Mexican monarchy, 87; Tepoztecan migrants, 190; and universal rationality, xvii; universities,

Textile workers, 149 Tlahuica Nahua, 173 Tlabuieole, 97

xvi-xvii, 198; and U.S-Mexico border, 122 University system, xvi, architecture

Tlanepanda, 173

of, xvi, xviii; based on French models, 197-98 based en U.S . models , 197-98;

Tlatelolco massacre, 214; and Enrique Krauze, 216 Tlaxcalans, 16

under Echeverría, 214-15; emulation oí English universities , xvi, expansion of, 214-15 Untitled photograpb of a Maya Woman, 257

Tonalli, 38, 39 Tourism,142,183,184,185, 186,188, 252, 273, 281; excursionistas, 184; and

Urbanity. equated with civilization, 172, signs of, 172

land prices, 186; patterns of urbanization, 186

Urban rabble, 74-75

Trade unions, 152; and public sphcre, 151

U,S.-Mexican War: and backwardness, 204

Transition to democracy, xxi. 152, 164 Transnational capital impact of xxi Túpac Amaru, ton

Usos y costumbres, 150

Valley oí Teotihuacán, 250 Van Young, Eric, 220

Tornee, John Kenneth, 255 Turner, Víctor, 11, 108, 224; essay en Hidalgos revolt, 108 Tutino, John, 220

Vasconcelos, José; building oí schools, 74; and contact zone, 135; as "intellectual caudillo," 224

Tylor, E. B . , 234-35, 236, 239, 241,

Vásquez, Genaro, 140

242, 254; Juan Alvarez, 245, Anahuac, orMexrco and tbe Mexicans, Ancient and

Vaughan, Mary K., 73, 155, 156 Velásquez, Fidel, 119

Modere, 235, classihcation of Mexican races , 244-45, contrast w,th Justo Sierra,

Velásquez de León, Don Joaquín; debate

242; description of Mexico, 235, 237-39, description of Mexico' s national muse-

Veracruz, 15, 147, 200, 206; 1915 renters' strike, 152

with FatherJ. Antonio Alzate, 8

um, 237-38; description of Yucatán,

Verdery, Kathleen, xix

235, development oí Mexican anthro-

Viceroys, 198

índe x 352 =

353 =

Victoria, Guadalupe, 31, 94, rem.nns placed in Merco C nv. e4: violauon

\V'snrack, lohn 267 \Fndd Bank. 129

ot tomb hy Panrrican s:ddiers c,+

Vilar, Manuel. 97

Sc.... hubia. xl

Villa, Pancho 9.1 98 descc ratlon

Xc 11ol1h'111ic

tomb 94; as ol,cct ot scient,hc'utcr-

47, 48, and losó María Morelos -47 painting ot . 19. 20 217, 28 Virgen de Guadalupe escudo dr sah;d em:nn la epidemia de M,lllam6unti de vie-1735. 20 Virgin oí the Nativiry, 168, 169 Von Humboldt, Alexander, 26, 30, 234; and Bourbon rcforms, 26; portrayal of Spanish America , 199, publications of, 26; roya) mmmission of, 26 Vuelta, 218 , 219, 226

ante-Chinese

131, anti-Spanish

4

nti n;ent 131 : Arabs 131; identifica-

es 94

Violente < ,f 1-13 Virgen de C,undalule and Miguel Hidalgo

; n1Velrlents:

n roa u m Sonora

flor, w ,t1, Ioreign businessmen, 131; us.. 131 X eu te ncatl. 239 Xo:1[In. 26'i

Yautepec. 178,271 Yucatán, 52, 67, 244 Zapata, Emiliano, 98, 178, 280, 283, Mrxieo: Biograpby of Pomo, 224; Zapatismo, 180, 280 Zárate, Julio, description of conditions oí Indians, 66, prohibition of jails in haciendas, 66

Waire, C. B 105 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 191 Ward, George, 30 Warman, Arturo, 183; director oí INI,

Zavaln, Lorenzo de- chronicle of voyage to America, 65, comparisons between the United States and Mexico, 65-66 Zedillo, Ernesto, 223; as well-meaning democrat, xxi

232; minister oí Agravian Reforni, 232, 260; and Carlos Salinas, 232-33; and

Zineantán, 161

Ernesto Zedillo, 233

Zizek. Slavoj, 208

Weber, Max, 35, 266 Weiner, Annette: discussion of exchange, 36; focus un inalienable goods, 36

Zolov, Frie, 134; description oí the hippie movement, 134

Zúñiga, Ángel, 285

edex 354 =

CLAUDIO LOMNITZ is professor oí history and anthropology at the University oí Chicago. His arcas oí interest include politics, culture, and history. He is author oí Exits from tbe Labyrintb, Culture and Ideology in the Mexican National Space, Evolución de una sociedad rural, and Modernidad indiana: nueve ensayos sobre nación y mediación en México.