Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy)

DECONSTRUCTlON IN A NUTSHELL ,4 Conversation with JACQUES DERRIDA Edited with a Commentary by JOHN D. CAPUTO

Fordham University Press NewVork 1997

© 1 997 Fordham University Press All rights reserved. LC 96 4 5 1 89 ISBN 0-82 32-1 754-X (hardbound) ISBN 0 8232 1 75 5 8 (paperback) ISSN 1089 3938 Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, No. I John D. Caputo, Series Editor Fourth printing 1999 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Derrida, Jacques.

Deconstruction in a nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida I edited with a commentary by John D. Caputo. p. cm. (Perspectives in cont in en tal philosophy, ISSN 1 089 3938; no. I) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 8232 1 7 54 X (hardcover). ISBN 0 8232 1 75 5 8 (pbk.) I. Derrida, Jacques Interviews. 2. Philosophers France Interviews. 3. Deconstruction. I. Caputo, John D. II. Title. III. Series. B809.6.D46 1996 96 4 5 1 89 194 dcZl CIP Printed in the United States of America

In Memoriam Lawrence C. Gallen,

For his

O.S.A. (1 929-1995)

love of Villanova

Contents Acknowledgments Abbreviations

IX XI

Part One The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida

Part Two A Commentary: Deconstruction in a Nutshell I. Deconstruction in a Nutshell : The Very Idea (!) The Aporetics of the Nutshell The Axiomatics of Indig n a tion (The Very Idea!) Apologia: An Excuse fo r Violence Nutshells, Six of Th em

2. The Right to Philosophy Of Rights, Responsibilities,

and a New Enlightenment

Institutional Initiatives Between the Depa rt m ent of Philosophy" and a Philosophy

31 31 36 44

47

49 49 60

"

to Come

3. KhOra: Being Serious with Plato A Hoax Deconstruction Is Serious Business

E xorb ita n t Method Khora Two Tropics of Negativity Differance: KhOra Is its Surname 4. Community Without Community Hospitality An

Identity Without Identity

An Open Quasi-Community

69 71 71

74 77

82

92 96 106 109

113 121

CONTENTS

VIII

5. Justice, If Such a Thing Exists Doi ng Justice to Derrida Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice

Gift Dike: Derrida, The

Heidegger

and Dis-iuncti-ve Justice

6. The Messianic: Waiting for the Future

The

Messianic Twist in Deconstruction

125 125 129

140 151

156 1 56

Faith Without Religion

164

The

168

Messianic and the Messianisms:

Which Comes First? When Will You Come?

7 . Re-Joyce, Say "Yes" Between Husserl and The

Joyce

G ra m ophone Effect

Joyce's Signature Inaugurations: Encore

168

178

181 182

184

189 198

A Concluding Amen

201

Bibliography

203

Index of Names

209

Index of Subjects

213

Acknowledgments would like to thank the administration of Villanova University, Rev. Edmund J. Dobbin, O.s. A. , President; Dr. Helen Lafferty, University Vice President; and Dr. Daniel Ziegler, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, for their financial and moral support of this Roundtable and of the doctoral program in philosophy. Their ki ndness and support, along with the loving encouragement of the late Rev. Lawrence C. Gallen, O. S . A. , former Academic Vice President, to whom this volume is dedicated, has been invaluable to us all . I would like to thank my colleagues, Professors Walter Brogan, Thomas Busch, and Dennis Schmidt for their help in planning this conference and for their contributions to the "Roundtable." I wish to tha nk Barbara Romano for her help in the preparation of the index. I wish to thank my wife, Kathy, for the design of the cover of this book, and Vincent J. Massa for the photography used on the cover. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Jacques Derrida for his participation in this Roundtable, which provided everyone at Villanova with a very special day, for his help with the transcript of the "Roundtable, " for his inspiring and groundbreaking work, and, above all , for his friendship. I

Abbreviations Note: I cite Oerrida's works in parentheses in the body of the text, using the following system of abbreviations, referring fi rst to the French a n d then , after the slash, to the English translation where such is a va il a b l e . I have adapted this system of abbreviations from the one t h at I fi rst devised for The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1 997). AC AL

Circon. Circum.

OOP DiT

DLE DLG

DM

DNT

L'autre cap. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991. E ng. tra n s . OH. lacques Derrida: Acts of Literature. Ed. De re k Attridge. New York: Routledge, 1992. Circonfession: Cinquante-neuf periodes et periphrases. In Geoffrey B e n n in gton and Jacques Derrida , Jacques Der­ rida. Paris: Ed itions du Seuil, 1991. Eng. trans. Circum. Circumfession: Fifty-nine Per iods and Periphrases. In Geof­ frey Bennington an d Jacques Derrida, lacques Derrida. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1 993. Du droit ala philosophie. Paris: Ga l il e e 1990. Eng. trans. Pp. 46 1-498: PR; pp. 577-6 1 8: "Sendoffs." Difference in Translation. Ed. Joseph F. Graham. Ithaca, N.Y.: C or nell University Press, 1 98 5 . De ['esprit: Heidegger et fa question. Paris: Galilee, 1987. E n g . trans. OS. De la grammatologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967. Eng. trans. OG. "Donner la mort." In L'Ethique du don: Jacques Derrida et la pensee du don. Paris: Metailie-Transition , 1992. Eng. trans. GD. Derrida and Negative Theology. Ed . Howard Coward and Toby Foshay. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. ,

Xl!

DPJ

ABBREVIATIONS

Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. Ed . Drucilla C o rnell et a l .

DT ED

FL

Foi

GO

Glas

GT

HOdG HOG

KhOra

New York: Routledge, 1992. Donner Ie temps. I. La fausse monnaie. Paris: Galilee, 1991. Eng. trans. GT. L'ecriture et la difference. Paris : E ditions de Seuil, 1967. Eng.

trans. WD.

Force de loi: Le "Fondement mystique de l'autorite." Paris: Galilee, 1994. Eng. trans. "The Force of Law: 'The Mysti­

cal Foundation of Authority.' .. Trans. Mary Quaintance. In DPf, pp. 68-9l. "Foi et Savoir: Les deux sources de la 'religion' aux limites de la s i mpl e raison." In La Religion. Ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo. P a ris: Seuil, 1996. Pp. 9-86. The Gift of Death. Trans . David Wills. Chicago: The Uni­ versity of Chicago Press, 1995. Glas. Paris: Galilee, 1974. Eng. trans. Glas. Trans. Rich­ ard Rand and John Leavey. Lincoln: University of Ne­ braska Press, 1986. Given Time. I. Counterfeit Money. Trans . Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. Husserl: L'origine de la geometrie. 2nd . ed . Paris: Presses Universitaires de F ranc e , 1974. Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry. Trans. J oh n Leavey. Boulder: John H ay s , 1978. KhOra. Pa ris : Galilee, 1993. Eng. trans. Kh6ra. Trans. Ian McLeod,

LO

MB

in

ON, 87-127.

" Living OnlBorder Lines , " Trans . James Hulbert. In Har­ old Bloom et al. Deconstruction and Criticism. New York: Continuum, 1979. Pp. 75-176. Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait

and Other Ruins.

Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: Univcrsity of Chicago P res s , 1993.

Trans. Pascale-Anne The

MdA

Memoirs d'aveugle: L'autobiographie et autres wines. Paris: E ditions de la Re u n ion des m use es nationaux, 1990. Eng.

trans . MB. MdP

Marges de philosophie. P ari s : E ditions de Minuit,

1967.

Eng. trans. MoP. MfPdM

Memoires: For Paul de Man. Trans. C e cil e Li nds a y , Jona-

ABBREVIATIONS

MpPdM MoP N u mber OCP

OG OH

ON

OS

Parages

Pass.

PdS Points

Pol.

PR

PSJ

XIII

than Culler, and Eduardo Cadava. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Memoires: Pour Paul de Man. Paris: Galilee, 1988. Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982. "A Number of Yes. " Trans. B rian Holmes . Qui Parle, 2 ( 1 988), 1 20- 1 33. "On Colleges and Philosophy, " Interview with Geoffrey Bennington, in Postmodemism: ICA Documents. Ed . Lisa Appignanesi. London: Free Association Books, 1989. Pp. 209-228 . Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Bloomington: In­ diana University Press, 1 992. On the Name. Ed . Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 99 5 . Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: The U niversity of Chicago Press, 1 989. Parages. Paris: Galilee, 1986. Eng. trans. pp. 1 18-2 1 8: LO; pp. 250-287: "The Law of Genre." Trans. Avital Ro­ nel l . I n AL, pp. 22 1 -252. Passions. Paris: Galilee, 1993. Eng. trans . "Passions: 'An Oblique Offeri ng. ' " Trans . David Wood. In ON, pp. 3-3 1 . Points de suspension: Entretiens. E d . Elisabeth Weber. Paris: Galilee, 1 992. Eng. trans. Points. Points . . . Interviews, 1974-94. Ed. Elisabeth Weber. Trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 995. Politiques de l'amitie. Paris: Galilee, 1 995. "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils. " Trans. Catherine Porter and Edward Morris. Diacritics, 13 ( 1 983), 3-20. Post-Structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French. Ed. Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer. New York: Ca mbridge Univer­ sity Press, 1984.

XIV

Psy.

PTe RDR

ABBREVIATIONS

Psyche: Inventions de ['autre. Pa ris : Galilee, 1987. Eng. trans. Pp. 11-62: "Psyche: I nven t ions of the Other." Trans . Catherine Po r tert , in RDR, pp. 25-65. Pp. 203-235: "Des Tour de Babel." Eng. trans. DiT 165-207; Pp. 535-596: "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," trans. Ken Frieden, in DNT, pp. 73-142. Pp. 639-650: N u m b e r. Politics, Theory, and Contemporary Culture. Ed. Mark Poster. New York: Columbia U ni ve rsi ty Press, 1993. Reading De Man Reading. Ed. Lind say Waters and Wla d Godzich. M i nn eapoli s : U niversity of Minnesota Press, 1989.

RTP

Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida. Ed. Peter Fenves. Baltimore: The J oh ns H o pkins University

Sauf

Saufle nom. Paris: Galilee, 1993. Eng. trans. "Saufle n om (Post-Scriptum}." Trans. John Leavey, Jr. In ON, pp.

Schib.

Press, 1993.

33-85.

SchibboLeth: pour Paul Celano Paris: Galilee, 1986. Eng. trans.

SdM

Sendoffs

SoM

SP

Ton

UG

"Shibboleth:

For Paul

Celan."

Trans.

Joshua

Wilner. In WT, pp. 3-72. Spectres de Marx: Etat de La dette, Ie travail du deui!, et la nouvelle Internationale. Paris: Galilee, 1993. Eng. trans. SoM. "Sendoffs." Trans. Th omas Peper. In Yale French Studies, 77 (1990), 7-43.

Specters of Marx: The State of the Deb t, the Work of Mourning, and the New Inte rn a t iona l . Trans. Peggy Kam uf. New York: Routledge, 1994. Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's The­ ory of Signs. Tran s . David A lliso n. Evanston, Ill.: North­ western University Press, 1973. D'un ton apocalyptique adopte naguere en philosophie. Paris: Galilee, 1983. Eng. trans. "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy." Trans. John Leavey, JI. In RTP, p p. 117-171. Ulysse gramophone: Deux Mots pour Joyce. Paris: Galilee, 1987. E n g. trans. Pp. 15-53: "Two Words for Joyce," tra ns. Geoff Bennington, in PSJ. Pp. 145-59. Pp. 57-143:

xv

ABBR�:VIATIONS

"Ulysses Gra mophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyc e Kendall and Shari Benstock , in

trans . Tina AL, pp. 256-309. ,"

VP

La voix et le phenomene. Paris: Presses Universitaires de

WD

Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: The

WT

Word Traces: Readings of Paul Celano Ed. Aris Fioretos. Baltimore: The Joh ns H opkins University Press, 1994.

France, 1 967. Eng.

tra ns. SP.

University of Chicago Press, 1978.

PART ONE

The Villanova Roundtable .4 ConYersation with Jacques Derrida

The Villanova Roundtable A Conversation with Jacques Derrida

EDITORIAL NOTE

On October 2 , 1994, Jacques Derrida participated in a roundtable dis­ cussion that was the centerpiece of a day dedicated to the official inau­ guration of the new doctoral program in philosophy at Villanova University. Professor Derrida was speaking in English, extemporane­ ously and without a text, to questions put to him by Professors Walter Brogan, Thomas Busch, John D. Caputo, and Dennis Schmidt, all of Villanova's philosophy department. The question on Joyce was put afterward from the audience by Professor James Murphy, a Joyce spe­ cialist in Villanova's English department. While th is forum did not allow Derrida to develop the complexities of deconstruction , as he himself repeatedly protests, Derrida succeeded in putting things in a strikingly concise and illuminating way. His audience was mixed, composed of people from many different disci­ plines across the university, and Derrida held them spellbound for the better part of two hours. What follows is, I think, as eloquent and reliable an "introduction" to deconstruction as one is likely to find. The reader should remember that Derrida is here improvising his answers and speaking in English, although his English is extremely good and much better than his modesty will allow him to ad mit. The first words he utters in the "Roundtable" are an apology for his En­ glish, and he asks us repeatedly throughout the discussion to have mercy 011 him. The "Ro undtable" is not a carefully wrought manu­ script that he has labored over at length but a faithful transcript of h is extemporaneous remarks in the space of about a n hour and a half one October afternoon in 1 994. I am grateful to Professor Derrida for kindly consenting to the publi­ cation of this conversation. I have annotated the text by supplying in

4

DECONSTRUCI ION IN A NUTSHELL

square brackets references to his publ ished works and occasional foot­ notes that explain certain poi nts. I have also made minor stylistic alter­ ations here and there to give the sentences a better flow. Professor Derrida has graciously looked over the transcript and has himself made only minor changes. In the second half of the present volume, I have added the danger­ ous supplement of a commentary, in order to elaborate upon the nec­ essarily abbreviated discussions imposed by the " Roundtable" format, in which Derrida's suggestive but condensed observations are explored in greater detail . * * *

JOHN D. CAPUTO: Professor Derrid a , I would like to begin today's dis­ cussion by raising the issue of what we are in fact doing here and now, at this moment, which is inaugurating a doctoral program in philosophy, This is a rich and suggestive "event, " and it evokes many themes that you have been addressing over the years in your work. Many people, whose impression of deconstruction has been drawn from the public media, m ight find this an odd thing for you to be doing. They associate deconstruction with the "end of philosophy, " while we are here beginning a new program i n philosophy. They iden­ tify deconstruction with a destructive attitude toward texts and tradi­ tions and truth , toward the most honorable names in the philosophical heritage. They think that deconstruction is the enemy of academic programs and academic i nstitutions, that it is anti-institutional and cannot accommodate itself to institutional life. Finally, you have often spoken about the very notion of "inaugura­ tion" as the irruption of something "absolutely n ew," and today we are trying to inaugurate, to irrupt. We would be interested in knowing what your reflections are on this inaugural moment. JACQUES DERRIDA: First of all, I want to apologize for my English . I must improvise here, and that will be a very difficult task for me. I

would like to thank the President and the Dean for their kind words and for their hospitality, and to tha nk all of you for being present here . I t i s a n honor for m e to b e part o f this exceptional moment in the history of your university, and I am very proud of sharing this experi-

TH�: VILLANOVA ROUNDTABLE

5

ence with you , especially because it is the inauguration of a philosophy program. I think that is very important and I will t ry to say something shortly about just what I think it is so important. Before that, I would emphasize the fact that the institution of such a program is not only important for Villanova University; it is impor­ ta nt for the community of philosophers both in this country and abroad. As you know, the space for philosophy has been more and more reduced in the industrialized societies. I myself, in my own country, try as far as I can to struggle in order to enlarge the space for philosophical teaching and philosophical research. I This program is important for your university, for the country, for other philosophical communities in the world. I say this, first of all, because the philoso­ phers in this university who are conducting this program are alread y well known, both in this country and in Europe. I have some friends around me and I can assure you that they are very important philoso­ phers for us, very precious thinkers. Their presence is a guarantee for the future of this program, and we know this in advance. A moment ago, I met for an hour with many of your graduate students , the stu­ dents who will work in this program. I can tell you quite honestly tha t they are very bright. I was very happy t o engage with them for a n hour o f intense philosophical debate; they a re very well informed, very learned, and it makes me very optimistic about the futu re of this pro­ gram. I want to co n g ra tulate you and everyone who participated in the crcation of this program . I wish you the best, and in my modest way I will try to associate myself as far as possible with its life. What is called "deconstruction" - and I will be very sketchy here, because time does not permit detailed analyses - has never, never op­ posed institutions as such, philosophy as such, discipline as such. Nev­ ertheless, as you rightly said, it is another thing for me to be doing what I am do i n g here. Because, however affirmative d econstruction is, it is affirmative in a way that is no t simply posi t i ve, not simply conservative, not simply a way of repeating the given i n sti t ution . I I For a commentary on Derrida's view of philosophy as an academic discipline and his "practical initiatives" in educational institutions, see below, Part Two, chap. Z, "The Right to Philosophy." See the writings collected in DO, PR, and, also, Jacques Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington, "On Colleges and Philosophy," ICA Documents, 4/5 (1986), 66 7 1 ; reprinted in Postmodernism: leA Documents, ed. Lisa Appignanesi (London: Free Association Books, 1989), pp. Z09 228; "Women in the Beehive: A Seminar with Jacques Derrida," in Men in Feminism, ed. Alice Jardine and Paul Smith (New York: Methuen, 1987), pp. 189 203.

6

Of,CONSTRucnON IN A NUTSHELL

that the life of an ins ti tu tion implics tha t we are able to cri ti ciz e , to o pen the institution to its own f u ture. The p ara d o x in the instituting moment of an in sti t ut ion is that, at t he same time that i t sta rts so m et h ing new, it also conti n u es som eth i ng , is t ru e to the memory of the past, to a heritage, to so meth i n g we receive from the past, from o u r p re deces s o r s , from th e culture. If an inst i tut io n is to be an i n stitut ion , it must to some extent break with the pas t, keep the memory of the past, wh ile i n a u gu r ati n g so me th ing abso l ut ely new [cf. PdS I39/Points 130-131]. So, I am c o nvinc e d that today, a ltho ugh this program to so m e extent looks like other, similar p rogra m s , it does som e t h i ng absolutely new. The i ndica t i o n of this is found not simply in the structural organization of the program, but in the work, in th e content of the w ork, of t h os e who w i ll run thi s program, the new themes. The fact, for instance, tha t the faculty includes such topi c s as H e idegg e r or deconstruction indicates that they a r e not simply repro­ ducing, that they are trying to open someth i ng new and som eth i ng original, som e thing that hasn't been done in that way in other , similar universities or programs. So the paradox is that the in st itut i ng moment in an in st i tuti on is violent in a way, violent because it h as no guaran­ tee. A ltho u gh it follows the p remi s e s of t h e past, it sta rts something absolutely new, and this newness, this novelty, is a r i sk , is someth ing that h a s to be ri s ky, and it is v iol ent because it is gu a ra n teed by no previous rules. So, at the same time, you have to foll ow the rule a nd to i n ve n t a new rule, a new norm, a new criterion, a new law [ef. FL 50-52/DPJ 23]. Th at ' s why the m ome n t of institution is so da ngerou s at the same time . One sho u ld not have an ab s olute guarantee, an absolute norm; we ha v e to invent the rules. I am sure th at the respo nsi­ bility tha t is taken by my c o l leag u es , and by the students, implies that they give themselves the new r ule. There is no responsibility, no d e ci ­ sion, without t h is inauguration, this absolute break. That is wh at de­ co n st ru c t i o n is made of: not the mixture but th e tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of s o m ethi n g that has b e en given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, some th in g absolu tel y new, and a break. The condition of this pe rfor m a t i v e success, which is nev er guaranteed, is the alliance of th e s e to newness. Let me now address the question of a program. In France, we have for a lo ng time been confr o n ted with similar issues. I have a t the same time said two thi ngs which sound contradictory. On the one ha nd , I was fi gh t i n g or opposin g the rigid definition of programs, d i s c ip li nes , think

to transform,

THE VILLANOVA ROUNDTABU:

7

the borders between disciplines, the fact that in my country philosophy was taught not only in the university but also in the last grade in the high school . So we founded a nother i nstitution in 1975, a movement called the "Research Group for the Teaching of Philosophy, " 2 which opposed the dominant institution, which tried to convince our col­ leagues and French citizens that philosophy should be taught earlier than in this last grade of the high school, earlier than 1 6 or 17 years old. There should be philosophy across the borders, not only in philos­ ophy proper, but in other fields, such as law, medicine, and so forth. To some extent these struggles were a failure; nevertheless, I am sti ll convinced it was a good war. But at the same time I emphasized the necessity of discipline, of something specifically philosophical, that we should not dissolve philosophy into other disciplines, that we need at the same time interdisciplinarity, crossing the borders, establ ishing new themes, new problems, new ways, new approaches to new prob­ lems, all the while teaching the history of philosophy, the techniques, professional rigor, what one calls discipline. I do not think we need to chose between the two. We should have philosophers trained as philosophers, as rigorously as possible, and at the same time audacious philosophers who cross the borders and discover new connections, new fields, not only interd isciplinary researches but themes that are not even interdisciplinary. Allow me to refer to another institution that I have been part of in France. I have already mentioned the "Research Group for the Teach­ ing of Philosophy" in 1975. But in 1 983, some friends and I founded a new institution called the "International College of Philosophy, " i n which we tried to teach philosophy a s such , as a discipline, and a t the same time, to discover new themes, new problems, which have no legitimacy, which were not recognized as such, in existing universities. That was not simply interdisciplinarity, because interdisciplinarity im­ plies that you have given, identifiable competencies - say, a legal theo­ rist, an architect, a philosopher, a literary critic - a nd that they work together on a specific, identifiable object. That's interdisciplinarity. But when you discover a new object, an obiect that up until now has not been identified as such, or has no legitimacy in terms of academic 1 "Le Groupe de Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophique," founded in 1975 (DDP 146 153), along with the "College International de Philosophie," which Der rida mentions next, both of which I discuss below in Part II, chap. 2.

DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL

8

fields, th e n you have to invent a new competency, a new type of re­ ea rch , a new discipline. The International College of Philosophy granted a privilege to such new themes, new disciplines which were s

not, up to then, recognized and legitimized in other instihltions. So, you see, I am a very conservative person. I love institutions and I spent a lot of t i me participating in new institutions, which sometimes do not work. At the same ti me, I try to dismantle not institutions but some structures in given institutions which are too rigid or are dog­ matic or whi ch work as an obstacle to futu re resea rc h .

WALTER BROGAN: I would like to ask you a question that is very much related to the material that you have just been discussing, a question real ly also about beginnings and inauguration. Specifically, I wa n t to ask about the relationship o f your work to the Greeks as the inaugura­ tors of the Western tradition. This semester we are reading your essay on Plato in our c l a ss in Greek philosophy.3 As a matter of fact, this program in continental philosophy has very much at the forefront also a study of the history of philosophy. I w ond er how you might charac­ terize the connection of your own wo rk and the work of deconstruction to the task of reading inherited texts fro m the tradition. You have al­ ready begun to address that question. Specifically, postmodernism is often situated at the end of trad it i o n and is often characterized as hav­ ing the task of dismantling the founding texts, such as those of Plato and Aristotle. Yet, in many ways, your read i ng of the Phaedrus i s so attentive t o the structural integrity and the composition of the dia­ logue. So I wo u ld l ike to ask you if this is a characteristic of your philosophy, this tension between disruption, on the one hand, and attentiveness, on the other. What would you suggest to us as people of this age, what strategies would you suggest we employ, in the reading of these texts? JACQUES D�:RRIDA: First of all, I would say, yes, this tension is charac­ teristic of everything I try to do. Now, at the risk of being a little over­ simplifying, I would take this opportunity to reject a commonplace, a prejudice, that is widely circulated about deconstruction. That is, not o n l y among bad journalists, and there are many of them, but among people in the academy who behave not like good journalists-I have 1

"Plato's Pharmacy" (1968), in Dissemination, pp. 61 171.

THE VILLANOVA ROlJNDTARI.E

9

the deepest respect for good iournalists- but like bad journalists, re peating stereotypes without readi n g the text. Perhaps we will come back to this later on. Th i s has been f ro m the beg i nn ing a t e rr ib le prob­ lem for me, and not o n l y for me, this caricature, this lack of respect fo r readi n g . 4 Because as soon as one ex a m ines my te x ts and not only mi n e but the texts of many people close to me, one sees that respect for the great texts, for the texts of the Greeks and of others, too, is the con d i tio n of our work. I have constantly tri ed to read and to under­ stand Plato and Aristotle and I have de voted a number of texts to them. If you will allow me to make a self-reference, my book on friendship [Politiques de l'amitie], which will appear the day after tomorrow in France [ Par i s : Galilee, 1994], is ma i nly a book on Plato and Aristotle on friendship. So I think we have to read t he m again and a gai n and I feel that however old I am, I am on the threshold of reading Plato a nd Aristotle. I love them and I feel I have to start again and again and again. It is a task which is in front of me, before me. Now, nevertheless, the way I tried to read Plato, Aristotle, and oth­ ers is not a way of commanding, repeating, or conserving this heritage. It is an analysis which tries to find out h ow their thinking works or does not work, to find t h e tensions, the contradictions, the h eterogene ity within th eir own corpus Icf. KhOra BI-B4/0N 119-1 21]. What is the law of th i s self-deconstruction, this "auto-deconstruction"? Decon­ struction is not a metho d or some tool that you apply to so m eth i ng from the outside [cf. M p Pd M 122-123iMfPdM 124]. Deconstruction is something which happens and which happens i nsi de ; there is a de­ construction at work within Plato's work, for in sta n ce . As my col­ leagues know, each time I study Plato I try to find some heterogeneity in his own corpus, and to see how for instance, within the Timaeus the theme of the khOra is i nco mpatibl e with this supposed system of P lato . 5 So, to be true to Plato and th is is a sign of love and respect for Plato, I have to analyze the functioning and disfunctioning of his work. I would say the same for the whole opening, a pote n tia l force which was ready to cross the borders of Greek la n gu age Greek cul ture. ,

,

­

,

,

,

4 One of Derrida's best articulations of his respect for reading is to be found in "Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion," trans. Samuel Wcber, in Jacques Der rida, Limited Inc. (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1988). One of the principal aims of the commentary that follows in Part Two of this volume is to dispel this misrepresentation of deconstruction's approach to texts. I Sec below, Part II, chap. 3, for a detailed discussion of Derrida's interpretation of Plato's khora.

10

DECONSTRUCTION 1 1\ .. NUTSHELL

I would say the same for democracy, although the concept of de­ mocracy is a Greek h eritage This heritage is the heritage of a model , not si mply a model , but of a model that self-deconstructs, th at decon­ structs itself, so as to up ro ot, to become i n de pe nd e n t of its ow n grounds, so to speak, so that, today, philosophy is Greek and it is not Greek [ef. ED 227 228IWD 153]. In my boo k on friendship, Poli­ .

tiques de l'amitie, I tried to analyze what happened to Greek thought

with the advent of Chr i s ti a n ity, especi a ll y with the concept of brother­ hood.6 The way the Christi a n concept of brotherhood transformed the Greek concept of bro th e r hood was at the same time so m eth i n g new, an inauguration, a mutation, a break, but this break, at the same time, was developing something which was p o tential ly inscribed in the Greek tradition. So, we have to go back constantly to the Greek origin , not i n order to cultivate the origin, or in order to protect the etymol­ ogy, the etymon, the philological p u rity of the orig i n but in orde r first ,

of all to understand where we come from . Then we have to analyze the history a n d the historicity of the breaks which have p r od u ced our current world out of Greece, for i n st a n c e out of Christianity, out of this origi n , and breaking or transforming this or i gi n at th e same time. So there is this tension. Going back to my own tendency or taste or idiosyncratic style: I love reading Greek; it is still a very difficult task, and when I read Pl a to I enjoy it. I think it is an infinite task. The prob l em is not behind me. Plato is in front of me. That's why today, i n the midst of so many stereotypes and prej ud i c e s that are cir c ul a ti n g about deconstruction, I fi nd it pa i n fu l to see that many people who address the question of the canon think they have to make a choice between re adi ng Plato or o th er "great white males" and read i ng black women writers .7 But why sh ou ld we c hoose? Even before the question of the cano n became so visible, no one in the university could be s im u l ta n eo usl y a great specialist in Plato a n d in Aristotle and in Shakespeare. The choices h a d to be ,

,

6 For an F.nglish text that adumbrates Pol., see "The Politics of Friendship," trans. Gabriel Motzkin, The Journal of Philosophy, 85, No. 11 (1988), 632 644. For a dis

4 and 5 . 7 See Amy Gutman, "Relativism, Deconstruction, and the Curriculum," in Cam­

cussion of the issues surrounding this book see below, Part II, chaps.

pus Wal'li: Mlllti Cultllralism and the Politics of Difference, ed. John Arthur and Amy Shapiro (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 57 69, who accuses "deconstruction" (she never quite gets around actually to citing Jacques Derrida) of just such a view. This whole issue is discussed in more detail below, in Part Two, chap. 2, "The Right to Philosophy," and chap. 3, "A Hoax."

TH E V I I . LA NOVA ROU N DTABLE

II

made, and that is the finitude of our condition . No one can at the same time be an expert in Plato and in Milton, for instance . We ac­ cepted this. It was common sense. Why today should we choose be­ tween the great canon - Plato, Shakespeare [see AL 4 1 4-4 3 3), Cervantes, and Hegel - and others on the other hand? The academ ic field is a differentiated field . Everyone can find his or her way and make choices . A program, of course, can become special ized , but th is does not mean that there cannot be other programs with no excl usivity which would specialize in other fields. That is why I do not understand what is going on with this question of the canon. At least as regards deconstruction, it is interested in what is considered the great canon ­ the study of great Western works - and open at the same time to new works, new objects, new fields, new cultures, new languages, and I see no reason why we should choose between the two. That is the tension in deconstruction. W. B U SCH: If I might, I would like to follow up on a remark you made about internationa lism in the sense of your founding of the International College of Philosophy and also what I take to be, in your book Specters of Marx, perhaps a call for a new form of international­ ism . Recently a distinguished American historian said, apropos of the American motto E pluribus unum, that today, in the United States, we have too much pluribus and not enough unum . 8 Now, I have always considered deconstruction to be on the side of the pluribus, that i s , as deconstructing totalities, identities , in favor of loosening them up in terms of diversity, disruptions, fissures . I think that is a l esson we have all learned from deconstruction. What I would like to a sk regards a n y deconstructive salvaging of the unum. That is, can the plu ribus, the diversity, itself become too dangerous? What does deconstruction say, if anything, in favor of the unum, of community? Is there a place for unity after deconstruction? What might it look like?

THOMAS

Thank you. Again a difficult question. Let me say a word first about the internationality that you refer to at the begin­ ning. The internationality I referred to in this book, since Marx was

JACQUES DERRIDA:

� Arthur Schlesi nger, The Disu n i ting of America : Reflections on a M u lticultural Society ( N e w York: W. W . Norton Co. , 1 992); see t h e excerpt of t h i s book i n Cultu ra l Wars, p p . 226 2 34.

12

DECONST R I Jl."TION I N t\

N liTSI IELl.

the

m a i n reference of the book, was supposed to be different from what was called in the Marxist tradition the " I nternational" [cf. SdM I 39- 1 42/SoM 84-861 . I th ink that, today, there are wars and a num­ ber of world crises in which i nternational o rganizations such a s the U nited Nations, for instance, have to intervene but cannot intervene the way they should. That is, international law, wh ich is a good thing, neverth elcss is still rooted in its mission, in its action, i n its languages, in a Western concept of philosophy, a Western concept of the state a nd of sovereignty, and this is a limit. We have to deconstruct the fou ndations of this international law, but not in order to destroy the inte rnational organization . I th ink international organizations are something good , something perfectible, and something necessary, but we have to rethink the philosophical foundations of these international orga nizations. That's one limit. The other limit, which is connected with the first one, has to do with the fact that these international organizations are, in fact, governed by a number of particular states which provide these international organizations with the means to intervene, with the mili­ tary power, with the economic power, and, of course, the United States plays a major role in this. Sometimes it is a good thing, but it is at the same time a limit. So the universality of international law is in fact i n the hands of a number of powerful, rich states and has to change, a nd it is in the process of changi ng, through a number of disasters, crises, economic inequalities, inj ustices, and so on . Hence, the international arm I think is looking for its own place, its own fig­ ure, something which would go beyond the current stage of interna­ tionality, perhaps beyond citizenship, beyond belonging to a state, to a given nation state. And I think that in the world today a number of human beings arc secretly aligned i n their suffering against the hege­ monic powers which protect what is called the "new order. " So that's what I mean by a "New International . " Not a new way of assoc iating citizcns belonging to given nation-states, but a new concept of citizen­ ship, of hospitality, a new concept of the state, of democracy. In fact, it is not a new concept of democracy, but a new determination of the given concept of democracy, in the tradition of the concept of de­ mocracy. 9 9 1 n addition to Specters of Marx, Derrida also discussed the problems of interna tiona lism and the " new w o rl d order" i n The Other Heading, both of which are dis cussed below in Part ' [ wo, chap. 4, wh ich elaborates the question of deconstruction and the poss i b i l i ty of comm unity.

TH E V I L LANOVA ROU N DTA B LE

13

Now, having said this - again very simply, in a way which is too simple - I think we do not have to choose between unity and multi­ plicity . Of course, deconstruction - that has been its strategy up to now - insisted not on multiplicity for itself but on the hetcTOgene i ty, the difference, the disassociation , which is absolutely necessary for the relation to the other. What disrupts the totality is the condition for the relation to the other. The privilege granted to unity, to total ity, to organic ensembles, to community as a homogenized whole - th is is a danger for responsibil ity, for decision, for ethics, for politics . That i s why I insisted on what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from being ched up. This is not only a matter of description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting for the possibility of responsibility, of a decision , of ethical commitments . To understand this, you have to pay attention to what I would call singularity. Singu­ larity is not simply unity or multiplicity. Now, this does not mean that we have to destroy all forms of unity wherever they occur. [ have never said anything like that. Of course, we need unity, some gathering, some configuration . You sec, pure unity or pure multiplicity -when there is only total ity or unity and when there is only multipli city or disassociation - is a synonym of death . Wha t i nterests me is the limit of every attempt to totalize, to gather, versammeln - and I will come to this German word in a moment, because it is important for m e - the limit of th is unifying, uniting movement, the limit that it had to e n ­ counter, because the relationship of the unity to itself i mplies some d i f ference. To be more concrete, take the example of a person or of a culture. We often insist nowadays on cultural identity - for i nstance, national identity, linguistic identity, and so on . Sometimes the struggles under the banner of cultural identity, national identity, linguistic identity, are noble fights. But at the same ti me the people who fight for their identity must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self­ identity of a thing, this glass , for instance, this microphone, but im­ plies a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a culture is a way of being different from itself; a culture is different fro m itself; lan­ guage is different from itself; the person is different from itself. Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for you r own identity is not exclusive of another identity, i s open to another identity. And this prevents totalitarianism , nationalism , egocentrism, and so

14

m:CONsTR ucnON I N A NUTS H E LL

on . That is what I tried to demonstrate in the book called The Other Heading: in the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a self-differentiating identity, an identity different from itself, having an opening or gap within itself [AC I S-17/0H 9-1 1 ) . That totally affects a stru cture, but it is a duty, an ethical and political duty, to take into account this impossibility of being one with oneself. It is because I am not one with myself that I can speak with the other and address the other. That is not a way of avoiding responsibility. On the contrary, it is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make decisions. That raises one of my questions regarding Heidegger. As you know, deconstruction owes a lot to Heidegger. That is a complex problem that I cannot take up now. Nevertheless, one of the recurrent critiques or deconstructive questions I pose to Heidegger has to do with the privilege Heidegger grants to what he calls Versa m m i u ng, gathering, which is always more powerful than dissociation. I would say exactly the opposite [cf. Sd M 49- S7/SoM 2 3 2 9] . 10 Once you grant some privilege to gathering and not to dissociating, then you leave no room for the other, for the radical otherness of the other, for the radical singularity of the other. I think, from that point of view, separation, dissociation is not an obstacle to society, to community, but the condi­ tion . We addressed this a moment ago with the students. I I Dissocia­ tion, separation, is the condition of my relation to the other. I can address the Other only to the extent that there is a separation, a dissoci­ ation, so that I c an n ot replace the other and vice versa. That is what some French-speaking philosophers such as Blanchot and Levinas call the " ra pport sa ns rapport, " the relationless relation [cf. Foi 84 8 5 ] . 1 2 The structure of my relation to the other is of a "relation without relation . " It is a relation in which the other remains absolutely tran­ scendent. I cannot reach the other. I cannot know the other from the inside and so on. That is not an obstacle but the condition of love, of friendship, and of war, too, a condition of the relation to the other. In See be l ow, Part Two, chap. 5, for a d isc uss io n of Der ri d a s notion of j ustice as a "dis j uncture" as opposed to H e ide gger s interpretation of dike as Versa m m l u ng. II In a private conversation (no faculty allowed ! ) with the grad u a te students . 12 In Totality a nd Infinity, trans. Alphonso L i ng is (pittsburgh : Duquesne U n i ver sity Press, 1 969), Emmanuel Levinas repeatedly speaks of a relationship from which the relata absolve themselves, that is, keep withdrawi n g themselves , "ab Iating" or "absol utizi ng" themsel ves, preserving and sheltering their singu larity. See pp. 64, 1 0 2 , 1 80, 1 9 5 , 208, 2 2 0 . '

'

Ti l E V I L LA N OVA ROU N DTA B L E

15

So, dissociation is the condition of community, the condition of a n y unity as such . S o , the state, t o come back t o the state: a state in which there wou l d be only u n u m would be a terrible c a tastr op he And we have had, un­ fortunately, a number of such experiences. A state without plurality and a respect for p l u r a l i ty would be, fi rs t a t o talitar i a n sta te, and not only is this a terrible thing, but it docs not work. We know that it is terrible and that it does not work. Finally, it would not even be a state . I t woul d be, I d o not know w h a t, a stone, a rock, o r som ething like that. Thus, a state as such must be attentive as much as possible to p l u rality, to the pl u ra l ity of peoples, of languages, cultu res, ethni c groups, persons, a n d s o on. That i s t he condition for a state . .

,

DENNIS SCHMIDT: I have a very s im pl e question . It follows s o m e of the remarks you j ust made about the nature of community, about the impossibility of ethical life , the i m possib i lity of justice, as being the condition of the appearance of justice. In s om e of your more recent work the topic of j ustice has surfaced far more expl icitly and far more clearly, e ve n th o u gh YOll might argue that it has been there all the ti m e. I would like to ask YOll to elaborate a bit more on the n a tu re of justice, how you understand justice. You speak, for instance in the Marx book, of the sense of justice that is so strong and so powerful that it shatters every calculus, every p o s sible economy, that it can only be described in terms of the gift. In a n u m ber of little texts, such as Pas­ sions, Sa uf Ie nom , and KhOra [Eng. trans. , ON] , w h ich together form a sort of ess a y on the name, you say that this e ss a y on the n a m e needs to be understood, among its other dimensions, as politi ca l in its truth. C o u l d you elaborate a bit more on the meaning of this justice that can only be de sc rib ed as a gift, that cannot be l inked to any calculus, to any economy, to a dialectic, to a set of exchanges, to th e po ssi b i l i ty of vengeance or p u ni s h me n t? This might be an imp oss i bl e question , but could you say a l ittle bit more about that and say something about th a t in rel ation to the q u es tio n of the name, and singularity, and some of the re m a rk s you j ust made in response to Professor Busch?

JACQUES DERRIDA: Well , before I try to answer these questions, would again say that, as YOll see, these questions cannot really be dealt with in such a foru m , because they are difficult. Really to do j ustice to them you have to read texts, to revive a number of tra d i tions, so it

[)ECONSTRlJCrION IN A NUTS H �: I . I .

16

is very brutal to address these questions in such a way. If I were more responsible, I would s i m ply say "No, I won't, I won't participate in this game. " Nevertheless, sometimes it is not a bad thing, at least if you do not do it too often . It is not that bad that we try to encapsulate deconstruction in a nutshell . Let me offer you an anecdote . One day, two years ago, when I was in Cambridge - there was this terrible hon­ orary degree crisis in Cambridge - and a journalist took the micro­ phone and said, "Well, coul d you tell me, in a nuts h e l l , what is deconstruction?" [Points 406]. Sometimes, of course, I confess, I am not able to do that. But som e t im e s it may be useful to try nutshells. So, what about this problem of justice in a nutshell? It is true that, a l th ou g h the problem of j ustice has been on my mind in previous texts all the time, it is only in recent years that I have addressed this p rob l e m them a tical l y . It was in the conte x t of a confer­ ence at Cardozo Law school on "Deconstruction and the Poss i b il ity of Justice, " where I had to address a text by Benjamin on violence [see FL 7 5 ff. /DPJ 29ff. ] . I found it useful to make a distinction between law and j ustice, what one calls in French Ie droit, that is, right, or Rech t in G e r m a n . In English, when you say "law, " you are say both right and law, Ie droit et Ie loi , at the same time, whereas in French, we distinguish between them . So I make a distinction between the law, th a t is the history of right, of legal systems, and justice. Following Be n j a min, and at the same time trying to deconstruct Benjamin's text, or to show how Benjamin's text was deconstructing itself, I made this statement - in a nutshell - that t h e law could be deconstructed. There is a history of legal systems, of rights, of laws, of positive laws, and this history is a hi s tory of the transformation of laws. That why they are there. You can improve law, you can re place one law by another one . There are constitutions and institutions. This is a history, and a his­ tory, as such, can be deconstructed . Each time you replace one legal system by another one, one l aw by another one, or you improve th e l aw that is a kind of deconstruction, a critique and deconstruction . So, the law as such can be deconstructed and has to be deconstructed . That is the condition of historicity, revolution, morals, ethics, and pro gre s s But j ustice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the i m pu l s e the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for j ustice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law. That is why I sa id that the condition of possi­ bility of deconstruction i s a call for justice. Justice is not reducible to ,

.

,

T H E VI LLANOVA ROU N DTABLE

17

the law, to a given system o f legal structures . That means that j ustice is always unequal to itself. It is non-coincident with itself [cf. FL 34-36IDPJ 1 4 - 1 5 ] . 1 3 Then, i n Specters of Marx, I went back again to the Greeks, to the word dike, to the interpretation of the Greek word translated by "j us­ tice. " I contested the interpretation by Heidegger of dike and adikia, j ustice and injustice [see above, n . I O] . I tried to show that j ustice again impli ed non-gathering, dissociation, heterogeneity, non-identity with itself, endless inadequation, infinite transcendence. That is why the call for justice is never, never fully answered . That is why no one can say " I am just" [ef. FL 52IDPJ 2 3] . If someone tells you "I am just, " you can be sure that he or she is wrong, because being j ust is not a matter of theoretical determination. I cannot know that I am j ust. I can know that I am right. I can see that I act in agreement with norms, with the law. I stop at the red light. I am right. That is no problem. But that does not mean that I a m j ust. To speak of justice is not a matter of knowledge, of theoretical j udgment. That's why it's not a matter of calculation . You can calculate what is right. You can j udge; you can say that, accord ing to the code, such and such a misd eed deserves ten years of imprisonment. That may be a matter of calcula­ tion . B ut the fact that it is rightly calculated does not mean that it is just. A j ud ge, if he wants to be j ust, cannot content himself with apply­ ing the law. He has to rei nvent the law each time. If he wants to be responsible, to make a decision , he has not simply to apply the law, as a coded program, to a given case, but to reinvent in a singular situation a new just relationship; that means that j ustice cannot be reduced to a calculation of sanctions, punishments, or rewards. That may be right or i n agreement with the l aw, but that i s not justice. Justice, if it has to do with the other, with the infinite d istance of the other, is always unequal to the other, is always incalculable. You cannot calculate justice. Levinas says somewhere that the definition of justice- which is very minimal but which I love , which I think is really rigorous - is that j ustice is the relation to the other . 1 4 That is all . Once you relate to the other as the other, then someth i ng incalculable comes on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or to the history Il For a fuller d iscussion of Derrida's treatment of j usti ce and the law, see below, Pa rt I I , chap. 5 . 14 See Totality a n d Infi n i t y, p . 8 9 (FL 49IDPJ 22).

18

DECO N STRUCTION I N A N UTSH ELL

of legal structures . That is what gives deconstruction its movement, that is, constantly to suspect, to criticize the given determinations of culture, of i nstitutions, of l egal systems, not in order to destroy them or simply to cancel them , but to be j ust with j ustice, to respect this relation to the other as justice . In the essays you mentioned [see ON] I tried to read a number of texts, mainly Plato's Timaeus, in terms of the question of the place, khora, which disturbs and undermines the whole Platonic system, all the couples of opposition which constitute the Platonic system . This reflection on khOra is part of a political discussion . I tried to reconsti­ tute th is political scenario in order to suggest-and that is all that is possible here, without reopening Plato's text - that, if you take into account the strange structure of the khOra, of place, which is the open­ ing for any inscription, for any happening or any event, then you h ave not only to deconstruct the traditional concept of politics , but to think of another way of interpreting politics, that is, the place for the place, the place for hospitality, 1 5 the place for the gift. You have to think politics otherwise . That is part of a number of gestures I have made in recent years to deconstruct the pol itical tradition, not in order to depoliticize but in order to interpret differently the concept of the polit­ ical , the concept of democracy, and to try to articulate these concepts of the political and of democracy with what I said about the gift and about singularity. The only thing I would say about the gift- this is an enormous problem - is that the gift is precisely, and this is what it has in common with j ustice, something which can not be reappropriated . 1 6 A gift is something which never appears as such and is never equal to gratitude, to commerce, to compensation, to reward . When a gift is given, first of all , no gratitude can be proportionate to it. A gift is something that you cannot be thankful for. As soon as I say "thank you" for a gift, I start canceling the gift, I start destroying the gift, by proposing an equivalence, that is, a circle which encircles the gift in a movement of reappropriatio n . So, a gift is something that is beyond the circle of 15 Oerrida's l ectu res o n "hospitality" a re as yet unpubl ished, but I have pr o v i ded an overview of h is argument below, Part Two, chap. 4, in connection with under standi n g his hesitations about the word "com m u n i ty . " 16 The most important discussions of the gift are in OT/GT and OM/GO, although the notion was al ready being analyzed in the texts of the 1 970s, m ost notably Glas. I have treated th is notion below, Part Two chap. 5 . ,

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reappropriation, beyond t h e circle of gra titude. A gift should not even be acknowledged as such . As soon as I know that I give something, if 1 say "I am giving you s o m e t h i ng , " 1 just canceled the gi ft . I c on g ratu ­ late m yse lf or thank m ys e l f for giving so m e thi n g and then the circle has a l re ad y started to cancel the gift. So, the gift should not b e Je­ warded, should not be rea ppr op ria ted , and should not even appear as such . As s oon as the gi ft appears as such then the movement of grati­ tude, of acknowledgment, has started to des t ro y the gift, if there is su c h a thing- I am not sure, one is never sure th a t there i s a gift, that the gift is given. If the gift i s given, then it should not even appear to the one who gives it or to the one who receives it, n ot appear as such. That is paradoxical , bu t that is the condition for a gift to be given [DT 2 3 -27IDT 1 1 - 1 4]. That is the condi t ion the gift shares with justice. A justice that could appea r as such, that could be calculated, a cal c ul a t i on of what is just and what is not just, saying what has to be given in order to be j ust­

that is not justice. That is social secu ri ty , economics. Justice and gift s h ou ld go beyo nd calculation . This does not m ea n that we should not calculate. We have to calculate as rigorously as p o ss i ble . But there is a point or limit beyon d which calculation must fai l , a nd we must recognize th a t . What I tried to think or suggest is a concept of the po l i ti cal and of de mocracy that would be co m pa ti ble with, that could be articulated w i th , these i m pos s i b le notions of the gift and j ustice. A d e m oc racy or a politics that we s i mpl y calculate, without justice and the gift, would be a terrible thing, and this is often the case . JOHN D. CAPUTO: Can we talk a l ittle bit about th eol o gy?

JACQUES DERRIDA: We have started al rea d y , but we could continue.

JOHN D . CAPUTO. You have written a book called Circumfession (Cir­ confession) which is constructed on an analogy with St. Au g u stine' s Confessions. Tha t is profoundly interesting to the members of the Vil­ lanova U niversity community, which is an institution conducted by the Order of St. Augustine, a Catholic re l igi o u s order. Like St. Au­ gustine, you were born in what is today Algeria . You we r e even raised on a street called the rue Saint-Augustin. JACQUES DERRIDA . Two months after 1 was bo rn, I went back to the h ouse, which was in Algiers, located on the rue Saint-Augustin .

20

DECONSTRUCTION IN A N UTSHELL

CAPUTO: One of the most famous themes of the Confessions that you invoke is that, like St. Augustine , your mother was wo r r ied about you , that you too were a "son of these te a rs" (filius istarum lacrimarum). S h e was worried about whether you stil l believed i n God , and she would not ask you about it [cf. Circon . 1 46/Circum . 1 54-1 5 5] . JOHN D.

JACQUES DERRI DA. Never.

JOHN D. CAPUTO: She d i d not dare ask you, so she as ked everyone else . You go on to say there that, whi l e you " q u ite rightly pass for an atheist, " still "the c onstan cy of God in my l ife is c al l e d by oth er names [Circon 1 46/Circum . 1 54-1 5 5] . " Now, I always been interested in the intersection of thinkers l ike Heidegger a n d the r e li g iou s tradition; my earliest work was on the relationsh i p between Heidegger and M e i ster Eckhart. One of the thi ngs that has fas c in a ted me about your work, and of which I am re m i n ded as I l iste n to you answering Professor Schm i d t 's questi on about j ustice, is how much what you say about justice resonates with the biblical notions of j u st i c e and ca re for s i n gu ­ l ar i ty, as opposed to the philosophical notion, where j ustice is defined in te rm s of universality, of the bli n dness of justice. The question that I wo u ld pose to you today has to do with the messianic, s om ethi n g you address in Specters of Ma rx. In th i s book, the thema ti c of a-venir and viens!, of the i m pos s i bl e future, are framed in terms of what you c al l a "quasi-atheistic" mes s iani c , which you distinguish from the historical "messianisms, " th ose of the religions of the Book [ S d M 26 5-268/SoM 1 67- 1 69] . My question is, what do Judaism, the biblical tradition gen­ era l l y, a nd in p ar ti c u l a r the p ro ph e t i c tradition of j usti ce , mean for you and for you r work? How can biblical rel i g i o n and deconstruction commu n ica te with each other? Can they do each other any good? Are they on ta l king terms with each other? JACQUES DERRlDA: F i rs t of all, I am really intimidated here, not only by this audience, but by this reference to St. Augustine. The way I refer to St. Augustine is re a lly not very orthodox; it is rather - a sin! I have to confess that my relation to St. Augustine's Confessions is a little stra nge . If I h a d to summarize what I am doing with St. Augustine in Circumfession , I would say th is . On the one hand, I play with some analogies, that he came from Algeria, tha t his mother died in Europe, the way my mother was dying in Nice when I was writing th i s , and so

TH �: V I L LANOVA RO U N DTABLE

21

on. I a m constantly playing, seriously playing, with th is, a n d quoting sentences from the Confessions in Latin, 1 7 all the while trying, through my love and admiration for St. Augusti ne - I have enormou s and im­ mense admiration for him - to ask questions about a number of axioms , not only in his Confessions but in his pol itics, too . So the re is a love story and a deconstruction bern·een LI S . But I won ' t insist on St. Augustine, here. It is too difficult, and the way the text is written cannot be taken into account in a forum l ike th is. To address, more directly, the question of religion - aga in, in an oversimplifying way - I would say this. First, I have no stable position o n the texts you mentioned, the prophets a nd the Bible. For me, th is is an open field, and I can receive the most necessary provocations from these texts as well as, at the same time, from Plato and others . In Specters of Ma rx, I try to reconstitute the link between Marx a nd some prophets through Shakespeare [ef. SdM 7 5-78/SoM 4 1 44] . This does not mean that I am simply a rel igious person or that I am simply a believer. For me, there is no sllch thing as "religion" [cf. Foi, 3 7 ff. ]. Within what one calls religions - J udais m , Christianity, Islam , or other religions - there are again tensions, heterogeneity, disruptive volcanos, sometimes texts, especially those of the prophets , which can­ not be reduced to an institution, to a corpus, to a syste m . I wan t to keep the right to read these texts in a way which has to be constantly reinvented . It is something which can be totally new at every moment. Then I would distinguish between religion and faith . If by religion you mean a set of bel iefs, dogmas, or institutions - the church, e . g. - then I would say that rel i gion as such can be deconstructed, a nd not only can be but should be deconstructed, sometimes in the name of faith . For me, as for you , Kierkegaard is here a great example of some paradoxical way of contesting religious discourse in the name of 1 7 Derrida uses Latin in Circum fession to emphasize the degree to which the Juda ism in which he grew up had been assim i lated into a Ch ristian world h is fam ily, for example, spoke of "baptism" and "communion" instead of c i rcu mcision and ba r m i tzvah. Lacking a l angu age of his own , which should have been either Hebrew (as a Jew) or Arabic (as an Algerian), the French he speaks is a "foreign language , " the language of the colonizers, "Christian Latin French, " and not his o wn . See Ci rcon . 264 268/Circum. 286 290. For a fu rth e r discussioll of Derrida's treatment of the Confessions in Circumfession, see John D. Caputo , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Withou t Religion (Bloomington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1 997), § 1 8 . For m o re on the messianic, see below, Part Two, chap. 6, and Prayers and Tears, § §9 10.

DECON STR U CTION I N .'1. N UTSHELL

22

a faith that cannot be simply mastered or domesticated or taught or logically u n d e rstood , a faith that is pa ra d o x i cal . Now, what I c a l l faith in th i s case is like som e th i ng that I said ab o ut j ustice an d the gift, so m eth i n g that is presupposed by the most rad ical deconstructive ges­ ture. You ca nnot address the other, speak to the other, without an act of fai th , without testimony. 18 What are you d oing when you a ttes t to something? You a dd re s s the oth er an d ask, "believe me. " Even if you are lying, even in a perjury, you are addressing the other and asking the other to tr ust you. This "trust me, I am s peaki n g to yo u" is of the o rd e r of faith, a fai th that cannot be reduced to a th eoreti cal statement, to a determinative j udgment; it is the open in g of the address to the other. So this faith is not religious, st rictl y speaking; at least it ca nnot be tota l ly determined by a given r e l igi o n . That is why this fa ith is ab sol u te l y universal . This attention to the singularity is n ot opposed to universality. I wo u l d not oppose, as you did, universality and s ing u l a r ­ ity. I 9 I wo u l d try to ke e p the two together. The s tru ctu re of this act of faith I was j ust re fe r ring to is n ot as such conditioned by any given religion. That is why it is universal . This does not mean that in any determi nate re l igion you do not find a reference to thi s pure faith which is neither Christian nor J ew i sh nor Islamic nor Buddhist, etc . Now, I would sa y the same thing about the messianic. z o When I i ns is ted in Specters of Marx o n messianicity, which I d i s tinguis h ed from messianism , I w a n ted to show th a t the m es si a nic structure is a un ive r sal structure . As soon as you a d d re s s the other, as soon as you are open to the future, as soon as you have a temporal experience of w a iting for the future, of w a iti n g for someone to com e : that is the openi ng of experience. Someone is to come , is now to come. Justice and pe ace will ha v e to do with this coming of the other, with the promise. Each ti me I open my mouth , I am promising someth ing. 18

I n his most reccnt discussion o f rel igion , " Foi et Savoir: Les deux sources de l a 'religion' aux limites de la si mple ra ison , " i n LA Religion , ed. Jacques Derrida a n d Gia n n i Vattimo (Paris: Seu i l , 1 996), pp . 9- 86, Derrida explores t h e relationship be tween faith and re l igion , at the end of which he elaborates upon this question of faith and testimony. For a commentary on this text in particular, see Caputo, Prayers a nd Tears, S 1 1 . The q uestion of testi mony is of growing importance to h i m ; all the addi t i o n s he made i n t h e 1 993 Galilee ed ition of Passions (ON 3ff. ) t o t h e text t h a t ap peare d in English in 1 992 have to d o with testi mony. 19 I n Foi 28, Derrida speaks of messianic justice as a "un iversalizable culture of singulariti es , " thus combi ning both the si n g ul a r and the u n i versa l into one expression. 10 I have discussed Derrida's treatment of the m e ss i a n ic below, Part Two , chap. 6 .

TH E V I LLA NOVA R O U N DTARU:

23

When I sp e a k to you, I a m te l l i n g you that I promise t o tell yo u some­ th i ng , to tell you the truth. Even if I lie, th e condition of my lie is that I pro m ise to tell y o u the truth . So th e promise is not j ust one speech act among oth e rs; e ve ry spe e c h act is fundamentally a promise. This u n i ve rsal structure of the promise, of th e expectation for the future, for th e coming, and the fact that this e x pe cta ti on of the corning has to do with j usti c e th a t is what I call the messianic structure . This m essi­ a n i c structure is n ot limited to what one calls messianisms, that is, Jewish, Christian, or Islamic m ess i a n i sm , to these determi nate figures and form s of the Messiah . As s oo n as you reduce the mess ianic struc­ tu r e to messianism , then you are red u c i n g the unive rsality a n d this has important pol it i c a l consequences . Th e n you a re a c c r e d iti ng one tradition a m o n g others and a noti o n of an elected p e op l e of a given li te r a l language, a given fundamentalism . That is why I think th a t the difference, however subtle it may appear, between the messianic and m e ssianis m is very i m por ta n t On the side of messianicity there is fa i th , no doubt. Th e re is no society without faith, without tru st i n the other. Even if I a b u s e this, if I l i e or if I com m i t perjury, if I am violent b eca u se of this fa i th, even o n the ec ono mi c level, the re is no society w itho u t this faith , this m i n i m a l act o f fa ith . What one calls credit in capitalism , in ec o nom ics has to do with fa i th , and the econom ists know that. But this faith is n ot and should not be reduced or defi ned by r e lig ion as such. Now, I will end this d i s cuss ion with th is point. The problem re­ m ain s a n d this is really a prob l e m for me, an enigma -whether the reli g i on s , say, for instance, the reli gions of the Book, are but s pe c i fic examples of this g en era l structure, of messianicity. Th ere is the general str u c tu re of m es s i a n i c ity, as the str uct u re of expe ri e nc e, and on this groundless g ro un d there have been revelations, a h i sto ry which one c alls J u da i s m or C h ri s ti a ni ty and so on. That is a possibility, a n d then you would have a H e id egge ria n gesture, in style. You would have to go back fro m these reli g ion s to the fu n d a m en ta l on to l og i c a l conditions of possibil ities of religions , to d e s c r ibe the structure of messianicity on the groundless g rou nd on which re l ig i on s have b ee n made possible . That is one hypothesis. The other hypothesis - and I c onfess that I h e sitate between th e se two possibilities - is that the events of revela­ tion, the b i b l i c al trad itions, the Jewish, C h r i sti a n , and Islamic tradi­ tions, have been absolute events , irreducible even ts which have u n ve il e d this m e s s i a nic i ty We would not know what messianicity is -

,

.

,

-

.

24

m:CONSTRUc.,ION IN A N UTS H F. L L

without messianism, without these events which were Abraham, Moses, and J esus Christ, and so on . In that case singular events would have unveiled or revealed these universal possibilities, and it is only on that condition that we can describe messianicity. Between the two possibilities I must confess I oscillate and I think some other scheme has to be constructed to understand the two at the same time, to do j ustice to the two possibilities. That is why - and perhaps this is not a good reason , perhaps one day I will give up this - for the time being I keep the word "messianic. " Even if it is different from messianism, messianic refers to the word Messiah; it does not simply belong to a certain culture, a Jewish or Ch ristian culture. I think that for the time being I need this word , not to teach , but to let people understand what I am trying to say when I speak of messianicity. But in doing so I still keep the singularity of a single revelation, that is Jewish, Christian revelation , with its reference to Messiah. It is a reinterpretation of this tradition of the Messiah [ef. SdM 26 5-268/SoM 1 67-1 69J . Let me tell you a story, something I reread recently, and which I quote in the book on friendship [Poli tiques de L'amitie, 5 5 n l ] , which will be published in a few days . Maurice Blanchot tells this story. 2 1 The Messiah was a t the gates of Rome unrecognized , dressed i n rags. But one man who recognized that this was the Messiah went up to him and asked him, " When will you come?" I think this is very pro­ found . It means that there is some inadeq uation between the now and now. He is coming now; the messianic does not wait. This is a way of waiting for the future, right now. The responsibil ities that are assigned to us by this messianic structure are responsibilities for here and now. The Messiah is not some future present; it is imminent and i t is this imminence that I am describing under the name of messianic structure. Now, there is another possibility that I also mentioned in this book on friendship: that the Messiah is not simply the one, the other, that I am constantly waiting for. There would be no experience without the waiting on the coming of the other, the coming of the event, and justice. But the Messiah might also be the one I expect even while I do not want him to come. There is the possibility that my relation to the Messiah is this: I would like him to come, I hope that he will 21 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock University o f Nebraska Press, 1 986), pp. 1 4 1 14 2 .

(Lincoln :

TH E V I l .l .AN OVA ROU N m'A B LE

25

come, that the other will come, a s other, for th a t would be justice, peace, and revolution - because in the concept of messianicity there is revolution - and, at the same time, I am scared . I do not want what I wa nt and I would like the coming of the Messiah to be infin itely postponed, and there is this desire in me. That is why the man who addressed th e Messiah said, "When will you come?" That is a way to say, w e l l as lo ng as I speak to you, as l o n g as I ask you th e question, "When will you come?" , at least you are not coming. And that is th e condition for me to go on asking questions and living. So there is some ambiguity in th e messianic structure. We wait for someth ing we would not like to wait for. That is another name for death . JAMES M U RPH Y : I want to ask you about the infl uence of yo u r work on literary texts and in reve rs e , in pa rtic u la r your works on James Joyce, where the i n fluen c e seems to go from h i m to you, and then from you back again. So you are deconstructing Joyce while J oyce is decon­ structing you . Could you expand upon this relationship? JACQUES DERRIDA: It i s already very difficult to write on Joyce, but to speak on Joyce is even more difficult. 22 Nevertheless, I will try to say something. A long ti m e ago, in 1 956-57, I spent a year at Harvard , and what I did there was to read Joyce i n the Widener Li b rary which pro vided my encounter with Ulysses. S in c e then, Joyce has repre­ sented for me the most gigantic attempt to gather in a s i ngle work, that is, in the singularity of a work which is irreplaceable, in a singular event- I am referr i ng here to Ulysses and to Finnega n 's Wake -the presumed total ity, not only of one culture but of a number of cultures, a number of languages, lite ra tures, and religions This impossible task of precisely gathering in a totality, in a pote ntial totality, the potentially infinite memory of h u ma n ity is, at the same time and in an exemplary way, both new in its modern form and very classical in its ph ilosop h i cal form. That is why I often compare Ulysses to Hegel , for instance, to the Encyclopedia or the Logic, as an attempt to reach absolute knowledge through a single act of memory. This is made possible only by loading every sentence, every word, with a maximum of e q uivocali­ ties, virtual associations, by making this organic l ing u i stic totality as rich as possible . Of course, at the same t i m e this attempt reas sembl ed ,

.

­

,

22

See below, Part Two, chap. 7 .

26

DECONSTRUCTION I N A N UTSHELL

the h i sto ry of li teratu re and inaugurated and produced a break in the history of l i te rature What I tri ed to show also in my work on Joyce is that, at the same time, the writing of these works functions as an in­ j unction to the a c a d e my that is, to literary critics to come, to the institution of J oy ce a n scholarship, to b u il d a sort of beehive, an infinite institution of peo ple working as i nterpreters and philologists, people dec i ph e ring Joyce's si gn atu re as a s ingula r signature. From tha t point of vi ew I think th a t Joyce is a great landmark in the history of decon­ struction . That is why the reference to Joyce is important to me. In my first book on Husserl [Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction, 1 962) I trie d to compare the way J oy c e treats language and the way a classical philosoph e r such as Husserl tre a ts langua ge Joyce wan ted to make history, th e resuming and the tota l i z a t i on of history, possib l e th rough the accumulation of metaphoricities, equ iv o­ calities , and tropes. H u s s e rl on the other han d , thought that historic­ ity was made po ssible by the transparent u nivocity of lan gua ge, that is, by a s ci e n ti fi c mathematical, pure lan gu age There is no historicity without the transparency of the tradition, H usserl says , while Joyce says there is no historicity without this accumulation of equivocality in language. It is from the tension between these two interpretations of l a n g uage that I tried to a ddre ss the question of lan gu a ge [cf. HOdG .

,

.

,

,

.

1 04-1 071HOG 1 02- 1 04J

I would mention o nly two other po i n ts in Joyce in reference to our current discussion. One has to do with what Joyce calls at some point the legal fiction of fatherhood lUG 1 3 5/AL 304] . This is a very Chris­ tian moment, when S teph en Daedalus says that paternity is a legal fiction , a nd he refers to well -known Christian texts Why is that so? Because one is supposed to know who the m other is. There is the possibility of bearing witness to who the mother is, whereas the father is only reconstructed, inferred . The identification of the father is al­ ways resigning a j u dgm en t; you c a n no t see the fat h er Our experience today is that it is not o nly the fa t her who is a legal fiction , from which it draws and has drawn its authority. Freud confirms t h i s by saying that patriar chy represents progress in the h istory of mankind , because to deter mine who the father is, you need reason, whereas to d ete r min e who the mother is, you need only sensible perc e p tion I th ink he is wrong , and he has always been wrong but we know this now better than ev e r For today the mother is also a l egal fiction from that poi nt of view. Motherhood is something which is interpreted , the theme .

.

.

.

TI l E VI LLANOVA ROU N DTABLE

27

of a reconstruction from experience. What one calls today surrogate mothers, for instance, and all the enormous problems that you are fa miliar w i th , attest to the fact that we do not know who the mother is . Who is the mother in the case of surrogate mothers? And when we realize that motherhood is not si mply a matter of perception, we real­ ize that it has never been so . The mother has always been a matter of interpretation, of social constructio n . This has enormous political consequences, which we do not have time to deal with now. But if we had time, I would try to show what the equivocal conseq uences would be of th is fact that the situation of the mother is the same as that of the father. That is the fi rst thing I insisted on in this text on Joyce. The second thing I would select here has to do the question of the "yes. " In my short essay on Joyce, I tried to deal only with th e word "yes" as it was performed , so to speak, in Ulysses . I tried to show all the paradoxes that are linked to the question of the "yes , " and this has to do with the fact that deconstruction is "yes , " is linked to the "yes , " i s an affirmation . As you know, "yes" i s the last word in Ulysses. When I say "yes" to the other, in the form of a promise or an agreement or an oath, the "yes" m ust be absolutely inaugura l . Inauguration is the theme today. Inauguration is a "yes . " I say "yes" as a starting point. Nothing precedes the "yes. " The "yes" is the moment of institution, of the origin; it is absolutely originary. But when you say " yes, " you i mply that i n the next m oment you will have to confirm the "yes" by a second "yes. " When I say "yes, " I immediately say "yes, yes . " I commit myself to confirm my commitment in the next second , and then tomorrow, and then the day after tomorrow. That means that a "yes" immediately d uplicates itself, doubles itself. You cannot say "yes" without saying "yes, yes . " That implies memory in that promise. I promise to keep the memory of the first "yes . " In a wedding, for instance , or in a prom ise, when you say "yes , I agree, " " I will , " you imply "1 will say ' I will' tomorrow, " and "I will confirm my promise" ; otherwise there is no promise . That means that the "yes" keeps i n advance the memory o f i t s o w n begi n n i ng , a n d that i s the way tradi­ tions work. If, tomorrow, you do n ot confirm that today you have founded your program , there will not have been a ny ina uguration . Tomorrow, perh a ps next year, perhaps twenty years from now, YOLl will know whether today there has been an i nauguration . We do not know that yet. We pretend that today we are ina ugurating someth ing . But who knows? We will see. So "yes" has to be repeated and repeated

28

DF.CONSTR uc nON IN A N UTS H E L L

immediately. That is what I call i tera bility It implies repetition of itself, which is also threatening, be c au s e the second "yes" may be sim­ ply a parody, a record , or a mechanical repetition. You may say "yes, yes" like a parrot. The technical reproduction of the originary "yes" is from the beginning a threat to the l iving origin of the "yes . " So the "yes" is ha unted by its own ghost, its own mechanical ghost, from the beginning . The second "yes" will have to reinaugurate, to reinvent, the first one. If tomorrow you do not re i nven t today's inauguration, you will be dead . So the inauguration has to be rei n vented everyday. .

JOHN D. CAPUTO: Professor Derrida, thank you very much .

PART TWO

A Com m entary: Deconstruction in a Nutshell

1 Deconstruction i n The Very Idea (!)

a Nutshe l l :

"One day, two years ago, when ] was i n Cambridge journalist took the microphone and sai d , ' Well,

.

could

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.

a

you

tell me, in a nutshel l , what is deconstructi o n ? ' So metimes, of cou rse , I confess, I am not able to do that. But sometimes it may be useful to t r y nutshells . "

" Roundtable, " 1 6

THE APORETICS O F THE N UTSHELL

Deconstruction in a nutshell? Why, the very idea ! The very idea of a nutshell is a mistake a nd a misunderstanding, an excess - or rather a defect- of journalistic haste and impatience , a ridiculous demand put by someone who has never read a word of Der­ rida's works (Points 406) . Nutshells enclose and encapsulate, shelter and pIOtect, reduce and simplify, while everything in deconstruction is turned toward opening, exposu re, expansion, and complexification (Points 429), toward releasing unheard-of, undreamt-of possibil ities to come, toward cracking nutshells wherever they appear. The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things - texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs , and practices of whatever size and sort you need - do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mis­ sion would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy. What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is always to come. Every time you try to stabilize the meaning of a th ing, to fix it in its missionary position , the thing itself, if there is anyth i ng at all to it, slips away (VP 1 I 7/SP 1 0 4) A "meaning" or a "mission" is a way to contain and compact th ings, like a nutshell, gathering them .

32

DECON STRUCTION IN A N UTSH E LL

into a unity, whereas deconstruction bends all its efforts to stretch be­ yond these boundaries, to transgress these confines, to interrupt and disjoin all s uch gathering. Whenever it runs up against a limit, deconstruction presses against it. Whenever deconstruction finds a nutshell -a secure axiom or a pithy maxim - the very idea is to crack it open and d isturb this tran­ quillity. Indeed , that is a good rule of thumb in deconstruction. Tha t i s what deconstruction is a l l about, its very meaning a n d mission, if i t has a ny. One might even say that cracking nutshells i s what decon­ struction is. In a nutshel l . But then have w e n o t gone too far? Have w e not run u p agai nst a paradox and an aporia? To put in a nutshell what refuses to let itself be so put, not just because, as a matter of fact, deconstruction is too complicated to summarize, but because it is, in principle, opposed to the very idea of a nutshell and bends all its efforts to cracking nutshells. And then to see, having said this, that that is not a bad way of putting what deconstruction is, if it is. Once we have d ismissed the very idea of a nutshell, indignantly slammed the door behind us, it swings backs and slams us in return (you know where). Let us call this the aporetics of the nutshell . Still , this aporia is not the end of the road. For the paralysis and impossibility of an aporia is j ust what impels deconstruction, what rouses it out of bed i n the morning, what drives it on and calls it into action. Indeed , one might even say, maybe it has already been said , that "the experience of the impossible" (FL 3 5IDPJ 1 5 ), being in an impossible fix, is just what deconstruction is all about. l Indeed , even when no one has stuck a microphone in his face, whenever he simply feels the need to summarize and briefly characterize deconstruction , Derrida often has recourse to this expression: "experience of the impos­ sible. " He even says it is the "least bad" way to define deconstruction, that is, the least bad n utshell . Dec onstruction i s the relentless pursuit o f the impossible, which means, of things whose possibility is sustained by their impossibility, of thing s which , instead of being wiped out by their impossibility, are actually nourished and fed by it. Derrida says he l ikes the old word I I have documented at some le ngth the pervasiveness of this expression in Der ri da's worles in Prayers a n d Tea rs ofJacques Derrida. A recent issue of The Oxford Liter ary Review, 1 5 , Nos. 1 2 ( 1 993), ed. Timothy Clark and N icholas Royle, was very nicely entitled "Exper iencing the Impossible. "

DECO N STRUCTION IN A NUTS H E LL

33

"experience, " taken not i n the traditional , dusty phenomenological sense, wh ich means to perceive what presents itself, but rather when it is "dusted off" a little so that it can take on a deconstructive sense . Then "experience" means running up against the lim its of wha t can never be present, passing to the l i mits of the unpresentable and unrep­ resentable, which is what we most desire, namely, the impossible (Pd S 22 1 , 3 871Poinis 207, 3 7 3). The impossible i s more interes ting than the possible and provokes more interesti ng results, provided that any­ thing at all results . Therefore, it is "not that bad that we try to encapsu­ late deconstruction in a nutshell, " to give it its l east bad definition , provided we do not try it too often and provided we admit, nay, love, the i mpossible situation in which it is ensnared , by wh ich it is impas­ sioned. That is the foolhardy, impossible task we set ourselves here . To fol­ low Derrida around the "Roundtable" as he lays out, expounds, "ex­ poses" certain basic gestures in a deconstructive approach to things , just enough to encapsulate it, to mark off its style and what he himself will call its "signature, " to catch the spirit, some of the several and uncontainable spirits, of a certa in way to read and write, to think and act called deconstruction - all along appreciating the aporia in which this i mplicates us. For the aporia of the nutshell is not without merit: to see tha t in deconstruction wherever we find a nutshell, the idea is to crack it, and-this is the impossible - to see that tha t is what deconstruction is, that that is a certa in way, per impossibile, to con dense it. In a nutshell, a certain auto-deconstructing nutshel l . We m a y read the "Roundtable" a s offering several such nutshells, several succinct encapsulations of deconstruction in terms of justice, the gift, the messianic, the institution, traditions, hospitality, fa ith , the affirmation of the other, the viens, the oui, oui, the imposs ible, etc . Indeed, I will go so far as to say that, once you "try nutshells , " a s Derrida puts it, the precise problem will be not that deconstruction cannot be concisely condensed into a nutshell - I have found many a nutshell strewn a round Derrida's texts - but, if anything, that there are too many nutshells scattered hither a nd yon. That is a result at which we ought not to express too much surprise or dismay, for in a phi loso­ phy where "dissem ination" plays a major role, we should expect rather more disseminative strewing than Heideggerian gathering . But it is a well-known philosophical axiom , handed down to us by the a n ­ cients - I am sure it is to be found somewhere in Diogenes Laertius -

34

DECONSTRUCTION IN A N UTSHELL

that too many nutshells make for no nutshell at all, as when a man swears up and down that he is making now a deep and lifelong vow, that this the defining moment in his life, that his whole life is con­ densed into this single moment, but does this regularly, on the hour, each time revising his resolution. So, then, we will need a way to think about the nutshell, an ab­ stract, theoretical model of the nutshell, a paradigm (or two) powerful enough to help us "think" - in the transitive mode - the nutshell in its very being and essence, its very coming-into-being and emerging into unconceal ment as a nutshell, its very Wesen (understood verbally, to be sure), if it has one. Several such complex and advanced models leap to mind: • Think of the nutshell on this disseminative m odel I just men­ tioned, as a seed to plant, to be squ irreled away here and there, l ike an acorn or a chestnut, within the nurturing soil . By planting nuts that they sometimes forget, which then grow into mature trees, squirrels serve an important ecological and disseminative function (provided that their memories are weak enough). So, with enough nuts and squirrels, you could have a full-grown forest, a whole field of decon­ structive works and practices. • But if it troubl es you to think of Derrida and deconstruction as a bunch of nuts and squirrels, something we are trying iiI fact in the present work devoutly to avoid, think of these little nutshells, these little capsules , "pyrotechnically" -feu la cendre - which, alas, must eventually turn to ash . 2 Think of them as compact little fireworks de­ vices that, when set off- the trick being how to release their energy and power without getting burnt - fill the sky with the most magnifi­ cent display of color and form, not to mention a terrific, explosive boom. Deconstruction then would be a way to l ight the night air with awe-inspiring color, with a magnificent pyrotech nic plumage, begin­ n i ng with a si mple little saying or phrase. • Or you may, in a related way, think of these nutshells as six mis­ siles fi red into the establishment's camp, so that if the powers that be saw one of them headi ng at their head they would, after shouting

l As a trace and a figure of the trace, as a quasi being neither quite present nor absent, the i m age of the "ci nder" runs throughout Derrida's work. See Cinders, tran s . N ed Lukacher (Lincoln: U n iversity o f Nebraska Press, 1 99 1 ), a bil ingual edition con ta i ning the text of Feu fa cendre (Paris: Des fem mes, 1 987).

DECO N ST R U CTION IN A N UTS H E LL

35

"incom ing, " quickly scatter. 3 The limitations of this and the previous model are twofold . On the one hand they invite h is critics to thi nk of Derrida as simply shooting off his mouth, which aga i n is a confusion we aim to quell . On the other hand, they give an unduly negative idea of deconstruction, as if the aim of deco nstruction is simply to take aim on our most cherished institutions and blow them out of the water, a s if deconstruction is not to be distinguished from a simple destruction. 4 That again is something of which we mean to disabuse our readers , if there arc any. • So, then , i n a final gesture, think of these nutshel ls, still one more time, as samplers to be tasted, l ike those selections of four or five of the best prod ucts of the local microbrewery served on a n inviting tray, and th ink of the present volume as a " Derrida Sampler" and j ust such a tray. The result of reading this little book, then , will have been to savor some of the several flavors of deconstruction, the idea being not to slake one's thirst but to sti r one's desire, to whet one's appetite to d rink more deeply of the deconstructive wel l . But I must a d d a word o f caution about the advanced, abstract, a n d h ighly theoretical chara cter o f the models here proposed, a word t o the wa ry about what I d o not mean by a n utshell, and this is important in order to protect Derrida and deconstruction whenever it tries nutshells . Although I vow and promise, and concentrate my entire life into this resolution , that I will speak American English and not bury the reader alive in jargo n , I am not saying that what follows is really simple and easy to understa nd, that deconstruction can be treated in a facile way. Although nutshells are made for cracki ng, they can still be hard to crack, and I do not mean to engage in false advertising, to trick the unwary, into th inking that I am going to simplify and summarize to an extreme. I am taking up certain themes, certain motifs, without pretending to take up everything, and exhibiting how deconstructive approaches work (since there is not only one and there are many dc­ constructions). I want to show what sorts of moves deconstruction makes in given situations, what sorts of results it produces under cer� I borrow this model from a piece by Derrida on the a mlS race, " No Apocalypse , Not Now (full speed ahead, seven m i ssiles, seven m i ssives), " tra n s . Catherine Porter and Phi l i p Lewis, Diacritics, J 4 (Summer 1 984), 20 3 1 . 4 For exa mple, i n Foi 62ff. , Derrida worries about grell ades or shells i n con n ection with Isl a m i c fundamenta l is m .

36

D ECONSTRUCTION I N A NUTS H E L L

tain circumstances , what are some of its characteristic gestures, strate­ gies, styles, twists and turns. I am doing so within a limited amount of space, with the hope that, later on, rea de rs , having been d isabused of the abuse heaped on deconstruction, will be motivated to look into these matters further, to try to crack these nuts on their own , which will involve buying a certain amount of difficulty for themselves. Like Johannes Climacus, 5 whose methodological d ifficulty is also drama­ tized near the end of The Life of Brian, I am trying by these nutshells to get the reader, to get you, to do something on your own without its being said that Derrida or I got you to do it and thereby made it easy for you . Neither Derrida nor I am trying to rob you of your anxiety.

THE AxIOMATICS OF INDIGNATION : THE VERY IDEA! The idea wil l be to give the reader an idea of what deconstruction is up to or about, j ust enough , without burying you in every microdebate into which Derrida and deconstruction has been drawn , 6 without drawing you down every complex corridor of a formidably subtle thinker . The questions put to Derrida by his interlocutors in the "Roundtable" aim, on the whole, at dispelling the idea that Derrida is a nut. It is not uncommon to portray Derrida as the devil h imself, a street-corner anarchist, a relativist, or subjectivist, or nihilist, out to destroy our traditions and institutions, our beliefs and val ues, to mock philosophy and truth itself, to undo everything the Enlightenment has done - and to replace all this with wild nonsense and irresponsible play. That, alas, is how he is portrayed by his- often very i rresponsi­ ble - c ritics who speak in the name of academic responsibility. Elabo­ rating a nd documenting the way the "Roundtable" puts the torch to this stupefying misrepresentation of deconstruction is a principal goal , nay, the most solemn duty, o f t h e present volume. The thrust of each of the questions put to Derrida in the " Roundta­ ble" was to press him about the relevance of deconstruction to the most traditional values of institution , tradition, community, j ustice , 5 Kierkegaard's Works. XII. I . Concluding Unscienti fic Postscript to the " Philosoph i cal Fragmen ts, " trans. Howard Hong and E dn a Hong (Princeton: Princeton U n i ver sity Press, 1 992), pp. 72 80. 6 For a n account of the various debates i n to which Derrida has e ntered , see Niall Lucy, Debating Denida (Melbou rn e : Melbourne University P r ess , 1995).

I WCONSTR U C I ION IN A N UT S H ELL

37

and rel igio n . The occasion was a solemn moment in the life o f Villa­ nova University, a wel l-establ ished university in the middle of its sec­ ond century of life, which was inaugurating a new doctoral program in a depa rtment that is one of the departments that define - what else can I say? - the "mission" of this university. So, all were on thei r best behavior, trying to make deconstruction (look) respectable, and Der­ rida was eloquent about the place of deconstruction at the heart of our most time-honored and hoary institutions. Derrida was trying to persuade us that deconstruction is on our side, that it means to be good n ews, and tha t it does not leave behind a path of destruction and smoldering embers . Of course, he was not saying, Cod forbid, that deconstruction is - and he is also accused of this - a form of conservativism . H e has always done everyth ing he can t o resist conservativism , has always tried to be productive not reproductive, to reread and revise the oldest of the old , to unfold what has been folded over by and in the trad ition, to show the pliant multiplicity of the innumerable traditions that are sheltered within "tradition. " The very idea that the tradition is one " the one history itself the one tradi ­ tion" - is what needs t o b e "contested a t its root, " he says (Sa uf8 5/0N 7 l ). A tradition is not a hammer with which to slam dissent and knock dissenters senseless , but a responsibility to read, to interpret, to sift and select responsibly among many competing strands of tradition a nd interpretations of tradition . If you have a tradition, you have to take responsibility for it and for its multiplicity (SdM 40/SoM 1 60). But that, of course, is the only way to conserve a trad i tion . That is why Derrida says in the "Roundtable, " to the surprise no doubt of many, "So, you see, I am a very conservative person . " For he sees d econ­ struction as a way to keep the event of tradition going , to keep it on the move, so that it can be continually translated i nto new events, continually exposed to a certain revolution in a self-perpetuating auto­ revolution. Tha t is an aporia that conservativism can never swallow. That is why conservativism is such a limp and mummifying theory of a "tradition , " which is a bigger, wider, more d iffuse and mobile, more self-revising and "auto-deconstructing" idea than "conservativism . " Let me risk, with fear a n d trembling, the following axiom which governs what I call a certa in "axiomatics of indignation" that Derrida seems to provoke: the most fundamental misunderstanding to beset Derrida and deconstruction is the m istaken i mpression that is given of a kind of anarchistic relativism i n which "anyth ing goes . " On this .

.

.

DECON STRlJCnON I N A N UTSHEI .I .

38

view, texts mean anyth ing the reader wants them to mean; trad itions are j ust monsters to be s l a i n or escaped from; the great masters of the Western tradition are dead white ma le ty ra n ts whose power m u s t be broken and whose name defamed; institutions a re j ust pow e r p l a y s op­ pressing everyone; and l a ng ua g e is a prison , j ust a game of signifiers sign ifying noth i n g a play of d i ffe r e nc es without re fe r enc e to the real world . Thus the dominant reaction that Derrida provokes a m ong his critics, who do not c o n te nt themselves with s imply disagreeing with him , is i nd i gn a tion His critics seem immediately to shift into high dudgeon , cloaki n g themselves in a se l f- ri g h te o u s "moral" or "ethical" mantl e - where ethics h a s the look of a se l f app rov i n g good con­ science -appointing th em s elves Defenders of the Good and th e True. Critics of deconstruction feel obl iged to r u s h to the i r closets, dust off and don th e i r academ ic suits of a rm or and then co l l ecti vel y c ha rge this enemy of the c o m mon good, thei r l a n c e s pointed at h i s heart. For if Derrida's sh e n a n i gan s arouse their ire when deconstruction is con fi n ed to reading Joyce or Mallarme, you can imag i n e how th e tem­ pers of these K n i ghts of the Good a nd True flare w h e n deconstruction threatens to spill over into the streets , when it gets translated into poli­ tics and ethics. Then th e infl uence of this dre a dfu l nihilism is i n to l e ra­ ble, for it poses a threat to the common good . E rgo, we, the Good and the Just (self-authorized a nd self-knighted, to be sure) - that is wh at "we" al m o s t always m ea n s - m u st stamp it out. Just in case you th ink I am exaggerating or m a ki ng this up, let us revisit the o cc a s i o n to which Derrida briefly refers when in the "Roundtable" he ad ve rts to "this terrible h o n or a ry d e gr ee crisis in Cambridge . " In the spring of 1 992 Derri d a was nominated to receive an honora ry d e gree fro m C a mb rid ge University. On May 9, 1 992, a lette r was pu b l i s h ed in the Lon do n Times u rg i n g the faculty of Cam­ bridge to vote aga inst a wa rd i n g this d egr ee to Derrida (see Poi n ts 4 1 942 1 ). To b egi n wi th , we may ask, who had a p poin ted the signatories protectors of Cambridge University? Does the University not have its own board of protectors? Has it not been able to get along for centuries without such help? Are the dons not adult enough to be able to make up th e i r own minds? Be that as it may, the a ll e ged gro u n ds for th is extra ordinary intervention of outsiders - this wa s the first time in thirty years that such a vote was r equi re d 7 - were, among other thi ngs , that -

,

.

-

,

, See N . Rothwell, "Those Dons a nd t h e Derrida To Do , " Australian Higher Edu­ cation S upplemen t, 626 (May 1 3 , 1 99 2 ) , 1 3 ; "Honour Served in Derrida Affa i r , " ibid. , 627 (May 20, 1 99 2 ) , 1 3 , 20; Ben n i ngto n and Derrida, 1acques Derrida , p. 3 3 1 .

DECONSTRUCfION IN A N UTSHF.LI .

39

Derrida 's "style defies comprehension" and that "where coherent as­ sertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial . " The fi nal blast in this letter runs like this: Academic status based on what seems to

us

l i ttle

more

than semi i ntel l i

gible attacks upon the values o f reaso n , truth , and scholarshi p is

not,

we s ub m i t sufficient gro u nds for the awarding of an honorary degree ,

in a distingu ished u n i versity

[Poin ts 420 42 1 ].

The signatories, who say they are signing "sincerely" - includ ing Ruth Barcan Marcus and Wilfred Van Orman Quine (some grati­ tude! S) in the U nited States - constitute a kind of international associa­ tion of "officials of anti-deconstruction" (Pass. 4 1 10N 1 7) who, while trying very hard to make themselves look international (Ba rry Smith gets to sign his name twice, once as the agent provoca teu r and once as "International Academy of Philosophy" at Liechtenstei n ! ) are in fact for the most part intensely narrow "analytic" philosophers . Of Marcu s, in particular, one might say that she has made a career out of- her "academic status seems to us based upon" - attacking "continental" and more generally non-analytic philosophers wherever she finds them, and maintaining the dominance of a narrow and c u l tu rally i rrel­ evant style of philosophizing in the American Philosophical Associa­ tion and Ivy Leagues departments of philosophy, resistant to its own history, to history itself, and to the socio-political matrix of philoso­ phizing in every age. In this, alas, she and her friends have largely succeeded, wi th the result that philosophy today tends to be of almost no importance what­ soever in the United States and in most of its major universities. Indeed, the only places one can read Hegel - not to mention De r­ rida - in these i nstitutions are the comparative literature a nd modern language departments, something that has served greatly to promote the growth of departments other than philosophy. In a fascinati ng and provocative study, John McCumber has suggested recently that this cultural a nd political isolation, this "bleak house" of analytic philoso­ phy, was a state of affairs actively embraced by analytic philosophy in 8 One of Derrida's earliest publ ications was a translation i nto French of an article by Qui n e , "Les frontieres de la theorie logique , " trans. ) . Derrida and R . Marti n , EtlJdel Phi[osoph iqlJes, 2 ( 1 964), 1 9 1-208 . Also, i n h i s autobiography, Q u i n e reports borrowing the office of Derrida wh i l e in Paris for a visit. See W. V. O. Qu in e , The Time of My Life : An Autobiography (Cambridge: The M IT Press, 1 98 5), p. 3 5 5 .

40

m:CONST R U C' ( 'ION I N A N UT S H E ll ,

the era of M cCarthyism, a way of protecting itself from attack by the House U n-American Activities Committee in the 1 9 50s, that has per­ sisted , anachronistically, into our own day , 9 Richard Rorty, the one American philosopher to break l oose from that church of latter-day analytic Aufkliirers and to make himself, in the spirit of William James or John Dewey, into a public intellectual, has been excommunicated from their club, no doubt by the U nanalytic Activities Committee ­ after having excused or excommunicated him s elf from their ranks. It is inconceivable to me that the signatories of this letter, despite thei r "yours sincerely, " have read Derrida with care, if they have read him at alL What they know of Derrida , I would bet the farm , if I had one, has been gathered by hearsay and the public press, from second­ ary, not to say second-rate sources, from dinner-hour gossip at annual meetings of groups like the A , p, A. , from at most a casual scanning of a famous text or other. Their condemnation of Derrida is not a carefully reasoned and researched j udgment, but an allergic reaction to some­ thing different, an expression of contempt for a different philosophical style by which they are shocked and scandal ized; but it is impossible to believe they have carefully studied what they have denounced . In oth er words, their condemnation of Derrida violates on its face the very "values of reason , truth , and schola rship" with which they so self­ righteously cloak themselves, in the name of disinterestedly "protect­ ing" Cambridge University from itself. As if anyone asked them ! As if, and "this is also extremely funny" (Points 404) even as it is extremely serious, the faculty of Cambridge U niversity needed to be protected from itself by the International Academy of Philosophy of Liechten­ stein! 1 0 The very idea! The very idea that anything as irresponsible as this letter could be signed in the name of responsible scholarship, that the people who signed such a thing can sleep at night, gives one an idea of the axio­ matics of ind ignation , of the reaction that the name " Derrida" pro­ vokes. So the reader will trust me when I say that Derrida is a bit of 9 See J ohn McCumber, "Time in the Ditc h : American Philosophy and the Mc Carthy Era , " Diacritics, 26, No. I (Spring 1 996), 3 3 49 . McCumber a lso suggests that the record of the American Philosoph ical Association in defending i ts own m e m bers from attacks by the H U AC was s i n gu l a r ly " u n pleasant. " 10 H e w o n t h e vote, the first n ec e s sa ry i n th i rty years, 3 36 t o 204; see Benn ington and Derrida , Jacques Derrida , p. 3 3 1 .

DECON ST R U C TION

IN

,\ N UTSH ELl .

41

a bete noire i n certai n bastions of the academic establ ishment, both American amI French . Alas, the meanness of spirit and i n tellectual shortsightedness of it a l l ! For Dcrrida's analyses often co nverge with , and have even taken their point of departure from, "analytic " philoso­ phers . Derrida patiently explores the meanings and use of words with a sensitivity - at certain moments even matching the sam e level of ted iousness of analytic philosophy - that would be the envy of any Ivy league dissertation director. I I You will believe me, then, although I will also document it, that Derrida and "deconstruction , " as we will see, have been bl amed for almost everything. For ruining American departments of phil osophy, English , French, and comparative l iterature, for ruining the u n i versi ty itself (provided that they a re rui ned), for dimming the lights o f the Enl ightenment, for undermining the law of gravity, for destroying all standards of reading, writing, reason - {and 'rithmetic, tool - and also for Mormon polygamy. Dcrrida even gets a fi nger (pointed at him) for the nationalist wars in Central Europe and for Holocaust revisionism, even as he has been accused, i f i t is possible to be guilty of all these thi ngs at once, of an apol itical aestheticism , for being a flower child of the 1 960s still being read i n the 1 990s , a quasi-academic Timothy Leary inviting us to tune into textuality and drop out of real ity. The list goes on . (For M ormon polygamy?) The way out of these misunderstandings of Dcrrida - which inci­ dentally also accuse him of undermining the very idea of m isunder­ standing anythi ng, since "anything goes" {Points 40 1 ) - is to see that, far from being n ihil istic, deconstruction is deeply and p rofo undly "af­ firmative . " Qui, oui. To be sure, deconstruction does not affirm what is, does not fall down adoringly before what is present, for the present is precisely what demands endless an alysis, criticism, and deconstruc­ tion . (An old and hoary tradition - n 'est-ce pas? - that goes back to Socrates , with whom philosophy, on some accounting, opened its doors . ) On the contrary, deconstruction affirms what is to come, a

I I Th is is not to say that red faces are found lacking alllong Contincnta l i st critics. J . Claude Evans, Stra tegies of Deconstruction: Derrida a nd the Myth of the Voice ( M i n neapolis: U n iversity of M i n nesota Press, 1 99 1 ) seems to me also to pu nctuate h i s argu ments agai nst Derrida with a fl o w of i nsults , deba ting at length whether Derri d a ' s reading of Husser! is a joke or whethe r we are supposed t o ta ke it seriollsly.

42 ven ir,

m�CONSTRUc.ION I N A N U TS H E L.1 .

which is what its deconstruction of the present, and of the values

of presence, is all about. So radical is this deconstructive impulse that the d venir itself is not to be construed in terms of presence, viz . , as the "future present, " as something that will eventually roll around if

are patient, but rather as something that is structurally and neces­ sarily to come, always still outstanding, never present. Deconstructive analysis deprives the present of its prestige and exposes it to something tout autre, "wholly other, " beyond what is foreseeable from the pres­ ent, beyond the horizon of the "same. " Deconstruction, I will argue here, is the endless, bottomless affirmation of the absolutely undecon­ structible. But let us keep the metaphorics of the nutshell straight: the "unde­ constructible" does not mean the "uncrackable" but, rather, that in virtue of which nutshells can be cracked , in order to make an opening for the coming of the other. The undeconstructible, if such a thing exists, is that i n vi rtue of which whatever exists, whatever poses as assured and secure, whole and meaningful, ensconced, encircled, and encapsulated is pried open - cracked open and deconstructed . Accordingly, everything in deconstruction -here comes a nutshell (heads up! ) - is organized around what Derrida calls ['inven tion de ['au tre, the in-coming of the other, the promise of an event to come, the event of the promise of something comi ng. Indeed, I will argue below, deconstruction is best thought of as a certain inventionalism . For if Derrida is anything but an essentialist, someone who hangs ev­ erything on the hook of unchanging essences, that does not mean he is a conventional ist, which is but an alternative way to hang things up (or tie them down), this time by way of a certain settled but contingent way things have tended historically to have fal l en out. Both essential­ ism and conventionalism are too binding for him, too much inclined to hang thi ngs u p or tie them down, whereas the business of decon­ struction is to open and loosen things up. Deconstruction means to be essentially anti-essential and highly unconventional, not to let its eyes wax over at the thought of either unchanging essences or ageless tradi­ tions, but rather to advocate an in-ventionalistic incoming, to stay con­ stantly on the lookout for something unforeseeable, something new. Deconstruction is a way of giving things a new twist; it is bent on giving thi ngs a new bent, which is what sets the nerves of both essentialists and conventionalists on edge. For example, and this is not j ust an example but the very idea of we

OF.CON ST R U G I'ION IN A N UTSI I !o:l-L

43

deconstruction , everything in deconstruction is turned toward a "de­ mocracy to come. " For even if the existing democracies a re the best we can do at present, the least bad way to organize ourselves, still the present democratic structures are deeply undemocrati c . They are corrupted , among other th ings, by the money that blatantly buys votes, by corporate contributions to politicians and political parties that frees their corporate hand to fill the air and water with carci nogens, to en­ courage smoking by the youngest and poorest people in our society; by cowardly politicians who believe in nothing, who change their views with each new poll, who perpetuate themselves with demagogic prom ises, who appeal to the worst and lowest instincts of th e populace; by media that corrupt national discourse, that fuel the fires of nationalist resentment and racism and stampede voters . (Rather the way the letter in the London Times tried , unsuccessfully, I am happy to report, to stampede the Cambridge dons . ) American politicians regula rly pred icate their careers on promises to lower taxes, exclude immigrants, throw the weakest and most de­ fenseless people in our society - usually black and Hispanic women and children - on their own under the cloak of "reform" and "free­ dom , " thereby filling the pockets of the richest members of society. In the highest hypocrisy of all, they try to ram down every one's throat a right wing, xenophobic, reactionary Christianity that has nothing to do with , which flies in the face of, Jesus's prophetic fervor and his stand with the weakest and most outcast among peopl e . They claim that the Un ited States was founded on Christian principles while d i s­ m issing the mass genocide of native Americans by the colonizing, Christianizing, missionary Europeans . Their "Christia n" message of hatred for the other and self-aggrand izement, their skill at turning the crucifixion into a profitable business, has more to do with the self­ righteous hypocrisy of what Kierkegaard called "Christendom" than with Jesus's prophetic denunciation of the powers that be. 1 2 Democracy does not exist, and the corruption of existing democra cies must become the subject of endless analysis, critique, and decon12 For a way to read Kierkegaa rd someth ing that I am always i n terested i n that shows his convergence with "post- modernism , " whatever that m ea n s , let us say with recent Conti nental thought, including Derrida, which takes Kierkegaard , and not j ust Nietzsch e, as an a n tecedent of recent Conti nental thought, see Kierkegaard and Post­ Modern ity, ed. Martin M atustik and M e rold Westphal (Bloomi ngton: Indiana U n i ver­ sity Press, 1 99 5 ) .

44

DF.CONSTRUC'TION IN A N UTS H H .l.

stru ction, for these democracies are hardly d em o c ra t i c . The idea of such analyses is not to level d emocratic i n s t i t ut i ons to the gro u n d but to open the m u p to a d em oc r a c y to come, to turn them a ro u nd from what th e y are at p re s e nt, which is the p re -ve nt i o n of the other, forces that forestall in advance a n y t hin g different or radically ne w . The very idea , th e very in-ventionalist id e a , of dec o n s tr u c ti on is to o pe n democ­ racy to its own promise, to what it p ro m is e s to become: to provide a c h a nc e or an opening for the invention, th e in-coming, of the other (which is n ot a bad way to define immigration). Preparing for the in­ co m i n g of the other, w h i c h is wh a t constitutes a radical democracy ­ that is what d e c o nstr uc ti o n is (Psy. 59-60IRDR 60), s ometh i n g that would also be, o n my accounting, a little more b i bl i c a l and a lot less hypocritical. (In a nutshell). lbat is why the "Roundtable" took the form it d i d , to p rov id e Der­ rid a wi t h the opportunity to a ddre s s a m o re or less traditional a u d i e n c e on issues on wh i c h he has pro voked a more or less ( m o s tl y more) indig­ nant r e ac t i o n . Issues such as these - tradition, community, j u stice, de­ mocracy, rel igi o n , and i nst i t u t i o n al life - a re close to the hearts of everyone, if they h a ve a heart. Remember, this very d iscussion was a n important mo m e nt in the life of a traditional institution th a t invited Jacques Derrida to be the m a n of the moment, the man who was asked to illuminate th i s inaugural moment. Derrida was trying to look r es p e c ta b l e , which is not hard , be ca us e he a n d deconstruction a re wor­ thy of t h e highest respect. Indeed , and here co m es another nutshell, one might go so fa r as to say deconstruction is respect, respect for the other, a resp ec tfu l , res po n si ble affirmation of the other, a way i f not to efface at least to delimit the narcissism of the self (which is, quite l iterally, a tautology) and to make some space to let the oth e r be . That

is a g ood way to start out thinking about institutions, traditions, com­ munities, j ustice, and re l i g i o n .

ApOLOGIA: AN EXC U SE FOR VIOLENCE I s h o u l d say a word or two about the present format, about the m u l t i pl e violence of forcing Derrida to speak i n English ( wh e n he c o m pl a ins that the w h o l e world is g ra du a l l y being fo rc e d to speak English), to

DECON STR U CTION IN A N UTS�I ELL

45

make himself understood b y a mixed audience composed of peoplc from across all the colleges and departments in the U niversity, but, above all, to give relatively compacted answers within the confines of about an hour a nd a half. To begi n with, I openly confess to a proper and proportionate a mount of gu ilt for perpetrating such violence, about which Derrida quite rightly complains throughout the "Round­ table . " Cur confitem ur deo scienti (Circum . 1 9/Circum. I S)? Derrida says at one point in the "Roundtable, " j ust after a nother impossible question had been put to him, "If I were more responsibl e, I would simply say ' No, I won't, I won't participate in this game. ' " After which , he proceeds to say something very interesting in response to the question. (The aporetics of the nutshell . ) But I would also propose, in my own defense, that the re is something very fitting about putting Derrida on the spot l i ke this and hence I offer the following "apology" for all this violence. Derrida is very much a public philosopher, an urban, cosmopol itan intellectual - contrary to Heidegger, say, who beat a hasty retreat to his Hiltte in the Schwarzwald whenever the opportunity presented it­ self. By this I mean that he is someone whose work, whose productiv­ ity, has never been insulated from the international reacti on it provokes, whose work has Rou rished in an ongoing interaction with an international readership. His published writings, by and large, are collections of papers given at conferences and lectureships a round the world to which he has been invited by pcople who have been read ing his work at the time and who have reason to believe that he would have something to say on a given topic . His writing always arises, he says, "from some external provocation , " "some request, invitation, or com m ission" (PdS 3 6 3 /Points 3 5 2; cf. 1 2 811 1 9) . His hosts th ink they can predict what Derrida will say an this or th at issue, so thcy invite him, a nd his job is to surprise thcm without d isappointi ng them, to live up to the invitation and a very considerable reputation whil e start­ ing out from scratch, de novo. That, of course, is partly a reRection of the jet age, which makes international philosophizing and conferencing possible. (It is interest­ ing to ponder how the ease of international travel would have affected Kant, who never left Konigsberg. Would Kant, like H eidegger, have been c ontent to stay at home and watch these big bi rds fly overhead?) But I think this international colloquializing has, i n additio n , a lot to do with Derrida's own philosophical style or signature. His works do

46

DECON STRUCTION I N A N UTS H �� LL

not re flect a long-range p l a n or private program sta ked out in advance years ago that he has been r e l e n tl essl y and single-mindedly ca r rying out. He has not been grimly stalk i n g some p hi lo so phi c a l prey. Each time he takes up a top i c , he says, it is as if he has ne ve r written any­ thi ng before, as if he is s tarting all over again in the face of an over­ whelming novelty and strangeness ( Pd S 363/Points 3 5 2). So, if Derrida has a style, a s i gn a t u re , a d o m inan t tone, a u n i ty of purpose, if hi s works weave a certain fa b ri c , it is up to someone else to trace that signature out later on, to counter-sign it for him. It is n o t his business and it would be stultifying for him to have to o bey any such internal i mperative, to censor h i mself, to pursue such an image, to abide by a contract that has been signed for him without his consent. "I have never had a ' fu n da m e n ta l project, ' " he says i n an interview (PdS 3671Poin ts 3 5 6). 1 3 H e has not projected to write three great cri­ tiques, as Kant did; no r do h u ndred s of assistant professors, in heat over promotion and tenure, pour over his works and fill the jo u rnals with articles s pec u l a ti n g on the l i ke l y contents of the missing part of a great treatise that he left unfin ished , in wh ic h he w ou l d finally an­ nounce the me a n in g of Being. Even Of Gra mma tology, the closest thi ng to a comprehensive tre a ti s e in his writings, started out as a discus­ sio n a rticle on three books published in the early 1 9605. 14 His texts thus embody the very occasionalism, chance, and openness to th e coming of so m e th i n g unforeseeable tha t he loves so m uch as a theorist. Each w o rk wrestles anew, de novo, w i th the idiosyncrasies of ever shift­ ing singularities. His works reflect th e ability, to be described below, to ke ep his h ea d without having a heading (cap), to fo rge ahead in a no th er way than with a heading, to move a h ea d without h av i n g a p la n that programs things in adva n ce , which is part of the twist he gives to the titl e of a l ittle book of his called The Other Heading. (That is also not a bad way, i nc i d e n tall y, to condense deconstruction i nto a nutshell . ) Derrida has done a great deal of h i s work i n publ ic, o r at least not far from the p u bli c : writing on ai rp l a n es , trying to fin ish papers in time 1 3 To the ex te n t there i s such a project, i t is o n e that is n ot t o be ca r r i ed out: "As for a book p ro j e c t , I have only one, the one I will not write, but that guides, attracts, seduces everything I read. Everyth ing I read is either forgotten or else stored up i n view of t h i s book" (PdS I S I IPoints 1 42). 1 4 " De la gra mmatologi e , " Critique, No. 223 ( December \ 96 5 ) , 1 6 42; No. 224 (Jan uary, 1 966): 2 3 - 5 3 . See DLG 7 n l lOG 3 2 3 n l (" Preface").

OECON STR UCTION IN A N UTSH ELL

47

for conferences he is to add ress, form ulating titles over the telephone, in more or less continual conversation with others, on both sides of the Atlantic, a lot of trans-Atla ntic phone calls, sleeping in more hotel rooms than he cares to remember, responding to questions and worry­ ing over his response, taking advantage of the several gra ces of the moment that get him thro ugh the day, especially if is it a day on which he is asked to put deconstruction in a nutshel l . For a while he was wary a bout being photographed and giving personal interviews, but since he has given in, his interviews h a ve proven to be i m m ensely illuminating and have provided one of the most helpful entrees to his work, as any reader of Points . . . can testify. So, while we confess , in public, a nd beg both his and h is readers' forgiveness, to doing h i m violence, to forcing compa cted answers out of h i m on the spot, in front of a large audience, with a microphone in his face, it is at least a violence to which he has become accustomed and with which he has learned to cope with an amicable grace and felicity, with a charm and clarity that surprises o nl y those who do not know h i m . There is no pure non-violence, but only degrees and econ­ omies of violence, some of which are more fruitful than others . (That is a Derridean way of saying that nobody ever said life is easy. )

N UTSH ELLS ,

SIX OF THEM

I have tried i n the present commentary to present Derrida as straight­ forwardly as the twists and turns of deconstruction permit. In another work, The Pra yers a nd Tea rs ofJacques Derrida : Religion Withou t Reli­ gion , to which I commend the reader as a follow-up to the present "introduction , " I have raised the stakes of my interpretation and put a faster spin on my reading. While I would bet the farm, again, that I am right about Derrida's "prayers and tears , " that this represents the way Derrida loves to be read, I will admit that Prayers and Tears is a high-risk reading in which I have ventured to speak of what Derrida hi mself has called "my religion , " or at least his rel igi o n "without" rel i gi o n , "without" (sans) being for him a technical term . I th ink that this rel igio-messianic twist gives deconstruction the right bent, that it well describes its proclivity and propensity, its tendency toward what is to come. That messianic tendency is discussed i n Chapter 7 of the present work, and it is developed further in Prayers a nd Tea rs , which

48

DECON STR UCTION IN A N UTS H E L L

the present readers are cordially invited to visit. The present work means to be more straightforward and to pay attention to the way that deconstruction is distorted by its critics. For it is one thing to give deconstruction the right twist and quite another to bend it out of shape. The present "Commentary" simply follows Derrida around the " Roundtable" as he, prompted by his interlocutors, and full of fear and trembling, serves up a number of nutshells in the course of re­ spondi ng to six questions about his work. Like a dutiful Extraskriver, serving as a supplementary clerk to the quasi-philosophy of the supple­ ment, 1 5 r take up each question in the order i n which it is asked and , as best I can, try to fill in his extemporaneous remarks by elaborating upon the more careful explorations of these themes in his published writings. Remember, too, both the spirit and the letter of the occasion, that Derrida has been invited as the guest of honor on a day set aside to inaugurate a new doctoral program i n philosophy. Indulge yourself in the fi ction that, l ike James Joyce's Ulysses (or "Hill Street Blues, " if you haven't read Ulysses), this all takes place on a single day, and that the question of inaugurations is on everybody's mind, so that the discussion begins and ends with the question of the day, with the ques­ tion of beginnings, of how someth ing gets started . The six themes raised by the interlocutors do excellent service for getting us under way toward dcconstruction, serving up, let us say, six nutshells, all of which have something to do with the connection of deconstruction with the most honorable elements of "our" "tradi­ tions . " Allowing myself to be led by the various knights of this Derri­ dean " Roundtable" (who look like tax collectors to me), I will argue that deconstruction is, in turn: the right to philosophy; the love of the Greeks; a community without community; justice; the messianic (a certain rel igion); and finally, yes, affirmation, yes . In a nutshell . Six of them. Maybe morc.

I; For more on be in g an "Extraskriver, " see Kierkegaard's Works. V I . Fear a nd Trembling a nd Repetition, tra ns. Howard Hong a n d Edn a Hong (pri nceton: Princeton U n i vers i ty Press, 1 98 3 ) , p. 7. For a Derridean staging of the scene created by an Ext raskri ver, see ffi)' Against Ethics: Con tribu tions to a Poetics of Obliga tion with Constant Reference 10 Deconstruction (Bloom in gton : I n d iana U n i vers i ty Press , 1 99 3 ) .

2

The Right to Philosophy "I

bring good news . " ocp

209

"So, you see, I am a very conservative person . I love institu

tions and I spent a lot of time participating in new tions, wh ich sometimes do not work . "

i nstitu

- " Roundtable, " OF RIGHTS, RE SPONSIBI LITY

AND A

8

NEW ENLIGHTENMENT

Though it obviously raises an eyebrow or two in many quarters , noth­ ing is more fitting than to invite Derrida to speak at the inauguration of a new program in philosophy - "new, " "progra m , " and "philoso­ phy" all being words that Derrida has thought about at great length . Despite the popular image of deconstruction as some sort of intellec­ tual "computer virus" (Points 406) that destroys academic programs, disciplinary specializations, institutional structures , indeed the univer­ sity and -where will it end ? - reason itself, I deconstruction is in fact a philosophy - and practice - of i nstitutions, and Derrida is a lover of 1 See Amy Gutma n n , " Relativism, Deconstruction, a n d the Cu rriculum, " in Campus Wars, pp. 57 69. G utm a n n never once cites Jacques De r r id a but si mply uses the word "deconstruction" to sta n d for the view that intellectual standards a re nothing more than masks for the will tu puwer (pp. 60 6 1 ), that is, more generally, for e\'ery thi ng bad, arguing amung other th i n gs that deconstruction leaves us defenseless aga inst Mormon pol y ga m y (pp. 64 68)! See also John S ea rl e , " Postmodern ism and the Western Rationalist Tradition , " in ibid . , pp. 2 8 48; "The Storm Over the Un iver sity, " The New York Review of Books, 27, No. 19 (December 6, 1 990), 34 42; and "Is T h e re a Crisis in American H i gher Educa tion ?" The Bulletin of the American Acad emy of Arts and Sciences, 46, No. 4 (January 1 99 3 ) , 24 47 . The Searle Derrida debate

goes all the way back to "Signature Event Context" ( 1 97 1 ) (MdP 3 6 5 ff. /MoP 307ff. ). Then, uf cou rse, there is always the unforgettable Allan Bloom , The Closing of the American Mind (New York: S i m o n & Schuster, 1 987).

50

D H;()NST R U c."T ION IN 1\ N UTS H E l.1.

institutions (especially ones that honor him - there being, after all, only degrees of narcissism ! ) . If we repeat with a difference an old j oke about marriage - the university is a great insti tution, but who wants to live in an institution? - we get an idea of what deconstruction is up to. As a philosophy of institutions, deconstruction is, wh ile suspicious of

institutional power, i ntent on making institutions l ivable - open­ ended , porous, and on the qui vive - and structured around programs that do not try to program everything (DDP 5 9 3 /Sendoffs 1 9). Its a i m , Derrida says in the "Roundtable, " i s "to open the institution to its own future" (RT 6), and even, whenever possible, to open new institutions. Deconstruction loves to attend openings, if not to preside over at least to ass ist in openi ngs. Far from being an academic renegade and antag­ onist of philosophy and philosophy programs, one more undertaker i n the long "history of the deaths o f ph ilosophy, " one more apocalyptic proclaiming still again "the end of philosophy, " Derrida is one of phi­ losop hy's sta unchest advocates, an activist strongly committed to the idea that phi losophy is today all the more necessary (PdS 1 1 8/Points 1 1 0). It will surprise only those who know little about Derrida2 that, over the course of an active life, he has consistently rallied to the de­ fense of philosophy and undertaken various practical initiatives aimed at promoting the teach ing of philosophy. Let the word go forth and let there be no mistake: philosophy for Derrida is one of our most fundamental rights. But let the word also go forth that "rights" is not the first word i n deconstruction , which is the central point to be considered in figuring the difference between a "new" Enlightenment he has call ed for ( DDP 496IPR 1 9) and the old one defended by Searle and Gutmann. For rights come after responsi­ bility, which is the fi rst word, if there is one. If Derrida is a renegade, a word he would not utterly renounce, he is a highly responsible one. The work of deconstruction is set in motion , engaged (engage) only by 2 For example, neoconservative apologist Gertrude H i mmelfarb i n c lud es Derrida in her tirade aga i nst the i n fl uence of "post m odernists" in American u n iv ers i ti es in her On Loking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on Culture a nd Society (New York: Knopf, 1 994) . In a review of H i mmelfa rb , Michael Howard , a former Regius P ro fe sso r of History at Oxford, says that " Derrida has tried to evade the pr ob l e m [of the Holo caust] by e m i tting a dense cloud of u n i ntel l igible verbiage" and goes on to call him one o f a group of fr i vo l ous game players w h o m a k e a virtue o f thei r moral i rresponsi­ bility" who underm ine the standards of schol a rship a nd the univers i ty . The New York Times Book Review, March 6, 1 994, pp. 1 1 1 2 . Th is, of course, is a l l said in the "

name of ca reful readi n g!

T H E R I C I IT TO P H I LOSOPI IY

51

a pledge (gage) of responsibility, indeed of unlimited responsibility, beca use a "limited responsibility" (drawing oneself into a "corporate" circle) is i ust an excuse to credit oneself with a good conscience (DDP 1 08). For Derrida , deconstruction is set i n motion by something that calls upon and addresses us, overtakes (sur-prises) and even over­ whelms us, to which we must respond , and so be responsive and re­ sponsible. Endlessly. Whenever anything very hallowed and revered comes i nto question in deconstruction , as someti mes happens - be it religion or law, science or democracy, even knowledge or philosophy itself- such questioning, be assured , arises from the height- or depths - of respon­ sibility (whichever i mage gives you more comfort or warmer assur­ ance). Whatever trouble Derrida manages to make, whatcver seams he manages to expose in our most venerable garments, wha tever distur­ bance can be traced back to him - that is all rooted in the deepest sense of responsiveness to something that is silently astir in these hoary and prestigious structures . Deconstruction is not irresponsible. How could it be - if deconstruction is responsibility itself, if there is such a th ing? Whenever someth ing is deconstructed , or, better, whenever some­ thing is allowed to auto-deconstruct itself right before our eyes, as sometimes happens, that is to say, whenever deconstruction gets under way, that always happens in the name of an "undeconstructible re­ sponsibility" (DDP 3 5 ), which is what sets the heart of Derrida aflame, and of deconstruction, too (if it has a heart). This sense of responsibility being well u nderstood, we may say that deconstruction reserves the righ t (droit) to ask any question, to think any thought, to wonder aloud about any improbability, to impugn the veracity of any of the most venerable veri ties. But do not bc misled : that seemingly self-righteous, even legalistic characterization does not mean that deconstruction takes itself to be the master and j udge of all it surveys . I ndeed the very idea that philosophy is some sort of supreme tribunal sitting in judgment on all that passes in review before its judi­ cial eye is the very sort of thing Derrida would unseat. (Dcrrida does not like courts and lawyers any more than the rest of us . ) He does not wan t philosophy to be a sitting j udge but rather a wanderer and nomad, on the move, on cal l , without the wherewithal to Jay down its head, hastening hither and yon whenever the call of the "other" s u m mons it mto action. This seemingly i mpudent and self-asse rtive sense of the rights of philosophy springs from a boundless, maybe even

52

DECONSTRUCTION I N A N UTS H E Ll .

vaguely b i bl i c a l , sense o f responsibility for the neighbor and the stranger . For d eco n s tr u ctive thinking is ac u tely sensitive to the contingency of our constructions, to the dee pl y h i storic a l , soc i a l , an d l i n g u i s t ic "constructedness" of our bel i e fs and practices . But that is not beca use it ha s appointed itself the sup re m e arbiter of what is true and fa l se . On the contrary, it i s b ecause it con fe s s es that it does not "know" the "se­ c ret" that sits in the m iddle and smiles at our ignora n c e . In oth e r words, deconstructive thi n k i n g is a way of affirming the i r red u cib l e alter i ty of the world we are trying to construe - as oppose d to the stupe­ fying n o nse n se that deconstruction reduces the world to words without refe ren c e . So the phi l osophe r on De rrid a ' s tell ing is not an Aufkliirer who sits in judgment over all our judgm ents, a m eta - j u dge or hyper­ j udge presiding over our j udgments as a court of last ap pe a l (DDP 89ff. ), picki ng thi ngs to pieces . That is the seat the old En l i ghten men t seeks to fill . But in the new Enl ightenment, quite the opposite is the case . For Derrida, the philosopher is a bi t of a "rag picker" himself, ' looking for the bits and pieces that tend to drop from sight in the prevaili n g view of things, listen i ng with cocked ear for the still small voices of what he, following Levinas, calls the "other" or even the "wholly other" (tout autre) . A deconstructive "thinking, " eve n before it becomes philo s o phy, "finds itself engaged, inscribed in the s p a ce opened and closed by this pledge (gage) - given to the other, recei ved from the other" (DDP 28). The i mage of the rag picker takes on added impact when it is connected with Blanchot's use of the story of the Messiah dressed in rags that Derrida discusses in the "Roundtable. " This figure, which C ornel l borrows from Benjamin , is al so a highly bi bl ica l i mage , and constitutes a much more humble form of " g a ther ­ ing" that stands in de l i cious contrast to Heideggerian gathering, which gathers the glories of phainesthai into a Greco-German glow. That is why, like a b i t of a rag picker (Walter Benjamin), like a collector of " fr a gments " (Johannes Cl i mac u s ) , this new Enlighten­ m e nt puts responsibil ity (to the other) before ri gh ts (of the s el f ) , why it puts he te ron o m y before autonomy, pace Kant, who is something of a 3 See Drucilla Cornell's wonderful depiction of Derrida, borrowing from Wal ter

Benjam i n , as a rag picker (chiffonnier) i n her The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1 992), chap. 3 .

T H E R I C I IT

TO P H i l OSOPHY

53

u n i ve rsi ty . 4 We may th i nk o f it this way: decon­ str uc ti o n reserves the r i g h t to ask any question but it is not the right to q u estion that comes first. Rather, the first q u esti o n , if there we re s u ch a th i n g , would itself have a l r ea d y come as an answer, a response to the addres s of t he other, whose advance, w h os e com ing or i nc o m i ng ­ ['inven tion de l'a u tre, the incoming of the othe r - deconstructior1 all al o n g affirms. To put it in a nutshell : deconstruction is the affirmation of the co m in g of the o th e r (Psy. 5 9-60IRDR 60), to which com ing it is all a l o ng res p o n d i n g , about which it is being very responsible . Prior to any q u esti o n , preceding, passing th ro u gh , a n d s urpa ss i ng question­ i n g , is a more o ri g i n a l affi r ma t i o n , a "yes" to the other, to the neighbor and the s tra nge r , a " ye s" that comes before the qu es t i o n , before science and critique a nd research, even before philosophy, an affirmation of something to come. 5 Any q u e sti o n that is p u t in deconstruction always co mes as a question en retour, a que st i o n put in re tu r n or response to a p re v i o us solicitation, a way of answering back by q uestioning back, as a qu estio n put in re spo n s e to a p r i o r question, a se c o nd question that comes after one has already been pu t in que s ti o n . So what sounds l ike a s a s s y an d lega l i s t i c "right" to ask any q uest i o n is someth i ng t h a t has surrendered all its rights in o rder fi rst to say yes to so meth i n g that comes first. Questions are not the first word but the second, the second yes (ou i, oui). So, re mem b e r , a nd this is one of the a x i o ms in this axiom atics of the n u tshel l , whenever deconstruction seems to ca us e or get itself i nto trouble, or even to look a little n egati ve and destructive a nd likely to ra ise the wrath of the Good and t h e Just, remember that deco nstruc­ ti on i s bein g very res pon s ib l e and affi rmative, i nd e ed that deco nstruc­ ti o n is a ffi rm a t ion , responsibility, engagement, which a re the touchstones of a new Enlightenment. The idea of our " right" to this o r that, wh i c h now a day s has been extended to a n i m a ls and trees, not w i th ou t reason, is one of the most father of the mo de r n

� Derrida's read ing of Ka n t on university st u di es may be found in " Mochlos, or, The Con flict of the Faculties , " tra ns. Richa rd Rand and Amy Wygant, i n Logo machia : The Conflict of Faculties (Lincol n : U n i versity of Nebraska Press, 1 992). The other st u d i e s in this v a l uable vol ume are an e ffec ti ve a n tidote to the n on s e n se pe!pe trated i n the work of Bloo m , Sea rle, Gutman n , and H i m m elfarb (see a bove, n n . 1 2). I Crit icism in Society, In terviews by Imrc Salusinszky (New York and L ondon :

Methue n , 1987), p. ZO o

54

DECON STR U CY ' I O N I N A N UTS H E LL

honorable l egaci e s of the Enlightenment. W h i l e Derrida is often made out to be the sworn enemy of the E nl i g h tenmen t , he would co n tend , and we with him, that in fact the deconstruction he advocates is a continuation of what is best a bo u t the En li ghte nmen t , but by another means, His idea of the r ight that deconstruction reserves to ask any question illustrates very nicely Derrida's re lati ons hip to the Enlighten­ ment, which is not uncomplicated . As he often says, his interests lie in provoking not an anti-Enlightenment but a new Enl i gh tenment, in question ing the "axioms and certainties of Enlightenment, " but to do

precisely i n order to effect "what should be the Enlightenment of our time" (Poin ts 428). True, he is a cri ti c of the Enlightenment, but c r i ti q u e is the most honorable of Enlightenment works, even when it is directed at th e Enlightenment, which must be thick-skinned enough to un d ergo self-critique. For it may be that what the Enlightenment seeks cannot be found on the basis that the E nl ighte n m e n t lays . That is pre c i sel y what Derrida thinks about rights. For his idea of a right is not a right rooted in an autonomous rational subj ect, the seated r i gh t of an (old) Aufkliirer who is the sitting j udge and master of all it sur­ veys. It is a mobile right to respond to a call by which one has been visited - "before any contract" (FL 5 51DPJ , 2 5 ) - a right tha t one has to answer whenever one has been a ddressed . Nor is his right a right inscribed in nature itself, a natural r i ght , a universal essence, s i nc e it preserves the right to question the very idea of nature and essence. So, if deconstruction were to have a constitution, the "bill of rights " would come second, after the "bill" or, better, the "confession of respo n s i bi li ­ ties , " and its declaration of i nde pen d e n c e would come r igh t after its declaration of dependence, for ri gh t s are rooted in responsibility. The talk about rag picking helps us see that part of the difference between the old and the new En l i ghtenme n t is a question of style. Derrida's more a va nt-garde styl e makes the old Aufkliirers nervous, even when their aims are often the same as his. Gutmann and Derrida, for exampl e , a re both seriously i n terested in demo c racy and "demo­ cratic education , " and they share more in common than her loose talk about deconstruction s u ggests. 6 Derrida's doubts about th e absolute j udicial authority claimed by and for Enlightenment Reason, by and for " p ure Reason" (capitalized), do not consti tu te an outright attack so

6 See Amy Gutma n n , Democratic Educa tion Press, 1 987)

(Pri nceton:

Princeton U n iversity

Ti l E RIGHT TO PHILOSOPHY

55

upon reason , upon giving good reasons, the best you can u nder the circumstances. If the old Enl ightenment makes everything tum on "Reason , " the New Enlightenment wants to know the reason for rea­ son, wants to take responsibility for what at a specific point in h istory calls itself reason and the age of reason, and to consider carefully what is being declared "irrational" in the name of reason, instead of sim ply marching to its tune (DDP 47 3-4741PR 9). Nor does Derrida desire to break with the old Enlightenment's desire for "emancipation" (DPJ 28) Rather, deconstruction means to continue the struggle for emanci­ pation but by another means and in a nother key, by taking a second look at the very things the old Enl ightenment tended to devalue ­ literature, faith, and the messianic, for example - j ust in order to look for the sorts of things that tend to drop through the grids of the old Enlightenment. Like one who picks among the rags, Derrida "con­ sorts" with suspicious characters, like all the strange figures in Genet's novels who appear in the right-hand col umn of Glas to the great sca n­ dal of H egel's "absolute knowledge . " But the effect of this new Enlight­ enment would be not to jettison reason but to redefine and redescribe it, for example, by steering clea r of the simple opposition of reason and faith and seeing the extent to which reason is deeply saturated by faith; not to jettison emancipation but to continue to seek it in places that are overlooked by the old Enlightenment. In the new Enlighten­ ment, th ings are always more unlikely and complicated than the simple oppositions favored by the old Au/klarers - like Kant and Marx - might suggest. Philosophy is the right to ask any question about all that we hold sacred , even and especially about reason and philosophy itself. Does that mean that philosophy itself comes into question in deconstruct­ ion? To be sure, but always from a love of philosophy, or from a l ove of what philosophy loves - knowledge and truth (no capitals, please) and ethics and every other honorable and prestigious name in philoso­ phy's intimidating repertoire. But in deconstruction this love dema nds that we admit that philosophy does not have the last word on the things that we love . The " right to philosophy" (Ie droit d ta philosophie), both to study and to teach it, to read and write, discuss and publish it, is everyone's . It is in particular not the private property of a self-validating academic establishment comfortably housed in prestigious academic institutions , of professors whose works circulate within a closed circle of institu-

56

DI:.CON STRlJCTION IN A N UTS H E LL

tion s , journals, publishers, and associations (DDP 1 3 ). It is precisely the threat posed by deconstruction to their closed circle that arouses the wrath of analytic philosophers l ike Ba rry Sm ith7 and Ruth Marcus. But this does not mean that Derrida denies that philosophy is a techni­ cal , disciplinary specialty. He has always insisted, as he repeats i n the " Roundtable, " on the need for specialized , discipli nary training in a "philosophy d epartment, " m uch l ike his own very technical tra i n ing in H usserl's transcendental phenomenology. His misinformed critics notwithstanding, he has always ba ttled against dissolving ph ilosophy into literature or the humanities . The right to philosophy does not mean you can go "right to - straightaway to - philosophy" (droit a phi­ losophie) - without careful preparation and disciplined work (DDP 14- 1 5). But this specialization , he says, i s "paradoxical" and should not be made to serve conservative ends . For over and beyond th is technical specialty, philosophy is not just one discipline among many, the one housed in the "philosophy department. " Philosophy must be ex-posed , dis-located , ex-propriated and ex-patriated , made to understand that it cannot be wholly confined within the limits of a d isciplinary special­ ization (DDP 22-23). Philosophy must be audacious and made to "cross the borders" (RT 7) of the discipli nes. Philosophy cannot con­ tain what it contains. Unl ike other specialized disciplines philosophy should have not be finally conta ined by discipl inary horizons, and what horizons philosophy has it should press to the limits, so that it constantly pushes beyond its familiar objects, themes, and certitudes (DDP 3 2 - 3 3). For Derrida , philosophical questioning, proceed i ng from the basis of a technical specialty, tends to shade off into the larger space of a general deconstructive thinking (une pensee deconstructice, DDP 28) which , taken in its broadest sense, means the unfettered freedom to think, the right to ask any question . As he says in a 1 989 interview: The only attitude (the only pol i tics j udici a l , med i cal , pedagogica l and so forth) I wou l d absolutely condemn is one which, di rectly or indi rectly, cuts off the poss ibility of an essentially i nterm inable questioning, th at is, an effective and thus transform ing q uestioning [ Pd S , 2 5 21 Points 2 39]. 7

II I . :

See E u ropea n Philosophy and the American Academy, ed. B a r ry Smith ( la Sa l l e , Hegeler I nstitute, 1 994) .

Open C o u rt ,

57

Ti l l': RIGI IT TO PI I I LOSOI'I I Y

To be s ure , s o m e of the most p o we rful examples of su c h q uestioning, of th i n k i n g are to be found in the canonical "history of philoso­ phy" - from the Greeks to A u g us ti n e , Neoplatonism , and th e h igh m iddle ages, from Desca rtes, Ka nt, and Hegel up to H usserl and H ei degg e l About the uncircu mventable ne c essi ty to study closely and faithfully these g re a t dead w h ite E uropea n m a l e s ( a l th o u g h St. August­ ine may have been a sli g h t ly sw a rthy North African), to read them with disciplinary rigor and interd isciplinary inventiveness, Derrida does not e n tcrtain the slightest doubt. These are writers upon whom he himself has extensi ve l y a n d lov in gl y commented, a n d that work he rcg a rd s as "an infi n ite task. " (RT 1 0) " [ EJach time that I rea d Kant, " he says, "it is always the fi rst time" (DDP 8 1 ) . In the R ou n dtab l e he says, "[HJowever old I am, I am on the threshold o f r e a d i n g Plato and Aris­ totle . I love them and I feel I have to start aga i n and again and again. It is a task wh ich is in front of me, before me. " Let that word go forth as well , clearly and unambiguously! Sti l l , it is i m po rta nt to preserve the "tension " in Derrida's attitude to "philosophy. " The l i gh t that shines in th e new Enl ighten ment con­ stantly illuminates a s ce n e that is m or e complicated tha n we first th o ugh t For it is from the s a me sense of "responsibility" that Derrida is engaged in t h e battle for p h i loso phy to extend the right to teach and study the great de a d white masters of phil os op h y as far as possible, to follow with pa i ns ta kin g deta il the elaborate and well-formed system of distinc ti o n s and o p p o si t i o n s that mark the work of Plato, Kant, or Hus­ sed and yet also to undertake th e most v i gil a nt deconstruction of these oppositions, to learn to rea d the masters o th e r w is e (autrement), to hear within thcm the stirring of other possibilities, the in-coming of other events. Ph il o so ph y and its deconstruction, the deconstruction of ph i losophy, p h i l o soph y as deconstruction - all belong to a si ngle operation, and if one does not un d ers ta nd how these two go together, then one d o es no t u nde rsta nd e i th e r sepa r ate l y For deconstruction is not - we will repeat thi s agai n and again - a destruction or d emolition, but a way of re l e a s i n g and res po n d i ng , of l i s te n i n g and opening up, of being re s po n s i b l e not only to the dominant voices of the great masters, but also to other voices that speak more gently, more dis c r e e tl y more m ildly in the texts of dea d white F.uropean males and in quite a few other texts, too (DDP 88-89). The th inking that takes place i n philosophy, thus, cannot in the end be confincd to tech n ical philosophy, or to the ca nonical history of "

, "

.

"

, "

.

,

"

"

.

,

58

D ECONSTRUCTION I N A N UT S H E LL

ph ilosophy, even if that is the place one starts; it is also to be sought a nd found in many other places, i n law, linguistics, and psycho a n a l y ­ sis. Above a l l , the thinking that occurs in philosophy communicates i n a very special way for Derrida himself with literature . If philosophy is a questioning that pushes against the limits of language a nd knowl­ edge, that is no less true of literature and of its experience of language; both philosophy and literature push against the impossible (PdS 3 871 Points 3 7 2 - 3 74). Hence, l ike philosophy, "literature" too fluctuates between a narrow, disciplinary sense a nd a more genera] sense where it tends to shade off into a general deconstructive thinking. It is this more general sense that he has in mind when he says that "literature" is "the right to say everything, " "a certain noncensure , " "the space of a certain democratic freedom . " " No dem ocra cy without literature; no l iterature without democracy" (Pass. 65/0N 28). Of phi losophy, the right to think, and of l iterature, the right to write, we can say the same thi ng: they represent "the unlimited right to ask any question, to sus­ pect all dogmatism, to anal y z e every presupposition, even those of ethics or the politics of responsibility" (Pass . 6 5-66/0N 28). Jacques Derrida himself has never, personally, been able to decide between philosophy and literature or to leave one behind for the other (AL 34) . 8 As the " Protean" right to say anything and everything, the unlimited right of writing and reading, the right to defy laws of prohibi­ tion, to engender fictions aga inst the prevailing sense of reality, litera­ ture is an "institution which tends to overflow the i nstitution , " which even destabilizes the distinction between nature and institution . Con­ trary to his critics, Derrida is not arguing th a t "anything goes" nor is he turning truth over to caprice, but he is arguing strongly for a demo­ cratic open-endedness that makes those who have appointed them­ selves the Guardians of Truth nervous. 8 One effect o f t h i s Huctuation on Derrida's part is that there h a s tended t o be something of a war between his m ore philosophical and his more lite rary readers. For a sarcastic review of this battle, see Ge o ffrey Ben ni ngton 's "Deconstruction a n d the Ph ilosophers (The Very Idea), " in his Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction (London: Verso, 1 994). Benni ngton is discussing, a mong other thi ngs, Rodolphe Gascho:, Th e Ta in of the Mirror (Cambridge , Mass . : Harva rd U n iversity Press, 1 986) and Irene H a rvey, The Economy ofDifferance (Bloom i ngton : Indiana U n i versity Press, 1 9 86), both of which appeared i n the same year and wagged the i r lingers at the l i terary theorists for m issing the hard , stra ight, serious phi losophical side of Derrida, thereby contri buting m ightily to the popular i mage of him as a relativist and subjectivist. I have a l so reviewed these pieces in " Derrida: A Kind of Phi losophe r , " Research in Phenomenology, 1 7 ( 1 987), 24 5 2 59.

T H E R I C H T TO PI I I I .OSOPHY

59

On a practical and political level , he is talking about censorship - of which Khomeini's "contract" on Salmon Rushd ie is perhaps the para­ digmatic case , the ne plus ultra of censorship (AL 37). He is resolute about preserving the right to say things that are not allowed , to analyze a nd criticize what the powers that be consider a closed question. Con­ ceptually, he is a rguing that the very idea of littera, of "letters , " of writing, philosophical or literary, scientific or politica l , is resista nt to the possibility of closi ng a question dow n . For the letter, by its very structure, is repeatable, disseminative , public, uncontainable, u nfet­ tered to any fixed meaning, definition, destination, or context. He is arguing not that our discourse has no meaning or that an ything goes but, on the contrary, that it has too ma ny meanings so that we can fix meaning only tentatively and only so far. And that does not spell anarchism; it is not bad news . The letter not only permits but requires and releases endless reading and respond ing, re-reading and repeating, commentary and counter-signing. Indeed, if we did not know better, if we were less vigilant Aufkliirers, we might be tempted to say that releasing these readings represents the defining mission of deconstruc­ tion around which the totality of its work is centered ! So let us say instead that such release, such cracking open , belongs to the aporetic axiomatics of the nutshell . Literature and philosophy are not ingredient elements i n a democ­ racy for Derrida, but defi ning and creative forces that open up the space of democracy, that constitute democracy, constituting Derrida's declaration of independence. The right to philosophy is not one more element in a homogeneous field of rights, like the right to work, be­ cause phil osophy is presupposed a priori in every "right to" th is or that (DDP 64-6 5). Democracy survives and flourishes just to the extent that it preserves the right of all to philosophy and literature, wh ich is the right of a democracy to criticize and correct itself, to ask any question about itself, which is why philosophy and literature and right go to the heart of what Derrida calls a "democracy to come . " The very idea of a right is a philosophical one - deriving from the philosophy of the Enl ightenment. Therefore, the state must preserve the right to ph iloso­ phize, even if, paradoxically, the right to philosoph ize, to ask any question, would l ead philosophers beyond the Enlightenment, or be­ yond a certain Enlightenment and its tradition of "natural rights" (DP 68-69), since deconstruction is the conti nuation of the En lighten ment

60

m:CON STR ucnON I N A N UTSH E L l .

by another means, a way of th inking rights otherwise, and hcnce the

invention of an other Enlightenment. For rights in deconstruction, as we have seen, derive not from na­ ture or from the essence of autonomous rational agents - as in the Enlightenment but rather , in something of a post Enlightenment or post critical way , from very heteronomic and responsible patients , from the depths of responsibility, which is undeconstructible. So, if it is true enough that democracies provide the surest element within which the right to philosophy can be exercised -as Richard Rorty l ikes to remi nd us - it is no less true that the rightful exercise of philosophy entails the right to analyze and criticize, to deconstruct, both the En­ l ightenment and all existing democracies, in their present and actual determ inations, including even in their very foundations in the En­ lightenment. For all this is undertaken in deconstruction in the name of democracy, of an undeconstructible democracy to come, which is the "promise of an event and the event of a promise . An event and a promise which constitute the democratic" (DDP 70-7 1 ) . That is why Derrida is glad to be on hand, is honored to be invited , if someone wants to start a new program in philosophy.

I N STITUTIONAL I NITIATIVES

Over the years, Dcrrida has been personally active on a number of poli tical fronts. Early on, an opponent of the French war in Algeria and the American war in Vietnam (MdP 1 3 1 - 1 3 5 1M0P 1 1 1 - 1 1 4), he has been active on behalf of Nelson Mandela , 9 was one of the founders of the Jan Hus Association, a society formed to express solidarity with persecuted Czech intellectuals (which earned him a night in jail), sup­ ports the rights of Palestinians, and participates in international associ­ ations aimed at protecting the rights of writers everywhere. I II Recently, Derrida has taken an active part in calling for a new trial for Mumia q See Derrida, " T h e Laws o f Reflection: Nelson M a ndela , I n Adm i ration , " trans. M a ry Ann Caws and Isa belle Lorenz, i n For Nelson Ma ndela , ed . Jacq ues Derrida and M u tapha Tlil i (New York: Henry Holt, 1 987), pp. 1 3 42; and, for a commentary, see Robert Bernascon i , " Pol itics Beyond Humanism: Mandela and the Struggle Aga i nst Apartheid, " in Working Through Derrida , ed . Gary Mad ison (Evanston , I l l . : Northwestern U n iversity Press , 1 99 3 ) , pp. 94- 1 1 9. 10 See the biographical sketch by Benni ngton ill /acques Oerrida , pp. 3 2 5 3 36.

nm

R I GHT TO PI I i LOSOPHY

61

Abu-Jamal , a broadcast journalist and African-American , who was convicted of killing a Philadelphia policeman in a trial that has been widely criticized by legal scholars . Having l ived on death row since his 1 982 conviction, Abu-Jamal has been frustrated in his attempts to win a new tria l , despite the unearthing of a considerable body of new evi­ dence, in no small part beca use he is dealing with a Pennsylvania governor who ca mpaigned on the death penalty. Abu-Jamal drew in­ ternational attention to his plight when he published Live from Death Row, a searing indictment of American criminal justice , and Derrida has contributed a preface to the French translation, which has j ust ap­ peared. 1 I That is why the "death of philosophy" would be, as a practical , political , and institutional matter, nothing short of a disaster for Der­ rida. I t would spell the end of democracy, of the prom ise of democ­ racy, dimming the very idea, if it is an idea, of what is to com e . Far from being a matter for rejoicing or a result at which deconstruction aims, as his critics charge, the end of philosophy would spell terror, the suppression of dissent and questioning, the end of reading, an e n closing totalization, a totalizing closure . On a practical level, this is translated into Derrida's deep alarm at any attempt to curb or constrain philosophical instruction in the schools, even as he is alarmed by ef­ forts to suppress or limit the rights of writers . Furthermore, Derrida has, over the years, undertaken a series of " 'institutional' initiatives" (DDP 96), as he mentions in the " Roundta­ ble, " including his efforts in 1 97 5 to expand the teaching of philosophy in the French high school (lycee) beyond the final yea r (Terminale), his central role in the creation of the "College International de Ph ilo­ sophic" in 1 98 3 , and the 1 990 "Report of the Commission on Philoso­ phy and Epistemology, " the relevant documents of which are collected in Du droit d ph ilosophie, filling over six hundred pages . I Z Deconstruction i s a n analytic operation aimed a t keeping thinking II See M umia Abu Jamal, En direct du couloir de la mort (Paris: La Decouverte , 1 996), the French translation of Live from Death Row (New York: Avoll Books , 1 996). Attorney Leonard Weinglass presents Abu Jamal's case in the "Afterword , " pp. 1 67 1 85. 1 2 A translation of the m os t i m portant of these documents has been projected for some t i m e now by Harvard U n i ve rsity Press under the title Institu tions of Plrilosophy, ed. Deborah Esch and Thomas Keenan. See W i l l ia m R. Sch u l tz and Lewis L. B . Fri ed , Jacques Derrida: An A n n ota ted Prima ry and Secondary Bibliography (New Yo rk: Garlan d , 1 992), p. 48 (A I 9) .

62

DECON STR UCTION I N A N UTSHELL

and writing a live, keeping them open to surprise , by keeping on the alert to the institutions in which they are housed . If language is the house of being, institutions are the house of language . That is why Derrida describes deconstruction as "an institutional practice for which the concept of i nstitution rema ins a problem" (DP 88). Indeed , we are apt to be misled by speaking of "housing" as if the institution were merely externa l . Deconstruction is integral ly, and not merely passingly or i ncidentally, devoted to an analysis of the way philosophy functions i n an institutional setting, of philosophy and l iterature in the "institu­ tion , " as an institution or "establ ishment, " as a socio-pol itico-juridico­ institutional structure. For i nstitutional structures tend to harden over and to protect philosophy from the restlessness and anarchic freedom of writing in which philosophy is i nscribed . Instead of protecting phi­ l osophy, i nstitutions can easily end up protecting us from philosophy. It has never been true that deconstruction consisted in some merely "internal" and "apolitical" analysis of texts, isolated and insulated from the institutions in which these texts are read and by which these read­ i ngs are monitored. For the institutional "context" belongs integrally to the "general" text, the archi-textuality of which deconstruction is . the analysis. Institutions reach all the way down i nto the so-called interna l structure of the text, maki ng the very distinction between in­ ternal and external questionable, turning the inside out and letting th e outside in . The classical idea that instihltions are merely external structures having nothing to do with philosophy itself, in its internal essence, is a conservative illusion . Deconstruction has always been a political and institutional analysis. 1 3 So, when i t comes to the right to philosophy, Derrida has been all along advancing on two fronts . I n the course of a very considerable amount of practical activity he has also steadily accumulated an exten­ sive body of theoretical reflection on educational institutions . Du droit a la philosop h ie, in which these writings are collected, is not only a call to action but the name of a very large book aimed at transforming philosophy from an "establishment" into a "provocation" (PPR 5 6 1 ). Let us look briefly at two of his most well-known practical interven­ tions, the two Derrida singles out in the "Roundtable": the first under a conservative government, the next under its social ist successor . Il See the fi rst two interviews i n Points for an i l l u m i n at i n g d iscussion by Derrida of the sensitivity of deconstruction to its i nsti tu t i ona l and political matrix (PdS \ 3 0 1 8 1 /Points 5 77). Points i s a particularly valuable i n troduction t o deconstructi o n .

THE RIGHT

..

TO P H I LOSOPHY ..

63

..

( I ) Derrida was the central figure i n the foundation in 1 97 5 of CREPH (Le Groupe de Recherches sur I'Enseignement Ph ilosophique), Research Croup on Philosoph ical Teaching (see DDP 1 46 - 1 5 3 ). CREPH was formed in order to offer resistance to a n attempt on the pa rt of a post- I 968 conservative French government that was bent on d i m inishing the role of philosophy in French cultu re . In th is connec­ tion, GREPH made contact with public media and sponsored a num­ ber of conferences, the best known of which was the " Estates General of Philosophy" i n 1 979, all in an effort to "enlarge the space for phil o­ sophical teaching and philosophical resea rch , " as he says in the "Roundtable. " GREPH mobilized in particular aga i nst the govern­ ment's program of curtailing the teaching of ph ilosophy i n the Lycee (Pd S 9 3-94/Points 88). Such a curtailment would have weakened the "critical" component in lycee education, and, needless to say, would have been felt in the universities, too, where the need to tra in such teachers would have been correspondingly eliminated . To limit the teaching of philosophy, even and especially on the h igh school level, is to limit the unlimited right to question, to nip th inking in the bud . Calling into question the nest of assumptions - about philosophy, soci­ ety, and the educational process - which lead to the conclusion that philosophy could not be studied at an early age , GREPH advocated the expansion of ph ilosoph ical education and even experimented vl/ith teaching philosophy to children aged 10 or 1 1 . 14 Beyond pursuing these practical measures , GREPH was interested in the very concept of teaching philosophy: in the ways in which philosophy is affected by i ts being taught, the ways in which teaching is affected when it is ph ilosophy that is to be taught, in the history and evolution of the "philosophy professor, " the modes of recruiting ph ilosophy teachers, and the character and make-up of the institutions i n which it is taught, the social and h istorical context in which philosophy is taught, the political stakes of teachi ng philosophy. (2) In 1 982, shortly after the election of Fran�ois Mi tterand and of a socialist majority, the new Minister of Research and I ndustry, Jean­ Pierre Chevenement, reversing the "refo rms" of the previous adminis­ tration, comm issioned a study to be headed up by Derrida that l ed directly to establ ishing the College International de Philosophie ( DDP " Criticism in Society. ed .

Salusinszky.

pp. 1 3 1 4.

64

m:CO N S T R U CTION IN A N UTSI I E L L

577 ff. lSendoffs 7 8). 1 5 The College, which opencd its doors on Octo­ ber 1 0, 1 98 3 , with Derrida serving a one-year term as its first elected Director (he was succeeded by Lyotard), illustrates quite nicely what the right to philosophy ought to l ook like in the concrete for Derrida , and it repays a closer look. This can be conveniently organized around the name of the institution . College. Inasmuch as the College is itself an institution, it finds itself in an impossible situation: for while it means to be suspicious of all institutional power and hierarchy, programs and programming, missions and destinations, the College needs to have some sort of i nsti­ tutional structure and direction . To be sure, a paralyzing impossibility is not an obj ection for Derrida , but rather an impulse and an indicator that things a re really getting interesting. Accordingly, the College m ust not exempt itself from its own analyses; its founders must recogn ize that the College itself, and the topics it pursues, will - if its founders a re successful -tend to acquire "legitimacy" and become "established" (DDP 594/Sendoffs 20). So, the College must make every effort to be vigilant about its collegiality (DDP 5 74- 5 76) it must be so structured as to bring together scholars and researchers in such an open-ended way as precisely to resist any "stable hierarchy, " to provide for a free and autonomous association that preserves maximum mobility as re­ gards both the themes that are studied there and the scholars and re­ searchers who teach there ( DDP 5 74) . The mission - its mission without m ission , without narrowing and confining definition - of the College will be: [T] o orga n i ze resea rch on objects - themes, which are not suffici ently represented in existing institutions i n France or outside

France. Obj ects

and themes which are margi na l i zed or repressed or not sufficientl y stud­ ied i n other i nsti tutions; p h i losoph i cal or

not

ph iloso p hical i nstitutions

[OCP 2 1 0] .

I ; For the relevant d oc u men ts see "Titres , " DDP 5 5 1 - 576; "Coups d 'envoi , "

DDP

5 7 7 6 1 8/Sendoffs 7 4 3 . For further information , see the i n terview with IllIre Salusin szky, i n Cri t icism in Society, ed. Salusinszky, pp. 9 24; Vi ncent Leitc h , " Research and Education at the Crossroads: A Report on the College I n ternational de Philoso phie , " Substa nce, No. 5 0 ( 1 986), 1 0 1 1 1 4 . Leitch's piece is informative but one sidedly "po-rno": while the word " responsibility" never appears, "rhizomatic" is spread all over its surface; again, Leitc h concludes, quite ama7.ingly, by say i n g that " postmod ern" movements l i ke deconstruction d isplay "less concern" with " j ustice" tha n wi th " novelty" (p. 1 1 3 ), whereas Derrida says t h a t deconstruction is j ustice . See above,

" Roundtable, "

II.

I.

THr·: RIGHT TO P H I LOSOPHY

65

This i s not t o say that what i s studied i n existing i nstitutions, basic courses in Plato and Aristotle, for example, is not important, or that deconstruction is conducting a war on the canon or standa rd curricula or the technical training of philosophers . It is never a question of choosing between proving oneself according to the most tra ditional d isciplinary standards and putting those standards to the test (DDP 49 I IPR 1 7). But the specific mission of the College itself is to thema­ tize what is not studied or legitimized in these established institutions, what is excluded by their missionary zeal, what tends to drop through the grids of existing institutions - and this on the bet or the risk that someth ing is always being lost when things operate in regularized and routinized ways . But as he says in the "Roundtable, " it is never neces­ sary to chose between the canon and "new works, new objects, new fields, new cultures, new languages. " ( RT I I ) (" It is never a question of choosing between . . . " is another n utshell . ) The College will thus have no tenu re o r chairs, n o academic "ranks , " no fixed or core curriculum, no grades or standard degrees. It will especially not be an "aristocratic and closed 'center for advanced shldies' " (PdS 1 I 9/Po i n ts I l l ), at the very sound of which name knees everywhere turn to water. The sale criterion for teaching or doing re­ search there is whether one can propose an object for resea rch that has been "marginalized or excl uded or disquali fied in other institutions" (OCP 2 1 1 ), "insufficiently 'legitimated' " (Pd S 1 1 9/Poin ts I I O) - and that promises to repay study, since not every bizarre, unusual , or ille­ gitimate idea is a good one . Philosophy. Furthermore, it must be understood that the College is to be a college of philosophy because philosophy is n ot dead and over with: As soon as you give up philosophy, or the word philosophy, what hap pens is not something n ew or beyond philosophy, what happens is tha t some old hidden ph ilosophy under other name for instance t h e name of l iterary theory or psychology or anthropology a nd so on go on dom i nati ng the research in a dogmatic or implicit way. And when you want to make thi s i mplicit philosophy as clear and as expl icit as possi ble, you have to go on ph ilosophizing . . . . That's why I am true to ph ilosophy [OCP Z l 8} .

To dance over the death o f philosophy is t o e n d u p dancing to some old a nd now forgotten philosophical tune, which is why it is necessary

66

DECONSTR U CTION IN A N UT S H ELL

to keep ph i l o s o ph y as open-ended and unlimited questioning a l ive . The c o n ti n u a l effort to worry over presuppositions, to keep on ques­ tioning and talk i ng , is what is called philosophy, and that must be kept going . The idea behind the College is to d isturb the reigning and con­ joined ideas of philosophy and the university that go back to the found­ ing of the University of Berlin in 1 8 1 0 w h i c h have "defined the rol e o f phil oso p h y in the university" ever since (OCP 2 1 0). On this " para doxical" model the ph ilosophe r is both ev ery th i n g a nd nothing. As a ki n d of Neo-Kantian overseer and surveyor of the whole of academic space, ph il o sophy stands atop a n aca de mi c py ra mid staking out th e domain of the va ri o us d i sc ip l i n es that are localized in the di fferen t "departments" down b elow . Thus far, the philosopher is taken to be a certain omnipotent philosopher-king. But, at the same t im e , the "department of ph il o soph y" is itself localized in one o f th es e part i c u l a r compartments , and hence becomes a " s ubje ct" of the k i n g , enlisted thus in the service of the whole. A "department of philosophy" is thus both impotent and omnipotent (DDP 572- 5 7 3 ) . The ul ti ma te effect of this paradoxical model is more and mo re to "reduce the space of phil o soph ic al teaching and p hil o s oph i ca l research" (OCP 2 1 1 ) to a small depa rtm e nt in a large university or multi-versity, which is why we today are worried about th e end or d ea th of philosophy. This model o f p hiloso ph y, which holds sway from Kant to Being and Time, goes b a c k to Kant's idea of ph i l os o ph y as a critical tribunal, as a j u dge who marks off the limits of possible experience and the boundaries of the various domains of kn ow l e d g e , mora l s, art, and re l i­ gion. For Kant the first question of ph i l os o ph y is the q ue s ti o n qu id juris, w i th what right do we claim to know or be obliged to do th is or that. The Kantian schema of ph il o s ophy takes the form of what Der­ rida calls a "hyperj udicialism, " where the phil os o pher is not merely a j udge but a hy pe r - j u dge , a judge of the j udges, who surveys and legitimatizes the rules of j udgment for the sev era l regions of human j u dgme n t . The philosopher not only gives the law (droit) of a subject matter, but also the truth of the law and of its j udgments, for the exercise of wh ich Kant sa ys t h e phi l os o ph ica l fac u lty needs the abso­ lute right to spe ak the truth . Philosophy is not just one part i c u l a r do­ main of legitimate j u d gm e n t , but the absolute source of all l e giti ma t i on , "the law of the l a w, the j usti ce of j ustice , " Ie droi t du droit, la justice de la justice (DDP 96-97), as such . ­

THE RIGHT TO PHI LOSOPHY

67

Kant's "critical philosophy, " which elevates the philosopher to a supreme tribunal , transcending the particular disciplines , th us forms a modern , critical - "transcendental" - counterpa rt to the pIe-critica l aspiration of classical "metaphysics" for "transcendence" (epekeina tes ousias) . Kant gives the philosopher a symbolic mastery of the world, before which everything must pass in review - even if in fact (quid facti) the philosopher is a professor (and not a king) with l i ttle or no real power. The world is a system, philosophy is its encyclopedia , and the university is a metonym for the universe and society as a whole . Even if the Enlightenment denounces totalitarianism, this is a very totalizing ideal (DDP 98-99) . It should also not go unnoticed that, in this hyper-judicial scheme, the philosopher h imself reserves the right to be ignorant of the speci fic contents of the particular domains of the encyclopedia, even while clai ming the right to speak of the essence of knowledge in general and of the meaning of each region of being or objectivity. Even if philosophers in fact do know about other th ings (in France they tend to know the human ities and social sciences, in Anglo-America they tend to know mathematics and the physical sciences), philosophy, as the science of science, is "structura l ly" ignorant; such knowledge is taken to be unnecessary and exterior to the philosophical act. Th is supreme philosopher-judge, resting atop h is tribunal, serenely asking quid juris of everything passing in review before h i m , has an " i mpotent power" (DDP 1 00- 1 0 1 ). The neo-Kantian philosopher/j udge, on Der­ rida's telling, is like a sidewalk beggar hallucinating that everyone pass­ ing before him needs his perm ission to pass. To resist that idea of philosophy and that i nstitutional framing of philosophy is the reason deconstruction has come i nto the worl d . S uch resistance would be its mission, if deconstruction d id not also resist the idea of having a mission. The College set out to disturb the pyramid and to effect a more horizontal - and hospitable - arrangement. This it does n ot by way of " interd isciplinary" work (DDP 569ff. ; Pd S 1 1 8/ Points l I D), which is an essential but al ready well-legitimated practice within existing institutions, somethi ng that has already become a "clas­ sical" concept (lCA 2 1 3). I nterd isciplinarity confirms (ra ther than de­ constructing) disciplinarity by establishing l ines of com m u n ication among already constituted d iscipl i nes, collaborative work a m ong peo­ ple with different competencies - as when students of history, l i tera­ ture, philosophy, and theology come together in a "med ieval studies"

m:CONSTRUC,ION IN A N UTS H E l l .

68

progra m . Thc Col lege , on the other hand , is in search of new obj ects for which there are no existing competencies , objects for which no one has had "training , " topics about which no team of specialists can be assembled . That itself requi res that there be no expectation of the im­ med iate applica bility of this work, no demand that it serve an immedi­ a te and evidently useful purpose. Such obj ects are studied in what is called at the College six different "intersections, " viz . , philosophy i n intersection with science, art a n d litera ture, politics, psychoanalysis, internationalities - a nd with philosophy itself. All this is aimed at pro­ voking philosophy into "new moves" in a "new space" in which it does not "recognize itself, " exposed to an other which is not its other - that negation of itself by which it mediates itself i nto a higher form of it­ self- which moves philosophy into an exposure with "others" i t can­ not reappropriate . In the report to M . Chevenement, Derrida ill ustrates the general categories of "themes" or "obj ects" he would propose investigating, among wh ich I would mention his interest in the problems of the technology of telecommunications ( DDP 608-6 1 0/Sendoffs 3 2-3 3 ) , a n d the philosophical i mplications of the life sciences, problems issu­ ing from the new medical technologies, l i ke questions surrounding organ transplants , genetic engineering, new tech niques of torture, the new ways we have found to occupy outer space, information technolo­ gies, "smart" weapons and the new modes of warfa re (DDP 600-60 5 / Sendoffs 2 5-29). In the first year, for example, there was a seminar on philosophical problems surrounding hospital autopsies . 16 Interna tional. Final ly, while the College is not the fi rst i nstitution to regard itself as international , international here is i ntended to mean something different (OCP 2 1 5-2 1 7). The College wishes not only to invite foreign visitors but also to include them in the College as deci­ sion-making "organic members , " with the effect even of delimiting the authority of the French language within the College . Not only does the College pursue the famil iar international l i nks, French and Ger­ man, for example, or French and America n , or even the much more difficult French and British, but it also seeks to cross ba rriers with non­ European la nguages , cultures, and ph ilosophy that are hardly known 16

Le itch , "Research a n d Education at the Crossroads, " 1 0 2 .

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in France, l ike Asian and African philosophy (OCP 2 2 5 ) , of which the debate over Placide Tempel's Bantu Philosophy serves as a n exa mple . 1 7 This internationalism is no Enlightenment universalism that would mean to spread a monochromatic European universal over the globe, to paint the whole world European , and to treat what is not Eu ropean as "pre-Eu ropean , " which means pre-rational, but a kind of linking or networking that breaks open what would otherwise be self-enclosed national isms and lets otherwise silenced voices be heard . It does not seek to dissolve the national identities into a universal medium. Its idea of translation is to cope with the different and idiomatic national differences - translation is both necessary and im possible - and to keep them exposed to one another to prevent self-enclosure. I ndeed , one of the problems that interests Derrida is the growing and increasingly h egemon ic un iversality of the English language around the world which tends to wipe out difference. If by Enl ightenment one means a uniform universalism, then that is something to deconstruct. But, by the same token, insofar as the Enlightenment dissolves obscurantism , authoritarianism, and fanaticism , nothing is more aufkliirisch than de­ construction (OCP 220-2 2 1 ).

BETWEEN THE "O":PARTM ENT OF A

PIIILOSOPHY" AND PI IlLOSOPHY TO COME

If one asks where, in the u niversity, one fi nds deconstruction, i n what department, one would have to say that it inhabits the distance be­ tween the departmentalized academ ic specialties of philosophy or l iter­ ature or law, or architecture, or rel igious studies, etc. , and something absolutely new, absolutely singular, and unprecedented : I dream of a writing that would be neither ph i l osophy nor l i ter ature , nor even contaminated

by o n e or the other, while still keeping

no desire to abandon th i s

I have

th e memory of l i terature and philosophy

[AI, 7 3 ] . 1 7 See Pa u l i n J . H o u n tond j i , African Philosophy: Myth and Rea lity, 2 n d ed. (Bloomi ngto n : I ndiana U niversity Press, 1 996) for a critique of Placide Tcmpels's view that there is a n ind igenous, disti nctly non-Western "Africa n p h i l osophy" as an eth no­ centric myth .

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70

Deconstructio n is n o u r ish ed by a d ream of t he invention of the other, of something to come, so me th in g absolutely unique and idiomatic, the invention , the in-coming, of an absolute surprise . Such a work would l ikewise involve the invention of its readers, the forming or consti tuti ng of a new c omm un i ty of readers a round it, a commu n i ty which does not exist - how could it? Such readers would get on th e­ job tra ining , on the spot, when it comes (AL 72) In d eed , this is a genera l ru l e , a n u tsh e l l of deconstruction: it always inha bi ts the d is­ tance between something impossible, justice or the gift, say, of whi c h we d r eam a n d all the ex i sti ng actualities and foreseeable possibilities, with which we are more or less discontent. But how a re such thinkers to be trained in the mea n t i m e ? For it is always the meantime, the in-between time, j ust because w h at is com­ ing is always to come, d ven ir. In the m e a n tim e it would be ne cessa ry to undergo the most rigorous and c las si cal trai ni ng in d epa rtme n ts of phi losophy and literature, of religion a nd law, etc . Where else? That is why De r rida is happy to be on hand w h en a new program i n philoso­ phy is being instituted , why he is the perfect guest for such a n occa­ sion. But these programs must always be o pe n e n d ed , porous, experi menta l , nonprogrammable, v i gila n t self-questioni ng, self-revis­ ing, exposed to their other, inventive of th e other. In a n utshell, deconstructive. -

,

,

,

-

,

3 Khora: Being Serious with Plato am on th e threshold of re ad ing Plato and Aristotle. [ love feel [ have to sta rt aga i n and aga i n a n d aga i n . It is a task which is in front of me, before me. " "[

them and [

" Roundtable , " 9 more than we think we know from 'trad i t i o n but the scene o f the gift a ls o obl igates us to a ki n d of filial lack of p i e ty at once serious and not so serious, a s rega rds th e th i nking to which we have the greatest debt. "

" We have go tte n , '

,

PdS I 39fPoin ts 1 3 0

A HOAx May I S, 1 996, The New York Times reported on its front pa ge a story of a h oax that was played on Social Text, th e chief outlet of th e "cultural studies" movement; the headline of the story ran " Po s t m od ­ ern Gra vi ty Deconstructed, Slyly. " The Times re po rte d a story that had j ust appeared i n Lingua Fra nca and s u b s eq u e n tl y created quite a controversy, in whic h a p h ys ic is t named Alan S o ka l revealed that he had subm i tted a sati re e nt i tl ed "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutic of Quantum G r a v i ty aimed at makin g w h a t postmodernist s o c i ol og ists of science say abo u t g r a vity l ook silly, wh i c h is what the Times meant by "deconstructed . " The e d i to rs of Social Text took it quite se r i o u s l y and had j ust published it, wh i c h led to Soka l 's "gotch'ya . " Taki ng on a look of p erfe ct grav i ty, Sokal took on what he took to be the relativism of the cultural studies movement, pa rticularly as regards h a rd science" - the gravely se rious issue of the

On

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"

"

72

DECON STR UCTION I N A N UTS H ELL

principle of gravity in mathematical physics. I Soka l , for whom "grav­ ity" is not a suggestion, but the law, said that he defended the truth of "the sill iest quotes about mathematics a nd physics from the most prominent academics . I invented an a rgument pra ising them and li nking them together. All this was ve ry easy to carry off becau s e my argument wasn't o bl iged to respect any standard s of evidence or logic. " Sokal feels obl iged to rise to the defense of "science" against its "bashers , " whi c h is obvious l y what he thinks "deconstruction" means. Sokal's rakish claim was that i n a postm odern perspective "the space­ time manifold ceases to exist as an objective physical reality; geometry becomes relational and contextua l ; and the foundational conceptual categories of prior science - a mong them, existence itself- become problematized and rel ativiz e d " Defending hi mself to the Times re­ porte r, Sta n ley Aronowitz , co-founder of th e journal and City U niver­ sity of New York professor, said Sokal is i l l rea d and half-educated" and "got it wrong. " That d oe s not seem like much of a defense, as it leaves the reader to wonder what "standards of evidence or logic" e dito r Aronowitz uses when he accepts articles for publication in hi s journal . Stanley Fish, among other things Executive Director of Duke U niver­ sity Press, which publishes Social Text, was incensed that anyone should disturb , disrupt, transgress, mime, satirize, or subvert postmod­ emists (who spend their time, of course, doing just that to everybody else). Fi sh said he was not am used , that this was a bad joke, not funny at al l and then , like an aging Sh a kespe are scholar, invoked the most classical and straight sta ndards of academic propriety against Soka l . Questioning the very ethics o f Al a n Sokal, Fish took all th is very seri­ ously and i n dig n a ntly arg ued that the so c io l ogy of science is i n the serious business of d e lim i tin g science, not of bashing it, of showing the extent to which scientific claims are embedded in social, politica l , and even sexual systems possessed o f s e rious political implications Z .

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I See Alan D. Sokal , "Transgress ing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative H er meneutics of Quantum Gravity, " Social lext (Spring/Sum mer 1 996), 2 1 7 2 5 2 ; and

Physicist Experiments with Social Stud i es , " Lingua Franca (May/J U l i e 1 996), 62 64. Science Wars, cd . Andrew Ross (Dnrha m , N . C . : Duke U n i versity Press, 1 996) is a separate pri n t ing of th i s issue of Socia l Text, whose contributors a re respon d i l lg to a wave of criticism headed by Paul Gross and Norman Levitt's Higher Superstition (Balti more: The Johns H opki n s U n i vers ity Press, 1 994), which presel lts the cultural stud ies critique of "value free science" as "science bashing. " 2 Sta n ley Fi s h , "Professor Soka l 's Bad Joke , " The New York Times, )I.·l ay 2 1 , 1 996, p. 2 3 , "Op ed" page. The d i sanalogy, if I may weigh i n on this d i spute , between the

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