D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion

D-DAY DECEPTION

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

D-DAY DECEPTION Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion Mary Kathryn Barbier

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Barbier, Mary. D-day deception : Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion / Mary Kathryn Barbier. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99479–2 (alk. paper) 1. Operation Fortitude. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—France—Normandy. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Deception. 4. Normandy (France)—History. I. Title. D756.5.N6B347 2007 940.54’21421—dc22 2007027854 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Mary Kathryn Barbier All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007027854 ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99479–2 First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The author gratefully acknowledges permission to reprint portions of this book that first appeared in ‘‘Deception and the Planning of D-Day,’’ The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On (Routledge, 2006).

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Chapter One: Setting the Stage

1

Chapter Two: Devising a Plan

11

Chapter Three: Threatening Norway

41

Chapter Four: Deciding How to Implement Fortitude South

63

Chapter Five: Putting Fortitude South into Play: From the Beginning until D-Day

74

Chapter Six: Continuing the Deception

106

Chapter Seven: Reacting to the Deception

148

Chapter Eight: Assessing Operation Fortitude

182

Glossary

197

Notes

203

Bibliography

247

Index

257

Acknowledgments

This project would have not been successful had it not been for the help and support of so many people. First, let me thank Dr. Andrew Wiest, my first mentor, for suggesting that I investigate Operation Fortitude. He patiently guided my steps and helped me to organize my ideas and conclusions throughout every stage of this project. Second, I would like to thank my other mentor Dennis Showalter, who has read many versions of this manuscript and who provided numerous useful suggestions, all of which helped make the manuscript better. This manuscript would not have seen the light of day without Andy and Dennis. Special thanks go to Dr. G.D. Sheffield and Dr. Nigel de Lee who suggested several valuable avenues of research and identified the availability of important interviews at the Imperial War Museum’s Sound Archives. I conducted research in several archives in the United Kingdom and the United States. The staff at the Imperial War Museum was always helpful and patient. It was a pleasure to arrive each day and find the requested materials waiting for me. Equally, the staff at The National Archives, formerly the Public Record Office, was efficient, professional, and helpful. I would also like to thank Seb Cox at the Air Historical Branch Library and the archivists at the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, the Beinecke Library at Yale University, and at the Library of Congress. I would like especially to thank Mitchell Yokelson at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Mitch made my research at the National Archives easy. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge an important group who provided me with funding that enabled me to conduct additional research and to make revisions

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to the original manuscript. I would like to thank Professors Paul Kennedy, John Lewis Gaddis, and Theodore Bromund of International Security Studies (ISS) at Yale University for awarding me a two-year postdoctoral fellowship. Their belief in and encouragement of my project was immensely beneficial. In addition, through their efforts, I also received additional funding from Smith Richardson Foundation. The Smith Richardson Fellowship financed an additional trip to the archives in England, which facilitated the final substantive revisions. I gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint portions of this book that first appeared in ‘‘Deception and the Planning of D-Day,’’ The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, Routledge, 2006. I would like to thank my colleagues at Mississippi State University for their support and advice and my editors, Elizabeth Demers, for her belief in this project, and Haylee Schwenk, for her valuable help in the final stages of production. I would also like to thank my family who believed in me. Without them, I could not have accomplished all that I have. Special thanks to Dr. David I. Hall, who pushed me to finish the manuscript and who helped me to have confidence in myself when I was overwhelmed by this whole process.

1

Setting the Stage

Returned to-day from my long trip. I saw a lot and was very satisfied with the progress that has been made. I think for certain that we’ll win the defensive battle in the West, provided only that a little more time remains for preparations.. . .In the West: I believe we’ll be able to beat off the assault. —German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, January 19, 19441

D-Day, June 6, 1944, marked the day on which British and American forces launched a major amphibious assault against German troops stationed in northern France. Following massive naval bombardment and airborne attacks along the coast, Allied soldiers landed on the beaches of Normandy signaling the commencement of Operation Overlord. The invasion of Normandy was, however, a long time in coming. The June 1940 forced evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from Dunkirk had made the British more determined than ever to defeat their German enemy. After fighting the Germans with little help for almost two years, the British gained an unexpected ally in the Soviet Union. On July 19, 1941, approximately one month after the Germans invaded the U.S.S.R., Josef Stalin made his first request for the British to establish a second front by attacking the Germans in western Europe. Although they immediately began shipping supplies to the Soviets, the British did not consider it possible to establish a second front in 1941. The United States’ entry into the war in early December did not make the immediate establishment of a second front any more feasible. Neither Britain nor the United States had the forces available to launch a major offensive in late 1941 or early 1942. 2 Consequently, because he was unwilling to approve an operation when the forces necessary for success were unavailable, Winston Churchill reasserted Britain’s strategy to attack the ‘‘periphery of Hitler’s empire.’’ As the German offensive in the Soviet Union continued, Stalin renewed his requests for an Allied attack in the West to draw enemy forces from the Eastern

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D-DAY DECEPTION

Front. Thus began a series of debates between American and British military and political leaders over their future war strategy and the establishment of a second front. Churchill walked a fine line during this time. Although he remained committed to the invasion of Europe, he did not believe that British or American forces were ready for such a major undertaking. While Allied military leaders drew up plans for Operation Sledgehammer, a small scale invasion of France to be carried out in the fall of 1942, and while Stalin continued to push for Allied action in 1942, Churchill approached President Franklin D. Roosevelt with the possibility of invading North Africa that year.3 Finding an unexpected ally in Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s most trusted advisor, Churchill argued convincingly that the inequality of troop strength between the Allies and the Germans made a 1942 cross-Channel invasion impossible. Persuaded by Churchill and Hopkins, Roosevelt insisted that Allied forces mount an alternative offensive in 1942; therefore, the president presented several options to his Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included among the options was Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Although he strongly supported mounting a crossChannel invasion as soon as possible, General George C. Marshall, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, reluctantly endorsed the North African operation. Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the North Africa campaign would constitute the main Allied offensive in 1942, but it would not be the only one. The belief that the possession of a port was essential to a successful landing along the French coast prompted the British to authorize a raid by British and Canadian forces against Dieppe, a German-held French port. Numerous problems plagued the raid, and casualties were high. The British and Canadian failure to launch a successful raid against Dieppe in August 1942 reinforced Churchill’s fears about a major cross-Channel attack and his belief in amassing an overwhelming force before attempting to invade France. In addition, the disaster at Dieppe would later bolster British demands for a cover plan to mask the real invasion when the time came. The failure at Dieppe did not, however, cause a postponement of Operation Torch. In November 1942, British and American forces landed in North Africa. Although the campaign lasted until May 1943, it did not satisfy Stalin’s demands for a second front. Allied leaders had not, however, abandoned the idea of invading France. They prepared plans for Operation Roundup, a cross-Channel invasion, which they slated for implementation in 1943. Churchill had committed himself to a second front in 1943, but he remained unconvinced that the operation would be feasible even then.4 In January 1943 Churchill, Roosevelt, and their military and political advisors met in Casablanca to discuss the direction of the war. The defeat of German forces in North Africa and in the Soviet Union had weakened the enemy’s position, which Churchill had previously claimed was a condition necessary for the launching of a second front offensive. A few months earlier, although he had suggested to Stalin that the Western Allies would invade France in 1943, the British prime minister did not make a firm commitment to the operation. During the Casablanca Conference, however, the British proposed the invasion of Sicily, instead of France, as the major Allied offensive in 1943. Their proposal presented a serious challenge for Churchill

SETTING THE STAGE

3

and his advisors, who had to convince their American counterparts that Operation Husky would not interfere with the promised second front. Although Marshall, in particular, needed convincing, Churchill’s fears that a cross-Channel operation in 1943 would end in disaster remained. Despite Marshall’s objections, Roosevelt accepted Churchill’s arguments that it was important to build on the momentum that Allied forces had in the Mediterranean, that the defeat of the Italians would open the area to Allied shipping, and that control of the region would facilitate an expansion of the air offensive against Germany. Following the Casablanca Conference, Allied troops under General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s command began preparations for the invasion of Sicily. On July 10, 1943, Allied forces landed on Sicily and began a campaign that quickly resulted in control of the island. After much debate, Allied leaders decided on July 20 that the next logical step was to take the offensive to the Italian mainland. On September 3, 1943, as the British Eighth Army landed in Italy, the Italian government concluded negotiations that resulted in the transfer of its navy, merchant marine, and air force to the Allies and in Italy becoming a ‘‘cobelligerent against Germany.’’ On September 9 American troops landed at Salerno. Although Allied forces no longer faced Italian troops, the fight for Italy did not prove to be an easy one. Because of the staunch German resistance, by late 1943 the Allies had only advanced seventy miles north of Salerno and were still eighty miles from Rome. Allied troops finally took Rome on June 5, 1944, the day before the commencement of the Normandy invasion.5 Throughout the summer and fall of 1943, as Allied troops fought first in Sicily and then in Italy, military leaders worked on a plan for the invasion of France. As the campaign in Italy continued and demanded more and more resources, Stalin’s vision of a second front in 1943 became increasingly unlikely. Although Stalin fumed about the delay, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their military advisors remained committed to the invasion of France. In November 1943 at Teheran, Churchill and Roosevelt renewed their pledge to Stalin and promised to launch Operation Overlord in early May 1944. Conditions in Italy and shortages of landing craft, however, delayed the invasion until early June 1944.6 Although American and British military and political leaders had debated the second front issue for several years, they had to accept the invasion of France as a way to placate Stalin, but more importantly, as a way to bring the war to Germany and defeat to Adolf Hitler. Unfortunately, based on preparations underway in the United Kingdom, the Germans had concluded that the enemy would land a large number of troops in northwest France in the summer of 1944. The Germans also realized that weather conditions would limit when the invasion could occur.7 Fearing that the establishment of beachheads along the French coast would be difficult, if not impossible, because enemy forces would greatly outnumber the invading troops, Allied planners, particularly the British, concluded early on that Operation Overlord needed an insurance policy. They had to keep the Germans from moving reinforcements into Normandy for as long as possible both before and after the commencement of the invasion. First, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, then

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D-DAY DECEPTION

Colonel John Bevan and the London Controlling Section (LCS), worked on a deception plan, eventually called Operation Fortitude, which they hoped would increase the odds of Overlord’s success. The British were not new to the use of deception plans. They had used them with varying degrees of success since early in the war, particularly when launching an operation in which their forces were greatly outnumbered. By falsifying the picture of their preparations, they hoped that the enemy would make specific mistakes that would help their military operation. The British successfully developed a strategy for disguising military intentions that a staff, which had the confidence of the commander in the field, could plan and implement using specially trained and equipped forces. Early in the war, the British had established a network of organizations that contributed to the creation and implementation of deception plans designed to help the military engage the enemy in battle. The Double Cross or Twenty (XX) Committee, a branch of MI 5, the British security service, had the responsibility of running captured enemy agents who became double agents. Beginning in 1941, three MI 5 operatives—Lieutenant Colonel T.A. Robertson, Captain J.C. Masterman, and J.A. Marriott—with the help of a team of case officers ‘‘looked after’’ the double agents and utilized them as a useful means of communicating information, or misinformation, to the enemy. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) provided information based on intercepted radio transmissions, particularly after cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park broke the Germans’ Enigma cipher in December 1941. Although the Double Cross Committee, along with a group called the W Board, provided the double agents with information and misinformation, neither organization determined British ‘‘deception policy.’’ That job initially fell to the Joint Inter-Service Security Board, which the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee created in February 1940, but the British had been implementing deceptions even earlier. Between 1939 and 1941 General Sir Archibald Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, created ‘‘A’’ Force, a special deception section run by Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke. Because of his successes in the Middle East, the Chiefs of Staff solicited suggestions from Clarke. Following recommendations made by Clarke in October 1941, the Chiefs of Staff approved the formation of the London Controlling Section (LCS), which assumed control over the establishment of deception policy and the development of deception plans for particular operations.8 Two organizations provided an important connection between ‘‘A’’ Force and the LCS. The Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC), which began operating in Cairo in June 1939, ‘‘co-ordinate[d] and furnish[ed] intelligence both for GHQ Middle East and for the Joint Intelligence Committee in London.’’ By November 1940 the Combined Bureau Middle East (CBME) joined the MEIC in Cairo. The CBME was the ‘‘centre of all cryptanalytic activity, directly linked with the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park.’’9 Wavell put Clarke to work immediately upon his arrival in Cairo. Clarke’s first job was to build up the number of forces available to Wavell by notionally suggesting the existence of new formations. By increasing the size of Wavell’s force, Clarke hoped to accomplish two objectives. He hoped to deter an enemy attack, and he wanted to use

SETTING THE STAGE

5

deception to help Wavell’s upcoming offensive. ‘‘A’’ Force initiated its first plan in November 1940. Wavell, who was planning an attack on Italian forces at Sidi Barrani in Egyptian territory, saw the need for a cover plan. ‘‘A’’ Force planted misinformation with identified Axis sources in Cairo and through diplomatic channels and instituted administrative measures consistent with the impending embarkation of a large force. In addition, ‘‘A’’ Force used dummy radio traffic to simulate the withdrawal of British forces from the Western Desert. Although the British achieved surprise when they attacked Italian forces on December 9, 1940, the existing evidence does not prove that it resulted from the cover operation.10 ‘‘A’’ Force launched a second deception, Camilla, a few months later to cover the British assault on Italian East Africa. The deception included supplying British units with maps and guides to British Somaliland, the radio transmission of deceptive information, the circulation of rumors in Cairo, the leakage of information, and the misplacement of certain documents that pertained to the impending British offensive. Although Camilla was instrumental in enabling British forces to achieve complete surprise when they launched their offensive against Italian East Africa, not all of ‘‘A’’ Force’s deception plans had the desired effect. Despite its early successes, it took time for ‘‘A’’ Force to create a well-organized, effective deceptive operation. In 1941, after successfully implementing Camilla, ‘‘A’’ Force experienced a series of setbacks. The simulation of an attack against the enemy’s lines of communication between Tripoli and El Agheila had no effect on Axis operations. After the fall of Crete to the Germans in May 1941, ‘‘A’’ Force attempted to discourage a German assault on Cyprus by ‘‘inflating the notional size of the garrison.’’ ‘‘A’’ Force also initiated a complete visual deception program that included camps, divisional signs, and transport for viewing by enemy agents and air reconnaissance, the issuing of movement and administrative orders, and the flooding of the airwaves with radio signals. Allied officials in Cairo conveniently ‘‘lost’’ the defense plan for Cyprus. ‘‘A’’ Force’s efforts to protect Cyprus proved unnecessary. Documents captured by the British a short time later indicated that the Germans did not have plans to invade the island.11 Both the Cyprus operation and Crusader, which the British launched a month later, demonstrated deficiencies in British intelligence gathering and counterintelligence work. ‘‘A’’ Force tried to mask a British offensive in the Western Desert by suggesting an imminent assault to keep German forces on the defensive for four months. On three separate occasions the British ‘‘notionally mounted and stood down’’ the attack. By the time they launched Crusader in November 1941, the British Eighth Army exhibited a ‘‘combination of high morale and overconfidence.’’ Although the British had good intelligence on which to rely when planning Crusader, the offensive did not proceed as envisioned. The British had placed too much faith on their own intelligence in 1941. Even though they were good at intelligence gathering, the British were not, in 1941, good at operations.12 Despite its setbacks, ‘‘A’’ Force’s responsibilities increased, resulting in the creation of a separate organization to handle tactical deception in the field. Two developments late in 1941 provided more avenues for the designing and implementing of future

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deception operations. The first was the creation of the London Controlling Section (LCS), the organization that acquired the task of developing deception plans. Second, in December 1941, ‘‘A’’ Force and other British deception groups received an important boost when cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park broke the Abwehr Enigma cipher. Consequently, the deception planners had access to German intelligence when planning future deception operations. In the spring of 1942, a combined effort by the LCS and ‘‘A’’ Force resulted in the development of a cover plan for the British attack on Madagascar. The deception implied that the British would land in the Dodecanese Islands. The placement of enemy defenses indicated that the deception apparently contributed to the German conclusion that the Dodecanese Islands were threatened. Because the Germans had placed their garrisons in Leros and Rhodes on alert, British troops met no opposition when they landed on the beaches of Madagascar. A second threat to the Dodecanese Islands during the summer did not, however, achieve the desired result. During the spring of 1942, the LCS instituted a second deception operation in an attempt to persuade the Germans to reinforce Norway. Although they placed their forces in southern Norway on maximum alert during the first two weeks of May, the Germans did not increase the number of formations in the Scandinavian country.13 While the British took a serious approach to the use of deception operations in the Mediterranean Theater, the system apparently broke down with regard to the August 1942 Dieppe raid, which was in fact the second assault planned against the French port. For several reasons, the British cancelled the original operation, Rutter, on July 7, 1942. The troops who had been trained for the raid were reassigned to various postings around the United Kingdom, and British military officials briefly debated the wisdom of remounting the cancelled assault. Despite strong opposition and lack of consensus, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten decided to proceed with the raid against Dieppe. He failed, however, to consult security experts, and his use of deception included releasing his plans to the Germans. Mountbatten had suggested the Dieppe raid would constitute part of a deception to hide the actual targets of the operation—St. Nazaire, Alderney, and Boulogne. The fact remains that the assault was launched against Dieppe and had disastrous results. The failure of Mountbatten to consult the experts for the creation of a cover plan, among other equally important factors, doomed the raid to failure. The disaster at Dieppe reinforced the growing perception within the British intelligence and military community that adequate use of intelligence and deceptive means was crucial.14 Despite the Dieppe fiasco, the British continued to devise and implement cover plans for the Mediterranean Theater. In August 1942, ‘‘A’’ Force and the LCS initiated a deception operation designed to mask the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), which Allied officials planned for November. The plan had several interconnected operations. According to the first scheme, the Allies planned to launch major operations against northern France in the fall of 1942 in order to tie down the large German force located there. To mask the concentration of personnel and shipping for Torch, the second plan implied preparations for an attack on Norway. The goal of the third operation was ‘‘to allay Vichy suspicions’’ and to

SETTING THE STAGE

7

conceal the final destination of the invasion force by suggesting a threat to Sicily and southern Italy. The final part of the plan implied the reinforcement of Malta to conceal the buildup of forces on Gibraltar. The overall operation had varying degrees of success. Although they maintained their force in northern France, the Germans never seriously considered the area threatened. The threat to Norway was moderately successful. In addition to declaring the Trodheim-Narvik area protected and the Swedish-Norwegian border a prohibited zone, the Germans expected an attack by ten Allied divisions. The lack of an attempt to intercept the Allied convoys entering the Mediterranean and the lack of preparations by the Vichy and the Germans indicated that they did not expect an attack against Northern Africa. Finally, according to German appreciations, they expected the Allies ‘‘to relieve Malta,’’ but they ‘‘were otherwise undecided as to whether the assault was to be made on Sicily, Tripoli or even Crete.’’ 15 In addition to the cover plan for Torch, the British also implemented a deceptive cover for the Battle of El Alamein in October 1942. Churchill suggested that the cover plan contributed to the British success at El Alamein. Following the lead of their allies, the Americans carried out some minor deception experiments in the Battle of Tunisia with varying degrees of success.16 By the summer of 1942, the Americans had not, however, had the same sort of practice with developing and implementing cover plans as the British had. In fact, since Operation Torch was the first Allied campaign in which the Americans had participated, they had not had the opportunity to institute the necessary organizations in time to have gained experience that was comparable to that of the British. Consequently, as the Allies began preparations for the cross-Channel invasion during the summer of 1943, the British took the lead in determining the deception strategy for the Allied effort and in developing the cover plan that would subsequently be implemented. Initially, only a few Americans participated, and generally, they were ‘‘students or members of a joint staff under British command.’’17 The LCS initiated several other major deceptions during 1943, both with and without help from ‘‘A’’ Force. Between March and July 1943, the LCS implemented the Barclay deception that they designed to cover the invasion of Sicily. Barclay had several goals that included threats to ‘‘pin down enemy forces in the south of France and the Balkan peninsula; to weaken the garrison of Sicily and retard its reinforcement, especially by German troops; and to reduce to a minimum air and naval attacks on the shipping being assembled for the assault on Sicily from Britain, North Africa and Egypt.’’18 According to the deception, if the Allies attacked Sicily, it would be a diversion to draw Axis forces from other, more important areas. Barclay also simulated preparations for Allied attacks against Sardinia, Corsica, and the southern Balkans. The plan suggested first that the assault, which the Allies would only launch when no moon was visible, would come in late June, and then that the Allies had postponed the attack for four weeks. Evaluating Barclay after Allied troops had landed in Sicily, the LCS concluded that the deception had been a success for several reasons. First, the Germans had sent reinforcements to the Balkans.

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Second, the Axis divided its reserves in Italy between Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily. Finally, information obtained from captured documents and prisoners suggested that Axis forces had been surprised both by the date and by the scale of the Allies’ attack.19 After Allied leaders had decided to invade Italy in early September, the LCS and ‘‘A’’ Force implemented a supporting deception that continued the threats to Sardinia and Corsica. In addition, the plan indicated a possible Allied landing at Crotone, which is located on Italy’s heel. Allied forces successfully landed in Italy on September 3 and 9. After the landings, the LCS concluded that, because of the limited amount of time for implementation, the deception had not been as successful as the previous one. According to the LCS, ‘‘nevertheless, some degree of surprise was obtained and opposition during the early stages was confined to that of a single German division. Later information indicated that a German division had been moved from the west coast to the heel shortly before the Salerno attack.’’20 In addition to implementing deception plans to provide cover for the invasions of Sicily and Italy, Allied officials decide to initiate a series of deceptions designed to suggest the possibility of a large-scale cross-Channel invasion in 1943. The deception, Operation Cockade, which fell under the direction of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate), otherwise known as COSSAC, included deceptions aimed at three different locations, all of which commenced during the summer of 1943 and culminated in September. Operation Starkey indicated an amphibious threat by British troops to the Pas de Calais area; Operation Wadham suggested an assault against Brittany by American forces; and Operation Tindall intimated a British assault against Norway to seize the port and airfields at Stavanger.21 G-3 Operations of General Jacob L. Devers’s command received the responsibility of implementing Wadham. By displaying dummy landing craft, dummy aircraft, and real gliders, along with the transfer of false information by double agents and the flying of aircraft into enemy radar range, G-3 attempted to suggest the placement of an American amphibious force in Southwest England. No real troops were involved in the implementation of Wadham. Despite American efforts, the Germans did not reinforce northwest France. They did, however, maintain twelve divisions in Norway during Operation Tindall. Hitler’s preoccupation with Norway persuaded him to consider any threat to the country seriously. Consequently, he generally maintained a particular troop level there throughout the war.22 Although Wadham and Tindall were purely deception operations, Starkey united deception with a ‘‘large scale movement exercise by the Army, combined with actual sea and air operations to simulate a real intention to carry out a cross-Channel operation.’’23 Of the three threats, the LCS considered the one to the Pas de Calais to be the most important. The shortage of landing craft, however, made it unlikely that the Germans considered the threat to be anything other than a large raid. Although it elicited a few minor German responses, Cockade failed to achieve its objectives. Despite its failure, Cockade proved useful. It provided the LCS with

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experience in creating a deceptive threat to Norway, and it demonstrated a German sensitivity with regard to the Pas de Calais.24 Following Cockade, Devers ordered his new permanent Cover and Deception officer to study the results of the operation and make recommendations for improvements to facilitate American participation in future deception endeavors. In the study, the officer recommended that the general ask the War Department ‘‘to activate, equip and train a field deception unit capable of simulating one corps, consisting of one infantry and one armored division, by means of prefabricated portable dummies together with the appropriate radio communication.’’ On January 20, 1944, the 23rd Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Troops, Army, was activated. By March 1, 1944, the War Department activated a sonic unit, which was attached to the 23rd.25 The American 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, which was an unorthodox unit, included 82 officers and 1,023 enlisted men, many of whom were artists, actors, engineers, designers, advertising layout men, electronic wizards, writers, architects, and special-effects experts. It was, however, some time before these units could play an active role in Allied deception operations. When it took to the field, the 23rd, instead of avoiding enemy fire, invited it. Their mission was to divert enemy attention and to protect the lives of the combat troops on the front lines. The men of the 23rd ‘‘never wore their own sleeve insignia, camouflaged their vehicles with the markings of other outfits, operated at night and in strict secrecy, and were under orders never to divulge the nature of their mission even to superior officers in their own army.’’26 Although they did not participate in the cover plan for Operation Overlord, a small part of the 23rd landed in Normandy shortly after the invasion began; the rest arrived over the next few weeks. The men of the 23rd ‘‘served under fire with four armies in five European countries during five major campaigns from D-Day until the end of the war.’’27 While the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops did not provide cover for the Normandy invasion, another American unit, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, did participate in that deception, but because of the nature of the invasion’s cover plan, final decisions were not made until the eve of implementation. In fact, the LCS continually reassessed and made changes to the plan after its commencement. Despite the mixed results of the deception plans developed and implemented by the LCS, British military leaders believed that a cover plan for Operation Overlord was essential. Drawing on their own experiences, as well as those of ‘‘A’’ Force, members of the LCS went to work on a plan in the fall of 1943. The LCS created the Fortitude deception plan that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) accepted and helped to implement. Fortitude was by far the most ambitious plan created by the LCS during the war. Because Fortitude was much more complex than most realize, the following discussion presents a detailed examination of Fortitude from the planning stage through its conclusion in the fall of 1944. Particular attention is paid to the previously neglected Fortitude North. In addition to examining the operation from the Allied perspective, the discussion examines the German responses before, during, and after D-Day, June 6, 1944. After

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exploring numerous primary sources, particularly the Wingate and Hesketh reports and Ultra intercepts, this work concludes with an analysis of Fortitude’s contribution to the Allies’ victory in Normandy, as well as an examination of reasons, other than the deception, that explain the Germans’ behavior toward Normandy during this period.

2

Devising a Plan

Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies. —British Prime Minister Winston Churchill1

It is not difficult to understand why the Allied leaders believed that it was necessary to devise and implement a deception plan to cover their upcoming invasion of the coast of northwestern Europe. They had implemented some successful deceptive measures during the North African and Italian campaigns. The assault on northern France in late spring 1944 would be the largest amphibious operation ever attempted by Allied forces. In addition, the Allies would launch an assault against a strongly defended coastline in an area where the Germans were building the infamous Atlantic Wall. As the Allies defeated German troops in North Africa and then slowly advanced northward up the Italian peninsula, the enemy’s ‘‘sole remaining hope’’ lay ‘‘in defeating the Allied invasion in the West.’’ 2 The Germans expected the Allies to launch an assault against France in late spring 1944. They were, however, uncertain about the location and the time of the impending Allied invasion. Therefore, the Allied leaders, taking into consideration the heated debates that had occurred over the opening of a Second Front, as well as continuing British concerns over the possibility of Operation Overlord’s success, chose to create a cover plan, which was originally called Torrent, then Mespot, and, finally, Fortitude.3 Although Fortitude represented a deception, rather than a real invasion, Allied planners, who experienced difficulties similar to those encountered when they devised Overlord, spent over six months constructing a scheme that went through numerous revisions before the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved it. In terms of scale, the Fortitude deception was the largest of which we have knowledge. After all, what were they trying to disguise? They were trying to disguise movement of 3000 ships in a very small area of sea. The movement of 3000 ships into a funnel of

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sea about at its greatest 100 miles long and 20 or 30 miles wide. And these ships had to move from identifiable ports through confined waters to a single concentration area in a highly compressed space of time. They were also for example trying to disguise the movements of 13,000 aircraft. It was the largest invasion force that has ever been assembled in the history of amphibious operations.4

Creating a cover plan for the ‘‘largest invasion force’’ proved a daunting task, especially in light of the failed Cockade project from the summer of 1943, but the British approached Fortitude with vigor. Initially it was a British plan, but the Americans ultimately became ‘‘full partners’’ in its execution.5 In April 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Command designate (COSSAC), to ready Overlord plans. After he and his staff completed their assignment and submitted it to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in mid-July, Morgan began constructing an invasion cover plan. In designing the deception, Morgan had to consider certain security factors—communications restrictions, particularly after the Overlord briefing of troops, and frontier closings in England, Scotland, and Wales. Colonel John Bevan, head of the London Controlling Section (LCS), argued against closing the frontiers too soon because it might alert the enemy to the time of the invasion more than the leakage of information after troop briefings.6 In presenting his thoughts about strategic deception plans for Overlord to Morgan, Bevan noted that he hoped for tactical, not strategic, surprise. Morgan received Bevan’s plan on July 14, but disagreed with it. Although he voiced legitimate concerns about the Bevan plan, Morgan’s alternative proved to be unrealistic. Morgan did stress, however, that the Allies would be unable to keep the buildup of troops a secret until D-Day. Consequently, he believed that they had to suggest another assault or assaults.7 Morgan and others had a high opinion of the German Intelligence Service; therefore, they believed that they had to deceive the Germans in three separate ways— intelligence, air reconnaissance, and spies. According to Sir Ronald Wingate, another member of the LCS, ‘‘this automatically implied an extensive program of visual misdirection,’’ which created a major problem for the Allies. The main concern for the Allied commanders remained Operation Overlord, which received priority over any available supplies. Providing troops, armaments, equipment, landing craft, and other supplies for Overlord took precedence over making them available for other operations, including the cover plan. As a result, the planners decided to coordinate planning of Overlord and the cover plan to enable the sharing of physical supplies whenever possible. Other obstacles, such as the failure of Allied officials to agree upon an overall strategic deception policy, hindered the development of a cover plan for Overlord. Not until the Teheran Conference in November 1943 did Allied leaders agree on an overall policy of strategic deception. Morgan and his advisors devised a temporary solution. They separated the strategic from the tactical planning. While they continued to work on tactical aspects of the cover operation, the planners shelved the strategic planning until after the Teheran Conference.8 Bevan devised a preliminary plan called Jael, which

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he submitted to Morgan on October 8, 1943. Bevan’s deception consisted of two parts. The first stage, during which the implementers would attempt to persuade the Germans to move their troops into areas other than Normandy, would end once the enemy had deduced that the main cross-Channel assault would be launched in 1944. The second part of the deception would begin at that point and conclude on D-Day. Bevan conceded that this plan contained certain weaknesses. Enemy reconnaissance flights could discover the real invasion preparations in England. The Germans could deduce a shift in emphasis from the Mediterranean to the European theater once the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander became known and conclude that the time of the Allied assault was approaching. Allied bombing and newspaper reports could spotlight the activity in England. In addition, although Bevan’s plan called for the simultaneous simulation of threats against the Axis powers from Norway to the Dardanelles, the availability of forces would limit Plan Jael.9 Meanwhile, Morgan, who did not agree with Jael, continued to work on his own cover plan, Torrent, also known as Appendix Y. Before submitting it to the British Chiefs of Staff, Morgan asked Brigadier Dudley Clarke, the leader of ‘‘A’’ Force,10 to review Appendix Y. Clarke, responding in a letter dated October 28, advised Morgan to clarify the object of his plan. Clarke suggested, ‘‘What you really want to achieve is, of course, to make him [the enemy] dispose his forces in a way in which they can do the least harm to your operations. I therefore think that it would have been better to have started with a short appreciation as to what you really want the German High Command to do.’’11 Clarke expressed his doubt that the original deception could be maintained after D-Day and his belief that the weakening of German forces in the invasion area should be of prime importance. He suggested a separate cover plan be devised for the post D-Day period with the object of hindering the movement of German reserves into the region. Referring to Husky (code name for the invasion of Sicily), Clarke advised that Morgan ‘‘adjust your cover plan dates to enable you to make full use of any exercises which the enemy might detect, especially if you use the device of postponing the date of the attack.’’12 On November 29, 1943, Morgan submitted Appendix Y to the British Chiefs of Staff. Because it was essential to prevent the Germans from moving ground and air forces out of the Pas de Calais area, the cover plan included the following objectives: a. To induce the German command to believe that the main assault and the follow-up will be in or east of the Pas de Calais area, thereby encouraging the enemy to maintain or increase the strength of his air and ground forces and of his fortifications there at the expense of other areas, particularly of the Caen area. b. To keep the enemy in doubt as to the date and time of the actual assault. c. During and after the main assault to contain the largest possible German ground and air forces in or east of the Pas de Calais for at least fourteen days.13

Recognizing that the buildup of real troops would imply an assault against the Cherbourg–Caen–Le Havre area, Appendix Y called for deceptive measures, such as wireless activity, to suggest concentration of forces in southeast England, which would

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indicate the Pas de Calais area as the target of an impending Allied operation. Although the majority of naval forces would be occupied with Overlord preparations, the creators of Appendix Y realized that naval forces were essential to a successful deception. Therefore, they suggested a concentration of short-range craft in the Ramsgate-Hastings area, with a follow-up force in the Thames Estuary ‘‘augmented with any available craft and dummy craft so that it represents an assault division.’’ In addition, they devised a plan for assembling as large a concentration of shipping as possible in the Thames Estuary–Great Yarmouth area in order to suggest specifically a threat to the Pas de Calais–Belgium area.14 Appendix Y also suggested several methods for enhancing the size of military and air forces in southeast and east England in order to make the threat to the Pas de Calais–Belgium area more realistic. The methods included wireless deception; camouflage and concealment; preparations for troop movements and accommodations; the imposition of visitor bans and restrictions in the deception area; deceptive lighting of ports, assembly areas, and transit routes; the simulation of concentrations of antiaircraft weaponry; sabotage by resistance forces in the threatened area; and an emphasis on civil defense and citizen evacuation in southeast and east England. Morgan and his staff acknowledged the difficulty in masking the invasion preparations in southwest and south England. Concerned that enemy radar and air reconnaissance would discover the buildup of short-range aircraft, they included measures to suggest that the aircraft would provide protection for the forces assembling in southeast and east England. In addition, the aircraft would increase the number of planes available for the air campaign against the Pas de Calais region prior to and during the amphibious assault.15 Crucial to any deception plan was the ability to deceive the Germans as to the exact time and date of Overlord; therefore, Appendix Y included several measures to accomplish that objective. First, to prevent the Germans from discovering the embarkation of assault and follow-up forces and the transportation of buildup troops to the coast, the implementers would manipulate the wireless traffic. In addition, they would use wireless transmissions to simulate the training and preparation of the deception forces to suggest a target date after the Overlord D-Day. Second, the planners hoped to persuade the Germans, using ‘‘large scale combined exercises in the normal course of training, and maintaining active sea borne and air reconnaissance during the winter and spring,’’ that the final invasion preparations were additional training exercises. Finally, Appendix Y suggested the increased restriction of enemy air reconnaissance over the real preparation site shortly before D-Day.16 Recognizing the necessity of pinning down German forces, both ground and air, in the Pas de Calais region during and after Overlord, Morgan included a provision for the continuation of the deception threat after Allied troops sailed for Normandy. This provision called for an assault force, which included one assault division and the necessary follow-up and buildup divisions along with adequate landing craft, to be housed in the Hastings-Harwich area. The physical display would contain whatever real craft could be spared and would be supplemented by dummy landing craft. Because most of the landing craft would be fake, the plan authorized the use of false

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wireless traffic to enhance the illusion that a real assault force was poised to attack the Pas de Calais. In addition to the wireless transmissions, the U.S. and British forces that were not yet earmarked for Normandy would simulate the follow-up forces.17 Appendix Y designated that the same command and control structure would implement Overlord and the cover operation. The plan divided the cover operation into three phases. The first, or preliminary, phase, which would end when the Rosyth force set sail, would begin immediately and include several features. The appropriate authorities would impose restrictions in the Wash-Bristol Channel area, as well as in areas where secret training was underway, in order to maintain security. Deceptive wireless activity would endeavor to accomplish the following: suggest the presence in the United Kingdom of additional forces trained for amphibious assaults and of an additional combined headquarters located in southeast England, and ‘‘conceal the true character of the amphibious training and to induce the enemy to believe that steps are being deliberately taken to conceal the concentration of aircraft in the South-East.’’18 To mask the meaning of wireless silence on D-Day, implementers would impose ‘‘intermittent and varied periods of wireless silence.’’ Deception forces would construct tented camps and deceptive lighting and magnify civil construction projects in the Thames Estuary region, including Yarmouth, to suggest the daily movement of one and a half divisions in that area. Deception forces would also assemble available short-range craft in the Ramsgate-Hastings area. Finally, while a concealment policy would be in place to mask real invasion preparations, implementers would use ‘‘judicious display’’ of the deception forces.19 The preparatory phase, which would commence at the end of the first phase, would conclude at zero hour D-Day, when the invasion forces landed on the Normandy beaches. The main aspects of the second phase included the following. First, participants would assemble dummy landing craft in the area around Yarmouth and Hastings in order to suggest that the follow-up force in the Nore (at the mouth of the Thames Estuary) was actually an assault force. A concentration of MT ships and coasters would simulate the presence of a follow-up force. Second, actual expeditionary troops in other areas would synchronize large-scale movements in southeastern and eastern England with forces not slated for immediate transfer across the channel. Third, crews would construct displays of dummy aircraft in the deception area to supplement the number of real fighter aircraft. Finally, the appropriate civil authorities would reinforce fire services and civil defense organizations and encourage voluntary civilian evacuation of the region.20 The final, or post-assault, phase would last until Allied troops had established a firm foothold in France. In order to perpetuate the threat to the Pas de Calais area during this period, crews would concentrate any craft not employed in the Normandy operation, along with fake craft, in the areas of the Dover and Nore commands. Troops not needed in Normandy during the first two weeks of the campaign and those not part of the expeditionary force would represent the presence of six divisions in southeast and east England. The deception implementers would use wireless and other deceptive methods to simulate any deficiency in real forces. Wireless activity,

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the display of dummy aircraft, and activity by real aircraft would sustain the threat posed by short-ranged aircraft. Finally, the plan suggested the implementation of bombing raids against the Pas de Calais to suggest assault preparations.21 Morgan and his staff attached three annexures to Appendix Y. Annexure I, ‘‘Long-Term and Short-Term Preparations for Operation ‘Overlord,’’’ first addressed a number of issues concerning the long-term arrangements, such as the camouflage and concealment of real invasion preparations and the discrete display of the deceptive preparations. The display of dummy craft, as well as provisions for additional troop transfer and accommodation, should suggest a concentration of forces, shipping, supplies, and craft in southeastern and eastern regions. Annexure I also proposed the utilization of written narratives for training exercises, involving all services, aimed toward the Pas de Calais. ‘‘Further, by making no effort to conceal the intensity of this training and exaggerating the scope of large scale exercises, the enemy command may gradually become accustomed to this activity and it will be difficult to distinguish between the final preparations for the operation and these training activities.’’22 Although the plan indicated that the use of air and sea borne reconnaissance and raids from the United Kingdom should be spread out as evenly as possible, those in the Pas de Calais–Belgium area should occur more frequently. Annexure I included greater detail about possible civil preparations than those included in Appendix Y and advised that they be undertaken to imply that the assault on the Pas de Calais would occur twenty days after the commencement of Overlord. The second part of Annexure I addressed the short-term preparations for Overlord. Included in this section was a provision that the lighting of ‘‘all ports, hards, transit areas, and assembly areas’’ in the deception area should be the same as that in other coastal areas in the United Kingdom, beginning at least three months prior to D-Day. The planners also stipulated that dummy artillery (see Figure 2.1) would be used to reinforce the antiaircraft concentrations in southeast and east England and what type of resistance activity would support the deceptive threat to the Pas de Calais. Finally, the designers of the plan provided more detail about the use of dummy aircraft to supplement the displays of fighter squadrons in the deception area.23 Annexure II, ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Camouflage and Concealment,’’ supplied clarification about concealment, in Western and Southern Commands, and display of troop preparations. It also included information about the requirements for ‘‘discreet display,’’ which was slated for the deception area. a. Deliberately omitting technical camouflage advice and not using the camouflage surveys and schemes which were designed for concealment. b. Where possible, siting assembly and transit areas away from built-up and enclosed areas and by permitting a greater degree of concentration than would be acceptable if heavy air bombardment were expected. c. Carrying out day movements, between concentration and assembly areas and by arranging halting places on routes where concealment is difficult.24

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Figure 2.1 The planners hoped to fool German reconnaissance planes with this fake antiaircraft gun. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

The final provision in Annexure II suggested the implementation of ‘‘normal’’ camouflage and concealment by the air forces.25 Annexure III, ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Information to Participating Forces and Civil Authorities,’’ noted that the 1943 exercise called Cockade had proven that attempts to put a cover story over on the enemy provided little benefit for the operation as a whole. Harlequin and Tindall had demonstrated that soldiers form their own opinions despite what information is presented to them by their commanders. Therefore, ‘‘it is almost certain that a proportion of those engaged in any operation will not believe in the operation as we hope the Germans may.’’ The only solution was to provide security adequate to prevent the leakage of information out of the country, especially in southeast and east England, where troops scheduled for shipment overseas at a later date and Home Forces units might be involved in perpetrating the deception. According to Annexure III, these soldiers must be convinced ‘‘that dummy equipment is part of the normal equipment of war, that it is used extensively by both sides in most operations, either to distract the enemy’s attention from important targets or to misrepresent intention.’’26 Therefore, security provided a key element in the success of the operation.

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On November 20, 1943, as noted above, Morgan submitted Appendix Y to the British Chiefs of Staff, who withheld approval until Allied strategic policy had been determined. They did, however, approve those aspects of the plan, such as some of the camouflage measures and the introduction of periods of wireless silence, because of the length of time necessary for them to become effective.27 Critics of Appendix Y included General Jacob L. Devers, the CG ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army), Colonel John Bevan, Controlling Officer London Controlling Section, and General Bernard Montgomery’s staff. Continuing to vocalize his disagreement with Appendix Y, Bevan provided three reasons for his objections. First, he stressed that acceptance of the plan should not come before the end of the Cairo Conference. Second, according to Bevan, ‘‘when in due course a tactical cover plan for Operation Overlord was prepared, there could be no question of simply adding it to the genuine plans as an appendix.’’ Finally, because the Allied position for the post D-Day period was unclear, Bevan objected to a scheme that dictated the cover plan after the landings.28 Bevan was soon able to exert his influence over the development of the final cover plan for the Normandy landings. Like Morgan, however, his design evolved before he received final approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From November 28 until December 1, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Premier Josef Stalin, and their advisors met in Teheran. One of the crucial debates during the conference revolved around the opening of a Second Front. By December 1 the Allied leaders had decided to launch Overlord in May 1944; the decision to postpone the assault for a month occurred later. They agreed that a separate landing in southern France to pin down German troops should occur. The Allied leaders also agreed about the necessity of a cover and deception plan for Overlord. Bevan attended the Teheran Conference, where he discussed the Allied situation in the Mediterranean with Brigadier Dudley Clarke, ‘‘A’’ Force Commander. Following orders received after the conclusion of the Allied summit, Bevan and his department commenced work on an overall plan of deception for the war against Germany in 1944.29 Before discussing the plan that was submitted a short time later, however, a brief examination of the importance of the London Controlling Section to the Allied deception effort is warranted. ******************* The London Controlling Section (LCS), formed on October 9, 1941, was the brainchild of Winston Churchill. During the first year and a half of its existence, the LCS, which had a staff of three, felt its way through unknown waters. Initially, the LCS functioned as an advisory body for the deception planners in the Middle East and India, served as agents for them with the Inter Services Security Board (ISSB), and proposed cover plans for amphibious operations. The LCS began to define its functions more clearly between June 1942 and December 1943. As a result of an increase in staffing, the LCS began to formulate the primary policy of strategic deception, as well as deception plans, and to serve as the conduit through which personnel implemented cover operations. It forged close ties to the Joint Planning Staff, the

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Service Ministries, the Secret Services, and the Foreign Office and provided advice about Allied deception policy for the war to the United States and Soviet Union. Negotiations among the Allies resulted in a delegation of power concerning the formation and administration of deception plans. According to Wingate, the agreement became ‘‘that the London Controlling Section was responsible for initiating policy and plans in regard to the war against German and Italy and that their counterpart in America, the Joint Security Control, for initiating plans for the war against Japan.’’30 Under the auspices of its new authority, the London Controlling Section concocted and implemented plans to cover the Allied landings in North Africa and schemes intended to limit the number of German forces opposing the Russians on the Eastern Front in 1943. As noted above, following the conclusion of the Teheran Conference, the LCS began to work on an Allied cover plan for 1944 that would include a specific plan to mask Operation Overlord. In order to construct the deception plan, the department reworked Bevan’s original plan Jael and renamed it Bodyguard.31 The process did not prove to be an easy one. The LCS faced a twofold problem. First, the plan had to convince the Germans to reorganize their forces so that few would oppose the Overlord and Anvil landings or the Soviet offensives on the Eastern Front. Second, ‘‘the tactical problem was, as soon as our preparations for Overlord and Anvil clearly indicated to the enemy our intention to take a crosschannel operation and an amphibious operation in the Western Mediterranean, to devise tactical cover plans to deceive the enemy as to the strength, objective and timing of Overlord and Anvil.’’32 The theater commanders received the charge of using real activities to pin down German forces in southern Germany and northern Italy and false operations in Scandinavia and southeast Europe. This responsibility of the commanders was a carryover from Bevan’s original plan. The new plan, however, contained two important features that the original one did not. First, the planners expected the enemy to conclude that the main Russian summer offensive would occur in late June and that Allied forces would not launch Overlord, a subsequent operation, until late summer. Second, the Russians would cooperate in the deceptive assault on Northern Norway (part of Fortitude North, see Chapter Three) and the coast of Bulgaria and Rumania. Despite the difficulties involved, the London Controlling Section submitted a plan of strategic deception, Bodyguard, to the British Chiefs of Staff within three weeks and received their approval on December 25, 1943. Two days later the British Chiefs of Staff forwarded the plan to Washington for examination. After Washington accepted the plan on January 18, the Combined Chiefs of Staff voted to proceed with Bodyguard.33 Plan Bodyguard consisted of several parts; the goal of each was to tie down German troops around Europe and to prevent their transfer to the invasion area. While the objective of Bodyguard was to focus German attention away from Normandy, only one operation, Fortitude, had a direct impact on the invasion site. Before examining Fortitude, however, a brief explanation of the entire plan is necessary. *******************

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Plan Bodyguard contained the following areas of secret activities: deception, security and counterintelligence, offensive intelligence, political warfare, and mayhem. The goal of the deception was to use any means possible to pass along bits of information to the Germans, who would assemble them and hopefully reach the right conclusion about an inflated view of the capabilities and aims of the Allies. Security and counterintelligence had the job of preventing the enemy from learning Overlord secrets by deceiving the Abwehr and other German intelligence agencies. Allied offensive intelligence had to ascertain the intentions of the Germans by using information gathered to identify and locate German forces, in other words, to construct an order of battle. The Allied political warfare organization, using propaganda, hoped to lower the willingness to fight and the morale of the German population and instill a lack of confidence by the people in the Nazi leadership. Finally, the Allies expected to use commando raids and resistance group activities to create turmoil in areas controlled by the Germans.34 The object of Bodyguard was to convince the Germans to place their troops in areas where they would cause the least problems for Allied operations. To accomplish this objective, according to a member of the LCS, Colonel Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) received three tasks. First, SHAEF had to suggest that, in the event Germany showed any signs of weakening or withdrawing its troops in northwest Europe (which they expected to facilitate by bombing the war potential of Germany), the Allies had a plan that would allow them to take advantage of the situation. Second, using whatever means necessary, SHAEF had to suggest that the Allies intended offensives in a number of different areas. The Germans had to believe that British, American, and Russian troops were going to launch a joint offensive in the spring against northern Norway in order to open a supply route from Sweden. In conjunction with the Norwegian offensive, the Allies expected to obtain Swedish support and access to Swedish airfields in order to advance into Denmark. They also planned operations in Italy and the Balkans, including an attack against the Dalmatian coast by an Anglo-American force, one against Greece by a British assault team, and an amphibious operation by the Soviets against the Bulgarian-Rumanian coast. In addition, Allied leaders would approach Turkey about providing access to airfields for an attack on the Aegean Islands prior to the invasion of Greece. Finally, SHAEF had to convince the Germans that the cross-Channel assault would not come until late summer 1944 for a couple of reasons. It would take time to amass enough landing craft and to train the fifty divisions slated for the invasion and follow-up force. In addition, the delay of the cross-Channel invasion provided the justification for the Allied operations against Norway, Italy, and the Balkans.35 A message sent by the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin in November 1943 persuaded the planners to stress the above three themes. Information gathered by Allied intelligence late in 1943 indicated that the Germans believed the Allies would focus on a cross-Channel invasion in 1944 and had strengthened their defenses and troops accordingly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s appointment as Supreme Allied Commander helped the enemy come to their conclusion about the Allied assault.

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Other intercepted messages reinforced Allied beliefs that they had to focus German attention on areas other than Normandy.36 The London Controlling Section expected to accomplish two goals with Bodyguard. The first was to confuse the Germans about the site of the upcoming Allied invasion. To realize that aim, they designed threats to Italy, Scandinavia, and the Balkans. However, the LCS also had to address the problem of German troops already situated in northwest Europe, in or near Normandy. Consequently, in January 1944, hoping to mislead the enemy about the exact location of the Allied assault against northern France, the LCS and MI 5 began work on a plan to focus German attention on the Pas de Calais region, which was east of the intended Overlord invasion site. By February 1 the work of the two departments resulted in Plan Mespot, which included two separate deception threats, one to the Pas de Calais area and the other against Scandinavia. Because of his reservations about the Scandinavian action, Bevan insisted upon the inclusion of a diplomatic plan that suggested the possibility of obtaining cooperation from Sweden. Bevan proposed Plan Graffham as reinforcement of the threat to Scandinavia. 37 The LCS and MI 5 submitted Mespot to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which accepted it on February 10, 1944, and passed it on to General Eisenhower for fine-tuning and implementation. The LCS, because of feedback from Eisenhower and the Chiefs of Staff, revised Mespot, which evolved into Operation Fortitude, by February 23. There was little difference between the two plans. While Mespot had included an assault on southern France, called Anvil, the planners omitted it from the Fortitude scheme.38 ******************* The purpose of Fortitude, the cover plan for the invasion of Normandy, was to persuade the German High Command ‘‘to make faulty dispositions in Northwest Europe before and after the Neptune [code name for Overlord] assault.’’ 39 The strategy of the original cover plan was to hide the troops and preparations in southern and southwestern England and to show preparations in southeast England. The revised cover plan provided for an invasion in two or more areas, with the initial landing being a feint. After the original assault, a second landing would occur at Calais. Bevan, realizing that the troop buildup for Normandy could not be kept a secret, had expanded the number of troops involved in the deception to persuade the Germans that the forces were sufficient for two invasions—one led by General Bernard Montgomery with the 21st Army Group that consisted of British and American troops and the other by the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), which contained Canadian and American soldiers. Fortitude had several objectives. First, it planned to decrease the ‘‘rate and weight’’ of enemy reinforcements of the Normandy area. Second, the planners hoped to persuade the Germans to spend more time fortifying areas other than the Overlord site. Third, through decoy and concealment, the deception expected to decrease the enemy’s watchfulness while the Allies were amassing troops and launching Overlord (see Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 for a partial list of fake equipment constructed). Finally,

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Figure 2.2 Catalog of targets #1 lists details about the pneumatic equipment used for deceptive purposes. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

the designers of Fortitude expected to convince the Germans to keep their troops in areas away from Normandy.40 The fine tuning of Fortitude continued until the Allies implemented the plan, which was divided into two parts—Fortitude South and Fortitude North—‘‘but the keystone would be Fortitude South, the Calais hoax, to which something like 1,500 uniformed Allied personnel would ultimately become involved.’’41 On February 26 the Allied leadership allocated the ‘‘command and control of the Fortitude operations.’’ The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (G.O.C.-in-C.), Scottish Command, General Sir Andrew Thorne, received the responsibility for planning and control of physical aspects of Fortitude North, the deception aimed at Norway. SHAEF retained authority over the naval and air measures. The Joint Commanders—Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force (ANCXF), 21st Army Group, and Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF)—received orders to plan and control the physical parts of Fortitude South, the deception that targeted the Pas de Calais. SHAEF was to direct the double agents and other Special Means for both Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Between February and mid-July 1944, the Physical Deception Staff integrated the deception plans devised by the Joint Commanders with those constructed by the G.O.C.-in-C., Scottish Command.

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Figure 2.3 Catalog of targets #2 contains information about some of the pneumatic equipment used for deceptive purposes. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Special Means adjusted the plans to their own methods for planting information with the Germans. Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) received orders to employ resistance groups in the implementation of Fortitude. SFHQ was to coordinate bombing operations and supply drops to resistance groups in the appropriate areas.42 In addition, in March 1944, Eisenhower authorized the creation of the Special Plans Section by the Commanding General, FUSAG. The general recognized that the British had used cover and deception effectively in Africa. Not only did few American officers have experience with cover and deception work, but ‘‘none had planned and conducted an operation in the field.’’ Therefore, Eisenhower issued a directive ordering the creation of the Special Plans Branch.43 Attached to ETOUSA, the Special Plans Branch would be responsible for preparing and implementing the cover and deception plans for U.S. forces in the European Theater. Eisenhower’s directive noted the immediate mission of the newly created section. Although the Special Plans Section was given several duties, the most important ones were: ‘‘(a) to implement the cover and deception plans prepared by SHAEF which involve US troops not under the command of 21 Army Group and (b) to implement the cover and deception plans involving US troops under the command of 21 Army Group, as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.’’ On April 7, 1944,

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Figure 2.4 Catalog of targets #3 includes details about fabric and mechanical equipment used for deceptive purposes. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Colonel William A. Harris became the Chief of the Special Plans Branch, FUSAG. He received orders to organize a staff of not more than ‘‘six officers, one warrant officer, and seven enlisted men.’’ At the same time, Harris learned that Major Ralph M. Ingersoll, G-3, would be a member of his staff.44 ******************* One of the main difficulties in planning and implementing Operation Fortitude was the amassing of troops, equipment, supplies, and landing craft, in other words, what was normally needed for mounting an invasion. The planners, acknowledging the supply problem, included several methods for implementing the deception. The first of the resources slated for Fortitude was wireless deception. According to Wingate, the deception staff had to use one of three wireless methods to confound German Intelligence. One method was to send messages ‘‘in the clear’’ or in lowgrade cipher, which could easily be broken. Over time, the Germans could use intercepted transmissions to construct an Allied order of battle, which was the object of the Tactical ‘‘Y,’’ or Intercept, Service. When the volume of wireless telegraphy (W/T) and radio telephony (R/T) traffic was large, the German Intelligence Service would experience difficulty in distinguishing voices and ciphers. Therefore, it would attempt

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to reach conclusions about enemy activity by interpreting circumstantial evidence gathered by its ‘‘Y’’ Service. Wingate classified that activity as ‘‘the use of the Strategical ‘Y’ Service.’’ Finally, the Germans would implement direction-finding equipment. Using transmissions from two or more Allied receiving stations, they could ‘‘accurately pinpoint a sender at the intersection of their ‘bearings.’’’45 Each of the armed branches played a role in the use of wireless deception, though to varying degrees. Naval wireless emanating from the base proved more useful than that originating at sea, since vessels maintained wireless silence until engaged in activity. Because at sea wireless proved crucial at the commencement of an assault, Allied leaders staged several rehearsals of actual landings, which were incorporated into the deception. In addition, the planners learned early on of the importance of coordinating ‘‘live’’ wireless activity with the display of dummy landing craft to create the illusion of reality. Land forces played a greater role in the manipulation of wireless transmissions. The command of the forces involved was responsible for land tactical deception. Consequently, according to Wingate, ‘‘planning of wireless deception must be done on the same level as the real plan it is designed to assist.’’46 The implementers employed a variety of methods to attain high levels of realism—transmitters that could simulate six R/T stations; traffic recorded by officers and operators; special three hundred men signal units that could deliver R/T communications for three divisions. The Air Forces utilized two signal types—point-to-point (telephone or teletype traffic) and air-to-ground. The purpose of their wireless deceptive measures was to convince the enemy that the operational strength of the Air Forces was greater than it actually was. Mobile vans with special equipment simulated the peculiar sound emitted from a set operating in an airborne craft. The Air Forces also used measures to interfere with enemy radar and wireless beams. By varying the amount of traffic to mask the movement of aircraft, signalers caused ‘‘squadrons of aircraft to ‘appear’ in areas suggesting a move in another direction.’’ The Air Forces used similar methods to divert German forces away from an intended target.47 Although ‘‘A’’ Force had used wireless deception in North Africa, it had only been implemented once before the Fortitude deception. The Combined Signals Board initially handled problems concerning wireless deception. The Signals Security Committee, COSSAC, which operated under the Combined Signals Board, assumed that role during the fall of 1943. As early as December 1943, the Signals Security Committee had begun constructing schedules that included periods of intense, normal, and no wireless activity and directives for ‘‘deceptive wireless exercises and arrangements for the monitoring of enemy reactions.’’48 The schedules contained several periods of wireless silence, instead of no activity for ten days before D-Day, in an attempt to mask the loading of the invasion force. Since the restrictions on wireless activity interfered with troop training, the Signals Security Committee occasionally allowed wireless silence to be broken.49 *******************

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Because Fortitude was divided into two parts, the planners delegated responsibility for wireless deception to different groups. The Fourth Army represented the British forces for Fortitude North. CLH units provided wireless traffic for the naval assault forces. Wireless was particularly important for Fortitude North because the number of physical displays would be much less for its deception than those used for the Fortitude South story. General Montgomery, as commander of the 21st Army Group, was responsible for the Pas de Calais threat ‘‘and therefore all wireless deception required in connection with the false order of battle.’’ No. 5 Wireless Group transmitted wireless activity for British land forces, while the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur McCrary, represented American land forces during Fortitude South.50 In addition to wireless deception, the LCS had other channels at its disposal for Fortitude, including activities planned by deception staffs in Washington and the Mediterranean. The inclusion of false information in correspondence to prisoners of war for reading by German censors provided another avenue for misleading the enemy. The LCS also had use of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), the group that orchestrated sabotage and resistance groups’ activities behind enemy lines, and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which supplied propaganda to mislead the German population. To suggest the buildup of troops in areas where there were few, high fidelity loud speakers emitted recorded sounds of military activity, such as bivouacked or moving military forces—the sounds of tinkling mess kits, shouting soldiers, and moving tanks, or the normal pre-dawn noises heard on ‘‘assault-type’’ landing craft—clanking chains, revving engines, and so on. The American 23rd Headquarters Special Troops provided tactical special effects. Using inflatable vehicles, loudspeakers to project ‘‘military-like’’ noises, radios, and ‘‘artillery flash devices,’’ soldiers from the 23rd Special Troops followed orders to deceive civilian observers.51 The LCS had a number of physical displays upon which to draw. Debate ranged around the amount of physical display needed for a successful deception, as well as the Allied policy of concealment and display. In September 1943 COSSAC had initiated a concealment and display policy designed to mislead enemy German spies and reconnaissance aircraft. As they considered accepting Appendix Y, the Chiefs of Staff authorized the commencement of the COSSAC policy. Although progress had been made by the time the Combined Chiefs accepted Bodyguard, the ‘‘false’’ invasion preparations had begun to place a strain on available supplies, most of which were assigned to Overlord. SHAEF acknowledged that the construction of the physical deception could be limited by the priority given to the real invasion. After D minus 30, however, focus could shift to the deception, which would support the later invasion date for the Pas de Calais and alleviate the competition for supplies between the two operations. Brigadier R.T. Ransome, Q Ops, addressed several relevant issues in a memorandum to Headquarters, COSSAC, G-3 Division, dated January 12, 1944. Ransome inquired about the necessity of including medical evacuation centers, transit and reception camps for prisoners of war, accommodations for wounded prisoners, and provisions for ships and craft, in the operation. A SHAEF directive, which concurred

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with Ransome’s concerns about realism, made provisions for the influx of casualties and enemy prisoners into, and display of military stores in, South Eastern Command’s region.52 Reiterating the importance of realism, Ransome noted, ‘‘If visible arrangements are to be made by which enemy air recce [reconnaissance] is to be deceived, these deceptive arrangements must be ‘married up’ with movement. Otherwise in a few days it will be obvious that any camps erected for deception are in fact dummies.’’53 SHAEF expressed concern that supplies would be insufficient to complete preparations designed to deceive German air reconnaissance, as well as agents, and that the lack of completion should be concealed. The LCS did not, however, plan the concealment of all sites in east and southeast England. In a memorandum to GHQ Home Forces, Lieutenant General H.C. Loyd, Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, identified four degrees of camouflage for areas exposed to enemy aircraft. Category A included fully concealed areas that were slated to remain thus for the duration. Category B contained areas that were partially hidden, but that would eventually evolve into type A. Category C areas, those that had been poorly chosen for camouflage or those that had been occupied for a considerable length of time, could never be fully hidden. Category D referred to permanent structures that dated back to the commencement of the conflict. Loyd also noted certain camouflage problems in his communication to GHQ Home Forces. Because of time restrictions and ‘‘administrative convenience,’’ the camps could not always be constructed with concealment as the priority. Expansion of camps outside of wooded areas to accommodate personnel and wire surrounding troop locations increased the possibility of enemy sightings.54 However, because of the story being passed to the Germans that the assault on the Pas de Calais would not occur until July, the physical development of camps in east and southeast England was to occur later in the spring. According to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C.), South Eastern Command, The picture that I wish to convey to the Germans at this date is that although the camps are not being allowed to fall into disrepair, there is at present no sign of their being occupied by troops in the near future. This is being effected by small routine repair parties of Royal Engineers or Pioneers carrying out work in the camps, and also by some camps being occupied from time to time for a few days by troops who may be training near them.. . .At some Hards, embarkation extension piers are being build and this will show up to any German air reconnaissance, and will give the correct impression that these Hards are to be used sometime in the future and are not being allowed to become derelict.55

The reference to ‘‘hards’’ in the GOC-in-C.’s letter suggested another resource that the LCS had at its disposal for the Fortitude deception—fake landing craft. ******************* In order to suggest their ability to transport an invasion force to the coast of France around the Pas de Calais, the Allies had to display sufficient numbers of landing craft. The limited number of craft available had affected the date set for the

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Normandy invasion. A surplus of craft for the deception display did not exist; therefore, the LCS had to use the next best thing—dummy craft. Two types of dummy landing craft, bigbobs and wetbobs, existed. A bigbob was a fake landing craft tank (LCT), which was made of steel tubing and canvas. Its buoyancy came from floats, and it had wheels, which allowed short distance movement, ‘‘over a reasonably smooth surface,’’ into the water. The craft measured 160 by 30 feet and weighed five and a half tons. British forces had previous experience in using bigbobs and looked to a report issued on September 19, 1943, by the Commander-in-Chief, GHQ Home Forces, for guidance. According to the report, having too many commanders from the different Allied services dictating the erection and placement of dummy landing craft caused organizational problems, and, as a result, GHQ Home Forces was ‘‘operationally responsible’’ for future operations. The training of the installation teams determined the length of time needed for the construction of a display. Adequate training was crucial because, in the interest of security, many of the displays had to be erected at night. Several factors affected the construction of bigbobs under the cover of darkness. If the amount of ground available for erection was too small, not enough craft could be built at night. Security prevented the use of suitable launching sites. The report suggested the consideration of the following for future fake displays: the severe limitation of enemy reconnaissance when the craft were built and embarked; completion of displays on dates required by the deception; and the effect of local security on the project. Finally, the report suggested cooperation from the Navy, which would have to supply one towing craft for each bigbob and would have to set the time for the launching of each.56 A wetbob was a fake landing craft assault (LCA), which was constructed of inflatable rubber. According to a South Eastern Command (S.E.) report entitled, ‘‘Notes on the Berthing, Mooring, Launching, Construction, and Maintenance of Wetbobs (Dummy Landing Craft Assaault),’’ the ‘‘peculiarities, scope and limitations of wetbobs’’ required the complete training of naval and military crews prior to the commencement of the deception.57 A deflated LCA measured approximately seven feet in length and two feet in diameter. A three-ton vehicle could transport ten to twenty deflated wetbobs. An LCA required 300–400 cubic feet of air for inflation. Using ‘‘exhaust gases from a 30 cwt truck,’’ a crew could inflate a dummy craft in fifteen minutes. It would take forty-five minutes if the crew used an 8 cwt truck. Crews used compressed air cylinders for periodic topping of the craft. After the initial inflating, wetbobs left in the water needed periodic maintenance. Inflated, the wetbob measured forty by eight by four feet and weighed two hundred pounds. Because of its light weight the LCA was susceptible to wind. A four-knot wind could capsize or toss one on top of another. Therefore, the report recommended that each craft ‘‘be berthed clear of everything and anchored well down from head, stern and sides with either mooring lines, or drogues, or a combination of both.’’ Crews launched wetbobs at night, but the type of mooring used dictated when they could accomplish their task. Tide did not affect the berthing of a craft to a central buoy, from which it was ‘‘allowed to swing to wind and tide,

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steadied by drogues at sides and stern.’’58 The display of bigbobs and wetbobs proved complicated and, in some cases, risky. ******************* In addition to dummy landing craft, Allied commanders authorized the use of dummy aircraft for both Fortitude North and Fortitude South. The deception planners limited Fortitude North to an aircraft exhibition on airfields in eastern Scotland. Although the presence of gliders would have made the displays more realistic, a surplus did not exist. Operation Overlord claimed all available gliders. Because troops for the Norwegian assault would embark in western Scottish ports, however, the LCS did not consider the absence of gliders a threat to the deception. Fake twin-engine Boston aircraft and Spitfires supplemented the exhibits in Scotland. Teams constructed the heavy wooden Boston aircraft in hangers during the day and transported them to airfields in the evening. Crews built the Spitfires, which were made of collapsible canvas, at night. Both dummy airfields and dummy aircraft, constructed of wood and canvas, made the Fortitude South deception more realistic. Poor camouflaging purposely exposed the aircraft to enemy reconnaissance. To facilitate the reality of the deception, a British unit already experienced at decoy displays received orders to provide lighting for the dummy airfields. This unit was led by Colonel John Turner and was known as Colonel Turner’s Department (or CTD). Turner’s department planned the placement of Q, or dim illumination, lights and fake recognition beacons alongside the phony runways in east and southeast England. Turner and his department first practiced using concealment and display (C & D) equipment in the fall of 1942 when they received orders to conceal aircraft and troop movement and preparation for the North African campaign and to mount a deceptive display of dummy aircraft between Hampshire and Kent to mask the direction of the upcoming Allied assault. Crews utilized heavy C type nets to camouflage U.S. aircraft at Portreath, but strong winds made covering them difficult. Lessons learned at Portreath resulted in the subsequent development of Z and twin engine nets. In conjunction with the concealment of U.S. planes at Portreath, Turner’s department assembled displays in east England—two squadrons of wooden Hurricanes at Dunkkerswell, Stoney Cross, Holmesley South, and Dunsfold airfields and on an open field near Dunsfold. The display at Dunsfold field proved the most difficult. The lack of a hanger for construction resulted in plane parts being camouflaged under nets by day and assembled under cover of night. Although crews frequently changed the configuration of the displays, failure to supply ‘‘movement, personnel, transport, tracks and litter’’ opened the deception to discovery by the enemy. German reconnaissance did not reveal the deception; however, the experience demonstrated to the C & D units the importance of ‘‘life,’’ in terms of movement, litter, and tracks. In February 1943 when the army held large-scale maneuvers in south and southwest England, Turner’s department provided nets and dummies for tactical aircraft protection. Using dummies made of light canvas, the C & D units displayed one squadron of Spitfires at Middle Wallop, Chilbolton, and Lasham airfields and one squadron of Mustangs at Stoney Cross and Hurn airfields. They used tree nets

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obtained from the Directorate General of Equipment (DGE) to hide ‘‘camps, transport and temporary accommodation in the field.’’ Despite the limitations of the exercise caused by poorly trained ground crews and a shortage of C & D units, the opposing force frequently bombed the display during the exercise.59 The real test came for Turner’s department with Plan Tindall, which commenced in Scotland in July 1943. Tindall was the cover for the Allied assault on Italy. Tindall’s implementers used a large glider force to simulate the preparations for an invasion of Norway. Turner’s department received orders to display dummy Boston aircraft—‘‘20 at Peterhead, 10 at Fordoun and 10 at Fraserburgh.’’ A shortage of vehicles to tow the gliders and material to construct dummy aircraft limited the displays to two gliders at each airfield. Although the crews produced and displayed fake Bostons, the exhibits lacked realistic support—transport, litter, and tankers. Failure to intersperse real antiaircraft guns amongst the dummy ones affected the apparent realism of the displays, although they did draw attention from enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Turner’s department received orders to mount a second deception, Starkey, in conjunction with Tindall. Designed to convince the Germans to divert aircraft from Italy to meet an impending Allied invasion against the Pas de Calais region, Starkey ‘‘included the concentration of dummy landing craft in ports and estuaries on the south coast, the movement of a force of army strength to embarkation points, and the concentration of aircraft, supplemented by dummies in the south and east of England.’’60 A shortage of fake craft severely hindered the cover plan. Consequently, the army abandoned the invasion pretense and enacted transportation and embarkation exercises from area ports and hards. Still hoping to engage enemy aircraft in an air battle, the RAF authorized the display of canvas Spitfires at Biggin Hill, Hawkinge, Hornchurch, Southend, Shorham, Friston, and Ibsley and fake Mustangs at Gravesend, West Malling, and Martlesham. Each well-trained C & D unit of six men succeeded in assembling eighteen aircraft, plus the necessary ‘‘transport, tank lorries, and litter’’ in one night. C & D units assembled protective decoy lighting at thirty-four sites, of which twenty-one were inland sites and thirteen were coastal ones. Detachments simulated army convoys and camps using ASQL—very light decoy lighting. The Flag Officer in Charge (FOIC) Portsmouth handled questions about the amount of lighting displayed. Although the Starkey cover plan was not considered a success because the Germans did not respond as the planners had hoped, Turner’s department and the C & D units gained valuable experience that they used for the Fortitude deception. In addition, they successfully convinced the army of the importance of decoy lighting for field protection and misdirecting enemy nighttime reconnaissance. ******************* The London Controlling Section hoped to use certain restrictions as indications of invasion preparation in the south and southeast England. In order to persuade the British Cabinet to impose a ban on visitors traveling to all coastal areas involved in both the Overlord and Fortitude operations, the LCS hoped to obtain support from

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the Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Major General R. H. Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) indicated support of the proposed ban as early as October 18, 1943. Major General P. G. Whiteford, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, COSSAC, recognized the importance of tying restrictions on visitors’ travel in coastal areas to the Overlord operation. The issue of the visitors’ ban remained unresolved for some time, however, as evidenced by an appeal from Morgan to Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Deputy Secretary (Military) War Cabinet, dated February 1944, in which he reiterated the reasons why the ban should be put into effect. Eisenhower continued to press for imposition of the ban, which was finally authorized for commencement on April 1, 1944, for the area from the Wash to Land’s End, Cornwall, and an area of the Scottish coast next to the Firth of Forth.61 Because the Germans could construe constraints on troop leaves as an indication of an impending invasion, Allied leaders had to decide when and if to impose them. Extension of leave restrictions to the Fortitude areas appeared imperative to prevent compromising the deception. In addition, leave restrictions in Scotland and south and southeast England could help to promote the possibility of Allied actions against Norway and the Pas de Calais. Despite the benefits of restricting travel and leave, Allied leaders did not find it easy to impose them. Because the war-weary British nation and military viewed travel and leave restrictions as inconveniences, they had to be approved at a high level for use only when necessary. In addition, ‘‘there was difficulty in imposing the restrictions . . .in making them effective but at the same time drawing the minimum attention to them, thus avoiding causing enemy apprehension by leakage through the press, which would have been the case if public announcement had been employed.’’62 Debate over leave stoppage continued until the order was issued in a memorandum dated April 1, 1944. As early as July, however, despite the ongoing conflict, requests for the lifting of leave stoppages surfaced.63 In addition to travel and leave restrictions, Allied leaders had to determine when and if to impose two postal measures: censorship and the initiation of the ‘‘closed’’ address. The purpose of censorship was to prohibit the exposure of secrets by the troops, whereas the aim of the ‘‘closed’’ address was to prevent the location of particular units or formations from becoming known. Under normal wartime circumstances, the leadership generally imposed the two simultaneously. For deception, however, the purposes changed. Censorship became a security measure to learn if uninformed troops had guessed their real role in the upcoming action and if informed troops had released classified information. The ‘‘closed’’ address, on the other hand, assumed a purely deceptive function. The normal job of the concealed address was to mask the location of the troops, but the goal of the deception was to reveal it. Although certain units involved in the false order of battle would receive ‘‘closed’’ addresses, others, such as signal companies, would be subject to censorship, but not to concealed addresses. Allied leaders imposed the postal restrictions on Fortitude North only for the period prior to the Normandy invasion. Although the troops engaged in the

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Fortitude North deception experienced both censorship and ‘‘closed’’ addresses, the authorities did not impose them simultaneously. Because the Fortitude South formations were slated for future participation in the Normandy area, they received the mail constraints for the duration. Manpower shortages, however, resulted in the decision to discontinue concealed addresses on D-Day although the War Office did not enforce it until August 22, 1944.64 ******************* The London Controlling Section had other resources upon which to draw for the Fortitude deceptions. Perhaps the most important resource available to the LCS, according to John C. Masterman, a member of the Double Cross Committee, Sir Ronald Wingate, and Sir David Hunt, an intelligence colonel who served on General Montogomery’s staff, was the use of controlled agents.65 According to Hunt, controlled agents provided no doubt about the most effective means of planting false information on the Germans. . . .The answer is simply double agents. The Germans had got all the wrong ideas. They believed that the great success of the British intelligence service, which was of course their great bugbear and at the same time their great inspiration, they believed that it was all done by spies. Now in fact spies are not good at all in war. I don’t know about peacetime. But in wartime they never produce anything that is worth anything. The Germans alas fell for them, and they made things worse because first of all they had too much money. With all the money they got corrupt. They also recruited quite a number of anti-Nazis anyway. And secondly they began to pay their spies by their results. This is always totally fatal. The amount of rubbish that they believed is really very, very striking indeed.66

Although he personally did not believe that double agents could accomplish much in wartime, Hunt conceded that the Germans bought into the information that spies passed along to them. MI 5, the counterespionage agency of Great Britain, started using double agents early in the war. Shortly after the war broke out, members of MI 5 and Scotland Yard began to arrest German spies operating in Great Britain. The initial ‘‘Class A espionage’’ list included 356 names. From the beginning, a number of spies indicated a willingness to work as double agents. Receptive to the idea of using double agents, MI 5 planned to supply the messages that were sent to the spies’ controllers and hoped to maintain the links of communication between particular agents and their controllers, without the Germans becoming the wiser. In addition, requests for information by the Abwehr, the German secret service, would indicate enemy plans. To facilitate the successful establishment of a double agent network, the Directors of Intelligence formed the Double-Cross Committee, which was also called the Twenty (XX) Committee, in January 1941. MI 5, MI 6(British Secret Intelligence Service), the Foreign Office, the Home Defence Executive, and other intelligence departments all supplied members for the committee. The participants included Lieutenant Colonel T.A. Robertson, Bill Luke, Martin Lloyd, John Drew of the Home Defence Executive, Lieutenant Commander the Honorable Ewen

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Montagu, Norman Holmes Pearson, and Captain John C. Masterman, who became the chairman of the Double-Cross Committee on January 2, 1941. An American academic and member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Pearson received assignment to the OSS’s London office. As time passed, three MI 5 officials, Robertson, Masterman, and J.A. Marriott, along with a force of caseworkers who were in charge of the day-to-day control, became responsible for the double agents. The Double-Cross Committee evaluated possible messages to be sent, coordinated them, and rewrote them when needed. The Committee also approved the MI 5 case workers, who were responsible for supplying the agents with material for their messages and for ascertaining that the information was sent in the prescribed form.67 In order to prove the credibility of the agents, the Double-Cross Committee approved the transmission of information about security measures being used in Great Britain. As mentioned earlier, the measures included the restriction of postal service to Portugal; the cessation of travel to coastal areas of England and to Ireland; and the censoring of diplomatic messages. The information, which could be verified in the newspapers, would suggest Allied attempts to hide invasion preparations. Once the agents had proven themselves, they could be counted upon to pass on reliable information. As Hunt indicated, the Germans accepted much of what their spies transmitted, and they seemed unaware that their agents had been turned.68 When LCS was planning the Fortitude deception, Colonel John Bevan and his colleague, Lieutenant Colonel H.N.H. (Noel) Wild, approached the Double-Cross Committee for assistance. Previously the Committee had used the double agents for defensive purposes, but the time was ripe for a change in how the Committee utilized them. The Committee welcomed ‘‘Wild’s scheme to integrate visual and wireless deception with that of double agents, the three being blended and harmonized to corroborate and support each other and add up together to a picture which would trap Hitler and his intelligence into a catastrophically mistaken reading of the Allied intentions.’’69 Working together, Bevan, Wild, and the Committee examined the files of possible double agents to be used in the Fortitude deception. Although they had many from which to choose, the men had to keep certain factors in mind when making their decisions. Having four to five spies and their networks operating at the same time in one operation might prove difficult. If the committee lost control of an agent, the Germans could discover the nature of the entire team. The speed with which the agents could communicate with their Abwehr controllers was another consideration. The coordinators preferred agents with radio transmitters over those who conveyed important information by letter; therefore, the agents with transmitters would send most of the material while the others would provide details by mail. The three main double agents chosen to work on Fortitude were Garbo, Brutus, and Tricycle.70 Before providing background information about them, a brief examination of a few minor players is warranted. *******************

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In September 1940 Hans Hansen, a Danish Nazi, parachuted into Great Britain, but British authorities promptly arrested him. After being held for a time, Hansen convinced B1A., the MI 5 section that controlled and operated double agents, that he was willing to cooperate. After being given the code name Tate and released, under supervision, in October 1940, Tate established wireless contact with his controllers in Hamburg and quickly became a main supplier of air raid damage information to the Germans. He also disclosed information about the movement of troops in southeast England. Tate communicated with Hamburg in ‘‘extremely low-grade cipher,’’ which indicated, according to Roger Hesketh of the LCS, the low level of importance given to him by Abwehr and which enabled the British Monitoring Services to keep track of his communications and report on them to MI 5. Because of the possibility that he might have been compromised in 1943 by a repatriated German prisoner of war, the Double-Cross Committee chose to limit Tate’s activities to daily weather reports and a small role in Operation Starkey. While the Committee debated Tate’s future, his German controllers sent him a highergrade code for subsequent communications. Consequently, the Double-Cross Committee and the LCS chose to include Tate in the Fortitude deception.71 Another minor agent chosen by the Double Cross Committee and the LCS, primarily because of her possession of a transmitter for communication with her Abwehr controller, was Lily Sergeyev, whose code name was Treasure. Treasure was a Frenchwoman of Russian origin, who had lived in Paris for most of her life. There she established herself as an artist and a journalist. The British secret service first began to notice Sergeyev in 1937 because of the activities of her uncle, General George de Miller, who provided leadership in Paris for exiled Czarist Russians. Sergeyev passed on her first opportunity to work for Abwehr when she was asked to supply information about the Spanish Civil War. When the Germans invaded Poland, she was in Lebanon, but Sergeyev decided to go to Paris and approach MI 6 about working against the Germans. Before she could contact an MI 6 operative, however, Paris fell to the Germans. Deciding that she needed help in traveling to England, Sergeyev approached an Abwehr agent and suggested that she spy on the English. Through her contact, Emil Kliemann, she convinced Abwehr in June 1943 to provide her with money and papers to facilitate her passage to England, by way of Spain. She also received secret writing materials and the name of a contact in Lisbon. In addition, Kliemann promised to supply her with a W/T set in England. Before her departure, Kliemann gave Sergeyev a diamond ring and pin and told her that he would send ‘‘a W/T set disguised as a gramophone to England.’’ Arriving in August 1943, Sergeyev contacted British authorities, convinced them of her willingness to work as a double agent, and began to operate under the code name Treasure in Bristol, England. Treasure reported her enlistment in the army service of British women and her establishment of a relationship with a staff officer in the fictitious American Fourteenth Army. Because she had not received the W/T set, Treasure returned to Lisbon in March 1944. She told her contact that she was in Lisbon as part of her job with the Ministry of Information. While in Lisbon,

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she met with Kliemann who provided her with a ‘‘wireless transmitter disguised as a receiving set.’’ He also provided money to cover some of her expenses. When she realized that Kliemann was offering her £1,500 in £1 notes, Treasure claimed that she would have difficulty returning to England with ‘‘such a large parcel of notes.’’ Before she returned to England, ‘‘Kliemann gave Treasure a diamond bracelet set in platinum for which he paid 39,000 escudos. He also gave her £300 in £10 notes and 20,000 escudos.’’ Thus, once she had established herself to Abwehr’s satisfaction, Treasure was in position to participate in Fortitude South.72 Several other agents, code named Gelatine, Sniper, Hamlet, Mullet, Puppet, Cobweb, Beetle, Bronx, Mutt, and Jeff were also available for the Fortitude deceptions. Because none of them had access to radio transmitters, which meant slow communication with Abwehr by mail, the LCS and the Double-Cross Committee slated them for small roles. None of these agents would be responsible for supplying crucial information to the enemy. Discussion of the agent Brutus, who participated mainly in Fortitude North, will follow in Chapter Three.73 ******************* One of the first spies to become employed as a double agent for the Double-Cross Committee was a Yugoslav businessman and playboy, Dusko Popov, who had proAllied sympathies. The Abwehr approached Popov about spying against the British in August 1940. After agreeing to become an agent, Popov contacted an MI 6 operative at the British Embassy in Belgrade, told him of the Abwehr request, and offered to work for the British. The Abwehr sent Popov to England on a business trip in December 1940. Upon his arrival in London, he met with Major T.A. Robertson,74 an MI 5 official, who put the Yugoslav through an extensive series of interrogations. MI 5 assigned the case officer, Bill Matthews, to work with Popov, who assumed the code name Tricycle. As part of his cover, Tricycle informed the Germans of his new position, assistant to the Yugoslav military attache´, and established himself as a reliable agent by supplying information about the strength of the post-Dunkirk British army. Tricycle maintained constant contact with his German controllers and frequently received requests for information in return. Few agents had the amount of direct contact with the Germans that Tricycle did. Popov made routine trips to Portugal, which made meetings with Abwehr agents easier. While in England, Popov established a network of agents, but enemy occupation of Yugoslavia caused the Germans to question his loyalty. The Abwehr eliminated Tricycle’s business in London and sent the agent to the United States in June 1941 with orders to organize a spy network there similar to the one in England, but on a larger scale.75 As a cover for his work in America, Popov became a Yugoslav Ministry of Information delegate. The Abwehr ordered the agent to gather information about Pearl Harbor for the Japanese. Popov informed the Double-Cross Committee, who contacted the FBI. Arriving in the United States on August 24, 1941, Popov discovered that J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director, refused to cooperate. Hoover’s refusal to let Tricycle operate in the United States forced him by October 1942 to go to Lisbon,

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where he consulted with Abwehr controllers. He did not, however, return emptyhanded. Tricycle informed von Karsthoff, an Abwehr operative, about aircraft sent to England by the United States and about the British military buildup in Malta. By providing the Germans with that information, Popov helped to carry out Allied deception for the invasion of North Africa. During his meeting with von Karsthoff, the agent blamed insufficient funds for his lack of success in the United States. The Abwehr decided to send Tricycle back to England. After returning to England, Tricycle expanded his network and became one of the Abwehr’s most important agents. Popov recruited a number of subagents, including a British army officer (Dickie Metcalfe, code named Balloon), an Austrian woman who worked for MI 5 (Friedl Gaertner, code named Gelatine), and a Yugoslav who was close to King Peter (Eugen Sostaric, code named Meteor). He also convinced an Abwehr official, Johann Jebsen, to switch sides. Through Jebsen, code named Artist, Popov began to work with another agent, Freak, whom Abwehr had trained to operate radio wireless. Freak subsequently began to operate Tricycle’s wireless for him. Tricycle continued to communicate with Abwehr on behalf of the Double-Cross Committee. A trusted agent, Tricycle was ready by February 1944 to participate in the Fortitude deception.76 ******************* In addition to Tricycle, the LCS and the Double-Cross Committee chose Captain Roman Garby-Czerniawski, a Polish officer, to participate in Fortitude. Garby-Czerniawski had fled to France in 1939 and organized a network of spies for Polish intelligence. He approached an MI 6 representative and worked successfully for the British until November 1941, when betrayal led to his arrest by the Germans. After he was tortured in Fresnes Prison, the Germans believed that they had convinced Garby-Czerniawski to become a spy; however, the Polish officer had no real intention of working for the Germans. In July 1942 the Polish officer agreed to relocate to England as an agent for the Germans. After providing him with the equipment needed to build a wireless set, his German captors ‘‘allowed’’ Garby-Czerniawski, whom they renamed Armand, to escape on July 14, 1942. When he arrived in England several months later, Armand turned himself in to British intelligence authorities and offered to become a double agent. The DoubleCross Committee initially hesitated to accept the Pole’s offer, because he had been captured while working for MI 6. The Committee feared that the enemy would soon conclude that he had returned to work for them. The Committee finally agreed to use Armand and changed his code name to Brutus. Despite his apparent acceptance by Abwehr, the Committee was reluctant to use Brutus in deception operations. Brutus began to work at Polish Headquarters as a liaison officer with the Royal Air Force. In December 1943 Brutus informed the Germans that he had recruited a wireless operator, Chopin, who had retired from the Polish Air Force. Because of his position as a liaison officer, the Committee realized that Brutus was in a position to discover

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information about the upcoming invasion. Consequently, the LCS and the Double Cross Committee decided to include Brutus in the Fortitude deception.77 ******************* Arguably the most important double agent chosen by the LCS and the DoubleCross Committee to work on Fortitude was Juan Pujol Garcia (see Figure 2.5), who was known as Garbo.78 Born in Barcelona, Spain, Pujol, a Liberal who tried to stay out of the conflict that erupted in 1936, wound up serving both sides at different times before the Spanish Civil War ended. Taught at an early age to fight tyranny, the Spaniard decided to work against Adolf Hitler when war broke out in Europe. In January 1941 Pujol requested an interview with the British attache´ in Madrid. Because he refused to write down the purpose of his visit, Pujol failed to meet the British diplomat. Pujol admitted that he was unsure at that point how he could be of service to the British.79 Deciding that the British would take him more seriously if the Germans employed him as a spy, the Spaniard prepared to offer his services to the Nazis. He succeeded in establishing contact with an Abwehr agent named Federico, whose real name was Gustave Knittel, and offered to travel to

Figure 2.5 Juan Pujol Garcia, code-named Garbo, was one of the most important double agents to participate in Operation Fortitude. Courtesy of the National Archives (PRO), Kew, England.

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Britain as a newspaper or magazine employee. Under the guise of a foreign correspondent, he could obtain crucial information for the Germans. When he offered to travel to England as a foreign correspondent, Pujol obviously did not consider one of the most important obstacles that he faced: He did not speak English. Federico promised Pujol an answer when the Spaniard returned from a trip to Barcelona, which he did not actually take. From the beginning, Pujol succeeded in fooling his Abwehr contact. Time passed and Pujol did not hear from the German. Rather than press Federico for an answer, he decided to move to Lisbon, where his prospects might be better. Although he believed that an exit visa to Britain would convince Federico that he could obtain information for the Abwehr, Pujol initially failed to get one through the proper embassy channels in Lisbon. Taking advantage of an acquaintance, Pujol succeeded in forging a diplomatic visa. Posing as a chancery official, the Spaniard had two hundred copies of the form printed, although he only kept a dozen of them. Prior to his return to Madrid, however, Pujol received an official visa from the Spanish consulate.80 Arriving back in Madrid, Pujol arranged to meet Federico. During the meeting, he mixed truth and fiction and admitted that he had been in Lisbon obtaining a resident’s visa to prove that he could easily travel between Spain and Portugal. With the Spaniard’s position unresolved, the two men met several more times. Pujol realized, however, that it would be difficult to secure a job as a foreign correspondent; therefore, he had to devise another reason for traveling to Britain. During one meeting, he showed Federico the falsified diplomatic visa that he had acquired in Lisbon. The Abwehr agent accepted the document, which listed Pujol’s ‘‘assignment to travel to London on a special mission for the commercial administrative department,’’ as authentic. The diplomatic visa convinced Federico and his superiors to accept Pujol as an agent, and they supplied him with a code name (Arabel), invisible ink, secret codes, and $3,000 for his journey to England. Concluding that it was not yet safe to contact the British again, Pujol went to Portugal in July 1941.81 While he was in Portugal, Pujol pretended to be in England. He purchased ‘‘a Baedeker tourist guide to England, Bradshaw’s railway timetable and a large map of Great Britain.’’ After carefully reviewing the documents, Arabel communicated with Federico, who believed that the agent was in England, for the first time in October 1941. In addition to the information about where the Germans could collect his messages, the agent informed his superiors that he had recruited a KLM pilot to collect his letters in England and mail them in Portugal. The KLM pilot did not exist; Pujol posted his own communications. Over the next several months, Pujol invented three subagents who would supply him with information. Arabel’s messages, especially one about a convoy that had sailed from Liverpool, caused the British, who feared that a German spy was operating in England, much concern. Abwehr requests for more information about locations and movements of troops made Pujol think that the Germans were suspicious of him. In addition, he was concerned about his lack of knowledge of England. Because he had not established direct contact with

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the British, Pujol decided, early in February 1942, to request an interview with the U.S. military or naval attache´ in Lisbon. If this attempt failed, he had resolved to abandon his attempt to become a double agent. Pujol found the Americans more receptive to his request, and he related his tale to Lieutenant Demorest in the naval attache´’s office. After Pujol had proven his story, Demorest contacted the British. Demorest and Captain Arthur Benson, his British counterpart, arranged a meeting between Pujol and an MI 6 officer, Gene Risso-Gill. Three days later, the Spaniard received word that Risso-Gill and his superiors were sending him to London. Pujol, who traveled by way of Gibraltar, arrived in London in April 1942, where he met with Mr. Grey (Cyril Mills, an MI 5 case worker), Toma´s Harris, who became the agent’s primary case officer, and Desmond Bristow from SIS (Security Intelligence Service), who had been following Arabel’s messages. Pujol underwent debriefing from April 26 to May 11, 1942. Arabel’s interrogators quickly learned that he had brought an imaginary, but established, ‘‘ready-made espionage network’’ with him and that the Germans had not questioned the existence of the spy’s subagents.82 The subagents included two civilian couriers who carried Arabel’s communications between Portugal and England and ‘‘Agents ONE, TWO and THREE who were scattered around the country and were apparently able to report their own independent observations.’’ Harris and Pujol began to work closely together organizing the agent’s nonexistent network of spies, which Harris catalogued to prevent mistakes and continued to develop for future communications with Abwehr. Around this time, Mr. Grey suggested giving Pujol a new code name, and the two MI 5 case officers agreed on Garbo, a reflection of their esteem for the Spaniard and a cover that would hopefully protect him should his position be compromised. In the event the Germans discovered the existence of the double agent, the case officers hoped that Abwehr would conclude that Garbo was a woman. By the time the Chiefs of Staff approved the Fortitude deception, Garbo’s network included twenty-four invented subagents, which persuaded the LCS to include the Spaniard in the cover plan.83 ******************* In the midst of planning the deception, Bevan had to address an important issue. Because Fortitude North included participation by the Soviets, the LCS had to convince them to cooperate. Consequently, on January 30 Bevan and Colonel William H. Baumer of the U.S. Joint Security Control traveled to Moscow. Their mission was not an easy one. In fact, Baumer traveled to Moscow despite the fact that he had been unable to acquire the appropriate visa. After their arrival, Bevan and Baumer were unsuccessful in arranging a meeting with the proper officials for a week. Following a direct appeal to Stalin and Molotov, a series of congenial meetings occurred between February 7 and 14, and the men discussed the Bodyguard deception. Although a final meeting to confirm the plan was scheduled for February 16, the Soviets canceled it without an explanation. Finally, on February 24, the Soviets requested additional information. Bevan and Baumer did not receive further communication until midnight March 5, at which time they were given an hour’s notice of another meeting. At that time, without further discussion, the Soviets accepted the

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plan in its entirety. With the acceptance of the Soviets, Bevan and Baumer left Moscow on March 6.84 Upon his return to London, Bevan could finally prepare to put the plan in motion. The LCS and SHAEF included an air plan, naval diversionary operations, and a naval cover and deception plan to supplement Operation Fortitude, all of which will be discussed in the next few chapters. After February 23, 1944, with the acceptance of the Fortitude plan, SHAEF and the LCS had to concentrate on finalizing and implementing the scheme. Their intention was to implement Fortitude North to convince the Germans to believe that the Allies would launch two attacks against Norway, near Narvik and Stavanger, in May 1944. In addition, Allied planners hoped the enemy would conclude, based on the implementation of Fortitude South, that the main Allied invasion target was the Pas de Calais, that the assault on Normandy was a feint, and that the primary operation would come in July 1944.85 In order to discuss whether or not the Fortitude deception fulfilled its designers’ plans, further examination of both Fortitude North and Fortitude South is necessary.

3

Threatening Norway

Information about the concentration and preparation for invasion of the Scottish group of forces in the region of Edinburgh continue. Their strength is still to be regarded as five to seven divisions. There is no concrete evidence as to their target. It therefore remains undetermined whether reports about their proposed employment against Norway or Denmark are correct. The essential fact remains that in either case theirs could only be diversionary undertaking.1

As indicated in Chapter Two, the London Controlling Section (LCS) designed and implemented a second part of Operation Fortitude—Fortitude North. The deception planners devised Fortitude North with the object of convincing the Germans of three things: first, that the cross-channel invasion had been delayed; second, that the air campaign against Germany had precedence over an amphibious assault; and third, that Allied forces located in Scotland and Northern Ireland would invade Norway in May 1944.2 Although less is written about it than about Fortitude South, the less developed Fortitude North was still an important part of the Normandy deception scheme. Before examining the plan, however, it is necessary to examine why Norway was so important to both the Germans and the Allies. ******************* Desiring to deny the British entry into Norwegian territorial waters and expressing concern about access to Swedish iron ore supplies should British troops occupy Norway, Hitler made plans for the occupation of the Scandinavian country in the spring of 1940. Accepting the recommendation of the future commander of German forces in Norway, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, the Fu¨hrer decided to ensure access into Norway by adding the occupation of Denmark to his plan. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway began on April 9, 1940. Although Denmark surrendered immediately, the Norwegians chose to fight. Approximately 12,000 British and French troops rushed to Norway’s aid, but they failed to force a German

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withdrawal. German forces made short work of their Norwegian campaign. On May 3 Hitler’s soldiers compelled Allied troops fighting around Trondheim to evacuate the country. Both Britain and France withdrew their troops from Narvik a week later after the Allied front in France failed to hold.3 German control of Norway, which had long-term consequences, demanded the presence of a large number of troops. According to Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, the occupation of Norway put the German fleet at risk, and as a result, they ‘‘had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger.’’4 Why, therefore, was Norway so important to Germany? Finland’s supplies of nickel were essential to the German war effort. After gaining control of the Petsamo mines in Finland, Germany transported the nickel through Norway to its processing facilities. In addition, Germany received seventy-three percent of its iron ore from Sweden. Much of the ore passed through the ports of Narvik and Kirkenes en route to Germany. Initially, inland transportation of nickel, other essential ores, and raw materials from Narvik to Stavanger, or other southern cities, proved difficult. Because no railway lines connected Narvik in the north with southern cities, such as Trondheim, Bergen, or Oslo, Hitler instituted plans for the construction of the Sorland and Norland railways. The Fu¨hrer devoted much money and resources to several building projects in Norway, especially for the construction of railroads.5 Transportation of raw materials to Germany did not provide the only justification for occupation of Norway. According to Hitler, ‘‘Without the coast of Norway at our disposal, we should not have been able to launch our attacks against the ports of the Midlands and Northern Britain, and operations in the Arctic waters would also have been impracticable.’’ 6 General von Falkenhorst suggested another reason why Hitler was determined to hold onto Norway, even if it meant tying up troops needed on the Russian or Western fronts or, later, for the defense of the German homeland. The Fu¨ hrer denied von Falkenhorst’s requests to utilize some of his idle troops elsewhere. Hitler feared the loss of Norway, to which he would not consent, if he withdrew any forces. According to von Falkenhorst, ‘‘It was his own campaign, and he had figured it out for himself. Giving up Norway would have seemed to him an acknowledgement before the whole world that on April 19, 1940, he had made a mistake.’’7 ******************* Interest in Norway extended beyond the borders of Germany. Shortly after the war in Europe erupted, two factors persuaded the British government to focus on the coast of Norway. First, during the First World War the British had laid a minefield across the North Sea. In order to protect Great Britain, government officials made plans to construct another similar line across the North Sea. Doing so would, however, infringe upon Norwegian territorial waters. Second, Germany transported large quantities of iron ore from Sweden through these same waters. One way to limit Germany’s ability to fight would be to deny Germany access to Norway’s territorial waters.8

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France and Great Britain demonstrated an early concern for Norwegian independence by committing troops to the conflict in April 1940; however, they failed in their attempt to stop the German conquest of Norway. Being forced to withdraw from the country made the British determined to regain control of it from the Germans. From May 1940 until the end of the war, Britain instituted a series of campaigns against German forces in Norway. These campaigns, some of which only posed deceptive threats, culminated in Operation Fortitude North in the spring of 1944. Like Germany, Britain had a vested interest in the Petsamo nickel mines. Britain had nickel-mining concessions that predated the war. The status of the Finnish city, the mines, and Norway determined Britain’s access to the nickel.9 Consequently, Britain launched a series of operations designed to loosen the German hold on Scandinavia. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who approved the commando raids and deceptive threats to Norway, often expressed a desire to launch an operation against German forces in Norway in order ‘‘‘to roll the map of Hitler’s Europe down from the top.’’’10 The prime minister believed that the Scandinavian Peninsula was strategically important.11 Britain’s first attempt to halt Nazi aggression in Scandinavia ended in failure; however, the British nation remained committed to fighting Germany, even if it had to do so on its own, which proved to be the case after June 1940. Militarily unprepared to return to France or fight against the main German army, Britain searched for other areas in which to pursue the conflict. Churchill and British leaders examined the possibilities of engaging enemy forces in the Balkans, North Africa, and Italy. However, closer to home was Norway. Churchill’s attention frequently turned to Scandinavia. A series of British operations against Norway beginning in 1941 resulted in an increase in the number of German troops in Norway from 150,000 to 250,000 by June 1942. These raids reinforced Hitler’s belief in the strategic importance of Scandinavia in general and of Norway in particular. On March 4, 1941, the British launched a raid against the Lofoten Islands, which persuaded Hitler to consider the possibility of a British invasion of Norway. In December 1941 the British launched Operation Archery, a commando raid against Vaagso. They succeeded in eliminating a garrison controlled by German troops and in destroying over 15,000 tons of shipping and key facilities that processed fish oil. Operation Archery caused Hitler to consider the danger of Allied threats to Norway and the northwest European coast and influenced his decision to increase the fortification of northwest Europe.12 At the same time as Archery, the British instituted a minor deceptive threat against Norway, Plan Omnibus. Double agent reports stressed a British plot to use Norwegian fishermen as pilots for the assault.13 The British reinforced the threat with Operation Hardboiled early in 1942. Hardboiled posed a ‘‘notional’’ menace to Stavanger, a city in southern Norway. The troops chosen to participate in the deception underwent training that they ultimately used in Madagascar in May 1942. Hardboiled gave the LCS experience that would prove useful as the war progressed. Utilizing misinformation passed by double agents, the British succeeded in presenting a threat that the German military took seriously. The Germans

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reinforced Norway, brought their troops in the Scandinavian country to ‘‘maximum degree of readiness’’ in May, and hastened their work on coastal fortifications in the area. In addition, the Germans transferred major assets of the German Navy, including the Tirpitz to Norway. Throughout this period, British commando raids continued, and targets included the cities of Svolvaer, Glomfjord, and Maloy.14 By mid-1942, Churchill authorized the development of an ambitious invasion plan designed to drive German forces from northern Norway and from Finnmark, the northern region of Scandinavia where Finland and Norway meet, and especially from the Scandinavian cities of Petsamo, Kirkenes, Banak, and, possibly, Narvik. Although work was done on Operation Jupiter, as the plan was called, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave it little support. Initially, Churchill proposed that Jupiter be launched in conjunction with the North African campaign, but the Allies implemented Solo I instead. The prime minister returned to Operation Jupiter time and again. He repeatedly pushed for Jupiter, especially in the event that an invasion of the French-Belgian coast became impossible. Churchill, who had proposed the plan to President Franklin D. Roosevelt several times, did so again on July 27, 1943, and although he advocated Jupiter as late as January 1944, the prime minister never obtained the support from Roosevelt or the Combined Chiefs of Staff that was necessary to implement the operation.15 The Allies implemented plan Solo I in conjunction with Operation Torch, the campaign against North Africa. Rather than a plan for a real invasion of Norway, like Jupiter, Solo I was a deceptive one. Deception planners designed Solo I, along with its subsidiary plan, Solo II, as a protective operation to help mask the invasion of North Africa. The LCS used troops and shipping that were assigned to Torch and located in Scotland to create the illusion of a force poised to attack the TrondheimNarvik area. The deception planners used double agents, including Garbo and Tate who later played a role in both Fortitude North and South, to pass false information to Abwehr, the German Intelligence Service. To facilitate the fictional threat to Norway, some of the troops involved in the deception received mountain clothing. By early October, the Germans in Norway began preparing for an ‘‘imminent’’ invasion that did not come, at least not in Scandinavia.16 Because the Allies credited their deception planning with facilitating the invasion of North Africa, they decided to create another deception to mask the real invasion of northwest Europe. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, assigned the task of developing a plan to Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate). In his report submitted on June 3, 1943, Morgan restated his instructions to create operations for ‘‘an elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the WEST and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the US 8th Air Force.’’17 Morgan devised a plan called Operation Cockade that consisted of three parts—Starkey, a fake amphibious assault on the Pas de Calais area; Wadham, deceptive preparations for a large-scale attack on Brittany; and

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Tindall, ‘‘a purely deceptive operation designed to pin GERMAN forces in NORWAY by giving the impression of preparations for a major BRITISH operation to take place about mid-September for the capture of the port and airfields of STAVANGER.’’18 Only Tindall is pertinent to the discussion of Fortitude North. Morgan designed Tindall to create a fictitious threat to southern Norway in the Stavanger area. The threat consisted of three phases and extended through the summer and fall of 1943. During the first phase, which ended in early September, British I Corps implemented a threat to Stavanger. The second phase began on August 25 and included an apparent postponement of Tindall. On September 10 phase three began with the reactivation of Tindall. This last part of the deception set the target date for the attack on Stavanger for November 5–6. After capturing Stavanger, the I Corps would move toward Oslo attacking the Lister Peninsula and Kristiansand along the way. Morgan used several methods of deception to implement Tindall. Double agents sent reports about the 49th, 52nd, and three other divisions, including one airborne division, which were training for mountain warfare in Scotland and were part of the fictitious British Fourth Army. Tricycle, a double agent who would participate in other deceptions, and others provided information about the movement of shipping and the deployment of troops. Colonel John Turner’s department was in charge of decoy lighting and deception and received the job of displaying real and dummy gliders and antiaircraft weapons on airfields. In addition to establishing displays on airfields and sending out radio traffic, the 52nd Division and a Norwegian brigade carried out a training exercise—Goliath—in October 1943. During the same month aircraft from the HMS Formidable and the USS Ranger attacked Bodo and Narvik. British agents infiltrated Norway, and Political Warfare Executive (PWE) messages to the resistance movement increased.19 Coordinated by F.O.I.C. Rosyth, General Officer Commanding in Chief Scottish Command, and No. 18 Group, RAF, and implemented by Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth, Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, and the Air Ministry, Tindall lasted from June to November 1943. Despite Allied efforts, Tindall, like the other parts of Cockade, did not succeed in achieving its objectives. German forces in Norway did not increase in number nor did they go on alert. In fact, they took little notice of Allied activities. The lack of German air reconnaissance during Tindall led General Andrew Thorne, General Officer Commanding in Chief, Scottish Command, to conclude that the operation had not succeeded. ******************* Although Tindall failed, Norway continued to occupy Hitler’s attention and to play a role in Allied deception operations.20 Tindall did, however, accomplish one important thing. It provided a rehearsal for Fortitude North and was ‘‘the first really inter-service cover plan.’’21 It also marked the first time in which the fictitious British Fourth Army made an appearance. The LCS would use the British Fourth Army again during Operation Fortitude North. In many respects, Fortitude North extended the threat to Scandinavia begun by Tindall, but it also expanded the scope of the failed plan to include northern, as well as southern, Norway.22

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D-DAY DECEPTION

As indicated earlier, the LCS devised Fortitude North with the object of convincing the Germans of three things: that the cross-channel invasion had been delayed; that the air campaign against Germany had precedence over an amphibious assault; and that Allied forces located in Scotland and Northern Ireland would invade Norway in May 1944. The purpose was to keep the twenty-seven German divisions stationed in Denmark, Finland, and Norway by 1944 in Scandinavia during and after the Normandy invasion. The Norway deception had a second purpose. Double agents would put across part of the plan’s ‘‘story.’’ Consequently, the LCS hoped the German intelligence officers would come to rely upon their agents who were operating in Britain, Portugal, Spain, and other countries to provide information about the buildup and location of Allied invasion forces in Britain.23 In devising the deception plan, however, the LCS had to consider certain problems. In a memorandum dated February 6, 1944, Colonel John Bevan, the LCS Controlling Officer, raised a key concern. According to Bevan, ‘‘It must be remembered that the Scandinavian threat has been three times mounted before, and though the strategic threat to Norway must always remain in the enemy’s mind, on this occasion it will depend upon his appreciation of our political action in Sweden, combined with his observation of shipping in the north and of the threat from Russia.’’24 The deception planners added a political element to Fortitude North in an attempt to convince the Germans that they should take the scheme seriously, despite the previous unfulfilled invasion threats against Norway. Initially, Fortitude North, considered in terms of Operation Bodyguard, only included an invasion deception aimed at the northern part of Norway. The goal was to open a ‘‘supply route to Sweden,’’ which, if successful, would result in Allied access to Swedish airfields for an assault on Denmark in the summer of 1944. However, acknowledging that the presence of German troops in southern Norway would probably prevent Swedish officials from cooperating with the Allies in this regard, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) modified the plan to include an assault on the southern part of Norway as well. SHAEF also recognized that preparations for the Normandy invasion would have a negative impact on the Norway threat. Therefore, SHAEF dictated that the threat to the Stavanger area be developed by D-Day minus 30 and that to the Narvik area by D-Day minus 17.25 In addition, ‘‘the enemy should be led to believe that we intend to allow this offensive to develop for six weeks until about ‘NEPTUNE’ D plus 45, before launching large-scale cross-Channel operations.’’26 A SHAEF document dated February 23, 1944, identified the ‘‘story’’ that SHAEF wanted to convey to the Germans through Fortitude North. Prior to the assault on northwest Europe, the invasion of southern Norway would occur and would include an attack on the ‘‘Stavanger area by one infantry division supported by parachute troops and commandos, followed up by one infantry division.’’27 The entire invasion force for the southern assault would include two corps. One would be a real corps consisting of one assault and one follow-up division. The other would be a fictitious corps made up of wireless traffic that would simulate the existence of three divisions. Skeleton crews using methods to suggest the activities of fully operational units

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would run the three notional divisions. The deception plan called for both corps to be located in Northern Ireland. During the three months following the initial invasion in the Stavanger area, the deception planners scheduled an increase in the size of the force to six divisions, including some mountain-trained troops. Working with amphibious forces, infantry troops would march on Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim to capture the airfields, the control of which would enable the Allies to execute air operations against German-held territories previously out of bomber range. After securing southern Norway, the Allies planned to launch an attack on Denmark.28 Approximately two weeks after the commencement of action against Stavanger, the Allies would launch a campaign against Narvik in northern Norway. It would ‘‘be mounted in conjunction with Russian forces. . .to open road and railway communications with Sweden.’’ Anglo-American naval forces would provide support for the invasion.29 One corps, consisting of one assault and one follow-up division to mount the assault, would include one full-strength division and one division run by a skeleton crew using wireless traffic. The assault division would set up camp near Dundee, Scotland, the follow-up division in Iceland. Two divisions would land near Narvik. After securing the area, they would drive inland along the railroad to Gallivare, Sweden, in the east. A Soviet force coming from Petsamo would meet the Allied force in Gallivare.30 The LCS basically devised a wireless deception plan to implement the story created by SHAEF. The Order of Battle identified the Allied forces required to achieve the deception under the auspices of the British Fourth Army. The Fourth Army, located near Edinburgh, first made its appearance in Scotland during Operation Tindall. Because the LCS logically dictated that the Fortitude North deception be conducted from Scotland, the scheme’s implementation fell under the control of General Sir Andrew Thorne, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Scottish Command. Thorne assigned the task of executing the plan to Colonel Roderick Macleod.31 Macleod, who later wrote an account of Fortitude North, claimed that he received his orders from Brigadier Richard Barker, the Signal-Officer-in-Chief, who directed him to proceed to Scotland to ‘‘represent an Army about to invade Norway with the object of pinning down the 9 German divisions known to be there and prevent them from interfering with the landings.’’32 According to Sir Peter Thorne, the son of General Sir Andrew Thorne, his father, as head of Scottish Command and Commander of the Fourth Army, was ultimately responsible for Fortitude North, but he let Colonel Macleod implement the deception with the general concept of the operation. 33 No matter who gave the orders, the fact remains that Macleod received the responsibility of directing the fictitious threat against Norway. In addition to the Order of Battle for Fortitude North, SHAEF developed a ‘‘Requirement for Military Wireless Activity’’ to indicate the designation of headquarters Fourth Army, along with specific corps and divisions, the area in which each operated, the date of commencement of wireless activity, and the resources available for the operation. The plan noted the scale and character of activity to be implemented. 34 The fictitious British Fourth Army began wireless activity on D minus 70. It consisted of three corps, only one of which, the U.S. XV Corps,

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was real. Commanded by Major General Wade H. Haislip, the U.S. XV Corps, consisting of three U.S. divisions, the 2nd, the 5th, and the 8th, established its headquarters in Northern Ireland. Slated to play a part in the southern invasion force, the XV Corps carried out the role of the ‘‘buildup corps’’ and helped create the illusion of an assault force preparing, along with other forces, to sail from Belfast, Mersayside, Rosyth, and Invergordon to attack Norway. At one point to reinforce the deception, General Sir Andrew Thorne traveled to Northern Ireland to inspect the XV Corps. Despite its participation in the deception, the XV Corps was actually in training for participation in the Normandy invasion. The fictitious British II Corps made up the southern assault force and contained the real British 55th Infantry Division, the notional British 58th Infantry Division, and the real 113th Infantry Brigade. The II Corps had existed prior to the implementation of Fortitude North. After the British Chiefs decided to disband the corps, the LCS chose to keep it alive notionally for participation in the assault on Stavanger. The British II Corps set up its headquarters near Stirling, Scotland, and commenced wireless activity on D minus 65. The northern invasion force, the British VII Corps, included the real British 52nd Lowland Division located near Dundee and a followup division, the fake U.S. 55th Infantry Division, situated in Iceland. The British 9th Armoured Division and the II Corps provided headquarters for VII Corps, which began transmitting wireless messages on D minus 60. While staff officers and division signals from the British 55th Infantry Division supplied headquarters for the U.S. 55th Infantry Division, one divisional section of the 5th Wireless Group did the same for the 58th Infantry Division and began activity on D minus 56.35 The Fourth Army Order of Battle included fictitious subordinate units in addition to the British II and VII Corps and the U.S. XV Corps. These fake units provided necessary services for the Fourth Army. For example, the 87th Field Cash Office handled pay for the phantom soldiers. Incoming and outgoing troop mail passed through the VII Corps Postal Unit. In preparation for the large number of ‘‘casualties’’ that would result from the Norwegian campaign, the 55th Field Dressing Station arrived on the scene. Antiaircraft, film and photographic, and Royal Engineers units also received postings to the Fourth Army. The deception included more than wireless and radio transmissions. To perpetuate the ruse and suggest the actual presence of nonexistent soldiers, the implementers leaked accounts of troop football matches and training exercises to local papers and radio commentators.36 Colonel Macleod collected a staff, including a second in command, Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Horne of the 3rd Carabiniers, to help him implement the deception. He assigned two majors to take on the corps commanders’ tasks. Major Rumsey and six junior officers set out to simulate British II Corps; Major Bowles with six officers did the same for British VII Corps. Placed in charge of British Fourth Army headquarters, Major Edwards worked closely with Major Wheeler, who represented the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General’s department, Captain Coxhill, who was in charge of signals, and Captain Skinner, the cipher officer. Captain Johnson joined the cipher staff shortly after Fortitude North began operating. Not all of the traffic generated by Johnson was in code. ‘‘Although his main task was to

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simulate radio traffic which by its intensity would suggest the presence of important and substantial forces to the Germans, Johnson interlarded this with unciphered messages and radio telephony which would fascinate the Germans.. . .One calculated indiscretion pointing at Norway was a hurry-up order for skis.’’37 Fortitude North included a number of facets and participation by different branches of the Allied armed forces; therefore, Scottish Command controlled only part of the deception: implementation by land forces. SHAEF oversaw the double agents, special means, and naval and air measures. The LCS created activities for the navy and air force to facilitate the deception. The Royal Navy, through wireless deception, created two forces that were responsible for transporting the invasion forces to Norway. Slated to participate in the northern assault, ‘‘V’’ Force trained with the 52nd Lowland Division while ‘‘W’’ Force practiced with the British 58th Infantry Division for the southern assault.38 During April and May 1944, the Royal Navy suggested that ships concentrating in the Firth of Forth and the Clyde were preparing to transport follow up troops to Norway. It also simulated participation in Fabius, a dress rehearsal for Neptune, and Veritas, air reconnaissance of Narvik in late April. The British Home Fleet received orders to create a threat to the Narvik area through periodic air reconnaissance and bombardment of the region during the last week of April and the second week of May. The role of the air force, however, was minor. The Royal Air Force (RAF) displayed fake aircraft on Scottish airfields to supplement existing concentrations of planes. It allowed occasional enemy reconnaissance planes to photograph the displays to reinforce the deception. In addition, fighter squadrons provided protection for ships in the Firth of Forth. The designers and implementers made every attempt to establish realism. Despite its minor role, however, Air Force preparations fell into two categories: ‘‘Real Measures’’ and ‘‘Deceptive Measures.’’ Under ‘‘Real Measures,’’ increased air activity would be made apparent in several ways, including a. an intensification of air visual and photographic reconnaissance of Norwegian airfields. b. raids by heavy bomber aircraft on selected airfield targets in Norway commencing on April 14th. This increased air activity must be consistent with the mounting of the proposed operation and sufficient to indicate our intentions to the enemy. c. Long range Air Sea craft and Air Sea Rescue Squadrons operating in Northern areas.39

Because the Air Sea Rescue Squadrons would be operating along the East coast, it was hoped that their activity would add credibility to the story being passed to the Germans. Other measures undertaken by the Air Force were more deceptive in nature. In conjunction with the increased presence of land forces in Scotland, an increased number of aircraft was warranted. Dummy aircraft would be used to supplement the displays. Appropriate signals would enhance the displays. ‘‘The W/T and V.H.F. deceptive signalling will be carried out by aircrews W/T operators of experience, augmented if necessary, by ground W/T operators. The operators will be changed frequently to simulate extra forces.’’40 The plan stipulated the number of aircraft to be erected at the various sites, as well as the dates on which the signaling should begin.

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Although implementation of Fortitude North required much preparation, Colonel Macleod received little advance notice before the plan was scheduled to begin. The LCS obtained approval for Fortitude in late February 1944. On March 4 Brigadier General Barker gave Macleod his orders, which set March 17 as the date for commencement of wireless activity; however, that date was subsequently changed to March 22. According to Barker, genuine British and American signals formations would take part in the deception by representing the fake divisions, corps, and army. He stressed the importance of precise wireless traffic because of the enemy’s ability at ‘‘interception and radio-location. They’ll have your headquarters pinpointed with a maximum error margin of five miles. And it won’t take them more than a few hours to do so. What is more, they’ll be able to identify the grade of headquarters—whether army, division, corps, or what not—from the nature of the traffic and the sets being used.’’41 Within a short time, Macleod had devised a program for implementing Fortitude North. He assigned code names to protect the groups concerned. Because the wireless plan he was ordered to carry out had been designated Operation Skye, Macleod applied the following names: Skye I to Fourth Army, Skye II to II Corps, Skye VII to VII Corps, and Skye III to U.S. XV Corps. He later affixed code names to the training exercises that his group simulated and issued a story to mask its activities. According to Macleod, ‘‘We have decided that the best cover story for our part of the business is to say that we are carrying out a series of large scale exercises with all services in different parts of SCOTLAND.’’42 Although Fortitude North was implemented mainly through wireless traffic, the plan had other integral parts—physical deception, political deception, and double agents. Before delving deeper into Operation Skye, a discussion of the other facets of the threat to Norway is warranted. As noted earlier, the RAF participated in visual deception by displaying aircraft constructed from wood and canvas on airfields primarily in eastern Scotland. By simulating part of an invasion force, the RAF hoped to convince the Germans not to move Luftwaffe aircraft from Norway.43 Air force personnel from Colonel Turner’s department built two different types of aircraft. They constructed canvas Spitfires at night and wooden Bostons by day in hangers and erected the displays at night when their work would be undetected by enemy reconnaissance flights. Normandy invasion preparations limited the resources available for the displays; therefore, Turner had to choose the sites carefully. He eliminated airfields in western Scotland because activity in the Clyde and other ports, which were preparing for the real invasion, made supplemental exhibits unnecessary. Focusing on the east, Turner chose Peterhead, Fraserburgh, and Fordoun. Peterhead held the largest display of dummy aircraft—two squadrons of twin-engined Bostons and eight Spitfires that were added to a real squadron housed on the field. According to Turner, ‘‘two real Bostons were also located at Peterhead partly to show life and also to send from them air signals specifically prepared beforehand to indicate reconnaissance reports, etc.’’44 Turner’s department assembled one squadron of Bostons at each of the other two sites.

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The biggest problem faced by Turner’s department was how to make the displays realistic. Placing dummy aircraft on ‘‘already occupied airfields’’ helped solve the problem. ‘‘The usual station transport and personnel . . .provided the ‘life,’ which dummy aircraft on dummy airfields lack.’’ In order to add ‘life’ to the dummy displays, Turner’s men added fake petrol tankers, vans, tins, and litter ‘‘to simulate the usual odds and ends always to be seen in the neighborhood of aircraft dispersal areas.’’ The department also exhibited realism by integrating the arrival of aircraft and vehicles, as well as reports from reconnaissance aircraft, with wireless traffic.45 A number of rumors spread throughout Britain about an upcoming assault reinforced the threat to Norway. Both General Dwight Eisenhower and King Haakon VII, the exiled Norwegian ruler, made speeches about the impending action. The king admonished the Norwegian resistance movement not to act too soon, but to wait for the Allied assault. In addition to his speech, King Haakon VII and the Crown Prince visited a Norwegian brigade attached to the 52nd Infantry Division. General Sir Andrew Thorne also contributed to the visual deception by traveling to Northern Ireland, where he inspected the U.S. XV Corps on April 12-14. Activities in Norway by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and commandos increased. The RAF perpetuated the scheme by leaking information about training on the west coast of Scotland by air sea rescue craft and squadrons for operations in Scandinavia. It also increased photo reconnaissance of airfields, ports, and the coastal defenses of Norway. Using wireless, high frequency signaling, and call signs manipulation, the ‘‘RAF conjured up and maintained four squadrons of nonexistent A-20 Havoc light bombers on Scottish airfields.’’46 In the spring of 1944, the Royal Navy embarked on operations that bolstered the Norwegian threat. In April, aircraft from the Home Fleet attacked the Tirpitz. During the same month, the Royal Navy, using carrier aircraft, bombed shipping at Bodo and sent reconnaissance flights over the harbor at Narvik. The navy also helped simulate the training of assault forces preparing for an amphibious landing by providing the wireless traffic that would normally accompany a training exercise. ‘‘Wireless traffic between aircraft and the Home Fleet’s escort carriers’’ furnished ‘‘notional air support’’ for the troops participating in the exercise. American and British vessels enacted ‘‘mock sweeps in Norwegian waters.’’ By May the Soviet Union provided support for the deceptive threat. The U.S.S.R. demonstrated an impending assault on Petsamo ‘‘by a concentration of troops and ships in the Kola Fjord, by air and sea reconnaissance of the Norwegian coast, and by increased wireless traffic in the whole area.’’ The Soviets also let the Germans learn about an army of specialists being formed by the Soviet High Command by late June. In addition, the Germans discovered that Soviet reserves were being prepared for action in July 1944.47 ******************* Colonel Bevan, the Controlling Officer, voiced concerns that visual and wireless activities would be insufficient to convince the Germans that the Allied threat was real, especially after three previous threats failed to materialize. Soviet participation

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in the deception helped, but not enough. Therefore, the LCS added a political element to the plan—Operation Graffham, which was strictly a British, not an Allied, plan. The LCS believed that if Sweden could be persuaded that a real danger to Norway existed, the government would pass that information along to the Germans. Not only would the Germans be gathering information that indicated an impending action, but they would receive similar indications from a neutral nation. Although perceived by some as the diplomatic twin of Fortitude North, Graffham remained separated from the other scheme by one important factor—the absence of an American role in the diplomatic deception.48 On February 10, 1944, the LCS received approval for a plan to convince the Germans that the British were actively seeking Sweden’s help with the Allied— British and Russian—assault in the Narvik area and access to Swedish military facilities that were essential to the success of the Narvik operation. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the following bids be made to Sweden. The British suggested the interception of wireless messages by their own personnel from facilities in Sweden. They requested permission to obtain meteorological reports about Sweden and to install navigation equipment that would be operated by British workers and that would aid assaults on German targets. The Combined Chiefs of Staff rejected the interception of wireless traffic from Sweden. After examining the suggestions made by the British Chiefs of Staff, the LCS devised a seven-part proposal to present to the Swedish government. The proposal included the following requests: 1. permission for aircraft engaged in activities over enemy territory be allowed to make emergency landings in Sweden in order to refuel 2. access by damaged aircraft to Swedish repair facilities for a period not to exceed fortyeight hours 3. authorization for aircraft to carry out photographic reconnaissance flights over Sweden 4. approval for British transportation experts to devise a plan with Swedish authorities for the transportation of goods to Scandinavia after the Germans had withdrawn from the region 5. permission for Colonel H.V. Thornton, former British Air Attache´ to Sweden, to meet with Swedish officials 6. British manipulation of Norwegian securities 7. the establishment of false wireless traffic between the two capitals. British officials also considered adding a proviso to solicit for Norwegian exiles wishing to travel from Britain to Sweden.

Further consideration of the numerous requests led to rejection of the request for aid to Norwegian exiles and permission for aircrafts needing fuel or repairs to land in Sweden. British officials further decided not to present the proposals all at once, but to do so in stages. Operation Graffham began when the British Minister to Sweden, Sir Victor Mallet, traveled to London to discuss his role in the scheme. He returned to Sweden

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for his first meeting with Eric Boheman, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the meeting, which occurred on April 4, 1944, Mallet solicited permission for British transportation experts to consult with their counterparts in Sweden and for reconnaissance aircraft to travel through Swedish air space. The Soviet minister in Sweden voiced his support of the British proposals three days later. Although he officially relayed his government’s rejection of the reconnaissance missions, Boheman privately indicated that Swedish planes would take no action against British planes that violated the Scandinavian nation’s security. While his government agreed to allow British transportation experts to meet with Swedish authorities, Boheman, noting that certain matters could not be discussed, claimed the British would not find the venture fruitful. Despite the inauspicious beginning of Graffham, the British did not abandon the plan. After receiving approval for his trip, Colonel Thornton, who assumed the title of Air Vice Marshal for the duration of his visit, traveled to Stockholm, where he remained for at least two weeks, during which time he attended several meetings with Lieutenant General Bengt Nordenskiold, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Swedish Air Force. Because Nordenskiold was pro-Ally, the British hoped that the conferences between the two men would lend credibility to the story that they were trying to promote. Although he indicated a willingness to help the British in the event of a German withdrawal from Scandinavia, Nordenskiold could not provide the British with the sensitive security material that Thornton requested. The meetings between Nordenskiold and Thornton were not as successful as the British had hoped they would be. Although convinced that the Allies intended to invade Norway, Nordenskiold did not mention his conclusions or the nature of his conversations with Thornton to anyone. Failing to accomplish his goals, Thornton returned to England on April 30.49 Other parts of Graffham proved to be virtually ineffective also. The deception planners believed that the purchase of Norwegian bonds would indicate that an invasion was imminent; however, the acquisition of Norwegian securities by the British had little impact. In fact, it received no notice outside of Britain, where attention was minimal. Although low level Swedish officials gossiped about an impending Allied invasion of Norway, high level officials, with the exception of Nordenskiold, hesitated to believe the rumors. They believed an assault against Norway would be a diversion. The real attack would come on the European mainland. Sir Ronald Wingate, however, disagreed and claimed that both the Swedes and the Germans became convinced that a real threat to Norway existed.50 ******************* The deception planners did not, however, expect Graffham to work on its own. Graffham was only one part of the overall plan, which also included employing double agents to convince the enemy that the threat to Norway was real. Since November 1943, the LCS had emphasized Allied strength in the Mediterranean and downplayed the buildup of forces in Britain through information passed by double agents and foreign diplomats. However, the buildup of Normandy invasion troops

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made that story more difficult; Allied officials had to create an incorrect impression of these forces. The LCS realized that they had to pass the false Order of Battle gradually to the Germans; therefore, they decided to have double agents send the enemy pieces of information, not the entire picture. The LCS could only hope that the Germans would put the pieces together and construct the correct Order of Battle puzzle. Several double agents, with code names like Freak, Mutt, and Jeff, provided the puzzle segments. Although Mutt, an agent from Norway, supplied the Germans with false information about the movement of Allied troops in Scotland, he was a minor player. The Germans tracked the maneuvers of U.S. forces through reports gathered by the Abwehr from its agents. For example, German appreciations noted the transfer of the nonexistent U.S. 55th Infantry Division from Iceland to Scotland. Unbeknownst to the Germans, Freak, who reported on Allied troops stationed in Northern Ireland, never actually observed the forces he described. In March the Abwehr learned from Tate, another double agent, of meetings that Sir Victor Mallet, the British Ambassador to Sweden, attended in London. At the meetings, Mallet received information about his role in Graffham. The aide de camp (ADC) to Yugoslavia’s King Peter traveled to Scotland and reported the discovery of British II Corps headquarters near Stirling. He supposedly met an indiscreet officer from the U.S. XV Corps, stationed in Northern Ireland. From the officer, the ADC learned about the three U.S. divisions, 2nd, 5th, and 8th, that made up the corps. He reported that the U.S. XV Corps, which was part of the British Fourth Army, was undergoing intensive training. The ADC also informed his superiors that General Sir Andrew Thorne had inspected the American corps and been ‘‘favorably impressed.’’51 In April Brutus disclosed plans to his Abwehr connection to observe Polish forces in Scotland. He noted the presence of the headquarters of the Fourth Army in Edinburgh, that of II Corps in Stirling, and VII Corps in Dundee and identified their insignias, along with that of the fictitious 58th Division. Brutus’s reports reinforced those that the Abwehr had received from other agents, such as King Peter’s ADC, and helped add credibility to the information being sent to Germany. Brutus added to other intelligence already obtained by the Germans ‘‘by reporting on 16 April that an attack on Norway must be expected early in May and, on 4 May, that a Russian military and naval mission was established in Edinburgh.’’52 The Abwehr learned about the movements of General Sir Andrew Thorne, including his trip to Northern Ireland, and a Soviet liaison mission’s visit to the headquarters of the Fourth Army from observations made by Beetle, Cobweb, Humbert, Mutt, Jeff, Tricycle, and Garbo or those made by their subagents. One of Garbo’s fictitious subagents was a British sailor who had communist sympathies and who was attached to a ship on the Clyde. The sailor provided important information about Allied invasion preparations being made in Scotland.53 ******************* Established before the spring of 1944, many double agents helped pass the Fortitude story to the Germans. Throughout the war, the Abwehr sent numerous

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spies to Britain; however, according to J.C. Masterman, who was a member of the Double-Cross Committee, the British captured all of them. The captured spies suffered various fates; they were executed, imprisoned, or turned into double agents. Masterman claimed that by 1943 no German agents were acting independently in Britain.54 The Germans continued to send agents to spy on the Allies as late as mid-1944. Anxious about the upcoming Allied invasion of France and concerned about a ‘‘diversionary attack’’ against German forces in Norway, the Germans sent a number of agents to Iceland in April 1944 with orders to infiltrate the island nation. Authorities apprehended all of them. However, not all double agents were spies sent by the Abwehr. A couple, such as Garbo and Tricycle, approached the British because they wanted to spy on the Germans for the Allies. As might be expected, the British did not welcome these men with open arms. Each took his own road in convincing the British that they were sincere. As noted earlier, one of the reasons that the Double Cross System worked was that British intelligence succeeded in quickly capturing spies sent by the Germans. In some cases, however, Abwehr agents turned themselves over to British authorities upon their arrival in England. One example was a Polish staff officer, code named Brutus.55 Brutus was originally part of a Polish ring that was spying on the Germans. Unfortunately, the Germans arrested him along with other members of the ring in late 1942. The Germans placed Brutus and the others in prison. Some time later, the Germans offered Brutus the opportunity to end his incarceration. They would permit him to escape if he agreed to become one of their agents in England. Brutus finally agreed. Arriving in England, he immediately contacted British authorities. Not sure whether or not to trust the new double agent, the British watched him carefully and at first gave him only minor information to send to the Abwehr. Eventually, Brutus began to participate in the Normandy deception. He informed the Germans that the Allies had decided to delay the cross-channel invasion. Brutus placed the blame for the postponement on General Bernard Montgomery. According to the agent, the Allies had chosen Montgomery to lead the invasion force, but the British general refused to commence the operation until his forces were one hundred percent prepared. Garbo also informed the Abwehr about Allied preparations for the upcoming invasion, but that they were proceeding at an unhurried pace. As the spring progressed, the LCS realized that they would not be able to hide the troop buildup as D-Day approached; therefore, they had to discontinue sending invasion ‘‘postponement’’ information through the double agents. They feared that continuation would adversely affect the impact of the double agents’ messages to the Abwehr, which began seeking specific information from its spies. Brutus made several trips to Scotland, some at the request of his Abwehr contacts. While in Scotland, he ‘‘discovered’’ the location of several units of the British Fourth Army. After a trip to Scotland for meetings with Polish officers in early April, Brutus reported that the Fourth Army contained two British corps, the II and the VII, and an unidentified American corps. It also included a Norwegian brigade, the 58th and Lowland Divisions, and an unknown brigade in the Orkney Islands. Brutus went on to predict an Allied assault on Norway in May.

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Like Brutus, Garbo received requests for specific information from the Abwehr. Supposedly unable to make the trip himself, Garbo sent subagents to investigate rumors of naval exercises in the Clyde area and shipping concentrations in Methil. He forwarded their reports, along with information about the sighting of the 52nd Lowland Division near Dundee from another subagent. Another of Garbo’s subordinates, after watching the training of naval assault forces near Greenock and land and sea exercises in Loch Fryne on May 10 and 11, suggested that Norway was an Allied target. The agent also noted the presence of arctic equipment, which suggested an operation against northern Norway. A message from Brutus reinforced the notion of a threat to that region. On May 4 he ‘‘signalled his controller that according to the Dutch Command a Soviet military and naval mission had established itself in Edinburgh, probably in order to co-ordinate Russian military naval operations in the far north of Norway with General Thorne’s 4th Army.’’56 The British also fed information to the Abwehr through an Austrian double agent who was operating in Lisbon. The double agent supposedly had a subagent who worked with the Fire Office Committee. He reported that the Ministry of Economic Warfare was seeking information about flour mills, bakeries, cold storage plants, and printing shops in two different regions of Norway—Narvik in the north and Aalesund, Bergen, Oslo, Larvik, Stavanger, Moss, Porgrund, Kristiansand, and Trondheim in the south. Those requests provided the Germans with one of the first indications that the Allies planned two separate attacks on Norway. The subagent later noted inquiries about similar information regarding northern France and Belgium. ******************* Although British intelligence could gauge the impact of the messages from double agents to Abwehr, the LCS was aware of the constant danger that the double agents could be blown. If that happened, the deception would be revealed. Therefore, the double agents made up only one part of the plan. The deception also included physical displays, a diplomatic plan, and wireless traffic. The wireless activity, slated to begin on March 22, 1944, required planning, practice, and precision. The signals groups simulated brigade exercises, artillery practices, amphibious assault rehearsals, and embarkation and disembarkation drills by wireless. The goal was to fill the airwaves with wireless traffic that would accurately simulate a real army’s traffic in various situations.57 According to Colonel Macleod, the wireless traffic consisted of three kinds of messages: ‘‘operational, training, and routine and administrative. All messages . . . would be within the framework of an outline plan for the invasion of Norway.’’ Signals operators used the most secret cipher for operational messages that were only sent by wireless transmission. Macleod devised a three corps invasion plan, and ‘‘messages went backwards and forwards regarding the plan, and details connected with it.’’ They used both wireless and radio to transmit training messages. Because of the possibility of voice recognition, ‘‘officers representing various commanders and staff officers stayed in those appointments.’’ The training messages

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began at a ‘‘comparatively low standard’’ and gradually improved ‘‘until they reached a high pitch of perfection towards the end of May, ready to invade Norway.’’ Signals operators sent the routine and administrative messages either in code or in cipher, depending upon the nature of the message. Messages traveled by wireless from army to corps to division to brigade and back up the chain to army headquarters. Macleod borrowed Scottish Command’s cipher staff, a Women’s Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) officer in charge of ATS girls. The ATS staff remained with the deception implementers until July when Fortitude North merged with Fortitude South.58 The Fortitude North implementers created wireless traffic to simulate the following stories: the completion of collective training by the U.S. XV corps 45 days prior to D-Day; between 61 and 31 days before D-Day, the simulation of two brigades’ amphibious training by the 52nd Infantry Division and Combat Training Centre Troon; the completion of the same training by two brigades of an unnamed infantry division between D minus 31 and the start of the Normandy invasion; and the continuation of training by the same division for 15 days after D-Day, but in a different area. The LCS dictated a series of exercises to be feigned on specific dates by the notional 58th Infantry Division—April 14–25, exercises to demonstrate the division’s movement toward the Clyde from Aberlour; April 26, embarkation and disembarkation practices simulated by naval wireless activity; and May 1–31, mountain and ordinary training in the Doune area—and by the 52nd Lowland Division; April 5– 6, 12, and 20, assault brigade signal exercises; April 15 and 24, amphibious exercises by an assault brigade; May 7, signal exercise by a division; and May 10, amphibious exercises by a division, including follow-up brigades. A SHAEF directive dated March 23, 1944, dictated the culmination of the threat to Norway in two phases: 1) ‘‘by 1st May Fourth Army will be prepared to carry out a landing in Southern NORWAY’’ and 2) ‘‘by 15th May Fourth Army will be prepared to carry out a landing in Southern NORWAY and a landing by 7 Corps in Northern NORWAY.’’59 In order to provide the appropriate wireless activity, the signals operators established fixed nets from the British Fourth Army headquarters in Edinburgh to the U.S. XV Corps headquarters in Northern Ireland and to VII Corps headquarters near Dundee between 56 and 60 days before D-Day, with the United States providing the net terminals. The Fourth Army also established nets between II Corps and 55th Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and the 113th Independent Infantry Brigade 65 days prior to the Normandy invasion. Scottish Command received orders to achieve a ‘‘high standard of collective training’’ by the II, VII, and XV Corps through wireless traffic by D minus 45. SHAEF ordered General Haislip, the commander of U.S. XV Corps, ‘‘to execute a succession of increasingly advanced CPX’s, commencing shortly after 15 March, and culminating in a Corps CPX [Command Post Exercises] about 15 April.’’ No. 5 Wireless Group received orders to help Scottish Command to monitor the CPX’s. Haislip also had a directive to establish a radio net with Fourth Army headquarters with activity to begin on March 22.60 Activity commenced throughout the British Fourth Army on March 22. Not only did operational and routine messages travel up and down the net from Fourth Army headquarters to brigades, some of the wireless divisions held brigade exercises, as did

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the 52nd Lowland and 58th Divisions. According to Colonel Macleod, ‘‘we had artillery exercises and even an artillery practice camp with shooting on a range, all by wireless.’’61 Although the operation opened ‘‘with a bang,’’ as Macleod claimed in his account of the deception, the colonel and his officers had to enact security measures to ensure success in the event that the enemy broke the codes and ciphers and was able to read the messages. Therefore, with the exception of signals training, all messages had to be militarily plausible. If they succeeded in reading the messages, the Germans had to be able to tell what type of headquarters sent them. The transmissions had to have a purpose; they could not be nonsense that could possibly jeopardize the deception. As a result, Macleod’s staff carefully constructed the traffic to be sent over wireless and radio. His staff utilized wireless silence periods to amass a surplus of messages. The signals operators did, however, send out a few ‘‘calculated indiscretions’’ designed to suggest the upcoming invasion of Norway.62 Signals operators from both the RAF and the Royal Navy transmitted messages as part of the deception. The RAF simulated the transfer of medium bomber squadrons to northeast Scotland. The display of real and fake Spitfires added validity to the wireless deception. The navy supplied evidence of invasion training to the enemy through wireless deception. ‘‘The Admiralty set up a number of CLH units, each of which was able to simulate the wireless traffic of a naval assault force capable of lifting an infantry division.’’63 The navy used two CLH units to fake the training of ‘‘V’’ and ‘‘W’’ Forces with assault divisions, the 52nd and 58th, in the Clyde area. In addition to wireless, the navy used the concentration of shipping in the Clyde and on Scotland’s east coast to feign the confluence of naval forces engaged in amphibious training.64 The amount of radio and wireless activity varied according to the schedule that Colonel Macleod received from Major General Barker on March 4. The schedule indicated periods of wireless silence, normal activity, and intense activity. Wireless silence generally indicated troop movements or the beginning of an operation. Intense activity occurred during the simulated training exercises. The implementers tried to suggest an impending assault with an increase in activity during the spring of 1944. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops, ‘‘Notes on Decisions Made on the 21st and 22nd March, 1944 Regarding Wireless Program for Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ dated March 23, 1944, indicated the progress to be made with Fortitude, including amphibious, embarkation and disembarkation training, and troop concentrations, one for northern Norway, the other for southern Norway by May 1–10. The report also dictated both real and deceptive measures to be taken beginning in mid-April. The real exercises included an increase in visual and photographic reconnaissance over Norway, the commencement of heavy bomber raids on Norwegian airfields, and the initiation of ‘‘long range air sea rescue operations.’’ The deceptive activities included wireless support for fake bomber displays and ‘‘wireless traffic associated with the training of escort carriers and aircraft in Scotland.’’65 Throughout the period, SHAEF and the LCS continually evaluated the wireless situation and the overall deception plan and made changes in the transmission schedule in order to build up the force and to develop the threat to Norway by the assigned dates.66

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Colonel Macleod initiated a number of measures to make the deception more realistic. As noted earlier, General Sir Andrew Thorne traveled to Northern Ireland at Macleod’s request to inspect the U.S. XV Corps. SHAEF declared the Firth of Forth a ‘‘protected area,’’ which meant that people traveling into or out of an area within ten miles of the Firth of Forth needed a special pass. All those within the ten-mile radium had to submit to a security check. The purpose was to target the area as an embarkation site for the invasion of Norway. In an attempt to distinguish the Fourth Army from Scottish Command and to show the army’s mobility, Macleod moved VII Corps, with the exception of the 52nd Infantry Division that remained near Dundee, and II Corps, without the 55th Infantry Division, near Glasgow. Fourth Army shifted its headquarters from Edinburgh to Ayr on May 20 during a period of radio silence. Both locations were near the Clyde’s embarkation ports. In addition, the Fourth Army established a link with the 35th Tank Brigade, camped in Dumfries. According to Macleod, ‘‘7th Corps moved first on 1st May during a silent period, Corps H.Q. going to Beith. With Combined Operations H.S., on Loch Fyne we had practice embarkations on various large transports arriving at the ports.’’67 Practice in landing operations and inland ground gaining continued with Combined Operations in the Troon area. As Macleod related in his account, ‘‘We had a H.Q. ship and sent parties from 52nd, 58th and the wireless divisions ashore to establish beach heads and beach parties with wireless communications and calls for naval bombardments on enemy resistance, and then an advance inland. I was given a DUKW to run about in from the ship to the shore and then across land.’’68 According to Macleod, his fears that German reconnaissance flights would notice the sparcity of troops training on the coastal areas of Scotland did not materialize. The Allies succeeded in shooting down any enemy aircraft that flew over the area. Macleod confidently claimed that the Germans remained ignorant of the size of the actual Allied force perpetrating the deception. By the end of May, however, Allied intelligence indicated that the ruse in Scotland was no longer having an effect on German troop movement and was in danger of being discovered a deception; therefore, SHAEF ordered Macleod to cease the threat to Norway, feign a movement to the south to join the menace to the Pas de Calais, and merge with the Fortitude South deception. The movement of actual and fictitious troops to southeast England was a gradual process and will be discussed in greater detail later. Wireless traffic suggested corps training exercises during the middle of June. Macleod planned the movement of the Fourth Army by the end of June. Traveling in wireless silence, the transfer occurred during the middle of July. From this point until SHAEF terminated its activities, Fortitude North took on a more flexible role in the deception.69 ******************* Prior to the end of May 1944, although Allied intelligence indicated that the Germans believed the deception, historians continue to debate the credibility of the conclusions made by intelligence officials. As noted above, SHAEF intelligence suggested to Macleod that the activities executed in Scotland achieved the desired

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results. The Germans increased divisions in Norway from nine to twelve by midMay 1944. The German force, which included 58,000 Luftwaffe and 89,000 naval personnel, totaled approximately 372,000 men. The twelve divisions remained in Norway until the end of the war.70 In a letter dated July 18, 1944, to the Right Honorable Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War, Eisenhower acknowledged that Fortitude North had helped in the early phase of Operation Overlord.7172 Although he concurred, Sir Ronald Wingate also offered evidence in his report that indicated that the deception might not have been necessary. He claimed that captured German High Command documents indicated that the German had correctly located most of the fictitious formations in Scotland. According to Wingate, however, the German documents indicated that the Germans ‘‘feared a diversionary operation against Norway’’ before Macleod began to implement the deception. In a wireless communication, dated April 6, 1944, the Japanese Naval Attache´ concluded that the Germans did anticipate the possibility of Allied commando raids on the Norwegian coast with the object of cutting communications between the northern and southern parts of that country. A later communication dated May 16, 1944, from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Minister in Tokyo indicated the German belief that ‘‘the troops stationed in SCOTLAND appear to be held in readiness for a diversionary attack on NORWAY.’’73 Referring to Norway, Dennis Wheatley, a member of the LCS, claimed that the deception ‘‘led to one of the greatest coups that we ever achieved in deceiving Hitler.’’ 74 The available documents do not necessarily agree with Wheatley’s assertion. The evidence indicates that the Norway deception was not entirely fruitful. Hitler did not have the forces necessary to transfer to Norway to counter the Allied threat. The deception did, however, frighten Hitler enough to prevent him from removing any troops from Norway and Denmark.75 The evidence also suggests that although the Germans accepted the existence of the fictitious forces, including the British Fourth Army, they did not fall for the threat to Norway. The Germans realized ‘‘that the forces at General Thorne’s disposal were not enough to mount more than diversionary operations which the existing garrison of Norway should be able to contain.’’76 Radio reconnaissance indicated the movement of German troops south. The Germans failed to pick up much of British radio traffic originating in Scotland. Soviet radio traffic attracted the attention of Germans in Norway much more than that of the British did. Hitler kept twelve divisions in Norway ‘‘to protect his shipment of Finnish nickel ore, his northern flank, and his U-boat departures,’’ not because of the deception. Fortitude North did not affect German strategy in Norway; the Germans actually did transfer soldiers from Norway to Denmark and to the eastern front shortly before the Normandy invasion. The Germans were aware of some of the Allies’ deceptions, but Fortitude North was no more successful than Graffham. Although the Germans did not exclude the possibility of an Allied attack, the number of troops in Norway remained the same. Only their state of readiness changed.77 Included in the Wingate Report is a brief excerpt from a 1946 interrogation of Jodl in which the general claimed, ‘‘We kept 300,000 men in Norway during most

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of the war, when 100,000 men would have been sufficient had Norway been for us merely an occupational and security commitment.’’78 Wingate does not, however, present any information about the interrogation of Jodl—when or where it took place, who questioned him, what questions were asked, how he responded, or if Jodl just told his interrogators what they wanted to hear. One must, therefore, not place too much emphasis on the accuracy of Jodl’s statement. Jodl did, however, answer questions about Norway during his interrogation by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on June 4, 1946. Dr. Franz Exner, Jodl’s defense counsel, asked him about the occupation of Norway. According to Jodl, the occupation of Norway put the German fleet at risk. The belief that the Allied threat was real justified the presence of 300,000 idle soldiers protecting 3,000 kilometers of coastline.79 Both the quotation in the Wingate Report and Jodl’s responses in his interrogation suggest that Jodl, at least, considered the threat to Norway real. The Germans, including Hitler, believed that the primary invasion would come in France. Any assault on Norway would be secondary. The German commander in Norway, General von Falkenhorst, in a report dated September 30, 1945, suggested that a large scale attack by the British was not considered a possibility in 1940, 1941, or 1942. Although the Germans believed an invasion of Norway conceivable in 1943, by 1944 they considered an assault on northern France more feasible than one against Norway. Von Falkenhorst claimed that he recognized by 1942 that Norway was a secondary theater and would not dictate the course of the war. According to von Falkenhorst, the British did not intend to invade Norway. He cited as evidence the lack of invasion preparation in Scottish or English east coast ports, which was indicated by air reconnaissance flights. Von Falkenhorst, like the LXX Corps commander and other German officers in Norway, recognized that an attack on Norway would have split the Allied forces and would have made an invasion of France more difficult, if not impossible. An Ultra intercept, dated March 22, 1944, acknowledged the possibility of Allied action against Norway, but did not indicate that it would be the anticipated Second Front. According to the intercept, the OKM noted the transfer of an English corps and an infantry division from Scotland to south England, which left four to six divisions in Scotland prepared for action. The OKM also cited the presence of one to two American divisions in Iceland, which it expected to be used in activity in the north, and of adequate shipping to transport troops to north, central, or south Norway ‘‘with the object of tying down German forces in northern area and preventing withdrawal of further forces from this area.’’ According to the intercept, the OKM believed that an Allied invasion of Norway would not be the main Allied operation.80 Von Falkenhorst and the commanders in Norway were not the only leaders to conclude that an invasion of Norway was not likely. Colonel Alexis Baron von Roenne, Foreign Armies West, deduced that an attack on Norway ‘‘did not coincide with his impressions of inter- and inner-Allied political rivalries.’’ Although he did not think that the Allied operation was possible after May 23, von Roenne concluded that the only real justification for an Allied effort in Norway was

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‘‘the interruption . . .of German sea communications, along the Norwegian coast, the containment of German armed forces, and an insurrection of the Norwegian population.’’81 In May, however, Hitler and his advisors believed that the Allied diversionary Norwegian assault would open the Second Front campaign. By the end of the month, however, Allied intelligence indicated that the deception was becoming untenable. As a result, SHAEF and the LCS decided to reduce the threat to Norway and gradually transfer both real and fictitious Fourth Army formations southward beginning in June for inclusion in the Fortitude South deception. Although the LCS devised a Fortitude North II plan, the decision to merge the original Fortitude North with Fortitude South basically signaled the end of the threat to Norway. Until the deception officially ended, SHAEF and the LCS only left a small force in Scotland that was available for the occupation of Norway should German troops collapse or withdraw from Scandinavia.

4

Deciding How to Implement Fortitude South

A military operation involves deception. Even though you are competent, appear to be incompetent. Though effective, appear to be ineffective. —Master Sun Tzu1

British and American leaders agreed during the May 1943 Trident Conference to schedule the invasion of northwest Europe for May 1944, a date that they confirmed with the Soviets six months later at Teheran. However, a number of factors, including the difficulty in amassing an adequate number of landing craft, forced postponement of the assault until early June. But whether the assault occurred in May or June, the planners of Overlord had to face certain realities. The Germans expected the Allies to invade northwest Europe in 1944, and, consequently, they had embarked on a plan to strengthen their coastal defenses in the West.2 In fact, the Allies, recognizing the Germans’ determination to thwart an assault on northwest Europe, tracked the buildup of enemy forces in western Europe. According to the GSI 21st Army Group Weekly Review for February 13, 1944, ‘‘The sole remaining hope of the German Army lies in defeating the Allied invasion in the West.’’3 A report issued less than a week later noted that 53 German divisions had been identified in western Europe and that, although new divisions had moved into the Bouches du Rhoˆ ne and Abbeville-Boulogne areas, the enemy had concentrated a large number of troops in the Pas de Calais region. The report concluded that ‘‘if there are to be no departures to counter-balance these arrivals, we may find a new development in the German policy for the defence of the WEST: an attempt to provide the much-publicised PAS DE CALAIS with defence in depth provided by infantry divisions in a layback role.’’4 Allied leaders acknowledged that, as the target date approached, it would become increasingly difficult to conceal the concentration of troops and ships in southern and southwestern England. Therefore, they ordered the London Controlling

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Section (LCS) to develop a deception plan that was initially intended to mask the buildup of forces for Overlord. Recognizing the inadequacy of such a plan, the focus of the deception shifted to a plan designed to suggest a different location and date of the Allied invasion. To accomplish this goal, Allied forces had to create another invasion force and choose another site for an assault. Drawing on intelligence reports, the LCS decided to create a threat to the Pas de Calais area. Located across the narrowest part of the English Channel, the Pas de Calais included good beaches and a port that would be essential for the expansion of the Allied operation. In addition, the area was relatively close to the border of Germany and would allow easier access to the Ruhr industrial region and Berlin than a site further to the west. As early as mid-February 1944, the Germans had begun to concentrate troops in the Pas de Calais area, which indicated the importance that they gave the region. Since 1940 the Germans had considered the Pas de Calais region the most strategically important part of France and had fortified it accordingly.5 By producing the illusion of an Allied troop concentration in southeast England, the Allies hoped the Germans would incorrectly deduce the size of the force available for an invasion of the continent. By the middle of May 1944, the enemy estimated an Allied invasion force of ‘‘56 infantry divisions, 5 independent infantry brigades, 8 airborne divisions, 8 paratroop battalions, 15 armored divisions, and 14 armored brigades.’’ In reality, the Allied force included 20 American divisions and 18 British and Canadian divisions.6 When they designed Fortitude South, which targeted the Pas de Calais, the members of the LCS hoped to take advantage of the Germans’ inaccurate assessment of Allied troop strength in Great Britain. Although implementation of the Fortitude deception began before it was accepted by the Combined Chiefs, the LCS did not issue the final plan until May 18, 1944.7 The LCS designed Fortitude South with several goals in mind, the most important of which was to convince the Germans that the invasion was going to occur in the Pas de Calais area, not in Normandy. If they could not convince the Germans that the Allies’ target was the Pas de Calais, then the LCS had to convince them that the main assault would be against the Pas de Calais. Any other attack would be a diversion. They hoped to play on the Germans’ preconceived notions of the importance of the Pas de Calais region. In addition, the LCS wanted to use the southern deception to ‘‘protect with decoys our hards and ports of embarkation on the South Coast.’’8 Because German guns could hit the area between Dover and Folkestone and because no large harbors existed between Folkestone and Chichester, the concentration of shipping for the invasion force had to be located in harbors in and west of Chichester. ‘‘If landing craft were reported on the east coast, north of the Thames estuary he [the enemy] would be likely to anticipate attack much more to the east than the Normandy coast, and if he was misled completely, he would probably keep troops in the Pas de Calais area for a considerable time after the actual invasion took place.’’9 By creating a fictitious force in southeast England, the LCS hoped to prevent the enemy from moving the ‘‘formidable’’ German Fifteenth Army, which included 19 divisions and which had access to an additional five panzer divisions in the area, from the Pas de Calais 170 miles southwest to the Normandy beaches. Therefore, the task

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of Fortitude South became the containment of enemy forces, especially three armored divisions, in the area north of the Seine River. The LCS gave the code name Quicksilver I to the part of Fortitude South that included the dummy force that would be situated in southeast England across from the Pas de Calais. The fictitious Allied army group would contain approximately one million men. Colonel Roger Fleetwood Hesketh and Colonel J.V.B. Jervis-Read, members of the Committee of Special Means (CSM), devised Quicksilver I, which presented a two-part story. During the first phase, which was before D-Day, Supreme Commander ordered two army groups, 21st British Army Group and First U. S. Army Group (FUSAG), to set up camp in southeast England. Once it was activated, FUSAG established its initial headquarters in Bryanston Square, London. FUSAG contained two armies, the Third U.S. Army and the First Canadian Army. The Third U.S. Army contained the XX and XII Corps, and the First Canadian Army included the II Canadian and the VIII U.S. Corps. Elements of the Ninth U.S. Air Force would be stationed with the two army groups. The story would change after D-Day. After the 21st Army Group drew German troops toward the Normandy area, the Supreme Commander would launch an attack on the Pas de Calais area with FUSAG. Prior to the assault against the Pas de Calais, the Allied forces would participate in a series of training exercises. Although Fortitude South would feature physical displays, like Fortitude North, it was basically a deception program presented by wireless traffic, which would be controlled by the 21st Army Group and by double agents.10 Devising an Order of Battle for Fortitude South did not prove easy. The Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander’s (COSSAC’s) deception staff had begun working on the fictitious Order of Battle during the summer of 1943. The staff had faced several problems. Although it assumed that the Joint Commanders would ultimately have responsibility for determining the Order of Battle, they had not yet done so. The failure of the Joint Commanders to construct the Overlord Order of Battle created another obstacle. Because the deception planners had limited resources, they hoped to include real invasion forces in the Fortitude South Order of Battle. Consequently, the deception planners relied on the development of the Overlord Order of Battle in order to devise one for Fortitude South. Because COSSAC acknowledged that adequate time was needed to present the false Order of Battle, he ordered wireless and Special Means to begin suggesting the existence of fictitious troops as early as September 1943, using Appendix Y, the COSSAC deception plan, as a guide. COSSAC decided that GHQ, Home Forces, would represent the fake army. As a result, on September 19, 1943, Home Forces established two wireless links to the 21st Army Group.11 As debate over the false Order of Battle continued, two separate plans emerged. Both designated an invasion force of two army corps represented by GHQ, Home Forces; however, they differed over implementation. One plan authorized enactment by II British Corps and one U.S. corps to be determined at a later date; the other by South Eastern and Eastern Commands, each of which would represent one corps. By December 3, 1943, however, officials chose the second option and authorized the establishment of a fixed line wireless network. By late January 1944, a change in the

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deception plan indicated the need for alteration of the Order of Battle. Major General Francis de Guingand, chief of staff for the 21st Army Group, suggested that the Pas de Calais be presented as the main Allied target after the Normandy invasion. Therefore, the initial landing force of six divisions would be inadequate. On February 3 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) changed the Order of Battle for Fortitude South to include a pre-invasion and a post-invasion story. The pre-invasion story included two armies, the GHQ army that would attack east of the Dover Straits and the real invasion force that would assault the area west of the Dover Straits.12 ‘‘After D-Day, the G.H.Q. Army, continuing its threat to the Channel coast East of the Straits, would ‘operate with four additional assault divisions which will be mounted in the Portsmouth area to assault South of Cap Gris Nez when the German reserves have been committed.’’’13 The proposal dated February 3, 1944, exhibited several weaknesses, one of which was repeated by the Fortitude plan. Neither scheme took ‘‘sufficient account of the story that would have to be told after D Day.’’ The planners would later realize the importance of addressing this oversight. In addition, the February 3 plan placed the fictitious GHQ Army under the 21st Army Group’s control prior to the Normandy invasion. Because the 21st Army Group could not oversee both the Normandy and the Pas de Calais invasions, the GHQ Army would have to shift to another command during Overlord. Although the change in command structure was possible, it would not enhance the ‘‘main’’ operation, the threat to the Pas de Calais. As a result of the problems of the February 3 plan, the Joint Commanders assumed charge of the ‘‘detailed planning,’’ and the 21st Army Group, commanded by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, received orders to determine the final Order of Battle for Fortitude South.14 Two important changes resulted from the 21st Army Group’s assessment of the existing Order of Battle. First, 21st Army Group established two separate army groups, one for Overlord, the other for Fortitude South. ‘‘Second, it decided to build the Order of Battle wholly from real operational formations, that is to say, it dispensed with imaginary formations as well as with those under the command of Home Forces and under War Office control.’’15 Although European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) controlled American formations in the United Kingdom, American officials, following suggestions from the British War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff, had activated FUSAG, which was to coordinate American field forces, in the spring of 1943. Initially a ‘‘paper organization,’’ FUSAG later took on an important role in the Fortitude South deception. FUSAG would include some real U.S. units that were designated as Overlord follow up forces. The goal was to convince the Germans that the two army groups ‘‘were in an equal state of readiness.’’16 By mid-May 1944, Montgomery’s staff had constructed the final FUSAG Order of Battle. FUSAG would contain an assault force, First Canadian Army, and a follow up formation, Third U.S. Army. First Canadian Army included two corps, the II Canadian, which was divided into the 2nd Canadian Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisions, and the VIII U.S., which contained three U.S. infantry divisions, the

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79th, the 28th, and the 83rd. The follow up force, Third U.S. Army, also contained two corps, the XX U.S. Armored and the XII U.S. The XX Corps consisted of the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th Armored Divisions, while the XII Corps also contained three divisions, the 80th Infantry, the 7th Armored, and the 35th Infantry. A SHAEF directive dated February 26, 1944, clarified the chain of command for the deception. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, retained control of the implementation of the deception as a whole. He was responsible specifically for ‘‘the implementation of the plan by special means; political warfare and propaganda; and the occupation and Scandinavian operations.’’ The directive assigned the task of ‘‘directing towards the Pas de Calais the threat created by the forces under their control and for concealing the state of readiness of these forces so as to indicate ‘NEPTUNE’ D plus 45 as the real target date’’ to Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force (ANCXF); General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, the Air Commander-inChief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). Although they had the task of implementing the deception, the three commanders were ultimately responsible to Eisenhower.17 Although General George S. Patton would play a vital role in the FUSAG deception, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group, became ‘‘the commander charged with the operation in the Pas de Calais in accordance with 21 Army Group’s detailed cover plans.’’18 Plan Fortitude South evolved as D-Day approached. Although the LCS under Colonel John Bevan devised the original plan that was approved in February 1944, Ramsay, Montgomery, and Leigh-Mallory were each responsible for fine tuning and implementing the deception in their own areas. Fortitude South was a joint operation—all three military branches participated in some way. Allied leaders divided the Fortitude South cover plan into several different phases. The basic story of the deception fell into two phases. During the first, pre-invasion phase, the implementers, using whatever means necessary, were to suggest that the main target of the Allied assault was the Pas de Calais area and that the target date was D plus 45, or 45 days after the Normandy invasion. The planners expected the Germans to anticipate the assault as D-Day approached. During the second, post-invasion phase, Allied leaders hoped the Germans would reach the following conclusions. First, the purpose of the attack on Normandy was to draw enemy reserves from Belgium and the Pas de Calais. Second, after German forces had evacuated the Pas de Calais, the Allies planned to launch their main assault. Finally, Allied leaders hoped to persuade the Germans to anticipate the Pas de Calais invasion for as long as possible after D-Day.19 The deception planners assigned the code word Quicksilver to the numerous ways in which Fortitude South would be implemented. Quicksilver I referred to the two phases of ground force activities. Prior to D-Day, ‘‘the Supreme Commander has under command two Army Groups, the 21 Army Group, commanded by General Montgomery, and the First United States Army Group, under command General Bradley, which consists of the First Canadian Army with under command

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II Canadian and VIII U.S. Corps, and the Third United States Army with under command XX Corps and XII Corps.’’20 FUSAG would set up camp in east and southeast England. Assigned the task of providing support for FUSAG, the Ninth U.S. Air Force would establish positions in south and southeast England. After the Normandy invasion, the 21st Army Group would persuade German reserves to move toward the Allied beachhead, which would enable FUSAG and the Ninth U.S. Air Force to assault the Pas de Calais area. The armies involved would participate in invasion exercises prior to launching their attack. Wireless activity would supplement the ground forces’ training exercises during the pre-invasion phase and would indicate the movement of troops preparing to embark for the invasion. The wireless telegraphy (W/T) plan received the code name Quicksilver II. Ramsay, Montgomery, and Leigh-Mallory included two appendices with Quicksilver II. Appendix A demonstrated FUSAG’s false Order of Battle, while Appendix B presented a diagram of wireless communications for FUSAG. The wireless stations would initiate operations on April 24. The plan scheduled ‘‘two notional combined exercises, the first DRYSHOD the second WETSHOD . . .by the 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade assisted by Force G’’ for April 16 and 25. In addition, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion and the Radio Contermeasures (RCM) Detachment, FUSAG, would contribute to the wireless activity.21 The presence of a second invasion force, FUSAG, required adequate shipping to transport the troops across the English Channel. The commanders assigned the name Quicksilver III to ‘‘craft indication.’’ They ordered that 270 dummy landing craft be displayed in Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Waldringfield, Wolverstone, Dover, and Folkestone to support the deception in the event the enemy flew reconnaissance flights to verify the existence of an invasion force in southeast England. According to the plan, ‘‘Naval wireless traffic proportionate to the number of craft will be simulated in the mooring areas, appropriate Army wireless traffic being linked to these flotillas as far as possible.’’ In addition, the groups involved received orders to install the necessary signs on roads and in special areas to further the embarkation picture.22 The creation of an invasion force, even a fictitious one, required an air component. Quicksilver IV, which referred to the threat to the Pas de Calais by air, included a general Fortitude air plan. ‘‘Prior to D-Day, air forces would suggest long term preparations for the D plus 45 target day in several ways. Fighter squadrons based in southern England would engage in flight training exercises. High Speed Air Sea Rescue launches and Air Sea Rescue squadrons stationed in southeast England would also practice. Fighters and bombers would participate in a ‘large-scale air operation’ in east and southeast England approximately three days before the Normandy invasion.’’23 ‘‘The aim of the operation will be to test the efficiency of operating fighter squadrons in ‘shuttle service’ from advanced bases whose position gives tactical advantage.’’24 ‘‘By using ‘careful manipulation of call signs, arrangement of deliberate indiscretions by R/T [radio telephony] and very strict orders as to the height at which aircraft are to fly,’ the air force would attempt to ‘conceal’ the movement of aircraft to Kent and the Thames Estuary from southern England. The construction of ‘dummy hard standings’ would supplement the normal activity

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on southeast England airfields. Small scale fighter and bomber practices would also occur in the same area and include ‘deliberate indiscretions on R/T and manipulation of call signs.’ Immediately before the invasion, the air force would drop bombs on beaches and rail targets in the Pas de Calais area as part of the tactical railway bombing initiative.’’25 Ramsay, Montgomery, and Leigh-Mallory conceded that the Germans would surmise that the Normandy assault was a major Allied operation. Therefore, because they agreed that steps had to be taken to maintain the threat to the Pas de Calais area, Quicksilver IV included measures for the post-invasion period. First, special means would reveal the purpose of the American air forces situated in southeast England. Allied forces would engage in practice exercises to ‘‘simulate normal Army/Air Force cooperation.’’ Bombers would execute operations that would not jeopardize Neptune, but would facilitate the deception. Allied leaders recognized that the Pas de Calais threat could not be maintained indefinitely; therefore, they suggested that the threat be climaxed between D-Day and two weeks after the invasion.26 ‘‘If and when it is decided that the threat should culminate, concentrated close support bombing attacks, consistent with the time, size and scope of the operation, should be undertaken.’’27 In order to perpetuate the menace to the Pas de Calais, the planners included Quicksilver V, which orchestrated increased activity by Combined Headquarters, Dover. Combined Headquarters, Dover (in reality, II Canadian Corps Headquarters) undertook special work to create the illusion of ‘‘extra tunnelling and the erection of further wireless stations.’’ New wireless circuits would go online to supplement the deception. The plan also contained a provision for nighttime activity, Quicksilver VI. Beginning in the middle of May, Quicksilver VI dictated the erection of night lighting installations at Breydon Water, Culton Broad, Benacre Mess, Whitehall Farm, Kirton Creek, Falkenham Marshes, Long Reach, and Trimley Marshes. The purpose of the installations was to suggest activity in areas, such as Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft, River Deben, and River Orwell, where dummy craft were located by ‘‘simulating vehicle lights and beach lighting.’’28 Fortitude South proved to be much more complex that one might suppose. SHAEF, in accord with the LCS, devised a wide-ranging strategic cover plan that incorporated implementation by all branches of the military. In addition to Quicksilver I–VI, the deception included naval diversionary operations, as well as several subsidiary plans. According to the Admiralty, ‘‘because the power of manoeuvre at sea was so limited and because it was vital to hold the enemy reserves in sectors other than that to be assaulted as long as possible, the need for cover and deception was paramount, both strategically during the preparatory period and tactically during the approach.’’29 The naval diversionary operations were supplemented by air sorties, but not by troop landings. Using sonic warfare, smoke, and RCM, the Coastal Craft Forces would simulate landing threats to appropriate beaches, other than those in Normandy. The purpose of the diversion was twofold. First, SHAEF and the LCS hoped to postpone the transfer of German reserves into the assault area. Second, by

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engaging enemy naval forces into a skirmish the night before, and during the day of, the assault, Allied leaders wanted to prevent the German navy from hindering the landing of both the invasion and the follow up forces. The plan was to execute feints against three German-held coastal areas: Operation Taxable near Cap Antifer, Operation Glimmer around the Pas de Calais, and Operation Big Drum, in which a force would serve ‘‘as a flank force on the western flank of our assault forces to occupy the attention of the enemy radar and confuse him as to the progress of the main assault forces.’’ Although the Big Drum force was not technically a diversion, it was going to operate like the other diversionary forces. Allied leaders hoped that Glimmer and Taxable would suggest the impending invasion in Calais and Cap Antifer with forces that were equal in size.30 The naval and air forces engaged in Taxable, Glimmer, and Big Drum would have access to a number of resources—sonic equipment to suggest the operation’s climax, RCM, smoke to hide the fleet from enemy sea and air patrols, balloons, and window and moonshine jammers—to facilitate their diversions. RCM could either disrupt enemy radar or simulate the presence of ships or aircraft. Window (metalized paper strips) jettisoned from high-flying aircraft would hinder radar transmissions that could not be jammed for one of two reasons—the frequency was unknown or the appropriate equipment was unavailable.31 British scientists Dr. Robert Cockburn and Dr. Joan Curran discovered that window could totally disrupt the enemy’s radar defenses, by ‘‘[blacking] out enemy radar screens, [snarling] direction-finding equipment, and [creating] so many false ‘echoes’ that confused operators would gain the impression that not hundreds, but many thousands, of bombers were attacking.’’32 When it was possible, Allied technicians would use medium power jammers to neutralize surface watching radar or gunnery control type radar, low power jammers on Seetakt or Wurzburg radar bands, or high power jammers for Wurzburg frequencies. In addition to obstructing enemy radar, Allied scientists developed ways in which to persuade enemy operators to see nonexistent craft on their radar screens. Low-flying aircraft could simulate the advance of both large and small ships by progressively dropping window. Aircraft carrying Type 660 (Moonshine) could also suggest the presence of vessels. Type 660 (Moonshine) was a ‘‘hand-tuned receiver transmitter which produces false radar signals representing craft disposed at intervals of range (i.e. in line astern).’’ Balloons could also be utilized to simulate ships. Reflectors placed inside balloons would ‘‘give a response equal to that of a 5,000 ton ship. . . .a craft towing one of these can also tow a float from which a second balloon is flown. For technical reasons balloons in any unit should be flown at three different heights, 350, 400 and 450 feet. . . .As well as producing a large echo normally associated with a big ship, these balloons increase range at which detection is likely for coastal craft from 15 to 30 miles.’’33 SHAEF realized, however, that jamming would cause the Germans to surmise ‘‘that something was happening’’ and feared that the enemy might ‘‘accidentally’’ discover the real Normandy invasion forces. Consequently, SHAEF planned to allow German radar operators to ‘‘discover’’ two fictitious fleets heading for Cap Antifer and Pas de Calais (Operations Taxable and Glimmer), rather than the actual invasion

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fleet. ‘‘All the signals which should have come out of a convoy would have come out of the force that was doing the deception.’’ However, the lack of available vessels dictated the use of aircraft ‘‘flying at more than 200 miles an hour to pretend to be ships on the surface of the sea traveling at five miles an hour’’ by dropping window or employing moonshine.34 The purpose of Operation Taxable was to convince the Germans that, around dawn on D-Day, Allied forces would land between Bruneval and Fe´camp. During the night before the real Normandy invasion, Special Force Task A would advance toward the area. Aircraft would simulate approaching ships and landing craft. After approaching as close as possible to Cap Antifer, the forces would ‘‘simulate ships and craft lying off the beaches after the actual retirement has been made.’’ If possible during the deception, Allied crews would lay mines in the waters around Cap Antifer. Before daylight, the force would withdraw from enemy gun range.35 Eight aircraft implemented Taxable. Divided into two groups, the aircraft flew orbits, during which they jettisoned large amounts of chaff, window, radar reflective foil. There were four aircraft flying in line abreast with one and a bit miles between them and behind them at a distance of four miles was another four aircraft doing the same thing. But the way the orbits were worked out, once every seven minutes the aircraft moved forward toward the French coast one mile. The effect of that was to produce this huge radar reflector that was moving toward the French coast at about five knots.. . .At the same time, one needed to give signals from the surface of the sea as well and again small craft like motor torpedo boats carrying jammers also carried echo systems by which a single boat would provide such an echo because the radar impulse coming in from the German radar station would be amplified, delayed a bit, and radiated back.36

Like Taxable, the goal of Operation Glimmer was to persuade the Germans that the Allied invasion forces were going to land in the Pas de Calais, rather than on the beaches of Normandy. Leaving from Dungeness, one group would target the beaches around Boulogne if the extent of enemy mines present in the waters permitted. Another group, departing from the Thames and ports along the east coast, would advance toward the Dunkirk beaches and those between Boulogne and the Somme. Allied deception forces would use the same methods as those dictated for Taxable to perpetuate the ruse. The only difference between the two naval diversions was that Glimmer omitted the laying of mines in the waters around the Pas de Calais.37 The object of Operation Big Drum was, however, different from that of Taxable and Glimmer. Instead of creating a phantom fleet on enemy radar, Big Drum dictated that a RCM force operate ‘‘on the western flank of the assault forces to engage the attention of and, as far as possible, jam enemy radar stations situated in the North-East COTENTIN PENINSULA.’’ Consequently, German radar operators would discern false information about the invasion fleets as they approached Normandy.38 The goal was to create confusion along the coast from the Cotentin Peninsula to Dunkirk. If German radar operators all along the northern

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French coast received conflicting images, then perhaps they would be unable to discern the actual invasion fleet heading for Normandy. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) had a role in the deception beyond facilitating the naval diversionary operations. Allied leaders assigned the Combined Signals Board, SHAEF, the task of preventing enemy radar or signals intelligence systems from determining information about the invasion fleet—size, composition, destination, and, most importantly, departure. The Air Signals Officer-in-Chief, AEAF, and the Director-General of Signals Air Ministry assumed the duty of implementing Allied plans for masking the invasion fleet. The chosen countermeasures had a twofold purpose. First, they were to obstruct the German early warning system by using air attacks to decimate German radar links on the northern coasts of France and Belgium. The Air Signals Officer-in-Chief, AEAF, and the Director-General of Signals Air Ministry chose targets that would leave holes in the German ‘‘cover of the approaches to the Baie de Seine and of its beaches.’’ The objectives also had to fulfill the SHAEF criteria that for every target within the Normandy area, two had to be selected in another area. Second, they were to prevent ‘‘radar-controlled gunfire against the seaborne and airborne invaders, to interfere with Germany Fighter R/T [radio-telephony] control, and to create diversions so that the enemy would be unable to appreciate our true objectives.’’39 The goal was to create as much havoc in the enemy radar system as possible, thereby protecting the real invasion fleet as it approached the French coastline. In addition to participating in the naval diversion plans, the AEAF developed its own airborne diversions—Operations Titanic I–IV. In order to entice German reserves that were south of the Seine River to join German formations stationed north of the river, Titanic I ordered the simulation of an airborne division parachuting into that area. Allied aircraft were to drop two hundred dummies, along with pintails and the appropriate noises, into the Yerville-Doudeville-Fauville-Yvetot area shortly before the Overlord forces landed. Two SAS (Special Air Services) groups would parachute into the same area to enhance the illusion of an airborne assault. Titanic II, which was canceled before June 6, targeted enemy reserves in the area east of the Dives River. Using 50 fake paratroopers, pintails, and noise, Titanic II hoped to prevent German reserves from traveling west of the Dives River. The goal of Titanic III was to spark a counterattack by enemy troops in the area southwest of Caen by dropping fifty dummies, pintails, and noise around Maltot and in the woods north of Baron. By jettisoning two hundred fake paratroopers, pintails, and noise near Marigny, Titanic IV hoped to prompt the same response from enemy forces west of St. Lo. As in Titanic I, two SAS groups would land and create havoc around St. Lo.40 Allied forces began implementing Fortitude South before SHAEF and the LCS had agreed to the final plans. They acknowledged that it would take time to suggest an Order of Battle for the Pas de Calais deception. SHAEF and the LCS worked closely together because the Supreme Commander received orders to implement the plan along with the LCS and the War Office. In addition to utilizing special means, they were able to take advantage of the existence of FUSAG, which the

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U.S. Army had activated on October 18, 1943. SHAEF hoped to use available resources to demonstrate ‘‘movement and administrative preparations,’’ which would imply the following: the Pas de Calais as the target of the main Allied effort; a delay in the end of Neptune arrangements; and the ability of Allied forces to launch an assault on the area east of Cap Gris Nez from D-Day on. By stationing FUSAG in southeast England, the LCS and SHAEF hoped to persuade the German High Command to delay the transfer of the Fifteenth Army from Calais to Normandy until after the Allies had built a strong beachhead that could withstand enemy counterattacks.41

5

Putting Fortitude South into Play: From the Beginning until D-Day

When you are going to attack nearby, make it look as if you are going to go a long way; when you are going to attack far away, make it look as if you are going just a short distance. —Master Sun Tzu1

Once the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Operation Fortitude and the various commanders decided what forces were needed to implement it, they were ready to put the plan in motion. According to Colonel Bevan of the London Controlling Section, three things were necessary for a successful deception: ‘‘a good workable plan; a transmission belt to include what you call HUMINT, SIGINT and open sources, particularly diplomatic in neutral countries; and feedback from the enemy through ULTRA.’’2 The Allies intended to rely on all three as they implemented Fortitude South as a cover for the Normandy invasion. By March 1944, thousands of real and imaginary American soldiers began arriving in Great Britain. The real forces joined General Omar Bradley’s Twelfth U.S. Army Group, which had established camp in southern England, across the English Channel from the Normandy beaches. The imaginary forces received orders to report to the Third U.S. Army in southeast England. Because the Third Army could not be completely fictitious, SHAEF and the LCS decided to maintain the illusion by using nine divisions of the Third Army and two of the First Canadian Army and later by providing a high-profile commander. Although SHAEF initially kept his appointment as commander of the Third Army a secret, information about Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s command leaked to the Germans. Patton received the command despite his difficulties in Italy because the Germans, who considered Patton ‘‘the most able battlefield commander,’’ believed that he would command the Allied invasion force.3

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On March 30, the 21st Army Group convened a meeting at which two crucial parts of the deception plan were decided—the FUSAG Order of Battle and the locations of the divisions, corps, and armies involved. The group designated 2nd Canadian Infantry and 28th U.S. Infantry Divisions as the two assault divisions that would lead the attack against the Pas de Calais. The decisions about the Order of Battle and the troops’ locations furnished the operation’s foundation on which the wireless program and the Special Means plans could be based. Consequently, the Joint Commanders issued directions for the physical deception, although the Chiefs of Staff did not approve the Special Means plan for the controlled agents until May 18. Implementation of some aspects of the plan, however, did begin before its final approval. SHAEF and LCS chose the sites for dummy landing craft displays by the end of March.4 By May 11, 1944, SHAEF designated the commanders who would play a dual role—command Overlord formations and participate in the deception. SHAEF also indicated which formations they would command, their dates of release, and their probable dates of departure for command overseas. Patton received command of the Third U.S. Army HQ, although the Germans would have the impression that he was the Commander of FUSAG. Major General Troy H. Middleton received the command of VIII U.S. Corps, Major General Walton H. Walker of XX U.S. Corps, Major General Leroy H. Watson of 3rd U.S. Armored Division, and Major General Robert W. Crow of 6th U.S. Armored Division. The British commanders included Lieutenant General M. C. Dempsey of British Second Army, Major General C. Foulkes of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, and Major General R.N. Gale of 6th British Airborne Division. The arrival of American troops in Great Britain began to lend an air of realism to the deception. However, the appropriate departments had to make provisions for constructing the displays for the Fortitude deceptions. SHAEF began allocating equipment in late February. Under the terms of a directive dated February 26, 1944, the Supreme Commander received one hundred inflatable bigbobs. The Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, together received several hundred fake landing craft and airplanes for the displays.5 A directive dated March 26, 1944, to the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief, South Eastern, Southern, and Eastern Commands and to the GSO.1, London District, indicated the methods to be used to accomplish the Fortitude South objectives. They included fake displays and the concentration of real troops in marshalling areas in eastern and southeastern England, as well as around London. The directive also called for the institution of a camouflage policy for the deception area. ‘‘The general policy in Eastern and South Eastern Commands and London District will therefore be to carry out the straightforward policy of concealment, restrictions, etc. for actual concentrations of troops and movement within their respective Commands and London District.’’6 Charged with perpetrating the threat to the Pas de Calais, the 21st Army Group, commanded by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, had the authority to continue

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any measures already begun by dealing directly with the War Office and GHQ, Home Forces. Montgomery also had ‘‘direct control’’ of the specialist troops required for implementing Fortitude South. Before implementing the deception, however, Montgomery borrowed organization practices established earlier in the Middle East and formed a Deception Staff called G(R) or ‘‘R’’ Force.7 ‘‘R’’ Force ‘‘incorporated the wireless deception unit (No. 5 Wireless Group), the visual deception units (the camouflage field companies or . . .the special field companies, R.E.), and a sonic deception unit (a light scout car company), and, when necessary, coordinated the activities of the camouflage pool of officers and the camouflage staffs of formations.’’8 Colonel David I. Strangeways received command of ‘‘R’’ Force and instructions to implement the physical aspects of the Fortitude South deception.9 Strangeways later claimed that he reviewed and rewrote Fortitude South because the plan was too complicated. According to the ‘‘R’’ Force commander, people who did not have experience with deception had written the Fortitude South plan. Although the London office was unhappy with Strangeways’s changes, they had to accept them. Because he was responsible for overseeing the deception’s land displays, Montgomery agreed to the alterations. Ever confident in his own abilities, Strangeways said fifty years later in an interview, ‘‘Obviously I had been doing this kind of thing for what, three years it was. And obviously it was easier for me than it was for them. But they had to start from scratch without any experience, which is no criticism of them.’’10 The Joint Commanders believed that, because enemy reconnaissance would learn little from ‘‘land preparations,’’ and because an ‘‘elaborate physical deception’’ might reveal the deception, it was important to concentrate on the display of landing craft and the use of wireless. The War Office department (SWV8) that handled camouflage and all aspects of visual misdirection by technical means, from static production to tactical development, supplied 256 dummy landing craft (Mark II and Mark V, landing craft tanks, LCTs) for the displays on the coast of east and southeast England. GHQ, Home Forces, loaned the 21st Army Group two infantry battalions, the 4th Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment (also known as the 4th Northants) and the 10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment (also known as the 10th Worcesters), to construct the bigbob displays. The 185 Camouflage Field Company, RE, later joined the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcesters in constructing dummy landing craft. In February 1944 the 4th Northants began sending 150-men groups to Ipswich to prepare for their part in the deception. In early April their training became even more secret with the ‘‘imposition of postal censorship.’’ The 4th Northants moved to Broadstairs on April 19 after being relieved by a Canadian division. Two days later, the battalion received orders to begin Exercise Flake, ‘‘the erection, launching and maintenance of a number of ‘mock-up’ landing craft, on the River Deben at Ipswich, at Oulton Broad in Norfolk, at Lowestoft and at Yarmouth.’’11 The 4th Northants erected a fleet of approximately 150 bigbobs. A bigbob was a fake landing craft tank (LCT), which was made from steel tubing and canvas. Crews attached the structure that was camouflaged to resemble a real LCT to large airtight drums, which gave it buoyancy. It took a crew eight hours to construct one fake LCT. Although the bigbob had wheels, which allowed it to be transported over short

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distances into water, it required 30 men to launch one five and a half ton craft, which was 160 feet long and 30 feet wide. Once it was in the water, a small craft towed the bigbob to its mooring. Although they launched the bigbobs at night, the 4th Northants continuously performed maintenance on the crafts during the day. To add a sense of realism to the displays, the crews used ‘‘smoke issuing from the dummy funnels, oil seeping from the sterns, washing flapping in the breeze and men rowing from craft to craft’’ to deliver the mail and supplies. The bigbobs did not prove to be as durable as the deception planners had hoped. At one point high winds tore numerous craft ‘‘from their moorings, and . . .beached them up creeks and on mudbanks, with buckled sides, torn canvas and funnels awry,’’ which could have compromised the deception had enemy reconnaissance planes discovered the damage. The 10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment, or the 10th Worcesters, traveled to Harwich near Ipswich and underwent a period of extensive training on a tributary of the River Orwell. The battalion trained from January until April and constructed dummy landing craft, initially at dusk or early morning. As the battalion became more experienced, the men erected the dummy landing craft at night. The 10th Worcesters received orders deploying them to Dover, Folkestone, and Harwich. Forty-men crews assembled each bigbob in eight hours. The dummy craft even included fake antiaircraft guns. With training complete in May, the 21st Army Group set May 24 as the start date for the erection of the fake landing craft by the 10th Worcesters. The battalion did not, however, succeed in erecting all of the displays on time. Untrained sappers slowed down the completion of the display on the River Orwell. As the crews became more comfortable constructing and launching the dummy craft, they increased the number of craft launched each night to ten. The 10th Worcesters succeeded in displaying 122 craft by June 6.12 Dr. Peter Tooley was responsible for the bigbobs that the 10th Worcesters launched on the River Orwell. According to Tooley, My job was to climb up onto the rickety bridge some 20 feet above the water and maneuver the bigbob to its river anchorage using the assault boats as giant outboard motors. An air of realism was given to the dummies by flying the white ensign during daylight hours and lighting smoke generators in the funnels. Regular small boat services also called at each craft in turn delivering mailbags, ammunition boxes, and other ship stores. Also oilers and leave-boats were sailed around the fleet while skeleton crews moved around the decks.13

Erecting the displays of bigbobs proved difficult at times. Brigadier M.B. Dowse, General Staff, South Eastern Command, complained in a letter dated April 24, 1944, that lack of direction from above made the job more complicated than he had expected. ‘‘This lack of information available to Commanders concerned has not been for security reasons but because it has been impossible despite repeated attempts, to elicit a clear and definite plan from 21 Army Group.’’14 The majority of Dowse’s communication included a chronology of events beginning with the first request for the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcesters for special training. According

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to Dowse, he first learned that the 21st Army Group planned to erect bigbob displays at a meeting that occurred on March 21. Over a month elapsed before Dowse began to receive satisfactory responses to his repeated requests for information. The GSO.1, ‘‘R’’ Force, admitted that a ‘‘lack of co-ordination’’ created some of the difficulties that Dowse had been experiencing. Dowse obtained a promise that the 21st Army Group would supply the required information as soon as it could. Lack of 21st Army Group’s experience in creating bigbob displays may have resulted in the confusion about which Dowse complained. ‘‘R’’ Force was responsible for more than bigbob displays. It had to produce the illusion of another invasion force, FUSAG, by ‘‘providing troop concentrations, vehicle parks, guns, tanks and landing craft throughout southeast England.’’ 15 Deception crews erected fictitious troop camps that contained ‘‘tent cities,’’ field kitchens, ammunition dumps, vehicle displays, whatever was needed to add realism. Although they were empty, the canvas tent sides fluttered in the wind. The field kitchens’ chimneys emitted large amounts of smoke daily to suggest the preparation of meals for the forces that did not exist. American engineers orchestrated the construction of tracks connecting existing roads. Army trucks drove back and forth to leave visible tire tracks. Crews built hospitals and warehouses out of wood, wire, and canvas. ‘‘Shepperton Studios, movie-set designers, provided rubber tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft for FUSAG’s displays.’’ Using fiberboard, wood, canvas, and sewer pipe, Shepperton craftsmen constructed a dock and ‘‘a large oilstorage complex near Dover.’’ Although it appeared functional, the storage complex did not contain any oil. Both the King of England and Montgomery ‘‘inspected’’ the new dock facilities, while General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, addressed the workers who had constructed them during a dinner at a hotel in Dover. Although his remarks were specifically vague, the mayor of Dover noted the ‘‘opening’’ of the new dock. The presence of RAF fighter patrols enhanced the illusion.16 For examples of some of the equipment made for these fictitious camps, see Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. Some problems with the deception exhibits became apparent. Colonel Strangeways, ‘‘R’’ Force, claimed that he modified the displays of dummy barges because they were not important, which meant a waste of manpower and effort. Because the Allied air forces had restricted the number of enemy reconnaissance flights flown over southeast England, big displays proved unnecessary. ‘‘And what they’d forgotten is, is that their role is landing craft. Where the hell were the troops to come from to get onto them? And they’d forgotten to make any hards on the coast.’’ Strangeways approached Montgomery’s chief engineer, who suggested erecting fake hards. Objecting, Strangeways said, ‘‘You daren’t make dummy hards because, if they are dummy and they’re spotted as dummy, you’ve done the very thing that you shouldn’t have done. Better no hards at all.’’ Listening to Strangeway’s objections, the chief engineer agreed to erect real, rather than fake, hards.17 Deception forces implemented a series of field exercises in the Thetford area in the weeks prior to D-Day. On May 28 elements of an armored division appeared and remained in the area for two days as part of Operation Cabbage. Exercise Cheese,

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Figure 5.1 Germans flying overhead would have difficulty noticing that one of the two trucks in this picture is actually a dummy. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

executed on May 30, entailed the movement of an entire armored division into the Thetford area. The next day an infantry division transferred into the same area to fulfill Exercise Spam. The erection and placement of rubber tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft was not always successful. On June 1, 1944, Major MoneyCoutts witnessed an exercise by 23rd Headquarters Detachment U.S. Special Troops near Thetford. The purpose of the exercise was to ‘‘see how American devices simulated in the field, an armed division comprising 2 combat teams with another in reserve.’’ Although 23rd Detachment U.S. Special Troops successfully inflated a variety of dummies, one in ten had collapsed by the next morning. ******************* Because the 21st Army Group was responsible for southeast England, Montgomery had to make provisions for the concealment and display of troops, vehicles, and dummy aircraft and landing craft according to SHAEF’s plan. In March 1944 he issued orders in reference to camouflage policy. They included provisions for vehicles, tents, the polishing of vehicles and guns, washing, and smoke. Vehicles fell into two categories, A and B. Montgomery’s directive ordered that all vehicles be painted dark

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Figure 5.2 Nestled in a forest, this tank would seem real to German soldiers as long as they were unable to approach it. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

brown (SCC No. 1A) or dark green (SCC No. 7 or olive drab) and that windscreens be covered with material or dirt to prevent the reflection of sunlight. The general also ordered that tents be darkened with the same colors as the vehicles and that crews only polish necessary parts of vehicles and guns. Although crews received orders to conceal washing and cooking smoke, the desire to create the illusion of the presence of another invasion force in southeast England dictated the construction of physical displays.18 A directive dated May 6, 1944, from Strangeways to the First Canadian Army, the Second Army, Eastern Command, South Eastern Command, the 79th Armoured Division, and HQ GHQ troops, provided instructions for vehicle displays in southern and eastern England. The directive suggested the placement, when practical, of vehicles along the side of roads or in open parking places. In the area of South Eastern Command, 2nd Canadian and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions of the II Canadian Corps and 43rd, 53rd, and 59th Divisions of the XII Corps received orders to place their vehicles in the open. The directive excluded marshalling areas from exhibiting vehicles. In the area of Eastern Command, the display area included Yarmouth–Deben River–Woodbridge–Debenham–Eye, but excluded the

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Figure 5.3 From the sky, this truck would look real, especially with tire tracks behind it, but an up-close inspection would reveal its true nature. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Norwich Ipswich-Norwich road and the Norwich Yarmouth road. The directive prohibited the placement of vehicles on the main road that connected Yarmouth with Ipswich. ‘‘Formations and units of Second Army, 21 Army Group units under HQ GHQ Troops, units of 79 Armored Division’’ received orders to ‘‘‘show’ vehicles.’’ None of the displays could, however, prevent the movement of traffic on the roads involved in the deception.19 ******************* Allied leaders recognized the need for an air force to support the FUSAG invasion force. Consequently, they ordered the construction of dummy airfields in southeast England. The RAF installed decoy sites and lighting to augment the displays of bigbobs and to provide protective lighting for hards, areas where landing craft were loaded and unloaded. Because the Admiralty dictated that little light be used on real hards, Colonel John Turner’s department, which installed and operated the decoy lighting, could not use lighting that would attract enemy attention. Consequently, Turner and his advisers concluded that ‘‘decoys should simulate what might happen on a real hard if an attack took place.’’ Turner’s C & D crews left lights on vehicles

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Figure 5.4 An overhead view shows a jeep pulling a trailer of equipment in a small convoy, but in the close-up, the rear tire suggests that the convoy has stalled. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

and lit a few small fires, which ‘‘became a main feature of the decoys,’’ but the crews only used lights and fires when an attack occurred in the area. Turner’s department was responsible for other types of lighting, as well, and received information about its role very early in the game. At a meeting held on February 24, 1944, the 21st Army Group and Turner’s department made decisions about the lighting for the bigbob displays. They divided the displays of lighting and fire into three groups. Group No. 1 provided protective lighting from Falmouth to Hastings. Group No. 2, responsible for the coastal area from Hastings to the Thames estuary, provided displays that were protective first, but that could become misleading ones if necessary. The planners concluded that it was impractical to reinforce the bigbobs in Folkestone and Dover with misleading displays of lighting and fire. Group No. 3 constructed displays to strengthen the concentration of bigbobs that were in waters north of the Thames by providing lighting that was intended to attract, not distract, enemy attention. Group No. 3 provided ‘‘hooding lighting along the banks of the rivers and Broads, with lines of vehicle lights leading towards the water. At specified times they were to be operated all night to simulate embarkation activity.’’ Although the local Naval authority controlled the displays in

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order to protect shipping and craft movement, RAF personnel from Turner’s department operated the night displays.20 C & D (Concealment and Display) units established other protective decoys at East Tilbury and Lower Hope Point to protect shipping concentrations on the Thames near Tilbury and Gravesend, three at Cobnor Point to protect the western side of the Chichester port and Portsmouth, and at Cuckmere Haven to protect the port and railway at Newhaven. C & D crews established QL/QF sites at Breydon Water (Yarmouth), Benacre Ness (Lowestoft area), Oulton Broad (Lowestoft), Whitehall Farm (River Deben Nore), Falkenham Marshes (River Deben Nore), Trimley Marshes (River Orwell Nore), and East Tilbury (Tilbury Nore) and QL sites at Churston (Brixham), St. Mawes (Falmouth area), East Cornworthy (Dartmouth), and Ruan Lanihorne (Falmouth area) by April 26, 1944. Decoy lighting proved to be an important component of the dummy airfields. Turner’s C & D crews placed Q lights, which provided dim illumination, alongside the runways, which bulldozers had created in various fields in southeast England. Next to the runways, crews installed fake recognition beacons and phony aircraft that they had built out of wood and heavy-duty canvas. Following instructions, C & D teams improperly camouflaged some of the planes. To add realism to the displays and fool enemy agents, ‘‘R’’ Force provided sound tracks that contained the noise of the revving of aircraft engines for crews to play. ‘‘At night, when a snooping Luftwaffe plane was overhead, salvaged automobile headlights mounted on wheels were dragged up and down the fake airfields, conveying the impression that planes were landing and taking off.’’21 Many of the decoy lighting displays required cooperation between Turner’s department and ‘‘R’’ Force. Interdepartmental rivalries resulted. Colonel John Turner and Colonel David Strangeways failed to see eye-to-eye on several occasions, which made cooperation difficult. Turner first complained about disagreements with Strangeways to the ACAS(G) on February 14. Following several discussions with the ‘‘R’’ Force commander, Turner believed that Strangeways wanted to commandeer some of his C & D units. According to Turner, he notified Strangeways of the Air Marshal Commanding 2nd TAF’s opposition and suggested that the 21st Army Group and 2nd TAF settle the dispute themselves. The movement of Allied troops into the Southern Command area created problems between troop camps and decoy displays. Turner reported efforts to solve the existing problem and to prevent future ones as more troops moved into the southern coastal areas. Colonel Turner wrote to the ACAS(G) on May 16, 1944, about various problems that his department had been experiencing, including difficulties with Lieutenant Colonel Strangeways, who ‘‘appears to be so embedded in his own worth that he tried to pull a fast one over T.A.F. and myself.’’ Turner complained that Strangeways attempted to commandeer all of the C & D units for deception purposes. Although the two men agreed that Turner would provide the equipment and training and that Strangeways’s men would provide deceptive lighting, Strangeways, operating contrary to the agreement and without notifying TAF, ordered his men to construct decoy lighting. Turner complained that Strangeways’s men ‘‘have no knowledge of

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decoy work and its difficulties, no experience, and no training in that line.’’ Turner concluded that Strangeways was ‘‘a careerist whose chief idea is to push himself. I may be wrong, but I shan’t trust him much in the future.’’22 Strangeways held an equally poor opinion of Turner. In addition to implementing decoy and deceptive lighting in southeast England, Turner and Strangeways had to make similar provisions for the Normandy beaches. Difficulties between the two men continued when Strangeways attempted to direct plans for decoy lighting on the assault beaches. Turner expressed his concern to Air Marshal Sir A. Coningham and to Flight Lieutenant A.P. Godfrey that Strangeways’s lack of experience with decoy lighting would result in the construction of sites that could easily be detected by the enemy.23 According to Strangeways, Turner had run, brilliantly, the decoy fires and things to divert the enemy aircraft when they were bombing England. And he had trained a lot of pioneers, etc. to do the job. I was going to have dummy bridges and things in the bridgehead. Sir John Turner. . .assumed that his pioneers would go over. And I said no. My own engineers, I mean real engineers, not pioneer engineers.. . .I had to say, I’m very sorry, but this is not going to be. I next told them why. They were pioneers; they’d not ever been in battle. They’d been bombed often enough, but they’d never been in battle. I thought it wasn’t fair to them.. . .Sir John Turner’s department was under the RAF. He was anti-bombing air side. It was a matter of pride, or, I can see it because this chap had built up a very, very fine organization. And he’d been thinking in terms of them all going overseas, you see, for the battle.24

When Strangeways attended a combined 83rd Group/21st Army Group meeting on May 20–21, 1944, he learned that the responsibility for decoy lighting on the assault beaches would fall to the RAF, which meant to Colonel Turner’s department.25 ******************* In addition to displays of landing craft, aircraft, army camps, hospitals, supply depots, and airfields, SHAEF and the LCS wanted the enemy to take particular notice of the concentration of forces in southeast England, and they decided that the key would be the commander of the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG). Although SHAEF had already chosen General Omar Bradley as the FUSAG commander, by late April 1944 SHAEF realized the problem with their earlier decision. ‘‘There is a risk, previously accepted, that General Bradley would be identified by the enemy as Commanding General, First US Army, after D day. This might prejudice attempts to indicate him as Commanding General, FUSAG.’’ 26 Consequently, SHAEF ordered the 21st Army Group to change its plan and ‘‘suggest General Patton as the notional Commanding General, FUSAG.’’ SHAEF decided, however, to pass the information to the enemy by Special Means and not to make special arrangements to publicize Patton’s appointment. Believing that Patton was ‘‘the most able’’ Allied battlefield commander, the Germans quickly accepted Patton as the commander of FUSAG, the invasion force poised to attack the Pas de Calais. In reality Patton had received command of the Third U.S. Army. Consequently, although he secretly inspected the Third Army, Patton publicly moved around southeast England

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visiting FUSAG units.27 The deception planners used Patton and the Third Army’s training exercises and preparations for transfer to Normandy after D-Day to enhance the Fortitude story. Because Patton’s presence in England could bolster the deception, SHAEF did little to hide his visits to Eisenhower, Bradley, and General Sir Alan Brooke, but they were not always successful in limiting the general’s exposure at other times when it was desired. Patton, who became Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, met with Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and on another occasion with numerous British generals and admirals as American soldiers on the Queen Mary watched. Contrary to Eisenhower’s orders, Patton agreed in April 1944 to attend the opening of the Knutsford ‘‘Welcome Club’’ for American servicemen. Although he was the principal guest, Patton believed that his presence would be unofficial and that no ceremony would occur. The event proved to be a fiasco. Not only was Patton greeted by a crowd, a band, and a British women’s auxiliary honor guard, but press photographers were also present. After receiving promises that the photographers would not take his picture and that the crowd lacked reporters, Patton agreed to make a brief statement, in which he insulted Russia. The story of his appearance became known inside and outside of Britain and landed Patton in trouble again. Although General George C. Marshall had the authority to remove Patton, he allowed Eisenhower to decide Patton’s fate. Several military officials, including Colonel N.W. Campanole who witnessed the incident, verified that Patton’s version of events was accurate. Eisenhower, after reprimanding the flamboyant general, decided that Patton was crucial to the campaign in Normandy. Eisenhower ordered that Patton’s participation in Fortitude continue, and the general remained Third Army commander.28 From the beginning, Patton found it difficult to hide his presence in Great Britain and to conform to the role expected by SHAEF. On February 8, 1944, in a letter about Patton’s secret presence in England, Colonel Harry A. Flint wrote, ‘‘Just got back from a landing show and found a note from Lee saying you were with him ‘incognito’. That work always makes me unduly discreet!’’29 Patton described his role to Major General Guy V. Henry in a letter dated February 26, 1944. ‘‘I had some very interesting trips while I was working as a decoy for German divisions, and I believe that my appearances had a considerable effect and probably ran up their railroad freight bill a good deal.’’30 The general made several references in his diary to being a ‘‘myth’’ and that his presence was a secret.31 While he seemed to relish his part in the deception at times, Patton was often frustrated with the necessity of remaining unobtrusive. He frequently complained about it in letters to his wife. On February 20, 1944, he wrote, ‘‘I wish I could stop being incognito.’’ A couple of weeks later, he complained to her, ‘‘This damned secrecy thing is rather annoying particularly as I doubt if it fools any one. Every time I make a speech I have to say now remember you have not seen me—a voice crying in the wilderness.’’32 Patton found it particularly difficult after the incident in Knutsford, which almost cost him his job. Eisenhower frequently complained to Marshall about his colleague’s indiscretions. On April 29, 1944, Eisenhower wrote,

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Dear General Marshall: This morning I sent you a telegram about the Patton case. Frankly I am exceedingly weary of his habit of getting everybody into hot water through the immature character of his public actions and statements. In this particular case investigation shows that this offense was not so serious as the newspapers would lead one to believe, and one that under the circumstances could have occurred to almost anybody. But the fact remains that he simply does not keep his mouth shut. I am waiting on an answer to my telegram to you before taking final action.33

Despite his frustration, Eisenhower believed that because he needed Patton in Normandy, he would have to leave him where he was and not send him stateside in disgrace. The Supreme Commander hoped that he would not have cause to regret his decision. ******************* The deception planners had more to worry about, however, than Patton’s alleged indiscretions. They were concerned about their ability to make the deception’s physical displays real enough to fool the enemy. To make the physical displays more realistic, planners devised wireless traffic for each of the real and fictitious formations participating in the deception. COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command), wrote the initial wireless deception plan, which dictated periods of wireless silence and intense activity for FUSAG and the 21st Army Group. According to the plan, each wireless silence period would commence on the first day at 0001 A hours and conclude on the last day at 2359 A hours. The length of the silent periods varied from two to ten days, with the first scheduled to begin on December 25, 1943, and the last to end on September 5, 1944. Within each period the participating formations began and ended at different times. Although SHAEF later approved exceptions to the silent periods, the only wireless transmissions approved by the original plan were those from sets with ‘‘dummy aerials for training and maintenance purposes.’’ When possible, the naval assault forces, participating in training exercises with their military counterparts, would observe the same periods of wireless silence, as would those air force groups that had direct wireless links with the army formations. The COSSAC plan also stipulated periods of intense wireless activity, with the first one commencing on December 29, 1943, and the last one ending on September 8, 1944. The intense periods varied in length from one to four days. According to the directive, ‘‘during these periods W/T (wireless telegraphy) nets will be worked to full capacity and R/T (radio-telephony) nets for at least eight hours per day.’’34 In the plan, COSSAC anticipated the formation and training of a ‘‘British wireless deception unit’’ by March 1, 1944. The 21st Army Group would command part of the unit, which would be able to simulate a minimum of two divisions, ‘‘for the purpose of covering the move of the Rosyth force, and for augmenting the wireless facilities of the notional assault and follow-up forces in the South-East.’’ Around the same time COSSAC expected the availability of an American radio deception battalion that would be ‘‘capable of simulating a corps of two divisions.’’ In addition, the 21st Army Group would receive orders to establish a fake combined headquarters at Chatham and to arrange its ‘‘military wireless component.’’

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In order to anticipate the enemy’s response, the 21st Army Group’s ‘‘Y’’ or SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) sections would intercept and evaluate the ‘‘deceptive wireless activity.’’ Furthermore, 21st Army Group would monitor the transmissions ‘‘to ensure that it is being carried out according to plan and that the necessary standards of wireless security and discipline are being maintained.’’ Finally the COSSAC plan instructed the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, and the Air Commander-inChief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), to provide ‘‘the detailed planning and preparation of the remainder of the wireless measures necessary.’’35 By late February 1944 SHAEF allocated deception units and equipment for the Fortitude scheme. The Supreme Commander received three deception units from No. 5 Wireless Group, which would establish one static monitoring section, one divisional section, and one monitoring section. The Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, the 21st Army Group Commander-in-Chief, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, AEAF, received three deception units, which were the 3103rd U.S. Signal Service Battalion and two units from No. 5 Wireless Group. One unit would establish two divisional sections, and the other would set up one mobile monitoring section.36 The British War Office initiated the formation of a special wireless deception unit called No. 5 Wireless Group, the use of which it offered to SHAEF for the Fortitude deceptions. No. 5 Wireless Group, which the War Office ‘‘formed to enable wireless deception plans to be implemented with the maximum verisimilitude, coupled with the minimum demands upon man-power,’’ contained 295 members of all ranks. Using special equipment, the Group could transmit ‘‘recorded conversations . . . through normal Army wireless equipment.’’ Each installation would have the ability to represent at most six RT stations. No. 5 Wireless Group included Administration and Maintenance Sections and two companies. No. 1 Company, which contained, in addition to its headquarters, two mobile monitoring and one static monitoring sections, monitored wireless traffic to ensure that it advanced an accurate overall deception picture and that the melding of the Group’s individual RT nets with any CW nets followed prescribed procedures. The mobile sections conducted detailed studies of any formation’s communications picture that it intended to simulate. No. 2 Company included three divisional sections and a headquarters. Two general staff officers from each section, using information provided by No. 1 Company, constructed ‘‘schemes of a type in consonance with the training being carried out by the formation to be simulated.’’37 Each divisional section contained four recording and nine reproducing detachments. ‘‘Each recording detachment provides facilities to enable staff and regimental officers, and others required to record an RT conversation, to do so within the confines of one 3-ton vehicle.’’ The GSO (General Staff Officer) II and III from each section provided a script for RT conversations, which the recording detachments registered on records. The reproducing detachments played the records in the area where they were simulating a particular formation.38 In late February 1944, following a request from Major General C.A. West to the Under Secretary

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of State, the War Office assigned No. 5 Wireless Group to the 21st Army Group. SHAEF did, however, retain operational control of three sections—one static monitoring, one mobile monitoring, and one divisional. On January 27, 1944, Major General Harold R. Bull, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, informed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army) that the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, which would arrive in Great Britain sometime the next month, had received orders to report initially to the VIII U.S. Corps. It would fall under the command of a U.S. Army Group, when one had been formed. In January 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur McCrary received an offer to command the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, which the Pentagon had activated for ‘‘strategic operations.’’ According to James Bowman, a 3103rd radioman, the battalion was ‘‘designed solely to implement a major element of the Calais hoax.’’ As the leader of 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, McCrary commanded 708 men and 31 officers.39 The unit included over 200 vehicles, ‘‘almost one for every three men. The organization was to be based on the cellular radio team, and each team was to have seven or more men and two vehicles.’’40 For subordinates, McCrary had Major Alfred R. Braddock, executive officer, and First Lieutenant John Nichols, S-3 or operations officer. McCrary’s radio teams, which included a ‘‘cryptographic unit with coding equipment,’’ received training in using and maintaining the equipment, opening networks, practicing effective camouflage techniques, and exercising proper radio security. While the 3103rd’s B Company reported first to Northern Ireland and then to the British Fourth Army in Scotland for participation in Fortitude North, the remainder of the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion received posting to Headquarters, ETOUSA, and Headquarters, 21st Army Group. SHAEF ordered VIII Corps to release the 3103rd Battalion to 21st Army Group until it exhausted its usefulness. According to Major General Bull, the 3103rd received orders to simulate a two-division U.S. Corps through radio activity. SHAEF also dictated that the ‘‘battalion should be so trained that it can simulate, by radio means, any corps formation. A portion of the battalion should be trained to monitor the radio activity of the entire battalion to insure that necessary security, control and phasing are effected.’’ SHAEF expected the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion to be operationally prepared to commence operation in Great Britain by March 15, 1944.41 The 3103rd Signal Service Battalion had to undergo adequate training before it would be operationally prepared to commence its assigned role for the deception. Initially placed under VIII Corps for training and administration, the battalion spent the first month undergoing ‘‘specialist training as well as training in certain basic subjects required of all units stationed in the U.K.. . .The second month was devoted to specialist training and field exercises. Radio nets of a corps and infantry and armored divisions were set up and operated with dummy antennas.’’ According to its orders, once the unit was operational, the nature of ‘‘its operations probably would be that of simulating, by radio activity, a corps consisting of an armored division and an infantry division.’’42 In order to help the battalion become better prepared to fulfill its role in the deception, the Signal Intelligence Division (SID)

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monitored its progress and provided the unit with analysis reports on a regular basis. Officially organized on March 15, 1944, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion received its mission on the same day. The unit would ‘‘simulate the arrival of a corps consisting of two divisions which would be going into its final training period.’’ The radio traffic designed to implement the plan would be classified as ‘‘traffic below division as low level traffic and above division as high level traffic.’’ 43 The preparations undertaken by the 3103rd met only part of the wireless part of the deception plan. Before the acceptance of the Fortitude Plan, the only deceptive wireless measure taken in England was the formation of Combined Headquarters at Chatham. Because it was responsible for the Pas de Calais threat, the 21st Army Group controlled all wireless deception necessary to build the fake Order of Battle. The Fortitude South Cover Plan included a diagram, ‘‘Wireless Layout S.E. Force,’’ which indicated FUSAG’s wireless links. The plan connected the main FUSAG link in Wentworth to that of First Canadian Army in Leatherhead and Third U.S. Army in Chelmsford. Some of the links connected two stations, while others constructed nets that linked three or four locations. Each FUSAG formation had its own link.44 By mid-March SHAEF made an adjustment to the schedule of wireless silence. According to SHAEF/18201/5/Ops, dated March 15, 1944, ‘‘21 Army Group are arranging to continue the wireless activity associated with the training of airborne forces up to and including D day with the object of not disclosing the fact that these forces are preparing to take part in ‘NEPTUNE.’’’45 As the date for the commencement of wireless activity approached, revisions of the wireless cover plan continued. According to a directive from General Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, although the armies involved might establish lateral links, none would be set up between corps. The SO in C branch 21st Army Group had the job of assigning frequencies to the appropriate formations. In addition, ‘‘nets would begin to open on 24 Apr—starting with the lower formations and working back to FUSAG.’’ The directive also set some guidelines for the traffic. The First Canadian Army was responsible for ‘‘25% notional ‘real traffic’’’ and would receive help, if necessary, from the War Office authorized ‘‘dummy traffic.’’ The SO in C 21st Army Group agreed to provide whatever equipment and material was necessary. As part of its training, First Canadian Army received authorization to ‘‘operate down to Bn/Regt level.’’ Both First Canadian and Third U.S. Armies would receive signal instructions from FUSAG.46 The 3103rd Signal Service Battalion established seventeen radio teams at thirteen locations in East Anglia and southeastern England. According to its operational instructions, the battalion was to commence activity by its first net on April 20 and conclude operation on June 26, 1944. The RCM Detachment, Signal Section, HQ FUSAG, provided the battalion’s traffic schedules, as well as the plain text of the messages to be transmitted. By June 1 the unit was maintaining four cryptographic installations, and it would do so until the operation ended. While one of the cryptographic installations provided service for U.S. nets, the other three established service

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nets for British and Canadian units. The RCM Detachment’s mission ‘‘was that of providing the plan which would show by radio activity the formation of US units in East Anglia.. . .All units shown were to be typical US units arriving in the UK to undergo final training for an invasion.’’47 The Fortitude South wireless nets opened on April 26, 1944.48 Soon, southeast England was alive with wireless messages passing back and forth between the FUSAG command posts that did not exist to fictitious battalions and companies. In some cases, the signals operators transmitted the communications in ‘‘easily breakable codes.’’ The fact that the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion had studied the radio communications between real American formations enabled it to ‘‘plausibly imitate normal’’ wireless traffic.49 SHAEF continued to make adjustments to the wireless silence schedule until after D-Day. Recognizing that periods of wireless silence might indicate impending action, Allied officials constantly reevaluated the situation. By scheduling numerous periods of imposed quiet, they hoped to condition the Germans to their occurrence, and, consequently, the enemy would not connect a particular period of no activity with an impending assault. In early May Colonel David I. Strangeways from the 21st Army Group sent a communication, entitled ‘‘Pre-D Day Wireless Preparations,’’ to First Canadian Army, Second Army, No. 5 Wireless Group, and SO in C 21st Army Group. Strangeways indicated the threefold object of the plan: ‘‘(a) to achieve a measure of surprise by eliminating an ‘enforced’ wireless silence in the event of a postponement of D Day; (b) to cover the final moves of assault Corps; and (c) to overcome the obvious disadvantages of a prolonged wireless silence in the event of a postponement of D Day.’’50 Strangeways stipulated a number of changes in wireless activity to be implemented between mid-May and D-Day. According to the directive from the 21st Army Group, First Canadian Army received orders to simulate wireless exercises for 3rd Canadian Division beginning on May 30 and ending H minus 7 hours D-Day, which was seven hours before the commencement of the invasion. The directive ordered Second Army to suggest the movement of a headquarters during the period May 8–12 by ‘‘staggering the moves of their static links from High Wycombe to Tunbridge Wells.’’ Between May 11 and 16 operators from the 21st Army Group Signals would gradually assume responsibility for Second Army’s static links. While I and XXX Corps observed wireless silence beginning on May 27, VIII Corps not only had to maintain its own wireless activity, it also had to simulate wireless exercises from May 30 until H minus 7 hours D-Day. The directive assigned two tasks to XII Corps: to assume responsibility for I Corps’ static links between May 10 and 20 and to simulate 3rd British Infantry Division with wireless exercises between May 30 and H minus 7 hours D-Day. During the same period, No. 5 Wireless Group would ‘‘simulate one divisional and two brigade signal exercises of 51 (H) Inf Div.’’ The directive also made changes in the wireless schedule. The period of wireless silence that had been scheduled for May was eliminated. It scheduled several others instead—a general silence May 27–30 and two, May 17–20 and May 23–30, for the 21st Army Group’s fixed links. The directive indicated two periods, May 18

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and May 23-27, for ‘‘netting operational frequencies’’ and for intense wireless activity by the 21st Army Group.51 ******************* In addition to Patton and the fake airfields, landing craft, supply dumps, oil depots, and wireless traffic, SHAEF and the LCS decided to use double agents to reinforce the physical aspects of the Fortitude South deception. Special Means and the Double-Cross Committee had been cultivating several double agents, such as Garbo, Brutus, Tricycle, Treasure, and Tate, who would prove useful for Fortitude South. Some, like Tate, proved less valuable than others. Tate, a Danish draftsman named Hans Hansen, was part of a group of Abwehr spies who invaded in England in 1940 and who, like the others, quickly fell into the hands of British authorities. While Garbo, Brutus, Tricycle, and Treasure agreed to spy for the Germans as a way in which to become double-agents and work against them, Tate was a German spy whom Allied intelligence captured, interrogated, and ‘‘turned.’’ In October Tate opened wireless communications with his controllers in Hamburg. MI 5 tracked the messages of Tate and other agents to Hamburg and then their transmission to Berlin. In 1941 Tate informed his controllers that he had avoided service in the military and had settled on a farm in Radlett, where he began working for a friend. From the beginning the Double-Cross Committee was hesitant about Tate. He transmitted his messages, generally about the weather, in ‘‘extremely low-grade cipher.’’ As the Committee debated whether or not to continue using him, Tate received an upgraded cipher from Abwehr. Consequently, Tate continued to function as a double-agent. In September 1943 MI 5 considered closing Tate down because Hamburg had only communicated with him fourteen times in six months. MI 5 decided, however, to retain him. Two months later MI 5 received information that Tate’s cover might have been compromised. After conferring, MI 5 and the Double-Cross Committee decided to suspend a decision about Tate’s fate for a couple of months. Because his Hamburg contacts continued to communicate in a normal fashion, they chose to give Tate a minor role in the Fortitude deception. In March 1944 Tate informed Hamburg of the arrival in London of the British Ambassador to Sweden. The ambassador was apparently participating in special meetings, which inferred a connection to the Allied Scandinavian operation. Thus, Tate provided a minor contribution to Fortitude North. Tate’s employer conveniently sent him to work on a friend’s farm in Kent near Wye, which permitted him to transmit information about the concentration of Allied troops in the area to Hamburg. By late May, Tate had developed a relationship with an Ashford railway clerk, who provided him with facts about arrangements for the transportation of FUSAG forces to embarkation ports by railway. Around the same time, Tate learned about the existence of an American expeditionary force that was going to participate in Operation Ironside, the capture of Bordeaux, from his nonexistent girlfriend Mary, who worked for the Admiralty and the U.S. Naval Mission.52 Other agents, such as Treasure, Tricycle, Brutus, and Garbo played an even greater role in the Fortitude deception than Tate. Treasure, whose real name was

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Lily Sergeyev, and Tricycle (Dusko Popov) informed Abwehr of Patton’s presence in England in March 1944. As noted in Chapter Two, after arriving in London and establishing contact with her German controller, Treasure notified him that she had met an American staff officer from the fictitious Fourteenth Army, which was stationed in Bristol. Later Treasure reported the Fourteenth Army’s move to Little Waltham in Essex, which was northeast of London and across the Channel from the Pas de Calais. Although Treasure helped the Germans construct the FUSAG Order of Battle by reporting the existence of real American and British units, she provided false information about their locations, missions, and army group affiliations. Wireless traffic corresponded with the locations of units identified by Treasure and other double agents. Although Treasure’s relationship with the American officer ended because of his imminent departure for France, she quickly became friends with someone at the Cheltenham branch of the U.S. Judge Advocate General’s office. Treasure’s contribution to the deception is, however, questionable because of her actions. After her arrival in England, in order to establish her credentials, Treasure told her Abwehr controller that she had taken a job in the Ministry of Information’s film division. Treasure’s ‘‘job’’ allowed her to travel in February 1944 to Lisbon, where she met with her controller, who provided her with instructions and a transmitter. Treasure arranged for the British embassy to send the transmitter to England. Although she returned to England in late March, Treasure did not begin communicating regularly with German officials in Paris until May 10. Stricken by her conscience, Treasure notified her MI 5 contact a week later that she had not revealed the special transmission check that she was to use in the event that she fell under MI 5’s control. Distressed by the death of her dog that had been quarantined in Gibraltar, Treasure planned to warn the Germans of her MI 5 job by activating the special check, but she decided to tell her MI 5 contact the truth instead.53 More important to the deception than Treasure, however, was Dusko Popov, or Tricycle. By early 1944 the Double-Cross Committee had decided to use Tricycle, who had by that time established an extensive network of subagents, to provide the Germans with information about FUSAG and the threat to the Pas de Calais area. According to Popov, they hoped that the Germans would reach the following conclusions based upon information supplied by him and by the other agents: First, the Allies would attack in the Pas de Calais area. Second, a second, more powerful, attack would follow in the same area. Third, the Allies might launch a diversionary attack in the Bordeaux area to draw enemy troops from the invasion area. Finally, the Allies would launch the Pas de Calais assault near the end of June, while the attack on Normandy in early June would be a diversion. According to Popov, ‘‘Never did we say anything directly about the Pas de Calais. Naturally, we couldn’t say things right out. We had to give the Germans indications that would make them draw these conclusions themselves.’’54 The Germans apparently relied upon the information that Tricycle supposedly discovered because they requested specific data from their reliable Yugoslav agent. At one point Tricycle received a request for information, including photographs,

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about a particular ‘‘RAF fighter airfield.’’ Tricycle drove to the area, remained in a pub for a couple of hours, and then returned to London. He subsequently mailed five photographs to a drop site in Lisbon. The British agents who had supplied the pictures had photographed one of Colonel Turner’s dummy airfields. Crews had positioned some Spitfires and Hurricanes on the field to add reality to the photos. In February 1944 Tricycle visited his Abwehr controller in Lisbon and provided him with information about the FUSAG Order of Battle, which was based on reports by several of his subagents, including Freak, Balloon, Gelatine, Meteor, The Worm, and others. Tricycle was unique because he was the only double agent to meet with his controller. Like Albert von Karsthoff, Tricycle’s controller, the Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West, or FHW) accepted the agent’s information, which provided ‘‘the embryo of FUSAG assembling in southeastern and eastern England.’’ While Tricycle was in Lisbon, Freak sent further data by wireless. Tricycle returned to Lisbon the next month and provided more information about the movement of formations into the FUSAG area. During one meeting with Karsthoff, Tricycle noted the presence of the 82nd U.S. Airborne Division, which had transferred from Italy, and three fictitious American divisions in southeastern England. After another trip to Lisbon in April, another agent compromised Tricycle’s position.55 Popov (Tricycle) had made the acquaintance of a man named Johann Jebsen when they were both students at Freiburg University before the war. Jebsen, who later became an Abwehr official, approached Popov in 1940 about spying on the British for the Germans. Although he did not immediately respond to Jebsen’s request, Popov informed the British. On a trip to Lisbon in July 1943, Tricycle contacted Jebsen, who was there on business for Rear Admiral Wilhelm F. Canaris, the commander of Abwehr. As a result of their meeting, Tricycle told the Double-Cross Committee that Jebsen was ready to work for the British. Jebsen came on board with the code name Artist, and he helped Tricycle enlist the services of Freak, who became Tricycle’s wireless operator. Initially, the Double-Cross Committee remained uncertain about Artist’s value, but in November 1943 when Tricycle traveled to Lisbon, Artist supplied him with information about V-weapons and the Schwarze Kapelle (the Black Orchestra), a group of anti-Hitler conspirators. After two MI 5 officials checked out the information, the Double-Cross Committee decided to use Artist, although it was unsure of the wisdom of the decision. The committee realized that, if the Abwehr became suspicious and arrested Artist, he could jeopardize both Tricycle and Garbo.56 About a month before the Normandy invasion, the Double-Cross Committee realized its fears, when the Sicherheitsdienst (SD, the security service of the SS) arrested Artist. Before his arrest, however, Artist had reported that the Abwehr believed that Tricycle at one point had been controlled by the British, but that he was no longer supplying intelligence that had been provided by the British. The SD transported Artist back to Germany by way of Spain and France and placed him in the Gestapo prison in Prinzalbrechtstrasse for questioning. Despite their efforts, British Intelligence failed to learn definitively why the Germans arrested Artist. They surmised, however, that Artist’s inquisitive nature prompted him to

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investigate the activities of a man named Brandes, who was an uncontrolled Abwehr agent operating in Lisbon. Brandes, scared that Artist’s inquiries would ‘‘show him up,’’ decided to implicate Artist in some way in order to protect himself. Artist’s friendship with Dr. Erich Vermehren, an Abwehr official who was a member of the Schwarze Kapelle and who had defected to the British, along with Brandes’s questions about his reliability, made him a liability to the Abwehr. Although the Double-Cross Committee later learned that Artist did not betray Tricycle, Garbo, or any other agent, at the time it chose to consider Tricycle’s cover blown. Because his usefulness to Fortitude South had ended, Tricycle ceased to supply information about the invasion force in southeast England by wireless, and Freak suspended all wireless transmissions on May 19, 1944. Tricycle sent a written communication that Freak had fallen under suspicion and that he feared that British intelligence might search his house for the wireless set. Although Freak briefly reopened wireless communications on June 30, he sent little useful information and shortly thereafter shut down his wireless set for good.57 Brutus, who picked up the slack when Tricycle ceased communicating with the Germans, was a Polish captain named Roman Garby-Czerniawski. GarbyCzerniawski fled to France, where he established a network of spies and began working against the German occupiers. After his capture and imprisonment, Garby-Czerniawski’s captors approached him with an offer—his life if he agreed to spy for them in England. Following his ‘‘escape,’’ the Pole arrived in England in January 1943, where he turned himself in to British authorities, explained his mission, and offered to work as a double agent. Because they did not believe that the Germans regarded Garby-Czerniawski highly, the Intelligence Directors decided to give him a real job at Polish Headquarters, rather than use him for deception purposes. As Brutus, Garby-Czerniawski opened communications with the Germans. The nature of the traffic between the two prompted the Polish Deuxieme Bureau to pressure British Intelligence to reconsider their position, which they did. In March 1944 Brutus became part of Fortitude and began using Chopin, an imaginary wireless operator, to send messages to his controller.58 Brutus first provided the Germans with information about the Allied threat to Norway as part of the Fortitude North deception. Because of the presence of Polish units in the Scottish Lowlands, he had a reason for traveling to the area. In early April Brutus identified the headquarters of the Fourth Army in Edinburgh, II Corps in Stirling, and VII Corps in Dundee. He also noted the presence of the fictitious 58th Division near Stirling. Along with Garbo and a number of subagents, Brutus succeeded in conveying the Fourth Army’s Order of Battle and an idea of its intentions that the deception staffs had constructed. Consequently, the Germans began to display a high regard for Brutus. In addition to participating in Fortitude North, the Polish spy provided his Abwehr controllers with information about the concentration of Allied forces in southeast England. After his return to London, Brutus received a position as a Polish liaison officer assigned to the FUSAG headquarters, which he reported on May 18, 1944. A week later, Brutus informed his superiors that he would begin his new job

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on May 27. By providing him with a new position, the Double-Cross Committee wanted to give Brutus access to more, but not too much, information, which would enable him to fill the void that would be left when Tricycle went off the air. By transmitting information shortly before midnight every day, Brutus succeeded in sending a complete FUSAG Order of Battle to his Abwehr controller before D-Day. Brutus provided an extensive report about Allied forces in southeast England based on information obtained at FUSAG and on trips to Kent and East Anglia. He sent the material in stages. Although amazed, neither Abwehr nor FHW apparently questioned the Order of Battle that both Brutus and Garbo supplied. With the loss of Artist and Tricycle and his network, the Double-Cross Committee relied upon Brutus to provide the Germans with more information that would bolster the Fortitude South deception. After a communication on June 4, Brutus received a request for details about the 21st Army Group. In his response, Brutus noted that his position at FUSAG, however, limited his access to information about other army groups. Accepting his response, Abwehr turned to another agent, Garbo, whose real name was Juan Pujol Garcia.59 In many respects, Garbo was the most important and influential double agent who participated in the Fortitude South deception. Within a year of his arrival in England he had recruited a wireless operator, who had built his own radio, and could supplement his written messages by transmitting wireless communications to his contacts. By early 1944, Pujol, with the help of his British case worker, expanded the number of agents working under him to at least 24, which enabled him to provide Abwehr with a wide range of information for the Fortitude deception scheme. Garbo’s network included seven agents, most of whom had a number of subagents supplying them with material for their reports. Shortly after Pujol’s arrival in England, a KLM steward took over the KLM pilot’s courier duties. MI 5 gave the new courier, the name J(1), which meant Juan’s Agent One.60 The MI 6 agent, Gene Risso-Gill, performed the courier’s role, by filling and emptying Pujol’s safety deposit box at the Espiritu Santo Bank. J(2), Garbo’s second fictitious agent, was a KLM pilot, who was to act as courier in the event that J(1) could not. Because MI 5 believed that he was unnecessary, J(2) soon disappeared from Garbo’s network. By November 1943, Garbo and his case worker decided that the KLM steward was not proving satisfactory. Consequently Garbo reported J(1)’s resignation because he had ‘‘been caught up in a disastrous deception plan, code named COCKADE.’’ Fear that Garbo did not have enough reliable sources for his information and that the Germans would eventually conclude that Garbo had been fabricating his messages led Tomas Harris, an MI 5 officer, to approach the Double-Cross Committee. The Double-Cross Committee agreed to the creation of some new, more reliable subagents for Garbo. The first was J(3), who oversaw the ‘‘Spanish section of the Ministry of Information.’’ Garbo met him in May 1942. Not only did he provide material for Garbo, but J(3) also got him a part-time Ministry job that allowed him access to some policy documents. On April 10, 1943, Garbo met a Ministry of Information censor, who had left-wing political opinions and who became J(4).

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Five months later, Garbo added another Ministry worker, a secretary at the Ministry of War. The woman, J(5), had an affair with Garbo, who persuaded her to provide him with important political information.61 Garbo’s network evolved between his arrival in England and his involvement in the Fortitude deceptions. Some agents and subagents remained with him longer than others. Before he left Portugal, Garbo created the man who became Agent Two. Agent Two, William Maximilian Gerbers, was a German-Swiss businessman who lived in Bootle and provided information about Mersey traffic. He had uncovered news about a convoy sailing from Liverpool to Malta that Garbo had forwarded in his third message to his Abwehr contact. Because Gerbers would have to report on the Allied military concentrations that were amassing around Liverpool in preparation for the invasion of North Africa, Garbo had to eliminate him. On November 19, 1942, Gerbers died following a lengthy struggle against cancer. Garbo forwarded Gerbers’s fictitious obituary notice, which Harris had posted in the Liverpool Daily Post, to Lisbon and notified his superiors that Gerbers’s fictional widow had agreed to assume her husband’s position. Although officially called Agent 2(1), Mrs. Gerbers, who worked as personal assistant to Garbo, became known as ‘‘the Widow.’’ In October 1941, Garbo recruited Agent Three. Carlos was a wealthy student from Venezuela, who was living in Glasgow. Abwehr gave Carlos the code name Benedict. Benedict became Garbo’s second in command and took over in 1944 when Garbo’s cover was ‘‘blown’’ as part of the deception. Although Benedict had three subagents, only one of them proved useful. Agent 3(1), an RAF NCO (noncommissioned officer), and Agent 3(2), a lieutenant in the fictional British 49th Infantry Division, played virtually no part in any Double-Cross plan. In December 1943 Benedict recruited a Greek sailor, who was a deserter and a communist. The sailor promised to report on Scotland’s east coast ports.62 In June 1942 Garbo reported that he had met Fred, a waiter from Gibraltar, who was unhappy about his relocation to Kent. Although he was increasingly anti-British, Fred had obtained employment in the NAAFI, a British military canteen, that was connected to an underground depot in the Chislehurst caves. Garbo easily recruited Fred, who became Agent Four and who received the code name Chamillus from the Germans. Not only did Chamillus supply information about the secret work in the caves and the army units passing through the area, he also recruited several important subagents. Subagent 4(1), code name Almura, was a wireless operator. He handled all wireless communication with the Abwehr contacts in Madrid. Garbo did not tell 4 (1) that he was working for the Germans, and he let the man believe that he was helping a London-based group of Spanish Republicans. Chamillus persuaded 4(2), a guard at the Chislehurst caves, to provide information that Almura transmitted to Madrid. Perhaps Chamillus’s most important contact was an American NCO, who became Agent 4(3). ‘‘Not only was he well informed about the movements and constitution of the 1st US Army Group, but he was the son of a senior American officer on Eisenhower’s staff who was ferociously anti-British and passed on to his son all the gossip about high-level disagreements that came his way.’’63 Apparently

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4(3)’s father ‘‘indiscreetly’’ contributed to information about Patton and his whereabouts in late spring 1944. Because he was Benedict’s (Agent Three’s) brother, Agent Five, a Venezuelan student living in Aberdeen, easily succumbed to Garbo’s recruitment pitch. Agent Five received the code name Moonbeam. After joining his brother in June 1942, Moonbeam traveled to the Isle of Wight and then to the west country to gather special intelligence. In 1943 Garbo sent Moonbeam to Ottawa, because his safety had been jeopardized on the missions. While in Canada, Moonbeam persuaded 5 (1) to join his spy network. Moonbeam gained a wireless operator in October 1944 when Chamillus left his NAAFI position in Chislehurst and connected with him in Canada. Garbo notified his Abwehr contacts that he had recruited a Field Security Police NCO (Agent Six). Along with Agent One, Agent Six had provided most of the information about the Allied Operation, Starkey, which had been part of a larger plan called Cockade. Garbo blamed the Starkey fiasco on the two agents. Consequently, in 1943 Agent One resigned, and Agent Six received a transfer to North Africa. Although he obtained important high-level facts, Agent Six experienced delays in transmitting it. He had to mail the information to Garbo, who then sent it to Lisbon. As a result, the Germans received out-of-date communications from Agent Six, who later perished in an airplane crash. Fortunately for Garbo, he did not suffer any repercussions from the Starkey incident, and he began to prepare himself for his role in masking the Normandy invasion. Late in 1942, after Gerbers (Agent Two) died, Garbo ‘‘bought’’ an ex-sailor from Swansea. Although he would only work for money, Agent Seven, whom the Germans named Dagobert, added seven subagents to Garbo’s network. In seeking permission to hire Agent Seven, Garbo emphasized the benefits of a sailor who could ‘‘smuggle documents and other items of espionage paraphernalia which were too bulky for his regular KLM couriers to handle,’’ through neutral ports. The Abwehr approved the hiring of Dagobert, which eventually resulted in the expansion in the number of spies providing Garbo with information for his Abwehr superiors.64 On September 16, 1943, Dagobert reported the recruitment of a soldier from the fictitious 9th British Armoured Division, who received the designation 7(1). A few months later Dagobert recruited another former sailor, 7(2), who received the code name Donny. Donny, rejecting his membership in the Welsh Nationalist Party, helped found an organization called ‘‘Brothers in the Aryan World Order,’’ which identified a number of ‘‘political and racial undesirables.’’ The brothers targeted the ‘‘undesirables’’ for assassination after their order had come to power. Once he had joined Dagobert, Donny settled in Dover, where he could report on the increased Allied activity in the area. Late in 1943 the Double-Cross Committee decided to take advantage of Dagobert’s acceptance by the Abwehr to expand his network, which would have ‘‘access to shipping,’’ in order to help the Overlord deception. The Committee did not, however, want the entire spy ring centered in Wales because that would not benefit the plan. Therefore, early in 1944 Dagobert recruited ‘‘Rags,’’ a radical poet

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from India, who became 7(4), code named Dick, and dispatched him to Brighton. Because of the impending travel ban, the Double-Cross Committee had to expand and send out the rest of Dagobert’s spy network quickly. Each new member had to establish ‘‘the necessary residential qualification before applying for the muchvalued permit to live in a coastal area.’’65 The Abwehr agreed to the expansion of Dagobert’s spy circle. Consequently, Dagobert recruited four more subagents. The first was Dick’s secretary, a woman named Theresa Jardine, who was also his mistress. Drafted into the Women’s Royal Naval Service (WREN’s), Jardine, 7(3), reported, as ordered, for preparatory training, at the Mill Hill Wren depot. Because of her fluency in Hindustani, 7(3) received posting at the headquarters of South-East Asia Command in Ceylon. Dagobert also enlisted one of Donny’s relatives, Drake, who became 7(5). Although initially sent to Southampton, Drake received a transfer to Exeter in February 1944. At the same time, another subagent, 7(6), who was a Welsh fascist, was originally supposed to move to Exeter; Dagobert ordered him to remain in South Wales instead. The last of Dagobert’s subagents, Dorick, designated 7(7), settled in Harwich. Once Garbo’s network of agents was in place, the Double-Cross Committee decided that he was ready for the Fortitude deception schemes. Garbo and his ‘‘subagents’’ contributed to both Fortitude North and Fortitude South. For the Fortitude North plan, the threat to Norway, Garbo received valuable information from a British sailor who believed that he was part of a Soviet spy ring. After he received a request for information about troop concentrations in Scotland and northeast England in early March 1944, Garbo, using information supplied by the sailor, communicated almost daily with his Abwehr contact in Madrid. Through Benedict, Garbo identified the presence of the British 52nd Lowland Division and another unidentified unit, both of which had established camps in Dundee by late March. Garbo also ordered Benedict to observe the Allied naval exercises in the Clyde that were increasing in number. On May 10–11 Benedict observed exercises in Loch Fyne by a large naval assault force that carried troops wearing arctic clothing and suggested that the force was preparing for an attack on Norway. Agent 3(3), an associate of Benedict, reported the increasing number of cargo ships in Methil and concluded that, like the cargo ships amassed in other east coast Scottish ports, the ships would ‘‘supply an operation in which a large number of troops were to take part.’’ In addition, Garbo, along with Brutus and their agents, provided the Germans with an Order of Battle for the Fourth Army.66 Even more important than his contribution to Fortitude North was Garbo’s role in Fortitude South. In mid-February 1944, Garbo noted the presence of soldiers from the 1st U.S. Infantry Division near Portland in Dorset, England. He suggested that Allied troops were preparing to launch occupation forces in the event German forces collapsed or withdrew from northwest Europe. Garbo stole a copy of a pamphlet entitled ‘‘Avis a la Population’’ from the Ministry of Information and forwarded it to his contact in Lisbon. According to Garbo, after the Germans had departed from France, the Allies planned to distribute the pamphlet among the citizens to smooth the way for the occupation forces. Dorick reported that the 9th Division

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passed through Norwich in mid-April. In addition to passing along information provided by his agents and subagents, Garbo sent reports verifying the accuracy of the facts, thereby enhancing the reliability of the network. A couple of weeks later Chamillus reported the establishment of a new base, Hiltingbury Camp, near Otterbourne, Hampshire, as well as the presence of both the 3rd Infantry and the 47th London Divisions in the area. Chamillus claimed, ‘‘all the 3rd Infantry Division are concentrated here ready to embark. There are other camps full of troops ready for attack. Have identified the 47th London Division in a camp to the south of mine . . .it is extremely difficult to leave the camp. They are preparing cold rations for two days, also vomit bags and lifebelts for troops’ sea voyage.’’67 The Double-Cross Committee wanted Chamillus in an area where he could see and report the embarkation of the invasion fleet. The Double-Cross Committee and Tommy Harris decided to evaluate the German response to Garbo’s correspondence with Abwehr. Another MI 5 officer, who was unaware of the Overlord or Fortitude plans, reviewed the communications and concluded that only a ‘‘slight imbalance in favor of the Pas-de-Calais’’ as the site of the impending Allied invasion existed. The Double-Cross Committee decided, however, to continue transmitting the Garbo messages. Other double agents, including Tricycle and Freak, reported the movement of Allied troops into southeast England to supplement the information supplied by Garbo. Freak noted the installation of FUSAG formations in Cheshire and the Third U.S. Army, including the 79th and 83rd Infantry Divisions, at Knutsford, in mid- to late April. Around the same time, Brutus discovered the XX Corps at Marlborough and the 6th U.S. Armored Division in North Gloucestershire. On May 1 Donny, a subagent from Garbo’s network, reported the presence of Allied troops in southeast England—the 28th American Infantry Division in Tenterden and Dover and the VIII American Corps in Folkestone. Dorick had noticed the 28th American Infantry Division, an assault force, earlier in Tenby, South Wales. The goal of the LCS and the Double-Cross Committee was to demonstrate the concentration of assault troops in Dover. To indicate a later target date for the Pas de Calais assault, Garbo claimed, on May 2, that, according to his mistress, the Allied invasion was not imminent, but the Abwehr did not place much credit in J(5)’s information.68 The reports from Garbo and his agents continued almost daily. On May 3 Dorick observed armored vehicles and tanks from the 6th U.S. Division at the railway depot in Ipswich. According to Chamillus, the 3rd Canadian Division departed from Hiltingbury on May 4 for embarkation in Southampton. With the 3rd Division’s departure, the Hiltingbury camp prepared to receive the next Allied formation, possibly ‘‘second-line units.’’ After assuming that Chamillus’s report indicated the movement of Allied forces ‘‘toward their far-off objective or to join the fleet,’’ Garbo reported in disgust on May 7 that Chamillus had conveyed the wrong conclusion about the departure of the 3rd Division, which had just returned to Hiltingbury. Apparently, the 3rd Division, along with other formations, had participated in a pre-invasion exercise, ‘‘one of the many rehearsals which Churchill announced would be carried out before the second front was opened.’’ Consequently, Abwehr

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concluded that J(5) and the other Ministry agents did produce accurate information and that they were not trying to ‘‘mislead intentionally.’’69 On May 8, according to Garbo’s communication, Dick had observed parts of the 61st and 45th Divisions and of the Nos. 3 and 6 Commandos in the area between Brighton and Newhaven. Two days later, Garbo reported the results of a conversation with 4(3), the NCO recruited by Chamillus. According to 4(3), the Allies would launch an assault to open a second front when the 21st Army Group, commanded by Montgomery, and FUSAG, provisionally commanded by Bradley, had completed their preparations. In addition, Eisenhower planned to assign FUSAG a special task. A short time later, Garbo conveyed Dagobert’s spotting of ‘‘one hundred and twentyfive military vehicles of all types, including bren gun carriers,’’ with the 54th and 47th London Division insignias, on the Romsey-Ringwood road. The frequency of communications from Garbo prompted requests from Abwehr for particular information. After a solicitation for facts about the 21st Army Group, Garbo responded that 4(3) knew little except that, although most American soldiers belonged to FUSAG, some were part of the 21st Army Group. Correspondence, particularly from Garbo, emphasized the concentration of Allied forces in southeast and east England. Dagobert reported the movement of the 9th British Armoured Division through Ipswich on its way to East Anglia on May 25. Garbo located the headquarters of the ‘‘8th British Army Corps’’ in Lewes, in eastern Sussex. According to Dagobert, the 9th Armoured Division had camped outside of Tilbury by June 1. Although Garbo and many of his agents provided much needed information, not all of them proved successful. Despite being ordered to the west country, Drake, by mid-April, had not succeeded in obtaining entrance to the prohibited zone near Taunton. By mid-April, because his position had become tenuous, Drake failed to supply the information Abwehr had requested. On June 2, according to 7(6), after being arrested for failing to obey area restrictions, Drake received a sentence of one month in prison. Garbo disclosed a decision to no longer rely upon 7(6) for information, because of the poor nature of his work. Thus, within a short time, Garbo lost two members of his network, Drake and 7(6). Pujol’s superiors considered the loss of the two subagents necessary to maintain the plausibility of the Garbo network. Because of the volume of work produced by the network, Garbo procured permission from Abwehr to recall Benedict from Glasgow and to give him and Mrs. Gerbers new assignments. Benedict became Garbo’s deputy; Mrs. Gerbers began to help with the large amount of ciphering work. In fact, his contact in Madrid suggested that, in order to make Mrs. Gerber’s work easier, Garbo begin to correspond in English. Garbo, with the approval of his German superiors, cultivated another source of information. Garbo had identified J(3) as the head of the Ministry of Information’s Spanish section. In early May the real head of that department traveled to Madrid. Because Garbo notified the Germans about the department head’s trip, the British Embassy, at the request of MI 5, sent the official back to England after a short time. Because it might lead to important information, Garbo received permission to spend extra time with J(3), helping him prepare second front

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propaganda. Garbo, who officially accepted the position on May 28, informed his contact that he had had to sign an agreement promising not to break the Official Secrets Act. 70 ‘‘The object of giving Garbo an appointment at the Ministry of Information was in order that he should gain access to the Allied propaganda directives. By reading these ‘in reverse,’ he would learn the Allies’ intentions.’’71 ******************* The May 6 Special Means plan dictated the release of information by way of the double agents. ‘‘Appendix D of this Plan, a ‘Phased Programme for Identification and Grouping of Military Forces—1st May to D Day,’ provided the controlled agents and their case officers with a working programme of release dates for disclosing the identity, as well as the location and grouping, real or false, of every operational formation in the United Kingdom.’’72 In addition to the FUSAG Order of Battle, perhaps the most crucial bit of information sent by Brutus, Tricycle, and Garbo referred to the major pre-invasion exercises scheduled by SHAEF. Fearing that the planned exercises would convince the enemy that the invasion site was Normandy, the London Controlling Section (LCS) and the Committee of Special Means (CSM) devised a plan to disguise the true nature of the exercises. Brutus, Garbo, and Tricycle informed their Abwehr contacts that the Allies had scheduled a series of exercises to prepare for the invasion of France. The first would be Operation ‘‘Fabius,’’ but several more would follow, with the last one occurring shortly before the target date, which would be around July 20, 1944. The decision to hold Operation ‘‘Fabius’’ created security problems because it conflicted with the fake Fortitude target date. Fabius was, however, only one of two large scale practices scheduled to occur prior to D-Day. The first, Tiger, occurred from April 24 to 28, while Fabius took place between May 3 and 8.73 Initially the ‘‘training facilities and assault firing areas’’ could accommodate forces for an attack by three divisions. Because Montgomery insisted on a five-divisional assault, the facilities had to be expanded. The five assault forces included ‘‘J,’’ ‘‘S,’’ ‘‘G,’’ ‘‘O,’’ and ‘‘U’’ Forces. Each force trained in conjunction with land forces. The Eastern Task Force included ‘‘J,’’ ‘‘S,’’ and ‘‘G’’ Forces. ‘‘J’’ Force, working with the 3rd Canadian Division in the Isle of Wight area, executed ‘‘twelve assault and three ferry exercises, as well as several beach reconnaissances—the latter in the actual ‘Neptune’ area.’’ ‘‘S’’ Force trained with the 3rd British Infantry Division in Scotland under adverse weather conditions. ‘‘S’’ Force did, however, successfully carry out several full scale practices near Burghead, in an area that resembled hydrographically a section of the Normandy beach. Between early and late May, ‘‘S’’ Force completed a move to Portsmouth. ‘‘G’’ Force, which was formed in early March 1944, executed brigade practices near Studland with the 50th Northumberland Division. Because of its late formation, ‘‘G’’ Force had less time to prepare than the other forces. On April 28, ‘‘G’’ Force moved its headquarters from PortlandPoole to Southampton-Solent.74 The Western Task Force included two American assault forces, ‘‘O’’ and ‘‘U,’’ both of which had been part of the U.S. Eleventh Amphibious Force. Based near Portland,

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‘‘O’’ Force trained with the V Corps. ‘‘U’’ Force, situated in ports of the west country, practiced with the VII Corps. Both forces engaged in training along the English south coast, mainly near Slapton Sands in South Devon. The forces gradually increased the size and scope of their practices, beginning with ‘‘battalions and regimental combat teams’’ and ending with ‘‘full divisional and corps rehearsals with all supporting elements.’’ During the practices, the forces endeavored to create conditions that would mirror those that they would encounter during the real invasion. Exercise Tiger attracted an upsurge in Channel activity by German naval forces. E-Boats and Allied patrols sailing from Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Dover experienced several run-ins. The only real problem occurred during Exercise Tiger, ‘‘a full scale exercise including assembly, loading, assault and build-up, carried out by Force ‘U,’ then comprising 337 ships and landing craft under Rear-Admiral [D.P.] Moon, U.S.N.’’ On the night of April 26/27, ‘‘U’’ Force sailed to Slapton Sands from Plymouth, Salcombe, Dartmouth, Torquay, and Brixham. The force successfully completed its exercise on April 27. After dark the last convoy, which contained eight tank landing ships and two pontoons and which was simulating the buildup force, sailed for Slapton Sands. Its scheduled arrival time was 0730 the next day. Between one and two E-Boat groups attacked the convoy, which had only one of its two escorts, at 0220 on April 28. Because of the convoy’s vulnerability, E-Boat torpedoes succeeded in sinking two and damaging one tank landing ship. ‘‘Casualties, twothirds of whom were military personnel, amounted to 638 killed and 89 wounded.’’75 Between May 2 and May 6, ‘‘J,’’ ‘‘S,’’ ‘‘G,’’ and ‘‘O’’ Forces participated in their last rehearsal, Exercise Fabius, which had been scheduled by Allied officials in late February 1944. On May 3 the four forces practiced ‘‘berthing, loading and sailing of the ships and craft.’’ The following day they executed assaults under as realistic conditions as possible: ‘‘Force ‘O’ at Slapton Sands, Force ‘S’ west of Littlehampton, Force ‘J’ at Bracklesham Bay and Force ‘G’ off Hayling Island.’’ Bad weather that began on the afternoon of May 4 caused an early end to the invasion rehearsal. Although two separate incidents of enemy air attack on the forces participating in Fabius occurred, German naval forces demonstrated little reaction to the Allied forces operating in the English Channel.76 According to SHAEF’s ‘‘Appreciation of the Treatment of Exercise ‘Fabius’ 3rd-5th May, 1944,’’ the purpose of the exercise was ‘‘to induce the enemy to believe that Exercise ‘Fabius’ is the first and that ‘Neptune’ is the second of a series of large-scale exercises.’’ Using Special Means, SHAEF, the LCS, and the War Office wanted to suggest that the British, American, and Canadian assault forces would engage in other exercises that they scheduled around June 1 and June 23, 1944.77 As the Allied Tactical Air Forces concentrated aircraft on bases in southern England, SHAEF feared that presence of a large number of fighter planes in Hampshire would lead the Germans to deduce that Normandy was the correct Allied invasion target. To persuade the Germans to accept a different conclusion, on May 29, the Second British Tactical Air Force launched a sixty-six squadron operation against

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the Pas de Calais area. The squadrons operated out of advance bases in Kent, Surrey, and Sussex and rear ones in Hampshire, which were their normal bases. Operating from the bases in Kent, Surrey, and Sussex, fighter pilots refueled and rearmed at the rear bases. ‘‘The purpose was to indicate to the enemy our intention of using fighter aircraft located in the Southampton area against targets in North Western France, which in the normal course of events have been too far from their bases, but which could be reached by the employment of an intermediate airfield.’’ Three agents, Brutus, Tate, and one of Garbo’s subagents, reported observing the operation.78 As D-Day approached, Garbo prepared to perform his most important work for the Fortitude deception. In late May the Madrid Abstelle, an Abwehr sub office, inquired about the 52nd Infantry Division, which had established camp near Glasgow. In addition to the inquiry for specific information, the Madrid Abstelle requested an estimate about ‘‘how much time will be lost from the moment the division starts its embarkation operation until the news reaches you for transmission to us by message.’’ 79 According to Garbo, 3(3) had observed the invasion fleet in the Clyde and the 52nd Division in the areas near Kilmarnock, Saltcoats, Prestwick, and Ayr. Garbo instructed 3(3) to keep a close watch on the fleet, because its departure would indicate the commencement of an invasion. In addition, after consulting MI 5, Garbo wired Madrid that he could transmit the information within twelve hours, which meant that the Madrid receiving station would have to stay open past its normal shutdown time of 11:00 P.M. Both Garbo and MI 5’s Tommy Harris had argued that Garbo should be allowed to notify the Abwehr about the commencement of the Normandy invasion. Doing so would serve two purposes. First, it would enhance Garbo’s reputation with his German superiors.80 Second, as a result, ‘‘the Abwehr would then be more likely to believe that this first attack was a feint and would then listen to Garbo’s information about preparations for the main landing in the Pas-de-Calais area.’’81 Although he finally agreed to allow Garbo to warn the Germans about the invasion, General Eisenhower stipulated that the message could go out no sooner than three and a half hours prior to the initial landing of Allied troops, which had been set for 6:30 A.M. on June 5, 1944. On June 3 Garbo arranged for the Madrid receiving station to remain open after 11:00 P.M. by radioing at 8:20 P.M. that Agent 3(3), instead of sending the agreed coded message that indicated the launching of the invasion fleet, was on his way to London. Garbo concluded that something had happened and requested that the station wait for another communication, which he would transmit at 3:00 A.M. the next morning. At the appointed time, Garbo’s correspondence noted that 3(3) had misunderstood his instructions and had come to report in person, rather than send a message. Although Garbo straightened out the misunderstanding, he requested that the receiving station maintain a ‘‘night watch’’ to prevent any delays. Abwehr agreed, which set the stage for Garbo’s most important transmission a few hours prior to the landing of forces in Normandy.

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During the last couple of weeks before D-Day, in addition to an increase in traffic between the double agents and their German controllers, the deception forces, using a variety of methods, indicated the completion of invasion preparations. When the VIII U.S. Corps moved into East Anglia, Patton’s force took up residence in the vacated camp. As the real invasion forces began boarding their ships, American and British radio teams took over their wireless activity, which prevented the Germans from noticing their departure. Another formation, XII Corps, set up camp in Folkestone, and on May 30 its forward command post received its assignment to the First Canadian Army, FUSAG. The opening and closing of wireless stations also indicated troop movement. On May 30, Stations 24 and 27, which represented XIII Corps’ rear formations and the 35th Division, shut down, while Station 23, which represented the Third U.S. Army’s Special Task Force, opened near Brentwood. In addition, although VIII Corps’ Station 12 in Folkestone ceased transmissions, Stations 14 and 15, which represented the 28th and 83rd Divisions, joined XII Corps’ wireless net.82 Two days later, on June 1, D minus 5, Allied bombers launched a major attack on the Pas de Calais, including Cape Gris Nez and the region east of the cape. Targets included railways. The British ‘‘A’’ Force and Beach Jumpers engaged in activities that suggested threats to southern France and the Balkans. As the 35th Infantry Division advanced into Kent, the 28th Infantry practice exercises in Ipswich and the embarkation of assault forces continued. Four days before Overlord, the United Press reported on German expectations about the upcoming invasion. The Germans believed that the Allied plan included four phases: an air offensive, a push northward further into Italy, attacks against German defensive positions, and an invasion from England, which would occur on June 22. On June 3, the 23rd Special Troops removed the signs of Allied practice activities in the Thetford area. The 28th Infantry landing exercises in Ipswich concluded. An AP operator, Joan Ellis, drilling on a supposedly disconnected machine, inadvertently reported that the Allies had landed in France. The Joint Intelligence subcommittee issued a report in which they evaluated the situation on the eve on the invasion. The subcommittee concluded that the Germans, who had not ‘‘accurately assessed’’ the invasion area, expected the attack to come in the area between Calais and Cherbourg. In addition, the Germans had an inflated estimate of the size of the Allied invasion force. Finally, the Germans had concluded that the assault against the coast of Norway would be a diversion. On D minus 1, the day before the invasion, Allied bombers, attacking Boulogne and Calais, dropped more bombs on the latter. A situation report issued by Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt suggested that the invasion site fell between the Schelde River in Belgium and Normandy and that the invasion was not imminent. Allied signal men continued to transmit information that supported the Fortitude North and South deceptions. In the early morning hours of June 6, Garbo tried to wire the message, which SHAEF had approved, announcing the invasion of Normandy.83 Allied forces on ships off the coast of France waited for the commencement of the most ambitious amphibious operation ever attempted by the joint forces.

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As occurred throughout this period, the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee continually assessed the deception and concluded as early as June 3 that the pre-invasion part of Fortitude South had not convinced the Germans that the Allies were going to land in the Pas de Calais. Their attention was focused equally, if not increasingly, on Normandy as the possible invasion site. This made the Garbo message even more important.

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Continuing the Deception

I am very disgusted as, in this struggle for life and death, I cannot accept excuses or negligence. I cannot masticate the idea of endangering the service without any benefit. Were it not for my ideals I would abandon the work as having proved myself a failure. . . —Double Agent Garbo1

As D-Day approached, the Supreme Commander and other Allied leaders nervously anticipated the culmination of months of preparation for the return of Allied forces to the European continent. The London Controlling Section (LCS), the deception implementers, and intelligence officials were equally anxious. They hoped that the German presence in Normandy at the time of the invasion would be minimal as a result of the months of planning, training, constructing fake aircraft and landing craft, transmitting messages from double agents, and dropping bombs in the Pas de Calais area. The expectation of the landings could not, however, detract from the business at hand—the deception’s continuation. As they contemplated and planned the continuation of Fortitude South, Allied leaders and the LCS had to factor in both their concerns and the evidence that the pre-invasion part of the deception had not been as successful as had been anticipated or hoped. Prior to landing troops at Normandy, the Allies had utilized numerous resources to implement the Fortitude deception, including naval diversionary operations that commenced in the early morning hours on D-Day. According to the Admiralty, ‘‘because the power of manoeuvre at sea was so limited and because it was vital to hold the enemy reserves in sectors other than that to be assaulted as long as possible, the need for cover and deception was paramount, both strategically during the preparatory period and tactically during the approach.’’2 Air sorties, not troop landings, supplemented the naval diversionary operations. Using sonic warfare, smoke, and RCM (radio countermeasures), the Coastal Craft Forces would simulate landing threats to beaches, other than those in Normandy, in an attempt to postpone the

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transfer of German reserves into the assault area. In addition, by engaging enemy naval forces in a skirmish the night before, and during the day of, the assault, Allied leaders wanted to prevent the German navy from hindering the landing of both the invasion and the follow up forces. The plan was to execute feints against three German-held coastal areas. Forces participating in Operation Taxable would threaten the coast near Cap Antifer, which was east of the actual landing zone. Those taking part in Operation Glimmer would suggest an assault around the Pas de Calais. The final naval simulation, Operation Big Drum, included a force that would serve ‘‘as a flank force on the western flank of our assault forces to occupy the attention of the enemy radar and confuse him as to the progress of the main assault forces.’’ Although it was not technically a diversion, the Big Drum force was going to operate like the other diversionary forces and hopefully focus German attention away from Normandy. Allied leaders hoped that Glimmer and Taxable would suggest the impending invasion in Calais and Cap Antifer with forces that were equal in size.3 Before proceeding with the discussion of Fortitude, a closer examination of Operations Taxable, Glimmer, and Big Drum is warranted. The purpose of Operation Taxable was to convince the Germans that, around dawn on D-Day, Allied forces would land between Bruneval and Fe´camp, which is northeast of Le Havre and southwest of Dieppe. During the night before the Normandy invasion, Special Task Force A would advance toward the area. Aircraft would simulate approaching ships and landing craft. After nearing as close as possible to Cap Antifer, the forces would ‘‘simulate ships and craft lying off the beaches after the actual retirement has been made.’’ If possible during the deception, Allied crews would also lay mines in the waters around Cap Antifer. Before daylight, the force would withdraw from enemy gun range.4 Like Taxable, the goal of Operation Glimmer was to persuade the Germans that the Allied invasion forces were going to land in the Pas de Calais, rather than on the beaches of Normandy. Leaving from Dungeness, one group would target the beaches around Boulogne if the extent of enemy mines present in the waters permitted. Another group, departing from the Thames and ports along the east coast, would advance toward the Dunkirk beaches and those between Boulogne and the Somme. Allied deception forces would use the same methods as those dictated for Taxable to perpetuate the ruse. The only difference in the organization of the two naval diversions was that Glimmer omitted the possibility of mining the waters around the Pas de Calais.5 The object of Operation Big Drum was, however, different from that of Taxable and Glimmer. Instead of creating a phantom fleet on enemy radar, Big Drum dictated that a RCM (radio countermeasure) force operate ‘‘on the western flank of the assault forces to engage the attention of and, as far as possible, jam enemy radar stations situated in the North-East COTENTIN PENINSULA.’’ Consequently, German radar operators would discern false information about the invasion fleets as they approached Normandy.’’6 Rear Admiral D.P. Moon, U.S. Navy, who was the commander of assault force ‘‘U,’’ issued last minute orders for Operation Big Drum on May 26, 1944. Because of its exposure to observation by enemy radar at

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Barfleur la Viel and Barfleur St. Vaast, Admiral Moon provided a schedule for each convoy’s entry into the assault area. The first to enter would be convoy U-2B, which included five U.S. LSTs, each of which would tow one Rhine Ferry. A second convoy, UM(2), would provide a ‘‘screen approximately three miles to westward of Convoy U-2B, with HDMLs disposed one mile apart on line of bearing normal to bearing of enemy radar stations. Adjust speed so that southern HDML keeps on the line between LST of convoy and enemy radar stations; maintain distance of about 3 miles from convoy until about H-7 hours.’’7 According to Admiral Moon’s orders, the ‘‘Big Drum unit should close [approach] the land in the vicinity of the enemy radar stations’’ at Barfleur la Viel and Barfleur St. Vaast under cover of darkness either the night before or in the early hours of D-Day. Either at dusk or when the force was thirty miles offshore, whichever was later, the unit was to turn on its radar jammers. According to the order, the unit was to switch them off ‘‘at morning nautical twilight.’’ In order to achieve the best results, ‘‘the ships should be disposed in line normal to the bearing of the radar stations, one mile apart, while approaching the coast. This disposition should be maintained as long as possible, and ships’ heads should be directed towards the enemy radar sets to obtain maximum jamming effect.’’8 After completing the RCM operation, the convoys had orders to return under a smoke cover to Newhaven.9 Prior to the launching of Operations Taxable and Glimmer, Lieutenant Commander Ian Cox, Officer-in-Charge, Mobile Deception Units, issued scripts for wireless traffic, along with instructions, to the appropriate CLH mobile units. Cox reminded the men that they were ‘‘competent operators’’ and to rely upon their training on both T.W.12 and Army Type 22 transmitters.10 As early as D-Day, Cox assessed the outcome of the diversions. In a report entitled, ‘‘Wireless Contributions to Diversions ‘Taxable’ and ‘Glimmer’ 6th June 1944,’’ Cox noted that the purpose of the two operations was to use HDMLs with special RCM, sonic and wireless equipment to convince the Germans that the Allies were about to launch two amphibious assaults along different parts of the French coast. Acknowledging that wireless traffic ‘‘associated with S.P. Artillery’’ was the best for the diversions, Cox said that R/T transmitted the traffic in plain language and that, if the Germans had been monitoring the training traffic of the South coast assault force, they should have been aware of the R/T traffic. According to Cox, some problems did occur when several operators quit trying to transmit the traffic because of the interference with the R/T transmissions, which was caused by RCM. Cox concluded, ‘‘It is considered that this by no means vitiates the value of such traffic as transmitted, since interference of this sort is by no means unheard of during an attack, and, provided the operators who are ‘on the air’ persist, the enemy is not necessarily to know that the silent stations are not being read by them.’’ 11 Cox did admit, however, that if the mobile units had been able to practice with the HDMLs, then the problem might have been avoided. Cox continued to critique the diversions after their completion. On June 11, 1944, he issued a document entitled, ‘‘Summary Report on Wireless Measures Taken to Ensure Tactical and Strategic Surprise in Operation ‘Neptune,’’’ in which he

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briefly evaluated the wireless traffic more than Taxable and Glimmer as a whole. According to Cox, To ‘‘animate’’ the diversions ‘‘TAXABLE’’ and ‘‘GLIMMER’’ which were to draw attention by R.C.M. and sonic devices to the Eastern part of the Channel area at about H-3, special ‘‘pre-H hour’’ wireless traffic was written for transmission by the telegraphists in the H.D.M.L.s taking part in the diversions. The scripts were carefully prepared beforehand and the ratings rehearsed in order that the enemy should be convinced that landings were about to take place. Events have proved that he was so convinced.12

In addition to noting his assessment of Taxable and Glimmer, Cox concluded that the possibility of engaging in future short-term tactical wireless deception operations was feasible. ******************* The naval diversions must, however, be evaluated completely, and not just in terms of wireless performance. For the Taxable plan, the navy, using eighteen small ships, wanted to simulate a convoy traveling at seven knots along a 140-mile front toward Cap d’Antifer. Employing aircraft that dropped bundles of window, the navy hoped that the German’s coastal Wurzburg/Seetakt radar equipment would see a large convoy approaching the coast. To enhance the illusion, the small craft would tow balloons equipped with reflectors, which would provide echoes of large ships on enemy radar screens. In addition, the craft would provide low level jamming that would not obscure the echoes created by the falling window. After receiving orders to participate in Operation Taxable, No. 617 Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander G. L. Cheshire, began intensive training on May 7, 1944. Although No. 617 Squadron flew its mission accurately and successfully simulated the Taxable convoy, it received little attention from the Germans, who observed its approach at the Vetnor Type 16 ground radar station.13 Special Task Force A, which provided the naval component of Taxable, included ‘‘8 H.D.M.L’s fitted with R.C.M. equipment, 5 being additionally equipped for Sonic Warfare; 6 H.D.M.L’s towing and carrying balloons, and 3 A.S.R. Pinnaces equipped with ‘Moonshine’ and towing one balloon each.’’14 Lieutenant Commander Calder, along with his staff officer, Lieutenant Commander G.E. Bailey, commanded Special Task Force A. According to Calder, force 4–5 winds and moderate to rough seas made conditions on the small craft unpleasant. Following operational orders, Calder divided the force into three units at the rendezvous point. Shortly after getting underway on June 5, Calder discovered that the ‘‘S’’ Force Convoy, which was late and had altered course, hindered his timely arrival at the next point. Consequently, Calder ordered the unit commanders ‘‘to proceed independently to their Spreading Points.’’ Calder did, however, arrive at the deployment position according to schedule at 0037 on June 6. After altering course, Calder’s unit proceeded toward the coast, dropped a Dan buoy and activated the RCM equipment. Two minutes later, Calder’s crew spotted the first ‘‘window’’ aircraft, and they subsequently observed aircraft at

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regular intervals. At 0137 and 0237, Calder’s ship dropped lit Dan Buoys to guide the ships that traveled astern. Following the scripts provided by Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force (ANCXF), wireless operators made R/T transmissions on Army Type 22 sets from 0200 to 0400. According to Calder, ‘‘At 0337 we had completed the Advance and as the Sonic Equipment in H.D.M.L. 1382 [Calder’s vessel] was reported unserviceable due to being swamped by heavy seas, I decided to approach the coast as if for a run and lay smoke on the way out, in the hopes that it might assist other craft during their runs inshore.’’15 After proceeding to within two miles of the shore, Calder’s vessel returned to its ‘‘original finishing position’’ by 0507. Calder noted little enemy reaction—searchlights and gunfire at 0350 and a light that flashed twice at 0420. The German radar stations did not seem to be getting the picture that Taxable was intended to project. After reaching the seven mile line, Calder signaled the ships to retreat, although he suspected that RCM interference prevented reception of his signal. The entire force, which had not suffered any damage or casualties, arrived in Newhaven shortly after 1200. Adverse weather conditions prevented Taxable from being a complete success. Although Special Task Force A anchored ten balloons approximately six to eight miles off the coast, the ships lost four balloons as they crossed the English Channel. ******************* The implementers of Operation Glimmer faced problems similar to those encountered with Taxable. Both had to coordinate the timing between the aircraft and the naval vessels. Commanded by Wing Commander R.M. Fenwick-Wilson, No. 218 Squadron trained for its role in Glimmer between May 20 and 31. Because of its particular situation, No. 218 Squadron adopted a different navigational plan from that used by No. 617 Squadron. In addition, No. 218 Squadron, unlike No. 617, did not use relief aircraft; therefore, each aircraft had two pilots, three navigators, and four crewmen to drop the window at the appropriate intervals. In other respects, the techniques used by the two squadrons to simulate an advancing fleet were the same.16 The commander of Glimmer’s naval force, Special Task Force B, which included 12 Harbour Defence Motor Launches (HDMLs) (the HDMLs were divided into three groups of Fleet Reserves [FR1, FR2, and FR3] and an Air Sea Rescue [1 ASR Pinnace]), was Lieutenant Commander W.M. Rankin. According to Rankin, since he did not personally observe the entire operation, his account is a compilation of reports submitted by the commanding officers involved in the operation.17 As the force got underway at 0111 on June 6, the lead ships activated the RCM equipment and dropped red, white, and green Dan buoys to light the course for the ships that followed. Because the RCM equipment jammed QH equipment on the ships, the crews made adjustments, but they proved unsuccessful. The advance ships dropped a second set of Dan buoys at approximately 0205. Fifteen minutes later, wireless operators, using Army Type 22 R/T, began to send the designated signals. The ships dropped the final set of Dan buoys at 0255. In the meantime, aircraft from No. 218 Squadron ‘‘were flying up the line of advance, turning to port approximately over the

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position of F.R.1 and returning at ten minute intervals. They were flying over, and from astern to ahead, of F.R.2. . .and A.S.R. Pinnace. . .and F.R.3 .’’18 According to Rankin, between 0320 and 0455, three to five searchlights swept over the water in an area that stretched from two miles north to approximately three or four miles south of Cap Alprecht. Not all of Force B’s units reached the rendezvous point at the appointed time. One group, M.L.1412, finding itself alone at the rendezvous, activated the appropriate sonic warfare from its position approximately two miles from the shore in the area between Hardelot Plage and Cap Alprecht. According to the commander, the ship’s roll in conjunction with the loud wind and surf noises probably prevented his transmissions from being heard on shore. Although searchlights swept the water, none located the M.L.1412. By 0354 the FR1 ships turned off their sonic equipment. Because the FR2 and FR3 groups had anchored their balloons by 0440, Rankin gave the order to retreat five minutes later. The navy later confirmed that Special Task Force B had successfully anchored thirteen balloons between seven and ten miles off the French coast. The FR1 ships shut down their RCM equipment at 0554. By 1300, the entire Special Task Force B fleet had returned to port.19 According to a report issued by Bomber Command, the Germans did accept the fleet simulated by Glimmer as an actual threat to the French coast. They also believed that aircraft from Nos. 101 and 214 Squadrons, called the A.B.C. patrol, were providing cover for the fleet. ‘‘At all events, the enemy opened up with both searchlights and guns on the imaginary ‘convoy’ and sent the bulk of the night fighter force which he put into the air after the A.B.C. aircraft. . . Nos. 101 and 214 Squadrons had between them a total of seven combats, as well as a number of visuals on enemy fighters, and claim one night fighter destroyed and two damaged.’’ The Germans shot down one aircraft of the No. 101 Squadron, but its crew was saved. Another indication that Glimmer achieved some success was that German commanders ordered several E-boats to the Pas de Calais area, which was Glimmer’s target.20 While some German E-boats investigated the target area, a larger number investigated the waters near the invasion beaches. It appears that in the case of Glimmer, as in that of Taxable, the complexity of the plans adversely affected their completely successful reception by the enemy. ******************* Although part of the naval diversions, Operation Big Drum was different from Taxable and Glimmer. Unlike the other two diversions, Big Drum did not have an air force component. Although the plan for Big Drum was similar to the Taxable and Glimmer diversions, the Big Drum participants provided a force for the invading units’ western flank. Commanded by Lieutenant Commander H.M. Nees, Special Task Force C, which consisted of four HDMLs, traveled on May 25 to Plymouth, where it joined Flag Officer ‘‘U’’ Force. Operating under Flag Officer ‘‘U’’ Force’s orders, Special Task Force C would implement Big Drum. Commander Grenfell, the Force Commander, directed Special Task Force C’s training and preparation for Big Drum. According to Nees, ‘‘One of the worst problems was the necessity for remaining in one spot on a given heading, in a tidal stream of 4.2 knots. This was

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theoretically solved, after experimental exercises, by anchoring the vessels by the port quarter ready to cut or slip. In practice, this was found to be unnecessary as the strength of wind almost against the tide enabled the craft to maintain position by steaming slowly on one engine.’’21 Near Portland, Special Task Force C met U-2B convoy, which it escorted to the point of dispersal. Despite the preceding days’ bad weather, ‘‘the M.L’s (minelaying force) carried out a spreading manoeuvre previously planned and exercised.’’ The ships adjusted for the presence of a higher tidal stream, fixed their positions on enemy coastal lights, and maneuvered into ‘‘an ideal screening position.’’ Because the enemy did not respond to the ships’ approach, Nees sailed to within one and a half miles of shore, where he remained for approximately an hour. According to Nees, this action ‘‘was carried out independently by all boats without signal, the possibility having been previously discussed.’’ Because of the proximity of Allied bombing, Nees retreated to a safer distance from the coast. After completing the diversion, Special Task Force C returned intact to Newhaven.22 ******************* In addition to participating in Taxable and Glimmer, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) developed its own airborne diversions—Operations Titanic I–IV. In order to entice German reserves that were south of the Seine River to join German forces stationed north of the river, Titanic I ordered the simulation of an airborne division parachuting into the area north of the Seine. Allied aircraft were to drop 200 dummies, along with pintails and the appropriate noises to simulate paratroops landing and engaging in skirmishes, into the Yerville-Doudeville-Fauville-Yvetot area shortly before the Overlord forces landed. Two SAS (Special Air Services) groups would parachute into the same area to enhance the illusion of an airborne assault. Fifteen aircraft from No. 3 Group implemented Titanic I by carrying out two separate tasks. First, to confuse enemy radar, the aircraft dropped large amounts of window on the way to their target. Once they had reached their objective, the aircraft performed their second job—the jettisoning of fake paratroopers. By dropping dummy parachutists, the implementers hoped to convince the Germans that a major Allied airborne landing was underway. Titanic II, which was canceled before June 6, targeted enemy reserves in the area east of the Dives River. The original intention of Titanic II was to use 50 fake paratroopers, pintails, and noise to persuade the Germans not to shift their German reserves west of the Dives River. The goal of Titanic III was to spark a counterattack by enemy troops in the area west of Caen by dropping 50 dummies, pintails, and noise around Maltot and in the woods north of Baron. By jettisoning 200 fake paratroopers, pintails, and noise near Marigny, Titanic IV expected to prompt the same response from enemy forces west of St. Lo. As in Titanic I, two SAS groups would land and create confusion around St. Lo. Nineteen aircraft from No. 3 Group implemented Titanic III and IV. The first SAS group landed around St. Lo shortly after midnight on the morning of June 6, 1944. A short time later, the second SAS group landed in the same area. In addition to the noise made by the dummy paratroopers, jettisoned rifle and machine-gun simulators also erupted with the sounds of battle. The SAS groups set

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up boxes that emitted ‘‘the recorded, amplified sounds of more fire mixed with the thud of mortar bombs and soldiers’ oaths and commands.’’ Approximately thirty minutes later, the noises stopped, and the SAS groups withdrew from the St. Lo area.23 Bomber Command’s assessment of Titanic praised No. 3 Group for maintaining their schedule throughout the operations, but the evidence does not support that assertion. Although the German response was not what had been anticipated, the enemy shot down two Stirling aircraft participating in the Titanic III mission. According to the Bomber Command report, ‘‘The simulation was watched by our own ground radar and is reported as giving an excellent representation of a large force of low-flying aircraft, and there is also evidence that TITANIC did delay the reaction of the enemy ground forces to the real airborne operations.’’24 The Germans reported the landing of paratroopers east of Caen and in the Coutances-Valognes-St. Lo area shortly after 2:00 A.M. on June 6. A few minutes later, German commanders placed the Seventh Army on full alert. General Max Pemsel, who reported the sound of ships’ engines off the Cotentin coast, suggested that the invasion had begun. Because enemy soldiers reported the discovery of dummy paratroopers, General Hans Speidel rejected Pemsel’s supposition. Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, on the other hand, was fooled by some of the dummy paratroopers. At approximately 4:30 A.M. on D-Day, the field marshal ordered General Kurt Meyer to send half of the 12th SS Division to handle the parachutists who had landed on the coast to the north of Lisieux. The paratroopers in question were Titanic fakes.25 Michael Foot was the SAS brigade intelligence officer at the time. Because few of the SAS soldiers who participated in Titanic survived, Foot and others viewed the operation as ‘‘a beastly disaster,’’ regimentally; however, Titanic apparently had much more of an impact than they realized. Deciphered German enigma messages indicated that the operations had been effective. ‘‘The one on the Seine between Rouen and Le Havre at least gave the commandant of the Le Havre a horrible fright. He sent a very agitated telegram at about half past three in the morning to Berlin and all sorts of junior people as well he could think of, saying, ‘I’ve been cut off; there’s been a major landing upstream from me. What am I to do? What am I to do?’’’ Even more important than the report from the Seine, according to Foot, was the landing in the Isigny, which Germans in the area observed and reported. The report made its way to the local divisional headquarters, where the Chief of Staff, who was in charge because the general was attending a conference in Rennes, was awakened. Taking the reported sighting seriously, the Chief of Staff ‘‘woke up his entire reserve regiment who spent the morning of D-Day beating the woods southeast of Isigny for a major airborne division that wasn’t there, instead of being available to push the Omaha landing back from Omaha beach into the sea.’’26 ******************* As the Allied invasion began on the morning of June 6, 1944, the role of the double agents in the Fortitude deception, for a time, assumed greater importance than that of wireless or physical deception. Tate, a double agent originally sent to England by the

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Germans in the fall of 1940, continued to communicate with his controller in Hamburg until the end of the war, despite his low status with his German superiors. Tate had notified his employers of General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s arrival in London to assume his new position as Supreme Commander. Prior to D-Day, Tate informed Germany of his move to Wye in Kent, where his agricultural job allowed him to observe the movement of Allied troops. Shortly before the invasion, he reported that American military leaders were creating an expeditionary force in the United States,27 noted the presence of a large number of British, Canadian, and American soldiers, and identified the 83rd U.S. Infantry Division. One Abwehr official even suggested that Tate’s information might help determine the war’s outcome.28 On June 7 Tate received a communication from his German controllers requesting information about troops located in the region south and southeast of London. The communique´ asked Tate to ‘‘investigate preparations of airborne troops and preparation for the embarkation of these troops in gliders, etc. Also investigate large troop transports as well as preparations or sailing of troops transport vessels from southern English harbours.’’ In his response Tate expressed surprise that an invasion of France had just occurred. The agent reported that nothing had changed, that no noticeable troop rearrangements or removal had transpired. In fact, the spy, noting that soldiers continued to move into the area, identified the 11th U.S. Infantry Division traveling toward Cambridge, the XX U.S. Army Corps heading west, and the 25th U.S. Armored Division moving south from Cambridge. Tate later notified his superiors that part of the 25th Armored Division was situated in Norwich. In his June 8, 9, and 14 communications, the agent claimed that the Allies were preparing to transfer FUSAG to Tilbury, Gravesend, Dover, Folkestone, and Newhaven, where they would embark on ships bound for France. Although his employers requested that Tate maintain his vigilance and reports about troops concentrations and movements in southeast England, record of his transmissions after early June are not available. Apparently, communications between Tate and his Abwehr controller continued through early May 1945. Tate received a communication from Hamburg on May 2 shortly before the Allies captured the city.29 ******************* Although Tate’s role in the Fortitude deception after D-Day was minimal, that was not the case with the other double agents, as noted earlier. Traveling to Lisbon in March 1944, Tricycle, or Dusko Popov, provided his contact with important information about Allied troops in England. Later he supplied data about the forces in Scotland preparing for an attack on German troops in Norway. Although he contributed to Fortitude South in the spring of 1944, by early May the blown cover of another agent, Artist, compromised Tricycle’s position and virtually ended his usefulness to the deception. Despite his precarious position, the Germans did not indicate any suspicions; therefore, Tricycle’s network continued to operate after D-Day although its role in Fortitude was minimal.30 *******************

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Other agents, such as Brutus and Garbo, played more important roles in the Fortitude deception before, during, and after the Normandy invasion. Because he had established himself as a reliable spy for the Germans, the Double-Cross Committee chose to use Roman Garby-Czerniawski, code named Brutus, in the Fortitude deception. In early May, because of the precariousness of Tricycle’s position, he assumed a more prominent role in Fortitude. By mid-May the Polish agent received an appointment to a section of FUSAG headquarters that was responsible for recruiting Poles living in occupied territory in danger of being overrun by Allied forces. Brutus informed his contact that he would assume his new FUSAG job on May 27. Along with Garbo, Brutus provided Abwehr with most of the facts that it needed to construct the FUSAG Order of Battle. Information supplied by Brutus and Garbo contributed to Hitler’s perception of the status of Allied forces in Great Britain on the eve of D-Day. After receiving news of the Allied invasion, Brutus contacted his controller. Because of FUSAG’s continued presence in southeast England, he expressed surprise about the Allied action and concluded that, although FUSAG appeared ready for commitment in France, the army group would engage in an action independent of the assault started by the 21st Army Group. The Normandy invasion increased Brutus’s value to his Abwehr employers. On June 8 he claimed that he had observed Patton’s army group ‘‘preparing to embark at east coast and south-eastern English ports.’’ Patton was ready to implement Allied plans for Calais since the Normandy assault appeared successful. According to Brutus, Patton’s assault force included five airborne divisions, a 10 division ‘‘sea force,’’ and 50 land divisions.31 Responding to requests for more information, Brutus admitted that he was having difficulty obtaining what his superiors wanted. On June 10 he informed Abwehr that, because he could not travel to London, he had to rely upon an associate to visit him in Staines in order to supply the requested information. Brutus further lamented his position on June 11. ‘‘With regard to FUSAG, it is difficult for me to penetrate the Operations Room because my personal relations are still weak and because security restrictions are very severe and in principle the Allied Liaison officers are kept apart. Nevertheless I am obliged to be there every day and each day I improve my relations.’’ 32 Like Garbo, Brutus transmitted information about FUSAG throughout the month of June. He reported the continuing influx of new American troops into southeast England. Although he strove to keep his contacts informed, the Polish agent experienced great personal difficulties that hindered his ability to transmit important information about FUSAG. Because Brutus participated in political opposition to the head of the Polish air force, his fellow Poles instituted court-martial proceedings against him. Brutus’s actions had jeopardized his role in the Fortitude deception. Despite the potential disaster, he overcame the problem and subsequently fulfilled several military appointments, which provided him access to military information desired by his German employers;33 however, Garbo’s role in the deception was even more vital than Brutus’s. *******************

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Between 1942, when he arrived in England, and the spring of 1944, Juan Pujol Garcia, code named Garbo, had established himself as a reliable agent, who had built a network of over 20 subagents, and as such, his potential usefulness for the Fortitude deception became assured. Much of the value given to double agents who participated in the deception before and after D-Day revolved around a message that the double agent planned to send early on the morning of the invasion. Garbo and MI 5’s Tommy Harris had argued convincingly in the spring of 1944 that the Germans would be more likely to accept Normandy as a diversion if he notified them about the commencement of the invasion. The two men also concluded that the Germans would also then more readily accept Garbo’s conclusions about the threat to the Pas de Calais. Although he reluctantly agreed to the request, Eisenhower stipulated that the message could be transmitted no sooner than three and a half hours prior to the initial landing of invasion troops, which had been set for 6:30 A.M. on June 5, 1944. On June 3 Garbo arranged for the Madrid receiving station to remain open after its normal shutdown time of 11:00 P.M. by requesting a ‘‘night watch’’ to prevent any delays in the transmission of important messages. Abwehr agreed, which set the stage for Garbo’s most important communication in the early hours on D-Day.34 Things did not, however, go as smoothly as the Double-Cross Committee had hoped. First, bad weather forced the postponement of the invasion by a day. Then, when Garbo’s radio operator, Almura, went on the air as scheduled to notify the Germans that an invasion had begun, the Madrid receiving station was not operating and could not receive his transmission. Consequently, Almura failed to send Garbo’s message until after the invasion had begun. Garbo pretended to be unaware of the problem until the next day. When Garbo sent another message on the evening of June 6, his goal was to enhance the Fortitude South deception. Garbo reported that, when he had gone to the Ministry of Information earlier that day, the office was in total confusion. Rumors about the invasion of France ran rampant as his coworkers speculated about the significance of the Allied action. Garbo then included a copy of a PWE (Political Warfare Executive) directive that his office had received. The directive, entitled ‘‘Special Directive on the Offensive against Northern France, Political Warfare Executive, Central Directive,’’ included the following provisions: 1. The offensive launched today by General Eisenhower forms another important step in the Allied concentric attack on the fortress of Europe. 2. It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be kept in the dark as to our future intentions. 3. Care should be given to avoid any reference to further assaults and diversions. 4. Speculation regarding alternative assault areas must be avoided. 5. The importance of the present assault and its decisive influence on the course of the war should be clearly stated.35

Garbo proceeded to relate the gist of a conversation with J(3), the head of the Spanish section of the Ministry of Information, in which they attempted to examine

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the discrepancies between the PWE directive, Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s speech, in which he suggested that the assault on Normandy was the first of several invasions that the Allies planned, and Eisenhower’s speech, in which he warned the French not to launch a ‘‘premature uprising’’ against the Germans. Eisenhower had also referred to the Normandy invasion as the ‘‘opening phase’’ of the European campaign. The directive appeared to be a crucial endeavor by the Allies to disguise the true nature of the Normandy invasion, which was a diversion, not the main attack.36 Shortly before midnight on June 6, the Spaniard sent another communication, in which he reported that Agent 3(3) had observed the Allied fleet still in the Clyde. Although it was in a state of alert, there was not much activity in the Clyde. During his message, Garbo alerted his contact that he had just discovered that Madrid had not received his first June 6 message until after the invasion had begun. The agent ‘‘complained vigorously to the Germans and pointed out that they had not been ready to receive the most important message he was ever going to send them . . . and that he was so fed up that he was going to stop working for them.’’ Garbo’s communication sparked an apology from his controller the next day. He attempted to soothe the agent’s feelings by saying, ‘‘I wish to stress in the clearest terms that your work over the last few weeks has made it possible for our Command to be completely forewarned and prepared and the message of Four would have influenced but little had it arrived three or four hours earlier.’’ His controller then pleaded with Garbo not to abandon the important work that he was doing. Apparently, either the Germans believed that their own communications problems prevented them from gaining the valuable information sooner, or they were trying to cover up their own mistake.37 After an extensive conference with several of his subagents, Garbo sent a comprehensive message on June 9 that took over two hours to transmit. In it, he made startling conclusions about the Normandy invasion and about future Allied plans. After presenting a detailed list of the locations and insignias of numerous Allied divisions, Garbo reached the most important part of his transmission. From the reports mentioned it is perfectly clear that the present attack is a large-scale operation but diversionary in character for the purpose of establishing a strong bridgehead in order to draw the maximum of our reserves to the area of operation and to retain them there so as to be able to strike a blow somewhere else with ensured success. I never like to give my opinion unless I have strong reasons to justify my assurances, but the fact that these concentrations which are in the east and south east of the island are now inactive means that they must be held in reserve to be employed in the other large-scale operations. The constant aerial bombardments which the area of the Pas-deCalais has suffered and the strategic disposition of these forces give reason to suspect an attack in that region of France which, at the same time, offers the shortest route for the final objective of their illusions, which is to say, Berlin.38

The OKW, which received Garbo’s message at 10:30 P.M. on June 9, quickly gave it to Hitler and Field Marshal Jodl. As a result on June 10, Hitler ordered Field Marshal von Rundstedt to cancel the transfer of the 1st SS Panzer Division to Normandy,

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which he had ordered on June 6. Hitler also ordered the movement of the 116th Panzer Division to the Pas de Calais area.39 Although messages continued to pass between Garbo and his Abwehr contact throughout the month of June and into July, none carried the weight of the June 9 communique´. The goal of Garbo’s messages was to persuade the enemy not to send reinforcements into the Normandy area. On June 12 the agent reported the results of a conversation that he had had with subagent 4(3), who was an American sergeant. According to Garbo, although he was unable to determine the location of General Omar Bradley’s headquarters, he had learned that the general was under Montgomery’s orders. In addition, General Patton had assumed command of FUSAG, whose headquarters was located in Ascot. A few days later, Garbo acknowledged information gathered by Dagobert and his agents that indicated the movement of the 55th Division from Scotland to southeast England, where it was preparing to embark for its passage across the channel. The next day, June 17, Garbo reported an exercise by the 28th U.S. Division on the Felixstowe beaches. By noting that the exercise included practice with landing craft, Garbo implied the possibility of an impending amphibious landing. The agent’s transmissions included notations of the increased presence of Allied troops in southeast England—new divisions from the United States and some previously located in Scotland that had participated in the threat to Norway. According to subagent 4(3), the new American divisions did not belong to either FUSAG or 21st Army Group, which suggested the formation of a new army group. On July 2, Garbo reported the results of another conversation with 4(3). ‘‘He told me that FUSAG will undertake a more important task and that in order to be able to accomplish it, four American divisions have recently arrived in this country under the command of another American army.. . .He insinuated that the war was about to enter a new and decisive phase.’’40 In addition to using messages from double agents to suggest that the Normandy invasion was a diversion, British intelligence attempted to control agents operating on the continent. According to a letter sent to Brigadier E.E. Mockler-Ferryman from the Special Force (SF) Liaison Detachment, SHAEF, both Colonel H.N.H. Wild and Lieutenant Colonel J.V.B. Jervis-Read approved help from SF in persuading the Germans to accept the Normandy invasion as a diversion, with the major assault to occur against the Pas de Calais some time between eight and 20 days after D-Day. According to the SF Liaison Detachment, ‘‘it is therefore probable that G-3 will want us to issue warning messages to a certain proportion of our blown agents in the PAS DE CALAIS and ARDENNES area, whom we might reasonably not know to have been captured.’’ The brigadier suggested that a large number of fake warning messages would be sent to ‘‘blown’’ agents over a wide area on June 15–16, for which air time would have to be obtained from the BBC, and that the warnings targeting a particular area would probably be transmitted between 11 and 20 days after D-Day.41 Major General J. F. M. Whiteley sent a memo to Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) on June 8, 1944, to confirm arrangements made with Mockler-Ferryman

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by telephone. Whiteley ordered that ‘‘action’’ messages be broadcast to resistance groups in Belgium on June 8. The communique´s would request ‘‘the sabotage of specific railway, road and telecommunication targets, but must NOT call for general harassing action and guerrilla warfare.’’ 42 A debate over whether or not to send dummy messages resulted. General Montgomery believed that blocks of fake warning transmissions should not be sent to Special Operations Executive (SOE) resistance groups until the Fortitude deception had reached its climax. He asked that the 21st Army Group be allowed to set the date for the request for ‘‘requisite broadcasting time’’ from the BBC.43 Added to the question about dummy warning messages was a request from Cricket, an organizer in Holland, to SFHQ. Cricket sent the communication on June 6/7 through a W/T operator, Swale, whom SFHQ knew was under enemy control. Cricket requested special instructions concerning the invasion in France. Mockler-Ferryman ordered that Cricket be instructed to ‘‘follow broadcast instructions and defer action for the present’’ because it was not yet time for him to take any action. On June 10 Cricket, responding through Swale, noted that the Dutch, although they welcomed the Allied assault, feared the spread of air bombardments and fighting to Holland. Because of the current situation, Cricket wondered if the SFHQ would designate new supply drop areas. Since a decision had not been made with regard to new drop zones, the SFHQ suggested that Lieutenant Colonel JervisRead and Lieutenant Colonel David Strangeways be consulted for ways in which to take advantage of the request for the purposes of deception. SFHQ did, however, express the following concern. ‘‘It must be borne in mind that, unless this is planned very carefully, and should the ENEMY be aware that he is known to be controlling SWALE, there is a danger of revealing to the GERMANS in what manner it is intended to deceive them.’’44 Although a decision about dummy warning messages and Cricket’s request were not immediately forthcoming, on June 22, 1944, General H.R. Bull requested that Special Forces Headquarters broadcast ‘‘blocks of dummy messages’’ to resistance groups in France and Belgium on July 1–2. A week later he made a similar request for messages to be broadcast on August 1–2.45 ******************* As discussed earlier, Operation Fortitude consisted of two separate plans— Fortitude North, which suggested a threat to Norway, and Fortitude South, which threatened the Pas de Calais. Although it was part of Fortitude North, the British Fourth Army, commanded by General Sir Andrew Thorne, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command, included real divisions that were slated for participation in France. Therefore, shortly before D-Day, several divisions received orders to transfer their camps into England. Other divisions replaced those in southeast England that were part of the invasion or follow up force. Several double agents reported the movement of those divisions because, the LCS and SHAEF believed, their presence in France could not be kept secret. The removal of troops from the Fourth Army changed the nature of the Fortitude North deception. According to Colonel John H. Bevan, the LCS Controlling Officer, Fortitude North had

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reached its maximum threat around D-Day. Although the LCS planned to retain a lesser threat to Norway, the section realized that it could no longer mount an imminent threat.46 By August 22, 1944, Bevan acknowledged that the Germans had no concern about an imminent large-scale Allied amphibious assault against Norway. Their major concern was the likelihood of increased Allied naval and air attacks on German shipping and Norwegian port facilities. Although he noted that the number of imaginary divisions in the United Kingdom would permit a renewal of the threat against Norway, Bevan admitted that no justification existed for such an operation.47 Between June 6 and Bevan’s report dated August 22, 1944, the Fortitude North deception underwent a number of changes and gradually merged with the Fortitude South deception. The transfer of II British Corps from Scotland to southeast England commenced a sequence of events that led to the merger of the two operations. The British Fourth Army contained three corps—II and VII British Corps and XV American Corps—each of which included both real and fictitious divisions. Both SHAEF and the LCS reevaluated Fortitude North and South in terms of the possibility of maintaining the Pas de Calais threat longer than had first been anticipated. The realization that the transfer of General Patton and his real command, the Third U.S. Army, to France would blow the FUSAG cover encouraged the decision to transfer Fortitude North formations to southeast England because, unlike Bevan, Sir Roland Wingate claimed that, by this time, ‘‘the FORTITUDE NORTH story was becoming untenable.’’ 48 See Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3. The transfer of other formations, both military and naval, occurred earlier in May and contributed to the decision to incorporate II Corps in the Fortitude South deception. The 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, originally under XV Corps’ command in Northern Ireland, replaced 28th U.S. Infantry Division in Tenby, South Wales. The naval deception units that had been representing ‘‘V’’ and ‘‘W’’ Forces received orders for redeployment in the south. Although XV U.S. Corps traveled from Northern Ireland to the Midland counties during the middle of May, it was not available for participation in Fortitude South because of the corps’ reassignment to Normandy. After careful consideration of all options, the LCS and SHAEF decided that it was easier to move imaginary forces situated in Scotland than real ones located in Ireland to southeast England; therefore, they chose II British Corps and the 58th British Infantry Division. After some discussion the War Office ‘‘agreed that the signals of this formation should be formed into an advance party and transferred to Scotland, where they could represent it on the air, the remainder being instructed to use lowpowered sets in the division’s old location.’’ SHAEF subsequently issued orders for II British Corps and its two divisions to move into the area vacated by II Canadian Corps. Fourth Army Headquarters remained in Scotland to supervise VII British Corps and XV U.S. Corps. A detachment of 3103rd Signal Service Battalion covered XV Corps’ departure from Northern Ireland by simulating its presence there until late June. SHAEF had also ordered the movement of Fourth Army’s headquarters from Edinburgh to Ayr, which had occurred around May 20.49

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Figure 6.1 The Allies hoped that no spies would get close enough to this convoy to discover that the tanks, trucks, and jeeps were not real. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

That day Colonel R. Macleod, who was implementing Fortitude North, received orders to begin to shift the focus of the Fourth Army’s threat from Norway to the Pas de Calais by moving II Corps south. Four days later, the Home Forces’ General Staff notified Eastern, Scottish, and South Eastern Commands of the movement of ‘‘notional 2 Corps consisting of Headquarters 2 Corps, 55 Infantry Division and 58 Infantry Division’’ to 21st Army Group’s command. The job of II British Corps was to take the place of II Canadian Corps, which had orders to land in Normandy on D plus 8. The General Staff stipulated that the code word for all messages and correspondence relative to the transfer was ‘‘Tweezer.’’ In addition, the notional Headquarters II Corps was divided into two parts, one of which would remain under Scottish Command, the other of which would move into southeast England. Likewise, part of 55th Infantry Division would stay in Northern Ireland, while its Signals traveled with Headquarters II Corps (Advance). The rest of 55th Division arrived in southeast England at a later date. FUSAG assumed command of 58th Division. On May 30 Macleod issued new orders to HQ II Corps, VII Corps, XV U.S. Corps, 52 Infantry Division, and 55 Infantry Division (Advance) explaining future policy, the transfer of II Corps, the dates of Fourth Army exercises, and changes in wireless

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Figure 6.2 A quick glance suggests a truck traveling along a ridge, but this decoy truck cannot move under its own steam. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

links. The 113th Independent Infantry Brigade, situated in the Orkneys, switched from II Corps’ command to that of VII Corps. The transfer of II Corps from Fourth Army significantly reduced the threat to Norway.50 Unfortunately, the transfer of II Corps to FUSAG did not proceed as planned. Originally SHAEF and the LCS scheduled a four-day large-scale army exercise to begin on June 2. Three days later, an order for the immediate transfer of II Corps along with the 52nd and 55th Infantry Divisions to Lincolnshire interrupted the maneuvers. A request from the 21st Army Group for the movement of II Corps to occur on June 2 resulted in a cancellation of the exercise. ‘‘On 5th June 2nd Corps, still netted to Fourth Army, came on the air at Louth with the 55th British Infantry Division at Skegness and the 58th at Horncastle, and on the 6th a link was opened between 2nd Corps and FUSAG.’’51 In a letter dated June 6, 1944, Macleod expressed his concerns about the way in which the movement of II Corps had occurred. He suggested that the picture presented by the move might not have been the one intended. According to Macleod, ‘‘HQ 2 Corps opened at LOUTH on 5 Jun and closed at STIRLING at the same time. The distance between the two is some 350 miles and it probably would have

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Figure 6.3 As this picture of a dummy jeep demonstrates, keeping the fake equipment inflated was sometimes a problem. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

taken a week to complete the move of the Corps. Presumably, therefore, the advanced elements should have begun their move from STIRLING on or about 29 May and the warning order gone out some four or five days before.’’52 Macleod also addressed the transfer of 55th Division first to Dumfries, Scotland, and then to Skegness, Lincolnshire. He questioned why the situation, which might have allowed the transfer of 55th Division directly to Skegness, England, without first traveling to Scotland, was not evaluated more closely. ‘‘Advanced and main bodies of 55 Div both moved on the afternoon of 3 Jun, closing down in the DUMFRIES area then and having orders to open in the LINCOLNSHIRE area some 24 hours later, leaving no rear links behind.. . .The distance of the move is some 300 miles and in actual fact would probably have taken at least four days. As the same sets . . .were used in LINCOLNSHIRE as in SCOTLAND, this might show a totally false rate of move to the Germans.’’ Macleod expressed similar apprehensions about the 58th Division’s transfer. Macleod concluded by requesting that he or someone on his staff be allowed to participate in the planning of future movement of Fourth Army formations.53 Lieutenant Colonel Jervis-Read, from the G-3 Division at SHAEF, apparently misunderstood Macleod’s concerns. In his reply to Macleod, Jervis-Read said,

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‘‘I absolutely agree that these moves were made in the shortest possible time. Although we had foreseen that this move might take place at very short notice, we were quite unable to give you prior warning before we did as the move was ordered immediately a certain situation arose.’’54 Macleod responded in another attempt to clarify his position. In a letter sent two days later, he said: What I was really a little worried about was not the short notice we had of the move—we are quite prepared to move anywhere at any time!—but that the distance covered by the Divs of the 2 Corps, as it would possibly be picked up by the Germans, might appear unreal, especially if the same operators had to be used in the new and old locations. I was only suggesting that we might, by direct contact with you beforehand, be able to make such moves appear as real as possible by improvising a suitable rear HQ for the formations so that the same operators would not appear too quickly in two different areas.55

As the correspondence between Macleod and Jervis-Read indicates, even a week after the beginning of the Normandy invasion, the movement of troops as part of the Fortitude deception did not always occur smoothly or realistically. Had the Germans been paying closer attention, Macleod’s concerns might have been realized. ******************* On June 6, 1944, as a result of a meeting attended the day before by representatives from the 21st Army Group, including Lieutenant Colonel Strangeways, and FUSAG, 21st Army Group issued a new Order of Battle for the FUSAG formations. It reflected the addition of II British Corps. A 21st Army Group directive dated June 8, 1944, stipulated Eisenhower’s allotment of Fourth Army divisions to the appropriate commands. The Supreme Commander shifted II Canadian Corps and XII U.S. Corps to the 21st Army Group, effective June 14, and II British Corps, which was scheduled to arrive in Dover on June 16, to FUSAG.56 Changes in the wireless program indicated the shift in formations. The I Canadian Corps began observing wireless silence on June 14. ‘‘On 16th June the wireless links of the 2nd British Corps were to close in Lincolnshire and simultaneously to open in the vicinity of Dover, that corps having already established wireless communication with FUSAG on 4th June.’’ Communications from Brutus and Garbo reinforced the wireless deception that indicated the troop movements. Both agents reported sightings of II Corps and 58th Infantry Division troops in Kent by mid-June. Another 21st Army Group directive ordered one No. 5 Wireless Group monitoring section to simulate the 10th Airborne Division, under II British Corps’ command, and to open the appropriate wireless nets eleven days after D-Day. The War Office (Sigs 9) would provide the frequencies, call signs, appropriate sets, and one time pad traffic.57 The 35th Tank Brigade, situated in Dumfries, provided support for the shift of Fortitude North components to the Fortitude South deception. Macleod instituted plans for corps training exercises in which the 35th Tank Brigade participated. He scheduled a three day exercise for June 18–20. With the exception of XV U.S. Corps, all of Fourth Army engaged in the practice. The 55th Division provided

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wireless sets to represent XV Corps. According to the exercise, II Corps and 35th Tank Brigade landed around Troon and proceeded inland against positions defended by VII Corps. The deception leaders provided wireless messages, including those for the umpire net, for the exercise. Taped messages recorded by officers around Scotland and England provided the bulk of material transmitted during the activity.58 ******************* The original Tweezer plan had dictated the shutdown of the entire FUSAG wireless network on June 26 to suggest an imminent threat in order possibly to prevent the movement of the German Fifteenth Army into the Normandy area. The Fortitude North formations that had moved into southeast England would return to Scotland. Some Fortitude South divisions would move to Normandy, and No. 5 Wireless Group and 3103rd Signal Service Battalion would transfer to new duties overseas. An evaluation of the deception shortly after D-Day, however, indicated apparent success, which resulted in a reevaluation of the situation, changes in the plan, and the decision to continue the Fortitude deception for as long as possible.59 Although the Normandy invasion had naturally shifted the focus to more immediate concerns, such as the attempt to delay the transfer of enemy forces to the battlefield, Fortitude North, despite the reduction of Fourth Army, remained operational. By early June, ‘‘it was in any case obvious that the force of FORTITUDE NORTH was spent.’’ The course of the battle in Normandy also forced changes in the deception. By the end of the month, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion quit simulating the presence of the XV U.S. Corps in Northern Ireland since its landing in Normandy was approaching. A few days later 52nd Lowland Division relinquished its fictitious part in Fourth Army. By the middle of July Fourth Army and VII British Corps relocated to England for inclusion in the Fortitude South Order of Battle. In addition, the 55th Infantry Division Signals had completed its role in the deception and began plans for its return to England from Northern Ireland. A memorandum from Brigadier General A.S. Nevins, dated July 31, 1944, suggested, however, that 55th Division’s contribution to the deception had not yet ended. Although the threat to Norway basically concluded in July, the official end of Fortitude North did not come until September 30, 1944.60 ******************* Although the transfer of British Fourth Army to the Fortitude South deception seriously hindered the Allied threat to Scandinavia, SHAEF believed that it was important to continue to tie down German forces in Norway and Denmark. As a result, the LCS developed Fortitude North II, which suggested the presence of an ‘‘occupational’’ force in Scotland that would land in Norway in the event of the German collapse. General Thorne received command of one U.S. and two British divisions, along with the appropriate ‘‘naval lift’’ to create the ‘‘occupational’’ force and then ordered two of the divisions and part of the naval force, situated around the Clyde, to be prepared for embarkation on short notice. SHAEF situated the third

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division where it would be able to sail out of Humber and other northeast ports. The Ninth U.S. Army would provide reinforcement for the occupation force. Although the plan did not indicate special military wireless activity, it dictated that the 48th Infantry Division would produce activity consistent with normal training. To supplement the story, the air force would carry out regular reconnaissance flights over the coast of Norway, paying particular attention to ports and railways, and the LCS would use diplomatic channels to facilitate acceptance of the new scheme. As the Germans lost ground in Normandy, however, it became apparent that the Germans might be willing to withdraw forces from Norway despite the resulting vulnerability in the region. Consequently, the Fortitude North deception grew less effective and, at the same time, more difficult to perpetuate. Although adopted and executed by Special Means, Fortitude North II was not an ‘‘official’’ plan and did not involve physical deception. SHAEF ultimately decided to close Plan Bodyguard and leave short term deception operations to the individual theater commanders. By October 4, 1944, Eisenhower acknowledged the cancellation of Bodyguard and a review of the cover requirements for operations in the future. He also stipulated that the only threat to Scandinavia would be the presence of an ‘‘unspecified’’ occupation force located in the United Kingdom.61 Although activity related to Fortitude North diminished greatly in the days, weeks, and months following the commencement of the Normandy invasion, the same cannot be said about Fortitude South. ******************* Shortly after the Normandy invasion began, Colonel David Strangeways initiated an evaluation of ‘‘R’’ Force’s activities, in terms of Fortitude South, and its future policy. On June 8, 1944, Strangeways concluded that the Fortitude South story had ‘‘gone over’’ and then reviewed the steps taken by ‘‘R’’ Force to maintain the threat to the Pas de Calais area, the number of fake landing craft that had been deployed, and changes in the wireless nets caused by the movement of II British Corps to Lincolnshire. Strangeways indicated what was required for further perpetration of the deception, including: a concentration of shipping in eastern waters, along with the routing of spare destroyers to ports in East Anglia and Dover; the bombing of targets behind the beaches at Boulogne; ‘‘oblique’’ reconnaissance of the Boulogne area; an inspection of Canadian troops situated in Dover by the prime minister; and propaganda aimed at Belgian resistance groups suggesting future assistance ‘‘by urging them to take no action until told’’ against enemy forces in the Pas de Calais area.62 Other aspects of the Fortitude deception fell under scrutiny in the days following the invasion. According to Major General J.F.M. Whiteley, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, the ports between Yarmouth and Folkestone contained 240 fake LCTs. He anticipated the ability to operate wireless for nine divisions ‘‘with their appropriate Corps and Army headquarters’’ on a continuous basis. The lighting around the ports and hards created the illusion of ongoing amphibious training. Various types of aerial reconnaissance continued over the Pas de Calais region. Whiteley concluded that geography and the constant movement through the Dover Straits by vessels that originated in east coast ports enhanced the continued deception.

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During the original planning of the Fortitude deception, the LCS did not envision that the threat to the Pas de Calais region would last for very long after the Normandy battle had begun. After the initial assault, Allied forces underwent a buildup period in the Normandy beachhead. As the weeks progressed, the real formations that had played a role in the fictitious FUSAG Order of Battle prepared for relocation to the Normandy. Once the Germans identified these formations in France, the deception would be ‘‘blown.’’ Therefore, after consulting SHAEF, the LCS constructed a new order of battle, which consisted almost completely of fictitious formations, in order to continue the threat to the Pas de Calais. The LCS decided that, because the Germans believed that FUSAG was the ‘‘headquarters of the PAS DE CALAIS force,’’ it would be harmful to the deception to change FUSAG’s role. Because SHAEF designated them to fight in France, the real FUSAG forces became the Twelfth Army Group, and ‘‘FUSAG in a notional form’’ in England perpetuated its original role.63 There was no certainty about how long Fortitude could be sustained, and as a result, the planners constantly assessed the situation while at the same time planning for its continuation. The planning of the new FUSAG Order of Battle and Fortitude South II went through several stages before Allied leaders adopted the plan. SHAEF issued a draft entitled, ‘‘Draft Stage—Post (D Day) ‘Overlord’ Planning Cover and Deception Operations,’’ on June 14, 1944. Because the LCS devised several versions of the new plan between mid-June and mid-July, it had to formulate explanations for several changes—the presence in France of most of the FUSAG formations, the demotion of Patton from army group commander to army commander, and the appointment of a new FUSAG commander.64 During a meeting held by SHAEF on June 26 at 21st Army Group Headquarters, representatives of ANCXF, AEAF, and 21st Army Group agreed to the following story, which was partially based upon fact, that would explain the alterations in the FUSAG Order of Battle. First, because the Allied advance in Normandy had met unexpected obstacles and had not proceeded as planned, General Montgomery requested more reinforcements than had originally been allocated to the invasion. Consequently, Eisenhower transferred FUSAG formations to the bridgehead to reinforce the situation and ordered the formation of a new army group called Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Because of his experience and availability, General Omar Bradley received command of Twelfth U.S. Army Group and authorization to draw upon FUSAG officers when necessary. General George S. Patton, displaying his normal fiery temper, objected to the loss of FUSAG formations under his command. Following a heated disagreement with General Eisenhower, in which his past behavior became an issue, General Patton suffered a demotion from army group commander to commander of Third U.S. Army. Finally, the old FUSAG staff received command of new British and American formations located in east and southeast England and instructions to prepare for the assault on the Pas de Calais, which, due to current circumstances, would be postponed for a short time. The British Fourth Army would replace the First Canadian Army in Kent, and the newly arrived Fourteenth U.S. Army would take Third Army’s place in East Anglia. The Fourth and Fourteenth Armies would make up

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the assault force, while the Ninth U.S. Army in Bristol would provide buildup formations. A ‘‘high-ranking’’ American general would arrive shortly to assume command of the ‘‘new’’ First U.S. Army Group.65 ******************* Although SHAEF did not accept the final version of Fortitude South II until July 19, 1944, the plan was in effect from July 6 until September 8, 1944. The purpose of the new plan was ‘‘to maintain the threat of a landing in the Pas de Calais area of France from the River Somme exclusive to Boulogne inclusive with the object of reducing the rate and weight of reinforcement of enemy forces opposing the Normandy beachhead from about D+30 for as long as possible.’’66 With the shift from Plan Fortitude South to Fortitude South II, responsibility for the Pas de Calais threat changed from the 21st Army Group to the Supreme Commander. CG ETOUSA and the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, received orders to implement the plan by wireless deception. Like the original Fortitude South plan, the new one had naval, military, and air components. The navy would, when possible, maintain the displays of dummy craft in the east and southeast England locations and would attempt to concentrate shipping and craft in the ports of east and southeast England. In addition, the navy would use wireless to simulate three notional assault divisions, as well as divisional and RCT assault exercises in the normal training areas. Using permanent nets, which would begin operating by July 26, wireless would represent FUSAG and its associated formations according to the new Order of Battle. The plan stipulated the schedule for Fourth Army’s movement and the arrival of Fourteenth U.S. Army in the FUSAG area and indicated the continuation of training, activities suggesting assault preparations, and dummy lighting at ports and hards. In addition, the plan gave the Eighth U.S. Fighter Command the responsibility of selecting ten groups ‘‘to act purely as a notional close support force’’ for FUSAG. When feasible, the USSTAF would participate in assault xercises, and the strategic bombing program for the Fortitude South area would continue.67 The target date for the training and concentration of military and air forces was July 26. The assault forces would concentrate in the Southampton-New Haven area ports. Three infantry and three airborne divisions would mount an assault on the beaches, with 55th British Division and two British airborne divisions on the right, the 59th U.S. Division in the middle, and the 17th U.S. Division on the left. The 9th and 21st Airborne Divisions would support the assault in the middle and on the left. The 58th British Division would follow up the assault on the right, while the 25th U.S. Armored Division would do the same on the left. ‘‘The force will be followed up and built up from the THAMES (US forces) and the SOUTHAMPTON area (BRITISH forces) at a rate of about one and a half divisions per day.’’68 By July 20 SHAEF and the LCS had also devised an outline for Special Means participation in Fortitude South II. The outline included ‘‘Moves to Concentration, and Other Related Troop Movements’’ and indicated the dates, routes, either by rail

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or by road, and old and new locations for the formations involved. A new code name went with the new plan; instead of Quicksilver, it became Rosebud.69 Various drafts of Plan Fortitude South II exist and reflect the evolution of the plan. While the third draft, dated June 23, 1944, included Fortitude North and had a section entitled, ‘‘Southern Norway—‘Fortitude/North II,’’’ the July 19 version omitted any reference to the Norway threat. Its focus was the Pas de Calais threat. As already noted, the removal of the Fourth Army from the northern deception totally changed the nature of the threat to Norway. Consequently, the new Fortitude North plan only provided occupation, not assault forces. As SHAEF and the LCS worked on the new deception plans, Colonel John H. Bevan reiterated the desires of the two groups. He acknowledged the reality that the Fortitude North deception had culminated around D-Day and that the implementers could no longer suggest an imminent threat to Norway and the desire to maintain Fortitude South II ‘‘from now until September in support of OVERLORD. It will reach a high peak of intensity about 14th August in order to support ANVIL also.’’70 ******************* Before the Fortitude South II plan received final approval, however, circumstances dictated its implementation. In late June General Bradley and the Twelfth Army Group, originally FUSAG, crossed the English Channel to France. On July 6, Patton traveled to France to join the Third U.S. Army secretly, in an attempt ‘‘to avoid compromising the great deception.’’ (The Third Army did not become officially operational until August 1.) Even after the Third Army ‘‘became operational’’ in France, Allied leaders attempted to keep Patton’s role from being discovered by the Germans. It proved difficult, however, to keep Patton’s presence in France a secret.71 In the meantime, subject to General Marshall’s approval, Eisenhower had to appoint a replacement for Patton as FUSAG commander. In addition, SHAEF decided to use special means to release the names of other FUSAG leaders to the enemy. On July 26, SHAEF recommended the following: Major General J. P. Lucas, command of Fourteenth U.S. Army (in reality CG HQ Fifteenth U.S. Army in the United States), Major General M. B. Ridgway, command of XXXVII Corps (CG 82nd A/B Division), Brigadier General Stuart Cutler, command of 21st A/B Division (Acting Chief of Staff, HQ Combined A/B Troops), and Major General Terry Allen, command of 17th Infantry Division (CG 104th Infantry Division in the United States). According to a memorandum from Major General H.R. Bull to the Chief of Staff, ‘‘These names will not be associated with the commands listed other than by special means for enemy consumption only.’’72 Although Patton had not been associated with the FUSAG deception since early July, SHAEF did not officially release information about his new position, Commanding General of Third U.S. Army, until July 30. Eisenhower, however, did not wait until the official announcement to request a replacement for Patton. On July 6, 1944, the Supreme Commander sent a communique´ to General Marshall requesting General McNair, General DeWitt, or someone comparable to become the

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new FUSAG commander. On the same day, Major General H.R. Bull sent a letter to the Chief of Staff requesting General McNair’s services ‘‘in support revised cover and deception plan.’’73 Three days later Eisenhower received word from Marshall that McNair had accepted the position and would be arriving in England after July 12. After receiving confirmation from Marshall, Eisenhower requested that he not yet announce McNair’s appointment or arrival date. Apprised of McNair’s impending arrival, Jervis-Read recommended that the general be informed about his role in the deception, as an observer in the United Kingdom and in France, both at SHAEF and at ETOUSA. Jervis-Read cautioned, ‘‘Bearing in mind that he should be training and preparing the First U.S. Army Group for an operation in the near future, visits to FRANCE should not be overdone.’’74 Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair arrived in England to assume his new duties on July 14, 1944. Two days later Bull requested permission from the Chief of Staff to announce McNair’s appointment through special means. Unfortunately, McNair’s role in the deception was short-lived. Shortly after his arrival, McNair traveled to France to observe the fighting. On July 25, bombs released by Allied aircraft participating in Operation Cobra fell short of their intended targets; over six hundred Allied casualties resulted. Among those killed was the new FUSAG commander. Besides the obvious tragedy, McNair’s death caused an immediate problem for the Fortitude South II deception. FUSAG no longer had a commander.75 McNair’s death caused problems for the deception. SHAEF had to decide if and when to announce the tragedy publicly. Initially, SHAEF wanted to hide the general’s demise, and only Patton, Bradley, and three other officers attended his funeral. SHAEF quickly realized, however, that it would be impossible to prevent the Germans from learning the truth. On July 26, Brigadier General A. S. Nevins, GSC, Chief Ops Section contacted the Chief of Staff and offered to use special means to apprise the enemy of McNair’s death and suggested that General Simpson become the new FUSAG commander. In a separate communication, Bull recommended not issuing a press release about McNair until July 29, which would allow Ops B to make special arrangements. A communication from 21st Army Group to the Chief of Staff concurred that a postponement of the announcement, until at least July 30 when special means could pass it to the Germans, was in order; however, the information leaked out before the designated date. The Germans received notification on July 26, and the press learned of McNair’s death two days later. Apparently, Garbo contacted the Germans about the death on July 29. Acting on Eisenhower’s recommendation, however, Marshall ordered the release of McNair’s death announcement to the press on July 29, 1944. Although it stated ‘‘that General McNair was killed in action while observing operations in FRANCE,’’ the statement did not mention the general’s U.K. assignment.76 SHAEF generated numerous messages, beginning on July 26, to discuss the implications and ramifications of McNair’s death. In addition to choosing a successor, SHAEF had to decide when to announce the name of the new FUSAG commander. Colonel H.N.H. Wild recommended that Lieutenant General William H. Simpson assume McNair’s post because he was the senior army commander in the FUSAG

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Order of Battle. Because another general from the United States was not available, Wild suggested that Simpson become permanent FUSAG Commanding General and that special means convey Simpson’s appointment to the Germans.77 According to SHAEF Forward, McNair’s reputation had enhanced the continuation of the Pas de Calais threat. In addition, special means had already presented information to the Germans about his position as FUSAG Commanding General. Therefore, ‘‘it would be desirable to assign another General Officer from the United States with a reputation comparable to McNair’s to replace him as First United States Army Group Commander.’’ Until the Chief of Staff named a replacement for McNair, Eisenhower appointed General Simpson the Acting Commander of FUSAG for the purposes of the deception, but SHAEF did not release a public announcement about Simpson’s temporary position as Acting FUSAG Commander. In reality, Simpson remained commander of the Ninth U.S. Army.78 About a week before the Chief of Staff named McNair’s replacement, Major General Bull notified Marshall of SHAEF’s recommendations for British commanders, whom special means would link with FUSAG positions. The list included: Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan, command of British Fourth Army (in reality Southern Command); Lieutenant General P. Neame, command of II Corps (a former POW, who did not have an assignment in the United Kingdom); Major General E. G. Miles, command of VII Corps (District commander in South Eastern Command); Major General J.C. D’Arcy, command of 2nd Airborne Division (unassigned former commanding general, 9th Armoured Division); and Major General H.L. Birks, command of 5th Armoured Division (unassigned former commanding general, 10th Armoured Division).79 In late July Eisenhower learned the name of McNair’s replacement. SHAEF recognized the importance of installing the new commander as soon as possible ‘‘in order to maintain Fortitude South II at its maximum strength.’’ A couple of days later Eisenhower requested that the new FUSAG commander travel to England as soon as Marshall could spare him. Eisenhower recommended that a press release acknowledge the name of McNair’s replacement but not note his departure or arrival dates. On August 8 Bull advised Marshall that, in addition to special means methods, SHAEF had publicly announced the appointment of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt as Commanding General, FUSAG. DeWitt arrived in England on August 6, 1944. The Times noted DeWitt’s appointment on August 9. Although the general participated in the deception as Commanding General, FUSAG, until some time in September, he had returned to the United States by September 23, 1944.80 ******************* Fortitude South II, however, included more than finding a replacement for Patton as the FUSAG commanding general. According to the July 19 plan, the target date for the training and concentrating of military and air forces remained July 26, 1944. SHAEF scheduled the arrival of Fourteenth U.S. Army and the movement of the British Fourth Army from Scotland to southeast and east England between

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July 11 and 21. In June Colonel Macleod received orders to move Fourth Army, with the exception of XV U.S. Corps, which traveled to France, and 52nd Division, which remained in Scotland, but was ‘‘replaced’’ by a real division, the 61st Division. The Fortitude North group that represented Fourth Army traveled July 14–16, during a period of wireless silence. According to Macleod, ‘‘the Army was spread over Kent, Sussex and part of Hampshire. Army HQ went to Heathfield Park in Sussex, 7th Corps HQ to Tunbridge Wells, 2nd Corps HQ near Three Bridges in West Sussex, 55th Division to Three Bridges and 35th Tank Brigade to Solly Joel’s house near Newmarket. The Kent harbours were full of dummy landing craft presumably to take over our 7th Corps, while the 2nd Corps embarked at Portsmouth.’’ Throughout July and August, Macleod’s group continued training exercises, ‘‘bringing in the 55th and 61st Divisions and the tanks at Newmarket, with the object of showing that we were still in a high state of training.’’ The group conducted landing exercises at Swanage and Studland Bay.81 ******************* The preparation of real FUSAG formations slated for France caused problems for the 21st Army Group, which hoped to prevent the movement of fresh German formations into the Normandy bridgehead by not appearing weak. SHAEF and the LCS did not want the double agents to note the transfers of these forces or their departure from their camps in southeast England. Because several agents lived in the vicinity of the FUSAG formations, however, it would be difficult for them to miss the movement of these troops, which created a dilemma for the Double-Cross Committee. Although lesser agents could note the departure of some formations, Garbo and Brutus, who had been keeping the FUSAG formations under constant surveillance, could not remain silent. The Double-Cross Committee could temporarily solve the problem if the two agents quit transmitting messages to their controllers for a time. The question then became how to accomplish their silence. Brutus proved to be the easier of the two. Although he did not have double agents living in close proximity to FUSAG formations, the Double-Cross Committee decided to get him out of the way by sending him to Scotland for a week. Brutus left after he had sent a transmission on July 10 about the arrival of the Fourteenth U.S. Army. The disappearance of Garbo was much more complicated. After reviewing past communications between Garbo and the Abwehr, the Double-Cross Committee came upon a solution. In December 1943 Garbo’s Madrid contact suggested that, because of impending German action, he should move his residence outside of London. The contact was referring to the launching of V-1 flying bombs against the English capital. Despite several attempts, Garbo failed to receive advance warning of the V-1 attacks. After an assault on June 13 (the first day of V-1 rocket attacks on England), in which the bombs fell on a railway bridge in the East End killing six people and wounding nine others, Garbo sent a caustic communication. The Spaniard implied that the Germans had been too absorbed by events in France to notify him about the attack beforehand, which would have allowed him to leave the city.82

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The Abwehr responded that headquarters had been unable to give advance warning of when ‘‘the new arm would be employed since they themselves were not informed on account of an order from the high command that the secret should only be disclosed to those people who had to be told in order to put into operation.’’ 83 Garbo’s contact then asked him to report information on the V-1 damage in London, such as when and where the bombs hit, so that improvements could be made in launching the V-1s. Initially, Garbo found excuses for failing to provide the requested information. First, he informed his contact that he no longer lived in Hendon, but in Bray, which was, in fact, true. The Germans requested facts about a particular area in London. Garbo, after noting that ‘‘the area affected is so extensive that it embraces a semicircle from Harwich to Portsmouth,’’ lamented his inability to provide adequate details about the requested site. On June 30 Garbo suggested that Benedict (Agent Three) had hesitated to inspect the area properly and that he would see if he could obtain more information, which sparked a concerned response from the Abwehr. Garbo’s quest provided the solution to the Double-Cross Committee’s problem of the agent’s silence in the coming weeks. According to the Committee’s story, on July 3, while in a pub, Garbo learned of a V-1 hit in Bow. On the next afternoon, he traveled to the East End site and began to question locals about the time of the strike. A plainclothes detective in the crowd became suspicious of Garbo, a foreigner, asking questions. The agent, realizing the interest of the policeman, tried to swallow his notes. The policeman arrested Garbo and took him to the Bow police station, where the local chief inspector interrogated him. Protesting his innocence, Garbo asserted that the Ministry of Information needed information about the attack. The first that Abwehr knew of the agent’s predicament was when Agent Three reported on July 5 that Garbo had not reported for meetings on July 4 and 5. Agent Three passed on the reports that Garbo had not yet transmitted in order to prevent further delay.84 On July 6, Agent Three announced in his transmission that, although Garbo had not yet turned up, he feared that inquiries into his disappearance might cause problems. He suggested that Garbo was possibly investigating in a prohibited area, which hindered his ability to contact his associates. The next day, in his response, Garbo’s Madrid contact expressed puzzlement that, if he was on a special mission, Garbo had not indicated his plans either to his family or to Agent Three. The Abwehr agent cautioned Agent Three to remain calm and, in the event of Garbo’s capture, to protect the service ‘‘and take all measures to protect its members and prevent clues of any kind from falling into the hands of the Police.’’ Agent Three subsequently transmitted a report of Garbo’s arrest to Madrid, but on July 12 Benedict reported the surprising news of Garbo’s release. Two days later, on July 14, Garbo contacted Madrid and related an account of his arrest and his subsequent release. According to Garbo, he had remained jailed for three days while the police investigated his story that he had been acquiring information for the Ministry of Information. The head of the Spanish Section of the Ministry of Information, J(3), had helped obtain his release. While he was in jail, however, Garbo had learned from another inmate that his incarceration had been illegal, since the commissioner had to

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approve the detention of a person for more than two days without a warrant. Following his release, Garbo complained about his treatment in a letter to the home secretary. Garbo forwarded a copy of the home secretary’s apology, which was dated July 10. Approximately two weeks later, the Abwehr ordered Garbo, Brutus, Tate, and the other agents not to investigate the V-1 attacks further and to confine their reports to the location and movement of the Allied forces.85 ******************* In the midst of the dilemma over Garbo and Brutus, SHAEF and the London Controlling Section continued their work on the Fortitude South II plan, which they issued on July 19, 1944. According to Benedict’s July 12 communique´ to Madrid, Garbo had told him to return to Glasgow and had given subagent 4(1), the radio operator, a ten-day vacation. This would explain the decrease in messages from Garbo over the next few weeks as he prepared for his role in the new deception operation. By July 9 several divisions from FUSAG had left for France. SHAEF and the LCS estimated that the Germans would identify them by July 16. The Ministry of Information expected that the secret of Patton’s presence in France would not extend past July 20. The Fortitude South II schedule indicated that the wireless links would open a day later. The time had come for Garbo and Brutus, who returned from Scotland on July 15, to begin transmitting information to the Germans again. SHAEF, the LCS, and 21st Army Group agreed that the agents could commence transmissions on July 18. While Garbo, whose wireless operator was on vacation, posted a letter that would reach his contacts late in the month, Brutus would transmit several messages between July 18 and 21, which Garbo’s letter would confirm. According to Brutus, General Montgomery’s demand for immediate reinforcements in Normandy had forced changes to FUSAG when Eisenhower ordered the release of the First Canadian Army and a large part of the Third U.S. Army for transfer across the Channel. Newly arriving American units and British reserves would replace the departing FUSAG formations. Although he could not supply details, Brutus claimed that sources confirmed that FUSAG would include three armies—the Ninth and Fourteenth U.S. Armies and the British Fourth Army. The agent also reported Patton’s replacement by General McNair. According to Brutus, the Fourteenth Army had already settled in the Third Army’s abandoned camp, and the Fourth Army had recently moved into England. Brutus concluded that his contact expected ‘‘that the fresh units in FUSAG will be ready to take the offensive towards the beginning of August.’’ 86 Before Brutus completed his transmissions, however, a German newspaper, the Pariser Zeitung, printed an article entitled, ‘‘Patton’s Army in the Bridgehead.’’ The timing of Brutus’s messages was perfect. In addition to the newspaper article, a July 27 OKH Intelligence summary reported the Third Army’s transfer to France.87 ******************* After his arrest and release, Garbo received orders to ‘‘lie low’’ for a time and to let Agent Three (Benedict) assume control over communications; however, Garbo could

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not remain inactive for long. After a meeting with subagent 4(3), the American NCO, Garbo sent a written account of FUSAG’s reorganization. It reinforced the communications sent by Brutus between July 18 and 21. On July 28 Garbo informed his Madrid contact that, after a meeting with Agents Three and Seven (Dagobert), the change in the situation in England had dictated a reorganization of his network. A series of setbacks, such as the loss of Agents Four (Chamillus) and Seven (Dagobert) and subagent 7(5) (Drake), forced Garbo to reorganize his network of spies. Chamillus had been in hiding since deserting his waiter job in Hiltingbury. In early June, the police had caught Drake, who did not have the proper papers, in a restricted area. Drake received a sentence of a month in prison. News of Drake’s imprisonment made Dagobert too nervous to perform his job effectively; therefore, Garbo arranged to have Agents Seven and Four smuggled out of England on a ship bound for Canada. The failure of subagent 7(6) to perform adequately prompted Garbo to cancel his services. Agent Three (Benedict), who helped Garbo reorganize his network, suggested that the Spaniard decrease his activity. According to Benedict, the police might have released Garbo in order to follow him. If that was the case, then the entire network was at risk. Garbo concurred and placed Benedict as head of the new organization. After a brief period of inactivity, Garbo resumed communications with his superiors. After a letter dated July 20, in which he confirmed Brutus’s communique´s about the changes in FUSAG and Patton’s departure for France, Garbo, on July 29, reported the death of Patton’s replacement. He transmitted information that had been accumulated by his subagents during his period of incarceration and inactivity. Garbo relied increasingly on information supplied by Dagobert’s subagents, 7(2) (Donny), 7(4) (Dick), and 7(7) (Dorick). On July 29, in the midst of news of reorganization and information about Allied formations in southeast England, Garbo received word that he had been awarded the Iron Cross, which normally only front line combatants could receive, for his ‘‘extraordinary merits.’’ Garbo responded appropriately to this unexpected honor, which indicated his importance to his German superiors. He said, ‘‘I cannot at this moment, when emotion overcomes me, express in words my gratitude for the decoration conceded by our Fu¨hrer, to whom humbly and with every respect I express my gratitude for the high distinction which he has bestowed on me, for which I feel myself unworthy as I have never done more than what I have considered to the fulfilment of my duty.’’88 After giving credit to his agents and subagents, who had contributed to his ability to fulfill his duty successfully, Garbo concluded, ‘‘My desire is to fight with great ardor to be worthy of this medal which has only been conceded to those heroes, my companions in honor, who fight on the battlefront.’’89 Garbo supplied the Abwehr with intelligence throughout August 1944. Most of his information came from Donny, Dick, and Dorick. Garbo transmitted information about the movement of FUSAG troops and the arrival of new formations in the FUSAG area. The information contributed by both Garbo and Brutus during August allowed the Germans to construct the new FUSAG Order of Battle. The Abwehr sent

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requests for specific information, especially about particular commanders. Garbo and Brutus provided some of the information requested, but not always as quickly as their superiors hoped. By the end of August, however, the Double-Cross Committee received orders to conclude Fortitude South II quickly so that some of the agents, such as Benedict, could participate in the 21st Army Group’s short-term deception plans to cover the advance to the Rhine.90 Benedict complied with a message transmitted on August 31, in which he said, Important! The following obtained at meeting between myself, ARABEL [Garbo] and 4 (3) yesterday, in reply to your questionnaire about airborne army and also explains the moves of the 14th US Army from the east coast. 4(3): He says that the original FUSAG plan for attacking Pas-de-Calais has been definitely canceled and the FUSAG forces are again being organized in the following way: The 14th US Army and the 9th US Army are now under the direct command of SHAEF, as SHAEF strategic reserve. This force will be at the disposal of SHAEF for Eisenhower to be able to reinforce the allied armies in France if they want assistance in the advance which is now about to be driven to prevent the German army from escaping to Germany. The 14th US Army is being replaced in FUSAG by the new airborne army which has now been given the name of the First Allied Airborne Army. With this rearrangement a great part of FUSAG is now composed of airborne troops and will be used for special operations, in fact FUSAG will become a sort of modern version of combined operations.91

Brutus, Garbo, and several other agents continued to supply the Abwehr with information even though their role in Fortitude South II ended in late August 1944. Despite Fortitude South II’s conclusion, which officially occurred in September, the effectiveness of the agents had not ended. ******************* Like the original plan, however, the Fortitude South II plan did not just rely on double agents to maintain the threat to the Pas de Calais. Physical displays also played a role in the new plan. Colonel John Turner and his C & D (Conceal & Display) units continued to operate. Prior to D-Day, static decoys attracted 80% of enemy attacks near the Plymouth and Portsmouth ports. With a decline in enemy attacks, however, the need for static decoys decreased. Crews continued to operate the misleading displays from D plus 2 until July 12. Although some enemy reconnaissance aircraft flew over the displays, enemy planes only attacked one site during that period. According to an analysis of the RAF visual deception, ‘‘Again full information will not be available with regard to the success of the combined misleading display in East Anglia and Kent till after the war, but the enemy certainly kept a number of his divisions in N. France and Belgium when they would have been invaluable to him in Normandy.’’92 With the new deception plan, however, some changes occurred in the C & D strategy. In a letter to the ACAS(G), Turner noted the closure of the cover plan in Scotland by late June. At the same time Turner voiced a number of concerns about several deception areas. He complained about the lack of coordination on the part

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of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, citing two instances when orders went from the AEAF to a No. 2 Group wireless officer, to the local wireless officer, to the C & D representative, but the orders did not go to Turner’s department. Although he did recognize the successes of the decoy displays around Plymouth and Portsmouth, Turner blamed Lieutenant Colonel Strangeways for compromising the security of the displays at Yarmouth. According to Turner, the site that Strangeways chose for bigbob production, which was in close proximity to one of Turner’s deceptive decoy sites, gave the town’s population a good view of what was going on. Because Strangeways did not hide the production site with screens, Turner concluded that the local populace, including any spies, could have easily determined that crews were building fake landing craft. The lack of restriction on traffic in and out of Yarmouth would enable any spies to use knowledge gained in the city to determine that crews had constructed similar dummies on the Rivers Orwell and Deben. In late July, SHAEF made the decision to abandon the displays at Yarmouth and Lowestoft.93 The development of a new deception plan for the threat to the Pas de Calais caused a change in control of the C & D displays. In early July SHAEF assumed control of the implementation of Fortitude South II from the 21st Army Group. Consequently, SHAEF took over control of the decoy displays. Around the same time, Colonel Turner’s department broached the idea of discontinuing the deceptive lighting in East Anglia after July 5 and suggested the closure of those sites shortly thereafter. Although the initial request went to the 21st Army Group, SHAEF assumed the responsibility of deciding which sites to close and which to keep open.94 By mid-July SHAEF made the decision to shut down several C & D sites. In a directive issued July 16, 1944, SHAEF ordered the immediate closure and removal of the decoy lighting west of Newhaven. SHAEF dictated that the sites at Newhaven, Hythe, and Deal only operate when ordered. In addition, SHAEF ordered the closure of the sites at Yarmouth, Lowestoft, and Benacres Ness between July 31 and August 14. The directive did not, however, just close sites; it also dictated the opening of others. SHAEF ordered the establishment of new sites on the Rivers Thames and Orwell, but none were to begin operating before August 14. The SHAEF order also dictated a lighting schedule for the sites. With the exception of those that were closed and the ones that were not to operate until August 14, the schedule ordered the crews to display normal lighting from July 16 to 30. Under normal lighting conditions, the crews illuminated the beaches and one in five craft. Between July 31 and August 14, the schedule dictated a quiet period. Under quiet conditions, the crews did not illuminate the beaches; they displayed lighting on one in eight craft. After August 15, unless otherwise notified, the crews received orders to resume normal lighting conditions. During night alarms, however, the crews would intensify the lighting around the dummy craft.95 On July 31, 1944, John Higham notified the Commander-in-Chief, the Nore, and the Flag Officerin-Charge, Harwich, of a slight change in the July 16 orders. SHAEF had decided to close the Breydon Water, Oulton Broad, and Benacres Ness sites after July 31 and to open two new sites, Burnham and Canewdon.96

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Turner’s department’s participation in the Fortitude South II deception proved minimal. C & D units continued to maintain the decoy sites according to SHAEF’s direction. Turner did, however, send C & D units to Normandy, where they set up decoy displays on the beaches. The congestion on the beaches interfered with the effectiveness of the units’ work, which is not an area of concern for this discussion.97 ******************* An evaluation of the bigbob displays began shortly before D-Day and continued until SHAEF made a decision about their inclusion in Plan Fortitude South II. In a report dated June 2, the ‘‘R’’ Force Commander noted that, although the displays appeared admirable from the air, they did not exhibit any life. Because he anticipated a continuation of enemy reconnaissance flights over the displays in Dover, the commander recommended that steps be taken to make the displays more realistic. He suggested the inclusion of oil traces, galley smoke, and the attachment of small boats to the dummy craft. Less than a week later, Lieutenant Colonel Strangeways evaluated the activity and future policy of ‘‘R’’ Force. After stating that the Fortitude South story had ‘‘gone over,’’ he emphasized the importance of maintaining the story. Strangeways reviewed the steps being taken. In addition to increasing the number of bigbobs at Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Waldringfield, Harwich/Ipswich, Dover, and Folkestone, ANCXF (Allied Naval Expeditionary Force) would supply wireless traffic for the fake craft. On June 14 Lieutenant Colonel Jervis-Read, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, advised that crews maintain displays of the maximum number of dummy landing craft for as long as possible. When necessary, he suggested that individual craft be ‘‘dismantled, reconditioned and possibly relaunched.’’ Jervis-Read further recommended that the 10th Worcesters (10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment) and the 4th Northants (4th Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment), who were the only groups qualified to assemble the bigbobs, remain available until the dismantling of the displays.98 Bad weather in mid-June disrupted the bigbob displays at Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Strong winds and rough seas damaged numerous craft, which necessitated reconditioning them. Around the same time, however, according to the War Diary of HQ ‘‘R’’ Force, ‘‘it is also decided to remove Bigbobs from YARMOUTH and LOWESTOFT in order to give the impression to the Enemy that the operation against the Pas de Calais is beginning to be mounted.’’99 Commander A.N. Finter expressed concern about the impact of weather on the bigbobs in a letter to Colonel H. N. H. Wild, dated June 19, 1944. Bad weather had caused the loss of 26 bigbobs at Great Yarmouth. Because of the weather and normal wear on the dummy crafts, Finter expected the displays to warrant dismantling around July 10, except those on the Rivers Orwell and Deben, which had been constructed later than the others. The commander anticipated two possible courses of action, either the removal of the craft as necessary, which would demonstrate a gradual decline in strength, or a maintenance program that would allow for refitting of damaged craft and a gradual increase in the number displayed. According to

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Finter, SHAEF would have to consider the following if it chose the second option. First, crews must maintain the displays at Dover and Folkestone, which were the most important ones, at the expense of other sites. Second, crews should gradually dismantle the displays at Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Third, ‘‘that the refitting resources are such that including time in transit 20 BIGBOBS can be refitted in the first 14 days and thereafter at a rate of 3 a day.’’ Finally, Finter recommended that the displays not be allowed to deteriorate noticeably before the end of June and that a schedule be maintained that would allow for as few bigbobs to be refitted after July 10 as possible. SHAEF had to consider the problems encountered with maintaining the bigbobs when they devised the plan for Fortitude South II. They had to decide whether or not to maintain the displays. At a meeting held at the 21st Army Group Headquarters on June 30, 1944, representatives from ANCXF, 21st Army Group, and AEAF considered the recommendations of the June 29 Fortitude South II outline plan, which suggested dismantling, reconditioning, and storing the bigbobs for future use by D plus 45. The plan adopted on July 19, however, stated, ‘‘As far as durability and the rate of reconditioning allow, dummy craft will be displayed in the more sheltered SOUTH-EAST and EAST coast anchorages.’’101 The decision to include bigbobs in the new deception plan did not mean, however, that all of the displays in existence before July 19 remained intact. In fact, some of the displays no longer existed on July 19. For example, crews had completely dismantled the bigbob displays at Yarmouth and Lowestoft by July 6. The key phrase in the new plan was ‘‘as far as durability and the rate of reconditioning allow;’’ therefore, SHAEF frequently reevaluated the situation. On July 23, Colonel Wild issued orders to the 4th Northants and the 10 Worcesters in reference to the displays on the River Deben, 59 bigbobs, and on the River Orwell, two different types of fake craft that totaled 59. Initially, the display at Dover would continue to include 42 craft, but by August 1, crews transferred the bigbobs from Folkestone to Dover.102 According to Colonel Wild, the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcesters continued to maintain and animate approximately fourteen flotillas, or 168 craft, of dummy LCTs. By August 21, however, SHAEF decided to disassemble the dummy landing craft displays on the Rivers Deben and Orwell. SHAEF ordered the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcesters, along with the 24th Armoured Brigade to commence the dismantling on August 25 and to conclude the project by September 11. SHAEF ordered the final disassembly of the Dover displays to occur between August 23 and September 19. Prevailing weather conditions and the advance of the battle in France decreased the effectiveness of the bigbobs; therefore, SHAEF made the decision to shut them down by mid-September 1944. Consequently, the ‘‘misleading’’ displays of landing craft, which were coordinated with the deception wireless activity, supported the threat to the Pas de Calais from shortly before D-Day until mid-September.103 ******************* Wireless activity played an important role both in Fortitude South and Fortitude South II. In addition to adding reality to landing craft displays, No. 5 Wireless

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Group, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, and other wireless groups used periods of intense activity and silence to simulate training exercises and the movement of troops. When the fictitious 55th U.S. Division transferred from Iceland to the fake VII British Corps’ command in Scotland in late June, Brigadier General A.S. Nevins requested that the ‘‘traffic between these two links could be made to conform to the past practices of Fourth Army.. . .In order that wireless traffic should simulate in all respects that which passes over real links, it will be necessary to allot priorities to messages and to arrange for the number of groups to be passed daily and the proportion of messages which are to be ‘live,’ cipher dummy and signal training.’’104 SHAEF and the LCS took the wireless activity seriously and changed the plan as the situation dictated. SHAEF provided schedules for intense and normal activity, as well as for periods of wireless silence before, during, and after the Normandy invasion. In late June, because XV U.S. Corps had to prepare for its transfer to Normandy, it dropped out of the Fortitude North deception. According to a SHAEF directive, XV U.S. Corps went off the air at 0200 hours on June 30, and the Fourth Army Signal Detachment that had represented the corps returned to its normal location. As the end of June approached, SHAEF, which began working on a new Fortitude South plan, brought the original plan to a close by shutting down the Quicksilver (Fortitude South) links on June 26. The work of the wireless groups was not over; the groups had to prepare for the next phase—Fortitude South II.105 ******************* All three branches of the Allied armed forces contributed to the wireless deception program, and SHAEF had to consider their roles in the upcoming plan. The navy anticipated making a large contribution to the plan and believed ‘‘that arrangements will have to be made shortly to induce the enemy by this means to believe that at least three new Assault Forces have been formed and are located in this country.’’ Although the Mobile Wireless Deception Units under ANCXF would normally perform this job, the Admiral recommended that, because it had to be carried out in the United Kingdom, the Admiralty and the Director of Signal Division assume control of the operation.106 In devising a wireless plan for Fortitude South II, SHAEF had to consider the influx of American forces into England. At a meeting held on July 6, representatives of SHAEF, ANCXF, FUSAG, and ETOUSA unanimously concurred that all U.S. divisions, no matter how trained they were, would need training with Naval Assault Forces before they would be ready for the assault on the Pas de Calais. Because the training would have to occur in England, SHAEF would have to include wireless traffic for the training exercises in the general plan and its implementation. The representatives agreed that, in order to keep the time of training to a minimum, ‘‘each division should be shown as having only one assaulting brigade (RCT)’’ and ‘‘that, for the wireless ‘picture’ to be convincing, there must be at least one (notional) amphibious exercise on Brigade level and one on Divisional level for each Division/ Naval Assault Force.’’107 Based on the premise that three assault divisions, two American and one British, with the necessary naval lift, had to be ready for the

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operation as soon as possible, the representatives set July 21 as the earliest possible date for the army to simulate brigade amphibious exercises. Ten to thirteen days later the army could simulate the divisional exercises. Consequently, the group scheduled three sets of exercises, July 21–23, July 30–31, and August 2. In an attempt to prevent compromising the wireless deception, they suggested July 26 as the target date for the commencement of Fortitude South II. According to the new wireless plan, 3103rd Signal Service Battalion represented Fourteenth U.S. Army, and 12th Reserve Unit represented Fourth Army. When the employment of II Corps Signals, 9th Armoured Division Signals, and other small signals units to represent the Fortitude North wireless deception did not work satisfactorily, SHAEF decided to form the 12th Reserve Unit, which was a self-contained signals unit made from II Corps and 9th Armoured Division signal personnel, to provide the Fourth Army’s wireless activity for the new plan. SHAEF issued frequencies, call signs, and code signs, along with signal instructions, for use in Fortitude South II.108 In addition, SHAEF reassessed the situation in view of the resources committed to the plan and clearly set the parameters of the work assigned to both the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion and the 12th Reserve Unit, including the representation of the training and concentration of FUSAG, which consisted of two armies, four corps, and thirteen divisions. ‘‘3103 Signals Battalion is a deceptive wireless unit and can only be employed on deception; the 12 Reserve Unit is made up of staff officers, signalers and equipment drawn from Headquarters 2 Corps and 9 Armoured Division Signals. This unit has been given a basic War Establishment which can not be further reduced without reducing the scope and effectiveness of the deceptive representation of Fourth BRITISH Army.’’ In addition, two divisions from General Headquarters Home Forces—the 55th and 61st British Divisions—would provide background to the wireless activity. SHAEF addressed every possible detail of the plan.109 Under the new Fortitude South II plan, the U.S. signal portion of the plan, Operation Rosebud, was to suggest the concentration of the Fourteenth U.S. Army in East Anglia, which was preparing to assault the Calais coast in conjunction with British and Canadian troops. The 3103rd Signal Service Battalion received a new mission: ‘‘(a) to represent the notional high level radio nets (division and higher levels); (b) to represent the notional 17th US Infantry Division engaged in an amphibious assault and land exercise (VIOLA II) in the WAREHAM and STUDLAND BAY area (south coast); [and] (c) to represent the notional 59th US Infantry Division engaged in a similar exercise (VIOLA III) in the FELIXSTOWE area (East Anglia).’’110 The RCM Detachment provided the plan for radio activity that would be consistent with an army training in southeast England. The 3103rd Signal Service Battalion participated in a series of exercises that were enhanced by the naval wireless activity, which was also part of Fortitude South II.111 ******************* Naval wireless would create a ‘‘notional story,’’ in which three Naval Assault Forces were undergoing ‘‘final intensive training’’ in south and southeast England. Of the

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three fake forces, wireless had established ‘‘F’’ Force, which had completed training two months earlier and which had originally been prepared to sail in early July. Naval signals groups, using wireless traffic, would simulate final assault with 59th U.S. Division around Felixstowe according to the following schedule: ‘‘(a) Exercise MOUSTACHE with 1 R.C.T. of the Division, on 22nd July; (b) Exercise FILMSTAR, combined Signal exercise on Assault Force/Divisional level, 29th July; and (c) Exercise VIOLA III, with whole of 59 (US) Division (1 R.C.T.), 5th August.’’112 SHAEF and ANCXF scheduled a series of amphibious exercises for ‘‘M’’ Force with 55th British Division at Hayling Island: (a) Exercise Vanity I—one assault brigade, July 22 or 23; (b) Exercise Vanity II—a second assault brigade—July 25; (c) Exercise Honeysuckle—assault force/divisional level combined signal exercise—August 1; and (d) Exercise Viola I—complete 55th British Division (two assault brigades)— August 5. ‘‘N’’ Force would conduct amphibious exercises with 17th U.S. Division near Studland according to the following schedule: (a) Exercise Haircut—one R.C.T. from the division—July 22; (b) Exercise Jitterbug—assault force/divisional level combined signal exercise—July 29; and (c) Exercise Viola II—entire division (one R.C.T.)—August 5.113 ******************* According to Colonel Wild, ‘‘The notional training of the assault forces for the PAS DE CALAIS will be completed by 5th August 1944. Until it is desired to culminate the threat, First US Army Group will be represented by wireless activity as being highly trained and ready to concentrate at short notice to proceed overseas.’’114 By mid-August, H.F. Drew, General Headquarters, Home Forces, in a letter to Wild, questioned the effectiveness of Fortitude South II. He suggested that the operation was ‘‘nearing the end of its useful life.’’ After listing the areas in which the plan proved costly, such as bigbob display and the maintenance of dummy camps and signposts, Drew admitted, ‘‘I believe modern experience tends to show that by far the most important factor contributing to the effectiveness of a deceptive scheme is the wireless traffic.’’115 Because the cost was low, Drew did not question its continued use for deceptive purposes. Wild responded, by saying that SHAEF was ‘‘committed to carrying on with the wireless traffic for the duration. As you know, all the real forces have left this country and once the enemy appreciates this fact, there is no telling from where he may draw in reserves.’’116 Consequently, wireless traffic simulating corps and division assault and amphibious training continued throughout August 1944. ******************* Fourth Army participated in a number of training and amphibious assault exercises in late July and August. According to Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘it is still essential to show all formations in Fourth Army as highly trained and ready to proceed overseas by 10 August.’’117 In addition to Vanity I, Vanity II, Honeysuckle, and Viola I, in which 55th Division practiced, the Fourth Army and FUSAG participated in exercise Rosebud. Changes in the schedule did occur, however, after the commencement of Rosebud. On August 17 all of the U.S. and British units participating in Fortitude

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South II received orders to observe wireless silence. Effective the same day, the Ninth and Fourteenth U.S. Armies pulled out of Rosebud. The fictitious U.S. airborne divisions received orders to observe wireless silence from August 17 until 24. In mid-August the Fourteenth U.S. Army transferred to Normandy.118 The goal of Exercise Rosebud was to demonstrate the Fourth Army’s high state of training and ability to launch an assault on short notice. In addition to normal wireless activity, Rosebud included wireless traffic for assault, corps, and divisional training exercises and an army exercise. According to the schedule, the army exercises would last 48 hours, corps exercises 24 hours, division exercises 12 hours, and HQ and Arms or Service exercises 6–9 hours. Rosebud commenced with VII Corps’ exercise, code named ‘‘Michael,’’ on August 11–12. On August 16, II Corps conducted its exercise, code named ‘‘Lapwing.’’ The army exercise, originally scheduled for August 25, received the code name ‘‘Jumper.’’ Allied officials rescheduled Jumper first for August 30 through September 1, then for late September.119 SHAEF canceled several other exercises that had been slated for late August and early September. By late August, however, Fortitude South II had begun to wind down, although Fourth Army, headquarters and troops, VII Corps, headquarters and troops, and HQ 58th Division continued to move around southeast England. By early September conditions in Normandy and the regrouping of forces in England forced a change in Fourth Army’s role from an ‘‘assault’’ army to a ‘‘reinforcing’’ army that could be sent anywhere on the continent, not just to the Pas de Calais. When Fourth Army became a ‘‘reinforcing’’ army, SHAEF scheduled exercises for late September, October, and early November. By mid-September, however, Colonel R. Macleod issued ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 5,’’ in which he stated that the Fourth Army would not participate in any more exercises. Although some wireless links would remain in operation, others would shut down. Wireless activity continued into October. On October 6/7 HQ II Corps’ wireless nets shut down; HQ XVII Corps replaced HQ II Corps and opened its nets on October 12. Throughout October the nets closed, opened, or engaged in silence. According to ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 6,’’ Fourth Army, although it continued to retain its status as a ‘‘reinforcing’’ army, underwent reorganization. All of the Rosebud nets officially shut down on November 10.120 ******************* Naval forces provided wireless traffic and simulated movements and exercises throughout August and September. Operating under wireless silence from September 7 to 14, ‘‘M’’ Force sailed to the Humber area and ‘‘N’’ Force traveled to the Firth of Forth. ‘‘F’’ Force remained where it was. According to the Admiralty’s Signal Division Section 10, ‘‘the reappearance of these ships in the places stated is necessary for ‘rounding off ’ the programme and would also make possible a flying start for anything further that might be required.’’121 By late September, however, ‘‘F,’’ ‘‘M,’’ and ‘‘N’’ Forces received orders to cease transmitting wireless traffic at the conclusion of their exercises on the morning of September 27. *******************

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The Allied Expeditionary Air Force provided more than wireless support for Fortitude South and Fortitude South II. Prior to D-Day, General Eisenhower authorized the implementation of the Transportation Plan, which was the bombing of railways and bridges to hinder enemy reinforcement of the Normandy area. The plan included sites in the Pas de Calais region for another reason as well—to support the deception. Support of the deception could not, however, interfere with the primary goal of the Transportation Plan. Consequently, several directives concerning the air commitment said the same thing. ‘‘In carrying out Operation ‘FORTITUDE’ (the Cover Plan) it is desirable to create the maximum deception with the minimum expenditure of effort, in order to conserve the greatest possible air effort for operations on D-Day. With this in view it is suggested that not more than 50% of the day and night bomber effort should be employed over the period D–2/D–1.’’122 During the last few days prior to June 6, however, Eisenhower insisted ‘‘that air attacks outside the Neptune area should positively indicate the Pas de Calais as the region in which the Allies were primarily interested.’’ 123 On June 1, bombers attacked four coastal batteries in the Pas de Calais and two in Normandy, and on June 2, 598 aircraft from Bomber Command bombed coastal and radar installations and railway centers in the Pas de Calais. On June 4, after the postponement of D-Day, the VIII Air Force bombed seven coastal batteries in the Pas de Calais, although the raid against the same number of coastal batteries in Normandy was canceled. For every critical raid carried out in preparation for the invasion, another one occurred in the Pas de Calais area. Bombers attacked eleven airfields and nineteen railway junctions in the Pas de Calais. ‘‘Direct attacks on coastal defences and radar installations on the cover area were twice as heavy as those on the actual target region . . .on 29 May the Kent airfields were used as advance bases by squadrons of British Second Tactical Air Force for a massive attack against the Pas de Calais.’’124 Approximately 10 days after D-Day, Major General J. F. W. Whiteley recommended that the air operations against the Pas de Calais be continued in order to maintain the threat of an Allied assault against the region. Whiteley requested that targets selected in the Pas de Calais be attacked between June 15 and 30 if the existing rail interdiction program permitted. He suggested that the targets include ten railway communications, five ammunition and Petrol, Oil, Lubricant (POL) dumps, five coast defense batteries, and three radar targets. Whiteley assumed that the bombers would automatically attack suitable airfields in the region. On July 3 Whiteley renewed his request for air operations in the Pas de Calais area. Acknowledging that bad weather and ‘‘higher priority operational requirements’’ had caused a suspension of the assault on the region, Whiteley asked that the June 17 requirements be completed between July 1 and 15, with priority being given to particular railway communications targets. Brigadier General A. S. Nevins issued a similar request on July 13.125 According to the Fortitude South II plan, Allied air forces were to continue the strategic bombing program against the cover area. On July 23, SHAEF issued an air plan for Fortitude South II. In addition to the creation of a new Tactical Air Command, the VIII Tactical Air Command, the plan ordered real bombing

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operations and reconnaissance flights over the Pas de Calais as a prelude to a land operation. The Overlord bombing and reconnaissance plan that included the cover area would continue. A week later, Colonel Wild evaluated the Fortitude South II bombing program. He concluded that, because of the small number of targets bombed, it would be difficult to determine the enemy’s reaction. If the Germans compared the effort in the Pas de Calais to that in Normandy, they would realize that the greater effort had occurred in the latter region. Wild recommended that the bombers focus on railway communication targets and coastal radar and defense targets, rather than airfields, ammunition dumps, or POL targets. Other air force commitments to the battle in France hindered completion of the attacks on the Fortitude targets. On August 8 Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, in reference to a SHAEF directive dated June 17, noted that ‘‘the program of ‘FORTITUDE’ air operations as set forth in this directive has not to date progressed to an extent sufficient to create any significant pattern in the mind of enemy intelligence.’’ Because of the importance that Eisenhower gave to the bombing effort, Smith ordered a change in previously designated targets.126 In addition, in mid-August, Colonel P.H. Lash, Jr. reported that the air force had not yet launched attacks against the Pas de Calais that month.127 ******************* In late July Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, Deputy Chief of Staff, expressed British views about the continuation of the Fortitude deception. Although he acknowledged past and continuing faith in the operation, Morgan noted that closing or restricting the number of fake installations in southeast England would lead to a consolidation of personnel into two British divisions that could be available for use where needed. Morgan believed that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, should be made aware of British feeling ‘‘and should watch for any tendency to undermine the effectiveness of FORTITUDE on the plea of possible increases in our troop resources.’’128 General Montgomery requested that General Eisenhower determine the date when Fortitude South II would end. Although he realized that the Supreme Commander might have difficulty in setting a firm date, Montgomery wanted to arrange the transfer of Royal (R ) Signals personnel to the 21st Army Group and to South East Asia Command as soon as they could be released. The general also stressed ‘‘that no further demands for R Signals personnel should be put forward.’’129 In early August, SHAEF, evaluating the future of the deception in the event of the ‘‘congealment in the ‘OVERLORD’ lodgment area,’’ determined two possible courses. First, the FUSAG Order of Battle could be maintained and the threat continued ‘‘at the greatest strength possible under winter conditions.’’ Second, FUSAG could move to Allied Force Headquarters, which would hopefully persuade the Germans that the main effort would come through southern France. After weighing all the options and the conditions in France at the time, SHAEF, intending to maintain the Fortitude South II deception through the 1944–45 winter, chose the first alternative. Sometime in August, however, SHAEF considered changing the deception plan to cover the Allied crossing of the Seine River. The proposed changes

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included: first, temporarily increasing the threat to the Pas de Calais; then a cessation of the threat; and, finally, a transfer of the threat to Belgium, Holland, and northern Germany. By early August the Germans no longer believed in an imminent threat to the Pas de Calais. They anticipated a further weakening of FUSAG and concluded ‘‘that early new landing plans of extensive scope’’ were unlikely. Although it would have helped the deception had Eisenhower remained in England, he set up a small command post in France in early August. Despite efforts to keep Eisenhower’s presence in France a secret, newspapers reported the general’s arrival on August 10. To counteract the damage, the Germans received word of the increasing reinforcement of FUSAG formations in England, and Garbo reported that only part of SHAEF had transferred to France while the rest remained in England.130 Throughout August wireless traffic and messages from double agents, mainly Garbo and Brutus, together helped the Germans construct the new FUSAG Order of Battle. Apparently in late August, SHAEF again considered Fortitude’s outlook. On August 25, Home Forces reported SHAEF’s conclusion to Eastern and South Eastern Commands. ‘‘There is no prospect of this operation closing down until the end of the GERMAN War, but the existing plan will be changed in the near future and the new one will entail considerably less activity and strain on units taking part than is the case with the present one.’’ 131 On August 26, SHAEF issued a new Fortitude Order of Battle. Although the Order of Battle included the Fourteenth U.S. Army, it had transferred to Normandy in mid-August. SHAEF made the decision to shift formations out of FUSAG because the Germans had been rapidly withdrawing forces from the Pas de Calais region since the middle of August. Because the threat to the Pas de Calais was no longer reasonable, the Fourth Army received orders to move into East Anglia, where it would be in a better position to threaten the Low Counties. The goal was to tie down German troops and prevent them from hindering the Allied northward drive. The Fourth Army completed its transfer September 11–12.132 On August 28, however, Colonel Jervis-Read suggested that Fortitude South II ‘‘in its present form is dead and G-2 agrees with this view.’’133 In addition to the removal of German forces from the Pas de Calais, Allied forces approached the region from the west. The Fortitude threat to the Pas de Calais was no longer necessary; consequently, Fortitude South II formally ended on September 8, 1944. According to Colonel Macleod, however, the Fourth Army continued to participate in exercises aimed against Holland until November. In November Fourth Army, ‘‘reduced to one corps of three wireless divisions,’’ traveled to Yorkshire, where it engaged in activities to create a threat to Denmark. The Fourth Army remained in Yorkshire until March 1945, according to Macleod. The threat created by FUSAG had changed. By September, both the Ninth and Fourteenth U.S. Armies had moved to France to provide strategic reserve support for the overland advance of the Allied force. To support the Allied airborne assault on Arnhem, ‘‘FUSAG had been reconstituted as an amphibious force comprising Fourth British Army and the First Allied Airborne Army which was to threaten an attack against the North West German ports.’’

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During September, although SHAEF considered transferring the rest of the FUSAG force to the continent, it ultimately decided against taking such action. By the end of October, when the remaining imaginary formations disbanded, SHAEF had gradually withdrawn troops from FUSAG.134 Although the planning for what ultimately became Operation Fortitude began during the summer of 1943, none of the SHAEF, London Controlling Section, or Double-Cross Committee planners expected to implement the deception for as long as it did. Thousands of wireless operators, soldiers, C & D crewman, pilots, sailors, and double agents, both real and imaginary, worked hard on an operation that in reality would never take place. They built dummy aircraft and dummy landing craft and sent countless hours of wireless traffic. However, questions about the success of Operation Fortitude and its importance to the success of the Normandy invasion remain.

7

Reacting to the Deception

Based on information received, OB West reckoned with approximately 60–65 AngloAmerican divisions in England.. . .Hitler expected a second landing in the sector of the 15. Army up to some time in July and therefore had OB West warned nearly daily. . . 1

The Allies expended a great deal of time, effort, and resources in devising and implementing the parts of Operation Fortitude—Fortitude North, Fortitude South, and Fortitude South II—with no guarantee that the deception would succeed. The London Controlling Section (LCS) hoped to persuade the Germans to concentrate their troops in areas outside Normandy, which would afford Allied forces a better chance of establishing beachheads after they landed. In addition, the LCS expected that, after the invasion, the Germans would not quickly reinforce the battle area if they expected a second, larger assault six weeks later. In order to gauge the success or failure of the deception, one must consider the Germans’ appreciation of Allied intentions and their reaction to Fortitude before, during, and after the onset of the Normandy invasion, as well as changes in the German defenses along the Channel coast during the weeks prior to June 6, 1944. An examination of Fortitude’s implementation must judge more than whether or not the Germans accepted and acted upon the stories conveyed by the deception plans. Finally, the discussion must consider whether or not the enemy could have reinforced the Normandy battle area with troops from the Pas de Calais area sooner than they did. While the LCS was constructing the deception plan, the Germans were making their own preparations for the expected Allied invasion. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued a directive for the ‘‘preparations for the imminent large-scale battles in the West.’’ Dated December 12, 1943, the directive explained several of Hitler’s conclusions about the nature of future conflicts with Allied forces. According to Keitel, Hitler expected heavy ships to provide support for the invasion forces. In addition, ‘‘the enemy will land on a broad front at several separate areas with hundreds of

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landing craft, in order to divert from his main objective, split up the defenses, and find the weakest spot.’’ Hitler also anticipated Allied airborne landings to accompany the amphibious assault.2 The British War Cabinet’s Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee frequently evaluated the German position, the state of its defenses, particularly in northwest Europe, and the location of its forces. In an assessment of German intentions with regard to the Allied invasion, dated February 21, 1944, the Sub-Committee concluded that Germany would be unable to sustain fronts in the east against Russian forces and in the south and west against Allied forces for any length of time. In order to avoid collapse, Germany envisioned the defeat of the Allied invasion of France or the Low Countries as its only option that might have a compromise peace as an ultimate result. Consequently, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee expected the Germans to commit all available formations to the defense of the region. According to the Sub-Committee, although the Germans knew that the Allies were preparing for an invasion, they did not expect it to be executed for two to three months, unless Germany showed signs of weakening its hold on France or the Low Countries. In addition, the enemy anticipated minor assaults, which would gain information about German defenses, to occur prior to the large-scale invasion. The Sub-Committee estimated the deployment of German forces in France and the Low Countries to number 52 divisions, of which 12 were offensive and 36 were defensive.3 The Germans likewise constantly appraised Allied preparations in England and tried to determine the timing and location of the anticipated Allied assault on northwest Europe. In a January 10, 1944, report, the Germans, by evaluating wireless traffic, identified Northern, South Eastern, Southern, and Western Commands, I and II Canadian Corps, and 4th Canadian Armoured and 9th Armoured Divisions. The report indicated the continuation of exercises by an unidentified South Eastern Command unit during the first week of January. The Germans also noted newly identified formations within the First U.S. Army formation, including the First U.S. Army Group, First U.S. Army, and Third Tank Group.4 Although Allied leaders had not yet approved the Fortitude plan, the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) had been activated on October 18, 1943. The Germans succeeded in identifying the American army group before it became incorporated into the Fortitude deception plan, which added credence to the Order of Battle that the LCS hoped to suggest prior to D-Day. By January 1944 the Germans concluded that the Allied divisions in Britain numbered 55, although in reality the number was only 37.5 Furthermore, before the deception had a chance to influence the Germans, Hitler had targeted the Pas de Calais as the invasion site because ‘‘an analysis of relevant military factors weighted the scales in favour of an attack across the Straits of Dover.’’6 According to General Gu¨nther von Blumentritt, as early as November 1943, Hitler expressed the belief that, after a successful landing across the Dover Straits, a rapid Allied ‘‘advance into Germany would have cut off all their forces in France.’’ Although military officials had reached some conclusions about the location of the Allied assault, the German High Command remained uncertain about when the attack would come. Between January and April 1944, the Germans, who expected the

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invasion to come at any time, frequently predicted that the Allies would attack within a few weeks.7 Even if German intelligence had been better, however, that might not have mattered because of the ‘‘human factor.’’ Hitler had an ambivalent attittude toward intelligence, which he believed was unimportant except on a tactical level or when employed as a ‘‘counter-intelligence tool.’’ Hitler’s arrogance interfered with his ability to accept intelligence. ‘‘Early successes in the face of senior German military and foreign policy opposition convinced him that his intuition was infallible. He knew what would be the outcome of his decisions and had no need for intelligence estimates—particularly contrary ones.’’8 ******************* In late February, German intelligence issued a report about Allied preparations in England. The report indicated the presence of transportation aircraft and gliders on airfields in southwest England and assumed the existence of four British and two American ‘‘air-landing divisions.’’ It also noted the transfer of troops, such as the French Expeditionary Corps and an American Army, from northwest Africa to General Dwight Eisenhower’s command in England.9 On February 29 an Abwehr representative in Madrid contacted his superiors in Berlin about an agent’s report from the week before. According to the report, the British Ambassador in Madrid acknowledged that, by applying pressure on Spain, the Allies hoped ‘‘to attract the attention of the Germans to the Spanish frontier and induce them to move several divisions from the north of France to the South. This would favour the operations of the Allies near Calais and in the northwest.’’10 A telephone call on March 1 followed the Abwehr communication. Citing an Algiers source, Madrid claimed that the enemy’s invasion plan would be completed within six to ten weeks and that they would launch the assault a week before a full moon. Madrid proceeded to suggest that ‘‘the main invasion area will be between Boulogne and Ostende, with simultaneous landings in South France, North Italy and the Balkans.’’11 Despite reports such as the ones from Madrid, the Germans remained uncertain of the Allies’ plans. They continually reassessed the situation and attempted to draw conclusions based upon the Allies’ activities. Communications from various foreign officials stationed in Berlin reflected the Germans’ uncertainty. On March 19 the Siamese Minister in Berlin contacted his Foreign Office in Bangkok and tried to determine the meaning of the cessation of Allied night attacks on Berlin. Noting that bombs had not fallen on Berlin for almost a month, the minister suggested that the lack of raids could indicate that the Allies were seriously preparing for the upcoming invasion, which ‘‘many people’’ predicted would occur ‘‘on or after 21st March.’’ The minister also suggested that the British air force was ‘‘resting’’ and allowing the Americans to take a turn bombing Berlin.12 Around the same time, Allied intelligence intercepted a German wireless communication that indicated the arrival in England of the Ninth U.S. Army, which along with the First U.S. Army and two British armies would participate in the impending invasion. The message also suggested that General George Patton would assume

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command of one of the American armies. The Germans had already begun to construct an Allied Order of Battle that would include First U.S. Army Group under General Omar Bradley and the 21st British Army Group under General Bernard Montgomery when Fortitude South began on April 24.13 Although the Germans had begun to construct an Allied Order of Battle, they remained unclear about when, or even if, the invasion would take place because of conflicting reports received from different sources, which reflected the deficient nature of German intelligence gathering. On March 18, 1944, an Abwehr officer in Lisbon, in a message to Berlin, stated that, although the English were unhappy, the Americans appeared ecstatic because the assault had not happened. According to the Abwehr officer, rumor had it that the Americans would shift all of their troops from England to the Pacific and that the invasion had been canceled. Commando activity, ‘‘including formation of a bridge-head in southern France, Mediterranean area,’’ would occur to ‘‘tie down’’ German troops. In a second communication on March 18, the Abwehr officer in Lisbon, referring to two reports from the Portuguese Consulate in England, claimed that an attack on Holland, Belgium, and north and south France would occur by the end of March or the beginning of April.14 On the surface, the two communique´s appear to be contradictory; however, that is not the case if the Abwehr officer meant commando raids, instead of major attacks, in the latter case. The German High Command relied on information and assessments from other sources in an attempt to ascertain the Allies’ invasion plan. In an appreciation of Allied invasion intentions dated April 6, Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief West, reviewed the situation as of March 21. According to the C-in-C West, the Allies had almost completed their invasion preparations in England. Although it noted reports of a delay in the date for the European invasion, von Rundstedt’s report also suggested reasons for concluding that the invasion ‘‘was immediately imminent’’ and that preparations by Allied forces in North Africa for an assault on southern France were nearing completion.15 By April 12, however, Foreign Armies West concluded, ‘‘Numerous items of information about alleged postponement of invasion or about its complete abandonment in favour of intensified air warfare and small scale local undertakings are to be considered as planned cover for the actual intentions.’’16 An evaluation by the German Air Force (GAF) Operations Staff suggested that British and American forces had taken another step toward the final stage of preparation for invasion and that the 38th British Division, which had been providing air supplies for resistance movements, might have the added duty of ‘‘towing and transport tasks.’’17 In early April the Japanese Naval Attache´ in Berlin reported to his superiors in Tokyo that, although ‘‘the enemy had completed his strategic deployment and concentrated his main force in Southern England,’’ it appeared more likely, because of weather considerations, that the enemy’s assault would occur between May and July rather than in April. According to the attache´, the Naval Operations Section had concluded that the Allies had chosen the closest area of Northern France as the invasion site despite the strength of defenses built there by the Germans.18 A few weeks later, however, the Japanese ambassador to Angora suggested that a number

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of factors would make it difficult for the Allies to assault Europe before the end of the year. The ambassador listed several reasons for the possible delay, including the state of the American and British military potential, the inability of the British, Americans, and Soviets to reach a consensus, and the failure of the Allied bombing effort to persuade neutral countries and Axis allies to join sides with the Allies.19 The Germans continued to gather information throughout the spring of 1944 before and after the Allies’ commencement of Operation Fortitude. Beginning in April, Major Anton Staubwasser noted an increase in Allied ‘‘landing exercises against defended coasts’’ and in ‘‘extensive airlanding exercises.’’ Staubwasser concluded that the Allies would employ a large number of ‘‘parachutists and airlanding units.’’ The German commander noted the presence of several divisions in England, including the 1st and 9th American Infantry, 51st British Infantry, 1st British Airborne, and 1st and 7th British Armoured. The 51st Highlands and the 7th Armoured Divisions were veterans of the Mediterranean campaign, which might have led the Germans to draw certain unsubstantiated conclusions about the Allied invasion force. Staubwasser, who estimated the availability of sixty-five divisions in Great Britain by late May or early June for the assault on Europe, lamented the lack of adequate German air and sea reconnaissance, which might have provided a clearer picture of the Allied position.20 While the Germans attempted to determine their enemy’s planned course of action, the Allies tried to learn what the Germans believed about their invasion preparations. In early April, GSI, 21st Army Group, ascertained that the Germans had begun reinforcing the Brittany region. Noting the movement of panzer divisions to the area, GSI, 21st Army Group, concluded ‘‘from the shaping dispositions of the remaining Panzer and the layback Infantry divisions in France that the enemy expects an assault anywhere from the Pas de Calais to the Bay of Biscay, with an added emphasis on Brittany and a lessened risk to the Low Countries and the Mediterranean littoral.’’21 Around the same time, the Germans, citing an increase in Allied air activity in the Pas de Calais, Paris, Tours, and the Loire Estuary, surmised that the deployment of Allied troops indicated that these areas were ‘‘points of main effort.’’ The German Department Foreign Armies West confirmed the presence of the Ninth U.S. Army in Great Britain and reiterated the possibility that General Patton would command one of the American invasion armies.22 By April 17, because the Germans again believed that the Allied invasion was imminent, Admiral Karl Do¨nitz, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, issued a proclamation. After claiming that the Allies had completed their invasion arrangements, Do¨nitz stated, ‘‘A large-scale landing in western Europe may be expected at any time. The success or failure of this invasion will be decisive for the issue of the war and for the existence of the German people.’’23 The admiral did not, however, indicate a specific site for the anticipated assault. Three days later, he sent the same communication, marked ‘‘emergency,’’ to Leipzig, Nuremberg, and other addressees.24 On the same day that Do¨nitz first issued his announcement, the Japanese Naval Attache´ to Berlin communicated with Tokyo. After acknowledging that the Germans believed the Allied invasion to be imminent, the attache´ listed the preparations that

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provided the impetus for the Germans’ conclusion. First, the Allies had concentrated troops and shipping in southern England, and the Americans had established IX Army Corps and First Army headquarters. Second, Allied air forces had increased their strategic bombing, especially against fortifications, communications, and air bases in the occupied territories in the west. Third, the Allies had restricted traffic in certain British ports and had prohibited the exchange of mail with Europe and North Africa. Finally, the Allies had initiated numerous landing exercises.25 As the furor over the imminent invasion increased, the Fu¨hrer issued a ban on leave for the entire command of Commander-in-Chief, West. Although the decree went into effect immediately, Hitler did permit a few exceptions.26 Only two days before the German western command received notification about the leave restrictions, the Allies had begun to implement Fortitude South. Obviously, however, one cannot draw a connection between the two events. Continuing to monitor events, the Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies West (Fremde Heere West), released a document entitled, ‘‘Survey of the British Empire No. 28,’’ on April 29, 1944. According to the report, Allied army and air force formations appeared ready for invasion. Although the report could not make the same determination about Allied shipping, it did note the concentration of transports in Portsmouth and Dartmouth-Salcombe. The Intelligence Section stressed several factors, besides those communicated by the Japanese Naval Attache´ to Tokyo on April 17, that suggested the imminence of the Allied assault. The British government had placed a restriction on the transfer of diplomatic mail and on civilian travel in certain areas. Maneuvers by Allied air forces in southern England apparently masked the movement of troops in the area. In addition, Allied forces had begun to claim public buildings for hospitals and had issued a call for nurses. Analyzing these and other activities in England led the Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies West, to conclude that the Allied invasion could occur at any time.27 ******************* While the Germans monitored Allied forces in the United Kingdom, the British continued their efforts to determine their enemy’s perceptions about the state of Allied invasion preparations. The Combined Intelligence Section (CIS) issued weekly reports, called the Martian Reports, in which they provided information on a variety of topics, including sections about enemy air and naval forces.28 Martian Report No. 94, dated May 3, 1944, included an extract from a captured German document, entitled ‘‘Durchfu¨rhung Feindlicher Landungsunternehmen Und Die Hieraus Gezogenen Erfahrungen (Carrying-out of Landing Operations and Findings Based Thereon).’’ According to the document, the Germans warned that ‘‘in addition to main beaches account must be taken of subsidiary landing-places and places for feint landings and diversionary manoeuvres.. . .Subsidiary landings are intended for direct or indirect support of the main landing, and may take place before, simultaneously with, or after the main landing.’’29 Because the Germans expected more than one landing to occur, when the Allies invaded Normandy, they would initially be uncertain whether or not the D-Day landing constituted the main invasion.

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Because they knew that the Germans had preconceived notions about the importance of the Pas de Calais region, the Allies hoped to convince them that the D-Day invasion was a diversion and that the main invasion would occur in the suspected area several weeks later. When the Allies did not launch an invasion in late April, the German Commander-in-Chief, West, reassessed the situation. During the first week of May, the Allied bombers concentrated their attack on railway bridges, viaducts, and dams in northern France although they also attacked some airfields, factories, and supply organizations. Operating ‘‘without recognizable unity of plan,’’ Allied aircraft assaulted German coastal defenses. After noting that Allied wireless telegraphy (W/T) traffic had returned to normal on May 4, the Commander-in-Chief reported that Allied forces had participated in a landing exercise, called ‘‘Fabius,’’ around the Isle of Wight, which persuaded him to conclude that it ‘‘provides evidence for the conjecture that the enemy, in view of the outer beach obstacles known to him, is attempting to achieve a modified landing and battle technique for his foremost landing wave.’’30 According to the German commander, Exercise Fabius demonstrated that the enemy recognized the importance of eliminating the ‘‘outer-beach obstacles’’ at low tide; however, this was a factor that the Germans appeared to have forgotten by D-Day. Citing various reasons, the Commander-in-Chief also concluded that the British and Americans had finished their preparations for invasion. He noted, Despite the fact that visual and photo recce has not yet been able to include the whole of the English south coast, the observed concentrations of landing shipping space, especially in the area north of the Isle of Wight (Portsmouth–Southampton), nevertheless give a clear picture of a main concentration defining itself in that area. Tonnage of shipping space for landings which has so far been observed can be assumed to be sufficient for 12 to 13 divisions. . .for fairly short sea-routes.. . .The point of main effort within the whole threatened Channel front stretching from (Scheldt) to the northern tip of Brittany, appears to be roughly from Boulogne as far as Normandy inclusive. In this connection, the enemy’s chief concern must be to gain possession of large harbours with good performance. Of primary importance as such would be Le Havre and Cherbourg, and of secondary imporance (in respect of performance as well) Boulogne and Brest. . . .The enemy landing exercise which took place most recently indicates that the enemy attaches special importance to recognizing and clearing the outer-beach obstacles at low water. . . 31

The Allied commanders at SHAEF and the LCS may have been disturbed by the German commander’s message since they were hoping to reinforce the Germans’ belief in the likelihood of an enemy landing in the Pas de Calais region. The report from Rundstedt’s headquarters seemed to indicated a shift of German attention from the Pas de Calais to Normandy. On the same day that the Commander-in-Chief, West, communicated his assessment of the Allied position, Luftflotte 3, IC, did the same. He interpreted Allied air attacks on the railways and waterways along the Seine River between Mantes and Le Havre to mean that the Allies planned to invade the area between Le Havre and

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Cherbourg.32 The Luftflotte 3 communication likewise must have dismayed the Allies, who hoped Operation Fortitude South would persuade the Germans to focus on the Pas de Calais area rather than on Normandy, where Allied troops would land in less than a month. The German High Command, however, must have come to a conclusion comparable to that suggested by the Luftflotte 3 report and decided to authorize further preparations. The sea defense commandant at the Pas de Calais and the naval authorities at Boulogne, Ostend, Calais, and Dunkirk conducted an anti-invasion exercise between May 7 and 10, which was ‘‘the first recorded naval exercise assuming Allied landing to be carried out in the area between Cherbourg and the [German] Bight’’33 ******************* As D-Day grew nearer, Allied crews furiously constructed dummy aircraft, landing strips, camps, and landing craft. Wireless traffic flew across southeast England. Double agents sent messages to their contacts in Madrid and Berlin. All worked toward creating a fake FUSAG Order of Battle and a false story of Allied invasion intentions. Several diplomats kept their governments apprised of conditions as they unfolded. On May 11, the Japanese Naval Attache´ to Berlin reported an increase in Allied air attacks against key communication and supply centers in the Channel area and on the battlefront in Italy as the Allies prepared to launch a major assault on Europe. In addition to bombing French airfields, the Allies increasingly and systematically targeted the communication lines that connected France to Belgium. According to the Naval Attache´, a week earlier, German aircraft had successfully provided reconnaissance photographs of the area around the River Thames and Yarmouth. The photographs revealed a concentration of landing craft, primarily LCT class, or smaller, in ports along the south coast of England. An analysis of the photographs fostered the conclusion that ‘‘five landing units. . .are assembled in this area.’’34 MI 14 (British Military Intelligence, Section 14, which specialized in intelligence about Germany) issued weekly summaries to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), who was the head of the British Army. In its report for the week ending May 15, 1944, MI 14 summarized the latest German appreciation, which noted that the Germans expected the Allies to invade ‘‘at any time in the immediate future’’ and that the only warning of the imminence of the assault would be an intensified attack by Allied aircraft. The German report argued that the Allies could land anywhere between Boulogne and Normandy because of the importance of the Le Havre and Cherbourg ports. MI 14 also passed along the German acknowledgment that the enemy recognized the importance of clearing underwater obstacles at low tide, which they had drawn from observations of the Allied exercise, Fabius .35 By the middle of May, the Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies West, disclosed several developments to Berlin. First, the Allies had begun amassing a noticeable concentration of forces in south and southeast England. Second, in addition to moving two British divisions to Portsmouth, Allied leaders had attached several American divisions to British forces situated in southeast England. Third, the American Army had formed a new force in the Folkestone area, where it had also transferred its 28th

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Infantry Division. Finally, the Allies moved some of their fighter forces to southern England, where they could offer support for the invasion force.36 In a situation report for the week May 15–21, 1944, the Commander-in-Chief West identified south and southeast England as the main areas in which the Allies had concentrated troops for the invasion. The German commander believed that the ships in the Portsmouth-Southampton area would provide transport across the English Channel for the amphibious forces. In considering the location of the attack, the commander adamantly stated, ‘‘Without any doubt, the Channel Coast between the Schelde and Normandy, and the northern part of Brittany, including Brest, remains the endangered main front.’’37 The area indicated by the Commander-in-Chief West provided an enormous amount of coast for the Germans to defend. He was not, however, apparently ready, or able, to be more specific about the endangered area. As May passed, the Germans continued their attempts to ascertain the Allied plan of attack based on information from numerous sources. In addition, Germany’s allies attempted to keep abreast of the Germans’ perception of the situation in Europe. On the 16th, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin forwarded the latest German calculations to Tokyo. The prevailing view was that the Allies had postponed the invasion, which would probably not occur in May. Although he claimed that Allied forces in the United Kingdom stood at 55 divisions, the ambassador believed that they were insufficient for an assault on northwest Europe. Allied forces in Scotland had, however, completed preparations for a ‘‘diversionary attack on Norway.’’ 38 The Siamese Counselor to Berlin, however, communicated conclusions that differed from those of the Japanese Ambassador. The Siamese diplomat reported that, according to General Alexander, the Italian campaign was a ‘‘prelude’’ to an assault on Europe; he also believed that the Allies’ target would be Norway and Denmark. Although the invasion of the two countries ‘‘would not, of course, bring about a decisive conclusion of the war in favour of the Allies,. . .it would be a good move politically as well as strategically for England, while Russia is busy elsewhere.’’39 ******************* Foreign diplomats in Berlin were not the only speculators. On May 22, in its weekly report to the War Cabinet, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee presented what the Germans had deduced about Overlord. In late May, according to the Germans, the invasion target area included the coastal region that stretched from Cherbourg in the west to Boulogne in the east. ‘‘Although the German High Command will, until our assault takes place, reckon with the possibility that it will come across the narrow Straits of Dover to the Pas de Calais area, there is some evidence that the Le Havre-Cherbourg area, including as it does those two first class ports, is regarded as a likely, and perhaps even the main, point of assault.’’40 The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’s opinion had not changed when it submitted its next report a week later.41 MI 14 in its weekly summary dated May 29 concurred somewhat with the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’s assessment. Although it contended that the Germans still believed that the endangered region lay between Scheldt and the Brest Peninsula, MI 14 admitted that the movement of German

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forces indicated a focus on the Cherbourg peninsula.42 Unfortunately, SHAEF and the LCS hoped that the Germans would conclude that the Pas de Calais was the main target area. However, just because the German High Command believed that the Allies would attempt to take the ports of Le Havre and Cherbourg did not mean that there was consensus or that Hitler necessarily concurred. In late May, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, following a conversation with Paul K. Schmidt, the Head of the Press Bureau, again addressed the issue of the Allied invasion in a communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. According to the ambassador, Schmidt suggested that the Allies could not end the war with an air attack; they needed to commit land forces. The concentration of troops in Great Britain demonstrated the Allies’ realization of that fact. The Allies’ invasion could, the ambassador claimed, come anywhere, even in the Baltics. In addition, he said, ‘‘one had to admit that the second front would come sooner or later. As regards the place[s] where the landing[s] would take place, it would not necessarily be absurd for it [them] to take place in some unforeseen locality, even for instance in the BALTIC[S]. From the impression he (Schmidt) had got when travelling in SWEDEN, it was even thought that [the enemy] might emerge from the KATTEGAT and land, say, at GOTEBORG,. . .’’43 In addition, noting that Allied air attacks against the Seine bridges and communication north of Paris had resumed on May 26 after a bout of bad weather, the Luftflotte 3, IC, concluded that the enemy planned to assault the area around Dieppe and the Seine Bay.44 German appreciations of the Allied situation in the West generally continued to reflect confusion and uncertainty. As June neared, the Germans became increasingly tense. They had been expecting an Allied invasion since March, and one had not yet materialized. Because they were expecting it, the Germans became easily persuaded that the assault had begun, even if it had not. On May 31 Field Luftgau in West France reported a landing by Allied gliders. Although it was a false report, the Germans’ nervousness was apparent.45 Intercepted communications ‘‘showed that, despite their growing anxiety about Normandy and their inclination to believe that the invasion would come in June, the Germans remained radically uncertain as to its place and time.’’46 Although the Allied deception plan contributed to their confusion, the Germans’ preoccupation with the real invasion site immediately prior to D-Day demonstrates ‘‘that Allied deception had not wholly succeeded in persuading the enemy that the landings would not come in Normandy.’’ Because Ultra intercepts and reconnaissance flights demonstrated the German reinforcement of the Cherbourg peninsula shortly before D-Day, deception planners made modifications to Fortitude.47 In the days and weeks before D-Day, the Germans frantically attempted to determine where and when the Allies would attack. There was no consensus among the military leaders themselves or between Hitler and the German High Command. According to Colonel Hans von Luck, who received command of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 125 in May 1944, Major General Edgar Feuchtinger maintained that the Germans expected the landing to occur in the Pas de Calais area, not Normandy, because of the short distance across the English Channel at that point. He did, however, acknowledge the importance of Caen. While he believed that the Allies would

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attack the Pas de Calais, General Erwin Rommel admitted that they might assault Normandy, ‘‘because the British could be expected to do the unexpected.’’[48] By June 1944 Hitler incorporated both sites in his appreciation of Allied intentions. The Fu¨hrer believed that the Allies would launch several invasions, most of which would be diversions. While he thought that the Allies would stage the first major diversion in the Normandy area, Hitler believed that the Pas de Calais was the site of the main Allied invasion.49 ******************* The Germans based their appreciations of Allied intentions primarily on their understanding of the strength and location of Allied forces in Great Britain. By June 6, 1944, the Germans had a greatly inflated idea of the number of Allied divisions available for the invasion of Europe. Part of the overestimation was the result of reports from double agents, such as Garbo, Brutus, Tricycle, and Tate, but part was fostered by Colonel Alexis Baron von Roenne, who provided Fremde Heere West’s (FHW’s, or Foreign Armies West’s) estimates of enemy strength in his daily Lagebericht West, or Situation Report West, to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), which was the SS’s security branch. The FHW and SD had engaged in a long-term rivalry to prove which provided the more reliable information. In late 1943, the SD, when it supplied the Fu¨hrer with estimates of Allied strength, had cut the figures furnished by FHW in half. Believing that the data, which had apparently been compiled by von Roenne, to be accurate, Hitler began, early in 1944, to transfer German troops from France to the Russian front. A member of Schwarze Kapelle (Black Orchestra, a group who tried to bring about Hitler’s downfall), von Roenne wanted the Atlantic Wall strengthened, not weakened. Consequently, von Roenne proceeded to ‘‘grossly exaggerate’’ the number of Allied divisions in Great Britain to counteract the SD’s deflation of the figures supplied by FHW.50 Although the figures and the ways in which they were calculated vary, the evidence suggests that the Germans believed that the Allies possessed many more divisions than they actually had. In January the Germans estimated Allied troop strength at 55 divisions, which was at least 18 divisions more than were present in the United Kingdom at that time.51 When in late April von Roenne suggested that Allied forces in Great Britain numbered between 85 and 90 regular and seven airborne divisions that could be utilized for an invasion, the actual number stood at three airborne and 32 infantry and armored divisions. According to Major Anton Staubwasser and Lieutenant General Max Pemsel, in late May the Allied divisions numbered approximately 75, of which seven were airborne. 52 Shortly before D-Day, the Germans credited the Allies with 42 divisions more than they had. In addition, according to their estimates, the Allies had landing craft sufficient to land 20 of its 89 divisions in the first wave. In reality, the craft could transport at most six divisions. According to a communication sent by the Japanese Ambassador to Japan, Hitler claimed that the Allies, who had finished their invasion preparations, had concentrated 80 divisions in Great Britain. Of the 80, eight had previous combat experience.53 Hitler stated further that following diversions in ‘‘Norway, Denmark,

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south-west France and on the French Mediterranean coast,’’ Allied soldiers ‘‘would establish a bridgehead in Normandy or Brittany.’’ Once that operation progressed, the Allies would attempt to begin ‘‘a second real front in the Straits,’’ or, in other words, in the Pas de Calais area.54 Several factors contributed to the German overestimation of Allied troop strength in England. The Germans’ experiences in Italy probably gave them an inflated idea of Allied amphibious capabilities. Because of their ideological perception of Allied capabilities, the Germans were willing to accept even questionable evidence about the number of forces concentrated in England.55 Equally, it is possible that the Germans made incorrect assumptions about the how, when, where, and strength of the Allied invasion because of a failure in the ‘‘estimative process.’’ What is apparent, however, is that the Germans had poor intelligence. Major Anton Staubwasser concurred. After crediting the Allies with a system of intelligence that provided Allied leaders with an accurate portrait of German defenses, coastal obstacles, and troop strength and placement, Staubwasser asserted ‘‘that the whole intelligence service against the western Allies was exceedingly faulty.’’56 According to Staubwasser, the German High Command did not have ‘‘usable information’’ that told them where and when the Allies would attack. As D-Day neared, German intelligence continued to supply reports that speculated about the invasion’s details relating to all coastal areas controlled by the Germans, including Norway, northwest Germany, western Europe, and the Balkans. Staubwasser also claimed that ‘‘the Allies had been very clever at playing no end of false reports into the hands of the German command.. . . The Oberkommando of H Gp B was well aware of the complete lack of agents having insight to Allied invasion plans.’’57 An analysis of the German Intelligence Service after the war reinforced Staubwasser’s perception of inadequacies. Part of the problem was attributed to Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of Abwehr, who was apparently a bad judge of men. In addition, he was a poor organizer. There is some evidence to suggest that Abwehr officers ‘‘sat in Paris and Athens, in Biarritz and Estoril, enjoying the opportunities for self-indulgence provided by these resports [sic], undisturbed (thanks to a complete lack of centralization at Hq), so long as a quota of reports was sent in.’’ The validity of these reports was unimportant. ‘‘. . .‘It was better to have a controlled agent than none at all’, observed one cynical officer when it was suggested to him (correctly) that his prinicpal source of information was under Allied management . . .’’ Another officer reacted in horror at the thought that his agent was controlled by the enemy. ‘‘If he were to admit that to his chief, he said, he would be shot for defeatism.’’58 According to John Masterman, who ran the Double-Cross Committee, the British captured and turned every agent whom the Germans sent to Great Britain. This could imply a certain degree of ineptitude on the part of the Germans either in the people whom they chose to be agents or in the level of training that they gave prospective agents. There is no denying that the British excelled at identifying possible enemy spies. The exploits of Garbo and Tricycle, as portrayed in their autobiographies and their case files, seem at times a bit far fetched; therefore, one has to wonder why the Germans failed to question their reliability and appeared to accept all of the

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information that these two and other spies provided.59 According to ‘‘Johnny’’ Jebsen, a double agent known as Artist, Canaris ‘‘did not care if all the agents in Britain were fakes as long as he could go to Field Marshal Keitel, the head of the German high command, and report that he had twelve agents in Britain, each of them writing a letter a week.’’60 In addition, it is possible, by the end of the war, that several Abwehr officers were no longer employing agents despite the fact that they were still providing information from them. Several officers pocketed the money meant for the agents and either fabricated the information or obtained it from the newspapers.61 Reliable or not, information from the double agents contributed to the Allied order of battle that the Germans were constructing, including their overestimation of Allied troop strength, and affected their plans for defending against the upcoming invasion. ******************* Appreciations of Allied troop strength and of where the Allied invasion would strike had an impact on the German defenses and on the deployment of their forces. As their perceptions changed in the weeks prior to D-Day, the Germans adjusted both their defenses and the location of their forces. As might be expected, German defenses did not remain static throughout the winter and spring of 1944. In November 1943 Allied intelligence intercepted a message sent by Ambassador Oshima from Berlin, in which he described the state of German defenses in France. According to Oshima, General Friedrich Dollmann’s Seventh Army in Normandy consisted of eight understrength divisions, and the Germans had approximately fifteen mobile divisions in the West to counter an Allied invasion.62 In mid-January 1944, Field Marshal Alfred Jodl sent a telegram in the Fu¨hrer’s name classifying various coastal defenses as fortresses, including Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Le Havre in the Fifteenth Army’s area and Cherbourg, St. Malo, Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire in the Seventh Army’s region. Although they would not receive additional forces, Hitler gave the fortress commanders combat zone ‘‘command authority.’’63 By February 20, however, the 21st Army Group’s GSI reported the movement of Germans troops into the West. In addition to noting the congestion of forces in the Pas de Calais area, the transfer of forces, according to GSI’s weekly review, appeared to be ‘‘an attempt to provide the much-publicised PAS DE CALAIS with defence in depth provided by infantry divisions in a layback role.’’[64] A few weeks later, the 21st Army Group’s GSI reported changes being implemented by the Germans along the northern European coast. Because of a lack of divisions and confidence in the Atlantic Wall guns, the Germans had begun a program of ‘‘casemate construction’’ that included the installation of various types of artillery and underwater obstacles along the coast. In addition to the evacuation of civilians, the Germans flooded coastal regions primarily in Belgium and Holland. They increased their defensive measures in the ports of Calais, Boulogne, Le Havre, and Cherbourg. Despite the physical improvements, however, few new German divisions moved into the area. GSI speculated that the placement of infantry divisions inland around the Pas de Calais indicated the German intention ‘‘to absorb fully

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the first shock of an Allied assault in that area. Without such buffers the dwindling number of Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions immediately available to the area might find difficulty in concentrating effectively against a bridgehead in the early stages of the battle.’’65 The failure to supply forces that could adequately meet a major Allied invasion forced the Germans to construct strong coastal defenses and to determine the best placement of their forces, as well as of their reserves. The two major German commanders in the West, Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt and General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, could not, however, agree on the appropriate strategy, which ultimately compromised the Germans’ defensive capabilities along the coast of France. Von Rundstedt believed that the Pas de Calais, which was of ‘‘vital importance’’ to the Germans, would have the same value for the Allies as it did for the Germans. He found agreement for his opinion in the General Staff at OKW.66 Apparently, von Rundstedt’s experiences in 1940 led him to believe that the Allies and the Germans would both view the Pas de Calais in the same way, particularly because of the width of the English Channel between that region and the English coast at Dover. Because his air and naval support in 1940 had been weak, the German commander had planned an invasion of England across the English Channel at its narrowest point. In 1944 von Rundstedt, reversing his own plan, applied the same rationale to his enemy when he asserted that they would strike at the Pas de Calais; however, Rommel believed that the Allied invasion could come between Dunkirk and Cherbourg, an area that encompassed both the Pas de Calais and Normandy regions. While he believed that the Allies might invade Belgium, Rommel recognized the importance of Cherbourg to the Allied position in Europe. Therefore, he considered the defense of Cherbourg vital. In addition to disagreeing about the possible invasion site, the two generals failed to agree on the placement of the German central armored reserve. Von Rundstedt advocated placing the reserve near Paris, from where a counterattack could be launched against the Allies no matter where they landed. Rommel, on the other hand, believed the reserves should be located near the coast, where they could prevent the Allies from establishing a beachhead. The two generals appealed to Hitler, whose solution made both strategies ineffective. Although he gave Rommel direct command of 2nd, 21st, and 116th Panzer Divisions, the Fu¨ hrer retained personal control of 1st and 22nd SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions, which formed the OKW reserve. Only Hitler could approve the commitment of the reserves to battle. Although Hitler eliminated von Rundstedt from the equation, he also tied Rommel’s hands, which became increasingly apparent on June 6 and the days immediately following the commencement of the Allied invasion.67 ******************* Although he believed the endangered area fell between Dunkirk and Cherbourg, Rommel, beginning in February 1944, focused his attention on the Seine Bay and the mouths of the Somme and Bresle Rivers. Because of the reefs along the coast of Calvados, the German navy disagreed that a threat to the Seine Bay existed.

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According to Lieutenant General Pemsel, however, around January 1, 1944, Rommel had told him that the Allies would land in the Fifteenth Army’s sector, or the Pas de Calais region. Because of the forces available, the Germans could only create a strong defense in the Pas de Calais, not in Normandy or Brittany. Between February and April, in an effort to strengthen their defensive force in the Pas de Calais, the Germans increased the number of infantry divisions attached to the Fifteenth German Army by five, from 10 to 15. Although they sent other reinforcements to Brittany and the Mediterranean coast, Normandy did not receive any. 68 However, the situation began to change in late April/early May, when General O. Jodel told OB West (Oberbefehlshaber West, or general Western Front HQ) that ‘‘the Fuehrer has definite information that Normandy is endangered.’’ Following Hitler’s revelation, the Germans transferred the ‘‘91 Luftwaffe Division, several armored battalions and antitank battalions to the COTENTIN peninsula and for the assembly by OKW of the Pz Lehr Division and 12 SS Pz Division from OKW reserve, west of Paris and not in the rear of the 15. Army.’’69 By the beginning of May 1944, Rommel had also come to believe that the Allied assault would hit Normandy. An Allied training exercise, Operation Tiger, in the Slapton Sands area helped convince Hitler and Rommel that Normandy was the Allies’ invasion target.70 By early May the Germans had four ‘‘base forces’’ defending the Channel coast: the Calais force in the area east of the Somme; the Seine-Somme group between the Seine and Somme Rivers; the Normandy force between the Seine River and St. Malo; and a force on the Channel Islands. Two ‘‘guard forces’’ set up headquarters in Boulogne and Brest.71 In mid-May, the SHAEF weekly intelligence report indicated that the Germans had begun reinforcing the Seventh Army in the Normandy area on a ‘‘considerable scale.’’ Brittany also received reinforcements. In addition, armored units, traveling by rail and road, had moved into the area south of Caen. Other units moved into, or out of, the Normandy area.72 Around the same time, GSI 21st Army Group reported that Rommel was in the process of ‘‘organising as many of the sixty divisions as he can get his hands on to meet one of the three main eventualities: assaults upon the Pas de Calais; astride Le Havre; or either side of the Cherbourg peninsula.’’73 The Germans continued to make adjustments to their defenses and to their placement of troops, especially after their May anti-invasion exercises. Allied air activity, which increased as D-Day approached, forced the Germans to update their conclusions about the impending enemy invasion constantly. Approximately a week before the invasion, because Allied aircraft bombed bridges across the Seine, Luftflotte 3 concluded that the Allies probably intended to attack ‘‘the Dieppe and Seine Bay area.’’74 Although the Germans appeared to be confused about Allied plans on the eve of the invasion, the Allied deception story helped Hitler to reach the ‘‘right’’ conclusions, even though the main story would not be released until the invasion had begun. In fact, ‘‘a conversation between him [Hitler] and the Japanese Ambassador shows that by 28th May he had acquired a thorough grasp of the FORTITUDE SOUTH plot, thus anticipating by more than a week the systematic programme of disclosure which the Allied deception staff had set for the performance of the game.’’75

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By early June 1944 the Germans had 62 divisions with which to defend the Channel coast. Although the German High Command believed the invasion would come in the Pas de Calais, because of its proximity to the Ruhr, defense of Brittany, Normandy, and the Cotentin peninsula remained essential. Consequently, although they concentrated 15 divisions in northeast France, the Germans placed 17 west of the Seine. Evidently, ‘‘this division of German forces reflected an indecision within the German High Command that recognized that north of the Loire only Normandy and the Pas de Calais offered themselves as possible landing areas.’’76 The Germans placed their ‘‘mobile reserves,’’ which consisted of most of the motorized and armored divisions, in position to launch a counterattack should their coastal and beach defenses fail to prevent the establishment of an Allied beachhead. Most of the mobile reserve divisions were inexperienced in battle. Of the ten available divisions, ‘‘four. . . were not yet operational because OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres or Army High Command] had, as usual, been dilatory in moving such remnants of them as remained from the Eastern Front.’’77 ******************* Although as late as June 1, 1944, General Erich Marcks, the LXXXIV Corps commander, predicted that the Allies would land at Normandy within the next few days, his opinion did not receive any support. Staubwasser admitted that shortly before the invasion German reconnaissance planes had spotted constant movement of landing craft in the western ports of the English southern coast. Because reconnaissance aircraft failed to view the eastern ports, the Germans were not able to create a complete picture of Allied concentrations. With the help of other information, such as Allied air attacks and reconnaissance, sabotage by the Resistance, and ‘‘reconnaissance thrusts of enemy naval forces,’’ the Germans eliminated the Dutch and Belgian coasts as Allied targets. The Allied air offensive around Boulogne on the eve of the invasion left the Germans unclear as to ‘‘whether this should be regarded [as] a direct preparation for invasion, or as a maneuver of diversion.’’78 On June 1 Foreign Armies West (FHW, or Fremde Heere West) issued a brief appreciation of the Allies in the West to the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest, IC. After identifying several airborne divisions and noting the movement of 79th American Division into southeast England, the FHW stated its assessment of a landing exercise carried out by Allied troops at low tide along the south coast on May 23. The FHW concluded that the Allies might attempt to land at low tide because of German beach obstacles and that ‘‘as the enemy can hardly intend to keep uniformed Allied officers in hiding for a long period, the period from 12/6 [12 June] onwards (when there will be little moon-light) must be considered the new danger period.’’79 The Fremde Heere West even speculated that the Eastern and Western Allies would coordinate attacks. According to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee report on June 3, the Germans had still not pinpointed the exact location of the upcoming Allied assault, but they did expect more than one landing in the area between Cherbourg and the Pas de Calais. 80 Von Rundstedt evaluated the situation late on June 5, 1944. After

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considering the impact of increased Allied air attacks, Rundstedt concluded that Allied invasion preparations were ‘‘well advanced.’’ The general suggested that the main attack would come between Scheldt and Normandy although the possibility of a threat to Brittany did exist. Allied air attacks against the ‘‘coastal defenses between Dunkirk and Dieppe’’ and on bridges over the Seine and Oise Rivers suggested a large-scale invasion. According to von Rundstedt, ‘‘the elimination of the SEINE crossings would have however the same effect on changes in the disposition of troops in the event of a possible enemy attack on the area west of the Gulf of the Seine, NORMANDY, and the north coast of BRITTANY. That the ‘invasion’ is actually imminent does not seem to be indicated as yet.’’81 Unfortunately, von Rundstedt would soon learn that he had made a mistake. During the night of June 5 the BBC broadcast the second part of a coded message aimed at resistance organizations in northwest Europe. They had transmitted the first part a few days earlier, as they had done periodically since 1943. The second transmission, ‘‘Fills my heart with languorous sorrow,’’ which, like the first one, came from a poem, was the key one, for it indicated the commencement of the invasion. OB West, aware of the first coded message, had previously placed its units on alert, but in each instance the Allies failed to invade. Although OB West had come to believe that the coded message was a diversion, they realized that they did not know which message was the right one, which one meant the Allies were coming.82 A few hours before midnight on June 5 Oberst Staubwasser learned from a Fifteenth Army general staff officer that, following the interception of the code words, Fifteenth Army had gone on alert. After contacting OB West, Staubwasser received an order to ‘‘desist from alerting the troops.’’ Consequently, since Seventh German Army did not receive the alert order until early on June 6, the Allied invasion in Normandy came virtually as a surprise.83 During the early hours of the assault, German commanders remained confused about the nature of the Allied activity. According to Admiral Theodor Krancke, who had earlier suggested that the invasion would come between Boulogne and Cherbourg, ‘‘when after midnight the first paratroop landings were reported to Naval Group Headquarters, these could not immediately be identified as the beginning of the major invasion.’’84 Air Fleet 3 and C-in-C West concluded that the landings were either part of a sabotage operation or emergency parachute drops from Allied planes returning from bombing missions. According to Krancke, even after incoming information suggested otherwise, C-in-C stuck to his original interpretation. At 3:20 A.M. the Naval Group Commander received the first definite information that the Allied action was indeed an invasion. The C-in-C West did not reach the same conclusion until three hours later.85 The German military leadership failed to take early reports of Allied activity seriously. Around midnight, after receiving word about paratroop landings, von Luck ordered an immediate alert of all units and the notification of division headquarters. While interrogating captured British paratroopers, von Luck learned of Allied plans to seize control of the Orne River bridges at Ranville before the Germans could destroy them. After gaining control of the bridges, the paratroopers were to establish

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a bridgehead to the east of the river in preparation for the sea assault that would occur on June 6.86 Because of orders not to engage the enemy without permission, von Luck contacted Army Group B and planned to oppose the impending invasion. After establishing a ‘‘defensive front,’’ von Luck’s troops could do nothing until Army Group B responded to his request. Von Luck’s unit was not the only part of the division condemned to inactivity in the early hours of the Normandy conflict. ‘‘The rest of the division, with the panzer regiment and Panzer Grenadier Regiment 192, was equally immobilized, though in the highest state of alert.’’ Von Luck did not receive the answer that he desired. According to his account, ‘‘Army Group B merely informed us that it was a matter of a diversionary maneuver: the British had thrown out straw dummies on parachutes.’’87 Von Rundstedt’s headquarters notified OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or High, or Supreme, Command of the Armed Forces) around 3:00 A.M. of largescale air landings. An hour later a regiment from the 352nd Division received orders from Major General Dietrich Kraiss to proceed by bicycle to the area where the paratroop landing had been reported. In reality, the regiment pursued the dummy paratroopers that had been dropped as part of the pre-invasion diversion. By 6:00 A.M. General Gu¨nther von Blumentritt called OKW again from von Rundstedt’s headquarters requesting the release of I SS Panzer Corps from the armored reserve to meet what appeared to be a major invasion. Jodl refused to wake the sleeping Hitler to pass on the request. Von Rundstedt’s headquarters finally received permission to transfer I SS Panzer Corps from Paris to Normandy ten hours after the initial request.88 In addition, the German officer on the scene in Normandy failed to assess the situation correctly. As a result, he did not request support to meet the threat posed by the Allied invasion. General Friedrich Dollmann commanded the Seventh German Army in Normandy. His chief of staff, General Max Pemsel, notified General Hans Speidel around 6:15 A.M. that a major naval and air attack on the Normandy coastal defenses had begun. A half an hour later Pemsel contacted General Hans von Salmuth, the Fifteenth Army’s commander-in-chief, about the assault. According to Pemsel, however, the Seventh Army could handle the attack without any help. As a result, von Salmuth, Speidel, and the majority of Rommel’s staff, which was at La Roche-Guyon, returned to bed. ******************* Jodl’s decision not to wake Hitler, when the first requests arrived from von Rundstedt’s headquarters, would prove costly as Allied forces stormed the beaches at Normandy on June 6, 1944. Jodl, who claimed that the conditions could not be resolved before daybreak, and the other commanders decided not to inform Hitler of events occurring along the French coast until after the Fu¨hrer had eaten breakfast. Consequently, the German leader did not learn about the invasion until the war conference at midday.89 According to Albert Speer, in the days before June 6, Hitler had adamantly proclaimed that ‘‘the enemy would probably begin with a feigned attack in order to draw our troops away from the ultimate invasion site.’’

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At the June 6 war conference, Hitler, according to Speer, appeared even more convinced that the assault on Normandy was an Allied attempt to fool him. At this point Hitler rejected his earlier conviction that Normandy was the main invasion site. Finally, around noon, the Fu¨hrer considered the request from von Rundstedt’s headquarters for the release of the OKW reserve.90 Four hours later Hitler agreed to the request and released part of the reserve, including the 12th SS Panzer, 17th SS Panzer Grenadier, and Panzer Lehr Divisions. By that time, however, the cloudy skies had cleared enough for Allied bombers and fighters to create havoc among the panzer formations traveling on roads or by rail toward Normandy. Consequently, the panzers could not advance to the battle site until darkness fell and covered their movements. In addition to Allied bombers, other factors prevented the OKW reserve from being more effective on the battlefield. The German command remained uncertain on D-Day as to the true nature of the Allied invasion. Although at 6:00 A.M. Blumentritt had suggested that a major landing was underway, three and a half hours later, he admitted that he could not determine if the Allied assault was a ‘‘large-scale feint or the main attack.’’ Admiral Do¨nitz and his staff agreed with the Foreign Armies West assessment that the Allies would launch other assaults. Because they believed that one would come in the Pas de Calais area, Foreign Armies West recommended that no forces be transferred from Fifteenth Army to Normandy.91 It is possible that von Rundstedt’s preconceived ideas about the Allied invasion clouded his judgment on D-Day. Because of poor communications and the lack of air reconnaissance, the Commander-in-Chief, West, remained uncertain about the extent of Allied intentions. He did not, however, deviate from the belief that the Allies would launch two assaults, the first of which would be a decoy. On June 6 Hitler, von Rundstedt, and Rommel all agreed that Normandy was a ‘‘prelude’’ to an attack on the Pas de Calais. The June 6 OKH Intelligence Summary concurred with their assessment. Acknowledging that a large-scale landing had occurred at Normandy, the report concluded that, because only 10 to 12 of the 60 divisions in southern England were involved, the rest would participate in a second assault. The overestimation of Allied strength contributed to an erroneous conclusion. Since they anticipated another Allied assault, the three Germans, in agreement with the Foreign Armies West recommendation, decided to maintain an intact Fifteenth Army in the area north of the Seine River. Doing so would serve two purposes. First, German forces would be available to protect the V-weapon sites in the Pas de Calais. Second, they would be in position to secure the path to the Ruhr.92 Hitler’s orders to von Rundstedt on June 6, when he released part of the OKW reserve, contributed to its failure to prevent the Allies from establishing a foothold on the coast. The Fu¨hrer ordered von Rundstedt to use the reserve to ‘‘destroy the beachhead by nightfall.’’ Because Hitler agreed to transfer the reserve so late in the day, Allied aircraft hindered its movement. The reserve could not advance until after nightfall; therefore, it failed to fulfill Hitler’s order.93 On June 7 the 12th SS Panzer Division joined the action. After undergoing a harrowing one-hundred mile trip, Panzer Lehr arrived two days later. Although Rommel immediately sent 21st Panzer

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Division to the beach and the 2nd Panzer Division within 24 hours of the invasion, it was insufficient to prevent Allied forces from gaining a foothold. ******************* The OKW reserve also contained other divisions that had not yet been committed to the battle and that would not become available without orders from Hitler. The 1st SS Panzer Division and the 116th Panzer Division’s armored elements, which OKW released on June 8, began their journey to the front the next day in compliance with orders issued by von Rundstedt. Two days later, however, von Rundstedt, following instructions from Hitler and the German High Command, rescinded the order and ordered the 1st SS and 116th Panzer Divisions to stop their transfer to Normandy and to move to the Pas de Calais instead. Von Rundstedt did, however, place Fifteenth Army on ‘‘a state of alarm II.’’ 94 Much speculation, about why von Rundstedt received orders to alter his original directive, has resulted. Many historians credit the double agent Garbo with the change in orders. In the early hours of June 9, Garbo sent a message in which he conveyed information provided by his associates. According to Garbo, the Allies had launched a diversionary operation against Normandy in order to ‘‘draw the maximum of our reserves’’ there where they would be occupied while Allied forces launched the real invasion elsewhere. Because of the large number of Allied forces in southeast England that had not been committed to the battle, the double agent suggested that an assault on the Pas de Calais would follow after the reserves had moved to Normandy.95 Although the influence of the Garbo message is frequently noted, three communique´s received by Colonel Friedrich-Adolf Krummacher, the Chief of Intelligence, on June 9 possibly contributed to the Fu¨ hrer’s decision to cancel permission for movement of the panzer divisions to Normandy. Of the three, it is likely that Garbo’s message was the most important factor in Hitler’s decision. Around 1:30 P.M. Krummacher received the two coded messages transmitted by the BBC, the first of which suggested that an invasion would occur within two days, the second of which indicated the commencement of the assault. The Abwehr Stelle, which forwarded the transmissions to Krummacher, assumed that the Allies were aware that the Germans controlled the sabotage network for which the communications were intended and that, therefore, the Allies issued them for deceptive purposes. The senior headquarters disagreed. Krummacher decided that the messages lacked the importance necessary to dictate providing Jodl with a copy.96 About four and a half hours later, Krummacher received a message from Josephine, an agent who was not controlled by the Allied Double-Cross Committee. Josephine, whose real name was Karl Heinz Kraemer, was a German officer who worked for the Abwehr in Stockholm. People traveling in Swedish military circles and the press provided source material for Josephine’s transmissions. On June 9, Josephine reported that the Allies planned to initiate another main attack within a short period of time. The target for the second assault was the Pas de Calais. After writing ‘‘sofort,’’ or urgent, on the message, Krummacher passed it on to Jodl and Hitler.97

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Garbo transmitted the third message that Krummacher received on June 9. Although Garbo sent it between midnight and 2:30 A.M., the Chief of Intelligence did not receive an abbreviated version of it until around 10:00 P.M. By 10:30 P.M. both Jodl and Keitel had received Garbo’s message, on which Krummacher, the Chief of Intelligence, had underlined ‘‘diversionary manoeuvre designed to draw off enemy reserves in order to make an attack at another place.’’ Krummacher supposedly added a note suggesting that the statement confirmed the German High Command’s view concerning another attack. Jodl highlighted the words referring to Allied troops in southeast and east England and then submitted the communication to the Fu¨hrer.98 Berlin evidently accepted Garbo’s message as ‘‘credible,’’ because the Germans had confirmed reports that the agent had sent during the weeks prior to the invasion and had indicated the need for further investigation of Allied troops situated in east and southeast England. After the war, according to Sir Ronald Wingate, neither Keitel nor Jodl had clear memory of the messages or which provided the greatest reason for the issuance of the countermanding order. Wingate concluded, however, based on the evidence, ‘‘that Garbo’s report tilted the balance.’’ After the war, when shown Garbo’s communication, ‘‘Keitel replied: ‘there you have your answer. If I were writing a history I would say, with ninety-nine per cent certainty, that that message provided the reason for the change of plan.’’’99 Later the two Germans saw copies of the first two messages received by Krummacher, and both dismissed the coded messages sent by the BBC to Belgian resistance groups, especially since neither had seen them at the time. Both men decided that the messages from Garbo and Josephine contributed to the decision to countermand the initial order given by von Rundstedt, but they disagreed about which was more important. While Jodl favored Josephine’s communication, Keitel maintained his original assertion the Garbo’s transmission provided the deciding factor for the decision. Keitel and Jodl both concurred that, because the Germans received message from Garbo last, it ‘‘must have tipped the balance.’’100 Other German sources, however, suggest the importance of Garbo’s June 9 transmission. The OKW War Diary included an appendix that contained numerous documents concerning the Normandy invasion, which the Supreme Command of the German Forces had received daily. While the documents themselves no longer exist, their headings do remain. The appendix originally included four invasion documents dated June 10, one of which had the title, ‘‘News from Madrid,’’ which was where Garbo sent his messages. None had the title, ‘‘News from Stockholm,’’ which was Josephine’s location. One could, therefore, possibly conclude that the Germans did not consider the communication from Josephine important enough to warrant inclusion in the appendix to the OKW War Diary.101 Although the Garbo communication was conceivably the determining factor, the message would not have had an impact if the Germans had not already accepted the presence of FUSAG in southeast England.102 *******************

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On D-Day and the days and weeks that followed, the Germans continued to believe that a threat to the Pas de Calais region existed. Around 3:00 P.M. on June 6, Gruppe West reported that a ‘‘major operation’’ was underway and that Allied forces still in England, along with ‘‘the proclamation by the Allied leaders,’’ indicated that other ‘‘major operations’’ were possible. Because he could not determine the site of future activity, ‘‘Gruppe West’’ recommended all possible areas, particularly in ‘‘strong indications areas,’’ be alerted.103 The chief of intelligence on the Western Front concurred in a report that he sent late on D-Day. The overestimation of Allied strength remaining in England after the invasion, including the belief in the existence of the large FUSAG force, caused the Germans to reassert the conclusion that ‘‘the threat of a follow-up invasion’’ existed.104 Earlier preconceptions that the Pas de Calais was a logical invasion site led the Germans to conclude after D-Day that it would be the location of a second Allied assault. Because they had already ‘‘concluded that the enemy would land in the Pas-de-Calais, the Germans naturally tended to ignore or misinterpret indicators pointing to large-scale landings in other sectors.’’ The German misconception persisted after Allied forces had landed in Normandy. Their overestimation of post-invasion Allied troop strength simply reinforced the Germans’ previous assessments that a landing in the Pas de Calais would afford the Allies easier access to Germany. Consequently, they hesitated to deploy their armored reserves to the Normandy area.105 Even as the German High Command debated over the deployment of the armored reserves, the officers continued to receive reports evaluating the situation in Normandy. On June 9, according to the appreciation from ‘‘Admiral Atlantic,’’ ‘‘hesitant and slow progress of Allied land operations in Cotentin and Seine Bay sectors may indicate ‘an intended 2nd landing at another point.’’’106 On the same day, the Commander-in-Chief, West, presented two conclusions. First, the next anticipated Allied assault could come ‘‘against the front of 15 and 7 Armies.’’ Second, the Allies would employ the Normandy assault format; parachute and air landing troops would land behind the German line before the amphibious troops reached the shore.107 According to the Siamese Minister to Berlin, the Germans remained uncertain about the Allied invasion—it could be the main invasion or one of a series of small assaults, or the Allies could still launch what would be the main thrust. The recognition by Allied leaders that the enemy anticipated other amphibious assaults along the Channel coast and/or in other areas did not change the realities of the Normandy battlefield. Although it took longer than expected for Allied forces to establish a strong bridgehead, German troops failed, even in the early days of fighting, to stem the influx of Allied troops, ammunition, and supplies, the tools of combat. Combat realities forced the Germans to send troops to Normandy. Even though they hesitated to transfer the armored reserves to the front, the German High Command sent other forces. Therefore, the military situation undermined the Allied deception. Consequently, it is legitimate to assert that the deception was a complete waste of time after D-Day.108

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The military situation overrode concerns about a second landing. Despite the ongoing deception, the Germans reacted to the Allies’ growing strength in the Normandy battlefield area. In fact, ‘‘during the week immediately following D-Day, German intelligence appreciations continued to stress the strength of the Allied forces remaining in south-east England. Nevertheless the Germans committed the bulk of their armoured reserves to the Normandy bridgehead remarkably quickly.’’109 They did not, however, commit the bulk of the Fifteenth Army for approximately six weeks after the invasion. The German High Command continued to expect another invasion and split their attention between meeting the real threat in Normandy and preparing for the anticipated one in the Pas de Calais. Numerous documents and military appreciations reflected the continued anxiety, primarily about the Pas de Calais, but also about other regions, such as southern France. German military leaders, who had previously believed that any assault against Norway would be a diversion, quickly dropped the Scandinavian country from the list of threatened areas. Attempting to determine future enemy action, the Germans continued to track the movement of Allied forces in England and to construct an Allied Order of Battle. Foreign Armies West noted the transfer of the 28th U.S. Infantry Division from Dover to Harwich by June 10 and of II British Corps and 58th British Infantry Division from Scotland to Doncaster by June 12. In addition to reports from double agents, such as Garbo and Brutus, the Allies used intense wireless activity, or utter silence, to suggest the relocation of these and other formations.110 Based on agent communications and intercepted enemy radio traffic, the Germans concluded that the Allied FUSAG forces would launch another assault near Dieppe on June 15. Although the invasion did not materialize on June 15, Hitler and much of the German High Command remained convinced that a threat to the Pas de Calais existed. The Fu¨ hrer relied upon more than intelligence in reasserting his convictions about the danger. Because of V-1 launch sites in the region, from which the Germans could launch attacks against London, Hitler believed that the Allies would have to assault the Pas de Calais to eliminate the threat.111 However, not all German military leaders maintained belief in the threat of a second invasion. On June 17 Hitler met with Rommel and von Rundstedt at Margival. ‘‘[A]fter Hitler’s departure he [Rommel] was still uncertain (and cannot be blamed for an uncertainty prevalent in the German Higher Command) about the possibility of a second landing on the coasts held by 15 Army: ‘A large-scale landing’, he reported to von Rundstedt on the 19th, ‘is to be expected on the Channel front on both sides of Cap Gris Nez or between the Somme and Le Havre.’’’ Therefore, Rommel could not order the consolidation of forces for a major counterattack against the Allies. As will be discussed later, the German logistical situation in Normandy did not help matters. The reinforcement of German troops fighting in Normandy consequently remained piecemeal.112 *******************

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Prior to D-Day, Allied leaders feared that, if the Germans transferred its Fifteenth Army to Normandy too quickly, the invasion would be in jeopardy. Although much is made of Rundstedt’s order of June 10, the Germans did reinforce Normandy, despite the limitations placed on troop movements by the Allies. Rommel immediately transferred the 21st Panzer Division to the battle area, and within 24 hours he ordered the transfer of the 2nd Panzer Division from Amiens. Rundstedt received the release of three divisions of the OKW reserve—the 12th SS Panzer, the 17th Panzer Grenadier, and Panzer Lehr—within twelve hours of his request. Although the 12th Panzer Division arrived in Normandy on June 7, Allied aircraft delayed Panzer Lehr’s arrival for two days. By June 13 two more German Panzer Divisons entered the battle. A few days later, the 1st SS Panzer Division, which the Germans had held as a reserve by the Fifteenth Army, traveled to Normandy, as did all or part of five other panzer divisions. Part of the 1st SS Panzer Division LAH arrived in Normandy during the night of June 27–28. By the end of the month, elements of three more panzer divions had begun to arrive, and the Fifteenth Army had access to only one panzer division.113 In addition to panzer divisions, the Germans also deployed two types of infantry divisions to meet the threat in Normandy—static and attack divisions. Between June 6 and 7, the Germans committed six static divisions to the fighting. Of the Fifteenth Army’s fourteen static and reserve infantry divisions, two received orders for immediate transfer to Normandy and were subsequently integrated into the Seventh Army. A third division moved to the battlefield in late July. Five of the remaining eleven arrived in Normandy by mid-August. Poor fighting conditions, not a threat to the region, was responsible for six divisions remaining in the Pas de Calais. Although the remainder of the Fifteenth Army did not receive transfer orders, several factors would have made it difficult for the army to move from the Pas de Calais to Normandy. Much of the army lacked transport, suitable equipment, and armaments. Many of the men were not well trained and were very old or very young. Of the remaining eleven infantry divisions attached to the Fifteenth Army, seven of them were static divisions, which meant that they were trained for defense, and two of them were Luftwaffe in origin. Furthermore, many of the Fifteenth Army formations were not combat ready. Therefore, the Germans transferred infantry formations from other areas to the battlefield. On June 6, the Germans also ordered attack divisions to Normandy, particularly those from the Seventh Army. By June 11, a First Army division began to move north from the south of France. Three attack divisions from the Nineteen Army arrived in mid-July.114 ******************* Despite reinforcement of the battlefield, a number of factors, including the continued presence of FUSAG in England, fed the Germans’ fear of a second landing, but conflicting assessments hindered their ability to determine future Allied intentions definitively. By mid-June, while some Germans speculated that shipping problems had delayed the second invasion, which they still considered imminent,

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the Luftwaffe Command IC suggested that the Allies had completed air landing and parachute preparations for the second landing. Consequently, the Germans began to think that the Allies did indeed have adequate shipping available to transport another invasion force to France.115 The debate about a second Allied landing occurred outside German military circles as well, as foreign ambassadors sent reports from Berlin. The Japanese Ambassador to Germany sent an evaluation of the situation in western Europe to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. After briefly assessing the battle in Normandy, the ambassador addressed the possibility of a second Allied landing. ‘‘According to investigations made by the supreme command on the basis of prisoners’ statements and captured documents there were in ENGLAND, in addition to the army group under MONTGOMERY, twenty-three divisions under the command of General PATTON ready to carry out an invasion.’’116 The diplomat suggested that the likelihood of another assault had prevented the Germans from ‘‘pouring their armies into NORMANDY.’’ The ambassador then noted the German interpretation of the Allied plan. After gaining control of Cherbourg and Le Havre, 17 of Montgomery’s 36 divisions would proceed to the southeast while Patton and his army group landed along the coast to the east of Dieppe. Montgomery, however, remained west of Caen and could not release the divisions to meet Patton’s assault. Nevertheless, according to the Japanese official, the Germans still expected, and had prepared for, an attack in the area between Dieppe and Boulogne by Patton’s forces.117 A few weeks later, when the Allies began releasing the Fortitude South II story, which suggested that FUSAG forces had proceeded to Normandy to reinforce Montgomery’s efforts and that new forces had joined FUSAG causing a delay in the second landing, it reinforced the ambassador’s earlier interpretation. By June 22 Foreign Armies West (FHW) had concluded that FUSAG, with a size comparable to the forces under Montgomery, contained approximately 28 ‘‘large formations’’ and three airborne divisions. Still situated in southeast and east England, FUSAG appeared ready to engage in an assault. After indicating the completion of invasion preparations by FUSAG’s airborne divisions, FHW emphasized the importance of the convergence of landing craft in Harwich, Yarmouth, and other east coast ports. Evaluating the available information about troop and landing craft placement, FHW eliminated Brest and the Channel Islands as possible targets of the expected Allied second landing.118 A few days after FHW had issued the June 22 report, in addition to removing Norway from the site of a potential assault, the Germans, relying on information supplied by Brutus and other agents, reiterated the threat to the area east of the Seine River. They concluded that, in conjunction with the movement of Montgomery’s forces toward Paris, Patton would lead FUSAG in an attack in the area of the Seine and Somme Rivers. However, the Germans failed, when focusing on the Pas de Calais as a possible invasion site, to consider certain natural features.119 As Roger Hesketh later remarked, ‘‘[I]n favouring the Seine-Somme sector as the objective of our second assault no reference was made to the natural features of this coast line which would have placed almost insurmountable difficulties in the way of any attacking force and which had ruled out this stretch of coast from Allied deliberations at an early stage of planning.’’120

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Throughout the remainder of June, the Germans, using numerous sources including information provided by their spies, continued to assess Allied troop strength. The June 26 OKW Daily Situation Report indicated, according to ‘‘an unverified agent’s report,’’ the transfer of three American formations, the XXXVII Corps, the 59th Infantry Division, and the 7th Armored Division, into the Harwich area of southeast England. The narrative suggested that the 59th Infantry had transferred from Scotland and that the 7th Armored had moved from southwest England. The addition of the two American divisions, along with some English formations, to FUSAG increased its size to 20 infantry and seven armored divisions and enough brigades to create three additional divisions.121 Their inaccurate assessment of their enemy’s remaining troop numbers in the United Kingdom helped the Germans cling to their preconceived notion that the Allies would launch their primary attack in the Pas de Calais region. Ambassador reports reflected the German reluctance to concede that the Allies might not land troops in the Pas de Calais region. In late June, according to an update on the situation in the west provided by the Japanese Ambassador to Germany to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Patton’s forces continued to await deployment to the continent. Although the Germans did not know when Patton’ assault on northern France would come, it would not be a surprise. The Germans anticipated two possible scenarios. Either the Allies would launch their assault in the near future to coincide with the advance of Montgomery’s forces, or they would delay their attack until Allied forces had captured Cherbourg and extended their bridgehead to Le Havre.122 Von Rundstedt’s reports from the front were not encouraging. After noting the presence of 30 Allied divisions in Normandy, the German general claimed that 67 divisions remained in England for another operation. At a June 29 meeting at Berghof, Hitler and his generals acknowledged that, based upon von Rundstedt’s information, formations from the Fifteenth Army could not be transferred to Normandy. The Fu¨hrer finally accepted Rommel’s and von Rundstedt’s claims that German forces could not launch a counterattack against the Americans on the Cherbourg peninsula and that Germany was no longer on the offensive in France.123 ******************* In late June the Allies had begun to construct Fortitude South II, which was subsequently approved by mid-July. As SHAEF and the London Controlling Section (LCS) devised a story to explain Patton’s arrival in France while FUSAG remained in England, the Germans continually attempted to anticipate their enemy. On June 30 Foreign Armies West reported that the possession of Cherbourg by the Allies would ‘‘relieve landing ship space from being used for supply purposes, thus creating the shipping space which is a pre-requisite for operations by Army Group Patton.’’124 German intelligence did not indicate the possibility of Allied diversionary operations slated for Belgium. In an attempt to identify the date of the impending assault, FHW suggested that the Franco-Belgian Resistance Organization predicted a second landing on July 6. Despite the Franco-Belgian Resistance

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Organization’s prediction, the FHW believed the ‘‘second half of July to be the more probable date for the beginning of Patton’s operations.’’125 As the Allies shifted to the Fortitude South II deception plan, the Germans continued to expect a second assault. By the end of the month, however, their belief in another Allied invasion had begun to wane. The Germans returned to the alert in early July. On July 2 the Commander-in-Chief West noted an increase in traffic on French and Belgian wireless the day before. Compared to a daily average of 50, on July 1 groups in France and Belgium sent 240 messages. Referring to the ‘‘advance warning messages’’ transmitted on June 1 prior to the Normandy invasion, the Commander-in-Chief concluded that ‘‘announcement of a landing in preparation must be assumed.’’126 On the afternoon of July 2, the Germans received notice from an agent that the Allies would invade Belgium that night or early the next morning. The July 3 ‘‘Naval Headlines’’ repeated the Commander-in-Chief West’s report from the day before, but noted that, while an invasion was expected within a few days, they were uncertain as to its location. Neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the ‘‘Naval Headlines’’ indicated a probable, or a possible, invasion site. However, ‘‘U-Boats in the Channel area were urged on 2/7 [2 July] to send situation reports whenever possible, in order to clear up the existing obscurity.’’127 On July 3 Admiral Abe transmitted an appreciation provided by General Alfred Jodl to Tokyo. According to Jodl, that Army Group Patton, which included 18 infantry, six armored, and five airborne divisions, was preparing for ‘‘the next landing’’ was ‘‘obvious.’’ Furthermore, he considered the location of the assault ‘‘obvious.’’ ‘‘It is also evident, from the operational sectors of the two enemy army groups and the state of preparations, and from the fact that it would be difficult for the port of Cherbourg alone to supply two army groups, that the landing area will be the channel region facing the German 15th Army.’’128 Jodl believed, however, that German defenses and the troops in the Pas de Calais area, who had previously fought in Africa and Italy, could defeat the Allied invasion.129 Throughout this period, the Allies studied Ultra messages and German troop movements to determine what conclusions their enemy had reached about their future plans. The British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, on July 3, issued an assessment of the German appreciation of Allied intentions. According to the report, the Germans remained anxious about a second large-scale landing in the area between the Pas de Calais and the mouth of the Seine River. ‘‘They firmly believe that Havre is objective of a new landing and Paris the prize. They fear subsidiary operations in Brittany, such as coup de main against Brest.’’130 The reports prepared by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee provided the LCS and SHAEF with information that they needed in designing, approving, and, when necessary, adjusting the new Fortitude South deception plan. Although German officials, during late June and July, gradually deleted areas from those that they considered in danger from Allied assaults, they remained unclear about their enemy’s future intentions. Rumors about the location of the second assault continued and included ‘‘Brest on 22 June, Ostend on the 23rd, St. Nazaire on the 29th, Flanders on the 30th, Belgium on 2 July. . ., Le Havre-Scheldt on 4

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July.’’131 One German official predicted, because of weather and flying conditions similar to those of June 5 and 6, that the Allies would land ‘‘on the northern French, Belgian and Dutch coast’’ on several nights beginning on July 5.132 After July 5 had passed without an invasion, the Germans reverted to an earlier hypothesis that the Allies would attack during the second half of July. They continued, however, to consider diversionary operations in Brittany, Belgium, and Holland possible.133 By mid-July, around the time that SHAEF approved the plan for Fortitude South II, von Rundstedt concluded that there were ‘‘no grounds for changing appreciation of intentions of the Army. . .Group assembled in southeast England.’’ Commitment by FUSAG, which depended on the progress of Allied forces in Normandy, would follow the transfer of German forces from the Pas de Calais area to the front. 134 Conditions on the battlefield, however, dictated the release of Fifteenth Army divisions. Because of the situation in Normandy at that time, Hans von Kluge (Rommel’s replacement as commander, Army Group B) insisted on the transfer of the 116th Panzer Division from the Fifteenth Army to the Normandy battlefield, where it could be used to close a breach in the German line near Caen. Hitler agreed to Kluge’s demand, ‘‘thus accepting for the first time that the Fifteenth Army was waiting for an invasion of the Pas de Calais that might never come.’’135 As more time passed, however, the Germans had to face the reality of the situation. After July 20, they began to dismiss the idea of a second landing. The further the Allies’ advance in Normandy progressed, the less necessary another amphibious assault became. That reality, with which von Rundstedt concurred, contributed to Hitler’s decision to release the 116th Panzer Division and other reserves that had remained idle in the Pas de Calais and elsewhere. Although Hitler rejected the transfer of forces from the Nineteenth Army, situated along the Mediterranean coast, he authorized the movement of two armored and four infantry divisions from the Bay of Biscay coast and from the Pas de Calais region. 136 The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee acknowledged that the Germans had moved two divisions, one from Belgium, the other from the Pas de Calais, toward Normandy. Although their fear of a second invasion had diminished somewhat, the Germans remained hesitant to commit the remaining Fifteenth Army units to the battle.137 By late July 1944, although they were less inclined to accept the possibility of a second landing, the Germans remained too preoccupied to devote adequate attention to the battle in Normandy. Following a meeting with General Jodl, head of Supreme HQ’s Supreme Command Department, Meisel, head of the Navy’s Operations Department, and Korten, Chief of the Air Force General Staff, Admiral Abe sent a report to Tokyo updating the situation in the west. Abe hoped that Patton’s army would land soon, and he speculated that Patton would land between Le Havre and Calais. According to Abe, ‘‘at present one has the impression that the GERMANS are distracted by this force and are hesitating to launch a general offensive in NORMANDY.’’138 Until the Germans gave the battle their full attention, they would be unable to ‘‘make their final troop dispositions and counterattack in earnest.’’139

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Despite the implementation of Fortitude South II, the Germans concluded by the end of July that the Allies would not launch a second amphibious assault. Consequently, four divisions (the 84th, 33rd, 89th, and 85th), following their release from the Fifteenth Army by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces), traveled to Normandy between July 27 and August 1. The 2nd, 1st SS, and 116th Panzer Divisions had already proceeded to Normandy. None of the divisions arrived in time to stop the Allied advance completely. According to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, the situation in Normandy had forced the Germans to transfer the forces despite their concerns about the Pas de Calais. They admitted that the Germans, although they still feared an invasion, considered it ‘‘less imminent’’ by the end of July.140 In early August Hitler continued to release Fifteenth Army forces for employment in the Normandy battle. By August 6 the 84th and 89th Field Divisions, both situated between Le Havre and Rouen, had departed for Normandy. Although 17 divisions remained north of the Seine, the situation in the Pas de Calais was undergoing a change. By August 13, five more divisions—49th, 85th, and 331st Field Divisions, 6th Parachute Division, and 344th Limited Employment Division— received orders transferring them to Normandy.141 According to SHAEF’s August 12 Intelligence Summary, ‘‘Fifteenth Army is now sending infantry divisions to West Normandy as fast as the railways, or more often bicycles and legs, can carry them.’’142 Because they entered the conflict in a piecemeal fashion, the formations, like earlier reinforcements, failed to change the battle’s momentum in the Germans’ favor. Consequently, Hitler had to face certain realities. The situation in Normandy was increasingly tenuous, and the Allies’ need for a second invasion was greatly reduced, if not nonexistent.143 As might be expected, although the possibility of a second landing had lessened considerably by late July, the Germans continued to monitor the situation. Brutus had reported Patton’s demotion to commander of Third Army and his arrival in Normandy in mid-July, yet German intelligence did not confirm his presence in France until an August 6 communication, which also noted that they had not yet discovered the identity of Patton’s replacement as head of FUSAG.144 Recognizing that the Germans were acknowledging that a second assault was not likely, the Allies attempted to prolong their belief in it, by keeping Eisenhower’s establishment of a command post in France a secret, but they failed. The Daily Telegraph reported Eisenhower’s move on August 10. By August 18, both Garbo and Brutus informed their contacts of the transfer of the Fourteenth U.S. Army to Normandy. Foreign Armies West (FHW) situation reports, dated August 31 and September 12, acknowledged the presence of the Fourteenth Army. The transfer of FUSAG forces to Normandy in mid- to late August signaled the end of the threat to the Pas de Calais. By late August, all that remained of the Fifteenth German Army in the Pas de Calais were ‘‘seven largely immobile divisions.’’ By this time the Fortitude South II deception indicated a reduction in the FUSAG force. A supplement to a German Situation Report, dated September 10, noted the movement of more Allied troops into Normandy and the thinning out of troops from southeast England, which

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corresponded to the deception story. Even if a real threat to the area had still existed, the Germans could no longer counter it.145 ******************* Intelligence communications from late July/early August 1944 support, to some extent, the possibility that Fortitude South was less effective after D-Day and that combat realities forced the Germans to send troops to Normandy.146 Certainly by late July, the Germans no longer believed that the invasion was either certain or imminent, and concerns about Normandy began to overcome those about the Pas de Calais. However, the question of whether or not the Germans could have reinforced the Normandy area with Fifteenth Army formations before mid-July remains. The Allies needed more than the Fortitude deception plan to delay the German reinforcement of Normandy. Allied military leaders concluded that the Allied Air Force could fulfill an important role in providing protection for the invasion force, but it could also enhance the cover plan. The Allied Air Plan to support Overlord that Allied planners had developed during the summer of 1943 had three phases. During the first, Allied air forces would continue the strategic bombing attack on Germany, particularly against the German aircraft industry. During the second phase, Allied air forces would shift their efforts to invasion targets, such as airfields, harbors, railway centers, and coastal defenses. The final phase provided direct support for the ground forces.147 Although the Air Plan had its supporters, its opponents advocated other air strategies. By the spring of 1944, Eisenhower evaluated three possible strategies for the air offensive in preparation for Overlord. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur ‘‘Bomber’’ Harris, RAF Bomber Command, proposed a continuation of the bombing of German industries. General Carl Spaatz, U.S. Eighth Air Force, advocated the Oil Plan, which targeted German oil refineries. According to Spaatz, by destroying the refineries, the Allies would immobilize the German mechanized forces. Air Marshal Arthur Tedder’s plan, the Transportation Plan, which Solly Zuckerman had created at his request, suggested an Allied assault against German lines of communication, in other words, French and Belgian railroads. Tedder provided a list of over 70 railway targets, which, if destroyed, would effectively isolate the Normandy battlefield, shortly before the invasion and for months following the assault. Following heated debates with his advisors and his own careful consideration of the three plans, Eisenhower, on March 25, 1944, chose the Transportation Plan as the one best suited for advancing a successful invasion of Normandy. On April 3 the War Cabinet commenced its review of the plan. Although he feared that the bombing of civilian areas would result in criticism, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, after being swayed by Eisenhower, pled the Supreme Commander’s case before the War Cabinet. Eisenhower’s April 17 directive provided the authorization necessary for the continuation of the Transportation Plan.148 The air attacks associated with the Transportation Plan began with a vengeance on March 6, even before the plan received final approval and before the Allies began to implement Fortitude North and South. On March 20, 1944, Captain

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Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower’s naval aide, noted in his diary that Allied aircraft gave ‘‘higher priority’’ to bombing approximately 78 key railway targets, mainly in France, than the coastal defenses. Between March 6 and June 6, of the 67,000 tons of bombs dropped by Bomber Command, 45,000 targeted locomotive sheds, maintenance and repair facilities, and marshaling yards.149 Two weeks after the beginning of the assault on French and Belgian railways, Allied aircraft commenced bombing the Seine and Loire River bridges. Allied leaders adjusted the Transportation Plan to accommodate the Fortitude deception. In addition to bombing road and rail bridges across the Seine River between the coast and Paris, Allied aircraft attacked bridges along Belgium’s Albert Canal. The Allies hoped to hinder the movement of the Fifteenth German Army into Normandy and to suggest that they were attempting to ‘‘isolate the Pas de Calais in preparation for an assault by General Patton’s fictitious army group.’’ Approximately three weeks before D-Day, the air assault on German airfields within 130 miles of Normandy began. Allied officials approved air attacks against running trains and open lines on May 20.150 Implementation of the bombing campaign did not silence the opposition. Critics of the Transportation Plan claimed that the bombs would not damage the small targets earmarked by Tedder for destruction. However, ‘‘on 7 May, eight American P-47 fighter-bombers dropped two 1,000 pound bombs each on the railway bridge across the Seine at Vernon, proving beyond doubt that these targets could be destroyed with pin-point accuracy and few bombs. Over the next three weeks 74 bridges and tunnels were destroyed, effectively isolating the whole of north-western France, and fatally curtailing the prospects of rapid German reinforcement.’’151 Approximately a month prior to D-Day, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee evaluated the effect of the Allied bombing offensive and concluded that the Germans were quickly repairing damage to the French and Belgian main lines and marshaling yards that were essential for military purposes. Although certain repairs, such as those to damaged trains, rolling stock, and repair facilities, took several months, the effect on military traffic appeared minimal. ‘‘Locomotive, rolling-stock and repair facilities, particularly heavy cranes, have been considerably damaged and cannot be repaired for many months. Nevertheless, enemy military traffic is not at present being appreciably hindered and the weight of dislocation is falling primarily on French civilian traffic.’’152 Because of the German ability to divert traffic, delays in the transport of troops and supplies ranged from 12 to 48 hours. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee did note a great reduction in the transportation of coal on the Nord and Est railroads and the exhaustion of coal stocks at gas and power plants in Paris.153 The bombing efforts continued and produced some important results by the beginning of June. By June 6, only two bridges over the Seine River remained intact, and ‘‘75 per cent of the railroad system within 150 miles of the assault beaches had been rendered unserviceable.’’ Consequently, the Germans failed to win the race to build up forces in Normandy. German forces did, however, cross the Loire River into the battle area, because Allied aircraft did not target the Loire bridges until after the invasion had begun.154 The Allied bombing effort rendered the German ability to transfer trucks

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and tanks into the invasion area by day virtually impossible. The supply shortages, which resulted, prevented the Germans from mounting effective defensive measures.155 Furthermore, there were other factors that impeded the Germans’ defensive efforts. The keys to the German transfer of troops from the Pas de Calais to Normandy were combat readiness, a criteria that many of the Fifteenth Army formations failed to meet, and transportation. The Germans did not have the capacity to move troops into Normandy any faster than they did. Some forces traveled from Calais through Cologne and then to Normandy. On June 6, the only workable rail routes were those along the Loire-Seine gap. Although some rail bridges over the Seine remained standing, Allied aircraft had destroyed the infrastructure on both sides of them. The destruction of marshaling yards, rolling stock, and railway signaling apparatus created a backlog of trains, which hindered their movement.156 Despite Hitler’s emphasis on defeating Allied forces in the West, the region never received logistical priority, which affected the Germans’ ability to mount an effective defense. The situation on the Eastern Front after June 1941 contributed to the logistical deficits in the West, especially with regard to mobility. By D-Day most German formations lacked sufficient vehicles and, as a result, had ‘‘limited mobility.’’ ‘‘[T]his poor mobility made the Westheer dependent on rail transport to redeploy its forces to an invasion site and for resupply operations.’’157 Although the Germans expected the Allies to bomb French railways, they remained confident that the extent of the French rail system would be sufficient to meet their resupply needs. A combination of factors—the loss of locomotives to air attacks and normal deterioration and the damage to rail and servicing facilities, although small—contributed to a sixty percent decline in French rail traffic during the period from March 1 to June 6.158 Perhaps even ‘‘more significantly, in the area most heavily bombed, the Region Nord, threequarters of the normal traffic was knocked off the rails.’’159 For security reasons, the invasion area received less attention from Allied bombers and had only a 30 percent reduction in rail traffic prior to D-Day. In late May, the Germans noted 246 Allied attacks on the area north of the Seine, the Pas de Calais, and only thirty-three in the area south of the river. After the invasion, however, rail traffic in Normandy suffered a greater loss than the Region Nord.160 The Allied Transportation Plan, however, had more of an impact than the Germans had anticipated. Not only did the Allied air forces isolate Normandy from the East by attacking bridges across the Seine, the Oise, and the Meuse Rivers, they ‘‘all but ended train movement into Normandy.’’ The Allied air offensive had an even bigger effect on the movement of fuel to the West and its consumption. The disruption of rail service forced the Germans to rely more on the transportation of troops and supplies by road. Consequently, the consumption of fuel greatly increased and resulted in growing demands for new supplies.161 As of June 3, fuel rationing had sidelined approximately thirty percent of the German vehicles. As a result, ‘‘the air campaign had eroded the Westheer’s ability both to redeploy its reserves to an invasion site and to resupply such forces.. . .Thus as early as 7 June planned German troop redeployments to Normandy grossly exceeded the available trucking capacity,

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and the 7th Army’s ability to resupply these formations once committed to combat.’’162 Continuous attacks on railways by Allied bombers after D-Day caused the Germans to experience further delays in reinforcing the battlefield. For example, damage caused by Allied aircraft and the French Resistance hindered the movement of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, which the Germans transferred from the eastern front. It took less time for the two panzer divisions to travel from the eastern front to France than it did for them to proceed from eastern France to Normandy. In addition, shortly after the invasion, Allied aircraft succeeded in obstructing the major railways across the Loire River, which hindered the movement of German forces and supplies into Normandy from the south. By closing the Loire rail lines, the Allied air forces completely isolated the Normandy battlefield. During the first week of the invasion, the Germans failed ‘‘to run a single supply train into Normandy across the Seine and the Loire.’’163 ******************* There is ample proof that suggests that the Germans experienced transportation and fuel supply problems well before the invasion began. Ultra intercepts provide evidence of the German difficulties with regard to the movement of troops and supplies beginning in early May. On May 1, in a communication to von Rundstedt, Keitel complained that repairs to railways damaged by air attacks was insufficient. In addition, 2nd SS Panzer Division was suffering from a transport shortage, and 12th SS Panzer Division lacked fuel for training. On May 8, according to C-in-C West, ‘‘the enemy is already effectively hampering our supply and troop movements, and in the event of active operations would hamper the latter in particular.. . .Latterly the enemy has also been attacking important railway-bridges on the lower Seine. The supplying by air of agents and of the Resistance Movements has been stepped up very greatly and acts of sabotage, especially on the railways, have increased.’’ A few weeks later von Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff, in a message to OKH, noted that prompt delivery of anti-gas equipment and other supplies was not possible because of the transport situation. On June 7, the Germans reported that two truckloads of bombs had been held up because of a bombing attack on the railway. A report sent the next day indicated the urgent, immediate need for transport space for the 3rd Parachute Division, which was 40 miles southeast of Brest. On June 8, the head of the Highway Commission in France, Ceidl, reported that all of the bridges across the River Seine from Rouen to 12 miles north of Paris had been destroyed by that afternoon. A communication dated June 9 and signed by Neumann suggested communication problems. ‘‘The conduct of close support operations is very considerably hampered by inadequate signals communications. Operations are greatly impeded by the considerable delay in the passing on of orders.’’ Reports in this vein continued well after the invasion began. By early June, approximately 15 percent of German fuel supplies for the western front were ‘‘backlogged’’ throughout France. Although Luftflotte 3 reported fuel shortages as early as June 8, the situation was much worse by June 12. The Germans issued a directive to forbid unnecessary travel because the

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fuel situation was ‘‘extremely strained.’’ The Germans had begun to use fuel from their ‘‘state of emergency stocks.’’ By the middle of June, German forces in Normandy received daily deliveries of munitions that replaced less than 15 percent of what they used in a day. By the end of June, the Seventh German Army had received only 37 percent of the munitions that had been sent.164 Consequently, the Allies’ Transportation Plan and the resulting logistical problems that the Germans experienced hindered their defensive capabilities in Normandy. ******************* The Germans failed to transfer a large part of the Fifteenth Army from the Pas de Calais to Normandy until mid-July, approximately six weeks after the invasion, for a number of reasons. First, because of their own pre-invasion conclusions, which Allied deception measures reinforced, they expected the Allies to attack the Pas de Calais region. When the Allies failed to do so on June 6, the Germans, relying on repeated reports of a large force situated in southeast England, persisted in the belief that their enemy would launch a second assault, probably in the area protected by the Fifteenth Army, even though they did not immediately reject other sites. Although the Allies maintained Fortitude South until late August/early September, the Germans had concluded by late July that a second landing was not likely and had begun to release formations from the Fifteenth Army for commitment to the conflict in Normandy. Second, and equally important, the Germans, because of the Allied air offensive, could not transport troops and supplies into Normandy. Allied aircraft had effectively isolated the battlefield by damaging or destroying road and rail bridges across the Seine, Loire, Oise, and Meuse Rivers and by creating havoc in the French railway system. By forcing the Germans to rely upon road travel, the Allies imposed a strain on the Germans’ fuel supply and their ability to replenish their diminishing supplies. While some historians might argue that the Fortitude deception was important to the Allied success in Normandy, others would assert that German logistical problems, which the Allied bombing efforts made much worse, caused the German defeat in Normandy. The reality is probably a combination of the two assertions.

8

Assessing Operation Fortitude

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are away; when far away, we must make him believe that we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder And crush him.. . .If he is superior in strength, evade him.. . .If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. —Master Sun Tzu1

When reaching a conclusion about the importance of Operation Fortitude to the Allied invasion of Normandy, one must first consider whether or not the deception operation was a success. Most historians who mention Fortitude in a discussion about the Normandy invasion do so in terms of the success, not the importance, of the deception. Several of them suggest that success and importance were synonymous and credit Fortitude, because it appeared successful, with playing a major role in the Allied victory in Normandy. They fail, however, to address the issue of which part or parts of the operation—wireless transmissions, physical displays, or double agents’ messages—had the responsibility of preventing the German buildup of forces in Normandy before the invasion and the reinforcement of the area immediately after the Allies landed. In addition, few historians examine the role of Fortitude North and Fortitude South separately. Many either treat the two as one operation, instead of two separate parts of the same operation, or only examine Fortitude South. Before determining the success or failure of Operation Fortitude as a whole, one must analyze each part of the deception plan separately.2 Fortitude North, which suggested a threat to Norway, was the less complex of the two plans because it involved a smaller invasion force, fewer physical displays, and less overall activity than Fortitude South and, as a result, has received little attention

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in the literature about the Normandy invasion. Although crews constructed some fake aircraft on airfields in Scotland, implementation of the plan generally consisted of wireless traffic to simulate the normal activity of Allied armed forces, as well as invasion exercises, and messages sent by agents who were under the control of British intelligence. Not all of the spies who provided information that was transmitted to the Germans were real, and most who operated in the United Kingdom were under the control of the British. Under the guidance of Colonel R. Macleod, the implementation of Fortitude North commenced on March 22, 1944, with the opening of British Fourth Army’s wireless nets. Within a week, the Germans had concluded that any Allied activity against Norway would probably be a diversion. Still the Germans continually monitored the situation in Scotland, primarily through information supplied by agents, such as Garbo and Brutus.3 Fortitude North continued in full force until late May when Allied intelligence determined that it was no longer having an effect on German troop movement and was in danger of being discovered a deception. Consequently, Macleod, following SHAEF’s instructions, phased out the threat by gradually transferring Fourth Army formations to southeast England for merger with the Fortitude South deception.4 Prior to the end of May, SHAEF intelligence had indicated to Macleod that the activities executed in Scotland had achieved the desired results. The Germans increased their divisions in Norway from nine to twelve by mid-May 1944. The 12 divisions remained in Norway until the end of the war. By late May, the Germans concluded, because of the small amount of shipping in Scottish ports, that an Allied operation against Norway was not imminent.5 Dennis Wheatley, a member of the London Controlling Section, claimed that Fortitude North ‘‘led to one of the greatest coups that we ever achieved in deceiving Hitler.’’6 Although in reality the deception might not have been the ‘‘greatest coup,’’ Fortitude North helped to pin down German forces in Norway and Denmark, which prevented them from opposing the Allied forces that landed in Normandy; although the Germans failed to transfer forces from Norway, the deception’s success was limited because it did not draw more formations away from France. Consequently, the deception had little direct impact on the Normandy invasion. In addition, Hitler’s obsession about an Allied invasion of Norway and his determination not to relinquish any part of the country, contributed equally, if not more, to the maintenance of 12 German divisions there. Because Fortitude North diverted ‘‘German attention and forces from France at a critical moment in the war,’’ however, it ‘‘achieved its primary object.’’7 Most analysts of Fortitude North agree that the number of Germans divisions in Norway remained virtually the same after D-Day. Although some divisions transferred to France in mid-June to reinforce the Fifteenth Army, other formations moved into Norway to replace them. According to Sir Peter Thorne, whose father, Sir Andrew Thorne, was technically in charge of Fortitude North and who considered the deception a success, Adolf Hitler refused to authorize the removal of troops from Norway. 8 General von Falkenhorst, the German commander in Norway, suggested a reason, other than the Allied threat to Norway, for Hitler’s refusal to release forces from Scandinavia for deployment to France. Hitler feared that if he

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removed formations from Norway, he would have to give up his control of the Scandinavian country. ‘‘It was,’’ according to von Falkenhorst, ‘‘his [Hitler’s] own campaign, and he had figured it out for himself. Giving up Norway would have seemed to him an acknowledgment before the whole world that on April 19, 1940, he had made a mistake.’’9 Unlike Falkenhorst, General Alfred Jodl apparently thought that the Allied threat warranted the presence of 12 divisions in Norway, or at least that was his claim after the war. During his post-war interrogation, Jodl claimed, ‘‘We kept 300,000 men in Norway during most of the war, when 100,000 men would have been sufficient had Norway been for us merely an occupational and security commitment.’’10 On June 4, 1946, Jodl answered questions about Norway during his interrogation by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Dr. Franz Exner, Jodl’s defense counsel, asked him about the occupation of Norway. According to Jodl, the occupation of Norway put the German fleet at risk. In addition, the belief that the Allied threat was real justified the presence of 300,000 idle soldiers protecting 3,000 kilometers of coastline.11 Although it might appear that Fortitude North was a success, several factors indicated that the Germans, even before May 1944, did not consider any Allied threat to Norway to be a serious one. An Ultra intercept, dated March 22, 1944, acknowledged the possibility of Allied action against Norway but claimed that the move would not be the anticipated Second Front. The OKM (Oberkommando der Marine or Germany Navy High Command) did not believe that the Allied assault would be the main Allied operation, nor did the Germans expect a ‘‘large scale’’ operation against Norway. They did, however, admit the possibility of a four to five division assault. According to von Falkenhorst, although the Germans believed an invasion of Norway conceivable in 1943, by 1944 they considered an assault on northern France more feasible than one against Norway.12 If the Allies did launch an assault on Norway, the Germans believed that it would be a move to divert their attention from the real invasion. In fact, captured German documents indicated a German fear of a ‘‘diversionary operation against Norway’’ before Macleod began to implement Fortitude North. Furthermore, on April 6, 1944, the Japanese Naval Attache´ notified his government that the Germans expected the Allies to launch a series of commando raids on the Norwegian coast with the object of cutting communications between the northern and southern parts of that country. Approximately a month later, the Japanese Ambassador indicated the German belief that ‘‘the troops stationed in SCOTLAND appear to be held in readiness for a diversionary attack on NORWAY.’’13 Although the deception might not have been necessary, it apparently reinforced Hitler’s fears enough to prevent him from removing troops from Denmark and Norway. The evidence seems to indicate that the operation was only partially successful, but for different reasons. The Germans accepted the existence of the fictitious forces, including the Fourth Army, but they did not fall for the threat to Norway in the way that the Allies had hoped. The Germans realized that General Sir Andrew Thorne’s forces in Scotland were insufficient to mount more than a diversionary

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operation and that German troops in Norway were sufficient to counter such an operation. Even though Allied deception forces in Scotland bombarded the airwaves with radio traffic, the Germans proved more interested in radio traffic that originated in the Soviet Union than that from Scotland. It is possible that Hitler kept twelve divisions in Norway simply ‘‘to protect his shipments of Finnish nickel ore, his northern flank, and his U-boat departures,’’ not because of the deception. Although Fortitude North was not particularly convincing, it still succeeded ‘‘because the Germans were prepared to believe it.’’ The deception reinforced their preconceived ideas about the importance of Norway. As a result, the Germans failed to remove formations from Norway and retained a special submarine force off the coast for an extended period.14 In recent years a heated debate has erupted over whether or not Fortitude North was a success. One side of the debate proposes that Fortitude North did not affect German strategy in Norway, that the Germans actually did transfer soldiers from Norway to Denmark and to the eastern front shortly before the Normandy invasion, and that the German archives did not substantiate the theory that the Germans fell victim to the Allied deception. The Germans were aware of some of the Allied deceptions, but Fortitude North was no more successful in influencing the German High Command than Graffham, the political deception implemented to support Fortitude North. Although the Germans did not exclude the possibility of an Allied attack, the number of troops in Norway remained the same. Only their state of readiness changed. The other side of the debate focuses more on the limitation of the sources used, but agrees that historians need to reconsider the existing interpretations of the impact of Allied deception on the German High Command. The arguments do not, however, revolve around the same issues and they involve different criteria for judging deception’s success. The first side, which denies the success of Fortitude North, argues that ‘‘deception can never be ‘decisive’ unless it alone leads a target to experience a specific process of thought and action.’’ The other side in this debate, noting the need for reassessment, contends not only that deception had a significant effect on German strategy during the war, but also that if Allied deception persuaded the Germans to continue to accept a preconceived notion, then it was successful. Therefore, carrying the analogy a step further, Fortitude North was a success because the Germans, meaning Hitler, continued to believe that a threat existed and refused to transfer forces from Norway to France. This is contrary to the argument that only accepts the deception as successful if it was the only factor in the Germans’ decision to maintain twelve divisions in Norway. Historians generally lean more in favor of the latter argument, primarily because the former is based on only two examples, which have received much criticism.15 Fortitude North, although neat and dramatic, had little impact on the size of the German force in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway. Because the Germans expected any Allied assault against Norway to be diversionary in nature, there have to be other reasons to explain not only why the Germans maintained twelve divisions in Norway even after the Allies landed in Normandy. First, because the British had mounted numerous empty threats against Norway since 1940, there was no real reason for

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the Germans to expect that the Allied threat in 1944 was real. Nothing had changed to make Norway a more valuable commodity in 1944 than it had been in 1940. Second, the troops in Scandinavia protected the Germans’ control of the Petsamo nickel mines, which remained crucial to the German war effort. Third, since 1942, Hitler had been concerned about protecting his northern flank. Consequently, he was reluctant to weaken his flank by withdrawing formations for commitment elsewhere. Finally, as Jodl admitted, the length of Norway’s coastline necessitated the presence of more troops than were necessary for the defense of Norway. By withdrawing formations, Hitler feared, according to von Falkenhorst, that he would lose his control of Norway, a country that Germany had acquired as the result of his personally designed plan. The Fu¨hrer did not want to have to admit that the invasion of Norway had been a mistake. ******************* The descriptions of Fortitude South, which involved more displays, troops, wireless activity, and invasion exercises than its northern counterpart, have been quite different and effusive. In referring to Fortitude South, scholars have used phrases, such as, an ‘‘outstanding achievement,’’ the ‘‘largest, most elaborate, most carefullyplanned, most vital, and most successful of all the Allied deceptive operations,’’ ‘‘unquestionably the greatest deception in military history,’’ and ‘‘perhaps the most complex and successful deception operation in the entire history of war.’’ Both before and after the war had ended, the Germans remained convinced of the existence of the phantom units that they had included in the Allied Order of Battle, which they had constructed with the help of Garbo, Brutus, Tricycle, and other agents. ‘‘[I]t was the success of Fortitude South in misleading every level of the German Command, from Hitler himself through Jodl to von Rundstedt and Rommel, as to the precise nature and location of that danger that remains one of the central triumphs of the deception staffs of the entire war.’’ Although good luck contributed to the Germans’ failure to determine the target and date of the Allied invasion, Fortitude South also played a part in it. Their belief in the existence of FUSAG (First U.S. Army Group) contributed to the Germans’ slow reaction to the Normandy invasion on D-Day and during the months that followed.16 Some evaluators of the Fortitude deception have concluded that the Germans’ failure to transfer forces quickly from the Pas de Calais to Normandy ‘‘proved more than an adequate reward for the toil that had been expended.’’17 In some respects, one can compare Fortitude South to a deception plan that the British implemented in conjunction with the 1941 Crusader offensive in North Africa. In 1941 the British had good intelligence on which to rely when planning Crusader, yet the offensive did not proceed as envisioned because the British Eighth Army exhibited a ‘‘combination of high morale and overconfidence’’ in November 1941. The same could be said of the German High Command prior to the Normandy invasion. Unlike June 1944, the British, although having the benefit of good intelligence, failed to confuse their adversary about the date and location of their offensive. In 1941, the British underestimated the quality of the enemy force

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that they faced. In 1944, the Germans did the same, but they also grossly overestimated Allied troop strength, which enabled them to realistically consider the possibility of a second offensive. The British placed too much faith in their own intelligence in 1941, a mistake, which they did not repeat in 1944. Although the British were good at intelligence gathering in 1941, they were not yet good at operations. Despite being surprised by Crusader, which exposed German weaknesses in intelligence and generalship, the German troops ‘‘were well deployed against any attack.’’18 The Germans displayed the same weaknesses in 1944, but their troops were not ‘‘well deployed against any attack.’’ By June 1944, the Germans were plagued by a shortage of forces sufficient to defend the French coast, especially since they remained uncertain about the location of the impending Allied offensive. By the time the Allies launched the invasion, they had become good at intelligence and operations, and ‘‘the evidence, incidentally, indicates that deception certainly was a significant contributory cause and most probably a necessary cause of the success of the Allied invasions of Sicily and Normandy.’’19 Historians credit Fortitude South for the decision by the German High Command to retain the Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais area until late July 1944. According to the standard argument, because they accepted the reality of an Allied threat to the Pas de Calais, the Germans did not ‘‘concentrate their superior forces’’ in Normandy before the invasion. Consequently, they were completely surprised when Allied forces landed in Normandy. Because of Fortitude, the Germans had concentrated their attention on the Pas de Calais, where they believed the Allies would land, and had deployed many of their panzer formations in the area north and east of the Seine River, which made them virtually ‘‘unavailable for counterattack in Normandy.’’ Even after Allied forces had landed, the Germans hesitated to shift panzer reserves or Fifteenth Army formations to the battlefield. Despite statements made by the German High Command after the war, they just could not believe that the Allies would make their major, much less their sole, landing west of the Seine River.’’ A landing in the Pas de Calais made more sense, because it would offer a quicker route to the Ruhr industrial area and to Berlin. Consequently, according to the prevailing argument, the ‘‘successful’’ Fortitude deception immobilized the German panzer divisions that were situated east of the Seine River.20 Sir Ronald Wingate and Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, both of whom were involved in the planning of Operation Fortitude, have each written an account of the deception, in which they have analyzed its outcome. Although he suggested that the deception succeeded in disguising the time and place of the Allied invasion from the Germans, Wingate conceded that not all aspects of the plan—wireless traffic, physical displays, and double agents’ messages—contributed to the Germans’ acceptance of the fictitious threat to the Pas de Calais area. According to Wingate, OKW Lagebericht indicated that the Germans accepted all of the imaginary formations that participated in Fortitude as real. He admitted, however, that the OKW might not have obtained its information about these formations from the wealth of wireless traffic sent out over the airwaves as part of the deception. ‘‘It is rather surprising to note that the OKW Lagebericht provides no single example of wireless

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program having brought any item in the FORTITUDE story to the knowledge of the Germans in the first instance. There are a few rare cases where the ‘Y’ report purports to confirm Intelligence which has already been supplied by one of the controlled agents.’’ In his report, Wingate noted another part of the deception that the Germans did not observe. Allied crews erected numerous displays of fake landing craft, supply depots, airfields, and army camps. The OKW Lagebericht did not, according to Wingate, note the presence of landing craft in southeast England, primarily because few German aircraft succeeded in flying reconnaissance missions over the area either before or after Allied troops arrived in Normandy. Wingate concluded, ‘‘every phase in the story can be directly attributed to the three double-cross agents, GARBO, BRUTUS, and TRICYCLE. Individual messages can be checked with passages in the German Intelligence Summary.’’21 Other historians agree that the role played by the double agents was by far the most important aspect of the Fortitude deception and that these men and women provided ‘‘the most effective means of planting false information on the Germans.’’ Allied command of the air and control of enemy intelligence in England receive the most credit for the success of Fortitude South.22 Wingate did not, however, suggest that Allied deception teams should not have transmitted wireless messages or displayed dummy landing craft, which he called ‘‘valuable insurance, the omission of which might on another occasion cause disastrous results.’’ Although the lack of enemy reconnaissance flights explained the Germans’ lack of awareness of the physical displays, Wingate admitted that he did not understand why the wireless program failed to garner German attention.23 Concurring with some of Wingate’s conclusions, Hesketh acknowledged that the dummy landing craft displays did not contribute to the deception. The purpose of the displays was to fool enemy spies and air reconnaissance. In addition, Hesketh also admitted that few enemy aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over southeast England, the location of the majority of fake landing craft and camps. Like Wingate, Hesketh compared the physical displays to having an insurance policy for the deception plan. Because British intelligence had captured all of the German agents, no uncontrolled spies could provide the Germans with information about the displays. Acknowledging the limitations of wireless deception, Hesketh concluded that ‘‘even if one has the resources and the skill to disclose false intentions by controlled leakage, one can scarcely hope that the enemy will always be listening at the right moment, nor can one be sure that faulty reception may not prevent him from hearing if he is listening.’’24 Consequently, Hesketh confessed that the most reliable aspect of Fortitude South was the role played by the double agents. Throughout his report, however, Hesketh reiterated his opinion that the Fortitude deception succeeded beyond the planners’ initial expectations in convincing the Germans that the assault on Normandy was a feint and that the Allies would invade later in the area around the Pas de Calais. Although Fortitude was a ‘‘remarkable success,’’ it could have been even more effective had Hesketh and his associates used ‘‘Ultra’s revelations to sharpen his technique.’’25

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Although Fortitude South was a success in many ways, one must hesitate to give it sole, or even major, credit for the outcome of the Normandy invasion. Fortitude South was only one part of the overall Overlord plan. One cannot ‘‘claim that Fortitude South alone gave the Allies victory in Normandy. There were other factors. The weather hindered the invasion forces as they headed for France, but it helped to conceal them. It also discouraged enemy aerial reconnaissance over East Anglia which could have revealed the flotillas of dummy landing craft for what they were.’’26 Colonel John Turner’s department, which participated in implementing part of the deception, prepared a monograph, ‘‘Decoy and Deception,’’ in which they addressed the effectiveness of Fortitude South. Recognizing that the Germans failed to transfer forces from Belgium or the Pas de Calais until after the Allies had won in Normandy, the department concluded that it could not determine ‘‘how much of this was due to the cover plan and to what extent the great activity in the Thames estuary also affected the issue.’’27 One could even argue that, although victory in Normandy would have been harder, it would have still been possible without Fortitude South because of Allied air and fire power.28 Furthermore, the Germans believed that the Pas de Calais was a possible invasion site even before the Allies began to implement Fortitude South. When planning the invasion of Britain in 1940, von Rundstedt intended to cross the English Channel at its narrowest point, which was from the Pas de Calais area to Dover. The German general, looking at the invasion in reverse, expected the Allies to cross the channel in the same area. Between April and June 1944, however, the German High Command considered other possible invasion sites. Both Hitler and Rommel believed the Allies could conceivably assault the Normandy beaches. Although the Pas de Calais appeared to be the most likely site of the Allies’ attack, the Germans did not eliminate other areas before the invasion. In the weeks preceding the invasion, the Germans considered the area between Dunkirk and Brest to be endangered, and their attention focused more and more on Normandy as D-Day neared.29 After D-Day, the Germans hesitated to transfer the Fifteenth Army and the panzer reserves to Normandy because they believed that the Allies would launch a second assault, probably in the Pas de Calais area, but possibly elsewhere. To a certain extent, one can attribute that hesitation to the Fortitude South deception. That the Germans believed the Allies had enough forces to launch a second large landing resulted from an overinflated estimate of Allied troop strength by early June 1944. The Germans had, however, been overestimating Allied troops strength for some time. In January 1944, although the Allies had 37 divisions in England, according to an FHW assessment they had 55. By late May, German estimates ranged from 75 to 90 Allied divisions in the United Kingdom. Part, but not all, of the overestimation can be attributed to reports provided by agents, such as Garbo and Brutus. Before the agents came onto the scene, however, the FHW chief, von Roenne, was grossly inflating the assessments of Allied divisions to counterbalance the deflated figures provided by the SD. Von Roenne more than compensated for the SD’s reduced numbers. Although he did not create divisions, von Roenne showed the presence of an entire division, when only part had arrived in an area.30 According to Lieutenant

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General Max Pemsel, ‘‘this overestimation may have played an unfortunate part in the Supreme and High Commander’s expectation of a second landing.’’31 ******************* The success of Fortitude South hinged on the Allies being able to ‘‘reinforce preconceptions in the mind of the enemy.’’32 The Germans had preconceived notions about the importance of the Pas de Calais area and were, consequently, willing to accept any evidence, supported or unsubstantiated, that strengthened them and to reject or ignore those that conflicted with them. The inflated assessments of Allied troop strength just made the idea of a second landing more feasible and reinforced the prevaling German belief. In addition, because they had concluded months earlier that the Allies might launch several assaults, some of which would be diversionary,33 the Germans could not immediately react to the Normandy invasion as if it were the main attack. As a result, the Germans did not transfer their panzer reserves immediately to Normandy. While Garbo’s June 8/9 message was apparently responsible for the cancellation of General von Rundstedt’s order transferring the 1st SS Panzer Division to Normandy, the unit did, however, move to Normandy a week later, but ‘‘too much should not be made of this. Even had the division moved, Allied Air Forces and the forces of the Resistance would have harassed its 250 mile journey across Belgium and northern France, whether it traveled by road or rail, and the eventual intervention of such units as arrived intact would hardly have been in itself decisive.’’34 Prior to D-Day, the Allies instituted the Transportation Plan, which was an air offensive aimed at isolating Normandy to prevent German reinforcement of the battlefield. By attacking road and rail bridges across the Seine River, Allied aircraft performed a twofold purpose. They suggested the Pas de Calais as the site of the impending invasion, and they limited traffic from the Pas de Calais into Normandy. Allied bombing forced the Germans to send supplies and troops via indirect routes, often through or around Paris, to the battlefield, which frequently delayed their arrival for several days. By D-Day, no routes across the Seine River north of Paris remained open. Allied bombers were particularly successful in attacking the railway bridges across the Seine River and the Paris-Ceinture railway junctions in the days prior to D-Day, which forced the Germans to disembark from trains north of the Seine River and travel to Normandy by road. Prior to the invasion, the Germans could only use three road bridges across the Seine between Paris and the sea. As a result, the Germans had to ferry troops, supplies, and vehicles across the river, which greatly impeded their ability to reinforce their troops in Normandy quickly. Continuous attacks on railways by Allied bombers after D-Day caused the Germans to experience further delays in reinforcing the battlefield.35 For example, damage caused by Allied aircraft and the French Resistance hindered the movement of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, which the Germans transferred from the eastern front. It took less time for the two panzer divisions to travel from the eastern front to France than it did for them to proceed from eastern France to Normandy.36

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In addition, shortly after the invasion, Allied aircraft succeeded in obstructing the major railways across the Loire River, which hindered the movement of German forces and supplies into Normandy from the south. By closing the Loire rail lines, the Allied air forces completely isolated the Normandy battlefield. In fact, ‘‘in the first week of the invasion, Allied ground forces reaped considerable benefits from the air offensive: the Germans were unable to run a single supply train into Normandy across the Seine and Loire.’’37 In a report of the situation in Normandy, Admiral Krancke reiterated the difficulty that the Germans experienced, because of Allied air superiority, in transferring forces into the battle area. Continuous air activity resulted in heavy losses in equipment, vehicles, and personnel before the troops could be committed on the battlefield. According to Krancke, ‘‘access by rail and sea to the battle area is virtually blocked.’’38 The Transportation Plan had perhaps an even greater impact than had been anticipated. General Spaatz claimed that the Allied air offensive against the German transportation network cleared the way for a successful assault in Normandy, and ‘‘the strategic bombers and tactical air forces so disrupted the rail system of France that significant reinforcements could not reach the beaches in time to be effective.’’39 If the Allies had not launched a major air assault against the roads, bridges, and railways leading into Normandy, they might have experienced failure. The Germans themselves acknowledged the effectiveness of the Allies’ air assault, when ‘‘after the war almost every German officer who knew anything about the subject said that the bombing of the railways of North-West Europe was the main cause of the success of the invasion.’’40 The Germans could not move troops into Normandy any faster than they did for two reasons. The first was combat readiness. Most of the formations in the Pas de Calais area were not combat ready; therefore, the Germans hesitated to transfer them to Normandy. The second reason was transportation. The destruction to roads and bridges leading into Normandy hindered German troop and supply traffic into the area. Some formations that received orders to proceed to Normandy had to travel by way of Cologne. The only workable rail routes were those in the Loire-Seine gap, but Allied air attacks against marshalling yards, rolling stock, and locomotives caused a backlog of trains.41 A shortage of vehicles forced the Germans to rely on the French rail system, which forced delays in transporting reinforcements to Normandy. Allied aircraft had severely limited train movement into Normandy by D-Day. Not only were the Germans unable to transport troops to Normandy, but they also failed to provide adequate supplies of ammunition, fuel, vehicles, and weapons. The Allied air assault had an enormous impact on the availability of fuel supplies for German troops in the west. By early June, approximately 15 percent of German fuel supplies for the western front were ‘‘backlogged’’ throughout France. The ‘‘German logistical problem,’’ which the Allied air offensive had created, began prior to the invasion. Up to the middle of June, German forces in Normandy received daily deliveries of munitions that replaced less than 15 percent of what they expended in a day. By the end of June, the Seventh German Army had received only 37 percent of the munitions that

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had been sent. Consequently, it is clear that ‘‘logistical difficulties were a major factor in the collapse of the German defence of Normandy.’’42 ******************* Although the evidence appears to indicate that Fortitude South succeeded, not all aspects of the deception successfully provided the Germans with the information that they needed to reach the conclusions that the LCS and SHAEF hoped they would make. While the key factor in the success of the deception plan was the double agents, little evidence exists to suggest that the physical displays, the Allied air offensive, and the extensive wireless traffic sent over the airwaves enhanced the story that SHAEF and the deception planners hoped to convey. The double agents, particularly Garbo and Brutus, contributed to, but were not solely responsible for, the Germans’ construction of an Allied Order of Battle and their overestimation of Allied troops strength, both of which fostered the German belief that an assault against the Pas de Calais was possible even after the Allies had landed in Normandy. Wingate and others have stressed the importance of a message sent by Garbo on the night of June 8/9, 1944. Shortly after the invasion, von Rundstedt requested the release of the OKW reserve. After receiving approval on June 8, von Rundstedt issued orders transferring to Normandy the 1st SS Panzer Division from Belgium and armored elements from the 116th Panzer Division from the area northwest of Paris. Following receipt of Garbo’s message, however, the OKW contacted von Rundstedt, who on June 10, 1944, rescinded his original order and transferred the reserve to the Pas de Calais. 43 Although he acknowledged that two other messages, one from an independent agent named Josephine, might have influenced the OKW’s decision, Hesketh concluded, based on an interview with General Keitel after the war, that Garbo’s message was the key. It is possible, however, that neither Garbo’s nor Josephine’s message alone would have had the necessary impact, but the two together caused the cancellation of von Rundstedt’s June 8 order and delayed the transfer of 1st SS Panzer Division for one week. One can challenge Hesketh’s conclusion that Garbo and Fortitude were solely responsible for the German June 10 decision not to transfer the panzer divisions to Normandy, by questioning the validity of Keitel’s admission to Hesketh’s brother in the midst of the Nuremberg trials, when his fate was in question, that Garbo’s message alone had caused Hitler to halt the movement of the panzer divisions. In all probability, Keitel’s ‘‘mind was focused on his own future fate, not on past history, and he was hardly in a frame of mind to review his recollections objectively, especially to an interrogator who clearly hoped for a particular answer.’’44 Prior to D-Day, Allied leaders feared that, if the Germans transferred their Fifteenth Army to Normandy too quickly, the invasion would be in jeopardy. Although the June 10 order caused the temporary diversion of two panzer divisions to the Pas de Calais, the Germans did reinforce Normandy. Rommel immediately transferred the 21st Panzer Division to the battle area, and within 24 hours he ordered the transfer of the 2nd Panzer Division. Von Rundstedt received the release of three divisions of the OKW reserve—the 12th SS Panzer, the 17th SS Panzer

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Grenadier, and Panzer Lehr—within 12 hours of his request. Although the 12th SS Panzer arrived in Normandy on June 7, Allied aircraft delayed Panzer Lehr’s arrival for two days. By June 13 two more German Panzer Divisions—the 2nd and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier—entered the battle. A few days later, the 1st SS Panzer Division, which the Germans had held as a reserve behind the Fifteenth Army, traveled to Normandy.45 The Germans failed to transfer a large part of the Fifteenth Army from the Pas de Calais to Normandy until the middle of July for a number of reasons. First, because of pre-invasion conclusions that they had even before the Allies began to implement the Fortitude deception, the Germans believed that, although their enemy might launch a series of assaults, the main invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais area. General von Rundstedt and other German officials believed that the Allies, like them, accepted the importance of the region. The deception planners were able to use the Germans’ preconceptions to their advantage when they designed Fortitude. When the Allies failed on June 6, 1944, to land in the Pas de Calais, the Germans concluded, with a little help from messages sent by Garbo and Josephine, that Normandy was a diversion designed to draw German forces away from the real Allied target—the Pas de Calais. The German High Command continued to a certain extent to believe in a second landing until the end of July. They had difficulty rejecting an idea that they had accepted for months, especially when reports from double agents about the continued presence of a major Allied force in southeast England appeared to reinforce it. Although they continued to implement Fortitude South in August, the Allies’ eastward advance finally convinced the Germans that a landing in the Pas de Calais was no longer likely. Second, the Allied air offensive hindered the transfer of German troops and supplies. Damage to railways, locomotives, and marshalling yards forced the Germans to rely on road travel, which imposed a strain on the Germans’ fuel supply and their ability to replenish their diminishing supplies. In addition to the obstacles that they encountered on the way to Normandy, the German formations faced constant harassment by Allied air forces, which limited how and when they could travel and which created further delays in their attempts to reach the battlefield. Although they reinforced Normandy, the Germans did so in a piecemeal fashion, which prevented the reinforcements from being as effective as was needed to drive the invaders back into the sea and for a German victory on the battlefield. Third, most of the Fifteenth’s Army’s divisions were static divisions trained for coastal and fortress defense. At least two of the divisions were Luftwaffe in origin, and shortly after the invasion began, two other divisions received orders transferring their command to the Seventh Army. The units were poorly trained, equipped, and supplied and lacked adequate transport. Many of the men were either old or very young. Several factors would have limited the impact of the Fifteenth Army on the battle raging in Normandy even if it had received orders to proceed to the battlefield. Harrassment by Allied aircraft and lack of transport would have delayed their arrival. In addition, because of the damage to and destruction of bridges across the Seine River, the units would have been unable to travel directly to Normandy. Practical

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reasons, in conjuction with the German belief in a threat to the Pas de Calais, which the deception reinforced, prevented the transfer of the Fifteenth Army to Normandy until it was too late to have had any effect on the outcome of the battle.46 Although Fortitude South made an important contribution to the Allied success in Normandy, historians should not place too much weight on the deception plan’s value. Fortitude South was not the sole contributor to the successful invasion. Other factors were equally, if not more, important. First, although the Germans believed that the Allied invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais area, as D-Day approached, Germans officials, particularly Hitler and Rommel, began to lean toward Normandy as a possible site. Despite the Fortitude deception, the Germans accepted that the Allies might land in an area outside of the Pas de Calais. By late May, the Germans had concluded that the invasion could occur anywhere between Dunkirk and Brest, and they had begun to reinforce the Normandy area. Because the threatened coastal area was so large and because the number of formations available for the western front was limited, the Germans could not effectively protect the entire coastal area. Therefore, ‘‘it was the Germans’ utter uncertainty about where the Allies would land that contributed decisively to their debacle in June.’’47 In addition, German intelligence gathering and assessment inadequacies greatly enhanced the Germans’s misconceptions and confusion both before and after the commencement of the invasion. Hitler’s ambiguous attitude toward the usefulness of intelligence and his role in creating the problems that existed within the German intelligence organizations should also not be ignored. Second, the dispute between Rommel and von Rundstedt over the placement of defenses and reserves contributed to the Germans’ inability to meet the Allied threat effectively. Hitler rendered the German effort even more problematic by providing a compromise solution and not siding with one general over the other. Hitler further tied Rommel’s and von Rundstedt’s hands by placing part of the OKW reserve under his own control. Because only Hitler had the authority to release those divisions, neither Rommel nor von Rundstedt could quickly commit them to a counterattack of the invading enemy. Even had the Germans been aware that the Allies would land in Normandy, the generals’ dispute over the placement of the reserves would have hindered reinforcement of the area. The fact that Jodl refused to wake the Fu¨hrer after the commencement of the invasion also did not help German response time in the hours, days, and weeks following the arrival of Allied troops on the beaches of Normandy. Third, by attacking rail and road bridges across the Seine and Loire Rivers, locomotives, and marshalling yards before and after the invasion, Allied air forces effectively isolated the Normandy area long enough for the Allied invasion forces to establish and reinforce beachheads. Allied aircraft continually harassing German formations as they moved toward Normandy not only inflicted heavy losses in vehicles, supplies, and personnel before the troops even entered the battle but also in many cases restricted when and how German troops traveled to the battlefield. As a result, logistical problems and the piecemeal commitment of forces to the battle greatly contributed to the German defeat in Normandy.

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Finally, one cannot forget the role of the Allied invasion forces themselves on D-Day and during the days, weeks, and months that followed. The tenacity, courage, determination, and fighting spirit of the Allied soldiers, rangers, sailors, pilots, navigators, and bombardiers on D-Day fostered victory when defeat was equally possible. The large stockpile of supplies—munitions, weapons, and other equipment—provided Allied forces with an advantage that would have been lost had it not been for the installation of the man-made harbors. In addition, Allied air superiority protected the invasion forces from destruction by the German Air Force. Furthermore, when American forces came under heavy attack on Omaha beach, Allied destroyers risked running aground in order to provide much needed artillery support. Although one cannot deny the contribution of the Fortitude deception plan— both Fortitude North and Fortitude South—to the Allied success in Normandy, one must not overemphasize its importance. The successful invasion resulted from a combination of factors, not from any one. In addition, one cannot conclude definitively that the untimely arrival of the Fifteenth German Army in Normandy would have resulted in disaster for, and possibly defeat of, the Allied forces. While most of the Fifteenth Army formations were not battle ready, their arrival would have made the battle more difficult, but even though Allied forces would have suffered greater losses, they would have emerged victorious. By pinning down the Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais, the deception plan made the Normandy battle easier for the Allied forces. Fortitude provided a useful contribution, but it was not, despite the opinion of Allied leaders at the time, the determining factor in the Allied victory in Normandy. The entire Fortitude deception plan—Fortitude North, Fortitude South I, and Fortitude South II—provided a dramatic operation aimed at the Germans. In the final analysis, however, its impact was minimal. A reexamination of archival sources and recent scholarship suggests that, although the Allies successfully implemented the deception, it was not in fact as ‘‘vital’’ to the Allied victory in Normandy as is often assumed. Moreover, the persistent tendency to exaggerate the operational effect of Fortitude on the German military performance at Normandy continues to draw attention away from other, technical-military reasons for the German failures there.

Glossary

ABSTELLE–an Abwehr sub-office ABWEHR–German Secret Intelligence Service ACAS(G)–Assistant Chief of Air Staff (General) ADC–Aide de camp AEAF–Allied Expeditionary Air Force AFHQ–Allied Force Headquarters ANCXF–Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force APPENDIX ‘Y’–original cover plan for OVERLORD, written during the fall 1943 ASQL (Assault QL)–designates a very light QL set which can be used to represent a small military camp or convoy B1A–Sub-section of MI 5 that operated the double-cross agents BEF–British Expeditionary Force BIGBOBS–fake landing craft tank made of steel tubing and canvas BRUTUS–a Polish captain named Roman Garby-Czerniawski, who became a double agent for the British CBME–Combined Bureau Middle East CCS–Combined Chiefs of Staff (Anglo-US) C & D–Concealment & Display CIGS–Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who was the head of the British Army CIS–Combined Intelligence Section

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GLOSSARY

CLH units–units that represented naval assault forces through wireless transmissions COSSAC–Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander CSM–Committee of Special Means DGE–Directorate General of Equipment DOUBLE CROSS COMMITTEE–also known as the Twenty, or XX, Committee, was a branch of the British Security Service, MI 5, that had the responsibility of running captured enemy agents as double agents DROGUE–a buoy attached to the end of a harpoon line ENIGMA MACHINE–enciphering machine used by the Germans ETOUSA–European Theater of Operations, United States Army EXERCISE FABIUS–an Allied exercise in early May 1944 that was designed to convince the Germans that Fabius and Neptune were the first and second in a series of large-scale exercises FHW–Fremde Heere West or Foreign Armies West F.O.I.C.–Flag Officer in Charge Royal Navy F.R.–Fleet Reserve FUSAG–First United States Army Group G-1–Army personnel staff officer G-2–Army intelligence staff officer G-3–Army operations staff officer G-4–Army logistics staff officer G-6–Army communications staff officer GAF–German Air Force GARBO–Juan Pujol Garcia, a Spaniard, who became a double agent for the British and who was a major contributor to the Fortitude deception GC & CS–Government Code and Cypher School GHQ–General Headquarters GIS–German Intelligence Service GOC-in-C–General Officer Commanding-in-Chief GSI–General Staff Intelligence Officer GSO–General Staff Officer HARDS–Beaches paved to facilitate the loading and unloading of landing craft HDML–Harbour Defence Motor Launches HUMINT–Intelligence gathered from human sources ISSB–Inter Services Security Board JCS–Joint Chiefs of Staff LAGEBERICHT WEST–Intelligence Summary produced daily by OKH LCA–Landing Craft Assault LCS–London Controlling Section

GLOSSARY

199

LCT–Landing Craft Tank MEIC–Middle East Intelligence Centre MI 5–British Security Service MI 6–British Secret Intelligence Service ML–minelaying force MOONSHINE–a receiver transmitter that produces false radar signals in order to simulate the movement of craft at particular intervals NAAFI–a British military canteen NCO–noncommissioned officer 4TH NORTHANTS–4th Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment OKH–Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the German Army) OKL–Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command of the German Air Force) OKM–Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (High Command of the German Navy) OKW–Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High, or Supreme, Command of the German Armed Forces) OPERATION ANVIL–Allied plan for an assault against the south coast of France and originally slated to be launched in conjunction with Overlord. OPERATION ARCHERY–British commando raid against Vaagso, Norway, in December 1941. OPERATION (or PLAN) BODYGUARD–designed by the London Controlling Section, it was the overall Allied strategic deception cover plan for Operation Overlord OPERATION COCKADE–a deception plan implemented in the summer of 1943 that had two goals—to tie down German forces in northwest Europe and to destroy German aircraft. OPERATION (or PLAN) GRAFFHAM–an Allied diplomatic deception plan aimed at Sweden and implemented in conjunction with Fortitude North OPERATION HARDBOILED–a deception operation that targeted Stavanger, Norway, and that was implemented by the British early in 1942 OPERATION JUPITER–a British amphibious invasion plan that Churchill favored, that was designed in 1942 to drive German forces from northern Norway and from Finmark, but that the British never implemented OPERATION NEPTUNE–code name used in Overlord documents that mentioned the target date or area. OPERATION OVERLORD–code word for all preparations and activities in connection with the invasion of Northwest France in June 1944 OPERATION ROUNDUP–an Allied cross-Channel plan for 1943 to be implemented under certain conditions OPERATION SLEDGEHAMMER–Allied plan for a small scale invasion of France to be carried out in the fall of 1942 under the right conditions OPERATION TORCH–Allied plan for the invasion of North Africa in 1942 OSS–Office of Strategic Services POL–Petrol, Oil, Lubricant

200

GLOSSARY

PWE–Political Warfare Executive QL/QF SITES–sites of decoy lighting designed to draw enemy bombs; night display with light simulating any other form of lighting, civil or military, that may be visible in war at night QUICKSILVER–Code word assigned to the numerous ways in which Fortitude South would be implemented ‘R’ FORCE–General Montgomery’s deception staff RAF–Royal Air Force RCM–Radio Countermeasures RCT–assault exercises RE–Royal Engineers R/T–Radio Telephony SAS–Special Air Services SD–Sicherheitsdienst or the security service of the SS SFHQ–Special Forces Headquarters SHAEF–Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force SID–Signal Intelligence Division SIGINT–Signals Intelligence SIS–Security Intelligence Service SOE–Special Operations Executive SOLO I–a deceptive invasion of Norway that was designed to cover the real invasion of North Africa SOLO II–a subsidiary plan for SOLO I SWV8–the War Office department that handles camouflage and all aspects of visual misdirection by technical means, from static production to tactical development. The SWV8 reports to DDSW (Deputy Director of Special Weapons), who reports to DSWV (Director of Special Weapons and Vehicles), who reports to the Department of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Imperial General Staff in the War Office. TAF–Tactical Air Force TATE–a Danish draftsman named Hans Hansen, who was sent to England by the Abwehr and who became a double agent for the British TREASURE–a Frenchwoman of Russian origin named Lily Sergeyev, who became a double agent for the British and who played a minor role in the Fortitude South deception TRICYCLE–a Yugoslav playboy named Dusko Popov, who became a double agent for the British and who played a role in the Fortitude deception ULTRA–term used by the Allies to refer to SIGINT that was intercepted as the enemy transmitted it from one location to another USSTAF–US Strategic Air Force VHF–very high frequency radio WETBOBS–fake landing craft assault made from inflatable rubber

GLOSSARY

201

WINDOW–metalized paper strips that were dropped from aircraft to hinder radar transmissions 10th WORCESTERS–10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment WREN–Women’s Royal Naval Service W/T–Wireless Telegraphy Y SERVICE–Wireless intercept

Notes

CHAPTER 1 1. B.H. Liddell-Hart, The Rommel Papers (New York: Da Capo Press, 1953), 462. 2. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 311; Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1983), 17–22; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Norwalk, Connecticut: The Easton Press, 1948), 3; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 128–30, 205, 245–63. 3. Keegan, 311–13; D’Este, 24–27. 4. Keegan, 316–18; D’Este, 24–34; Eisenhower, 95–158; Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 248–67; Oxford Companion to World War II, eds. I. C. B. Dear and M.R. D. Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 298–99. 5. D’Este, 33; Eisenhower, 159–92, 201–19; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890–1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 218–33; Weinberg, 591–93; Keegan, 317–19, 350; Robert A. Doughty, Ira Gruber, et al. Warfare in the Western World, Volume II, Military Operations Since 1871 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), 762–64, 780–83. 6. Doughty, Gruber, et al., 763, 767, 783–86; Keegan, 375–78; Eisenhower, 229–31, 239; D’Este, 43; Weinberg, 627–31. 7. Michael Howard quotation from Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude: The Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy 1944,’’ Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program, recorded October 7, 1993 by the Imperial War Museum (IWM) Sound Archive, Imperial War Museum, London, Tape no. 13493/2. 8. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations,

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NOTES

RG319 E101 Box 1, National Archives (NARA), College Park, Maryland; ‘‘Cover and Deception, Definition and Procedure,’’ dated September 8, 1944, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, RG319 E101 Box, 1, NARA; Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1990), 3–29. 9. Ibid., 31–32. 10. E. Montagu, NID 12, September 18, 1945, ‘‘Machinery of Deception Outside NID, W-Board, Twenty Committee & London Controlling Section,’’ 6–7, ADM 223/794, The National Archives (PRO); Howard, 32–34. 11. Howard, 34–36. 12. John R. Ferris, ‘‘The ‘Usual Source’: Signals Intelligence and Planning for the ‘Crusader’ Offensive, 1941,’’ (n.d.), 28, 30, 33–34, forthcoming article in a collection in Intelligence and National Security, ed. David Alverez, provided by the author. See also Howard, 37. 13. LCS(44)3, dated February 5, 1944, ‘‘Cover and Deception Plans,’’ CAB 81/78, PRO; Howard, 42. 14. Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Toronto: Oxford University Press, revised edition, 1998), 248–67. 15. LCS(44)3, dated February 5, 1944, ‘‘Cover and Deception Plans,’’ CAB 81/78. See also Howard, 55–63. 16. ‘‘Official History of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops,’’ NARA. 17. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, RG319 E101 Box 1, NARA, 1. 18. Howard, 85. For information about the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), see ‘‘History of the OSS in London,’’ War Diary , SO Branch, OSS, London, Beinecke Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, Yale University; Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001); and Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995). 19. LCS(44)3, dated February 5, 1944, ‘‘Cover and Deception Plans,’’ CAB 81/78. 20. Ibid. 21. Appendix II/1, COSSAC(43)15(Final), dated June 3, 1943, Appendices to Parts I–III of Notes of the Planning & Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Invasion of Northwest France—June 1944, Library, Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, London. See also LCS (44)3, dated February 5, 1944, ‘‘Cover and Deception Plans,’’ CAB 81/78; Howard, 71–83. 22. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, RG 319 E101 Box 1, NARA; Howard, 81–82. 23. Appendix 11(7), William Elliot, Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy), letter dated July 15, 1943 to the Ar Officer Commanding in Chief, Headquarters, Bomber Command, Royal Air Force, Appendices to Parts I–III of Notes of the Planning & Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Invasion of Northwest France—June 1944. 24. LCS(44)3, dated February 5, 1944, ‘‘Cover and Deception Plans,’’ CAB 81/78; Howard, 77–83, 112. 25. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, RG 319 E101 Box 1, NARA, 3–4.

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26. Philip Gerard, Secret Soldiers: The Story of World War II’s Heroic Army of Deception (New York: Dutton, 2002), 3–4. 27. Ibid., 3. See also Jack Kneece, Ghost Army of World War II (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 2001); Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson: 2004); Jonathan Gawne, Ghosts of the ETO: American Tactical Deception Units in the European Theater 1944–1945 (Havertown, Pennsylvania: Casemate, 2002); and Jon Latimer, Deception in War (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2001).

CHAPTER 2 1. Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001), 285. 2. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074—GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 1 based on information available to 0900 hrs 13 Feb 44, in WO 205/532, The National Archives, London (PRO). 3. Stephen E. Ambrose, ‘‘The Secrets of Overlord,’’ MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 1(1989), 71; Glossary in Flight Officer Lady E. Freeman, M.B.E. Notes on the Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Invasion of North West France in June 1944, Library, Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, London. See also Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 89–91, 96; ‘‘Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),’’ Naval War College Lecture, 4, IRIS #1005486, Call #47/03/06, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 4. John Keegan, interviewed by Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude: The Deception Tactics used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy, 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2; ‘‘Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),’’ 5. 5. James Bowman, ‘‘Fortitude South: The Making of the Calais Hoax,’’ a 1,000 page manuscript and clippings file, Eisenhower Center, New Orleans, Louisiana, Part I, 1-13 and 5-8. 6. Sir Ronald Wingate, Historical Record of Deception in the War Against Germany & Italy, Volume II, DEFE 28/49, Defence Papers, PRO, 390–91; Major General Whiteley, letter dated September 9, 1943; R.F. Hesketh, Appendix ‘‘C,’’ dated August 30, 1943 in WO 219/250, PRO; Mary Kathryn Barbier, ‘‘Deception and the Planning of D-Day,’’ in The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 170–71. 7. Cruickshank, 85–88. 8. Wingate, Volume II, 391; Barbier, 171. 9. Cruickshank, 88–89. 10. Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1990), xi–xii, 31–44. 11. Dudley Clarke, letter to J.V.B. Jervis-Read, dated October 28, 1943, WO 219/2204A, PRO. 12. Ibid. 13. ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Cover Operation—(Pas de Calais),’’ Appendix to ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/4849, PRO, 1. 14. Ibid., 2. 15. Ibid., 2–3.

206

NOTES

16. Ibid., 3. See also War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee ‘‘Overlord’’—Cover Plan Memorandum by COSSAC, C.O.S. (43) 735 (0), dated November 28, 1943, Premier (PREM) 3/342/4, PRO, 1. 17. Appendix to ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/4849, 3–4; War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee ‘‘Overlord’’—Cover Plan Memorandum by COSSAC, C.O.S. (43) 735 (0), dated November 28, 1943, PREM 3/342/4,1. 18. War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee ‘‘Overlord’’—Cover Plan Memorandum by COSSAC, C.O.S. (43) 735 (0), dated November 28, 1943, PREM 3/342/4, 2. 19. Operation ‘Overlord’ Cover Operation—(Pas de Calais),’’ Appendix to ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/4849, 4; War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee ‘‘Overlord’’—Cover Plan Memorandum by COSSAC, C.O.S. (43) 735 (0), dated November 28, 1943, PREM 3/342/4, 2; Roger Hesketh., Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 12–15. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. For more detailed proposed measures, see ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Cover Operation—(Pas de Calais),’’ Appendix to ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/4849, 5–9. 22. ‘‘Long-Term and Short-Term Preparations for Operation ‘Overlord,’’’ Annexure I to Appendix ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/4849, 1–2. 23. Ibid., 1–2. 24. ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Camouflage and Concealment, Annexure II to Appendix ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/4849, 1. 25. Ibid. 26. ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Information to Participating Forces and Civil Authorities,’’ Annexure III to Appendix ‘Y’ to COSSAC (43) 28, dated November 20, 1943, AIR 20/ 4849, 1. 27. Wingate, Volume II, 391. See also Cruickshank, 91–92. 28. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, Record Group 319, Box 1, Folder 1, National Archives (NARA), 6; Cruickshank, 91. 29. Wingate, Volume II, 360–61; Hesketh, 17. 30. Sir Ronald Wingate, Historical Record of Deception in the War Against Germany & Italy, Volume I, DEFE 28/48, Defence Papers, PRO, 49; Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1977), 180. See also Howard, 21–30; Hesketh, 28–32. 31. Wingate, Volume I, 50; Wingate, Volume II, 361. See also Howard, 103–7; overview document in ‘‘Cover and Deception Policy (December 1943 – March 1945),’’ WO 219/ 2246, PRO. 32. Wingate, Volume II, 361. 33. Ibid., 361–62; Hesketh, 17–19; Cruickshank, 92; Howard, 107–9. 34. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, RG 319, Box 1, Folder 1, NARA, 1; Exhibit 3, dated September 8, 1944, Cover & Deception, Definition and Procedure, RG 319, Folder 4; William H. Baumer, ‘‘Talk to CIA Group,’’ May 15, 1986, Box 3, Baumer Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, copyright Stanford University; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 679–81; ‘‘Plan ‘Bodyguard’ Overall Deception Policy for the War against Germany,’’ Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, SHAEF, Office of the Chief of Staff, RG 331, Box 69, Decimal File 381, NARA.

NOTES

207

35. Hesketh, 18–19; F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume III, Part II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 45; Wingate, Volume II, 362–64. See also London Controlling Section Series (44) 1 to (44) 26 in CAB 81/78, PRO; Cruickshank, 115–23; Baumer Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, copyright Stanford University. 36. Hinsley, 45–47. 37. Hinsley, 47–48; Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Pollock, Historical Section of the Cabinet, ‘‘OVERLORD: PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 1940 to the ‘Touch Down,’’’ in CAB 44/ 242, PRO, 185–86; Hesketh, 19; ‘‘Cover Operations for ‘Overlord,’’’ COSSAC (43) 34, dated August 18, 1943, WO 219/2204B, PRO; Major General F. W. de Guingand, letter to Major General C.A. West, dated January 25, 1944, 21 A.Gp/25/COS, in SHAEF/Ops ‘B’/ 1, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ WO 219/2204A, PRO. 38. Hinsley, 47–48; Pollock, 185–86; Hesketh, 19; Overview, SHAEF/Ops ‘B’/1, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ WO 219/2204A. 39. Exhibit 62, in Document 9, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (A) Plan FORTITUDE, 26 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing Co., Inc., 1989), 1. 40. Bowman, Part II, 2-1, Part III, 2-9, 2-10; Hesketh, 19–20; ‘‘Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),’’ Naval War College Lecture, 23, Air Force Historical Research Agency; Barbier, 172. See also Wingate, Volume II, 392–95. 41. Bowman, Part I, 1-13. See also Overview, SHAEF/Ops ‘B’/1, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ WO 219/2204A; Hinsley, 47–49; Hesketh, 17–27. See interview with David Strangeways, recorded June 1996, tape no. 16755/6, IWM (London) Sound Archive. 42. Wingate, Volume II, 393–95; Hesketh, 34–35; ‘‘OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries,’’ microfilm, MISC 1043, Yale University. 43. ‘‘Cover & Deception Synopsis of History,’’ Cover & Deception Report, ETO, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, RG 319 E101 Box 1, NARA. 44. SHAEF/18209/1/Ops, dated March 26, 1944, from Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff, to Commanding General, FUSAG, RG 319 E101, Box 1, NARA; 321 (G-3), dated April 7, 44 from Brigadier General A. Franklin Kibler, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Colonel William A. Harris, GSC, RG 319 E101, Box 1, NARA. 45. Wingate, Volume I, 23–27. 46. Ibid., 23–26. 47. Ibid., 25–27. 48. Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’ Section II—Implementation, Combined Signal Board—Signal Security Committee, October 1943–April 1944,’’ in WO 219/2208, PRO; ‘‘Appendix ‘A’ to COSSAC/2355/Ops dated 9 December 1943—Operation ‘Overlord’ Wireless Deception,’’ WO 219/2208. 49. Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’—Section II—Implementation, Wireless Deception & Security July 1943–July 1944,’’ in WO 219/2207, PRO; ‘‘Appendix to COSSAC/00/6/5/ Ops—Operation ‘Overlord’ Notes on Wireless,’’ undated, in WO 219/2207; Lt. Col. P.H . Lash, Jr., memorandum to Lt. Col. Jervis-Read, dated October 8, 1943, in WO 219/ 2207; Major General H.R. Bull, two memoranda dated February 24, 1944, in WO 219/2207. 50. Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’ Section II—Implementation, Combined Signal Board —Signal Security Committee, October 1943–April 1944,’’ in WO 219/2208; Hesketh, 36– 38; Bowman, Part I, 1-13 and Part I, 6-3.

208

NOTES

51. Hesketh, 39–40; Bowman, Part I, 8-1, Part I, 5-9 and 5-10; Hesketh, handwritten note, dated March 11, 1946, in WO 219/2213, PRO; and ‘‘Official History of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops,’’ 5, NARA. 52. Hesketh, 80–82; Brigadier R. T. Ransome, Q Ops, memorandum to Headquarters, COSSAC, G-3 (Operations) Division, dated January 12, 1944, B.M. 1061/33/Q(Ops) 3, in WO 219/2209, PRO. 53. Brigadier R. T. Ransome, Q Ops, memorandum to Headquarters, COSSAC, G-3 (Operations) Division, dated January 12, 1944, B.M. 1061/33/Q(Ops)3, in WO 219/2209. 54. ‘‘Plan ‘Mespot’—Movement and Administrative Preparations,’’ SHAEF/18201/4/Ops (Second draft), dated January 20, 1944, in WO 219/2209; Lieutenant General H.C. Loyd, Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, memorandum to GHQ Home Forces, dated February 4, 1944, SC Z/18330/G(Ops), in WO 219/2211, PRO. 55. Hesketh, 82–83. Hesketh cites SE/00/3/BGS dated 9 February 1944. GOC-in-C, South Eastern Command to GHQ, Home Forces. 56. Hesketh, 38–39; ‘‘Operation BIGBOBS,’’ dated July 20, 1943, SE/00/9/Ops, in WO 199/2629, PRO; Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘R.A.F. Monograph (First Draft), Decoy and Deception,’’ Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, 142; Report on the Display of Bigbobs, from the Commander-in-Chief, GHQ Home Forces, dated September 19, 1943, S//00/349/ G(O), in WO 219/2215, PRO. 57. ‘‘Operation WETBOBS,’’ dated July 20, 1943, SE/00/9/Ops, in WO 199/2629; ‘‘Notes on the Berthing, Mooring, Launching, Construction and Maintenance of Wetbobs (Dummy Landing Craft Assault),’’ S.E./00/9/Ops, in WO 199/2629, 1. 58. ‘‘Notes on the Berthing, Mooring, Launching, Construction and Maintenance of Wetbobs (Dummy Landing Craft Assault),’’ S.E./00/9/Ops, in WO 199/2629, 1–3; ‘‘Operation WETBOBS,’’ dated July 20, 1943, SE/00/9/Ops, in WO 199/2629. 59. Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘R.A.F. Monograph (First Draft), Decoy and Deception,’’ 133–37, 146–47; ‘‘Appendix ‘D’ to Part I—Fortitude (South)—Air Plan,’’ NJC/00/ 261/33, BLM 102, Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum London (IWM London); Hesketh, 38–39. 60. Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘R.A.F. Monograph (First Draft), Decoy and Deception,’’ 137–39. 61. Ibid., 139–42; Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Section II, Implementation, Visitors’ Ban and Restrictions on Coastal Areas,’’ SHAEF/Ops ‘B’/49, in WO 219/2240, PRO; Major General R.H. Barker, letter to VCIGS, dated October 18, 1943, COSSAC/5MX/INT, in WO 219/2240; Major General P.G. Whiteford, letter to Major General N.C.D. Brownjohn, and Brigadier General R. A. McClure, dated December 12, 1943, COSSAC/5MX/INT, dated December 12, 1943, in WO 219/2240; Lieutenant General F.E. Morgan, letter to the Chief of Staff to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated December 12, 1943, COSSAC/ 5MX/INT, in WO 219/2240; Lieutenant General F.E. Morgan, letter to Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, dated February 3, 1944 in WO 219/2240; 21 A Gp/1001/G-in-C, letter to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, dated March 3, 1944, in WO 219/2240; General Dwight D. Eisenhower, letter to The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated March 6, 1944, SHAEF/5MX/INT, in WO 219/2240; Major General L. C. Hollis, letter to Eisenhower, dated March 11, 1944, in WO 219/2240. 62. Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Section II—Implementation—Leave and Travel Restrictions,’’ SHAEF/Ops ‘B’/60, in WO 219/2241, PRO, 1–2. 63. Major General J.F.M. Whiteley, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, letter to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations) Division, dated February 18, 1944,

NOTES

209

SHAEF/16FX/3/Int, in WO 219/2241; ‘‘Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 302, Norfolk House, to Discuss Stoppage of Leave in Connection with ‘Overlord,’ 21 February 1944,’’ SHAEF/18202/2/3/Ops dated February 22, 1944, in WO 219/2241; Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, letter to The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated 3 March 1944, SHAEF/18202/2/3/Ops, in WO 219/2241; Colonel E.C. Boehnke, Acting Adjutant General, memorandum number 34, dated April 1, 1944, in WO 219/2241; ‘‘‘Overlord’ Security— Service Leave,’’ Report by the Adjutant General, Second Sea Lord and Air Member for Personnel to L.C. Hollis, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, in WO 219/2241. 64. Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Section II—Implementation Postal Restrictions,’’ SHAEF/Ops ‘B’/51, in WO 219/2242, PRO, 1–3; ‘‘Extract from Operation ‘Overlord’— Security ISSB Sub-Committee,’’ dated February 1, 1944 and February 8, 1944, SHAEF/ 18202/2/2, in WO 219/2242. See also Major C.R. Blunt, GS for Major-General A C of S, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, letter to ANCXF and AEAF, dated February 12, 1944, WO 219/2242. The following WO 219/2242 documents imposed postal restriction on Fortitude deception units: Lt. Col. H.N.H. Wild, Ops B Sub-Section, letter to Major Blunt, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, dated February 15, 1944, COSSAC/00/16LX/INT; H.N.H. Wild, letter to Major Marshall, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, dated February 15, 1944, COSSAC/00/16LX/ INT; Lt. Col. H.G. Sheen, GSC, letter to I.S.S.B., dated February 17, 1944, SHAEF/2TX/ INT; Lt. Col. J.V.B. Jervis-Read, letter to A C of S, G-3 (through Chief of Ops and Plans), dated February 19, 1944, SHAEF/18202/2/2/Ops; Major Sidney L. Briggs, letter to The Under Secretary of State; Headquarters, 21 Army Group (G(R)); GHQ, Home Forces, dated March 4, 1944, SHAEF/2TX/INT; and Bowman, Part I, 6-5 and 6-6. 65. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 146, 162; Wingate, Volume I, 43; Wingate, Volume II, 408. 66. Sir David Hunt, interviewed by Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude: The Deception Tactics used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy, 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 67. Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson of London, 1971), 40–41; Masterman, 145–47; Howard, 3–7, 171; Bowman, Part II, 2-8 and 2-9; Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation GARBO: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II (New York: Random House, 1985), 64–65. See also Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra. 68. Bowman, Part III, 6-5 and 6-6, Part II, 2-8 and 2-9; Sir David Hunt, interviewed by Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 69. Delmer, 42. 70. Ibid., 42–43; Hesketh, 46–57. 71. Hesketh, 49–57; Montagu, 179; Howard, 14, F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume IV, Security and Counter-Intelligence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 240; Masterman, 150. 72. Document 57a, Notes of MI 5 of information for MI 19 in connection with Major Emil Kliemann,’’ KV 2/278, PRO; Hesketh, 55–56; Hinsley and Simkins, 241. 73. Hesketh, 56–57; Masterman, 149, 159–62. 74. Russell Miller, Codename Tricycle: The True Story of the Second World War’s Most Extraordinary Double Agent (London: Secker & Warburg, 2004). There are conflicting reports about T.A. Robertson’s rank at the time Popov first met him in 1940. Whereas Miller notes he was a major at that time, Popov’s account indicates a rank of colonel. See Dusko Popov, Spy/ Counterspy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974).

210

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75. Popov, 14–58, 65, 69–70, 98, 106–13; Hesketh, 53–55; Hinsley and Simkins, 238. 76. Popov, 184–92, 194–201; Hinsley and Simkins, 235. 77. Hesketh, 53. 78. Hesketh, 46–52; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 356; Delmer, 51; Juan Pujol and Nigel West, 3–8. 79. Garbo: The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond, England: Public Record Office, 2000), 42–45. 80. Pujol and West, 9, 14–15, 44–56, 183, 201; Hesketh, 46–47. 81. Pujol and West, 53–54; Hesketh, 46–47. 82. Pujol and West, 4, 7, 68–78, 84–85, 92–94, 204; Hesketh, 46–47; Wingate, Volume I, 41–43. 83. Pujol and West, 93–94; Hesketh, 46–47; Kahn, 357. 84. Baumer, William H. ‘‘But General. . .A Study of Leadership,’’ unfinished manuscript, copyright 1982, 118–38, Box 1, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, copyright Stanford University; Howard, 111–12; John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1946), 147–48. 85. Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘R.A.F. Monograph (First Draft)—Decoy and Deception,’’ 145–51.

CHAPTER 3 1. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1224, dated April 3, 1944, in Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 162. 2. Sefton Demler, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson of London, 1971), 107, 109–10, 112. See also Donal J. Sexton, ‘‘Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 1941–1944,’’ Military Affairs 47 (October 1983): 109–14; ‘‘Air Plan For ‘Fortitude,’’’ AEAF/MS 695/Air Plans (First draft for Head Planners), dated March 2, 1944, IRIS#00206431, Call #505.61–21, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. 3. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 49–51; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 113–21; O. Riste, ‘‘War Comes to Norway,’’ in Norway and the Second World War, eds. Johs Andenaes, O. Riste, and M. Skodvin (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1966), 40–41; Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945—Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-271 (Washington, DC, Department of the Army 1959), 16–22, 40–112. 4. International Military Tribunal—Nuremberg, volume XV (Nuremberg, Germany: Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany, 1948), 376. Department of Documents Imperial War Museum Duxford (IWM Duxford). 5. David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 428; Donal J. Sexton, 109; Alan S. Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 115. 6. Hitler’s Secret Conversations 1941–1944, translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 355–56. 7. General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, ‘‘Report and Interrogation of General von Falkenhorst, General Commander in Chief, Norway,’’ 62, 102. Document AL

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211

613—translation of unpublished report signed and dated Oslo, September 30, 1945, by von Falkenhorst, EDS Collection, Department of Documents, IWM Duxford. 8. Martti Ha¨ ikio¨, ‘‘The Race for Northern Europe, September 1939–June 1940,’’ in Scandinavia During the Second World War, ed. Henrik S. Nissen. Translated by Thomas Munch-Peterson (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 60. 9. Weinberg, 134. 10. H.P. Willmott, ‘‘Britain, Norway and the Second World War: Operation JUPITER and possible landings in Norway,’’ 3 (Author’s copy of original article). 11. O. Riste, ‘‘War Comes to Norway,’’ 14. 12. Klaus-Jurgen Mu¨ller, ‘‘A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War,’’ in Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1987), 316–18; Sexton, 110; T. L. Cubbage, II, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ in Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, 156. 13. Cubbage, 110. 14. Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1990), 23–24; Sir Ronald Wingate, ‘‘Cases Where the Enemy Disposed His Forces as if He Had Accepted a Deception Plan But Where There is Not Conclusive Proof That These Dispositions Were Solely Due to the Deception Plan,’’ a chart in Historical Record of Deception in the War Against Germany & Italy, Volume II, DEFE 28/49, Defense Papers, The National Archives (PRO), London; Falkenhorst, 59–61; Ziemke, 215–16. See also Sexton, 110. 15. Willmott, 2–3, 6; Weinberg, 357. 16. Sexton, 110–11; Howard, 61. 17. Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, Ministry of Defence, Appendix II/1, COSSAC (43) 15 (Final), Appendices to Parts I–III of Notes of the Planning & Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Invasion of Northwest France—June 1944, Library, Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London. 18. Ibid. 19. Sexton, 111–12; Howard, 75, 77, 81–82; Colonel Turner’s Department, R.A.F. Monograph, Decoy and Deception, First Draft (Air Historical Branch), 138, AIR 41/3, PRO. 20. Untitled, undated, unsigned document in WO 219/2220, War Office Documents, PRO; Colonel Turner’s Department, R.A.F. Monograph, 138; Mu¨ller, 319; Sexton, 111–12; Howard, 75, 77, 81–82, 103–4. 21. Howard, 112; Colonel Turner’s Department, R.A.F. Monograph, 137. 22. Untitled, undated, unsigned document in WO 219/2220; Howard, 112. 23. Delmer, 107, 109–10, 112–13; Sexton, 109–14; Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 20. 24. Controlling Officer, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff memorandum dated February 6, 1944, C.O.S. (44) 136 (0). WO 219/2220, PRO. 25. Wingate Report, Volume II, 392–93; SHAEF/18216/Ops dated February 23, 1944 from Major General H. R. Bull, AC of S, G-S to SHAEF, G-3 Division, WO 219/2220, PRO. See also SHAEF (44) 13 dated February 23, 1944 (Amended by SHAEF/18216/Ops dated March 29, 1944), in Document 10, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (B) FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing Co., Inc., 1989), 1.

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26. SHAEF/18216/Ops dated 23 February 1944 from Major General H.R. Bull, AC of S, G-S to SHAEF, G-3 Division, WO 219/2220. 27. SHAEF (44) 13 dated February 23, 1944, in Document 10, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (B) FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ 3. 28. ‘‘Report on Naval Assistance to Plan ‘Fortitude’,’’ WO 219/2220; SHAEF/18216/Ops dated February 23, 1944, from Major General H. R. Bull, AC of S, G-2 to SHAEF, G-3 Division, WO 219/2220; Sexton, 112; Delmer, 114–15; Howard, 107. 29. SHAEF (44) 13 dated February 23, 1944, in Document 10, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (B) FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ 3. 30. Wingate Report, Volume II, 396; ‘‘Report on Naval Assistance to Plan ‘Fortitude’,’’ WO 219/2220; Sexton, 112; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its part in the Deception Operation to cover the Normandy Landings,’’ in Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, IWM, 2–3; ‘‘Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),’’ Naval War College Lecture, IRIS #1005486, Call #47/03/06, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, 24–25; Howard, 107. 31. Charles G. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 101. 32. Macleod, 1. 33. Sir Peter Thorne of London, England, interview by author, August 3, 1995, London. 34. Appendix ‘A’ to SHAEF/18216/Ops dated March 10, 1944, ‘‘Requirement for Military Wireless Activity,’’ in Document 10, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (B) FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ 1–3. 35. James Bowman, ‘‘Fortitude South: The Making of the Calais Hoax,’’ a 1,000 page manuscript and clippings file, Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans, part II, 2–7; Order of Battle, WO 219/2220; Wingate Report, Volume II, 396; Sc.CCR MS4/43878/2/ Ops dated March 26, 1944, from Col. R. Macleod, for Lt. Gen., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command to GHQ Home Forces, WO 199/1377, PRO; letter dated May 6, 1944, from Lt. Col. J. V.B. Jervis-Read, G-3 Division, SHAEF to Lt. Col. S.B. Horn, Exercise detachment, ‘A’ Headquarters, Scottish Command, WO 219/2220; Annexure I to Appendix ‘A’ to SHAEF/18216/Ops dated May 4, 1944, WO 219/2220; Appendix ‘A’ to SHAEF/18216/Ops dated March 10, 1944, ‘‘Requirement for Military Wireless Activity,’’ in Document 10, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE : (B) FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO;’ letter from Major R.F. Fleetwood-Hesketh, Ops B Sub-Section to Colonel H.N.H. Wild, Ops B Sub-Section, WO 219/2221, PRO; Hesketh, 64–66. 36. Breuer, 123. 37. Delmer, 119, 121. See also Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ 2, 5; Macleod, ‘‘A Short Story of the Deception, or ‘Cover’ Plan for the Normandy Campaign in 1944,’’ 1, 3, CAB 106/1122, PRO. 38. Wingate Report, Volume II, 393, 397. 39. ‘‘Air Plan for ‘Fortitude,’’’ AEAF/MS 695/Air Plans (First Draft for Head Planners), dated March 2, 1944, IRIS# 00206431, Call #505.61–21, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB; ‘‘Air Plan for ‘Fortitude,’’’ AEAF/MS 695/Air Plans (Fourth Draft), dated March 16, 1944, RG331, 370.2 Fortitude, NARA. 40. Ibid.

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41. Delmer, 118. 42. SC.C.C.R. MS4/438878/2/Ops. Letter from Macleod to J. V.B. Jervis-Read dated March 12, 1944, WO 219/2221, PRO. 43. ‘‘Cover Plan Fortitude: R.A.F. Visual Deception,’’ AIR 2/6022, Air Force Documents, PRO. 44. Colonel Turner’s Department, R.A.F. Monograph, 146. 45. Ibid., 146–47. 46. David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 308; Hesketh, 64–65, 74; Sexton, 112–13; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ 5; SHAEF/18216/1/3/Ops, letter from Major R.F. Fleetwood-Hesketh, Ops B Sub-Section to Colonel H.N. H. Wild, Ops B SubSection, dated April 30, 1944, WO 219/2221; Hesketh, 64–66. 47. Delmer, 131. 48. Wingate Report, Volume II, 383–89, 397; Leif Leifland, ‘‘Deception Plan Graffham and Sweden—Another View,’’ Intelligence and National Security 4 (1989): 296, 298; Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners: My Secret War (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 176–79; Mu¨ller, ‘‘A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War,’’ 316. 49. Wheatley, 176–79; Wingate Report, Volume II, 383–89; Leifland, 295–307, 309; Hesketh, 66–67, 78–79. 50. Wheatley, 180; Leifland, 310–12; Wingate Report, Volume II, 388–89. 51. Howard, 116–17; Sexton, 112; Delmer, 109–10, 113, 123–25; Kahn, 494. 52. F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume Four, Security and Counter-Intelligence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 239–40; Howard, 116. 53. Sexton, 112–13; Howard, 116–17. 54. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 151. 55. In The Counterfeit Spy, Sefton Delmer refers to this double agent as Paul, a Dutch staff officer. He does not give Paul’s real name. In Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), however, Anthony Cave Brown notes that Paul is another code name for Brutus, a Polish staff officer. Both accounts about how the staff officer became a double agent are virtually the same. It is possible that Delmer incorrectly identified Paul’s nationality. Because the evidence seems to suggest that Delmer and Brown are referring to the same person, I have used the code name Brutus. 56. Delmer, 109–12, 123–29, 131. See also Brown, Bodyguard of Lies. 57. Ibid., 128–29; Masterman, 146, 162. 58. Colonel Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ in Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM London, 2–4, 9. See also Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘A Short Story of the Deception, or ‘Cover,’ Plan for the Normandy Campaign in 1944,’’ in CAB 106/1122, PRO, 3–5, 9. 59. Revised Appendix A to SHAEF/18216/1/Ops dated March 1, 1944, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’ Requirement for Military Wireless Activity,’’ WO 219/2220; Notes from March 16, 1944, Conference, WO 219/2221. Changes in the wireless schedule also noted in Sc.C.C.R. MS4/ 43878/2/Ops, a letter from Macleod, dated March 23, 1944, WO 219/2221; SHAEF/

214

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18216/1/Ops dated March 23, 1944, ‘‘Notes on Decisions Made on the 21st and 22nd March, 1944 Regarding Wireless Program for Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ WO 219/2220. 60. Revised Apendix ‘A’ to SHAEF/18216/1/Ops dated March 1, 1944, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’ Requirement for Military Wireless Activity,’’ WO 219/2220; S/00/355/9/1/G(0) dated March 7, 1944, letter from Major General, General Staff, Home Forces to HQ Scottish Command, WO 219/2220; SHAEF Outgoing Message from ETOUSA signed Eisenhower to CG XV Corps to Haislip for Stickney, dated March 8, 1944, WO 219/2220; SHAEF/5656/1/Sigs, letter from Col. J.R. Ross, R Signals, Chief Security and RCM Sub-Section to SHAEF Signals Division, WO 219/2220. 61. Colonel Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landing,’’ 5. 62. Ibid., 5; Sc.C.C.R. MS4/43878/2/Ops dated 31 March 1944, letter from Colonel S.B. Horne to SHAEF and others, WO 219/2221; SHAEF/18216/1/Ops, dated March 23, 1944, ‘‘Notes on Decisions Made on the 21st and 22nd March 1944 Regarding Wireless Program for Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ WO 219/2220. 63. Wingate Report, Volume II, 395. 64. Ibid., 395–97. 65. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops dated March 23, 1944, ‘‘Notes on Decisions Made on the 21st and 22nd March 1944 Regarding Wireless Program for Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ WO 219/ 2220. 66. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops dated April 18, 1944, ‘‘Notes for Meeting Regarding Program for Forces Engaged in Plan ‘Fortitude’ (Scandinavia) for Period Y minus 15 to Y plus 28,’’ WO 219/2220; Letter dated April 28, 1944 from Lt. Col. J.V.B. Jervis-Read, GS, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section to SD 1, the War Office, attention Lt. Col. A.M. Field, WO 219/ 2220; Basic Program No. 3 (revision of Basic Program issued under Sc.C.C.R. MS4/43878/ 2/Ops dated March 23, 1944, from April 1, 1944), WO 219/2221; Sc.C.C.R. MS4/43878/ 2/Ops dated April 24, 1944, letter from Colonel R. Macleod, for Lt. Gen., Commandingin-Chief, Scottish Command to HQ 2 Corps, 7 Corps, 52 Div, WO 219/2221. 67. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ 5–6. 68. Ibid., 6. 69. Ibid., 6–10; ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (B) FORTITUDE NORTH, 23 February 1944, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO;’’ Wingate Report, Volume II, 541b. 70. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ 6; Document 15, ‘‘Informal Report by Special Plans Branch to Joint Security Control, 25 May 1945,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 1. 71. Eisenhower to Grigg, July 18, 1944, WO 219/2220. 72. Wingate Report, Volume II, 397–98. 73. Communication dated April 6, 1944 from the Japanese Naval Attache´, BERLIN, to KARIGANE, TOKYO, intercepted by the Allies. HW 1/2723, PRO; Communication dated May 16, 1944 from the Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, to the Foreign Minister, TOKYO, HW 1/2807, PRO. See also HW 1/2815 and Howard, 117. 74. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners: My Secret War (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 156. 75. Delmer, 134–35. 76. Howard, 117.

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77. Howard, 117; Kahn 502; Mu¨ller, 318, 321. 78. Appendix 15, ‘‘Extract from Interrogation of General JODL in 1946, on NORWAY,’’ in the Wingate Report, Volume II, DEFE 28/49. 79. Ibid. International Military Tribunal—Nuremberg, Volume XV, 376. 80. Ultra intercept dated March 22, 1944, CX/MSS/T131/23, DEFE 3/150, PRO. 81. General von Falkenhorst, 61–63; Sexton, 113, 138.

CHAPTER 4 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 1988), 49. 2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Norwalk, Connecticut: The Easton Press, 1948), 229–39; Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1977), 152; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 611–13, 625–31. For information on the Atlantic Wall, see Alan F. Wilt, The Atlantic Wall (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990); Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 153–54, 163–64. 3. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, GSI 21 Army Group Week Review No. 1, Based on Information Available to 0900 hrs 13 Feb. 44, in WO 205/532, The National Archives (PRO), London. 4. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 2, Based on Information Available to 0900 hrs 20 Feb. 44, in WO 205/532. 5. Eisenhower, 231; 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 2, Based on Information Available to 0900 hrs 20 Feb. 44, in WO 205/532; Montagu, 152; Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946), 152. 6. James Bowman, ‘‘Fortitude South: The Making of the Calais Hoax,’’ a 1,000 page manuscript and clippings file, Eisenhower Center, New Orleans, Louisiana, Part IV, 3–3; Major General J. J. M. Whiteley, ‘‘G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Build up against Operation Overlord,’’ SHAEF/2DX/INT, dated May 5, 1944, in WO 219/1836, PRO. 7. Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Pollock, Historical Section of the Cabinet, ‘‘OVERLORD PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 1940 to the ‘Touch Down,’’’ in CAB 44/242, PRO, 189– 90. 8. Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘R.A.F. Monograph (First Draft): Decoy and Deception,’’ Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, Ministry of Defence, London, 147; Ingersoll, 23. 9. Colonel Turner’s Department, 147–48. 10. William Baumer, speech given to CIA Group on May 15, 1986, Box 3, Baumer Papers, Hoover Institution, copyright Stanford University; Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 101–7; Part I, ‘‘Cover and Diversionary Plans,’’ by Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group and Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Air Force, N.J.C/00/261/33, BLM 102, Department of Documents, IWM London; Part I of ‘‘Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, dated May 16, 1944, in Document 11, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (C ) FORTITUDE SOUTH I, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing Co., Inc., 1989), 2; Overview to ‘‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude,’ Section II – Implementation, Combined Signal Board—Signal Security Committee,’’ in WO 219/2208, PRO; Mary Kathryn Barbier, ‘‘Deception and the Planning of D-Day,’’ in

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The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 172. 11. Hesketh, 87–88. 12. Ibid., 87–90. 13. Ibid., 89–90. 14. Ibid., 90; SHAEF/18216/Ops, dated 15 March 1944, letter from C.A. West, MGGS, DAC of S, G-3 to Headquarters, 21 Army Group, in WO 219/5187, PRO. 15. Hesketh, 90. 16. Ibid., 90–91; Extract from War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Meeting held on April 23, 1943, WO 219/527, PRO; COSSAC (43)3, memorandum from The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, dated May 8, 1943, in WO 219/527, PRO; Bowman, Part III, 4–12 and 4–13. 17. ‘‘Order of Battle for S.E. Force,’’ Appendix ‘A’ to Part I, MJC/00/261/33, in Document 11, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (C ) FORTITUDE SOUTH I,’’ Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO, Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion; SHAEF/(44)21 dated February 26, 1944, directive from W. B. Smith for the Supreme Commander to Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, in WO 219/1847, PRO; ‘‘Cover Plan, Fortitude (South),’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, in WO 205/173; ‘‘Cover and Diversionary Plans,’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, BLM 102, Department of Documents, IWM London; and ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Provisional Order of Battle (Pas de Calais),’’ WO 219/2217, PRO. 18. Colonel H.N.H. Wild, GS, Ops ‘B’ Sub-Section, letter dated April 4, 1944 to AC of S, G-3, in WO 219/2217, PRO; Brigadier-General A.S. Nevins, GSC, letter dated April 30, 1944; Appendix C to SHAEF/24113/4/SM/Ops dated May 11, 1944, WO 219/2217. 19. ‘‘Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, WO 205/173; ‘‘Cover and Diversionary Plans,’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, BLM 102, Department of Documents, IWM London. 20. Ibid.; Hesketh, 93; Barbier, 172. 21. Ibid; ‘‘Order of Battle for S.E. Force,’’ Appendix ‘A’ to Part I, NJC/00/261/33, WO 205/173; ‘‘Wireless Layout S.E. Force,’’ Appendix ‘B’ to Part I, NJC/00/261/33, BLM 102, Department of Documents, IWM London; Signal Section, HQ 12th Army Group, ‘‘Special Signal Operations in the United Kingdom,’’ RG 331, NARA. 22. ‘‘Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ WO 205/173; ‘‘Cover and Diversionary Plans,’’ BLM 102; Appendix ‘C’ to Part I of NJC/00/261/33, in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion; Hesketh, 93; Barbier, 172. 23. Barbier, 172–73. 24. ‘‘Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ WO 205/173; ‘‘Cover and Diversionary Plans,’’ BLM 102; Appendix ‘D’ to Part I—Fortitude (South)—Air Plan,’’ BLM 102, Department of Documents, IWM London; Hesketh, 93. 25. Barbier, 173. 26. Ibid. 27. ‘‘Appendix D to Part I—Fortitude (South) Air Plan,’’ NJC/00/261/33, WO 205/173. 28. Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, WO 205/173; ‘‘Night Lighting Installations,’’ Appendix ‘E’ to Part I, MJC/00/261/33, BLM 102, Department of Documents, IWM London; Hesketh, 93; Barbier, 173. 29. Tactical and Staff Duties Division, (Historical Section) Naval Staff, Admiralty, Battle Summary No. 39, Volume 1, ‘‘Operation ‘Neptune,’ Landings in Normandy, June, 1944,’’ ADM 234/366, 38.

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30. ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410, PRO. 31. Ibid; ‘‘Technical Information,’’ Appendix I to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; ‘‘Details of R.C.M. Equipment in H.D.M.L.,’’ Appendix II to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410. See also R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945 (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978), 288–91, 405, 411–12. 32. ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; ‘‘Technical Information,’’ Appendix I to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; William B. Breuer, The Secret War With Germany: Deception, Espionage and Dirty Tricks, 1939–1945 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), 213. 33. ‘‘Technical Information,’’ Appendix I to ‘‘Plan of Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410. 34. Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude, the Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 35. ‘‘Operation TAXABLE,’’ Annex ‘A’ to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; Air Historical Branch, R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft, Revised), ‘‘The Liberation of North West Europe,’’ Volume III—‘‘The Landings in Normandy,’’ AIR 41/24. 36. Dr. Alfred Price, former RAF air crew officer and air warfare historian, interview by Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude, the Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normany 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. See also ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’: The Plan, its Execution, and the Results,’’ from Headquarters, Bomber Command to Air Ministry, D.G. of S., D. of Tels., D. of Radar, D.D.I.4, A.D.I. (Sc), dated June 13, 1944, ADM 179/ 410. 37. ‘‘Operation GLIMMER,’’ Annex ‘B’ to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; Sir Robert Coburn, interview by Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude, the Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 38. ‘‘Operation BIGDRUM,’’ Annex ‘C’ to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operation,’’ ADM 179/410; Air Historical Branch, R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft, Revised), ‘‘The Liberation of North West Europe,’’ Volume III—‘‘The Landings in Normandy,’’ AIR 41/24, 8–9. 39. Air Historical Branch, R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft, Revised), ‘‘The Liberation of North West Europe,’’ Volume III—‘‘The Landings in Normandy,’’ AIR 41/24, 8–9. 40. ‘‘Diversionary Plans,’’ NJC/00/261/33, Covert Warfare. See also ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’: The Plan, its Execution and the Results,’’ dated June 13, 1944, from Headquarters, Bomber Command, to Air Ministry, D.G. of S., D. of Tels., D. of Radar, D.D.I.4., A.D.I. (Sc), ADM 179/410; Wingate, Volume II, 412; M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940–1944 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966), 386. 41. ‘‘Implementation and Allocation of Tasks,’’ Appendix ‘A’ to SHQ AEF (44) 13, dated January 30, 1944, WO 219/1847, PRO; Headquarters COSSAC, memorandum dated October 21, 1943, to all divisions, WO 219/527, PRO; ‘‘Movement and Administrative Preparations in the East and South-East,’’ Appendix ‘A’ to SHAEF/18301/4/Ops, dated February 9, 1944, WO 219/1847. See also ‘‘Notes for Meeting with Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff,’’ SHAEF/18200/Ops, dated April 1, 1944, WO 219/2204A, PRO.

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CHAPTER 5 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 1988), 50. 2. William Baumer, speech given to CIA Group, May 15, 1986, Box 3, Baumer Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, copyright Stanford University. 3. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Perennial Publishers, 1995), 593; SHAEF/18234/Ops, letter dated April 30, 1944, from Brigadier-General A.S. Nevins, GSC, Chief, Plans & Ops Section, to AC of S, G-3, WO 219/2217, PRO; Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 178. See also SHAEF/18234/Ops to Chief of Staff from Major-General H.R. Bull, GSC, AC of S, G-3, dated April 10, 1944; James Bowman, ‘‘Fortitude South: The Making of the Calais Hoax,’’ Part III, 4-12 and 4-13; Mary Kathryn Barbier, ‘‘Deception and the planning of D-Day,’’ in The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 173. 4. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 91–93. See also Bowman, Part III, 4-13 and ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (C ) FORTITUDE SOUTH I, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion. 5. ‘Fortitude’ (South), Appendix C to SHAEF/24112/4/SM/Ops, dated May 11, 1944, WO 219/2217; ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’ (‘Neptune’)—Allotment of Wireless Deception Units and Major Equipments,’’ Appendix ‘B’ to SHAEF (44) 21, dated February 26, 1944, WO 219/ 1847. 6. ‘‘Fortitude (Neptune) S/00/355/1/G(0),’’ Appendix H, to GOCs-in-C, South Eastern, Southern, Eastern Commands, and GSO.1 London District, dated March 26, 1944, WO 219/2210, PRO; Barbier, 173. 7. SHAEF/18216/Ops, letter from C.A. West, MGGS, DAC of S, G-3, to Headquarters, 21 Army Group, dated March 15, 1944, WO 219/1847; Sir Ronald Wingate, Volume II, 393–95, 398–401; Hesketh, 491–93. 8. Colonel D.J.C. Wiseman, The Second World War 1939–1945 Army: SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TYPES OF WARFARE, Volume III, Visual and Sonic Warfare (London: The War Office, 1953), 4. 9. Len Whittaker, Some Talk of Private Armies (England: Albanium Publishing, 1984), 72. 10. David I. Strangeways, interview recorded June 1996, tape no. 16755/6, IWM Sound Archive, London; Barbier, 174. 11. Wingate, Volume II, 393–95, 398, 537–38; Brigadier W.J. Jervois, The History of the Northamptonshire Regiment: 1934–1948 (England: The Regimental History Committee, 1953), 321–22; Wiseman, 84. 12. Jervois, 322; ‘‘Operation BIGBOBS,’’ SE/00/9/Ops, dated July 20, 1943, in WO 199/2629; SE/00/9/Ops, letter from Lieutenant Colonel C. E. H. Dolphin for Brigadier, General Staff, South Eastern Command, to East Kent District, dated April 6, 1944, in WO 199/2630; Wingate, Volume II, 538–39; Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Birdwood, The Worcestershire Regiment, 1922–1950 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1952), 225, 230–32. 13. Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude: The Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy, 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 14. SE/00/9/Ops, letter from Brigadier M.B. Dowse, General Staff, South Eastern Command, dated April 24, 1944, in WO 199/2630.

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15. Ibid.; Whittaker, 72; Hesketh, 82–83. 16. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, 113–15; Breuer, The Secret War with Germany, 233–35; Barbier, 174. 17. David I. Strangeways, interview recorded June 1996, tape no. 16755/6, IWM Sound Archive. 18. Camouflage Section & G(R) sheet 1, War Diary of G(R) Main HQ 21 Army Group, WO 171/3831, PRO; Bowman, Part IV, 6-12; 21 A Gp/00/70/G(R), directive from (signer unknown) for General, Commander in Chief, HQ 21 Army Group, to Headquarters, First Canadian Army, Second Army, Airborne Troops, 79 Armoured Division, GHQ Troops, Headquarters L of C (54 Division), dated March 25, 1944, in WO 219/ 2211, PRO. 19. 21 A Gp/00261/33/1/1/G(R ), from D.I. Strangeways, for Major General, Chief of Staff, to First Canadian Army (for Colonel Beament), Second Army, Eastern Command, South Eastern Command, 79 Armoured Division, HQ GHQ troops, dated May 6, 1944, in WO 199/2630. 20. Wingate, Volume II, 541d; Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 23; Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘RAF Monograph (First Draft): Decoy and Deception,’’ 148–51. See also Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘Instructions for Display Lights and Fires for Overlord,’’ dated April 20, 1944, AIR 2/6022. 21. Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘RAF Monograph (First Draft): Decoy and Deception,’’ 151–52; ‘‘Mobile Q.L. (Decoy Lighting)—Operations,’’ AIR 2/6017, PRO; Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, 114. 22. Minute Sheet, Air Ministry File No.—M.S.N.4, letter from Colonel Turner’s department to A.C.A.S.(G ), dated February 14, 1944, AIR 20/4259, PRO; Minute Sheet, Air Ministry File No.—T.S.N.3, Ops TAC/TS21/700, OP 11/14, letter from Colonel Turner’s department to A.C.A.S.(G ), dated March 21, 1944, AIR 20/4259; Personal Minute Sheet, Air Ministry File No.—T.S.N.3, letter from Colonel Turner’s department to A.C.A.S.(G ), dated May 16, 1944, AIR 20/4259. 23. Colonel John Turner, letter to Air Marshall Sir A. Coningham, dated May 19, 1944, AIR 2/6022; Colonel John Turner, letter to Flight Lieutenant A.P. Godfrey, No. 1 C and D Unit, dated May 23, 1944, AIR 2/6022. 24. David I. Strangeways, interview recorded June 1996, tape no. 16766/6, IWM Sound Archive. 25. War Diary of G(R ) Main HQ, 21 Army Group sheet 13 dated May 20, 1944 and sheet 13–14 dated May 21, 1944, WO 171/3832, PRO. 26. SHAEF/18234/Ops, letter from Brigadier-General, A.S. Nevins, GSC, Chief, Plans & Ops Section, to AC of S, G-3, dated April 30, 1944, WO 219/2217. 27. Ibid.; D’Este, 593–94; Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation GARGO: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II (New York: Random House, 1985), 147; Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 407–38. 28. The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 439–53; Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995) 593–94; Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 471–76; Chronological File, Patton Papers, Box 12, Folder 1, LC. See also Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Obolensky, 1964), 386–87, 400–422. 29. Letter from Colonel Harry A. Flint to Patton, dated February 8, 1944, Patton Papers, Box 28, Folder 7, Library of Congress.

220

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30. Letter from Patton to Major General Guy V. Henry, dated February 26, 1944, Patton Papers, Box 28, Folder 10, Library of Congress. 31. Diaries—annotated transcripts, Patton Papers, Box 3, Folder 4, Library of Congress. 32. The Patton Papers, 418, 421. 33. Joseph P. Hobbs, Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 160. 34. ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Wireless Deception,’’ Appendix ‘A’ to COSSAC/2355/Ops, dated December 9, 1943, WO 219/2208, PRO. 35. Ibid. 36. ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitide’ (‘Neptune’)—Allotment of Wireless Deception Units and Major Equipments,’’ Appendix ‘B’ to SHAEF (44) 21, dated February 26, 1944, WO 219/ 1847. 37. 32/Security/15 (Signals 9), including Appendix A, from the Director of Signals to SHAEF, dated February 1, 1944, WO 219/2207, PRO. 38. Ibid. 39. SHEAF/18201/5/Ops, request from C.A. West, Major-General for AC of S, G-3, to The Under Secretary of State, the War Office (D Sigs), dated February 22, 1944, WO 219/ 2207; SHAEF/18201/5/Ops, memorandum from C. A. West to Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, dated February 22, 1944, WO 219/2207; SHAEF/18201/5/Ops, memorandum from H.R. Bull, Major General, USA, AC of S, G-3, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, ETOUSA, dated January 27, 1944, WO 219/2207; Bowman, Part I, 1-12, 1-13, 5-9, 5-10; Bryan Bowman, letter to author dated January 31, 1995. See also 32/Security/15 (Signals 9), from L.G. Phillips, Major-General, Director of Signals to Headquarters, 21 Army Group, dated February 29, 1944, WO 219/2207. 40. Bowman, Part I, 6-3, 6-5, 6-6. 41. Ibid., Part II, 7-4, 7-7; SHAEF/18201/5/Ops, memorandum from H.R. Bull, Major General, USA, AC of S, G-3, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, ETOUSA, dated January 27, 1944, WO 219/2207. 42. Signal Section H Q 12th Army Group, ‘‘Special Signal Operations in the United Kingdom,’’ RG 331, E 199, Box 108, NARA. 43. Ibid. 44. Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Section II—Implementation, Combined Signal Board —Signal Security Committee,’’ WO 219/2208, PRO; ‘‘Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ N.J.C./00/261/33, in Document 11, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (C ) FORTITUDE SOUTH II, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ Covert Warfare. 45. Brigadier General A.S. Nevins, USA, Chief, Plans and Ops Section to AC of S, G-3, SHAEF/18201/5/Ops, dated March 15, 1944, WO 219/2207. 46. 21 A Gp/00/261/33/1/G(R ), directive signed by the Lieutenant Colonel GS for General, Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, to SHAEF (G-3 Division), ETOUSA, FUSAG, Third US Army, First Canadian Army, dated April 15, 1944, WO 219/2207. 47. Signal Section HQ 12th Army Group, ‘‘Special Signal Operations in the United Kingdom,’’ RG 331, NARA. 48. Wingate, Volume II, 407; Howard, 121. 49. Signal Section HQ 12th Army Group, ‘‘Special Signal Operations in the United Kingdom,’’ RG 331, E 199, Box 108, NARA. 50. 21 Agp/00/26/1/8/G(R ), D.I. Strangeways to First Canadian Army, Second Army, 5 Wireless Group, SO in C 21 Army Group, dated May 9, 1944, WO 219/2207. 51. Ibid.

NOTES

221

52. Hesketh, 53–56; Pujol and West, 59–61; Howard, 121, 125, 234; J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 160; F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 4, Security and Counter-Intelligence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 240–42; Pujol and West, 59–60; KV 2/61 PRO. 53. Hesketh, 55–56, 96, 130n, 185n, 187; Masterman, 161; Hinsley and Simkins, 241–42. 54. Popov, 224; Barbier, 175. 55. Breuer, The Secret War with Germany, 83; Brown, 481, 487–89; Hinsley and Simkins, 238–39. 56. Hesketh, 106–15; Popov, 246–49. 57. Masterman, 155; Hinsley and Simkins, 238–39; Hesketh, 106–15; Popov, 246–49; Pujol and West, 121–23. 58. Hesketh, 53; Hinsley and Simkins, 238–39; Pujol and West, 146; Howard, 84. 59. Howard, 115–17, 121, 131, 234; Hinsley and Simkins, 239; Pujol and West, 146–47; Hesketh, 125–30. 60. GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), 62, 293–94; Hesketh, 47; Pujol and West, x–xi; 68–69, 94–95; Howard, 231–32; Hesketh, 47–49. 61. Pujol and West, x–xi, 94–95, 97–98, 100, 104, 108; Howard, 231–32; Hesketh, 51–52; GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 96–7, 295–98. 62. GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 15, 21, 60, 84, 107, 126–27, 299–307; Pujol and West, 97–98, 110; Howard, 232; Hesketh, 47–49, 134, 147–48; Hinsley and Simkins, 225. 63. GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 84, 92, 308–12; Pujol and West, x–xi, 100–102; Howard 232–33; Hesketh, 49; Hinsley and Simkins, 225–26. 64. Howard, 233–34; Pujol and West, x–xi, 98, 102–3, 106–7, 110–14; Hesketh, 50–51; GARBO:The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 60, 97–98, 106, 110, 313–17. 65. GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 118, 318–23; Pujol and West, x–xi, 102–3, 108, 110–14; Hesketh, 50–51, 94–95; Howard, 233–34; Wingate, Volume II, 399–400. 66. GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 174–83, 324–26; Pujol and West, x–xi, 111–12, 120, 125–26; Hesketh, 50–51, 94–95; Howard, 116–17; Hinsley and Simkins, 225–26, 239–40. 67. Pujol and West, 119–21; Hesketh, 94–95, 131–32, 135–36. 68. Pujol and West, 123–24; Hesketh, 97–100, 135–37. 69. Pujol and West, 124–25; Hesketh, 135–38. 70. GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 324–25; Pujol and West, 125–29; Hesketh, 131–34. 71. Hesketh, 133. 72. Ibid., 99–100. 73. Ibid., 135–36; ‘‘Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Section II—Implementation— Exercise ‘Fabius,’’’ WO 219/2216; Tactical and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, B.R. 1736 (42)(1), Battle Summary No. 39, Volume I, ‘‘Operation ‘Neptune’ Landings in Normandy June, 1944,’’ 63, in ADM 234/366, PRO. 74. Tactical and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, B.R. 1736 (42)(1), Battle Summary No. 39, Volume I, ‘‘Operation ‘Neptune’ Landings in Normandy June 1944,’’ 63–64; J.R.A. Segmann, S.O.P.(C ), ‘‘Notes on Naval meeting to discuss rehearsal before OVERLORD,’’ dated February 29, 1944, in WO 219/2216, PRO.

222

NOTES

75. B.R. 1736 (42)(1), Battle Summary No. 39, 64–65. 76. Ibid., 66–67; Segmann, ‘‘Notes on Naval meeting to discuss rehearsal before OVERLORD,’’ dated February 29, WO 219/2216; SHAEF/18231/Ops, ‘‘Appreciation of the Treatment of Exercise ‘Fabius’ 3rd–5th May, 1944,’’ dated March 18, 1944, in WO 219/2216. 77. SHAEF/18231/Ops, ‘‘Appreciation of the Treatment of Exercise ‘Fabius’ 3rd–5th May, 1944,’’ dated March 18, 1944, in WO 219/2216. 78. Hesketh, 121–22. 79. Pujol and West, 129; Barbier, 175. 80. Ibid., 129–31; Hesketh, 138–40; GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 192–98; Barbier, 175. 81. Pujol and West, 130. 82. Ibid., 130–32; Howard, 128, Hesketh, 139–42; Bowman, Part IV, 6-4, 6-5, 6-7; Barbier, 175–76. 83. Bowman, Part IV, 7-1, 7-3, 7-11 through 7-15; 8-1, 8-3 through 8-6.

CHAPTER 6 1. Message sent by Garbo to Madrid on D + 1, Garbo: The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), 204. 2. Tactical and Staff Duties Division, (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, Battle Summary No. 39, Volume 1, ‘‘Operation ‘Neptune,’ Landings in Normandy, June, 1944,’’ ADM 234/366, 38, PRO. 3. ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410, PRO; ‘‘Diversionary Plans,’’ NJC/00/261/33, Document 13—‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (E) Diversionary Plan, Summary and Results, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989). 4. ‘‘Operation TAXABLE,’’ Annex ‘A’ to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410. See also ‘‘Diversionary Plans,’’ NJC/00/261/33, Document 13, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (E) Diversionary Plan, Summary and Results, exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ Covert Warfare; Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude: The Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 5. Ibid.; ‘‘Operation GLIMMER,’’ Annex ‘B’ to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410. See also ‘‘Diversionary Plans,’’ NJC/00/261/33, Covert Warfare. 6. ‘‘Operation BIGDRUM,’’ Annex ‘C’ to ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; Air Historical Branch, R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft, Revised), ‘‘The Liberation of North West Europe,’’ Volume III, ‘‘The Landings in Normandy,’’ AIR 41/24, 8–9. See also ‘‘Diversionary Operations,’’ NJJC/00/261/33, Covert Warfare. 7. Rear Admiral D.P. Moon, U.S. Navy, Commander Assault Force ‘U,’ ‘‘Operation Order No. 4-44,’’ dated May 26, 1944, File No. 2G11Phib/A16-3(3), ADM 179/410; ‘‘Annex ABLE to Operation Order No. 4-44,’’ dated May 26, 1944, ADM 179/410. 8. ‘‘Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 4-44,’’ dated May 26, 1944, ADM 179/410; Rear Admiral D.P. Moon, U.S. Navy, Commander Assault Force ‘U,’ ‘‘Operation Order No. 4-44,’’ dated May 26, 1944, File No. 2G11 Phib/A16-3(3), ADM 179/410. 9. Rear Admiral D.P. Moon, U.S. Navy, Commander Assault Force ‘U,’ ‘‘Operation Order No. 4-44,’’ dated May 26, 1944, File No. 2G11 Phib/A16-3(3), ADM 179/410.

NOTES

223

10. Lieutenant Commander, Officer-in-Charge, Mobile Deception Units, ‘‘Order No. CLH/A.123/44,’’ to C.O. Naval Party 1666 at ANCXF Headquarters, dated May 27, 1944, WO 219/2214. 11. Cox, Officer-in-Charge, Mobile Wireless Deception Units, ‘‘Wireless Contributions to Diversions ‘Taxable’ and ‘Glimmer’ 6th June 1944,’’ dated June 15, 1944, Reference: CLH/ A.135.44, WO 219/2214. 12. Cox, Signal Officer (Security), Staff of ANCXF, ‘‘Summary Report on Wireless Measures Taken to Ensure Tactical and Strategic Surprise in Operation ‘Neptune,’’’ dated June 11, 1944, Reference: CLH/A.123.44, WO 219/2214. 13. Headquarters, Bomber Command, ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’—The PLAN, its EXECUTION and the RESULTS,’’ document dated June 13, 1944, and sent to Air Ministry, D.G. of S., D. of Tels., D. of Radar, D.D.I.4., and A.D.I. (Sc), ADM 179/410. 14. Acting Commander R.N., Senior Officer Naval Party 1666, ‘‘Report on Operations Taxable – Glimmer – Bigdrum,’’ dated 14 June 1944, ADM 179/410. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid.; Headquarters, Bomber Command, ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’ – The PLAN, its EXECUTION, and the RESULTS,’’ document dated 13 June 1944 and sent to Air Ministry, D.G. of S., D. of Tels., D. of Radar, D.D.I.4., and A.D.I. (Sc), ADM 179/410. 17. Acting Commander, R.N., Senior Officer Naval Party 1666, ‘‘Report on Operations Taxable—Glimmer—Bigdrum,’’ dated June 14, 1944, ADM 179/410; Lieutenant Commander W. Rankin, R.N.V.R., Appendix II, ‘‘Report on Operation Glimmer,’’ dated June 14, 1944, ADM 179/410. 18. Lieutenant Commander W. Rankin, R.N.V.R., Appendix II, ‘‘Report on Operation Glimmer,’’ dated June 14, 1944, ADM 179/410. 19. Ibid., Acting Commander R.N., Senior Officer Naval Party 1666, ‘‘Report on Operations Taxable—Glimmer—Bigdrum,’’ dated June 14, 1944, ADM 179/410. 20. Headquarters, Bomber Command, ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’—The PLAN, its EXECUTION, and the RESULTS,’’ dated June 13, 1944, ADM 179/410. 21. ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410; Acting Commander R.N., Senior Officer Naval Party 1666, ‘‘Report on Operations TAXABLE— GLIMMER—BIGDRUM,’’ dated June 14, 1944, ADM 179/410; Lieutenant Commander H. Nees, R.N.Z.N.V.R., Appendix III, ‘‘Report on Operation Big Drum,’’ ADM 179/410. 22. Ibid.; ‘‘Operation Neptune—Diversionary Operations,’’ ADM 179/410. 23. ‘‘Diversionary Plans,’’ NJC/00/261/33, Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989); Sir Ronald Wingate, ‘‘Historical Record of Deception in the War against Germany & Italy,’’ Volume II, DEFE 28/49, 412, PRO; Headquarters, Bomber Command, ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’—The PLAN, its EXECUTION, and the RESULTS,’’ dated June 13, 1944, and sent to Air Ministry, D.G. of S., D. of Tels., D. of Radar, D.D.I.4., and A.D.I. (Sc), ADM 179/410; M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940–1944 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966), 386. 24. Headquarters, Bomber Command, ‘‘R.C.M. for ‘Overlord’—The PLAN, its EXECUTION, and the RESULTS,’’ dated June 13, 1944, and sent to Air Ministry, D.G. of S., D. of Tels., D. of Radar, D.D.I.4., and A.D.I. (Sc), ADM 179/410. 25. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 77; Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day, June 6, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 145–53.

224

NOTES

26. Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 27. Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1990), 14, 121, 125, 223–30; Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 54–55; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 352–53; F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume Four, Security and Counter-Intelligence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 242. 28. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 161, 183–85; Kahn, 352; Howard, 14, 121, 125; Hesketh, 54–55; Hinsley and Simkins, 242. 29. E. Montagu, N.I.D. 12, Appendix D, Twenty Committee, dated June 8, 1944, ‘‘Naval Deception,’’ Volume 3, ADM 223/794, PRO; Masterman, 184–85; Kahn, 352; Hinsley and Simkins, 242. 30. Dusko Popov, Spy/Counterspy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974) 246–49; Masterman, 59, 83, 152–55; Howard, 16–18, 121; Hesketh, 53–54; E. Montagu, N.I.D. 12, Twenty Committee, dated August 18, 1944, ‘‘Naval Deception,’’ Volume 3, ADM 223/ 794. 31. Howard, 77, 121, 131; Masterman, 140–42, 148–49, 155–56; Hesketh, 53, 63–64, 125–30, 303–11. 32. Hesketh, 125–29. 33. Howard, 18–20, 189; Masterman, 115–17, 142–43, 147–49; Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II (New York: Random House, 1985), 44–114; Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude’’; Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson of London, 1971), 51–83. 34. Pujol and West, 129–32; Hesketh, 137–43; Howard, 128; Delmer, 179–80. 35. Pujol and West, 137–38; Hesketh, 141–45; Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude.’’ 36. Pujol and West, 138–39; Hesketh, 143–47; Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude.’’ 37. E. Montagu, N.I.D. 12, Twenty Committee, dated June 8, 1944, ‘‘Naval Deception,’’ Volume 3, ADM 223/794; Hesketh, 141–47; Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude.’’ 38. Pujol and West, 143–44; Wingate, Volume II, 401, Appendix B; Hesketh, 209; Howard, 188–89. 39. Wingate, Volume II, 401; Pujol and West, 144–45. 40. Pujol and West, 147–51; Howard, 189; E. Montagu, N.I.D. 12, Twenty Committee, dated June 23, 1944, ‘‘Naval Deception,’’ Volume 3, ADM 223/794. 41. ADE/SAC/P1/195, dated June 3, 1944, from Brigadier, SF Liaison Detachment, SHAEF, to Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, SFHQ, WO 219/2213, PRO. 42. SHAEF/17240/17/Ops(A), dated June 8, 1944, from J. F. M. Whiteley, Major General, GS, DAC of S, G-3 to Special Force Headquarters, WO 219/2213. 43. 21 A Gp/00/261/22/G( R), dated June 10, 1944, signed Temple, Major for General, Commander-in-Chief, to SHAEF (Ops B Sub Section) (For attention of Lt-Col Jervis-Read), WO 219/2213. 44. ADM/0/3, dated June 10, 1944, from SFHQ, to Brigadier E. C. W. Myers, CBE, DSO—OC No. 3 SF Det., WO 219/2213. 45. SHAEF/18202/6/Ops(B), dated June 22, 1944, from General H.R. Bull to SFHQ, WO 219/2213; SHAEF/18202/6/Ops(B), dated July 29, 1944, WO 219/2213. 46. J.H. Bevan, ‘‘War Cabinet—London Controlling Section—Present Position Regarding European Deception Plans,’’ L.C.S.(44)19, dated July 11, 1944, CAB 81/78, PRO.

NOTES

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47. J.H. Bevan, Controlling Officer, ‘‘War Cabinet—London Controlling Section—Plan ‘Bodyguard,’’’ L.C.S.(44)24 (Final), dated August 22, 1944, CAB 81/78. 48. Wingate, Volume II, 403. 49. Hesketh, 149–50; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘A Short Story of The Deception, or ‘Cover,’ Plan for the Normandy Campaign in 1944,’’ CAB 106/1122; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ Colonel Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM London. 50. Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM London; S/00/355/9/1/G(O), dated May 24, 1944, Col. G S for Major-General, General Staff, Home Forces, to Headquarters, Eastern Command, Scottish Command, South Eastern Command, WO 219/2221, PRO; Sc.CCR MS4/438/78/2/Ops, dated May 30, 1944, from R. Macleod Colonel for Lieutenant-General, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command, to HQ 2 Corps (who will infm 58 Div and 113 Inf Bde), 7 Corps, XV U.S. Corps, 52 Div, 55 Div (Adv), WO 219/2221; Hesketh, 149–52, 217–18. 51. Hesketh, 149–51. See also SHAEF incoming message dated June 2, 1944, from EXFOR (G( R)) to SCOTCO (for exercise DET B), SHAEF (for Col. Jervis-Read, G-3 Div), GHQ Home Forces, SCOTCO (for DETA), WO 219/2223, PRO; S/00/355/9/I/G(O), dated June 2, 1944, from Ashley Bramall for Major-General, General Staff, Home Forces, to Headquarters, Northern Command, WO 199/1377, PRO; Sc.CCR MS4/43878/2/Ops dated May 30, 1944, from Colonel R. Macleod for Lieutenant-General, General Officer Commanding-inChief, Scottish Command, to HQ 2 Corps, 7 Corps, XV US Corps, 52 Div, 55 Div (Adv), WO 219/2221; Sc.CCR MS4/43878/2/Ops dated June 2, 1944, from Lt-Col S. B. Horn, for Lieutenant-General, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command, to HQ 2 Corps, 7 Corps, XV U.S. Corps, 55 Div (Adv), WO 219/2221; ‘‘Notes for Major Bowles on Moves of 2nd Corps,’’ SHAEF/18216/Ops(B), dated June 5, 1944, WO 219/2223. 52. Sc.CCR MS4/43878/2/Ops dated June 6, 1944, letter from Colonel R. Macleod to Lt. Col. J.V.B. Jervis-Read, SHAEF, WO 219/2221. 53. Ibid. 54. SHAEF/18216/1/3/Ops(B), dated June 12, 1944, letter from Lt-Col J. V. B. Jervis-Read, G-3 Division, SHAEF, to Col. R. Macleod, Headquarters, Scottish Command Exercise Detachment ‘A,’ WO 219/2221. 55. Sc.C.C.R. MS4/43878/2/Ops, dated June 14, 1944, letter from Colonel R. Macleod to Lt. Col. J.V.B. Jervis-Read, SHAEF, WO 219/2221. 56. ‘‘Quicksilver II,’’ dated June 6, 1944, minutes from meeting held at main HQ 21 Army Group at 1430 hrs. 5 June, and Appendix A, ‘‘Order of Battle for S.E. Force—after 6 June 1944,’’ WO 219/2223; 21 Agp/00/261/33/1 G( R), dated June 8, 1944, signed Temple for Major General, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, WO 171/3832. See also 21 Agp/00/261/ 33/1/G( R), dated June 8, 1944, ‘‘Quicksilver II (Tweezer),’’ Appendix A to ‘‘Quicksilver II (Tweezer)—Move of 2 Corps and Wireless Programme,’’ and Appendix B to ‘‘Quicksilver II (Tweezer)’’ 21 Agp/00/261/33/G( R), Order of Battle for S E Force, WO/219/2223. 57. Hesketh, 218–19; 21 A GP/00/261/33/1/G( R), dated June 11, 1944, ‘‘X Airborne Div,’’ WO 219/2223; Pujol and West, 148–50. 58. Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM London.

226

NOTES

59. Hesketh, 223; Undated cipher message from EXFOR (G-4)—HOFOR (for Col Drew) ETOUSA (Special Plans Section) Main 2 Brit Corps (for Lt Col Rumsay) 5 Wireless GP to SHAEF (for A C of S G-3 Div), WO 199/1377; SHAEF incoming message dated June 23, 1944, from EXFOR G to HOFOR (for Col Drew), ETOUSA (Special Plans Section), Main 2 Brit Corps Adv (for Lt Col Rumsay), 5 Wireless Gp, WO 219/2223. 60. Hesketh, 151–54; SHAEF/18201/5/2/Ops(B), dated June 23, 1944, note from SHAEF, signed Eisenhower, to SCOTCO Exercise Detachment ‘A,’ ETOUSA G-3, Special Plans, WO 219/309; Note dated June 25, 1944, from Lee to for action TUSA, for info XV Corps, 5th Inf Div, 8th Inf Div, WO 219/209; Undated cipher message from SHAEF signed Eisenhower to SCOTCO Exercise detachment ‘A,’ ETOUSA G-3 Special Plans, Lt-Comdr Cox Admiralty—Staff ANCXF—Troopers (MO2) (Sigs9)—Staff Air C-in-C, AEAF—G/R EXFOR—G(O) HOFOR, WO 199/1377; Undated message from HOFOR to SECO (BGS (Ops)), SCOTCO for Ex Det A (Col. Macleod), SHAEF G3 (Ops)B (Lt-Col Jervis-Read), EXFOR G( R) (Lt-Col Strangeways), Broadness 1 (Lt-Col Merton), SCOTCO (BGS (Ops)), WO 199/1377; S/00/355/9/1/G(O), dated June 29, 1944, from Major-General, General Staff, Home Forces to Headquarters, South Eastern Command, WO 199/1377; SHAEF incoming message dated 26 June 1944, from HOFOR to SCOTCO for Ex Det A Col Macleod, SHAEF G3 (Ops)B Lt Col Jervis-Read, EXFOR G(R ) Lt. Col. Strangeways, Broadness One Lt. Col. Merton, SCOTCO BGS (Ops), WO 219/2223; 20/ Sigs/980(SD1), dated July 25, 1944, Top Secret Memorandum from Major-General Gainbridge (or Sainbridge), Director of Staff Duties, WO 21/2233; SHAEF/18216/1/Ops (B), dated July 31, 1944, from Brigadier-General A.S. Nevins, GSC, Chief, Ops Section, to SD 1, the War Office, WO 219/2233; R. Macleod, Colonel, Comd, Fourth Army Det., ‘‘Fortitude South II,’’ including Appendices 1–7, G(O)/1523, dated July 11, 1944, WO 219/2229, PRO. 61. Overview to ‘‘Plan Fortitude—Section II—Implementation—Fortitude North II (Scandinavia),’’ WO 219/2222, PRO; SHAEF/18240/Ops(B), dated July 10, 1944, from Lt-Col J. V. B. Jervis-Read, GS, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, to Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, WO 219/2222; SHAEF 18252/Ops(B), dated July 27, 1944, from Colonel H.N.H. Wild, GS, Chief of Ops B Sub-Section, to Staff of Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, (Commander A.N. Finter, RN), WO 219/2222; SHAEF incoming message dated October 1, 1944, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF Main for Eisenhower, SHAEF FWD, HQ Com Zone ETO, MAAF for Wilson, WO 219/2222; SHAEF incoming message dated October 4, 1944, from SHAEF Forward signed Eisenhower, to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, WO 219/2222. 62. Lt-Col D. I. Strangeways, GSO 1, ‘‘Review of G(R ) Activity and Future Policy,’’ 21 A Gp/00/272/2/G(R), dated June 8, 1944, WO 171/3832. 63. J. F. M. Whiteley, Major-General, AC of S, G-3, memorandum to Chief of Staff, dated June 11, 1944, WO 219/309; Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Fortitude South II— Section I—Preparation,’’ WO 219/2223, PRO; Hesketh, 241–52. 64. ‘‘Draft Stage—Post (D Day) ‘Overlord’ Planning Cover and Deception Operation,’’ SHAEF/18236/1/Ops(B), dated June 14, 1944, WO 219/2224; ‘‘New ‘Fortitude’ Regrouping—Case I,’’ Appendix—Case I to SHAEF/18236/1/Ops(B), dated June 14, 1944, WO 219/2224; ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude II,’’’ SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B), dated June 22, 1944, WO 219/ 1847, PRO; Annexure ‘A’ to SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B), dated June 22, 1944, WO 219/ 1847; ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude II,’’’ SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B) (Third Draft), dated June 23, 1944, WO 219/1847; ‘‘Plan Fortitude South II,’’ SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B) (Fifth Draft), dated June 27, 1944, WO 219/2224; ‘‘Outline Plan ‘Fortitude/South II,’’’ SHAEF/18236/3/Ops

NOTES

227

(B), dated June 29, 1944, WO 219/2224; ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ SHAEF/18250/Ops (B), dated July 19, 1944, WO 219/1847; Hesketh, 241–48. 65. Hesketh, 241–43; 21 A.Gp/00/272/G( R), dated June 28, 1944, from General, Commander-in-Chief to SHAEF (A C of S, G-3 Div), WO 219/2224; ‘‘Fortitude South, Part II,’’ G(R ) War/Diary/oppsc ‘‘T,’’ WO 219/5187; SHAEF/17100/5/Ops(A), from Lieutenant General W.B. Smith, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, to Lieutenant General O.N. Bradley, USA, WO 219/2217, PRO; Wingate, Volume II, 403–4; Bowman, Part V, 7-3 and 7-4, Part VII, 1-6; SHAEF Outgoing Message, dated July 6, 1944, from Eisenhower, to AGWAR for Marshall, Bowman clippings file; Pujol and West, 163; Lt.-Col. D.I. Strangeways, GSO 1, ‘‘Notes on Redesignating of FUSAG,’’ dated July 2, 1944, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/ 2226, PRO. 66. ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (D) FORTITUDE SOUTH II, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing Co., Inc., 1989), 1; Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 19, 1944, WO 219/1847. See also Appendix VI, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ Hesketh, 412–18; Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Pollock, DSO, Historical Section of the Cabinet, Section D, Chapter I—‘‘Overlord: Plans and Preparations, 1940 to the ‘Touch Down,’’’ CAB 44/242, PRO. 67. ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 19, 1944, WO 219/ 1847; Appendix VI, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ Hesketh, 412–18; ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (D) FORTITUDE SOUTH II, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report ETO,’’ Covert Warfare; Overview to ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Fortitude South II—Section II—Implementation Wireless Plan,’’ WO 219/2227, PRO; SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 13, 1944, from Major General H.R. Bull, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/309. 68. Appendix VI, ‘‘Plan Fortitude South II,’’Hesketh, 412–18; Colonel William A. Harris, GSC, Chief, Special Plans Branch to Headquarters, SHAEF (Ops B), dated 11 July 1944, WO 219/2227; Lt-Col Olen J. Seaman, Inf, Chairman, ‘‘Minutes of Meeting Held 6 July,’’ dated July 11, 1944, WO 219/2227. 69. Appendix VII, ‘‘Fortitude South II—Outline Plan for Special Means,’’ Hesketh, 419–28; Bowman, Part VII, 1-7, 1-8. 70. ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 19, 1944, WO 219/ 1847; Appendix VI, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ Hesketh, 412–18; ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B) (Third Draft), June 23, 1944, WO 219/1847; J.H. Bevan, ‘‘War Cabinet—London Controlling Section—Present Position Regarding European Deception Plans,’’ L.C.S.(44)19, dated July 1944, CAB 81/78. 71. Hesketh, 241–47; Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), 613, 626; Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: Harper Perennial, 1983), 308; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 271. 72. SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 26, 1944, from Major General H.R. Bull to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2217. 73. SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 30 from Major General H. R. Bull to Chief of Staff, AGWAR for Marshall, Bowman clippings file; SHAEF/18236/3, from H. R. Bull, Major-General, G.S.C., A.C. of S., G-3, to Chief of Staff, dated July 6, 1944, WO 219/ 2226. 74. SHAEF Incoming Message, dated July 9, 1944, from AGWAR signed General Marshall, to SHAEF for General Eisenhower, SHAEF 218/09, WO 219/2226; SHAEF Outgoing Message, dated July 10, 1944, from SHAEF Forward, signed Eisenhower, to AGWAR

228

NOTES

for General Marshall, WO 219/2226; SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B), dated July 12, 1944, from J.V.B. Jervis-Read, Lt-Col, GS, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, to Chief, Ops Section, WO 219/2226; Hesketh, 247–51; Bradley and Blair, 271. 75. SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 1944, from H. R. Bull, Major-General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2226; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Norwalk, Connecticut: The Easton Press, 1948), 272; Howard, 192; D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 337–51, 400–407; D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, 621. 76. D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, 621; SHAEF.18234/Ops(B), dated July 26, 1944, from H. N. H. Wild, Colonel, GS, Chief, Ops B, to Chief, Ops Section, WO 219/2226; Brigadier General A.S. Nevins, GSC, Chief Ops Section, letter dated July 26, 1944, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2226; SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 1944, from H.R. Bull, MajorGeneral, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2226; G(R ) War Diary Appendix G, 21 A Gp/00/272/2/G(R ), dated July 27, 1944, signed Temple for Col GS to Chief of Staff, WO 171/3831, PRO; Hesketh, 269–70; SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 27, 1944, from H.R. Bull, Major-General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of PR Division, WO 219/2226; Pujol and West, 163. 77. SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 26, 1944, from H.N.H. Wild, Colonel, GS, Chief, Ops B, to Chief, Ops Section; Hesketh, 269–70. 78. SHAEF Message, dated July 26, 1944, from SHAEF FWD to AGWAR, ref no: FWD 12466, WO 219/2226; SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 27, 1944, from H.R. Bull, Major General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of PR Division, WO 219/2226; Hesketh, 270. 79. SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated August 1, 1944, from H.R. Bull, Major General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2226. 80. SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated July 30, from F.W. Barnes, Lt-Col, Cav, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, to Chief, Ops Section, WO 219/2226; Eisenhower, cable, dated August 1, 1944, sent to General Marshall eyes only, WO 219/2226; SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated August 4, 1944, from H. R. Bull, Major General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2226; SHAEF/18234/Ops(B), dated August 8, 1944, from H. R. Bull, Major General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Chief of Staff, WO 219/2217; Hesketh, 269–71; Colonel H.N.H. Wild, letter dated September 23, 1944, to Lt-Gen J.L. DeWitt, Army and Navy Staff College, WO 219/2226. 81. Pollock, ‘‘Overlord: Plans and Preparations,’’ CAB 44/242; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM London. 82. Hesketh, 253–59; Pujol and West, 152–58; Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson & London, 1971), 205–10. 83. Pujol and West, 154. 84. Pujol and West, 154–56; Hesketh, 255–57, 264–68; Garbo: The Spy Who Saved DDay, 208–9. 85. Hesketh, 255–59, 264–68; Pujol and West, 157–59; Garbo: The Spy Who Saved DDay, 208–9. 86. Hesketh, 264–68. 87. Ibid., 266–68; Appendix 14, Wingate, Volume II. 88. Pujol and West, 127–28, 159–63; Hesketh, 271–76; Garbo: The Spy Who Saved DDay, 222–25, 261–62. 89. Ibid. 90. Pujol and West, 163–66; Hesketh, 279–83. 91. Pujol and West, 165–66; Garbo: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, 231–32.

NOTES

229

92. Cover Plan Fortitude—R.A.F. Visual Deception,’’ AIR 2/6022, PRO. 93. T.S.N.3., dated July 26, 1944, from Colonel Turner’s Department to A.C.A.S. (G), AIR 2/6022; T.S.N.3., dated August 14, 1944, from Colonel Sir John Turner to A.C.A.S. (G), AIR 2/6022; Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘RAF Monograph (First Draft)—Decoy and Deception,’’ Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, Ministry of Defence, 152–56. 94. Colonel David Strangeways for Major General, C of S, letter dated July 2, 1944 to Air Ministry, Colonel Turner’s Department, AIR 2/6022; T.S.N.3/II Wing Commander W. Ridley, Section III, Colonel Turner’s Department, letter dated June 29, 1944, to Headquarters, 21 Army Group, AIR 2/6022. 95. Appendix to SHAEF/18250/7/Ops(B), dated July 16, 1944, WO 219/2232, PRO. See also A. S. Nevins, Brigadier-General, GSC, Chief, Ops Section, letter dated July 24, 1944, to Air Ministry (Colonel Sir John Turner’s Department), AIR 2/6022. 96. M/LD004660/44, dated July 31, 1944, from John Higham, to the Commander-inChief, the Nore, and the Flag Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, WO 219/2232; John Higham, letter dated July 31, 1944, to the Commander-in-Chief, the Nore, and the Flag Officer-inChief, Harwich, AIR 2/6022. 97. For discussions of C & D units on the Normandy beaches and beach exits (Operation Paradise), see T.S.N.3., dated July 6, 1944, from Colonel Turner to A.C.A.S.(G), AIR 2/6022; T.S.N.3., dated August 14, 1944, from Colonel Sir John Turner to A.C.A.S.(G), AIR 2/6022; T.S.N.3., dated December 5, 1944, from Colonel Sir John Turner, to A.C.A.S.(G), AIR 2/ 6022; T.S.N.3., dated January 5, 1945 from Colonel Sir John Turner, to John H. Bevan, AIR 2/6022; ‘‘Part III, Cover Plan—Fortitude (South),’’ NJC/00/261/33, dated May 18, 1944, WO 205/173; ‘‘Part III—Decoy Lighting of Western Beaches and Beach Exits,’’ NJC/ 00/261/33, dated May 18, 1944, signed by Admiral Ramsey, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force; General Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group; and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, Commander-in-Chief, AEAF, WO 219/2223. 98. 21 A Gp/00/261/33/1/1/G(R ), dated June 2, 1944, signed Temple for Comd. ‘R’ Force, WO 219/2215, PRO; ‘‘Review of G(R ) Activity and Future Policy,’’ 21 A Gp/00/ 272/2G(R ), dated June 8, 1944, signed D.I. Strangeways, Lt-Col, GSO 1, WO 171/3832; SHAEF/18208/Ops(B), dated June 14, 1944, from J.V.B. Jervis-Read, Lt-Col, GS, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, to G(Ops), GHQ Home Forces, (Attention Lt-Col Churchill), WO 219/2215. 99. Sheet 8, dated June 21, 1944, War Diary of H.W. ‘R’ Force – 21 Army Group, WO 171/3832. 100. Commander A.N. Finter, RN, letter dated June 19, 1944, to Colonel Wild, WO 219/2215. See also 21 A Gp/00/261/33/1/1/G(R ), dated June 21, 1944, signed by Temple for D.I. Strangeways, WO 219/2215. 101. ‘‘Outline Plan ‘Fortitude/South II,’’’ SHAEF/18236/3/Ops(B), dated June 29, 1944, WO 219/2224, PRO; ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 19, 1944, WO 219/1847. 102. Wingate, Volume II, 539; SHAEF/18208/Ops(B), dated July 23, 1944, from Colonel H.N.H. Wild to the 4th Northants, 10 Worcs., WO 219/2215. 103. SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated August 4, 1944, signed by J. V. B. Jervis-Read for H.N.H. Wild, Colonel, GS, Chief, Ops(B) Sub-Section, to Chief Ops Section, WO 219/ 2233; SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated August 21, 1944, signed H. N. H. Wild to Colonel H. F. Drew, GHQ, Home Forces, WO 219/2233; SHAEF Outgoing Message, dated August 22, 1944, from SHAEF signed Eisenhower to 4 Northants and 10 Worc Regiment, WO 219/2215; Wingate, Volume II, 539, 541e; Captain J. Allan, RA, Camouflage Adviser

230

NOTES

for Operation Quicksilver III, ‘‘Report on Operation Quicksilver III—‘Bigbobs,’’’ dated November 3, 1944, WO 219/2215. 104. SHAEF/18201/5/Ops(B), dated June 22, 1944, from A. S. Nevins, BrigadierGeneral, GSO, Chief, Ops Section to Headquarters, ETOUSA (Special Plans), WO 219/ 2207, PRO. 105. SHAEF Outgoing Message, dated June 23, 1944, from SHAEF signed Eisenhower to SCOTCO Exercise Detachment ‘A,’ ETOUSA G-3 Special Plans, WO 219/2217; SHAEF Incoming Message, dated June 23, 1944, from EXFOR G to HOFOR (for Col Drew), ETOUSA (Special Plans Section), Main 2 Brit Corps Adv (for Lt Col Rumsay), 5 Wireless Group, WO 219/2214; SHAEF Incoming Message, dated June 23, 1944, from EXFOR G(R ) to ETOUSA (special plans section), Main 2 Corps ADV (for Lt Col Rumsay), WO 219/2214; SHAEF Incoming Message, dated June 26, 1944, from HOFOR to SCOTCO for Ex Det A Col Macleod, SHAEF G3 (Ops) B Lt Col Jervis-Read, EXFOR G(R ) Lt Col Strangeways, Broadness, One Lt Col Merton, SCOTCO BGS (Ops), WO 219/2214. 106. No. 1049/X/0923/6/1, dated June 27, 1944, signed M.J. Mansergh, for Admiral, to the Secretary of the Admiralty (copies to: Supreme Commander, AEF; Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group), WO 219/2214. 107. William A. Harris, Colonel, GSC, Chief, Special Plans Branch, letter dated July 11, 1944, to Headquarters, SHAEF (Ops B), WO 219/2217. See also Olen J. Seaman, Lt-Col, Inf, Chairman, dated July 11, 1944, ‘‘Minutes of Meeting,’’ WO 219/2217. 108. Ibid.; Wingate, Volume II, 407–8; Overview, SHAEF/OPS ‘B’/54, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude’—Organization of No. 12 Reserve Unit,’’ WO 219/2244, PRO; SHAEF/21229/OE, dated July 27, 1944, from J.F.M. Whiteley, Major-General, DAC of S, G-3, to the Under Secretary of State, War Office (DSD), WO 219/2244; SHAEF/5656/4/Sig, dated July 17, 1944, from J.R. Ross, Lt. Col., R Signals, Chief, Radio and Radar Sub-Section, to Special Plans Branch, G-3 Division, ETOUSA (attention Major Palik), WO 219/2227; SHAEF/18250/ Ops(B), dated August 4, signed J.V.B. Jervis-Read for H.N.H. Wild, Colonel, GS, Chief, Ops(B) Sub-Section, to Chief Ops Section, WO 219/2233. 109. SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated August 4, 1944, from J.V.B. Jervis-Read to Chief Ops Section, RG 331 Box 73 Decimal File 381, NARA. 110. Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, Signal Section HQ 12th Army Group, ‘‘Special Signal Operations in the United Kingdom,’’ 256, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University. Copy of document in RG331 E199 Box 108, NARA. 111. Ibid., 257. 112. No. X/0923/6/1/3, dated July 19, 1944, signed M. J. Mansergh for Admiral, to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, WO 219/2227; SHAEF/18259/1/Ops (B), dated July 20, 1944, ‘‘Wireless Plan for ‘Fortitude South II’ (Revised),’’ WO 219/2227; Appendix ‘F’ to SHAEF/24183/3/SM/Ops, dated July 20, 1944, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II’—Outline Plan for Special Means Wireless Activity—Training of Assault Divisions,’’ WO 219/1847; Order No. CLH/A.186/44, dated July 31, 1944, from Officer-in-Charge, Naval Mobile Deception Units to Naval Commander Force ‘F,’ Force ‘M,’ and Force ‘N,’ WO 219/2227. See also SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 1944, from John B. Corbett for J.V. B. Jervis-Read, to G-2 Division, SHAEF, WO 219/2235, PRO. 113. Ibid.; G(O)/1523, dated July 21, 1944, ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 2,’’ signed R. Macleod, Colonel, Comd. Fourth Army, WO 219/2229. See also SHAEF/18250/ Ops(B), dated July 11, 1944, from J.V.B. Jervis-Read to G-2 Division, SHAEF, WO 219/ 2235.

NOTES

231

114. SHAEF/18250/1/Ops(B), dated August 6, 1944, from H.N.H. Wild, Colonel, GS, Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, to Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations, United States Army, G-3 Division (Special Plans), WO 219/2227. 115. S/00/355/9/3/G(O)A, dated August 16, 1944, from General Headquarters, Home Forces, H.F. Drew, to Col. H.N.H. Wild, G-3 Division, Ops ‘B’ Sub-Section, SHAEF, WO 219/2233. 116. SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated August 21, 1944, from H.N.H. Wild to Col. H.F. Drew, GHQ, Home Forces, WO 219/2233. 117. G(O)/1523, dated July 21, ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 2,’’ signed R. Macleod, Colonel, Comd. Fourth Army, WO 219/2229. 118. Ibid., AG 381/676 TSCB (GC), dated August 18, 1944, from T. I. Harriman to Headquarters, First U.S. Army Group (Lt Colonel McCrary); Headquarters Fourth British Army (Colonel Macleod); Commanding General, Ninth U.S. Army (Attention Colonel Miller), WO 219/2228; Wingate, Volume II, 407–8; Hesketh, 289–91. 119. G(O) 1523, dated August 8, ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 3,’’ WO 219/2229; G(O)/ 1523, dated July 21, 1944, ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 2,’’ signed R. Macleod, Colonel, Comd, Fourth Army, WO 219/2229; C/115, INDEX II, ‘‘Exercise ‘Michael,’—Gen Exercise Instrs,’’ WO 219/2230, PRO; MS/B/125, ‘‘2 Corps HQ and Sigs Ex ‘Lapwing,’’’ WO 219/ 2230; G(O)/1523, dated August 15, 1944, signed S.B. Horn, Colonel, Comd, Fourth Army, WO 219/2229. Entire Exercise ‘Michael’ plan can be found in WO 219/2230. 120. G(O)/1523, dated August 15, 1944, signed S. B. Horn, Colonel, Comd, Fourth Army, WO 219/2229; G(O)/1523, dated September 1, 1944, signed R. Macleod, WO 219/ 2229; G(O)/1523, dated September 17, 1944, ‘‘Fourth Army Directive No. 5,’’ signed R. Macleod, WO 219/2229; 41/1/Q, dated September 7, 1944, signed K.H. Wheeler, Major, for Colonel, Comd., Fourth Army, WO 219/2229; G(O)/1523, dated October 7, 1944, signed R. Macleod, WO 219/2229; G(O)/1523, dated October 13, 1944, signed R. Macleod, WO 219/2229; G(O)/1523, dated November 10, 1944, signed I.C. Edwards, Major, for Colonel, Comd, Fourth Army, WO 219/2229. 121. CLH/A.180/44, dated August 31, 1944, from Signal Division Section 10, Admiralty, to Wing Commander M. McGoogan, HQ AEAF, WO 219/2227. See also CLH/A.176/44, dated August 30, 1944, from Officer-in-Charge, to All Unit Officers and Lieut. Coates, 2/0 Stephenson, Sub. Lieut. Jones, WO 219/2227. 122. AEAF/TS.22014/Bomber Ops, dated April 30, 1944, to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Subject ‘‘Operation ‘‘Overlord’’—Preparatory Air Operations, IRIS #00206988, Call #506.451-322C, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB; ‘‘Air Commitments in Connection with the Cover Plan,’’ dated May 4, 1944, in AEAF/TS.22,014/ B.Ops, ‘‘Preparatory Air Commitments for Operation ‘‘Overlord,’’ IRIS #00206991, Call #206.451-322E, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB. See also AEAF/MS 695/Air Plans (First Draft for Head Planners), dated March 2, 1944, ‘‘Air Plan for ‘Fortitude,’ IRIS #00206431, Call #505.61-21, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB. 123. Order No. CLH/A.249/44, dated September 23, 1944, from Officer-in-Charge, to Unit Officers; Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft) (Revised), ‘‘The Liberation of North West Europe,’’ Volume III—‘‘The Landings in Normandy,’’ DS 94352/1(1), AIR 41/24, PRO. 124. Ibid.; Eisenhower, 233; Howard, 128. 125. SHAEF/18201/8/Ops(B), dated June 17, 1944, from J.F.M. Whiteley, to ASAO, AEAF, WO 219/1847; SHAEF/18201/8/Ops(B), dated July 3, 1944, from J.F.M. Whiteley, Major-General, GS, DAC of S, G-3, to ASAO, AEAF, WO 219/1847; SHAEF/18250/5/

232

NOTES

Ops(B), dated July 13, 1944, from A.S. Nevins, Brigadier-General, GSC, Chief, Ops Section to Senior Air Staff Officer, AEAF, WO 219/2231. 126. SHAEF /18250/Ops(B), dated August 8, 1944, from Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff, to C-in-C Allied Expeditionary Air Force, RG 331 Box 73, Decimal File 381, NARA. 127. SHAEF/18250/Ops(B), dated July 19, 1944, ‘‘Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ WO 219/ 1847; SHAEF/18250/5/Ops(B), dated July 23, 1944, from H. R. Bull, Major-General, GSC, AC of S, G-3, to Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force; Commander-inChief, 21st Army Group; Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, WO 219/2231; SHAEF/18250/5/Ops(B), dated July 31, 1944, from John B. Corbett for H. N.H. Wild, Colonel, GS, Chief, Ops (B) Sub Section, to AC of S, G-3 Division, WO 219/2231; SHAEF/17209/Ops(A), dated August 18, 1944, P. H. Lash, Jr., Colonel, GSC, ‘‘Current Operations of Strategical & Tactical Air Forces,’’ WO 219/1847. 128. F.E. Morgan, Lieutenant-General, Deputy Chief of Staff, letter, dated July 27, 1944, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WO 219/309, PRO. 129. S/00/355/9/2/G(O), (n.d.), signed for General, Commander-in-Chief, to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (G3 Div), WO 219/2233. 130. SHAEF/19000/1/Ops(B)(FWD), dated August 3, 1944, from F.W. Barnes, Lt-Col, Cav, Deputy Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, to Chief, Ops B Sub-Section, WO 219/2246; SHAEF/19004/Ops B (FWD), undated, ‘‘Extension of Plan ‘Fortitude South II,’’’ WO 219/ 2246; Hesketh, 277–86. 131. S/00/355/9/3/G(O), dated August 25, 1944, from Major General, General Staff, Home Forces, to Headquarters, Eastern Command and South Eastern Command, WO 219/ 2233; Hesketh, 281–83. 132. SHAEF/18216/3/Ops(B), dated August 26, 1944, ‘‘ ‘Fortitude’ Order of Battle,’’ WO 219/2225; Hesketh, 289–91; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘A Short Story of the Deception, or ‘Cover,’ Plan for the Normandy Campaign in 1944,’’ CAB 106/1122, PRO. 133. Chief Ops Section, letter dated August 25, 1944, to D/AC of S, G-3, and letter dated August 28, 1944, from Colonel Jervis-Read, WO 219/2224. 134. Hesketh, 289–91, 321–27; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM London.

CHAPTER 7 1. Anton Staubwasser, ‘‘The Enemy as seen by the Oberkommando of Heeresgruppe B before the invasion (Time: End of May–Beginning of June 1944,’’ MS # B-675, dated October 1, 1947, 3–4. Document furnished by Professor Russell Hart, Ohio State University (currently at Hawaii Pacific University). 2. Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command, Nr. 007774/43 g. K. WFSt/Op., dated December 12, 1943, Fuhrer Directives and Other Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces 1942–1945 (Washington, D C: n.p., 1948), 111. AL/768, Department of Documents, IWM Duxford. See also Hitler Directive No. 51, dated November 3, 1943, Fuhrer Directives and Other Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces 1942–1945. 3. War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Plans and Intentions During the First Half of 1944, with Particular Reference to ‘Overlord,’’’ J.I.C.(44)66(O)(Final), dated February 21, 1944, D/Germany/1, Volume 2, German Intentions, CAB 121/413, PRO.

NOTES

233

4. German Army Y Service Report, dated January 10, 1944, signed Major De Leliwa, on behalf of O.C. Signals Recce. 5, to C-in-C South West, Ops. Dept., CX/MSS/T/75/29, in HW 5/428, PRO. 5. Ibid.; Edward O. Berry, Captain Infantry, Assistant Adjutant, memorandum to All Divisions, dated October 21, 1943, WO 219/527, PRO; Ralph Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra and the ‘Need to Know,’’’ Intelligence and National Security 9 (1989): 487–88; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 151–52. 6. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 168–70. 7. Ibid., 168–70. 8. T.L. Cubbage, II, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ in Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass & Co., LTD., 1987), 122–25. 9. Konsul (G.A.F. Command S.E.) IC to Fliegerkorps X IC for Hptm. Kaehler, dated February 21, 1944, CX/MSS/T102/51, HW 1/2490, PRO. 10. Ultra Zip Mel 1441, Abwehr Madrid to Chief I H Berlin afternoon of February 29, 1944, HW 1/2571, PRO. 11. Text of a telephone conversation between Madrid and Berlin at 4:53 P.M., March 1, 1944, HW 1/2571. 12. Communication dated March 19, 1944, from Siamese Minister, Berlin, to Foreign Office, Bangkok, No. 37—dated March 15, 1944, HW 1/2641, PRO. 13. Hesketh, 172–73. 14. Ultra/Zip/Mel 1641, Abwehr officer Lisbon to Berlin, March 18, 1944, HW 1/2653, PRO; Ultra/Zip/Mel 1642, Abwehr Lisbon to Berlin, March 18, 1944, HW 1/2653. 15. CX/MSS/T146/19, Charlie in Charlie West Appreciation dated March 21, 1944, communication sent April 6, 1944, DEFE 3/36, PRO. See also CX/MSS/T146/19, ‘‘West/ South Europe,’’ HW 5/463. This document appears to be an incomplete copy of the C-in-C Appreciation of Allied intentions as of March 21, dated April 6, DEFE 3/36. 16. CX/MSS/T151/71, Appreciation by Department Foreign Armies West, dated April 12, 1944, DEFE 3/38, PRO. 17. CX/MSS/T152/73, No. 51198 from G.A.F. Ops Staff, IC, Foreign Air Forces West (Robinson), dated April 6, 1944, addressed to Intelligence Center West for Oberstltn. Killinger, HW 1/2708, PRO. 18. Ultra/Zip/SJA/54, sent at 7:00 P.M., April 6, 1944, from Japanese Naval Attache´, Berlin, to Karigane, Tokyo, HW 1/2723, PRO. 19. No. 130565, dated April 19, 1944, from Japanese Ambassador, Angora, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, HW 1/2723. 20. Anton Staubwasser, ‘‘The Enemy as seen by the Oberkommando of Heeresgruppe B before the invasion (Time: End of May–Beginning of June 1944),’’ MS # B-675, dated October 1, 1947, 7–9. 21. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, ‘‘GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 9,’’ Based on information available to 0900 hours 9 April 1944, WO 205/532. 22. CX/MSS/T151/71, Appreciation by Department Foreign Armies West, dated April 12, 1944, DEFE 3/38. 23. CX/MSS/T160/74 (ZTPG/232340), A proclamation by C-in-C Navy, dated April 17, 1944, which was ‘‘to be promulgated to all ranks and ratings,’’ HW 1/2727, PRO. 24. ADM(4), Zip/Ztpg/232340, dated April 20, 1944, from Fleet Training Unit, to Leipzig, Nuremberg, also other addressees, DEFE 3/408, PRO.

234

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25. Ultra/Zip/SJA/95, dated April 17, 1944, from N.A., Berlin, to Karigane, Tokyo, HW 1/2740, PRO. 26. CX/MSS/T167/2, No. 9947, from OKL, QMG. QM 2, to Fliegerkorps XI, dated April 26, 1944, HW 1/2745, PRO. 27. Army High Command (OKW), Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies West (Fremde Heere West), ‘‘Survey of the British Empire No. 28,’’ dated April 29, 1944, Document No. 1, in ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, May 25, 1945,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1989); Hesketh, 94–95. 28. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume Three, Part II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12. 29. ‘‘Durchfuhrung Feindlicher Landungsunternehmen Und Die Hieraus Gezogenen Erfahrungen (Carrying-out of Landing Operations and Findings Based Thereon),’’ Annex VI to Theatre Intelligence Section Martian Report No. 94, dated May 3, 1944, WO 219/1942, PRO. 30. CX/MSS/T183/84, No. 3580/44, from C-in-C West, Army Group D, dated May 8, 1944, HW 5/482, PRO. See also CX/MSS/T183/84, Appreciation by Charlie in Charlie West, dated May 8, 1944, DEFE 3/155; OKH, Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies West III/V, ‘‘Survey of British Empire No. 29,’’ dated May 15, 1944, Document 3, ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, May 25, 1945,’’ Covert Warfare; Mary Kathryn Barbier, ‘‘Deception and the planning of D-Day,’’ in The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 181. 31. CX./MSS/T.183/84, KV 3763, ‘‘Appreciation by Charlie in Charlie West Eight May,’’ HW 1/2784, PRO; Barbier, 181. 32. CX/MSS/T178/86, KV 3242, dated May 8, from Luftflotte 3, IC, No. 7228/44, HW 1/2781, PRO. See also U.S. Army Air Force, Ultra and the History of the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1980), 98. 33. CX/MSS/T180/62, Wireless communication compiled from documents dated May 8 and 9, 1944, HW 1/2777, PRO. See also CX/MSS/T181/106, Wireless communication compiled from documents dated May 7, 9, and 10, 1944, HW 1/2878, PRO; CX/MSS/T178/86, Luftflotte Three Appreciation on Eighth of Air Situation, dated May 9, 1944, DEFE 3/47; Bennett, 490; Naval Section, ‘‘Naval Headlines 1042,’’ dated May 11, 1944, HW 1/2777. 34. Ultra/Zip/SJA/184, dated May 11, 1944, from the Naval Attache´, Berlin, to Yayoi, Tokyo, HW 1/2817, PRO. 35. MI 14 Summary for week ending May 15, 1944, WO 208/3573, PRO. 36. OKH, Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies West, III/V, ‘‘Survey of British Empire No. 29,’’ dated May 15, 1944, Document 3, ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, 25 May 1945,’’ Covert Warfare. 37. ‘‘Weekly Situation Report by C-in-C West for the period from 15 May to 21 May 1944 to OKH Operations, and others,’’ dated May 23, 1944, Document No. 2, in ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, 25 May 1945,’’ in Covert Warfare. See also Hesketh, 193–94. 38. 131562, Communication No. 467, dated May 16, 1944, sent from the Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo, on May 19, 1944, HW 1/2807, PRO. 39. 131667, Communication No. 61, dated May 17, 1944, sent by Siamese Counselor, Berlin, to Foreign Office, Bangkok, on May 21, 1944, HW 1/2815, PRO.

NOTES

235

40. J.I.C.(44)214(0) Final, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions Regarding ‘Overlord,’’’ dated May 22, 1944, CAB 81/122. See also J.I.C.(44)214(0) Final, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions Regarding ‘Overlord,’’’ dated May 22, 1944, CAB 121/ 394, PRO; F.H. Hinsley, ‘‘The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War,’’ in Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, eds. F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9. 41. J.I.C.(44)221(0) (Final), War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions Regarding ‘Overlord,’’’ dated May 29, 1944, CAB 81/122. 42. MI 14 Summary for Week Ending May 29, 1944, WO 208/3573. 43. 131886, sent May 27, 1944, from Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, dated May 20, 1944, HW 1/2843, PRO. 44. CX/MSS/T197/64, dated May 24, 1944, from Luftflotte 3, IC (No. 8333) to Robinson, IC, Major I. G. Kienitz, HW 1/2848, PRO. See also CX/MSS/T197/64, Appreciation by Luftflotte 3, dated May 27, 1944, DEFE 3/161, PRO; Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra and the ‘Need to Know,’’’ 490. 45. CX/MSS/T201/83, dated May 31, 1944, No. 2751 from Field Luftgau West France, IA, HW 1/2868, PRO. 46. Hinsley, ‘‘The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War,’’ 10. 47. Ibid., 10; F.H. Hinsley, ‘‘An Introduction to Fish,’’ in Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, eds. F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 146. See also Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944–1945 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1979); Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra, and the Need to Know,’’ Intelligence and National Security 9 (1989): 482–502. 48. Hans von Luck, Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck (New York: Praeger, 1989), 132–34. 49. T.L. Cubbage, II, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ in Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass & Co., LTD., 1987), 116. See also Cubbage, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ Intelligence and National Security 2(1987): 114–74. 50. Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), 100–101; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 495–97; The Oxford Companion to World War II, eds. I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 982; Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson of London, 1971 (uncorrected proof copy), 139–47. See also David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 638. 51. Hesketh, 169. 52. Breuer, The Secret War with Germany, 243; Anton Staubwasser, 7; Generalleutant Max Pemsel, Commentary on the work of Oberst Anton Staubwasser, ‘‘The Enemy as seen by the Oberkommando of the Heeresgruppe before Invasion,’’ 23. Dr. Russell Hart provided Pemsel’s commentary, which was attached to Staubwasser’s report. 53. Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 83. See also Overy, 152; Irving, 638; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 48–49. 54. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 61.

236

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55. Dr. Russell Hart, Ohio State University, telephone interview by author, September 9, 1997. 56. Ibid.; Cubbage, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ 124; Staubwasser, 9–10; Barbier, 177–78. See also Overy, 150. 57. Staubwasser, 13–14; Barbier, 178. 58. ‘‘The German Intelligence Service and the War,’’ 4. Norman Holmes Pearson Papers, Beinecke Library, Yale University; Barbier, 178. 59. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 3, 6–7; Barbier, 178. For more inforamtion about the exploits of Garbo and Tricycle, see the following books: Dusko Popov, Spy/Counterspy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974); Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation GARBO: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II (New York: Random House, 1985); GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000); and Russell Miller, Codename Tricycle: The True Story of the Second World War’s Most Extraordinary Double Agent (London: Secker & Warburg, 2004). 60. Miller, 184; Barbier, 178. 61. ‘‘The German Intelligence Service and the War,’’ 4; Barbier, 178. 62. Carl Boyd, ‘‘Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin: (V) News of Hitler’s Defense Preparations for Allied Invasion of Western Europe,’’ Intelligence and National Security 4(1989): 475–76. 63. OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 00606/44 gKdos., Telegram signed Jodl, dated January 19, 1944, Fuhrer Directives and Other Top-Level directives of the German Armed Forces 1942– 1945, 115. 64. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, ‘‘GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 2,’’ Based on information available to 0900 hours 20 February 1944, WO 205/532. 65. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, ‘‘GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 7,’’ Based on information available to 0900 hours 26 March 1944, WO 205/532. 66. Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 200. 67. Hesketh, 195–97; H.P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 224; Ronald Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1968), 213–17; F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 124–28. 68. Staubwasser, 14–15; Pemsel, 23–25; 69. Staubwasser, 1–2; Ambrose, 586. It is possible that the translator mistakenly typed O. Jodel instead of A. Jodl. See also Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939– 1945, trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 409; David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 626–29, 883. 70. Hesketh, 195–96; Dr. Russell Hart, Ohio State University, telephone interview by author, September 9, 1997. 71. Ultra/Zip/SJA/139, dated May 4, 1944, from N.A. Berlin to Hagoromo, Tokyo, HW 1/2768, PRO. 72. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 8, for week ending May 13, 1944, WO 219/1919, PRO. 73. 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, ‘‘GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 14,’’ based on information available to 0900 hours 14 May 1944, WO 205/532.

NOTES

237

74. CX/MSS/T197/31, dated May 13, 1944, Report from C-in-C West (Army Group D) IA, HW 1/2848, PRO; CX/MSS/T197/64, dated May 27, 1944, from Luftflotte 3, IC (No. 8333) to Robinson, IC, Major I.G. Kienitz, HW 1/2848. 75. Hesketh, 193. 76. Willmott, 357. 77. Warlimont, 423–24; Hesketh, 247. 78. Cubbage, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ 115; Ambrose, 177; Staubwasser, 16–17. 79. CX/MSS/T212/40, dated June 1, 1944, memorandum signed by Foreign Armies West, IA, numbered 3373/44, to C-in-C South West IC, HW 1/2937, PRO. 80. Ibid.; Ambrose, 164. 81. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, telegram dated June 5, 1944, Appendix 11, in Ronald Wingate, ‘‘Historical Record of Deception in the War against Germany & Italy,’’ Volume II, DEFE 28/49, PRO. See also Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 187–88; Hesketh, 95; Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1990), 132. 82. Brown, The Secret Servant, 590; Staubwasser, 21–22; Hesketh, 205–6. 83. Staubwasser, 22. 84. Rough translation of a postmortem on the Normandy landings, by Admiral Theodor Krancke, the German Flag Officer of a Naval Group Command West, Source P.G.32576 ‘‘Handakte Invasion,’’ ADM 223/705, PRO; Ambrose, 85. 85. Rough translation of a postmortem on the Normandy landings, by Admiral Theodor Krancke, the German Flag Officer of a Naval Group Command West. 86. Wilmot, 230; Cubbage, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ 116; Hesketh, 198–200; von Luck, 137–38. 87. Von Luck, 138. 88. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 77–78; Hesketh, 198–204; Ambrose, 302–3. 89. Hastings, 77–78; Ambrose, 302; Irving, 637; Overy, 163; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 421–22; ‘‘General JODL’s appreciation of the 3rd July 1944 quoted by ADMIRAL ABE in his despatches to TOKYO,’’ Appendix 13, in Wingate, Volume II, DEFE 28/49. 90. Speer, 422. See also Irving, 637; Ambrose 481; Cubbage, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ 117. 91. Ambrose, 481; Howard, 187; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 514. 92. Wilmot, 294; Hesketh, 199; Howard, 185–86. 93. Irving, 637–38; Ambrose, 481. 94. Howard, 187; Wingate, Volume II, 401; Field Marshal von Rundstedt’s telegrams ordering moves of formations of the German Fifteenth Army south of the Seine, and canceling these moves, June 8th and 10th 1944, Appendix 12 in Wingate, Volume II; Hesketh, 200–203. See also J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 157. 95. Garbo’s message of June 9, 1944, Appendix 9 in Wingate, Volume II; Howard, 188; Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra, and the ‘Need to Know,’’’ 492; T.L. Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ Intelligence and National Security 2 (1987): 334–40; Hesketh, 200–216; GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day

238

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(Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), 204–5; Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2. 96. Hesketh, 204–6; Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 336–37. 97. Hesketh, 204–9; Howard, 188; Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 337–38. See also Hesketh, 487–90. 98. Garbo’s message of June 9, 1944, as received by teleprinter in OKW and seen by Jodl, Keitel, and Hitler, Appendix 10 in Wingate, Volume II; Howard, 188; Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 339–41. See also J.C. Masterman, 156–57. 99. Wingate, Volume II, 401–2; Hesketh, 207–12; Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 340. 100. Hesketh, 209–12. See also Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 340. 101. Ibid., 210–12; Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 340–41. 102. Hesketh, 210–12; Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ 340–41. See also Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra, and the ‘Need to Know,’’ 497. 103. CX/MSS/T207/61, Gruppe West report dated June 6, 1944, HW 1/2893, PRO. See also Appendix ‘A’ to W. Bedell Smith, SHAEF, Office of the Chief of Staff, letter dated June 11, 1944, to The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State, CAB 121/394, PRO. 104. Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude.’’ 105. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 48–49; Cubbage, ‘‘The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process,’’ 134. 106. CX/MSS/T211/74, ‘‘Admiral Atlantic Appreciation,’’ dated June 9, 1944, HW 1/ 2925, PRO. See also Appendix ‘A’ to W. Bedell Smith, SHAEF/ Office of the Chief of Staff, letter dated June 11, 1944, to The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State, CAB 121/394. 107. CX/MSS/T214/136, C-in-C West appreciation, dated June 9, 1944, HW 5/500, PRO. 108. Dr. Russell Hart, Ohio State University, telephone interview by author, September 9, 1997. 109. Howard, 187. 110. CX/MSS/R234(C)6, Western Sitrep of Foreign Armies West for June 10, HW 5/519, PRO; R233A 1, indications OKH/Foreign Armies West on June 12, HW 5/519. See also Overy, 163–64. 111. Speer, 423; Overy, 164. 112. Lewin, 225–26; Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ War in History 3 (1996): 418–35. 113. Howard, 187–88; Michael Reynolds, Steel Inferno: 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy (New York: Dell Publishing, 1997), 162–63; Craig Bickell, ‘‘Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH: An Analysis of its Influence upon German Dispositions and Conduct of Operations in 1944,’’ War & Society 18 (May 2000): 104–7; translations by Professor Pier Battistelli of the appropriate passages in Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der Alliierten Invasion (Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlagss-Anstalt, 1982), 112, 131;

NOTES

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Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions: The German Army Order of Battle of World War II (New York: Stein and Day, 1985), 348, 360, 377, 384–85, 440, 442, 450, 452, 454, 458; Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnepeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc., 2000), 396–99. See also A. Russell Buchanan, ed. The United Stated and World War II Military and Diplomatic Documents (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 170; B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Compnay, 1953), 483–84. 114. Bickell, 104–21; Mitcham, 179, 193–94, 237, 310–11, 314; Zetterling, 396–400; David Westwood, ‘‘The German Army in France 6 June 1944,’’ paper presented at Normandy 1944: Sixty Years On conference, University of Wolverhampton, July 2004; Barbier, 180–81. 115. Hesketh, 231–36; J.I.C.(44)260(0)Final, dated June 19, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. See also Harry C. Butcher, USNR, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942–1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 581. 116. No. 132854, dated June 22, 1944, from the Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, HW 1/2993, PRO. 117. Ibid. 118. CX/MSS/T230/67, from Dept Foreign Armies West IA No. 3946, dated June 22, 1944 to C-in-C South West IC and Army A Normandy, HW 5/516, PRO. 119. Hesketh, 233–34; ‘‘Situation Report by C-in-C West for the period from 19 to 25 June 44, to OKH and others,’’ dated June 27, 1944, Document 6 in ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, 25 May 1945,’’ Covert Warfare. See also J.I.C.(44)276(0)(Final), dated June 26, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. 120. Hesketh, 234. 121. ‘‘OKW Daily Situation Report,’’ dated June 26, 1944, Document 6 in ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, 25 May 1945,’’ Covert Warfare. Reports from OKW, FHW, and other German officials did not indicate which agent provided the information. 122. No. 133047, dated June 28, 1944, from Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, HW 1/3016, PRO; Howard, 190. 123. Irving, 649. 124. CX/MSS/T235/9, dated June 30, 1944, No. 4156 from Dept Foreign Armies West, IA, to C-in-C South West, IC, Army Group F, IC, and AOK Norway, HW 1/3032, PRO. 125. Ibid. 126. CX/MSS/T233/51, dated July 2, 1944, urgent communication from 5 JD IA, No 1124, to Jafue Brittany and GAF SIGS RGT 54, HW 1/3029, PRO; CX/MSS/T233/37, dated July 2, 1944, untitled document that references CX/MSS/T233/51, HW 1/3029; CX/ MSS/T233/51, dated July 2, 1944, urgent communication from 5 JD IA, No 1124, to Jafue Brittany and GAF SIGS RGT 54, HW 5/519. 127. CX/MSS/T233/38, dated July 2, 1944, note signed Flivo, HW 1/3029; Ultra/Zip, Naval Section, ‘‘Naval Headlines 1095,’’ dated July 3, 1944, HW 1/3030, PRO. 128. ‘‘General JODL’s appreciation of the 3rd July 1944 quoted by ADMIRAL ABE in his despatches to TOKYO,’’ Appendix 13, in Wingate, Volume II. See also Hesketh, 237, 240; Howard, 190–91.

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129. Ibid.; Hesketh, 117. 130. J.I.C.(44)287(0)(Final)(Limited Circulation), dated July 3, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. 131. Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra and the ‘Need to Know,’’’ 494. 132. CX/MSS/T236/115, dated July 5, 1944, unnamed document signed Wolff, HW 1/ 3037, PRO. 133. J.I.C.(44)299(0)(Final), Limited Circulation, dated July 10, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394; CX/MSS/T235/9, dated June 30, 1944, No. 4156 from Dept Foreign Armies West, IA, to C-in-C South West, IC, Army Group F, IC, and AOK Norway, HW 1/3032. 134. CX/MSS/T268/70, dated July 18, 1944, C-in-C West appreciation, HW 5/553; Howard, 193; Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 615. 135. Irving, 661; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 519. 136. Warlimont, 443; Howard, 193; William B. Breuer, The Secret War with Germany: Deception, Espionage, and Dirty Tricks 1939–1945 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), 252–53. 137. J.I.C.(44)321(0)(Final)(Limited Circulation), dated July 24, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. 138. Ultra/Zip/SJA/613, dated July 29, 1944, from Jap. N.A. Berlin to C C B Tokyo, HW 1/3138, PRO. 139. Ibid. 140. Howard, 193; Hesketh, 492; J.I.C.(44)333(0)(Final)(Limited Circulation), dated July 31, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. See also Kahn, 519–20. 141. Overy, 173; Hesketh, 277, 281–83, 286; J.I.C.(44)345(0)(Final)(Limited Circulation), dated August 7, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. See also Kahn, 519. 142. Hesketh, 283. 143. Overy, 173; Hesketh, 277, 283–86; J.I.C.(44)345(0)(Final)(Limited Circulation), dated August 7, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘German Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,’’ CAB 121/394. See also Kahn, 519. 144. CX/MSS/T276/64, dated August 6, 1944, unnamed, incomplete report, HW 5/561, PRO. 145. Howard, 194; Hesketh, 277–79; CX/MSS/T311/2, dated September 10, 1944, Supplement to Situation Report West No. 1383 of 9 September, 1944, addressed to C-in-C South West IC and Army Group F IC, HW 5/588, PRO. 146. Dr. Russell Hart, Ohio State University, telephone interview by author, September 9, 1997. 147. Arthur William Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), 504; Richard P. Hallion, D-Day 1944: Air Power Over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1994), 2. See also Tedder, Air Power in War (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), 105–8; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 69, 143, 156–59, 163–64.

NOTES

241

148. Charles Messenger, ‘Bomber’ Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 158–63; Ambrose, 93–97; Tedder, With Prejudice, 506–9; Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, 153–54; Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969), 182–83; Tedder, Air Power in War, 107–8; Butcher, 509–10; Gordon A. Harrison, The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, Volume 3, Part 2, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), 217–24. For more information about the Transportation Plan, see Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: The Dial Press, 1979), 274–78, 327–36; Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 58–67; Alan J. Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), 129–36, 165; Craven and Cate, 73–78; 153–62, 727, 734–46, 788–98; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, Volume III (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 1809–10, 1842–45, 1857–58; W.W. Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower’s Decision of March 25, 1944 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890–1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); 286–90, 332. 149. Butcher, 496; Tedder, Air Power in War, 110.; IIH4/1/5, Professor S. Zuckerman, B.A.U. (Bombing Analysis Unit) Report 1, dated November 4, 1944, ‘‘The Effects of the Overlord Air Plan to Disrupt Enemy Rail Communications,’’ AIR 40/1669, PRO. 150. Hallion, 7–8; Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, 156; Wilmot, 209; Zuckerman, 2–4, AIR 40/1669. See James Bowman, ‘‘Fortitude South: The Making of the Calais Hoax,’’ a 1,000 manuscript and clippings file, Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, Louisiana. Bowman included several newspapers clippings that referred to Allied bombing efforts in the Calais and Dunkirk areas. Titles include: ‘‘Bomb Blasts Rock British Villages on Dover Strait,’’ ‘‘Heavies Hit Coast Near to Britain,’’ and ‘‘U. S. Bombers Lead Attack on West Wall.’’ 151. Overy, 149–50. See also Henry D. Lytton, ‘‘Bombing Policy in the Rome and Pre-Normandy Invasion Aerial Campaigns of World War II: Bridge-Bombing Strategy Vindicated—and Railyard-Bombing Strategy Invalidated,’’ Military Affairs 47 (1983): 53, 55; 21 A Gp/00/INT/1074, GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 17, based on information available to 0900 hours June 4, 1944, WO 205/532; Lieutenant A.E. Warhurst, Historical Section of the Cabinet, ‘‘Overlord: D-Day 6 June 1944,’’ Book One, 23–25, in CAB 44/ 243; Russell Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ War in History 3 (1996): 425, 426; Air Co-Ord/BM/126, ‘‘Report by SHAEF on the Effects of the OVERLORD Air Plan to Disrupt Enemy Rail Communications,’’ WO 233/ 30; GBI-OI/B/373.11.–3, dated November 12, 1944, Colonel E.J. Foord, GS, G-2, ‘‘Survey of Attacks on the French Railway Centres,’’ WO 233/30. 152. J.I.C.(44)177(0)(Final), dated May 1, 1944, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘‘Effects of the Allied Bombing Offensive on the German War Effort With Particular Reference to ‘Overlord,’’’ CAB 81/122, PRO. 153. GBI-0I/B/373.11.-3, dated November 12, 1944, Colonel E. J. Foord, GS, G-2, ‘‘Survey of Attacks on the French Railway Centres,’’ WO 233/30, PRO; 21 A Gp/00/INT/ 1074, GSI 21 Army Group Weekly Review No. 17, based on information available to 0900 hours 4 June 1944, WO 205/532; Warhurst, 23–25, CAB 44/243. 154. Willmott, 355; Harrison, 230; Secret German military telegram, dated June 5, 1944, in James Bowman, ‘‘Fortitude South: The Making of the Calais Hoax.’’ (Dr. Karl F. Baum,

242

NOTES

University of Southern Mississippi, translated the telegram.) ; Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ 418. See also Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944, 251; Tedder, Air Power in War, 110; Zuckerman, 8–12, AIR 40/1669 and an analysis that disputes some of Zuckerman’s conclusions in WO 233/30. 155. Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944, 251; Warlimont, 424; Tedder, Air Power in War, 112; Hart, 418. 156. Dr. Russell Hart, Ohio State University, telephone interview by author, September 9, 1997. See also Flight Officer Lady E. Freeman, ‘‘Notes on the Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Invasion of North West France in June 1944,’’ 531, in AIR 37/1213, PRO. 157. Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ 418–19. 158. Ibid., 419–20; Harrison, 224–25, 230. 159. Harrison, 230. 160. Ibid., 230; Willmott, 355; Wilmot, 209–11. 161. Wilmot, 212; Hart, 420–22, 427; Henry D. Lytton, 55. 162. Hart, 422, 425. 163. Sir Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive (Don Mills, Ont.: Stoddard, 1990), 207; Forrest C. Pogue, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, Volume 3 Part 4, The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 132–34; Hart, 420, 423, 425–26; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 167; Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Warhurst, the Historical Section of the Cabinet, Section D, Chapter II (Book One), ‘‘Overlord: D-Day 6 June 1944,’’ 23–25, CAB 44/243, PRO. 164. C/6431 from Boniface to Loxley, dated May 6, 1944, HW 1/2765, PRO; CIGS/PM/ 497 dated May 3, 1944, signed Brooke, CIGS to the Prime Minister, HW 1/2761, PRO; CX/ MSS/T183/84, KV 37663, dated May 8 from C-in-C West, HW 1/2784; Hart, 419–21, 425, 434; and ultra intercepts in the following PRO files, HW 1/2761, HW 1/2764, HW 1/2861, HW 1/2907, HW 1/2916, HW 1/2923, HW 1/2917, HW 1/2934, and HW 1/2939; Barbier, 179–80; Russell A. Hart, ‘‘Learning Lessons: Military Adaptation and Innovation in the American, British, Canadian, and German Armies during the 1944 Normandy Campaign,’’ Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1997. See also Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000).

CHAPTER 8 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, quoted in ‘‘Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),’’ Naval War College Lecture, IRIS #1005486, Call #47/03/06, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 2. Mary Kathryn Barbier, ‘‘Deception and planning of D-Day,’’ in The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 176. 3. Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ Colonel R. Macleod’s Papers, 82/31/1, Department of Documents, IWM, London, 5; Colonel R. Macleod, ‘‘A Short Story of The Deception, or ‘Cover,’ Plan for the Normandy Campaign in 1944,’’ CAB 106/1122, PRO, 2;

NOTES

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Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999), 160–63. See also Ralph Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra and the ‘Need to Know,’’’ Intelligence and National Security 4 (1989): 491. 4. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its Part in the Deception Operation to Cover the Normandy Landings,’’ 6–10; Macleod, ‘‘A Short Story of the Deception, or ‘Cover,’ Plan for the Normandy Campaign in 1944,’’ 6–10. 5. Macleod, ‘‘The Story of the Fourth Army and its part in the Deception Operation to cover the Normandy Landings,’’ 6; Document 16, ‘‘Informal Report by Special Plans Branch to Joint Security Control, 25 May 1945,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1989), 1; Document 14, ‘‘Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (F) Results, Exhibit ‘6’ of C & D Report,’’ in Covert Warfare, 1–2; Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1994), 118–19. 6. Dennis Wheatley, Deception Planners: My Secret War (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 156. 7. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 219; Major James R. Koch, ‘‘Operation Fortitude; The Backbone of Deception,’’ Military Review 72 (March 1992): 75; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 151; Donal J. Sexton, ‘‘Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 1941–1944,’’ Military Affairs 47 (October 1983): 113. 8. Sir Peter Thorne, son of Sir Andrew Thorne, G.O.C.-in-C., Scottish Command, interviewed by author, August 3, 1995, London, England. 9. General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, ‘‘Report and Interrogation of General von Falkenhorst, General Commander in Chief, Norway,’’ 61–62. Document AL 613—translation of unpublished report signed and dated Oslo, September 30, 1945 by Falkenhorst—Department of Documents, IWM London. 10. Appendix 15, ‘‘Extract from interrogation of General JODL in 1946, on Norway,’’ in Sir Ronald Wingate, ‘‘Historical Record of Deception in the War against Germany & Italy, Volume II, DEFE 28/49, PRO. 11. International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg, Volume XV (Nuremberg, Germany: Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany, 1948), 376, Department of Documents, IWM Duxford. 12. CX/MSS/T131,23, Ultra intercept dated March 22, 1944, DEFE 3/150, PRO. 13. Wingate, Volume II, DEFE 28/49, 397–98; Communication dated April 6, 1944, from the Japanese Naval Attache´, BERLIN, to KARIGANE, TOKYO, intercepted by the Allies. HW 1/2723, PRO. Communication dated May 16, 1944, from the Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN, to the Foreign Minister, TOKYO, which was intercepted by the Allies. HW 1/ 2807, PRO. See also Howard, 117. 14. Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson of London, 1971), 134–35; Howard, 117; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), 502; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 680–81. 15. Klaus-Jurgen Muller, ‘‘A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War,’’ Intelligence and National Security 2 (1987): 318, 321; Michael I. Handel, ‘‘Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective,’’ in Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1987), 66, 68–69, 80–81; John Ferris, ‘‘The Intelligence-Deception Complex: An Anatomy,’’ Intelligence and National Security 4 (1989): 721.

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16. Cruickshank, 170, 220; Harold C. Deutsch, ‘‘Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence,’’ Intelligence and National Security 3 (1988): 201; Weinberg, 680–81; Howard, 105, 119, 200; Overy, 150, 163. 17. Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Pollock, Historical Section of the Cabinet, Section D, Chapter I, ‘‘Overlord: Plans and Preparations—1940 to the ‘Touch Down,’’’ CAB 44/242, PRO. 18. John R. Ferris, ‘‘The ‘Usual Source’: Signals Intelligence and Planning for the ‘Crusader’ Offensive, 1941’’ (n.d.), 28, 30, 33–34, forthcoming article in a collection in Intelligence and National Security, ed. David Alverez, provided by the author. See also Stephen Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 83. 19. Ferris, ‘‘The Intelligence-Deception Complex: An Anatomy,’’ 732; Ambrose, 216. 20. Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘‘Iconoclasm: German Plans for Victory, 1944–45,’’ Central European History 26 (1993): 224; Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: Harper Perennial, 1983), 107; Howard, 191; Overy, 163, 179; Ambrose, 303, 480, 567; See also Ralph Bennett, ‘‘The Duty Officer, Hut 3,’’ in Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, eds. F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39. 21. Wingate, Volume II, 407–8; Barbier, 176–77. 22. Peter Snow, ‘‘Operation Fortitude, the Deception Tactics Used for the D-Day Landings, Normandy 1944,’’ on Dirty Tricks, BBC radio program recorded October 7, 1993 by the IWM Sound Archive Tape no. 13493/2; Howard, 119–20. See also Cruickshank, 216; Ralph Bennett, ‘‘Fortitude, Ultra and the ‘Need to Know,’’’ Intelligence and National Security 4 (1989): 483. 23. Wingate, Volume II, 408–9; Barbier, 177. 24. Hesketh, 351–54; Barbier, 177. 25. Bennett, 495. 26. Cruickshank, 220. See also Bennett, 498. 27. Colonel Turner’s Department, ‘‘RAF Monograph (First Draft)—Decoy and Deception,’’ Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, Ministry of Defense, London. See also AIR 41/3, PRO, which includes a copy of the RAF Monograph. 28. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 177–78. 29. Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War II,, ed. and trans. Christopher Kasparek (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1984), 179–80; F.H. Hinsley, ‘‘The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War,’’ in Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, eds. F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9; Hinsley, ‘‘An Introduction to Fish,’’ in Code Breakers, 145; F.W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row), 124, 190. See also Ultra intercepts included in HW 1/2843, HW 1/2848, DEFE 3/161, PRO; ‘‘Weekly Situation Report by C-in-C West for the period from 15 May to 21 May 1944 to OKH operations, and others,’’ dated May 23, 1944, Document 2 in ‘‘Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan FORTITUDE, 25 May 1945,’’ in Covert Warfare, Volume 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989); Krancke, Rough Translation of a Postmortem on the Normandy Landings, by the German Flag Officer of a Naval Group Command West, ADM 223/705, PRO.

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30. Howard, 115; Ambrose, 83; David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), 495–97; David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 638; William B. Breuer, The Secret War with Germany: Deception, Espionage and Dirty Tricks, 1939–1945 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), 242–43. See also Anton Staubwasser, ‘‘The Enemy as seen by the Oberkommando of the Heeresgruppe B before the invasion (Time: End of May–Beginning of June 1944),’’ MS #B-675, dated October 1, 1947, 7. Document furnished by Professor Russell Hart, Ohio State University (currently at Hawaii Pacific University). 31. Generalleutnant Max Pemsel, ‘‘Commentary on the work of Oberst I. G. Anton Staubwasser IC, H Gp B,’’ MS #B-675, dated October 8, 1947, 23. Document furnished by Professor Russell Hart, Ohio State University (currently at Hawaii Pacific University). 32. Overy, 152. 33. Nr. 007774.43 g,K. WFSt/Op., Keitel directive, dated December 12, 1943, Fuhrer Directives and Other Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces 1942–1945, translation (Washington, DC: n.p., 1948), 110–15. AL768, Department of Documents, IWM Duxford; Barbier, 179. 34. Howard, 188–89; Barbier, 179. 35. Sir Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive (Don Mills, Ont.: Stoddard, 1990), 207; D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 107–8; Forrest C. Pogue, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, Volume 3, Part 4, The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 132–34; Ambrose, 85–86; Russell A. Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ War in History 3 (1996): 420. See also Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 289–90. 36. Overy, 167; Lieutenant Colonel A.E. Warhurst, the Historical Section of the Cabinet, Section D, Chapter II (Book One), ‘‘Overlord: D-Day 6 June 1944,’’ 23–25, CAB 44/243, PRO. 37. Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ 423, 425–26; Barbier, 179. 38. Krancke, Rough Translation of a Post-Mortem on the Normandy Landings, by the German Flag Officer of a Naval Group Command West, ADM 223/705, PRO. 39. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, Georgia: HigginsMcArthur/Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), 189–90, 237. 40. Overy, 130; Harris, 208. 41. Dr. Russell Hart, Ohio State University, telephone interview by author, September 9, 1997. 42. Hart, ‘‘Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,’’ 419–21, 425, 434. 43. Wingate, Volume II, 401. 44. Hesketh, 99–102; T.L. Cubbage, ‘‘The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception,’’ Intelligence and National Security 2 (1987): 334–41; Howard, 188; Bennett, 497. 45. Howard, 187–88; Barbier, 180. 46. Craig Bickell, ‘‘Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH: An Analysis of its Influence upon German Dispositions and Conduct of Operations in 1944,’’ War & Society 18 (May 2000): 104–21; Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions: The German Army Order of Battle of World War II (New York: Stein and Day, 1985), 179, 193–94, 237, 310–11, 314; Niklas Zetterling,

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Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnepeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc., 2000), 396–400; David Westwood, ‘‘The German Army in France 6 June 1944,’’ paper presented at Normandy 1944: Sixty Years On conference, University of Wolverhampton, July 2004. 47. Hastings, 60.

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Index

‘‘A’’ Force, 4–9, 13, 18, 25, 104 Abstelle, 103 Abwehr, 6, 20, 44, 114, 150–51, 159–60, 167; and Brutus, 36–37, 54–56, 101, 115; Fortitude North and, 54–56; and Garbo, 95–101, 103, 116, 118, 132–36; in Lisbon, 32–35, 38–39, 56; and Tate, 91; and Treasure, 92; and Tricycle, 35– 36, 93–94, 101 ACAS (Assistant Chief of Staff ), 83, 136 ADC (Aide de camp), 54 AEAF (Allied Expeditionary Air Force), 22, 67, 72, 87, 112, 127, 137, 139 AFHQ (Allied Force Headquarters), 145 Allen, Major General Terry, 129 ANCXF (Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force), 22, 67, 110, 127, 139–40, 142 Appendix Y, 13–16, 18, 26, 65; Annexure I, 16; Annexure II, 16–17; Annexure III, 17 Arabel. See Garbo Armand. See Brutus Artist, 36, 93–95, 114, 160 ATS (Women’s Auxiliary Territorial Service), 57

B1A, 34 Bailey, Lieutenant Commander G.E., 109 Balkans, 7, 20–21, 43, 104, 150, 159 Barclay, 7 Barker, Richard H., 31, 47, 50, 58 Baumer, Colonel William H., 39–40 Beetle, 35, 54 Belgium, 104, 119, 151, 155, 173–75, 178, 190, 192; deception and, 14, 16, 56, 67, 145–46, 189; German defenses in, 136, 160–61 Benson, Captain Arthur, 39 Bevan, Colonel John, 18–19, 33, 39–40, 74; and deception plans, 12–13, 18–19; and Fortitude, 4, 21; and Fortitude North, 46, 51, 119–20; and Fortitude South, 67, 119–120, 129; and LCS, 4 bigbobs, 28–29, 75–77, 81–2, 138–39 Birks, Major General H.L., 131 Bletchley Park, 4, 6 Blumentritt, General Gu¨nther von, 149, 165–66 Boheman, Eric, 53 Bordeaux, 91–92 Boulogne, 6, 63, 71, 104, 107, 126, 128, 150, 154–56, 160, 162–64, 72

258

INDEX

Bowles, Major, 48 Bowman, James, 88 Braddock, Major Alfred R., 88 Bradley, Lieutenant General Omar, 67, 74, 84–85, 100, 118, 127, 129–30, 151 Brest, 154, 156, 160, 162, 172, 174, 180, 189, 194 British Air Forces: RAF (Royal Air Force), 49–51, 58, 78, 81, 83–84, 93, 96, 136, 177 British 21st Army Group, 21, 132, 152, 160–62; and control over physical parts of Fortitude South, 22, 67, 75–80; and Fortitude South, 63–73, 74–105, 115, 118–119; and Fortitude South Order of Battle, 66, 75, 124; and Fortitude South wireless plan, 26, 65, 87–91; and Fortitude South II, 127–28, 130, 134–139, 145; and Fortitude North, 121–22 British Armies: Second Army, 75, 90; Fourth Army, 60, 62, 88, 183–84; Fourth Army and Fortitude North, 26, 41–62; Fourth Army and Fortitude North Order of Battle, 47–48, 54–55, 94, 98; Fourth Army Fortitude North wireless activity, 47–48, 50, 57–59; Fourth Army merger with Fortitude South, 119–25, 127–29, 131–32, 134, 140–43, 146; Eighth Army, 3, 5, 186 British Brigades: 35th Tank Brigade, 59, 124–25, 132; 113th Infantry Brigade, 48, 57, 122 British Commands: Bomber Command, 111, 113, 144, 177–78; Eastern Command, 65, 75, 80, 121, 146; Home Forces, 17, 27–28, 45, 65–66, 76, 121, 141–42, 146; London District, 75; Northern Command, 149; Scottish Command, 22, 45, 47, 49, 57, 59, 119, 121; South Eastern Command, 27–28, 65, 75, 77, 80, 121, 131, 146, 149; Southern Command, 16, 27, 75, 83, 131; Western Command, 16, 149 British Corps: I Corps, 45, 90; II Corps, 48–59, 94, 120–22, 124–26, 131–32, 141, 143, 170; VII Corps, 48–59, 94,

102, 120–22, 125, 131–32, 140, 143; XII Corps, 65, 67–68, 80, 90, 104; XXX Corps, 90 British CTC (Combat Training Centre) Troon, 57 British Deception Units: 4th Northants (4th Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment), 76–7, 138–9; No. 5 Wireless Group, 26, 48, 57, 76, 87–88, 90, 124– 25, 139–40; 10th Worcesters (10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment), 76–77, 138–39; 12th Reserve Unit, 141; 185 Camouflage Field Company, RE, 76 British Departments: Admiralty, 58, 69, 81, 91, 106, 140, 143; Home Defence Executive, 32; Foreign Office, 19, 32, 150; War Cabinet, 31, 44, 66, 149, 156, 177; War Office, 32, 66, 72, 76, 87–89, 102, 120, 124 British Divisions: 1st Airborne Division, 152; 1st Armoured Division, 152; 3rd Infantry Division, 90, 99, 101; 6th Airborne Division, 75; 7th Armoured Division, 152; 9th Armoured Division, 48, 97–98, 100, 131, 141, 149; 38th Division, 151; 43rd Division, 80; 45th Division, 100; 47th London Division, 99–100, 152; 49th Infantry Division, 96; 50th Northumberland Division, 101; 51st Infantry Division, 90; 52nd Lowland Division, 48–49, 56–59, 98, 103, 121–22, 125; 53rd Division, 80; 54th Division, 100; 55th Infantry Division, 48, 122, 128, 132, 141–42; 58th Infantry Division, 48–49, 54–55, 57–59, 94, 120–24, 128, 143, 170; 59th Division, 80; 61st Division, 100, 141; 79th Armoured Division, 80–81 British Naval Forces (Royal Navy), 49; Coastal Craft Forces, 69, 106; ‘‘F’’ Force, 142–43; ‘‘G’’ Force. See Eastern Task Force; Home Fleet, 49, 51; ‘‘J’’ Force. See Eastern Task Force; ‘‘M’’ Force, 142–43; ‘‘N’’ Force, 142–43; ‘‘O’’ Force. See Western Task Force; ‘‘S’’ Force. See Eastern Task Force; ‘‘U’’ Force. See

INDEX

Western Task Force; ‘‘V’’ Force, 49, 58; ‘‘W’’ Force, 49, 58 British Royal Engineers, 27, 48 Bristow, Desmond, 39 Brittany, 8, 44, 152, 154, 156, 159, 162– 64, 174–75 Bronx, 35 Bruneval, 71, 107 Brutus, 33, 35, 91, 94–95, 158, 170, 172, 176, 186; background, 36–37; and Fortitude North, 54–56, 183; and Fortitude South, 99, 101, 188–89, 192; FUSAG Order of Battle, 115, 124, 132, 134–36, 146 Bull, Major General Harold R., 88, 119, 129–31 Butcher, Captain Harry C., 178 Caen, 13, 72, 112–13, 157, 162, 172, 175 Cairo, 4–5; Conference, 18 Calais (Pas de Calais), 105, 106–7, 111, 148–50; bombing of, 69, 102–4, 144– 45; deceptive threats to, 8–9, 13–16, 21– 22, 36–27, 30–31, 44, 70–73; double agents and, 92, 99, 103, 115–118, 136; and Fortitude South, 40, 59, 63–69, 75, 84, 88–89, 199–21, 126–29, 131; and Fortitude South II, 137–43; German defenses of, 63–65, 146, 152; German reaction to threat to, 154–63, 166–67, 169–79, 181, 186–95 Calder, Lieutenant Commander, 109–10 Camilla, 5 Campanole, Colonel N. W., 85 Canada, 97, 135. See also Canadian Army units listed by number Canadian Armies: First Canadian Army, 65–67, 74, 80, 89–90, 104, 127, 134 Canadian Corps: I Canadian Corps, 124, 149; II Canadian Corps, 65–69, 80, 120–21, 124, 149 Canadian Divisions: 2nd Infantry Division, 66, 75, 80; 4th Armoured Division, 66, 80, 149; 3rd Infantry Division, 90, 99, 101 Canaris, Admiral Wilhelm, 93, 159–60 Cap Alprecht, 111

259

Cap Antifer, 70–71, 107 Casablanca Conference, 2–3 CBME (Combined Bureau Middle East), 4 CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff—AngloUS), 11–12, 18–19, 44, 52, 74 C & D units, See Turner, Colonel John Chaff, 71 Cherbourg, 13, 104, 154–57, 160–64, 172–74 Chopin, 36, 94 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S., 1– 3, 7, 11, 18, 43–44, 99, 117, 177 CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff ), 155 CIS (Combined Intelligence Section), 153 Clarke, Dudley, 4, 13, 18 CLH units, 26, 58, 108 Cobweb, 35, 54 Cockburn, Dr. Robert, 70 Combined Signals Board, 25, 72 Coningham, Air Marshal Sir A., 84 COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander), 8, 12, 25–26, 31, 65, 86–87 Cotentin Peninsula, 71, 107, 162–63 Cox, Lieutenant Commander, 108–9 Coxhill, Captain, 48 CPX (Command Post Exercises), 57 Cricket, 119 Cross-Channel Invasion, 2, 7–8, 20, 41, 46, 55 Crow, Major General Robert W., 75 Crusader, 5, 186–87 CSM (Committee of Special Means), 65, 101. See also Special Means Curran, Dr. Joan, 70 Cutler, Brigadier General Stuart, 129 D’Arcy, Major General J.C., 131 D-Day, 1, 32, 55, 73, 169, 194–95; devising a cover plan for, 12–16, 18; deception forces on, 9, 78, 85, 149; double agents and, 95, 103–4, 114–16, 118; fake landing craft and, 138–39; Fortitude North and, 46, 57, 119–20, 129, 183; Fortitude South and, 65–69, 106, 125, 171, 186; German reaction to, 113,

260

INDEX

153–54, 157–60, 162, 166, 169–71, 189, 192; Operations Taxable and Glimmer on, 71, 107–8; physical deception displays and, 136, 155; training exercises for, 101; transportation plan for, 144, 177–80, 189–91; wireless plan for, 25, 90, 124, 139 deception sites: Chichester, 64, 83; Dover, 15, 68–69, 77–78, 82, 126, 138–39; East Anglia, 89–90, 95, 100, 104, 126– 27, 136–37, 141, 146, 189; Folkestone, 68, 77, 82, 104, 126, 138–39; Harwich, 14, 77, 138, 172–73; Ipswich, 76; Kent, 29, 68, 144; Lowestoft, 68–69, 76, 83, 137–39; Norfolk, 76; Plymouth, 102, , 111, 136–37; Portsmouth, 30, 45, 66, 83, 101–2, 132–33, 136–37, 153–56; River Deben, 69, 76, 83, 139; River Orwell, 69, 77, 83, 139; River Thames, 155; Slapton Sands, 102, 162; Thames Estuary, 14–15, 64, 68, 82, 189; Waldringfield, 68, 138; Wolverstone, 68; Yarmouth, 14–15, 68–69, 76, 80–81, 83, 126, 137–39, 155, 172 Demorest, Lieutenant, 39 Dempsey, Lieutenant General M.C., 75 Denmark, 20, 41, 46–47, 60, 125, 146, 156, 158, 183–85 Devers, General Jacob L., 8–9, 18 DeWitt, Lieutenant General John L., 129, 131 Dieppe, 2, 6, 107, 157, 162, 164, 170, 172 Dives River, 72, 112 Dollmann, General Friedrich , 160, 165 Do¨nitz, Admiral Karl, 152, 166 double agents, 55, 116, 132, 158, 182, 187; deception and, 8, 32, 43–46, 160, 192–93; Double Cross Committee, 4, 33–34; Fortitude North, 50, 53–54, 55– 56; Fortitude South, 65, 91–92, 99, 113–14, 188; Fortitude South II, 136; SHAEF (Special Means), 22, 49, 101; traffic, 104, 106, 116, 118–19, 146–47, 155, 170 Double Cross Committee, 4, 32–37, 55, 91–99, 115–16, 132–33, 136, 147, 159, 167

Dover, 64, 102, 161, 170, 189; deception, 15, 97, 99, 114, 124; physical displays, 68–69, 77–78, 82, 126, 138–39 Dover Straits, 66, 126, 149, 156 Dowse, Brigadier M.B., 77–78 Drew, H.F., 142 Drogue, 28–29 Dryshod, 68 Dunkirk, 1, 35, 71, 107, 155, 160–61, 164, 189, 194 Eastern Front, 19, 60, 163, 179–80, 185, 190 Eastern Task Force, 101; ‘‘G’’ Force, 68, 101–2; ‘‘J’’ Force, 101–2; ‘‘S’’ Force, 101–2 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 3, 96, 134, 136, 150; and deception plan, 23, 31, 67, 124; as Overlord Commander, 20–21, 114; Fortitude North and, 51, 60; Fortitude South and, 78, 100, 126– 27, 145–146; Garbo’s message and, 103, 116–17; and McNair’s FUSAG command and death, 130–32; on Patton and deception, 85–86, 129; Transportation Plan and, 144–45, 176– 78 El Alamein, Battle of, 7 Enigma, 4, 6, 113 ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, United States Army), 18, 23, 66, 88, 128, 130, 140 Exercise Cheese, 78 Exercise Fabius, 49, 101–2, 154–55 Exercise Filmstar , 142 Exercise Flake, 76 Exercise Haircut, 142 Exercise Honeysuckle, 142 Exercise Jitterbug, 142 Exercise Moustache, 142 Exercise Rosebud, 142–43; Jumper, 143; Lapwing, 143; Michael, 143 Exercise Spam, 79 Exercise Tiger, 101–2, 162 Exercise Vanity I, 142 Exercise Vanity II, 142 Exercise Viola I, 142

INDEX

Exercise Viola II, 141–42 Exercise Viola III, 141–42 Exner, Dr. Franz, 61, 184 Falkenhorst, General Nikolaus von, 41–42, 61, 183–84, 186 Fe´camp, 71, 107 Federico, 37–38 Fenwick-Wilson, Wing Commander R.M., 110 Feuchtinger, Major General Edgar, 157 FHW (Fremde Heere West or Foreign Armies West), 93, 95, 151, 153, 155, 158, 163, 166, 172–74, 176, 189 Finland, 42, 44, 46 Finter, Command A. N., 138–39 Foot, Michael, 113 Fortitude, 4, 9–12, 19; approval granted for, 67; double agents and, 32–39; German reactions in June to, 148, 158– 59, 163–73; implementation of, 26–27, 30–31; London Controlling Section and, 9, 21, 24, 30, 64; objectives of, 21– 22, 30–31; physical displays used in, 27– 30; wireless deception and, 24–26 Fortitude North, 9, 19, 22, 31–32, 41–62; British Fourth Army and, 26, 45; Brutus and, 35, 54–56; Garbo and, 44, 54–56; German reaction to, 59–62; Graffham and, 46, 51–53; implementation of, 49– 51, 59; Macleod, Colonel Roderick and, 47–49; objectives of, 41, 46–47; Order of Battle for, 47–48, 54–55; physical displays used in, 29, 50–51; Tate and, 44, 54; Thorne, General Sir Andrew and, 22, 47; Tricycle and, 45, 54–55; U.S.S.R., role of in, 39–40, 51; wireless deception and, 47–48, 50, 56–59 Fortitude North II, 62, 125–26, 129 Fortitude South, 22, 26, 32, 41, 63–73, 74–105; Brutus and, 91, 94–95, 98–99, 101, 103, 115, 124; FUSAG and, 66, 68; Garbo and, 91, 95, 98–101, 103, 118, 124, 130; German reaction to, 152–57, 160–81; implementation of, 23, 64, 67–69, 72; Joint Commanders for, 22; merged with Fortitude North,

261

57, 59, 62, 120–22; naval diversionary operations in, 69–70; objectives of, 40, 64–65, 67; Order of Battle for, 65–66, 151; Patton and, 67, 84–86, 91–92, 97, 115, 118, 120, 127; physical displays used in, 29, 68; Quicksilver I-IV, 65, 67–69, 129, 140; Tate and, 91, 103, 113–14; Taxable, Glimmer, and Big Drum, 70–72; Titanic I-IV, 72, 112–13; Treasure and, 34–35, 91–92; Tricycle and, 91–95, 99, 101, 114–15; wireless deception and, 26, 68–69 Fortitude South II, 127–131, 134, 136–46, 148, 172–176, 195; Brutus and, 132, 134–136, 146; Garbo and, 134–36, 146, 176; German reaction to, 160–81; Order of Battle for, 127–28 Foulkes, Major General C., 75 France, 1–3, 6–8, 11, 15, 18, 21, 27, 36, 42–43, 55–56, 61 Freak, 36, 54, 93–4, 99 FUSAG. See United States Army Groups, FUSAG (First U.S. Army Group) Gale, Major General R.N., 75 Garbo (Arabel), 33, 44, 93–94, 115, 170, 188; background, 37–39, 95–98; D-Day message, 103–5, 116–118; disappearance of, 130, 132–34; Fortitude North, 54–56, 94, 183; Fortitude South, 91, 95, 98–101, 103, 118, 124, 130; Fortitude South II, 134–36, 146, 176; German reaction to, 158–59, 167–68, 186, 189– 90, 192–93; and V-1 attacks, 132–34 Garbo’s subagents: KLM pilot, 38, 95; Agent One, 95, 97; Agent Two, Wilhelm Maximilian Gerbers, 96–97; Agent Two subagent: Mrs. Gerbers, or the Widow, 96, 100; Agent Three, Carlos (Benedict), 96–98, 100, 133–36; Agent Three subagent: 3(1), an RAF NCO, 96; Agent Three subagent: 3(2), a lieutenant in the British 49th Infantry Division, 96; Agent Three subagent: 3(3), an associate of Benedict, 98, 103, 117; Agent Four, Fred (Chamillus), 96–97, 99–100, 135; Agent Four subagent: 4(1), Almura, 96,

262

INDEX

134; Agent Four subagent: 4(2), Guard at Chislehurst caves, 96; Agent Four subagent: 4(3), an American NCO, 96– 97, 100, 118, 135–36; Agent Five, Benedict’s brother (Moonbeam), 97; Agent Six, Field Security Police NCO, 97; Agent Seven, an ex-sailor from Swansea (Dagobert), 97–98, 100, 118, 135; Agent Seven subagent: 7(1), soldier from the British 9th Armoured Division, 97; Agent Seven subagent: 7(2), ex-sailor (Donny), 97–99, 135; Agent Seven subagent: 7(3), Theresa Jardine (Dick’s secretary and mistress), 98; Agent Seven subagent: 7(4), Rags (Dick), 97–98, 100, 135; Agent Seven subagent: 7(5), relative of Donny (Drake), 98, 100, 135; Agent Seven subagent: 7(6), Welsh fascist, 98, 100, 135; Agent Seven subagent: 7(7), Dorick, 98–99, 135; J(1), KLM courier, 95; J(2), aviator friend, 95; J(3), officer who oversaw the Spanish Section of the Ministry of Information, 95, 100, 116, 133; J(4), censor at the Ministry of Information, 95; J(5), secretary in the Ministry of War, 96, 99–100 Garby-Czerniawski, Captain Roman. See Brutus GC & CS (Government Code & Cypher School), 4 Gelatine, 35–36, 93 Gerbers, Mrs. or the Widow, 96, 100 Gerbers, Wilhelm Maximilian, 96–97 German Air Force (GAF), 151, 195 German Armies: First Army, 171; Seventh Army, 113, 160, 162, 164–65, 171, 180–81, 191–93; Fifteenth Army, 125, 160, 171, 177–78, 181, 183, 187, 189, 192–95; Fifteenth Army and Calais, 64, 162; Fifteenth Army and Allied invasion, 164–67; Fifteenth Army and Transfer to Normandy, 73, 170–71, 175–76; Fifteenth Army and Combat Readiness, 171, 179; Fifteenth Army and Transport and fuel, 171, 193; Nineteenth Army, 171, 175

German OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres or High Command of the German Army), 60, 166–70, 184–87, 189–90, 193; deception efforts against, 13, 21, 73; pre-D-Day Allied invasion assessments by, 149, 151, 155–57, 159, 163; intelligence summary for, 134, 166; transport problems of, 180 German OKM (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine or High Command of the German Navy), 61, 184 German OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or High, or Supreme, Command of the German Armed Forces), 117, 161–62, 165–8, 171, 173, 176, 187–88, 192, 194 German Corps: I SS Panzer Corps, 165; LXXXIV Corps, 163 German Divisions: 3rd Parachute Division, 180; 6th Parachute Division, 176; 12th SS Division, 113; 33rd Division, 176; 49th Field Division, 176; 84th Field Division, 176; 85th Field Division, 176; 89th Field Division, 176; 331st Field Division, 176; 344th Limited Employment Division, 176 German Luftflotte 3, 154–55, 157, 162, 180 German Panzer Divisions: 1st SS Panzer Division, 117, 161, 167, 171, 176, 190, 192–93; 2nd Panzer Division, 161, 167, 171, 176, 192; 2nd SS Panzer Division, 180, 192; 9th Panzer Division, 180, 190; 10th SS Panzer Division, 180, 190; 12th SS Panzer Division, 162, 166, 171, 180, 192–93; 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 166, 171, 192–93; 21st Panzer Division, 161, 166–67, 171, 192; 22nd SS Panzer Division, 161; 116th Panzer Division, 118, 161, 167, 175–76, 192; Panzer Lehr Division, 161–62, 166, 171, 192–93 GIS (German Intelligence Service), 12, 24, 44, 159 Godfrey, Flight Lieutenant A.P., 84 Goliath, 45 Grigg, Right Honourable Sir James, 60

INDEX

Guingand, Major General Sir Francis de, 66 Haakon VII, King, 51 Haislip, Major General Wade H., 48, 57 Hamlet, 35 Hansen, Hans. See Tate Hards, 16, 27, 30, 64, 68, 78, 81, 126, 128 Harris, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur ‘‘Bomber,’’ 177 Harris, Tomas (Tommy), 39, 95–96, 99, 103, 116 Harris, Colonel William A., 24 Hesketh, Colonel Roger Fleetwood, 10, 20, 34, 65, 172, 187–88, 192 Hitler, Adolf, 1, 3, 33, 37, 135, 153, 160– 61, 165–67, 179; estimation of Allied troop strength, 115, 158; opinion about intelligence, 150, 194; and Norway, 8, 41–43, 45, 60–62, 183–86; response to Allied invasion, 117–18, 165–67, 170, 173, 175–76, 192; views about Allied invasion, 148–49, 157–59, 162, 186, 189, 194 Hoover, J. Edgar, 35 Hopkins, Harry, 2 HUMINT (human intelligence), 74 Hunt, Sir David, 32–3 Iceland, 47–48, 54–55, 61, 140 Ingersoll, Major Ralph M., 24 Ireland, 33, 41, 46–48, 51, 54, 57, 59, 88, 120–21, 125 Ismay, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L., 31 ISSB (Inter Services Security Board), 18 Italy, 3, 7–8, 19–21, 30, 43, 74, 93 Japan, 19; ambassador to Angora, 151; ambassador to Germany (Oshima), 20, 60, 156–58, 160, 162, 172–73, 184; naval attache´ in Berlin (Admiral Abe), 60, 151–53, 155, 174–75, 184 JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff ), 2 Jebsen, Johann. See Artist Jeff , 35, 54 Jervis-Read, Colonel J.V.B., 65, 118–19, 123–24, 130, 138

263

Jodl, Colonel-General Alfred, 160, 174– 75, 186, 194; and the Allied invasion, 165, 146, 162; Garbo’s message and, 117, 167–68; and Norway, 42, 60–61, 184, 186 Johnson, Captain, 48–49 Joint Intelligence Committee, 4 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 4, 149, 156, 163, 174–76, 178 Joint Inter-Service Security Board, 4 Joint Planning Staff, 18 Joint Security Control, 19, 39 Josephine, 167–68, 192–93 Karsthoff, Albert von, 36, 93 Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm, 148, 160, 168, 180, 192 Kliemann, Emil, 34–35 Kluge, Hans von, 175 Knittel, Gustave. See Federico Kraemer, Karl Heinz. See Josephine Kraiss, Major General Dietrich, 165 Krancke, Admiral Theodor, 164, 191 Krummacher, Colonel Friedrich-Adolf, 167–68 landing craft, 3, 20, 118, 163, 172; assault (LCA), 28; deception displays, 8, 14–15, 24, 75–79, 84, 91, 132; dummy, 81, 137–39, 147, 155, 188–89; Fortitude, use in, 25–30, 64; Fortitude South, use in, 68, 71, 102, 106–107, 126, 158; invasion, use in, 12, 20, 27, 63, 149; tank (LCT), 28, 76, 126, 139, 155 LCS (London Controlling Section), 106, 140, 147, 154, 157, 173–74, 192; Bodyguard planning and, 19–21, 64; and deception planning prior to November 1943, 6–9, 12, 18, 43–44; establishment of, 4, 6, 18–19; and Fortitude planning, 4, 26–30, 32–40; Fortitude North and, 41, 45–50, 54–60, 62, 119–20, 122, 183; Fortitude North II and, 62, 125–29; Fortitude South and, 62, 64–65, 67, 72–75, 84, 91, 99, 101– 2; Fortitude South II and, 127–29, 132,

264

INDEX

134, 148–49, 173; Graffham and, 52– 53; Quicksilver I-VI and, 69 Le Havre, 13, 107, 113, 154–57, 160, 162, 170, 172–76 Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L., 67–69 lighting, 16, 29–30; deceptive, 14–15, 30, 45, 81–84, 126, 128, 137; night, 69 Lisbon, 34–35, 38–39, 56, 92–94, 96–98, 114, 151 Lloyd, Martin, 32 Loyd, Lieutenant General H.C., 27 Lucas, Major General J.P., 129 Luck, Colonel Hans von, 157, 164–65 Luke, Bill, 32 Macleod, Colonel Roderick, 47–48, 50, 56–60, 121–24, 132, 142–43, 146, 183–84 Madrid, 37–38, 96, 98, 100, 103, 116– 117, 132–35, 150, 155, 168 Mallet, Sir Victor, 52–54 Marcks, General Erich, 163 Marriott, J. A., 4, 33 Marshall, General George C., 2–3, 85–86, 129–31 Martian Report, 153 Masterman, Captain J.C., 4, 32–33, 55, 159 Matthews, Bill, 35 McCrary, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur, 26, 88 McNair, Lieutenant General Lesley J., 129– 31, 134 Mediterranean, 3, 6–7, 13, 18–19, 26, 53, 151–52, 159, 162, 175 MEIC (Middle East Intelligence Centre), 4 Mespot, 11, 21 Meyer, General Kurt, 113 MI 5, 4, 21, 32–36, 39, 91–93, 95, 99– 100, 103, 116 MI 6, 32, 34–36, 39, 95 Middleton, Major General Troy H., 75 Miles, Major General E.G., 131 Mills, Cyril. See Mr. Grey Ministry of Information, 34, 92, 95, 98, 100–1, 116, 133–34

Mockler-Ferryman, Brigadier E.E., 118–19 Montagu, Ewen, 33 Montgomery, General Sir Bernard L., 75– 76, 89, 100–1, 151, 172–73; invasion cover plan and, 18; and Fortitude South, 26, 55, 66–69, 78–80, 118–19; and Fortitude South II, 127, 134, 145; and 21st Army Group, 21 Moon, Rear-Admiral D.P., 102, 107–8 Moonshine, 70–71, 109 Morgan, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick, 3, 8, 12–14, 16, 18, 31, 44–45, 131, 145 Morgan, Lieutenant General W.D., 131 Mountbatten, Vice Admiral Lord Louis, 6 Mr. Grey, 39 Mullet, 35 Mutt, 35, 54 Neame, Lieutenant General P., 131 Nees, Lieutenant Commander H., 111–12 Nevins, Brigadier General A. S., 125, 130, 140, 144 Nichols, First Lieutenant John, 88 Nordenskiold, Lieutenant General Bengt, 53 Normandy, 1, 3, 9–10, 14–15, 31–32, 53, 148, 153–83, 185–95; Allied invasion of, 1, 3, 15, 48; cover plan for, 18–19, 21–22, 28, 40–41; and Fortitude North, 46, 50, 57, 60; and Fortitude South, 55, 64–73, 74–105, 106–147; German defense of, 3, 13 North Africa, 2, 6–7, 11, 19, 25, 29, 36, 43–44, 96–97, 151, 153, 186 Norway, 13, 30–31, 118–122, 182–86; and Fortitude North, 22, 40, 41–62, 94, 98, 114; and Fortitude North II, 62, 125–26, 129; German reaction to deceptive threat to, 156, 158–59, 170, 172; German reinforcement of, 6–9, 104; Narvik, 7, 40, 42, 44–47, 49, 51– 52, 56; Soviet deceptive attack on, 19– 20; Stavanger, 8, 40, 42–43, 45–48, 56; Trondheim, 42, 44, 47, 56 Operation Anvil, 19, 21, 129

INDEX

Operation Archery, 43 Operation Big Drum, 70–71, 107–8, 111 Operation Bodyguard, 19–21, 26, 39, 46, 126 Operation Cabbage, 78 Operation Cobra, 130 Operation Cockade, 8–9, 12, 17, 44–45, 95, 97 Operation Fabius. See Exercise Fabius Operation Fortitude. See Fortitude Operation Glimmer, 70–71, 107–9, 110–12 Operation Graffham, 21, 52–54, 60, 185 Operation Harlequin, 17 Operation Hardboiled, 43 Operation Husky, 3, 13 Operation Ironside, 91 Operation Jupiter, 44 Operation Neptune, 21, 46, 49, 67, 69, 73, 89, 101–2, 108, 144 Operation Overlord, 1, 60, 72, 75, 104, 112, 156, 177, 189; devising a cover plan for, 3–4, 9, 11–12, 14–21; and Fortitude South, 63–66, 97, 99; and Fortitude South II, 127, 129, 145; logistics of, 12, 26, 29–31 Operation Roundup, 2 Operation Skye, 50; Skye I, 50; Skye II, 50; Skye III, 50; Skye VII, 50; Operation Sledgehammer, 2 Operation Starkey, 8, 30, 34, 44, 97 Operation Taxable, 70–71, 107–12 Operation Tindall, 8, 17, 30, 45, 47 Operation Titanic, 72, 112–13; Titanic I, 72, 112; Titanic II, 72, 112; Titanic III, 72, 112–13; Titanic IV, 72, 112 Operation Torch, 2, 6–7, 44 Operation Wadham, 8, 44 OSS (Office of Strategic Services), 33 Pas de Calais. See Calais Patton, General George S., 115, 118, 131, 134–35, 150, 152, 172–76, 178; change in Patton’s deception role, 120, 127; and Fortitude South, 67, 84–86, 91–92, 97; German perception of Patton’s status,

265

150, 152, 172–75; and Third Army, 74–75, 104, 129–30 Pearson, Norman Holmes, 33 Pemsel, General Max, 113, 158, 162, 165, 189–90 Petsamo, 42–4, 47, 51, 186 Plan Jael, 13, 19 Plan Omnibus, 43 Popov, Dusko. See Tricycle Pujol Garcia, Juan. See Garbo Puppet, 35 PWE (Political Warfare Executive), 26, 45, 116–17 Quicksilver, 67, 129, 140; Quicksilver I, 65, 67, 69; Quicksilver II, 68; Quicksilver III, 68; Quicksilver IV, 68–69; Quicksilver V, 69; Quicksilver VI, 69; ‘‘R’’ Force, 76, 78, 83, 126, 138 Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram H., 67–69 Rankin, Lieutenant Commander W.M., 110–11 Ransome, Brigadier R.T., 26–27 RCM (Radio Countermeasures), 68–71, 89–90, 106–11, 141 Ridgway, Major General M.B., 129 Risso-Gill, Gene, 39, 95 Robertson, Lieutenant Colonel T.A., 4, 32–33, 35, 209 n.74 Roenne, Colonel Alexis von, 61–62, 158, 189 Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, 173, 175, 186; assessment of Allied plan, 158, 161–62, 189, 194; reaction to Allied invasion, 165–66, 170–171, 192 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 2–3, 18, 44 Rosebud, 129, 141–3 R/T (Radio Telephony), 24–25, 68–69, 72, 86, 108, 110 Rumsey, Major, 48 Rundstedt, Field Marshal Karl Gerd von, 117, 161, 166–68, 180, 186, 189, 190, 192–94; assessment of Allied plan, 104, 151, 154, 163–64; reaction to Allied

266

INDEX

invasion, 113, 165–66, 170–71, 173, 175 Salmuth, General Hans von, 165 SAS (Special Air Services), 72, 112–13 Scandinavia, 6, 19, 21, 41, 43–46, 51–53, 62, 67, 91, 125–26, 170, 183–86 Schmidt, Paul K., 157 Scotland, 12, 31–32, 101, 134, 136; and Fortitude North, 29, 41–62, 88, 98, 114, 120, 125, 140; and Fortitude South, 118, 120, 123, 131–32; German assessment of, 156, 170, 173, 183–85; other deceptions involving, 30, 96 SD (Sicherheitsdienst or the security service of the SS), 93, 158, 189 Second Front, 1–3, 11, 18, 61–62, 99–100, 157, 184 Sergeyev, Lily. See Treasure SFHQ (Special Force Headquarters), 23, 118–19 SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force), 132, 136–47, 154, 157, 162, 173–76, 183, 192; and Bodyguard, 20–21; and Fortitude, 9, 22–23, 26–27, 40; and Fortitude North, 46–47, 49, 57–59, 62; and Fortitude North II, 125–26; and Fortitude South, 62, 66–73, 74–105; and Fortitude South II, 127–32, 134, 137–39, 141–45; and merger of North with South, 119–24 Siamese Minister in Berlin, 150, 156, 169 Sicily, 2–3, 7–8, 13, 187 SID (Special Intelligence Division), 88 SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), 4, 74 Signals Security Committee, 25 Simpson, Lieutenant General William H., 130–31 SIS (Special Intelligence Service), 39, 87 Skinner, Captain , 48 Smith, Lieutenant General W.B., 145 SOE (Special Operations Executive), 26, 51, 119 SOLO I, 44 SOLO II, 44 Somme, 71, 107, 128, 161–62, 170, 172 Spaatz, General Carl, 177, 191 Spain, 34, 37–38, 46, 93, 150

Special Means, 65, 67, 101–2, 128–31; and double agents, 75, 91, 101; and Fortitude, 67, 69, 72, 126, 128–31; and SHAEF, 22, 49, 84 Special Plans Section, 23 Special Task Force A, 71, 107, 109–10 Special Task Force B, 110–11 Special Task Force C, 111–12 Speer, Albert, 165–6 Speidel, General Hans, 113, 165 Stalin, Premier Josef, 1–3, 18, 39 Staubwasser, Major Anton, 152, 158–59, 163–64 St. Lo, 72, 112–13 Strangeways, Colonel David I., 76, 78, 80, 83–84, 90, 119, 124, 126, 137–38 Supreme Allied Commander, 13, 20, 65, 78 Sweden, 20–21, 42, 46–47, 52–54, 91, 157 Tactical ‘‘Y,’’ or Intercept, Service, 24 TAF (Tactical Air Force), 102, 144, 191; British Second Tactical Air Force, 83, 102–3, 144; VIII Tactical Air Command, 144; USSTAF, 128 Tate, 34, 44, 54, 91, 103, 113–14, 134, 158 Tedder, Air Marshal Sir Arthur, 85, 177–78 Teheran Conference, 3, 12, 18–19, 63 Thorne, General Sir Andrew, 22, 45, 47– 48, 51, 54, 56, 59, 60, 119, 125, 183–84 Thornton, Colonel H. V., 52–53 Tooley, Dr. Peter, 77 Torrent, 11, 13 Transportation Plan, 144, 177–79, 181, 190–91 Treasure, 34–53, 91–92 Tricycle, 33, 91, 95, 101, 114–15, 158–59, 186, 188; background, 35–36; and Fortitude North, 45, 54–55, 114; and Fortitude South, 91–93, 99, 101, 114; Jebsen, 93–94 Trident Conference, 63 Turner, Colonel John, 29, 50, 81, 83–84, 93, 136–38; C & D units, 29–30, 81, 83, 136–38, 147; Turner’s Department,

INDEX

29–30, 45, 50–51, 81–84, 137–38, 189 Tweezer, 121, 125 Twenty Committee. See Double Cross Committee Ultra, 10, 61, 74, 157, 174, 180, 184, 188 U.S. Air Forces: Eighth U.S. Air Force, 44, 144, 177; Eighth U.S. Fighter Command, 128; Ninth U.S. Air Force, 65, 68; U.S. Strategic Air Force (USSTAF), 128 U.S. Armies: First Army, 84, 149–50, 153, 171; Third Army, 74, 84–85, 127, 129, 134, 176; Ninth Army, 126, 128, 131, 134, 136, 143, 152; Fourteenth Army, 34, 92, 127–29, 131–32, 134, 136, 141, 143, 176 U.S. Armored Divisions: 3rd Armored Division, 75; 4th Armored Division, 67; 5th Armored Division, 67; 6th Armored Division, 67, 75, 99; 7th Armored Division, 67, 173; 25th Armored Division, 114, 128 U.S. Army Groups: FUSAG (First U.S. Army Group), 21, 114–15, 118, 132, 140–42, 149, 168–76, 186; activation of FUSAG, 65–66; FUSAG commander, 67, 75, 84–85, 118, 127–31; FUSAG and Fortitude South, 65–68, 72–73, 78, 114–15, 155; FUSAG and Fortitude South physical displays, 78, 81–82; FUSAG and Fortitude South II, 120–22, 127–29, 134–36, 140–43, 145–47; FUSAG Order of Battle, 65–68, 75,91– 95, 99–101, 124–25; FUSAG Special Plans Section, 23–24; FUSAG wireless activity, 68, 85–86, 89–90, 104, 125; Twelfth U.S. Army Group, 74, 127, 129 U.S. Corps: VIII US Corps, 65–66, 68, 75, 88, 90, 99, 104; IX Corps, 153; XII Corps, 65–66, 124; XV Corps, 47–48, 50–51, 54, 57, 59, 120–21, 124–25, 132, 140; XX Armored Corps, 67–68, 99; XXXVII Corps, 129, 173 U.S. Deception Forces: 23rd Headquarters, Special Troops, 9, 26, 79, 104; 3103rd

267

Signal Service Battalion, 9, 26, 68, 87– 90, 120, 125, 140–41 U.S. Infantry Divisions: 1st Infantry Division, 98, 152; 2nd Infantry Division, 48, 54, 120; 5th Infantry Division, 48, 54; 8th Infantry Division, 48, 54; 9th Infantry Division, 152; 17th Infantry Division, 128–29, 141–42; 28th Infantry Division, 67, 75, 99, 104, 118, 120, 155–56, 170; 35th Infantry Division, 67, 104; 48th Infantry Division, 126; 55th Infantry Division, 48, 54, 57, 59, 118, 121–22, 125, 140; 59th Infantry Division, 128, 141–42, 173; 79th Infantry Division, 67, 99, 163; 80th Infantry Division, 67; 83rd Infantry Division, 67, 99, 114 U.S.S.R.: and Fortitude North, 51 V-1 Rockets, 132–34, 170; damage, 133; V-weapon sites, 166, 170 Veritas, 49 Walker, Major General Walton H., 75 Watson, Major General Leroy H., 75 Wavell, General Sir Archibald, 4–5 West, Major General C.A., 87–88 Western Front, 42, 162, 169, 180, 191, 194 Western Task Force, 101; ‘‘O’’ Force, 101–2; ‘‘U’’ Force, 101–2, 107–8, 111 wetbobs, 28–29 Wetshod, 68 Wheatley, Dennis, 60, 183 Wheeler, Major, 48 Whiteford, Major General P.G., 31 Whiteley, Major General J.F.M., 118–19, 126, 144 Wild, Lieutenant Colonel, H.N.H. (Noel), 33, 118, 130–31, 138–39, 142, 145 Window, 70–71, 109–10, 112 Wingate, Sir Ronald, 24–25, 53, 120, 168, 192; and LCS, 12, 19; assessment of Fortitude, 10, 32, 60–61, 187–88 wireless deception, 25, 124, 188; Fortitude, use in, 24–26; Fortitude North, use in,

268

INDEX

49, 58, 141; Fortitude South, use in, 89, 109; Fortitude South II, use in, 128, 140–41; No. 5 Wireless Group, 76, 87; plan for, 14, 33, 47, 86 wireless traffic, 68, 91–92, 138, 140, 149, 155, 183, 187, 192; for deception purposes, 14–15; intense traffic, 86, 91, 170; Fortitude North, use in, 26, 46–47, 50–52, 56–59; Fortitude South, use in, 65, 68, 86–87, 91–92, 108–9, 138, 140; Fortitude South II, use in, 142–43, 146– 47normal traffic, 90; wireless silence, 15,

18, 25, 58–59, 86, 89–90, 124, 132, 140, 143; W/T (wireless telegraphy), 24, 34, 49, 68, 86, 119, 154 Wurzburg/Seetakt radar equipment, 70, 109 XX Committee. See Double Cross Committee ‘‘Y’’ Service, 25, 87, 188 Zuckerman, Solly, 177

About the Author

Mary Kathryn Barbier is Assistant Professor of History at Mississippi State University and is the author of America’s Armed Forces: The U.S. Army (2005).