Cyprus At War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis

Cyprus At War

Jan Asmussen is Assistant Professor at Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, Northern Cyprus. He previously worked as Head of the Department of International Relations at Girne American University, Northern Cyprus. He studied History, Political Science, Sociology and Economic History in Kiel and Copenhagen. After working on the SouthEast European Handbook Project on Cyprus between 1994 and 1998 he completed his PhD at Hamburg University. He is the author of numerous articles in English and German which have been widely published, including in the Cyprus Review and Orient.

Cyprus At War Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis

Jan Asmussen

Published in 2008 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of St. Martin’s Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2008 Jan Asmussen The right of Jan Asmussen to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Library of International Relations: 38 ISBN: 978 1 84511 742 9 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall From camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

‘Having read the Department’s status report on the Congo [sic] situation, I am concerned over its gloomy tone. The inadequacies of the Makarios government, as contrasted with the discipline, energy and able leadership of the local Communist Party, are most worrisome. Perhaps we need some preventive medicine to forestall further deterioration of the situation…’ John F. Kennedy, 22 August 1961, US National Archives, ARC Identifier: 193468

‘Although flatly denied in all quarters of the Administration, to many observers, there was a perceptible “tilt” toward Turkey in the American approach to developments on Cyprus.’ United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees, Crisis on Cyprus: 1975, One Year after the Invasion, Washington 1975

‘Why in fact then did Britain not intervene? (…) The full truth will never be known unless and until all official papers of the period can be seen.’ The House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee on Cyprus, 8th April 1976

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction Literature Review 1 2 3 4 5 6

7

The Centre of a Pre-Copernican Universe: A Very Short History of Cyprus The Road to Disaster: Makarios and the Junta Coup d’état in Nicosia: The First 48 Hours The Evacuation of Makarios Contingency Plans and Delaying Tactics Joint Intervention? Kissinger’s ‘pet idea’ – The Clerides Solution Downing Street Meeting, 17 July 1974 ‘Promoting a solution which will be in US interests’, 18 July 1974 Sisco in Athens and Ankara: Kissinger’s Failure to Restrain the Turks, 19 July 1974 Makarios at the Security Council NATO’s Attitude toward the Crisis ‘A new ballgame’: Turkey’s First Military Operation

XI 1 4 11 15 21 36 39 49 56 57 65 75 87 89 91

VIII

8

9 10 11 12 13

14 15

16 17

18

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The First Two ‘Ceasefires’, 21 and 22 July 1974: The Road to the First Geneva Conference The Sinking of the Kocatepe Anglo-Turkish Confrontation at Kyrenia, 22 – 23 July 1974 ‘A net gain for the West’: Political Implications of the Turkish Military Operation Further Anglo-Turkish Confrontation, 23–26 July 1974 Confrontation at Nicosia Airport Blockade of Northern Cyprus? The First Major AngloAmerican Rift The Danger for Turkish Cypriot Communities First Geneva Conference, 25–30 July 1974 The Eviction of the UN from Kyrenia – Britain Considers Military Intervention The Final Phase at Geneva Between the Talks, 1–12 August 1974 Second Geneva Conference, 8–13 August 1974 The Kissinger Solution – Cantonal Proposal ‘There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus’ – Final US Efforts to Save the Conference The Final Showdown Stopping the Turks? Final Debates on British/UNFICYP Military Intervention and a Greek Convoy War, 14–16 August 1974 Confrontation at Ayios Nikolaos, 15 August 1974 – The Last Possible Anglo-Turkish Showdown or the ‘Trigger-Happy’ Commander Diplomatic Activities The Final Day, 16 August 1974 Big and Little Lies: Conspiracy Theories Gain Ground Anglo-Turkish Collusion or Anglo-Greek Collusion? – The Evacuation of Officers from the British Bases ‘If these attitudes continue we will wash our hands of the whole thing’ – The Death of Roger Davies Permitting Racial Separation: Attempts at Post-Crisis Management A Present for Secretary Kissinger – Greek-Cypriot Territory as a Bargaining Chip ‘A hard character with not much charity in his soul’ – A Change in Turkish Attitude Tyler’s Mission to Athens – No Chance for a Solution

105 111 112 117 125 126 133 139 147 162 165 171 181 195 210 213 217 225 230 231 238 241 244 246 249 254 256 260

CONTENTS

20

21

Refugees and War Crimes Refugees on the British Bases Population Exchange Exchange of Prisoners Missing Persons – and other War Crimes Beyond the Crisis: Cyprus from Cold War to Annan

IX

265 266 272 273 274 281

Conclusion ‘There is no nation of maniacs I don’t get involved in’: Henry Kissinger’s Idiosyncratic Methods of Working

289

Annexes Notes Bibliography Index

299 305 353 361

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a number of people for their considerable assistance, support and encouragement, in researching and writing this book. In particular I would like to single out Peter Loizos at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for reading and commenting on the initial drafts of this work. Likewise, Robert Holland from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, was a great help in discussing various concepts from the outset of this endeavor. Special thanks go to Michael Walsh who helped with the project from the very beginning, criticizing and editing drafts, and never being tired of discussing various problems. I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of the National Archives, Kew Gardens, Surrey, UK; the personnel at the National Archives and Record Administration at College Park, Maryland, USA; and, to Helmi Raska at the Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. A SEED Money Award provided by the Eastern Mediterranean University was helpful to cover some of my travel expenses from Cyprus to London and America at the research stage. Toby Macklin did a great job in copy editing this book, and Edward Keynes and Frank Reynolds are to be applauded for their valuable editorial comments too. Many thanks go to Liz Friend-Smith at I.B.Tauris for her never waning confidence in the project.

Cyprus and the position of the buffer zone after the war Source: http://www.cyprus-maps.com/maps/Cyprus_big.gif

Introduction

On 17 December 2004 the European Union’s Council of Ministers decided to give Turkey a date for accession negotiations to begin. However, a tough condition remained on the table: the solution of the Cyprus problem. This requirement is complicated by the fact that the Republic of Cyprus, i.e. the Greek-Cypriot administration, is already a member of the Union that Turkey hopes to join. It is difficult to imagine that Turkey will recognise the Republic of Cyprus as it is and it is equally difficult to think of a formula enabling the Turks to join the club without recognition of one of its members. Cyprus was once described by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as ‘the oldest item continuously on the the Secretary-General’s peacemaking agenda.’ 1 Despite the island’s small size and relatively small population the issue has indeed for more than 50 years made the agendas of many international bodies, including the UN, the EU (previously the EEC and EU), the USA, and last but not least Britain. Even before the Republic of Cyprus was founded the question of its fate was brought by Greece to the United Nations General Assembly (1950). And a solution to its problems remains pending to this day. However, there have been periods of hope. Headlines such as ‘New round of Cyprus talks’, ‘Crucial meeting on Cyprus’, ‘UN Secretary’s new initiative on Cyprus’, ‘Hopes for a settlement’ have appeared in local and international newspapers from the late 1950s. Sadly, in every case such headlines were followed by negative ones about the breakdown of talks, the

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failure of initiatives and renewed violence. While the number of initiatives to solve the Cyprus problem multiplied after Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots started to engage in direct intercommunal talks from 1968 onwards, the vicious circle of hope and disappointment has remained a feature of the island’s political culture. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots on 24 April 2004 revealed the deeper complexity of the problem, and highlighted the fact that with no solution at hand, the topic will continue to plague the European Union, the United Nations and the United States alike. And since the minimum estimate for completing Turkey’s accession negotiations is ten to 15 years, it is almost certain that the ‘Cyprus problem’ will attract international, political and diplomatic interest for at least one more decade. At the core of the problem, and therefore of the solution, lies the question of who is to blame for the present situation, and therefore what has to be done to solve it. While the troubles date back at least to Winter 1963/64 (UN troops were deployed on the island in 1964), the most violent events in recent Cypriot history took place around the 1974 Greek/GreekCypriot military coup and the subsequent Turkish intervention/invasion/ military operation on the island. 2 The ‘chicken-and-egg’ debate about the responsibilities for these events certainly dominated the discussions during the Annan Plan referenda in Spring 2004, while conspiracy theories connecting US, British and NATO interests to the causes competed with arguments concerning violent clashes of nationalisms and even civilizations. This conflict was fought as an ideological one, with all the attendant elements of irrationality, distrust and conspiracies. Until now, the unbiased reader of the rich and varied literature on the topic of war and conspiracy in Cyprus will have found it extremely difficult to discriminate between a propagandistic or a scholarly work, since the facts presented seem to be conclusive in many respects. The art of propaganda within the literature has developed and supports divergent opinions, not by distorting but by selecting convenient facts in an intentional and manipulative manner. This has been exacerbated by research limited to secondary or non-auditable sources, i.e. memoirs, newspaper articles, and interviews. In 2005 this obstacle was cleared away. British and American archives opened most of their files pertaining to 1974. For the first time previously unanswered questions can be addressed based on these newly released sources: questions concerning the British policy towards their right of intervention; American involvement or non-involvement in events; and diplomatic initiatives to prevent war between NATO members Greece and Turkey. Through archival access it is possible now to move closer to the heart of the debate about whether Cyprus fell victim to a western conspiracy or if the local dimension was far more important then any

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outside factors. Conspiracy theories can also be checked in the light of primary sources that offer us a better idea of the actual intentions of British and American foreign policy making at the time of the crisis. That is the principal contribution of this book. For the first time an account of the 1974 events is presented based not on hearsay, but on the surviving records of British and American government activities in and around Cyprus. The British files include records of the British Prime Ministry, Cabinet, War and Foreign Offices as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee; American records are those of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, including, among others, White House Central Files, National Security Council Files, State Department Files and telegrams as well as Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversation transcripts (Telcons). Thus a much better picture of the most recent history of the island emerges; misconceptions are corrected and disputed facts confirmed. Most importantly, the conspiracy theories about British-American involvement in the coup are conclusively discredited. Previously, many books on the Cyprus question have focused strongly on conspiracy theories, emphasising US interest in containing communist movements. The main argument of this scholarship is that because the biggest communist party in Europe (in terms of membership/votes compared to population), the Greek-Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL), backed President Makarios, the British and American governments were deeply suspicious of the archbishop, labelling him the ‘Castro of the Mediterranean.’ The weakness of this argument, apart from the fact that it is not supported by strong evidence, is that it fails to explain how American interests could be served by bringing two NATO allies close to all-out war. In fact, an in-depth analysis of British and American foreign policy indicates that both British and American governments had long (at least since 1968) given up their suspicions about Makarios. While American policy under Kennedy at least suggested that some ‘pre-emptive medicine’ was needed to prevent the island falling into communist hands, the Nixon administration’s evaluation was that Makarios controlled AKEL and not vice versa. 3 However, it was equally clear that neither Britain nor the US would have objected if Makarios had been replaced with a more ‘reliable’ leader. Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that this was an issue so vital as to justify the above-mentioned risk of war. Another neglected factor appears to be the political limbo in the White House during the final stages of the Watergate affair. While Nixon was struggling for his political survival, the real power lay in the hands of Henry Kissinger, and his style of ‘secret’ foreign policy frequently antagonised American allies and American diplomats alike. The fact that the Cyprus crisis (15 July–16 August 1974) coincided with the climax of the Watergate scandal (Nixon resigned on 8

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August 1974) must be taken into account when we judge the measures taken by the American government towards Cyprus. Indeed some fascinating information has come to light since the opening of the archives, not least of which seems to be the probability that at least certain quarters of British and American intelligence knew about Athens’ plans for a coup and decided not to inform the Cyprus government. And even though British intelligence suggested that a coup might occur some time in Autumn 1974, the actual event, when it happened, took the British and the Americans by surprise. Equally interesting is Britain’s reluctance to get involved by using her right of intervention. For the first time, scholarship can observe how things were discussed in London behind closed doors. Why, for example, did the British government’s attitude change when soldiers of the British United Nations Contingent (BRITCON) were instructed to open fire on Turkish soldiers in the event of a further advance on Nicosia Airfield? Was Britain really ready to go to war with Turkey? How far would it have gone? These open, and previously unanswered, questions are here addressed on the basis of recently released archival sources, thus establishing the ‘facts’, rather than assembled rumours, speculations and politically manipulated ‘realities.’ This book is a work on British and American diplomatic history, based on research conducted between 2004 and 2006, using original British sources from the Foreign Office, the Prime Ministry, and the Cabinet and War Office (Secret Intelligence) Files of 1974 and 1975. Research in the United States archives comprised files from the National Archives at College Park, Maryland (Richard M. Nixon, Presidential Materials Staff – National Security Council and State Department files) and the Gerald R. Ford Library/Ann Arbor, Michigan (White House and State Department) covering the years 1974 to 1976. Thus, it is a vital re-reading, in the light of recently released documents, of a long-running conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, now transported to the heart of the European Union.

Literature Review At present there are no other up-to-date scholarly works, articles conference proceedings, etc., on the issue based on UK/US archives. However, there are two books dealing specifically with Kissinger’s role in 1974: the 1999 Cyprus Conspiracy by Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig and the 1997 Hostage to History by Christopher Hitchens. 4 Both studies are highly controversial and have been criticised for failing to provide conclusive evidence for the US Secretary of State’s conspiracy against Cyprus. Of course, both works were from the outset doomed to failure in this respect, since government files had not been released at the time. O’Malley and

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Craig argued that ‘the Cyprus crisis was no failure of American diplomacy, but a deliberate Cold War plot to divide the island and save the top secret spying and defence facilities from the twin threats of a communist takeover or British withdrawal.’ 5 Citing an emergency plan from 1964 that foresaw the division of Cyprus in the event of an American failure to prevent Turkey from intervening, the authors argue that all subsequent American schemes for Cyprus were based on what they termed ‘the Cyprus contingency plan.’ Thus they failed to recognise any shift in policy making during the ensuing ten years. American contingencies for Cyprus were in fact frequently revised, to the point that in 1974 alone there existed six different contingency plans, none of which foresaw a division of the island. As will be shown later in this study, quite to the contrary State Department thinking was based on the assumption that a division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey would merely result in another disputed border forming a ‘bone of contention’ between two already difficult allies. O’Malley and Craig also asserted that Kissinger was opposed to a British plan to interpose British and American naval units between Cyprus and Turkey to prevent Turkish intervention. This assertion is in fact based on British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan’s memoirs and not on any archival research, though it is nevertheless correct, as this work will show. By asserting British readiness for determined action against Turkey the authors actually contradict their own thesis of a British-American conspiracy. The other major work based on the assumption of an American conspiracy against Cyprus is Hitchens’ Hostage to History. Hitchens’ main argument is ‘that the Turkish invasion was not “the climax of the struggle for union with Greece”, but the outcome of a careless and arrogant series of policies over which Cypriots had little or no control.’ 6 Hitchens insists that his is not a conspiracy theory, but that he argues logically that ‘there was collusion between unevenly matched and differently motivated forces who, for varying reasons, feared or disliked an independent Cyprus.’ 7 Hitchens does not hide his conviction that those colluding powers were Britain, the USA, Turkey and – during the reign of the Junta – Greece. Hitchens came out even more strongly against Kissinger in another book, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, 8 in which he accused the former Secretary of State of ‘using covert channels, and short-circuiting the democratic process in his own country, [so making] himself an accomplice of a plan of political assassination, which, when it went awry, led to the death of thousands of civilians.’ 9 The work is a journalistic one basing its findings on literature and interviews; it does not provide actual proof for its main thesis. Ivar-André Slengesol argues that there was ‘no evidence of an American plot or conspiracy to partition Cyprus, but for its stubborn Greece policy, and for the bureaucratic clumsiness that delayed and undermined the

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warnings to Ioannides.’ Accordingly, the US administration had to ‘bear some responsibility for the events that unfolded in Cyprus in July and August 1974. 10 Slengesol analysed US documents released by 1999 and conducted interviews with the relevant protagonists. His account, though the first serious attempt on the issue, also suffered because vital files were not available at that time. The most comprehensive account of US policy towards Cyprus to date is Claude Nicolet’s United States Policy towards Cyprus. 11 Nicolet’s excellent work was based on US Government files, but not the Ford Library collection, and so lacks information regarding the transition and early days of the Ford administration. In addition, Nicolet’s book was published before the release of information such as the Kissinger telecons, Thomas Boyatt’s critique of the substantial handling of the Cyprus crisis, and, of course, British files for the years 1970–75. Importantly, Nicolet describes a shift in the American perception of Makarios who from 1969 was no longer perceived as the ‘Castro of the Mediterranean’ but merely as an obstacle to finding a solution. Accordingly, Nicolet’s findings suggest that the Americans had no fundamental interest in the island and, therefore, no reason to wish for the Archbishop’s violent removal – let alone a Greek mainland take-over. Nicolet described Kissinger’s policy during the actual crisis as a series of misjudgements. First, he – and most of his staff – had not taken seriously forewarnings of an impending coup; second, in trying to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis he had failed to come out strongly against Greece, with disastrous consequences; third, he had sent ambiguous signals to Ankara, which might have been interpreted as acquiescence in military action, and, fourth, Nicolet describes the AngloAmerican dispute regarding a military deterrent against Turkey’s advance, which had been coupled with further ambiguous signals to Ecevit, which the Turkish Prime Minister could have misinterpreted as consent. In his conclusion, Nicolet claims that the US could not have prevented or reversed the situation ‘as long as it was unwilling to implement the forceful diplomacy backed by threats that it had used in the 1960s.’ However, the author cautioned that the situation in 1974 was quite different from all previous occasions, and the absence of a Soviet threat to Turkey had made this option less likely to succeed. There is an astonishing lack of academic literature describing the actual events surrounding the coup and the subsequent war of 1974. Most of the printed documents are propaganda brochures edited by the Press and Information Offices of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot administrations. Typically one-sided pamphlets are The Attila ‘Peacemakers’ published by the Greek Cypriot PIO 12 and Sabattin İsmail’s Peace Operation 13 . More reliable and objective are the detailed chronological accounts of Mehmet Ali

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Birand, for the Turkish point of view, 14 and Stavros Psychari for the Greek position. 15 The psychological and physical hardships of the war are well researched in the works of Peter Loizos and Vamik Volkan. 16 An outstanding book on the origins of the Cyprus conflict was written and first published shortly after the 1974 war by Zenon Stavrinides 17 who presents a self-critical account of the responsibilities and failures of Greek-Cypriot politics. Pierre Oberling’s Road to Bellapais and Scott Gibbons’ Genocide Files are detailed reports on Greek-Cypriot atrocities committed against Turkish Cypriots. 18 Unfortunately, both works are heavily biased and fail to record any crimes and failures committed by Turkey or the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. It is especially distasteful that Gibbons refers to ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ when it comes to Turkish Cypriots, but says nothing about the forced expulsion of, and massacres committed against, Greek Cypriots from the North. More scientific, but nevertheless biased, are the works of Kyriakos Markides (for the Greek view) and Halih Ibrahim Salih (for the Turkish one). 19 Joseph S. Joseph’s Ethnic Conflict and International Politics 20 is a refreshing attempt at a neutral study of the impact of various international actors on the Cyprus problem. Joseph argues that while superpower influence in Cyprus was manifest during the crisis, it came in response to developments there rather than as an instigator of the troubles. Accordingly, he argues that, though well intended, NATO politics failed to play a constructive role in resolving the conflict. However, Joseph’s findings are – like the works proposing conspiracy theories – based on published material and cannot therefore claim to constitute the final word on the matter. Laurence Stern 21 describes the shortcomings of a US diplomacy led by a strong phobia regarding Makarios. However, in his efforts to brand the US administration he fails to see the shortcomings and failures of Makarios’ government in coming to terms with the Turkish Cypriots. In its analysis of US foreign policy on Cyprus and the region, the Aegean Foundation supports the conspiracy thesis, again without providing convincing evidence. 22 On a different level, Tozun Bahceli analyses the difficult relations between Turkey and Greece from a Turkish-Cypriot viewpoint. 23 More recent works of importance include Yiannis Papadakis’ Echoes from the Dead Zone, 24 which tackles the problem from an anthropological point of view; Sir David Hannay gives a very personal account of the failure of the Annan Plan 25 and Rebecca Bryant searches for the roots and cultivation of nationalism. 26 Memoirs of politicians engaged in the Cyprus problem constitute a valuable source, either by shedding different light on various aspects of the subject or by trying to rectify or conceal their authors’ own failures. George Ball gives proof of CIA connections with Grivas. 27 The general line of

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American policy towards Makarios is described by Cyrus Vance. 28 Glafkos Clerides emphasises Makarios’ stubbornness regarding the intercommunal talks preceding the war, 29 while Rauf Denktash (in Turkish, Denktaş) tries to justify the ethnic cleansing of North Cyprus by emphasising the inability of either side to co-exist in peace. 30 Bülent Ecevit stresses his efforts to avoid war by incorporating Britain into the management of the crisis. 31 Richard Nixon was deeply entangled in his struggle for political survival and so had little time to deal with Cyprus; accordingly his memoirs contain only a scant reference to the event, saying that he noted on 15 July in his diary: ‘The Cyprus thing brought home the fact that with the world in the situation it is, with peace as fragile as it is in various parts of the world, a shake-up in the American presidency and a change would have a traumatic effect abroad and a traumatic effect at home.’ 32 Henry Kissinger covers the crisis extensively in the third volume of his memoirs, in which he puts much of the blame on Makarios, calling him the ‘proximate cause of most of Cyprus’ tensions.’ 33 He claimed to have had no pre-knowledge of the coup; even Makarios had not indicated any anxiety when he visited him in Nicosia on 7 May. 34 Remaining vague about the reasons for the failure to stop (and contain) Turkish intervention, he claimed that his inability to play a more active role was due to Nixon’s resignation. Subsequently, much of the diplomacy on the ground had to be done by the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, who Kissinger described as an experienced political operator who could be ‘more easily aroused to anger by obstinacy and occasional duplicity of passionate interlocutors’ than Kissinger, since he lacked the Middle East experience of the Secretary. Callaghan’s anger had shifted between Athens and Ankara, but finally settled on the latter, 35 leading Kissinger to put some of the blame for failure on Callaghan’s inexperience. Finally, Kissinger concluded that while America’s Cyprus policy had failed in restoring a unitary Cypriot state, the most important objectives (keeping NATO’s eastern flank intact, keeping Greece and Turkey as members of the alliance, and keeping the Soviet Union at arm’s length) had been achieved. 36 Efforts to justify the British government’s apparent apathy in Cyprus are to be found in the memoirs of Callaghan and Wilson. 37 Callaghan wrote that Ecevit’s request for the use of British bases by Turkish troops had been an impossible proposition, since the legal framework of the bases forbade their use by a third country. If Britain had cooperated with the Turks on this, Callaghan claimed, it would have had to be without any international support. In his opinion, this had been neither a feasible shortterm option nor a basis for a long-term solution. He claimed that while Britain and the US shared the broader objectives of defusing the crisis they differed on procedure and tactics, and in so doing had failed to develop a

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coordinated policy, mainly due to lack of communication. Callaghan blamed the Watergate affair, which was consuming much of Kissinger’s time. For example, Kissinger had been away during the weekend of 20 July to join Nixon in California for consultations and as a result there had been no communication between him and Callaghan that day. 38 Callaghan emphasises the fundamental difference he had with the Americans on how to prevent further Turkish advances in Cyprus. While Kissinger had resorted to personal pleas, he was sure that the only deterrent to the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition, though it was understood the United States was not prepared to put military pressure on them. Callaghan claimed that Britain could not have stopped Turkey alone; indeed, in the face of US opposition this could have led to a ‘second Suez.’ He concluded that Britain had behaved honourably and fulfilled her obligations (as Greece and Turkey had not) to the limit of possibilities open to her. Wilson avoided a discussion of Britain’s shortcomings. He described the British rescue operation for Makarios; mentions that it had courteously but decisively rejected an agreement for a ‘Turkish invasion of the island’; and referred to his conversation with Ecevit on 24 July, when the latter had threatened to take over UN-controlled Nicosia Airport by force. Wilson sensed that ‘that was probably the nearest that Britain came to war with another nation since 1945.’ 39 As for the failure to contain the crisis, Wilson claimed that Kissinger later had expressed regret that, due to the Watergate affair, the United States had been ineffective at a critical time. Finally, Wilson asserted that after the failure of the second Geneva Conference the intervention of the United States was ‘once again missed’ by the British Government. This review of the literature reveals that the conflicting sources confuse rather than enlighten the reader about what really happened in Cyprus. In order to set the record straight a detailed analysis of Anglo-American Cyprus diplomacy based on government records is needed. Following a short historical introduction and a chapter focusing on President Makarios’ troubled relationship with the Athens Junta, a chronological set of chapters will provide a day-to-day and hour-to-hour account of British and American crisis diplomacy starting from the 15 July coup d’état and ending with the second Turkish military operation on 14 August. Special emphasis is given to Anglo-American efforts to avoid war between Greece and Turkey, as well as to attempts to find diplomatic solutions to the Cyprus problem at the two Geneva Conferences. This account is based almost entirely on original diplomatic material, such as records of conversations, telephone communications, telegrams and other exchanges conducted within various British and American govern-

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ment agencies, either quoted directly or reported. These include material stemming from highest bodies like the White House and the UK Prime Ministry, as well as the Foreign Office and State Department, the embassies of both countries in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, various secret agencies and finally parliamentarian records and committees. This material has been used extensively in order to provide a vivid, ‘live’ account of the crisis. A new picture emerges showing that British and American views on how to diffuse the crisis differed significantly on various occasions. And these views are openly and sometimes quite undiplomatically expressed in records of conversations, telegrams and memoranda never intended to reach the eyes and ears of the American or British counterparts. In short, chapters three to seventeen will provide a unique image of the crisis taken ‘from the horse’s mouth.’ Thereafter, the origins of various conspiracy theories about AngloAmerican collusion with the coup and the Turkish invasion are analysed. The ensuing two chapters deal with the immediate aftermath, post-crisis management, refugees and war crimes. Chapter twenty-three takes on the legacies of the still unresolved Cyprus problem. The redundant concluding chapter revolves around Henry Kissinger’s handling of the 1974 Cyprus crisis as a whole and aims to answer the question of why Anglo-American diplomacy ultimately failed to prevent the division of Cyprus.

1 The Centre of a Pre-Copernican Universe A Very Short History of Cyprus

Cyprus has had many rulers during its long history. Among others Greeks, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, and Venetians have all left their imprint on the island. However, only the Greeks actually settled in Cyprus in large numbers, ultimately dominating and absorbing the original population. When the Ottomans came to the island in 1570, the inhabitants of Cyprus were – with the exception of a tiny Latin group of rich landowners – Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians. The most significant legacy of Ottoman rule was that they were the first rulers to actually change the demographic pattern by introducing large numbers of Muslim farmers to the island, forming eventually about 20 per cent of the population – the Turkish Cypriots as we know them today. As nationalism developed in the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire slowly but surely collapsed, and Greece (1830) and Turkey (1923) emerged, among others, from the ruins. These young states developed conflicting national ideologies and constructed national histories based on negative images of their neighbours. Both countries were to become models for theories of imagined communities (Benedict Anderson) and invented traditions (Eric Hobsbawm), with the improvement of education systems and the press acting as driving forces for the implantation of nationalism in vast portions of the population. 1

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When Cyprus came under British administration in 1878, British interest in the island was limited to a political gesture against Russian influence in the eastern Mediterranean. The strategic importance of Cyprus became negligible when Britain gained control over Egypt and the Suez Canal in 1882. As a result, Britain did not invest much money or interest in the island, though it introduced some important administrative reforms based on the previous Ottoman system. One of these was the improvement of the Ottoman educational system based on religious division; village schools were built throughout Cyprus, and soon schoolbooks and syllabuses arrived from mainland Greece and the Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey). National education quickly succeeded, therefore, in constructing Greek and Turkish identities among the respective Christian and Muslim populations. While the Greek Cypriots orientated their national aspirations towards the dream of unification with Greece (Enosis), Turkish Cypriots were faced with the dilemma that as a minority of about 20 per cent they could hardly dream of a ‘return’ of the island to Turkey. The counter-slogan of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership developed in the 1950s, therefore, was taksim (division) of the island. This concept never seemed to be a real option to most Turkish Cypriots given the fact that they were settled in various localities throughout the island, often even in ethnically mixed villages. A clear regional division of both ethnic communities seemed unfeasible. The Greek-Cypriot national movement was led by two outstanding figures, George Grivas and Archbishop Makarios III (Michail Mouskos). While the first was a skilled soldier who spent much of his life in the service of the Greek mainland army, the second was a brilliant organiser. In 1955 both triggered a violent movement for Enosis called EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston/National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). EOKA employed guerrilla warfare and terrorism in order to oust the British from Cyprus. What had started as an anti-colonial struggle was transformed, by 1958, into an interethnic conflict in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots fought each other. The latter had founded their own organisation, TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati/Turkish Resistance Organisation/TMT), which also used terrorist methods like their GreekCypriot counterparts. Greek efforts to internationalise the issue at the United Nations level were countered by the British through the introduction of Turkey as party to the conflict. Finally, Greece, Turkey and Britain negotiated a compromise solution at the Zurich and London conferences (1959) and presented it to the leaders of both Cypriot communities, who had no choice but to accept. The result was the Republic of Cyprus, a bicommunal state under President Makarios and Vice President Fazıl Küçük.

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The attention Cyprus got at this time resulted in a dangerous overestimation by the Greek-Cypriot leadership of the actual significance the conflict had from an international perspective. The British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Sir David Hunt, described this thinking in 1966 in the following terms: ‘The Cypriots regard their island as if it were the centre of a pre-Copernican universe. This obsession is illustrated from political journalism and pastoral theology.’ 2 Hunt’s observation has remained a feature of Cyprus policy making to the present day, with the persistent incapacity of Cypriot politicians – from Makarios to Denktaş to Tassos Papadopoulos – to see their situation objectively or realistically. Cypriot politicians have consistently harboured the conviction that world politics revolves around the Cyprus problem. Neither Cypriot community actually believed in the new republic. Greek Cypriots saw it as nothing but a step towards the ultimate goal of Enosis, while Turkish Cypriots, deeply distrusting their Greek-Cypriot counterparts, jealously guarded their privileges under the constitution and showed no flexibility in implementing any practical changes. 3 Ten years later a British assessment concluded that ‘the Greek Cypriots regarded the Constitution as an apparatus of Greek rule, while the Turkish Cypriots treated it as a Bill of Rights.’ 4 Finally, Makarios drafted 13 proposals for constitutional amendments, which would have revoked most of the Turkish-Cypriot constitutional rights; this attempt resulted in a civil war that started during Christmas 1963 and persisted until Summer 1964. It saw the build-up of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves and the establishment of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus surrounding them for their protection. In the wake of the civil war US President Lyndon B. Johnson was compelled to stop Turkey from intervening. He did so by sending a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü, forbidding the use of US-supplied weapons and threatening not to come to the defence of Turkey in case of a Soviet attack. For the next ten years most Turkish Cypriots lived in their enclaves deprived by the now exclusively Greek-Cypriot government of Cyprus of their political rights and under severe economic hardships. During the same period Greek Cypriots experienced a kind of economic miracle, with their economy and living standards developing much faster than in Greece. 5 Subsequently, for many Greek Cypriots the aim of Enosis became of secondary importance, especially as Greece was suffering under a military dictatorship established by Georgios Papadopoulos in 1967. In addition, Archbishop Makarios clearly enjoyed his position as president and played an important role in the non-aligned movement alongside Nehru, Nasser and Tito. As unification would have reduced him to the position of a local

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cleric, it appears that he thought this could wait for some time, perhaps indefinitely. 6

2 The Road to Disaster Makarios and the Junta

Makarios’ relations with the Greek military Junta were troubled from the beginning. In their quest for European and American support, the Greek colonels were ready to settle the Cyprus dispute even over Makarios’ head. Contrary to claims by several authors that the Greek Government was prepared to settle for a kind of double Enosis, dividing the island between Greece and Turkey, this now appears not to have been the case. 1 In fact, Greece and Turkey had discussed the issue during a NATO ministerial meeting in Lisbon (3–4 July 1971); thereafter, the Greek Ambassador handed Makarios a note explaining that it was the Greek view that since the Turkish side had virtually accepted all of the 13 points Makarios had brought forward in November 1963, then causing the civil war, it was now for the Archbishop to make concessions of his own. This infuriated him and he warned the Junta’s leader, Georgios Papadopoulos, that he had survived 13 Greek Prime Ministers and would survive the fourteenth too. 2 However, the Greek Government had not proposed partition, or even two separate local authorities, but rather the creation of a Ministry of Local Government with a Turkish-Cypriot Minister or Deputy Minister. This was in fact a constructive and moderate suggestion. 3 Nevertheless, Makarios was convinced that he could retain his firm grip on the island’s political institutions without making any concessions to the Turkish Cypriots.

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On the island itself intercommunal talks had started in 1968 between the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community Rauf Denktaş 4 and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides. Turkish Cypriots, wornout by the hard conditions of life in enclaves, were prepared to give up many of their constitutional rights in exchange for local autonomy. Clerides latter claimed that in 1971 and 1972 the talks had been close to agreement, and he had advised Makarios to approve the proposals. But the Archbishop had declined on both occasions, believing he would get the Turkish Cypriots to accept even tougher conditions. 5 Clerides concluded that ‘it was fatal because had I succeeded in convincing Makarios to accept my point of view, events in Cyprus would have taken an entirely different course. The coup would have been avoided, the invasion of Cyprus would not have taken place, and Cyprus would have been spared its devastating effects.’ 6 Given the pro-Enosis nationalistic opposition to Makarios in Cyprus and the irrational attitude of the Greek Junta that developed later under Dimitrios Ioannides, it is highly debatable whether a coup could have been avoided. However, with the intercommunal dispute settled, a Turkish military intervention might have occurred with the sole purpose of restoring Makarios to power. But this was only the first of two critical mistakes the Archbishop would make, leading to catastrophe befalling the island in 1974. Many nationalist-minded Greek Cypriots could not comprehend Makarios’ shift away from the immediate implementation of Enosis, and accordingly in March 1969 a ‘National Front’ (Ethnikon Metopon) was formed, accusing the Archbishop of betrayal. On 8 March 1970 Makarios’ helicopter was grounded by machine-gun fire on its departure from the Archbishopric in Nicosia. While the pilot was wounded, Makarios escaped unharmed. The main suspect for the attack was the former Minister of Interior, Polycarpos Georghadjis, a former EOKA fighter who had openly broken with the Archbishop, though he claimed to be innocent. Georghadjis was found murdered on a lonely street outside Nicosia before investigations could start (13 March). 7 The investigation was bungled, despite evidence for the involvement of Greek mainland officers of the National Guard. 8 Makarios had received forewarnings of the attack from the Americans; an American Embassy official had told Makarios during his visit to Kenya at the end of January 1970 that there might be an assassination attempt on him upon his return. The US Ambassador to Cyprus, David H. Popper, repeated the warning to the Archbishop in late February, telling him of a planned attempt within the next 15 days. 9 It remains unclear how the Americans had received the information. What is remarkable is that they passed it on to the Archbishop. The very fact that they did casts doubt on the notion that there was American cooperation or

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conspiracy with the nationalists in Cyprus or the Junta in Athens to kill Makarios. George Grivas joined the critics and returned to Cyprus in September 1971 to form the terrorist EOKA-B. After a meeting with Makarios (26 March 1972), which failed to placate the General, he decided to organise militant resistance in order to remove the Archbishop from power. 10 Makarios narrowly escaped another assassination attempt on 7 October 1973. The road along which he was due to travel was mined extensively near Salamis. Five large bombs exploded, some five minutes before the Archbishop’s car had arrived. The presumed culprit was caught and confessed to have been acting on the instructions of Grivas. 11 Nevertheless, Makarios seemed to prevail in the conflict with both the Junta and the nationalists in Cyprus. President Papadopoulos, who had announced ‘free’ elections in order to establish a presidential system with pseudo-democratic legitimacy, adopted a reconciliatory approach towards the Archbishop and even asked Grivas to renounce violence. Makarios managed to overcome opposition from within the Church and his Police Tactical Reserve arrested many of the EOKA-B activists. When Grivas died of a heart attack in his hideout in Limassol in January 1974, the Archbishop seemed to have achieved complete victory. 12 Makarios’ second tragic mistake was that he failed to evaluate the repercussions of the regime change that occurred in Athens on 25 November 1974. Following the bloody suppression of a student rebellion at Athens Technical University, Georgios Papadopoulos was ousted by the Chief of the Military Police, Dimitrios Ioannides. British intelligence pointed to the fact that most of the leaders of the coup had a much closer attachment to Cyprus than the previous Junta. General Phaedon Gizikis was Deputy Commander of the Greek National Contingent in 1962–63, and the new Chief of the Armed Forces; General Grigorios Bonanos was Chief of Staff of the National Guard in 1966–68 and served directly under Grivas before the latter’s withdrawal from Cyprus in 1967. Colonel Ioannides also had a background of service in Cyprus. 13 Under Ioannides Greek policy towards Makarios took a radical turn. Following Grivas’ death it appeared, at first, that the situation would calm down. Makarios stopped the hunt for insurgents and proclaimed an amnesty. Grivas’ successor, Georgios Karousos, thereupon declared suspendsion of all hostilities. Karousos’ decision, however, met with resistance within his organisation and he was forced to resign and leave the island. EOKA-B was now under the direct control of Athens. In April Makarios banned EOKA-B and asked its leaders to surrender their weapons. The following month rumours of a coup d’état against Makarios gained ground and Makarios called in the Greek Ambassador,

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Efstathios Lagakos, to complain about Greek mainland officers of the National Guard allegedly supplying EOKA-B with weapons. He demanded the withdrawal of these officers and announced the reduction of conscription from 24 to 14 months. This would have resulted in the reduction of the 10,000-strong National Guard by half. 14 Early in Summer 1974 documents captured in the possession of leading EOKA-B members carried remarks in Ioannides’ handwriting, evidence that the organisation was controlled by Athens. Makarios now felt obliged to react and thus made his second mistake, thinking he could score an international victory by exposing the Junta and its interference in Cyprus’ ‘internal’ affairs. On 5 July 1974 he sent a letter to Greek President Gizikis demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Greek mainland officers from Cyprus. In addition, he ordered the arrest of four of the six members of the EOKA-B executive board and announced the establishment of a Greek mainland government-in-exile on Cyprus. The six-page letter to Gizikis was published on 8 July and constituted a general showdown with the Junta: Since the clandestine arrival of General Grivas in Cyprus in September 1971, rumours have been circulating and there have been reliable indications that he came to Cyprus at the instigation and with the encouragement of certain circles in Athens. In any case, it is certain that from the first days of his arrival here, Grivas was in touch with officers from Greece serving in the National Guard from whom he received help and support in his effort to set up an unlawful organisation (...) I am sorry to say, Mr. President, that the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens. It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread. In order to be absolutely clear, I say that cadres of the Greek military regime support and direct the activities of EOKA-B terrorist organisation (...) The guilt of the circles of the military regime is proved by documents which were found recently in the possession of leading cadres of EOKA-B. (...) I cannot say that I have a special liking for military regimes, particularly in Greece the birthplace and cradle of democracy. But even in this case, I have not departed from my principle of cooperation. Your realise, Mr. President, the sad thoughts which have been preoccupying and tormenting me since ascertaining that men of the Greek government are incessantly hatching conspiracies against me and, what is worse, are dividing Greek Cypriot people and pushing them towards catastrophic civil strife. I have more than once so far felt, and in some cases I have almost touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence. For the sake of national expediency, however, I kept silent (...) I would have continued to keep silent about the responsibility and role of the Greek government in the present drama of Cyprus if I had been the only one to

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suffer in the drama. But covering things up and keeping silent is not permissible when the entire Greek Cypriot people are suffering (...) The Greek government must take great responsibility for this attempt to abolish the state of Cyprus. The Cyprus state could be dissolved only in the event of Enosis. However, as Enosis is not feasible it is imperative that Cyprus should be strengthened as a state (...) The National Guard is an organ of the Cyprus state and should be controlled by it and not from Athens (...) The National Guard, with its present composition and staffing, has deviated from its aim and has become (...) a source of recruitment for EOKA-B (...) In conclusion, I convey that the Greek-officered National Guard, the plight of which has shaken the Cypriot people’s confidence in it, will be restructured on a new basis (...) I would ask that the Greek officers staffing the National Guard be recalled. Their remaining in the National Guard and commanding the force would be harmful to relations between Athens and Nicosia (...) I do not desire my cooperation with the Greek government to be interrupted. But it should be borne in mind that I am not an appointed prefect or locum tenens of the Greek government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and as such I demand an appropriate conduct by the National centre towards me. 15

Makarios’ miscalculation was that Ioannides would back down on the pretext of international exposure. In fact, the letter had the opposite effect and resulted in a catastrophe. The Greek Foreign Minister, Spyridon (Spyros) Tetenes, resigned on 9 July together with two other senior officials, apparently in protest about having been bypassed on behalf of the military regarding decisions relating to Cyprus. 16 On 13 July 1974 the Greek General Staff under the chairmanship of Greek President General Gizikis, met in Athens together with the Greek Ambassador to Cyprus, Efstathios Lagakos, the commander of the Cypriot National Guard, Georgios Denisis, and other leading Junta members to ‘discuss’ Makarios’ letter. 17 At this meeting it was decided to carry out a coup d’état and to liquidate Makarios. 18 The Cyprus crisis was to begin.

3 Coup d’état in Nicosia The First 48 Hours

First news of the coup d’état reached London through a telegram sent by High Commissioner Stephen Olver shortly after 7 o’clock GMT on 15 July 1974. 1

FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 178, 150705Z, 15 July 1974, TNA.

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About an hour later Olver could confirm that a coup had taken place and that Makarios was reported dead by the coupists: It looks increasingly like a coup organised by the Greek Contingent/Greekofficered elements of National Guard. Nicosia airport is sealed and controlled by tanks, presumably from Greek National Contingent at Waynes Keep. Tanks are flanking out from Nicosia airport area towards the city and Kykko Monastery, which had earlier been turned into barracks for Police Tactical Reserve [PTR], has been under tank and mortar attack. The Presidential Palace has been under attack by what look like regular troops since early this morning and is rumoured to have fallen; (…) CYTA [Cyprus Telecommunication Authority] is believed to be under control of the National Guard. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation seems similarly to have been taken over and has broadcast announcements that anyone intending to resist National Guard should lay down their arms and surrender. It has just announced the death of Makarios. 2

The National Guard had indeed taken the Cypriot radio station. The, announcement made by CYBC at 10:00 hrs was as follows: The National Guard intervened today to stop internecine war between the Greeks. The main purpose of the National Guard is to maintain order. The matter is internal between the Greeks alone. The National Guard at this moment is in control of the situation. Makarios is dead. Anybody interfering will be immediately executed. In a little while an order of the day to the Greek Cypriots will be issued. This is an internal matter. 3

Normal telephone and telegraph lines were cut and the Reuters correspondent could get his report out only with the assistance of the British Embassy. His first account gave a good picture of the events during the first day of the crisis. He wrote: Cypriot troops led by Greek officers fought running gun battles with police in this island capital Monday. Radio broadcast announced that President Archbishop Makarios had been killed in a coup. The broadcast named a new president, Nicos Sampson (…) Thick palls of black smoke hung over Nicosia Airport, the Presidential Palace and Police Headquarters. Machine-gun fire rattled sporadically in the streets, interspersed with the whistle of mortars and the roar of tank canon. A few Soviet-made T54 tanks were seen at key intersections near military bases. Eyewitnesses said the Presidential Palace was partially destroyed by heavy shelling from at least 10 tanks. Wounded soldiers were seen being admitted to Nicosia General Hospital (…) Radio announced that Makarios has been killed but did not say how. It urged

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Cypriots to rally around the ‘Government of National Salvation’ and said the National Guard had seized power to avert civil war. Hourly broadcasts blamed Makarios for causing ‘chaos in the ranks of the church.’ They promised free elections within 12 month. No change in Cypriot foreign policy or alignment and continuation of Intercommunal talks (…) [Radio] later announced that Maj. Andreas Pantazis, Head of Makarios’ personal bodyguard had surrendered with some of his special police. Hundreds of foreign tourists were stranded in their hotels when military units closed all harbours and airports (…) General curfew [was announced]. In Nicosia, the takeover was heralded by a siren blast at 0630 GMT, immediately followed by outbreaks of shooting in various Greek areas of the city. The Turkish enclave was quiet, but Turkish troops and a few civilians were seen carrying machine guns. Blue-beret soldiers of the United Nation Peace-Keeping Force here patrolled the outskirts of the Turkish area in full combat gear to prevent the Greek conflict from escalating into intercommunal fighting (…) There were reports of a ‘confused situation’ and small skirmishes from other population centres on the Island. 4

While the coup itself was conducted with vigour and efficiency, the political foundations were virtually non-existent. The eventual ‘President’ was Nicos Sampson, a journalist, who had been charged with the murder of a British captain during the EOKA campaign in 1956. Sentenced to death on 1 January 1957, his verdict was later commuted to life imprisonment, and in 1959 he was pardoned, after which he founded the right-wing daily newspaper Machi (Battle) using a grant from the Kykko monastery. (He later confessed to the murder in an article in his paper.) During the 1963/64 intercommunal civil war he led a paramilitary force against the Turkish Cypriots which earned him the reputation of being a ‘Tourkofagos’ (Turk-eater). Having fallen out with Makarios, he founded (in 1969) the Progressive Party (Proodeftiki Komma), which merged in 1970 with Odysseas Ioannides’ organisation into the Progressive Front (Proodeftiki Parataxis). He joined EOKA-B in 1971. 5 US Ambassador to Athens, Henry J. Tasca, described Sampson as an ‘out and out gangster, a gorilla type with no compunctions against murder and assassination. He may be considered as potentially a pliable tool for Ioannides, but it seems more likely he would be a marked liability in most respects.’ 6 According to Sampson’s own account published in Machi he had no advance notice of the plan to overthrow Makarios. In fact, there were at least two other persons who were asked to take the office of President before Sampson was approached; the Chief Justice, Michael Triantafyllides, and Zenon Severis. Triantafyllides, who was head of the Supreme Court, was in Strasbourg attending a Council of Europe meeting at the time of the coup. Severis, who later became Health

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Minister, refused on account of his heart condition. According to Olver, a third person, Judge L. Loizou, had refused the job. 7 As details of the new ‘government’ emerged it sounded like a who’s-who of EOKA-B and other rightist organisations. The other members of the cabinet were Dimis Dimitriou (Foreign Affairs), Kyriacos Saveriades (Communications and Works), Pantelis Dimitriou (Internal Affairs and Defence), Costas Adamides (Justice), Andreas Parisinos (Under Minister to the President), Spiros Papageorgiou (Director of the Public Information Office), 8 Odysseas (Odysseus) Ioannides (Health), Andreas Neocleous (Agriculture and Natural Resources), Panayiotis Dimitriou (Education), 9 Iannakis Droussiotis (Labour), 10 and; Aris Hadjigeorghiou (Commerce, Industry and Finance 11 ). In addition, Doris Pierides, a councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed as Ambassador in Athens and Loukis Papaphilippou as Cyprus Permanent Representative to the UN. 12 Kyriacos Saveriades (Communications and Works) was a Famagusta lawyer. He was a member of the right-wing Pancyprian Human Rights Committee and was vice-president of the Committee for the Co-ordination of the Enosis Struggle (ESEA). He spoke at the 40-day memorial service for General Grivas, giving a strongly anti-Makarios speech, which embarrassed the Greek Ambassador, Efstathios Lagakos. He had been arrested on 11 July along with Eleftherios Papadopoulos, the EOKA-B leader for Nicosia, and had claimed that he was physically abused after arrest. Pantelis Dimitriou (Internal Affairs and Defence) was a businessman from Larnaca who had a long EOKA record and was, according to Olver, ‘reportedly anti-British.’ Costas Adamides (Justice) was a lawyer who had signed the manifesto of the ESEA (20 November 1971). He undertook the legal defence of many arrested persons, particularly right-wingers charged with anti-Makarios activities. Spyros Papageorgiou (Public Information Office) was described by Olver as a ‘skilful professional journalist.’ In 1973 he worked simultaneously full-time for Eleftheria (daily), wrote for Patris (bi-weekly), edited Tharros (weekly), and edited the weekly newspaper of the nationalist trade union Synomosponia Ergaton Kyprou (SEK). 13 He signed the ESEA manifesto, was a close contact of Grivas, and latterly was said to be the only journalist who saw Grivas regularly. According to Olver’s information he was involved in the editing of Grivas’ memoirs. Odysseas Ioannides (Health) founded the Progressive Front (Proodeftiki Parataxis) in 1969. He became a prominent member of EOKA-B in 1971.

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He had already been Health Minister under Makarios and agreed to carry on in this post. Andreas Neocleous (Agriculture and Natural Resources), a Limassol lawyer, had been Member of the House of Representatives for Limassol since 1970. Olver described him as ‘strongly anti-Makarios‘ and ‘on the right wing of [Clerides’] Unified Party.’ Panayiotis Dimitriou (Education), an advocate from Nicosia, was recruited into the Unified Party by the former Interior Minister Polycarpos Georghadjis whose protege he was. In 1969 he was elected Assistant General Secretary and became a member of the five-man Political Bureau of the Unified Party. He was a member of the House of Representatives for Nicosia from 1970. He defended Antonakis Solomondos, one of four men convicted of the attempt on the Archbishop’s life in March 1970. 14 Andreas Parisinos (Under Minister to the President), a dentist, and Iannakis Droussiotis, a lawyer from Paphos, were personal friends of Sampson and previously unknown as political activists. Dimis (Dimitrios) Dimitriou (Foreign Affairs) was probably the exception among the other radical members of the government. He was from a prominent Larnaca family. His brother Nicos Dimitriou was Cyprus’ Ambassador to Washington and a former Minister of Commerce and Industry. Dimitriou was a former Chairman of the Cyprus Employers’ Federation, an industrialist described by Olver as ‘highly intelligent’ and ‘basically friendly.’ 15 His appointment was widely regarded as a gesture of good will toward the Turkish Cypriots. This move, coupled with the continuation, announced later, of Clerides’ role as negotiator in the intercommunal talks, was intended to forestall any Turkish intervention in Cyprus: hence the repeated references to the coup as an ‘internal GreekCypriot affair.’ The coupists failed to convince Dimitrios’ brother Nicos to stay on as ambassador of the new government in Washington and also to represent Cyprus in the United Nations, replacing Zenon Rossides who had been ‘relieved of his duties.’ Nicos Dimitriou told his brother that his loyalties to Makarios did not allow him to accept the UN assignment. He later told the British Ambassador to the US, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, that he was inclined to stay on as long as the US would not recognise the new regime. 16 The regime’s new Foreign Minister, Dimis Dimitriou, informed High Commissioner Olver on 17 July that he had a ‘guarded assurance’ that Glafkos Clerides would continue to function as President of the House and that the intercommunal talks would continue with Clerides representing the Greek side. 17 The announcement that Clerides would continue as negotiator was only possible after he was subjected to heavy pressure. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Luiz Weckmann-Muños, told

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Olver ‘in strict confidence that Clerides sought to obtain certain precise assurances, including very early parliamentary elections, before agreeing to carry on the intercommunal talks. These assurances were not forthcoming. Clerides subsequently agreed to carry on after a visit from a representative of Gizikis who threatened him with dire consequences.’ 18 The political side of the coup was ill prepared indeed. If the Chief Justice was the first choice for the presidency, why was he absent at the time the coup was launched? Even stranger is the choice of Sampson. Did the instigators totally ignore his reputation as Tourkofagos? Moreover, could they not foresee the probable Turkish reaction to a military takeover by the National Guard, which was known for its connection to EOKA-B? As High Commissioner Olver put it: ‘The miscalculations were enormous: the consequences disastrous.’ 19 British intelligence did not predict the coup d’état. According to the Commander of the British Forces Near East (Cyprus), John Aiken, ‘reliable sources had for some time confirmed that a coup was inevitable but indications were that the plan was to mount it in October.’ 20 Makarios’ letter had probably precipitated the event earlier than scheduled. High Commissioner Olver equally reported that a ‘coup had always been a possibility and most observers of the Cyprus scene were agreed that the attitude of the National Guard would be crucial to the success and failure of any move against Makarios.’ 21 While the coup did not come as a total surprise, British intelligence failed to recognise the actual preparations in Cyprus and Greece. The British Fortnightly Intelligence Summary for the period 19 June–2 July 1974 of the Joint intelligence Group did not contain any hint of a possible coup. Regarding Makarios’ decision to reduce conscription from two years to 14 months, and his call on Greece to withdraw its officers from Cyprus, it was commented: ‘To date there is no public comment from the Greek Government either about the Cyprus Government’s announcement that members of the Greek regime are behind EOKA-B and Cyprus Government proposed changes in the National Guard.’ 22 And on 8 July Olver wrote to the Foreign Office that ‘a coup can I believe be ruled out.’ 23 Consequently, Britain was not prepared for the coup and had to improvise a reaction to it. In a first statement to the House of Commons on the afternoon of 15 July, the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, refrained from hinting at Greek mainland involvement and referred very generally to the obligations Britain (and the other guarantors) might have under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. 24 According to that treaty, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain had the right to come together for consultations in the event of danger to the constitutional order and to intervene jointly or, if this was impossible, individually. 25

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However, during Question Time, Callaghan was pressed to answer whether Britain had any responsibility for ‘internal security.’ In answering the question presented by the MP Mr. Grimond, Callaghan stated: ‘No. We have no such responsibility. We have the right to consult the other governments who are signatories of the Treaty of Guarantee. That is what I have set in motion today to ensure that security is maintained in the island and that there is no attack from outside.’ 26 Not everybody in the House was happy with that statement, since it did not seem to correspond with the exact wording of the treaty. Another MP, Mrs. Jaeger, asked Callaghan to ‘pay some attention’ to Article Four of the treaty, which pointed out that ‘where common concerted action may not be possible, each of the three Guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take some action.’ Jaeger went on to express her belief that it was ‘a fact that the setting up of the British Sovereign Bases was a part and parcel of [the British] agreement to guarantee the integrity under the constitution as then laid down.’ She urged Callaghan ‘to bear this very much in mind during the next few hours.’ 27 Callaghan remained vague in his answer. While he agreed that the article gave Britain rights, he stated that ‘we are in the early hours of this event.’ He stressed that ‘those who led the coup [said] that foreign policy [would] not change.’ However, he was not sure ‘how much reliance’ could be attached to such statements and expressed the belief that the integrity, security and independence of Cyprus were vital to the whole House. 28 Callaghan refused to commit himself to Sir G. Sinclair’s suggestion that the independence of Cyprus was ‘called into question by the National Guard’s actions in trying to achieve precipitate Enosis.’ Instead, he said that he did ‘not know at the moment whether the actions of the Greek officers and the National Guard were taken of themselves, or were inspired elsewhere’ and reserved judgement on that ‘for the time being.’ Answering suggestions by Sinclair that the ‘danger of serious disagreement, if not worse, between Greece and Turkey’ was ‘just over the horizon again’ and by Mr. David Watkins that the government should use ‘all possible influence to avoid (…) the possibility of war between Greece and Turkey with Cyprus as the battlefield’, Callaghan outlined what would become the mainstream of British policy during the crisis: Of course. That is why I have taken an initiative this morning in all directions. I was glad to see that in a speech he made this morning (…) the Turkish Prime Minister indicated (…) that violence of this sort could solve no problems. Talking to a Turkish audience, he made quite clear in what he said of his feelings about the death of Archbishop Makarios. 29

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Accordingly, military intervention on behalf of the elected [Greek Cypriot] government of Cyprus was not a British consideration. The real aim was to prevent war between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Meanwhile, a most unwelcome suggestion reached London from the Soviet Union. The Soviet councillor to Nicosia, Beliaev, acting on his ambassador’s instruction, had approached Olver in order to discuss the following points: a) The Soviet Union had firm information of Greek (mainland) involvement, and it ‘considered this an inadmissible intervention by Greece against the legitimate democratic Government of Cyprus.’ b) What would the British Government’s reaction be if the Soviet Government were to send troops to restore the situation? Olver commented, on a personal basis – but clearly in line with British policy – that it would be ‘undesirable for the large forces already on the island to be further augmented from outside.’ 30 Thus another feature of British policy towards the crisis became apparent – to avoid Soviet involvement. Throughout the crisis, American foreign policy – and many of the country’s internal affairs as well – were almost totally under Henry Kissinger’s authority. President Nixon, for his part, clearly indicated that he was not interested in the Cyprus issue. He was far too much engaged in his own battle for political survival and told Kissinger on 18 July: ‘We’ll try not to commit ourselves here. I’ll leave it to you (…) We just – We want to try to avoid Cyprus.’ Kissinger said that he only wanted to inform Nixon and would ‘take it from here.’ 31 In spite of Kissinger’s later statements that information about the coup was ‘not exactly lying in the street’, rumours about it were known to the State Department well in advance. 32 The Leader of the Greek Military Junta, Dimitrios Ioannides, told the American Ambassador to Athens, Henry J. Tasca, on 14 July that he saw one of two things happening in Cyprus: either Cyprus would slowly drift left and become a ‘Cuba of the Mediterranean’ or the 80 per-cent Greek majority would ‘achieve union with Greece.’ The one thing that could not happen was union with Turkey. 33 On 17 May the State Department Area Specialist for Cyprus, Thomas D. Boyatt, upon his receipt of CIA reports, anticipated trouble in Cyprus and attempted to do something about it. He wrote that ‘If the National Guard and EOKA-B succeed in getting rid of Makarios, a direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey would be inevitable.’ 34 However, on 24 June Tasca argued against any strong actions and made a low-key representation to the Greek Government instead of talking to the Military, which was really in charge in Athens. Tasca agreed that the

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intensification of EOKA-B activities could result in a deterioration of Makarios’ position. Tasca thought that ‘co-existence between Makarios and Ioannides over any extended period of time was difficult to imagine.’ Therefore, he said that the ‘possibility cannot be excluded that Ioannides was encouraging EOKA-B to render Makarios’ functioning difficult, to say the least, and to arrange his removal from the scene, to say the most.’ Tasca stated that, while there was no hard evidence for Ioannides’ clandestine support for EOKA-B’s campaign of violence, there was ‘clear evidence of links between EOKA-B leadership and the Greek regime.’ However, Tasca still did not think the US Government should do anything other than ‘keeping a tentative watching brief and encourage the UN SecretaryGeneral and NATO Secretary-General to work directly with LondonZurich signatories for maintenance of stability and order in Cyprus.’ 35 On 1 July Tasca again argued against an approach through whatever discrete channel to Ioannides, and to convey US views concerning possible efforts to remove Makarios from power by violent means. He said that the Greek Government was fully aware of US opposition and had repeatedly emphasised publicly its own view that the Cyprus issue should be settled through intercommunal talks, and not through violence. In his view, there would be no possible Greek/Greek-Cypriot differences before early September, when the question of new mainland cadet officers for the National Guard would arise. Therefore, Tasca argued, the prudent course was to wait until the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Roger Davies, had had contacts with Makarios and other leading personalities in Cyprus. Finally, Tasca argued that a direct approach to Ioannides would tend to make the US a major participant in the Cyprus problem, a ‘role we have deliberately thought to avoid.’ 36 On 14 July the CIA reported that Ioannides had decided not to intervene, and on 15 July, the day of the actual coup, the CIA summary contained a statement to the same effect. A State Department’s ex-post assessment was that Ioannides had deliberately misled the US Government. Consequently, the intelligence on Cyprus was at best ‘conflicting’ and Kissinger had clearly no clear forewarning of the day of the coup. 37 Direct American involvement, at least, on behalf of the Secretary of State or of high-ranking CIA officers, can thus be ruled out. There are nevertheless some indications that somebody at the US Embassy had encouraged the Greek colonels, as a US document recording a telephone conversation on 24 July between US Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, and Kissinger, which has been released in part, reads:

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CYPRUS AT WAR S[chlesinger]: The subject he [Sisco] should brief you on … Some of the weaknesses we perceived in the Embassy in Athens on this thing. (SANITIZED) 38 K[issinger]: The overthrow in Cyprus? S: …they may have thought they had American acquiescence. (SANITIZED) S: Yes, I can see that. K: If this is true I’ll have to talk to [US State Department’s Under Secretary] Sisco about it. Then I have a basis for doing something.’ 39

Even though there are parts missing in the document, it appears that the Greeks ‘may have thought they had American acquiescence’ because of the ‘weaknesses (…) perceived in the Embassy in Athens.’ Kissinger’s determination to get rid of Tasca, which will be dealt with later, might have been boosted by this ‘weakness.’ As the news of the coup broke, there was, however, no doubt in Washington that Ioannides was behind it. Kissinger was informed by his department in the morning of 15 July that ‘this situation is the “dynamic” solution to Athens’ concern about Makarios that Junta leader Ioannides, according to reliable intelligence, has been speculating on in recent weeks.’ 40 If there were any doubts left about Ioannides’ involvement, they were laid to rest in a telegram Tasca sent in the late afternoon stating that the evidence to date seems clearly to implicate Ioannides with the coup in Cyprus (…) The brutality of the operation as well as the skillful manner in which it was pursued indicate once again how dangerous and unreliable General Ioannides can really be (…) Makarios apparently misjudged Ioannides, believing his confrontation with Turkey would make him more amenable to elimination of Greek National Guard officers (…) Instead, in the Ioannides posture, there is evidence the Greek military considered the Greek military presence in Cyprus important in their own overall military posture vis-à-vis Turkey, because it kept important Turkish forces in southern Turkey and away from Aegean and European areas (…) Available information (see EHA 019, EHA 912 and ECN-112 July 8) indicates GOG [Government of Greece] made last effort to deter Makarios but failing had clearly completed contingency plans to remove him. Dep[artmen]t will recall that earlier Ioannides stated flatly he could get rid of Makarios within 24 hours whenever he wished. 41

In a further State Department memorandum the Secretary was informed that ‘Our ally Greece has precipitated the Cyprus leader’s removal and is installing a government more favorable to Athens. In short, through proxy (Greek officered National Guard) it has interfered and changed the Cyprus

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Government.’ Kissinger was warning of the dangers for NATO and the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey were to ‘react strongly in a military way, perhaps invading, if the Turkish community appear[ed] threatened.’ Among the immediate issues to be discussed at the meeting of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) on the Crisis were the protection and preservation of US installations on the island. 42 At the WSAG meeting, which took place at 10:15 a.m. on 15 July, the group decided that the current US objective was to avoid internationalisation. Apart from that, no clear decisions were made: ‘While we watch the situation, we will operate on (and make it known) our assumption that the sovereignty and integrity of Cyprus as a nation will be maintained.’ The group opted to seek information through the Embassies in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia. ‘Our public line will reflect our understanding that the sovereignty and integrity of Cyprus will be protected and our impression that the problem remains internalized on Cyprus. We will privately low-key the situation in Athens, informing the Greeks of this position.’ 43 Avoiding internationalisation had two aims: to forestall war between Greece and Turkey and to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the crisis. Nevertheless, fears of Soviet involvement came to the forefront as Britain informed Kissinger about the Soviet councillors’ suggestion to Olver that Soviet troops be introduced to restore order. Kissinger immediately called the Soviet Ambassador, Anatol Dobrynin, and said: ‘I can’t believe this (…) You know, we would not look on it with favor.’ Dobrynin told him that he had no information on this. 44 Meanwhile in Cyprus, the British forces were trying to organise the return of 4,450 British service personnel from the bases to the dormitory towns of Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta. As convoys were assembled in the Western SBA Akrotiri, they encountered Makarios supporters: At this stage renewed outbreaks of fighting on the route into Limassol prevented the convoys to start, a column of at least 1,000 Makarios supporters from the Paphos district overtook the British convoy on the M1 [road on the SBA south of Episkopi and Kolossi] and then split towards Kolossi and Zakaki, on the two principal routes to Limassol. The convoy from Paphos consisted of a few PTR [Police Tactical Reserve] patrols interspersed with a lot of irregulars armed with anything from muzzle-loaders to World War II Japanese field guns. For a while this volatile crowd was drawn up alongside the British convoy and a most uneasy situation [developed]. The British vehicles could not be turned round in the congested roadway and in the face of questioning cheers of ‘Makarios, eh?’ the occupants could do little else but smile back with wanly feigned enthusiasm.

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CYPRUS AT WAR Subsequently, heavy firing broke out only a few hundred yards from the M1 assembly point as Makarios’ supporters ran into a well established N[ational] G[uard] road block at Kolossi. It was here and at Ypsonas, 3 miles further along the road to Limassol, that the major battle in the Limassol area developed in which it was later reported some 40 of Makarios’ supporters were killed. 45

Fierce fighting continued until dawn. The main battles in Limassol centred upon the police stations, all of which eventually capitulated to National Guard forces, despite the counter action by those Makarios supporters from Paphos who entered the town via the Zakaki route. These were subsequently seen ‘bedraggled and in full retreat’ returning through the Western British SBA at about 0630 hrs on 16 July. 46 The Commander of the British Forces in Cyprus reported that compared to Limassol, in Larnaca and Famagusta opposition to the coup was much more easily subdued. 47 Apart from Paphos, Cyprus was now in National Guard hands. Even though all internal communications were cut, Olver could report that fighting did not cease in other parts of Cyprus. He informed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that ‘bitter fighting was continuing around the District Police Station in Limassol.’ 48 At 1322 hrs GMT first news reached the Foreign Office that Makarios might have survived. Olver cabled that the police network relayed a request by the President to broadcast this fact and that the Bishop of Paphos had asked for UN intervention on behalf of Makarios. 49 Turkish Cypriots watched the fighting with fear. But the National Guard and EOKA-B, apparently on strict orders from Athens, avoided any confrontation or attacks on them. The Turkish Embassy confirmed to the British Ambassador on 16 July that there had been so far no intercommunal incidents and no aggressive acts on the part of the Greek Cypriot Community against the Turkish Cypriots. 50 On the morning of 15 July Denktaş had made an announcement on Bayrak radio, in which he told the Turkish Cypriots that the situation was believed to be ‘among the Greeks, our duty is to protect our own internal security, take defense measures, and not to get involved in any manner in the events taking place among the Greeks. Our citizens should avoid traveling as much as possible.’ 51 In Ankara a statement was issued by the Defence Minister and Acting Foreign Minister, Hasan Işık, on the morning of 15 July 1974: It has been learned that a coup d’état has taken place in the Greek sector of Cyprus. Although it has been stated that this intervention is aimed solely at the Greek Cypriot administration it is known that the question of Cyprus is

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an international problem and it is a problem in which Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the two communities in Cyprus have undertakings based on agreements. It is natural that Turkey will not allow this action to violate the status quo in any way. Cyprus is an independent state in which both the Turkish and Greek communities live together without each dominating the other and will so remain. It is obvious that the Turkish Government is observing the subject with due importance and will not fail to take the necessary precautions. 52

The Director General of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mümtaz Soysal, contacted the British Ambassador with reference to the consultations envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee. Asked if he could give details about the ‘necessary precautions’ mentioned by the Defence Minister, Soysal said that the Turks were still at the ‘stage of consultation and assessment.’ 53 Alarmed by the possibility of a Turkish military move, Callaghan sent similarly worded notes to Athens and Ankara expressing his concern about the dangerous situation, which could have serious implications for the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and for the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. He urged that the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus should be maintained and asked both governments for their comments on the situation as they saw it. 54 While the British Ambassador in Athens was instructed to inform the Greek Government that a similar note had been submitted to Ankara, the UK Embassy in Ankara was told that apart from doing precisely that, an oral message should be added informing the Turkish Foreign Minister that ‘while we understand how gravely the Turks must be concerned about the situation, I hope very much that they will avoid any kind of precipitate action or intervention at this stage. It seems that fighting is primarily between members of the Greek-Cypriot community. In these circumstances it is clearly essential, if the conflict is not to spread, for the Turkish Government to display extreme patience.’ 55 At the same time, Callaghan aimed to streamline British policy with Washington and asked the UK Ambassador to inform the State Department immediately of these messages, together with an oral message to Kissinger asking for his ‘view of the situation, for information on any action which he may contemplate, and for any information about the course of events which he [could give].’ 56 The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, asked the Foreign Office for advice on whether the United Kingdom should take the initiative in referring the current situation in Cyprus to the Security Council. The head of the South European Department (SED), Alan C. Goodison, informed

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Downing Street that ‘the grounds on which we should ask for a Security Council debate would have to be that the situation constituted a danger to international peace and security. This is an awkward assertion for us to make. The principal grounds for regarding the events in Cyprus as constituting such a danger are the possibility of Turkish armed intervention. We must take no action which makes this possibility greater or points a finger publicly at Turkey. A Security Council meeting now, while the situation is still very unclear, could encourage the parties concerned to make provocative statements in public, which could make the situation worse, not better.’ 57 In other words, Britain should wait to see who would prevail during the fighting and do nothing to intervene on behalf of Makarios. In an ITN television interview on 19 July Callaghan said that ‘it wouldn’t be very sensible to put him back by using force if it was against the will of the people.’ 58 Meanwhile Sampson himself broadcasted that he had accepted the office of president and stated that he would follow the general policy set out in the ‘order of the day.’ 59 Although some firing continued, Nicosia was now for the most part in National Guard control with the airport, palace, Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA), and Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in their hands. A new ‘Radio Free Paphos’ announced that Makarios was alive and the British High Commissioner, Olver, reported that outside Nicosia the situation was still unclear. There were reports that both Famagusta and Paphos remained in pro-Makarios hands, with shooting reported in Limassol and Famagusta and perhaps also Kyrenia (though this might, in Olver’s view, have been celebration). Meanwhile, the Turkish Fighters had been brought to an increased state of alert but were not making any obstructive movements. 60 Olver was the first to suggest that recognition of the Sampson regime should at least not be ruled out as an option. He proposed that once the situation settled, and as soon as it became possible to establish contact with the ‘Government of National Salvation’, he would be able to make recommendations about recognition. He assumed that ‘when the time comes, our normal criteria’ would apply, and displayed no real concern about Greek mainland involvement in the coup, stating that ‘although there is strong circumstantial evidence of mainland Greek involvement, this is not yet proven.’ He carried on that ‘unless otherwise instructed’ he would ‘refuse to comment on HMG’s attitude and in particular … [would] avoid any suggestions that HMG might become involved in any way.’ He emphasised that he had already turned down requests for British intervention from pro-Makarios Cypriots (e.g., the Bishop of Kitium). 61 Two days later he reported that he had informed the ‘the new Foreign

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Secretary’, Dimitriou, that Britain ‘had and did not now intend to use the [British] base’ for the purpose of intervention. 62 In his first reaction to the British note, Hasan Esat Işık, the Turkish Minister of National Defence and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, indicated that Turkey might intervene if there was to be no common British-Turkish action as Guarantor Powers. He said ‘that intervention was undesirable but did not affirm that it was unthinkable.’ He stressed that ‘he looked to the United Kingdom as a Guarantor to exercise their power positively, and publicly, by making it clear that they supported the independence of the island and the right of the Turkish community to live in freedom and equality with the Greek Cypriots.’ 63 While Olver was still speculating on recognition, the British Embassy to the United States reported the ‘State Department have no doubt that the Greek Government are behind the coup, but hope to avoid having to say so publicly. They see a serious danger of the Turkish Cypriots being drawn into the fighting, and deplore the appointment of Sampson as President, which will be badly received by the Turks.’ 64 There was no suggestion that the US Government would recognise Sampson, thereby consenting to a fait accompli. By now, Makarios’ survival had been confirmed by the local UNFICYP Commander in Paphos, who had seen him, 65 and later by a dramatic broadcast the Archbishop made to the people of Cyprus. Speaking from a secret ‘Free Cyprus Radio Station’ he said ‘I was the target for the Athens Military Junta, but they have failed. The military coup by the Junta will not succeed. The only thing they have managed to achieve so far was to take over the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. They have been trying to get me for a long time and now they have decided to destroy Cyprus and its people. But they will not succeed. They will have to face the determination of the people of Cyprus to resist and fight.’ His voice quivered with emotion as he appealed to the Greek Cypriot people to rally round him and added, ‘Together we will carry on the sacred resistance and win freedom.’ He ended his broadcast with ‘Long live freedom. Long live Cyprus.’ 66 However, resistance was not boosted by the broadcast. Olver reported that after sporadic firing during the night, Nicosia was ‘now quiet’ and seemed ‘firmly in National Guard hands.’ The National Guard was believed to be in control in Famagusta, Larnaca, Kyrenia, and Limassol. The exception was Paphos, which was solidly pro-Makarios. A confrontation there seemed imminent. In the early morning of 16 July a convoy comprising five armoured cars, four field guns, and upwards of 15 lorries was seen heading westward out of Nicosia towards Paphos. 67 The last

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phase of the coup was imminent, and the life of the Archbishop was again in danger. Though Makarios’ supporters and left-wing activists were arrested, questioned, and in some cases tortured, mass executions or widespread assassinations did not occur. Olver reported on 19 July: ‘We have no evidence so far of inhuman treatment, though I would not exclude this in individual cases.’ 68 While the Central Committee of the communist AKEL later spoke of an ‘endless list of the coup d’état’s tragic victims’, its own account of the event listed only 18 victims of which nine were actually murdered, while the rest were either killed in battle or ambush. 69 Much worse things might have happened if the Sampson regime had survived. As will be shown later, after the Turkish landing in Cyprus most of the Makarios supporters were immediately released and enlisted into the National Guard. Those responsible for the crimes committed during the coup d’état were never really brought to justice. This was due to a kind of informal national truce formed after the Turkish ‘invasion’, preventing the origins of the tragedy being dealt with.

The Evacuation of Makarios The National Guard’s advance towards Paphos was delayed in Limassol on the afternoon of 16 July by two returning British convoys. Makarios, who had been in the Bishop’s Palace in Paphos, used this delay to move to the sanctuary of UNFICYP in the Paphos area (under the protection of a captain and a detachment of the British Coldstream Guards serving with the UNFICYP). 70 Following his broadcast, Makarios’ situation became inceasingly dangerous. At around noon, with the Bishop’s Palace under fire from National Guard boats lying just off the harbour and a National Guard force approaching from Nicosia via Morphou, Makarios concluded that his refuge in Paphos had become untenable. Therefore, he asked Olver to arrange for him to be evacuated from Cyprus. Olver asked the FCO for authorisation, and sent notice to the Commander of the British Forces Near East (CBFNE), John Aiken, to prepare for Operation SKYLARK, 71 a contingency plan for the evacuation of Makarios in the event of a coup that had existed since February 1972. 72 Aiken immediately alerted 84 Squadron (Whirlwind helicopters) and put his own Argosy aircraft at the President’s disposal to take him off the island. Aiken was keen to keep the operation secret, ‘because of the probable adverse reaction of the N[ational] G[uard] and the vulnerability of British families to any act of retaliation.’ 73 He decided therefore not to use yellow Save-and-Rescue (SAR) helicopters and ordered a camouflaged one from the British UN detachment in Nicosia to stand by. According to Aiken, the UN were very anxious that the rescue operation should not be directly attributable to them and, at their request,

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the UN markings were covered. On its departure from RAF Akrotiri, the helicopter headed inland to make its approach to the Paphos UN helipad from the direction of Nicosia, a well established route which would arouse least suspicion in the minds of observers on the ground. To conceal the fact that Makarios was being flown to the Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) Akrotiri, where there was always the probability that he might have to be held for a while, the helicopter made a similar detour when it left Paphos at 1625 hrs with Makarios and three of his aides on board. 74 Aiken reported that ‘throughout the whole operation time was of the essence. It was clear that the NG were taking up positions for major attack on Paphos thus, with the delay in receiving authority from Whitehall, the airlift, albeit unopposed was a decidedly “close run thing”.’ It had been apparent for some time that Paphos would be the focal point of resistance to the Greek National Guard, and at the time SKYLARK was mounted the National Guard was grouping its forces for a major attack, which would almost certainly have resulted in the death or capture of Makarios. In the event, SKYLARK went off smoothly and was successful, although in Aiken’s opinion ‘had the decision to mount it been significantly delayed, or had the National Guard followed up its earlier success more quickly the British may not have saved Makarios and might have lost a helicopter and crew in the attempt. 75 A brief battle for Paphos occurred soon afterwards but, demoralised by the departure of their leader, the Makarios supporters offered little resistance and quickly capitulated. 76 Meanwhile, Whitehall attempted to delay Makarios’ departure from Cyprus in order to decide where to send him. When Callaghan informed Kissinger that Makarios was on the SBA, the American Secretary of State said, ‘If that is the case, we don’t want to have him leading an outside movement and ask for Soviet help.’ Callaghan agreed and asked: ‘What should we do with him? He may want to come here. Actually, he’ll probably want to go to New York to talk.’ 77 Consequently, Callaghan tried to stall Makarios’ arrival in the United Kingdom. Aiken protested that this would do untold damage to the British position in the SBAs once the National Guard were aware that ‘we had spirited His Beatitude away.’ Aiken continued that ‘at worst the NG could have entered Sovereign territory in force.’ The FCO had reservations about rapid onward transit especially because of lack of knowledge at the time of Makarios’ desired destination; however, Aiken’s arguments prevailed and, after a slight pause at RAF Akrotiri, Makarios boarded an aircraft, which was airborne at 1702 hrs, bound for Malta. Malta was chosen as the next stopping point because of the limited range of the Argosy aircraft and the presence of British installations at Luqa airport. Very early in the flight an enquiry from Callaghan as to Makarios’ ultimate destination was relayed to the aircraft.

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The escorting officer, Wg Cdr Hodgkinson of RAF Akrotiri, conferred with Makarios and elicited the reply that he ‘had no concrete plans’ but that his ‘final destination was London.’ From other preparations and remarks that Makarios was making, Hodgkinson deduced that he was envisaging a grand arrival at a major London Airport. Judging that this would be embarrassing to Her Majesty’s Government, he attempted to dissuade him and play for time. At this stage, Makarios had not been told that his immediate destination was Malta. When Hodgkinson told him this was the case, and that he did not know what arrangements were being made for any onward journey, the Archbishop agreed to amend his stated destination to ‘the United Kingdom’ and to delay sending any message about reception arrangements. Makarios arrived in Malta at 2130 hrs local time. Callaghan had told the British High Commissioner in Malta, W.R. Haydon, that he did not want Makarios to fly to London that night and would rather that he came by boat. Haydon was to tell the Maltese Prime Minister, Dom Mintoff, that ‘we thought Makarios should have a night’s rest.’ Haydon should not agree to Makarios’ going to London from Malta until he had first got in touch with London again to ask for instructions. Haydon reported that Mintoff ‘saw a great deal of kudos in being able to tell the world that Makarios was coming to Malta and was concerned, as we were – for quite different reasons – that Makarios should spend the night in Malta.’ Meeting Makarios, Haydon was surprised by the ‘extraordinary freshness of appearance and calm of the Archbishop. I had met him at the UN in the early 60s and, quite frankly, I thought he looked ten years younger now than he did then. His eyes were clear, there was hardly a wrinkle on his face, his hands were steady and he was able to talk freely about his experiences.’ Haydon complained that the Maltese representatives left the task of persuading Makarios to stay entirely to him and said that ‘it was perhaps a unique experience for me to feel glad when I saw Mintoff arrive. He went straight aboard the aircraft with me and a really memorable Mediterranean scene was then enacted. The two men sat together in the Argosy and Mintoff put his hand on Makarios’ and said in a wheedling, pleading tone, that he really must stay the night, or longer if he wished, so that he would be refreshed and fit to fight the battle which was not only his own but ‘our battles.’ As the Archbishop continued to resist, Mintoff kept on saying to me ‘am I not right, is that not what Mr. Callaghan wants?’ and I put in my oar as often as possible in support of Mintoff. It was an interesting marriage of convenience, but I was very aware of the shortcomings of the Anglo-Saxon in that emotion-charged atmosphere.’ 78 Makarios still declined Mintoff’s offer and insisted that he should continue his journey to London as soon as possible. At this point it was ‘discovered’ that the aircraft had ‘one or two problems’ and could not leave

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for at least an hour or two. Finally, Mintoff and Haydon managed to persuade Makarios ‘that it would be better all round for him to spend the night in Malta.’ Makarios agreed reluctantly but insisted that he must leave Luqa airport at 0900 hrs the next morning. 79 He stayed overnight with the Governor General, and was flown out next morning to Lyneham military airport. 80 While Makarios was safe, Whitehall made it clear that further evacuations of politicians from Cyprus were not intended. During the evening of 17 July Makarios asked the British Government for the clandestine evacuation from Cyprus of his Private Secretary and two other ‘wanted’ Makarios men. John Aiken, following consultation with Olver, advised against acceptance of this request, because of the effect it might have on the working relationship which had been established with the new regime. He emphasised that in his opinion the Archbishop was ungrateful: ‘Not to put too fine a point on it, his Beatitude was extremely fortunate in the bread he was given, now he is asking for cake.’ 81 The FCO stated that applications for asylum in the High Commission or the SBAs should not be accepted except in cases of ‘hot pursuit.’ In the event of the coup no further applications for asylum were received. 82

Contingency Plans and Delaying Tactics Britain and the US were facing tough decisions about what to do during the next few days. Should they continue to recognise Makarios as President of Cyprus? If so, how should Britain act as Guarantor Power? Should it consider intervening on behalf of Makarios? British contingency planning for Cyprus included five scenarios: 83 a) ABLAUT – Reinforcement of British forces by a brigade group of two battalions in the event of an internal security breakdown. 84 b) ENTIRETY – Service assistance in evacuating British subjects and friendly nationals in the event of a Greek/Turkish conflict. c) FALLACY – Evacuation of British subjects and friendly nationals (including service dependants from the SBAs). d) PLATYPUS – Replacement of local labour units in service establishments by service personnel from UK. 85 e) SKYLARK – Evacuation of Makarios from Cyprus in the event of a coup ( described above). After the implementation of SKYLARK the British SBA authorities prepared reinforcements for the security (ABLAUT) and the replacement of local Cypriot labour force on the bases (PLATYPUS). In accordance with ABLAUT it was first decided on 17 July that two regiments training in Cyprus at the time of the coup 86 should remain until further notice and during the night of 19/20 July considerably more forces than envisaged in

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the ABLAUT plan were brought to 24 hours notice in the UK for a move to Cyprus. On 21 July, the 41 Commando Royal Marines disembarked from HMS Hermes and other troops arrived by air from the UK. 87 After further reinforcements 88 a total of nearly 2,700 officers and men with all their vehicles and equipment, including Scorpion light tanks were despatched in six days. 89 A considerable British Naval presence was despatched to Cyprus, with HMS Hermes, HMS Devonshire, HMS Andromeda, and HMS Rhyl arriving on 20 July and HMS Brighton on 23 July. The Devonshire was replaced by HMS Hampshire on 26 July. 90 Throughout the crisis British troop movements continued as noted in the report on Operation ABLAUT: On 1 Aug (…) 41 Cdo RM sailed in HMS Hermes for Malta. On 9/10 Aug 19 Bde HQ, 40 Cdo RM and their avn [aviation] fit and the advance party of 3 RRF left Cyprus by air and sea (…) for UK, only to return by sea and by air from leave in UK to Cyprus between 11 and 15 Aug due to the breakdown of the Geneva talks. 10 GR arrived in Cyprus on 11/12 Aug, on a 6 month tour as the second resident infantry battalion and was deployed to the Eastern SBA on 13 Aug, the day before the Turkish second offensive. The last reinforcement unit to arrive was 7 Cdo Lt Bty RA on 15 Aug. 91

The first replacements/reinforcements under the PLATYPUS scheme arrived together with the Internal Security Reinforcements under Operation ABLAUT in the early hours of 21 July. Over the next few days a total of 783 Army and 281 RAF personnel arrived in Cyprus. 92 This considerable amassment of troops naturally triggered suspicions that Britain was planning to restore the administration of Makarios by military force. Olver was alarmed by BBC reports that HMS Hermes, HMS Devonshire, and HMS Rhyl also had been ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean and that NATO powers had issued a statement that they still recognised Makarios as President and calling on Greek mainland officers to leave the island. He warned that ‘these reports inevitably convey the impression that thought is being given to the possibility of Makarios reestablishing himself in Cyprus as President.’ Olver empathised that the new regime backed by the National Guard was now in control of virtually the entire island. Opposition had, to all intents and purposes, died out, and the Police Tactical Reserve had surrendered, with most of its members now under arrest. He discounted the possibility of any local uprising to restore Makarios and stressed that the National Guard could without difficulties put down any such attempt. He carried on that

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many Cypriots will be sad that Makarios has gone. Many of them have no respect or affection for the new regime. Nevertheless the regime cannot now be overthrown by any force within Cyprus. Makarios could only re-establish himself with military assistance of some foreign powers. Many people dislike the thought that Sampson has been brought to power on the backs of Greek Military; but there is relief at the disappearance of some aspects of Makarios’ regime: his restoration by force would be very far from popular and would cause more problems locally than it would serve.

Consequently, he warned that the announcement of British military deployment in this area coupled with Makarios’ flight via the SBAs would ‘undoubtedly convince some, including probably members of the Government and National Guard that we plan to intervene militarily on Makarios’ behalf. If any such suggestion is allowed to gain currency it would gravely affect the whole future of Anglo/Cypriot relations. It would also have highly dangerous consequences for the large British community and tourist population here.’ 93 As the question of intervention arose it was discovered that Britain had actually never developed a contingency plan for the re-instalment of Makarios in case of a coup d’état. A plan estimating the need of troops was hastily drawn up by the Ministry of Defence to prove the dangers of such a move rather than in anticipation of any real preparations. The study estimated the need for three brigades to bring about the re-instalment. One brigade would be needed to secure the Government in Nicosia, one in the Western SBA to secure the SBA and to support the Government in Limassol, and a further brigade in the Eastern SBA to secure that SBA and support the Government in Larnaca and Famagusta. Given the military strength of Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces, the Ministry warned that if the large number of British servicemen, families, and other British subjects on the island could not be evacuated in time, they might be taken as hostages. While most of the Greek-Cypriot forces were described as poorly trained, not having high morale, and with heavy equipment and old weapons, the Ministry cautioned that during any ensuing guerrilla warfare, Britain could find herself ‘facing an open-ended and expensive situation, similar to Northern Ireland.’ 94 Subsequently, there was no British commitment to honour her obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. Any intervention could really only by justified by proven outside interference to alter the status of Cyprus. Starting on the first day of the coup, intelligence sources continued to produce evidence to corroborate the widespread assertions of mainland Greek involvement in the coup. Olver summarised this evidence in a telegram on 18 July:

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CYPRUS AT WAR The following are incidents and indications of active participation by the Greek National Contingent in Cyprus (ELDYK) in the events which began on Monday 15 July 1974. On Monday 15 July four soldiers wounded in the fighting at the airport were taken in to the UNFICYP Medical Centre and later transferred to B[ritish] M[ilitary] H[ospital] Dhekelia. 95 On Tuesday 16 July, at N[ational] G[uard] HQ Athalassa a Greek Lt Col interrupted the conversation between D[efence] A[ttaché] and the interpreter, Major Etsolakis, in a rather odd manner, Etsolakis was embarrassed and caught off balance. In a clumsy way he asked the DA to arrange the release from BMH of one of the four soldiers Pte George Diplaris. Suspicious, DA made enquiries and discovered that Diplaris was a member of ELDYK. Etsolakis was advised that Diplaris was suffering from multiple gunshot wounds that he required about 6 weeks hospital treatment and should not be moved for at least four days. On 17 July a Major, reported to be a mainland Greek doctor, arrived at BMH with an ambulance and a small escort and took Diplaris away. DA toured Nicosia during 16 and 17 July. He is convinced that certain road blocks particularly at and on the approaches to Nicosia Airport, were manned by ELDYK. In some cases the road blocks were jointly manned by ELDYK and the National Guard. The difference in men, dress and conduct are very obvious. On 15 and 16 July an Olympic Airways Boeing 720 landed at Nicosia Airport. On each occasion a number of people dispersed in the direction of Nicosia in private cars. On 16 July a number of stretcher cases were loaded into the aircraft. 96 Additional details are contained in paragraph 5 of JICTEL 483 of 17 July. On 19 July, Mr Cheesman (First Secretary Commercial) learned from a woman nursing auxiliary from Nicosia General Hospital, that on the morning of 15 July only selected members of the hospital staff were permitted entry to the hospital. The woman alleged that there were at least 17 seriously wounded Greek National Officers and NCOs in the hospital. The inference was that these were members of ELDYK, not Greek Nationals serving in the Cyprus National Guard. 97

In addition, Colonel Kurmay Albay Katırcıoğlu, the Commander of the Turkish National Contingent, handed the British Embassy’s Defence Adviser photographs, supporting the claim that the coup was mounted by the Greek National Contingent as the primary striking force, with the National Guard in support. Katırcıoğlu stated that the coup had been planned by Brigadier Michaelis Georgitis, adding that this officer was formerly commander of the Third Tactical High Command at Famagusta. He had been promoted to Brigadier three month previously, remaining in Cyprus on leave and at some stage moving to the National Guard Headquarters at Athalassa to establish a planning cell. Georgitis had replaced General Denisis as commander of the National Guard. 98

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While this and other incoming information, clearly proved that Athens was behind the coup, Greek officials still tried to declare the entire matter an ‘internal Greek-Cypriot affair.’ Answering Callaghan’s call for restraint, the Greek Acting Foreign Minister, Kypraios, replied on 16 July that the policy of the Greek government, in connection with Cyprus, remained unchanged, and that he fully shared Callaghan’s view that the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus should be maintained. 99 In a press statement at lunchtime the same Minister declared that ‘recent developments in Cyprus are an internal affair of an independent state and a member of the United Nations.’ 100 During the UN Security Council meeting on the afternoon of 16 July the Soviet Ambassador stressed that ‘the coup resulted from gross interference by Greek officers for whom the Government of Greece was responsible. Greece’s armed interference was a grave threat to peace and Greece would be responsible for the consequences if it continued.’ The Turkish delegate, Osman Olcay, said that ‘the coup was evidently planned in Athens. It should now be clear to all that the Turkish Community was the only guarantee of Cyprus’s independence.’ In his reply the Greek delegate Megalokonomos refuted vehemently the allegations made against his government. He claimed that the ‘events in Cyprus were an internal Cypriot affair (…) The National Guard was under the exclusive control of the Cyprus Government and consisted of some 10,000 Greek Cypriots, including many Greek Cypriot officers. Greece was not interfering.’ 101 Greece stood by her line of defence at the NATO council on 17 July, where the American delegate Donald Rumsfeld and the Secretary-General Lüns gave Greek delegate Chorofas a hard time. He was pressed to explain to whom the Greek officers in the Cyprus National Guard were responsible. When Chorofas replied that they were responsible to the Cyprus Government he was asked why in that case they were not sent back to Greece as soon as Makarios wanted them to go. Chorofas had no convincing answer. He went on to express surprise that the Council should be showing such support for Makarios and particularly that Turkey was doing so. The Belgian delegate, De Staerke, called this a distortion and pointed out that what had been done was to support the legitimate elected government of Cyprus. Chorofas replied that revolution was a recognised way of acquiring legitimate power, which De Staerke interpreted as an admission of guilt. 102 There was little doubt left that the Greek Junta had triggered the coup. The United States contingency planning for Cyprus had last been updated by an interdepartmental group of the National Security Council in April 1974. 103 The Interdepartmental Group, which comprised, among

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others, Thomas Boyatt, Joe Sisco, and Roger Davies, 104 foresaw six possible contingencies in Cyprus: 1. status quo providing ‘tolerable stability’; The other five were qualified as having ‘great potential to evolve in a manner that threatens basic US policy interests’; 2. deadlock in the local talks; 3. spontaneous outbreak of violence; 4. an attempted coup by pro-Enosis forces; 5. mainland Greek putsch against Makarios, and 6. joint Greco-Turk attempt to occupy and partition Cyprus. In the the actual event, contingencies 4 and 5 developed, although some conspiracy theories even suggest number 6 happened. On closer inspection of the group’s recommendations for these three contingencies, it appears that the group counseled for ‘low-key joint diplomatic representations to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from undertaking potentially disastrous para-military or military adventures in Cyprus.’ The continuing challenge for the United States was ‘to avoid a Cyprus crisis without becoming too involved in the Cyprus dispute itself.’ Contingency number 4 was described as follows: ‘Pro-enosis Greek Cypriots, possibly with the help of mainland Greece or Greek officers, [would] initiate efforts to overthrow the Government of Cyprus (GOC). This effort might include an attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios.’ Number 5 would include the Greek Government was attempting ‘to subvert the GOC and remove Makarios from office or closely control his activities.’ This development would occur without the knowledge of the Turkish Government, whose reaction remained unpredictable. Contingency number 6 was that Greece and Turkey, acting jointly, would ‘attempt to “solve” the intercommunal problem through joint or parallel steps to occupy Cyprus militarily and partition the island between them.’ The group defined US interests as follows: To neutralize the Cyprus problem’s potential to embroil NATO allies Greece and Turkey in armed confrontation and/or conflict, thus unhinging NATO’s southeastern flank. A second US interest [would involve] the Soviet dimension (...) In reacting to various contingencies – most of which would arouse Soviet suspicions of a ‘NATO plot’ to subvert Cyprus’ independence – the US must therefore consider whether and how its moves might complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and affect the atmosphere in which the US and the Soviet Union deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, the US has an interest in the maintenance of our now much reduced communications facilities on the island. It is likewise important for us that the two British bases on Cyprus (which are currently ‘sovereign’ bases)

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remain in friendly hands (...) Our broad goal remains the promotion of a viable intercommunal solution that will remove Cyprus as a potential cause for a Greco-Turk clash on NATO’s southeast flank.

After this general definition, the group assessed the outcome of an assassination of Makarios: ‘The departure of Makarios from the political scene – through death, overthrow, or assassination – will transform the political equation (most likely bringing House of Representatives President Glafkos Clerides to the presidency), create considerable political instability, and increase the chances of a spontaneous outbreak of violence on the island (contingency 3).’ Thus the violent replacement of Makarios was not in the US interest. In all contingencies, the group stressed that both Greek and Turkey were too important as NATO allies to be pressured by military or economic means except in most extreme circumstances. U.S. military intervention – even the more subtle forms of naval diplomacy – [was] not a viable means of influencing the Cyprus situation. Such a course would be widely criticized and would provoke a Soviet counter-move (shifting their fleet). This would nullify any moves on our part, increase tension on Cyprus and involve us directly with the USSR. Above all – assuming that timely and appropriate diplomatic action [was] taken – US military intervention would be avoidable. Any Cyprus contingency situation [was], therefore, almost totally and uniquely diplomatic.

The group then defined four questions on ‘whether to use U.S diplomatic influence, when to exert such influence, with whom; and how.’ The group answered ‘(1) the USG should use its influence, (2) this influence should be used in any given Cyprus scenario before the situation degenerates into a crisis, (3) U.S. influence should be applied evenhandedly to all parties including Greece and Turkey and (4) joint initiatives under UN or third party aegis are preferable, but when the chips are down the U.S. is likely to be required in an acute crisis situation to act unilaterally.’ The group actually assumed that in all contingencies there would be ample time for the US Government [USG] to react before any situation deteriorated. The group proposed the following courses of action: • On Contingency 5 (GOG attempt to depose Makarios): ‘On an informal, personal basis, point out to GOG [Government of Greece] the pitfalls of a coup in hopes that the GOG will conclude on its own that the removal of Makarios is not necessarily in its long-range interests. On the same basis, keep GOT [Government of Turkey] informed of US views and express hope that the need for Turkish

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actions can be avoided as it was in 1972.’ The group warned that a totally ‘hands off’ policy by the US would be interpreted by the GOG (and GOT) as a tacit approval of a Greek ‘putsch’ against a sovereign, independent nation. Greek adventurism risks Soviet involvement to preserve Makarios, chaos on Cyprus, and eventually confrontation between Greece and Turkey. • On Contingency 6 (Greco-Turkish attempt to occupy Cyprus and partition): ‘In concert with UN, UK, and possibly other members of NATO, re-emphasize to Greece and Turkey USG opposition to military adventures resulting in the partition of Cyprus and USG support for a peaceful negotiated solution on the basis of Cyprus’ independence and sovereignty.’ The group concluded ‘that given the serious destabilizing effects which partition could well bring in train, the US Government could not afford to remain silent. On the other hand, condemnation of GOG-GOT actions after they had been undertaken would antagonize both countries and would probably not contribute to reversing a determined joint effort to partition the island (…) This was the US Government’s current policy stance and in the scenario outline would represent effective preventive diplomacy. The group declared ‘We believe that the USG would have the time necessary to make this option viable and it is certainly worth avoiding the severe problems that a joint Greco-Turk military venture on Cyprus would bring.’ 105 In sum, US Cyprus Policy was based on the assumption that neither a coup d’état nor a partition of the island between Greece and Turkey was in the US interest. The envisaged US policy in a crisis was to discourage Greece from action against Makarios and Turkey from military invasion. US policy evidently failed on both accounts. Since all contingencies foresaw that there would be enough time for diplomatic action before a crisis developed, the US Government was in the actual event short of options. Kissinger called Callaghan on the morning of 16 July to tell him that the USG was ‘going along with about two-thirds of what [Callaghan had] done in Athens.’ It would not legitimize the coup and would ‘continue to recognize the existing government.’ Callaghan said that he was going to make a statement in the House of Commons in which he planned to demand the replacement of the Greek Officers of the National Guard ‘at the earliest moment.’ Kissinger interrupted to say, ‘Wait, I think we should stop short on that.’ In his view they should be sure that there was a clear outcome. But if there was a civil war, the US and the British ‘would be getting involved.’ The USG was ready to ask the Greeks to state their intentions, though on the topic of the replacemet of the officers they would come to it ‘but not today.’ Kissinger also stressed that the US was against

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Enosis, and that their only difference was on the timing of that ‘officer point.’ 106 In a briefing paper for the WSAG meeting in the morning of 16 July it was emphasised: ‘The main new element is that Makarios is alive, thus further complicating the picture of yesterday’s coup.’ There was a need for more information and, therefore, the US should hold operations. ‘We will stick to our line that the issue of recognition does not arise, not be positive about who we might recognize and leave that open. We will not recognize the new Sampson government however. We will do nothing with our fleet at the moment.’ The aim was to avoid any internationalisation and not to provide a context for legitimisation of Soviet intervention. 107 The meeting followed this line as it was decided that the US needed a clearer picture of the situation and of Turkish intentions in order to formulate policies. The US Ambassador in Ankara, William B. Macomber, was instructed to urge restraint and Ambassador Tasca in Greece was to get a firm reading of Greek intentions and to make a direct approach to Ioannides to assure a sovereign Cyprus. No US operations were planned before that. The official line was formulated that the ‘issue of recognition’ did ‘not arise’, i.e., ‘not to be positive about who we might recognize and leave that open.’ As overall strategy the WSAG decided the aim ‘to avoid any internationalization [and] not provide a context for legitimization of Soviet intervention. 108 In following his instructions Tasca met with General Ioannides. After he had read out Kissinger’s personal message ‘the General literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity. He continued that one day Kissinger makes public statements regarding non-interference in Greek internal affairs and a few weeks later the USG says “consistent with the above principles…” and threatens interference. No matter what happened in Cyprus I [Ioannides] will be blamed. If I had pulled the troops out the former politicians would have blamed me for turning the island over to the communists. Some day USG will realize that on 15 July Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the communists.’ He claimed that Greece believed in noninterference and a free, independent, sovereign Cyprus. Greece would abide by the decision of the ‘nationalist majority of the Greek Cypriots’ who had moved against Makarios. It was immaterial whether these Greek Cypriot nationalists moved with or without the prior blessing of Greece or whether Greek officers subsequently assisted them. Neither Greece nor Greek Cypriots had asked for Enosis. He claimed that the Turkish Government had ‘obviously accepted these developments in Cyprus, [and] that Turks understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair.’ About Makarios, he said,

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CYPRUS AT WAR that everyone should forget that [he] was an international figure, that he was a national hero, that he had served several useful functions and that he was a man of the cloth; Makarios had become a rotten priest homosexual; he was perverted, a torturer, a sexual deviate and the owner of half of the hotels on the island. To preserve his position and to continue his activities, Makarios was willing to sacrifice seventy percent of the Greek Cypriot population (only thirty percent were AKEL and entire anti-communist Turkish Cypriot population.

Ioannides claimed that ‘the initial plan and approach was from Greek Cypriot nationalists on 13 July and he had decided to assist them. He did not tell the armed forces leadership nor any Greek official. He limited knowledge of his intentions to a few selected officers on 13/14 July. No one else knew and even after events unfolded on 15 July only a handful of people were aware of his role.’ Tasca asked whether Greeks were in direct touch with the Turks. Ioannides answered: ‘We have not bothered the Turks; We have not declared Enosis; Turks agree that the principal thorn (i.e., Makarios) is gone and I am not in touch with the Turks.’ Ioannides added that he personally did not like Nikos Sampson, who in his opinion was ‘crazy.’ 109 It is doubtful whether Ioannides’ outburst provided the US Government with the intended guarantees for an independent Cyprus. Ioannides had actually admitted his own ‘assistance’ to the coup, thereby indicating that Greece (or at least he) was in control of the island. The US Government could no longer afford to pursue the wait-and-see approach if it was to prevent the internationalisation of the dispute. This became even clearer when UN Secretary-General Waldheim informed Kissinger that Makarios might request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss what he termed ‘Greek military intervention in Cyprus.’ 110

4 Joint Intervention?

By the morning of 17 July the island was generally quiet. The National Guard was in firm control and relaxed the island-wide curfew to allow movement from 0600 to 1400 hrs. Mopping-up operations continued in the main towns. ‘Large bands of heavily-armed irregular forces were very much in evidence, patrolling the streets and intermittently but exuberantly firing their weapons into the air.’ 1 High Commissioner Olver reported that the National Guard was probably now in control of Paphos as well. Neither Vassos Lyssarides nor other pro-Makarios groups had offered resistance and ‘the popular uprising promised earlier by Government spokesmen’ was not forthcoming either. Resistance had come mainly from loyal police stations, which were now subdued. The Police Tactical Reserve was quickly demoralised and had not been a major factor in the coup; its leader, Pantazis, surrendered and had broadcast to his men to lay down arms. Only in Paphos a bloody battle seemed imminent on the 16th; Cypriot gunboats had shelled the town in the afternoon. Olver said that ‘this [Paphos] is Makarios country, consolidated by the militant Bishop of Paphos. [But] the departure of Makarios from the field seems to have taken the heart out of the resistance.’ Olver described the popular reaction as ‘bemused and yet to crystallise.’ He assessed that there would be ‘resentment at the inconvenience, damage danger and loss of life; scepticism at the new regime and dislike of a veiled military dictatorship.’ On the other hand, he thought that there would be ‘relief that the “slide of the left” has been stemmed.’

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Even though Greece would not ‘come well out of this’, Olver did not expect widespread popular resistance. He wrote that, while ‘sporadic guerrilla action by left-wing groups’ could not be excluded, he believed that ‘they are more likely to lick their wounds before thinking about any kind of resistance.’ However, a real danger stemmed from the right-wing supporters of the coup, which Olver described as ‘a number of unattractive heavily armed young thugs (…) roaming the streets.’ These groups of irregulars later would become responsible for violent attacks on Turkish Cypriot villages. But at the moment Olver described the intercommunal situation as remaining calm. He reported that the Turkish Cypriots remained ‘alerted but behaving responsibly.’ 2 Meanwhile, an attempt by the National Guard to seize Czech arms that had been brought under UN control in 1972 was thwarted by UN troops who refused to hand them over. 3 Waldheim authorised UN General Prem Chand to deploy additional troops if necessary to ensure security of arms stores. 4 In the event, no further attempt to seize the weapons was made. The situation was very clearly unstable, and on the diplomatic front there were growing anxieties that Turkey might intervene unilaterally despite the new Cyprus regime’s stated disavowals of Enosis. On 16 July Turkey called on Britain to enter into consultations in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. Stating that ‘the Government of Greece, a guarantor state, is not only involved in this coup but has also been its initiator,’ Turkey wished to discuss the possibility of joint action by British and Turkish Forces. Britain was asked to answer the call the same day. Turkey made clear that given Greek involvement there could be no question of Greece attending the consultations. 5 There was no doubt in Whitehall that what Turkey really wanted was for Britain to agree to joint military action to ‘restore the balance of power’ in Cyprus. 6 Without committing himself to any course of action Callaghan informed the Turkish Defence and Acting Foreign Minister, Hasan Işık, that he should ‘be glad to enter into consultations’ as he proposed. He suggested a meeting in London at ‘any time from tomorrow.’ 7 During a conversation with the British envoy, Richard Fyjis-Walker, the Turkish Director-General for Political Affairs, Soysal, explained that the essential point of the Turkish reply to Callaghan’s message was the call for both consultations and concerted action by the UK and Turkey under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. He drew the Ambassador’s attention particularly to Paragraph 2, saying that if they could not agree to concerted joint action, Turkish hands would be legally free to take any unilateral steps they wished. 8 Even though the Ambassador reported that there were no imminent preparations for Turkish intervention, Callaghan was alarmed by this report.

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Seeing the danger of being pressed for joint action or doing nothing, Callaghan decided to put pressure on Athens. He instructed HMG’s Ambassador to Greece, Sir Robin Hooper, to impress on the Greek Government that it should ‘replace at the earliest possible moment the Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard who, whether correctly or not, are generally held to have been responsible for the attempted coup against President Makarios.’ He warned that if the Greek Government failed to do so, the internationalisation of the crisis (i.e., Turkish intervention) would become inevitable. 9 Callaghan revealed the initial line of British policy towards the crisis in a telegram to the British Embassy in The Hague. He was commenting on the position expressed by the Netherlands Governor, Van der Stoel, that the coup ‘had been a deliberate action by the Greek Government to disturb the precarious balance in Cyprus’ and that ‘even though the new “Hellenic Republic” may formally exist for some time it seems tantamount to the ending of independence for Cyprus. Since the Turks will not tolerate this, there will be serious consequences both in the area and for the Alliance.’ In his view, ‘we should not hesitate to put the blame squarely on the Greek Government, privately rather than publicly.’ Sir John Killick, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State FCO, who had received the Dutch Ambassador since Callaghan had not being available, commented that, while Callaghan probably agreed with most of Van der Stoel’s assessment, ‘our immediate objective must be to prevail upon Athens to draw back and restrain the Turks.’ Callaghan later confirmed that he shared this view and wrote ‘I had hitherto deliberately refrained from directing blame to the Greek Government although public statements and action pointed in that direction. Whatever the culpability of the Greeks we must continue to concentrate on preventing the serious conflict to which Van der Stoel had referred. The best way of doing so was to press Athens to reaffirm publicly Greece’s international obligations to replace the Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard.’ 10 During another meeting with the Acting Foreign Minister of Greece, Kypraios, on the evening of 16 July 1974, Ambassador Hooper had expressed Britain’s disappointment that Greece did not respond to the call to respect her international obligations. Asked whether Britain may say publicly ‘that the Greek Government had assured [Britain] that they intended to respect their international obligations in regard to Cyprus, Kypraios readily agreed.’ Pressed on the replacement of Greek mainland officers, the Greek Acting Foreign Minister was ‘apparently receptive.’ However, Hooper cautioned, ‘we have learned from experience, making representations to civilian ministers is one thing and getting them translated into action by the military is quite another.’ Regarding recognition, Hooper

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had a quarrel with Kypraios, when the latter asked ‘why in that case [i.e., continuing to recognise Makarios] we did not still recognise Dr Gaetano, and, come to that, Mr Papadopoulos, as heads of the Portuguese and Greek States respectively.’ Hooper retorted ‘that there was still a difference in the world between a freely and constitutionally elected President and one imposed without any genuine popular consultation.’ 11 Parallel to diplomatic efforts to put pressure on the Junta, the British Government tried to influence those circles within the Greek military who were considered more conciliatory than Ioannides and his followers. As part of this strategy, broadcasts on the BBC’s Greek section were made by King Constantine and former Prime Minister Karamanlis. The King, who had been living in British exile since 1967, appealed to the ‘armed forces of the country (…) [as] a select, inseparable and responsible part of the people’ and asked them to take the initiative for the ‘salvation of the country.’ He assured them that ‘the people will be whole-heartedly with them not only in the common confrontation of today’s dangers but also in the construction after so many sufferings, of a better, happier and democratic Greece.’ 12 Former Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis declared that the dramatic events in Cyprus constitute a national disaster (…) Only madmen could be capable of provoking civil strife at a time when the nation, in view of clearly defined dangers, has an absolute need for cohesion.’ He addressed himself to the armed forces ‘in order to tell them: first, that the immediate end of the tragedy in Cyprus is imperative, as also is the restoration, in the person of Archbishop Makarios, of legality there; second, that the restoration of democratic normality in Greece constitutes the supreme national imperative; third, that at present a way out of the anomaly through means safe and dependable for the country is possible; fourth, that after some time this possibility of peaceful and non-violent change will not remain; and fifth, that for this endeavour to restore normality and national reconciliation I place myself at the disposal of the country. 13

Thus Karamanlis was declaring himself ready to take over the Government any time the military should ask him to do so. In the event, that was exactly what was in the end to happen. The strategy of calling for the replacement of the Greek officers did not satisfy Turkey at all. Soysal informed Fyjis-Walker that he did ‘not think the Greeks would listen: they were behind the coup, and for instance, if they replaced officers in the National Guard it would only be with more of the same kind.’ 14 Another strategy had to be developed to stop Turkey. But

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what could Britain do, if she wished at the same time to avoid joint military intervention? A possible answer came from Washington. Messages coming on 17 July from Ankara made clear that the Turks were ready to intervene with or without British participation. Ecevit told US Ambassador Macomber (noon local time) that the coup had been completely engineered by the Greek Government. If intervention was necessary, it would be ‘bloodier’ the longer it was put off. Therefore, his government was not prepared to delay intervention beyond a few days. The objectives would be the ‘restitution of Cyprus’ constitutional government’ by which he meant the return of Makarios, or if that was not possible, that Makarios’ successor should emerge through ‘previously established constitutional procedures.’ The Greek officers of the National Guard had to leave the island, and a ‘secure corridor to the sea’ had to be obtained for the Turkish community. 15 Thereby he indicated that if Turkey intervened, its aims would go beyond the reinstallation of Makarios. It was at this point that the Americans decided to put forward more concrete proposals to defuse the crisis. At the WSAG meeting on 17 July 1974 the following evaluations were made: The Sampson government is probably considered as de-facto enosis by Turkey and not an acceptable alternative. The return of Makarios (…) is not necessarily in our interest or in the interest of the parties. The Turks have no particular interest in his return. It would directly counteract Greek regime efforts with implications for internal ramifications in Athens and for the US. Our interest would not be served by a Makarios regime, free of Greek influence, that would depend on leftists internally and on the east block internationally. [The] logical alternative [was] Clerides [as] basis for compromise between Turkey and Greece. Next US steps[:] make US views known in London (Makarios and Ecevit are there) [Under Secretary Joseph Sisco was sent to London]. US talks with Turkey [were] to (a) urge restraint; (b) have a clear reading on what is acceptable to them (…) We will (a) not press Turkey on the opium issue right now; (b) reverse a decision on stopping the flow of requisitions for normal Turk purchases of spare parts (following Macomber’s return to Washington on the opium issue). Stonewall at the UN, citing the fact that consultations in London are in progress. The main effort will be made now in London. 16

This was a completely new approach. The US Government was now considering the possibility that by replacing Makarios with Clerides, it could

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appease the Turks and at the same time get rid of the much detested Archbishop. While the State Department started to adjust its policy to the new circumstances, the US Ambassadors in Athens and Nicosia were – very much like their British counterparts – still suggesting US acquiescence to the de-facto situation. Tasca argued against any request to the Greek Government for a withdrawal of its officers since this might invite an attempt to overthrow the regime in Athens. Ioannides would offer ‘extreme resistance.’ Tasca warned that if such a regime change was a desired aim, the US Government should evaluate such an objective in terms of the possibility that it might not succeed and that ‘other vital interests in this country and the area’ could be ‘adversely effected.’ 17 Roger Davies from Nicosia argued that the best hope we see of avoiding war is not to try to persuade [the] Greek Junta to undo what it has done, but rather to encourage Turkey to come to believe that its interests are better served by dealing with a weak and compliant Sampson [instead of] going to war to restore a constitutional order which includes restoration of their arch-enemy Makarios. On recognition, suggest we made clear that we continue to recognize Makarios Government, but not foreclose prospect of moving to recognition of new regime (on strict nonmoralistic grounds) if, as seems fairly likely, it succeeds in consolidating its power for a period in Cyprus. Withdrawal of Greek officers at this stage would leave a heavily-armed and disorganized rabble in control of the island, with catastrophic results. As to line of command, we would prefer even Ioannides’ finger on the trigger rather than Sampson’s. 18

The State Department ignored this advice and moved forward with its new policy. While the US would try to ‘stonewall’ at the UN, its conduct was not intended to block a resolution if Makarios managed to press for it. The WSAG sensed that Makarios was likely to win broad support at the UN for Cypriot independence, for restoration of the legitimate government of Cyprus (…) and perhaps for condemning Greece’s armed intervention (…) To support this position would be consistent with our interests and would prevent letting the USSR play the champion of an independent Cyprus but we could face a situation where it would fall to us to persuade Greece to cooperate or where Greece had refused to cooperate in removing the coup government. 19

The Soviets were, of course, well aware that Kissinger would do everything in his power to avoid their involvment. This became more than

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obvious during a phone conversation that the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatol Dobrynin had with Kissinger at 2245 hrs on 17 July: K: Anatol, I am sending over an interim answer on that Cyprus thing. (…) D: So what is it about? Are we going tomorrow to make joint intervention in Cyprus? K. Absolutely. D: I think it will be very nice. K: We just want to get your – if you send us the disposition of your forces in southern Russia, we will give you an advice on how to do it. D: I think you even want our disposition in the north? Not the south of Russia. K: Why in the north? D: For us it’s much more easier to jump over – you know, when you have a [missile] along the range, it’s very difficult to use it on a short range. It is better to go it alright, so our divisions there used to use a [inaudible] that goes for 10,000 kilometers, not three or two. [Laughter]

Apart from the Soviet realism that there would not be a joint US/SU intervention Dobrynin clearly wanted closer Soviet involvement. While he pressed for a discussion on international guarantees for Cyprus (including Soviet ones), Kissinger spoke vaguely of the exchange of ideas ‘and maybe (…) some parallel things, not necessarily joint right now.’ Dobrynin claimed that some of his people had the idea of, ‘in a friendly way’, doing something together. They had ‘good intentions saying: It’s rather simple. Why we shouldn’t sit down and do something which will be really wonderful, things for both, so we have good personal relations on a top level.’ He added that this sometimes happened and that there were ‘not really any specific tricks.’ 20 While Kissinger did not comment, it was clear that he did not trust Soviet altruism. Accordingly, the US Government was working for a delay of a Security Council meeting on grounds of an unclear situation. Sisco told Kissinger that if the question came to the Council and the US were to ‘bat this down’, people would accuse the US of collusion with the Greeks. The alternative position would be to reaffirm constitutional arrangements in Cyprus. Kissinger agreed to that and said that instead of being isolated in the Council at such a point he would consider voting for it. 21 The State Department’s stalling policy at the Security Council first attracted criticism from the US Senate. Senator William J. Fulbright called Kissinger at 1255 hrs to tell him that as the committee chairman he wanted to invite the President of Cyprus, who was coming to New York that night, ‘down for a

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coffee.’ Kissinger asked whether Fulbright could wait until ‘tomorrow morning’, until they saw a clearer picture. Fulbright said that this was too late, but agreed to wait until the afternoon. Fulbright stressed that, as Kissinger knew, the committee had not been sympathetic to the Greek colonels. Now they heard that the US was very reluctant to take the matter to the UN. Kissinger denied this, explaining that the US Government wanted first to stop the possibility of a Turkish intervention. Asked whether the US was prepared for an embargo on arms during the period, he said that the US Government would not be unsympathetic to that, particularly if it accelerated into an international confrontation. 22 The central objective of the Sisco mission to London was defined in a memorandum drawn by National Security Council staff member Harold H. Saunders: ‘to persuade the Turks to hold off military intervention.’ The US Government saw two policy options: 1. A compromise solution (Clerides); 2. Increased pressure on the Greeks by means of a) forcing them into negotiations (which was seen as ‘unlikely to succeed’, making the US the ‘scapegoat for failure in any form’) or b) US–UK acquiescence in Turkish military intervention, from which there could come two results: (1) partition of Cyprus (‘double Enosis’) or (2) a negotiated intercommunal solution. 23

Kissinger’s ‘pet idea’ – The Clerides Solution Callaghan informed Kissinger of the British position, which was basically that of Europe, too (i.e., the European Economic Community and NATO), namely, that the ideal solution would be the return of Makarios. He said: ‘When you look ahead for six months – will the situation be more than or less tense? Our estimation is more – that it would look to be more tense if we can’t get Makarios back.’ Kissinger mentioned that Clerides might be a compromise; but Callaghan claimed that Clerides couldn’t ‘hold it.’ Another possible compromise would be ‘an election in three months with Makarios back on the island.’ Asked how he would get him back, Callaghan suggested impressing on the Greeks that if they would not move on the National Guard officers the Turks might act unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee. The US in concert with Britain could then put pressure on the Greeks to replace Sampson with Makarios. Kissinger said that this was almost certainly true and that he agreed. 24 In fact, Kissinger did not agree at all. He told Nixon: The problem in Cyprus is that the Europeans have taken a united position that Makarios ought to be brought back and they want us to bring pressure on the Greeks. My worry is that Makarios now has to lean to the communists and Eastern Bloc (…) My recommendation is that first, we get someone over there to make our view clear and secondly, we work for a compromise in

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which neither Makarios or the other guy take over … They want us to rake the Greeks but if they get overthrown then that will jeopardize our whole position (…) We cannot openly oppose Makarios but we can try to slow it down enough so that perhaps we can try [to] stabilize enough support for an internal solution (…) If the Greeks collapse, then the left wing could take over or a bunch of Greek colonels who could [be] thrown in with the Quadafi group. 25

At that time even the Turks seemed to be pressing for a Makarios return. Kissinger told Sisco that it seemed that the Turks were hoping to make Makarios a Turkish satellite. He said: ‘Makarios won’t be a Turkish satellite, if he won’t be a Greek satellite. You better get the facts of life to Ecevit‘. 26 Kissinger subsequently followed what he termed the ‘pet idea’, i.e., the Clerides solution. 27

Downing Street Meeting, 17 July 1974 Preparations by the Turkish Armed Forces for a possible operation in Cyprus became increasingly visible. The British Embassy in Ankara reported on the morning of 17 July that amphibious craft had left Marmaris for Mersin and that further naval units were heading for the area. The 6 Army Corps Adana, INC 39 Infantry Division, 9 Armoured Brigade, and another unidentified infantry division including an airborne brigade from Kayseri were on alert. Two fighter bomber squadrons at Adana/Incirlik were equally alerted and Air Force officers recalled from leave. One command battalion was sighted on the Ankara/Istanbul road heading east. 28 However, even as the military build-up continued, there seemed still to be a chance of a diplomatic solution as Ecevit accepted the invitation to go to London. 29 Since Turkey was suggesting an intervention to restore the constitutional situation in Cyprus, Callaghan thought it a good idea to bring together Ecevit and Makarios in London. Maybe a meeting could help forestall any broader plans by Turkey to impose a solution. The Turkish response was ‘if the British Prime Minister suggests it, and if Archbishop Makarios desires it, complying with the suggestions of the British Prime Minister, Mr Ecevit will be happy to meet Archbishop Makarios.’ 30 Whether or not such a meeting would have changed the course of events remains unclear. However, the opportunity was lost – like many others in the recent history of Cyprus – when Makarios informed Callaghan that he doubted whether he would have time to meet Ecevit, saying that there were so many Cypriots in London that he had no time for anything other than talking to them. 31 Makarios did have time, however, to meet Wilson and Callaghan on the morning of 17 July.

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Wilson recalled Makarios’ visit in his memoirs: On arrival he came straight to Downing Street, where I received him at the door, in accordance with the protocol for Heads of State and Governments, which he still was. He was still wearing the clothes he had worn when the crisis began. Prime Minister Mintoff had provided him with a clean shirt and I supplied him with a change, as we had the same collar size, but the cassock he always wore was more than due for a change. I gave orders for a reconnaissance of all the Greek Orthodox Churches in London, in search of a priest who equalled the Archbishop in height, and who might have a spare cassock. This was forthcoming. 32

Makarios’ main concern during the meeting was to ensure that HMG would not recognise the Sampson regime. He said that it was for Britain and Turkey to press the Greeks in the hope that they would withdraw their officers from the National Guard and withdraw support from Sampson, thus restoring the status quo ante. Callaghan agreed that the restoration of the status quo ante was the declared British aim. But he later pointed out that the situation could never be exactly the same again. Makarios suggested new elections could be arranged under the auspices of a committee composed of the three Guarantor Powers and of the legitimate government of Cyprus. He expressed the wish to abolish the National Guard entirely. He certainly wished to see the Greek officers withdrawn and not replaced. Concerning the Turkish attitude, Makarios thought that, while the Turks would be happy to see the National Guard abolished, they would certainly not agree to dismantle their own forces. He said that the British close consultations with the Turks could be described publicly as having his consent, and reiterated that the situation would continue to be unstable under Sampson. Any agreement authorised by Sampson in the intercommunal talks would be valueless. In conclusion, Makarios again pressed for a promise not to recognise the new regime. Callaghan reiterated that Britain had not recognised this regime yet and that he ‘had noted what the Archbishop had said.’ 33 While it was clear to the British Government that there could be no question of British armed intervention on behalf of Makarios, this was not clear to Ioannides, who suspected that the object of the London talks with Ecevit was to plan either joint British-Turkish or unilateral Turkish intervention in Cyprus. The presence of Makarios in London reinforced these suspicions. The British Ambassador to Athens did his best to ‘correct these misapprehensions’ but warned that ‘any over-ostentatious naval movements in the Eastern Mediterranean’ were likely to ‘revive them to the detriment of relations with the regime here.’ 34 However, it was by no

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means against Callaghan’s will that the Greeks should have these concerns. He instructed Hooper that in his talk with Ioannides he should not inform him what the Turks were up to. He was hoping that this stage of insecurity coupled with pressure by Britain, the US, NATO, and the EEC would eventually ‘crack the Greek nerve and at least persuade them to withdraw the National Guard officers.’ 35 As far as British decision making was concerned, the first major crossroad was the meeting between the British and Turkish Governments in the evening of 17 July at 10 Downing Street. The British were represented by Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, Defence Secretary Roy Mason, and seven other officials. 36 The Turkish delegation consisted of eleven members led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Acting Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence, Hasan Işik, and the Minister of the Interior, Aslıtürk. 37 For the Turkish delegation this meeting would decide whether or not Turkey would intervene unilaterally in Cyprus. Would Britain agree to common action? If yes, the Turkish Army would have to redefine its operational aims. Common action with Britain would not result in the establishment of a single Turkish-Cypriot territory in the north of the island, though Ecevit decided to pursue this approach anyway in order to prevent giving the impression that Turkey was trying to exploit the situation. The British Government – having ruled out any intervention on their part in order to restore Makarios – was trying to avoid being drawn into a military confrontation over Cyprus. Secondly, it wanted to discourage Turkey from doing anything that could lead to war with Greece, thus endangering NATO’s south-eastern flank. With the two parties starting from such divergent points of view, the meeting was doomed to failure from the beginning. Ecevit started the discussion at the dinner table. He said that the events in Cyprus amounted to no ordinary coup d’état but constituted a violation of international treaties. The new Government of Cyprus was only a projection of the Government in Athens, and so the present situation in Cyprus was intolerable. He was not deceived, he said, by the apparent restraint from the use of force against the Turkish communities so far, and regarded the present situation as a form of unnamed Enosis. Pressures on the Turkish community, he suggested, were merely postponed. Therefore, if it was not feasible to return to the previous state of affairs by recalling the Greek officers of the National Guard, it would be impossible for Turkey to refrain from intervention. If the Sampson regime were allowed to take root, it would be the end of the south-eastern flank of NATO. Ecevit claimed that Turkey wanted a peaceful solution. Britain and Turkey, jointly or separately, should state that they did not recognise the new regime and that

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the old Administration must be restored. If Makarios could not return, the constitutional provisions should apply [i.e., as Speaker of the House of Representatives Clerides should replace him]. As the two guarantors under the 1960 Treaty, Britain and Turkey, in cooperation with the United States, should warn Greece of the violation of the independence of Cyprus that had taken place, and should ask for the withdrawal of Greek forces under effective United Nations supervision. Ecevit pressed as well for an international agreement about effective control of the situation thereafter, and for this he demanded a more effective Turkish presence on the island. In his view, this should be done in cooperation with the British Government as the other guarantor, in order to safeguard both communities. The Turkish Government, he reminded those present, did not wish to exploit the situation in Cyprus, nor did it wish to act alone and create anxieties thereby. The British Government was in a position to help Turkey to achieve this result, and to avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and Turkey, by allowing Turkey to send forces to Cyprus through the British SBAs. Everyone, including the United Sates and the Soviet Union, would welcome such action, which would in fact justify the British military presence. He felt that action of this kind, coupled with a joint statement of the British and Turkish objectives, would be a relief to the whole population of Cyprus and also to the population of Greece, and could facilitate a return to democracy there. The alternative was unilateral action by Turkey, which he felt would be inevitable sooner or later. If Britain were prepared to accept action on these lines, the Turkish authorities would be careful to avoid any embarrassment, by agreement on the deployment of Turkish forces. The minimum Turkish requirement in the future, whatever the status of Cyprus – independent of ‘whatever other arrangement’ – would be to secure access to the sea somewhere near Turkey, which would enable his Government to prevent Turks from dying from starvation as had occurred in the past. If the Turkish proposal was accepted, his Government could compensate any weakening that would occur as a result of a lack of cooperation with Greece in NATO. Ecevit said that he saw a real opportunity to achieve cooperation between the communities on the island. It was strange that Turkey was ‘almost weeping’ over the departure of Makarios, but nonetheless there was now a chance to create nationhood on the island, and without this an independent state could not be said to exist. It was also an opportunity for dialogue with President Makarios, an historic opportunity for a peaceful solution and a better future on the island. In short, Ecevit had asked the British Government either to help Turkey to intervene by allowing Turkish troops to enter Cyprus through the SBAs, or to propose other means of joint intervention. If Britain had accepted,

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the Turkish intervention would have taken quite a different form. Instead of starting in the north, as it ultimately did, it would have come from the south, and thus the partition of the island would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Turkey to achieve. In addition, British troops could have controlled the number of incoming troops, thereby containing Turkish actions. In retrospect, the British Government missed this positive opportunity. Instead, Wilson said that he did not think that ‘all the proposals were on the right road.’ Callaghan tried to avoid a clear answer, explaining that the British Government agreed with the Turkish analysis of the situation; it had not been an internal coup, and the officers of the National Guard had been directed, either openly or covertly, from mainland Greece. Both governments shared a negative objective, i.e., not to recognise Sampson. Was there not a positive objective too, he asked: to see Archbishop Makarios restored to power? Finally, Callaghan came round to say: ‘We do not want more troops in the island, but fewer.’ Coming to the core of the Turkish proposal, Callaghan stated that the British Government would need to examine closely what the legal basis would be for Turkish troops to pass through the SBAs and said that he could not recommend such a course. Callaghan reported that Kissinger would send an emissary to London the next day and tripartite discussions could begin. There would be a great advantage in a meeting among British, Turkish, and Greek delegations at which the Turkish and British sides could put the Greeks under pressure. Ecevit, who had not received a clear answer to his proposals, reverted to the importance of reassuring the Turkish population of Cyprus by redressing the balance of forces on the island by the intervention of Turkish troops. He was very sceptical as to whether diplomatic pressure or even economic sanctions would be effective on Greece. He said that he wanted to try all peaceful means but that past experience showed that discussions with the Greek civilian government were futile, since real power rested with the military. Wilson said that the SBAs had been established for the benefit of British forces only, and so the suggested move would not be desirable. Callaghan agreed. Orhan Eralp, the Turkish Ambassador to NATO, said that consultations under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee had taken place with Greece through the Turkish Ambassador to Athens, and such consultations with the United Kingdom were taking place that very evening. Early action, as distinct from consultation, was now required. Ecevit said that force must be met with force, though without bloodshed, while Işık said that the United Kingdom was free to invite the Greeks. Following a forty-minute recess during which separate discussions took place, Ecevit returned to say that he had just received reports that the National Guard had attacked the Turkish

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sector, killing three Turks, and other reports indicating that action was being taken by the National Guard against the Turkish minority. He recalled that he had told the Prime Minister earlier that the Greeks were bound to attack the Turkish sector, as Greek policemen had taken refuge there. His anxieties were thus confirmed earlier than he had feared. Ecevit noted that Callaghan had told Parliament in effect that Greece was an aggressor, a view with which he was in agreement. Therefore, Turkey and Greece could not come together directly, but likewise Turkey would not object if the British Government sought to talk to Greece. He would be willing to see Mr. Sisco but insisted that it would be right to separate talks between the guarantor powers from discussions between Turkey and the United States. Therefore, he preferred to meet him at the Turkish Embassy in London. Ecevit said that it was up to the British Government to decide how to use its bases in Cyprus. So far as he knew, there were no provisions restricting the use of the bases. The essence of the proposal he had made was to promote cooperation to restore stability, but now the attacks on the Turkish community in Cyprus he had mentioned meant that his Government would have to act. He emphasised that, while Turkey wished for a peaceful solution, it had a duty to protect the Turkish population on the island. He thought British participation would be a factor working to reassure the Greek community, and he feared that the British Government might feel a burden on its conscience in the future if it declined to accept the Turkish proposal. Wilson said that if the situation of the Turkish community on the island deteriorated, Turkey would feel it necessary to intervene, but he did not think that the SBAs could be used for that kind of intervention. Ecevit replied that he could not insist on the point and reiterated that the bases were not essential for this purpose. However, he did repeat that access to the sea was essential and he hoped that the British Government might be able to find other means of helping Turkey. Callaghan asked what British help, in these circumstances, might involve. Ecevit clarified that he had only meant that Britain would not put obstacles in Turkey’s way and would persuade the United States not to do so either. Callaghan said he would consider this suggestion but on the whole he did not think that the British Government could help in any way, as he believed that this would constitute a breach of the Treaty. He asked if the Turkish Government was asking Britain to facilitate a bloodless landing. Ecevit said that the Turks would not necessarily land on the coast. At present they had no access to their population by sea or air and there was no airstrip under Turkish control.

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Wilson said that he understood that Ecevit’s remarks were an expression of the Turkish wish for Britain not to obstruct the kind of action contemplated by Turkey, but that they would blockade the Greeks. Ecevit then asked if Britain would be ready to do so, to which Callaghan said that it was not impossible. Ecevit said that the Greeks were already reinforcing their forces by air. Wilson said that action against aeroplanes was more difficult than a sea blockade. After that the discussion returned to the British proposal for tripartite talks, in which the two sides repeated their divergent arguments. Wilson then asked Ecevit if his problem was a political one with his own parliament, the upshot of which was that he could not sit down with the Greeks. Ecevit conceded that this was one factor, saying that he had already taken a risk by talking to Mr. Androutsopoulos in Brussels. He would take another risk of the same kind if he thought it would be worthwhile. Işık said that Turkey might be prepared to consider discussions with Greece but the Greeks must first be declared as aggressors. Ecevit said it would be ‘commendable’ for Britain to have bilateral talks with the Greeks but he could not regard them as guarantors. Callaghan said that they would not necessarily be invited as guarantors. After further discussions, in which the Turkish representatives suggested that it would be desirable for a joint communiqué to be issued by the two Guarantor Powers condemning Greece (Wilson doubted whether this would be the right prelude to the tripartite talks), it was finally agreed that both delegations should make separate statements to the press. It was also agreed that nothing should be said in response to questions about possible military action, so as to create the maximum possible pressure on the Greek Government. 38 A chance to control any possible Turkish intervention had just been lost, though neither the British nor the US Government realised this. Kissinger told Callaghan later that he thought that the Turks had decided ‘to go it’ before they went to London. Callaghan said he thought they were divided and assured him that if Britain had given them helpful answers they would use them for peaceful purposes and not as an excuse for going in. Kissinger said: ‘You couldn’t have offered them any more that you did,’ to which Callaghan replied ‘Well, there you are.’ 39 While Britain and the US had clearly decided that there would be no armed intervention on behalf of Makarios, the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, seriously contemplated such a move, provided it was authorised by the Security Council. Waldheim expected that the Council would, within the next 48 hours, adopt unanimously a resolution calling for the restoration of the legal government. At some stage, the Council might go on to decide on an action to enforce the resolution. It was clear that, with

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about 2,000 troops on the island, UNFICYP was in no position to take effective action on its own. The obvious place to look for reinforcements was the British Government, which already had troops in the Sovereign Base Area and could presumably reinforce them discreetly over the next few days. Following Security Council authorisation, British troops could move from the SBAs to support UNFICYP in action to reverse the coup. They would be under UN command and probably under a non-British commander. Waldheim thought that it was probable that the very threat of such action involving the promise of British military power being deployed would lead to a swift Greek withdrawal and probably the collapse of the Nicosia regime. Waldheim expected that, with the possible exception of the United States, all members of the Council would agree to this sort of action. And he thought that, in the event, the Americans would be prepared to acquiesce. He asked the British Permanent Representative to the UN, Ivor Richard, to ‘acquaint’ Callaghan with his contingency thinking and to seek his reactions. Richard reported that the US Ambassador was sceptical about a UN intervention and that Waldheim was not ‘being realistic in thinking that there is much unanimity about restoring the legal government.’ 40 Given the lack of any British or American backing, the idea of UN intervention was doomed from the outset. Callaghan rejected Waldheim’s proposal and instructed the British Ambassador to inform the SecretaryGeneral that Britain was ‘under no illusions that it will be easy or indeed possible to restore legitimate government to Cyprus by diplomatic and other pressures, short of force.’ But that the Government was ‘not at present contemplating any British military action or threat of action, though [it] would not necessarily rule it out in all circumstances.’ Emphasising the dangers of such action, he mentioned that ‘other interested powers’ might contemplate intervening militarily as well.’ Of course, Waldheim could feel free to continue sounding out other delegations about this. But Callaghan did expect other important governments to be hesitant, certainly the United States Government. 41

5 ‘Promoting a solution which will be in US interests’ 18 July 1974

Anglo-American disagreement arose about two basic points: First, the State Department refused to commit itself to Makarios as ‘President of Cyprus’ and second, it thought that a call for withdrawal of the Greek officers would be harmful. This American view was reinforced by reports by the US Embassy in Athens warning that a National Guard deprived of its Greek officers might turn into a dangerous, undisciplined band, threatening internal security and possibly turning against the Turkish Cypriots, thus heightening the danger of a major Greco-Turkish confrontation. 1 The United States strategy laid out at the WSAG meeting on 18 July was ‘to see what, preferably in the Guarantor Power framework, can be worked out that would be agreeable to these parties and consistent with [US] interests.’ That meant ‘promoting a solution which on Cyprus itself will be in our interests and will not lead either to further instability or increased leftist/east block influence.’ It was generally agreed that US Government should avoid making clear statements on Makarios. Some scenario involving Makarios’ return was ‘not ruled out’ but depended heavily on the attitudes of the US’s allies. The Sisco mission would not take a specific position on possible elements of a settlement. For the moment it was agreed to stay in touch with Sisco; try to stall action at the UN, even if

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Makarios appeared, and depending on what he said following his talks in London; and keep a close eye on Turkish, Greek and Soviet force disposition and movements. The US Government’s public line would not now reflect any specific decision on the fate of Makarios. 2 However, this was not a move towards recognition of Sampson, and Ambassador Davies received and followed strict orders not to have any official contacts with the Sampson regime, and he instructed his staff accordingly. The US Government would continue to recognise the Makarios government. 3 Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s European Affairs Bureau, told the British Head of Chancery that the US had been careful in public not to commit itself on the status of Makarios. For example, he had been invited to Washington the following Monday by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but the Administration would be keeping out of it, though it may send a protocol officer to meet him. Stabler said that on the assumption that Makarios could be restored only by force from outside Cyprus, the Americans were tempted to wonder whether it might not be possible to build on the first of the three Turkish objectives and to bring about the replacement of Sampson by a third party who ‘emerged from the original constitutional arrangements’, e.g., Clerides. ‘If such a solution were to be worked out, Makarios’s retirement would be the price, and the problem would be how to achieve that.’ 4 As envisaged in a British draft for the Security Council, american arguments against the withdrawal of Greek officers were expressed by Stabler, who argued that ‘although the Greek officers’ presence might be illegal in terms of the 1960 Treaties, the parties to the Treaties had turned a blind eye to it and it might be said that their presence as far as the Security Council was concerned was a bilateral matter between Cyprus and Greece.’ 5 The British intention for the draft resolution was to satisfy Makarios’ two main requirements: (a) his recognition as legitimate head of state and (b) withdrawal of Greek National Guard officers. The draft referred to statements of ‘the President of the Republic of Cyprus’ and representatives of Greece and Turkey and called on the Greek Government to ‘draw its National Guard officers from Cyprus.’ 6 Kissinger telephoned the British Ambassador to the US in the morning of 18 July and told him that he had seen the British draft resolution for the Security Council and, frankly, did not like it. Kissinger thought it would be a mistake to present a resolution to the Security Council that, in effect, gave unqualified support to Makarios and committed the Council to a legal position inconsistent with what ‘we could deliver.’ The Americans, he said, were not taking any steps to produce a resolution themselves, but they were worried lest the US and British Governments take what were admittedly only diplomatic steps

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that were unlikely to succeed but which, through the Security Council, might give the Russians a legitimate excuse for interference in Cyprus, possibly even leading to their military intervention. British Ambassador to the US, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, replied that HMG’s support for Makarios was ‘not unqualified.’ Makarios had asked Britain not to recognise the new regime but had been told no more than that ‘we would take full account of his request.’ He added that one of the concerns in discussing a draft resolution for Britain was to pre-empt a move by the non-aligned countries. But Kissinger insisted that the resolution could be a step along the way to further difficulties. The American concern was to prevent a situation in which Soviet troops could come onto the island. The Americans would resist that, no matter what the legal position might be and would appreciate it ‘if our friends did not make it more legal than necessary.’ About the Greek officers, Kissinger reiterated that to press for their withdrawal, in the existing situation, could produce a dangerous shift in the power balance in Cyprus. Without the stiffening presence of some Greek officers, the chance of disorder spilling over into intercommunal strife would be increased. He said that he was not against trying for the withdrawal of the officers, but this should only be after some constitutional solution had been reached. Kissinger stressed that he did not want to see a resolution that day at all. He was quite happy to have a meeting of the Council the following day (19 July), at which Makarios could make a statement. Kissinger hoped that Callaghan would agree to get the Greeks and Turks together in London, perhaps on Sunday, and try to work out a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. The United States would give its full support and would join the British in presenting a proposal on which a Security Council resolution could be based. Asked what kind of constitutional solution he had in mind, Kissinger said ‘we might try to shape it so that an acceptable alternative both to Sampson and Makarios could be agreed upon. For instance, Clerides. In fact this might mean the Greeks giving up Sampson, and ourselves and the Turks abandoning Makarios. For the Turks this should be no great sacrifice as they had never trusted him.’ Kissinger doubted whether the Cypriots would really welcome Makarios back in present circumstances, ‘in the guise of a Turkish stooge.’ Nor would Makarios himself relish that role, and he might well, in due course, seek to adjust his position by turning to the Russians. Kissinger was clearly troubled that the British might be committing themselves ‘too far without being able to calculate the longer-term consequences.’ 7 Callaghan found Kissinger’s approach a little confused and told the Cabinet that the United States policy was ‘not entirely clear.’ 8 Kissinger’s

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fears, however, were reinforced as the Soviet Union reported to the UN Security Council that the National Guard had taken hostile action against the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia (firing on it with small arms). 9 The American line on the postponement of a Security Council resolution prevailed and the president of the Security Council could not secure a consensus on the draft resolution. The president then said that Makarios wished to address the Council the following day. Having invited comment, and none being forthcoming, he said that he took it that he was authorised to greet Makarios as President of Cyprus. Waldheim later told the British delegate that he was surprised that the Americans had accepted this. 10 In Athens, the Junta finally came round to agreeing to replace her National Guard officers, which was – of course – not enough for Turkey. When the British Ambassador, Sir Robin Hooper, managed to see Ioannides (he described Ioannides as being ‘all very cloak and dagger’) the General informed him that the Greek Government had already decided and orders had already been signed for the replacement of Greek officers of the National Guard. He added that this would happen ‘very soon.’ Ioannides gave Hooper a ‘long and rambling account of the genesis of the coup (…) The punch line was that (for the present anyway, I [Hooper] thought) the Greek Government were not seeking Enosis “which would not be in our interest”. [Ioannides] confirmed the assurances regarding the independence of Cyprus and Greece’s international obligations to secure this independence.’ Hooper reported that Ioannides took his explanation of the Turkish talks ‘fairly calmly and accepted, perhaps a touch grudgingly, that the presence of both Makarios and Ecevit in London at the same time was not intentional’ and that any talks there had not been à trois. Hooper noted that Ioannides didn’t display curiosity about what had passed with Ecevit.’ 11 The decision for the replacement of the National Guard officers was officially announced in the NATO Council meeting on 18 July. 12 By the time the decision was announced Britain had already moved away from its policy that a mere replacement of the Greek officers would be enough. Following the long and inconclusive talks with the Turks, Callaghan was convinced that the British position must move from ‘replacement’ to an explicit requirement for the ‘withdrawal’ of Greek officers from Cyprus, if there were to be any chance of convincing Turkey not to intervene. 13 Meanwhile, HMG’s Ambassador to Nicosia was still trying to comfort the new regime. When the new Foreign Minister, Dimitriou, complained to him about British help in the removal of Makarios, Olver explained that in his view Britain had done the regime a service: the rapid crumbling of resistance in Paphos was undoubtedly due to the departure of Makarios and

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had he been killed or taken prisoner by the National Guard, this would have posed awkward problems. Olver warned that Sampson was very angry, and could be a dangerous enemy. Referring to a statement repeatedly carried by the BBC that Britain would work for the restoration of Makarios, Olver cautioned that ‘for those who listen carefully the qualification “diplomatically” may be some slight reassurance. But I fear that the new regime and the National Guard will undoubtedly take this, coming on top of our removal of Makarios, as a direct threat of intervention. The result, for Anglo-Cypriot relations, for the British community and, above all, for the SBAs could be serious indeed.’ 14 Callaghan now felt it necessary to impress on his Ambassador that ‘we do not recognise the new regime’ and yet the Ambassador’s telegrams seem to suggest that the new regime was already near fulfilling the British general criteria for recognition. These criteria identified governments ‘which may fairly be held to enjoy, with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of much the greater part of the national territory.’ He explained that ‘of these criteria, it is the reasonable prospect of permanence which is most in question for the time being.’ Moreover, HMG had to take account of her obligations arising under an international agreement applying to the particular case or the existence of some relevant United Nations action (…) If the normal criteria were to be applied on their own, we could be in the position of recognising a regime which has come to power by methods in violation of the state of affairs of which HMG is a Guarantor under the 1960 Treaty, since the coup would appear to violate several basic articles of the Cyprus Constitution, notably those relating to the election and tenure of office of a president. 15

Olver remained defiant for some hours and vigorously opposed the British shift from demanding replacement to withdrawal of the Greek officers. In his opinion, withdrawal would lead to serious weakening of the regime, breakdown of discipline, a renewed and widespread outbreak of intra-Greek violence, and new intercommunal violence, and finally to increased threats for the British community in Cyprus. 16 Olver’s advice was backed up by a revealing telegram from HMG’s Ambassador in Athens who stressed the Greek Government’s resentment of British criticism and urged that they should not be pressed too strongly. Hooper stressed that Greek cooperation would be essential if any thing positive and concrete were to be achieved. A joint Anglo/Turkish Public Declaration condemning Greece would be likely to destroy any hope of such cooperation. He doubted that the demand for withdrawal would be

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successful. In his opinion it was ‘just possible that maximum diplomatic pressure on the Greeks would persuade [the Greeks] to make enough concessions to lay the basis for a temporary settlement provided that the Turks [could] be restrained.’ If humiliating conditions were forced on the Greek Government, this could ‘precipitate a crisis within the leadership which might lead to a change for the worse, not as many commentators assume, for the better, as among other things increase the risk of a conflict with Turkey.’ 17 Callaghan was not impressed by the views coming from the posts in Nicosia and Ankara. In the light of an imminent Turkish military operation pressure had to be exerted on Athens. Sisco’s efforts in London to appease the Turks were unsuccessful. He had two meetings with Ecevit in the morning and in the afternoon of 18 July. Sisco reported that in the morning Ecevit had been comparatively moderate, but he had taken a noticeably tougher line in the second session, airing some ideas that seemed to Sisco to be tantamount to partition. Ecevit said that two autonomous provisional governments should be established, one for each community. A new legal status would be created with the agreement of the two provisional governments and the three guarantors of the treaty. The Turkish community would also have free access to all airports and seaports, or all should be jointly administered. These new measures, plus access to the sea as mentioned in the morning session should be supervised by the three Guarantor Powers. However, Sisco derived the clear impression, not least from a short private conversation with Ecevit, that the latter genuinely wanted a peaceful solution but was under pressure from hard-liners. Sisco stated his belief that ‘this represents to some degree a split in his delegation and perhaps also a bargaining chip of maximal demands, [a] number of which would require months of negotiation, if negotiable at all. In my discussion with him alone after meeting with his entire entourage, he gave me [the] distinct impression that he would like to resolve the matter peacefully. However, there are strong forces in country, army, parliament taking tough interventionist line.’ Ecevit, who knew already that the planned intervention would start on 20 July, said that Saturday, when Parliament would meet, ‘is not good day for me [Sisco] to be in Ankara, [Sisco] agreed to Ecevit’s request that I come to Ankara evening 19 July prior to 20 July Turkish Parliament session.’ 18 Before he left for Athens Sisco informed Callaghan that Kissinger was very keen that Britain should set up a trilateral Anglo/Greek/Turkish meeting. Sisco hoped that, if the Greeks accepted the invitation to talks, the Turkish Foreign Minister might be persuaded to attend as well. Sisco claimed that in the morning the Turks had given him the impression that ‘there might be some flexibility in their position on trilateral talks.’ The

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British view differed significantly from Sisco’s evaluation since Ecevit had ruled out tripartite talks the night before, and Işık had given Callaghan no indication that the Turkish position had changed. Sisco insisted that he expected when in Athens ‘to concentrate on trying to get the Greeks to come to London; for the rest, he would explore their ideas on the substance of the problem, rather than advocate any particular solutions to it.’ 19 Callaghan decided with Sisco that Britain would issue a formal invitation to the Greek Government to send representatives to London for consultations. They also agreed that the invitation should reach the Greeks just before Sisco saw them so that there would be no time for them to refuse before he had had an opportunity to urge them to accept. 20 In the Cabinet Callaghan described the United States policy as not being ‘entirely clear.’ Sisco had come to London for discussions and he would seek to persuade Sisco to go to Athens to put pressure on the Greek Government to withdraw the Greek officers from the Cyprus National Guard. He would also ask the Americans to put the maximum pressure on the Turkish Government not to invade Cyprus. Wilson stressed that military intervention by Britain or the Turks, separately or together, would not be ‘desirable.’ If diplomatic pressures on Greece failed, and military action against Cyprus had to be contemplated, this should be a United Nations decision and operation. 21 Kissinger’s fear, which was to an extent shared by Callaghan, that the Soviet Union would use the Cyprus crisis to get herself established in the Eastern Mediterranean, was not supported by the analysts of the British Embassy in Moscow. Ambassador Dobbs wrote that there would be two Soviet objectives: [and this would be the overriding one] to prevent any change in the status of Cyprus or the policies of its government which would lead to the establishment of an additional NATO presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. [If the Sampson government prevailed, the Soviet government was likely] to accept the coup as a fact and to concentrate on exerting, and persuading others (notably the US) to exert, all possible pressure on the Greek government to reduce its military presence to a minimum and to guarantee that Enosis can never become a reality. b) to exploit the crisis in any way which would weaken NATO’s southern flank and create political division within the Alliance. In particular, despite the superficial attractions of conflict between two NATO members the Russians are unlikely to regard the possibility of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus with any enthusiasm. If, as is probable their assessment is that such an invasion would be rapidly and a)

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CYPRUS AT WAR overwhelmingly successful, they will recognise that no foreseeable sequel (occupation, partition etc.) is likely to serve the overriding objective defined (…) above. The end result could easily be more unfavourable to Soviet interests than the status quo. I would therefore expect the Russians to counsel moderation and restraint to the Turks (…) The exploitation of political differences within the alliance, e.g.[,] over how much pressure should be applied to Greece, is also a risky business: their experience has shown that nothing would close and heal NATO fissures more quickly than overt Soviet meddling. The same consideration would, of course, apply to and probably inhibit any demonstrative muscle-flexing by Soviet forces in Bulgaria on the northern Greek frontier. Unless new factors emerge, therefore, I expect the Soviet government to huff and puff as strenuously as usual but in concrete terms to behave with caution. Their experience last October of the US military alert, and the impact of the Middle East war on US domestic attitudes to détente, has shown them how easily a regional explosion can complicate east-west relations and the USSoviet relationship which is Brezhnev’s central concern. From their point of view, there is not enough at stake in the Cyprus situation to tempt the Russians to stir the pot very vigorously. 22

According to information the State Department passed to the British Embassy, the American Ambassador in Moscow’s assessment was very similar to the British one. 23 Fears of Soviet intervention were thus not in the foreground of British-American crisis management. The principle of keeping the Soviets out of the affair never really translated into action, since the Soviets acted exactly as Dobbs predicted. Işık made a last effort in the afternoon of 18 July to break Britain’s reluctance, as a Guarantor Power, to condemn Greece and to intervene to restore the pre-coup situation. During a meeting with Callaghan he put forward a number of specific suggestions. In effect he asked whether Her Majesty’s Government was prepared to subscribe to the following propositions: a) Did the British Government agree that the situation was wholly the fault of the Greek Government? b) If so, was it prepared to ask the Greek Government to ‘restore’ the situation? c) Was Britain prepared to press the Greek Government to remove their ‘illegal’ force from the island and the military equipment which went with them? (Işık was talking of all forces other than the 950 officers and men provided for in the Treaty of Alliance). d) Was HMG prepared to agree that Turkey must have the same ‘rights and possibilities’ in the island as Greece did? (Işık explained

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that he had in mind the right of access by sea and air, which would not depend in any way on the Greek Cypriots.) e) Did it favour the creation of an organisation that would have a real capability to control all movements of military forces and military equipment in and out of the island? Işık went on to say that if Britain could agree on these five points he would also like her to agree on the ‘transitional measures’ that would be necessary until they had been implemented. Callaghan, sensing that this was another way of asking again whether Britain would admit Turkish troops into the SBAs, said that this was ‘out of the question’ and added that putting Turkish forces into Cyprus, by whatever means, would inevitably make more difficult the contracts necessary to achieve Turkey’s other objectives. Işık was unable to explain what alternative transitional measures he had in mind (except possibly unilateral action). He said he would be grateful for suggestions. Callaghan said that offhand he could not think of any, but ‘undertook to reflect.’ After a pause for consultation with his advisers Callaghan gave Işık the following answers to his five points: The first was a value judgement and/or a question of fact. There was plenty of evidence to suggest collusion. But the British Government had no firm evidence that the coup had actually been directed from Greece. Nevertheless, he ‘had sympathy with the spirit of the question’ as would be shown by the fact that he had referred in the House of Commons to the ‘heavy responsibility’ which the Greek Government bore. By the same token, the publicly declared policy that HMG had been following was broadly in accordance with the spirit of Işık’s second point. Callaghan added that the word ‘restore’ was capable of various interpretations. As for the other three points, Callaghan claimed that they would all require detailed discussion with the Greek Government before one could begin to be sure whether or not it might be possible to make something ‘concrete and positive’ out of them. They could certainly not be given effect without Greek cooperation. Callaghan then said that he would be prepared to discuss his substantive points with the Greek Government and advised Işık to put them to Sisco as well. He hoped that the Greek Government would be prepared to send representatives to London for discussion as a matter of urgency. He had no suggestion what Britain would do if they were not, other than to say that then his Government would have to see how they could proceed through the ‘usual diplomatic channels.’ Işık then asked whether, in view of what Callaghan had said about his first two points, Britain would be prepared to subscribe to them in a joint public declaration. Callaghan said that ‘in principle’ he did not exclude this but would wish to give the matter ‘further thought.’ It would be a delicate declaration to draft, notwithstanding the positions

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HMG had taken in public; moreover, he said, the very fact that it was a joint declaration, even if it covered no new ground, might make the Greek Government less well disposed towards the other ideas Işık had put forward. In short, Callaghan tried to stall in order to avoid a joint declaration. Işık then made his final attempt and asked whether HMG would be prepared positively to recommend his third, fourth and fifth points to the Greek Government as distinct from merely putting the questions. Callaghan’s answer was that he ‘would like to reflect further on this.’ Prime facie he saw no difficulty about the third point, which accorded broadly with HMG’s own position. In principle the fifth point might well have a lot to commend it. The fourth however, might well be more difficult, and there might conceivably ‘be other ways’ in which this particular Turkish requirement could be met, perhaps in some combination with the fifth point. This was, of course, another kindly put rejection. Callaghan was particularly not prepared to accept the Turkish demands for access to the sea for the Turkish Cypriots. Instead, he warned Işık that his reaction to his proposals was based on the hope and expectation that the Turkish Government was not contemplating resort to unilateral action of a military character. If it were, he said, then a new situation would have arisen. Işık stressed that the last thing the Turkish Government wished to do was to resort to such action, but he refused to give any firm undertaking on this point. He repeatedly emphasised that the decision to intervene might be forced on the Turkish Government if something could not be done immediately to reverse present trends, and if the situation in Cyprus continued to ‘deteriorate.’ Until he knew whether or not it would be possible to implement the ‘transitional measures’ he could not say whether or not his Government would be able to avoid unilateral action. Işık said more than once that time was very short, but he declined to be drawn on how much time was available. 24 This meeting was in fact the last time when Callaghan could have prevented unilateral Turkish military action. The idea of an organisation controlling all movements of military forces and military equipment might have given Britain a role, as the only Guarantor power that was not directly involved, to prevent any one-sided schemes. Again, this would have involved British military intervention. And this was the last thing Callaghan was prepared to engage in. Britain had had her last chance and missed it. Now it was up to the Americans to make a decisive impact. Would Sisco succeed in restraining the Turks?

6 Sisco in Athens and Ankara Kissinger’s Failure to Restrain the Turks 19 July 1974

The Turkish press, on 19 July, was fully anticipating a military operation, though still ran stories devoted to continuing diplomatic activity. Some headlines were more militant and pronounced: ‘We have given 24 hours notice’ (Cumhuriyet); ‘Now our patience is exhausted’ (Hürriyet); ‘The situation is very critical’ (Günaydin). Several papers continued with accounts of what Ecevit said during the London talks. He was reported to have reserved the right to ‘take our own steps’ in the face of British determination not to intervene by force. On his return home Ecevit was quoted as saying, ‘We have come closer to a solution which would please humanity, the people of Cyprus and Turkey. I am hopeful about the near future.’ He went on to stress the importance of speed. In Milliyet it was argued that it was up to those states, notably Britain and America, who were unwilling to intervene militarily, to restore the status quo, to find a diplomatic answer. If they were unsuccessful, however, it was for Turkey to go it alone. Leftist Cumhuriyet called for intervention to uphold the independence of Cyprus and its constitution, to guarantee the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and to close the door against Enosis. Right-wing papers also continued to press for action, with Tencuman blaming Britain and America for thwarting Turkey’s realisation of a lasting solution through partition of the island, declaring ‘Nothing can be achieved unless arms are

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allowed to talk.’ Independent Ekonomi Politika proposed that a short-term ultimatum should be delivered to Greece demanding the restoration of the status quo and withdrawal of all Greek forces. 1 British military intelligence began indicating Turkish military preparations as well. The British Defence Attaché in Ankara reported that Turkish forces were on full alert, regular officers had been recalled from leave, and that some reservists had been called up. He continued that unconfirmed but reliable reports suggested that a Turkish Airborne Brigade, possibly one battalion in strength, had already clandestinely infiltrated into Northern Cyprus during the ‘past few days.’ 2 Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Horace Phillips, still harboured the belief that the final decision on the attack had not as yet been taken. Ambassador Bayulken, the Chief Foreign Ministry Adviser, had told Phillips that the talks in London had been ‘useful – more than useful.’ Phillips reported that he was ‘somewhat encouraged by these reactions’ and sensed that, even if the Turkish delegation had not received the ‘desired support for military intervention, they were gratified at the sympathy and understanding shown to them in London’, and with Callaghan’s search for a political solution. Accordingly, Phillips urged Callaghan to reply positively to ‘as many as possible of the propositions put forward (…) by the Turkish Minister of Defence’, since this could enable Ecevit to ‘hold off the Hawks’ in Ankara. He emphasised that time was short and that by 21 July the commanders of the armed forces might have ‘won the day and got the green light for action.’ He explained that there was ‘strong feeling among them that if they miss the boat now as they did in 1964 and 1967 the situation in Cyprus will consolidate against Turkey until it is only a matter of time before Athens is in complete control of the island.’ Even moderates like Ecevit were coming round to the view that, ‘cost Turkey what it may to act on its own, and whatever the Greek retaliation in Thrace or the Aegean coast, better now than later.’ 3 In another cable Phillips emphasised that though there had been a substantial ‘build up of Turkish forces on the south coast to a state of full alert’ to the point that ‘they must be presumed to be in a state of readiness that would enable them to invade Cyprus at a moment’s notice (…) no political decision on this [had] yet been taken.’ He anticipated that there would be no decision before 20 July, by which time the Prime Minister would have reported on his visit to London, Sisco would have spoken to him, and when the Grand National Assembly would have met. He elaborated on ‘those in the Government (possibly including the Prime Minister himself) who would prefer to explore all possibilities of a political solution in cooperation with the United Kingdom in particular.’ Annother

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worry was that ‘the influential officers of the armed forces’ might have the last word. Consequently, he could not rule out the possibility of an early invasion. 4 Phillips’ reports can thus be described as, at best, confused. In a mixture of wishful thinking and poor evaluation of the facts, the Ambassador failed to see the obvious: Turkey was going ahead with the operation. It became clear how dangerous the situation was actually becoming when the British Embassy in Athens cabled to London that Greek armed forces were coming to a higher state of alert. Leave restrictions were made in units of three services in Attica and leave cancelled for army units in the north. A build up of forces started on the night of the 18th in Heraklion/Crete. Parachute troops arrived and nine F5 fighters were deployed there. ‘Some activity’ was also reported at the Tanagra air base, while a few scheduled Olympic Airways domestic services were cancelled, keeping some aircraft in reserve for the possible movement of troops. An airlift of Greek soldiers to Cyprus as reported in The Times on 18 July did not actually take place. In fact, even on the preceding days, there had only been two Olympic Airways flights to Nicosia, carrying approximately twelve military personnel each. These aircraft returned with several wounded and four dead, who were identified as two majors, one captain, and one staff sergeant of the Greek National Guard. The British Ambassador in Athens reported that there were preparations that could be implemented in case of a Turkish move, but the Greeks were ‘generally optimistic that Turks will not intervene.’ 5 Meanwhile, Callaghan outlined his thoughts on the crisis in a message to Kissinger. He told him that ‘If we can work closely together I believe that we can keep this situation under control.’ Even if the Turks did not invade now they would ‘not acquiesce in a new regime in Cyprus which they are convinced is committed to what they call unnamed and creeping Enosis.’ In terms of wider strategy, Callaghan reiterated, Turkey was ‘at least of as much importance to western interest as Greece.’ Callaghan then outlined the policy the US and Britain should pursue. He suggested the continued assertion of the legitimacy of President Makarios, without becoming committed to him for all time; working for the removal of the Sampson regime; return of arrangements which were at least constitutional and more stable; Makarios or the constitutional appointment of a successor until such time as new elections are held; entering discussions with the Turks and Greeks about what should be the system of military arrangements within Cyprus (national contingents and local forces); thinking of other modifications to the constitutional arrangements and exerting very great pressure on the Greeks (which, in his view, Kissinger was better able to achieve than anyone else). As for the United Nations, Callaghan thought

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that there would be a resolution eventually, the substance of which he was not keen to weaken, especially in the paragraph requesting withdrawal of the foreign military personnel serving in the National Guard. Perhaps he felt this could be put in the wider context of improving the system of military security within Cyprus and of the need for a phased withdrawal. Callaghan ended by informing Kissinger that he had just received ‘some disquieting intelligence reports about Turkish movements’, which made the need for heavy pressure on the Greeks all the more necessary. He concluded, ‘If the Turks do invade it will be a new ball game.’ 6 Kissinger responded via the British Ambassador in Washington (Ramsbotham), saying that he ‘basically agreed’ with Callaghan’s analysis and stressed that the United States was not working to keep Sampson in office. The draft resolution, he felt, might still be ‘watered down a little.’ Asked whether he had any further thoughts about a constitutional solution he said that this should be followed up eventually, but in the meantime the United States would be careful not to be hurried into committed positions. Instead, he would like to be allowed to use tactics that had not yet failed (clearly referring to his Middle East diplomacy). Ramsbotham pointed out that the Cyprus situation was very different from the Arab/Israeli affair, because of the existence of the 1960 treaty and the parties concerned. 7 Elaborating on the causes of Anglo-American differences, Ramsbotham wrote: We have had indications that Kissinger is still worried that we are rather too committed to Makarios and anxious lest we try to go too fast and too far. As is his habit, he has expressed his anxieties fairly freely to others as well as to us, and they are beginning to creep into the press (…) Although I have not had the opportunity to discuss the situation with Kissinger properly I think that he may be seeing the situation rather in terms of last autumn’s Middle East crisis. He appears to be overanxious about the Russians as the most likely beneficiary of the crisis (…) Secondly, I think that he may in some sense consider Greece the counterpart of Israel, with the US the only party which can ‘deliver’ them (…) Moreover, initially at any rate, he clearly did not appreciate that because we are a guarantor power and the US are not, the US and the UK were not in comparable situations. 8

Kissinger, who clearly was eager not to have this developing into a major rift at this time, finally telephoned Ramsbotham to say that, as far as he was concerned, there were no real differences between the two governments. He suggested that both the Ambassador and himself could tell the press that he and Callaghan had regular telephone conversations and that there was ‘a consistency in our appraisal of this situation. Britain as a

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guaranteeing power had a different position but there was no difference in policy.’ Kissinger went on to say that it was ‘no bad thing if the United States was not so far along the line of support for Makarios as [the British]: if necessary, the United States could move to the British position, or vice versa.’ 9 But time for delays, discussions and diplomacy was running out and the different ‘ballgame’ Callaghan had referred to was in fact under way. British Radar surveillance by Nimrod aircraft showed that, on the evening of 19 July, six large vessels that had sailed from Iskenderun were now 40 miles due north of the eastern tip of Cyprus. A further flotilla of 16-plus smaller vessels was about 40 miles north of a point halfway between Kyrenia and the north-eastern tip of Cyprus. These movements were compatible with dawn landings on the north coast of Cyprus and simultaneously near Famagusta. 10 Intelligence from Greece indicated some naval and air-force activity, but no large-scale manoeuvring. 11 Despite the news on the military build up, Sisco still tried to prevent the inevitable. Upon his arrival in Athens he called Kissinger and told him that he thought even Greek agreement to go to London would not halt the Turks. However, such an agreement would make his task easier. If he had to go to Ankara empty-handed he proposed that the US should make a direct effort to make the Greeks accept the return to constitutional arrangements (Clerides), to agree to explore Turkish wishes for access to the sea, and to answer within four days (if Turkey agreed not to undertake military action). Sisco feared that the UK no longer had enough determination or influence to carry forward the kind of process that was required to cool the situation, and he thought that the US Government should do more. 12 In Athens, Sisco had a meeting with the Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister. Ioannides and Bonanos (Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces) were present as well for part of the time. After the meeting finished, Sisco reported to Kissinger that he was going to Ankara with something, but feared that what he was bringing was ‘probably not enough.’ In essence, he had secured Greek agreement to go to London for consultations on 21 July and Greek agreement to strengthen the role of the UN in certain seaports and airports in order to ensure against clandestine importation of troops, arms, and material. He said that he had gotten nowhere on the question that interested the Turks most, namely, a willingness to give the Turkish community access to the sea. The Greeks saw this only as a form of separatism or partition, while the Turks regarded it as paramount as a safeguard against a Greek-Cypriot blockade of Turkish Cypriots. Sisco stressed that he would try to make the most of all this with the Turks, but he did not believe it would be enough and felt that it would

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be necessary to launch his recommendations on constitutional arrangements to prevent intervention. He was beginning to get the distinct impression that no matter what was done now, the Turks saw the present situation as an ‘ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely, double enosis.’ 13 Sisco told the British Ambassador in Athens that he thought he had been successful in impressing on the Greeks the ‘extreme gravity of the situation and their isolated position internationally.’ He had certainly succeeded in securing commitments on a number of substantive points posed by the Turks in the London talks. After all, the Greeks had now agreed to work out practicable arrangements to strengthen the role of the United Nations in attaining effective control of certain ports and airfields in Cyprus in order to ensure against clandestine importation of troops, arms, and material. Secondly, the Turks had asked for tighter UN control of troop rotations, and in response the Greeks had agreed to ‘use their influence on the Cyprus Government’ in this matter. The Greeks went so far as to confirm that, as they had stated in the NATO Council the previous evening, they intended to replace all the Greek officers of the National Guard. Those who were found on investigation to have been implicated in the coup would be withdrawn immediately; the others would be replaced later. The Greeks had also told Sisco that they did not want Enosis (Ioannides had told Sisco, ‘there will be no Enosis as long as I am around’). And perhaps most important of all: ‘The Greeks had agreed to go to London for consultations. They had said that they had it in mind to go on Monday.’ 14 But, while Sisco felt that this was a success, William Macomber, the American Ambassador in Ankara, simply stated to his British counterpart that ‘Sisco is coming empty-handed.’ Macomber’s British colleague Horace Phillips now had little choice but to change his evaluation, that there would be no landing in Cyprus before 21 July. Instead, he speculated pessimistically that ‘the secret session of Parliament yesterday [18 July] gave the Government the required mandate to deploy Turkish forces outside Turkey if necessary, and that at the meeting of the Grand National Assembly on 20 July the Prime Minister would simply announce that Turkish Forces are now in Cyprus under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee.’ 15 Similarly, Macomber reported from Ankara that it was the ‘judgment of all components [of] this embassy that Turks [would] move militarily – and even [within] a short time frame – if satisfactory peaceful alternatives [were] not produced quickly (…) What Turks seem to be looking for is either return to previous constitutional regime or a visible improvement in the position both as regards civil rights and security of Turk residents on the island.’ 16

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On the other side of the Atlantic, on the same day, Henry Kissinger was beginning to feel the pressure. Sisco’s talks in London and Athens had failed to produce the desired results, reports from Ankara suggested a Turkish military intervention, and now the US press was starting to attack him. Worst of all, the criticisms seemed to be coming from within the State Department. The New York Times quoted senior American officials who said that Kissinger had rejected the appeals of his departmental specialists to stand by Makarios and assert that Greek forces had intervened illegally on the island. These same officials claimed that for years the Nixon administration had viewed Makarios as the ‘Castro of the Mediterranean’ who turned too readily to communist states for assistance. The same source concluded, ‘it was a great opportunity to disavow the Athens Junta, but Kissinger was adamant and would not intervene.’ Instead, Kissinger was said to have argued at meetings of the Washington Special Action Group that the United States depended strategically on its bases in Greece and would do nothing to jeopardise them. Now ‘a war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus,’ the report continued, ‘would cripple the Alliance and possibly permit the Soviet Union to move in the area.’ A report by Drew Middleton, also in the New York Times, said that senior officers in London and Washington shared ‘the view that prolonged Greek/Turkish political dispute or war might wreck NATO defence deployments in the Eastern Mediterranean.’ The United States, which had already dealt with the new government in Cyprus, 17 apparently wanted to keep the friendship of the Greek regime in the hopes that there would be no Greek interference with the Sixth Fleet’s use of port facilities near Athens. Even closer, an aide of Kissinger’s was reported to have said, ‘We think Makarios is finished politically. He cannot go back to Cyprus unless General Ioannides is thrown out of Athens and, even though the Junta has problems, that does not seem likely now.’ 18 These suspicions were bolstered when the Americans granted non-diplomatic visas to two representatives of the Sampson regime to come to New York in order to appear at the UN. 19 Kissinger was furious and told Nixon that they had ‘trouble here with some guys who [were] leaking’, promising to ‘take care of them next week’ after the immediate crisis was over. But now the New York Times was in pursuit, especially concerning Makarios, about whom some of the Members of the House were also ‘starting to rumble.’ 20 Kissinger discussed the articles in the press (in Christian Science Monitor by Dana Schmidt/New York Times by John Oaks) about disagreements in the State Department with the Department’s Spokesman, Bob McCloskey. Quoting from the New York Times as an example, he said,

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CYPRUS AT WAR US officials were critical of the decision to seek postponement of the Security Council meeting for Monday until Friday, ostensibly to wait until all the facts were in. Well, the delay according to officials gave the insurgents time they needed to consolidate their position. Now then, on Monday we didn’t even know Makarios was alive – Secondly, supposing there had been a meeting. How would we have unconsolidated their position? Thirdly, from Wednesday until today the delay was not at our request but at Makarios’ request. We just delay[ed] only until Tuesday when Makarios could get there… (…) And furthermore, not one of these policies was even raised with me. Do you recall that this was ever raised? McCloskey: No. Kissinger: Was there one person who ever said to me, ‘Let’s have a meeting this afternoon?’ (…) The fact is in the Department no one seems interested in defending our policy and everybody that has a gripe that he doesn’t have the guts to tell me personally is going to the press with it. The impression that makes of the Department is a disaster. 21

Kissinger was angered as well about stories coming out of the State Department, leaked to the Financial Times, that he had been furious with Callaghan. He was now forced to tell the British Ambassador Ramsbotham that there were ‘no disagreements of any major substance between us.’ 22 McCloskey subsequently went to the members of the State Department’s Cyprus Task Force and told them that if any of this represented their views they should tell it to him directly. Their behavior was putting Kissinger in an intolerable position when he was accused of ignoring the advice of his people, even when he had not received any advice contrary to what he was doing. He told the head of the Europe Desk at the State Department, Under Secretary Arthur Hartman, to keep his eye on the Task Force and to see that it had some good strong leadership. 23 Realizing that he seemed to be losing control of the situation, Kissinger started to attack his staff. During a staff meeting at 0930 hrs on 19 July Kissinger told McCloskey that he disagreed with the line that his meeting with Makarios should be announced and explained by saying the question of recognition had not yet arisen. He had always thought that this formulation was used in connection with the Sampson government, he said. If used in connection with Makarios it would mean that the US Government was distancing itself from Makarios. He stressed that he could not be held responsible if, for example, it was not him who had instructed the Department’s spokesman, Robert Anderson, to say that there was no outside intervention. As McCloskey tried to defend the line on Makarios, Kissinger blew up: ‘Now just a second Bob. It makes a hell of a lot of difference whether when you are asked about Sampson who is in de-facto

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control, whether you say the question of recognition hasn’t arise [sic] or whether you say about Makarios who happens to be the legal head of government…’ Kissinger finally ageed to say that the request for a meeting has been made through the Cyprus Embassy and if asked about recognition it should be said that ‘we have nothing to add to what we said earlier this week.’ 24 A State Department guidance telegram was drawn up saying: ‘In response to queries as to whether Makarios is being received as President of Cyprus, [the] Department spokesman will say that “he has nothing to add to what has been said on this subject”.’ 25 Kissinger still was not appeased and continued his rampage by asking: ‘Now, may I get around to getting instructions to Sisco or would this be against State Department rules?’ When McCloskey tried to interrupt, Kissinger continued: ‘Now just a second, one more moment for me please. Sisco is not going to talk to anybody until he gets instructions. Is that clear?’ McCloskey: We have sent a flash –. Kissinger: Is it clear that he has – is not to talk until he gets instructions? McCloskey: We sent a flash message out right after – I talked to you – the instructions are coming. Kissinger: That doesn’t mean he will not come back to us and say in the absence of instructions, I had no choice. You fellows better understand one thing – I am going to do this thing – as long as I am in charge the way I want it. And Bob Ingersoll, you will see to it that this department is going to do what is needed in this crisis. And I do not give a good goddamn about the independence of emissaries and I want to make goddamn sure that Sisco knows he is not to talk until he gets instructions and if Ecevit climbs down a grease pole, that is going to happen. McCloskey: Do you want to run over the telegram now? Kissinger: The first thing that – No, no I want to tell you what I want. Then you may run over a telegram with me, and not one second before that. I want a telegram to Sisco that as soon as he arrives he is to tell Ecevit that we are extremely concerned about unconfirmed reports we have about Turkish military moves. He is instructed to point out to the Turkish Government that the US would take the gravest view of Turkish military moves before all diplomatic processes are exhausted. That is point one. That he must do immediately, because I think we have been waffling and weeping around the place and we have not made clear that we are opposed to military intervention. Secondly, he is to say we are doing this in Turkish interest. 26

After Kissinger had cooled down, he watered down his position again and told McCloskey that in the instructions for Sisco’s meeting with Ecevit there should be no US threat, because they would then be unable to control

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events. Instead, Sisco should make Ecevit understand that Turkish intervention would only be ‘the first in the sequence of moves which would be difficult if not impossible to control.’ A new Cyprus government emerging from this might look for internal and external communist support, and this would have serious adverse effects for Turkey and the West as a whole. 27 As such, the guidance telegram for Sisco fell short of threatening Turkey and clearly did not give Ecevit the desired impression that the US was totally against intervention. The telegram read: The Secretary wants you in your approach to Ecevit to demonstrate compassion and understanding for Turkish concerns and to avoid any feeling by Turkey that we are letting them down. They should be made to feel that we believe a pro-Makarios intervention would not be in Turkey’s interest because it would set in train precisely those events which in the end would be damaging to Turkey’s long-term interests. Ecevit must also understand that by the same token, we are totally opposed to Enosis either direct or creeping and have so informed the Greeks. We shall cooperate with Turkey to the end that Enosis can be prevented.

Sisco was instructed to tell the Turks that their course of action (i.e., intervention) was against Turkey’s long-term interests. A Makarios solution would be ‘no better’ for Turkey than Sampson. Instead, Sisco was to sound out what Ecevit’s reaction would be to Clerides as a possible compromise solution. The overall objective of Sisco’s talk was summarised as follows: ‘Briefly, we must not get ourselves in the situation where we are backing one solution, the UK and Turkey another solution with the Soviets having the role of opting if they so desire for a Turkish solution. We must remain as flexible as possible and not get ahead with the Clerides proposal until we can bring the parties themselves to recognize that a compromise solution must be sought as in their best interest.’ 28 Kissinger then gave instructions to inform the British about what Sisco would tell the Turks. 29 When Kissinger was asked whether anyone else should be informed, he revealed his view of UN Secretary-General Waldheim, saying: ‘No, Ramsbotham, and has somebody talked to the Secretary-General – that horses’ ass.’ 30 This resentment remained unknown to Waldheim, who two months later learned from President Ford that ‘Dr. Kissinger has always spoken very highly of you and your collaboration.’ Waldheim – unaware of Kissinger’s true feelings – responded: ‘Yes, we have been working very closely together.’ 31 Kissinger explained the rationale for his soft approach to the Turks to Assistant Secretary Bob Ingersoll: ‘My nightmare is that we are going to wind up totally isolated. And will be committed. I want us to be in a

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position where others are committed and we could go either way depending on the balance of forces. You know, it isn’t that I’ve failed so often in these things (…) I mean, that’s where I want to come out. If I had surfaced an American plan on the second day of the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have been home on the fifth day.’ 32 In Ankara, between 0200 and 0430 hrs on Saturday morning (20 July), Sisco tried to convince Ecevit and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, to call off the operation, but found them ‘almost fatalistically resigned to military intervention.’ They told him that for ten years Turkey had shown patience and acted constitutionally. Looking to the future, the government had no choice but to act now. Once it had done so and had established a bargaining position by developing a greater physical military presence on the island, it would be ready to negotiate – and with anyone. Sisco had tried to reason with the two ministers on humanitarian grounds and to persuade them to have any decision on military intervention put off for 48 hours to allow some progress towards a political formula. The United States, he warned, would take a ‘most serious view’ of it if they did not. 33 Sisco reported that, despite the new proposals he had brought, it was clear that the Turks had already taken the decision to intervene militarily, and that Ecevit had ‘refused to budge.’ Instead, he said that although the Greeks were ready to negotiate this was not much of an offer, since it had come after they had grabbed control by force in the first place. In any case, they were only talking about replacement of officers, not withdrawal. Sisco had put forward the Clerides idea, which had not been meet with great enthusiasm either. Ecevit asked, if Sampson went and Clerides arrived, how would there be assurances that the same thing that happened under Makarios would not happen to Clerides? Throughout the discussion Ecevit stressed that Turkish strengths had to balance those of Greece in order to achieve successful negotiations, and so Ecevit concluded gravely that if Turkey accepted Kissinger’s demands, it would be a sign of submission, not friendship, and would wreck US-Turkish relations. Finally, he said: ‘Up to now we have tried your way; so please let us once try our way.’ Sisco countered, as an ally, that he took grave exception to Ecevit’s continued use of the word ‘demand.’ Nothing in what he had said or that was contained in Kissinger’s message was a ‘demand.’ Nonetheless, Sisco again outlined the dangers of Turkish military action but assured Ecevit that the ‘United States has not been a bad ally [to Turkey] in the past and would not be in the future.’ In the end, he asked Ecevit for a 48-hour delay in any decision on intervention, in order to allow him to go back to Athens; Ecevit promised to raise this issue in the ensuing meeting with the Council of Ministers. 34 But at 0500 hrs (local time) Ecevit called Sisco in again and broke the news to him that no delay was possible now. Turkish troops would land in

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Cyprus. He stressed that if the Greeks did not fire, the Turkish troops would not fire either and they would only ‘stabilise their positions promptly.’ Although the Turkish Government did not inform the Greeks directly about their intentions to land in Cyprus, they did ask Sisco to pass the message ‘urgently to Athens.’ 35 This the State Department readily did. 36 Sisco now knew that the Turks would not stop. As a result, he no longer wished to go back to Athens, since Ecevit had rejected the Clerides idea. Kissinger did not accept this and had him informed that he would personally talk to him, saying, ‘It would be a pleasure to talk to somebody who takes orders.’ 37 He told Bob McCloskey: ‘There is to be no debate – he is going to inform them [the Greeks] – there is to be no more lip from Sisco – he is going back to Ankara [to inform them about what he was going to tell the Greeks, i.e., the Clerides solution], he is going back to the airport and he is going to Athens.’ 38 Sisco was still reluctant and Kissinger was running out of patience. In a staff conference call he exploded: ‘Joe Sisco is going to Athens or I’m going to clean out the whole stinking department.’ Kissinger was especially angered that Sisco’s objections had arrived via an open telephone line and that as a result ‘everybody from Yugoslavia over’ knew the US plan. The incompetence staggered him and he lamented that the Russians now knew what their scheme was – everybody knew what they were trying to do. He asked Ingersoll to ‘get some discipline in this bunch,’ and added that ‘if you tip everything to the Russians, we might just as well call Gromyko on an open line and tell him.’ 39 While preparing to go to Athens, Sisco, who was now afraid of antiAmerican demonstrations, asked for permission to meet the Greek Prime Minister or Foreign Minister at Athens airport. After that he wanted to head straight on to Rome or preferably back to Washington. Kissinger exploded again and told McCloskey: ‘Oh no, he is going to Athens like a good boy, he is going into the town of Athens (…) there have [been] other people who have taken risks and Sisco is going to take a few risks (…) it is out of the question. However, if his nerves aren’t up to it, let him come home and I’ll go out there. How can we ask our Ambassador to stay in Athens while our Under Secretary is afraid to leave the goddamn airport?’ 40 Kissinger complained about Sisco’s attitude to Nixon: ‘I figure if Tasca [US Ambassador in Athens] can stand it, he must be able to stand it (…) That’s what they pay Undersecretaries for.’ Nixon said ‘God almighty, that’s what they pay us all for.’ Nixon went on, ‘And with Tasca there I should think he could have some – If any body could have any influence with the people. Thanks God he’s there: he’s a tough guy.’ Kissinger commented, quite against his own conviction, that Tasca was ‘a good fellow.’ And Nixon continued: ‘Good Sisco may lose his nerve, but Tasca

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won’t. Don’t underestimate what he can do. He will put the arm on him now (…) And they know too the penalty for failing to negotiate is…’ 41 As it turned out Kissinger was to be totally unhappy with Tasca’s performance. On 23 July he told the White House Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig: ‘We have to get Tasca out of there (…) That guy is no good. I don’t care what line he used with the President.’ 42 Meanwhile, Macomber was instructed to see Ecevit to once more impress the Clerides idea on the Turks. ‘Now,’ Kissinger told his staff, ‘(…) the only thing we have to keep in mind is to leave open the door to double enosis – but I think we better not start pushing that yet.’ He thought that they ‘should go to that after trying the Clerides [idea].’ It was ‘too dangerous to come up with it now because it [would] run into massive Soviet opposition.’ 43 The pressure he was under and the danger of failure had a clear effect on Kissinger, who was beginning to show signs of strain. Throughout the day he continued to shout, explode, and threaten his staff. He was going to spend the weekend in San Clemente to join Nixon for consultations. During the following week Congress was to begin televised proceedings, which could lead to impeachment in relation to the Watergate scandal. Nixon was trying to prevent this by constructing a majority. Kissinger instructed Ingersoll to take over ‘this goddamn department till I come back.’ He added that nobody was ‘going to move without your [Ingersoll’s] authority. And anybody who doesn’t like it should hand in his resignation. I just had it.’ 44 Because of Kissinger’s trip to San Clemente, there was no communication between him and Callaghan that day. 45

Makarios at the Security Council Makarios, who had clearly recovered from the shock of the coup, was determined to play a decisive role in the crisis. First, he sent a message to Clerides (via the British High Commission) to tell him ‘to exercise the utmost restraint and caution regarding any dealings with the present regime in Cyprus (…) Clerides should know better than jeopardise his own position in the event of a change from the present illegal regime.’ 46 Upon his arrival in New York, Makarios had also called on Waldheim, and told him how grateful he was to the British (and to the UN), for saving his life. He claimed that he was very happy at his talks in London. He had refused to criticise the Americans and to rush to Washington to see Kissinger, commenting light-heartedly, ‘My English is not good enough for him.’ He hoped to talk to Sisco later. In the meantime Makarios told Waldheim that Sampson could only govern with the help of the Greek army. When the Secretary mentioned that a number of missions owed their presence in

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New York to coup d’état, Makarios said that the Cyprus coup was very different: it had sprung directly from outside intervention. 47 But it was at the Security Council of the United Nations where Makarios found his form, and in a long statement said that the coup in Cyprus had been organised by the Greek Junta and put into effect by Greek officers of the National Guard. The Junta had extended its dictatorship to Cyprus. He alleged direct Greek government influence in directing EOKA-B and the conversion of the National Guard into an instrument of subversion. The coup had been the answer to his demands in his letter of 2 July. Makarios appealed to the Council to do its utmost to put an end to the situation created by the coup and to restore democracy to Cyprus. It should do this by calling on Greece to put an end to its invasion and withdraw the National Guard officers. The Greece delegate, Panyatakos, was having none of this and in a vicious rejoinder repeated the Greek Prime Minister’s assurance to the Secretary-General, and referred additionally to other recent Greek statements. He rejected utterly allegations of intervention by Greece and replied sharply to the accusations made previously in the Council. He would comment, he said, in detail on Makarios’ statement when the legitimate representatives of Cyprus were present to express their views. Makarios’ own actions, he suggested, were responsible for the revolutionary movement headed by the National Guard. The Turkish delegate, Osman Olcay, said that the new regime in Cyprus was altogether illegitimate. The UN had a duty to restore the situation and Turkey herself had a duty to make use of the rights conferred by international treaties. The Greek agreement to replace National Guard officers was not enough. The Soviet delegate, Vasiliy Safronchuk, said there was now not a shadow of doubt about Greek responsibility. International peace and security were threatened. The Greek denials deceived no one. He alleged that NATO countries, which were involved in the plot, had delayed Council action. He called for decisive steps to put an end to Greek interference in Cyprus and for the withdrawal of Greek military personnel. US Permanent Representative John Scali stressed that the US continued to support the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the existing constitutional arrangements. For the United States, Enosis was not an acceptable solution. He added that military intervention by any party in the present circumstances was not justified and appealed to all interested governments to exercise the utmost restraint. He went on to ask whether or not it would be wise to call for the immediate withdrawal of Greek officers of the National Guard, as nothing should be done to complicate the discussions already in train, particularly in London, to achieve a peaceful and constitutional solution. 48 In doing so, he avoided any statement about the origins of the coup or the legal position of Makarios. Kissinger was,

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predictably enough, not happy with Scali’s performance. He told Ingersoll that he had ‘just got the speech of Scali’s but I suppose it is too late since I also had a call from Ramsbotham congratulating me on the masterful way in which Scali sometimes referred to Makarios as President and sometimes as Archbishop. I don’t consider that masterful, I consider it another example of total indiscipline (…) Did we all agree on that – I mean is everyone happy with this, I am not.’ Ingersoll replied: ‘He started out with Archbishop – that is what we had in the text. I don’t know where he got to President Makarios.’ Kissinger retorted: ‘Well, will somebody call it to his attention? That he is to stick to Archbishop Makarios (…) If we can interrupt his great flights of policymaking.’ 49 The British delegate, Richard, refuted Russian allegations of NATO involvement and said that Makarios had made serious allegations against the Greek government, which needed to be answered. The UK was concerned as Guarantor Power and hoped that the talks proposed for 21 July would be helpful. Concerning Makarios he said that HMG would wish to see him back in his rightful place. He endorsed the US plea for restraint and said that if the London talks were to be fruitful those most concerned must exercise extreme restraint in the next few days. A peaceful solution was in the interest of all. 50

NATO’s Attitude toward the Crisis One of the major conspiracy theories surrounding the 1974 war in Cyprus is the idea that there had been a NATO plan to divide the island between the NATO members Greece and Turkey. In reality NATO strategy was reactive rather than proactive. NATO’s interest during the Cyprus crisis was shaped and expressed in meetings the Secretary-General of NATO, Joseph Lüns, had on 18 July with Sisco and the US delegate to NATO, Donald Rumsfeld, and on 19 July with the Permanent Under Secretary of State of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir Thomas Brimelow, and other officials. Lüns explained to Sisco the NATO point of view, saying that there were already great difficulties between Greece and Turkey in other fields, for example, over command structures and the continental shelf. As the Greek government had clearly abetted the present coup in Cyprus, he could not but be sympathetic to the Turks. And if the Greek regime was shaky and without much authority in Greece, he asked why the Americans should be so dismayed about actions that might lead to the installation of a more democratic government? Turkey, he pointed out, was much more important to NATO than Greece, and Greece could hardly face the withdrawal of the NATO shield. In short, he thought it unlikely that the Greeks would want to leave the Alliance. There was also a feeling in Greece in favour of continued membership. They had also to take account of the body of opinion in NATO countries, which would strongly

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resent any condoning of action of the kind undertaken in Cyprus. To condone such illegal activity could even damage NATO itself. Lüns said that he thought that Sisco had not shown himself insensitive to the arguments he had put forward, nor had Rumsfeld disagreed. Sir John Killick, the Deputy Under Secretary of State FCO, reminded Lüns that the British Government was worried about the possibility of unilateral action by Turkey. There was a danger of being accused of complicity. Lüns said that he did not understand, saying ‘Only the Greeks would accuse us of complicity. Even the Russians would not object if we [give] the Turks some help.’ Brimelow asked what the consequences for NATO would be of unilateral action. Lüns said that he did not think they would necessarily be bad. Most members of the Alliance would sympathise. Indeed some would be delighted to see the Greeks humiliated and – a possible consequence – the present regime overthrown. Brimelow asked what would happen if there were a war between Greece and Turkey. Lüns said that ‘the Turks would make mincemeat of the Greeks. There was nothing they like more then cutting Greek throats.’ 51 In sum, the NATO position was as follows: Turkey was more important for the Alliance than Greece. If there were a Turkish intervention, world opinion would back it. The Greek dictatorship would probably fall and be replaced by a more democratic regime. It was unlikely that Greece would leave NATO. In case of a Greco-Turkish war there would be a swift Turkish victory. Consequently, there was no reason for Lüns to oppose the Turkish landing in Cyprus.

7 ‘A new ballgame’ Turkey’s First Military Operation

As Callaghan’s prediction of ‘a new ballgame’ became a reality, he had to adjust British foreign policy towards the new situation. In a Foreign Office memorandum on ‘HMG’s response to possible Turkish invasion of Cyprus’ drafted the day before the operation started, British aims were laid out as follows: a) to prevent harm coming to British subjects in Cyprus; b) so far as possible to avoid military involvement ourselves; c) to persuade the Turks to moderate their aims and limit their intervention to the maximum extent possible; d) to prevent any other external involvement in Cyprus, particularly on the part of the Greeks, [and]; e) to prevent Greeko/Turkish clashes elsewhere in the Aegean.

Action plans foresaw the evacuation of civilians, the reinforcement of the sovereign base areas ‘with a view to preserving their integrity, defending those inside them and preventing their being used by the combatants in the rest of Cyprus.’ While there was a clear ‘desire to avoid British involvement on one side or the other’, there should be a reinforcement of the British naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in case it became necessary to prevent Greek reinforcements reaching the island. On the political field

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Britain aimed to bring the ‘maximum pressure to bear both on the Turkish Government to limit its involvement and on the Greek Government to prevent its involvement.’ But all this could only work with the assistance of the United States, which would have to play a key role both in making representations in Ankara and Athens and ‘in any attempt to prevent forcibly other external involvement in Cyprus.’ The United Nations should be kept out of any ‘responsibility in restoring peace in the area because of the Russian involvement which would result.’ However, they should play a role in exercising pressure on Greece and Turkey. The longer-term objectives of British Cyprus Policy were described as achieving a limited Turkish withdrawal from the island, the creation of a new Cyprus constitution, and new elections, which might lead ‘to the replacement of both Sampson and Makarios by a more neutral figure.’ 1 For this they probably had Clerides in mind. The goal of persuading the Turks to moderate their aims became paramount to British crisis management once it was realised what these aims actually were. A report conducted by the Joint intelligence Committee (JIC), the highest body of British Secret Services, presented to the Cabinet on 19 July, one day before the Turkish intervention, shows that Britain had a clear reading of Turkish aims and intentions, though she was not involved or helping in the actual planning. Perhaps this explains to an extent Britain’s later stance towards her own intervention against Turkey. It read: In this assessment we consider the probable military objectives of a Turkish intervention in Cyprus and whether they would succeed. (…) MILITARY AIMS The Military objectives must depend in the longer term on the political aims of the intervention but the initial strategy will probably be dictated by two primary considerations: first, the need to secure a deep water port and an airfield and, second, the geographical disposition of the Turkish Cypriot population. Fortunately for the Turks, these considerations are compatible. (…) The seizure of the Port of Famagusta and the airfield of Tymbou are thus likely to be primary Turkish objectives. (…) Once established ashore, the Turkish force, with such air support as might be necessary, would probably drive southwards to near the border of the Dhekelia SBA and Westwards through Tymbou, Nicosia and on to the Morphou area, as indicated on the Map Annex. Thus the island would be effectively portioned, with most of the Turkish areas in the North of the partition boundary. (…)

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The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would almost certainly oppose the Turks but we have no doubt that the latter would succeed in attaining their objectives. CONCLUSION We see the primary military objectives being to achieve a de facto partition of the island, with the Turks occupying the North-East, including the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and the Port of Famagusta. They might well occupy an area in the South-East as well, so as to establish there a secure Turkish enclave. We do not believe that the Greeks could prevent the Turks from attaining their military objectives. 2

The document contained a map that quite accurately defined what later became known as the ‘Attila-Line’, which marked the limits of the Turkish operational plans. However, the document seemed not to be based on actual Turkish operation material, since it contained some inaccurate assessments. For example, it predicted the main landing to take place close to Famagusta, with additional amphibious operations in Kyrenia and possibly Paphos. Nevertheless, British intelligence was able to foresee Turkish aims and thus Callaghan knew what the outcome might be if Britain failed to contain the Turkish advance. On the morning of 19 July the US State Department still had no clear reading of the actual purpose of the Turkish military moves. The Washington Special Action Group decided to ask the military whether the Turks aimed at diplomatic pressure, the establishment of a sea link to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, an invasion to remove the Sampson regime or partition of the island. Additionally, the Department wanted to know if Turkey planned to invade immediately and how Greece would react. 3 Kissinger’s evaluation of Turkish aims differed considerably from those of the Defense Department. While the US Secretary for Defense, James Schlesinger, thought ‘that the Turks (…) [were] not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island,’ Kissinger believed their assurances that ‘they [were] willing to stabilize their forces and (…) to keep the existing structure and [would] accept any President other than Sampson.’ Schlesinger, probably sarcastically, commented: ‘That’s very generous of them. That’s good.’ Kissinger, both sensing Schlesinger’s irony and the possibility that he might be wrong said: ‘If the Turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enosis and give the Greeks the other part of the island. So my view is there are now two possible outcomes: either double enosis or Clerides.’ 4 American intelligence did not differ significantly from the information available to the British Government. Basically, the Americans foresaw that

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the Turks were aiming for a partition along the Famagusta-Kyrenia line. The Director of Central intelligence Agency (CIA), William E. Colby, informed Kissinger on the night of 19 July 1974 in two telephone conversations (2135/2235 hrs) of the Turkish aims: C: They apparently are going for Kyrenia on the north coast. That’s the first step. K: But what do you think they are after? They’re not after the whole island are they? C: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia and a kind of line between the two. K: That kind of a quadrangle in the north west. C: Yeh. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka [probably Larnaca] on up and then just assess themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with. 5

During the second conversation Colby mentioned a possible landing at Famagusta: K: Do you think they’ll take Nicosia? C: Yeh, well there will be some fighting there, but you see what they can do is land there and land at the airport – link up with the people coming in from the sea from the north and then they fight a lot of National Guard in that area (…) Then they also have a separate landing at Famagusta on the coast and perhaps one down at Lynica [Larnaca?] down on the south east coast. The object would be then to try to establish themselves in three or four places and perhaps even link up but that is a little less sure and then have a basis for negotiation. 6

The British and American evaluations both contained the erroneous notion that there would be a landing at Famagusta. This was probably based on the assumption that an amphibious landing would be much easier at the long sandy beaches close to the city compared to the narrow salient between the stony beaches at Kyrenia and the Kyrenia Mountain Range. From there Turkish tank columns could have advanced easily towards Nicosia via the plains of the Mesaoria. In addition, Colby did not mention the possibility of Turkish intentions to include the Morphou/Lefka area. Thus it is clear that while the JIC and CIA had a clear reading of maximum Turkish military aims, they were neither informed nor involved in the actual operational planning of the Turkish Military. This is in diametric contradiction to the existing literature based on the premise of AngloAmerican collusion with the Turkish landing. Contrary to those ‘studies’ on Western conspiracy against Cyprus there was no overt cooperation of

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British or American intelligence circles or military with their Turkish counterparts. Early in the morning of 20 July Turkey officially informed the United Nations, the US, and Great Britain that she had decided to intervene in Cyprus. 7 In a public statement Ecevit, described the objectives of the military operation as follows: The Turkish armed forces have started landing in Cyprus. May God help it be for the good of our nation, all of the Cypriots and humanity. We believe that in this way we are rendering a great service to humanity and to peace. I trust that our forces will not be met with fire and that this will not lead to a bloody struggle. In fact, we are going to the island not for war but for peace, and peace not only for the Turks but also for the Greeks. We were forced to make this decision after experimenting with all the political and diplomatic channels. Meanwhile, I would like to express my gratitude to our friends and allies, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, with whom we have been in close consultations recently, for their well-intentioned aims to solve this problem through diplomatic channels and without the need for intervention. If these aims have failed, the responsibility, of course, does not lie with these states who have shown their well-intentioned aims. Again, I hope that this action will be for the good of all humanity, our nation and all the Cypriots. I wish to God to protect our nation and all humanity from disasters. 8

The Turkish landing in Cyprus began at 0610 hrs local time as Turkish fighter planes attacked Kyrenia and Nicosia airport and 20 Turkish planes dropped paratroops into the Turkish Cypriot main enclave northeast of Nicosia airport. 9 The naval landing force started to go ashore at 0735 hrs at beaches to the east of Kyrenia. 10 Callaghan immediately called in the Turkish Ambassador, Turgut Menemencioğlu, and expressed his regret at the ‘unjustified Turkish action.’ He asked him to convey to his Government the need for high-level talks on Cyprus as soon as possible. Callaghan told him that he ‘very much regretted that I should hear on the radio and not from his Government news of the Turkish invasion.’ He said that he ‘knew of no attacks on the Turkish community in Cyprus which would have justified armed intervention’ and asked Turkey to ‘limit hostilities so far as possible and to bring about a ceasefire immediately.’ Menemencioğlu, who claimed to have no information on the invasion except from what he had heard from the BBC, did not accept the term ‘hostilities’, since Ecevit had announced that ‘no shot would be fired if the intervention was unopposed.’ Callaghan retorted that ‘when it was reported that ships were off the coast and paratroops

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landing, I did not know what word other than “hostilities” I could use.’ And then he added that the ‘Turkish intervention constituted a hostile act against an independent member of the Commonwealth for which Turkey as a Guarantor Power had special responsibility.’ 11 The Greek Chargé d’Affaires was summoned after the Turkish Ambassador’s call. Callaghan assured him that Britain had ‘no prior knowledge’ of the Turkish action, asked that the Greeks should ‘desist from any counter-action’ against the Turks, and that they should do nothing that might aggravate the situation. He asked that the Greeks should send ministers to London that day to discuss the situation. 12 The US Government’s initial reaction was a message delivered by Sisco saying that the United States took ‘an extremely grave view of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, which will have the most serious consequences not least of which is the jeopardy in which it will place the free world security. We are deeply disappointed that the Turkish Government did not hear our pleas and exercise restraint. Now that the step has been taken, however, the most urgent means must be found to restore peace and stability in the area.’ The US was still prepared to support a constitutional solution. ‘The only way in our view to restore constitutional government is through the legitimate succession of Clerides. No other solution is possible or acceptable to the Greeks.’ Sisco would propose the Clerides solution in Athens, while the US would propose urgently to the UK that it call for immediate negotiations with the Guarantor Powers ‘to seek the constitutional solution which would open the way for the restoration of stability in Cyprus and in the area.’ The US Government urged the Government of Turkey to ‘weigh most carefully the proposals (…) To do otherwise would be self-defeating in terms of Turkey’s own interests.’ 13 In addition, Nixon sent a message to the Turkish President Korutürk in which he stated that he believed the Turkish move to be a ‘tragic mistake.’ He appealed to Korutürk ‘as an ally and friend to avoid any step which might lead to an irreversible worsening of the situation and the opening of the entire area to a security threat from forces only too anxious to benefit from a weakening of our alliance.’ There were still opportunities to begin negotiations and he urged him ‘to accept the invitation of Great Britain to begin discussions at once.’ 14 Both US messages again fell short of using threats or even any threatening language. Nobody in Ankara could understand from them that Washington wanted the military operations to stop at once. Evaluating the American failure to stop the Turkish intervention, Kissinger told Nixon on the morning of 20 July that ‘the only way I suppose we could have done it was by being more threatening which we weren’t. We were maybe too

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pleading but frankly we didn’t think they’d move this fast.’ Both agreed that to threaten them now would be too late. 15 However, Kissinger had, from the onset, ruled out US military intervention to stop Turkey. 16 The American focus now turned to try to stop Greece from going to war with Turkey. Sisco was instructed to ‘tell the Greeks that as they must bear a heavy share of the responsibility for what has happened, we look to them to recognize that unless they are prepared to accept a change in the territorial integrity and structure of Cyprus they must join with us, with the British and the Turks in finding a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. As we see it, only Clerides offers an acceptable alternative.’ 17 Ioannides was not impressed by the American position and gave a firm message to Sisco for Ecevit stating that the Greek terms for not going to war were (a) an immediate ceasefire and (b) the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus. Failing this, Greece would declare Enosis and war on Turkey. 18 Kissinger called Callaghan at 0805 hrs GMT and informed him of Ioannides’ threat. 19 Sisco was authorised to tell the Greeks that if they took such action, military aid to Greece would be withdrawn. The American Under Secretary of State, Ingersoll, informed the British Ambassador in Washington that ‘US diplomatic efforts were now being devoted to urging maximum restraint on the Greek Government and on the National Guard not to respond.’ On a practical note, he informed Ramsbotham that a US aircraft carrier was ‘near enough Cyprus to lift evacuees by helicopters.’ 20 The American Ambassador in Ankara was instructed to tell the Turkish Government of the US Government’s extreme disappointment at the Turkish intervention, which the US continued to doubt could produce a result satisfactory to Turkey. Instead, he was to repeat, but in much clearer terms, the idea that a compromise candidate for the presidency of Cyprus should emerge from the pre-existing Cyprus constitution. According to information obtained by the British Embassy in Washington from Wells Stabler, when Sisco had presented this idea before, Ecevit said that they did not care who became president. Meanwhile, Sisco was on his way to Athens where he was to tell the Greek Government that it carried ‘a heavy burden of responsibility for the present situation.’ He would also put forward the Clerides idea, which he had not done with the Greek Government before. 21 If a full-scale conflict could be prevented, there may yet have been time for a viable alternative. The American aim of restraining the Greeks was shared by the British Government, as was the need to call for a meeting of the Guarantor Powers. But Callaghan felt that this could only be achieved when these talks resulted in ‘the removal of Sampson and a return to constitutional procedures.’ He reported that he had discussed this twice with Kissinger and he ‘shared these aims and objectives.’ 22 Kissinger

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informed Sisco in Athens that Callaghan fully supported the Clerides solution since Makarios’ return was ‘highly improbable.’ 23 In order to prepare Clerides, the US Ambassador in Nicosia, Roger Davies, was instructed to tell Clerides that he should under no circumstances resign his position as President of Parliament. 24 Elsewhere, signs were not encouraging. The Greek ultimatum was presented by the Greek Acting Foreign Minister, Kypraios, to the Turkish Ambassador in the morning, in which the Ambassador was informed that the Greek Government had called general mobilisation. It was claimed that Turkish forces had attacked the Greek regular contingent (ELDYK) in Cyprus. Greece demanded the immediate cessation of Turkish military action against Cyprus and a ceasefire. All Turkish troops landed or parachuted into Cyprus should be concentrated in the Turkish enclaves by 1400 hrs Cyprus time, after which the Greek Government was willing to attend talks in London on the basis proposed. As he learned of this, the British Ambassador, Hooper, told Kypraios that if he ‘had understood the Minister correctly, the Greek Government had presented the Turkish Government with a choice between complying with their demands and war. Kypraios first accepted this – one of the officials present (Ossides) adding “war on all fronts”.’ He later tried to back down, saying that he had concluded his message to the Turkish Government by saying that ‘the Greeks were presenting them with an opportunity of settling their differences and stabilising the situation for years to come.’ Kypraios subsequently lowered the demands by saying that ‘he did not think they would insist on the operation being completed by 1400 hrs so long as it was carried out within the next 24 or 48 hours.’ 25 The Greek President Gizikis had broadcast at 1300 hrs GMT a statement that Greek forces were defending the island. However, he fell short of calling his people to war: Greek people. At 0545 this morning the Turkish forces without reason and without any warning invaded the island of Cyprus. In complete disregard of all allied agreements they have turned their arms against our Cypriot brothers. In doing so they have violated our vital rights. Greece has always shown respect for other nations and has strictly abstained from any intervention in other nations’ domestic affairs. The Greek nation has never provoked or harmed the Turks. At this moment the Greek forces in Cyprus are defending the island. True to our traditions we will defend our national interests. The Greek forces have confidence that they have the powers and the ability to defend Greek interests against this flagrant provocation. We remain confident to our traditions. We all have to respond to the expectations of our nation.’ 26

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Meanwhile, the Greek Navy was reported to have sailed out and reserves were called in. British intelligence estimated that the total mobilisation would still take about 15 days. 27 It was clear, however, that if a war was to be prevented the Americans would have to act firmly. US Ambassador Tasca first went alone to the Greek Ministry of Defence where a meeting of the National War Council was to be held at 0800 hrs under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Tasca gave the meeting a strong warning against precipitate courses and escalating the conflict. The senior generals reacted fairly calmly to this but Ioannides, he felt, had been ‘extremely hawkish.’ At 0750 hrs Tasca was joined by Sisco, who spoke on the same lines – with a similar reaction from Ioannides. He had said that if the Turks did not get out of Cyprus the consequences would be double Enosis and war. Ioannides then left the meeting, and after some further discussion between Tasca and Sisco and the Council, the latter agreed that their meeting should proceed but should take no decisions without further discussions with Tasca and Sisco. Later in the morning Foreign Ministrer Kypraios announced that the Greeks were withdrawing the Greek NATO element from Izmir and recalling their Ambassador from Ankara. Sisco said that the package put forward by the Greeks could be used as the basis of a settlement and that he would go to Ankara with it. Nevertheless, he believed that the 1400 hrs deadline was unrealistic. Kypraios said there might be some give on this. Initially, both Tasca and Sisco had been reluctant to use the threat of cutting off US military aid, which they thought might be counter-productive, and had obtained the agreement of the White House and Secretary of State not to do so. But after seeing Kypraios the first time, they changed their minds. After clearance with the White House and State Department, they saw him again and made a threat in ‘courteous but unequivocal’ terms. However, this time, they thought it better not to inform the military of what had been said. Nearer 1400 hrs, Tasca telephoned Kypraios and asked him to confirm that ‘nothing would happen’ at 1400 hrs, which the Greek Minister did. Tasca again checked with Bonanos, who confirmed what Kypraios had said but added that the Greeks could not wait indefinitely. Tasca told British Ambassador Hooper that at his meeting with the National War Council he and Sisco ‘had been impressed by the division between the hawks, led by Ioannides, and the (relative) doves, led by Bonanos and the senior generals.’ In this he hinted at the first indications of the later downfall of Ioannides. 28 Sisco, who had told the Greeks that the American Government would stop all military aid if the Greeks proceeded with their plans to declare Enosis and war on Turkey, believed that he could persuade the Greeks not to proceed and to agree to a ceasefire if the Turks were prepared to withdraw their forces to their enclaves on Cyprus. The Turks could keep on

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the island those forces which were already there. If this could be agreed, the Greeks would be prepared to send someone to London immediately. 29 Turkish claims that an intervention was needed because of an immediate danger to the Turkish Cypriot community were discounted by British High Commissioner Olver, who reported that there was ‘no evidence of any immediate threat to the Turkish Cypriot Community.’ He reported on 18 July that there had been ‘no attacks on the community during the past few days.’ The Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defence, Osman Örek had confirmed to a member of the Embassy that the Greek Cypriot Community, and ‘in particular the National Guard, had been behaving with admirable caution; there had been a few minor casualties through bullets straying inadvertently across the Green Line, but in general the Turkish Cypriot Community had no cause for complaint in this respect.’ The new Foreign Minister, Dimitriou, had endeavoured to meet Denktaş to assure him of the ‘desire of the new regime to maintain peaceful and amicable relations with the Turkish Community and to seek a solution to the intercommunal problem through enlarged talks’, but Denktaş had refused to see him, since any meeting could have been regarded as a form of recognition. Olver referred as well to Sampson’s press conference in which he had given ‘similar reassurances to the Turkish Cypriots and he has said that they were in no danger; the mission of the new regime was to find a peaceful solution through the talks; there was no need therefore for Turkish intervention.’ Ecevit’s remarks, reported by Reuters, claiming that Greece was sending military reinforcements to the island by air and sea, were equally denied by Olver, who said that there was ‘absolutely no evidence’ that this had taken place. There had been two unscheduled flights by Olympic Airways to Nicosia in the past three days. Those were not troop reinforcements and in each case a comparatively small number of individuals had emerged. Olver concluded that ‘on the basis of all our information so far there is no genuine pretext for Turkish military intervention.’ 30 US Ambassador Davies had unofficially advised Dimitriou to avoid any firing at Turkish Cypriots, as this might prompt reprisals in mixed villages. 31 In fact, the threat of Turkish Cypriot casualties was first realised after the Turkish Army began operations in Cyprus. While Turkish troops continued to land on the northern coast, the National Guard started an allout attack on Turkish-Cypriot villages and quarters of mixed villages and towns. At 0900 hrs the British High Commissioner reported that intercommunal fighting had broken out in Cyprus. 32 Turkish planes continued to bomb Nicosia and heavy ground fighting was reported from

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there. Fighting was also reported in Famagusta, Kyrenia, and Limassol. In Nicosia the fighting centred round Athalassa barracks and the airfield. 33 Fierce fighting around the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia endangered the lives of more than 380 tourists who were trapped there. UNFICYP declared the hotel a ‘United Nations protected area’ in order to ensure their safety. In the evening of 21 July, the Special Representative and the Force Commander reported that the tourists had been evacuated earlier that day. UNFICYP thereupon reached agreement with both sides that it would occupy the hotel and deny it to both sides. The hotel remains under UNFICYP to this day. 34 At 1100 Greece announced a general mobilisation and Greek troops were reported moving towards the Greek/Turkish border. 35 In Limassol UNFICYP succeeded in arranging a three-and-a-half-hour ceasefire in the Limassol area to enable residents to get to the Sovereign Base Area. 36 A similar ceasefire for the ‘Green Line’ 37 in Nicosia was agreed for 1500 hrs local time, but broke down later that evening. 38 At noon the British Ambassador in Athens announced that the Greeks were ready to send a representative to London, but were first awaiting a Turkish reply to the appeal for a ceasefire at 1200 hrs; without such a reply they would not send a representative. In the NATO Council meeting at 1300 hrs the Turkish representative stated Turkey’s aims as: a) the protection of Turkish citizens; b) a return to normality and constitutional order, and; c) the re-start of inter-community talks. 39 The Turks stated that they were ready for negotiations at any time. They had no territorial ambitions, their action was not aimed at the Greeks, and they would fulfil all their obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. However, they were not ready to agree to any ceasefire or to attend negotiations before their initial operational targets had been reached. Güneş told Phillips that if Turkish troops withdrew into the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves they might be left vulnerable. In such a situation they would be forced to continue the negotiations in London from a position of weakness. It was Greek action that had set the whole thing off. Now that Turkey had had the courage to act alone the British and Americans were trying to stop her prematurely by pointing to Greek threats. Reminded by the Ambassador that these threats included war, Güneş said that his government in its plans had not overlooked the danger of war, but this was a risk accepted by parliament and the people and no government could back down. Phillips sensed ‘something of an air of self-confident jingoism here, of relief that the hurdle has at last been taken.’ 40 In Cyprus the 10,000 Turkish-Cypriot citizens and militiamen of Limassol surrendered to the Greek-Cypriot National Guard at 1400 hrs.

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The Turkish community was being corralled in the Limassol football stadium by the National Guard, although under the supervision of the United Nations. 41 On the diplomatic front the US State Department issued a statement saying, ‘We regret the military action by the Turks just as we deplore the previous action by Greece which precipitated the crisis.’ 42 Kissinger’s distress continued throughout 20 July. His strategy had been to threaten openly to cut off military aid to the Greeks. At the same time a similar threat should have been made to the Turks, but in a veiled manner. Kissinger was furious to learn that Head of the Europe Desk at the State Department, Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman, had failed to tell the Turkish Ambassador to Washington that the US had threatened Greece, that if they did not agree to a ceasefire the US would cut off its total support, and that Hartman privately thought it might lead to military aid being cut off to Turkey as well. Kissinger told Ingersoll that ‘it’s going to be a lonely department when I get back (…) You get Hartman to call the Turkish Ambassador – and you tell Hartman that the next time he doesn’t carry out instructions I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Secretaries have a judgment when they’re given an order.’ 43 Kissinger called Ingersoll again to confirm whether his instructions had been carried out. The conversation below provides a good insight into Kissinger’s agitated state of mind at that time: I: Hartman is calling him [Tr. Ambassador] right now. K: That isn’t the message I want. You mean Hartman is going over there. I: No, he’s just calling him. K: Hartman did not do it, right? I: He did not. K: For what reason? I: Because he has some concern about the man’s connections and he thought that Joe should get to the top people and we have given those instructions and I talked to Joe and also sent a message. K: I would like to raise this question with you Bob. When you or I give an order who the hell are these guys not to carry it out whatever their reason is (…) No Bob I do not accept the proposition that subordinate State Department officials cannot carry out instructions. It is not acceptable to me (…) I cannot believe that if you tell the Ambassador of a country to do something – that aid will be cut off that it won’t get to the right people (…) Besides Hartman is Assistant Secretary. If he doesn’t want to carry out my orders he has at least got to tell me. 44

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Kissinger now was a bundle of nerves. When Ingersoll informed him that Sisco had delivered the message to Ecevit, he said ‘OK. Now the only question we have in our mind now is what message did he deliver since nobody yet has delivered the message he was ordered to I don’t want him to break the record.’ While Ingersoll was confirming that Hartman had delivered Kissinger’s message Kissinger burst out again: By this point he probably went the other way. My instructions [were that] Hartman should express his personal opinion that having threatened aid cutoffs to Greece it would certainly come to Turkey if they didn’t accept a Sisco proposal. It was not to be an official U.S. Government threat at that point. It was supposed to be Hartman’s personal opinion. I will bet my bottom dollar he didn’t do it that way (…) Bob, you’d better think of whom we put in what places because I am going to make some massive changes after this crisis. Find out from Hartman whether he carried out his instructions or whether he had a better idea of how to present their threat to the Turks. 45

Kissinger’s mood did not improve when William B. Buffum (Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs) informed him of a new draft of a Security Council resolution produced by the British containing a reference to Makarios as President. In Buffum’s view the Americans would have to live with it, and the rest of the resolution was 99.9 per cent what they wanted: a ceasefire and support for the London Conference. Kissinger, who was still furious, shouted: ‘Listen Buffum. When I get through with the Department we settle for nothing less than 100 per cent of what we want.’ 46 Finally, Kissinger had realised that he needed a much tougher line with the Turks if they were to agree to a ceasefire. Sisco was told that the ‘Secretary wants you to be brutally frank in expressing to the Turks in pressing them to agree to a ceasefire and to go to London as quickly as possible. You should express our view that as we have told the Greeks that if they go to war we will cut off our aid. Similar action with respect to aid to Turkey may have to be taken if hostilities continue. It is essential that we exert maximum pressure at this point to obtain the above two objectives.’ 47 The Turks had tried to delay talks with Sisco by holding up the clearance for his flight. The plane finally took off without clearance. In Ankara it took him almost one and a half hours to get through to Ecevit and he was clearly angered by this ‘stalling game.’ Sisco described his encounter with Ecevit in a telegram to Kissinger in the following terms:

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I saw Ecevit and laid it on the line in the toughest language, giving him ceasefire proposals contained (…) telling him all of his conditions for starting talks had been met and letting him know clearly that prolongation of conflict risked not only war with Greece but gravest damage to US-Turkish relations. He began by saying he could not talk to military and cabinet before tomorrow. He ended by promising to meet them right away and see me again within two or three hours. 48

Sisco put forward four points to Ecevit: a) all armed activity to cease; b) no introduction of further forces; c) withdrawal to Turkish enclaves, and; d) the dispatch of representatives to London. 49 Sisco said that Ecevit had been ‘visibly shaken’ both by the message about bilateral relations and by the challenge to him to make good on what he had said after the US had delivered on what he had asked of them (i.e., no Greek intervention). 50 However, Sisco cautioned that in his judgment Ankara did not take very seriously the Greek threat to declare war. He commented: ‘You know how difficult it is to stop armies when they are winning.’ 51 Kissinger came now to the conclusion that something more was needed to satisfy the Turks. He told Callaghan that when it came to talks there would have to be some adjustment of boundaries in Cyprus as a ‘facesaving device.’ 52 Meanwhile, at the United Nations the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a general ceasefire, the end to foreign military intervention, withdrawal of foreign military personnel other than those present under the authority of the international agreement on Cyprus, and for negotiations among Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 53 Fighting continued over night in Cyprus, where at 0130 increased firing was reported on the Green Line, with National Guard units firing into the Turkish enclave. At 0330 hrs the British High Commissioner related that 250 British subjects near Kyrenia had been shelled. Further bombing of Nicosia was reported at 0500 hrs, while more Turkish ships approached the Cypriot coast at Kyrenia. 54 The British Joint intelligence Service Near East (JISNE) reported at 2020 hrs of attacks by the National Guard on Turkish enclaves and villages throughout the island. Between 1640 and 1858 hrs the Turkish enclaves at Limassol, Episkopi and Paphos had surrendered. 55 Another British intelligence report stated that while ‘all now appear[ed] to have gone quiet now (…) the possibility of reprisal raids by Greek Cypriots on Turks cannot be ruled out.’ 56

8 The First Two ‘Ceasefires’, 21 and 22 July 1974 The Road to the First Geneva Conference

In the first three days of the Turkish military operation, from the dawn assaults on 20 July until the ceasefire at 1600 hrs on 22 July, the Turkish forces succeeded in capturing only a narrow salient, some 15 miles wide, extending from the beachhead west of Kyrenia to the northern edge of Nicosia. Thus they failed to meet their initial targets. Turkish progress during the first day was very slow. Their airborne forces, which were dropped between Kyrenia mountains and Nicosia, did little more than consolidate their positions in the Turkish enclave of Geunyeli, while the seaborne force established a small beachhead about five miles west of Kyrenia. During the next day these forces linked up across the Kyrenia pass, but not without the loss of many lives and tanks, largely through inept use of narrow mountain roads and because of stiff resistance by the National Guard. British intelligence estimated that by the morning of 21 July the ‘strength of the invasion force ashore was 6,000 men and 40 tanks.’ 1 In summarizing the situation on the morning of 22 July the British High Commissioner Olver said, ‘Somewhat to our surprise, Greek Cypriot forces have held their ground and maintained pressure. The general picture is one of Turkish confusion of their objective. They have failed to take advantage of their opportunities and have, until this morning, shown no real drive.’

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He went on to say that, outside the main fighting areas, the Turkish-Cypriot fighters could not hold out much longer and that they had already surrendered in Limassol. In Paphos (despite close air support), Polis, Lefka, Chatos, and Famagusta, collapse seemed imminent. However, he also reported that there had been a further sea-borne landing that morning and he concluded, ‘It appears that the intervention force may be attempting to seize Kyrenia town before the ceasefire.’ 2 According to British intelligence Turkish casualties were much higher than announced. While Ecevit had informed the Turkish Parliament on 23 July of 57 killed, 184 wounded and 242 missing soldiers, the British Defence Attaché in Ankara reported that more than 1,000 had been killed. Particularly the Airborne Brigade was said to have suffered heavy losses. 3 The slow Turkish advance surprised friend and foe alike. In light of the bad Turkish army performance in Cyprus, Kissinger asked the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff , General George Scratchley Brown, on 22 July for an assessment of what this meant for NATO. 4 From the beginning of the Turkish intervention operation, urgent diplomatic efforts were directed towards the achievement of a general ceasefire and, in particular, to the negotiation of a truce in the Nicosia area to allow neutral parties to be evacuated. Initially, both British and Americans experienced great difficulties in contacting military representtatives of the Turkish Army and of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard. While the National Guard had been especially elusive, because the Junta in Athens were at this stage reluctant to admit mainland influence in GreekCypriot military affairs, the Turkish side did not want to stop its advance before attaining their minimum targets. In Ankara Ecevit tried to postpone another meeting with Sisco, informing Macomber that he could not see him before early next morning because of his meetings with the military commanders. Sisco called Bayulken in the Foreign Ministry and told him ‘in strongest language I have ever used to foreign diplomat that continuing Turkish failure to meet me was forcing me to conclude that Turkey is not interested in continuing close relationship with US. I told him that treatment accorded Special Representative of President is shabby and that I would soon have no choice but take a plane back to United States and report that Turkey no longer cares about United States or NATO.’ Sisco told Bayulken that he expected a call within fifteen minutes (0745 hrs local time) setting a time for an early meeting. This call helped, and a meeting at the Foreign Ministry was scheduled for 0815 hrs. 5 Ecevit informed Sisco during their meeting that Turkey would accept the ceasefire according to the Security Council resolution if Greece would comply as well. 6 Soon after, it became clear that

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Ecevit was not prepared to agree to any concrete time for a ceasefire to begin. Kissinger informed Callaghan that the Turks were not ready for a ceasefire. Both agreed to call Ecevit again to pressure him. Callaghan said that he would ‘twist his arm’, but he did not have much influence. Kissinger advised him to ‘try charm.’ 7 Meanwhile, at the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting in Washington, Kissinger had a clash with Defense Secretary James A. Schlesinger, who wanted to overthrow the Greek Government. Schlesinger had argued that a ceasefire in Cyprus was not consistent with NATO principles; he was willing to give up home porting, i.e., American Naval Bases in Greece. Kissinger told White House Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, that he had been ‘outflanked on the left.’ Schlesinger had agreed 100 per cent with him on Friday. Now Kissinger would return to the WSAG meeting and say that USG had to insist on a ceasefire, but Schlesinger would ‘crucify’ him. 8 Haig blamed this controversy on the ‘leftist channels’, which could ‘unravel the whole thing.’ Kissinger claimed that there was a ‘massive insurrection in Defense.’ He said that Haig should call General George Scratchley Brown (Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff) and inform him privately about it. Kissinger decided to go back to the WSAG meeting and claim that he had talked to San Clemente (Nixon) and had gotten Presidential approval. But, Schlesinger would attempt to ‘kill us in the press.’ Kissinger then lamented: ‘Al, we can never go through another crisis like this. It has been too bad.’ 9 Meanwhile, news arrived from Athens that the Greek Prime Minister, Adamantios Androutsopoulos, had told Tasca in the morning of 21 July that there was going to be a change in government within the next 24 hours. He had said that the ‘Captains are going to take over.’ As Tasca reported, ‘it was obvious by the way he put it that he did not know whether this was good or bad. The clear implication was that it was very bad indeed.’ 10 Apparently there was a fierce battle within the Greek leadership over what to do and a change in government seemed inevitable. The American evaluation was that this would be a more moderate government. Kissinger broke the news to Callaghan and told him to call Ecevit to tell him that he didn’t have to worry about Sampson ‘because we will support his removal.’ 11 Callaghan called Ecevit around 1230 hrs on 21 July in order to get him to accept a face-to-face meeting. Ecevit agreed ‘in principle’, but would do so closer to Ankara than London. Callaghan than called the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, who accepted the proposal that talks should be held in Vienna. 12 Ecevit told Kissinger that Turkey would announce that it accepted the principle of a ceasefire that night and that it would be prepared for talks

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‘anywhere in Switzerland if minimum conditions for ceasefire would be met.’ The conditions would be defined later that day. Kissinger then informed Ecevit about the possible change of regime in Greece the following day. 13 At noon Callaghan informed Kissinger that the Turks were ready to come to Vienna. 14 Kissinger then called Androutsopoulos, but could not get a clear response to whether or not the Greeks were prepared to come as well. The Greek Prime Minister asked whether it would be possible to postpone the meeting to the ‘day after tomorrow’ (Tuesday) and promised to inform Kissinger or Sisco on the Greek decision. 15 Kissinger decided to press Ecevit for a clearer commitment to a ceasefire. The tactic he used throughout the crisis was to play on the teacher-student relationship he had with Ecevit, who had taken the Secretary’s courses at Harvard. The following conversation exemplifies both Kissinger’s approach and the reality that the student controlled the teacher rather than the other way round. Kissinger informed Ecevit that he thought that it would be impossible to get Ecevit’s proposal accepted: E: Why? K: Well, as I understand your proposal, it is quite frankly another delaying tactic. E: No, no, it is not a delaying tactic, you see… K: You’re a good student of mine. E: We have reason to be [guarded] of their intentions. We made … ceasefire. But they have pilots in there speaking Turkish, using our codes (…). We cannot be sure whether they will not violate the ceasefire in our name so we must take certain conditions of security assurances. We can finish that discussion within a couple of hours (…) K: But again, you know what high regard I have for you. I would like you to… E: Could you repeat again – your voice was cut off. K: I said, you know my high regard for you. E: Thank you, Mr. Kissinger. K: And I would like you to think of the long-term consequences of what you’re doing. E: No, please don’t think that I’m making a tactic. We have serious problems [assuring workable ceasefire]. K: Because on Cyprus itself we are very sympathetic to your position. E: Yes, thank you.

Kissinger warned Ecevit of the danger that when this was over Cyprus would lean towards the communists. Ecevit answered that the Turkish presence in Cyprus was the best guarantee against communism and added:

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We have followed the policy recommended by America for 10 years and where have we ended? (…) Now we took the initiative here and Britain as well and we have reached somewhere. We want to make good use of it (…) K: Yes but the outcome – Cyprus cannot become part of Turkey. E: No I’m not saying that at all – [but Turkey was influential enough to prevent Cyprus drifting towards communism].’ 16

In the early afternoon of 21 July Sisco informed the British Ambassador in Athens, Hooper, that a ceasefire had been agreed in Cyprus and barring last-minute hitches would be arranged within half an hour (1600 hrs). 17 . In practice, this ceasefire had little immediate effect and two days later in commenting to the British Ministry of Defence on the military situation Aiken remarked ‘If anyone thinks there is a ceasefire here, he is badly mistaken.’ 18 Finally, the Turks informed Sisco that they would agree to a ceasefire, as requested in the Security Council resolution, provided that they received assurance from the Americans that the Greeks would also abide by it. They did not, however, accept the other requirements of the resolution, nor did they accept that their forces should withdraw to Turkish enclaves. In the event of such a ceasefire they would be prepared to send representatives to London for talks, possibly on 23 July. 19 Sisco again put the conference idea combined with a ceasefire to the Greeks. In a meeting he had with Androtsopoulos and the Acting Foreign Minister Kypraios, the Prime Minister answered by quoting Abraham Lincoln: ‘The important thing is not whether God is on my side, but whether I am on God’s side.’ 20 Kissinger instructed Sisco to tell the Greek Prime Minister Androutsopoulos that if Greece agreed to attend the meeting with Britain and Turkey the US would ‘produce a ceasefire.’ Kissinger continued: ‘Also tell him in reference to his quote from Abraham Lincoln that in an emergency such as this those on “God’s side” must take risk.’ 21 Nixon sent a telegram to the Greek President Gizikis urging him to accept the ceasefire as of 1400 hrs GMT on 22 July and threatened that failing to do so would mean the US having to ‘reconsider its entire relations in the area.’ 22 A similar message was forwarded to the Turkish President Korutürk 23 In another example of Kissinger’s teacher approach he had asked Ecevit at 2245 hrs on 21 July, ‘What exactly is it that you want? I know you are an intelligent man – I know you from the days of Harvard. With all due respect, I cannot take this. This cannot go on for six weeks on this basis.’ Ecevit said that the Greeks would try to exploit a ceasefire to amass troops on Cyprus. This had to stop before a ceasefire could be arranged. 24 Kissinger then urged Ecevit again to accept a truce and the Turkish Prime Minister finally agreed. The ceasefire was to start from 1400 hrs on 22 July.

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Following the Turkish announcement, Sisco and Tasca in Athens and Kissinger and the Head of the European Affairs Desk, Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman, from Washington worked intensively on the Greeks to accept the arrangement. 25 At 0245 hrs the State Department reported Greek agreement. The Greeks and Turks would publicly confirm a US announcement of the ceasefire. 26 A landing of Greek reinforcements at Nicosia Airport occurred on the morning after the official cessation of hostilities and, in the first of many violations, the Turks later the same morning carried out air attacks on both Nicosia and Famagusta. The Greeks had sent 14 Noratlas aircraft, which began landing at Nicosia Airport at 0255 hrs on 22 July. But it seemed that their arrival had not been notified to all National Guard units in the vicinity because they flew into a very hostile reception. One aircraft was shot down on the downwind leg, one on the approach, one exploded on the apron, setting fire to another aircraft close to it; yet another was seen being towed into the Cyprus Airways hangar presumably for emergency repairs. It is possible that more were destroyed because at 0525 hrs, when they departed, observers counted only seven aircraft taking off. It was estimated that they had delivered approximately 200 troops and ammunition. Thirty minutes later Turkish fighter aircrafts started heavy bombing of the airfield, the first of many such attacks that day. 27 More Turkish bombing occurred at Famagusta on the morning of 22 July. Bombing and napalm attacks concentrated mainly on two tall hotels, the Salamina Towers and Golden Mariana, which were singled out because one of them at least was being used by the National Guard. From there the Greek units had fired into the walled city held by Turkish-Cypriot fighters. The Salamina Towers was demolished and the Golden Mariana was damaged extensively. Some of the National Guard officers suffered very serious burns and were later evacuated to Athens via the British base at Akrotiri. 28 It was evident that Turkey was not prepared to stop before her operational aims were reached. Only after Kyrenia fell into Turkish hands around noon on 22 July could a ceasefire be arranged. 29 In the early hours of 22 July NATO Secretary-General Lüns urged the Greek and Turkish Governments to do all within their power to bring the fighting to an end. Both Turkish and Greek radio stations announced during the morning the acceptance of the UN ceasefire call, which would take effect at 1400 hrs. Around noon Olver reported that Turkish tanks had passed through Kyrenia and that fighting in the town was dying down. Thus the Turks seemed to have achieved their initial goal of establishing a beachhead. The Greek Foreign Minister told Callaghan in the morning of 22 July that he would prefer Geneva as the venue. 30 Callaghan subsequently called Ecevit (1330 hrs), who agreed that Turkish representatives would go to Geneva for talks at 1100 hrs on 23 July. 31 However, the second ceasefire

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was not fully observed and Kissinger was again forced to urge Ecevit to make sure that his troops had stopped fighting by dawn of 23 July and also restrain to Asaf Inhan, the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires, who seemed in Kissinger’s evaluation to be ‘over-excited’, making bellicose statements on the ground and endangering the ceasefire. If the Turks observed the ceasefire, the Americans would put maximum pressure on the Greeks to do likewise. Kissinger then gave instructions to the US Ambassador in Athens to make representations to the Greeks and for the US Ambassador in Cyprus to do what he could with the commanders in the field to ensure good behaviour. 32

The Sinking of the Kocatepe Apparently, Turkey never suspected that Greece would resort to all-out war. However, the General Staff was clearly worried that Greek reinforcements might reach Cyprus. This had to be prevented at all costs. At 1345 hrs on 21 July, the British Naval Attaché in Ankara sent a telegram to John Aiken, on behalf of the Turkish High Command, asking for confirmation of the presence and identity of a force of ships that was allegedly approaching Paphos. At the time, the strong Turkish enclave at Paphos was one of the few places in which the Turkish Fighters had not surrendered to the National Guard; the Turks were clearly sensitive about the situation there. The British decided not to send observation Nimrod aircraft close enough to identify the ships, as air intelligence was then reporting intense activity in the area by a force of ten Turkish fighter aircraft (1410 hrs). 33 Apart from that, Ecevit told Callaghan at 1245 hrs that he thought that the Greek Prime Minister had ordered the ships to turn away. ‘Both the Secretary of State and the Private Secretary found Mr. Ecevit’s remarks on this subject confused and hard to understand.’ 34 When Sisco asked Ioannides about the Greek convoy the Greek General told him flatly, ‘If the Turks see Greek ships in Cyprus Danger Zone, tell them to sink them.’ 35 Kissinger called Ecevit about this. But Ecevit said: ‘We doubt the reliability of Greece. Ioannides word of honor is a joke (…) He said we could fire on any ship bearing a Greek flag. His ships are drawing Turkish flags! Kissinger then said that ‘No one can blame you if you sink your own ships.’ But Ecevit insisted that they were not Turkish ships but ‘Greek ships drawing Turkish flags.’ Kissinger concluded: ‘Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, but you can sink them if they are not your ships but are flying Turkish flags.’ 36 While the Turkish High Command still judged that the naval force was Greek, it turned out that it was actually a Turkish naval unit of three destroyers. 37 All but one of the Turkish pilots had recognised the ships at the last minute and had broken off their attacks. 38 The one exception pressed home his attack with, as the Aiken put it, ‘unfortunate accuracy’,

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scoring a direct hit on the destroyer Kocatepe. Then, presumably aware of his mistake, he returned to Turkey where he was reported to have flown into a hillside. 39 Whether this was an accident or a deliberate act of contrition will never be known. The American Embassy in Ankara received a call at 1845 hrs from the Turkish Foreign Ministry reporting that the Turkish Air Force had just bombed several Greek ships; one Greek ship had sunk and two were fleeing the area. A patrol boat with a Greek flag had also been sunk but it later turned out that it was Cypriot. 40 Upon realising the mistake Ankara requested British Search and Rescue assistance. Intensive rescue operations ensued, but at first failed to locate any survivors. On 24 July the British Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that, on 22 July, an Israeli training ship had picked up 42 survivors from a Turkish destroyer. A British helicopter (RAF Gold Rover) found a life jacket at 1045 hrs some 25 miles SSW of Akrotiri and this confirmed suspicions that the original search area designated by the Turks had not allowed sufficiently for the south-easterly drift. Nimrod aircraft and HMS Andromeda hastened to the area where a Turkish tracker aircraft and the Turkish destroyer TCG Berk were already searching. 41 Seventy-two survivors were rescued and transferred to a British military hospital at Akrotiri. According to the Turkish Naval Command, there had been a total crew of 235 of whom about 175 had been rescued; there were still 60 unaccounted for. The search continued until 28 July but no further survivors, and only nine bodies, were recovered. On the evening of 24 July the survivors were flown by helicopter to TCG Berk. 42

Anglo-Turkish Confrontation at Kyrenia, 22–23 July 1974 Concern that Greece might declare war on Turkey was voiced in diplomatic circles the day before the Turkish intervention, but it was Turkish violations of the 21 July ceasefire that first gave the threat some prominence. From then on it caused continued anxiety until the day of the second Turkish advance, after which neither the National Guard nor Greece displayed much inclination for overt military countermeasures. The commander of the British forces in Cyprus, John Aiken, later declared that the ‘threat of Greece being provoked into war with Turkey must seem less real than it did at the time. Now the inescapable conclusion is that Greece would have been embarking on a war she could not hope to win; this clearly prevailed over arguments based on honour.’ He continued to say that, ‘In the heat of the crisis and as seen from within the island, things looked quite different at the time.’ Consequently, both he and Olver had backed proposals and plans for UN or British Military intervention to contain the Turkish advance. 43 The first occurrence of an Anglo-Turkish showdown, however, had nothing to do with overall diplomatic tactics.

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British rescue and evacuation operations were pursued as ‘first evacuation of Dormitory Towns, 20–21 July i.e. British Service families from Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta’; ‘evacuation of British and friendly Nationals from Nicosia, 21 July’ 44 and ‘evacuation of British and friendly Nationals from Kyrenia, 22–23 July.’ While the first two operations went reasonably well and unopposed, the Kyrenia operation brought Britain and Turkey to the verge of a major military confrontation. In order to diminish the danger of local British residents and tourists getting hurt by the fighting in and around Kyrenia, Britain decided on 21 July to go ahead with a Royal Naval rescue operation. Subject to clearance from Athens and Ankara it was proposed that the evacuation should start at dawn on 22 July. BBC and BFBS (British Forces Broadcasting Service) broadcasts were transmitted to this effect and in the course of the afternoon and evening of 21 July, HMS Andromeda, HMS Rhyl and RFA Olna were detached for the operation. Throughout the night of 21/22 July, despite intense diplomatic activity, Turkish agreement could not be obtained. At midday on 22 July, with the prospect of ceasefire at 1600 hrs, the FCO stated that ministers had agreed to postpone the operation. The main reason for the Turks’ objection to the operation at that time was their failure to capture Kyrenia and their need to continue reinforcement of the bridgehead unhindered. Their claim to have done so, first broadcast on 21 July and repeated by the BBC, much to the annoyance of the Greeks and the three BBC correspondents in Kyrenia, proved to have been completely unfounded. Throughout the day of 22 July reports on the continuing plight of the British and other residents and tourists in Kyrenia area continued. Support from Greece was equally pending. While the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed HM Ambassador at Athens that evacuation from the beaches east of Kyrenia would be unsafe, the Greek Supreme Command claimed that reliable reports had been received in Athens that HMS Hermes was being escorted by Turkish destroyers. Greek submarines were in the area and the Supreme Command ‘would not be responsible for the consequences.’ 45 At 1520 hrs John Aiken decided to ‘put the pressure on to clear the rescue operation for tomorrow’ and HMS Hermes and HMS Devonshire were despatched to join the frigates off Cape Andreas. In the evening Callaghan informed diplomatic posts that the operation was to start at dawn the following morning. He instructed them to seek immediate assurances from the Greek and Turkish Governments that their forces would not interfere with the operation, ‘indeed we expect their support for it.’ The British Air Force received the authority ‘if necessary’ to fly into the danger zone previously declared by the Turks, to ‘protect the naval task force.’ At 0205 hrs Aiken was informed that Ankara continued to be unwilling to approve the operation. Turkish military authorities threatened that they would not

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accept responsibility for any ship that entered the ‘advertised, forbidden and dangerous zone.’ An Athens signal stated that the Greek Supreme Command could not guarantee the safety of the operation. Nevertheless, preparations continued. At 0303 hrs Callaghan sent a personal message to Ecevit stressing the humanitarian aspect of the operation and explaining that Aiken had been given discretion to proceed with the operation at the time and the place already notified, and ‘I expect him to receive full cooperation from your people on the spot and shall have to hold your Government responsible for any incident involving you forces.’ Notwithstanding continued warnings transmitted through the British Ambassador in Ankara, Aiken issued orders to his Naval and Air Commanders. 46 When at 0440 hrs Turkish aircraft were detected over Kyrenia, orders were given that the operation should continue and the Task Force was given advice on the air defence rules of engagement, i.e., they were only allowed to engage when an attacking aircraft had ‘committed a hostile act directly on the force.’ At 0550 hrs, HM Ambassador in Ankara reported on an early morning interview with Ecevit, who was apparently still advising that the operation should be postponed ‘possibly by a day.’ Meanwhile, the Task Force was already closing the coastline of Kyrenia and proceeding with the helicopter transports from the beaches. As this phase got under way, with continuing cautions from Ankara, the Task Force Commander was instructed: ‘You should know that gloomy noises keep coming from Ankara to effect that the Turks are not ready for us to begin. Your operation has strong support at highest level in London. We are gritting our teeth: you play it cool.’ At the very moment that this signal was being transmitted (0645 hrs), the Turkish High Command sent an urgent voice message to Aiken that ‘unless the operation was called off, Turkish authorities would take appropriate action.’ Helicopter operations were suspended and the ships ordered to stand off about 23 miles NNE of Kyrenia. Aiken sent personal replies to the Turkish High Command stating that the life-saving operation had already begun, and telling them not to interfere in what was ‘purely a life saving mission.’ 47 Almost simultaneously, the British Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) passed a similarly robust message to the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, whom he knew personally, concluding with the remark, ‘I am assuming that this message [the Turkish order to hold off] was signed at a low level without your knowledge or authority. CBFNE [Commander of British Forces Near East] is proceeding with the operation. Grateful for your urgent instructions to your commanders that the operation is not to be interfered with.’ At 0725 hrs, Aiken authorised the continuation of the evacuation at Six Mile Beach and Kyrenia harbour. Here another dangerous incident developed at 1105 hrs when a Turkish tank drove up to the harbour and its commander

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threatened to shoot at everything in sight, including the three ships, if anyone tried to prevent him entering the old Kyrenia Fort where, he alleged, a National Guard tank was lying up. The episode was resolved by UN officers. By noon some 800 people had been lifted to the landing site at Six Mile Beach and the flow of refugees to this area had virtually ceased. Operations, therefore, focused on the area west of Kyrenia, behind which continuous fighting was evident. In response to a request from Washington, the staff of the American radio station at Karavas and the associated camp at Chiklos were evacuated by helicopter. Among the evacuees onboard RFA Olna was a party of Russians who turned out to be a folk-dance group from Ukraine. John Aiken reported that ‘They gave a splendid impromptu performance during the voyage.’ 48 HMS Hermes and HMS Rhyl carried out a final search of the coast line, picking up a few stragglers. At 1630 hrs a major Turkish force approached over the horizon, making for Kyrenia from the north east. Its presence persuaded Aiken to return the evacuation force west about. The Turkish force seemed surprised to find British ships still in the area and turned north when HMS Hermes attempted to exchange identities with them. Since the evacuation was then complete, both Hermes and Rhyl turned west at 1635 hrs and left the area. 1,552 people of 23 different nationalities had been rescued in the course of the operation. If any Turkish naval commander or any Turkish air pilot had attempted to stop the operation, the British orders had been to resist. Such an act could have led to the outbreak of hostilities between British and Turkish forces in Cyprus. That might well have set in train a chain of events ending in a major confrontation in which Britain would have found herself as party to the conflict. Equally, a US-Turkish confrontation could have ensued on similar terms as the US Consul in Nicosia had in the morning of 21 July asked for permission for a company of US Marines to land at Dhekelia from an amphibious ship to handle US nationals within the base. Shortly after that, Lawrence Eagleburger (Kissinger’s Executive Assistant) informed the Foreign Office Private Secretary, Anthony Arthur Acland, that Kissinger had only just heard of the request to land US Marines at Dhekelia and was angry about it. He had ordered that the request be withdrawn. During a phone conversation with Defense Secretary Schlesinger, Kissinger had already objected on 19 July to the use of American helicopters for evacuations, because if the US got them in ‘no one will ever know what they are there for.’ 49 If not for Kissinger’s intervention it is easy to picture US helicopters and Marines in dangerous confrontations with Turkish troops.

9 ‘A net gain for the West’ Political Implications of the Turkish Military Operation

The start of the Geneva Conference was delayed by the political changes in Greece. Callaghan and Kissinger discussed the situation at 1630 hrs on 22 July. Kissinger said that the Americans understood that a coup had taken place under General Ioannis Davos. He doubted if the Greeks would be ready to attend a meeting the following day and suggested Wednesday (24 July). He said that Sisco would be returning to Washington. He would send William B. Buffum (Assistant Secretary for International Organisations Affairs) to be in London first thing on Wednesday morning. He would be fully briefed on Kissinger’s own views and could go on to Geneva if necessary. Kissinger said that he was seeing Makarios that afternoon. He would play it cool and would be noncommittal, though friendly. Callaghan advised Kissinger to deal more delicately with this question. He should not get himself isolated in not supporting Makarios. Kissinger said that he merely did not want to enter into any final commitments. Kissinger subsequently telephoned again at 1700 hrs. He said that the Americans certainly did not want Sampson as the final outcome but before they turned on him they wanted to see what the general package looked like. He would keep Makarios in play but not go overboard for him. Callaghan said that perhaps Clerides was the right man to aim for on a temporary basis but there would have to be elections subsequently and Makarios would have to

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be able to run in them. Getting rid of Sampson seemed to be the first point of any package. Sampson could not remain for long. Kissinger said that he would not oppose holding elections. He thought that he supported Callaghan on procedure and probably on the outcome. Callaghan said he expected support for both. Kissinger said that, although the process had been very painful, the present situation was probably a net gain for the West. 1 At 1430 hrs on 23 July Nicosia Radio reported that Nicos Sampson had resigned and Clerides had been sworn in as President of Cyprus. 2 High Commissioner Olver assessed the change as a welcome development and said that Clerides should have a positive and effective influence on the situation, especially in the field of intercommunal negotiations, in which his good relations with Denktaş should be most beneficial. He expressed the wish that Clerides might be more than just Acting President on behalf of Makarios and said he hoped ‘that, in this constitutional interregnum when it is I suppose not certain that Makarios will resume his position on the island, we can avoid rubbing Clerides nose too obviously in his Acting Presidency.’ 3 Meanwhile, Sampson was hiding in the Troodos Mountains accompanied by 50 armed men. 4 In the beginning, it was far from clear whether Clerides saw himself as President or as Acting President in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives. In his first statement after assuming the Presidency of the Cyprus Republic Clerides stated that he would do so ‘under the relevant provision of the constitution at moments critical to our country.’ His immediate objectives were: a) to strictly adhere to the ceasefire; b) to strive urgently to find a just, viable solution to the Cyprus problem within the framework of an independent and sovereign state; c) to show full respect for democratic principles, and to fully safeguard human rights for all the Cypriot people; d) this would include close cooperation with the Turkish element in order to create conditions of welfare for all, and; e) to maintain harmonious relations with the ‘national centre.’ Clerides said that any critique of the past and present should be left for the time being; what was now of paramount importance was the salvation and good of Cyprus. 5 At the ensuing press conference Clerides revealed that he had asked all ministers appointed by Sampson to remain in their posts. He was asked to comment on the impression Makarios was giving that he was acting on Makarios’ behalf. Clerides replied that he had assumed the presidency under the provisions of the Cyprus constitution; that the relevant provisions had been interpreted in the past by the Supreme Court, and; that

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the position had been clarified concerning the position of the Chairman of the House of Representatives in assuming the presidency in the sense that the President has to use his discretion. He did not see himself as caretaker president because the constitution did not provide for this, but it did provide certain responsibilities such as the holding of elections. Both presidential and parliamentary elections were necessary and would be held in the near future. Asked about the position of Makarios, Clerides gave the impression that he regarded himself as succeeding Sampson as a constitutional right rather than Makarios. He said Makarios was free to return, though he would advise against it under the circumstances. Makarios could stand for election as president if he wished to, as could any free man. 6 Differences about Clerides’ position stemmed from the question as to whether he was sworn in under Article 36 or Article 44 of the Cyprus Constitution. Article 36 foresaw that in the event of a temporary absence or temporary incapacity to perform the duties of the President of the Republic, the President of the House of Representatives would act for the President of the Republic during such a temporary absence or temporary incapacity. 7 According to Article 44 the office of the President would become vacant upon an absence, other than temporary, as would prevent the President to perform effectively his duties. In such event, the President of the House of Representatives would act, during such a vacancy, as President of the Republic. The vacancy of the President would then be filled by a by-election, which had to take place within a period not exceeding 45 days of the occurrence of the vacancy. 8 In the first case Clerides would only act on behalf of Makarios, who could replace him any time. Makarios could use this as a means to interfere with Clerides’ decisions. And he was going to do so. The second option would prevent Makarios from taking over again without holding new elections. That would have given Clerides a much stronger and independent position. Callaghan instructed foreign posts to take the following line in response to enquiries: a)

We continue to recognise Archbishop Makarios as the lawfully elected President of Cyprus. b) The Cyprus constitution provides that in certain circumstances the President of the House of Representatives (i.e., Mr. Clerides) may exercise presidential powers. c) [If pressed] in a confused and evolving situation we cannot comment on the precise relationship between Archbishop Makarios and Mr Clerides at present.

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Our High Commission in Cyprus are, of course, maintaining necessary contacts with the authorities there to enable them to carry out their duties.

Callaghan noted that the British formula was ‘more cautious’ than the American one. ‘The latter, because of its use of the words ‘has the right to act as President’, could be taken to mean that they regard the presidency as ‘vacant’ within the meaning of Article 44 of the constitution and are not basing their view on Article 36(2) which relates to what happens if a president is temporarily absent.’ 9 Thus the British Government wanted to keep all options open. While they preferred Clerides, they clearly did not want to be the party to push Makarios out of the ring. If needed, the Americans might do so. Ramsbotham nevertheless urged the Cyprus Ambassador to Washington, Nicos Dimitriou, to advise Makarios not to ‘stress his own active position of authority under the constitution at the moment.’ He argued that it would embarrass Clerides, who had a difficult role to play in consolidating the ceasefire, using his good relations with Denktaş, and maintaining the support and confidence of the people. Asked whether he thought that Makarios should press for his return, British Ambassador Ramsbotham advised that the Archbishop should wait for the establishment of the Geneva Conference, and take into consideration the attitude of the Turkish Government towards him and the development of relations between the Turkish and the new Greek governments. 10 While Britain was cautious not to commit herself on the question, the US Government clearly wanted to see the back of Makarios. Stabler told the Head of Chancery at the British Embassy to Washington that on reflection the Americans were quite satisfied that their public announcement had been based on Article 44 rather than 36. Ramsbotham concluded that ‘though Stabler did not say so, this reflects the relatively lukewarm public support for Makarios’ constitutional position which had been a characteristic of the U.S. approach since the start of the crisis.’ 11 Kisssinger wrote to Nicosia that it was the US understanding that Clerides was sworn in under Article 44. He instructed Davies to be ‘extremely friendly’ to Clerides, and continue to establish effective communications and contact with him ‘stopping just short of recognition.’ 12 Davies in return recommended that the State Department ‘move very quickly to [the] recognition of Clerides’ Government.’ For Davies, Clerides would be the ‘ideal President because he [had] moderate political orientation, [a] prospect of attracting [the] widest spectrum of votes, and because he [was] the only Greek Cypriot likely to be able to negotiate successfully arrangements’ with the Turks. 13 On 24 July Davies warned that Makarios’ early return to

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Cyprus would disrupt the return to normality. He should be persuaded to put off his return for at least three months. Davies warned that if Makarios were to come back as announced in two or three weeks, civil strife would be ‘almost a certainty.’ 14 Kissinger celebrated the Clerides deal in a phone conversation with Senator Nelson Rockefeller: ‘It has come out the way we want. Sampson is out and they have a guy in there who is really our first choice (…). But we are keeping the door open for the other (…) and we kept the Russians out of it totally.’ 15 Makarios himself had made his position clear from the outset. He reacted immediately and wrote to Clerides: ‘I have just heard the news that Sampson has resigned and you have assumed the duties of Acting President according to the constitution. Until I return to Cyprus, you shall preside over my Council of Ministers with the exception of Odysseus Ioannides who is hereby dismissed. Temporarily, Minister Spanos shall act also as Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources.’ 16 Makarios continued to interfere in Clerides’ decisions, thus reminding him that he was only acting on his behalf. For example, on 24 July he asked the British Government to pass a message to Clerides saying that it would be important for Clerides’ own long-term position to get rid of the present Sampson-appointed Council of Ministers. 17 During a telephone conversation between Makarios and Clerides on the morning of 25 July Clerides sought to allay the Archbishop’s suspicions of his intentions. Makarios told Clerides that he had his full support in his efforts to normalise the situation, that he appreciated the difficulty he was in, but that he should gradually rid himself of the Ministerial Council illegally appointed under Sampson and reconstitute the government. Makarios had sent a message to Prime Minister designate Karamanlis, emphasising the importance of changing the Cypriot ministers appointed by Sampson and also the Greek officers in the National Guard responsible for the coup. According to the Cypriot Ambassador to Washington, Nicos Dimitriou, these were the Archbishop’s overriding concerns, especially the importance for Clerides of extracting himself from the clutches of the right-wing extremists and ending the present unconstitutional position of presiding over a rebel group of ministers. Makarios claimed that he was not concerned about his own immediate future. He realised that he might have to remain outside Cyprus for some time, and he accepted that there might have to be elections. 18 Kissinger’s meeting in the afternoon of 22 July reflected the US Government’s non-committal attitude towards the Archbishop’s future role. Kissinger declined Makarios’ request to mediate, but told him that he would not oppose his return. Makarios said that not opposing him would not get him back: he wanted more active support. Kissinger told the British Ambassador Ramsbotham that he had found Makarios ‘attractive’ but he

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did not trust him. In his judgement he was ‘too able and ambitious.’ Away from Cyprus, he would never stop plotting to return; and if he came back before the Turkish forces had withdrawn he could be tempted to turn to the Russians for support in pushing them back. To achieve the right balance of forces, therefore, it was essential first to get the Turks back. Kissinger said Britain and the US had to consider the future balance of power and the risks of Makarios being driven towards AKEL and the communist block. He had no fundamental objection to his return if the circumstances could be structured satisfactorily, though he should stay away from Cyprus for a time. Kissinger was not enthusiastic, however, about Makarios’ proposal for policing the island, which would leave the Turkish Cypriots with ‘too little protection.’ 19 In Athens President Gizikis announced at 1715 hrs that the Armed Forces had decided to entrust the government of the country to the politicians. And at 1815 hrs Constantinos Karamanlis was asked to form a new government. 20 According to information from the German Embassy in Athens, Ioannides and his followers had been overthrown by the four Chiefs of Staff with the support, or at least approval, of Gizikis. The main ‘moving spirits’ of the change of government had been Vice-Admiral Petros Arapakis (Chief of the Hellenic Navy) and Alexandros Papanicolaou (Chief of the Air Force). 21 The Turkish Government’s reaction was mixed. During a conversation with Callaghan at 2300 hrs on Tuesday, 23 July, Ecevit described Clerides as ‘the representative of the Greek community’ but said that the Turks could certainly form a dialogue with him. He gave the impression of being happy to deal with Clerides. As regards Makarios, he said that he was not a legitimate president either, because he had been acting unconstitutionally in many respects, in particular in ignoring the position and the rights of the Turkish Vice President. 22 In other words, the replacement of Sampson with Clerides was welcome, but Turkey did not regard this as the solution of the crisis. In Cyprus, Clerides managed to get the support of all Greek-Cypriot political groups with the exception of that of Lyssarides. Clerides gave an account of the political forces in Cyprus in a conversation with US Ambassador Roger Davies: Clerides said he was confident now that with one major caveat on [a] short term basis he had [the] full support of all political elements in Cyprus other than Lyssarides’ group. This included AKEL, the Progressive Party, the United Party, and, subject to caveat of Makarios not coming back, the extreme right. On the left, AKEL leaders Papaioannou and Ziartides saw Clerides (…) and told him they [were] prepared to extend support as [the]

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only way out of [the] present crisis for Greek Cypriots. They agreed Makarios’ return could only precipitate civil war. They had offered to issue statement in his support, but he urged they not be the first to move since this would make more difficult getting center and right public positions established. AKEL leaders said they had consulted with Lyssarides in a foreign Embassy, and he was adamantly and violently opposed to Clerides as a successor and [had] insisted [that the] only solution was [the] return of Archbishop Makarios. According to Papaioannou, Lyssarides described Clerides’ succession as a CIA plot with the Sampson interregnum as part of the scenario. [He claimed that the] U.S. objective was to get Clerides, who [was a] known puppet of [the] U.S., in position in order to convert Cyprus to [a] NATO base. [The editor of the] ‘Haravghi’ [newspaper had taken the] same line. For this and other reasons, Clerides told me he was not allowing resumption of publication of newspapers until at least next Monday. He had met with all editors and others than ‘Harvaghi’ had agreed that press activities [were] now not in interest of stability. [The] Progressive Party and [the] United Party were fully in support of Clerides as [the] constitutional successor, he said. [The] greatest danger to Cyprus, the ceasefire and to the area, was [the] fact that the right had been armed after the coup d’état with weapons of the Tactical Reserve unit and from large stores previously hidden by Makarios, EOKA-B, through reservists, was now heavily represented in [the] National Guard and outside now had their own commando forces. These groups were adamantly opposed to Makarios’ return and in threatening him yesterday after his press conference and this morning after statement by [Greek Foreign Minister] George Mavros that Makarios was legal President, told him they would rather be under the Turks than Makarios. Rightist National Guard officers who held positions after [the] coup [were] still in position while moderates [had been] ousted. 23

However, Clerides’ control over the right-wing elements was highly questionable. In the morning of 26 July, Olver reported that Clerides had narrowly escaped being deposed by EOKA elements on two occasions. 24 In another development, Clerides told Olver that he had been under pressure to replace the Minister of the Interior (Pantelis Dimitriou) with an ex-EOKA National Guard Officer. He had flatly refused and threatened to resign. 25 On the other hand, he could count on the support of the National Guard as Olver’s Defence Attaché, upon returning from a visit to the Commander (Commander Brigadier Michael Georgitsis) and Chief of Staff (Brigadier Panayiotis Yiannakodimos) of the National Guard, reported. 26 Clerides told Olver that he had to be careful not to call himself Acting President, which would infuriate his right-wing support, nor to claim any permanence for his appointment, which would alienate the left. He considered it essential that he should remain in office through the coming

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period of intercommunal negotiation and reconstruction, which he thought that he, of all Cypriots, was best qualified to handle. Thereafter, the question of a permanent appointment could be considered. He had stated publicly that elections for the Presidency should then be held. Clerides had advised Makarios that it would be better in the present troubled situation for Makarios to avoid making statements or trying to take any active part in the island’s affairs. Clerides claimed that Makarios had accepted this advice. He had also dissuaded Makarios from going to Geneva. Makarios would, he thought, remain for some time in London. He thought that any attempt by Makarios to return to the island in the present situation or in the near future would lead to civil war. In the longer term, things might change. 27 Clerides’ conviction that he could keep Makarios out of the negotiations would prove wrong. Makarios indeed went to London and allowed Clerides to go to Geneva. 28 But he made sure that Clerides was under firm instructions not to sign or agree to anything without his consent. Immediately after resuming his duties, Clerides meet Denktaş and reached agreement on a military standstill. However, this was subject to the authority of the Turkish military commander. Denktaş had frankly explained his difficulties over this. 29 He was simply not in charge.

10 Further Anglo-Turkish Confrontation 23–26 July 1974

Despite the absence of overt military offensives, the period following the ‘ceasefire’ of 22 July was a time of intense activity and tension. Turkish military action throughout this period, and even after the more substantive ceasefire call on 26 July, consisted of persistent low-key expansion and consolidation. In this way, they achieved a considerable widening of their original salient and an extension of their beachhead to include Kyrenia itself and the shoreline east to Six Mile Beach. As a result of their pursuit of this policy, the Turkish forces found themselves openly resisted by UN forces at Nicosia Airport, where a major confrontation developed. Waldheim and Kissinger had agreed that, while the UN forces in Cyprus needed to be reinforced, there was no need for a new mandate or debate in the Security Council. 1 However, reinforcements could not arrive rapidly from outside the island. As a result, only British troops already on the SBAs could be used at short notice. The success of the UN stand at the airport and the continuing Turkish expansion and reinforcement then led to a proposal for a Royal Navy blockade of the north coast of Cyprus. This in turn gave way to a proposal for the interposition of UN ground forces around the Turkish-held area. Following the ceasefire call from Geneva on 26 July, the Turkish expansion became less obstructive and they justified their consolidation manoeuvres by claiming that ground dominated by fire was ground held.

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As they had some dominating tank and artillery positions on the crests of the Kyrenia Range, the area they thus felt entitled to occupy was extensive; it included Lapithos and the important main road to Myrtou. It later became clear that they had not succeeded in capturing either, although in the confused fighting the flow of Turkish propaganda had caused most commentators to credit the Turks with much greater gains than they had actually achieved. Throughout the whole period from the initial Turkish landings, and during the Geneva talks, the Turks kept up a regular flow of seaborne and heli-borne resupply and reinforcement. On the morning of 27 July the strength of mainland Turkish forces ashore was estimated as 16,000 men, supported by 46 tanks and 88 helicopters. Furthermore, a fleet of some 14 landing craft and other shipping was approaching Kyrenia and many more were known to be loading at Mersin. By 8 August the force had been increased to an estimated 36,000 men and 200 tanks. This was clearly far more than was needed to hold the small area then occupied. Nevertheless, already on 26 July Olver had pointed out the likelihood that the Turks would seek to achieve a position of considerably greater geographical occupation and military strength from which to press for their ‘federal’ objective. Olver summarised Turkish thinking as follows: a. The intercommunal situation had reached stalemate under Makarios, who would never agree to a solution which the Turks could accept and who still kept harping on about Enosis. b. They had for some months been suggesting that some major upheaval would be necessary in Cyprus if the stalemate was to be broken. c. The Samson [sic] coup gave them their opportunity. It provided, in their eyes, a justification for intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. Samson [sic] was a mere puppet; the National Guard was Greek led. The coup was a Greek plot to undermine the independence of Cyprus and achieve Enosis. d. Turkish military intervention thus became necessary to preserve Cypriot ‘independence.’ 2

On the basis of such thinking and faced with the reality of their failure to seize a really viable enclave initially, the Turkish commanders were inevitably tempted to extend their perimeters and to expand strategic objectives.

Confrontation at Nicosia Airport Fighting developed in the vicinity of Nicosia airport at 0930 hrs on 23 July and continued throughout the morning. At 1230 hrs on 23 July the Chief of Staff of UNFICYP arranged a ceasefire. The airport was declared a UnitedNations-controlled area and was occupied by UNFICYP troops after

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National Guard troops had agreed to withdraw. An UNFICYP announcement was broadcast in several languages: The United Nations Force in Cyprus is taking over the Nicosia International Airport temporarily after a new and serious breach of the ceasefire this morning in the vicinity of the airport. The airport thus becomes a United Nations internationally protected area. This will at the same time facilitate the arrival of reinforcements for UNFICYP. 3

At 1925 hrs on 23 July an anxious query from HM Ambassador in Athens as to whether the UN or the Turks held Nicosia Airport gave the first indication that a confrontation was developing there. The query was made on behalf of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was reacting to a report from its Embassy in Nicosia to the effect that UNFICYP had handed over the airport to the Turks, following a Turkish attack. Olver sent a reply at 2157 hrs, assuring Athens that the airport was still in UNFICYP hands at 2020 hrs. At the time, Olver reported a Turkish tank build-up two miles NW of the airport. He said that Clerides regarded this as a serious threat to the ceasefire. Clerides had ordered the National Guard to take up defensive positions and he was urging that all possible pressure be brought to bear on the Turkish military commanders. The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Cyprus, Luiz WeckmannMuños, meanwhile informed US Ambassador Davies of the danger of a Turkish attack on the airport. 4 At 1413 hrs on 24 July Olver reported a conversation among Weckmann-Muños, General Prem Chand, and the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires, Asaf Inhan, in which the latter had given the impression that the Turks were determined to take the airport. Olver shared the view of Brigadier Francis Henn, Commander BRITCON (who had told him of the conversation), that the Turks should be resisted by force and that the Turkish Government should be warned most strongly not to engage in operations against UNFICYP. He warned that ‘if the Turks do attack and capture the airport, thereby destroying UNFICYP, the consequences in Cyprus will be catastrophic and the international implications forbidding.’ 5 Alarmed by the danger of a major UN-Turkish confrontation, Waldheim called Ecevit and received a categorical assurance that the Turkish Army had firm instructions not to challenge UNFICYP’s occupation of the airport; its task was to prevent any further landing of Greek reinforcements. 6 Fears nevertheless persisted, with reports that Radio Ankara was announcing that the airport was under the control of the Turkish Armed Forces who, it was claimed, would repair and open it for civil traffic within the next few days. However, the British Ambassador in

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Ankara, Sir Horace Phillips, advised that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was aware of the real situation and that the broadcast should be regarded ‘as part and parcel of tendentious Turkish reporting.’ Waldheim was at this time advising the Turkish Government that, since all the airport runways were unusable, there was no reason for their concern about Greek reinforcements landing there. He also advised that UN investigations into Turkish allegations of Turkish-Cypriot villagers being persecuted had shown no cause for undue concern, and certainly gave no justification for further Turkish violations of the ceasefire, or for an attack on the airport. Callaghan had asked Kissinger already at 1815 hrs on 22 July to warn Ecevit in general terms that if the Turkish Air Force bombed a UNFICYP camp the British ‘would stop them.’ 7 Now, early in the evening Callaghan called Ecevit and Güneş in protest over Inhan’s warning of Turkish intentions to capture the Airport. Callaghan said, ‘If the Turks were to carry out Inhan’s threat they would come up against the UN and the British Contingent, who were at present in control of the airport. HMG would not stand by if our forces were attacked: we would not allow them to be slaughtered.’ Ecevit was evasive about declaring publicly that the airport was under UN control and Güneş asserted ‘that the UN had left the airport and that a vacuum had emerged there.’ Callaghan ended the conversation by warning Ecevit ‘that if there were any hostilities involving British and Turkish forces, there would be no talks in Geneva tomorrow.’ He then contacted Kissinger and urged him also to put pressure on the Turks. 8 Callaghan had previously stressed to the American Secretary of State that ‘we cannot have them [the Turks] bombing UN forces in my view. 777 of them are our own men apart from everything else.’ 9 Kissinger called Ecevit at 1505 hrs Washington time. Trying again the teacher approach he started: ‘(…) and since a day isn’t complete without my talking to my students I have been calling all over the world. Your Ambassador in Cyprus who tends to get a little excited…’ (…) He told the British and Cypriots that you are going to take the airport in two hours.’ Ecevit said that this was not true. He had talked with Waldheim, Macomber, and Callaghan about it. There were confusing reports. It seemed that the Turkish army had already taken the airport. Thereafter, British forces had arrived and claimed they had certain legal rights based on the agreements. This had been accepted by the Turks, who had agreed to respect the British rights at the airport. He concluded by saying that ‘whatever the position may be under Turkish control or UN control, Turkish forces have strict orders not to get into conflict with the UN forces, but we are not clear about who really controls the airport but whatever the situation our people will respect it and maintain it (…). We are not going to cause any confrontation with British forces.’ 10 Kissinger informed Callaghan of his conversation with the

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Turkish Prime Minister, explaining that Ecevit thought Turks were holding the airport. Callaghan’s reaction was: ‘I have less and less time for that man.’ 11 Later Ecevit again gave Macomber ‘categorical assurance that under no circumstances would Turkish troops attack British and other UN forces.’ He said this was ‘absurd’ and absolutely ‘out of the question.’ 12 However, he repeated again to Macomber (1945 hrs local time) that it was ‘his understanding’ that the airport had been in Turkish hands ‘for some time.’ 13 Despite these exchanges, the situation at Nicosia took a sharp turn for the worse at 1937 hrs GMT, when Inhan told General Prem Chand that ‘Turkish troops intend to attack Nicosia Airport tonight.’ 14 The background to the Turkish stand was considerably clarified during a conversation Goodison had with the Minister Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy, Alacakaptan. Callaghan judged, ‘It appears that, in anticipation of military success at Nicosia Airport, the Turks have put their cover story too soon.’ The Counsellor had stated that according to information received from Ankara at 1600 hrs the airport had come under Turkish control ‘with the consent of UN forces who had evacuated the airport.’ He was informed that this was not the British understanding of the situation. 15 Callaghan meanwhile expressed his belief that the UN forces at the Airport should be reinforced immediately and asked Olver and the UK Mission in New York to elicit the official UN request needed to formalise the assignment of any such reinforcements. 16 By 1955 hrs this request was received. In Cyprus Aiken, Olver, UNFICYP General Prem Chand and the Commander of BRITCON, Brigadier Francis Henn, assessed that the Turkish Military had ‘the bit between their teeth and nothing but a resolute show of force would deter them.’ 17 Prem Chand told Inhan of his intention to resist any Turkish attack and Olver informed the FCO that the UN personnel at the airport were already established in their defensive position, but could not expect to hold out for more than four hours if the Turks attacked in strength. He asked whether an American task force in the area could be involved in this exercise of deterrence. 18 This point was never specifically answered. However, two days later in the context of a proposed naval blockade of the north coast of Cyprus, it was explicitly affirmed that the US would not contemplate taking military measures against the Turks. Callaghan urged Ecevit again at 1955 hrs to instruct his Army ‘urgently that there should be no further outbreak of fighting’ at the airport. 19 At 2118 hrs, Olver sent a further signal reporting that he had again spoken to Inhan, who was now arguing ‘that all that was intended was a military take-over of the airport’ and that if the UN cooperated there would be no shooting. Olver told him that this was a mere pretext and drew from him an

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assurance that he had warned his Government of UNFICYP’s determination to resist any such take-over. A Phantom squadron was ordered to Cyprus and reached Akrotiri by 0400 hrs (25 July). 20 Two armoured car squadrons were moved to Nicosia Airport by midnight, and two companies of 2nd Coldstream Guards were sent there ‘with all possible haste.’ 21 Callaghan had in the meantime called Ecevit again. Although still believing that the Turkish forces already controlled the Airport, Ecevit confirmed that his forces were under strict orders not to attack it. He also stated there would be no military operation there that night. 22 This apparent back-pedalling was soon explained by an equivocal message from Güneş, who was attempting to pass off the conflict over the airport as a misunderstanding on technicalities. He suggested that the British should retain the use of all parts of the airport and all the facilities to which the British were normally entitled but that the Turks must control the remainder, which, he asserted, was already ‘in their hands.’ 23 Sir Horace Phillips reported that he had been unable to contact Ecevit but had spoken to the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry who, on hearing of the Turkish Army’s intention to attack the airport and General Prem Chand’s intention to resist, had commented ‘good’, thus revealing the Turkish Government’s apparent irritation over the hot-headed independence of their military commanders. 24 Callaghan immediately talked to Kissinger, who had received an assurance from Ecevit that the Turkish Army would not attack. Kissinger expressed the view that ‘on any rational basis the Turks would not attack’, but he agreed ‘that there were too many irrational people around.’ 25 Kissinger had himself put pressure on the Turkish military but with no satisfactory response and, at this juncture, he brought the influence of NATO to bear with the personal intervention of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) General Andrew J. Goodpaster. As midnight passed without incident, the tension relaxed somewhat and hope grew that the Turks were responding to the joint UN/British resolve and show of strength. John Aiken later explained the gravity of the situation: As dawn broke the Turkish positions could be clearly seen, and it was appreciated how they might with some justification claim to ‘control’ the airport. Their tanks and forward gun positions were close enough to dominate the approach roads to the terminal and to put at risk any aircraft attempting to use it. By the same token the presence of the UN, particularly of the BRITCON reinforcements (…) were plain for the Turks to see, and no further signs of an overt Turkish advance could be detected. 26

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Olver summarised the crisis in a post-mortem signal: What was intended [by the Turks was] to be a reassurance to the UN that the Turks, who seemed to believe themselves to occupy the airport, would cooperate with the UN, was taken by Prem Chand as a threat to take it over. Having announced publicly and through diplomatic approaches that they were in possession of the airport, the Turks were faced with a cruel dilemma when they realised that this was not the case. They either had to make good their declarations by taking over, even if this meant a war with the UN; or they had to find some way to make a graceful retreat. Had it not been for the determination of the UN to defend what they held and the immediate and impressive response of HMG to the request for reinforcements, the Turks might have decided to try their luck. In the event they appear to have realised that they would have a severe military and political battle on their hands if they proceeded. They therefore stood down and retreated in the smoke screen produced by such communications as that of Mr Gunes to you (Note: alleged misunderstandings over technicalities).’ 27

Güneş finally officially informed Waldheim that ‘the Government of Turkey undertakes not to attempt to assume possession of the Lefkose [Nicosia] airport by force, the threat of force or be means of coercion.’ 28 The Airport confrontation was already the second incident in which Turkey and the United Kingdom had come close to armed conflict. If the Turkish generals had ordered their forces to go ahead, Britain would have resisted and air fights between Turkish Starfighters and British Phantoms would probably have ensued. The outcome of this might well have changed the entire train of following events. Most certainly it would have hindered Turkish plans to go ahead with a second military operation, if the diplomatic talks failed to achieve what was desired.

11 Blockade of Northern Cyprus? The First Major Anglo-American Rift

The Airport incident and Turkey’s continuous violations of the ceasefire led the Commander of the British Forces in Cyprus, John Aiken, to propose the idea of blockading the northern coast of Cyprus to prevent the delivery of further Turkish reinforcements. At 1325 hrs on 25 July he asked London for authority to send a Task Group of four Royal Navy ships to the area to mount a patrol on behalf of the United Nations. 1 Nine hours later, a similar proposal was put to the British Ambassador in Athens by Prime Minister Karamanlis, who said that it was HMG’s duty as a Guarantor Power to stop the seashore reinforcements. A day before British Ambassador Hooper and US Ambassador Tasca in Athens had expressed their common belief that it was unrealistic to expect that the Turks would be deterred by anything but the threat of force. Tasca recommended to Kissinger that the most effective way in which the US Government could make manifest its determination would be by an appropriate deployment of the Sixth Fleet. 2 Tasca had promoted the idea of telling the Turks that already, on the first day of the operation, the US was considering interposing units of the Sixth Fleet between mainland Turkey and Cyprus. He hoped that it would have a psychological influence on the Turks to accept a ceasefire. 3 In the view of both ambassadors, to fail to oppose the action that they expected the Turks to take at Nicosia airport ‘by all means available to us’ would be disastrous. It would ‘remove all credibility from our and the US’s

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attempts to secure a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement.’ Hooper stressed the dangers for the newly formed democratic government in Greece: ‘This is still far from firmly installed, and it is unlikely to survive unless it is able to find a solution to the problem which largely brought it into being – that of finding a way out of the disastrous situation into which the policies of the last government led Greece. If it fails and if in consequence a situation develops in which the Greek military cannot be restrained from going to the help of the Greek Cypriots, it may fall, and give way to a new military regime worse than the last and violently opposed not only to NATO but also and principally to the US and ourselves, whom they will consider to have tricked Greece and played the Turk’s game.’ 4 The Task Group was despatched to the vicinity of Cape Andreas in anticipation of the blockade being authorised but, at 2326 hrs, Whitehall sent a message saying that ‘Interposition of RN was too grave a step at this stage, would have serious consequences and might not effect the ground situation.’ 5 Nevertheless, this was not the end of the discussion. Hooper in Athens stressed that it was vital for ‘Anglo/Greek relations, the future of the Geneva talks, and the survival of the present Greek Government that we should take, and be seen to take, vigorous action.’ He concluded that such actions should also ‘have the effect of deterring further action by the Turks.’ 6 Callaghan, who was clearly worried about the effect the ceasefire violations might have on the Geneva talks, sought further information on the Turkish strengths and intentions and an assessment of the feasibility and legality of using the Royal Navy and the US Sixth Fleet units in this role with the UN mandate. The answer provided for Callaghan early next morning indicated that present Royal Navy forces in the theatre were adequate for the blockade but that if the Turks were to use all the forces at their disposal the blockade might be unable to guarantee 100 per cent effectiveness. US Sixth Fleet assistance would of course make the task much easier but it was feared that the use of any naval force, even as an officially declared part of UNFICYP, would open the door to most unwelcome questions on the UNFICYP mandate and force composition. It was also explained that the Turks could argue, with some justification, that their sea traffic between the mainland and Kyrenia consisted only of legitimate resupplies of food, etc., for troops already landed. 7 After urgently considering this information, Callaghan decided not to pursue the proposal. At 1125 hrs the withdrawal of the task group from the Cape Andreas area was ordered. Fifteen minutes later, Sir Horace Phillips in Ankara confirmed that there would be extreme danger of a direct confrontation with the Turkish intervention effort. He explained that the Turks would probably have seen the blockade as ‘tantamount to war upon them.’ Speculating on the Turkish motives and objectives he identified

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Turkish chauvinism, national security and Pan-Turkish call for an end to a Cyprus where Turks are harassed and confined by Greeks and where Greece could establish a base for attack on Turkey. For this Turkey needs a secure physical presence in a clearly definable part of the island with access to the sea. However this is run (probably federated with the Greek part in a single independent Cyprus), it must for the present be held by Turkish arms. To do this satisfactorily the Turkish forces should have had more ground than they did at the ceasefire. It was with difficulty that the Prime Minister got the Generals to accept the ceasefire. They probably only did so with the understanding – if not with ECEVIT then at least among themselves – that they would nevertheless go on expanding and consolidating (in the style of the Israeli forces whom they admired) to a point short of major confrontation with UN or principal allies. Nicosia Airport was such a point. There could be others. The Prime Minister genuinely does not want confrontation, so gives us his assurances. But he can only call the Generals back from the brink when he can show them that we and the Americans and the UN mean what we say about resisting a real confrontation. And I am sure we are right to. But I am not sure about our role in regard to Turkish reinforcement and re-supply, and attacks on Greek enclaves. The UN should by all means continue to keep the contestants apart. But the UN does not have mandate or capability to prevent reinforcement and I believe it would be dangerous for the UK to take a lead in trying to stop it. There is unanimous and emotional support across the country for what the Government and particularly the Armed Forces have done. Moreover, they did it alone. Britain would not help. That is not widely held against us (though it is not forgotten). But that we should not have helped, yet now seem to be trying to stand in the way of Turkish consolidation, that to all Turks is unforgivable. These people are tough and sensitive, with stubborn national pride. They regard us as friends and allies and see in their genuine parliamentary democracy and current political inclination (unlike Greece) a close link with Britain. They are not aiming to annex Cyprus and they cannot understand why in our (as they see it) anxiety to please Greece we should deny Turkey the right to secure its National interests in Cyprus. 8

Hooper countered Phillips’ presentation of the Turkish view of events with a strong plea for the interposition of a UN military screen across likely Turkish lines of advance, on the grounds that the precarious position of the Greek Government was threatened by continued Turkish encroachment, which would not be halted by mere political admonitions: Their aim [of achieving a Cyprus in which Turkish Cypriots will no longer be second-class citizens] may be a legitimate one but the means being used to achieve it are not. Not only are they likely to lead to a breakdown of the

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Geneva talks (…) but they fail to take account of (…) the extreme precarious situation of the Greek Government. Only the strongest pressure at the eleventh hour by my US colleague and myself got the Greeks to Geneva at all and I very much fear that they will not continue to negotiate if their position and that of the Greek Cypriots continues to be eroded by Turkish encroachments. (…) If [the Greeks] do leave the talks, and the consequences which we fear here ensue, it looks from here very much as though we might lose Clerides as well. It follows from this that despite the manifest difficulties and dangers involved, we must try to find some way of lowering the ‘threshold’ at which the Turks will begin to apprehend a confrontation with us, the US, and perhaps most importantly the UN to a point at which Turkish encroachment will cease.

Hooper carried on to say that while he recognised the objections to a blockade his view and that of his US colleague was that ‘something more than admonitions to the Turkish Government is required if the Turkish military are to be restrained.’ He suggested that UNFICYP could put a partial screen in the path of a likely Turkish advance. In that case Britain could ‘make it clear that any attack on UNFICYP Forces would be resisted’, and that this might have the effect of holding the Turks back. 9 In Cyprus Prem Chand requested that UNFICYP posts should be interposed between the National Guard and Turkish Forces. Following the successful UN reinforcement operation to deter a Turkish attack on Nicosia Airport, General Prem Chand proposed (at 2030 hrs on 25 July) that a similar operation should be mounted to deter a Turkish break-out towards Kythrea (the last sizeable National Guard post in that area) and then on to Chatos. Prem even thought they might continue on to Famagusta. He cited a build-up of some 30 tanks and 15 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) in the Dhikomo area south of the Kyrenia range as evidence. He suspected that the reason for this formidable concentration was that the Turks were likely to make a dawn advance to Kythrea on 26 July. 10 Waldheim was conscious of the opposition they could expect from the governments of certain UNFICYP contributor countries, since the Canadian Defence Minister had just withdrawn his country’s contingent from Nicosia Airport because of disagreement over their employment there. He argued that ‘UNFICYP should give up the airport if attacked and that it was not a correct use of UN troops to constitute a third army fighting the combatants.’ Richard of UKMIS New York, in reporting these developments to the FCO, said that his views on the Canadian ‘sophistry’ were ‘unprintable.’ 11 The affair was discussed in the morning of 26 July between Waldheim and the British, French and US permanent representatives to the United Nations. Waldheim considered this should

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only be done with the agreement of the two sides; and even then he did not think that the existing mandate would cover it. He felt he must refer to the Council for a new mandate; the alternative was to sit back and watch a small country over-run by force. The French and British representatives did not want a debate on the question of a new mandate. They believed that the existing mandate was adequate. US Deputy Representative John Bennett, under instructions from Kissinger, rejected any such proposal. He made it clear that ‘the US would in no circumstances use force or the threat of force to deter Turkey. He seemed to accept that nothing could now prevent Turkey from attaining her objectives.’ Waldheim said he was not prepared to take the whole responsibility on his own shoulders as Hammarskjöld had done. 12 He must have a new mandate or at least the authority of the Council firmly and explicitly behind him. UK delegate Richard reported that ‘Speaking with some emotion [Waldheim] said that if the great powers who were capable of acting made it plain that they would not act, Turkish Forces would go ahead and a small country would be destroyed. This raised the whole future of the UN and would have repercussions in the Middle East where the Israelis would have even less respect for UNEF.’ 13 Nevertheless, the manifest weakness of UNFICYP and the problems of the mandate, which had been the principal obstacles to UN intervention and the chief cause of Waldheim’s despair, proved, in this instance, to be insuperable and General Prem Chand’s proposal was fated to be shelved, albeit only temporarily. 14 Kissinger’s conviction that nothing would stop the Turks if they were determined to go ahead remained the principle of US policy throughout the crisis. However, the real difference between his and Callaghan’s evaluation was that he never thought that there would be a real danger of Greece declaring war on Turkey. In this respect Kissinger’s view proved to be the more realistic one.

12 The Danger for Turkish Cypriot Communities

From the very beginning of the Cyprus crisis Turkey had stressed the danger of the Turkish-Cypriot communities in Greek-held areas being attacked or even massacred. As shown above there had actually been no attacks before the Turkish Army intervened. This was of course not due to any great sympathy that Sampson and the EOKA-B terrorists might have had for them. The absence of violence can rather be explained by the fact that during the first phase of the crisis the new regime was dealing with Makarios supporters. In addition, Sampson did his best to prevent Turkish intervention by not giving any pretext for it by threats to the Turkish Cypriots. All-out attack on Turkish enclaves started after the first Turkish soldiers landed in Cyprus. Apart from those close to the Turkish landing points most enclaves fell into the hands of the National Guard or – worse – into the hands of EOKA-B irregulars. In the remainder of the island most organised Turkish-Cypriot resistance appeared to have ended on 22 July. Waldheim reported that UNFICYP was attempting to supervise ceasefire or surrender arrangements. In the Limassol district, Turkish Cypriots were placed in the Municipal stadium and UNFICYP was denied access. In the Larnaca district, sporadic fighting continued in some mixed villages. At Mari, UNFICYP attempted to supervise the surrender of the Turkish Cypriots to the National Guard. In the city of Larnaca National Guard elements demanded entry into the

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UNFICYP camp in order to interrogate 600 unarmed Turkish Cypriots who had sought United Nations protection. These demands were refused. In the Paphos district, the village of Mandria was burned to the ground, many of its inhabitants were killed and 60 were wounded. At Stavrokono, UNFICYP established an observation post and endeavoured to negotiate a ceasefire. 1 The Turkish Cypriots complained to UNFICYP of a severe attack by the National Guard against Turkish-Cypriot civilians in Chatos. This charge was denied by the National Guard. 2 Almost parallel to the ceasefire agreement, Turkey started a fierce initiative complaining about atrocities committed against Turkish Cypriots. Ecevit called Callaghan in the early afternoon of 22 July and said that he was ‘very worried about the treatment of Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island. He described the situation as amounting to genocide and asked whether the United Nations Forces in Cyprus could do anything to step up their protective role.’ Callaghan instructed the UK Mission at New York to support the request. 3 Earlier (1230Z 4 ) Güneş had summoned the American and British Ambassadors. He told them that outside the areas between Nicosia and the sea, which were held by the Turkish Armed Forces, a massacre of the civilian Turkish population had begun. In the areas of Famagusta, Kokkina, and Selladhi there were particularly violent attacks. ‘And all this with barely 90 minutes to go before the ceasefire,’ said Güneş. The Turkish Government greatly feared that this aggression would continue. The only possible way for the Turkish forces to prevent it was by using aeroplanes. If this could not be stopped there would inevitably be retaliation since no peaceful countermeasures were open to the Turks. Moreover, with the reported coup in Greece it might become impossible to find an effective authority with whom to implement the imminent ceasefire. 5 Olver commented on the matter as follows: We do not know whether these allegations are true. They are completely denied by the National Guard. You should know that during the last one and a half hours before the ceasefire there was not only a violent physical battle with Turkish planes over a good deal of Cyprus but also a running contest between the UN and Turkish Ambassador who has become increasingly hysterical. Inhan has repeatedly threatened the UN that unless they can prove with impossible short deadlines that the massacres in these various places have not occurred he will call the Turkish planes to destroy the Greek sector of Nicosia.

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Olver continued that Inhan was refusing to guarantee the ceasefire unless the UN could in their turn guarantee ‘that no shot is fired throughout Cyprus and that there is reinforcement.’ The Turkish Ambassador threatened to bring Turkish Fighters in throughout the island if these demands were not met by 1600 hrs GMT. 6 Waldheim, who had ordered an investigation into the allegations, reported that UNFICYP troops had visited the village of Chatos on 23 July and were informed by the local Turkish-Cypriot leader that ‘complaints of massacres were unfounded. More than 4,000 Turkish Cypriots were said to have congregated at nearby Knodhara, where UNFICYP was attempting to assist them.’ He went on to say that UNFICYP had also supervised the surrender of the Turkish Cypriots to the National Guard at Platonissa. The National Guard had turned off the water supply in the Turkish-Cypriot sector of Famagusta and UNFICYP had forwarded an urgent request to the National Guard to restore the water supply on humanitarian grounds. In the Larnaca district, the National Guard had attacked and captured Kophinou. The Turkish Cypriots in that village were placed under UNFICYP protection. UNFICYP had also supervised the surrender of Turkish Cypriots in the villages of Killea, Kalokhorio, Kivisli, Mari, and Tokhni. In Larnaca town, 738 Turkish Cypriots remained under UNFICYP protection. In the Limassol district, UNFICYP had finally succeeded in gaining access to the Turkish Cypriots held in the stadium and reported that they were being well treated. In the district of Paphos, a charge that massacres of Turkish Cypriots took place at Polis was ‘investigated and found to be unfounded.’ A ceasefire was arranged at Vrecha and UNFICYP observation posts were re-established in the city of Paphos and at Stavrokono. In the region of Lefka, the evacuation of civilian personnel was arranged on 22 July and thereafter the Danish contingent continued to maintain detachments in Limitis and Xeros. 7 The Turkish claim that large-scale massacres had occurred could such not be sustained. However, while UNFICYP had helped to supervise surrender in certain villages, UN observers did not stay in those villages. Consequently, many Turkish Cypriots remained without any protection and could face attacks from Greek-Cypriot extremists at any time. Such fears were not exaggerated as the case of Tokhni (and others) would later prove. The imminent danger to the Turkish-Cypriot population served as justification for further Turkish army encroachment after the ceasefire. However, this reasoning was not matched by the actual pace of Turkish military advances, which was clearly based on operational targets rather than reactions to alleged massacres in particular enclaves. International public opinion had significantly turned against Turkey after the downfall of the Junta in Athens and the replacement of Sampson by Clerides. The

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origin of the crisis (i.e.,the coup d’état), which had been the main justification for the Turkish intervention, had thus been rectified. As a result it could be and had been argued that the Turkish aims had been fulfilled. Why then did Turkey not stop its advance? British and American intelligence showing Turkish aims as achieving a federal solution by diplomatic, or in case of failure by military, means were not available to the international press. Therefore, Turkey started to justify their military advance in Cyprus by allegations of attacks on Turkish Cypriots in areas held by the Greek-Cypriot National Guard. The United Nations reported that during the hours that followed the coming into force of the ceasefire (1600 hrs, 23 July) there were numerous violations of the ceasefire agreement. Within five hours of the ceasefire UNFICYP observed and recorded 29 incidents. 8 On 24 July the Turkish Ambassador made another major demarche on this subject to the Permanent Under Secretary Goodison at the FCO. It cited ‘groups of Turkish Cypriots including women and children were completely surrounded. They were lacking food and water and were in fear of their lives. The Turkish Government had already requested UN assistance but they demanded from HMG as a guarantor power that food and water be sent to these villagers from the SBAs. There was also grave news of brutal treatment and threats to the Turkish population in Limassol.’ The FCO authorised Olver to approach Clerides on the matter and posed certain questions about what might be done. Olver and Aiken were asked to co-ordinate a reply. 9 In an earlier signal, which crossed with the FCO signal on the Turkish demarche, Olver had already reported that UN investigations into 30 cases of alleged brutality from both sides had shown that not one of them had so far proved to be true. 10 Answering the request for a co-ordinated reply Olver said: I suspect that the Turkish report is considerably exaggerated. There are of course some critical shortages of food and water throughout the island as a result of the fighting. Many Turkish villagers are in any case economically ‘completely surrounded.’ (…) [Aiken] is already planning to encourage the return of his Turkish refugees to their homes, after enquiries in the villages concerned to make sure that the situation warrants this. But for Turkish violations of the ceasefire and the threat of an attack on Nicosia Airport, the return to normal conditions would have been much faster. Even so, in areas other than Nicosia and the boundaries of the new Turkish Kyrenia enclave, the situation will rapidly settle down and the process of returning to normal will achieve its own momentum. (…) Clerides is already working for rapprochement between the Greek and Turkish communities (…) I have no doubt that he will support any sensible action which we, the Americans or

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ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] plan to take in the relief of these villages (…) [Olver suggested that] it should be very strongly emphasised to the Turkish Ambassador that an essential prerequisite to any possible relief programme is intercommunal peace on the ground and that this hangs in the balance so long as major Turkish ceasefire violations continue. I have no doubt that if fighting is resumed on a considerable scale (…) there is a real danger of intercommunal tension erupting into widespread violence from which Turkish Cypriots in isolated outlying villages would be the main sufferers.

Unfortunately, this prophecy proved only too accurate after the breakdown of the second Geneva Conference as real massacres occurred in the villages of Tokni, Maratha, Sandalaris and Aloa (see Chapter 20 ‘Refugees and War Crimes’). On 29 July the Turks delivered another long and detailed note to the UN and Britain alleging numerous violations of the ceasefire and killings of Turkish Cypriots by the Greek-Cypriot National Guard. 11 Olver reported the next day that UNFICYP had ‘now checked virtually all villages about which there have been complaints of atrocities from either side. No single case has been substantiated.’ 12 The absence of large-scale massacres before the collapse of the talks did not, however, mean that there was no danger that such massacres could have occurred during any phase of the crisis. The restraint exercised by Greek-Cypriot extremists was largely due to the control that National Guard officers had on them. Two instances of actual harassment of Turkish-Cypriot villagers however might illustrate this clearly. These were the EOKA-B attacks on Episkopi and Evdhimou villages, both of which lie just outside the boundary of the Western SBA (Akrotiri). Early in August many buildings, especially in Evdhimou, were deliberately set on fire and Aiken, who saw the fires from his house on 3 August, instructed an officer of his staff to take up the matter personally with Colonel Sirmopoulos, the National Guard Commander in the area. Apart from the danger that incidents such as this would provoke massive Turkish retaliation, Aiken saw them as a major setback to his attempts to encourage the refugees to leave the SBAs and return to their homes. Therefore, he attempted to bring the situation under control by arranging for the despatch of a UN patrol and the SBA fire tenders to the scene. 13 When it transpired that the EOKAB/National Guard irregular troops in the village were not permitting either the UN patrol or the fire tenders to enter, Aiken at once referred the problem to Olver, urging him to make representations to the Cyprus Government. He reported that Episkopi village had been looted and at least three houses burned. The mosque in Evdhimou had been completely

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destroyed and at least 20 houses burned down. Fires were observed in three other Turkish or mixed villages. SBA fire engines with UNFICYP escort were refused entry into Evdhimou village. Aiken reported that the attack had apparently been carried out by some 40 irregulars. Finally, a Greek National Guard Major had appeared in Evdhimou village to ‘take charge’ with half a dozen regulars. Aiken judged this as a belated attempt to control the situation. 14 The National Guard actually asked Aiken for permission to send regular reinforcements from Limassol through the SBA to Evdhimou, ‘to bring the irregular terrorists to heel.’ Aiken was reluctant to make any exception to the orders he had issued to regulate the passage of armed bodies through the SBAs, and insisted that they should be admitted only under escort and after being disarmed. The problem was solved by the National Guard, which sent in the necessary reinforcements from Paphos, who then brought the situation under control. 15 On 27 July Olver continued to investigate Turkish (and later GreekCypriot) allegations about atrocities and reported that those allegations were exaggerated: We understand from the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] that, among the major centres, the situation at Paphos/Ktima is under control. The situation at Lefka is also satisfactory. The Turks within the walled city of Famagusta are short of food, but the UN are ready to run a convoy if one is required. Of the other centres mentioned by the Turks (Your Telno 251 and Washington Telno 2511), UN have investigated and report that there are no major problems at Knodara, Galinoporni, Limnitis (=Limivitis), Polis, Mandria, Dhikomo (= Duconez) and Yiallia. They were not aware of difficulties at Galatia or Angoulemi but have undertaken to investigate. As regards Ambeliku where fourteen Turkish Cypriots were killed, the UN are prepared to facilitate an enquiry into allegations of atrocities if the Turks ask for one. The UN are trying to get doctors into Kokkina where 25 Turkish Cypriot Fighters were reported wounded, but Turks have in any case access by sea. We are unable to identify Kallithea. There are also problems for groups of Greek Cypriots; but in the main the authorities have access and can deal with the situation. Greek villages under the hills along the north coast may be in some difficulty. A UN convoy got through to Bellapais yesterday and found 3,000 people in reasonable comfort; another convoy is due to go there today. A convoy is also due to go to Kermi [Karmi], where there are 800 Greek Cypriots. There are another 500 in the Dome Hotel Kyrenia. The UN are enquiring how many want evacuation and will try to get them out. 16

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In a conversation with Denktaş regarding the treatment of the Turkish communities in Limassol and Larnaca, Olver informed him that from his contacts with the UN, he knew that ‘neither community was in any danger. That they were being fed; and that in the case of the Larnaca community in a municipal park, they were not badly off, though admittedly those in Limassol were in an open stadium with only some umbrellas.’ Olver then put the allegation to Clerides. His immediate reaction was to point out that neither community was in danger or suffering too badly. But he went on to undertake to issue instructions for the return of the two civilian communities to their homes provided that this was on the basis of reciprocity, viz. that the Greek Cypriot communities at present taking refuge in the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia and at Bellapais should also be allowed to return to their homes and that free passage should be given for convoys of food and medicine to them. Clerides proposed that Denktash should accompany him on a joint visit of inspection to Limassol and Larnaca. In return, he would wish to make a joint visit – or at any rate some sort of conducted visit – to his communities in Kyrenia and Bellapais. He emphasised that he had a problem with public opinion here. His own position was still delicate. If he was to have any chance of holding extremists in check, he must be able to show that he was protecting his own community and getting a reasonable response from the Turks. 17

The British Defence Attaché in Cyprus reported on 31 July about the dangerous strength EOKA-B had developed. They had been under the command of the National Guard since hostilities began. Their intention was to keep both their command structure and their forces intact, so that they would constitute the ‘military enotist force’ when the National Guard no longer required their services. They had, over the previous ten days, acquired considerable quantities of arms from the Turkish-Cypriot Fighters and from the Lyssarides groups (Civil Guard). The Attaché described this as a ‘charade: EOKA-B have handed in the captured arms to N[ational] G[uard] units as ‘good citizens.’ N[ational] G[uard] have immediately reissued arms as EOKA-B are under command and ‘need weapons.’ Secret sources consider that EOKA-B is now even more formidable than before hostilities began.’ 18

13 First Geneva Conference 25–30 July 1974

The start of the conference was delayed by events in Athens, where it took Karamanlis some time to arrange his new cabinet. Britain and Turkey had considered meeting at Geneva with or without Greek representatives. Kissinger thought this to be a mistake and did his best to torpedo the idea. Kissinger informed Tasca of Callaghan’s request to press the Greeks to go to Geneva on Wednesday 24 July. Kissinger had agreed to do so, but instructed Tasca to make a ‘very low key approach at an appropriate level in Foreign Office’, since in his view, Wednesday was ‘too early to convene the conference and the Greek desire for a delay until at least Friday’ was a better approach. Kissinger said that at the same time he wanted Callaghan to see that the US were doing what they could to support him. He concluded, ‘I want to be able to say that we have been unable to convince the Greeks to change their mind.’ 1 Kissinger then called Ecevit on 23 July (1500 hrs Washington time) to register dismay at a report he had heard that the UK and Turkey were planning to begin the conference in Geneva the next day whether or not Greece was represented. 2 Kissinger told Ecevit that he was opposed to starting the talks at Geneva without Greek representatives. He would not send anyone there without knowing that the Greek Government would send a representative. 3 Finally, both Britain and Turkey agreed to postpone the conference to 25 July.

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The US State Department’s Cyprus Task Force had developed two papers concerning alternative settlements and post-ceasefire negotiations for the WSAG meetings on 21 and 22 July. The Task Force saw three possible solutions: double Enosis, independence based on the 1960 agreements, or an independent, federated Cyprus. It warned that while double Enosis would probably be ‘indeed the Cypriot preference’ it would result in large numbers of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots living under Turkish/Greek authority, the border would remain a source of friction and costly compensation for property left behind would be required as well as a UN presence to supervise a resettlement process. Independence based on the London-Zurich Agreements would push the Cyprus dispute back to the unstable conditions that had obtained from 1963 to 1967. In an independent, federated Cyprus Turkey might be able to assure its Cypriot compatriots of more meaningful protection. But the Task Force warned that the tension between the Greek preference for unity and the Turkish desire for maximum communal autonomy would create a permanent prospect for communal strife: ‘Federalism contains the same inherent instability as a return to the London-Zurich arrangements and would be no more workable over the long term.’ The Force concluded that ‘While far more acceptable to the Soviets than double Enosis, neither federation nor a return to 1960 [would] meet the basic test of stable practicality.’ 4 Evaluating the current politico-military situation the Force reported that ‘The Turks (…) have been less impressive, and the Greek-officered National Guard more impressive, than expected. Outside the areas held by mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots have been disarmed, with the TMT effectively destroyed as a fighting force.’ The implications of this were that Turkey had a stronger bargaining position than ever before, with substantial numbers of troops on the island, but were not in a position to impose double Enosis. However, the Greek position was not weak, since the Greeks had made a decent military show and held numerous Turkish Cypriots hostage in exposed areas. While all three outcomes for a solution were possible, the basis for communal autonomy and de facto partition had been strengthened, because the two communities were more separated and hostile to each other than before. 5 Kissinger was reluctant to join the Task Force’s assessment that double Enosis might be the best feasible solution. He defined the US aims in a guidance telegram to Tasca saying that he wanted a viable, durable settlement of the Cyprus problem and restoration of the Greek-Turkish alliance relationship. The US had no ready-made solution to offer and no special preferences as to the person who should emerge from a consensus of Greece and Turkey and the Cypriots themselves, provided the Soviets

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had no hand in the selection. He claimed that ‘we are open minded.’ This meant that ‘we neither support nor oppose Makarios or Clerides.’ 6 Asked by Ramsbotham as to how he saw the next moves once a ceasefire had been secured, Kissinger said he would like to procrastinate until he could see clearly how the forces were balanced. Ramsbotham told him that this was similar to Callaghan’s own approach to the conference: ‘To let the Greeks and the Turks put their own ideas forward to see if they could agree, before coming forward with any ideas of our own. Kissinger agreed. We should not be too ambitious.’ 7 Makarios had explained his position on the Geneva Conference to the British Ambassador to the United States, Ramsbotham, in the morning and to Kissinger in the afternoon of 22 July. He said it was not a good thing that he should be receiving the most unqualified support from the Russians. This was not helpful to his position vis-à-vis the Americans, nor in Cyprus. He did not ask for his own participation and was content that he should be kept closely informed and his view be taken into consideration. Makarios described the ‘ideal solution’ on the following lines: a) Agreement on full implementation of the operative parts of the Security Council Resolution. b) The Guarantor Powers at Geneva should aim at a lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. c) The agreed basis for this should be the 1960 constitution. d) If no agreement were reached at Geneva, or while the discussion continued, the 1960 constitution as a whole should be regarded as continuing in force. e) Only with the agreement of the parties concerned would it be possible to change any provisions of the constitution. f) A committee should be set up representing the Greek, Turkish and British governments, as guarantors, together with representatives of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The committee’s task would be to take the necessary practical measures for normalisation under the constitutional regime of 1960, and the dissolution of the existing de facto situation. g) A mixed special police force comprising Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, together with UN police, should be formed, to take measures to disarm all those who had been armed illegally (this would embrace both the National Guard and the Turkish Fighters). About his own future Makarios claimed ‘this was of less concern to him at the moment than re-establishing an independent future for his country.’

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Meanwhile as he was still the legal President of Cyprus, but out of the country, the constitution provided for Clerides to be the Acting President, though it was still Makarios’ responsibility to approve the appointment of ministers, etc. If he was unable to function as president, then there was provision for Clerides to act as president and hold elections within 45 days. 8 In addition, Makarios proposed the voluntary withdrawals of Greek and Turkish contingents. 9 During a second meeting with Kissinger before his departure to London on 29 July Makarios claimed that the Americans had not done enough to restrain the Turks and said that the absence of clear public statements by the US Government had given the impression that they were not using enough leverage on Turkey. Kissinger replied by reference to his recent conversations with Ecevit and said that the Americans did not condone Turkish actions. They were trying to avert further killings. The question of Turkish withdrawal could be addressed when the ceasefire had been established. Makarios again appealed to Kissinger to use US influence with Turkey. Kissinger replied that the US would not be driven to apply pressure. They would do what they thought right, despite the criticism they were receiving for it. Makarios said that the Russians were obviously trying to exploit the present situation to their own ends. Kissinger agreed, but said that they were not getting far with their efforts in New York. 10 Makarios was clearly not happy with Kissinger’s ‘support.’ Speaking to the press afterwards he said that his talk with Kissinger had been satisfactory, though he was not sure that he understood US policy. Thereafter he denied that he had said he was dissatisfied with US policy. He also said that he had been assured that the US would play an increasingly constructive role in the future. Kissinger also spoke to the press, repeating that US support for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus within its constitutional arrangements was the framework for US efforts in Geneva and in [Turkish and Greek] capitals. 11 Kissinger simply commented to McCloskey that he didn’t give a damn about Makarios’ impact on the press. The press conference had, in his view, not been one of Makarios ‘more brilliant performances.’ But that was OK. If one of them had to get ‘rattled’, he was glad that it was him. 12 Makarios’ solution proposal met with little understanding as the Political Councilor of the American Embassy in Ankara presented it to the Director of Greek-Cyprus Affairs/Turkish Foreign Office, Ecmel Bartuçu. Bartuçu laughed three times as he read the paper himself and then commented ‘too late.’ He went on to say that Makarios should have thought a long time ago of returning to the 1960 Constitution, but any such possibility would now ‘never’ be acceptable to the Government of Turkey. Instead, an entirely new Cypriot Constitution should now be written. 13 Clerides reacted in a similar way, commenting that Makarios was badly out of touch with reality.

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He said that in earlier intercommunal talks Denktaş had refused to return to the 1960 Constitution claiming that the Turkish Cypriots needed safeguards to protect themselves. 14 The Greek Government was apparently divided over the desired final outcome of the conference. Hooper reported that according to ‘secret sources’ the Greek number two of the Geneva delegation, Dimitrios Bitsios, 15 was ‘believed to be in favour of a solution involving some form of separately administered Turkish area in Cyprus and that the Prime Minister shares this view, though not, according to our informant, Mavros or Vlachos.’ 16 From the outset the chances for a negotiated solution brought about by Clerides and Denktaş were thought to be reasonable. Olver reported that Clerides had a remarkably similar view to Denktaş. During separate talks Olver had with the two leaders on 27 July he gathered the following main political points: Denktaş had confirmed that the Turkish aim was an independent Cyprus with autonomy for each community’s canton within a federal structure. They did not want partition: this would inevitably lead to double Enosis. They were determined to put an effective end to Turkish fears of discrimination. They hoped that, given time, cooperation between the communities would grow. The present opportunity would be used to make sure that the Turkish-Cypriot community was able to stand up for itself and could no longer be disregarded or bullied. Denktaş expected that the broad principles would be quickly settled in Geneva and that there would then be a fairly brisk negotiation between him and Clerides in Cyprus over the detailed administrative and constitutional arrangements. Clerides for his part took a ‘remarkably similar view of the intercommunal situation.’ There were in his view two possibilities: partition or a federal solution. The former would lead to double Enosis. The latter would start off with two autonomous cantons, but the island would remain independent and in the course of time cooperation between the two would grow. Clerides said that it was only realistic to realise that the situation had now fundamentally changed. He said that he had often warned Makarios to be prepared to give more autonomy to the Turks – in vain. Clerides would be willing to negotiate a federal solution with Denktaş based broadly on the present territorial division. Olver stressed that though Clerides had actually ‘not explicitly renounced the claim that the Turks should revert to the situation as at the original ceasefire (…) this was implicit’ in what he had said. Clerides thought he would have the support of the great majority of the Greek-Cypriot population in this and that the main National Guard leaders had already signified their assent to it. Clerides repeated several times the view that the prospects for a peaceful and positive intercommunal future in

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Cyprus were potentially better now than before the upheaval. The sort of solution which might now emerge was, he thought, realistic and should prove stable. But it all hinged on there being no further breaches of the ceasefire and on the maintenance of a sharp negotiating momentum. 17 The start of the conference was endangered by continuing ceasefire violations. UNFICYP reported that while on 23 July violations of the ceasefire agreement appeared to decrease in number, still some serious breaches occurred. 18 The situation remained generally quiet throughout the night of 23/24 July, although interrupted by occasional fire fights or sporadic shooting. 19 Callaghan wrote to UKMIS New York that the Greeks were ‘becoming increasingly agitated about alleged violations of the ceasefire.’ He warned that as long as they were convinced ‘that serious violations continue to take place, the chances that the Karamanlis Government will be able to take hold speedily and that they will come to Geneva tomorrow are bound to be reduced.’ 20 Ceasefire violations continued during the day on 24 July and were committed by both sides. Turkish forces began to advance in several directions from the area under their control between Nicosia and Kyrenia. At the same time, National Guard forces in outlying parts of the country surrounded a number of Turkish-Cypriot villages and demanded their surrender. 21 On 25 July Turkish troops occupied Bellapais and pressed on over the mountain in order to capture the Pentadhaktylos pass and thus secure the new road over the mountain from Nicosia to Kyrenia south of the mountains. Dhikomo fell and Turkish units moved towards Kythrea. 22 On 25 July the Greek Foreign Minister Mavros threatened not to go to Geneva because of continued Turkish attacks. US Ambassador to Athens Tasca ‘told Mavros in the strongest terms that he must go.’ This had clearly made an impact on Mavros; in a conversation he had with the British Ambassador Hooper he confirmed that he would go to Geneva. However, Hooper warned that the meeting might still be ‘off’ for the Greeks, if the Turkish attacks did not cease. 23 The three delegations reached Geneva on 25 July where the first meeting was scheduled for the evening. Callaghan described the British aims for the conference to Waldheim’s Special Adviser Roberto Guyer. He said that the United Kingdom delegation could be more flexible than the others. He thought they should spend a couple of days trying to make a provisional ceasefire work and be careful to describe the arrangements made so far as temporary. Then there should be another meeting in a fortnight to see whether the Constitution of 1960 should be put into force once more or whether it should be amended. Another aim of the second stage should be to get troops off the island. The Greek and Turkish contingents provided for in the 1960 agreement should be abolished. The National Guard and

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the Turkish Fighters should be abolished and only the force of 2,000 gendarmerie provided for in the 1960 agreement should be established. The Cypriot communities would have to be involved in the conference at the second stage. Guyer said that the period before the second stage could be used to consult and involve the Cypriots. In April Denktaş had been in favour of abolishing the Turkish Fighters because they were too expensive for the Turkish-Cypriot community. Referring to continuous Turkish violations of the ceasefire both Callaghan and Guyer sensed that Ecevit was misinformed about the activities of the Turkish military and that the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia had lost his judgement. 24 Callaghan decided to meet Güneş and Mavros separately before the first plenary session started. He asked Güneş whether the Turkish Government intended to occupy new territory. Güneş answered ‘not unless forced to do so.’ He claimed that he was constantly receiving reports from Ankara, for example, that Turkish enclaves were under attack. Callaghan said that he had reports that large numbers of Turkish landing craft were approaching the Cypriot coast. This could cause consternation and fear of further Turkish military movements within Cyprus. Güneş said that politicians did not always know what the military were doing. But he could give an assurance that there was no intention of taking military advantage. But frankly speaking in the present situation in the island it was impossible to say nothing would happen. Declarations were unlikely to affect the situation on the ground. Callaghan said that he could not accept that. The three Ministers, he said, were responsible people and declarations made in the name of the three governments would be carried out and could have significant effect. Güneş said that he did not mean to say that there was no value in declarations but public opinion would be shaken if a declaration were made and events turned out differently, e.g., if the National Guard fired on Turkish troops. In that case they would have to be surrounded and ‘mopped up.’ Callaghan then put forward a British draft for an opening statement produced by Goodison. Güneş accepted a first sentence stating that each power would ‘undertake to use his best efforts to promote the observance of the ceasefire in Cyprus called for in Security Council Resolution 353’ but a second referring to an intention not to extend the territory occupied by Turkish forces ‘obviously caused him much more difficulty.’ 25 Callaghan described the Turkish Foreign Minister in his memoirs as a ‘dark, loquacious character who looked somewhat like Groucho Marx but without the humour.’ While he was an ‘expert of obstruction’, Güneş had, in Callaghan’s view, ‘little or no authority.’ Behind him were standing the Turkish cabinet and the generals. 26

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It was clear that at this stage the Turks were not prepared to accept a freezing of the present lines of advance, since their operational targets had not been reached. Throughout the ensuing discussions the Turkish justifications for further advances would be alleged attacks on TurkishCypriot villages and, as mentioned by Güneş, the National Guard firing on Turkish troops. The main concern of the Greek side was to attain exactly the opposite result, an immediate halt to Turkish military advances. When Callaghan called on Mavros he was told that the Greek Foreign Minister would not be willing to talk about a ceasefire as long as violations continued. He wanted the British forces to do more. He could produce evidence beyond dispute of more than 25 violations since 22 July. The Turks were moving every day. Asked by Callaghan how far he thought the Turks intended to go Mavros replied that they were preparing for partition. According to the Greek military the Turks had a clear plan. Callaghan replied that Mavros, of all people, should not believe what the military said to him. Callaghan recalled that when Ecevit had come to London he had said that it was not his government’s intention to do more than intervene to safeguard the 1960 Constitution. He had spoken of promoting the intercommunal talks. Callaghan said he agreed with Ecevit that the balance of power had been disturbed by the intervention by the Greek National Guard and the appointment of Mr. Sampson. Mavros answered that Sampson had now disappeared. Callaghan replied that he had spoken of a period of hope. They should not start from the assumption that partition was intended. The Turkish Government would exclude both this and Enosis and they should go back to the 1960 Constitution. Mavros’ position was that the main purpose of the Conference should be the complete withdrawal of all forces. A debate on security guarantees for Turkish Cypriots, as Callaghan suggested, would, according to Mavros, not achieve a ceasefire. At the least, the return to the positions held at 1400 hrs GMT on 22 July must be agreed. Callaghan said there was no doubt that in theory this was right but it would be difficult to achieve. 27 He then presented a draft opening statement, which was criticised by the Greeks for not insisting on the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 353 in toto. Callaghan then put forward a second draft, which the Greeks accepted for consideration. However, they presented their own draft just before the start of the Conference. The first United Kingdom Formula referred to the three Guarantor Powers declaring that they would use there best efforts to promote the observance of the ceasefire in Cyprus called for in Security Council Resolution 353 and to ensure that no incidents should occur that might lead to a resumption of firing. In the second version, reference to the

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Treaty of Guarantee was omitted and a paragraph added that the three parties would undertake to ensure that the ceasefire was strictly observed. The Greek Formula included an explicit reference to the ceasefire line as at 1400 hrs GMT on 22 July. 28 During the first meeting the main dispute concerned whether the meeting was mainly one instigated by the UN Security Council’s resolution (Mavros) or by the consultation of the three Guarantor Powers (Güneş). The Greek position was based on the conviction that the Treaty of Guarantee did not provide for any military action – a notion that was shared by neither Britain nor Turkey. The compromise press release tried to encompass both positions and read: The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, at their first meeting in Geneva on 25 July, considered Security Council Resolution No. 353, especially its call for the restoration of peace in the Republic of Cyprus, and reaffirmed their endorsement of the Resolution and their determination to achieve its aims taking into account the international agreements referred to therein. 29

The conference continued the following morning with a statement by Mavros saying that the latest news from Cyprus about ceasefire violations was a great cause of anxiety. He noted that the situation was critical and that he regarded the continuation of the Conference with his participation as ‘problematic.’ Meanwhile, 49 violations of the ceasefire agreement had already occurred, most of them confirmed by UNFICYP. The Ministers should break off and return later to see if this Conference could continue or not. Mavros said that he was not willing to participate in a farce. By that morning, he claimed, there had been 45 violations; now there had been 49; by that afternoon there would be 55. Güneş retorted that this was no farce. They were there to stop a tragedy. As for the ceasefire, some Turkish villages had been attacked, about which UNFICYP had no reports. He could not accept that the ceasefire only applied to Turkey. Until there was a universal ceasefire he could undertake no promises on behalf of Turkish forces. Nor could he accept that UNFICYP should be stationed round the Turkish forces; this would simply mean freedom throughout the rest of the island for people to kill one another. Callaghan said that Resolution 353 was addressed to all parties, not merely one, but a regular armed group was an obvious focus of attention. It was the responsibility of the Ministers that all firing should cease. He did not see that the advance of Turkish troops could assist the situation of the Turkish villagers in the south. 30 Given the danger of a breakdown, Callaghan resorted again to separate talks with the two adversaries. He first saw Mavros and managed to

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convince the Greek Foreign Minister to abandon his demand for Turkish withdrawal to the ceasefire line of 22 July. However, he insisted on the creation of a buffer zone and demanded the end of reinforcements other than monitored supplies. The security of the Turkish villages should be assured by UNFICYP. Mavros also accepted a Turkish two-part agenda under the condition that the two Cypriot communities should participate in the second stage. 31 Callaghan then went to see Güneş, who thought his Government would not accept the interposing of UNFICYP in the buffer zone, but undertook to consult Ankara on this. He outlined the conditions under which Turkey might consider the establishment of buffer zones: a) there should be two autonomous Greek-Cypriot and TurkishCypriot Administrations to fill the present vacuum of authority on the island. Turkey could not accept the Clerides Administration as a legitimate authority; b) in addition to buffer zones, there should be Turkish troops within the Turkish enclaves; c) the buffer zones should not be occupied by UNFICYP; d) without prejudice to United Kingdom rights, Nicosia airport should be operated jointly by Britain, Greece, Turkey and UNFICYP. This would remove one bone of contention; e) a temporary joint Greco-Turkish Council should supervise the two autonomous Administrations in the Island. 32 The Turkish delegation presented these ideas as a common declaration by the three powers on the evening of the same day. However, in that proposal point (e) was missing. 33 The Turks probably feared that such an institutionalised body would be a recipe for future Greco-Turkish clashes rather than a functioning organisation. After his meeting with Güneş, Callaghan went to Mavros again. The Greek Foreign Minister described his difficulties in accepting any decisions that might endanger Karamanlis’ efforts to consolidate his position in Athens. Mavros said that President Gizikis was willing to cooperate. The Chiefs of Staff had stated before Karamanlis had even taken over in Athens that they were finished with politics and intended always to obey the civilian government. Some of them wanted to resign. Ioannides, they said, even if he was a psychopath, had behaved honestly. But a group of officers who were associated with him were ‘beasts’ and the new civilian government would have to get rid of them. However, according to Mavros, Karamanlis was yet not strong enough. Mavros said that he had left Athens under ‘humiliating circumstances.’ Moreover, he had no Foreign Ministry at the time. There were only some Generals, some ex-Ambassadors, and a few typists. Everything would have to be built from scratch. He had to achieve

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a face-saving formula in Geneva. If he returned without such a formula he (and by implication the government of which he was a member) could not survive. The military remained very powerful and the civilian government was not really in charge. Therefore, if nothing were achieved that night Mavros intended to break off the meeting the following morning, make a statement to the Press, and return to Athens. Callaghan pressed him to agree that ‘whatever happened he would not go without a formal meeting a least for protocol purposes [the following morning]. At such a meeting, assuming no substantial discussions were possible, he would make a statement setting out the importance which he attached to friendship between Greece and Turkey.’ Mavros clearly thought that the chances of the Turks agreeing to anything that would help him in Athens were slim. 34 Alarmed by Mavros’ threat to leave the conference, Callaghan again went to see Güneş, only to learn of a similar crisis that the Turkish Government would face if they made too many concessions. Güneş told Callaghan that he had discussed with Ecevit the terms on which Turkey could settle fully and he did not think that they would be able to get any further. The Government was not in a secure position. One of the parties that made up the coalition could defect and in the present inflamed state of public opinion the government would not last. This was a clear reference to Vice Prime Minister Necmettin Erbacan’s National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Parisi). Throughout the crisis, Erbacan advocated a ‘solution’ based on the partition of the island, which should be brought about by Turkish arms rather than negotiations. Güneş speculated that it might be preferable, therefore, to have war with Greece because the alternative would be a Turkey alienated from the West. He said he would certainly be in favour of demilitarisation and the withdrawal of all troops. He did not believe in partition, provided the Turks were organised into cantons, and of course they must resist Enosis. The only condition he had was that the island should not fall into the hands of the Soviet Union. He announced that he intended to ‘speak broadly’ to Mavros about some of these matters. 35 US policy toward the conference had at that point been confined to pressure on both sides to keep the talks going and to reach a face-saving compromise. Kissinger had sent messages on 25 July to Karamanlis and Ecevit. Both messages laid great stress on the importance of keeping the talks in Geneva going and the unforeseeable consequences of a breakdown. The message to Karamanlis stressed that the Greek Government, even though it had just come to office, would have to recognise that Greece had a measure of responsibility for what had occurred in Cyprus. The message to Ecevit urged on him the need for an immediate end to action by Turkish

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forces in Cyprus and the desirability, from a Turkish point of view, of keeping Karamanlis in office. 36 Kissinger told Karamanlis on 26 July that the US Government was ‘in strong support’ of his efforts and was willing to do what it could to help. Karamanlis thanked him but said that he thought that Kissinger had ‘to go further’ since the Turks were violating the resolution. Kissinger said that he was in touch with the Turkish Government and that they were ‘working quietly.’ Karamanlis insisted that good wishes were not enough and Kissinger should do something in order to prevent violations of the ceasefire. He described the opinion in the Greek Army as ‘very anxious and very dangerous.’ He said if Kissinger did not try to control the Turks, he would be obliged to do it himself. 37 Tasca warned the same day of the danger of a new rightist coup in Cyprus and the weakening of Karamanlis’ position with the Greek military if ceasefire violations continued. He warned that Ioannides was still sitting at his desk in the Greek Pentagon and had stated that the ‘Greek military may take over again.’ 38 William B. Buffum, American observer at Geneva, reported thereafter that the Turks had been a little more accommodating than he had expected in the formulation of conditions. However, the chances that the Greeks would accept standstill on the present basis were four to one against. Buffum’s impression was that Athens had continued the dialogue so far ‘out of great weakness.’ 39 Callaghan now brought a new topic into the arena in order to break the stalemate and/or to make the Americans more determined to press for a solution. In a conversation with Buffum he said that he was increasingly interested in the idea of demilitarisation. He argued that this would raise the question of the future of the Sovereign Base Areas. He was inclined to think that the strategic value of the bases was less now than formerly; while he recognised the importance of the intelligence facilities which were maintained there, the main significance of the British presence was perhaps to deny the island to the Russians. Total demilitarisation might be another way of doing this. This was, of course, the last thing the Americans wanted to see as a result of the conference, a demilitarised Cyprus without the western intelligence facilities. Buffum was cautious not to give a hostile answer, but mentioned that Cyprus might be an important ancillary base in any future Middle East conflict. He said he would ask for a formal assessment of the strategic value of the island and of the implications from the American viewpoint of its demilitarisation. 40 After that the State Department evidently got in to action to avoid any such developments. Meanwhile Kissinger’s fight against other agencies of his government and opposition within his own department continued. Kissinger complained on 26 July to Sisco that Schlesinger had made a statement on

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25 July in which he had said USG would recognise Karamanlis (‘We’re not in the business yet where the Defense Department recognizes government’). Kissinger instructed Sisco to ‘make sure that our guys are under control.’ He was all for Karamanlis. But he was against this ‘indecent rushing around of the very people who last week were accusing us of being too pro-Greek (…) for whom we can’t be too anti-Turkish now. Sisco said that this represented a ‘180° reversal on their part.’ Kissinger complained that they had ‘some guys who were out making end runs around him’ through other departments. This was undoubtedly a reference to members of the State Department’s Cyprus Task Force. Kissinger said that he had written letters to Ecevit and Karamanlis. Those should only be shown to Hartman, Ingersoll and McCloskey, but he did not want the Task Force to read them. 41 As a result Kissinger handled the remainder of the Cyprus crisis without the advice of vital parts of his own organisation. The morning meeting on Saturday, 27 July, proved to be reconciliatory. Unfortunately this was to be an exception. Mavros and Güneş expressed some similarities regarding their ideas for the future of Cyprus. Mavros stressed the need to build up confidence between the two peoples. He quoted the words of Solzhenitsyn that it was impossible to live on this planet unless one made the other’s problem one’s own. If he were to say that the Greek Government was not prepared to talk in any circumstances unless and until Turkey return to the ceasefire line, that would be an ultimatum. It would create impossible problems for the Turks at home. But if he accepted the enlargement of the area occupied by the Turks since the ceasefire, then, he would have to resign as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Government would fall. The people could not be humiliated either in Greece or Turkey. For if the choice was humiliation or war, the choice they would make was war. They were neighbours and had to behave as such. Mavros suggested that the Ministers should agree that the Turks would not expand their territory. This would be a victory for Turkey. In exchange all parties should agree on the withdrawal of all troops from the Republic, including those provided for in the Zurich and London Agreements. Güneş said that he agreed with the principle that the text of the final declaration could not be humiliating for either party. He urged Mavros to look at the problem in its global context. In order to reach a final solution for Cyprus the Ministers had to consider the role of the island in Western strategy. He stressed that in the time of Makarios there had been two dangers: first for the Turkish Cypriots themselves; and secondly because of Soviet interest in the area, which had been encouraged by Makarios’ politics. If Greece and Turkey were not in agreement among themselves and with their allies on the status of the island, its internal stability must depend upon external influences. The imperative condition was that the Guarantor Powers should

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not fear that internal political activity would change under external pressure. For example, Turkey must not fear annexation by Greece. Mavros remarked that both countries had to agree that Enosis and partition were excluded. Güneş clarified that he was speaking not of what statements would contain but of realities. Sometimes there were valid strategic reasons that might give the allies as a whole different ideas from those of Turkey or Greece. With Makarios there the Turks feared that the island might fall under the control of the USSR. Against this background the problem of Enosis or partition was a minor one. Mavros said that he agreed and that in such a case United Kingdom bases would also be useless. Güneş said that this was the heart of the problem and that they had to keep it constantly in mind if the internal problems of Cyprus were to be solved. They had to give an institutional and constitutional status to the island that would give the necessary guarantees and that would not change as the internal political situation in the island developed. These guarantees would regulate the relations between the two communities on a constitutional level. Confidence could not be established tomorrow between the two communities. It was necessary to give the island an international status that avoided strategic danger to either Greece or Turkey and these ideas should inspire the final solution of the island’s problems. Mavros said that he agreed with the points made by Güneş, which were of great importance. There was a risk that the island could fall under the influence of another bloc and the means to avert this needed a profound study. But the aim of averting this possibility could not be achieved by force or by reducing the independence of the island to that of a satellite. Mavros said that he understood what Güneş had said about Makarios. He had been everywhere – to Peking and to Moscow. Why? Because he had said he would go anywhere if the independence of the island was in danger. He had even said in public that he would be willing to call in the Soviet Union. Güneş said that Cyprus must retain its independence. ‘There were enough troubles with Greek islands in the Aegean already. It would be wrong to make half islands or three-quarter islands on the coast of Turkey.’ He agreed with Mavros that changes to the Constitution should be made (‘It is impossible to return completely to the 1960 Constitution’) and that these changes required the consultation of the leaders of both communities. Greece and Turkey should use their influence to convince them of the ‘need to accept a reasonable formula which would be in accord with the general approach that he and Mavros had outlined. He said that he had a good understanding with Mavros, and Ecevit had written a poem in which he said ‘the Greeks are our brothers.’ Mavros stated that the Turks had much more influence on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership than the Greek Government had on Makarios, but that ‘even that problem would become

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easier if the two Governments or the three Governments were in agreement.’ 42 The anti-Soviet element uniting Mavros and Güneş had been introduced by Clerides, who had the day before asked for Soviet diplomatic support. Clearly unhappy about this, the State Department (Ingersoll) instructed US Ambassador Davies to tell Clerides that this would be a ‘serious mistake’ that could ‘only complicate an already difficult situation. Ingersoll stressed that Soviet presence in Cyprus or any active Soviet role in the diplomacy ‘now underway (…) must be avoided.’ Davies should make Clerides understand ‘that Soviet involvement could only force [the US Government] into positions which, under other circumstances, we would not take.’ 43 Davies immediately went to see Clerides and told him that Soviet interference could result in the return of the military in Athens and a hardening of the Turkish position, which the US would be unable to contain. Clerides gave in and promised that there would be no further appeals or contacts asking for Soviet support. 44 The spirit of at least gradual agreement at Geneva did not last long. As soon as a drafting committee took on its work it became clear that the differences were far from having been overcome. The Turks demanded a clear and definite reference to the Treaty of Guarantee, which both Greece and Britain resented since it might be interpreted as consent to Turkey’s military operation. In addition, Turkey wanted all Turkish-Cypriot enclaves to be restored to the status quo ante before the fighting began, i.e., returning control to the Turkish-Cypriot Fighters; UNFICYP should not have the right to oppose Turkey’s troops as guarantors; the status of the Turkish Administration as autonomous should be recognised; Turkish troops should stay at their present positions and have the right to return fire when attacked, and; finally there should be no limitation on reinforcements for the Turkish troops. None of these points was accepted by the Greek committee members. Greece demanded the attachment of a map showing the exact ceasefire positions. The Turks would not consent to this, asserting it was not needed. Goodison, who represented the British side at the committee, took the view that the Turks would not make any concessions. Consequently, ‘Our aim is to secure a really effective ceasefire, since without this war between Greece and Turkey may well ensue, and we have little alternative but to side with the Greeks.’ He pointed out that all this ignored the political will to reach an agreement shown during the private meeting among Mavros, Güneş and Callaghan. Apparently, the Turks had not instructed their members to make any concessions. Goodison urged Callaghan to call another meeting of the Ministers in order to break the deadlock. As to Callaghan’s tactics, his suggestion was ‘to express sympathy for the Greek point of view, while conceding some

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minor points of substance to the Turks. [Callaghan] will wish to bear in mind that the Greeks need a ceasefire more than the Turks; it is the latter therefore who most need manoeuvring into an agreement.’ 45 The Turkish side now feared that time would play against them. Therefore, they decided to apply more pressure by threatening to carry on with the military operation. Members of the Turkish delegation (Ambassador Bayulken and Bartuçu) approached the British team’s John Goulden 46 and told him that Güneş was deeply disappointed by the lack of give in the Greek position. The Greeks had conceded only on trivial points, such as the policing of mixed villages (where there were, at most, 3,000 Turkish Cypriots). On the basic question of principle the Greeks still clung to the idea that Cyprus was a Greek island, not a bi-communal one. The Greeks knew that if they played for time the issue would go to the United Nations within a week. The Turkish intervention would increasingly appear to be a military occupation. Turkey would be criticised and could not, they assumed, rely on their friends to veto action by the Security Council. However, they had prepared plans to settle the problem unilaterally in a manner that would be satisfactory to most United Nations members though not, they hinted, to Britain and the United States. 47 Callaghan subsequently reacted by suggesting to Buffum that Kissinger should apply more pressure, especially since Güneş appeared to be less cooperative during a meeting with him and Mavros in the morning of 28 July. 48 After long discussions on the draft, the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers finally appeared to agree to a compromise paper – only to withdraw their consent the next day. 49 Towards the end of the discussion, Mavros had already indicated that he thought that he had made too many concessions and in the evening a message from Karamanlis arrived accusing the Turks of acting in Cyprus in a way ‘rendering impossible the continuation of the Geneva Conference’ and announcing that Greece had the ‘right and the duty’ to intervene in order to prevent the otherwise unavoidable generalisation of the conflict.’ 50 And Ecevit phoned Callaghan to tell him that he was not satisfied with the current text in so far as it related to: the Vice-President; withdrawal; Nicosia Airport; recognition of Turkish-Cypriot Administration, and; the maltreatment of Turkish villagers. 51

The Eviction of the UN from Kyrenia – Britain Considers Military Intervention The question of whether Britain with or without UNFICYP might attempt, by military means, to restrain further Turkish expansion in Cyprus was renewed on 28 and 29 July. At stake was the prospect of Greece being

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forced into a war that would be disastrous not only for Greece but for the whole NATO Alliance. Turkish ceasefire violations continued throughout the Geneva Conference. On 26 July Olver reported that the Turks had occupied Myrtou. Turkish forces southeast of Kato Dhikomo were on the move eastward. He commented that the Turkish forces seemed ‘determined to press on with the consolidation they consider essential.’ 52 On 28 July the Turkish Army moved eastwards to take Ayios Epicteos and Buffavento Castle was reported to be in their hands. 53 On 29 July Turkish units continued to advance on the strategic Klepini-Pentadhaktylos road. UNFICYP reported a large Turkish concentration east of Boghaz comprising 81 APCs, 47 Land Rovers, 8 trucks, and some tanks and artillery. 54 Waldheim instructed Guyer on 27 July to discuss in Geneva questions of interposing UNFICYP between the combatants. 55 The diplomatic initiative for direct British intervention came from the Greek Prime Minister on 28 July, in the form of a strong plea to the British Prime Minister seeking his ‘immediate action.’ Karamanlis said, ‘I believe that your government in accordance with the existing agreements has the right and the duty, as well as the power, to intervene in order to stop the inevitable generalisation of the conflict.’ Sir Robin Hooper followed this message with a report of a conversation he had with the spokesman of the Greek Government, Angelos Vlachos, who had delivered it. In outlining the consequences of allowing Turkish expansion to proceed unchecked, Vlachos said, ‘If there were war, the Karamanlis Government would be replaced by a military one. This might be followed after the inevitable defeat, by civil war from which there might emerge a left-wing government under Papandreou or some other, which would withdraw from NATO and either declare neutrality or take Greece into the Soviet Bloc.’ He explained that to avoid this it was essential that the Geneva talks should result in something which could be presented to the Greek people as ‘peace with honour.’ The British Defence Ministry counselled against a stronger military engagement. The troops on the SBAs would hardly be able to defend themselves. Upon visiting the bases the Under Secretary of State (RAF) reasoned that in the long run one base in Cyprus would be sufficient for British military requirements and advised the abandonment of the Dhekelia base in case of a diplomatic solution. 56 The FCO drafted a reply to the Greek Government for consideration by Callaghan, who was in Geneva. In essence the draft stressed the importance of continuing the Geneva talks and undertook to send a strong appeal for restraint to Ecevit. It demurred at the idea of unilateral military intervention but mentioned the possibility of further British reinforcements of UNFICYP. A key sentence stated, ‘I am bound to say that I cannot believe that this [the use of British military force] would do otherwise than exacerbate and complicate the

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situation which UNFICYP is already trying to deal with.’ Hooper argued for a less non-committal reply and suggested a slightly stronger text, which was substantially accepted by the FCO. This was received by the Greek Government on the evening of 29 July with ‘profound disappointment.’ 57 The matter was immediately revitalised as news broke on the afternoon of 29 July that there had been a Turkish order to the UN to vacate their camp near Kyrenia. The message from the Turkish Corps Commander in Cyprus for General Prem Chand read: ‘All UN troops, UN civilians and UN Civilian Police including those in Kyrenia will be removed from the area occupied by the Turkish force. If UN troops remain in the Turkish area the Turkish Force Commander cannot be responsible for the safety of UN personnel. All UN forces are to be removed from the Turkish controlled sector by this evening.’ 58 Sir Robin Hooper in Athens stated that it was likely to prove the last straw for Greek patience and that Greece would be forced to declare war. He urged that the Turkish demand should be firmly resisted. Within half an hour he signalled again, suggesting that the Turkish action provided a good opportunity for Waldheim to issue revised instructions to UNFICYP, without waiting for a new mandate from the Security Council. He argued that ‘if Prem Chand were willing to interpret his instructions in such a way as to produce a screen of British troops under UN command which should be thrown in the path of a likely Turkish line of advance South West and South East of Kyrenia (…) something might at any rate be done to stop the rot.’ He went on to point out that ‘if nothing is done, and the UN is kicked ignominiously out of Kyrenia while the Turks go on in advancing, it will be fruitless to argue in Athens for further patience.’ Behind the Turkish move was apparently the wish of the local military commanders to free themselves of UN surveillance in order to land further reinforcements. 59 However, Ecevit defended the eviction with the argument ‘that since Turkish Armed Forces were in complete control of the area, he saw no need for UNFICYP there.’ 60 Callaghan promptly raised the issue with Güneş in Geneva, reminding him that UN Resolution 353, to which both Turkey and Greece had subscribed, called upon all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP. Güneş replied that Callaghan should realise that there was an anarchistic situation in the Turkish-occupied area, which was, after all, still a battleground. It was better to leave the task of looking after civilians to the agencies, by which Callaghan understood him to mean the International Committee of the Red Cross. Callaghan then asked him whether he recognised UNFICYP. Güneş replied that this raised very difficult questions for the Turkish Government. Callaghan told him that he could not regard this explanation as satisfactory.

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Waldheim immediately took up this issue with Ecevit, saying that ‘it was not a question of the fine print (…) but (…) a political problem of the most serious kind.’ He said he ‘saw himself under obligation to inform the Security Council.’ However, as the British delegate to the UN reported, the UN ‘have few illusions about the effectiveness of these if others do not support them heavily.’ Consequently, Waldheim instructed Prem that, ‘if the Turks insist on UNFICYP withdrawal from their area, he must comply under protest making it clear that he is going under threat of force.’ Waldheim, who was conscious that he enjoyed little backing in such matters from either the Council or troop contributors except for the UK, did not think it feasible to contest this Turkish demand if it were pressed. 61 Finally, Ecevit altered the ultimatum to allow UNFICYP to vacate the area ‘within the next two days or so, and in good order and dignity.’ In face of that ‘concession’ the issue was not further contested and the prospect of UNFICYP being allowed to make a firm stand receded once again into the background. The British UN delegate, Ivor Richard, summarised the position as follows: ‘Waldheim authorised Prem Chand to take a firm stand over Nicosia Airport because of very special circumstances [i.e. it was handed over by Greek Cypriots under an agreement to which the Turks subscribed; and UNFICYP had a good chance of succeeding militarily]. These circumstances are not repeated either over the UN presence in Kyrenia or over the UNFICYP screen proposal. Waldheim has made it clear he does not consider that UNFICYP could succeed militarily if attacked.’ Therefore he concluded, ‘I do not believe there is any chance of Waldheim acting as proposed [i.e., issuing revised instructions to UNFICYP] unless specifically authorised by the Security Council. The Council now being divided, and the Russians making trouble, a decision to authorise such action seems highly unlikely.’ 62

The Final Phase at Geneva The final phase of diplomatic activities surrounding the Geneva Conference centred on the final wording of Paragraph 4 of the Declaration. The version originally agreed by the three Ministers declared the aim ‘that all foreign personnel in the Republic of Cyprus, other than those permanently stationed there under the authority of international agreements and those whose presence is authorised by the United Nations, should be withdrawn with the least possible delay consistent with finding a just and equitable solution to the Cyprus problem.’ 63 Güneş informed Callaghan at 0430 hrs that Ecevit had refused permission to accept Paragraph 4. The British then came up with a new proposal asking for the agreement ‘that consideration should be given to

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the possibility of the eventual demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus and on the desirability of elaborating measures which would lead to the timely and phased reduction of the numbers of armed forces.’ 64 While Güneş accepted, Mavros rejected the proposal. Ecevit informed Kissinger that he had accepted the British text. The Turkish Prime Minister complained that the Greeks had rejected it and now Callaghan would give Turkey an ultimatum to accept a proposal acceptable to Greece. 65 Ecevit complained that he could not understand why Callaghan was ‘trying to treat Turkey and Greece as equals in this. We have won a war. If we restrained ourselves from gaining more territory it was because we respect the UN. We cannot let our good intentions be exploited.’ 66 Kissinger told Ecevit that the US would try to find a compromise between the Turkish and British texts. 67 A new Anglo-Turkish proposal agreed at 1400 hrs, stating ‘that the three Foreign Ministers agreed to implement Resolution 353 in its entirety and within the shortest possible time, as the situation improves in the Republic of Cyprus and as a just and lasting solution is found to the problem of Cyprus.’ 68 This was rejected by Ecevit, who suggested a version that would only call for a ‘timely and phased reduction after the establishment of complete security on the Island and mutual confidence between the Parties concerned.’ 69 At this point a deep disagreement between the Turkish delegation at Geneva and Ecevit became apparent. Around 1630 hrs Callaghan ‘was informed by Mr. Goulden of a message from Ambassador Kirça. The latter recognised that the latest (Ecevit) version of paragraph 4 was unacceptable to the Greeks and that it would lead to a very unfortunate conclusion being drawn about Turkey’s long-term intentions. He urged that pressure should be applied not on Mr. Güneş, who was “shattered”, but on Mr. Ecevit. If Her Majesty’s Government threatened to cause difficulties in the Security Council – and if Dr. Kissinger reinforced these threats – Mr. Ecevit (who was schizophrenic) would probably give in and revert to the GüneşCallaghan version.’ Subsequently (1730 hrs), Callaghan delivered an ultimatum to Güneş, that either Turkey should accept the original version or Britain would withdraw from the Conference by 0930 hrs the next day and put the blame, in front of the press, on Turkey. Güneş, who was of course not really surprised, reacted, as Callaghan put it, ‘with a certain dignity and restraint.’ In his official telegram Callaghan simply mentioned that ‘officials of my party have privately been advised by the Turks that the only way we can hope to reach “agreement” in Geneva is to get rough and put maximum pressure on Ankara. At this point some of our Turkish sources said that the problem is not merely “the military” but the eccentricities of Ecevit himself and his Parliamentary problems.’ Callaghan

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asked the Americans to exert maximum pressure on Ankara before the deadline. 70 The Turkish Ambassador to the UN Mission at Geneva, Kirça, whose message had prompted the British ultimatum, called on the evening of 29 July on the FCO’s Private Secretary, Charles Wiggin, to launch a formal protest by the Turkish Government about the British attitudes and handed over another Turkish version of Paragraph 4. Having done so, he made clear in private that both the protest and the latest formula were part of a face-saving device and that the Turks would settle for a text which in substance was much nearer to the one agreed between Güneş and Callaghan earlier. 71 Thus Güneş and Kirça had saved the Conference against the hard-line position Ecevit had developed in Ankara. The Americans did in fact increase pressure as well, but it appeared that their approach was not only centred on the acceptance of the paragraph. They were keen to delete any reference to demilitarisation as it had appeared in the first alternative version promoted by Britain. Kissinger got Ecevit to agree to a formula in which no reference was made to demilitarisation and Eagleburger and Sisco made him finally accept a reference to Resolution 353. The American formula, 72 that was finally agreed with few changes, spoke of measures that should be ‘elaborated which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces.’ This would happen within ‘the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned.’ 73 In a telephone conversation with Sisco and Eagleburger, Acland said that he ‘noted that it [the Department of State] had deleted all reference to demilitarisation. Eagleburger tried to argue that the omission provided a better-balanced formula. [Acland] said that [he] knew that the Americans did not like the concept and had presumably omitted it largely for that reason. Sisco interrupted with “right”!’ Acland concluded that while he was sure that the Americans had been very keen to avoid a breakdown he could not help wondering whether their interest in and great activity over this particular formula did not result from their determination to strike out any reference to demilitarisation. 74 It had indeed been Buffum’s intention to seek the deletion of the demilitarization reference in according with guidance he received earlier. 75 After the obstacles on the Turkish side had been overcome Callaghan finally had the task of convincing the Greeks that they would have to accept that the Turks would not accept a withdrawal before ‘something like a just and lasting solution was achieved.’ Clerides urged the Americans to make sure that the Greeks would continue talks until an acceptable agreement was reached. He feared that Mavros was proving to be a ‘weak reed’ in Geneva both because of his desire to return to the political arena

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and his reluctance to be identified with concessions that in Clerides’ assessment had to be made in the face of Turkish power. 76 In a meeting with Mavros and Dimitrios Bitsios, at 0945 hrs in the morning of 30 July the British Foreign Secretary, seconded by Wiggin, persuaded the Greeks to accept the new formula against the concession that prisoners of war should be released ‘within the shortest time possible’ (Paragraph 3 b). 77 At a tripartite meeting at 1215 hrs the Ministers agreed on the final text of the Declaration, apart from the question of buffer zones and demarcation. They agreed as well that the second stage of the talks should begin on the evening of 8 August. 78 A final working meeting at 1515 hrs brought no solution to the outstanding problem of the buffer zone. While Güneş insisted on a buffer zone of 10 km (later he indicated that he might settle for 5 km) with a limited policing role for UNFICYP, Mavros insisted on a maximum of 500 metres and Callaghan pressed for permanent UNFICYP posts to be installed between the lines. Since no agreement could be reached the question was left for the next round of talks. The final Declaration was amended with reference to the security zone by the following sentence: ‘Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces should be entered by no forces.’ The position of the ceasefire line should be determined by ‘representatives of Greece, Turkey and the UK in consultation with the UNFICYP.’ The Conference ended with the signing of the Declaration and Statement about the release of Prisoners of War after 2200 hrs on 30 July. 79 The final document contained the following important elements: a) cease fire by 30 July 1974 at 2200 hrs; b) establishment of a security zone at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces of a size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in consultation with UNFICYP; c) immediate evacuation of all Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek-Cypriot forces; d) in mixed villages the functions of security and police would be carried out by UNFICYP; e) exchange or release of detained military personnel and civilians under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross within the shortest time possible; f) measures leading to the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and the amounts of armament, munitions and other war material in the Republic of Cyprus to be elaborated within the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned;

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g) negotiations to secure (a) the restoration of peace in the area and (b) the re-establishment of Constitutional Government in Cyprus to begin on 8 August, 1974 at Geneva with the participation of representatives of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities; h) among constitutional questions to be discussed should be immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution, and; i) Ministers note the ‘existence in practise in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous Administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation, the Ministers agreed to consider at their next Meeting the problems raised by their existence.’ 80 If fully implemented the Declaration could not only have brought immediate peace to the island, but also contained important elements for a future solution. The reference to two autonomous administrations and the prerogative of the reinstallation of the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, which would have included far reaching veto-powers, represented a great success for the Turkish side. The dangers to the success of the Declaration were rooted in the adherence of Turkey to the ceasefire (Paragraph 2 of the Declaration) and the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves by the National Guard (Paragraph 3 b). The implementation of both elements was vital for the development of trust among the two communities in Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. Without it successful negotiations on the other thorny issues agreed could hardly be expected to be successful. Both Callaghan and Kissinger claimed credit for the success of the conference. Callaghan in his memoirs at least was prepared to share the ‘glory’: The talks developed into a gruelling cliff-hanger with the Turks as well as the Greeks at times inclined to say that they were prepared to face war rather than ‘retreat’ or ‘humiliation.’ (…) As our formal sessions were rarely productive, I spent much time bilaterally, with one or the other in an endeavour to secure two major objectives: first, to make the ceasefire stick; and second, to prepare the ground for a new settlement. (…) Henry Kissinger continued his diplomatic pressure from afar and ten days after the invasion had begun, on 30 July, both parties were ready to sign a declaration 81

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Kissinger told Nixon that there had been a deadlock at Geneva the night before and all were ready to go home at 2130 hrs. ‘We came up with a compromise. We were able to sell it to the Turks and the British.’ 82 In other words, without American interference the conference would have failed.

14 Between the Talks 1–12 August 1974

The period between the two Geneva Conferences was marked by low-key military activity on the ground and the start of the eviction of Greek Cypriots from Turkish-held territory. Diplomacy focused on the preparation of the second stage of talks and on possible solution models for the Cyprus problem. When at 2200 hrs on 30 July the talks finally produced an agreed ceasefire declaration, both the Greek Government and the FCO urgently pursued the proposal that the area occupied by the ground forces at the time should be demarcated by inspection and mapped and that this line should form the basis of any future settlement. The Turks professed to support the scheme but in practice dragged their heels for nearly three days while they got on with the expansion and consolidation of their zone. The British Joint intelligence Service Near East assessment of Turkish forces in Cyprus as of 30 July estimated the total strength of Turkish forces as between 17,000 and 18,000. They were under the command of Lieutenant General Nurrettin Ersin (Commander of the 6 Corps). The Turkish HQ was at Boghaz/Aghirda. Apart from Turkish forces, there were an estimated 8,000 Turkish-Cypriot Fighters – including reservists – in the Nicosia/Kyrenia area. There were between 120 and 130 M 48 tanks. Up to 30 helicopter supplies were reported as reaching the Aghirda air strip every day. 1 One day later their strength had grown to a maximum of 25,000

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troops and 150 tanks. 2 Turkish troops continued to push through westward towards Lapithos. 3 Greek resistance was slim: the commanders of the National Guard, Giorgitzis and Yiannkodomos, were reported by British Military intelligence on 31 July to be ‘realistic about their inability to take on the Turkish Intervention Force but consider, with justification, that NG has done well.’ The British Defence Attaché in Nicosia observed that their morale was high and their casualties ‘comparatively light.’ 4 The first meeting of the Demarcation Committee took place at 1615 hrs on 2 August; the first inspection by helicopter was carried out two days later. By this time the divergence between the actual Turkish front line and the line which the Greeks claimed to have held at the time of the Geneva Declaration five days earlier was considerable. 5 In several areas it was found to be necessary to plot both a Greek version of the line and a Turkish one overlapping it. In particular, this was the case in the north-west of the Turkish enclave (the much fought-over and disputed Lapithos area) which the Turks would not allow the committee to visit. Furthermore, some stretches of the line that had been agreed initially had to be adjusted later, usually in favour of the Turks, before the final maps were produced and taken to Geneva on 9 August. 6 Olver described Turkish aims and policies in Cyprus in a letter to Goodison on 1 August. He said, It is quite clear that until we get a cease fire line demarcated and properly policed, the Turkish military will go on extending their area. (…) The Turks are sticking firmly to the proposition that their army is liberating Cyprus and should be welcomed by Turks and Greeks alike. Its secondary role, completed so far as the north is concerned, but still with a big question mark over Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta, was to rescue the Turkish community.

Olver then described first signs of Turkish attempts to create a homogenous Turkish Zone out of which all Greek Cypriots would be evicted: We have telegraphed an attempt to analyse the Turkish double think in all this. Behind this specious façade, there are some pretty ugly rumours. There seems little doubt that the Turkish military commander has been concentrating prisoners, including civilians, with a view if necessary to using them as hostages. There are persistent rumours, so far unconfirmed, that numbers of Greek Cypriot civilians, men, women and children, have already been shipped off to Turkey for this purpose. Denktash, when I called on him yesterday to congratulate him on the Geneva Agreement, was in a strange exultant mood: he was quite unabashed in his complaint that the Turkish

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military had not moved far and fast enough to give him a really viable Turkish enclave to negotiate with. He was obviously worried about the very large Greek Cypriot preponderance in the Kyrenia enclave and was in little doubt that, in the fullness of time, if not necessarily straight away during the negotiations, the Turkish ploy would be to ‘encourage’ Greek Cypriots to leave and Turkish Cypriots from other parts of the island to take their place. 7

Turkish efforts to evict Greek Cypriots from the Kyrenia region continued on 3 August. This was accompanied by stories of atrocities, which served to cause panic among Greek Cypriots living close to the Turkish line of advance. Olver reported on 3 August ‘that an operation to weed out all Greek Cypriot males of military age left in Kyrenia and intern them may be under way.’ 8 He stated that the Turks were deliberately evicting Greek Cypriot women, children; and elderly males from villages within the area of the Kyrenia bridgehead. The men were being held as hostages for the Turkish Cypriots in areas such as Larnaca and Limassol. This had been openly admitted by a member of Denktaş’s staff to the High Commission on 1 August. According to information Olver obtained from the Greek Embassy villagers from Trimythi, Karmi; and Ayios Georgios had arrived in Nicosia. While many of those from the first two villages had left because of gunfire; the ones from Aiyos Georgios had been ‘deliberately evicted by the Turks.’ The Greeks claimed that women, children; and old men had been taken to an unknown destination. The Greek-Cypriot press covered these stories intensively with lurid accounts of Turkish atrocities. UNFICYP informed the British High Commission that the woman and children of Bellapais had been put in the Bellapais Hotel and were without food and water; despite the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had delivered three tons of food on 1 August. The UN checkpoint had been occupied by the Turks and the UN flag removed. UNFICYP also reported that the Greek-Cypriot people of Kazaphani village were ordered on 2 August to leave and make their way over the mountain to Kythrea. 9 The Turkish-Cypriot answer to these allegations was flat denial. Osman Örek, the Turkish-Cypriot Minister of Defence; claimed in a meeting with a member of Olver’s staff that he had made enquiries and could absolutely deny allegations that Greek Cypriots were being evicted, which he dismissed as propaganda. There had naturally been confused movement of people from village to village during the fighting, but this was only to be expected. He claimed that Greek Cypriots were now allowed freedom of movement in Kyrenia town but they did not wish to move. Olver stressed that this conflicted with all evidence the British High Commission had. 10 After denying the allegations Örek had

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burst forth into an impassioned tirade about the plight of 100 or so Turkish Cypriot villages comprising some 50,000 people around Cyprus. He had claimed that they were still facing siege conditions and the threat of annihilation. They lacked food, water, and medical supplies. The diplomats, UN and Red Cross were only interested in the plight of Greek Cypriots and were totally disregarding the Turkish community. But the normalisation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the Greek held areas was an integral part of the general agreement and if this situation did not improve it was a poor prospect for the future.

Olver sensed that the Turks, conditioned by their experiences in 1963 and 1967, instinctively believed any atrocity story and virtually refused to listen to evidence to the contrary. Örek was ‘sadly typical of much Turkish Cypriot opinion.’ All the information that Olver had from UNFICYP contradicted these atrocity stories. 11 Similarly; the Turkish Government continued to complain about the fate of Turkish Cypriots under Greek occupation. On 4 August the Turkish Embassy in London released a statement to the press claiming that while on 1 August 150 Turkish Cypriots were released by the Greek National Guard from the Limassol soccer field, there had been no change in the state of the Turkish Cypriots, totalling 7,000, who were being kept as hostages in a school in Larnaca. Only 64 old people and children had thus far been released by the Greek National Guard. Further, the statement mentioned that in six localities in the district of Nicosia, 35 in Paphos, 17 in Larnaca, 17 in Limassol, 21 in Famagusta; and in 17 localities in the neighbourhood of Serdarlı (Chatos) the Greek occupation continued ‘with the utmost deprivation for the imprisoned Turkish-Cypriots.’ The localities of Erenköy (Kokkina), Yeşilırmak (Limnitis), Akıncılar (Kophinou), Eastern Serdarlı (Chatos) including Mora and İngönü, Famagusta, Mehmetçik (Galia), Kaleburnu (Galinoporni) were still under siege and the requirements of the inhabitants for food and medicine had not been met. The Turkish-Cypriot villages of Yalova (Piskobi), Düzkaya (Evdhimou), and Gökağaç (Alehtora) had been looted and burned by the Greek National Guard. 12 Harold Wilson tried to address both the eviction of Greek Cypriots and Turkish fears about the fate of Turkish Cypriots in a telegram he send to Ecevit on 4 August. He said that he was increasingly disturbed by reports that villagers were being evicted from their homes in the Kyrenia area and that their men were being held as hostages. He stressed that if a sensible and long-term solution to the problem were to be achieved at the Geneva talks, it was essential that confidence between the two communities in Cyprus was restored. He appealed to Ecevit to instruct his forces on the

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island to show restraint and compassion towards civilians and to cooperate in every way in implementing the provisions of the Geneva Declaration. On the fate of the Turkish Cypriots in Greek-Cypriot areas he said that HMG was impartial in its attitude to claims from whatever quarter and an appeal for restraint had been addressed to the other parties concerned. He assured Ecevit that HMG would continue to exercise its influence to ensure that both communities were treated with humanity. Otherwise he feared that ‘we shall get nowhere at the next round in Geneva.’ 13 Olver discussed the urgency of implementing the whole of Paragraph 3 of the Geneva Declaration with Clerides on 5 August. Clerides said that the Government’s position on this was based on reciprocity. They would be willing immediately to implement 3(b) and (c) once they were assured that the Turkish troops would genuinely implement 3(a) by retiring to the line occupied by them on 30 July. So far from having such assurance, it was clear for the Government that the Turks had not only occupied considerable areas in the three days following the Geneva Declaration, but were even now pressing forward in the Karavas-Lapithos area. Olver argued that this was the usual vicious circle that was so familiar in the intercommunal talks: each side making a pre-condition of action by the other, with a resultant deadlock. Clerides thought there might be something in this, but stated that moves on his part toward retreating from Turkish villages were out of the question without some show of reciprocity of the Turkish side. 14 Thus neither side did abide by the Geneva Declaration. Clerides’ decision provided the Turkish side with a perfect excuse to consolidate their position. In retrospect, this was another example of Greek-Cypriot shortsightedness. The Turkish military build-up could continue and Turkey could even claim that it was needed to protect Turkish Cypriots. Michael G. MacDonald from the British High Commission Nicosia reported on 6 August to London on talks he had with various TurkishCypriot politicians about a final settlement. 15 He said that there seemed to be general agreement among leading Turkish Cypriots on the shape of a final settlement for Cyprus. All agreed that an independent sovereign state of Cyprus was essential. But physical security for Turkish Cypriots was also essential and to achieve this some geographical movement of people would be necessary. He concluded that these views on the shape of a final settlement ‘would fit in with Denktash’s recent remarks about movement of populations, with the Turkish Chargé’s comments to the High Commissioner some month ago that those remaining outside the main enclave would have to fend for themselves, and with the present Turkish policy of evacuation of Greek Cypriot villagers from the area of the Kyrenia bridgehead.’ MacDonald then referred to large-scale plans recently

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announced by Turkish Ministers for the economic development of Cyprus (e.g.,water and oil pipelines). Those seemed in his evaluation to make ‘little economic sense for the present limited Kyrenia/Nicosia enclave’; but they would make good sense if the majority of the Turkish Cypriots were living in the same area in the north of the island. 16 The Greek-Cypriot political scene after the first Geneva Conference was marked on the one hand by Clerides’ realism and on the other by growing resentment of concessions among other government officials, coupled with increasing interference on the part of Makarios. Olver reported that it was his impression that Clerides regarded himself as the full President, entitled to continue to lead the country until there could be fresh presidential elections. 17 Clerides confirmed this at Geneva as he answered Callaghan’s question whether he was acting under Article 36 (ii) or Article 44 of the Constitution, saying ‘both.’ However, he added that he would base his position on Article 36 (ii), which would be easily defensible vis-à-vis the Russians. 18 According to Olver, Clerides was a realist, who realised ‘the difficulty of holding the Turks in check in their present militant mood.’ He fully accepted the Geneva Agreement and was ready to negotiate on the basis of a ‘fully independent federal or cantonal government covering the usual portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Defence etc.’ Clerides told Davies on 5 August that he actually preferred a cantonal to a federal solution. 19 Lower down the ladder, however, feelings were rather different. Olver wrote that his contacts with MFA officials, and with other officials and members of the public, revealed ‘a considerable and disturbing degree of anti-British feeling.’ There was a feeling that Geneva had ‘sold the pass for the Greek Cypriots.’ The reference to autonomous regions was a ‘particular source of resentment.’ 20 War between Greece and Turkey appeared to be less likely at the beginning of the second Geneva Conference. Nevertheless, British intelligence reported on the deployment of Turkish forces in Thrace that ‘this is good tank country and posture may be defensive but (…) in event of war Turkish plan envisages all out armoured thrust directed at Salonika.’ 21 On the Greek side the Greek forces were described as remaining ‘on alert and edgy.’ The Hellenic Air Forces had been ‘placed at maximum readiness on night 3–4 Aug as a result of a false report that a Turkish naval force from Cyprus’ was heading towards Greek waters. 22 US Ambassador Tasca reported from Athens on 1 August that Karamanlis and Mavros had succeeded in getting better control over the military and counter weighting the efforts of Ioannides to prepare his return. 23 Thus the likelihood of war was further reduced.

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During the days before the second Geneva Conference started, US policy was clearly focused on the final phase of the Watergate affair. Nixon resigned on 8 August. The only major American initiative was Arthur Hartman’s mission to Callaghan, Ecevit,and Karamanlis. The idea was to get an analysis and to define the limits of each of them and to get the US analysis in tune and showing compassion ahead of time. Instructing Hartman, Kissinger again revealed his anger with Tasca. After saying that Hartman’s mission should be introduced to the parties with the premise that ‘Hartman was closely related to Kissinger’s views and would come to give messages from him to them’, Kissinger remarked: ‘Even Tasca can deliver that.’ To Callaghan Hartman should ‘on a very personal basis say we have some problem getting the best report out of Athens.’ 24 Hartman met Ecevit, Güneş and Işık on the evening of 5 August. He told them that the ‘US would adopt intransigent position’ if during the coming weeks anyone appeared to be trying to pressure the United States, mistakenly thinking the US were in a period of weakness. He explained Kissinger’s position that Turkey should exercise moderation, and that the parties should find an agreed solution rather than one side presenting a dictated solution. He warned that this could lead to dangers for the new Greek Government and to partition and double Enosis on Cyprus. And this could create an opening for the USSR. The Turks stressed that they did not want partition but that despite failure of all previous solution attempts, ‘this time Turkey had introduced “originality” into the situation by sending in its Army.’ Turkey was determined to use new realities to bring about a lasting solution. Two autonomous administrations had been created by ‘natural forces’, which were also pressing Turkish Cypriots to congregate in one geographic area on the island. Ecevit said that the two communities ‘needed to be separated, but not divorced.’ In discussing the 30 per cent zone for the Turkish Cypriots, Ecevit and others were very vague as to how much would be in a single large zone and how much in smaller enclaves. Hartman said that US actions since the onset of the crisis should have demonstrated clearly to Ecevit and his ministers ‘the sympathy and understanding’ that Turkey enjoyed with the US Government. He added that frankly some of Turkey’s other allies had shifted their support ‘almost instantaneously’ from Turkey to Greece once a new government had emerged there. The US had not done this and was taking a balanced position, keeping with Kissinger’s approach to solving this type of problem – an approach whose success had already been ‘clearly demonstrated in the Arab-Israeli dispute.’ Hartman promised that the US Government would study the Turkish proposals carefully.

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Hartman commented in a cable to Kissinger about the meeting that Ecevit clearly understood Kissinger’s philosophy of moving gradually toward a solution without choosing sides. He also understands the importance of our support for Turkey’s objective of some sort of a federal solution on Cyprus. (…) Both Ambassador Macomber and I found the Turkish line very hard indeed. Even assuming some minor bargaining room on area designated as Turkish, their reference to the need for a surgical solution sounds remarkably reminiscent of your conversations in the Middle East. Callaghan is going to have to show uncharacteristic amount of patience and imagination to keep the coming talks going. 25

In fact, Hartman had done little to nothing to impress on the Turks that the US Government wanted them to refrain from further military action. In Cyprus the Turkish Army mainly concentrated on the consolidation of their positions westward on the northern coast towards Lapithos The exception was Famagusta, where on 5 August Turkish Fighters in platoon strength rallied out from the old city and established themselves in the new port area. There was some firing, but this was not returned by the National Guard. Olver reported that the Turks had not before been in this area, and this was a clear breach of the ceasefire. Clerides told Prem Chand that if the UN could not intervene to restore the position, he would order the National Guard into action the next day. Prem proposed to the Turkish Cypriots that the UN could take over the whole port area. Prem proposed to make a considerable show of force on the spot the following day in the hope of inducing the Turks to withdraw. Whether he would actually interpose himself between the Turks and the National Guard would depend on instructions from New York. Olver warned that if not and if the National Guard should act, this would doubtless be regarded by the Turkish command as a pretext for a further major intervention. 26 Finally, Prem Chand and Weckmann-Muños conferred with Turkish officials in Nicosia. The outcome was that the Turks refused to withdraw but gave assurances that there would be no further Turkish encroachment in the harbour area. The UNFICYP troops in the port area retired to their camp. The main result of the Turkish move was that the Famagusta port was now unusable by either side since both the Turks and the National Guard effectively covered it. 27 During 7 August Turkish troops continued to advance in a westerly direction along the coast outflanking Lapithos. 28 Thereafter the situation seemed to have calmed. UNFICYP reported on 8 August a clear improvement of the humanitarian situation in Cyprus. The freedom of movement for convoys in the Kyrenia area was better. Supplies reached Greek Cypriots at the Dome Hotel and at Bellapais and Turkish

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Cypriots at Ayios Sozomenos and Louroujina. UNFICYP was to help villages where electricity and water had been cut. Sixty-four male Greek Cypriots who had previously been removed from the Dome Hotel were returned on 6 August. 29 By 8 August the British reinforcements brought to Cyprus under operation ABLAUT were on their way back to UK and the Naval Task Force had been reduced to HMS Devonshire and HMS Rhyl.

15 Second Geneva Conference 8–13 August 1974

Callaghan outlined the main British aims a day before the second Geneva Conference started, in a guidance telegram sent to several British embassies. First of all, he said, questions not resolved in the Geneva Declaration should be settled. These were: a) control of and access to Nicosia Airport; b) the size and shape of the buffer zone; c) the precise functions of UNFICYP; d) freedom of movement in the Turkish enclaves. Callaghan aimed to avoid for now long-term questions about the future status of the island. In particular, he stressed the need to avoid giving the impression that those questions would be decided by the Guarantor Powers, over the heads of the Cypriots. The main purpose of the conference should be to consider problems related to the ceasefire. He added: ‘There is no question of the constitutional framework for Cyprus being settled trilaterally, nor of our riding roughshod over Cypriot interests. It is the Cypriots themselves who must primarily work out the future arrangements which are acceptable to both communities.’ He was soon to discover that a conference with this as its aim was doomed to failure. Given Makarios’ intransigence during previous periods of talks, there was no real chance of an ‘arrangement acceptable to both communities’ that would find the Archbishop’s approval. Certainly

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Callaghan pinned his hopes on Clerides’ ability to stay in power and see through an agreement with Denktaş. In the same telegram, he described Clerides as ‘the most moderate and broadminded of the Greek Cypriot politicians’ and warned that if he returned from the conference emptyhanded or with even worse conditions for the Greek-Cypriot side there would be the ‘danger of reprisals by EOKA-B.’ 1 Callaghan’s view that the conference should focus mainly on solving the problems of the ceasefire was by no means shared by the Americans. Kissinger was aiming for a comprehensive solution to the problem. AngloAmerican differences became apparent during a conversation Callaghan had in London with the US Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Arthur Hartman, before his departure to Geneva. While Callaghan said that he was worried that the Turks were clearly pushing west, Hartman emphasised that while this was correct, they were definitely not pushing further east. He thought that they were probably just occupying territory that Ankara thought was already under their control. Then he added that it had been made clear to him in Ankara that ‘the intention was to occupy the whole of the Pentadaktylos range.’ Hartman did not think that the Turks intended to go any further. He said that he had been told in Athens that despite Mavros’ statements about returning to the 30 July line, the Greeks would not make a big issue of this. Unlike the British, the Americans thought it was not enough to focus on the ceasefire and leave everything else for the Cypriots. Hartman said that there would be no progress until there could be a ‘more general exchange about how each side saw the future.’ He was convinced that both Ecevit and Karamanlis accepted this; only Mavros, who could not see further than the ceasefire, did not. Consequently, the American position was that pressure should be put on Mavros not to focus only on short-term issues like the ceasefire. Regarding the Turkish enclaves, Hartman had received the assurance of the new Greek Minister of Defense, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, that a new commander of the National Guard was now in place who could address complaints by the Turks simply by ‘lifting the telephone.’ Hartman was sceptical about this and pointed out that many units of the National Guard remained without officers. For the conference Hartman suggested the establishment of two working groups: one on the implementation of the Declaration and one on constitutional issues. Apart from Enosis and partition nothing should be ruled out. Clerides had indicated to him that he was prepared to discuss a cantonal system and had accepted that the idea of a unitary state was ‘out.’ Hartman criticised the ‘legalistic’ stance taken by the UNFICYP, which he said should be more active in regard to the enclaves. Callaghan agreed,

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saying that he had stressed this to Waldheim. Hartman said that he thought the reduction of troops was not of real concern to the Greeks. Callaghan retorted that it was certainly a concern to the Russians and the non-aligned countries. He had to think about his position at home and at the UN as well. ‘Hartman said that one could get 80 votes for almost everything at the United Nations but the fact was that the members of the United Nations were not willing to take responsibility. If the three Guarantor Powers tried to find an equitable and just solution, they ought to be prepared to take a little heat from the United Nations.’ When Callaghan mentioned that he remained uncertain about Turkish intentions with regard to their troops, Hartman expressed some sympathy with the Turks, who felt that they should protect their people. Callaghan questioned whether 25,000 troops were really necessary for this, saying that with that number they could take the whole island. Hartman said that Makarios had told him that he would prefer the Turks to divide the island rather than that there should be a bad agreement. Callaghan said that he himself would not put his hand to a bad agreement. Hartman assured him that that wouldn’t be necessary. All Callaghan should do was to encourage the parties to find a common ground. He knew that it would be difficult to keep Mavros at the table, but reminded Callaghan that the other Greek leaders had ‘more patience than Mavros.’ 2 Meanwhile, in Washington Vice-President Gerald R. Ford called Kissinger directly after Nixon had informed him of his decision to resign. Nixon had told him that Kissinger was the only one in the cabinet with whom he had shared his decision. They agreed to meet at 1500 hrs to discuss what needed to be done in the next two days. Ford said that he really wanted Kissinger to stay and stand with him ‘in these difficult days.’ Kissinger said, ‘You can count on me, Mr. Vice-President.’ 3 Nixon handed in his official resignation the following day and Gerald Ford became the thirty-eighth President of the United States. The Anglo-American friction would continue throughout the Conference. The result was that despite several daily contacts between Callaghan and either Kissinger in person or Hartman, who was representing the Americans in Geneva, there was no real coordinated pursuit of policy making by the two powers. Callaghan had separate talks with Mavros and Güneş upon his arrival in Geneva. From the beginning it was clear that he had an almost impossible task. Mavros said that if the Turks guaranteed to observe the ceasefire as called for on 30 July, the Geneva Conference could continue. Otherwise, from the Greek point of view the matter would be better handled in the United Nations, where the Turks would be put under enormous pressure. He added that the Greek Army had a division ready to go to Cyprus in the

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event of a breakdown of the Geneva talks. 4 Güneş refused even to discuss Article 2 (ceasefire) before a discussion on Article 3 with all its subsections had begun (covering the situation of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves). 5 Callaghan warned at the opening of the Conference in the evening of 8 August that if this meeting were to fail, the Cypriot communities had nothing to look forward to. Lengthy exchanges between Mavros and Güneş followed, which confirmed their personal preoccupations with, on the Greek side, the observance of a ceasefire and standstill called for in the declaration of 30 July and, on the Turkish side, the evacuation of Turkish villages. After that it was agreed to form working groups on the implementation of paragraphs 2, 3(b) and 3(d). Callaghan’s suggestion to start a discussion on the Constitution as well was rejected by Mavros, who insisted on the presence of Clerides and Denktaş. 6 The working groups met the following day (9 August) as planned. The group dealing with exchange of prisoners and detainees produced ‘a useful and on the whole encouraging report ad referendum to the Ministers.’ 7 The other group, dealing with the Turkish enclaves, made little progress other than to exchange lists produced by UNFICYP and the Turks. During the meeting the Greek delegates refused to discuss the lists before they had been checked in Athens and Nicosia. 8 At noon Callaghan talked to Waldheim and Weckmann-Muños, both of whom had come to Geneva. He said that ‘he was unhappy that the Conference seemed to be developing to the exclusive benefit of the Turks.’ Waldheim commented that ‘the Greeks were in a depressed and even desperate state of mind.’ He mentioned the Greek plan to send troops under the umbrella of UK, US, and USSR guarantees organised by UN. Further, Mavros was hoping for a Security Council meeting. Both ideas were unrealistic given the Islamic grouping controlling the membership of the non-aligned group and seven seats in the Security Council. In Waldheim’s assessment there was an element of wishful thinking in much of Mavros’ conversation. Callaghan referred to Turkish claims that the Turkish villages were being starved and attacked and were short of water. Callaghan reported that Weckmann-Muños had strongly dissented to that view. The situation had been restored in most Turkish-Cypriot areas. UNFICYP was looking after Turkish-Cypriot villages that had surrendered or had been surrounded (and Turkish Cypriots who were not allowed to depart). The problem areas were limited to Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca. Discussing measures to contain the Turkish advance by means of interposing UNFICYP between the parties, Waldheim said that it was United States’ fears about the Soviet Union that prevented him from seeking a mandate for UNFICYP from the Security Council. Judging from reports about Kissinger’s letter to Ecevit, the United States seemed to be

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exerting very little pressure on the Turks. Callaghan said that ‘the signs were beginning to emerge of divergence between the British and American positions.’ 9 The Turks were clearly pressing for a decision on a solution not to be postponed to a time after the Conference. Therefore, Güneş decided to give the general outline of a Turkish solution proposal to Callaghan in the early evening of 9 August. Denktaş put the same proposal simultaneously to Waldheim. 10 Güneş said that the only solution was to create within a united republic of Cyprus, whose territorial integrity he fully respected, two (and only two) administrative autonomous regions. From the Turkish point of view, prolongation of the Conference, with referral to expert groups, would be no better than an immediate failure. He thought however that it might be better for the principle he had outlined to be put forward by Denktash rather than himself. He was not suggesting discussion of constitutional detail nor of the boundaries of the proposed regions, all he wanted now was acceptance of the broad principle.

Callaghan then asked if the Turkish region would be the one already occupied and if not, whether it would include areas such as Famagusta. He wanted to know as well what would be the functions of the central government. Güneş answered that the present zone covered just one twenty-fifth of the Republic and was insufficient. The final border would have to be drawn in the light of considerations such as population and landownership. The Turkish region could only be in the north of the Island, but he would say nothing precise about Famagusta. As for the Central Government, it would have responsibility for such matters as international relations, currency, Federal Courts, central taxation etc.; there would be a legislative assembly to deal with matters concerning the whole population with a President and VicePresident but there should be no provision by which the Government could by paralysed by a veto. (…) While the Central Government looked after subjects affecting the totality of the population, communal points should be decentralised; this would reduce friction.

Callaghan pointed out that Makarios would never agree to this and Clerides’ position would be endangered if he were pressed to accept. Güneş answered that he was aware that Makarios would not agree. ‘But then no solution to which Makarios would agree was acceptable to the Turkish Government.’ Güneş said,

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he was ready to reduce Turkish forces but on condition that he had a better idea of the future status of the communities within the Island, and this meant that the principle of autonomous regions must be agreed by the Conference and the community leaders and its application started. He hoped Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Hartman (…) could help in this regard with Clerides and other interested parties.

Callaghan then made three final points: (a) he would not advocate the principle of regionalisation to Clerides; he would only discuss it with him (b) if Mr. Günes felt it essential to have a quick result he must make a concrete move concerning withdrawal of forces; he would not get acceptance of his principle in return for vague assurances (c) Mr. Callaghan accepted the role which Mr. Günes asked him to undertake only on the basis of the personal assurance given to him earlier by Mr. Günes – which he had accepted – that the Turkish Government had no intention of enlarging the Turkish occupied zone. 11

Callaghan went directly to Mavros and outlined Güneş’ position to him. Mavros asked to see the Foreign Secretary alone. Callaghan reported that he was surprised that Mavros seemed quite receptive provided he could sell the idea to Makarios. He was inclined to go with Clerides to see him immediately in London but [Callaghan] advised him not to act impetuously and if he talked to Makarios at all to get him to come more than half-way to meet him. [Callaghan’s] impression was that Mavros wanted to get rid of the Cyprus problem at almost any price provided Greek face could be saved. 12

After that Callaghan dined with Clerides and the Cypriot Chief Justice. Clerides, who had already been briefed by Mavros about the new Turkish proposal, said that any sizeable autonomous region would inevitably contain a large Greek-Cypriot majority. It would be democratically impossible for this majority to be governed by the Turkish Cypriots and the creation of an autonomous region with a Turkish-Cypriot majority would involve massive transfers of population. He would not contemplate this and even if he were prepared to, he could not sell it to the people of Cyprus. However, he was inclined to accept an administrative federal system that would give autonomy to a series of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves linked together under a Turkish-Cypriot administration. This, Clerides maintained, was what Denktaş had asked earlier for in the intercommunal talks, though he had now raised his bid considerably. 13

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Ecevit told Macomber around midnight of 10 August that after a conversation between Güneş and Callaghan he feared that the latter was considering referring the whole matter to the community leaders. Like the unsuccessful intercommunal talks of the past this might allow an unsettled situation to drag on and a deteriorating situation on the island (‘more clashes, more problems’) would be the inevitable result. He and Güneş had concluded that Callaghan was ‘not going to back their position. They did not think the British would put friendly weight behind the Turkish position when it was tabled in Geneva later that morning. Therefore, he urgently requested a timely and helpful ‘contribution’ by Kissinger, which would be of critical importance. 14 In order to keep up the pressure Denktaş went to see Callaghan first thing in the morning of 10 August. He told him that Ecevit had not sent his troops to Cyprus ‘to play football.’ Their objectives were to stop Enosis and to save the Turks. They had achieved the first but not the second. Turning to the future, he claimed that it was he who had sold to Güneş the plan for regional autonomy based on geographical separation. Now this plan was ‘a must.’ Previously, he and Clerides had been thinking in terms of functional federalism based on the existing Turkish enclaves but recent events had ruled that out as they could ‘never feel secure’ there. Callaghan then asked how many Greeks or Turks were to stay in the respective areas. Denktaş answered that that did not matter. In the Turkish area, he said, the Turkish Cypriots would insist on controlling their own security and he would expect there to be ‘fairly soon a voluntary exchange of people and property on a considerable scale.’ He thought that the Turks would come ‘flocking in from the Greek-Cypriot region even though this meant abandoning their land.’ Callaghan referred to Güneş’ assurances that the Turkish Army did not intend to extend their present area of occupation. Denktaş said ‘it was not the Turkish Army’s intention to see Turkish Cypriots harassed either and therefore he thought this assurance must be conditional. He also said that if there was no agreement in principle here about regional autonomy the Turkish Army could well move to Famagusta.’ 15 Alarmed by the conversation with Denktaş, Callaghan met with Waldheim. He told him that there was evidence that if the Conference did not produce an agreement satisfactory to the Turks they might extend their zone by military means. Waldheim explained that UNFICYP’s presence would not be strong enough to stop the Turkish advance. However, he thought that the airport incident had proved that the Turks were reluctant to engage a UN force. If reinforced rapidly UNFICYP might be able to deter the Turks from further advance. Callaghan agreed to this and asked Waldheim whether he ‘could look to the reinforced UNFICYP to stand

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astride the lines of the Turkish advance?’ Waldheim declared his readiness on this basis.’ While Callaghan thought that no Turkish move would occur before the 19th, Waldheim warned him that in the light of his own conversation with Denktaş he would not rule out the possibility of an even earlier action, i.e., the following week. Later Waldheim confirmed his intention to resist the Turks. On the question of the mandate not covering such action he said that he could act without an extra mandate, but would have to report to the Security Council at once if an emergency arose. He thought that neither the Soviet Union nor China would oppose such a move. Callaghan reported that he was astonished that Waldheim had not mentioned the possible reaction of the United States. Whatever the reasons were, Callaghan noted that he ‘was impressed by Waldheim’s staunchness.’ He concluded: ‘My strong impression is that he does not wish to expose himself to criticism such as that met by U Thant in 1967 over his withdrawal of United Nations forces in Sinai.’ 16 The concrete boundaries of the Turkish proposal were revealed by a map and article published in the Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet the same day. The report indicated that Ecevit wanted a united Republic with two autonomous administrations, each with its own armed forces and parliament. The Turkish-Cypriot area would amount to 30 per cent of the island and stretch from Lefka to Famagusta. 17 That basically corresponded with the 19 July Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of the Turkish military objectives. Callaghan, Clerides, and Mavros discussed the Milliyet report at noon. Clerides said that he thought the Milliyet version was more extreme than that outlined by Güneş on the previous evening. But he thought that it accurately described Turkish objectives. He insisted that he was only willing to ‘concede functional self-government but without geographical boundaries.’ Mavros said that acceptance of Turkish proposals would amount to ‘unconditional surrender by Greece, which would lead to the fall of the Government in Athens and military counter-measures by Greece.’ 18 The conference seemed to have arrived at a critical juncture before actual talks between the parties had even started. Since Clerides rejected the basic idea of geographic separation of the two Cypriot communities, Mavros had no choice but to join him. Greece, which was responsible for the crisis in the first place, was in no position to impose a solution on the Greek-Cypriot side. This meant as well that the imminent ‘alternative’ was the resumption of Turkish military action in Cyprus. Consequently, Callaghan came to the conclusion that only a strong military deterrent could stop Turkey from carrying out her plans. He considered the possible reinforcement of UNFICYP and a plan to interpose the peacekeepers between Turkish and Greek troops. As a precaution he decided to

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postpone the return of the Phantoms and the further withdrawal of British troops. Callaghan requested from the Ministry of Defence an assessment of the role UNFICYP, suitably reinforced, could play if it interposed itself, having made it quite clear to the Turks that they would have to take on a UN force in order to achieve their objectives. The MOD’s answer was that the force would have to be large enough and so armed as to give a good account of itself. It was emphasised that deterrence was all that could be hoped for, and that any expectation of holding the Turks was unrealistic with the estimated Turkish force levels and in the face of Turkish air power. As a result of these deliberations the airlift of returning ABLAUT reinforcements and the return to the UK of the Phantoms were brought to a halt. 19 In order to put pressure on the Turks, Callaghan indicated his position on this to the British press. Talking to journalists, Callaghan accused the Turkish side of having undermined the Conference and stated that Britain was bringing Gurkha troops to the island: A short while ago, I sent a message to the British Defence Minister, Roy Mason, not to withdraw the Phantoms and the troops recently sent to Cyprus. I have also spoken to Waldheim and suggested that U.N. troops should be stationed opposite the Turkish units so that they might prevent any possible offensive. I wish to make it quite clear that, if a single British soldier of the U.N. Peace force is fired upon, our troops and planes will go into action to protect British lives.

Callaghan was asked, ‘Have you also told Güneş what you just told us?’ He replied, ‘That’s your job!.’ 20 After talking to the press Callaghan decided to inform the Americans of his move. Again it became clear that the US Government was not happy with his stance. During a lunch with Hartman, Callaghan complained about the Turkish demands and the danger of Turkish unilateral military action. He said that he had conferred with Waldheim about possible reinforcement of UNFICYP and the plan to interpose the peacekeepers between Turkish and Greek troops. He mentioned the precautionary military measures he had taken, and that he had reported this to the press. Hartman said that President Ford’s initial message to the Turkish President, Fahri Korotürk, had referred to the Cyprus situation and had said that it was undesirable to humiliate the Greeks. Ecevit had told the American Ambassador in Ankara, William Macomber, that he shared this view. Ecevit had said that Karamanlis could agree at this point to proposals that might be politically distasteful since for the moment he could still blame the Colonels. The elements Ecevit asked for were separation and autonomy within each

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designated area. Macomber understood these to be non-negotiable demands rather than an initial negotiating position. Hartman then said that he had told Washington that Mavros appeared to be relaxed and would have no difficulty with these ideas if Makarios could accept them. Thus the American view appeared to be that there was indeed a chance of coming to terms with the Turkish proposal. Callaghan disagreed and said that it was his firm view that ‘now it was time to stand up to the Turks and make them realise that we were in earnest but that United Kingdom and United States policies must be coordinated. (…) If British troops, albeit in blue berets, equipped with antitank weapons and heavy artillery, faced the Turks it would be up to the Turks to decide whether to advance or not.’ Hartman promised only that he would communicate this to Washington in order to get his governments comments. Callaghan made clear that he was not willing to pressure Mavros or Clerides into a ‘humiliation which he would share.’ Hartman urged Callaghan ‘not to get into the position of not considering other avenues.’ Callaghan said that he would ‘of course leave an escape route for the Turks but he would be grateful for United States views on what route could be left. (…) It should not be allowed to get to the point where the Turks thought they could push and push and for example take Famagusta without receiving any adverse response.’ 21 After this conversation there was no chance of a compromise emerging from the Conference. Only an outside initiative might have broken the deadlock. As discussed later in this chapter, Kissinger did come up with such an initiative: the cantonal proposal. The continuation of the Conference itself was delayed by a seven-hour dispute about the wording of name cards to be placed in front of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot delegations. While the Turkish side insisted on labelling them as ‘Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Communities’, the Greeks insisted on ‘Republic of Cyprus.’ Finally, Clerides said that the Turks could have whatever label they wanted, while he would have no card at all. 22 The Conference resumed in the evening of 10 August. During a meeting in which for the first time Clerides and Denktaş participated, the two positions seemed to be irreconcilable. Güneş and Denktaş pressed for concrete talks on a new constitutional basis for Cyprus. Clerides and Mavros proposed a return to the 1960 Constitution in order to safeguard the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots. Thereafter there would be intercommunal talks on the amendment of the Constitution. 23 With these positions as far apart as ever, was there any chance of a move towards a federation?

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Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand records that Güneş called Ankara, where the Council of Ministers was in session, and reported that neither Greece nor Britain was willing to accept the Turkish proposals. In the phone conversation he had with Finance Minister Deniz Baykal he said: ‘The most they are prepared to do is to leave matters to the intercommunal talks. (…) No matter how flexible we are, I feel we shall secure no concrete results. As far as I am concerned, the conference is finished. Other ways of making progress must be sought.’ According to Birand, this telephone conversation served as the green light for the second Turkish military operation. 24 Birand further reports that before leaving to attend the second Geneva Conference, Güneş and Ecevit had had a conversation about the Turkish strategy. Ecevit said: ‘According to the General Staff, all preparations for the second operation will be completed in 2 or 3 days time. Within that time, we must submit our final proposals to the Greeks and obtain their answer.’ Answering the question of how they would communicate that the preparations were finished, Ecevit remembered that Güneş’ daughter Ayşe was planning to go for a holiday; this would provide their code word. He said, ‘When I say “Ayşe is going on vacation” it will mean that our armed forces are ready to go into action. Even if the telephone line is tapped, that would rouse no suspicion.’ 25 Birand continues that in the morning of 11 August, over breakfast in the Intercontinental Hotel (…), Halûk Ülman was excitedly recounting his telephone conversation with Ecevit when he suddenly remembered that the Prime Minister had given him a personal message for Güneş. He said ‘Good heavens, I nearly forgot to tell you that, according to Ecevit, your daughter Ayşe, has completed all the preparations for her holiday and feels that, if your stay in Geneva is likely to be prolonged, she might as well start off on her own.’ Güneş became very excited. He asked: ‘When is she going to start her holiday?’ Ülman could only reply: ‘That is all that Bulent Bey said to me.’ ‘But didn’t you ask?’ Ülman: ‘I’m afraid I didn’t … To tell you the truth, I thought it odd that the Prime Minister should bother to concern himself with Ayşe’s holiday…’ Mrs. Nerimen Güneş, who was also in Geneva, was even more puzzled. Whatever were these children coming to? Why should her daughter worry the Prime Minister over her holiday? But Güneş was not even listening to his wife. He rushed to the telephone to speak to Ecevit. 26

The Greek Foreign minister sensed the danger of war and made an attempt to break the deadlock. During a meeting with Callaghan and Clerides he said that he was ‘very worried. The Council of Ministers was meeting in Ankara and in Athens the Greek War Council was meeting. He

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was prepared to move on two issues. He had instructed Ambassador Tsounis to tell Mr. Günes that the Greek side were prepared to release Turkish prisoners of war straight away and that they were prepared to evacuate the Turkish enclaves in phases, making a start immediately, on the condition that UNFICYP should be present to take responsibility for the security of the relieved villages.’ Mavros suggested a formula that the Conference should make proposals on the amendment of the 1960 Constitution and that officials should work out the details, report back to the Foreign Ministers in three weeks’ time, before the UN General Assembly met. Proposals should exclude Enosis and partition. Since Turkey claimed that its troops were entitled to be in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee and were not covered by Security Council Resolution 353, the Security Council should clarify which troops had the right to be in Cyprus in accordance with international agreements. On the enclaves, he provided a list of Turkish villages that could be evacuated the same day. Thus 13,715 people or 20 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots at present under Greek control (according to figures provided by the Turks) could return to normal life. Their security would be provided by UNFICYP. 27 With this new proposal, the only hope for a peaceful solution was to convince the Turkish side to agree to a prolonged negotiation process. This could only be achieved with the help of Washington. The British Foreign Secretary eagerly waited for the American response to his ideas. However, the answer he got was not the one he expected. Kissinger was not prepared to exert the pressure on Ankara that he had hoped for. Hartman informed Callaghan that Kissinger ‘was not happy with Her Majesty’s Government’s approach.’ When Hartman briefed Kissinger on the British assessment he had talked to Ecevit on the telephone and sent him a message urging the Turks to continue talks and to refrain from military action. Kissinger had received assurances from Ecevit with which ‘he was content.’ Kissinger thought that the line proposed by Callaghan would have the effect in Turkey of bringing domestic pressures to bear on Ecevit to take a harder line. These pressures would work against Kissinger’s efforts to convince Ecevit of the limits to which Turkey could go and of the extent of Clerides’ and Mavros’ opposition. Kissinger would like the political discussions to be kept going. He thought there was a real possibility of moving the Turks off their idea of a single Turkish zone in Cyprus. The Turks should be allowed to back down from their extreme position by the negotiation of a diplomatic framework, which should include a timetable and programme for the next meeting of the Geneva Conference. Kissinger would react very strongly against another public

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announcement of British military activities. It would have an adverse effect on his tactics with Ecevit. Callaghan told Hartman that he thought that Kissinger was not facing up to the real problem on the military side. He asked Hartman to find out from Kissinger what the United States’ reaction would be if the Turks used force to enlarge their bridgehead. Hartman said that Kissinger would ‘not get boxed in’ on this question. He would privately paint a picture for Ecevit so that Ecevit himself would come to the intellectual conclusion of the grave consequences for himself, his party, and his country. Callaghan then insisted that the Americans should face the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. He said that both the British and Americans were simply guessing at the Turkish intentions. Since there were sufficient pointers in the direction of Turkish military action, Britain was conducting contingency planning. Hartman said that there was nothing preventing Kissinger from doing so as well, but Kissinger was convinced that Ecevit understood that any further action on their part would have serious consequences. If they focused on the military intentions of the Turks it would affect the whole tone of the political discussions. Callaghan said that two interpretations could be put on Güneş’ conduct – he could be clearing the decks before military action or it could merely be his ‘unfortunate tone.’ Callaghan said that he doubted that Güneş would get positive proposals from Ankara since previously concessions made on the Conference table had been overruled from home. He was not prepared to sit around in Geneva forever, particularly if he were not getting backing from Kissinger. Hartman counselled patience on Callaghan’s part and urged him to be prepared to listen. Callaghan retorted that he was prepared to listen. He had shown no impatience in the meetings, but he also had a responsibility to take military precautions. The tougher you were with the Turks the more they would listen to you. He thought that Kissinger was mistaken about this. He mentioned the Nicosia Airport incident to underline his point. He believed that the Americans were not yet handling the Turks in a way that would have an effect. He wished to work with the United States on this and would not make an announcement today about his intention to order in more Phantoms and further British troops at once. He would wait to see what came out of the Turkish Council of Ministers but thereafter he would see if he wished to make any publicity for the reinforcement. Hartman urged him to inform Kissinger beforehand if he intended to make such an announcement. Callaghan agreed to do so and stressed his strong desire to work with the United States, but he reserved his position on British policy. He stressed that Britain had to take care of her 12,000 dependents in Cyprus, while Kissinger was concerned with the broader issues of the south-east flank of NATO and US relations with

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Turkey and Greece. Hartman contradicted this view and said that apart from NATO strategy Kissinger’s main concern was to ‘convince the Turks not to follow the Israeli example in 1967. He had the same objective as Callaghan but had reached a different assessment of how it could be achieved.’ Callaghan than made a thinly concealed threat, indicating that Britain might take the short-sighted view that it would be ‘the best thing for British interests (…) to reject the Treaty of Guarantee and withdraw from the SBAs. If there was no American backing for Britain, he might consider this, but [he would of course like to learn Kissinger’s views on the telephone] before taking any decisive steps.’ 28 Tension was heightened on 11 August by a Greek allegation that Turkish aircraft were massed on southern Turkish airfields, the military were on full alert, and a second Turkish operation was imminent. This was at first discounted by Sir Horace Phillips in Ankara, who had received an assurance from Ecevit that he intended to continue to seek a political settlement. However, he added that the Turks were being driven to adopt a hard line by what they saw as the apparent Greek and Greek-Cypriot refusal to recognise that the old order in Cyprus had gone for good. He concluded that if under this delusion the Greeks persisted in seeking to obtain support from Britain and others for what they could not achieve in the field or in Geneva at the first round of talks, ‘then the Turks will fight if necessary in despair of a political solution and in fear of losing what they have gained so far.’ 29 Alan Goodison committed to paper some basic principles of British policy in Cyprus, which effectively ruled out British intervention. In the short term the clear British interest was to prevent further fighting in Cyprus, i.e., to preserve the Geneva Declaration. He noted that there were thousands of British subjects in Cyprus and that the British had bases there which ‘we wish to use for our national purposes for the time being.’ On the possibility of armed intervention he stressed that the British Government had no long-term interests in Cyprus that it did not share with the Americans. As a result HMG ‘should take no forcible action except in cooperation with the Americans or with their support.’ Any such forcible action should be under UN auspices. In so saying, Goodison had articulated two unattainable preconditions for British intervention: American cooperation and UN participation. Thus it seemed to be clear that the military option had in fact been ruled out. As other courses of action, Goodison suggested that the Government ‘should do all it could to secure the implementation of the Geneva Declaration in detail’, even though this might be to British disadvantage or that of the Greek Cypriots if Turkey were to fight again. By doing so, he thought, such a fight might be prevented. At least it would deny the Turks any plausible pretext for an

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attack. As the last principle, Goodison stressed that Britain should ‘aim all the time to reduce [her] long term involvement in Cyprus. We … should avoid undertaking any new long term commitments.’ 30 The British Chiefs of Staff meeting on the morning of 12 August reiterated that ‘on no foreseeable scale of reinforcement could UNFICYP prevent major Turkish military expansion, deterrence was the only realistic objective.’ Later in the day the temperature eased at Geneva and Callaghan reported that, after the personal intervention of Kissinger ‘it seems as if the Turks have decided against the military option for the time being’ and ‘I do not think that we need for the moment to pursue the precautionary measures which have been under discussion.’ 31 Nevertheless British intelligence revealed that the Turkish military build-up in Cyprus had continued in the morning of 12 August with 31 Turkish tanks, 23 APCs, and a large number of troops, which had moved south from a position about 5 kilometres north of Nicosia. A second large contingent of troops was observed dismounting from vehicles immediately north of Nicosia. 32

The Kissinger Solution – Cantonal Proposal Kissinger told President Ford that Callaghan represented a government that would have to ‘stand for action’ and was ‘looking for a quick success.’ They were acting ‘a bit like a bull in a china shop.’ Callaghan was not too experienced, he said. The Turks wanted a quick result ‘leading to partition.’ They had about 15 per cent of the island and wanted about 30 per cent. ‘They might try to grab it. I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey. He was a student of mine and I have told him that we could not – really in the first 48 hours of your term of office – be very relaxed about unilateral military action. Ford said: ‘We sure cannot.’ Kissinger continued: If that happens we might have to dissociate from the [Turks] which we have tried to avoid. [There might be all-] out danger in Turkey and [that’s] why we must maneuver carefully. They might turn very nationalistic and the Russians have been trying to exploit that but we cannot let them act unilaterally. I am writing a letter to Ecevit. He has promised to hold off for 26 hours. I am writing to Ecevit on my behalf outlining where I see the negotiations stand. The Turks propose two areas – one Turkish and one Greek. I think the Greeks we can push them into a position where they would be willing to accept two or three autonomous Turkish areas but not one contiguous area. That could avoid population transfer.

Ford interjected, ‘Right.’ Kissinger argued that this would give them an opportunity to stall military actions long enough to get it working on the Foreign Minister level to see if they could get a compromise. Ford asked

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whether Kissinger thought the letter to Ecevit would first hold off any military action and secondly maybe lead to some modification of their demand. Kissinger confirmed this. 33 Kissinger now moved to persuade Ecevit of his idea of having more than one Turkish area. He sent a telegram to Ankara, which Macomber delivered in the morning of 11 August. Kissinger first warned Ecevit that while the US had from the very start of the crisis tried in every way to show ‘sympathy and helpful understanding for the Turkish position’, any further unilateral military action by Turkey would present the US Government with the ‘most enormous difficulties.’ He added that ‘such a military move would simply not be understood in the United States.’ As a result, if Turkey resorted to unilateral military measures to enlarge the areas it held, the US would not be able to support Turkey in the Security Council. Kissinger stressed that he had discouraged other parties from making any possible unilateral moves on their part. This was probably a reference to Britain’s call for a joint US/UK blockade of north Cyprus. And, as if to confirm this, Kissinger added that the US Government was ‘totally opposed to the resort to any tactic of pressure.’ After this appeal for restraint Kissinger came to the real purpose of his telegram – the cantonal idea. He said that as he understood the present situation, ‘the differences with regard to the future structure of Cyprus seem to be between the Turkish desire to have a single autonomous zone and the Greek view that there should be a cantonal arrangement possibly involving more than one canton.’ Kissinger expressed the belief ‘that the difference here might be narrowed and [he] would urge that an attempt [be] made to do so. Perhaps, for example [ Ecevit’s] government could consider two or three well-defined Turkish areas rather than one single geographic zone.’ The US was not wedded to any particular formula and would support any reasonable compromise that would assure peace and stability in Cyprus. Kissinger suggested that the ministers at Geneva should instruct a working group of senior officials of Greece and Turkey and representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities to explore the details of such a settlement. This working group should report back to the ministers at a specified time, which in Kissinger’s view should not be more than three weeks ahead. 34 In the beginning Ecevit did not respond well to Kissinger’s message. Macomber reported that his face was flushed and his effort to suppress anger was not altogether successful.’ He said he was deeply disturbed by the message. (…) If this was America’s attitude (…) there is no hope. (…) Turkey was being threatened by the British and (…) once the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots sensed the US attitude (…) there

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would be absolutely no possibility of altering the total intransigence which they had shown to this point. (…) He said what you were proposing was in fact a continuation of the de facto cantonal situation which had existed for several years. (…) At this point, it was obvious he wished to terminate the interview.

Macomber prevented this by insisting on first explaining the intention of the note. First of all, the note was personal and would not be passed to anyone else. He stressed that Kissinger remained ‘deeply sympathetic’ to Turkey’s legitimate interest and pointed out that a careful reading of the letter would show that what Kissinger was trying to do was find a way around the present impasse. Ecevit, who had at that point relaxed somewhat, interrupted to insist that the only way Turkish basic interests could be met was through the Turkish proposal with which Kissinger was familiar. Macomber responded that he could not agree that there was ‘only one possible way’ that Turkey’s needs could be met. Macomber’s account now turns to the decisive part of the discussion, which actually changed Ecevit’s mind. I said the key stumbling block was the [Greek-] Cypriot view that it was not possible for any Cypriot Government to agree to a dividing of the island in two. On the other hand I emphasized, Clerides was obviously prepared to accept a cantonal arrangement of some kind. I asked whether it was really out of the question for Turkey to achieve its objectives through a solution which left them with one or two major cantons and one or more smaller ones. The Prime Minister said that this was completely impractical, and at this point in our conversation he jumped up, left the room momentarily, and returned with a map of the island which graphically showed how numerous and widely dispersed were the present Turkish Cypriot communities. He said that I could obviously see from looking at this map that what was being suggested was not possible. I said that I could not agree. For the next two or three minutes, with a map immediately before us, we argued the practicalities of a cantonal system as an alternative device to meet fundamental Turkish needs. Towards the end, the Prime Minister became more interested in some lines I was drawing on the map, with my finger, by way of the most general illustration of how a cantonal system might still meet his requirements – and be something at the same time which the Greek Cypriots could live with. At one point, the Prime Minister said, ‘Of course, if we had separate cantons, we would have to have to have Turkish troops in each of these cantons – at least at first.’ I let that pass without comment. I, of course, emphasized the illustrative character of the lines I was indicating, stressing they represented no one’s official thinking. The line I indicated, however, started from the northwest roughly half way between the

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point Turks currently hold on the coast there and the point farther westwards shown on the Milliyet map, and then ran in a shallower curve eastward (so that the centre Turk canton was notably thinner and shorter than the Milliyet map). As the line proceeded eastwards, I then hooked it back to the northern coasts short of a point where it reached the Panhandle. 35 Then leaving a gap for Greek Cypriot territory, I marked another line with my thumb across the neck of the Panhandle – indicating that the peninsula might then possibly end up being a second canton. (…) It seems to me that there could be a third and possibly a fourth canton somewhere which would bring the total Turk holdings up to whatever percentage is negotiated. There was a silence for some time after this, as the Prime Minister and Işık looked at the map. Işık said, ‘We can’t have the Panhandle separated from the main canton.’ But agreed that a central canton could be a considerable thinner version of the Milliyet map and one that sterted [sic] short of the western extremity the Milliyet map had called for. At the same time, they conceded it might be possible to have a smaller canton of this kind associated with one or two (Işık said ‘at least two’) other cantons. (…) I said, however, that I would like to be able to tell you that the GOT was prepared to look at an alternative arrangement of this kind (…). There was another silence which Ecevit finally ended by saying, ‘All right, I will consider it.’ 36

Kissinger, keen to disguise the fact that this initiative was initiated by the US Government, instructed Macomber and Hartman to make sure that the Turks would not characterize ‘our illustrative example as a “proposal.” (…) We have not made a proposal; we have only suggested that there may be other arrangements which could be looked at by the parties to find a compromise which all could support.’ 37 The Turks swiftly started to work on the proposal and came up with a cantonal solution in the evening of the same day (1830 hrs) in a message to Kissinger: We have studied your proposal for a compromise. I can see it may both meet our requirements to some extent [Ecevit had some reservations regarding the security of the cantons, but was ready to accept that] and, at the same time, may re-assure those who may be concerned about the possibility that local autonomy (…) might lead to partition. (…) We lay claim to about one third of the island for Turkish-Cypriot administration zones, yet the zone that we should immediately define and take over for Turkish-Cypriot administration (which should, of course, entail the immediate evacuation of the Greek military forces there) would only amount to about 17 percent of the total area of Cyprus. (…) [Additionally the Turks proposed five cantons in Lefka, Polis, Paphos, Larnaca, Karpasia.] These are all regions in which there are large concentrations of Turkish people. All together they amount to 2977 square

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kilometres, and to 32.5 percent of the whole island. The exact demarcations and areas of the cantons proposed should be negotiable within reasonable bounds. We would not be too rigid. (…) We can only afford allowing such time [for an expert study on demarcations] if we are assured from the beginning that the Turkish administration on Cyprus is to take immediate control of the basic zone comprising of Kyrenia-Nicosia-Chatos and part of Famagusta. This is essential for our sense of security and for feeling confident that we may reach a fair solution for the whole island in due time. 38

Kissinger answered via an oral message: The Prime Minister’s willingness to consider possible alternative approaches to the territorial arrangements seems to me to offer the possibility for negotiation by the parties concerned. It is for this reason that the Prime Minister might wish to explore the ideas informally at Geneva to obtain the reaction of other parties. The ideas should, of course, be put forward as Turkish proposals. Once the reactions of the other parties are obtained, perhaps we then can be helpful. 39

In other words, while the cantonal idea clearly came from Kissinger, he preferred to remain in the background. However this did not go the way Kissinger planned. Güneş told Ecevit in the morning of 12 August that the British and the Greeks had already indicated that there was an ‘American plan.’ Ecevit told Güneş that while there were certain essentials the Turks must achieve, every effort should be made to avoid humiliation for others. He instructed him to emphasize Turkey’s flexibility in ‘staging’ a solution in the most palatable manner possible. Güneş said that the Greeks realised that Turkey’s basic requirements were unavoidable but could not ‘bring themselves to say it.’ Ecevit told Macomber about the conversation and expressed his hope that the US would ‘find a means to get the negotiations more usefully underway.’ He added that he was glad to tell Macomber that the British stance was ‘much softer.’ 40 Callaghan first heard about the cantonal proposal in the morning of 11 August through the Turkish Ambassador to the UN, Kirça, who told him that the Turkish Council of Ministers were meeting to consider the ‘United States suggestions of alternative solutions for Cyprus.’ 41 Furious, Callaghan called Washington where he could only reach the US State Department's Under-Secretary, Joseph Sisco, who told him that Kissinger had tried to call him but while the call was going through he had been called to the White House. Sisco explained that Kissinger had been led to believe that Callaghan was concerned about the possibility of the

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Turkish Army moving forward on 11 August. This could have been a result of confusion in American minds arising from the previous night’s reports from Athens. Kissinger had sent a strong message to Ecevit, who had ‘agreed to hold off.’ Kissinger also understood that Callaghan was apprehensive about United States proposals to the Turks. ‘There had been no United States proposals, though the Americans had asked the Turks whether they were considering the possibility of cantonal rather than a geographically separate solution.’ Sisco emphasised that any proposal should be framed by the British and United States Governments together. Still angry, Callaghan said that he accepted Sisco’s reassurances but said he would have liked to have been better informed about American conversations with the Turks. ‘He was not prepared to be a dummy in the middle.’ However, he stated that he would be ‘happy to continue to work with Dr. Kissinger through Mr. Hartman.’ Callaghan then asked for a definite answer on whether the US Government was prepared to act in concert with the British plan in the event of Turkish forces moving forward. Sisco did not offer an opinion but promised a reply. 42 The reply came the following morning when Hartman told British officials about the cantonal proposal that Turkey would put forward the same day. Hartman said that Kissinger had instructed him to say that ‘the United States Government supported British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means; that they had told the Turks that they could expect no support in the Security Council from the United States if they made a military move; indeed, that if they made such a move the United States would mount a major diplomatic effort, with the United Kingdom, to halt them. But the United States could not themselves consider taking military action, particularly so soon after the inauguration of President Ford, nor did they consider that the threats of military action were helpful or appropriate in these circumstances. The United States Government considered that talk of military action distracted concentration from the political options.’ 43 Callaghan was clearly not enthusiastic about the cantonal idea. However, during a conversation he had with Güneş in the late afternoon of 11 August he suggested that it could pave the way to a solution. He told the Turkish Foreign Minister that a cantonal model might satisfy the Turkish Cypriots’ quest for security without involving the betrayal of the Greek Cypriots. At the same time, he cautioned that it would take some time to get the Greek Cypriots to swallow it. 44 In reality though, Callaghan did not believe that the cantonal idea would result in a lasting solution. Hence he saw no merits in promoting or even evaluating the cantonal model further. Therefore, he began a different initiative by proposing that the Conference should end without a formal statement by the Guarantor Powers. Instead, Clerides and

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Denktaş should announce that they had agreed that a fundamental revision of the system of government of the Republic of Cyprus was necessary to ensure conditions in which Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities could live together in peace. In order to do so, both would hold discussions in Nicosia and inform the representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom on the details of changes to the Constitution agreed by them at a conference to be held in three weeks’ time. 45 Callaghan hoped that such a statement would prevent the breakdown of the Conference. At first, he got positive responses to his initiative by Güneş and Mavros, who agreed as long as the Cypriots had no objections. 46 Both Denktaş and Clerides agreed in principle, but were not entirely happy with the British Draft Declaration. Clerides said that ‘although he would not exclude some new arrangements, even a cantonal solution, at the moment he was not in a position to declare so publicly.’ 47 Denktaş said that ‘he had been depressed after learning from Mr. Günes that Mr. Günes was prepared to accept a cantonal solution. His people were destitute: their flocks, their grapes and their grain had been taken away from them. He needed to make arangements for 60,000 people to be fed rather than to spend his time on arrangements about the text of a joint statement.’ 48 Denktaş then presented an alternative draft in which he stated that the constitutional revision should result ‘in the establishment of a federal system of Government based on the following fundamental elements: a) The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent bi-national state. b) The Republic shall be composed of two federated States with full control and autonomy within their respective geographical boundaries. c) In determining the competence to be left to the Federal Government, the bi-national nature of the State shall be taken into account and the Federal competence shall be exercised accordingly. d) The area of the Turkish-Cypriot Federate State shall cover 34 per cent of the territory of the Republic falling north of a general line starting from the Limnitis-Lefka area in the west and running onwards towards the east, passing through the Turkish controlled part of Nicosia, including the Turkish part of Famagusta and ending at the port of Famagusta.’ Finally, Denktaş demanded the participation of Greek and Turkish representatives during the talks. 49 However, when Callaghan called Clerides and Denktaş to discuss the new draft the Greek-Cypriot leader’s reaction was negative. Clerides said that there was no question of any Greek Cypriot being able to agree to such a draft ‘in 15 days or even 15 years.’ The geographical limits were inconceivable. Denktaş commented that the details were ‘completely

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negotiable’; it was the principle that mattered. Clerides said that he had told Denktaş that he was prepared to consider an autonomous Turkish-Cypriot community with groupings of villages where possible. Denktaş said that this would not offer adequate security. Callaghan said that was in favour of some measure of geographical separation and asked whether this principle was wholly unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. Clerides said that he could not accept the principle of two separate states federated at the top. He could however contemplate a system in which villages were grouped together under different communal administrations. Callaghan said that he agreed that the Turkish Cypriots needed to be given a greater sense of security. This would include some geographical separation but need not imply a single line. 50 The British approach appeared to be doomed. Instead, the cantonal idea again came to the table when Callaghan informed Güneş about Clerides’ reaction to Denktaş’ proposal in the early evening of 12 August. There was no prospect of Clerides saying even privately, and certainly not publicly, that he could agree to it. Instead of pushing for a single geographical zone, Callaghan suggested that he himself would now be prepared to advocate a cantonal solution. Güneş said that he had taken up ‘Callaghan’s idea’ of cantons, ‘which he knew was shared in other milieux.’ He put forward a new Turkish proposal endorsed by the Council of Ministers for a cantonal solution. 51 It divided the island into two main regions for the communities and five additional cantons for the Turkish-Cypriot community. While the borders of the main regions should be agreed at the conference, the boundaries of the cantons would be negotiable. Güneş said that he wanted the Conference to take a decision on the principles of the proposal on the same evening. ‘If the Conference could not agree it was better to leave the problem as it was.’ Callaghan thanked Güneş for what he called ‘a serious attempt to solve the problem’ but said that it would be impossible for Clerides to accept it the same night. If he did so, he would be overthrown on his return. Güneş said he himself would be overthrown if the issue was not solved that evening. There was a need for a ‘surgical operation’ that would prove to be of ‘benefit to all.’ He said that ‘at certain times in political life certain things had to be done. (…) Mr. Clerides must have been aware of the risk he was running.’ Callaghan noted that the proposal did not deal with the functions of an administration. Güneş said that even though the details needed to be worked out by the Central Government, he thought that there should be a federal legislature for the whole state, federal foreign policy, a central Defence Ministry, a national currency, a national roads’ system, national postal and telephone communications, and a federal police force, as well as communal police forces. Answering a question by Callaghan, he did not exclude the possibility that the Greek and Turkish

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contingents permanently stationed in Cyprus under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance could be abolished. During this conversation Güneş handed Callaghan a map of Cyprus on which the geographical effect of his draft had been illustrated by rough lines in blue pencil. 52

FCO 9/1907 Map including proposed Turkish-Cypriot cantons handed by Güneş to Callaghan 12 August 1974.

That Callaghan had no intention of promoting the cantonal idea, as he had claimed to Güneş, became clear as he talked an hour later to Clerides. Callaghan told him that the talks had reached a critical point. It was now a question of tactics. If the talks were to break down it would be better for Clerides that the Turks should walk out and Clerides appear to be ready to agree to ‘reasonable proposals.’ In order to secure that, Callaghan urged Clerides to produce his own proposals. There had been British, Turkish, Turkish-Cypriot, and Greek proposals; the Greek proposals had been as extreme as the Turkish ones, and would not do. He advised Clerides that he should use some of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot language, such as the need for ‘a fundamental revision of the constitutional structure’ (Denktaş’ paper) and the possibility of establishing a bi-communal state. He might refer to the need to ensure the security of both communities and he should decide whether to incorporate references to the extent of the autonomy. The drafting of Clerides’ paper could then be used to ask the Turks for more time. 53 After that Callaghan saw Denktaş again, who told him that he had not read Güneş’ proposals. Callaghan translated them for him. Denktaş’ reaction was that the Turkish community could not insist on anything that

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the Turkish Government would not back. Anyway, he would prefer a single-zone solution. He was not happy about the new Turkish proposals and would certainly be criticised in Cyprus for going along with them. He recognised that he had no alternative. He hoped a cantonal solution might offer a diplomatic way out of the impasse. He would not, therefore, table his own proposals in competition with those of Ankara. Callaghan commented that Denktaş’ reaction was enlightened. But the Turkish Government’s proposal for a cantonal solution entailed an obvious risk of bloodshed. Whatever the merits of the proposals, Greek and Greek-Cypriot opinion had to be prepared. Both governments were under pressure. 54 What emerges from this conversation is that Callaghan favoured a clear separation of the two communities rather than a fractioned island where both communities would have numerous possibilities to clash, as had happened from 1963. Meanwhile in Ankara Ecevit pleased Macomber with remarks that he was deeply grateful for the candour that had characterised US-Government dealings from the very start of the crisis. He noted the striking contrast between his Government’s satisfaction with US-Government dealings during this period and their ‘acute dissatisfaction’ with the UK’s attitude and performance. He referred to the unacceptability of UK threats. The UK was ‘acting as if it now was 50 years ago’ and spoke ‘of his contempt for the UK’s seeking to make its threatening moves behind a UN umbrella.’ 55 Kissinger celebrated his ‘successful’ cantonal idea and his perceived leadership in dealings with the Turks in a meeting with Ford. He said that the Turks have accepted that they will settle for general commitment rather than specifics, but the total is sizeable. They will put it in Geneva as their proposal but maybe Callaghan should. He is trying to hit a home run and take sides. I learned to stay out and let all the parties jockey. A Turkish military intervention becomes less likely as time goes on and we are dragging things out. (…) The longer Callaghan is tough, the better our position with the Turks becomes. The Turks have already favorably compared the US with the UK. This is interesting because we have been cutting back Turkey’s options. 56

Kissinger clearly believed that everything at Geneva was heading towards the cantonal solution. However, there was not much time left for a negotiated solution. Denktaş told Callaghan in the evening of 12 August that Güneş was under instructions from Ecevit to ‘finish the talks here tonight.’ Denktaş had described the Turks as ‘mad’ and as quite prepared to fight their way

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through UNFICYP. Callaghan reported that ‘the implication was that they might be thinking of attacking at dawn.’ 57 Callaghan immediately rushed to see Güneş (2240 hrs). He informed him of Clerides’ intention to table his own proposal. Güneş said he considered the Conference at an end and could not receive further proposals. He wanted to know if Mavros and Clerides could accept the essentials of the Turkish plan or not. The essentials were: (a) That the main region in the North should be accepted along the lines set out on the map left earlier in the evening with Mr. Callaghan. (b) That this area should be evacuated by Greek forces and occupied by Turkish forces within 48 hours and turned over to autonomous Administration at the same time. (c) That the five other Turkish districts should be instituted.

Güneş was, however, prepared to grant Mavros and Clerides further time for reflection and agreed to a meeting the following morning. 58 Thus some time was won and Callaghan decided to call Kissinger. Kissinger told him that he had spoken again to Ecevit who had agreed that the meeting should be resumed the following day. Ecevit realised that the Greek Cypriots would want to table a counter proposal before the end of the day. According to Kissinger, Ecevit was giving a further assurance about the northern zone. If the Greek National Guard were willing to withdraw from the Turkish line, the Turks would not advance into the space thus created. Kissinger mentioned a withdrawal of 20 kilometres as being the sort of thing Ecevit had in mind. He said that he liked the idea put to him earlier in the evening by Clerides that Callaghan should visit Ankara if this seemed necessary to keep the talks going. Callaghan said he would consider this further. 59 This appeared to be the last chance to hold back the Turkish army. Unfortunately, it was lost. According to Birand, Callaghan did not ‘consider’ this any further. Following Kissinger’s telephone conversation with Ecevit, Kissinger had a round of talks with all concerned. During which he explained to each of them the advantages which the Greeks, and especially the Greek Cypriots, would derive from acceptance of the Turkish proposals. But his day-long efforts to secure acceptance got no support from Callaghan who, on the plea of wishing to remain neutral, hoped to exert pressure on Turkey to abandon a further operation. According to the Americans, it was this unwillingness that eventually led to the second Turkish operation. 60

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Clerides handed a counter proposal to Callaghan in the morning of 13 August, but this did not meet the Foreign Secretary’s expectations. In fact, it contained nothing that might have satisfied the Turkish side. Clerides claimed that it provided for autonomous communal Administrations, but not for separate geographical zones or population movements. However, there was no reference to ‘autonomous communal Administrations’ in his proposal. It read: The parties agreed that the re-establishment of constitutional legitimacy in the Republic was a matter of utmost urgency and that it could be achieved only through the active cooperation and free consent of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities living on the territory of the Republic. The parties also agreed that the creation through appropriate constitutional provisions of an enhanced feeling of security for both communities was essential. In view of these considerations the three Foreign Ministers asked Messrs. Clerides and Denktash to examine the problem urgently and to put forward suitable proposals for the restoration of Constitutional Government in the Republic of Cyprus not later than… 61

Realising that this would not be enough to save the Conference, Callaghan explained to Clerides the seriousness of the situation. He said that the time had come for Mr. Clerides to face his situation realistically and to offer more. The fact was that Dr. Kissinger was not prepared to put military pressure on the Turks. UNFICYP were ready to withdraw. There was no prospect of a determined joint stand by Britain, the United Nations and the United States of the kind which Mr. Callaghan had sought. The only alternative to war was diplomatic concession. He hoped that, if Mr. Günes tabled his proposals, Mr. Mavros and Mr. Clerides would receive them quietly and not offer a pretext for the Turks to walk out. But it would also be necessary for Mr. Clerides to accept the principle of a Turkish geographical zone. He was coming to the personal view that the least dangerous solution was to allow the Turks to concentrate in a single zone within a Federal State.

Clerides said that neither he nor Archbishop Makarios could accept federation on a geographical basis. The proposed Turkish zone would contain a Greek-Cypriot majority or would require the movement of about 90,000 Greek Cypriots to the south. It also represented ‘millions of pounds worth of investment and tourism potential.’ Mavros, who had joined the conversation later, called the Güneş proposals ‘worse than the Denktaş plan’, since they involved a Turkish area of 18–19 per cent in the north and 15 per cent elsewhere. Callaghan made clear that the Turks would not allow

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much more time for reflection and said that ‘in a situation where the choice was war or drastic surgery, it would be advisable for the Greek Cypriots to look at all the options, including those involving large transfers of population. Several of the basic principles were agreed, the existence of two autonomous Administrations, the need for constitutional revision, the creation of a federal system which accorded with the bi-communal character of the Island.’ He urged them to consider ‘very seriously the possibility of setting up two autonomous Administrations in appropriately defined geographical areas.’ Clerides commented that ‘if his people accepted such a framework, it would be conditional on all Turkish forces withdrawing from Cyprus.’ Mavros said that if the Turkish Government did not allow a 36-hours recess, then ‘the Conference would break up forthwith.’ 62 At midday on 13 August Sir Horace Phillips warned of growing Turkish truculence. He said ‘There is growing jingoism here which will assure full popular support for the Government if it decides that Geneva has failed and only further military operations can secure Turkish interests. As the Turks see it, it is not part of the UN role to oppose such operations. (On the airport, Turkey has already given assurance that UK user rights will be respected). Any attempt to oppose will be met with superior Turkish force. If this brings Turks into conflict with British playing a leading role with UNFICYP so much the better, for (to Turkish thinking) the British have shown quite clearly that they side with the Greeks, and are only to ready to try to put the pressure on Turkey by building up British Forces in Cyprus and misusing the SBA’s for this purpose. That Britain would be acting simply as a contributor to UNFICYP would be derided here. Turkey does not yield to threats!’ However, despite these warning signs from Ankara, in an atmosphere of last minute desperation in Geneva Callaghan again took up the question of UNFICYP reinforcement and the use of Phantoms, and he argued for a tougher line. Explaining that until UNFICYP was deployed around the Turkish-controlled area, it could not even be regarded as a deterrent, Callaghan said he saw the need for Waldheim to take two immediate preparatory steps. First, he should order the necessary redeployment on his own initiative leaving only token elements to protect the Turkish enclaves and installing the bulk of the force in a de facto security zone. He reasoned that this could be claimed to be no more than an extension of the light patrolling already undertaken by UNFICYP along the demarcation lines, and he suggested that this could be done all the more convincingly if the National Guard could be persuaded to withdraw in order to create a de facto security zone. Second, Waldheim should prepare a statement to justify his instructions to UNFICYP in case he was asked to do so by the Security

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Council. Callaghan also suggested that Waldheim might wish to resurrect the idea of commissioning RAF aerial reconnaissance to assist in determining Turkish intentions, while ostensibly acting in a UN peacekeeping role as observers of the ceasefire. He also challenged the idea that UNFICYP, or indeed the UK Phantoms, should not effectually resist a Turkish attack on the airport. As he said ‘We agree that a major reinforcement of UNFICYP would need prior notification to members of the Council, but we would still be able bilaterally to threaten the use of the RAF in defence of our contingent if attacked, as during the last airport crisis.’ 63 As a last diplomatic resort, Callaghan presented Mavros and Clerides with a third British draft of a statement to be issued by Clerides and Denktaş envisaging a geographical federation. Since neither Clerides nor Mavros was prepared to commit himself at that point he did not proceed to propose it to the Turks. 64 Instead, he tried to convince Denktaş and Güneş to allow Clerides and Mavros a recess in order to discuss the Turkish proposal with their governments. He proposed a recess until the next evening in order to give Clerides and Mavros enough time to work out with their colleagues a clear answer to Güneş’ proposals. Güneş declined that and said that the time limit for consideration expired at 2200 hrs. Ecevit had said that the problem must be settled that night. Before Clerides left he should agree both on a geographical zone and to its demarcation in the next two days. Callaghan replied that Clerides could not return to Nicosia having committed himself to such an extreme concession. Güneş said that in that case he could not proceed with the Conference. Callaghan replied that the responsibility for a breakdown would be seen to rest with Turkey, ‘for refusing to allow two days for reflection on such fundamental principles.’ He claimed that he had succeeded in moving Clerides away from the draft that had been presented to Denktaş at 1000 hrs. 65 But, without the backing of his colleagues, Clerides’ signature would not be worth the paper it was written on. Güneş said that if Mavros and Clerides returned ‘with no more than an agreement on the principle of a geographical zone, we would be no further forward.’ He needed an early decision on the practical details of a geographical zone. He feared that Clerides would, on his return, make other proposals – for example,the reduction of the Turkish Army in Cyprus. Callaghan said that indeed was the next thing to be discussed after a geographical zone had been agreed on. Güneş said that the Turkish Government, inspired by Denktaş, wanted a solution based on a division of the island into two zones. He was not insisting on 34 per cent of the land, but could not accept discussion on the basis of 18 per cent.

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Callaghan said that he would return to London with the intention of returning the following evening for (a) discussion à cinq on a geographical principle, in the light of replies from Athens and Nicosia, and (b) an effort to delineate the Turkish zone. It was unreasonable to ask Clerides to commit himself in advance. Clerides was engaged in a delicate exercise to persuade his colleagues; it was important not to undermine his position in advance. This would only strengthen Archbishop Makarios’ capacity for mischief. Güneş said that Clerides would not be able to convince Archbishop Makarios. Callaghan replied that, with agreement in Nicosia and Athens, Clerides could begin to out-flank Archbishop Makarios. Güneş commented that, in his assessment, Clerides was merely playing for time. Callaghan asked Güneş to accept his judgement that Clerides would go to Nicosia with the intention of moving his colleagues. In any case,Turkey, ‘with 35,000 men on the Island, would lose nothing by waiting for 36 hours.’ Güneş agreed to put the idea to Ecevit; but he thought that ‘the reaction would be negative.’ 66 Deeply frustrated, Callaghan again called Kissinger. He told him that he had been working hard to alter the Greek position but it was essential that Kissinger speak to Ecevit again. He had persuaded Mavros and Clerides to consult their colleagues in Athens and Nicosia on the proposal that there should be one zone only of Turkish-Cypriot Administration and one of Greek-Cypriot Administration. They would return to Geneva the next evening with the results of their consultations. It was Callaghan’s impression that they would recommend such a solution to their problems. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister who had treated Callaghan in an ‘unforgivable way’, had refused to give them the opportunity to do this unless Clerides was willing to state in advance of his departure that he accepted the principle of a single geographical zone. This was ‘intolerable behaviour.’ The Greeks, after all, needed time to discuss this proposal with Archbishop Makarios and secure his acquiescence. Güneş had said that he would put Callaghan’s proposal to his Prime Minister with a negative recommendation. Kissinger was surprised by Callaghan’s optimism regarding a positive Greek response to a geographic federation and asked him if Mavros and Clerides would really try to convince their colleagues. Callaghan said that this was hardly possible to say. But, in his judgement, they would advocate a single Turkish-Cypriot administrative zone and they would return with a positive decision; but it would be for a Turkish-Cypriot zone comprising less than 34 per cent of the territory of the Republic, which was what the Turkish side was at present demanding. He hoped that Kissinger would be willing to press Ecevit to give them time to secure this. Kissinger replied

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that he agreed it would be intolerable for the Turks to maintain a deadline of this kind, and he would press Ecevit to lift it. 67 Actually, the view Callaghan had presented to Kissinger that the Greeks would consider a geographic federation was not supported by his own talks with them. Clerides had clearly ruled this out. Rather, both politicians had opted to go for consultations so that they could put the blame for the breakdown on the Turks. As Clerides had said earlier, a solution based on the Turkish demands could not have been accepted by any Greek Cypriot ‘in 15 days or even 15 years.’ Thus the Conference would probably have failed even if the Turks had agreed to a recess.

‘There is no American reason why the Turks should not have onethird of Cyprus’ – Final US Efforts to Save the Conference In a final desperate effort to save his cantonal proposal and prevent the breakdown of the Conference, Kissinger wrote in the morning of 13 August to Karamanlis, urging him to ‘approach negotiations on such key issues as constitutional arrangements in a flexible manner.’ Only through consensus could a settlement emerge that the US Government could support. He stressed that while such a settlement ‘must be perceived by all concerned as protecting their legitimate interests’, there were ‘new realities in [the] Cyprus situation produced in part by the previous Greek Government.’ 68 Karamanlis reacted strongly to Kissinger’s message and told Tasca that ‘the US was perfectly aware that GOG had been as reasonable and flexible as they possibly could be.’ He added emphatically that the key to peace or war was in Ankara. The US could act effectively if they wished to make the Turks understand that they must be reasonable. A reasonable Greek position had only induced the Turks to ‘raise the anti.’ Karamanlis said he knew Turks and Turkish psychology. The Turks felt they had won and instead of becoming more reasonable, they were asking for more. The previous morning, contrary to the advice of Mavros and his delegation, he had authorised concessions on enclaves, exchange of prisoners, and food for isolated Turkish communities. The Turkish response was an ultimatum that the Greeks should accept Turkish terms. Continuation of Turkish pressure would force Karamanlis to resign, with resulting chaos in Greece, or go to war. The US would be primarily responsible because it had failed to take measures beyond words, which clearly had not impressed the Turks. Karamanlis chided the British for inaction when they had the material means on the island to stop the Turks. He indicated that he was contemplating sending troops to Cyprus. He said that he expected the US to supply Sixth Fleet protection to enable Greece to exercise its legal rights. He said he has been criticised by his colleagues for having publicly rejected Soviet ‘assistance.’ Some of them felt that the

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USSR was sincere in wishing to help the Greek and Cypriot Governments and that the Soviets could find it in their interest to do so. If war occurred the US would have to intervene more drastically. Referring to Johnson’s intervention in 1964, he asked, ‘Why not intervene with the Turks more drastically now?’ 69 While public and political opinion in Athens was clearly turning against the US, the American Ambassador in Ankara reported a quite different picture of the Turkish political scene: In recent years (…) Turkish press has almost always been hostile, and almost all of Turkey’s problems have in one way or another been blamed on us. In recent days, however, this has changed notably. America, and specifically Secretary Kissinger and American Embassy, have had excellent press. We are portrayed as true friend of Turkey which is trying to find a way to be helpful in a situation which for us extremely difficult and complex. (…) Turkish military forces are in position to renew hostilities immediately, with no further preparations required. Turks are deeply angered, but also concerned, by British military moves with respect to Cyprus situation. (…) Turks clearly regard British military steps as a challenge and as a threat, and the use of Gurkha ‘mercenaries’ is considered here particularly insulting. To back down in face of this type of move is contrary to Turkish instincts. The worst way to deal with Turks is publicly threaten them. For Geneva Turks were prepared to go a distance – but a limited distance to avoid humiliation of the Greeks. They were clearly thinking in terms of cosmetics and presentation, rather than substance. (…) As the break-up process starts, however, it will be Turkish hope that this will prompt ‘a show of reality’ on the part of others which will, at the eleventh hour, save the negotiations. Macomber stated that no one could definitely say if Turkey would go to the brink of renewing hostilities. In the end this would be a decision made by Ecevit, greatly influenced by Bancar (Sancar?) – And if it’s a very close decision, much influenced, too, by President Koroturk’s views. Ecevit in this situation remains unpredictable. A fault I have detected in him (and here I am not (…) referring only to the poppy decision) is that he is a strong-willed man, but one who has a tendency in the end to pursue, in a strong-willed way, the path of least resistance. He tends to do this to satisfy immediate pressures at the risk of long-term consequences which he hopes can be worked out, one way or the other, later on. However, from the day this crisis began to the present moment I have seen this highly intelligent and self-assured leader go through an extraordinary and almost hourly learning process. He has abdicated to no one in this crisis, but has obviously learned from each key phase and each key phase conversation. There is no question that he is a ‘fast learner.’ We have on the scene now a far more mature leader

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that the one we began with on July 15. While Ecevit does not particularly care for public references to his past role as a student of the Secretary, he has in fact been an adept student of the Secretary’s throughout this crisis. Each time I have dealt with him, and his respect for the Secretary (which was considerable to begin with) has grown markedly as the crisis has progressed. In the end, of course, if military escalation is being seriously considered here, I cannot be certain which way he will jump. But American influence – and specifically that of the Secretary – is very considerable. This represents our key resource if Turkey should seriously approach such a decision. 70

The US Government had a choice between enjoying the positive attitude achieved in Turkey or antagonising it at a time when relations with Greece were already at an all-time low. Kissinger decided to go for the strategically more important partner. In a conversation with Ford and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, he answered the President’s question on what to do if the Turks moved in the following terms: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. (…) For a few years ago, the Turkish tactics are right – grab and we have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi. We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it. If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey – that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have onethird of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm. 71

The United States would do nothing to stop the Turks, apart from diplomatic appeals, which had previously proved futile. Athens now tried to put more pressure on Kissinger by threatening the possibility of war. Defence Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Averof told Tasca (1300 hrs local time) that ‘after last Turkish proposal at Geneva and complete intransigence of Turkish in many areas’ ‘we are lead to clash.’ Tasca asked if he was speaking of armed clash and Averoff replied ‘Yes.’ 72 Tasca urged Kissinger to make a quick trip to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia to save the situation. ‘The timing of such a personal intervention (…) so soon after the assumption of office of President Ford would underscore urgency with which we view the deterioration of NATO’s eastern flank.

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Letters and telephone calls will no longer do the trick. This is the time for a move that is bolder and more reassuring.’ 73 This advice of Tasca’s on policymaking sealed his own fate as Ambassador. Kissinger did not believe that Greece would go to war. Thus the American position remained unchanged. Nevertheless, Kissinger tried to keep the talks going and asked the Turks not to leave the negotiating table. The Turkish cabinet decided in the afternoon of 13 August to meet Kissinger’s request ‘as last act of good will and patience’ to send Güneş to the 1600 hrs (1800 hrs local time) meeting at Geneva to make a final effort to get agreement on Turkey’s basic zone. Ecevit told Macomber that ‘if this agreement could be reached Turkey could afford to wait many more than 36 hours.’ Macomber tried twice subsequently to persuade Ecevit that a 36hour adjournment would be in the Turkish interest (since they would not then open themselves to blame for the situation), but Ecevit told him that though he would try he could not give him any guarantee that he could succeed. He knew his ‘outer limits’, and he was ‘at them now.’ The military had become increasingly impatient with the six days of stalling at Geneva. Turkish military and civilian elements had not been divided until now, and he emphasised that he had considerable sympathy for the military’s concerns. 74

The Final Showdown The final meeting of the second Geneva Conference was a mere tactical adventure to decide who would be held to blame for the break-up, rather than a serious attempt on a negotiated settlement. During the mammoth session, which lasted from 1840 until 0225 hrs, 75 Güneş presented Mavros and Clerides with another proposal on a bi-zonal federation and insisted on a definite answer on the principle of either this or the cantonal solution. 76 Clerides kept demanding a 24-, Mavros a 36-hour recess, and Callaghan accused Güneş of being unreasonable – in short the Conference was running in circles. It is difficult to assess whether or not there was at this point any chance that the Turkish army could have been stopped at the last minute. Birand claimed that if Mavros and Clerides had accepted in principle but not on the details they might have got the recess they asked for. 77 But there was in fact nothing to suggest that Güneş would have settled for anything less than the acceptance of at least the boundaries of the main Turkish-Cypriot zone or the 20-kilometre withdrawal of the National Guard as brokered by Kissinger in his talks with Ecevit. In Ankara the decision had been made to go ahead with the military operation. Ecevit informed the Americans that the Cabinet had concluded ‘that they could have no confidence that after 36 hours an affirmative answer concerning basic Turkish region would be forthcoming from the Greeks or the Greek

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Cypriots. (…) The ministers had decided that the only acceptable course for Turkey was to refuse a 36-hours delay and to insist that the basic Turkish region be agreed’ that evening. 78 Responding to US pressure, Ecevit again agreed to consult the National Security Council. Macomber had told him that ‘Turkey, if it failed to agree to this 36-hour request, would receive a very costly and unnecessary black eye in world opinion.’ 79 As correct as Macomber’s prediction was, Turkey was ready to risk it. And the Council stood by its decision. Ecevit later (15 August) explained to Macomber the rationale for the Turkish unwillingness to acquiesce to the requested 36-hour adjournment. He said that he had concluded by 13 August that domestic political considerations would preclude either Mavros or Clerides being able to obtain a consensus among their political colleagues to accept the Turkish position. Nevertheless, Ecevit thought that ‘while it would have been difficult for them’, both Mavros and Clerides had sufficient standing in their own countries that they could have accepted Turkish conditions. While there would have been great grumblings at home, the personal prestige of each of those men would have allowed them to pull it off. Thus, Ecevit said, if these two leaders were not prepared then to stay at the table and agree to what Turkey was asking for, there was no way Turkey could achieve its objectives without renewed fighting. 80 At Geneva Callaghan’s objective had been to keep all the delegates talking until 4 a.m. (which would be first light in Cyprus) in the hope of preventing the Turks from taking precipitate military action. The talks made little progress and consisted largely of sterile exchanges and accusations. 81 Callaghan warned that ‘today the Island was prisoner of the [Turkish] army, [but] tomorrow the army would be the prisoner of the Island.’ In the event, no solution developed at the conference table and the record of the final meeting of the Conference ended as follows: ‘In response to questions by Mr. Callaghan, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Mavros said that they were prepared to return to Geneva on Thursday morning. Mr. Callaghan confirmed that he also was prepared to do so. Mr. Denktash said that he was bound to the Turkish Government; he would come if the Turkish Foreign Minister would do so. Mr. Günes said nothing. The Conference broke up at 2.25 a.m.’ 82 There is no doubt that having realised that they would not get a definite positive answer to their proposals at that time, the Turks wanted the Conference to break down. However, the real issue is whether a recess of 24 or 36 hours would have produced positive or flexible responses from the Greek and Greek-Cypriot quarters. During the Conference Mavros appeared to be quite flexible. But he would not have moved, if there had been no Greek-Cypriot consent. In an interview with Birand he claimed that there was no reason to move since the Turks would have taken action

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in any case. 83 Clerides took the same line in his memoirs, claiming that acceptance of the Turkish proposals would have entailed abandoning the Greek argument that the Turkish forces constituted an illegal occupation force. 84 Nevertheless, it is highly questionable whether Clerides could have secured Makarios’ consent. It is obvious that without this consent there would have been no chance of getting the decision accepted in the GreekCypriot Council of Ministers. Given Makarios’ lack of flexibility on previous occasions (i.e., during the intercommunal talks) there is little to suggest that he would have been different in 1974. From the Turkish point of view there was no chance of a diplomatic solution that would come near to anything they desired. Consequently, they decided to move their army. Given the lack of American support for a decisive international military deterrence they felt that they had little to lose, even if it meant some bad international press. On the Greek and Greek-Cypriot side there appears to have been a disastrous miscalculation about the Turkish determination to carry out their plans even if this resulted in international condemnation and isolation. While it is quite understandable that the cantonal solution would have resulted in hardships for the Greek-Cypriot population, clearly it would have been preferable to the partition that was then brought about by military means. Makarios’ statement that a Turkish invasion of the whole island would be preferable to a bad solution highlights a dangerous element of fatalism in Greek-Cypriot political thinking at that time.

16 Stopping the Turks? Final Debates on British/UNFICYP Military Intervention and a Greek Convoy

A meeting held on the afternoon of 14 August at 10 Downing Street by the British Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of State for Defence, Roy Mason, and the Acting Chief of Defence Staff closed the intervention debate as far as the United Kingdom was concerned. Callaghan said that he saw no prospect of a diplomatic solution at present. The Greeks would not be prepared to negotiate in the present situation and the Turks were going for a military solution to the problem. He thought that there was no possibility of stopping the Turks from achieving their military objectives; but once they had done so, then their problems of policing and administering the area would start. The Americans were clearly worried but were not going to take any military action, or give any military aid, to either side. Britain should not act militarily without the US, and it was UNFICYP’s policy at present to move out of the way. It was his view that the Turks would leave the SBAs alone, and the Turks would not make trouble for Britain. Therefore, there was very little to be done at present. The Minister of State for Defence, Roy Mason, said that his Department had identified two problems. The first was that the road to Famagusta, which the Turks were believed to be hoping to use, passed through the SBA near Ayios Nikolaos. The second problem was that a unit of British forces with UNFICYP was near Nicosia Airport. However, there were

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grounds for thinking that the Turks would not try to capture the airport, though they might seek to bomb the runway. Wilson said that Britain should concentrate on the diplomatic initiative in the UN, and work with its EEC and NATO partners. There was no purpose in thinking that British troops could or should take on the Turks. The UN had no capability to stop the Turks militarily. If the Secretary of State was asked whether Britain was considering a major military role the answer must be that she was not. The meeting ended with the decision that ‘HMG’s policy should be one of a long diplomatic haul and that we would continue to maintain a low-key military posture concentrating upon the security of our Sovereign Base Areas and our own nationals.’ 1 Any suggestions of interposing UN forces ahead of the Turkish advance had in any case been overtaken by events. From the outset, the Turks showed no inclination to attack or encircle Nicosia Airport and General Prem Chand’s request for air support was, therefore, held in abeyance while Turkish intentions were assessed. Waldheim had asked Callaghan about the possibility of providing British reinforcement to UNFICYP in order to permit the force to retain control of Nicosia Airport. On 15 August Callaghan informed the Secretary-General that it would not be feasible to attempt to hold Nicosia Airport in the face of a determined Turkish attack. He assured Waldheim that the Turks evidently feared the political odium that an attack on the airport would incur, and that, therefore, the present strength of UNFICYP at the airport was sufficient to hold it. In these circumstances there was no point in giving the force any additional support for this purpose. 2 British Forces were already committed to evacuating families and securing SBAs, and the use of British air support would be likely to lead to Turkish retaliation against the SBAs. Callaghan ruled out as well the idea of using UNFICYP to prevent further clashes if the Turkish forces called a halt. He pointed to the absence of a ceasefire agreement bearing Turkish and Greek-Cypriot signatures and stressed that UNFICYP would be in a more difficult position than during the period 22 July to 8 August. Furthermore, he stressed, while there undoubtedly was a risk of an incident around the new Turkish lines, there would surely be a greater risk of trouble around the Turkish enclaves, where the National Guard would feel stronger and more self-confident. Finally, if UNFICYP were to delineate the new Turkish positions, it would be more difficult to secure Turkish geographical concessions in later negotiations. To him, it seemed best to leave them undefined. 3 This effectively sealed the fate of the concept of British military intervention. Callaghan said an hour later, when commenting on likely Greek reactions to the British passivity, ‘I am sure they know the realities of the situation. We can give them only diplomatic

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help and assistance in negotiation about the future. Meantime we must assure them of our sympathy and understanding for their situation.’ 4 What would be the Greek reaction to a breakdown of the talks and the resumption of fighting in Cyprus? Would there be war with Turkey? The Greek Defence Minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, had, in a conversation with Hooper on 10 August (0815 local time), actually ruled out the possibility that Greece would start an attack on Turkey. He claimed that no Greek in a responsible position wanted war with Turkey, ‘if only because the disparity in forces was so great.’ But he thought that if war was forced on them, the Greek forces would at least give a good account of themselves, both on the mainland and if the Turks were to try to capture any of the islands adjacent to Turkey. If the Turks attempted the latter, the Greek forces – given the poor showing the Turks had made in the early stages of the invasion of Cyprus – would see them off. 5 The decision not to embark directly on a suicidal war with Turkey left the new democratic government under Constantinos Karamanlis in danger of being accused of abandoning the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, Karamanlis decided to make it absolutely clear who was to blame for the current situation, i.e., the previous government and the military extremists. The daily newspaper Vima reported on 10 August that Karamanlis, during a conversation with Clerides, had underlined the primary need for national reconciliation in Cyprus and said that the Greek Government would do everything to help in bringing it about. (…) He emphasised that the Government would do its full duty despite the appalling difficulties bequeathed by the reckless policy of its predecessors and the absurd reactions of those who were responsible for the present Cypriot tragedy. He said that extremists, both in Greece and Cyprus, should not forget that the present Government was confronted with faits accomplis. It took up office after the cease fire had been accepted. 6

But Karamanlis felt that at least something, short of an all-out war, had to be done in order to show Greek commitment to Cyprus. The British Military Attaché in Athens reported in the morning of 13 August that though the situation remained ‘brittle, secretive and obscure (…) the only viable military initiative remaining to the Greeks’ was ‘to reinforce Cyprus by amphibious forces and perhaps on a limited scale by air to Tymbou.’ This would be ‘a risky operation in face of Turkish air superiority but it [had] the merit of confining hostilities to Cyprus.’ He estimated that this operation would take at least 48 hours to mount plus passage time. Units were likely to embark from Crete, from where they could reach the western shores of Cyprus in 26 hours. The Attaché concluded that ‘As yet, there is

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no repeat no indication of embarkation but preliminary concentration of forces is probably completed.’ 7 Hooper, in Athens, described the Greek reaction to the resumption of hostilities as ‘calm.’ Public opinion was resigned to a direct confrontation with Turkey even if this involved physical sacrifices. Specialists released from their reserve commitment had been recalled and war contingency plans were in train. The courses open to Greece were: a) To advance eastwards across the Greek Turkish border into Turkish Thrace. However, Hooper stated that the border areas reported quiet that morning and all indications suggested that Greeks accepted the futility of this course. b) To seek to reinforce the National Guard in Cyprus. This option, he thought, might be linked with a demand for British naval and air support for Greek amphibious forces. c) To conduct a limited operation to secure the Turkish island of Imbros. In his evaluation a ‘desperate gamble but one which my US colleagues do not appear to rule out.’ 8 In the evening of 14 August Greece called on Britain to provide air cover for a naval convoy to reinforce the National Guard in Cyprus. Mavros called on Hooper (1730 hrs) to say that the Greek Government was apprehensive about a collapse of National Guard resistance and, in consequence of this, of Greek-Cypriot morale. This would lead in turn to further Turkish encroachments and to the Turks advancing even more exorbitant demands as a basis for a settlement. His Government had, therefore, been considering a proposal, which Mavros claimed to have mentioned to Callaghan in Geneva. A Greek division (approximately 10,000 men) was being concentrated in Crete, and would shortly be ready to move to Cyprus. Mavros was ‘somewhat vague’ about the modalities of the operation, but the proposal was that the division should be put ashore at Larnaca. How it would then be deployed would have to be decided on the spot by the National Guard commander; but Mavros emphasised that the object would be not to engage in active hostilities against the Turks but to ‘hold a demarcation line.’ This action would be taken in pursuance of Greece’s obligations as a Guarantor Power, though at a later stage he seemed to be suggesting that it could also be taken under UN auspices if the UN were prepared to agree to this. Mavros went on to say that the Greek Air Force would not be able to provide air cover for the convoy carrying the division beyond a certain limited range from Crete. Therefore, he asked whether Britain would be prepared to provide air cover for the convoy from Akrotiri after it had passed beyond the effective range of the Greek Air Force. Britain could, he said, take this action jointly with Greece (i.e., under the Treaty of Guarantee or possibly under UN auspices). 9 This

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was already the second request of this kind, as Mavros on 5 August had put the idea to Hooper to send Greek troops to Cyprus to hold the line of demarcation. The British Ambassador informed US Ambassador Tasca that Mavros had asked for British air cover. 10 Callaghan spoke to Kissinger on the telephone (2330 hrs) and asked whether he had received a request from the Greek Government to support their plans for a counter-attack in Cyprus. Kissinger said that he was unaware of these plans. He also said that they intended to invite Karamanlis to the United States for talks. 11 Lawrence Eagleburger called at 0200 hrs on 15 August to confirm that the Americans had received no request for support from the Greek Government. 12 This was actually not entirely true since Karamanlis had told Tasca on 13 August to inform Kissinger that he expected the US to supply Sixth Fleet protection to enable Greece to exercise its legal rights. 13 However, no formal request was made regarding the Greek convoy. The American evaluation of this was quite clear. The US State Department’s Wells Stabler informed Callaghan that Kissinger did not consider it likely that Callaghan would seriously consider the idea of British air cover for a Greek convoy, but would like the British to know that ‘he would be strongly against it.’ 14 Macomber was instructed to inform Ecevit that the US Government strongly discouraged the British from providing air cover for the transportation of a Greek division from Crete to Cyprus. Kissinger emphasised that it would greatly strengthen the US Government’s hand ‘if Ecevit would assure [it] that Turkish forces would not move south of the line described to [the US Government] earlier that week as the basic zone.’ 15 Callaghan told Hooper that he was unwilling to respond to the Greek request (about which he was not enthusiastic) before he knew the result of the American approach to the Turks, and Kissinger and he agreed with the Ambassador ‘that we should be slow in reacting in the hope that Turkish military intentions are limited to the Morphou/Nicosia/Famagusta line.’ Therefore, he hoped that Hooper could stall on an answer into the following day (16 August). 16 After Callaghan was convinced that Turkey would not advance further than the line Famagusta-Nicosia-Morphou, he decided to give a negative answer to the Greek request. He told Hooper that he had given Mavros no encouragement in Geneva to think that Britain would provide air cover for a Greek convoy. Waldheim had told Mavros that the UN would be unable to persuade the UK, USA, and USSR to give any guarantees against Turkish air attacks. Even in the changed situation, there could be no question of Britain providing air cover between Crete and Cyprus. Callaghan argued that the introduction of more Greek troops into the island would make war between Greece and Turkey inevitable – probably

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not only in the island but elsewhere as well. Mavros himself had told him that he was opposed to war because of the opportunities it would give for Russian meddling. It would aggravate the situation in the island by increasing Turkish fears of action against Turkish enclaves and, therefore, increasing the risk of tougher Turkish action against Greek enclaves within their control. Outside Cyprus there would be a serious danger of Turkish attacks in the Aegean. A larger Greek force inside Cyprus would be militarily vulnerable, hard to maintain, and difficult to get out. It would also increase the risk, which at present seemed minor, of double Enosis. The British assessment was that the Turkish forces would stop ‘quite soon’ after securing limited objectives. Any Greek force would arrive too late to prevent this. The force at present contemplated would be too small to drive the Turks back. Callaghan reported that when he had mentioned the idea of sending such a force to Makarios that morning, he said he saw no purpose in it. Therefore, the British Government would counsel the Greek Government most strongly against sending more troops to Cyprus at this stage. From this it followed that Britain would not be prepared to assist them in such an operation. 17 Callaghan informed Kissinger (1440 hrs) about his decision not to provide air cover for a possible Greek convoy from Crete to Cyprus. Kissinger again claimed that he had no similar request from the Greeks and that he agreed with Callaghan’s decision. 18 Finally, the Greek Government decided not to go ahead with the convoy. This did not go down well with the Hellenic Armed Forces. The British Defence Attaché reported that the Greek General Staff had assembled a composite division of 10,000 of their best troops drawn largely from Special Forces. This division might be intended to reinforce the Cyprus National Guard. He assumed the balance of this composite division to be in Crete. To embark the composite division and ship it to Cyprus would take several days, and the lack of activity in the Megara area over the previous three days suggested that there was no immediate intention of doing so. However, he cautioned, there was considerable pressure from services (so far successfully contained by the Minister of Defence) for some form of military action, and anti-American feeling was growing over what was regarded as ‘the unhelpful attitude of the US.’ 19 When the Turks had almost reached their operational targets, Greece considered again embarking on the convoy idea. Mavros told Hooper in the morning of 16 August that while Greece could not go to a conference under the present humiliating conditions, the Greek Government had decided to continue with concentrating the division in Crete. Though the final decision to move it had not yet been taken, they would be prepared to despatch it to Cyprus under cover of darkness without any air cover

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beyond what the Greek Air Force could provide. Hooper emphasised the extreme risks of such an operation. It was militarily extremely hazardous. It would destroy the international goodwill that Greece (with a good deal of British help) had been building up at Geneva and the UN. In terms of maintenance of world peace, the risks were incalculable. It seemed to be in flat contradiction to what the Prime Minister had said in his statement the previous night. It would put an end to the relationship of confidence and cooperation that had been established between Greece and Britain in Geneva. Hooper said that he ‘could find no words strong enough to urge the Greek Government not to embark on this venture. It could expect no support and no countenance’ from Britain. Hooper related that at one point in the conversation, Mavros had hinted that the Government now felt strong enough to take drastic action to establish full political control over the forces (i.e., to rid themselves once and for all of Ioannides and his supporters) and it was preparing to act within the next few days. It seemed possible that acquiescence in the Cyprus scheme (which Mavros himself was obviously uneasy about) was the price the Government had to pay for this. Equally, Hooper speculated, it might have been be ‘a ploy to put the squeeze on us and the Americans or a combination of the two.’ Therefore, Hooper urged Callaghan to appeal directly, and perhaps jointly with Kissinger, to Karamanlis in order to stop the convoy. 20 Callaghan decided not to take the matter lightly and initiated a direct message from Wilson to Karamanlis. In this, Wilson said, I have heard from Sir Robin Hooper that the possibility of sending a division by convoy to Cyprus is still under discussion in Athens. I do not of course know how seriously this idea is being considered. But I want to make clear to you my view that this would be a most unwise course, for the reasons given in your broadcast. (…) As I see it, the best way of bringing the Turkish Government to a more realistic frame of mind is to avoid any action likely to prolong the fighting; to continue to attract the support of international opinion; and to make clear that a Turkish Cypriot region within a Federal State of Cyprus can be legitimised only with the agreement of our two governments and of the Greek Cypriots. 21

Callaghan instructed Hooper to stress on deliverance of the note that one of his principal objectives now that the Turks had declared a ceasefire was ‘to secure an early and substantial reduction in the number of Turkish troops in the Republic.’ He intended to state publicly, and before any talks, that this was so. He was sure that Mavros shared the objective of getting foreign forces out of the Republic and hoped that he would agree that an increase in the number of Greek troops in the period immediately

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preceding any conference would diminish rather than increase the chances of achieving it. 22 Hooper was probably right that the Greeks were not really contemplating the idea of the convoy anymore but rather trying to put pressure on the American and British governments. As it became apparent that no strong western support was forthcoming, the convoy idea was not pursued by the Greek Government. The British Defence Attaché in Athens confirmed on 17 August that the Karamanlis broadcast appeared ‘to close the door to Greek military intervention in Cyprus and the proposal Mavros put to HMA may have been designed to put the squeeze on Britain and USA. (…) The amphibious squadron remains [at] anchor [in] Megara bay today and provided the ceasefire holds in Cyprus we consider this option [sending the convoy] increasingly unlikely.’ 23

17 War 14–16 August 1974

Following the breakdown of the Conference, hostilities resumed in Cyprus at 0500 hrs local time. Fighter bombers went into action east of Nicosia and firing broke out on the demarcation line. 1 Turkish aircraft attacked the National Guard HQ, Police HQ, and the radio station. 2 Aiken, Commander of the British Forces in Cyprus, ordered an immediate evacuation of the British service families into SBAs as Turkish military action had now begun. The British Joint Intelligence Service Near East (JISNE) reported that there were 20-plus aircraft moving down the Panhandle towards Nicosia and Famagusta Bay and the UN reported that there was small-arms fire taking place in the region of the golf course at Nicosia. At 4.35 a.m. GMT it became known that Istanbul and Ankara had just been closed to international air traffic. An hour later British Airways was informed that the entire Turkish Flight Information Region had been closed. A British intelligence situation report (SITREP) at 0625 BST held that the Turkish army was now moving on the ground. They were attacking south towards Omorphita (a suburb of Nicosia) towards Mia Milia (on the new Famagusta road near Nicosia); a number of tanks had been seen on the Morphou road, travelling east. 3 Turkish tanks were reported to be moving south-east from Mia Milia, just east of Nicosia, where there had also been artillery exchanges. Tank movement was also reported on the MorphouNicosia road towards Nicosia. Other tank movement had been observed in

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the northern Nicosia suburb of Omorphita, again moving southeast. 4 The Greek National Guard had moved into the UN married quarters on the perimeter of Nicosia airport; they had stated that they would defend their positions from there. All United Nations units were being withdrawn from the airfield. Initial air attacks had taken place at Athalassa. Since then there had been single aircraft attacks in the Nicosia area. A British Vulcan aircraft reported that there were some 14 ships at sea to the north of Cyprus and six to the south. At 0650 GMT the RAF Operations Centre telephoned the FCO’s Cyprus Emergency Unit to say that the Greek FIR had been closed. 5 In his statement regarding the resumption of hostilities in Cyprus Ecevit emphasised the threat under which the Turkish Cypriots were still living. He accused the Greek and Greek-Cypriot sides of delaying tactics and violations of the Geneva Declaration. He said that the Turkish objective was not to destroy the State of Cyprus but to bring stability, freedom, and durable peace to the island. He said that Turkey intended to establish a balanced society on Cyprus, which would enable the Turks and the Greeks to cooperate and prosper under equitable conditions: The Turkish Armed Forces have started fulfilling their duty in Cyprus this morning, when it became obvious that the Geneva Conference could not yield any positive results and that the Conference would be obstructed by the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriot administration from attaining the objectives set forth by the Security Council. (…) They continued treating many unarmed and defenceless members of the Turkish community as prisoners and hostages, whenever and wherever they had the power to do so, in open violation of the provisions of the Geneva Declaration, of international law and of human rights. Days after the Geneva Declaration was signed and after the second round of Geneva talks had started, they promised to let the Turks return to their villages, districts and houses which should be evacuated by the Greek National Guard. But after fulfilling this promise in a very limited degree in some localities, they declared yesterday, in defiance of the basic rules of humanity, that they were suspending the application of this promise and obligation and were not going to release the Turks they had been holding as hostages. The Greek Government, in a statement issued yesterday, described the Turkish forces stationed in Cyprus as ‘invaders’, in spite of the fact that these forces acted under the authority of a guarantor power. In complete disregard of the Geneva Declaration, the Greek Government requested their withdrawal as a primary condition. (…) Having reached the conclusion that there is no use but only harm in maintaining the appearance of continuing a conference that is intentionally obstructed and whose deliberations are unilaterally violated, Turkey has considered it her duty to fulfil by herself her prerogatives and duties as a

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guarantor power and her responsibilities concerning the independence of Cyprus as well as the rights and security of the Turkish Cypriot people. The action now undertaken by Turkey is at least as rightful and legal as the action she had started on July 20, as a guarantor power and strictly within the bounds of her authority as such a power, for the same conditions still exist today as on July 20, conditions that formed the basis of her action’s rightfulness and legality. (…) The objective of this operation is not to destroy the State of Cyprus but to contribute to the rebuilding on sounder bases of that State which was destroyed, and to ensure its territorial integrity. The objective of this operation is to bring peace, freedom and security to Cyprus. (…) When the objectives of this operation are attained, the Greeks as well as the Turks on the island will enjoy full security and durable peace. Our action is not against Greece or against the Greek Cypriot community. We intend to establish a balanced society on Cyprus which will enable the Turks and the Greeks to cooperate and prosper under equitable conditions. May God help the Turkish Armed Forces to succeed in their peaceful and humane mission. 6

Turkey sent an aide-memoire to the British Government that substantially reiterated Ecevit’s remarks. 7 Goodison, who did not met the Turkish Ambassador to receive the note, said that he was ‘glad not to have seen Menemencioglu myself. I should have been tempted to tell him what I thought of this revolting propaganda.’ 8 Olver reported from Cyprus that contrary to expectations, the Turkish forces did not appear yet to be making any determined drive either east or west of Nicosia. Six hours after the resumption of hostilities the Turks seemed to have little to show on the ground. Their slow progress was not the result of fierce National Guard resistance. No major battles were reported. With their overwhelming superiority in armour, and overall air control, he would have expected the Turks to be well on their way to Famagusta or Morphou by the time he reported (0945 hrs). 9 This was even more astonishing since the Turkish troops met with little Greek resistance. Clerides told US Ambassador Davies that he had asked the Greek Government to instruct Karamanlis to pull the National Guard behind the lines cited by Güneş at Geneva, using military force only in cases where it was necessary to permit orderly retirement. 10 Turkish advances were first reported in the early afternoon. They were moving at about three miles an hour only. John Aiken speculated that behind that was probably the ‘Turkish wish to avoid unnecessary casualties and damage to property.’ In his description ‘they wasted much time forming up for each stage of the advance in pedantic lines and each thrust was preceded by air attacks on villages lying along the main axis of advance.’ 11 The result of this advance was that the Greek civilian

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population on the route of the advance, no doubt spurred on by the fearful reports of earlier Turkish atrocities in the North, abandoned everything and fled en masse to the South. 12 Even large numbers of the population of the Karpass peninsula were able to flee before their access to the South was cut of. Apparently, this was the real reason behind the slow Turkish advance: the Turks thus saved themselves having to take responsibility for a large number of refugees. According to UNFICYP, in the early afternoon one column of approximately 20 Turkish tanks had passed Chatos and was moving southeast towards the old Famagusta road. A second column of tanks was on the old Famagusta road, almost level with the first one. A third column was following on the same road. Tanks supported by air strikes were attacking Yeralakkos to the north-west of the airport. Tanks and infantry were reported moving to the south of the airport, via the main road between Nicosia and the airport. 13 British and UNFICYP situation reports described the Turkish advance in the direction of Famagusta as consisting of three columns: a middle column had in the late afternoon reached a position short of Styllos; a northern column had occupied Lefkoniko, and; a southern column had turned north after passing Tymbou airfield. The Turkish advance on Yerolakkos and south of the airport had been halted by accurate National Guard artillery fire. 14 In addition to supporting the columns moving towards Famagusta Air strikes were made throughout the day at Yerolakoy Philia, Morphou, Coral Bay radio station, Qissouri radio, Goshi, Kato Lakatamia, Kythrea, Famagusta. At 1700B 15 two medium groups of warships were spotted 13 miles off Famagusta and later shelled Famagusta. 16 By the end of 14 August the Turkish forces were still 15 miles west of Famagusta and their advance was suspended for the night. 17 On 15 August UNFICYP and JISNE reported that the Turkish advance to the north-east had reached a point north of Boghaz. Some tanks were turning south to Boghaz itself; others moved into the Karpass. The central Turkish column remained stationary a few miles out of Famagusta town, while Famagusta itself had been subjected to air strikes. The southern Turkish column was near Lysi on the old Famagusta road. Fighting continued west of Nicosia in the area between the roundabout on the airport road and the village of Yeralakkos. The extent of the Turkish advance along the Myrtou road north-east of Yeralakkos was unknown. Olver reported that from the High Commission he could observe artillery and tank fire in the area east of the Nicosia-Morphou road. 18 Already early on 14 August Britain’s High Commissioner Olver had put to Clerides the idea of a separate ceasefire covering Nicosia. Roger Davies put the same idea to Washington; it was also welcomed by UNFICYP, which made unofficial but unsuccessful efforts to arrange a local ceasefire

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in the morning. Clerides welcomed this idea. 19 Finally, UNFICYP had succeeded in obtaining both parties’ agreement to a local ceasefire in the city starting at 1615Z. 20 This did not hold for long, however, and fighting continued throughout the next day. UNFICYP tried, once more unsuccessfully, to arrange a local ceasefire in the morning of 16 August. 21 The heavy fighting in the vicinity of the British High Commission finally forced Olver to move during the morning of the same day with some of his staff to his residence, while the rest went to Dhekelia, where the High Commission was established. 22 The following morning the Turkish forces broke out to the West toward the agriculturally important area around Morphou and resumed their advance on Famagusta, against which they then launched repeated air strikes. The Greek-Cypriot population of Famagusta started fleeing into the British Eastern SBA at Ayios Nikolaos. In the face of a mass exodus of the population of Famagusta into and through both Ayios Nikolaos and Dhekelia, orders for the ESBA (Dhekelia) were revised on 15 August. Large numbers of armed men, both individuals and formed units of the National Guard, fled in great disorder before the Turkish advance. Initially, in case Turkish forces might be tempted to pursue and attack them inside SBA territory, the first National Guard troops to arrive at the SBA were ‘politely turned away’ and told to go around the southern border of the ESBA, but this was resented, and later arrivals were freely admitted and escorted through the SBA. Some attempts were made to disarm them, but many were allowed through with their weapons unloaded and ‘as far as possible, out of sight.’ 23 The Turkish forces did not attempt to enter the SBAs in pursuit of the National Guard units. A British eyewitness report described the movements of the refugees on 15 August as follows: Throughout the early hours of the morning there was a stream of refugees passing through our check point en-route to seek sanctuary in the SBAs. They came on foot, in smart cars, on tractors and on mule drawn carts. Some managed to travel on busses and it was a daunting experience to see so many people with dazed and fearful expressions peering through the windows. There was also a steady flow of GNG soldiers coming out of the town and going into the Greek camp under a mile from Mercury Barracks, the Northern section of Ayios Nikolaos camp. Famagusta was emptying itself of all the Greek population. 24

Turkish forces advancing on Famagusta accidentally shelled the British base at Dhekelia. A Turkish helicopter marked the SBA boundary for the benefit of Turkish troops, and the shelling stopped. 25 Nevertheless, this event

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brought Britain and Turkey for the last time during the crisis to the brink of battle.

Confrontation at Ayios Nikolaos, 15 August 1974 – The Last Possible Anglo-Turkish Showdown or the ‘Trigger-Happy’ Commander On 13 August, the day before the talks broke down in Geneva, the Turkish Government protested to the FCO about British Military dispositions in Cyprus and in particular about the deployment of the Phantoms. The Turks complained that these preparations had been linked in the British press with some supposed need for anti-Turkish action and they assured HMG that there was no need for this. They said that there would be no danger to the SBAs from Turkish forces. Despite assurances from the Turks, a serious violation of the Eastern SBA occurred on 15 August, during the final stage of the Turkish advance on Famagusta. At 1426 hrs one of a group of seven Turkish tanks, which had approached within a few hundred yards of the north-western corner of Ayios Nikolaos, fired three shells into the SBA narrowly missing a British Ferret Scout car and a white van belonging to Thames TV. The Ferret hastily withdrew to cover, taking the television crew with it. There was no return of fire and the Turkish forces then began to regroup for an attack on the National Guard camp. 26 Aiken immediately complained to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief saying that ‘your troops have entered British Sovereign Territory and fired on British troops. This is to cease forthwith.’ The Turks replied very promptly through the Base Commander at Incirlik to the effect that British Sovereignty would be respected. 27 High Commissioner Olver put part of the blame for possible clashes with the Turks on Aiken, whom he accused of being trigger happy. Olver wrote to the FCO that there was a pattern of what is beginning to look like Folie de Grandeur on the part of CBFNE. There have been numerous instances of this over the last four weeks since emergency broke out. An obvious early one was his message to the BBC about evacuation of British subjects from Kyrenia over which we were neither informed nor consulted. [The] SBA incident has provided further example of trigger-happiness. CBFNE’s original message through UNFICYP to Turkish Commander stated that Turkish tanks had entered SBA and fired on British troops. On the basis of this information I made a formal protest to Inhan and sent my telegram no 781. We now discover that the SBA was not violated, though shots were fired into it. I have this morning obtained rather reluctant admission from CBFNE that the latter version is correct (my Telno 794). I have done what I can, with some detriment to our local relations, to hang on to Sir J Aitken’s coat-tails. But with little success. If this can be done without a major row between FCO and

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MOD, I think a quiet but firm remonstration with them would be the most likely to be effective. I have the impression that this might not be unwelcome to some of the soberer lower echelons in HQBFNE.’ 28

Meanwhile two British officers 29 had walked out from the SBA and succeeded in making contact with the Turkish forces. They learned that the Turks had strict orders not to fire on the SBAs and they were able to explain to them the position of the boundary. A Turkish helicopter then flew along the SBA border and an English-speaking liaison officer gave assurances that there would be no further trouble. However, the following incident is described by a British military eyewitness: For most of the day refugees had been making their way on to the SBA and several thousand must have passed through, however, at 1842 hrs a lone Turkish tank arrived at the check point much to the horror of the refugees in the area. There were 8 Turkish soldiers in it and they were totally lost, they had no radio, they had run out of main armament ammunition, their 0.5’ machine gun had jammed and they had run out of fuel. From somewhere petrol was hurriedly produced and the tank was escorted to the Northern edge of the SBA and pointed in the direction of a known Turkish position. By now it was dark and the fighting had died down for the day. The Turkish forces had linked up with the Turkish Cypriots in the old city which had been under siege for almost a month. 30

Again, Anglo-Turkish confrontation had been luckily prevented. As in Kyrenia and at Nicosia Airport before, British troops had orders to resist. If Turkish tanks had tried to advance into the SBA, for example in pursuit of National Guard units, the result would have been unpredictable. By the early evening of 15 August Turkish troops had occupied Famagusta and linked up with Turkish Fighters in the walled city. 31

Diplomatic Activities How would the United States react to its failure to stop Turkey from resuming fighting? Would there be more pressure on Ecevit? Did Kissinger realise that his soft teacher-student approach was not working? As it turned out there was no change in the US Government’s attitude. Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Senior Staff member – National Security Council) defined the US Government’s response to the outbreak of fighting in Cyprus in a memorandum for Kissinger. The ‘only conceivable modus vivendi [would] have to rest on de facto division.’ Nothing he could think of would ‘stop the Turks now from trying to secure by force what they demanded.’ As a result the US should ‘try to contain Greek reaction,

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bluntly tell the Turks that they must stop tomorrow at the latest; warn the Turks that Greece is rapidly moving leftward. Assuming that Turks quickly take Famagusta, privately assure Turks we will get them solution involving one third of the island, with some kind of federal arrangement; assure Greeks we will contain Turk demands and allow additional enclaves etc.’ 32 This was basically the line Kissinger followed during the next few days. The Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Esenbel, called on Under Secretary Sisco at 0400 hrs on 14 August to convey the following message: During all phases of the Cyprus problem GOT has given scrupulous attention to cooperation with USG and to follow US suggestions. GOT’s considerations have been maintenance of peace in the region, Turkey’s Alliance obligations and fact that the Greek/Turkish relations depend on equal rights between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. However, Greece refused to cooperate with Turkey towards this and GOT was obliged to take necessary actions. GOT is grateful to USG for constructive suggestions it has forwarded and hopes this will be precursor for more fruitful relations in future. It is to mutual benefit of USG and GOT that Cyprus question not be internationalized.

Esenbel then told Sisco that Turkey expected the United States Government to use its veto in the event that the UN Security Council would take a decision against Turkey. Sisco answered that the United States Government’s basic approach in the Security Council would be ‘more in sorrow than in anger.’ However, a Security Council resolution had just been adopted unanimously. The US had no alternative but to support it. If the US Government had done otherwise, it would have been isolated. Sisco added that the Turkish Government should understand that while the US Government had voted for such resolutions, it had not taken the lead in this matter. It was not in Turkey’s interest for the United States to lose its bona fides in the entire Eastern Mediterranean region. 33 It is noticeable that Sisco did not make the slightest attempt to criticise Turkish actions. Instead, he was even apologetic about the US Government’s vote in the Security Council. Kissinger himself managed a mild criticism of Ecevit and at the same time declared the chapter closed. What the Turks had they might keep but they should stop immediately to allow the Americans to arrange negotiations. This time Kissinger promised that the US would be ready to play a more direct role. He wrote to Ecevit: I regret that Turkey was not able to agree to a further period of time for discussions in Geneva. I believe that had there been additional time, we

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might have been able to help to move negotiations in the directions you were seeking. (…) I had (…) told you in all candor that we could not accept as justifiable the continuation of military action on Cyprus. It continues to be my firm view that the long-term risk in resuming the military operations – and I have in mind here the pretext this provides for further Soviet meddling – are considerable out of proportion to the gains. The United States is prepared to engage itself directly in the negotiations if Turkey and the other partners should desire it. We would also be prepared to use our influence toward developing the consensus that would be necessary to obtain a lasting solution. However, for the United States to play such a role the military actions on Cyprus must be brought to an immediate halt. I would greatly welcome your ideas as to how we could play a more direct role. 34

On 15 August Kissinger gave Macomber orders to tell Ecevit that the US Government was trying to be ‘helpful to the Turkish Government’ but was ‘fast reaching the limits’ of what it could continue to support domestically. It was ‘sympathetic to the Turkish position, but the continuation of military operations puts [it] in an increasingly difficult position.’ 35 Meanwhile Kissinger tried to avoid a condemnation of Turkey at the Security Council. Kissinger told Ford that the French were with the US Government on this. 36 The next day Kissinger instructed Macomber to tell Ecevit that the US Government had succeeded in delaying a vote on a French resolution in the Security Council and were actively trying to have it withdrawn and not put to a vote. However, if it were put to a vote, they would have no choice but to vote for it due to increasing domestic pressures. 37 As a matter of fact the US voted for all Security Council resolutions between 14 and 16 August, but managed to avoid any reference to Turkey. 38 The resolution passed on 16 August recorded the Council’s ‘formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus.’ It was considered so weak by the Soviet Union that it decided to abstain during the vote. 39 In Greece, Karamanlis had issued a statement in the morning of 14 August condemning Turkey. The next day he spoke to the nation on the radio at 2000 GMT. He gave a brief account of the situation in which his Government had come to power and emphasised the ‘folly of the dictatorship’ and the ‘sinful past.’ His Government had immediately realised the critical nature of the situation, and their inability adequately to reinforce the Greek side in Cyprus without endangering mainland defence. They were faced by a fait accompli, in which Greece had to rely largely on diplomatic means. He attacked Turkey’s bad faith, aggression, and disregard of international opinion and international engagements. Turkey had proved a ‘threat to world peace.’ With the object of taking advantage of an

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irresponsible and senseless action by the previous regime, three weeks ago Turkey had landed military forces in Cyprus on the pretext of restoring lawful conditions and protecting the independence of the island. The acts of violence and lawlessness committed by the Turkish troops were well known. Despite all the dramatic efforts made during the last few days to obtain respect for the elementary principles of international law, Turkey had ‘insolently persisted in her deception and unlawful action. As a climax to the deception, whilst the Geneva Conference was meeting to find a peaceful solution, the Turkish troops, whose withdrawal the Security Council had called for, again launched an unprovoked attack.’ Greece, he continued, had done everything possible. Armed opposition to the Turks in Cyprus was made impossible by reasons of distance and also by reason of the accomplished facts. And it could not be attempted without the risk of weakening the defence of Greece itself. Greece demanded the convocation of the Security Council, and the Council condemned Turkey. Greece brought the great powers face to face with their responsibilities. Karamanlis had ordered Greek withdrawal from the military alliance of NATO and ‘other measures which I cannot disclose.’ He congratulated the Greek people on their self-control and patriotism and the Armed Forces for their vigilance, and said they should remain patient and confident until the day when Greece would be able to restore the balance. 40 In accordance with Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum, Kissinger turned on 14 August to the Greek Government and instructed Tasca to tell Karamanlis that the US Government considered the resumed Turkish military operations as ‘completely unjustified.’ It was vital that all should work together to return the question ‘as soon as possible’ to the negotiating table. He offered a more direct role from the US and said that he regretted Greece’s decision to withdraw her forces from NATO. 41 On 16 August Kissinger addressed Greek allegations that his government had failed to bring about an end to Turkish military actions. In a telegram to Karamanlis (and during a phone call mentioned therein), he explained that it had been his belief that he could be ‘more effective’ dealing ‘privately and directly with the Turkish Government’ in order to bring to bear ‘maximum influence.’ He had been in direct touch with Ecevit ‘a great many times’ to make clear the US Government’s disapproval. As result of this strong representation Ecevit had agreed to a ceasefire starting at 6:30 p.m. Athens time on 16 August. 42 Karamanlis reacted strongly to Kissinger’s messages: ‘It is a matter of regret to me that you could not see Mr. Mavros when our Foreign Minister proposed to visit Washington before the second phase of the Geneva Conference at a time when the further deterioration of the situation could

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have been averted. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government has already publicly stated its views with regard to essential features of a future settlement of the Cyprus question on which my government has yet to take position.’ Regarding new talks, Karamanlis said that it was ‘utterly impossible for Greece to return to the negotiating table in face of faits accomplis.’ He listed Greek conditions for resumption of talks as the immediate evacuation of Famagusta by Turkish forces and the withdrawal of Turkish forces to the stabilization line of 9 August. In the light of this Greek position, Karamanlis concluded, the decision of the Turkish Government to order a ceasefire at 6 p.m. Athens time, August 16, was of ‘no value.’ Tasca reported that Karamanlis had referred to information he had received concerning a meeting between Assistant Secretary Hartman and Soviet observer Minin in Geneva, at which the former asserted that both concurred that the Greeks should ‘accept scheme prepared by Turks.’ Mavros had added that the Greek Government should also take into account public statements of Secretary Kissinger that in the Greek view meant ‘Americans taking sides [i.e., for Turkey].’ 43 Kissinger answered Karamanlis’ allegation that the US Government had ‘publicly stated its views (…) with regard to a future settlement’, which had reassured the Turks. Kissinger stressed that the US Government’s statement of 13 August had been intended to forestall a resumption of Turkish military action and was not a statement of ‘unreserved support for the Turkish position on Cyprus.’ He had believed that a public acknowledgement of the principle of greater autonomy for the Turkish community, coupled with a warning against further military action, might have succeeded in forestalling another Turkish attack. It was phrased in that way since it was the US Government’s understanding that Clerides had accepted the principle of greater autonomy, but that the details remained to be negotiated. 44 Karamanlis’ response to Tasca was that he would never let Greece be humiliated and had to find ways to retain and preserve ‘Greek honor and Greek philotemo.’ Now he would receive 90 per cent of the votes in elections but if he were to leave, Greece would inevitably fall into communist hands. Karamanlis said that the Greek people felt betrayed by the US. It was a sad day for him to see these people – once the most pro-American in the world – now so hostile to the US because of its failure to stop Turkish military action, which everybody believed the US could have done had it so desired. 45 Kissinger’s patience with Karamanlis was now clearly exhausted and he decided that the time had come for some ‘less formal and more frank and direct exchanges’ with the Greek Prime Minister. On 17 August he instructed Tasca to tell Karamanlis that while the US Government

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understood the disappointment and frustration that the Greek Government and the Greek people felt at the ‘presumed inability of the U.S.’ to prevent the Turkish military action, it was ‘totally unjustified for the blame to be laid on the U.S.’ As a ‘close and friendly allies’ it was important for both to remember that this crisis was not of the US Government’s making or that of the Karamanlis Government. Both Greeks and Americans had been put into the situation by ‘irresponsible and unwise actions of the Greek Junta in upsetting the balance of forces in Cyprus.’ Kissinger reminded Karamanlis that Greece was in NATO in furtherance of its own security interest and warned that ‘the continued growth of anti-Americanism could only make impossible the mutually productive relationship’ the US Government wished to establish. Furthermore, anti-Americanism would in the long term help only the extreme left and undermine Karamanlis’ position. Kissinger concluded by saying: ‘We must tell you in all friendship that continuation of all this [anti-American] trend (…) will undermine our ability to play a positive role.’ Kissinger promised to send a personal representative to Athens in order to overcome this crisis and work out future steps. 46 The Greek reaction to Kissinger’s statements – particularly to his assertion that the US Government would ‘not be pressured by threat or withdrawal from the Alliance, etc’ – was unreceptive. Karamanlis said that Greece did not engage in blackmail. He believed that the actions Greece had taken were far less than the US Government would have done in similar circumstances. In a conversation with Tasca on 20 August he repeated several times that the US Government had not and was not helping his government, although they could have done so. 47 Greek-American relations were at an all-time low. A lot of work would be needed to bridge the gap between the two allies. In Cyprus, Clerides appealed to Britain on 14 August to do whatever she could to induce the Turks to comply with the further Security Council ceasefire resolution. In answering, Olver pointed to Callaghan’s efforts at Geneva and to the fact that the meeting of the Security Council and the resolution were both British initiatives. He said that maximum pressure had already been brought on Turkey, not only by the British Government but by the Americans and by the members of the European Community, not to resume hostilities in Cyprus. In practical terms it was not easy to see what further immediately effective steps could be taken; but he could be assured that Callaghan was working on this with ‘all his strength.’ 48 At 1345 hrs Callaghan talked again to Kissinger. He told him there was no chance of resuming negotiations at present. Kissinger suggested a ministerial meeting of NATO, which Callaghan thought would not help, and inviting Mavros to Washington, which the he thought would. Both

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agreed to let the situation develop for a day or so and reconsider. Kissinger promised to take no more initiatives without telling Callaghan. 49 If a negotiated settlement in Cyprus based on the new realities could be achieved there was only one person on whom the United States could pin their hopes: Clerides. Kissinger instructed Ambassador Davies on 15 August to deliver Clerides an oral message in which he told him that he ‘admired the statesmanlike position’ he had assumed at Geneva. Kissinger said that it seemed to him that ‘given greater flexibility on all sides’ it might have been possible to avoid the resumption of fighting. The US Government considered the resort to military action ‘completely unjustifiable in the circumstances’ and expressed hope that Clerides would consider options to bring about a resumption of negotiations. The US Government would be prepared to assume a more direct role if the ‘parties concerned’ believed that this would be helpful. 50 Clerides reacted with the realism that had characterised him during most of the crisis. He said he was willing to enter negotiations with the tacit understanding that he recognised the reality of Turkish military power and the likelihood that they would retain control of the area they had occupied. However, he could notbe put into a position where he would be seen publicly to be going to the table in order to sign a fait accompli. Nor could he go with a short fuse in terms of a deadline for agreement. He must be seen to be going for a give-and-take. He realised that in the end Turkish terms as outlined in Geneva were likely to be the best he could get. He pledged that he would negotiate for settlement and not for the purpose of delaying the inevitable. Clerides had a meeting with the political leaders in which Lyssarides, the Bishops, and ESEA were the most vocal in calls for no surrender, no negotiation, and fighting to the death. However, he felt that there was a large silent minority that was prepared to face up to reality. There were almost 100,000 GreekCypriot refugees. Economic dislocation would quickly lead to chaos and the Turks might not be satisfied with what they now held. 51 On 15 August Callaghan and Kissinger agreed (1440 hrs) that there should be no further diplomatic initiatives until the situation in Cyprus was clearer. 52 Both the US and the British Ambassadors at Ankara were instructed to see Ecevit to try to find out how far south the Turks were planning to advance. British Ambassador Sir Horace Phillips was told to stress ‘the immense dangers’ if the Greeks were forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus to protect Greek-Cypriot lives. 53 In his answer to the American Ambassador, Macomber, Ecevit said that the Turkish operation would not exceed the original Turkish proposal. He assured him that the Turkish forces would not secure more that one third of the island. Eastward of Nicosia they would not advance south of a line running generally from the capital to Famagusta, though there might be

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some ‘tactical adjustments – e.g. to include Tymbou.’ Similarly, west of Nicosia, Ecevit said, they would not advance south of what Turkey originally had in mind as the basic line. He did not make it absolutely clear what the western limit of this line was, largely because operations at the end were not yet completed. But from the way Macomber described this to Phillips, the British Ambassador concluded that the line ran through Morphou. 54 The British Ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, approached Ecevit at the airport. The Turkish Prime Minister was waiting for Güneş’ and Denktaş’ arrival from Geneva. Ecevit told Hooper more or less the same as he told the American Ambassador, except that he did not rule out the possibility that the western limit of the final line might descend to Lefka. He repeated that once the line was established there would be no advance south of it. Ecevit said that he hoped the armed forces would have established the desired line by the following night, 16 August. Immediately thereafter, Turkey would be ready to come to the conference table again. 55 Ecevit informed Kissinger as well that he agreed that Turkish operations would halt at 1200 noon Washington time, Friday. 56 Turkey officially announced the ceasefire the following morning. 57

The Final Day, 16 August 1974 During the night of 15 to 16 August and after the exertion of considerable pressure from Kissinger, Ecevit finally gave an undertaking that the Turks would stop their advance at 1700 hrs on 16 August. Callaghan reported that Kissinger would hold them to this. The Americans and the British recognised that by 1700 hrs the Turks should have achieved their objective. 58 In the morning Ecevit again assured Sir Horace Phillips that Turkish operations would stop at 1700 hrs on 16 August. Thereafter, Turkey would be ready to resume negotiations. 59 Ecevit made the official announcement about the ceasefire at noon. 60 The Turks continued their advance throughout 16 August virtually unopposed. Olver sent a Military SITREP [Situation Report] at 0700 hrs. In Nicosia there were continued air strikes on targets near Yerolakkos and in the vicinity of Nicosia Airport. Turkish tanks and Turkish infantry tried to reach the strategic high ground between Nicosia and the airport. There had been three more Finnish UN casualties from shell and mortar fire. In Famagusta Turkish tanks appeared linked up with the Turkish-Cypriot Fighters and the National Guard had withdrawn from the town. The National Guard was reported to be moving from Larnaca to Limassol in large numbers. Around Lefka heavy fighting continued at the Limnitis enclave. Turkish troops tried to link up with the Turkish-Cypriot enclave at Kokkina but ultimately failed. During the morning the National Guard

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withdrew from Morphou. All villagers between Morphou and Lefka were warned to leave their homes and headed for the hills. 61 For several thousands it was their second such flight in as many weeks since they had fled to Morphou from the Kyrenia area in the earlier phases of the military operation. 62 By the afternoon British intelligence reported that a Greek-Cypriot battalion was somewhere west of the SBA at Dhekelia and south of Famagusta and might be cut off between the Turks and the SBA. 63 The same afternoon Turkish forces had advanced as far as Lefka in the west of Cyprus. Morphou was captured and in the east the Turks stopped at Troulli 10 miles north of Larnaca. At 1700 hrs Reuters reported that Turkish operations stopped, but had continued until 5 minutes before. 64 The Turks had achieved their objectives and the advance ceased. By this time, they had come to the northern corner of the Dhekelia SBA, and beyond Morphou, to Lefka and Karovostasi in the West. However, this was not quite the end, for as the FCO observed, ‘Kissinger had obtained no undertaking on any follow-up action.’ 65 While the ceasefire seemed to be holding in most parts of the island, shelling was reported from the Athienou and Pyroi areas during the morning of 17 August. 66 Olver reported in the evening that the ceasefire was ‘by no means solid.’ Neither side appeared to be adhering faithfully to its provisions, he wrote. There had been exchanges of tank and artillery fire in the area southeast of Nicosia in the neighbourhood of the villages of Pyroi, Athienou and Troulli. 67 The reason for the Turkish activity in that area was actually that the Turks were trying to link up with the Turkish-Cypriot enclave of Louroujina, which was held by Turkish-Cypriot Fighters. Apparently, the relief of that enclave was not included in the original operational plans of the Turkish Army. Over the next few days they took the village of Galini in the West, the town of Louroujina between Nicosia and Larnaca, and the land right up to the borders of the Dhekelia SBA in the East, including all of Varosha. 68 The take-over of the prosperous tourist area of Famagusta, Varosha, was not among the military aims of the Turkish Army. As Aiken wrote, ‘They would have been unlikely to want to take on the huge administrative problem of a large Greek city they did not need. The Turkish populated Old Walled City with its excellent port in the North must have been their primary aim.’ 69 As soon as, the Turks realised that the town had been abandoned by its inhabitants, they decided to occupy it.

18 Big and Little Lies Conspiracy Theories Gain Ground

As described earlier, British (and later US) involvement in the Cyprus crisis has been the subject of much speculation among journalists, scholars, and politicians from all points on the political spectrum. Conspiracy theories remain popular today and it seems not to diminish their value that they are frequently in contradiction to one another. The United Kingdom has been accused of having prior knowledge of the coup d’état and of colluding in the Turkish military operation. The United States (notably Kissinger and the CIA) have been charged with cooperation with the Junta in staging the coup and helping Turkey to land in Cyprus. The question of why the British and Americans would first help the Junta in Athens and then the Turkish Army led to the theory of a grand NATO design to divide the island. Conspiracy theories first developed in Greece, amounting to what the British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Robin Hooper, called ‘the big lie.’ He said that allegations of military cooperation between the British and the Turks in Cyprus together with more generalised charges that throughout the crisis the British and Turkish governments had been ‘ganging up on the Greeks’ had been frequently made from the moment the Turks landed in Cyprus. The stories had almost resulted in a breakdown in the British Embassy’s working relations with the Hellenic Armed Forces. 1

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Already on 23 July during anti-British demonstrations in Athens the Embassy had been attacked. A few windows had been broken and cars damaged. Sir Robin Hooper had then reported that the Greek police were standing ‘idly by.’ 2 On 2 August the daily newspaper Vima carried a frontpage photograph of a British armoured vehicle captioned ‘British commander greets his Turkish counterpart, while the Turks fire the last round against Lapithos.’ 3 Hooper related a story according to which the Chief of the Greek Navy on 1 August had told a US officer that he had ‘proof’ of British resupply of Turkish units by helicopter. Hooper said that the stories had been invented and spread by Ioannides’ followers who were still in their jobs in the Ministry of Defence. The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had told Hooper that these people were known to the Government and that Averoff was trying hard to get rid of them. But Hooper cautioned that ‘although Ministers and many members of the public give no credence to these stories, Turkey and Cyprus are an emotive subject and big lies repeated often enough inevitably have their effect, especially on those who want to believe them.’ This applied particularly to senior officers. They were ‘mortified by events in Cyprus’ and were ‘looking for a scapegoat on whom to divert criticism of themselves.’ Hooper stressed the danger that unless those stories were ‘killed’ they could have dangerous repercussions by creating an ‘atmosphere which could destroy confidence in our good intentions, wreck the second phase of Geneva and make it impossible to initiate or maintain the arrangements on the ground agreed at Geneva.’ 4 Some days later Hooper stated, ‘We shall never get it really right until the government feel strong enough to root out the lie-factory in the Ministry of Defence.’ 5 Averoff confirmed this line in a conversation with Hooper on the morning of 10 August. He said that he was replacing the trouble makers in his Ministry, and indicated that he was moving some of the proIoannides units away from the Athens garrison; but it would be a long and difficult business. 6 Ambassador Phillips’ personal experience during the crisis led him to rather strong doomsday assessments on the Greek political scene. On 6 August he admitted this in a cable to the Foreign Office, saying: ‘I don’t blame the Secretary of State (which will no doubt be a great comfort to him!) for finding my draft rather wet. But the fact is that having, if I may say so, been more personally involved than most – screamed at all morning, on 22 July, by hysterical Foreign Ministers and Colonels, and done over by Rentacrowd in the afternoon – I leant over backwards to keep personal resentments out of it. With hindsight, I can see that I overbalanced!’ 7 However, he stood by his general assessment regarding what he called ‘Megalopsemma or the Big Lie.’

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In Cyprus an equal variety of stories about British-Turkish collusion circulated. According to Olver those fell into four major categories: 1. Prior Collusion, i.e., Britain had prior warning of the Turkish invasion; 2. Military help to the Turks; 3. Psychological help to the Turks; 4. Anti-Greek tone generally. As ‘evidence’ for the first point it was cited that 70 tourists had left the Mermaid Hotel, Kyrenia, two days before the Turkish landing when they were scheduled to stay until four days after. In addition, the BBC allegedly had prior warning of Turkish occupation or attacks on Kyrenia, the airport, Myrtou, and Famagusta (where the British had evacuated the Service families just before Turkish air attacks). In the second category, that Britain helped the Turks militarily, the allegations were that Turkish aircraft had been refuelled at Akrotiri; Turkish helicopters were flown by British pilots from the Turkish mainland and from Turkish ships; British helicopters were loaned to Turkey for the military operation – these had the letter ‘U’ on their sides (i.e., UK) – and the loan of British pilots to fly Turkish aircraft was ‘proved’ by the capture of a British pilot whose plane was shot down; British assistance to an air attack on Nicosia Airport was ‘proven’ by a British pilot winding up in Nicosia General Hospital. In the third category, it was alleged that Britain had helped Turkey to spread panic and defeatism among the Greeks by getting the BBC to broadcast false propaganda. As examples inaccurate BBC statements were quoted, such as the capture of Kyrenia and Myrtou falsely or long before the event; the announcement of a parachute landing in the Ayios Dhometios area, which never occurred; news of a Turkish disembarkation in Limassol, which never occurred; the claim that the Ledra Palace Hotel was captured by the Turks when this was untrue and there were 100 correspondents in the Ledra, and; finally a story claiming that Turkish ships were arriving at Famagusta. As ‘evidence’ for active anti-Hellenistic and pro-Turkish bias a BBC broadcast was cited that 40 crew members of a Turkish boat were rescued from the sea (Kocatepe) with no mention that these were from a torpedo boat assisting the invasion of Cyprus. This had given the Turks false sympathy. Generally, the British had shown a ‘disposition to expect the worse of the Greeks with regard to atrocity stories, massacres etc’, while they were at the same time prepared ‘to accept Turkish good intentions at face value.’ 8 While there was certainly no British assistance in the Turkish military operations it is worth evaluating the ‘evidence’ circulating in Cyprus. The BBC had indeed repeatedly reported news that conflicted with the information transmitted by the Joint Intelligence Staff and the British High Commission. Olver had on more than one occasion complained about this – especially on the grounds that this misinformation could endanger British

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rescue operations for British and other foreign nationals. However, there is clearly no information in the files of either the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the Prime Ministry or Defence Ministry to suggest that the British Government tried to influence the BBC to transmit false information. Olver’s vigorous complaints indicate that the BBC was insisting on its independence and simply got some stories wrong. Another story appeared in Athens on 13 August. It stemmed from Nicos Sampson’s Cyprus paper Aghon, which alleged that a map had been found in the office of a British expert employed by the Cyprus Government, who left suddenly at the time of the coup. On it were marked the places where the Turks were to land. According to the reports, the accuracy of this proved that Britain had advance warning of the attack. 9 However, there is nothing in the British files supporting this allegation. As shown previously, the British Joint Intelligence Service had no absolute knowledge where exactly the Turks would land (they expected an additional landing at Famagusta). The story thus appears to be fabricated, as were many others circulated at that time. However, conspiracy theories are popular and more were to come.

Anglo-Turkish Collusion or Anglo-Greek Collusion? – The Evacuation of Officers from the British Bases Interestingly enough, the story that might have caused most embarrassment to the British, concerning a secret evacuation of Turkish mainland officers via Akrotiri, escaped those who were developing theories of Anglo-Turkish conspiracy. During the afternoon of 25 July, the Chief Officer of the Sovereign Base Area Administration had learned that there were three (later found to be four) mainland Turkish officers among the Turkish-Cypriot refugees in the Happy Valley Refugee Camp. On hearing this Aiken immediately consulted Olver, who agreed that it was out of the question, because of their combatant status, to hold these officers in the SBA as refugees. They had originally surrendered to the UN (BRITCOM) and were assumed to have been from the mainland staff of the Turkish Fighters in Limassol. After several options about what to do with them were discussed (internment on the SBAs, hand-over to the National Guard, return to UNFICYP – which was rejected by UN) Callaghan finally decided that ‘a clandestine deportation immediately was the only sensible course.’ At 0155 hrs on 27 July the officers were put on a Hercules air freight schedule to Lyneham, as the only passengers. From Lyneham, they were discreetly sent to Ankara on a Turkish Airways flight from Heathrow that afternoon. In order to diminish trouble with the Greeks, ‘steps had been taken at Episkopi before departure to ensure, as far as possible, that the officers would keep their

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mouth shut as to the true method of return to their country.’ 10 In any event, the story did not cause much trouble. In any case the British Government was following a policy of evenhandedness, as Callaghan approved on 3 August a plan for the evacuation of 25 wounded Greek officers from Akrotiri to Athens on an Olympic Airways flight. Phillips warned from Ankara that this would have to be explained ‘very carefully the Turks’, who would be intensely suspicious, since there was something of a ‘little lie’ currently developing there to the effect that the British were pro-Greek and were obstructing the Turks. 11 The flight was eventually cancelled due to the gravity of the officers’ physical condition. 12 What remains to be noted is that British policy was to assist both sides in humanitarian cases. Britain eventually managed to minimize the ‘big lie’ in the perception of Greek public opinion, which diverted the blame to the United States and especially Kissinger for involvement in the crisis. The British Defence Attaché cabled on 17 August that ‘the new Government acknowledges Britain’s helpful role at Geneva. The USA has for the present become the prime target in the eyes of Greek public opinion.’ 13 What we know now is that rather than being of help to the Turkish Army, Britain repeatedly considered containing the Turkish advance. In connection to this, another set of conspiracy theories about Anglo-Greek collusion developed. This is what Sir Horace Phillips in Ankara had termed ‘the little lie.’ Phillips reported on 3 August that the British were perceived in some quarters as ‘pro-Greek and obstructing the Turks.’ 14 Phillips reported on 16 August an editorial in the largest newspaper accusing Callaghan of being personally responsible for the bloodshed in Cyprus. The editorial read: The Turkish people will not be able to forget Britain and Callaghan for a long time. If anyone is responsible for the Second Cyprus War and for the bloodshed in the island it is Mr Callaghan and the British Foreign Office. (…) Britain wants to protect her own Bases and touristic investments in Cyprus. This is why she could not resist sending troops, both paid and unpaid, to the island. (…) There is no such country as the British United Kingdom among the big states of the world. Today there is only something called ‘British Interests Kingdom.’ 15

Phillips commented that Turkish news reporting, both diplomatic and on the ground, remained ‘predictably partisan and chauvinistic.’ More disturbing, he said, was that much of the editorial comment had continued to be directed against Britain. The main subjects of attack had been the alleged threat of use of British forces against the Turkish, the Gurkha

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reinforcement, the retention of Phantom aircraft, and alleged British support for the Greek cause at Geneva. These had served as ‘a framework for a tirade, bitter even by Turkish journalistic standards, accusing Britain of vacillation, perfidy, double dealing, imperialistic delusions of grandeur; as well as raking up Gallipoli and Mosul.’ In Phillips’ opinion it was pointless to protest officially about press comment. But when he saw the Prime Minister he had complained particularly about the gratuitous attack on Callaghan. Ecevit had read it and ‘had the grace to admit that it was distasteful.’ Phillips stressed that such extreme views were not shared by Ecevit and the ‘more responsible Ministers and officials.’ But there were others who did share them. And, he said, the state-controlled radio had put out at least one highly critical commentary. 16 According to the British Defence Attaché in Ankara this line of allegations continued the following day. He reported that Britain was being attacked ‘vituperatively’ in the press. Above all, Britain was blamed for declining to join with Turkey in the operation; by extension she was held responsible for all subsequent bloodshed. The Attaché wrote that Britain was ‘held to be anti-Turkish and by our attitude and statements we are responsible for much of the present world criticism of Turkey.’ 17

‘If these attitudes continue we will wash our hands of the whole thing’ – The Death of Roger Davies Stories of American conspiracy against Cyprus spread not only in Greece but on the island itself. Anti-American demonstrations were organised by leftist and rightist organizations. US Ambassador Roger P. Davies wrote on 15 August: ‘I fear [that the] Greek Cypriot man-in-the-street (…) is all too ready to believe garbled reports of U.S. support for Turkish objectives.’ 18 Not only did Davies’ view prove correct, but tragically he was to become a victim of this very situation. In the morning of 19 August a large crowd of approximately 2,000 Greek Cypriots attacked the Embassy. Stones were thrown breaking many windows. Many of the Embassy’s vehicles were destroyed by fire. Thereafter, automatic fire was directed against the Embassy. Davies was shot in the chest and critically wounded. Antoinette Darnaya, a Foreign Service local female employee, was shot through the head and died immediately. The Cypriot Police had not acted to prevent these events. Thereafter National Guard units and President Clerides arrived at the Embassy and dispersed the crowd. Clerides then personally took the Ambassador to the hospital in an attempt to save his life. Davies died on the way to the hospital. Clerides then initiated radio announcements expressing horror and condemnation of the attack, which had been carried out ‘by enemies of Cyprus’; he ordered 24-hour National Guard protection

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around the Embassy, with orders to fire on any further demonstrators, and banned all public meetings. 19 President Ford reacted with the following statement: ‘The President said he was shocked and deeply saddened by the news of the death of Ambassador Davies in Nicosia today. The tragic incident emphasizes the urgent need for an end to violence in Cyprus and an immediate return to negotiations for a peaceful settlement.’ 20 In Cyprus, Davies’ duties were taken over by the second in charge, Edwards, and the State Department announced that it was sending immediately L. Dean Brown (Deputy Under Secretary for Management; Former Ambassador to Jordan 1970–73) to take charge of the Cyprus Embassy. 21 Clerides called Kissinger to express his bitter sorrow and grievance, saying that ‘not only had the United States (…) lost an Ambassador, but [he had] lost a precious friend.’ This was the first conversation Clerides actually had with the Secretary and he said that he was ‘terribly sorry, (…), that our first conversation has to be under such circumstances.’ Kissinger answered: ‘Mr. President, we understand that this was out of your control and you are quite correct, Roger Davies was a friend and the United States thinks of itself as a friend of yourself and of what you are trying to do.’ He then carried on to say that the only thing he ‘would ask is that the deliberate effort to blame the United States for what has happened is one of the contributing causes to this situation, and if we are to play a useful role (…) we cannot do it under this sort of pressure. And so we are asking all responsible Greek leaders to stop anti-American agitation or we will withdraw completely from the negotiations, and leave it to be settled between Greeks and Turks. (…) If these attitudes continue in Athens and Cyprus, then we will wash our hands of the whole thing.’ Clerides assured Kissinger that he would do everything possible, even publicly, to prevent anti-Americanism. 22 Kissinger’s threat to wash his hands of the crisis was – of course – an empty one, given the US interest in restoring stability to NATO’s southeastern flank. Actually, it was quite bizzare to make this threat to Clerides, who was the last person to be criticised in this case. Rather it seemed that the tragic incident served as a tool to silence criticism of the Secretary of State. Conspiracy theories were given further impetus by Flora Lewis’ article in the New York Times by saying that the Turks had decided to invade Cyprus after Sisco had said that the US Government had no objection to an invasion and that Sisco had told the Turks that military aid was being restored. 23 Kissinger was so perplexed that he asked State Department Spokesman McCloskey whether this was true. 24 The American position had

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indeed been presented in such a soft way that the Turks had not been deterred. But Sisco had not told them that there was no objection. Kissinger told McCloskey that Haynes Johnson, a Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist, had a piece in the Washington Star saying ‘we made the coup in Greece.’ Kissinger had mentioned it in his press conference, so he must have known about it. The fact was that reports of the coup had come in all that morning. Kissinger had come out of the WSAG meeting and said ‘(…) there have been reports (…) that there may be a coup in Greece this morning.’ Kissinger realised now that volunteering this information ‘wasn’t the smartest thing I have done.’ 25 All evidence available from British and American government files goes against claims for any Anglo-British collusion with either Athens or Ankara in a) staging the coup and b) helping Turkey to divide the island. There was no NATO conspiracy. Nevertheless, conspiracy theories persist throughout the region, in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and it is hard to overcome them. Many people want to believe in them, since they seem to offer help in dealing with the trauma of the crisis. 26 Sadly, they also serve to prevent a serious discussion of local responsibilities.

19 Permitting Racial Separation Attempts at Post-Crisis Management

On 15 August, towards the end of the crisis, NATO Secretary-General Lüns tried to embark on a diplomatic mission of his own and proposed to visit Ankara and Athens. The idea was not welcomed by the Turks and Callaghan advised him not to visit Athens either. Lüns and Callaghan agreed that the Greek decision to leave NATO should not be over dramatised. 1 Greece had – like France –left the military command of the alliance, but remained a member. Callaghan told Kissinger that he had dissuaded Lüns, who had been ‘in a very legalistic frame of mind’, from going to Athens to pursue the question of Greece’s relations with NATO. He feared that if he did so he would get the wrong answers. Kissinger said that he was sure that this was right. 2 Lüns’ visit probably would have exacerbated the Greek attitude towards the alliance. Kissinger outlined the American strategy on Cyprus in a meeting with President Ford and the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership on 20 August. He claimed that the US was supporting the Greek Government, but since it had replaced the Junta ‘it didn’t feel it could make concessions. It was afraid of being caught between left and right. The Greek Cypriots are willing to make concessions.’ He accused the British of having ‘got mad at the Turks and put pressure on them.’ Thus they had relieved the pressure on the Turks for concessions. An American cut-off of aid would not have affected the battle and would have forced the Turks either towards the Soviet Union

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or a Qaddafi-type regime. The American aim was now to get them to the conference table. Kissinger summarised his diplomatic ‘success’ by saying: ‘So, a war was stopped; the Turks will give up some of their gains; and the Turks will reduce some of their forces. The pressures on the Greek Government were severe. They couldn’t go to war and so they kicked us a bit.’ 3 The kicking Kissinger referred too started with the Greek refusal to send Mavros to Washington for talks with him. Mavros announced on 15 August that he was too busy to visit the US. Callaghan told Kissinger that in light of this attitude he was clearly pessimistic about the prospects for a quick resumption of talks. He did not intend to hurry back if attempts were made to re-convene the Geneva Conference. His inclination was to ask a junior minister to go for the opening session and to come in himself at a later stage in the proceedings. Kissinger felt strongly that this was the right approach and said that it would inhibit efforts to create further showdowns in the opening phase of the conference. 4 However, such a conference did not materialise. Kissinger called Mavros early on 16 August and asked again whether Karamanlis or Mavros himself would be prepared to visit Washington. Kissinger wanted to know as well on what conditions – assuming that the Turks ceased hostilities on the evening of 16 August – the Greeks would be prepared to return to the conference table. On the first point, Mavros’ answer was that neither he nor the Prime Minister could come to Washington at that time. On the second, Greece could not negotiate in the face of a fait accompli. Before the Greeks could contemplate a resumption of negotiations the Turks must withdraw from Famagusta immediately and thereafter return to the ‘stabilisation line’ of 9 August. Mavros informed the British Ambassador that going to the conference table with the Turks in undisturbed possession of the whole area comprised in the plan put forward by Denktaş at Geneva would be a humiliation that no Greek Government could accept and survive. 5 The British approach toward Cyprus after the crisis had settled was laid out in a paper titled ‘Policy after Stage II’, written by the Head of the South Eastern European Department, Alan Goodison. In order to obtain a lasting settlement as main priorities he named the reduction of the risk of future Greco/Turkish squabbles; a solution that would allow Britain to withdraw from her prominent position under the 1960 agreements and the Geneva Declaration, and; avoiding perpetuating UNFICYP – and the British contribution to it – at its present level. Thus it was clear that Britain wanted to get as little involved as possible in the ‘internal’ struggle between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. Goodison saw the ‘best solution’ in a ‘bi-regional federation in Cyprus, on lines advocated by Denktash, but involving an area under Turkish Cypriot administration rather smaller than

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34 per cent of the Republic. To achieve this,’ Goodison thought, ‘the Turkish military advance should cease at the Attila line. Thereafter, a few days may be needed for the Turks to accept that they must be ready for real negotiation and for the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to get used to the new situation. This suggests that we should not go to the conference table until we are sure of the broad policies of the parties.’ Further British aims were to limit the damage to NATO, the scope for Soviet intervention, and the harm to Britain’s own relations with Turkey. In Cyprus itself, Britain wished to avoid the risk of Turkish forces being drawn into fighting beyond the Attila line, of the SBA Dhekelia becoming involved, or of guerrilla fighting on a large scale. Any start of a Stage III conference should be delayed ‘until about 25 August’ in the hope of generating international pressure on the Turks; bringing the Turks to appreciate their difficult position in Cyprus (including the financial strains their military action would impose); getting the Greeks and Greek Cypriots – including Makarios – to accept the need for a bi-regional federation; and ‘permitting de facto changes which will facilitate a radical separation of the two communities in Cyprus (that is population movements and consolidation of the Turkish zone).’ 6 The last point is especially notable. Britain thereby acknowledged that a solution without the movement of population was not attainable. Thus Goodison was consenting to the forceful transfer of Greek Cypriots from the north of Cyprus. Not that this was preferred British policy, but in the light of the persisting Cyprus problem it appeared to him – and nothing in the ensuing Foreign Office discussion suggests that there had been much opposition to his view – that only the separation of the communities could bring forward the desired durable solution. Goodison stressed in another document that it was important to ‘avoid any suggestion that in favouring the geographical separation of the two communities as the most viable solution of the Cyprus problem’ Britain was ‘working for the partition of the Island.’ Therefore, he suggested the use of the term ‘biregional federation.’ 7 For the immediate future Goodison suggested the aims of discouraging the Greeks from action likely to make Stage III even more difficult (in particular, military action against Turkey); building up Clerides, since ‘the chance of a radical settlement in Cyprus depends on having Clerides rather than Makarios at Stage III’; the maintenance of the British position as ‘honest broker’ i.e., not taking any action to strengthen Turkish belief that the British are wholly parti pris (e.g., by sponsoring UN resolutions or publishing a White Paper). Goodison suggested that the Government should stick to Callaghan’s line that ‘the Turks have a case even though their methods are regrettable.’ The last immediate aim was to constrain the

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Turks. Goddison wrote that ‘it would suit our strategy if the Turkish armed forces ended up with 25/30 per cent rather than 40 per cent of the island. But they cannot be negotiated with in their present self-confident mood. We should therefore do what we can to make them more amenable by Stage III.’ 8 Pressure on Turkey should be exerted in the form of delaying over the attendance at Stage III. Goodison sensed that as soon as Turkish military advance stopped, they would want a quick conference. He suggested that this could be delayed by putting up conditions such as the implementation of relevant parts of the Geneva Declaration, e.g. dealing with Nicosia Airport. In addition, it was planed to exerted pressure through NATO, the UN, and The Nine (EEC). Goodison then speculated on the possible future course of events. The desired outcome for the British Government would have been a return to Geneva after 25 August; an agreement on a map giving 25 per cent to the Turkish zone (‘though we do not want to become impaled on percentages’), and a framework for detailed intercommunal talks in Nicosia within precise time limits. Ultimately there should be an agreement on the competences of the federal and communal administrations. Towards the end of his draft Goodison refered to the ‘less convenient possibilities’, i.e., to the results of the failure of his suggested policies. He named the extension of guerrilla warfare (i.e., attacks on Turkish enclaves and guerrilla resistance within the Turkish zone) and the subsequent risk of the Turkish forces advancing even further; trouble within Greece (i.e., the fall of Karamanlis and the risk of Greco-Turkish war); and the overthrow or death of Clerides. In the last scenario, Goodison emphasised the need to ‘embroil’ Makarios in a compromise solution since he was ‘the only other Greek Cypriot with the authority to make the necessary concessions in Geneva III.’ However, Makarios’ presence would reduce the chances of an early agreement. A public acceptance by Makarios that Geneva III should be conducted on the basis of the Denktaş proposals would, in itself, help to protect the position and life of Clerides. But this Makarios was most unlikely to give. Finally, Goodison named as a last possible obstacle to a solution the only factor that was really to persist over the years to come: intransigence. Quite prophetically he wrote: ‘The Turks might refuse to accept our minimum demands for flexibility at the conference table. The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots might refuse to sit down with the Turks. The Greek Cypriots might refuse to accept the principle of a bi-regional federation.’ 9 Sadly, – with minor variations – this was the situation that would persist for the next 30 years. While Makarios in 1977 officially accepted the principle of a bizonal federation in the so-called ‘Denktaş–Makarios

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Guidelines’, the Greek Cypriot understanding of bizonality remained that this could only take place after the return of all Greek Cypriot refugees to the north. This would have left the Turkish Cypriots as a minority within their zone, which against the background of past acrimonious experiences was not acceptable. On 16 August the Soviet Union came out with a note to President Ford suggesting a joint effort of the United States and the Soviet Union for the purpose of implementing the Security Council Resolution 353 of 20 July: The joint effort of the USSR and the US could provide appropriate guarantees of both our countries aimed at securing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cypriot state, as well as creating necessary conditions for the Cypriots to settle their internal affairs themselves without any outside intervention. We would also be prepared to consider a possibility of providing such guarantees on the part of the Security Council. Along the same lines, in our view, a special group should be established, composed of nonpermanent members of the Security Council, representing all main geographic areas. The functions of such group, small in its composition (representatives of 5–6 states), could include observing on behalf of the Security Council, the situation on Cyprus, the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus, as well as the promotion of a just, peaceful and democratic settlement on the problem of Cyprus, including a direct participation in negotiations. Undertaking this initiative, we express our readiness to cooperate closely with the US in implementing measures, both those mentioned above and possibly others, aimed at preserving Cyprus as a sovereign and independent state. 10

The Soviet Union proposed this idea, especially on new guarantees and on the formation of a special UN Security Council group, in separate notes to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. The US rejected the proposal as they had done with previous calls for joint intervention. The following day the Soviets continued to press the United States for some form of joint action, insisting that a future solution should be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Kissinger informed Ecevit that the US Government would ‘reject this proposal too’, but warned that as long as the dispute continued unresolved the USSR would continue to agitate for a role in the settlement. And this ‘could not be in the interest of either of our governments.’ 11 On 24 August Kissinger urged Ecevit to take a firm stand against the Soviet proposal. 12 Then he instructed Ambassador Brown in Cyprus to tell Clerides that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would ‘not move the Cyprus problem towards a solution.’ Instead, it would lead to a stalemate that would be ‘of benefit to

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the Soviets.’ 13 Finally, he moved to warn Karamanlis that the Soviet proposal for an expanded conference was ‘nothing more than a capricious effort at meddling.’ The Soviet Union had no interest in solving the Cyprus problem, since continued tension in the area was to its greater advantage. 14 Ecevit told Macomber on 25 August that the Government of Turkey would reject the Soviet proposal ‘with some kind words.’ 15 But Tasca reported from a meeting with Karamanlis on the Soviet proposal that the Prime Minister had expressed himself in the ‘most forceful, personal and bitter manner and harbored feelings that USG was letting him down at a moment of national crisis.’ 16 The next day Karamanlis said, in his written answer to Kissinger, that while he agreed with the Secretary’s suspicion of Soviet motives, the door to the United Nations through the Soviet proposal was the only one remaining open to them. He asked how he could justify to his people an offhand rejection of the proposal. It was ‘due to the position to which Greece was reduced as a result of the hesitant policy followed heretofore by both the United States of America and the United Kingdom.’ He told Kissinger that he had advised Clerides to comply with a similar US request. As a result, not only had the situation not improved, but it had deteriorated to the extreme of ‘unhindered, further Turkish advances in Cyprus.’ He rejected the US suggestion to return to the negotiation table ‘under present circumstances.’ He said that Kissinger had proposed that the resumption of talks should come first and pressure by the US would follow. His government replied that pressure by Kissinger should come first, and if it proved effective, Greece would resume negotiations. However, Karamanlis took up Kissinger’s idea of having a safe and discreet way of exchanging views and left it to the Secretary to determine the method and the person who would be used. 17 Nevertheless, given Ecevit’s negative reply, the Soviet proposal was doomed to failure. Judging by the Soviet Union’s low-profile approach towards the crisis as a whole, it seems that the entire proposal was just another attempt to spoil the relations between the NATO allies. Of course, Moscow realised that Western policy operated on the principle of keeping the USSR out of the island rather than helping it to get more closely involved.

A Present for Secretary Kissinger – Greek-Cypriot Territory as a Bargaining Chip What would be the way ahead after the the dust of the crisis had settled? Would there be new negotiations? Could the refugees return? And most importantly, was Turkey really satisfied with what it had or would more territory be captured by the Turkish army? Reports of Turkish advances continued on 18 August. Macomber confronted Ecevit with situation reports 18 and pointed out that Troulli,

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Athinou, Pyroi, Potamia, and Dahli were south of the general NicosiaTymbou-Famagusta line. Ecevit said that while there had been ‘some flexibility’ along the southern line, the Turkish objectives had always been eastward not southward. Orders for a ceasefire had been issued but he could not rule out that enterprising captains on the ground, particularly if they were near predominately Turkish areas, would not on their own initiative seek further local advances. He said that he wanted Kissinger to know that Turkish troops had already acquired more territory than Turkish interest required. The extra, he said was a ‘present for Mr. Kissinger’, by which he explained he meant that there now was territory under Turkish control that could be offered up as a concessional gesture when the moment was appropriate. 19 The real chances of Turkish territorial concessions appeared to be limited from the beginning, as the British Defence Attaché reported on 17 August. According to his information, obtained from the military, ‘the Turkish held area is almost certainly non-negotiable.’ 20 However, given the fact that the army had actually taken more territory than originally intended and large numbers of Greek Cypriots were still living in the north, while tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots still resided in Greek territory or at the Akrotiri SBA, there was certainly more room for negotiation than there would be a couple of months later. If Turkey really wanted to return territory Kissinger sensed that it had better be sooner rather than later and tried to convince Ecevit to agree to a speedy resumption of talks. He wrote that he welcomed Ecevit’s assurances that Turkey had no intention of continuing the fighting. He also informed the Turkish Prime Minister that he appreciated the ‘present’ Ecevit had offered. He said that a ‘gesture at the right time’ would be essential. 21 Kissinger suggested that talks on the ground between Clerides and Denktaş should not be proposed. If those should come, it should be done on request from Greece, perhaps following a UK initiative. Ecevit reacted positively to this approach. As he read Kissinger’s message, he ‘smiled when it came to your reference to his “present” [and] said “certainly” when he heard your request that he hold off on a Denktaş approach to Clerides.’ 22 However, Clerides had realised that the Greek Government was not ready to return to the negotiations. Karamanlis had told him that he refused to negotiate unless the Turks retuned to the lines of 9 August. Instead, Clerides proposed direct talks with Denktaş. He told the American Ambassador that he could not, however, survive politically if these talks were labeled as a successor to Geneva (i.e., dealing with territory). Instead, they should discuss problems of refugees and POWs. While this would be the public position, it would be clearly understood in Ankara and Athens

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that once these topics were dispatched then the sensitive question of areas for Turkish enclaves could be addressed. 23

‘A hard character with not much charity in his soul’ – A Change in Turkish Attitude In earlier messages, Ecevit had indicated that he only wished to maintain control of about one half of Famagusta. On 20 August Kissinger reminded him of this and asked him to indicate what withdrawals he was prepared to make in advance of the negotiations. He told him that in talks with the British Clerides had accepted the principle of a bi-zonal federal solution. A new British initiative would now be made to Athens and Ankara. 24 Ecevit told Macomber on the evening of 20 August of revelations of new atrocities, which would affect Turkish public opinion. He mentioned a report ‘alleging that in the town of Atliar, near Famagusta, 57 TurkCypriots had been killed with only two left alive – an old man and a middle age woman, both of whom, he asserted, had been blinded.’ Macomber said that ‘stories of this kind, often compounded by exaggerations, were undoubtfully going to be circulated by both sides and that [he] saw nothing but danger coming from this mutual effort.’ It was possible that atrocities had been committed by both sides, but inflaming public opinion over them could only lead to more atrocities. Ecevit said that given the current Turkish mood that had sprung up as a result of the atrocity stories, it would not be possible for him to agree to any concessions being made by Turkey, even privately, to the Greeks before the conference began. Pressed by Macomber, who repeatedly mentioned that Ecevit left Kissinger with ‘very little to work with’, Ecevit agreed that immediately after the start of a conference in connection with the movement of Turkish Cypriots the area north of Dhekelia (the tourist hotel area of Famagusta/Varosha) could be returned. Ecevit said that he did not want any of the Greeks who had fled the Turkish region to return (‘Each would be a potential terrorist’). From now on no additional Greeks would be asked to leave, but those who had gone – and he admitted that these were many thousands – would not be welcomed back. 25 Two elements of the above conversation are striking. First, Macomber discounted the Atılar/Aloa event as another of the innumerable horror stories the Turks had produced throughout the crisis. After most – if not all – of them had been proven false, who would believe them now? Tragically, the story was only too correct, but the Turks had simply lost all credibility in this (see chapter 20 ‘Refugees and War Crimes’). Second, the Turkish position had hardened significantly. Apparently, Ecevit now thought to exploit the massacres at Atilar and other villages to justify the second Turkish military operation and the policy of expulsion of

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Greek Cypriots from Turkish-held territory. The ‘present’ to Kissinger had been reduced to the return of Varosha. In short, Turkey’s position had hardened: no refugee would return and most of the territory occupied in the recent war would remain under Turkish-Cypriot control. The new Turkish thinking prompted a more in-depth analysis of why Turkey had intervened in Cyprus in the first place. On 25 August the new US Ambassador to Nicosia, Dean Brown, wrote an assessment titled ‘Turkish Intentions on Cyprus’ in which he said: Turkish actions on ground, and statements by officials both here and in Ankara, have reinforced our initial impression that Turkish army intervened to protect the security of mainland and not assist local community, except insofar as this relates to primary purpose. Best indication this regard is total write off of enclaves located in southern half of island, despite repeated radio request for aid. So far as we aware, Turks made no effort reinforce or resupply these areas. Turk mainland commander in Larnaca, who exfiltrated in civilian dress via Dhekelia, reportedly told British that his instructions were to offer token resistance before surrendering. Said he had ample ammo and weapons to have continued fight for extended period. (This info, which contradicts accounts put out by Turkish Cypriot leaders, largely confirmed by UNFICYP observation.) Thus, while Turks had force to occupy entire island, and divide it up as they wished, they carefully limited operation to grabbing sufficient territory to insure that they would be in predominant position to dictate future status of an independent Cyprus. As we read their intentions, Turkey wants a federal (confederal) state and has little or no interest in creation of an independent Turk Cypriot mini-state, or move towards double Enosis. Either of latter two courses would run contrary to basic reason for intervention since, by implication, they would open the door to introduction of substantial Greek mainland forces onto the island. 26

Thus, in Brown’s assessment, Turkey’s entire policy had been based on domestic strategic considerations rather than on the wish to relieve the Turkish-Cypriot community and the Turks wanted to prevent double Enosis for exactly the same reason. The Turkish approach was personified by Ankara’s emissary in Cyprus, Asaf Inhan. A clearly disgusted US Ambassador Brown described Inhan’s personality on 30 August as follows: He is a hard character with not much charity in his soul. As far as he is concerned, the only purpose of negotiation will be to determine the line which separates the two federal regions, TA would not give much back. The population question is essentially determined; there will be little or no return of Greek Cypriots to the Turkish zone. He talks of a new and different

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Cyprus, which will be far more orientated towards Turkey economically and commercially (…). He approves Denktash-Clerides meetings as long as they do not stray into political matters (which is exactly what everyone here wishes to see happen). (…) He is a tired man after four years here and probably will not play a positive role. 27

Inhan’s attitude revealed as well how Turkey saw the present and future role of the Turkish-Cypriot community and of Denktaş as their leader: They were to follow Turkish orders and not to develop policies of their own. Greek Cypriots had no place in the new Turkish scheme. Subsequent Turkish policy was to make life at best ‘uncomfortable’ for those Greeks remaining in the north of the island. Denktaş rejected a proposal by Clerides to withdraw Turkish troops to the Güneş-line (i.e., Morphou to Famagusta) and to create a UN-controlled buffer zone in the remaining area, which could then be resettled by refugees. 28 The US Embassy reported on 25 September on the plight of Greek villages in Turkish zone. Citing a new confidential UNFICYP report the Embassy stressed harsh living conditions. Waldheim was planning to raise with Güneş’ problems of access and food supplies to these areas. There were food supplies available on the Greek side, but the Turkish army would not give the green light to allow their regular delivery by UNFICYP. Otherwise, commodities did not reach destinations. The report noted huge differences between conditions of Greek-Cypriot villages in the Turkish zone and Turkish-Cypriot villages in the Greek zone. While the UN was very satisfied with overall conditions in the south they complained about restricted access for UNFICYP and inadequate food supplies. The Turks had rejected visits, arguing that the ICRC and Red Crescent were doing an adequate job. The Embassy then referred to an unofficial report from Famagusta from earlier in September about ‘wholesale abandonment of villages, untended/stolen livestock, heavy looting by Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots. In addition it noted ‘minimal nourishment or water for remaining villages.’ Some 73 Greek Cypriots, recently evacuated from Morphou, had had to enter Nicosia General Hospital for urgent treatment. The UN understood that some 150 others still in the Morphou area required hospitalisation. Their evacuation had been impeded by the Greek side’s inability to encourage further Greek outflow from the area. The Embassy commented that the UN expert’s report rang true and reinforced earlier ICRC findings on which ICRC mission chief Marti had briefed the US Embassy. The Embassy’s own limited observation confirmed ‘that Turk occupation is indeed rugged, even for Turk Cypriots.’ There were however exceptions: Embassy visits to north shore villages (particularly Karvas and Bellapais) indicated that ‘life

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there [was] fairly normal, though strict curfew in force and movement outside village boundaries prohibited.’ The UK Consul, who had visited Yialousa (Karpass), had said that local conditions ‘appeared normal and situation similar to that which existed before occupation.’ ICRC had told the Embassy that the Turkish occupation in Morphou was ‘generally in accord with Geneva Conventions.’ 29 On 30 September Denktaş used a report on the shooting of a Greek priest and raping of his daughter in the Karpass region to gain more freedom of movement from the Turkish military. He told the US Ambassador that he had informed the mainland military the day before that he was going to visit the area to investigate personally and punish the Turkish Cypriot responsible for the crime. He had not received a reply for several hours but was finally informed that he could go, provided a military escort accompanied him. This was the first time since the Turkish military landed in Cyprus that Denktaş had been allowed to visit the Karpass peninsula. Denktaş’ thinking at that time regarding Greek Cypriots living in the north differed from that of the Turkish Government. US Ambassador William R. Crawford suggested that it would be ‘better to have in each zone a substantial minority as positive hostage to cooperation and harmony. To my surprise (and this is a change on his part) Denktash agreed and commented that “substantial” would have to be defined very carefully. One could not define it to permit growth of an EOKA-B in Turkish zone.’ Denktaş’ success in gaining more political influence and freedom, however, was still limited. He had asked Clerides for permission for Turkish representatives to visit Turkish-Cypriot villages in the Greek zone. Clerides had told him that would not be a problem provided Clerides first visited Yialousa (in Karpass peninsula) or Bellapais and Kyrenia. Denktaş twice requested approval of the mainland military for him to escort Clerides to Yialousa but was refused permission. 30 By November Denktaş had managed to get Turkish approval for upgrading his Turkish-Cypriot administration into a Council of Ministers. At the same time a number of other measures solidified the Turkish mainland’s hold on Turkish-Cypriot affairs. The Greek Government complained to the US on 4 November and listed a number of Turkish faits accomplis in the north: a)

Establishment of full administrative organization in Morphou; renaming of Turkish Cypriot administration in ‘Council of Ministers’; b) Renaming of Greek cities and villages, roads and squares;

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Turkish Cypriots setting up own tariff for telephone and telex services; d) Harvesting of agricultural products on Greek land; formation of export company for citrus fruit; e) Amalgamation of Greek commercial and industrial concerns into Turkish Cypriot holding; f) Turkish occupation authorities had appealed to Turkish Cypriots to return; but GOG fears that actually Turks from Anatolia would come; g) Turkish currency will be used concurrently with Cypriot money; Turkish Cypriots will introduce their own stamps, courts, travel documents; h) Direct shipping lines with Anatolia; i) Turkish Banks are opening branches in Kyrenia; j) Independent Directorate of Antiquities, Ministries for Programming and Coordination, Tourism and Promotion, and Housing and Rehabilitation to be established.’ 31

As Inhan had predicted, Turkey was organizing, at least in the north, ‘a new and different Cyprus, which [was] far more orientated towards Turkey.’ 32

Tyler’s Mission to Athens – No Chance for a Solution Callaghan had told Kissinger on 15 August that there could be unfortunate consequences if the Turks created a situation where the de facto partition of the island resulted in Enosis, whether double or otherwise. Among other things, Makarios would become a Greek politician. An alliance between Makarios and Papandreou would result in a neutralist government in Greece. 33 Kissinger repeated this fear in a conversation with Ford and said that it was ‘important to keep the Greeks with the West.’ They had to tell the Greeks that the status quo would work against them. In order to use American influence against the Turks, the Greeks had to stop their anti-Americanism. He had told the Greek-American lobbyists that ‘if this anti-Americanism is encouraged they were putting Papandreou into office.’ He continued: ‘The reason we weren’t anti-Greek at the outset of the Cyprus problem is we foresaw problems for the Greeks and didn’t want to be blamed. Karamanlis came in and we got blamed anyway.’ He warned of a ‘Makarios-Papandreou atmosphere in Greece’, which was a ‘poor prospect.’ That was why the US could not break with the Turks. To stop the Turks they would have to ‘threaten a cutoff and promise them twothirds of what they got. The Greeks couldn’t have it and we still would have been the whipping boy. Now we must extract from the Turks and we are better off that way now.’ 34

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An approach towards Greece was nevertheless needed, if talks were to be arranged. On 28 August Karamanlis accepted Kissinger’s idea of having a safe and discreet way of exchanging views and left it to the Secretary to determine the method and the person to be used. 35 Kissinger decided to send Ambassador William R. Tyler. Tyler had been the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, but had retired in 1969. He was Director of the Dumbarton Oaks Research Center of Harvard University in Washington. 36 Karamanlis insisted that Tyler’s visit should be kept secret. He stressed that the US had made mistakes in the handling of the crisis. However, this was in the past and he would cooperate fully with the Secretary and with Ambassador Tyler in working for what he termed an ‘honorable solution.’ 37 Since secrecy was agreed, Tyler traveled officially in his capacity as Director of the Dumbarton Oaks Research Center. 38 Tyler had two meetings with Karamanlis on 9 and 11 September. During the first meeting Karamanlis ruled out any major role for the United Kingdom in the future, saying: ‘There are no Guarantor Powers. You have the Turks, you have us, and the British sit with their arms folded.’ 39 Meanwhile, the planned secrecy of Tyler’s visit was spoilt. On 10 September the BBC and Reuters correspondents called the US Embassy to ask about Tyler’s identity. 40 The Americans accused the British Ambassador of leaking the information of Tyler’s visit to the press, despite the fact that he had been informed only in order to pass the information to the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. 41 Kissinger complained about this to the British Ambassador to Washington, Ramsbotham. Ramsbotham commented on this in a telegram to Callaghan that this was not the first time Kissinger accused the British of leaks which subsequently ‘proved to be the responsibility of someone else, usually the Americans.’ 42 During the second meeting in the evening of 10 September Karamanlis gave Tyler his assessment of the Cyprus crisis: ‘The Junta made a stupid mistake in trying to purge Makarios and they later claimed to have been encouraged from Washington.’ Karamanlis said that he believed that the attempted coup could have been prevented by Washington and London. The British had both the right and the duty under the London-Zurich accords to act to protect the independence and legitimacy of Cyprus. They failed to do so. He sensed that the Turks had taken advantage of the Junta’s stupidity to execute a plan they had prepared beforehand. Karamanlis believed that the Americans and British could have prevented both the Junta’s coup against Makarios and the Turkish landings in Cyprus. He asked that ‘Washington should admit that it had followed the wrong policy.’ At Geneva the Turks had proposed a plan which was unacceptable to the Greek Government. Nevertheless, the Greek Government requested a delay of 24 hours to study the Turkish proposal. Karamanlis narrated that

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‘because of the lack of a Turkish response to the Greek request, the twentyfour hours became thirty-six hours. Secretary Kissinger had called the PM at two in the morning asking him to keep Mavros and the Greek delegation in Geneva. The PM had done so and had then found himself faced with a Turkish ultimatum. The Turks launched their attack at five in the morning.’ In his evaluation this had been ‘an attempt to kill my government and they did it under the eyes of the Americans.’ For these reasons he believed that the US had made mistakes ‘both of omission and commission.’ Tyler answered that the President and Secretary believed that ‘we had done everything we could (…). We had no intention of admitting mistakes because we did not accept that we had made mistakes.’ Tyler then outlined Kissinger’s ideas for a solution: • some kind of bizonal federal arrangement (Karamanlis: ‘We accept this idea, although the Greek Cypriots do not!’); • some reduction in the area of Turkish control; • important reductions in size of Turkish troops, and; • return of some refugees; but probably a fairly sizable exchange of populations as well. Answering Karamanlis’ question whether these were Kissinger’s views on a final solution, Tyler said that they were his preliminary estimates. Any bizonal federal solution had to be accepted by the two communities. In conclusion, Karamanlis said that the Greek Government was aware that it would have to make concessions but ‘we will not let the Turks have everything they want.’ In 1960 the Greeks had abandoned Enosis and accepted independence; in 1974 the Greeks were prepared to accept modifications of the 1960 structure and the creation of a federal system. It was not realistic to expect the Greek Government to go further than that. 43 Karamanlis handed Tyler an unofficial statement of the Greek position on a possible Cyprus solution. Therein, Karamanlis laid out two preconditions for direct negotiations with the Turks. First, the Turkish forces had to withdraw to the line of 9 August or, at least, north of the Piroi area and the old Nicosia-Famagusta road. Second, the refugees should return to their homes in safety. If these conditions were not met, an indirect dialogue through a third power could start at once. The basis of such an exchange of views could be the federative organization of the Cypriot state under the following conditions: a)

The Turkish area would correspond approximately to the percentage of Turkish Cypriot population; b) No exchange of populations would take place; c) refugees would return to their homes where they would be allowed to reside in safety;

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the Federal government would have substantive powers effectively ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Republic would be demilitarised and an effective system of guarantees put in place to preclude a repetition of the ‘Turkish invasion.’ A new constitution could be drawn in talks between Clerides and Denktash under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and in the presence of Greek and Turkish Ambassadors. 44 These conditions were unlikely to meet with Turkish approval especially since the Turkish Government had evidently hardened its views on the shape of a future settlement. Kissinger informed Ecevit on 20 September about Tyler’s talks in Athens and told him that he had the clear impression that Karamanlis was trying to move toward a resumption of negotiations, but found himself in a very difficult position domestically. He said that Karamanlis’ conditions for the resumption were excessive but stated that he thought that most of the problems were caused by Karamanlis’ domestic situation and he believed that with patience they could be removed. 45 There was actually nothing in what Karamalis had said to justify this hope. Moreover, the Greeks were not now the most important players if a new understanding were to be reached. The only chance of a solution would come from the Greek-Cypriot side. And there two figures were standing against each other, Clerides and Makarios.

20 Refugees and War Crimes

Human suffering rarely plays an important role in international policymaking. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 was no exception. British and American diplomacy was focused on preventing a war between Greece and Turkey, and secondarily on keeping the Soviets out of the game. This study has demonstrated that both London and Washington were not married to any specific solution on Cyprus. Any scheme that would lead to stability in the region was acceptable to them. As long as this did not involve the ‘exchange of population’, a term coined to disguise what it actually meant, that is, the forceful eviction of people from their homes, they had no genuine objections. The fate of refugees and other victims of war did not figure high on the agenda of the US State Department. In the US files, refugees are discussed for the most part in connection with food supplies, and other war crimes are hardly dealt with. This can be blamed partly on the fact that reports of atrocities at the beginning of the crisis mainly proved inaccurate. In addition, the overall casualties, even in relation to the total population, never reached numbers comparable to contemporary crises such as Vietnam or Cambodia. On the Turkish policy of expelling Greek Cypriots from their territory, US Ambassador Davies simply commented on 15 August: ‘We suspect that there is no (…) way to prevent Turks from expelling majority of Greek Cypriots living within their area of control. Assuming they will make every effort [to] turn expulsion into trade off,

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exchange Greek Cypriots for their compatriots located elsewhere on the island.’ 1 The British files differ in this respect from the Americans because refugees actually sought refuge on the SBAs. These refugees posed a real problem to the British authorities, which produced a number of files dealing with these specific groups of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Most of the UK files do not concern the refugee problem as a whole but are confined to those allocated to the British bases. However, the first warnings that a huge refugee problem might develop became apparent during the drafting of a report by officials of the Guarantee Powers regarding detainees. The Turkish side stated that no civilians were being detained by them. The report said, ‘There are, however, a number of Greek Cypriots in the Dome Hotel, Kyrenia, and a considerable number in Bellapais who, while not under constraint, have not returned to their homes.’ The officials agreed that the process of exchange and release should begin on 12 August and be completed not later than 22 August. Turkish-Cypriot civilians under detention were to be released on 12 August and Greek Cypriots who had taken refuge in the Dome Hotel, Kyrenia, should be informed by the authorities on 12 August that those who were willing and able to do so could return to their homes at once. A British and Greek draft proposal referred to ‘Cypriots who had left their homes, whether voluntarily or not’, while a Turkish draft said that ‘prisoners of war and civilian detainees’ would be permitted to return to their homes by the Greek, Turkish, GreekCypriot and Turkish-Cypriot authorities. 2 Goodison asked himself: ‘If the Turks will not accept the British and Greek text, why not? Do they not accept the principle that people must be able to return to their homes?’ Goodison rightly assumed that this was actually the ‘beginning of forcible separation of the communities.’ 3

Refugees on the British Bases The British authorities in the Sovereign Base Areas first became involved with refugees on the day Turkish Forces landed in the north of Cyprus. By the evening of 20 July some hundreds of Cypriot nationals had sought refuge in British territory. The numbers were minimal in the Dhekelia area (Eastern SBA) and they were absorbed in Greek and Turkish communities bordering on the area, but in the Western SBA (Akrotiri) some 200 to 300 Greek Cypriots and 2,000 to 3,000 Turkish Cypriots arrived during the day. Women and children of Turkish families were allowed to spend the night seated in the open air cinema at Episkopi and Greek families were directed to Curium beach. The number of Turkish refugees at Episkopi then continued to increase as inhabitants of local villages abandoned their houses in the face of continued harassment by regular and irregular Greek-

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Cypriot forces. The decision was taken to implement contingency plans for the construction of refuge camps. Similar arrangements on a much smaller scale were set up for the Greek Cypriots at the other end of Episkopi cantonment for a few days, after which the inhabitants dispersed into the Republic. Contingency plans provided resources for operation of refugee camps for some 5 to 10 days, but it soon became clear that the TurkishCypriot refugees would need humanitarian assistance for a matter of weeks rather than days. By early August some 5,500 Turkish Cypriots were housed in two camps in the WSBA. Continued efforts were made to secure the cooperation of local civil and military authorities to resettle the refugees in their homes but these were unsuccessful. There was a time in the early stages when the Turkish refugees in the WSBA might well have been persuaded to return to their villages under UN protection but approaches, including at the highest level, were unsuccessful. Later, when the Turks would not return to their homes in any circumstances, the Greek-Cypriot authorities, faced with the huge transfer of population from the north, were most anxious to get the Turks to return to their areas as a lever for the return of Greeks to their homes in the north. 4 Following the failure of the Geneva talks and the renewed outbreaks of fighting on 14 August, the rate of inflow of Turkish Cypriots to the WSBA increased. However, the main focus of attention was an enormous influx of Greek Cypriots, mainly from Famagusta and Nicosia, into the Dhekelia SBA (ESBA). Estimates put the number in the region of 120,000, the majority of whom went to the Republican enclave villages of Xylotahou and Ormidhia, but about 10,000 took shelter in the Athna Forest, on the SBA territory. 5 The British High Commission had arranged for a number of civilians, including some foreign nationals, to be settled in Anzio Camp – a selfcontained hutted camp normally occupied by exercise troops in Dhekelia – and beds and a diet to European standards were provided for them. The majority of them were Greek Cypriots. Some of them opted to move to the UK or to alternative accommodation in the Republic, but a hard core remained. 6 In the Western SBA there was a change in the attitude of the Turkish refugees, who had largely abandoned any thought of returning to their former homes in favour of resettlement elsewhere. By 29 August their number had increased to 7,250. 7 On 23 August the Turkish and TurkishCypriot authorities had asked the British authorities to allow their mass evacuation by sea, ostensibly to Turkey; the refugees themselves embarked on a campaign of support for this request, inspired from the outside and pressed by militants on the inside, on the promise that the refugees were being forcibly detained by the British from settling in the north of the

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island. The features were non-cooperation in the running of the camp (including some deliberate unhygienic practices) and demonstrations in married quarter and office areas in Episkopi. The SBA authorities tried to contain these measures by instituting regular discussions with the spokesman of the refugees, Fikri Karayel, about the conduct of demonstrations and about alleviation of camp conditions. The latter included engaging small numbers of refugees for camp duties on a paid basis. 8 Nevertheless, unrest continued throughout the period. For example, on 15 September 300 men with stones and staves demonstrated outside their camp and shortly thereafter a crowd of 1,000 persons marched on CBFNE’s residence. 9 Commander John Aiken and Phillips in Ankara argued in favour of a speedy transfer of the Turkish Cypriots, while Olver insisted that for the time being the movement of these Turkish Cypriots to the north could only be contemplated as part of a general political agreement between the two communities. 10 Callaghan decided to follow Olver’s advice and the refugees had to stay. However, he proposed that a transfer might be feasible if the Turks were to allow resettlement of Greek Cypriots in Famagusta. 11 Kissinger joined in and informed Ecevit on 6 September that regarding the plight of Turkish Cypriots not now within the Turkish-controlled zone he had no specific proposal but he believed that there might be an arrangement in the framework of the Clerides-Denktash discussions in which Greek Cypriots could return to certain areas as the new city of Famagusta while at the same time Turkish-Cypriots could move to the northern part of the island. 12 Little progress was made in the intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktaş and they were reduced to dealing with humanitarian aspects. In the beginning, Clerides was opposed to any transfers of Turkish Cypriots and argued they should return to their villages in the south. He rightly feared that by allowing this movement he would diminish the chances of Greek-Cypriot refugees to return to the north. 13 The first organised movement from the camps was of some 120 university and higher technical college students who went to Turkey under UN arrangements in order to resume their studies; on 30 November agreement was reached on the movement of limited categories of displaced persons. With the cooperation of leaders among the refugees, lists were drawn up of those who appeared to fall within the agreed categories, except for the purely medical cases, which were to be selected by ICRC doctors. The lists were sent through UN and ICRC channels for clearance in Nicosia. The clearing processes not only proved very slow and cumbersome but were clearly prone to political obstruction. Some 560 students left under these arrangements. Between 1 December 1974 and 20 January 1975 715 Turkish Cypriots went to the north, while 245 remained

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on the waiting list and 505 Greek Cypriots went south, compared to 123 on the waiting list. 14 By contrast UN-sponsored movement of Turkish Cypriots from villages in the south of the Republic proceeded briskly. 15 Matters came to a head on 17 December when Archbishop Makarios, at a few hours notice, travelled to the area with a view to visiting the Turkish refugee camps. Olver found no reason to object to the visit and agreed after consultations with the FCO and with the Acting Base Administrator. Denktaş was informed and his message asking for cooperation was passed to the refugee leaders a little in advance of the planned time of arrival. It was hoped that this would forestall Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations against the visit. As Makarios’ motorcade approached Long Beach camp it was obstructed by Turkish-Cypriot refugees and a tense situation arose. The Archbishop had to withdraw and returned to Nicosia. Resentment among the refugees, particularly at the fact that Makarios had brought his own armed escort, developed into rioting near Paramali Station resulting in severe damage to two wine tankers and a Land Rover belonging to a road construction company; some damage was caused by stone throwing to police vehicles and to married quarters in Paramali North. The situation was contained without resort to force and the crowds dispersed after four hours. 16 Unrest continued in the Turkish camps, including attempted and actual burning of administration tents and structures. On the night of 9 January a heavy storm resulted in a number of tents collapsing in Paramali Forest Camp, the damage as usual being deliberately worsened for appearance’s sake. In the course of a rowdy demonstration, attempts were made to prevent the Chief Officer and other staff who had gone to the scene from leaving the area; a van and two Land Rovers were overturned, and the RAF Police tent was attacked and ransacked. There were further threats to march on the married quarters. 17 On 30 December Callaghan decided to stop at Akrotiri on his way to Africa. He visited Episkopi and spoke to Olver and Aiken. He wrote to Kissinger that he feared that next month the plight of the refugees could deteriorate and the Turkish government might try to stir up security troubles. 18 On 28 December Callaghan had already tried to impress on Makarios that Turkish Cypriots could not be kept on the SBAs much longer. 19 Now he decided to review British policy on the Turkish refugees and concluded that neither British nor Greek-Cypriot interests would be served by refusing any longer to permit their removal to the north; the governments of Greece and Cyprus were then put on notice that a decision to let them go would have to be taken very soon if no intercommunal agreement could be reached in the meantime. On 14 January the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary instructed the Ambassadors in Ankara and

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Athens and the High Commissioner in Nicosia to pass messages to the respective governments that, for overwhelming humanitarian reasons, he had decided that he should let the Turkish Government remove those refugees who were currently in the WSBA and wished to go. He did not want this to be made public immediately, but he had directed that an open census should be held on 16 January to find out the wishes of individuals. 20 The refugees were told of the census operation only on the previous afternoon in order to reduce the risk of an influx of those Turkish Cypriots still living in the Republic. The census was designed to elicit from each family unit a Yes or No answer to the question – ‘Do you wish to go to Turkey?’, and to record the main details of those wishing to go so that they could be readily identified subsequently. It went on throughout the day of 17 January. 21 UNHCR and the International Red Cross were invited to send representatives to observe the proceedings but both declined on the grounds that they should not formally recognise proceedings that were not agreed by both Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot authorities. 22 The outcome was that everyone who applied to be recorded in the census opted to go. 23 The British authorities were surprised that the number of names registered proved to be only a few short of 12,000 – a figure some 3,000 in excess of previous estimates of the refugee population. Since the number of people actually evacuated by air in due course was just under 9,400, it appeared that many people who were not present in the SBA were registered at the time of the census, presumably in the hope – largely unfulfilled – that they would be able to arrive in time for evacuation. 24 The Greek and Greek-Cypriot reaction to the British decision was hostile. The Greek-Cypriot Foreign Minister, Ioannis Christofides, protested to Olver saying that the Turkish refugees in the WSBA formed only a small part of the problem. The British decision to move them would prejudice the possibility of a satisfactory overall solution. 25 The Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios took pretty much the same line in condemning the one-sided British act. 26 In Cyprus, Greek-Cypriot demonstraters tried on 17 January to disrupt road travel to the airport. Several service vehicles were burned and the RAF Regiment were obliged to use batons and CS smoke. One young demonstrator was killed accidentally by a UNFICYP armoured car. 27 Protests continued over the next few days but failed to hinder the operation. The actual removal of the refugees was done by a shuttle service of Turkish civil aircraft between Adana and Akrotiri, starting with three flights on the first day and working up to eight or ten at peak. The official report on the evacuation noted: ‘Despite the necessarily improvised nature of

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these arrangements and the largely peasant-farmer composition of the travellers, the operation went smoothly, the daily total of passengers increasing from 370 on the first day to 1,700 on the fifth day. The final flight on 27 January which included medical cases from [the Military Hospital] Akrotiri, brought the total to 9,390 in 57 flights.’ 28 As they departed, the refugees handed in firearms, which included 31 rifles, 32 machine guns, 10 pistols, 26 grenades and 9,000 rounds of ammunition. The British authorities suspected that these had been hidden near the SBA boundary rather than in the camps. 29 The refugees left behind some 650 vehicles, ranging from cycles to bulldozers, and a mountain of baggage that has been estimated as amounting to 30 Hercules loads. These possessions were taken to a wiredin compound at RAF Episkopi and the baggage covered with old tentage and tarpaulins, though no responsibility was accepted for them. The GreekCypriot Foreign Minister Christofides intervened against any removal of these items since Greek-Cypriot refugees had left behind most of their belongings in the north. Britain was first inclined to leave them on the base until there was intercommunal agreement on the terms for their removal. 30 . Meanwhile it turned out that they provided a constant temptation to thieves. On 28 April five Greek Cypriots were arrested and charged for attempting to steal Turkish-Cypriot property. 31 The possessions were finally moved via the UN Headquarters at Nicosia Airport under the codename ‘reindeer.’ 32 There were no more refugees left at Akrotiri SBA and by February attention had shifted back to the Dhekelia area where the new Republican camp on SBA territory had at last been completed and had begun to be occupied. Difficulties continued in persuading the Athna Forest refugees to move to the new camp, primarily because those of them whose homes were in Athna village were reluctant to move any further away than they had to – a sentiment that was probably reinforced when the Turkish Army made overt moves in February to prepare the village for occupation; fortunately these moves were forestalled by diplomatic action. In September 1975 there were still 7,000 Greek Cypriots in the ESBA and 8,000 in the Republican enclaves. 33 In order to provide space for Greek-Cypriot refugees and to ease pressure on the ESBA, Britain had returned the retained site at Limassol on 2 July for resettlement. Retained sites were those sites situated outside the SBAs, which were reserved for British Military use under the 1960 agreements. On 7 October 1975 Callaghan proposed giving up two other retained sites at Polemidhia and Ziyyi to settle Greek-Cypriot refugees. 34 The Greek Cypriots accepted and Polemidhia was handed over on 14 November and Ziyyi at the end of that month. 35

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Population Exchange After the Cyprus crisis Greek-Cypriot policy was based on the principle of discouraging emigration. The aim was to return as many Greek Cypriots to the north instead of encouraging Greek Cypriots to move to the south. The problem with this policy was that it ran contrary to the Greek Cypriots desire to live in safety. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin, told the UK Mission at Geneva on 30 August 1974 that almost all, if not all of the Greek Cypriots in Turkish-held areas wanted to get out into the Greek area. Only about 6000 or 7000 remained. Turkish Cypriots in the isolated communities in Greek areas had been disarmed and lived in fear of their lives. Were it not for UNFICYP and particularly the British contingent they would receive ‘short shrift’ from their Greek neighbours. 36 The High Commissioner estimated on 9 September 1974 that there were 225 000 refugees, 154 000 in the South, 50 000 Greek Cypriots and 7 888 Turkish Cypriots in the SBAs and 8 000 in the North. In addition, there were still 35 000 Turkish Cypriots living in the South and 20 000 Greek Cypriots in the North in need of protection. 37 Ten month later, there were still 10 294 Greek Cypriots living in the north and 10 187 Turkish Cypriots residing in the south of the island. 38 It remained the goal of the Turkish side to get almost all Turkish Cypriots to settle in the north. Realising that this would end all hopes of return for Greek-Cypriot refugees, the Greek side wanted to prevent this. As negotiations did not progress Denktaş resorted to open threats. During a speech he gave on the anniversary of the Turkish military operation on 20 July he said that he could ‘not accept any formula which puts Turkish Cypriot Community under the yoke of the Greek Cypriots. (…) Not one Turkish Cypriot who does not want to remain in the South will remain in the South. We shall implement our plan and programme of transferring kinsmen in the South to the North in the coming month. Otherwise not even a single Greek Cypriot will remain in the North. We will return them to the Greek Cypriots.’ Denktaş repeated this threat in a conversation with Olver, whom he told that henceforth if any Turkish Cypriot who whished to leave the South were prevented from doing so, he would despatch south five times as many Greek Cypriots, continuing daily until the Turkish Cypriots were allowed to leave. 39 In the end Denktaş and Clerides agreed at the 3rd round of the Vienna talks (31 July to 2 August 1975) on the following principles for the exchange of populations: a) Turkish Cypriots in the South were allowed, if they wanted, to proceed to the North; b) Greek Cypriots in the North were free to stay;

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c) Greek Cypriots in the North could move to the South at their own request and without being subjected to any kind of pressure; d) Reunification of families, of which a number might involve the transfer of Greek Cypriots in the South to the North. 40 The population movement proceeded smoothly: as of 7 September 8 033 Turkish Cypriots had been moved to the North – thus completing that transfer operation. 296 Greek Cypriots moved north and 14 more were due to be moved. 149 Greek Cypriots moved south. 41 According to Greek-Cypriot estimates the total number of GreekCypriot refugees moving to the south between July 1974 und December 1975 was 142 000. 42 Those remaining in the north were, in contravention of the Vienna agreement, subjected to harsh conditions forcing more and more to move. Today there are less than 600 mainly elderly Greek Cypriots left, most of them residing in the Karpass peninsula. 43

Exchange of Prisoners The first exchange of prisoners was organised following the first Geneva Conference. A report by officials of the Guarantee Powers reported at the second conference that ‘of persons detained by either side, five Greek Cypriot prisoners of war had been released by the Turkish authorities and, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 38 Turkish Cypriots had been released by the Greek Cypriot authorities. These comprised wounded persons with the exception of one Greek Cypriot who was released on account of his age. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, among the prisoners of war still held there are only five Greek nationals now in a camp at Adana. 16 Turkish nationals are being held by the Greek Cypriot authorities. All other detained persons are of Cypriot nationality. 375 Greek Cypriot prisoners of war are detained in the camp at Adana and 63 in the Seray police station at Nicosia. According to the Greek Cypriot authorities, 2,582 Turkish Cypriots are being held by them as prisoners of war. The Greek side said that 686 Turkish Cypriot civilians were under detention.’ 44 Following the second round of fighting, on 14 September Clerides and Denktaş agreed on the exchange of all prisoners. 3,400 Turkish Cypriots and 2,300 Greek Cypriots were released. 45 When the numbers were announced it appeared that many soldiers (and civilians) were missing.

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Missing Persons – and other War Crimes More then 30 years after the Cyprus war there are still over 2,000 Cypriots registered as ‘missing.’ Figures released after the war by Turkish and Greek authorities estimated the numbers of soldiers killed in action as 250 Turkish and 700 Greek. 46 Greek-Cypriot civilian fatalities are reported as 192. 47 Turkish-Cypriot figures given in confidence to the British High Commission in 1975 recorded 965 Turkish Cypriots as dead. 48 Others not recorded were classified as missing. An intercommunal ‘Committee of Missing Persons’ is still discussing details about the location of mass graves and their excavation. Greek Cypriots claim that there are 1,493 Greek Cypriots missing since summer 1974. 49 Turkish Cypriots claim that there are 803 missing since 1963. 50 For the most part, this is a diplomatic history of the tragic events in summer 1974 based on British and American government files. It is a saddening feature that so little attention was paid to this issue in London and Washington. As a result there is not enough evidence from those sources to allow for a balanced and conclusive judgement on the war crimes committed by Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish, and Turkish-Cypriot troops and irregulars during the crisis. However, no account of a war like the one in Cyprus would be complete without at least mentioning the victims and referring to the suffering of innocent people entangled in the conflict. There is conclusive evidence for a vast number of war crimes committed by both sides during the summer of 1974. Among these are cold-blooded murders (amounting in certain cases to massacres of entire village populations), rapes, looting, and burning of houses and religious buildings. Unfortunately, the topic has never been addressed in a satisfactory manner. The perpetrators of the crimes, though known in many cases, have never been brought to trial. Instead, the events have been employed as weapons in the cold war persisting between the conflict parties. The nonsolution of the Cyprus problem has resulted in one-sided perceptions of the war crimes. 51 For a long time, Turkish-Cypriot publications on the topic excluded any reference to Turkish offences. Equally Greek-Cypriot accounts of 1974 hardly ever mentioned any Turkish-Cypriot sufferings. However, there are exceptions to this rule. Greek-Cypriot and TurkishCypriot journalists were the first to address the sufferings on both sides. Sevgül Uludağ wrote a number of articles in the newspapers Yenidüzen and Alithia dealing with war crimes committed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Some of the articles were published in a book called Cyprus: The Untold Stories. 52 The Greek-Cypriot journalist Tony Angastiniotis made a film called Voice of Blood in which he describes the massacres committed in four

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Turkish-Cypriot villages on 14 August 1974. The story of how he produced the movie is published in a book called Trapped in the Green Line. 53 Both works rely on interviews with survivors and do not claim to cover all war crimes committed in 1974. Nevertheless, in the absence of scholarly works on this topic they form valuable contributions to the history of Cyprus. According to Uludağ, massacres against Greek Cypriots were committed in Palekythrea (Balıkesir), Kythrea (Degirmenlik), and Assia (Paşaköy). In Palekythrea three Turkish Cypriots murdered around 18 persons (mainly women and children) on 16 August 1974; only three Greek Cypriots survived. At Kythrea, Turkish soldiers killed a family of three (mother, father, and daughter) and buried them under a vine tree. The biggest massacre of Greek Cypriots occurred on 14 August at Assia, where after an orgy of rape and torture by Turkish soldiers 84 people ‘disappeared.’ So far, only one corpse has been recovered. The remaining 83 are still on the list of ‘missing persons.’ Another story related by Uludağ is the killing of a GreekCypriot priest and the rape of his daughters by Turkish Cypriots in Trikomo on the Karpass peninsula. 54 In addition, Uludağ tells of a mass grave found at Trachonas (Kızılbaş), where among others the body of a Greek Cypriot missing from Yiallousa (Yeni Erenköy) has been recovered. 55 Both Uludağ and Angastiniotis cover massacres committed by mainly Greek-Cypriot irregulars on 14 August 1974. In the villages of Maratha (Muratağa), Sandalaris (Sandalar) and Aloa (Atlılar) 124 Turkish Cypriots, the youngest being a 16-day-old girl, the oldest an 88-year-old woman, were murdered by Greek Cypriots from neighbouring Peristeronopigi (Alaniçi). Their corpses were found later dismembered in a mass grave. Angastiniotis relates that at least one of the attackers had spoken with a mainland Greek accent suggesting that he had been a junior mainland officer. 56 Another massacre was committed against Turkish Cypriots from Tohni, where the entire male population (80) was arrested and brought to a camp somewhere between Aya Fila and Palodya. There they were put against a wall and shot. Only one of them survived. 57 Uludağ and Angastiniotis also mention Aleminyo/Alamino 58 and Trimithi 59 as places where war crimes were committed against Turkish and Greek Cypriots respectively. These stories indicate that war crimes happened in different parts of the island, but they are of course not exhaustive. There has never been an independent investigation into the matter and many stories remain untold. The Greek-Cypriot director Panikos Chrysanthou made a couple of documentaries covering various other cases of murder and rape during the 1974 crisis. 60 Given the conservative structure of Cypriot societies at that time, it is quite possible that in many cases woman simply tried to keep the

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fact that they were raped to themselves in order to protect their honour in the eyes of others. Thus the exact figure of rapes will probably never be established. On 15 October 1974 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) requested assistance from the British in the treatment of GreekCypriot woman raped by Turks. In talks between Clerides and Denktaş it had been agreed that ‘the women victims should be returned with their families to their communities for examination, treatment and release.’ The ICRC had noted only two Turkish-Cypriot cases of rape so far, and Denktaş was confident that these could be ‘handled discreetly in the north.’ However, there were 40 Greek-Cypriot women involved and Clerides did not think that so many could be dealt with in hospitals in the Republic ‘without exciting considerable hostile publicity.’ Therefore, ICRC asked whether the women could be treated in the British Bases. 61 A total of 37 Greek-Cypriot women were finally transferred and treated between 22 and 29 October at the Military Hospital at Akrotiri. They were between 12 and 45 years old, with the majority being at the younger end of the age scale. Two of the women (aged 14 and 21) were pregnant and abortions were carried out in accordance with a special SBA ordnance drawn to legalise these acts. 62 In 1976 the European Commission on Human Rights analysed only war crimes committed by Turkish soldiers. Referring to an incident near Elia (Ayios Elias?) the Commission reported the killing of 12 civilians by Turkish soldiers commanded by an officer. The Commission concluded from other evidence provided by the Republic of Cyprus that ‘killings happened on a larger scale than in Elia.’ In addition, the Commission regarded as established that incidents of rape happened constituting ‘inhuman treatment.’ 63 The Commission found that ‘rapes were committed by Turkish soldiers and at least in two cases by Turkish officers, and this is not only in some isolated cases of indiscipline. It has not been shown that the Turkish authorities took adequate measures to prevent this happening or that they generally took any disciplinary measures following such incidents.’ 64 The Commission decided only to investigate the said incident in Elia and did not go into further cases. Besides, since the case was brought against Turkey by the Greek-Cypriot Government there was no investigation into Greek or Greek-Cypriot violations of the charter. As a result, the Commission never achieved a full account of the war crimes committed in 1974. In one of the rare scholarly books on the fate of refugees in Cyprus, Peter Loizos relates the story of the rape of a ninety-year-old woman by Turkish soldiers in the village of Argaki and the killing of – among others – a Turkish-Cypriot child on behalf of an EOKA-B militant, called Kajis,

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from Argaki in Gaziveran village. 65 It must be concluded that many more cases remain unknown. Again, those cases occurred on both sides and an independent study has still to come. If one compares the Cyprus case with more recent cases of forced population exchange like those in Bosnia and Kosovo, one has to ask whether rape was used as an ‘instrument’ employed to make people leave. The little evidence at hand at the moment suggests that there was probably no order issued by the Turkish Army for deliberate raping. Nor are there any stories suggesting the introduction of mass rape or of raping camps as there were in Bosnia. Angastiniotis was probably right when he said that ‘there are no barbaric societies, only barbaric individuals.’ He reasoned that there were Turkish officers who killed their prisoners and others who saved them. Similarly, there were cases where Turkish officers prevented their soldiers from raping Greek Cypriots and other cases where they turned a blind eye or encouraged them or participated themselves. 66 It is very unlikely that Turkish officers would have prevented rapes if there had been an explicit order. However, the truth will not be known until relevant Turkish archives are opened. Among the few references to war crimes to be found in British archives there is a judgement by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin, who told the UK Mission at Geneva on 30 August that ‘even if many units of the Turkish army were maintaining discipline and behaving well some units were behaving very badly.’ 67 This would confirm the above reasoning. In the American files there is a report on the above-mentioned killing of a priest and rape of his (one) daughter in a Karpass village. Denktaş informed the US Ambassador about the crime on 12 September. He told him that he was shocked by evidence of recent inhumanity by both communities, which would exacerbate the problem of finding a solution and would make living peacefully together difficult for years to come. He had just returned from his first visit to Greek and Turkish villages in the Karpass peninsula, where he went in order to investigate personally and punish the shooting by a Turkish Cypriot of a Greek priest and raping of his daughter. Although [the] incident had taken place several days previously, it had not been acted on by mainland military. Aware of how much this would hurt Clerides once publicised, he said he had informed the mainland military the day before that he was going. He had not received a reply for several hours but was finally informed that he could, provided military escort accompany. (…) Denktash said he had arrived at mixed village where incident had taken place prepared to arrest offending Turkish Cypriot but mainland military had acted previous evening. In touring villages in area and speaking to villagers both Greek and Turkish, he had

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come to appalled realization of brutality meted out by both communities. He had listened to many instances of rape of Turkish girls by Greeks but he would not adduce these publicly. 68

This story exemplifies the feature repeated in other cases north and south of the island in which any attempts to investigate or punish war crimes were resisted on the grounds of perceived ‘national interests.’ Who were the killers and rapists? There is enough evidence to suggest that the perpetrators were in many, if not most cases Greek- and TurkishCypriot irregulars rather than regular officers or soldiers from the two motherlands. Turkish Cypriots were threatened throughout the island after the National Guard had overrun most of their enclaves after the Turkish army arrived. UNFICYP reported that on 9 August 1974 out of 142 Turkish and mixed villages outside the Turkish-controlled enclave of Kyrenia, 94 were under National Guard control. One village (Chatos/Famagusta) was partly taken over by the National Guard and 29 were surrounded. Only 15 villages were neither overtaken nor surrounded and on three villages the UN had no information. 69 As long as the National Guard was under disciplined control of its Greek officers no inhuman incidents occurred. But on 2 August 1974 Clerides told US Ambassador Davies that the National Guard had turned over firearms indiscriminately to partisans of both right and left when the Turkish operation began. Too many guns now were in the hands of too many irresponsible people. 70 The British Defence Attaché in Athens reasoned that whereas the Karamanlis Government was firmly in control of Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard, Athens was likely to have little influence over EOKA-B after the deposition of Ioannides. He carried on to say that ‘in view of Turkish ruthlessness in dealing with any opposition we imagine it will be some time before Greek Cypriot elements recuperate sufficiently to conduct guerrilla operations against mainland Turkish forces although revenge against Turkish enclaves in Greek Cypriot territory is another matter.’ 71 In other words, while EOKA-B, which was more heavily armed than before the crisis, would hesitate to attack the Turkish army, it was quite likely to embark on revenge actions in the south of the island. At the time this assessment reached London EOKA-B had already completed its ‘revenge businesses.’ Equally, it can be assumed that many ‘Turkish Fighters’ who had reached the north were seeking revenge and were not under firm control by mainland officers. The United Nations Forces in Cyprus had no mandate to enforce peace. Nevertheless, UNFICYP soldiers did save many lives. They stopped innumerable columns of Greek and Turkish prisoners, demanding to take their names, and prevented bloodshed in a great number of cases. Up to 14

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August UNFICYP had suffered 24 casualties inflicted by Turkish forces: 17 Finns from shell fire at Kykko UN camp; four British in a white UN armoured vehicle with UN insignia strafed by Turkish aircraft; and three Austrians in a UN marked vehicle flying a large UN flag were killed by attack from an aircraft which had overflown them and could not have failed to identify them. The UN demanded from the Turkish Permanent Representative at the UN that attacks on UNFICYP should cease and informed him that the full facts were to be published forthwith in a report by the Security Council. 72 The Austrian UNFICYP members were attacked by a Turkish aircraft at Koshi (Nicosia-Larnaca road). They were four travelling in a white vehicle with UN signs and a UN flag. The aircraft made three passes including rocket and machine gun attacks, after which the four Austrians abandoned their vehicle. The aircraft subsequently attacked with napalm bombs: three Austrians were killed. 73 At the end of the crisis UNFICYP recorded 5 dead and 50 wounded soldiers. 74

21 Beyond the Crisis Cyprus from Cold War to Annan

Which way would affairs in Cyprus go? Would there be a permanent partition or was there a chance of speedy negotiations leading to a sustainable settlement? The answer was very much connected to the question of who would be in charge of Greek-Cypriot affairs. The only politician realistic enough to accept the bitter outcome of the crisis and to try at least to diminish its effects was Clerides. In the morning of 15 August he had already told High Commissioner Olver that he realised he would have to accept a division of Cyprus imposed by the Turks. He foresaw growing frustration and bitterness in Cyprus and a large political swing to the Left. 1 His further actions were based on this reality and he tried to engage in negotiations with the clear aim of limiting the damage, i.e., the amount of territory under Turkish control and the number of refugees. His approach had in the beginning the backing of Athens. When Henry Kissinger met with Mavros on 26 September at the Plaza Hotel, Mavros described Clerides as ‘reasonable’ and Makarios as ‘more extreme.’ Kissinger had warned that if Makarios did not stop his anti-American line the US Government would publicly oppose him. Mavros indicated that he would try to keep Makarios under control. Mavros accepted the principle of federal government but the size of the Turkish canton (or cantons) should be closer to the Turkish percentage of the population. He also opposed the exchange of population. 2

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Clerides, under attack for his realistic approach, defended his position in a speech on 6 November 1974. He said: Our past policy was based on certain miscalculations. The first miscalculation was that we could unilaterally overturn international treaties wrongly or correctly accepted by us. (…) We proceeded with seeking an alternation of the Agreements without ascertaining correctly whether either militarily or politically, either alone or with Greece, we had the military or political superiority through which we could secure an amendment (…). Moreover, we made another terrible mistake for which I am also responsible: viz, in our effort to overturn the Zurich regime we were cherishing the illusion that we could treat the Turkish community as a mere minority without taking into serious consideration the fact that this mere, as we regarded it, minority had by its side the Turkish nation numbering 33 million people. So while in reality we are the majority in Cyprus, in the immediate area we are in the minority. (…) The only solution that can now emerge is that of a federal state. A solution can take various forms. It can be a cantonal solution through the creation of a number of cantons in which the Turks will be in majority. This will be the best solution for us. The only solution can also be geographical federation based on two regions corresponding to the population ratio. I do not favour such solutions but it is my duty and responsibility to inform public opinion that through negotiations on an equal footing no negotiator (…) can find a solution which requires Turkish consent and is not based on a federal independent state and moreover does not contain the element of geographical federation. 3

Keeping Makarios under control proved impossible. On 28 September Clerides had already threatened to resign since ‘the degree of personal interference by the Archbishop in Cyprus affairs’ made it impossible for him to continue. 4 While Clerides tried to achieve a speedy solution Makarios was trying to internationalise the crisis. Makarios’ plan was to get the United Nations General Assembly to condemn Turkey. William R. Crawford, US Ambassador to Cyprus, described the rational for Makarios’ actions as follows: Past few days have witnessed greatly enhanced role for Makarios in Cyprus context. (…) Despite two-month exile, Makarios progressively returning to center stage of Cyprus scene. This gives him an ideal spoiler’s role. He benefits directly from general malaise produced by Turk occupation, refugee problem. Reportedly, many in refugee camps view him as only possible ‘savior’ of Greek Cyprus. His influence weights heavily once again Go[vernment of] Cyprus machinery: all his ambassadors and directors general; two of his key ministers; and many other appointees now back in old

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jobs. According FonMin DirGen Panatides, Makarios now in direct contact 8–10 times daily with these people. (…) Makarios’ performance presages continuing major problem for ongoing efforts find responsible solution to Cyprus crisis. Specifically, we expect him to strike major disruptive chords in UNGA debate. Justifiably, he will claim – and get – recognition as President of Cyprus, despite likely Turk challenge. (…) He will probably control Cyprus’ Del[egation] to UNGA [Rossides/Spyros Kyprianou] regardless of what Clerides may want. (…) Makarios has always sought refuge in greater numbers to avoid discussion of Cyprus problem by small circle of Guarantor Powers who might actually solve it. His (and Mavros’) ready acceptance of Sov[iet] proposal for unwieldy 18-nation forum and agreement on recourse to UNGA in order ‘internationalize’ Cyprus issue, reflect this basic predisposition. (…) His main goal [at UNGA] will be to (1) undermine any prospect for settlement, and (2) create conditions to his ultimate return as President. 5

Thus Makarios’ first interest was to return as the saviour of the Greek Cypriots even though this meant that, at least for the time being, no refugees would return. His subsequent actions demonstrated this interest. His return on 7 December 1974 was celebrated by thousands of Greek Cypriots, as if he were a messiah rescuing the country. Makarios proclaimed: ‘We shall not accept any solution involving transfer of population and amounting to partition of Cyprus. It is possible to find a way for self-government of the two co-habitant elements.’ 6 In fact his return sealed the fate of the refugees who, through his stubbornness, lost their last chances for at least a partial return. Makarios’ vision of a solution was one of honour and victory rather then one of realism. As early as late August 1974 he had told Olver that he was moving towards acceptance of geographic federation as the only possible basis for negotiation. However, he and many of his advisors conceived of cantons as a means of chopping Turkish-controlled areas into the smallest, weakest possible pieces. The US Ambassador commented, ‘Obviously the Turks would never accept this.’ 7 On 15 March 1975 Makarios reiterated his view to Crawford, telling him that a reduction to 30 per cent for Turkish-held territory was not good enough. In any case, in his view the focus on the territorial percentage was wrong. The primary question for Greek Cypriots was refugee return. Unless a really substantial number could go back to their houses, he would prefer indefinite perpetuation of the present de facto situation over any so-called solution, even though this was admittedly dangerous. It became even clearer that Makarios was not afraid of a total breakdown of negotiation and the indefinite continuation of the status quo when he told Crawford that since Denktaş had apparently decided to retire as a negotiator (since he

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was the self-styled President of the Turkish Federate State), Clerides could not continue either. In this case Makarios would appoint the next highestranking member of the House of Representatives, Tassos Papadopoulos. Crawford commented that he had refrained from pointing out that Papadopoulos was a ‘rabidly anti-Turkish Greek nationalist whose participation would be likely to condemn negotiation to almost immediate failure.’ 8 Makarios could not care less, and he put Tassos Papadopoulos in charge – the failure came as Crawford predicted. It is a saddening fact that the US Government dealing with the promotion of the Annan Plan 30 years later did not take warnings about Papadopoulos seriously enough to realise that the election of this ‘rabidly anti-Turkish Greek nationalist’ would have exactly the same effect again. 9 Negotiations carried on throughout the years to come. Sometimes they were direct, sometimes proximity talks were held by the UN Secretary Generals. The outcome was that Cyprus gained the reputation of being a ‘cemetery for diplomats.’ Scores of envoys from the United Nations, USA, and various European countries gnashed their teeth on the problem without getting anywhere. The only ‘success’ scored was the High Level Agreement of 12 February 1977 between Makarios and Denktaş. The parties agreed therein that they were seeking an ‘independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.’ 10 This was confirmed and amended two years later with an aim of reaching demilitarisation of the island during talks between Denktaş and Spyros Kyprianou. 11 Apart from the general framework of a federal bi-communal system nothing could be agreed. Following the Declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 most observers saw the main obstacle for a solution in the person of Rauf Denktaş, who became infamous for his intransigence. Subsequently, it was a foregone conclusion that the European Union would not only accept the Greek-Cypriot application for EU membership, but agreed as well that the Greek-Cypriot side should become a member even without a solution to the Cyprus problem, since it was seen as the conciliatory party. However, the EU application process set in train a number of events starting with the exchange of letters between Clerides and Denktaş in November 2001, resulting in direct talks and culminating in the presentation of a Basis for an Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (the Annan Plan) on 11 November 2002. 12 While Denktaş did his best to torpedo the plan, mass demonstrations in North Nicosia indicated a shift in Turkish-Cypriot public opinion against the aging leader. 13 Parliamentary elections in the North on 14 December 2003 resulted in the formation of a pro-solution

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government under Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat. This, coupled with pressure from the new AKP government in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, forced Denktaş to agree to put the Annan-Plan to a referendum, which was held on 24 April 2004 in both parts of the island. The result came as a shock wave to international observers and mediators. While Turkish Cypriots accepted the UN blueprint with a 64.91 per cent majority, Greek Cypriots rejected the plan with an overwhelming ‘no’ vote of 75.83 per cent. The extent of the Greek-Cypriot ‘Oxi’(no) brought an end to a large-scale effort by the United Nations Secretary General to broker a final deal for a solution of the ‘oldest item continuously on the peacemaking agenda.’ 14 How was it possible that the Greek Cypriots should reject a plan which in large part brought together everything Greek-Cypriot politicians had been demanding in 30 years of negotiations? The reason was that many Greek-Cypriot politicians managed to hide their own maximalist ideas behind the ‘intransigent’ Denktaş. So long as he rejected any kind of solution-proposal, there was no need for Greek-Cypriot politicians to put forward objections of their own. With attention focussed on change in the North, the significance of regime change that occurred during the presidential elections in the South on 16 February 2003 was almost totally unnoticed. The moderate Glafcos Clerides was defeated by the well-known extremist Tassos Papadopoulos who on 7 April 2004 called on the Greek Cypriots to reject the plan with a ‘resounding no.’ Like Makarios 30 years before he thereby killed the last hope for refugees who could still remember living in the North to return to their homes. National pride had again won against humanity. 15 Following the catastrophe of 1974 Greece showed no real interest in solving the Cyprus problem. It was fully engaged in the restoration of democracy and in achieving membership in the European Economic Community. Internal strife around the responsibilities for the coup d’état was limited to the trial of a few major militaries. 16 The government tried to divest itself of further liabilities. US Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch noted from a conversation he had on 29 July 1976 with Karamanlis that the Prime Minister ‘and his Government had resigned themselves to the fact that no significant progress on Cyprus was possible in the foreseeable future (...) and that the present state of affairs therefore must and could be tolerated. Obviously, there is no way [K]aramanlis or his Government could acknowledge [this]. However, I have detected increasing disinterest on the part of [K]aramanlis to discuss the Cyprus issue in recent month.’ 17 Greek foreign policy regarding Cyprus followed this line of thinking under Papandreou, Simitis, and Kostas Karamanlis. While occasional radical statements (notably from Papandreou) were made in support of the Greek-

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Cypriot side, the only real pressure Athens has ever exerted was to help the Republic of Cyprus with its application for EU membership. Following the failure of the Annan Plan (which had full Greek backing) Athens continued to follow a policy of good neighbourly relations with Turkey and supports the latter’s own aspirations to join the EU. As the winning side in the war, Turkey could not benefit from its gains. Instead of engaging in intense diplomacy to settle the problem in terms favourable for Turkey, the country’s policy became entangled in turmoil. Ecevit resigned on 16 September 1974, hoping to bring about an election in which he could profit from the popularity won during the Cyprus crisis, but his gamble failed. Following a severe political crisis, power passed in March 1975 to Süleyman Demirel of the Justice Party. Since there was no Turkish movement on the Cyprus issue the US Congress decided to cut off military aid to the country on the ground that the use of US weapons for reasons other than defence was forbidden under the Foreign Assistance Act. The move to ban military aid until the President certified that ‘substantial progress’ had been made toward agreement regarding military forces in Cyprus was twice vetoed by Ford, until the policy was finally enacted on 17 October 1974. However, the effective date of the ban was postponed until 10 December ‘unless Turkey violates the ceasefire, increases its forces on Cyprus, or transfers any U.S. implements of war to that island.’ 18 Despite firm resistance by Ford and Kissinger, the embargo became effective in February 1975. Turkey’s cabinet decided thereupon on 25 July 1975 that with exception of directly NATO-related operations at Incırlık, all US operations at common defence installations would be suspended as of 26 July. These common defence installations were Diyarbakır, Karamursel, Sinop, Balbası, and non-NATO activities at Incırlık. 19 The US intelligence facilities in Turkey were important to the monitoring of arms limitation agreements. At the same time, the bases were involved in monitoring Soviet ground, air, and naval activities in the area. 20 The result of the Turkish decision was devastating: The Defense Department, reporting on the ‘Impact of Loss of Electronic Intelligence Collection Activities in Turkey’, came to the conclusion that the loss had been greater than anticipated. Regarding Soviet weapons systems development, the result was a net loss of about 15 per cent of total information available to the United States. With regard to Soviet military forces in the south-west USSR, the US had lost more than 50 per cent of their surveillance capability. ‘In summary, electronic intelligence derived from U.S. bases in Turkey was extensive, important, and often unique. (…) We can replace this source only partially and only through significant investment in time and money.’ 21 Subsequently, the embargo was partly lifted and later suspended during the Carter administration (1977–81). US

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security interests persisted against other concerns, including a viable settlement in Cyprus.

‘Major Bases in Turkey to which U.S. has access’, not dated – presumably summer 1975, Turkey Military Aid (2), Congressional Relations Office, Loen and Leppert files, Box 26, Ford Library.

Turkey’s attitude toward Cyprus hardened throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Only the arrival of the AK Party under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, in connection with changes in North Cyprus and Turkey’s own aspirations to join the EU, made a policy shift possible. This led to Turkish support for the Annan Plan. Today, Turkey remains committed to a solution based on a bi-zonal federation as envisaged in the plan. Of course, there is no guarantee that this will remain so, especially if Turkey’s own membership aspirations are stalled or even blocked. British and American Cyprus policies following the 1974 crisis were remarkably low-key. Since their main interest had been to prevent war between the two ‘motherlands’, there was no real incentive to become closely engaged in negotiations. As a result the main responsibility remained on the shoulders of the UN Secretary General. Only during the latest efforts to promote the Annan Plan did British (and other EU) diplomats, together with US State Department officials, become more intensely engaged. However, this only provided more and renewed grounds for Greek-Cypriot conspiracy theories linking the Annan Plan to a perceived Anglo-American betrayal that had started in 1974.

Conclusion ‘There is no nation of maniacs I don’t get involved in’ Henry Kissinger’s Idiosyncratic Methods of Working

For all the rumours and stories that developed during and after the Cyprus crisis in 1974, there has been no Anglo-American conspiracy to divide the island among the NATO ‘allies’, Greece and Turkey. Equally inaccurate are allegations that both sides aimed to commit genocide. The story of the 1974 war in general and British and American diplomacy in particular is far more complex than such simplistic approaches suggest. With the Middle East crisis of 1973 settled, a policy of detente with the Soviet Union as a declared aim and talks for the reduction of nuclear arms underway, the Eastern Mediterranean was peaceful. The last thing NATO strategists needed was another crisis developing there. Relations between the Greek colonels and Ankara had already deteriorated over the Aegean question. It was the clear American and British understanding that the partition of Cyprus would do nothing but create another disputed border for the obstinate parties to quarrel over. Subsequently, there was no interest in opening up the Cyprus issue to any further disruption. American suspicions during the Kennedy administration that Cyprus might turn towards communism had long been replaced with the conviction that Makarios, rather than being the ‘Castro of the Mediterranean’, was in fact a conservative nationalist controlling the

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communist party AKEL, and not vice versa. Kissinger’s ex-post description of the Archbishop as being ‘more of a nuisance than a menace’ quite accurately describes US (and British) thinking. 1 The importance of British and US intelligence installations in Cyprus was negligible in comparison to the value US installations in Turkey had for NATO, forewarning of Soviet moves. While the British Labour government in their defence review actually considered abandoning the Sovereign Base Areas, the US wanted the British to keep them. The rationale for that was not so much the tangible need the Western alliance had for them but rather the thought that they might be useful in the future and the fact that British presence on the island would forestall any Soviet attempt to establish itself on the island. Consequently neither the US Government nor the British saw the need to change the status quo on Cyprus unless this could be achieved by a negotiated settlement resulting in more stability. This could, in both Anglo and American views, only be done in the framework of intercommunal talks. Since little progress had been made, the situation as it existed was preferable to any disruption that would trouble between the two motherlands. Rumours of a possible coup d’état popped up frequently after Ioannides took over control in Athens. While Thomas Boyatt, the State Department Area Specialist for Cyprus, warned of an imminent strike against Makarios in May, his efforts to give a stern American warning to the Junta were foiled by Ambassador Henry Tasca, who underestimated the danger. The CIA reported on the day of the coup that it would not happen. Apparently, the Junta had deliberately misinformed them. It remains unknown whether or not individual CIA members had knowledge of the plan to replace Makarios. What is sure is that there was no organised involvement or orders from CIA headquarters at Langley to encourage such a move. British intelligence was totally in the dark about the coup. Their estimate was that any attempt to overthrow the Cyprus Government would not come before October, if at all. Both the British and American Governments immediately sensed the danger of a Greco-Turkish war. Britain saw no obligation to intervene on behalf of Makarios. A hastily drafted contingency plan warned that Britain might find herself entangled in a situation similar to that in Northern Ireland. The British ‘solution’ was to call on the Greek Government to replace the mainland officers of the National Guard, who were engaged in the coup. As it became clear that this would not satisfy Turkey, Callaghan altered British demands to a withdrawal of the officers.

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The American view was that a total withdrawal of the officers would lead to chaos rather than stability. Following Kissinger’s assessment that the entire affair could actually be converted into a net gain for the West, the Americans proposed the replacement of Sampson with Clerides. Clerides was thought to be capable of settling the longstanding dispute with the Turkish-Cypriots. In Kissinger’s view this would satisfy Turkey’s fears regarding the security of Turkish Cypriots and its demands for a return to constitutional government. While Clerides remained the preferred American candidate, the US Government never considered recognising Sampson. However, Kissinger’s reluctance to commit himself openly to Makarios was interpreted by the press and parts of the congress as tacit American consent for the coup. Callaghan, while being sympathetic to the idea, was sceptical that Clerides could cope with the situation in Cyprus. Therefore, Britain never abandoned the idea of a possible return of Makarios. British soldiers actually saved the Archbishop’s life by putting into force a contingency plan developed in 1972. As Turkey called on Britain for consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee, with the clear purpose of military intervention (joint or assisted), Britain agreed to talks only with the clear aim of stalling Turkish intervention until Anglo-American diplomacy could produce a satisfactory solution. American diplomacy was visibly disrupted by the Watergate affair, which ended with Nixon’s resignation on 8 August. Kissinger’s crisis diplomacy in Cyprus was a disaster to anybody save himself. He describes the outcome of his efforts in his memoirs, saying that while America’s Cyprus policy had failed in restoring a unitary Cypriot state the most important objectives (keeping NATO’s eastern flank intact, Greece and Turkey remaining members of the alliance, and the Soviet Union being kept at arm’s length) had been achieved. 2 If there was anybody to blame it was, according to Kissinger, Callaghan, who lacked the Secretary’s Middle East experience. He had been ‘more easily aroused to anger by obstinacy and occasional duplicity of passionate interlocutors’ than Kissinger. Callaghan’s anger had shifted between Athens and Ankara, on which it had finally settled. 3 Kissinger made this point shortly after the crisis in a telephone conversation with Cyrus Vance, who had been President Johnson’s special envoy during the Cyprus crisis in 1967. Kissinger said, ‘We have been extremely forbearing with the British. They insisted that they had the problem solved. They didn’t want us to send anybody to Geneva. We did not realize until Monday that there was going to be a blowup. Callaghan had made some threatening statements. I had put forward a proposal that I thought the Turks would accept. Callaghan went through the roof that I

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put forward a proposal so that made the Greeks reject it.’ Vance had commented that he thought it was a mistake for the US Government not to have jumped in immediately with support of the British position because that would have been the only thing that would have kept the Greeks from moving. Kissinger said that the US Government had substantially supported the British position. Vance interrupted to say that this never came through. Kissinger said that the Turks knew it and that had been the problem entering the first week. He thought that ‘once Sampson was in there the Turks saw an opening to do what they had missed in ‘67. We were ready to support almost everything in the British position. They were doing it openly and we were not doing it publicly on the theory that some Greek government would have to swallow it.’ Vance’s argument that they should have done it publicly was according to Kissinger ‘a technical disagreement. We will never be able to prove it. It was never doubtful that we wanted to get rid of Sampson and we did it.’ 4 The ‘We did it’ or rather ‘I did it’ approach was quite significant for the Secretary’s style of thinking and working. While he was mending the crisis (he told Melvin Laird in a reference to the Cyprus crisis that there was no nation of maniacs he would not get involved in), 5 others would make the mistakes. During the crisis Kissinger did not mention his anger to the British. Quite the contrary, he told British Ambassador Ramsbotham that he was most appreciative of the speed and ease of communications with Callaghan, and of the effective way in which the American and British action had been coordinated. 6 With regard to leaks within his own Department the Secretary became increasingly paranoid. As a result, he prevented parts of his own administration from being involved in the decision making. The British Ambassador Ramsbotham warned on 18 July that ‘given Kissinger’s idiosyncratic methods of working (…) he may not record the telephonic conversations he has with the Secretary of State.’ He saw the danger ‘of both State Dept., and this Embassy working in the dark with all the resultant risks of confusion and misunderstanding.’ 7 As has been shown earlier, Kissinger regarded the Cyprus Task Force as unreliable. Consequently, he left them in the dark about many of his undertakings. Sisco’s mission to London, Athens, and Ankara lacked instructions, determination, and authority to prevent a major crisis. Neither in Athens nor in Ankara was he able to make threats of American aid cuts in time to effect decision making on the ground. The scapegoat for the American failure to contain the Cyprus crisis was the American Ambassador in Athens, Henry Tasca. Kissinger’s anger with Tasca was based on three considerations:

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a) He had clearly failed to react to follow departmental orders to approach Ioannides early enough to stop an invasion. b) He continued to give Kissinger advice on how to conduct his policy, for example, urging him to engage in shuttle diplomacy personally. c) He supported the idea of sending the US Sixth Fleet to the area to prevent Turkey from landing in Cyprus. In addition, Kissinger was not happy with Tasca’s reports and felt that he was holding back information. Now, after the crisis was over and with Nixon, who had been Tasca’s sole protector, out of office, Kissinger started his final attack. On 20 August he wrote to Tasca saying that he had failed to report on (a) Karamanlis’ reaction to the text of Kissinger’s press conference which he had delivered; (b) a meeting he was instructed to have with Averoff and Mavros; and (c) changes in Greek military command. 8 Even though Tasca immediately sent reports on meetings with Mavros, 9 Karamanlis, 10 and Averoff 11 his time was up. He left his position on 16 September, to be replaced by Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch (already appointed on 23 August). Tasca justified his actions in an interview with Arnold de Borchgrove for Newsweek, in which he said that he could not talk to Ioannides since ‘you don’t make diplomatic demarches to a cop.’ 12 When Kissinger was asked for clearance of the interview he asked one of his aides, Klein: ‘What’s the basic point?’ Klein: ‘It’s an apologia.’ K: ‘For him or for me?’ Klein: ‘For him.’ K: ‘We have not reached the point where my colleagues start defending their job.’ However, Kissinger said that he would not block the interview. 13 There is no doubt that Tasca carried a considerable share of responsibility in his failure to react in time. He failed to impress on the Junta in May 1974 that the US Government would not agree to a coup d’état in Cyprus. There are even indications that signals coming from his Embassy were giving the colonels tacit agreement to their actions. That alone was, of course, a good reason for his replacement. However, Kissinger’s own shortcomings during the crisis should not thereby be disregarded. The fact that he had no clear forewarning of what happened proved that the State Department was not running a proper chain of information and command. Kissinger’s hysterical outbursts, notably on 19 and 20 July, indicate that he had lost control. Instead of getting his staff more involved, he decided against the background of press leaks to get fewer people involved, thus disconnecting himself from vital information from within his own department. This, coupled with his utterly exaggerated judgment of his influence on his ‘student’ Ecevit, was the reason he failed to contain Turkish advances in Cyprus.

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Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus immediately after the news of the coup broke. British and American diplomatic documents provide only a shallow view as to how decision making evolved in Ankara. Apparently, there were different views about the scope of military action and the possible outcome. Since this was the third attempt at intervention after 1964 and 1967, contingencies were in place providing for a two-phase intervention. While the first aimed to establish a bridgehead around Kyrenia (the Şahin line), the second phase was to effectively partition the island along the so-called Attila line. Whatever the motives behind Ecevit’s call on Britain either to allow Turkish troops to enter the military bases or possibly joint intervention, it shows that the Turkish Prime Minister was prepared to consider ways to satisfy Turkey’s security concerns other than by partition. Ankara’s initial demand for access to the sea for the Turkish-Cypriot community indicates that there was initially some flexibility as to the outcome of the military operation. The British outright rejection of the Turkish request deprived London of any real chance of containing the Turkish operations and preventing partition. British and US intelligence had a clear reading of Turkish military intentions before the actual operation had started. Details such as the capture of the airfield at Tymbou and the seizure of Famagusta harbour were known to the JIC and CIA in advance. However, both secret services wrongly predicted that the main landing would take place near Famagusta instead of Kyrenia, where it actually happened. Thus it is clear as well that the Turks did not inform the Americans or British about their actual operational plans. Turkish operations in Cyprus did not go as smoothly as the Turkish military had planned. Stiff National Guard resistance, coupled with apparent organisational difficulties, resulted in delays in reaching the operational targets of the first stage. Subsequently, Ecevit tried a range of delaying tactics while the British and Americans tried to arrange a ceasefire. When the Junta retired in Athens the danger of all-out war between Greece and Turkey diminished. The establishment of Karamanlis’ government in Athens and Clerides’ take over of the Cypriot presidency was celebrated as big success both in London and Washington. But Turkey was apparently not content with this outcome. Turkish troops continued to advance in Cyprus and Ecevit’s demands for a comprehensive solution based on a federal model became more vocal. While British and American diplomacy had not been altogether successfully coordinated during the first part of the crisis it now deteriorated into utter confusion. Despite frequent phone conversations between Callaghan and Kissinger the two were working on completely

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divergent assumptions. The British Foreign Secretary thought it paramount to back up the new democratic Greek Government and Clerides in order to prevent a renewed coup d’état, resulting in worse regimes ready to go to war with Turkey. Therefore, he became increasingly ready to deter Turkey from making further territorial gains. This was a total departure from the previous British policy, which had ruled out military engagement in Cyprus. Now Britain was prepared to reinforce UNFICYP and – with American cooperation – to impose a naval blockade on further Turkish reinforcements. Acts of Turkish military jingoism at Kyrenia and Nicosia Airport furthered Callaghan’s conviction that a strong deterrent was needed to get Turkey involved in meaningful negotiations. The American view, however, was that the Greek military had seen its final call and would not return, whatever Turkey did on the island. Kissinger did not believe that a war was still possible. As a result he decided that the worst thing America could do would be openly to challenge Turkey militarily, thereby antagonising a vital NATO ally. Instead, he tried to control the crisis by using the personal influence he thought he had with Ecevit. The Turkish Government was by no means united in their aims on Cyprus. During the first Geneva Conference Foreign Minister Güneş showed more flexibility than Ecevit, who was apparently under pressure from his junior coalition partner Necmettin Erbakan and whose stance was increasingly hardened by the military. The Turkish delegation actually provoked Callaghan to produce threats against the Turkish Government in order to soften the Turkish Prime Minister’s demands. The episode proved that there was still room for a solution other than partition. Kissinger’s otherwise futile attempts to coax Ecevit in the direction he wanted him to had one success when he came up with the idea of a cantonal solution. Whatever the reasons behind it, Ecevit accepted the idea and Turkey developed a plan providing for one main Turkish-Cypriot area and five minor cantons. This was a major departure from previous Turkish demands for a federated Cyprus, and was a surprise to friend and foe alike. Neither Denktaş nor Callaghan had been informed about the idea. While the first had no choice but to follow his motherland’s ‘advice’, the latter was furious and felt, in his own words, like a ‘dummy in the middle.’ Callaghan, who thought that only a negotiated bi-zonal federal structure could really provide a viable settlement, did not promote the idea wholeheartedly. Again, Britain and the US had failed to coordinate their policies in advance. Thereby they missed the last chance of settling the crisis peacefully. The new Greek Government under Karamanlis and Mavros appeared to be ready to agree to a settlement based on a cantonal or federal system,

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provided they had the consent of the Greek-Cypriot leadership. However, since the previous Greek Government was the main responsible party for the entire crisis, they did not feel compelled to force any solution upon the Greek-Cypriot side. Any such solution perceived as dishonourable or imposed on the Greek Cypriots would most probably have led to their immediate downfall. Thus the impulse for a negotiated solution at Geneva could only come from the Greek-Cypriot side. However, there were two obstacles preventing such a thing. First, there were internal differences between Turkish hardliners who wanted to seize the chance to impose any solution they wanted in the light of their military success and those ready to negotiate a cantonal solution. Given this split in the Turkish leadership there was little room for manoeuvre left for the Güneş delegation at Geneva. Second, Clerides saw that Turkey would probably take by force what it could not get at the negotiating table. He reasoned as well that a cantonal solution might reduce the hardships that would befall Greek Cypriots anyhow. Nevertheless, he knew that he would never be able to sell the idea to his council of ministers, let alone to Makarios. In short, he would not survive the moment he signed such a commitment, not politically – and very likely not physically either. Instead, he decided – together with Mavros – to ask for the face saving 36-hours recess. There is nothing to suggest that either Mavros or Clerides would have returned to Geneva with affirmative answers to either of the Turkish proposals. It was the Turkish impatience that provided the Greek and Greek-Cypriot side with the chance not to be in a position where they had to reject them. War in Cyprus resumed for another three days, resulting in the partition of the island with hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. Hideous war crimes were committed by both sides especially during this final phase of the crisis. These crimes were later used as justification for the partition of the Turkish-Cypriot side. The Greek Cypriot side was emphasising the victimization of their own side, similarly white-washing all atrocities committed against Turkish Cypriots during the 1960s. On 7 December 1974 Archbishop Makarios III returned to Cyprus in triumph. Promising hope to the Greek-Cypriot refugees and justice to the Greek-Cypriot nation, he took over the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus again. A hero for many Cypriots to this day, he managed to survive. Analysing the Archbishop’s performance before, during and after the crisis one cannot but wonder how he managed to preserve this reputation. While there is no doubt that Ioannides was largely responsible for the tragedy, Makarios clearly bears his own share of the blame. His intransigence during the intercommunal talks prevented a settlement that would inevitably have

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made a Turkish military operation leading to the violent partition of Cyprus impossible. Given a settlement agreed upon by both communities, resulting in a harmonious working relationship between their leaders, it would have been extremely difficult for the Greek colonels to carry out their coup. If there had been a coup after such a solution, Turkey might even have intervened on behalf of a joint Greco-Turkish Cypriot Government with the sole aim to restore it. This is, of course, speculative, but at least it would have been extremely difficult to carry out partition plans on grounds of alleged ill treatment of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots. Makarios’ second mistake was to dangerously underestimate Ioannides’ probable reaction to his letter of 5 July. If he really believed that the letter would force the Greek General to withdraw his officers from the island he was totally out of touch with reality. After his lucky escape from Cyprus, he refused to meet Ecevit in London, missing the opportunity at least to try to find a common line with the Turks. After Clerides took over the Acting Presidency Makarios’ main effort went into organising his return rather than helping to manage the crisis. Starting from his surprising proposal to return to the 1960 Constitution (which he had personally and repeatedly declared as being unworkable) he showed no understanding of the actual danger of violent partition. Frequently interfering in Clerides’ policymaking, he directly addressed ministers and other government officials, who readily accepted his judgement and orders from outside. This considerably reduced Clerides’ room for manoeuvre. Any chances for a return of at least some territory, cynically described by Ecevit as a ‘present for Kissinger‘, were foiled by Makarios’ demands for an immediate return of all refugees. Instead, no Greek-Cypriot refugees could return and more Greek Cypriots were made to leave by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Makarios was not the only one lacking real compassion for the plight of refugees in Cyprus. Turkey’s ‘solution’ of the Cyprus problem forced at least 50,000 Turkish Cypriots to leave their homes. The decision to form a Turkish Federal State in the North of Cyprus was clearly made out of strategic considerations rather than demographic ones. Subsequently, the Turkish army made little attempt to relieve besieged Turkish-Cypriot enclaves in Paphos, Limassol, and Larnaca districts. Turkish Cypriots living in Paphos and Limassol escaped to the British Base at Akrotiri where they were caught up in another inhumane tug-of-war between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot politicians, until they were finally allowed to leave for Northern Cyprus via Turkey. There they settled in Greek houses and were not supposed to call themselves ‘refugees.’ Instead of mourning their lost homes they were supposed to be happy in an alien environment. GreekCypriot refugees found themselves equally misused. Fed with false

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promises of a speedy return by their leadership, they were used as political pressure groups. As no quick solutions were forthcoming and frustration grew among the refugees, relatives of missing persons and others suffering from the division, conspiracy theories gained ground. Instead of reflections on mistakes committed by their own community, notably by their leaders, Cypriots from both sides started to believe in stories of vicious outside forces which had befallen a once tranquil island and left it in its present misery. This way of thinking has prevailed on the island for more than 30 years and is very much present to this day. The arguments brought forward against the Annan Plan and its supporters were throw-backs to the stories of an Anglo-American conspiracy in 1974. In both cases the theories proved wrong. The origins of the Cyprus problem are mainly local. Of course it was the Greek mainland military Junta that staged the coup d’état and the Turkish mainland military that subsequently divided the island. But all this would never have happened if not for the Greek-Cypriot inability to settle a conflict with the Turkish Cypriots under conditions much more favourable to them in the early 1970s than after the crisis of 1974. Moreover, many of the war crimes committed during the crisis must be attributed to local perpetrators, whose identities are known in most cases. None of them has ever been brought to justice. Instead, both sides hide behind a wall of complaints and counter complaints coupled with a cocktail of handy conspiracy theories.

Annexes

Annex 1 Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1 1.

2.

3.

The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland held negotiations in Geneva from 2530 July, 1974. They recognised the importance of setting in train, as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to regularise within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis. Having regard to the International Agreements signed at Nicosia on 16 August, 1960 and to Resolution 353 of the Security Council of the United Nations. 2 They were, however, agreed on the need to decide first on certain immediate measures. The three Foreign Ministers declared that in order to stabilise the situation the area in the Republic of Cyprus controlled by opposing armed forces on 30 July, 1974 at 2200 hours should not be extended: they call on all forces including irregular forces, to desist from all offensive and hostile activities. The three Foreign Ministers also conclude that the following measures should be put into immediate effect: (a) A security zone of size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in consultation with UNFICYP should be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces at the time specified in paragraph 2 above. This zone should be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which should supervise the

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4.

5.

prohibition of entry. Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces should be entered by no forces. (b) All Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately evacuated. These enclaves will continue to be protected by UNFICYP and to have their previous security arrangements. Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish armed forces shall continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and may, as before, maintain their own police and security forces. (c) In mixed villages the functions of security and police will be carried out by UNFICYP. (d) Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities shall be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross within the shortest time possible. The three Foreign Ministers, reaffirm that Resolution 353 of the Security Council should be implemented in the shortest possible time, agreed that within the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned and as peace, security and mutual confidence are established in the Republic of Cyprus, measures should be elaborated which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and the amounts of armament, munitions and other war material in the Republic of Cyprus. Deeply conscious of their responsibilities as regards the maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, the three Foreign Ministers agreed that negotiations, as provided for in Resolution 353 of the Security Council, should be carried out with the least possible delay to secure (a) the restoration of peace in the area and (b) the re-establishment of Constitutional Government in Cyprus. To this end they agreed that further talks should begin on 8 August, 1974 at Geneva. They also agreed that representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities should, at an early stage, participate in the talks relating to the Constitution. Among the constitutional questions to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution. The Ministers noted the existence in practise in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous Administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation, the Ministers agreed to consider at their next Meeting the problems raised by their existence.

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The three Foreign Ministers agreed to convey the contents of this Declaration to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to invite him to take appropriate action in the light of it. They also expressed their conviction of the necessity that the fullest co-operation should be extended by all concerned in the Republic of Cyprus in carrying out its terms. Done in duplicate at Geneva the Thirtieth Day of July, 1974, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Greece Turkey GEORGE MAVROS

Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. GÜNES

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland JAMES CALLAGHAN

Annex 2 The Cantonal Proposal 3 La République de Chypre sera un Etat bi-communautaire et indépendant. 2. La République sera constituée d'une zone autonome turque cypriote (sic) composée de six districts et d'une zone autonome grecque cypriote composée de deux districts: (a) Zone autonome grecque cypriote: (i). District principal grec cypriote; (ii). District grec cypriote de Karpassia. (b) Zone autonome turque cypriote: (i). District principal turc cypriote: dent les limites seront tracées de l'Ouest vers l'Est par un ligne incluant PANAGRA – MYRTOU – ASAMATOS – SKYLLOURA – YEROLAKKOS -Secteur de Nicosie contrôlé par les Turcs – MOKA – ANGASTINA – YENAGRA – MARATHA – STYLLOS ‘Fresh Water Lake’ – La partie torque de Famagouste, et, au Nord-Est par une ligne excluant GALOUNIA, incluant KOMI KEBIR, AYIOS EVSTATHIOS et excluant GASTRIA; (ii). District turc de la région de Lefka; (iii). District turc de la région de Polis; (iv). District turc de la région de Paphos; (v). District turc de la région de Larnaca; et (vi). District turc de la région de Karpassia. La superficie de la zone autonome turque cypriote sera équivalente aux 34% environ du territoire de la République.

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La superficie et les limites des chacun des districts autres que le District principal de la zone autonome turque cypriote seront déterminées dans le délai et selon la procédure devant fixés par des dispositions que seront ajoutées á cette Déclaration. Le district principal de la zone autonome turque cypriote sera évacué par les éléments des Forces Armées Grecques e par les [deleted: soi-disant] Garde Nationale Grecque Cypriote ainsi que par les irréguliers grecs dans un délai qui n'excédera en aucun cas 48 heures á partir de la date de la signature de la Déclaration en question L'administration, l'ordre st la sécurité de ce District seront immédiatement pris en main par l'Administration turque cypriote. 3. L'Administration des chacune des zones autonomes aura le contrôle entier de la sienne dans ses limites géographiques. 4. La libre circulation entre les Districts d'une même zone autonome sera garantie par le Gouvernement contral (sic). 5. Il sera procédé á la détermination des compétences du Gouvernement central de la République en tenant pleinement compte de la nature bicommunautaire del'Etat (sic). 6. En attendant l'entrées en vigueur de nouveau système constitutionnel de la République, les deux Administrations grecque cypriote et turque cypriote existantes en fait prendront conjointement les mesures nécessaires en vue de normaliser et de stabiliser la vie sur le territoire de la République et s'abstiendront de tout acte de violence, d'harassement et de discrimination.

Annex 3 Federal Proposal 4 La Turquie propose deux alternatives: 1. La première alternative est le plan la Délégation t'arque a présenté hier. 2. La seconde alternative consiste en une [zone] autonome turque cypriote qui se trouve au Nord d'une ligne générale incluant la partie turque de Famagouste et le secteur de Nicosie contrôlé par les Turcs et se dirigeant vers l'Ouest, la superficie totale de cette zone correspondant aux 34% environ du territoire de la République de Chypre. Cette zone doit être évacuée par les éléments des Forces Armées Grecques, par la (soi-disant) Garde Nationale Grecques Cypriotes ainsi que par les irréguliers grecs, et, les services publics, l'ordre et la sécurité dans la partie évacuée doivent être pris immédiatement en charge par l'Administration Turque Cypriote. La partie de la zone autonome Cypriote turque qui se trouve occupée par les éléments et les troupes grecs précités sera évacuée par eux selon la plan suivant: A. A l'Est de la région contrôlée par les Forces Armées Turques: (a) Les éléments armes et les troupes grecs précités évacueront au plus tard dans les 24 heures à partir de 4.00 h du jour suivant la date de la Déclaration à cet effet, la région délimitée a L'Est par

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la ligne VATILI – MOUSOULITA – MARATHOVOUNO – SERDARLI – KALOUREA. (b) Un zone de 5 Km de largeur à partir de la ligne de contact actuelle sera de toute façon évacuée la même jour jusqu'à 12.00 h, et cette zone sera transférée sous le contrôle des Forces Armées Turques afin d'y assurer les conditions de sécurité nécessaires, en particulier pour entreprendre les opérations de déminage. (c) Dans un délai de 3 jours à partir de la signature de la nouvelle Déclaration, les limites précises de la zone autonome Cypriote Turques s'étendant de Nicosie à Famagouste seront définitivement fixées et cette région sera complètement évacuée par les éléments armés et les troupes grecs précités. Dans les cas ou la fixation de cette ligne et l'évacuation de cette région ne se sont pas complétées à temps, les Forces Armées Turques se réserveront le droit d'occuper la région en question. (d) Au cours des opérations d'évacuation, les éléments armés et les troupes grecs précités s'abstiendront de pénètre dans la région tenue par les forces de défense et sécurité dépendant de l'Administration Turque Cypriote et ne tenteront aucun acte hostile contre elles. Cette région se trouve entre SERDARLI et LEFKONUKE et délimitées par la ligne générale KONATHARA – PSILATOS – LOFKONUKE –ARTEMI. B. A l'Ouest de la région contrôlée par les Forces Armées Turques: Une zone de 8 km de largeur à partir de la ligne de contact actuelle à L'Ouest de la région contrôlée par les Forces Armées Turques sera évacuée par les éléments armés et les troupes grecs précités la même jour à partir de 04.00 h jusqu'à 20.00 dans les même conditions que celles formulées dans le paragraphe A. C. Les Forces Armées Turques se réservent le droit de contrôler en permanence par les moyens aériens les opérations d'évacuation. Tout acte hostile contre ces opérations de contrôle sera interdit. D. La pose de mines les vicinités de la zone autonome cypriote turques sera prohibée.

Notes

Introduction S/2003/398 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, April 2003, para 4. 2 The terming of Turkish military actions in Cyprus is a matter of dispute between various politicians and scholars. While Greek and Greek Cypriots generally write about a Turkish invasion, many Turks and Turkish Cypriots call the event a ‘Peace Operation.’ This preposterous reference to a war is quite naturally a contradiction in terms. The term ‘invasion’ seems to omit the fact that Turkish Cypriots did not regard the Turkish army as aggressor but as saviour from Greek and Greek Cypriot threats. This confusion is mirrored in British diplomatic files where ‘intervention’ and ‘invasion’ are both frequently and alternately used words. The more neutral term ‘military operation’ is used in most American diplomatic files of the period. 3 ‘Having read the Department’s status report on the Congo [sic] situation, I am concerned over its gloomy tone. The inadequacies of the Makarios government, as contrasted with the discipline, energy and able leadership of the local Communist Party, are most worrisome. Perhaps we need some preventive medicine to forestall further deterioration of the situation…’; John F. Kennedy, 22 August 1961, US National Archives, ARC Identifier: 193468. 4 O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian: The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 1999; Hitchens, Christopher: Cyprus: Hostage to History, Quartet Books, London 1984. 5 O’Malley and Craig, x. 6 Hitchens, 10. 7 Ibid., 164–165. 1

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Hitchens, Christopher, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, Verso, London and New York, 2001. 9 Ibid., 87 10 Slengesol, Ivar-André: ‘A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 2000, 99–129, 129. 11 Nicolet, Claude, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954–1974, Bibliopolis, Mannheim, 2001. 12 PIO (eds.), The Attila ‘Peacemakers’, Nicosia, 1974. 13 İsmail, Sabattin, 20 July Peace Operation. Reasons, Development and Consequences, Istanbul, 1989. 14 Birand, Mehmet Ali, 30 Hot Days, London, Nicosia and Istanbul, 1985. 15 Psychari, Stavros P., 70 Krisimes Meres [70 Critical Days], Athens, 1976. 16 Loizos, Peter, The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981); Volkan, Vamik D., Cyprus – War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Charlottesville, 1979. 17 Stavrinides, Zenon, Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood, Nicosia, 1976 (reprinted Nicosia, 1999). 18 Oberling, Pierre, The Road to Bellapais, New York, 1982; Gibbons, Harry Scott, The Genocide Files, Charles Bravo, London, 1997. 19 Markides, Kyriakos, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, New Haven, 1977; Salih, Halih Ibrahim, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, Alabama, 1978. 20 Joseph, Joseph S., Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union, London and New York, 1997. 21 Stern, Laurence, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy, New York, 1977. 22 The Aegean Foundation; American Hellenic Institute; Ohio State University College of Law and Modern Greek Studies Program (eds.), United States Foreign Policy Regarding Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, Ohio, 1988. 23 Bahceli, Tozun, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, Boulder and London, 1990. 24 Papadakis, Yiannis, Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide, I.B. Tauris, London, 2005. 25 Hannay, David, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, I.B. Tauris, London, 2004. 26 Bryant, Rebecca, Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus, I.B. Tauris, London, 2004. 27 Ball, George W., The Past Has Another Pattern. Memoirs, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1982. 28 Vance, Cyrus, Hard Choices. Critical Years in American Foreign Policy. Memoirs, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1993. 29 Clerides, Glafkos, Cyprus: My Deposition, 4 volumes, Alithia Publishing, Nicosia, 1989–1992. 30 Denktash, Rauf Raif, The Cyprus Triangle, George Allan & Unwin, 1982; revised edition, Nicosia, 1988. 31 Ecevit, Bülent, The Cyprus Question, Nicosia, 1984. 8

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32 Nixon, Richard M., The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1978, 1047. 33 Kissinger, Henry, Years of Renewal, Simon and Schuster, New York 1999, 199. 34 Ibid., 203. 35 Ibid., 209. 36 Ibid., 239. 37 Callaghan, James, Time and Chance, Collins, London, 1987; Wilson, Harold, Final Term. The Labour Government 1974–76, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1979. 38 Callaghan, James, Time and Chance, 344. 39 Wilson, Harold, Final Term, 64.

1. The Centre of a Pre-Copernican Universe: A Very Short History of Cyprus Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. and extended ed, 13. impression, Verso, London, 2003 (first edited 1983); Hobsbawm, Eric, and Ranger, Terence, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. 2 FO 371/185620 Sir David Hunt, High Commissioner – Cyprus, to Herbert W. Bowden, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 17 December 1966, The National Archives of the UK (=TNA). 3 Bahceli, Tozun, ‘Domestic Political Developments’, in Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev, Steffani, Winfried and Zervakis, Peter (eds.), Südosteuropa-Handbuch VIII: Zypern, Vandenoeck & Ruprecht, 1998, 100. 4 FCO 51/152 ‚Contravention of 1960 Cyprus Settlement by Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities’, Middle East Section, Research Department, 20 August 1970, TNA. 5 Markides, Kyriakos, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977, 78. 6 ‘He is probably content that Cyprus should continue as an independent State while he is President, but he would not wish to appear in history as the Ethnarch who finally ended the dream of Enosis.’, FCO 9/1364 Impressions of Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, by the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, 1971 Jan 01-1971 Dec 31, Peter E. Ramsbotham to Sir Alec DouglasHome, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 29 March 1971, TNA. 1

2. The Road to Disaster: Makarios and the Junta Coufoudakis, Van, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation’, Millennium, vol. 5, no. 3, 1976/77, 245-268, 257; Foley, Charles and Scobie, W.I., The Struggle for Cyprus, Hoover Institutions Press, Stanford, CA, 1975, 170. 2 The Times, 14 July 1971. 3 Nicolet, Claude, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, Bibliopolis, Mannheim 2001, 400. 4 Denktaş was Vice-President of the Turkish Cypriot Administration (Türk Yönetimi Yürütme Kurulu) until 1973 when he replaced Fazıl Küçük as Vice-President of the 1

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Republic of Cyprus. According to British intelligence Kücük was forced not to rerun for office by Turkey; WO 386/11 Joint Intelligence Group (Cyprus) – General Intelligence Report No 1/73, 3 January 1973, TNA. 5 Clerides, Glafkos, Cyprus: My Deposition, 4 vols. III, Alithia Publishing, Nicosia, 1989-1992, III, 81, Letter rejecting Denktaş’ proposal, ibid, 879; 6 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, III, 204. 7 FCO 9/1155‚Murder in Cyprus: An Attempt, and a Kill’, Peter E. Ramsbotham; High Commissioner Nicosia to Secretary of State, 5 June 1970, TNA. 8 Bell, J. Bowyer, ‘Violence at a Distance: Greece and the Cyprus Crisis’, Orbis, vol. 18, 1974, 791-808, 794. 9 Stern, Laurence, ‘Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus’, Foreign Policy, vol. 19, 1975, 34-78, 44-45. 10 WO 386/10 Joint Intelligence Group (Cyprus): Secret Intelligence Report No 16/72, 19 April 1972, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1681 Olver to FCO, 7 October 1973, TNA. 12 Foley/Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus, 172; Modiano, Mario: ‘After General Grivas, which way will Cyprus go?’, The Times, 28 January 1974. 13 WO 386/11 Joint Intelligence Group (Cyprus) – General Intelligence Report No 48/73, Not Dated, November 1973, TNA. 14 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, III, 319. 15 An English version of the full text was published in The Sunday Times, 21 July 1974. 16 FCO 9/1999 Hooper to FCO, Telno 162, 091520Z, 9 July 1974, TNA. 17 UN Security Council Official Records, S/PV, 1780. Statement by President Makarios at the UN. Security Council, 19 July 1974. 18 Der Spiegel (German weekly magazine), 22 July 1974. 3. Coup d’état in Nicosia: The First 48 Hours FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 178, 150705Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 180, 150815Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 181, 150822Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1890, Holgar Jensen, Reuters report from Nicosia send via Olver to FCO, Telno 188, 151419Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 5 Asmussen, Jan/Kızılyürek, Niyasi/Zervakis, Peter, Biographien führender Persönlichkeiten des politischen Lebens, in Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev/ Steffani, Winfried/Zervakis, Peter, Südosteuropa-Handbuch Vol. 8, Zypern, Vandenhoeck & Rubrecht, Göttingeen 1998, 889-908, 898-899. 6 US Embassy Athens to State Department telegram (=ATHENS) 4530, 161936Z, 16 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Richard M. Nixon, Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland (= Nixon Material). 7 FCO 9/1914 Undated translation from Machi, presumably November 1974. The information that Judge Loizou had been approached as well stems from Olver’ despatch `The Coup against Makarios´ FCO 9/1914 Olver to FCO, Diplomatic Report No. 410/74, 2 December 1974, TNA. 1

NOTES

309

All announced at 1225 hrs local time by CBC; FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 209, 161147Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 9 Announced later on 16 July; FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 221, 162150Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 10 Announced by CBC on 18 July; FCO 9/1893 Olver to FCO, Telno 243, 180840Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 11 According to Olver Andreas Patsalides, the former Minister of Finance, had been offered the job again but had declined; FCO 9/1893 Olver to FCO, Telno 243, 180840Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 12 Announced on 19 July according to local newspaper Ethinki FCO 9/1894 Olver to FCO, Telno 260, 190816Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 13 Cyprus Workers Association. 14 FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 221, 162150Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 15 FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 221, 162150Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 16 FCO 9/1892 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2406, 171945Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 17 WO 386/21 Olver to FCO, Tel No 232, 17 July 1974, TNA. 18 FCO 9/1894, Olver to FCO, Telno 263, 191004Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1914 ‘The Coup against Makarios’, Olver to FCO, Diplomatic Report No. 410/74, 2 December 1974. 20 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 13, note 2, TNA. 21 FCO 9/1914 ‘The Coup against Makarios’, Olver to FCO, Diplomatic Report No. 410/74, 2 December 1974, TNA. 22 WO 386/12 Fortnightly Intelligence Summery No 13/74 for the period 19 June2 July 1974, TNA. 23 FCO 9/1950 Olver to Goodison, SED, letter, 8 July 1974, TNA. 24 FCO 9/1892 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2406, 171945Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 25 Draft Treaty of Guaranty between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State fort he Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence by Command of Her Majesty, Cmnd. 1093, July 1960, Appendix B, Article IV. 26 FCO 9/1890, Verbatim Service 133/74, Statement on Cyprus, Supplementaries, 15 July 1974, TNA. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 184, 151028Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 31 Nixon/Kissinger, Telcon, 18 July 1974, 2:48 p.m., U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, Electronic Reading Room (=http://foia.state.gov), http://foia.state.gov/documents/Kissinger/0000C9F8.pdf. 32 United States Senate, Subcommittee to investigate problems connected with refugees and escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, Crisis on Cyprus: 1975, Washington 1975, 9. 8

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33 ATHENS 3705, 141007Z, 14 June 1974, Greece Vol. IV, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 34 STATE (= State Department telegram) 103030 Boyatt to Tasca, State Department Telegram, 17 May 1974, Nixon Material. 35 ATHENS 3936, 241133Z, 24 June 1974, Greece Vol. IV, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 36 ATHENS 4179, 011625Z, 1 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 37 Thomas D. Boyatt to Kissinger, ‘Critique of the Substantive Handling of the Cyprus Crisis’, memorandum, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (= Ford Library). 38 The document was edited and the cleared (sanitized); parts are not available for public viewing. 39 Schlesinger/Kissinger, Telcon, 24 July 1974, 2:24 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 40 Rosmary Niehus to Kissinger, Memorandum, 6 a.m., 15 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 41 ATHENS 4494, 151615Z, 15 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 42 Richard T. Kennedy/Henry R Applebaum/ Rosemary Niehuss to Kissinger, memorandum for WSAG meeting Monday, 15 July 1974, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 15-17 July 74, Box H-096, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 43 Richard T. Kennedy to General Scowcroft, memorandum, WSAG meeting, 15 July 1974, 10:15 a.m., WSAG Meetings Cyprus 15-17 July 74, Box H-096, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 44 Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger, Telcon, 15 July 1974, 5:30m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 45 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 5, TNA. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 185, 151103Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 49 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 187, 151322Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 50 FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 205, 160755Z, 16 July 1974. 51 U.S. Embassy Ankara telegram to State Department (=ANKARA) 5564, 151129Z, 15 July 1974, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 15-17 July 74, Box H-096, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 52 FCO 9/1890 Fyjis-Walker, Ankara to FCO, Telno 746, 151415Z, 15 July 1974, TNA.

NOTES

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53 FCO 9/1890 Fyjis-Walker, British Embassy, Ankara to FCO, Telno 745, 151408Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 54 FCO 9/1890, Callaghan to British Embassies Athens, Ankara and Washington, UK Delegation NATO and UK Mission New York, Telno 129,151345Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 55 FCO 9/1890, Callaghan to British Embassies Athens, Ankara and Washington, UK Delegation NATO and UK Mission New York, Telno 129,151345Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 56 FCO 9/1890, Callaghan to British Embassies Athens, Ankara and Washington, UK Delegation NATO and UK Mission New York, Telno 129,151345Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 57 FCO 9/1890 Cyprus: Action by United Nations, A C Goodinson, Southern European Department to Private Secretary, Downing Street 10, 15 July 1974, TNA. 58 FCO 30/2509 ‘Mr Callaghan’s ITN interview on Cyprus, ITN News at Ten, p.m. yesterday 18 July’, London Press Service, Verbatim Service 141/74; 19 July 1974; FCO 9/1900 Callaghan to certain posts, Guidance 96, 251600Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 59 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 189, 151511Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 60 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 189, 151511Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 61 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, Telno 190, 151512Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 62 WO 386/21 Olver to FCO, Tel No 232, 17 July 1974, TNA. 63 FCO 9/1890 Fyjis-Walker, Ankara to FCO, Telno 747, 151720Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 64 FCO 9/1890 Ramsbothan, British Ambassador Washington to FCO, Telno 2383, 151720Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 65 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, TelNO 203, 151945Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 66 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, TelNO 202, 151840Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 67 FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 205, 160755Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 68 FCO 9/1894, Olver to FCO, Telno 263, 191004Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 69 Central Committee of AKEL (Eds.): Chronicle of the contemporary tragedy of Cyprus, Nicosia 1978, 10. 70 ‘The UN Secretary General informs me that his Special Representative [Weckman] saw Makarios in Paphos today and that the latter asked for UN protection.’ FCO 9/1891 Richard, New York to FCO, Telno 779, 161510Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 71 FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 208, 161057Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 72 ‘Ministers have agreed that if the Archbishop appears in person requesting political asylum or sends you a message seeking an assurance that it will be granted, you may inform him that he will be received in the UK and that we shall if at all possible provide transport for this purpose. You should expect him to leave Cyprus as soon as we could arrange this. For your own information there would be no question of his being allowed to take up residence in the High Commission or the SBAs to ‘await developments’. You should, of course, give no (repeat no) indication of the above to anybody in the absence of specific and authoritative

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request. The above has been discussed with MOD’; FCO 9/1891 Douglas-Home to Nicosia, Telno 74, 112354Z, 11 February 1972, TNA. 73 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 8, TNA. 74 Makarios was accompanied by his Aide de Camp, Nicos Thrasyvolou, Captain Andreas Neophytou and Inspector Andreas Potamrios, FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 212, 161330Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 75 WO 386/21 HQ BFNE to FIA SH MODUK, Flash 172245Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 76 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 8, TNA. 77 Kissinger/Callaghan, Telcon, 16 July 1974, 10:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 78 ‘The Makarios Interlude’, FCO 9/1907, W R Haydon, British High Commissioner Malta to Alan C Goodison, Southern European Department, FCO, letter, 17 July 1974, TNA. 79 FCO 9/1891 Haydon; British High Commissioner Valetta, to Callaghan, Telno 207, 162230Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 80 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 10, TNA. 81 WO 386/21 HQ BFNE to FIA SH MODUK, Flash 172245Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 82 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 12, TNA. 83 FCO 9/1890 Decisions taken at a meeting of the DOE held at 1030 hours on Monday 15 Jul 74 to discuss points arising from the attempted coup in Cyprus; J Hall-Tipping, Lt Col, DOC W1, 15 July 1974, TNA. 84 The Joint Theatre Plan for Operation Ablaut provided for the reinforcement of the British Forces in Cyprus in an Internal Security situation, with a brigade group of up two Infantry Battalions (or one infantry battalion and one RM Commando) and an airportable squadron RAC. Also included were an RAF Regiment (Field) squadron and individual reinforcements totalling some 130 officers and men. It was planned that the operation should be complete within 6½ days. WO 386/21 Annex C, Operation ABLAUT. 85 The Plan for Operation Platypus provided for the replacement of civil labour and the despatch from UK of reinforcements and units to maintain essential services and to institute the emergency system of logistic support of the SBAs. WO 386/21 Annex D, Operation PLATYPUS, TNA. 86 HQ 19 Bde and 9 Bty 12 Light AD Regt. 87 The balance of HQ 19 Bde and 40 Cde RM. 88 By 26 Jul, RHQ Sqn and A Sqn 16/5 L, C Sqn 4/7 DG, B Sqn RHG/D, 8 Fd Sqn RE (-), 3 RRF, 15 Sqn Regt, RM and Army aviation dets and four Puma helicopters from 33 Sqn RAF. WO 386/21 Annex C, Operation ABLAUT, TNA. 89 WO 386/21 Annex C, Operation ABLAUT, TNA.

NOTES

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90 The Rhyl remained until 8 September, the Hampshire until 30 September. WO 386/21 Annex C, Operation ABLAUT, TNA. 91 WO 386/21 Annex C, Operation ABLAUT, TNA. 92 WO 386/21 Annex D, Operation PLATYPUS, TNA. 93 WO 386/21 Olver to FCO, Tel No 230, 17 July 1974, TNA. 94 PREM 16/19 Ministry of Defence to Secretary of State FCO, Re-Instalment of President Makarios by means of British military support, 17 July 1974, TNA. 95 Originally reported in FCO 9/1890 Richard, UKMIS New York to FCO, Telno 129, 2305Z, 15 July 1974, TNA; ‘One patient under treatment at BMH Dhekelia is a Private George Diplaris. Who has multiple gunshot wounds. He was taken to Dhekelia from the HQ UNFICYP Medical Centre. He was wounded during the fighting at the airport. Private Diplaris is a member of the Greek National Contingent in Cyprus.’; FCO 9/1891 Olver to FCO, Telno 210, 161220Z, 16 July 1974. Waldheim informed Kissinger said that the UN knew that four members of the Greek Contingent were treated for wounds received during the coup d’etat in the last two days, so there had been ‘some involvement’; Waldheim/Kissinger, Telcon, 16 July 1974, 11:50 a.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000C9EA.pdf. 96 Originally reported in FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, TelNO 203, 151945Z, 15 July 1974, TNA. 97 WO 386/21 ‘Coup – ELDYK Involvement’, Olver – UKREP Nicosia to FCO, Tel 253, 18 July 1974, TNA. 98 FCO 9/1893 Olver to FCO, Telno 254, 181222Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 99 FCO 9/1891 Hooper, Athens to FCO, Telno 201, 161245Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 100 FCO 9/1891 Hooper, Athens to FCO, Telno 200, 161240Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 101 FCO 9/1891 Richard, UKMIS New York to FCO, Telno 781, 162335Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 102 FCO 9/1891 Logan, UKDEL NATO to FCO, Telno 368, 170015Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 103 NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia., Contingency Study for Cyprus, April 1974. Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Security Council Institutional (‘H’) Files, Meeting Files (1969-1974), Washington Special Action Group Meetings, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 7-18-74 to WSAG [Cyprus] 723-74, Box H-097, Nixon Material. 104 Drafters: TD Boyatt, RW Erdman - Concurrences: NEA - J.J. Sisco; NEA R.P. Davies; NEA/GRK G.T. Churchill; NEA/TUR R.S. Dillon; IO/UNP J.W. Kimball; EUR/SOV J.S. Roy. 105 NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia., Contingency Study for Cyprus, April 1974. Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Security Council Institutional (‘H’) Files, Meeting Files (1969-1974), Washington Special Action Group Meetings, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 7-18-74 to WSAG [Cyprus] 723-74, Box H-097, Nixon Material. 106 Kissinger/Callaghan, Telcon, 16 July 1974, 10:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to

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August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material; FCO 9/1891 Callaghan to British Embassy Washington, Telno 1533, 161930Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 107 Richard T. Kennedy ‘Cyprus situation – Today’s WSAG meeting’, memorandum, WSAG (=Washington Special Action Group) meeting 16 July 1974, 10:30 a.m, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 15-17 July 74, Box H-096, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 108 ‘Today’s WSAG meeting’, memorandum for President, 16 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 109 ATHENS 4528, 161836Z, 16 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 110 Waldheim/Kissinger, Telcon, 16 July 1974, 11:50 a.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000C9EA.pdf. 4. Joint Intervention? WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 11, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1892 Olver to FCO, Telno 223, 170817Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1892 Olver to UKMIS New York, Telno 2, 171528Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1892 Waldheim (via Olver) to Prem Chand, UKMIS New York, Telno 2, 171725Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1891 Hasan Esat Işık, Minister of National Defence and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey to Callaghan, 16 July 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1891 M I Goulding to Acland, 16 July 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1891 Callaghan to Işık, 16 July 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1891 Fyjis-Walker, Ankara to FCO, Telno 754, 161510Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1891 Callaghan to UK Missions in Athens, Washington, Ankara, New York, Nicosia, Paris, NATO, Telno 131, 161320Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1891 Callaghan to British Embassy The Hague, Telno 92, 161715Z, 16 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1891 Hooper to FCO, Telno 204, 170830Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 12 FCO 9/1891 Statement of exiled King Constantine broadcast by BBC Greek section, 16 July 1974, TNA. 13 FCO 9/1891 Statement of former Prime Minister Karamanlis (living in Paris) broadcast by BBC Greek section, 16 July 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/1891 Fyjis-Walker, Ankara to FCO, Telno 754, 161510Z, 16 July 1974. 15 ANKARA 5629, 171329Z, 17 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 16 Richard T. Kennedy to Scowcroft, ‘The Cyprus situation – Today’s WSAG meeting’, memorandum, WSAG meeting 17 July 1974, 1 p.m., WSAG Meetings Cyprus 15-17 July 74, Box H-096, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 17 ATHENS 4538, 171050Z, 17 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 1

NOTES

315

18 ‘Short-term US policy and mid-term considerations’, U.S. Embassy Nicosia to State Department telegram (=NICOSIA) 1446, 172146Z, 17 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 19 Richard T. Kennedy/Harold H. Saunders to Kissinger, memorandum, WSAG meeting on Cyprus, 17 July 1974, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 15-17 July 74, Box H096, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 20 [Anatol] Dobrynin/Kissinger, Telcon, 17 July 1974, 10:45 a. m., http://foia.state. gov/documents/Kissinger/0000C1EC.pdf. 21 Sisco/Kissinger, Telcon, 17 July 1974, 12:45 p.m., http://foia.state. gov/documents/Kissinger/0000C9ED.pdf. 22 Senator Fulbright/Kissinger, Telcon, 17 July 1974, 12:55 p.m., http://foia.state. gov/documents/Kissinger/0000C9EE.pdf. 23 Harold H. Saunders to Kissinger, ‘Where are we going in Cyprus?’, Memorandum, 17 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 24 Kissinger/Callaghan, Telcon, 17 July 1974, 2:50 p.m.; http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000C9EF.pdf. FCO 9/1893 Wiggin, Private Secretary FCO to Washington, Telno 1545, 181330Z, 18 July 1974. 25 Nixon/Kissinger, Telcon, 17 July 1974, 4:30 [m], http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CA78.pdf. 26 Sisco/Kissinger, Telcon, 17 July 1974, 5:10 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CA79.pdf. 27 Kissinger had referred to the Clerides-solution as ‘our pet idea.’ during a conversation on 19 July with Callaghan Since he didn’t want to talk about it on an open telephone line Callaghan had asked what Sisco would put to Athens. Callaghan however didn’t understand Kissinger’s code and the American Secretary was forced to clarify: ‘You know the one I’ve mentioned the compromise I mentioned to Clerides or I mean to…’; Callaghan/Kissinger, 19 July 1974, 8:22 p.m. – San Clemente, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 28 FCO 9/1892 Fyjis-Walker to FCO, Telno 761, 170955Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 29 FCO 9/1892 Fyjis-Walker to FCO, Telno 762, 171020Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 30 FCO 9/1892 Fyjis-Walker to FCO, Telno 763, 171135Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 31 FCO 9/1923 Record of conversation between Callaghan and Makarios held at the FCO on 17 July 1974 at 5:45 pm. 32 Wilson, Harold, Final Term. The Labour Government 1974–76, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1979, 62. 33 FCO 9/1893 Callaghan to Olver, Telno 165, 182020Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 34 FCO 9/1892 Hooper to FCO, Telno 209, 171815Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 35 FCO 9/1892 Callaghan to Hooper, Telno 137, 171945Z, 17 July 1974. 36 Those were Sir Thomas Brimelow (Permanent Under Secretary), Sir John Killick (Deputy Under Secretary ), Charles Wiggin (FCO), Arthur Hockaday (Deputy Head of Defense and Oversees Division of the Cabinett Secretary), Alan Goodison

316

CYPRUS AT WAR

(Head of SED), Joe Haines (Wilson’s Press Secretary) and Lord (Thomas Edward) Bridges (Wilson’s Private Secretary – Oversees Affairs). 37 The others were Halük Bayulken, Special Advisor (former Foreign Minister), Turgut Menemencioğlu, Ambassador to UK, Orhan Eralp, Ambassador to NATO, Ercüment Yavuzalp, Director General of the International Security Department, MFA, Ecmel Bartuçu, Head of the Cyprus and Greek Affairs Department, MFA, General Haydar Saitik, General Kemal Yamak, both Turkish General Staff and Aydin Alaçakaptan, Minister, Turkish Embassy, London. 38 FCO 9/1893 Record of Conversation between Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and the Defence Secretary, and the Prime Minister, the Acting Foreign Minister, and the Minister o the Interior [of Turkey] after dinner at Mo. 10 Downing Street, Wednesday 17 July 1974, TNA. 39 Callaghan/Kissinger, 19 July 1974, 8:22 p.m. – San Clemente, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 40 FCO 9/1892 Richard to Callaghan, Telno 786, 172355Z, 17 July 1974, TNA. 41 FCO 9/1893 Callaghan to UKMIS New York, Telno 524, 181950Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 5. ‘Promoting a solution which will be in US interests’, 18 July 1974 Tasca argued again against the withdrawal of the National Guard officers because of the grave impact this would have on local public order, including dangers for the Turkish Cypriot community; ATHENS 4575, 181141Z, 18 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 2 Brent Scowcroft to Nixon, ‘Today’s WSAG meeting’, memorandum, WSAG Meeting 18 July 1974, 11:30 a.m., WSAG Meetings Cyprus 18-23 July 74, Box H097, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 3 NICOSIA 1463, 181055Z, 18 July 1974, Cyprus Vol. II, Box 592, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 4 FCO 9/1892 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2415 (of 17 July 1974), 180800Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 5 Ibid. 6 Scali to Kissinger, ‘British draft resolution on Cyprus’, USUN (=US Mission to United Nations telegram) 2467, 180310Z, 18 July 1974, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 18-23 July 74, Box H-097, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 7 FCO 9/1893 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telegram Number 2422, 181710Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 8 CAB 128/55/2 Conclusions of a meeting at the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 18 July 1974 at 11.30 a.m. 9 FCO 9/1893 Richard to FCO, Telno 791 (of 18 July 1974), 190900Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1893 Richard to FCO, Telno 791 (of 18 July 1974), 190900Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1893 Hooper to FCO, Telno 216, 181200Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 1

NOTES

317

‘The Greek Government indignantly rejects allegations suggesting that it was in the least involved in recent events in Cyprus. They also consider to be entirely without real foundation the accusations made against Greek Officers at present at the disposal of the Government of Cyprus. Nevertheless, in the desire to satisfy the demand made by the majority of members of the Council and to give further proof of their good faith and peaceful and friendly intentions towards everyone, they have decided to replace the above-mentioned officers and hope that this gesture will be appreciated in its true value. The replacement will take place by stages and will begin in the next few days’; FCO 9/1893 Logan, UKDEL NATO to FCO, Telno 378, 181010Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 13 FCO 9/1893 Wiggin, FCO to Hooper, Athens, Telegram No. 138, 180130Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/1893 Olver to FCO, Telno 241, 180650Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 15 FCO 9/1893 Callaghan to Olver, Telno 167, 182020Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 16 WO 386/21 UKREP Nicosia to FCO, Tel No 242, 18 July 1974, TNA. 17 WO 386/21 Hooper, British Ambassador Athens to FCO, Tel No 228, 19 July 1974, TNA. 18 Copy of Sisco’s report to State Department given to FCO; FCO 9/1894 FCO to Washington Telno 15 Saving, 191420Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1894, Callaghan to Washington, (Immediate Athens, Ankara, UKMIS New York, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, UNKDEL NATO, Nicosia, CBFNE), Telno 1549, 191420Z, 19 July 1974; FCO 9/1893 Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Sisco on 18 July at 3:30 PM, TNA. 20 FCO 9/1893 Callaghan to Athens, Telno 141, 182039Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 21 FCO 9/1893 Cabinet Meeting – CC(74) 27th Meeting, 18 July 1974, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1894 Dobbs, Moscow to FCO, Telno 860, 191543Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 23 FCO 9/1894 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2438 (of 19 July 1974), 200032Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 24 FCO 9/1893 Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Turkish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 18 July 1974 at 4 30 PM; WO 386/21 Annex O, Callaghan to Athens, Tel No 142, 18 July 1974, TNA. 12

6. Sisco in Athens and Ankara: Kissinger’s Failure to Restrain the Turks, 19 July 1974 1 FCO 9/1894, The Turkish press, Phillips to FCO, Telno 775, 190920Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1894, Phillips to FCO, Telno FOG, 191000Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1894, Phillips to FCO, Telno 777, 191352Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1894, Phillips to Nicosia, Telno 14, 191230Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1894, Hooper to FCO, FOG 363, 191010Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1894 Callaghan to Kissinger, Telno 9, 191710Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1894 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2437 (of 19 July 1974), 200030Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1894 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2434, 192300Z, 19 July 1974, TNA.

318

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FCO 9/1894 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2435, 192305Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. FCO 9/1894 Callaghan to Washington, Telno 1553, 191725Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 11 ‘From DA. First. Hellenic Navy. Six submarines have sailed Salamis but other units remain in port. However US colleagues believe that most will sail overnight. Second. HAF. 114 Combat Wing at Tanagra comprising one F104 Sqn and one F102 Sqn have deployed to unknown destination. Third. No military activity Athens or Elefsis airports.’; FCO 9/1894 Hooper to FCO, FOG 366, 191945Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 12 Sisco to Kissinger, ATHENS 4624, received 6:30 a.m., 19 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 13 Sisco to Kissinger, ATHENS 4658, 1917072Z, 19 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 14 FCO 9/1894 Hooper to FCO, Telno 231, 191910Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 15 FCO 9/1894 Phillips to FCO, Telno 778, 191952Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 16 ANKARA 5693, 191031Z, 19 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 17 This is presumably a reference to the unofficial talk the US Ambassador in Nicosia had with Dimitriou. 18 FCO 9/1893 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telegram Number 2420, 181915Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1893 Richard, UKMIS New York to FCO, Telno 790, 181945Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 20 Nixon/Kissinger, Telcon, 18 July 1974, 2:48 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000C9F8.pdf. 21 Kissinger/McCloskey, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 12:45 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CA00.pdf. 22 Kissinger/McCloskey, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 2:15 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CA01.pdf. 23 McCloskey/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 3:40 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CA03.pdf. 24 Kissinger/Robert McCloskey/Robert Ingersoll/Wells Stabler/William Buffum, Conference call – Telcon, 19 July 1974, 9:30 a.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000C9FC.pdf. 25 U.S. State Department telegram (=STATE) 156906, 191947(?)Z, 19 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 26 Kissinger/Robert McCloskey/Robert Ingersoll/Wells Stabler/William Buffum, Conference call – Telcon, 19 July 1974, 9:30 a.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000C9FC.pdf. 27 Kissinger/McCloskey, Telcon, 19 July 1974, no time – presumably a.m. after 9:30., http://foia.state.gov/documents/Kissinger/0000C9FB.pdf. 28 STATE 157127, 192205Z, 19 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 9

10

NOTES

319

29 Stabler showed the instructions for Sisco to the British Head of Chancery Graham; FCO 9/1894 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2438 (of 19 July 1974), 200032Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 30 Kissinger/McCloskey, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 12:45 p.m. – last three words were released in full after appeal on 16 May 2005; http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CF49.pdf. 31 Ford/Kissinger/John Scali/William B. Buffum (Ass. Sec. for Int. Org. Affairs) – Waldheim/Under. Sec. Gen. Bradford Moorse, memorandum of conversation, 9 September 1974, 2:30 p.m., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations 1973-77, Box 4, Ford Library. 32 Kissinger/Ingersoll, Telcon, 19 July 12:05 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000CA7C.pdf. 33 FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 780, 200310Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 34 ATHENS 4742, 211725Z, 21 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 35 FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 780, 200310Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 36 Schlesinger/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 8:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 37 Amb. McCloskey/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 38 Kissinger/McCloskey, 19 July 1974, 8:45 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 39 Kissinger/Stabler/Ingersoll, Telecon, 19 July 1974, 8:50 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 40 McCloskey/Ingersoll/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 9:25 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 41 Nixon/Kissinger, Telecon, 19 July 1974, 10:06 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 42 Haig/Kissinger, 23 July 1974, 2:40 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 43 Kissinger/Ingersoll/McCloskey/Stabler, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 8:51 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 44 Kissinger/Ingersoll/McCloskey/Stabler, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 8:51 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 45 Callaghan, James, Time and Chance, London 1987; Wilson, Harold, The Governance of Britain, London 1976, 344.

320

CYPRUS AT WAR

FCO 9/1894 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2436, 192308Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. FCO 9/1894 Richard to FCO, Telno 796, 191725Z, 19 July 1974, TNA. 48 FCO 9/1894 Richard to FCO, Telno 803 (of 19 July 1974), 200140Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 49 De Sec. Ingersoll/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 3:40 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/documents/Kissinger/0000CA02.pdf. 50 FCO 9/1894 Richard to FCO, Telno 803 (of 19 July 1974), 200140Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 51 FCO 9/1894 Record of a conversation between the Secretary General of NATO and the Permanent Under Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 July 1974 at 0915 hours, TNA. 46 47

7. ‘A new ballgame’: Turkey’s First Military Operation FCO 9/1894 HMG’s response to possible Turkish invasion of Cyprus, FCO memorandum, 19 July 1974, TNA. 2 WO 386/21 JIC London to Paris (Sir John Hunt for Prime Minister), (191450Z JUL), 14:50, 19 July 1974, TNA. 3 Niehuss/Appelbaum to Kennedy, ‘Today’s WSAG meeting’, memorandum, WSAG meeting, 19 July 1974, WSAG Meetings Cyprus 18-23 July 74, Box H-097, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 4 Schlesinger/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 8:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 5 Director Colby/Kissinger, 19 July 1974, 9:35 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 6 Director Colby/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 10:35 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 7 The Turkish Charge d’affairés in Cyprus informed UNFICYP’s Brigadier Henn UNFICYP at 0250Z that ‘Turkey would intervene directly shortly.’; FCO 9/1895 Olver to FCO, Telno 274, 200303Z, 20 July 1974; US: Sisco was informed by Ecevit around 4:30 (local time); FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 780, 200310Z, 20 July 1974; UK: Güneş called Phillips at 0330 GMT; FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 781, 200430Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 785, 200800Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1895 JISNE to MODUK, RTT781, 200417Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1895 JISNE to MODUK, RTT782, 200600Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Ankara, Telno 811, 200715Z, 20 July 1974, TNA.. 12 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Hooper, Athens, Telno 152, 200650Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 13 STATE 157937, recorded 2:11 a.m., 20 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 14 Nixon to Turkish President Koruturk, STATE 157948, 200721Z, 20 July 1974. 1

NOTES

321

15 Kissinger/Nixon, 19 July 1974, 8:00 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 16 Senator Mansfield/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 1:15 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/documents/Kissinger/0000CA7E.pdf. 17 STATE 1579939, 200557Z, 20 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 18 FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2447, 200940Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Hooper, Telno 153, 200805Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 20 FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2442, 200440Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 21 FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2443, 200555Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Athens, Ankara, Moscow, UNKDEL NATO, UKMIS New York, Paris, Telno 151, 200700Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 23 STATE 157947, 200655Z, 20 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 24 STATE 157921, 200243Z, 20 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 25 FCO 9/1895 Hooper to FCO, Telno 237, 201115Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 26 FCO 9/1895 Hooper to FCO, Telno 240, 201330Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 27 FCO 9/1895 BRITNAVAT Athens to MODUK, MODUK FOG, 201205Z, 20 July 1974; FCO 9/1895 Hooper to FCO, Telno 241, 201430Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 28 FCO 9/1895 Hooper to FCO, Telno 242, 201750Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 29 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Ankara, Nicosia, UNKDEL NATO etc., Telno 812, 200950Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 30 WO 386/21 Olver to FCO, Tel No 256, 18 July 1974, TNA. 31 NICOSIA 1553, 200645Z, 20 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 32 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Athens, Telno 156, 201000Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 33 FCO 9/1895 Olver to FCO, Telno 892, 201004Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 34 S/11353/Add 1, Further progress report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 21 July 1974, para 3. 35 FCO 9/1895 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 20 July, 20 July 1974, TNA. 36 FCO 9/1895 Olver to FCO, Telno 303, 201437Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 37 Nicosia had been already divided after violent troubles into Greek and Turkish quarters along the so-called Mason-Dixon Line in 1958; in 1963 following the outbreak of further intercommunal violence the British General Young marked the exact demarcation of both quarters using a green pencil. As a result the demarcation line was named ‘Green Line’. 38 FCO 9/1895 Olver to FCO, Telno 305, 201450Z, 20 July 1974; FCO 9/1895 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 20 July, 20 July 1974, TNA. 39 FCO 9/1895 Olver to FCO, Telno 305, 201450Z, 20 July 1974; FCO 9/1895 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 20 July, 20 July 1974, TNA. 40 FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 793, 201455Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 41 FCO 9/1895 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 20 July, 20 July 1974, TNA. 42 Ibid.

322

CYPRUS AT WAR

43 Ingersoll/Kissinger; Telcon 20 July 1974, 9:30 a.m. – San Clemente, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 44 Ingersoll/Kissinger, Telcon, 20 July 1974, 9:55 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 45 Ingersoll/Kissinger, Telcon, 20 July, 10:15 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 46 McCloskey/Buffum/Kissinger, Telcon, 20 July 1974, 1:45 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 47 STATE 157969, 201523Z, 20 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 48 Sisco to Kissinger, ANKARA 5745, 201909Z, 20 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. Text delivered by the State Department to the UK Embassy to Washington; FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2453, 202220Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 49 FCO 9/1895 Phillips to FCO, Telno 795, 201715Z, 20 July 1974; FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2452, 202131Z, 20 July 1974; FCO 9/1895 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 20/21 July, 21 July 1974, TNA. 50 Sisco to Kissinger, ANKARA 5745, 201909Z, 20 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. Text delivered by the State Department to the UK Embassy to Washington; FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2453, 202220Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 51 ANKARA 5746, 201814Z, 20 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material; FCO 9/1895 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2453, 202220Z, 20 July 1974,TNA. 52 FCO 9/1895 Callaghan to Ankara, Telno 817, 202219Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 53 Security Council Resolution 353 (1974), 20 July 1974, TNA. 54 FCO 9/1895 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 20/21 July, 21 July 1974, TNA. 55 FCO 9/1895 JISNE to CBFNE, SITREP for period 201200B to 210400B Jul, 202045Z, 20 July 1974, TNA. 56 FCO 9/1895 JISNE to MODUK, RTT 792, 202040Z, 20 July 1974, TNA.

8. The First Two ‘Ceasefires’, 21 and 22 July 1974: The Road to the First Geneva Conference 1 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 31, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1897 Olver to FCO, Telno 344, 221045Z, 22 July 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1898 BRITDEFAT, Ankara to MODUK, Telno FOG, 231500Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 4 Chairman [George Scratchley] Brown/Kissinger, Telcon, 22 July 1974, 5:55 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material.

NOTES

323

ANKARA 5750, 0145 a.m., 21 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 6 ANKARA 5753, 210617Z, 21 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 7 Kissinger/Callaghan, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 11:15 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 8 Kissinger/General Haig, Telecon, 21 July 1974, 10:50 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 9 Kissinger/Haig, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 11:20 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 10 ATHENS 4728, 211140Z, 21 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 11 Kissinger/Callaghan, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 11:44 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 12 FCO 9/1896 Callaghan to Ramsbotham, Telno 1556, 211359Z, 21 July 1974, TNA. 13 Kissinger/Ecevit, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 11:26 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 14 Callaghan/Kissinger, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 12:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 15 Kissinger/Greek M. Androutsopoulos, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 12:25 and 12:35 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 16 Ecevit/Kissinger, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 1:25 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 17 FCO 9/1896 Cyprus: Timetable of events 21 July, 21 July 1974, TNA. 18 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 28, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1896 Cyprus: Timetable of events 21 July, 21 July 1974. 20 ATHENS 4746, 211930Z, 21 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 21 STATE 158081, 212209Z, 21 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 22 Nixon to Gizikis, STATE 158085, 212309Z, 21 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 23 STATE 158084, 212309Z, 21 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 5

324

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24 Kissinger/Ecevit, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 10:45 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 25 ‘Events leading to ceasefire agreement’, ATHENS 4759, 220750Z, 22 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 26 FCO 9/1896 The Cyprus Crisis, Second draft, Cabinet paper, 22 July 1974, TNA. 27 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 29, TNA. 28 Ibid, 30. 29 FCO 9/1897 Olver to FCO, Telno 347, 221217Z, 22 July 1974; FCO 9/1897 Olver to FCO, Telno 348, 221358Z, 22 July 1974, TNA. 30 FCO 9/1897 Callaghan to Athens, Telno 173, 221400Z, 22 July 1974, TNA. 31 FCO 9/1897 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 22 July, 22 July 1974, TNA. 32 FCO 9/1898 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2476, 230535Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 33 FCO 9/1896 Cyprus: Timetable of events 21 July, 21 July 1974, TNA. 34 FCO 9/1896 Supplement to diary of events 21 July, 21 July 1974, TNA. 35 ANKARA 5763, 211238Z, 21 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 36 Kissinger/Ecevit, Telcon, 21 July 1974, 10:45 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 37 The destroyers were the Adatepe, Fevzi Çakmak and Kocatepe. 38 Birand clams that the pilot’s didn’t break off attacking, since the commanders of the Turkish ships didn’t know the password; Birand, 30 hot days, 42. 39 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 26, TNA. 40 ANKARA 5775, 21 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 41 FCO 9/1899 HQNEAF to BRITAIRAT Ankara, DIG RTT15, 241217Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 42 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 28, TNA. 43 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 32, TNA. 44 The total number of people safely evacuated to Dhekelia in this operation alone was 3,639 and, with the main evacuation of Famagusta which was reported as 95 per cent complete at 1555 hrs the same afternoon, the grand total of those withdrawn into the SBAs then stood at just over 14,000; WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 38, TNA. 45 FCO 9/1897 Cyprus: Timetable of Events, 22 July, 22 July 1974, TNA. 46 WO 386/21 Annex AA – Record of Conference between CBFNE, Naval Commander and Air Commander at 0405 hrs 23 July 1974, TNA.

NOTES

325

47 WO 386/21 ANNEX CC – Examples of messages passed to Turkish High Command by CBFNE, TNA. 48 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 43, TNA. 49 Schlesinger/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 July 1974, 8:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material.

9. ‘A net gain for the West’: Political Implications of the Turkish Military Operation 1 FCO 9/1897 A. A. Acland, note for the record, 22 July 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1898 Cyprus: Timetable of events 23 July, 23 July 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1898 Olver to FCO, Telno 369, 231335Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1898 JISNE (reported by Callaghan to Nicosia), Telno 239, 232011Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO, Tel No 391, 241315Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO, Tel No 392, 241420Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 7 Cyprus. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1960. Cmnd. 1093. Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Article 36 (2). 8 Ibid. Article 44 (1-d), (2) and (4). 9 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Washington, Tel No 1573, 241500Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1899 Ramsbotham to FCO, Tel No 2499, 241620Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1900 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2509, 251653Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 12 STATE 159994 232310Z, 23 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 13 NICOSIA 1663, 231430Z, 23 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 14 NICOSIA 1723, 241353Z, 24 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 15 Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger, Telcon, 23 July 1974, no time, http://foia.state. gov/documents/Kissinger/0000CA31.pdf. 16 FCO 9/1898 Makarios to Clerides (via Washington and BHC Nicosia) FCO Telno 2481.231508Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 17 FCO 9/1900 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2507, 251606Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 18 The Cyprus Ambassador to US, Nicos Dimitriou, informed Ramsbotham about the conversation; FCO 9/1900 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2520, 252240Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1898 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2475, 230530Z, 23 July 1974, TNA; The details of Makarios’ proposed solution will be dealt with in Chapter 15 on the second Geneva Conference. 20 FCO 9/1898 Cyprus: Timetable of events 23 July, 23 July 1974, TNA.

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FCO 9/2003 Hooper to FCO, Telno 339, 251730Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. FCO 9/1899 A. A. Acland to Goodison, 24 July 1974, TNA. 23 Stabler passed the report on to Ramsbotham; FCO 9/1900 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2510, 251839Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 24 FCO 9/1901 Cyprus: Table of events 26/27 July, 27 July 1974, TNA. 25 FCO 9/1902 Olver to FCO, Telno 451, 271745Z, 27 July 1974, TNA. 26 The National Guard ‘are prepared to support and accept orders from the Clerides administration.’; FCO 9/1902 Olver to FCO, Telno 450, time unclear (afternoon), 27 July 1974, TNA. 27 FCO 9/1902 Olver to FCO, Telno 451, 271745Z, 27 July 1974, TNA. 28 FCO 9/1901 Cyprus: Table of events 26/27 July, 27 July 1974, TNA. 29 FCO 9/1898 Olver to FCO, Telno 375, 231954Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 21 22

10. Further Anglo-Turkish Confrontation, 23–26 July Walheim/Kissinger, Telcon, 22 July 1974, 9:40 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 2 WO386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975,47, TNA. 3 S/11353/Add. 4, Further report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 23 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1898, TNA). 4 NICOSIA 1678, 232210Z, 23 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 5 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO, Flash Tel No 390 241213Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1899 Richard, UKDEL New York to FCO, Tel No 842, 241423Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1897 A. A. Acland, note for the record, 22 July 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Nicosia, Tel No 256, 241655Z, 24 July 1974. Kissinger did so and instructed the American Ambassador accordingly; FCO 9/1899 Ramsbotham to FCO, Tel No 2497, 241515Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 9 Callaghan/Kissinger, Telcon, 22 July 1974, 1:15 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 10 Ecevit/Kissinger, Telcon, 24 July 1974, 3:05 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material; STATE 161223, 250002Z, 25 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 11 Callaghan/Kissinger, 24 July 1974, 3:30 p.m.; Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 12 ANKARA 5895, 241712Z, 24 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 13 ANKARA 5897, 241939Z, 24 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 14 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO, Tel No 397, 241737Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 1

NOTES

327

FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Ankar, Tel No 852, 241745Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Nicosia, Tel No 257, 241702Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 17 WO386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 50, TNA. 18 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO, Tel No 398, 241809Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1898 Callaghan to Ecevit (via Embassy Ankara), Telno 840, 231955Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 20 DEFE 13/966 ‘Threatened attack on Nicosia Airport’, W.E. Mumford, PS Defence to Lord Bridges, S. of S. Defence, memo, 24 July 1974. 21 WO 386/21 Annex EE, CBFNE to GOC NEARELF/AIR CDR CYPRUS, Flash 241959 Z, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Ankara, Tel No 855, 241945Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 23 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Ankara, Tel No 853, 241900Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 24 FCO 9/1899 Phillips to FCO, Tel No 846, 242020Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 25 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Ankara, Tel No 856, 242030Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 26 WO386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 53, TNA. 27 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO Tel No 406, Immediate 250650Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 28 S/PV 1784, UN Security Council, Provisional verbatim record of the seventeen hundred and eighty-fourth meeting, held in private at Headquarters at 9 p.m., 24 July 1974. 15 16

11. Blockade of Northern Cyprus? The First Major Anglo-American Rift WO386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, TNA. 2 ATHENS 4967, 242150Z, 24 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 3 ATHENS 4708, 202125Z, 20 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 4 FCO 9/1899 Hooper to FCO, Tel No 323, 242215Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 5 WO386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 54, TNA. 6 Ibid. 7 FCO 9/1901 Callaghan to UKMIS Geneva, Telno 310, 260714Z, 26 July 1974, TNA. 8 WO 386/21 Annex GG, Sir Horace Phillips, British Ambassador Ankara to UKMIS Geneva, Tel No 001, Flash 260940Z, 26 July 1974, TNA. 9 WO 386/21 Annex JJ, Hooper, British Ambassador Athens to UKMIS Geneva, Tel No 2, Flash 261640Z, 26 July 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1900 Olver to FCO, Telno 416, 251830Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 11 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 56, TNA. 12 In 1960 Dag Hammarskjöld (UN Secretary-General between 1953 and 1963) sent a UN force into the Republic of the Congo in order to suppress civil strife 1

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there. He resisted Soviet pressure to resign for his action and insisted on the freedom of the Secretary-General to take emergency action without prior approval by the Security Council or the General Assembly. 13 FCO 9/1901 Richard, UKMIS New York to FCO Tel No 868, 26 July 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/1901 Richard, UKMIS New York to FCO, Telno 867, 1613Z, 26 July 1974 & Callaghan to UKMIS Geneva, Telno 316, 261735Z, 26 July 1974, TNA. 12. The Danger for Turkish Cypriot Communities S/11353/Add 2, Further progress report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 22 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1897, TNA). 2 S/11353/Add 3, Further progress report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 22 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1897, TNA). 3 FCO 9/1897 Callaghan to UK Mission New York, Telno 539, 221315Z, 22 July 1974, TNA. 4 Z-Time or Zulu-Time is Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) (the acronym is based on the French wording). It is identical with GMT and is used in diplomatic and military telegrams. Sometimes there are forms like 0620B which represents the timezone centred on 30° East longitude, which is East European Time, i.e. local time in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 5 FCO 9/1897 Phillips, Ankara to FCO, Telno 816, 221435Z, 22 July 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1897 Olver to FCO, no number, no time, 22 July 1974, TNA. 7 S/11353/Add. 4, Further report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 23 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1898, TNA). 8 S/11353/Add. 4, Further report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 23 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1898, TNA). 9 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to Olver Tel No 250, Flash 241425Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1899 Olver to FCO, Tel No 388, 241021Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1904, Recent information on the violations of the ceasefire and killings by the Greek Cypriot National Guard in a number of towns and villages in Cyprus, Press release, send by Güner Öztek, Counsellor Turkish Embassy, London to Georgina Wright, Southern European Department, FCO, 29 July 1974, TNA. 12 FCO 9/1905 Olver to FCO, Telno 488, 301220Z, 30 July 1974, TNA. 13 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 61, TNA. 14 WO 386/21 Annex MM, [FCO 9/1907] HQ BFNE to BHC Nicosia, Immediate 041405Z, 4 August 1974, TNA. 15 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 61, TNA.. 16 FCO 9/1902 Olver to FCO, Telno 448, 271108Z, 27 July 1974, TNA. 17 FCO 9/1902 Olver to FCO, Telno 449, 271130Z, 27 July 1974, TNA. 18 FCO 9/1906 BRITDEFAD, Nicosia MODUK, TelNO FOG, 312140Z, 31 July 1974 (altered copy; original retained by department), TNA. 1

NOTES

329

13. First Geneva Conference, 25–30 July 1974 STATE 158230, 221657Z, 22 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 2 STATE 160115, 232342Z, 23 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 3 Ecevit/Kissinger, Telcon, 23 July 1974, 3:30 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 4 Cyprus Task Force, Cyprus Planning Group, Paper No. 1, Annex: Alternative Cyprus Settlements, 21 July 1974 [Group members: Hartman (Chairman), Mr. Lowenstein (State), Gen Eston, Col Freeland, Cde McVoy (JCS), Ms Niehuss, Mr. Ranson, Mr. Day, Mr. Stoddard, Mr. Simons(NSC)] (for WSAG meeting 21 July 1974), WSAG Meetings Cyprus 18-23 July 74, Box H-097, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 5 Cyprus Task Force, Cyprus Planning Group, Paper No. 2, Cyprus Elements in Post-Ceasefire Negotiations, 22 July 1974 (for WSAG meeting 22 July 1974), WSAG Meetings Cyprus 18-23 July 74, Box H-097, National Security Council Institutional (H) Files, Nixon Material. 6 STATE 161368, 250253Z, 25 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 7 FCO 9/1898 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2476, 230535Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1897 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2467, 222058Z, 22 July 1974, TNA. 9 STATE 166128, 310027Z, 31 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 10 Report on the Kissinger Makarios meeting given by McCloskey to Ramsbotham; FCO 9/1904 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2547 [of 29 July 1974], 300005Z, 29 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1904 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2547 [of 29 July 1974], 300005Z, 29 July 1974, TNA. 12 McCloskey/Kissinger, Telcon, 29 July 1974, 7:32 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 13 ANKARA 6135, 021152Z, 2 August 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 14 NICOSIA 2093, 021322Z, 2 August 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 15 Bitsios later replaced Mavros as Greek Foreign Minister (15 October 1974). 16 WO 386/21 Annex JJ, Hooper, British Ambassador Athens to UKMIS Geneva, Tel No 2, Flash 261640Z, 26 July 1974, TNA. 17 FCO 9/1902 Olver to FCO, Telno 451, 271745Z, 27 July 1974, TNA. 18 S/11353/Add. 5, Further report of the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 24 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1899, TNA). 19 S/11353/Add. 6, Further report of the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 24 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1899, TNA). 1

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CYPRUS AT WAR

20 FCO 9/1899 Callaghan to UKMIS New York, Tel No 547, 240940Z, 24 July 1974, TNA. 21 S/11353/Add. 7, Further report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus, 25 July 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1900, TNA). 22 FCO 9/1900 Olver to FCO, Telno 404, 250525Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 23 FCO 9/1900 Hooper to FCO, Telno 331, 251130Z, 25 July 1974, TNA. 24 FCO 9/1922 Record of conversation between Callaghan and the United Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Cyprus (Dr. Roberto Guyer) at the residence of the British Ambassador to the United Nations Mission in Geneva, Thursday, 25 July, 1974 at 1530, TNA. 25 FCO 9/1922 Record of Conversation between Callaghan and Güneş at the house of the Turkish Ambassador in Geneva on Thursday, 25 July, 1974, at 1730, TNA. 26 Callaghan, James: Time and Chance, Collins, London, 1987, 348-349. 27 FCO 9/1922 Record of conversation between Callaghan and Mavros at the Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva on Thursday, 25 July 1974, at 1845, TNA. 28 FCO 9/1922 The Geneva Conference on Cyprus, July-August 1974, Records of Conversation, Annex to Document 7, TNA. 29 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting of Callaghan, Mavros and Güneş (and their entire delegations) held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 25 July, 1974, at 2030, TNA. 30 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting of Callaghan, Mavros and Güneş (and their entire delegations) held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 26 July, 1974, at 1050, TNA. 31 FCO 9/1922 Record of conversation between Callaghan and Mavros at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 26 July, 1974, at 1240, TNA. 32 FCO 9/1922 Record of conversation between Callaghan and Güneş at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 26 July, 1974, at 1430, TNA. 33 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Proposed Guidelines, Annex A to Document 19, TNA. 34 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 721, 26 July, 1974, TNA. 35 FCO 9/1922 Record of a tête-à-tête conversation between Callaghan and Güneş at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 26 July, 1974, at 2130, TNA. 36 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 726 of 27 July, 1974, TNA. 37 Kissinger/Karamanlis, Telcon, 26 July 1974, 1:25 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 38 ATHENS 5048, 261345Z, 26 July 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 39 Kissinger/Buffum, Telcon, 26 July 1974, 4:18 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 40 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 726, 27 July, 1974, TNA.

NOTES

331

41 Sisco/Kissinger, Telcon, 26 July 1974, 4:30 p.m. – San Clemente, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 42 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting of Callaghan, Mavros and Güneş in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Saturday, 27 July, 1974, at 1030, TNA. 43 STATE 163905, 270339Z, 27 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 44 NICOSIA 1842, recorded 6:25 a.m., 27 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 45 FCO 9/1922 Analytical note by Mr. Goodison on the work of the drafting committee 27 July, 1974, at 1630, TNA. 46 (Sir) John Goulden was actually ‘Chief of Recruitment’ at the Foreign Office, but had joined the British team at Geneva as former member of FCO’s planning staff. 47 FCO 9/1922 Minute by Mr. Goulden on Turkish views, 28 July, 1974, TNA. 48 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 23, Extracts from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 743 of 28 July, 1974, TNA. 49 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting of Callaghan, Mavros and Güneş in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 28 July, 1974, at 1630, TNA. 50 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 26, Message from Karamanlis to Wilson, 28 July, 1974, TNA. 51 FCO 9/1922 Chronology of the events of 29 July, 1974 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, TNA. 52 FCO 9/1901 Olver to FCO, Telno 439, 261720Z, 26 July 1974, TNA. 53 FCO 9/1903 Olver to FCO, Telno 456, 281915Z, 28 July 1974; FCO 9/1903 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telno 747, 282222Z, 28 July 1974, TNA. 54 FCO 9/1904 Olver to FCO, Telno 475, 291720Z, 29 July 1974, TNA. 55 FCO 9/1901 Cyprus: Table of events 26/27 July, 27 July 1974, TNA. 56 AIR 20/12649 B.J., Under Secretary of State (RAF) to Lord Bridges, Secretary of State MODUK, letter, 29 July 1974. 57 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 65, TNA. 58 FCO 9/1904 Olver to FCO, Telno 473, 291153Z, 29 July 1974, TNA. 59 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975,65, TNA. 60 Ibid. 61 FCO 9/1904 Richard, UK Mission New York, to FCO, Telno 880, 291358Z, 29 July 1974, TNA. 62 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 66, TNA. 63 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document 27, Annex A, TNA. 64 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document 27, Annex B, TNA. 65 Ecevit/Kissinger, Telcon, 29 July 1974, 6:05 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material.

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66 Ecevit/Kissinger, Telcon, 29 July 1974, 6:05 p.m. – this passage was released in full after appeal on 16 May 2005; http://foia.state.gov/documents/Kissinger/ 0000CF4A.pdf. 67 Ecevit/Kissinger, Telcon, 29 July 1974, 6:05 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 68 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document 27, Annex C, Text A, TNA. 69 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document 27, Annex C, Text B, TNA. 70 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 29, Extracts from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 757, 29 July, 1974, TNA. 71 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 761 of 30 July, 1974, TNA. 72 Sisco was instructed to put a new version first to Callaghan and then to Ecevit.; Sisco/Kissinger, Telcon, 28 July 1974, 7:10 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 73 FCO 9/1922 Note by Auckland, 30 July 1974; FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 760, 30 July, 1974, TNA. 74 FCO 9/1922 Note by Acland, 30 July 1974, TNA. 75 ‘Situation report No. 26’, STATE 164065, 291504Z, 29 July 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 76 NICOSIA 1932, 291112Z, 29 July 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 77 FCO 9/1922 Chronology of the Events of 30 July, 1974 at the Palais des Nations Geneva, TNA. 78 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting of Callaghan, Mavros and Güneş held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 30 July, 1974, at 1215, TNA. 79 FCO 9/1922 Chronology of the Events of 30 July, 1974 at the Palais des Nations Geneva, TNA. 80 FCO 9/1922 Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 30 July 1974, TNA (see Annex 1). 81 Callaghan, James: Time and Chance, Collins, London 1987, 349. 82 Nixon/Kissinger, Telcon, 30 July 1974, 3:10 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material.

14. Between the Talks, 1–12 August 1974 FCO 9/1905 JISNE to MODUK, 302115Z, DIG FOGG101 [or IOI], 30 July 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1906 BRITDEFAD, Nicosia MODUK, TelNO FOG, 312140Z, 31 July 1974 (altered copy; original retained by department), TNA. 1

NOTES

333

FCO 9/1906 JISNE to MODUK, DIGFOG901, 311338Z, 31 July 1974; FCO 9/1906 Olver to FCO, Telno 511, 311448Z, 31 July 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1906 BRITDEFAD, Nicosia MODUK, TelNO FOG, 312140Z, 31 July 1974 (altered copy; original retained by department), TNA. 5 FCO 9/1907 Callaghan to Nicosia, Telno 422, 061600Z, 6 August 1974, TNA. 6 WO 386/21 Annex OO Report on the Demarcation Task by Lt Col Linley, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1907 S J L Olver to A C Goodison, SED FCO, letter, 1 August 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 587, 031447Z, 3 August 1974, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 590, 031512Z, 3 August 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 590, 031512Z, 3 August 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 590, 031512Z, 3 August 1974, TNA. 12 FCO 9/1907 Greek violations of the ceasefire agreement, Press release, Turkish Embassy, London, 4 August 1974, TNA. 13 FCO 9/1907 Message Wilson to Ecevit, FCO to Ankara, Telno 920, 041850Z, 4 August 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 618, 050855Z, 5 August 1974, TNA. 15 He had spoken to Fuat Veziroglu (MP from Famagusta); Vedat Chelik (TCA member for Commerce, Industry and Tourism and former Under Secretary of Denktash); Necati Tashkin (Secretary-General of Turk-Sen). 16 FCO 9/1907 Michael G MacDonald, British High Commission Nicosia to James L Jones, SEED, FCO, letter, 6 August 1974, TNA. 17 NICOSIA 2176, 052339Z, 5 August 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 18 FCO 9/1922 The Geneva Conference, Document No. 58, Record of Conversation between Callaghan, Clerides and Mavros at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Saturday, 10 August, 1974, at 1200, TNA. 19 NICOSIA 2176, 052339Z, 5 August 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 20 FCO 9/1907 S J L Olver to A C Goodison, SED FCO, letter, 1 August 1974, TNA. 21 FCO 9/1907 BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK, TelNO FOG, 051350Z, 5 August 1974, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1907 BRITDEFAT Athens to MODUK, Telno FOG, 051415Z, 5 August 1974, TNA. 23 ATHENS 5300, 011848Z, 1 August 1974, Greece Vol. V, Box 595, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 24 Hartman/Kissinger, Telcon, 3 August, 1974, 9:35 a.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 25 ANKARA 6176, recorded 12:45 a.m., 5 August 1974, Turkey Vol. IV, Box 634, NSC Files, Country Files – Middle East, Nixon Material. 26 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 630, 051825Z, 5 August 1974, TNA. 27 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 668, 071058Z, 7 August 1974, TNA. 3

334

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FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 671, 071423Z, 7 August 1974, TNA. S/11353/Add 17 Further report by the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus [period 1300 local on 6 August to 1200 on 7 August], 8 Augst 1974; FCO 9/1907 Richard to FCO, Telno 964, 081645Z, 8 August 1974, TNA. 28 29

15. Second Geneva Conference, 8–13 August 1974 FCO 9/1922 The Geneva Conference, Document No. 40, Extracts from FCO Guidance Telegram on Geneva II, No. 103 of 7 August 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1922 Record of Conversation between Callaghan and the United States Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, A. Hartman, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on Thursday, 8 August, 1974, 10.30 a.m., TNA. 3 Vice-President Ford/Kissinger, Telcon, 8 August, 12:30 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 4 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Mavros at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 8 August, 1974, at 1615, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Güneş at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 8 August, 1974, at 1715, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 794, 8 August, 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO Telegram No. 801, 10 August, 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No. 53 Report of Working Group on Paragraph 3 (b) of the Geneva Declaration; Document 54, Minute by Mr. Freeland, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Waldheim at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 9 August, 1974, at 1200, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Telephone conversation between Callaghan and Waldheim, Friday, 9 August, 1974, at 2130, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Güneş at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 9 August, 1974, at 1800, TNA. 12 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO Telegram No. 801, 10 August, 1974, TNA. 13 FCO 9/1922 Summary Record of points made during dinner between Callaghan and Clerides at La Reserve, Geneva, Friday, 9 August, 1974, at 2200, TNA. 14 ANKARA 6404, 100114Z, 10 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 15 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 808, 10 August, 1974, TNA. 16 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO Telegram No 807, 10 August, 1974, TNA. 17 Milliyet, 10 August 1974. 18 FCO 9/1922 Record of Conversation between Callaghan, Clerides and Mavros at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Saturday, 10 August, 1974, at 1200, TNA. 19 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 78, TNA. 1

NOTES

335

Birand, 30 hot days, 89. FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting between Callaghan and Hartman at La Reserve, Geneva, on Saturday, 10 August, 1974, at 1430, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No 60, Note for Record – Cyprus Talks: Name Cards and Setting, TNA. 23 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting between Callaghan, Mavros, Güneş and Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities [Clerides and Denktaş] at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Saturday, 10 August, 1974, at 1720, TNA. 24 Birand, 30 hot days, 93. 25 Ibid, 79-80. 26 Ibid, 93. 27 FCO 9/1922 Record of Conversation between Callaghan, Mavros and Clerides, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Sunday, 11 August, 1974, at 1100, TNA. 28 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting between Callaghan and Hartman at the United Kingdom Mission, Geneva, on Sunday, 11 August, 1974, at 1200, TNA. 29 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 78, TNA. 30 FCO 9/1907 ‘A few basic principles’ Goodison to Private Secretary, letter, 11 August 1974, TNA. 31 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 79, TNA. 32 FCO 9/1907 Olver to UKMIS Geneva, Telno 17, 120551Z, 12 August 1974, TNA. 33 Ford/Kissinger, Telecon, 10 August 1974, 3:40 p.m., Temporary Parallel File, Box A1, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files 1972) 1974-77, Office of the Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs, Ford Library. 34 Kissinger to Ecevit, STATE 175382, 110200Z, 11 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 35 The Panhandle is a reference to the Pentadhaktylos or Beşparmak (Five-finger) mountain range also known as Kyrenia mountain range. Its name derives from a mountain which resembles a human hand. 36 ANKARA 6412, 110924Z, 11 August 1974/ ANKARA 6415, 111836Z, 11 August 1974 (Details of the proposal), Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 37 STATE 175402, 111727Z, 11 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 38 Ecevit to Kissinger, talking paper, ANKARA 6414, 111725Z, 11 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 39 Kissinger to Ecevit, STATE 155417 (oral message), 120152Z, 12 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 20 21

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CYPRUS AT WAR

40 ANKARA 6426, 120745Z, 12 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 41 FCO 9/1922 Record of Conversation between Callaghan and the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Kirça, Geneva, on Sunday, 11 August, 1974, at the United Kingdom Mission Geneva, at 1300, TNA. 42 FCO 9/1922 Record of a telephone conversation between Callaghan and the United States Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sisco, at 1720 on 11 August, 1974, TNA. 43 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting between British and American Officials, Geneva, on Monday, 12 August, 1974, at 1030. Present: Mr. A.C. Goodison; Mr. M. O’D. B. Alexander (British); Mr. A. Hartman (American), TNA. 44 FCO 9/1922 Record of Conversation between Callaghan and Güneş on 11 August, 1974, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, at 1745, TNA. 45 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No. 74, British Draft Declaration by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash (Second draft - The first British draft was not shown to any other delegation), TNA. 46 FCO 9/1922 Summary record of a discussion between Callaghan, Mavros and Güneş at dinner at La Reserve Hotel, Geneva, on Sunday, 11 August, 1974, at 2100, TNA. 47 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting between Callaghan and Clerides, Palais des Nations, 12 August, at 1030, TNA. 48 FCO 9/1922, Record of a meeting between Callaghan and Denktaş, Palais des Nations, 12 August, at 1100, TNA. 49 FCO 9/1922 Mr. Denktash’s Draft Declaration by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, TNA. 50 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan, Clerides and Denktaş at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on 12 August, at 1640, TNA. 51 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No. 79, Explanatory Turkish Paper of 12 August, 1974, TNA (see Annex 2). 52 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Güneş at the Palais des Nations on Monday 12 August, at 1830. According to the record of conversation Güneş had left the map with Callaghan ‘but next day at his request, it was returned to him.’ This information is incorrect since the map can be found in FCO 9/1907, TNA. 53 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Clerides at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on Monday, 12 August, at 1935, TNA. 54 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Denktaş at the Palais des Nations on 12 August, at 2000, TNA. 55 ANKARA 6425, 1207297, 12 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 56 Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, memorandum of conversation, Monday, 12 August 1974, 9:00 a.m., Oval Office, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations 1973-77, Box 4, Ford Library.

NOTES

337

57 FCO 9/1922 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telegram No. 824, 12 August, 1974, TNA. 58 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan and Güneş in the Palais des Nations on Monday, 12 August, 1974, at 2240, TNA. 59 FCO 9/1922 Summary note on a telephone conversation between Callaghan and Kissinger, 12 August, 1974, at 2245, TNA. 60 Birand, 30 hot days, 104. 61 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No. 87, Mr. Clerides Draft Declaration by the three Foreign Ministers, TNA. 62 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan, Clerides and Mavros at the Palais des Nations on 13 August, 1974, at 1000, TNA. 63 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 82, TNA. 64 ‘Third British Draft Statement. (…) they agreed that this revision [of the Constitution] should result in the establishment of a federal system of government based on the following fundamental elements: (a ) The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent, sovereign and integral State, comprising within a federal system which accords with its bi-communal nature two autonomous Administrations operating in appropriately defined geographical areas; (b) In the determination of the competences to be allotted to the Federal Government, and in the exercise of those competences, full account shall be taken of the bi-communal nature of the State; (c) The geographical areas within which the two autonomous Administrations shall operate shall be defined with due regard to such factors as population, land tenure, communications, utility supply and general administrative efficiency.’ FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Annex to Document 86, Third British Draft Statement, TNA. 65 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No. 87, Mr. Clerides Draft Declaration by the three Foreign Ministers, TNA. 66 FCO 9/1922 Record of a Conversation between Callaghan, Denktaş and Güneş at the Palais des Nations on 13 August, at 1100, TNA. 67 FCO 9/1922 Record of a telephone conversation between Callaghan and Kissinger on 13 August, 1974 at 1215, TNA. 68 STATE 176390, 130015Z, 13 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 69 ATHENS 5608, 130948Z, 13 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 70 ‘Cyprus: Current Turkish Scene’, ANKARA 6475, 131137Z, 13 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 71 Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, memorandum of conversation, Tuesday, 13 August 1974, 9:00 a.m., Oval Office, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations 1973-77, Box 4, Ford Library.

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CYPRUS AT WAR

72 ATHENS 5626, 131236Z, 13 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 73 ATHENS 5628, 131310Z, 13 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 74 ANKARA 6493, 131645Z, 13 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 75 The talks were only interrupted by a one recess between 21.00 and 22.15 and a 20 minutes coffee-break at 1.20. 76 FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference, Document No. 91, Explanatory Turkish Paper on 13 August, 1974, TNA (see Annex 3). 77 Birand, 30 hot days, 109. 78 ANKARA 6495, 132244Z, 13 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 79 ANKARA 6496, 132256Z, 13 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 80 ANKARA 6558, 151445Z 15 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 81 FCO 9/1909, Note for the Record, Lynton Jones, Cyprus Emergency Unit, 0800 hrs, 14 August 1974, TNA. 82 FCO 9/1922 Record of a meeting between Callaghan, Mavros, Güneş, Clerides and Denktaş, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 13 August, 1974, at 1840, TNA. 83 Birand, 30 hot days, 99. 84 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, IV, 68-69.

16. Stopping the Turks? Final Debates on British/UNFICYP Military Intervention and a Greek Convoy 1 FCO 9/1909 Record of a meeting at 10 Downing Street at 3.0 p.m. on Wednesday 14 August 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to UKMIS New York, Telno 631, 151440Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to UKMIS New York, Telno 633, and Nicosia, 151505Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 4 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 84, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1908 Hooper to FCO, letter, 10 August 1974, TNA. 6 Vima, 10 August 1974 (copy in FCO 9/1908, TNA). 7 FCO 9/1908 BRITDEFAT Athens to MODUK, Immediate 342 FOG, 131030Z, 13 August 1974, TNA.

NOTES

339

FCO 9/1909 Hooper to MODUK, 344 FOG, 140925Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. FCO 9/1909 Hooper to FCO, Telno 450, 141920Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 10 ATHENS 5707, 051252Z, 5 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (= Ford Library). 11 FCO 9/1909 Diary: 14-15 August 1974, TNA. 12 FCO 9/1909 Diary: 14-15 August 1974, TNA. 13 ATHENS 5608, 130948Z, 13 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 14 FCO 9/1909 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2697, 142229Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 15 STATE 178616, 150150, 15 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 16 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Athens, Telno 263, 150302Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 17 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Athens, Telno 267, and to Washington, 151440Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 18 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Washington, Telno 1713, 15 August 1974., TNA. 19 FCO 9/1910 BRITDEFAT to MODUK, FOG 347, 151630Z, 15 August 1974. 20 FCO 9/1911 Hooper to FCO, Telno 462, 161135Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 21 FCO 9/1911 Wilson to Karamanlis, FCO to Athens, Telno 274, 161922Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1911 Callaghan to Athens, Telno 273, 161922Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 23 FCO 9/1912 BRITDEFEAT Athens to MODUK, FOG 351, 171335Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 8 9

17. War, 14–16 August 1974 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 752, 140315Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1910 JISNE to MODUK, DIG FOG 954, 15 August 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1909, Note for the Record, Lynton Jones, Cyprus Emergency Unit, 0800 hrs, 14 August 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 755, 140538Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1909, Note for the Record, Lynton Jones, Cyprus Emergency Unit, 0800 hrs, 14 August 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1909 Statement by the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Bülent Ecevit, 14 July 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1909 Turkish Embassy London, aide-mémoire, handed by Ambassador Menemencioglu to Killick on 14 August 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1909 Handwritten comment by Goodison on a letter to him by Killick describing a meeting with the Turkish Ambassador handing over the aide-mémoire and Ecevits statement, 14 July 1974, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 762, 140945Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 1

340

CYPRUS AT WAR

10 NICOSIA 2379, 151640Z, 15 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 11 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 89, TNA. 12 Ibid. 13 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 766, 141312Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 769, 141753Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 15 B represents the timezone centred on 30° East longitude, which is East European Time, i.e. local time in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 16 FCO 9/1910 JISNE to MODUK, DIG FOG 954, 15 August 1974, TNA. 17 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 89, TNA. 18 FCO 9/1910 Olver to FCO, Telno 778, 150940Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 768, 141440Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 20 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 769, 141753Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 21 FCO 9/1911 Olver to FCO, Telno 795, 160750Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 22 FCO 9/1911 Diary – 16 August 1974, TNA. 23 WO 386/21 Annex NN, Control of movement of armed bodies through the SBAs, TNA; AIR 20/12649 Acting CDS to CBFNE, COSCYP 3, 141342Z, 14 August 1974 (on disamrement of Greek Cypriot NG), TNA. 24 WO 386/21 Annex SS, The Turkish advance on Famagusta – As seen from Ayios Nikolaos 15 August 1974, TNA. 25 FCO 9/1910 Diary – 15 August 1974, TNA. 26 WO 386/21 Annex SS, The Turkish advance on Famagusta – As seen from Ayios Nikolaos 15 August 1974, TNA. 27 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 92, TNA. 28 FCO 9/1911 Olver to Sir John Killick FCO, Telno 797, 160818Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 29 Lt Col I Cartwright OBE, CO 3 RRF and Lt Col H A Johnstone, CO 9 Sig Regt. 30 WO 386/21 Annex SS, The Turkish advance on Famagusta – As seen from Ayios Nikolaos 15 August 1974, TNA. 31 Ibid. 32 ‘Cyprus Actions’, Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, memorandum, 14 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 33 STATE 177625, 141525Z, 14 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 34 Kissinger to Ecevit, STATE 177679, 141554Z, 14 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library.

NOTES

341

35 STATE 178616, 150150, 15 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 36 Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, memorandum of conversation, Thursday, 15 August 1974, 9:00 a.m., Oval Office, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations 1973-77, Box 5, Ford Library. 37 Kissinger to Macomber, State 179920, 161609Z, 16 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 38 UNSC Resolution 357 (1974), 14 August; 358 (1974) 15 August; 359 (1974), 15 August; 360 (1974), 16 August. 39 UNSC Resolution 360 (1974) adopted at the 1794th Security Council meeting on 16 August 1974 by 11 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Iraq, Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). One member (China) did not participate in the voting.. 40 Text of statement made on the morning of 14 August by the Greek Prime Minister; FCO 9/1910 Hooper to FCO, Telno 455, 151040Z, 15 August 1974; FCO 9/1910 Hooper to FCO, Telno 459, 152105Z, 15 August 1974; Text of Karamanlis address to the Greek nation on the evening of 15 July; FCO 9/1911 Hooper to FCO, Telno 460, 160840Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 41 STATE 177680, 141655Z, 14 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 42 STATE 179778, 160012Z, 16 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 43 ATHENS 5739, 161320Z, 16 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 44 STATE 180549, 162130Z, 16 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 45 ATHENS 5783, 171055Z, 17 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 46 STATE 181127, 172326Z, 17 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 47 ATHENS 5892, 201637Z, 20 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 48 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 768, 141440Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 49 FCO 9/1909 Diary: 14-15 August 1974, TNA.

342

CYPRUS AT WAR

50 STATE 178628, 151150Z, 15 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 51 NICOSIA 2379, 151640Z, 15 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 52 FCO 9/1910 Diary – 15 August 1974, TNA. 53 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Ankara, Telno 975, 150048Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 54 ANKARA 6543, 151020Z, 15 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library; FCO 9/1910 Phillips to FCO, Telno 989, 151135Z, 15 August 1974, TNA. 55 FCO 9/1910 Phillips to FCO, Telno 993, 152123Z, 15 August 1974; Güneş had proposed the same that morning in Geneva (UKMIS Geneva Telno 833 to FCO), TNA. 56 STATE 179770, 152359Z, 15 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 57 ANKARA 6582, 161011Z, 16 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 58 FCO 9/1911 Callaghan to Nicosia, Telno 492, 160321Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 59 FCO 9/1911 Diary – 16 August 1974, TNA. 60 FCO 9/1911 Phillips to FCO, Telno 1002, 161215Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 61 FCO 9/1911 Olver to FCO, Telno 795, 160750Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 62 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 90, TNA. 63 FCO 9/1911 Diary – 16 August 1974, TNA. 64 FCO 9/1911 Diary – 16 August 1974, TNA. 65 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 91, TNA. 66 FCO 9/1912 Olver, Dhekelia to FCO, Telno 14, 171025Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 67 FCO 9/1912 Olver, Dhekelia to FCO, Telno 18, 171900Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 68 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 91, TNA. 69 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975, 90, TNA.

18 Big and Little Lies: Conspiracy Theories Gain Ground FCO 9/1907 S J L Olver to A C Goodison, SED FCO, letter, 1 August 1974, TNA.

1

NOTES

343

FCO 9/1898 A C Goodison, Southern European Department, Conversation with Greek Charge d’Affaires, 23 July 1974, TNA. 3 Vima, Athens, 2 August 1974. 4 FCO 9/1907 Hooper to FCO, Telno 394, 021610Z, 2 August 1974, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1907 ‘MEGALOPSEMMA: OR, THE BIG LIE’ Robin W J Hooper to John Killick, letter, 6 August 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1907 Hooper to FCO, Telno 426, 101010Z, 10 August 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1907 ‘MEGALOPSEMMA: OR, THE BIG LIE’ Robin W J Hooper to John Killick, letter, 6 August 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1907 Olver to FCO, Telno 563, 022020Z, 2 August 1974, TNA. 9 The document contains the following handwritten comments: ‘Goodison: The story at (…) is interesting. Any collateral? [Answer] Cromer: No collateral of which I am aware. MoD (D1) think it was the US but have no proof. I shall investigate. Goodison: Yes pl[s]. But don’t ask the U.S.’ – The file doesn’t indicate any results of this investigation; FCO 9/1908 J B Denson, British Embassy Athens to R H Baker, SEED, FCO, 13 August 1974, TNA. 10 WO 386/21 Report by Commander of British Forces Near East on the Cyprus Emergency 15 Jul – 16 Aug 1974, 61-63, UK Eyes A – Secret, 15 May 1975; FCO 9/1901 Cyprus: Table of events 26/27 July, 27 July 1974, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1907 Phillips to FCO, Telno 909, 030715Z, 3 August 1974, TNA. 12 FCO 9/1901 Cyprus: Table of events 26/27 July, 27 July 1974, TNA. 13 FCO 9/1912 BRITDEFEAT Athens to MODUK, FOG 351, 171335Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/1907 Phillips to FCO, Telno 909, 030715Z, 3 August 1974, TNA. 15 Editorial from Turkey’s largest circulation paper, FCO 9/1911 Phillips to FCO, Telno 1008, 161600Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 16 FCO 9/1911 Phillips to FCO, Telno 1007, 161545Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 17 FCO 9/1912 BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK, FOG, 170942Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 18 NICOSIA 2370, 151321Z, 23 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 19 Nicosia telegram to White House Situation Room, 191100Z, 19 August 1974; Nicosia to White House Situation Room, telegram, 191106Z, 19 August 1974; NICOSIA (to SECSTATE) 9557, 191239Z, 19 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 20 STATE 151215 to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 191529Z, 19 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 21 STATE 181571, 192109Z, 19 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 22 Clerides/Kissinger, Telcon, 19 August 1974, 8:21 a.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000BA62.pdf. 2

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New York Times, 31 July 1974. McCloskey/Kissinger, Telcon, 31 July 1974, 3:10 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 25 McCloskey/Kissinger, Telcon, 31 July 1974, 3:10 p.m., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, June 1, 1974 to August 8, 1974, Box 26, Nixon Material. 26 The existence of a wide variety of conspiracy theories has resulted in a huge number of studies explaining the function of conspiracy theories in various political cultures and contexts. See for example: Barkun, Michael, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America, University of California Press, Berkeley 2003; Fenster, Mark, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1999; Goldberg, Robert Alan, Enemies Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2001; Melley, Timothy, Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999; Pipes, Daniel, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998; Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1945. 23 24

19. Permitting Racial Separation: Attempts at Post-Crisis Management FCO 9/1910 Diary – 15 August 1974, TNA. 2 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Washington, Telno 1713, 15 August 1974, TNA. 3 Ford/Bipartisan Congressional Leadership/Kissinger/Scowcroft, memorandum of conversation, Tuesday, 20 August 1974, 8:30 a.m., Cabinet Room, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations 1973-77, Box 5, Ford Library. 4 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Washington, Telno 1713, 15 August 1974, TNA. 5 FCO 9/1911 Hooper to FCO, Telno 462, 161135Z, 16 August 1974, TNA. 6 FCO 9/1911 Cyprus: Policy after Stage II, draft by Goodison, 16 August 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1911 Cyprus: A Geographical Solution, Goodison to Killick, letter, 16 August 1974, TNA. 8 FCO 9/1911 Cyprus: Policy after Stage II, draft by Goodison, 16 August 1974, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1911 Cyprus: Policy after Stage II, draft by Goodison, 16 August 1974, TNA. 10 Kissinger to Macomber, State 179920, 161609Z, 16 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 11 STATE 181115, 172022Z, 17 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 12 STATE 186008(?), 241958Z, 24 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 1

NOTES

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13 STATE 186667, 2420007Z, 24 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 14 STATE 186676, 242243Z, 24 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 15 ANKARA 6790, 251055Z, 25 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 16 ATHENS 6068, 251621Z, 25 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 17 ATHENS 6201, 282006Z, 28 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 18 NICOSIA 2424/2434; while Pyroi was actually taken by Turkish forces in pursuit to reach the Turkish enclave at Lourijiina, Dahli (Dhali), Potamia and Athinou were not. 19 ANKARA 6612, 181035Z, 18 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 20 FCO 9/1912 BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK, FOG, 170942Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 21 STATE 181141, 181433Z, 18 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 22 ANKARA 6615, 181823Z, 18 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 23 NICOSA 2440, 181642Z, 18 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 24 STATE 182344, 201910Z, 20 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 25 ANKARA 6683, 210228Z, 21 August 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 26 ‘Turkish intentions on Cyprus’, Ambassador Brown, NICOSIA 2622, 251419Z, 25 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 27 NICOSIA 2696, 271523Z, 301128Z, 30 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 28 AIR 20/12650 Olver to FCO, 141305Z, Telno 982, 14 September 1974.

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29 ‘UNFICYP concern re Greek villages in Turkish zone’, NICOSIA 3308, 251757Z, 25 September 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 30 ‘Meeting with Denktash’, NICOSIA 3069, 122138Z, 30 September 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 31 ATHENS 7940, 041610Z, 4 November 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 32 NICOSIA 2696, 271523Z, 301128Z, 30 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 33 FCO 9/1910 Callaghan to Washington, Telno 1713, 15 August 1974, TNA. 34 Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, memorandum of conversation, Saturday, 24 August 1974, 9:20-10:00 a.m., Oval Office, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations 1973-77, Box 5, Ford Library. 35 ATHENS 6201, 282006Z, 28 August 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 36 STATE 192505, 011819Z, 1 September 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 37 ATHENS 6325, 021115Z, 2 September 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 38 STATE 193228, 032250Z, 3 September 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 39 ATHENS 6507, 091220Z, 9 September 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 40 ATENS 6571, 101554Z, 10 September 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 41 STATE 199144, 110057Z, 11 September 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 42 FCO 9/2008 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2945, 101926Z, 10 September 1974, TNA. 43 ATHENS 6587, 110040Z, 11 September 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 44 ATHENS 6587, 110045Z, 11 September 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library.

NOTES

347

45 Kissinger to Ecevit, STATE 201452, 20 September 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library.

20. Refugees and War Crimes NICOSIA 2373, 151313Z, 15 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 2 FCO 9/1922, The Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 62, Draft Report by officials on the implementation of paragraph 3 (d) of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July (third revise), TNA. 3 FCO 9/1922, The Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 63, Prisoners of War and Detainees: Minute by Mr. Goodison, TNA. 4 WO 386/21 Annex R, Refugees and SBA Refugee Camps throughout the Emergency and until the Evacuation of the Turkish Refugees from Akrotiri, 15 May 1975, TNA. 5 FCO 9/2217 Greek Cypriot Refugees in the SBAs, Note fort he Select Committee on Cyprus, 15 September 1975, TNA. 6 FCO 9/2214 Anzio Camp, note, J C Long, 29 Januar 1975; FCO 9/2216 ‘Refuges in the SBA’s Anzio Camp’, M G Fort, FCO SED to Whobman, Ministry of Oversees Development, 24 June 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1984, FCO to Nicosia, Telno 909, 051520Z, 5 September 1975, TNA. 8 WO 386/21 Annex R, Refugees and SBA Refugee Camps throughout the Emergency and until the Evacuation of the Turkish Refugees from Akrotiri, 15 May 1975, TNA. 9 FCO 9/1984 Olver to FCO, Telno 965, 151350Z, 15 September 1974, TNA. 10 FCO 9/1984 Goodison to Killick, letter, 6 September 1975, TNA. 11 FCO 9/1984 Callaghan to Athens/Ankara, Telno 630, 071500Z, 7 September 1974, TNA. 12 STATE 196468, 062320Z, 6 September 1974, Turkey, Box 34, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 13 FCO 9/1983 Olver to FCO, Telno 857, 260930Z, 26 August 1974, TNA. 14 FCO 9/2196 ICRC Action in Cyprus, Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, RO 5706/b, memorandum, 1 April 1975, TNA. 15 WO 386/21 Annex R, Refugees and SBA Refugee Camps throughout the Emergency and until the Evacuation of the Turkish Refugees from Akrotiri, 15 May 1975, TNA. 16 FCO 9/1987 Olver to FCO, Telno 1414, 171400Z, 17 December 1974; FCO 1987 9/1987 CBFNE to MODUK, 171416Z, 17 December 1974, TNA. 17 FCO 9/2211 Nicosia to Ankara, Telno 004, 121300Z, 12 January 1975, TNA. 18 FCO 9/1988 Callaghan to Kissinger, via HQBFNE to BE Washington, 30 December 1974, TNA. 19 FCO 9/1988 Callaghan to Makarios, FCO to Nicosia, Telno 1164, 281826Z, 28 December 1974, TNA. 1

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FCO 9/2212 FCO to Ankara, Telno 61, 1400Z, 14 January 1975, TNA. WO 386/21 Annex R, Refugees and SBA Refugee Camps throughout the Emergency and until the Evacuation of the Turkish Refugees from Akrotiri, 15 May 1975, TNA. 22 FCO 9/2212 Olver to FCO, Telno 58, 160830Z, 16 January 1975, TNA. 23 FCO 9/2213 Nicosia to FCO, Telno 80, 181010Z, 18 January 1975, TNA. 24 WO 386/21 Annex R, Refugees and SBA Refugee Camps throughout the Emergency and until the Evacuation of the Turkish Refugees from Akrotiri, 15 May 1975, TNA. 25 FCO 9/2212 Olver to FCO, Telno 56, 0715Z, 16 January 1975, TNA. 26 FCO 9/2212 Athens to FCO, Telno 20, 161330Z, 16 January 1975, TNA. 27 FCO 9/2213 Evacuation of Turkish Cypriots: Greek Cypriot Demonstrations, M G. Fort to Goodison, letter, 17 January 1975; Nicosia to FCO, Telno 67, 171030Z, 17 January 1975, TNA. 28 FCO 9/2214 Note for Cabinet meeting, Goodison, 27 January 1975; FCO guidance Telno 16, 291645Z, 29 January 1975, TNA. 29 WO 386/21 Annex R, Refugees and SBA Refugee Camps throughout the Emergency and until the Evacuation of the Turkish Refugees from Akrotiri, 15 May 1975, TNA. 30 FCO 9/2214 Turkish Cypriots from Western Sovereign Base Area: Possessions, Goodison to Morgan, letter, 4 February 1975, TNA. 31 FCO 9/2215 Olver to FCO, Telno 354, 281330Z, 28 April 1975, TNA. 32 FCO 9/2217 A.W. Stephens to Col. I. Chiswell, Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ UNFICYP, letter, 24 October 1975, TNA. 33 FCO 9/2217 Greek Cypriot Refugees in the SBAs, Note fort he Select Committee on Cyprus, 15 September 1975, TNA. 34 FCO 9/2217 FCO to Nicosia, Telno 479, 070955Z, 7 October 1975, TNA. 35 FCO 9/2217 Nicosia to FCO, TelNO 765, 051125Z, 5 November 1975, TNA. 36 FCO 9/1984, Hildyard UKMIS Geneva to A C Goodison, letter, 30 August 1974, TNA. 37 FCO 9/1984 UKMIS Geneva to FCO, Telno 118, 6 September 1974, TNA. 38 FCO 9/2216 Greeks in the North; Turks in the South, M J Pawley, memorandum, 19 June 1975, TNA. 39 FCO 9/2216 M G Fort to Private Secretary, letter, 21 July 1975, TNA. 40 S/11789 Interim Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 370 (1975), 2 August 1975. (copy in FCO 9/2147, TNA). 41 FCO 9/2148 UKMIS New York to FCO, Telno 1072, 151522Z, 15 September 1975, TNA. 42 Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, About Cyprus, Nicosia, 2001, 23. 43 Ibid., 24. 44 FCO 9/1922, The Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 62, Draft Report by officials on the implementation of paragraph 3 (d) of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July (third revise), TNA. 45 FCO 9/1984 Olver to FCO, Telno 982, 141305Z, 14 September 1974, TNA. 20 21

NOTES

349

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 August 1974. Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus, Report on the Attila ‘Peacemakers’, Nicosia, n. d., 29. 48 This was compared to 724 dead and 1100 wounded in 1963; and 100 randomly killed between 1963 and 1974; altogether Turkish-Cypriot claimed to have lost 1789 lives since 1963; FCO 9/2187 ‘Post-Independent Turkish-Cypriot Casualties in Cyprus’, M.J. Pawley, Nicosia to Miss M.G. Fort, SED, FCO, letter, 19 September 1975, TNA. 49 Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, About Cyprus, Nicosia, 2001, 24. 50 http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/Missing%20Persons.htm 51 See Sant Cassia, Paul, Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus, Berghahn Books, Oxford and New York, 2005. 52 Uludağ, Sevgül, Cyprus: The Untold Stories, Bibliopolis, Mannheim 2005. 53 Angastiniotis, Tony, Trapped in the Green Line: The story behind the documentary Voice of Blood, Rüstem Bookshop and Publishing, Nicosia, 2005. 54 Uludağ does actually not name the village, but the story is related in a protest letter the Cyprus Permanent Representative Rossides sent to the UN SecretaryGeneral on 6 December 1974. Therein he relates the ‘case of Reverend Ioakim Phillippou of Tricomo (…). His daughters Phanitsa (19), Maria (16), and Irini (15) were by the use of force raped in his and in his wife’s presents. While trying to rescue his daughters the Referent was savagely beheaded by the invading rapists.’ S/11569 Letter dated 6 December 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex I, ‘Atrocities, mass executions and murders in cold blood, rapes and other indignities’, 4 (copy in FCO/1971, TNA). 55 Uludağ, Cyprus: The Untold Stories, 98, 71, 108, 104-105, 56 Angastiniotis, Tony, Trapped in the Green Line, 66. 57 Ibid., 76-79. 58 According to Turkish Cypriot official information the Committee for Missing Persons has reports verifying that on 20 July 1974, under the leadership of Greek Colonel Vassilos Panayopoulos, Turkish Cypriots were taken from their homes by a unit of 400 men from the Greek Cypriot National Guard, and after being detained for three days and three nights at the Greek Cypriot primary school, the women and children were set free, and the 13 Turkish Cypriot men in question were taken to an unknown location by bus. The results of exhumations carried out at Aleminyo revealed that the 13 missing Turkish Cypriots were buried in the mass graves pointed out by Greek Cypriot villagers. http://www.trncinfo.com/ tanitmadairesi/2002/ENGLISH/MISSING/m7.htm 59 ‘At Trimithi, eye-witnesses told of the deaths of five men (two shepherds aged 60 and 70, two masons of 20 and 60, and a 19 year-old plumber)’; Sunday Times, 23 January 1977 60 Leptomeria stin Kyprou, engl. A detail in Cyprus (Cyprus 1986); together with Niazy Kızılyürek, Our Wall (Cyprus 1993); Parallel Trips (Cyprus 2005). 61 AIR 20/12651 Olver to FCO, Telno 1186, 150600Z, 15 October 1974, TNA. 46 47

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AIR 23/8716 Headquarters British Forces Near East, NEAF/37005/4/MED, Report on assistance given to Greek-Cypriot rape victims, not dated, TNA 63 European Commission of Human Rights, Applications Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Cyprus against Turkey, Report of the Commission, adopted on 10 July 1976, part IV, 4. III and IV. 64 Ibid., para 373. 65 Loizos, Peter, The Heart Grown Bitter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, 79-98. 66 Angastiniotis, Tony, Trapped in the Green Line, 69. 67 FCO 9/1984, D H T Hildyard UKMIS Geneva to A C Goodison, letter, 30 August 1974, TNA. 68 ‘Meeting with Denktash’, NICOSIA 3069, 122138Z, 12 September 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 69 FCO 9/1983 UNFICYP Information on Turkish and mixed villages outside the Turkish controlled enclave of Kyrenia, 9 August 1974, TNA. 70 NICOSIA 2093, 021322Z, 2 August 1974, CO 40 Cyprus, Box 24, NSC Country Files, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Nixon Material. 71 FCO 9/1912 BRITDEFEAT Athens to MODUK, FOG 351, 171335Z, 17 August 1974, TNA. 72 FCO 9/1909 Richard to FCO, Telno 995, 141605Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 73 FCO 9/1909 Olver to FCO, Telno 769, 141753Z, 14 August 1974, TNA. 74 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 August 1974. 62

21. Beyond the Crisis: Cyprus from Cold War to Annan FCO 9/1910 Diary – 15 August 1974, TNA. 2 STATE 212293, 261713Z, 26 September 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 3 FCO 9/1919 ‘Realism and Responsibility needed fort he Solution of the Cyprus Problem’, President Glafcos Clerides statement at the ‘Argo’ Gallery on November 6, 6 November 1974, TNA. 4 He told UN envoy Weckman that Makarios was in daily contact not only with Lyssarides and AKEL, but also with the Bishops and figures such as Tassos Papadopoulos and even members of Clerides entourage. Clerides claimed that Makarios was inciting them to mount the public campaign for his return; FCO 9/1924 Olver to FCO, Telno 1057, 281040Z, 28 September 1974, TNA. 5 Ambassador Crawford to State Department ‘Makarios’ role: First thoughts for UNGA spoiling’, NICOSIA 3036, 111835Z, 11 September 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 6 FCO 9/1925 Republic of Cyprus, Public Information Office, Press Release, No. 1, 7 December 1974. 1

NOTES

351

NICOSIA 2798, 311800Z, 31 August 1974, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 8 NICOSIA, 151730Z, 15 March 1975, Cyprus, Box 2, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 9 While the American Ambassador to Cyprus, Michael Klosson, frequently briefed against Papadopoulos, the State Department did little to nothing to put up pressure on him. As they – like the Europeans – did it was too late. 10 High Level Agreement of February 12, 1977, para 1. 11 10-Point Agreement of May 19, 1979, points 2 and 7. 12 For the final (fifth) version of the Annan plan from March 2004 see http:// www.un.org/Depts/dpa/annanplan/annanplan.pdf. 13 The demonstrations were organised by the ‘This country is ours’-platform founded by 92 NGO’s. They occurred on 26 December 2002, 14 January 2003 and 27 February 2003. 14 S/2003/398 Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, April 2003, § 4. 15 For detailed accounts on the outcome of the referenda see Asmussen, Jan, Cyprus after the failure of the Annan-Plan, ECMI issue brief, no. 11, Flensburg, 2004 www.ecmi.de/download/brief_11.pdf and by the same author, Ungewisse Zukunft – Zypern nach den Referenda, Erfurter Beiträge zur Westasiatischen Geschichte 2, Universität Erfurt, Erfurt, 2004. 16 Woodhouse, Christopher Montague, Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy, Oxford University Press,. Oxford, 1983, 235; Psomiades, H.J., ‘From Colonels Rule to Democracy’, in Herz, John (ed.), From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Greenwood Group, London, 1982, 259. 17 ATHENS 7696, 291708Z, 29 July 1974, Greece, Box 11, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 18 House Joint Resolution 1167; Public Law 93-448. 19 ANKARA 5766, 251955Z, 25 July 1975, Turkey Military Aid (3), Box 26, Congressional Relations Office, Loen and Leppert files, Ford Library. 20 ‘U.S. Intelligence Facilities in Turkey’, Memorandum, John O. March for Brent Scowcroft, 25 September 1975, Turkey, Box 33, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East ands South Asia, Ford Library. 21 ‘Impact of Loss of Electronic Intelligence Collection Activities in Turkey, memorandum, not dated – presumably summer 1975, Turkey Military Aid (3), Box 26, Congressional Relations Office, Loen and Leppert files, Ford Library. 7

Conclusion ‘There is No Nation of Maniacs I Don’t Get Involved In’: Henry Kissinger’s Idiosyncratic Methods of Working 1 Kissinger, Henry, Years of Renewal, Simon and Schuster, New York 1999, 199. 2 Ibid., 239. 3 Ibid., 209.

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Cyrus Vance/Kissinger, Telcon, 21 August 1974, 7:45 p.m., http://foia.state.gov/ documents/Kissinger/0000BA67.pdf. 5 ‘L: You seem to be busy in another area in the Mediterranean. K: There is no nation of maniacs I don’t get involved in.’; Mel Laird/Kissinger, Telcon, 22 July 1974, 5:00 (m.?), http://foia.state.gov/documents/Kissinger/0000CA27.pdf. 6 FCO 9/1898 Ramsbotham to FCO, Telno 2476, 230535Z, 23 July 1974, TNA. 7 FCO 9/1892 Ramsbotham to Private Secretary, FCO, Telno 2416 (of 17 July 1974), 180800Z, 18 July 1974, TNA. 8 STATE 182149, 201434Z 20 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 9 ATHENS 5891, 201609Z, 20 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 10 ATHENS 5892, 201637Z, 20 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 11 ATHENS 5898, 201711Z, 20 August 1974, Greece, Box 10, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Ford Library. 12 Newsweek, 2 September 1974. 13 Edward Klein/Kissinger, Telcon, 21 August 1974, 3:10 p.m., http://foia.state. gov/documents/Kissinger/0000BA68.pdf. 4

Annexes FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 38, Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, TNA. 2 Greece insisted to sign a auxiliary declaration stating: ‘The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made it clear that the adherence of their Governments to the Declaration of today's date in no way prejudiced their respective views on the interpretation or application of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee or their rights and obligations under that Treaty.’; FCO 9/1922 Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 39, Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 30 July 1974, TNA. 3 FCO 9/1922, The Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 79, Explanatory Turkish Paper of 12 August, 1974, TNA. 4 FCO 9/1922 The Geneva Conference on Cyprus, Document No. 91, Explanatory Turkish Paper on 13 August, 1974, TNA. 1

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Argyrou, Fanoula, Conspiracy or Blunder: The Evolution of a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation in Cyprus, Adouloti Kyrenia, Nicosia, 2000. Asmussen, Jan, Kızılyürek, Niyasi and Zervakis, Peter, ‘Biographien führender Persönlichkeiten des politischen Lebens’, in Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev, Steffani, Winfried and Zervakis, Peter, Südosteuropa-Handbuch VIII: Zypern, Vandenhoeck & Rubrecht, Göttingen, 1998. Asmussen, Jan, ‘Wir waren wie Brüder’: Zusammenleben und Konfliktentstehung in ethnisch gemischten Dörfern auf Zypern, Lit-Verlag, Hamburg 2001. – Cyprus after the failure of the Annan-Plan, ECMI issue brief, no 11, Flensburg, 2004. – Ungewisse Zukunft: Zypern nach den Referenda, Erfurter Beiträge zur Westasiatischen Geschichte, vol. 2, Universität Erfurt, Erfurt, 2004. Attalidis, Michael A., Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, Q Press, Edinburgh, 1979. Bahceli, Tozun, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1990 – ‘Domestic Political Developments’, in Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev, Steffani, Winfried and Zervakis, Peter (eds.), Südosteuropa-Handbuch VIII: Zypern, Vandenoeck & Ruprecht, 1998. Ball, George W., The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1982. Bell, J. Bowyer, ‘Violence at a Distance: Greece and the Cyprus Crisis’, Orbis, vol. 18, 1974. Bentley, Marilyn and Warner, Marie (eds.), Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, CD-Rom, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, 2000. Berner, Uwe, Das vergessene Volk: Der Weg der Zyperntürken von der Kolonialzeit zur Unabhängigkeit, Centaurus Verlagsgesellschaft, Pfaffenweiler, 1992. Bilge, A. Suat, ‘The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey’, in Karpat, Kemal et al. (eds.), Turkeys Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1975. Birand, Mehmet Ali, Thirty Hot Days, Milliyet, Istanbul, 1976, (Turkish: 30 sicak gün). Bitsios, Dimitri S., Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic, Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1975. Bölükbasi, Suha, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1988. Bryant, Rebecca, Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus, I.B.Tauris, London, 2004. Callaghan, James, Time and Chance, Collins, London, 1987. Campbell, John C., ‘The United States and the Cyprus Question, 1974-75’ in Coufoudakis, Van (ed.), Essays on the Cyprus Conflict in Memory of Stephan G. Xydis, Pella, New York, 1976. Choisi, Janette, Wurzeln und Strukturen des Zypernkonfliktes 1878 bis 1990, Frank Steiner Verlag, Frankfurt, 1993.

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Clerides, Glafkos, Cyprus: My Deposition, 4 vols., Alithia Publishing, Nicosia, 19891992. Clogg, Richard A., A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992. Coufoudakis, Van, ‘American Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem, 1974-1978: the “Theory of Continuity” Revised’, in Couloumbis, Theodore A. and Iatrides, John O. (eds.), Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review, Pella Publishing, New York, 1980. Coufoudakis, Van, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation’, Millennium, vol. 5, no. 3, 1976/77. Couloumbis, Theodore A. and Hicks, Sallie M., ‘The Impact of Greek-Americans upon U.S. Foreign Policy: Illusion or Reality?’, in Attalides, Michael A. (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed, Nicosia, 1977. Denktash, Rauf R., The Cyprus Triangle, George Allan & Unwin, 1982. Dickie, John, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1994. Divine, Robert A., Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985. Dobson, Alan P., Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers, Routledge, London and New York, 1995. Dodd, Clement, The Cyprus Issue, Eothen, Huntingdon, 1995. Ecevit, Bülent, The Cyprus Question, Nicosia, 1984. Ertekün, Necati Münir, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 2nd edition, Rüstem & Brother, Nicosia, 1984. Foley, Charles and Scobie, W.I., The Struggle for Cyprus, Hoover Institutions Press, Stanford, CA, 1975. Ford Gerald R., A Time to Heal, The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford, W.H. Allen, London, 1979. Franz, Eberhard, Der Zypernkonflikt: Chronologie – Pressedokumente – Bibliographie, Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg, 1976. Gibbons, Harry Scott, The Genocide Files, Charles Bravo, London, 1997. Gürbey, Gülistan, Zypern. Genese eines Konfliktes: Eine konfliktursachenforschende Analyse, Centaurus Verlagsgesellschaft, Pfaffenweiler, 1999. Gurkan, Ishan, NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective, Transaction Publishers, New York, 1980. Hannay, David, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, I.B.Tauris, London, 2004. Higgins, Rosalyn, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV, Europe 1946-1979, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. Hitchens, Christopher, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, Verso, London, 1997. – The Trial of Henry Kissinger, Verso, London, 2001.

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Hobsbawm, Eric, and Ranger, Terence, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. İsmail, Sabattin, 20 July Peace Operation. Reasons, Development and Consequences, Kastaş, Istanbul, 1989. Joseph, Joseph S., Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern, American University Studies, Series X, Political Science 6, Peter Lang, New York, 1985. – Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997. Kadritzke, Niels and Wagner, Wolf, Im Fadenkreuz der NATO: Ermittlungen am Beispiel Cypern, Rotbuch Verlag, Berlin, 1976. Ker-Lindsay, James and Richmond, Oliver (eds.), Promoting Peace and Development in Cyprus over Four Decades, Macmillan, London, 2001. Kissinger, Henry A., Years of Upheaval, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1982. – Years of Renewal, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1999. Landau, Jacob M, Johnson's 1964 letter to Inönü and Greek Lobbying of the White House, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 28, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1979. Loizos, Peter, The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981. Mallinson, William, Cyprus: A Modern History, I.B.Tauris, London and New York, 2005. Markides, Kyriakos, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977. Mayes, Stanley, Makarios: a Biography, MacMillan and St. Martin's Press, London and New York, 1981. Mirbagheri, Farid, Cyprus and International Peacekeeping, Hurst, London, 1998. Morris, Roger, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Harper & Row, New York, 1977. Necatigil, Zaim M., The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993. Nicolet, Claude, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, Bibliopolis, Mannheim, 2001. Nixon, Richard M., The memoirs of Richard Nixon, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1978. Oberling, Pierre, The Cyprus Tragedy, K. Rüstem & Brother, London, 1989. – The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, East European Monographs, New York, 1982. O'Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, I.B.Tauris, London and New York, 1999. Pantelis, Stavros, The Making of Modern Cyprus, Interworld Publications, London, 1990.

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Index

Adamides, Costas 24 Adamides, Costas 24 Aiken, John 26, 36-37, 39, 109, 111 -113, 129-130, 133, 142-144, 225, 227, 230, 239, 244, 268-269 Anderson, Robert 82 Androutsopoulos, Adamantios 63, 107-109 Arapakis, Petros 122 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos 182, 212, 219, 242, 293 Ball, George W. 7 Bartuçu, Ecmel 150, 162 Bennett, John 137 Birand, Mehmet Ali 7, 191, 205, 213-214 Bitsios, Dimitri S, 151, 168, 270 Bonanos, Grigorios 17, 79, 99 Boyatt, Thomas D. 6, 28, 43, 290 Brimelow, Thomas 89 Brown, George Scratchley 106-107 Brown, L. Dean 247, 253, 257 Buffum, William B. 103, 117, 158, 162, 167 Callaghan, James 5, 8, 26-27, 33-34, 37, 42, 46, 50-51, 56-59, 61-64,

67-74, 76-79, 82, 87, 91, 93, 95, 97, 104, 107-108, 110-111, 113, 117, 119-120, 122, 128-130, 134, 137, 140, 147, 149, 152-158, 161169, 176-178, 181-193, 195, 199210, 213, 217-218, 220-223, 236238, 244-246, 249- 261, 268-269, 271, 290-292, 294-295 Carter, James (Jimmy) E. 286 Chand, Prem 50, 127, 129-131, 136137, 164-165, 178, 218 Christofides, Ioannis 270-271 Clerides, Glafkos 8, 16, 25, 45, 53, 56-57, 60, 66-67, 79, 84-87, 9293, 96-98, 117-124, 127, 136, 141142, 145, 149-151, 156, 161, 167, 175-178, 182, 184-188, 190-192, 197, 200, 201-206, 208-210, 213, 215, 219, 227-228, 235-237, 246247, 251-253, 255-256, 258-259, 263, 268, 272-273, 276-278, 281285, 291, 294-297 Colby, William E. 94 Constantine (King) 52 Crawford, William R. 259, 282-284

362

CYPRUS AT WAR

Davies, Roger 29, 43, 54, 66, 98, 100, 120, 122, 127, 161, 176, 227228, 237, 246-247, 265, 278 Davos, Ioannis 117 Demirel, Süleyman 286 Denisis, Georgios 19, 42 Denktaş, Rauf R. 8, 13, 16, 32, 100, 118, 120, 124, 145, 151, 153, 172173, 182, 184-187, 190, 200-204, 206, 208, 214, 238, 250, 252, 255, 258-259, 263, 268-269, 272-273, 276-277, 283-285, 295 Dimitriou, Dimis 24-25, 34, 68, 100 Dimitriou, Nicos 25, 120-121 Dimitriou, Panayiotis 24-25 Dimitriou, Pantelis 24, 123 Dobrynin, Anatol 31, 55 Droussiotis, Iannakis 24-25 Eagleburger, Lawrence 115, 167, 221 Ecevit, Bülent 6, 8-9, 53, 57-63, 68, 70-71, 75-76, 83-87, 95-97, 100, 102-104, 106-111, 114, 122, 127130, 140, 147, 150, 153-154, 157, 159, 160, 162-167, 174, 177-178, 182, 184, 187-189, 191-200, 204205, 208-209, 211, 213, 221, 226227, 231-234, 237-238, 246, 253256, 263, 268, 286, 293-295, 297 Eralp, Orhan 61 Erbakan, Necmettin 295 Ersin, Nurrettin 171 Ford, Gerald R. 3, 4, 6, 84, 183, 189, 195, 200, 204, 212, 233, 247, 249, 253, 260, 286-287 Fulbright, William J. 55 Fyjis-Walker, Richard 50, 52 Georghadjis, Polykarpos 16, 25 Georgitsis, Michael 123 Gizikis, Phaedon 17-19, 26, 98, 109, 122, 156 Goodison, Alan 33, 129, 142, 153, 161, 172, 194, 227, 250-252, 266 Goodpaster, Andrew J. 130 Goulden, John 162, 166 Grivas, George 7, 12, 17, 18, 24

Gromyko, Andrei 86 Güneş, Turan 85, 101, 128, 130131, 140, 153-157, 159-162, 164168, 177, 183-193, 199-200, 202206, 208-209, 213, 227, 238, 258, 295-296 Hadjigeorghiou, Aris 24 Haig, Alexander 87, 107 Hartman, Arthur 82, 102-103, 110, 159, 177-178, 182-183, 186, 189190, 192-193, 198, 200, 235 Henn, Francis 127, 129 Hooper, Robin 51, 59, 68-69, 98-99, 109, 133-136, 151-152, 163-164, 219-223, 238, 241-242 Hunt, David 13 Inhan, Asaf 111, 127-129, 140-141, 230, 257-258, 260 Inönü, Ismet 13 Ioannides, Odysseas 23-24 Işık, Hasan 32, 34, 50, 61, 63, 71-74, 177, 198 Johnson, Haynes 248 Johnson, Lyndon B. 13 Karamanlis, Constantinos 52, 121122, 133, 147, 152, 156-159, 162163, 176-177, 182, 189, 210, 219, 221, 223-224, 227, 233-235, 250, 252, 254-255, 260-263, 278, 285, 293-295 Karayel, Fikri 268 Karousos, Georgios 17 Katırcıoğlu, Kurmay Albay 42 Kennedy, John F. 3, 289 Killick, John 51, 90 Kissinger, Henry A. 3-6, 8-10, 2831, 33, 37, 46-48, 54--57, 61, 63, 66-67, 70-71, 75, 77-79, 81-88, 93-94, 96-97, 102-104, 106-109, 111, 115, 117, 121, 125, 128, 130, 133, 137, 147-150, 157-158, 162, 166-167, 169, 177-178, 182-184, 187, 190, 192-193, 195-200, 204206, 209-213, 221-223, 231-239, 241, 245, 247-250, 253-257, 260-

INDEX 263, 268-269, 281, 286, 289-295, 297 Küçük, Fazıl 12 Kyprianou, Spyros 283-284 Lagakos, Efstathios 18-19, 24 Laird, Melvin 292 Lewis, Flora 247 Lüns, Joseph 43, 89-90, 110, 249 Lyssarides, Vassos 49, 122, 145, 237 MacDonald, Michael G. 175 Macomber, William B. 47, 53, 80, 87, 106, 128, 178, 187, 189, 196199, 204, 211, 213-214, 221, 233, 237, 254, 256 Makarios III. (Archbishop) 3, 6-9, 12-13, 15-19, 22-28, 30-32, 34-41, 43-49, 51-54, 56-61, 63, 6568, 77-79, 81-82, 84-85, 87-88, 92, 98, 103, 117-122, 124, 126, 139, 149-151, 159-160, 176, 181, 183, 185-186, 190, 206, 209, 215, 222, 251-252, 260-261, 263, 269, 281-285, 289-291, 296-297 Mason, Roy 59, 189, 217 Mavros, George 123, 151-157, 159162, 166-168, 176, 182-184, 186, 188, 190, 192, 201, 205-206, 208210, 213-214, 220-223, 234-235, 237, 250, 262, 281, 283, 293, 295296 McCloskey, Bob 81-83, 86, 150, 159, 247-248 Menemencioğlu, Turgut 95, 227 Michaelis Georgitis 42 Mintoff, Dom 38, 58 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 13 Nehru, Jawaharlal 13 Neocleous, Andreas 24, 25 Nixon, Richard M. 3-4, 8-9, 28, 56, 81, 86-87, 96, 107, 109, 169, 177, 183, 291-293 Oaks, John 81 Olcay, Osman 43, 88 Olver, Stephen 21-22, 24-26, 28, 3132, 34-36, 39-41, 49-50, 68-69, 100, 105, 110, 112, 118, 123, 126-

363 127, 129, 131, 140-145, 151, 163, 172-176, 178, 227-228, 230, 236, 238-239, 243-244, 268-270, 272, 281, 283 Papadopoulos, Eleftherios 24 Papadopoulos, Georgios 13, 15, 17, 52 Papadopoulos, Tassos 13, 284-285 Papageorgiou, Spiros 24 Papandreou, Andreas 163, 260, 285 Papanicolaou, Alexandros 122 Papaphilippou, Loukis 24 Parisinos, Andreas 24-25 Phillips, Horace 76, 80, 101, 128, 130, 134-135, 194, 207, 237-238, 242, 245, 268 Pierides, Doris 24 Popper, David H. 16 Ramsbotham, Peter 25, 67, 78, 82, 84, 89, 97, 120-121, 149, 261, 292 Richard, Ivor 4, 8, 50, 64, 89, 136, 165 Rockefeller, Nelson 121 Rossides, Zenon 25, 283 Rumsfeld, Donald 43, 89 Safronchuk, Vasiliy 88 Sampson, Nicos 22-23, 25-26, 3436, 40, 47-48, 53-54, 56, 58-59, 61, 66-67, 69, 71, 77-78, 81-82, 84-85, 87, 92-93, 97, 100, 107, 117-118, 121-123, 139, 141, 154, 244, 291-292 Saunders, Harold H. 56 Saveriades, Kyriacos 24 Scali, John 88 Schlesinger, James 29, 93, 107, 115, 158 Schmidt, Dana 81 Scowcroft, Brent 212 Severis, Zenon 23 Sisco, Joseph J. 29-30, 43, 53, 55-56, 57, 62, 65, 70-71, 73-76, 79-81, 83-87, 89, 96-99, 102-104, 106, 108-111, 117, 158, 167, 199-200, 232, 247, 292 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut 231, 234

364

CYPRUS AT WAR

Soysal, Mümtaz 33, 50, 52 Stabler, Wells 66, 97, 120, 221 Tasca, Henry J. 23, 28, 30, 47-48, 54, 86, 99, 107, 110, 133, 147148, 152, 158, 176-177, 210, 212213, 221, 234-236, 254, 290, 292293 Tetenes, Spyridon 19 Tito, Josip Broz 13 Triantafyllides, Michael 23 Tyler, William R. 260-263 U Thant, Sithu 188 Vance, Cyrus 8, 291

Vlachos, Angelos 151, 163 Waldheim, Kurt 48, 50, 63-64, 68, 84, 87, 125, 127-128, 131, 136137, 139, 141, 152, 163-165, 183185, 187, 189, 207, 218, 221, 258 Weckmann-Muños, Luiz 25, 127, 178, 184 Wiggin, Charles 167-168 Wilson, Harold 8-9, 33, 57, 58-59, 61-63, 71, 174, 218, 223 Yiannakodimos, Panayiotis 123