Cracked but Not Shattered: Hillary Rodham Clinton's Unsuccessful Campaign for the Presidency

Cracked But Not Shattered Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Unsuccessful Campaign for the Presidency e d ite d by Theodore F. S...

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Cracked But Not Shattered Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Unsuccessful Campaign for the Presidency

e d ite d by

Theodore F. Sheckels

Cracked But Not Shattered

Lexington Studies in Political Communication Series Editor: Robert E. Denton, Jr., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University This series encourages focused work examining the role and function of communication in the realm of politics including campaigns and elections, media, and political institutions.

TITLES IN SERIES: Governing Codes: Gender, Metaphor, and Political Identity, By Karrin Vasby Anderson and Kristina Horn Sheeler Paving the Way for Madam President, By Nichola D. Gutgold Maryland Politics and Political Communication, 1950–2005, By Theodore F. Sheckels Images, Issues, and Attacks: Television Advertising by Incumbents and Challengers in Presidential Elections, By E. D. Dover Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the American Forum Movement, By William Keith Picturing China in the American Press: The Visual Portrayal of Sino-American Relations in Time Magazine, 1949–1973, By David D. Perlmutter Lottery Wars: Case Studies in Bible Belt Politics, 1986–2005, By Randy Bobbitt Post-9/11 American Presidential Rhetoric: A Study of Protofascist Discourse, By Colleen Elizabeth Kelley Making a Difference: A Comparative View of the Role of the Internet in Election Politics, Edited by Stephen Ward, Diana Owen, Richard Davis, and David Taras Seen and Heard: The Women of Television News, By Nichola D. Gutgold Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex, Edited by Bryan C. Taylor, William J. Kinsella, Stephen P. Depoe, Maribeth S. Metzler Conditional Press Influence in Politics, By Adam J. Schiffer Telling Political Lives: The Rhetorical Autobiographies of Women Leaders in the United States, Edited by Brenda DeVore Marshall and Molly A. Mayhead Media Bias? A Comparative Study of Time, Newsweek, the National Review, and the Progressive, 1975–2000, By Tawnya J. Adkins Covert and Philo C. Wasburn Navigating the Post–Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric, By Jason A. Edwards The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul II, Edited by Joseph R. Blaney and Joseph P. Zompetti Stagecraft and Statecraft: Advance and Media Events in Political Communication, By Dan Schill Almost Madam President: Why Hillary Clinton “Won” in 2008, By Nichola D. Gutgold Cracked But Not Shattered: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Unsuccessful Run for the Presidency, Edited by Theodore F. Sheckels

Cracked But Not Shattered Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Unsuccessful Campaign for the Presidency

EDITED BY THEODORE F. SHECKELS

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.lexingtonbooks.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2009 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cracked but not shattered : Hillary Rodham Clinton’s unsuccessful campaign for the presidency / edited by Theodore F. Sheckels. p. cm. — (Lexington studies in political communication) Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7391-3729-1 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-3730-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-3731-4 (electronic) 1. Clinton, Hillary Rodham—Career in politics. 2. Presidential candidates—United States. 3. Presidents—United States—Election—2008. 4. United States—Politics and government—2001– I. Sheckels, Theodore F. E887.C55C73 2009 973.93—dc22 2009020330

⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America

Contents

List of Tables

vii

List of Figures

ix

Introduction Theodore F. Sheckels

1

PART I. CONTEXTS 1

2

3

4

Alternative Approaches to Delegate Selection and Their Effects on the 2008 Democratic Primary Election Results Lauren C. Bell Public Woman, Private Wife: Hillary Clinton Could Not Have Won Kathleen M. Torrens Hillary, You Can’t Go Home Again: The Entrapment of the First Lady Role James M. Schnoebelen, Diana B. Carlin, and Benjamin R. Warner The Clinton Political Team: Marriage, Gender, and the Presidential Quest Janette Kenner Muir and Anita Taylor

9

29

45

69

PART II. COMMUNICATION 5

It Takes a Village to Win: A Rhetorical Analysis of “Hillary for President” Julia A. Spiker v

99

vi

6

7

CONTENTS

The First—and Last—Woman Standing: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Presidential Primary Debate Performance Mitchell S. McKinney, Corey B. Davis, and Jeffrey Delbert “It’s 3 a.m.”: Strategic Communication in Hillary Clinton’s 2008 Presidential Primary Televised Announcements Mary Christine Banwart, Kelly Winfrey, and James M. Schnoebelen

125

149

PART III. MEDIA 8

9

10

The Cleavage Commotion: How the Press Covered Senator Clinton’s Campaign Karen F. Stein She’s Not Laughing: Political Humor and Hillary Clinton’s Campaign for President Joan L. Conners A Democrat Suffers Media Bias: Hillary’s Fight Against Pro-Obama Coverage Richard E. Vatz

173

189

203

Afterword Theodore F. Sheckels

211

Index

217

List of Contributors

225

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 9.1

2008 Republican Presidential Nomination Format/Rules, by State Actual Delegate Counts, by Date and Candidate Delegate Counts Using the “Republican Model,” by Date and Candidate Delegate Counts Using the “General Election Model,” by Date and Candidate Attacks in Early Primary Debates Candidate-to-Candidate Attacks in Early Primary Debates Clinton and Obama Attacks in Late Primary Debates Primary Debate Issue Agenda/Top Five Issues Clinton and Obama “Masculine” and “Feminine” Debate Message Strategies Overall Frequency of Issue Discussion Frequency of Issues Discussed by Category Overall Frequency of Character Trait Discussion Frequency of Traits Discussed by Category Frequency of Appeal Strategies by Category Monthly Count of Jokes of Presidential Candidates in Late-Night Comedy

vii

13 18 20 22 132 134 136 137 141 155 156 157 158 159 196

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 9.1 9.2 9.3

Actual Pledged Delegate Counts: 2008 Democratic Primary Elections Delegate Counts Using Republican Method “General Election” Model of Delegate Selection Cartoon by Jeff Koterba, Omaha World-Herald, January 9, 2008 Cartoon by Robert Arial, The State, March 27, 2008 Cartoon by Ed Stein, Rocky Mountain News, May 9, 2008

ix

19 22 24 191 193 195

Introduction

Perhaps it is as simple as Barack Obama’s having run a superior campaign. Or, maybe, Hillary Rodham Clinton’s negatives were just too high. Nonetheless, when a frontrunner for a major political party’s presidential nomination loses, it is incumbent on communication scholars to ask why. Failure needs to be explained, just as success does, for there are always the two sides of the campaign coin, and scholars—as well as those who read their work or seek advice from them—need to know both what goes right and what goes wrong in any major political campaign. This particular campaign, of course, has another dimension that provokes study: gender. Hillary Clinton was not the first woman to seek the presidency. She had forerunners, as Nichola D. Gutgold traces in Paving the Way for Madam President (2006). And although people might debate whether these predecessors were or were not “major” candidates, they were certainly not the presumed winner at any point during their campaigns. Hillary was, of course, the presumed winner until “things” started happening during the primary-and-caucus season. This volume brings together the work of many political communication scholars, all of whom are, in one way or another, trying to explain what those “things” were. Was Clinton’s rhetoric poor? Was her debate performance weak or her advertising in some way deficient? Was the media coverage of her such that it fueled her demise? Was she simply impeded by her gender or by her identification in the eyes of the public with her presidential husband, Bill? The chapters in this volume provide answers to these political communication questions; in addition, they probe other important dimensions of this landmark campaign. 1

2

I NT R O D U C TION

The chapters are divided into three sections: contexts, communication, and media. The organization suggests that the Clinton campaign cannot be understood unless one considers the constraints under which it operated, the different kinds of communication it used, and the way the media—both the news media and the popular media—reported on it to the American public.

Contexts Three different contexts are sketched in the book’s first section. Lauren C. Bell looks at the rules under which the campaign was conducted— specifically, the rules for awarding delegates. The Clinton campaign, of course, had no choice but to follow the rules, but it is well worth asking if the rules made a difference—not only in the outcome, but in how close the race between Clinton and Obama seemed to be. Bell argues that the use of the Republican Party’s rules would have changed things minimally; however, if something akin to the rules of the general election (i.e., the Electoral College procedures) were used to award delegates, not only would the race have been closer, but Clinton would have won. Kathleen M. Torrens looks at gender. She specifically considers the other gendered roles political women such as Hillary Clinton typically play and how having played these roles makes it very difficult for a woman to win a presidential nomination. Torrens argues that Hillary was almost doomed to fail because of gender assumptions still dominant in American society. Hillary Clinton was, of course, not just any woman seeking the presidency: she was also a former “First Lady.” In the past, other first ladies had wielded considerable political power, usually in the background. However, none of them had ever sought the presidency. Despite being in her second term in the U.S. Senate and, therefore, having a record of her own, Clinton’s having been First Lady was part of her story, and, if she evoked it, she ran the risk of both foregrounding a role many view as dealing more with ceremony than policy and foregrounding her husband Bill. James M. Schnoebelen, Diana B. Carlin, and Benjamin R. Warner consider these rhetorical problems Hillary Clinton had from the interesting perspective of narrative theory. Janette Kenner Muir and Anita Taylor also consider the story of Hillary and Bill as a context that the campaign must be viewed against. But rather than focus on Hillary as First Lady, they examine the constraints on a marital team in the political arena. They argue that, culturally, we are not ready for a co-presidency. Therefore, the members of a marital team must present themselves through their communication in ways that signal who is the dominant public face. They argue that both Bill Clinton’s stature as a former

IN T RODUCT ION

3

president and his personality made it difficult for the Clintons, as a couple, to present themselves in a manner that consistently positioned Hillary as the public face.

Communication Having established contexts in which to view the Hillary Rodham Clinton campaign, the volume then offers several chapters that explore the campaign’s communication activities. Julia A. Spiker considers Clinton’s public rhetoric. Spiker argues that, although there are certainly some consistent threads, there is also marked shifting of message and style from point to point in the campaign. Some of the shifting can be explained by the campaign dynamics; a candidate does speak differently when ahead than when behind, and a candidate does change approach based on demography. Some of Clinton’s shifting, Spiker suggests, reflects her wrestling with the binds she found herself in as a female candidate seeking an office that most defined in more male-gendered terms. Mitchell S. McKinney, Corey B. Davis, and Jeffrey Delbert consider Clinton’s performance in numerous primary-season debates. They find what one would suspect based on previous studies. Interestingly, they do find Clinton adopting a style that blends in many stereotypical masculine traits. She perhaps felt she had to embody rhetorically a role that had never been filled by a woman. This feeling—and the fact that she slipped from frontrunner status—caused her to emphasize her experience. Doing so compelled her to talk a great deal about her years in the White House, using language that tried to claim the experience and the accomplishments of 1993–2000 as hers. Mary Christine Banwart, Kelly Winfrey, and James M. Schnoebelen consider Clinton’s advertising. In some respects, they argue, Clinton’s videostyle was not exceptional. She conformed to patterns normal in a presidential campaign. The advertising, however, did have a few striking characteristics, among them the multiple foci of both the campaign as a whole and the individual ads. Banwart, Winfrey, and Schnoebelen argue that this lack of sharp focus may have prevented voters from deriving a clear idea of who Hillary Clinton was and what her presidency might be like.

Media A candidate’s words, debate performance, and advertising are common foci for campaign studies. Equally important—if not more—is how the communication

4

I NT R O D U C TION

a candidate cannot wholly control, that of the media, presents the candidate and the campaign to the public. Some—scholars and pundits both—pointed to the role the media played in the 2008 campaign. Many felt that not only were the media too focused on “the horse race,” but they lacked objectivity. Some suggested they treated Obama deferentially; some thought they prematurely declared the primary campaign over because either they thought an Obama victory was the better story, or they personally favored Obama over Clinton, or they wanted to reduce their expenditures on the campaign by making later primaries and caucuses no longer especially newsworthy. The last three chapters in the volume deal with the media’s role in this campaign. Karen F. Stein considers news coverage, looking at it with the variable of gender as her focus. She begins her chapter by noting what previous writers have noted to be common in the campaign coverage of a female candidate. Then she proceeds to see if these elements were present in the coverage of Hillary Clinton. Disturbingly, they were. The extent of the coverage of one day when the senator wore a blouse that revealed cleavage serves in Stein’s chapter as a synecdoche for the entirety of media coverage of her. Joan L. Conners looks at the popular media’s coverage of the Clinton campaign. This coverage was more volatile, for there were times when the popular media skewered the news media for its gender biases, but there were also times when the popular media exhibited the exact same biases. Conners explores the rather mixed message the popular media presented. Editorial cartooning, rarely favorable to political figures, tended to emphasize shortcomings in the Clinton campaign. Late-night television comedy, after initially helping her campaign assert media bias toward Obama, satirized her as well, concentrating more on personal characteristics than on campaign dynamics. Both Conners and the last author in the volume, Richard E. Vatz, note how significant a role popular media played in this particular campaign. Vatz, who, in addition to his academic appointment, is a conservative media commentator in the Baltimore market, explores how the news media, which he argues frequently reflects a liberal bias, wrestled with two arguably liberal candidates who also possess the sometimes privileged (by the news media) gender and race. The news media, Vatz argues, although consistently negative toward Republicans, was compelled to abandon—temporarily—its bias toward Obama when exposed for that bias by the popular media. Together, these eleven chapters do indeed offer many answers to the questions posed by the Hillary Clinton campaign. My previews of the chapters suggest what some of these answers might be. Some deal with campaigning; many deal with gender. Some raise issues—communication and political issues—that

IN T RODUCT ION

5

are not always discussed in campaign postmortems. In the brief afterword, I will try to extract some of the important lessons scholars and practitioners both might learn from the unsuccessful Clinton campaign. In that afterword, as well as here, let me highlight and then question the word “unsuccessful” that I just used. Yes, Clinton lost, so the campaign was indeed unsuccessful in achieving its immediate goal—the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. However, many of the authors suggest that there are also ways in which the campaign was successful. Put simply, cracking the glass ceiling, especially if it is to the tune of eighteen million cracks, may well be an important achievement, even if the ceiling remains for the moment unshattered. An important subtext of this volume is just how far the Clinton campaign advanced the cause of women in politics. The authors who reflect on this question and those that imply answers do not agree: some are optimistic, some not. In the afterword, I will conclude the book by attempting to construct what seems to be the consensus of this group of political communication scholars on this important question.

PART I

CONTEXTS

CHAPTER 1

Alternative Approaches to Delegate Selection and Their Effects on the 2008 Democratic Primary Election Results Lauren C. Bell

For nearly all of 2007, Hillary Clinton enjoyed double-digit leads in virtually every survey of likely Democratic voters when they were asked who they would prefer the party nominate as its candidate for president in the 2008 presidential election. Yet by mid-June 2008, Clinton’s principal rival for the nomination and eventual presidential election winner, Barack Obama, clinched enough pledged and superdelegates to assure that he would be the Democratic Party’s nominee. Clinton’s supporters were stunned, and many vowed they would not vote for Obama in the November 2008 general election. Some explanations for Clinton’s inability to claim the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination have focused on whether voters were “ready” to vote for a woman or whether the country felt confident in this woman in particular. Other analyses, including many in this book, have focused on her campaign strategies and her policy positions, as well as her ability to connect with voters. In contrast, this chapter looks not at political, policy, or personality factors per se, but instead explores the structural and institutional constraints that affected the presidential nominating process. Specifically, this chapter explores whether the outcome of the Democratic Party’s 2008 presidential candidate selection process would have been different for Hillary Clinton had the party employed a different method for selecting delegates than its mandatory proportional allocation method. To address this question, I consider two scenarios. First, I consider what would have happened had the Democrats simply allocated their delegates in each state using the Republican Party’s rules for delegate selection in that state. Second, I consider what would have happened if the primary elections were “winner-take-all” events with each state’s delegation forced to vote on the floor 9

10

L A U R E N C . BELL

of the Democratic Nominating Convention for the statewide winner of the state’s primary or caucus in the same way that winners of the presidential general election are decided in every state (except for Maine and Nebraska) on a winnertake-all system. The results of these analyses demonstrate that if the Democrats used the Republicans’ system of delegate allocation, Obama would have done almost as well as he did in actuality. However, under a winner-take-all scenario that mimicked the general election’s electoral vote allocation system, Hillary Clinton would have been able to win the Democratic Party’s nomination. Before proceeding, a note about methodology is important. My analyses herein focus only on the pledged delegates, not the so-called superdelegates, the uncommitted party leaders and elected officials who are not required to reveal their choice for the nomination prior to the convention. Because superdelegates are not required to express a preference for a candidate, and because any expressed preferences are subject to change—and many, in fact, did change throughout the primary season—it is impossible to know with certainty how many superdelegates Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama had on any particular date. Ignoring the superdelegates should not fundamentally change the analysis, since consensus emerged early in the race for the nomination even among Democratic superdelegates, such as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, that “If the votes of the superdelegates overturn what’s happened in the elections, it would be harmful to the Democratic party” (Associated Press, 2008). Likewise, political analyst Charles Cook noted: “It would seem extremely unlikely that superdelegates would overturn a pledged delegate lead of 100 delegates or more” (as quoted in the Fort Wayne [IN] Journal Gazette, May 7, 2008). That is not to say that the superdelegates are not important; they are. However, in light of the reforms to the Democratic Party’s nominating process, instituted in the mid-1970s and described briefly below, to have party leaders overturn the will of the party rank-and-file in the selection of a presidential candidate would be antithetical to the principles of candidate selection that have been in place within the party for the last three decades. Therefore, although for the purposes of this analysis I do not consider them, I would not necessarily expect that including them would lead to different results. The next section should help to explain why.

Delegate Selection Systems As Tolbert, Redlawsk, and Bowen (2009) note, the Constitution does not provide a system for nominating presidential candidates, but to be fair, none was required when the country was small (just thirteen states) and lacked political parties. Moreover, the Electoral College’s procedures were perceived to be

A LTERNAT IVE APPROACH ES

11

sufficient to select a president. However, “[o]nce parties developed and began nominating candidates, processes were needed to determine their nominees. The result was a hodgepodge of rules and processes guided largely by the selfinterest of individual state legislatures, secretary of states [sic], and state parties, who determine the timing of caucuses or primary elections and whether independents can participate in these party events. Institutionally, nominating U.S. Presidential candidates was never rationally designed” (Tolbert et al., 2009, 71). For most of the twentieth century, party leaders in both parties controlled the selection of the two parties’ candidates for president. Although many states held primary elections or caucuses, these events were considered advisory to the party leaders and delegates from each state who gathered at the quadrennial national conventions to choose their party’s respective nominees. Convention delegates were selected by state party leaders and therefore were more loyal to these leaders than they were to voters or to the public’s expressed preferences (Atkeson and Maestas, 2009, 59). Candidates for the nomination thus had only to appeal to party leaders and the delegates they appointed, and not to the mass public. Atkeson and Maestas (2009, 50) sum up the presidential nominating process in the period between 1924 and 1968 as follows: [N]omination rules and procedures made participation by rank-andfile party members quite difficult in many states. During this period caucuses, not primaries, dominated the nomination process, which made it easier for state-level party elites to maintain control, especially in the delegate-selection process. Many states used secret caucuses, closed slate-making, and extensive proxy voting for determining delegate selection. Some states had no formal rules for delegate selection or they changed their rules after delegates had been selected. In other cases, the delegates to the national convention were selected prior to the presidential election year before the slate of presidential candidates was even known.

In 1968, after Robert F. Kennedy, the clear public (and party leader) favorite to receive the Democratic Party’s nomination at its convention in Chicago, was assassinated, delegates selected Hubert H. Humphrey to be the party’s nominee for president. Yet Humphrey, who had served as President Lyndon Johnson’s vice president, had neither contested nor won a single caucus or primary during the period preceding the 1968 convention; nevertheless, he was selected over Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy, whom many voters perceived as a viable second choice for the nomination following Kennedy’s assassination. Ultimately, Humphrey lost resoundingly to Republican nominee Richard M. Nixon in the 1968 general election, and Democratic Party reformers cried out for changes

12


to the party’s nominating system to make it more democratic and to align the party’s choice of nominee more closely with the preferences of a majority of rank-and-file partisans. In 1970, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, also known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission (so-called for its two co-chairs), recommended a series of changes to the party’s nominating processes to the Democratic National Committee. These changes were adopted in 1971 and were first put into practice in 1972, and included the important reform that a candidate receiving at least 15 percent of the popular vote in a Democratic Party primary or caucus would receive a share of the delegates in proportion to the votes they received in each congressional district (Polsby and Wildavksy, 2000, 120). This change in procedure offered an important linkage between voters’ preferences and delegates’ obligations at the Democratic Party’s nominating convention. The Republican story is a bit different. Conventional wisdom holds that the Republican’s system of awarding delegates is largely a “winner-take-all” system, in which the candidate who wins within a state wins all of the delegates apportioned to that state. For example, Wayne (2000, 112–13) writes: “Whereas the Democrats impose proportional voting, the Republicans do not. They permit winner-take-all voting within districts or within the state. Such a voting system greatly advantages front runners.” Keefe and Hetherington (2003, 73) add: “The Republicans have resisted the allure of proportionality in delegate allocation, placing much more emphasis on some version of winner-take-all. In 2000, for example, well over one half of the Republican state parties used winner-take-all or direct election and only about one fourth used proportional representation.” Even recent accounts persist in the claim that the Republicans have a winnertake-all approach that far preferences frontrunners over second-place finishers. For example, Atkeson and Maestas (2009, 61) describe the early 2008 Republican primary results in this way: Even though John McCain did not cross the 50% threshold until March 4, he was essentially the nominee after Tsunami Tuesday [February 5, 2008] when Mitt Romney, who had the second highest delegate count, withdrew. Mike Huckabee remained in the race, but momentum would have had to significantly change for him to catch up to McCain, who had more resources and nearly three times as many delegates, particularly given the more common winner-take-all delegate allocation rule that many Republican state parties use.

These accounts, and others like them, contribute greatly to the myth that the Republican Party’s delegate selection system is a tidy, winner-take-all system that greatly advantages frontrunners. In actuality, there are fifty different Republican delegate selection systems, as the national party has resisted anything


13

Table 1.1. 2008 Republican Presidential Nomination Format/Rules, by State Format

State(s)

Caucus

Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, Colorado, American Samoa, Guam, Maine, Montana, Northern Marianas Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands

Winner-Take-All by Congressional District

Maryland

Winner-Take-All, Statewide

New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont, Virginia

Proportional Allocation + Statewide Bonus

South Carolina, Arkansas, California, Florida, Ohio, Oklahoma, Wisconsin

Proportional Allocation

Nevada, New Mexico, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota

Other

Louisiana, Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming

Source: Compiled by author from state Republican Party rules and www.thegreenpapers.com.

even approximating the set of standards imposed by the Democratic Party in the mid-1970s. As table 1.1 reveals, while some states do use a strict winnertake-all system, that is not the most common system employed by Republican state parties. Far from being inconsequential, the lack of a national standard means that Republican delegate selection varies dramatically from state to state. Some states are, in fact, winner-take-all states, in which the winner of a statewide primary receives all of the delegates allocated to the state by the national party. Delaware is a good example; although Romney managed to win a third of the statewide vote, he came in second to John McCain and therefore was ineligible to be awarded any of the state’s eighteen delegates. In other states, the state’s allocation of delegates is split between state delegates (frequently allocated wholesale to the statewide primary winner) and congressional district-level winners, allocated to each candidate on the basis of which congressional districts they win. The fact that Republicans permit winner-take-all voting within a congressional district, as Wayne (2000) points out, frequently means that in states with multiple congressional districts, each of

14


which might have several delegates allocated to it, two or more candidates might win district-level delegates by virtue of having won the popular vote within the district. The consequence is that two or more candidates end up sharing a state’s allocation of delegates, even if one candidate has a significantly greater share than the other(s). California is a good example of this; in 2008, John McCain received 155 of California’s 170 delegates to Mitt Romney’s 15—more than ten times the number of delegates—even though McCain managed just 7 percent more of the statewide vote than Romney. And in still other states, the proportion of the vote that a candidate receives will determine whether he or she takes all of the delegates or only a proportion; for example, in 2008, Alabama awarded Republican delegates on a winner-take-all basis if a candidate received more than 50 percent of the popular vote in the primary election, but on a proportional basis to each candidate receiving more than 20 percent of the vote if no candidate garnered a majority. Mike Huckabee managed 41 percent of the vote in Alabama’s primary, and therefore received twenty-six delegates; John McCain, who had 37 percent of the vote, received the remaining nineteen of the state’s forty-five total delegates. As if these variations were not complicated enough, some states require Republican Party delegates to be pledged to the candidate all the way to the floor of the national convention, while in other states, the primaries are essentially advisory, and delegates are free to vote their consciences at the convention. And, regardless of the delegate selection system, many state delegations voted en bloc for one candidate—perhaps not even the candidate who won their state’s primary election—at the party’s national convention; this is often the result of deals made internally within the delegations or between candidates’ supporters, as the delegations seek to demonstrate party unity within their states. It may also occur because the state delegation’s preferred candidate dropped out of the race prior to the convention. Because the Republican Party had no event similar to the Humphrey nomination to bring about changes to its nominating procedures, today the Republicans employ a range of procedures to select their delegates, who frequently vote for the frontrunner regardless of their home state’s preferences.

The 2008 Democratic Presidential Nomination Contest It is with this background that we can explore whether a different nomination scenario would have led to a different outcome in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Hillary Clinton entered 2008 as the frontrunner for the Democratic Party’s nomination. But


15

with New Year’s revelry still ringing in people’s ears, Clinton’s aides were privately expressing concerns about the difficult task confronting her in the Iowa caucuses, the first test of the presidential nomination season (Breslau, January 1, 2008). Indeed, Barack Obama won the Iowa caucuses handily, and Clinton came in a shocking third, behind Obama and former North Carolina senator John Edwards.1 But Clinton was able to reclaim her frontrunner status less than a week later, when she defeated Obama and the handful of other Democratic hopefuls in the New Hampshire primary on January 8. And so the race for the Democratic nomination went for the next four months, with Obama and Clinton trading victories in primaries and caucuses across the country (Edwards dropped out of the race on January 30 without endorsing either candidate). Determining a nominee was confounded a bit by the fact that so many Democratic Party leaders had already endorsed Clinton’s candidacy prior to the Iowa caucuses on January 3. Thus, although she came in third in that contest, she held a commanding lead in the delegate count as of that date, with CNN reporting that Clinton was the frontrunner for the Democratic Party’s nomination, with 169 delegates, followed by Barack Obama with sixty-six delegates, and John Edwards with forty-seven delegates. Clinton had won only fourteen pledged delegates in Iowa, but a majority of the party elite, the so-called superdelegates, that had made a commitment to a candidate had selected her as their choice.2 In fact, although Obama had a lead in the pledged delegate count from the outset, it was not until the week of February 12, after more than half of the states had already held their primaries or caucuses, that Obama’s overall delegate count (pledged delegates + superdelegates) exceeded that of Hillary Clinton. Ultimately, on June 5, 2008, after the last states had held their primary elections, Clinton sent her supporters an e-mail in which she announced that she was leaving the race. In it, she stated: “I have said throughout the campaign that I would strongly support Senator Obama if he were the Democratic Party’s nominee, and I intend to deliver on that promise.”3 The end of Clinton’s campaign was disappointing to many of her supporters, who had hoped to see her nominated as the first female major party candidate. Many could not understand how it was possible for a candidate who was so far ahead in the polls to fall so short of the number of delegates needed to win the nomination. Calls abounded for the Michigan and Florida delegations to be seated in their entirety, despite the fact that the two states had been sanctioned by the party for violating its rules; both states had supported Clinton in their primary contests. Questions about the nature of the Democratic Party’s delegate selection system, its requirement of awarding delegates to second- and even third-place finishers, and whether Clinton might have been the party’s nominee were a different system in place abounded in the months between the end of the primary campaigns and the party’s convention. Ultimately, however, Barack

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Obama was confirmed as the party’s nominee at the August 2008 Democratic National Convention; he went on to win the presidential general election in November 2008.

Data and Methodology It is unclear whether there is merit to the claims that Hillary Clinton would have been able to secure the Democratic Party’s nomination for the presidency if the party had used a different system of allocating delegates. Thus, the remainder of this chapter explores in detail the delegate allocation system used to award delegates to Clinton and Obama, and considers how the nominations results might have changed had alternative structures been in place. As noted above, I consider two scenarios: what would have happened had the Democrats simply allocated their delegates in each state using the Republican Party’s rules for delegate selection in that state, and what would have happened if the primary elections were “winner-take-all,” with each state’s delegation forced to vote on the floor of the Democratic Nominating Convention for the statewide winner of the state’s primary or caucus. In order to conduct the first analysis, I first needed to identify the Republican Party’s rules, which I obtained from several sources, including www .thegreenpapers.com and www.procon.org, as well as the individual state party websites for the Republican Party. The Green Papers are an elections information clearinghouse, and ProCon.org is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) educational charity, the mission of which is to “to research issues that . . . are complicated and important and work to present them in a balanced, comprehensive, straightforward, and primarily pro-con format for free and without advertising on the internet.”4 In addition to collecting information about how the Republican Party allocates its delegates, I also obtained the results of the Democratic primary elections and caucuses as reported by the CNN news network on CNN.com, as well as the official election returns available on each state’s Board of Elections website. Once these data were collected, I used the information previously gathered about the Republicans’ delegate selection system within each state to recalculate the number of delegates that each candidate would have received had that system been in place during the 2008 Democratic primary elections. In some cases, this was easy; in a state where Republicans award delegates on a winner-take-all basis, I simply awarded the winner of the Democratic primary in that state (Clinton or Obama) the total number of delegates available. However, for most states it was not quite so easy to award the Democrats’ delegates using the Republicans’ system.


17

In states where the Republicans award delegates by congressional district, it was first necessary to convert the county-level data collected by the State Boards of Election to congressional district level data, using information from the sources noted above, as well as from the Almanac of American Politics and Politics in America; both of these sources provide congressional district maps at the county level, so that it is possible to convert the county-level data to districtlevel data. Once that task was completed, it was then necessary to calculate the total number of congressional districts that each candidate won, as well as the number of delegates allocated to each district (since the Democrats do not always award the same number of delegates to all congressional districts within a state). The total number of delegates awarded to each candidate in states that award delegates on the basis of congressional district was thus calculated by considering the number of congressional districts won by each candidate and adding the appropriate number of delegates to reach a sum that reflected the number that each candidate would have received using a Republican allocation scenario. Finally, if a state’s Republican method would have required a combination of congressional district-level delegate awards as well as a specified “bonus” number of delegates for winning the state overall, I employed the method discussed in the preceding paragraph to determine the appropriate number of congressional district-level delegates each candidate ought to be awarded, and then simply added the appropriate number of “state-level” delegates to that total. Combined, these approaches allowed me to calculate hypothetical delegate totals for each Democratic candidate that represent the number of delegates they would have received had their party employed the Republicans’ delegate selection methods.5 Data for the second analysis—which considers what would happen if the Democratic Party used a similar system to that used to award electors in the general election—were easier to collect. In the second analysis, I simply identified the statewide winner of each Democratic primary election and awarded the total number of Democratic delegates to the appropriate candidate.6

Analysis and Results Before proceeding to a discussion of the results I obtained when I applied the new ways of allocating delegates to the results of the Democratic primaries, it is important to examine what actually happened. Figure 1.1 graphically represents these results. As is apparent in table 1.2, Barack Obama led in the pledged delegate count from the outset of the primary season; the only time Clinton led in the pledged delegate count was after her victory in California’s primary, which

Table 1.2. Actual Delegate Counts, by Date and Candidate Date 1/3/2008

2/5/2008

3/4/2008

Clinton

Obama

14 23 34 46 49 74 101 132 336 355 377 383 409 412 461 470 525 549 585 590 649 663 802 826 866 875 897 905 905 930 934 962 971 1000 1006 1038 1112 1125 1219 1225 1230 1243 1328 1330 1368

27 39 53 86 96 123 131 156 323 359 385 394 455 470 574 597 635 683 719 727 775 787 880 894 922 936 970 986 989 1042 1053 1095 1110 1164 1178 1220 1286 1294 1393 1402 1409 1429 1502 1504 1538

A LTERNAT IVE APPROACH ES Date

6/3/2008

Clinton

Obama

1416 1436 1473 1494 1532 1539 1548 1583 1586 1638 1638 1640

1605 1613 1627 1658 1675 1684 1690 1719 1723 1762 1762 1763

19

gave her a small lead over Obama for a matter of days. By the end of the first week of February, however, Obama had recovered the lead and never lost it. In the end, Obama was able to win the Democratic nomination by 123 pledged delegates, with 1763 to Clinton’s 1640. The results of the two novel analyses conducted for this chapter demonstrate that under one scenario—using the Republican’s selection method to apportion the Democratic pledged delegates—Obama would still have been able to

Figure 1.1. Elections

Actual Pledged Delegate Counts: 2008 Democratic Primary

Table 1.3. Delegate Counts Using the “Republican Model,” by Date and Candidate Date 1/3/2008

2/1/2008

3/4/2008 4/5/2008

Clinton

Obama

14 14 25 36 36 36 36 39 39 73 129 440 440 440 440 440 443 450 505 505 505 510 617 849 882 922 938 938 938 946 946 955 955 955 955 1010 1010 1130 1143 1249 1249 1254 1254 1254

27 27 37 51 106 126 150 160 212 212 212 271 326 374 374 389 473 619 657 729 801 809 809 809 814 842 842 874 930 1000 1015 1076 1177 1251 1251 1251 1274 1295 1303 1370 1385 1413 1413 1413

A LTERNAT IVE APPROACH ES Date 5/3/2008

6/3/2008

Clinton

Obama

1254 1282 1330 1330 1358 1395 1416 1419 1433 1503 1567 1576

1417 1441 1508 1532 1532 1546 1577 1592 1604 1613 1613 1619

21

win the nomination, while under the other—using a “winner-take-all” system similar to that used to determine the winner of the general election, Clinton would have won the nomination handily. Figure 1.2 provides the results of the first analysis—that of what would have happened had the Democrats employed the Republicans’ methods of delegate allocation. As the figure shows, in this scenario, Barack Obama would have led from early on in the Democratic primary contests. Although his lead would have been slim, there is no time after early February when Hillary Clinton would have had a lead in the pledged delegate count over her rival. And ultimately Obama would have managed to win the nomination by forty-three delegates (1,619 delegates for Obama as compared with 1,576 delegates for Clinton). While this is a narrower margin of victory in the pledged delegate count, Obama would have led nonetheless. Table 1.3 provides the data to support the graph in figure 1.2. The results of this analysis indicate that Clinton would have fared better but not well enough to win the nomination if the Democrats selected their delegates the way the Republicans do. Even had the Democratic delegates been apportioned using the Republicans’ method of allocating delegates, Clinton would have fared only slightly better than she did under the Democrats’ system and she still would not have been able to wrest the nomination away from Obama. However, if the Democrats had employed the same method of allocating delegates as is used to allocate electors following the presidential general election, Hillary Clinton would have fared much better than under either the Democrats’ current system or the alternative one used by the Republicans. Under a “winnertake-all” delegate selection system like the one that is used in the general election, Clinton would have won the democratic nomination handily (see figure 1.3). As table 1.4 and figure 1.3 demonstrate, under a purer “winner-take-all” system, the two candidates would have begun their quest for the nomination in

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Figure 1.2. Delegate Counts Using Republican Method

Table 1.4. Delegate Counts Using the “General Election Model,” by Date and Candidate Date 1/3/08

Clinton 0 0 0 0 3 3 37 93 463 518 566

Obama 41 62 87 142 152 204 204 204 204 204 204

Date

2/5/08

3/4/08

6/3/08

Clinton

Obama

566 566 566 566 659 707 707 707 814 1046 1084 1084 1084 1084 1084 1087 1113 1113 1121 1121 1121 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1271 1292 1465 1465 1465 1465 1623 1627 1679 1679 1699 1750 1771 1826 1842 1913 1977 1992

204 219 306 459 459 483 555 568 568 568 568 636 668 668 691 706 706 762 832 835 859 874 889 959 1060 1080 1154 1154 1154 1154 1169 1181 1214 1214 1214 1214 1329 1337 1337 1368 1368 1368 1368 1368 1368

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Figure 1.3. “General Election” Model of Delegate Selection

much the same way, with Clinton trailing slightly in early February. However, by early March, Clinton would have pulled ahead of Obama, and the two would have been more than one hundred delegates apart by early April, when Clinton would have really surged ahead following big victories in delegate-heavy states like California. By the end of the primary election season, the winner-take-all model projects that Clinton would have won the nomination with almost two thousand pledged delegates (1,992) to Obama’s more modest count of 1,368. This difference of more than six hundred delegates demonstrates that Clinton would not only have won, she would have won with a far larger margin of victory than Obama’s margin in the Democratic primaries.

Discussion and Conclusion The results of this analysis offer important insights into the dynamics of the presidential primary system and raise important questions about both parties’ systems


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of delegate selection. First, as noted above, those pundits and Hillary Clinton supporters who suggested that she would have fared better if the Democrats used the Republican system were correct. However, the Republican system would not necessarily have led to a better outcome for Clinton (in fact, this analysis suggests that Obama still would have won by forty-three pledged delegates), and would likely have been just as difficult to administer as the Democrats’ mandatory proportional allocation system. This is because the Republicans do not use a single system of delegate selection and allocation, but rather permit each state party to select whatever system of delegate selection it prefers. However, had the Democrats employed a “winner-take-all” system like the one in place (with the two exceptions noted above) for the presidential general election, Hillary would have won by a margin of more than six hundred pledged delegates. These results not only offer insights into the Clinton primary loss, but also generate questions about, and insights into, the presidential election system in the United States. First, with the caveat that this analysis was focused solely on the Clinton-Obama 2008 primary race, it is clear that the system of allocation employed by the two parties does make a difference to election outcomes. Moreover, the system that is employed can make all the difference in whether the delegate counts are close or whether one candidate or the other wins by a landslide. As this analysis has shown, without changing anything about the election outcomes within each state, it is possible to project Obama winning the nomination by more than one hundred pledged delegates (using the Democrats’ proportional allocation system) or to project him winning the nomination by just under fifty votes (using the Republican Party’s multiple systems of counting delegates within the states). Most strikingly, however, it is also possible to project Clinton winning the nomination by more than six hundred pledged delegates if a counting method closer to that used during the presidential general election is employed. The short story, then, is that the rules of the game matter. This is not news to the political scientists who study presidential elections, nor is it news to the political parties themselves, who want the rules of the game to be as advantageous to their side as possible. It is well-known that the parties work internally to create party structures that result in the outcome that each party prefers. For example, as William G. Mayer (2009, 68) notes: In both 2000 and 2008, the Republican Party rules committee spent a substantial amount of time analyzing the faults of the current system and considering a range of options, finally settled on an alternative, got the new plan approved by a number of other party bodies—only to have the presidential-nominee-to-be pull the plug on the whole venture just days before the opening of the Republican National Convention.

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In addition, both parties seek the fairest possible rules of the game in the areas they cannot control, such as the timing of certain election contests (such as Iowa and New Hampshire’s January events). Of course, were the rules governing the Democratic presidential primary election different, we could expect that both of the candidates would have modified their campaign strategies to attempt to capitalize on whatever rules were put in place. Therefore, while the preceding analysis suggests that Clinton could have won the Democratic presidential nomination by more than six hundred pledged delegates under a “winner-take-all system,” it is also possible that Obama would have run his campaign differently were those the rules of the game in place at the outset of the 2008 campaign season. Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated that the structure and rules of the 2008 Democratic primary election were themselves part of the reason that the race for the Democratic nomination was as close as it was and has offered insights into why Obama was the eventual winner.

Notes 1. The results of the Iowa caucuses are available at www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/ primaries/results/state/#val=IA (accessed January 28, 2009). 2. Using the delegate scorecard on CNN.com permits an analysis of the superdelegate count at particular points in time during the primary election season. See www.cnn.com/ ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/scorecard/#D (accessed January 28, 2009). 3. See Franke-Ruta, June 5, 2008. 4. See www.procon.org for more information about this organization (accessed January 28, 2009). 5. It must be noted that in a handful of cases, it was nearly impossible to apply the Republican method of delegate selection to the Democratic contest. For example, in Pennsylvania, Republican Party rules require that all delegates remained committed to any candidate until the time of the convention. Thus, in situations where it was impossible to determine how to apportion delegates, that state’s primary results were not included in the cumulative totals of delegates awarded to each candidate. I was unable to award approximately 214 delegates, or 6.3 percent of the total number of Democratic delegates (3,409). 6. As noted above, the exceptions to the “winner-take-all” electoral vote apportionment scheme are Maine and Nebraska.

References Associated Press. (2008, April 1). Pelosi says superdelegates should “vote their conscience.”


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Atkeson, L. R., and Maestas, C. D. (2009). Meaningful participation and the evolution of the reformed Presidential nominating system. P.S.: Political Science and Politics, 42(1), 59–64. Barone, M., and Cohen, R. E. (2007). The almanac of American politics. Washington, DC: National Journal Group. Breslau, K. (2008). What if she loses? Hillary Clinton’s advisors worry that a poor Iowa finish could hurt the candidate’s once commanding lead. Newsweek Web. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/id/83096/page/1. Franke-Ruta, G. (2008). Clinton’s e-mail to supporters. Washington Post.com. Retrieved from www.blog.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/06/05/clinton_to_rally_party_behind .html. Keefe, W. J., and Hetherington, M. J. (2003). Parties, politics, and public policy in America, ninth ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Koszczuk, J., and Angle, M. (2007). CQ’s politics in America 2008: The 110th Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Mayer, W. G. (2009). An incremental approach to presidential nomination reform. P.S.: Political Science and Politics, 42(1), 65–69. Polsby, N., and Wildavsky, A. (2000). Presidential elections: Strategies and structures of American politics. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Smith, S. A. Superdelegates complete nomination puzzle. Fort Wayne (IN) Journal Gazette (online edition). Retrieved from www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article ?AID=/20080507/NEWS03/805070382/-1/election01. Tolbert, C. J., Redlawsk, D. P., and Bowen, D. C. (2009). Reforming the presidential nominations: Rotating state primaries or a national primary? P.S.: Political Science and Politics, 42(1), 71–79. Wayne, S. J. (2000). The road to the White House 2000: The politics of presidential elections. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press.

CHAPTER 2

Public Woman, Private Wife: Hillary Clinton Could Not Have Won Kathleen M. Torrens

Lawyer, policy wonk, partner, feminist, mother, wife, hostess, trendsetter, children’s advocate, health care crusader, cover girl, icon, media sensation, Midwesterner turned Arkansasan turned New Yorker, senator, Democrat, and presidential hopeful, since 1992 HRC has been bolstered by her friends, betrayed by her husband, cheered by Congress, interrogated by prosecutors, hounded by reporters, slandered by talk-radio hosts, accepted by senatorial colleagues, and lionized by women throughout the world Troy, 2006

Hillary Rodham Clinton lost her bid for the Democratic nomination for president because she is Bill Clinton’s wife. This statement implies two key arguments, only one of which will be developed in this chapter. The most obvious argument is that the legacy of William Jefferson Clinton’s presidency, and her part in it, tarnished Hillary Clinton’s own presidential campaign. While that argument may be somewhat true, I suggest it is Clinton’s role as a wife that, for historical, cultural, and ideological reasons, prevented her success in the campaign. The very office of U.S. president is uniquely gendered and, at this historical moment, unavailable to a woman inhabitant. Thus, Hillary Clinton’s campaign stood no chance of success because of the discursively gendered nature of the presidency and because of her prior choices regarding her position as wife. This chapter explores the historical constraints on women’s public and political agency, Hillary Clinton’s performance of the role of wife, and the essentially gendered nature of the presidency. 29

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K A T H L E E N M . TORRENS

Historical Constraints on Women’s Political Agency In her concession speech on June 7, 2008, Senator Clinton honored the historical legacy of women and African Americans, as well as the constraints of the current moment. She said: [W]hen I was asked what it means to be a woman running for President, I always gave the same answer: that I was proud to be running as a woman but I was running because I thought I’d be the best President. But I am a woman, and like millions of women, I know there are still barriers and biases out there, often unconscious.

She continued a bit later: Think of the suffragists who gathered at Seneca Falls in 1848 and those who kept fighting until women could cast their votes. Think of the abolitionists who struggled and died to see the end of slavery. Think of the civil rights heroes and foot-soldiers who marched, protested and risked their lives to bring about the end of segregation and Jim Crow. Because of them, I grew up taking for granted that women could vote. Because of them, my daughter grew up taking for granted that children of all colors could go to school together. Because of them, Barack Obama and I could wage a hard fought campaign for the Democratic nomination. Because of them, and because of you, children today will grow up taking for granted that an African American or a woman can yes, become President of the United States.

Her comments imply the common adage, “We’ve come a long way, BUT . . .” Clinton’s failure to snag the nomination is particularly interesting in light of preelection polling data. In April 2008, a Newsweek poll of 1,203 registered voters nationwide found 70 percent of the respondents believed that the United States was “ready to elect a woman president.” In May 2008, an ABC News/Washington Post poll of 1,122 adults revealed that 62 percent were “entirely comfortable” with the idea of “a woman president of the United States.” In July 2007, 85 percent of 905 adults polled nationally answered “Yes” to the question posed by Newsweek: “If your party nominated a WOMAN for president, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?” (Pollingreport.com, 2009). (We will pause only a moment to assume that no one would be nominated for president by a valid party unless she or he were qualified.) Clearly the votes did not support the ide-

P U BLIC WOMAN , PRIVAT E WIFE

31

ology purported by these voters. Something got in the way. A quick review of nineteenth-century ideologies of gender will enhance the picture. Women’s struggles for suffrage and political agency have been welldocumented. The transformation of American culture necessary to naturalize equality continues today, demonstrating sometimes-glacial progress. Hillary Clinton’s presidential bid certainly indicates great progress, yet we still see remnants of the restrictive expectations of femininity that have their roots firmly entrenched in the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century women were constrained by cultural ideologies that limited their opportunities explicitly and implicitly. In Beyond the Double Bind: Women and Leadership, Kathleen Hall Jamieson notes: “Under the law of coverture, married women could not sue, sell, or contract without first getting their husband’s permission. They were, in the eyes of the courts, represented in and through the man they had married” (1995, 15). Legally, then, women did not exist except as an appendage to a husband. Consequently, the culture devalued women’s physical, intellectual, and economic contributions. The nineteenth-century woman was relegated to hearth-keeping, monitoring, and safeguarding the well-being of her family in terms of their home environment and physical health as well as their moral health. Her status was institutionalized by the postindustrialization dichotomization of the public (male)/private (female) spheres and by what Welter termed the “cult of true womanhood” (Welter, 1966). This set of ideological constraints shaped expectations of the proper role, sphere, and behavior of women of the time, determining their chastity, piety, and domestic nature to be paramount to social stability. What is interesting and somewhat disturbing about the status of women in the nineteenth century is how solid were the binds that constrained them. Women’s restrictions seemed the glue holding together the cultural framework. Their role as keepers of the home and moral compass safeguarded not only the family structure but the social structure as well. Women stepping outside of their scripts, whether by speaking publicly, not marrying, or not bearing children, posed significant danger to the well-being of all, as noted by Jamieson. She states: “Those who chose to exercise their intellects in public life upended the natural order, endangered the family, and called into question whether they were really women” (1995, 17). For example, consider that Susan B. Anthony, prominent suffragist, was arrested for voting in the 1872 presidential election. Not only were women not allowed to vote, their vote was technically illegal. It was commonly believed that women exercising suffrage would weaken their physical capacities for motherhood by diverting valuable bloodflow from their female organs to their brains—imagine. The explicit constraints such as suffrage, divorce laws, and barriers to education have changed over time through activism and growing support within culture. As women gained access to education and other elements of the public

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sphere, the notions of their inferiority in intellect and physical capacities diminished. Witnessing little social chaos as a result of women’s public involvement, people had little choice but to relax their restrictive attitudes toward such participation. Brave women took to the pulpit and the stump to advocate for their rights, breaking through the barrier to their public speaking. Workplaces began to reflect women’s influences and participation. Women achieved suffrage in 1920, institutionalizing their presence in public deliberation. The implicit controls, the attitudinal barriers, have been much more intransigent and difficult to address and transform. Yet, as Anderson (2002) notes, “[a]lthough most of those laws have been dismantled, the social and psychological traces of double binds endure” (107). Women may have achieved a place in the public sphere, but it is a place still fraught with constraints as they are still expected to behave as women—not too tough, not too aggressive, not too power-hungry. Jamieson concurs: “Although the result is not a steady move toward equitable treatment of women, it is a world in which progress is certainly sufficient to justify optimism” (1995, 7). The efforts of women, famous and otherwise, and of men, too, have gone far to rectify the invisibility and oppression of women in the United States. Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for president stands as an obvious testament to the transformations of women’s cultural, political, and social standing. Her journey to this place of prominence has been, of course, shaped by her affiliation with Bill Clinton and his ascendancy to positions of governmental prominence, most notably of president of the United States. The journey has also been shaped significantly by her decisions and actions, as well as by the cultural milieu in which she was raised and educated and her professional abilities. In Hillary Rodham Clinton: Polarizing First Lady, Gil Troy describes Hillary Clinton’s development into the icon of First Lady and subsequent senator as reflecting “the odyssey of modern American women, continually struggling to strike just the right balance, to convey just the right image, amid powerful competing forces” (2006, 2). In other words, for women to achieve public credibility and acceptance, they walk a line between conventional expectations of femininity (reminiscent of the cult of true womanhood) and more modern opportunities for ambition, assertiveness, and power. As we will see, Hillary Clinton’s career very publicly traversed this terrain, sometimes erring on the side of the public perception of too much ambition and aggression, sometimes earning public accolades for a more traditional feminine persona. Thus, Clinton exemplifies the balancing act performed by public women today as a result of residual influences of nineteenth-century constraints. Even as a candidate for senator or president, a woman today must still dance carefully between traditional expectations of femininity and masculinist expectations of public office, particularly the presidency. In fact, Clinton’s role as First Lady added an additional layer of constraint to her


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presidential candidacy as that office “remains a throwback, a nineteenth-century ceremonial position set amid the rapid-fire pace of twenty-first century life. It remains more fit for a queen, or at least a homegrown American aristocrat, than for a corporate go-getter or a political crusader” (Troy, 2006, 213). Here I would like to introduce an idea to which I will return periodically throughout the paper, that of a meme. Memes, introduced into social and academic parlance by Richard Dawkins in his seminal work The Selfish Gene, are defined as “a unit of cultural transmission, a unit of imitation” (1976, 206). If we think of cultural institutions, habits of thinking, and norms as examples of how culture is transmitted from person to person, generation to generation, we can begin to understand this concept of the meme. We can also conceptualize this notion in the framework of hegemony—the push and pull between dominant and subordinate groups and ideas that can, over time, result in cultural change. Cultural transmission, in the memetic sense, does not imply that culture is simply handed down unchanged by context, events, interpretation, or presentation. Rather, developments such as new laws, accidents, great speeches that change minds, elections, new books, or disasters, natural or man-imposed, affect how that culture, or cultural norm, is transmitted. When we consider the cultural transformations evidenced in the United States alone since the nation’s founding, the ideas of memetic transmission might start to make more sense. On the most basic level, the fundamental notion inherent in the founding documents had “citizen” defined as men, not of color, and owners of property. Today, in 2009, a black man has taken the presidential oath of office. The possibility of such an event would not have occurred to the men establishing this nation, as the concept of “citizen” in 1776 denoted white males of property. How persons of color became persons under the law correlates to the ways in which women became persons under the law. From the laws of coverture in the nineteenth century to Hillary Clinton running for president as a bona fide candidate in 2008, a seismic shift in not only cultural opinion, but cultural knowledge and awareness had to have occurred. Cultural information and knowledge are copied and transmitted in various ways. With regard to women achieving political capital and agency in the public sphere, we need to place ourselves in that context. Consider an extended example: Imagine that you, an average nineteenth-century male, believe, similar to your contemporaries, that women possess inferior brains and physiques and should be relegated to the home—to keep them safe, pure, and appropriately employed in keeping the home. You read in your newspaper that certain women have been “agitating” or speaking about suffrage or equality. Nonsense, you think! Your wife expresses some interest in what these women are saying but does not

34

K A T H L E E N M . TORRENS seek further information. Your male neighbor, on the other hand, possessed of an “uppity” wife, tells you that his spouse ventured to a meeting and came home talking of votes for women, equality, and a brave new world. While your neighbor might be nonplussed, you dismiss his wife as dangerous and to be avoided, particularly by your wife. Naturally, the wives share time together as a result of their proximity and common social status. The “dangerous” wife tells your spouse of her experiences and new knowledge. Your wife finds some rationality in what she has been told. She explains her position to you. You, being a reasonable sort, determine that your wife joining a local women’s club is a good idea, as she will be intellectually entertained with people like herself—as you consider her to be an intelligent woman (you are clearly enlightened). Your home life changes. Your wife attains new friends and acquaintances. More important, you speak to your business acquaintances and, perhaps, men you know socially about the changes you are seeing in contemporary women. You are fairly complimentary, albeit somewhat hesitant to see suffrage and outright equality as a determinantly good thing for your community. Some of your acquaintances rail against the very notion of equal rights for women; they argue that social chaos will reign if women’s energies are diverted from appropriate female pursuits like childbearing and rearing. However, others of your acquaintance may see reason in your statements and begin to allow their wives more freedom, particularly those wives interested in the new ideas of suffrage and equality. Over time, then, the idea—the meme—of women’s natural inferiority begins to transform. Over time, common wisdom does not begin with that notion of inferiority but with a more rational perspective on women’s abilities and intellect, with the acceptance of women speaking publicly and, finally, with women achieving suffrage, rights to employment and education, and, in today’s world, an accepted (or reasonably so) candidacy for president of the United States. How did this happen?

As demonstrated in my extended example, this cultural transformation took place through the exchange of information among everyday people, and then through the representations of women doing things other than what they had done before—working, wearing sensible clothing, speaking in public—without ridicule or complete social chaos, by caveat—the allowing of participation in school and other public forums, and by legal sanction. These are all rhetorical events which participated in the transformation and transmission of the meme regarding the status of women. My example should demonstrate a significant means of cultural evolution, the meme. As Kate Distin argues, “A form of selection must occur in minds and


35

culture, and we should expect to see the preservation of those ideas and skills with the best fit to their environment, and the extinction of those without” (2005, 14). It seems that most reasonable people in the United States today would agree, particularly since a woman nearly made it to the White House in 2008, that the idea that “women are inferior to men” is an idea that does not fit well with the current sociopolitical environment. That meme, like so many other antiquated, bigoted, and harmful ideas, is likely destined for extinction. Yet I cannot argue that the idea of women’s equality has achieved hegemonic status; there remain memetic roadblocks to that idea. There remain people in our culture who continue to believe that women’s roles should be primarily domestic, that they are not capable of political agency (particularly of holding the office of president—which goes to other memes), and that women are simply not of the same status as men. Memes mutate over time, as a result of education, practices (like those of the suffragists and women’s movement members), laws, and changes in the sociopolitical environment. So, in order for Hillary Clinton to have gotten as far as she did in the 2008 presidential campaign, the meme or idea concerning women’s abilities and political agency had mutated significantly. However, because of prevailing or residual notions surrounding the role of wife and the office of the presidency, as well as holdover nineteenth-century prejudices about women, she could only go that far. I would like to turn to another meme, that of “wife,” to further elucidate why Hillary Clinton could not be elected president of the United States.

Hillary Clinton’s Performance of Wife Hillary Clinton’s decisions regarding her role as Bill Clinton’s wife put the nail in her presidential campaign’s coffin. Since the 1970s when Bill Clinton began his public service career, Hillary Clinton navigated the rocky road of a feminist spouse capable of her own public service career. However, circumstances in their relationship placed Bill in the forefront of those options. As Clinton herself notes in her 2003 autobiography Living History, “I could get away with ‘eccentricities’ as wife of the Attorney General, but as First Lady of Arkansas, I was thrown into the spotlight. For the first time, I came to realize the impact of my personal choices on my husband’s political future” (2003, 33). One of those “eccentricities” that Clinton had to deal with concerned her use of her birth name instead of her husband’s surname. She said: “Many Arkansas voters were offended when I kept my maiden name, Rodham” (93). She became Hillary Rodham Clinton in 1982, as her husband announced his second candidacy for the governorship of Arkansas. Her adoption of the Clinton surname was urged upon her by Vernon Jordan, a close friend and political ally to the aspiring governor; he called the

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move “the right thing to do” in order to aid her husband’s successful bid for office. Clinton claims that “it was more important for my husband to be governor than for me to keep my maiden name” (93). Unfortunately for Clinton, adopting her husband’s name probably made it virtually impossible for her to be elected president of the United States—along with a web of other decisions and circumstances arising from her relationship with Bill Clinton, of course. The rhetorical significance of one’s name trumps, to some extent, how one behaves or what one says, particularly if one chooses or adopts that name for oneself. In the case of marital naming, adopting the name of one’s spouse has been traditional for centuries. Recently, though, studies have shown “that women who kept their birth names were perceived as more feminist and less likely to make good wives than those who took their husband’s name,” according to Michelle Hoffnung (2006, 11–12). Talk about a double bind. Clinton adopted Bill’s surname to promote his career and to fulfill cultural expectations of an appropriately wifely wife. Yet, in the later post–Bill Clinton presidency, post-Lewinsky years, as Clinton strove to separate her identity from that of her spouse, the image so carefully crafted of Hillary as wife stood stalwartly in her path. And with her presidential bid, as we will establish later, the wifely wife has no place in the Oval Office. When a name is adopted strategically by the person wearing it, that name bears more significance than our naming of a pet, child, or element in our environment. In Clinton’s case, the fact that her critics backed off somewhat on her adoption of Bill’s surname indicates the power of that move. In a sense, Clinton relinquished a great deal of her feminism, at least from the perspective of her public, by changing her name. As Robert Heath argues, we choose terms (names) to “influence other’s judgment and behavior,” to change or influence situations, and to convey attitudes or dispositions (1986, 96). Hillary Rodham became Hillary Rodham Clinton in order to change the opinions of people who felt that her feminist principles, as demonstrated by her choice not to be known as Mrs. Clinton, posed a threat to her husband’s political fortunes. In The Rhetoric of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton: Crisis Management Discourse, Colleen Kelley notes the irony of Clinton’s position: During the first term of Bill Clinton’s governorship, the image of Hillary Rodham as too ambitious and aggressive hurt his political goals. However, as Mrs. Bill Clinton, she could successfully participate in his political career. She used the Arkansas mores favoring traditionalism, over which she had previously stumbled, to combat press and public criticism. . . . She was still outspoken and independent, but she had now become a “real wife”—a Mrs.—and so such behavior was not only accepted, it was applauded and it helped Bill Clinton become elected to a second term as governor of Arkansas. (2001, 219)


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While significant, her naming choice did not solely impede her bid for the presidency. Since the late 1970s, Clinton made many choices that framed her as appropriately wifely, but inappropriately presidential. Hillary Clinton traversed a variety of difficult terrains once Bill Clinton’s political career took off. As First Lady of Arkansas, she managed a professional identity as a successful attorney. Clearly, she had her feet planted in two vastly divergent ideological fields—First Lady vs. professionally employed woman, establishing the minefield for controversy and conflicting perspectives by the public. Kelley notes the “First Lady Paradox” that dogged Hillary Clinton from Arkansas to Washington and, likely, to New York. The “First Lady must be ‘modern’ but not ‘push too far’; her shortcomings are maligned, her strengths dismissed. She must contribute but not meddle; be progressive but not radical; political but social; loyal but not blind; international but American” (8). Furthermore, a First Lady must retain her individuality while demonstrating her marital and political partnership and her femininity must be above question. For any smart, professional, ambitious person, this paradox reads like a recipe for disaster. The paradox was lived out by Hillary Clinton. The many sides of her personality shone through at various times, depending on the campaign season and the vagaries of Bill’s political (or other) fortunes. The “tough, aggressive and power-hungry” woman tended to be on display during the gubernatorial and presidential campaigns (at least until 1996) and when Bill needed support (Kelley, 2001, 223). After the 1994 debacle of the failed health care overhaul, Clinton closeted her tough side, beginning a carefully orchestrated transformation to a more traditional First Lady, the “kinder, gentler wife,” which included a physical makeover (Kelley, 2001, 224). Campbell argues that Clinton’s adoption of a “more feminine” persona—clothing, jewelry, hair cut, and style—resulted from “the efforts of opponents” to “compel her to retreat into more conventional displays of femininity” (1998, 14). I would argue that Hillary Clinton’s opponents were just as likely to be Bill Clinton’s protectors; to safeguard his presidency, his wife needed to be more wifely, more First Lady–like. Hillary’s dance delicately skirted this need for propriety, particularly when the Clintons ascended to the White House. Kelley notes that, as the First Lady of Arkansas, “Hillary Clinton became her husband’s watchdog, policy adviser, and problem solver, in addition to playing the roles of wife, mother, and family breadwinner” (2001, 218). She continued in these roles in the White House. Clinton’s first term as U.S. First Lady was fraught with controversy concerning her West Wing office, the “co-presidency,” and widely held concerns that “if it [the healthcare program] didn’t work, she couldn’t be fired, and in fact none of the usual penalties for failure could be applied” (Noonan, 2000, 60). Her power was immense. However, her breaking of the First Lady mold and her attempts to

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be her own person and fulfill her own political ambitions backfired—the mold of First Lady proved more staunchly resilient than Clinton’s resolve, particularly in light of the public relations burden of being married to Bill Clinton. Despite her protestations to the contrary, Hillary Clinton continually proved herself to be a stand-by-her-man woman. From the 60 Minutes interview in 1992 where she first denied being that sort of woman, Hillary Clinton has demonstrated the contrary. She withdrew from the political spotlight to make sure her intellect and power did not threaten Bill’s presidency. At the 1996 Democratic convention, her speech focused on kitchen table conversations, children, and appropriately womanly concerns, rather than policy, ambition, or politics. She “paid tribute to her husband and their marriage, assuming the same traditional persona that had served both of the Clintons so well during other crucial moments in their political life together” (Kelley, 2001, 227). Through all of Bill’s scandals, the Lewinsky embarrassment, and the impeachment nightmare, Clinton stood by her man. Hillary Clinton, through the strength of her own persona as the smart, faithful, trusting wife, and her ability to reshape her husband’s image in the light of that persona, kept Bill in the Oval Office and effectively nixed her own presidential aspirations. It is not surprising that Hillary Clinton is considered a controversial wife. She elicits deep feelings on many levels. She transgressed as First Lady, itself a contested position in American culture, by assuming political agency seemingly equal to her presidential spouse. She supported her philandering husband, a husband who misbehaved on the public stage and then lied to the American public. She demonstrated political acumen and wielded political power as a wife, rather than as a candidate or officeholder in her own right. As a professional, Clinton earned a large salary, managed her family’s finances, and had plenty of child care for her daughter. Her triumphs, sorrows, mistakes, and joys occurred, to a large extent, in the public eye. As Clinton noted, “I was navigating uncharted terrain—and through my own inexperience, I contributed to some of the conflicting perceptions about me. It took me awhile to figure out that what might not be important to me might seem very important to many men and women across America. We were living in an era in which some people still felt deep ambivalence about women in positions of public leadership and power. In this era of changing gender roles, I was America’s Exhibit A” (2003, 141). Clinton’s comments reflect her awareness of both the very public nature of her persona and experiences and the sense that the public just didn’t know what to do with her. By living her own life by her own choices, Hillary Clinton had violated the essential role of “woman” as a reflection of male power, in particular the reflection of her husband’s power (Templin, 1999).1 Inhabiting the position of First Lady, her actions, power, and charisma were especially problematic. Prior to


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the Clinton presidency, the traditional roles played by first ladies had begun to reflect expectations beyond decoration or hostessing. Yet the wives of U.S. presidents are regarded variously as political institution(s), inspiring role model(s), and “dragon ladies,” to name a few characterizations (Kelley, 2001, xvi and 5). The First Couple are considered “Mr. and Mrs. America, an ideal First Family expected to represent cherished U.S. values” (Anderson, 2002, 124). Reactions to Clinton’s performance as First Lady cover all of those, and more, as already mentioned, indicating what Templin refers to as the “contestatory nature of the discourse about Hillary Clinton” (1999, 21). Patrick Halley, who traveled with Clinton, suggests that to those threatened by women’s progress, she was a pariah, while to “progressives and champions of women’s and children’s rights and human rights, she was a hero and pioneer” (2002, 122). Thus, in her role as First Lady, Clinton drew criticism, contempt, even hatred, as well as accolades and admiration. While her gender and her performance of her gender may have been at the root of all sides of her public’s perception of her, I have to say that her relationship to Bill Clinton is the most salient reason that she is such a lightning rod of public opinion. Through it all, Clinton’s primary persona remained that of wife. Interestingly, once Bill Clinton no longer held the office of president, it seemed that Hillary Clinton could begin to move forward on her own. In fact, Troy argues, “freed from the gossamer shackles of being first lady, Senator Clinton—or Senator-to-be Clinton—was free to be as brainy and as policyoriented as she wished to be” (2006, 205). Clinton’s bid for the Senate allowed the public’s vision (their imagination, perhaps) of her to shift from a reflection of her husband to a candidate and public official in her own right. Anderson argues, in fact, “that she went from being viewed primarily as a woman to being judged predominantly as a candidate” (2002, 109). Interestingly, that perception seemed to revert during Clinton’s presidential campaign, likely due to the gendered nature of the presidency. Karin Anderson compared the presidential campaign of Elizabeth Dole to Hillary Clinton’s 2000 Senate campaign, finding significant differences in media coverage, perceptions of gender, and barriers in place for public women. She noted that the coverage of Dole tended to focus more on her gender and her feminine characteristics than did coverage of Clinton’s run for the Senate. Noting that Clinton’s campaign seemed to highlight the progress of women in the public arena, Anderson queried why Dole’s campaign did not seem to “echo that progress.” The answer, according to Anderson, was “the office for which she [Dole] was running” (2002, 126). There was more preventing Elizabeth Dole from successfully bidding for the presidency than money or her gender, and the same barriers and constraints came into play when Hillary Clinton challenged for that office. In other words, important memes have yet to shift and transform

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in order for a woman to achieve the Oval Office. Not the least of these is the meme of the “male presidency.”

The Gendered Presidency It will likely not surprise anyone to hear the claim that the U.S. presidency is gendered or, more specifically, masculinized. Yet, as Anderson notes, “the fact that it is just as gendered as it has always been, however, is worth noting” (2002, 125). Most obviously, of course, this nation has yet to elect a woman to that office, for a multiplicity of reasons which, I believe, serve to construct the meme of the “male presidency.” Many women have sought the office of president, beginning with Victoria Woodhull in 1872. Yet “some of the women who have made exploratory bids and those who have actually run for president are not recognized by many historians, rhetoricians, and political scientists, as well as the press” (Gutgold, 2006, 6). Consequently, the women who earn public attention by their presidential campaigns continue to be labeled “the first” (first woman, first successful woman candidate, first woman senator to run, and so forth) creating the public illusion that no women have remotely approached the ultimate political glass ceiling, an illusion that is patently false.2 The question, of course, is “why?” and the answer is complicated. Anderson, for one, claims, “as a nation, we have yet to imagine a woman president of the United States” (2002, 127). One important element of the public imagination is the prevailing meme of the male president, the masculine office. Robert Asen conceptualizes the public imagination as a constitutive, discursive process. Thus, public imagining takes place through talk, media representation (including popular culture), and legislative action—essentially the public circulation of ideas, knowledges, institutions, and cultural references. “Collective imagining,” according to Asen, “refers to those images that emerge in intersubjective relations” (2002, 349). In other words, collective imagination is not necessarily a process forced upon a public, or the manifestation of an evil public policy agenda. Rather it transpires over time, can shape memes—like the male presidency—and relies upon a certain sense of mystery. Average U.S. citizens probably do not spend a great deal of their time thinking concretely about the gender of the office of the presidency; they do not have to. That office, as a symbol and a public institution, has been created by the words and actions of its male definers and its male inhabitants, and has taken root in the public’s imaginings as a thoroughly masculine place. The memes of women’s inferiority, the male presidency, and “wife as institution” share similar assumptions, values, and cultural roots. In a sense, we can look to an understanding of the relationship of these cultural concepts to


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the female body, articulated by many scholars as a contested site of “otherness,” placed in opposition to the “normal” or male body (Turcotte, 2004). Turcotte, referencing Judith Butler, describes “a historical process of feminization that is essentially valued as weak, less than, in need of protection, and a liability—a devalued body based on its otherness. This feminization is only possible through the simultaneous construction of femininity’s opposite, masculinity” (10–11). In other words, the root of attitudes devaluing women and wives and investing the nation’s highest office with masculine values and expectations rests with historical attitudes of similar devaluation. Assuming weakness and a need for protection on the part of women creates, obviously, the perception that women could not—should not—be placed in the position of protecting a nation, making decisions about war and other crises, or negotiating, say, with terrorists. (Note: I must comment on the irony of my own moment. As I write, I have been watching Barack Obama’s inauguration. He and his wife are currently walking down Pennsylvania Avenue. The masculinity of the entire event is overwhelming—the Secret Service men protecting the presidential couple, the predominantly male voices describing for me what is happening [and the qualities of the presidential protection team], Mrs. Obama “appropriately” attired in a dress and heels despite the frigid temperatures. It is difficult to imagine this event in a more feminized fashion.) Consider the rhetorical shape of the office of U.S. president. Turcotte notes: “The US has historically built itself upon the social, political, and economic violence through racialized, gendered, classed, religious[,] and sexualized policies and practices that enabled white-free-protestant-male-landholders to be the architects and protectors of the nation” (2004, 8). Established by the U.S. Constitution at an historical moment when women were unrecognized as citizens and veritably invisible to the law, the language used then not surprisingly denotes a male officeholder. Again, not surprisingly, that standard of language—the use of “man” as a universal reference point—has survived in legal and political discourses. On Scholastic.com, an educational website, the president’s job is described in this way: A Demanding Job: The President of the United States has many responsibilities. The President acts as the head of his political party, the chief representative of the government, and the country’s popular leader. Chief Executive: The President is considered the country’s chief executive. He develops federal policies, prepares national budgets, enforces federal laws, and appoints federal officials. (The President’s and Vice President’s Jobs, n.d.)

Think of the labels given to presidential responsibilities, such as commander-inchief (from Scholastic.com: “He is responsible for keeping the country safe and

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strong both in wartime and during peaceful periods” [The President’s and Vice President’s Job, n.d.]), chief executive, chief diplomat, head of state, manager of the economy. These labels are certainly not inherently male but they do carry values of protection, toughness, decision-making, and assertiveness, qualities typically correlated with masculinity (Gutgold, 2006, 163).3 As Jamieson explains, “In the political arena, where toughness ostensibly means discipline and courage, the real subtext continues to be masculinity—just as it is in war and contact sports” (1995, 37). In addition, the president is regarded as the “national patriarch: the paradigmatic American Man” (Anderson, 2002, 124). Furthermore, the U.S. presidency is an inherently public office, public to the point of having little or no privacy (if the media coverage of this inauguration day is any evidence, not to mention the very public embarrassment of Bill Clinton’s private transgressions). Given the continuing expectation that women operate more in the private sphere than the public, the expectation/assumption of a male president makes some sense. This delineation of the public versus private sphere continues to be problematic for women endeavoring to crack through the myriad glass ceilings operational in U.S. politics. Bower points out that “for women to fully enjoy the possibilities of the public domain, they must be able to demonstrate their ability with masculine personality traits, since the male stereotypical traits dominate in most public venues” (2003, 108). Political women—public women—face impediments grounded not only in traditional barriers to their public participation (rooted in those nineteenth-century mores) but also in expectations of male-centric public behaviors and communication strategies. The “male president” meme coheres all of these issues through the public imagination and construction of the office. Because no woman has held the office, it is virtually impossible to invite public imagining of a woman president. As noted above, the presidential institution has never been feminized by a woman inhabiting the office. No words have been uttered by a woman president, no actions taken. Perhaps as a result of Hillary Clinton’s near-snagging of the Democratic nomination in 2008, some inkling of the possibility of a public reimagination of that office may have begun. However, considering the historical nature of the office, its tradition-laden maleness, links to power, public policy, and toughness, it seems doubtful that this meme will evolve sufficiently in the next four to eight years to allow for the imagining (and electing) of a woman.

Conclusion Hillary Rodham Clinton’s presidential campaign failed for many reasons beyond those I’ve articulated here. However, I contend that her status as wife, with its


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cultural and memetic baggage, invited nineteenth-century mores out of hiding into full public view, tainting media coverage and public objectivity. Additionally, the meme of the male presidency remains rigidly institutionalized in our public imagination despite the progress made by courageous women succeeding in national, state, and local politics. However, I must argue that memes change. Our gendered culture has accommodated women’s advancements and public participations, assisted by language. Jamieson describes Sandra Day O’Connor’s joining the Supreme Court as a defining moment when “those addressing the court could no longer refer to each assembled justice as they had in the past as Mr. Justice. The title ‘Justice’ replaced its gender-identified predecessor when a woman took her place on the bench” (1995, 192). As I already noted, the fact that Clinton made the successful run that she did is evidence that the public imagining of the presidency has begun its overdue evolution. That we have not yet achieved the ability to fully envision a woman in the Oval Office merely supports the notion of a deeply entrenched institutional meme, the male presidency. Over time, we should assume, too, that the meme of wife will lose some of its oppressive power as it relates to women’s political agency and participation. Of course, this meme is likely as deeply entrenched as the male presidency, perhaps even more so because it arises from the sanctity of the private sphere and serves as an anchor to the safety of that sphere. Yet as women like Clinton (and others with less public marriages) continue to stretch the public imagining of women’s political participation, presence, and success in politics and other public ventures, the ideal model of wife must transform to accommodate those activities. As the forty-fourth president of the United States begins his term, the male presidency meme remains intact. However, keep in mind that the white male presidency meme has gone extinct.

Notes 1. Here Templin is arguing that an essential role of women, particularly women in the public eye, is to reflect male power rather than deflecting it or manifesting their own power too strongly. To do otherwise, in this view, disrupts a certain social balance and decenters the male as the stronger figure. Inherent in the role of First Lady, then, is the reflection—through dress, appropriate feminine interests, pursuits, and behaviors—of the securely powerful male at the head of his nation. 2. The National Women’s History Museum lists thirty-five women who have run for U.S. president since 1872. Available at www.nwhm.org/president.html (accessed January 21, 2009). 3. Gutgold describes Geert Hofstede’s argument that the United States is a masculinist nation, claiming Hofstede notes that “femininity stands for a society in which social

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gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Masculinity, on the other hand, stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success.”

References Anderson, K. V. (2002). From spouses to candidates: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Elizabeth Dole, and the gendered office of U.S. president. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 5(1), 107. Asen, R. (2002). Imagining in the public sphere. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 35(4), 349. Bower, C. L. (2003). Public discourse and female presidential candidates. In R. P. Watson and A. Gordon (Eds.), Anticipating madam president (107–16). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Campbell, K. K. (1998). The discursive performance of femininity: Hating Hillary. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 1(1), 14. Clinton, H. R. (2003). Living history. New York: Simon & Schuster. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Distin, K. (2005). The selfish meme: A critical reassessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gutgold, N. D. (2006). Paving the way for madam president. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Halley, P. S. (2002). On the road with Hillary. New York: Viking Press. Heath, R. L. (1986). Realism and relativism: A perspective on Kenneth Burke. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press. Hoffung, M. (2006). What’s in a name? Marital name choice revisited. Sex Roles, 55(11– 12), www.springerlink.com/content/86424303hr01464p/. Jamieson, K. H. (1995). Beyond the double bind: Women and leadership. New York: Oxford University Press. Kelley, C. E. (2001). The rhetoric of first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton: Crisis management discourse. Westport, CT: Praeger. Noonan, P. (2000). The case against Hillary Clinton. New York: Harper Collins. Pollingreport.com. (2009). www.pollingreport.com/politics.htm. The President’s and Vice President’s Jobs. (2009). www2.scholastic.com/browse/article .jsp?id=4686. Templin, C. (1999). Hillary Clinton as a threat to gender norms: Cartoon images of the first lady. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 23(1), 22. Troy, G. (2006). Hillary Rodham Clinton: Polarizing first lady. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Turcotte, H. (2004). Terrorizing the body politik: The discursive formations of gender in U.S. international security. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Welter, B. (1966). The cult of true womanhood: 1820–1860. American Quarterly, 18(2), 151–74.

CHAPTER 3

Hillary, You Can’t Go Home Again: The Entrapment of the First Lady Role James M. Schnoebelen, Diana B. Carlin, and Benjamin R. Warner

Hillary Clinton’s White House story and the years leading up to it were chronicled in her book Living History (2003). In 2008 Hillary Clinton wrote a new chapter in her life and the life of American women by making history as the first serious woman candidate for the nation’s highest office. The now famous eighteen million cracks in the glass ceiling are a testimony to how far she went in her quest to be the first woman president of the United States. They are also emblematic of the distance she was unable to bridge. Numerous postmortems of the Clinton campaign provide explanations for her loss to Barack Obama in the Democratic primary race. Yes, there were problems among her staff and too much turnover. Yes, her Super Tuesday strategy ignored smaller states and caucuses where Obama slowly built momentum and a lead. Yes, her ever-changing message failed to connect. Yes, her many years in politics made it nearly impossible for her to be a symbol of change unless she exploited her womanhood—something she did less than she most likely should have done. And the list of reasons tied to debates, advertisements, and campaign speeches could go on. This chapter looks, not at campaign artifacts or strategies as unsuccessful, ill-conceived, or ill-advised, but at the fundamental obstacle that was rooted in her past life as First Lady. By becoming a U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton did something none of her predecessors had done or likely even considered doing. By running for president she demonstrated the impossibility of shedding the First Lady’s “gossamer shackles, the delicate, exquisitely feminine bind that thrust them close to power and into the maelstrom of American politics yet forbade them from flexing their muscles” (Troy, 2000, x) even after leaving the White House. 45

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S C H NO E B ELEN, C A RLIN, A ND WA RN ER

Clinton’s candidacy was inextricably tied to the history she lived as First Lady and the marriage that led her to the White House. Her desire to maintain a private persona in the most famous glass house in the land, even when writing a “tell all” book, made it impossible for Clinton to reveal who she really is. One of the major criticisms of Clinton throughout her husband’s presidency, in the reviews of her book, and throughout her campaign, was that no one really knew who she was. Her frequent hairdo changes were a metaphor for her chameleonlike ability to go from West Wing near-powerbroker on healthcare reform to wounded wife in the wake of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. As Gil Troy (2000) wrote: “For a supposedly rigid ideologue, Hillary Clinton proved remarkably elastic. In what was billed as ‘the year of the Woman,’ this woman—and her man—would do anything to win” (353). Thus, the only authentic quality about Hillary Clinton seemed to be her palpable desire for power. Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles (1996) underscored the importance of a candidate’s authenticity when they wrote, “[t]he more that voters see and know of a candidate’s character and private life, the more confident voters can be of their ability to pass judgment on the candidate’s suitability for office and the candidate’s ability to confront the public issues of importance” (11–12). Given Hillary Clinton’s history with the American public, it was essential that she get past a view that she was “too poised” and refused “to acknowledge any conflicts, any sacrifices, or any sense of loss” (Troy, 2000, 354). Ultimately what stood in the way of Clinton’s ability to produce an authentic image and a campaign narrative was the complex influence that her life as First Lady had on her preparation for the office, her election to the U.S. Senate, and her frontrunner status two years before the election. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1995) explained the differences between presidential wives and women political candidates in this way: Presidential wives challenge the public and press differently than do women candidates for public office. Women candidates ask voters to revise the relationship between women and public power directly. By contrast, presidential wives raise the more problematic issue of the relationship between women, sexuality, and power . . . their influence is indirect and intimate, a subtle intrusion of the private into the public, political sphere. (181)

The Clintons’ unsuccessful co-presidency approach to Bill Clinton’s administration caused her to be viewed as both a First Lady and a political operative, albeit one who was viewed by some as overstepping her boundaries. Being the candidate-wife of a former president brought the private into the public in ways that it had not been for other women candidates.

HILLA RY, YOU C A N’ T GO H OME AGAIN

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Thus, we argue in this chapter that Hillary Clinton’s unique position as a presidential wife who became a presidential candidate blurred the lines Campbell drew and ultimately made it impossible for her to win the nomination. Added to the complexity of merging roles was the even more complex nature of the Clinton marriage/political partnership. Andrew Stephen (2008) in a New Statesman article summarized the two-for-one nature of the Clinton political alliance: “Rarely is she depicted as an intellectually formidable politician in her own right. . . . Rather, she is the junior member of ‘Billary,’ the derisive nickname coined by the media for herself and her husband. Obama’s opponent is thus not one of the two US senators for New York, but some amorphous creature called ‘the Clintons,’ an aphorism that stands for amorality and sleaze” (para. 14). To support our argument we examine three critical incidents from the campaign: the emotional scene in a New Hampshire cafe, the Bosnia sniper fire narrative, and Bill Clinton’s role on the campaign trail. Each of these is examined using Walter Fisher’s (1984) narrative paradigm theory and Louden and McCauliff’s (2004) work on the authentic candidate.

Character and Authenticity Through Narrative Countless scholars conclude that character is of crucial importance to those seeking the presidency, as character represents how persuasive an individual is (Hargrove, 1998; Louden and McCauliff, 2004). Central to the public assessment of character is the notion of authenticity—of appearing genuine, honest, trustworthy, and giving the sense that the public has access to enough personal information about a candidate to accurately approximate the candidate’s character. Aristotle believed that judgments of a person’s authenticity, and thus ethos, were derived from “good sense, good moral character, and goodwill” (in Turpin, 1997, 77). Walter Fisher (1980) contends that “whether a leader inspires or estranges an audience depends on the degree to which its members identify with the leader” (125). This sense of inspiration or estrangement often occurs in a mass media-dominated culture through the stories that are told by political actors as well as the stories that are told about them. These narratives create what Walter Fisher (1980) refers to as a “persona.” Fisher elucidates: “‘Persona’ is a symbolic construct in life and in literature. When applied to an actual person, such as a president, it denotes a characteristic style of action and is clearly a rhetorical interpretation, an instance of a realfiction. Persona, in this sense, is nearly synonymous with ethos” (1980, 121–22). In considering the importance of an appropriate persona for a politician, then,

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it becomes increasingly clear that the end-product is just as important as how that product came to be—the narratives that construct the individual should be examined to fully understand how we come to assign politicians with authenticity (qua credibility) or not. Louden and McCauliff (2004) agree with Fisher, and add an important requirement of persona—that it be stable or fluctuate little: “[C]haracter may be considered an organized set of actional tendencies. If these tendencies contradict one another, change significantly, or alter in ‘strange’ ways, the result is a questioning of character. Coherence in life and literature requires that characters behave characteristically” (47). Fisher’s narrative paradigm is an instructive way to understand how individuals assess the character and authenticity of politicians running for office. What Fisher means by “narrative” is “a theory of symbolic action—words and/ or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them” (1984, 1–2). In applying this construct to the political arena, Fisher notes: [P]erceptions and appraisals of political discourse and action become stories, narratives that must stand the tests of probability and fidelity, and these stories are no less valuable than stories constructed by persons who are rational in the traditional way. There is no evidence to support the claim that “experts” know better than anyone else who should be elected president. (1984, 9–10)

Therefore, the narratives told by individuals and those told about or involving individuals create a means to better understand our world and, in this case, the political actors for whom we vote. In a later work, Fisher (1985) argues that these constructed narratives can, in many cases, determine action, as in the case of hearing stories from or about a presidential candidate that affect whether or not citizens will vote for them. Fisher argues that probability and fidelity determine a narrative’s effectiveness. Narrative probability determines the rational assumptions underlying the use of the narrative to explain individuals or their actions—“what constitutes a coherent story” (Fisher, 1984, 7–8). Narrative fidelity refers to the process whereby individuals continually test the narratives they encounter—“whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their own lives” (Fisher, 1984, 7–8). Thus, individuals are constantly assessing whether the narratives they encounter make sense and whether they are in keeping with their expectations and past experiences with those subjects of the narratives. These narratives, then, help us assess the authenticity of political actors as we are exposed to new information about them via mass mediated messages, stories we tell each other about candidates, and the stories that these candidates tell us directly. Caldiero (2007) argues that these narratives, because they domi-


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nate our culture so profusely, are the foundation of how we create meaning as a society, rather than drawing on rationality or sound argument. Turpin (1997) agrees, concluding that “even the closest readers [of news stories, for instance] must still rely on connections made to references and experiences outside a specific story in order to make any meaning of it at all” (76). The creation of norms fostered by cultural narratives is indicative of the strong hold these stories have on our society, particularly in relation to politics in general and the presidency specifically. Edelman (1977) argues that “common political situations . . . permit officials . . . to remain in their positions of authority only so long as they hold to the norms that are taken for granted within the organization that employs them” (117). As such, in Fisher’s (1980) view, “the Presidency is an office and a role, an institution and a persona . . . an entity wherein rhetoric, poetics, politics, dialectic, and ethics converge” (120–21). The credibility expected of the president is of particular relevance for Fisher, who claims that ethos, or notions of credibility and trustworthiness, is crucial for politicians who wish to occupy the Oval Office. Fisher further contends that such notions of credibility are often ascribed to presidential contenders early on in their candidacy, by voters and media sources, based on the narratives voters are exposed to during their campaigns. Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles (1996) agree and also contend that this desire for voters to establish who may or may not be credible has led to an “increased intimacy in politics” (112) wherein voters demand to see and know as much about candidates’ personal lives as their political platforms.

The Dilemma of the First Lady Narrative Another ingredient to the narrative soup that constitutes the presidency is the role of the First Lady. Several scholars have noted that, increasingly, one cannot escape the idea that there is, in reality, a co-presidency—a narrative that is composed not just by the president but also by the First Lady (Anthony, 1991; Campbell, 1995; Troy, 2000; Wertheimer, 2005). Anthony contends that “some presidents openly admit their wives’ power; most others acknowledge it” (1991, 448–49), while Campbell (1995) refers to the relationship between the president and the First Lady as a “two-person career” (180). And while this social construction may seemingly avail more power to the First Lady, the opposite is usually true. Anthony (1991) notes the role of the First Lady is one that is “always scrutinized, usually criticized, and perpetually debated” (8). Wertheimer (2005) agrees, noting that “every First Lady faces the same dilemma. She is an individual, but she becomes more than that when she assumes the office of First Lady”

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(xi). Winfield (in Wertheimer, 2005) contends that the First Lady is only able to wield power if she is able to control her image, “including her photographic and video images, as well as written and electronic statements” (xv). Citizen attention to and critique of the details of the narrative of the First Lady (and, thus, the presidency) are often apportioned due to the expectation that these women represent an ideal of U.S. womanhood (Anderson, 2002; Campbell, 1995; Troy, 2000). Consequently, when First Ladies do not represent the norm of femininity, or attempt to wield too much power, the co-presidency becomes problematic for citizens, necessitating a solution to return the narrative of the presidency to its normal, relatively static state. Hillary Clinton, perhaps more than almost any other First Lady in U.S. history, has been the focal point of both derision and acclaim for her lack of adherence to the traditions of the First Lady narrative. Several studies since 1992 (Anderson, 2002; Campbell, 1998; Corrigan, 2000; Dubriwny, 2005; Kelley, 2001; Parry-Giles, 2000; Parry-Giles and Blair, 2002; Trent and ShortThompson, 2003; Vavrus, 2002) analyzed Clinton’s persona as First Lady of the United States and early in her Senate campaign. And while these studies differ in their approaches, scope, and theoretical lenses, several ideas resonated. First, Hillary Clinton was widely criticized as an inappropriate, radical first lady early on in Bill Clinton’s first term. Second, Hillary Clinton made several attempts to rectify this perception and to make herself appear more feminine, and thus more conventional and acceptable. Third, Hillary Clinton was considered largely successful in transforming her public image and recapturing the traditional First Lady persona, accomplished largely through her use of communication and image restoration strategies. Parry-Giles and Blair (2002) contend that Clinton was partially successful in feminizing her persona in publishing her book It Takes a Village, which grounded the First Lady in the domestic sphere and made her appear concerned about being a mother. Anderson (2002) argued that Hillary Clinton became so adept at using the feminine rhetorical style and appearance that she was successful in creating a space “in which femininity and feminism are no longer cast as antithetical” (8–11). Furthermore, Vavrus (2002) contends that this more feminine style espoused by the then–First Lady was largely responsible for her successful Senate campaign in 2000, as she was successful in framing herself as more caring, cooperative, and collaborative than her male counterparts (155). How this feminine persona functioned during Hillary Clinton’s run for the White House in 2008 was less effective. Clinton, in attempting to win the presidency, was forced into a narrative that defied the feminine persona established during her time as First Lady. Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1995) claims that such a “double bind” is common for women who seek elective office; she argues that “women who are considered feminine will be judged incompetent . . . women


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who succeed in politics and public life will be scrutinized under a different lens from that applied to successful men” (16). We argue that such a double bind is particularly relevant in Clinton’s case due to her lack of narrative fidelity, and thus authenticity, as she attempted to transition from the role of former First Lady to the role of president of the United States.

The “Crying” Game If there was a consistent image of Hillary Clinton while she was First Lady, it was that of the ice maiden, and the image carried over to the campaign. The double bind suggests that while it is important for a woman running for office to show that she is tough, it also has to be balanced with feminine traits. Clinton’s First Lady persona was heavy on the former and only included the latter during the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Descriptions of her during the campaign included the terms “overbearing, unapproachable and too manly” (Tannen, 2008, para. 7), “‘steely’ and remote” (Williams, 2008, 10), or “cold and unlikable” (Hoyt, 2008, para. 5). New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd (2008b) noted that upon being elected to the Senate, Clinton “was so busy trying to prove that she could be one of the boys—getting on the Armed Services Committee, voting to let W. go to war in Iraq, strong-arming supporters and donors, and trying to out-macho Obama” that she overlooked “the value of a less autocratic leadership style, with an emphasis on behavior women excel at: reading emotions and social interactions, making eye contact and expressing empathy” (para. 6, 8). An authentic view of Clinton was considered that of an ambitious woman determined to return to the White House to finish what her husband had failed to do because of impeachment and to undo what his successor had done. Upon declaring her candidacy for president on January 20, 2007, Hillary Clinton was considered the clear front-runner for the Democratic nomination, according to a nationwide Washington Post-ABC News poll completed Friday night. The poll showed her the favorite of 41 percent of Democrats, giving her more than double the support of any of her potential rivals. . . . In hypothetical general election matchups against the two most prominent prospective GOP candidates, Clinton narrowly leads Arizona Sen. John McCain and is running about even with former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani. (Balz, A1)

She had avid supporters, many women who were ready to shatter a glass ceiling, and the Clinton organization and fundraising machine. However, when the primary season started in January in the Iowa caucuses, her third-place finish

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(29 percent) behind Obama (38 percent) and John Edwards (30 percent) was described by CNN political analyst Bill Schneider as “tell[ing] us this was a debate between change and experience, and change won” (“Huckabee, Obama,” 2008, para. 3). Clinton recognized late in the game in Iowa that something was happening to her well-planned march back to the White House and flew her daughter Chelsea and her mother Dorothy Rodham to Des Moines in what was described as “part of a last-minute push to humanize [Hillary] before an electorate that sometimes needs to be reminded” (Smith and Frates, 2008, para. x). Obama’s message of change clearly attracted a new group of voters—the under-thirty cohort that he won with 57 percent of the vote. The New Hampshire primary scheduled for the next week had polls predicting another Obama victory. Considering the polling data from the previous year when she announced, Clinton was facing a future she had not anticipated—a contested primary. The day before the New Hampshire primary, Clinton was campaigning in Portsmouth, meeting with undecided voters when the following transpired: “How,” a woman asked Hillary Clinton at an event in Portsmouth, N.H., designed to woo undecided voters, “did you get out the door every day? I mean, as a woman, I know how hard it is to get out of the house and get ready. Who does your hair?” Clinton chuckled, made a few jokes about how she “has help” on certain days (but those are never the pictures you see on Web sites, she joked). Then she paused. Her eyes grew red. The coffee shop, packed with about 100 members of the media and 16 outnumbered voters, grew silent. “I just don’t want to see us fall backward as a nation,” Clinton began, her voice strained, her eyes welling. “I mean, this is very personal for me. Not just political. I see what’s happening. We have to reverse it. . . . Some people think elections are a game: who’s up or who’s down,” Clinton said, her voice breaking and tears welling. “It’s about our country. It’s about our kids’ future. It’s about all of us together. Some of us put ourselves out there and do this against some difficult odds.” As the 16 undecided voters—14 of them women—nodded sympathetically, some with their own eyes watering, Clinton went on. “We do it, each one of us, against difficult odds. We do it because we care about our country. Some of us are right, and some of us are not. Some of us are ready, and some of us are not.” Although still emotional, Clinton was hitting the points in her post-Iowa stump speech. Obama’s name was unspoken but obvious. “Some of us know what we will do on day one, and some of us haven’t thought that through.” “This is one of the most important elections we’ll ever face,” Clinton continued after a long pause, her cracking voice barely audible at


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times over the clicking shutters. “So as tired as I am and as difficult as it is to keep up what I try to do on the road, like occasionally exercise, trying to eat right—it’s tough when the easiest thing is pizza.” There were a few sympathetic chuckles and nods from her female compatriots. At this point Clinton, struggling for composure, delivered what may become the sound bite of her campaign. “I just believe . . .” She had to pause again, then went on. “. . . so strongly in who we are as a nation. I’m going to do everything I can to make my case, and then the voters get to decide.” (Breslau, 2008, para. 1–3)

The episode took on a life of its own with breaking news reports, countless headlines, and thousands of views on YouTube: “In less than twenty-four hours, it got so much attention that it ceased to need an explanation. ABC News is now calling it, simply, ‘The Moment.’ In caps” (Garber, 2008, para.1). While no tears were actually shed, the display of emotion from a usual “steely” Clinton was seen by many as an authentic moment—an unguarded look at the woman who was usually so in control. Jane Harrington, who was with Clinton, said “I wanted to see who the real Hillary was. That was real” (Breslau, 2008, para. 7). Others concurred. Eva Rose (2008) on the Utube Blog wrote: “I am Pleased (finally) to see a bit of Hillary peeking thru.” Nick Fish (2008) wrote on the same blog: “Her passion for America is what touched so many people who saw her tears.” There were others, however, who described it as her inability “to handle the pressure,” or as a sign that she was “desperate.” Some went so far as to question the sincerity calling them “crocadial [sic] tears [that] are as phony as a two dollar bill” (dd, 2008). Others “link[ed] Clinton’s tear ducts to adolescent girl feelings” (White, 2008, para. 6). Primarily male members of the media fueled the debate by calling the tears “‘contrived,’ a ‘calculated’ move from a woman seeking political advantage” (Harper, 2008, para. 3). It was, however, a turning point that kept the campaign alive. Clinton reversed Obama’s advantage among women in Iowa and collected 47 to 34 percent of their votes for a three-point victory. Clinton attributed the victory to “this incredible moment of connection with the voters of New Hampshire and they saw it and they heard it. And they gave me this incredible victory last night” (Strange and Naughton, 2008, para. 3). For the next several days, Clinton described the moment as “finding her voice.” The most interesting aspect of the event was that, unlike Edmund Muskie, whose tears in New Hampshire in 1972 doomed his candidacy, and Pat Schroeder’s short foray into presidential politics that also ended with tears, Clinton’s candidacy experienced a resurgence because it was so out of character and registered, at least initially, as sincere. The prospect that the First Lady image of Clinton might not be complete was grounded in a narrative in the café that

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sounded more about the public and less about her. Even the word “personal” took on a meaning opposite of what one would expect. Rather than being seen by most as being about her, it was seen as a personal concern for others. Of course, those who believed the authentic Hillary was the Hillary of Travelgate and secret healthcare reform sessions remained unconvinced. While the near tears helped Clinton rejuvenate her campaign, it also created an expectation that what was seen in the café would dominate the remainder of the campaign—that Hillary had shed the protective shell that her First Lady experiences had required her to develop. Clinton was able to escape from the First Lady persona during a moment when she was tired and facing an uncertain future rather than the coronation she had expected. But also part of that moment at the café was a message replete with her traditional campaign messages about experience and who was ready to lead. Clinton interpreted the New Hampshire victory as a vote for her as a change agent and an experienced leader that was wrapped up in a sincere desire to right the wrongs of the Bush administration. As a result, she reverted to the persona that was more familiar: the First Lady whose long public life prepared her for any contingency—including dodging bullets in a war zone. The sincere Hillary whose personal quest was intended to be interpreted as selfless devotion to country was once again seen as a woman who would say anything to get elected and bolster her credentials. The complexities of her combined First Lady and U.S. Senator roles came into conflict and brought the narrative full circle to pre–New Hampshire when she chose to talk about her experiences in Bosnia.

Taking Fire over an Exaggerated Trip to Bosnia Clinton sought to use her experience as a First Lady to embody the presidential persona. By emphasizing her eight years of experience in the White House, she attempted to project herself as a head of state. Unfortunately, the office of First Lady has a rigid persona already attached. Campbell (1995) wrote that “the First Lady functions as a representative of the nation. She is expected to welcome heads of state, preside at state dinners, make public appearances, attend local and national celebrations, and become the patron of selected charities or projects” (180–81). Rather than enacting the presidency, the First Lady facilitates the president’s role as the head of state through largely ceremonial activities. Because the office of the First Lady is perceived as predominantly being ceremonial the picture of Clinton as an experienced executive could be challenged on the basis of narrative fidelity. While she cited her time in the White House


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as evidence of “her ‘strength of experience’ since the start of the presidential race, framing her 80 trips abroad as first lady as preparation for dealing with foreign affairs as president” (Healy and Seelye, 2008, para. 3), the Obama campaign countered that “Clinton’s eight years in the White House as a first lady were a glorified ‘tea party’” (“Clinton appears weary,” 2008, para. 8). Herein lies a fundamental tension in the narrative of Clinton as the candidate “ready to lead on day one”: she needed her eight years as First Lady to count as executive experience. As when she was initially attempting to expand the official responsibilities of the office of the First Lady during her husband’s presidency, she again “had to accept a ceremonial role in order to make it also political” (Anderson, 2002, 19). It was this tension that motivated what would become one of the major blunders of the Clinton campaign. While campaigning for the Pennsylvania primary in March, Clinton related her experience traveling to Bosnia as First Lady during the time of the NATO military operations. She “offered a vivid description of having to run across a tarmac to avoid sniper fire” (Healy and Seelye, 2008, para. 1). The story was intended to bolster the overall campaign narrative and position her as a battle-tested and ready-to-lead candidate. The story, however, was a substantial exaggeration of the actual events. When Clinton landed, she was greeted by a young Bosnian girl with a poem, not sniper fire. Though the military base was technically still in a war zone, all combat in the area had long since ceased. The harrowing vision of the First Lady ducking bullets and sprinting to a reinforced barracks was fictitious. Newspapers reported that “100 news accounts of her visit show that not a single newspaper or television station reported a security threat to the First Lady” (“Sniper Fire,” 2008, para. 4). CBS News accompanied her and released the footage of the actual arrival (along with her full visit). The entire episode was posted on YouTube. Clinton immediately clarified the story and called her earlier account a “misstatement” (Thompson, 2008, para. 2) even though she had reported it correctly in her book Living History. Her clarification did not prevent the ensuing challenges to the experience narrative. The story of the Bosnian sniper fire underlies the complication Clinton faced when attempting to translate her time in the White House into foreign policy experience. The trip to Bosnia was presented “as part of her argument that she has the best experience and instincts to deal with a sudden crisis as president” (Healy and Seelye, 2008, para. 1). Lack of experience was a main line of attack on Barack Obama. She had been saying for months that “her years as First Lady give her an edge over the other candidates, making her ‘ready to lead from day one’” (Smith, 2008, para. 1). The unraveling of the Bosnia story was the centerpiece of a comprehensive challenge to the notion that her First Lady experience made her more qualified than her opposition. News reports began investigating other claims and

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minimizing her role in foreign policy more broadly. Obama challenged other elements of her resume, “including her claims that as first lady she played a prominent role in brokering peace in Northern Ireland and negotiating with Macedonia to accept Kosovo refugees” (Miller, 2008, para. 3). A Washington Post fact-check article informed its readers that “[i]n an effort to polish her foreign policy credentials, Clinton has been telling exaggerated stories about her April 1996 trip to Bosnia for many months” (“Clinton appears weary,” 2008, para. 15). When the Obama campaign pressed for the release of White House documents regarding Clinton’s time as First Lady, more challenges to the legitimacy of her experience were leveled, as was made evident by a report in The Daily Telegraph that reported, “Clinton’s boasts that she gained major foreign policy experience as First Lady were undermined yesterday when 11,046 pages of her White House schedules provided scant evidence to back up her claims” (Harnden, 2008, para. 1). The story of Bosnian sniper fire allowed critics and skeptics to reframe Clinton’s foreign travels and meetings with dignitaries within the ceremonial function of the First Lady persona. Her trips to Northern Ireland are instructive on this point. While she had previously implied playing a role in “brokering peace in Northern Ireland” (Miller, 2008, para. 3), the story was now being challenged and the experience marginalized. Her trips could not have given her relevant experience for the presidency, her critics argued, because they were visits as First Lady. Thus, when her claims about Northern Ireland were examined by the press, they found that “details of her visits to Northern Ireland indicated that she went little beyond the traditional role of a president’s wife, attending social events, meeting women’s groups and greeting children” (Harnden, 2008, para. 5). Had she advanced beyond the primary it is clear that these criticisms would have continued to haunt her and perhaps only have worsened. An aide close to John McCain told The Washington Times, “‘she appears to be hanging herself with this thing,’ noting that Mrs. Clinton has equated her foreign-policy experience as a first lady with Mr. McCain’s 22-years as a Navy fighter pilot and four terms in the U.S. Senate” (Miller, 2008, para. 20). This McCain aide clearly delineates between apparently legitimate foreign policy experience and the separate, less valid category of First Lady experience. Clinton’s difficulty in harnessing her years in the White House to fit her experience narrative undermined a cornerstone of her electoral strategy. She had traveled the world, met foreign dignitaries, exerted influence in policy, and learned a great deal about the internal workings of the White House (Smith, 2008). Nevertheless, her work was filtered through her role as wife and First Lady. The exaggerations regarding her trip to Bosnia signaled that the narrative of her campaign was overreaching the persona she inhabited. Ironically, it was Clinton’s ability to recapture the image of the traditional First Lady during her


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husband’s presidency that would later complicate her ability to position herself as an experienced leader. Worse still, the Bosnia story undermined her overall narrative fidelity. When Clinton lost narrative fidelity, she also lost an important component of the presidential image, characterological coherence or the idea that “whether a story is believable depends on the reliability of characters, both as narrators and as actors” (Louden and McCauliff, 2004, 94). Clinton was losing believability, as was the persona she wished to invoke. For her experience argument to resonate, Clinton needed to persuade voters that she served in the executive branch and that as the First Lady she was learning the dangers and demands of a complicated world. When her Bosnia example unraveled, her overall narrative suffered as a result. All of this reinforces a perception about Clinton that she lacked authenticity, an issue which raised a host of other problems associated with the Clinton era. Democratic strategist Bob Beckel warned of the potential spillover from the Bosnia sniper story to more general concerns regarding the honesty of the Clintons when he told The New York Times that “for Hillary it’s particularly tricky, because she has made her foreign policy experience a major issue, and then the whole Clinton honesty thing in general” (Healy, 2008, para. 10). Strategists from each party echoed this: “Mrs. Clinton had to be especially careful because of a belief among many Americans, unfair or not, but detected in opinion polling, that the Clintons have a mixed and sometimes tortured history with being honest and giving direct answers” (Healy, 2008, para. 8). Challenges to Clinton’s authenticity invoked baggage from her husband’s presidency. These challenges made evident her difficult struggle to establish an identity independent from Bill, an important goal if she were to be able to rescue her candidacy from being dubbed the second run of the Clintons. The former First Lady suffered from her inability to carve out an individual identity after years of publicly occupying a co-presidency with her husband. The nature of the Clinton presidency made the risk to Hillary’s authenticity more severe. The exaggerated Bosnia story fueled an old narrative about Hillary and about the Clintons—that they would do and say anything to return to the White House. They lacked trustworthiness. Clinton’s rivals quickly took advantage of this alternative narrative to undermine her other claims about experience with the presidency. Representatives from the Obama campaign were quoted saying that “the former first lady has a ‘troubling’ penchant for inflating her foreign-policy credentials” (Miller, 2008, para.1), and that “her story joins a growing list of instances in which Senator Clinton has exaggerated her role in foreign and domestic policy-making” (Thompson, 2008, para. 2). Here the dual attack is evident. Clinton is not only less experienced than she presented herself to be, she is also a liar.

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Clinton’s campaign narrative thus lost a vital component, narrative fidelity. Many point to this moment as pivotal in the campaign. One editorial argued “there’s no question that her decline in poll numbers was matched by (or caused by) her drop in truthfulness” (Adair, 2008, para. 15), boldly asserting: the turning point for Clinton’s record—and quite possibly for her entire campaign—came in March when she claimed she had ducked sniper fire in Bosnia. . . . The accuracy problem took a toll. In a Washington Post/ABC News poll in mid April—about one month after the Bosnia mistake—Clinton was viewed as “honest and trustworthy” by 39 percent, down from 52 in May 2007. (Adair, 2008, para. 7–12)

The loss of trustworthiness precipitated by the Bosnia story should not be considered an isolated event, a one-shot mistake that cost Clinton her credibility by itself. Rather, it must be understood in context of her overall struggle for authenticity that is rooted in what Beckel called “the whole Clinton honesty thing.” Instead of appearing honest and genuine she again fit the old caricature from her time in the White House, “the assertive, power-hungry wife” (Troy, 2000, 363) willing to say anything to win. If the story did not do enough damage to Clinton’s campaign by itself, her high-profile husband certainly did not help bury it. Adair (2008) argued that “her mistakes were compounded in separate blunders by Bill Clinton. He said his wife’s Bosnia error, for example, was a momentary, late-night slip of the tongue” (Adair, 2008, para. 11). Further investigation revealed that she had told this version of the story on multiple occasions. Bill Clinton’s attempt to silence critics inadvertently made the event seem even more typical of the campaign rhetoric by emphasizing its recurrence. He also, through continued comments about the Bosnia trip, kept the story in the headlines for an extended period of time, as observed in one article assessing the damage: “Just as the Bosnia sniper flap seemed to be dying down, count on a finger-pointing Bill Clinton to fan the embers” (“Bill Clinton adds fuel,” 2008, para. 1). A candidate for president must seem the part to the American people. To emphasize her advantage over Obama, Clinton overstated her experience as a First Lady. The difficult question of how to consider experience gained while occupying a ceremonial persona exploded into controversy when she exaggerated a specific trip to a safe war zone in Bosnia. The fallout placed a spotlight on the tension inherent in drawing executive experience through a role primarily generated through marriage. Clinton’s narrative no longer “rang true,” and her authenticity suffered accordingly. As one might already comprehend from our previous discussion of the narrative paradigm and its effects on voter perception toward candidates, the headlines


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that dominate any political campaign are instructive for voters. When one peruses a sampling of headlines during the Democratic primary campaign for the 2008 presidential nomination, it becomes clear that Bill Clinton had a negative effect on Hillary’s chances of winning the nomination. The Toronto Sun proclaimed that voters should “Blame Bill for [Hillary’s] beating” (Worthington, 2008a), while the Washington Post asserted that Hillary Clinton had been “Hobbled by hubby” (Dionne, 2008). Instead of assuaging any possible questions that voters had about Hillary’s experience, the Washington Post asserted that “Bill Clinton adds fuel to Bosnia sniper fire” (“Bill Clinton adds fuel,” 2008). After allegations of, at worst, racist statements, and at best, negative campaigning in South Carolina occurred for Bill, the Boston Globe noted that “Some think ex-president [is] stooping on campaign trail” (Bombardieri, 2008). The list of negative headlines involving the former president continued, but the tone should appear clear: Bill Clinton seemed to be more of a liability on the campaign trail than an asset, especially in terms of establishing an authentic and presidential persona for his wife. Why this perception dominated the news from the campaign trail is not conclusive, though in the following section we offer some educated assertions.

The First Lady Persona First, in a general sense, Bill Clinton’s presence on the campaign trail relegated Hillary Clinton to the gender-normative persona of former First Lady, a persona that, as we have already demonstrated, she continued to struggle with. Long ago, when Hillary Clinton was forced to defend her feminist ideology while occupying the constricted space of U.S. First Lady, Clinton proclaimed to the world that “This is my choice. This is how I define my personhood—it’s Bill and Chelsea” (Troy, 2000, 371). Anthony (1991) argues that the role of the First Lady has long been constructed by strict gender norms that do not allow women occupying this role to step outside of the boundaries of acceptable female behavior. Indeed, faced with such prescriptions, Clinton was compelled to alter her persona to fit within more conventionally female, and thus acceptable, norms (Anderson, 2002; Mattina, 2005). This increased her popularity while First Lady, but, in running for president, Bill Clinton’s presence on the campaign trail reminded voters (and the media who informs the voters) of the more feminine, and thus less presidential, aspect of Hillary Clinton’s persona. This forced voters to “revise the relationship between women and public power directly” (Campbell, 1995, 181). Such a revision was not made easy due to the “Bubba problem.” Blatchford (2008) notes that Hillary Clinton was joined on the campaign trail by “an enormous amount of baggage, much of it properly her husband’s”

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(para. 14). Bill Clinton was described as Hillary’s most prominent surrogate and also her most ardent defender, often aggressively attacking her rivals (Bombardieri, 2008). The prominence of Bill Clinton on the trail reminded voters of the “two-for-one” deal the Clintons offered voters in 1992, causing Worthington (2008b) to assume “Americans must be uneasy at the idea of a Hillary White House in which Bill lurks in the bedroom, thinking up mischief” (para. 8). Bagnall (2008) cautions that Hillary Clinton, in using Bill on the trail, risked losing her own efficacy as a political candidate for an office that Bill has already occupied: “Hillary Clinton needs to win on her own. She needs her husband back on the sidelines . . . if he pushes her to victory, then far from being a breakthrough, her victory will mean that a woman can only win the top job if there’s a man pulling the strings” (para. 12–13). Thus, while seemingly a political boon for Hillary Clinton on the trail, Bill Clinton’s presence on the trail likely did more harm than good in causing voters to question whether Hillary was able to be president, as a woman, without her husband’s assistance.

Stealing the Spotlight Second, Bill Clinton harmed Hillary Clinton’s chances due to allegations of Bill hijacking the spotlight from his candidate wife, superceding his own presidential persona over hers. As previously indicated by Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles (1996), voters require as much information as possible to discern whether or not the candidate exhibits character that is worthy of their votes. Unfortunately for Hillary Clinton, voters were often confronted with just as much information about her spouse and his actions on the trail as with information about her. Bombardieri (2008) opined that Bill Clinton often seemed more concerned about defending his presidential legacy than extolling the virtues his wife could bring to the presidency. Advisors for both of the Clintons during the campaign and during Bill Clinton’s presidency noted that Bill Clinton was stealing the spotlight from his wife. One former Clinton staffer, who became an Obama supporter, noted that, in South Carolina, Hillary Clinton was moving in the polls before Bill “got in the way” (Dionne, 2008, para. 10). Another longtime Clinton insider wondered if “maybe, deep down, [Bill Clinton] can’t stand not being the center of attention himself” (Bazinet and McAuliff, 2008, para. 13). Merle Black, a professor at Emory University, asserts: “At times he badly overplayed his role in her campaign and let his emotions get away from him. He has been a negative force. He always puts her in the shadows—and that is not where you want your candidate to be” (Alberts, 2008, para. 11–12). Bill Clinton’s tendency to put his wife in the background while campaigning on her behalf caused one reporter to comment that “Bill Clinton carried on as though he were running for a third


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term in office” (Bagnall, 2008, para. 5), and precipitated one of Hillary’s aides to state that Bill “hijacked the candidacy in South Carolina. It was appalling to watch it” (Alberts, 2008, para. 18). Because Bill Clinton relegated his wife to a secondary position in this state, and because these actions drew harsh criticism in the media and from trusted advisors to the Clintons, Hillary Clinton’s campaign was facing an even more uphill battle to win the nomination and to establish Hillary as a viable, authentic candidate able to fit the presidential persona. This situation, of course, was only going to worsen due to Bill Clinton’s actions while in South Carolina.

The “Bubba” Problem in South Carolina Ground zero for Bill Clinton’s negative effect on his wife’s campaign was, by most accounts, South Carolina. According to polling at this time, Hillary Clinton had virtually no chance of winning in this state and, consequently, left the state in the hands of her husband while she and the majority of her staff traveled to the battleground states of Super Tuesday (Bagnall, 2008). It was during this period of time when Bill Clinton, by many accounts, did the most damage to Hillary’s chances. Bill Clinton drew ire from Democrats and voters due to his treatment of Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton’s chief rival for the nomination, while Bill campaigned in South Carolina. During his time in the state, Bill leveled many accusations at Obama. He accused “Obama’s union supporters in Nevada of intimidating workers who wanted to caucus for his wife. He said . . . that Obama had praised Republican Ronald Reagan’s presidency over his. He called Obama’s assertion of superior foresight on the Iraq war a ‘fairy tale’” (Bombardieri, 2008, para. 11). He also argued that Obama was receiving a “virtual free pass by the press” while his wife was being treated more harshly (Beckerman, 2008, para. 5). Yet the primary source of criticism stemmed from Bill Clinton’s alleged lack of racial sensitivity concerning Hillary’s African American rival. In fact, Worthington (2008b) argues, “Obama’s stunning devastation of Hillary [in South Carolina] can be attributed to one person—Hillary’s husband Bill, who campaigned door-to-door among African-Americans and brought ‘race’ into the mix, along with meanness, an ugly temper and unwarranted vindictiveness” (para. 3). Bill Clinton called Obama’s lead “understandable because people are proud when someone who they identify with emerges for the first time” (Bombardieri, 2008, para. 15), acknowledging the large African American population in the state. He also likened Obama’s win in South Carolina to Jesse Jackson’s, insinuating for many that the only reason Obama won the state was because of his race (Alberts, 2008). However, in addressing the race issue in the first place, some contend

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that Bill Clinton was more pejorative than sensitive: “It’s ironic that Bill Clinton, who advertised himself as America’s ‘First Black President,’ has managed to insult and demean black voters in efforts to aid his wife” (Worthington, 2008b, para. 7). Some contend that Bill Clinton was purposefully using race as a way to put Obama into a box—one that might alienate white or Hispanic voters. And after the campaign had ended in South Carolina, Clinton felt compelled to bring the race issue up on election day in Pennsylvania in order to defend himself and his wife from allegations of dirty politics (Bazinet and McAuliff, 2008). Dionne (2008) and Alberts (2008) both contend, however, that the damage had been done, and Bill Clinton had not only likely alienated the African American vote, but also some white voters who had been on the fence during the Super Tuesday contests and in the final days of the campaign season. Given the hostility of Bill Clinton’s attacks against Obama, such a decrease in support would seem understandable since “a president should reflect an image of us but one that calls forth the better part of us that honors our dignity, worth, and intelligence” (Fisher, 1980, 125). Bill Clinton, as a former president speaking on behalf of his wife, a hopeful presidential contender, seemingly did nothing while in South Carolina to conjure the characteristics required for a presidential persona in the minds of voters. Louden and McCauliff (2004) remind us that individuals determine the character of another through interpreting “the person’s decisions and actions that reflect values” (94). Thus, Bill Clinton’s actions in South Carolina did more to harm his wife’s chances of winning the nomination because his character was a reflection of hers (and a poor one, at that).

The Nonpresidential Persona His inability to control his behavior and rhetoric while campaigning for Hillary Clinton is a final theme relevant to our discussion of Bill Clinton’s erosive effect on his wife’s campaign. Put simply, as many reporters and political pundits did during the primary season, Bill Clinton “doesn’t know when to shut up” (Bazinet, Defrank, McAuliff, and Sisk, 2008, para. 5). Keith Boykin, an author and former Clinton White House aide, sums up a concern shared by many Clinton supporters and Democrats: “Much of what [Bill Clinton] does baffles me. Sometimes I can’t tell if he’s trying to sabotage the campaign or is just off the range” (Bazinet et al., 2008, para. 12). Bill Clinton’s lack of decorum caused many to wonder if this was how a former president should be acting; in essence, they believed that he was defying the presidential persona because his behavior lacked narrative fidelity. Tom Daschle, a former South Dakota senator, argued that Bill Clinton’s actions, especially his negative attacks, were “not presidential” (Bombardieri, 2008, para. 12), while Jim Clyburn, dean of the Congressional


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Black Caucus and third-ranking Democrat in the House, told reporters that Bill Clinton “need[ed] to chill a little bit,” contending that Clinton’s actions were going to jeopardize Democratic party unity heading into the presidential election (Bombardieri, 2008, para. 13). Maureen Dowd of the New York Times argued that Bill Clinton’s “transition from elder statesman, leader of his party and bipartisan ambassador to ward heeler and hatchet man has been seamless— and seamy” (2008a, para. 4). This lack of self-control could be the result of Bill Clinton being ill-equipped at being a first spouse, one who must “contribute, but not meddle, be progressive, not radical, political but social” (Anthony, 1991, 450). Such a role, of course, has traditionally been occupied by First Ladies while their president husbands are not constrained by such expectations. Because of his presidential experience and the accompanying spotlight associated with being the “leader of the free world,” Bill Clinton often spoke too much, not in the right way, and thus helped to speed the demise of his wife’s presidential aspirations. He mitigated her attempts to carve out an authentic and presidential persona because he served not only as a source of anxiety and scorn for her campaign but also as a constant reminder of her former First Lady persona. And Bill Clinton also demonstrated, through his narrative performance, that he (and probably Hillary) was likely uncomfortable with the new personae ascribed by her status as presidential contender.

Conclusion Historian and First Lady expert Carl Anthony (1991), who was quoted previously in this chapter, claimed that all First Ladies have some type of power and how it is perceived is partly dependent upon how the president recognizes it. In the Clintons’ case, Hillary Clinton’s power was acknowledged and shared by the First Couple but often derided by the media and the public. Anthony takes a positive view of a First Lady’s power when he acknowledges that “[t]here is nothing Machiavellian about it. It is partly the balance of marriage, the desire to right social wrongs, perhaps the need to gratify an ambition and develop an identity” (450). In Hillary Clinton’s case, the development of an identity was most commonly associated with gratifying an ambition. Her historic march from the White House to the U.S. Senate and then to the presidential campaign trail as a candidate, not a spouse, was one with a considerable number of stumbling blocks as a result of her persona. There is no denying that Hillary Clinton was a formidable candidate, and if she had been running against someone other than Barack Obama, the White House might indeed be hers even with her campaign’s miscalculations. It is also possible that an opponent such as John McCain would have exploited Clinton’s

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polarizing nature and kept the White House in Republican hands. What we do know is that in 2008, Hillary Clinton was not the right woman to break the glass ceiling and access the most powerful office in the world. Although her experiences in the U.S. Senate and dedication to service more than matched those of Barack Obama, her experiences as a political wife created a narrative from which she could not escape. It was a narrative of a woman whose ambition was so blind that she could not see her husband’s liabilities as a campaigner and her own set of experiences as an impediment to rather than a confirmation of her ability to lead. Hillary Clinton in her new role as secretary of state in the Obama administration has the opportunity to write a new narrative for her career as a public servant. She continues to represent someone else, but she can now separate her actions, her commitments, and her policies from her husband’s administration. In losing to Barack Obama and taking on a new title that does not require her to campaign to the masses and is free of marital linkages, she may have found the means to allow her authentic self to surface in ways that were once briefly viewed in a café in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, but were again lost in the heat of political battles.

References Adair, B. (2008, June 3). As the facts slid, so did Clinton. St. Petersburg Times. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Alberts, S. (2008, February 29). Bill wind blows Hillary no good: Former president curbs his tongue after denting wife’s White House chances. The Gazette (Montreal). Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Anderson, K. V. (2002). Hillary Rodham Clinton as “Madonna”: The role of metaphor and oxymoron in image restoration. Women’s Studies in Communication, 25(1), 1–24. Anthony, C. S. (1991). First ladies: The saga of the presidents’ wives and their power, 1961–1990 (Volume II). New York: Quill William Morrow. Bagnall, J. (2008, February 1). Hillary must do it on her own: The former first lady should prove that she doesn’t need Bill to win. The Gazette (Montreal). Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Balz, D. (2007, January 21). Hillary Clinton opens presidential bid. The Washington Post. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com. Bazinet, K. R., Defrank, T. M., McAuliff, M., and Sisk, R. (2008, April 12). Bill in “sniper” mire: “He doesn’t know when to shut up,” says source. Retrieved from www .lexis-nexis.com. Bazinet, K. R., and McAuliff, M. (2008, April 27). Pals point to Bubba’s flubs. Daily News (New York). Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Beckerman, G. (2008, January 8). Bill Clinton: Media critic. Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved from www.cjr.org.


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Bill Clinton adds fuel to Bosnia sniper fire. (2008, April 12). The Washington Post. Retrieved electronically from www.lexis-nexis.com. Blatchford, C. (2008, January 9). The stigma of being a woman in this race: Many of the judgments being passed against Clinton are unfairly rooted in her sex. The Globe and Mail (Canada). Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Bombardieri, M. (2008, January 24). Some think ex-president stooping on campaign trail; Clinton defends his role as feisty advocate. The Boston Globe. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Breslau, K. (2008, January 7). Hillary tears up: A Muskie moment, or a helpful glimpse of “the real Hillary”? Newsweek. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com. Caldiero, C. T. (2007). Crisis storytelling: Fisher’s narrative paradigm and news reporting. American Communication Journal, 9(1), 2–22. Campbell, K. K. (1995). The rhetorical presidency: A two-person career. In M. J. Medhurst (Ed.) (1996), Beyond the rhetorical presidency (179–95). College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Campbell, K. K. (1998). The discursive performance of femininity: Hating Hillary. Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 1(1), 1–19. Clinton appears weary of taking “sniper fire.” (2008, March 26). The Washington Post. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Clinton, H. R. (2003). Living history. New York: Simon & Schuster. Cohen, J. E. (2000). The polls: Public favorability toward the First Lady, 1993–1999. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30(3), 575–85. Corrigan, M. (2000). The transformation of going public: President Clinton, the first lady, and health care reform. Political Communication, 17(2), 149–68. dd. (2008). Hillary Clinton tears up—near crying—in New Hampshire. Retrieved from www.theutubeblog.com. Dionne, E. J., Jr. (2008, January 29). Hobbled by hubby. The Washington Post. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Dowd, M. (2008a, January 23). Two against one. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com. Dowd, M. (2008b, February 24). Quien Es Less Macho? The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com. Dubriwny, T. N. (2005). First ladies and feminism: Laura Bush as advocate for women’s and children’s rights. Women’s Studies in Communication, 28(1), 84–114. Edelman, M. (1977). Political language: Words that succeed and policies that fail. New York: Academic Press. Fish, N. (2008). Hillary Clinton tears up—near crying—in New Hampshire. Retrieved from www.theutubeblog.com. Fisher, W. R. (1980). Rhetorical fiction and the presidency. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66(2), 119–26. Fisher, W. R. (1984). Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public moral argument. Communication Monographs, 51(1), 1–22. Fisher, W. R. (1985). The narrative paradigm: An elaboration. Communication Monographs, 52(4), 347–67.

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Garber, M. (2008, January 8). Play misty for me: The media on The Moment. Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved from www.cjr.org. Hargrove, E. C. (1998). The President as leader: Appealing to the better angels of our nature. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Harnden, T. (2008, March 20). White House papers fail to back Clinton’s claims of experience in foreign policy. The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis .com. Harper, T. (2008, January 10). Clinton’s tears make Obama backers weep: Show of emotion struck chord with U.S. women. The Star. Retrieved from www.thestar.com. Healy, P. (2008, March 26). Clinton seeks to soften impact of misstatement. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Healy, P., and Seelye, K. Q. (2008, March 25). Clinton says she “misspoke” about dodging sniper fire. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Hoyt, C. (2008, June 22). Pantsuits and the presidency. The New York Times. Retrieved from infoweb.newsbank.com. Huckabee, Obama have huge night in Iowa. (2008, January 4). CNN. Retrieved from www.cnn.com. Jamieson, K. H. (1995). Beyond the double bind: Women and leadership. New York: Oxford University Press. Kelley, C. E. (2001). The rhetoric of first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton: Crisis management discourse. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Louden, A., and McCauliff, K. (2004). The “authentic candidate”: Extending candidate image assessment. In K. Hacker (Ed.), Presidential candidate images (85–103). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mattina, A. F. (2005). Hillary Rodham Clinton: Using her vital voice. In M. M. Wertheimer (Ed.) (2005), Leading ladies of the White House: Communication strategies of notable twentieth-century first ladies (217–34). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Miller, S. A. (2008, March 26). Clinton remarks hit as “misleading”: Obama camp eyes her resume. The Washington Times. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Parry-Giles, S. J. (2000). Mediating Hillary Rodham Clinton: Television news practices and image-making in the postmodern age. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 17(2), 205–26. Parry-Giles, S. J., and Blair, D. M. (2002). The rise of the rhetorical first lady: Politics, gender ideology, and women’s voice, 1789–2002. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 5(4), 565–600. Parry-Giles, T., and Parry-Giles, J. (1996). Political scopophilia, presidential campaigning, and the intimacy of American politics. In T. F. Sheckels, J. Kenner Muir, T. Robertson, and L. M. Gring-Pemble (Eds.) (2007), Readings on political communication (102–15). State College, PA: Strata Publishing. Rose, H. (2008). Hillary Clinton tears up—near crying—in New Hampshire. Retrieved from www.theutubeblog.com. Smith, B., and Frates, C. (2008, February 3). Chelsea Clinton steps up her role. Retrieved from www.politico.com.


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Smith, S. B. (2008). Hillary’s hidden hand: The former First Lady says her years in the White House give her unmatched experience. Newsweek. Retrieved from www .lexis-nexis.com. Sniper fire, and holes in Clinton’s recollection. (2008, March 22). The Washington Post. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Stephen, A. (2008, May 22). Hating Hillary. The New Statesman. Retrieved from www .newstatesman.com. Strange, H., and Naughton, P. (2008, January 9). Hillary Clinton: My teary moment won me New Hampshire. The Times Online. Retrieved from www.timesonline.co.uk. Tannen, B. (2008, February 29). Media perpetuates sexism in presidential race. Yale Daily News. Retrieved from www.yaledailynews.com. Thompson, P. (2008, March 25). I wasn’t shot at in Bosnia, confesses Clinton. The Evening Standard. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Trent, J. S., and Short-Thompson, C. (2003). From first lady to United States senator: The role and power of image in the transmogrifying of Hillary Rodham Clinton. In R. E. Denton and R. L. Holloway (Eds), Images, scandal, and communication strategies of the Clinton presidency (113–41). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Troy, G. (2000). Mr. and Mrs. President: From the Trumans to the Clintons, second ed. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Turpin, P. (1997). Reconsidering the narrative paradigm: The implications of ethos. Paper presented at the NCA/AFA Alta Conference on Argumentation. Vavrus, M. D. (2002). Postfeminist news: Political women in media culture. Albany: State University of New York Press. Wertheimer, M. M. (2005). First Ladies’ fundamental rhetorical choices: When to speak? What to say? When to remain silent? In M. M. Wertheimer (Ed.) (2005), Leading ladies of the White House: Communication strategies of notable twentieth-century first ladies (ix–xix). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. White, V. (2008, November 6). Prevalent sexism in presidential election undercut Palin, Clinton. Cardinal Points. www/cardinalpointsonline.com. Williams, P. J. (2008, January 28). American pie. The Nation. Retrieved from www .thenation.com. Worthington, P. (2008a, January 28). Blame Bill for beating: Hillary’s hubby offends in S. Carolina. The Toronto Sun. Retrieved from www.lexis-nexis.com. Worthington, P. (2008b, January 29). Bill provides a big Hill chill: While McCain gathers speed, Obama rides an anti-Clinton wave. The Toronto Sun. Retrieved from www .lexis-nexis.com.

CHAPTER 4

The Clinton Political Team: Marriage, Gender, and the Presidential Quest Janette Kenner Muir and Anita Taylor

Consider these headlines: ABC News, July 1, 2007: “The Dynamic Duo: Bill Joins Hillary on the Trail” The Toronto Star, January 23, 2008: “Tag-teaming, Clinton-style: Couple keeps rival Obama off balance, sometimes switching roles in Democratic presidential race” London Observer Magazine, June 1, 2008: “Is this goodbye? He was ‘the man from hope’. She was going to be America’s first female president. But are the lights finally going out on the Clinton era?” Newsweek, January 5, 2009: “Hillary Clinton and Bill Clinton: The most powerful couple in politics may find the times suited to their skills.”

The political life of Bill and Hillary Clinton is filled with accolades and contradictions—observations of great success and moments of tension and stress—“a lifetime of all kinds of experiences.”1 Sometimes, they are tremendously popular; other times, people wish they would just go away. All the time, they leave distinctive and significant impressions on those who watch them. Any study of Hillary Clinton’s bid for the presidency must take into account the role of her husband Bill in her campaign. As individuals, each Clinton has an ability to adapt and respond to various political situations and be highly successful in garnering public support. However, for a married team, the political 69

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J A NE T T E K ENNER M U IR A ND A NIT A T AY L OR

influences and challenges take on a vastly different dimension given the intersections of marriage, gender, and politics.2 In previous work (Muir and Taylor, 2009), we have argued that analysis of Hillary as a candidate and elected official cannot be complete without recognizing that, from the point she decided to marry Bill and move to Arkansas, the two must be viewed as a team, not just as two separate individuals. Understanding such an entity is helped by using a feminist theoretical perspective to illuminate some of their challenges and gender expectations. In this chapter, we will apply that lens to examine the Clintons’ campaign for Hillary’s nomination to be the 2008 Democratic candidate for the presidency. Our approach will be to focus on critical moments in the campaign chronology—specifically, their decision for Bill to publicly join Hillary’s campaign, their campaigns in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, subsequent reactions to their political strategies, and the final days of Hillary’s candidacy. We do this by considering candidate speeches, newspaper and magazine reports, and video transcripts to capture the essence of the campaign and to illustrate the perceptions that developed about each individual and the couple’s dynamic as a political team. By doing so, we hope to gain a fuller picture of the way Bill was integrated into the campaign, the impact his role had on political reporting, and perceptions about Hillary’s chances to win the Democratic nomination. Ultimately, we hope to further understand the specific constraints married political teams face as they navigate their roles based on traditional gendered expectations and attempt to challenge these preconceived ideas with new ways of looking at dual-career political marriages.

Feminist Dimensions of a Political Marriage As we have previously explained, past research on married officeholders and candidates has focused on the two individuals involved, framing one of them primarily as a supporter who, to varying extents, takes part in the campaign of the other, contributing to or detracting from the effectiveness of “the” political agent, the one who “really” is the actor in the situations.3 In the case of Hillary and Bill Clinton, such a perspective distorts the picture. It does not reveal the extent to which they jointly formulated goals and strategies, and molded outcomes. Because of the culture in which U.S. campaigns occur, most political campaign analysis has focused on “the individual” (the person who campaigns or holds office). Applying a lens that views two people as one team requires a radical shift in perspective. Utilizing a perspective that sees two people as one operational entity is rarely done. Instead, political couples are seen as having one public face (or candidate) and one supporter, a private face, virtually inevitable given the cognitive frames of a worldview generated by patriarchy and driven by an eleva-

THE C LINTON POL IT ICAL T EAM

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tion of the individual person as the highest value. Such a cognitive frame is, to some extent, required because the social structure of our political system permits only one person to hold an office (or job or role). She or he may rely on advisers, counselors, supporters, and other helpers. She or he may delegate both tasks and authority on specific issues or cases. However, given the cultural rules, ultimately only one is permitted to be the candidate or the officeholder. We offer here a shift in that perspective by thinking about Hillary and Bill as a different kind of political entity, a team, not just a leader and a supporter or “helpmeet.” As Hillary and Bill enacted the offices they campaigned for, and one or the other of them held, they were in part inventing a new political entity, and to do so required of them constant negotiation of their individual parts in the whole. As we previously argued, several occasions from their lives prior to 2008 are especially revealing of these renegotiations. None is more revealing, however, than the campaign of 2008 because it required the team to present a new public face. The readjustments that were required, especially by Bill, demonstrate how difficult it is to play as a team in an arena that not only foregrounds individuals, but establishes barriers to any other kinds of enactments of the role. Feminist theoretical perspectives provide useful insights into the negotiations reflected by Hillary’s campaign for the presidency. Among the most useful of the insights is the recognition of how patriarchal structures form both gender and politics. Such constructions not only assign political roles to individuals, but they also align the appropriate enactment of those roles to males with male-identified characteristics. In addition, the cultural structure aligns the characteristics of leaders and leadership with attributes expected of males with male-identified characteristics. Thus, cultural gender constructions create a prototypical campaigner and officeholder who is one person, and that ideal individual is usually a man. In current practice, a woman with the appropriate male-identified attributes may also fill the role.4 Thus, with past political couples, including Hillary and Bill Clinton, when two persons did constitute or work as a team in the White House, they usually did so with the male member of the team being its public face. At least in presidential campaigns the man was the political candidate or officeholder. Partners may have planned and strategized together (e.g., Rosalyn and Jimmy Carter), she may have campaigned for him or advised him or served as his eyes and ears outside the cocoon of the presidency (e.g., Eleanor Roosevelt), she may have been his trusted confidant and fierce protector (Nancy and Ronald Reagan), but he was always the public face. Any notable exceptions to this “rule” generated intense commentary and no little controversy (e.g., Edith Galt and Woodrow Wilson, the Carters). The presidential office has always been enacted with the male half of the pair as the public face. In this public sense, the Clintons did not differ. No matter how closely the two worked as a team during the time Bill

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held the presidency, nor how much people recognized Hillary’s importance in developing and implementing policies, nor how much the two of them violated the prototypical gendered expectations of female as soft and submissive and male as cool and logical, the presidency, as they enacted it, fit the larger pattern of the man “in charge” and the woman in supporting roles. With Hillary’s presidential candidacy, all these cultural elements had to be renegotiated. Hillary and Bill had to find new ways to enact the public face of their team; they had to engage Bill in the campaign in ways that, while stretching audience expectations, still sufficiently conformed to the cultural structure to be seen as acceptable. The following section considers Hillary’s campaign chronology, with a specific focus on Bill’s role in the campaign, to see how these various expectations unfold. Since perspectives on this (or any) campaign are mediated by the framing of the viewer, with no one view encompassing all of what is viewed, we remind the reader that she or he, as well as the authors, brings a perspective to this reading. Our goal in this chapter is to offer a different way of seeing, and thus understanding, the Clintons in the campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008.5

A Presidential Quest for the Third Time In his book Tag Teaming the Press, James E. Mueller (2008) writes about the ways Hillary and Bill Clinton work together to manage their media coverage. Even when they appear to be operating in an independent manner, they operate as a team using complementary strengths to achieve their political goals. Whether it was Hillary carefully monitoring what Bill would say to the press during his time as president, or running on positive associations with her husband’s record, the team approach to handling the media was evident. Mueller writes: “Like two wrestlers who compete one at a time against a common enemy, Bill and Hillary have switched roles regularly throughout their shared political life, one in the ring while the other cheers and offers advice from the corner” (5). Nowhere was this tag teaming and role switching more evident than in the presidential primary campaign arena. As we consider the campaign chronology from mid-January 2007 to June 2008, it becomes clear that they engaged in a team approach with varying degrees of success along the way.

ENTERING THE FRAY After two successful senatorial elections in New York, on January 20, 2007, Hillary announced that she had put together an exploratory committee to de-


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termine her viability to run as a candidate for president of the United States, writing on her website, “I’m in and I’m in to win.”6 Over the first several months of 2007, Hillary promoted and benefited from an impression of her inevitability as the Democratic nominee. Those attending to the campaigns at this early stage pondered the possibility of the first woman president, and the first “First Lady” running for this office. Much, if not most, political reporting foregrounded the question of Bill’s role in the campaign, and what it might be in a subsequent H. Clinton administration. The press, in adjusting to Hillary as the new public face of the Clinton team, wrestled in a variety of ways with the task. In the beginning, many believed that being viewed as a political duo was essential to winning the nomination for Hillary. A March 2007 USA Today poll reported Bill’s approval rating at 60 percent compared to a 48 percent approval rating for Hillary. Writer Jill Lawrence (2007) noted that Bill put his “strategic skills, fundraising clout and fabled charisma to work for her,” which helped to promote the pair as “a campaign juggernaut designed to crush her Democratic rivals.” Peter Canellos (2007) of the Boston Globe described both the power of the Clinton marital team, and the inherent challenges in their relationship as “the most scrutinized in marital history, a national tutorial on changing—and unchanging— gender roles.” Canellos credited widespread acceptance of two-career couples, but also noted an undercurrent of concern that the Clinton partnership “was fueled by ambition, and that they would playact certain roles—devoted husband, supportive wife—in service of professional ambition alone” (2A). Leaving aside the question of whether any presidential candidate is not motivated by ambition and the extent to which such ambition achieves different levels of acceptability for women and men, it does need to be noted, however, that the acceptance of two-career couples is not the same as accepting two people in one position of leadership. Other skeptics raised concerns about a potential “Clinton fatigue” should there be a third Clinton administration. Many were weary of the drama and unpredictability of the Clintons and their entrenched opposition, and expressed concerns about the possibility of four, maybe eight more years of a Clinton White House. A variety of writers speculated on the possible implications. Philadelphia Inquirer political analyst Dick Polman (2007) voiced issues that captured some of the mystery surrounding the Clintons’ relationship and how they might enact another presidency with Hillary as the officeholder: Would Bill function as First Adviser? Would he agree not to upstage her, by staying out of the limelight that he loves? Would she agree not to make decisions that would benefit his global initiatives? Would she risk her presidential standing to defend him again if he does something to embarrass her? The terms of the deal are inextricably tied to the nuances of their personal relationship, and even those who know the relationship won’t talk about it. (D1)

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These questions framed several concerns about the viability of Hillary’s campaign and the role that Bill would/should play in both campaigning and governing. Even with the mixed reactions to the Clintons’ third presidential campaign, most reports at the beginning of Hillary’s run suggested that Bill would play a positive and important role in her claiming the nomination. At the very least, he would be a force to be reckoned with, a “one-of-a-kind spousal support system” (Mueller, 2008, 103). Bill publicly entered the political arena mid-2007 as the supportive spouse, following some time away from the campaign trail. As Hillary moved further into the presidential primary campaign process, Bill became unhappy with the way the campaign was progressing and took on the more active role of political strategist and surrogate for Hillary. This role, while mostly welcomed by Hillary’s campaign staff, was not without great challenge. As Hillary began to establish her own individual political image, many (voters and commentators alike) wondered how she would be seen juxtaposed with her charismatic and generally well-liked (among Democratic voters at least) husband. An ABC World News segment on July 3, 2007, featured journalists discussing Bill’s involvement in Hillary’s campaign (note the perspective of her, not their, campaign), and the balancing act needed to inject enthusiasm into the campaign, without upstaging the candidate. Political analyst Mark Halperin noted: “She’s the frontrunner for her party’s nomination, but she’s not her husband, the most popular person in the party. He’s gonna have to make sure that they leave thinking about her and not thinking about him” (Wright, 2007). Reporter David Wright (2007) observed the difficulty Bill had with sitting on the sidelines: [H]e still has a few things to learn about his new role. The adoring stare, for one. Hillary Clinton struggled with that look in 1992 and her husband is struggling now. Last night, he fidgeted constantly during her stump speech. Today, he quickly ducked off stage out of view. Apparently, you can teach an old dog new tricks.

Beyond the possible upstaging of Hillary, the candidate, advisors to her campaign were concerned about Bill’s tendency to speak his mind, veering off script and possibly changing the tenor of the campaign. For example, after Hillary’s weak performance in a Philadelphia debate, Bill likened the debate to the “Swift Boating” of John Kerry in 2004 campaign and the smearing of Max Cleland, the Vietnam vet defeated in his bid for reelection to the Senate in 2002 (Harper, 2007). His behavior led the Toronto Star to report that “the manly shield he offered his embattled wife hurt her more than it helped her” (Harper, A3). So, from the beginning, Hillary’s campaign faced several dilemmas. First, knowing the idea of a duo in an elective office was no more acceptable than it had been in 1992, the campaign had to consider how to project a vision seen as


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Hillary’s. And since most of Hillary’s experience intersected with and relied on a presidency seen as Bill’s, building her own credibility was essential. Bill needed to play the supportive spouse, while also using his adept communication skills and popularity to give her campaign the weight needed through the primaries. Hillary needed her spouse on the campaign trail—his absence would be far more notable—but they needed him to not upstage her or appear to try to control her campaign. Finally, she needed Bill to embrace the political surrogate role and stay on the message that now placed her as the public face of the team. In some earlier campaigns, in marked contrast with the run for the presidency in 1992, there were more than a few times when Bill would stray from the campaign message because of what Mueller says several associates call his “uncanny” ability to read a crowd (2008, 30). But, present or absent, Bill could be a large detraction from the image of Hillary in charge. These tasks were huge challenges. Bill, after spending eight years in the presidency and amassing a large fortune since then, sometimes acted as if he believed he could say whatever he wanted, whenever he wanted, which, in the context of the 2008 primary campaigns, could not be. The Clinton power couple needed to operate as a political team with clear, strategic goals and strong message control, a goal that in the end they did not achieve.

CAMPAIGNING IN IOWA AND NEW HAMPSHIRE The processes for nominating a democratic presidential candidate in Iowa and New Hampshire differ greatly. True, both elevate a kind of kitchen table politics, with well-informed potential voters who expect a lot of face time with the candidates, and the parties’ activists drive the process. Many democratic activists in both states considered the Iraq war a primary issue, which, given Obama’s claim of early opposition to the war in contrast to Clinton’s Senate vote authorizing George Bush to use force if needed, presented the Clinton campaign with a formidable hurdle. Any nomination selection process, election or caucus, requires significant organization by a campaign. However, Iowa’s use of caucus meetings to select delegates placed a premium on an apparatus that would get people to an evening event, in strong contrast to New Hampshire (and any primary state) where voters have all day to find their way to polling places. The Clinton organization had not started organizing early in Iowa, in contrast to Edwards, who had been in the state dozens of times over the past two years, and Obama, who, being from neighboring Illinois, also had visited very often and begun the organizing process far in advance. It is not possible yet to know why the Clinton campaign delayed their move to Iowa; we do know the inner circle of advisers did not fully agree about

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making a significant effort there due to the hurdles the situation presented. The Iowa caucuses were particularly suited to candidates who could establish an easy rapport with voters and adapt to the Midwestern style of openness and conversation. Mueller argues that Hillary Clinton is good with such face-to-face interaction, but usually only in settings where the interaction is extended and has more depth than the usual campaign meeting permits. Given the tight control she maintains over her interactions with the press and in many campaign settings, her widespread and in many settings well-earned reputation for a steely coolness, and her evident identification with the East since 1992, Iowa was not ideally her kind of campaign venue. Even in 1992 Bill Clinton had not achieved significant caucus votes in Iowa, in part perhaps due to competing candidates with closer regional ties. Conceivably, the flinty, fiercely independent New Hampshire voters would find Hillary more acceptable than Iowans. Once the choice was made to contest the Iowa caucuses, it was important for Hillary to remind voters of her Midwestern roots and make connections to their specific needs. In this milieu, the campaign needed all its person power, and both Clintons appeared in Iowa. Bill was now overtly a major player in the campaign for Hillary’s nomination. On July 1, 2007, Good Morning America ran a segment announcing Bill’s foray into the political scene. In describing a joint appearance at the Iowa state fairgrounds, correspondent Kate Snow reported that “Hillary Clinton’s campaign has decided it’s time to let the most famous spouse come out of the shadows . . . their first big campaign event together and the campaign is calculating the benefits outweigh the risks.” Former Clinton aide, now ABC reporter, George Stephanopoulos (2007) agreed that Bill was a greater asset than liability to the campaign, especially when it came to voter enthusiasm and fundraising: “Right now it’s not even close. He’s all asset in the primaries and they’re gonna create a lot of excitement in Iowa this week.” The decision that Hillary would campaign in Iowa, a state that Bill did not win in previous primaries, and against some of her own campaign advisors’ recommendations, yielded mixed results. Bill’s role in the campaign, and the concern that he would detract attraction from Hillary immediately became issues. New York Post reporter Ian Bishop (2007) wrote about a Fourth of July parade that featured the Clintons: Ex-President Bill Clinton was the prince of the parade during Fourth of July festivities in rural Clear Lake, Iowa, yesterday—but insisted all the attention he gets won’t hurt wife Hillary Rodham Clinton’s front-running White House bid. . . . “I didn’t want to come out on this campaign in any place before voters had an opportunity to establish an independent feeling about Hillary Clinton,” he said. But though the ex-prez said he wasn’t “overshadowing his wife,” he stole


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the spotlight yesterday. Paradegoers, sometimes seven or eight deep, shrieked for his attention—and one teen girl even dashed into the parade route to plant a peck on his cheek. He brought the parade to a standstill several times when he plunged into the crowd to pose for photos.

Despite this initial reaction in Iowa, Bill’s work in Hillary’s campaign continued to become more pronounced as he took on the role of chief strategist and stump speaker. His involvement, however, was met with mixed results. While campaigning in Iowa, for example, there were other times when Bill’s persona would outshine Hillary and attention would shift from her message. For example, several reporters talked about a supermarket incident when Bill strayed away from Hillary’s side and seemed to receive more media attention than Hillary; some reported advisor concerns over Bill’s comment that he had opposed the Iraq war from the beginning, and the impact this would have on reminding voters that Hillary had, initially, supported Bush on U.S. involvement in Iraq. Other reports noted that the former president tended to talk more about himself than about the actual candidate, and those who were counting noted a 9:1 ratio of words that Bill used to talk about himself compared to talking about Hillary (Robinson, 2007). International coverage, however, reported Bill’s involvement as critical to sharpening Hillary’s message and getting her campaign refocused. On July 4, 2007, the London Guardian featured a lengthy article about Bill’s role. Reporter Ed Pilkington (2007) wrote that Hillary’s advisors recognized the assets Bill brought to the campaign: “They are not going to repeat the ‘Al Gore mistake’ as it is referred to by some in the Clinton camp—keeping Bill at arms-length for fear of his downside only to forgo his considerable upside.” By the end of the year, Paul Harris of the London Observer credited Bill with “seizing the reins” on Hillary’s campaign, helping her to launch a “likability tour.” Harris noted: Sources close to the campaign say Bill Clinton is highly active at all levels of the senior decision-making process. It was he who devised the new central “talking points” of Hillary Clinton as an “agent of change.” It was also the former President who has since rolled out the new “change” catchphrases at a series of campaign events. It is Bill Clinton who is helping draft and polish campaign press releases and who also appears on TV talk shows to launch scathing attacks on his wife’s arch-rival, Senator Barack Obama. Bill Clinton is not just playing good cop or bad cop. He is playing both. (2007, 28)

The campaign’s time in Iowa rendered mostly negative reactions, including a caucus loss to Barack Obama, and highlighted the overall problem of Bill in Hillary’s campaign. Associated Press reporter Nancy Benac (2008) noted the

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problems of advocating change by appealing to the past successes of the Clinton administration, even referring to Bill as a “relic of the past.” Bill’s experience and charisma tended to distract many of the voters, even as it attracted others, and both highlighted the problem of seeing Hillary as the president, not Bill. Benac quotes Rutgers political scientist Ross Baker’s observations about the Iowa loss: “When people see him and her together, she suffers by comparison even if he says nothing. . . . One of the things that the Iowa caucuses demonstrated is that the DNA of political genius is not easily spliced into someone else’s genetics.” Clearly, Baker does not even see Hillary’s role in establishing perceptions of Bill’s political genius. The New Hampshire primary experience found both Clintons on generally stronger ground. Appearing in a Nashua airplane hanger the day after the Iowa loss, Hillary appeared ready to move forward with energy and enthusiasm. Introducing her “power team” of Bill and Chelsea, Hillary claimed she would be ready on the first day of her presidency to start making changes—a theme that would be repeated throughout her week in New Hampshire leading up to the election. During this time, Hillary presented a softer image (credited by some to Bill), and Bill stayed mostly on message (Kornblut and MacGillis, 2007). Bill’s strategy for persuading voters to vote for Hillary was argued on several grounds: her vision, her plans, her record, and her ability to deal with unseen threats. The argument about an “unseen threat” and Hillary’s readiness to be president is a strategy most often adopted by incumbent candidates. For example, during President Bush’s 2004 reelection campaign Vice President Cheney warned of the consequences of a John Kerry presidency on national security and work against terrorism, noting: “If we make the wrong choice, then the danger is that we’ll get hit again—that we’ll be hit in a way that will be devastating from the standpoint of the United States” (Kornblut and MacGillis, 2007, A1). This appeal, along with others focused on her experience and expertise, led some reporters to write about Hillary as an incumbent, hence elevating the role of First Lady to one that engendered the image of a returning, seasoned leader. Her claim that she would start “Day One” with strong leadership in the White House was a major strategy to diminish Obama’s experience and shift the focus to who could best protect the country. This claim, coupled with Bill’s attacks on Obama as inexperienced and naïve regarding foreign policy, helped shift the debate to competence and leadership. At the same time Bill’s specific remarks that Obama’s position on the war in Iraq was “the biggest fairy tale I’ve ever seen” did little to help Hillary in the end despite the fact that his comments were intended to point out the media biases in reporting about both campaigns.7 At least in part because of the number of newspaper columns predicting her demise in New Hampshire, Hillary was dubbed the “Comeback Kid” when she won the primary. Likening her win to Bill’s unexpected finish in 1992, political


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pundits, quick to dismiss her prior to the election, scrambled for explanations of her ultimate win. Even the Clinton campaign was reported to have shown some surprise with the final turnout, as just in the days leading up to the election, the campaign seemed to be disorganized with in-fighting among the staff (“Hillary a ‘Comeback Kid,’ too,” 2008). As Hillary claimed on election night that in New Hampshire she had “found my voice,” speculation as to how that voice was found centered on visual dimensions of her actions rather than words, when she displayed an emotional reaction to a question posed in a diner the day before the New Hampshire election. A simple question by a New Hampshire voter about how she was holding up through the campaign process resulted in Hillary’s eyes welling up with tears as she expressed the difficulties inherent in the grueling campaign schedule. It was a simple response that generated significant press and public reaction. Headlines about Hillary’s tears spread throughout the nation and into international news. New York Daily News declared, “Losing It Made Hil a Big Winner: Weepy Breakdown Sent Women Flowing to Her in Droves”; the Canadian National Post wrote, “Her strategy: go human; By tearing up on Monday, Hillary Clinton showed voters she actually has feelings”; the Australian press claimed, “A glimmer of emotion is all it took to catapult Senator Clinton back into contention—Hillary shows she is human after all.” These headlines, and others, gave significant credit to this emotional moment, arguing that it was a turning point for humanizing and, to a great extent, feminizing her, making Hillary ultimately more acceptable to the New Hampshire voters. Indeed, the turnout of women voters in the New Hampshire campaign was connected in several accounts to this campaign moment.8 There were a number of different interpretations of Hillary’s emotional display. Some reporters likened Hillary’s tears to the Edmund Muskie’s “tears in the snow” story of 1972, seeing this moment as her demise.9 Some saw her reaction as calculated for the most political gain, an intentional effort to make her more approachable and “human” (Harris, 2007; Kennedy, 2008). Others framed the story as a simple example of commitment to the process and the perils of campaign fatigue. Jeff Jacoby (2008) of the Boston Globe describes Hillary’s emotional display as an “unexpected and obviously genuine moment” that showed her vulnerability in a positive way: [The tears] may have done more to awaken sympathy for her than anything else voters have seen from the Clinton campaign in a long time. . . . Running for Bill Clinton’s third term has gotten Hillary Clinton nowhere. She will not win the nomination with an air of entitlement. She may not have Obama’s boundless charisma, but she does have a heart and soul. They may yet prove her strongest weapon.

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Despite mixed perceptions about the New Hampshire campaign, Hillary’s win provided the Clintons with a positive, energetic bounce, supporting the beliefs many had that Hillary, as the frontrunner, was on her way to winning the Democratic presidential nomination, and becoming the first woman president. Following the New Hampshire election, there was great debate in the Clinton camp about next steps. Some advisors believed Hillary needed to campaign in South Carolina; others thought Hillary’s chances of winning were slim given John Edwards’s southern connections. Some argued that she needed to focus on the other states that had been moved up in the primary calendar, now composing “Super-Duper Tuesday” with twenty elections on February 5. Hillary ultimately decided to spend some time in South Carolina, but leave the remainder of time to Bill as her surrogate, a decision that many argue was a turning point for her campaign.

RHETORICAL PUNCHES IN SOUTH CAROLINA The voters in South Carolina were quite different compared to those in Iowa and New Hampshire, and this state would prove to be the first strong testing ground for the Clintons’ influence on African American voters. In the past, Bill had been very popular with African Americans, and Hillary had performed well in early African American voting polls. As early as October 2007, Eugene Robinson (2007a) quoted results from a “just released” CNN poll showing that among Democrats 68 percent of African American women said Clinton was their choice, with Obama leading 46–42 percent among African American men. Thus, it was important for Hillary to win the South Carolina primary and diminish the assumptions that Obama would naturally attract most African Americans to his campaign. Given Bill’s popularity in the South, and the need to also win a strong Southern state primary, the Clintons decided to spend significant time and money campaigning in this state. A door-to-door campaign, a lively political debate, and several public appearances became the cohesive strategy designed to keep the African American vote from turning to Barack Obama. The end result, however, was “the most controversial week in the political contest so far,” with the Clinton tag team generating the greatest amount of media coverage, and Bill specifically receiving more coverage that week than any of the Republicans running in the primary.10 Of course, the African American shift to Obama was starting to happen prior to the Clintons’ visit to South Carolina. Doubtless, Bill’s “fairy tale” comment at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, where he argued that Obama’s claim of being against the war from the beginning was a fairy tale, helped accelerate the move. The comment quickly morphed into something much big-


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ger, reminiscent of Hillary’s 1992 comment about baking cookies as First Lady. When removed from context and perpetuated by the press, the comment upset a number of people who believed Bill was, at best, inappropriate in phrasing the attack or, at worst, charging Obama with fabricating a story. Another inflammatory comment was Hillary’s citation of the importance of a president, Lyndon B. Johnson, in realizing the dream of Martin Luther King Jr. during an interview with Major Garrett of Fox News.11 While it was true that she did not say Johnson was more important than King, even though Garrett reported it as if she had, Hillary also never used the words “it took them both.” Still, it was an insensitive thing to say. It was not racist, any more than Bill’s fairy tale comment was racist, but both were impolitic because they ought to have known that many people would hear the comments as racist. In this political context the Clintons campaigned in South Carolina. One strategic choice was to leave Bill to serve as the main surrogate in the state, while Hillary covered other ground, which resulted in unintended consequences that reverberated throughout the remainder of the campaign and put Bill in a place of questionable use. While serving as Hillary’s surrogate, he evoked significant negative reactions mainly because of (1) the incessant focus on his administration’s successes, and (2) the impression that he was angry and racist when referring to Barack Obama. Correspondent Terry Moran comments about Bill’s campaign style in an ABC Nightline report on January 24, 2008: The man often called the most gifted politician of his generation is once again at the center of American politics, taking over the 2008 Democratic campaign, and he’s clearly loving every minute of it. . . . Hour after hour after hour in the past few days here in South Carolina, the former president has been conducting a schedule as ambitious as any candidate who’s running here. . . . As he makes the case for another Clinton administration, there’s an awful lot of boasting about his own.

While some might frame Bill’s appeals as simply those made by “a passionate, committed spouse,” as Hillary would describe them in the last South Carolina debate (Clinton, 2008b), it was Bill’s style, coupled with what some journalists described as racist remarks, that led Obama to remark during a South Carolina primary debate that “I can’t tell who I’m running against sometimes” (Obama, 2008). Indeed, Bill’s aggressiveness was heavily reported by the media. Many journalists took issue with Bill’s role in South Carolina. He was referred to as “the big dog” sent in to handle the negative side of Hillary’s campaign. He was described as a pit bull, a bad cop, and a political beast. Together, the Clintons were depicted as a “two-headed monster,” “a political juggernaut,” and “a campaign

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machine.”12 The end result in South Carolina was a triumph for Obama, who won 55 percent of the vote in a three-way race, anchored by majorities of the black and youth vote in the state (“Obama wins,” 2008). While it was a convenient rationale to claim Bill as the main factor for Hillary’s loss in South Carolina, other factors were involved. First, the Iowa caucus win by Obama surely helped him immensely as it proved a black man could be a viable candidate with white voters and actually, therefore, win the presidential election. Second, both Clintons angered African Americans in part by what they said in New Hampshire, and their attempts at self-explanation, and in part by the spinning of what they said by the press and Obama surrogates.13 Third, Bill lost his cool because he fiercely resented the biased media treatment of Hillary, himself, and Obama, as underscored by the Pew Report on media coverage for that week (Jurkowitz, 2008). Bill’s inability to maintain his composure, however, did prompt several reporters to question how far he could go before becoming a liability to Hillary’s campaign, raising the concern that Hillary could not “rein him in.” The Obama win in South Carolina prompted Bill Clinton to dismiss the result, likening the victory to those of Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988. While his intent was to diminish the victory as short-lived, Bill’s specific references to Jackson, probably the most viable African American candidate in recent presidential campaigns, provoked additional outrage by many in the public as well as within Hillary’s campaign and media circles. In fact, South Carolina representative Jim Conyers specifically took issue with Bill’s remarks and suggested that he go away and “chill for awhile,” a remark that infuriated Bill Clinton and for which he would hold a grudge long after this primary (Darman, 2008b). Political pundits reacted to Bill’s behavior in South Carolina, seeing it as an overall disaster to Hillary’s campaign. Eugene Robinson (2008b) noted in The Washington Post the inevitability of Bill taking attention away from Hillary. His observation that “after South Carolina, it’s hard to claim that this candidacy is entirely about her. At the very least, it’s about them—and if you listen to Bill’s speeches, you get the distinct impression that he thinks it’s all about him” epitomizes overall reaction to the idea of electing a team. Columnist E. J. Dionne (2008) wrote that those working within the Clintons’ ranks were sharply divided about the usefulness of Bill Clinton to the campaign and noted “the beginning of a defection toward Obama, even among participants who have long held a positive view of Hillary Clinton.” Hillary’s win in New Hampshire, Dionne claimed, was “entirely her own doing, but Bill Clinton’s heavy-handedness in South Carolina undercut her achievement.” This comment strangely elides Bill from the scene in New Hampshire, again illustrating the press frame of focus on a single candidate. In response to what happened in South Carolina, Bill took a defensive posture, claiming that the lesson learned was that he could promote his wife’s


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presidential candidacy, but that he was not free to defend her. In early February, while appearing in an interview in Portsmouth, Maine, Bill observed: “I think the mistake that I made is to think that I was a spouse like any other spouse who could defend his candidate. . . . I think I can promote Hillary but not defend her because I was president. I have to let her defend herself or have someone else defend her.”14 Perhaps Bill’s biggest mistake in the first place was feeling that he needed to defend Hillary when she was capable of taking care of herself. Had Bill not felt the need to come to her rescue, he might have avoided some of the political gaffes that he made. Then again, his penchant for speaking his mind, regardless of the circumstances, surfaced in other states like Ohio, Texas, Mississippi, and California, to name a just a few. VICTORIES AND MISHAPS As Bill continued to travel the country reminding people of his administration’s success, Hillary campaigned with a message to voters that her time working as First Lady and as a senator gave her invaluable experience to handle the presidency. The interweaving of rhetoric about the previous Clinton administrations with Hillary’s preparedness provoked questions about the interdependency of the Clintons in claiming and defending their record, while also looking ahead to future actions. Noting that the messages from both Hillary and Bill directly contributed to questions about how the Clintons would handle another round in the White House, pundit Eugene Robinson (2008a) spoke for many when he framed seeing two Clintons as a team as a major difficulty for Hillary in claiming her legitimacy: When she tries to portray herself as a battle-scarred political veteran and Obama as an ingénue, she counts the years she spent as first lady in Little Rock and Washington. When she adds the policy successes of the 1990s (but not the failures) to her resume, she implies that she was part of a co-presidency.

Following South Carolina, Bill did begin to tone down his rhetoric and stay on message, putting direct focus on promoting Hillary’s candidacy by highlighting her experience and expertise. As he crossed the country stumping for Hillary, Bill declared that Hillary would be the best leader for the country, even if she were not married to him. When he stayed close to his script, Bill was capable of charming audiences and the press alike. When he started to stray off topic, advisors would keep him focused; at one rally he even noted, “there is something else Hillary wanted me to say” (Alberts, 2008). After South Carolina, Hillary lost several primaries and many within Hillary’s camp attributed these losses to

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Bill’s involvement. Meanwhile, Bill believed the campaign lacked a solid strategy after the February 5 election. At this time many people decided Hillary was beaten and began calling on her to quit, despite the big states yet to vote. The campaign resisted the calls with an apparent strategy of focusing on superdelegates and argued that all voices deserved to be heard (including a consideration of Michigan and Florida) since Obama’s delegate counts did not yet guarantee him a win. The strategy, reflected in Hillary’s rhetoric and a relative silence on Bill’s part, could well have been a decision by them, not just her, especially since the campaign central staff seemed to be in a bit of disarray at the time. Such a conclusion is bolstered by the low probability that Bill would have complied with any strategy to which he did not contribute. Interestingly, it was Bill who made some of the first public statements about the possibility of Hillary suspending her campaign. For example, at a rally in Ohio, Bill candidly told the audience that “Hillary’s campaign is dead unless she wins both the Buckeye State and Texas next Tuesday” (Alberts, 2008). This statement may have helped get out the vote on Hillary’s behalf, and given the fact that Hillary did win Texas and Ohio by small margins, one could argue that it was a successful strategy; however, Bill’s sense of entitlement and belief that he could make this kind of statement about Hillary’s chances are reminders of the intertwining of the political team. Not only is it a candidate’s prerogative to announce when her campaign is over, it is highly unlikely that any “mere” political spouse would likely make such a statement before their partner. The Clintons are so inextricably linked as a couple and as campaigners that Bill saw little problem in making this declaration . On the day before the March 4 Super Tuesday elections, Newsweek writer Jonathan Darman (2008a) wrote about the ability of the Clintons to learn from their mistakes, pick up the pieces, and move on, showing the ability to “reinvent themselves for another day.” He observed that losses for Hillary taught her that sometimes she must sacrifice herself for the Clintons’ greater good. It is a lesson that may be worth remembering if she fails to reverse Obama’s momentum. . . . A protracted, nasty fight for the nomination would tarnish the Clinton name and might endanger the party Bill and Hillary have spent three decades trying to build. The Clintons’ place in history is too valuable to them for Hillary to take that risk. In the history books, after all, she can be the woman who conceded gracefully—and the woman who never quit.

The March Super Tuesday presented mixed results for the Clintons, but they continued on, attempting to regain some momentum through the remainder of the primaries and picking up big wins in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky.


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A significant moment of distraction and detraction appeared mid March when the story of Hillary and a sniper attack made the news. The story was presented in a foreign policy speech at George Washington University where Hillary, making the case for her foreign policy experience, described a dangerous arrival in Bosnia when she was First Lady. She said that, arriving in Bosnia on March 25, 1996, “I remember landing under sniper fire. There was supposed to be some kind of a greeting ceremony at the airport, but instead we just ran with our heads down to get into the vehicles to get to our base” (Duke, 2008). She mentioned this event several additional times during campaign speeches. Finally, CBS aired a story including video footage of her arrival that appears to show Hillary and Chelsea calmly walking from a U.S. Air Force plane, greeting children, and eventually meeting with troops (Duke, 2008). In a meeting with the Philadelphia Daily News editorial board, Hillary was asked about the discrepancies in the account, and she claimed to have misspoken about the incident, admitting: “I was told that we had to land a certain way and move quickly because of the threat of sniper fire. So I misspoke—I didn’t say that in my book or other times but if I said something that made it seem as though there was actual fire—that’s not what I was told” (Duke, 2008). Hillary dismissed the statement to miscommunication and simple fatigue. This might have been the end to the story. Instead, Bill decided to raise the issue again with journalists by providing his own explanation of the situation, which seemed to only make matters worse. A CBS News report by Jim Axelrod (2008) reported Bill’s comments attributing Hillary’s misstatement to her exhaustion and age. Noting that Bill’s outbursts and defense of Hillary tended to overshadow her, shifting her off track, Axelrod ended with Bill’s comments on Hillary’s response to his defense: “Hillary called me and said ‘you don’t remember this, you weren’t there, let me handle it.’ I said ‘yes, ma’am.’” This exchange is illustrative of the tensions that continued to develop in Hillary’s camp as Bill’s role became more questionable, particularly as the campaign drew closer to the end of its run. Several political gaffes and temper outbreaks, while not so different from his previous years of campaigning, led many journalists and campaign advisers to wonder what had happened to Bill. He was viewed as different in this campaign, and some believed that he created more harm than good for Hillary. Pundits argued that the campaign was important to Bill because, in many ways, it was a reaffirmation of his administration’s success. Others believed that Bill was out of touch as a campaigner and not able to stay connected with the fast news style of the twenty-first century. Some even wondered if his mistakes were simply a result of his age and recent bypass surgery. No matter what the reason, it was clear that many people saw a different Bill Clinton in this campaign and believed that he directly contributed to Hillary’s demise.15 New York Daily News columnist Mike Lupica (2008) echoed

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the sentiments of many writers regarding Bill’s shortcomings, referring to him as “his wife’s Dick Cheney.” Though many will attribute Hillary’s losses to Bill’s “interference” in her campaign, we offer an alternative narrative. We point to the comments just a year earlier, where many saw Bill as important to Hillary’s campaign, and suggest that perhaps the problem occurred when the campaign, concerned about Bill upstaging Hillary, decided to keep the Clintons on separate stages during much of the early campaign. The effort to let Hillary, the candidate, have much of the limelight put Bill in the background, a position in which he tends not to do well. Most people, himself included, were used to seeing Bill as the leader, not the follower, and at times in the campaign he projected himself as the victim, an image that simply did not work well for many of his audiences, who were accustomed to him presenting a strong, public face.16

THE FINAL STRETCH As primary results came in and electoral votes were tabulated, it became clear that Hillary’s run for the Democratic nomination was over. The question was how long she might stretch out her campaigning and when she would make the final announcement supporting Barack Obama. The campaign continued on through the final primaries, and many reporters wrote about the inevitable moment when the Clintons would suspend the campaign. Dana Milbank (2008) of the Washington Post described Hillary’s final days as “the Clinton Campaign Death Watch,” likening the campaign to a “search for the Holy Grail.” International reports were speculative about the Clinton campaign as well. The England Observer declared the campaign as “the most resounding defeat the Clintons have faced” (Crowley, 2008). London Daily Telegraph reporter Toby Harnden (2008) underscored the importance of the campaign for both Clintons and why it was difficult to suspend the race, “as this race has gone on, it has become clear that this is a co-campaign, just as, presumably, it would be a co-presidency if Mrs. Clinton returned to the White House in 2009 or even 2013—a more realistic goal for her.” In the end, Hillary did suspend her campaign, endorsed Barack Obama as the Democratic nominee, and campaigned vigorously on his behalf.17 A more reluctant Bill finally followed her lead and publicly supported Obama at the Democratic National Convention and on the campaign trail (Alter, 2009). Despite the Clintons’ losses in the campaign, most people who wrote about the couple, and those who closely worked with them, were confident that their story was not to end with the 2008 campaign. It was merely one chapter in a long political life together. Hillary’s support for Obama led to a Cabinet position as secretary of state, but even there significant concerns surfaced regarding what


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to do with the former President Clinton and how his international financial dealings might impact her nomination process and conduct in office. Bill Clinton continues to build his foundation and doubtless will play an important role on the international stage, and he will, inevitably, be a strong behind-the-scenes advisor to Hillary. Whatever this next chapter holds for the Clintons clearly remains to be seen and scrutinized, but they are still viewed by many as one of the great power couple in politics.

Lessons Learned for Married Political Teams As one of the most powerful couples in politics, the Clintons afford us the opportunity to explore the intersection of gender, leadership, and marriage in a way that can inform future presidential campaigns that feature women as viable candidates. Clearly the Clinton marriage is marked by tremendous successes and major challenges, and it continues to survive and evolve with each new chapter. The Clintons offer us a way to see, through a feminist lens, the inherent challenges in thinking about political leadership and marriage partnerships. In reviewing some of the highlights from Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, two major concerns stand out that merit further discussion: the power of situational constraints and the pervasiveness of cultural boundaries. CONSTRAINING SITUATIONS Given the political situation at the time and the various experiences each individual brought to the campaign, it was clear that the Hillary and Bill team (not just the campaign) needed to transform in order to convince the public of Hillary’s viability as a candidate. The difficulty of this transformation was, in large part, because of the significant requirements of responding to the situational constraints—that is, an individual in charge, with only one person elected. To be responsive to this situation, major transformations had to occur for both Hillary and Bill, and for their relationship. Hillary had to transform her image if she were ever to be seen as the public face. The constraints of the situation required that, or “she” could never win significant numbers of votes. On the other hand, Bill had to transition to “second string,” no longer the “singular” public face of the team, a transformation he managed with limited success. At the same time, the marital relationship, and the public image of such, required some shifting of expectations concerning traditional marital roles. The Clintons have never really had a “traditional” marriage; however, many people, press and public alike, remain wedded to traditional expectations of

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how political couples should behave together and apart. When the Clintons, or any couple, stray significantly from these expectations, the images work against them. Such couples have hard work to do to surmount public perceptions, particularly as those perceptions are shaped by a press that many feminist critics, as well as the examples we have cited throughout this chapter, have shown see through traditional frames. As future scholarship explores what happened in Hillary’s campaign, and how it might have handled things differently, that analysis will be incomplete unless one considers how the situation impacted the Clintons’ rhetorical choices and how that rhetoric was heard. We maintain that, in many ways, they did well given the situational constraints they existed within and had a role in shaping, by virtue of their political career choices. While many blame Bill’s individual actions for Hillary’s demise, we believe his actions were not the major issue in the campaign. The Clintons do nothing if not what it is required to succeed. The team had to transform; it had to become Hillary because of the situation in which it existed. And it is clear that this was no easy task. As Hillary worked hard to become the public face of the team, she suffered at times from the perception that she was not being authentic—she was described as Machiavellian, manipulative, and deceptive. As Bill attempted to stay out of the spotlight, he often ended up gaining more attention because of his attempts to defend Hillary, challenging the press and politicians alike to see him in a different kind of role where he was not the one in charge. By virtue of their identities, especially as a former president and First Lady, it was especially difficult to gloss over the reality of the rhetorical situation and the perceptions that were created regarding how they worked together to achieve their political ends. The Clintons consistently renegotiated their individual and team roles within the constraining situations. In the end, cultural barriers still do not yet permit two persons to function as one with the woman as public face.

BOUNDED BY CULTURE Truth is, we struggle as scholars to apply a lens that is not used by the public(s) who were the audiences, nor by the press from which we get much of our information, and this lens is not used by ourselves with consistency. How do we see outside our own worldview, and how do we see people trying to negotiate acceptance of a new way to see those (intended plural here) wanting to occupy the highest, most male elective office in a powerful patriarchy (the United States), which is used to imposing its worldview, if not its will, on the rest of the world? Indeed, it is likely that the Clintons themselves struggle(d) with that task. They started as young idealists working to remake the world in a time when end-


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less optimism about the ability to succeed at that existed. They were relatively successful at it, with a variety of failed or partly successful ventures along the way. But their very success, achieving the highest elected political (not redundant, witness the Supreme Court) office in a land that is deeply riven by the very cultural changes they represent, presented them with obstacles that could not be overcome by a single couple in a single campaign. Cultural clashes lie beneath many arguments seemingly about other things. The culture in which they campaigned for Hillary to become president may have changed to where a female (if appropriately male-identified) could be elected president; the jury is still out on that. But it has not changed to where a team could be elected president. That idea is so radical that even when suggested, the idea is considered a negative as our citations above and many from a variety of blogs that we could cite demonstrate. Even successful presidencies that have reflected such teamwork in part did not present it overtly. So why is it that cultural boundaries still exist despite the fact that in 2008 a woman came closer to winning a presidential nomination contest than ever before? First, female/male distinctions still permeate our culture. The U.S. political system, in spite of the desire by some of its participants that it be different, is primarily, and strongly, patriarchal. That means it elevates characteristics that are male-identified, such as force, competition, and sheer physical strength. To be male is not required to be “on top” any longer. But to be male-identified is still required whether the candidate is female or male. Second, in addition to the privileging of male-identified characteristics, the system is strongly Western, in that it is individualistic not communitarian—or to discard the philosophical baggage—in that it holds the individual, not the group, as the highest value. This means that while there may be many people providing strength to a campaign, from spouses to speech writers to advisors to surrogates, the “buck still stops” at the top—with one person in charge. This system does not, virtually cannot, see two people as one entity. Consider the famous biblical line our culture exudes even when it is not being JudeoChristian—that when two marry, they become one, and the wife is expected to be submissive toward her husband. The subtext is that the one is a “he” in values and behavior and dominance, if not in biology. We “talk” a good story of teamwork at home, at work, at play; teams constantly wrestle with the tension between team and individual components. Our cultural values impose strong barriers (nearly insurmountable) to the individuals being one as two. Third, not only does American culture elevate the individual; when it operates in default mode it automatically ranks. The basic premise of the English language is a hierarchical ranking system, meaning we cannot understand either rhetor or audience without remembering that whenever comparing (thinking about) two related items, the strong tendency, unless consciously resisted, is to

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rank them.18 We talk an equality that we do not practice either at work or in the political system and that we struggle to practice in all our personal relationships. We do not practice it because we are not used to thinking, or talking, that way. In default mode, we see teams as composed of individuals, and we rank either the individuals or what they contribute to the team “success.” And, where we permit teams to exist (which is decidedly not in political offices, not overtly) teams are ranked (elected or not) and individuals within them are ranked, and one, if not the, primary characteristic that determines the ranking is male-identification. The hierarchy in teams is clear. We often have second-string, lesser players, and the best players get to play the most, unless there is such an obvious lead that anyone can play to improve their performance and possibly move up the hierarchy. Given the situational constraints and cultural boundaries that exist in American society, the Clintons have, remarkably, overcome many of the obstacles that might prohibit success for more “ordinary” married couples. But when it came to attaining “the highest office in the land” these obstacles were insurmountable. Some people will attribute Hillary’s loss to a dislike for either, or mistakes by, her or her spouse, thinking in a singular fashion about one person’s actions. Using a different perspective, it is clear that the Clintons, together, lost their third campaign for the presidency. Others who follow them in pioneering new trails for political spouses in the White House may find it easier simply because the public and the press have had to consider different ways of thinking about the marital team and political leadership. At the very least, as more women seek the presidency, we inevitably will evolve in our thinking about the role of marriage and gender equality, when it involves those who seek to occupy the presidential office and lead the American people.

Notes 1. At her swearing in as secretary of state, Hillary Clinton thanked all of her friends and family and expressed gratitude to Bill Clinton for “a lifetime of all kinds of experiences which have given me a, which have given me an extraordinary richness that I am absolutely beholden to and grateful for.” See “Remarks at Swearing-In Ceremony of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton” (Washington, DC: Federal News Service, February 2, 2009). 2. For ease of reading and clarity, the remainder of this chapter will refer to the Clintons by their first names, “Hillary” and “Bill,” rather than by their full names, which could encumber the reading process. 3. A lengthier theoretical discussion on gender, politics, and marriage can be found in “Navigating Gender Complexities: Hillary and Bill Clinton as a Political Team,” in Gender and Political Communication in America: Rhetoric, Representation, and Display, ed. Janis Edwards (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).


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4. Worth noting is that men have to avoid displaying inappropriately femaleidentified attributes, which explains why, with the exception of only a few in the House of Representatives, no overtly gay men have successfully achieved national political office. 5. It is important to note here that creating such a perspective is complicated by the necessary reliance on press accounts for “seeing” many campaign appearances and events. The various reporters and commentators all bring a particular perspective that frames, even creates, what they see and report, which in turn is shaped by editors and managerial decisions about how and what to air or print. In short, escaping an explanation that uses a culturally imposed worldview requires a suspension of perceptual acceptance in order to allow room for seeing differently. 6. See Hillary Clinton, “Presidential Campaign Announcement,” January 20, 2007, www.HillaryClinton.com. 7. Bill went on to criticize the “sanitized” coverage of Obama claiming that he was getting easy coverage while the Clintons (in particular, Bill) were the brunt of a negative campaign launched by the Obama camp. He claimed: “I have seen it and I have been blistered by it for months.” Quoted by Rebecca Sinderbrand, “Bill Clinton Targets Media Coverage of Obama,” CNN Political Ticker, January 8, 2008, politicalticker.blogs .cnn.com/2008/01/08/bill-clinton-targets-media-coverage-of-obama. 8. See for example, Helen Kennedy’s analysis in “Losing it Made Hil a Big Winner. Weepy Breakdown Sent Women Flowing to Her in Droves,” New York Daily News, January 10, 2008. Also see the analysis provided by L. Ian Macdonald, “Her Strategy: Go Human; By Tearing Up on Monday, Hillary Clinton Showed Voters She Actually has Feelings,” Canada National Post, January 10, 2008; and Samela Harris’s commentary in the article titled “A Glimmer of Emotion is all it Took to Catapult Senator Clinton Back into Contention, Hillary Shows She is Human after all,” The Advertiser (Australia), January 12, 2008, 50. 9. Muskie was an important contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972 who, during a snowy New Hampshire press conference, presented an emotional defense of his wife’s character. What the press reported as tears, Muskie claimed were melted snowflakes. Whatever the reality, many believe the perception of an emotional display of tears led to his political demise. For an interesting discussion of the richness this story provides to reporting about Hillary’s tears, see John Robinson’s response, “Remembering Edmund Muskie’s Tears,” The Editor’s Log, January 17, 2008, blog .news-record.com/staff/jrblog/2008/01/something_was_e.shtml. 10. See Mark Jurkowitz’s report on media coverage the week before the South Carolina primary: “Clinton Finishes Third in Battle for Campaign Coverage (But it’s Bill!!!)” Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, January 28, 2008, journalism .org/node/9512. 11. See Hillary Clinton’s interview with FOX reporter Major Garrett, “Sen. Hillary Clinton: LBJ vs MLK,” Youtube, January 7, 2008, www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9Lh WUsrJnM. 12. Several types of coverage provide these depictions. Critic Maureen Dowd laid out several concerns about the Clintons in her op-ed column “Two Against One,” New York Times (January 23, 2008), which provoked several people to write subsequent letters to the editor voicing their concerns about the Clintons’ campaign strategies and Hillary’s

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need to stand on her own record. International writers also voiced negative reactions to Bill’s role in South Carolina. See for example, Ewen MacAskill, “Race for the White House: Pitbull Bill—the ‘other’ Clinton Reveling in his Return to the Fray,” The Guardian (London), January 23, 2008, 16; Tim Harper, “Tag-Teaming, Clinton-style; Couple Keeps Rival Obama Off Balance, Sometimes Switching Roles in Democratic Presidential Race,” The Toronto Star, January 23, 2008, sec. A.; and Janet Bagnall, “Hillary Must do it on Her Own: The Former First Lady Should Prove that She Doesn’t Need Bill to Win,” The Montreal Gazette, February 1, 2008, sec. A. 13. See Hillary Clinton’s interview with FOX reporter Major Garrett, “Sen. Hillary Clinton: LBJ vs MLK,” Youtube, January 7, 2008, www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9Lh WUsrJnM. 14. See interview with Bill Clinton, “Bill Clinton says He’s Learned he can Promote, but not Defend, Hillary’s Candidacy,” Associated Press Worldstream, February 8, 2008, sec. International News. 15. See, for example, Kenneth R. Bazinet’s report, “Pals Point to Bubba’s Flubs,” New York Daily News, April 27, 2008, 11. Another lengthy account of Bill Clinton’s actions was written by Todd S. Purdum, “The Comeback Id,” in Vanity Fair, July 2008, www .vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/07/clinton200807. Pointing to concerns about his legacy, All Things Considered featured “The Bill Clinton Factor” with Carol Felsenthal, author of “Clinton in Exile: The President out of the White House,” who wrote about Bill’s life since the presidency and watched him on the campaign trail. See National Public Radio transcripts for May 30, 2008. 16. See Darman’s discussion on May 5, 2008, as an example of the problems of putting Bill in the role of follower, and the difficulty for many in seeing him this way. 17. Hillary made over sixty appearances on Obama’s behalf, and Bill made many presentations around the country as well. For further information and some speculation about these appearances, see Dee Dee Myers’s report on the CBS News Early Show, “Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s Contentious Past Relationship During the Campaign” (December 1, 2008); Beth Fouhy, “Clintons Launch Campaign Swing for Obama,” The Associated Press, October 12, 2008; and Derrick Z. Jackson, “The Force of the Hillary Effect,” The Boston Globe, October 18, 2008, sec. A. 18. Kenneth Burke’s discussion of the negative and construction of hierarchies is relevant to this discussion. Burke describes the negative as the basis of how humans construct hierarchies of knowledge. See A Grammar of Motives (Berkley: University of California Press, 1969); M. J. Hardman’s argument that the basic premise of English thought is gender-based ranking is also germane to this discussion. See “Gender through the Levels,” Women and Language, 16(2) (1993), 42–49.

References Alberts, S. (2008, February 28). Bill Clinton turned lightning rod for controversy in Hillary’s campaign. Canwest News Service.


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Alter, J. (2009, January 15). Hillary Clinton and Bill Clinton: The most powerful couple in politics may find the times suited to their skills. Newsweek, 153(10), 44. Axelrod, J. (2008, April 11). Bill Clinton is Hillary’s biggest campaign liability. CBS Evening News. Bagnall, J. (2008, February 1). Hillary must do it on her own: The former first lady should prove that she doesn’t need Bill to win. The Montreal Gazette, sec. A. Bazinet, K. R. (2008, April 27). Pals point to Bubba’s flubs. New York Daily News, 11. Benac, N. (2008, January 5). Hillary Clinton says it’s all about change, but there at her side is “relic” Bill. The Associated Press. Bishop, I. (2007, July 5). Bubba on parade: Robs Hill of July 4 spotlight. The New York Post, sec. A. Burke, K. (1969). A grammar of motives. Berkeley: University of California Press. Canellos, P. (2007, May 29). Team Clinton looks stronger than ever. The Boston Globe, sec. A. CBS News transcripts. (2008, December 1). Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s contentious past relationship during the campaign. The Early Show. Clinton, B. (2008, February 8). Interview. Bill Clinton says he’s learned he can promote, but not defend, Hillary’s candidacy. Associated Press Worldstream, sec. International News. Clinton, H. (2007, January 20). Presidential campaign Announcement. Accessed at www.HillaryClinton.com. Clinton, H. (2008a, January 7). Interview by Major Garrett. Fox News. Accessed at www .youtube.com/watch?v=v9LhWUsrJnM. Clinton, H. (2008b, January 24). Transcript: Democratic debate in South Carolina. New York Times. Clinton, H. (2009, January 24). Remarks. Swearing-In Ceremony of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. In State Department Briefing. Washington, DC: Federal News Service. Crowley, M. (2008, June 1). Is this good-bye? He was the “man from Hope.” She was going to be America’s first female president. But are the lights finally going out on the Clinton Era? The England Observer, 16. Darman, J. (2008a, March 3). How they have lost: In defeat, the Clintons are remarkably adept at picking up the pieces. Newsweek, 28. Darman, J. (2008b, May 5). The natural no more: The greatest mystery in a mystifying campaign: What happened to Bill? Newsweek, 39. Dionne, E. J. (2008, January 29). Hobbled by hubby. The Washington Post, sec. A. Dowd, M. (2008, January 23). Two against one. New York Times, sec. A. Duke, A. (2008, March 25). Clinton says she “misspoke” about sniper fire. CNN Election Center 2008. www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/25/campaign.wrap/index .html. Felsenthal, C. (2008, May 30). Interview by Michelle Norris. All Things Considered. National Public Radio. Fouhy, B. (2008, October 12). Clintons launch campaign swing for Obama. The Associated Press.

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Hardman, M. J. (1993). Gender through the levels. Women and Language, 16(2), 42–49. Harnden, T. (2008, April 24). The race is over—but Hillary can’t see it. The London Daily Telegraph, 22. Harper, T. (2007, December 2). Husbanding Hillary’s resources: “Bill factor” is proving to be a two-edged sword as candidate’s hubby fails to stay on message. The Toronto Star, sec. A. Harper, T (2008, January 23). Tag-teaming, Clinton-style: Couple keeps rival Obama off balance, sometimes switching roles in Democratic presidential race. The Toronto Star, sec. A. Harris, P. (2007, December 23). World: Bill’s magic touch bolsters White House bid: The ex-president has seized the reins to get his wife’s faltering bandwagon back on track for the Democratic nomination. The Observer, 28. Harris, S. (2008, January 12). A glimmer of emotion is all it took to catapult Senator Clinton back into contention, Hillary shows she is human after all. The Advertiser (Australia), 50. Hillary a “comeback kid,” too. (2008, January 9). The Toronto Star, sec. A. Jackson, D. Z. (2008, October 18). The force of the Hillary effect. The Boston Globe, sec. A. Jacoby, J. (2008, January 9). Let Hillary be Hillary. The Boston Globe, sec. A. Jurkowitz, M.(2008, January 28). Clinton finishes third in battle for campaign coverage (but it’s Bill!!!). Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, journalism .org/node/9512. Kennedy, H. (2008, January 10). Losing it made Hil a big winner: Weepy breakdown sent women flowing to her in droves. New York Daily News, sec. A. Kornblut, A. E., and MacGillis, A. (2007, December 30). Warning of threats, Clinton sells Clinton: Ex-president emphasizes wife’s experience. The Washington Post, sec. A. Lawrence, J. (2007, March 29). Big question for Hillary: What will Bill’s impact be? Some Democrats worry, but most Americans polled say he’s a plus. USA Today, sec. A. Lupica, M. (2008, May 15). The Billstone around Hillary’s neck. New York Daily News, 8. MacAskill, E. (2008, January 23). Race for the White House: Pitbull Bill—the “other” Clinton reveling in his return to the fray. The London Guardian, 16. Macdonald, L. I. (2008, January 10). Her strategy: go human; by tearing up on Monday, Hillary Clinton showed voters she actually has feelings. Canada National Post, sec. A. Milbank, D. (2008, May 20). Still after the holy grail. The Washington Post, sec. A. Moran, T. (2008, January 24). The Bill show: Former president steals the spotlight. ABC Nightline News. Mueller, J. E. (2008). Tag teaming the press. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. Muir, J. K., and Taylor, A. (2009). Navigating gender complexities: Hillary and Bill Clinton as a political team. In J. Edwards (Ed.), Gender and political communication in America: Rhetoric, representation, and display. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Myers, D. D. (2008, December 1). Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s contentious past relationship during the campaign. CBS News The Early Show.


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Obama, B. (2008, January 24). Transcript: Democratic debate in South Carolina. New York Times. Obama wins big victory in S.C. primary. (2008, January 26). AP Report, MSNBC. www .msnbc.msn.com/id/22854377/#storyContinued. Pilkington, E (2007, July 4). Clinton campaign: In a fairground in Des Moines, the comeback kid returns to frontline: Hillary intends to keep Bill “on tap but not on top” in long haul to Presidency. The Guardian (London), sec. A. Polman, D. (2007, March 4). The American debate—Clinton fatigue may not be thing of the past; and the senator’s efforts to dampen criticism and control the Bill-andHillary narrative aren’t going to work. The Philadelphia Inquirer, sec. D. Purdum, T. S. (2008, July). The comeback id. Vanity Fair. www.vanityfair.com/politics/ features/2008/07/clinton200807. Robinson, E. (2007a, October 19). The power of madam president. The Washington Post, sec. A. Robinson, E. (2007b, December 21). A problem like Bill. The Washington Post, sec. A. Robinson, E. (2008a, February 5). The baggage Hillary bears. The Washington Post, sec. A. Robinson, E. (2008b, January 29). Cards from a worn-out deck. The Washington Post, sec. A. Robinson, J. (2008, January 17) Remembering Edmund Muskie’s tears. The Editor’s Log. blog.news-record.com/staff/jrblog/2008/01/something_was_e.shtml. Sinderbrand, R. (2008, January 8). Bill Clinton targets media coverage of Obama. CNN Political Ticker, politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/01/08/bill-clinton-targets-media -coverage-of-obama. Snow, K. (2007, July 1). The dynamic duo: Bill joins Hillary on the trail. ABC Good Morning America. Stephanopoulos, G. (2007, July 1). Quoted in “The dynamic duo: Bill joins Hillary on the trail.” ABC Good Morning America. Wright, D. (2007, July 3). The Clintons: Campaigner in chief. ABC World News.

PART II

COMMUNICATION

CHAPTER 5

It Takes a Village to Win: A Rhetorical Analysis of “Hillary for President” Julia A. Spiker

“I’m in. And I’m in to win. Today I am announcing that I will form an exploratory committee to run for president.” So stated Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton when she tossed her hat into the race for the White House (2007). Thus began an historic run for the presidency that culminated eighteen months later when Senator Clinton suspended her campaign and stated: “This isn’t exactly the party I’d planned, but I sure like the company” (2008p). Hillary Clinton is well-known in American politics due to her years as the First Lady (1992–2000), then as the junior U.S. senator from New York (2001–2009), and now as the U.S. secretary of state (2009 to the present). Media coverage of her early political years in Arkansas and as a First Lady was intense (Gutgold, 2006) and filled with reports ranging from Clinton’s hairstyles (Mandziuk, 2008) to Clinton’s involvement in various political dealings and scandals (healthcare, Whitewater, and Travelgate). Since she became a U.S. senator, the only scandals swirling around her are traced back to the Bill Clinton White House years (Morris and McGann, 2005). With these battles “behind her,” Clinton decided to tackle a new political adventure and try to be the first woman president of the United States. The presidential campaign of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton began on January 20, 2007, and ended on June 7, 2008. Clinton lost the race even though she won primary and caucus elections in twenty-two states and won 1896 delegates (CNNPolitics.com, 2008), the largest number ever won by a woman candidate. It was an extraordinary moment in the history of American politics as a woman and an African American male fought to be the Democratic nominee for president. It was a close battle and the Democratic Party struggled to select its presidential nominee without tearing the party apart. 99

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While the country quite naturally moved on to new business, Clinton’s campaign is now being studied by many academics in order to understand how she was able to come so close to winning the presidential nomination of a major political party and how she was stopped short of her goal. This chapter examines the rhetorical style of a woman running for the office of president of the United States, specifically that of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, by focusing on her public remarks—many of her campaign speeches and interviews—to yield insight into the transformative nature of her campaign message and how that influenced her political chances.

Power and Rhetorical Style Clinton has garnered public attention with some of it being positive and much of it being critical. Throughout all of the criticism and controversy, she has continued to thrive politically (Darman, Hosenball, Clift, Bailey, and Conant, 2007): “The controversy is much less about Hillary Clinton herself than it is about America’s continuing, deep-seated ambivalence, even hostility, toward power in the hands of women” (Mayo, 1993, A52). Clinton’s use of power in combination with her communication style are both key to understanding the “Hillary phenomena,” especially during her bid for the White House. Next, the issues of power and rhetorical style are addressed. The power of gender is expressed rhetorically. Naomi Wolfe, in her book Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How to Use It, examines a societal split relating to women with power, and she comments on this connection between language and power believing that “there is a taboo that makes it virtually impossible in ‘women’s language’ to directly claim power or achievement” (1994, 250). What she calls “women’s language” relates strongly with “feminine rhetorical style” as each suggests reduced power exhibition by women rhetoricians. Campbell and Huxman (2009) define style as “what is distinctive about the language of a rhetorical act [and it] reflects the attitudes and character of the rhetor and hints at feelings about the subject being explored or advocated” (165). Rhetoric can be described as having a feminine or a masculine style. A feminine rhetorical style is characterized by distinctive language and strategies and is also marked by the absence of style markers generally associated with masculine rhetorical styles. Campbell (1998) states that feminine style has meant preferring anecdotal evidence (reflecting women’s experiential learning in contrast to men’s expertise), developing ideas inductively (so the audience thinks that it, not this presumptuous woman, drew the conclusions), and appropriating strategies associ-

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ated with women—such as domestic metaphors, emotional appeals to motherhood, and the like—avoiding such “macho” strategies as tough language, confrontation or direct refutation, and any appearance of debating one’s opponents. (5)

Distinguishing between feminine and masculine style is helpful in order to understand Clinton’s rhetorical style.

Hillary Clinton’s Rhetorical Style as First Lady and as U.S. Senator Clinton’s rhetorical style has been examined by researchers during her various political tenures—as a First Lady (Muir and Benitez, 1996; Campbell, 1998; Kelley, 2001) and as a U.S. senator (Mayhead and Marshall, 2005; Manning, 2006). Muir and Benitez (1996) describe Clinton’s rhetorical style in a traditional manner. They find: Hillary Clinton’s style is powerful and engaging. On many speaking occasions she uses few notes, maintains eye contact with audience members, and exhibits animated facial expressions. Her nonverbal cues tend to support her verbal commitments and passionate pleas. Her voice level increases as she emphasizes those issues she cares most about, softening as she turns to a story of someone who cannot afford health care coverage. . . . Clinton employs repetition of words to create momentum, uses pauses for emphasis, and incorporates humor when appropriate. (153)

Clinton’s rhetoric does not fit the typical feminine style model. Researchers studying Clinton’s rhetorical style describe her discourse as more masculine than feminine (Muir and Benitez, 1996; Campbell, 1998; Kelley, 2001; Manning, 2006). Campbell (1998) defines a masculine style as she describes Clinton’s rhetorical style as a First Lady. She states: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s style of public advocacy typically omits virtually all of the discursive markers by which women publicly enact their femininity. Her tone is usually impersonal, disclosing minimal information about herself; her ideas unfold deductively in the fashion of a lawyer’s brief; all kinds of evidence are used, but personal examples rarely, if ever, appear, although she incorporates stories she has been told by others. She is impassioned but very rarely emotional. (6)

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Manning (2006) concurs with Campbell’s description of Clinton’s rhetorical style as she examines Clinton’s rhetorical style as a U.S. senator. She states: Hillary Rodham Clinton portrays all of the markers of stereotypical masculine communication. She is aggressive, authoritative, and ambitious. She does not shrink from the limelight, often seeking it out to better champion her causes. In lieu of anecdotal evidence she utilizes statistics to emphasize her points. She rarely mentions her life outside of politics and when she does tell a story it usually refers to visiting other nations, relating not her own experiences, but the experiences of others she met during her travels. She presents herself as an expert, and is aggressive in asserting her opinions, showing commitment through her efforts to follow through until an issue is resolved and she has won her case. (114)

Clinton’s rhetorical style remained consistent as a First Lady and then as a U.S. senator.

Hillary Clinton’s Rhetorical Style as a Presidential Candidate Clinton’s rhetorical style as a presidential candidate continued her demonstrated pattern of using a masculine rhetorical style. During the campaign, Clinton used literal language almost exclusively, which is “more precise and exact, but . . . often is less vivid and engaging” (Campbell and Huxman, 2009, 167). It expresses an effort to describe accurately and produce careful proof (Campbell and Huxman, 2009, 167). Her rhetoric demonstrated competence, knowledge of the complex nature of serious issues, a clear and consistent message (“I am a problem-solver”), and direct, strong language with few embellishments or emotional entanglements. Even though she offered few personal revelations, she did offer stories of citizens confronting crisis situations or day-to-day life challenges. However, these citizen stories fell short of creating what Campbell and Huxman (2009) refer to as a “sensation that you are watching events as they occur” (169–70). Kornblut (2008b) described Clinton’s use of stories in her speeches as demonstrating one of her best skills—listening to voters. She states: “In speeches that sometimes wear on and sometimes derail into deadening policy, sharing bleak stories can focus the audience’s attention” (A6). Clinton’s stories were presented more as a factual listing of cases, as evidence in her argument that there were problems and she had the solutions. She argued the case with every speech and interview that she was the best candidate for the office.


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Clinton most commonly used repetition to place emphasis on points she believed important. The occasional allusion, such as to the “Statue of Liberty” as the symbol of American citizenship, was used to call out to our immigrant roots, and the rare metaphor, such as the “journey we travel” used to visualize unity, was sometimes found embedded toward the end of some speeches to create a visionary lift. Her interview style was to take the questions without flinching, look directly at the interviewer, and always appear composed. Her responses to the questions invariably deflected any negative portion by offering a positive reflection of her stances on issues and the comparison of records. Manning (2006) posits that while Clinton’s masculine rhetorical style did not fit “the desired image of a First Lady” (110) due to society’s traditional perceptions and expectations of how a woman, a First Lady, handles power (Kelley, 2001), it was useful and successful in her role as a U.S. senator. Political power is complex, especially when gender is also a factor (Kelley, 2001). Society has different expectations for how women political figures (i.e., First Lady, U.S. senator, or presidential candidate) should use power. A woman presidential candidate has a fine line to walk in gauging male and female citizens’ perceptions (Wolfe, 1994) and expectations of how to use power. Such a woman must appear powerful enough to lead and garner votes yet not too powerful as to appear masculine. Clinton walked that fine line, meeting success and failure simultaneously. One explanation for this simultaneous mixture ties directly with Clinton’s status as the wife of a powerful politician. Clinton is considered to be a “flawed vessel” for feminists because “her route to power was derivative”; that is, instead of building her political power on her own, she built it from the power base of her husband’s career (Marcus, 2008b, A19). Many voters viewed her as Bill Clinton’s wife (Cohen, 2008) and considered her power to be tied to his accomplishments. Women like Clinton receive more criticism than women who have obtained power through their own record (Hitt, 2007). Another perspective on the use of power by women politicians helps to explain Clinton’s simultaneous successes and failures in her career. Wolfe (1994) distinguishes between two perspectives of power stances held by women using self-made labels—power feminism and victim feminism. A key difference between these two perspectives is who holds power. “‘Power feminism,’ she states, “sees women as human beings—sexual, individual, no better or worse than their male counterparts—and lays claim to equality simply because women are entitled to it” (xxvii). In the power feminism perspective, women “seek power” and use power “responsibly,” all the while acknowledging that women have an interest in “recognition and fame” and, finally, accepting that “aggression” and “competiveness . . . are as much a part of female identity as are nurturant behaviors” (Wolfe, 1994, 237–38).

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On the other hand, “‘victim feminism’ . . . casts women as sexually pure and mystically nurturing, and stresses the evil done to these ‘good’ women as a way to petition for their rights” (Wolfe, 1994, xxvii). In the victim feminism perspective, women are supposed to “identify with powerlessness” because they are “naturally noncompetitive, cooperative, and peace loving”; in addition, “leadership” is belittled as is “logic, reason, and the public voice” in favor of “women’s speech,” and, finally, “aggression (and) competitiveness” are considered to be qualities of only “men or patriarchy” and not of women (236–37). These two stances represent a societal split as well as a split within the feminist movement. Following Wolfe’s thinking, Clinton’s use of power has represented a power feminism approach. She has sought power, used it responsibly (although her critics argue this point), and demonstrated an interest in recognition and fame. Clinton has had a talent for aggression and competitiveness, and laid claim to equality simply because she is a woman. These qualities and this approach would suggest a strong political candidate for the highest office in the land. Predominantly, Clinton’s rhetorical style has fit within this power feminism perspective; however, she did make use of a political strategy whereby she used the victim feminism perspective, thus modifying her rhetorical style with varied results. This research argues that this combination of power and victim feminism rhetorical styles was successful for Clinton as a First Lady and even in her first campaign running for the U.S. Senate; however, this combination was not successful in her campaign as a presidential candidate. This argument is illustrated in the following example. After a particularly brutal Democratic primary debate in which six male candidates focused their attacks on Clinton, The Washington Post’s Ruth Marcus commented on the Clinton campaign’s implications that Clinton was a victim of sexism: [A] candidate as strong as Clinton doesn’t need to play the womanas-victim card, not even in the “all-boys club of presidential politics” . . . what I detected . . . was not sexism but the desperation of candidates confronting a front-runner who happens to be a woman. . . . A female president can’t help but change attitudes toward women—I believe for the better. But using gender this way is a setback. Hillary Clinton is woman enough to take these attacks like a man. (2007, A21)

This reaction was shared by other citizens and fellow presidential candidates like Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), who were confused and upset by the dissonance of a woman who presented herself both as a powerful woman and as a less powerful woman or a victim (Kapochunas, 2007). This research argues that the simultaneous presentation of a power feminist rhetoric and victim feminist rhetoric (under attack by sexist males) created a dissonance for citizens and that this dissonance had political consequences.


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To that end, this analysis examines Clinton’s rhetorical style and message in her public remarks to capture how she portrayed political power as a woman candidate in order to understand how these factors influenced her political standing in the presidential race. Transcripts of Clinton’s public remarks were obtained predominantly from the website “The American Presidency Project.” First, Clinton’s campaign speeches are examined followed by an examination of her interviews.

“Hillary for President”: Clinton’s Rhetorical Message in Speeches Clinton’s presidential rhetoric as found in her speeches demonstrated a woman candidate who wanted power, argued a plan to use that power, and was able to transform her message to remain powerful. She addressed issues, stressed her experience, challenged the opposing party and her primary opponent in her own party, and redefined success as she faced political obstacles.

THE “NATIONAL CONVERSATION” Clinton opened her presidential campaign in 2007 cleverly incorporating new media technology by “appearing in a living room setting in a video post on her Web site” (Kapochunas and Kady, 2007, para. 3). This first phase of Clinton’s presidential bid offered a message of openness with her invitation to join her “not just for the campaign but for a conversation about the future of our country” (Clinton, 2007). This opening speech set the tone for the upcoming campaign. Clinton wanted to listen to and work with citizens to have a “national conversation.” At this early phase of the race, the campaign deliberately placed emphasis on revealing more of her personal qualities such as “friendliness, a sense of humor, and a willingness to listen” (Walsh, 2007, para. 3). This opening speech also sent the message that Clinton had experience working for issues important to Americans (children, education reform, healthcare, and women’s rights) and that her survival of previous battles made her capable of beating the Republicans. Her discourse throughout 2007 continued to address issues in order to lay out her platform. She covered issues like the Iraq war, military action in Iran, government reform, the cost of healthcare, the housing and mortgage crisis, infrastructure, college affordability, the climate and energy challenge, and AIDS. She gave speeches paying tribute to the anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma, Alabama, firefighters, and veterans of foreign wars. During the 2008 caucus and

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primary season, Clinton’s message evolved as a response to her victories and losses, her verbal missteps in the media, her dwindling campaign funds, and pressure from political insiders to drop out of the race. In this early phase, the majority of her speeches was made after a caucus or primary election, and referenced each while also referencing the next battle.

FINDING HER VOICE During January 2008, Clinton gave speeches stressing messages of change, voice, solutions, and conversation after the Iowa and Nevada caucuses and the New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Florida primaries. After the Iowa caucus she addressed the need for change: “Today we’re sending a clear message: that we are going to have change, and that change will be a Democratic president in the White House in 2009” (2008a). The word “change” is often used in political races though its meaning varies. In Clinton’s rhetoric, “change” meant political power moving from the Republicans to the Democrats. Clinton also began to include references to her Democratic opponents as if they were all part of a team working together to fight Republicans. She distinguished herself from the “team” by laying out her goals as a leader. After the New Hampshire primary her rhetoric revealed how Clinton’s connection to the people of New Hampshire and her overall listening strategy in 2007 helped her connect. Clinton’s campaign message of finding her voice stands out as a representation in those early elections that she had indeed listened to the citizens in the previous year and by doing so she was changed. Clinton stated, “over the last week, I listened to you and in the process, I found my own voice” (2008b). This statement referenced an exchange in which Clinton had tears well up as she responded to a citizen’s question (Myers, 2008; Kornblut, 2008a; Williams, 2008). Some media and political pundits argued that her reaction was an act—a political ploy designed to win votes (Williams, 2008). To say that she found her own voice was a powerfully emotional statement for Clinton—quite atypical from her usual rhetoric because she rarely revealed her inner thoughts and feelings. Clinton also stated, “You want this campaign to be about you” (2008b), as she attempted to divert the focus from her “emotional” display (prior to the New Hampshire primary) back to citizens. After the Nevada caucus (won), Clinton hit her stride by offering a message of solutions, specifics, and accountability. This type of rhetoric—the workhorse approach—was typical of Clinton. It was also a prelude to upcoming attacks on her main opponent, Barack Obama: “They [people of Nevada] want somebody who’s going to give them solutions, not just rhetoric” (2008c).


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After the South Carolina primary (second place), Clinton returned to her campaign’s opening message—that of a conversation between her and the American people: “We’re just people having a conversation about what we believe and what we want, what we hope” (2008d). After the Florida primary (won), Clinton focused on a partnership with citizens. She stated: As we move forward in this campaign, all of your voices will go with me, because I am not only going to take my thirty-five years of experience to the White House. I’m going to take your voices, your concerns, your hopes, your dreams. (2008e)

Clinton offered the “voice” message in an attempt to extend the momentum of the New Hampshire win and overcome the loss in South Carolina. After Florida, she returned to her 2007 message of the “national conversation” in the hope that it would restart the race in her favor.

FIGHTING SPIRIT TO DESPERATION Clinton’s fighting spirit came out strong in early February 2008, when she acted like a frontrunner as she attacked the current president and Republicans. After the Super Tuesday primaries of February 5 (American Samoa, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee, New York) and the February 12 primaries (Maryland, Virginia, District of Columbia), Clinton acted as if she was already the Democratic nominee and she was ready to take on the Republican challenger in November. In her February 12 speech, she went on the offensive with President Bush: “You know, there’s a great saying in Texas—you’ve all heard it—‘all hat and no cattle.’ Well, after seven years of George Bush, we need a lot less hat and a lot more cattle” (2008g). In her Super Tuesday speech, she also challenged the Republicans by stating: The Republicans want eight more years of the same. They see tax cuts for the wealthy and they say, “Why not more?” They see $9 trillion in debt and say, “Why not trillions more?” They see five years in Iraq and say, “Why not 100 more?” (2008g)

This last statement was a clear attack on the Republican candidate John McCain, who had made a reference in the media about the length of the Iraq war. These messages reflected a discourse strategy on the offense. She attacked the opposing political party. Clinton addressed her solutions to a variety of soft and hard issues like healthcare, education, mortgage crisis, energy costs, minimum wage,

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green energy, jobs, global warming, immigration reform, borders, infrastructure, Iraq, and veterans. She offered a vision of a future America: “Every problem we face can be solved because we’re Americans. We are problem-solvers” (2008g). This description of Americans fit Clinton’s rhetorical and political stances. She offered herself to the American people as a problem-solver. If she could convince the American voters to accept this definition of Americans, then it should have followed naturally that they would elect her to be their leader. Ironically, these two speeches also offered an undertone of desperation. She began the call for citizens to go to her website and join her campaign, and, of course, donate much needed money. This website call became a standard element in her rhetoric from this point on to the end of her campaign. Within these undertones one can also find the foundation of her future attacks on her major Democratic rival, Barack Obama: “We know we need someone who is ready on day one to solve our problems” (2008f). This point was also made when Clinton stated that “we need in America, the kind of president that will be required on day one to be commander-in-chief to turn the economy around” (2008g). At the time, these undertones toward Obama were subtle and minor compared to the offensive directed toward the Republicans; Obama as the target became clear in later rhetoric. FRONTRUNNER TO UNDERDOG Following the Wisconsin primary and continuing through the Pennsylvania primary (with Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont in between), Clinton’s message changed from a frontrunner stance taking on the Republicans to that of a competition stance in which she attacked a fellow Democrat for the party’s nomination: “They [working citizens] need a president ready on day one to be commander-in-chief, ready to manage our economy, and ready to beat the Republicans in November” (2008h). The message attacking her Democratic challenger peaked when incorporating a fear appeal: Protecting America is the first and most urgent duty of the president. When there’s a crisis and that phone rings at 3 a.m. in the White House, there’s no time for speeches or on-the-job training. You have to be read to make a decision. (2008i)

These references were not made against the Republicans. They were directed toward her main Democratic opponent, Barack Obama. The attack message charged that speeches are not a substitute for experience when dealing with a crisis. Clinton’s rhetoric (and a political ad) generated strong reaction against the use of a fear appeal.


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By her April 22, 2008, speech, Clinton’s message attacking her Democratic opponent was weakening. Clinton stated Americans need “a president who’s ready to lead on day one” and that we should “stop talking about our problems and start solving them” (2008j). These comments referenced previous attacks on her opponent’s lack of experience. At this point, Clinton’s rhetoric contained a mixture of messages all in one speech. There was the half-hearted attack on Obama, an emphasis on her ability to solve problems, and much stressing of her ability to persevere. On this last point, two points clarified her stance. Clinton stated, “some people counted me out and said to drop out. But the American people don’t quit, and they deserve a president who doesn’t quit, either” (2008j). At another point, she also stated, “I might stumble and I might get knocked down, but as long as you’ll stand with me, I will always get right back up” (2008j). Her perseverance rhetoric no longer demonstrated a status of a frontrunner but that of an underdog. It was the rhetoric of someone who was battling for position, an underdog who would fight to the end. Endurance has always been a key component of Clinton’s fighting style (Leibovich and Zernike, 2008). Just as previous speeches hinted at future attacks on her Democratic challenger, so too did this phase of her rhetoric hint at future modifications of her message. This same speech also began to suggest where the Clinton message was going—how the message was changing: “The mothers and fathers at my events . . . lift their little girls on their shoulders and whisper in their ears, ‘See, you can be anything you want’” (2008j). While this comment had been made previously by Clinton, the placement of it at this point in the race seemed to suggest that she was getting ready to modify her message. This phrase combined with a comment about the “women in their nineties who tell me they were born before women could vote. And they’re hopeful of seeing a woman in the White House” (Clinton, 2008j) suggested the message was evolving—success will be redefined. The new vision of success began to be connected to the narrative of women’s political struggles, with Clinton to be seen as a role model for girls and women. Her speech also offered a glimpse of another transformation in the message. Here, Clinton was testing the waters about combining the frontrunners to create the “dream team”: “I believe with all of my heart that, together, we will turn promises into action, words will be become solutions, hope will become reality. So my answer to any who doubt it: Yes, we will” (2008j). This ending suggested a combination of her campaign with that of her opponent. Clinton’s campaign was the message of “solutions” while her attacks against her opponent had been that he was only “words.” When these two approaches are combined, “words will become solutions.” Of course, this message of combining campaigns was premature even though Clinton had predicted the future success of a “dream team” and especially since in this same speech Clinton’s perseverance rhetoric indicated that she was fighting to the finish. At the time it was unclear whether

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she was fighting for the combined Democratic ticket or to have her agenda adopted by her opponent or both. SUCCESS REDEFINED In the last month of Clinton’s campaign for the Democratic nomination for president, she gave five speeches after primaries before her final concession speech. The most dramatic change in Clinton’s message began with the May 6, 2008, speech after the North Carolina and Indiana primaries (lost North Carolina, won Indiana). Clinton’s rhetoric at this phase began to suggest her campaign to be the Democratic nominee was ending and she was looking toward the future. She included her perseverance rhetoric again as she stated, “I will never give up on you and on your families and on your dreams and on your future” (Clinton, 2008k). This discourse, while demonstrating perseverance, was modified from previous similar rhetoric. Here Clinton opened the door to forever fighting for citizens. This rhetoric went beyond simply the case of fighting to stay in the race; rather, this rhetoric implied that she was looking beyond the current race for the Democratic nomination to the next phase of her political life. Most important, this speech contained the renewed message displaying loyalty to the Democratic Party and, specifically, the eventual nominee: “I can assure you, as I have said on many occasions, that, no matter what happens, I will work for the nominee of the Democratic Party, because we must win in November” (Clinton, 2008k). Clinton was recharged after her win in West Virginia, and her rhetoric revealed this. Her May 13, 2008, speech was filled with energy. She cited a song about West Virginia (“it’s almost heaven”), adapted a colloquial (“give up, it’s too hard, the mountain is too high”) to West Virginia terrain (“you know a thing or two about rough roads to the top of a mountain”), and made a reference to the Bible (“faith can move mountains”) about how “the faith of the Mountain State has moved [her]” (Clinton, 2008l). She used a metaphor of “common threads that tie us together” to send a message that no matter what our differences may be, she was cognizant of the commonality of Americans—that “we want the best for our country” (Clinton, 2008l). She used this speech to answer critics calling for her to step out of the race: I’m in it [the race] because of the people that I have worked for my entire life and the people I meet along the campaign trail, people who need someone who fights for them because they’re fighting so hard every single day. . . . You will never quit, and I won’t either. (Clinton, 2008l)

One week later, as the air was being let out of the balloon, her final primary speeches following the Kentucky, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Montana, and South


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Dakota elections revealed victory, as well as preparation to end the battle for the good of the party. Modification of the Clinton message entered the final round. A message of party unity dominated these speeches: “We [Clinton and Obama] continue to go toe-to-toe for this nomination, we do see eye-to-eye when it comes to uniting our party to elect a Democratic president in the fall” (Clinton, 2008m). Later she stated, “I am committed to uniting our party so we move forward stronger and more ready than ever to take back the White House this November” (Clinton, 2008o) and “Let’s keep fighting for one another” (Clinton, 2008n). On May 20, 2008, Clinton stated: We will come together as a party, united by common values and common cause; united in service of the hopes and dreams that know no boundaries of race or creed, gender or geography. And when we do, there will be no stopping us. We won’t just unite our party; we will unite our country and make sure America’s best years are still ahead of us. (Clinton, 2008m)

Clinton used the metaphor of a “journey” in her final primary speech. She continued with the “journey” metaphor in her June 7 speech in which she suspended her campaign and endorsed Obama: “We may have started on separate journeys, but today our paths have merged. And we’re all heading toward the same destination” (Clinton, 2008p). Building on the message of past women’s struggles and future young girls’ dreams, Clinton connected her campaign to the “narrative of women’s emancipation” (Goldberg, 2008, 30) when she stated, “you can be so proud that, from now on, it will be unremarkable for a woman to win primary state victories” (2008p). Her rhetoric made the final transformation by redefining success from winning the Democratic presidential nomination to that of breaking through barriers blocking women as a role model for young girls. In this final campaign speech, Clinton’s rhetoric transcended her standard issue-listing, problem-solving structure. She found her voice in a much truer fashion than previously in New Hampshire. Her voice shone through in this final speech: To those who are disappointed that we couldn’t go all the way, especially the young people who put so much into this campaign, it would break my heart if, in falling short of my goal, I in any way discouraged any of you from pursuing yours. Always aim high, work hard, and care deeply about what you believe in. And, when you stumble, keep faith. And, when you’re knocked down, get right back up and never listen to anyone who says you can’t or shouldn’t go on. As we gather here today in this historic, magnificent building, the fiftieth woman to leave this Earth is orbiting overhead. If we can

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J UL I A A . SP IK ER blast fifty women into space, we will someday launch a woman into the White House. Although we weren’t able to shatter that highest, hardest ceiling this time, thanks to you, it’s got about eighteen million cracks in it and the light is shining through like never before, filling us all with the hope and the sure knowledge that the path will be a little easier next time. (2008p)

This portion of Clinton’s speech soared above her previous rhetoric in that it incorporated the powerful metaphor of “light shining through,” offering hope. She redefined her efforts and those efforts of her supporters as putting “eighteen million cracks” in the glass ceiling, the ultimate metaphor signaling the societal limitations on women with power. She has been a fighter who fought a good battle for all women. This rhetoric worked effectively for Clinton as she tried to shape her political image and legacy as she left the campaign battlefield.

SUMMARY OF MESSAGES IN SPEECHES Through her speech rhetoric, Clinton defined success in her terms at each stage of the campaign. Her speech rhetoric reveals a strong political fighter, a woman candidate speaking from a power feminism stance whose message was rejected in favor of another’s. Her message offered a candidate who solved problems, which would seem appealing to voters during these difficult political and economic times. However, this message did not resonate with voters. The message evolved, attempting to connect with voters as the results came in with each caucus and primary. First, the message presented a stance on problems and Clinton was the problem-solver. Second, the message was from a frontrunner and presumed Democratic nominee who attacked Republicans. Third, the message took a step back to wage an internal party battle and attack her Democratic challenger. Fourth, the message emphasized the unity of the Democratic Party and urged an end to in-fighting. Finally, the transformed message ended with a successful woman who connected with the dreams of women who fought for the right to vote in order to be a role model for young girls. This transformative message reflects Clinton’s use of power feminism rhetoric because she actively seeks power, demonstrates aggressiveness and competitiveness, and portrays an interest in success.

“Hillary for President”: Clinton’s Rhetorical Message in Interviews Clinton’s presidential rhetorical message throughout her 2007 interviews demonstrated her stance on issues by using a power feminism perspective that matched


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her tone in her speeches. However, starting in 2008, her rhetorical message alternated between a defensive stance and a victim feminism stance. Clinton’s rhetoric demonstrated a woman candidate on the defensive trying desperately to stay on message, even if it was an evolving message. She defended ill-received comments and her campaign’s strategies that attacked her Democratic challenger. She ineffectively refuted her campaign’s implications that a sexist media criticized her more harshly than male candidates. Both of these positions—on the defense and a victim of a sexist media—portrayed Clinton as less powerful and thus not a likely candidate for the powerful position of president.

EARN EVERY VOTE The early phase in Clinton’s 2007 interviews was marked by candor and direct rhetoric that closely matched the message of a “national conversation” offered in Clinton’s speeches. Many of Clinton’s interviews (Tumulty, 2007; NYTimes .com, 2007a) addressed issues like the “No Child Left Behind” program, the war in Iraq, healthcare, and trade. These interviews were structured as routine question-and-answer formats, giving the candidate the opportunity to present her platform. Clinton also demonstrated an awareness that she was not the presumed nominee when she stated, “I know I have to earn every vote” (Tumulty, 2007). By the middle of the year, an important interview emerged on Clinton’s religious beliefs, specifically on her Methodism: “My faith has always been primarily personal. It is how I live my life and who I am, and I have tried through my works to demonstrate a level of commitment and compassion that flow from my faith” (NYTimes.com, 2007b). By opening up on how important her religion was to her (Anderson, 2008), Clinton attempted to show her personal side and appeal to religious right voters who expect political candidates to discuss religious beliefs.

GOING ON THE OFFENSE AND GETTING OFFENSIVE However, throughout the 2008 interviews, Clinton was routinely on the defensive, having to justify her rhetoric, her husband’s rhetoric, her husband’s actions as president, her personal qualities of whether she was honest and trustworthy, and why she stayed in the race. Her typical response was first to “explain” how her message had been misinterpreted or taken out of context, then to present an attack on her main Democratic challenger, and finally to end with an argument demonstrating why she was the best candidate. After the Iowa caucus and the New Hampshire primary, the tone of the interviews changed dramatically. The race was on and the competition was

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intense. Internally, the Clinton camp was divided as to whether to focus the campaign message on humanizing her or emphasizing her strength and readiness (Cottle, 2008). Clinton’s strategic response was to emphasize her readiness and to attack the opposition by emphasizing his lack of readiness, and so the Clinton machine went on the offensive in South Carolina and the target was Obama. Public reaction to these attacks was swift and negative toward Clinton. In a January 13, 2008, interview on NBC’s Meet the Press Tim Russert called on Clinton to explain the attacks. Russert cited The New York Times columnist Bob Herbert to sum up the attacks: There was the former president chastising the press for the way it was covering the Obama campaign and saying of Mr. Obama’s effort, “the whole thing is the biggest fairy tale I’ve ever seen.” And there was Mrs. Clinton telling the country we don’t need “false hopes,” and taking cheap shots at . . . Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. We’ve already seen Clinton surrogates trying to implant the false idea that Mr. Obama might be a Muslim, and perhaps a drug dealer to boot. (Woolley and Peters, 2008a)

Initially, Clinton responded by saying “there’s not one shred of truth in what you’ve just read” (Woolley and Peters, 2008a) before moving on to offer explanations. She stressed her respect for Martin Luther King Jr. She accused the Obama camp of distorting these claims. She clarified Bill Clinton’s statement about the “fairy tale” by explaining that the former president was referring to “the story of Senator Obama’s campaign, being premised on a speech he gave in 2002” (Woolley and Peters, 2008a), and then she argued her case that Obama’s subsequent actions did not support his premise. Russert continued to challenge Clinton to defend her campaign tactics by using her own words as the basis for the questions. The terms of “work horse” and “show horse” were tossed out. She declined to directly and publicly call Obama a show horse but rather described herself as a “work horse”: “I believe that is what our country needs right now. We need a president who will . . . roll up our sleeves collectively as a nation and tackle the problems that we confront” (Woolley and Peters, 2008a). Even though her interview rhetoric during this phase was consistent with her campaign message that she was a problem-solver, this image retreated as the new dominant image took over. The new image was a defensive, weakening Clinton justifying her and her husband’s ill-received campaign remarks. Clinton was unable and unwilling to separate herself from her husband’s actions at this point because her rhetoric was based on her thirty-five years of experience, which included her work with her husband. After the South Carolina defeat, Clinton went on the CBS news Face the Nation program on January 27, 2008, to address the negativity of the South


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Carolina campaign tactics once again. She used justification to respond by saying that in an election voters needed to “compare and contrast our records” (Woolley and Peters, 2008b). She defended her husband against attacks made on him that he went too far in his comments. Her standing as a presidential candidate weakened when she changed the target from Bill to herself as she confessed to getting “a little bit carried away” during his Arkansas campaigns. The timing of the Schieffer interview coincided with the endorsement of Obama by Caroline Kennedy and slowed Clinton’s momentum. Clinton’s rhetoric changed in response because the all-out offensive in South Carolina failed. Clinton briefly reverted to more subtle attacks against Obama while addressing her platform in a February 3, 2008, interview on the ABC news program This Week.

EMOTION, GENDER, AND SEXISM Clinton’s message during this phase of campaign interviews began using the victim feminism rhetorical stance. The charge that the media was using the gender issue against Clinton was implied while Clinton’s rhetoric offered a surface message that gender was not an issue. In the Russert interview, Clinton was called on to address her atypical behavior before the New Hampshire primary when she demonstrated an emotional response—“Her voice cracked, and her eyes appeared to well with tears” (Kornblut, 2008a, A9)—to a citizen’s question. The citizen asked, “How do you do it?” to which Clinton stated, “I couldn’t do it if I didn’t passionately believe it was the right thing to do . . . this is very personal for me. It’s not just political. It’s not just public. I see what’s happening, and we have to reverse it” (Kornblut, 2008a, A9). Clinton told Russert, that moment was “a moment of real emotional connection” (Woolley and Peters, 2008a). Clinton was able to control the message in her speeches, but not as much in the interviews, as seen when Russert kept pressing the emotion issue. He informed Clinton that the woman who asked the question voted for Obama because Clinton had immediately reverted to her tough political style of going on the offensive with the “ready” attack against Obama. Russert implied Clinton used emotion as a political strategy. Clinton did not refute the implication. The New Hampshire incident flowed into a brief discussion about gender because Clinton sent contradictory messages about gender and politics (Kantor, 2008). At one point, Clinton indicated that she did not want the race to be about gender while in another interview Clinton raised the gender issue when she stated, “I represent change. The fact that I am, as a woman, competing to become the president of the United States would be an extraordinary change” (Woolley and Peters, 2008e). Here “change” was directly tied to gender, and it was inserted into the campaign rhetoric. This conflicting message in her interviews suggested

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Clinton was conflicted with how her gender played a role in her political campaign (Kantor, 2008). Many women believed the media permitted sexism to enter their reporting (Dionne Jr., 2008). Clinton believed the media were more critical of her than of her opponents: “I think the media has certainly been very, shall we say, tough on me . . . but that’s okay” (Anderson, Beecher and Rosen, 2008). Clinton sidestepped a direct question about whether the media criticism was sexist by offering this: “I think the historic nature of the campaign is causing a lot of cognitive dissonance among so many people” (Woolley and Peters, 2008d). Clinton chose not to take on the “sexist media” charge directly in these interviews. This public stance conflicted with the implied message offered by her campaign, and, as a result of the mixed message, she appeared weaker. These particular interviews were pivotal because they occurred at a peak time in the primaries. At this point, Clinton was forced to publicly address her negative campaign attacks and her charges about gender.

PLAYING THE TERROR CARD Aggression and intensity returned on the eve of the Pennsylvania primary as Clinton went on the offense again. A Clinton ad containing images of Osama bin Laden was a hot topic in two interviews on MSNBC’s Countdown and CNN’s Larry King. This ad was labeled a “scare tactic” (Woolley and Peters, 2008d), and Obama was cited saying that Clinton was using the “politics of fear” (Woolley and Peters, 2008e). Clinton’s responses included references to the importance of “leadership experience” (Woolley and Peters, 2008d) in the current “reality” (Woolley and Peters, 2008e) of involvement in wars combined with an economic crisis. Her responses offered a rationale for using the image while also continuing the attack on Obama. The interviews gave her another chance to argue her case for her candidacy while attempting to undermine that of her opponent. However, the interviews also made a direct link between Clinton and the negative attack. It was her face and her voice on the screen addressing the charges of using fear appeals. Clinton tried to soften this connection by never directly stating the name of the international terrorist and by talking about her positions.

ACHILLES HEEL An interview toward the end of primary season addressed a weakness in the Clinton campaign strategy. George Stephanopoulos of the ABC news program


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This Week cited an ABC poll showing “six out of ten voters think [Clinton is] dishonest,” and he called this the “Achilles heel of [Clinton’s] campaign” in a May 4 interview (Woolley and Peters, 2008f). Clinton found this “troubling” and immediately touted her election success in New York where she was “reelected with 67 percent of the vote” (Woolley and Peters, 2008f). While this interview tactic demonstrated a positive answer, it did not address the issue of dishonesty that was raised. She redefined “dishonesty” as a by-product of being a leader: “Have I drawn a lot of fire from people who have come right at me and, frankly, you know, done a lot of attacking of me? Sure. But I think that goes with being a leader” (Woolley and Peters, 2008f). She identified the foundation of the attacks when she stated, “I just have a fundamental disagreement about how you get change in America” (Woolley and Peters, 2008f). Stephanopoulos pressed on with the issue of trust. Her response was again to stress the support of the people of New York before indicating that when people see her in person, as opposed to just hearing things about her, people trust her: “I know you hear a lot about me. There is a lot out there that . . . I have no control over” (Woolley and Peters, 2008f). These issues relate to the fact that many people simply disliked Clinton and believed she was not “likeable” (Drake, 2008; Taibbi, 2008). Sanders (2006) offers a connection between “likeability” and honesty: “Voters who felt a ‘personal liking’ . . . for a candidate . . . also tended to view that politician as more honest and his or her message as less deceitful than that of less likeable counterparts” (85). Clinton’s “likeability” factor was challenged because of the dissonance she produced. In fact, the framework of “dishonesty,” “trust,” and “likeability” can be traced back to Clinton’s days as First Lady with the various reported scandals (Kornblut and Cohen, 2008). Combine this controversial history with her misspoken comments during the campaign—how she faced sniper fire in Bosnia (Malkin, 2008), her reference to Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination in the month of June (Barrett, 2008), and using the phrase “white Americans” to describe her support base prior to the West Virginia primary (Woolley and Peters, 2008i; Kiely and Lawrence, 2008)—with her conflicting rhetorical style (a woman speaking in a masculine style), and it is not surprising that a negative public response was triggered (Kornblut and Cohen, 2008; Kornblut, 2008c). One of the flaws in Clinton’s campaign strategy was that she never tried to “win over voters who told pollsters they viewed her unfavorably” (Lawrence, 2008, 1A).

THE LAST WORD Toward the end of her campaign, Clinton presented messages of support for the Democratic nominee along with her determination to stay in the race until the

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last primary was held (Woolley and Peters, 2008g; Woolley and Peters, 2008h; Woolley and Peters, 2008i). In an April 21 interview with Larry King, when asked by King whether she would campaign for Obama if she did not get the nomination, Clinton stated, “We’re going to do everything we can to make sure a Democrat is elected president. . . . I’ll work my heart out to make sure that we have a Democratic victory” (King, 2008). While previous interviews criticized Clinton (her record, her husband, and her campaign tactics), this new message was preparation for possible defeat and how to redefine it as a success. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS Throughout her 2008 interviews Clinton found her campaign message of being an experienced problem-solver overshadowed by her misspoken comments, her ill-fated strategic attacks against her Democratic challenger, and her stance that she was a victim of a sexist media. Clinton’s rhetoric took on a defensive posture, which made her appear weak as a presidential candidate. The more she lost ground politically, the more gender became an issue. Her campaign’s response was to charge the media criticism of her campaign as sexist. Even though Clinton’s rhetoric in the interviews did not make this direct charge, neither did it counter the implication of a sexist media unfairly criticizing Clinton. Her rhetoric projected a conflicting message that gender should not be part of a campaign. Her interview rhetoric implied a defensive position as a victim of unfair, excessive, and sexist attacks. This created a dissonance for voters who also heard a message of a powerful woman in Clinton’s speech rhetoric. As Marcus states, “The candidate of inevitability and the victim of the uneven playing field aren’t compatible concepts” (2008a, A21).

Discussion During her career, Clinton’s style has not fit the feminine style of rhetoric that is typically associated with women in politics. Her style of “methodically gathering evidence and marshaling her arguments” (Liebovich and Zernike, 2008) has been more masculine in nature, perhaps more fitting in a courtroom setting and perhaps more acceptable to society if it were used by a male candidate. As one individual in a focus group stated, “You get the sense that she doesn’t think like a woman. She thinks like a man” (Savage, as quoted in Tomasky, Hillary’s Turn, 2006, 27). Her communication style caused dissonance among citizens even as it broke the stereotypes for how women candidates present themselves rhetorically. Her rhetorical style has been fairly consistent throughout her career (Muir


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and Benitez, 1996; Campbell, 1998; Kelley, 2001; Manning, 2006). Hillary is Hillary. She has never changed who she is although she has effectively adjusted her political strategies to fit the currency (Buchanan, 2007). As a result, she was able to transform her message throughout the campaign. While she consistently presented herself as a problem-solver, ultimately she did redefine what a successful outcome to the 2008 campaign would look like—from being the Democratic nominee to serving as a role model for young girls and women. Her use of power varied throughout the campaign, causing dissonance for supporters and critics alike. Clinton’s rhetoric in her campaign speeches demonstrated an active stance of seeking out political power while some of her rhetoric in her campaign interviews demonstrated a stance of being a victim and having reduced power. The majority of the time, she was a rhetorical power feminist actively seeking power, comfortable with power, and demonstrating effective experience with power. However, there were times when she offered the rhetorical victim feminist portrayal of power in which she portrayed herself as a victim of the patriarchal society persecuting and criticizing her because she was a woman. In her bid for the presidency, Clinton used both power perspectives (power feminism and victim feminism) because this worked for her in the past. Playing the victim feminist status was effective for Clinton as she left the role of First Lady when she gained popularity as a victim because she persevered through her husband’s infidelity. Playing the victim feminist status was effective for Clinton when she ran for U.S. senator in New York after the incident when, during a debate, her male opponent Rick Lazio crossed into her personal space, violating her right to that space, and demanded that she sign a pledge statement. When Clinton asked him to step away, women responded in support of Clinton as they connected emotionally to similar experiences of males exerting power unethically over women. In the Senate race this stance as the victim feminist was effective because it was not initiated by Clinton. A male initiated the power play, and Clinton simply let the narrative play out in the media and in the public to increase her political success. But playing the dual strategy of both power feminist and victim feminist as a presidential candidate is not effective, as demonstrated by Clinton in 2008. Even though the vast majority of the time Clinton portrayed herself as a power feminist through her rhetoric, there were times when she “took up the gender card and chose to play it as victim instead of trailblazer” (Marcus, 2008b, A19) (i.e., the male candidates ganged up on her during the debates or the sexist media overly criticized her as in New Hampshire when she had tears in her eyes). Some interpreted her actions as using the gender card in the form of the victim feminism stance as an attempt to regain lost political ground. While she was not always overt in sending these messages, as it was often her surrogates who

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implied these messages, Clinton allowed them to circulate and by doing so sent a mixed message to the public and the media (Cohen, 2008, May 20). People like a neat story, and when the story gets confusing (powerful or victim?), then people become uncomfortable (Hitt, 2007). Clinton let this narrative unfold but the public did not accept it. People want a strong leader, not a victim president. Dr. Alvin Poussaint believes that Obama would never be president if he thought of himself as a victim (Fischer, 2009). While Poussaint was making a reference to Obama’s campaign during a panel discussion of race and politics, his statement holds true for anyone. Clinton could not be elected president while believing and portraying herself as a victim. The country demands a president who will lead, solve problems, and keep the peace and prosperity all want. A president who is seen as or who presents her- or himself as a victim of forces beyond his or her control does not appear strong enough to take on the job. Citizens respond negatively to mixed messages. Clinton offered mixed messages in her rhetoric, that of a power feminist and that of victim feminist. Finally, by staying in the race until the last primary was held, Clinton recreated her image as a strong, powerful political woman. Her legacy would have been completely different if she quit the race early. She chose to create a strong legacy in this campaign to position herself for future opportunities (Kornblut and Balz, 2008). By the time Clinton conceded defeat she demonstrated the leadership qualities of “stamina and determination” (Marcus, 2008b, A19) and “pride, honor, and a sort of unforgiving toughness” (Cohen, 2008, A13) to the world. She set the stage for future opportunities for herself. In addition, instead of a loser legacy Clinton rewrote her success legacy. She fought to the end and redefined success from an original goal of becoming president to an end goal of becoming a role model for women and young girls. Staying in the race reestablished Clinton’s political power. By the time Clinton conceded her race and publicly supported Obama, he needed her support and the support of her followers in order to retain unity in the Democratic Party and to go on to win in November (Powers, 2008). Even though the village of the Democratic Party did not accept Clinton as their presidential nominee in 2008, in her loss Clinton remained a powerful voice in the Democratic Party and for women.

References Anderson, K. V. (2008). The personal is political: Negotiating publicity and privacy in Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Living History. In B. D. Marshall and M. A. Mayhead (Eds.), Telling political lives: The rhetorical autobiographies of women leaders in the United States (111–46). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.


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Anderson, R., Beecher, L., and Rosen, I. (2008, February 10). Hillary Clinton’s run for the White House. CBS Evening News. Barrett, D. (2008, May 23). Clinton regrets Kennedy assassination remark. CQ Today, www.cqpolitics.com. Berman, A. (2007, June 4). Hillary inc. Nation, 11–18. Buchanan, B. (2007, July 4). Fearing the new & improved Hillary Clinton. USA Today Magazine, 10–12. Campbell, K. K. (1998). The discursive performance of femininity: Hating Hillary. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 1, 1–19. Campbell, K. K., and Huxman, S. S. (2009). The rhetorical act: Thinking, speaking, and writing critically. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. Cohen, R. (2008, May 20). Why she fights on. The Washington Post, A13. Clinton, H. (2007, January 20). Senator Clinton’s statement about her candidacy for president. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com/2007/01/20/us/politics/20clinton -text.html. Clinton, H. (2008a, January 3). Remarks following the Iowa caucus. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008b, January 8). Remarks following the New Hampshire primary. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008c, January 19). Remarks following the Nevada caucus. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008d, January 26). Remarks following the South Carolina primary. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008e, January 29). Remarks following the Florida primary. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008f, February 5). Remarks following the “Super Tuesday” primaries and caucuses. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election _speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008g, February 12). Remarks following the Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia primaries. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb .edu/2008_election_speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008h, February 19). Remarks following the Wisconsin primary at the Solutions for America Event, Youngstown, Ohio. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008i, March 4). Remarks following the Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont primaries. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb .edu/2008_election_speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008j, April 22).. Remarks following the Pennsylvania primary. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70.

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Clinton, H. (2008k, May 6). Remarks following the Indiana and North Carolina primaries. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election _speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008l, May 13). Remarks following the West Virginia Primary. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008m, May 20). Remarks following the Kentucky and Oregon primaries. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008n, June 1). Remarks following the Puerto Rico primary. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election_speeches .php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008o, June 3). Remarks in New York City following the Montana and South Dakota primaries. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb .edu/2008_election_speeches.php?candidate=70. Clinton, H. (2008p, June 7). Remarks conceding the Democratic Presidential Nomination. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2008_election _speeches.php?candidate=70. CNNPolitics.com. (2008, August 20). ElectionCenter 2008, www.cnn.com/ ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/candidates. Cohen, R. (2008, February 26). Hillary’s diminished returns. Real Clear Politics, www .realclearpolitics.com. Cottle, M. (2008, May 7). Voices in her head. New Republic, 20–23. Darman, J., Hosenball, M., Clift, E., Bailey, H., and Conant, E. (2007, June 18). The new war on Hillary. Newsweek, 30–33. Dionne, E. J., Jr. (2008, May 30). Look what they’ve done to her. The Washington Post, A13. Drake, B. (2008, March 27). Clinton struggling with her likeability problem. CQ Today, www.cqpolitics.com. Fischer, B. (2009, January 11). Meet the press. NBC-TV network. Goldberg, M. (2008, July 25). Three a.m. for feminism. New Republic, 29–31. Gutgold, N. D. (2006). Paving the way for madam president. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Hitt, J. (2007, January/February). Harpy hero heretic Hillary. Mother Jones, 36–43. Kantor, J. (2008, May 19). Gender issue lives on as Clinton’s bid wanes. The New York Times, www.nytime.com. Kapochunas, R. (2007, November 2). For Hillary: The ups and downs of being a woman. CQ Today, www.cqpolitics.com. Kapochunas, R., and Kady, M., II. (2007, January 20). Clinton launches plans for 2008. CQ Today, www.cqpolitics.com. Kelley, C. E. (2001). The rhetoric of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton: Crisis management discourse. Westport, CT: Praeger. Kiely, K., and Lawrence, J. (2008, May 8). Clinton makes case for staying in. USA Today.


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Kornblut, A. E. (2008a, January 8). “It’s not easy,” an emotional Clinton says. The Washington Post, A9. Kornblut, A. E. (2008b, April 3). In speeches, Clinton often veers to dark side. The Washington Post, A6. Kornblut, A. E. (2008c, May 26). Remark about RFK keeps Clinton on the defensive— her aides say Obama campaign has exploited statement. The Washington Post, A4. Kornblut, A. E., and Balz, D. (2008, June 5). She could accept losing: She could not accept quitting. The Washington Post, A1. Kornblut, A. E., and Cohen, J. (2008, April 16). Poll shows erosion of trust in Clinton. The Washington Post, A6. Lawrence, J. (2008, June 5). Under pressure, she moves to unite party. USA Today, 1A. Leibovich, M., and Zernike, K. (2008, May 5). Seeing grit and ruthlessness in Clinton’s love of the fight. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com. Malkin, M. (2008, March 31). The Clintons’ truth deficit disorder. Human Events, 1–6. Mandziuk, R. M. (2008). Dressing down Hillary. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 5(3): 312–16. Manning, M. R. (2006). The rhetoric of equality: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s redefinition of the female politician. Texas Speech Communication Journal, 30(2): 109–20. Marcus, R. (2007, November 2). Damsel in distress. The Washington Post, A21. Marcus, R. (2008a, March 5). The Force of gender. The Washington Post, A21. Marcus, R. (2008b, May 21). The ground Clinton broke. The Washington Post, A19. Mayhead, M. A., and Marshall, B. D. (2005). Women’s political discourse. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Mayo, E. P. (1993, September 15). The influence and power of First Ladies. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 52. Morris, D., and McGann, E. (2005). Condi vs. Hillary. New York: Regan Books. Muir, J. K., and Benitez, L. M. (1996). Redefining the role of the First Lady: The rhetorical style of Hillary Rodham Clinton. In R. E. Denton Jr., and R. L. Holloway (Eds.), The Clinton Presidency: Images, issues, and communication strategies (139–58). Westport, CT: Praeger. Myers, D. D. (2008). Why women should rule the world. New York: Harper. NYTimes.com. (2007a, March 14). Transcript of interview with Senator Clinton. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/washington/15clintontext.html. NYTimes.com. (2007b, July 6). Transcript of interview with Senator Clinton. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/washington/15clintontext.html. Powers, M. (2008, June 11). How staying in the race benefited Clinton. CQ Today, www.cqpolitics.com. Sanders, T. (2006). The Likeability factor: How to boost your L-factor & achieve your life’s dreams. New York: Random House. Savage, L. C. (2006, November 13). President Hillary? Maclean’s, 27. Taibbi, M. (2008, March 20). Hillary’s last stand. Rolling Stone, 32–33. Tomasky, M. (2006). Hillary’s turn: Inside her improbable victories in Senate campaigns. New York: Simon and Schuster.

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Tumulty, K. (2007, February 1). Hillary: “I have to earn every vote.” Time, www.time .com. Walsh, K. T. (2007, March 4). Crafting the new Hillary: She’s removing the rough edges, but not everyone’s convinced Senator Clinton is warm and fuzzy—or that she’s a winner in 2008. U.S. News & World Report, www.usnews.com. Williams, B. (2008, January 14). Media’s rush to judge. Broadcasting & Cable, 44. Wolfe, N. (1994). Fire with fire: The new female power and how to use it. New York: Vintage Books. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008a, January 13). Hillary Clinton interview with Tim Russert on NBC News’ “Meet the Press.” The American Presidency Project, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77748. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008b, January 27). Hillary Clinton interview with Bob Schieffer on CBS News’ “Face the Nation.” The American Presidency Project, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78604 Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008c, February 3). Hillary Clinton interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’ “This Week.” The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77316. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008d, April 21). Hillary Clinton interview with Keith Olbermann on MSNBC’s “Countdown.” The American Presidency Project, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77155. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008e, April 21). Hillary Clinton interview with Larry King. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77156. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008f, May 4). Hillary Clinton interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’ “This Week.” The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77207. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008g, May 5). Hillary Clinton interview with Katie Couric of CBS News. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=77751. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008h, May 14). Hillary Clinton interview with Wolf Blitzer on CNN’s “The Situation Room.” The American Presidency Project, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77308. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008i, May 14). Hillary Clinton interview with Charlie Gibson of ABC News. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=77320. Woolley, J. T., and Peters, G. (2008j, May 14). Hillary Clinton interview with Katie Couric of CBS News. The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=77754.

CHAPTER 6

The First—and Last— Woman Standing: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Presidential Primary Debate Performance Mitchell S. McKinney, Corey B. Davis, and Jeffrey Delbert

Sitting mere inches from her only remaining primary campaign opponent, Hillary Rodham Clinton noted the historic nature of their presidential nominating contest in her closing statement while debating Barack Obama in Cleveland, Ohio, in late Feburary of 2008: You know, it’s been an honor to campaign—I still intend to do everything I can to win—but it has been an honor, because it has been a campaign that is history-making. I am thrilled to be running to be the first woman president, which I think would be a sea change in our country and around the world and would give enormous, enormous hope and a real challenge to the way things have been done and who gets to do them and what the rules are. So I feel that either one of us will make history.1

Certainly, the Democratic Party went on to make history with its pick of presidential candidates, even if not the historic choice desired by Hillary Clinton. Both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama had ample opportunity to debate which vision of “history making” the party should pursue and persuade Democratic primary voters to endorse one historic candidate over the other. Indeed, the primary campaign to select the Democratic Party’s 2008 presidential nominee featured twenty-three different primary debates, a process spanning nearly one year that winnowed the field of eight candidates in April of 2007 to a battle of two remaining contenders in early 2008. During this protracted marathon, former First Lady and New York senator Hillary Rodham Clinton went from the odds-on favorite to secure her party’s nomination to the lone 125

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challenger fighting vigorously to wrest the nomination from leading contender and eventual Democratic pick—and successful presidential candidate—U.S. senator Barack Obama of Illinois. The 2007–2008 Democratic primary debates are particularly historic and worthy of analysis as these encounters featured, for the very first time, a female candidate as the leading contender for a major-party presidential nomination. While former Illinois senator Carol Moseley Braun participated in the first few 2004 Democratic primary debates, she was never regarded as a viable candidate and was not included in subsequent debates after her quick exit from the field. Also, earlier female presidential candidates, including Democrat Pat Schroeder in 1988 and Republican Elizabeth Dole in 2000, abandoned their bids for presidential nomination before participating in their respective party’s primary debates. Thus, for the first time in presidential nomination history, Hillary Rodham Clinton took to the debate stage as a frontrunner—and frequent target—when debating her several opponents (all of whom were male). Clinton’s debate performance offers a unique case study for analyzing presidential primary debates. Past studies of campaign debates represent a vital area of political communication research, providing greater understanding of candidate rhetorical strategies as well as effects from debate viewing. Yet, as McKinney and Carlin (2004) point out, our knowledge of general-election campaign debates is far more extensive than that for primary debates. Also, beyond the few studies of the 1984 George H. W. Bush and Geraldine Ferraro vice-presidential debate (and the likely studies that will be conducted of the Joe Biden and Sarah Palin 2008 vice-presidential debate), very little presidential debate research exists that examines candidate gender as a variable of analysis. Examination of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s presidential primary debate performance will advance our understanding of the role of gender in presidential campaign debates in a number of important ways. The current chapter explores the style of argumentation and issue appeals adopted by Hillary Rodham Clinton and her male opponents in the 2007–2008 Democratic primary debates. Specifically, this study examines candidates’ attack strategies (including frequency and specific targets of attack), campaign issues emphasized in debate dialogue, and candidates’ development of so-called feminine and masculine character traits in their debate messages. Finally, the study incorporates a longitudinal design by exploring possible differences in Hillary Rodham Clinton’s debate performance and treatment by opponents early in the campaign when she was viewed as the frontrunner and likely nominee, compared to her performance and treatment late in the campaign when she was seen as the lone challenger battling Barack Obama for the nomination.

T HE F IRST—A ND LA ST—WOMAN ST AN DIN G

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Review of Literature In their comprehensive review of the presidential debate literature, McKinney and Carlin (2004) point out that the extant primary debate research, for the most part, closely mirrors the various topics examined in general election debate research. In particular, a focus on candidate preference following debate exposure, perceptions of candidate image, and analysis of voter learning from debate viewing constitute the major variables analyzed. Yet McKinney, Kaid, and Robertson (2001) argue that it is shortsighted for scholars to approach their study of primary debates as they do general election debate encounters. In short, the context of a primary debate is fundamentally different from the communicative dynamics of a general election debate and thus our investigation of primary debates should reflect these differences. First, perhaps the most obvious difference between primary and general election debates is the presence of multiple candidates—all of the same party—appearing on the primary debate stage. Unlike a general election debate in which almost always only two candidates of opposing parties must distinguish themselves from each other, frequently employing sharp lines of attack to do so, a primary debate requires several candidates to differentiate themselves from within a much narrower range of issue positions and ideological differences while attempting to maintain some semblance of party unity. Opponent attack as a debate strategy has been long recognized by debate analysts and scholars, yet it is not frequently the focus of systematic study. In her examination of the history of presidential primaries, Kendall (2000, 86) observed the common debate strategy of attacking the field’s frontrunner. Systematic content analysis by Benoit, Blaney, and Pier (1998, 170) also found that the frontrunner is the recipient of the most attacks made during a multicandidate primary debate. Similarly, Lanoue and Schrott (1989, 69) found that in a debate featuring a large field of Democratic primary candidates in 1988, the “also-rans” adopted a strategy of “ganging up” on the frontrunner. Finally, McKinney et al. (2001) examined a 2000 Republican primary debate that included six candidates, identifying the various candidates as the frontrunner, the contenders, and the also-rans. Their findings revealed that while the most frequent target of attack, the frontrunner actually refrained from attacking fellow party opponents, with most of the intra-party attacks coming from the contenders (those trailing in the opinion polls yet with still a chance to secure the nomination) and also from the various “also-rans” (the several often perennial candidates with little or no hope of securing their party’s nomination).

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To guide our exploration of the Democratic primary candidates’ attack strategies, examining both their frequency and target of attacks, we posit the following research question: RQ1: How frequently did each of the Democratic candidates attack during their 2007–2008 primary debates, and who was the specific target of their attacks? Also, a primary debate’s rhetorical situation differs greatly from general election encounters in terms of the audience to which the candidate-rhetors must appeal. During the fall debates, with their party nomination already in hand, candidates are free to speak to the issue concerns of a larger, more general audience—often attempting in the fall campaign to appeal to undecided or independent voters, or perhaps even appealing to the “persuadables” of the opposing party. In a primary debate, however, the rhetorical imperative is to convince the faithful of one’s own party—often represented through “single interest” and/or core constituencies—that you understand their particular interests, share their fundamental concerns, and best embody the ideals of the party. In fact, one might view the issues championed in a primary debate by party candidates as somewhat representative of the party’s issue agenda. Here, we are interested in the issue appeals developed by the Democratic primary candidates in their primary debates. Specifically, we explore the issue agenda championed by the Democratic candidates by positing the following research question: RQ2: What issues did the Democratic candidates discuss most frequently during their 2007–2008 primary debates? Yet another feature that distinguishes primary from general-election debates is the sheer number of primary debate encounters that occur over such a prolonged period of time. In a general-election campaign, a fall presidential debate series (typically two to four exchanges) takes place over a relatively short span of time (most often within a two-week period from late September until the middle of October). As McKinney and Carlin (2004) note, the number of primary debates has continued to increase, beginning in the early to mid-1980s, particularly with the growth of cable news networks that compete to sponsor and broadcast these debates. Now it is not uncommon to have primary debates beginning more than a year before the first primaries and caucuses, with the record number of total primary debates thus far going to the Democratic Party’s twenty-seven debate encounters in 2003–2004 (McKinney and Banwart, 2005, 162). Despite their frequency and prominence throughout a primary campaign, very little debate research has attempted to capture the longitudinal nature of a


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debate series, examining how the evolving nature of the campaign and debate situation may affect candidates’ debate and message strategies. Specifically, as a large field of candidates early in the primary campaign is winnowed to just two or more candidates late in the primary season, one might expect that such debate dynamics as candidates’ attack and message strategies, as well as issue agendas, may change over time. In the current study we capture the longitudinal nature of the year-long series of twenty-three Democratic primary debates by examining debates that occurred at the very beginning of the primary campaign in which the full field of eight candidates participated, and also debates that took place at the very end of the primary campaign that included only Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. To examine the evolving nature of candidates’ attack strategies as well as issue agendas, we posit the following research questions: RQ3: How did the Democratic candidates’ patterns of attack change from their early to late 2007–2008 primary debates? RQ4: How did the Democratic candidates’ issue agendas, as represented by the issues they discussed most frequently in their debate responses, change from their early to late 2007–2008 primary debates? Finally, to guide our exploration of possible gendered differences in the message strategies of Hillary Clinton and her principal opponent Barack Obama, we draw on Banwart and McKinney’s (2005) examination of mixedgender debatestyles. In their analysis of mixed-gender gubernatorial and U.S. Senate campaign debates, Banwart and McKinney found that when female and male candidates meet face-to-face on the debate stage, both seem mindful of gendered stereotypes and approach their debate task by generating a dialogue of gendered adaptiveness (a style of debate argumentation in which female candidates incorporate typically masculine attributes into their debate dialogue just as frequently as their male opponents, and male candidates incorporate typically feminine attributes in their debate dialogue just as frequently as their female opponents). The mixed-gender debatestyle construct is grounded in Bystrom’s (1995) adaptation of Kaid and Davidson’s (1986) initial work on candidate videostyle, which incorporates the systematic content analysis of the verbal, nonverbal, and production content of political campaign ads. Bystrom’s work (e.g., Bystrom, 1995; Bystrom, Banwart, Kaid, and Robertson, 2004; Bystrom and Kaid, 2002) expands the original videostyle system to include variables that capture male and female candidates’ gendered communication styles. Studies employing this method have indicated that indeed differences do exist in female and male candidate videostyles—particularly candidates’ verbal content—although it is evident that female and male candidates’ communication styles and strategies

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have evolved over time and differ according to campaign context (for a review of this scholarship, see Banwart and McKinney, 2005). While Banwart and McKinney’s (2005) mixed-gender debatestyle is captured by a rather exhaustive coding system that includes one hundred discrete variables across sixteen different categories, in the current chapter we are particularly interested in possible differences in the “feminine” and “masculine” character traits emphasized in Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s debate responses. We seek to explore not only possible differences between Clinton and Obama, but also possible changes from early to late primary periods. Thus, we posit the following two final research questions: RQ5: Did Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s debate responses differ in the types of “feminine” and “masculine” character traits emphasized? RQ6: Did the types of “feminine” and “masculine” character traits emphasized by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in their debate responses change from their early to late 2007–2008 primary debates?

Method PROCEDURES This study utilized content analysis to examine the verbal content of the Democratic candidates’ 2007–2008 primary debates. As discussed in the previous section, we sought to capture the span of the year-long primary campaign debate series; thus from the total twenty-three primary debates held we selected the first three debates and the final three debates for analysis. This sampling allowed us to analyze debate dialogue at the very beginning of the primary season when the field included eight Democratic candidates, and also at the very end of the campaign when only Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama remained on the debate stage. The three early primary debates that we analyzed included the April 26, 2007, debate in Orangeburg, South Carolina; a debate on June 3, 2007, in Manchester, New Hampshire; and a debate on June 28, 2007, in Washington, D.C. The eight candidates participating in each of these three debates included Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, former Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico, Senator Joe Biden of Delaware, U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, former Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska, and Senator Barack Obama of Illinois. The three late primary debates analyzed included the


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January 31, 2008, primary debate in Los Angeles; a February 21, 2008, debate in Austin, Texas; and the February 26, 2008, debate in Cleveland, Ohio. The final three debates included only Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.

DATA ANALYSIS A verbatim transcript was obtained for each of the six debates. The unit of analysis chosen for this study was each candidate’s full response, including any rebuttal/follow-up responses to questions posed in the debate. The formal content analysis was designed to address the study’s six research questions, with coding categories developed to examine candidates’ attack strategies, the Democrats’ primary debate issue agenda, and Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s “masculine” and “feminine” message characteristics. Each candidate response was coded for specific target of attacks (see table 6.1 for attack target categories), and frequency of attacking was calculated for each candidate. Each candidate response segment was also coded for the specific issues discussed. To code for issues mentioned by the candidates, we utilized a twenty-two-category presidential campaign issue typology adapted from previous campaign communication studies (e.g., Banwart and McKinney, 2005; Bystrom et al., 2004), along with an open-ended “other” category to identify any issues not included in the issue list. A frequency of specific issues mentioned was calculated for each debate and then summed across both the three early and three late debates, producing a rank-ordered issue agenda for the two primary debate periods. Finally, each debate response by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama was coded for “masculine” and “feminine” traits. Here, we utilized the typology of character traits used in previous gender campaign communication research.2 Coding materials were developed containing the coding categories described above, and a training session was conducted—utilizing primary debate dialogue not included in the current study—to familiarize the coders with the codebook, coding instrument, and procedures for coding. After initial training, three coders each coded one of the early primary debates, followed by a session to discuss and clarify any questions regarding coding decisions. The very few instances of disagreement in the coding of the first three debate transcripts were resolved following discussion among the coders. The remaining transcripts were divided evenly among the three researchers and coded separately. In presenting our results, descriptive statistics are used to present frequencies and the presence or absence of defined categories in each debate response. Cross tabulations are calculated to compare the early and late primary debate segments and also to compare Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s message strategies.

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Results and Discussion CANDIDATES’ ATTACK STRATEGIES As table 6.1 reveals, the most frequent target of attack by the Democratic candidates in their early primary debates was not one of their fellow opponents appearing along side them on the debate stage, but rather President George W. Bush. It was clear throughout their early debates that the Democrats were running against the incumbent president and his “record of failure.” From Bush’s execution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to his tax policies and his response to Hurricane Katrina, President Bush was the preferred target for these Democrats. Indeed, of the 203 specific attacks that were made by the Democrats across their three early debates, nearly half of all their attacks (ninety-six, 47 percent) were made against Bush and his administration. Interestingly, the Democratic primary candidates virtually ignored the field of Republicans seeking their party’s nomination (two, 1 percent), preferring instead to level their numerous criticisms against the incumbent president. Blaming Bush for a failed war effort came early and often for the Democrats. In their very first primary debate in South Carolina, Mike Gravel boldly announced: “Well, first off, understand that this war was lost the day that George Bush invaded Iraq on a fraudulent basis.” Hillary Clinton was quite emphatic in giving Bush full ownership of the war effort when she noted in the New Hampshire primary debate that “I think it’s important particularly to point out this is George Bush’s war. He is responsible for this war. He started the war. He mismanaged the war. He escalated the war. And he refuses to end the war.” Later in the same debate Clinton went on to claim that the Iraq war could have been avoided altogether, “if George Bush had allowed the inspectors to finish the job they started, we would have known that Saddam Hussein did not have WMD and we would not have gone and invaded Iraq.” Table 6.1. Attacks in Early Primary Debates

Attacks on George W. Bush / Bush Administration Attacks on Democratic Opponents (general) Attacks on Democratic Opponents (by name) Other Attacks Attacks on Miscellaneous Democrats Attacks on Miscellaneous Republicans Attacks on Republican Presidential Candidates Note: N = 203

%

N

47 19 15 13 3 2 1

96 39 30 27 5 4 2


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Also in these early debates President Bush was frequently attacked based on his handling of the economy, and particularly for his tax policies that Democrats claimed favored the wealthy. In their Washington, D.C., primary debate, John Edwards offered this assessment: “First, we need to get rid of George Bush’s tax cuts for rich people—(applause)—which have distorted the tax system in America. I would use that money to pay for universal health care, to make sure everyone’s covered.” Hillary Clinton noted in the same debate: “When the Bush administration came in, they were determined to tilt the balance back toward the privileged. We are paying a very big price for this, because middle-class and working families are paying a much higher percentage of their income.” While George W. Bush received most of the Democrats’ ire in their debates, the field of eight candidates did find numerous opportunities to turn their attention—and attacks—on one another. As noted in table 6.1, just over one-third of all Democrats’ attacks across the first three debates were of their colleagues, either as a general attack or specifically by name (sixty-nine, 34 percent). Still, even when attacking a fellow Democrat, the more general attack (thirty-nine, 19 percent) was the preferred tactic of calling out one’s opponents without naming names. For example, in the New Hampshire primary debate, Bill Richardson called to task several of his opponents—although indirectly— when he observed, “Most of the people on this stage voted consistently to fund a war we should have never gotten in in the first place.” In the same debate, the following exchange between John Edwards and debate moderator Wolf Blitzer of CNN demonstrates the seemingly uncomfortable task of attacking one’s opponents face-to-face: Edwards: And I said throughout the lead-up to the vote that I was against a funding bill that did not have a timetable for withdrawal, that it was critical for the Congress to stand firm; they were given a mandate by the American people. And others on this stage— Chris Dodd spoke out very loudly and clearly—but others did not; others were quiet. They went quietly to the floor of the Senate, cast their vote. There is a difference between leadership and legislating. Blitzer: Do you want to name names? Edwards: No, I think it’s obvious who I’m talking about Clinton: (Laughter) Blitzer: It’s clear to me, but it might not be to some of the viewers out there. Edwards: Well . . . (pause) . . . well Senator Clinton and Senator Obama did not say anything about how they were going to vote until they appeared on the floor of the Senate and voted. They were among the last people to vote.

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M C K I NNEY, DA VIS, A ND D ELBERT Table 6.2. Candidate-to-Candidate Attacks in Early Primary Debates Candidate Joe Biden Hillary Clinton Chris Dodd John Edwards Mike Gravel Dennis Kucinich Barack Obama Bill Richardson

Source of Attack

Target of Attack

0 1 1 11 6 7 3 1

3 8 2 6 1 0 10 0

Note: N = 30

While in the previous exchange John Edwards appeared somewhat reluctant to call out his two opponents by name, preferring initially for the more general attack of “others on this stage,” Edwards finally did go on to directly attack his rivals, something he would do on several occasions throughout the early debates. In fact, as table 6.2 reveals, John Edwards led the way in attacking his fellow Democrats. In examining how often each of the Democratic candidates attacked and was attacked by a fellow opponent, we see several indicators that illustrate the specific dynamics of the early primary contest, and also find results that confirm past primary debate research. First, in examining who was on the attack—the source of attacks—we see John Edwards leading the pack with more than one-third of the thirty candidateto-candidate attacks (eleven, 37 percent). Other frequent attackers included Dennis Kucinich and Mike Gravel. On the receiving end of attacks, Barack Obama, among all eight candidates, received one-third of all specific attacks (ten, 33 percent), and Hillary Clinton is next in line as the recipient of several direct attacks (eight, 27 percent). Here, it is instructive to interpret the pattern of candidate-to-candidate attacks through the McKinney et al. (2001) primary debate lens of frontrunner, contenders, and also-rans. As a possible contender for his party’s nomination, it appears that John Edwards’s strategy was to go after Barack Obama (seven of Obama’s ten attacks were from Edwards), attempting to dethrone the Illinois senator who was beginning to emerge as the principal contender to frontrunner Hillary Clinton. We also see, confirming past work by McKinney et al. (2001), that while the frontrunner is the frequent target of attack, they typically refrain from attacking party opponents, preferring to stay above the fray and appear as unifier or presumptive leader of the party (Hillary Clinton responded with a counterattack only once— to John Edwards—throughout the three early debates). Additionally, two of the field’s also-rans (Mike Gravel and Dennis Kucinich) frequently attacked their


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party opponents, yet their colleagues found neither of these challengers much of a threat and thus saw little need to return verbal fire to either individual. Frequently, the role played by the also-rans in televised primary debates is to provide dramatic moments of conflict or bombast, oftentimes keeping the debate lively and somewhat entertaining. In their defense, however, also-rans are largely ignored by debate moderators and receive fewer questions and much less talk time than the contenders or frontrunners. It appears that the strategy of also-rans, when they are favored with a question, is to attack frequently in an attempt to call attention to their candidacy and issue concerns, and they seem to particularly relish in challenging the leading candidates. For example, in the South Carolina debate when the discussion turned to proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mike Gravel was given the floor and he declared: “You know something, the greatest violator of the nonproliferation treaty is the United States of America. We’re expanding our nukes. Who the hell are we going to nuke? Tell me, Barack, who do you want to nuke, Barack?” To which Senator Obama replied: “I’m not planning to nuke anybody right now, Mike, I promise.” Finally, it is interesting to note that the only candidate who did not level a single attack of an opponent during the three opening debates was Joe Biden. Even at this early stage of the nominating process, one might speculate that Senator Biden wished to avoid offending his colleagues, one of whom would go on to secure the nomination and be faced with the important decision of selecting a running mate. (Yet, in all fairness to Biden, candidates Dodd and Richardson also were somewhat reluctant to attack their colleagues in these early debates.) Next, in addressing our third research question, we turn to analysis that captures something of the longitudinal nature of the year-long series of Democratic primary debates. Specifically, we explore the attack strategies of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in their final three debate meetings. As table 6.3 reports, the late primary debate exchanges were actually rather contentious. When comparing the overall level of clash or attack in the Clinton-Obama debates to the early debates (see table 6.1), the two remaining candidates alone produced more than three-fourths (76 percent) of the total number of attacks generated by eight candidates at the start of the primary season (155 versus 203 attacks). Overall, the two candidates were relatively even in their level of attack in the final three debates, with Hillary Clinton just slightly ahead (eighty-one, 52 percent) of Barack Obama (seventy-four, 48 percent), who at this point in the primary season was seen as the frontrunner. Just as he was at the beginning of the primary season, the most frequent target of attack in the final Democratic primary debates remained incumbent president George W. Bush and his administration (fifty-one, 33 percent). In assessing how Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama clashed in their final debate meetings, we find the two competitors going toe-to-toe with one another,

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Table 6.3. Clinton and Obama Attacks in Late Primary Debates N

Attacks on George W. Bush / Bush Administration Obama Attacks on Clinton Clinton Attacks on Obama Attacks on John McCain / Republican Candidates Other Attacks Attacks on Miscellaneous Republicans Attacks on Miscellaneous Democrats

%

HRC

Obama

33 23 22.5 13 4 2.5 2

33 — 35 7 2 2 2

18 23 — 13 4 2 1

Note: N = 155

exchanging attacks in a “tit-for-tat” fashion. Across the three debates, Clinton and Obama were almost exactly even in the number of attacks they leveled against each other (Obama attacking Clinton thirty-six times, and Clinton attacking Obama thirty-five times). A close analysis of the three debate transcripts reveals that no charge went unanswered by either of the two candidates. When one attacked, the other would respond in kind with a counterattack, demonstrating the highly contested primary battle these two titans were waging Beyond the candidate-to-candidate attacks, it is also instructive to look inside specific attack categories and see how the two candidates’ attack strategies differed (again, see table 6.3). Here, we see how Barack Obama at this late stage of the primary campaign takes on the mantle of frontrunner and actually begins to verbally pivot by sounding like the Democrats’ general-election candidate. As previously noted, while George W. Bush remained a frequent target of attack in the final primary debates, it was actually Hillary Clinton who maintained a focus on the incumbent president (delivering thirty-three, or 65 percent, of the Bush attacks in the final debates). Barack Obama instead turned his attention to the likely Republican nominee John McCain (of the twenty attacks on John McCain during the final three Democratic primary debates, Obama made thirteen, or 65 percent, of these attacks). With his eagerness to take on John McCain— much more so than Hillary Clinton was willing to do—Barack Obama seemed to be signaling to Democratic primary voters that the primary contest had been decided and it was now time for him to turn his attention to doing battle with the expected Republican nominee. Barack Obama seemed particularly mindful of the “commander-in-chief” comparison that would be drawn between himself and the war hero John McCain, as most of Obama’s attacks on McCain addressed matters of war and foreign policy. For example, in the Los Angeles Democratic primary debate, Obama observed:


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When John McCain suggests that we might be there [Iraq] one hundred years, that, I think, indicates a profound lack of understanding that we’ve got a whole host of global threats out there, including Iraq; but we’ve got a big problem right now in Afghanistan. Pakistan is of great concern. We are neglecting potentially our foreign policy with respect to Latin America. China is strengthening.

Finally, in Cleveland, Ohio, while debating Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama made his case even more directly that he was ready and eager to face John McCain in the fall campaign: I think I will be the Democrat who will be most effective in going up against a John McCain, or any other Republican, because they all want basically a continuation of George Bush’s policies. I will offer a clear contrast as somebody who never supported this war, thought it was a bad idea. I don’t want to just end the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the first place. That’s the kind of leadership I’m going to provide as president of the United States.

DEMOCRATS’ PRIMARY DEBATE ISSUE AGENDA The Democratic candidates’ primary debate issue agendas are represented in this study as the issues most frequently discussed by the candidates during their debates. Presented here (see table 6.4) are the rank-orderings of specific issues discussed during both the early primary debates and also late in the primary season during the Clinton and Obama debates. While the early and late primary phase agendas share several common issues, the order of importance which specific issues were discussed changes from early to late primary phase, and also each campaign phase highlights different issues based on the specific dynamics of the primary campaign and the ability of a particular candidate to affect the issue discussion. Table 6.4. Primary Debate Issue Agenda/Top Five Issues Issue Rank

Early Primary Debates

Clinton and Obama Late Primary Debates

1 2 3 4 5

War (Iraq and Afghanistan) U.S. Foreign Policy Terrorism Healthcare Poverty

Healthcare War (Iraq and Afghanistan) U.S. Foreign Policy Trade Immigration

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The Democrats began their primary campaign with a heavy focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, discussion of U.S. foreign policy, and our nation’s ability to combat terrorism (with these three issues representing the top three issues discussed, respectively, during the early debates). The Democrats’ leading focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was driven largely by their frequent attacks on George W. Bush, who was repeatedly blamed for his misguided war efforts. The second and third issues of U.S. foreign policy and discussion of terrorism were often linked by candidates in arguments that suggested Bush’s mishandling of the Iraq war diverted attention and resources from fighting terrorism—and especially those terrorists who attacked our nation on September 11—and thus what we needed was a president who understood how to work within the international community to more effectively advance our nation’s national security interests (foreign policy). In their South Carolina debate, for example, Chris Dodd articulated this issue trilogy of war, foreign policy, and terrorism when he explained: When you consider what this administration has done over six years, given the attacks we faced on 9/11, the war in Iraq, rather than dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan where our efforts should have been over the last number of years; not building the kind of international support—stateless terrorism is a multinational problem. It’s a tactic. It requires a multinational response. This administration has walked away from that. It’s the absence of diplomacy, the absence of engaging with nations around the world to build those relationships that allow us to have a far more effective response to the scourge of terrorism that we face in this century.

Similarly, a response by Barack Obama in the same debate connected U.S. war efforts, foreign policy, and fighting terrorism: Well, I think the European Union as a whole has been a longstanding ally of ours, and through NATO we’ve been able to make some significant progress. Afghanistan, in particular, is an area where we should be focusing. NATO has made real contributions there. Unfortunately, because of the distraction of Iraq, we have not finished the job in terms of making certain that we are driving back the Taliban, stabilizing the Karzai government, capturing bin Laden and making sure that we’ve rooted out terrorism in that region.

The Democrats’ remaining top issues of healthcare and poverty in their early debates reflect both party priorities and also the ability of an individual candidate to affect the issue discussion. First, healthcare was featured prominently in these debates as several of the candidates (particularly Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama,


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and John Edwards) each competed to argue the merits of their healthcare proposals over their opponents’ plans. The Democrats’ New Hampshire debate sounded something akin to dueling healthcare plans as John Edwards attempted to assert ownership of the issue when he declared: “I’m proud of the fact that I was the first person to come out with a specific, truly universal health care plan. Senator Obama came out with a plan just a few days ago, which I don’t believe is completely universal, but it deserves to be credited because he laid out what the cost is and exactly how he was going to pay for it.” To Edwards’s claim that he was “first” to champion universal healthcare, Hillary Clinton replied: “Well, I’m thrilled that universal healthcare is back on the national agenda. You know, as we remember back in ’93 and ’94, we tried to come forward with a plan. We weren’t successful—I have the scars to show for that experience. But I am convinced that now, with the Democrats all coming forward saying this has to be a national goal, we then can try to get the political will to act.” The issue of poverty as one of the Democrats’ top debate matters early in the primary campaign season can be credited to John Edwards, who was the first candidate to mention poverty in each of the early debates, only to be followed by several other candidates who would also incorporate poverty into their debate responses. In their Washington, D.C., debate, Edwards proclaimed: “The issue of poverty in America is the cause of my life. It’s the reason I started a poverty center at the University of North Carolina. The reason I’ve been working so hard is this issue.” Later in the same debate, Barack Obama noted, “[w]e have poverty in the inner cities and rural communities all across the country,” and Bill Richardson followed by framing poverty in the context of international affairs when he asked, “Why is it that America does not care about Africa, about genocide, about issues relating to the enormous amount of deaths that are brought forth by international poverty?” When comparing the issue agenda championed by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in their late primary debates to the early debate exchanges, we find that healthcare replaces war as the issue discussed most frequently by the two remaining Democratic candidates. While discussion of war and U.S. foreign policy remained among the most frequently discussed issues later in the primary season, the earlier issue trilogy of war, foreign policy, and terrorism is clearly not as prominent a matter of debate between Clinton and Obama as are the domestic concerns of healthcare, trade, and immigration. In the later debates, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama continued their frequent arguments regarding the merits of their healthcare proposals. The Cleveland, Ohio, debate, for example, began with a protracted exchange between the two as to which candidate’s healthcare plan would most likely achieve universal coverage. After the back-and-forth between Clinton and Obama had gone on for some time, moderator Brian Williams of NBC news attempted to cut Hillary Clinton off by announcing, “I’d

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like to change up—Senator, I’m going to change the subject.” When Clinton objected, suggesting she had much more to say about her healthcare plan, Williams declared, “Well, a sixteen-minute discussion on healthcare is certainly a start,” to which Hillary Clinton replied, “Well, there’s hardly anything more important. I think it would be good to talk about healthcare all night and how we’re going to get to universal healthcare.” Williams was eventually successful in shutting down Hillary Clinton as he went on to introduce yet another topic likely important to the citizens of Cleveland and throughout Ohio, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A large segment of the Ohio debate was devoted to discussion of free trade, and the loss of jobs—particularly manufacturing jobs in Ohio—due to U.S. trade agreements. Here, we see the issue agenda in the final debates influenced by the primary election calendar with the discussion of issues most prevalent to particular states and regions of the country. In the late primary debates, the issues of trade and immigration became top concerns as debates were held in states—Ohio and Texas—that would soon vote. While the candidates’ positions on trade were examined in the Cleveland, Ohio, debate, it was immigration that was of prime concern to Clinton and Obama in their Austin, Texas, debate. Their discussion of immigration included such specifics as their plans for immigration reform, the building of a border fence, and whether legislation should be enacted making English the “official” language of the United States. One of the debates’ three moderators was Jorge Ramos of the Univision network, who queried the candidates in both Spanish and English when he asked: Federal raids by immigration enforcement officials on homes and businesses have generated a great deal of fear and anxiety in the Hispanic community and have divided the family of some of the three million U.S.-born children who have at least one undocumented parent. Would you consider stopping these raids once you take office until comprehensive immigration reform can be passed?

CLINTON AND OBAMA’S MESSAGE STRATEGIES The study’s final two research questions examine the message strategies employed by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in their debate responses. Specifically, our analysis is guided by the framework of “masculine” and “feminine” character traits employed in candidates’ self-presentation (character traits incorporated as part of one’s overall message and argumentation). We ask if Clinton and Obama differ in the character traits they utilize most frequently in framing their debate responses, and also if the traits adopted by either candidate changes from their early to late primary debates.

HRC

Past performance/success

Action-oriented proponent

Aggressive/fighter

Issue Rank

1

2

3

Early Primary Debates

Cooperation with others


Sensitive/understanding

Obama

Aggressive/fighter


Past performance/success

HRC

Late Primary Debates

Table 6.5. Clinton and Obama “Masculine” and “Feminine” Debate Message Strategies

Cooperation with others


Sensitive/understanding

Obama

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In comparing the top three message strategies found in Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s primary debate responses (see table 6.5), two patterns are immediately apparent. First, the two candidates are consistent in the message strategies they adopt in both their early and late primary debates. Second, the two candidates differ significantly in their dominant message strategies employed. The only message strategy shared by both candidates was their propensity to depict themselves as action-oriented proponents (defined as a candidate who offers a plan to fix and not just complain about a pressing problem). Both Clinton and Obama throughout these debates seemed to have a plan at every turn, including their much discussed healthcare plans and specific plans to end the war in Iraq, as well as any number of reform plans to address such pressing national concerns as the environment, immigration, education, and welfare reform. Hillary Clinton most frequently framed her debate responses by touting her past performance/success (a trait that emphasizes one’s previous accomplishments and achievements). Interestingly, the past performance and success that Clinton most often referred to was not from her time in the U.S. Senate, but rather the time she spent in the White House as First Lady. Here, Hillary Clinton would characteristically refer to achievements of the Bill Clinton presidency as “we” or “our” accomplishments. For example, in her New Hampshire debate, Clinton noted: “I think it’s important to remember that six years ago we had a balanced budget and a surplus, and we did that—(applause)—the old-fashioned way, by cutting spending and raising revenues.” While debating in Los Angeles, Hillary Clinton referred to the “Clinton years” by reminding voters “during those eight years we went from deficits and debt to a balanced budget and a surplus, and twenty-two million new jobs, and the hopefulness that people brought with them. And, you know, it did take a Clinton to clean up after the first Bush, and I think it might take another one to clean up after the second Bush.” Indeed, after enduring more than a year hearing Hillary Clinton tout her past performance and success—drawn largely from the successes of her husband’s administration—Barack Obama called his opponent to task for her credit claiming—and blame avoiding—habits in their final debate in Cleveland, Ohio: Well, I think what is absolutely clear is, is that when Senator Clinton continually talks about her experience, she is including the eight years that she served as first lady, and you know, she often says, you know, “Here’s what we did.” “Here’s what we accomplished”—which is fine. And I have not, I have not in any way said that that experience is not relevant, and I don’t begrudge her claiming that as experience. What I’ve said, and what I would continue to maintain, is you can’t take credit for all the good things that happened but then, when it comes to issues like NAFTA, you say, well, I—behind the scenes—I


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was disagreeing. That doesn’t work. So you have to, I think, take both responsibility as well as credit.

Hillary Clinton also frequently depicted herself in her debate responses as one who is aggressive and a fighter (characterized by calls for aggressive action and as a candidate who is ready to fight for what he or she believes in). In the very first primary debate in South Carolina, Hillary Clinton was perhaps the most aggressive-sounding candidate among all eight of her colleagues when it came to describing how a President Hillary Clinton would respond to a terrorist attack against the United States. While others spoke of building coalitions, working with allies through the United Nations, Hillary Clinton intoned: “If we are attacked, and we can determine who is behind that attack, and if there are nations that supported or gave material aid to those who attacked us, I believe we should quickly respond to those who have attacked us and do everything we can to destroy them.” In addition to her aggressive military posture, Hillary Clinton also portrayed herself as a fighter. In her Ohio debate, she was rather explicit in her claim that she would fight to the very end when she assured voters, “I am a fighter, and I will fight for the people of Ohio and the people of America, and I will not give up!” In his debate responses, on the other hand, Barack Obama most frequently developed messages depicting himself as sensitive and understanding (as a candidate who understands, cares about, and is sensitive to the needs of “ordinary” people), and as one who seeks to cooperate with others (a candidate who desires to work with others to find solutions to problems). Obama’s sensitive, understanding, and caring traits were most frequently developed as a way for the rather inexperienced politician to argue his qualifications for the presidency. Throughout the debates, Obama repeatedly described his background as one of caring for people in need, much like he did in the Texas debate: And so working as a community organizer on the streets of Chicago with ordinary people, bringing them together and organizing them to provide jobs and health care and economic security to people who didn’t have anything, then working as a civil rights attorney and rejecting the jobs on Wall Street to fight for those who were being discriminated against on the job, that cumulative experience I think is the judgment that I now bring. It’s the reason that I have the capacity to bring people together, and it’s the reason why I am determined to make sure that the American people get a government that is worthy of their decency and their generosity.

Obama’s many appeals to cooperate with others came in his frequent calls to find bipartisan solutions to our nation’s problems, and his desire to reach

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out to “Republicans, Independents, and voters of no party affiliation.” In fact, on at least two occasions during the primary debates Obama paraphrased the memorable words from his 2004 Democratic national convention keynote address when he reminded voters, “there are no red states, there are no blue states, only the United States of America.” Much like Obama did in calling Hillary Clinton to task for claiming the previous Clinton administration’s achievements as part of her own past performance/success, over the course of the long primary campaign Hillary Clinton seemed to tire of hearing Barack Obama’s repeated calls for unity and cooperation; while campaigning in Ohio she suggested the junior senator from Illinois was perhaps a bit naïve as to the ways of Washington politics. Clinton’s stump performance, ridiculing her opponent for his “KumBa-Yah”–like attitude toward politics, was replayed during the two candidates’ Ohio debate, bringing everyone to laughter when Clinton—in a rather dramatic voice—was shown proclaiming: “Now I could stand up here like my opponent and say ‘Let’s just get everybody together. Let’s get unified.’ And the sky will open—(laughter)—the light will come down—(laughter)—celestial choirs will begin singing—(laughter)—and everyone will know we should do the right thing, and the world will be perfect!” Analyzing the two candidates’ messages strategies through the lens of gendered campaign communication, categorizing their dominant message strategies as projecting either “masculine” or “feminine” characteristics, the results of this study seem to support previous research. As Banwart and McKinney (2005) found in their analysis of mixed-gender U.S. Senate and gubernatorial debates, female candidates are actually more likely than their male opponents to develop stereotypically masculine character traits in their appeals—such as aggressiveness and being a fighter. Conversely, male candidates seem more willing and able than their female opponents to incorporate stereotypically feminine traits in their verbal debate messages, such as stressing sensitivity and understanding, as well as cooperation with others. Over the course of the long Democratic primary battle, it became quite apparent through her debate messages that Hillary Clinton projected the image of a fighter, and certainly offered herself as the more aggressive military tactician. She staked her claim to the presidency on her experience and knowledge of Washington, based largely on the eight years that she—and her husband—occupied the White House. By her failure to gain the nomination, can we conclude that Hillary Clinton adopted the wrong or ineffective message appeals? We might ask this question another way: What other or better options did Hillary Clinton have? Actually, Hillary Clinton’s communicative route back to the White House, this time to occupy the Oval Office, seems somewhat the conventional route to national political office taken by female candidates. To be considered seriously as our nation’s first female leader, Hillary Clinton stressed her experience and


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knowledge of Washington, D.C., and was particularly careful to develop the image of an aggressive commander-in-chief who would be a relentless fighter. That her experience and inside knowledge to lead came indirectly through association with her husband’s presidency may well have diminished claims of her past performance and success. Yet based on prevailing gendered expectations of political leaders (Banwart and McKinney, 2005), it is not at all likely that Hillary Clinton could have succeeded by adopting the message strategies of Barack Obama, portraying herself as the sensitive, caring, and understanding leader, eager to extend the olive branch of cooperation, particularly in military and world affairs. Barack Obama’s image of sensitivity and understanding fit perfectly with his overall campaign themes of hope and change, and this message resonated particularly well in a time of increasing economic hardship. Too, the Obama message of unity and cooperation with others seemed a much needed corrective for an existing politics of polarization (of which Hillary Clinton had been a principal player), and existing national leadership seen as unyielding if not downright stubborn. The successful Obama message was uniquely suited to him as the ideal messenger and could not very well have been adopted by Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Conclusion On June 7, 2008, at the National Building Museum in Washington, D.C., Hillary Clinton’s long journey back to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue came to an end when she suspended her campaign and congratulated Senator Obama for securing the Democratic nomination (Milbank, 2008). She noted: “When I was asked what it means to be a woman running for president, I always gave the same answer: that I was proud to be running as a woman but I was running because I thought I’d be the best president.” Yet she went on to acknowledge the remarkable nature of her candidacy: “From now on, it will be unremarkable for a woman to win primary state victories, unremarkable to have a woman in a close race to be our nominee, unremarkable to think that a woman can be the president of the United States, and that is truly remarkable.” Certainly, Hillary Clinton’s presidential candidacy has taken us one step closer to gender equality in our nation’s highest elected office. From major-party female vice-presidential candidates (only two thus far) to our first serious female contender for presidential nomination, the Oval Office’s glass ceiling will surely—hopefully—someday be shattered. There will be many stops along the road to the White House—just as Hillary Clinton endured twenty-three times—for future female presidential candidates to debate their opponents, persuading voters they are qualified to hold the highest office in our political system.

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With Hillary Clinton’s primary debate experiences as example, the current study paints a picture that suggests both similarities and differences for the female presidential candidate. Hillary Clinton began the primary campaign as the frontrunner, with her treatment and behavior much like past frontrunners. While the frequent target of attack, as all frontrunners must endure, Clinton largely refrained from attacking her opponents. Later in the campaign, there appeared to be very little difference in how Clinton and Obama interacted with each other in their one-on-one debates. Our study does suggest, however, that Hillary Clinton was mindful of gendered stereotypes in terms of the traits she projected in her debate responses. Her frequent development of characteristics depicting an aggressive leader and of a tireless fighter points to a candidate very mindful of the need to project strength. Some questioned Clinton’s frequent use of her First Lady experiences as the bases of her past performance and success, a difficulty that may also be instructive for future female presidential candidates. While other female presidential candidates may not use the role of First Lady as their springboard to the Oval Office, the question of appropriate experience and past performance that one might draw on as qualifications for the presidency is of prime concern for any candidate and was particularly problematic for Hillary Clinton. While we are not there yet, we welcome the day when Hillary Clinton’s prediction will come true, a day when a female presidential candidate—and president—will be truly unremarkable.

Notes 1. Throughout the chapter each debate quoted is identified by location and date. Debate transcripts can be found at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_presidential _debates,_2008. 2. The character traits included in the codebook/codesheet, which have been used consistently in previous studies (e.g., Banwart and McKinney, 2005; Bystrom et al., 2004; Kaid and Johnston, 2001) examining candidate self-presentation through content analysis, are as follows: honesty/integrity, toughness/strength, past performance, success/failure, aggressive/fighter, cooperation with others, competency, leadership, experience in politics, Washington or political outsider, sensitive/understanding, knowledgeable, qualified for office, action-oriented proponent, trustworthy, and of the people (commonality).

References Banwart, M. C., and McKinney, M. S. (2005). A gendered influence in campaign debates? Analysis of mixed-gender United States senate and gubernatorial debates. Communication Studies, 56, 353–73.


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Benoit, W. L., Blaney, J. R., and Pier, P. M. (1998). Campaign ’96: A functional analysis of acclaiming, attacking, and defending. Westport, CT: Praeger. Bystrom, D. G. (1995). Candidate gender and the presentation of self: The videostyles of men and women in U.S. Senate campaigns. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oklahoma, Norman. Bystrom, D. G., Banwart, M. C., Kaid, L. L., and Robertson, T. A. (2004). Gender and political candidate communication: Videostyle, webstyle, and newsstyle. New York: Routledge. Bystrom, D. G., and Kaid, L. L. (2002). Are women candidates transforming campaign communication? A comparison of advertising videostyles in the 1990s. In C. R. Rosenthal (Ed.), Women transforming congress (146–69). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Kaid, L. L., and Davidson, D. K. (1986). Elements of videostyle: Candidate presentation through television advertising. In L. L. Kaid, D. Nimmo, and K. R. Sanders (Eds.), New perspectives on political advertising (184–209). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Kaid, L. L., and Johnston, A. (2001). Videostyle in presidential campaigns: Style and content of televised political advertising. Westport, CT: Praeger. Kendall, K. E. (2000). Communication in the presidential primaries: Candidates and the media, 1912–2000. Westport, CT: Praeger. Lanoue, D. J., and Schrott, P. R. (1989). The effects of primary season debates on public opinion. Political Behavior, 11, 289–306. McKinney, M. S., and Banwart, M. C. (2005). Rocking the youth vote through debate: Examining the effects of a citizen versus journalist controlled debate on civic engagement. Journalism Studies, 6, 153–63. McKinney, M. S., and Carlin, D. B. (2004). Political campaign debates. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), Handbook of political communication research (203–34). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. McKinney, M. S., Kaid, L. L., and Robertson, T. A. (2001). The front-runner, contenders, and also-rans: Effects of watching a 2000 Republican primary debate. American Behavioral Scientist, 44, 2232–51. Milbank, D. (2008, June 8). A thank-you for 18 million cracks in the glass ceiling. Washington Post, A1.

CHAPTER 7

“It’s 3 a.m.”: Strategic Communication in Hillary Clinton’s 2008 Presidential Primary Televised Advertisements Mary Christine Banwart, Kelly Winfrey, and James M. Schnoebelen For both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the two most viable candidates for the Democrat Party’s presidential nomination in 2008, televised advertisements during the primary election were considered “something of a test of the messages each believes could eventually register with a national audience” (Steinberg, 2008, para. 2). In hindsight, with Clinton’s 2008 primary nomination defeat secured in the books of history, it would be seemingly easy to conclude that her advertising simply failed to register with her primary audience, let alone a national audience. But on closer analysis, the campaign ads used by the Clinton campaign tell a more complex story. This chapter seeks to unveil that story through an examination of Clinton’s primary election advertising campaign. More specifically, we offer an analysis of Clinton’s self-presentation strategies as developed through the televised advertisements sponsored by her campaign. Our results demonstrate that much of the complexity in Clinton’s 2008 primary nomination story is her attempt, through her televised advertising, to balance the double bind; to meet the expectations of this traditionally masculine position of the presidency—both in the lineage of officeholders and in expectations—while also meeting society’s expectations of what it means to be a female in the public sphere. As Clinton addressed multiple messages across her advertisements, her lack of consistency in remaining “on message” likely limited voters’ ability to connect with her purpose and thus her vision. Furthermore, we argue that, as she sought to balance the double bind of image expectations, she in turn now raises the question as to whether the norms of female candidate self-presentation styles can effectively meet those of the presidential candidate styles. Are they in such conflict that in fact we are farther away from electing a female president than we may realize? We begin with an 149

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B A NWA R T , WINF REY, A ND SC HNOE BEL EN

overview of the primary election events that signaled important moments in Clinton’s advertising campaign. We then provide a brief review of the literature focused on self-presentation strategies in female candidate advertising before presenting the method, results, discussion, and conclusions of the study.

Clinton’s Primary Advertising Hillary Clinton seemed destined to be the Democratic presidential nominee before the primary season began, but as the Iowa caucuses approached, what once seemed inevitable became less than certain. In the fall of 2007 even Republican primary candidates believed her to be the likely candidate, and they focused their attacks accordingly. In turn, Clinton ran ads responding to attacks launched by Republican primary contestants in both Iowa and New Hampshire. The ad “machine” presumed Clinton to be the Democratic candidate in 2008 and claimed the GOP “machine” was up to its same old dirty tricks by attacking Clinton. Some claimed the ad was an attempt by Clinton to garner sympathy, while other primary opponents claimed the ad demonstrated that a Hillary Clinton presidency would be characterized by partisanship (Lambro, 2007; Memmott, 2007). By mid-December 2007 the presumed nominee’s lead was shrinking in the early primary states, and the Iowa airwaves were flooded with political advertising. As the caucus approached, Obama’s support among women began to increase, a demographic that many thought would widely support Clinton. In what some claimed to be an attempt to soften her image and more directly appeal to women, Clinton released an ad featuring her mother on December 13, 2007 (“Mother love,” 2007). In the ad her mother talked about Clinton being a “good person,” that she has empathy for others, and that she should be the next president (2007 ad titled “Dorothy”). Despite Clinton’s targeted attempts to regain her lead, the horserace numbers remained inconsistent in the days before the Iowa caucuses; some polls indicated a slight lead for Clinton while others tilted toward Obama (“Polls give conflicting,” 2008). Ultimately, to secure the all-important first victory in Iowa, Clinton spent approximately $6.5 million on televised advertising; however, even at that price she was outspent by Obama’s $8.3 million (Healy, 2007). After an unprecedented turnout at the Iowa caucuses, Obama emerged the victor, but even more devastating for the Clinton camp was her third-place finish behind both Obama and Edwards. Clinton’s third-place finish in Iowa made the next primary in New Hampshire even more important. And Clinton continued to focus her attention on female voters. In New Hampshire she spent $4.3 million on television advertising and aired many of her ads during the midday programming that was targeted at

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women (O’Connell, 2008). Obama slightly outspent Clinton in New Hampshire advertising, spending $4.4 million on television ads, but more specifically targeted young voters by purchasing time during programs such as Grey’s Anatomy and Ugly Betty (O’Connell, 2008). Although the polls reported Obama leading by as much as ten to thirteen points two days before the election, on January 8 Clinton proved the polls wrong and emerged from New Hampshire with a two-point victory. A particularly important day for the Democratic primary candidates was Super Tuesday, February 5, 2008, when Democrats awarded 1,700 of their 4,000 delegates. Two weeks prior to Super Tuesday, the national polls still suggested Hillary Clinton was the favorite to win the nomination (Davies, 2008), with Clinton leading Obama by double digits (MacAskill, 2008). As Super Tuesday approached Clinton continued to pour money into advertising at an estimated $2 million per week (Steinberg, 2008); her ads ran in sixteen of the twenty-two primary states, and her advertising message focused on the economy (Nagourney, 2008). By February 2, while Clinton appeared to still be the favorite in many statewide polls, she now held only a four-point lead over Obama in the national polls (MacAskill, 2008). Super Tuesday provided many close races, and although Clinton ended the day winning more delegates, Obama seemed to win the media race as pundits touted his victories in several small states. After Super Tuesday it became increasingly important that Clinton secure wins in Ohio and Texas on March 4, 2008. Two weeks before the Ohio primary, Clinton held a double-digit lead in the statewide polls, but by election day Obama had successfully closed the gap to five points (Goldenberg, 2008a). While in Ohio, the Obama campaign outspent Clinton two-to-one in televised advertising, airing over ten thousand spots and spending approximately $4.4 million. The Clinton campaign spent about $2.3 million for over six thousand spots. Clinton’s tenacity proved fruitful, however, as on election day she won Ohio 53 percent to 45 percent (“Election center,” 2008). Texas was a more difficult and publicized battle. Ten days before the Texas primary, Clinton saw her lead in the state disappear as polls reported a tie or slight lead for Obama (“Eyes of Texas,” 2008). In the midst of what appeared to be Texas tipping in favor of Obama and a close race in Ohio, Clinton’s camp began airing the ad “Resolved,” which argued she had spent her life fighting for those less fortunate and was resolved to continue the noble battle. Yet the statewide polls officially tipped in Obama’s favor for the first time at the end of February (Ratcliffe and Bernstein, 2008). The Houston Chronicle reported Obama leading by six points on February 29 (Ratcliffe and Bernstein, 2008), the same day Clinton released a widely viewed and publicized ad titled “Children,” which was more commonly known as the “red phone ad” or the “3 a.m.” ad. The ad was a remake of a 1984 ad for Mondale (Helman, 2008), and highlighted her

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foreign policy leadership by asking: “It’s 3 a.m. and your children are safe and asleep. Who do you want answering the phone?” (Stelter, 2008). Clinton’s 3 a.m. ad aired in Texas in the morning of February 29, and before the evening news Obama had responded with his own television ad. The Obama strategy was to parrot the ad, using some of the same imagery as Clinton’s ad. Obama emphasized his consistent opposition to the Iraq war, saying, “Shouldn’t the president be the one—the only one—who had judgment and courage to oppose the Iraq war from the start?” (Stelter, 2008). The speedy response by Obama’s team to the Clinton ad made the evening news, providing each with even more attention. In addition to television, the ads were widely viewed on YouTube; within three days Clinton’s ad had received six hundred thousand views, and Obama’s response had received two hundred thousand (Stelter, 2008). On the defense, Obama criticized the message of the 3 a.m. ad at a Texas townhall meeting, arguing Clinton had resorted to cheap political tricks in the ad to “scare up votes” (“Obama blasts,” 2008). It is unclear whether the ad’s so-called scare tactics were responsible, but Clinton managed a slim victory (51 percent) in Texas. The April 22 Pennsylvania primary promised to be an even more contentious battle. Even after Ohio and Texas Obama still had more delegates, and Clinton needed a double-digit victory in Pennsylvania to make her case to the superdelegates (“‘Special Report’ Panel,” 2008). Both candidates dumped massive amounts of money into advertising in the state, and, once again, Obama massively outspent Clinton three to one (“‘Special Report’ Panel,” 2008). Both attempted to target a voting block in the Pennsylvania advertising; Obama targeted women by featuring his wife, grandmother, and sister, while Clinton focused on the middle class and featured endorsements from Governor Rendell and Philadelphia’s Mayor Nutter (Eichel, 2008; Wheaton, 2008). Statewide polling in Pennsylvania reported Clinton with a five-point lead over Obama in early April (Goldenberg, 2008b). Clinton’s camp then released an ad using the same “3 a.m.” ringing red phone, but this time the attack targeted the presumed Republican nominee, Senator John McCain from Arizona. The ad featured a similar sleeping family and a ringing red phone, with a voiceover stating, “John McCain just said the government shouldn’t take any real action in the housing crisis. He’d let the phone keep ringing” (2008 ad titled “Ringing”). McCain was quick to respond to the Pennsylvania red phone ad, releasing an Internet ad using footage identical to Clinton’s 3 a.m. ad while stating, “Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama just said they’d solve the problem by raising your taxes—more money out of your pockets” (Cooper, 2008). Clinton ultimately won the Pennsylvania primary on April 22 by ten points, but her victory there, combined with previous contests, was ultimately not enough to defeat Obama in the Democrat Party’s primary delegate count.

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By the time the primary had finished, Clinton’s largest expense was broadcast media, totaling a $48 million expenditure in her bid for her party’s presidential nomination (“Expenditures,” 2008). While it is impossible to know for certain if her advertising strategies were to thank for her victories in states like Texas and Pennsylvania, or to blame for her overall loss, the ads merit study as an important aspect of message dissemination in her campaign.

Videostyle and Self-Presentation One of the most consistent methods by which the content of female candidates’ televised advertisements has been studied is that of videostyle (e.g., Bystrom, 1995; Bystrom, Banwart, Kaid, and Robertson, 2004; Bystrom and Miller, 1999). Videostyle is the study of “the way candidates present themselves to voters through the television medium” (Johnston and Kaid, 2002, 285), and the framework encompasses the verbal, nonverbal, and production components of advertisements. Kaid and Davidson’s (1986) initial work on candidate videostyle established the major categories and items of study, while Bystrom (1995) modified the coding framework with the influence of Campbell’s (1989) feminine style with communication-related gender variables. This expanded framework offered the first systematic analysis of female candidate videostyle, and has been used primarily to study female and male candidates running in mixed-gender U.S. Senate, gubernatorial, and U.S. House races (for a review, see Bystrom et al., 2004). Bystrom, Banwart, Kaid, and Robertson’s (2004) comprehensive work on female and male candidate videostyles in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races from 1990 to 2002 found that women and men have in fact relied on more similar strategies over time, although specific differences continued to emerge. For instance, their analysis of 1,400 ads determined both female and male candidates were equally as likely to attack the opponent in their ads and to use negative advertising, to use logical appeals most frequently, and to use “feminine” strategies, such as a personal tone and addressing viewers as peers. Some differences have emerged in issue discussion, and in their study the authors acknowledged that the traits the candidates emphasized reflected “stereotypical expectations about the roles and behaviors of women and men” (Bystrom et al., 2004, 42). For instance, female candidates were significantly more likely to emphasize their toughness and strength, and male candidates were significantly more likely to emphasize their experience in politics as well as their sensitivity and understanding. Hillary Clinton’s bid for her party’s primary nomination during 2007 and 2008 offers the first opportunity to extensively study the videostyle of a female

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presidential candidate. Her campaign further provides a foundation for understanding if female presidential candidates may in fact differ from their male counterparts as well as other female political candidates. Thus, it is the purpose of our study to examine the style of verbal content, nonverbal content, and production content used in Hillary Clinton’s 2008 Democrat presidential primary televised campaign advertising.

Method SAMPLE Clinton began her televised advertising campaign for the Democrat presidential primary nomination on August 2, 2007, and aired her last televised ad for the nomination on June 2, 2008. The advertisements analyzed in this study were gathered from her official campaign website and nationaljournal.com, which provides an archive of political televised advertisements from presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial campaigns. A total of sixty-one ads were collected for this study, and because this study was interested in the candidate’s self-presentation of herself as a viable presidential candidate via the channel of televised advertising, the sample contained only televised advertisements sponsored by the campaign itself. Each advertisement was treated as a separate unit of analysis.

CATEGORIES The fundamental categories used in this study were first developed as an analysis of presidential candidate videostyle (Kaid and Davidson, 1986; Kaid and Johnston, 2001), which examines the verbal, nonverbal, and production content of televised ads. Bystrom (1995) further expanded videostyle coding to identify the influence of gender in videostyles. Based on this prior work, the categories used to measure verbal content in the advertisements included the issues addressed, use of a negative attack, candidate characteristics, use of appeals or evidence (logical, emotional, or source credibility), and communication strategies typically used by incumbents and challengers (as identified by Trent and Friedenberg, 2004) and women and men (as identified by Bystrom, 1995; Bystrom et al., 2004). Nonverbal categories included settings of the video shots, identification of those pictured, eye contact, facial expressions, body movement/posture, and candidate attire. Production categories included types of camera shots and angles, as well as the production qualities and animation.

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CODING PROCESS Three coders—two females and one male—received two hours of training, conducted by the authors, in which the coders became familiar with the coding instrument, codebook, the procedures for coding.1 Intercoder reliability was determined on a set of sample ads (20 percent), in order to test for reliability and appropriateness of the training session and coding instrument. The intercoder reliability across all categories was calculated at .93. Coders were then each assigned a random set of advertisements to code from the remaining compilation.2

RESULTS Verbal Content We first sought to examine the style of verbal content Clinton used in her presidential primary advertisements that aired from 2007 to 2008. The verbal content component of videostyle includes issues discussed, character traits emphasized, types of appeals, and the negative/positive focus of the ads. Issues Discussed Results regarding the overall content of the ads found that 72 percent of Clinton’s ads focused on campaign issues, whereas 28 percent predominantly focused on candidate image. The most common issues (see table 7.1) discussed in Clinton’s presidential primary ads included healthcare in general (38 percent), taxes (30 percent), job growth/economic development (26 percent), the Iraq war (21

Table 7.1.

Overall Frequency of Issue Discussion

Healthcare in general Taxes Job growth/econ. dev. Iraq war Economy Education Energy Defense Budget

%

n

38 30 26 21 20 15 13 12 8

23 18 16 13 12 9 8 7 5

Senior citizens issues Healthcare—groups War on terror International issues Dissatisfaction w/gov’t Cost of living Crime Recession Women’s issues

Note: Percentages indicate frequencies within advertising sample.

%

n

7 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 2

4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1

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percent), and the economy (20 percent). Among the ads in which issues were present, 44 percent discussed as many as three to four separate issues, 34 percent discussed one to two separate issues, and 8 percent discussed five to seven different issues: 2 (2, N = 53) = 14.64, p = .001. A total of ten “feminine” issues and twelve “masculine” issues were coded for in the study,3 and in order to examine issue discussion categorically, the actual number of feminine and masculine issues discussed were compared. Feminine issues were included in 51 percent of Clinton’s ads and masculine issues in 62 percent of her ads. Further analysis categorized the advertisements as “combination feminine/masculine issues” ads, “feminine issues only” ads, “masculine issues only” ads, and “neither feminine or masculine issues” ads; the latter category also included those ads in which no issues were present. The results indicate that in 34 percent of her ads she discussed a combination of feminine and masculine issues, in 28 percent of her ads she discussed masculine issues only, and in 16 percent of her ads she discussed feminine issues only (see table 7.2). A one-sample chi-square analysis determined these differences were not statistically significant (p = .144). An examination of the combinations of feminine and masculine issues discussed revealed that different combinations were present across all twentyone (34 percent) ads. Granted, taxes and healthcare were the most commonly discussed issues throughout these ads, with taxes being discussed in 43 percent of the “combination-issue” ads and healthcare being discussed in 81 percent of these same ads. However, there was not a consistent common combination of issues discussed. Healthcare in general was also the most common issue discussed (60 percent) when only feminine issues were present in the ads, whereas job growth/economic development was the most common issue discussed (60 percent) when only masculine issues were present in the ads.

Table 7.2. Frequency of Issues Discussed by Category

Feminine/masculine issues Frequency of masculine/feminine issues1 Feminine issues Masculine issues Categorized by issues2 Combination feminine/masculine issues Masculine issues only Neither feminine or masculine issues Feminine issues only 1

Percentages indicate frequencies within advertising sample. Percentages indicate frequencies within category.

2

%

n

51 62

31 38

34 28 21 16

21 17 13 10

p

.144

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Image Content The two most common image/character traits (see table 7.3) emphasized by Clinton were her leadership (41 percent) and her experience (25 percent), followed by aggressiveness (21 percent), that she is action-oriented (18 percent), and her toughness (16 percent). The “feminine” and “masculine” traits4 were then collapsed into their respective categories and frequency of emphasis compared. Of the six feminine traits for which the sites were coded, Clinton emphasized these traits in 26 percent of her ads; whereas, she emphasized masculine traits in 87 percent of her ads. Further analysis categorized the advertisements as a “combination feminine/ masculine character traits,” “feminine traits only” ads, “masculine traits only” ads, and “neither feminine nor masculine traits” ads. The results indicate that 67 percent of the ads emphasized masculine traits only, 20 percent emphasized a combination of feminine and masculine traits, and 7 percent emphasized feminine traits only (see table 7.4). A one-sample chi-square test was conducted to determine whether Clinton was more likely to emphasize a combination of feminine and masculine traits, masculine traits only, or feminine traits only. The results of the test were significant: 2 (2, N = 57) = 39.90, p < .001. Within the ads in which masculine traits only were emphasized, leadership (56 percent) was the most common trait highlighted, followed by past experience in politics (29 percent), and aggressiveness (27 percent). Among the traits most commonly emphasized in the few ads in which feminine traits only were emphasized, sensitivity/understanding was highlighted in two (50 percent) of the four ads, while honesty, cooperation, trustworthiness, and being of the people were each emphasized in one ad. Similar to the issue combinations, when Clinton combined her emphasis on masculine and feminine traits, no consistent combination of traits emerged. Being sensitive/understanding was emphasized in 50 percent of the combination trait ads, with cooperation (25 percent) the other most commonly emphasized feminine trait. Experience in politics was the most Table 7.3. Overall Frequency of Character Trait Discussion

Leadership Experience in politics Aggressive/fighter Action-oriented Toughness/strength Past performance Qualified

%

n

41 25 21 18 16 15 13

25 15 13 11 10 9 8

Sensitive/understanding Competency Cooperation with others Knowledgeable/intelligent Of the people Trustworthy Honesty/integrity

Note: Percentages indicate frequencies within advertising sample.

%

n

13 12 8 5 5 3 2

8 7 5 3 3 2 1

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Table 7.4. Frequency of Traits Discussed by Category

Feminine/masculine traits Frequency of masculine/feminine traits1 Feminine traits Masculine traits Categorized by traits2* Masculine traits only Combination feminine/masculine traits Feminine traits only Neither feminine or masculine traits

%

n

26 87

16 53

67 20 7 7

41 12 4 4

p

.001

1

Percentages indicate frequencies within advertising sample. Percentages indicate frequencies within category. *indicates significance 2

frequently emphasized masculine trait in the “combination-trait” ads, but was only present in 25 percent of the “combination-trait” ads. Other masculine traits emphasized within this category of ads included leadership and being qualified, competent, and tough; each of these were highlighted across 17 percent of the “combination-trait” ads. Appeal Strategies Also included in the verbal content analysis of the televised advertisements was Clinton’s use of appeal strategies (see table 7.5). The presence of incumbent, challenger, feminine, and masculine appeals were coded for each ad. Clinton used incumbent strategies in 71 percent of her ads, whereas she used challenger strategies in 56 percent of her ads. Further analysis indicated that 38 percent of Clinton’s ads included a combination of incumbent and challenger strategies, whereas 33 percent contained incumbent strategies only and 18 percent contained challenger strategies only. A one-sample chi-square analysis determined these differences were not statistically significant (p = .115). The presence of feminine and masculine strategies were also analyzed. Of note, 53 percent of her ads used feminine strategies whereas 38 percent used masculine strategies. Further analysis indicated that 41 percent of Clinton’s ads relied only upon feminine strategies, 12 percent relied upon a combination of feminine and masculine strategies, and 26 percent relied only upon masculine strategies. A one-sample chi-square analysis was conducted to determine whether Clinton was more likely to emphasize a combination of feminine and masculine strategies, feminine strategies only, or masculine strategies only. The results of the test were significant: 2 (2, N = 48) = 10.13, p = .006.

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Table 7.5. Frequency of Appeal Strategies by Category

Incumbent/challenger strategies Frequency of incumbent/challenger strategies1 Incumbent strategies Challenger strategies Categorized by appeal2 Combination incumbent/challenger Incumbent strategies only Challenger strategies only Neither incumbent or challenger strategies Feminine/masculine strategies Frequency of masculine/feminine strategies1 Feminine strategies Masculine strategies Categorized by appeal2* Feminine strategies only Masculine strategies only Neither feminine or masculine strategies Combination feminine/masculine strategies

%

n

71 56

43 34

38 33 18 12

23 20 11 7

53 38

32 23

41 26 21 12

25 16 13 7

p

.115

.006

1

Percentages indicate frequencies within advertising sample. Percentages indicate frequencies within category. *indicates significance 2

Attack and Group Appeals In order to analyze attack appeals, the dominant focus of the ads, the presence of a negative attack, who issued the attack, and the strategy used in making the attack were coded. Overall, the dominant focus of the ads analyzed in this study was positive; 93 percent of her ads were positive ads about the candidate, and 7 percent were opponent-focused. Clinton issued direct negative attacks in 7 percent of the ads analyzed (n = 4); in three of the ads an anonymous announcer launched the attack, and in one ad a known surrogate delivered the attack. Overall, 97 percent of the ads in this study ended the advertisement on a positive tone; thus, only 3 percent ended the ad with a negative tone. In terms of group appeals, 26 percent of Clinton’s ads targeted citizens of a specific state, 8 percent targeted senior citizens, 10 percent targeted veterans, and 5 percent targeted women. Not one of the ads in this sample targeted young voters. Type and Structure of Appeal The type of appeal (logical, emotional, or source credibility) as well as the structure of the reasoning used (inductive or deductive) also measures the verbal

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content of candidate videostyle. Clinton’s ads most frequently employed source credibility appeals (57 percent), followed by emotional appeals (51 percent), and logical appeals (44 percent). Her advertising also used inductive reasoning (66 percent) more frequently than deductive (33 percent).

NONVERBAL CONTENT The nonverbal elements coded for included candidate attire, facial expressions, body language, eye contact, setting of photographs, and who was shown in the photographs. Clinton appeared in 93 percent of the ads in this sample. Within the number of ads in which she was present, Clinton was most likely to appear in a formal style of dress (98 percent), and her dominant facial expression was attentive/serious (58 percent). Only 9 percent of the time did she have eye contact with the viewer in her ads, and she used a style of body language considered compact/closed (74 percent). In terms of gestures, Clinton sometimes used gestures (47 percent; compared to frequently using gestures, 14 percent) or simply did not use them at all (39 percent). When people other than Clinton or her opponents were included in her televised ads, men were most frequently present (84 percent), followed by women (82 percent), and then children (61 percent). People of various ethnic or racial minorities were present in 69 percent of her ads, and senior citizens were present in 57 percent of her ads. Members of Clinton’s family were present in 7 percent of her ads, most commonly her mother and daughter. The dominant video setting used in Clinton’s ads was an inside setting (56 percent); 25 percent of her ads used an inside setting and an outdoor setting equally, and 4 percent of her ads used outside shots as the dominant setting. In 16 percent of her ads the coders could not identify the setting, as it was often filmed at a generic “campaign rally.” In 43 percent of Clinton’s ads an anonymous announcer was the dominant speaker, and in 38 percent of her ads Clinton herself was the dominant speaker. Another government official or officeholder was the dominant speaker in 12 percent of her ads. Overall, a male was the dominant speaker in 59 percent of her ads, and a female was the dominant speaker in 39 percent of her ads.

PRODUCTION CONTENT Regarding the production content of her advertising, Clinton used a cinema verité style (54 percent), which consists of video that is live or is filmed to appear live. Ten percent of Clinton’s ads used slides, 10 percent focused on someone other than the candidate head-on, 8 percent featured the candidate head-on, and

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3 percent used special production techniques. A majority of the ads also employed a voice over (58 percent) as the dominant speaker of the ad, followed by the candidate (27 percent), and also a person other than the candidate (15 percent). Among the specific production techniques coded, music was the most common (87 percent) technique used. Seventy-two percent of the ads used computer graphics, and 31 percent used stills. Ten percent of the ads used slow motion, while fast motion was used in 7 percent of the ads, split screens were used in 7 percent of the ads, and morphing was used in 5 percent as were special lighting techniques. Camera angle and camera shot were also coded in this study, with coders recording the dominant angles and shots used. In 87 percent of Clinton’s ads the dominant camera angle was straight-on, with 5 percent of the ads featuring a “high” camera angle and 3 percent featuring a combination of angles. In 64 percent of her ads the camera shot of Clinton was “tight,” featuring head-andshoulders shots, and 25 percent featured “medium” (from the waist up) shots of Clinton; 2 percent used full-length shots.

Discussion The purpose of this study was to systematically analyze Hillary Rodham Clinton’s videostyle as presented in her presidential primary campaign advertisements. The ads analyzed were aired during the early primary stages in 2007 through to the suspension of her primary campaign in June 2008. The results of this analysis indicate that Clinton used a complex approach to her self-presentation. Her self-presentation included an emphasis of traditionally masculine traits woven throughout a discussion of masculine and feminine issues, all presented through appeals that highlight feminine communication strategies. Clinton’s selfpresentation also employed feminine nonverbal strategies and traditional production techniques. Our findings further indicate that she employed many of the traditional self-presentation strategies of past presidential candidates as she balanced the double bind found in videostyles of female candidates in mixed-gender races. However, doing so raises the more global question as to whether normative female candidate videostyles can in fact complement voters’ expectations of a presidential candidate. CLINTON’S VERBAL CONTENT The verbal content of Clinton’s advertising was marked by a frequent discussion of the feminine issue of health care, but also the masculine issues of taxes, job growth,

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the Iraq war, and the economy. Overall, Clinton included a higher frequency of masculine issues in her advertising, and also aired more individual ads that focused on masculine issues only. Granted, it is not uncommon for female candidates to discuss masculine issues more frequently than feminine issues (Bystrom et al., 2004), and also for presidential candidates to discuss masculine issues more frequently (Kaid and Johnston, 2001). While one may be likely to dismiss any gender-related difference by suggesting that issue discussion present in advertising often is driven by the agenda set by the campaign cycle, studies have found that in fact female candidates’ issue discussion in their advertising does differ from that of media coverage (Banwart, Bystrom, Robertson, and Miller, 2003). In other words, while research on gendered candidate videostyle suggests that female and male candidates often discuss the same “top” issues and at similar frequencies, it is worth noting that the discussion of masculine issues consistently dominates the political agenda for presidential candidates (Kaid and Johnston, 2001). Similarly, for Clinton, 62 percent of her entire advertising sample included masculine issues, a combination of discussion of taxes, job growth, the Iraq war, and the economy. Granted, 51 percent of her advertising sample included a discussion of feminine issues, but this percentage was dominated heavily by the discussion of a singular issue, which was healthcare. While Clinton was either meeting public sphere standards—or electoral cycle standards—in her prioritizing of issue discussion, the complexity of her case becomes evident when examining how many issues she discussed in any given ad. Eighty-seven percent of her ads included issue discussion, and within those issue-based ads 44 percent included three to four different issues and 8 percent included five to seven different issues; the two-minute ad in the sample did contain three to four issues, but more important to note is that 9 percent (n = 5) of the thirty-second ads contained five to seven issues. The following offers an example of how many issues Clinton could—and did—cover in her thirty seconds of airtime. This ad, titled “Falling through—South Carolina,” ran statewide in South Carolina beginning January 22, 2008, and later expanded to Super Tuesday states: The Bush economy is like a trapdoor. Too many families are one pink slip, one missed mortgage payment, one medical diagnosis away from falling through and losing everything. The oil companies, predatory student loan companies, the insurance companies and the drug companies have had seven years of a president who stands up for them. I intend to be a president who stands up for all of you. I’m Hillary Clinton, and I approve this message.

Not only did Clinton include numerous issues in most of her ads, she often failed to include a consistent set of issues. For instance, when analyzing her “combina-

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tion” ads—the ads in which she discussed both masculine and feminine issues— she included a uniquely different set of issues in each of the twenty-one ads. This is perhaps not surprising given the number of ads (52 percent) that included three or more issues, but what actually surprised us was the lack of consistency in her issue discussion. Granted, she did mention healthcare in 86 percent of those combination ads and taxes in 43 percent of those ads, but in each ad she discussed a unique assortment of issues. We offer the argument that this lack of consistency, beyond the frequent discussion of healthcare, proved problematic for Clinton in the context of the election. A May 2008 Pew Research Center poll indicated the economy and energy became increasingly more important to voters as the campaign continued, while healthcare remained stable. Instead of trying to focus on the emerging issues of concern, or even more specifically focusing on healthcare in a more singular way, Clinton mentioned many issues but really focused on none; we posit that without that focus, voters had difficulty identifying with her vision and thus her presidency. This analysis of Clinton’s advertising also clearly demonstrates her emphasis on masculine character traits during her primary presidential bid. Fully 87 percent of her ads emphasized masculine character traits, whereas only 26 percent emphasized feminine traits. In fact, 67 percent of her ads emphasized masculine traits only, compared to 7 percent that only emphasized feminine traits such as honesty, cooperation, trustworthiness, and being of the people. While presidential candidates have frequently stressed masculine character traits, such as aggressiveness, toughness/strength, and their competency (Kaid and Johnston, 2001), female U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates have also emphasized these masculine traits over feminine traits (Bystrom et al., 2004). However, the issue of possessing masculine traits raised a double bind for Clinton in 2008. First, why would female candidates be concerned with emphasizing masculine traits? In politics the masculine traits of toughness, strength, and decisiveness are still preferred (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993a; Lawless, 2004; Pew Center for People and the Press, 2008c; Rosenwasser and Dean, 1989), and these masculine traits are associated most frequently with male candidates (Lawless, 2004; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988). Furthermore, they become increasingly more important at the level of the presidency (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993b; Lawless, 2004; Rosenwasser and Dean, 1989; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988). The decision was also strategic for Clinton as her campaign was driven by poll data that indicated she should focus on her experience, a stereotypically masculine quality, and not her more sensitive qualities (Healy and Broder, 2008). Even after a loss in Iowa to the inexperienced “change” candidate, and a victory in New Hampshire following her tearful, public moment on the campaign trail, the Clinton campaign stuck to their original strategy of emphasizing the more masculine traits of leadership and experience over personal qualities.

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Clinton’s ads emphasized her leadership and experience with statements such as “she’ll never stop fighting” (“Soldiers”), “she has been a leader in pushing the Administration for a serious exit strategy” (“Strongest Plan”), “I will bring more than my thirty-five years of experience to the White House” (“Can Do”), and “there is one candidate with the strength and experience to get us out of Iraq . . . the strength to fight, the experience to lead” (“Machine”). However, by February 13, 2008, a Pew Research Center poll (2008a) confirmed Clinton’s struggle. The poll reported that while primary voters did agree that she was more prepared to lead than Obama, she was also considered “hard to like,” not as inspiring, and not as honest or trustworthy. While Clinton discussed more masculine issues within a more masculine image of leadership, past experience, and being a fighter, she did so with the use of feminine style strategies. Bystrom et al. (2004) argue that in fact feminine style strategies work more effectively in the intimacy of a thirty-second television ad. In fact, in 41 percent of Clinton’s advertisements she used feminine style strategies only, most frequently addressing viewers as peers (60 percent) and using a personal tone (52 percent). For instance, in her caucus-eve Iowa ad, “Crossroads,” Clinton addressed voters by reiterating the problems America faces, and then explained why she was running: I’m not running for president to put Band-Aids on our problems. I am running to solve them. You have welcomed me into your hearts and your homes, and I thank you. The stories you’ve shared will always stay with me. . . . I know you’ve waited for a long time for a president who could hear you and see you, and I would like to be that president.

In her “Arkansas” ad, which aired statewide in Arkansas on February 2, 2008, she explained, Over thirty years ago I came to Arkansas. Bill and I married, and I became Chelsea’s mom here, too. You taught me so much, and we worked together to expand health care and improve education. I’ve tried to use those lessons every day in the White House and in the Senate to solve people’s problems. Now I need your help, because we have big things to do for America. I won’t just be bringing my years of experience back to the White House, I’ll be bringing your voice with me. I’m Hillary Clinton, and I approve this message.

These findings seem to further substantiate the claim that in fact the more personal nature of contemporary televised advertising lends itself well, even at the presidential level, to the use of the feminine style communication strategies (Bystrom et al., 2004). While research indicates that male candidates at U.S. Senate and

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gubernatorial levels use the feminine style as frequently as female candidates (Bystrom et al., 2004), further research on presidential campaigns should explore this use of feminine style in thirty-second advertisements. The institutionalization of such a style may in fact be one bright spot for female candidates. In this study, only four of Clinton’s ads in this sample were coded as negative. A review of the media coverage, which indicated that a very negative advertising campaign had been run by the Clinton campaign, prompted further exploration of this discrepancy. Our post-hoc analysis revealed that, in fact, out of context, Clinton’s ads were not negative in nature. Most importantly, many that had been criticized in the media did not overtly attack anyone—neither Obama nor McCain—however, in context the references made were clear references to Obama’s message and his inability to either deliver on the change or have the experience to make the tough decisions. Certainly this finding brings into question the tone of the media coverage regarding Clinton’s advertising, but also the importance of context in the analysis of campaign messaging. The following transcript of the advertisement “Make it Happen,” which aired statewide in New Hampshire beginning December 20, 2007, illustrates this point: I’ve seen what change takes. It doesn’t happen because you want it to, or because you hope for it. You have to work for it. I have thirty-five years’ experience making change, for kids, for our troops, for families. This election isn’t about choosing change over experience. Change only comes with experience. And with a war to end and an economy to fix, we’ve never needed change more, or the strength and experience to make it happen.

NONVERBAL CONTENT In the nonverbal content of her advertising, Clinton utilized a nonverbal style similar to that of female candidates in lower level races but also violated certain gender-related expectations in favor of the styles identified in presidential candidate videostyles. For instance, as with female candidates running for the U.S. Senate and governor, Clinton dressed formally and was not likely to appear with her family in her advertising. However, unlike female candidates at those levels, Clinton rarely smiled and almost never had eye contact with the camera. Use of an attentive/serious facial expression is more commonly observed in presidential candidate advertising (Kaid and Johnston, 2001); however, male presidential candidates have historically engaged in more eye contact with the viewer, a “mark of his [sic] ability to communicate directly with the voter” (64). Clinton used a closed/compact body movement, typical of female norms, and either sometimes or never used gestures in her ads.

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Presidential candidates have also historically used either an anonymous announcer or the candidate as their dominant speaker, trends that Clinton also employed in the nonverbal production of her ads. Clinton’s use of a dominant male speaker in 59 percent of her ads is consistent with the sex of the dominant speaker in female U.S. Senate and gubernatorial ads (Bystrom et al., 2004); thus, the remaining 40 percent of the ads that engage a female speaker are predominantly those in which the female candidate is the primary speaker of the ad. Therefore, while Clinton engaged in some of the typical nonverbal components engaged in female candidate videostyles, she in turn was as likely to engage in those employed more regularly by presidential candidates. We propose that it is worth exploring whether Clinton’s violation of the female norm of smiling “to gain acceptance in everyday life” (Bystrom et al., 2004, 43) and her lack of eye contact that viewers had come to expect from presidential candidates increased the perception she was “hard to like” and not as honest or trustworthy as Obama.

PRODUCTION CONTENT Based on this analysis and comparison of Clinton’s videostyle with that of presidential candidates and female candidates from mixed-gender U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races, we argue that the production content of candidate advertising at this level is more likely to be institutionalized for the level of office than to contextual and differentiating factors. In other words, when competing at this level as a viable and funded candidate, the campaigns hire professional advertising firms who specialize in producing political ads. Granted, further down the ballot where money may be tight, which in turn limits the amount of advertising a candidate can run, more risks may be taken with production techniques in order to stand out, or, as the case may be, higher quality production techniques may be limited in use due to a lack of funds. However, Clinton’s production content was similar to that of prior presidential campaigns, in which computer graphics, music, and stills have been commonly used. Like presidential videostyles, Clinton’s ads used a straight-on camera angle and a tight camera shot. As camera angles and shots “tell the viewer what to focus on” (Kaid and Johnston, 2001), we argue that Clinton’s ads focused the viewer directly on Clinton as she engaged with viewers directly, “as one of them.” Clinton’s ads used cinema verité most frequently in their production style, giving viewers a window into the campaign trail as they witnessed her speaking at rallies, engaging with voters in crowds and also one-on-one. This technique suggested to viewers that Clinton was one of them, that she cared about their concerns, and that they could depend on her. Unfortunately for

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Clinton, though, production content alone cannot shape the image of the candidate and overcome challenges created within the verbal and nonverbal content.

Conclusions In conclusion, Clinton’s race for the 2008 Democrat presidential primary campaign certainly made history in terms of raising the ceiling for women and politics. Although not the first woman to be considered a viable candidate, Clinton certainly outlasted, outraised, and outspent her predecessors. And that heightened level of viability granted her the tools—monies, staff, resources—needed to compete on television in the still-important market of political advertising. In turn, Clinton’s advertising provides a rich foundation for further research on the self-presentation strategies employed by female candidates. However, it also tells well the difficulties women continue to face and the challenges that such a campaign still poses. Clinton’s lessons not only remind us that in fact a focused message is critical for a political candidate, regardless of gender, but also that female candidates still must manage a double bind in terms of images presented and expectations to be met.

Notes 1. The authors would like to thank Scott Anderson, Stephanie Nelson, and Kimberly Westphall for their coding on this project. 2. The formula used to calculate intercoder reliability and appropriateness of the training sessions and coding instrument is that given in North, Holsti, Zaninovich, and Zinnes (1963). R=2(C1,2) C1+C2 C1,2 = # of category assignments both coders agree on C1 + C2 = total category assignments made by both coders

3. “Feminine” issues included education/schools, healthcare in general, healthcare for specified groups, senior citizen issues/problems of the elderly, poverty/homelessness, welfare, environment, drugs/drug abuse, ethics/moral decline, and women’s issues. “Masculine” issues included taxes, budget/deficit, unemployment, cost of living, recession/ depression, immigration, economy in general, crime/prison, defense, international issues, and homeland security. 4. “Feminine” traits included: honesty/integrity, cooperation with others, Washington outsider, sensitive/understanding, trustworthy, and of the people (commonality). “Masculine” traits included toughness/strength, past performance, aggressive/fighter,

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competent, leadership, experience in politics, knowledgeable/intelligent, and actionoriented.

References Banwart, M. C. (2002). Videostyle and webstyle in 2000: Comparing the gender differences of candidate presentations in political advertising and on the Internet. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oklahoma, Norman. Banwart, M. C., Bystrom, D. G., Robertson, T. A., and Miller, J. (2003). Issue agendas in candidate messages vs. media coverage: Are women and men on the same page? In Lynda Lee Kaid, J. C. Tedesco, D. G. Bystrom, and M. S. McKinney (Eds.), The millennium election: Communication in the 2000 campaigns (147–63). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Bystrom, D. G. (1995). Candidate gender and the presentation of self: The videostyles of men and women in US Senate campaigns. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oklahoma, Norman. Bystrom, D. B., Banwart, M. C., Kaid, L. L., and Robertson, T. A. (2004). Gender and political candidate communication: VideoStyle, WebStyle, and NewsStyle. New York: Routledge. Bystrom, D. B., and Kaid, L. L. (2002). Are women candidates transforming campaign communication? A comparison of advertising videostyles in the 1990s. In C. R. Rosenthal (Ed.), Women transforming Congress. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Bystrom, D. G., and Miller, J. L. (1999). Gendered communication styles and strategies in campaign 1996: The videostyles of women and men candidates. In L. L. Kaid and D. G. Bystrom (Eds.), The electronic election (303–18). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Campbell, K. K. (1989). Man cannot speak for her: A critical study of early feminist rhetoric. Westport, CT: Praeger. Cooper, M. (2008, April 4). Candidates spar on mortgage crisis: Clinton pushes aid while McCain warns against intervention. The International Herald Tribune, 4. Retrieved September 13, 2008, from LexisNexis Academic database. Davies, A. (2008, February 2). Power of the super poll. The Age, 5. Retrieved on September 20, 2008, from LexisNexis Academic database. Eichel, L. (2008, April 9). Clinton and Obama tailor 9 new PA ads; Rendell and Nutter appear in a Clinton ad. An Obama ad features his female relatives. The Philadelphia Inquirer, B08. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Election center 2008. (2008, August 20). CNN. Retrieved from www.cnn.com/ ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/scorecard/#D. Expenditures. (2008, August 28). The Center for Responsive Politics. Retrieved from www.opensecrets.org/pres08/expend.php?cycle=2008&cid=N00000019. Eyes of Texas upon Obama (2008, February 23). Washington Times. Retrieved from washingtontimes.com/news/2008/feb/23/eyes-of-texas-upon-obama. Goldenberg, S. (2008a, February 28). International: Race for the White House: Rust belt gives Clinton last chance to restore gloss to fading campaign: In Ohio’s former

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industrial heart, voters may be about to delver a knockout punch. The Guardian, 23. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Goldenberg, S. (2008b, April 2). Pelosi urges Democrats to avoid long, drawn-out race. The Guardian, 18. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Healy, P. (2007, December 28). Iowa saturated by political ads in 11th-hour bid for undecided. The New York Times, A1. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Healy, P., and Broder, J. M. (2008, January 5). Campaigns on each side retool as they head for next round. The New York Times. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Helman, S. (2008, March 1). Clinton employs famous Mondale ad strategy: Spot suggests Obama not ready to lead. The Boston Globe, A6. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Huddy, L., and Terkildsen, N. S. (1993a). Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 119–47. Huddy, L., and Terkildsen, N. S. (1993b). The consequences of gender stereotypes for women candidates at different levels and types of office. Political Research Quarterly, 46, 503–25. Johnston, A., and Kaid, L. L. (2002). Image ads and issue ads in U.S. Presidential advertising: Using videostyle to explore stylistic differences in televised political ads from 1952 to 2000. Journal of Communication, 52, 281–300. Kaid, L. L., and Davidson, D. K. (1986). Elements of videostyle: Candidate presentation through television advertising. In L. L. Kaid, D. Nimmo, and K. R. Sanders (Eds.), New perspectives on political advertising (184–209). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Kaid, L. L., and Johnston, A. (2001). Videostyle in presidential campaigns: Style and content of televised political advertising. Westport, CT: Praeger. Kaid, L. L., and Tedesco, J. (1999). Presidential candidate presentation: Videostyle in the 1996 presidential spots. In L. L. Kaid and D. G. Bystrom (Eds.), The electronic election (209–22). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Lambro, D. (2007, November 21). Hillary ad targets GOP, not her rivals: Spot seen as bid for sympathy. The Washington Times, A04. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Lawless, J. L. (2004). Women, war, and winning elections: Gender stereotyping in the post-September 11th era. Political Research Quarterly, 57, 479–90. MacAskill, E. (2008, February 2). Race for the White House: Obama catching up with Clinton but pair adopt polite approach in televised debate: Poll puts candidates just four points apart: Sources say there’s no prospect of “dream team.” The Guardian, 24. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Memmott, M. (2007, November 21). Clinton spot targets her GOP opponents. USA Today, 7A. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Mother love and apple of her eye. (2007, December 15). The Daily Telegraph, 115. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Nagourney, A. (2008, February 3). Democrats flood states with ads as Tuesday nears. The New York Times, A1. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database.

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North, R. C., Holsti, O. R., Zaninovich, M. G., and Zinnes, D. A. (1963). Content analysis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. O’Connell, S. (2008, January 10). Biggest spend doesn’t always get the best results. The Irish Times, 19. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Obama blasts “scare tactics” by Clinton. (2008, March 2). Sunday Tasmanian, 14. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Pew Center for People and the Press (2008a, February 13). Media themes that connect with voters: Obama inspiring but inexperienced, Clinton prepared to lead but “hard to like.” Retrieved from people-press.org/reports/pdf/394.pdf. Pew Center for People and the Press (2008b, May 29). Clinton backers cool to Obama— White female support in question. Retrieved from people-press.org/reports/pdf/425 .pdf. Pew Center for People and the Press (2008c, August 25). A paradox of public attitudes: Men or women: Who’s the better leader? Retrieved September 7, 2008, from pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/gender-leadership.pdf. Polls give conflicting view of Iowa contest. (2008, January 2). U.S. News & World Report. Retrieved from www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/bulletin/bulletin_080102 .htm. Ratcliffe, R.G., and Bernstein, A. (2008, February 29). Poll: McCain and Obama lead in Texas. The Houston Chronicle Retrieved from www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ politics/5580776.html. Rosenwasser, S. M., and Dean, N. G. (1989). Gender role and political office: Effects of perceived masculinity/femininity of candidate and political office. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, 77–85. Rosenwasser, S. M., and Seale, J. (1988). Attitudes toward a hypothetical male or female presidential candidate—A research note. Political Psychology, 9, 591–98. “Special Report” Panel on the Pennsylvania Primary and Iraqi Leadership. (2008, April 22). FOX News. Retrieved from www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,352279,00.html. Steinberg, J. (2008, January 25). Democrats test messages in early nationwide ads. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com. Stelter, B. (2008, March 5). Candidates respond with internet speed. The International Herald Tribune, 6. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Trent, J. S., and Friedenberg, R. V. (2004). Political campaign communication: Principles & practices (fifth ed.). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Wheaton, S. (2008, March 26). It’s time to level the playing field. The New York Times, A19. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database. Witt, L., Paget, K. M., and Matthews, G. (1995). Running as a woman: Gender and power in American politics. New York: The Free Press.

PART III

MEDIA

CHAPTER 8

The Cleavage Commotion: How the Press Covered Senator Clinton’s Campaign Karen F. Stein

When Senator Hillary Clinton wore a slightly low-cut black shirt under a rosecolored jacket and displayed some cleavage during her appearance at a Senate discussion of the high cost of education, Washington Post fashion columnist Robin Givhan (2007) wrote a 730-word essay that became the “most viewed story on the website all day” and generated discussion and analysis around the globe (“Clinton’s cleavage,” 2007). Why would her décolleté receive such attention? This seemingly trivial incident is a symbol of the press coverage of Senator Clinton’s campaign; analyzing it may help to clarify why the campaign failed. The cleavage question leads us to larger one: Can a woman become the president of the United States? Apparently not yet. Why not? The chapters in this book seek to explain why Senator Clinton lost her nomination bid, but they also suggest why we have not yet elected a woman president. My chapter highlights the cleavage controversy as an indication of how the press handles women candidates. I argue that the media reflect traditional American concepts of women’s proper roles and perpetuate a discomfort with powerful women. Dear readers beware! In writing this piece I have found it difficult to avoid puns and have decided to keep as many as common sense and good conscience allow. It is important to set Senator Clinton’s campaign in the context of contemporary American culture. Feminist theorists teach us that in patriarchal culture men are the standard, the universal, the neutral, the unmarked gender. Men are identified with the mind, with physical power, and with action in the public space. Women are the other, the marked gender; they have come to be linked with the body, and with domestic, private space. Men are acting subjects; women are passive objects meant to be looked at.1 Thus, a woman running for 173

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political office runs counter to the stereotype of femininity or womanhood, and becomes a greater target for scrutiny than a man would be. Much of this scrutiny focuses on her physical appearance. I derived the categories for analyzing print media coverage of the Clinton campaign from Erika Falk’s book Women for President: Media Bias in Eight Campaigns (2008). Out of the more than one hundred women who have run for president in the United States, Falk focuses on the eight candidates (before Senator Clinton) who have been “most likely to gain press attention” (7). She compares each with a man contender in the same election and finds that the media tend to disadvantage women compared to the men in several ways: using gender markers, giving them less coverage, focusing more on personal appearance than on issues, presenting them as novelties, suggesting that they might make good vice presidents (either stating outright or implying that they were less fit for the role of president), and printing negative or disparaging “vox populi”/person on the street comments. All of these factors operated in the Clinton campaign coverage. I will look briefly at these topics and then focus in more depth on the questions of Senator Clinton’s name, her hairdo, and her clothing.

Novelties Listing a woman as “the first” candidate makes her seem an anomaly. Victoria Woodhull, a stockbroker, brilliant orator, and publisher of a journal, was, in 1872, the first woman to run for president, campaigning vigorously, raising money, and publishing position statements. Yet a subsequent woman candidate, Belva Bennett Lockwood, nominated by the Equal Rights Party in 1884, was termed “the first woman to run a full-fledged campaign for the presidency of the United States” (Norgren, n.d.). Falk explains that similar references about novelty recur for each candidate. In the case of Senator Clinton the novelty issue was raised again, as in this comment: “the first feasible female presidential contender” (Jacobs, 2008, 20). The following quote falls into two categories—novelty and quoting disparaging comments: “Some people say she was the worst person to be the first woman running for president” (Alberts, 2008a, A12). The novelty label erases big chunks of American history—the stories of previous women contenders. Moreover, it makes the candidate seem even more unusual. Of course, the novelty designation also applied to Senator Obama. Some articles revealed a similar historical amnesia about previous black candidates. Although there have been other black people who ran for president (including Shirley Chisholm in 1972, Carol Moseley Braun in 2004, and Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988), headlines named him as “Obama: First black man to run for White House” (Thompson and Murphy, 2008, A6).

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Gender Markers: Female or Woman If women are seen as inappropriate for the role of president, repeating the modifier “female” or “woman” may reinforce that belief. In fact, the choice between “female” or “woman” as the modifier of a noun such as “candidate” has recently become something of a political issue in itself. William Safire explains that some people reject the adjective “female” because it applies to animals, especially mammals, as well as to humans. Safire (2007) quotes linguist Robin Lakoff: The use of either woman or female with terms such as “president, speaker, doctor, professor,” suggests that a woman holding that position is marked—in some way unnatural, and that it is natural for men to hold it (so we never say “male doctor,” still less “man doctor”). When I first began in my job, people like me were often referred to as “woman” or “female” professors, but thankfully no more, as we have become a more normal (unmarked) part of the academic landscape. . . . Since we feel so strongly (still) that a president is necessarily male, every time we say “woman president,” we reinforce that view: that only a man can be commander in chief, symbolize the U.S. (which is metonymically Uncle Sam and not Aunt Samantha, after all) and make it harder to conceive of, and hence vote for, a woman in that role. (sec 6, 20)

(Of course, Senator Obama was similarly marked as “black.”)

Selective Quotations Newspapers print quotations from “ordinary people” or experts. The problem with printing such comments is that reporters do not clarify what the pool is from which the comment was chosen. Was there a wealth of negative or positive comments from which to select a representative example? Or did the reporter have to seek far and wide to discover a particular comment?

Less Coverage for Women According to Erika Falk, in January 2007, the first month of the campaigns of Senator Hillary Clinton and Senator Barack Obama, “the top six circulating papers in the United States ran fifty-nine stories that mentioned Obama in the headline and just thirty-six that mentioned Clinton” (Falk, 2008, 1). Headlines promote name recognition and signify the importance of the candidates.

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The first month of a campaign is an important time, and the fact that Senator Clinton was mentioned two-thirds as often in headlines may be an indication that newspapers found Senator Obama more newsworthy or his candidacy more credible.

Use of Names and Honorifics Falk observes that rules of etiquette “call for the use of a person’s highest status identification” (Falk, 2008, 62). I looked up Senator Clinton in the LexisNexis newspaper data base for the period from May 17, 2008, to July 7, 2008, in the closing days of her campaign. In thirty articles from ten major newspapers Senator Clinton was frequently mentioned without the honorific title.2 Senator Hillary Clinton, Senator Clinton, or Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton appeared fourteen times, and Senator Obama or Senator Barack Obama appeared sixteen times. Mr. Obama appeared forty-three times while Mrs. Clinton or Ms. Clinton appeared seventy times. Thus, in Senator Clinton’s case, the candidate was named without the highest status identification almost twice as often. But even more striking is the use of first names. Barack alone without a surname appeared once, while Hillary alone without a surname appeared 136 times. (True, Senator Clinton is mentioned more frequently, but remember that the search term was Senator Clinton.) By using her first name and eliminating the honorific, the media may be diminishing her credibility for high office. On the other hand, Senator Clinton’s campaign may have made a decision to use the first name. Clinton spokesman Jay Carson said that use of her first name “reflects the warmth and familiarity people feel toward her” (Smalley and Brant, 2008, 9). Clinton’s name is an interesting case in itself, and people’s reactions to her choice of surname reflect a cultural ambivalence about married women. Does a woman lose her unique identification in marriage? Is the wife a new identity? In 1855 noted abolitionist and women’s rights activist Lucy Stone created a stir when she became the first woman to use her own last name rather than her husband’s.3 Apparently, for a married woman to use her birth name was still considered outrageous in Arkansas in 1978 when Bill Clinton was first elected governor and his wife went by the name Hillary Rodham. Her name became a talking point in challenger Frank White’s successful campaign for governor. After White was elected, Hillary began to use the Clinton surname, and Bill Clinton was subsequently reelected. Suzanne Smalley and Martha Brant report: “The [surname] issue followed the Clintons to Washington. In a poll conducted just after Bill took office, 62 percent of respondents said the First Lady should be known as Hillary Clinton rather than Hillary Rodham Clinton” (Smalley and


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Brant, 2008, 9).4 Smalley notes that New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd wrote a satirical column addressed to Ms. Rodham Clinton Rodham in 1999. To put Senator Clinton’s campaign in context, remember that women have often governed countries. In the twentieth century Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, and Golda Meir were outstanding examples of women elected heads of state. As of this writing, Presidents Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (Argentina), and Chancellor Angela Merkel (Germany) are among the current women heads of state (a fuller list may be found at www.guide2womenleaders.com/Current-Women-Leaders. htm). What are the ideologies that have precluded electing a woman president of the United States? Erika Falk reports that in February 1937 (seventeen years after women were enfranchised) a Gallup poll found that 33 percent of respondents answered yes to the question “Would you vote for a woman for president if she were qualified in every other respect?” [emphasis added by Falk]. The phrase “every other respect” was dropped after 1939. The rate of favorable response had been rising steadily; it rose to 91 percent in 1996 (Falk, 2008, 13). In contrast, Brenda Conroy (2008) reports that a Gallup poll in February 2007—shortly after Senators Clinton and Obama had declared their candidacy—showed that 88 percent would vote for a qualified woman and 94 percent would vote for a qualified black (presumably male) candidate. (Of course, even though the poll used the generic terms “woman” and “black,” answers may reflect some of the respondents’ opinions about the specific candidates.) Why is gender so important to voters? An ideology called “the cult of true womanhood” urges women to devote themselves to family. In its May 1957 issue, Woman’s Day magazine offered a concise statement of society’s role expectations for women, “A Good Wife’s Duties.” It advised good wives to tidy the house, clean the children, and freshen themselves to welcome their husbands when they return from work. Women should be understanding and patient if their husbands are late, and trust their husbands to be the family leaders. Much has changed since this list appeared. What many consider to be the most significant revolution of the twentieth century—the feminist movement— has brought about profound and far-reaching changes in the United States. Many good wives now go to work themselves; many good husbands stay home to clean house and care for children. But our perceptions of appropriate gender roles have not been as quick to change. What help do advisors now offer to working women? Lisa Belkin sums up the conflicting advice currently proffered: “Don’t get angry. But do take charge. Be nice. But not too nice. Speak up. But don’t seem like you talk too much. Never, ever dress sexy.” Belkin cites the report “Damned if You Do, Doomed

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if You Don’t” published by Catalyst, an organization that studies women in the workplace. Catalyst surveyed 1,231 senior executives and found that women who act in ways that are consistent with gender stereotypes— defined as focusing “on work relationships” and expressing “concern for other people’s perspectives”—are considered less competent. But if they act in ways that are seen as more “male”—like “act assertively, focus on work task, display ambition”—they are seen as “too tough” and “unfeminine.” (Belkin, 2007, G1)

It is significant that Belkin’s article appears in the fashion and style section.5 Would advice to businessmen appear in the sports section? Psychologist Virginia Valian asks why women’s advancement into positions of power and privilege and into full equality with men has not been speedier. Her book Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women (1999) argues persuasively that gender “schemas” (a term she suggests as more encompassing and less negative than “stereotypes”) persist. These schemas are often unconscious, and they persist in the behaviors of many well-intentioned people who believe they are egalitarian and unbiased. Schemas tend to simplify and to make sharp distinctions between men and women. According to Valian one result is that in the public sphere “men are consistently overrated, while women are underrated. Whatever emphasizes a man’s gender gives him a small advantage, a plus mark. Whatever accentuates a woman’s gender results in a small loss for her, a minus mark” (Valian, 2). Valian cites studies demonstrating that when the same resume is sent out with names of men or women, the men are evaluated more positively than the women. Skills and achievements that are viewed positively when men possess them may be seen as negatives when women possess them. For example, learning a foreign language gave men extra points when they were considered for a job in international business, while women with similar language proficiency lost points.6 In the same way, leadership skills are rated differently for women and men. Experiments conducted in 1990 asked college students to rate trained men and women leaders who followed the same script in staged group situations. They rated the women as too emotional, “bossy and dominating relative to the males” (Valian, 1999, 131). Experiments conducted in 1995 by other researchers found the same results. Another experimental finding is that when women are a small minority in a particular group, they are judged more negatively than when the proportion of women is larger (Valian, 1999). This factor may operate to color the judgments people form about women politicians and candidates.


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These assumptions about gender lead us to expect men to be the leaders and women the followers: “The gender schema for men includes being capable of independent, autonomous action, assertive, instrumental and task-oriented. Men act. The gender schema for women is different; it includes being nurturant, expressive, communal, and concerned about others. . . . Men who are nurturant and emotionally expressive are perceived as feminine; women who are agentic and assertive are seen as masculine” (Valian, 1999, 13). Women who appear very feminine may be perceived as less competent, while “a woman with masculine traits runs the risk of appearing unnatural and deviant” (15). Consequently, the woman with ambition to become a leader must find a workable balance between the traits that mark her as feminine or masculine. Senator Clinton was repeatedly labeled as aggressive and cold, but when she showed emotion and became teary while campaigning in New Hampshire, newspapers skewered her. On the other hand, when Senator Joseph Biden was teary during the campaign, his tears were not the main subject of the articles, and reporters did not speculate about Biden’s motives. It appears that men candidates’ tears are acceptable, but women’s are not. Molly Watson (2008) sums up the response to Senator Clinton’s brief show of emotional vulnerability: But ironically, in a race in which the male candidates for the US presidency have shed tears weekly—and in the Republican front-runner Mitt Romney’s case almost daily—Hillary’s moment of vulnerability may well sound the death knell for her struggling campaign. Far from reassuring the US electorate that ambition has not turned her into an insensitive bitch after all, the thought that she may be far too feminine to hold high office will terrify them. (Features, 2)

Some of the articles questioned if she had rehearsed her tears. Article titles include “The Crying Game” (Carey, 2008) and “Fake tears of St Hillary” (Hamilton, 2008). Maureen Dowd (2008) quotes the joking responses of fellow reporters (an example of selective quotes) and accuses Senator Clinton of “playing the victim” in order to gain support.

Clinton’s Appearance According to Falk, the attention paid to women candidate’s appearance, especially their clothing, has remained consistent over time. Falk notes for example that much was made of Belva Lockwood’s “cardinal red underpants!” (Falk, 2008, 88). In their study Fashion Power Jeanette C. Lauer and Robert H. Lauer explain that “each society has its own notions of appropriate roles for the sexes.

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. . . Clothing styles help to maintain those role differences” (1981, 110). Thus, the focus on Senator Clinton’s clothing and appearance may resonate with deeply held beliefs and anxieties about women’s proper roles. Let us look now at the notice paid to Senator Clinton’s appearance. Media attention to appearance is meant to provide human interest and to entertain readers, but it distracts from the focus on a candidate’s political positions. While the other problems facing women candidates—less coverage, novelty, omitting the high status title—are often politically damaging, references to a candidate’s appearance may be personally damaging as well. Many of the comments about Senator Clinton’s appearance went beyond merely trivializing and distracting—they were disrespectful and demeaning.7 News items (as well as TV talk show hosts, YouTube postings, and cartoons) spoke disparagingly about her wide ankles (“cankles”), hairdo, pantsuits, and cleavage. Her laugh was described as a “cackle,” while her tone was sometimes labeled “whining” or “bleating.” I will focus here on three items of appearance that received print media attention: representations of Senator Clinton’s hair, pantsuits, and cleavage.

HAIR Women’s hair is laden with symbolic significance. For example, when the flappers began to cut their hair short in the 1920s it was first seen as scandalous. Hillary Clinton’s hairdo was a target of criticism when she was the First Lady during Bill Clinton’s terms as president. As a result, when she campaigned for president, she had a stylist fix her hair every morning. Changes in her hairdo made the news. Several articles commented punningly and tongue-in-cheek on her switch of a part from the left to the right. The NY Daily News featured “Hil’s Part-y on Right” proclaiming “the longtime lefty is making a dramatic change—not in her policies—but in her hair style” (Hutchinson, 2008). The Washington Post reported: July 15: Senator Clinton appears on the Senate floor with a new hairstyle—shorter, the part moved from left to right. . . . Deeper research into Clinton’s parting past reveals a historical preference for the left side except for her collegiate center-part days. . . . Photographers reportedly stalk the senator to document the new do. (Argetsinger, 2008, C3)

Clinton herself remarked once that all it would take to get Iraq off the front page of newspapers would be a change in her hairdo.


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PANTSUITS AND POWER Clothing is especially fraught with cultural symbolism. Cynthia Kuhn writes: “The clothed body displays an individual’s situatedness in culture; each vestimentary instance is—all at once—aesthetic, political, and rhetorical” (2005, 1). According to Erin Mackie, “fashion plugs the body into consumer culture, announcing acceptance, challenge, or revision of the limits that culture offers” (Mackie, 1997, 146). Clearly, Senator Clinton’s choice of colorful pantsuits challenged the limits of what is culturally acceptable for a woman presidential candidate. Women wearing pants in America, even as recently as the 1970s, have been perceived as violating taboos, or looking too masculine, and some have been the butt of ridicule.8 For example, President Richard Nixon told reporter Helen Thomas “at a public gathering in the White House” to stop wearing slacks and wear a dress instead (Lauer and Lauer, 1981, 130). In fact Robin Givhan notes “it wasn’t until the early ’90s that women were even allowed to wear pants on the Senate floor” (2007, C1). Deborah Tannen argues that clothing marks women more strongly than men, because women have more style and color choices and more stringent role expectations: “Every woman faces a challenge when she gets dressed for work: Be sexy enough to be seen as feminine but not so sexy as to be unprofessional— knowing all the while that any two people are likely to differ on where they draw the line between the two” (2008, B3). Pointing out that Robin Givhan spoke of Clinton’s typical pantsuit outfit as “a desexualized uniform,” Tannen responds: “Now, every male senator wears a dark suit. Yet we wouldn’t refer to this uniform as ‘desexualized,’ because no one expects men to dress in a way that displays their sexuality” (B3). But when Clinton’s cleavage hinted at her sexuality, Givhan was critical. Lisa Bertagnoli defended Senator Clinton’s pantsuits and cautioned: “Remember that when Ms. Clinton did wear skirts, she was mocked for the shape of her ankles and lower legs” (Bertagnoli, 2008, 61). I don’t recall any other American woman politician wearing pants on formal public occasions, but pantsuits for women have become perfectly acceptable in corporate offices and just about anywhere else. The symbolism of power linked to the person wearing pants runs deep as Clinton acknowledges in her comment: “We all have very dedicated spouses who are out on the campaign trail. But I don’t think there’ll be any doubt who will wear the pant suit in the White House” (Alberts, 2008b, A3). Trying to lighten up the tension about her outfit, Senator Clinton remarked before one of the debates that she was wearing “an asbestos pantsuit,” and she acknowledged her women supporters by referring to the sisterhood of the traveling pantsuits.

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Although she rejected a Vogue photo shoot, Senator Clinton did allow a spread of her wearing unflattering clothes, the fashion faux pas feature of US Weekly. Perhaps she believed that would introduce humor into the clothing controversy (Aspan, 2008).

CLEAVAGE While the novelty issue and the gender or race marker apply to Senator Obama as well as to Senator Clinton, the cleavage issue is unique to Senator Clinton. The LexisNexis Academic data base compiled 215 entries—newspaper articles and letters to the editor—responding to this “tempest in a B-cup” (Bazinet, 2007). Responses prompted puns: “Wait Chest a Minute!” (Bazinet, 3), “Milking Money from Hillary’s Cleavage” (Kathirasen, 2007, 19), “Cleavage and the Clinton Campaign Chest” (Kurtz, 2007, C1), “Hillary’s Cleavage Divides Opinions” (Melocco, 2007, 26), “No Booby Prizes In This Campaign” (Pruden, 2007, A4), and “Hillary Busted” (2007, 15) are among the headlines. Kathirasen (2007) summed up the debate in a paragraph punctuated by puns: The Americans, it appears, are deeply divided. They have dived into a debate that’s cleaving them apart, unable, it appears, to even differentiate the valleys from the peaks. . . . Is it a cleavage or not, and should Hillary Clinton have shown skin on the US Senate floor? Some say they see a cleavage. Others claim they see only shadows. (19)

One response of the Clinton campaign to the cleavage commotion was a fund-raising letter that read in part: “Focusing on women’s bodies instead of their ideas is insulting.” Several media responses, reflected in the headlines “Milking Money” and “Campaign Chest,” found it inappropriate to use the insult as part of a fund-raising appeal. Kenneth R. Bazinet quoted an unnamed source who called Senator Clinton a “whiner” for responding with outrage: A longtime Democratic operative who is no Clinton fan said it wasn’t surprising that Team Hillary would try to generate a sympathy backlash—and then ask for cash to help ease the pain. “She looks for every opportunity she can get to be the victim.” (Bazinet, 2007, 3)

In this case she did not have to look far. Given that fund-raising continues throughout a campaign, I wonder why some journalists found this particular example egregious. I believe the appeal appropriately reached out to women in


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hopes that a Clinton victory would change the culture that looks at women’s bodies rather than listens to their words. Ellen Goodman responded to the accusation that Senator Clinton was playing the victim role for sympathy: To the extent that a woman is feminine she’s seen as weak. To the extent . . . that she is forceful, aggressive, and decisive, she’s not seen as a good woman. . . . And now, anyone who complains about all that is playing the gender card. Should we call it a triple bind? A woman can be accused of taking unfair tactical advantage of her disadvantage. Who made the rules of this game? (Goodman, 2007, A15)

Bazinet quoted responses of noted feminists: “It’s so trivial for the press to waste its time on this while our sons and daughters are dying in Iraq” said feminist author and activist Naomi Wolf. . . . The campaign’s anger over the article “is a natural reaction,” added Georgetown University linguistics Prof. Deborah Tannen, author of You’re Wearing That? (Bazinet, 2007, 3)

In sum, reporters reinforced traditional gender schemas and stereotypes by focusing an extraordinary amount of attention on Senator Clinton’s appearance and personality. They wondered if she were “likable.” Some accused her of being “cold” and “aggressive,” but when she showed vulnerability they argued that her tears were faked. They criticized her wide ankles when she wore skirts, then complained that her pantsuits were “desexualized,” but mocked her for hinting at her sexuality when her shirt revealed a bit of cleavage. This commentary served to divert attention from her policies to her appearance, from the serious issues facing our nation to the clothing and hairdo of a presidential candidate.

Conclusion In the aftermath of the Clinton campaign articles assessed its impact. Some looked for explanations of the campaign’s failure within the campaign organization or American culture. While some journalists took the media to task for its sexism, others summed up the message of Senator Clinton’s campaign and its meaning for feminism and for women. Katie Couric posted a video of some overtly sexist comments asserting “Like her or not, one of the great lessons of that campaign is the continued—and

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accepted—role of sexism in American life, particularly in the media” (Seelye and Bosman, 2008, A1). Ariel Sabar wrote about the media’s sexism: Some feminist leaders say reaction to Clinton’s candidacy reflects just how much work remains. Commentators in the news media dissected everything from Clinton’s laugh and clothes to her ankles and cleavage, and hecklers at a New Hampshire campaign stop in January shouted, “Iron my shirt!” “Will that treatment be the norm for women who run in the future? Has it become acceptable?” asked Kim Gandy, president of the National Organization for Women. (Sabar, 2008, 1)

Amanda Fortini contrasted the stereotypes of candidates Senator Clinton as bitchy and Governor Sarah Palin as ditzy, and observed: “Among the darker revelations of this election is the fact that the vice-grip of female stereotypes remains suffocatingly tight” (Fortini, 2008, 34). Other journalists addressed the larger question of cultural acceptance of powerful women. An Australian journalist writes: When a mature woman has got some serious work to do . . . must she strip away, or indeed cover up, any sign of her femaleness? Are we still so dreadfully afraid of the power of a woman’s sex, that when she is past her mid-40s, and no longer of fertile age, we’re affronted, even embarrassed by a reminder of her sexuality? (Haussegger, 2007, B5)

Ellen Goodman refocused the question about the meaning of the cleavage controversy: “The question is not whether a candidate can show a hint of breast but whether you can have breasts and be president” (Goodman, 2007, A15). Erika Falk asks: “Could the way the press covers women candidates affect women’s decision to run for office? . . . The press plays an integral role in the campaign by framing, shaping, ignoring, or presenting the candidates to the public. More important, how the press portrays and treats candidates may affect who later decides to be a candidate” (Falk, 2008, 2). While some stressed the faults and failures of Senator Clinton and her campaign, or the problems of media coverage, other journalists found a more positive message. For example, Sandy Grady in USA Today celebrated Clinton’s achievement: She transformed failure into historic triumph for women. . . . Clinton lost a campaign but found her true personality and her future. Her transcendental growth as a politician and her nearly 18 million votes will make her a powerhouse. (Grady, 2008, A12)


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Hillary’s campaign foundered for many reasons, some of them undoubtedly bad decisions within the campaign itself. Nevertheless, Senator Clinton ran a good fight, held her own, and, let’s hope, helped to pave the way for the next well-qualified woman presidential candidate who will shatter the glass ceiling to win the election.

Notes 1. For example, in her study of women’s status, The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir argued that women are perceived to be passive objects, the “Other” (xviii–xix). Elizabeth Grosz analyzes the mind-body dichotomy as it links masculinity to intellect and femininity to the body. 2. The newspapers were the International Herald Tribune, Independent (London), Washington Times, USA Today, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Guardian (London), Toronto Star, and Globe and Mail (Canada). 3. At their marriage Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell jointly signed a statement protesting the laws that made women inferior to their husbands. See womenshistory.about .com/library/etext/bl_marriage_stone_blackwell.htm 4. Smalley and Brant do not say who conducted the poll or how many responded. 5. Thanks to Charisse Gendron for sending me the Belkin article. 6. The investigators attempted to explain how this discrepancy in assigning a value to learning a foreign language occurred. Employers may have perceived that men who learned foreign languages were preparing for careers, while women were studying foreign languages for their own interest (Valian, 1999, 197). 7. Even more outrageous than the newspapers were the cable TV talk show hosts: Chris Matthews, a host on MSNBC, called Mrs. Clinton a “she-devil” and said she had gotten as far as she had only because her husband had “messed around.” Mike Barnicle, a panelist on MSNBC, said that Mrs. Clinton was “looking like everyone’s first wife standing outside a probate court.” Tucker Carlson, also on MSNBC, said, “When she comes on television, I involuntarily cross my legs.” (Seelye and Bosman, 2008, 1)

Especially egregious were some of the posts on YouTube and other websites with pictures featuring Senator Clinton’s face inside a target or a toilet bowl, and related objects offered for sale such as the “Hillary nutcracker,” or a Hillary voodoo doll complete with pins. 8. When women in the United States first began to wear pants rather than restricting corsets and heavy layers of petticoats they were ridiculed. A furor over women in pants erupted in 1850 when, Mrs. Amelia Jenks Bloomer (borrowing an idea from Elizabeth Smith) championed the harem pant outfit that came to have her name. Women wearing bloomers were so frequently followed on the streets and harassed that the fashion was quickly dropped (Lauer and Lauer, 1981, 247). In 1881 the Rational Dress Society was formed in London to advocate for less restrictive clothing. People believed women wearing

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pants were not just changing roles, but were “making an assault on human nature itself, a nature that had been created and ordained by God” (Lauer and Lauer, 1981, 110–11).

References Alberts, S. (2008a, May 25). After Hillary can there be a Ms. President? Canwest News, A12. Alberts, S. (2008b, February 6). Clinton and Obama split vote: Democratic candidates set stage for epic battle for nomination. The Gazette (Montreal), A3. Argetsinger, A., and Roberts, R. (2008, July 21). From the Clinton files, one more hair piece. The Washington Post, C3. Aspan, M. (2008, February 11). Hillary as the fashion police: My polka-dot dress should be arrested. The New York Times, C6. Bazinet, K. R. (2007, July 28). Now, wait chest a minute! Daily News (New York), 3. Beauvoir, S. de. (1952). The second sex. H. M. Parshley (Trans.). New York: Vintage. Belkin, L. (2007, November 1). The feminine critique. The New York Times, G1. Bertagnoli, L. (2008, May 19). A call to action: Defending pantsuits. Crain’s Chicago Business, 61. Carey, B. (2008, January 13). The crying game, and the political herd. The New York Times, sec 4, 3. Clinton’s cleavage takes the spotlight. (2007, July 30). The Australian, World 13. Conroy, B. (2008, June 1). Hillary: How she failed the feminists. Sunday Telegraph (Australia), 85. Dowd, M. (2008, January 9). Can Hillary cry her way back to the White House? The New York Times, Op-Ed, 19. Falk, E. (2008). Women for President: Media bias in eight campaigns. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Fortini, A. (2008, November 24). The “bitch” and the “ditz.” New York, 30–34. Givhan, R. (2007, July 20). Hillary Clinton’s tentative dip into new neckline territory. The Washington Post, C1. Goodman, E. (2007, November 9). Trumped by the gender card. The Boston Globe, A15. Grady, S. (2008, June 10). The house of Clinton. USA Today, A12. Grosz, E. (1994). Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hamilton, N. (2008, January 13). Fake tears of St Hillary. Sunday Express (UK), 31. Haussegger, V. (2007, August 4). Politics of cleavage an age-old cover up: Just ask Hillary. Canberra Times (Australia), B05. “Hillary busted.” (2007, July 29). Sunday Territorian (Australia), 15. Hutchinson, B. (2008, July 17). Hil’s part-y on right. New York Daily News, July 17, 2008. Jacobs, A. (2008, February 10). The candidate. The New York Times, Section BR, 20.


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Kathirasen. (2007, August 5). Milking money from Hillary’s cleavage. New Straits Times (Malaysia), 19. Kuhn, C. G. (2005). Self-fashioning in Margaret Atwood’s fiction: Dress, culture, and identity. New York: Peter Lang. Kurtz, H. (2007, July 28). Cleavage and the Clinton Campaign Chest. The Washington Post, C01. Lauer, J, C., and Lauer, R. H. (1981). Fashion power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Mackie, E. “Fashion.” (1997). In E. Kowaleski-Wallace (Ed.), Encyclopedia of feminist literary theory. New York: Garland Publishing. Melocco, J. (2007, August 3). Hillary’s cleavage divides opinions. The Daily Telegraph (Australia), Features, 26. Norgren, J. (n.d.). Prologue Magazine, U.S. Archives. www.archives.gov/publications/ prologue/2005/spring/belva-lockwood-1.html. Pruden, W. (2007, July 31). No booby prizes in this campaign. The Washington Times, A4. Sabar, A. (2008, June 17). How Clinton and Obama boosted feminism, civil rights. Christian Science Monitor, sec USA, 1. Safire, W. (2007, March 18). Woman vs. female. The New York Times, sec. 6, 20. Seelye, K. Q., and Bosman, J. (2008, June 13). Critics and news executives split over sexism in Clinton coverage. The New York Times, A1. Smalley, S., and Brant, M. (2008, March 21). Hillary: What’s in a name?” Newsweek, 9. Tannen, D. (2008, March 9). Through a lens wrongly. The Washington Post, B3. Thompson, P., and Murphy, J. (2008, June 4). Obama: First black man to run for White House. The Evening Standard (London), A6. Valian, V. (1999). Why so slow? The advancement of women. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Watson, M. (2008, January 9). It’s my political party and I’ll cry if I want to. The Times (London), Features, 2.

CHAPTER 9

She’s Not Laughing: Political Humor and Hillary Clinton’s Campaign for President Joan L. Conners

Political Humor in Politics Late-night comedy is certainly becoming a popular source of political information, as evidenced by recent research by the Pew Research Center in which one poll reported 48 percent of adults regularly or sometimes used late-night programs such as The Daily Show and The Tonight Show as a source of news on political campaigns (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2005). However, other research (Feldman and Young, 2008; Young and Tisinger, 2006) found that viewers of late-night comedy were not replacing news viewing with entertainment viewing, but that viewing of The Daily Show or other humorous content occurred in addition to exposure to television news sources. Research has explored the influence of political humor in the recall or evaluation of messages. For example, Nabi, Moyer-Guseé, and Byrne (2007) found in their research on two studies of humorous messages that subjects attended to humorous messages, but were not more critical of them. Their findings suggest that counterarguments against messages may be disrupted due to the humorous context of the message. However, they also found that humorous messages are discounted by audiences, in that they are not taken as seriously as factual statements. Kim and Vishak (2008) concluded in their research on message processing from late-night comedy: “Entertainment media clearly promote online-based information processing, but news media appear to facilitate memory-based information processing” (356). Entertainment media may be useful in impression formation in political contexts, but not necessarily in learning about political issues. 189

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While much of the political humor research has examined the influence of late-night television comedy, “[l]ike late-night TV, political cartoons supplement other sources of information and persuasion” (Conners, 2005, 480) audiences receive. What political cartoons and late-night comedy share is that, while their primary role may be entertainment, they cannot disconnect themselves from information, the basis for the comedy; these humorous political messages may have the potential to be persuasive as well as entertaining. This study assesses the representations in political humor of Hillary Clinton as presidential candidate during the 2008 primaries and the messages most often conveyed about her candidacy to media audiences. Specifically, it will assess the portrayals of Clinton during the presidential primaries through two types of political humor: political cartoons and late-night comedy.

Political Cartoons of Presidential Candidates Presidential candidates have not only been featured consistently in political cartoons during election cycles, such images have also been the focus of past research, including analyses of the Bush and Kerry 2004 race (Conners, 2005), Bush and Gore in 2000 (Edwards, 2001), Dole and Clinton in 1996 (Sewell, 1998), Bush and Clinton in 1992 (Koetzle and Brunell, 1996; Lamb and Burns, 1996), Bush and Dukakis in 1988 (Buell and Maus, 1988; Edwards, 1997), Reagan and Carter in 1980 (DeSousa and Medhurst, 1982), and Carter in 1976 (Hill, 1984). Prior to this current analysis of cartoon representations of Hillary Clinton as presidential candidate, past research has examined the representations of Hillary Clinton while she was First Lady; Edwards and Chen (2000) found representations in political cartoons in which Hillary Clinton was silenced while First Lady, as well as demonized. They say “[c]artoons which, in depicting the strength or competence of a First Lady, lampoon the President by implication, acknowledge the potentials of female power, even as they identify the social unease over female power. That unease is particularly pronounced with Hillary Rodham Clinton” (386) in representations of her while First Lady. Templin (1999) also explored political cartoon imagery of Hillary Clinton as First Lady and found Hillary frequently portrayed as taking over, as not serving as a traditional First Lady, and in general as not fulfilling gender norms. To examine how Hillary Clinton was portrayed during the 2008 presidential primaries, a sample of 847 U.S. editorial cartoons was analyzed. Of the cartoons in the sample published between the Iowa caucus on January 3, 2008, and Hillary Clinton announcing the suspension of her campaign on June 7, 336, or 39.7 percent, of cartoons visually featured Hillary Clinton or some aspect of

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her campaign. While Hillary was not consistent in her ability to win delegates during the Democratic primaries, she did remain a fixture in the humor and commentary of political cartoons. As with most political cartoons, the current events of a presidential campaign provide the setting for cartoonists’ imagery. A few key events of Clinton’s campaign were the focus for many cartoon representations that will be analyzed here: Hillary’s tears in New Hampshire, her “3:00 a.m.” ad, and her misspeaking while on the campaign trail, as well as issues that were represented in cartoons throughout her campaign, specifically the influence Bill Clinton had on her campaign and Hillary Clinton’s determination in the 2008 primaries. Hillary Clinton’s tears during a campaign stop that were captured on television cameras were also capitalized upon in a number of political cartoon images. On January 7, the day before she won the New Hampshire primary, Hillary Clinton addressed an undecided voter’s question in a New Hampshire coffee shop, and her voice cracked as she responded with tears in her eyes. An image by Jeff Koterba for the January 9, 2008, Omaha World-Herald (figure 9.1) implies the strategic success behind Hillary Clinton’s tears in New Hampshire, as many other cartoons suggested—a tear being shed by Hillary Clinton is in the shape of the state of New Hampshire. Although news coverage of the instance focused on the stress Clinton was under during the campaign, and her emotional passion

Figure 9.1. Cartoon by Jeff Koterba, Omaha World-Herald, January 9, 2008 (Jeff Koterba © NORTH AMERICA SYNDICATE)

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for running for president, political cartoons represented the event as being more calculated than spontaneous, given her victory in the New Hampshire primary. Cartoons also represented other presidential candidates such as John Edwards attempting to cry to see if it would have an impact on their primary outcomes. Hillary Clinton’s “‘It’s 3:00 a.m.’ phone call” advertisement was also the focus of a number of cartoon images, none of them favorable to her campaign. The advertisement, which reflected imagery from Walter Mondale’s 1984 “red phone” advertisement against Gary Hart, questioned if Barack Obama had the experience to handle crises while president and began airing in Texas on February 29, 2008. A handful of cartoon images in this sample utilized this advertisement, either using the setting for a phone call to Hillary Clinton that her campaign was over, or for implying Bill Clinton’s late-night cavorting. As other editorial cartoons implied that the Democrats were losing ground to the Republicans by the continued battle between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama for the nomination, the 3:00 reference was also represented as time running out for the Democrats while Clinton and Obama persisted in their negative campaigns against each other. A few events of Hillary Clinton misspeaking during the campaign were also highlighted in political cartoons. One event was in late March 2008, when Hillary Clinton acknowledged that she misspoke about a trip to Bosnia while she was First Lady in 1996. She had recounted earlier that month that her airplane to Bosnia had landed under sniper fire, and that they had to run with their heads down to awaiting vehicles, when news pictures of the event surfaced and showed the First Lady with daughter Chelsea walking calmly from the plane to greetings on the tarmac. Robert Arial’s cartoon in South Carolina’s The State on March 27 (figure 9.2) makes light of this misstep in Clinton’s campaign. Rather than dodging sniper fire, Clinton is portrayed in Arial’s image as running from reporter’s questions on a myriad of issues that had plagued her husband’s presidency while she was First Lady. There is also a reference to Bill Clinton’s grand jury testimony regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, as Hillary is saying “that depends on what the meaning of ‘hostile fire’ is.” This statement is an allusion to Bill Clinton’s explanation for lying to his aides about his affair, saying “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is,” in his attempt to distinguish present and past tense regarding his relationship. Cartoon images such as this suggest how the past events of her husband’s presidency may have been factors that continued to plague her candidacy. Other events in which what Clinton said or implied in her campaign was turned against her in political cartoons included a statement by Hillary Clinton about the type of voters she was gaining compared to Barack Obama that expressed potential race or class tensions. A cartoon by Steve Benson on May 9, 2008, for the Arizona Republic quoted Hillary Clinton’s statement from May 7, “These are the people who you have to win if you’re a Democrat,” with Hillary


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Figure 9.2. Cartoon by Robert Arial, The State, March 27, 2008 (Robert Ariail: © The State/Dist. by Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.)

Clinton on a campaign rally stage joining a raised hand in victory with a unshaven man with a beer belly, wearing a Confederate flag T-shirt and NASCAR belt buckle, holding a Budweiser beer can. Other cartoons represent Hillary Clinton either catering to such voters, or being troubled by having won lesseducated voters over to her campaign. Another statement by Hillary Clinton later in her campaign that was negatively highlighted in political cartoons was a May 23, 2008, statement defending her decision to remain in the race until at least June 3, in which she indirectly referenced Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination in June 1968 during the Democratic primary season. While she apologized for the statement and explained she was simply illustrating that past nomination campaigns had continued into June, others interpreted it that Clinton thought Obama’s life might be in danger. Some pundits concluded that Clinton may have ruined her chance to be considered a vice-presidential running mate. While this event was not featured in many cartoons in the closing days of her campaign, some images did imply the statement reflected Clinton’s desperation at the end of her campaign. One aspect of Hillary Clinton’s campaign that was a frequent focus of cartoon imagery was her husband, former President Bill Clinton. Cartoon images of Bill Clinton being affiliated with Hillary Clinton’s campaign portrayed him as either a liability or an asset to her presidential bid. For example, images of Bill Clinton in April 2008 cartoon made reference to Clinton’s potential to erupt (as a geyser in a national park) or how explosive baggage cannot be permitted

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on planes (with a security agent gesturing to Bill Clinton). These images were published shortly after Bill Clinton’s speech at the California Democrats State Convention, in which he attacked the media for its unfair treatment of Hillary, as well as criticized Bill Richardson for backing Obama’s candidacy. The potential for the former president to be negative “baggage” in Hillary Clinton’s campaign was represented in other cartoons as well, such as luggage collecting outside of Hillary’s campaign bus featured by John Deering in a January 29, 2008, cartoon in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. Although Bill Clinton was typically portrayed as a detriment to Hillary’s campaign, some cartoon images represented him instead as a threat, as part of the “Clinton campaign machine.” For example, a January 23, 2008, cartoon by John Cole for the Scranton Times-Tribune features Hillary Clinton as the wicked witch from the Wizard of Oz sending Bill Clinton (flying and carrying a bat labeled “Bash Obama”) out to help her weakening campaign. Bill Clinton was often portrayed as a guard dog either protecting Hillary or attacking Barack Obama. Such images appeared early in the Democratic primaries when it was not yet clear what role Bill Clinton would take in Hillary’s campaign, and what impact he might have on the primary election results. Hillary Clinton’s determination and unwillingness to concede the Democratic nomination were featured in a variety of portrayals in political cartoons, many of which also seemed to question the logic of her remaining in the race for as long as she did. Clinton was represented in a number of cartoons during the primaries as the Energizer Bunny who keeps going and going and as a contestant on American Idol who refuses to leave the stage. Other imagery features Clinton in a horserace with Obama, Hillary shrinking in size as her chances for winning the nomination decline (yet she continues to fight and compete), or Hillary ignoring signs that indicate her campaign should end. While such cartoon representations imply Clinton’s determination and commitment, they also suggest desperation in her unwillingness to concede the nomination. Grave and coffin imagery appear in a number of cartoons, suggesting questions about whether or not Clinton’s campaign was dead. In many images early in the primaries, Clinton was portrayed as reemerging from the brink of death, or arising from the coffin. However, such images from later in the campaign implied the pending death of her campaign in the midst of her willpower to continue. For example, a May 9, 2008, cartoon by Ed Stein for the Rocky Mountain News (figure 9.3) contrasts the visual of Hillary Clinton’s campaign being buried with the text of Hillary’s statement from the grave. Famous quotes from John Paul Jones, Nietzsche, Mission Control during the Apollo 13 crisis, and Winston Churchill that convey themes of determination are strung together. While nobody would expect a favorable candidate portrayal in political cartoons (to be favored is to be ignored in them), the representations of Hillary


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Figure 9.3. Cartoon by Ed Stein, Rocky Mountain News, May 9, 2008 (Ed Stein: © The Rocky Mountain News/Dist. by Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.)

Clinton during the 2008 presidential primaries do revolve around consistent themes discussed above. Rather than focus on exaggerating personal flaws or physical features, the cartoon images of Hillary Clinton as presidential candidate most frequently highlight Clinton’s strategies as well as missteps while campaigning. Previous research on cartoon representations of Hillary Clinton as First Lady focused on issues of her gender and expected roles. As Templin (1999) states, “The number and virulence of the cartoons, with the excessive use of negatively coded images of Hillary, reveal the strength of the culture’s reaction to a woman whose actions and style place her outside the accepted female paradigm” (33). However, in political cartoons of the 2008 presidential primaries, Hillary Clinton is more commonly portrayed as a trailing presidential candidate than a female candidate.

Late-Night Comedy and Presidential Candidates One analysis of late-night comedy early in the 2008 presidential campaign concluded that Hillary was a more popular target of late-night humor than other

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candidates. In a Center for Media and Public Affairs analysis of comedy from January 1 through October 10, 2007, Hillary led all democratic candidates as the focus of late-night jokes with 186 jokes, compared to fifty-six for Barack Obama, forty-three about John Edwards, thirty-four for Dennis Kucinich, and twenty-six for Joe Biden (Center for Media and Public Affairs [CMPA], November 2007). The report also broke down the focus of Clinton jokes, with 16 percent about her physical appearance, 23 percent on a lack of emotional warmth, and 11 percent about marital problems. Robert Lichter, CMPA president, states about these findings that “[t]he jokes about Ms. Clinton make fun of her inadequacies as a woman. They seem to suggest that she’s not man enough to be president” (para. 2). CMPA’s analyses track the jokes made on the late-night comedy programs Late Night with Conan O’Brien, The Colbert Report, The Daily Show, The Late Show with David Letterman, and The Tonight Show with Jay Leno. Hillary continued to lead the presidential candidates as the focus of latenight jokes during the 2008 primaries as well, as seen in table 9.1. The number of jokes about Hillary Clinton was nearly double those about Barack Obama (Center for Media and Public Affairs, Aug. 2008). In the CMPA’s analysis of late-night jokes from January 1 through July 31, 2008, they reported The Daily Show had more jokes about Barack Obama than Hillary Clinton (122 jokes to 100) and The Colbert Report featured Obama in more jokes than Clinton (91 to 79). In contrast, Late Night with David Letterman featured only 46 jokes about Obama but 131 about Clinton. While not a political candidate in 2008, Bill Clinton was the subject of frequent late-night comedy jokes himself. In addition to 467 jokes about Hillary Clinton from January 2008 through May 2008, 114 jokes were made about Bill Clinton in the same set of late-night programs. While suggested earlier in the discussion regarding political cartoons that Bill Clinton was portrayed as both a Table 9.1. Monthly Count of Jokes of Presidential Candidates in LateNight Comedy

Hillary Clinton Barack Obama John Edwards Joe Biden Dennis Kucinich John McCain Mitt Romney Mike Huckabee Rudy Giuliani

January

February

March

April

May

Total

41 31 22 1 10 23 67 33 28

88 35 4 1 4 76 52 16 1

65 67 2 1 1 57 3 6 0

142 64 9 0 0 96 1 0 0

131 47 7 0 2 59 0 0 0

467 244 44 3 17 311 123 55 29

Source: Abbreviated from CMPA Election Watch 2008: Punchlines, www.cmpa.com/studies _humor_punchlines.htm (accessed January 23, 2009).


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liability to Clinton’s campaign as well as a potential asset (in the threat Bill and Hillary might present in a campaign), late-night comedy typically portrayed Bill Clinton as a liability to Hillary Clinton’s campaign. The NBC program Saturday Night Live was not included in the CMPA analysis above, although the program does have parallels to other late-night comedy programs. Saturday Night Live is a variety comedy program, which features “fake news” in “Weekend Update” that may compare to segments of The Daily Show; it relies on contemporary current events for the basis of many of its humorous scenes. The parodies of political candidates that appear in many SNL segments during elections make it a unique late-night comedy program from the others, as are the appearances of political candidates in SNL performances, sometimes within parodies of themselves. Political candidates may appear in a humorous interview situation with Jay Leno or Stephen Colbert, for example, but it is a different entertainment circumstance to have Hillary Clinton standing next to an identically dressed Amy Poehler as the female candidate, as they did in March 2008. The Saturday Night Live parodies of Hillary Clinton during the 2008 primaries will be analyzed below. As political cartoon research has concluded that political commonplaces are often the context for cartoon imagery (Medhurst and DeSousa, 1981), current events are also the context for humor in late-night comedy such as Saturday Night Live. In his research on the early years of Saturday Night Live, Reincheld (2006) quotes SNL “Weekend Update” writer Herb Sargent confirming this: “You don’t want to have to explain your premise every time you do a story, so you try to pick things that you think most people know, are aware of the facts or the basis of the story at least” (193). Presidential politics and elections have been a popular subject of Saturday Night Live through the years, with Chevy Chase portraying a clutzy Gerald Ford in the 1970s, Dana Carvey rising to fame for his portrayals of George H. W. Bush and Ross Perot in the early 1990s, Phil Hartman portraying Bill Clinton in the 1990s, and Norm MacDonald playing Bob Dole in 1996, to name a few examples. Just as the public saw presidential candidates appearing on late-night comedy programs since the early 1990s, many candidates appeared on Saturday Night Live during the 2008 elections. Viewers saw guest appearances by Barack Obama, John McCain, and Mike Huckabee in 2008, as well as Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin, both of whom appeared in parodies with SNL cast members caricaturing them. Hillary Clinton was portrayed in a number of Saturday Night Live episodes during the 2008 presidential primaries, including two debates with Barack Obama (one of which was followed by a guest appearance by Hillary Clinton), a spoof of her “It’s 3:00 a.m.” advertisement, and a direct comparison between what she and Barack Obama would say in the late weeks of the primary before

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Clinton suspended her campaign. Through these caricatures, we see negative portrayals of Hillary Clinton as a silenced candidate, as a relentless and pushy candidate, and as a determined candidate, but her own appearance on the show contrasts all of these and viewers see Clinton as having a sense of humor about herself and being relaxed even during the stress of the primaries. The first SNL skit featuring an Obama-Clinton debate, which aired February 23, 2008, focused more on the media “love affair” with Barack Obama than any attention toward Hillary Clinton. In a primary debate following this episode, Hillary Clinton even commented on the spoof and the media’s favorable treatment of Obama. In this debate, Amy Poehler’s Hillary is introduced as the former First Lady whose husband cheated on her, following which she “rode the wave of sympathy” to the Senate seat in New York. Hillary is also described as being known in the Senate as a “good listener” and as having “an excellent attendance record.” Following Obama’s breathtaking response to the final question of the debate scene, Hillary is excluded from commenting and the debate concludes without her speaking. In this scene Hillary is first discredited as a senator who easily won her seat, and then as a silenced candidate not given an opportunity to respond. A second Obama-Clinton debate was featured on March 1, which was followed by an “editorial comment” by Hillary Clinton herself to open the show. In the debate scene, Hillary Clinton’s character responds to a question about her saying Obama can talk about change but she can make change happen. Hillary responds on what type of person needs to get special interests to respond; in doing so, she describes that person as “someone who is aggressive enough, and relentless enough, and demanding enough to take them on, someone so annoying, so pushy, so grating, so bossy and shrill, a personality so unpleasant that at the end of the day the special interests will have to go ‘Enough! We give up! Life is too short to deal with this awful woman. Just give her what she wants so she’ll shut up and leave us in peace.’ And I think the American people will agree that someone is me.” This scathing criticism comes from the character of Hillary Clinton’s own mouth, not Barack Obama or the media participants in the debate. These statements imply a commentary of Hillary Clinton as determined to a fault, and unpleasant in a variety of ways, many of which are particular criticisms for women. This debate scene was followed immediately by an “Editorial Response,” which featured the candidate Hillary Clinton in person at SNL. Rather than responding to the content of the scene and defending herself, Clinton simply describes it: “The scene you just saw was a reenactment of a debate and not an endorsement of one candidate over another.” She continues that she “enjoyed that sketch a great deal because I simply adore Amy’s [Poehler] impression of


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me.” Poehler, dressed identically as Hillary Clinton from the first skit, appears for a short exchange. They compliment each other’s outfits, and Poehler breaks into a loud giggle to which Clinton responds, “Do I really laugh like that?” Poehler asks, “So how is the campaign going?” to which Clinton answers, “The campaign is going very well, very, very well. Why, what have you heard?” This scene is a friendly exchange between the comedian who performs Hillary Clinton and Clinton herself, with a focus on Hillary’s attire, her laugh, and a suggestion of her expressing confidence in her campaign while also having concerns about what others are saying about it. After the critique made in the debate scene, Hillary Clinton’s appearance on the program demonstrated that she was a “good sport,” that she didn’t take the criticism in the program’s skits seriously, and was not offended by the portrayal of her. The parody of Hillary Clinton’s “3:00 a.m.” ad, which aired March 8, first features still photography narrated by characters playing Obama and Clinton. Obama had won the presidency and is calling Clinton at 3:00 a.m., panicking about many of his challenges as president. Clinton calmly coaches him and walks him through how to proceed with international negotiations, for example. When the photograph sequence concludes, Poehler’s Hillary Clinton is sitting behind a desk and states “What you’ve seen is a frightening dramatization, a dramatization based on facts. Well, not facts, but more what we call specious campaign talking points,” which implies her campaign’s questionable tactics. Clinton continues that it is not too late to change that future, and that viewers should contact the offices of the Democratic National Committee and tell them “Wait. We’ve changed our minds” (a graphic of the phrase also appears): “With enough pressure we can convince the party that nominating my opponent would be a huge mistake.” She also takes credit for using the phrase “Yes we can” first. This portrayal conveys the determination and perhaps even more the desperation of the caricatured Clinton, competitive to the end. “There can only be one” aired May 17, 2008, with a split screen face, half Barack Obama and half Hillary Clinton. For much of the image, Obama and Clinton say identical lines in unison, but occasionally diverge to make their points about themselves or their opponent. Poehler’s Hillary critiques the Iowa caucuses (“it shouldn’t carry as much weight”), and makes a plug to count Michigan and Florida in the delegate count; both of these statements reinforce the notion of how unfair the primaries have been for Hillary Clinton. The scene continues with the character of Hillary referring to the backbone of the Democratic Party being “hard-working white people”; such a statement has potential class as well as racial overtones that plagued Clinton’s final weeks in the primary. This SNL episode aired less than two weeks after her reference to needing lesseducated white support for her candidacy. The clip closes with both saying

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“Because in the end, we can all stand behind one idea,” and simultaneously Obama states “democracy” while Clinton states “I deserve it.” While the Obama character was not portrayed in this parody as always providing more favorable responses than the Clinton character, these final statements are in marked contrast to each other, with Obama’s statement being idealistic and neutral, and Clinton’s statement reflecting a sense of entitlement. While only the Saturday Night Live parodies featuring a caricature of Hillary Clinton were analyzed here, she was a more frequent focus of parody during the 2008 primaries than Barack Obama, or any other presidential candidate. In these parodies, Clinton is portrayed as a presidential candidate who was determined to a fault, who saw herself as entitled to the presidential nomination, and who was not covered by the media as favorably as her opponent Barack Obama. Although highlighted in the humorous scenes of Saturday Night Live, these themes reflect opinion conveyed in other coverage about the 2008 presidential election. And as with the cartoon representations of Hillary Clinton’s campaign, gender issues were not the primary focus of the humor in the SNL skits.

Conclusion Although this analysis does not examine the potential impact of political humor on voters, it is relevant to consider in the context of this imagery. Considerably more research has been conducted on the impact of late-night comedy than political cartoons, but both media devices present critiques and opinions under the veil of humor and reach voters without filtering that audiences may perform for more traditional political messages. To have audiences laugh as well as contemplate the issues underlying the political humor has been considered not just by researchers, but creators of such programs as well. In Reincheld’s (2006) review of the history of SNL, he states: “The ultimate goal of Saturday Night Live is to make its viewers laugh a whole lot while learning and thinking at least a little. If it were not possible to do both, [he quotes SNL producer Lorne Michaels from a 2003 interview] ‘my life would be meaningless, wouldn’t it?’” (190). Hillary Clinton’s gender was not a primary focus of either political cartoon or late-night political comedy analyzed here. Representations more frequently portrayed Clinton as a trailing candidate, perhaps a desperate candidate if not at least a determined candidate, rather than a “female” candidate. The imagery highlighted in cartoons of Hillary Clinton tearing up in New Hampshire might be one exception to this, but the majority of imagery examined here did not make light of gender in the political humor of Clinton as presidential candidate.


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References Buell, E. H., Jr., and Maus, M. (1988). Is the pen mightier than the word? Editorial cartoons and 1988 presidential nominating politics. P.S.: Political Science and Politics, 21(3), 847–58. Center for Media and Public Affairs (2007, November 30). TV writers strike helps Hillary most. www.cmpa.com/media_room_press_7.htm. Center for Media and Public Affairs (2008, August 21). Obama’s no joke to late-nite TV comics. www.cmpa.com/media_room_press_1.htm. Conners, J. L. (2005). Visual representations of the 2004 presidential campaign: Political cartoons and popular culture references. American Behavioral Scientist, 49, 479–87 DeSousa, M. A., and Medhurst, M. J. (1982). Political cartoons and American culture: Significant symbols of campaign 1980. Studies in Visual Communication, 8, 84–97. Edwards, J. L. (1997). Political cartoons in the 1988 presidential campaign: Image, metaphor, and narrative. New York: Garland Publishing. Edwards, J. L. (2001). Running in the shadows in campaign 2000: Candidate metaphors in editorial cartoons. American Behavioral Scientist, 44(12), 2140–51. Edwards, J. L., and Chen, H. R. (2000). The first lady/first wife in editorial cartoons: Rhetorical visions through gendered lenses. Women’s Studies in Communication, 23, 367–91. Feldman, L., and Young, D. G. (2008). Late-night comedy as a gateway to traditional news: An analysis of time trends in news attention among late-night comedy viewers during the 2004 presidential primaries. Political Communication, 25, 401–22. Hill, A. (1984). The Carter campaign in retrospect: Decoding the cartoons. In M. J. Medhurst and T.W. Benson (Eds.), Rhetorical dimensions in media: A critical casebook. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. Kim, Y. M., and Vishak, J. (2008). Just laugh! You don’t need to remember: The effects of entertainment media on political information acquisition and information processing in political judgment. Journal of Communication, 58, 338–60. Koetzle, W., and Brunell, T. L. (1996). Lip-reading, draft-dodging, and Perot-noia: Presidential campaigns in editorial cartoons. Harvard International Journal of Press/ Politics, 1(4), 94–115. Lamb, C., and Burns, J. (1996). What’s wrong with this picture? The anti-incumbent bias of cartoon during the ’92 campaign. Paper presented to the Newspaper Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Southeast Colloquium, Roanoke, VA. Medhurst, M. J., and DeSousa, M.A. (1981). Political cartoons as rhetorical form: A taxonomy of graphic discourse. Communication Monographs, 48, 197–236. Nabi, R. L., Moyer-Guseé, E., and Byrne, S. (2007). All joking aside: A serious investigation into the persuasive effect of funny social issue messages. Communication Monographs, 74, 29–54. Pew Internet and American Life Project. (2005, March). Campaign 2004. www.pew internet.org/pdfs/PIP_2004_Campaign.pdf.

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Reincheld, A. (2006). “Saturday Night Live” and Weekend Update: The formative years of comedy news dissemination. Journalism History, 31, 190–97. Sewell, Jr., E. H. (1998). “Torture-by-Tedium” or editorial cartoons during the 1996 presidential campaign. In R. E. Denton Jr. (Ed.), The 1996 presidential campaign: A communication perspective. Westport, CT: Praeger. Templin, C. (1999). Hillary Clinton as threat to gender norms: Cartoon images of the first lady. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 23, 20–36. Young, D. G., and Tisinger, R. M. (2006). Dispelling late-night myths: News consumption among late-night comedy viewers and the predictors of exposure to various latenight shows. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11, 113–34.

CHAPTER 10

A Democrat Suffers Media Bias: Hillary’s Fight Against Pro-Obama Coverage Richard E. Vatz

A tremendous volume of material has been written and continues to be written regarding accusations that the mainstream media in America are biased and preponderantly, but not exclusively, liberally biased.1 The primary campaign between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton seemed theoretically to be irrelevant to that concern; they are both liberals, and the differences in their ideological stances were largely found in their foreign policy positions, but these were small differences in, for example, how quickly American troops should be taken out of Iraq. Regardless, early on in the Democratic presidential primary campaign, there were growing accusations of media bias in favor of Barack Obama. These claims from the Clinton side seemed to reflect the possibility that electronic and print media political biases are more multi-causally motivated, including such factors as personality, race, and winnability. The favoring of Barack Obama in the mainstream media over Hillary Clinton when the Democratic race whittled down to two was in fact palpable throughout the primaries. If rhetoric in a national election is the creating of salience and agenda and the spinning and framing of said saliencies,2 it is valuable to look at what was ignored by the mainstream media, including the following matters that likely would have redounded to the detriment of Senator Obama’s presidential campaign had the matters been accorded more salience, investigation, and skeptical interpretation: (1) Senator Obama’s contemptuous referring to frightened Americans and their clinging to “guns and religion”; (2) What columnist Charles Krauthammer called Obama’s “tolerance of the obscene: Convicted felon Tony Rezko. Unrepentant terrorist Bill Ayers. And the racebaiting Rev. Jeremiah Wright”3; and (3) Obama’s being wrong on the “surge” 203

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issue, opposing early a military strategy that may, at least in the short run, have turned Iraq around (and as of this writing, parenthetically, it did). The media’s general aggressive demeanor toward Hillary Clinton in the primaries stood in stark contrast to the warmth shown by the mainstream media toward Senator Obama. The contrast was so patently evident that it was satirized by a newly relevant player in the national election—Saturday Night Live.

Saturday Night Live The prominence and influence of Saturday Night Live in the 2008 presidential election was unprecedented. The highly esteemed and longstanding satirical show had a history of periodically prioritizing humor over political preference— although no major source has ever accused the show of being pro-conservative— in presidential elections. In 2004, for example, in satirizing the presidential debates, while portraying a clueless President Bush who had a back-up plan of reinstalling Saddam Hussein as Iraq’s leader if other plans failed, SNL portrayed through Seth Meyers a clever, dead-on impression of an object of almost equally scornful humor, the flip-flopping John Kerry. In 2008, apropos of overwhelmingly uncritical news coverage of Barack Obama, Saturday Night Live—despite, for example, the same Seth Meyers, according to Wikipedia, having “donated over $4,000 to Senator Barack Obama‘s presidential campaign”4—decided to go on a full comedy blitz supporting Hillary Clinton’s candidacy. SNL became Hillary Clinton’s unpaid aide, as Amy Pohler (with guest star Clinton herself) satirized the media’s propensity to ask Senator Obama only softball questions and display their general worship of him. SNL’s writers, producers, directors, and cast had decided that the media were blatantly opposed to Senator Clinton, treated her with more scrutiny and harsh inquisitive techniques than they did Barack Obama, and in fact were giving him a “free ride.” For weeks, SNL’s satire hit those points harder and harder until much of the mainstream media came around and asked Senator Obama some slightly tougher questions and treated the two, not even-handedly, but less differentially. It should be noted that, once Senator Obama gained the Democratic nomination, Saturday Night Live became his full-fledged supporter. When the contest was between him and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton in the Democratic primaries, the show was more than willing to make the case regarding the mainstream media’s favoritism toward him, but when the contest was between Democrat and Republican, SNL’s liberal impulses took over, and the television show became almost full-fledged Obama supporters. The grist for this new political favoritism took hold via a fortuitous coincidence: the physical similarity—

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and with makeup the physical near-identity—between the Republican vicepresidential candidate Governor Sarah Palin and comedian Tina Fey, who, while an alumna but no longer a regular member of the SNL cast, became the satirical face of Palin on the show and throughout the media. Fey’s impersonation was dead-on and devastating. The November 1, 2008, last-Saturday-SNL-show-before-the-election (but not the last appearance, as SNL had several mid-week “special” shows) took some strides toward providing some sustained satire against the Obama-Biden ticket and Democratic-tilting media. The show opened with Senator John McCain—the real one—and Fey as a slightly toned-down Sarah Palin pitching for QVC, due to the fictive candidates’ lacking the funds of Barack Obama for multi-major-network appearances. In this segment there was a reference to and a picture of Bill Ayers, a reference to Governor Palin’s extravagant election clothing purchases, and a clever take on Palin’s 2012 options should this current presidential ticket fail, but, even though the show was not on balance pro-McCain, it was overall more positive for Senator McCain than anything SNL had done to date. It should also be stated that to this reviewer’s quasi-keen eye there were no subtle, unrealized-by-McCain attempts to make the senator look bad. The show avoided any harsh satire of Senator Obama, but there was a crushing and devastating impersonation of the consistently offensive liberal, self-important and self-obsessed, self-considered talkmeister Keith Olbermann, with Ben Affleck portraying his (Olbermann’s) self-serving Ted Baxter–style buffoonery. The SNL “Weekend Update” had satirical takes on Governor Palin and Senator McCain’s admittedly overbearing and self-ennobling label of “maverick,” but the satire worked without being offensive or unfair. There was also a telling reference to “Joe the Bummer” Biden’s gaffe predilections. Not insignificantly, the closing goodbyes at the end of the show included Obama supporter Ben Affleck’s genuinely warm hugging of Senator McCain. Parenthetically, the Obama-supporting Affleck showed how an entertainer can support a candidate without the seemingly inescapable heavy-handedness with which most actors bring their political preferences onstage. He is also that unusual talent who can satirize convincingly those with whom he is ideologically allied, the kind of quasi-fairness in which Saturday Night Live used to specialize but no longer prioritizes.

Calls for Hillary to Pull Out The rhetorical dynamic between the Obama supporters, who saw Hillary’s continued candidacy as a source of attacks on Barack Obama that could redound

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to his detriment in the general election, and Hillary’s supporters, who saw her candidacy as establishing a precedent for a woman candidate that sported a small but mathematically possible chance to win, was tense. The mainstream press seemed to want to announce her pulling out of the race, including most overtly the MSNBC Democrats, such as Keith Olbermann and Chris Matthews. Chris Matthews’s obsequiousness had become synecdoche for the press’s rolling over and abjuring journalistic conventions in order to support Senator Obama’s candidacy. Arianna Huffington’s Huffington Post, a liberal blog, described it this way: Matthews “who, in the past, has both cried over an Obama speech and compared him to Jesus, described exactly what happens to him when Obama speaks: ‘I have to tell you, you know, it’s part of reporting this case, this election, the feeling most people get when they hear Barack Obama’s speech. My, I felt this thrill going up my leg. I mean, I don’t have that too often.’”5

The national Democratic Party itself was roiled by the fight between those who wanted Senator Clinton to fight through to the final June primaries and/or the Democratic National Convention and those who wanted her to quit the presidential race. Many conservatives early on supported Hillary Clinton over Barack Obama, due to the suspicion that Senator Clinton’s high polling negatives would militate against her ability to win a national election. This unofficial conservative strategy included, famously, Rush Limbaugh’s support of Hillary when, for example, he publicly indicated to conservative commentator Laura Ingraham that Republican primary crossover voting for Senator Obama would “bloody” up the senator. The Washington Post on May 22, 2008, narrated the argument of Obama supporters—but not Obama himself—that although “she has received more votes than Senator Barack Obama[,] her calculation includes invalidated results in Michigan and Florida, where the candidates didn’t campaign, and apparently excludes the estimated results of four caucus states that don’t release voting totals. Regardless, delegates determine the nominee, not the popular vote.” The Post then listed the scenarios under which each could be interpreted as leading in popular votes as well as the delegate count at that point in which Obama led by a mere—but relatively difficult to overcome—183 delegates. The arguments most commonly made—millions backed her, to many she represented the first woman who has contested for the presidential nomination who could actually win it, and there was no reasonable basis to disenfranchise the few states left in the Democratic primaries—seemed compelling to disinterested observers, of whom, parenthetically, there were not many. The Democrats’ calls for an early Hillary withdrawal, when their mantra had been in presidential


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election disputes over George W. Bush’s victories “Count all the votes,” seemed petty and inconsistent, to say the least. Had Senator Clinton quit, she would have sustained all of the stereotypes of women’s lack of toughness. It would have been devastating to her political legacy and to those who fought and were fighting for women’s equality. There is not even any basis for the claim by Obama supporters that her participation would hurt his candidacy in the general election; more likely, it would—and perhaps did—help by attenuating the resentment of her supporters that she did not get a fair hearing. Finally, the specious argument that superdelegates should reflect the primary vote is counter to the raison d’etre of their appointment. If they were simply to follow unquestioningly the popular vote, why have them at all? This writer, no Hillary fan (even though she has certainly won all conservatives’ admiration for her claim of brave behavior under fire in Bosnia in 1996), saw no ethical, historical, or electoral rationale to justify her being called on to withdraw precipitously.

Hillary Clinton’s Most-Watched Speech There was enormous and consistent pressure on Senator Clinton to pull out of the race when it appeared that her chances of winning had diminished to nearzero. Attorney General John Mitchell’s famous dictum respecting the Nixon administration’s intentions regarding desegregation came to mind during Clinton’s stem-winder at the Democratic National Convention: “Watch what we do, not what we say.” Clinton’s was a speech that arguably supported Barack Obama without qualification. That was the great question Democrats had: Would Hillary try to undermine Barack Obama’s candidacy by damning him with faint praise? She did not, but the peculiarity and preciosity of the moment lingered on. It was a speech that supported party unity with no winks to indicate that she really felt otherwise. It was a speech that referenced the lineage of women’s political significance. It was a speech filled with magnanimous praise for, again, Barack Obama, and his wife, Michelle, and also for Joe Biden, the man who arguably took Hillary’s place as runner-up with relatively little Democratic support in the primaries. There were strong policy attacks on her “friend” John McCain and the Republicans. The speech was literate and it was powerful, but it had a perceptible if virtually unnoticed thud with the unspoken culmination of Hillary’s campaign—at the end, no place on the ticket. Yes, for all of the Hillary-articulated congratulations and implicit selfcongratulations for women’s political advancement, the denouement, it seemed then, was a couple of nights of her family’s dominating the convention speeches.

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After cataloguing her accomplishments as the first serious woman candidate, the predicate is that a politics-as-usual male was chosen as vice-presidential candidate. At the end of the day, how do you give a speech celebrating a woman’s attainment of eighteen million votes and rationalize the fact that it earned her no place on the presidential ticket, not even any public or probably private vetting for the vice-presidential position? The Clintons and their supporters knew what to say, but it could not have been lost on them what Barack Obama and the Democratic Party did.

Conclusion The accusation of pro-liberal bias in the mainstream media has always ignored some of the other biases which come in to play as well. In the case of the mainstream press using their thumb on the scale of balanced reporting in favor of Senator Barack Obama, the motive was multifaceted, including, but not limited to, his liberalism, his being an African American, and perhaps personal animosity toward Hillary Clinton and the Clinton presidency, wherein the Monica Lewinsky–based scandal and impeachment of President Bill Clinton had created bad blood between the media and the Clintons in general. Media prejudice against Hillary Clinton notwithstanding, she was selected by then–Presidentelect Obama to be secretary of state and ratified overwhelmingly by the U.S. Senate. Media attacks had greatly subsided as her liberal acceptability trumped her Clintonesque media opposition in time to provide an acceptable outcome to all—in the mainstream media.

Notes *A number of the points made in this paper were made by me contemporaneously in the Red Maryland blog. 1. There is a multitude of sources regarding this accusation, including Ann Coulter’s blog at www.humanevents.com and Bernard Goldberg’s books (Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the News [2002] and A Slobbering Love Affair: The True (and Pathetic) Story of the Torrid Romance Between Barack Obama and the Mainstream Media [2009]). The latter, bestselling Goldberg book catalogues and focuses on the 2008 presidential campaign pro-Obama bias in the mainstream media and the motives behind it. There is a short section in the work in which Goldberg makes a pointed claim regarding why the media favored Senator Obama over Senator Clinton in view of their both being media-friendly liberals. Respecting the relative coverage of the Clinton and Obama campaign, Goldberg summarizes by saying: “The media not only gave him [Senator Obama]


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extremely favorable coverage, but they also took the only other real contender for the nomination, Hillary Clinton, into the back room and beat her with a rubber hose. There was a simple explanation for this: in liberal media circles, race trumps sex. It was more important, as many journalists saw it, that American gets its first black president than its first woman president” (4–5). Other sources on alleged media political bias include E. Alterman’s 2003 book What Liberal Media? The Truth about BIAS and the News. Debates on the excellent CNN show on media criticism Reliable Sources, including one particularly excellent exchange (January, 2002) between liberal E. J. Dionne and conservative commentator Laura Ingraham, is illustrative of the battles over media political bias. One of the best and most potentially consequential editorials from the perspective of reluctant testimony on the matter was written by Deborah Howell on November 16, 2008: “Remedying the bias perception” (The Washington Post, B6). 2. See R. E. Vatz (1973), “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” and R. E. Vatz (2009), “The Mythical Status of Situational Rhetoric: Implications for Rhetorical Critics’ Relevance in the Public Arena.” 3. C. Krauthammer (2008), “Obama & Friends: Judge Not?” 4. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seth_Meyers. 5. www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/02/13/chris-matthews-i-felt-t_n_86449.html.

References Alterman, E. (2003). What liberal media? The truth about bias and the news. New York: Basic Books. Goldberg, B. (2002). Bias: A CBS insider exposes how the media distorts the news. Washington, DC: Regnery. Goldberg, B. (2009). A slobbering love affair: The true (and pathetic) story of the torrid romance between Barack Obama and the mainstream media. Washington, DC: Regnery. Howell, D. (2008, November 16). Remedying the bias perception. The Washington Post, B6. Krauthammer, C. (2008, October 10). Obama & friends: Judge not? The Washington Post, A9. Vatz, R. E. (1973). The myth of the rhetorical situation. Philosophy and Rhetoric 6, 154–61. Vatz, R. E. (2009). The mythical status of situational rhetoric: Implications for rhetorical critics’ relevance in the public arena. Review of Communication, 1–5.

Afterword

All political campaigns teach lessons, but some do so more than others. I would suggest that Hillary Rodham Clinton’s quest for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination is one of the richest in recent history insofar as it reinforces what we know about political campaigns and sheds considerable light on how gender still affects such campaigns. In this afterword, let me extract from the preceding chapters six general lessons relevant to future campaigns. First, the rules matter. Lauren C. Bell demonstrates that the rules under which the Democrats select their delegates favored Obama. The use of the Republicans’ rules would have resulted in a somewhat closer result, and, startlingly, the use of the rules used in our general presidential election to award electoral votes would have resulted in a Clinton victory. If the rules can alter the results in such a manner, then the campaign was far closer than both some Democratic Party leaders and the media were suggesting in its late days. That the results alter as the rules alter should cause one to question the rules. Perhaps the Democrats’ rules go too far in awarding delegates to all comers. Put another way, perhaps in its reforms, the party designed procedures that inadequately reward victory. Or perhaps our electoral college system used during the general election is not as democratic as some might think. Bell’s chapter also reminds us that the rules, whatever they may be, do—or at least should—determine how one plans a campaign. The press of course plays a major role in announcing which states are crucial at different points in the primary season, and candidates must heed this “spin,” even if they would rather not. However, one could play the media-defined game and end up seeing one’s 211

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opponent gathering an increasing number of delegates if one is not also attentive to the rules under which the party-defined game is played. Second, the usual modes of campaign communication do matter. As Julia Spiker demonstrates, one needs to send a message that is consistent. Hillary Clinton’s message, unfortunately for her campaign, shifted from time to time. Mary Banwart, James M. Schnoebelen, and Kelly Winfrey’s analysis of the Clinton advertising reveals a similar inconsistency. In addition, individual advertising texts tend to have multiple foci. The result of this campaign communication is that voters had a difficult time defining both who Hillary Clinton was and what a Hillary Clinton presidency might be like. The importance of such defining has been demonstrated repeatedly in campaigns. Without it, voters lack a reason to support a candidate, and opponents have the opportunity of providing a definition for the undefined candidate. For example, it might be argued that 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry lacked a clear definition as the campaign entered September. His support waned, and the Bush/Cheney campaign was able to define Kerry, in the minds of enough voters, as a “flipflopper.” Third, the one now-usual mode that has not been mentioned—debates— has a very different “feel” in the primary season than in the general election, but they nonetheless do situate candidates for voters. As Mitchell McKinney, Corey B. Davis, and Jeffrey Delbert point out, these debates have many—perhaps too many—participants, and, because they are all of the same political party, there are often not major differences among them. In addition, they refrain from harsh commentary on each other because they both do not want to wreck party unity and they do not want to give the GOP nominees soundbites to use against the ultimate Democratic winner in the fall. Attacks then focus on Republicans—in this case, on outgoing President George W. Bush and, late in the cycle, presumptive Republican nominee John McCain on Obama’s part. A candidate’s goals in the debates are different than for the fall presidential debates. One goal is to get airtime; another is, once the field has narrowed, to project an image of both candidate and president that voters will find appealing. McKinney, Davis, and Delbert’s analysis of the primary season debates showed that Hillary Clinton did rather well securing airtime. However, once she was centerstage, she offered a persona that mixed gender traits, making her more aggressive than some voters would have preferred. Then, once she was no longer the frontrunner, she fell into the trap of emphasizing her comparatively higher level of experience by talking about her work in her husband Bill’s administration. She thereby tapped questions voters had about the First Lady role and concerns they had about a co-presidency. Rather than offer a positive image, she depicted herself, during the 1990s and in the future, in terms that raised problems for some.

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Fourth, the campaign within the campaign matters. This communication is not the subject of much scholarly inquiry, probably because of the difficulty researchers have acquiring “data.” Interviewing campaign principles is probably the only viable method of gaining information, and that information will almost necessarily be incomplete. However, one would be remiss not to note that there were internal communication problems within the Hillary Clinton campaign. An article by Joshua Green titled “The Front-Runner’s Fall” that appeared in September 2008 Atlantic Monthly reveals many of the campaign’s communication difficulties. And scholars do remember how comparable periods of in-fighting have damaged previous campaigns. Michael Dukakis’s 1988 presidential campaign, for example, endured internal communication problems after a very successful convention, permitting the Bush/Quayle campaign to define both presidential candidates for the voters and thereby take the lead. Fifth, media coverage matters. Three chapters in this volume consider the media in different ways, and all reach the same basic conclusion. Karen Stein’s chapter looks at press coverage and quickly zeroes in on the variable of gender. She pinpoints a number of very specific ways in which the media coverage treated the candidates differently, based on gender stereotypes—for example, calling Hillary by her first name or devoting stories and headlines to her body. Stein’s review demonstrates that media coverage disadvantaged Clinton. There are media, and then there are media. Increasingly, popular media play a role in political campaigns. Televisions programs such as The Tonight Show, The Daily Show, and Saturday Night Live deal with political campaigns extensively; the candidates now even feel compelled to make personal appearance on many of these heretofore entertainment programs. In this particular primary election, the commentary in this popular media seems to have played a major role. Joan Conners’s chapter points to the humorous side of popular media. Humor might be thought to be merely entertaining, but not so. Since so many people, especially young voters, rely on television humor for political information, how one’s campaign is presented “for laughs” can have a telling effect on that campaign’s success. In the Democratic Party’s primary campaign, the popular media both hurt and helped Hillary Clinton. They helped by pointing to what might well have been preferential treatment being given the Obama campaign by the mainstream media; they hurt by reinforcing several negative stereotypes voters held of the candidate and by focusing unwanted attention on the Hillary Clinton–Bill Clinton relationship. Editorial cartoons, a long-standing source of humor, may also have disadvantaged the Clinton campaign by highlighting its problems and its troubled moments. Richard E. Vatz’s chapter focuses more narrowly on specific moments in the Clinton campaign and media coverage. His commentary also suggests that

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the media helped and hurt the Clinton effort. The popular media—specifically, Saturday Night Live—helped Clinton by suggesting that Obama was receiving favorable news media treatment, but the news media hurt Clinton by joining some in the Democratic Party in suggesting that the campaign was over before it arguably was. Vatz’s commentary reminds us that the media, whether due to political biases or the power of the “good story” or the “good skit,” has the ability to shape our politics by influencing how we view candidates. The media were not, however, the only forces influencing how Hillary Clinton was viewed in this particular campaign. Societal attitudes were, and, thus, the sixth and last lesson is that societal attitudes matter. In this case, there were four of note. First, gender matters. Women have certainly made significant inroads into politics—as members of Congress and as governors. However, there still seems to be a glass ceiling separating them from the presidency. Kathleen M. Torrens’s chapter clearly points to its existence. That Hillary Clinton got as close as she did suggests that the ceiling is ready to shatter. Her campaign-concluding address, then, might not have been rhetorical spin: her campaign may well have cracked the ceiling sufficiently that the next woman who seeks the highest office may gain it. Some might argue that Hillary Clinton could have made it if not for the three other societal attitudes. Second, race trumps gender. Certainly both being African American and being female have made candidates underdogs in the past. It would seem, however, that the barrier of race was less formidable than that of gender. If so, then, it reinforces Torrens’s suggestion that the presidency is defined by prospective voters in very male terms. In addition, we need to consider the comparative appeal of overcoming racism and overcoming sexism in the liberal mind. Which was more necessary? Which was more important? Some would answer that, thanks to second-wave and power feminism, efforts to combat gender bias were less vital than those to combat deeply entrenched racism. So, not only was Obama advantaged by being male, but he was advantaged by representing an “-ism” that American society had less fully addressed in the minds of many political liberals. I hedge, however, in saying definitively that race trumps gender because of the next two societal factors that clearly mattered in this campaign. Third, the position of “First Lady” is not necessarily considered as one that qualifies a candidate for high political office. Many still see the position as social or ceremonial. As James M. Schnoebelen, Diana B. Carlin, and Benjamin R. Warner suggest, there have been many politically active women serving in this unofficial position. Nonetheless, it does not carry with it the presumed portfolio other positions such as U.S. senator or a state’s governor do. One can certainly talk about all that was done as “First Lady,” but, if one does, then one runs squarely into the next attitude.

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Fourth, a co-presidency is suspect. As Janette Muir and Anita Taylor point out, voters in this highly individualistic culture are not ready for a marital team in the White House. To the extent that Hillary Clinton talked about her service as “First Lady” in her husband’s eight years in the White House, she suggested that a co-presidency existed then. She also suggested that a co-presidency featuring Hillary and Bill (as “First Gentleman”) would exist should she be elected. As McKinney, Davis, and Delbert point out in their analysis of Clinton’s debate performance, she inadvertently foregrounded these concerns by emphasizing her “First Lady” work in an attempt to distinguish her level of experience from Obama’s. The generic problem of a co-presidency is, of course, exacerbated by the spousal member being Bill. As Schnoebelen, Carlin, and Wright note—as do Muir and Taylor—Bill posed a number of problems for the Hillary Clinton effort. Societal attitudes, then, proved to be a triple-whammy for Hillary Clinton. She was a woman, she was a former First Lady, and she raised the specter of a co-presidency. Almost certainly, the next woman who finds herself in Hillary Clinton’s position a year away from the Democratic Party’s convention will not have to deal with either having been “First Lady” or suggesting a co-presidency. Very likely, she will not find herself in a tough campaign against a charismatic African American male. So, the next time, most of these societal attitudes will likely be irrelevant. Only the one focused exclusively on gender is likely to be in play. Then, we will be able to ascertain the extent to which the Hillary Clinton campaign did indeed put eighteen million cracks in the gender-based glass ceiling. The consensus of this group of scholars on how successful Hillary Clinton was in advancing the cause of political women is difficult to ascertain. Some dodge the question; some answer it by praising Clinton, and then quickly retreating from their praise, realizing that their hopes might be overtaking their judgments as scholars and critics. Some others may be more pessimistic, believing that gender bias remains a major barrier before any woman who seeks to attain an office as male-defined as the presidency. If there is a consensus, it is on the extent to which Hillary Rodham Clinton normalized the presence of a woman in the group of serious contenders. Although gender may well still be a formidable obstacle for women seeking the presidency in the future, Clinton’s success will make it easier for a future woman to reach this elite group and, possibly, reach beyond that to the White House.

Index

Adair, B., 58 Affleck, Ben, 205 Alberts, S., 60, 61, 62, 83, 84, 174, 181 Almanac of American Politics, 17 Anderson, K. V., 32, 39–40, 42, 50, 59, 113 Anderson, R., 116 Anthony, C. S., 49, 59, 63 Anthony, Susan B., 31 Argetsinger, Amy, 180 Arial, Robert, 192, 193 Aristotle, 47 Asen, Robert, 40 Aspan, M., 182 Atkeson, L. R., 11, 12 Axelrod, Jim, 85 Ayers, Bill, 203, 205 Bachelet, Michelle, 177 Bagnall, Janet, 60–61 Bailey, H., 100 Baker, Ross, 78 Balz, D., 120 Banwart, Mary, 128, 129–30, 131, 145, 146n2, 153, 162 Barnicle, Mike, 185n7 Barrett, D., 117 Bazinet, Kenneth R., 60, 62, 182, 183 Beckel, Bob, 57, 58

Beckerman, G., 61 Beecher, L., 116 Belkin, L., 178 Benac, Nancy, 77–78 Benitez, L. M., 101, 118 Benoit, William, 127 Benson, Steve, 192, 195 Bernstein, A., 151 Bertagnoli, Lisa, 181 Biden, Joe, 126, 130, 134, 135, 179, 196, 205, 207 bin Laden, Osama, 116, 138 Bishop, Ian, 76 Black, Merle, 60 Blackwell, Henry, 185n3 Blair, D. M., 50 Blaney, Joe, 127 Blatchford, C., 59–60 Blitzer, Wolf, 133 Bloomer, Amelia Jenks, 185n8 Bombardieri, M., 59, 60, 61, 62–63 Bosman, J., 184, 185n7 Bosnia, 55, 57–58, 85, 117, 192, 207 Bowen, D. C., 10–11 Bower, C. I., 42 Boykin, Keith, 62 Brant, Martha, 176, 185n4 Braun, Carol Moseley, 126, 174 Breslau, K., 52–53 217

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Broder, D., 163 Brunell, T. L., 190 Buchanan, B., 119 Buell, E. H., Jr., 190 Burke, Kenneth, 92n18 Bush, George H. W., 126, 142, 190, 197, 213 Bush, George W., 51, 54, 75, 77, 78, 107, 132–33, 135, 136, 137, 138, 162, 190, 204, 207, 212 Butler, Judith, 41 Byrne, S., 189 Bystrom, Diane, 129, 131, 146n2, 153, 154, 162, 163, 164–65, 166 Caldiero, C. T., 48 California, 17, 24, 83, 131 Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs, 37, 46–47, 49, 50, 54, 59, 100–102, 119, 153 Canellos, Peter, 73 Carey, B., 179 Carlin, Diana, 126, 127, 128 Carlson, Tucker, 185n7 Carson, Jay, 176 Carter, Jimmy, 71, 190 Carter, Rosalyn, 71 Carvey, Dana, 197 Catalyst, 178 Chase, Chevy, 197 Chen, H. R., 190 Cheney, Dick, 78, 86, 212 Chisholm, Shirley, 174 Churchill, Winston, 194 Cleland, Max, 74 Clift, E., 100 Clinton, Bill: Arkansas, 35, 165, 176; attacks against Obama, 62, 77, 81, 91n7, 115, 193; campaign appearances with Hillary, 70; defense of Hillary, 58, 60, 81, 83, 85; husband, 29, 32, 36, 51, 71–72, 81, 90, 103, 118, 144, 165, 213, 215; impeachment, 38, 51; Iowa caucuses in 1992, 76; jokes about, 196–97; negative effect on campaign, 59, 61–63, 82, 86, 88,

92n12; popularity, 73; postelection, 87; presidency, 2–3, 38, 46, 50, 57, 60, 75, 78, 99, 113, 142, 145, 193, 212; presidential candidate, 190; relationship with press, 208; role in campaign, 74, 77, 80–81, 84, 86, 191; transgressions, 42, 191, 198 Clinton, Chelsea, 52, 59, 78, 85, 160, 165, 191 Clyburn, Jim, 62–63 CNN.com, 16 Cohen, R., 103, 117, 120 Colbert, Stephen, 197 Colbert Report, The, 196 Cole, John, 194 Conant, E., 100 Conners, Joan L., 190 Conroy, Brenda, 177 Conyers, Jim, 82 Cook, Charles, 10 Cooper, M., 152 co-presidency, 2, 37, 46, 49–50, 57, 83, 86, 212, 215 Corrigan, M., 50 Cottle, M., 114 Couric, Katie, 183–84 Crowley, M., 86 crying in New Hampshire, 106, 115, 119, 163, 179, 191, 200 Daily Show, The, 189, 196, 197, 213 Darman, Jonathan, 82, 84, 100 Daschle, Tom, 62 Davidson, D. K., 129, 153, 154 Davies, A., 151 Dawkins, Richard, 33 Dean, N. G., 163 debatestyle, 129–30 de Beavoir, Simone, 185n1 Deering, John, 194 DeSousa, M. A., 190, 197 Dionne, E. J., Jr., 59, 60, 62, 82, 116, 209n1 Distin, Kate, 34–35 District of Columbia, 107, 130

IN DEX Dodd, Christopher, 104, 130, 133, 134, 135 Dole, Bob, 197 Dole, Elizabeth, 39, 126 Dowd, Maureen, 51, 63, 91n12, 177, 179 Drake, B., 117 Dubriwny, T. N., 50 Dukakis, Michael, 190, 213 Duke, A., 85 Edelman, Murray, 49 Edwards, J. L., 190 Edwards, John, 15, 51, 75, 80, 130, 133–34, 139, 150, 191, 196 ethos, 47, 49 Falk, Erika, 173, 175–76, 177, 179, 184 Feldman, L., 189 Ferraro, Geraldine, 126 Fey, Tina, 205 First Lady, 2, 32–33, 37–39, 43n1, 45, 46, 49–51, 53–54, 56–57, 58, 59, 63, 73, 78, 81, 85, 88, 99, 101–2, 103, 104, 117, 119, 125, 142, 146, 180, 190, 192, 195, 198, 212, 214–15 Fischer, B., 120 Fish, Nick, 53 Fisher, Walter, 47–48, 49, 62 Florida, 15, 84, 106, 107, 199 Ford, Gerald R., 197 Fortini, Amanda, 184 Frates, C., 52 Friedenberg, R. V., 154 Galt, Edith, 71 Gandhi, Indira, 177 Gandy, Kim, 184 Garber, M., 53 gendered adaptiveness, 129 Giuliani, Rudolph W., 51, 196 Givhan, Robin, 173, 181 Goldberg, Bernard, 208n1 Goldberg, M., 111 Goldenberg, S., 151, 152

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Goodman, Ellen, 183, 184 Gore, Al, 77, 190 Grady, Sandy, 184 Gravel, Mike, 130, 132, 134, 135 Green, Joshua, 213 Green Papers, 16 Grosz, Elizabeth, 185n1 Gutgold, Nichola D., 1, 40, 42, 43n3, 99 Halley, Patrick, 39 Halperin, Mark, 74 Hamilton, N., 179 Hardman, M. J., 92n18 Hargrove, E. C., 47 Harnden, Tony, 56, 86 Harper, Tim, 53, 74 Harrington, Jane, 53 Harris, Paul, 77, 79 Hart, Gary, 191 Hartman, Phil, 197 Haussegger, V., 184 Healy, P., 55, 57, 150 Heath, Robert, 36 Helman, S., 151 Herbert, Bob, 114 Hetherington, M. J., 12 Hill, A., 190 Hitt, J., 103, 120 Hoffnung, Michelle, 36 Hofstede, Geert, 43n3 Hosenball, M., 100 Hoyt, C., 51 Huckabee, Mike, 12, 14, 196, 197 Huddy, L., 163 Huffington, Arianna, 206 Humphrey, Hubert H., 11, 14 Hussein, Saddam, 132, 204 Hutchinson, B., 180 Huxman, S. S., 100, 102 Indiana, 110 Ingraham, Laura, 206, 209n1 Iowa caucuses, 15, 26n1, 51–52, 70, 75–77, 80, 82, 106, 113, 150, 163, 165, 190, 199

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I ND E X

Jackson, Jesse, 61, 82, 174 Jacobs, A., 174 Jacoby, Jeff, 79 Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, 31, 32, 42, 43, 50–51 Johnson, Lyndon B., 11, 81 Johnston, A., 146n2, 153, 154, 162, 163, 165, 166 Jones, John Paul, 194 Jordan, Vernon, 35–36 Jurkowitz, Mark, 82 Kady, M., II, 105 Kaid, Lynda Lee, 127, 129, 146n2, 153, 154, 162, 163, 165, 166 Kantor, J., 115–16 Kapochunas, R., 105 Kathirasen, 182 Keefe, W. J., 12 Kelley, Colleen, 36–37, 38, 39, 50, 101, 103, 119 Kendall, Kathleen, 127 Kennedy, Helen, 79 Kennedy, Robert F., 11, 117 Kentucky, 84, 110 Kerry, John, 74, 78, 190, 204, 212 Kiely, K., 117 Kim, Y. M., 189 King, Larry, 118 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 81 Kirchner, Cristina Fernandez de, 177 Koetzle, W., 190 Kornblut, A. E., 78, 102, 106, 115, 117, 120 Koterba, Jeff, 191 Krauthammer, Charles, 203 Kucinich, Dennis, 130, 134, 196 Kuhn, Cynthia, 181 Kurtz, H., 182 Lakoff, Robin, 175 Lambro, D., 150 Lanoue, D. J., 127 Late Night with Conan O’Brien, 196 Late Show with David Letterman, The, 196

Lauer, Jeanette C., 179, 181 Lauer, Robert H, 179, 181 Lawless, J. L., 163 Lawrence, Jill, 73, 117 Lazio, Rick, 119 Leibovich, M., 109, 118 Leno, Jay, 197 Lewinsky, Monica, 36, 38, 46, 51, 192, 208 Lichter, Robert, 196 Limbaugh, Rush, 206 Lockwood, Belva Bennett, 174, 179 Louden, Alan, 47, 48, 57, 62 Lupica, Mike, 85–86 MacAskill, Ewen, 151 MacDonald, Norm, 197 Macedonia, 56 MacGillis, A., 78 Mackie, Erin, 181 Maestas, C. D., 11, 12 Malkin, M., 117 Mandziuk, R. M., 99 Manning, M. R., 101, 102, 103, 119 Marcus, Ruth, 103, 104, 118, 120 Marshall, B. D., 101 Maryland, 107 Matthews, Chris, 185n7, 206 Mattina, A. F., 59 Maus, M., 190 Mayer, William G., 25 Mayhead, M. A., 101 Mayo, E. P., 101 McCain, John, 12, 13, 14, 51, 56, 63, 107, 136–37, 152, 196, 197, 205, 212 McCarthy, Eugene, 11 McCauliff, K., 47, 48, 57, 62 McCauliff, M., 60 McGann, E., 99 McGovern-Fraser Commission, 12 McKinney, Mitchell, 126, 127, 128, 129–30, 131, 134, 144, 146n2 Medhurst, Martin J., 190, 197 Meir, Golda, 177 Melocco, J., 182

IN DEX Memmott, M., 150 Merkel, Angela, 177 Meyers, Seth, 204 Michaels, Lorne, 200 Michigan, 15, 84, 199 Milbank, Dana, 86, 145 Miller, J. L., 153, 162 Miller, S. A., 56, 57 Mississippi, 83 Mitchell, John, 207 Mondale, Walter, 151, 191 Montana, 110 Moran, Terry, 81 Morris, D., 99 Moyer-Guseé, E., 189 Mueller, James E., 72, 74, 75, 76 Muir, Janette Kenner, 70, 101, 118 Murphy, J., 174 Muskie, Edmund, 53, 79, 91n9 Myers, Dee Dee, 106 Nabi, R. L., 189 Nagoumey, A., 151 narrative theory, 2, 47 National Women’s History Museum, 43n2 Naughton, P., 53 Nevada, 61, 106 New Hampshire, 15, 26, 52–53, 54, 70, 75, 78–80, 82, 106, 107, 111, 113, 115, 119, 130, 150, 163, 165, 179, 191–92 Nietzche, F. W., 194 Nixon, Richard M., 11, 181, 207 Noonan, Peggy, 37 Norgren, J., 174 North Carolina, 110 Northern Ireland, 55 Nutter, Michael, 152 O’Connell, S., 151 Obama, Barack: advertising, 152; African American, 80, 174, 175, 182; attacks on Clinton, 56, 116, 136; attacks on McCain, 136, 212; campaign

221

dynamics, 1, 30, 45, 57, 62, 63, 69, 84, 126, 203; charisma, 79, 166; closeness of race, 2; delegates pledged to, 9–10, 15–25, 211; debates, 125, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135–37, 138, 140, 141, 142–43, 146, 198; endorsed by Hillary Clinton, 86, 111, 118; healthcare, 139; inexperience, 78, 83, 106, 108–9, 114, 136, 191, 215; inauguration, 41; Iowa caucuses, 15, 51, 53; jokes about, 196, 198, 199– 200, 205; keynote address at 2004 Democratic National Convention, 144; media treatment of, 4, 91n7, 204, 213–14; New Hampshire, 151; opposition to war in Iraq, 75, 81, 114, 133; Saturday Night Live appearance, 197; Senate, 51, 64; senator, use of title by media, 176; South Carolina, 82; style, 145; women voters, 53, 150 Obama, Michelle, 41, 207 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 43 Ohio, 83, 84, 108, 131, 140, 151 Olbermann, Keith, 205, 206 Oregon, 110 Palin, Sarah, 126, 184, 197, 205 Parry-Giles, Shawn, 46, 49, 50, 60 Parry-Giles, Trevor, 46, 49, 50, 60 Pelosi, Nancy, 10 Pennsylvania, 62, 84, 108, 116, 152–53 persona, 47 Perot, H. Ross, 197 Peters, G., 114, 115, 116, 117, 118 Pier, P. M., 127 Pilkington, Ed, 77 Poehler, Amy, 197, 198–99, 204 Politics in America, 17 Polman, Dick, 73 Polsby, N., 12 Poussaint, Alvin, 120 Powers, M., 120 ProCon.org, 16 Pruden, W., 182 Puerto Rico, 110

222

I ND E X

Quayle, Dan, 213 Ramos, Jorge, 140 Ratcliffe, R. G., 151 Reagan, Nancy, 71 Reagan, Ronald, 61, 71, 190 Reincheld, A., 197, 200 Rendell, Edward, 152 Redlawsk, D. P., 10–11 Rezko, Tony, 203 Rhode Island, 108 Richardson, Bill, 130, 133, 134, 135, 139 Robertson, Terry, 127, 129, 153, 162 Robinson, Eugene, 77, 80, 82, 83 Rodham, Dorothy, 52, 150, 160 Rodham, use of name, 35–37, 176 Romney, Mitt, 12, 13, 14, 196 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 71 Rose, Eva, 53 Rosen, I., 116 Rosenwasser, S. M., 163 Russert, Tim, 114, 115 Sabat, Ariel, 184 Safire, William, 175 Sanders, T., 117 Sargent, Herb, 197 Saturday Night Live, 197, 198–200, 204–5, 213, 214 Savage, L. C., 118 Schieffer, Bob, 115 Schneider, Bill, 52 Scholastic.com, 41–42 Schroeder, Pat, 53, 126 Schrott, P. R., 127 Seale, J., 163 Seelye, K. Q., 55, 184, 185n7 Sewell, E. H., Jr., 190 Short-Thompson, C., 50 Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, 177 Smalley, Suzanne, 176–77, 185n4 Smith, B., 52 Smith, S. B., 56 Snow, Kate, 76

South Carolina, 60–62, 70, 80–83, 92n12, 106–7, 114–15, 130, 132, 162, 192 South Dakota, 110–11 Stein, Ed, 194, 195 Steinberg, J., 149, 151 Stephen, Andrew, 47 Stelter, B., 152 Stephanopoulos, George, 76, 116–17 Stone, Lucy, 176, 185n3 Strange, H., 53 Super Tuesday, 45, 61, 62, 80, 84, 107, 151, 162 Taibbi, M., 117 Tannen, Deborah, 51, 181, 183 Taylor, Anita, 70 Templin, Charlotte, 38, 39, 43n1, 190, 195 Terkildsen, N. S., 163 Texas, 83, 84, 108, 131, 140, 151–52, 153, 191 Thatcher, Margaret, 177 Thomas, Helen, 181 Thompson, P., 55, 57, 174 Tisinger, R. M., 189 Tolbert, C. J., 10–11 Tomasky, 118 Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The, 189, 196, 213 Travelgate, 54 Trent, Judith, 50, 154 Troy, Gil, 29, 32–33, 39, 45, 46, 49, 50, 58, 59 Tumulty, K., 113 Turcotte, H., 41 Turpin, Paul, 47, 49 Valian, Virginia, 178–79, 185n6 Vavrus, M. D., 50 Vermont, 108 videostyle, 3, 129–30, 153–54 Virginia, 107 Vishak, J., 189

IN DEX Walsh, K. T., 105 Watson, Molly, 179 Wayne, S. J., 12, 13–14 Welter, B., 31 Wertheimer, Molly M., 49–50 West Virginia, 84, 110, 117 White, Frank, 176 Wildavsky, A., 12 Williams, Brian, 106, 139–40 Williams, P. J., 51 Wilson, Woodrow, 71 Wisconsin, 108

Wolfe, Naomi, 100, 103–4, 183 Woodhull, Victoria, 40, 174 Woolley, J. T., 114, 115, 116, 117, 118 Worthington, P., 59, 60, 62 Wright, David, 74 Wright, Jeremiah, 203 Young, D. G., 189 YouTube, 53, 55, 152, 180, 185n7 Zernike, K., 109, 118

223

Contributors

Mary Christine Banwart, associate professor of communication studies, University of Kansas Lauren C. Bell, associate professor of political science, Randolph-Macon College Diana B. Carlin, professor of communication studies, University of Kansas Joan L. Conners, associate professor of communication studies, RandolphMacon College Corey B. Davis, assistant professor of communication, University of Wisconsin, Whitewater Jeffrey Delbert, doctoral student, University of Missouri Mitchell S. McKinney, associate professor of communication, University of Missouri Janette Kenner Muir, associate professor, New Century College, George Mason University James M. Schnoebelen, instructor, Washburn University Theodore F. Sheckels, professor of English and communication, RandolphMacon College 225

226

C O N T R I B U TORS

Julia A. Spiker, associate professor of communication, University of Akron Karen F. Stein, professor of English and women’s studies, University of Rhode Island Anita Taylor, professor emeritus of communication, George Mason University Kathleen M. Torrens, associate professor of communication studies, University of Rhode Island Richard E. Vatz, professor of political rhetoric, Towson University Benjamin R. Warner, doctoral student, University of Kansas Kelly Winfrey, doctoral student, University of Kansas

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