Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400

John M. Najemy

Corporatism and Conse~lsus in Florentine Electoral Politics,

The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill

The Hull Memorial Publication Fund of Cornell University provided a subvention to aid in the publication of this work. O 1982 The University of North Carolina Press

All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Najemy, John M., 1943Corporatism and consensus in Florentine electoral politics, 1280-1400. Includes index. I. Elections-Italy-Florence-History. 2. Florence (Italy)-Guilds-Political activityHistory. I. Title. ~s5817.3.N34 324.945'5105 81-16481 ISBN 0-8078-1506-3 AACRZ

For my mother and father

Contents Acknowledgments Sources and Abbreviations Introduction

I . Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292 2. The Success and Failure of the Guilds in Electoral Politics, 1293- 1303 3. Election by Balia, 1310- 1326 4. The Reform of 1328: The Institution of the General Scrutiny and Sortition 5. The Popular Revival, I 343 - I 348

6. The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377 7. The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382 8. Consensus and Controls, 1382- I400 Epilogue: Consensus Politics and Civic Humanism Appendix Index

xi

...

Xlll

3

'7

Tables 3. I

Priorates with Electoral Balia, I 31 8- 1323

5.1

Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Family, 1343-1348

6.1

Distribution of Posts in the Signoria, 1352-1377

6.2 Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Family, 1352- I377 8. I

Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Family, 1382- I399

8.2 Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Individuals, 1382- 1399

A. I Distribution of Posts in the Signoria, 1282- 1399, Number of Appearances by Each Family A.2 Distribution of Posts in the Signoria, 1282-1399, Summary by Groups of Families A.3 Yearly Totals of New Families Admitted to the Signoria, 1282- 1532 A.4 Families with Ten or More Appearances in the Signoria, 1282- 1399

A.5 Families with Twenty or More Appearances in the Signoria, 1282- I 532, in Order of Their First Appearances

Acknowledgments

I am happy to express my gratitude to several institutions whose generosity allowed me to carry out the research for this book in Florence. I would first of all like to acknowledge my debt to the Villa I Tatti and its directors, the late Myron Gilmore and Craig Hugh Smyth, for the hospitality and kindnesses extended to me during two memorable periods of study at the Berenson Library. There I enjoyed the friendly assistance of the library's staff and the fellowship of scholars from whom I learned much. I extend special thanks also to the Leopold Schepp Foundation of New York for the grant that made possible my second tour at I Tatti in 1974-75. Travel grants from the Clark Fund of the Harvard Graduate Society and the Humanities Faculty Research Grants Committee of Cornell University enabled me to spend additional summers in Florence. I am grateful to Harvard University for a year of leave in 1974-75, and similarly to Cornell University for the year of leave in 1978-79 during which I completed the writing of this book. Finally, throughout these years I have benefited enormously from the kindness and cooperation of the dedicated staff of the Archivio di Stato of Florence under the directorships of Professors Guido Pampaloni and Giuseppe Pansini. The gracious welcome and assistance I have always received in the Florentine archives have made the seasons of research a sheer delight. To all these institutions I extend my thanks and warm appreciation for their contributions to this book and to the projects that will follow. To do scholarship in and on Florence is to participate in what often seems a collective enterprise, especially to those whose workday centers on the sala di studio of the archives. Over the years I have made many friends and accumulated many debts as a member of this "guild." Among those who have given valuable help and advice, I wish especially to thank Anthony Molho for liberally sharing his expert knowledge of the archival collections and for the literally hundreds of hours we spent talking about Florentine politics, and Gene Brucker for his constant interest and encouragement. And I am grateful to them both, as I am to David Herlihy, Brenda Preyer, and David Peterson, for reading and commenting on the completed manuscript. Many others helped in countless ways, too many, in fact, to be listed here, but I would at least like to thank Ronald Witt, who first introduced me to the archives, and Humfrey Butters and John

xii Acknowledgments Stephens, who listened patiently and critically to my early attempts to formulate some of the ideas contained in this book. Friends, secretaries, and students at Cornell University helped me in various ways. I am grateful for the encouragement of my colleagues in the history department, especially Clive Holmes and Richard Polenberg. James John gave parts of the manuscript the benefit of his close scrutiny. My thanks go to Andrea Fudala and Pat Guilford for their skillful typing of a relentlessly difficult manuscript. Over many years the students in my course on Florentine history, at both Harvard and Cornell, have provided me with a valuable forum for developing and testing the interpretation of Florentine politics that I offer in this book. They may not remember, or perhaps even have realized, how much they contributed to this process, but I do, and I am happy to acknowledge my debt to them. I also thank Deborah Goldman for her valued friendship and advice during the time I was writing this book and for her careful reading and typing of parts of the manuscript. Some of my debts are very profound and cannot be adequately specified or acknowledged in this space. The late Myron Gilmore, teacher, mentor, and friend, gave unfailingly of his generous and good spirit, especially in the two years I spent at I Tatti under his gentle directorship. His untimely death has deprived students and friends alike of his wise counsel, but it has not diminished the memory of his vibrant, Erasmian blend of humanity and scholarship. Hans Baron has offered me the privilege of his friendship and the benefit of his wisdom for almost a decade. What he has so abundantly sought to teach me is not sufficiently reflected in this book, but his interest in my work has been a precious and inspirational gift. Linda Pellecchia graced my years in Florence with her companionship and support. Beyond her specific contributions to this project (among other things, in compiling the data from the Priorisfa Mariani on which the officeholding statistics are based), her daily presence was an inestimable source of strength. Antonio and Marina Reina gave me my first home in Italy and have continually enriched my many returns with their extraordinary generosity and warm hospitality. And, finally, I am proud to dedicate this book to my parents, George and Bertha Najemy, whose enthusiasm and loyal interest have been my greatest and most enduring good fortune.

Ithaca, New York May 1981

Sources and Abbreviations

Manuscript Sources Archivio di Stato di Firenze Archivio delle Tratte ( Tratte) Arte del Cambio (Cambio) Arte dei Giudici e Notai ( G N ) Arte della Lana (Lana) Arte dei Medici e Speziali [e Merciai] ( M S M ) Arte della Seta, or Por Santa Maria (Seta) Balie Camera del Comune, Camarlinghi, Entrata and Uscita Capitoli (Cap.) Capitoli, Protocolli (Cap. Prot.) Consulte e Pratiche ( C P ) Diplomatico, Riformagioni (Dipl. Rif.) Libri Fabarum ( L F ) Manoscritti Provvisioni, Duplicati ( P D ) Provvisioni, Protocolli ( P P ) Provvisioni, Registri ( P R ) Signori e Collegi, Deliberazioni fatte in forza di speciale autorit; Statuti di Firenze Tribunale di Mercanzia (Mercanzia) Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze Fondo Panciatichiano (Panciatichi) Biblioteca Riccardiana

Abbreviations of Frequently Used Printed Sources ASI Archivio Storico Italiano Compagni, Cronica L a Cronica di Dino Compagni, ed. Isidoro Del Lungo, i n R R I I S S , new ed., vol. 9, pt. 2 (Citti di Castello, 1907-16)

xiv Sources and Abbreviations Consigli Consulte

Delizie R RZZSS

Stefani, Cronaca

Velluti, Cronica Domestica Villani, Cronica

Consigli della Repubblica Fiorentina, ed. Bernardino Barbadoro, 2 vols. (Bologna, I 92 I -30) Le Consulte della Repubblica Fiorentina dall'anno MCCLXXX a1 MCCXCVZZZ, ed. Alessandro Gherardi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1896-98) Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani, ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi, 24 ~01s.(Florence, 1770-89) Rerum Italicarum Scriptores: Raccolta degli Storici Ztaliani dal cinquecento a1 millecinquecento ordinata da L. A. Muratori, new ed., ed. Giosue Carducci and Vittorio Fiorini (Citth di Castello, 1900-) Cronaca Fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, ed. Niccolh Rodolico, in RRZZSS, new ed., vol. 30, pt. I (Citth di Castello, 1903-55) La Cronica Dornestica di Messer Donato Velluti, ed. Isidoro Del Lungo and Guglielmo Volpi (Florence, 1914) Cronica di Giovanni Villani, ed. Franc. Gherardi Dragomanni, 4 vols. (Florence, 1844-45)

Conventions employed in the citation of archival sources are standard for Florentine historiography. Abbreviations for folio and folios are f. and ff. respectively. For most archival sources, the number immediately following the source name is the volume number (e.g., P R Y7, f. 128). Citations from the Cronaca of Marchionne di Coppo Stefani include both rubric and page numbers (e.g., Stefani, Cronaca, r. 204, p. 73).

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280- 1400

Introduction

This book is the first of two projected volumes on the history of the Florentine guilds and guild politics in the fourteenth century. In the present work I seek to locate the guilds in the wider context of the development of communal politics from the late thirteenth century, when the guilds first emerged to assume a crucial role in constitutional affairs, to the end of the fourteenth century, when their claim to a significant share in communal government was definitively quelled.' The investigation of this phenomenon will focus primarily on the attempts of the Florentine guild community to impose its own definition of republican government on the institutions of electoral politics, and on the determined opposition of the oligarchy to the realization of this program. My aim in this study is to set forth, with as much precision as the available documentation will permit, the evolution and significance of the century-long conflict between the corporate approach to political organization advanced by the Florentine guild community and the consensus-based approach developed by the oligarchy. The struggle between the proponents of corporatism and consensus was in fact a contest between two competing conceptions of communal society and politics, rooted in a fundamental clash of social and class interests. This conflict was, however, waged and ultimately resolved chiefly in the arena of electoral politics. It is, therefore, appropriate to begin with some general remarks on the relationship of electoral politics to the larger constitutional and social issues that enveloped this struggle. The election of officeholders in the Italian communes of the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance was one of the central and defining moments of the complex evolution of these small but politically creative communities. In the fluid and unstable circumstances in which the communes emerged and gradually transformed the tenuous privileges of self-contained associations into the unexceptionable powers of sovereign states, the process itself of selecting magistrates had an ineluctable impact on the nature and shape of the polities that these officials were called to lead. Political life in the developing city-states was experimental and tentative, I . The second volume, currently in preparation, will analyze the guild community from within-its institutions, social structure, political evolution, and collective values-over roughly the same period treated in the present work.

4 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics lacking a firm theoretical or constitutional basis. The essential novelty of the city-state precluded the easy adaptation of the legal assumptions and customary attitudes that informed prevailing attempts to understand political life. Neither the personal, contractual basis of feudal tradition nor the centralized and absolute sovereignty of the princeps of Roman law was an adequate foundation for ordering and conceptualizing the experience of politics in the Italian cities. Despite the undeniable importance of contractual obligations in the early stage of communal development, the feudal emphasis on personal ties of dependence was fundamentally alien to the collectivist and egalitarian impulses that animated the commune. And although fourteenth-century lawyers did not hesitate to argue that each city was a "prince unto itself" as a means of affirming the independence and legislative sovereignty of the communes against the claims of imperial overlordship, the famous dictum was nonetheless hardly appropriate for understanding political relationships within the cities. The Roman model of princely sovereignty could not accommodate the limited and fragmented powers of communal government; it failed, in short, to account for the popular character of sovereignty in these self-governing communities. In practice as well as in theory, considerable uncertainty surrounded the nature and scope of the authority, or amalgam of authorities, represented by each commune. And if it long remained unclear just what sort of government the commune was and on what principles its authority rested, it was equally uncertain to whom the commune belonged. Since the cities were governed through the direct participation of their own citizens, it became a matter of both necessity and controversy to determine which groups among the inhabitants of a city had a right to such participation. These two fundamental problems-the nature, basis, and scope of governmental authority and the size and composition of the class of citizens that was allowed to exercise this authority-remained unresolved for the first two centuries of the life of the communes. For as long as the most urgent issue faced by the Italian cities was the preservation of their independence against the imperial authority, a task best entrusted to the aristocracies of wealth and military power that effectively controlled the communes from the end of the eleventh to the middle of the thirteenth century, these questions remained in the background. But by the second half of the thirteenth century, a combination of circumstances shifted the focus of communal politics from external dangers to internal struggles. After the final collapse of Hohenstaufen ambitions at Benevento in 1266, imperial power in Italy was definitively eclipsed, and although Charles of

Introduction

5

Anjou, who had defeated Manfred with papal support and Florentine money, aspired for a time to replace the vanished imperial presence from Tuscany to Sicily, by the late 1270s it was clear that in Tuscany at least the papacy was determined to block the realization of these plans. In the wake of the 1282 uprising in Sicily against the French, which caused Charles to concentrate his attention in the south, Angevin power was no longer a serious factor in the communal heartland of central Italy. At the same time, demographic and social developments altered the balance of forces in the urban centers. Immigration to the cities from a densely populated countryside upset traditional patterns of aristocratic dominance. The old mercantile and military elites were challenged by newcomers whose numbers, wealth, and ambition increased social mobility and political tensions. The most important cities had long been centers of international and regional trade, but with the great increase in population, providing both markets and a labor force, they soon developed complex artisanal and industrial economies as well. By the end of the thirteenth century, the larger cities were filled with an intricate array of professional and working classes, from the humble workers of the textile industries to skilled artisans, entrepreneurs, and merchants of both the local and international variety, as well as practitioners of the learned and intellectual disciplines-all in large and ever-growing numbers and with an intensifying awareness of their separate collective identities and interests. In these conditions, the unresolved problems of communal politics came to the forefront of city life.z No circumstance served more sharply to focus the attention of these now independent and ever more complex societies on the crucial issues of their political existence than the periodic necessity of having to elect officeholders. In the absence of an established constitutional system for such elections, each electoral exercise became, implicitly or explicitly, a forum for debate on the two central problems outlined above. Because the communes lacked a precise definition of the principles that legitimated the ele2. For two excellent introductions to the early history of the Italian communes, see Daniel Waley, The Italian City-Republics (New York, 1969)~and J. K. Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval Italy (New York, 1973). On the legal, constitutional, and theoretical aspects of communal government, see Lauro Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968). And for the general environment of political thought in which the communes emerged and grew, see Walter Ullmann, Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, N.Y.,

1977).

6 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics vation of citizens to positions of authority, and hence of that authority itself, debates on electoral procedure inevitably involved the delineation and confrontation of contrasting views on these larger issues. In determining the institutional arrangement of such elections, the communes went a long way toward the establishment of the legal framework in which the elected magistrates would govern and therefore toward an implied declaration of' the principles that defined the "state" itself. Similarly, without any general agreement on the notion of citizenship or on the relationship of citizenship to participatory rights, debates on the question of eligibility to office repeatedly raised the larger problem of the configuration of the political class. Decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of citizens in successive elections became the medium for formulating the criteria that distinguished different groups within communal society according to their political rights. From this perspective, the history of electoral politics in the Italian communes assumes a significance that goes far beyond the mere description of the techniques for the selection of officeholders. Indeed, the debates and reforms that fill the annals of electoral history were a testing ground on which the communes experimented with and resolved the most fundamental questions regarding the nature of government and sovereignty, citizenship and participatory rights. Electoral politics in Florence between 1280 and 1400 was a constant and dynamic aspect of communal life. Over these 120 years the Florentines experienced a complex evolution of their electoral institutions, a process of innovation and adaptation, definition and redefinition, whose major turning points coincide with the decisive junctures of the larger political history of this turbulent p e r i ~ dSome . ~ of the institutions of electoral 3. The political history of Florence from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth century has been studied by a group of skilled and insightful historians who have placed all subsequent students of the period in their debt. Nothing like a comprehensive bibliography can be attempted here, but it is essential to mention at least those works which constitute the indispensable point of departure for all investigations of the field. Working in the problems of late thirteenth-century politics, Gaetano Salvemini and Nicola Ottokar established two influential paradigms for the study of late medieval Italian urban history. The former advanced a Marxistinspired class conflict model of communal politics in his Magnati e Popolani in Firenze dalrz80 a1 1295 (Florence, 18gg),and the latter countered with a groundbreaking prosopographical analysis of the Florentine elite in I1 Cornune di Firenze alla fine del Dugento (1926;rev. ed., Turin, 1962). More massive in scope and research, if less innovative in conceptual terms, is the multivolume work of Robert Davidsohn, whose Geschichte van Florenz (Berlin, 1896-1927)is now fully avail-

Introduction 7 politics forged at this time survived into the fifteenth century to play a leading role in the so-called oligarchic and Medici regimes before and after 1434. Historians of fifteenth-century Florence, principally Nicolai Rubinstein, have underscored the importance of these institutions and the way in which their manipulation contributed to the success of Medicean government.4 By the time of the Medici, however, and for all practical purposes by 1400, Florentine electoral institutions had assumed a sufficient degree of stability to warrant their designation as a system. By this time the Florentine upper classes had succeeded in working out a clear vision of the nature of communal government and its ruling class, a vision reflected and refined in the optimistic pronouncements of civic humanism. This stability, grounded in a fundamental consensus regarding the two major issues of communal politics, was not, however, characteristic of the fourteenth century, which witnessed a rapid succession of electoral experiments based on fundamentally different premises and expectations. In fact, the special significance of the evolution of electoral institutions in able in Italian translation: Ston'a di Firenze, 8 vols. (Florence, 1972-73). Volumes and 3 (in the Italian edition) are the most comprehensive treatment of the wider imperial, Angevin, and papal theater of the struggles between the Guelf and Ghibelline parties of Florence. The basic work on the Florentine guilds is Alfred Doren's Das Florentiner Zunftwesen vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert, published as the second volume of his Studien aus der Florentiner Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1908; reprint ed., Stuttgart, 1969)~also available in Italian as Le Arti Fiorentine, 2 vols. (Florence, 1940). Doren's analysis of the rise of the guild constitution in the thirteenth century ( L e Arti Fiorentine, I :1-67) is an important contribution to the interpretation of this formative period. The first decade of the fourteenth century is covered in detail by Isidoro Del Lungo in I Bianchi e I Nen' (Milan, 1921). The generation from about I310 to I340 has not received extensive treatment of the sort bestowed on the earlier and later periods. The best pages on these years are contained in Marvin B. Becker's Florence in Transition, vol. I (Baltimore, 1967), which is also the most valuable treatment of the crisis that led to the revolutions of 1343. For the period after 1343, Gene Brucker's Florentine Politics and Society, 13431378 (Princeton, 1962) is masterful in research and authoritative in interpretation. On this period, however, see also Niccolb Rodolico, I1 Popolo Minuto: Note di Storia Fiorentina (1343-1378) (1899; reprint ed., Florence, 1968)~and Marvin B. Becker, Florence in Transition, vol. 2 (Baltimore, 1968). One of the earliest and most successful syntheses of fourteenth-century Florentine history is Gino Scaramella's Firenze a110 Scoppio del Tumulto dei Ciompi (Pisa, 1914). For the studies of Brucker, Rodolico, Antonio Rado, Carlo Falletti-Fossati, and Anthony Molho on the last quarter of the fourteenth century, see below, chaps. 7 and 8. 4. Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494) (Oxford, 1966).

2

8 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics fourteenth-century Florence lies in the intense and sometimes tumultuous competition between the supporters of two contrasting sets of responses to the questions left unresolved in the earlier stages of communal history. In the next few paragraphs an attempt will be made to outline the defining characteristics of these competing positions and to indicate, in a general and preliminary way, the constituencies that embraced them. Although this overview of the problem is intended to orient the reader in a set of issues and themes that will recur throughout this study, it must of course be said at the outset that the realities of Florentine politics were never as neatly polarized as the following somewhat abstract definitions might suggest. The alternatives represented by the terms "corporatism" and "consensus" were real enough as goals to be pursued and as more or less integrated sets of assumptions from which specific policies might emerge. In practice, of course, this was not a contest between fully articulated and diametrically opposed political philosophies. That they are here (and occasionally throughout this study) presented in such terms is a convenience of interpretation, a way of making some sense of the complexities of electoral reforms by relating them to the sometimes unstated, or understated, assumptions and attitudes that gave them precise meaning to contemporaries. Florentine politics was more often a history of elaborate and precarious compromise than a struggle between pure or idealized theories. But compromises do imply alternatives, and it is the purpose of the next few pages to establish a guide to the alternative positions to which, in the best of their imagined or desired worlds, the guild community and the oligarchy of fourteenth-century Florence aspired. The first of the two positions to be articulated in coherent form came from the Florentine guild community and traced its origins to the experience of thirteenth-century c~rporatism.~ This view of communal politics 5. On the origins and principles of medieval corporatism, see Pierre MichaudQuantin, Universitas: Expressions du mouvement communautaire duns le Moyen-Age Latin (Paris, 1970); Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought (Princeton, 1964), pp. 27-60; Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. E W. Maitland (Boston, 1959); and Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (Cambridge, 1955). On the corporate phenomenon in Italy, in addition to the fundamental work of Doren on the Florentine guilds cited in n. 3, see Franco Valsecchi, Le Corporazioni nell'organismo politico del medio evo (Milan, 1931); the same author's Comune e Corporazione nel Medio Evo Italiano (Milan, 1948-49); Giovanni de Vergottini, Arti e Popolo nella prima met&del sec. X I I I (Milan, 1943); and Alfred Doren, Storia Economics dell'Italia Nel Medio Evo, trans. Gino Luzzatto (1936; reprint ed., Bologna, 1965), pp. 236-83.

Introduction 9 was predicated on the emergence of the guilds as autonomous corporations based on the principle of collective self-governance by constituencies of equal members. Although they never achieved the status of sovereign entities, the Florentine guilds were, in effect, separate governments exercising extensive legislative, judicial, coercive, and regulatory powers among their members. These powers were considered to be the property of the full membership (the universitas or tota ars) and were delegated to elected heads, called consuls, whose authority was strictly limited by the terms of the constitutions or statutes of each guild. The consuls were elected from and by the membership and served in office for limited periods of time. By the second half of the thirteenth century, a score or more of Florentine guilds had elaborated and codified the essential principles of one mode of popular republicanism: equality among the members, the collective rule of the full membership, the delegated quality of ascending executive authority, and a theory of consent that recognized the right of either direct participation or representation for each of the constituent parts of a corporation. At the level of communal politics, these principles translated into a vision of the Florentine republic as a sovereign federation of equal and autonomous guilds, with each guild free to elect its own representatives to the governmental committees through which the sovereignty of the full community was exercised. Because the guilds were primarily professional and occupational associations, the corporate system of communal organization in effect institutionalized the various socioeconomic categories of Florentine society as the constituent parts of the republic. The guilds became the "members" of the body politic in a framework that called for a harmonious correspondence of "head" to "members" and "members" to "head."6 To be sure, the historic weakness of this corporate ideal was always the difficult matter of deciding how many guilds should participate in the federation and enjoy the constitutional prerogatives of political recognition. Each class of Florentines simultaneously advanced the claims of corporatism on its own behalf as it sought to deny, or only reluctantly conceded, similar claims put forward by its perceived social inferiors. But despite the contradictions engendered by this recurrent dilemma, the idea of 6 . This was the formula adopted by the Ordinances of Justice in one of the supplementary rubrics of 1293 that barred the magnates from access to the priorate. Their exclusion from the high office was achieved by declaring that all persons who were ineligible to serve as consuls in the guilds (the membra) would henceforth be ineligible for the priorate (the capud), on the grounds that "cum membra capiti et capud membris debeat convenire. . ." (Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, p. 424).

10

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

the Florentine republic as a federation of equal and autonomous corporations was a powerful force in Florentine politics until the end of the fourteenth century, winning the active support of thousands of middle-rank merchants, artisans, and laborers who could not depend on family prestige or great wealth to safeguard their collective interests.' Those Florentines who did possess such assets viewed political corporatism with suspicion and hostility. The great merchants, international bankers, and landed and entrepreneurial interests of the Florentine oligarchy, both magnate and non-magnate, had little use for a constitutional system that elevated the corporations of the butchers, shoemakers, and bakers (to name but a few) to political parity with their own. The families of the elite were principally represented in only six of the guilds: the lawyers of the Giudici e Notai, the international merchants and cloth finishers of the Calimala, the bankers of the Arte del Cambio, the woolen-cloth manufacturers of the Arte della Lana, the traders and silk-cloth manufacturers of Por Santa Maria, and the doctors and international spice and specialty importers of the Medici, Speziali e Merciai. Except for the Calirnala, where the supremacy of the oligarchy was never in question, the elite families were not securely and permanently in control of the internal politics of even these major guilds. Within each guild there were elements that resisted oligarchic dominance and that could, in times of crisis, make common cause with the artisan and shopkeeper classes of the so-called minor guilds. These non-elite major guildsmen included many of the notaries of the Giudici e Notai, the local moneychangers of the Cambio, the local cloth producers and brokers of the Lana, the retail cloth dealers, retail traders, and various and sundry artisans of Por Santa Maria, and the shopkeepers (merciai) and minor subdivisions (membra) of the Medici, Speziali e Merciai. This distinction between the elite (or oligarchy) and the nonelite (or rank-and-file) members of the major guilds is fundamental to the analysis of Florentine politics developed in this book. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the non-elite components of these major guilds, together with the minor guildsmen with whom they were frequently allied in the pursuit of corporate political aims, will be referred to as the "guild community." Although most oligarchs were also members of major guilds, they did not share the sense of community, built around the idea of the 7. This paragraph summarizes the descriptionof Florentine corporatism offered in my "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics," Arner@anHistorical Review 84 (1979): 55-60.

Introduction

II

corporate federation, that was felt by their non-elite fellow major guildsmen and the minor guildsmen. The oligarchs of the great international trading and banking families tended to see themselves, despite their guild affiliations, as a class apart, united by business, patronage, and family ties that transcended their association with the various guilds. This sense of belonging to an interguild elite was, in fact, institutionalized in the Mercanzia, the organization of international and interregional merchants and bankers from the five major commercial guilds (Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria, and the Medici, Speziali e Merciai). Although the Mercanzia was itself a corporation, it was never integrated into the guild federation. In fact, it was later used by the oligarchs as an instrument for irnposing electoral and political controls over the guilds themselves. The analysis of the origins, growth, and political functions of the Mercanzia will be reserved for the second volume of the projected two-part study of the guilds in Florence. For the purposes of the present introduction, it is sufficient to point out that the Mercanzia gave a precise institutional configuration to the merchant oligarchy's sense of itself as constituting an interguild elite whose members had more in common with each other than they did with the hundreds of non-oligarchic members of their own guilds. Throughout this book the term "oligarchy" will be used to refer to the families that formed the solid core of this mercantile elite. The guild community and oligarchy of Florence, in the terms outlined above, thus form the essential social constituencies of the confrontation between the politics of corporatism and consensus. In the early fourteenth century the total membership of the seven major guilds may have approached thirty-five hundred, whereas the twenty-one guilds of the full corporate federation probably had a combined membership of between seven and eight thousand. At the same time, the merchants from the five major commercial guilds who could claim some share in the governance of the Mercanzia numbered between five and six hundred. After the population decline of the mid-fourteenth century, the Mercanzia elite comprised some three hundred persons out of a combined membership of no more than seventeen hundred in the five major commercial guilds and perhaps four thousand in all twenty-one guilds. But despite the relative precision that the guild matriculation books and the lists of eligibles to the offices of the Mercanzia permit us in formulating some idea of the size of these constituencies, it must be pointed out once again that the distinction between these two groups was, in practice, far more fluid than such lists might appear to indicate. Many rank-and-file guildsmen aspired to the prestige and

12

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

status of eligibility in the Mercanzia, and, by virtue of business dealings beyond the Florentine dominion, gained such recognition for a time, despite the fact that they lacked the antiquity of lineage and wealth characteristic of the great oligarchic families. Entrance into the exalted ranks of the Mercanzia could not of itself provide them with these qualities, but it did bring them into the network of business, family, and patronage connections that were the essence of oligarchic consensus. Thus, times of economic prosperity, which permitted the expansion of the merchant elite, generally coincided with an enlargement of the area of upper-class consensus and a blunting of corporate loyalties, as many guildsmen, inhabiting the fluid space between the two constituencies, opted for cooperation with the oligarchy. Conversely, whenever economic or fiscal difficulties threatened the collaboration between oligarchs and affluent guildsmen, the latter tended to rediscover their corporate loyalties and to emphasize their sense of divergence from the policies of the oligarchic families. Such crises, by isolating the oligarchy from the guild community, gave birth to the experiments in guild government of 1293, 1343, and 1378. In this sense, the rank and file of the major guilds, caught between professional ties to their corporate world and patronage and business ties to the oligarchy, held the balance of power between the two constituencies and were able to determine the outcome of the struggle, sometimes latent and sometimes explosive, between the adherents of corporatism and consensus in political life. Given the social and political configurations of the guild community, the elite families consistently opposed any constitutional arrangement that called for the equal and autonomous participation of twelve, twenty-one, or more guilds in the government of the republic. The relatively few guilds in which the oligarchy was represented would have been outnumbered by the more numerous corporations of the minor guilds in any such arrangement. Thus, the central aim of the oligarchy in guild politics was to keep the non-elite members of their own guilds safely anchored to upper-class consensus and away from the necessity or temptation of reviving corporate principles of government in alliance with the minor guilds. Through the mechanism of the Mercanzia, the Florentine oligarchy gradually succeeded in instituting a broad network of electoral and political controls over the entire guild system. But the security afforded by these controls was ultimately dependent on the oligarchy's constant efforts to tame or coopt the non-elite elements in their own major guilds. Much of the instability of fourteenth-century Florentine politics can be traced to the willingness and capacity of non-oligarchic major guildsmen to side either

Introduction

I3

with the oligarchy or with the guild community in response to the circumstances of the moment. Oligarchic opposition to the corporate mode of political organization was, as we shall see, swift enough in practice, even if somewhat slower to develop a theoretical underpinning. In the 129os, under the impact of the first experiment in corporate government, the oligarchy responded with a straightforward elitism, maintaining that complex political decisions were best left, in the words of a 1298 deliberation, to "the timely solicitude and careful meditation of prudent men privately consulted, whose decisions will, as a result of their wisdom and prudence, shine with the clarity of justice once they are subsequently made known to the general p u b l i ~ . " ~ This was, more or less, the extent of the oligarchy's ability to generate its own vision of communal politics in the aftermath of the guild government that came to power in 1293 under the banner of the Ordinances of Justice and the leadership of the enigmatic Giano della Bella. But even this rather primitive elitism contained the kernel of the complex of ideas that the oligarchy advanced over the course of the fourteenth century in response to the constitutional claims of corporatism. Embedded in the 1298 statement are two distinct but related ideas that gradually became more explicit and were ultimately institutionalized in oligarchic attempts to combat the decentralized popular republicanism of the guilds: first, the conviction that communal society was not the sum of autonomous parts, but rather an organic, harmonious whole whose closest analogue, it would later be argued, was not the corporation or universitas, but the family; second, that this organism naturally produced a beneficent elite of trained and experienced leaders who were identified with the patricians of the oldest and most prominent families. From this vision of communal society it followed that those citizens who shared the common purposes and values of the "civic family" both could and should willingly accept the leadership of its natural spokesmen, subordinating private whims to the general good and actively contributing to its realization. In political life these assumptions intensified the sense of civic obligation to participate responsibly and selflessly in the governance of the republic, while they sharpened the distinc8. PRY7, f. 178: "Quia . . . secundum varietates temporum opporteat leges novas fieri et salutifera remedia adhiberi, et etiam de veteribus plerumque commemorationem facere ad notitiam singulorum, et hec fieri non possint in multitudine hominum, sed cum opportunitate et deliberatione prudentium privatim habendorum per quorum scientiam et prudentiam que fient in publicum postea deducta iustitie claritate lucescant. . . ."

I4 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics tion between participation, which became the duty of all good citizens, and power, which remained the prerogative of the leadership elite. Thus, consensus politics accommodated both an expansion of individual participation (at least in t&ms of the numbers of officeholders) and a consolidation of elitism at the center of the decision-making apparatus. These notions were not fully elaborated into an integrated vision of the republican state until the early fifteenth century, when Leonardo Bruni incorporated them into the political and historical synthesis of civic humanism. But b e hind the full intellectual expression of these ideas lay almost a century of institutional experimentation during which the still inchoate assumptions of consensus politics were tested and implemented in the electoral sphere, principally with the introduction of the system of general scrutinies and extraction by lot. It was, therefore, on the battleground of electoral politics that these two contrasting visions of republicanism collided in a series of escalating encounters from the last two decades of the thirteenth century to the end of the fourteenth century. The story of this struggle must consequently be a history of both institutions and ideas. The underlying theme of this study is that the experience of politics, in particular electoral politics, in all its complex detail and mundane application, gave birth and shape to the competing ideologies of corporatism and consensus, and that this clash of institutional systems and ideas generated the characteristic political forms and mature political thought of Renaissance Florence. If in the end the politics of consensus came to dominate the assumptions of civic humanism, as I shall argue in these pages, it must be realized that the institutions of consensus politics had been forged as a conscious attempt to counter and displace the claims of electoral corporatism. Consequently, a full understanding of the aims of consensus politics is only possible through an analysis of corporate politics, and it is only in their dialectical relationship that the political history of Renaissance Florence can be adequately approached. The Florentines faced these issues most squarely when they came to grips, as they did so frequently, with the task of devising rules and regulations for the selection of the members of the central executive magistracy that went under the name of the priorate, or, as it was often referred to by the Florentines themselves, the Signoria. This study will therefore concentrate on the development of these most important of all Florentine elections. The evolution of the institutions created for this purpose from 1280 to 1400 is a complex and sometimes tortuous story, whose successive stages it will be necessary to trace in considerable detail. In the pages that

Introduction

I5

follov~,each institution or reform of the electoral process will be understood as the implementation of an idea or the realization of a policy; conversely, each idea must be seen as the reflection of or reaction to some institutional or political development. From this perspective, the distinction between political and institutional history on the one hand, and the history of political ideas and ideologies on the other, survives only as a tool of historiographic convenience. For it was in the matrix of institutions that the fundamental assumptions of political life, and ultimately of political thought, gathered concrete significance and precise definition in the minds of the Florentines. And if it is true, as Quentin Skinner has recently maintained, that "in recovering the terms of the normative vocabulary available to any given agent for the description of his political behaviour, we are at the same time indicating one of the constraints upon his behaviour it~elf,"~ for the purposes of the present study it is possible to go further and to suggest that in any historical moment this "normative vocabulary" is most clearly visible in the web of institutional arrangements into which politicians and political thinkers alike are born. The language that legitimates and determines political behavior is most likely to be found in the records documenting the evolution of those institutions that gave shape and substance to political assumptions, ideas, and goals. It was, in short, through the medium of institutions that the normative vocabulary was generated and propagated in its most characteristic and influential form. For fourteenth-century Florentines, as for the inhabitants of any similarly dynamic and intense political community, the institutions of political life were neither distant from everyday concerns nor abstract in formulation and impact. In other words, institutions did not merely establish the ideologically neutral limits of political action. Rather, every institution or reform was imbued with an immediate purpose and a precise expectation, charged with a significance that was intimately related to the needs of conflicting ideologies. Successive generations of fourteenth-century Florentines came to the political theater equipped or burdened with the institutionalized manifestations of the complex layers of experience of earlier generations. They could no more have ignored this inheritance than discarded the very language they spoke. The impact of this legacy at any given moment was so pervasive, so much a matter of course, and so completely understood, that contemporaries did not as a rule bother to articu9. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 1978)~I :xiii.

16 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

late the theoretical implications of the institutions they inherited or of the reforms they contributed. Such conceptualization was not necessary b e cause the meaning of events was built into the language and structure of the institutions themselves. But if this significance was, as it were, selfevident to the Florentines, by virtue of their absorption in the normative and institutional context they shared, and if this same context inescapably informed every reflection and act of interpretation by contemporary chroniclers, historians, and their readers, it follows that, in attempting to penetrate the significance of events as they were understood by the Florentines themselves, we who do not share in this context must reconstruct it from the sort of evidence in which it is most fully available. It is the working assumption of this study that the evidence that best meets these needs is provided by those documents in which the Florentines explicated the functional structures and legal principles of their political existence and in which they both implemented and legitimated their assumptions and objectives according to the standards of the institutional legacy that informed all political action and thought. Only by rebuilding this framework and penetrating the dynamic of its evolution over time can we hope to seize the meaning of events as experienced by their protagonists.

One Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, I 280- 1292

The office of the priorate (priores artium) was created by the Florentine guild community in 1282 against a background of rapid social and political change. Since the middle of the thirteenth century, the impact of external events and the conflicting political interests of Guelfs and Ghibellines, Angevin and papal supporters, and merchant and military classes had produced a complex succession of different regimes in the commune, each with its own particular magistracies and institutions. From the Primo Popolo of 1250-60 to the Ghibelline government of 1260-66, the popular revival-of 1266-67, the Angevin protectorate of 1267-80, and finally to the papally sponsored government of the Fourteen in 1280-82, no Florentine regime had succeeded in sinking firm institutional roots into the shifting sands of communal politics.' The great success of the guild-based priorate, which took hold and became the pivotal magistracy of the republic for the next two centuries, thus stands in sharp contrast to the constitutional instability of the previous thirty years. But if the priorate itself became a nearly permanent fixture of the Florentine political scene, the same can hardly be said of the procedures and regulations governing the election of its members during its first few decades. The system of election by general scrutiny and sortition was instituted only in 1328, almost half a century after the inception of the new office. Until then the electoral process was in a state of more or less continuous flux and experimentation, as different groups and classes alternating I . O n the period from I250 to 1282, see Robert Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, vols. 2 and 3 (Florence, 1972-73); Gaetano Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani in Firenze dal 1280 a1 1295 (Florence, 1899); Alfred Doren, Le Arti Fiorentine, 2 vols. (Florence, 1940)~I : 1-67; Nicola Ottokar, ZZ Comune di Firenze alla flne del Dugento (1926; rev. ed., Turin, 1962); and Pasquale Villari, Z Primi Due Secoli della Storia di Firenze, 3d ed. (Florence, n.d.).

18 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics in power sought to adapt the methods and results of the bimonthly selection of priors to their own particular aims. The frequent debates and modifications of the electoral system were in fact a reflection of the spontaneous vitality of Florentine politics in this formative period. Indeed the very survival of the priorate, in the still far from stable political conditions of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Florence, would scarcely have been possible without the creative flexibility of a rapidly evolving electoral system that was responsive to the competing aspirations of rival social and political forces. But despite Dante's contemptuous lament that the Florentines were unable to make last until the middle of November what they had spun in October (Purg~torio,VI, 143- I&, the sometimes bewildering threads of these electoral debates do contain a certain political and historical logic. The central issue on which they turned was the much debated problem of the constitutional role of the individual guilds in the electoral process. The principles of corporatism, which advanced the thesis of the equal and autonomous participation of the guilds in the election of the communal government, were first elaborated in 1282 and implemented in the elections of the 129os, in which the corporations gained, and then lost, a significant measure of influence. At the same time, the earliest strategies of accommodation and resistance on the part of the anticorporatist oligarchy are also revealed in these debates. Thus, a close analysis of the myriad of proposals and counterproposals made in the electoral debates of the 1280s and 1290s constitutes the indispensable prelude to the history of Florentine electoral politics in the fourteenth century. Only from such an analysis can the larger ideological and constitutional issues of electoral politics be adequately grasped. When the priorate was created in June 1282, it was not yet the supreme executive magistracy that it later became. At the time, that role belonged to the office of the Fourteen, which had been established in 1280 as a part of the general reconciliation of the Florentine Guelf and Ghibelline parties by Pope Nicholas 111's legate, Cardinal Latino. Conceived as a compromise between the two fratricidal factions of the Florentine aristocracy, the Fourteen consisted of eight Guelfs and six Ghibellines to be elected for one-month terms. Nicola Ottokar characterized this regime and its leading magistracy as weak and artificial, partly because they were urged on the Florentines by a pope more interested in the success of his Italian policy than in the stability of Florentine government and partly because they were, in Ottokar's words, a "mechanical arrangement" that lacked any

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292

19

real support from the social and corporate groups constituting the solid base of the Florentine upper class. The most important of these corporate groups, the guilds, had grown in number and size throughout the thirteenth century and had come to represent a wide variety of economic and professional groups, ranging from an elite of international merchants, bankers, and capitalists to broad and numerous strata of manufacturers, shopkeepers, and artisans. Their potential contribution to the stability of the regime derived from their neutrality in the struggles between Guelf and Ghibelline, and this at least had been recognized in 1280 as the guilds were called upon to serve as formal guarantors of the reconciliation and as defenders of the new constitution. As the weakness of the government of the Fourteen became more pronounced, however, the role of the corporations and their consuls broadened from the legal responsibilities envisioned in 1280, to consultative and deliberative functions in conjunction with the Fourteen from at least 1281, and ultimately to a share in the election itself of the Fourteen in 1282. From this perspective, as Ottokar has suggested, the creation in June 1282 of the guild-based priorate was a formalization of the de facto role of the guilds in a government that needed their support, and by early 1283 this process culminated in the wholesale substitution of the new magistracy for the now impotent office of the F~urteen.~ Every month, from early in 1280 to January 1283, a new contingent of Fourteen was elected, and since no fixed procedure for their election had been established when the office was created in 1280, it became the responsibility of the Council of the Captain of the People (hereafter referred to as the Council of the People) at the end of every month to seek advice, to debate, and to determine the method of the election of the new Fourteen. Many of these debates, or hearings, on the electoral procedures to be adopted have been preserved in the volumes of the Libri Fabarurn, the registers of votes taken in the council^.^ Most of those that survive cover the months in 1282 during which the question of the role of the guilds in the election of the Fourteen became a controversial issue. These debates do not concern the election of the priorate itself, but since the priorate came into being at this time as a result of the very phenomenon of expanding 2. Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 3-12. The role assigned to the guilds in the Peace of 1280 is discussed on page 5. 3. The first four volumes of this series have been edited by Alessandro Gherardi as Le Consulte della Repubblica Fiorentina dall'amo M C C L X X X a1 MCCXCVZIZ, 2 ~01s.(Florence, 1896-98); hereafter cited as Consulte.

20

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

guild power that was then the central issue in the debates on the election af the Fourteen, they can illuminate the essential elements of the political atmosphere in which the new magistracy was created. For the years 1280 and 1281 only one of the monthly debates has survived, that of April 1280. One of the two speakers on that occasion suggested that the election of the Fourteen be entrusted to the overseers of the communal statutes with as many as twenty-four additional electors (arroti) of their choice; the other speaker, whose proposal was approved by the council, advised that the outgoing Fourteen, again with twenty-four arroti, should elect their own successors. These proposals, both made by members of prestigious families of the old aristocracy,4 were reasonably similar and fairly conservative in that the appointment of the participating arroli lay in each case with a small number of persons already in positions of considerable influence and power. By the beginning of 1282, however, when the procedural debates reappear in the volumes of the Libri Fabarum, the political mood was very much changed. In the first place, the number of speakers in each debate increased. In April 1280 and even as late as January 1282, two proposals had sufficed for the council to reach a decision. But from February through November 1282 (i.e., over the crucial period when the priorate was instituted), the recorded speakers on each occasion numbered between four and eight. At the same time, the diversity of approaches to the problem of electing the Fourteen also increased. The most important new idea, and the one that dominated the debates through these months, was that the consuls of the guilds should in some way participate in the elections. In January 1282 the council considered and rejected a suggestion that the consuls of the seven major guilds, together with the Captain of the People and his judges, should conduct the electionY5 which was instead entrusted to the outgoing Fourteen. In February, however, no less than five of six speakers proposed plans in which the consuls of the seven major guilds had a preponderant role, and this time a guild-based plan was accepted. It called for the election of the members of the Fourteen from each sesto (the city was at this time administratively subdivided into sixths) 4, Consulte, I :31. The successful proposal was made by Messer Bonaccorsc! Bellincionis, the other by Messer Lottieri dei Visdornini, both of whom appeared frequently (five and three times, respectively) in the recorded electoral debates between 1280 and 1283. 5 . Ibid., p. 59: "Bernardus Rubei Fornarii consuluit, quod electio XIIIIcimfiat per Capitaneum et suos Iudices et Capitudines septem maiorum Artium."

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic,

1280-1292

21

by the guild consuls who resided in the other five sesti6 In March, three of four proposals gave prominence to the guild consuls, but the council instead opted for the single proposal that excluded the representatives of the guilds and entrusted the election to the outgoing Fourteen and the Council of the People.' The debates of April and May do not survive, which is particularly unfortunate because the great constitutional innovation represented by the priorate had already come about by the time of the next procedural debate at the end of June. However, all eight speakers in the June debate proposed that the newly installed priors take part in electing the Fourteen for the month of July. To propose the participation of the priors was indirectly to propose a role for representatives of the guilds, but because these first priors numbered only three and came from the Calimala (international merchants), Cambio (bankers), and Lana (woolen-cloth manufacturers) guilds, such a procedure actually tended to restrict electoral influence to a narrow segment of the guild community. The proposal that was accepted allowed the priors and the Captain to select as many arroti as they wished and to carry out the election as they saw fit. Notably, the one suggestion to include the direct participation of the guild consuls was not a c ~ e p t e dIn . ~ August the election was entrusted to the Captain, the priors, the outgoing Fourteen, and two arroti from each of the sesti, to be appointed by the Council of the People. Only one of five speakers mentioned the guild consuls, but he made a startling proposal that would have placed the election in the hands of the consuls of no fewer than thirty-two 6 . Ibid., pp. 70-71: "Manetus Beninccase consuluit, quod Capitudines septem maiorum Artium faciant electionem hoc modo: quod Capitudines quinque sextus [sic] eligant XIIII""\ alterius sextus, in absentia Capitudinum illius sextus." The list of candidates for the sesto of Oltrarno (following the summaries of the proposals, in ibid., pp. 71-72) shows that the consuls of each of the seven guilds nominated three candidates, two Guelfs and one Ghibelline. There were thus twentyone nomination slots, which resulted in the actual nomination of only thirteen persons, several being nominated by more than one guild. The total number of votes cast by the consuls of the other five sesti was 75, and the three persons elected to represent the sesto of Oltrarno on the new Fourteen were Volpe Canigiani, Manetto Benincase (who had proposed this plan), and Mongia del Rosso delle Botte; they received, respectively, vote totals of 17, 15, and 10. The complete list of the new Fourteen is given in ibid., p. 72. 7. Ibid., p. 82: "Gaddus domini Bianchi consuluit, quod electio XIIIIcimfiat per XIIIIcimet Consilium predictum, per sextum; ita quod XIIIIamet Consiliarii cuiuslibet sextus suam electionem faciant." 8. Ibid., pp. 94-95.

22

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

guild^.^ In September five of seven speakers included the consuls or other representatives of the guilds in their proposals, and now four of the five spoke in terms of twelve (instead of seven) major guilds. On this occasion, the council adopted a plan giving the priors (now increased from three to six) the authority to select one consul from each of the twelve guilds and to carry out the election with their co~peration.'~ However, the apparent expansion of the electoral base (to embrace as many as twelve guilds) was in practice moderated by depriving the guilds of the freedom to select their own representatives to the electoral committee. A month later, three of six proposals included the guild consuls, but the procedure that was accepted simply permitted the priors to appoint twenty-two arroti, including among them some members of the guilds." By November, not a single speaker proposed any role for the consuls, and this was also the case during the last two debates of December 1282 and January 1283.'~The Fourteen, whose authority was by now replaced by that of the firmly established priorate, were no longer elected after this point. Two important conclusions emerge from this brief summary of the development of the guild approach to electoral politics in the debates of 1282. First, the idea of giving the guilds a role in the election of the Fourteen almost inevitably encouraged expansionist tendencies. Soon after the creation and expansion of the priorate itself, several of the speakers who favored some role for the guilds began to formulate proposals involving larger numbers of guilds. The seven major guilds referred to in the debates from January to June were the Giudici e Notai (lawyers and notaries), Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria (retailers and small merchants), Medici e Speziali (doctors and druggists-the merciai did not achieve equal status in the guild until 1296)~and the Vaiai e Pellicciai (furriers). The twelve guilds for which electoral responsibilities were recommended by a number of speakers in September included these seven and the guilds of the butchers, shoemakers, smiths, used-cloth dealers, and master builders and carpenters. It is impossible to say exactly what occupations or 9. Ibid., p. 97: "Dominus Bonacursius de Archu pietatis consuluit, quod Capitudines XXX'" duarum Artium se conveniant c o r m Capitaneo . . . [text missing] . . . elect. sicut eis placuerit." 10. Ibid., p. 102: "Dominus Lapus de Raynuciis consuluit, quod electio XIIIIcL"fiat per Priores et xijc'" Sapientes Capitudinum xij"" maiorum Artium, eligendos per ipsos Priores." 11. Ibid., pp. 113-14. 12. Ibid., pp. 123, 130, 135-36.

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292

23

corporate bodies were in the mind of the speaker in the August debate who wanted the participation of thirty-two guilds in the election, but his proposal does suggest the radical potential of these expansionist tendencies. It is essential to recall that the figure of twenty-one guilds, traditionally associated with the Florentine corporations, was not formally fixed until 1293. Until that time, and even for a while thereafter, there were dozens of more or less organized corporate bodies, each aspiring to a political role. Thus, in 1282 when some guilds gained a foothold in the government of the commune, it was only natural that others should seek to follow suit. The second important conclusion to be drawn from that year's electoral debates is that the corporate approach to the election of the Fourteen, although strongly supported by numerous spokesmen, was even more firmly resisted by its opponents. In the very year in which the guild-based priorate was instituted, only once (in February) was the office of the Fourteen elected according to procedures that gave the consuls of even the seven guilds independent and equal electoral authority. On two other occasions (September and October) representatives of the guilds were appointed by the priors to the electoral committee, but without the possibility of selecting their own delegates the individual guilds were not in a position to exercise autonomous influence in the election. To understand why there was so much opposition to the guild approach in the election of the Fourteen (as there would later be in the election of the priorate), it is necessary to articulate the implications of the emerging corporate view of the Florentine body politic as contained in the proposals for an electoral system based on the notions of guild autonomy and equality, and to imagine the sorts of pressures and demands that, stimulated and encouraged by the affirmation of corporate principles among the seven major guilds, soon began to emanate from the wider guild community as well. The earliest and most concise formulation of the corporate view came in the electoral debate of February 1282. Lotto Ardenghi, a virtually unknown member of a little-known family, recommended that the consuls of each of the seven major guilds, without the participation of any other committees or arroti, should elect the new Fourteen for the month of March by selecting two persons from their own guild.13 This plan may seem simple and straightforward enough, at first glance hardly a radical or dangerous 13. Ibid., p. 70: "Loctus Ardenghi consuluit, quod Capitudines septem maiorum Artium eligant XIIII"" hoc modo: scilicet, quod de qualibet Arte eligantur ij qui sint de XIIIIcim,et non de aliis." On this proposal, see Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, p. 12.

24 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

proposal. But in fact it contained the seeds of three ideas that, although unsuccessful in the immediate context of 1282, subsequently became both influential and highly controversial in Florentine electoral politics: first, that the election of the chief Florentine magistracy be entrusted to the consuls of a defined number of corporations, with each guild free to appoint its own representatives to the electoral committee, but without the participation of any arroti, thus ensuring the independent and equal influence of each guild; second, that the guilds should share equally in the assignment of offices in the elected magistracy, in effect making these magistrates the representatives of specific corporate groups; and third, that eligibility to the office be limited to the members of the designated corporations, with each guild selecting its pair of representatives on the Fourteen from the roster of its own members ("et non de aliis"). This in practice would have given the guilds the opportunity to determine the size and composition of the Florentine political class through their matriculation policies. Put more sirnply, Lotto Ardenghi's proposal implied that a federation of guilds would have legal and exclusive control of Florentine political life in a system based on the principles of autonomy and equality among the participating corporations. Variants, fragments, and developments of these basic ideas continued to find expression in the months that followed. In June, Messer Tribaldo de' Giandonati revived the notion of distributing the fourteen posts equally among the seven major guild^.'^ In August the astounding suggestion that the Fourteen be elected by the consuls of thirty-two guilds was made by Messer Buonaccorso degli Elisei, a jurist from an old Ghibelline family.'' Whatever his motives may have been in offering this proposal, the inclusion on an apparently equal basis of the representatives of such a large number of corporate groups (existing or potential) was a logical extension of the same principles of autonomy and equality among the guilds. Then, in October, two speakers went so far as to propose that the election be entrusted to representatives from all the guilds except the seven major guilds. One of them, Messer Lottieri dei Visdomini, wanted each guild's representative on the electoral committee to be appointed independently by its consuls, yet another instance of the application of the related notions of 14. Consulre, I :94: "quod Capitaneus et Priores eligant XIIIIc'", et eligendi sint de septem maioribus Artibus, duo pro qualibet Arte." IS. Ibid., p. 97. On Buonaccorso degli Elisei and the interpretation of his extraordinary proposal, see Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 22, 30.

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic,

1280-1292

25

equality and autonomy among the guilds."j All these electoral plans were rejected, as were many others, more moderate than these, which simply advanced the idea that the independently elected consuls of either the seven or the twelve major guilds should enjoy a preponderant influence in the election of the Fourteen. The moderate proposals involved, to one degree or another, the same basic principles of guild autonomy and equality found in the more radical plans, and it was almost certainly for this reason that even they were rejected so regularly. The extreme suggestions made in August and October indicate that the inevitable tendency of a rigorously applied guild system for Florentine elections was toward the expansion of the political class at the expense of the traditional ruling elite. To go so far as to exclude the powerful major guilds from the electoral committees, as proposed in October, was of course inconsistent with the notion of the equality of all the guilds, but in practical terms it pursued an aim quite similar to that of the speaker who had proposed an electoral committee composed of representatives from thirty-two guilds. To exclude the elite altogether was only one step beyond placing it in the position of a hopelessly outnumbered minority. The guild system of elections tended to place the elite of the major guilds in precisely this position. We are thus faced with the apparent paradox that the guild-based priorate was instituted in the very year in which the idea of a guild-based electoral system was considered but firmly rejected by the political leaders of Florence. The guild community was in ferment throughout 1282, as new waves of corporate groups sought admission to the political theater. The creation of the priorate in June and its subsequent expansion into a committee of six members representing the diverse corporate community of Florence were no doubt a response to this ferment. However, some elements of this community were not satisfied with the indirect and unspecific representation of their interests by officials generically designated as "priors of the guilds," and such persons argued for the more rigorous implementation of the corporate principles of electoral politics. These were initially recommended for application among the seven guilds. But very quickly other spokesmen came forward and urged their extension to a considerably more numerous association of guilds whose limits would have 16. Consulte, I : 114: "quod electio XIIII" fiat per unum ex Capitudinibus cuiuslibet Artis, exceptis quam de septem Capitudinibus, una cum Capitaneo; et Capitudines ipsarum Artium eligant ipsum de Arte sua, qui faciat electionem predictam." See also Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, p. 22.

26 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics been nearly impossible to establish in the conditions of rapid social mobility and demographic growth that characterized the late thirteenth century. Indeed, the frightening possibility of a chaotic extension and fragmentation of political power among a myriad of corporations large and small made the Florentine elite wary of entertaining even the moderate formulation of corporate principles offered by men such as Lotto Ardenghi. For if the principles of a corporate polity had received the legitimacy of implementation in an electoral program, even one restricted to the narrow circle of the seven major guilds, it would have been difficult to argue the illegitimacy of their extension to any and all guilds. The elite, even as it accepted the innovation of the priorate, was obviously opposed to such an extension of political influence and consequently had no intention of experimenting, any more than necessary, with the broader implications of a system firmly anchored to the notions of guild autonomy and equality. At the end of 1282, as the priorate became solidly established at the apex of the communal constitution and the period of governmental weakness came to an end, the elite no longer felt the need of enlisting the support of the wider guild community and was thus able to ignore the aspirations and demands of the many corporate groups that stretched beyond the seven, or at most the twelve, major guilds." Lottieri dei Visdomini, only one month after he had made the radical proposal for the exclusion of the seven major guilds and for the election of the Fourteen on the basis of the equal and autonomous electoral participation of the remaining guilds, had nothing at all to say about any role for the guilds and simply recommended that the new Fourteen be selected by the priors and their predecessor^.'^ Within a matter of a few months, the political mood had changed and the guildbased priorate became something quite different from what had been expected and imagined by the advocates of the guild movement during the summer and early fall of 1282. The sense of great expectation and subsequent disappointment was eloquently recorded by one of the principal supporters and ideologues of the guild idea, Dino Compagni. He explained in the Cronica (bk. I, chap. 4) that because of the unabated hostilities between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines after the attempted reconciliation of 1280, many citizens feared the ruin of the city through civil war. A group of six cittadini popolani met to discuss proposals that might save Florence from such a fate. This group 17. Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 2 3 - 2 6 , 3 1 - 3 2 . 18. Consulte, I :123.

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic,

1280-1292

27

included Dino Compagni himself, who wrote: "Because of my youth, I had no knowledge of the difficulties and sorrows of politics and was motivated only by my purity of heart and by my understanding of why the city was headed for disaster." Dino reported that he personally had a major role in propagandizing the idea of the guild-based priorate: "I spoke on this matter, and so successful were we in converting the citizens to our views that three citizens and leaders of the guilds were elected who should come to the aid of the merchants and guildsmen whenever necessary." The institution of the new office was warmly welcomed among those who sought refuge from the warring aristocratic factions of the great families: "The ordinary citizens were exceedingly encouraged by the election of these three, seeing that the authority of the priors was unopposed; and the frank words of those citizens who spoke of their liberty and of injuries suffered in the past so enflamed and emboldened the priors that they promulgated new ordinances and decrees, which would prove very difficult to abrogate. . . . And they were called the of the guilds, and they locked themselves in the torre della Castagna near the Badia, so that they should not have to fear the threats of the powerful." Dino lists the major areas of responsibility of the priorate: the supervision of communal finances, the guarantee of equal justice to all citizens, and the protection of the "piccoli e impotenti" against the "grandi e potenti" : "And as long as it remained true to these original intentions, the priorate was a source of great help to the popolo." But these hopes were quickly disappointed, and Dino's explanation for the failure of the priorate to live up to these expectations is that the wrong sort of persons were being elected to the new office: "But very soon everything changed, because the citizens who were being elected to that office cared less to observe the laws than to corrupt them. . . . The weak were not helped, and were again the victims of the grandi and of those popolani grassi [powerful non-magnates] who held political office and were related to the grandi. . . . Consequently, the good popolani citizens were very unhappy, and they spoke ill of the office of the priors, because the grandi Guelfi had come to dominate it."I9 Compagni's negative judgment is meant to apply to the whole decade between the institution of the priorate and the popular government of the mid-~zgos,but his comment that things changed soon ("tosto si mutb") seems to confirm the conclusion that emerges from the analysis of the electoral debates of 1282. Compagni's great hopes of mid-1282 coincide chro19. Compagni, Cronica, pp. 15- 18.

28 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics nologically with the optimistic affirmation in those debates of the principles of a guild constitution. And Dino's sense that the bold experiment had failed all too soon seems equally to coincide with the elimination of these corporate claims at the end of 1282. As will be seen, however, Dino Compagni himself became one of the champions of their revival just a decade later. No constitutional document survives to illustrate how the first priors were elected, and it is impossible to say whether the variations in procedure for the election of the Fourteen were paralleled by similar instability and experimentation in the earliest elections of the priorate. If the outcome of the debates of 1282 can be accepted as a reliable indication, we should expect to find, at least from the end of 1282 and perhaps even from June, that the priorate was not elected according to the principles of the guild system, as formulated and rejected in the debates of that year. The guilds, however, could not be totally bypassed in the election of a magistracy that took the name of priores artium20 According to Giovanni Villani, the consuls of the twelve major guilds did indeed participate in electing the priorate in its first decade, but they had to share this authority with the outgoing priors and with a number of arroti appointed by the priors to the electoral com20. In the memorandum "Del Governo della citti di Firenze," Carlo Strozzi claimed that until 1286 the priors were elected by the same method used in the election of the Fourteen, who, he believed, were elected by the outgoing Fourteen and a body of richiesti (arroti); Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, p. 312. Strozzi believed that only in 1286 did the consuls of the twelve major guilds gain a place on the electoral committee. There is no evidence to support this interesting idea, and Salvemini rejected it as inaccurate because the procedure for the election of the Fourteen was not fixed as Strozzi implied, but rather decided anew each month (ibid., p. 117). Salvemini is certainly right about this, but it might be noted that Strozzi's notion of how the Fourteen were elected does correspond generally to the procedure adopted in the last three surviving debates of November and December 1282 and January 1283, and it could very well be that this procedure was maintained in the election of the priorate for the first few years. The important point is that Strozzi implies that until 1286 the guild consuls were excluded from the elections of both the Fourteen and the priors, which is at least consistent with the conclusion that a guild system of elections was defeated in the fall of 1282. Strozzi's suggestion, therefore, seems plausible enough, and since 1286 was also the year of some of the most important of the early anti-magnate laws (ibid., pp. 133-45; Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 103-6), it is not unreasonable to imagine that this popular thrust may have been accompanied by an expansion of the electoral committee to include the consuls of the twelve guilds. But, however plausible, this is merely speculation.

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292

29

mittee.2' Villani says nothing about the nomination of candidates, nor about the number of arroti, and it is likely that these points of procedure were not fixed.22In any case, the presence on the committee of a potentially large body of arroti selected by the priors certainly worked to limit the ability of the consuls to act influentially and independently. However elected, the priorate was monopolized during its first decade by an elite largely recruited from a handful of the major guilds. According to the statistics assembled by Ottokar, based on his painstaking effort to identify the guild affiliation of the men elected to the commune's highest office during the ten and a half years between the creation of the priorate and the promulgation of the Ordinances of Justice, 65 percent of the priors (248 of 381) were members of only three of the guilds (Calimala, Giudici e Notai, and Cambio). Almost half of the priors came from the Calimala and Cambio alone. The complete breakdown by guild, as provided by Ottokar, is as follows: 23 Calimala Cambio Calimala or Cambio Giudici e Notai Lana Por Santa Maria Medici e Speziali Vaiai e Pellicciai Beccai Uncertain

Ninety percent of the posts were monopolized by six of the seven major guilds, but the Lana, Por Santa Maria, and Medici e Speziali guilds, which 21. Villani, Cronica, I : ~ I I "L'elezione : del detto uficio si facea per gli priori vecchi colle capitudini delle dodici arti maggiori, e con certi arroti ch'elleggeano i priori per ciascuno sesto, andando a squittino segreto, e quale piii boci avea, quegli era fatto priore." 22. From later entries in the Consulte, however, it is clear that there was a body of legislation dealing with the election of the priorate. On 27 July 1290 the divieto, which had been fixed at two years ("secundum formam statuti"), was increased to three years (Consulte, I :416). By the end of 1292, this statutory legislation had already been reformed and possibly replaced, even before the promulgation of the Ordinances of Justice (ibid., 2 :214; see below, n. 30). 23. Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 17- 19.

30 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics were among the largest corporations, sent far fewer of their members to the priorate than did the Giudici e Notai, Calimala, and Cambio. Thus, striking inequalities prevailed even among the major guilds. The electoral politics of this period was clearly dominated by the merchant and banking elite, which was, to be sure, part of the community of the major but its control of the priorate was based on a rejection of any corporate system of elections. The regime of 1282-92, although nominally based on the guilds, never seriously experimented with the full implications of an electoral system grounded in the equality and autonomy of the corporations. Not even the remotest sense of equality conditioned the apportionment of power and office among the guilds, major or minor. Such would appear to have been the result of the exclusion of the consuls from any significant role in the election of the priorate. At the end of 1291, the Florentines experimented with a new twist in the electoral system that seems to mark the first grant of an electoral balia and the earliest use of the technique of imborsazione, or the placing into bags of name tickets to be drawn at regular intervals. The legislative councils gave the priorate of October-December 1291 special authority to provide for the election of new priors for one or more terms by any method of their choosing.25Instead of electing the usual number of six priors for a single term, they approved thirty-six candidates all at once, enough to fill the Signoria for six two-month terms from 15 December 1291 to 15 December 1292. The names of the thirty-six priors-elect were placed into bags from which six of them were drawn every two months.26This was done in order to provide a measure of continuity and political consensus, 24. This elite has been studied by Ottokar in a chapter entitled "I1 Ceto Dirigente," ibid., pp. 33-89. 25. Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, pp. 164-65;Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 196-97.The proposal for the balia, granted on 15 November 1291,and the ensuing debate are in Consulte, 2 :66-68: "Item super balia danda Prioribus, per se vel alios quos habere vellent, quod possint providere super electione et electionibus Priorum in futururn faciendis, prout et secundum quod viderint con:mire et utile fore; et valeat et teneat quicquid factum fuerit." The balia was approved in the Council of the Hundred by a vote of 50 to 20 and in the Special Council by a vote of 45 to 15.The decisions of the priors entrusted with the electoral balia did not require the approval of any of the councils and there is no mention of any role for the guild consuls in the articulation of the new procedures. 26. The decision of the balia to adopt imborsazione in 1291 is known from the reference to it by a participant in the debate of 24 November 1292:"quod aliquis non possit esse Prior qui sit in hoc Consilio vel qui fuerit ab uno anno citra, scilicet ab eo tempore citra quo Priores extracti fuerint de pissidibus" (Consulte, 2 :224).

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292

31

which was certainly difficult, if not impossible, to obtain with a system of bimonthly elections. The need for greater long-term stability in the priorate was probably related to the emerging mood of unrest and dissent within the guild community in 1289 and 1290. Embroiled in an inconclusive war against Arezzo and Pisa, the ruling oligarchy found itself confronted with growing opposition to its foreign and fiscal policies. One of the first signs of popular agitation was the formation of a tentative military union of the seven major and five middle guilds in 1289, an event that Villani described as "almost the beginning of a popular government." And in 1290 the anti-oligarchic forces managed to have the period of ineligibility for the reelection of officeholders (the divieto) extended from two to three years.27This made it more difficult for the members of the ruling elite to succeed themselves in office with regularity and had the effect of making the bimonthly elections even more unpredictable than usual. The adoption of imborsazione in 1291 was doubtless a way of resisting this effort to expand the officeholding class. By electing, all at once, enough priors for a full year, the ruling group would not have to face a new electoral challenge every two months.28 It should be noted that nowhere in the documents is there any mention of the use of extraction by lot in connection with the reform of 1291. The lack of any reference to this practice does not mean that it was not actually used. But even if it was, it could only have been applied in a very limited way because the balia approved and placed into bags only the names of just enough persons to fill the priorate for six terms, or until the extraction of 15 October 1292. Evidence for this comes from a special session of the Council of the People and the consuls of the twelve major guilds, held two days later on 17 October, to decide how to elect a replacement for one of the new priors who was ill and unable to assume Had the bags created in 1291 contained still more names, it would have been logical and appropriate to find a replacement among the remaining imborsati whose names had not yet been extracted. This was not done, however, and no mention of this possibility was even made in the deliberation of 17 October. This first experiment with imborsazione must be understood within its political context. There is no evidence that the guilds or their consuls had any role in the electoral balia or in the approval of candidates. And there is 27. On the guild union of 1289, see Villani, Cronica, I :462-63. For the divieto legislation of 1290, see PRY2, f. 130, and Consulte, I :416. 28. See Ottokar's comments in I1 Comune di Firenze, p. 196, n. 3. 29. Consulte, 2 :2 14.

32 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics likewise no indication that sortition, even if used, had any of the "democratic" effects that were later associated with the idea of chance selection. The aim of the 1291 reform was in fact precisely the reverse: to eliminate the instability of electoral chance and to provide the ruling group with the security of knowing exactly who would be sitting on the priorate for the next year. The popular movement, which consolidated in ever greater strength in the second half of 1292, perceived imborsazione in these terms and, as we shall see, rejected it without hesitation in the great debate of November 1292. The experiment with imbmsazione and multiple elections in December 1291 represented a departure from the normal custom of holding a separate bimonthly election for each new priorate. Although some degree of stability and security may have been gained for a year, it was obvious that at the end of the one-year experiment the problem of finding an acceptable procedure for electing the prioraze would have to be faced in conditions of greater uncertainty than ever before.30Politically, it was a crucial moment. The reform movement was beginning to find leaders, ideas, and institutional focal points. It must have been clear that the new priors elected in December 1292 would be influential and perhaps decisive in giving direction to the gathering insistence for popular reform in the conduct of the war, the administration of justice and the courts, taxation, the election of officeholders, and the control of upper-class violence. It was this very priorate that promulgated the first edition of the Ordinances of Justice in January 1293. Thus, the debates and deliberations concerning the election of this priorate constitute a particularly important stage in the early development of Florentine electoral systems, as well as a moment of considerable drama in the political annals of the young republic. On 24 November 1292 the Captain of the People convened the consuls of the twelve major guilds and an unspecitied number of appointed savi, altogether an assembly of at least eighty-seven citizens, to deliberate "on the method and form of the election of the priors of the g ~ i l d s . " ~NO ' less 30. This is already reflected in the prologue of the deliberation of 17 October 1292 on the replacement of the ailing prior: "cum statutum sit correctum, et ordinamenta non habeant locum in hoc caw" (ibid.). 31. Ibid., p. 223: "In Consilio Capitudinum xij ""maiorum Artium proposuit d. Capitaneus: Quid videtur Consilio providere super mod0 et forma electionis dominorum Priorum Artium, de cetero pro comuni Florentie eligendorum." The text of the debate that followed, including the summaries of the speeches and resolutions

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic,

1280-1292

33

than twenty-three members of this Special Council rose to express opinions on the crucial matter. The proposals put forward on that day revealed a wide range of views on the problem of how to elect the next priorate and on the larger constitutional issues that were in the background. The two principal matters to be debated and resolved were the procedure for the nomination of candidates and the regulations governing their eligibility. Most of the proposals regarding nomination were variations of or compromises between two divergent approaches: either to award the right of nomination to the consuls of the twelve major guilds or to bypass the guilds and entrust the major responsibility for nominations to the priors in office. These two systems held the promise of widely varying electoral results. To understand why this was so, it is sufficient to recall Ottokar's statistics on the share of the different guilds in the priorate between 1282 and 1292. AS we have seen, almost two thirds of the posts in that decade had been held by members of only three of the guilds. Any electoral system that contemplated giving the greater share of nominating power to the priors in office would have meant a perpetuation of this monopoly of high office by the restricted circles of lawyers, international merchants, and bankers. The incumbent priors were among those who had been selected in the special multiple-term election of December 1291 and may therefore be considered the handpicked choices of the oligarchy in a time of crisis.32 Thus, the proposals that emphasized the nominating authority of the incumbent priors were essentially attempts to preserve the status quo. On the other hand, those who proposed that the right to nominate candidates for the priorate be entrusted to the consuls of the twelve guilds were in effect attempting to enlarge the ranks of the officeholding class. To do this, it was necessary to expand the social and institutional base from which candidates for the priorate were normally recruited. In simpler adopted, is in Consulte, 2:223-26. It is also found in Isidoro Del Lungo, Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica, vol. I , pt. 2 (Florence, 1880), app. pp. xxvii-xxx; see also Del Lungo's analysis of the debate in ibid., vol. I, pt. I (Florence, 1879), pp. 118-23. 32. The priors of October-December 1292 were: Rinuccio Guidalotti, a member of an old GueIf family (Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, p. 7); the lawyer Maffeo Tedaldi, an important figure in several Florentine regimes (Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, p. 60); Geri Pagnetti, a Calimala merchant (ibid., p. 66); Ciaio Ristori, a lanaiuolo who had been associated with the Guelf government prior to 1280 and was six times a prior between 1282 and 1292 (ibid., pp. 18, 72); Lapo Buoni; and Bernardo di messer Manfredi Adimari, who was closely tied to the banking interests of the powerful Cerchi (ibid., p. 81).

34 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics terms, this meant giving a greater share of influence in the election to those guilds that had not shared significantly in the office before 1292. Because a minority of the twelve guilds had managed to control the priorate in those years, the reformers quite logically supported electoral systems that emphasized the autonomy and equality of the participating guilds; for, in any procedure in which the independently delegated consuls of the twelve guilds participated on an equal basis, the politically neglected majority of the years before 1292 would obviously prevail. This is the crucial fact to bear in mind in examining the proposals made in the November debate and the decisions arrived at for the important election three weeks later. The most radical plan for a guild-based electoral system was proposed by a member of the butchers' guild, Dino Pecora. Years later, Dino Compagni bitterly portrayed the "gran beccaio" in his role as a leader of the conspiracy of 1294-95 against Giano della Bella.33In 1292, however, Dino Pecora had not yet aligned himself against Giano, and the proposals that he offered in the council meetings of October and November of that year were firmly grounded in the guild approach to electoral politics, a position that was fully consistent with his status as a member of one of the middle guilds. On 17 October, speaking in the assembly that met to elect the replacement for the ailing prior, he proposed that the consuls of each guild ("quelibet Capitudo") be allowed to nominate candidates for the vacancy.34 The electoral plan that he formulated on 24 November was an elaboration of this same idea. He proposed that the priorate be expanded from six to twelve members, with one prior from each of the twelve major guilds. Each guild's prior was to be elected by the eleven other Such a plan was clearly favorable to the political ambitions of the middle guilds and the less prestigious of the major guilds because it would have placed each of the guilds on an equal footing in the commune's highest magistracy. And in terms of electoral mechanics, it was especially unfavorable to the elite that had dominated political life in the 1280s. This elite was, as we have seen, primarily associated with only three of the guilds. If Dino Pecora's plan had been followed, each guild's prior would have been elected without the participation of its own representatives on the electoral 33. Compagni, Cronica, pp. 40, 52. 34. Consulte, 2: 214. 35. Ibid., p. 224: "Dinus Peccora consuluit, quod Priores sint xij"" de xijcim

maioribus Artibus; et dividantur ita, quod Priores sint duo per sextum. Et xi"" Artes faciant Priores alterius Artis. Et nemo esse possit qui fuerit Prior ab uno anno citra, vel qui sit in hoc Consilio. Et hoc fiat pro duobus mensibus tantum."

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292

35

committee, with the result that the elite would have lost a full third of its voting strength in the election of priors from these three guilds. Support for the popular party was distributed throughout a greater number of guilds, so that the loss of electoral influence represented by any one guild would have been of only marginal importance. Dino Pecora's electoral proposals, like those of Lotto Ardenghi a decade earlier, were a clear and simple expression of the basic principles of Florentine guild republicanism. The fundamental assumptions of his electoral plan were that the twelve guilds should share equally in the priorate and that the responsibility for the election be divided evenly and independently among them. He did not propose the participation of the outgoing priorate or of any arroti, savi, or richiesti in the election. In his view the guilds would be completely autonomous and equal in the electoral process. This was a revolutionary way of approaching Florentine electoral politics, so revolutionary in fact that it had little chance of being approved, at least in the extreme terms advanced by Dino Pecora. But the basic idea behind it, couched in slightly more moderate form, did find further expression and support in the November debate, and, by ultimately carrying the day, laid the political foundation for the popular government of the next few years. The speaker who formulated Pecora's guild plan in terms acceptable to a majority of the assembly was none other than Dino Compagni himself. Although they later fell into opposing political camps, in November 1292 Pecora and Compagni were in basic agreement on the issue of electoral reform. Compagni had enjoyed moderate success in communal politics in the decade between 1282 and 1292,~'but he belonged neither to a powerful and prestigious family, nor to one of the three guilds that had dominated the priorate in those years. As a member of the Por Santa Maria guild of mostly small and local merchants, Compagni represented a numerically large and economically advancing segment of the community of the major guilds, which must certainly have resented its meager share in the priorate in the previous ten years. The electoral plan that he offered was, like Pecora's, based on the idea of the equal participation of the guilds. He proposed a six-man priorate, but specified that no guild could have more than 36. He appeared often in the councils, first became a prior in 1289, and in 1293 served as Standard-bearer of Justice under the new popular government. He was also a prior one final time during the last government of the White Party in 1301. On Compagni's life and career, see Del Lungo, Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica, vol. I , pt. I , pp. 19-282.

36 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

one of its members in that office at a time. The consuls of each of the twelve guilds would nominate six members of their own guild, one from each of the city's sesti, thus assuring an equal number of candidates from each guild. The resulting seventy-two candidates would then be voted on by the council of the capitudini (the guild consuls) and the savi. The individual receiving the highest number of votes in each sesto would be designated as prior.37 Compagni's plan was somewhat less radical than Dino Pecora's for several reasons. First, the final vote was based on the sesti rather than the guilds. Because the representatives of each sesto were excluded from the vote to determine the prior for their sesto, the withdrawal of support cut across guild lines and would not have damaged the interests of the top guilds more than those of the middle guilds. It simply tended to ensure greater impartiality by removing the chance of undue influence from family or neighborhood favoritisms. Second, although Compagni wished to limit the representation of any one guild in each priorate to a single member, he did not insist on long-term full equality among the twelve guilds. His plan left open the possibility of cumulative predominance by the major guilds over the course of several priorates. Finally, he did not specify that the scrutiny be conducted by the guilds alone. Rather, it was to take place within the council of 24 November, and, as we know from the statement of another speaker, that assembly contained a certain number of In Comarroti, or savi, in addition to the consuls of the twelve pagni's plan, the consuls were entrusted with great, but not unlimited, influence. The hegemony of the oligarchs of the top guilds was weakened, but complete equality among the corporations was not institutionalized. As a member of one of the underprivileged major guilds, Dino Compagni reflected, perhaps no less than Dino Pecora, the aspirations of his segment of the guild community. Pecora and Compagni were by no means the only supporters of the idea 37. Consulre, 2:223-24: "Dinus Compagni consuluit, quod in electione procedatur hoc modo: quod Priores sint sex, unus per sextum et unus pro Arte tantum; et quelibet Capitudo eligat unum per sextum et de Arte sua solum; et postea fiat scruptinium in hoc Consilio, absente ill0 sextu de quo fiet scruptinium: et qui plures voces habuerit sit Prior. Et hic modus observetur per sex menses. Et sorte dirimatur in quo sextu primo fiat scruptinium: dummodo non possit esse aliquis, qui sit in hoc Consilio, in hac electione, nec etiam aliquis qui fuerit Prior ex pissidibus extractus. Et durent per duos menses tantum." 38. Ibid., p. 225: ''Fatius de Micciole consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes huius Consilii eligant duos per sextum."

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic,

1280-1292

37

of extending electoral influence to the consuls of the twelve guilds. The poet Guido Orlandi wanted the consuls of the twelve guilds to elect three men from each sesto and then have the names drawn from bags by lot.39 The notary Arrigo Grazie suggested that the consuls, organized by sesto, elect two men from each of the city's six sections.40Chiaro di Salvi Girolami proposed that the consuls nominate nine men from each sesto for the final ~crutiny.~' Albizzo Corbinelli, a known partisan of Giano della Bells? wanted the priors to be twelve in number. He suggested that each guild's consuls nominate two persons from each sesto and that a scrutiny be held among the consuls and the members of the Consiglio Speciale (the Special C ~ u n c i l ) Tieri . ~ ~ Burbassi, the only speaker who suggested that the magnates be excluded from the election, proposed a twelve-man priorate elected by the consuls of the twelve major There were some in the November 24 meeting who suggested various forms of cooperation between the consuls and other officials in the nominating process. Manetto Tiniozzi offered a complicated plan involving three sets of nominations in which the priors and the consuls would join in electing the new S i g n ~ r i a The . ~ ~ jurist Lapo Saltarelli proposed that the priors meet with two consuls from each guild and two arroti from each sesto to elect the new p r i ~ r a t e Fazio . ~ ~ da Micciole wanted the consuls and the savi assembled on 24 November to select two persons from each sesto and put them to a vote.47Three speakers-Lotteringo da Montespertoli (a 39. Ibid., p. 223. 40.Ibid. 41. Ibid. Girolami, however, wanted to continue the system of multiple elections and imborsazione: "quod Priores fiant pro uno anno; et ponantur in pissidibus viiij" per sextum per Capitudines eligendi; et postea vadant ad scruptinium: et in omnibus observetur modus observatus in ipsis pissidibus." 42. "Cronica Fiorentina compilata nel secolo XIII," in Villari, I Primi Due Secoli della Storia di Firenze, p. 571.

43. Consulte, 2 :224. 44.Ibid., p. 225: "cons~luit,quod Priores sint xijcim,et presentialiter fiant pro sex mensibus; et eligantur per Capitudines xijcim maiorum Artium. Et nullus possit esse Prior in cuius domo sit miles vel fuerit a XXX'" annis citra." 45. Ibid., p. 224: "quod Priores cum quatuor ex Capitudinibus eligant [xijcim], duos per sextum; et postea alie quatuor eligant alios xijc", duos per sextum; et postea alie iiij "'eligant alios xij"", duos per sextum: dummodo non eligant aliquem qui fuerit Prior extractus de pissidibus, nec aliquem qui sit de hoc Consilio. Et postea fiat scruptinium." 46. Ibid., pp. 224-25. 47. Ibid., p. 225.

38 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics jurist), Mongia del Rosso, and Latino Bonaccursi-advocated varying degrees of electoral collaboration between the guild consuls and the members of the Special Council.48These compromise suggestions had in common the objective of limiting the extreme amount of guild autonomy in the electoral process which was the chief characteristic of the proposals made by the first group of speakers. This is true, not only of those who desired the direct intervention of the priors in the electoral process, but equally of those who suggested the participation of one of the legislative councils, since the members of these councils were at that time nominated by the priors t h e m ~ e l v e s . ~ ~ Finally, there were those who preferred simply to eliminate the guild consuls from the nominating procedure. Albizzo Orlandini suggested that the incumbent priors elect six men from each sesto and then hold a scrutiny in the council of the c ~ p i t u d i n iThis . ~ ~ plan, which would have limited the power of choice of the consuls to narrow options already established by the priors, was seconded by Giovanni de' Cerchi, a member of the powerful magnate far nil^.^' The jurist Aldobrando da Cerreto proposed that the whole matter of the election of the new priors be placed in the hands of the outgoing S i g n ~ r i a Ubertino .~~ Strozzi recommended that the priors, with four arroti from each sesto, elect two persons from each sesto to be voted on in the council of the c a p i t ~ d i n iNiccola .~~ Acciaiuoli wanted the Captain of 48. Ibid., pp. 224,225. Latino Bonaccursi made a startling proposal that seems to have enjoyed little favor: "Et possint esse Artifices et subpositi Artibus." The idea was revived in dramatic fashion in 1378 with the creation of the guilds of the former sottoposti. 49. On the legislative councils, see Ghrrardi's introduction to the Consulte, I :vii-xviii, and Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 90-91. Lists of members of the Special Council for 1295-96 are preserved in Tratte, 138, ff. 1-2. The same volume contains the names of the consuls of the twelve major guilds for two terms in the same years (ibid., ff. zv-4). 50. Consulte, 2 :223: "quod Priores eligant sex per sextum, et postea fiat scruptinium inter illos de presenti Consilio." 51. Ibid. However, he did agree to disqualify the thirty-six priors elected in December 1291: %on possit esse . . . qui extractus fuerit de pissidibus." 52. Ibid., p. 224: "quod Priores presentes provideant de Prioribus usque ad revocationem capituli. Et ponantur in pissidibus, et extrahantur de pissidibus solito more." 53, Ibid., p. 225. His conservative position on the issue of nominations was balanced by the suggestion that no guild should have more than one member in each priorate and that all persons who had held the office in the previous three years be disqualified for the coming election.

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic, 1280-1292

39

the People and the priors to elect a large body of men from the ranks of the twelve guilds who would then meet secretly to elect the new priors.54Another well-known member of the legal profession, Jacopo da Certaldo (Compagni later stigmatized both Niccola Acciaiuoli and Jacopo da Certaldo by including them among the four judges "who have destroyed Florence"), suggested that the new priorate be elected by the outgoing priors together with one guildsman from each sesto. His plan was noteworthy for two additional features: first, he suggested that anyone who had ever held the office of prior be ineligible for the coming election; second, he wanted a priorate of twelve members, four from the seven major guilds, four from the five middle guilds, and four from the "popullaribus." 55 It is not clear what group he wished to designate with this last term; he may have meant the members of the nine lower guilds. In any case, the extension of participation in the chief magistracy beyond even the middle guilds was certainly a radical proposal, but it should be emphasized that the election, according to his plan, would have fallen almost completely into the hands of the incumbent priors. The oligarchy could always find sympathetic allies and clients in any group or class in the city. The important factor was the method by which the magistrates were elected. The November debate on nominating procedures clearly produced a wide variety of approaches. The speakers in the assembly voicing opinions on the question of nomination fell into three almost equal groups of those who favored a guild-based electoral system (seven in number), those who wished to bypass the guilds (six), and those who stood somewhere between these contrasting approaches (six). As Ottokar has insisted, it is sometimes dangerous to suppose that the proposals and opinions of individual participants in these debates accurately reflected the policies of their families or the interests of their presumed social categorie~.~~ Yet it is surely not with54. Ibid., p. 224: "quod d. Capitaneus cum Prioribus eligant ex xij- maioribus Artibus tot homines quot sunt Capitudines et tot Sapientes per sextum: qui, quando videbitur Capitaneo et Prioribus, congregentur secrete, et faciant electionem sex Priorum, dummodo non eligant aliquem qui sit in hoc Consilio; et procedatur hoc modo, videlicet, quod qui electus fuerit reducatur in hoc Consilio vel coram Capitudinibus." 55. Ibid., p. 225: "quod aliquis qui hic est non possit esse, nec aliquis qui hactenus fuerit Prior. Et Priores sint xiic*; et quatuor sint de maioribus Artibus, scilicet de vii"", et quatuor de V' minoribus Artibus, et quatuor de popullaribus. Et eligantur per Priores cum uno artifice per sextum, electo per Priores." Compagni's condemnation of the four judges is in Cronica, p. 152. 56. See his comments on this point in I1 Comune di Firenze, p. 3on.

40 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics out significance that among those who supported a strong role for the guild consuls in electoral politics only the names of Girolami and Corbinelli stand out as representatives of even the second rank of moderately prestigious families within the aristocracy. For the most part, this list carries the definite impression of the middling ranks of the guild community-a small merchant, a minor guildsman, a notary, and so on. On the other hand, the roster of those who preferred to exclude the consuls from the nominating process contains four lawyers and three of the most illustrious names from the upper ranks of the Florentine aristocracy: Cerchi, Strozzi, and Acciaiuoli. The great oligarchic families clearly recognized that their interests were not served by electoral and constitutional reforms based on the equal and autonomous participation of the guilds. The second important issue resolved on 24 November was the matter of eligibility. Twelve of the recorded speakers addressed themselves to this problem. Seven of them agreed that the thirty-six priors elected in November 1291 should be ineligible for the forthcoming election. Two other speakers offered more radical ideas: the exclusion of anyone who had ever served as prior since the inception of the office and the exclusion of any person whose family (domus) had included a knight (miles) within the previous thirty years. This last proposal aimed at the exclusion of the families designated as magnates, something that was not achieved until some months later during the popular government. For the time being, it was decided to establish a three-year divieto, which eliminated from consideration all the priors since December 1289.~' The outcome of the deliberations and debates of 24 November 1292 constituted a major victory and breakthrough for the anti-oligarchic popular movement and its corporate approach to electoral p o l i t i ~ s At . ~ ~the end of the long debate, those who had championed the supremacy of the guilds in the electoral procedure to be adopted in December had their way. By a 57. Proposals to this effect were made by Ubertino Strozzi and Messer Boninsegna Becchenugi (Consulte, 2 :225-26). The latter was, according to the author of the Pseudo-Brunetto chronicle, a supporter of Giano della Bella ("Cronica Fiorentina," p. 571). 58. Salvemini thought differently. He believed that the outcome confirmed the hegemony of the major guilds and represented a defeat for the minor guilds, among which he included the five middle guilds; see Magnati e Popolani, pp. 164-66. However, the middle guilds certainly benefited by gaining an equal share in the nominating process. As for the nine minor guilds, since the end of 1282 no one had even raised the possibility of including them among the guilds enjoying electoral rights. See also Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 196-98.

Electoral Debates in the Early Republic,

1280-1292

41

vote of 80 to 7 (surprising indeed in view of the strong opposition during the debate), the assembly decided that the consuls of each of the twelve guilds would elect one candidate from each of the six sesti. A scrutiny was to be held, sesto by sesto, in the absence of the representatives of the sesto being considered in turn.s9 Equally important was the approval, by a vote of 68 to 18, of the suggestion that no guild be permitted to have more than one member in the new p r i ~ r a t eIn . ~all ~ essential points this was the electoral plan that had been advocated by Dino Compagni. Finally, by a vote of 58 to 18, the three-year divieto was instituted, thereby disqualifying the entire officeholding class of the years 1290 to 1292.~'There was perhaps an element of compromise in the fact that the council decided to limit the application of the newly approved method to the December election alone.62This is doubtless an indication that there was not sufficient consensus on the electoral issue to permit the formulation of a stable long-term policy for the election of the priorate. The differences between the parties were real and important enough to prevent any definitive resolution of the question. The main conclusion to be emphasized from an analysis of the debate of 24 November 1292 is that electoral systems based on the equal and autonomous participation of the guilds were already becoming identified, even at this early stage in the republic's history, with popular challenges to oligarchic rule. By and large, it was the opponents of the oligarchy who supported a guild-based electoral reform and who advanced the radical thesis of equal participation among the twelve guilds in the priorate, or at least in its election. Representatives of the temporarily discredited ruling group, on the other hand, preferred electoral procedures that gave primary influence to the incumbent priors and ensured continuity of policy and concentration of officeholding in the same families that had directed the government since the institution of the priorate in 1282. The rejection of imborsazione can be similarly interpreted. Growing dissatisfaction with the 59. Consulte, 2: 226: "quod quelibet Capitudo eligat unum per sextum; et postea fiat scruptinium de unoquoque sextu per se, in absentia illorum de sextu de cuius electione tractabitur; et qui plures voces habuerit sit Prior." 60. Ibid.: "quod ultra unum pro Arte non possit esse Prior; volentes quod possint esse duo pro Arte fuerunt xviij solum." 61. Ibid.: "quod aliquis qui fuerit Prior a tribus annis citra non possit esse Prior; illi qui voluerunt devetum esse solum pro duobus annis fuerunt xviij." 62. Ibid.: "placuit xxviiij, quod modus debeat adinveniri et firmari pro sex venturis mensibus; volentes quod duret pro duobus mensibus, scilicet pro presenti electione, fuerunt lviij ."

42

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

policies of the ruling group quite naturally blended with opposition to its restrictive use of imborsazione, and one of the noteworthy results of the debate was the abolition of this electoral technique. The 1292 debate reveals much about the political atmosphere in Florence on the eve of the promulgation of the Ordinances of Justice. The idea of the guild-based electoral system was highly controversial and was by no means assumed as inevitable. Within the oligarchy, as can be seen in the proposals of members of the Orlandini, Cerchi, da Cerreto, Strozzi, and Acciaiuoli families, there was considerable sentiment for some kind of electoral solution that would avoid altogether the participation of the guild consuls in the nominating process. Thus, the results of the debate, insofar as they established the central and equal role of the consuls of each of the twelve guilds in the election of the priorate, must be interpreted as a major setback for the ruling families that had domin.ated Florentine politics during the previous generation. The elevation of the guilds to a pivotal role in the electoral politics of the Florentine commune came about as the consciously pursued policy of a popular party in open opposition to the merchant and banking oligarchy. This guild-based electoral system was a revolutionary innovation imposed on the city's patriciate, one that it tolerated reluctantly for a while, but eventually modified, dominated, and ultimately abolished.

Two The Success and Failure of the Guilds in Electoral Politics, 1293- I303

The great debate of 24 November 1292 initiated a period of approximately five years in which the consuls of the twelve guilds were the determining voice in the election of the priorate. This half decade of guild predominance in electoral politics coincided with the brief but tumultuous popular government under the leadership of Giano della Bella, which sought to recast the constitutional framework of the republic in a corporate mold and to shift the social bases of communal government by excluding a large portion of the oligarchy from the right to elective office. Indeed, the very introduction of the guilds on an equal footing into the electoral process enabled the popular party to sustain an effective presence in the Signoria and to implement these radical policies. The lawyers, bankers, and merchants who had been firmly in control before 1292 were quick to realize that the corporate foundations of the new regime threatened to become a launching pad for continuous attacks on oligarchic privilege and power. It was, therefore, inevitable that the newly won electoral authority of the guilds should become one of the most frequently and intensely debated issues in Florentine politics. Supporters of the popular government and its guild constitution struggled to retain a prominent role for the consuls in the election of the priorate, and for several years their efforts met with considerable success. After 1296, however, the tide began to turn as crucial technical modifications in the procedure for the nomination of candidates increasingly neutralized the participation of the consuls by diminishing the autonomy of the individual guilds. Thereafter, the influence of the guilds steadily waned until they were deprived of even formal representation on the electoral committees sometime after 1303. What they lost in the years between 1296 and 1303 was not regained for over a generation. The new priors, elected according to the procedures and regulations ap-

44 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics proved on 24 November, were installed in office on 15 December.' Little more than a month later, on 18 January 1293, they promulgated the Ordinances of Justice. This famous document was at once the manifesto of the popular party and a declaration of the principles of a guild-based constitution. Its first rubric established the legal framework for the formal union of the twenty-one politically recognized corporations into their "good, pure, and faithful society and company" and elevated this federated "society and company, sacrament and universal union among all the guilds" to a position of undisputed constitutional primacy within the republic. The political role and de jure sovereignty of the corporate federation were predicated on the idea that "that is judged to be most perfect which consists of all its parts and which is approved by the consent of them all." On I . They were: Pela Gualducci, Maso di Lamberto dellYAntella,Messer Palrnieri di messer Ugo Altoviti, Monpuccio di Salvi di Chiaro Girolami, Lapo Pratese, and Gaddo di Forese Falconieri. Pela Gualducci was an important merchant of the Por Santa Maria guild who had successfully promoted Florentine commercial interests against the Pisans in Tunisia many years earlier (Nicola Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze allafine del Dugento [1926; rev. ed., Turin, 19621, pp. 54-56; Villani, Cronica, I :277). Maso di Lamberto dellYAntellawas the son of a prominent banker (Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, p. 18). Three of his brothers were enrolled as members of the Arte del Cambio from 1300 to 1302 (Cambio, 6, f. IOV; Biblioteca Riccardiana, ms. 3239, f. 151). A generation later, in 1324, his two sons were also matriculated in the guild (Cambio, 10, f. 19v). Thus it seems likely that Maso too had been a member of this guild. The lawyer Palmieri Altoviti, who later emerged as one of the conspirators against Giano della Bella (see Compagni, Cronica, p. 43), was the son of another lawyer who had been an influential participant in many councils and pratiche of the previous decade (Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 42, 124, 136-37, 146-47, 151). He was, like his father, almost certainly a member of the guild of the Giudici e Notai. Monpuccio di Salvi di Chiaro Girolami belonged to a family of woolen-cloth manufacturers (ibid., p. 67), several of whose members were prominent in communal politics at crucial moments in the history of the guild-based popular movement. His father had been one of the three original priors of June 1282 (Compagni, Cronica, p. 17). His brother Chiaro di Salvi had spoken in favor of allowing the guild consuls to select the candidates for the priorate in the debate of November 1292 (Consulte, 2 :223). Another brother, Girolamo di Salvi, was, with Dino Compagni, a member of the ill-fated priorate of October-November 1301, which was swept away in the victory of the Black Guelfs (Stefani, Cronaca, r. 224, p. 84). Lapo Pratese was a member of the butchers' guild (Dino Pecora's guild) who had spoken occasionally in the pratiche (Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 921-1, 116n, 124). And Gaddo di Forese Falconieri belonged to a prestigious family associated with the Calimala guild (ibid., pp. 78-81). Thus, the six priors did indeed represent six different guilds, one of them a middle guild.

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293 -1303 45 these grounds the Ordinances proceeded to entrust the determination of the procedures for the election of the Signoria to the twelve most prominent guilds in the federati~n.~ The Ordinances expanded the Signoria to include a seventh member, the Standard-bearer of Justice, who also became the chief officer of the regime's new thousand-man internal security force. Although he was an integral part of the Signoria and was vested with equal powers and the same constitutional responsibilities as each of the six priors, the election of the Standard-bearer of Justice was at first conducted separately from that of the priorate. According to the fourth rubric of the Ordinances, every two months the outgoing Signoria had to appoint twelve arroti, two from each sesto. The arroti and the consuls of the twelve major guilds were then asked to nominate six candidates from one of the sesti (the office rotated among the sesti) and to put them to a vote to determine which one would sit as Standard-bearer of Justice with the new prior^.^ The Ordinances did not spell out the precise modalities for nominating the candidates, a matter left to the discretion of the consuls and the arroti on each occasion. These bimonthly deliberations on nominating procedure, preserved in the Libn' Fabarurn, reveal that from mid-1294 to 1298 the guild consuls and the arroti of each sesto regularly selected one candidate from the sesto in which the Standard-bearer was due to be elected: although on at least three occasions in 1293 and early 1294 the nominations were entrusted to the outgo2. For the text of the Ordinances of Justice, see the documentary appendix to the first edition of Gaetano Salvemini's Magnati e Popolani in Firenze dal 1280 a1 1295 (Florence, 1899)~pp. 384-432; the first rubric is found on pp. 385-88. This interpretation of the constitutional basis of the Ordinances, with particular attention to its paraphrased utilization of the maxim quod omnes tangit, has been sketched in my article, "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics," American Historical Review 84 (1979): 58-59. The nine minor guilds included in the corporate federation in 1293 were those of the Vinattieri (wine retailers), Albergatori (innkeepers), Oliandoli e Pizzicagnoli (sellers of oil and cheese), Galigai (tanners), Corazzai (armorers), Chiavaiuoli (ironworkers), Correggiai (girdlemakers), Legnaiuoli (woodworkers), and Fornai (bakers). These guilds did not, however, take part in the electoral process outlined by the Ordinances. 3. Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, pp. 391-93. 4. Consulte, vol. 2, pp. 348 (February 1294), 427 (August 1294)~435 (October 1294), 449 (December 1294), 473 (August 1295)~493 (October 1295)~512 (December 1295), 528 (February 1296)~542 (April 1296)~571 (August 1297)~584 (October r297), 598 (December 1297)~631 (April 1298), 650 (June 1298).

46 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics ing Signoria i t ~ e l f The . ~ consuls, who far outnumbered the arroti, were largely in control of these nominations, although their arrangement by sesto rather than by guild tended to weaken the independent voice of each guild. This system became routine and was never seriously challenged in the preelection deliberations. No such stability was achieved, however, in the elections of the six priors during these same years. Here controversy and diversity abounded from the outset. As with the election of the Standard-bearer of Justice, the Ordinances did not specify any fixed procedure for the nomination of candidates, being limited instead to the constitutional assignment of responsibility for the periodic determination of such procedures and to a general declaration of eligibility requirements. By the terms of the third rubric, at least one day before the end of each priorate, the Captain of the People invited the consuls of the twelve major guilds, together with an unspecified number of savi appointed by the outgoing priors, to deliberate "on the method and form of the election of the future prior^."^ The.only restriction on the appointment of the savi was that they had to be guildsmen. Apart from this, the Ordinances did not limit their selection either by number o r b y any rule of equality among the guilds. Potentially at least, this gave the outgoing priorate considerable opportunity to influence the course of the procedural debate and the outcome of the election itself. As will become evident, the extent to which this potential was realized depended on the way in which the nominating committees of the consuls and the savi were actually organized. The debates on this issue thus became the fulcrum of the entire electoral process. As soon as the consuls and the savi reached agreement on the question of nomination, they proceeded to carry out the election on the basis of their resolution. This process had to be repeated every two months. On the matter of eligibility, the Ordinances made explicit a requirement that had only been implied in the outcome of the November debate, namely, that candidates for the Signoria had to be guildsmen. But this re5 . Ibid., pp. 326 (October 1293)~339 (December 1293), 403 (April 1294). 6. Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, p. 389: "Et in presentia ipsorum dominorum Priorum predictus dominus Defensor et Capitaneus coram ipsis Capitudinibus et sapientibus proponat et consilium petat quomodo et qua forma electio futurorum Priorum Artium . . . pro duobus mensibus tunc futuris fieri et celebrari debeat pro Comuni predicto. . . . Sicque quolibet anno singulis duobus mensibus predicto tempore super electione Priorum facienda, proponendo semper quo mod0 et qua forma in ipsa electione procedendum sit, de cetero observetur et fiat."

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

47

quirement was now interpreted in a new and revolutionary way with considerable impact on both communal and guild politics. The third rubric restricted nominations to "the most prudent, the best qualified, and the most law-abiding guild members of the city who are continuously engaged in the exercise of a profession or trade, and who are not knights."' This formula contained three important limitations, all cardinal points in the electoral policies of the popular government. The most obvious was the exclusion of those enjoying the military dignity of knighthood, the milites who had been so influential in communal politics before 1250. Their disqualification was not exactly equivalent to the disenfranchisement of the magnates, which occurred later in 1293, but it was an important step in that d i r e c t i ~ n The . ~ other two points had to do with guild affiliation. As already stated, candidates had to be artifices, that is to say, guild members. Although the vast majority of priors in the 1280s were also guildsmen, as Ottokar demonstrated, this was the first direct assertion by any Florentine government that only members in good standing of the twenty-one politically recognized guilds could henceforth aspire to the office of prior. But by far the most significant limitation of eligibility was contained in the phrase "continue artem exercentibus." In effect, it meant that membership in a guild was a necessary but insufficient condition of eligibility, for, in addition to the oath of obedience taken by all members to the statutes and the consuls of their guilds, it was now required that candidates be actively engaged in the profession or trade of their guild at the time of their election to the priorate. This criterion of eligibility was based less on the legal concept of formal admission to the membership of a guild than on observed and manifest participation in some economic or professional activity that fell within the range of the trades and business enterprises governed by the twenty-one guilds. Its immediate effect was to endanger the eligibility to high office of many members of aristocratic families who, although nominally guild members, had no direct personal involvement in trade, banking, or manufacture. Many such persons had only recently joined guilds when it became clear, after 1282, that affiliation with a guild might be necessary for the full exercise of political rights. But not all of them were actively or 7. Ibid., p. 390: "Illi autem, qui nominabunt seu in scripstis [sic] dabunt illos quos voluerint in Priores eligi, teneantur et debeant nominare et in scriptis dare de prudentioribus melioribus et legalioribus artificibus civitatis Florentie continue artem exercentibus . . . durnmodo non sint milites." 8. See n. I 5 below.

48

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

"continuously" engaged in the business or professional activity of their guild and, with the new "continue artem exercentibus" clause of 1293, they faced the loss of their eligibility. This was also the case for individuals who were only occasionally or intermittently involved in business as investors in short-term partnerships or companies and who would have found it difficult to demonstrate the continuous exercise of their profession or trade. The criterion of continuous exercise was one that ill suited the fastchanging and mobile investment patterns of the international merchants and bankers. It was far more appropriate to the steady and small-scale activities of local merchants, shopkeepers, and providers of skilled and professional services, most of whom were indeed continuously engaged in the exercise of their arte. There can be no doubt that the leaders of the popular government fully understood this and that the intended purpose of this novel requirement was to diminish the presence in office of the great families and factions, many of whose members could not meet such a test. The nominating committees were therefore required to specify the formal guild affiliation of each candidate they selected; more importantly, they were enjoined to nominate only those citizens who were actively and continuously involved in the exercise of the business or trade of their guild. Persons enrolled in more than one guild could enjoy the right to office only through the guild in which they "truly exercised" a profession. As established in November, no guild could have more than one of its members in each priorate. Those participating in an election were, of course, ineligible, as were the family members of the outgoing priors. The divieto for officeholders, which had been fixed at three years for the December election, was reduced to two years.g Over the next ten years, from 1293 to the end of 1303, the consuls and savi met at regular two-month intervals to determine the procedures for 9. Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, p. 390: "et debeant etiarn declarare et exprimere pro qua Arte ipsos et quemlibet eorum nominabunt et dabunt et ipsos et quelibet [sic] eorum pro ea Arte quam vere exercuerint . . . nominare et dare solummodo teneantur. . . . Et ut in electionibus ipsorum futurorum Priorum debita convenientia et condecens equalitas observetur, aliquis ex Capitudinibus duodecim maiorum Artium vel ex sapientibus ad hoc vocatis, vel aliquis qui sit de domo sive casato alicuius qui ipsius electionis tempore fuerit in Prioratus offitio, vel aliquis qui quandocumque fuisset in ipsius Prioratus offitio infra tempus duorum annorum tunc proxime preteritorum, vel aliquis qui continue Artem non exerceat . . .vel aliquis miles non possit nec debeat mod0 aliquo eligi vel esse in dicto offitio Prioratus; nec etiam possint eodem tempore eligi vel esse duo vel plures Priores de una et eadem Arte."

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

49

the election of the priorate and to nominate candidates within the terms of these eligibility requirements. The summaries of these bimonthly debates, which have survived with only one sizable gap between June 1298 and April 1301, are a precious source for understanding political trends in Florence from the beginning of the popular government to the years of civil strife between the parties of the Black and White Guelfs in the early fourteenth century. The development of electoral politics that can be traced in these debates certainly reflects, and may even help to explain, the larger political changes in Florence during that turbulent decade. For the first half of this period, from 1293 to 1298, we have the records of twenty-three meetings of the consuls of the twelve guilds and the savi on the election of the priorate. The intensity of debate in these convocations is revealed both by the level of participation.and by the variety of plans and proposals made by the speakers. The Libri Fabarum contain summaries of no fewer than 142 speeches by sixty-four individuals over these five years, for an average of more than six recorded speeches in each meeting. Many of the meetings were in fact open debates, lacking either prior consensus or the guiding hand of a leadership elite. In this respect, as will be seen, they contrast markedly with the deliberations of 1301-3. These debates focused on two specific procedural questions concerning the organization of the nominating committees. Central to both was the degree of autonomy to be given to the individual guilds in the nominating process. The first involved the arrangement of the consuls; the second pertained to the role of the savi and their relationship to the consular committees. Before examining the debates themselves, it will be useful to have an idea of what was at stake in each of these issues. There were two basic ways of convening the guild consuls on these committees: by sesto or by guild. If the consuls were arranged by guild, the result was twelve separate nominating agencies, with each guild's contingent of consuls meeting separately to prepare its own list of nominations. Because the guilds still elected their consuls without any interference from the Signoria or the Mercanzia, such a system allowed the representatives of each guild to make nominations freely and autonomously. For the most part, the supporters of the guild constitution favored this sort of arrangement. But the consuls could also be organized by sesto. This plan yielded six nominating committees instead of twelve by assigning each consul to the committee representing the sixth of the city in which he was an official resident. In effect, this broke up the consular committees of the guilds and redistributed the consuls on the basis of the city's territorial-

50 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics administrative subdivisions. Each of the six committees thus included representatives of both the major and the middle guilds, thereby diluting the autonomy and the electoral independence of each guild. In practice, this meant that the less powerful guilds were deprived of the chance to make nominations free of any influence or pressure from the greater guilds in which the oligarchic families were principally represented. The second question had to do with the function of the savi. In elections in which both the consuls and the savi were to nominate candidates, there arose the problem of whether they should face this task as members of the same committees (which could also be arranged either by guild or by sesto) or independently of each other, with the consuls serving on one set of committees and the savi on another. Once again, the root of the issue was the autonomy of the guilds in the nominating process. If the consuls and savi met on separate sets of committees, the latter were unable to influence the nominations of the guilds and the autonomy of each corporation was thereby preserved. Whatever additional candidates might have been nominated by the committees of savi, the guild consuls could at least be certain that the candidates of their choice would be nominated and advanced to the scrutiny. And since the less powerful guilds, which included at least two or three of the so-called major guilds, enjoyed an overall numerical superiority in the council of the capitudini and the savi, they would certainly be able to elect many of their candidates. If, on the other hand, the consuls and savi sat on the same committees, it became crucial to determine whether such committees were to be organized by guild or by sesto. In the former case, the influence of the savi could be neutralized through their reassignment to the consular committees of their own guilds, with each nominating agency still exclusively composed of members from only one guild. In the latter case, which tended to occur more frequently, the effect was to diminish the electoral autonomy of the guilds in general, and that of the less powerful guilds in particular, not only by destroying the integrity of each consular committee but also by allowing the participation of savi from different guilds on each sesto's committee. Thus, the partisans of the popular government and its guild-based constitution, which was grounded in the twin principles of the equality and the autonomy of the participating corporations, generally supported systems of nomination in which the separate consular committees of the twelve guilds prepared and submitted their own lists of nominees for the election, and in which the savi, whenever their participation was mandated, prepared separate lists of nominations independently of the con-

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

51

sular committees. Opponents of the guild-based system or those who sought to moderate its radical potential preferred to rely on a system in which nominations were entrusted to six joint committees of consuls and savi arranged by sesto. On the surface, both plans called for the participation of guild representatives in the electoral process, but between them lay a world of political difference in practical terms. The most obvious difference concerned the number of candidates likely to be nominated. The system of separate nominations would have produced no less than eighteen independent nominating committees, twelve from the guilds and six from the savi, whereas the plan for joint nominations would have resulted in only six. More significantly, the guild system would allow twelve independent professional categories, representing a wide range of economic and class interests, to make their own nominations to the priorate unhampered by pressure from members of the oligarchy. Giving each of the twelve guilds a large measure of autonomy in the electoral process extended access to the priorate to those small merchants and manufacturers, shopkeepers, and artisans who had been mostly excluded from the high office in the 1280s. To this extent, therefore, the electoral controversies of the 1290s reflected important social and class divisions within the commune. There was, however, another dimension to these debates that deserves attention. The implementation of equality and autonomy among the guilds in the electoral process militated against the emergence in public life of a well-defined political class or elite. The decentralizing impulses of a multipolar electoral system almost guaranteed the continuous introduction of new men into the offices of communal government. The degree of this mobility depended on political and social conditions within the guilds (a matter that will be treated in another study). At the end of the thirteenth century, the guilds were large, socially mobile, and relatively democratic in their own political and electoral institutions. Thus, a system of communal elections affording these guilds a significant and independent influence in the selection of candidates would naturally have reflected the mobility and openness of the guilds themselves by sending a stream of new and largely unknown guildsmen into the Signoria. This was not something that the narrower ruling elite of the 1280s and the great families of the oligarchy could have viewed with equanimity. From their viewpoint, the management of communal affairs required experience and continuity in the officeholding class, and this meant returning the same proven men (or at least men from the same trusted families) to office year after year. But the old families of the traditional ruling elite were not the only ones

52 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics who shared this concern. Much of the tension in the electoral debates of the mid-1290s and the lack of a solid consensus in favor of a strict guildbased system of elections are probably to be understood in terms of the reluctance of large sections of the popular party itself, once it had arrived in power, to embrace so radical and so unpredictable a system. The popular party was neither socially nor politically homogeneous; it did not represent a uniform point of view. It was instead a coalition of sociopolitical forces and, like so many coalitions of its kind, it tended to be stronger and more compact as a rising opposition movement facing entrenched adversaries than it was as a "government" party with a share of power. Inevitably, the social fissures and varied political interests within the coalition began to assert themselves after the great political victories against the oligarchs and magnates in the months from November 1292 to April 1293. This development is reflected in the failure of the popular party to institutionalize a consistent approach to the electoral issue. In broad terms, it is possible to think of the alternatives facing the popular party on the issue of electoral procedure as falling somewhere between the poles of "consolidation" and "continuous revolution." For those who favored a degree of consolidation, the guild system of elections must have been viewed as a convenient but temporary instrument serving the needs of the moment in the crucial days of the movement's rise to power. Once accomplished, however, it became imperative to bring men of experience and proven loyalties from within the movement to the leadership of both party and commune. It was necessary, in other words, to permit and to encourage the consolidation of a new political class, a new elite, upon which the long-range success of the regime would ultimately depend. Understandably, these views were not shared by all the member groups of the coalition. The less powerful guilds had the most to lose in any attempt to shift electoral procedure away from the principles of equality and autonomy among the participating guilds, back to a system designed to favor men of experience and ability. Their safeguard lay in the preservation and elaboration of the constitutional principles enunciated in November 1292. Only the "continuous revolution" of new men (literally, the continuous turnover of the officeholding class) could prevent the reemergence of political elitism and ultimately a return to the oligarchic domination of the 1280s. From this perspective, the controversies and debates of these years over the apparently technical question of how to organize the nominating committees for the election of the priorate assume much broader constitutional and political

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

53

significance. To a great extent, the political fate of the popular movement was both reflected in and determined by the outcome of these debates. The first debate following the promulgation of the Ordinances took place on 14 February 1293. Of the eight speakers who offered proposals for the upcoming election, four suggested that the nominations be entrusted to the consuls of the twelve guilds: either by themselves (as recommended by a member of the furriers' guild and by the notary Nino de' Cantori, who also stressed the principle of equality among the guilds by advocating that each guild be allowed to nominate one candidate in each sesto), or with the participation of the savi reassigned to the consular committees (as suggested by Pacino Peruzzi), or, with all organized according to sesto, in collaboration with the Captain of the People, the priors, and the savi (proposed by Ruggiero degli Albizzi).lo The other four put forward plans according to which the priors, together with either the Captain of the People or the savi, would be allowed to make the nominations without the participation of the consuls. Even within this group, however, there was a suggestion that reflected the pressures from the guild community. The jurist Lapo Saltarelli advised that the election be conducted either by the Captain and the priors directly or by two consuls selected by them from each sesto to carry out the nominations, making sure, however, that each guild had one consul among the twelve." In the end, however, despite the heavy representation of the partisans of the guild system, this debate was resolved in favor of allowing the priors and the Captain to nominate three or four candidates in each sesto.I2This was the recommendation of Rosso 10. Consulte, 2 :294: "Migliaccius pelliparius consuluit, quod solito mod0 norninatio fiat per Capitudines; et postea scruptinium fiat ut dictum est." "Ser Ninus de Cantoribus consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudinum nominet unum pro sextu. . . ." "Pacinus Peruzzi consuluit illud idem: hoc addito, quod Sapientes electi sint cum Consulibus suarum Artium." "Rogerius Hugonis Albiczi consuluit, quod Capitaneus, Priores et Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant tres per sextum, et postea fiat scruptinium inter Priores et alios omnes de presenti Consilio, exceptis illis qui essent de sextu in quo fiet scruptinium." I I. Ibid. : "D. Lapus Saltarelli consuluit, quod Capitaneus et Priores faciant electionem Priorum, vel quod Capitaneus et Priores eligant duos per sextum ex Capitudinibus; ita quod de qualibet Capitudine sit unus. Et unus ex Sapientibus per sextum eligant tres vel quatuor, quibus dentur voces; et posteac fiat scruptinium ut dictum est." 12. Ibid.: "Rossus Strocze consuluit, quod Capitaneus et Priores presentes eligant tres vel quatuor per sextum, et postea fiat scruptinium; et qui plures voces

54 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics dello Strozza.13It was also supported by Dino Pecora, who only added that six candidates should be selected in each sesto.14 At first glance, it seems odd that Pecora, who had previously supported electoral systems based on the guilds and would continue to do so later, should now favor a plan that bypassed the guilds and entrusted the nominations to the outgoing Signoria. But the political situation had changed drastically since November 1292, and the priorate was now occupied by men elected according to the guild system who were presumably sympathetic to the aims of the popular party and the guilds. They had, after all, issued the Ordinances of Justice just a month earlier. In these circumstances, it was not necessarily inconsistent for adherents of the guild movement, such as Dino Pecora, to look to the incumbent Signoria for an assurance of continuity in the election of the next priorate. This was indeed the result. The new priorate, in office from 15 February to 15 April, included Giana della Bella himself. During his term, the Ordinances were not only maintained but notably reinforced with the five additional rubrics of 10 and I I April, the last of which excluded the magnates (whose ranks were now increased from 38 to 72 families) from the Council of the Hundred, the Council of the People, and, most importantly, from the guild consulates." In fact, Pecora's support for the idea of entrusting the nominations to the incumbent Signoria suggests that there may have been some prearranged plan among the leaders of the popular party for the election of Giano and his colleagues. In this case at least, the lack of fixed electoral procedures seems to have served the purposes of the new regime rather well. In April the contrasting positions were again clearly drawn, but this habuerit sit Prior in ill0 sextu: salvo quod Capitudines et Sapientes illius sextus in quo fiet scruptinium non sint presentes." 13.Many years later, Dino Compagni singled out Rosso dello Strozza as the most reprehensible of those who betrayed the city into the hands of the Black Guelfs in 1301 (Cronica, p. 100). 14. Consulte, 2:294: "Dinus Peccora consuluit, quod Capitaneus et Priores norninent usque sex per sextum, et posteac fiat scruptinium ut dictum est." 15.Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, pp. 198-203.The five new rubrics are those numbered XXX to XXXIV in Salvemini's edition; ibid., pp. 416-20. For their approval by the legislative councils, see PRY3, f. 131.The exclusion of the magnates from the priorate itself came about later in 1293when it was decreed that no one ineligible for the guild consulates and the councils could be elected to the Signoria; see SaIvemini, Magnati e Popolani, pp. 206-7 and 424 (rubric 50 of the Ordinances).

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

55

time the parameters of the debate shifted toward the basic assumption of any guild system of elections, namely, that the consuls, however they were organized, should participate in one way or another in the nominating process. All nine speakers shared this view, and their disagreement turned on the question of how the consuls were to be arranged and in what relationship to the savi. One group, which included Borgo Rinaldi, Lapo Saltarelli, and Pela Gualducci (who had been a member of the priorate from 15 December to 15February), favored the system'of joint nominations by the consuls and savi of each sesto. The council ultimately adopted Gualducci's conservative version of this plan, which called for each of the six committees to nominate six candidates in its own sesto alone.16 Thus, the total number of candidates presented to the final scrutiny in April amounted to only thirty-six. Although defeated, the proponents of complete guild autonomy were well represented in the April debate. Pacino Peruzzi, who was a faithful ally of the popular party in 1293despite his prominent family and banking connections, made one of the most radical proposals in the long history of Florentine electoral debates. He suggested that each guild assemble its full membership to nominate three candidates in each sesto of the city." With each guild responsible for eighteen nominations, Peruzzi's plan would, in theory at least, have produced a total of 216candidates for the scrutiny, six times more than were actually nominated according to Gualducci's successful proposal. Why someone of Peruzzi's stature and origins should have favored such an explosively democratic interpretation of corporate autonomy in the electoral process is a mystery; nonetheless, his extraordinary plan strikingly demonstrates the potential inherent in the guild system. It was seconded by Dino Pecora, who returned to his usually staunch support of corporate principles in electoral matters, and by Chiaro di Salvi Gir~lami,'~ whose brother Monpuccio had served on the priorate that issued the Ordinances. On this occasion, supporters of the 16. Consulte, 2:299: "Burghus Renaldi consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant duos per quemlibet sextum, et postea fiat scruptinium de illis duobus in quinque sextibus; et qui plures voces habuerit sit Prior." "Pela Gualduccii consuluit, quod sex per sextum eligantur per illos de suo sextu." Saltarelli seconded Gualducci's proposal. 17. Ibid.: "Pacinus Peruczi consuluit, quod omnes artifices unius Artis sint simul et eligant tres per sextum in quolibet sextu; et postea qui plures voces habuerit sit Prior, in scruptinio faciendo ut dictum est." 18. Ibid.

56 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics popular party were ranged on both sides of an electoral debate that marked the emergence of contrasting conservative and radical alternatives within the movement. For the moment, the former held sway. By June, however, the less powerful guilds began to demand a greater share of the nominations than had evidently come to them under the system adopted in April. This is indicated in the proposal made by an aristocratic ally of the popular movement, Bandino Falconieri, who, although in favor of the joint organization of the nominating committees by sesto, advised that one out of every six nominees be "from the minor guilds."lg Perhaps in response to such pressures, the June debate was carried by the more radical wing of the guild movement, again represented by Dino Pecora and Pacino Peruzzi. Pecora proposed separate sets of nominations by the consuls and the savi, while Peruzzi spoke in favor of the reassignment of the savi to the consular committees of their guilds.20According to Peruzzi's plan, each guild committee, together with the savi of the same guild, was to select one candidate from each sesto. Thus, while the autonomy of each guild was guaranteed, the total number of nominees was held to the manageable figure of seventy-two. This may have contributed to the willingness of the council to embrace Peruzzi's proposal, despite the recommendations of five other speakers for the organization of the committees by sesto rather than by guild.21In the debate of August 1293 three of four recorded participants favored the idea of independent nominations from each of the twelve guilds. Dino Pecora appears again, this time in support of Peruzzi's plan of the preceding June for the reassignment of the savi to their own He was seconded by Girolamo di Salvi Girolami, 19. Ibid., p. 307: "Bandinus de Falchoneriis consuluit, quod quilibet Prior cum Capitudinibus et Sapientibus sui sextus eligant sex artifices, inter quos sit unus de minoribus Artibus." It is not clear, however, whether he intended to refer to the nine minor guilds (beyond the twelve guilds) or to the fourteen minor guilds (including the five middle guilds). 20. Ibid. Dino Pecora: "quod quilibet Capitudo norninet unum per sextum, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant unum per sextum." Pacino Peruzzi: "quod Sapientes se conveniant cum Consulibus sue Artis, et eligant unum per sextum." 21. In addition to Bandino Falconieri, they were: Neri Rustichi, the notary Nino de' Cantori, another notary called Ser Tancredi, and Migliaccio di Salvi ds' Girolami. 22. Ibid., pp. 316-17: "Dinus Pecora consuluit, quod Sapientes conveniant cum Capitudinibus sue Artis et eligant sex bonos viros, et postea vadant ad scruptinium." The jurist Giovanni Rustichelli went so far as to recommend the exclu-

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

57

yet another of the Girolami brothers who figured so prominently in the popular movement. In the end, however, it was the organization of the committees by sesto that prevailed on the suggestion of Noffo G ~ i d iFol.~~ lowing Guidi's plan, the consuls and the savi of each sesto nominated six candidates in each sesto. Although on this occasion the guilds lost the autonomy they had gained in June, Guidi did specify that a certain number of nominees and one of the eventual priors had to come from the minor guilds.'4 The debate of October 1293 is a striking example of both the vitality and the confusion of the popular party at the height of its influence. Thirteen speakers (the contribution of the fourteenth, Pela Gualducci, went unrecorded) offered a total of seven electoral plans, all securely based on the idea of guild participation in the nominating process. Despite their agreement on this fundamental point, however, the proposals ran the gamut of possible systems of organization. Dino Compagni contributed the original idea of having the consuls of each guild nominate one candidate in each sesto, while the savi of each guild (rather than of each sesto) also nominated one in each sesto, for a total of 144 nomination^.^^ Dino Pecora, on the other hand, opted for separate nominations by the consuls of each guild and the savi of each ~ e s t oPacino . ~ ~ Peruzzi retreated from the more radical ideas he had espoused earlier in the year by proposing joint nominations by the consuls and savi of each ~esto.~' His plan was seconded by Migliore Guadagni, Palmieri Altoviti, and the jurist Aldobrando da Cerreto, except sion of the savi: "quod Capitudines cuiuslibet Artis eligant sex Priores, pro quolibet sextu unum, et postea vadant ad scruptinium" (ibid., p. 316). 23. Although he was an influential figure in the guild movement, Guidi later joined the ranks of the victorious Black Guelfs in November 1301, earning the contempt of his former ally, Dino Compagni; see the Cronica, pp. 109- 10. 24. Consulte, 2: 316: "Noffus Guidi consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant sex homines in quolibet sextu, et sit ad minus unus ex minoribus Artibus. Et si contingerit quod in quinque sextibus non esset aliquis ex minoribus Artibus, quod in alio sextu esse debeat de minoribus Artibus et non de maioribus." 25. Ibid., p. 325: "Dinus Compangni consuluit, quod quilibet Capitudo eligat unum per sextum, et Sapientes de qualibet Arte dent unum per sextum." 26. Ibid.: "Dinus Pecora consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo det unum per sextum, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus unum alium per sextum." 27. Ibid.: "Pacinus Peruczi consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant tres per sextum."

58 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

that the latter wanted each committee to select six candidates in every sesto. The electoral system that emerged from this long debate resulted from a combination of the proposals put forward by Girolamo di Salvi Girolami, who wanted the consuls and savi of each guild to nominate one candidate in each sesto, and Noffo Guidi, who seconded Girolami's proposal and added a detail of extraordinary importance, namely, that each guild's committee be allowed to make nominations only from the membership of its own It was no doubt this extreme interpretation of the principles of full autonomy and equality among the guilds, so reminiscent of Lotto Ardenghi's proposal of 1282, which, by assuring the presentation of an equal number of candidates from each guild in the final scrutiny, produced a priorate for October-December 1293 composed entirely of men from families previously unrepresented in the executive Girolami's plan was seconded by ~io'vanniRustichelli and Lando degli Albizzi, whereas its combination with Guidi's recommendation of full equality among the guilds received the support of Girolami's brother Chiaro di Salvi and, ultimately, of the full council. In December the claims of the guilds were again advanced by Giovanni Rustichelli, who wanted each guild's consuls, together "with the men of their guild," to pick one candidate in each sesto, and by Dino Pecora, who proposed separate nominations by the consuls of each guild and the savi of each sesto. Pecora added, however, that the outgoing Signoria should have the power of review and veto over these nominations and that they should be allowed to replace unacceptable candidates with others of their own choice.30This suggests that once again the popular party may have had particular confidence in the incumbent Signoria, which would help to explain why on this occasion, on the advice of Dante Rinaldi, the council 28. Ibid.: "Girolamus Salvi consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo cum Sapientibus sue Artis eligant unum per sextum; et postea fiat scruptinium more solito." "Noffus Guidi consuluit secundum dictum dicti Girolami: hoc addito quod quelibet Capitudo det in scriptis solummodo de illis de Arte sua; et postea fiat scruptinium modo solito." 29. Priorista Mariani 11, in Manoscritti, 249, ff. 248-51. 30. Consulte, 2 :338: "Dominus Iohannes Rustichelli iudex consuluit, quod Capitudines, cum hominibus sue Artis, eligant unum per sextum. . . ." "Dinus Pecora consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo det unum per sextum in scriptis, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus dent unum per sextum, et postea fiat scruptinium more solito. Hoc addito, quod si aliquis daretur in scriptis qui non videretur Prioribus et Vexilifero esse sufficiens, possint ipsi Priores et Vexilifer removere, et alium sufficientem poni facere."

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

59

decided to entrust the nominations to that body.3' The rather exceptional resolution of the December debate did not necessarily mark 'a loss of ground by the guild forces, for in February 1294 the same Dante Rinaldi returned to support both the idea of an equal number of nominations from each guild and the organization of the nominating committees by Although six other speakers (including Rinaldi's brother Borgo, Pela Gualducci, Noffo Guidi, and Dino Compagni) favored the organization of the committees by sesto, the council approved the plan of Manetto Tiniozzi, which called for the consuls of each guild to nominate one candidate in each sesto, while the savi, organized independently by sesto, nominated three persons in each ~ e s t oThis . ~ ~ was something of a compromise in that it preserved the autonomy of the guild committees while holding their share of the nominations to less than half of the total (72 of 180). In April and June, however, the consuls and savi were combined according to s e ~ t o and , ~ ~ only one speaker in each debate declared himself in favor of independent guild nomination^.^^ The pendulum swung back in the direction of guild autonomy in August. Four of seven speakers favored some measure of consular independence. Dante Rinaldi proposed that the savi be reassigned to their guilds and that each guild committee select three candidates in each sesto. He added that any savi who were not members of one of the twelve guilds should be permitted to join the consular committees of their choice.36Pela Gualducci made an interesting suggestion that again illustrates the kinds of pressures emanating from the five middle guilds at this time and the desire 31. Ibid.: "Dante Rinaldi consuluit, quod electio futurorum Priorum fieri debeat, hoc modo: quod Priores et Vexilifer presentes eligant duos vel quatuor per sextum, quibus per omnes in dicto Consilio existentes dentur voces." 32. Ibid., p. 348: "quod Capitudines cum Sapientibus sue Artis nominent duos per sextum de suis Artibus." 33. Ibid., p. 347: "quod quelibet Capitudo xijcimmaiorum Artium det in scriptis unum per sextum, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus dent tres per sextum in scriptis." 34. Ibid., p. 403: "Borghus Rinaldi consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant sex per sextum; dummodo illi de uno sextu faciant illos sex de alio sextu: et sit in provisione dominorum Priorum et Vexiliferi, qui sextus debeat eligere illos sex de alio sextu"; ibid., p. 413: "Girolamus Salvi consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus eligant duos per sextum." 35. In April, the notary Ser Torna de Remolo; the name of the proguild spokesman in the June debate is incompletely recorded. 36. Ibid., p. 426: "quod Capitudines cum Sapientibus sue Artis, debeant eligere tres per sextum. . . . Et si aliquis ex Sapientibus non esset de dictis Artibus, vadat ad illam Capitudinem quam voluerit."

60 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics on the part of the popular movement's conservative wing to accommodate such pressures without embracing the principle of full equality and autonomy among the guilds. He recommended that the consuls of the seven major guilds select twelve candidates in each sesto from which the consuls of the "five minor guilds," together with the savi, would pick six (in each sesto) for the final scr~tiny.'~ Gualducciys plan would not have given the middle guilds a chance to put forward candidates of their own, but it would have allowed them a limited veto over the candidates advanced by the consuls of the seven major guilds. The council decided, however, to adopt the proposal of Noffo Guidi, who called for independent nominations by separate sets of committees of consuls and savi (two nominations by each committee in each sesto, for a total of 216, 144 from the consuls and 72 from the ~ a v i ) . The ~ * same arrangement was implemented in October at the suggestion of Dino Compagni, except that each committee was asked to nominate three candidates in each sesto (for a total of 324 nominat i o n ~ )In . ~ this ~ debate, Dino Pecora again advocated the reassignment of the savi to the consular committees. This plan gained the approval of the council two months later on the recommendation of Dante Rinaldi, who called for each of the twelve committees of consuls and savi to select four candidates in each sesto (for a total of 288 nomination^).^^ 37. Ibid.: "quod Capitudines vijcmmaiorum Artium eligant duodecim pro quolibet sextu, et postea Capitudines quinque minorum Artium et Sapientes eligant sex ex dictis nominatis per sextum." 38. Ibid.: "quod quelibet Capitudo det in scriptis duos per sextum, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus per se dent duos per sextum." 39. Ibid., p. 434: "Dinus Compangni consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo dent in scriptis tres per sextum, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus dent alios tres pro quolibet sextu; et quod in scriptis dandis non fiat remissio aliquorum Sapienturn, nisi de necessitate fieri opporteret." The significance of the last part of Compagni's speech is not altogether clear. He may have been suggesting a prohibition against the nomination of any of the savi who participated in the election, although this was already covered by the Ordinances of Justice. 40. Ibid., p. 449: "quod Capitudines cuiuslibet Artis cum Sapientibus sue Artis eligant quatuor bonos viros de quolibet sextu; et postea fiat scruptinium de eis more solito, dummodo in scruptinio alicuius sextus non possint esse minus sex ad scruptinium." Rinaldi's proposal was seconded by a member of the shoemakers' guild, one Ciuto di Ser Manetto, with the proviso: "salvo quod sint sex per sextum; et quod omnes qui cassabuntur, loco eorum alii reponantur." The last part of this speech seems to refer to a feature of the electoral process of which there are only obscure and occasional hints in the debates. Apparently, the full committee of consuls and savi or perhaps the outgoing Signoria (as recommended by Dino Pecora in December 1293) had the power to eliminate certain candidates even be-

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

61

The affirmation of a more consistently guild-based approach to electoral politics in three consecutive debates between August and December I294 coincided with one of the most revolutionary initiatives of the popular government. The legislative councils gave the Signoria of October-December unprecedented authority for a sweeping revision and recodification of the communal statutes. To carry out the work of reviewing the existing compilations and reducing them to a single coherent body of law, the Signoria ' them appointed an extraordinary commission of fourteen ~ r b i t r i , ~among Giano della Bella, Dino Compagni, and several prominent figures such as Noffo Guidi and the lawyers Palmieri Altoviti and Baldo d'Aguglione (the "villan d'AguglionY' of Dantesque infamy). Guidi, Altoviti, and d'Aguglione had supported the popular government in its early stages, but they now opposed Giano's increasingly dictatorial tendencies. It was, in fact, from this group within the reform committee that Dino Compagni traced the origins of the conspiracy against Giano, which led to his condemnation and exile early in 1 2 9 5 . ~The ~ eminent lawyers and jurists who served on the committee may have felt that the program of legal reform represented an unwarranted political infringement on their professional prerogatives. It may also be that the split within the committee reflected the culminating divergence between the conservative and radical wings of the popular movement, although the position of Noffo Guidi in this split is admittedly ambiguous in view of his support for guild autonomy in the August debate. However this may be, it is worth emphasizing that this radical initiative on the part of the popular regime was undertaken during a period in which the electoral process had come firmly within the control of the And the crisis sparked by the opposition to this initiative tempofore the final vote was taken on each nominee. The shoemaker's proposal was, in effect, that those excluded be replaced by other candidates in order to prevent an excessively narrow field of candidates at the final scrutiny. 41. Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, pp. 218-20; Ottokar, I1 Comune di Firenze, pp. 210-11; P R , 4, ff. 129-30. The text of the provision, with the names of the fourteen arbitri, appears in Isidoro Del Lungo, Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica, vol. I , pt. 2 (Florence, 1880), app. pp. xxxix-xli. 42. Compagni, Cronica, pp. 40-43; Dante's bristling reference to Baldo d'Aguglione is in Paradiso, XVI, 56. 43. Three of the seven members of the Signoria of both October-December 1294 and December 1294-February 1295 came from politically new families (Priorista Mariani 11,in Manoscritti, 249, ff. 262-67). The mood of these months is also revealed by the law approved on 7 December 1294, which prohibited the election of any person to the post of Standard-bearer of Justice in the two years following his tenure on the priorate (PR, 4, f. 119).

62 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics rarily weakened the popular party and resulted in a loss of electoral control by the guilds for the next half year. No direct evidence has survived concerning the elections of February and April 1295 that surrounded the ouster of Giano della Bella in March. The fourteenth-century chronicler Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, referring to the February election, wrote that the powerful magnate Corso Donati, later a leader of the Black Guelfs, worked behind the scenes with other magnates to secure the election to the Signoria of a group of their followers and partisans. According to Stefani, the election was conducted by means of "segreti modi," indicating no doubt that the normal procedures were either set aside or bypassed. It was this priorate that submitted a denunciation against Giano to the Captain of the People.44Nothing at all is known of the April election, and the record of the June debate in the Libri Fabarum is so badly damaged that most of the proposals and the decision of the council cannot be deciphered. Although at least seven of the nine speakers recommended some form of consular participation in the nomination~,4~ Stefani reports that the rebellious magnates still had the upper hand in the aftermath of Giano's eviction from the ranks of the popular party's leadership: The magnates, who were dominating the political arena to a degree that was unacceptable to the popolani minori, had, through their deceitful intrigues (astuzia), managed on every occasion to put in office priors of their choice and men who favored the magnate faction; thus it happened that the priorate from mid-June to mid-August 1295that of Vanni Ugolini and his associates-seemed to provide the magnates with the ideal occasion for an armed revolt aimed at the abolition of the Ordinances of J ~ s t i c e . ~ ~ An attempt at armed insurrection did indeed take place on 5 July, but it was a failure and resulted in a revision of the Ordinances on the next day, which strengthened the hand of the guilds in the determination of eligi44. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 204, p. 73: "Messer Corso con gli altri tennono segreti modi della elezione de' Priori d'averla a loro modo e di uomini li quali volessero quello che eglino; e cosi ebbono. Ed a1 nuovo Priorato fu data una notificazione a1 Capitano del Popolo che Giano della Bella avea perturbato il pacific0 stato . . . e cosi ebbe bando a' di 5 di marzo 1294." Stefani gives the date, of course, according to the Florentine style. 45. Consulte, 2 :467. 46. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 208, p. 74.

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

63

bility for the pri~rate.~' The popular government weathered the storm and remained, as Villani observed, "in suo stato e ~ignoria."~'But the significance of the events of early 1295, and the main point to be emphasized here, is that the fall of Giano della Bella and the brief crisis of the regime were closely related to the temporary disintegration of the electoral procedures that had elevated the guilds to a prominent role in the selection of the commune's highest magistrates. Such a connection is implied in the absence of the regular bimonthly debates for February and April from the pages of the Libri Fabarurn and is quite directly stated in Stefani's account of the origins of the July revolt. The first half of 1295 witnessed the reemergence of electoral practices based more on the power of patrons and the support of their clients than on the institutionalized interests of social and corporate constituencies. 47. The changes made in the text of the Ordinances were approved by the councils on 6 July (PR, 5, f. 114; Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, pp. 230-32). The interpretation of these modifications, which focused on the problem of eligibility to high office and the function of the guild matricula in its definition, was the object of one of Gaetano Salvemini's earliest articles, "Gli Ordini della Giustizia de16 luglio 1295," ASI, 5th ser. 10 (1892): 241-61. Salvemini believed that they were designed to qualify the scioperati (i.e., those persons not actively involved in the exercise of a profession or business) for nomination to the Signoria by allowing them to be included in the matricule of the guilds and by making such inclusion a sufficient condition for the full enjoyment of political rights. Some decades later, Ottokar reviewed the evidence and rejected Salvemini's contention that inactive, "fictitious" guildsmen were admitted in this way either to the guild rolls or to the lists of eligible candidates for the Signoria; for Ottokar's largely convincing interpretation, see his article, "A Proposito della presunta riforma costituzionale adottata i16 luglio dell'anno 1295 a Firenze," ASI, 7th ser. 91 (1933): 173-79; reprinted in Nicola Ottokar, Srudi Comunali e Fiorentini (Florence, 1948), pp. 125-32. My own view of the matter, although in general agreement with Ottokar's conclusion that the reform did not benefit the scioperati, differs somewhat from his conception of the relationship of the scioperati to the guilds. This problem, which is more germane to the internal history of the guilds than to the electoral politics of this early period, will be treated in my forthcoming study on the Florentine guilds; for the moment, see my discussion in "The Guilds in Florentine Politics, 1292-1394" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972, I :97- 130). The immediate impact of the 1295 reform on the issue of eligibility was that it made inclusion in the matricula of a guild a necessary condition for the enjoyment of political rights, thereby strengthening the authority of the individual guilds in the extension or denial of such rights. 48. Villani, Cronica, 2: 19. Villani even observed that "per questo romore e novitadi si mutb nuovo stato di pop010 in Firenze."

64 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics In the short run, however, the guilds were equal to the challenge. The rebellion of the magnates seems to have drawn the components of the popular coalition back into a defense of electoral procedures securely anchored to the notion of guild autonomy. In the debate of August 1295, six of eight recorded speakers offered proposals featuring an independent role for the consuls of each of the twelve guilds in the nominating process. Three of these even wished to exclude the savi from any share in the nominations. Bandino Falconieri wanted each consulate to select three candidates in each sesto. Chiaro di Salvi Girolami seconded his proposal with two modifications: first, that four, instead of three, candidates be selected in each sesto; and second, that a committee of twelve consuls, one from each guild, be empowered to eliminate candidates deemed unacceptable ("insuficientes").49 This suggestion would, in effect, have given the less powerful guilds a veto over the nominations of oligarchic elements in the top few guilds. Three speakers declared themselves in favor of nominations by separate sets of committees of consuls and savi, and the council accepted the version of this plan put forward by Dino Pecora, who called for the consular committees to make two nominations in each sesto while each contingent of savi made only Thus, the guilds were responsible for a total of 144 nominations and the savi for 36. In the next three elections, of October and December 1295 and February 1296, the system of independent nominations from separate committees of consuls and savi was maintained. In a surprising show of unity, the council adopted this plan in October without even considering the usual variants and alternatives. At the suggestion of Bandino Falconieri, three candidates were selected in each sesto by the twelve consulates and the six committees of savi (for a total of 324: 216 from the guilds and 108 from the s a ~ i ) . In ~ ' December, at least three speakers, including Dino Pecora, up49. Consulte, 2 :473: "Bandinus de Falchoneriis consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo nominet tres in quolibet sextu. . . . Chiarus Salvi del Chiaro consuluit secundum dictum Bandini, salvo quod sint quatuor per sextum, dummodo minus quatuor non vadant ad scruptinium; et quod postea habeantur unus pro Capitudine qui iurent extraere illos qui essent insuficientes." The third speaker favoring the exclusion of the savi from the nominations was Neri Guidinghi: "quod Capitudines omnes simul eligant quatuor pro sextu." 50. Ibid.: "Dinus Pecora consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo nominet duos in quolibet sextu, et Aiunti cuiuslibet sextus eligant unum in quolibet sextu." The two speakers who agreed with Pecora on the organization of the committees were Vanni Angelotti and Albizzo Orlandini. 51. Ibid., p. 493.

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

65

held the notion of guild autonomy, which the council accepted at the suggestion of Lando degli A l b i ~ z iAnd . ~ ~ in February Dino Pecora advised the adoption of the same plan that had been implemented in the previous Oct ~ b e r Thus, . ~ ~ four consecutive priorates from August 1295 to February 1296 were elected according to procedures that respected the fundamental principles of the corporate system. However, the election of February 1296 was something of a watershed, for it seems to have been the last occasion on which the nominating committees of the consuls were organized according to guild. In April only one of five speakers proposed that the consuls of each guild be allowed to make independent nominations (again a Girolami, this time Migliaccio di Salvi), and even he wanted two other sets of nominations from the savi and from the S i g n ~ r i a The . ~ ~ plan that was accepted did not exclude the consuls from the process, but it organized them by sesto rather than by The procedural debates on electoral policy for June, August, and October 1296 have not survived, but in December the consuls and savi were again arranged by sesto,s6 and in all the debates and elections for which evidence has survived, from the end of 1296 to 1303, the organization of the nominating committees by sesto prevailed without exception. Thus, the practice of organizing at least some of the electors of the Florentine priorate ac52. Ibid., p. 511. Because of the poor condition of the folio page on which it is found, the outcome of the December debate is only partially known. Lando degli Albizzi's plan reads: "quod Capitudines [text missing] sextu, et Sapientes faciant illud idem." Thus, although it is clear that the consuls made nominations separately from the savi, it remains uncertain whether they were organized by guild or by sesto. The gap in the text also prevents us from knowing the number of candidates nominated by each set of committees. Altogether, eleven speeches were made in the December debate, but many were either incompletely recorded or have been corroded by the damage sustained by this volume. Of those that were successfully deciphered by Gherardi, one is particularly noteworthy: "Dante Alagherii consuluit, quod Capitudines et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus dent [text missing] in scriptis in quolibet sextu; et postea fiat scruptinium inter omnes de presenti Consilio." 53. Ibid., pp. 527-28. Pecora's plan was seconded by Migliore Guadagni, who had also supported independent nominations by the guilds in the previous December. 54. Ibid., p. 542: "Miglaccius Ser Salvi consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo nominet duos pro quolibet sextu, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus nominent totidem, et Priores et Vexillifer nominent totidem." 55. Ibid.: "Ser Arrighus Gratie notarius consuluit, quod Capitudines cuiuslibet sextus nominent quatuor in quolibet sextu, et Sapientes cuiuslibet sextus nominent totidem." 56. See n. 59 below.

66 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics cording to their guild-a procedure that, by permitting independent nominations from each guild, had favored the less powerful guilds and nourished the priorates of the popular regime with considerable numbers of politically new men5'-enjoyed an intermittent lifespan of something less than four years, from the end of 1292 to perhaps the middle of 1296. By this time, therefore, one of the two chief procedural issues of the electoral politics of the 1290s was resolved in the direction of consolidation and restriction, and although the consuls continued to play a role in nominating candidates for the Signoria down to 1303, they were never again allowed to do so on the basis of full autonomy for each guild. No actual list of nominees has survived from this early period, and it is consequently not possible to measure statistically the restrictive tendencies that seem to be indicated in these developments. Fortunately, however, a bit of indirect evidence concerning the election of June 1297 serves to confirm this impression as convincingly perhaps as any statistics or lists. On this occasion, the nominating committees of consuls and savi, arranged separately by sesto, each nominated three candidates from each of the city's six divisions. Thus, twelve distinct nominating bodies (six groups of consuls and six groups of savi) each made eighteen nominations, for an overall total of 216. At the end of the provision describing the procedure to be followed, however, it was added that in the event that the total number of individuals nominated in any sesto should come to less than six, the committees would be authorized to supplement the lists of candidates with additional names until each sesto had at least six candidates in the final scrutiny.58In other words, it was feared that the total of thirty-six nominations made in each sesto might not be sufficient to ensure the nomination of at least six different individuals. Evidently, the nominating committees were selecting the same persons, and some individuals must have been included on half or more than half of the lists. The nominal figure of 216 nominations is thus highly misleading and obscures the fact that, by 1297 at least, access to the priorate was being restricted to a much narrower circle of candi57. The numbers of new families reaching the Signoria in these years are as follows: 1293, 16; 1294, 14; 1295, 10;1296, 19; see Priorista Mariani 11,in Manoscrirti, 249, ff. 244-93. 58. PRY 8, f. 79: "Et si contingerit quod in aliquo predictorum sextuum numerus predictorum ut dictum est nominandorum et inscriptis dandorum sic deficeret quod illi in tali sextu nominati non essent et remanerent ad minus sex numero, tunc in ips0 tali sextu numerus suppleatur ita quod nominandi et inscriptis dandi ut dictum est sint et remaneant sex vel plures in quolibet sextu."

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

67

dates. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this was in part the result of the now solidly established practice of organizing the nominating committees by sesto. The less powerful guilds, and particularly the five middle guilds, were no longer able to make a free and unhampered choice of candidates. From 1296 to 1298, the focal point of debate shifted to the second issue: whether the consuls, arranged by sesto, and the savi, similarly organized, would make separate or combined sets of nominations. In December 1296, the combined plan was adopted.s9 In February, June, and August 1297, separate sets of nominations were made by the consuls and savi of each s e s t ~There . ~ ~ was a brief return to combined nominations in October and December:' but separate nominations again prevailed in the elections of February, April, June, and August 1 2 9 8 . ~With ~ the debate and election of October 1298, however, another turning point was reached. On this occasion, the practice of a single set of nominations in each sesto, prepared by a combined committee of consuls and savi, won what turned out to be a definitive victory.63The same plan was accepted without modification in December 1298, and again in June and August 1 2 9 9 . ~AS ~ far as the docu59. P R , 7, ff, IV-2: "Capitudines et alii Sapientes adiuncti cuiuslibet sextus, simul congregati, et ab aliis capitudinibus et sapientibus aliorum sextuum separati . . . nominent . . . sex sapientes et ydoneos populares artifices in quolibet et pro quolibet sextu." 60. Ibid., f. 6: "Capitudines cuiuslibet sextus simul congregati, et ab aliis capitudinibus et sapientibus adiunctis separati, nominent . . . tres sapientes et ydoneos populares artifices in quolibet . . . sextu. Et etiam sapientes adiuncti cuiuslibet sextus simul congregati et ab aliis sapientibus et capitudinibus separati, nominent . . .alios tres sapientes et ydoneos populares artifices in quolibet . . . sextu." For the June election, see P R , 8, f. 79, and for August, see Consulte, 2:572, where separate sets of nominations were recommended by Borgo Rinaldi. 61. For October, see Consulte, 2 :584 (at the suggestion of Borgo Rinaldi); for December, see ibid., p. 598 (Migliaccio di Salvi Girolami), and also P R , 7, f. 125. 62. February: P R , 7, f. 13zv; April: Consulte, 2 :630 (Borgo Rinaldi); June: ibid., p. 650 (Migliore Guadagni), and P R Y9, f. 10; August: P R , 9, f. 19v. In the April debate, the notion of guild autonomy in the nominating process, by now consistently overlooked, was supported in vain by a Machiavelli: "Bindus Fierencze Malchiavelli consuluit, quod quelibet Capitudo eligant iiii"' pro quolibet sextu, et Adiuncti cuiuslibet sextus eligant iiii"; et postea fiat scruptinium ut dictum est" (Consulte, 2 :63I). 63. P R Y9, ff. 24V-25. 64. December 1298: ibid., ff. 96v-97; June 1299: P R , 10, f. 42; August 1299: ibid., ff. 44-44v.

68 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics ments permit us to see, there were no further returns to the system of separate nominations after August 1298. Admittedly, there is a fairly long gap, covering the nine elections from October 1299 to February 1301, during which the official sources are silent; but happily a passage from Villani serves in part to fill the lacuna and to confirm the general impression that the consuls of the guilds were being excluded from any significant role in the election of the priorate during this period. In 1300, says Villani, a papal legate, Cardinal Matthew of Acquasparta, was sent to Florence to make peace between the warring factions of Blacks and Whites. The cardinal asked the Florentines for special powers to "reform the city offices by placing into bags for each sesto the names of persons from both parties considered worthy to hold the office of prior and having them drawn from these bags by lot every two months, since, due to partisan jealousies and the outbreak of factional divisions; the election of the priors was not being conducted by the consuls of the guilds [italics added]."65 The government of the White Guelfs refused the cardinal's offer, but Villani's comment nonetheless establishes a close connection between the intensification of factional struggles around 1300 and the decline of the electoral role of the guilds. By the beginning of 1301, a considerable degree of formal stability had been achieved in the electoral process. All of the regular bimonthly elections from April 1301 to December 1303 were carried out as follows: the consuls and the savi of each sesto, convened as a single body, nominated three, four, or sometimes six candidates in each sesto of the city; a vote was then taken among all the consuls and savi to determine the selection of one prior from each ~ e s t oWithout .~~ exception, these elections were charac65. Villani, Cronica, 2 :45: "richiese balia a1 comune di pacificare insieme i Fiorentini; e per levare via le dette parti bianca e nera volle riformare la terra, e raccomunare gli ufici, e quegli dell'una parte e dell'altra ch'erano degni d'esser priori, mettere in sacchetti a sesto a sesto, e trargli di due in due mesi, come la ventura venisse; che per le gelosie delle parti e sette incominciate, non si facea lezione de' priori per le capitudini dell'arti, che quasi la citti non si commovesse a sobuglio." 66. The deliberations of the consuls and savi for the elections of the years between 1301 and 1303 are found in vols. 5 and 6 of the Libri Fabarurn. Volumes 5 through 10 of this series have been edited by Bernardino Barbadoro in Consigli. For the individual deliberations, see vol. I , pp. 8 (April 1301)~I3 (June 1301, for which see also PRY11, ff. 26-26~)' 23 (August I ~ O I ) , 31 (October 1301)~38 (December 1301)~42 (February 1302)~52 (April 1302)' 57 (June 1302), 62 (August I~OZ), 64-65 (October 1302)~71 (December 1302)~81-82 (February 1303), 91

The Success and Failure ofthe Guilds, 1293-1303

69

terized by the two organizational features that tended to restrict or even extinguish the autonomy of the individual guilds in the nominating process: the arrangement of consuls by sesto rather than by guild and the combining of consuls and savi into a single nominating committee for each ~ e s t oThe . ~ ~savi, it is worth recalling, were appointed by the priors, apparently without restriction as to number or guild a f f i l i a t i ~ nNow . ~ ~ that they regularly and directly participated in the most crucial phase of the electoral process, they were in a position to use their influence to muffle the autonomous political voices of the individual guilds. The extent to which the guilds were silenced in these years is indicated by their failure even to challenge the electoral procedures repeatedly approved in the council of the capitudini and the savi. Although decisions on electoral matters continued to be ratified in this council, and despite the numerical strength of the still autonomously elected consuls of the twelve guilds within its membership, between 1301 and 1303 there was surprisingly little opposition to the regular endorsement of nominating procedures that deprived the guilds of their former influence and independence. Only twice in three years (in April 1301 and February 1303) did speakers propose plans that would have restored this influence by entrusting either (April 1303)~IOO (June 1303), 114 (August 1303), and 129-30 (December 1303). It should be noted that the deliberation of June 1301, which, according to a recent study by Guidubaldo Guidi, established a "new system for the election of the priorate," in reality did no such thing; see Guidi, "I sistemi elettorali agli uffici del Comune di Firenze nel primo Trecento: I1 sorgere della elezione per squittino (1300-1328): ASI 130 (1972): 372. The system approved in June I301 was not structurally different from that adopted two months earlier and was, in any case, the product of a long development stretching back to the early 1290s. Guidi's treatment of Florentine electoral systems begins abruptly in 1300, and he seems unaware of their complex evolution in the preceding decade. 67. The irregular and anomalous election of 7 November 1301, following the coup engineered by Charles of Valois and the Black Guelfs, took place under pressure and in violation of the Ordinances of Justice: "I Signori [i.e., Dino and his fellow priors] erano molto stirnolati da' maggiori cittadini, che facessono nuovi signori. Bench? contro alla Legge della Giustizia fusse, perch? non era il tempo da eleggerli, accordamoci di chiamarli, piu per piath della citti che per altra cagione" (Compagni, Cronica, p. 109). 68. See the excursus at the end of this chapter for a discussion of rubric 50, book 5, of the 1322-25 Statutes of the Captain of the People, which may have represented an attempt by the guild forces in the late 1290s to impose certain limits on the selection of the savi by the priors.

70 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics the nominations or the election itself to the consuls alone, arranged by guild, and on both occasions the proposals were defeated.69Not a single other participant in all these meetings suggested a plan that differed in any way from the method ultimately adopted, except with regard to the number of nominations. The degree of unanimity achieved on this issue was such that in nine of the sixteen meetings (they can no longer be meaningfully termed "debates") from April 1301 to the end of 1303, only one member of the council rose to speak and his proposal was accepted immediately without the need for further discussion. In fact, the sixteen meetings on electoral procedure held over this period produced a total of only thirty-four speeches by twenty-four persons, for an average of just over two speeches per meeting (as against the more than six speeches per meeting recorded in the debates from 1293 to 1298).'" Whether the consuls of the middle guilds and the less powerful major guilds felt intimidated or simply powerless to change the direction of events can only be speculated. With good reason they may have felt either 69. Consigli, I :8: "Guido Ubaldini de Signa consuluit quod capitudines cuiuslibet artis nominent duo in quolibet sextu"; ibid., p. 81: "Rossus de lo Stroza consuluit quod dicta electio fiat per capitudines XI1 maiorum artium." 70. Most of the former champions of guild-based electoral systems no longer participated in the "debates." Although some may have died in the late 129os, it seems significant that so many of them ceased their active support for these ideas by about 1296. In that year, Chiaro di Salvi Girolarni, Manetto Tiniozzi, Dino Pecora, Pela Gualducci, and Noffo Guidi all made their last appearances as speakers in the electoral debates. Bandino Falconieri and Girolamo di Salvi Girolami made their final contributions to the electoral policy of the regime in 1295. Pacino Peruzzi, who may have been discredited as a result of his feud with Dino Pecora, was not heard from after the end of 1293, and Dino Compagni, although elected to the Signoria in 1301, made no appearances in the electoral debates after October 1294. In Compagni's case, his close association with Giano della Bella probably diminished his influence for a number of years. On the other hand, two frequent speakers of the mid-1290s who had almost always advocated the organization of the nominating committees by sesto rather than by guild, Borgo Rinaldi and Migliaccio di Salvi Girolami, continued to participate in the debates of the years 1301-3. Of the strong supporters of guild-based electoral systems during the popular regime, only Giovanni Rustichelli, the judge who went over to the Black party after 1301, made as many as two appearances in the debates of 1301-3. Compagni, in fact, confirms that Rustichelli made his peace with Corso Donati's party and that Borga Rinaldi and at least some of the Girolami also sided with the Blacks; see the Cronica, pp. 70-71, 133.

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

71

or both in the turbulent and increasingly violent political atmosphere of Florence during the months leading up to and following the victory of the Black Guelfs in November 1301. Din0 Compagni recorded an episode of that pivotal month that seems to symbolize the general loss of nerve within the guild community at this time. As Charles of Valois prepared to enter Florence in open support of the Blacks, who made no secret of their intention to overturn the regime, the Signoria, including Dino himself, made a last-gasp appeal to the guilds in an effort to forestall the arrival of the French prince. They asked every guild to prepare a formal statement of its opinion on the question of whether Charles was to be granted or denied entry into the city, and, as Dino recalled with bitterness, "they all answered, by voice and in writing, that he [Charles] should be permitted to enter the city and should be honored as a prince of noble blood: except for the guild of the bakers, who said that he should be neither received nor honored, because he was coming to destroy the city."" Because in Compagni's view the city was indeed destroyed by subsequent events, it is clear that the chronicler's own sentiments were with the lonely bakers and that he must have been devastatingly disappointed by the failure of the guild community to respond with more courage in his, and their, hour of need. Indeed, one of the major themes of the second book of the Cronica is the disintegration of the old popular party under the pressure of threats, intimidation, and violence from the aristocratic factions, especially the Blacks. According to Compagni, many of the former supporters of the government of the mid-1290s defected from the movement out of fear, passivity, or a simple desire to be on the winning side. Compagni felt personally abandoned and betrayed by such men as Bandino Falconieri, Noffo Guidi, and Dino Pecora, who actively collaborated with the city's new masters, but he had contempt as well for others who simply resigned themselves to the inevitable. Just before Dino and his fellow priors were forced out of office on 8 November 1301, they desperately "requested the aid of many leading popolani, asking them for God's sake to have compassion for their city; but they would do nothing."72 In such conditions, it is somewhat easier to see why the claims of the guilds for autonomy and equality in the electoral process were overwhelmed and lost. 71. Compagni, Cronica, pp. 95-96; on this episode, see also my "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence," pp. 60-61. 72. Compagni, Cronica, p. 125.

72 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

Excursus to Chapter 2: Dating and Interpretation of the Rubrics on the Election of the Priorate Contained in the Fifth Book of the 1322-25 Statutes of the Captain of the People The fifth book of the 1322-25 redaction of the Statutes of the Captain of the People contains four rubrics relevant to the election of the Florentine priorate: rub. 3. Quod de aliqua capitudine non vadant ad consilium plures quam quatuor. rub. 50. De adiunctis in electione priorum dandis. rub. 51. De deveto domus priorum et vexilliferi per annum. rub. 52. Quod nullus tractet in secret0 loco de electione p r i o r ~ m . ~ ~ Because of the difficulties involved in any attempt to date and to interpret correctly the individual rubrics of statutory compilations like those of the 1322-25 redaction of communal laws, this legislation has been reserved for separate treatment. As Gaetano Salvemini pointed out in one of his early articles, the 1322-25 statutes are a miscellany of laws and ordinances, the vast majority undated, which had been promulgated by the councils and other legislative organs of the republic over a long period of time stretching back to the mid-thirteenth ~entury.'~ Each rubric has a history of its own, which can be uncovered only if it is possible to determine the date and circumstances of the original promulgation and of subsequent additions and modifications as well. This is never an easy task, and sometimes an impossible one, because the laws and decrees selected for inclusion in the statutory compilations were usually incorporkted into these collections in a generalized form, i.e., without those details of date, circumstance, institutional origin, or application that defined their specific historical and political context. Obviously, in any reconstruction or analysis of Florentine political institutions, these statutes should be used only 73. Romolo Caggese, ed., Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina, vol. I , Statuto del , 220,254-55. Capitano del Popolo degli anni 1322-2s (Florence, I ~ I O )pp. 74. Gaetano Salvemini, "Gli Statuti fiorentini del Capitano e del Potesta degli ,anni 1322-'25," A S I , 5th ser. 18 (1896): 66-97; reprinted in Gaetano Salvemini, L a Dignitri cavalleresca nel Comune di Firenze e altri scritti (Milan, 1972)~pp. 66-90.

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

73

with the greatest care and with a sharp awareness of the risks deriving from the sometimes elusive nature of their precise origin. It goes almost without saying that the redactions of communal laws that have come down to us as the statutes of 1322-25 cannot be used to illustrate the political realities or legislative trends of the 1320s~except in the relatively few instances where the overseers of the statutes made specific changes or additions to the text that they inherited from earlier compilers.75 These four rubrics are introduced and discussed at the conclusion of the second chapter, rather than in the third (which covers the years surrounding the 1322-25 redaction), because they almost certainly originated sometime between 1293 and 1303, the decade of strong guild involvement in electoral politics, and in all probability between the promulgation of the revised edition of the Ordinances of Justice in 1295 and the outbreak of full-scale factional warfare in I 300- 1301. However, it should be emphasized that the following observations are at best an educated guess and that the conclusions are necessarily tentative. A first indication of the relatively early date of these rubrics comes from their location within the fifth book. The four rubrics in question are all found in the first half of book 5, which contains a total of 137 rubrics. This does not of itself constitute reliable evidence of their dates of origin, but because the later additions to existing statutory compilations were generally incorporated at the end of the books in which they were included (for example, rubric 133 of book 5 , which deals with the election and duties of the twelve buoni uomini, is a revised version of a law passed on 22 June 132176),this suggests at the very least that the four rubrics were not the result of laws passed in the years immediately preceding the 1322-25 re75. This was apparently overlooked by Guidubaldo Guidi, who tried to discern what he considered the new electoral trends of the 1320s from rubrics 3 and 50 of book 5 of the Statutes of the Captain of the People: "In questa tecnica elettorale vi i: gi5 una notevole spersonalizzazione, una precisa normativa sugli istituti e persone che devono partecipare all'elezione: vi concorrono numerosi cittadini, appartenenti a diversi istituti, espressione di forze politiche non uguali" ("Sistemi elettorali," pp. 386-87). As the next chapter will demonstrate, in the quarter century from I303 to 1328, electoral authority in Florence gravitated in precisely the opposite direction, toward a system of direct appointment controlled by a handful of powerful politicians. Guidi's misreading of Florentine electoral politics in the 1320s derives from the assumption that these statutory rubrics were the product of reforms instituted at the time of, or shortly before, the 1322-25 redaction. 76. Caggese, Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, pp. 332-35; for the original legislation instituting the office, see P R , 17, ff. 118-118v.

74 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics daction. More important, however, is the fact that within book 5 they precede the well-defined bloc of rubrics (83- I I I) regulating the formation of the neighborhood militia companies (sotietates populi) and the duties of the gonfalonieri, whose origin can be securely traced to reforms of 1304 and 1306.'~Thus, from their relative position in book 5, a probable case can be made for the pre-1304 origin of the rubrics on the election of the priorate. A close reading and consideration of the content of the rubrics seem to confirm this hypothesis. Rubric 3 simply states that no more than four consuls from any guild may take part in the election of the priors and Standardbearer of Justice (or of any other officials) or in any councils in which the consuls of the guilds were normally invited to p a r t i ~ i p a t e .The ~ ~ most likely explanation of this regulation is that it attempted to equalize the electoral influence of single corporations in the scrutinies held by the council of the capitudini and savi, which, as we have seen, was generally entrusted with the final approval of candidates in the elections from 1293 to 1303. Some guilds had more consuls than others, and among the large major guilds consular committees of six and eight were not uncommon. Now it is obvious that such a regulation would only be relevant in a period in which the consuls of the guilds still retained a significant role in electoral politics. As chapter 3 will demonstrate, there is no evidence for this role beyond the year 1303, and by 1310 there is definite proof that the consuls had relinquished their electoral authority altogether. The general thrust of this attempt to equalize the voting power of each guild by limiting the number of participating consuls from the larger guilds is, moreover, fully in keeping with the principle of equality among the guilds that animated the popular electoral reforms of the mid-1290s. These considerations lead, apparently inescapably, to the conclusion that rubric 3 dates from the years in which the middle and less powerful of the major guilds 77. Caggese, Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, pp. 292-310; on the reforms of I304 and 1306, see Robert Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 8 vols. (Florence, 1972-73), vol. 3, PP. 3 7 ~ 7 6 , 4 6 3 4 5 ,and vol. 4, pt. I, PP. 298-305. 78. Caggese, Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, p. 220: "Statuimus et ordinamus auod ad electionem dominorum Priorum et Vexilliferi iustitie et auamvis electionem aliorum offitialium fatiendam vel aliquod aliud consilium, ad quod vocentur vel venire debeant capitudines artium, non debeant ire ex aliqua capitudine plures quam quatuor." This rubric makes no mention of the number of guilds called upon to take part in such elections, and Guidi's observation that in it for the first time an electoral role was allowed to all twenty-one guilds, including the minor guilds, is entirely without foundation; see Guidi, "Sistemi elettorali," p. 386.

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

75

had consistently advocated the equalization of the electoral influence of each guild, i.e., to the period from late 1292 to about 1298." Similar reasoning can be applied to rubric 50, which deals with the appointment of the arroti who took part in the election of the priorate. "Because it is fitting and proper that the elections of the Signoria take place with a maximum degree of fairness and fidelity to established procedures, and since these aims are best served by not allowing the continuous reelection of the same persons to high office," rubric 50 urged future priorates to appoint the arroti only after an examinatio diligens and to limit their selections to persons loyal to the Church and desirous of the prosperity of the pop010 and the commune of Florence. In order to have a readily available record of past arroti, which would make it easier to avoid the reappointment of the same men as arroti (and therefore the perpetuation in office of the same persons or factions), each priorate was instructed to provide its successors with a list of the arroti whom it had appointed for their election. In turn, the second priorate, before proceeding with the election of its own successors, was required to read aloud in the electoral council of the capitudini and the savi the names from the list they had received from their predecessors, as well as the names of the new arroti they themselves were about to designate for the next election.80Thus, at each bimonthly elec79. Yet another indication of any early date for rubric 3 is the subjective form in which the decree was promulgated: "Statuimus et ordinamus" instead of "statutum et ordinatum est." According to Salvemini, the subjective form was commonly used in older legislation; see "Gli Statuti fiorentini," in Salvemini, La Dignitd cavalleresca, p. 84. 80. Caggese, Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, p. 254: "Quia convenit cum omni honestate et modi observantia offitia dominorum Priorum et Vexilliferi iustitie procedere, et ipsorum electiones fieri, et ad predicta magis conveniat continuationes honorum et offitiorum non fieri inter Florentinos, provideant domini Priores et Vexillifer iustitie qui pro tempore fuerint, quatenus viderint convenire et eis placuerit et cognoverint expedire, quod in adiunctis eligendis et fiendis, qui interesse debebunt electioni futurorum dominorum Priorum et Vexilliferi iustitie, fiat examinatio diligens et electio ipsorum adiunctorum de prudentibus viris amatoribus et devotis Sancte Matris Ecclesie, cupientibus felicem statum populi et Communis Florentie. Et ad hoc ut de ipsis adiunctis facilior possit haberi memoria et per hoc facilius possint, si viderint convenire, talem continuationem evitare teneantur domini Priores et Vexillifer iustitie adiunctos quos elegerint representare et in scriptis dare successoribus eorumdem; qui successores teneantur tales preteritos proxime adiunctos per sextum et illos etiam adiunctos quos elegerint pro eorum successoribus eligendis legi facere in consilio capitudinum et adiunctorum, notificando eisdem capitudinibus et adiunctis, ante quam ad successorum electionem procedant, hoc mod0 videlicet: isti sunt adiuncti qui electi fuerunt per

76 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics tion, the council of the capitudini and savi was to be advised, in advance of the election, of the identity of both the newly appointed arroti and of those who had taken part in the previous election. Although no specific divieto against the reappointment of arroti was instituted, there can be little doubt that the objective was to prevent the concentration of electoral influence in the hands of a few continuously reappointed electors of the Signoria. Again, we must ask: when would such a precaution have been relevant, both politically and institutionally? Because the names of the arroti were ordered to be read aloud in the council of the capitudini and the savi, the lack of any evidence of the continued electoral functions of this council after 1303 seems to mark this year as a terminus ante quem for rubric 50, as it does for rubric 3. By 1310-11, when electoral balie began regularly to be granted to the Signoria for the election of its own successors (see chapter 3), no mention was made of any role for arroti, adiunti, or savi in the electoral process. On the other hand, a fairly certain terminus post quem is suggested by the reference in this rubric to the election of the "priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice." The latter was, of course, regularly elected only from the beginning of 1293. Thus, from purely internal evidence, we may again conclude that this rubric probably originated in the decade between 1293 and 1303, but certainly no later than 1310. However, the general political aim envisioned in rubric 50, that of broadening the electoral base of the Signoria, is particularly reminiscent of the mood of the middle and late 1290s~when the popular elements of the guild community were especially anxious to defend the electoral innovations of 1292-93 against the reviving encroachments of elitism and factionalism. The essentially defensive posture of rubric 50 is also reflected in the two following rubrics. According to rubric 51, all the members of a prior's family ("de eodem domo et progenie") were declared ineligible for the Signoria for a full year following the conclusion of his term of office.*' Bepredecessores nostros ad presens offitium eligendum; et isti sunt adiuncti per nos electi ad electionem de nostris successoribus fatiendam." 81. Ibid., p. 255: "Item stabilitum et ordinatum est quod infra unum annurn proximum post depositum offitium prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie non eligatur in Priorem vel Vexilliferum iustitie aliquis de eodem domo et progenie unde Prior vel Vexillifer iustitie est vel fuerit infra annum. Et si secus factum fuerit non valeat, et insuper puniatur per dominum Capitaneum talis qui receperit offitium in libris quingentis f.p." In the case of this rubric, there does exist firm proof that its contents were not the product of legislation passed in the 1320s. The one-year divielo for the family members of a prior was included among the restrictions on the elec-

The Success and Failure of the Guilds, 1293-1303

77

cause this restriction does not appear among the divieti listed in the July 1295 edition of the Ordinances of JusticeYs2 it may be assumed that it postdates that document, although not perhaps by very much. For rubric 52, which may have originated with it, seems to refer to circumstances that, from Stefani's account, we are able to locate with some precision in the year 1295. Rubric 52 forbids secret meetings, by day or by night ("in aliquo secreto loco de die vel de nocte"), for the purpose of conspiring to influence the election of the Signoria in violation of the Ordinances of Justice and invests the Captain with jurisdiction over such offenses, including the authority to assess heavy penalties against guilty parties.83 Now we have already seen that, according to Stefani, Corso Donati and his supporters secretly schemed in February 1295 to fix the election of the new priors ("tennono segreti modi della elezione de' Priori d'averla a lor0 modo" [italics added]) and that in June of the same year the magnates managed, "through their astuzia," to elect a priorate openly sympathetic to their objective of abolishing the Ordinances of Justice.84The stated aim contained in rubric 52 of defending the Ordinances against the secret machinations of those who would corrupt its electoral provisions ("quod nulli liceat contra formam ordinamentorum iustitie convenire ad tractandum de electione") seems to fit perfectly the situation of 1295 as described by Stefani. The revolt of the magnates was, as we know from Villani's account,85a failure, and over the next half year, from August 1295 to February 1296, guild-based electoral procedures were maintained and regularly implemented.86It seems likely, therefore, that the decree eventually transformed toral authority granted to the Signoria in December 1316 ("reservato deveto personarum et domuum," in LF, 11, f. 66); again in April I317 ("servandis devetis domus et progenieii," in ibid., f. 93); and also in July 1318 (see PR, 15, ff. ZOIV-202).For the text of the 1318 provision, see below, chap. 3, n. 16. 82. Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani, p. 390. 83. Caggese, Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, p. 255: "Item statutum, provisum et ordinatum est quod nulli liceat contra formam ordinamentorum iustitie convenire ad tractandum de electione futurorum Priorum et Vexilliferorum iustitie, aut aliquam conventiculam facere in aliquo secreto loco de die vel de nocte. Et qui contra fecerit pena ducentarum librarum condempnetur, et contra tales commictentes Capitaneus et Defensor habeat plenum arbitrium in inquirendo et veritatem inveniendo, ita quod ab huiusmodi tractatibus et convencticulis homines arceantur." 84. See above, nn. 44 and 46. 85. Villani, Cronica, 2 :18-19. 86. See above, nn. 49-53.

78 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics into rubric 52 may have been originally promulgated in this period of successful defensive reaction against the magnate challenge to the Ordinances. If so, its position in the 1322-25 redaction as the third of three consecutive rubrics on the election of the priorate, all tending to reaffirm the institutional framework and the political objectives of the electoral policy of the popular government, suggests the obvious hypothesis that all three may have originated in the second half of 1295 or shortly thereafter, as part of a broad counterthrust in defense of the electoral practices of the guild regime against its aristocratic opponents. In the absence of the original legislation, of course, this hypothesis remains a conjecture based on circumstantial evidence. Even so, enough has been said to support the contention that the rubrics on the election of the priorate inserted in the 1322-25 redaction of communal statutes have no relevance to the electoral politics of the 1320s and to suggest the strong probability that their original context must be traced back to the latter half of the 1290s.

Three Election by Balk, 1310-1326

The final step in the gradual exclusion of the guilds from electoral politics in the early fourteenth century was to deprive the council of the capitudini and the savi of even nominal responsibility for the selection and ratification of electoral procedures. Exactly when this happened cannot be determined, but it must have been accomplished sometime early in 1304, since after December 1303 the bimonthly deliberations of the consuls and the savi on the election of the Signoria disappear from the pages of the Libri Fabarurn. For the next seven years, the official sources are silent on the matter of the election of the priorate. Chronicle sources indicate that the factions and their powerful leaders exerted great influence over the selection of the commune's highest magistrates. Indeed, it would probably be more accurate to say that they simply appointed the Signoria. In describing the factional wars of 1304, which led the Florentines to seek the aid of the neighboring city of Lucca in restoring civic peace, Villani recorded that the temporarily influential visitors "summoned new priors of concord" into office. Only a month or so later, again according to Villani, another papal legate, the Cardinal of Prato, became involved in the republic's electoral affairs. He was given full authority (balia) to "appoint the priors [and other officials] of the city at will ( a sua volontci)."' However, Compagni reports that in February 1304 "Messer Rosso dalla Tosa and his followers summoned the new office of priors and installed them at night in the palace without the sounding of trumpets or any other ceremony."' Such episodes suggest that the Signoria became hostage both to internal factions and to outside influences as its election was estranged from any regular constitutional procedures. Not until late in 1310 was this de facto control of elections by the factions reflected in formal legislation. On 10 December of that year, the Captain of the People proposed in the Council of the Hundred that extraordiI. 2.

Villani, Cronica, 2 :85-86. Compagni, Cronica, p. 172.

80 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics nary powers be given to the Signoria then in office for the "creation of the new priors, Standard-bearer of Justice and their n ~ t a r y . "The ~ proposal was approved by a vote of 80 to 13 and then ratified in the special and general councils of the Captain. Two months later, in February 131I, an identical proposal encountered greater opposition in the Council of the Hundred, passing by a vote of 60 to 34.4In June5and August6 of the same year, the Signoria was again given authority to proceed as it wished in electing its successors. The tally of dissenting votes on these occasions was modest enough,' but the possibility of dissatisfaction in some quarters is indicated by the exaggerated penalties established for those refusing to abide by the decisions of the Signoria-two thousand lire for judicial officials and the death penalty for private citizens.' Although no evidence has come to light regarding the specific procedures adopted by virtue of these grants of special authority, the very concession of a balia suggests that either directly or indirectly the priors were now free to appoint their own successors. In a strictly legal sense, these balie entailed no modification of the existing laws. What took place was instead a temporary suspension of such laws, usually lasting for only a few days, during which the recipients of the balia powers were allowed to carry out the election without being accused of a violation of the communal statutes governing elections. However, the fact that such balie were repeatedly enacted from December 1310 to August 1311, and, as will be seen, on still other occasions from 1314 to 1323, points to the obvious conclusion that, even if formal constitutional or statutory changes were not enacted, the existing legislation was being systematically ignored and in its place a new electoral system was beginning to assume practical validity. The overriding political significance of these balie is that they enabled the oligarchic factions to dispense with the cumbersome electoral machinery of the guild system. The electoral regulations regularly suspended 3. Consigli, 2: 522: "Provi~ionemfactam super balia danda prioribus et vexillifero super creandis novis prioribus et vexillifero et notario ipsorum pro duobus futuris mensibus, initiandis die XV presentis mensis decembris, duratura ea die qua f i a t a fuerit in consilio potestatis et comunis Florentie." Among those who rose to speak in favor of the proposal was the jurist Baldo d'Aguglione. 4. Ibid., p. 532. 5. Ibid., pp. 549-50. 6. Ibid., p. 561. 7. The August balia was approved in the Council of the Hundred by a vote of 80 to 16, in the Special Council by 58 to 13, and in the other councils by majority votes indicated with the usual formula "quasi omnibus." 8. Consigli, 2 :561.

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

8I

by the balie were, of course, those contained in the Ordinances of Justice and elaborated by the guild government of the 1290s. In this way, the factions indicated their readiness to ignore not only the penal and antimagnate provisions of the popular constitution, but equally its electoral prescriptions, which had so closely tied the executive branch of the government to the power of the guilds. The basic strategy of bypassing the guilds in the electoral process is also disclosed by the fact that the deliberations on these balie never once took place in the council of the capitudini and the savi, the very forum that in 1293 had been solemnly entrusted with the responsibility for determining electoral procedures. Instead, the balie were initially proposed and passed in the Council of the Hundred, the one communal council in which the consuls of the guilds did not sit. Only then were they sent for ratification to the Special and General Councils of the Captain, which included the consuls as ex officio members. Thus, at least as early as 1310-11, the regular implementation of electoral balie deprived the guilds of all but the most negligible part in the election of the priorate. Between August 131I and February 1314, no balie seem to have been enacted for electoral purposes, and it is not at all clear how the members of the Signoria were selected in this period. On 5 April 1313 the number of priors was increased from six to eleven by authority of the councils, but the Libri Fabarum make no mention of the procedure for their designat i ~ nWhen . ~ the institution of the electoral balia was resumed in February 1314, however, its authority was notably expanded, as the priors were empowered to appoint not merely their immediate successors for the term February-April 1314, but also the magistrates for the following three terms, for a total of eight months through the term of August-O~tober."~ The more usual balia for the election of only their immediate successors 9. Ibid., p. 616: "Primo, provisionem factam super augend0 numerum priorum." On 15 April, "iuraverunt XI priores artium et unus vexillifer iustitie" (ibid., p. 617). The priorate was composed of eleven, instead of six, members for nine two-month terms until mid-October 1314; see Stefani, Cronaca, rr. 306 and 310, pp. 114-16. 10.. Consigli, 2 :647: "Die VIII mensis februarii. In consilio centum virorum. . . . Primo, videlicet provisionem factam super balia danda prioribus et vexillifero eligendi priores et vexilliferum et notarium eorum, usque in tempus et terminum octo mensium." The Signoria of October-December 1314, whose election is nowhere accounted for in the official sources, may have been appointed by the vicar and brother of King Robert of Naples, who, according to Villani, arrived in Florence in mid-August "e faceva priori e tutti li uficiali di Firenze" (Cronica, 2 : 185; see also Guidubaldo Guidi, "I sistemi elettorali agli uffici del Comune di Firenze

82

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

was renewed for the Signorie of December 1314,~'February,Iz April, June, August, and September 1315.'~By this time the virtual appointment of each new government by its predecessor had become standard practice. Electoral balie were instituted on a fairly regular basis throughout 1316 and 1317, although on one occasion (and perhaps more) the Signoria had to share its authority with King Robert's vicar in Florence.14 In some instances, the references in the Libri Fabarum to the customary grant of electoral authority to the Signoria do not make specific mention of the right to elect the new priorate, being limited instead to a more general statement concerning the election of officials in both the city and the d i s t r i ~ t . But '~ since on each occasion these balie were enacted just a few days before the new priorate was to assume office, there is little room to doubt that these officials included, among others, the priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice. For the balie from 1310 to 1317, we have only the brief summaries contained in the Libri Fabarum of the proposals placed before the councils. A much fuller insight into the nature and scope of the electoral authority that was being so regularly granted to the Signoria by this time is afforded by the law establishing the balia of 1318, whose complete text is preserved in the Provvisioni. On 24 July 1318, the Signoria was given the right to elect new magistrates, either directly or through electors of their choosing, for the next term or "for a longer period," as they saw fit. Because the term of nel primo Trecento: I1 sorgere della elezione per squittino (1300-1328)," AS1 I30 [19721: 375). I I. Consigli, 2 :681. 12. Ibid., p. 688. 13, LF, 11, ff. 3, 5v-6,9, and 12v. 14. Ibid., ff. 35, 58, 66, 79v, and 93. According to Villani, in October 1316, following the expulsion of the bargello Lando d'Agobbio, the pro-Angevin party, fortified and led by the newly appointed royal vicar, succeeded in appointing six extra priors, in addition to the seven members of the Signoria selected by the outgoing priors, for a total of thirteen (Cronica, 2: 197; see also Guidi, "Sistemi elettorali," p. 376). The division of electoral responsibilities between the priorate and Robert's vicar is recorded in LF, 11, f. 58: "Item provisionem factam super balia danda domino Amelio vicario una cum prioribus et vexillifero super eligendo offitiales et cassando." It is not certain, however, whether this entry refers to the specific occasion described by Villani, because the vicar in October 1316 was Count Guido da Battifolle. 15. See, for example, LF, I I , f. 35: "Primo super balia danda prioribus et vexillifero quod possint et eisque liceat eligere et deputare omnes et singulos offitiales tam cives quam districtuales cum illis offitio licentia et balia quibus eisdem videbitur convenire."

Election by Balia, 1310-1326 83 office of the Signoria continued to be limited to two months throughout this period, t h e reference to a "longer period" must be understood to mean that the electing priors could appoint successors for as many future terms as they wished, just as had been decreed in February 1314. They could elect whomever they wanted to the office, provided they observed two divieti: a two-year ban on the reelection of officeholders and a one-year period of ineligibility for their family members. Apart from these two limitations, the electors were explicitly freed from all other regulations, formalities, and restrictions contained in the statutes a n d laws of the commune. Of particular interest is the stipulation that they were not bound to observe any restrictions that might have barred the election of certain candidates "in connection with the guild o r guilds of which they are memb e r ~ . " ' ~This was probably aimed at undermining the "continue artem exercentibus" requirement of 1293. 16. PR, 15, ff. zorv-zoz: "Domini Priores Artium et Vexillifer Iustitie volentes et cum omni affectione cupientes ad ea intendere et in hiis et super hiis salubriter providere, que ad honorem salutem et bonum statum populi et comunis Florentie pertinere et spectare noscuntur . . . providerunt . . . quod ipsi iamdicti Priores Artium et Vexillifer iustitie qui nunc . . . dicto presunt offitio et in eo esse et durare debent usque ad diem quartumdecimum mensis Augusti proxime venturi . . possint eisque liceat nominare, eligere et deputare seu nominari eligi et deputari facere, per se vel alios quos ad hec deputare voluerint, Priores Artium et Vexilliferos iustitie . . . pro tempore et termino duorum mensium . . . seu in maiori tempore et termino seu terminis et temporibus quo et quibus et prout voluerint, dummodo nullum eligant vel eligi faciant in priorem vel vexilliferum iustitie qui infra duos annos proxime preteritos a die quo eius debebit offitium incipere computandos retro fuerit in offitio prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie, nec aliquem de cuius domo vel progenie fuerit aliquis prior vel vexillifer iustitie infra annum proxime lapsum a die quo suum offitium debebit incoare retro numerandum. . . . Non obstante eo quod ipsi futuri Priores et Vexillifer iustitie . . . nominentur et eligantur contra tenorem et formam . . . ordinamentorum, capitulorum et statutorum dicti populi et comunis de hoc loquentium, vel quod pro maiori tempore et termino eligantur sive aliter aut alio mod0 quam contineatur in ipsis ordinamentis et statutis, vel quod ipsi sic nominandi et eligendi ratione artis vel artium de qua vel quibus fuerint, sive pro alio quocumque offitio vel offitiis in quo vel quibus nunc essent aut hactenus fuerint, sive quocumque alio mod0 iure vel causa essent in aliquo alio deveto aut per aliqua ordinamenta seu statuta dicti populi et comunis cuiusque vigoris essent prohibeantur inibeantur seu quomodolibet devetentur eligi et esse seu adsummi in aliquo offitio dicti populi et comunis, vel quod talis electio fiat ante tempus et terrninum in ipsis ordinamentis seu statutis prefixum, ac contradictione inibitione et quolibet alio deveto salvo quod supra dicitur de tempore vacationis in predictis in aliquo non obstantibus. . . . In quibus et super quibus omnibus et singulis suprascriptis ipsi iamdicti Priores et Vexillifer possint . . . semel

.

84 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics The balia of 1318 set the pattern for the next half decade. An identical grant of electoral authority was made to the Signoria on 9 October 1319,'~ and this was followed by the balia of 6 February 1321 in which even the few divieti maintained in 1318 and 1319 were swept away.I8By this time, no restrictions of any kind remained to hamper the will of the incumbent Signoria in the multiple-term selection of future magistrates. On 2 September 1322 the balia was renewed, with the sole limitation that the candidates had to be popolanz, i.e., non-magnates.I9 The last balia of this type was created on 10 November 1323 and did not differ in substance from that of 1 3 2 2 . ~ ~ The electoral balie from 1318 to 1323 were enacted at intervals ranging from fourteen to twenty months. There is no evidence of any intervening elections within these roughly comparable periods, and it would seem that the priors to whom balie were granted did indeed elect magistrates for more than one term, probably enough to fill all the available posts of a projected interval. When the supply of elected priors was exhausted, another election was held by the last group of priors. Unfortunately, the legislation that authorized these balie tells us almost nothing about the specific procedures adopted by the electing priors. Certain basic features of the system can be inferred, however, from a document of 12 October 1321 in which the Signoria presented the following proposal to the legislative councils: Since it has recently come to the attention of the priors and Standardbearer of Justice that the person nominated and elected to be the Standard-bearer of Justice in the Signoria which will assume office on et pluries providere ordinare et firmare . . . prout et secundum quod de eorum processerit voluntate." 17. PR, 16, f. 115v. 18. PRY17, f. 61: "non obstantibus aliquibus inibitionibus seu devetis, et non obstante . . . quod ipsi sic nominandi et eligendi ratione artis vel artium . . . sive pro alio quocumque offitio . . . vel ratione domus vel progeniei, de qua fuisset vel esset aliquis de ipsa domo in ipso offitio, sive quocumque alio modo, iure vel causa essent in aliquo alio deveto." 19. PR, 19, f. 32: "ipsi domini Priores et Vexillifer Iustitie nunc in offitio residentes . . . possint . . . per se ipsos vel alios quibus commiserint, nominare et eligere . . . Priores Artium et Vexilliferos iustitie . . . pro ill0 et illis termino et terminis ac temporibus et in illo numero et quantitate Priorum et Vexilliferorum et de illis popularibus florentinis quibus et prout et sicut eisdem presentibus dominis Prioribus artium et Vexillifero Iustitie placuerit vel convenire videbitur." See also LF, 12, f. 17. 20. PR, 20, f. 40V, and LF, 12, f. 85.

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

85

15 October is absent from the city, contado, and district of Florence and is, as they say, in such distant parts that he can in no way return to Florence in time to hold the office . . and considering the utility, indeed the necessity of an appropriate remedy . . . [the Signoria] decrees . . . that if at the time of the upcoming publication of the names of the priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice, who will assume their respective offices for two months beginning on 15 October, the person who was previously elected and nominated for the post of Standardbearer of Justice, and whose name is written together with those of his fellow priors in a container sealed with wax, is not present in the city, contado, or district of Florence, or is publicly declared to be absent from the city, contado, and district, or does not come to the Palazzo [of the Signoria] at the time that his name and those of the new priors are drawn from the bag, then the priors and Standard-bearer of Justice currently in office, whenever they like, but at least before 15 October, together with the twelve buoni uomini . . must . . . elect another suitable person of their choosing, of popolano status and Florentine citizenship, from the sesto of Porta del Duomo in place of the one previously elected to the office of Standard-bearer of Justice. . He who is thus designated will be the Standard-bearer of Justice . . . as if he had been elected according to due process and method and at the appropriate time by persons having such electoral authority, or as if he had been elected according to the Ordinances of Justice which deal with the election of the Standard-bearer of J ~ s t i c e . ~ '

.

.

. .

Several important points emerge from this document. First, the reference to the Standard-bearer of Justice as "the person who was previously elected and nominated" makes it clear that the Signoria had been elected in advance for the specific term that was to begin on 15 October 1 3 2 1 . ~ ~ Second, the members of the Signoria in office at the time of this provision (i.e., until 15 October 1321) knew the identity of the Standard-bearer-elect. Obviously, only with such knowledge was it possible for them to know that he was not in Florence. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that this information was not public at the time of the provision, because his PR, 18, f. 20. The system described in the provision of 12 October applied equally to the election of the priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice. An almost identical document of 9 December I321 authorized the replacement, in similar fashion, of one of the priors elected for the term December 1321-February 1322, who was discovered to be absent from the city (ibid., ff. 33-33~). 21.

22.

86 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

name is nowhere to be found in the text. The names, in fact, were still a secret; they were enclosed in the container sealed with wax, which was to be opened, presumably, on the fourteenth or fifteenth of the month. The third point is that the names were drawn from pouches or bags and that they were therefore imborsati in a technical sense. But the extraction of the names was not conducted by lot, a conclusion that seems certain in view of the fact that the name of the individual in question was "written together with [the names] of his fellow priors." It is therefore possible to reconstruct the electoral procedure in use at this time as follows. Upon the grant of a balia, the incumbent Signoria elected a number of priors and Standard-bearers of Justice for specific terms over a relatively long period that ranged from seven to ten terms. The names of those elected for each term were written together and sealed in a separate container. Several days or a week before the end of each two-month term, the outgoing Signoria checked to see whether those who had been elected for the next term were present and eligible. Then, a day or two before the beginning of the new term, a public announcement (publicatio) was made in which the names af the new priors and Standard-bearer of the next term only were re~ealed.?~ This procedure was followed every two months until the supply of elected priors was exhausted. The last Signoria elected by the original balia was given the authority of a new balia, under which it proceeded in like manner to elect the priors and Standard-bearers of Justice for another set of terms. Throughout this period, electoral power was monopolized by the small number of men who sat in the balia priorates. To illustrate the extent to which this system came under the control and served the interests of the oligarchy, it will be useful to look briefly at the composition of the five balia priorates of the years between 1318 and 1323. Two of the most influential patrician families of Florence in this period, the Acciaiuoli and the Bordoni, were represented in four of the five electoral balie. Dardano di Tingo Acciaiuoli, who was elected to the Signoria no less than ten times between 1302 and 1334, sat on the balia priorates of 1318 and 1323. TWO other members of this illustrious banking family, Francesco di Meo, who 23. Thus, for example, the publicatio of February 1321, in Tratte, 1084, f. I : "Die nono mensis Februarii . . . in Consilio Centum Virorum, Generali et Spetiali domini Capitanei et populi florentini, et Capitudinum XIICh maiorum artium civitatis Florentie in pallatio populi . . . publicati fuerunt novi priores Artium et Vexillifer Iustitie eorumque notarius quorum offitium initiare debet die XVo presentis mensis Februarii sub annis domini MCCC"XXo[Florentine style]."

Election by Balia, 13 10-1326

87

reached the Signoria seven times, and Donato di Mannino, four times a prior in his career, were, respectively, on the balia priorates of 1319 and 1321. Between 1310 and 1328, seven Acciaiuoli were elected to the Signoria a total of sixteen times. The Bordoni present an equally striking if somewhat different example of concentrated electoral authority. The three sons of Pagno Bordoni sat on four of the balia priorates: Chele (who reached the Signoria eight times) in I 319 and 1323, Ghigo in 1321, and Bernardo (six times in the Signoria) in 1322. The Alberti del Giudice and the Baroncelli-Bandini, two of the most prominent families of the period (respectively, ten and fifteen appearances in the Signoria from 1310 to 1328)~were each represented on two of the five balia priorates: the former by Jacopo d'Alberto in 1321 and Neri di messer Jacopo in 1323; the latter by Bartolo di Manetto Buonricoveri in 1322 and Francesco di Giamoro in 1323. (One of the priors in the electoral balia of 1318, Bartolo Bandini, may also have been a Baroncelli.) Most of the other members of these five crucial and influential priorates were either individuals who enjoyed notable personal success in communal politics or scions of great oligarchic families: Buto di Ricco Davanzi, who reached the Signoria eight times, sat on two electoral balie in 1319 and 1322; Cecco di Spina Falconi, seven times on the Signoria, also sat on two of the five electoral priorates (1321 and 1323); Messer Caro di Ser Venisti, who was on the balia priorate of I 3 I 8, was five times in the supreme magistracy of the republic, as was Cionetto di Giovenco Bastari, a member of the balia priorate of 1323. The Strozzi, represented by Piero di Pinaccio on the balia of 1319, sent eleven of their number to the Signoria for a total of fifteen appearances between 1310 and I 328, whereas the Peruzzi had six family members elected for a total of nine appearances, including Donato di Pacino in the electoral balia of I 318. Among the remaining names are those of representatives of only slightly less prestigious houses, including the Aldobrandini, Quaratesi, del Forese, Del Bene, and Da Certaldo (see Table 3.1, pp. 88-89).24 These balie were, in short, dominated by an inner 24. The lists of priors have been published in Stefani, Cronaca, r. 331, p. 124; r. 333, p. 125; r. 335, p. 126; r. 342, p. 129; r. 355, p. 131; and by Modesto Rastrelli, Prioristafiorentinoistorico (Florence, 1783),pp. 82,83-84, 86,89,92. The data on individual and family officeholding have been compiled from the Priorista Mariani 1-11, in Manoscritti, 248, ff. 26-28 (Acciaiuoli), 38-39 (Bordoni), 91-93 (Peruzzi), 94-97 (Strozzi), 177-78 (Baroncelli-Bandini), 194-96 (Alberti del Giudice), 199 (Falconi), and in Manoscritti, 249, ff. 314 (Caro di Ser Venisti), 317 (Bastari), 327-28 (Davanzi).

88 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics Table 3. I . Priorates with Electoral Balia, 1318- 1323 Bartolo Bandini Messer Caro di Ser Venisti Dardano di Tingo Acciaiuoli Filippo Aldobrandini Ser Manno Talenti Vanni di Corso di Matteo Donato di Pacino Peruzzi, Standard-bearer of Justice Niccolh di Ranieri Buongradi August-October, 1319: Ghese Buonaccorsi Francesco di Meo Acciaiuoli Chele di Pagno Bordoni Buto di Ricco Davanzi Lapo di Geri Jacopi Piero di Pinaccio Strozzi, Standard-bearer of Justice December 1320-February 1321: Gherardo Bonsi Jacopo d'Alberto del Giudice degli Alberti Donato di Mannino Acciaiuoli Ghigo di Pagno Bordoni Cecco di Spina Falconi Giano di Dino Gherardini (di Lapo) Boninsegna Gherardi, Standard-bearer of Justice Bernardo di Neri da Quarata August-October, 1322: Bartolo di Manetto Buonricoveri [Baroncelli] Francesco del Bene Bencivenni [Del Bene] Bernardo di Pagno Bordoni Buto di Ricco Davanzi Cambio di Geri Messer Rinieri del Forese, Standard-bearer of Justice Messer Pace di Messer Jacopo October-December, 1323: da Certaldo June-August, 1318:

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

89

Table 3. I. (continued) Neri di Messer Jacopo del Giudice degli Alberti Dardano di Tingo Acciaiuoli Chele di Pagno Bordoni Cecco di Spina Falconi Cionetto di Giovenco Bastari Francesco di Giamoro Baroncelli, Standard-bearer of Justice elite of experienced politicians who used their authority to concentrate the honors of high office in the hands of the city's leading families. If the balia was a convenient technique that served the needs of the oligarchy by providing it with the means of avoiding the complex and unpredictably centrifugal tendencies of the guild system of elections, it must also be said that it afforded ample opportunity for corruption, manipulation, and favoritisms. These blatant defects became the target of much criticism. Villani explains the institution of the advisory college of the twelve buoni uomini in 1321 by noting that the priors were being defamed and that the new office was created as a check on the excessively broad powers of the S i g n ~ r i a In .~~ fact, one of the important stipulations of the law that established the Twelve was that the priors could no longer propose the grant of a balia without the deliberation of the new m a g i s t r a ~ yBut .~~ 25. Villani, Cronica, 2 : 230: "Nel detto anno [1321] e mese di Giugno, incorrendo a' Fiorentini si fatte traversie di guerra, e per la setta di quelli che non reggeano la citth, erano i priori e' rettori calonniati e biasimati, onde si crib un uficio di dodici buoni uomini popolani due per sesto, che consigliassono i priori, e che sanza loro consiglio e diliberazione, i priori non potessono fare niuna grave diliberazione, nit prendere balia. I1 mod0 fu assai lodato, e fu sostegno della setta e stato che reggeva." 26. PR, 17, ff. 118-118v: "Item ut negotia populi et comunis Florentie cum maiori solito solempnitate procedant et parcatur averi comunis antedicti, provisum et ordinatum est, quod domini Priores Artium et Vexillifer Iustitie tam presentes quam qui pro tempore fuerint hinc ad quartumdecimum diem mensis Decembris millesimo trecentesimo vigesimo secundo . . . nequeant vigore eorum offitii . . . deliberare fore utile pro populo et comuni predict0 . . . teneri consilium vel consilia . . . de petendo vel super petendo vel habendo ab ipso populo vel comuni . . . super aliquo negotio re vel causa . . . aliquam baliam, potestatem, licentiam vel arbitrium, vel quod eis detur, concedatur, vel atribuatur ab ipso populo et comuni vel consilio seu consiliis ipsius populi et comunis, absque deliberatione duodecim

go Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

electoral manipulations and the dissatisfaction they provoked were not so easily eliminated. On the same day in which the electoral balia of November 1323 was created, a law was approved by the legislative councils that prohibited the simultaneous assumption of more than one office by any individual and established a strict divieto against the nomination or election of those participating in communal elections. The Signoria announced that these steps were needed in order to ensure that "the distribution of offices and public honors shall proceed with a greater degree of equality than usual" and to put an end to the "complaints and resentments generated by elections which in many cases are said to have been conducted behind closed doors (sub quodam involucro: literally, under a certain cover) and not in open and honest compliance with constitutional requirements."*' The heart of the trouble was, of course, the pervasive phenomenon of factionalism. Throughout the years of balia-dominated elections, the factions repeatedly attempted, often with success, to manipulate the institutions of electoral politics to their partisan advantage and to the detriment of their enemies. Behind the facade of procedural stability and oligarchic continuity in the Signoria, factional rivalries erupted with increasing intensity and prevented the formation of a stable consensus around the electoral choices of the successive balie. From the official sources there are only occasional glimmers of the darker realities that underlay the electoral politics of the period. In a provision of 5 October 1324, which approved the addition of more names to the 1323 bags at the urging of the faction led by the Bordoni family, the Signoria tried to persuade the legislative councils that these supplementary elections had been carried out "with honesty and in good faith, without regard to any rivalry, division, or political Such protests of electoral impartiality were, however, only too bonorum virorum popularium infrascriptorum." Henceforth, a proposal would need the approval of thirteen of the combined members of the Signoria and the Twelve in order to be sent to the legislative councils. Every six months the Signoria and the gonfalonieri of the companies met to elect the new Twelve. 27. PR, 20, ff. 42-42~: "Ad hoc ut offitiorum et honorum publicorum comunis Florentie distributio cum maiori solito perequatione procedat, et cesset murmur et invidia que nasci poterat ex electionibus offitialium que ut plurimum fieri dicebantur sub quodam involucro, et non cum solempnitate vel honestate." 28. PRY21, f. 49: "electio seu electiones nuper facte de prioribus artium et vexilliferis iustitie . . . per presentes dominos priores artium et vexilliferum iustitie et offitium duodecim bonorum virorum pure ac fideliter facta seu facte sunt, et remote ab omni sismate, divisione, ac septa, quod cedit in evidentem utilitatem et unionem comunis et populi Florentie, et omnium civium et popularium ipsius komunis et populi, et de quo omnes possunt et debent merito contentari."

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

91

transparent. From Villani we know that the election of the priorate in I 3 I 6- I 7 was manipulated by pro- and anti-Angevin factions. When King Robert sent Count Guido da Battifolle as his vicar to Florence in mid1316, the priorate, according to Villani, was composed exclusively of persons from the anti-Angevin faction, referred to by the chronicler as the "sect that ruled the city through [its hold on] the priorate." In October two separate elections actually took place, with one group of priors elected by the still anti-Angevin Signoria and another from the "party of the king." By the next election, in December, the pendulum had swung all the way to the pro-Angevins, and the members of the new Signoria (which still numbered thirteen as a result of the double election of October) "were almost all from the party that favored the rule [in Florence] of the king."29 This may have been a somewhat exaggerated instance of the way in which factional struggles could distort electoral politics in these years, but it was nonetheless symptomatic of the basic and persistent malady that affected the political life of the commune in the generation between the collapse of the guild-based constitution around 1300 and the institution in 1328 of the system of biennial general scrutinies and extraction by lot. During this turbulent quarter century, there was no constitutionally ordained procedure for the selection and circulation of a leadership elite. The balie electing the priors had no institutional base beyond the incumbent Signoria, no legitimacy except that which derived from their designation by a previous balia and the sometimes reluctant approval of the legislative councils, and no point of political reference or constituency beyond the factions at whose instigation they were usually created. Even after King Robert's nominal lordship over the commune came to an end in 1322p the factions continued to hold sway. The sizable contingents of Florentines in exile were a constant source of friction and instability, as their allies within the city were frequently suspected of plotting conspiracies and coups to get them readmitted. Two such episodes occurred in July and August 1323. Both failed to achieve the primary objective of securing the return of the exiles, but the ruling faction was sufficiently shaken by these plots to make important concessions in electoral politics to the rival faction that had been largely out of power since the pro-Angevin coup of late 1316. The confusing events of the summer of I323 form the immediate background for the electoral balia of the following November when, according to Villani, the Signoria elected a new 29. Villani,

Cronica, 2 : 196-97. 30. Ibid., p. 235.

92 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

group of priors for the next forty-two months and "included persons who had not been in power since the time of Count Battifolle, two out of every three for the office of prior, to give the appearance of uniting the people after the events perpetrated by the exiles in the previous A u g ~ s t . " ~Less ' than a year later, in September 1324, factional quarrels once again resulted in a modification of the electoral lists. The faction called la Serraglina or the Serraglini, after its leader Serraglio de' Bord0ni,3~in alliance with "those who had not been in power until then, . . . induced the creation of a balia in the hands of the Signoria and their twelve advisers [the Dodici], authorizing them to correct and reform the elections of the previous August as they saw fit." Villani says that the promoters of this scheme were persons "who wanted more than just a share of According to Stefani, they feared that the electoral choices made by the balia of August 1323 had not been "to their liking."34 Apparently to their surprise, however, they found little to object to in the bags and contented themselves with adding new names for a total of six additional priorates, "including some from the other faction that had not been in power, to give an impression of civic unity and to allow the participation [in government] of good men."35 Thus, even in 1324, without the divisive Angevin question and in the absence of any immediate threat from the exiles, the factions were capable of manipulating the system of election by balia quite openly to their own ends. "In this way," Villani concludes, "a new regime was installed in Florence, without any turbulence or danger to the city, by combining the faction that had ruled the city from the time of Count Battifolle until then 31. Ibid., pp. 287-88. These events are described by Villani, ibid., pp. 278-80, 282-83, and by Stefani, Cronaca, rr. 360-62, pp. 132-33. See also Robert Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 8 vols. (Florence, 1972-73), 4:9-j2-58, and Romolo Caggese, Firenze dalla Decadenza di Roma a1 Risorgimento d'ltalia, 3 vols. (Florence, 1912-21), 2 : 132-38. 32. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 377, pp. 137-38. 33. Villani, Cronica, 2 :310- I I. 34. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 377, p. 138. 35. Villani, Cronica, 2:311. Guidi confuses the events of 1324 by associating them with Modesto Rastrelli's description of the alleged "scrutiny" and adoption of extraction by lot in 1323 (Prioristafiorentino,p. 92); see "Sistemi elettorali," pp. 395-96. Rastrelli's information is clearly reported in connection with the electoral balia of 1323 and has no bearing on the inclusion in the bags of an additional group of names by the balia of 1324. Moreover, as we shall see further on, Rastrelli's account of the "scrutiny" of I323 is plainly anachronistic. The institutions ascribed by the eighteenth-century compiler to the balia of I323 are in fact much closer to those of the great reform of 1328 than to any of the practices of I323 or 1324.

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

93

with those who had not been part of the ruling group, although the former retained much of their power."36 Villani's somewhat murky identification of these factions involves little more than a simple distinction between the "ins" and the "outs," between those who had ruled since the 1316 coup and those who had not. The priorate was a prize to be contended for among the powerful families, and the electoral balie of these years were hardly more than attempts either to consolidate or to challenge the advantageous position enjoyed by the "ins." It was a system doomed to failure by its own recurrent instability, a fact finally recognized in 1328 when the thoroughgoing reform of that year called for measures designed to "remove all cause for scandal and error, which, both from experience and from the common reputation that has spread to all parts of Italy, we know to have existed among the citizens of this city over the matter of a election^]."^' Having described the oligarchic and factional dimensions of the system of election by balia, we are in a position to approach the problem of the presumed "electoral reform" of October-November 1323. A certain amount of confusion had persisted in the treatment of this event. The "reform" has often been considered to have introduced the method of imborsazione and extraction by lot into Florentine elections for the first time, or at least for the first time since 1291.38 Before assessing the accuracy of this contention or the significance of what in fact happened, a review of the evidence is needed. The major sources for the problem are the descriptions of the chroniclers, Villani and Stefani, and the relevant legislation. Villani, whose account has already been quoted in part, wrote as follows: In this year [1323] at the end of October, the priors and the Standardbearer of Justice who at that time sat in the Signoria (and they were 36. Villani, Cronica, 2 :31 I. 37. See chap. 4, n. 9. 38. See, for example, Alfred Doren, Le Arti Fiorentine, 2 vols. (Florence, 1940), I :270n; Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 4: 958; and Caggese, Firenze dalla Decadenza di Roma, 2 : 138-39. Caggese further confused the issue by assigning the reform to the year 1324 instead of 1323, apparently because he failed to distinguish between the balia of October I323 and that of September-October 1324. Guidi's analysis of the electoral balia of 1323 in "Sistemi elettorali" (pp. 394-95) is based on Davidsohn and on an inaccurate reading of Villani's account. Guidi claims, without any evidence, that "a new method for the election of the priorate" was adopted in 1321 and that the I323 "reform" elaborated and consolidated the new system by applying the technique of extraction by lot. Neither assertion is warranted in the light of the extant sources.

94 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics among the most important popolani of the city) were entrusted with the authority of a balia to elect the priors for the following period, and they elected them for the next forty-two months. And they included persons who had not been in power since the time of Count Battifolle, two out of every three for the office of prior, to give the appearance of uniting the people after the events perpetrated by the exiles in the previous August; and they put the elected priors into arranged bags to be drawn every two months. From this there later arose new difficulties before a year had passed, as we will mention further on.39 Stefani described these events in a slightly different way: Those who were in power in Florence, fearing that their control of the government might be the cause of scandal, decided to placate the people; and they assumed the authority of a balia in order to reform Florence [i.e., to elect new officeholders] for four years and to place [the names of elected citizens] into bags and have them drawn by lot. Many of those who had not held office in that time were put in the bags; and a balia was voted by the councils in order that these things might take place; and so it was done; it is true that, although they assumed the authority of the balia for four years, they used it for only three and a half years. And this was done on 28 October 1323.~' In the volumes of the Libri Fabarum and the Provvisioni there is no entry for the second half of October that can conceivably be related to the reform described by Villani and Stefani. Not before 10 November do we find a major piece of legislation dealing with electoral policy. The provision in question granted extraordinary powers to the Signoria in several areas, including the authority to "nominate, elect, and appoint the priors of the guilds and the Standard-bearers of Justice . for whatever length of time or period and in whatever number and quantity and from among whichever popolani citizens of Florence seems fitting and pleasing to the priors and Standard-bearer of Justice now in office."41 The rest of the pro-

..

39. Villani, Cronica, 2 :287-88. 40. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 366, p. 134. 41. LF, 12, ff. 85-87; PRY20, f. 40v: "Item quod ipsi domini Priores artium et Vexillifer Iustitie possint eisque liceat usque ad kallendas mensis Decembris proxime venturi . . . nominare, eligere, ponere et deputare Priores Artium et Vexilliferos Iustitie dicti populi et comunis pro ill0 tempore et terrnino seu temporibus et terminis et in eo numero et quantitate Priorum et Vexilliferorum et de illis personis popularibus civibus florentinis de quibus et prout et sicut eisdem dominis prioribus et Vexillifero iustitie nunc in offitio residentibus placuerit et videbitur."

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

95

vision detailed the temporary suspensions of existing laws that legalized the election despite its failure to conform to the whole corpus of legislation regulating the election of the priorate that had accumulated since 1293. The balia of November 1323 was, in sum, identical to those of February 1321 and September 1322, with the sole difference that on this occasion the electoral authority of the priors was extended from 10 November to the end of the month, whereas previously it had been limited to a few days at most. Apart from the longer duration of the balia, which was altogether consistent with the fact that this Signoria assumed the unprecedented task of electing the priorates of the next three and a half years, there was no major procedural innovation. Neither the provision of 10 November nor the account offered by Villani makes any mention of extraction by lot. The only basis for claiming that this system of drawing names from the bags was introduced in 1323 is Stefani's contention that the electors decided to "mettergli in borse e trargli a sorte," and Stefani, who wrote decades after the events in question, was not always accurate in matters of constitutional detail. Villani spoke of "bossoli ordinati" into which the name tickets were placed and drawn every two months but did not specify that they were to be drawn "a sorte." The system he describes in no way differs from the elections of the previous half decade. The priors were elected in groups for specific terms of office, and the extraction of the names at bimonthly intervals was predetermined by the balia at the time of the election. These conclusions are further supported by the records of the bimonthly extractions of the priors. The entry for each priorate from April 1321 to April 1326 confirms that the name tickets of the priors-elect were extracted from bags, but nowhere in the regular extractions is there any hint that they were drawn by lot.42The only exceptions to this general absence of any reference to electoral sortition occur in the context of special circumstances. On two occasions in 1324 it became necessary to elect replacements for persons originally designated by the balia. Both times it was specified that the substitute priors were drawn by lot (sorte) from a bag.43This was not, however, the same bag from which regular bimonthly 42. Tratte, 1084, f. 2: "Die xiii" mensis Aprilis . . . in Consilio Centum Virorum, Generali et Spetiali domini Capitanei . . . in presentia . . . iudicis et collateralis assessoris dicti domini Vicarii. . . . Extracti fuerunt de pisside Priores Artium et Vexillifer Iustitie eorumque notarius." After Florence severed its formal connection with King Robert of Naples in 1322, the bimonthly extractions were carried out in the presence of the Podesti and the Captain in place of the royal vicar; for the first instance of this, see ibid., f. 8v. 43. Ibid., f. 26v (9 August 1323): "In dicto consilio in conspectu et presentia

96 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics extractions were made, for on the second of these occasions the bag is described as that "in which are written the names of those to be substituted in place of absent or deceased priors and Standard-bearers of J ~ s t i c e . " ~ ' Evidently, special elections had been held to fill bags of potential substit u t e ~ T. h~e~reference to extraction by lot in the case of substitutes makes the lack of the same in the extraction of regularly elected priors an even more secure indication that the first drawing of the names was predetermined by the balia. A final confirmation of this conclusion is furnished in another provision dealing with the problem of substitutes. Two of the priors elected for the term June-August 1325 died sometime between October I323 and June 1325. O n 7 June a provision authorized the Signoria then in office to elect directly two substitutes in their place and, in effect, to bypass the special bag of designated replacements from which the substitutes should have been drawn by lot, according to the procedure used in 1323 and 1324. T h e important point is that, like similar provisions already examined, the authorization of June I325 refers unmistakably to the deceased priorspredictorum extrattus fuit sorte de pixide Taverninus Donati loco Lapi Johannis Bonacorsi suprascripti qui dicebatur esse absens a civitate comitatu et districtu Florentie, et in tam longinquis partibus quod non poterat esse ad dictum prioratus offitium exercendum." 44. Ibid., f. 39 (14 August 1324): "Extractus fuit sorte Lorinus Ser Bonaiuti loco Talenti de Medicis Vexilliferi Iustitie, pro sextu Porte Domus, mortui, de pixide in qua scripta sunt nomina subrogandorum loco Priorum et Vexilliferorum absentium et mortuorum sextus Porte Domus. Item incontinenti de dicta pixide propter absentiam dicti Lorini, extrattus fuit de dicta pixide sorte Gratia Guittomanni." 45. PR, 21, f. 49 (5 October 1324): "Providerunt . . . quod electio seu electiones facte per dictos presentes Priores Artium et Vexilliferum iustitie et dictum offitium duodecim bonorum virorum de mense Septembris proxime preterit0 de prioribus artium et Vexilliferis iustitie et eorum scribis, et de subrogandis loco absentium et mortuorum pro tempore et temporibus pro quibus ipsa electio seu electiones facte sunt . . . licite, libere et impune et absque aliquo eorum preiuditio et gravamine fieri potuerint." The elections here approved were those conducted by the balia established in September 1324 at the instigation of the faction led by the Bordoni family. This balia decreed that no further additions or deletions could be made until after 15 April 1327. The length of time between the first priorate elected by the balia of October 1323 and the priorate that assumed office on 15 April 1327 amounts to twenty-one two-month terms, i.e., to the forty-two months mentioned by Villani and the three and a half years reported by Stefani; see above, nn. 39 and 40.

Election by Balia, 1310-1326

97

designate as having been elected for a specific term.46Thus, even after the presumed reform of October 1323, the priors and the Standard-bearers of Justice were still elected in preselected groups for specific terms. Despite the technical use of imborsazione and extraction from bags, there is no evidence to support the idea that the names were drawn by lot. The so-called reform of October 1323 was therefore simply an extension of the electoral system that had been in use certainly since 1318 and possibly as early as 1310. Its particular importance lay, even for Villani, not in any major procedural modifications, but in the exceptional political circumstances that prompted the ruling group to elect priors for the unprecedented number of twenty-one future terms and to include, among those elected, representatives of rival political factions. These developments all took place within the institutional framework of balia-dominated elections that had emerged in the previous decade. It was not until the major reforms of November-December 1328 that Florence's ruling class succeeded in creating an electoral system that swept aside the controversial and disputed method of election by balia, while still managing to avoid the dangers of a guild-based electoral system. The two and a half years from June 1326 to the end of 1328 constitute an interlude of relatively minor importance in the history of Florentine electoral politics. Still seeking escape from Castruccio and from the financial embarrassment he caused the city, Florence delivered herself once again to Angevin power, this time in the person of King Robert's son Charles, the 46. PR, 22, ff. 4-4v: "Quoniam ad notitiam dominorum Priorum Artium et Vexilliferi iustitie . . . nuper pervenerit quod Bene Chiari qui asseritur electus in priorem et pro priore artium pro sextu Burgi pro duobus mensibus proxime venturis initiandis die quintodecimo presentis mensis Junii, ac etiam dominus Albertus Rosonis iurisperitus qui electus asseritur in priorem . . . pro sextu Porte Domus . . . defuncti sunt, et attendentes quod multa et ardua negotia dicto tempore dictorum duorum mensium pro comuni predict0 iminent facienda . . . Ideo per dominos . . . priores . . . et vexilliferum . . . nunc in offitio residentes et offitium duodecim bonorum virorum . . . providerunt . . . quod ipsi iamdicti priores . . . et Vexillifer . . . nunc in offitio residentes, una cum dicto offitio duodecim bonorum virorum habeant . . . plenam baliam, licentiam, auctoritatem et potestatem . . . eligendi, deptandi, et subrogandi loco dictorum Benis et domini Alberti . . . duos probos et discretos viros . . . in prioribus . . . non obstante quod loco dictorum Benis [et] domini Alberti defuntorum ut dictum est aliqui deberent subrogari in dicto offitio, vel subrogati reperiantur vel electi." The appointment of the replacements is recorded in Tratte, 1084, f. 46.

98 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics D u k e of Calab~-ia.~' Despite his promises to obey the ordinances and statutes of the commune a n d to conduct the election of all city officials according to these same laws48(something the Florentines themselves h a d failed t o do), Charles and his famous vicar, Walter of Brienne, showed little respect for the constitutional formalities of the Florentine electoral tradition. T h e Tratte records inform u s that the priors who took office on 15 June 1326 were elected by simple and direct appointment of the D u k e of Athens and that the newly elected magistrates took the oath of office "at the feet" of the ducal vicar.49Although n o mention of any specific method of election is to be found for t h e duration of the ducal signoria, there can b e little doubt that Charles o r his vicar continued to elect the priorate by personal decree.50 47. His election as signore of Florence for ten years was approved by the councils; see PR, 22, ff. 54-55. 48. Ibid., f. 55: "Item quod dictus dominus Dux posit, sibique liceat eligi facere iuxta formam statutorum et Ordinamentorum dicti populi et Comunis, et terminis in ipsis statutis et ordinamentis contentis, omnes et singulos offitiales dicti populi et comunis. . . . Item quod prefatus dominus Dux eiusque vicarius . . . teneantur et debeant servare et servari facere omnia et singula statuta . . . et maxime Ordinamenta iustitie . . . ac etiam manuteneant et conservent . . . offitium prioratus Artium et Vexilliferatus Iustitie . . . et officium Executoris Ordinarnentorum Iustitie et offitium Gonfalloneriorum sotietatum populi." 49. Tratte, 1084, f. 58: "In public0 parlamento in ecclesia Sancti Petri Scheradii more solito congregati, infrascripti novi et futuri Priores Artium et Vexillifer Iustitie, per dominum Ducem Attenarum vicarium domini Ducis Calabrie eletti, eorumque notarius . . . iuraverunt eorum offitium ad pedes ipsius domini Ducis Attenarum in ipsius presentia. . . . Vexillum vero iustitie datum et exibitum fuit infrascripto Vexillifero iustitie per predictum Dominum Ducem Attenarum." According to Villani, Brienne "cassb tutte l'elezioni fatte de' priori per lo innanzi, e' prirni priori a mezzo Giugno fece a sua volont8" (Cronica, 2 :362). 50. In August 1326, Charles's electoral authority was freed of any and all restrictions: "il duca volle dichiarare co' Fiorentini la sua signoria, e allargare i patti, spezialmente di potere liberamente fare priori a sua volont8, e simile ogni signoria e ufici e guardia di castella e in citth e in contado" (Villani, Cronica, 3 :7). See also PRY23, ff. I - I V .

Four The Reform of 1328: The Institution of the General Scrutiny and Sortition

In the last months of 1328, death liberated Florence from her two great oppressors. Castruccio Castracani, the lord of Lucca whose territorial ambitions in Tuscany had brought about a sustained and costly conflict with the expanding republic to the east, died on 3 September, and his death was soon followed by that of Charles of Calabria on 9 November. A public funeral was held for Charles in Florence on 2 December, and Villani commented as follows on the mood of the Florentines: "Those citizens who were devoted to the Parte Guelfa were very saddened by the death of this lord, as far as it concerned the Parte, but, more generally, the citizens were glad on account of the burdensome taxes he imposed on them and because [now that he was dead] they would be liberated and free." "Liberi e franchi," the Florentines began immediately to "take counsel and deliberate on how they might provide the city with leadership and a government in a way that would gain general approval and eliminate the factions among citizens."' Villani's comment highlights the central preoccupation of the regime: the eradication from electoral politics of the bitter factional disputes that had lacerated the city in the previous two decades. The reform of December 1328, which resulted from these deliberations, proved to be the most far-reaching innovation in the history of Florentine electoral institutions. On 26 November, only nine days after the news of Charles's death reached Florence, the legislative councils approved a provision entrusting authority for a complete overhauling of the electoral system to a committee I. Villani, Cronica, 3 : 103: "Dappoich'e' Fiorentini ebbono novelle della morte del duca, ebbono pih consigli e ragionamenti e avvisi, come dovessono riformare la citti di reggimento e signoria per mod0 comune, acciocche si levassono le sette tra' cittadini."

IOO

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

of thirteen men. This committee included the seven members of the Signoria of October-December 1328 and six advisers selected by them to collaborate on the important p r ~ j e c t Some .~ of the most politically prominent families of the preceding generation were represented o n this powerful committee. T h e incumbent Signoria included two persons, Jacopo d'Alberto del Giudice and Cecco di Spina Falconi, as well as the son of another, Giovenco d i Cionetto Bastari, who had served o n at least one of the balia priorates between 1318 and 1323, and among the six ad hoc members of the reform committee was yet another representative of that elite group, Donato d i Mannino A c ~ i a i u o l i T . ~h e remaining priors, with one exception (Lapo d i Giovanni Gavacciani), were all from leading aristocratic houses (Gentile d i messer Oddo Altoviti, Maso Valori, a n d Tinoro d i Nardo Guasconi), as were the other five of the six appointees (Messer Tommaso Corsini, Giotto d'Arnaldo Peruzzi, Spinello d i Primerano d a Mosciano, Lorino di Bonaiuto, and Taldo Valori). As individuals, these thirteen enjoyed remarkably. successful political careers. Only Lapo Gavacciani was elected to the Signoria less than four times. Spinello d a Mo2. PR, 25, f. 25: "Providerunt . . . quod electiones seu approbationes, que facte fuerint pro futuro tempore de viris popularibus civitatis Florentie, ad offitia prioratus et Vexilliferatus Iustitie, ad offitium XII"" bonorum virorum, ad offitium Gonfaloneriorum Sotietatum populi, per dictos dominos Priores et Vexilliferum Iustitie, cum colegiis tam offitialium comunis Florentie quam artium et universitatum civitatis Florentie, ad secretum scruptinium, cui scruptinio debeant [interesse] septuaginta viri. . . . Quorum nomina cum suis prenominibus fuerint . . . in cedulis de membranis, et postea . . . in saculis, prout de huiusmodi electionibus, seu approbationibus, et scripturis dictorum nominum, et positionibus in saculis premissis continetur in provisione super hiis edita per eosdem dominos Priores et Vexilliferum Iustitie, de consilio Domini Thomasii Corsini iudicis, Giotti Arnoldi de Peruzzis, Donati Mannini de Acciaiuolis, Spinelli Primerani de Mosciano, Lorini Bonaiuti, et Taldi quondam Valoris, ad hec habitos per eosdem dominos Priores et Vexilliferum, et omnia et singula in ipsis provisionibus et qualibet earum contenta, tam circa dictas electiones, seu approbationes et scripturas et positiones in saculis quam circa extractiones dictorum nominum de dictis saculis, et remissiones in eisdem, vel alias, et deveta . . . valeant, et teneantur et serventur per populum et comune Florentie." The provision reveals that the new system had already been worked out in considerable detail. It was approved by solid majorities in the councils: 64 to 18 in the Council of the Hundred; 56 to 18 in the Special Council; and 250 to 12 in the general council of the commune (ibid., ff. 25v-26v). See also LF, 13, ff. 149-149~: "Provisionem factam super facto bonorum hominum ponendorum in sacullis." For the names of the priors and Standard-bearer of Justice, see Stefani, Cronaca, r. 445, p. 158. 3. See above, chap. 3, Table 3.1.

The Reform of 1328

IOI

sciano reached the high office eleven times between 1309 and 1343, Gentile Altoviti nine times from 1296 to 1332, Giotto Peruzzi eight times from 1293 to 1335, and Maso Valori and Cecco Falconi seven times each from, respectively, 1318 to 1334 and 1316 to 1334. Collectively, the thirteen reformers of 1328 were elected to the Signoria seventy-six times, an average of just under six appearances each.4 From this small and privileged group the Florentines received the electoral institutions that shaped the character of their republican polity for the next century and a half. Although the historic importance of the 1328 reforms has long been recognized by modern scholar^,^ as it was by contemporary observer^,^ its specific provisions have not been adequately studied and interpreted. Consequently, the precise relationship of these reforms to both the configuration of Florentine politics in the decade of the 1330s and to the long-term development of the system of general scrutinies and sortition has often been misunderstood. O n 8 December, the committee of thirteen presented the results of its labors to the same legislative councils that had validated its authority; and three days later the new ordinances were proclaimed before a general parlamento of the Florentine people in the piazza of the S i g n ~ r i aMuch .~ of the animating spirit of the reform is revealed in its prologue: 4. Priorista Mariani I-111, in Manoscritti, 248, ff. 15-16, 26-27, 91-92, 175, 194-95, 199,212- 13; Manoscritti, 249, ff. 317,377,388,463; Manoscritti, 250, ff. 57% 579. 5. Alfred Doren, Le Arti Fiorentine, 2 vols. (Florence, 1940), I :270-72; Robert Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 8 vols. (Florence, 1972-73), 4: 1181-83; and most recently, Guidubaldo Guidi, "I sistemi elettorali agli uffici del Comune di Firenze nel primo Trecento: I1 sorgere della elezione per squittino (1300- I 328);' ASI I 30 (1972): 396-407. 6. Villani, Cronica, 3 : 103-5; Stefani, Cronaca, r. 446, pp. 19-59. 7. For the text of the reform law, see PP, 6, ff. 292-302; there is another and somewhat flawed copy in Cap., 30, ff. 45-49v, which has been published by 11defonso di San Luigi in Delizie, 12:288-305. This published edition of the law contains a large number of errors, and I have consequently preferred to use the version in PP, 6. The December law was passed by votes of 91 to o, 56 to 3, and 202 to 23 in the councils. For the record of its passage, see LF, 13, ff. 150-53: "Provisionem factam super ordinamentis factis super approbando et inprobando omnes sufficientes ad offitium prioratus Artium et Vexilliferatus Iustitie." 8. Villani, Cronica, 3 :104: "E quest'ordine si fermb prima per gli opportuni consigli, e poi in pieno parlamento nella piazza de' priori, ove fu congregato molto popolo, ov'ebbe molti dicitori, e lodando l'ordine, e confermandola, a di I I di Dicembre 1328, sotto gravi pene chi contro facesse."

102

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

Desiring that henceforth those citizens of Florence, who shall be approved by the favorable consensus of the good and law-abiding citizens as worthy and sufficient in their life and customs, may in fair measure achieve and ascend to the honors [of political office], and in order to prevent those persons whose life renders them unworthy from zealously seeking the governance and rule of the city, and so that in these same honors and rewards appropriate periods of ineligibility may be decreed and the offices relinquished and reassigned to other citizens who justly deserve to aspire to the aforementioned offices; and finally, so that all cause for scandal and error may be removed which, both from experience and from the common reputation that has spread to all parts of Italy, we know to have existed among the citizens of this city over the matter of honors and offices until this day.g The dominant theme of this prologue is the need for greater stability and order in Florentine electoral politics. The unworthy and the incompetent should be denied access to and discouraged from seeking high office. Technical modifications, based on a strict enforcement of the divieti, would provide for the more equitable distribution of offices. Such controls, it was hoped, would put an end to the debilitating power struggles among the aristocratic factions, which had evidently become a source of great embarrassment to the city's merchant patricians. The reformers of 1328 sought to create an electoral system of continuity and predictability that would terminate the frequent eruptions of disorder arising from conflicting political ambitions. Thus, the prologue introduces a new idea into the lexicon of Florentine politics, one that reveals the overriding purpose of the institution of the general scrutiny: namely, that those persons, whatever their numbers, who were deemed worthy of holding the offices of prior, Standard-bearer of Justice, the twelve buoni uomini and the gonfalonieri of the companies, should be so recognized and designated "by the favorable consensus of the good and law-abiding citizens" of Florence 9. PP, 6 , ff. 292-zgzv: "Cupientes ut deinceps Cives civitatis Florentie gradatim perveniant ac adscendere possint ad honores et munera qui sufficientes et habiles vita et moribus bonorum et legalium Civium aspirante consensu fuerint approbati, et ne prosiliant ad gubernationem et regimen Civitatis predicte quos vite conversatio dignos ad predicta non facit, et ut in eisdem honoribus et muneribus competens tribuatur vacatio et perconsequens locus aliis civibus relinquatur qui digne ad dictos honores et munera aspirare meruerint; et ut omnis tollatur materia scandali et erroris quem hactenus occasione dictorum honorum et munerum fuisse inter cives civitatis predicte tam experientia novimus quam publica fama que per partes Italie undique viguit."

The Reform of 1328 103 (bononcm et legalium civium aspirante consensu). The key notion here, and indeed the cornerstone of the entire system, was consensus. The reform of 1328 did not abandon the fundamentally elitist character that the Florentine officeholding class had assumed in the preceding quarter century, but it did seek to place this elite on the more stable footing of consensus. The paramount aim of the reformers was to fashion electoral institutions that might permit the emergence and consolidation of such consensus within the ranks of the oligarchy. There were four principal stages in the electoral process created in 1328: (I) the preparation of lists of nominations (reductiones); (2) the voting or scrutiny of each nominee (scruptinium) and the placing of the names of approved candidates into bags or purses (imborsatio); (3) the extraction of name-tickets from the bags at designated intervals for each office (extractio); and (4) the regulations governing temporary ineligibility of officeholders and their families (devetum). The first step involved the nomination of eligible candidates for the three executive offices of communal government, the Signoria and the advisory colleges. For the first scrutiny to be held under the new system, that of December 1328-January 1329, the selection of candidates was entrusted to three nominating committees headed by the incumbent Signoria, the captains of the Parte Guelfa, and the five governing councilors of the Mercanzia. Each group was required to appoint no fewer than twentyeight popolani citizens to assist in the nomination of candidates, provided that no individual served on more than one committee. The three lists were drawn up separately, with the names arranged by sesto. Nominations were limited to popolani citizens of established reputation and proven Guelf loyalties who had reached the age of thirty for the offices of prior, Standard-bearer of Justice, and the Twelve, and the age of twenty-five for the college of the gonfalonieri of the companies. Within these limits, the nominating committees could select any and all persons whom they judged to be "sufficient and able" to sit in the executive branch of communal government. Of particular importance is the fact that for the first time no restrictions were placed on the number of nominations that could be made by any of the committees. The three completed lists, each bearing the seal of the committee in which it had been prepared, were submitted to the Signoria. lo 10.Ibid., ff. 292~-293:"Provisum et ordinatum est . . .quod presentes priores artium et vexillifer Iustitie cum adiunctis popularibus de quibus eis placuerit, presentes Capitanei Partis Guelfe cum hiis adiunctis popularibus quos voluerint ha-

104

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

T h e nomination of candidates in preparation for a scrutiny was, strictly speaking, nothing new i n Florentine elections. As described in chapter 2, the system of preelection nomination was used between 1292 and 1303. At that time, however, nominations were generally made by the guild consuls and the savi appointed by the Signoria, and only occasionally by the Signoria itself. T h e reform of 1328 completely excluded the guilds a n d their consuls from any say in this first critical phase of the electoral process. It was instead entrusted to three committees led and appointed by small a n d elite clusters of aristocrats: the Signoria of October-December whose membership has already been examined; the captains of the Parte Guelfa, whose conservative and oligarchic orientation is well known to students of the Florentine Trecento (even after the I323 reform of the prestigious organization, three of the six captains continued to. be selected from the ranks of the magnates);" and the Five of Mercanzia who represented the international merchant and banking elite of the five most powerful commercial guilds (Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria, and Medici, Speziali e Merciai).Iz These eighteen men, most of them from patrician bere, et Quinque Consiliarii Mercantie cum adiunctis popularibus quos habere voluerint, ita tamen quod adiuncti predicti cuiuslibet dictorum collegiorum fuerint ad minus viginti octo, et nullus possit esse adiunctus nisi in uno dictorum collegiorum, possint teneantur et debeant, videlicet, quodlibet dictorum collegiorum per se separatim unum ab alio, primo iuramento prestito singulariter per omnes . . . de nominatione bene et legaliter facienda in quolibet sextu de hominibus popularibus ipsorum sextuum vere Guelfis bone oppinionis et fame etatis triginta annorum pro offitio Prioratus et Vexilliferatus Iustitie vro offitio duodecim bonorum virorum et etatis viginti quinque annorum pro offitio Gonfaloneriorum Vexilliferatus Sotietatum vel ab inde supra, nominare omnes et singulos tam presentes quam absentes quos reputaverint sufficientes et habiles . . . et tradere teneantur suos norninatos in scriptis sub sigillo eorum collegii dominis Prioribus Artium et Vexillifero Iustitie." 11. LF, 12, f. 79v; P R , 20, f. 26v: "quod deinceps Capitanei Partis Guelfe civitatis Florentie sint sex, unus, scilicet, in quolibet sextu, quorum tres sint Magnates et alii tres populares, qui tres populares eligantur per Capitaneos Partis Guelfe . . . et per presentes dominos Priores et Vexilliferum Iustitie." On the Parte Guelfa, see Umberto Dorini, Notizie Storiche sull'Universitci di Parte Guelfa in Firenze (Florence, 1902), and the published edition of the 1335 Parte statutes in Francesco Bonaini, ed., "Statuto della Parte Guelfa di Firenze compilato nel MCCCXXXV," Giornale storico degli archivi toscani I (1857): 1-41. 12. The names of four of the Five of Mercanzia in office at the end of 1328 are recorded in Mercanzia, 139, no pagination, 10 September 1328: Vanni Bandini, Ruggieri de' Ricci, Priore di Ser Bartolo, and Maso Valori, who was also a member of the Signoria of October-December. How Valori's presence in both offices was

The Reform of 1328 105 houses and closely affiliated with the leading companies of Florence's international economic empire, controlled the selection of candidates for the first general scrutiny. As soon as the Signoria was in possession of the lists prepared by the three committees, the scrutiny was held in the palace of the priors. Included among the voting members of the scrutiny committee in 1328 were the seven members of the Signoria, the nineteen gonfalonieri of the companies, the Five of Mercanzia, two consuls from each of the twelve major guilds, and thirty Guelf popolani (five from each sesto) selected by the Signoria. No more than one consul from each guild was allowed in the voting contingent of each of the sesti, and no more than one member of a family in the scrutiny committee as a whole, although, significantly, the latter restriction did not apply to the members of the Signoria and the six savi who had written the reform law. Despite these restrictions, it is clear that the scrutiny of candidates, no less than their nomination, was tightly controlled by a small and powerful elite. Although the Parte captains were not included in the scrutiny committee (because all of its members had to be popolani), the Five of Mercanzia and the Signoria were. Representatives of the twelve guilds (the same twelve that had dominated electoral politics in the 1290s) were admitted to the voting, but their participation was limited to two per guild, to be selected, in the rather ambiguous phrasing of the reformers, "by lot by the priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice." By far the most significant element in the composition of the scrutiny committee, however, was the appointment of the thirty arroti who were picked entirely at the will of the Signoria. Thus, the Signoria and the Five of Mercanzia, together with the appointees of the former, constituted almost half of the scrutiny committee (42 of 85) and were in a position to control the voting, at the least by blocking the qualification of any candidates who did not meet with their approval. The acceptance of a candidate into the ranks of approved officeholders, and hence into the bags (borse), required the favorable votes of two-thirds, or fifty-seven, of the scrutators; thus, twenty-nine votes were sufficient to deny the approval of a candidate. But it is also certain that the members of the Signoria and their arroti could rely on the favorable votes of their allies among the consuls of the leading commercial guilds and the gofZfalonieri to secure the acceptance of candidates of their choice. reconciled with the rule that no individual could serve on more than one nominating committee is nowhere revealed; the prohibition may have applied only to the arroti or he may have ceded his Mercanzia post upon election to the Signoria.

106 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics When the eighty-five members of the scrutiny committee were assembled, the names of the nominees were read aloud, one by one, from the three lists. After the reading of each name, a separate and secret vote was taken by means of the traditional system of black and white beans inserted into an urn passed around the hall. Thus, although the identity of the nominees became public knowledge, the names of those approved remained an official secret, known only to the election secretaries who collected and sorted the beans, inscribed the names of successful candidates onto two name tickets, one for the Signoria and the other for the office of the Twelve, and placed them into separate bags for each sesto. Each person approved in this scrutiny was thus imborsato for both offices. A second scrutiny was then held for the office of the gonfalonien', and the names of those gaining the necessary two-thirds of the votes were distributed among nineteen bags, one for each administrative district or company (gonfalone). A master list of all persons approved for the three offices was also drawn up and safely stored under lock and key, together with the thirty-one bags, at Santa Croce.I3 13. PP, 6 , ff. 293-95: "Qui Priores et Vexillifer, habitis nominatis per dicta collegia . . . et nominatis per eosdem Priores et Vexilliferum iustitie . . . convocent in palatio populi . . . supradictos Gonfalonerios Sotietatum, Quinque Consiliarios Mercantie et duos ex consulibus cuiuslibet duodecim maiorum artium sorte eligendos per ipsos Priores et Vexilliferum iustitie, triginta bonos viros populares vere Guelfos, videlicet, quinque pro quolibet sextu eligendos per ipsos Priores et Vexilliferum, ita quod Priores et Vexillifer iustitie de quinque sextibus eligant adiunctos alterius sextus in absentia prioris vel vexilliferi et prioris ipsius sextus, ita tamen quod ex predictis qui approbare debuerint non sit ultra quam unus de una progenie, personis Priorum et Vexilliferi iustitie et dictis sex viris superius nominatis exceptis, et dummodo in uno sextu ultra quam unus Consul unius artis esse non possit ad approbationem premissam. Quibus omnibus supradictis congregatis . . . per scribam Reformationum prius recepto iuramento a predictis prioribus et Vexillifero iustitie et aliis convocatis predictis de bene et legaliter approbando et improbando personas . . . nominatas prout convenire crederint habito respectu ad condictiones et qualitates superius nominatas, legi ac nominari debeant nominati predicti seriatim unus post alium. Et facta nominatione ac electione unius, ante quam ulterius procedatur, talis nominatus et lectus ponatur ad scruptinium secretum inter dictos Priores et Vexilliferum iustitie et convocatos predictos celebrandum cum fabis nigris et albis . . . et illum quem repereant approbaturn per duas partes Priorum et Vexilliferi et convocatorum ipsorum [fratres] scribant pro approbato in quodam quaterno et sic fiat per ordinem de singulis nominatis in quolibet sextu per se et per ordinem prout sorte de sextu contingerit; et nomina eorum qui . . . fuerint approbati, per predictos tres fratres . . . scribantur sin-

The Reform of 1328 107 The extraction of names from these bags was a fairly simple matter. At the constitutionally designated intervals, the bags for each office were ceremoniously brought from Santa Croce and, in the presence of the incumbent Signoria, members of the colleges, the guild consuls, and the foreign officials, the name tickets were drawn by lot in the quantities required by the statutes: for the priorate, one from each of the six bags; for the Twelve, two for each sesto; for the gonfalonieri of the companies, one from each of the nineteen bags; and for the office of Standard-bearer of Justice, one name from one of the six bags from which the priors were drawn, to be rotated among the sesti according to a fixed plan.14 The procedure became more complicated, however, in the case of persons whose 'names were drawn but who for various reasons could not hold the office. Among the circumstances that might bring this about were the following: (I) temporary absence from the city, a category limited to individuals who were at least sixty miles away from Florence at the time of the extraction; (2) death; (3) forced exile for criminal offenses, without subsequent pardon; (4) condemnation for fraud or corruption in office; ( 5 ) fraudulent bankruptcy; (6) incarceration for debt or other reason; and finally (7) temporary ineligibility due to family or personal divieto. In cases I , 6 , and 7 (absence, incarceration, and prohibition by divieto), the name ticket was returned to the bag from which it had been drawn. In all the remaining cases the name ticket was destroyed and permanently removed from the gulariter in singulis cedulis de membranis ita quod de quolibet nomine sint due cedule et ponantur in duobus sacculis sive marsupiis in quolibet sextu . . . quorum sacculorum sive marsupiorum unus contineat approbatos pro offitio Prioratus et Vexilliferatus iustitie et alius approbatos pro offitio duodecim bonorum virorum ita quod quilibet de approbatis predictis ponantur in utroque dictorum sacculorum in uno sextu. . . . Super approbatione vero vel improbatione dictorum norninatorum ad offitium Gonfaloneriorum Sotietatum procedatur hoc ordine, videlicet, quod omnes qui fuerint nominati per dicta collegia . . . tam approbati quam improbati ad suprascripta offitia prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie et duodecim bonorum virorum, ponantur ad scruptinium mod0 et ordine suprascriptis . . . et habeatur unus sacculus sive marsupium pro quolibet vexillo . . . in quo ponantur et scribantur . . . nomina illorum de ipso vexillo qui fuerint approbati . . . et omnes supradicti sacculi in quibus scripta fuerint nomina approbatorum . . .in quadam Capsa reponantur que firmari debeat tribus clavibus. . . . Et habeatur unus liber de membranis in quo . . . scribantur per ordinem in quolibet sextu nomina . . . approbatorum ad supradicta offitia . . . videlicet, quodlibet ipsorum offitiorum per se separatim unum ab alio qui liber ponatur et conservetur in quadam Capsa." 14. Ibid., ff. 295-295~.

108 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics bag. After the ticket had been either replaced or destroyed, another was drawn in its place.ls The last feature of the procedure devised in December 1328 must still be discussed: the divieti. The divieti for officeholders remained unchanged from earlier communal legislation. For the members of all three executive colleges, the period of personal ineligibility for reelection was set at two years.I6 For family members, however, it was slightly modified. Before 1328 all persons from the family (domus) of a member of one of the colleges were barred from the same office for a full year.17 After 1328 the one-year divieto was restricted to fathers, grandfathers, their descendants in the male line, and full brothers. All other relatives (consortes) benefited from a reduced divieto of only six months, obviously a concession to the larger families. A six-month divieto was also decreed for the holders of one office with regard to the other two. Thus, a prior was ineligible for the offices of the gonfalonieri and the Twelve for a period of six months after the completion of his term, and likewise, a member of one of the advisory colleges IS. Ibid., ff. 296~-297: "Salvo in omnibus supradictis quod si fuerit absens a civitate Florentie tempore quo extractus fuerit per sexaginta miliaria vel ultra vel mortuus esset vel exbanditus comunis Florentie pro mallifitio scriptus in libris exbannitorum dicti comunis et non cancellatus, vel condemnatus in posterum pro baractaria vel falsitate seu qui in futurum tanquam mercator vel artifex pronuntiatus fuerit cessans vel fugitivus cum pecunia aliena vel nisi esset carceratus pro debito vel alia condempnatione occasione quacumque vel occasione alicuius processus facti seu qui fieret in futurum occasione alicuius malifitii vel delicti vel devetum haberet, quod in dictis casibus absentie vel deveti seu carcerationis cedula talis absentis vel carcerati ut dictum est vel devetum habentis remictatur in sacculo unde fuerit extracta, et alia de novo extrahatur et sic fiat donec idoneus habeatur. Cedula vero in qua repertum fuerit nomen mortui vel nomen exbanniti vel eius qui condempnatus esset ab hodie in antea pro baracteria vel falsitate vel cessatione et fuga ut supra dictum est incontinenti dilanietur et eiciatur in conspectu civium predictorurn et alia cedula de sacculo de quo dicta prima cedula dilaniata et eiecta extracta fuerit extrahatur et ille cuius nomen scriptum erit in cedula que aliquo dictorurn casuum de novo extrahatur de sacculo sit offitialis ad offitium ad quod fuerit extractus. Et si contingerit quod absit aliquem existentem in aliquo dictorum offitiorum decedere ante suum offitium finitum extrahatur de novo alia cedula de sacculo." 16. For the priorate, see the Ordinances of Justice in Gaetano Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani in Firenze dal 1280 a1 1295 (Florence, 1899), p. 390. For the advisory colleges, see Romolo Caggese, ed., Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina, vol. I , Statuto del Capitano del Popolo (Florence, I ~ I O )pp. , 296, 333 (book 5, rubrics 84 and 133). 17. Caggese, Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, pp. 255,296, 333.

The Reform of 1328

109

was ineligible for the priorate and the other college for six months after his residence in office.L8 The situation was contemplated in which these various divieti might disqualify all of the approved candidates whose names had been placed in the bag for a particular sesto and office. In this case, all the divieti, with one exception, were simply set aside, and the individual whose name ticket had been drawn first was put in office. The one divieto that could never be set aside was the prohibition against the simultaneous assumption of more than one office by an individual.19 It may have been mere caution that prompted this legislation concerning the possibility of a temporary suspension of the divieti, but it is also reasonable to suppose that the reformers of 1328 expected (and planned) that the number of candidates approved in the scrutiny would be relatively modest. This preference for occasional relaxations of the divieti in place of any expansion of the officeholding class is a telling indication of the basically elitist character of the 1328 reform law. Thus far, the regulations governing the extraction of name tickets from the bags should occasion little surprise. However, one unique and controversial feature of the sortition system created in 1328 had a profound impact on the composition of the Florentine political elite for the next ten years. The reform stipulated that the name tickets that are neither returned to the bags nor destroyed, as described above, . . . must immediately be placed in other similar bags to be identified as the "bag of name tickets drawn and replaced containing the names of those approved for the office of prior and Standard-bearer of Justice" for each sesto; the same procedure is to be followed for the bags of the other offices in each sesto. . . . When all the name tickets from any bag . . . have been extracted, then the tickets from the bag of those "replaced" will be drawn.20 18. PP, 6 , f. 2 9 7 ~ . 19. Ibid., f. 298: "Salvo quod si contingerit in sacculo seu sacculis dictorum offitiorum . . . non reperiri aliquam cedulam in qua sit descriptus aliquis qui iuxta observantiam dictorum devetorum vel alicuius eorum possit deputari vel esse ad offitium . . . in eo casu talis descriptus in tali cedula primo extracta possit deputari et esse . . . non obstante observantia deveti predicti dummodo eodem tempore unus esse non possit nisi ad unum offitium." 20. Ibid., f. 297: "Et quod cedule sic extracte que remicti non debent in sacculis nec dilaniari vel eici ut supra dictum est statim in conspectu omnium predictorum in aliis similibus sacculis reponantur descriptis et designatis de foris, videlicet, Sac-

I 10

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

The individuals whose "name tickets . . . [were] neither returned to the bags nor destroyed" were, of course, those actually elected and placed in office. It is curious that the reform law does not identify them as such, but there can be no other logical interpretation of the text. Clearly, persons whose name tickets were neither returned to the original bags nor destroyed did not fall into any of the seven categories that would have prevented their assumption of office. The name tickets of these officeholders were not destroyed, as later became standard procedure; instead, they were put into another, parallel set of bags that were stored together with the original bags of approved candidates. Then, whenever any of the original bags no longer contained any name tickets (or when all the remaining tickets belonged to persons temporarily ineligible because of the divieti), the extraction of names for subsequent terms of office continued from the parallel bag for the same sesto (or gonfalone) and office. This interpretation of the 1328 legislation is confirmed by Villani's description of the function of the parallel bags on the occasion of their abolition in 1339. "Previouslg [i.e., from 1328 on]," he wrote, "when [candidates] were approved in the scrutiny, their names were written on tickets that were placed in bags according to the sesti. Then, when they were drawn at the appointed times for these offices [the Signoria and the colleges], the tickets were put into other bags until they were all drawn, at which point they began to be drawn again."*' In effect, this meant that anyone elected to one of the three major offices was, by virtue of such election, automatically included in the next set of bags and guaranteed election to the same office for a second time. However, the full significance of the use of these parallel bags becomes clear only in the light of their relation to subsequent general scrutinies. culus cedularum extractarum et remissarum continentium nomina comprobatorum ad offitium Prioratus et Vexilliferatus Iustitie talis sextus, et sic fiat in sacculis cuiuslibet dictorum aliorum offitiorum in quolibet sextu, qui sacculi tam approbatorum ad supradicta offitia quam postea remissorum sigillari debeant sigillo parvo Dominorum Priorum et Vexilliferi Iustitie et sic sigillati stare et teneri debeant in capsa predicta salvo quam tempore extractionis vel remissionis fiende ut supra dictum est. Et quod extractis omnibus cedulis ex sacculo seu sacculis approbatorurn in dictis sextibus seu aliquo eorum, extrahantur cedule de sacculo seu sacculis dictorum remissorum." 21. Villani, Crunica, 3 :336: "i quali in prima com'erano eletti, erano i lor0 nomi scritti in polizze, e messe le dette polizze in borsa per sesti. A' tempi, quando si traevano per i detti ufici, si rimettevano in altre borse, infino che tutti n'erano tratti; e poi si ricominciava di nuovo a trarre."

The Reform of 1328

III

The second scrutiny under the new system was scheduled for January 1331 and subsequent scrutinies every two years thereafter (January 1333, 1335, etc.). The procedure established by the 1328 reform for all scrutinies after the first differed in some important details from that described above. The nomination lists, which were prepared in 1328 by the Signoria, the Parte captains, and the Five of Mercanzia, were subsequently to be compiled by the advisory colleges of the gonfalonien' and the Twelve, in ~ the scrutiny itself, the only addition to the three committees of 1 3 2 8 . ~For change was the addition of the Twelve as participants in both the selection of the thirty arroti and in the final vote for the approval of the nominees. At least seventy-five members of this slightly enlarged scrutiny committee had to be present and voting for a valid scrutiny of any candidate.23 22. This fact may help to explain an error contained in Giovanni Villani's account of the 1328 reform. Villani, who did not distinguish between the procedures established for 1328 and those projected for all later scrutinies, speaks of four nominating colleges: "di concordia trovarono questo mod0 nella lezione de' priori e gonfalonieri, cioe ch'e' priori con due arroti popolani per sesto facessono scelta e rapport0 di tutti i cittadini popolani guelfi degni dell'uficio del priorato, d'eti da trenta anni in suso; e per simile mod0 feciono i gonfalonieri delle compagnie con due popolani arroti per gonfalone; e simile recata facessono i capitani di parte guelfa col loro consiglio; e simile i cinque uficiali della mercatanzia col consiglio di sette capitudini delle maggiori arti, due consoli per arte" (Cronica, 3 : 103-4). Stefani's description of the reform was evidently based on Villani's, and he too speaks of a fourth list of nominations submitted by the gonfalonien' of the companies (Cronaca, r. 446, p. 158). Modern historians have followed the chroniclers and repeated the error; see Doren, Le Arti Fiorentine, I :271, and Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 4: 1182. The text of the reform law demonstrates quite clearly that in 1328 the nominations were made by three agencies and in 1331 by five. Villani's error seems to have originated as an inaccurate compromise between the original procedure and its planned modifications. Furthermore, the details that Villani gives regarding the arroti co-opted by the nominating agencies do not at all conform to the guidelines set down in the document. The only conclusion is that the chronicler must have confused subsequent practice with the original law. See the comments by Guidi, "Sistemi elettorali," p. 399n. 23. PP, 6, ff. 298-2g8v: "Insuper provisum est quod in M"CCCoXXXode mense Januarii fiat nominatio omnium et singulorum popularium dicte civitatis condictionis et qualitatis de quibus dictum est supra per collegia priorum et Vexilliferi Iustitie, Capitaneorum partis Guelfe, duodecim bonorum virorum, [Gonfaloneriorum Sotietatum, et Quinque Consiliariorum Mercantie qui pro tempore fuerint, eorum videlicet quos sufficientes et habiles reputaverint ad offitium prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie, offitium duodecim bonorum virorum] vel ad offitium Gonfaloneriorum Sotietatum cum adiunctis modis et sollempnitatibus suprascriptis quos adiunctos et in eodem numero habere debeant domini Priores et

I 12

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

Before the names of those approved in the second scrutiny were written onto name tickets, the results of the scrutiny were compared with those of the first scrutiny of 1328. Only the names of persons approved in 1331 for the first time, i.e., those who had not been approved in 1328, were written on new tickets. These were then added, according to office and sesto, to the parallel bags already containing the names of persons approved in 1328 and seated in office between January 1329 and January 1331. When the original bag of a given office and sesto no longer contained the names of enough eligible candidates to fill the required number of seats for a new term, the extractions continued from the parallel bags that now held the names of both the automatically reelected carry-overs from the 1328 list (known as the remissi) and the newly appi-ovedcandidates from the second scrutiny of 1331. This practice of mixing the remissi with the results of new scrutinies in the existing parallel bags was repeated every two years.24 Vexillifer Iustitie qui pro tempore fuerint, qui nominati approbentur et improbentur modis, formis et sollempnitatibus superius denotatis una cum offitio duodecim bonorum virorum, qui duodecim boni viri esse debeant in ellectione adiunctorum simul cum vrioribus et vexillifero. . . . Et scruvtinio cuiuslibet ex nominatis ad dicta offitia vel aliquod eorum intersint saltem 75 ex prioribus et vexillifero iustitie, duodecim bonis viris, Gonfaloneriis Sotietatum, Capitudinibus et adiunctis." The words enclosed in brackets are found only in the text of the reform in PP, 6, and are missing from the copy of the law in Cap., 30. The published edition of the law in Delizie is based on the copy in Cap., 30, and is consequently flawed by the absence of the bracketed words. It would seem that the scribe entrusted with copying the text inadvertently jumped from the list of agencies for the nominations to the list of offices for which the nominations were made. In both lists the gonfalonien' of the companies follow the twelve buoni uomini. His eye evidently skipped from the first mention of the Twelve to the second. In any case, a close reading of the passage reveals that the sentence makes no grammatical sense whatsoever without the bracketed section. 24. PP, 6 , ff. 298~-299: "Et quod predicti tres fratres . . . nornina approbatorum omnium scribant in uno quaterno et antea quam eorum nomina et prenomina in cedulis describantur videre possint et debeant dictum librum de membranis in quo scripta erunt nomina aliorum iam dictorum approbatorum, et collatione facta de tunc approbatis cum aliis primitus approbatis et in dicto libro pro approbatis descriptis, signent super dicto quaterno omnes approbatos quos alias approbatos seu in dicto libro pro approbatis descriptos invenient, ut sic solum de aliis tunc noviter approbatis qui alias approbati et pro approbatis descripti non reperiuntur, cedule fiat [sic], ut sic non possint [sic] contingere ut unus seu unius nomen plusquam semel vel ultra quam in una cedula in uno sacculo pro uno offitio sit descriptus et approbatus huiusmodi, scilicet, qui alias approbati non reperiuntur nomina describantur in cedulis de membranis; que huiusmodi cedule ponantur in sacculis dictorum remissorum cuiuslibet sextus distincte prout et sicut alias est distinctum secundum offitia, sextus et loca ad que et in quibus fuerint approbati,

The Reform of 1328

I 13

Here was perhaps the most crucial and significant aspect of the entire system created in 1328. The biennial mixture of candidates approved for the first time with all those who had held office since the time of the original scrutiny meant, in effect, that no subsequent scrutiny could ever overturn the results of the scrutiny of 1328. No one approved in that first scrutiny (whose name ticket was not subsequently destroyed owing to the accidents of political exile, condemnation for corruption in office, or fraudulent bankruptcy) could ever be removed from the lists and bags of the officeholding elite until his death. Even if such a person failed to gain the necessary twothirds of the votes in any or all subsequent scrutinies, his name would still be included among the eligible officeholders and regularly drawn for the offices for which he had been approved in 1328. The most that later scrutinies could do was to make periodic additions of new names to this privileged group. But once approved and admitted to this circle, a name could never be deleted except in the case of the extraordinary circumstances described above. Because the voting committees of these later scrutinies were largely staffed by officeholders who had been approved in 1328 and by the arroti of their choice, the possibility of a massive influx of previously excluded persons or families, which might have upset the political balance achieved in the first scrutiny, was small indeed.25As Villani concluded some years later, "one could say that [the successful candidates of et de eisdem tunc noviter approbatis fiat descriptio in dicto libro in quo fuerint descripti alii approbati per sextus et vexilla ut de aliis supradictis approbatis dictum est. Et de dictis tunc noviter approbatis et dictis remissis simul existentibus in uno sacculo seu marsupio, ut dictum est, deficientibus cedulis dictorum primorum approbatorum vel non existentibus aliquibus qui esse possint tempore extractionis ad illud offitium ad quod extraherentur obstante deveto fiat extractio cedularum et deputatio ad suprascripta offitia. . . . Et deinde subsequenter simili mod0 et forma quolibet biennio fiat nominatio et approbatio popularium civitatis predicte ad dicta offitia et descriptio et in sacculis missio in omnibus et per omnia observetur et fiat prout supra dictum est in dicta nominatione et approbatione fienda in MCCCXXX de mense Januarii." 25. The admission of the advisory colleges of the gonfalonieri and the Twelve into the nominating procedure, and of the latter into the scrutiny, in 1331 and beyond, poses no serious obstacle to this conclusion. Their absence from these functions in 1328 guaranteed that after the first scrutiny the members of these colleges would be as acceptable to the regime as the persons approved for the priorate itself. The institutional enlargement of the electoral process after 1328 was only an apparent liberalization because the colleges had been in effect "immunized" in the first scrutiny. In particular, the college of the Twelve, which at the time of its creation in 1321 seems to have represented a current of opposition to the prevailing but pressed oligarchy, was reborn as a faithful creature of the regime.

I 14

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

13281 had been elected for life."26 In fact, the regime that was born with the reform law of 1328 was ultimately brought down, not by domestic political challenges, but by its own military and fiscal policies and by the desperation that led it to place its faith in a foreign despot in 1342. The scrutiny of 1328 determined the configuration of the Florentine ruling class for the next decade. Understood in its relevant details, the reform was not, as some historians have claimed, the answer of democratic forces to the incessant factional struggles that had plagued Florence in the preceding decade^.^' It did indeed attempt to articulate a solution to the problem of factional conflicts, but the solution arrived at was hardly democratic. Historically, the great weakness of all Florentine electoral systems since the institution of the priorate in 1282 lay in their failure to generate the elements of political consensus. Elections were frequent and the results were for the short term only. Political factions or families excluded from office in one election had only to wait a very short time for the next election and a chance to overturn the previous results. Given the frequency of elections, there was little incentive for defeated parties or factions to cooperate with the elected government. For much of the early history of the priorate, the frequent elections provided the commune with periodic contingents of officeholders, but not with a stable officeholding or "ruling" class. The distinction is crucial. Each election produced a set of officeholders for a given term, but did not produce a commitment for a future share of power to anyone beyond the elected officeholders. The electoral system, in short, did not encourage consensus in those whom it failed to 26. Villani, Cronicu, 3 :336: "sicch? si pub dire quelli tali erano a vita." 27. Doren, summarizing the reform, says: "Si tratta dunque qui delle solite due tendenze fondamentali di un'organizzazione moderatamente democratica . . . e che qui trovano la lor0 classica espressione. Se il doppio scrutinio mirava a far pervenire alla piu alta magistratura del Comune solo i piu degni e cio? cittadini ligi ai principi fondamentali dello Stato, se inoltre merce quel duplice controllo si credette di poter superare le solite diffidenze reciproche, se si credette inoltre di aver posto riparo ai pericoli provenienti dalle consorterie, superando quei timori e pregiudizi propri di piccoli Comuni, con I'estrazione a sorte finale vennero poi in ultimo soddisfatte le richieste fondamentali della democrazia" (Le Arti Fiorentine? I :27z). Davidsohn interprets the reform in similar terms: "Poiche la snervante minaccia esterna era diminuita, la corrente democratica si mosse e procedette energicamente a riformare l'amministrazione principalmente riguardo all'assegnazione delle magistrature. Si mirb poi ad evitare il predominio di singoli gruppi nella cittadinanza. . . . Si mirava ad un'ulteriore democratizzazione dello Stato e per ottenere la maggiore imparzialit8" (Storb di Firenze, 4: I 182).

The Reform of 1328

II5

elect. This lack of consensus meant that those excluded had little interest in supporting a system that promised them little except another "all-ornothing" gamble at the next election. It was perhaps in recognition of this basic structural instability of the various electoral systems in use from 1282 until well into the fourteenth century that experiments in multipleterm elections became more frequent from about 1318. The balie of the period between 1318 and 1323, by electing in advance a whole contingent of officeholders for several terms, actually promised a future share of power to a larger number of persons and families than could ever have been satisfied in any of the bimonthly elections of the years between 1293 and 1303. In this way the support of at least those families and individuals was assured for the elected governments of the period, and a certain limited consensus was achieved. The electoral reform of 1328 was constructed on precisely this principle of the enlargement of the area of consensus by means of commitments to a future share of power. What the reform actually did was to extend the application of this principle far beyond the limited number of families or factional coalitions represented in the b d i e of 1318-23 to a whole social class. For the first time, a Florentine electoral system was designed for the purpose of articulating and defining a political class. The scrutiny of 1328 did not result in the election of officeholders for only a single term or even a number of terms. It provided instead for the simultaneous approval and confirmation to high office of as many citizens as were able to gain the necessary two-thirds vote of the scrutiny committee, and it promised to each of these approved citizens not merely the chance, but the certainty, of holding office sooner or later. Just how much sooner or later was, of course, left to chance. Thus, the number of "winning" candidates was enormously increased vis-2-vis the elections of the preceding half century, and the results of the scrutiny were intended to be as permanent as the lives and good standing of those who were approved. The political class that emerged from the scrutiny of 1328 was promised not only the certainty of power, but a collective, permanent monopoly of power as well. This last observation points once again to the elitist character of the 1328 scrutiny. There is no necessary contradiction in asserting the elitist quality of an electoral reform that resulted in a notable increase in the number of citizens approved and eligible for office. For the consensus gained through this enlargement was predicated on the necessity of limiting the area of consensus to a compact upper class. The promises of individual certainty and collective monopoly of office could only be meaning-

I I6

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

ful for a political class within certain manageable limits, and in the decade of the 1330s those limits were closely identified with the social boundaries of the international merchant and banking class. It would certainly have been far more difficult to create such a consensus from the vast and heterogeneous community of the guilds. Here, then, is the ultimate importance of the fact that in 1328 the crucial task of compiling the lists of nominations (that is, of defining the outer limits of potential electoral consensus) was given to the small circle of men who at that moment sat on the Signoria, the captaincy of the quasi-magnate Guelf party, and the Five of Mercanzia. These eighteen individuals controlled the initial and determining phase of the electoral mechanism. It is here that we come to the crux of the matter and to the resolution of the apparent paradox: the enlargement of the Florentine political class was carried out within narrow social limits strictly imposed by a handful of leading citizens representing the economic oligarchy of the great families and their clients. What they did, in effect, was to convert the Florentine political order from one in which the delegates of diverse social and professional groups, institutionalized in legally recognized corporations, competed for the election of a few rotating representatives of each category into an altogether different system in which political power became the shared monopoly of one class. The factions could be quelled only by promising them, collectively and in perpetuity, the whole of the pie. Thus, despite the creation for the first time of a relatively broad and stable political class, the electoral reform of 1328 and the subsequent scrutinies of the 1330s produced, in statistical terms, the most narrowly based and compact coterie of officeholders of any period in the Florentine Trecento. In the nearly fourteen years from 15 December 1328 through the priorate that entered office on I 5 August 1 3 4 2 , ~ the ~ 584 available places on 28. The scrutiny of 1328 was probably not completed in time for the tram of I j December, and the Signoria that assumed office on that day may not have been, strictly speaking, a product of the new electoral system. But if it was not, it is almost certain that the same small group that controlled the scrutiny also selected the priorate of 15 December. On this assumption, these priors have been included in the statistical analysis that follows. At the other end of the period, the priorate of 15 August 1342 has been chosen as the cutoff point on the grounds that the selection of subsequent priorates at the end of 1342 and through the first half of 1343 was heavily influenced, if not actually dictated, by the despot Walter of Brienne, who was proclaimed signore of Florence in September 1342. See Villani, Cronica, 4 : 16: "A di 15 d'ottobre il duca fece in Firenze nuovi priori, i piu artefici minuti, e mischiati di quegli che i lor0 antichi erano stati ghibellini."

The Reform of 1328

I 17

the Signoria were held by 302 individuals from 207 different families, for a n average of almost two appearances for each person and nearly three for each family.29Of those reaching the Signoria during this period 59 percent (178 of 302) did so more than once; 89 twice, 75 three times, 13 four times, and I (Giotto d i Fantone Angelotti) five times.30T h e 89 individuals elected three o r more times to the Signoria (equivalent to 29 percent of all the officeholders) held, collectively, 282 (or 48 percent) of all the posts. This solid core of the political class was returned to high office with systematic regularity over these years. T h e full dimension of oligarchic dominance, however, is best revealed by family rather than individual participation in the Signoria. Seven families were represented nine o r more times: the Strozzi, who led all families with a total of fifteen appearances in the Signoria; the Ricci, Albizzi, and Rucellai, twelve each; the Altoviti and the Baroncelli-Bandini, ten each; and the Acciaiuoli, nine. T h e officeholders from just these 7 houses held 29. The precise figures are 1.934 posts per man and 2.821 posts per family. Because these calculations cover a period of almost fourteen years and include the Standard-bearers of Justice as well as the priors, they cannot easily be compared with the ratios for the years from 1330 to 1339 computed by Anthony Molho. His ratios cover a shorter period and exclude the Standard-bearers of Justice; see "Politics and the Ruling Class in Early Renaissance Florence," Nuova Rivista Storica 52 (1968): 409. Molho studied the composition of the priorate in selected decades from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth century, focusing on the rate of individual and family participation, and found that the decade between 1330 and 1339 was the most restricted of the sample periods that he considered, with peak ratios of 1.55 posts per man and 2.03 posts per family. The higher ratios arrived at in my computations are in part accounted for by the inclusion of the Standard-bearers of Justice, who for the most part came from the same families represented in the priorate. Although my figures do confirm the essential conclusion of Molho's analysis for this decade, it ought to be pointed out that because the Standard-bearers of Justice were drawn from the same bags used to staff the priorate and because, once drawn and seated in office, they too were included among the remissi of the parallel bags and could be drawn again for either office, the extent to which the same individuals were repeatedly reelected to the Signoria is in reality even greater than Molho's figures suggest. 30. The thirteen persons who sat on the Signoria four times in these years were: Chele di Pagno Bordoni, Luca di Geri Strozzi, Francesco di Borghino Baldovinetti, Nerone di Nigi Dietisalvi, Ser Zato di Gaddo Passavanti, Ghino di Vieri Rondinelli, Sandro di Buto Davanzi, Bartolommeo di Guccio Siminetti, Vanni di Bartolo Armati, Niccolb di Berto Strozzafichi, Neri di Lippo del Palagio, Spinello di Primerano da Mosciano, and Taldo Valori. The last two were among the thirteen authors of the 1328 reform law.

I 18

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

13.7 percent of all the posts from December 1328 to August 1342. Six other families (Ardinghelli, Bordoni, Peruzzi, Bartolini-Davanzi, Stracciabende, and Armati) were each represented seven times. The total of 13 families from both groups (equivalent to 6.3 percent of all the families reaching the Signoria) held 20.9 percent of the posts in these years. Beyond these were clusters of 7 and 12 families with, respectively, six and five appearances each. These 32 families, which appeared five or more times in the Signoria and constituted 15 percent of all the families, supplied over one-third of the individuals admitted to the republic's highest office (103, or 34 percent) and collectively held almost two-fifths of the available posts (224, or 38 percent). If one continues this analysis further and includes families with four and three appearances in the Signoria, the results are even more startling: 43 families (those with four or more appearances) held 46 percent of all the posts, whereas 97 families (those with three or more) held no less than 74 percent (430 of 583).3' Although no single family or faction was able to dominate communal politics in this period, mobility into the officeholding elite was severely limited. The compactness of the elite is evident in terms of both guild affiliation and the rate of admission of new families. According to Marvin Becker, 71 percent of the members of the Signoria from 1328 to 1342 came from the three major commercial guilds (Calimala, Cambio, and Lana).= Such a heavy concentration of offices in the hands of the members of so few guilds is reminiscent of the similar situation that had prevailed in the 1280s when two-thirds of the posts also went to the members of only three By the 133os, however, the steady growth of the woolen-cloth industry had raised the Lana into the top three in place of the guild of lawyers and notaries. The political elite that governed the commune in the aftermath of the 1328 reform was practically synonymous with the city's dominant banking and commercial interests, and perhaps at no time more than in the 1330s did the government of Florence approach the character of a true plutocracy. This remarkably compact elite was especially reluctant to share its privileged position with families not previously admitted to the Signoria, in particular those from the populous and mobile strata of small merchants, 31. These figures have been assembled from Priorista Mariani 1-111, in Manoscritti, 248-50. 32. Marvin B. Becker, Florence in Transition, vol. I (Baltimore, 1967)~p. 17. 33. Nicola Ottokar, ZI Comune di Firenze allafine del Dugento (1926; rev. ed.! Turin, 1962)~pp. 18-19; see above, chap. I, pp. 29-30.

The Reform of 1328

I 19

shopkeepers, and artisans. In fact, so rigorously did the elite oppose the entrance into political life of such new families that it may not be an exaggeration to say that, for the first and only time in the history of the republic, the Florentine governing class was on the verge of turning itself into a closed caste. In the nearly fourteen years during which the electoral system of 1328 remained in force, a total of only thirty-eight new families (i.e., without previous representation in the Signoria) were admitted to the high office.34In no other comparable span of years before the fifteenth century was mobility into the officeholding elite so restricted. Even during the period of balia-dominated elections, the rate of admission of new families was almost three times higher (a total of 104 between 1312 and 1325)~and in the ten years during which the guilds had had a major role in electing the priorate, it was more than five times higher (143 between 1293 and 1302). AS will be seen in the next chapter, when the guilds regained their electoral authority on an even wider basis in the mid-1340s~the annual average of new families admitted to the Signoria was fully ten times what it had been in the years between 1328 and 1342. From 1344 to 1348, more new families reached the priorate each year than in the entire decade between 1330 and 1339. The extraordinary stability of the Florentine political class in the 1330s was, of course, the result of that unique feature of the electoral system instituted in 1328, the automatic biennial reelection of the officeholders admitted to the bags in 1328 and beyond. The original selection of candidates in the first scrutiny was transmitted from one set of bags to another, thus assuring their permanence in political life. For a number of years, the ruling elite and the upper class blithely overlooked the dangers involved in this system. Villani, for one, expressed his admiration and approval of the "buoni ordini" of 1328 and suggested that it was chiefly owing to this reform that Florence enjoyed a sustained period of domestic peace: "We have recalled and described this legislation so extensively because it instituted a system that was both successful and generally acceptable; and because of it our commune enjoyed tranquil and peaceful conditions for 34. These thirty-eight families, although they represent 18 percent of the total number of families reaching the Signoria between 1328 and 1342, did not enjoy a proportionate share of the offices. Only two of them were represented by as many as two individuals, for a total of only 40 persons (13 percent of the 302 officeholders), and collectively they held 65 of the 584 posts (11 percent). The new families averaged 1.71 appearances in the Signoria, as against 3.07 for the established families.

120

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

some time; let it therefore serve as a model for future generation^."^^ Nowhere in this initial commentary on the 1328 reform does Villani seem to comprehend the significance of the parallel bags or of the automatic reelection of the approved officeholders. Within a few years, however, Villani began to record a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction. In a passage that immediately follows his praise of the reform, although it was almost certainly inserted in one of the later revisions of the Cronica, he vented his anger over the subsequent corruption of the "buoni ordini": "But since the Florentines habitually inflict change and instability on themselves, all too soon these good ordinances were corrupted and vitiated by the factions of wicked citizens who desired to rule unchallenged over everyone else by placing in office their unworthy clients in violation of the laws and leaving aside good and worthy citizens. Much danger and harm befell the city as a con~equence."~~ Villani also reported that late in 1334 the regime created an internal security force headed by seven captains, one in each sesto and two in the populous Oltrarno, with a total of 175 armed guards. Although officially they were entrusted with the responsibility for maintaining law and order and preventing such disturbances as street fighting and gambling, Villani surmised that their real purpose was to intimidate potential opponents of the regime and, in particular, to ward off any challenges to the ruling oligarchy at the upcoming general scrutiny of January f 335. The chronicler identified this nascent opposition simply as "certain popolani who were worthy of election" to the Signoria, but who "were excluded because of the fact i o n ~ . "Up ~ ~to this point, however, Villani failed to put his finger on any particular defect of the electoral system established in 1328, and his criticism of the ruling elite (as well as his understanding of the growing dissatisfaction that he observed and reported) was limited to moralizing denunciations of those powerful few who refused to admit their worthy fellow citizens to a share of power. But by the end of the decade it had become apparent to critics of the regime (including Villani) that, more than anything else, the practice of 35. Villani, Cronica, 3 :105, 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., pp. 234-35: "Cuficio de' detti ebbe bello colore e buona mossa; ma quelli che reggeano la citth il feciono pih per lor0 guardia e francamento di loro stato, perch2 dubitavano ch'alla nuova riformazione della lezione de' priori, che si dovea fare il Gennaio appresso, non avesse contesa, perch2 certi popolani ch'erano degni d'essere a1 detto uficio per sette n'erano esclusi. Durb il detto uficio uno anno e non pih, fornita la detta lezione."

The Reform of 1328

121

automatic reelection of the remissi had turned the officeholding class into a closed political oligarchy. In December 1339 this now controversial feature of the 1328 reform was finally abolished. By votes of 133 to 30 and 182 to 19, the legislative councils approved a provision that modified the elevenyear-old electoral machinery in a number of ways, most notably with regard to the dispositions on the extraction of name tickets from the bags.38 The legislation of 1339 began by calling for greater equality in the distribution of offices and for controls on the kind of political corruption described by Villani.39It required that lists of nominations for the next scrutiny be prepared by the captains of the Parte Guelfa (assisted by thirty-two popolani citizens of their choice), by the two executive colleges of the gonfalonieri of the companies and the Twelve (assisted by five additional citizens from each gonfalone selected by the Signoria and the colleges), and by the Five of Mercanzia, together with two consuls independently selected from each of the six major guilds (assisted by twenty arroti appointed by the same Five and by the twelve consuls).40When contrasted with the much simpler organization of the nominating committees in 1328, it becomes evident that the new regulations of 1339 were designed to avoid the concentration of nominating influence in the hands of a small group. The captains of the Guelf party retained their role in the nominating process, but it was specified that their arroti had to be popolani. The priors were excluded from a direct hand in the nominations, although they did share in the selection of the arroti from each gonfalone who would assist the gonfalonieri and the Twelve. Whereas in 1328 the Five of Mercanzia had been able to appoint arroti of their own choice, they were now joined by two consuls from each of the six most important guilds (Giudici e Notai, Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria, and Medici, Speziali e Merciai). Significantly, the selection of the participating consuls was left up to the consular committee of each The consuls and the Five then proceeded to38. P R , 30, ff. 95-102. 39. Ibid., f. 95: "ut offitiorum prioratus artium et vexilliferatus iustitie . . . ac offitii Gonfaloneriorum sotietatum populi Florentie et offitii duodecim bonorum virorum sit maior equalitas, et cessent simultates et rogamina que fieri consueverunt pro electione ipsorum facienda, et ut qui eligentur procurent de bono in melius perseverare, et ut malivoli et indigni ad ipsa non promoveantur offitia." 40. See Tratte, 59, ff. 71-~ZV,for the oaths taken in January 1342 by the nominating committees, which are described as being organized exactly as required by the reform of December 1339. 41. P R , 30, f. g ~ v ". : . . duo ex consulibus cuiuslibet infrascriptarum artium . . . eligendi per Consules cuiuslibet dictarum artium de suis consulibus."

122

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

gether to elect the twenty arroti who would participate with them in drawing up the nominations. Thus, the composition of each committee became more complex and it became more difficult for any single group or small committee to control the process of nomination to the Signoria. Furthermore, the procedure for nomination within each committee was also specified to a greater degree than in 1328. Each of the three committees was now required to put all of its nominees to a vote, one by one, in what was essentially a preliminary scrutiny. A majority vote of the nominating committee was sufficient for the designation of a candidate as officially nominated for the Signoria. The introduction of this extra step in the electoral process was designed to make the final nominations of each committee reflect the will of the majority of committee members and to eliminate the possibility that a small group within a full committee (such as the Parte captains, one of the executive colleges, or the Five of Mercanzia) could add or delete nominees without the consent of the arroti. The intended effect of all this was to open up the nominating process so that the electoral system could more genuinely reflect a broad consensus within the community of the major guilds. The minor guilds were of course still totally excluded from the process. The procedure for appointing the scrutiny committee was also revamped and made more complex. The first step involved the extraction by lot, from the existing bags of approved candidates, of the names of eighteen citizens approved for the priorate, eighteen for the office of the Twelve, nineteen for the gonfalonieri, and twelve consuls, one from each of the twelve major guilds. All these persons were convened and given the task of electing one hundred arroti for the final scrutiny. The election of the hundred was itself a complicated process involving two stages of nomination and a scrutiny within each sesto. When the hundred were selected, the final scrutiny took place and the candidates presented by the three nominating committees were voted on, one by one. Sixty-six affirmative votes were required for approval.42These modifications in the formation of the scrutiny committee guaranteed that the committees in charge of the nominating process did not also control the scrutiny, as had happened in 1328. The overall purpose of these structural changes was to prevent the electoral system from being dominated by a small clique, without, however, risking a revival of the old corporate approach to communal elections. The names of those approved in the next scrutiny (scheduled for Janu42. Ibid., ff. 9 6 - 9 7 ~ .

The Reform of 1328

123

ary 1340) were to be added to the existing bags from which candidates for the Signoria and the colleges were then being drawn. If these additions failed to produce a total of at least twenty-eight names in each sesto's bag for the Signoria, the election secretaries were authorized to supplement the lists with as many names as necessary of candidates whose vote totals in the scrutiny came closest to sixty-six. Then, in the crucial section of the 1339 reform, it was decided to abolish the parallel bags of the remissi. From the existing parallel bags, the names of those who had not yet held office (presumably those newly approved in the most recent general scrutiny of January 1339) were placed in the bags from which extractions were then being made.43All those belonging to persons who had held office were ordered destroyed, and henceforth the name ticket of any candidate drawn from the bags and seated in office would likewise be d e ~ t r o y e dThe . ~ ~ results of each subsequent scrutiny were to be placed in a separate set of bags and were to remain unused until all the names in the earlier bags were drawn. Each set of bags would now contain the approved candidates of a different scrutiny, with no mixing of name tickets from separate scrut i n i e ~Also, . ~ ~ to be included in the bags of a given year, each candidate had to be approved anew in the scrutiny of that year. This was in essence the system that became standard procedure for the next century and a half. The reform of 1339 attempted to correct many of the abuses associated with the long-term concentration of power in the hands of a few that had been permitted by the "buoni ordini" of 1328, but it did not tamper with 43. The lists of names in Tratte, 58, ff. 3-4v, which are arranged by sesto and gortfalone and which identify persons "qui ad ipsum non essent offitium," would appear to have been drawn up in compliance with this disposition of the 1339 reform. 44. PR, 30, f. 97v: "Et quod omnes et singule cedule existentes in marsupiis que descripta sunt marsupia remissorum continentes nomina et prenomina eorum qui non fuerunt ad offitium prioratus et Vexilliferatus iustitie, duodecim et Gonfaloneriorum a millesimo trecentesimo vigesimo ottavo die quintodecimo mensis decembris citra extrahantur . . . de dictis marsupiis et ponantur in marsupiis in quibus fuerint cedule continentes nomina et prenomina illorum de quibus fit et fieri debet ad presens extractio ad dicta offitia et quodlibet ipsorum, videlicet in quolibet marsupio cuiuslibet sextus per se; alie vero cedule existentes in marsupiis remissorum delanientur et eiciantur et pro nullis habeantur. . . . Et quod omnes et singule cedule que deinceps extrahentur de ipsis marsupiis . . . continentes nomina illorum qui esse debuerint et extracti fuerint ad dicta offitia, statim facta dicta extractione delanientur et eiciantur." 45. Ibid., ff. 98v-100.

I24 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics the consensus-oriented aims of that system. It sought to preserve and broaden the hegemony of the upper class while avoiding the exclusivity and immobility of the 1330s. The success or failure of this attempt cannot be meaningfully assessed, however, for, less than three years after its implementation, the whole system was set aside when the oligarchy turned to Walter of Brienne for salvation from its own disastrous policies. In fact, the 1339 revision of the electoral machinery tells us more about how the 1328 reform had evolved and how it was viewed than it does about developments after 1339. Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from it is that, in the minds of many Florentines, this first and lengthy experiment with a system of open nominations, general scrutinies, and extraction by lot, far from ushering in a period of democratic participatory politics, actually resulted in the unprecedented domination of Florentine government by a narrow oligarchy which, by the end of the 133os, was being openly accused of tyranny. Even Giovanni Villani, who, although a critic, was certainly no foe of the regime, shared this mood and reflected the growing mistrust of the oligarchy and its electoral institutions. In describing the reform of 1339, Villani finally realized that the automatic reelection of the remissi was the heart of an electoral system that posed a grave threat to traditional Florentine liberties as he understood them. After outlining, for the first time, the way in which the use of sets of parallel bags guaranteed the continuous reelection of the same candidates from one scrutiny to another throughout the 1330s~the chronicler concluded: Thus one could say that they had been elected for life, and it was shameful and dishonest of them to wish to become the lords of the republic, without sharing power with other persons who were equally if not more worthy than they. And this practice was corrected so that when their names were drawn the first time, the tickets should be destroyed, and they, like everyone else, would have to be approved in the scrutinies in order to be included in the periodically renewed lists of candidates for high office. ' ~ n this d was justly done to deprive the ruling citizens of their overbearing and tyrannical ambition.46 46. Villani, Cronica, 3 :336: "sicchi: si pub dire quelli tali erano a vita, ch'erz sconcia cosa e disonesta a volere eglino signoreggiare la repubblica, sanza darne parte agli altri cosi o pih degni di loro. E corressesi, che come fossono tratti la prima volta, si stracciasse la polizza del loro nome, e alla riformazione degli ufici si rimettessono da capo a110 squittino con gli altri insieme; e chi ottenesse il partito vi rimanesse; e fu ben fatto per levare la superbia e tirannia a' cittadini reggenti."

The Reform of 1328 125 With such sentiments finding expression even in Giovanni Villani? who had once proclaimed the exemplary character of the "buoni ordini" of 1328, it is not difficult to see how public support for the ruling oligarchs and their electoral institutions was fast eroding. The lessons learned from the history of electoral politics in the 1330s were not lost on the popular government that emerged in 1343 after the years of disaster. 47. Villani's disillusionment with the ruling group culminated with this introduction to his account of the 1340 coup led by the Bardi: "E acciocchi: meglio si possano intendere le motive delle dissensioni e delle noviti occorse, e perchi: sia esemplo a quegli r h e sono a venire, acciocchi: eglino mettano riparo e piglino esemplo a simili casi, si narreremo brievemente il difetto del male reggimento ch'allora era in Firenze, e quello che ne segui di male, bench5 non sia per6 scusa de' mali operatori contra il comune. Per difetto de' mali uficiali e reggenti, la citth di Firenze si reggea allora e poi un tempo per due per sesto de' maggiori e piu possenti popolani grassi. Questi non voleano a reggimento pari ne compagnia, ni: all'uficio del prioratico ni: agli altri conseguenti ufici mettere se non chi a loro piaceva, e che facessono loro volonti, scludendone molto pih degni di lor0 per senno e per virth, non dando parte a' grandi ni: a' mezzani ni: a' minori, come si convenia a buono reggimento di comune" (ibid., pp. 345-46). Only a few years later, Villani may have regretted his endorsement of the idea that a "buono reggimento di comune" required the participation, among others, of the "mezzani" and the "minori"; see below, chapter 5.

Five The Popular Revival, I 343- I 348

The years 1342 and 1343 were ones of tumultuous change in Florentine politics. A singular convergence of political, military, and economic crises undermined the stability of the oligarchic regime and led to its abrupt demise. The immediate cause of this disintegration lay within the oligarchy itself and especially in the overextended state of its financial resources during a time of ever more costly warfare. When Edward I11 defaulted on the massive loans that the English crown had contracted with the Bardi and Peruzzi banking companies, it suddenly became clear that the survival of the financial empire of the Florentine upper class would be in grave danger unless the fiscal and foreign policy-making institutions of communal government were quickly harnessed to the immediate needs of the great families. To protect themselves from frightened creditors whose deposits had provided the bulk of the capital invested in the ultramontane wars, the banking companies needed the cooperation of a strong and sympathetic government that could marshall the resources of the public fisc in support of their foreign policy objectives while deflecting demands for the repayment of deposits. At the same time, however, these threatened companies were also the principal creditors of the commune. They provided the short-term, high-interest loans that enabled the government to meet its own increasing military expenditures, and by the end of the 1330s their investments in the public debt had reached the point where the continued viability of the companies depended on the solvency of the commune. Just to meet the interest payments on this expanding debt, the government was forced to channel more and more of its revenues from indirect taxes into the hands of creditors for whom the ability of the commune to honor its obligations assumed critical importance in the face of the mounting demands from their own creditors. If companies like the Bardi and the Peruzzi were essentially powerless to re.verse the effects of default by royal debtors in foreign lands, they could at least ensure that the policies of the Florentine government did not compound the crisis. In short, by about

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 27

1340, the complex financial interconnections between the banking oligarchy and the Florentine commune meant that the one could not do without the other. The oligarchs not only depended on the government for protection from creditors and reprisals; they also looked to the machinery of the public fisc as an important source of profit. For its part, the commune desperately needed the resources of the companies to sustain its own military, territorial, and diplomatic ambitions that, in turn, allowed it to safeguard the interests of its creditors. The mutual dependency of the commune and the banking oligarchy inexorably led to a situation in which the former came increasingly under the control of the latter. The pressures that led the oligarchy to intensify its control over both the institutions and the resources of communal government were perceived in different terms by the broad middle and lower strata of Florentine merchants and artisans. The fiscal burden, which called for the increasing imposition of indirect taxes and forced loans, fell in large measure on the rank and file of the guild community. From their point of view, the economy was being drained in order to salvage the banking companies from the folly of their own excessive risks and to rescue the commune from its own aggressive foreign policy. Consequently, the economic crisis of the companies produced severe political tensions at home, as the communal councils, staffed largely by the non-elite members of the guild community, blocked one proposal for fiscal reform after another in an effort to thwart what they now saw as the tyrannical and oppressive ambitions of a greedy oligarchy. It was the effort to overcome this paralysis of communal government and to bypass the opposition of the councils that led the oligarchy to engage in a series of emergency gambles that ended in the destruction of the electoral institutions established in 1328. The first move in this direction, and a striking indication of the desperation with which the banking giants viewed the situation, was the unsuccessful attempt at a coup d'etat by the Bardi family in November 1340. Although it was a failure and resulted in the condemnation of several members of that illustrious house, the conspiracy did at least signal the unwillingness of some of the most powerful magnates to continue to support a regime that, however sympathetic to upper-class interests in general, denied them the right of direct participation. This was certain to be a destabilizing factor in electoral politics, because the exclusion of the magnates had for half a century been among the most important concessions that persuaded the guild community to acquiesce in electoral systems that in other respects had not been to their liking. Less than a year later, in July 1341, the oligarchy tried a dif-

128 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics ferent approach by instituting an emergency governing board of twenty prominent citizens with full authority over matters of war, taxation, and foreign policy. Although the Signoria continued to be elected as before, the extraordinary powers of the Twenty effectively deprived it of its customary constitutional primacy. The rule of the Twenty was, however, an unmitigated disaster and, with the defeat of the Florentine army by the Pisans in October 1341, the credibility of oligarchic government suffered another damaging blow. At this point, instead of broadening the base of their support in communal society, the oligarchs tried the most extreme of possible solutions: that of the foreign despot. Walter of Brienne, the titular Duke of Athens and the former vicar of Charles of Calabria, was put in command of the Florentine armies in the spring of 1342 and in September was declared signore of Florence for life. One of Brienne's first acts was to proclaim a moratorium on debts. This measure gave the harassed banking firms temporary immunity from their threatening creditors at home and abroad and led the oligarchs to believe that the duke would prove to be the malleable creature and protector of their own interests that they had hoped for. But Brienne complicated matters by injecting his own political ambitions and those of the city's lower classes into a situation already fraught with danger for the hard-pressed oligarchs. The duke sought and gained great influence with the capitalist entrepreneurs of the woolen-cloth industry. He acquired the right to intervene personally and directly in the judicial administration and political life of the wool guild, and on 23 November he used this unprecedented influence to accept a petition submitted by the dyers (tintori) that permitted these skilled artisans to escape from the oppressive tutelage of the wool guild and to form a guild of their own. It was all too clear to the scandalized oligarchs that this momentous concession to the dyers could easily lead to an escalation of demands from the various professional and working classes that had been excluded for over half a century from any share in the rights and privileges associated with legally recognized incorporation in a guild. By the spring of 1343, Brienne openly dared to flaunt his newly forged alliance of convenience with the pop010 minuto by organizing thausands of unskilled workers, including day laborers in the textile industries, into paramilitary companies with their own coats of arms. In the eyes of the horrified oligarchs and major guildsmen, Brienne's outrageous disregard for constitutional tradition and upper-class privileges was nothing short of tyranny, and a broad coalition of magnates and high-ranking

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

129

guildsmen was quickly formed with the objective of overthrowing the hated duke with all dispatch.' In July 1343, after only eleven months in office, Walter of Brienne was driven from Florence, but it soon became evident in the months following his ouster that the impact of the many revolutionary developments since 1340, and especially those of 1342-43, had undermined the minimum consensus required for a revival of the political system and the electoral institutions of the 1330s. Although two general scrutinies had been held during this period in compliance with the legislation of December 1339 (in January 1340 and January 1342); the despotism of Brienne resulted, late in the summer of 1342, in the suspension of the regular electoral procedures for the drawing of names (tratte). According to Villani, the duke simply appointed the priors who held office under his rule.3 Having lost the continuity of their electoral institutions, the Florentines found it exceedingly difficult to recover in the changed political circumstances that emerged in the aftermath of Brienne's departure. In the first place, the magnates, many of whom had actively participated in the several conspiracies against the duke, were determined to regain the right to elective office that they had lost in 1293. AS Villani put it, they felt that because they had led the struggle "to recover the liberty of the commune," they should be rewarded with a share of seats on the priorate and with other office^.^ At the other end of the political spectrum, however, the aspirations of the middle and lower classes-both the middling ranks of the established guild community and those professional groups that sought corporate status in guilds of their own-had been awakened by Brienne's own policies. In part it was the unsettling prospect of magnate participation in the priorate that made the popular classes unwilling to support a resumption of the former electoral system. It was from the guild community that opposition arose to the idea of permitting the magnates access to the SiI. On the developments summarized in these pages, see Marvin B. Becker, Florence in Transition, vol. I (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 97-98 and 123-76; Gene A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 1343-1378 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 3-8; Gene A. Brucker and Marvin B. Becker, "Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella Firenze del Trecento," ASI 113 (1955): 251-60; Armando Sapori, La Crisi delle Compagnie Mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi (Florence, 1926); and Cesare Paoli, Della Signoria di Gualtieri Duca d'Atene (Florence, 1862). 2. Tratte, 59, ff. 71-pv. 3. Villani, Cronica, 4 : 16- 18. 4. Ibid., p. 38.

130 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics gnoria, and when, in September, these protests erupted into rebellion, the guilds themselves became a force to be reckoned with in electoral politics. Thus, within a very short time, the pressures emanating from both the magnate families and the guild community contributed to the destabilizing polarization of Florentine politics. After a brief and unsuccessful attempt by the oligarchy to breath new life into the electoral institutions of the 1330s by winning the support of the magnates, the stage was set for the guilds to undertake a political experiment in an altogether different direction. Early in August 1343, the bishop of Florence, Agnolo Acciaiuoli, took the initiative in support of magnate demands for representation in government. The bishop and his temporary governing committee of Fourteen reorganized the administrative divisions of the city into quarters, abolished the Ordinances of Justice, and relieved the magnates of the condition of political and civil inferiority to which they had been subjected in 1293.' They then held a general scrutiny for the major executive offices, entrusting the approval of candidates to a scrutiny committee of one hundred citizens; twenty-five came from each quarter, including seventeen popolani and eight magnates. The post of Standard-bearer of Justice was annulled, and the priorate was expanded from six to twelve members, with a third of the seats reserved for the previously excluded magnates. All other offices, including the advisory college of the Eight that replaced the Twelve, were divided evenly between popolani and magnates. According to Villani, the upper ranks of the guild community were satisfied with this arrangement because they could expect their own ambitions to be supported by the magnates, "coy quali aveano molti parentadi." Although the same could not be said of the rank-and-file guildsmen, they nonetheless acquiesced for the time being, in part because of the pressure exerted by the influential bishop and in part because they did not yet have an alternative plan of their own. It is possible that the reluctant guildsmen were willing to tolerate the new political role of the magnates because they hoped it would be tempo5. Cap. Prot., 4, ff. 45-46. Scattered deliberations of the bishop and the Fourteen from 4 August through early September are contained in ff. 44-50 of this volume, and also in Cap., 16, ff. 143-56. Summaries of the deliberations are published in Cesare Guasti, I Capitoli del Comune di Firenze: Inventario e Regesto, vol. 2 (Florence, 1893), pp. 594-99. For the names of the Fourteen, all from prominent oligarchic families, see Stefani, Cronaca, r. 582, pp. 207-8. 6. Villani, Cronica, 4 :38-39.

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 3I

rary. But early in September, the coalition of oligarchic popolani and magnates made it clear that such was not their intention. On 13 September they unveiled an electoral plan for future general scrutinies, beginning with that of January 1345. In structural terms this plan recapitulated the legislation of December 1339, but it also institutionalized on a permanent basis the recent admission of the magnate families to a fixed share of the priorate and the other offices. Although this legislation was never put into effect, because the regime that sponsored it was overthrown and replaced little more than a week later, its terms are still of considerable interest and importance, both as evidence of the kind of electoral system favored by this most oligarchic of Florentine governments and as background to the popular revolt that erupted shortly thereafter. The September 1343 reform entrusted the nomination of candidates to three committees: one formed by the captains and priors of the Parte Guelfa and by thirty-six arroti, who would be appointed by the captains and who would include three magnates and six popolatti from each quarter; the second consisting of the incumbent priors, the eight buoni uontini, and twenty-four arroti, of whom eight would be magnates; and the third composed of the Five of Mercanzia, two consuls from each of the six major guilds (to be appointed by the consulates of their respective guilds), and twenty-four arroti (to be appointed by the combined consuls and the Five), of whom eight would be magnates. Each committee was asked to nominate candidates, without restriction as to number, of both popolano and magnate status, who were at least twenty-five years of age and proven Guelfs of good reputation. After putting each candidate to a vote, each committee was to send the Signoria a list of all those gaining the approval of a majority. The three lists were to have been reduced to a single master list for the general scrutiny.' A long and complicated procedure was envisioned for the staffing of the scrutiny committee. Forty-eight persons (half of them drawn by lot from the bone of the previous August and half appointed by the priors from the consulates of the twelve major guilds, two from each guild) were to elect, by means of a complex process, a body of ninety-six citizens who, together with the incumbent priors, would conduct the general ~ c r u t i n yAccord.~ ing to the standard rule of this electoral reform, a third of the ninety-six had to be magnates. A minimum of sixty-six votes was needed for the de7. PR, 21 I, ff. 143-I45V. 8. Ibid., ff. 146-50.

132 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics finitive approval of a candidate, and the names of those approved were to be written on name tickets and placed in bags from which the priors and the Eight would be drawn once the existing bags (presumably those of August) were empty.y This electoral program of the oligarchic government of the summer of 1343 was little more than a retouched version of the system adopted in 1339, with, of course, the one great innovation of the systematic introduction of the magnates into the electoral process. Like its predecessor of the 1330s~it kept the role of the guilds to a minimum and, by mandating a fixed share of the seats for the newly enfranchised magnates, threatened to reduce the rank and file of the guild community to an even smaller and perhaps negligible quota of the offices. The guildsmen of Florence could not have contemplated such prospects with equanimity. Although it is difficult to say exactly what role this issue played in the crisis of middle and late September, the dissatisfaction of the guild community did indeed intensify over the next week, finally culminating in the forced expulsion of the magnate priors from Palazzo Vecchio on 22 September.1° Their departure left in office a group of eight men who presided over the crucial reforms that molded the new popular government. Among the eight were two prominent patricians, Bellincione d'Uberto degli Albizzi and Niccolb di Cione Ridolfi, whose families were associated with the ruling oligarchy of the 1330s.'' The other six, however, came from families 9. The regulations governing the extraction of name tickets from the bags and the divieti were modeled on the legislation of December 1339. The abolition of automatic reelection was confirmed;'the name tickets of candidates seated in office were to be destroyed at the time of their extraction. The divieto for officeholders was fixed at two years, that for fathers, brothers, and sons at six months, and that for other members of the same family or household at four months. New nominations and a new scrutiny were to be held every other year in January. If one of the three nominating committees failed to submit its list on time, the general scrutiny could still be conducted on the basis of the lists submitted by the other two. For further details concerning the projected regulations for the tratte, the divieti, and the filling of new bone every second year, see ibid., ff. 150-158~. 10. Villani, Cronica, 4:40-42. The four magnates removed from office were Zanobi di messer Lapo Mannelli, Messer Razzante de' Foraboschi, Ugo di Lapo degli Spini, and Messer Francesco di Lapo Adimari (Stefani, Cronaca, r. 602, pp. 218-19). 11. Bellincione degli Albizzi had already served on the Signoria in 1336, 1338, and 1340; Niccolb Ridolfi had previously been elected in 1339 and his father Cions in I321 and 1334 (Priorista Mariani I, in Manoscritti, 248, ff. 49-50, and Prioristil Mariani 111,in Manoscritti, 250, f. 535).

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

133

that were either new to communal politics or were subsequently affiliated with the anti-Albizzi faction after 1350. In the latter category, the most important was certainly Sandro di Simone Quaratesi, who, according to Brucker, was an "inveterate foe of the Albizzi and the Parte hierarchy" until he was murdered in 1370.'~Among the others, Nastagio di Bonaguida Tolosini belonged to a relatively new family that had been excluded from the Signoria between 1328 and 1342 and that also sided with the Ricci faction after mid-century.13 The remaining four priors were Neri di Lippo Del Palagio, who, although elected to the Signoria five times before 1343, was the only member of his family to reach the high office until his sons were approved in the scrutinies of 1348 and beyond;I4 Messer Marco de' Marchi, a judge, and Borghino di Taddeo, who were their families' first representatives in the Signoria in 1334 and 1340, respectively; and Antonio d'Orso, who was making his and his family's first and only appearance in the Signoria.15 Although not exactly popular in character (it had, after all, been elected during the oligarchic government of bishop Acciaiuoli and the Fourteen), this priorate did contain both new and antioligarchic elements from the fringes of the political class of the 1330s. The expulsion from its ranks of the four magnates placed the remaining oligarchic members in the minority and prepared the way for a revival of guild power in electoral politics. Over the next few weeks, the new popular government gradually took shape, accompanied at every step by a resurgence of the political and constitutional role of the corporations. Villani reports that the new regime's first institutional reforms, which reestablished the advisory college of the twelve buoni uomini and reduced that of the gonfalonieri from nineteen to sixteen members, were carried out "with the advice of the consuls of the twenty-one guilds." With these words, the chronicler sounded an important theme that reverberated throughout both the events of the next five years and his own description of them: namely, that the renewed claims of a guild-based constitution, after a hiatus of more than forty years, were now advanced as the common property of the full community of the 12. Brucker,

Florentine Politics, pp. 176, 199. 13. Ibid., p. 126; for the standing of the Tolosini in the 1330S, see Becker, Florence in Transition, I :100; and for their representation in the priorate, see Priorista Mariani ZZZ, in Manoscritti, 250, f. 500. 14. Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 34; Priorista Mariani ZIZ, in Manoscritti, 250, f- 573. IS. Priorista Mariani ZIZ, in Manoscritti, 250, ff. 593' 605,625.

134 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics twenty-one guilds. The guild government of 1343 was not founded, as its distant archetype of 1293 had been, on the participation of the twelve major guilds; rather, it was predicated on the assumption that the electoral and constitutional functions to which the guilds were called would be shared by all twenty-one legally recognized corporations. Villani was quite specific and insistent on this point: "The popolo rose in influence, audacity, and power," he wrote, "especially the middle and lower guildsmen, for at that time the government of the city fell into the hands of the consuls of the twenty-one guilds." l6 The pressures from the guild community that caused Villani to view the corporate resurgence in such terms were already apparent on 30 September when the Signoria convened a large group of citizens to deliberate on the composition and authority of a special balia to be entrusted with a general reform of the government. Four of the recorded speakers suggested the inclusion in the balia of a certain number of consuls from each of the guilds. One such proposal came from Domenico di Ser Lippo Castri, who specified that the participating consuls be recruited from each guild ("de qualibet arte"). Another speaker, Bartolo de' Ricci, recommended the addition of both the gonfalonieri and "two-thirds of the consuls," a formulation that almost certainly meant two-thirds of the consuls of each guild.'' His suggestion was seconded by two other speakers. In the end, however, the balia was limited, formally at least, to the Signoria and the Twelve, who were empowered until the end of October to proclaim any decrees or laws that they deemed necessary "for the governance and rule and for the peaceful and tranquil condition of the city, people, and commune of Florence, of the guilds and guildsmen of the same city and people, and of its contado and di~trict."'~ Very probably, the terms of the balia were meant to cover the authority, among other things, for a complete revision of the commune's electoral machinery. In fact, because the volumes of legislation passed by the councils (the Provvisioni) do not contain any enactments in the area of electoral politics for these last months of 1343, it seems quit? 16. Villani, Cronica, 4:42, 48: "il popolo montb in grande stato e baldanza e signoria, spezialmente i mediani e artefici minuti, che allotta il reggimento della citth rimase alle ventuna capitudini dell' arti." 17. LF, 22, ff. 38-39. Domenico di Ser Lippo Castri: "super proposita balk quod adungantur aliqui de Capitudinibus, bonis et sufficientibus, videlicet, de qualibet arte." Bartolo de' Ricci: "quod addantur balie Gonfalonerii sotietatum, et due partes capitudinum." 18. PD, 4, f. 11; also PR, 32, ff. 61-61v.

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

135

certain that the regulations approved for the October scrutiny must have been devised and promulgated by the Signoria and the Twelve, whose proceedings, under the terms of the balia, did not require the approval of the legislative councils. l9 The electoral regulations adopted by the balia, which unfortunately have not survived in any single document or description, must be reconstructed from a variety of sources, including the chronicles and a number of archival fragments. Among the former, the eyewitness accounts of Giovanni Villani and Donato Velluti are considerably more reliable than that of Stefani, who was too young to have had firsthand knowledge of the events in question. Among the latter, the most important is a sizable fragment of the preliminary draft of the procedures for the filling of the borse and the extraction of the name tickets. As in the electoral systems of 1328 and 1339, the scrutiny of 1343 began with a series of general nominations of eligible candidates. Regrettably, the procedure used for these nominations is nowhere described in detail in the extant sources. Villani says simply that "every good popolano worthy of the office" was put to a vote,z0but according to Stefani the selection of candidates was left to the sixteen gonfalo~ieri.~' Villani's comment implies, as one would expect, that the magnates were again declared ineligible for high office, but he says nothing about how, or by whom, candidates were actually chosen. As for Stefani's view that the nominations were entrusted to the gonfalonien, it is true that these officials had participated in the 19. The extant deliberations of the Signoria and the Twelve of October 1343, which survive in Cap. Prot., 4, ff. 53-67v, and in Cap., 16, ff. 158-71 (summaries published in Guasti, Capitoli, 2 :599-605), do not contain the regulations and decrees for the new scrutiny. However, among the measures that were approved by the two colleges, acting under the terms of the balia awarded to them on 30 September, was a minor clarification on 28 October of the rules for the extraction of the name tickets from the bags; see Cap. Prot., 4, f. 64, and Guasti, Capitoli, 2 :603. This would seem to confirm the hypothesis that it was indeed the Signoria and the Twelve who had responsibility for the determination of electoral procedures. Villani's information supports this conclusion: "i priori e'dodici col consiglio degli ambasciadori di Siena e di Perugia e del conte Simone, acciocchi: l'elezione andasse pih comune, diedono arbitrio nell'infrascritto modo" (Cronica, 4 :48).

Villani, Cronica, 4 :49. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 594, p. 216: "E qui diliberarono che ne' gonfalonieri stesse la discrezione, quelli che dovessero ire a partito, li quali fossero uomini buoni." 20.

21.

136 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics nominating process for every scrutiny after 1328, but it was not until 1352 that they were given an independent and determining role in the presentation of candidates. Stefani might have been assuming that the procedure used in his own time had been adopted as early as 1343, but, given the paucity of evidence on this point, it is impossible either to prove or to disprove his contention. Whatever role the gonfalonien may have had, there are strong indications that the guilds regained in 1343 the autonomous authority in the nominating process that they had enjoyed before 1300. Two months after the scrutiny, on 22 December, the wool guild retroactively approved expenditures of guild funds by its treasurer "for two scrutinies conducted among the members in the guildhall, to approve members of the same guild for the office of the priorate and for the guild's own c o n ~ u l a t e . " ~ ~ There can be no doubt that the scrutiny "for the office of the priorate" had been held in connection with the general scrutiny of the previous October. This evidence from the guild archives clearly demonstrates, moreover, that the Lana had conducted a separate scrutiny of its own members, in its own guildhall, independently of the other or of any interguild committees headed by the Five of Mercanzia. Such decentralized and autonomous guild scrutinies, for the purpose of making nominations to the general scrutiny for the priorate and the advisory colleges, had not been part of the electoral system of either 1328 or 1339. In 1328 the guilds had had no part whatsoever in the nominating process; in 1339 two consuls from each of the six major guilds had joined the Five of Mercanzia and twenty arroti to form a single nominating committee. Thus, in October 1343, for the first time since the closing years of the thirteenth century, at least some of the guilds regained the right to make independent nominations to high communal office. It is also apparent that the Lana's nominations in 1343 were not made by the consuls alone. The scrutiny of the guild's members ("de artificibus") was carried out by a council or committee of the guild's own members ("inter artifices"). Even during the popular government of the 129os, independent guild nominations were usually the exclusive responsibility of the consuls and did not, as far as one can see, involve the direct participation of the members that seems to be indicated in the Lana document of late 1343. A similar situation prevailed in the guild of For Santa Maria. One of the 22. Lana, 41, f. 120:". . . pro duobus scruptineis factis in domo dicte artis et inter artifices et de artificibus dicte artis pro offitio prioratus et pro offitio consulatus artis Lane."

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 37

rubrics approved in the 1344 revision of the guild's statutes established certain guidelines for the nomination of the guild's members for the offices of the commune by the consuls or by "others to whom the consuls may entrust this task." Whereas normally they were to nominate only active and resident guildsmen, the rubric specified that if, by express order of the commune, the consuls or officials appointed by them should be permitted to do so, they could nominate all of the guild's matriculated members, including those who were not active and resident at their shops.23This could very well be an echo of the balia's request for nominations for the general scrutiny of the previous year. If so, while the balia imposed its own criterion of eligibility, the guild was still free to determine the size and composition of its own class of political eligibles through its matriculation policy. Ultimately, the nomination of candidates rested with the guild's own elected officials. If, as this Por Santa Maria document seems to suggest, the guilds did indeed nominate all or most of their matriculated members for the 1343 scrutiny, such a policy would have been fully consistent with the basic corporate principle that sought to identify the commune's political class with the full guild community. What we should most like to know about this renewed autonomy of the guilds in the nominating process must unfortunately remain a question: how many of the twenty-one guilds were permitted to make independent nominations of their members in 1343? At thenveryleast, all the major guilds must have enjoyed this privilege, but, given the popular govern23. Umberto Dorini, ed., Statuti dell'Arte di Por Santa Maria del tempo della Repubblica (Florence, 1934)~p. 223: "Quod non possit fieri aliqua reductio pro Comuni Florentie hominum dicte artis nisi de veris mercatoribus ad apothecam residentibus. Item statutum et ordinatum est quod consules dicte artis qui pro tempore fuerint, aut aliquis alius vel aliqui alii, cui vel quibus ipsi consules commicterent, non possint vel debeant aliquam reductionem facere vel fieri facere pro dicta arte seu pro Comuni Florentie vel aliter quomodocumque, quacumque ratione vel causa, de hominibus et personis dicte artis, in qua reducantur seu scribantur nisi dumtaxat veri mercatores et artifices ad apothecam vel fundacum residentes, facientes seu fieri facientes dictam artem Porte Sancte Marie vel aliquod misterium dicte artis. Verum, si per aliquem ordinem qui fieret per Comune Florentie permicteretur ipsis consulibus, seu eis quibus ipsi consules commicterent, posse reducere seu reduci facere in dicta seu pro dicta arte omnes homines dicte artis in ipsa arte matriculates, licet non fuerint residentes ad apothecam vel fundacum et artem exercerent, eo casu ipsi consules, per se vel eos quibus commiserint, talem reductionem facere [possint] iusta formam ordinamentorum tunc editorum per Comune Florentie, dummodo nullum non matriculatum in arte predicta reducere possint vel debe[a]nt mod0 quoquo."

138 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics ment's consistent emphasis on the participation of all twenty-one guilds in constitutional functions, it seems more likely that every guild was allowed to conduct such internal scrutinies and to present its own nominations for the Signoria. According to Villani, 3,346 citizens were nominated for the final scrutiny.z4Although this is certainly less (and, as a percentage of the total population, far less) than the number of nominations made for the scrutinies of the later fourteenth century, it probably represents a considerable increase with respect to the preceding decade and a half. Whether the nominations were made only by the guilds or by the guilds and the gonfalonieri, it is clear that a much larger number of independent nominating agencies participated in this process in 1343 than in the electoral systems of either 1328 or 1339. If both the guilds and the gonfalonieri made their own nominations, as was indeed the case after 1352, the resulting thirtyseven nominating committees would have represented a broad cross section of the Florentine population on both territorial and corporate lines. In fact, the 3,346 nominations reported by Villani amounted to approximately three-quarters of the total population of the twenty-one guilds.25The inclusion of such a large proportion of the guild community in the electoral process was no doubt the result of this decentralization of the nominating committees. The general scrutiny committee that voted to approve or reject each of the nominated candidates included the following members: the Signoria and the advisory colleges of the Twelve and the Sixteen, the Five of Mercanzia, fifty-two consuls from the twenty-one guilds, and 112 arroti, djvided evenly among the quarters, for a total of 206 voting members. This was by far the largest voting committee assembled for any scrutiny up to this point, and its size alone made it difficult for any small group or faction to control. The sources do not reveal just how the fifty-two consuls, who 24. Villani, Cronica, 4: 48-49. Stefani says that around four thousand persons ' L a n d a r ~anpartito" ~ (Cronaca, r. 594, p. 216). 25. A precise count of the full guild community in any given year is not possible. For a rough estimate of its size around 1300, see my "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics," American Historical Review 84 (1979): 59-60, n. 21. The evidence from matriculation registers and company lists between I300 and 1343 suggests a rather substantial contraction from the seven to eight thousand that I estimated for the beginning of the century to about five thousand in the years before the plague of 1348. This data and the underlying causes that determined this trend will be discussed in detail elsewhere.

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 39

comprised slightly more than a quarter of the full committee, were distributed among the twenty-one guilds. Clearly there was some inequality of representation, and since the major guilds were allotted a greater number of seats on the executive colleges than the minor guilds, this may have been true of their participation on the scrutiny committee as well. The I 12 arxoti were the numerically dominant element on the committee, but the modalities of their appointment are nowhere revealed. Villani provides the only clues on this point. He commented that the arroti were "popolani tutti artefici" (all non-magnate guildsmen), which suggests that the guilds or their consuls probably had some role in their selection. In explaining why so many minor guildsmen reached the Signoria in the years after 1343, the chronicler also observed that, "at the time of the scrutiny, the consuls of the twenty-one guilds and the other popolani minuti were stronger in the voting than the popolani grassi and mediani."26 Although it is not clear exactly whom Villani had in mind in using the term mediani (perhaps members of the five middle guilds or non-oligarchic elements within the major guilds), it is significant that he associated the voting strength of lower-class elements in general with the prominence of the consuls from all twenty-one guilds. If, as Villani seems to suggest, these minuti cooperated with the consuls in the balloting to the extent that minor guildsmen were approved in greater numbers than ever before, this could only have been so if the consuls had been allowed to select arroti of their own choosing from their guilds. Thus, the real measure of guild strength in the 1343 scrutiny may have consisted in the selection of many, if not most, of the arroti. The scrutiny took place over the course of several days in mid-October. It may have begun as early as 9 October when the formidable sum of three hundred florins was appropriated to meet the expenses of feeding the more than two hundred scrutat~rs.~' The voting was certainly underway by the sixteenth and was completed on the twentieth.28This left about ten days 26. Villani, Cronica, 4:48-49: "quando si fece lo squittino, furono pib forti nelle boci le ventuna capitudini e gli altri popolani minuti, che'le boci de' popolani grassi e mediani." 27. Camera del Comune, Camarlinghi, Uscita, 2, f. 2ov: ". . . pro novo scruptineo faciendo pro expensis potus et cibi hominum et personarum qui adesse debent ad scruttinandum et scruptineum faciendum." 28. On 16 October a certain Bartolo d7Andreawas fined ten lire for being present without the permission of the Signoria: ". . . in scruptineo quod de presenti fit in palatio . . . ipso non citato eletto vel requisito" (Camera del Comune, Camarlinghi, Entrata, 3, f. 18). The conclusion of the scrutiny on 20 October is reported by Villani, Cronica, 4 :49.

140 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics for the filling of the borse before the first extraction of names for the priorate of November-December 1343. The task of filling the bags was far more complex in 1343 than for any previous scrutiny. Indeed, it was in this phase of the electoral process that the 1343 scrutiny introduced its most novel and characteristic features, which clearly distinguished it from the systems that preceded and followed the popular government. The three principal innovations in this area had a substantial impact on the size and composition of the officeholding group, the degree of political mobility, the rate of admission of new families to the Signoria, and the role of the minor guilds in political life between 1343 and 1348. The first of these features concerns the manner in which the name tickets of successful candidates were included in the borse. To be approved and placed in the bags for the Signoria and the advisory college of the Twelve, a candidate needed to receive at least I 10 affirmative votes in the scrutiny. This amounted to only 53 percent of the full contingent of scrutators, considerably less than the usual minimum of two-thirds established for approval in earlier scrutinies. However, the names of such successful candidates were not written on individual name tickets, as had been the case before 1343 and would be again after 1348. Instead, the election secretaries (accoppiatori) were authorized to arrange the names of all those approved in the scrutiny into groups of eight and to include all eight from .~~ each group on a single ticket (cedula) for the borsa of the p r i ~ r a t eThese eight candidates were thus placed in the bag together on the same ticket; when their ticket was drawn from the bag, all eight, barring divieti or other impediments, were seated together in office as members of the same priorate. From their responsibility of joining the candidates together into groups of eight, the election secretaries gained the title of accoppiatori. The same procedure was also used for the bags of the advisory college of the Twelve, but not, however, for those of the sixteen gonfalonieri. For this office, only 90 votes were required for approval in the scrutiny, and the names of those so approved were written on individual name tickets and placed in sixteen bags, one for each g o n f a l ~ n e . ~ ~ 29. Tratte, I I ~ ~ M fragment , entitled "Sec. XIV. Frammento di statuto riformato relativo alla tratta agli uffici maggiori," ff. 36gv-370: "Et illum quem invenerint approbatum per CX adminus ex dictis astantibus, scribant pro approbato. . . . Et scribi faciant . . . nomina et prenomina dictorum approbatorum in cedulis de membranis infrascripto modo, videlicet, in una quaque cedula de cartis de mernbranis duo nomina et prenomina de quolibet quarterio." 30. Ibid., f. 369v: "Et illos quos invenerint approbatos per nonaginta ex dictis

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I4I

A passage from Velluti's chronicle fully confirms this interpretation of the technique used for filling the bags in 1343. In 1348, according to Velluti, the 1343 lists had to be opened and examined in order to eliminate the names of the many victims of the Black Death. He described the borsa for the Signoria as containing "fifty pellets sealed with wax, each holding a piece of parchment on which were written the names of eight priors." After the names of the deceased were removed, the names of those still living were placed in new bags, one for each quarter, with each name written "by itself on a ticket, as is done today."" Only in 1348, therefore, was there a return to the practice of one name per ticket. As Velluti reveals, the accoppiatori arranged the names of eligible candidates into no less than fifty groups of eight, enough to staff the Signoria for over eight years. In predetermining the composition of the Signoria for such a long time, however, these officials had great but not unlimited authority. The most important constraint on their freedom to choose and arrange the names of candidates was the balia's guarantee of a regular minimum representation for the members of the fourteen minor guilds in each priorate. This second crucial innovation of the 1343 electoral reform caused some confusion even among contemporary observers. Villani reported that "in each priorate there were to be two popolani grassi, three mediani, and three artefici m i n ~ t i . "Velluti, ~~ on the other hand, believed that only two of the eight posts were assigned to the members of the fourteen minor In their analysis of the actual composition of the priastantibus scribant etiam pro approbatis pro dicto offitio Gonfaloneriorum sotietatum populi florentini." For the regulations governing the imborsazioni of the Twelve, see ibid., f. 370V, and for the Sixteen, f. 37IV. 31. Velluti, Cronica Dornestica, pp. 192-93: "dopo la detta mortalith, s'aperse il sacco de' Priori, ov'erano da cinquanta pallottole di cera, nelle quali pallottole in ciascuna era una scritta di pecora, ove erano otto Priori. . . . E aperte le dette pallottole e borse, sene trovarono molti morti: di che, dell'avanzo se ne feciono borse, per ciascheduno quartiere una, e misonvisi soli quelli erano nelle dette pallottole, ciascheduno di per s6 in una scritta, a1 mod0 d'oggi." Velluti's information on the 1348 scrutiny and reorganization of the 1343 bags was first hand, because he was a member of the scrutiny committee in that year; see Manoscritti, 269, 16 August 1348 (no pagination). The unique practice adopted in 1343 of predetermining the composition of each priorate by including eight names on each ticket has been accurately inferred from Velluti's description in a recent study by Guidubaldo Guidi, "I sistemi elettorali agli uffici della citth-repubblica di Firenze nella prima meti del Trecento (1329- 1349)," ASI 135 (1977): 392. 32. Villani, Cronica, 4 :49. 33. Velluti, Cronica Dornestica, p. 167.

142 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics orates from 1343 to 1348, Becker and Brucker discovered that the number of minor guildsmen in any single priorate never exceeded four and was normally three or less.34Their findings indicated that Velluti's information was clearly inaccurate and that Villani's categories of popolani grassi, mediani, and artefici minuti obviously were not meant to correspond to the seven major, five middle, and nine minor guilds. Were this the case, Villani's figures on the proportional distribution of the seats would have meant that the fourteen lower guilds had six of every eight posts, when in fact they had far less, as Becker and Brucker have shown.35 If, however, we understand Villani's category of artefici minuti to refer to the members of all fourteen minor guilds, it is possible to accept the chronicler's information on the share of seats allotted to this group. For, according to the preliminary draft of the tratte regulations of October 1343, at least three of the eight names selected by the accoppiatori for each ticket had to come from the fourteen minor guilds. Since the minori were ineligible for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice, this meant in effect that they had one-third of the seats in the Signoria, as they also did in the advisory college of the Twelve. In fact, the balia stipulated that if the general scrutiny of October did not result in the approval of enough minor guildsmen to ensure a minimum of three and four minori, respectively, in each priorate and college of the Twelve, for the desired number of terms (apparently fifty, according to Velluti), the accoppiaiori would be authorized to supplement the lists of approved candidates with the names of as many additional minor guildsmen as necessary, taking first those who had come closest to obtaining the I 10-vote level in the ~crutiny.'~ As we shall 34. Marvin B. Becker and Gene A. Brucker, "The Arti Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342- 1378," Mediaeval Studies 18 (1956): 96. 35. As Becker and Brucker therefore concluded, Villani's categories of popolani grassi and mediani must be understood to refer to distinctions within the membership of the seven major guilds, and not between these seven guilds and the five middle guilds (ibid., p. 96, n. 24). Guidi, however, seems to hold to the contrary opinion ("Sistemi elettorali (1329-1349)," p. 392). 36. Tratte, I 167M, f. 370: "ita quod in dicta cedula [for the priorate] scribantur saltem tres qui fuerint ex quatuordecim minoribus artibus." Ibid., f. 371: "Et quod si inter dictos approbatos pro offitio prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie et offitio xiicimnon reperirentur tot nomina et prenomina de hominibus dictarum quatuordecim minorum artium, quod in unaquaque cedula fienda pro dicto offitio dominorum priorum, possent haberi tria nomina et prenomina, et pro unaquaque cedula fienda pro dicto offitio xiici" haberi non possent quatuor, tunc predicti fratres et boni viri accipiant de dictis, ex dictis xiiii"" minoribus artibus qui habuerint plures fabas nigras tot nomina et prenomina quod dicte cedule perficiantur ut dictum est."

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348 143 see later in this chapter, this projected adjustment of the list of eligible candidates in compliance with the mandated minimum share of the seats for the minor guilds greatly increased the share of these guilds in the overall composition of the officeholding class during the years of the popular government. When the accoppiaton completed the imborsazioni at the end of October 1343, therefore, each group of eight names contained at least three representatives from the community of the minor guilds. But in the years that followed, the number of minor guildsmen actually seated in office did not always conform to this ratio. Villani, in fact, complained that when the tickets were drawn, it was found that the mino& in apparent violation of the distribution of seats established in 1343, had more than their allotted share.37And, as Becker and Brucker discovered, they did indeed on occasion have as many as four and at other times as few as two. How can these discrepancies be accounted for? In the first place, it should be recalled that the accoppiatori were authorized to include at least three minori in each priorate; thus, the fact that there were occasionally four was not, strictly speaking, a violation of the distribution decreed in 1343. But the chief explanation for the fluctuations in the number of minor guildsmen in the Signoria lies in the third major innovation of the electoral system of 1343, the so-called borsa di spicciolati. The balia had decreed that those candidates who received between go and I I O votes in the October scrutiny would have their names written on individual tickets. These tickets would be placed in four bags, one for each quarter, from which replacements would be drawn in the event that any of the eight candidates on each extracted ticket was ineligible to assume office due to temporary absence from the city, incarceration for debt or other cause, or one of the d i ~ i e t i . ~ ~ 37. Villani, Cronica, 4: 49: "Ma trovossi poi per li tempi, quando si traevano i priori, che degli artefici minuti v'avea pih per rata, che non fu l'ordine dato." Villani's explanation for this was that the consuls of the twenty-one guilds dominated the balloting in the scrutiny; see above, n. 26. 38. Tratte, I 167M, ff. 371-371~: "Et quod dicti fratres et quatuor boni viri etiam accipiant et scribi faciant per dictum scribam reformationum nomina et prenornina omnium et singulorum qui habuerint nonaginta fabas nigras vel abinde supra usque ad centum decem, in cedulis de membranis quodlibet nomen per se . . . pro extrahendo et habendo ad offitium et pro offitio prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie et offitio duodecim bonorum virorum prout inferius continebitur. Que marsupia vocentur marsupia eorum ex quibus supleri debent deffectus." These bags are described by Velluti, Cronica Domesrica, p. 192; they are also discussed by Becker and Brucker, "ArtiMinori," p. 96, and by Guidi, "Sistemi elettorali (132913491," P-393.

144 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics In the first tratta following the scrutiny (for the priorate of NovemberDecember 1343)~the names of candidates found to be ineligible for any of these reasons were written on new tickets, on a one-name-per-ticket basis, and placed in separate bags "of those to be rea~signed."~~ Their replacements were then drawn from the borsa di spicciolati. In all subsequent tratte the needed replacements would first be sought from the bags "of those to be reassigned" and then, should these prove to be insufficient, from the borsa di spicciolati.* The spicciolati were apparently drawn by lot, and this must account in large part for the irregularity, noted by Becker and Brucker and also by Villani, in the number of minori who sat in the priorates between 1343 and 1348. It must have happened on more than a few occasions that a temporarily ineligible minor guildsman was replaced by a major guildsman, and vice versa. Whether by chance or by calculation, however, the replacements that came from the borsa di spicciolati did not cause the long-term ratio of minor to major guildsmen to differ substantially from what the balia had established in 1343. In fifteen of the twenty-seven priorates between November 1343 and March 1348, the minor guildsmen occupied the three out of eight seats assigned to them. In seven priorates they held four posts, and in only five did they have as few as two. In these twenty-seven terms the minori held eighty-three posts overall, for an average 3.07 posts per term, equivalent to 38 percent of all the available seats in the priorate and 34 percent of all the seats in the Signoria. Thus, despite the short-term fluctuations in the number of minor guildsmen, the system did indeed work to safeguard the minimum representation of the minori guaranteed by the balia in October 1343. If the borsa di spicciolati did not materially affect the distribution of seats between the two divisions of the guild community, it did have the result of enlarging the officeholding class to a significant degree. It provided access 39. Tratte, I I ~ ~ f. M374v: , "nomen talis sic absentis, carcerati, vel devetum habentis . . . scribatur . . . in quadam cedula de membranis que cedula revolvatur et ponatur in quodam marsupio illius quarterii de quo fuerit, et conservetur in dicta capsa et appellentur [sic] huiusmodi marsupium marsupium reassumendorum." 40. Ibid., ff. 375-375v and 377: "Et quod si contingeret ex dictis pallottis extrahi aliquem a[d] dicta offitia prioratus seu duodecim bonorum virorum qui ratione alicuius deveti absentie mortis seu cuiuscumque prohibitionis esse non posset in offitio supradicto . . . tunc loco dicti talis debeat summi aliquis qui esset in ipso numero seu marsupio eorum ex quibus debet suppleri defectus, dum tamen primo et ante omnia assummantur si qui essent positi in marsupio reasummendorum de quo supra fit mentio."

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

145

to the Signoria for a large pool of persons who had received less than I I O votes in the scrutiny and, because the divieti touched the larger families more often than smaller ones, it tended to increase the chances of election for new men and for those who did not have close relatives in the bor~e.~' The willingness of the popular government to enforce the divieti strictly and to recruit replacements from beyond the pool of officially approved candidates stands in sharp contrast to the policies of the early 135os, when the divieti were frequently overlooked in order to prevent a similar enlargement of the officeholding The net effect of these revolutionary procedures on the size of the officeholding class and the actual patterns of officeholding can be measured with some precision, at least in one of the four quarters of the city. According to Villani, the number of candidates approved in the scrutiny of 1343 amounted to something less than one-tenth of the total of 3,346 nominat i o n ~This . ~ ~ information, if correct, would fix the class of eligible officeholders at somewhere between 300 and 330. But Villani apparently did not include the spicciolati or the supplementary minori in this figure and thus gives a misleading impression of the size of the total pool of candidates who became eligible for the Signoria in the aftermath of the 1343 scrutiny. No list of approved candidates for the entire city survives from 1343, but there is such a list for the quarter of Santa Croce, and it clearly demonstrates that any estimate based on Villani's rough "tenth of the nominations" stands in need of serious revision. According to the list, 126 citizens of Santa Croce received a minimum of I I O votes in the scrutiny and thus became eligible for inclusion in the primary borsa for the priorate as well as for the two advisory colleges. Twenty-one of the 126 were selected by the accoppiatori for the office of Standard-bearer of Justice, and the rest were presumably included in the fifty prearranged groups of eight. Among these 105 imborsati for the priorate were twenty-six persons who can be identified as either minor guildsmen or sottoposti in the textile industries 41. The divieti for the Signoria were: for officeholders, four years; for fathers, sons, and brothers, six months; for other relatives, four months. The divieto from one executive college to another was six months. No more than one partner or agent of a business firm was allowed on the priorate in the same term, nor more than "unus de una et eadem domo progenie seu stirpe." The divieto for the Twelve was two years for officeholders (ibid., ff. 376~-377). 42. See n. 76 below and chapter 6. 43. Villani, Cronica, 4: 49. Stefani gives an even smaller figure: "rimaserne circa 200" (Cronaca, r. 594, p. 216).

146 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics (tintori, farsettai, ~ a p o n a i )But . ~ ~the list is followed by three others. The first contains the names of twenty-six persons who received between go and I I O votes in the scrutiny and who thereby became eligible for inclusion in the borsa di spicciolati as potential replacements for the 110-vote eligibles.45Among the twenty-six were seventeen major guildsmen and nine minor guildsmen and sottoposti. The second list names forty-two members of the fourteen minor guilds who, although they received less than go votes in the scrutiny, were added to the ranks of the minori eligibles to ensure the necessary minimum number of officeholders from the minor guilds in the priorate and the Twelve. Many of these supplementary minori had very low vote totals in the scrutiny, some as low as only twenty or thirty.46 Finally, the third list is a group of thirty-six persons who qualified for the college of the Sixteen with vote totals between go and 110.~'Twenty-six of them are also named in the spicciolati list, but since four of the remaining ten did in fact make it to the Signoria between 1343 and 1348, these ten, all major guildsmen, should be included among Santa Croce's final list of eligibles for the Signoria. From these lists it is clear that the mechanics of the 1343 system actually granted eligibility, whether direct or potential, to a much larger group than those receiving the formal minimum of I I O votes in the scrutiny. Even the 126 who did reach this total are more than Villani's "tenth of the nominations." For, if we assume the roughly equal size of the quarters and multiply this figure by four, the Santa Croce list would suggest an approximate total of 500 candidates approved at the I 10-vote level, rather than the 300 to 330 implied by Villani. If we then add the spicciolati and the supplementary minori, the final total of candidates with eligibility to the Signoria from Santa Croce amounts to 204, of whom 127 were major guildsmen and 77 minor guildsmen or sottoposti. For the entire city, it would thus appear that the scrutiny of 1343 produced a potential officeholding class of about 800 persons, which is two and a half times greater than the estimates based on Villani. 44. Tratte, 394, ff. I-3v (for the full list of 126 names), and f. 10 (for the separate listing of the twenty-one persons designated for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice). 45. Ibid., f. 4: "Infrascripti sunt qui habuerunt LXXXX'"fabas et ultra usque in CX qui suplere debent numerum quarteriorum." 46. Ibid., ff. 5-5v: "De quarterio Sancte Crucis. Infrascripti sunt de minoribus artibus pro suplendo numerum ipsarum artium." 47. Ibid., ff. 7-7v.

The Popular Revival, 1343- 1348 147 The spicciolati and the supplementary minori not only reached the borse for the executive offices, but they also were elected and placed in office frequently enough to warrant their inclusion in any assessment of the total number of persons who could nourish some real hope of reaching the Signoria after 1343. For the period between November I 343 and March I 348, a comparison of the Santa Croce lists of approved candidates with the prior lists of the same quarter reveals that, over these four and a half years, thirty-seven (29 percent) of the 126 candidates who gained at least I I O votes in the scrutiny actually held office (thirty of them as priors and seven as Standard-bearers of Justice). Within this group, the major guildsmen had a 29 to 8 advantage over the minor guildsmen and the sottoposti (all seven Standard-bearers of Justice and twenty-two of the thirty priors being major guildsmen), which means that from the ranks of the I 10-vote eligibles the minori and sottoposti secured only slightly more than one in every five seats on the Signoria. But over the same period no less than fourteen of the thirty-six spicciolati of Santa Croce (equivalent to 39 percent of the total) also reached the Signoria, among them nine major guildsmen and five minor guildsmen and sottoposti. And of the forty-two supplementary minori who had received less than 90 votes in the scrutiny, ten (24 percent) were likewise elevated to the high office. Thus, of the sixty-one persons elected to the Signoria from Santa Croce in these years, twentyfour (39 percent) had received less than I I O votes in the scrutiny, and within this group the minori and sottoposti had an advantage of 15 to 9. Almost two-thirds of the posts secured by the minor guildsmen and sottoposti of Santa Croce (15 of 23) came from the ranks of either the spicciolati or the supplementary minori. Their total of twenty-three posts amounted to 38 percent of the sixty-one posts held by the residents of Santa Croce, whereas their share of the priorate alone (excluding the office of Standard-bearer of Justice for which they were not eligible) came to a healthy 43 percent (23 of 54 seats). In this quarter at least, it is evident that the regulations that had permitted the inclusion in the bags of so many persons who had not reached the I 10-vote level in the scrutiny, in particular the supplementary minori, substantially altered the ratio of major to minor guildsmen in the Signoria between 1343 and 1348. Only by allowing the imborsazione of such persons were the accoppiatori able to implement the 5 : 3 ratio in the priorate decreed by the balia. As reported above, the total number of minor guildsmen and sottoposti who held office between November 1343 and March 1348 was eightythree. At least five more were elected between May and August of 1348,

148 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics although there is some uncertainty regarding the composition of the Signoria during these months of the plague's worst devastation in Florence. Altogether, therefore, a minimum of eighty-eight minori and sottoposti reached the Signoria during the twenty-nine terms in which the electoral system of 1343 was in force. Becker and Brucker, who were the first to study the composition of the Signoria in this period, calculated that eighty of the 261 posts went to members of the minor guilds (apparently excluding the sottoposti). In their view, this constituted such an obvious minority that it seemed absurd to speak of the dominance of the minor guilds, as some earlier historians had done. They therefore concluded that "the commune remained under the control of the seven greater guilds after 1343," that "only a limited number of artisans and shopkeepers actively participated in the government," and that Giovanni Villani was mistaken when he complained in his chronicle: "Now we are ruled by the artefici and the popolo m i n ~ t o . " Technically, ~~ these conclusions are irrefutable; control over the major offices in these years was never relinquished by the major guilds, and the minor guildsmen never once constituted a majority in any of the priorates. But something of the dramatic reality of the politics of 1343-48 seems to be lost in dismissing the judgment of a generally acute observer like Villani, who, although he may in bitterness have exaggerated the political ascendancy of the middle and lower classes, was certainly not encouraged by personal or class bias to welcome the influx of new men into Florentine government. Villani was indeed often wrong about matters of constitutional or statistical detail, but he was never a complete victim of his imagination. When he wrote that "ora siamo a1 reggimento degli artefici e del popolo minuto," he probably did not mean to imply that the regime was dominated by the minor guildsmen. Villani's artefici are guildsmen, not artisans, and his use of the term should not be considered synonymous with popolo minuto. Villani almost certainly meant to suggest the ascendancy of the whole guild community, major and minor. He correctly perceived that this phenomenon entailed the rise of the minor guildsmen (popolo minuto) to an unprecedented, although not dominant, share of the government. In his eyes, the results of the 1343 scrutiny had to be set against the background of nearly fifteen years of tight oligarchic control from 1328 to 1342, in which the government had been restricted to a narrow aristocracy of international merchants, bankers, and industrialists and in which the participation of minor guildsmen in high office was negligible 48. Becker and Brucker, "Arti Minori," pp. 96-97; Villani's comment is in Cronica, 4:51.

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

149

(no more than a handful in a decade and a half). Suddenly, he and the other members of his class were faced with a situation in which more than a third of the posts were being awarded to minor guildsmen and more than half to men whose families had never previously been represented in the Signoria. It was probably small comfort to Villani to know that many of these new men were technically major guildsmen, and he must have viewed their elevation to the Signoria with the same troubled contempt that he directed at the minori. Thus, although the minor guildsmen were still a minority in the government, the combination of their enormous advance with the arrival of so many new men from the non-elite ranks of the major guilds meant that the families that had ruled Florence for half a century were now relegated to a secondary role, while hitherto excluded parvenus and modest guildsmen rose in greater numbers than ever before to positions of power. It was no doubt this combination that Villani had in mind when he claimed that Florence after 1343 was ruled by the "artefici and the pop010 minuto." The new families (those admitted to the borse for the first time as a result of the scrutiny of October 1343) were indeed a potent force in the Signoria between the end of 1343 and the summer of 1348. As reported in the previous chapter, in the entire decade 1330-39 only twenty-five families entered the priorate for the first time, and in the fourteen-year lifetime of the electoral system established in 1328, the total was a mere thirty-eight. By contrast, in the fifty-eight months of the popular regime from November 1343 to August 1348, no less than 136 families made their initial appearances in the Signoria, for an average of just under five new families (4.69 to be exact) in each term of ofice. These 136 new families accounted for 57 percent of all the families represented in the Signoria in these years, and for 53 percent of the available posts in the same period.49Table 5.1 com49. My counting of new families (from the Priorista Mariani 111,in Manoscritti, 250, ff. 626-726) agrees exactly with the figure published by Ronald G. Witt in his recent study, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class, 1382-1407," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 (1976): 274. However, my calculation of the percentage of posts occupied by these new families differs very slightly from Witt's (52 percent) for the reason that he did not count the four cases in which a second member of a new family was also elected to the Signoria in this same period. However slight the difference in this case, the importance of including such subsequent appearances by the same or other members of new families in any calculation of their total share of the Signoria within a given period will be examined in the context of the problem of the new men (gente nuova) of the next three decades; see chapter 6. As Witt points out in the aforementioned study, Brucker's figures of 175 priors from the new families and 86 from families previously represented in the

I 50

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

Table 5. I. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Family, 1343- 1348 Pre- 1343 Families

New Families (1343-48)

All Families

Number of Posts

Families

Posts

Families

Posts

Families

Posts

Totals

101

125

136

140

237

265

Source: Priorista Mariani I-ZIZ, in Manoscn'tti, 248-50

pares their participation in the high office with that of the pre-1343 families, both groups having been broken down according to the number of posts held by each family.50 Although a handful of oligarchic families were well represented in the regime (four appearances each by the Albizzi and the Altoviti, and three each by the Strozzi, Rucellai, and Bordoni), these figures indicate a substantial displacement of the old ruling group in favor of large numbers of persons of modest social rank, from both the major and minor guilds. That only four of the new families managed to place more than one prior Signoria are unsubstantiated; see Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 105. From the Priorista Mariani, I have counted 125 priors between November 1343 and August 1348 who came from families that entered the Signoria before September 1343. However, a reasonable case could be made for the inclusion among the new men of 1343-48 of four minor guildsmen who were first elected to the Signoria under the rule of the Duke of Athens between October 1342 and June 1343 and who were subsequently reelected under the popular government; see Priorista Mariani ZZI, in Manoscritti, 250, ff. 610 (Bellaccio di Puccio), 611 (Neri del Baldese), 615 (Giunta Ciati), and 622 (Francesco Pacini). The addition of these four to the roster of new men of 1343-48 would raise the number of posts occupied by the members of new families to 144 (54 percent), which is, however, still some distance from Brucker's figure. 50. The total number of available posts in these fifty-eight months was, as Brucker and Witt state, 261. However, the number of.persons actually seated in office was, by my count, 265. The discrepancy is due to replacements following the death of a number of priors in office. This procedure will also account for similar discrepancies between available posts and actual appearances in the statistical analyses offered in the next three chapters.

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

I 5I

in office over five years is itself a good indication that this wave of new men emanated from the ranks of mostly humble artisans and shopkeepers who lacked extended family connections. More than half of them, in fact, can be securely identified as belonging either to the minor guilds (62) or to the various categories of sottoposti (4) and secondary affiliated membra of the composite major guilds (at least 4). And many of the others, although major guildsmen pleno iure, were modest businessmen and shopkeepers, such as merciai from the guild of the Medici, Speziali e Merciai, r-itagliatori from Por Santa Maria, and pellicciai. For seventy-seven of the 136 new families (57 percent of the total), the single appearance achieved in the Signoria between 1343 and 1348 constituted their only representation in the priorate down to 1532. Of the remaining fifty-nine, only a handful gained even a limited regular presence in the Signoria for the rest of the fourteenth c e n t ~ r y . ~In' sum, the majority of newcomers, whether minor guildsmen or quasi-artisans and shopkeepers from the non-elite ranks of the major guilds, were not promoted into or sustained in political life by the advantages that accrued to the members of even moderately wellplaced families. Their influx into the commune's highest office came about as the result of the revived electoral influence of their guilds and caused an unprecedented democratization within the officeholding class: between November 1343 and August 1348, the 265 posts were held by 265 individuals from 237 different families, for a ratio of only 1.12 posts per family. These new men entered the priorate in great numbers in this half decade, but most of them, and their families, never returned to the office again. The scrutiny of October 1343 was a remarkable experiment in Florentine electoral politics. It represented a serious attempt to recast the city's political structure along lines that derived strength and inspiration from the old corporate view that the republic was embodied in its guild community. Several indications point to the revived importance of the guilds in the process of nomination and scrutiny. For the first time, the minor guilds were guaranteed a sizable long-term, fixed share in the commune's highest office. And the novel method of filling the bags and extracting the name tickets, together with the strict enforcement of tough divieti regulations, 51. None of the 136 families went on to enjoy more than a dozen appearances in the priorate down to 1400. TWOof them had more than nine, and twenty-three had more than seven. But ninety-six of the 136 had only two or less. The number of new families, their subsequent appearances in the Signoria, and their professional affiliations have all been counted from the Priorista Mariani 111, in Manoscritti, 250, ff. 626-726.

I 52

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

made it impossible for a small group of officeholders to succeed themselves regularly in office, as had happened in the 1330s. By insisting on the strict observance of a four-year personal divieto for the priorate and by predetermining the composition of the priorates in accordance with the declared fixed share of seats for the minor guilds, the popular reformers of 1343 enlarged the officeholding class, widened its social base, and sought to guarantee the duration of these results for at least eight years. As it turned out, this experiment did not last as long as planned, but for almost five years the political life of the Florentine commune was profoundly affected by the revolutionary reforms of October 1 3 4 3 . ~ ~ The system began to come under attack as early as the fall of 1346. By the late summer of that year, the political eligibility of the spicciolati emerged as the focal point of contention between supporters and opponents of the electoral reforms of 1343. At a distance of almost three years from the scrutiny that had defined the limits of the officeholding class and after the extraction from the bags of hundreds of names for all three executive colleges, the problem of electing substitutes in the ever more frequent cases of candidates disallowed by the divieti was becoming more acute. Because tenure in one office entailed a personal divieto of six months for the other two, and with periods of ineligibility in the same office of six months for the father, sons, and brothers of an officeholder and four months for other relatives also in force, it is easy to see how, by 1346, the implementation of these divieti was causing regular recourse to the bag of spicciolati. The total number of citizens approved in 1343 with I 10 or more votes was not very much greater than the number of posts to be filled over the course of three years (450, to be exact), and although the same individuals could and certainly did hold more than one office in this period, the same names were turning up with increasing frequency. On 12 September 1346 the Signoria sent to the councils a petition containing a proposed remedy for this problem. It noted that in the most recent extraction of names for the college of the Twelve all those whose names were found on the prearranged list for the quarter of Santa Maria Novella were barred from acceptance of the of52. The restructuring of electoral politics was not limited to the major executive offices. A year later, at the end of 1344, the election of citizens to several important administrativeposts was also reformed along lines closely patterned on the system devised in October 1343 for the election of the Signoria and the colleges. For the authorization of the special committee of eight appointed to oversee the reform of administrative elections, see Cap., 18, ff. 6-6v; for their names, and the reforms they adopted, see Cap. Prot., 5 , ff. 87-101.

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 53

fice by the divieti. When the election officials then turned to the bag of spicciolati for that quarter, expecting to draw the names of substitutes, they discovered that the bag was empty. Thus, because some of the candidates who had received between go and I 10 votes in the 1343 scrutiny had for some reason not been included in the bags of the spicciolati, it was proposed that the Signoria appoint a committee of four men to review the results of the scrutiny, prepare a complete and accurate list of all those who had received go or more votes, and have their names placed in bags, according to quarter. Substitutes would henceforth be drawn from this new set of bags in the event that the original bags of spicciolati did not contain a sufficient quantity of name tickets.53The effect of this legislation was further to broaden the officeholding class to include a greater percentage of persons who failed to reach the 110-vote level in the scrutiny. Because many such persons were artisans, shopkeepers, and small merchants (probably half of them minor guildsmen, to judge from the original Santa Croce list of spicciolati), the reform of September 1346, far from being a mere technical adjustment, practically guaranteed that more seats on the Signoria would be filled in the future by yet another wave of new men. Although direct evidence of a connection is lacking, it may have been this final escalation of popular ambitions that led the opponents of the regime to action. The first of a series of events that restored a slightly broadened oligarchy to political hegemony in the commune was the "antiforeigner" legislation of 17 October 1346.'~ This law, which was later included in the 1355 redaction of the communal statutesYs5 was, by Villani's testimony, the work of the Guelf party and represented a turning point in the struggle between the popular regime and its patrician oppon e n t ~Its . ~prologue ~ conveys a sense of urgency about the issue of the political eligibility of the new men, which could very well be related to the 53. P R , 34, ff. 85v-86. 54, On this law, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. I 16- 17; Julius Kirshner, "Paolo di Castro on Cives Ex Privilegio: A Controversy over the Legal Qualifications for Public Office in Early Fifteenth-Century Florence," in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971), p. 239; Kirshner, " 'Ars Imitatur Naturam': A Consilium of Baldus on Naturalization in Florence," Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1974): 300-301; and Guidi, "Sistemi elettorali (1329-1349);' pp. 408-9. 55. The original legislation of 1346 is in P R , 34, ff. 93v-94v. In the 1355 statutes it became rubric 201 of the first book of the Statutes of the Captain of the People: "Quod alienigene non admictantur ad offitia ad que eliguntur cives seu comitatini comitatus Florentie" (Statuti di Firenze, 10, ff. 28v-29). 56. Villani, Cronica, 4 : I 19.

I 54

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

provision on the spicciolati of the previous month. By branding as untrustworthy foreigners the newcomers who, "by means of bribery and corruption, desire, ambitiously seek, and attempt to have themselves promoted, admitted, and raised to offices and positions in the city of F l o r e n ~ e , "the ~~ oligarchs of the Parte evidently hoped to blunt the impact of the September provision. The law established that "no one who by public, common, or popular opinion is considered to be or is treated as a foreigner" would be permitted to hold office and that the category of forensis would, for the purpose of this law, be understood to be that commonly applied among the citizens or "among the guildsmen of the guild in which one is considered to be a member." No exceptions were to be made for persons in whose favor grants of citizenship or popular status had been conceded, nor for persons who had established residence within the city. Significantly, the prohibition extended even to those who had already been approved in an electoral scrutiny and whose names were, at the time of the passage of the law, in the bags of eligible officeholders, as well as to those who might be nominated in future ~ c r u t i n i e s In . ~ ~the event of controversy or doubt re57. PRY34, f. 93v: "multi forenses maxime orrigine incogniti, nec sufficientia aut legalitate probati reperiuntur et sunt in civitate et comitatu Florentie qui sub pretestu et ficto colore civilitatis seu comitatinatus florentini multis cautelis suggestionibus ac rogaminibus . . . ambitiose querunt et conantur promovi admicti st recipi ad offitia et honores in dicta civitate Florentie tamquam veri cives et comitatini civitatis Florentie, ipsius civitatis honera facere et substinere in opportuno tempore recusantes, quod si contingat eos eadem offitia seu honores assequi de re pubblica florentina sollicita gubernatione non curata, cum plerumque sint de longinquis partibus et locis non benivolis comuni Florentie, et per consequens amorem nataliter insitum ad ipsam civitatem Florentie non gerunt propter que dicti comunis negotia negligunt et posttergant, et multa schandala incurrere possent et indingnationes insurgere et insurgunt in dicta civitate Florentie et inter eius cives et comitatinos. Quare pro evitandis schandalis et indignationibus in dicta civitate, et ut illi ad honores et offitia in civitate predicta adsummantur et admictantur de quibus possit populus et comune Florentie et artes et artifices civitatis ipsius plene confidere, et quibus natalis zelus insit ut filiis veris ad civitatem populum et comune Florentie tamquam veram matrem." 58. Ibid.: "Quod nullus pubblica vel comuni oppinione vel vulgho reputatur sive tractatur forensis vel pro forense in civitate seu comitatu Florentie, et intelligatur forensis quantum ad predicta omnis ille qui publice comuniter seu vulgo seu comuni oppinione civium Florentinorum seu comitatinorum Florentie, seu inter artifices artis, de qua fuerit reputatus, seu habitus vel denominatus fuerit forensis seu de alia terra seu loco seu qui esset seu reputatus fuerit de aliqua terra vel loco in qua vel quo exerceretur iurisdictio sanguinis seu in qua vel quo seu cuius territorio vel curte exhigeretur gabella vel pedagium pro ipsa terra seu loco, etiarn si privilegium civi[li]tatis seu popularitatis haberet seu ipsam civilitatem seu popu-

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 55

garding these regulations, the ultimate decision would rest with the Signoria and the advisory colleges of the Sixteen and the Twelve. According to Villani, however, the category of persons excluded by the law was much more precisely defined: anyone who had not been born, or whose grandfather or father had not been born, in either the city or contad0 of Florence was held to be a forensi~.~~ The main body of the 17 October law, however, makes no mention of qualification by birth, nor of the extension of this requirement to three generations. These elements are introduced only at the end of the provision, in a series of modifications appended to the law. They appear in the form of two specific exceptions to the general and highly ambiguous terms of the petition submitted by the Guelf party. The first stated that anyone who could demonstrate Florentine birth for himself and his father, and who regularly resided with his family in the city or the contado, would not be considered a foreigner. The second exempted all those whose paternal grandfathers, or more distant ancestors in the direct male line, had been born in F l o r e n ~ e The . ~ ~ net effect was the situation as described by Villani, except in the case of permanent residents for whom the requirement was limited to two rather than three generations. Because most of those affected by the law were resident in the city, this modification should probably be interpreted as a minor concession to the popular elements, although it did not benefit the more recently arrived new families. How many persons did the application of this law actually exclude from further participation in the political life of the commune? A precise answer to this question is now possible owing to the discovery of a document that lists, guild by guild, the names of all persons, with their towns and cities of origin, who were declared to be "foreigners" according to the law of Octolaritatem prescripxisset seu domicilium civitatis Florentie habuisset seu habere diceretur, possit de cetero esse, eligi, vel assummi ad aliquod offitium cum salario vel sine . . . neque extrahi de aliquo saccho, pixide seu marsupio in quo descriptus qualitercumque reperiretur vel esset." 59. Villani, Cronica, 4: 118-19: "Nel detto anno, a di 18 dYOttobre,si fece ordine e dicreto in Firenze che neuno forestiere fatto cittadino, il quale il padre e l'avolo ed egli non fossono nati in Firenze o nel contado, non potesse avere alcuno uficio, non ostante che fusse eletto o insaccato, sotto certa grande pena." 60. PR, 34, f. 94: "Salvo quod nullus qui sua et patris orrigine fuerit de civitate seu cornitatu Florentie et in dicta civitate seu comitatu habitet et habitaverit cum familia sua quo ad predicta intelligatur esse forensis . . . hoc in predictis modificato quod quicumque avi sui paterni orrigine seu aliorum superiorum ab avo supra per lineam maschulinam fuerit verus civis seu cornitatinus Florentie per predicta non intelligatur excludi."

156 Cmporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics ber 1346.~'The list contains a total of 426 names, distributed among twenty of the twenty-one guilds. The only guild that did not submit a list was the Calimala, presumably because it had no foreigners to report. The largest group of excluded foreigners belonged to the guild of the Maestri di Pietra e Legname, which submitted no fewer than ninety-five names. Other guilds in which significant numbers of foreigners were found include the Giudici e Notai (63), the Medici, Speziali e Merciai (40), the Calzolai (34), and Por Santa Maria (30). About one-third of these foreigners were members of the seven major guilds, but only a handful were from the guilds of the economic oligarchy (seven from the Cambio, six from the Lana, and none from the Calimala).62Clearly, the anti-foreigner legislation 61. P R Y 211, ff. 123-34. Despite the incomplete date at the beginning ("134-'7, there can be no doubt that these lists were in fact prepared shortly after the passage of, and in compliance with, the legislation of October 1346. In a volume of deliberations of the Arte del Cambio for the years 1346-47, there is a copy of the list of foreigners submitted by that guild. It is dated 8 December 1346 and was based on a report prepared for the guild on 29 November (Cambio,57, no pagination). In addition, the list for the guild of the Albergatori is also dated 8 December 1346 ( P R Y211, f. 131v). The first list is that of the Giudici e Notai: "Infrascripti sunt iudices et notarii qui sunt et esse debent ac etiam censeri forenses secundum formam reformationis de predictis loquentibus exarninati et scruptinati per dominos vice proconsulem et Consules artis Iudicum et Notariorum et alios sapientes et arrotos habitos ad predicta" (ibid., f. 123). The introduction to the Cambio's list, like that of the Giudici e Notai, makes it clear that the consuls of each guild were responsible for conducting the necessary investigation among the members; it further suggests that the foreign official of the Mercanzia was assigned a supervisory role in the enforcement of the communal decree: "Consules artis et universitatis Campsorum . . . una cum . . . eorum officialibus . . . deputatis, volentes parere mandatis domini offitialis universitatis mercatorum et Mercantie . . . retulerunt eidem domino offitiali infrascriptos homines et personas artifices dicte artis fuisse et esse forenses et non oriundos ipsos nec eorum patres in civitate et comitatu Florentie" (ibid., f. 125). 62. The complete breakdown by guild is as follows: Giudici e Notai Cambio Lana Por Santa Maria Medici e Speziali Vaiai e Pellicciai Beccai Calzolai Fabbri Maestri Rigattieri

Vinattieri Albergatori Oliandoli Galigai Corazzai, Spadai Chiavaiuoli Coreggiai Legnaiuoli Fornai Total

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

I 57

was aimed at blocking the eligibility for office of new or recent citizens in both the major and the minor The vast majority of excluded foreigners originated from the nearby towns and cities of Tuscany. The only significant exception was a group of twenty-five individuals identified as coming from Lombardy, and twentythree of these belonged to the guild of the Maestri di Pietra e Legname." However, it must be remembered that all those listed were either formally enrolled guild members or regular practitioners of a trade or profession that fell under the jurisdiction of one of the guilds. They did not represent a transient element, and the vast majority of them must not be confused with the truly non-Florentine merchants or craftsmen who might have been in the city. Most of the 426 were probably born in Florence, and all of them certainly lived and worked in the city on a permanent basis. Indeed, the law's specific exclusion from office of foreigners whose names had already been placed in the electoral bags demonstrates that many, if not most, of the 426 were men who, before the passage of the law, had been considered Florentine citizens with full officeholding rights. Thus, the law of October 1346 was a political attack on the officeholding class that emerged from the popular scrutiny of 1343 and not a genuine expression of xenophobic tendencies in the Florentine ruling class. The passage of the anti-Ghibelline law in January 1347, again at the instigation of the Guelf party, was also related to disputes over electoral matters. According to Villani, the formal exclusion from high office of the families of Ghibellines and rebels was a compromise imposed on the Parte leaders, who originally intended to have the electoral borse opened in order to remove the names of certain individuals unacceptable to them. The 63. Although the anonymous chronicler cited by Brucker (Florentine Politics, p. 117) says that "the fourteen lower guilds were seriously weakened by this law," in fact no less than 35 percent of the designated forenses came from the seven major guilds. The subtotals for the seven major, five middle, and nine minor guilds are, respectively, 148, 166, and 112. 64. The localities with which the largest number of forenses were identified were the following: Lucca and its contado (69, Carmignano ($3, Pistoia and its contado (54), Siena (31), Lombardy (25), the Casentino (23), Prato and its contado (IS), Bologna and its contado (IZ), and the territories of the Counts Guidi (10). Most of the remaining "foreigners" were linked to places like Pisa, San Miniato, Arezzo, Fucecchio, Volterra, San Gimignano, Colle di Val d'Elsa, Artimino, Pescia, Dicomano, and a host of smaller towns and villages in or near Tuscany. Larger cities outside Tuscany-for example, Rome, Imola, Genoa, Padua, Brescia, and Como -are represented by only one or two names each. There were only four nonItalians: two "de Alamania," one "de Francis," and one "de Anglia."

I 58

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

guilds and their leaders objected strenuously and were able to block this attempt to tamper with the bags by agreeing to the anti-Ghibelline measure that was passed on 20 J a n ~ a r y . ~ ~ What the opponents of the popular regime were unable to accomplish in 1347, however, they achieved in the summer of 1348, taking advantage of the confusion and demoralization caused by the Black Death. Political life came to a halt during the peak months of the plague, but by midsummer it was clear that the high mortality had made the electoral lists of 1343 obsolete and that the borse would have to be opened and reviewed in order to eliminate the names of the deceased. This technical problem led to the creation of a balia and to a major reform of the electoral system. T h e balta of 1348 carried out the first steps in the dismantling of the electoral program of the popular government and signaled the beginning of the gradual return of Florentine electoral politics to conditions that were intended to generate consensus within the upper class rather than provide electoral representation among competing classes in Florentine society. On 18 and 19 July, the communal councils approved a petition drawn u p and submitted by the Signoria and the Twelve, in which the executive colleges asked for full extraordinary powers, valid through the month of August, to enact a series of political reforms.66 The most striking enact65. Villani, Cronica, 4: 127-28: "per quelli della parte guelfa in Firenze se n'ebbe gran sospetto [over the election of the new Emperor Charles of Bohemia]. E sentendo e sappiendo come le borse dell'elezioni de' priori aveano mischiate contro a1 loro volere e' pih dicevano ch'erano ghibellini sotto nome d'artefici delle ventuna capitudini dell'arti, e d'essere buoni uomini e popolani, pih consigli se ne tenner0 per correggere le dette elezioni de' priori. Ma era tanto il podere delle capitudini dell'arti e degli artefici, e per temenza di non commovere la terra a romore e ad arme, che si rimase di non fare cerna, o toccare la lezione de' priori; ma per contentare in parte i guelfi, si fece a di 20 di Gennaio decreto e riformagione [barring Ghibellines from office]." Villani says that the measure had the effect of intimidating many persons who decided not to risk a defense of their right to hold office, "per non esserne condannati ni: riceverne vergogna, e in lor0 luoghi ne furono chiamati altri. E qui comincib il principio de' fatti della parte per gara degli ufici ciei comune" (ibid.). Brucker has calculated that of the 165 individuals who held the office of prior from October 1343 to January 1347, only thirty-one were ever again selected; see Florentine Politics, p. 118. Even acknowledging, as Brucker does, that this was in large part due to the plague of 1348, these figures suggest that the combined effect of the anti-foreigner and anti-Ghibelline laws of 1346 and 1347 was the exclusion of much of the officeholding class of the previous three years from any continuing involvement in Florentine government. 66. Signori e Collegi, Deliberazionifatte in forza di speciale autoritci, I, ff. 8-13v. Despite the terror of that awful summer, a surprising number of council members

The Popular Revival, 1343-1348

159

ment of this balia was the reduction of the number of minor guilds from fourteen to a bold move that struck directly at the numerical strength of the minor guildsmen within the corporate federation. For the purposes of the present investigation, however, the electoral enactments of the balia are of primary interest. The balia began by calling for a new general scrutiny for the three executive colleges. The scrutiny committee included the nine members of the Signoria; the twenty-eight members of the two advisory colleges; forty-eight arroti, three from each of the sixteen gonfaloni, to be elected by the three executive colleges in combined session; the proconsul of the guild of Giudici e Notai; the Five of Mercanzia; and one representative from each of the twenty remaining guilds, to be elected by the Signoria.'j8Thus, out of I 11 participants, only twenty-one were included as delegates of the guilds, and, what is far more important, twenty of them were handpicked by the Signoria in office. The fact that the guilds did not select their own representatives for the 1348 scrutiny deprived the middle and minor guilds of any real influence in the voting. What little the balia had to say about nominations suggests that the matter rested almost entirely in the hands of the incumbent priors: "A scrutiny will be held . . . of all those who will be nominated, or of such persons as shall seem fitting and pleasing to the lord priors."'j9 A scrutiny for which nominations were made principally by the Signoria and in which a large majority of the scrutators were also selected by the Signoria and its colleges quite naturally resulted in a sharp reduction in the numbers of minori and new men who were approved for high office. According to Becker and were present for the vote on the balia petition. The opposition was modest, but in view of the demoralizing circumstances not insignificant: the petition passed by votes of 122 to 31 and 127 to 25 (ibid., ff. 11, 13v). 67. Manoscritti, 269, no pagination. For an analysis of the balia's work, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. 120-22. 68. Manoscritti, 269,16 August 1348. At least eighty of the 111 had to be present for the voting. The names of the forty-eight arroti and the appointed guildsmen (for some reason, twenty-two instead of twenty) are in ibid. The contingent of arroti was dominated by aristocrats and included members of the following families: Ridolfi, Velluti, Brancacci, Dell'Antella, Baroncelli, Mancini, Alberti, Peruzzi, Acciaiuoli, Altoviti, Ardinghelli, Bordoni, Rondinelli, and Albizzi. According to Brucker, only ten of the forty-eight qualify as new men (Florentine Politics, p. 121n). 69. Manoscritti, 269, 16 August 1348: "fiat inter eos singulariter et unanimiter scrutineum . . . de omnibus et singulis qui nominati fuerint seu de quibus ipsis dominis Prioribus videbitur et placebit."

160 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics Brucker, only 275 persons were approved, of whom 13 percent were minor guildsmen and 36 percent new men.'O The second phase of the electoral reform of August 1348 was concerned with the problem of the name tickets that still remained jn the 1343 bags. On 22 August these bags were opened in the Council of the People. The name tickets containing the prearranged lists of priors and members of the Twelve, as well as those on which the names of the designated Standardbearers of Justice had been inscribed, were extracted from the bags, and all the names were read aloud before the assembly. As Velluti reported, the names of the many plague victims were erased from the lists, while the names of the survivors were transferred to a new set of tickets, this time on the basis of one ticket per individuaL7' Before this was done, however, the balia ejected the names of fraudulent bankrupts and all persons who were declared foreigners according to the law of October 1346.~' The Signoria and the colleges then selected a committee of eight men to oversee the placement of all the name tickets in new bags for the different offices.73These accoppiaton began their work by dividing the remaining 70. Becker and Brucker, "Arti Minori," p. 97. Among the scrutinies for which statistical evidence is available, the total of 275 persons who qualified in 1348 represents the lowest figure in the history of the republic, although it is likely that even fewer individuals were approved in the scrutinies between 1328 and 1342. The modest percentage of new men is especially noteworthy in view of the decirnation of the ranks of the officeholding class by the plague. For Brucker's calculations of the percentages of new men among the approved candidates of the scrutinies from 1343 to 1363, see Florentine Politics, p. 160. 71. Manoscritti, 269, 17 August 1348: "Item quod die XXII dicti mensis . . . convocetur Consilium Domini Capitanei et Populi . . . et quod in ipso consilio . . . apportari debeat . . . capsa triclavia . . . et ipsa capsa in dicto consilio aperiri debeat et de ea trai cedule continentes nomina Coniunctorum, seu Accoppiatorum ad officium Prioratus predicti, et etiam cedule continentes singulariter nornina insaccatorum ad officium Vexilliferatus Iustitie, et etiam cedule continentes nomina Coniunctorum, seu Accoppiatorum ad officium Duodecim Bonorum Virorum predictorum, et quod ipsa omnia nomina in dicto consilio publice legi debeant, et ex eis nomina illorum qui dicentur esse mortui dilanientur. . . . Nomina vero illorum qui dicentur vivere debeant distincte et per quarterios scribi, ita quod ex eis possint fieri cedule, seu acceptationes ad officia supradicta." 72. Ibid.: "Item die XXII dicti mensis . . . providerunt . . . quod ex suprascriptis . . . traendis et scribendis, excipiantur et excepti esse intelligantur omnes illi qui essent falliti et cessantes, seu fuggitivi cum pecunia aliena, et omnes forenses, quorum nomina quantumcunque ipsi vivi essent scribi non debeant, sed prout mortuorum nomina laniari." 73. Ibid., 25 August 1348. The eight were Lapaccio di Bene Benizi, Giorgio di

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I6I

1343 names into two categories, maggiori and minori. They further separated the minori according to the city's four districts and placed their tickets into four corresponding bags from which they would be drawn for the priorate, but not for the office of Standard-bearer of Justice, for which the members of the fourteen lower guilds were still ineligible. The names of the maggiori and the scioperati (presumably those no longer active in guilds) were placed into two sets of four bags, one for the office of Standard-bearer of Justice and one for the priorate. For the colleges of the Twelve and the Sixteen, only one set of four bags was created for each office without distinction between major and minor guildsmen. The accoppiatori then turned their attention to the names of candidates approved in the new scrutiny. They selected a certain number for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice and placed the remainder in two sets of four bags for the priorate, one for the maggiori and scioperati and the other for the minori. The extraction of name tickets began from the revised bags of 1343. If a candidate drawn from these bags happened to have died after the accoppiatori had conducted their review of the names, his replacement was drawn from the 1343 bag of spicciolati. Only when the 1343 bags were empty did the extractions begin from the new bags of 1348. The balia reduced the personal divieto for officeholders in the Signoria from four to three years, and, in perhaps its most significant enactment in the electoral sphere, it diminished the share of the minor guilds in each priorate from three to two seats.74 From the end of 1348 to at least the beginning of 1352 (when the next general scrutiny was held), the extraction of names for the three executive colleges continued from both the revised bags of 1343 ("de bursa veteri") and the new bags of 1348 ("de bursa nova").75 Despite the fact that name tickets could now be drawn from two sets of bags resulting from two general scrutinies, within a couple of years after the scrutiny of 1348 it became Barone, Filippo Soldani, Giovanni di messer Lapo Arnolfi, Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, Azzino Gualberti, Alberto di Pagno Albizzi, and Neri di Lippo Del Palagio. At a later point in the proceedings of the balia, the eight are in fact referred to as the accoppiaton': ". . . liceat dictis Accoppiatoribus de illis dictis artibus." 74. Ibid.: ". . . octo cedulas, videlicet, duas cedulas de bursa signata pro illo quarterio pro quo tunc extractus fuerit Vexillifer Iustitie, in qua insaccata erant nomina predictorurn de dictis quatuordecim artibus, et alias duas de tribus bursis signatis pro aliis tribus quarteriis, in quibus bursis insaccata erant nomina predictorum et reinsaccatorurn qui non sunt de quatuordecim artibus supradictis." 75. Tratte, 205, passim.

162 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics necessary to forego strict observance of the divieti in order to fill the available posts. It happened on a number of occasions in these years that all the candidates whose names were drawn from the bags were found to be technically ineligible to assume office due to one or another of the divieti. In such cases it was decided to allow the individual with the least impeding divieto to be seated in office in spite of his technical ineligibilit~.'~ By adopting this procedure, the post-1348 regime departed significantly from the policy of the popular government, which had preferred to expand the ranks of eligible officeholders by increasing the number of spicciolati. Afta 1348, in a period of increasing control of Florentine political life by the competing oligarchic factions of the Albizzi and the Ricci, it became imperative to consolidate the officeholding class and to reduce the element of surprise in the bimonthly extractions of names. To this end, it was safer to allow minor infringements of the divieti than to open the gates to large numbers of untested and politically unknown new men. In the twenty years from 1328 to 1348, the Florentines experimented with two radically contrasting electoral systems having their respective origins in the reform balie of 1328 and 1343. It is true that the two systems shared some basic structural similarities: nominations and a general scrutiny, the use of borse into which name tickets were placed and from which they were drawn by lot, and the divieti. But these common features should not obscure some politically crucial differences. In 1328 nominations were controlled by narrow oligarchic committees; in 1343 a system of decentralized nomination, very likely based on the independent role of the guilds, was instituted. In 1328 the scrutiny committee was largely selected by the Signoria and consisted of eighty-five members, two-thirds of whose votes were needed for the approval of a candidate; in 1343 the committee was expanded to 206 voting members, and only slightly more than half of these were sufficient to approve candidates for direct eligibility, while many others gained delayed or potential eligibility with less (and in the case of many minori, far less) than half the votes of the scrutiny committee. The proce76. Ibid. The earliest recorded instance of this practice occurred on 28 August 1349 in the extraction of names for the college of the Sixteen; one of those seated in office "habet minus devetum." Two members of the Signoria drawn on 26 February 1350 were likewise placed in office on account of their "minus devetum." One of the Sixteen drawn on 28 April 1350 is described as follows: "habet devetum propter prioratum; remanet quia non erant alii in bursa." For the evolution of this practice after 1352, see chapter 6.

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 63

dures governing the use of the borse in 1328 permitted the regular and predictable circulation of the same small elite of officeholders in the priorate and the advisory colleges; in 1343 the regulations in this sector guaranteed access to office for an almost open-ended pool of guildsmen. In 1328 the divieto prohibiting individuals to return to the same high office was fixed at two years; in 1343 it was doubled to four years. The electoral reform of 1328 resulted in a tight and restricted political oligarchy in which "new" faces were extremely rare over a period of fifteen years; by contrast, the reform of 1343 offered political participation to more new families and individuals each year over a five-year span than the oligarchic regime had been willing to admit in the entire decade of the 1330s. Thus, within a common structural framework, the two systems of 1328 and 1343 actually represented experiments in electoral politics at almost polar extremes. But the measure of their difference is more than a matter of the numbers of officeholders or the rate of circulation of the officeholding elite. Each of these electoral systems embodied a particular set of assumptions about the nature of Florentine political society and about the mode of obtaining the necessary consensus upon which the legitimacy and stability of government depended. The electoral law of 1328 was built on the assumption of the objective existence of a unified ruling class supported by the general consensus of an integrated and harmonious society. In other words, it assumed that there was an elite body of men who, by training, education, and shared social experience, were ideally prepared to assume the collective burden of administering the affairs of the republic in the best interests of society at large. It further assumed that, because of their common experience, these natural leaders of communal society shared a common vision and sense of purpose, that they were in broad agreement on the essential principles of political life, and that they were supported by a coherent articulated consensus on fundamental issues. Both the ruling elite and the consensus that elevated it to power were held to be the natural products of society. It was, therefore, the aim of the electoral system predicated on these assumptions not to forge consensus, which existed independently of law and political institutions, but to allow that preexisting consensus to be expressed freely and to assert itself over the private aims and selfish impulses of those who, for one reason or another, had failed to embrace the common ethic. The reformers of 1343 made no such optimistic assumptions about the nature or degree of prior consensus in Florentine society. Indeed, they seem to have begun with the altogether contrasting hypothesis that communal

164 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics society was a theater of conflict among competing classes and groups and that such conflict constituted, moreover, the natural order of things. Political harmony, in other words, was not necessarily latent in the community as a whole. Instead, it would have to be created and achieved through the electoral and political institutions of communal government. Since this was principally a matter of balancing the different interests and g r o u p comprising this complex society, it followed that harmony could only be attained by allowing the direct representation of these competing forces in the electoral and political process. For the oligarchic regime of the 1330s~ civic peace was based on consensus that excluded opposition. For the guild regime of 1343, however, it entailed precisely the reverse: the recognition and systematically guaranteed inclusion of the separate and sometimes conflicting component groups. Within the framework of these assump tions, the reformers of October 1343 decided to apportion the seats in the priorate and the Twelve between two (or, according to Villani, three) groups of guilds and to devise decentralized systems of nomination and appointment to the scrutiny committee that permitted the autonomous representation of individual guilds in the electoral process. These ideas and concomitant structural modifications of the electoral system were responsible for producing the large and socially heterogeneous political class of the turbulent mid-1340s. Two decades of experimentation, therefore, had revealed that the system of election by nomination, scrutiny, and sortition was capable of widely varying results. The system undoubtedly brought a good measure of constitutional order to Florentine electoral politics, thereby resolving one of the great deficiencies of pre-1328 elections. But it also brought a new set of problems. As it became clear that the new system of scrutinies and sortition could be made to work in the interests of either a narrow oligarchy (presuming to represent the consensus of society at large) or a broadly based, decentralized popular regime (modeled on the corporate federation of autonomous guilds), electoral politics in Florence gradually became an arena of c o d i c t between these two rival conceptions of Florentine society and the republican state. By the 1340s the positions had been delineated and the alternatives had been made clear. The electoral process became a test of the competing strengths of a popular, corporate view of the Florentine republic and a consensus-oriented, oligarchic vision of the same community. In the long run, the latter won out, but in the second half of the fourteenth century this outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion. Nor did the triumph of the consensus view of Florentine elec-

The Popular Revival, 1343 -1348

I 65

toral politics come about in the extreme oligarchic form in which it had been introduced in 1328. The popular vision of the electoral process left its mark on the system even after 1348, first in a period of compromise lasting until 1378, and then in the last full affirmation of its own view of electoral politics in the revolutionary years of 1378-82. The permanent emergence of consensus politics in the 1380s~1390s~and beyond was conditioned in important ways by these developments, to which we must now turn.

Six The First Achievement of Stability, 1352- 1377

In the early I350s, after three decades of electoral turmoil and five major reorganizations (1328, 1339, September 1343, October 1343, and 1348) of the procedures for selecting the priors, the Florentines finally settled on a system that ushered in a period of electoral stability lasting just over a quarter of a century. Such a long period of stability in the complex world of Florentine electoral politics was unprecedented in the seventy-year history of the priorate. The specific origin of this achievement was yet another reform of the electoral machinery promulgated by the councils in January 1352; this reform was destined to serve as the model for all subsequent electoral systems in Florence until the end of the fifteenth century. The 1352 reform took a middle road between the oligarchic elitism of 1328 and the popular corporatism of 1343. Although on balance the electoral institutions of the I35os, 136os, and early 1370s provided for fairly strict controls on the size and composition of the political class, they managed to do so while still respecting the popular fear of a monopolization of high office by a small coterie of powerful families. The excesses of both 1328 and 1343 were more or less successfully avoided in these years. Through the vigilant observance of the divieti, the influential oligarchic families were prevented from reasserting the stranglehold on high office that they had exercised from 1328 to 1342; and by a careful control of the general scrutiny committee as well as by different aspects of the complex divieti laws, the "continuous revolution" of officeholders and high rate of political mobility of the mid-1340s were greatly moderated. Like most political compromises, this delicate balancing act generated grumblings from both sides. The oligarchs complained that the divieti regulations unjustly penalized the members of large families by depriving them of equal access to the Signoria, whereas the popular guildsmen and new men, to judge at least from the reforms they supported in the 1370s~objected in particular to the manner in which the scrutiny committees were staffed. During these years both these features of the electoral system were the source of tension and

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

167

debate. But for two and a half decades these tensions were held in rough equilibrium, as the electoral system succeeded in producing a political class whose configuration and patterns of mobility satisfied the minimum aspirations of both oligarchs and guildsmen. It was only in 1378 that the compromise broke down under the impact of special circumstances and opened the way for a last revival of the corporate approach to electoral politics. The specific events that gave birth to the 1352 reform remain obscure. In the early 1350s~three notable but sometimes contradictory forces were at work in communal politics. First was the patrician resurgence, which commenced with the balia of 1348 and continued into the next decade, consolidating aristocratic control over most of the administrative machinery and dampening the ambitions of the lower classes. Second was the intensification of factional conflict within the upper class, a phenomenon that eventually produced two competing alignments of patricians under the leadership of the Albizzi and Ricci. As Brucker has shown, most of the conservative and oligarchic families constituting the heart of the Parte Guelfa were identified with the Albizzi faction, while those who feared the dominance of the Parte, including many new men and former supporters of the popular regime of 1343, gravitated toward the Ricci. The third factor in this situation was perhaps the weakest, but it cannot be wholly discounted if we are to understand why the electoral politics of the next quarter century never returned to the level of oligarchic hegemony achieved in the 1330s. In part because of the debilitating quarrels that divided the oligarchy, the guild community, which had been humiliated in 1348, made a modest comeback in the early 1350s. In October 1350 the traditional number of fourteen minor guilds was restored by enactment of the councils. Even if this concession to the guild community was, as Brucker has claimed, a "gift from the patriciate," which felt sufficiently confident of its own revived strength to attempt to court the favor of the minor guildsmen, it still implies the recognition that the guilds constituted a force to be reckoned with. Velluti's suggestion that the measure was supported by the Albizzi faction as a way of winning the guildsmen to their own side and away from the Ricci supports the idea that the guilds were a third force in Florentine politics after 1350, too weak perhaps to assume leadership and initiative as they had in 1343, but strong enough to hold or tilt the balance between the factions. In this role, for as long as the upper class remained divided, the guild community was able to prevent a full restoration of oligarchic elitism. This limited and essentially defensive posture on the

168 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics part of the non-oligarchic classes was reflected in the measure passed by the councils in August 1352, which threatened high-ranking popolani, who were "inflated by pride and arrogance" to commit acts of violence against the "less powerful," with the same sanctions and penalties traditionally meted out to magnates.' The electoral reform bill, passed in January of the same year, was the product of the same tenuous relationship between a dominant but divided oligarchy and a weakened but tenacious guild community, which saw, in the circumstances of aristocratic partisanship, a chance to hold its own. The Signoria that sponsored the electoral legislation of 1352 presents no distinctive political coloration. It was not dominated by either aristocratic faction; nor was it controlled by especially noteworthy clusters of either oligarchs or new men. Its most prominent members were Bernardo di Piero Strozzi and Cambio di Lippo de' Medici, each making his first appearance in the high office. The Strozzi were partisans of the Albizzi, while the Medici were split between the two factions. The only other member of this Signoria from a leading house was the Standard-bearer of Justice, Nastagio di Lapo Bucelli, who died in office and was replaced by Bencivenni di Lippo Mancini. The remaining priors were from less prestigious families: Giovanni d'Arrigo Sassolini, Lorenzo di Meglio Fagiuoli, the druggist Niccolaio di Mone Guidi (Del Bianco), Azzolino di Ser Viviano (the only member who was making his family's first appearance in the Signoria), and the two minor guildsmen, the butcher Antonio di Martino and the tanner Paolo di Ricco Pelacane (Castellani). Although three members of this government had served as priors under the popular regime (Fagiuoli in 1344, Bucelli in 1347, and Pelacane in 1348)~only one had reached the high office before 1343 (again Bucelli, in 1330 and 1338).= I. For the overview of Florentine politics in the early 1350s presented in this paragraph I have drawn heavily on Gene A. Brucker's analysis in Florentine Politics and Society, 1343-1378 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 122-31; on the restoration of the minor guilds to their traditional number of fourteen, see ibid., pp. 123-24, and on the law of August 1352, p. 129. Velluti's comments on the role of certain Albizzi partisans in the reestablishment of the full contingent of minor guilds are in Cronica Dornestica, p. 242. For the petition presented by three of the minor guilds on this matter and accepted by the legislative councils on 12 October 1350, see Niccolb Rodolico, I1 Popolo Minuto: Note di Storia Fiorentina (1343- 1378) (1899; reprint ed., Florence, 1968)~pp. 110-11. 2. For the members of this priorate, see Stefani, Cronaca, r. 654, p. 240. For the participation of these men and their families In the Signoria, see Priorisfa Mariani I, in Manoscritti, 248, f. 74 (Mancini), ff. 94-96 (Strozzi), f. 122 (Bucelli), ff.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

169

Thus, although it may seem surprising that so leaderless a government should have undertaken a project involving a major revision of the commune's electoral machinery, the amorphous character of this Signoria very likely facilitated the achievement of the compromise settlement represented by the legislation of 17 January 1352. Both the reform and the government that promoted it appear to reflect the fluid circumstances of an uneasy standoff between oligarchs and guildsmen. According to the reform's prologue, the supply of name tickets in the existing borse (the revised bags of 1343 and the new ones of 1348) had so dwindled that it would soon have been impossible to fill the offices if steps were not promptly taken to hold a new general scrutiny. Vaguely alluding to certain imminent political innovations, the Signoria argued that it was best not to delay the new scrutiny any f ~ r t h e rThe . ~ reform legislation began by taking a middle-of-the-road approach to the problem of nominations for the three executive colleges. It provided that candidates be presented by the captains of the Parte Guelfa, by the consuls of each of the twenty-one guilds, and by each of the gonfalonieri of the sixteen districts of the city. The Parte captains met with a committee of arroti of their choice and nominated, from the popolani and Guelf citizens of Florence, those whom they deemed worthy. Similarly, the consuls of each guild, having convened a committee of councillors from the membership of their guild and met with them in closed session independently of the representatives of other guilds, nominated those members of the guild who were approved by a secret scrutiny of the committee. Finally, each gonfaloniere also pre234-35 (Medici); Priorista Mariani 11,in Maizoscritti, 249, f. 254 (Del Bianco), f. 380 (Sassolini), f. 452 (Fagiuoli); Priorista Mariani 111,in Manoscritti, 250, f. 639 (Castellani, not to be confused with the upper-class family of the same name), f. 738 (Martini); Priorista Mariani IV, in Manoscritti, 251, f. 777 (Viviani). On the butcher Antonio di Martino, who became a fixture of the regime and was elected to the Signoria no less than eight times between 1349 and 1382, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. 68, 168,291. For the political divisions within the Medici family, see Brucker's article, "The Medici in the Fourteenth Century," Speculum 32 (1957): 1-26. Although nothing is known regarding Cambio di Lippo de' Medici's political affiliations, his better known son Vieri was later an important partisan of the Albizzi faction; see ibid., p. 17. 3. PRY39, f. 84: "Considerantes quod in quibusdam ex bursis in quibus imbursate fuerunt et misse cedule continentes nomina assumendorum ad tria offitia . . . sunt adeo pauce cedule quod sine magno temporis spacio venient vacuande, et quod propter novitates maxime que parantur commodius est ad presens reformationi dictorum offitiorum intendere quam ulterius retardare."

170 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics pared a list of candidates from the residents of his d i ~ t r i c tThis . ~ arrangement was an obvious compromise that neutralized the political import of this first and hitherto crucial phase of the electoral process. In the first place, the incumbent priors were denied any role in the nominating procedure. By contrast, in both 1328 and 1348, the priors in office had been able to include individuals of their choosing among the nominees for the general scrutiny. This direct role of the Signoria in the nominating procedure had had the effect of introducing or, at the very least, of appearing to introduce factional quarrels and patronage struggles into the first step of the electoral process, thereby undermining general confidence in the fairness of the selection. Because the early 1350s were a period of intensifying factional disputes among the leading oligarchic families, both the competing oligarchic groups and the larger guild community probably thought it preferable to keep the factions away from any direct influence over nominations. The main objective behind the selection of nominating committees in I352 seems to have been to achieve a balance of political forces and interests in the advancement of candidates to the general scrutiny. The Parte Guelfa represented the interests of the oligarchy, and its participation in the nominating process guaranteed that the members of the great and powerful families would not fail to be nominated. That the Parte captains tended to favor aristocratic candidates is of course hardly surprising, but the fact is nonetheless nicely confirmed by Velluti. He recorded in his memoirs that he and others of his class felt that the scrutiny procedures of these years had resulted in the exclusion of many Guelfs of prominent families, including his own ("De' quali schiusi Guelfi siamo stati noi di casa"). In 1363 Velluti served on an ad hoc committee empowered to make recommendations on this problem, and one of the three proposals suggested by the committee was to have the Parte captains draw up a list of Guelfs who would then be put to a special scrutiny for inclusion in the b ~ r s eImplicit .~ in Velluti's understanding of the proposal was the assump tion that the Parte captains could be counted on to nominate high-ranking Guelfs of the sort that had been discriminated against in the scrutinies of the 1350s. Nevertheless, in the regular nomination lists prepared every third year for the general scrutinies, the Parte apparently tried to apply its criteria for selection fairly widely. The one complete Parte nomination list 4. Ibid. 5 . Velluti, Cronica Domestics, pp. 243-44.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

17I

that has survived, prepared early in 1364 for the scrutiny of that year, contains the considerable total of I ,994 names.6 At the other end of the political spectrum, the electoral interests of the guild community were ostensibly safeguarded by the independent nominating role of the consuls. The basic popular principles of autonomy and equality among the guilds were reflected in the decision to permit each guild's consuls (together with a special committee of awoti) to prepare a separate list of nominations limited to the membership of their guild.' The middle and minor guilds were thus assured of being able to nominate their own members without restriction or outside interference. Quite a number of guild nomination lists have survived from the decade of the 1360s. They show that all of the guilds did indeed prepare their own lists according to the guidelines established in the 1352 legislation, with some variations in 6. Tratte, 395. This volume contains two separate items bound together in a singlefilza. The first is an undated list of nominations prepared by the gonfaloniere of Bue Nero in the quarter of Santa Croce. The second document is the 1364 Parte list, which begins as follows: "Hec est reductio facta per capitaneos partis Guelfe civitatis Florentie de hominibus Guelfis civitatis eiusdem dignis poni ad scruptineum prioratus et vexilliferatus iustitie et aliorum collegiorum proxime celebrandum scripta per me Bartholomeurn Ser Bonaiuti de Rignana notarium dicte partis die trigesimo Januarii anni domini 1363 [Florentine style]." The nominations are distributed among the sixteen gonfaloni as follows: Scala Nicchio Ferza Drago Verde

111

I53 128 106

Carro Bue Nero Lion Nero Ruote

Total Santo Spirito

498

Total Santa Croce 520

Vipera Unicorno Lion Bianco Lion Rosso Total S.M. Novella

I37 146

Lion d'oro 107 Drago 147 Chiavi 83 Vaio 89 Total S. Giovanni 426

122

I45 550

72 I 62

211

75

There are additional fragments of Parte nomination lists in Tratte, 58, ff. 72-72v and 136. 7. PRY39, f. 84: ". . . et per Consules seu Capitudines cuiuslibet viginti unius Artium . . . per se segregatim ab aliis consulibus aliarum artium ex artibus supradictis, et cum illis adiunctis seu arrotatis quos de sua arte secum habere voluerint, de omnibus et singulis civibus popularibus florentinis et vere Guelfis hominibus bone oppinionis et fame, et de ipsa tali arte quos ydoneos et bonos ac sufficientes putabunt ad offitia supradicta."

172 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics the size and composition of the committees of arroti convened by the consuls of each guild to assist in the nominations. In some cases, these recate or reductiones do not identify the arroti; for example, one says only that the candidates were approved "by the consuls of the guild and their arroti by secret scrutiny"; another says that the list was drawn up "by the consuls of the guild and other members of the same guild appointed for this purpose."8 But some do provide the names of the arroti. The largest such committee (among the extant lists) was the group of fifty-four arroti assembled by the consuls of the Medici e Speziali in January 1 3 6 1 .The ~ others range from the fifteen arroti of the Vaiai e Pellicciai in 1 3 6 7 ' ~to the thirty-six arroti of the Medici e Speziali in 1364." In most cases, a special guild nominating committee drew up a list of names, which were then voted on, one by one, in a secret scrutiny among the consuls and their arroti.12 The candidates approved by the scrutiny committee13were then included in the recata sent to the Signoria for the general scrutiny of the three executive ~olleges.'~ 8. Dipl. Rif., 27 January 1360: Calimala nominations for the scrutiny of 1361; Dipl. Rif., 1 3 G : Lana nominations for the scrutiny of 1364. 9. Dipl. Rif., 25 January 1360. 10. Dipl. Rif., 27 January 1366. 11. Dipl. Rif., 27 January 1363. Other guild nomination lists containing the names of the arroti who assisted in the selection and approval of candidates are found in Cambio, 44, ff. 62-63v (February 1358: 23 arroti); G N , 90, f. 55v (9 February 1358: 16 arroti); Dipl. Rif., 30 January 1363 (Por Santa Maria: 26 arroti); Dipl. Rif., 28 January 1366 (Legnaiuoli: 4 members of the regular guild council plus 18 arroti); Tratte, 58, ff. 27-z9v (Calzolai, 26 January 1367: 33 arroti); and Dipl. Rif., 5 March 1370 (Legnaiuoli: 4 councillors and 25 arroti). 12. For example, in February 1358 the consuls and arroti of the Cambio scrutinized sixty-three guild members whose names had been presented by a nominating committee of three persons appointed by the consuls. Their appointment is recorded in Cambio, 44, f. 62: "Dicti Consules omnes 1111 in concordia . . . eligerunt et nominaverunt pro dicta arte probos viros Niccholaum Bartholi del Buono, Pinuccium Antonii de Boncianis, et Johannem Cantini, artifices dicte artis in offitiales dicte artis ad reducendum inscriptis coram dictis consulibus . . . omnes et singulos artifices dicte artis vere Guelfos et quos crediderint esse sufficientes et dignos ad offitium Prioratus Artium et Vexilliferatus Iustitie [and the colleges] pro ipsis ponendis ad secretum scruptineum inter dictos Consules et alios arrotos dicte artis quos dicti Consules ad predictum habere voluerint, pro ipsis promovendis ad dicta offitia." The names of the sixty-three guild members nominated by the three are found in ibid., ff. 63-63v. 13. In some cases by a two-thirds vote (Dipl. Rif., 30 January 1363: Cambio); in others by a simple majority (Dipl. Rif., 25 January 1363: Legnaiuoli). 14. For example, the 1367 recata of the Calzolai in Tratte, 58, ff. 27-z9v, which

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

173

The guilds tended to nominate a fairly modest number of candidates. Nothing like the full membership of a guild was nominated by any of the committees of consuls and arroti. The largest body of candidates approved by any guild for a general scrutiny was the list of 240 nominees submitted in 1364 by the Lanayiswhich may have had upwards of 400 matriculated members in that year.I6 The guild of Por Santa Maria, with a full membership of at least several hundred," nominated 91 of its members in both 1364 and 1367." In 1364 the Medici e Speziali nominated 98 personsig out of more than 500 guild members.z0 The more socially homogeneous Calimala probably nominated a larger percentage of its members than did most guilds, advancing 79 of its members in 1361 and 105 in 1364.~'The Calimala's matn'cula of 1354 lists 167 active members.2zThe Arte del Cambio nominated 49 in 1364 and 76 in 1 3 6 7 . ~The ~ minor guilds nominated even fewer candidates, although it must be recalled that on the whole these guilds were far smaller than most of the major guilds. The largest single group of nominations from any minor guild was the list of 62 approved begins: "Hec est relatio et reductio que fit vobis reverendis dominis prioribus artium et vexillifero iustitie populi et comunis Florentie per Consules artis et universitatis Calzolariorum civitatis Florentie de artificibus dicte artis civibus florentinis et vere Guelfis qui in scruptineo facto in domo dicte artis . . . inter ipsos consules et XXXIII arrotos et aiuntos dicte artis obtinuerunt vobis dominis prioribus et vexillifero antedictis reduci debere pro ipsis scruptinandis et ponendis ad scruptineum noviter per vos et vestra collegia opportuna fiendum de prioribus artium et vexillifero iustitie." 15. Dipl. Rif., 136--. The list is dated 3 February 1363 [1364 modern style]. 16. The matn'cula of 1353 contains the names of 413 "lanifices, stamifices, et lanivendoli" enrolled and active in the guild. Over the next twenty-five years, new members were admitted at the rate of about thirty per year. For these lists, see Lana, 20. 17. There are no sources from which the postplague membership of Por Santa Maria can be calculated. However, the rnatricula that was completed in May 1320 lists 613 members sworn to the guild "tamquam artifices et mercatores dicte artis et de ipsa arte operantes" (Sera, 6, ff. 57-64). 18. Dipl. Rif., 30 January 1363; Dipl. Rif., 29 January 1366. 19. Dipl. Rif., 27 January 1363. 20. In MSM, 9, ff. 1-39, there is an alphabetical listing of over 550 members for the year 1358. 21. Dipl. Rif. ,27 January 1360161; Dipl. Rif. ,7 February 1363. 22. Manoscn'tti, 542, no pagination. 23. Dipl. Rif., 30 January 1363; Dipl. Rif., 26 January 1366. The Arte del Cambio's book of partners and companies lists 105 active soci in 1363~83 in 1364~76in 1366, and 86 in 1367 (Carnbio, 14, ff. 47v-55~). Some of those nominated by the guild are not, however, included in these company listings.

174 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics candidates of the Legnaiuoli in 1367.'~The Rigattieri nominated 45 of their members in the same whereas the other minor guilds nominated less than that for the scrutinies of the mid-1360s. The smallest of the surviving minori nomination lists are those submitted by the Fornai in 1364 and by the Albergatori in 1367, each containing eighteen names.26 Lists of nominees for all twenty-one guilds do not survive for any one general scrutiny (the most complete sets are the thirteen guild lists from 1364 and eleven from 1367)~and it is therefore not possible to calculate precisely the total number of nominees from the full guild community in any scrutiny year. But a rough idea can be gained by looking at both the 1364 and the 1367 lists, which cover nineteen of the twenty-one guilds, and by taking the higher figure for any guild whose lists for both years have survived. The composite nominations of the nineteen guilds from these two years amount to 1,077. The two missing guilds are the Giudici e Notai and the Corazzai, the former a large guild whose nominees may have been quite numerous, the latter a small guild that almost certainly did not nominate more than the twenty or thirty nominees common to most of the minor guilds. The total number of guild nominations was therefore probably no higher than 1,300, or at the very most 1,400, which is to say, no more than a third of the guild community even in the depressed demographic circumstances following the Black Death. This is a finding that ought to occasion a mild degree of surprise. Why did the guilds, and especially the minor guilds, when given the opportunity to make nominations independently and to advance as many of their own members as they wished to the general scrutiny for the highest executive offices of the commune, fail to nominate more than a sizable minority of their memberships? The answer to this question goes beyond the scope of the present study into the complexities of guild politics and consular elections, subjects that must be reserved for separate treatment elsewhere. But the essence of the answer may nonetheless be briefly suggested. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the internal politics of most guilds, especially their electoral politics, had been brought to a great extent under the control of the Mercanzia, the elite organization of international merchants and bankers recruited from the five major commercial guilds. The selection of consuls for nineteen of the twenty-one guilds was directed by the Mercanzia. Because the consuls of each guild appointed the arroti to assist 24. Dipl. Rif..,28 January 1366. 25. Dipl. Rif., 28 January 1366. 26. Dipl. Rif., 25 January I 363; Dipl. Rif. ., 27 January I 366.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

175

in the nomination of candidates for the general scrutiny, the patricians and oligarchs of the Mercanzia had the leverage, albeit indirect, to keep guild nominations to high office at numerically modest and politically safe levels. The conclusion that must be drawn from this look at the guild component of the nominating process in the years from I352 to 1377 is that, although popular opinion in the guild community may have been reassured by the inclusion of the guilds' in the nominating process on theoretically equal and autonomous grounds, the oligarchy nevertheless did not lack the means to blunt in actual practice the implementation of the principle of guild equality. The oligarchy was willing to accept the principle only if it had the means to render it ineffectual. But the assertion and reaffirmation of the principle, however much undermined in practice, probably mollified the guild community and may have been an important step in forging the general consensus on electoral politics that emerged in these years. At the very least, the large numbers of major and minor guildsmen who served as consuls or arroti for their guilds could feel that they had a direct participatory role in the long and solemn process that produced the Florentine officeholding class. This too was an important source of stability. Whatever degree of ideological balance may have been achieved by having the Guelf party captains and the guild consuls make their own separate nominations for the general scrutinies, it is clear, both from the regulations established in 1352 and from subsequent practice, that the core of the nominating process rested with neither the Parte nor the guilds, but with the advisory college of the sixteen gonfalonieri. According to the 1352 reform, after the nomination lists had been received from the Parte captains, the twenty-one guilds, and the sixteen gonfalonieri (for a total of thirty-eight separate lists), three notaries were appointed to reduce the nominations to a single master list for the scrutiny. They were authorized to examine all the lists, and if they found among the Parte and guild nominations any names not included in the lists of the gonfalonieri, they were instructed simply to add such names to these lists.*' This meant in effect that the nominating committees of the Parte and the guilds could not ex27. PR, 39, ff. 84-84v: "tres notarii seu duo ex eis . . . dilligenter et solicite videant et examinent scripturas seu nominationes predictas. Et si in aliqua ipsarum reductionum seu nominationum factarum per capitaneos partis, seu per consules alicuius artium predictarum reperient aliquem nominatum seu descriptum qui in reductione seu nominatione facta per Gonfalonerios societatum populi descriptus seu nominatus non fuisset ipsum talem sic repertum teneantur et debeant ipsi notarii . . . describere in tali scriptura reductionis facte per Gonfalonerios antedictos."

176 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics clude anyone from the scrutiny. They could only add names omitted by the gonfalonieri. But because the vast majority of those nominated by the Parte and the guilds were also nominated by the gonfalonieri, the practical result of the long and complex nominating procedures of both the Parte and the guilds consisted merely in the addition of a few names at the end of each gonfaloniere's list.28 The nominations of the gonfalonieri provided the base list for the general scrutiny. For the period from 1352 to 1377 there are no extant complete sets of gonfalonieri nomination^.^^ However, one of the undated fragments from this period, very likely from the 1350s~lists 957 nominees from the quarter of San G i ~ v a n n i In . ~ ~the gonfalonieri nominations of both 1411 and 1433, the nominees from San Giovanni accounted for exactly 26.9 percent of the total for the whole city.31Applying this percentage to the San Giovanni fragment of the mid-fourteenth century, the nominations of all four quarters should have been somewhere in the vicinity of 3,550. This is a good deal less than the number of nominations for the scrutinies after 1382, but it is, relative to the diminished population following the plague of 1348, considerably greater than the 3,346 nominations of the popular scrutiny of 1343 and significantly more than the number of nominations submitted during this same period by either the Guelf party or the guilds. The significance of all this is that the nominating phase of the Florentine electoral system, once so controversial and so frequently the object of tight controls and manipulation, was gradually being inflated to the point where it no longer represented a meaningful step in the selection of a ruling class. From a strictly electoral point of view, nomination had become ideologically neutral and not very selective at all. But this does not mean that it 28. The names added to the lists of the gonfalonieri are those designated "arroti artium" (or "arroti per artes") and "arroti Partis Guelfe," as can be seen in the nomination lists of 1382 and I391 in Tratte, 396 and 397. An undated list compiled for the gonfalone Chiavi in the quarter of San Giovanni by Manetto da Filicaia contains a total of 226 names to which were added eight "arroti artium" and twentyone "arroti Partis Guelfe," for a final total of 255 nominations (Tratte, 58, ff. 83-86v). Generally speaking, however, the added candidates were considerably fewer. 29. The earliest complete set is from I391 (Tratte, 397). Two of the sixteen gonfaloni are missing from the 1382 lists (Tratte, 396). For the period before 1378, there are numerous fragments, occasionally complete for an entire quarter, in Tratte, 58, 61, 62, and 63. 30. Tratte, 58, ff. 149-167~. This list includes the added candidates from both the Parte Guelfa and the guilds. 31. Manoscrirti, 555.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

177

had no political significance whatsoever. As suggested earlier, since 1328 nominations for the Signoria had served to define the limits of consensus in Florentine politics. In a period such as the 1350s and 1360s~in which stability and a rough equilibrium between factions and classes were increasingly viewed as the desired objectives of political life, it was certainly legitimate to expect that the electoral process might contribute to these goals. The expansion of the lists of nominees did precisely that by enlarging the area of potential consensus to the point of embracing an unprecedented proportion of the Florentine p o p u l a t i ~ n .Although ~~ the vast majority of these individuals were not approved in the scrutiny and never reached high office, they could nonetheless derive some satisfaction and even prestige from the knowledge that they had been deemed "sufficientes" for the priorate. For many this designation came as the result of a solemn vote of their corporate peers; for others it was the result of a selection carried out by the elite captains of the Guelf party or by the powerful advisory college of the gonfalonieri. For all, and especially for those who previously could not have assumed or even expected that they would be so designated, it was a gratifying recognition and public declaration of their worthiness for high office. The psychological impact of this sort of recognition in the status-conscious world of communal politics ought not to be ~nderestimated.~~ It may very well be that it contributed heavily to the willingness of those who were not elected in the scrutiny to accept its re32. The percentage of the total city population represented by the nominations to the general scrutiny nearly doubled from 1343 (3,346 nominees out of a population of about 90,ooo) to the 1350s (roughly 3,500 nominees out of a population of perhaps 50,000). For evidence and estimates of demographic fluctuations before and after the plague, see Enrico Fiumi, "La demografia fiorentina nelle pagine di Giovanni Villani," A S I 108 (1950): 78- 158. 33. In this connection, it is interesting to observe that the practice of nominating children to high office began to be quite popular in these years. There was no question of their actually being elected, of course, because the commune had firm regulations concerning minimum ages for all officeholders. But the heads of families obviously saw some advantage in terms of social prestige in having very young members of their families nominated. Filippo Villani denounced this practice, claiming that "facendosi lo squittino in que' tempi si trovb che de' quattro i tre non passavano i venti anni, e per tali furono portati a110 squittino che giaceano nelle fascie" (Cronica di Filippo Villani, in Cronica di Matteo Villani, ed. Franc. Gherardi Dragomami, 2 vols. [Florence, 18461, 2 :453). As Brucker has pointed out (Florentine Politics, p. 212), this was obviously an exaggeration. But the practice was prevalent enough so that in 1367 the commune felt it necessary to legislate a minimum age limit of twenty for nominees to the general scrutinies (PR, 55, f. 71).

178 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics sults and to recognize in turn the legitimacy of those who were elected. It is in this sense that the inflation of the nominating process may have enlarged the area of consensus in which the stability of the electoral process, and of politics generally, could grow. Moreover, the results of a scrutiny were never made known to the public at the time of the scrutiny itself. They became known gradually, name by name, only at the time of the periodic extractions of tickets from the bags. Thus, only over the course of many years did the results of a scrutiny become public knowledge, and during all that time it was perfectly possible for an individual who had been nominated not to know whether he had been approved and imborsat^.^^ Such an individual was less likely to jeopardize his chance for the prize of prestigious office by some act of political opposition than was someone who knew that he never had nor would have such a chance. In this way too, a generous open policy of nomination, combined with the "secret of the scrutiny," enhanced the willingness of the broad middle range of politically ambitious but cautious citizens, mostly from the guild community, to acquiesce in an electoral system that continued to favor the oligarchy. There is one final aspect of the post-1352 nominating process that needs to be mentioned, although a more extended treatment of it must be reserved for its proper place in the history of the guilds. Membership in a guild, declared by the popular regime of 1293 to be the fundamental and universal requirement for eligibility to the priorate, was, by mid-century, no longer necessary for nomination or approval in the scrutiny.3sOnly the consuls were limited to guild members in their choice of candidates and in each case, of course, to the members of their own guild. The captains of the Tarte and, more importantly, the gonfalonieri were free to nominate scioperati (former guildsmen whose membership had lapsed as a result of their withdrawal from active participation in the business or trade of the guild) and other non-guild members.36The severance of the historic link 34. A well-known instance, although from a later period, is the case of Goro ~ a t i who , admitted that he hoped but could not be sure that his name was included in the borse for the executive offices (see below, Epilogue). 35. In fact, only for the members of the fourteen minor guilds was it even necessary to indicate the guild of which the nominee was a member: "fiant et fieri debeant nominationes distincte per quarterios et per gonfalones civitatis predicte et iuxta nomen cuiuslibet ex ipsis nominandis qui esset de aliqua quatuordecim minorum artium civitatis Florentie inserendo nomen eiusdem artis de qua esset" ( P R , 39, f. 84). 36. The 1352 reform makes it clear that at least some of the scioperati were not considered to be guild members. The regulations governing the selection of the

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

179

between guild membership and the right to elective office was one of the most significant results of the new nomination policy. The decision is hardly surprising, for the link had been created by a strongly antioligarchic popular movement, and to the extent that it remained in force it constituted a formal constraint threatening the political eligibility of those members of upper-class families who were not continuously engaged in entrepreneurial activity. To be sure, the vast majority of communal officeholders continued to be guild members long after 1352. Guildsmen never ceased to monopolize these offices, but their political eligibility was no longer a function of membership in a c~rporation.~' accoppiatori specified that they were to be four in number, one from the minor guilds, two from the seven major guilds, and a fourth described as follows: "et alius de scioperatis qui non sit de aliqua artium civitatis predicte" (ibid., f. 85). 37. This is not to imply that the severance of the link between guild membership and eligibility for the executive offices of the commune was either entirely new or legally complete by 1352. During earlier periods of oligarchic government, guild membership as a requirement for eligibility was simply ignored without being specifically abrogated. For example, the electoral legislation of December 1328 makes no mention of it as a prerequisite for nomination. The legal validity of the requirement rested on the third rubric of the Ordinances of Justice of 1293, which stated that nominations to the priorate were to be made "de . . . artificibus civitatis." Thus, as long as the Ordinances remained in force, guild membership was in theory necessary for nomination. But it is here that the problems begin. These Ordinances, abolished by the magnate regime of July-September 1343, were proclaimed anew by the popular government in the fall of that same year, and they continued to exist, separately and independently of the communal statutes, until their incorporation into the 1415 redaction. Should we conclude that the formal validity of the third rubric remained untouchecl throughout this period, despite the fact that, at least as early as 1328, a whole series of reforms had terminated its practical application? Or are we to understand that rubric to have been superseded by those reforms, de jure as well as de facto? The importance of the 1352 reform is that it explicitly admits, for the first time, the possibility of non-guild members reaching the priorate, whereas in 1328 this had only been implied. The communal lawyers, however, were still apparently unwilling to legislate a formal break with the I293 tradition. In the 1355 redaction of the communal statutues, the Ordinances remained separate and unincorporated (Statuti di Firenze, 10). (The 1352 reform is included in this redaction on ff. 55v-59v. The same rubric has been published from the Italian translation of the 1355 statutes in Demetrio Marzi, La Cancelleria della Repubblica Fiorentina [Rocca S. Casciano, 19101, pp. 557-65.) Thus, it would seem that even after the redaction of 1355 the link between guild membership and the right to office was not officially broken. This final step was taken only in 1415 when the Ordinances lost their independent status. In the new redaction of that year, the original third rubric of 1293 was suppressed. The Tractatus Ordinamentorum Iustitie, incorporated into the Statuta populi et comunis Florentiae publica

I 80

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

After 1352, therefore, the real focal point of the Florentine electoral system shifted definitively from the nomination of candidates to their scrutiny. The 1352 reform did not introduce substantial modifications into the scrutiny procedure decreed by the balia in 1348. The Signoria, the Twelve, the Sixteen, the Five of Mercanzia, and the proconsul of the Giudici e Natai continued to participate as ex officio members of the voting committee.38 As in 1348, the guilds were represented by one consul from each of the twenty-one corporations, all being elected by the Signoria and the colleges. The arroti, however, were increased from forty-eight to eighty, five from each gonfalone, and they too were selected by the three executive coll e g e ~ Thus, . ~ ~ 70 percent of the voting members in the scrutiny (101 of 144) were now directly appointed by the government. This centralized control over the scrutiny became the weakest link in the electoral system of the next quarter century. Since the selection of consuls and arroti proba.bly occurred by a process of direct individual appointment, the way was opened for the exercise of special influence and the bartering of political favors; this led ultimately to a number of scandals in the 1360s involving corruption and bribery, as certain individuals tried to buy their way onto the scrutiny committee. The worst of these scandals resulted in the conviction in 1361 of eight persons who offered bribes and four who accepted them.40 auctoritate collecta castigata et praeposita anno salutis MCCCCXV, 3 vols. (Freiburg, 1778-81)) I :407-516, contains no rubric on the election of the priorate. The regulations governing such elections are instead found in rubrics four through eight of the Statutorum Populi et Comunis Florentiae Tractatus in vol. 2 of the same edition. Thus, only in 1415 was the issue finally resolved from a legal standpoint. 38. P R , 39, f. 84v. In 1361 the popolani captains of the Parte Guelfa were added to the scrutiny committee (PRY48, ff. 18ov-181). 39. The Signoria and the Colleges "possint . . . semel et pluries et insimul et divisim quando volent . . . eligere unum de consulibus seu capitudinibus cuiuslibet viginti unius artium . . . et octuaginta alios cives populares et Guelfos quos volent homines utique providos et discretos, videlicet, quinque pro quolibet et de quolibet vexillo seu gonfalone" (PR, 39, f. 84v). 40. Brucker gives their names, which he culled from the record of the conviction in Atri dell'Esecutore degli Ordinamentidi Giustizia, 347, ff. 3,9- IOV; see Florentine Politics, pp. 212- 13, n. 77. (The volume has not yet been recovered from the damages sustained by the Florentine archives in the 1966 flood.) Matteo Villani, referring to this incident, says that "certi de' collegi per danari trassono a essere del numero degli squittinatori certi pochi degni per lor0 antichiti o virth, il perchi: finito lo squittino, e scoperta la cattivith, tali de' collegi trovati colpevoli dall'esecutore degli ordinamenti della giustizia furono condannati per baratteria, chi in libbre duemila, e chi in mille, e pur tale pena puose freno a1 disonesto peccato"

The First Achievement of Stability, 1332-1377

181

The only limitation placed on the selection of arroti aimed at preventing the concentration of voting power in family blocs. No more than one member of any household, family, or lineage was allowed on the ~ o m m i t t e e . ~ ~ Once again, as in other parts of the 1352 reform, a balancing of interests can be detected in this combination of regulations governing the appointment of the arroti. If the lack of any special procedure for their selection meant that oligarchic interests would not have to contend with formal quotas for the representation of guilds on the committee, from the other side the prohibition against the appointment of more than a single member of any family, no matter how large or powerful, must have allayed popular fears that without such quotas the scrutiny could easily be dominated by the great families. And in fact it seems that the influence of upper-class families in the scrutinies of this period was sufficiently contained to provide the laments of some of their spokesmen. Donato Velluti, who complained of the injustice done to the "schiusi Guelfi," pointedly noted that only one of the Velluti had been approved for executive office in the scrutinies of 1352 and 1 3 5 5 . ~ ~ The fully assembled scrutiny committee consisted of 144 members, of whom ninety-nine constituted a One by one, the nominations (Cronica di Matteo Villani, 2 :338). These penalties may not have been as effective as Villani supposed, however, for there were suspicions of corruption in connection with the scrutinies of 1364 and 1367 as well (Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 213). Stefani's account of what happened in 1367 suggests a repetition of the scandal described by Matteo Villani: ". . . le contese sono state in Firenze per gli uficj, che li Fiorentini sono molto solleciti in volerli, essendo alcuni preparatosi in volere essere del numero de' letti a fare le predette insaccazioni, non per far bene a1 Comune, ma per far bene a' suoi, e per essere certo d'esservi entro egli. . . . Di che alcuni procacciarono con danari d'essere degli eletti, e furono eletti. Di poi si seppe che fu simonia, e furne condannati" (Cronaca, r. 694, pp. 262-63). The "letti" (or "eletti") to whom Stefani refers in this passage are probably the arroti appointed to take part in the voting process. 41. P R , 39, f. 84v. In 1367 a minimum age of thirty was established for all participants in the general scrutinies (PR, 55, f. 71). 42. Velluti, Cronica Dornestica, p. 243. 43. Actually, it is not clear from the 1352 reform whether the incumbent priors and Standard-bearer of Justice were allowed to cast votes in the scrutiny. After specifying the role of the other scrutators, the text of the law says: "et presentibus etiam illis ex offitio dominorum priorum artium et Vexilliferi Iustitie predictis qui adesse volent" (PR, 39, f. 84v). Even if they were allowed to vote, this may have been a way of excluding them from the computation of the quorum. The popolani captains of the Parte, who became ex officio members of the scrutiny committee in 1361 (see above, n. 38), were likewise not figured in the quorum (PR, 48, f. 181).

182 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics were read aloud and voted on. The votes of two-thirds of those present and forming a quorum were required for the approval of a nominee.44 For every one of the 3,000 or more nominees, the black and white beans had to be collected from the scrutators, sorted out, and counted. This procedure must have taken days or even weeks to complete; and it was repeated, without interruption or serious modification, every third year from 1352 until the early 1370s.~~ The time spent in taking an official count of votes on every name, even in cases where it was realistically a waste of time to do so, was in effect a guarantee of what later became a cardinal principle of the republicanism of the civic humanists: namely, that even if officeholding could not be promised to all citizens on an equal basis, at least the hope of office was denied to no one, since every nominee was considered separately on his own merits.46 The elaborate and time-consuming scrutiny 44. In July 1355, just a few months after the scrutiny of that year had been completed, a law was passed prohibiting the scrutators from voting on themselves along with the other nominees. A special and separate procedure was devised for their scrutiny by another committee (PR, 42, f. 89). Stefani later voiced the sort of objections that must have inspired this change when he complained that some persons made every effort to get appointed to the scrutiny committee ". . . per essere certo d'esservi entro egli; per6 o che sia sofficiente o no a1 servigio del Comune,. eglino, che sono a far le borse, a lor0 medesimi si rendono le fave, e rirnangonvi" (Cronaca, r. 694, p. 263). But for some reason the safeguards erected in 1355 against this danger were repealed in February 1358, just prior to the scrutiny of that year (PR, 45, f. 123). The procedure elaborated in 1355 was, therefore, apparently never put into practice. 45. From the records of the tratte, it is clear that general scrutinies were held on schedule in 1352,1355,1358,1361,1364, and 1367. Then, in October 1367, it was decided to postpone the scrutiny scheduled for 1370 until March 1371 and thereafter to hold new scrutinies every five years (PR, 55, f. 71). However, this new timetable was itself modified in 1372 when the balia of that year scheduled the next scrutiny for April 1375 and thereafter every four years (Cap., 11, ff. 89-89~).This plan was in turn upset by the events of 1378; see below, chap. 7. 46. The principle of a separate vote by the full committee of scrutators on every nominee was reaffirmed in 1377 in order to counteract the occasional violations of the original legislation on this point (although there is no evidence that such violations took place in the scrutinies for the major executive offices): "Considerantes quod secundum ordinamenta comunis Florentie omnes et singuli imbursandi ad quecumque offitia dicti comunis primo et ante omnia scruptinari debeat quilibet . . . de per se singulariter . . . inter omnes scruptinatores huiusmodi scruptinii, et quod aliquando in dictis scruptiniis scruptinati fuerunt ad aliqua ipsorum officiorum per scruptinatores de illo quarterio de quo erant ipsi scruptinati et non per omnes scruptinatores omnium quarteriorum et aliquando scruptinati fuerunt omnes de uno quarterio simul quod fieri non debet; et quod ex his secutum h i t

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

183

process conducted every third year was a ritual celebration and renewal of that promise. By rendering the whole process solemn, durable, and impersonal and by channeling a whole series of political choices into a lengthy ritual, the scrutiny system contributed significantly to the transformation of Florentine attitudes toward participation in politics and toward the legitimacy of the exercise of public power. At the completion of the actual voting process and after the names of all those receiving at least two-thirds of the votes were written into an official ledger, the Signoria and the colleges attended to the selection of the four election secretaries, or accoppiatori. The 1352 reform stipulated no special procedures or restrictions for their appointment except that two of them had to be from the seven major guilds, one from the scioperati, and one from the fourteen minor Apart from this, the Signoria and colleges were free to appoint whomever they wished as long as they respected the prohibition against electing one of their own relatives or family members. In 1358, however, just before the scrutiny of that year, the appointment of the accoppiatori was subjected to stricter controls. Henceforth, each of the four was to come from a different quarter of the city, with the category to be determined by lot; within the category designated for each quarter, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes in the scrutiny was declared to be the accoppiatore. Thus, in the quarter of the city from which the accoppiatore representing the scioperati was due to be selected, the scioperato with the largest vote total in the scrutiny for that quarter was automatically elected, and likewise the minor guildsman with the most votes of all the minori in the quarter designated for that category and the two major guildsmen with the most votes in the two remaining quarters.48This, like some of the other changes instituted in these years, was obviously an attempt to diminish the direct influence of personal and factional ties in the selection of the accoppiatori and to leave the matter to the objective results of the votes cast in the scrutiny, thereby enhancing quod indigni ita obtinuerunt partitum quemadmodum digni. Et ut predicta in futurum non occurrant . . . providerunt . . . quod deinceps omnes et singuli hii qui reducentur scruptinabuntur et seu imbursabuntur ad aliquod officium castellanarie et seu ad aliquod aliud officium dicti comunis scruptinari debeant per omnes et inter omnes scruptinatores in dicto scruptinio in sufficienti numero existentes unusquisque de per se et separatim ab alio et ita quod de unoquoque imbursando fiat et fieri debeat partitum singulariter" (PR, 65, f. 38). 47. See above, n. 36. Curiously, the representative of the minor guilds among the accoppiatori could not be a member of the guild of the Chiavaiuoli. 48. P R , 45, ff. 123-I23V.

I 84

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

the acceptability and the legitimacy of their office. It may justly be said, however, that this new method of selecting the accoppiatoridid not so much eliminate the influence of the Signoria and the colleges as render it indirect, because the scrutiny committee itself was largely appointed by them. It was not until 1376 that a law was passed prohibiting the appointment of any member of the scrutiny committee to the board of acc~ppiatori.~~ But what exactly did the accoppiatori do? Rubinstein has shown that they were responsible in general for the placement of name tickets into the bags (imborsazione) and that under the Medici their role was expanded to include handpicked (a mano) elections of the Signoria.'' In the fourteenth century, nothing quite like the latter task was ever assigned to the accoppiatori, although for a few years at least their work involved considerably more than just overseeing the process of imborsazione. We have already seen that in 1343 the accoppiatori were responsible for the selection of candidates for the prearranged priorates of the period 1343 to 1348. In 1343 and 1348, they were allowed to determine which of the candidates approved for the priorate would be eligible for the office of Standard-bearer of Justice. They retained this important discretionary power in the refom of 1352," but apparently lost it after the scrutiny of 1355 when it was decided to discontinue the practice of filling a separate set of bags with the A single bag for names of candidates for the republic's highest each quarter was instituted, from which both the priors and the Standardbearers of Justice would henceforth be drawn, thereby depriving the accoppiatori of the chance to designate the holders of the prestigious office. After 1355, therefore, the responsibilities of these officials seem to have been purely technical. For the priorate, separate sets of bags for major and minor guildsmen were created. The 1352 reform kept the representation of the minor guilds 49. P R Y64, f. 223. 50. Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 ro 1494) (Oxford, 1966), pp. 6-7, 30-52. 51. PR, 39, f. 85: "Teneantur quoque et debeant dicti quatuor cives . . . ex dictis quos sic optinuisse reperierint elicere illos probos et virtuosos viros quos volent et ydoneos extimabunt ad offitium vexilliferatus Iustitie populi Florentie et quot volent quarteriorum equalitate servata, et habito respectu ad numerum aliorum remanentium imbursandorum ad offitium prioratus pro imbursando ad dictum vexilliferatus offitium." 52. PR, 42, f. I I ~ V .This modification was introduced "ad maioris equalitatis observantiam inducendam, et ut futuromm in offitio Vexilliferatus Iustitie notitia dificilius habeatur."

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

185

in the priorate at two seats per term, and the accoppiatori were authorized to place the names of additional minori in the bags, beginning with those who received the highest vote totals, in the event that the scrutiny failed to qualify enough minor guildsmen to fill the requisite number of posts until the next Bags were also filled for the colleges of the Twelve and the Sixteen, but without distinction between major and minor guildsmen, which meant that in these two offices the minori lost the guarantee of a minimum representation that had been achieved in 1343.'~ The extraction of names from the bags (every two months for the Signoria, once in three months for the Twelve, and once every four months for the Sixteen) was governed by two sets of regulations: an order of precedence among the bags from different scrutinies, which required the extractions to begin with the oldest existing bags and to proceed systematically from older to more recent bags; and the various divieti, the prohibitions against succession in the same or related offices within established periods of time for officeholders and the members of their families. The often complex rules for both these features of the extraction (tratta) influenced the patterns of officeholding and the politics of the period in important ways. The celebration of a new scrutiny and the filling of a new set of bags every third year did not have an immediate impact on the actual staffing of offices. Scrutinies did not supersede or replace one another, and their implementation was cumulative and consecutive. Approval in a scrutiny constituted a firm guarantee that an individual would, sooner or later, be placed in office. The credibility of the system and the consensus that it generated depended on honoring this promise. Only in exceptional cir53. PR, 39, ff. 85-85v: "Hoc insuper declarato addito et express0 quod si ex predictis de dictis minoribus artibus vel aliqua ipsarum scruptinatis non reperirentur obtinuisse per duas partes . . . tot quot videretur ipsis quatuor civibus . . . sufficere ad suplendum numerum aliorum qui non essent de aliqua dictarum artium qui optinuissent in scruptinio supradicto, seu ad ipsum numerum coequandum secundum formam hactenus observatam, videlicet, quod in quolibet prioratu[s] offitio saltem duo debeant esse de minoribus artibus supradictis . . . quod tunc liceat ipsis quatuor civibus . . . elicere ex aliis scruptinatis existentibus de dictis minoribus artibus . . . qui non obtinuerint per duas partes . . . usque in numerum qui eis . . . videbitur expedire, et de ill0 seu illis quarteriis de quo seu quibus et quos et quot expedire viderint seu volent, dum tamen non eliciant seu accipiant aliquem seu aliquos, quo, vel quibus aliquis alius de eodem quarterio qui non obtinuisset per duas partes ut dictum est, et ex dictis electis seu acceptis non esset, plures voces habuisse reperiretur in scruptinio supradicto, sed gradatim descendendo quousque habeatur numerus opportunus." 54. Ibid., f. 85v.

I 86

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

cumstances were the results of particular scrutinies nullified in favor of subsequent ones. In fact, aside from the elimination in 1348 of a number of candidates who had been approved in 1343, there was no instance of this sort of nullification in the thirty-five years before 1378. At each drawing of name tickets for one of the executive offices, the extractions began with the oldest existing bags. If, as a consequence of the divieti or because of the absence of candidates from the city or for other reasons, the office could not be filled from these bags, the drawings continued from the next set. From 1343 to 1348 there was only one set of bags. After the balia of 1348 there were two: that of 1343 (although revised), known as the bursa vetus, and that of 1348, called the bursa nova.55The records of the Tratte from October 1351 to October 1352 have not survived, but by April 1353, at the latest, extractions for the Signoria had started from the bags of the .~~ even after this, the 1352 scrutiny, called the bursa n o v i ~ s i m aHowever, Signoria was generally staffed for almost another year with names drawn from the 1348 bags and as late as February 1354 still exclusively so.57In June 1353 the independent existence of the 1343 bags for the Signoria was finally terminated. The few remaining name tickets (of persons who had been and were expected to be regularly absent from the city) were transferred to the 1348 bags.58Thereafter, the extractions continued from the so-called bursa nova of 1348 and the bursa novissima of 1352. In August 1356 the first name tickets from the scrutiny of 1355 were drawnYs9 but it was not until the end of 1357 that they came regularly into use.'jOHowever, even in the extractions of February and April 1358, the Signoria was staffed with candidates from the 1348 and 1352 bags only.61 Such delays in the actual implementation of a new scrutiny were common in the 1360s as well. The bags resulting from the scrutiny of 1364 were first used in extractions for the Signoria in February 1 3 6 8 , ~then ~ 55. Tratte, 205, passim. 56. Tratte, 206, ff. 18-18v. 57. Ibid., f. 49. 58. PRY40, f. 121. Their names and the record of this transfer are contained in Tratte, 206, f. 26. One of them was Niccolb Acciaiuoli, the grand seneschal of Naples. For the advisory colleges, the elimination of the 1343bags and the transfer of the remaining tickets took place somewhat later: in September 1353 for the Twelve (ibid., ff. 34-34v) and in August 1355 for the Sixteen (Tratte, 207, ff. 2-zv). 59. Tratte, 207, ff. 45-45v. 60. Tratte, 208, ff. 54-5~~65-65v. 61. Ibid., ff. 73-74, 87-87v. 62. Tratte, 214, ff. 51-53.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352 -1377

I 87

again in October of that year,63and after that not until February 1 3 7 0 . ~In fact, it was not until 1372, eight years after the scrutiny in question, that name tickets were regularly drawn from these 1364 bags.65The 1367 bags were first utilized in October 1 3 7 2 ~ and ~ not again until February 1 3 7 4 . ~ ~ These delays were made necessary by the fact that earlier sets of bags still contained the names of persons who had not yet been seated in office. On the other side of the coin, once the name tickets started to be drawn from the bags of a different scrutiny, these bags could often enjoy a life span of many years until they too were empty. For example, the last instance of the use of the 1352 bags occurred in December 1 3 6 8 . ~The ~ 1355 bags, first used in August 1356, were still in use in February 1 3 7 4 . ~ ~ One consequence of this long overlapping of separate scrutinies was that it became almost impossible to claim (or to complain) that the officeholding class of any given moment was the result of a particular electoral scrutiny. In the mid-135os, with only the 1348, 1352, and later the 1355 bags in use, the extractions for the Signoria were occasionally limited to only one set of bags,70more commonly to two, and sometimes (after 1356) to as many as three sets. But in the 1360s and early 1370s~extractions had to be made from at least three, generally four, and sometimes even five sets of bags in order to fill the required number of places in a single priorate. The oldest bags often yielded the name tickets of candidates who were barred from office by a divieto or because of absence, but it was nonetheless quite common for those actually seated in office for a particular term to come from two or three different sets of bags. The composition of individual priorates was therefore not traceable to any single committee of scrutators, with the result that the electoral discontent of a faction or social group lacked any obvious target for attack. It would do little good for a disgruntled faction to insist on major modifications in the selection of scrutators for a forthcoming scrutiny because the results of that scrutiny might not have any effect on actual officeholding for five or more years. On the other hand, it was hardly worthwhile to seek specific changes in any of the 63. Tratte, 191, ff. 21-22. 64. Tratte, 216, ff. 54-55. 65. Tratte, 192, ff. I - 2 , 2 3 - 2 4 v , 34-35, 39vJ 53-54, 65-65v, 81-82. 66. Ibid., ff. 53-54. 67. Tratte, 218, ff. 9 1 - 9 2 . 68. Tratte, 191, ff. 34-34v. 69. Tratte, 218, ff. 9 1 - 9 2 . 7 0 . Tratte, 206, ff. 3 1 , 36-36v, 49.

188 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics completed scrutinies because each drawing of names involved several sets of bags; changing any one of them would therefore have only a minimal effect on the selection of a particular priorate. Something of the resulting state of confusion that must have faced any discontented faction is apparent in Velluti's account of the proposals regarding the problem of the "schiusi Guelfi" that were formulated by the special committee on which he served in the fall of 1363. This committee came up with three suggestions for increasing the officeholding rights of those "good Guelfs" who, like many members of Velluti's own family, had been excluded from the priorate in the scrutinies of the 1350s. The first was to declare eligible for the priorate all Guelfs who had been approved for the office of captain in the Parte's own scrutiny of early 1362. The second proposal was that all those (does Velluti mean all citizens or all members of the Parte?) approved for the priorate in the scrutiny of 1358 should have their eligibility extended to the other scrutinies as well. The third suggestion was that the captains of the Parte Guelfa draw up a list of Guelfs who would then be put to a scrutiny by the priors, their advisory colleges, the Parte captains, and one consul from each guild, with those approved gaining access to the borse. As it happened, the reform package of which these proposals were a part did not gain the approval of the Parte itself, and the proposals came to n ~ t h i n g . But ~ ' the interesting feature of the whole affair is that the Guelf party, having accepted the logic of the electoral system by general scrutiny, lacked any very precise way of objecting to or modifying its results. The first and third proposals involved attempts to impose on the system additional candidates who were the result of an extraneous process of selection, whereas the second proposal mirrored the basic problem of how to affect the patterns of officeholding in a system in which name tickets were drawn from three or four separate sets of bags at each tratta. Thus, the overlapping utilization of different scrutinies, which made it much more difficult than previously to influence or modify the character of the officeholding class in the short run, contributed significantly to the gradual growth of the stability of the system. Like any institution whose functioning appears, as a result of such steadiness, to take on "a life of its own," the Florentine electoral system of the 1350s and 1360s began to acquire the prestige of semipermanence. The more it appeared to be resistant to drastic reversals and overt manipulation (as in the case of the "schiusi Guelfi" of 1363)~the more the Florentines expected it to function 71. Velluti, Cronica Domestics, pp. 244-45; Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 191.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

189

as a stable and impersonal institution, freed from the petty rivalries and ambitions of the moment. To be sure, the system never functioned as cleanly as this might suggest, and the process by which the Florentine political class was selected, rotated, and renewed certainly cannot be understood apart from the interests and influence of factions and party bosses. However, for the first time in the history of the republic, the generation of Florentines between about 1350 and 1370 entertained the expectation of stability as a norm to be safeguarded rather than as a distant and largely utopian ideal. The institutions of electoral politics were, in short, beginning to have a significant impact on the values and ideas with which the Florentines conceptualized their public world. The success of the electoral system in these years created the institutional and normative context for the full emergence of consensus politics in Florence at the end of the fourteenth century. The most controversial aspect of the electoral politics of this period remains to be discussed, namely, the divieti. The overall direction of divieti legislation in this period was toward a greater restriction of the frequency of representation of large consorterie in the priorate, and this was a major source of oligarchic dissatisfaction with the regime.72In practice, however, this legislation was not always strictly enforced, as the system regularly allowed a whole series of technical exceptions to the rules. Although the participation of great families in the priorate was held within limits broadly acceptable to the new men and the guild community, the application of the divieti in this period never produced any significant expansion of the officeholding class, as had been the case in the 1340s. The emphasis in these decades was on the more equal distribution of office within a compact and well-defined pool of eligibles. The history of the divieti in the two decades from 1352 to the early 1370s thus reveals the same thrust toward compromise and the same aim of generating a broad consensus between political extremes that are evident in the earlier phases of the electoral process. The basic divieti that remained in force throughout the thirty years of relative electoral stability had been established by the balia of 1348. After completing a term of office in the Signoria, individuals were barred from the same for three years and from both colleges for six months. Those who had sat in either of the colleges could be elected to another term in the same office only after two years, or to a term in the Signoria or the other college after six months. Fathers, sons, and brothers of officeholders were ineligible for the same office for six months, and 72. Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. 67-68,209-

10, 212-

13,216- 17.

190 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics other relatives for four months.73This last restriction, however, was made more stringent just a few years later. The general trend of the divieti legislation in the early 1350s was toward more and tighter restrictions. In October 1351 the councils enacted a measure to prevent individuals serving on the priorate from holding any other office at the same time,74and this was followed, in August 1353, by a more general prohibition against the simultaneous assumption of any two off i c e ~In . ~ October ~ of the same year, it was decreed that no more than a single member of a family or lineage could be seated in any office at any given time.76A more serious attempt to limit the officeholding potential of the great families was passed in August 1354. All the "consortes seu coniunti" in the male line of any member of the Signoria or the colleges were henceforth declared ineligible for the same office for an entire year (instead of the six months for immediate relatives and four months for others that had been established in 1348) and from each of the other executive offices for six months.77This was undoubtedly the most significant addition to the divieti laws in these years, for it meant in effect that an entire family, involving large numbers of individuals in the cases of the great aristocratic clans, became ineligible for all three executive offices of communal government for half a year after one of their number had served in any one of the three. This complicated and reduced the chances of reaching high office for many members of large extended families. In view of this legislation, it is not hard to see why the divieti were the target of frequent laments from the gjeat families of Florence during these years. This at least is the picture that emerges from the legislation of these years, and there is no reason to doubt that these statutory provisions reflected the aims and intent of the regime. But the reality of enforcement and application was somewhat different. As we have seen, at least as early as 1349 there were instances of individuals seated in office despite their technical ineligibility because of one of the divieti. This happened with increasing frequency in the first half of the decade of the 1350s when only 73. Manoscritti, 269, no pagination, 25 August 1348. 74. PRY 39, f. 2 7 ~ . 75. PR, 40, f. I42V. The guild consulates and the legislative councils were subsequently exempted from this regulation on the grounds that "quantum ad predicta non intelligantur esse nec sint, nec etiam fuisse intelligantur offitia comunis" (ibid., f. 147). 76. Ibid., f. 161. 77. PRY41, f. 55. The rationale for this measure was expressed as follows: "Ne nimia consanguinitatis gentium continuatio in offitiis invidiam pariat, vel exinde generata superbia aliis sit molesta."

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

191

two sets of bags were in use, those of 1348 and 1352. At this time the number of approved candidates must have been very limited, with the result that the same names were frequently drawn and redrawn, having incurred divieti on either an individual or a family basis. It began to occur on a number of occasions that all of the candidates drawn (veduti) from both sets of bags carried divieti that ought to have barred them all from office according to a strict interpretation of the law. However, in such cases the individuals whose divieti had come closest to expiring were placed in office notwithstanding their technical ineligibility. This practice is first recorded in the tratta of August 1349,'~ and between 1350 and 1353 it happened fairly regularly (between six and eight times a year), mostly in cases involving the advisory college of the Sixteen, but occasionally for the priorate as well. In April 1353 three of the Sixteen were elected "propter minus de~eturn";'~later that year, several persons were elected to the same office despite their divieti because there were no other name tickets remaining in the bags.80Interestingly, the extraction of name tickets for the Sixteen in 1353 had already moved into the bursa novissima of 1352, a strong indication that the number of candidates approved in the scrutinies of 1348 and 1352 must have been extremely limited. By 1354 the increasing frequency of these "propter minus devetum" officeholders began to be a serious problem even in the Signoria. The records of the Tratte are not extant for the middle months of this year, but on 31 August all six candidates drawn for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice were found to have incurred divieti. The successful candidate (Paolo Covoni) was selected because his divieto had only two months left to run.81 Two months later, on 29 October, the new Standard-bearer of Justice (Piero di Lippo Aldobrandini) was also elected with a divieto because all seven persons drawn were technically ineligible, and the same was true of two of eight new priors elected on the same day.82Then, in December, two of the newly elected Twelve were seated in office "propter minus de78. See above, chap. 5, n. 76. 79. Tratte, 206, ff. 19-19v. 80. Ibid., ff. ~ I V - 3 2 :"non obstante deveto quia nullus alius in bursa"; ff. ~ I V - 4 2 :"habet devetum sed remanet propter vacuate burse"; "habet devetum, non erat autem alius." 81. Tratte, 186, f. 19. 82. Ibid., f. 25v. The election of the Standard-bearer of Justice in these circumstances required special authorization from the legislative councils: "Quod ille ex eis qui reperietur habere devetum certi et determinati temporis minoris quam aliquis alius ex imbursatis predictis extrahatur ad offitium antedicturn, et perinde habeatur et sit, ac si devetum ipsum non haberet" (PR, 41, f. r o ~ v ) .

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

193

experiment in corporate politics, was the practice of allowing legal exceptions to the divieti completely disallowed. Significantly, the aspect of "propter minus devetum" elections that the reformers of the late 1370s found most objectionable was that some individuals could know exactly when their names would come up for the priorate or one of the colleges. Such knowledge, it was held, created the temptation for corruption in office.88The abolition of exceptions to the divieti was designed to safeguard the element of unpredictability in the electoral system. The absence of any major changes in the divieti regulations between the mid-1350s and 1377 does not mean that the issue ceased to be controversial in those two decades. From Velluti's account of the events and debates surrounding the reform of the Parte Guelfa in 1366, it is clear that the divieti were never far from the surface in the turbulent seas of Florentine politics. When, at the end of 1366, the Ricci faction set out to limit the expanding powers of the Parte, Velluti recorded that he rose in a joint meeting of the two advisory colleges to recommend that they should seize the occasion not only to reform the Parte, but also to enact a number of reforms desired by the Guelfs. He reasoned that an evenhanded policy between the factions would be more likely to win the assent of the Guelfs for the projected reform of their venerable organization. According to Velluti, his suggestion was immediately seconded by Pazzino degli Strozzi, a partisan of the Albizzi and a supporter of the Parte. The first grievance articulated by Strozzi was the matter of the divieti. Here, Velluti seems to be saying, was an issue of sufficient urgency over which Parte sympathizers might be willing to entertain some sort of deal: a curtailment of the Parte's 88. P R , 65, f. 37: "Advertentes quod aliqui sunt cives qui imbursati sunt seu erunt ad dicta offitia prioratus et Vexilliferatus Iustitie [and the advisory colleges] . . . et propter deveta dictorum officiorum et huiusmodi civium verisimiliter scire possunt quando extrahi debeant ad officia predicta et sic se providere possunt de inlicitis commictendis quod est inconveniens et ex dicta scientia potius posset sequi malum quam bonum et ut predicta non occurrant nec occurrere possint . . . providerunt . . . quod quicumque in futurum extraheretur ad aliquod predictorum officiorum et haberet devetum a dicto officio ad quod extractus esset quod ille talis devetum habens remictatur et remicti possit et debeat in bursa de qua extractus esset et alius loco sui extrahatur . . . de quacumque bursa sequenti non obstante quod in huiusmodi bursa de qua extraheretur habens devetum non esset aliquis alius imbursatus qui haberet minorem devetum huiusmodi sic extract0 devetum habente. . . . Et quod nullus sic extrahendus et devetum aliquod habens possit officium ad quod extraheretur et in quo haberet devetum tempore extractionis acceptare iurare vel mod0 aliquo exercere sub pena librarum mille f. p."

194 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics political clout in return for a reduction of the divieti regulations against the great families. Strozzi's proposal sparked a response from Uguccione de' Ricci to the effect that, given the sentiment of the guild community regarding the importance of the divieti, such a trade-off would be both irresponsible and dangerous. Ricci claimed that no family in Florence was as adversely affected by the strict divieti as his own, but he added that he was nonetheless determined that no one be able to accuse the aristocratic families of Florence of keeping the popolani and guildsmen in a state of anger and agitation over the issue of the d i ~ i e t iImplicit .~~ in this statement were the assumptions that any modification of the divieti in favor of these great families would indeed be a cause for anger in the guild community and that on this issue at least it was in the interest of both upper-class factions to maintain a posture of healthy respect for the strong views held by the guildsmen and the popular classes on the divieti. In fact, although the reform of the Guelf party did become law at this time, the various attempts to modify the divieti never met with any success in the legislative councils.g0 The significance of Uguccione de' Ricci's comment, as reported by Velluti, is that it illuminates the crucial role played by the divieti in maintaining the delicate balance of interests that was fundamental to the overall success of the Florentine electoral and political system between 1348 and 1378. Despite Velluti's complaints, the mechanisms of nomination and scrutiny did not prevent the approval of large numbers of citizens from the powerful families of the oligarchy, and this was no doubt necessary to ensure the support of these families for the institutions of electoral politics. The non-oligarchic elements of the guild community, however, were reconciled to these same institutions by two sorts of guarantees: first, the promise, inherent in the strict observance of the divieti, that the great families could not dominate the committees of government at any one moment through the force of their numbers; and second, the assurance, implied in the practice of extraction by lot and strengthened by the virtual elimination in 1355 of "propter minus devetum" elections, that no faction would be able to influence future officeholders through prior knowledge of the extraction of names from the bags. Any major modification of the divieti in 89. Velluti, Cronica Dornestica, pp. 249-50: "egli era di quegli che non intendea che si dicesse che le famiglie popolari grande di Firenze pe' fatti de' divieti tenessono incanati i popolari e artefici e '1 pop010 di Firenze." The episode has been described and analyzed by Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 209. 90. Velluti, Cronica Dornestica, pp. 251-52; Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp.

213, 217, 220.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

195

favor of the great families would have altered this balance and undermined the consensus of support for the regime within the guild community. As it happened, from the mid-1350s to the mid-1370s these guarantees were sufficiently observed to maintain the stability of the system. The patterns of officeholdingin the twenty-six years between 1352 and 1377 confirm the impression, gained from the foregoing analysis of electoral institutions, of a broad compromise between the stable elitism of the 1330s and the high mobility of the mid-1340s. Paramount among the issues affecting the interpretation of this period is the extent to which the influx of the so-called new men (gente nuova) limited the presence in office of the large aristocratic families that had dominated communal government before 1343. Both contemporary observers and modern historians have emphasized the rise of the gente nuova at the expense of the older and more established patricians. According to Gene Brucker's reconstruction from the tratte records of the lists of citizens approved for high office in the triennial scrutinies, the number of gente nuova from the major guilds who qualified for the Signoria increased from 84 in 1348 to 189 in 1364. The percentage of maggiori eligibles represented by the gente nuova increased from 36 percent in 1348 to 45 percent in 1364 (although in the scrutinies of 1352, 1355, 1358, and 1361 it remained significantly stable at 41-42 percent). Brucker concluded from these figures that "the infiltration by the 'new men' into offices was, in fact, in~reasing."~' This view of the question has recently been challenged by Ronald Witt on the basis of a calculation of 91. Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 160. His complete figures are as follows: Year of Scrutiny

Patricians

Gente Nuova

Percentage of Gente Nuova

It ought to be pointed out that the 1343 figures are not really comparable with those from later years. In the first place, they include many of the spicciolati and supplementary minori who did not achieve the I 10-vote level in the scrutiny. Secondly, many of those who were imborsati in 1343 were eliminated from the bone by the balia of August 1348 and never had their name tickets drawn.

196 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics the new families as a percentage of the total membership of the Signoria in each decade between I 348 and 1378. Witt counted I 16 new men appearing in the Signoria between September 1348 and August 1358 and computed this number as equivalent to "21 percent of the total membership of the body." In the next two decades, the new men were fewer: eighty-six (or 15.6 percent of the membership of the Signoria) in 1358-68 and ninetytwo (or 16.7 perqent) in 1368-78. According to Witt, therefore, "the regime of 1343- 1378 was not as 'open' as some scholars have suggested." 9Z Interpreting the rise of the gente nuova in Florentine politics depends to a great extent on one's definition of the term, the criteria employed for identifying gente nuova families, and the comparative framework within which these are applied. Brucker apparently includes in the category of gente nuova any individual belonging to a family not represented in the priorate before 1 3 4 3 . ~Thus, ~ a Florentine whose family reached the priorate for the first time in the mid-1340s or early 1350s would continue to be ranked with the gente nuova in the scrutinies of the 1360s~even though he (or his family) was, strictly speaking, not "new" in those later scrutinies. In other words, Brucker's figures on the gente nuova are cumulative, and they do not necessarily indidate any increase at all in the rate of admission of new families into the borse. Even a diminishing rate of admission of such families, when added to the accumulated total of all those families admitted since 1343 and still represented in the lists of eligibles, might give the impression of an increasing influx of gente nuova. Witt's figures, on the other hand, are neither cumulative nor familybased. In assessing the impact of the gente nuova in the decade 1348-58, for example, Witt counted only the first appearance of each family in the Signoria and computed this sum as a percentage of the total number of available posts in the Signoria over the ten-year period. Excluded from Witt's computation are the members of the new families of 1343-48 who served on the Signoria between 1348 and 1358, second and subsequent appearances of the new men of I 348- 58, and the appearances of other: members of their families. These different procedures, based on different assumptions about what constituted a "new man," produced statistics 92. Ronald G . Witt, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class, 1382-1407," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 (1976):246-48,251. 93. Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 2 1 . This would also seem to be the criterion employed by Marvin B.' Becker in his stimulating discussion of the novi cives in Florence in Transition (Baltimore, 1968), 2 :93- 149.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

197

suggesting a much more limited presence on the part of the gente nuova. Witt's decision to eliminate from consideration subsequent appearances in the Signoria of the new men and other members of their families in the same decade seems hard to justify, because such appearances would almost certainly have been seen by contemporaries as constituting an important aspect of the advance of the gente nuova. To take one example, among the new families of May 1349 were the Savini, represented by Giovanni di Rucco. In Witt's calculations, this new man counts as one of the 116 new men of 1348-58 who collectively accounted for 21 percent of the posts in the Signoria in that decade. But Giovanni di Rucco was reelected to the Signoria in July 1352, and his brother Andrea di Rucco reached the high office three times before 1358, in September 1350, May 1354, and March 1357. Andrea held the office one more time in July 1360, while yet a third brother, Bartolo di Rucco, became a prior in January 1363. The Savini, therefore, were represented in the Signoria no less than five times in the decade 1348-58 and a total of seven times in the space of fourteen years between 1349 and 1363. It seems quite likely that contemporaries, especially those who looked with disfavor on the "rise" of the new men, would have counted all seven posts for the gente nuova, rather than just the one represented by the initial election of Giovanni di Rucco. Similarly, the butcher Cione di Vaccino, who also entered the Signoria in 1349, was reelected in 1353; 1359, and 1361. Another member of the same year's group of new families, the retail cloth dealer Cecco di Cione, sat in the Signoria four times between 1349 and 1 3 6 3 . ~The ~ examples could be multiplied many times, and it is obvious that the inclusion of such subsequent appearances by the new men and their family members would considerably inflate any calculation of the share of the new men in government. More complex issues are raised by the problem of whether one ought to consider the new families of 1343-48 together with those of the post-1348 period down to 1377 as part of the same political phenomenon. If it can be demonstrated that the new families of the 1340s felt and experienced some community of political purpose with those of the next two or three decades, or that they were perceived by others as sharing certain common interests in challenging the old patrician order, then it seems perfectly reasonable to attempt to assess their combined impact on the patterns of 94. Priorista Mariani I I I , in Manoscritti, vini), 740 (Cione di Vaccino).

250, ff.

736 (Cecco di Cione), 739 (Sa-

198 Cmporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics officeholding in the quarter century from 1352 to 1 3 7 7 . ~Such ~ assumptions, if proved correct, would justify Brucker's technique of counting the members of families that were new in the mid-1340s among the gente nuova of the 1350s and 1360s and, similarly, of counting the new families of the 1350s as still new in the 1360s and 1370s. Witt's approach, on the other hand, by considering the new families of each decade as a discrete group, denies implicitly that the new men of such a long period can or should be considered as contributing to a single sustained political phenomenon. In other words, Witt assumes that the new families of the 1350s would have been counted among the established families of the 1360s and that the new families of each successive decade constituted as much of a challenge to those of the preceding decade as they did to the families of still older vintage. Although it is possible that, in the opinion of contemporaries, new families retained their "newness" for a briefer length of time than was assumed by Brucker, it is not at all clear that this process is best measured in decades or, for that matter, in periods of any uniform length. To illustrate the enormous difference, in statistical terms, between the two approaches for even a short period of time, we may consider the share of offices enjoyed by the gente nuova under both definitions in the five years from 1352 to 1356. Forty-four new families entered the Signoria for the first time in these years, holding a total of forty-nine posts, or just over 18 percent of the 270 available seats. But over the same five years, seventytwo posts were held by persons from families that had entered the Signoria 95. Brucker's own opinion in this regard appears to reject the first and to accept the second of these ciiteria as a means of collective identification of the,gente nuova: "The gente nuova . . . did not constitute an homogenous group with similar backgrounds, ideals, and objectives. These 'new men' did, however, possess certain common characteristics. First, nearly all of them came from obscure backgrounds; few were able to project their genealogy further back than their grandfathers. Some had no family name, but were identified only by their fathers' Christian names. Above all, they did not possess that most valuable of social commodities, a family. Theirs was an isolated and vulnerable position, which they sought to bolster by forging marriage alliances with ancient families, and by associating themselves-socially, politically, economically-with prominent citizens. What they all possessed in large measure was ambition: the determination to achieve wealth, political influence and some degree of social status" (Florentine Politics, p. 40). In stressing the obscurity of their backgrounds, their lack of pedigree, their desire to emulate the patriciate, and their ambition, Brucker's characterization of the gente nuova reflects quite closely the perception of these new men by their patrician critics.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

199

Table 6.1. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria, 1352-1377 Number of Families

Number of Number Individuals of Posts

Percentage Posts of Available per Posts Family

Pre-1343 families 1343-5 1 families 1352-77 families

181 91 222

362 124 246

735 274 412

51.73 19.28 28.99

4.061 3.011 1.856

All families

494

732

1421

100.00

2.877

Source: Priorista Mariani I-IVY in Manoscritti, 248-51 between 1343 and 1351. If these too are counted as new men, then the share of the posts allotted to the gente nuova increases from 18 to 44.8 percent (121 of 2 7 0 ) . ~ ~ With an awareness of the very different results that can be expected from such contrasting approaches to the problem of the gente nuova, we may proceed to a statistical analysis and summary of officeholding in the Signoria between 1352 and 1377. The distribution of all the seats filled over this twenty-six-year period among families that entered the Signoria before November 1343, those that entered between this date and the end of 1351, and the new families of 1352-77 is given in Table 6.1. The new families of 1352-77, considered as a single group and counting all subsequent appearances by members of these families down to 1377, held 29 percent of all the posts: much less than the 53 percent of the posts secured by the new families in 1343-48, but far more than the I I percent allotted to those between 1328 and 1342. However, the posts held in these twenty-six years by the members of all families entering the Signoria after 1343 amount to no less than 48 percent of the total. This is an impressive figure, and it would seem to justify the view of certain contemporary observers that the new men were a rising and potent force in communal politics. However, it is difficult to assess the true meaning of this statistic because of the impact of the plague of 1348. Estimates of the overall effect of the catastrophic mortality of that year do not reveal the percentage of the officeholding class that was swept away or the relative impact on the smaller new families as against the generally larger older families. It is be96. These figures are based on the data in the Priorista Mariani 111and IV, in Manoscritti, 250 and 251.

200

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

yond doubt, of course, that the death of so many persons necessitated a fairly high rate of admission of new men after 1348, simply to replace the deceased; thus, 557 of the 1,421 posts between 1352 and 1377 (39.2 percent) were held by persons from families that entered the Signoria after the summer of 1348. If we allow a certain replacement factor for a large portion of the influx of new men after the plague, then it is the tenacious recovery of the older pre-1343 families, who still managed to control more than half of the posts (almost 52 percent) between 1352 and 1377, that begins to assume the greater degree of significance. This impression is confirmed by a closer look at the rate of admission and the distribution of seats among the new families. After the avalanche of gente nuova between 1343 and 1348, the rate of admission declined quickly and significantly, despite the effect of the plague. Between 1349 and 1351, while the revised borse of 1343 were still in use, the annual totals of new families were seventeen, nineteen, and sixteen, but by the early 1350s only a third as many families were being admitted each year to the Signoria as in the mid-1340s. The decreasing rate of admission of new families in the decade after 1348 indicates that many of the vacancies created by the plague were occupied by members of older, pre-1343 families, although some were filled from the ranks of new families. Between 1352 and 1377, the annual average of new families admitted to the Signoria was 8.54, and in eighteen of these twenty-six years the number was ten or less." Few of the post-1343 families achieved more than occasional representation in the priorates between 1352 and 1377. Although 313 such families secured a total of 686 posts over this period, 263 of them (84 percent) were limited to three or less seats in twenty-six years. Only eleven of these families secured six or more posts, whereas fifty had between four and eleven representations. How far this contrasts with the situation among the pre1343 families is revealed by Table 6.2, which breaks down the distribution of posts by family within each group. Of the 181 pre-1343 families represented in the Signoria between 1352 and 1377, eighty-nine had four or more priors (for a total of 565 posts) whereas fifty-two had six or more. The conclusion that emerges from these figures is that, although the gente nuova were certainly heavily represented in the Signoria, their appearances were distributed among a large number of families. The presence of the older pre-1343 families, however, was con97. For the year by year totals, see appendix table A.3.

The First Achievement of Stability, ~ 5 2 - 1 3 7 7

201

Table 6.2. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Family, 1352-1377 Pre-1343

New Families 1343-5 1

New Families 1352-77

All New Families 1343-77

All Families Families Number of Posts Fam. Posts Fam. Posts Fam. Posts Fam. Posts Fam. Posts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

34 38 20 21 16 13 17 10 4 5 1

34 76 60 84 80 78 119 80 36 50 11

1 1

13 14

Totals

181

735

Source: Priorista Mariani I-IV, in Manoscritti, 248-51 centrated in a smaller, more compact group of families, The impact of this concentration among the older families on the overall patterns of officeholding was substantial. Over these twenty-six years, 17 percent of the posts (241) were held by the members of only twenty-six (5 percent) of the families (only four of which came from the ranks of the gente nuova: Aldobrandini di Ghingo, Baldesi, Caccini-Ricoveri, and Corsi). Thirteen percent of the families (63) held 34 percent of the posts (482); 28 percent (139) held 58 percent of the posts (822); and 42 percent (209) held 73 percent of the posts (1032). Thus, despite the large number of new families and the considerable share of the offices that went to the gente nuova, it cannot be said that the old families had lost control of the situation. For those patricians, however, who looked back to the 1330s as the standard by which to judge the political trends of the postplague generation, the picture was not quite as rosy as these figures might suggest. On the average, between 1352 and 137jthe great families were represented in the Signoria only about half as often as in the golden age of oligarchy. The

202

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

Strozzi, for example, who had amassed fifteen appearances in the fourteen years between 1328 and 1342, had to content themselves with fourteen in the twenty-six years before 1378. The Ricci, Albizzi, and Rucellai, with twelve each in 1328-42, had, respectively, nine, nine, and eleven in 1352-77. The oligarchic families complained loudly, and apparently with some justification, that the divieti laws unfairly excluded many of their members from the same access to high office enjoyed by the members of smaller, mostly newer families. But if the divieti laws, coupled with the regular flow of new men into the borse, did have a certain leveling effect, this did not prevent the traditionally prominent families from continuing to lead the pack. Among the forty-five families with seven or more priors between 1352 and 1377, only six entered the Signoria after 1343 (Petriboni and Lippi, plus the four families already mentioned). Most of the others belonged to the core of the old Florentine oligarchy: Strozzi, Medici, Rucellai, Altoviti, Rondinelli, Guasconi, Albizzi, Alberti, Da Filicaia, Ricci, Del Bene, Salviati, Covoni, Siminetti, Aldobrandini, Quaratesi, Ridolfi, Del Palagio, Magalotti, Peruzzi, Beccanugi, Bonciani, Capponi, Baroncelli, Giugni, Biliotti, Castellani, and others of somewhat lesser prestige.98 Only a handful (Fagiuoli, Soldi, Strada, and Pecori-the descendants of Dino Pecora) fall completely outside the ranks of the patriciate. The overwhelming impression is, once again, compromise. If the great families did not relinquish their leadership role, they were reduced to a more modest share of the offices than they had had in the 1330s. And if the new families were admitted to a steady and sizable proportion of the offices, partly determined by the necessity of replacing the victims of the plague, they did not dislodge the traditional oligarchy to the degree that had been attempted in the mid-1340s. Between 1352 and 1377 the advance of the gente nuova was real and considerable, but it was nonetheless held within manageable limits by a somewhat expanded oligarchy, which became reconciled to the necessity of a more widespread distribution of offices in the interest of safeguarding its own hegemony. Considerable care must be exercised in interpreting the comments of contemporaries on the electoral politics of this period. Whatever the statistics may show, most observers agreed in detecting and deploring the excessive 98. The others were the Bucelli, Amadori, Aldobrandini di Madonna, Machiavelli, Raffacani, Tecchini di Ser Rinaldo, Malegonelle, and Spinelli.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

203

ambition of the guildsmen and the "mezzana gente.'y99Matteo Villani, for example, from the vantage point of the early 1350s~lamented that "all lowly guildsmen wish to reach the priorate and the major communal offices . . . and, owing to the strength of the guild consulates, they are succeeding in their aim." He complained that the system of triennial scrutinies was promoting into office a class of ill-prepared and irresponsible new men: And so these citizens of simple mind and newly acquired citizenship, through bribery, gifts, and great expense, manage to get their names regularly included in the bags at the triennial scrutinies. There are so many of this sort that the good, wise, and prudent citizens of longstanding reputation are rarely able to attend to the affairs of the commune and can never support them fully. This is a far cry from the traditional government of our forefathers and their prompt sense of public service. . . . For now each person regards the two months that he spends in the high office in terms of his own advantage, to favor his friends or harm his enemies with the influence of the government.lw Matteo Villani's criticisms were echoed by other observers who had specific complaints about some feature of the electoral system of these years. We have already seen that Velluti thought that the scrutinies of the early 1350s excluded too many good Guelfs of prominent families, that Stefani, like Matteo Villani, pointed to instances of corruption in the appointment of members of the scrutiny committees, and that Filippo Villani com99. On patrician attitudes toward the gente nuova, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. 52-53. 100. Cronica di Matteo Villani, I : 120-21: "ogni vile artefice della comunanza vuole pervenire a1 grado del priorato e de' maggiori ufici del comune, ove s'hanno a provvedere le grandi e gravi cose di quello, e per forza delle lor0 capitudini vi pervengono; e cosi gli altri cittadini di leggiere intendimento e di novella cittadinanza, i quali per grande procaccio, e doni e spesa si fanno a'temporali di tre in tre anni agli squittini del comune insaccare: 2 questa tanta moltitudine, che i buoni e gli antichi, e'savi e discreti cittadini di rado possono provvedere a' fatti del comune, e in niuno tempo patrocinare quelli, che 2 cosa molto strana dall'antico governamento de'nostri antecessori, e dalla lor0 sollecita provvisione. E per questo avviene, che in fretta e in furia spesso conviene che si soccorra il nostro comune, e che pih l'antico ordine, e il gran fascio della nostra comunanza, e la fortuna, governi e regga la cittg di Firenze, che il senno o la provvidenza de' suoi rettori. Catuno intende i due mesi c'ha a stare a1 sommo uficio a1 comodo della sua utilith, a servire gli amici, o a diservire i nimici col favore del comune."

204 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics plained about the nomination of so many children. Stefani, prompted by the evidence of corruption and even more by the ruinous factional rivalries that tore the city apart in the late 1370s~was given to emotional outbursts over the vanity and illusion involved in all politics. Officeholding, he said in the Cronaca, was only so much smoke, and he attributed the evils of partisan strife to "the accursed ambition and smoke of desiring political offices." lo' Perhaps the most serious criticism directed against the electoral politics of the third quarter of the century came from the pen of Filippo Villani, who completed the eleventh and last book of his father Matteo's chronicle. The reggimento, he wrote, had come into the hands of new men from the contado with little experience of urban politics (obviously a favorite notion within the Villani family circle), and with their new wealth they bought their way up the social ladder and into politics. "They formed any marriage alliance that was to their liking, and they pushed themselves forward with so much bribery and graft and so many secret and open entreaties that they were admitted to the scrutiny and drawn for the offices." But the worst feature of the system was that the divieti kept these new men in power at the expense of the wiser and more experienced members of older families. This, according to Villani, was the source of the commune's troubles: The great popolani houses had to endure the divieti; many established and beloved citizens, those of wisdom and understanding, were barred from the offices. . . . The worst aspect of this government was that [the new men], although they were properly and advantageously advised by the wise and experienced citizens who served in office with 101. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 775, p. 307: ". . . la maladetta ambizione e fummo di volere gli uficj." Earlier in his chronicle, Stefani launched into another of these outbursts, focusing on the bartering of favors and influence peddling that occurred behind the scenes at the scrutinies: "Come addietro in piti luoghi abbiamo detto, l'ambizione degli uficj e del reggimento in Firenze era, ed era tanto cresciuta che ogni uomo volea e procurava il reggimento . . . e volesse Iddio, che non pure allora non fossono state queste arnbizioni e finite ma oggidi mancassono; chk come fossono allora io non l'ho di veduta ma d'udita, ma a1 di d'oggi io n'ho tanto veduto ed udito delle preghiere degli uficj e delle nimisti di chi non ha quello che chiede, che Iddio ne sia comportatore; che certo t miracolosa cosa che le preghiere passino ogni onesti, ch'io sono stato pregato talvolta, ch'io mi sono vergognato io del pregatore e dell'uficio che addimanda, o dello squittino ottenere; e certo tutte le maladizioni che ha avute la citti di Firenze a' miei di, 6 stato solo per gli ufficj" (ibid., r. 196, P. 70).

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

205

them out of love and loyalty for the republic, fearing that they might be deceived and misled, often took the contrary course, to the harm and infamy of the commune.'02 From such indictments of the genie nuova,, and from the widely expressed conviction that the institutions of electoral politics were being manipulated to the detriment of the traditional ruling families, one might conclude that the electoral system as a whole was viewed with suspicion and that it should be considered a failure because it lacked the support of politically articulate Florentines. But there are several reasons for not accepting this view of the matter. In the first place, the target of these attacks was less the electoral system itself than the ambitious new men from socially inferior families who were accused of corrupting the system to their advantage. This is particularly true of Matteo and Filippo Villani, who condemned, in very similar terms, the use of bribery and the trading of favors as means of securing success in the scrutinies. Stefani, whose experience imposed a somewhat different perspective, was easier on the new men and lashed out instead against the factions as the source of most troubles. But he too refrained from any sustained criticism of the basic structure of electoral politics. Unlike Giovanni Villani, who by the end of the 1330s was willing to see the electoral system of that decade as fundamentally flawed, neither the later Villanis nor Stefani ever came to such a drastic conclusion about the electoral institutions of their generation. This leads to a second and closely related point, namely, that the criticisms were usually directed at the abuse of certain specific aspects of the system, and never at the system as a whole. The nomination of children, corruption in the appointment of scrutators, and bribery in the scrutiny itself were all singled out as examples of such abuse, but in none of these instances was the validity of the institution itself placed in doubt. The only issue that seems to have raised questions about the wisdom of the system was the divieti, a matter on which Velluti was content to seek limited technical adjustments and which only Filippo Villani questioned on grounds of principle. And, as we have seen, Villani's dislike of the divieti was bound up with some fairly traditional prejudices against the so-called new men. Thus, even when criticisms were leveled against electoral institutions, they were usually confined to particulars and, more often than not, to their abuse. 102. Filippo Villani, in Cronica di Matteo Villani, 2 :452. Brucker has translated a portion of this passage in Florentine Politics, p. 53.

206 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics Third and most important, however, is the observation that these negative comments, especially those most closely related to fears about the gente nuova, seem to reveal the influence of the social turbulence and electoral experimentation of either the 1340s or the late 137os, and as such cannot readily be accepted as considered evaluations of the electoral politics of the intervening period. This is especially so in the case of Matteo Villani. His notion that the electoral success of the "lowly guildsmen" was attributable to the prominence of the guild consuls, although true enough of the mid-134os, was hardly applicable to the realities of the early 1350s. In fact, this idea is so obviously reminiscent of Giovanni Villani's similar comments about the popular government that one is tempted to believe that Matteo simply adopted it uncritically from his brother's well-stocked repertoire of laments about the gente nuova. In the early 135os, only a few years after the demise of the guild regime, it was probably still a conditioned reflex in certain quarters to blame the city's problems on the "lowly guildsmen" and their troublesome consuls, even when it was clearly misleading to do so. Matteo's superficially critical comments on the electoral politics of the years around the mid-century are thus better explained by what he disliked in retrospect about the 1340s than by any measured analysis of the effects of the new system. Stefani, on the other hand, under the impact of the factional discord of the late 137os, magnified the scandal surrounding the scrutiny of 1367 into a foretaste, replete with moral significance, of those "struggles for political offices" that brought the regime to ruin in 1378. The most thoughtful and by all odds the most accurate reflections on the electoral politics of this generation come from an anonymous commentator who wrote in the year 1377."~This writer shared the belief of Matteo and Filippo Villani that the middle rank of Florentines had made important political gains, but he located the period of their most significant advance between 1343 and 1358. In 1343, he observed, "the minor guildsmen began to be included in the government on a regular basis, two or three of 103. They have been published several times: in Delizie, 9:274-79; by Gino Capponi, in Storia della Repubblica di Firenze, 2 vols. (Florence, 1875), I :591-93; and by J. R. Woodhouse, in his recent edition of Vincenzio Borghini's Storia dellil Nobiltci Fiorentina: Discorsi inediti o rari (Pisa, 1974)' pp. 264-68. Brucker has translated a brief portion of them in Florentine Politics, p. 53. For references to additional manuscript copies of this text, besides the one quoted in the following notes, see Guidubaldo Guidi, "I Sistemi elettorali agli uffici della citti-repubblica di Firenze nella prima met&del Trecento (1329--13qg),"ASI 135 (1977): 39511.

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

207

them among the eight priors of each term of office." This influx of lower guildsmen was responsible for changing the character and composition of the ruling class and for sparking civil discord: From that time [1343] until the present, the lower guildsmen have been part of the reggimento, whereas previously there were hardly as many as two of them [in the Signoria] in an entire year. It is this which has caused divisions among the citizens, for everyone has raised their standing so much that they are constantly coming into the offices, and even more into others like the priorate; so much so that now, in our time, they have become captains of the Parte and sit among the Seven of Mercanzia, on a regular basis, as they do in the priorate; they have entered every office [of the city], and beyond this they serve as podestti and castellani [in the district] more than anyone else, although they have not yet reached as far as the ambassadorships. May God pardon those who have been responsible for leaving behind the honorable and established citizens and relying on lowly guildsmen and foreigners. Only time will reveal what will come of this.'" The anonymous commentator specified, however, that the influx of new men included both the lower guildsmen he had already referred to and the whole "communitti della mezana gente, merchants whose ancestors had never held any office," by which he seems to have meant the previously excluded non-oligarchic ranks of the major guilds: "and there are so many of them that it is impossible." But their impact on communal politics, he asserted, did not remain at the same high level throughout the entire period from 1343 to 1377. ''This influx of new men lasted down to 1357 [Florentine style]; until then it could be said that any merchant was al104. Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, Panciatichi, 120, ff. 32v-33: "Incontanente si chominci6 a mectere nel reggimento gli artefici minuti et eranne del continuo dua, o, tre per uficio di viiii priori in sino a tanto che si misse ordine che ne fusse dua per uficio et fussino del quartiere donde si chava el gonfaloniere della giustitia et da poi in qua n'i: dua per priorato. Et da questo tempo in qua gli artefici minuti sono stati nel reggimento che prima non v'erano in tutto l'anno due, et questo ha facto le divixioni de' ciptadini che ciascuno gli ha messi suso sichi: sempre sono venuti entrando negli ufici cosi et piu negli altri ufici come quello del priorato, tanto che hora a' nostri di sono capitani di parte et di sette della mercatantia per ordine come de' priori in ciascuno uficio nando, et oltre accih vanno in podesterie e 'n castellerie piii ch'altra gente, ovvero che non anno per6 ancora nell'ambasciate; ora dio lo perdoni a chi facto l'ha che hanno lasciato gli antichi ciptadini horrevoli per torre i vili Artefici et forestieri; il fine si loderh per sk."

208 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics lowed into office, provided he was a good man, even if his family was thought to have been Ghibelline in earlier times. And in truth everyone had become Guelf in his heart, his desires, and his thinking." Especially among the "common people, both of the middle and the lower ranks, of whatever origin they were, everyone was Guelf by choice." ' 0 5 Having established the presence of popular elements in government and having defended them in advance against the spurious charge of Ghibellinism, this anonymous author then made it clear that the anti-Ghibelline ammonizione law of 1358represented a turning point in the political fortunes of the minori and the mezzani: In 1358 a law was passed against those who were held or thought to be Ghibellines, or not true Guelfs, warning them not to accept any communal offices; and from then until the present year of 1377, a great number of those who had been in the offices were eliminated from them, and many more still are paralyzed with fear, whether they are Ghibellines or not. Many are afraid to be drawn for public office out of direct fear of those who can do them harm; and many times, because of such apprehension and fright, common sense and prudence have dissuaded them from accepting the offices so as not to displease one or the other of the factions of the powerful; nonetheless, so many persons of this middling sort have been included in the electoral bags that it is just an impossible situation. May it please God to care for this good city so that everyone may see his duty clearly. [And, as a clarifying afterthought, he concluded:] The majority of these persons of middle rank are persons whose families, including themselves, had never had any office before the plague of 1348,or rather, before the arrival of the Duke of Athens.lo6 105.Ibid., ff. 33-33v: "A chiarire ogni cosa dalla chacciata del ducha d'athene in qua, che fu nel MCCCXLIII, oltre a quelli artefici che siano entrati in uficio n'k entrata tutta la communitii della mezana gente, merchatanti che mai e' lor0 passati havevono havuto alcuno uficio, et sono tanta moltitudine che i: impossibile; et questo durb insino nel MCCCLVII che ogni huomo che era merchatante si pub dire che haveva uficio s'egli era buono huomo non stante che per gli tempi passari fussino stati tenuti i suoi ghibellini, et veramente ogni uno era diventato guelfo d'anirno, di volere, et d'ogni suo pensiero. Et potevasi dire che a Firenze non fussi alcuno ghibellino se non fussi antichi nobili rubelli, ma della gente commune, mezzana et rninore, di che natione si fussi, tutti di volonth erano guelfi." 106. Ibid., f. 33v: "Nel MCCCLVIII si fece una rinformazione a chi fussi tenuto o riputato ghibellino o non vero guelfo fussi ammuniti et non potessi pigliare uficio di commune et da poi in qua insino nel MCCCLXXVII istato tracto gran quantits

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

209

This interpretation makes several distinctions not found in the comments of other contemporaries. It points to the decade of the 134os, the period encompassed by the rule of Walter of Brienne and the Black Death, as the one in which the mezzana gente made gains that still affected communal politics in the 137os, although these gains had subsequently been blunted in the 1350s by the Parte's anti-Ghibelline campaign and in particular by the ammonizione law of 1358. The anonymous commentator offers a balanced assessment of the problem of the new men: they made their entrance in the 1340s in significant numbers, but were essentially on the defensive from the mid-1350s to the 137os, caught between the pincers of rival aristocratic factions. But nowhere does he suggest that the electoral procedures of the years from 1348 to 1377 had anything to do with the rise of the minori and the mezzana gente. In his view, that had been the dubious achievement of the 1340s. Whatever the feelings about the new men and despite occasional complaints about abuses of electoral institutions, the criticisms reviewed here fall far short of an overall negative view of the electoral system itself. In fact, this survey of contemporary views on electoral politics in the three decades between the Black Death and the Ciompi revolution suggests that most observers were beginning, gradually but decisively, to accept the legitimacy and even the inevitability of the commune's electoral institutions. More was involved here than the passive acceptance of a set of procedures that seemed to function smoothly and adequately enough not to arouse serious objections. In this generation, in addition to its primary function as a means for the periodic selection of officeholders, the Florentine electoral system assumed an even more fundamental task in political life. Its broader aspect was the semipermanent delineation of a political class in a community in which the distinction between "political" and "nonpolitical" classes was not the modern functional identification of a professional cadre of full-time politicians as against the mass of private citizens. The demarcation of the boundaries of the political class in Florence was degli ufici di quegli che v'erano et grandissima quantiti ne stanno sospesi et con paura, o ghibellino o no che sieno di natione; molti dubitano di non essere tracti degli ufici a posta di quegli che possono operare contra loro, et assai volte per tema et per paura la ragione el consiglib per non dispiacere a una delle parti dei maggiori . . . et non di meno 5 tanta la moltitudine di questa gente mezana che c't: entrata ne' sachi che t: impossibile. Addio piaccia provvedere a si buona cipti che ciascuno habbia suo dovere et la maggior parte di questa gente mezana sono gente che eglino et lor0 non havevano havuti uficio inanzi la mortaliti del MCCCXLVIII", o vero, inanzi la venuta del ducha d'athene."

210

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

above all a recognition of the social bases of power. The political class was that social class (or coalition of social groups) that succeeded in bringing the machinery and power of communal government under its control and in persuading other groups and classes of its legitimate right to exercise that power on behalf of the whole community. In reality, of course, these two tasks were closely related, for without the legitimacy conferred by the acceptance of the political class on the part of those not called to an actual share of power, there would be no power at all outside of the exercise of violence. In the conferral of such legitimacy, the system of broadly based triennial scrutinies made a vital contribution to the stability of Florentine politics in the 1350s and I 360s. The scrutiny system replaced the only other institutional and ideological base (viz., the guild system of corporate representation) experimented with by the Florentines to resolve this basic task of any stable political life. Under the popular regime of the mid-1340s (and again under the revived guild government of 1378-82), the legitimacy of the reggimento derived from the notion that officeholders were the delegated representatives of the constituent parts of the body politic, of the equal and autonomous guilds, which, taken together, were roughly coterminous with the political class. Corporatism, however, was fraught with dangers for an upper class that could not comfortably identify its interests with those of the wider guild community. But even as they rejected the corporatism of the 134os, the great families realized that a return to the elitist hegemony of the 1330s was impossible in the changed circumstances of the 135os, for the very reason that unmasked elitism could not meet the requirements of broad consensus, especially after the popular regime had advanced its own compelling principle of legitimacy.'07 The response of the Florentine upper 107. In chapter 13 of the first Discourse of the Defensor Pacis, Marsilius of Padua concisely formulated the alternative principles of legitimation grounded in the contrasting systems of corporate and consensus politics. Since the Defensor Pacis was translated "in fiorentino" in 1363, some of its Florentine readers may have found the experience of their city reflected in Marsilius's words: "E perb convenenvole e profittevole cosa i: conmettere per I'universiti de' cittadini a' savi e a quelli che ssono sperti a ccierchare trovare e isaminare le regole de' profitti e ddiritti civili e de' danni e gravanze e ffatti comuni e dd'altre somilglianti cose de' quali regole I'uomo d6 fare leggi o statuti; per tal maniera che o di ciasquna delle parti primaie e principali della citti annoverate nel V chapitolo di questo libro nella prima parte, tuttavia second0 la proporzione di ciasquna, sieno elletti alquno a pparte, o cche di tutti i cittadini insieme raghunati, tutti sieno elletti gli uomini prudenti e ssavi e sperti di su ddetti" (Marsilio da Padova, Defensor Pack nella

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

21 I

class was the consensus politics of open nomination, regular and broadly based scrutinies, and extraction by lot. These electoral institutions, which contributed so significantly to the formation of consensus around the political class, were the foundation of the myth, popularized by Leonardo Bruni some decades later, that all Florentine citizens enjoyed an equal hope of attaining high office.lo8 An equally important factor in this process was the belief, perhaps the illusion, that the selection of officeholders under the new system was the work of impersonal and impartial institutions operating over and above the will of individuals and factions. Indeed, it may have been this illusion that permitted Florentine political observers of this generation to express their abhorrence of the great evil of factionalism, not merely by appeals to the moral principles of peace and unity, but more concretely as a defense of established institutions and even of the regginlento itself, which could now increasingly be regarded as distinct from the factions, not as their creation.'09 Stefani gave expression to this idea when he claimed that the factional disputes that culminated in the campaign of proscriptions in the late 1370s were causing the "guastamento della nostra citth," which he equated, just a few lines further on, with the "guastamento del buono e bello reggimento." 'I0 The city and the reggimento could be so closely identified with each other only if the procedures for the selection and definition traduzione in volgarefiorentino del1363, ed. Carlo Pincin [Turin, 19661, p. 75). The notion of electing representatives from "each of the primary or principal parts of the city" was the essence of the corporate approach to government, while consensus politics envisaged the collective leadership of an elite of "prudent, wise, and expert men" on behalf of the entire citizenry considered as a single unit ("di tutti i cittadini insieme raghunati"). 108. On Bruni's notion of the equality of political opportunity in Florence, see Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1966), pp. 419, 556-57; and Nicolai Rubinstein, "Florentine Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendancy in the Fifteenth Century," in Nicolai Rubinstein, ed., Florentine Studies (Evanston, 1968), pp. 445-53. See also the comments in the epilogue of the present study. 109. For a discussion of the meaning and use of the term reggimento in the next generation, see Dale Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento in the Fifteenth Century," Renaissance QuarterZy 28 (1975): 575-638, especially pp. 577-84. 110. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 755, p. 294: "Nel detto anno 1375 seguendo la detta forma dello ammonire e guastamento della nostra cittB furono ammoniti gl'infrascritti . . . [among them Giorgio Scali]. Del quale Giorgio nacque grande ammirazione in tutti li cittadini, e fu quella cosa che fu principio del guastamento del buono e bello reggimento."

2 12

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

of the latter had gathered broad consensus and full legitimacy. Stefani's "buono e bello reggimento" is not the "regime" of a party or faction, nor even the privileged core of approved officeholders who actually staffed the committees of government. His phrase seems instead to denote a conceptualization of the public world that manages to integrate within one term both the magistrates who governed and the community of the governed upon whose consent and welfare the legitimacy of the former was based. The durable and apparently impersonal procedures that defined the reggimento allowed Stefani to characterize it in such favorable terms and to envision it as representative of the common good rather than of factional power. To see the reggimento as "buono e bello" was an essential step toward the republican and statist mentality of early fifteenth-century Florence. The institutions of open nomination, regular but secret general scrutinies, extraction by lot, the overlapping use of different sets of bags, and the divieti all contributed to this emerging civic posture by anchoring Florentine electoral politics to the notion that the exercise of public power could be deemed responsible and even virtuous precisely when it was conferred by such impersonal means. The experience of a generation of stable electoral institutions helped the Florentines conceptualize the distinction between public authority and private privilege, which, in the long run, was fundamental to the growth of an idea of the state as transcending, in terms of both time and legitimacy, the rule of any faction, party, family, or individual. However, if these electoral institutions contributed to the crystallization of such ideas and attitudes, it by no means follows that they were successful in eradicating the very phenomena that they stigmatized as noxious to the common good. Factionalism and civil discord, far from disappearing under the new system, seemed to contemporaries a more venomous poison than ever. But it could well be the case that these old and recurrent features of the Florentine political world seemed far worse than before without actually being so, for the very reason that for the first time a generation of Florentines came to the political theater equipped with an ideological alternative to the older, perhaps truer, vision of politics based on self and family interest, party bosses, patrons, and clients. The alternative may have been an illusion, but even if it was, it was nonetheless momentous for the future of the republic and of republican thought. The disgust and anger expressed over the issue of factionalism by so many articulate Florentines of the generation between the plague and the Ciompi revolution are a strong indication of the effect that the new ideas of public authority and consensus politics were having, ideas that nourished

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

213

the most powerful and effective movement for reform ever experienced by the Florentine commune. In many ways the twenty years of protest, reform, and revolution, which began with the attempts to rein in the Parte Guelfa and the factions in the late 1360s and early 1370s (attempts liquidated by the balie of the 1380s and 1390s)~were made possible by the indignation and resentment of large numbers of Florentines who simultaneously experienced the promising stability of an electoral system based on consensus and impersonality as well as the disaster of factional warfare and family ambitions. Their assimilation of the former hardened their resolve not to tolerate the latter and led to the protests of 1372 and ultimately to the revolutions of 1378. This heightened awareness of the nature and dangers of factionalism, stemming from an appreciation of the principles of consensus and public authority inherent in the new system of electoral politics, is nowhere better expressed than in the twenty-fourth chapter of the eighth book of Matteo Villani's chronicle. Anxious to explain how and why the ammonizione law of 1358 marked the beginning of "nuovi scandali" in Florence, Villani draws a general picture of the political situation in that year. The city, the chronicler writes, enjoyed "great tranquillity and peace" in its domestic and foreign affairs in those times (before the 1358 law). This brings Villani immediately to a series of comments on electoral institutions. He first discusses the divieti as the cause of the influx of gente nuova into the high offices of the commune, and on this subject his opinions are decidedly negative. Because of the divieti, the great and powerful citizens were rarely returned to the magistracies of government, which were instead filled with "every sort of person, mostly minor guildsmen, and odd, new men" who were not as affected by the divieti because they did not belong to a consorteria. Villani concludes that there was very little regard for the general welfare of the whole community. Shameless persons used bribery and any means of special influence to win the necessary number of votes from the triennial scrutiny committees, with the result that "unworthy and illicit men" outnumbered "virtuous and worthy" persons in the highest office of the republic. Nonetheless, Villani contends, obviously attempting to emphasize that even this state of affairs was preferable to the ruinous discord of the factions that was about to erupt, "the citizenry in those times was more united for the common good, and the factions had less influence [than now, i.e., since 13581, and the new and lesser citizens in the government did not dare to engage in wrongdoing at the beginning of their terms of office." The point of Villani's assessment of the situation is that, all

214 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

things considered, the system was in fact working. But he was no less insistent that "the republic was committing a serious mistake and was running grave risks by not attending to the manifest corruption that took place in the scrutinies." Whatever defects the electoral system may have had, Villani makes it clear that he envisioned a strengthened and reformed system of electoral scrutinies as a bulwark against the dangers and pretensions of the Parte Guelfa. It was all the more urgent to reform the electoral system in order to deny the Parte the pretext of electoral corruption as a justification for its anti-Ghibelline campaign. Certain individuals, among them both magnates and popolani, realizing the error of the commune [in not attending to the defects of the electoral system], with dangerous and clever malice, and with the evil intention of becoming so many little tyrants, agreed on a common plan; and what should and could have been reformed in the conduct of the scrutinies by means of a good and honest law they twisted into the issue of Guelfism, saying that Ghibellines were occupying the offices of government and that if the Guelfs did not remedy this situation, they had better prepare themselves for the loss of their power and influence and of the freedom of the commune on which the liberty of Italy depends."' I I I. Cronica di Matteo Villani, 2 : 108-9: "Era la citth di Firenze in questi tempi in grande tranquilliti e pace dentro, e di fuori non avea nemici, e con tutti i comuni e signori dYItaliaera in amicizia, non avendo contro ad alcuno voluto pigliare parte, e con tutti quelli ch'aveano guerra travagliatosi della pace, e la noviti del porto di Talamone non inducea guerra. La citta dentro per l'ordine de'divieti delle famiglje de' popolani, quando alcuno era tratto agli ufici de' collegi, aveva fatto venire il reggimento del comune in molte genti d'ogni ragione, e '1 piii in artefici minuti, e in singulari e nuovi cittadini, e a costoro quasi non toccava divieto perchi: non erano di consorteria, sicchi: frequentemente ritornavano agli ufici, e' grandi e potenti cittadini delle gran famiglie vi tornavano di rado. Ancora poca distinzione si faceva per uno comune buono stato degli uomini: e chi era senza vergogna, a' tempi che s'insaccavano per squittinio generale gli uomini all'uficio del priorato, si provvedea dinanzi con gli amici, e colle preghiere, e con doni, e con spessi conviti; e per questo mod0 piii indegni e illiciti uomini si ritrovavano agli ufici, che virtuosi e degni. Nondimeno la cittadinanza era pih unita a1 comune bene, e le sette aveano meno luogo, e i nuovi e piccoli cittadini negli ufici non aveano ardire di far male nella infanzia de' loro magistrati. Nondirneno in grande fallo e pericoloso correa la repubblica di non riparare a' manifesti falli che si commettevano negli squittini, come detto 6. Ma certi uomini grandi e popolari avvedendosi dell'errore del comune, con grave e sagace malizia, e a fine reo di divenire tirannelli, s'avvisarono insieme, e quello che si dovea, e potea racconciare con ordine di buona legge e

The First Achievement of Stability, 1352-1377

215

The significance of Matteo Villani's comments on the system of electoral scrutinies lies in his willingness to see that system as compatible with and expressive of the general welfare of the commune. This is not to say that in his view the system functioned flawlessly or even satisfactorily. Indeed, he makes it very clear that it stood in dire need of major reforms if it was to meet the task of resisting the corrupt influences of both patron-client machinations and the ideological partisanship of the Guelfs. But it is of the highest importance for the development of Florentine attitudes toward the state and the ruling class that Villani even entertained the idea that the institutions of electoral politics were capable of such a task. If, as Villani seems to have believed, the scrutinies had the potential of generating this sort of resistance to the age-old evil of factionalism, if they were capable of producing a broaq consensus around those called to office and power in government, and if they succeeded in fostering the illusion that those so called, selected by fair and impartial means, represented the common good of the whole community, then it was but a short step to the conviction that the liberty and welfare of the republic were bound up with and guaranteed by these same institutions of electoral politics. The corollary of this view of Florentine electoral institutions was that the ruling class that emerged from the system was itself the repository and guardian of republican liberty and the general welfare. Such notions, here visible in their embryonic state, in the long run provided the firmest basis of legitimacy, short of the divine mandate of sacral kingship, of which any late medieval government was capable. The officeholders of the Florentine commune could cease to be merely the faction or party in power and begin to be, as Bruni later claimed, the custodians of that "supreme magistracy which seems to have a certain force of regal power," men "previously approved by the judgment of the people and deemed worthy of so great an h ~ n o r . " " ~ onesta a1 fare degli squittini, convertirono sotto il titolo della parte guelfa, dicendo, ch'e' ghibellini occupavano gli ufici, e che se i guelfi non riparassono a questo, poteano pensare di perdere tosto lor0 stato e la franchigia del comune, la cui franchigia mantenea la liberta in Italia." For a valuable discussion of Matteo Villani's political ideas, especially his notions of Guelfism and liberty, see Louis Green, Chronicle Into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Fourteenth-century Florentine Chronicles (Cambridge, 197z),pp. 44- 85. 112. Leonardo Bruni, Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, in Hans Baron, From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni (Chicago, 1968), p. 259: "Principio enim supremus magistratus, qui quandam vim regie potestatis habere videbatur, ea cautela temperatus est, ut non ad unum sed ad novem simul, nec ad annum sed ad bimestre tempus, deferatur . . . nec ii quidem fortuiti sed iudicio populi iam dudum approbati et tanto

216 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

The "regime" was, in short, about to become the "state," and this transformation was in no small measure the result of the legitimacy and stability that Florentine electoral practices had acquired in the generation between 1348 and 1378. honore digni iudicati." A translation of the Laudatio is now available in The Earthly Republic: Italian Humanists on Government and Society, ed. B. G. Kohl and R. G. Witt (Philadelphia, 1978)~ pp. 121-75. .

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, I 378 - I 382

In the mid-137os, under the destabilizing impact of worsening factionalism, a costly war against the papacy, and another economic downturn, the consensus achieved in the preceding quarter century began to crumble. For twenty years the division within the oligarchy between the Albizzi and Ricci factions had provided the guild community with the leverage to restrain the reactionary policies of the Parte Guelfa, but when a rapprochement was negotiated between the leaders of the two factions late in 1371, it became clear that the era of compromise between oligarchs and guildsmen was at an end. The Parte intensified its effort to purge the political class of suspected Ghibellines through a wave of proscriptions aimed at intimidating guildsmen and gente nuova from accepting communal office. For their part, the guildsmen, claiming to defend the primacy of public law and to uphold the common good, launched an aggressive attack on the power of the factions and the unbridled privileges of the Guelf organization.' The resulting polarization of communal politics, reminiscent in many respects of the early 134os, led to confrontation and conflict on many fronts, including that of electoral politics. Between 1372 and 1377 the restive mood of the guild community manifested itself, among other developments, in a renewed popular trend toward reform in the electoral sphere. The changes made during these years were not of great moment in and of themselves, and certainly not by comparison with the revolutionary reforms of the summer of 1378. Their major thrust was to tighten the system and to make it as free as possible of manipulation and influence by the powerful. Such I. For a detaited and lucid treatment of these complex events, see Gene A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 1343- 1378 (Princeton, 1962), chaps. 6 and 7, pp. 244-335; the reconciliation of the Albizzi and the Ricci is discussed on pp. 248-50.

21 8

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

expectations, especially the idea that the dangers of oligarchic hegemony could be met by retouching and improving the institutions of electoral politics, are once again (as with Matteo Villani's optimistic call for electoral reforms in the 1360s) testimony to the centrality that these institutions had achieved by this time in the political assumptions of many Florentines. The balia of 1372 produced the most significant electoral reform of these years by tackling the one feature of the system that had proved to be the source of constant difficulties and complaints in the previous decade, namely, the appointment of the eighty arroti to the scrutiny c0mmittee.l As discussed in chapter 6, since the law of 1352 had established no fixed procedures for their selection, the Signoria and the colleges were able to appoint them by simple and direct designation, with sometimes scandalous results. Thus, in 1372, the same reformers who attempted to curb the factional excesses of the Albizzi and the Ricci also decided to formalize the selection of arroti for the next general scrutiny, which was scheduled for 1375. They decreed that the members of the Signoria and the colleges and the popolani captains of the Parte Guelfa should meet in four committees, corresponding to the four quarters of the city that they represented in those offices, and that each quarter's delegation should nominate 120 citizens of that quarter (thirty from each gonfalone) as candidates for the post of arroto on the scrutiny committee. The thirty candidates of each gonfalone would then be put to a vote among the full membership of the Signoria, the colleges, and the Parte captains in order to promote five persons from each district to the scrutiny ~ommittee.~ This revision of the appointment process aimed at removing the conditions that had generated past scandals by permitting the nomination of a large number of eligibles (480 in all) and by placing the scrutiny of each group of thirty in the hands of a voting body the majority of whose members were not residents of the same gonfalone or quarter as the candidates themselves. Although nothing is known about the scrutiny of 1375 or about the effect of this reform on its conduct and results, the balia's intent was clearly to reduce the ability of powerful individuals to manipulate the scrutinies through the appoincment of clients and allies to the voting committee. A number of other modifications and clarifications with a distinctly popular flavor were introduced into the electoral regulations during these 2 . On the balia of 1372 and its many reforms, see ibid., pp. 248-58. 3. Cap., 1 1 , ff. 89-90.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

219

years. In June 1370 the long-standing prohibition against the assumption of any communal office by persons not enrolled in the lists of regular ~ retaxpayers (either allibrati or assessed for and paying p r e s t a n ~ e )was affirmed with the objective of excluding certain powerful persons who "sometimes feigned poverty when it came to paying taxes but who were overly ambitious when it came to assuming political ~ffice.''~ However, the law also made room for legitimate exceptions in favor of genuinely poor persons who could not pay taxes, in an effort to safeguard their political and officeholding righw6 The most interesting aspect of this revision of the old law that had linked political rights to fiscal contributions is the very expectation that such poor persons (miserabiles et mendici) would or could have been approved in the scrutinies for communal offices. Half a year later, in a legislative enactment apparently directed against a particular individual; but reminiscent of traditional popular aims in limiting the political ambitions of the uppermost stratum of Florentine society, former magnates who had been permitted to acquire popolano status were nonetheless barred from the major offices and from participation on the scrutiny committees for twenty years after their change of s t a t w 8 In December 1376, as already noted; it was decided that voting members of the scrutiny committees could not serve as accoppiatori. Although it was not specified at this time just how the latter were henceforth to be appointed, the objective behind this prohibition was to depoliticize the appointment of these election secretaries. And on 22 May 1377, in the last revisions of the electoral system before the revolutions of 1378, a twin set of electoral provisions 4. See the legislation of 30 March I352 in P R , 39, ff. 117v-118; that of 23 August 1359 in P R , 47, f. 28v. 5. P R , 58, f. IIV: "Considerantes . . . quod multi etiam habiles et solvendo se subtrahunt quandoque per potentiam quandoque etiam simulata miseria a participando factiones et onera comunis Florentie incumbentia, et in honoribus non solum volunt participare sed etiam anteponi." 6. Ibid.: "Et salvo . . . quod predicte pene et gravamina supradicta non habeant nec vendicent sibi locum in illis nec contra illos qui per dominos priores artium et Vexilliferum Iustitie [and their advisory colleges] . . . declarati fuerint esse adeo miserabiles et mendici quod censeantur impotentes ad dicta honera subeunda." 7. Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 244; Stefani, Cronaca, r. 725, p. 277. 8. P R , 58, f. 164. The oligarchs of the Parte Guelfa responded in kind. In July 1371 they forced acceptance of a petition that extended the 1359 prohibition against the assumption of office by declared Ghibellines to cover all the anlmoniti as well; see Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 245, and P R , 59, f. 53v. 9. See above, chap. 6, n. 49.

220

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

ended the practice of allowing exceptions to the divieti and guaranteed every nominated candidate a separate and individual vote by the full scrutiny committee.'O These modest reforms were a prelude to the complex evolution of electoral politics in Florence in the tumultuous year of the Ciompi revolution. Although but a single thread in the tangled web of events of that memorable year, the development of Florentine electoral institutions in 1378 conditioned and reflected the several stages of the political and social crisis that led the commune from the initial reforms of late June to the revolution of the full guild community in July, the landmark general scrutiny of mid-August, and the establishment of the guild republic in September. Throughout these three fateful months that witnessed the rise and fall of the Ciompi, almost every major political document that emanated from the councils or the balie had something to say on electoral issues, and central to each was a continuing preoccupation with the reviving role of the guilds. Although variously interpreted and implemented by the regimes that succeeded each other with such rapidity during that turbulent summer, it was in fact the corporate vision of a polity based on the guild community as the embodiment of the republic that gave consistency and cogency to the many and sometimes confusing electoral reforms of 1378. The importance of the guilds and their constitutional program, not only in the events of 1378 but in those of the next three and a half years as well, justifies the view of this period as the last challenge of corporatism." The first phase of the upheavals was dominated by the balia of eightyone in the last week of June. On 22 June, the same day on which the legislative councils authorized the creation of the balia,12 they also prohibited magnates (or any members of magnate houses) from participating in the nomination, scrutiny, or election of non-magnates for any office of the commune or even the Parte Guelfa.13This was a clear signal that the longdebated issue of the appointment of members of the voting committee for general scrutinies was again to be the object of reform. The balia then proSee above, chap. 6, nn. 46 and 88. For recent views of the Ciompi revolution and the regime of 1378-82 the context of the Florentine corporate tradition, see Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1977), pp. 39-59; and my "Audiant Omner Artes: Corporate Origins of the Ciompi Revolution," in I1 Tumulto dei Ciompi: Un Momento di Ston'a Fiorentina ed Europea (Florence, 1981)~ pp. 59-93. 12. PR, 66, ff. 51v-52. 13. Ibid., f. 53v. 10.

II.

+

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

221

ceeded with its appointed work, having mostly to do with the partial restoration of political rights to those who had been ammoniti by the Parte during its campaign of proscriptions. When, on 30 June, the last day of its mandated term of office, the balia finally addressed itself to the problems of electoral politics, it approved an ambiguous and somewhat contradictory measure that underscores the divergent political impulses emerging into open contention at this time. The balia declared that, in all future scrutinies for the major executive offices, the eighty arroti appointed to the voting committee would have to be persons who had previously held office in the Signoria or one of the colleges, or as one of the captains of the Parte Guelfa, the Dieci di Liberth (an office created by the balia of 1372)~or the regulatores of the commune's finances. This limitation on the selection of arroti, which would have made any significant infusion of new blood into the political class extremely difficult, could hardly have been viewed with satisfaction by the agitated guild community and may indeed have been an attempt to stifle its rising ambitions in the electoral sphere. In fact, however, the decree was accompanied by an important qualification that seems to represent the dissenting voice of the guild community within the balia. The restrictions on the appointment of arroti were to be "minimally applicable" to the consuls of the twenty-one guilds who would be called upon to participate in future general scrutinies.I4The precise significance of this amendment was not spelled out, but it has all the appearance of a compromise formula designed to satisfy irreconcilable positions through deliberate verbal ambiguity. Moreover, the amendment's real impact on future scrutinies would obviously depend on 'the extent of guild and consular participation in them. For as long as such participation was limited to one representative per guild and thus to a small percentage of the total committee, the restrictive intent of the balia's decree would no doubt have made the scrutiny committees far more conservative assemblies, even with the exception grudgingly allowed to the guild consuls by the "minimal applicability" reservation. The guilds had no intention of allowing the consular role in electoral scrutinies to remain at this low level. But for the moment, the guild community was represented by only one delegate from each of the guilds and thus amounted to a minority of 14. Cap. Prot., 7, f. 282: "Et quod etiam predicta supra disponita ad Consules XXI artium habentes interesse dictis scruptineis minime se extendant." The decree is summarized in Cesare Guasti, ed., I Capitoli del Comune di Firenze: Inventario e Regesto, vol. 2 (Florence, 1893)~p. 95.

222

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

twenty-one among the eighty-one members of the balia.15 Although it was unable to prevent the approval of the restriction on the future appointment of arroti, it was at least able to make its voice heard and to insist that the selection of consuls for the scrutinies not be affected by the decree. It may also be significant that the clause containing this qualification does not specify the exact number of consuls who would participate, an indication perhaps that this point was now being called into question. Over the next week the guild community was in a state of turmoil. Meetings and assemblies (colloquia) were spontaneously convened within the guild^,'^ and among the issues debated the problems of electoral politics must have had a prominent place, as they were once again addressed in the petition of the guilds of 9-10 July. Submitted on behalf of "all the consuls of the twenty-one guilds of the city of Florence and all the guildsmen of these same guilds," the petition reflected the aims and fears of the established guild community, which now felt threatened by both the oligarchic reaction that had surfaced on the last day of the June balia and by the emerging demands of the sottoposti for an extension of corporate and political rights beyond the boundaries of the established guilds. Two items of particular interest for the development of electoral politics document the increasingly intermediate position of the guild community at this time: one concerning the still unresolved issue of the selection of arroti for the scrutiny committees, the other regarding the guild matriculation requirements for eligibility. On the selection of arroti, the petition states that "anyone who has been or will be, at the time a scrutiny for the priorate and colleges is held, a consul of any one of the twenty-one guilds of the city of Florence may be appointed as an arroto to the scrutiny committee."" Although the petition 15. The balia was composed of the Signoria and the colleges, the captains of the Parte, the Dieci di Liberti, the Otto di Balia, and the twenty-one syndics of the guilds. Their names are included by Alessandro Gherardi in the appendix to the Diario d'anonimo fiorentino dall'anno 1358 a1 1389, in Cronache dei secoli xiii e xiv (Florence, 1876)~p. 505. Despite its designation by contemporaries as the balia of eighty-one, the list of its members actually contains eighty-four names. The syndics of the guilds are also recorded in P R Y66, f. 52. The representative of the Calimala was Benedetto Alberti. 16. Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. 374-75. 17. P R Y66, f. 59: "Ancora che a110 scruptino de' priori del'Arti et gonfaloniere di Iustitia et de' lor0 collegi vi possa essere per arroto etiamdio chiunque 2 stato o sari a1 tempo del decto scruptino consolo d'alcuna delle ventuna capitudine del'arte della citti di Firenze." The petition was published by Carlo [Falletti] Fos-

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382 223 does not state so explicitly, there can be no doubt that this provision was intended as an amendment to the declaration of the balia on 30 June that only former priors, members of the colleges, captains of the Parte, the Dieci, and the regulatores could be appointed to the scrutiny committee.18 The petition of the guilds aimed at expanding the number of citizens eligible to serve as arroti to include the full contingent of former and existing consuls of any of the twenty-one guilds. It is important to recall that in the generation of stable electoral politics from 1348 to 1378 no restrictions at all (apart from the standard divieti) had been imposed on the selection of arroti. From this standpoint, even the limitation of such appointments to former guild consuls (as well as former priors and members of the other offices) must be seen as a restrictive measure, because it favored the existing political elite of the guild community against the rank and file. But against the background of the much more conservative restrictions decreed by the June balia, the petition of 9- 10 July represents a considerable liberalization; obviously the addition of the former consuls of all the twenty-one guilds created a much larger and socially more heterogeneous pool of potential arroti than did the former priors and members of the other offices alone. This detail of electoral politics rather neatly defines the middle position of the established guild community in the summer of 1378. The old corporate principles of equality and autonomy among the guilds were being revived at this time as the cornerstone of the guild community's defense against the oligarchic pretensions of the elite. Accordingly, the guilds' petition sought to encourage the opportunity for the equal influence of each guild in the general scrutinies by making the former and existing consuls of every guild eligible for appointment to the scrutiny committee. But it stopped short of allowing the appointment of any citizen, or even any guildsman, to the scrutiny committee. This should probably be interpreted as an indication of the fears of the guild sati in I1 Tumulto dei Ciompi, which was first printed in the Pubblicazioni del R. Istituto di Studi Superiori, vol. I (Florence, 1875), pp. 219-23. 18. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the Anonimo, in reporting the principal demands contained in the petition of 9- 10 July, conflates the pronouncement of the balia with what the guild petition says on the subject and gives the erroneous impression that the whole idea of restricting appointments to the scrutiny committee was the initiative of the guild community: "Settimo, che lo squittino di Priori si faccia a'tempo e a'modi usati, si veramente che gli Arroti sieno istati di Collegio o suti Capitani di Parte, o Consolo o Regolatore" (Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 363).

224

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

community's leadership that the trend toward corporate equality and autonomy might produce democratic revolutions within the guilds and even spill over to the masses of sottoposti and unincorporated workers, who were being steadily drawn to the idea of guilds of their own as a way of making their presence felt in communal and electoral politics. The guild petition's amendment thus reflects the delicate tightrope walking in which the moderate guild leadership was trying to gain for itself a greater measure of influence over electoral politics while at the same time keeping clear of the dangers of both narrow elitism and full-fledged democratic corporatism. The second item of importance for electoral politics in the petition of 9- 10 July was the change in the requirements for eligibility. To be eligible for offices in either a guild or the communal government, a matriculated guildsman now had to be actively engaged in his trade or profession. This paragraph seems straightforward enough, but the issues that it raises are very complex. It is not at all clear exactly what effect was intended through its implementation, or, for that matter, whether it actually was ever implemented. Part of the confusion arises from the fact that it does not go so far as to say that either matriculation in a guild or the active exercise of one's trade would be an absolute requirement for officeholding. What it does say is that such active exercise would be required of any person matriculated in a guild and seeking qualification for office through that guild.19The context in which this revision must be understood is provided by the legal definition of matriculation that had been formulated more than a quarter of a century earlier in a law of December 1352. That law dealt with the question of eligibility for guild offices, and it stipulated that only persons who, at the time of their election or extraction from the bags, were matriculated in a guild and who were generally resident (quasi continue) at 19. PRY66, f. 59v: "E che nessuna persona il quale fosse matricolato in alcuna arte delle decte ventuna capitudine del'arti il quale non facesse o facesse fare realmente et con effecto a1 tempo d'alcuna imborsagione o insacchagione l'arte, non possa ne debbia da quinci inanzi essere imborsato per cagione overo pretesto della decta arte in alcuno ufficio d'arte o di comune o della citth di Firenze o di parte. Et sse avenisse che vi fosse imborsato per lo tempo che de' venire non vaglia et non tenga essa imborsagione. . . . Et se facta o facta fare realmente et con effecto la decta arte a1 tempo della decta imborsagione o no, si stia di cib et stare si debbia con effecto alla dichiaragione de' consoli et de' consiglieri di quella arte per la quale et sotto pretesto della quale egli fosse stato imborsato." It is very likely that this requirement was intended to take effect chiefly in the arena of guild politics, although the measure does specifically contemplate its applicability in at least some cases to the determination of eligibility for communal offices as well.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

225

their shops or other places of business (i.e., actively engaged in a business or trade), or who were partners of resident matriculated guildsmen, could be eligible for the consulate or any other guild office. The law enjoined each guild to keep a register in which the names of all matriculated and resident guildsmen were to be entered and then declared that inclusion in such a register kept by any of the guilds would of itself constitute the necessary demonstration of an individual's legal status as a "matriculated and resident" guildsman.20 However, although the requirement of active involvement in a trade or business was formally maintained in the 1352 legislation, in practice it became possible for an individual to remain eligible for guild offices even after the cessation of active involvement in business through the continued inclusion of his name in the guild's register of matriculated and resident guildsmen. Moreover, the formal requirement of active involvement in business did not bar one from inclusion in the borse; it merely prevented an individual from assuming an office if his name was not in his guild's register, while preserving his chances for holding office whenever he might get his name included. The 1352 law had the effect of ensuring the eligibility for guild offices of many merchants, traders, and investors whose right to participate in guild government might otherwise have been placed periodically in doubt by temporary inactivity. Whether or not the result of this legislation, it often happened in the years that followed that individuals managed to get themselves matriculated in a guild for the purpose of holding the office of consul without actually being involved in the trade or business of the guild. This is confirmed by the laments of a provision of 1365, which asserts that many persons ineligible for guild offices were being included in the scrutinies, among them those "who do not practice the profession of the guild under which they have matriculated for the purpose of gaining access to the ~onsulate.''~' 20. Mercanzia, 3, ff. 136-136~: "Et insuper quod in qualibet artium predictarum penes consules cuiuslibet artis esse debeat quidam liber quem ipsi consules fieri facere teneantur . . . in quo scripti sint omnes artifices ipsius artis matriculati et residentes ut dictum est. Et illi solum intelligantur esse matriculati et residentes dicte artis qui in dicto libro erunt scripti . . .et notarius qui habebit scribere talem extractionem teneatur . . . si extraheretur aliquis non descriptus ad aliquod ipsorum offitiorum ipsarn laniare." 21. Ibid., f. 122v: "Et [cum] plerumque contingat quod quando huiusmodi consulum scruptinea fiunt . . . multi inhabiles secundum formam dictorum ordinamentorum etiam quandoque non matricolati in aliqua arte, nec etiam relati vel in scriptis portati . . . per consules . . . nec de arte, vel misterium facientes sub qua

226 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

Now it would seem that it was precisely these matriculated but professionally inactive guildsmen whom the petition of 9-10 July 1378 sought to exclude, not only from the offices of the guilds but from those of the commune and the Parte Guelfa as well.22But it did not simply disallow their assumption of office at the time of the extraction of their name tickets from the bags; instead, it declared that they could not even have their names placed in the bags for any scrutiny conducted while they were economically inactive, which effectively eliminated them from the offices in question for as long as the bags from that scrutiny were in use. Whom did this prohibition hit hardest? In view of the short-term character of the business investments of many Florentine bankers and international merchants, who found it occasionally advantageous to remain inactive for periods of time between different ventures, and also in light of the fact that many upperclass families (or members of the same) never did become involved in business enterprises beyond the ownership of land and the management of their estates, it seems likely that the prohibition against the imborsazione of inactive guildsmen was aimed against the oligarchic families and represented an attempt to reduce the proportion of offices held by them in both the guilds and the communal government. The,shopkeepers, artisans, and providers of services, whose businesses operated on a more regular and steady basis, would have been much less affected by the strict enforcement of this r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ~ ~ procurant ad consulatus offitium matriculari . . . ad dicta consulatuum scruptinea ponuntur et scruptinantur." 22. Whether this was tantamount to the exclusion of the scioperati from political life, as Gene Brucker has argued (Florentine Politics, p. 377), is more problematic. At least some of the scioperati were never matriculated in any guild and thus would not have been affected by the new provision contained in the petition of 9- 10 July. In any case, the scrutiny of August 1378 did not in fact exclude the scioperati, many of whom were nominated and put to a vote together with the nominees from the major guilds. This suggests that scioperati and inactive guildsmen may have been thought of as two separate categories by this time. 23. There is admittedly some room for doubt on this point, and it arises from the fact, mentioned in the previous note, that the scioperati (those who were economically inactive whether they were matriculated in guilds or not) were included in the scrutiny held in August. These scioperati were always associated with the major guildsmen and were nominated in lists that carried titles such as: "Infrascripti sunt homines maiorum artium et scioperatorum" (Tratte, 58, f. 129 [for the gonfalone Scala in Santa Croce]). There seems never to have been any listing of "minor guildsmen and scioperati." From this one could conclude that the prohibition against officeholding by economically inactive guildsmen was never very effective in the case of the upper-class families, who could still have their professionally

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

227

An important aspect of the projected enforcement of the new requirement was that the final say in the determination of a guildsman's status as an active and matriculated member of his guild, and hence of his eligibility for both guild and communal office, rested with the consuls and the council of each guild. Theirs was the authority to declare whether a guildsman was or was not actively involved in the trade, business, or profession of the guild, and the petition does not provide for any appeal beyond the jurisdiction of each guild in this matter. What the guilds stood to gain by this sort of arrangement was a much greater degree of control by each guild over the size and composition of its own contingent of political eligibles. With eligibility for communal offices once again linked, as in the 1qos,24 to the active exercise of the business or trade of a guild, and with the authority to declare such eligibility firmly in the hands of the guilds themselves, it became possible for each guild to play a much larger role in defining the outer boundaries of the Florentine political class. To a much greater extent than had been the case since 1348, the guilds now had the power to admit and to exclude individuals from the most basic level of political life in the commune. What unites the two electoral provisions of the petition of 9-10 July 1378 is the desire to place the guilds, on the basis of the traditional corporate principles of autonomy and equality, at the center of the electoral process and to give each guild its fair share in the determination of the eligibility and scrutiny of candidates. By allowing the individual guilds a voice in the selection of candidates and greater influence in the scrutiny committee, the guild community was in effect embracing the old corporate theory of communal organization predicated on the right of autonomously constituted corporations to advance and defend the interests of their constituencies through the independent and equal constitutional role of each guild. These principles are nowhere explicitly stated in the petition, but the political content of these seemingly technical modifications of the electoral regulations cannot accurately be assessed apart from the background of asinactive family members nominated under the heading of the scioperati, but that it was more rigorously enforced in the case of the minor guilds. This hypothesis would seem to receive some support from the Anonirno's summary of the provision as follows: "che niuno che non faccia arte, o far2 fare, possa per arte minute essere imborsato" (Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 363). But the mention of "arte minute" (instead of "minori") in discussing a document that predates the creation of the new guilds of the pop010 minuto is a technical inaccuracy that casts doubt on the reliability of the Anonimo's information in this case. 24. See above, chap. 2.

228

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

sumptions about corporate politics that had been inherited from the 1290s and the 1340s and that the guild community of the 1370s still understood very well. The corporate framework in which the petition was conceived is best indicated in its transferral of the powers and privileges enjoyed by the June balia to the new Signoria, the Seven of Mercanzia, and "all the consuls currently in office in any of the twenty-one guilds, and in addition all those . . . appointed as syndics of the twenty-one g~ilds."~' The petition was in fact the result of a collaborative effort by the assembled representatives of all the whose declared purpose was to enhance "the liberty, security, and tranquillity of the twenty-one guilds and of each and every guildsman of the city of Fl~rence."~' The problem was that, having enunciated and proclaimed the principles of egalitarian corporatism, it was very difficult to contain the appeal and the extension of those principles beyond the limits of the established guild community. With the petition of 9- 10 July, the guilds in effect created the institutional framework and the legal means for the introduction en masse of the popolo minuto into Florentine electoral politics. By announcing that political and electoral power would henceforth be shared among the guilds, with a more or less equal share and autonomous role for each guild, the moderate reformers of 9- 10 July practically invited the minuti to step forward, declare a guild (or guilds) of their own, and share in the division of electoral spoils. And that is precisely what happened. Stefani confirms that lower-class demands for a guild of the popolo minuto were intimately connected with the desire on the part of the minuti to gain representation 25. P R , 66, f. 58: "E che tucti coloro che a1 presente sono nello ufficio de' septe consiglieri della universiti della mercatantia et de' mercatanti della citti di Firenze et tucti et singuli a1 presente consoli d'alchuna delle decte ventuna arti, et etiamdio tucti et singuli coloro i quali sono stati del presente mese . . . constituti sindichi dalle decte . . ventuna capitudine del'arti o d'alchuna d'esse si intendano avere et abbiano con effect0 tucte quelle gratie et immuniti et concessione et favori et tucta quella medesima preheminentia beneficio et comrnodo et delle armi et d'ongni altra cosa che anno avuto ed ebbono del mese di giungno proximo passato Salvestro di Messer Alamanno e compagni e gli altri della balia." 26. In his memoirs, the notary of the Riformagioni, Ser Nofri di Ser Piero, says that the petition was the work of the syndics (four from the Lana guild and one each from the other twenty guilds), the consuls of all the guilds, and the Seven of Mercanzia, who met together to draft the document in the palace of the Mercanzia (Gino Scaramella, Cronache e memorie sul tumult0 dei Ciompi, in RRIISS, vol. 18, pt. I [Cittl di Castello, 1917-341, pp. 56-57). 27. P R , 66, f. 57: ". . . per liberti, sicurti et riposo delle ventuna Capitudini de 1'Arti et di tucti et singuli gli artefici della citta di Firenze."

.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

229

in the highest communal offices. "The guilds," he says, "began to regret what they had done, because all of their employees joined into the crowds and began yelling 'Long live the popolo minuto'; and whereas they at first said they wanted their own consuls, now they began to demand consuls and priors."28 Nor was the demand long in coming. The first petition of the popolo minuto, presented to the councils on 21 July, not only secured the creation of a new guild for the minuti, but also decreed that they would have two seats on the priorate, three in the college of the Twelve, and four in the college of the S i ~ t e e nA . ~special ~ scrutiny of candidates from the popolo minuto was scheduled to be held sometime before 20 August. Responsibility for drawing up the lists of nominees was entrusted to the thirty-two newly designated syndics of the popolo min~to.~O The scrutiny committee was to include, in addition to the priors and the colleges, twenty-one consuls (one from each of the established guilds), the thirty-two syndics, and sixty-four arroti appointed by the latter (two by each syndic), for a total of 154 voting members.-llCounting those who would have been present in the 28. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 795, p. 325. 29. PR, 67, f. I. Stefani reports that on the previous day the fourteen minor guilds had requested that their share of the priorate be increased from two to three seats. The request was turned down, and according to Stefani it was at this point that the minor guildsmen decided to ally themselves with the minuti and support their demands for a guild (Stefani, Cronaca, r. 795, p. 322). The alliance with the popolo minuto was a successful tactical move on the part of the minor guildsmen: their support for an expanded corporate regime helped to bring about the equal division of the priorate among maggiori, minori, and minuti just two weeks later. This gave the minori three seats in the Signoria, precisely what they had requested on 20 July. Although the petition of 21 July requested the formation of a single guild for the popolo minuto, three new guilds were in fact created: one for the tintori, one for the farsettai, and one for the Ciompi. It is not clear exactly why or when this happened, but the three guilds were certainly in existence by early August. 30. They are listed in the text of the petition (PR, 67, f. 3), which was published by Falleti-Fossati, I1 Tumulto dei Ciompi, pp. 228-33. See also Gene A. Brucker's important analysis of these syndics of the popolo minuto in "The Ciompi Revolution," in Flmentine Studies, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 1968)~p. 331. 31. PRY67, f. 3v. On the same day, a second petition of the popolo minuto added that the seven councillors of the Mercanzia had to take part in all scrutinies in which the consuls of the twenty-one guilds participated (ibid., f. n v ) . The projected scrutiny of the minuti fell into this category, and although a separate scrutiny for the popolo minuto was never conducted, the Seven of Mercanzia did indeed participate and vote in the general scrutiny that was heid in August.

230

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

three executive colleges, this gave the minuti a two-thirds majority on the scrutiny committee and near total control over both the nomination and the scrutiny of their own candidates. This was an arrangement that went even further in the direction of the autonomous electoral authority of independently constituted corporations than did the guild petition of 9-10 July, but it is essential to realize that both reforms were built on the same corporate approach to electoral politics. The legitimacy of the projected scrutiny of the pop010 minuto was certainly not based on any notion of citywide consensus or on the idea that those approved were somehow acceptable to the full community of Florentines expressing their will in a general scrutiny. Instead, such legitimacy was grounded in the manifest right of autonomous corporate bodies to elect their own leaders and representatives and in the vision of the body politic of the commune as a federation of such autonomous and equal corporations. Such was the thinking of the guild community, among both its old and new members, on the eve of the fall of the regime on 22 The revolution that occurred on that day upset the specific plans and schedules of the electoral policy that had been hammered out from the time of the June balia to the climactic petitions of 21 July, but the basic assumptions governing the electoral politics of the new regime of the expanded guild community, which assumed power on 22 July, were not substantially different from those that had been championed by the established guild community in the preceding weeks. The first urgent matter confronting the new regime was the formation of a government. The chronicles agree that the Standard-bearer of Justice, Michele di Lando, did not simply appoint the new priors and members of the colleges in place of those who had been driven from office by popular demand. Despite his undoubtedly grear influence in this special election, Michele relied on the advice of the guild community and seems in fact to have conducted something of a mini-scrutiny among the syndics of the guilds, who were rapidly becoming the true locus of power in the regime. Stefani reports that Michele assumed the authority ("prese balia"), together with the syndics, Salvestro de' Medici, and the Eight, to elect the new priors, the Sixteen, and the Twelve.33The chronicle attributed to Alamanno Acciaiuoli says that the new Standard-bearer "convened all the syndics of the guilds and also those 32. See Brucker, Florentine Politics, pp. 384-86. 33. See Stefani, Cronaca, r. 796, p. 326, for the list of those elected. According to Brucker, only five of the thirty-seven belonged to families previously represented in the tre maggiori; "The Ciompi Revolution," p. 330,

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

231

of the popolo minuto, and ordered them to be put to a vote; whoever got the most votes was elected prior."34 According to this version, Michele di Lando not only accepted the verdict of the syndics; he also agreed that they themselves would form the pool of candidates from whom the new magistrates would be selected.3sAnother chronicler confirms that Michele did conduct some sort of vote or scrutiny but adds that the latter personally drew up a list of proposed officeholders and presented it on an all-ornothing basis to the "council," presumably of the syndics.36In this version the election was less a consultation of the representatives of the guild community than a manipulation of their willingness to ratify the Standardbearer's own choices. In view of the authority enjoyed by the syndics within the balia, however, and especially their crucial role in the August scrutiny, Acciaiuoli's account of the special election of 23 July seems the most reliable. In any case, it is clear that the interim priors and members of the colleges were not elected without at least the consent of the organized representatives of the enlarged guild community. On the last day of July, the new government proceeded to do what no Florentine regime had dared to do in thirty-five years. For the first time since 1343, the existing borse for all communal offices were annulled and destroyed as the regime decided to hold a new general ~crutiny.~' No longer was it a question of conducting a scrutiny only of the nominees of the popolo minuto in order to add their names to the bags already in use. This is what had been proposed and accepted in the petition of 21 July, but the events of the next few days created a totally new situation in which the minor and the new guilds saw a chance to refashion the entire Florentine political class by emptying the borse and refilling them with the results of a new scrutiny conducted on their own terms, thereby enhancing the long34. Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, p. 33. 35. However, Acciaiuoli also says that Michele appointed the syndics: "fece i sindachi dell'arti quelli che parve a hi" (ibid.). This can hardly be correct, though, because the established guilds had appointed their own syndics from at least 19 June, as Acciaiuoli himself reports (ibid., p. 14); moreover, the syndics of the popolo minuto are already listed in the petition of 21 July and must have been selected at least a day earlier, whereas Michele's authority began only on 22 July. 36. Ibid., pp. 113-14. On Michele di Lando's role in the election of the new Signoria, see also Niccolb Rodolico, I Ciompi: Una Pagina di storia del proletariato operaio (1945; reprint ed., Florence, 1971), pp. 131-33. 37. Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, pp. 36, 77, 115; the third anonymous chronicle says that they were burned on 2 August (ibid., p. 130). The Anonimo says 31 July (Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 371).

232

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

term prospects of their still precarious regime. The August scrutiny has until now been known principally from the accounts of the chroniclers. Stefani and the anonymous chronicler known as the Squittinatore, who seems actually to have been a member of the scrutiny c ~ r n m i t t e e have ,~~ been the most valuable sources of factual detail and contemporary comment, although the chronicle attributed to Alamanno Acciaiuoli and the two other anonymous chronicles published by Scaramella also contain significant reactions and expressions of opinion. However, apart from a few nomination lists, which survive in the Tratte and which have been used as a means of calculating how many minuti were considered for communal off i ~ e there , ~ ~ has been no documentary basis against which to check the claims and accounts of the varying and unequally reliable contemporary reports. Fortunately, the ordinances of the balia governing the scrutiny have now come to light, bringing greater precision and certainty to our understanding of this central event in the history of the Ciompi. Drawn up by the balia on 4 August 1378 and redacted by the chancellor, Coluccio SalutatiY4" they constitute a complete set of regulations for the newly de38. He records his participation in the closing festivities: "Po', fatto questo, ciascuno si si puose a sedere, e ciascuno si confettb d'un confetto che si chiama zuccata; e po' si si beve; e vid'io e assagia' di cib, sedendo tutto lo scuittino a sedere" (Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, p. 78). 39. See Gherardi's introduction to the Diario d'anonimo, pp. 255-56; Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," p. 336. 40. The original has apparently not survived, but its contents have been preserved in full in a fifteenth-century copy found in a volume of electoral decrees and provisions that must have served as a handbook for the election officials. I found this volume among a small group of uninventoried bundles at the end of the regular series of the Tratte. Although uninventoried at the time it came into my hands, the volume in question had been given the number 11670 in the archive of the Tratte. The electoral ordinances of August 1378 are found on ff. 15-18 and are introduced as follows: "die iiii Augusti Mccclxxviii. Ordinamenta parlamenti rogata per Ser Colucium cancellarium Florentie." Although the document refers to the ordinances of the parlamento, rather than of the balia, there is no evidence that a general assembly of the populace was convened at this time, as in 1382 or 1393. It may be that the balia designated certain of its meetings with the term parlamento, perhaps on occasions when its membership was enlarged. In any case, Coluccio Salutati was the official notary of the balia (he is so identified in a deliberation of the Signoria and the colleges of 30 August, published by Gherardi in the documentary appendix to the Diario d'anonimo, p. 519). The fact that it was he who redacted the electoral ordinances of the parlamento of 4 August strongly suggests that these ordinances were in fact the work of the balia, which was, of course, still dominated by the syndics of the (now 24) guilds.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

233

creed general electoral scrutiny, which, unlike any other since the 1340s~ was to have an immediate and total impact on the shape of the Florentine officeholding class. According to the regulations of 4 August, the primary responsibility for the nomination of candidates was to remain with the sixteen gonfalonieri. Each gonfaloniere was instructed to prepare three separate lists of eligible candidates from his gonfalone: one for the scioperati and the members of the seven major guilds, a second for the fourteen minor guilds, and a third for the three newly created guilds of the popolo minuto. However, all the lists were then sent to the priors, the Twelve, and the captains of the Parte Guelfa, and the separate lists for each of the three sections of the guild community to the consuls of each guild within that section, all of whom were authorized to add any names of their choosing to the lists drawn up by the g~nfalonieri.~'Thus, although the consuls of the guilds and the captains of the Parte Guelfa did not prepare their own lists, as they had for the scrutinies before 1378, in practical terms their role in the nomination procedure was not substantially altered. They could ensure that candidates of their choice would be nominated and put to a vote in the scrutiny, but they could not exclude anyone from consideration. Conversely, this meant that the gonfalonieri also were unable to exclude potential candidates from the The real significance of this in the circumstances of August 1378, however, was that the nomination of candidates from the popolo minuto would not be impeded or limited by anyone outside the three newly created guilds. The freedom to advance their own candidates to the scrutiny without outside interference had been among the demands of the popolo minuto 41. Tratte, 11670, f. IS: "Et quod ipsi gonfalonerii teneantur et debeant huiusmodi reductiones mictere et ostendere dominis . . . prioribus artium et vexillifero iustitie populi et comunis Florentie, duodecim bonis viris et Capitaneis partis guelfe. In quibus liceat dominis duodecim atque Capitaneis addere et reducere quos voluerint. Et postea debeant scriptam artificum quatuor [sic] maiorum artium mictere ad consules cuiuslibet dictarum artium, et scriptam quactuordecim minorum artium mictere ad consules cuiuslibet artium predictarum, et cedulam et reductionem populi minuti mictere ad consules ipsarum artium populi minuti, qui consules possint sirniliter addere dictis cedulis et reductionibus quoscumque voluerint ." 4.The Squittinatore's remark that "ciascuno andb a partito, cioe que' fu portati in su le recate di confalonieri" (Scaramella, Cronache e memon'e, p. 78) should not be interpreted to mean that only the nominations of the gonfalonieri were considered in the scrutiny. It is true that only they presented formal lists, but these lists were modified by others; cf. Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," p. 336, n. 2.

234 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics in the petition of 21 July, and, despite the modifications of the nominating process decreed by the balia on 4 August, this right of the guilds was largely preserved in the regulations for the upcoming scrutiny. The balia also declared that if, in their review of the lists, the consuls discovered any candidates nominated under guilds of which they were not members, they were not to eliminate them from the lists but to notify the Signoria, which would assign such persons to some other list.43With this directive of the balia, the guilds lost the power (which had been claimed and won in the petition of 9-10 July) to exclude candidates from the scrutiny on the grounds of membership or matriculation. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency may lie once again in the special circumstances represented by the new guilds of the popolo minuto. If, as seems likely, these new guilds, which had been in existence only a few days before the balia's deliberations of 4 August, had not had time :o draw up formal membership lists and matriculation registers, they would logically have resisted the possible exclusion of their constituencies from the scrutiny on such grounds. So the architects of the scrutiny probably preferred a system of nominations that would cast its net as widely as possible, in the belief that this would best serve the interests of the newest members of the guild community. The likelihood that the priors, the guild consuls, and others may have made numerically and politically significant additions to the nomination lists of the gonfalonieri makes it very difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the overall number of candidates nominated for the scrutiny by counting the names contained in such lists. This is especially true of the nomination lists for the popolo minuto since the consuls of the three new guilds may very well have added more names than those of the established guilds. In any case, the surviving nomination lists for the 1378 scrutiny are (as far as it is possible to tell) all preliminary lists of the gonfalonieri, without the additions of the priors, Twelve, Parte captains, and guild consuls. Complete sets of nominations for all three divisions of the guild community exist for four of the city's gonfaloni. The gonfaloniere of Scala in Santo Spirito, Bruno di Pagolo, listed go major guildsmen and scioperati, 47 minor guildsmen, and 56 "homines de populo minuto," for a modest total 43. Tratte, I 1670,f. I S : "si dicti consules invenerint aliquem esse reductum pro arte aliqua de qua non esset, non debeant ipsum propterea cancellare sed notare quod non sit de illa arte pro qua fuerit reductus, et postea per dominos. . . priores debeant declarari ubi et in qua reductione scribi debeat dictus talis."

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

235

of 193 nominees.44Baldo di Lapo, representing the gonfalone Chiavi in San Giovanni, nominated a much larger total of 373 persons, including 129 major guildsmen and scioperati, 122 minor guildsmen (among them Michele di Lando), and an equal number of m i n ~ t i Even . ~ ~ without the additions from the guild consuls, 65 percent of the nominations in this gonfalone were of minor guildsmen and minuti. The three lists for the gonfalone Nicchio in Santo Spirito reveal a different balance: 244 maggion and scioperati, 89 minori, and 102 minuti, for a large total of 435, of which the 191 minor guildsmen and minuti constituted 44 percent.46 The one other gonfalone for which a complete set of nominations is extant is Lion Nero in Santa Croce; there 177 major guildsmen, 90 minor guildsmen, and 89 minuti made a total of 356, of which slightly more than half were from the two lower careg ~ r i e s . ~For ' Ferza in Santo Spirito there are lists of nominations for the major guildsmen (156), the scioperati (43), and the minuti (99).48In Ruote 44. Tratte, 58, ff. 129-31. 45. Ibid., ff. 244-46, 14-I~V,16-17v. 46. Ibid., ff. 67-68v, 99-ggv, I 19. 47. Tratte, 63, ff. 355-58,360-62,363-65. The first page of the list of maggiori and scioperati for Lion Nero is missing. The figure of 177 nominations is provided by the gonfaloniere (or his notary) at the end of the list, but the names actually appearing amount to 149. Interestingly, 67 of the 149 are identified as scioperati, 22 as Ianaiuoli, 10 as tavolieri or cambiatori, and 14 as members of the Calimala; thus, 113 of the 149 extant maggiori nominations of Lion Nero were from the uppermost echelons of the major guilds and the scioperati, and it may not be a coincidence that the gonfaloniere who prepared the list was Guido di Filippo Fagni, a banker and member of the Cambio. See Cambio, 14, f. 56v, for his first appearance in the guild's book of companies and partnerships and f. 76 for his inclusion in the last such list before 1378; see also Stefani, Cronaca, r. 796, p. 326. By contrast, of the 129 maggiori nominations submitted for Chiavi in San Giovanni by the gonfaloniere Baldo di Lapo, who identifies himself as a pizzicagnolo (Tratte, 58, f. 14), only 55 fall into these categories: 33 wool merchants, 18 scioperati, 3 merchants, and I banker (ibid., ff. 244-46). Even allowing for variations in the distribution of professional, occupational, and economic groups among the gonfaloni and neighborhoods of the city, this discrepancy still suggests something of the political dimension and significance involved in the nomination procedures for the 1378 scrutiny. 48. Tratte, 58, ff. 1 1 1 - I I ~ V , 254-55. The "rechata di tutti gli artefici del popolo minuto del gonfalone della ferza" is followed (on f. 255v) by two shorter lists: a "rechata di farsettai, sarti e barbieri che sono dell'arte del popolo minuto nel detto gonfalone e quartiere," containing only eight names; and a "rechata di fattori che stanno cho' lanaiuoli che sono nel detto gonfalone e quartiere," which has twentytwo names. It is not clear why these additional names are listed separately from the larger list, but they were all compiled by the gonfaloniere of Ferza, the dyer

236 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics in Santa Croce, the galigaio Bonaiuto di Giovanni nominated 195 major guildsmen and scioperati, and 150 m i n ~ t i . ~ ~ On the basis of these lists, what estimates can be made of the total number of Florentines nominated by the gonfalonieri for the scrutiny of August 1378? The total number of major guildsmen and scioperati for the six gonfaloni for which lists have been found comes to 1,034; projecting this figure evenly over the sixteen gonfaloni (i.e., without attempting to take account of the demographic and social differences among the city's subdivisions) yields a hypothetical total of 2,757 nominations in this category. Analogous computations for the minori (348 actual nominations in four gonfaloni) and the minuti (648 in six) yield, respectively, hypothetical totals of I ,392 and I ,728. The total number of nominations by the gonfalonieri in all three categories for the entire city would thus come to 5,877. Bearing in mind that these lists do not include the additional names submitted by the guild consuls and the other committees that were authorized to review and supplement the lists prepared by the gonfalonieri, it seems safe to conclude that the final total of nominations for the scrutiny of August 1378 certainly exceeded 6,000 and may even have approached 7,000 or just about twice the number of nominations made for the scrutiny of 1343.'' If these guesses are reasonably accurate, more Florentines by far were nominated for high office in the scrutiny of 1378 than in any previous general scrutiny, and at least as many as in the general scrutinies of the next half The nominating process for the scrutiny of 1378 thus resulted in a momentous expansion of the outer perimeter of the Florentine political class. In strictly numerical terms, this expansion became a permanent feature of the Florentine political system, as nominations for subsequent general scrutinies never again fell under five thousand and in 141I and 1433 went over six thousand. Still, there was an enormous difference between the pattern of nominations in 1378 and that of the later scrutinies of the oligarchic and Medici periods. The great expansion of 1378 was not the Lorenzo di Donato; see Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 370, and Stefani, Cronaca, r. 796, p. 326. 49. Tratte, 58, ff. 143-46, 22-24v. For the gonfaloniere's occupation and guild, see Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 370; Stefani, however, calls him a cardaiuolo (Cronaca, r. 796, p. 326). 50. See above, chap. 5. 51. For the later scrutinies, see Dale Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento in the Fifteenth Century," Renaissance Quarterly 28 (1975): 587,633.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

237

result, or at least not principally so, of a drastic increase in the nomination of members of the established guild community. Calculating again on the basis of the projections attempted above for the whole city, there was a significant but modest increase of about 24 percent in the nominations from this category over those of the scrutiny of 1343 (4,149 as against 3,346). This is not a negligible gain, and it does reflect the basic trend toward a more equitable sharing of political opportunity within the guild community. But it was principally the nomination in large numbers of the newly incorporated artisans and workers of the pop010 minuto that brought about the near doubling of the nominees in 1378. Approximately seventeen hundred to eighteen hundred members of the new guilds were nominated by the gonfalonieri, and more names may have been added by their consuls.s2Nearly a third of the nominations, therefore, and two-thirds of the overall increase vis-h-vis earlier scrutinies, are accounted for by the minuti. Together, the minor guildsmen and the minuti represented more than one half of all the nominations for the 1378 scrutiny, and this was no doubt the only general scrutiny in the history of the republic in which the major guildsmen did not enjoy a comfortable and even overwhelming majority of the nominations. Although total nominations remained at comparable levels in the scrutinies of 1382,1391, 1411, and 1433, they did so while reversing these proportions. Only a small number of minuti (who had been brought into the established guilds) continued to be nominated, and while the nominations of minori did not change appreciably, those of the major guildsmen and scioperati expanded beyond all previous levels, reaching over 70 percent of the nominations for the scrutiny of 1 3 9 1 . ~ ~ Taking into account both the number of nominations and their distribution among the social classes and corporate groups of the city, the nominating procedure for the scrutiny of 1378 must be considered the most democratic moment in the long record of Florentine electoral politics. Preparation of the nomination lists apparently took four or five days after the promulgation of the ordinances on 4 August, because the actual scrutiny of names was underway by 9 The balia decided to bypass the system established in 1352 (modified, as we have seen, in 1372 and in June and July of 1378) for the appointment of the scrutiny commit52. Brucker's estimate of minuti nominations is two thousand, but he considers it unlikely that the guild consuls would have submitted a large number of additional names ("The Ciompi Revolution," p. 336, n. 5). 53, See Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," p. 633; and below, chap. 8. 54. Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 372.

238

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

tee. It did not abolish those regulations but simply decreed that "for this time only" the scrutiny was to be conducted by a committee consisting of the Signoria, the advisory colleges of the Sixteen and the Twelve, the nonmagnate members of the Dieci di Libert8, the Seven of Mercanzia, ten arroti to be appointed by the Signoria (one by each prior and two by the Standard-bearer of Justice), and, finally, the "others of the b a l i ~ . "Who ~~ exactly were the "others of the balia" and how large should the full committee have been? The accounts of the chroniclers are difficult to reconcile with each other and with the regulations of 4 August in matters of detail, but the general thrust of most of them is that the scrutiny committee was dominated by representatives of the guilds, sometimes identified as the syndics and sometimes as a combination of syndics and consuls. The balia, composed of some 130 members,56certainly included the thirty-two syndics of the popolo minuto who had been appointed on 21 J ~ l y . ~ Stefani, ' however, says that no fewer than sixty-eight syndics of the popolo minuto participated in the scrutiny,s8but it is not clear how the additional thirtysix were appointed or what their status was, if any, within the balia. It is also certain that the balia included representatives of the twenty-one guilds, but again the numbers are in doubt. The June balia had included twenty-one syndics, one from each guild, but the petition of 9-10 July had extended balia powers to all the incumbent consuls of the twenty-one guilds, who numbered ninety-eight in all. If its membership was upwards of 130, the balia obviously included more than the thirty-two syndics of the minuti, the twenty-one syndics of the established guilds, and the thirty-seven members of the Signoria and colleges; even the addition of the Otto di Balia (the Eight), the Seven of Mercanzia, and the captains of the Parte Guelfa, who may have been part of the balia, will not account for 55. Tratte, 11670, f. 17v: "Scrutinium autem supradictum pro ista vice dumtaxat fiat et fieri debeat inter priores artium et vexilliferum iustitie populi et comunis Florentie, Gonfalonerios societatum populi, duodecim bonos viros et alios de balia ac decem libertatis populares et septem offitiales mercantie et unum arrotum nominandum per quemlibet dictorum dominorum . . . priorum et duos nominandos per vexilliferum iustitie ita quod sint decem arroti." 56. Brucker, Civic World, p. 44. For an analysis of the balia's membership, see Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," pp. 330-33; the size of the balia is indicated in the vote totals for the decrees passed in the session of 25-27 August, and they range from a low of 119 to a high of 133 (p. 333, n. I). 57. See above, n. 30. 58. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 798, p. 327. Another manuscript of the Cronaca says sixty-five.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

239

the difference. The answer is very likely that the consuls of the guilds, or some of them, were either part of the balia or were admitted as voting members to its deliberations, and as such they were probably among the "alios de balia" appointed to the scrutiny committee. The second anonymous chronicle published by Scaramella lists the participants in the scrutiny as including "the syndics and consuls," the Sixteen, Twelve, and Parte captains.59Stefani says nothing about the consuls and mentions, in addition to the syndics, the advisory colleges and the Parte captains, the Signoria, the Dieci di Liberti, the councilors of the Mercanzia (whom he prematurely counts as nine), the Otto di Balia "with messer Salvestro [de' Medici] and messer Benedetto [Alberti]," and the arroti appointed by the priors. He intended to report the total number of scrutators but left a blank space in the r n a n u ~ c r i p tAdding .~~ up the participants listed by Stefani indicates a scrutiny committee of about 170 members, assuming that no consuls were appointed and that the syndics of the established guilds were limited to one per guild. On the other hand, the Squittinatore says that the scrutators numbered 220 and included the Signoria, the colleges, the Eight, and the "syndics of the major and minor guilds and the scioperati, so that there were as many from the one group as from the other." This tantalizing but ambiguous comment suggests that there may have been some attempt to equalize the representation on the scrutiny committee of the different sections of the guild community, which would have been quite in keeping with the general thrust of corporate politics in this regime. Yet the balia's ordinances of 4 August say nothing to support or confirm the Squittinatore's remark. What of his contention that the committee included a total of 220 members? Neither Stefani nor the second anonymous chronicler can be reconciled with this figure, but what of the balia's instructions? They can be squared with the Squittinatore if the "others of the balia" are understood to include the consuls of the guilds, who, as observed above, had been joined to the balia by the petition of 9-10 July. On this hypothesis, the scrutiny committee, as outlined by the ordinances of 4 August, would have been composed of the thirty-seven members of the Signoria and the col59. Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, p. I 16. 60. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 798, p. 327. 61. Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, p. 78: "Incominciossi a fare questo scuittino nuovo per tutto il collegio, e otto di guerra, e sindachi d'arti maggiori e rninori e scioperati; si che tanti n'aveva de l'una parte, quanto dell'altra. A questo scuittino furono in tutto uomini ccxx."

240 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics leges, the Dieci, the Seven of Mercanzia, the ten ~ r r o t iand , ~ ~the "others of the balia," including the twenty-one syndics of the older guilds, the thirty-two syndics of the popolo minuto, and the ninety-eight consuls of the twenty-one guilds. This amounts to well over two hundred, and if the consuls of the three new guilds are added in: the size of the voting committee would indeed have exceeded 220 (to be precise, 233). The consuls and syndics alone, who directly represented their guilds, constituted a two-thirds majority of the scrutators. As usual, the adoption of such a system of representation gave great prominence to the non-oligarchic segment of the guild commmity, and it should come as no surprise that the members of the enlarged community of the seventeen minor guilds, even without their popular allies in the major guilds, also enjoyed a two-thirds majority on the scrutiny committee. This had almost certainly never happened in any previous electoral scrutiny (the only possible exception is the scrutiny of 1343)~but the important point is that this unprecedented result was achieved by allowing the voting body to be formed on the basis of the autonomous and more or less equal representation of each guild in the corporate federation. It was the high-water mark of the corporate approach in Florentine electoral politics. The ordinances of 4 August also established what was known as the adequatio membrorum, or the equal distribution of offices among the three subdivisions of the guild community. The seats on the three executive colleges of the Signoria, Sixteen, and Twelve were to be distributed evenly among the three groups of guilds, with the extra seat on the Sixteen going to the fourteen minor guilds. Interestingly, the balia specified that henceforth, whenever these colleges voted separately on any issue, seven votes would be necessary to carry a measure in the Signoria, nine among the Twelve, and twelve among the S i ~ t e e nThe . ~ ~effect in each case was to prevent the representatives of the popolo minuto from being outvoted by the major and minor guildsmen; or, to put it another way, it gave the minuti, whenever they should choose to vote as a bloc, a veto in the deliberations of each college. The balia intended, however, to apply the idea of the equal representa62. The members of the Signoria appointed the arroti on 9 August; their names are found in the deliberationsof the Signoria and appear in Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 517. 63. The provision of 22 September 1378, which approved the statutes of the guilds of the Tintori and Farsettai, reveals that the former had twelve consuls and the latter six; it is published in Rodolico, I Ciompi, pp. 240-45. 64. Tratte, 11670, f. 15v.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382 241 tion and weight of the three groups of guilds "not only to the offices but to the bags as well."65 In other words, each group of guilds had to have the same number of approved and eligible candidates for the priorate. To oversee this adequatio of the scrutiny itself, the Signoria selected six accoppiatori from the scrutators, two from each of the three groups of guilds, whose task it was to review the results of the voting and to equalize the number of approved candidates in the bags of each of the three categories by including as many additional names as necessary from the categories in which fewer candidates had been approved in the regular scrutiny.66The adequatio membromm, like the imborsazione of the supplementary minori and spicciolati in 1343, had the effect of enlarging the officeholding class beyond the ranks of those who had obtained a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in the The notion of equality among the guilds had always been central to the corporate approach to politics in general, and to electoral politics in particular. However, with the electoral experiments of the summer of 1378, this idea underwent an important modification. The August scrutiny and the planned distribution of offices in the new regime were no longer based on the equality of each individual guild, but rather on the equality of the three groups of guilds. This emphasis on groups of guilds, rather than individual guilds, clearly benefited the pop010 minuto, which claimed equal status in the regime despite its numerical inferiority in the corporate federation. The Ciompi regime, while maintaining the traditional corporate principle of equality among the parts, stressed the idea that state and society in Florence were composed of three parts instead of twenty-one. As one of the eyewitness chroniclers of that summer put it: "The government of the whole of the Florentine state was divided into three parts, one to the seven major guilds and scioperati, one to the minor guilds, and one to the pop020 minuto. "68 65. Ibid.: "Et provideatur de adequatione membrorum non solum in offitiis sed imbursationibus." 66. Ibid.: "Et quod si reperiantur inequalia in numero illorum qui obtinuissent debeant accipere de illis membris vel de illo menbro de quibus pauciores obtinuissent tot de illis qui plures fabas habuissent quod ipsa tria membra in omnibus equiperent et adequent . . . ita quod in quarteriis gonfalonibus et menbris supradictis circa extractionem quantum fieri poterit equaliter observetur." 67. A simple majority of votes in the scrutiny sufficed to qualify a candidate for the legislative councils (ibid., f. 16). 68. Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, p. 37: "Restb diviso il reggimento di tutto lo stato fiorentino in tre parti: una alle 7 arti maggiori e scioperati, una all'arti minori, e una a1 populo minuto o plebe."

242 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics The reactions of upper-class Florentines to the scrutiny of 1378 were predictably hostile. Exclaimed one commentator: Oh God! What people they were who had the power of remaking such a noble city and such a noble reggimento, for without doubt more than half of those who served on the scrutiny committee, and who passed judgment on the good and dear citizens, were uncouth types, swindlers, crooks, wool-beaters, sowers of evil, and dissolute persons of every evil condition, and very few of them were good citizens or guildsmen of established reputation; [most of them] were nothing more than upstarts who themselves, if asked, had no idea where they came from, nor from what town [in the countryside]. It was this sort of person who was given the task of passing judgment and voting on the good, dear, and ancient citizens; and afterwards it became clear that because of their influence in the scrutiny no one from any good family, no good, native citizens, and very few good guildsmen were approved for office, and instead they approved persons who had been ammoniti, or other people like themselves, lowly and useless as they are.69 These were the standard social prejudices of wealthy and well-born Florentines against those whom they considered inferior and too ambitious. Like Giovanni Villani's comments on the popular regime of 1343, they reveal the manner in which this class was disposed to react whenever Florentine politics and government were recalled to the principles of guild 69. Ibid., p. 36: "0 Idio, che gente fu quella che ebbe a rifare tanto nobile citti e cosi nobile reggimento, che certamente piu che la meti, che ebbono a rendere le fave e giudicare i buoni e cari cittadini, fu gente ruffiana, barattieri, ladroni, battilana, mettitori di male, e gente dissoluta e d'ogni mala condizione, e pochissimi buoni cittadini, e pochissimi artefici che fussino conosciuti; non altro che gente, erano tutti, veniticcia, che eglino medesimi, domandandogli, non sapevano dondr erano venuti, ni: di che paese. Questi cotali avevano e erano posti a giudicare e a render le fave ai buoni e cari e antichi cittadini; e per gli loro processi poi si' vide chiaramente, che non v'era niuno di famiglia, ni: niuno buono originale cittadino, t pochissimi buoni artefici vi rimasero, se non fusse gi8 ammunito o altra gente pari loro, vile e disutile come loro. Niuno buono uomo volevano udire mentovare, e ancora piu non voleano vedere in palagio niuno cittadino orrevole, che fusse vestito di buoni panni, ma i loro pari vedevano volentieri. 0 signore Idio, che cosa era a vedere quel palagio, chi lo signoreggiava e alle cui mani erano venuti i buoni e cari cittadini. Della famiglia di quel palagio non dico nulla, che non v'aveva famiglio, ni: piccolo, ni: grande, che non avesse voluto essere poco meno che nell'inferno, che quivi a veder tanta bruttura e fastidio."

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

243

republicanism. But there were also those who took considerable satisfaction in the results of this scrutiny. Noting that the nominations included "the poor as well as the rich," and that "every person had reason to be pleased," the Squittinatore called the scrutiny of August 1378 "the good scrutiny, which satisfied the many people who had never held any office but who had always been burdened by taxes."70 Te deums were sung and bells were rung throughout the city in celebration of the "good scrutiny" and, as the Squittinatore relates, the whole scrutiny committee sat down to a festive dessert and drink in recognition of a long and important task well done.71As another observer put it, "si feygrande festa e allegre~za."~~ The convulsions of the last days of August, which witnessed the uprising of the Ciompi against the regime they had helped to establish and their defeat by a coalition of the rest of the guild c0mmunity,7~resulted in the dissolution of their guild and the exclusion of most of its members from the borse of the August scrutiny. But these dramatic events did not cause the invalidation of the entire scrutiny, which, although modified and supplemented over the next few years, remained in force to dominate the patterns of officeholding and, to a great extent, the tenor of political life in the three and a half of the guild regime. In other words, the "counterrevolution" that took place on 31 August and that was legitimated by the parlamento of I September did not liquidate all that had been accomplished by the revolutions of June and July. The Ciompi were largely disenfranchised, and realignments among the remaining twenty-three guilds cost the minori and the minuti some of the share of communal offices that had been assigned to them in August. But they still enjoyed a majority of the seats in those offices, and the officeholding class of the regime that 70. Ibid., p. 78: "e cosi v'andava il povero come il ricco; e chi rimaneva per le

. . . fave si rimaneva priore; e chi era priore si era poi a tutti gli ufici del comune; e

chi non rimanea priore si rimanea negli altri ufici. Si che ciascuno si poteva contentare. Mentre che lo scuittino si penb a fare, si guardarono i balestrieri, com'ho detto per adrieto; e cosi si fece il buono scuittino, che contentb molta gente, i quali non avevano mai auto parte d'uficio, e sempre erano stati alle spese." 71. Ibid.: "Quando fu fenito lo scuittino, e signori fecero venire di molti frati, i quali cantarono il Tadeo con molte altre san'tissime cose; e si vi furon tutti i suoni del comune, ciascuno lodando Iddio, e suonarono tutte le campane alla distesa, e d'altre chiese, coygran groria e festa, a onore di Dio dicendo tuttavia." 72. Ibid., p. 116. 73. These events are incisively analyzed by Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," PP. 344-52.

244 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics ruled Florence until January 1382 continued to reflect in great measure the influence exerted by the expanded guild community in the scrutiny of August 1378. The rebellious Ciompi had neither the time nor the opportunity to contemplate another general scrutiny of candidates for the major offices, but they did succeed in forcing some changes in the composition of the new priorate in the very abnormal circumstances of the t r a m of 29 August. As name tickets were drawn from the bags, they were read to the excited crowd that had gathered in the Piazza della Signoria to shout its approval or disapproval, and a number of persons were apparently eliminated from the ranks of the approved candidates before a priorate was constituted t~ the liking of the C i ~ m p i . 'However, ~ the decreed distribution of seats on the Signoria into equal third shares among the three groups of guilds was respected, and the Ciompi even agreed to the election of a woolen-cloth manufacturer as one of the three priors representing the major guilds.75 Arbitrary as this interference in the sortition process certainly was,76there was no attempt to create an all-Ciompi priorate, nor any inclination to abandon the wide corporate base of the full guild community on which the regime rested. In fact, Stefani reports that among the ordinances passed by the Eight of Santa Maria Novella was one that authorized the consuls of all the guilds, sitting as a sort of special committee on eligibility, to withhold officeholding rights at their discretion from certain citizens.77The composition of this committee was in keeping with the constitutional principles of the regime, and it suggests that the Ciompi were not quite the lawless mob perceived by most contemporary commentators of the upper classes. Nonetheless, once the dust had settled, the first objective of the guild regime in the area of electoral politics was to eliminate the presence of the 74. Ibid., p. 349. Three of the chronicle accounts attribute this interference in the sortition process to the assembled and partially armed crowd (Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, pp. 80, I 18, 131). Another witness says that it was the revolutionary committee of the Eight Saints of Santa Maria Novella which passed judgment on each name drawn from the borse (ibid., p. 151). 75. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 803, p. 331. The elected lanaiuolo was Agnolo d'Uguccione Tigliamochi. 76. The characterization is Brucker's ("The Ciompi Revolution," p. 349). 77. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 804, p. 333: "E infra l'altre leggi, che fatte aviano, era un ordine tutti i consoli dei consolati con i dieci consiglieri eletti a lor mod0 potessero privare degli ufici del Comune e dell'Arti cui loro piacesse."

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

245

Ciompi. T h e parlamento of I September dissolved their g~ild,'~ reducing t h e number of corporations to twenty-three and depriving the individual Ciompi of any right to high office on the basis of the August ~ c r u t i n y . 'I~t also ordered the removal from the Signoria selected on 29 August of two of the three representatives of the pop010 minuto a n d their replacement by one major guildsman a n d one minor g u i l d ~ m a n This . ~ ~ arrangement, which still left the major guildsmen at a 4 to 5 disadvantage i n the priorate, conformed with the new distribution of the major offices promulgated on the same day. Although the reorganization of the guild community into two membra instead of three was not formalized until 11 September, it must have been assumed on I September that this would take place, because the parlamento decreed that henceforth the sixteen minor guilds (the original fourteen plus t h e two guilds remaining from the three created at the end of July) would have five seats in each priorate, while the major guildsmen and scioperati would have four. T h e sixteen minor guilds also kept 7 to 5 and 9 to 7 advantages in the advisory colleges of the Twelve and S i ~ t e e n . ~ ' T h e constitutional reforms prefigured by the parlamento were spelled out in greater detail in two laws passed by the councils on I I and 28 Sep78. Balie, 17, ff. 73v-74. Stefani reports that this and the other proposals presented by the Signoria to the parlamento had been recommended by a special meeting of the consuls of the twenty-one guilds in the church of San Piero Scheraggio (Cronaca, rr. 805-6, p. 335). 79. Balie, 17, f. 74: "Item quod quilibet hactenus scruptinatus vel imbursatus ad aliquod vel in aliquo offitio dicti comunis pro pettinatore, scardasserio, tessitore, divettino, reveditore, schamatino, vergheggiatore, datore stamis vel lane seu lanino vel factore artis lane et quilibet in dicta arte . . . matriculatus vel sub nominibus aut membris predictis vel eorum aliquo reductus vel scruptinatus . . . qui extraheretur ad aliquod offitium dicti comunis seu civitatis Florentie de offitiis scruptinatis, et seu pro quibus scruptineum factum fuit de mense augusti proxime preteriti, incontinenti cedula talis extractionis debeat reici et laniari tanquam de prohibito; et ipse sic extractus tali offitio sit et esse intelligatur privatus ips0 facto et ex nunc; et quod ab omni benefitio dicti scruptinii . . . penitus sit privatus et exclusus." The name tickets of such persons were not to be included in any future borse. Certain exceptions, however, were allowed to this general disenfranchisement of the minuti (ibid.). 80. Ibid., f. 73v. The replacements were selected and installed in office on the next day: Giorgio Scali, who emerged as one of the most important leaders of the regime, replaced the scardassiere Giovanni di Domenico, called Tria; and the rigattiere Francesco di Chele became Standard-bearer of Justice in place of the pettinatore Bartolo di Iacopo, called Baroccio (Stefani, Cronaca, r. 806, p. 335). 81. Balie, 17, f. 74v.

246 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics tember. In the first of these, the tripartite division of the guild community for electoral purposes was abolished in favor of the division between the two membra of the major and minor guilds, the latter now including the guilds of the Tintori and Farsettai. The name tickets of approved candidates from these two guilds, which, together with those of the Ciompi, had filled the third set of bags after the August scrutiny, were mixed into the NO more than one member of any existing bags of the minor minor guild could serve on the priorate or in any office in a given term, and only guild masters were henceforth eligible for the post of Standardbearer of Justice.83The rest of the provision deals with the offices of the Parte Guelfa. It is interesting to note that the borse for the prestigious captaincy of the Guelf organization were now filled with the names of those who had been approved for the priorate in the August scrutiny. In fact, the minor guilds even gained the same 5 to 4 advantage among the nonmagnate captains of the Parte Guelfa that they enjoyed in the S i g n ~ r i a . ~ ~ 82. The body of the provision of 11 September 1378 is published in Gino Capponi, Ston'a della Repubblica di Firenze, 2 vols. (Florence, 1879, I :599-602, but without the prologue, which is relevant to this rearrangement. It is found in PR, 67, f. 15: "Ad concordiam artium et artificum civitatis Florentie et maxime minorum artium et ad bonum et pacificum statum et regimen civitatis eiusdem sollicite intendentes . . . et considerantes ac colloquium habentes super scruptinio facto in civitate Florentie de mense augusti proxime preteriti . . . et considerantes quod dictum scruptinium et dicta offitia in tribus membris secundum ordinamenta tunc facta fuerunt divisa et secundum dictam divisionem certe burse fuerunt facte et alie debebant fieri in hoc ordine, videlicet, quod membrum septem maiorum artium et scioperatorum esset una pars, membrum quatuordecim minorum artium esset aha pars, et membrum populi dei esset alia pars, in quo quidem ultimo membro includebantur tres artes noviter create . . . et quod postea per aha ordinamenta dictum membrum et ars pectinatorum et schardasseriorum et plurium aliorum membrorum beneficio dicti scruptinii est privatum, dicteque due artes, videlicet, tintorum et farsettariorum et aliorum membrorum predictorum cum dictis aliis quatuordecim minoribus artibus . . . ad unum corpus et membrum comuni concordia sunt reducte et sic decetero perseverare intendunt et ubi hactenus dicebantur quatuordecim minores artes deinceps dicantur sedecim. Et quod quia omnes dicte artes minores ad unum membrum et corpus ut predicitur sunt reducte concorditer iam deliberaverunt quod omnes homines dictarum artium rninorum qui secundum ordinamenta supradicti scruptinii sunt imbursati vel veniunt imbursandi simul et mistim imbursentur." The provision thus calls for the creation of "unus solus sacculus sive bursa" for the approved candidates of all sixteen guilds (ibid., f. ISV; and Capponi, Storia di Firenze, I :599). 83. P R Y67, f. I ~ V . 84. Ibid., ff. 16- 16v; Capponi, Storia di Firenze, I :600.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382 247 On 28 September, a second provision regulated in great detail the distribution of all communal offices between the major and minor guildsmen. It reconfirmed the divisions of the three executive colleges, established by the parlamento on I September, and otherwise generally applied a rule of equal division for all internal and external offices.85 None of the September reforms, however, except for the exclusion of the Ciompi, in any way affected the lists of approved candidates whose names had been placed in the borse in August. Despite the temporary pacification of the city after the stormy days of the Ciompi revolt, it soon became apparent that the reforms had only succeeded in alienating the defeated Ciompi from the regime, while doing very little to placate the restless dissatisfaction of the oligarchy with the results of a scrutiny still tainted by association with this class of now disenfranchised workers. The oligarchy, accustomed to the lion's share of offices and power and to only a token representation of workers and artisans in the magistracies of government, saw itself reduced to a minority of the seats in the executive colleges. Before the elimination of the candidates of the twenty-fourth guild, the major guildsmen constituted only one-third of the officeholding class defined by the August scrutiny; even after the September reforms, they were probably still less than 40 percent of the remaining total of approved candidates. But to discuss the situation that confronted the old oligarchy in terms of the official subdivisions of the corporate community is to miss the even bleaker reality that it faced in the aftermath of the scrutiny of August 1378. The major guildsmen were not a homogeneous social group. Within their ranks were social, political, and economic differences of great importance, which tended to become exacerbated during times of economic crisis and popular a g i t a t i ~ nIt. ~was ~ among the non-oligarchic major guildsmen that popular politics found sympathizers in the upper ranks of the corporate hierarchy, and these crucial supporters of the guild government fared very well in the August scrutiny. Stefani put his finger squarely on 85. This law is also published in Capponi, Storia di Firenze, 1:602-8. The archival reference is PR, 67, ff. 39-42v. The extension of the distributio to almost all communal offices was promulgated "ut quiete et sub recta iustitia regatur Civitas Florentina, ac pro bono et pacific0 statu civitatis eiusdem, et ut quilibet dictorum mercatorum et artificum sentire valeat commoda et onera officiorum Comunis eiusdem." 86. This problem will be treated in my forthcoming study on the Florentine guilds.

248

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

this point: the August scrutiny had been dominated by the lower classes (gente minuta), but even the major guildsmen who were invited to take part were mostly from the "lesser" of the major guilds (such as the furriers) or from the lesser or secondary membra of the composite guilds (such as the stockingmakers from the guild of Por Santa Maria or the "smaller druggists, factors, and partners" from the guild of the Medici e Speziali). X1though the major guilds officially had four seats in the Signoria, Stefani complained that "from each guild there were more fattori than guildmast e r ~ . ' ' ~Thus, ' the share of posts that went to the traditional elite within the major guilds threatened to be far less than even the nominal share allotted to their guilds. I n the realization that they were now only a minority of the officeholding class, and perhaps even outnumbered among the approved candidates by adherents of the regime in their own guilds, lies the origin of the concerted and often bitter opposition of the Florentine upper classes to the s&utiny of 1378 and the guild regime of 1378-82.88 Smoldering upperclass antipathy, finding expression over a wide range of issues and taking sometimes political and sometimes conspiratorial form, dominated the history of the popular regime.89The debates over electoral issues were particularly intense in 1379, however, when three major crises erupted as a consequence of these antagonisms. 87. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 812, p. 341: "lo primo squittino che si fece, vi furono la maggior parte di gente minuta ed a farlo, tolsono pure delle 7 Arti delle pih mennome, come sono, pillicciai e vaiai e dell'Arte di Porta S. Maria, calzaioli e simili; e cosi delli medici e speziali tolsero li minori speziali ed i fattori e compagni pih che de' maestri, e cosi delle 16 Arti; di che cavatane quella una Arte de' Ciompi, comecchit fussero per quinto e quarto i Priori, 5 delle minori 16 Arti, e 4 delle maggiori, di ogni Arte v'erano i fattori piu che' maestri; e cosi era la citti e' cittadini in male stato e male contenti." 88. Stefani commented that, after the September reforms, "Bene alle maggiori parve essere male trattati, ma per non fare nuova quistione, che non era temp, lasciarono fare cosi" (ibid., r. 805, p. 335). An early indication of this dissatisfaction and of a willingness to do something about it can be seen in a measure that passed the councils on 9 December 1378 prohibiting the election to the Signoria, or to any other communal office, of various categories of service personnel employed by the government: servants, cooks, kitchen staff, guards, attendants, criers, etc. The Signoria proposed the bill "advertentes . . . quanta est excellentia et dignitas officiorum comunis predicti, et indecorum esset servos adscendere solium dominorum" (PR, 67, ff. 107- 107v). 89. For a brief but excellent overview of the regime's accomplishments and problems, see Brucker, Civic World, pp. 46-59. Niccolb Rodolico has treated this period in detail in La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto, 1378-1382 (1905; reprint ed., Rome, 1970).

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

249

The first of these confrontations was a direct outgrowth of the oligarchy's unhappiness with the situation described by Stefani. It resulted, early in 1379, in the holding of a new scrutiny whose results were used both to supplement the bags of the August scrutiny and to fill a new set of bags. Peace, unity, and concord among all citizens were the stated motives of the decision to conduct this special scrutiny,gOalthough, as Gene Brucker has recently written, the constant emphasis on the unity of the regime was "a pious hope that was some distance from reality." " The potentially disastrous disaffection of the upper class caused the regime to reconsider its exclusive dependence on the August scrutiny for the recruitment of officeholders and to make some important concessions in electoral politics to an oligarchy that it mistrusted but nonetheless could not do without. These concessions came in the form of two provisions, passed on 24 and 29 January 1379, which reviewed the general electoral policy of the regime and established the procedures for the supplementary scrutiny to be held in Febr~ary.'~Strong opposition in the legislative councils, however, nearly blocked the passage of these electoral bills. The Council of the People, where the guild consuls were a powerful influence, approved them by only the thinnest of margins, a clear indication of their controversial nat ~ r e . 'One ~ feature of the reforms that almost certainly aroused the opposition of the minor guilds was yet another revision of the apportionment of 90. In the words of the provision that legislated the necessary suspension of all laws prohibiting such irregular scrutinies: "presertim ut unio pax et concordia vigeant, sine quibus dei verbo et experientia ipsa docente compartum est nullum regnum civitatem sive rem publicam posse consistere vel durare" ( P R Y67, f. I 15 [22 January 13791). Similarly, the prologue of the law regulating the scrutiny begins: "Unionem pacem et tranquillitatem ac bonum et tranquillum statum liberi et guelfi populi florentini indefessis animis persequentes" (ibid., f. I 17 [24 January 13791). Stefani also echoes this theme in reporting that the special committee of thirty-one advisers which recommended that a new scrutiny be held had been appointed "a vedere lo mod0 di unire li cittadini" (Cronaca, r. 812, p. 341). 91. Brucker, Civic World, p. 48. 92. On the electoral reform of 24 January and the background of upper-class pressure that helped to bring it about, see Rodolico, La democraziafiorentina, pp. 239-48. 93. The provision of 24 January was passed by a 189 to 90 vote (PR, 67, ff. 1 2 2 ~ -123). The companion bill of 29 January has a recorded vote total of 178 to 90, which does not even meet the required minimum of two-thirds for approval. However, there may be a scribal error involved here, because the provision also records that 288 members of the council were present and voting on this occasion (ibid., ff. 142~-143).

250

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

seats in the executive colleges, this time depriving the minori of their majorities (of 5 to 4, 9 to 7, and 7 to 5 ) and establishing equal shares in each college for the two groups of guilds (4 to 4 in the priorate, with the post of Standard-bearer of Justice alternating between maggiori and m i n ~ r i ) . ~ ~ However, following Stefani's observation that many of the major guildsmen approved for the priorate in the August scrutiny hardly represented the great families or economic interests of the oligarchy, this revision of the distributio would not of itself have posed a real threat to the popular hegemony of the guild regime. This possibility rested instead in the combination of parity between the two groups of guilds and the addition of large numbers of new names to the bags of approved candidates. The scrutiny that was supposed to furnish these additional names was scheduled to be held before the end of February. Nomination lists were requested, according to the traditional procedure, from the sixteen gonfalonieri (separate lists in each gonfalone for maggiori and minori), from the captains of the Parte Guelfa, and from the individual In an effort to appease the malcontents among both the oligarchs and the Ciompi, eligibility requirements were reduced to a bare minimum: any resident Florentine citizen could be nominated for the new scrutiny, provided he was neither a Ghibelline nor a magnate. Minuti were declared eligible for nomination through the guilds representing their professions, and those who were not members of guilds (the disbanded Ciompi, for example) were allowed to matriculate in any of the original twenty-one guilds (but not in the two new guilds) willing to grant them membership, in order to be eligible for the scrutiny.96This was an attempt to siphon off some of the resentment of the Ciompi, but only in small doses and at the discretion of the established guilds. Allowing the matriculation and nomination of a few Ciompi as a 94. Ibid., f. 117. 95. Ibid., f. 142. 96. Ibid., f. 118v: "Item quod ad dicta scruptinia possit reduci quilibet cuiuscumque status vel qualitatis existat dumtamen sit civis florentinus et popularis et guelfus et qui possit secure stare in civitate Florentie, etiam si talis foret de populo minuto qui talis de populo minuto possit et debeat reduci pro arte et exercitio in qua et quo versatur, et si aliter reduceretur vel scruptinaretur habeatur . . . pro non reducto. . . . Liceat tamen cuilibet de dicto populo minuto se facere matriculari in quacumque arte voluerit eum recipere ad matriculam exceptis duabus novis artibus minoribus; et quod tales matriculati et exercentes artem in qua matriculatus fuerit pro ipsa arte et ut de illa artifex reducatur; et quod omnes et singuli qui reperientur ad dicta officia scruptinati intelligantur esse reducti illis mod0 et forma et in illis qualitatibus in quibus et prout scruptinati reperientur." See also Rodolico's observations in La democraziafiorentina, pp. 244-45.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

25 I

way of defusing their anger over the loss of their guild foreshadowed the analogous policy of the regime established in 1382 toward the former members of the two other guilds of the pop010 minuto. In effect, eligibility was declared to be universal even as the members of the lowest class were forced to seek it through the acquiescence of their social superiors. The requirements of consensus were already beginning to erode the corporate bases of the electoral system established in 1378. The voting committee for the 1379 scrutiny consisted of the same combination of ex officio members and arroti as had customarily been appointed in the period of stable electoral politics before 1378. Members of the two new guilds were exempted from the June 1378 requirement that arroti on the scrutiny committee should previously have held one important communal office.97The selection of the eighty arroti was entrusted to the Signoria and the colleges, which had to consider at least ten candidates in each gonfalone. However, from the regulations governing the nomination and scrutiny of the arroti, it is clear that the distributio was in force, most likely dividing the full contingent of arroti evenly between maggiori and m i n ~ r iSimilarly, .~~ of the four accoppiatori, two had to come from each membrum of the guild c ~ m m u n i t y . ~ ~ These arrangements, governed by the principle of parity between the two sections of the guild community, were considerably more favorable to the major guilds and the oligarchic families than the scrutiny of August 1378 had been. No lists of nominees or of approved candidates have survived, but Stefani makes it clear that many maggiori who had been unsuccessful in the earlier scrutiny were approved in 1 3 7 9 . ' The ~ ~ results of the voting were compared with the lists from the previous August, and the names of successful candidates who had failed to obtain majorities in the earlier scrutiny were added to the existing bags, making such persons immediately eligible for the Sign~ria.'~' No doubt both major and minor 97. P R , 67, f. 118v. 98. Ibid., f. 14zv: "Et quod pro quolibet artifice maiore vel scioperato qui esse deberet in aliquo gonfalone secundum distributionem faciendam secundum ordinamenta dicti comunis, et ipsis ordinamentis servatis sorte dirimendam duo de eodem membro debeant scruptinari atque reduci, . . . et similiter in omnibus et per omnia fiat de artificibus sedecim minorum artium dicte civitatis secundum predicta reducendis et scruptinandis pro arrotis." 99. Ibid., f. 142. 100. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 812, p. 341. 101. P R , 67, f. I 17v: "Et quod omnes et singuli qui obtinebunt in dicto scruptinio per duas partes scruptinatorum . . . et qui non obtinuerunt seu non fuerunt reducti in scruptinio facto pro offitiis antedictis de mense augusti proxime preteriti

252

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

guildsmen benefited, but very likely more of the former than of the latter. The regime evidently hoped that, by admitting more upper-class members to the borse of August 1378, it could drain away some of the discontent of the great families. At the same time, a new set of bags was also constituted from the results of the February scrutiny. The rule of equality between major and minor guilds was here again enforced, so that the bags would contain an equal number of approved candidates from each r n e m b r ~ mStefani . ~ ~ ~ called this procedure agguagliamento, and his comments on its implementation reveal that the minor guilds had fewer candidates approved in the scrutiny, making it necessary to include in the bags a large number of minon who had not attained two-thirds majorities in the voting. He expressed his displeasure at this extension of officeholding rights to so many "undeserving" minor guildsmen and openly criticized the whole concept of agguagliamento. But he was at least satisfied that the "good men" were restored to their political rights even if agguagliamento was the price that had to be paid for this restoration.'03 By the time of the extraction of the priorate for March-April 1379, the new scrutiny had been completed and the existing borse supplemented with its results.lo4Stefani made a point of noting that most Florentines felt et seu obtinuerunt et demum privati fuerunt beneficio ipsius scruptinii, mictantur et imbursentur in bursis ad presens vigentibus et factis ex ips0 scruptinio pro dictis offitiis." See also Rodolico, La democraziafiorentina, pp. 246-47. 102. PR, 67, f. 1 1 7 ~"Et : nichilominus in bursis novi scruptinii remaneant imbursati et etiam imbursari possint et debeant . . . hoc etiam express0 et proviso quod . . . in bursis novi scruptinii tot imbursentur de uno membro quot de a h , videlicet tot de membro septem maiorum artium et scioperatorum quot de membro sedecim minorum artium, et e converso, equando etiam si opus fuerit per numerum fabarum hoc mod0 videlicet, quod de illo ex dictis membris de quo pauciores obtinuissent quam de alio adsummantur tot de scruptinatis in quos plures fabe nigre concurrerint descendendo gradatim quod numerus sit equalis inter membra predicta et ita quod equalitas inter ipsa membra observetur." Rodolico provides a slightly different reading in La democrazia fiorentina, p. 247. 103. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 812, p. 341: "e che poi veduto di quale parte avesse piu uomini vinto il partito, o delle 7 maggiori Arti, o delle 16 minori, s'agguagliasse l'un membro coll'altro, si che tanti s'imborsasse delle maggiori come delle minori, togliendo chi avesse pih fave nere nello predetto agguagliamento. E questo agguagliare vi misse molti minuti, che non lo meritavano, ma i buoni uomini pure v'intrarono, comeccht. questo affare o agguagliare non fosse buono." 104. According to the Anonimo, the scrutiny was begun on 10 February and concluded on the 20th (Gherardi, Dian'o d'anonimo, p. 392). A provision of 24 Feb-

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

253

reassured by the election of the new priors, because they were "from all classes of citizens," by which, of course, he meant "the important families" and the "good merchants and guildsmen." ' 0 5 Indeed, whether by coincidence or as a direct result of the additions to the borse, this priorate's contingent of major guildsmen included a Corsini, a Strozzi, and an ArdinghelliY1*precisely the sort of citizen who fit Stefani's notion of good guildsmen. On the other hand, five of the nine members of this Signoria were from new families previously unrepresented in the priorate.'07 In the combination of these contrasting results of the draw lies the essence of the compromise that was hoped for in the supplementary scrutiny of February 1379. How successful was the attempt to unify the city on the basis of a generous electoral policy that sought to broaden the opportunities of officeholding for upper-class families while still basing itself on the notion of equal shares for the two subdivisions of the guild community? In the short run, most observers were satisfied that the February reforms had met their aim. Stefani, as we have seen, was pleased, and so was the Anonimo, who commented that the scrutiny redounded "to the honor of the city, of the people of Florence, and of its guildsmen," but then added, "a male e a morte de' Ciompi."lo8 Two other chroniclers agreed that the scrutiny was indeed conducted in order to pacify those who were "malcontenti" at having been excluded from the 1378 scrutiny, and, according to one of them, the conclusion of the ten-day balloting was celebrated with a "grandissima festa" and a ringing of the bells in a public ceremony "to the honor of God." ' 0 9 But no one was completely satisfied or sufficiently reassured by a reform that tried to give something to everyone. The tensions and debates over ruary authorized several payments for "expensas . . . factas occasione scruptinii celebrati de presenti mense" (PR, 67, f. 150). 105. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 814, p. 342: "questi Priori stettono, e trovarono in pace la citti, e come intrarono nello uficio, molto si confortarono il comune degli cittadini, perocchk mostrarono essere d'ogni generazione di gente, cioe di famiglie e d'ogni generazione di buoni mercatanti e artefici; ed ogni persona si conforth della lor0 estrazione." 106. Ibid., r. 813, p. 342. 107. Priorista Mariani V, in Manoscritti, 252, ff. 1012- 14. 108. Gherardi, Diario d'anonimo, p. 392. 109. Scaramella, Cronache e memorie, pp. 91, 132. The Squittinatore was especially insistent that the objective of the reforms was to "dare parte a1 povero ed a' ricco, di questi ufici che ci sono, si che ciascuno rimanga per contento o tutto o parte" (ibid., p. go).

254 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics electoral policy persisted throughout 1379, coming to a head in two more crises that indicate the limited nature of whatever success had been achieved by the supplementary scrutiny of February. In August the regime's upperclass enemies tried to reduce the numbers of new men in high office through the passage of another "anti-foreigner" bill, similar to the one used for analogous purposes a generation earlier in 1346. Whereas in February the upper class had sought to increase its own presence in the borse, it now adopted the reverse strategy and revived an old pretext for the exclusion of many Florentines who had only recently entered political life. Claiming that it was "consonant neither with the honor of the city nor with justice, that it was displeasing to the good and native citizens, and that it never had or would bring the republic any profit for the offices of the commune to be held by persons whose ancestors were not natives of the city or contado of Florence," IL0 the bill proceeded to bar from all the important offices of the commune, the guilds, and the Mercanzia any person who could not prove that his father had been born in either the city or the contado."' Just as in 1346, even if such persons had been awarded formal grants of Florentine citizenship or had been approved in past scrutinies for communal offices, the law prescribed that their name tickets had to be destroyed upon extraction from the bags. Moreover, the gonfalonieri and other nominating agencies were forbidden to nominate these "foreigners" for any future scrutinies. The testimony of four witnesses willing to confirm the "foreign" origin of an individual sufficed to activate these prohibitions, although appeals were allowed to the Signoria and the colleges, who could overrule the accusers of a suspected "foreigner" if twenty-five of the thirty-seven members of the three colleges c~ncurred."~ Again as in 1346, it was from the guild community that protests were 110. P R , 68, f. 108: "quod honori dicte civitatis non cedit, iustitie non convenit, bonis et originalibus civitatis et comitatus Florentie non placet, nec etiam rei republice florentinorum unquam profuit vel prodesset, quod officia dicti comunis, civibus congruentia, per eos qui suorum maiorum origine non essent de civitate aut cornitatu predictis gubernanda et exercenda venirent." I I I. Julius Kirshner has analyzed and published the central clause of this law in "Paolo di Castro on Cives E x Privilegio: A Controversy over the Legal Qualifications for Public Office in Early Fifteenth-century Florence," in RenaissanceStudies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971)' pp. 239-40. See also his discussion of the anti-foreigner legislation of 1379 in the context of the problems of citizenship and naturalization, in " 'Ars Imitatur Naturam': A Consilium of Baldus on Naturalization in Florence," Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1974): 289-331. 112. P R Y68, ff. 108-9.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

255

heard, and in this instance sufficient pressure was brought to bear on the Signoria for a revision of the law. According to Stefani, the guildsmen feared that the anti-foreigner legislation, like the ammonizione campaign a few years earlier, was nothing more than a cynical attempt to deprive them of their recently won political rights. The chronicler, whose confidence in the ability of guildsmen to evaluate and act upon their own political interests rationally and effectively was never very robust, could not believe that the protests were spontaneous or genuinely widespread. He suggested that they must have been generated by "alcuni malicontenti dello reggimento" as part of a conspiracy to overturn the regime.'13 With this interpretation (presented without names or evidence, it might be added), Stefani rather cleverly implied that it was the supporters of the August legislation who were the defenders of constitutional legitimacy against the few subversives attempting to manipulate the guild community to their advantage. But the pressure from the guilds was real enough,114and when, within a matter of weeks, it forced the Signoria to rescind the August legislation and to promulgate a revised law on the definition and status of "foreigners," one of the major changes stipulated that the appeals of those declared "foreigners" would have to be heard and voted on, not only by the Signoria and the colleges, but also by twenty-three consuls, one from each guild. All would sit as a single body, two-thirds of which could restore an accused individual to his citizenship and political rights.Il5 Although unable to do away completely with the threatening legislation, the guilds did at least succeed in establishing their authority to intervene and limit its effectiveness. A number of other changes discouraged the potential accusers of "foreigners" by making them liable to the same penalties in the event of acquittal,IL6canceled the application of the law to certain categories of "foreigners," and alleviated the penalties against others."' Florentines whose families hailed from any part of the district (beyond the contado but within the territory governed by the city) were allowed to hold communal offices 113. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 818, p. 346. 114. See the evidence from the Consulte e Pratiche, which may be found in Kirshner's "Paolo di Castro," p. 240, n. 39. Benedetto Alberti and Jacopo Ubaldini advised the Signoria to follow the wishes of the guild consuls in this matter and to tell them that "domini intendunt taliter providere quod ipsi [the guild consuls] sint contenti." 11s. PRY68, ff. IZOV-121. 116. Ibid., f. 12ov; Stefani, Cronaca, r. 820, p. 346. I 17. See Kirshner, "Paolo di Castro," pp. 241 -42.

256 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics if they had lived in the city and paid regular taxes for thirty years. Moreover, anyone from the district who had not yet met these requirements was not ejected from the borse, as he would have been according to the August law. Instead, his name ticket was returned to the bag from which it had been drawn and he was considered to be under a divieto until he had cornpleted the thirty-year residence and tax obligations, after which his eligibility was reactivated."* This was clearly a lesser penalty than had been envisioned in the first law, which not only required the destruction of the name tickets of such persons but also disallowed their nomination in future scrutinies. Moderated though it was by the guild community, this revised "anti-foreigner" law of September 1379 still encountered considerable opposition in the councils, passing by only extremely narrow marg i n ~ . "The ~ "anti-foreigner" laws and the controversy that surrounded them are telling indications of the strains still being generated late in 1379 by the regime's electoral policies, even after the reforms and the supplementary scrutiny of January and February. The third electoral crisis of 1379 followed in the wake of the discovery and suppression in December of a conspiracy against the guild regime hatched by a group of powerful oligarchic leaders. Piero degli Albizzi was executed along with several other leaders of the alleged plot, and the regime, realizing that its efforts to reach a compromise with the oligarchy had failed,'20now moved openly to limit the political power of the great families by attacking their officeholding rights. Supporters of the guild government feared that more trouble might arise if relatives or clients of the conspirators were selected in the next extraction of the Signoria and the college of the Sixteen, scheduled for the end of December. To preclude this possibility, spokesmen for the regime suggested that the new priors and Sixteen not be chosen by the usual method of sortition (extraction by lot) and that their selection be entrusted instead to the accoppiatori or to some other board that could ensure the appointment of candidates sympathetic to the popular government.I2' Pressures for a controlled election cul118. PR, 68, f. 121v. 119. The votes were 190 to 94 and 119 to 59 (ibid., f. 120. See Brucker, Civic World, p. 56.

122).

121. See ibid., p. 57, for the proposals made by Tommaso Strozzi and Bernardo Velluti. The latter's recommendation was for a system of preselected and prearranged priorates similar to that adopted by the popular government of 1343: "quod fiant pallotte officii dominorum et collegiorum, ita quod in qualibet pallotta sint adminus sex confidentes, et ad hoc faciendum octo cives venerabiles deputentur" (CP, 18, f. 50~).

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

257

minated with the formal request by the four civilian chiefs of the regime's armed security force for the outright designation of the incoming Signoria by the accoppiatori, who, according to their recommendation, would have been free to select any names of their choice from the existing b o r ~ e . This '~~ was, in effect, the technique of election a mano used so frequently and effectively by the Medici two generations later. In 1379, however, it was a controversial idea that generated a heated debate and carried the potential for a major scandal. To resolve the issue, the Signoria, true to the constitutional principles of the guild regime, decided to hold a large pratica to which they invited the consuls of all twenty-three guilds. What followed was a model instance of the decentralized decision-making process of this corporate government and a striking example of the way electoral policy could be determined by a consultation of the full guild community. According to Stefani, when the consuls were convened on 26 December, several speakers advised the Signoria that they wished to consult the membership of their separate guilds before rendering any opinion on how the next priorate should be drawn from the The discussions apparently took place on two levels within the guild community: first among the members of each guild and then among the representatives of all the guilds in a long debate in the palace of the Mercanzia. Finally, after several days of deliberations, the individual guilds responded with formal written opinions addressed to the Signoria. Seventeen of the twenty-three guilds decided the issue by agreeing that the traditional method of sortition should be observed. The other six-Stefani does not say which ones-proposed a variety of different solutions (also unspecified by the chroni~ler).'~~ The 122. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 840, p. 361. The four were Tommaso Strozzi and Benedetto Alberti for the major guilds, and Benedetto da Carlona and the dyer Lorenzo di Donato for the minor guilds. 123. Stefani's information on this point is confirmed and amplified by the record of the speeches made on that day, in CP, 18, f. 58: "quod omnes artes quelibet per se idem consulantur" (Biagio Guasconi); "quod artifices sint ad artes et cras bona hora respondeant consilia suarum artium" (Niccolb di Giovanni); "quod omnes sint ad artes et cras bona hora referant consilia super predictis" (Nuto di Vanni, a swordmaker speaking on behalf of the Nine of Mercanzia and the guild consuls). 124. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 840, p. 361: "e dissero il mod0 di levare questo fusse: che li quattro accoppiatori delle borse de' Priori andassero alla cassa, e degli imborsati togliessero cui a loro piacesse; di che udito i Priori questo ed i Collegi consigliarono se ne tenesse generale consiglio di richiesti e tutte le Capitudini, e cosi si fece a' di 26 di dicembre; e dissero in loro risposta ch'e' voleano essere alle botteghe de' lor0 consolati. Ed ultimamente l'altro di rispuosero, praticato lungamente pih e piii alla casa della Mercatanzia, per iscrittura, e le 17 Arti tutte in concordia, si

258 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics crisis was thus resolved as a large majority of the city's guildsmen repudiated the hasty proposals of their leaders and spokesmen. They evidently preferred the risks inherent in the free-chance selection of the new priorate to those of the regime's loss of credibility and of the creation of a dangerous precedent that could easily be turned against them. In the sequel, their choice was vindicated as the luck of the draw produced a priorate (for January-February 1380) devoid of names from the great oligarchic families.I2' If, as Brucker writes, the proposals for a mano elections in December 1379 "were the reactions of frightened men, who had lost their faith in the guild community and in constitutional government," 126 then precisely the reverse must be held true of the rank and file of those guilds that voted against such proposals. As with the crisis of August-September over the anti-foreigner legislation, the December controversy owed its resolution to the moderation and good sense of the guild community. In the first instance it tempered the radical impulses of patrician opponents of the regime, and in the second it rejected those of the regime's own patrician allies and leaders. In both cases it managed to preserve the electoral institutions and policies that were essential to the popular character of this government: a high degree of political mobility, open access to office for a continued stream of new men, equal distribution of offices between the two divisions of the guild community, and, most of all, the final authority of the full guild community in the determination of electoral policy. The December 1379 debate among the guilds over the fate of sortition and the role of the accoppiatori in the election of the Signoria was the culminating act of a long series of upheavals and controversies in Florentine electoral politics stretching back to June of 1378. Despite challenges from and concessions to a dissatisfied aristocracy, the electoral system forged on corporate principles had managed to survive, and, once the crises of 1379 were overcome, it functioned smoothly for two more years until, at the end of 1381 and the beginning of 1382, heightened tensions and renewed hostilities between the regime and its opponents set in motion the forces facesse la tratta a sorte, ed a fortuna, come era usato. Le sei volieno altre cose, non l'una, come l'altra. Di che presesi, col nome di Dio, di trarre a1 mod0 usato." 125.The four priors representing the major guilds in this term were Cristofano di Bartolo, a vaiaio; Agnolo Barucci, a lanaiuolo; Giorgio di Guccio di Dino Gucci; and Simone di Ser Matteo Biffoli. Stefani commented that "Dio concedette che la tratta fu tale che quasi ogni uomo si contentb" (ibid., rr. 840-41, pp. 361-62). 126. Brucker, Civic World, p. 57.

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

259

that led to the fall of the government and the restoration of consensus as the guiding principle of electoral politics. Quiescence on the part of the regime's opposition must not be mistaken, however, for acquiescence. During these two years there were, as far as the sources reveal, no major controversies or confrontations over the regime's electoral institutions or over the character, quality, and size of its officeholding cadres. But the deep-seated antagonism of the traditional elite of great families persisted. Privately, at least, they complained about the kind of men who were being selected for high office, describing them as ignorant and inexperienced.''' As already noted, however, these were the obligatory and almost formulaic terms in which Florentine aristocrats had always lamented the presence in public life of those whom they considered their social inferiors. A simpler and more fundamental reason for the oligarchy's continuing dissatisfaction with the regime's electoral politics is provided by Stefani. At bottom, he asserted, what the elite found intolerable were its drastically reduced chances of reaching the priorate under the system established in 1378 and 1379, as compared with the preceding period. Stefani explains the indignation of the "famiglie" and the "grandi casati" thus: whereas before 1378 the major guilds had been accustomed to seven out of every nine places on the Signoria, drawn out of a pool of roughly three hundred names, now, although they still had a sizable one-half share of the offices, the total pool of approved candidates in each scrutiny had more than tripled to include over a thousand names."* Before 1378, Stefani seems to be saying, a major guildsman's chances for selection to the priorate on any given occasion were hypothetically 7 out of 300, or I in 43.12' After the scrutinies and reforms of 1378 and 1379, a 127. Ibid., pp. 58-59, where the letters of Giovanni Del Bene to his cousin Francesco are quoted and cited on this point. 128. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 882, p. 384: "Era tanto dilatata la materia dello sdegno delle famiglie da Firenze e de' grandi casati, che soleano reggere, piu che le 7 parti delle 9 eglino ed alcuni, come 6 detto adrieto, tiranneggiare, che ora, comecch'eglino avessero assai parte; perocche aveano quello toccava lor0 per metii, ma erano in ogni squittino di Priorato piu di 1000 uomini, ove all'altro tempo ve ne avea circa 300 ed erano per metii a trarsi, dove si traevano de' 9 li 7, sicche non erano cosi spesso: per questo sdegno si avieno preso di starsi la maggior parte in villa." 129. Actually, they were somewhat better because the approximate figure of three hundred includes major and minor guildsmen. The seven maggiori members of the Signoria had been drawn from a separate set of bags containing only the names of approved major guildsmen, who were obviously less than the total pool of approved candidates. As Brucker has shown, the number of major guildsmen ap-

260 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics major guildsman had 4.5 (alternately four and five) chances in about 500 (the major guildsmen comprising exactly half the total pool), or I in I 11. The chronicler did not work out the odds, but his data led him to an obvious conclusion: with a much greater number of approved candidates in the borse, and with the major guildsmen eligible for a much smaller share of the offices than previously, each major guildsman's opportunity to reach the priorate was greatly diminished. To the non-oligarchic maggiori the situation afforded the unprecedented possibility for greater collective involvement in politics, even if no single individual was permitted to return to office very frequently. But to the members of the "grandi casati," accustomed as they were to an overwhelming preponderance of offices in the hands of the major guilds and to the tight control of communal politics by a small inner elite of powerful politicians ("ed alcuni . . . tiranneggiare," as Stefani admitted), the electoral policies of the popular regime seemed to deprive them of their birthright. In response to this affront, says Stefani, the great families boycotted the regime and left the city to live in their country estates. An examination of the lists of priors between September 1378 and February 1382 confirms the essence of Stefani's conclusion. The prestigious and traditionally powerful aristocracy was reduced to a meager represer tation in the Signoria, while another wave of new men, comparable to that of the 1340s~dominated the executive branch of communal government. Of the 189 individuals drawn for and seated in the Signoria over this period, only some twelve to fifteen came from families that can be identified as belonging to the traditional inner elite of communal politics: men such as Andrea di messer Francesco Salviati, Francesco di Neri Ardinghelli, Matteo di Niccolb Corsini, Filippo di Tommaso Corbinelli, Alberto di Bonaccorso Alberti, Niccolb di Iacopo de' Vecchietti, Piero di Neri Pitti, Manetto di Neri de' Medici, Manetto di Giovanni Davanzati, Messer Giovanni di messer Francesco Rinuccini, and Messer Pazzino di messer Francesco Str~zzi.'~" Beyond these was a cluster of priors from well-placed proved in the scrutinies of 1348, 1352, and 1355 ranged from 235 to 272, whereas they numbered between 365 and 423 in the scrutinies of 1358, 1361, and 1364 (Florentine Politics, p. 160). 130. Some others who might be ranked with these include Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, Marco d'uberto degli Strozzi, Giovanni d'Amerigo Del Bene, and Lionardo di Bartolino Salimbeni. Giorgio Scali and Jacopo di messer Tommaso Strozzi, who sat on the Signoria, respectively, in September-October 1378 and May-June 1380, also belonged to aristocratic families, but their selection can hardly have been pleasing or comforting to the oligarchy. In fact, Scali, one of the

The Last Challenge of Corporatism, 1378-1382

261

families of a somewhat lower rank: Tigliamochi, Alderotti, Guidetti, Bonaiuti, Machiavelli, and a few others. But even their inclusion in any calculation of the presence of the traditional elite in the executive branch of government in this period brings the total to no more than about twentyfive, or 13 percent of all the priors. Among the great families, only the Strozzi were fortunate enough to place more than one prior in office (three, in fact: Pazzino, Marco d'uberto, and Jacopo di messer Tommaso). More significant still is the complete absence from these lists of a score or more of families that had earlier held and would later regain center stage in the Florentine political theater: Albizzi, Ricci, Rucellai, Acciaiuoli, Canigiani, Ridolfi, Capponi, Baroncelli, Guicciardini, Spini, Altoviti, and many 0thers-all pillars of the traditional establishment and all shut out of the Signoria during the three and a half years of the guild government. In the forty-two months of this regime, the pre-1343 families accounted for only 16 percent of the posts (31 of 189). By contrast, over the next eighteen years, from March 1382 to the end of 1399, they held no less than 41 percent (398 of 977)Not counting the two minuti who were ejected from the Signoria on 2 September 1378 after only one day in office, the 189 available posts between September 1378 and February 1382 were held by 189 individuals from 186 different families, for an astonishingly low ratio of only I .02 posts per family over three and a half years. One hundred of these families made their first appearance in the Signoria during this period and collectively held 53.4 percent of all the posts (101 of 189).l3' The rate of admission of new families was equivalent to 4.76 families per term of office, almost exactly the rate sustained by the guild government of the 1340s. However, only thirty-seven of these hundred new families maintained any represenregime's most influential leaders, was executed in January 1382; Jacopo Strozzi, the son of another patrician ally of the guild government, was fined and deprived of the right to hold office. See Stefani, Cronaca, r. 901, p. 393, and r. 910, p. 401. 131. Summarizing the participation of the older, more recent, and new families in the Signoria between September 1378 and February 1382: Number of Families Pre-1343 families 1343-78 families 1378-82 families Totals

29 57

Number of Posts 31 57

Percentage of Posts

100

IOI

16.4 30.2 53.4

186

189

100.0

Source: Pt-iorista Mariani I-V, in Manoscritti, 248-52

262

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

tation in the Signoria over the next eighteen years. The proportion of major to minor guildsmen in this regime was, of course, determined by the adequatio membrorum: over twenty-one terms of office, ninety-four maggiori and ninety-five minori were seated in office (again, not counting the two minuti excluded on 2 September 1378). Of the ninety-five minon', at least twenty came from the various affiliated membra of the two new guilds of the Tintori and the Farsettai, which thereby accounted for almost I I percent of the officeholders in these years. Even among the major guildsmen, the great majority came from the non-elite ranks of their guilds: men such as the hatmaker Agnolo di Puccio, the stockingmaker Lorenzo di Romeo, the retail cloth dealer Piero di Ser Chiaro, the furrier Francesco di Manetto, the goldsmith Bonaccorso di Vanni, the glassmaker Giovanni di Benci, and many others of similar stature.'32 Only with the massive introduction of such non-oligarchic maggiori into the bone did the major guilds succeed in filling even the half of the posts assigned to them. In the light of these political realities, it is little wonder that, even during the apparently quieter years of 1380 and 1381, the hostility of the oligarchic families toward this most democratic of Florentine corporate regimes did not abate. 132. The prior lists are published in Stefani, Cronaca, rr. 803, 808, 811, 813, 816,817,819, 823,841,848, >81,879,859,854, 345-46,348,361-62,367-68,372,374,383,384, 389, 391. The data on the new families is from the Priorista Mariani V, in Manoscritti, 252, ff. 1001-71.

Eight Consensus and Controls, I 382- 1400

To pass the threshold of 1382 in the history of Florentine electoral politics is to enter territory whose configuration has recently been charted in considerable detail and whose chief characteristics are now being integrated into an overall view of the polity that emerged in Florence in the crucial half century of transition between the termination of the guild regime in 1382 and the affirmation of the Medicean system in 1434. Because of the survival of several complete (or nearly complete) lists of nominees and vote totals from general scrutinies held in 1382,1391, 141I , and 1433, the electoral history of these years can be illustrated through a wealth of data that is simply not available for the earlier period. Only in the last few years, however, have historians begun to make systematic and serious use of these valuable electoral records. The assessment of the results and general political significance of these scrutinies has been a central part of the effort to understand the nature of the "ruling class" or reggimento during the years that witnessed the conflict with Milan, the successful expansion of the territorial state, and the growth of civic humanism. To a great extent the special attraction of the problem for the present generation of historians has been inspired by the work of Hans Baron, whose interpretation of the intellectual and cultural changes of the early Renaissance rests in part on an optimistic evaluation of the commitment of the Florentine upper classes to a broadly based system of participatory politics.' The need to probe this view of Florentine politics in the age of civic humanism suggested the importance of a systematic analysis of the electoral scrutinies and the patterns of officeholding in the period. The most valuable contributions to this investigation in the last ten years or so have been made by Anthony Molho, Dale Kent, Ronald Witt, and Gene B r u ~ k e rTheir . ~ researches have tested and confirmed a cardinal fact in the I . See especially Hans Baron's essay, "The Social Background of Political Liberty in the Early Italian Renaissance," Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (1960): 440-51, and The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1966). 2. Anthony Molho, "Politics and the Ruling Class in Early Renaissance Flor-

264 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics electoral history of the period: in this, the era.of oligarchy and the Albizzi, more Florentines than ever before were nominated and approved for the highest communal offices. This indisputable conclusion ill accords with the age's older reputation for narrow oligarchy and, according to some, the hegemony of a few bosses. Yet evidence for restrictive tendencies in the domestic politics of the period is not lacking either, and the same historians who have documented the expansion of the political class have also emphasized patterns of elitism based on a contracting center of power. To some, the convergence of these lines of inquiry seems a contradiction, and the effort to resolve or eliminate this apparent paradox is a problem that remains at the heart of any attempt to understand the politics of the post-1382 era. In this concluding chapter, such an effort will be made. In part it will seek to build on the solid analytical and statistical foundations provided by Molho, Kent, Witt, and Brucker, but it will also make use of the perspectives offered in the preceding chapters by trying to understand the electoral reforms and trends of the crucial decade from 1382 to 1393 as a consciously articulated response to, and repudiation of, the corporate approach to electoral politics. It will be the theme of this chapter that the Florentine upper classesboth the oligarchy and much of the non-oligarchic community of the major guilds as well-embraced, hesitatingly but ineluctably, a consensusbased system of electoral politics. This system permitted both an enlargement of participation, thereby expanding the area of political consensus, and a tightly centralized procedure for the approval and election of candidates, in turn eliminating the danger that broadened participation might generate either a stable opposition party or renewed popular challenges to oligarchic hegemony. Such a policy was pursued as the surest and safest way of satisfying the demands for a more broadly based polity that had surfaced so explosively in 1378. At the same time it stifled the decentralizing forces of an electoral system that had attempted to meet such demands by implementing corporate notions of the equal and autonomous role of guilds or groups of guilds. To put it another way: the post-1382 regime realized that the clock could not be turned back to the relatively more reence," Nuova Rivista Sto-rica 52 (1968): 401-20, and "The Florentine Oligarchy and the Balie of the Late Trecento," Speculum 43 (1968): 26-27; Dale Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento in the Fifteenth Century," Renaissance Quarterly 28 (1975): 575-638; Ronald G. Witt, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class, 1382- 1407," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 (1976): 243-67; Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1977), chaps. 2 and 5 .

Consensus and Controls, 1382 -1400 265 stricted political class of the years of stability from 1348 to the mid-1370s~ much less to the narrow oligarchy of the 1330s. But if the numerical expansion of the officeholding class had somehow to be accepted as a permanent acquisition of the Florentine political system, the upper class was at least determined never again to acquiesce in the corporatism that had sustained and accompanied that expansion in the 1340s and again between 1378 and 1382. The separation of corporatism from the satisfaction of the general demand for broad participation in communal politics was the chief task and accomplishment of the electoral reforms from 1382 to 1393. Although the fullest expansion of the political class and the highest development of the attitudes of civic loyalty and commitment that were the very stuff of consensus politics lay far off in the years after 1400, the crucial task of the suppression of corporatism in Florentine electoral politics was for all practical purposes achieved by 1393. From 1382 to 1393 the Florentine oligarchy created the conditions for the politics of consensus on which the republicanism of civic humanist Florence was built. By the end of 1381 aristocratic opposition to the guild government had reached the point where drastic steps were needed to ensure the survival of the regime. On 19 October the councils approved an extraordinary measure that amounted to an open repudiation of the policy of electoral compromise instituted in 1379. By thin majorities of 167 to 79 and 97 to 48, a special balia was set up for a period of ten days with the authority to deprive individuals considered suspect or hostile to the regime of the right to hold office and to declare these or any other persons magnates. The petition requesting the balia was submitted on behalf of the nine councillors of the Mercanzia, the four preposti of the guild community, and the consuls and members of all twenty-three guilds, "so that the merchants and guildsmen may live in peace and tranquillity and more freely attend to their businesses and professions." Included among the members of this elec3. PR, 70, ff. I ISV- I 16: ". . . pro conservatione securitate atque augment0 presentis liberi ac pacifici status civitatis predicte et ad hoc ut cives et comitatini certique supponiti populo et comuni predictis et maxime mercatores et artifices cum pace ac quiete vivere et ipsorum mercantiis et artibus liberius actendere possint." The balia was instructed to "removere et privare et inhabilitare quibuslibet offitiis et ad quelibet offitia comunis civitatis comitatus et districtus Florentie in perpetuum et seu ad tempus ut et tamquam subspectos sive hodiosos presenti libero et pacific0 statui . . . omnes et singulos de quibus . . . per eos . . . ordinatum provisum . . . vel deliberatum fuerit. Et etiam possint . . . deliberare et providere quos volent esse et censendos esse magnates."

266

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

toral review committee were the three executive colleges, the non-magnate captains of the Parte Guelfa, the Dieci di LibertB, the Otto di Guardia, the Nine of Mercanzia, the four preposti of the guilds, and one consul and one other member,from each of the twenty-three guilds, for a total of 123. Even in this last gasp of the guild government, the regime remained faithful to its central constitutional principle: the forty-six direct representatives of the guilds were to be elected autonomously within each guild, either by the consuls alone or together with some of the member^.^ Each morning for the duration of the balia the Signoria was required to convene the committee in the palazzo and to keep it there until evening, which suggests that its task of purging the electoral lists of all enemies of the regime was viewed with considerable urgency. Stefani reports that only one person, Lapo di Vanni Rucellai, was relegated to the ranks of the magnates, but all those who had been convicted as rebels or conspirators against the government since the fall of 1378 were barred from the executive colleges for ten years. Moreover, in an obvious attempt to reduce even further the already meager presence of the great families in communal politics, this penalty was extended to the fathers, sons, and brothers of convicted rebels. Although he omits to give the names of those affected by the balia's decree, Stefani does say that there were many.5 The essentially negative and defensive purpose of this last effort'to use the decentralized pressures of the guild community against the families of the aristocracy reveals the weakness into which the popular government had fallen. Stefani suggests a direct link between the protests engendered by the work of the electoral review committee in October and the outbreak of counterrevolution in J a n ~ a r y The . ~ specific events that led to the collapse of the regime, the exile and execution of its leaders, and the reforms of the balie from January to March of 1382 have often been described, most recently by Brucker.' For the purposes of this study, it is important 4. Ibid., f. 116: "Qui quidem Consules et Artifices ut prefertur in numero pretassato eligi possint et debeant . . . per offitium cuiuslibet consulatus in arte sua per se ipsos tantum Consules aut euam una cum adiunctis quos ad ipsam electionem sic fiendam habere voluerint." 5 . Stefani, Cronaca, rr. 899 and 900, p. 392. Curiously, for someone who complained often and bitterly about the role o f the guilds i n these years, Stefani fails to mention the inclusion o f the representatives o f the guilds on the electoral review committee o f October 1381. 6. Ibid., r. 901, p. 392. 7. Brucker, Civic World, pp. 60-67. See also Niccolb Rodolico, La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto, 1378-1382 (1905; reprint ed., Rome, 1970), pp. 40421; and Antonio Rado, Dalla repubblicafiorentina alla signoria medicea: Maso degli

Consensus and Controls, 1382 -1400

267

to underscore Stefani's observation that the balia of January, limited and moderate as its achievements may have been, represented the insurgency of those leading families that had been slighted for three years by the guild government and threatened with disenfranchisement for a decade by the electoral review committee of the previous October. Following the execution of several key leaders of the disintegrating popular regime, "the families of Florence, both magnates and popolani, rose in arms and ran to the square, where they caused a parlamento to be summoned and gave full powers" to a special committee for the reform of the g o ~ e r n m e n tThe .~ event was then celebrated by the elevation of twenty persons to the dignity of knighthood. No less than nineteen of them were from the most illustrious families of the aristocracy, including many of those that had been excluded from elective politics since 1378: men such as Stoldo Altoviti, Donato Acciaiuoli, Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi, Iacopo Tornaquinci, Cristofano Spini, Gherardo Buondelmonti, Vanni Castellani, Filippo Adimari, Bello Mancini, Giovanni Rucellai, Luigi Guicciardini, Tommaso Soderini, and Baldo Tosinghi, as well as other lesser lights and a few (Michele de' Medici, Cipriano and Andrea Alberti) whose families had fared more successfully in the years of guild governmentagTheir knighthood symbolized the return of the "famiglie" to the helm of communal politics. At the same time, the constitutional basis on which the balia was instituted and selected indicated just as clearly the decline of the guilds and the suppression of the corporate principles that had been the foundation of their government. Popular consent remained the legitimating principle of the counterrevolution just as it had been for the guild regime, but whereas the latter, operating in a framework of decentralized and federated sovereignty, had looked to the representatives of equal and autonomous corporations for the expression of that consent, the balia of January 1382 advanced a notion of the popular will as unitary and general, as belonging to the "whole people" and capable of being expressed only through a general Albizzi e il partito oligarchic0 in Firenze dal 1382 a1 1393 (Florence, 1926). The older treatments o f these events b y Gino Capponi, Storia della Repubblica di Firenze, 2 vols. (Florence, 1879, I :367-75; and F.-T. Perrens, Histoire de Florence depuis ses origines jusqu'ri la domination des Medicis, vol. 5 (Paris, 1880), pp. 36890, and vol. 6 (Paris, 1883)~pp. I -20, have long been outdated. The most detailed account, and still perhaps the most valuable, is in Stefani, Cronaca, rr. 901-23, P P . 393-4138. Stefani, Cronaca, r. 902, p. 393. 9. The list o f new knights is given by Stefani, ibid., and by Naddo di Ser Nepo in his chronicle, in Delizie, 18 :39-40.

268 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics convocation, or parlamento, of the same. In the words of its enabling act: "The needed reforms cannot be legitimately carried out without the full, free, total, and absolute power and authority of the whole Florentine people, and unless the whole people, convened to hear these proposals, expresses its consent as required. This authority cannot lawfully be granted, nor this consent given . . . except through a parlamento, and by the convocation of the whole Florentine people in a general assembly." 'O There is no mention here of the guilds as the vehicles for 'the articulation of consent, and the substitution of the "whole people," expressing its will as a sovereign single entity, for the corporate view of the body politic as the federation of a multiplicity of entities, each with a will of its own, was the constitutional foundation of consensus politics. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the membership of the balia of 1382, unlike those of 1378, contained no representatives of the guilds. The Signoria, the executive colleges, and two members each from the Parte captains, the Dieci di Liberta, and the Nine of Mercanzia were joined by fifty-two appointed arroti, "omnes cives honorabiles florentini." " Although many of the arroti were identified as guildsmen, they were not appointed by their guilds and did not serve as their representatives. The balia's task was all-encompassing: to produce "a new order of things and a new government (novus status novumque regimen)" for the city of Florence, and to repeal or revise the "badly conceived" innovations of the recent past.'* One of its chief aims was a thorough overhauling of the electoral system and the preparation of a general scrutiny to fill a new set of bone in place of those of 1378 and 1379. On 21 January it began by abolishing the guilds of the Tintori and the Farsettai, created in the summer of 1378 as the twenty-second and twenty-third guilds of the corporate 10. Balie, 17, f. 5 : "quod ea que expediunt nullo mod0 exequi valent sine plenaria libera totali et absoluta potestate et auctoritate totius populi florentini et nisi totus populus convocetur cui expedientia proponantur et eius voluntas ut expedit exquiratur et quod huiusmodi auctoritas juridice haberi non valet nec voluntatis exquisitio, maxime considerato more in populo florentino hactenus observato, nisi per viam parlamenti et convocationis ad parlamentum totius populi florentini et per adunantiam generalem." 11. Ibid., ff. 6v-8. The balia's members are listed in Stefani, Cronaca, r. 903, pp. 395-96. The names of the fifty-two arroti are also given by Naddo d i Ser Nepo, in Delizie, 18 :41-42. 12. Balie, 17, f. 6: "maxime ut novus status novumque regimen ordinetur et fiat in ipsa civitate et pro exaltatione augment0 et conservatione guelforum et partis guelforum dicte civitatis et ut que male seu minus bene gesta hactenus fuerunt revocentur et debite corrigantur."

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

269

federation. Members of the defunct guilds either were returned to the jurisdiction of the guilds that had formerly controlled them-for the most part to the major textile guilds, the Lana and Por Santa Maria-or were assigned to a guild designated by the Signoria. Even though they became members of major guilds (or, more accurately, sottoposti with limited political rights), the balia decreed that they would still be considered minor guildsmen and counted in the quota of the minon' if their name tickets were drawn from the existing bags.13 As it turned out, however, these bags were never used again. On 23 January a new scrutiny was announced, to be conducted as soon as possible, and on the next day, claiming that such was the wish of the "assembly of the Florentine people," the balia declared the existing borse null and void and had all the name tickets in them burned.14On 27 January the procedure for the new scrutiny was outlined. Nominations were requested from the sixteen gonfalonieri and from the guilds, but not from the Parte Guelfa.Is Over the next few days, each of the Sixteen prepared and submitted separate lists'for the major guildsmen (and scioperati) and minor guildsmen of his gonfalone.I6 The nominations from the guilds were then examined for any names not contained in the lists of the gonfalonien', to which they were appended as arroti (or additi) per artes." No restrictions of 13. Ibid., ff. 14v-15. 14. Ibid., f. 17v: "audita congregatione populi florentini et ipsis relato quod intendunt et volunt quod cedule existentes in bursis offitiorum prioratus et Vexilliferatus Iustitie et eorum collegiorum combura[n]tur et similiter registra ipsorum offitiorum." This is confirmed by Naddo di Ser Nepo: "Detto di [24 January] s'arm6 il popolo, e prese, e posesi in Mercato nuovo, domandando alli Signori, che tutti li Squittini s'ardessero" (Delizie, 18 :44). See also Stefani, Cronaca, r. 906, p. 398. IS. Balie, 17, f. 21v. 16. The lists of fourteen of the sixteen gonfaloni, with the vote totals in the scrutiny, are in Tratte, 396. They were published, with a small number of errors and omissions, in Delizie, 16 :125-249. The missing gonfaloni are Scala and Nicchio in Santo Spirito. 17. These additions from the guilds were not very significant, at least as far as the results of the scrutiny were concerned. In the fourteen gonfaloni for which the lists of nominations have survived, the major guilds nominated 182 persons not included in the lists prepared by the gonfalonieri. However, only two of these obtained two-thirds majorities in the voting: Piero di Simone Orlandini, a woolencloth manufacturer from Lion Nero in Santa Croce, and Stagio di Barduccio, a druggist from Chiavi in San Giovanni; see Delizie, 16: 167 and 238. The minor guilds added only seventy-four nominees to the lists, and not a single one was approved by the scrutiny committee.

270 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics any sort whatsoever were placed on the nomination of candidates. The balia's policy on this matter was extremely liberal. It aimed at avoiding controversy over the eligibility of candidates by stating that anyone actually voted on by the scrutiny committee would be considered legitimately nominated, without the necessity of any further proof or demonstration of qualifi~ation.'~ At least part of the significance of this open approach to nominations was that it deprived the guilds of the right they had gained in 1378 to determine the eligibility of candidates and thereby to influence the size and composition of the political class.lg The result was that approximately 5,350 Florentines were nominated for the scrutiny of the three executive colleges in 1 3 8 2 . ~Although ~ this came fairly close to the 6,000 nominees estimated for the scrutiny of August 1378, the distribution among the groups of guilds was radically different. In 1378 the nominations of major guildsmen (and scioperati) were probably no more than about 2,750;' or less than half of the total, whereas in 1382 they exceeded 3,800, amounting to 71 percent of all the nominations. Minori nominations remained almost exactly at their 1378 level. There were of course no separate nominations of minuti as in 1378, but some of the former minuti, newly assigned by the balia as members of the major textile guilds, found their way into the scrutiny in the lists of the maggiori. However, only a small portion of the substantial increase in maggiori nominations is attributable to the relocation and nomination of for. ~ far ~ the most significant aspect of the 1382 nominations mer m i n ~ t iBy 18. Balie, 17, f. 21v: "illi quoque intelligantur sic esse reducti qui demum scruptinati reperientur, nec expediat de hoc aliter fieri fides." 19.See above, chap. 7. 20. An exact count is impossible because of the two missing gonfaloni in Santo Spirito. For the other fourteen districts, Kent has counted 3,368 major guildsinen and scioperati and 1400 minor guildsmen ("The Florentine Reggimento," p. 633). Assuming that the proportion of nominees from Scala and Nicchio v i s - h i s the total number of nominations was not very different in 1382 from what it was in 1391 (when these two gonfaloni produced 527 of the 4,584 maggiori nominations and 159 of the 1,726 minon nominations), one can estimate that some 450 or so major guildsmen and 140 minor guildsmen from these two gonfaloni should be added to the 1382 totals counted by Kent. 21. See above, chap. 7. 22. A survey of the lists yields only 34 tinton', 19 farsettai, 24 cimatori, 9 tiratori, 12 conciaton', and smaller numbers of the other categories of minuti. The largest contingent is in the list of the gonfalone Vaio in San Giovanni, which includes 13 tintmi and a total of 28 minuti in all categories. No other gonfalone nominated more than 14 (Ruote in Santa Croce), and in eight of the districts the nominated minuti

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

271

was the inclusion in the lists of what must have been nearly the entire population of the major guilds. Indeed, just about everyone who was not a minor guildsman, a former minuto, a sottoposto, or a worker of any description was nominated for this scrutiny. The decision to include an overwhelming majority of the city's major guildsmen and members of the great families in the electoral process was the first and most basic step in the implementation of a system of electoral politics based on upper-class consensus, and it established a secure pattern for the future. Because the 1382 scrutiny was held under the special constitutional authority of a balia, the normal statutory regulations governing the size and composition of the scrutiny committee did not necessarily obtain. Free to adopt procedures of its own choosing in this as in other matters pertaining to the scrutiny, the balia at first decided (24 January) that it would itself serve as the scrutiny committee, without the addition of any arrotLZ3Three days later, however, in order to achieve a decisive majority of major guildsmen among the scrutators, the balia reversed itself and decreed the appointment of forty-four arroti as supplementary members of the voting committee. The reason for this change was very probably that the balia, composed in part of committees whose membership was still regulated by the adequatio membrorum of the guild regime, was almost evenly divided between major and minor g u i l d ~ m e n Its . ~ ~oligarchic leaders may have feared that such a body could not be relied upon to produce a safe majority of major guildsmen and members of influential families among the approved candidates. Consequently, they opted for the remedy of applying were fewer than 10. Interestingly, the list from Vipera in Santa Maria Novella, which was prepared by the gonfaloniere Marchionne d i Coppo Stefani, whose hostility toward the guild of the dyers was among the chief causes of his opposition to the guild regime of 1378-82, contains not a single minuto, or at least no one identified as belonging to any of the ten or so most common categories of minuti (Delizie, 16: 177-82). The total of minuti nominations in all categories for the fourteen gonfaloni whose lists are extant is about 120. For all sixteen districts, 140 seems a reasonable estimate, and this represents only 13 percent of the increase in maggion' nominations from 1378 to 1382. 23. Balie, 17, f. 17v. 24. From the information provided by Stefani and Naddo di Ser Nepo, and from the list of members in Balie, 17, ff. 7-8, it seems that at best the major guildsmen had a bare majority of one within the balia. All of the constituent committees were evenly divided between maggion' and minori except for the Signoria, in which the minor guilds had the post of Standard-bearer of Justice and hence a 5 to 4 advantage, and the body of fifty-four arroti, among whom the major guilds enjoyed a majority of two.

272 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics to the scrutiny committee the same revised distributio between major and minor guildsmen that had been instituted a few days earlier for the membership of the three executive colleges of communal g o ~ e r n m e n t The .~~ new distributio (which was changed again on 17 February) called for maggiori advantages of 5 to 4 , 9 to 7, and 7 to 5 in the colleges, altogether a 21 to 16 division in favor of the major guilds and the sci~perati.~~ They calculated that this would require the appointment of forty-four additional scrutators (thirty-two maggian' and twelve minori), although they actually selected fifty-four, of whom forty were major guildsmen or scioperari. It was among these new arroti that such powerful figures as Niccolh da Uzzano, Piero Baroncelli, Vieri de' Medici, Maso degli Albizzi, Uguccione de' Ricci, Luigi Guicciardini, Filippo Corsini, Filippo Magalotti, and many other aristocrats became members of the voting committee for the 1382 scr~tiny.~' The addition of these fifty-four, together with the participation of one appointed member from each guildz8and the Otto di Guardia (Eight of Ward), resulted in a voting committee of 178 members, with a 99 to 79 advantage for the m a g g i ~ r i This . ~ ~ difference came very close to the stipulated distributio for the executive colleges. 25. Balie, 17, f. 21: "Decernentes et ordinantes quod totum corpus sive totus numerus eorum qui celebrationi dicti scruptinii interesse debent inter duo membra . . . debeat adequari, secundum partem utrumque membrurn tangentem decetero in supradictis offitiis pro quibus scruptinium fieri debet." 26. Ibid., f. 15v (22 January 1382). 27. The full list is in ibid., ff. 22-2zv; the procedure adopted for their selection, on f. 21. 28. The twenty-one guildsmen, like the arroti, were selected by the balia, not by the individual guilds; for their election and names, see ibid., ff. 21v-22. 29. The breakdown of the full voting committee for the scrutiny is as follows: maggiorilscioperati minori Signoria Twelve buoni uomini Sixteen gonfalonieri Eight of Ward (Otto di Guardia) Two of the Parte captains Two of the Dieci di Libertii Two of the Nine of Mercanzia Fifty-two arroti of the balia Fifty-four additional arroti Twenty-one guildsmen Totals: 178

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

273

For nearly two weeks, from 30 January to I I February 1382,~'the committee voted on most of the over five thousand names submitted by the gonfalonieri and the guilds. In keeping with tradition, the results were an official secret known only to the accoppiatori, their notaries, and staff (and presumably to those sufficiently influential or well-placed to have access to the voting records). Thus we should not imagine that the new configuration of the Florentine political class, as it emerged from the 1382 scrutiny, was at all clear to the majority of citizens in the immediate aftermath of the voting. What had been wrought by the balia and the arroti was gradually revealed to the citizenry with each bimonthly extraction of name tickets for the Signoria in the years that followed. Most upper-class Florentines, a majority of minor guildsmen, and a small but not insignificant number of former minuti could have been reasonably certain that their names had been placed in nomination, but they had to wait patiently, in some cases for many years, to learn the results of the balloting that had taken place back in the winter of 1382. The statistical summary of those results that historians now possess was therefore not common knowledge in 1382 and did not constitute a "political fact" to which most Florentines had any immediate reaction, positive or negative. Of the more than 3,800 major guildsmen and scioperati who were nominated, approximately 575 gained the approval of two-thirds of the scrutators. Among the minori, some 300 of approximately 1,550 candidates were successful.31Altogether, therefore, about 875 citizens out of 5,350 were approved and had their names placed in the borse for the executive colleges.32 Again, although the total of approved candidates was not very much less than that under the guild regime (if, for the latter, we accept Stefani's estimate of a thousand), the proportion of maggiori to minori was significantly altered. While the approved maggiori were on the increase, the number of 30. The dates of the scrutiny are given by Naddo di Ser Nepo, in Delizie, 18:44-45. 31. The exact count of successful candidates, as reported by Kent, for the fourteen gorrfaloni whose lists are extant is 487 major guildsmen and 265 minor guildsmen ("The Florentine Reggimento," p. 633). The figures in the text include my estimates for the two missing gorlfaloni. 32. Brucker's estimate of the total number of approved candidates in 1382 is between 800 and 850 (Civic World, pp. 62, 87). I am inclined to believe that it may have been closer to 900 in the light of Stefani's comment that there were enough name tickets in the borse to staff the Signoria for over seventeen years: "per lo vecchio [i.e., the scrutiny of 13821 ch'era per quello tempo, ve n'era tanti, che se bastato fosse, ve n'era per 17 anni o pih" (Cronaca, r. 921, p. 41I).

274 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

minori included in the borse was sharply reduced, perhaps by as much as 50 percent. The three hundred approved minor guildsmen still constituted one-third of the political class and were certainly more than had been a p proved in any scrutiny before 1378. But the trend inaugurated in 1382 was toward a definite limitation of their role in political life. In fact, just a few days after the conclusion of the scrutiny, the balia once again took up the issue of the distn'butio of seats in the executive colleges, reducing the share allotted to the minor guilds to only three seats in the Signoria, five in the college of the Sixteen, and four in that of the Twelve.33If, as some historians have justly claimed in recent years, the regime installed in 1382 was characterized by a high level of opportunity for new men and new families and by a considerable degree of political mobility, these opportunities were increasingly to be the privilege of the upper classes. Over the next few decades, open and comprehensive nominations became a standard feature of the Florentine electoral system. In keeping with the new regime's aim of overcoming, or at least stifling, the factional divisiolis within the upper class, the nominations for the next general scrutiny in 1385 were liberated from all restrictions relating to the past proscription of suspected Ghibellines. In 1382 a major controversy had developed over the readmission to their full political rights of persons who had been so victimized by the Parte Guelfa. A group of as yet unreconstructed reactionaries within the oligarchy tried unsuccessfully to have the former ammoniti and their descendents forever barred from all offices. This was thwarted by a compromise engineered by the moderates that still delayed their eventual rehabilitation for many years.34In order to lessen the bitterness resulting from this situation, the Signoria and the colleges insisted on the elimination of all such restrictions in 1385.~'At the same time, though: the captains of the Parte Guelfa were restored to their traditional role in the nominating process, together with the gonfalonieri and the guild cons u l ~perhaps , ~ ~ as a way of compensating the Parte hierarchy for its defeat on the issue of the ammoniti.Two years later, in 1387, another law recon33. Balie, 17, f. 47 (17 February 1382). 34. Stefani, Cronaca, rr. 916 and 921, pp. 407,41 I. 35. Biliotto Biliotti, speaking on behalf of the sixteen gonfalonieri in a pratica of 16 May 1385, supported this idea: "Quod reductiones scrutinii fiant indifferenter de omnibus etiam monitis secundum leges que de dicta materia loquuntur" (CP, 24, f. 65v). See also E. Bellondi, ed., Cronica volgare di anonimo firentino, in RRIISS, vol. 27, pt. 2 (Citti di Castello, 1915- IS), p. I I; Brucker, Civic World, p. 75; and Witt, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class," pp. 253-54. 36. PR, 74, f. 51v. The Parte captains were also included in the nominating process for the scrutiny of 1393 by the balia of that year (Balie, 17, f. I 17v).

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

275

firmed the eligibility for nomination of persons who were not active members of guildsa3'The net effect of this liberal nomination policy was to further increase the numbers of Florentine citizens admitted to the outer limits of the electoral process. The 1385 lists have not survived, but in I391 nominations were 18 percent greater than in 1382, rising from an estimated 5,350 to 6,310. Again, most of this increase came among the maggiori and scioperati (from about 3,800 to 4,584), although minori nominations gained as well (from roughly 1,550 to 1,726).~~ In the next scrutiny for which a complete set of lists has survived (that of 141I), nominations declined to 5,265 (3,910 maggiori and scioperati, and 1,355 minori), but this is in part to be explained by the sharp demographic contraction caused by recurrences of the plague. By 1433 nominations reached 6 ~ 5 4and , ~in~ 1484, far beyond the period under consideration in this study, they exceeded 8,00o.~~ Overall, therefore, the number of Florentines included in the electoral process almost doubled from the mid-fourteenth century to the early fifteenth century, an expansion whose real meaning lies in the fact that nearly every upper-class citizen had at least some initial hope of reaching the highest offices of the republic. Although the numbers of approved candidates were somewhat less in the scrutinies of both 1391 (677)4' and 1393 (619)~'than in 1382, they were still higher than in any pre-1378 scrutiny (with the possible exception of 1343). It was over the course of the next generation that the ranks of the imborsati really exploded, to 1,069 in 141I and to the astronomical total of 2,084 in 1 4 3 3 . ~Here ~ too, the significant increase came within the upper class. The number of approved minor guildsmen fell sharply from 1382 to 37. PR, 76, f. 54v. The nominating committees were instructed to register all candidates, "ut deinceps de illis qui scrutinabuntur pro aliquo offitio maior solita notitia habeatur," with their full names, including that of the family, or, lacking such, "cum appellatione artis quarn exerceret et si artem non exerceret reduci debeat cum nomine proprio et nomine patris et avi sui [italics added]." 38. The nomination figures for I391 are in Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," p. 633. Molho's count of maggion nominations for the same scrutiny is somewhat lower ("Politics and the Ruling Class," p. 405). 39. Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," pp. 587, 633. 40. Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494) (Oxford, 1966), p. 214. 41.Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," p. 633. 42. Molho, "The Florentine Oligarchy and the Balie," p. 27. Molho's count for 1393 is based on the alphabetical listing of successful candidates in Tratte, I 161, ff. 89-IO~V. 43. Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," pp. 587,633; Kent's breakdown of the scrutiny of 1433 by families is on pp. 624-32.

276 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics 1391 (from about 300 to I&), rose slightly in 1411 to 185, and regained or exceeded its 1382 level by reaching 327 in 1433. On the other hand, the totals of approved maggiori and scioperati, after a slight drop in 1391 vis-avis 1 3 8 2 , ~rose ~ dramatically to 884 iri 1411 and to 1,757 in 1 4 3 3 . ~The ~ impact of consensus politics in the age of civic humanism is nowhere better documented than in these figures. By the fourth decade of the fifteenth century, four to five times as many major guildsmen were being "prornised" the honor of high office than at any point before 1378. Such were the fruits of a generation of electoral reforms initiated in 1382 on the principle of upper-class consensus. This was one face of the electoral system that emerged after 1382: an enormous, if gradual, expansion of the numbers of Florentines admitted to the bags for the executive offices. At the same time, however, a series of checks and controls was instituted that prevented this enlargement of the political class from generating the sort of class antagonisms and conflicts that had accompanied earlier expansions in the periods of guild government from 1343 to 1348 and from 1378 to 1382. This other face of the post-1382 electoral system succeeded in excluding the guilds from any significant role in the electoral process, in keeping the participation of minor guildsmen at acceptable and innocuous levels, and in gradually reducing the influx of new families into the officeholding class, until, by the opening decade of the new century, the addition of new men reached its lowest point since the 1330s. Despite the potentially unwieldy growth in the numbers of imborsati, the implementation and refinement of these controls kept the whole system firmly anchored to the political interests of the families that collectively constituted the regime's inner circle. Two of these controls, a narrowly based system for the appointment of the scrutiny committee and the distribution of offices between maggion' and minori, were not new. The first was responsible for eliminating any vestiges of decentralized corporatism from the voting committee, whereas the second became the means for periodic reductions in the share of offices allotted to the city's minor guildsmen. By far the most important and original type of control, however, was the institution in 1387 of the borsellino, or little bag, a device that permitted a small group of powerful citi44. From approximately 575 to 535, for a decline of about 7 percent. Brucker, however, estimates the decrease at about 12 percent of the 1382 total (CivicWorld, p. 88). 45. Kent, "The Florentine Reggirnento," pp. 621,633.

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

277

zens to give preference in the sortition process to a preselected group of trusted candidates. In the long run, the policy represented by the institution of the borsellino undermined the free play of chance in the extraction of name tickets from the electoral bags and shifted the major emphasis in Florentine electoral politics from the scrutiny to the tratta. After the reforms of 1387 and 1393, and certainly by the early years of the new century, the most important decisions in the electoral process were no longer being made at the level of nomination or even at the level of the scrutiny. Just as the development of the scrutiny process in the mid-fourteenth century had permitted the expansion of nominations beyond the point where they represented a significant political selection, so the perfection of techniques for the control of the sortition process allowed the enormous growth in the numbers of approved candidates in the scrutinies after 1393. Except in October 1393, these techniques did not yet include the outright appointment (or handpicked election) of the Signoria by the ac~oppiatori.~~ But they did move in this direction by allowing the accoppiatori to decide which name tickets would be included in the borsellini. Only with the assurances provided by these three types of controls was the Florentine ruling class persuaded to indulge the momentum of consensus politics to the levels achieved in 141I and 1433. These mechanisms must now be considered in turn. After 1382, the composition of the voting committee for most general scrutinies (with the exception of the scrutiny of 1393, held under the authority of a balia) was about the same as before 1378: a core of ex officio members (the Signoria and colleges, captains of the Parte Guelfa, Mercanzia councillors, and the proconsul of the Giudici e Notai) supplemented by twenty-one guild consuls, one from each guild, and eighty arroti, five from each gonfalone. As in the 1350s and 1360s~the consuls and arroti, who together constituted two-thirds of the committee, were all selected by 46. According to Molho, the a mano election of the Signoria for NovemberDecember 1393 was the only instance of the direct appointment of the executive magistracy by the accoppiatoribetween 1382 and 1434; see "Politics and the Ruling Class," p. 412. Actually, however, it was the only instance of this practice before 1433, not 1434: in October 1433, just after the banishment of Cosimo de' Medici by the balia, the Signoria and the accoppiatori of that year's scrutiny were jointly entrusted with the direct election of the new Signoria of November-December; see Rubinstein, The Government of Florence, pp. 6-7. This minor observation does not, however, affect the significance of the point Molho sought to convey, namely, that the regime instituted in 1382 did not, except for the instance in 1393, make use of direct a mano elections, as did the Medici after 1434.

278

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

the Signoria and the college^.^' For the guild community this meant that even its limited representation on the scrutiny committee was not the result of a free selection of delegates by the individual guilds. T h e eighty arroti were also the handpicked choices of the three executive colleges, but their selection was affected by a decree of the balia of 1382, which stipulated that in all subsequent scrutinies the proportion governing the division of seats between maggiorilscioperati and minori on the executive committees was to be applied to the composition of the whole scrutiny committee as well.48 A permanent structural link was thus instituted between the number of minor guildsmen in high office and their representation on the scrutiny committees. Accordingly, in 1385, with the 2 :I ratio established in February 1382 in favor of the maggiorilscioperati still in force, two-thirds of the scrutiny committee were recruited from that sector and one-third from the minor guildsmen.49Although the authorization act of the balia of 1387 specifically prohibited that body from making any changes in the distributio,5O only two weeks following the conclusion of the baliays work, a proposal for its revision was submitted to the legislative 47. P R Y74, ff. 51-51v (for the scrutiny of 1385); PR, 87, f. 35ov (scrutiny of 1398); P R Y89, ff. 134-134v (scrutiny of 1400). In I404 the Otto di Guardia were added to the scrutiny committee (PR, 93, f. 77). See also Statuta populi zt communis Florentiae publica auctoritate collecta castigata et praeposita anno salutis MCCCCXV, 3 vols. (Freiburg, 1778-81), 2:481-82. In 1393 the scrutiny committee included, in addition to the usual ex officio committees, the Otto di Guardia, the 105 members of the balia itself (in place of the eighty arroti), and twentgone minor guildsmen appointed by the Signoria and the colleges (in place of the customary twenty-one consuls from twenty-one guilds); see Balie, 17, f. 117v (for the balia's decrees), and Tratte, 1161, ff. 105-1o8v (for the full list of scrutators:. The members of the voting committee for the scrutiny of 1398 are recorded in Tratte, 59, ff. 356-59. 48. Balie, 17, f. 46 (27 February 1382): "quad in quolibet et ad quodlibet scruptineum decetero faciendum pro aliquo offitio dicti comunis ad quod faciendum eligentur aliqui ultra offitium dominorum priorum et Vexilliferi Iustitie et eorum collegiorum fiat et fieri debeat equatio inter duo membra, . . . secundum partes tangentes cuilibet tali membro in tali offitio de quo fieret ipsum scruptineum, et hoc habito respectu ad totum numerum scruptinatorum." 49. PRY 74, f. 5IV. 50. P R , 76, f. 35v (3 May 1387). This and other limitations on the balia's powers were emphasized by contemporary observers (see Naddo di Ser Nepo, in Delizie, 18 :93; and Bellondi, Cronica volgare di anonimo, pp. 32-33), a clear indication of the controversy that surrounded the creation of the balia and the objectives of its leaders. For other evidence on this point, see Brucker, Civic World, p. 81,

Consensus and Controls, 1382 -1400

279

councils by the same Signoria that had summoned the balia. Over considerable opposition it passed and cleared the way for a new 3 : I advantage for the maggiori in the executive offices. Actually, the minor guildsmen were reduced to only two of the nine seats in the Signoria, and to four of sixteen among the gonfalonieri and three of twelve among the T w e l ~ e .At ~' the same time, the number of minor guildsmen to be included among the arroti in future scrutinies was fixed at two in each quarter of the city, for a total of only eight out of eighty.52Although these reforms still left the minor guildsmen with just under a quarter of the posts on the scrutiny committees, these minori were not selected by and did not represent their own guilds. The corporate constituencies could not therefore make their voices heard on anything like the autonomous and equal basis that had prevailed during the years of the guild g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~ 51. P R , 76, f. 52; Brucker, Civic World, p. 81. 52. PR, 76, f. 52. This actually left the minori with a slightly smaller proportional share of the scrutiny committee (35 of 154 scrutators, or 22.7 percent of the total) than they enjoyed in the three executive offices (9 of 37 seats, or 24.3 percent). The statutes of 1415 are somewhat confusing with regard to the participation of the minor guildsmen in the scrutinies. At first they say that one of the five arroti in each gonfalone must be a minore ("inter quos quinque sit unus de XIV. minorum artium") and that the minor guildsmen must not exceed one-fourth of the total number of arroti and guild consuls on the scrutiny committee ("faciendo tamen equationem in dictis duobus numeris vigintiunius et octuaginta, taliter quod in numero totali utriusque numeri non sit ultra quartam partem de numero XIV. minorum artium"); see Statuta, 2 :481-82. These guidelines are contradictory, because the combination of sixteen minor guildsmen among the arroti (one from each gonfalone) and the fourteen minor guildsmen among the appointed consuls amounts to a total of thirty minori, which is in excess of one-fourth of the IOI arroti and consuls. In apparent recognition of this contradiction, the statutes allowed for a reduction of the number of minori among the arroti ("et detractio fiat in numero LXXX. praedictorum"). A few lines further on, however, they incorporate the limitation (passed in 1387) of the minori among the arroti to only two from each quarter ("Et de dictis arrotis sint duo, et pro quolibet quarterio dictae civitatis, et non plures de membro quatuordecim minorum artium"); see ibid., p. 483. This seems to call for a total of only twenty-two minor guildsmen among the IOI consuls and arroti. 53. A later development in the selection of the arroti and the guild consuls for the scrutiny committees deserves to be mentioned. In 1406 it was decided that only persons who had previously held office in one of the three executive colleges or as a captain of the Parte Guelfa, or whose fathers, grandfathers, uncles, or brothers had held one of these offices, were eligible to be selected as arroti or consuls for the scrutiny committees (PR, 94, ff. 258-258~). This was a somewhat modified version of the similar restriction decreed by the balia of June 1378 (see above, chap.

280 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics The distributio, as we have seen, was used as a way of controlling both the number of minori in the executive colleges at any one time and the composition of the scrutiny committee. It was perhaps only logical therefore that it should also be applied to the results of the scrutinies. Thus, in both 1385 and 1393, the accoppiatori were authorized to adjust the numbers of approved candidates to conform with the prevailing proportions of maggiorilscioperati and minori in the Signoria and the colleges. In 1385 they met this requirement by adding to the roster of approved candidates as many minori as necessary to achieve an overall 2 : I ratio between the two categories in each quarter of the AS a result, the borse of 1385 must have contained the names of a sizable contingent of minor guildsmen who had failed to receive the minimum two-thirds of the votes in the scrutiny.55 This may have been one of the reasons why these bone were annulled by the balia of 1393 before any name tickets for the priorate had been drawn from them.56 In 1393 the procedure for attaining the new 3: I ratio in the borse involved two calculations. First, the accoppiatori had to make sure that at least two minor guildsmen were placed in the bags for the priorate far 7). In 1406 the qualifying offices were fewer than in 1378, but eligibility for the scrutiny committee could now be acquired through one's relatives as well as by personal tenure of the specified offices. This restriction goes far in explaining one of the chief features of the patterns of officeholding in this period, namely, that although a large number of individuals reached the priorate, the opportunities for new families in high office were sharply curtailed. For the evidence on this point, see the statistical analysis further on in this chapter. In effect, the law of 1406 opened up the scrutiny committee to the close relatives of former officeholden even as it closed the door to families previously unrepresented in the major offices or in the captaincy of the Parte. This regulation was incorporated into the communal statutes of 1415; see Statuta, 2 :483. 54. PR, 74, f. 52: "hoc addito quod si de membro quactuordecim minorurn Artium non obtinuissent in quolibet quarterio tot quot adscenderent ad medietatem illorum qui obtinuissent de membro septem maiorum Artium et scioperatorum, quod per accoppiatores dicti scrutinii . . . fiat et fieri possit et debeat equatio et additio ad supplementum dicti membri quactuordecim minorum Artium." 55. This was specifically prohibited in the case of major guildsmen and scioperati: "sed de membro septem maiorum Artium et scioperatorum, nullus imbursetur nisi qui obtinuerit per duas partes presentium ut prefertur" (ibid.). 56. The annulment of the 1385 borse is in Balie, 17, f. IOI (21 October 1393). That no names were ever drawn from them for the Signoria is apparent from the records of the extraction of name tickets in Tratte, 194 and 19qbis. Three names were, however, drawn from the 1385 bags on 28 April 1393 for the office of the Sixteen, all for the minor guilds; see Tratte, ~gqbis,no pagination.

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

28 I

every major guildsman selected by them for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice. For this purpose additional minori could be taken from the top of the list of unsuccessful candidates in the scrutiny, provided that they had received the votes of no fewer than half the scrutators. The second calculation was based on the stipulation that this enlarged group of minori whose name tickets were placed in the bags could not constitute more than one quarter of the overall total of imborsati, and the accoppiatori were apparently empowered to add the names of as many extra major guildsmen (or scioperati) as were necessary to guarantee a final 3 : I ratio in the Whereas in 1385 the implementation of the distributio required the extension of the privilege of office to a greater number of minor guildsmen than had been approved in the scrutiny, in 1393 it may have resulted in the extension of this privilege to a greater number of major guildsmen than had been approved. The actual number of imborsati was thus no longer necessarily equivalent to the number of candidates receiving two-thirds majorities in the voting. It could not of course be less than this total, but, depending on how many of the successful candidates were selected by the accoppiatori for the office of the Standard-bearer of Justice, it could conceivably have been greater. It is true that the accoppiatori had to exercise their discretionary powers within limits established by the results of the scrutiny (since any additional imborsati always had to come from the top of the list of candidates who failed to receive automatic qualification in the scrutiny), but the combination of their authority to designate the Standard-bearers of Justice and thereby to determine the number of minor guildsmen in the borse meant that they were in a position to determine the base numbers from which the distributio between major and minor guilds57. Balie, 17, f. 117v: "si pro equatione facienda in aliquo vel aliquibus quarteriis de artificibus habito respectu ad numerum Vexilliferorum Iustitie illius quarterii, videlicet quod pro quolibet Vexillifero quarterii non obtinuissent adminus duo artifices de membro quattuordecim minorum artium, quod de aliis artificibus ipsarum artium scructinatis pro ips0 quarterio adsumantur tot de illis in quorum partitis plures fabe reperientur quod supleatur numerus supradictus, ita tamen quod nullus ex dictis artificibus in cuius partito reperiretur numerus fabarum minor medietate scructinatorum tunc tali partito presentium non possit nec debeat aliqualiter imbursari, etiam si ob talem defectum numerus predictus non impleretur. Et insuper e converso fit equatio simili mod0 et effectu de et pro membro septem maiorum artium et scioperatorum in ill0 et pro illo quarterio et quarteriis in quo vel quibus non obtinuissent de ips0 membro tot quod essent in triplici numero cum artificibus qui in ipso quarterio obtinuissent, recte intelligendo ita quod artifices minorum artium non excedant secundum predicta omnibus qui obtinuissent cornputatis quartam partem."

282 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Polztzcs men had to be achieved. By manipulating these numbers, they could easily manage to include in the borse major guildsmen who had failed to gain two-thirds majorities in the scrutinies. To a certain extent, therefore, the powers acquired by the accoppiatori in this period began to undermine the authority of the scrutiny committee as the ultimate determinant of the size and composition of the officeholding class. And to the degree that these mechanisms resulted both in a concentration of electoral authority in the hands of the accoppiatori and in a further expansion of the numbers of Florentines whose names were included in the borse, they were fully consistent with the overall thrust of the electoral politics of consensus of the post-1382 generation. The single most important development among the institutions of electoral control, and the one that permitted the greatest growth in the powers of the accoppiatori, was the borsellino. A clear understanding of the way in which it was introduced and used in the sortition process requires a closer look at the watershed electoral reforms of the all-important balie of 1387 and 1393. The balia of 1387 is best known for its contribution to the destruction of the Alberti, and especially for the disgrace and exile of Benedetto Alberti. Brucker, however, has recently and quite rightly stressed the "broader political significance" of the anti-Alberti measures and the extent to which electoral issues and controversies surrounded the creation and the work of the balia. In a letter written on 4 May, just as the balia was being formed, one of its members, Lorenzo Buoninsegna, "reported widespread dissatisfaction with the traditional method of sortition." According to Brucker, "many felt that sortition left too much to chance; they favored some device for manipulating the electoral process to insure the selection of citizens loyal to the regime and to Guelf principles. Aristocrats had long felt that the list of eligibles in the 1382 scrutiny contained too many names from the lower echelons of the guild community: artisans, shopkeepers, professional men, petty entrepreneur^."^^ The reforms adopted in 1387 did not in any way reduce the numbers of such persons whose names were in the bags, and it was not until 1391 that a new scrutiny was held resulting in the approval of a substantially smaller body of eligibles. But, as Stefani observed, the bags of 1382 contained enough names to fill the available seats on the priorate for many years (until 1399, according to his 58. Brucker, Civic World, pp. 79-80. Curiously, however, Brucker does not directly link the balia of 1387 with the creation of the borsellino. He refers to "the plan for a special borsellino," reported by the author of the Minerbetti chronicle, but he does not give prominence to the new institution as one of the balia's major achievements (ibid., p. 81).

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

283

calc~lation).~~ And after these bags were exhausted, borse still remained from the apparently even more liberal scrutiny of 1385; these would have to be used in precedence over those of any subsequent scrutiny. It was thus clear that for the immediate future the pool of eligible candidates from which the officeholding class would be drawn could not be affected by a new scrutiny unless the procedures for the placement and extraction of the name tickets were modified. This was precisely the task that the balia of 1387 set for itself. On 5 May the balia began by declaring that anyone who had been approved in the scrutiny of 1385, but not in that of 1382, would be automatically included in the bags of the earlier year@ . ' According to the author of the chronicle attributed to Piero Minerbetti, this was done because of the "great desire" on the part of the balia that "certain citizens" who had not been approved in 1382 should nevertheless be placed in the bags and thereby become immediately eligible for high office. Those whom the balia intended to benefit were, he added, only a few, but the regulation was written and applied in "general" terms, with the result that almost four hundred names were added to the 1382 bags. This process was known as rimborsamento (and later as rimbotto) and was very soon regretted by the "good and wise citizens" on the grounds that "nothing like this had ever been done bef~re."~' On the same day, however, came an even more drastic departure from 59. In fact, however, because of the effect of the divieti and perhaps the manipulation of the borsellino as well, names from the I391 bags began to be drawn in late 1393, and by early 1398 some name tickets were being drawn from the 1393 bags; see Tratte, 194bis. 60. Cap. Prot., 9, f. 4v. 61. Bellondi, Cronica volgare di anonimo, p. 34: "e questo fu fatto per grande voglia c'aveano che alcuni cittadini fossero in quella borsa che non v'erano. Ma furon pochi; pure la legge fu generale e second0 che si disse di nuovo vi furon messi presso a quattrocento; fra' quali furon molti giovani di piccola eti, tanto che poi, quando erano tratti, si vedea chiaro che quello ch'era istato fatto di questo aggiugnere alle dette borse, era grande vituperio del Comune, e molto era biasimato day buoni e savi uomeni cittadini, dicendo che simile cosa non era stata fatta mai piu, perb ch'egli v'avea molti di quelli rimessi c'aveano ad aspettar pi6 di venti anni prima che esser potessono; perb che abbisognava che avessero almeno 30 anni prima che potessero essere." Actually, the balia established a minimum age limit of twenty-five for the priorate, the colleges, and all external offices. Only for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice was a minimum age of thirty required; see Cap. Prot., 9, ff. 4v- 5. On the later use of, and the controversies surrounding, the rimbotto, see Brucker, Civic World, pp. 412,476-77; and Rubinstein, The Government of Florence, p. 41.

284 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics custom. A special committee of accoppiatori, appointed by the balia, was authorized to make a selection of name tickets from the bags of both 1382 and 1385 and to place them in new and special ("nova et extraordinaria") bags, one for each quarter of the city. The candidates so designated constituted a preferential pool of eligibles, for which a specified number of seats in each future priorate was reserved. Since at first the balia decided that only one of the eight priors in each term of office should come from this borsellino, the accoppiatori were instructed to select as many candidates for this distinction as there were name tickets for the post of Standardbearer of Justice in the bags of each quarter for both 1382 and 1 3 8 5 . ~ This ~ is a detail of considerable importance (one that would assume even greater significance in 1393), for it had long been the constitutional responsibility of the accoppiatori to determine which and how many of all the candidates approved in any scrutiny would have their name tickets placed in the bags for the commune's highest office. In 1387, even though no scrutiny was held, the accoppiatori were authorized to designate for the office of Standard-bearer of Justice as many as they wished of the transfers from the 1385 to the 1382 bags.63The link between the number of designated Standard-bearers of Justice and the number of names to be included in the borsellino gave the accoppiatori a free hand in establishing just how many citizens would be accorded preferential electoral treatment through inclusion in the borsellino. On the very next day, 6 May, the balia proceeded to increase the number of seats reserved for the privileged eligibles of the borsellino from one to two, which also required the doubling of the number of 62. Cap. Prot., 9, f. 6v: "Item quod de his qui sunt imbursati ad offitium et seu pro offitio prioratus artium civitatis Florentie vigore scrutinii facti anno domini [138z] et similiter scruptinii facti anno domini [1385] ultra bursas consuetas et ordinatas imbursentur et imbursari possint et debeant in una alia bursa ordinanda er facienda pro et in quolibet quarterio dicte civitatis, tot quot numero sunt imbursati in ipso tali quarterio pro offitio Vexilliferatus Iustitie, et fiat talis imbursatio de prudentioribus ex imbursatis predictis secundum quod crediderint prudentiores esse illi qui huiusmodi imbursationes facere habuerint. Et quod tempore quo extrahetur offitium prioratus possit et debeat de dicta nova et extraordinaria bursa extrahi unus pro et de illo quarterio unde tunc fuerit Vexillifer Iustitie qui tunc offitium erit finiturus, et alii priores extrahantur de bursis ordinariis more consueto." This procedure was to be followed in all future scrutinies: "Et quod similis modus ordo et forma observetur et fiat et observari et fieri debeat in auolibet et de quolibet scrutinio pro offitio prioratus artium civitatis Florentie decetero celebrando, et in scrutiniis celebrandis huiusmodi imbursationes fiant et fieri possint er debeant per coppulatores scrutinii" (ibid., f. 7). 63. Ibid., f. 16.

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

285

names to be included in the new bags.64In effect this meant that as early as 1387 fully one-third of the Signoria (the Standard-bearer of Justice and two priors) was drawn from a small group of eligibles whose configuration was decided by a tiny committee of accoppiatori. The implications and potentialities of the borsellino, however, reached beyond the number of seats reserved for this preferential group. More generally, the borsellino weakened the central role of the scrutiny in the electoral process by dividing the class of eligibles into two distinct categories and creating two separate tracks to high office, each operating from a different base and on a different schedule. The balia stipulated that if, at the time of any future drawing of name tickets, no qualified candidates remained in the borsellino of a given year and scrutiny, the designated seats in the Signoria would be filled from the borsellino of the next scrutiny and not from the regular bags of the first scrutiny.65To give a hypothetical example: if in the year 1392 no name tickets remained in the borsellini of 1382 or 1385 (or if those remaining belonged to persons temporarily disqualified by a divieto or by absence from the city), the two places on the Signoria to be filled from the borsellino would not have been filled by other candidates from the bags of 1382 or 1385. Even though many names remained in these bags, those two seats would have been filled from the borsellino of 1391. Thus, candidates duly approved in the earlier scrutinies, whose names had not yet been drawn for office, would have been passed over in favor of others approved in a later scrutiny and selected for the borsellino by its accoppiatori. In this way the borsellino violated one of the cardinal principles of the scrutiny system, namely, that before any name tickets could be drawn from the bags of a later scrutiny, all of those from earlier scrutinies had to have been drawn at least once.66The realization of 64. Ibid., f. 16v: "et cum videatur de duobus melius providere, quod semper in qualibet extractione offitii prioratus extrahantur et extrahi debeant duo de bursis predictis ad hec ordinatis de duobus quarteriis. . . . Et quod ubi in dicto primo capitulo disponitur quod in bursa pro predictis ordinanda pro quolibet quarterio imbursentur tot numero quot sunt seu erunt imbursati Vexilliferi Iustitie, possint et debeant imbursari in quolibet quarterio de predictis pro quolibet Vexillifero duo de dictis aliis de quibus supra disponitur." 65. Ibid., ff. 6v-7: "Et quod quandocumque occurreret quod de dicta bursa extraordinaria non posset haberi prior aut propter devetum aut mortem absentiam vel inhabilitatem seu renuntiationem aut quia in illa non esset aliqua cedula seu alia causa quod tunc et qualibet vice qua sic occurreret possit et debeat fieri extractio de bursa illius quarterii ordinata et facta de scrutinio proxime et immediate sequente." 66. A rule categorically reaffirmed as recently as 1385 in the regulations for that

286 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics the "promise" of office made to each eligible candidate approved in the scrutiny (but not selected for the borsellino by the accoppiaton')could easily have been deferred for years, perhaps even beyond the lifetime of many of them. In sum, the preferential treatment given to the few who were in the good graces of the accoppiaton' drastically reduced the chances of the many who were not. According to the author of the Minerbetti chronicle, it was precisely the "division of the citizens" into two separate categories that made the borsellino so objectionable in certain quarters. He felt no hesitation in asserting that those whom the accoppiatori selected for the borsellino were persons '.'very loyal to their regime (molto confidenti a110 stato loro)." "And when the new priors were drawn, the citizens said: Which priors are the ones from the borsellino? And it [the borsellino] continued to be much criticized by the good citizens, because it did not seem to them a good thing to make such divisions among the citizens, and especially among relati~es."~'This interesting comment on the borsellino underscores the negative impact of the new institution on the illusion, fostered by almost sixty years of experience with the scrutiny system, that Florence was governed by a unified political class whose individual members enjoyed a roughly equal measure of opportunity in political life. Henceforth, with each new priorate, everyone would be anxious to identify the "priors of the borsellino," knowing that they, confdenti a110 stato loro, represented the regime, the inner circle of the powerful. The distinction in the public mind between the few handpicked choices of the oligarchy and the rest of the officeholding class-the very awareness that among the nine theoretically equal members of the Signoria three belonged to the center of power, while the rest were there by chance-was the result of the institutionalization of a two-tiered system of political opportunity. It was an attitude, and a system, that sharply distinguished between the "outsiders" and the "insiders." The deliberations of the balia of 1387 do not reveal the identity of the accoppiaton who carried out the first rimborsamento and the filling of the year's scrutiny: "donec duraverint imbursationes pro dictis offitiis hactenus facte et ad presens vigentes, de ipsis dumtaxat fiant et fieri possint et debeant extractiones" ( P R Y74, f. 52v). 67. Bellondi, Cronica volgare di anonimo, p. 35: "E quando si cavavano i nuovi Priori, diceano i cittadini: quali sono i Priori del borsellino? e fue ancora quello molto biasimato da' buoni cittadini, per6 che non pareva lor0 che fosse bene di fare alcuna divisione tra cittadini e massimamente tra congiunti."

Consensus and Controls, 1382 -1400

287

first borsellino. They do say that they were four in number (two major guildsmen, one scioperato, and one minor guildsman) and were elected by the balia from its own r n e m b e r ~ h i pOne . ~ ~ important clue to the political orientation of the accoppiatori is the fact that they were joined in their work by the incumbent Standard-bearer of Justice, Bardo Mancini, of whom one contemporary chronicler said that lie "was the whole of that priorate" and that "in his term of office great things were accomplished in all of which he was personally involved." On I July, when he left office, he was showered with gifts by the Parte Guelfa. They gave him a horse, the standard of the Parte, a shield with its coat of arms, and other gifts amounting in value to the sizable sum of two hundred florins.69That the Parte was so pleased with the work of Bardo Mancini and the balia that he headed is strong evidence that the electoral reforms of 1387 signally benefited the great families of the oligarchy.'O The instruments invented in 1387 were finely honed and perfected by the balia of October 1393. The events for which this balia, like that of 1387, is most remembered involve the continuing tragedy of the Alberti and the rumors and repression of an alleged conspiracy against the regime." But the balia's leaders came well prepared with a detailed program of electoral reforms that was hardly the product of a sudden reaction to unexpected crisis. This is not to say that the October crisis was manufactured by the Albizzi or anyone else as a mere pretext for constitutional and electoral changes, but only that these changes must have been contemplated and planned in advance by their promoters. The innovations of 1387 provided both a precedent and a foundation for the 1393 reforms, 68. Cap. Prot., 9, ff. 16, 17. On 9 May the balia modified these regulations slightly by opening the one slot for a minor guildsman to any minore who had been approved in the 1385 scrutiny (ibid., f. 30). 69. Naddo di Ser Nepo, in Delizie, 18 :96: "E nota, che Bardo Mancini fu il tutto di quel Priorato, e grandi cose si vennero a fare nel suo tempo, alle quali cose sempre fu presente la persona del detto Bardo." Naddo also lists the gifts and describes the procession of "honorable citizens" who accompanied him to the Parte's palace and then to his home. , 70. Brucker calls them "a substantial victory for those Guelf partisans who since 1382 had tried to limit the size of the officeholding group" (Civic World, p. 81). For another evaluation of the work of the 1387 balia, see Witt, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class," pp. 254-55. 71. The most recent analysis of the balia of 1393 is in Brucker, Civic World, pp. 90-94. See also Molho, "The Florentine Oligarchy and the Balie," pp. 31-32 and passim; Witt, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class," pp. 256-58; and Rado, Dalla repubblicafiorentina alla signoria medicea, chap. 4.

288 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics which elevated the accoppiatori to a position of unquestioned supremacy in the electoral pro~ess.'~ On 21 October, the second day of its deliberations, the balia addressed itself systematically and at length to the issue of electoral controls. It began by abolishing the bags of the 1385 scrutiny and decreeing that the extraction of name tickets would continue from those of 1391, now officially classified as the "second scrutiny," once the bags of the so-called first scrutiny of 1382 were emptied.73This, of course, did not completely nullify the results of the 1385 scrutiny because the name tickets of candidates successful in that year, but not in 1382, had already been added to the bags of the earlier year. What it did do was to replace the borse of 1385, which must have been liberally stocked, if (as the Anonimo reports) they contained the names of some four hundred additional candidates who had failed to gain approval in 1382, with those of the more restrictive scrutiny of 1391, which contained only 677 names. A reasonable guess is that several hundred Florentines who had been successful in the scrutinies of both 1382 and 1385, and who were already included in the bags of 1382, were deprived of a second opportunity to reach office through the 1385 bags. After the rimborsamento of 1385, the total number of eligibles who either had reached or would yet be drawn for office from the 1382 bags must have amounted to about 1,250 (the original 850 to 900 from the 1382 scrutiny, plus the 400 transfers from 1385). Instead of continuing the extractions from bags that contained at least as many and very likely more than those of 1382, sortition proceeded from the much smaller pool of 677 names approved in I 391. The balia then turned its attention to the borsellino and increased from two to three the number of seats in each priorate to be filled from it.74AS Brucker and others have pointed out, because the Standard-bearer of Justice was also selected from a pool designated by the accoppiatori, this meant that four of the nine members of each Signoria now came from the After 1393, the privileged restricted group approved by the acco~piatori.'~ elite that met with the favor of the accoppiatori competed for these four 72. These reforms have been summarized by Brucker, Civic World, pp. 92-93, with references to the published edition of the balia's decrees in Capponi, Storia di Firenze, I :625-38. See also Bellondi, Cronica volgare di anonimo, p. 179. 73. Balie, 17, f. 101. Those few persons who had already held any major office from the 1385 bags (see above, n. 56) were not allowed to hold the same office from the 1391 bags. 74. Ibid. 75. Brucker, Civic World, p. 92.

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

289

posts, while the hundreds, and eventually thousands, of other eligibles approved in the general scrutinies competed for the remaining five. The security and stability that this brought the regime were further enhanced by a complete review of all the existing borse and borsellini of 1382 and 1391. At their discretion, the accoppiatori were authorized to modify the lists of the Standard-bearers of Justice designated by their predecessors, by adding or deleting any names of their choosing; they were given the same authority for the borsellini of both 1382 and 1391. More specifically, they could include up to as many as two additional Standard-bearers of Justice in the bag for each quarter from the eligibles of 1 3 8 2 . ~They ~ could make an unlimited number of such additions to the bags of 1391 from that year's pool of eligibles and also eliminate the name tickets of any persons previously selected for the post of Standard-bearer of Justice from the results of the same Finally, they were instructed to examine the borsellini of both years, to exclude those whom they considered less than confidentes, and to raise any others they preferred from the ranks of those approved by the general scrutiny for the priorate to the privilege of the borsellino. 78 76. Balie, 17, f. IOIV: "Item quod revideantur et explorentur diligenter burse vigentes pro scructineo primo, videlicet, celebrato anno domini MCCCLXXXI . . . et si revidentibus et perquirentibus videretur quod aliqui pro prioribus imbursati in dictis bursis mererentur esse Vexilfiferi Iustitie possint ipsi revidentes et perquirentes ipsos tales pro prioribus imbursatos inde extrahere et mictere in bursis . . . Vexilliferatus Iustitie. . . . Eo tarnen declarato quod hoc fiat in quolibet quarterio nec plures mod0 predict0 mictantur pro Vexilliferis in uno quarterio quam in alio nec possint pro Vexilliferis micti secundum dictum modum ultra duos pro quolibet quarterio." 77. Ibid.: "Item quod videantur et perquirantur burse hactenus facte et vigentes pro Vexillifero Iustitie tertii scructiney, . . . et quod illi ibidem descripti seu imbursati pro Vexilliferis Iustitie de quibus videretur dictis videntibus et perquirentibus quod non essent ydoney vel confidentes pro Vexilliferis possint et debeant per eos inde extrahi et micti et poni in bursis eiusdem quarterii pro offitio prioratus ordinatis, et de imbursatis pro eodem quarterio pro offitio prioratus de illis videlicet qui predictis videntibus ydoney et confidentes apparerent . . . fiant per eos loco talium inde extractorurn Vexilliferi Iustitie et in bursis Vexilliferatus ponantur prout eis videbitur." 78. Ibid.: "Item quod videantur et indagentur borsellini utriusque scructiney . . . et de illis de quibus videntibus et indagantibus appareret seu videretur secundurn eorum iudicium quod non essent ydonei vel confidentes pro borsellino quod inde per ipsos extrahantur et ponantur et mictantur in alia bursa eiusdem quarterii pro offitio prioratus. Et alii simpliciter pro offitio prioratus imbursati possint in bursis pro borsellino ordinatis micti et poni."

290 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics Such far-reaching power in the hands of so few individuals was unprecedented in the history of Florentine electoral institutions. The accoppiatori of 1393 had nearly unlimited authority to range among the hundreds of candidates approved in the general scrutinies of 1382 and 1391, and, as it turned out, in that of 1393 as well, and to select at their discretion an elite of "suitable and trustworthy (idonei et confidentes)" candidates who would fill almost half of the seats on the Signoria for years to come. To a great extent, their power nullified the effects of the liberal policies of open nomination and the approval of so many hundreds (and later thousands) of Florentines in the general scrutinies. The throngs of newly qualified citizens were now competing for just over half the posts on the Signoria, with the result that each one's chances of ever reaching high office were drastically diminished. Still on the same day of 21 October, the balia ordered a new scrutiny held as soon as possible. As in 1387, a rimborsamento was carried out. Anyone approved in the new scrutiny who had been unsuccessful in either 1382 or 1391 was automatically included in the bags of the earlier scrutinie~.'~ Thus the balia, whose own membership constituted the bulk of the scrutiny committee and controlled the voting, was able not only to have candidates of its choice approved but also to make them immediately eligible for extraction and for the current borsellini from which the powerful bloc of the regime's confidentes was assembled. At first the balia saw fit to entrust the rimborsamento and selections for the new borsellini of 1393 to the usual committee of four accoppiatori (including one minor guildsman). This committee was appointed by the balia and supplemented, as in 1387, by the participation of the incumbent Standard-bearer of Justice, who on this occasion was none other than Maso degli Albi~zi.~O But the plenipotentiary body also faced the necessity of appointing a committee to carry out the revisions of the 1382 and 1391 bags, and, because it had further decreed that the new Signoria of November-December 1393 should be elected by direct appointment ( a mano) rather than sortition," electors for this purpose had to be selected as well. Three separate committees of electoral officials, entrusted with delicate and related tasks, may have been considered an inefficient and even risky way of accomplishing a set of re79. Ibid. See also Brucker, Civic World, p. 92, n. 170. On 27 October, a minimum age of thirty at the time of the 1393 scrutiny was required for the transfer of a candidate's name ticket to the 1382 bags (Balie, 17, f. 113). 80. Balie, 17, ff. IOIV-102. 81. Ibid., ff. ~ozv-103.

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

291

forms whose success depended in part on compatible orientations and results. In any event, on 25 October, the balia decided to assign all three tasks to a single committee, which, perhaps because of the extraordinary importance of its work, was expanded to nine members. These included Maso degli Albizzi and eight others selected by the balia from its own membership in a secret scrutiny. Each quarter of the city was represented by two of the eight, and the minor guilds had their legal share of two seats as On the next day, the balia put its members to a vote, one by one, and produced the single most powerful committee of electoral officials in Florence since the time of the balia-priorates of the period 1310-26.83 Among the eight were four persons who belonged to the regime's inner elite: Andrea di Neri Vettori, Giovanni di Francesco Bucelli, Davanzato di Giovanni Davanzati, and Bartolomeo di Niccolb di Taldo Va10ri.~~ These four, together with Maso degli Albizzi, gave the oligarchy five out of nine positions and a firm hold over the committee. Two others, moreover, were from prominent upper-class families just outside the perimeter of the elite (Andrea di Niccolb Minerbetti and Salvestro di Michele Nardi).8sThe re82. Ibid., ff. IIIV-112. 83. Their election is recorded and their names listed in ibid., f. 112v. They are also identified in Bellondi, Cronica volgare di anonimo, p. 181. 84. Andrea Vettori, a member of the Calimala guild and Standard-bearer of Justice in November-December 1395, is identified by Brucker as one of "the prominent figures in the inner circle" (Civic World, p. 265, n. 88). Giovanni Bucelli, whom Brucker similarly describes as "a powerful figure in the inner circle" (ibid., p. 281), had served on the priorate in 1386. His son Francesco is included among the sixty-four members of the "inner reggimento" of the next generation, as defined by Kent, "The Florentine Reggintento," p. 604. Davanzato Davanzati, a member of the bankers' guild, was twice prior (1367 and 1372) and twice Standard-bearer of Justice (1386 and 1396) before 1400. Bartolomeo Valori was a lanaiuolo and one of the most influential politicians of his generation, one of nineteen men who, by Brucker's count, spoke in over fifty pratiche in the decade between 1403 and 1414 (Civic World, p. 265). He first reached the Signoria in January 1394, immediately following the conclusion of the electoral reforms in which he participated. His son Niccolb is also among the sixty-four members of the inner circle identified by Kent for the late 1420s and early 1430s ("The Florentine Reggimento," p. 605). The information concerning the appearances in the Signoria of these four and of the others discussed in the next two notes is from the Priorista Mariani I-V, in Manoscritti, 248-52. The guild affiliations of the major guildsmen (with the exception of Giovanni Bucelli) are revealed in the lists of nominations of the five major guilds for the office of the Six of Mercanzia, in Mercanzia, 224, ff. 32~-35. 85. Andrea Minerbetti was a member of the wool guild and twice Standardbearer of Justice before I400 (in 1387 and 1394). He too spoke often in the pratiche

292

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

maining two came from the minor guilds (Rosso d i Piero del Rosso and Bartolomeo di Geri)."j Into the hands of these nine accoppiatori t h e balia confided all the authority to carry out a set of reforms that determined the patterns of officeholding in Florence for the next generation.*' T h e two faces of the post-1382 electoral system are both amply evident in t h e actual patterns of officeholding between March 1382 and the e n d of 1399. Over this span of just less than eighteen years, the available posts in (Brucker, Civic World, pp. 120, 129, I 33, 148), and he is the third member of the group whose son (Giovanni) appears among Kent's elite of sixty-four for 1429-33 ("The Florentine Reggimento," p. 605). Salvestro di Michele Nardi was a merciaio in the guild of the Medici, Speziali e Merciai and had served on the priorate in 1384. 86. Brucker calls the galigaio Rosso di Piero del Rosso the "only artisan who might have qualified for the elite," on the strength of three terms of service on thz war balia (Civic World, p. 269, n. 110). He had also been a prior in 1384. In 1404 he successfully petitioned the Signoria and colleges for a reduction of his prestanza assessment (PR, 93, f. 111). 87. The major electoral legislation between the balia of 1393 and the 1415 redaction of the communal statutes can be summarized briefly. The scrutinies of 1398, 1400, and I404 required special enabling acts, because they were held o& the regular schedule that called for a new scrutiny only every fifth year. The 1398 law introduced no modifications into the procedures elaborated since 1382 (PR, 87, ff. 350-51). In 1400 it was decided that, in the selection of the accoppiatori, no distinction would be made between major guildsmen and scioperati: "inter hec duo membra in hoc decetero nulla sit divisio vel separatio" (PR, 89, f. 135). The scrutiny of 1404 did not result in a new set of electoral borse. Instead, the names of those approved were added to the bags of 1393 and 1398 (PR, 93, ff. 77-77~). Finally, in 1412, the councils approved a general rimborsamento (or rimbotto) of the name tickets of candidates successful in the previous year's scrutiny. Those who were at least thirty years of age were included in the bags of 1393, if they were not already there as a result of some earlier scrutiny; if they were, they were then eligible for the bags of 1398, or, if already present in these, in those of 1400, and, as a last resort, in those of 1406. Approved candidates between the ages of twenty and thirty were included in the bags of either 1398, 1400, or 1406. Those between the ages of fifteen and twenty were eligible for the bags of I400 or 1406, whereas those between five and fifteen years of age were placed in the bags of the latter year only. As these procedures clearly demonstrate, by I411 children and adolescents were being nominated and approved in the general scrutiny. However, the most significant feature of the I412 legislation is that the privilege of rimborsamento was strictly reserved to persons who had held, or one of whose relatives had held, one of the three executive offices since the balia of 1382: "HOCetiam declarato et in predictis apposito intellect0 et in predictis proviso, quod vigore predictorum nullus imbursetur nec recipiat aliquod ex dictis benefitiis nisi solummodo ille et seu illi qui aut

Consensus and Controls, z382-z400

293

Table 8.1. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Family, 1382-1399 ~

~

- -

Number of Posts

Totals

Pre-1343 Families

New Families 1343-78

New Families 1378-82

New Families 1382-99

Fam. Posts Fam. Posts Fam. Posts Fam.

155

398

122

209

37

48

All Families

Posts Fam.

Posts

275

Source: Priorista Mariani I - V , in Manoscritti, 248-52.

the Signoria were more widely shared than at any previous time, excepting only the two periods of guild government. The 963 positions (977 actual appearances, including replacements) were filled by 898 individuals from 589 different families, for ratios of only 1.088 posts per individual and 1.659 posts per family. Such a fragmented distribution of the offices was unprecedented in any comparable length of time since the creation of the priorate in 1 2 8 2 . ~AS ~ Table 8.1 shows, only fourteen families managed to secure more than five posts, and only two (the Altoviti and the Salviati) had more than seven. Seventy-seven percent of the posts were held by families with three or less appearances (756 of 977), and just under 40 percent (384 of 977) were held by families with only a single appearance. The cuius vel quorum consors fuisset de offitiis dominorum priorum et Vexilliferi Iustitie et Gonfaloneriorum sotietatum populi et duodecim bonorum virorum dicti comunis, vel alicuius ex dictis offitiis, de aliqua vel aliquibus bursis factis pro scrutineis factis pro offitio prioratus anno domini Mccclxxxprimo de mense Januarii et seu Februarii, vel abinde citra" (PRYroo, f. 116). This constitutes further confirmation of the policy of limiting the number of new families reaching the Signoria; see appendix table A.3 for statistics that reveal just how successful this policy proved to be. 88. By contrast, in the twenty-six years from 1352 to 1377, 1,421 posts were held by 7-32 individuals (1.941 posts per individual) and 494 families (2.877 posts per family); see above, chap. 6 , table 6 .I.

294 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics Table 8.2. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria by Individuals, 1382-1399

Number

of Posts

Totals

Pre- 1343 Families

New Families 1343-78

New Families 1378- 82

New Families 1382-99

All Families

Ind. Posts Ind. Posts Ind. Posts Ind. Posts Ind. Posts

346

398

194

209

47

48

311

322

898

977

Source: Priorisla Mariani I- V , in Manoscritti, 248- 52 new families in these eighteen years accounted for 47 percent of all the families appearing in the Signoria (275 of 589), but fully 53 percent of all the families (312 of 589) had had no representation in the office before 1378. Although these post-1378 families appeared in the Signoria less frequently than the older pre-1378,families, they still managed to amass a sizable 38 percent of all the posts between 1382 and 1399. A similar picture emerges from an analysis of individual participation in the Signoria (see Table 8.2). Eighty-four percent of the posts were held by the 822 persons who made just one appearance in the Signoria over eighteen years and who collectively constituted 92 percent of all the officeholders. Only three persons-Forese Salviati, Giovanni Aldobrandini, and Benozzo Amadori-were elected to the Signoria as many as three times. Analogous conclusions regarding the distribution of offices in the post1382 period can be found in two recent studies of the membership of the Signoria by Anthony Molho and Ronald Witt. Molho's analysis of the prior lists in six sample decades from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth century shows that the coveted posts on the supreme executive committee were more widely shared in the so-called oligarchic period than in any other of the sample decades that he studied.89Molho found that the 480 available positions on the priorate (excluding the Standard-bearer of Justice) in the decades from 1393 to 1402 and from 1410 to 1419 were 89. Molho, "Politics and the Ruling Class," p. 409. It should be noted, however, that Molho's sample decades do not include either of the periods of popular guild government in the fourteenth century (1343-48 and 1378-82).

Consens~sand Controls, 1382-1400

295

held, respectively, by 431 and 433 individuals, for a posts-per-man ratio of 1.11, the lowest such ratio of any of his sample decades. The posts-perfamily ratios yield a similar story. Between 1393 and 1402, 353 different families were'represented in the priorate, for an average of 1.35 appearances for each, again the lowest of any of his decades. Molho's findings succeeded in laying to rest the old and erroneous idea that officeholding in this period was monopolized by a dwindling political class.90 A similar study by Ronald Witt has confirmed some of Molho's most important conclusions about the post-1382 era. Through an analysis of individual and family representation in the Signoria and by means of a series of comparisons with the period before 1378, Witt has concluded that the years from 1382 to 1393 were a time of exceptional political mobility. More than one-third of all the priors in these years came from families entering the priorate for the first time.9' As a result, the proportion of offices that went to the "leading political families" was lower in these years than in the quarter century 1353-78.92 Perhaps the most interesting of Witt's statistics is the one strongly supporting the idea that after 1382 a conscious effort was made to prevent the concentration of offices in the hands of a small leadership elite. From 1382 to 1407 only twenty individuals reached the Signoria three or more times, and collectively they managed a total of sixty-three seats. By contrast, in the twenty-five-year period from 1353 to 1378, 134 individuals sat on the priorate three or more times for a total of 539 appearance^.^^ The decline of concentrated individual participation in the Signoria and the distribution of offices among so many families and individuals were the consciously pursued results of the liberal face of post1382 consensus politics. However, from the same studies by Molho and Witt, and from some other statistics as well, the restrictive face of the same phenomenon becomes equally clear. Although the new electoral institutions succeeded in 90. See ibid., p. 402, for bibliographical orientation. 91. Witt's figures are as follows: for the period March 1382 to July 1387, 106 new families, accounting for 36.5 percent of all the priors of these years; and for July 1387 to October 1393, 113 new families, accounting for 33 percent of the membership in the Signoria; see "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class," p. 248. My own figures are very close to Witt's for these two periods, but not for the years after 1393; see n. 96. 92. Witt defines such families as those represented four or more times in the Signoria in the twenty-five years from 1382 to 1407. See ibid., p. 249, for the comparison with the period from 1353 to 1378. 93. Ibid., pp. 250-51.

296 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics permitting the participation of a very large number of both families and individuals, they also managed, gradually but decisively, to limit the influx of new men to levels not seen since the 1330s and to increase the collective share of the established families. By 1400 the combination of these two trends had resulted in a drastic reduction of political mobility. Molho's figures on the number of new families entering the Signoria in this period point to a "sharp decrease" after r4ooYg4 but his procedure in assembling the totals by decade obscures the impact of the electoral controls implemented in 1387 and especially 1393. Witt has studied this same development within shorter segments of time that do take account of the effect of these important reforms. His findings reveal an inexorable trend toward the exclusion of new men, particularly following the balia of 1393. Whereas new families held an average 3.3 of the nine seats in each term of office between 1382 and 1387, and 3.0 between 1387 and 1393, the share of offices allotted to the next group of new families between 1393 and 1400 fell to only 1.3 seats in each term and to a miniscule 0.7 between 1401 and 1407. Simultaneously, the share of each priorate that went to the "leading" families rose steadily from 2.2 in 1382-87 to 3.2 in 1387-93, 3.9 in 1393-1400, and 4.4 in 1401-7.95 By the early fifteenth century, more seats on the Signoria were held by such "leading" families than at any point in the generation before 1378. Yet more individuals were reaching the Signoria than ever before (with the exception of the periods of popular, guild-based government), as demonstrated by Molho's posts-per-man ratio of I. I I for the decades 1393- 1402 and 1410-19 and by Witt's finding that between 1382 and 1407 less than 5 percent of the posts were held by individuals who reached the office three or more times. As Witt concluded, after 1382 the seats on the priorate were being "more democratically distributed between family members." The combination of this trend with the gradual reduction of priors from new families (especially after 1393) means that the widespread sharing of positions in the Signoria was a phenomenon essentially limited to a group of mostly upper-class families, whose collective share of the total number of seats was rising. The conjunction of these developments must once 94. Molho, "Politics and the Ruling Class," pp. 414- 15. He reports the following totals from a survey of the family priorista in Manoscritti, 226: 1382-89, 135; 1390-99, I 14; 1400- 1409, 47; 1410- 19, 28. These figures differ somewhat from the ones I have assembled from the Priorisfa Mariani; see discussion below and appendix table A.3. 95. Witt, "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class," pp. 248-51.

Consensus and Controls, 1382 -1400

297

again be underscored as the desired goal and the signal achievement of the new electoral politics of consensus. The problem of the new men after 1382, like its earlier counterpart of the 1343-78 generation, is primarily one of perspective and procedure. For the whole eighteen-year period down to 1399, the share of seats that went to families entering the Signoria after February 1382 amounts to just under a third of the total (322 of 977 seats, equivalent to 32.96 percent). But, as Witt has shown, after an initial period of rather high mobility, the trend was clearly toward a severe limitation of both the number of new families admitted each year and the proportion of the offices assigned to their members. Between March 1382 and May 1387, a five-year period in which the scrutiny of 1382 and the rimborsamento of 1385 had generated the liberal face of consensus politics without the full balancing weight of the controls over the sortition process that would come later, 105 new families held 107 posts (37 percent). Over the next six and a half years, from the balia of 1387 to that of 1393 during which the borsellino first became operative, I 12 new families held I 14 posts (33 percent of the offices). But from November 1393 to the end of 1399, under the full impact of the expanded controls decreed by the balia of 1393, only 58 new families were admitted to the Signoria and they collectively held 63 posts (equivalent to only 19 percent of all the posts).96The trend was, moreover, irreversible. In the more than three decades from 1402 to 1433, a total of only 91 new families gained entry to the Signoria (for an average of just 2.84 per year and a negligible 0.47 per term), and over the 130 years from 1402 to 1531, the new families amounted to 333 (or 2.56 per year and 0.43 per term).97 Looking now at the participation of old oligarchic families in the Signoria between 1382 and 1399, it becomes clear that in some respects the most impressive aspect of the electoral history of this period can be found in the durability and the capacity for recovery of this beleaguered elite. After so 96. Witt counts eighty new families between November 1393 and February 1407, without, however, giving his subtotals for the years 1393-1400 and 1401-7. For the whole fourteen-year period, I count at least eighty-nine new families from the Priorista Mariani. Most of the difference between my count and Witt's must fall within the earlier half of the period. Witt's calculation of 1.3 seats per priorate for the new families between November 1393 and the end of 1400 indicates a total of fifty-six new families. My own figure for the same period is sixty-six (fifty-eight between November 1393 and the end of 1399, as reported above in the text, and eight more in 1400). This count yields an average I .5 seats per priorate for these new families (or 1.65 if subsequent appearances within the period are counted). 97. Priorista Mariani VI, in Manoscritti, 253.

298 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics many decades of new men, two major challenges from the guild community, and the enormous expansion of the political class that had occurred since 1378, the families that had entered the Signoria before the by now distant upheavals of 1343 were still able to command two-fifths of all the posts in the last eighteen years of the fourteenth century. Not all of the pre-1343 families can be classified as oligarchic, of course. Moreover, the policy of a wider distribution of posts after 1382 entailed a more lirnited role in the high office for the great families that had been accustomed to frequent appearances in the executive magistracy in former times. Even so, the families appearing most often in the Signoria between 1382 and 1399 were mainly from the old aristocracy of wealth and power: thirtgfour of the forty-three families with four or more priors in this period had entered the Signoria before 1343, twenty-four of them, in fact, before 1300. In addition to the Altoviti and the Salviati, who head the list with nine and eight appearances respectively, this group includes such traditional bulwarks of aristocracy as the Acciaiuoli, Albizzi, Strozzi, Biliotti, and Rucellai (seven appearances each); the Ardinghelli, Peruzzi, Guasconi, Baroncelli, and Davanzati (six each); the Medici, Pitti, Siminetti, Aldobrandini, Serragli, Castellani, and Baldovinetti (five each); the Canigiani, Dell'Antella, Mancini, Da Panzano, Da Filicaia, Spini, Del Palagio, Machiavelli, Orlandini, Capponi, Borghini, and Ricci (four each). Of the thirty-four pre-1343 families reaching this level, only the Pecori, the Del Bianco, and the Bentaccordi fell below the ranks of the old oligarchy, Among the nine post-1343 families with four or more priors between 1382 and 1399, the Vecchietti and the Gianfigliazzi (the only such family that entered the Signoria after the balia of 1382) may safely be included in any list of oligarchic families, whereas the remaining seven-Orlandi, Arrigucci, Berlinghieri, Caccini-Ricoveri, Bartoli, Busini, and Del Cacciabelonged to the middle and lower ranks of mercantile families. Thus, despite the heavy influx of so many new men between 1382 and 1393, the traditional oligarchy did well for itself. But even these figures, impressive as they are in documenting the tenacious recovery and revived leadership of the old elite after the debacle of 1378-82, do not reveal the essence of their success in the two decades after 1382. For the full measure of this achievement consisted less in a renewed attempt to concentrate the privileges and honors of high office in their own hands than in a skillful adaptation of new means to old ends. Four decades of new families, for the most part from the non-elite ranks of the guild community, could not be ignored, even in the mood of reaction against the perceived excesses of cor-

Consensus and Controls, 1382-1400

299

poratism that dominated the 1380s. The oligarchy realized that many of these families had to be incorporated into the political class via the scrutinies and included in the borse. But while they accepted this reality, they also defused its revolutionary potential with a series of important controls over the electoral process, including the distributio, the borsellino, and the discretionary authority of the accoppiatori. These mechanisms not only provided the inner elite with the means of reserving almost half the posts in the Signoria for a preferential pool of handpicked favorites of the regime, but they also had the effect of transforming the electoral process into a giant political lottery. The overwhelming majority of the "new families" of this period (236 of 275, or 86 percent) had only a single appearance in the Signoria. They neither constituted blocs of family power and influence in the manner of the older established families, nor did they represent the corporate constituencies of their guilds or professional and economic categories. Instead, together with the scores of other persons who made their families' only appearances in the Signoria and the hundreds of officeholders who made but a single appearance over these two decades, they were the politically isolated and dependent individuals who were the building blocks of consensus politics. Given the dimensions of the system and the fact that the manipulation of electoral controls, especially that of the sortition process, was beyond the purview of the vast majority of citizens, each individual outside the controlling elite now entered the electoral process as an isolated and "equal" participant, deprived of the backing and strength of corporate or factional ties and essentially powerless to affect the outcome of his own competition with the thousands of his fellow citizens. The lack of alternative institutional bases through which pressure and influence could be exerted and the leveling effect of extremely fragmented patterns of officeholding made organized opposition nearly impossible. Having eliminated the guilds as foci of dissent and bastions of electoral strength, the post-1382 elite succeeded in making thousands of middlerank Florentines completely dependent on an electoral process that was beyond their power to influence or even comprehend. By combining the numerical expansion of the political class with techniques of control that undermined the "promise" of office to each successful candidate, the system managed to maintain the illusion of increasing mobility and general equality at the very moment that the flow of new men into high office was being diminished, once and for all, to the point of insignificance. In short, as the number of participants reached new heights, real power in the sys-

300 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics tem underwent an unprecedented process of centralization. The thousands of individual Florentine citizens who willingly entered the lists of the electoral lottery, each nourishing his private hope of elevation to the priorate, gave the republican regime a stability it had not previously known. They played the game as faithful creatures of the regime, hardly aware that their own acquiescence in the illusion of political equality, their very willingness to play by rules they no longer shared in defining, and their acceptance of participation without actual power were the bedrock of consensus on which the stable and elitist polity of fifteenth-century Florence was built. Even less were they aware of having created the conditions that shaped the new republican ideology of civic humanism.

Epilogue: Consensus Politics and Civic Humanism

Waiting patiently for the great honor of high office to be visited upon them, thousands of upper-class Florentines developed an essentially passive attitude towa.rd their own destiny in politics. Officeholding became a privilege and ceased to be a right. It still remained a duty, but one whose fulfillment called less for active pursuit than for grateful acceptance. Because of a desire to enhance their chances of success and because of the sense of obligation engendered by its bestowal, many Florentines were persuaded that the proper conduct befitting a responsible citizen consisted in cooperation bordering on obedience and in a willingness to support and a reluctance to criticize those at the center of power: in short, in doing nothing to rock the boat. The foundation of this new attitude was the recognition that there was a "leadership elite" at the center,' a group of men whose superior wisdom and experience were the safest guarantees of the republic's well-being and, not least, of the privileges of the entire upper class. It was from this elite that the gift of office was expected and received and to which gratitude, cooperation, and support were owed in return. And, in fact, it seemed to the majority of upper-class Florentines, anxious and hopeful for a brief moment of glory in one of the commune's leading magistracies, that the expectation of office was rewarded just often enough to justify the long wait. An excellent illustration of these attitudes and of the way in which the electoral system operated to encourage the acquiescence of upper-class Florentines in the manipulation of consensus by a restricted inner circle can be found in the reflections of Goro Dati on the occasion of his first entrance into high office in 1412. Dati recorded in his diary that until he was elected to the office of the sixteen gonfalonieri at the age of fifty, he had not even been sure that his name was included in the bone for the executive colleges. He had, nevertheless, hoped that this was so, both for his own honor and for that of his descendants. His father Stagio had waited all his life in vain to be drawn for one of the colleges, only to have his name I. The term is Brucker's; see The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1977)~p. 251.

302

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

ticket come up for the priorate shortly after his death.* In Dati's case, therefore, the wait lasted two generations. Having seen his father's name drawn at long last, albeit too late, he must have been encouraged to believe that, if only he could live long enough and be patient enough, this great honor would eventually be bestowed upon him, as indeed it was. However, realizing that his name might be drawn from the bags at other times in the future, Dati was moved to comment: Now that I am able to assume other offices, I feel that I have received a very great favor, and I would have been satisfied if by some arrangement I could have been certain of being elected just once to one of the colleges. If I could have had this certainty, I would not have wished for anything more. Therefore, in order not to appear ungrateful, and not wishing to stimulate an insatiable ambition which, the more it gets, only wants still more, I have decided and resolved that from now on I must never implore the favors of anyone to secure the offices of communal government for which scrutinies are held. I will instead leave such matters to those who will have authority over them, and let happen to me whatever may please God. Henceforth, whenever my name is drawn for any communal or guild office, I promise to obey and not to refuse the burden, and to do as well as I can and know how. In this way I will ward off the vice of ambition and presumption, and I will live as a free man not bound by the necessity of seeking favors. And should it happen that I do otherwise, I must penalize myself each time in the amount of two gold florins to be given to charity within one month. Thus do I resolve, in this fiftieth year of my life [italics added].3 2. Gregorio Dati, I1 Libro Segreto, ed. Carlo Gargiolli (Bologna, 1869), p. 71: "A di 3 di maggio anno Domini 1412, essendo suto tratto a di 28 d'aprile gonfaloniere di compagnia; e per insino a1 detto di non era certo d'essere nelle borse di collegio, e pure lo disiderava per onore di me e di chi avesse a rirnanere dopo me; ricordandomi che Stagio nostro padre ebe molti ufici in sua vita, e de' consoli di porta santa Maria fu molte volte, e de' cinque di mercatanzia, e de' maestri delle gabelle e camarlingati, ma di collegio non fu tratto in sua vita e in poco tempo dopo la vita sua fu tratto de' priori di collegio." For the provision of 23 April 1412 that authorized Dati's removal from the specchio upon payment, ad perdendum, of one-fifth of his outstanding prestanze, see PR, 101, ff. 5ov-51. In his diary he records that he made the payment on the very day he was drawn for the Sedici (I1Libro Segreto, P. 72). 3. Ibid., pp. 72-73: "e ora ch' io posso sicurare altri, mi pare avere ricevuta grandissima grazia, e sarei stato contento di patto fatto essere sicuro d'essere una volta di collegio, e non disiderare pih avanti: onde per non essere ingrato, n t vo-

Epilogue 303 In Dati are contained all the essential elements of Florentine consensus politics: the expectation of a share in political life, even if only a small one; the sense of being on the receiving end of favors distributed by others; the dutiful passivity of the good citizen who has only his personal worth to offer, never any policies to pursue or collective interests to defend; and, most of all, the voluntary submission to "those who will have authority," the promise to obey and to accept the direction.of one's destiny from higher powers. Finally, it is ironic that Dati, the pioneer of civic humanism, resented his relegation to the role of a political mendicant just enough to let himself believe that only when he turned his back on the active pursuit of his political ambitions would he truly be a free man. But the revealing afterthought in which he anticipates the impossibility of adhering to his own resolution indicates just how much stronger the system was than the individual. Dati's comments highlight the conjunction of the two dominant trends in the electoral politics of the post-1382 era: the need to satisfy the general thirst for participation in politics-especially within the upper class (what Stefani called the "volere gli uficiV)-which resulted in the nomination, approval, and election of larger and larger numbers of citizens; and the willingness of most upper-class Florentines to leave the specific decisions regarding their selection to office (when and in what combinations) to a powerful few. Ultimately, there was no contradiction in the coexistence of consensus and elitism. The success of the latter was, in fact, made possible by the former. The relatively stable elitist regimes that governed Florence from the end of the fourreenth to the end of the fifteenth century were grounded in an unspoken reciprocal agreement that served the best interests of both the elite and the rank and file of the major guilds. Both groups wished to avoid the political chaos of factionalism that had produced so much discord in the 1360s and 1370s and that had opened the way for the revival of egalitarian corporatism in 1378 by dividing the upper class lendo usare lo insaziabile appetito, che quanto piu ii pih disidera, mi sono proposto e diliberato che da ora inanzi per ufici di Comune che s'abiano a fare o a squittinare, mai non deb0 pregare alcuno, ma lasciare fare a chi fia sopraccib, e seguiti quello che a Dio piace che di me sia, faccendo ragione che quando a uficio di Comune o d'Arte sarb tratto, d' ubidire e non ricusare la fatica, e fare quel buono ch' io saprb e potrb; e cosi schiferb il vizio della ambizione e del presumere di me, e viverb libero e non servo per prieghi. E quando avenisse che contro a cib io facessi, e per ogni volta mi deba condannare io medesimo in f. due d' oro a darli per limosina infra uno mese: e questo dilibero, vegendomi nel quinquagesimo anno ch' io naqui."

304 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics against itself. The banner of corporatism had been raised against the reactionary oligarchs of the Parte Guelfa by non-elite major guildsmen who never expected or wanted it to be seized in turn by the artisans and workers who constructed the regime of 1378-82 on its principles. After 1382, having realized what a Pandora's box of social revolution had been opened by their appeal to corporate notions of political organization, the rank and file of the major guilds happily renounced any future recourse to corporatism. Significantly, Goro Dati, although an influential member of the guild of Por Santa Maria in which he served many times as consul, never thought to represent himself as a spokesman for the guild's corporate interests and indeed never defined himself with reference to this or any other collectivity in Florentine society. The renunciation of corporatism was the rank and file's end of the bargain. For its part, the elite-the great families and the powerful financial and landed interests who controlled the economy and whose wealth was the key to success in foreign policy-gave up its claims to the kind of exclusive oligarchic hegemony that had been the aim of the Parte Guelfa before 1378. It agreed, for a time at least, to tolerate a regular but controlled flow of new men into communal politics and to extend the hope and.expectation of office to broad segments of the guild community. But-and this was the crucial difference-the post-1382 expansion of the officeholding class was achieved on an individual basis, not a corporate one: as an extension of honors and privileges to deserving individuals, not as a recognition of the constitutional rights of equal and autonomous corporations. As long as enough individuals were given sufficient opportunity to participate, the Goro Datis of Florence were content to forget the old rules and guidelines of corporate politics and to leave the decisions of electoral politics to those few whom, in another context, he called the "vantaggiati." The electoral reforms of the 1380s and 1390s were not merely a restoration of the status quo that had prevailed before 1378. To be sure, many of the great families returned to prominence after 1382, but they did so in circumstances that differed in some important respects from the pre-1378 world of Florentine politics. In the two decades after mid-century, the po4. This is his term for the powerful merchant oligarchs who sat on the Mercanzia's governing council; see Gregorio Dati, Istoria di Firenze, ed. L. Pratesi (Norcia, 1904), p. 157.

Epilogue

305

litical class at any one time had been composed of no more than a few hundred persons from a still smaller number of families. Yet, despite the compactness of this modest officeholding group, the regime was ultimately unable to maintain a unified and stable leadership elite. The oligarchy was divided by factional and ideological conflicts, and when these fissures within the upper class became exacerbated beyond repair in the late 1370s~ the regime dissolved. This was due in part to the superficial quality of its support among the city's guildsmen, of whom only a sizable minority had been admitted to a meaningful share of political life. Consequently, the rank-and-file guildsmen, major as well as minor, increasingly perceived the political conflicts raging around the Parte Guelfa and its use of ammonizione as an affair of the oligarchic families that had little positive relevance to their own interests. By 1372, and certainly by 1378, the middling guildsmen viewed this political civil war in terms of the selfish and dangerous manipulation of public institutions by private factions. Thus alienated from the elite, the non-oligarchic guildsmen abandoned an unstable government and opened the way for a revival of the decentralized corporatism of a guild-based political and electoral system. The post-1382 reforms did not simply dismantle the corporate system, with its decentralizing and socially radical tendencies; they also resolved the twin weaknesses of the pre-1378 regime that had permitted the restoration of corporatism: the lack of broadly based support for the ruling class, especially in times of crisis, and the failure to develop a stable and unified leadership. These weaknesses, of course, mirrored each other, because leadership could be stable only within the framework of a consensus of shared assumptions and goals in a system that eschewed the use of intimidating force and overt coercion. Leaders, in short, are successful and durable only when there are many people willing to be led. The pre-1378 oligarchy lacked such consensus and fell prey to the factionalism that resulted in its own demise. The events of 1378 (and, to a slightly lesser degree, of the whole period between 1378 and 1382) provided the catalyst for the emerging consensus of the post-1382 era. The fears of social turmoil, attacks on wealth and property, and egalitarian corporatism were shared by oligarchs and nonoligarchs alike within the guild community, and the desire to avoid a repetition of those events was the overriding factor in the compact of consensus politics forged between the oligarchic leadership elite and the rest of the guild community. For, just as the weaknesses of the pre-1378 system were reflected by each other, so were the major accomplishments of the post-

306 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics 1382 electoral system intimately and functionally related. They broadened the base of support by bringing the near totality of the upper and middle classes (the vast majority of major guildsmen and a large portion of minor guildsmen) into the electoral process, approving greater and greater nurnbers of them for high offices; at the same time, they created a more stable leadership than the commune had ever known by instituting electoral controls that permitted the emergence of a fluid but compact inner elite whose legitimacy in the eyes of the guild community was enhanced by the irnpersonality (or, more accurately, the institutionalized secrecy) of their selection. Both of these accomplishments became quasi-permanent features of the republican polity of fifteenth-century Florence. As Dale Kent has recently suggested, the three thousand members admitted in 1495 to the Great Council of the restored republic are a startling confirmation of the expansion of the political class, even after sixty years of Medicean control^.^ On the other hand, Nicolai Rubinstein has documented the refined and enlarged use under those same Medici of the electoral controls (accoppiatori, balie, and b~rsellini)~ whose beginnings we have traced in the reforms of 1387 and 1393. Several historians, most notably Gene Brucker, Lauro Martines, Anthony Molho, and Dale Kent, have contributed to the identification and analysis of the "inner circle,? "leadership elite," or "oligarchy" that, according to most historians, stood at the helm of communal politics in the fifteenth century.' The combination of these developments 5, Dale Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento in the Fifteenth Century," Renaissance Quarterly 28 (1975): 612. Membership in the Great Council was determined by the prior eligibility of citizens, their fathers, or grandfathers, for the major offices before 1494. 6. Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494) (Oxford, 1966), pp. 1-87. 7. See Brucker, Civic World, pp. 262-82; Lauro Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968), and The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460 (Princeton, 1963); Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," pp. 601-8; Anthony Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 14001433 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), especially pp. 153-92. See also the remarks of Alberto Tenenti in Firenze dal Comune a Lorenzo il Magnifico, 1350-1494 (Milan, 1970), pp. 33-38, 65-68. The transformation of Florentine politics outlined in this epilogue is in fundamental agreement with, and considerably indebted to, Gene Brucker's analysis of "The Reggimento in 1411," in Civic World, pp. 248318. The intended contribution of my observations is to highlight the impact of the electoral reforms of the last two decades of the fourteenth century in helping to bring about this transformation and to suggest that the essence of the change lay in the conscious pursuit of the "two faces" of consensus in political life. Obviously, I

Epilogue 307 was not a contradiction, and it would be as one-sided to argue from the evidence of an expanding political class that fifteenth-century Florence was a model of broadly based popular republicanism as it would be to argue from the tightening network of electoral controls that all was dictated by the will of a narrow oligarchy. Seen in their proper functional relationship, the two developments were complementary, not antagonistic or even paradoxical. The security provided by electoral controls allowed the elite to accept the expansion of the numbers of citizens approved in the scrutinies, while the extension of the opportunity to share in the honors of high office persuaded thousands of individual guildsmen (as in the case of Goro Dati) to take their chances in the electoral lottery and to acquiesce in the leadership of the powerful few. Expanding the base of the pyramid made its pinnacle rest more securely. Viewed in relation to the generation before 1378, the post-1382 system involved the substitution of a broadly based elitism for a narrow19 based one. Seen against the background of the popular government of 1378-82, it was a rejection of decentralized corporatism in favor of unitary conceptions of both power and consent. The rank and file of the guild community finally abandoned its corporate loyalties and threw in its lot with the oligarchy, accepting the wide sharing of political opportunity as fair compensation. In the process, these guildsmen, the former staunch advocates of corporate interests and constituencies, were discouraged from identifying with their guilds for political purposes and encouraged to think of themselves as members of one harmonious entity-the mass of Florentine citizens who collectively constituted the res publica-governed by the principle of individual equality in the distribution of rights, opportunity, and responsibility. Open nominations, liberal electoral scrutinies, and the inclusion of thousands of names in the borse for high office contributed substantially to the willingness of these guildsmen to merge their political identities into the theoretical homogeneity of individual equality. For a generation that witnessed the trebling, or even quadrupling, of the class of political eligibles, it was perhaps not unreasonable to entertain the illusion that the political system as a whole was veering toward the realization of am not the first to underscore the importance of consensus in post-1382 Florence. The idea appears implicitly throughout Brucker's Civic World, but explicitly on p. 299; in Ronald G. Witt, Coluccio Salutati and His Public Letters (Geneva, 1976), p. 86, as well as in his "Florentine Politics and the Ruling Class, 1382-1407," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 (1976): 263-64; and in Anthony Molho, "Politics and the Ruling Class in Early Renaissance Florence," Nuova Rivista Storica 52 (1968): 415-20.

308 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics the principle of equality among all citizens. As one of the most influential oligarchic leaders commented in a pratica in 1408, the regime had never been more stable, for the reason that "all those who merit it belong to it."s Here, in a most concise formulation, is the acknowledgment by a member of the leadership elite that the stability of the regime depended on a wide sharing of political offices, which were distributed according to criteria of personal and individual worth. The idea that political opportunity was offered in equal measure to "all those who merit itn-an idea deeply rooted in the experience of electoral politics since 1382-became one of the cardinal points of Leonardo Bruni's civic humanist vision of the Florentine republic. Paritas and equalitas, Bruni wrote in a letter to the Emperor Sigismund in 1413, were the two fundamental principles of the Florentine constitution: "All our laws work toward this one goal, that parity and equality may exist among the citizens, in which consists pure and true liberty." The great and the powerful were permitted no special advantages and were reduced to the same level as all other citizens in political life.gBruni's most extended statement of this conviction, a striking echo of its expression in the pratica of 1408, came some years later in his 1428 Oratio Funebris for Nanni Strozzi. Here Bruni focused sharply on the electoral dimension of the principle of equality: Equal liberty exists for all . . . ;the hope of winning public honors and ascending [to office] is the same for all, provided they possess industry and natural gifts and lead a serious-minded and respected way of life; for our commonwealth requires virtus and probitas in its citizens. Whoever has these qualifications is thought to be of sufficiently noble birth to participate in the government of the repub8. Quoted and translated in Brucker, Civic World, p. 300: "quod omnes qui merentur statum, habent." The speaker was Cristofano Spini, identified by Brucker as one of five men-"the apex of the hierarchy"-"who spoke in more than one hundred pratiche between 1403 and 1414" (ibid., p. 265). 9. For the text of the letter, see Hans Baron, Humanist@ and Political Literature in Florence and Venice at the Beginning of the Quattrocento: Studies in Criticism and C h r o n o l o ~(Cambridge, Mass., 1955), pp. 181-84. The passage translated above reads as follows: "Leges igitur nostre omnes ad hoc unum tendunt, ut paritas sit et equalitas inter se civibus; in quo est mera ac Vera libertas." It is also quoted and commented on in Nicolai Rubinstein, "Florentine Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendancy in the Fifteenth Century," in Nicolai Rubinstein, ed., Florentine Studies (Evanston, 1968), p. 445. See also Witt's comments on the importance in Bruni's thought of the related concept of aequitas, in Salutati and His Public Letters, pp. 86-87.

Epilogue 309 lic. . . . This, then, is true liberty, this equality in a commonwealth: not to have to fear violence or wrong-doing from anybody, and to enjoy equality among citizens before the law and in the participation in public office. lo Bruni chose his words carefully. He did not claim that all citizens, even all meritorious ones, shared equally in the actual governance of the republic. What he did say was that the hope, the chance, of achieving high office was the same for all deserving citizens. This was tantamount to saying that all citizens of worth entered the electoral lottery on an equal basis, even if, as Bruni realized, they could not and did not all emerge with equal results. Without the enlargement of the political class that had occurred in the scrutinies of the generation preceding the composition of the Oratio, Bruni's claim would have been a manifest absurdity. If the regime's broad base was one aspect of the politics of consensus that found its way into contemporary thought, of no lesser importance was the acceptance of the principle of elitist leadership, now identified not with the dangers of factionalism, as before 1378, but with the power, majesty, and benevolent paternalism of the state. Here, too, the idea was firmly grounded in experience, in the phenomenon of an inner elite elevated and legitimated by the legal and impersonal mechanisms of electoral controls. It was reflected in the unquestioning acknowledgment of the elite's natural right to leadership by those who, in Brucker's words, "were on the periphery of the reggimento": in Goro Dati's willingness to leave his political destiny in the hands of "those who will have authority" over such matters; in Giovanni di Paolo Morelli's commitment "to live honestly, without ever opposing . . . those who governed [the commune]," and to hold firm "to those worthy Florentines from ancient families"; and in Lapo Mazzei's confession that "those who have the reggimento in hand'' were masters to be served." It was but a short step from such attitudes of deference to the 10. The translation is Hans Baron's; see The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1966), p. 419; the Latin text, also published by Baron in ibid., p. 556, is as follows: "Aequa omnibus libertas . . . ;spes vero honoris adipiscendi ac se attollendi omnibus par, mod0 industria adsit, mod0 ingenium et vivendi ratio quaedam probata et gravis. Virtutem enim probitatemque in cive suo civitas nostra requirit. Cuicunque haec adsit, eum satis generosum putat ad rem publicam gubernandam. . . . Haec est Vera libertas, haec aequitas civitatis: nullius vim, nullius iniuriam vereri, paritatem esse iuris inter se civibus, paritatem rei publicae adeundae." 11. For the comments of Morelli and Mazzei, see Brucker, Civic World, pp.

261-62.

310 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics notion expressed in one of the pratiche of the period that "everyone should agree with the Priors and conform to their judgment,"'* and to what Brucker has aptly termed "the civic impulse to exalt the majesty of the supreme e ~ e c u t i v e . ' ' I~n~ a system of consensus politics, the highest responsibility of each good citizen consisted in loyalty and support for the government, not in the advocacy of corporate or class interests. Logically enough, tolerance for dissent declined under the impact of such attitudes.I4 Although implicit in statements such as those we have just seen, it was left to Giovanni Cavalcanti, the shrewd and eccentric critic of the Florentine ruling class, to articulate more directly the depreciation of dissent within the prevailing ethic of consensus and elitism. In his Istorie Fiorentine Cavalcanti has Rinaldo degli Albizzi speak as follows before a meeting of the regime's most powerful leaders in the church of Santo Stefano in 1426:"You know that the commune is nothing if not a multitude of citizens living under and obeying one and the same law; and whoever rebels against this law separates himself from the civile reggimento." l5 The intimate connection between the regime's broad base (the "multitude of citizens"), the consensus that held it together ("living under and obeying one and the same law"), and the illegitimacy of dissent ("whoever rebels against this law separates himself from the civile reggi12. Ibid., p. 305. 13. Ibid., p. 308. The impulse reached somewhat exaggerated proportions in the statement of the lawyer Lorenzo Ridolfi in 1428: "AS only one God should be

adored, so you, lord priors, are to be venerated above all citizens, and those who turn their eyes to others are worshipping false idols and are to be condemned"; see Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," p. 580; and Brucker, Civic World, p. 309. See Brucker's excellent analysis of this trend in ibid., pp. 305-10. 14. Brucker implies that the "regime's willingness to consult the citizenry" evinced such tolerance and caused a "proliferation of controversy" (ibid., p. 307). Given the attitudes and assumptions of consensus politics, it would seem that the purpose of such frequent consultation was not so much to hear, much less encourage, a diversity of views as to forge an even greater degree of unity: precisely the understanding of the matter contained in another observation of Lorenzo Ridolfi, quoted by ~ r u c k e rfrom a pratica of 1416: "So that all might speak with one tongue, and so that greater unity will be achieved among the popolo, it seems to me that a larger number of counselors should be assembled" (ibid.). It would be difficult to imagine a clearer expression of the purpose of consultation under a system of consensus politics. 15. Giovanni Cavalcanti, Istorie Fiorentine, ed. F. Polidori, 2 vols. (Florence, 1838), I :77: "Voi sapete che il Comune non 2 se non, una moltitudine di cittadini vivere ed ubbidire sotto una medesima legge: e chi da questa legge si ribella, si parte dal civile reggimento." For a description and evaluation of the Santo Stefano meeting, see Brucker, Civic World, pp. 473-78.

Epilogue

31 I

mento") could not have been more explicitly drawn. In Rinaldo's scheme of things, as described by Cavalcanti, the inner circle of the regime's leaders had the responsibility and the right to articulate the content of that consensus, for, as he told them, "You are the commune; you are the embodiment of honor; you guide the destiny of this city: therefore, whatever is done by you is done by the commune, because you are the commune." l6 In these few but powerful lines, Cavalcanti exposed the nexus between consensus and elitism that was the foundation of the regime. It should therefore come as no surprise that Rinaldo's speech, as reported by Cavalcanti, was also the occasion for a bitter denunciation of the guild community." For those few upper-class Florentines who, like Cavalcanti, found it difficult or impossible to share the consensus as defined by its aristocratic spokesmen, there may have been some element of paradox in the combination of mass participation and elitist leadership. At least this seems to be implied in Cavalcanti's noted dictum that "many were elected to the offices but few to the government." But although he clearly disapproved of the phenomenon, Cavalcanti understood as well as and perhaps better than anyone that the politics of consensus and participation served the cause of elitist hegemony. His famous story about Niccolo da Uzzano's manipulation of a gathering of richiesti, in which this powerful leader of the inner circle is said to have slept through a debate on an important matter of foreign policy, only to awaken at the end and announce a position that was then unanimously seconded by other^,'^ suggests that this consultative institution was being transformed from a forum for open debate into another 16. Cavalcanti, Istorie, I :77-78: "Voi siete il Comune, voi siete I'onore, voi sieteil consiglio di questa citti: adunque quello che per voi si fari, fari il Comune, perche il Comune siete voi." For the first part of this passage, I have used Brucker's translation (CivicWorld, p. 474). 17. He angrily reminded his listeners of those "quaranta maledetti mesi" from September 1378 to the beginning of 1382, in which the guilds and their consuls "tenner0 in servitu questo popolo," and then proposed a further reduction of the representation of the minor guilds in political life by lowering their number from fourteen to seven, exactly as had been done by the balia of 1348 (Cavalcanti, Istorie, I :82, 84-85). See also Brucker, Civic World, pp. 473-74. 18. Cavalcanti, Istorie, I :30: "molti erano eletti agli ufficii, e pochi a1 governo." 19. Ibid., pp. 28-29. Cavalcanti makes it clear that the consensus arrived at in this meeting was imposed on the group by the force of Niccolb da Uzzano's prestige and authority and that he spoke as a representative of "altri potenti" who had already decided the issue: "Allora, avendo io tenuto a mente i modi di Niccolb, per me si giudicb che lui, con altri potenti, aveva sopra quelle lettere, nel luogo privato e segreto, accordato e conchiuso, che quel consiglio fusse per lui dato, e per gli altri confermato e conchiuso."

312

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

instrument of consensus. Policy was not so much shaped as confirmed and legitimated by these consultations of citizens. Such convocations gradually ceased to be genuine expressions of public opinion and became instead a source of support and strength for the elite-a means of selling to the public policies already formulated in advance "in the dining halls and the studies" of the great families.20The transformation of the pratica from a theater of conflict to an instrument of consensus paralleled the analogous transformation of the whole electoral system. The elitist and statist "other face" of consensus politics was as central to Bruni's civic humanist conception of the republic as was the notion of broadly based equality of opportunity in political life. In the Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, this most committed of republican theorists had no hesitation in claiming that the Florentine priorate was an office of "almost regal power." For Bruni, as for Cavalcanti's Rinaldo, consensus meant obedience to constituted authority: "Private citizens," he wrote, "including those of the lower classes, are all obligated to obey the magistrates and to show proper reverence for the symbols of their However much the principle of equality may have governed relations among the citizens, Bruni likened their collective relationship v i s - h i s the government to that of children to their father. He summed up the virtues of the Florentine constitution with the remark that "under these institutions the government of this city has been so diligent and distinguished that one could say that no household was ever established with greater discipline by a solicitous father." 22 The duty of obedience and reverence toward the paternalis20. Ibid., p. 30: "il Comune era pih governato alle cene e negli scrittoi, che nel Palagio." For evaluations of this episode, as reported by Cavalcanti, see the observations of Kent, "The Florentine Reggimento," p. 604; and Brucker, Civic World, pp. 250-5 I. For the latter's view on the transformation of the pratica as a consultative institution, see ibid., pp. 289-90. 21. Leonardo Bruni, Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, in Hans Baron, From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni (Chicago, 1968)~p. 259: "Magistratibus ergo privati, itemque inferioris gradus homines, parere omnes et obedire coguntur eorumque insignia vereri." As already noted in chap. 6, Bruni described the priorate as the "supremus magistratus, qui quandam vim regie potestatis habere videbatur." 22. Ibid., p. 262: "Sub his igitur magistratibus ita diligens et preclara est huius urbis gubernatio ut nulla unquarn domus sub frugi patre familias maiori disciplina fuerit instituta." For some further comments on the use of the family as a model for conceptualizing political relationships in the consensus-oriented polity of post1382 Florence, see my "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics," American Historical Review 84 (1979): 69.

Epilogue 313 tic authority of the state admitted of no justified cause for rebellion or dissent. Accordingly, Bruni remarked in his Life of Dante that, although the great poet had been unjustly exiled in 1302 for alleged crimes against the state, he himself had ruined his own chances for reconciliation with the regime of the Black Guelfs "by having spoken and written against the citizens who were governing the R e p ~ b l i c . "Dissent, ~~ in short, had become the crime of lese majesty. Bruni's acceptance of the elitist principle in Florentine politics is also evident in the extended commentary on the institution of electoral sortition that he inserted in the fifth book of his Histories of the Florentine People. Referring to the early use of this technique in the 13zos,24 Bruni criticized this practice on grounds that, in retrospect, provided ample justification for the controls over the sortition process that were used so effectively in his own time: Experience has shown that this practice was useful in eliminating the struggles that so frequently erupted among the citizens competing for election [under the previous system]. But as much as extraction by lot is beneficial to the republic in this respect, just as much and even more is it harmful in another, namely, that because of the chance of the draw many unworthy persons are placed in the magistracy of the priorate. For the same care is not taken in staffing offices to be drawn in the future as in electing present ones, and we certainly give more attentive consideration to present matters and tend to be more negligent in judging those things ordained for an uncertain future. This practice of extraction by lot also extinguishes any motivation for prudent conduct, since, if men were forced to compete in direct elections and openly put their reputations on the line, they would be much more circumspect [in their life and behavior]. I do not doubt, therefore, that the earlier method of direct election, which was always used by the Roman people in selecting their magistrates, was more praiseworthy and benefi23. Hans Baron, Leonardo Bruni Aretino: Humanistisch-Philosophische Schriften (Leipzig, 1 9 2 8 ) ~p. 58. The translation is from The Three Crowns of Florence, ed. David Thompson and Alan F. Nagel (New York, 1972), p. 67. For further comment on Bruni's notions of consensus and dissent, see my "Arti and Ordini in Machiavelli's Istorie Fiorentine," in Essays Presented to Myron P. Gilmore, ed. Sergio Bertelli and Gloria Ramakus, 2 vols. (Florence, 1978), I : 167-68. 24. Perhaps relying on the description contained in Stefani's Cronaca, Bruni apparently believed that sortition was introduced at the time of the electoral balia of 1323. AS was shown in chap. 3 , this practice was actually instituted in 1328.

314

Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics

cia1 to the republic. Nevertheless, this technique of extraction by lot, introduced at that time [the 1320~1in Florence, has survived until our own day and has been preserved in the republic because of its considerable popularity among the people.2s Bruni fails to mention, of course,' that it survived only in very modified circumstances that effectively nullified the free play of chance and denied each imborsato equal access to office.26But although he does not describe, here or later in the Histories, the institution of the borsellino and the expanding role of the accoppiatori in the sortition process, Bruni's thinking reflects precisely the assumptions that had guided the balie of 1387 and 1393, both in the concern that too many "unworthy" candidates were reaching office and in the suggestion that the selection of the Signoria was better entrusted to electors who knew and took responsibility for the fact that they were electing specific individuals for the present and near future. After all, that is exactly what the accoppiatori did. T h e conclusions to be drawn from this brief look at the assumptions about Florentine politics held by Bruni and his contemporaries are: first, that they managed to integrate the two cardinal points of consensus politics-the broad base of participation and the narrow pinnacle of elitist power-into a single coherent vision of the republican polity of early Re25. Emilio Santini, ed., Leonardi Aretini Historiarum Florentini Populi Libri XZZ, in RRZZSS, vol. 19, pt. 3 (CittB di Castello, 1914-26), pp. 121-22: "Per hoc ipsum tempus sortitio magistratuum noviter instituta est, cum antea semper electio per suffragia obtinuisset. Ea mutatio, etsi parva tunc res opinione hominum visa sit, maximam tamen inclinationem reipublicae attulit, mutata penitus gubernandae civitatis forma. .. . . Prima sortitio in triennium et sex menses constituta; resque ipsa probavit utilem esse hanc legem ad tollendas civium contentiones, quae per procurata crebro oriebantur suffragia. Sed quantum in ill0 prodest reipublicae, tantum obest vel etiam magis, quod indigni plerumque ad magistratum ex sortitione sumuntur. Neque enim pari diligentia providetur praesenti officio et multis secuturis; sed remota quidem illa et an futura sint minime certa hebetiori intuemur oculo; praesentia vero acriter et argute. Extinguit praeterea virtutis studium, quia si suffragiis certandum foret, et aperte in periculum famae veniendum, multo magis sese homines circumspicerent. Morem igitur primum longe probabiliorem utilioremque reipublicae fuisse non ambigo, quo et populus romanus semper usus est in magistratibus creandis. Florentiae tamen hic sortitionis mos tunc primo inductus ad nostra usque tempora devenit, popularitate quadam in republica servatus." See also the Italian translation by Donato Acciaiuoli, in Zstoria Fiorentina di Leonardo Aretino tradotta in volgare da Donato Acciajuoli (Florence, 1861)~pp. 255-56. 26. See above, chap. 8.

Epilogue

315

naissance Florence; second, that such thinking reflected the actual development of electoral institutions and practices in the generation after 1382. The coexistence of an expanding political class and a contracting leadership elite implied no contradiction in the minds of those Florentines, like Bruni and Dati, who assumed that the raison dYCtreof the electoral politics of consensus was to achieve a greater degree of stability and unity in the governance of the republic, as far as this was compatible with upper-class interests, than had been possible under either a system of decentralized corporatism or the narrowly based elitism that proved so susceptible to ruinous factionalism. For those who could not share this assumption, consensus politics, as Cavalcanti warned, bordered on tyranny.*' Apart from Cavalcanti, however, contemporary expressions of critical dissent, especially from those in the lower echelons of the guild community who had the most to lose, are lacking. The suppression of the political role of the guilds had denied them their natural forum. To Machiavelli, however, who, a century later, decisively rejected the assumptions and aims of consensus politics, this combination of mass participation based on individual equality and centralized power based on elitist leadership began to appear as a serious and damaging contradiction. 27. His conclusion from the episode involving Niccolb da Uzzano's manipulation of the pratica was that "nella Repubblica ne dovesse seguire tirannesco e non politico vivere" (Cavalcanti, Istorie, I :30). For a recent and largely critical evaluation of Cavalcanti's negative assessment of the Florentine ruling class in the early fifteenth century, see Marcella T. Grendler, The "Trattato Politico-Morale" of Giovanni Cavalcanti (1381-c. 1451): A Critical Edition and Interpretation (Geneva, 1973)~especially pp. 13-30, 75-90. Grendler views Cavalcanti in rather harsh terms as presenting L'a classic profile of a political outsider whose judgment was seriously compromised by personal considerations," and whose "sentiments . . . revealed more of himself than of fifteenth-century Florentine society" (ibid., p. 89). Cavalcanti was certainly not an objective or neutral observer, and it is true that his "biases on certain subjects led him into errors of fact and judgment" (ibid., p. 87). But to dismiss Cavalcanti's "pessimism and disaffection" on such grounds as bespeaking "an attitude close to mental derangement brought on by his own misfortunes" (ibid., p. 88) may be the result of a rather uncritical acceptance of the very myths and assumptions that nourished the consensus fostered by the political and intellectual establishment of Florence. The relegation of the admittedly eccentric critic to the ranks of the mentally deranged would no doubt have pleased the powerful oligarchs and influential civic humanists whose consensus he did not share. For a different view on Cavalcanti and the value of the Istorie, see now Dale Kent, "The Importance of Being Eccentric: Giovanni Cavalcanti's View of Cosimo de' Medici's Florence," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 9 (1979):

3 I 6 Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics In the Discourse on Florentine Affairs After the Death of Lorenzo, written in 1520, Machiavelli commented that Florence "has never had a thoroughgoing republic or principate. You cannot say that a principate is stable when policies are carried out according to the will of one man and agreed on with the consensus of many." 28 When it is recalled that in Machiavelli's judgment the regime instituted in 1382 was indeed "sustained" by the virtii of one man-first by Maso degli Albizzi and later by Niccolb da UzzanoZ9-it becomes clear that this amounted to a conscious and explicit rejection by Machiavelli of the central assumption of consensus politics, namely, that stability can be achieved by integrating a narrow, centralized system of policy making within a broad, consensual framework. Interestingly, Machiavelli singles out the balia of 1393 as the crucial point of origin of this fatal contradiction: "The truth of this can be seen if one considers the regimes the city has had since 1393. To begin with the reform made at that time by Maso degli Albizzi, it will be seen that the aim was to give the city the constitution of a republic governed by aristocrats." Machiavelli, more clearly than Bruni and his contemporaries, understood that the generation around 1400 had paid a heavy price for the ephemeral stability of consensus politics. Whatever stability the new system afforded had been acquired, Machiavelli believed, by sacrificing the salutary effects of controlled conflict among competing social groups: "Nor can you believe a republic will last if it does not satisfy those aspirations which generally need satisfying if a republic is to survive."30 Only a society in which the 28. Niccolb Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra e scritti politici minori, ed. Sergio Bertelli (Milan, 1961), p. 261: "La cagione perch6 Firenze ha sempre variato spesso nei suoi governi, 2 stata perch6 in quella non 5 stato mai n6 repubblica n6 principato che abbi avute le debite qualiti sue; perch6 non si pub chiamar quel principato stabile, dove le cose si fanno second0 che vuole uno, e si deliberano con 11 consenso di molti." The translation, with a few amendments of my own, is by Judith Rawson, from Machiavelli: The History of Florence and Other Selections, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (New York, 1970), p. 15. 29. Niccolb Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine, ed. Franco Gaeta (Milan, 1962)~p. 272; see also Machiavelli: The History of Florence, p. 168. For a discussion of Machiavelli's interpretation of the events that led to this state of affairs and their relevance to the history of the guilds, see my "Arti and Ordini," pp. 168-87. 30. Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra e scritti politici minori, p. 261: "nC si pub credere quella repubblica esser per durare, dove non si satisfa a quelli umori, a' quali non si satisfacendo, le repubbliche rovinano. E che questo sia il vero si pub conoscere per li stati che ha avuti quella cittl dal 1393 in qua. E cominciandosi dalla riforma fatta in detto tempo da messer Maso degli Albizzi, si vedri come allora le volleno dar forma di repubblica governata da ottimati"; the translation is from the

Epilogue 317 institutional framework and legitimacy of such competition are preserved, Machiavelli seems to be arguing, can maintain itself vigorous, durable, and genuinely free. The fate of Florentine republicanism in the century following the consolidation of consensus politics inspired and still vindicates Machiavelli's insight. Gilmore edition cited in n. 28. Machiavelli further developed these ideas in the Istorie Fiorentine, especially in the introductory chapter to book 3; see Istorie Fiorentine, pp. 212- 13.

Appendix Table A. I. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria, 1282- 1399, Number of Appearances by Each Family Number of Posts

Number of Families

Total Posts

Number of Posts

Totals Source: Priorisfa Mariani I-V, in Manoscritti, 248-52

Number of Families

Total Posts

320 Appendix Table A.2. Distribution of Posts in the Signoria, 1282-1399, Summary by Groups of Families Number of Families

Number of Posts

Percentage of Families

Percentage of Posts

962

1413

70.68

24.88

253

1445

18.59

25.45

95

1232

6.98

21.69

51

1589

3.75

27.98

1361

5679

100.00

100.00

Families with 1 to 3 appearances Families with 4 to 9 appearances Families with 10 to 19 appearances Families with 20 or more appearances Totals

Source: Priorista Mariani I-V, in Manoscritti, 248-52

Table A.3. Yearly Totals of New Families Admitted to the Signoria, 1282-1532 Year

Number of New Families

Year

Number of New Families

Appendix

321

Table A.3. (continued) Year

Number of New Families

Year

Number of New Families

322

Appendix

Table A.3. (continued) Year

Number of New Families

Year

Number of New Families

Appendix 323 Table A.3. (continued) Year

Number of New Families

Year

Number of New Families

Source: Priorista Mariani I-VZ, in Manoscritti, 248-53

Table A.4. Families with Ten or More Appearances in the Signoria, 1282-1399 Number of Posts

Year of Entry

74 73 65 53

1284 1282 1283 1282 1291 1298

48

Families Strozzi Altoviti Albizzi (with Alessandri = 67) Acciaiuoli Medici Ricci Baroncelli-Bandini Rucellai Peruzzi Da Filicaia Beccanugi Alberti del Giudice

324 Appendix Table A.4. (continued) Number of Posts

Year of Entry

Families Ardinghelli Bucelli Salviati Bordoni Rondinelli Anselmi Magalotti (with Mancini = 57) Biliotti Dell' Antella Machiavelli Mancini (with Magalotti = 57) Siminetti Cerretani Aldobrandini Guasconi Bonciani Baldovinetti Giugni Bartolini-Davanzi-Scodellari Covoni Canigiani (with Paganelli = 26) Raffacani Girolami Ridolfi di Borgo Quaratesi Castellani Guadagni Corsini Fantoni Angiolotti (with Giotti = 22) Rinaldi Velluti Del Guazza Olivieri Soderini Marignolli Mangioni Tecchini di Ser Rinaldo Bastari (with Rittafedi = 33) Amadori Del Palagio

Appendix

325

Table A.4. (continued) Number of Posts

Year of Entry

Families Rocchi Pecori Capponi Della Badessa Mori Da Mosciano Sassolini Viviani Davanzati Pitti (with Ammirati = 23) Del Bene Attaviani Dietisalvi Neroni Del Nero-Aldobrandini di Madonna Manovelli Del Forese Benvenuti Malegonelle Ridolfi Caccini-Ricoveri Orlandini Migliorati Domenici Spina Falconi Passavanti Banchi Fagiuoli Spini Aglioni Del Bello Magli Da Panzano Cocchi Compagni Tolosini Spinelli Ristori-Del Baglione Gherardi del Bello Bentaccordi Rinucci (Nellus Rinucci and sons) Rittafedi (with Bastari = 33) Guicciardini Scilinguati

326 Appendix Table A.4. (continued) Number of Posts

Year of Entry

Families Risaliti Gianni Brancacci Arnolfi Stradi Corsi Deodati Minerbetti Da Ghiacceto Aldobrandini-Bellincioni Carnesecchi Ferrucci Stracciabende Benizi Gherardini della Rosa Bischeri Vettori Bencivenni Aldobrandini di Ghingo Ciurianni Borghi Pepi Cambi del Nero-Importuni Lapi Rinaldi Stefani Bonaccursi Orlandi Baldesi Bardi Falconieri Paradisi Del Beccuto Da Montespertoli-Boverelli Corbinelli Geri Da Certaldo Del Bianco Rinucci Fagni Bezzoli Capitani

Appendix

327

Table A.4. (continued) Number of Posts --

Year of Entry

Families

-

1309 1312 1314 1319 1325 1328 1328 1330 1331 1335 1343 1349 1350

Baroni Lupicani Cambi Donnini Ghiberti Serragli Falconi Della Stufa Soldi Baronci De ti Martelli Cerpelloni Lippi

Source: Priorista Mariani I-V, in Manoscritti, 248-52

Table A.5. Families with Twenty or More Appearances in the Signoria, 12821532, in Order of Their First Appearances Year of Entry 1282

Families Bardi, Gualterotti, Larioni Girolami Canigiani, Paganelli Altoviti Cerretani Acciaiuoli Rinaldi Ardinghelli Bordoni Dell'Antella Albizzi, Alessandri Pitti, Ammirati Tedaldi Anselmi Manovelli Del Bene Machiavelli Magalotti, Mancini Velluti Minerbetti Del Guazza Olivieri

Number of Appearances 35 32 77 118 40 91 27 45 37 57 141 68 23 33 21 23

66 93 33 46 20

328 Appendix Table A.5. (continued) Year of Entry

1284

Families Soderini Peruzzi Strozzi Beccanugi Da Filicaia Spini Tornaquinci, Popoleschi, Giachinotti, Tornabuoni Bucelli Pecori Raffacani Orlandini Corbinelli Visdomini, Tosinghi, Della Tosa Adimari, Alamanneschi, Cavicciuli Bonciani Della Badessa Marignolli Capponi Baroncelli, Bandini Baldovinetti Compagni Alberti del Giudice Mangioni Guadagni Ridolfi di Borgo Corsini Giugni Fantoni Angiolotti, Giotti Del Vigna Medici Dietisalvi Neroni Tecchini di Ser Rinaldo Riccialbani Da Ghiacceto Rondinelli Del Forese Salviati Carnesecchi Rittafedi, Bastari Ricci

Number of Appearances

Appendix Table A.5. (continued) Year of Entry 1299 1300 1301 1302

1303

Families Biliotti Bartolini, Davanzi, Scodellari Ferrucci Mori Pepi Lotti Cambi del Nero, Importuni Giucciardini Rucellai Benci Sassolini Risaliti Gherardini della Rosa Torrigiani, Valori Covoni Siminetti, Della Sannella Malegonelle Della Rena Banchi Viviani Aldobrandini Temperani Amadori Da Panzano, Firidolfi Cambi, Figliambuchi, Figliluchi Gianni Fagiuoli Guasconi Quaratesi Arnolfi Da Verrazzano Vettori Del Nero, Aldobrandini di Madonna Davanzati Ridolfi Monti di Pugio Serragli Castellani Leoni Spinelli Lorini

Number of Appearances

329

330 Appendix Table A.5. (continued) Year of Entry

Families Falconi Del Palagio Della Stufa Stradi Lanfredini Sacchetti Deti Bellacci Martelli Angiolini Ginori Guiducci Del Benino Orlandi Busini Bartoli Guidetti Federighi Segni Lippi Ugolini Nardi Vespucci Da Sommaia Caccini-Ricoveri Antinori Bini Gherardi Alamanni Corsi Nobili Niccolini Sirigatti Miniati di Dino Bartolini Salimbeni Dello Scarfa Berardi Canacci Bonsi Berlinghieri Vecchietti Arrigucci

Number of Appearances

Appendix Table A.5. (continued) Year of Entry 1376

Families Nasi Cocchi Mazzinghi Del Rosso Pieri Carducci Mellini Del Caccia Pandolfini Gianfigliazzi Del Nero Ubertini Lenzi Ciacchi Morelli , Venturi Sernigi Fantoni Serristori Lapi Pucci Giraldi Fedini Guidotti Corsellini Monti Del Zaccheria Puccini Taddei Peri del Bue Buondelmonti

Source: Priorista Mariani I-VI, in Manoscritti, 248-53

Number of Appearances 39 30 25 29 41 20 44 40 36 30 21 26 21 45 26 28 21 37 21 33 20 22 23 20 20 21 25 24 20 22

331

Index Acciaiuoli family, 42, 86-87, 117, 159n, 261,298; Niccola, 38-40; Dardano di Tingo, 86; Francesco di Meo, 86-87; Donato di Mannino, 87, 100; Agnolo, bishop of Florence, 130,133; Niccolb, grand seneschal of Naples, 18611; Donato, 267 Acciaiuoli, Alamanno: chronicle attributed to, 230-32 Accoppiatori, 140-43,145,147,16061,17811, 183-85,219, 241,251, 256-58,273,277,280-82, 284-92, 299,306, 314 Adequatio membrorum (agguagliamento), 240-41,252,262, 271 Adimari family: Bernardo di messer Manfredi, 33n; Messer Francesco di Lapo, 132n; Filippo, 267 Agnolo di Puccio, 262 Albergatori, Arte degli (guild of innkeepers), 45n, 156n, I74 Alberti (del Giudice) family, 87, 159n, 202,282,287; Jacopo d'Alberto, 87, 100; Neri di messer Jacopo, 87; Benedetto, 222n, z39,255,257n, 282; Alberto di Bonaccorso, 260; Cipriano, 267; Andrea, 267 Alberto di Rosone, Messer, 97n Albizzi family, 117, 150, 15911, 202, 261,298; Ruggiero, 53; Lando, 58, 65; Bellincione d'uberto, 132; faction, 133,162,167-69,193,217-18; Alberto di Pagno, 161n; Piero, 256; regime, 264,287; Maso, 272,29091, 316; Rinaldo, 310-12 Alderotti family, 261 Aldobrandini family, 87, 202, 298; Luigi di Lippo, 16111, 26011; Piero di Lippo, 191; Giovanni, 294

Aldobrandini di Ghingo family, 201 Aldobrandini di Madonna family, zozn Altoviti family, 117, 150, 159n; 202, 261, 293,298; Messer Palmieri di messer Ugo, 44n, 57, 61; Gentile di messer Oddo, 100-101; Stoldo, 267 Amadori family, 202n; Benozzo, 294 ammoniti, 219n, 221,242,274 Angelotti family: Vanni, 6411; Giotto di Fantone, 117 Angevins, 5,17, 81n,82,91,97-98 Anonimo (chronicler, 1358-89), 2 q n , 227n, 253 Anonymous commentator of 1377, 206-9 Antonio di Martino, 168-69 Antonio d'Orso, 133 Ardenghi, Lotto, z3-24,26, 35, 58 Ardinghelli family, 118, 15911, 253, 298; Francesco di Neri, 260 Arezzo, Florentine war against, 31 Armati family, 118; Vanni di Bartolo, 117n Arnolfi, Giovanni di messer Lapo, 161n Arrigucci family, 298 Arroti (appointed voting members of general scrutiny committees), 105, 111, 113, 121-22, 138-39, 159, 180-81,218, 221-23,229,238-40, 251, 271-73, 277-79 Azzolino di Ser Viviano, 168 Baldesi family, 201 Baldo di Lapo, 235 Baldovinetti family, 298; Francesco di Borghino, 117n Balia, 306; of 1291, 30-31; priorates of

334 Index 1310-26 selected by, 76, 80-97,115, 119,291, 313n; of October 1343, 134-35,137,141-44,147; of 1348, 158-61,167,180,189,195n~ 311n; of 1372,18zn, 218,221; of June 1378, 220-~3,228,230, 238,279-8on; of July-August 1378,228,231-32, 234,237-41; of 1381,265-66; of 1382,213,266-74,278,292n; of 1387,213,278-79,282-87,297, 314; of 1393,213,274n, 277-78, ~ 8 0 , ~ 8 2 , ~ 8 7 - 9 2 , 2 9 6 - 9 7314, , 316; of 1433,277n Bandini, Bartolo, 87 Bard family, 125n,127; banking company of, 126-27 Baron, Hans, 263 Baroncelli-Bandini family, 87, 117, 159n, 202,261,298; Bartolo di Manetto Buonricoveri, 87; Francesco di Giamoro, 87; Vanni Bandini, 10411; Piero, 272 Bartoli family, 298 Bartolo &Andrea, 13gn Bartolo di Iacopo, 24511 Bartolomeo di Geri, 292 Barucci, Agnolo, 258n Bastari family: Cionetto di Giovenco, 87; Giovenco di Cionetto, IOO Battifolle, Count Guido da, 82n, 91-92> 94 Beccai, Arte dei (guild of butchers), 10, 22,29, 34,44n, 156n Beccanugi family, 202; Messer Boninsegna Becchenugi, 40n Becker, Marvin B., 7n, 118, 142-44, 148,159,196n Bellaccio di Puccio, Ison Bellincionis, Messer Bonaccorso, 2on Bene di Chiaro, 97n Benedetto da Carlona, 257n Benevento, battle of, 4 Benincase, Manetto, 21n Benizi, Lapaccio di Bene, 160n Bentaccordi family, 298 Berlinghieri family, 298

Bernardo di Rosso, 2on Biffoli, Simone di Ser Matteo, 258n Biliotti family, 202, 298; Biliotto, 27411 Black Death, 141, 148, 158, 174, 199-200,208-9 Black Guelfs (Black party), 44n, 49, 54n, 57n, 62,68,69n, 70n, 71, 313 Bonaccorso di Vanni, 262 .Bonaccursi, Latino, 38 Bonaiuti family, 261 Bonaiuto di Giovanni, 236 Bonciani family, 202; Pinuccio d'Antonio, 172n Bordoni family, 86-87, 90, 96n, 118, 150,159n; Pagno, 87; Chele di Pagno, 87,117n; Ghigo di Pagno, 87; Bernardo di Pagno, 87; faction, 90, 92, 96n; Serraglio, 92 Borghini family, 298 Borghino di Taddeo, 133 Borse (bags containing name tickets of persons approved for communal offices),30-31,157-58,160-63,169,184, 195n, 22s-26,231,251-53,256-57, 268-699273-74, 29% 299,301, 307; for scrutiny of 1328, 103, 105-8; and parallel bags of remissi, 109-10, 112-13, 123; for scrutiny of 1343,135,140-47; overlapping use of between 1352 and 1377,185-88; for scrutiny of 1378,241,243-47; manipulation of by accoppiatori, 280-86, 288-90. See also Accoppiatori; Borsellino; Imborsazione; Scrutiny Borsellino, 276-77,282-90,297, 299, 306, 314 Brancacci family, 159n Brucker, Gene, 7n, 142-44,148, 149-5on, 160,167,195-96,198, 249,258-59,263-64,266,282, 288,306,309-10 Bruni, Leonardo, 14,211, 215-16, 308-9, 312-16 Bruno di Pagolo, 234 Bucelli family, 202n; Nastagio di

Index Lapo, 168; Giovanni di Francesco, 291; Francesco di Giovanni, 291n Buondelmonti, Gherardo, 267 Buoni, Lapo, 33n Buoninsegna, Lorenzo, 282 Burbassi, Tieri, 37 Busini family, 298 Caccini-Ricoveri family, 201, 298 Caggese, Romolo, 93n Calimala, Arte di (guild of international merchants and cloth finishers), 10-11, 21-22, 29-30, 44n, 104, 118, 121,156,172-73, 222n, 23511,291n Calzolai, Arte dei (guild of shoemakers), 10,22,156,172-7311 Cambio, Arte del (guild of bankers), 10-11,21-22,29-30,44n, 104,118, 121,156,172-73,235n,291n Canigiani family, 261, 298; Volpe, 21n Cantini, Giovanni, 172n Cantori, Nino de', 53, 56n Capponi family, 202,261,298 Captain of the People (Capitano del PoPolo), 20-21, 32,38-39,469 53, 62, 77, 79, 95n Cardinal Latino, 18; and reconciliation of Guelfs and Ghibellines, 18-19 Cardinal of Prato (papal legate), 79 Caro di Ser Venisti, Messer, 87 Castellani family, 202, 298; Vanni, 267 Castracani, Castruccio (lord of Lucca), 97, 99 Castri, Domenico di Ser Lippo, 134 Cavalcanti, Giovanni, 310-12, 315 Cecco di Cione, 197 Cerchi family, 33n, 42; Giovanni, 38, 40 Charles of Anjou, 4-5 Charles of Calabria, 97-99, 128 Charles of Valois, 6911, 71 Chiavaiuoli, Arte dei (guild of ironworkers), 45n, 156n,183n Ciati, Giunta, Ison Ciompi, 220,232,243-47,250,253;

335

in electoral politics of 1378, 228-43 .passim; guild of, 229n, 243, 245-47,251; uprising of, 243-44; fear of, 305 Cione di Vaccino, 197 Ciuto di Ser Manetto, 60n Civic humanism, 7,14,182,263, 300, 303,308-9,312-13 Compagni, Din% 39,44n, 54% 61, 6911, 70n, 71, 79; on the institution of the priorate in 1282,26-28; in electoral debates of the 129os, 34-36,41,57,59-60 Consensus, 3, 8,124,217,251; defined, 12-14; and reform of 1328, 102-3,114-16,163-65; and general scrutiny, 115-16, 182-83, 185, 210-12; and nomination, 175-78, 271, 274-75; and legitimacy of electoral institutions, 188-89,209-16; and divieti, 194-95; in patterns of officeholding, 202, 295-300; and reforms of 1382-93,264-65,267-68, 271,276-77, 282, 303-7; illustrated in Goro Dati, 301-4; and civic humanism, 308-15; rejected by Machiavelli, 315-17 Consuls of the guilds, 9,19,74,81, 122,131,133-34,156n, 174,188, 203,206,227-29,255,265-66; role in election of Fourteen in 1282, 20-25; role in election of priorate (1282-1303), 28-70 passim; role in nominations for general scrutinies, 104,121-22,136-37,169,171-73, 175-76,233-34, 274; participation in general scrutiny committees, 105, 138-39,180,221-23,238-40, 277-79. See also Guilds Corazzai, Arte dei (guild of armorers), 45n3 156n, 174 Corbinelli family: Albizzo, 37,40; Filippo di Tommaso, 260 Corporatism, 3,12-14,18,28, 35,44, 58,266, 303-5,307,315; defined,

336 Index 8-10; proposed and rejected in debates of 1282,23-28; in election of priorate (1292-1303)~ 33-69 passim; revived in 1343-48,133-34, 151, 163-65; revived in 1378,220, 223-24,227-28, 240-43; embraced by the pop010 minuto, 228-30; suppressed by reforms of 1382-93, 264-65,267-68 Correggiai, Arte dei (guild of girdlemakers), 45n,156n Corruption, electoral, 89-90, 180-81, 193,203-6,213-15, 218 Corsi family, 201 Corsini family, 253; Messer Tommaso, 100; Matteo di Niccolb, 260; FilipPO, 272 Council of the capitudini and the savi, 32-33,36-37,38,49-50,69-70, 74-76 79,81 Council of the Captain of the People, 19,20-22, 31, 54, 160,249; Special, 3011, 37, 38, 80-81, Ioon; General, 80-81, Ioon Council of the Hundred, 3on, 54, 79-81, Ioon Covoni family, 202; Paolo, 191 Cristofano di Bartolo, 258n Da Cerreto (Cerretani) family, 42; Aldobrando, 38, 57 Da Certaldo family, 87; Jacopo, 39 Da Filicaia family, 202, 298; Manetto, 176n dYAgobbio,Lando, 82n d'Aguglione, Baldo, 61, Son Dalla Tosa, Messer Rosso, 79 Da Mosciano, Spinello di Primerano, 100-101, 117n Dante, 18,61, 65n, 313 Da Panzano family, 298 Dati, Goro, 17811, 301-4, 307, 309, 315 Dati, Stagio, 301-2 Da Uzzano, Niccolb, 272, 311, 31511, 316 Davanzati family, 298; Manetto di

Giovanni, 260; Davanzato di Giovanni, 291 Davanzi (Bartolini-Davanzi) family, 118; Buto di Ricco, 87; Sandro di Buto, 117n Davidsohn, Robert, 6-7n, 114n Del Bene family, 87,202; Giovanni d'Amerigo, 259-6011; Francesco, 259n Del Bianco family, 298; Niccolaio di Mone Guidi, 168 Del Buono, Niccolb di Bartolo, 17211 Del Caccia family, 298 Del Forese family, 87 Della Bella, Giano, 13, 34, 37, 40n, 43, 4 4 n ~54961-639 70n Dell'Antella family, 159n, 298; Maso di Lamberto, 44n Delle Botte, Mongia del Rosso, 21n, 38 Del Lungo, Isidoro, 7n Del Palagio family, 202,298; Neri di Lippo, 117n, 133,161n Del Rosso, Rosso di Piero, 292 Dieci di Liberti, 221-23,238-40, 266,268,272n Dietisalvi, Nerone di Nigi, 117n Dissent, 315; attitudes toward, 310-13 Distribution (of offices among guilds or groups of guilds): applied to seats in the priorate and advisory colleges, 24,34-36, 39,41,142-44,149, 151-52, 161,164, 184-85,207,229, 243~258-60,262,274,276, 278-79,299; applied to borse, 185, 240-41,245-50,280-82; applied to scrutiny committee, 251- 52, 271-72? 278-80 Divieti, 29n, 31,40-41,48, 6111, 76-77, 83-84,90,10z-3,107-10, I32n, I40,I43,I45,I5I-53,161, 163,166,185-87,189-90+3, 256, 28311,285; exceptions allowed to, 161-62,1go-93,220; oligarchic complaints concerning, 166, 189-90, ~02,204-5,213; controversies over, 193-95

Index Donati, Corso, 62, 70n, 77 Doren, Alfred, 7n, 114n Edward I11 (king of England), 126 Eight of Santa Maria Novella, 244 Electoral reforms: of 1328,17, 92n, 93, 97, 99-116,119-20, 124-25,136, 162-63,179n, 313n; of 1339,12124,129, 131-32,136; of September 1343, 131-32; of October 1343, 135-45,152,162-63; of 1348, 159-61; of 1352,166-71,175,17911, 180-81,183-85,218; of 1378, 232-34,238-41; of 1379,249-52; of 1382,268-72; of 1387,277-79, 282-87, 306; of 1393,277, 282, 287-92, 306 Eligibility for office, 4, 6, 33, 37,40, 83,I03,I3I,I35,169,244,250, 269-70,274-75; and guild membership, 24, 47,178-79, 274-75; limited to economically active guildsmen, 46-48, 222,224-27; restricted by anti-foreigner and antiGhibelline laws, 153-58,254-56; and fiscal contributions, 219. See also Magnates Elisei, Messer Buonaccorso degli, 22n, 24 Elite. See Oligarchy Extraction of name tickets. See Name tickets Fabbri, Arte dei (guild of smiths), 22, 156n Factiods), 62-63,68, 77, 97, 99, 167-68,170,209,217, 303, 305, 309, 315; domination of electoral politics by, 79-81, 90-93; Angevin, 82n, 91-92; Bordoni, 90, 92,96n; muted by scrutiny system, 102, 114-16, 187-89, 274, 299; Albizzi, 133,162,167-69,193, 217-18; Ricci, 133, 162, 167, 193,217-18; divieti debated by, 193-94; denounced by chroniclers, 204-6, 211-15

337

Fagiuoli family, 202; Lorenzo di Meglio, 168 Fagni, Guido di Filippo, 23511 Falconi, Cecco di Spina, 87, 100-IOI Falconieri family, 4411; Gaddo di Forese, 44n; Bandino, 56,64, 70n, 71 Farsettai, Arte dei (guild of shirtmakers), 229n, 240n, 246,262, 268-69 Federation of guilds, 9-11, 24,159, 164,241; of 1289, 31; of 1293, 44-45 Foraboschi, Messer Razzante de', 13x1 Foreigners, legislation against: of 1346, 153-58; of 1379,254-56,258 Fornai, Arte dei (guild of bakers), 10, 45% 71,156n, I74 Fourteen (1280-83), office of, 17-26, 28 Fourteen (1343), committee of, 130, I33 Francesco di Chele, 24511 Francesco di Manetto, 262 Gaddo di messer Bianco, 21n Galigai, Arte dei (guild of tanners), 45% 156n Gavacciani, Lapo di Giovanni, IOO Gente nuova. See New men Ghibellines, 7n, 17-19, t m , 24,26, 274; exclusion from Signoria, 15758, 217,219n; legislation against, 157-58,208-9, 213-14 Giandonati, Messer Tribaldo de', 24 Gianfigliazzi family, 298; Rinaldo, 267 Giorgio di Barone, 160-61n Giovanni di Benci, 262 Giovanni di Domenico, 24511 Girolami family, 4411, 70n; Chiaro di Salvi, 37,40,44n, 55,58,64,7on; Monpuccio di Salvi di Chiaro, 441-1, 55; Girolamo di Salvi, 44n, 56-58, 70x1; Migliaccio di Salvi, 56n, 65, 67% 70n Giudici e Notai, Arte dei (guild of lawyers and notaries), 10, 22, 29-30,

338 Index 44n,118, I21,156,172n, 174; proconsul of, 159, 180, 277 Giugni family, 202 Gonfaloni (administrative districts), 106,110,121,140, 159, 17111, 180, 218,234-36,250-51~ 269,273n~ 277, 279n; Bue Nero, 171n; Chiavi, 176n,235, 26911; Scala, 226nY234, 269-7011; Nicchio, 235,269-70n; Lion Nero, 235,26911; Ferza, 235; Ruote, 235-36, 27011; Vaio, 270n; Vipera, 271n Gonfalonieri of the companies (nineteen until 1343, sixteen thereafter), 74, 9On, 102-3,106-8, 122, 133-34, 140,146, 155,161,162n, 185,186n, 191-92~229-30,240~2459 256, 272, 274, 279-80, 301-2; participation in scrutiny committees, 105,138, 159,180, 229, 238-40,272n~ 277; role in nomination of candidates for general scrutinies, 111, 11311, 121, 135-36,138,169-70,175-78, 233-37, 250~254,269,273-74 Grazie, Arrigo, 37, 65n Great Council, 306 Grendler, Marcella T., 315n Guadagni, Migliore, 57, 65n, 67n Gualberti, Azzino, 161n Gualducci, Pela, 4411, 55, 57, 59-60, 70n Guasconi family, 202,298; Tinoro di Nardo, 100; Biagio, 257n Gucci, Giorgio di Guccio di Dino, 258n Guelfs, 7n, 17-19, 21n, 26-27. See also Parte Guelfa; Black Guelfs; White Guelfs Guicciardini family, 261; Luigi, 267, 272 Guidalotti, Rinuccio, 33n Guidetti family, 261 Guidi, Guidubaldo, 6911, 7311, 7411, 92n, 93n, 141-42n Guidi, Noffo, 57-61, 70n, 71 Guidinghi, Neri, 64n

Guild community, 17,189,243-44, 254-55,257-58,266,278,282,

298, 304, 311, 315; defined, 10; population of, 11, 13811; relationship to oligarchy, 12-13> 167-68,17o,z10, 217, 306; condition of in 1282~23, 25-26; ascendancy of in 1343, 148-49; nominations from, 174-75; views of concerning divieti, 192, 194-95; in revolutions of 1378, 220-24, 228-31,237; preposti of, 265-66; fear of Ciompi within, 305; rejects corporatism, 307. See also Guild (popular) government; Guilds Guild (popular) government, 12; of 1292-96,13,43-45,61,63, 136; of 1343-48, 125,132-34, 137-38, 145,179n, 242,256nY261,276; of 1 3 7 8 - 8 z , 2 ~ o y ~ ~ 241,243-48, 9n, 257-58,261,265-67, 271n, 273, 276,279, 304-5,wn Guilds (consuls or members of), 9-10, 19, 23,25-26; minor (of indeterminate number), 10~12,56-57,122; seven major, 11-~z,zo, 22-z6,29, 31, 40n, 50~60,139,148,156, IW, 183-84,z-j7nY 258-60,262; twelve major, 22,25-26,28, 31-34, 36-38, 41-43> 45-46, S O - ~ I ~ 59,649 69,105, 122,131,134; five middle, 22~31,34~39-40, 50,60, 67, 70, 139, 157n, 171; twenty-one, 23,449 47, 133-34>137-39>143n> 156,169,171, 174-76,180~~~1-23, 228-29,238, 2 4 0 ~ 2 4 5 n250,277; ~ nine minor, 39-40, 45n,157nY171; six major, 121-22, 131, 136; fourteen minor, 139, I4I-5I,157nY 159-61, 167-68,173-74,178n, 183-85, 195n,206-9,226-27n,229n, 231, 233-37, 240-41, 243, 259% 26976,278-81,291-92, 3IIn; of the pop010 minuto, 229n, 231,233-37, 240-41,243,250-51; twenty-four, z32n; seven major, and scioperati, 226nY233-37, 240-41,244-48,

Index 250-53,269-73,276,278-82, 292n; sixteen minor, 245-47,24953,257-58,262; twenty-three, 255, 257,265-66. See also Consuls of the guilds; Guild community; Guild (popular) government Guildsmen. See Non-elite major guildsmen Guittomanni, Grazia, 96n Hohenstaufen: defeat of in 1266,4 Imborsazione (of name tickets), 30-32, 37n, 41-42,86,93-97,132,160-61, 241; regulated by reform of 1328, 103,106, 112; composition of priorates predetermined through, 140-47; controlled by accoppiatori, 140-43,145, 147,160-61,184-85, 280-90. See also Accoppiatori; Borse Kent, Dale, 263-64, 306 Knights, knighthood, 40,47,267 Lana, Arte della (guild of woolen-cloth manufacturers), 10-II,ZI-22, 29, 104,118,121,128,136,156,172-73, 228n, 23511,269 Lapo di Giovanni di Buonaccorso, 96n Leadership elite, 14, 91, 295, 301, 305-6,309-15 Legnaiuoli, Arte dei (guild of woodworkers), 45n, 156n, 172-74 Libri Fabarum, 19-~0,4~,49,62-63, 79, 81-82, 94 Lippi family, 202 Lorenzo di Donato, 235-36n, 257n Lorenzo di Romeo, 262 Lorino di Ser Bonaiuto, 96n, IOO Lucca, 79,15711; Florentine war against, 97, 99 Machiavelli, Niccolb, 315-17 Machiavelli family, 20211, 261, 298; Bindo di Firenze, 67n Maestri di pietra e legname, Arte dei

339

(guild of master builders and carpenters), 22,156-57 Magalotti family, 202; Filippo, 272 Magnates, 37,40,47,1o4,168,179n, 219-20,265-67; barred from priorate, 9n, 54, 135; legislation against, 28n, 54; 1295 rebellion of, 62-64, 77; readmitted briefly to offices, 127-33 Malegonelle family, 202n Mancini family, 159n, 298; Bencivenni di Lippo, 168; Bello, 267; Bardo, 287 Manfred (king of Sicily), 5 Mannelli, Zanobi di messer Lapo, 132n Marchi, Messer Marco de', 133 Marsilius of Padua, 2 1 0 - I I ~ Martines, Lauro, 306 Matriculation (in guilds), 24, 47, 137, 2~2,224-27,234; matricula, 63n Matthew of Acquasparta (cardinal), 68 Mazzei, Lapo, 309 Medici family, 168, 202, 298; regime, 7,184,236,257,263,277n, 306; Talento, 96n; Cambio di Lippo, 168-69; Vieri di Cambio, 169n,272; Salvestro, 230, 239; Manetto di Neri, 260; Michele, 267; Cosimo, 277n Medici, Speziali e Merciai, Arte dei (guild of doctors, importers of spices, apothecaries, and shopkeepers), 10-II,ZZ, 29,104,121, ISI,156,I72-73, 248,292n Membra: guilds as, 9; subdivisions of composite guilds as, 10,151,248; groups of guilds as, 245-46 Mercanzia, 156n, 207,228, 254, 257, 265-66,268, 30411; oligarchy organized in, 11; composition of, 11; control of guilds by, 12, 174-75; role in nomination of candidates, 103-4, 111,116, 121-22, 131, 136; participation in general scrutiny committees, IO5,138,I59,180,229~ 238-40, 272n, 277

Micciole, Fazio da, 36n, 37 Michele di Lando, 230-31, 235 Migliaccio (furrier), 53n Milan: Florentine wars against, 263 Minerbetti family: Piero, chronicle attributed to, 282-83,286,288; Andrea di Niccolb, 291-92; Giovanni d'Andrea, 292n Molho, Anthony, 117n, 263-64, 277n, 294-96, 306 Montespertoli, Lotteringo da, 37 Morelli, Giovanni di Paolo, 309 Name tickets, extraction of a mano, 184,256-58,277,290 Name tickets, extraction of by lot, 14, 17, 31-32> 93-97,123,129,132, I35,I52-53,161-62,164, 178,244, 273,297,299; instituted in 1328, 103,107-10; regulated by divieti, 107-9,143-44,189-94; regulated by order of scrutinies, 161,185-88; controversy over, 256-58; limited by powers of accoppiatori, 277, 282-86,288-90; Bruni's views on, 313-14 Nardi, Salvestro di Michele, 291-92 Neri del Baldese, Ison New men (gente nuova), 51- 52,58, 66,I45,I53,166,2I7,253-54,258, 274,276,280n, 293,298, 304; presence in the Signoria, 118-19, 148-51, 163, 199-202,260-62, 294-97, 299; approved in general scrutinies, 159-60,195; issues affecting the interpretation of their rise, 195-99; contemporary views of, 202-9, 213 Niccolb di Giovanni, 25711 Nicholas I11 (pope), 18 Nofri di Ser Piero, Ser, 22811 Nomination of candidates, 229-30; procedures debated for, 33-42,4960~64-70; in 1292-1303~41-43, 53-60, 64-70; guidelines established by Ordinances of Justice for,

46-48; for general scrutinies, 103-4, III,II6, 121-22, 131, 135-38, 159, 162,164,169-80,233-37~ 243, 250-51,269-71~ 273-75,277~290; contribution to electoral consensus, 176-78; expansion of, 103,138, 176-78,236-37,270-71,274-75 Non-elite major guildsmen, 127, 129-30,166,168-69,194,207, 223, 240; defined, 10-12; and guild regime of 1292-96, 35,40, 51-52; and guild regime of 1343-48,139, 149,151; and guild regimes of 1378-82,247-48,260,262; rejection of corporate government by, 264,298-300, 303-7 Nuto di Vanni, 257n Officeholding: statistics on, 29-30, 116-1g,147-51,195-202,260-62, 292-98 Oliandoli e Pizzicagnoli, Arte degli (guild of sellers of oil and cheese), 45n, 156n Oligarchic families. See Oligarchy Oligarchic regime of 1382-1434~7, 236,263-65, 294, 316. See also Albizzi; Oligarchy Oligarchy, 19, 31~34-36, 39, 159n, 163-64,166-7o,175,181,210, 217, 223,252-53,258,267,271,274,

276,286-87,291; defined, 10-11; opposition to guild government, IO-I3,18,25-26, 40~42-43~51, 62-63,153~158,242~247-50,256, 259-60,262,265; organized in Mercanzia, 11-12; and consensus politics, 13-14,114-16,202, 264-65, 298-99, 303-7; presence in the Signoria, 2 9 - ~ o , I I ~ - I ~ , I ~ o , ~ o I - ~ , 260-61, 297-98; eligibility for offices limited by guild governments, 43, 47-48, 54n, 135,179,226,266; control of balia-priorates by, 86-89, 93; crisis of, 126-29; opposition to divieti, 166,189-90, 193-95,202

Index Ordinances of Justice, gn, 13,29, 32, 42,44-46,53-55,60n, 62,69n, 73, 77-78, 81, 85,130, I79n Orlandi family, 298 Orlandi, Guido, 37 Orlandini family, 42; Albizzo, 38, 64n Orlandini family, 298; Piero di Simone, 269n Otto di Balia, ~ ~ ~ n , ~ 3 0 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 Otto di Guardia, 266,272,27811 Ottokar, Nicola, 6, 18-19, 29, 33, 39, 47,63n Pacini, Francesco, Ison Pagnetti, Geri, 33n Parlamento, 1o1,232n, 243, 245, 247, 267-68 Parte Guelfa, 99, 133,167,188, 193, 207,213,217-~3,~26,246,266, 268,279-8011, 287, 304; role in nomination of candidates, 103-4, 111, 116, 121-22, 131, 169-71, 175-78, 233-34, 250; political orientation of, 104,170; participation in scrutiny committees, 105, 180-81n, 238-39,26g,z7zn, 277; support of anti-foreigner legislation, 153-54; anti-Ghibelline campaign of, 157,208-9,214-15, ZIgn, 221, 274, 305 Participation in office: notion of transformed by consensus politics, 14, 299-304,308-9, 311,314-16 Passavanti, Ser Zato di Gaddo, 117n Pecori family, 202,298; Dino Pecora, 34-3644% 54-58,60,64-65, 70n, 71,202 Pelacane (Castellani) family, 16gn; Paolo di Ricco, 168 Peruzzi family, 87,118, I59n, 202,298; Pacino, 53, 55-57, 70n; Donato di Pacino, 87; Giotto d'Arnaldo, 100-101; banking company of, 126 Petition: of the twenty-one guilds (9-10 July 1378), 2 2 ~ - ~ 4 , ~ 2 6 - 2 8 ,

341

230,234,238-39; of the pop010 minuto (21 July 1378), 229-30, 233-34 Petriboni family, 202 Piero di Ser Chiaro, 262 Pisa: Florentine wars against, 31,128 Pitti family, 298; Piero di Neri, 260 Podesti, gsn Political class, 6; effect of guild-based system of elections on, 24-25, 51- 52,137,227; defined by general scrutinies, 115-16, 209-11, 273, 286; expansion of, 236,264-65, 270, 298-99, 305-7, 309, 315 Popolo minuto, 128-29,228-38, 240-43, 245, 250,270-71,273, 304 Popular party of ~zgos,32,40-43, 50, 52, 54-64, 71, 76, 179. See also Guild (popular) government Por Santa Maria, Arte di (guild of silkcloth manufacturers, retail cloth dealers, and other merchants and artisans), 10-II,ZZ, 29, 35,44n, 104, 121,136-37,15I,156,I72-73,248, 269, 304 Pratese, Lapo, 44n Pratica, 311-12, 315n Primo Popolo, 17 Priore di Ser Bartolo, 104n Publicatio, 85-86 Quaratesi family, 87, 202; Sandro di Simone, 133 Quarters (administrative subdivisions from 1343), 130,138,143, 146, 183-84,~18,280,284,28g, 291; Santa Croce, 145-47,171n, 226n, 235-36, 269-7on; Santa Maria Novella, 152-53, 271n; San Giovanni, 176, 235, 269-7on; Santo Spirito, 234-35, 269-70n Raffacani family, zozn Rainucci, Messer Lapo de', 22n Rastrelli, Modesto, gzn Reforms. See Electoral system reforms Regulatores, 221, 223

Remolo, Ser Torna de, 59n Ricci family, 117, 202, 261, 298; Ruggieri, 104n; faction, 133, 162, 167, 193,217-18; Bartolo, 134; Uguccione, 194,272 Ridolfi family, 159n, 202,261; Niccolb di Cione, 132; Cione, 132n; Lorenzo, 310n Rigattieri, Arte dei (guild of used-cloth dealers), 22, 156n, 174 Rimborsamento (rimbotto), 283, 286, 288,290,292n, 297 Rinaldi family: Borgo, 55, 59, 67n, 70n; Dante, 58-60 Rinuccini, Messer Giovanni di messer Francesco, 260 Ristori, Ciaio, 33n Robert (king of Naples), 81n, 82, 91, 95% 97 Rodolico, Niccolb, 7n Roman law, 4 Rondinelli family, 159n, 202; Ghino di Vieri, 117n Rubinstein, Nicolai, 7,184, 306 Rucellai family, 117, 150, 202,261, 298; Lapo di Vanni, 266; Giovanni, 267 Rustichelli, Giovanni, 56n, 58, 70n Rustichi, Neri, 56n

197; Andrea di Rucco, 197; Bartolo di Rucco, 197 Scali, Giorgio, 21111, 24511, 260-61n Scaramella, Gino, 7n, 232, 239 Scioperati, 63n, 161,178-79,183, 226-z7n, 239. See also Guilds Scrutiny, general, 14~17,162,178,

180-83,185-88,~03-5,210-15, 277,285; of 1328, 103-10,112-16; of 1331, 111-12; of 1335,120; of 1339,123; of 1340, 122-23, 129; of I342,121n, 129; of August 1343, 130; of October 1343,135-40,142-52, 176,236-37,240; of 1348,159-61, 186-87, 191,195,260n; of 1352,169, 181-82,186-87, 191,195,260n; of 1355,181-82,186-87,195,260n; of 1358,182n, 195,260n; of 1361,182n, 195,260n; of 1364,181-Szn, 18687,195,260n; of 1367,181-82x1, 187,206; of 1371,182n; of 1375, 18211,218; of 1378,220,226n, 229n, 231-50, 253,270; of 1379,249-54; of 1382,237,263,268-74,282-83, 288-90,297; of 1385,274-75,278, 280-81,283-86,288; of 1391,237, 263,275-76,282,288-90; of 1393, 274-75, 277-78, 280-81, 290; of 1398,27811, 292n; of 1400,27811, 292n; of 1404,292n; of 1411,23637,263,275-77,292n; of 1433, 236-37,263,275-77; of 1484,275 Scrutiny committees, 106, 130, 166, 219-20,227,270,~73,282; composition and selection of, 105,122,

Salimbeni, Lionardo di Bartolino, 260n Saltarelli, Lapo, 37, 53, 55 Salutati, Coluccio, 232 Salvemini, Gaetano, 6n, 28n,40n, 131,138-39,159,164,180-81,184, 63% 72 218,221-23,229-30,237-40, 242, Salviati family, 202, 293, 298; Andrea 251,~71-72,277-80; corruption in di messer Francesco, 260; Forese, 294 appointment of, 180-82, 205-6; Santo Stefano: 1426 meeting in church controls over appointment of, 276, of, 310-11 278-80 Sassolini, Giovanni d'Arrigo, 168 Serragli family, 298 Savi (also called arroti): appointed Sesti (administrative subdivisions to electors from 1280 to 1303, 20-24, 1343), 20-213 36-39,41, 459 49-51> 28-29, 32, 35-37,4648-5b53, 53-60,64-69,103,105-7,109-10, 55-60,64-69,75-76 112, 122-23 Savini family, 197; Giovanni di Rucco,

Index Siminetti family, 202,298; Bartolommeo di Guccio, 117n Sixteen, advisory college of. See Gonfalonieri Skinner, Quentin, 15 Soderini, Tommaso, 267 Soldani, Filippo, 161n Soldi family, 202 Sortition. See Name tickets, extraction of by lot Sottoposti, 38n, 145-48,151,222,224, 269-71 Spicciolati, 143-47,152-54,161-62, 19% 241 Spinelli family, zozn Spini family, 261, 298; Ugo di Lapo, 13x1; Cristofano, 267, 308 Squittinatore (chronicler), 232-33, 239,243,253n Stagio di Barduccio, 269n Standard-bearer of Justice, 61n, 117n, 147,160,184,191-92,238,246, 271n, 283; institution of, 45; election of, 45-46,84-85,102-3,107; annulled by magnate government of July-September 1343, 130; minor guildsmen ineligible for, 142, 161; selected by accoppiatori, 145,161,184, 281, 284-85, 288-89; alternates between maggiori and minori, 250 Statutes of Florence: of the Captain of the People (1322-25), 69n, 72-78; of the Captain of the People (1355), 153, 17911; of the people and commune (1415),179n, 279n Stefani, Marchionne di Coppo, 62-63, 77, 92-96, Inn, 135-36, 181-8211, 228-30,23~,~38-39,244-45,26667,282-83, 313n; views on officeholding and the electoral system, 203-6, 303; notion of reggimento, 211-12; analyzes electoral politics of 1378-82,247-53,255,257-60, 273; prepares nominations for the gonfalone Vipera in 1382,271n Stracciabende family, 118

343

Strada family, 202 Strozzafichi, Niccolb di Berto, 117n Strozzi, Carlo, 28n Strozzi family, 42, 87, 117,150,168, 202,253,261,298; Ubertino, 38, 40; Rosso (dello Strozza), 53-54, 70n; Piero di Pinaccio, 87; Luca di Geri, 11711; Bernardo di Piero, 168; Messer Pazzino di messer Francesco, 193-94,260-61; Tommaso, 256-5711, 26111; Marco d'uberto, 260-61; Jacopo di messer Tommaso, 260-61 Syndics, 230-32,238-39; of the twenty-one guilds, 222n, 228,238, 240; of the pop010 minuto, 229,238, 240 Tancredi, Ser, 56n Tavernino di Donato, 96n Tecchini di Ser Rinaldo family, 202n Tedaldi, Maffeo, 33n Tigliamochi family, 261; Agnolo d'uguccione, 24411 Tiniozzi, Manetto, 37, 59, 70n Tintori, Arte dei (guild of dyers), 128, 229n, 240n, 246,262,268-69, 271n Tolosini family, 133; Nastagio di Bonaguida, 133 Tornaquinci, Iacopo, 267 Tosinghi, Baldo, 267 Twelve buoni uomini, advisory college of, 73,92,122,152,155,158,230; institution of, 89- 90; imborsazione and election of, gon, 102-3,106-7, 140, 160-61,185-86, 191-92; divieti for, 108-9, 14511; role in nomination of candidates for general scrutinies, 111, 11311, 121, 233-34; replaced by Eight and restored as Twelve, 130, 133; participation in balk of October 1343,134-35; participation in scrutiny committees, 138,159,180, 229,238-40,27zn, 277; share of

344 Index minoti or minuti in, 142,146,164, 229,240,245,274, 279 Twenty, governing committee of, 128 Ubaldini da Signa, Guido, 70n Ubaldini, Jacopo, 255n Ugolini, Vanni, 62 Vaiai e Pellicciai, Arte dei (guild of furriers), 22,29, 53,151,15611,172 Valori family: Maso, 100-101, 104- 5n; Taldo, 100, 117n; Bartolomeo di Niccolb di Taldo, 291; Niccolb di Bartolomeo, 291n Vecchietti family, 298; Niccolb di Iacopo, 260 Velluti family, 159n, 181, 188; Donato, 135, 141-42,160,167-68, 170,181, 188,193-94,203,205; Bernardo, 256n Vettori, Andrea di Neri, 291 Villani, Filippo, 177n, 203-6

Villani, Giovanni, 28-29, 31, 63, 68, 77,793 89391-97~99~ 129-30,153, 155, 157; views on electoral reform of 1328, 110-11, 113-14, 119-21, 124-25,205; views on the popular government and scrutiny of 1343, 133-35,138-39,141-46,148-49, 164,206, 242 Villani, Matteo, 18on, 203-6, 213-15, 218 Vinattieri, Arte dei (guild of wine retailers), 4511, 156n Visdomini, Messer Lottieri dei, 2011, 24326 Walter of Brienne (Duke of Athens), 98,116n, 124,128-29, Ison, 208-9 White Guelfs (White party), 3511, 49, 68 Witt, Ronald G., 14911,195-98, 263-64, 294-97