Context Dependent Knowledge Robert Ackermann Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Mar., 1982), pp. 425-433. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28198203%2942%3A3%3C425%3ACDK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
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CONTEXT DEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE It is possible to suggest, on Wittgensteinian grounds, that no general analysis of knowledge exists, since no general analysis could capture the richness and variety of contexts in which human beings recognize instances of human knowledge. T h e most durable general analysis of human knowledge is the justified true belief analysis, but a vast literature bristles with counterexamples to this proposal. What has perhaps not quite been noticed is that the analyses of knowledge developed by many philosophers have looked to mathematics and science for paradigm cases of human knowledge, while the counterexamples proliferate in domains associated with everyday life. There may be a clue to the avoidance of scepticism about knowledge in this distinction. Perhaps there is justified true belief that may be taken as knowledge in mathematics and in science, but this situation may be rare or nonexistent in everyday life. If an appropriate distinction of epistemological domains can be found, then the counterexamples may make us pessimistic about knowledge claims in everyday life, but the existence of the counterexamples doesn't rule out mathematical and scientific knowledge. T h a t is the possibility I wish to explore in this paper. Suppose someone advances a knowledge claim. Let a be the person and let the knowledge claim be abstracted to Kap, where p is the proposition said to be known. There are two well-travelled routes to rejecting such a claim. First, any reason to think that p is false is a reason to think KaP false. So much is unarguable. Second, any reason to think that a's position is such that he doesn't have a sufficient epistemological justification for thinking p true (even though p may be true) is a reason to think Kap false. For an action oriented animal, action based on a false but revisable hypothesis is no doubt preferable to sceptical suspension of belief. This no doubt explains our willingness to place various eyewitness reports and authoritative assessments in our knowledge bank for practical purposes even though we do not know them to be true according to certain philosophical criteria. T h e same thing might be said about our acceptance of various scientific claims. Some philosophers have argued that we can pursue epistemological goals without ever accepting knowledge claims, by assigning probability structures to consistent
sets of beliefs. T h e alternative may seem to be scepticism in the absence of a satisfactory general analysis of knowledge. Scepticism about a knowledge claim can't be pressed without assuming something. For our purposes, agent a need not accept the position that he doesn't know that p simply because he cannot refute the claim that he might not be epistemologically completely justified in thinking that he knows that p. This is one form of scepticism's wedge. From the fact that an agent might always be wrong it does follow (by instantiation) that a might be wrong in any particular case. But this does not furnish a reason for thinking that a is wrong in this particular case. Consider an everyday example. Agent a claims to know that p because he remembers that p. But one might misremember in any particular case. T h e fact that a might be misremembering p is not therefore, by itself, a reason for thinking that he is misremembering p.' A reason for thinking that he is misremembering p must be context dependent. Perhaps a holds that something is true which is extremely unlikely if p is also true. Perhaps b remembers that -p and is an equally credible witness. Then one may reasonably object to a that he might be misremembering, and perhaps does not know that p. This objection (by itself, and in the absence of a definite context) is perhaps relevant, and perhaps not. If it is the sort of objection that could be formulated to any remembered claim, then it seems a spurious doubt or objection and one of the kind that I shall call metaphysz'cal hereafter.' On the other hand, if it is formulated because of a's specific claim and in virtue of particular features of that claim that seem to conflict with certain facts, then it will be regarded hereafter as a nonmetaphysical doubt or objection. We can analyze the notion of metaphysical doubt by gradually accumulating a list of stipulated metaphysical objections. Any general objection that one might be dreaming; that one might be ' O n e might argue that this requires another explicit assumption in any full analysis. So be it. I t would seem however, that the assumption is required of any epistemology compatible with certain intuitions. Compare this example. T h e fact that Joe might be in Barcelona is not (in general) a reason for thinking that he is in Barcelona. H e might be there in the sense that it is physically possible, but we don't have a reason for thinking that he is there without some further information about Joe's travel plans and his recent states of mind. Z A distinction between metaphysical and nonmetaphysical doubt appears in the writings of rationalists, for example, Descartes, and also of pragmatists, for example, Peirce. In this literature, nonmetaphysical doubt is usually called rcnl doubt. No prejudice regarding metaphysics is here intended by the use of the term rne/aphysical doubt. T h e term is convenient because of the noted historical connections.
under hypnosis; that one might be insane or deluded; that one has misremembered what one takes to be clearly remembered; that someone has made an (unspecified) contrary claim; all of these are metaphysical objections provided that no particular evidence differentially supports them in a given case. This lzit of metaphysical objections will here be taken as illustrative for purposes of this paper; if the general character of the analysis to be proposed seems right to sustained scrutiny, this list can easily be revised as a result of more detailed discussion. T h e touchstone of a metaphysical objection is the ease with which it can be formulated to address new knowledge claims. Once we have mastered a metaphysical objection we can find a variant of it for perhaps all knowledge claims. There can also be metaphysical objections relativized to a class of knowledge claims. For example, all knowledge claims based on statistical sampling are subject to the objection that the sample may be biased. Unless there is a particular reason to expect bias in a particular sample, however, the objection that the sample may be biased is metaphysical. For the most part, we will be concerned with metaphysical objections not relativized to a class of knowledge claims. T h e Gettier counterexamples to justified belief analyses are not metaphysical objections as they have been characterized here. Metaphysical objections are general objections to human knowledge, if one takes them seriously, as many sceptics do. I don't have an argument that the sceptic must be wrong, but I think such generalized scepticism is difficult to maintain in the face of specific examples of human knowledge. Let us consider two scientists who might be said to have come to know something as a result of their research. T h e first scientist counts some red blood cells in a grid on a slide and then claims to know that there are 1 7 cells in the grid. T h e second scientist examines a great deal of demographic evidence involving the contents of graves, the distribution of potsherds, etc., and then claims to know that a population migration occurred at some point in time between two Indian villages. Unless an analysis of knowledge can count such instances (with the facts filled in) as examples of human knowledge, it would seem to have hopelessly lost contact with the presumed object of analysis. Perhaps it will be obvious that the circumstances surrounding the first scientist's observations might be filled in at least in some cases of this kind of direct observation so that only metaphysical objections could be brought against the knowledge claim. T h e second case is different. T h e scientist in question cannot be sure that the system he is analyzing is closed in a relevant sense. A spaceship might
have picked up the population of the first village and placed alien replicas into the second village for all that his evidence can show him. Nothing counts against this as a logical possibility. Is it a relevant objection to his knowledge claims that such an event might have happened? It is, to be sure, a logically possible nonmetaphysical objection to his knowledge claim, since it does not depend on a metaphysical objection, but is specific to this situation. Much of the interesting conflict between philosophical scepticism and everyday assumptions about knowledge seems to lie in just such cases. T h e philosopher considers all possible logical nonmetaphysical objections to knowledge claims, but the scientist is interested only in objections to his knowledge claim that seem scientifically relevant and plausible at the time that a scientific knowledge claim is advanced. Should one wish to find an analysis of knowledge accomodating scientific intuition, i t is consequently clear that knowledge claims will have to be evaluated with respect to scientific plausibility at the point in tirrie when the knowledge claim is advanced. Suppose it is initially proposed that a knowledge claim is true if the claimant can meet all of the plausible objections that could be brought against the relevant knowledge claim when the claim is advanced. It is clear on this proposal that if p is found to be false, then K a p might have been a legitimate knowledge claim in the past, but can be no longer. We do not maintain " K a p 3 p" as a theorem of our analysis, and this would seem sufficient to rule out this analysis as far as many philosophers are concerned. If there is a general analysis of knowledge, perhaps there are some generalizations true of knowledge, and this would seem to be an obvious candidate to express one of them. But if there is no general analysis of knowledge, the desire to find theorems of this kind would be considerably diminished. I propose to see if we can do without i t , at least in this untensed version. There is some evidence from our use of language that the concept of knowledge embedded in ordinary language is highly context dependent and temporal. An example is the following: Kit Carson knew that since the edges of the tracks were sharp, the Indians could be overtaken within two hours. It is clear from one point of view that Kit Carson could have known no such thing. Neither logic nor the laws of nature permit Kit to have known that the Indians could be caught. One can imagine many pitfalls-say that the Indians could cross a rope bridge and destroy i t . Kit could have known that the Indians could be overtaken only if,
great scout that he was, he could have ruled out such circumstances from his knowledge of the terrain and the local weather. A modern Kit Carson would confront a different set of circumstances. Modern Indians might have a rendezvous arranged with a helicopter or an airplane, hardly a problem for the original Kit Carson. Confronted with identical tracks, terrain, and weather, the modern Kit Carson might not be able to make any assertions about overtaking the Indians. T h e past tense of know seems often to be used where one might say that someone knew something that one could not know now due to the development of scientific and mathematical knowledge in the interval. Further support for this claim can be gathered from the locution "I used to know." In contrast to "I thought I knew," this locution suggests not that one didn't know because one doesn't know now, but that one did know something which one doesn't know now due to some intervening development. "I used to know where Harry could be found on Saturday midnight" suggests that one knew but doesn't know now due to some change in the interval. Harry's habit patterns may have changed as a result of a new love affair, or whatever. Further, these points about tense are relevant to the development of science. It seems to me relevant to ask what chemists knew about valence in the nineteenth century, or what physicists knew about the atom at the turn of the century. T h e straightforward answer to such questions is to cite the evidence available to scientists at the time in question, and then to relate what they knew on the basis of this evidence, as opposed to what they merely believed or conjectured. Apart from the desire to accomodate a philosophical theory about knowledge, it seems obvious to me that something can be known at one point in time, and then become replaced by other knowledge, perhaps in conflict with it, at a later time. If this possibility is ruled out, scepticism threatens with a vengeance. Since we can't know now what is true (what will never be discovered false) among all the propositions scientists think true and accept, we couldn't say that they know anything unless we adopt an analysis of knowledge that works in fixed contexts. Scepticism about knowledge is buttressed by the so-called Gettier counterexamples and the subsequent l i t e r a t ~ r e .These ~ counter3Edmund L . Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analyst's 23 (1962-1963), pp. 121-23). Gettier's original paper, along with important papers from the ensuing controversy, can be found in Michael D. Roth and Leon Galis, Knowing (Random House, 1970).
examples show that no justified true belief analysis of knowledge can work in every presumed case. In the counterexamples, the claim supposed known is taken as true, but the evidence the agent uses to support the claim is misleading, despite appearances to the contrary. In one type of case, the evidence can be assumed to be true even though it can be shown that the claim might be false given the evidence in such a fashion that the agent isn't in a position to establish the truth of his claim on the evidence. What the counterexamples can be taken to provide is a relevant nonmetaphysical objection to the knowldge claim such that the rational agent would withdraw his knowledge claim if he were to be confronted with the objection. Consider one well-known case in greater detail. Tom claims to know that someone in his office owns a Ford. Someone in his office does own a Ford, only it is not Smith (as T o m thinks), but Jones. Tom's justifying evidence is that he has seen Smith driving a Ford, has seen Smith's registration for the Ford, and so on. We assume that Tom's evidence is as strong as the analysis requires of justified belief. Now in fact Smith has just sold his Ford and bought a Chevrolet. Tom's claim is true (someone in his office owns a Ford), and he is justified in believing it, but it is not a knowledge claim. T h e reason is that the fact that Smith does not own a Ford is a relevant nonmetaphysical objection to Tom's knowledge claim. In accepting the counterexample, we suppose that we know what Tom does not, that Smith does not own a Ford. T h e full evidence would show conclusively that Smith does not own a Ford. If Tom, assumed here to be rational, were also to come to accept this, and not merely to be confronted with somebody's claim to this effect, he would presumably retract or revise his own knowledge claim. Tom's evidence is only accidentally related to the truth of his knowledge claim. We know it is accidentally related because we know a fact that constitutes a relevant and unanswerable objection to Tom's claim, since his claim is based on his view that Smith owns a Ford. Tom is not familiar with this objection, but the counterexample supposes that he could not dispose of it if it were to be brought to his attention. This way of looking at the Gettier counterexamples suggests that someone might be said to know something if he or she can meet the objections that could be brought against the knowledge claim at the time when it is advanced. Considered abstractly, the space of possible objections to any given knowledge claim may seem unmanageable, and hence it may seem that knowledge as justified true belief about something can never be achieved. Do not the Gettier counter-
examples force the view that a Gettier counterexample might be constructed for any piece of presumed knowledge? Now the facts might not be kind to Gettier counterexamples across the board. Perhaps people sometimes do know things and the facts won't allow a real world Gettier counterexample to be constructed. But is not a single Gettier counterexample a refutation of the general thesis that knowledge is justified true belief? It would seem so, and yet there might be cases where we could show that Gettier counterexamples couldn't be constructed, and wouldn't these cases admit the possibility of genuine knowledge? The Gettier counterexamples arise (and gain their plausibility) from features surrounding the everyday matters of fact that they deal with. We frequently know little about our co-workers and casual acquaintances, and may even know little about other members of our immediate family. No piling on of evidence would seem to rule out every possible counterexample to our leaps from evidence to presumed knowledge in these cases. Further, we may keep our opinions to ourselves, or those with counterexamples may not hear of our opinions, or may prefer that we remain ignorant of various facts. T h e situation appears to be quite different in science and mathematics. Here the objects of inquiry can be isolated and manipulated in every conceivable way, making legitimate counterexamples to the link between evidence and theory difficult to construct. Further, the practice of publishing claims and encouraging their refutation makes it fairly likely that possible counterexamples to .~ here, at least, knowledge claims will make an a p p e a r a n ~ e Perhaps the space of possible counterexamples is sometimes manageable, so that sometimes we may justifiably be said to know things. In mathematical cases, the possibility that -p is often a blanket relevant nonmetaphysical objection to a mathematical claim that p, partly because of the atemporality of mathematical propositions. Proving a contradiction from -p is sufficient (classically) to prove p, and we may regard the production of such a contradiction as exhausting the logically possible nonmetaphysical mathematical objections to p. In other words, in many mathematical cases, the current objections to p may be equivalent to the logically possible objections to p. T h e more obvious problems with such a suggestion can be met. 4 T h e role of criticism in scientific knowledge has been emphasized in Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science. Jerome R . Ravetz, in S c i e n t f i c Knowledge a n d its Social Problems (Oxford, 1971), especially in Part 11, has made an extremely interesting analysis of the role of refereeing and journal citation in the creation of scientific knowledge.
For example, this might not seem to be so when new mathematical structures are discovered, to which previous knowledge claims are inadequate. Here a process of relativization allows the mathematician to keep his knowledge claims intact by relativizing them to the original structures. Claims about geometry were relativized to claims about Euclidean Geometry (but otherwise preserved) after the discovery of non-Euclidean Geometry. T h e account of mathematical knowledge offered to this point would require some revision for intuitionist approaches to mathematical knowledge. For our purposes, we need merely note that intuitionism is a way of trying to insure that all possible relevant nonmetaphysical objections to a claim are met by a constructive procedure that rules out these objections as the construction proceeds. Mathematical knowledge can then be regarded as constructive and cumulative. Any full discussion of scientific knowledge would encounter many difficulties, particularly the fact that even elementary laws and theories are always disputed by some scientists. But the laws of classical mechanics, for example, are agreed to sufficiently to constitute an example of scientific knowledge. They are, of course, limited to certain systems because various relevant systems for which they are inaccurate were not known in the nineteenth century. At the same time, so many controlled experiments have ruled out alternative possibilities that these laws can be defended against any known objections, and a fortiori against the objections raised and discussed historically. T o know what scientific knowledge is in hand requires something other than a logical analysis. T h e state of science must be mastered, including current controversies and experimental results. Science has an institutional structure that makes public to a great extent the process of giving and meeting objections, and perhaps this process allows the space of possible objections to become precise enough to talk about the legitimacy of justified true belief analyses here. T h e journals encourage argument and rebuttal, and the process of criticism is pursued in meetings between scientists. If we argue that mathematical and scientific knowledge at any time is what can be defended against mathematically and scientifically plausible objections, although the analysis is not precise, it is not clear that Gettier counterexamples could be produced for specific cases, and the sceptical wedge driven into the subject matter. In everyday matters of fact, the amorphous nature of possible objections to knowledge claims becomes unmistakable. People work-
ing in areas where there are rule of thumb generalizations know that they cannot control and explain and predict that which is subject to some deeper understanding than they know that they have. Nevertheless, books about plumbing, cooking, gardening, and so on, are written and consumed. At least in these areas, some knowledge clearly exists, and an analysis should allow for this fact. Controversies are settled partly by convention, partly by natural history and detail. Having seen something is generally better than having been told about it, and so forth. But in many of these cases, there is no analogue to the result of scientific and mathematical practice in deciding what constitutes sufficient evidence for the truth of some belief. T h e counterexamples are perhaps a sufficient warning that claims to knowledge in these areas should be circumspect and guarded. In retrospect it may seem that a lot of the emotional heat in the philosophical controversies about the nature of knowledge has been generated by attempting to extend analysis of mathematical and scientific knowledge to cases where it cannot fit. ROBERT ACKERMANN. O F MASSACHUSETTS
UNIVERSITY AT AMHERST.
