Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind (Great Debates in Philosophy)

Consciousness and Causality A Debate on the Nature of Mind

D. M. Annstrong and Nonnan Malcolm

Basil Blackwell

© D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm 1984 First published 1984 Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, England All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Armstrong, D. M. Consciousness and causality.-(Great debates in philosophy) 1. Mind and body 2. Intellect I. Title II. Malcolm, Norman III. Series 128'.2 BD162 ISBN 0-631-13212-0 ISBN 0-631-13433-6

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Contents Consciousness and Causality

I

NORMAN MALCOLM

Consciousness 2 The subjective character of experience 3 The causal theory of mind 4 Conclusion

100

Consciousness and Causality

10 3

I

3 45 66

D. M. ARMSTRONG I

Introductory 2 In defence of inner sense 3 In defence of the causal theory of mind 4 Qualities

105 108 137 169

Norman Malcolm's Reply

193

D. M. Armstrong's Reply

20 5

Index

21 9

Great Debates in Philosophy Since the time of Socrates, dialogue has been a powerful means of philosophical exploration and exposition. By presenting important current issues in philosophy in the form of a debate, this new series attempts to capture the flavour of philosophical argument and to convey the excitement generated by the interplay of ideas. There will normally be more than two sides to any argument, and for any two 'opponents' there will be points of agreement as well as points of disagreement. The debate will not, therefore, necessarily cover every aspect of the chosen topic, nor will it present artificially polarized arguments. The aim is to provide, in a thought-provoking format, a series of clear, accessible and concise introductions to a variety of subjects, ranging from formal logic to contemporary ethical issues. The series will be of interest to scholars, students and general readers alike, since each book brings together two outstanding philosophers to throw light on a topic of current controversy. The first essay states a particular position and the second essay counters it. The first author's rejoinder is again answered in the second author's reply. If the resulting book gives rise in its turn to further discussion, argument and debate among its readers it will have achieved its purpose.

Consciousness and Causality NORMAN MALCOLM

Acknowledgements I am grateful to the members of my seminars at King's College London, and at the University College of Swansea, in the academic year 1981-82, for their great help in our discussions of the topics of the present essay. I am especially indebted to Dan Rashid, ilham Dilman, Marina Barabas, and Dewi Phillips.

I

Consciousness

There is a grammatical difference between two uses of the word 'conscious'. In one use this word requires an object: one is said to be conscious of something, or to be conscious that so-and-so. One can be said to be conscious afa strange odour, of the stifling heat, of a friend's ironical smile; and one can also be said to be conscious that there is a strange odour in the house, that the room is stifling hot, that one's friend is smiling ironically. The expessions 'conscious of' and 'conscious that' are generally replaceable by 'aware of' and 'aware that'. Being conscious of something or that so-and-so, I shall call the 'transitive' use of the word 'conscious'; and I shall speak of 'transitive consciousness'. There is another use of the word 'conscious' in which it does not take an object. If we think that a person who was knocked unconscious has regained consciousness, we can say, 'He is conscious', without needing to add an 'of' or a 'that'. This use, in which someone can be said to be conscious or unconscious tout court, I shall call the 'intransitive' use of the word 'conscious', and shall speak of 'intransitive consciousness'. It may be noted that when 'conscious' is used intransitively it cannot be replaced by 'aware': to be aware is always to be aware ofor that.

Transitive consciousness Transitive consciousness is consciousness of or that: consciousness in this sense requires an object. A long disputed question is: what is the relation of consciousness to the objects of consciousness? In a famous early paper entitled 'The Refutation of Idealism', I G. E. Moore attacked th~ doctrine, held by some idealists, that esse is percipi. Moore understood this doctrine to amount to the claim that whatever is, is expen'enced! Apparently this meant that nothing that is an object of consciousness can exist except as an object of consciousness. In 'G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, Harcourt Brace & Co., 'Ibid., p. 7.

1922.

4

Nonnan Malcolm

his discussion Moore concentrated on what he called 'sensations' or 'ideas'. He spoke of 'the sensation of blue' and 'the sensation of green'. He said that although these are different sensations they have something in common that he called 'consciousness'. That in respect to which the two sensations differed, he called a difference in the 'objects' of consciousness. Moore said: 'We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call consciousness, and another which I call the object of consciousness.'3 Moore went on to say: The true analysis of a sensation or idea is as follows. The element that is common to them all, and which I have called 'consciousness', really is consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of 'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something. When we know that the sensation of blue exists, the fact we know is that there exists an awareness of blue. 4

Moore said that awareness of or consciousness of something 'is involved equally in the analysis of every experience-from the merest sensation to the most developed perception or reflexion'.s He went on to make an assertion that pertains to my present topic. He said that this awareness or consciousness 'is and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware (of it),. 6 This assertion of Moore's was a blow aimed at the doctrine of esse is percipi. This latter doctrine is certainly extravagant if it implies that chairs and mountains do not, or cannot, exist except when they are objects of consciousness. But did not Moore go too far in the other direction? Objects of consciousness include bodily sensations, such as pains and aches: for we can say, 'as I reached the summit I became conscious of a pain in my back'. Is a pain in one's back something of such a nature that, as Moore asserted, when one is aware of it it is precisely what it would be if one were not aware of it?'

A,mstrong on consciousness. Before treating this question we may note that David Armstrong has adopted a view of the 3G. E. Moore, p. '7.

4Ibid., p. 24.

SIbid., p. 29.

"Ibid.

Consciousness

5

nature of consciousness, which is in a certain way similar to the view that Moore took in his 'Refutation'. In A Maten·alist Theory of the Mind 7 Armstrong says: I suggest that consciousness is no more than awareness (perception) of inner mental states by the person whose states they are. . .. If this is so, then consciousness is simply a further mental. state, a state 'directed' towards the original inner state. 8

It would seem, from this passage, that Armstrong is using the term 'consciousness' in a narrower sense than Moore did. For Moore was using it in such a way that a person could be said to be conscious of a table or of the blue colour of a flower, neither of which are 'inner mental states'. But this difference in the employment of the term 'consciousness' is not relevant to the feature of Armstrong's view I want to consider. Armstrong says the following about the nature of awareness or consciousness: Let us consider the mechanical analogue of awareness of our own mental states: the scanning by a mechanism of its own internal states. It is clear that the operation of scanning and the situation scanned must be 'distinct existences' .... Now what reason is there to think that awareness of its own states in the case of, say, a spiritual substance, will differ in its logical structure from that of a self-scanning device in a mechanism? Why should the substitution of spiritual for material substance abolish the need for a distinction between object and subject? I must admit that I can see no way to prove that there must be such a parallelism, which is a lacuna in my argument. But it seems clear that the natural view to take is that pain and awareness of pain are 'distinct existences'. If so, a false awareness of pain is at least logically possible. 9

Several things in this passage may be noted. First, the assumption that the 'logical structure' of human awareness or consciousness is the same as that of a self-scanning device in a 7D. M. Armstrong, A M ateria/ist Theory ofthe Mind, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. (Hereafter cited as MTM.) 8MTM,p·94· 9MTM, pp. 106-7.

6 Norman Malcolm mechanism is surprising. I will come back in a moment to examine this analogy. Second, the distinction between 'spiritual substance' and 'material substance' is a red herring. It should not distract us: the concept of consciousness certainly applies to human beings, whether or not they are 'spiritual' or 'material'. Third, the phrase 'a false awareness of pain' is paradoxical. Probably it is supposed to mean the same as 'one's having a mistaken belief that one is in pain'. But the meaning of this expression is also uncertain, since the word 'belief' is not used like that in ordinary life-that is, we don't speak of anyone's either 'believing' or 'not believing' that he is in pain. Fourth, the meaning of 'distinct existences' is not transparent: nevertheless, there is no doubt that Armstrong, when he says that pain and awareness of pain are 'distinct existences', means both that a person could have 'a false awareness of pain', and also that a person could be in pain without being aware of it. The latter point is confirmed by the following remarks: A 'feeling of pain' is simply a sensation of pain. Now we can have a sensation of pain and be perfectly unaware of having it. So there can be a feeling of pain that we are unaware of feeling: unconscious pain. 10

So, on Armstrong's view, there is as great a logical gap between pain and awareness of pain, as between dogs and dog-collars: just as one could have a dog without a dogcollar, or a dog-collar without a dog, so too it would be possible for a person to feel pain without being aware of feeling pain, and also to be aware of feeling pain without feeling pain. I take it as fundamental that we cannot investigate the relation between the concept of pain and the concept of awareness unless we remind ourselves of how pain-locutions and awareness-locutions are actually employed in real life. When we do this it will be evident that there is not the radical separation between the concept of pain and the concept of awareness or consciousness, that Armstrong's theory requires. For example, suppose that an hour ago you com'"MTM, p.

312.

Consciousness

7

plained of a severe pain in your shoulder. 1 might now ask you any of the following questions: Are you still in pain? Do you still have pain? Do you still feel pain? Are you still aware of pain? Because of the different wording of these four sentences, a philosopher might be led to think that they must have different meanings. But in everyday life there would be no difference in how they were taken. Your answer of 'Yes' would have the same practical consequences in all four cases: likewise for an answer of 'No'. Of course you might have answered differently . You might have said, 'The pain is still there but it's not as bad as it was'; or, 'I'm conscious of pain but it doesn't trouble me as much as it did'; or, 'I have pain but it isn't as severe as previously'. These three replies, despite their different wording, would all be understood as coming to the same: no one would draw a different practical conclusion from one of them than from the other two. Another possible reply would be this: 'I still have pain; but if 1 sit quietly, as I'm doing now, 1 am not aware of any pain; if 1 move about, then 1 feel it'. This reply shows that the sentence 'I have pain' does not always mean that the speaker is in pain at the moment of speaking. It can instead be used as an abbreviated conditional statement, coming to much the same as, 'If 1 move about or lift something, etc., then 1 am aware of (feel, am conscious of, have) pain'. The sentences, 'I feel pain', 'I have a feeling of pain', can also be given this same conditional use. Armstrong's assertion, 'there can be a feeling of pain that we are unaware of feeling', could be given a sensible interpretation in terms of this conditional use of 'I feel pain' or 'I have a feeling of pain'. One could say, 'I still have a feeling of pain in my shoulder, but only when 1 lift my arm like this: otherwise 1 am not aware of feeling pain'. It is obvious, however, that this idiomatic way of speaking offers no support for Armstrong's philosophical thesis that pain and awareness of pain are 'distinct existences'. The meaning of this thesis is best revealed by Armstrong's opinion that the

8 Nonnan Malcolm awareness of a sensation has the same 'logical structure' as a self-scanning device of a machine. Let us look into this comparison. Suppose that an automobile engine is equipped with a temperature gauge that will measure the heat of the engine. If the engine is overheating the device will activate an electric warning light on the dashboard, so that the driver may know of the danger. Do this self-scanning device and a person's awareness of a sensation, have the same 'logical structure'? In raising this question, Armstrong, I assume, wants us to compare the concept of such a device with the concept of the awareness of a sensation: or, to put it in another way, to compare what is logically possible, or conceivable, or what it makes sense to say in the one case as compared with the other. In regard to the device that is supposed to indicate engine overheating, one possibility is that although the device had been manufactured it was never actually installed in any car, so that the frequent overheating of car engines was never indicated by the device. Another possibility is that although the device was usually installed in cars, in many or even most cars this was done incorrectly, so that in most cars no warning signal appears when the engine is overheating and also the signal often appears when the engine is not overheating. Another possibility is that even if the device was correctly installed, the materials and wiring of the gauge suffer from wear and age, so that after a few years overheating fails to be signalled or is falsely signalled. And so on. In the analogy, cars correspond to people, the overheating of engines to sensations of pain, and the signalling or registering of overheating by the self-scanning device corresponds to one's consciousness of one's own sensations of pain. According to the analogy the following are logical possibilities: that all human beings might go through life having many sensations of pain but without ever being conscious of any of them; or that most people are so constituted that not only is it the case that whenever they have sensations of pain they are not conscious of them, but also that whenever they seem to themselves to be conscious of sensations of pain they are in fact having no sensations of pain; or that usually everyone starts out in life with the 'right' constitution, but after some years nearly

Consciousness

9

everyone's consciousness of sensations of pain becomes defective and inaccurate. In order to fully appreciate how bizarre are these alleged possibilities one should understand that what is implied is not just that these supposed possibilities might be realized in some science-fiction never-never land, but instead that they may be what is actually the case here and now with ourselves. The analogy implies, for example, that most or even all of us, including you and me, may be so constituted that we have frequent sensations of pain without ever being aware of them, and also that whenever we seem to ourselves to be aware of sensations of pain there may actually be no such sensations present. Clearly there is something radically wrong with the suggestion that this may be the situation with us right now. What is wrong with it? I t is not difficult to see that the supposed possibilities are so contrary to the way we speak and think of our sensations and of our awareness of them, that to the extent we took these 'possibilities' seriously then to the same extent we would realize that we had no understanding of the language of sensation that we no longer knew how to use such expressions as 'a sensation of pain', 'a feeling of pain', 'aware of a feeling of pain', 'conscious of a sensation of pain', etc. But if we lost our grip on such expressions, then also we would fail to understand the supposed possibilities, since they are stated in terms of those very expressions! These 'possibilities' are thus seen to be selfdestructive and in that sense incoherent. Yet these supposed possibilities are implied by Armstrong's thesis that pain and awareness of pain are 'distinct existences', and that one's consciousness of one's own sensations has the same 'logical structure' as a self-scanning device in a machine. If the concept of consciousness did resemble the concept of a self-scanning device then, since there might be a machine that had not been equipped with such a device, or the device had been incorrectly installed or had become defective, so that the machine was not 'aware' of its states-so also there might be a human being who is suffering severe pain but is not aware of any pain! 'What would that mean? If the person was not aware of any pain at all, in the normal meaning of these words, then there ought to be an absence of any of the pain-behaviour that is

10

Nonnan Malcolm

natural to human beings: no contortions, grimaces, groans, outcries, etc.; and also nothing interfering with work or play; no seeking of help or comfort; no complaining of pain; and so on. Armstrong is asking us to conceive of the possibility of there being a person who gives every appearance of being healthy, vigorous, working efficiently, in a cheerful good humour, etc., but who is actually feeling intense pain! We cannot conceive of such a possibility, not from lack of imagination, but because the normal use of the expressions 'pain', 'feeling pain', 'sensation of pain', 'awareness of pain', etc., links all of them in a conceptual connection with the human behaviour, the reactions and actions, that are manifestations of pain-and does not link them merely causally and contingently with that behaviour, as Armstrong thinks. I I But I will postpone until section 3 a study of Armstrong's causal theory of mind.

Dennett on the inconsistency of the concept of pain. In philosophy there has been a huge amount of controversy over the topic of pain. There are disputes over whether there can be unfelt pain, whether one can feel pain of which one is unconscious, whether one can mistakenly think one is in pain or make a mistake in locating the pain, whether a computer could feel pain, whether two people could have the same pain, whether pain is a 'private' sensation, and so on. The topic of pain is a good one for bringing to the surface a lot of philosophical confusion about the concept of sensation. Recently it has been claimed that this turmoil is not so much due to the confusions and crude imagery that we philosophers bring to the topic, as to the fact that the ordinary use of the word 'pain' is inconsistent or incoherent. Daniel Dennett has made this claim. K. V. Wilkes says: 'Dennett has argued persuasively that the everyday concept of pain is internally inconsistent . . . '12 Let us see just how persuasively Dennett has argued. In his book Brainstonns he says: The ordinary use of the word 'pain' exhibits incoherencies [sic] great and small. A textbook announces that nitrous oxide "MTM, e.g. p. 3'2, p. 3'3. UK. V. Wilkes, 'Functionalism, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Mind·, Philosophical Topics 12, '98" p. 165.

Consciousness

I I

renders one 'insensible to pain', a perfectly ordinary turn of phrase which elicits no 'deviancy' startle in the acutest ear, but it suggests that nitrous oxide doesn't prevent the occurrence of pain at all, but merely makes one insensible to it when it does occur (as one can be rendered insensible to the occurrence of flashing lights by a good blindfold) . Yet the same book classifies nitrous oxide among analgesics, that is preventers of pain (one might say 'painkillers') and we do not bat an eye. 13

Dennett thinks he has here presented evidence that the ordinary use of the word 'pain' is incoherent. The evidence is that most readers of the textbook do not perceive the difference in meaning between saying that nitrous oxide renders one 'insensible to pain' and saying that it 'prevents pain'. But why does Dennett believe there is a difference in meaning? Clearly because his attention is fixed on a form of words and not on how that form of words is used. He says that the phrase 'insensible to pain' suggests that the pain is still there. To whom would it suggest this? Perhaps to a philosopher puzzled about the concept of consciousness: but not to a medical student who wants to learn how to relieve patients of pain in surgery. Dennett's comparison ('as one can be rendered insensible to the occurrence of flashing lights by a good blindfold') reveals his assumption that the phrase 'insensible to . . .' does have, or should have, the same meaning in every context. But that is not how our language works. If in some contexts, but not in others, the expressions, 'renders one insensible to X' and 'prevents X', are given the same meaning, then that is how they are used! There is no basis here for a charge of incoherence. Another alleged example of incoherence in the ordinary use of the word 'pain' is derived from the notion that different people have different 'pain-thresholds'. Dennett says: Some people, it is often claimed, can stand more pain than others: they have a high pain threshold. Suppose I am one of those with a low threshold, and undergo treatment (drugs, hypnosis, or whatever) supposed to change this. Afterwards I report it was a complete success. Here is what I say: (I) The treatment worked: the pain of having a tooth drilled is as intense as ever, only now I can stand it easily. Or I might say something different. I might say: 'JDaniei C. Dennett, Brainstonns, Harvester Press, 1978, p.

221.

I2

Nonnan iWalcolm (2) The treatment worked: having a tooth drilled no longer hurts as much: the pain is less severe. Can we distinguish these claims? Of course. They obviously mean very different things. Can I then know which claim is correct in my own case or in another's?'4

There is indeed an incoherence here. It lies in Dennett's first imagined report. It would certainly be surprising for someone to say that the treatment 'worked', was 'completely successful', 'I can now stand the drilling easily'; but, in the same breath, to add that 'the pain of having a tooth drilled is as intense as ever'. This combination of remarks would be apparently contradictory. If in addition to these remarks there had been a marked diminution of pain-behaviour during drilling, then this first report would probably be taken as a jocular way of saying that the pain of drilling was less severe. In which case the two reports would come to the same. In this connection it may be noted that both Dennett and Armstrong attach philosophical significance to a phenomenon that sometimes occurs when patients undergo prefrontal lobotomy. According to Dennett the patients say that they continue to be in pain, but they 'seem and claim not to mind' the pain. ' 5 Armstrong says: Intractable pain can sometimes be removed by severing connections between the prefrontal lobes and the rest of the brain. But patients on whom this operation has been performed sometimes give very curious reports. They say that the pain is still there, but it does not worry them any more. It seems as if they are saying that they have a pain which is giving them no pain!,6 This phenomenon is indeed significant. But in what way? If a patient said that the pain was as intense as ever but that he didn't mind it anymore, then we should not understand what he is saying. If the patient displays none of the normal behaviour of pain, but insists that 'the pain is as intense as ever', one would be baffled by his declaration. One would not understand what he is saying. '