Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability

Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability Thomas S. Kuhn PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1982, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1982), pp. 669-688. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281982%291982%3C669%3ACCC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.

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Commensurability, Comparability, communicability1

Thomas S. Kuhn

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Twenty years have passed since Paul Feyerabend and I first used in

print a term we had borrowed from mathenatics to describe the rela-

ationship between successive scientific theories. 'Incommensurabi-

lity' was the term; each of us was led to it by problems we had

encoun ered in interpreting scientific texts (Feyerabend 1962; Kuhn

1962). My use of the term was broader than his; his claims for the

phenomenon were more sweeping than mine; but our overlap at that time

was ~ubstantial.~ Each of us was centrally concerned to show that

the meanings of scientific terms and concepts -- 'force' and 'mass', for example, or 'element' and 'comp und' -- often changed with the theory in which they were deployed.' And each of us claimed that when such changes occurred, it was impossible to define all the terms of one theory in the vocabulary of the other. The latter claim we independently embodied in talk about the incommensurability of scien-

tific theories.

5

Till that was in 1962. Since then problems of meaning variance

have been widely discussed, but virtually no-one has fully faced the

difficulties that led Feyerabend and me to speak of incommensurability.

Doubtless, that neglect is due in part to the role played by intuition

I, for example, made much

and metaphor in our initial presentations. use of the double sense, visual and conceptual, of the verb 'to see',

and I repeatedly likened theory-changes to Gestalt switches. But for

whatever reasons, the concept of incommensurability has been widely

and often dismissed, most recently in a book published late last year

Putnam redevelops cogently two

by Hilary Putnam (1981, pp. 113-124). lines of criticism that had figured widely in earlier philosophical

literature. A brief restatement of those criticisms here should pre-

pare the way for some extended comments.

Most or all discussions of incomnlensurability have depended upon

the literally correct but regularly over-interpreted assumption that,

if two theories are incommensurable, they must be stated in mutually

PSA 1982, Volume 2, pp. 669-688 Copyright @ 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

untranslatable languages. If that is so, a first line of criticism

runs, if there is no way in which the two can be stated in a single

language, then they cannot be compared, and no arguments from evidence

can be relevant to the choice between them. Talk about differences

and comparisons presupposes that some ground is shared, and that is

what proponents of incommensurability, who often do talk of compari-

sons, have seemed to deny. At these points their talk is necessar-

ily incoherent. (For this line of criticism see: Davidson 1974,

A second

pp. 5-20; Shapere 1966; and Scheffler 1967, pp. 81-83.) line of criticism cuts at least as deep. People like Kuhn, it is

said, tell us that it is impossible to translate old theories into a

modern language. But they then proceed to do exactly that, recon-

structing Aristotle's or Newton's or Lavoisier's or Maxwell's theory

without departing from the language they and we speak every day. What

can they mean, under these circumstances, when they speak about incom-

mensurability? (For this line of criticism see: Davidson 1974,

pp. 17-20; Kitcher 1978; and Putnam 1981.)

My concerns in this paper arise primarily from the second of these

lines of argument, but the two are not independent, and I shall need

also to speak of the first. With it I begin, attempting first to set

aside some widespread misunderstanding of at least my own point of

view. Even with misunderstanding eliminated, however, a damaging

residue of the first line of criticism will remain. To it I shall

return only at the end of this paper.

1.

Local Incommensurability

Remember briefly where the term 'incommensurability' came from.

The hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle is incommensurable with

its side or the circumference of a circle with its radius in the sense

that there is no unit of length contained without residue an integral

number of times in each member of the pair. There is thus no common

measure. But lack of a common measure does not make comparison

impossible. On the contrary, incommensurable magnitudes can be com-

pared to any required degree of approximation. Demonstrating that

this could be done and how to do it were among the splendid achieve-

ments of Greek mathematics. But that achievement was possible

only because, from the start, most geometric techniques applied with-

out change to both of the items between which comparison was sought.

Applied to the conceptual vocabulary deployed in and around a

scientific theory, the term 'incommensurability' functions metaphori-

cally. The phrase 'no common measure' becomes 'no common language'.

The claim that two theories are incommensurable is then the claim that

there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into which both theories,

conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or

loss. No more in its metaphorical than its literal form does incom-

mensurability imply incomparability, and for much the same reason.

Most of the terms common to the two theories function the same way in

both; their meanings, whatever those may be, are preserved; their

translation is simply homophonic. Only for a small subgroup of

(usually interdefined) terms and for sentences containing them do

problems of translatability arise. The claim that two theories are

incommensurable is more modest than many of its critics have supposed.

I shall call this modest version of incommensurability 'local

incommensurability'. Insofar as incommensurability was a claim about

language, about meaning change, its local form is my original version.

If it can be consistently maintained, then the first line of criticism

directed at incommensurability must fail. The terms that preserve

their meanings across a theory change provide a sufficient basis for

the discussion of differences and for comparisons relevant to theory

choice. They even provide, as we shall see, a basis from which the

meanings of incommensurable terms can be explored.

It is not clear, however, that incommensurability can be restricted

to a local region. In the present state of the theory of meaning,

the distinction between terms that change meaning and those that pre-

serve it is at best difficult to explicate or apply. Meanings are a

historical product, and they inevitably change over time with changes

in the demands on the terms that bear them. It is simply implausible

that some terms should change meaning when transferred to a new theory

without infecting the terms transferred with them. Far from supply-

ing a solution, the phrase 'meaning invariance' may supply only a new

home for the problems presented by the concept of incommensurability.

This difficulty is real, no product of misunderstanding. I shall be

returning to it at the end of this paper, and it will then appear that

'meaning' is not the rubric under which incommensurability is best

discussed. But no more suitable alternative is presently at hand.

In search of one, I now turn to the second main line of criticism

directed regularly at incommensurability. It survives the return

to the original local version of that notion.

2.

Translation versus Interpretation

If any non-vacuous terms of an older theory elude translation into

the language of its successor, how can historians and other analysts

succeed so well in reconstructing or interpreting that older theory,

including the use and function of those very terms? ~istoriansclaim

to be able to produce successful interpretations. So, in a closely

related enterprise, do anthropologists. I shall here simply premise

that their claims are justified, that there are no limits of principle

on the extent to which those criteria can be fulfilled. Whether or

not correct, as I think they are, these assumptions are, in any case,

fundamental to the arguments directed at incommensurability by such

critics as Davidson (1974, p. 19), Kitcher (1978, pp. 519-529), and

Putnam (1981, p. 116). All three sketch the technique of interpre-

tation; all describe its outcome as a translation or a translation

schema; and all conclude that its success is incompatible with even

local incommensurability. As I now try to show what is the matter

with their argument, I come to the central concerns of this paper.

The argument or argument sketch I have just supplied depends

c r i t i c a l l y upon t h e e q u a t i o n o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h t r a n s l a t i o n . That I believe e q u a t i o n i s t r a c e a b l e a t l e a s t t o Q u i n e ' s Word and O b j e c t . it i s wrong and t h a t t h e m i s t a k e i s i m p o r t a n t . My c l a i m i s t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a p r o c e s s a b o u t which I s h a l l b e h a v i n g more t o s a y , i s n o t t h e same a s t r a n s l a t i o n , a t l e a s t n o t a s t r a n s l a t i o n h a s been c o n c e i v e d i n much r e c e n t p h i l o s o p h y . The c o n f u s i o n i s e a s y b e c a u s e a c t u a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f t e n o r p e r h a p s always i n v o l v e s a t l e a s t a s m a l l i n t e r p r e t i v e component. But i n t h a t c a s e a c t u a l t r a n s l a t i o n must b e s e e n t o i n v o l v e two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e p r o c e s s e s . Recent a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y on one and c o n f l a t e d t h e o t h e r To a v o i d c o n f u s i o n I s h a l l h e r e f o l l o w r e c e n t u s a g e and with it. a p p l y ' t r a n s l a t i o n ' t o t h e f i r s t of t h e s e p r o c e s s e s , ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' t o t h e second. But s o l o n g a s t h e e x i s t e n c e of two p r o c e s s e s i s r e c o g n i z e d , n o t h i n g i n my argument depends upon p r e s e r v i n g t h e t e r m 'translation' for the f i r s t

.

For p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , t h e n , t r a n s l a t i o n i s something done by a p e r son who knows two l a n g u a g e s . Confronted w i t h a t e x t , w r i t t e n o r o r a l , i n one of t h e s e l a n g u a g e s , t h e t r a n s l a t o r s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s u b s t i t u t e s w o r d s o r s t r i n g s of words i n t h e o t h e r l a n g u a g e f o r words o r s t r i n g s of words i n t h e t e x t i n s u c h a way a s t o produce an e q u i v a l e n t t e x t i n t h e o t h e r language. What it i s t o b e an " e q u i v a l e n t t e x t " c a n , f o r t h e moment, remain u n s p e c i f i e d . Sameness of meaning and sameness o f r e f e r e n c e a r e b o t h o b v i o u s d e s i d e r a t a , b u t I do n o t y e t i n v o k e them. L e t u s s i m p l y s a y t h a t t h e t r a n s l a t e d t e x t t e l l s more o r l e s s t h e same s t o r y , p r e s e n t s more o r l e s s t h e same i d e a s , o r d e s c r i b e s more o r l e s s t h e same s i t u a t i o n a s t h e t e x t o f which i t i s a translation. Two f e a t u r e s o f t r a n s l a t i o n t h u s c o n c e i v e d r e q u i r e s p e c i a l emphasis. F i r s t , t h e l a n g u a g e i n t o which t h e t r a n s l a t i o n i s c a s t e x i s t e d b e f o r e t h e t r a n s l a t i o n was begun. The f a c t of t r a n s l a t i o n h a s n o t , t h a t i s , changed t h e meanings of words o r p h r a s e s . I t may, of c o u r s e , have i n c r e a s e d t h e number o f known r e f e r e n t s of a g i v e n t e r m , b u t it h a s n o t a l t e r e d t h e way i n which t h o s e r e f e r e n t s , new and o l d , a r e d e t e r A second f e a t u r e i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . The t r a n s l a t i o n conmined. sists e x c l u s i v e l y o f words and p h r a s e s t h a t r e p l a c e ( n o t n e c e s s a r i l y one-for-one) words and p h r a s e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l . G l o s s e s and t r a n s l a t o r s ' p r e f a c e s a r e n o t p a r t of t h e t r a n s l a t i o n , and a p e r f e c t t r a n s l a t i o n would have no need f o r them. I f they a r e nonetheless required, we s h a l l need t o a s k why. Doubtless, t h e s e f e a t u r e s of t r a n s l a t i o n seem i d e a l i z a t i o n s , and t h e y s u r e l y a r e . But t h e i d e a l i z a t i o n i s n o t mine. Among o t h e r s o u r c e s , b o t h d e r i v e d i r e c t l y from t h e n a t u r e and f u n c t i o n of a Quinean t r a n s l a t i o n manual. I t i s a n e n t e r p r i s e p r a c t i c e d by h i s Turn now t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . t o r i a n s and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , among o t h e r s . Unlike t h e t r a n s l a t o r , A t the t h e i n t e r p r e t e r may i n i t i a l l y command o n l y a s i n g l e l a n g u a g e . s t a r t , t h e t e x t on which h e o r s h e works c o n s i s t s i n whole o r i n p a r t of u n i n t e l l i g i b l e n o i s e s o r i n s c r i p t i o n s . Quine's "radical translat o r " i s i n f a c t a n i n t e r p r e t e r , and ' G a v a g a i ' e x e m p l i f i e s t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e m a t e r i a l he s t a r t s from. Observing b e h a v i o r and t h e

circumstances surrounding the production of the text, and assuming

throughout that good sense can be made of apparently linguistic beha-

vior, the interpreter seeks that sense, strives to invent hypotheses,

like 'Gavagai' means "Lo, a rabbit," which make utterance or inscrip-

If the interpreter succeeds, what he or she has

tion intelligible. in the first instance done is learn a new language, perhaps the lang-

uage in which 'gavagai' is a term, or perhaps an earlier version of

the interpreter's own language, one in which still current terms like

'force' and 'mass' or 'element' and 'compound' functioned differently.

Whether that language can be translated into the one with which the

interpreter began is an open question. Acquiring a new language is

not the same as translating from it into one's own. Success with

the first does not imply success with the second.

It is with respect to just these problems that Quine's examples are

consistently misleading, for they conflate interpretation and transla-

tion. To interpret the utterance 'Gavagai', Quine's imagined anthro-

pologist need not come from a speech community that knows of rabbits

and possesses a word which refers to them. Rather than finding a

term that corresponds to 'gavagai', the interpreter/anthro~ologist

could acquire the native's term much as, at an earlier stage, some

terms of his or her own language were acquired.6 The anthropologist

or interpreter, that is, can and often does learn to recognize the

creatures that evoke 'gavagai' from natives. Rather than translate,

the interpreter can simply learn the animal and use the natives' term

for it.

The availability of that alternative does not, of course, preclude translation. The interpreter may not, for reasons previously explained, merely introduce the term 'gavagai' into his or her own language, say English. That would be to alter English and the result would not be translation. But the interpeter can attempt to describe in English the referents of the term 'gavagai' -- they are furry, longeared, bushy-tailed,and the like. If the description is successful, if it fits all and only creatures that elicit utterances involving 'gavagai', then 'furry, long-eared, bushy-tailed . . . creature' is the sought-after translation, and 'gavagai' can thereafter be introduced into English as an abbreviation for it, Under these circumstances, no issue of incommensurability arises. But these circumstances need not obtain. There need be no English

description coreferential with the native term 'gavagai'. In learning

to recognize gavagais, the interpreter may have learned to recognize

distinguishing features unknown to English speakers and for which

English supplies no descriptive terminology. Perhaps, that is, the

natives structure the animal world differently from the way English

speakers do, using different discriminations in doing so. Under

those circumstances, 'gavagai' remains an irreducibly native term, not

translatable into English. Though English speakers may learn to use

the term, they speak the native language when they do so. Those are

the circumstances for which I would reserve the term 'incommensura-

bility'.

3.

Reference Determination versus Translation

My claim, then, has been that circumstances of this sort are regu-

larly encountered, if not always recognized, by historians of science

attempting to understand out-of-date scientific texts. The phlogiston theory has provided one of my standard examples, and Philip Kitcher has used it as the basis for a penetrating critique of the whole notion of incommensurability. What is currently at issue will be considerably

clarified if I first exhibit the kernel of that critique and then indicate the point at which I think it goes astray.







Kitcher argues, successfully I think, that the language of twentieth-century chemistry can be used to identify referents of the terms and expressions of eighteenth-century chemistry, at least to the extent that those terms and expressions actually refer. Reading a text by, say, Priestley and thinking of the experimentshe describes in modern terms, one can see that 'dephlogisticated air' sometimes refers 'Phloto oxygen itself, sometimes to an oxygen enriched atmosphere. gisticated air' is regularly air from which oxygen has been removed. The expression 'a is richer in phlogiston than 8 ' is coreferential with 'a has a greater affinity for oxygen than f 3 ' . In some contexts, for example in the expression 'phlogiston is emitted during combustion', the term 'phlogiston' does not refer at all, but there are other contexts in which it refers to hydrogen (Kitcher 1978, pp. 531-536). I have no doubt that historians dealing with old scientific texts

can and must use modern language to identify referents of out-of-date

terms. Like the native's pointing to gavagais, these reference-deter-

minations often provide the concrete examples from which historians may

hope to learn what the problematical expressions in their texts mean.

In addition, the introduction of modern terminology makes it pos ible

8 to explain why and in what areas older theories were successful.

Kitcher, however, describes this process of reference-determination as

translation, and he suggests that its availability should bring talk

of incommensurability to a close. In both these respects he seems to

me mistaken.

Think for a moment of what a text translated by Kitcher's techniques

would look like. How, for example, would non-referring occurrences of

'phlogiston' be rendered? One possibility -- suggested both by Kitcher's silence on the subject and by his concern to preserve truthvalues, which are in these places problematic -- would be to leave the corresponding spaces blank. To leave blanks is, however, to fail as a translator. If only referring expressions possess translations, then no work of fiction could be translated at all, and for present purposes, old scientific texts must be treated with at least the courThey report what scientesy normally extended to works of fiction. tists of the past believed, independent of its truth-value, and that is what a translation must communicate.

Alternatively, Kitcher might use the same context-dependent strategy

he developed for referring terms like 'dephlogisticated air'.

' P h l o g i s t o n ' would t h e n sometimes b e r e n d e r e d a s ' s u b s t a n c e r e l e a s e d from b u r n i n g b o d i e s ' , sometimes a s ' m e t a l l i z i n g p r i n c i p l e ' , and somet i m e s by s t i l l o t h e r l o c u t i o n s . T h i s s t r a t e g y , however, a l s o l e a d s t o d i s a s t e r , not only with terms l i k e 'phlogiston' but with r e f e r r i n g expressions a s well. Use of a s i n g l e word ' p h l o g i s t o n ' , t o g e t h e r w i t h compounds l i k e ' p h l o g i s t i c a t e d a i r ' d e r i v e d from i t , i s one of t h e ways by which t h e o r i g i n a l t e x t communicated t h e b e l i e f s of i t s author. Substituting unrelated o r d i f f e r e n t l y related expressions f o r t h o s e r e l a t e d , sometimes i d e n t i c a l t e r m s of t h e o r i g i n a l must a t l e a s t suppress those b e l i e f s leaving the t e x t t h a t r e s u l t s incoherent. Examining a K i t c h e r t r a n s l a t i o n , one would r e p e a t e d l y be a t a l o s t o 4 u n d e r s t a n d why t h o s e s e n t e n c e s were j u x t a p o s e d i n a s i n g l e t e x t . To s e e more c l e a r l y what i s i n v o l v e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h o u t - o f - d a t e t e x t s , c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g epitome of some c e n t r a l a s p e c t s o f t h e phlogiston theory. For t h e s a k e o f c l a r i t y and b r e v i t y , I have cons t r u c t e d i t m y s e l f , b u t i t c o u l d , s t y l e a s i d e , have been drawn from an e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y chemical manual. A l l p h y s i c a l b o d i e s a r e composed of c h e m i c a l e l e m e n t s and p r i n c i p l e s , t h e l a t t e r endowing t h e f o r m e r w i t h s p e c i a l properties. Among t h e e l e m e n t s a r e t h e e a r t h s and a i r s , One s e t o f e a r t h s , and among t h e p r i n c i p l e s i s p h l o g i s t o n . f o r example, c a r b o n and s u l p h u r , a r e , i n t h e i r normal s t a t e , e s p e c i a l l y r i c h i n p h l o g i s t o n and l e a v e an a c i d r e s i d u e Another s e t , t h e c a l x e s o r o r e s , a r e when d e p r i v e d of i t . n o r m a l l y poor i n p h l o g i s t o n , and t h e y become l u s t r o u s , duct i l e , and good h e a t c o n d u c t o r s -- t h u s m e t a l l i c -- when Transfer of phlogiston t o a i r occurs impregnated w i t h i t . d u r i n g combustion and s u c h r e l a t e d p r o c e s s e s a s r e s p i r a t i o n A i r of which t h e p h l o g i s t i c c o n t e n t h a s and c a l c i n a t i o n . been t h u s i n c r e a s e d ( p h l o g i s t i c a t e d a i r ) h a s r e d u c e d e l a s A i r from t i c i t y and r e d u c e d a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t l i f e . which p a r t o f t h e normal p h l o g i s t i c component h a s been removed ( d e p h l o g i s t i c a t e d a i r ) s u p p o r t s l i f e e s p e c i a l l y energetically. The manual c o n t i n u e s from h e r e , b u t t h i s e x c e r p t w i l l s e r v e f o r t h e whole. My c o n s t r u c t e d e p i t o m e c o n s i s t s of s e n t e n c e s from p h l o g i s t i c chemistry. Most of t h e words i n t h o s e s e n t e n c e s a p p e a r i n b o t h e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y and t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c h e m i c a l t e x t s , and t h e y f u n c t i o n i n t h e A few o t h e r t e r m s i n s u c h t e x t s , most n o t a b l y same way i n b o t h . ' p h l o g i s t i c a t i o n ' , ' d e p h l o g i s t i c a t i o n ' , and t h e i r r e l a t i v e s , c a n b e r e p l a c e d by p h r a s e s i n which o n l y t h e t e r m ' p h l o g i s t o n ' i s f o r e i g n t o modern c h e m i s t r y . But a f t e r a l l s u c h r e p l a c e m e n t s a r e c o m p l e t e d , a s m a l l group of t e r m s r e m a i n s f o r which t h e modern c h e m i c a l v o c a b u l a r y o f f e r s no e q u i v a l e n t . Some have v a n i s h e d from t h e language of chemi s t r y e n t i r e l y , ' p h l o g i s t o n ' b e i n g t h e p r e s e n t l y most o b v i o u s example. O t h e r s , l i k e t h e t e r m ' p r i n c i p l e ' , have l o s t a l l p u r e l y c h e m i c a l s i g n i ficance. (The i m p e r a t i v e " p u r i f y y o u r r e a c t a n t s " i s a c h e m i c a l

principle in a sense very different from that in which phlogiston was

one.) Still other terms, 'element' for example, remain central to

the chemical vocabulary, and they inherit some functions from their

older homonyms. But terms like 'principle', previously learned with

them, have disappeared from modern texts, and with them has gone the

previously constitutive generalization that qualities like color and

elasticity provide direct evidence concerning chemical composition.

As a result, the referents of these surviving terms as well as the

criteria for identifying them are now drastically and systematically

altered. In both respects, the term 'element' in eighteenth-century

chemistry functioned as much like the modern phrase 'state-of-

aggregation' as like the modern term 'element'.

Whether or not these terms from eighteenth-century chemistry refer -- terms like 'phlogiston', 'principle', and 'element' -- they are not eliminable from any text that purports to be a translation of a phlogistic original. At the very least they must serve as placeholders for the interrelated sets of properties which permit the identification of the putative referents of these interrelated terms. To be coherent a text that deploys the phlogiston theory must represent the stuff given off in combustion as a chemical principle, the same one that renders the air unfit to breathe and that also, when abstracted from an appropriate material, leaves an acid residue. But if these terms are not eliminable, they seem also not to be replaceable And if that is individually by some set of modern words or phrases. the case, a point to be considered at once, then the constructed passage in which those terms appeared above cannot be a translation, at least not in the sense of that term standard in recent philosophy. 4.

The Historian as Interpreter and Language Teacher

Can it, however, be correct to assert that eighteenth-century chemi-

cal terms like 'phlogiston' are untranslatable? I have, after all,

already described in modern language a number of ways in which the

older term 'phlogiston' refers. Phlogiston is, for example, given off

in combustion; it reduces the elasticity and life-supporting proper-

ties of air; and so on. It appears that modern-language phrases like

these might be compounded to produce a modern-language translation of

'phlogiston'. But they cannot. Among the phrases which describe

how the referents of the term 'phlogiston' are picked out are a number

that include other untranslatable terms like 'principle' and 'element'.

Together with 'phlogiston', they constitute an interrelated or inter-

defined set that must be acquired together, as whole, before any of

Only after they

them can be used, applied to natural phenomena. have been thus acquired can one recognize eighteenth-century chemistry

for what it was, a discipline that differed from its twentieth-century

successor not simply in what it had to say about individual substances

and processes but in the way it structured and parceled out a large

part of the chemical world.

A more restricted example will clarify my point. In learning

Newtonian mechanics, the terms 'mass' and 'force' must be acquired

together, and Newton's Second Law must play a role in their acquisi-

tion. One cannot, that is, learn 'mass' and 'force' independently

and then empirically discover that force equals mass times accelera-

tion. Nor can one first learn 'mass' (or 'force') and then use it

to define 'force' (or 'mass') with the aid of the Second Law. Instead,

all three must be learned together, parts of a whole new (but not a

wholly new) way of doing mechanics. That point is unfortunately

obscured by standard formalizations. In formalizing mechanics one

may select either 'mass' or 'force' as primitive and then introduce

the other as a defined term. But that formalization supplies no

information about how either the primitive or the defined terms attach

to nature, how the forces and masses are picked out in actual physical

situations. Though 'force', say, may be a primitive in some parti-

cular formalization of mechanics, one cannot learn to recognize forces

without simultaneously learning to pick out masses and without recourse

to the Second Law. That is why Newtonian 'force' and 'mass' are not

translatable into the language of a physical theory (Aristotelian or

~insteinian,for example) in which Newton's version of the Second Law

does not apply. To learn any one of these three ways of doing mech-

anics, the interrelated terms in some local part of the web of lang-

uage must be learned or relearned together and then laid down on nature

whole. They cannot simply be rendered individually by translation.

How, then, can a historian who teaches or writes about the phlogiston theory communicate his results at all? What is it that occurs when the historian presents to readers a group of sentences like those about phlogiston in the epitome above? The answer to that question varies with the audience, and I begin with the one presently most relevant. It consists of people without any sort of previous exposure to the phlogiston theory. To them the historian is describing the world in which the phloqistic chemist of the eighteenth century believed. Simultaneously, he or she is teaching the language which eighteenth-century chemists used in describing, explaining, and exploring that world. Most of the words in that older language are identical both in form and function with words in the language of the historian and the historian's audience. But others are new and must be learned or relearned. These are the untranslatable terms for which the historian or some predecessor has had to discover or invent meanings in order to render intelligible the texts on which he works. Interpretation is the process by which the use of those terms is dishas been much discussed recently under the rubric covered, and hermeneutics. Once it has been completed and the words acquired, the historian uses them in his own work and teaches them to others. The question of translation simply does not arise.

if

All this applies, I suggest, when passages like the one emphasized

above are presented to an audience that knows nothing of the phlogis-

ton theory. For that audience these passages are glosses on phlogis-

tic texts, intended to teach them the language in which such texts are

written and the way they are to be read. But such texts are also

encountered by people who have already learned to read them, people

for whom they are simply one more example of an already familiar type.

These are the people to whom such texts will seem merely translations,

o r p e r h a p s merely t e x t s , f o r t h e y have f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h e y had t o l e a r n a s p e c i a l language b e f o r e t h e y c o u l d r e a d them. The m i s t a k e i s a n e a s y one. The l a n g u a g e t h e y l e a r n e d l a r g e l y o v e r l a p p e d t h e n a t i v e language t h e y had l e a r n e d b e f o r e . But it d i f f e r e d from t h e i r n a t i v e language i n p a r t by e n r i c h m e n t , e . g . , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t e r m s l i k e ' p h l o g i s t o n ' , and i n p a r t by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s y s t e m a t i c a l l y t r a n s formed u s e s o f t e r m s l i k e ' p r i n c i p l e ' and ' e l e m e n t ' . I n t h e i r unrev i s e d n a t i v e l a n g u a g e , t h e s e t e x t s c o u l d n o t have b e e n r e n d e r e d . Though t h e p o i n t r e q u i r e s f a r more d i s c u s s i o n t h a n c a n b e a t t e m p t e d h e r e , much of what I have been s a y i n g i s n e a t l y c a p t u r e d by t h e form of Ramsey s e n t e n c e s . The e x i s t e n t i a l l y q u a n t i f i e d v a r i a b l e s w i t h which s u c h s e n t e n c e s b e g i n can b e s e e n a s what I p r e v i o u s l y c a l l e d "placeholders" f o r terms requiring i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , e . g . , ' p h l o g i s t o n ' , ' p r i n c i p l e ' , and ' e l e m e n t ' . Together w i t h i t s l o g i c a l consequences, t h e Ramsey s e n t e n c e i t s e l f i s t h e n a compendium of t h e c l u e s a v a i l a b l e t o an i n t e r p r e t e r , c l u e s t h a t , i n p r a c t i c e , he o r s h e would have t o d i s c o v e r through extended e x p l o r a t i o n of t e x t s . That, I think, is t h e p r o p e r way t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e t e c h n i q u e i n t r o duced by David Lewis f o r d e f i n i n g t h e o r e t i c a l t e r m s t h r o u g h Ramsey s e n t e n c e s (Lewis 1970, 1 9 7 2 ) . Like c o n t e x t u a l d e f i n i t i o n s , which t h e y c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e , and l i k e ostensive d e f i n i t i o n s a s w e l l , L e w i s ' s R a m s e y - d e f i n i t i o n s s c h e m a t i z e an i m p o r t a n t ( p e r h a p s e s s e n t i a l ) mode o f language l e a r n i n g . But t h e s e n s e of ' d e f i n i t i o n ' i n v o l v e d i s i n a l l t h r e e c a s e s metaphorical o r a t l e a s t extended. None of t h e s e t h r e e s o r t s of " d e f i n i t i o n s " w i l l s u p p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n : Ramsey s e n t e n c e s c a n n o t be used f o r t r a n s l a t i o n . With t h i s l a s t p o i n t , of c o u r s e , Lewis d i s a g r e e s . This i s not t h e p l a c e t o respond t o t h e d e t a i l s of h i s c a s e , many o f them t e c h n i c a l , b u t two l i n e s o f c r i t i c i s m may a t l e a s t b e i n d i c a t e d . L e w i s ' s Ramseyd e f i n i t i o n s d e t e r m i n e r e f e r e n c e o n l y on t h e assumption t h a t t h e c o r r e s I t i s questionable ponding Ramsey s e n t e n c e i s u n i q u e l y r e a l i z a b l e . w h e t h e r t h a t a s s u m p t i o n e v e r h o l d s and u n l i k e l y t h a t it h o l d s regularly. When and i f it d o e s , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e d e f i n i t i o n s i t makes I f t h e r e i s one and o n l y one r e f e r e n t i a l possible a r e uninformative. r e a l i z a t i o n of a g i v e n Ramsey s e n t e n c e , a p e r s o n may of c o u r s e hope But h a v i n g h i t upon t h e s i m p l y by t r i a l and e r r o r t o h i t upon i t . r e f e r e n t of a Ramsey-defined t e r m a t one p o i n t i n a t e x t would b e of no h e l p i n f i n d i n g t h e r e f e r e n t of t h a t t e r m o n i t s n e x t o c c u r r e n c e . The f o r c e of L e w i s ' s a r g u m e n t d e p e n d s t h e r e f o r e on h i s f u r t h e r c l a i m t h a t Ramsey d e f i n i t i o n s d e t e r m i n e n o t o n l y r e f e r e n c e b u t a l s o s e n s e , and t h i s p a r t of h i s c a s e e n c o u n t e r s d i f f i c u l t i e s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o b u t even more s e v e r e t h a n t h e o n e s j u s t o u t l i n e d . Even i f Ramsey d e f i n i t i o n s e s c a p e d t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s , a n o t h e r I have p r e v i o u s l y p o i n t e d o u t (Kuhn 1970, major s e t would remain. pp. 1 8 8 f . ) t h a t t h e laws of a s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y , u n l i k e t h e axioms o f a m a t h e m a t i c a l s y s t e m , a r e o n l y law s k e t c h e s i n t h a t t h e i r symbolic f o r m a l i z a t i o n s depend upon t h e problem t o which t h e y a r e a p p l i e d . T h a t p o i n t h a s s i n c e been c o n s i d e r a b l y e x t e n d e d by J o s e p h Sneed and Wolfgang S t e g m i i l l e r who c o n s i d e r Ramsey s e n t e n c e s and show t h a t t h e i r

s t a n d a r d s e n t e n t i a l formulation v a r i e s from one range of a p p l i c a t i o n s t o t h e next (Sneed 1971, StegmUller 1 9 7 3 ) . Most occurrences of new o r p r o b l e m a t i c terms i n a s c i e n c e t e x t a r e , however, w i t h i n a p p l i c a t i o n s , and t h e corresponding Ramsey s e n t e n c e s a r e simply n o t a r i c h enough source of c l u e s t o block a m u l t i t u d e of t r i v i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . To permit r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a t e x t studded w i t h Ramsey d e f i n i t i o n s , r e a d e r s would have f i r s t t o c o l l e c t a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t ranges of a p p l i c a t i o n . And having done s o t h e y would s t i l l have t o do what t h e h i s t o r i a n / i n t e r p r e t e r a t t e m p t s i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n . They would, t h a t i s , have t o i n v e n t and t e s t hypotheses about t h e sense of t h e terms i n t r o d u c e d by Ramsey d e f i n i t i o n s .

5.

The Quinean T r a n s l a t i o n Manual

Most of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s I have been c o n s i d e r i n g d e r i v e more o r l e s s d i r e c t l y from a t r a d i t i o n which h o l d s t h a t t r a n s l a t i o n can be construed I have been i n s i s t i n g t h a t i t cannot, i n p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l terms. and my arguments have a t l e a s t implied t h a t something from t h e realm of meanings, i n t e n s i o n a l i t i e s , concepts must be invoked a s w e l l . To make t h o s e p o i n t s I have considered an example from h i s t o r y of s c i e n c e , an example of t h e s o r t t h a t brought me t o t h e problem of incommensurabil i t y and thence t o t r a n s l a t i o n i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . The same s o r t s of p o i n t s can, however, be made d i r e c t l y from r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n s of r e f e r e n t i a l semantics and r e l a t e d d i s c u s s i o n s of t r a n s l a t i o n . Here I s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h e s i n g l e example t o which I a l l u d e d a t t h e s t a r t : Q u i n e ' s conception of a t r a n s l a t i o n manual. Such a manual -- t h e end product of t h e e f f o r t s of a r a d i c a l t r a n s l a t o r -- c o n s i s t s of p a r a l l e l l i s t s of words and p h r a s e s , one i n t h e t r a n s l a t o r ' s own language, t h e o t h e r i n Each item on each l i s t t h e language of t h e t r i b e he i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g . i s l i n k e d t o one o r o f t e n t o s e v e r a l items on t h e o t h e r , each l i n k s p e c i f y i n g a word o r phrase i n one language t h a t c a n , t h e t r a n s l a t o r supposes, be s u b s t i t u t e d i n a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t s f o r t h e l i n k e d word o r phrase i n t h e other. Where t h e l i n k a g e s a r e one-many, t h e manual i n c l u d e s s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of t h e c o n t e x t s i n which each of t h e v a r i o u s l i n k s i s t o be p r e f e r r e d (Quine 1960, pp. 27, 68-82). The network of d i f f i c u l t i e s I want t o i s o l a t e concerns t h e l a s t of t h e s e components of t h e manual, t h e c o n t e x t s p e c i f i e r s . Consider t h e I n some c o n t e x t s ( t y p i c a l l y t h o s e i n v o l v i n g French word I-'. ceremonies) i t s E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t i s 'pomp'; i n o t h e r c o n t e x t s Both e q u i v a l e n t s ( t y p i c a l l y h y d r a u l i c ) , i t s e q u i v a l e n t i s 'pump'. are precise. 'Pompe' - t h u s p r o v i d e s a t y p i c a l example of ambiguity l i k e t h e s t a n d a r d E n g l i s h example, ' b a n k ' : sometimes a r i v e r s i d e and sometimes a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n . Now c o n t r a s t t h e c a s e of 'pompe'w i t h t h a t of French words l i k e ' e s p r i t ' o r 'douxl/'douce'. ' E s p r i t ' can be r e p l a c e d , depending on c o n t e x t , by such English terms a s ' s p i r i t ' , ' a p t i t u d e ' , ' m i n d ' , ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ' , 'judgment', ' w i t ' , o r ' a t t i t u d e ' . The l a t t e r , an a d j e c t i v e , can b e a p p l i e d , i n t e r a l i a , t o honey ( ' s w e e t ' ) , t o wool ( ' s o f t ' ) , t o underseasoned soup ( ' b l a n d ' ) , t o a memory ( ' t e n d e r ' ) , o r t o a s l o p e o r a wind ( ' g e n t l e ' ) . These a r e not c a s e s of ambiguity,

b u t of c o n c e p t u a l d i s p a r i t y between F r e n c h and E n g l i s h .

E s p r i t and

doux/douce a r e u n i t a r y c o n c e p t s f o r F r e n c h s p e a k e r s , and E n g l i s h -A s a r e s u l t , though t h e s p e a k e r s a s a g r o u p p o s s e s s no e q u i v a l e n t s . v a r i o u s t r a n s l a t i o n s o f f e r e d above p r e s e r v e t r u t h - v a l u e i n a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t s , none of them i s i n any c o n t e x t i n t e n s i o n a l l y p r e c i s e . ' E s p r i t ' and ' d o u x l / ' d o u c e ' a r e t h u s examples of t e r m s t h a t c a n b e t r a n s l a t e d o n l y i n p a r t a n d by compromise. The t r a n s l a t o r ' s c h o i c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r E n g l i s h word o r p h r a s e f o r one of t h e n i s i p s o f a c t o t h e c h o i c e o f some a s p e c t s o f t h e i n t e n s i o n o f t h e F r e n c h t e r m a t t h e expense of o t h e r s . Simultaneously it i n t r o d u c e s i n t e n s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s ~ 2 a r a c t e r i s t i co f E n g l i s h b u t f o r e i g n t o t h e work b e i n g t r a n s lated. Q u i n e ' s a n a l y s i s of t r a n s l a t i o n s u f f e r s b a d l y , I t h i n k , from i t s i n a b i l i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h c a s e s o f t h i s s o r t from s t r a i g h t f o r ward a m b i g u i t y , from t h e c a s e o f t e r m s l i k e I-'.

The d i f f i c u l t y i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e one e n c o u n t e r e d by K i t c h e r ' s a t r a n s l a t i o n of ' p h l o g i s t o n ' . By now i t s s o u r c e must be o b v i o u s : t h e o r y of t r a n s l a t i o n b a s e d on a n e x t e n s i o n a l s e m a n t i c s and t h e r e f o r e r e s t r i c t e d t o truth-value preservation o r equivalent a s a c r i t e r i o n of adequacy. L i k e ' p h l o g i s t o n ' , ' e l e m e n t ' , and s o o n , b o t h '*'/ ' d o u c e ' and ' e s p r i t ' b e l o n g t o c l u s t e r s o f i n t e r r e l a t e d t e r m s a number o f which must b e l e a r n e d t o g e t h e r and w h i c h , when l e a r n e d , g i v e a s t r u c t u r e t o some p o r t i o n o f t h e w o r l d o f e x p e r i e n c e d i f f e r e n t from t h e one f a m i l i a r t o contemporary E n g l i s h s p e a k e r s . Such words i l l u s t r a t e i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y between n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . I n t h e case of ' d o u x ' / ' d o u c e ' t h e c l u s t e r i n c l u d e s , f o r example, '='/'-', a t o E n g l i s h ' s o f t ' , b u t which a p p l i e s word c l o s e r t h a n '='/'=' a l s o t o warm damp w e a t h e r . Or, i n t h e c l u s t e r w i t h ' e s p r i t ' , consider 'disposition'. The l a t t e r o v e r l a p s ' e s p r i t ' i n t h e a r e a of a t t i t u d e s and a p t i t u d e s , b u t a l s o a p p l i e s t o s t a t e - o f - h e a l t h o r t o t h e a r r a n g e m e n t of words w i t h i n a p h r a s e . These i n t e n s i o n a l i t i e s a r e what a p e r f e c t t r a n s l a t i o n would p r e s e r v e , and t h a t i s why t h e r e can b e no p e r f e c t t r a n s l a t i o n s . But a p p r o x i m a t i n g t h e u n o b t a i n a b l e i d e a l r e m a i n s a c o n s t r a i n t on a c t u a l t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d , i f t h e cons t r a i n t were t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , arguments f o r t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f t r a n s l a t i o n would r e q u i r e a form v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t now c u r r e n t . By t r e a t i n g t h e one-many l i n k a g e s i n h i s t r a n s l a t i o n manuals a s c a s e s o f a m b i g u i t y , Q u i n e d i s c a r d s t h e i n t e n s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s on adequate t r a n s l a t i o n . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , he d i s c a r d s t h e p r i m a r y c l u e t o t h e d i s c o v e r y o f how t h e words and p h r a s e s i n o t h e r l a n g u a g e s refer. Though one-many l i n k a g e s a r e sometimes c a u s e d by a m b i g u i t y , t h e y f a r more o f t e n p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e o f which o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s a r e s i m i l a r and which a r e d i f f e r e n t f o r s p e a k e r s o f t h e o t h e r l a n g uage; t h e y show, t h a t i s , how t h e o t h e r l a n g u a g e s t r u c t u r e s t h e world. T h e i r f u n c t i o n i s t h u s v e r y much t h e same a s t h a t p l a y e d by m u l t i p l e o b s e r v a t i o n s i n l e a r n i n g a f i r s t language. Just as the c h i l d l e a r n i n g ' d o g ' must b e shown many d i f f e r e n t dogs and p r o b a b l y some c a t s a s w e l l , s o t h e E n g l i s h s p e a k e r l e a r n i n g ' d o u x ' / ' d o u c e ' must o b s e r v e it i n many c o n t e x t s and a l s o t a k e n o t e o f c o n t e x t s instead. These a r e t h e ways, where F r e n c h employs '='/'=' o r some o f them, by which one l e a r n s t h e t e c h n i q u e s f o r a t t a c h i n g

words and p h r a s e s t o n a t u r e , f i r s t t h o s e of o n e ' s own l a n g u a g e and t h e n , p e r h a p s , t h e d i f f e r e n t o n e s embedded i n o t h e r l a n g u a g e s . By g i v i n g them up, Quine e l i m i n a t e s t h e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s , a s I a r g u e d a t t h e s t a r t , what h i s r a d i Is i t t h e n a c a l t r a n s l a t o r must d o b e f o r e t r a n s l a t i o n can b e g i n . wonder t h a t Q u i n e d i s c o v e r s p r e v i o u s l y u n a n t i c i p a t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s about " t r a n s l a t i o n " ? 6.

The Invariants o f T r a n s l a t i o n

I t u r n f i n a l l y t o a problem t h a t h a s been h e l d a t a r m ' s l e n g t h s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h i s p a p e r : What i s i t t h a t t r a n s l a t i o n must r e f e r e n c e , I have a r g u e d , f o r r e f e r e n c e preserve? ~ o merely t p r e s e r v i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s may b e i n c o h e r e n t , i m p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d w h i l e t h e t e r m s t h e y employ a r e t a k e n i n t h e i r u s u a l s e n s e . That d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e d i f f i c u l t y s u g g e s t s an obvious s o l u t i o n : t r a n s l a t i o n s must p r e s e r v e n o t o n l y r e f e r e n c e b u t a l s o s e n s e o r i n t e n s i o n . Under t h e r u b r i c 'meaning i n v a r i a n c e ' , t h a t i s t h e p o s i t i o n I have t a k e n i n t h e p a s t and t h a t I a d o p t e d f a u t e d e n i e u x i n t h e i n t r o d u c I t i s by no means merely wrong, b u t i t i s n o t t i o n t o t h i s paper. q u i t e r i g h t e i t h e r , a n e q u i v o c a t i o n symptomatic, I b e l i e v e , of a deep d u a l i t y i n t h e c o n c e p t o f meaning. I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t i t w i l l be e s s e n t i a l t o confront t h a t d u a l i t y d i r e c t l y . Here I s h a l l s k i r t i t by a v o i d i n y t a l k of 'meaning' e n t i r e l y . Instead I s h a l l discuss, though a s y e t i n q u i t e g e n e r a l , q u a s i - m e t a p h o r i c a l t e r m s , how members of a l a n g u a q e community p i c k o u t t h e r e f e r e n t s of t h e t e r m s t h e y employ.

C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t which some o f you w i l l have e n c o u n t e r e d p r e v i o u s l y a s a joke. A mother f i r s t t e l l s h e r d a u g h t e r t h e s t o r y of Adam and Eve, t h e n shows t h e c h i l d a p i c t u r e of t h e p a i r i n t h e Garden o f Eden. The c h i l d l o o k s , frowns i n I would p u z z l e m e n t , and s a y s , "Mother, t e l l me which i s which. know i f t h e y had t h e i r c l o t h e s o n . " Even i n s o condensed a f o r m a t , t h i s s t o r y u n d e r s c o r e s two o b v i o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l a n g u a g e . In matching t e r m s w i t h t h e i r r e f e r e n t s , one may l e g i t i m a t e l y make u s e of a n y t h i n g one knows o r b e l i e v e s a b o u t t h o s e r e f e r e n t s . Two p e o p l e may, moreover, s p e a k t h e same l a n g u a g e and n e v e r t h e l e s s u s e d i f f e r e n t An o b s e r v e r c r i t e r i a i n p i c k i n g o u t t h e r e f e r e n t s of i t s t e r m s . aware of t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s would s i m p l y c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e two d i f f e r e d i n what t h e y knew a b o u t t h e o b j e c t s under d i s c u s s i o n . That d i f f e r e n t people use d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e r e f e r e n t s I shall of s h a r e d t e r m s may, I t h i n k , s a f e l y b e t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . p o s i t , i n a d d i t i o n , t h e now w i d e l y s h a r e d t h e s i s t h a t none o f t h e c r i t e r i a u s e d i n r e f e r e n c e d e t e r m i n a t i o n a r e merely c o n v e n t i o n a l , a s s o c i a t e d s i m p l y by d e f i n i t i o n w i t h t h e t e r m s t h e y h e l p t o c h a r a c t e r i z e . l3 How can i t b e , t h o u g h , t h a t p e o p l e whose c r i t e r i a a r e d i f f e r e n t s o A first r e g u l a r l y p i c k o u t t h e same r e f e r e n t s f o r t h e i r t e r m s ? answer i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . T h e i r lanquage i s adapted t o t h e s o c i a l and n a t u r a l world i n which t h e y l i v e , and t h a t world d o e s n o t p r e s e n t t h e s o r t s of o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s which would, by e x p l o i t i n g t h e i r

c r i t e r i a 1 d i f f e r e n c e s , l e a d them t o make d i f f e r e n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . T h a t answer, i n t u r n , r a i s e s a f u r t h e r and more d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n : what i s i t t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e adequacy of t h e s e t s of c r i t e r i a a s p e a k e r employs when a p p l y i n g language t o t h e world which t h a t l a n g uage d e s c r i b e s ? What must s p e a k e r s w i t h d i s p a r a t e r e f e r e n c e d e t e r m i n i n g c r i t e r i a s h a r e i n o r d e r t h a t t h e y b e s p e a k e r s of t h e same l a n g u a g e , members of t h e same l a n g u a g e community?14 Members o f t h e same language community a r e members of a common c u l t u r e , and e a c h may t h e r e f o r e e x p e c t t o b e p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e same r a n g e of o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s . I f they a r e t o co-refer, each must a s s o c i a t e e a c h i n d i v i d u a l t e r m w i t h a s e t of c r i t e r i a s u f f i c i e n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t s r e f e r e n t s from o t h e r s o r t s of o b j e c t s o r s i t u a t i o n s which t h e community's world a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t s , though n o t from s t i l l o t h e r o b j e c t s t h a t a r e merely i m a g i n a b l e . The a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y c o r r e c t l y t h e members of one s e t o f t e n t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s a knowledge of c o n t r a s t s e t s a s w e l l . Some y e a r s a g o , f o r example, I s u g g e s t e d t h a t l e a r n i n g t o i d e n t i f y g e e s e may a l s o r e q u i r e knowing s u c h c r e a t u r e s a s ducks and swans (Kuhn 1 9 7 4 ) . The c l u s t e r of c r i t e r i a a d e q u a t e t o t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of g e e s e d e p e n d s , I i n d i c a t e d , n o t o n l y on t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s h a r e d by a c t u a l g e e s e , b u t a l s o on t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c e r t a i n o t h e r c r e a t u r e s i n t h e w o r l d i n h a b i t e d by g e e s e and t h o s e who t a l k a b o u t them. Few r e f e r r i n g t e r m s o r e x p r e s s i o n s a r e l e a r n e d i n i s o l a t i o n e i t h e r from t h e world o r from each o t h e r . T h i s v e r y p a r t i a l model of t h e way s p e a k e r s match l a n g u a g e w i t h t h e world i s i n t e n d e d t o r e i n t r o d u c e two c l o s e l y r e l a t e d themes t h a t have emerged r e p e a t e d l y i n t h i s p a p e r . The f i r s t , of c o u r s e , i s t h e e s s e n t i a l r o l e of s e t s of t e r m s t h a t must be l e a r n e d t o g e t h e r by t h o s e r a i s e d i n s i d e a c u l t u r e , s c i e n t i f i c o r o t h e r , and which f o r e i g n e r s e n c o u n t e r i n g t h a t c u l t u r e must c o n s i d e r t o g e t h e r d u r i n g interpretation. T h a t i s t h e h o l i s t i c e l e m e n t which e n t e r e d t h i s p a p e r a t t h e s t a r t , w i t h l o c a l i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y , and t h e b a s i s f o r i t s h o u l d now b e c l e a r . I f d i f f e r e n t speakers using d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a succeed i n p i c k i n g o u t t h e same r e f e r e n t s f o r t h e same t e r m s , c o n t r a s t s e t s must have p l a y e d a r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c r i t e r i a each a s s o c i a t e s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l terms. At l e a s t t h e y must when, a s i s u s u a l , t h o s e c r i t e r i a d o n o t t h e m s e l v e s c o n s t i t u t e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t conditions f o r reference. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , some s o r t o f l o c a l h o l i s m must b e an e s s e n t i a l f e a t c r e of l a n g u a g e . These remarks may a l s o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r my second r e c u r r e n t theme, t h e r e i t e r a t e d a s s e r t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s impose d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s on t h e w o r l d . Imagine, f o r a moment, t h a t f o r e a c h i n d i v i d u a l a r e f e r r i n g t e r m i s a node i n a l e x i c a l network from which r a d i a t e l a b e l s f o r t h e c r i t e r i a t h a t he o r s h e u s e s i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e r e f e r e n t s of t h e nodal term. Those c r i t e r i a w i l l t i e some t e r m s t o g e t h e r and d i s t a n c e them from o t h e r s , t h u s b u i l d i n g a multi-dimensional s t r u c t u r e w i t h i n t h e l e x i c o n . That s t r u c t u r e m i r r o r s a s p e c t s o f t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e world which t h e l e x i c o n can be used t o d e s c r i b e , and i t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y l i m i t s t h e phenomena t h a t

can b e d e s c r i b e d w i t h t h e l e x i c o n ' s a i d . I f anomalous phenomena n e v e r t h e l e s s a r i s e , t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n ( p e r h a p s even t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n ) w i l l r e q u i r e a l t e r i n g some p a r t o f t h e l a n g u a g e , changing t h e p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t i t u t i v e l i n k a g e s between t e r m s . Note, now, t h a t homologous s t r u c t u r e s , s t r u c t u r e s m i r r o r i n g t h e same w o r l d , may b e f a s h i o n e d u s i n g d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f c r i t e r i a 1 l i n k ages. What s u c h homologous s t r u c t u r e s p r e s e r v e , b a r e o f c r i t e r i a 1 l a b e l s , i s t h e taxonomic c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e world and t h e s i m i l a r i t y / d i f f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e n . Though I h e r e v e r g e on metap h o r , my d i r e c t i o n s h o u l d b e c l e a r . What members o f a l a n g u a g e Their c r i t e r i a community s h a r e i s homology of l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e . need n o t b e t h e same, f o r t h o s e t h e y can l e a r n from e a c h o t h e r a s needed. But t h e i r taxonomic s t r u c t u r e s must match, f o r where s t r u c t u r e i s d i f f e r e n t , t h e world i s d i f f e r e n t , l a n g u a g e i s p r i v a t e , and communication c e a s e s u n t i l one p a r t y a c q u i r e s t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e other. By now it must b e c l e a r where, i n my view, t h e i n v a r i a n t s o f t r a n s l a t i o n a r e t o be sought. U n l i k e two members o f t h e same l a n g uage community, s p e a k e r s of m u t u a l l y t r a n s l a t a b l e l a n g u a g e s need n o t But t h e r e f e r r i n g e x p r e s s i o n s share terms: 'Rad' i s n o t ' w h e e l ' . o f one l a n g u a g e must b e m a t c h a b l e t o c o r e f e r e n t i a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n t h e o t h e r , and t h e l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e s e n p l o y e d by s p e a k e r s o f t h e languages must b e t h e same, n o t o n l y w i t h i n e a c h l a n g u a g e b u t a l s o from one l a n g u a g e t o t h e o t h e r . Taxonomy m u s t , i n s h o r t , b e p r e s e r v e d t o p r o v i d e b o t h s h a r e d c a t e g o r i e s and s h a r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them. Where it i s n o t , t r a n s l a t i o n i s i m p o s s i b l e , an outcome p r e c i s e l y i l l u s t r a t e d by K i t c h e r ' s v a l i a n t a t t e m p t t o f i t t h e p h l o g i s t o n t h e o r y t o t h e taxonomy o f modern c h e m i s t r y . T r a n s l a t i o n i s , o f c o u r s e , o n l y t h e f i r s t r e s o r t o f t h o s e who s e e k comprehension. Communication c a n b e e s t a b l i s h e d i n i t s a b s e n c e . But where t r a n s l a t i o n i s n o t f e a s i b l e , t h e v e r y d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n a r e r e q u i r e d . These processes a r e not arcane. H i s t o r i a n s , a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , and p e r h a p s s m a l l c h i l d r e n engage i n them e v e r y day. But t h e y a r e n o t w e l l u n d e r s t o o d , and t h e i r comprehension i s l i k e l y t o r e q u i r e t h e a t t e n t i o n of a w i d e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l c i r c l e t h a n t h e one c u r r e n t l y engaged w i t h them. Upon t h a t e x p a n s i o n o f a t t e n t i o n depends an unders t a n d i n g , n o t o n l y of t r a n s l a t i o n and i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , b u t a l s o o f I t i s no a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e s y n c h r o n i c a n a l y s i s c o n c e p t u a l change. of Q u i n e ' s Word and O b j e c t i s i n t r o d u c e d by t h e d i a c h r o n i c e p i g r a p h of N e u r a t h ' s b o a t .

Notes 1

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SLnce t h i s paper was f i r s t d r a f t e d , many people have c o n t r i b u t e d t o i t s improvement, among them c o l l e a g u e s a t M.I.T. and a u d i t o r s a t t h e P.S.A. meeting and a t t h e Columbia seminar i n H i s t o r y and Philosophy of Science where a p r e l i m i n a r y v e r s i o n was f i r s t t r i e d I a n g r a t e f u l t o a l l of them, above a l l t o Ned Block, Paul out. Horwich, Nathaniel Kuhn, Stephen S t i c h , and my two o f f i c i a l commentators.

' 1 b e l i e v e t h a t Feyerabend's and my r e s o r t t o 'incommensurability' was independent, and I have an u n c e r t a i n memory of P a u l ' s f i n d i n g i t i n a d r a f t manuscript of mine and t e l l i n g me he t o o had been using it. Passages i l l u s t r a t i n g our e a r l y usages a r e : Kuhn (1970, pp. 1 0 2 f . , 1 1 2 , 1 2 8 £ . , 1 4 8 - 1 5 1 , a l l unchanged from t h e f i r s t (1962) e d i t i o n ) and Feyerabend (1962, pp. 56-59, 74-76, 8 1 ) . 3 ~ o t hFeyerabend and I wrote of t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d e f i n i n g t h e terms of one t h e o r y on t h e b a s i s of t h e terms of t h e o t h e r . But he I spoke a l s o of d i f f e r r e s t r i c t e d incommensurability t o language; ences i n "methods, problem-field, and s t a n d a r d s of s o l u t i o n " (Kuhn 1970, p. 1 0 3 ) , something I would no longer do e x c e p t t o t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t t h a t t h e l a t t e r d i f f e r e n c e s a r e n e c e s s a r y consequences of t h e language-learning p r o c e s s . Feyerabend (1962, p . 5 9 ) , on t h e o t h e r hand, wrote t h a t " i t i s p o s s i b l e n e i t h e r t o d e f i n e t h e primit i v e terms of T' on t h e b a s i s of t h e p r i m i t i v e terms of T nor t o e s t a b l i s h c o r r e c t e m p i r i c a l r e l a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g both t h e s e t e r m s . " I made no use of a n o t i o n of p r i m i t i v e terms and r e s t r i c t e d incommensilrability t o a few s p e c i f i c terms. 4 ~ h i sp o i n t had been p r e v i o u s l y emphasized i n Hanson ( 1 9 5 8 ) . 5Note t h a t t h e s e terms a r e n o t t h e o r y independent b u t a r e simply I t follows used i n t h e same way w i t h i n t h e two t h e o r i e s a t i s s u e . t h a t t e s t i n g i s a p r o c e s s t h a t compares two t h e o r i e s , not one t h a t can e v a l u a t e t h e o r i e s one a t a time. 6Quine n o t e s t h a t h i s r a d i c a l t r a n s l a t o r might choose t h e " c o s t l y " way and " l e a r n t h e language d i r e c t a s an i n f a n t might." But he t a k e s t h i s p r o c e s s t o be simply an a l t e r n a t e r o u t e t o t h e same end a s t h o s e reached by h i s s t a n d a r d means, t h a t end being a t r a n s l a t i o n manual (Quine 1960, pp. 47, 7 0 f )

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'some would o b j e c t t h a t a s t r i n g l i k e ' f u r r y , long-eared, bushytailed c r e a t u r e ' i s t o o long and complex t o count a s a t r a n s l a t i o n of a s i n g l e term i n a n o t h e r language. But I i n c l i n e t o t h e view t h a t any term which can be i n t r o d u c e d by a s t r i n g can be i n t e r n a l i z e d s o t h a t , w i t h p r a c t i c e , i t s r e f e r e n t s can be recognized directly. I n any c a s e , I am concerned with a s t r o n g e r v e r s i o n of u n t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y , one i n which not even long s t r l n g s a r e available.

. . .

8 .

K l t c h e r s u p p o s e s t h a t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s p e r m i t him t o s p e c i f y which s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e o l d e r t h e o r y were t r u e , which f a l s e . Thus s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e s u b s t a n c e r e l e a s e d on combustion were f a l s e b u t s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e e f f e c t of d e p h l o g i s t i c a t e d a i r on v i t a l a c t i g i t i e s were t r u e b e c a u s e i n t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s ' d e p h l o g i s t i c a t e d a i r ' r e f e r r e d t o oxygen. I t h i n k , however, t h a t K i t c h e r i s o n l y u s i n g modern t h e o r y t o e x p l a i n why some s t a t e m e n t s made by p r a c t i t i o n e r s of t h e o l d e r t h e o r y were c o n f i r m e d by e x p e r i e n c e , o t h e r s not. The a b i l i t y t o e x p l a i n s u c h s u c c e s s e s and f a i l u r e s i s b a s i c t o t h e h i s t o r i a n o f s c i e n c e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t e x t s . ( I f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a t t r i b u t e s t o t h e a u t h o r of a t e x t r e p e a t e d a s s e r t i o n s which e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e o b s e r v a t i o n s would have i n f i r m e d , t h e n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y wrong, and t h e h i s t o r i a n must go t o work a g a i n . F o r a n example of what may t h e n b e r e q u i r e d , s e e Kuhn (1964) i n Kuhn ( 1 9 7 7 ) . ) But n e i t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n n o r Kitcher's t r a n s l a t i o n techniques allow individual sentences containi n g t e r m s from t h e o l d e r t h e o r y t o be d e c l a r e d t r u e o r f a l s e . T h e o r i e s a r e , I b e l i e v e , s t r u c t u r e s t h a t must b e e v a l u a t e d a s w h o l e s . ' K i t c h e r , of c o u r s e , d o e s e x p l a i n t h e s e j u x t a p o s i t i o n s by r e f e r r i n g t o t h e b e l i e f s of t h e a u t h o r o f t h e t e x t and t o modern t h e o r y . But t h e p a s s a g e s i n which he d o e s t h i s a r e g l o s s e s , n o t p a r t s of h i s translation a t a l l . ''perhaps o n l y ' e l e m e n t ' and ' p r i n c i p l e ' have t o be l e a r n e d t o g e ther. Once t h e y have been l e a r n e d , b u t o n l y t h e n , ' p h l o g i s t o n ' c o u l d b e i n t r o d u c e d a s a p r i n c i p l e t h a t behaved i n c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d ways. 'To t h e s e n s e of ' h e r m e n e u t i c ' I have i n mind ( t h e r e a r e o t h e r s ) T a y l o r , however, t h e most u s e f u l i n t r o d u c t i o n i s T a y l o r ( 1 9 7 1 ) . t a k e s f o r g r a n t e d t h a t t h e d e s c r i p t i v e language of t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s ( a n d t h e b e h a v i o r a l language of t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s ) i s f i x e d and n e u t r a l . A u s e f u l c o r r e c t i v e from w i t h i n t h e h e r m e n e u t i c t r a d i t i o n i s p r o v i d e d by Ape1 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . Both a r e c o n v e n i e n t l y r e p r i n t e d i n Dallmayr and McCarthy (19771, a n a n t h o l o g y u s e f u l a l s o f o r o t h e r a s p e c t s of t h e hermeneutic t r a d i t i o n . 12Glosses which d e s c r i b e how t h e F r e n c h view t h e p s y c h i c ( o r t h e s e n s o r y ) world c a n b e o f g r e a t h e l p w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m , and F r e n c h l a n g u a g e t e x t b o o k s u s u a l l y i n c l u d e m a t e r i a l on s u c h c u l t u r a l m a t t e r s . But g l o s s e s d e s c r i h i n g t h e c u l t u r e a r e n o t p a r t s of t h e t r a n s l a t i o n itself. Long E n g l i s h p a r a p h r a s e s f o r F r e n c h t e r m s p r o v i d e no subs t i t u t e , p a r t l y because of t h e i r clumsiness b u t mostly because terms l i k e ' e s p r i t ' o r 'doux'/'douce' a r e items i n a vocabulary c e r t a i n p a r t s of which must be l e a r n e d t o g e t h e r . The argument i s t h e same a s t h e one g i v e n p r e v i o u s l y f o r ' e l e m e n t ' and ' p r i n c i p l e ' o r ' f o r c e ' and ' m a s s ' . 1 3 ~ w op o i n t s must b e u n d e r s c o r e d . F i r s t , I am n o t e q u a t i n g meani n g with a s e t of c r i t e r i a . Second, ' c r i t e r i a ' i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n a v e r y b r o a d s e n s e , one t h a t embraces w h a t e v e r t e c h n i q u e s , n o t a l l

of them necessarily conscious, people do use in pinning words to the

world. In particular, as used here, 'criteria' can certainly

include similarity to paradigmatic examples (but then the relevant

similarity relation must be known) or recourse to experts (but then

speakers must know how to find the relevant experts).

141 have found no brief way to discuss this topic without seeming

to imply that criteria are somehow logically and psychologically

prior to the objects and situations for which they are criterial.

But, in fact, I think both must be learned and that they are often

learned together. For example, the presence of masses and forces is

criteria1 for what I might call the 'Newtonian-mechanics-situation',

one to which Newton's Second Law applies. But one can learn to

recognize mass and force only within the Newtonian-mechanical-

situation, and vice-versa.

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