Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance

13/16” ★ nicholas khoo Pr aise for Collateral Damage “Khoo returns to the roots of international relations theory to e...

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13/16”

★ nicholas khoo

Pr aise for Collateral Damage “Khoo returns to the roots of international relations theory to explain Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese behavior toward one another during the 1960s and 1970s on the basis of realist factors of power distribution and balancing. He uses new information released in China in the form of memoirs, scholarly works, and archival publications to tell a dramatic and in some ways tragic story with insight and vividness.” niCHol AS KHo o is a lecturer in the department of Politics at the University of otago, new Zealand. He received a Ph.d. from Columbia University in 2006 and an MA from Johns Hopkins University in 1998. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy, the international relations of Asia, the international politics of the Cold war, and international relations theory.

collateral

damage

A n dr ew J. nAtHA n Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science Columbia University “Collateral Damage offers both a sophisticated analytical treatment and a comprehensive history of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the 1960s and 1970s, thus presenting a persuasive explanation of the emergence of Sino-Vietnamese friction in the 1960s and the emergence of Sino-Vietnamese animosity and war in the 1970s.” robert S. ro SS professor of political science boston College

sino-soviet rivalry and the termination of the sino-vietnamese alliance

jacket design: chang jae lee

columbia university press new york www.cup.columbia.edu printed in the u.s.a.

ISBN 978-0-231-15078-1

columbia

Although the Chinese and the Vietnamese were Cold war allies in wars against the French and the Americans, their alliance collapsed and they ultimately fought a war against each other in 1979. More than thirty years later the fundamental cause of the alliance’s termination remains contested among historians, international relations theorists, and Asian studies specialists. nicholas Khoo brings fresh perspective to this debate. Using Chinese-language materials released since the end of the Cold war, Khoo revises existing explanations for the termination of China’s alliance with Vietnam, arguing that Vietnamese cooperation with China’s Cold war adversary, the Soviet Union, was the necessary and sufficient cause for the alliance’s termination. He finds alternative explanations to be less persuasive. these emphasize nonmaterial causes, such as ideology and culture, or reference issues within the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, such as land and border disputes, Vietnam’s treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, and Vietnam’s attempt to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia and laos. Khoo also adds to the debate over the relevance of realist theory in interpreting China’s international behavior during both the Cold war and post–Cold war eras. while others see China as a social state driven by nonmaterial processes, Khoo makes the case for viewing China as a quintessential neorealist state. From this perspective, the focus of neorealist theory on security threats from materially stronger powers explains China’s foreign policy toward not only the Soviet Union but also its Vietnamese allies.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

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COLLATERAL DAMAGE Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance

★ NICHOLAS KHOO

columbia universit y press

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new york

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c olumbia u niversity press publishers s ince 1893 n ew york

c hichester, w est s ussex

Copyright © 2011 Columbia University Press All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Khoo, Nicholas. Collateral damage : Sino-Soviet rivalry and the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance / Nicholas Khoo. p.

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-231-15078-1 (cloth : alk. paper) — isbn 978-0-231-52163-5 (ebook) 1. China—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 3. China—Foreign relations—Vietnam. 5. Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 1979.

2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—China.

4. Vietnam—Foreign relations—China.

I. Title.

ds740.5.s65k46 2011 327.5104709′—dc22 2010027352

Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper.

This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

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CONTENTS

List of Tables vii Acknowledgments ix

1. China’s Cold War Alliance with Vietnam: Historical and Theoretical Significance 1 2. Breaking the Ring of Encirclement: Sino-Soviet Alliance Termination and the Chinese Communists’ Vietnam Policy, 1964–1968 15 3. A War on Two Fronts: The Sino-Soviet Conflict During the Vietnam War and the Betrayal Thesis, 1968–1973 45 4. The Politics of Victory: Sino-Soviet Relations and the Road to Vietnamese Unification, 1973–1975 78 5. The End of an “Indestructible Friendship”: Soviet Resurgence and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1975–1979 103 6. When Allies Become Enemies

137

Notes 165 Bibliography 223 Index 251

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TABLES

Table 2.1. China’s Military Aid to North Vietnam, 1964–1968 29 Table 2.2. China’s Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1965–1975 30 Table 4.1. Estimates of Soviet Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1965–1975 86 Table 4.2. Estimates of Soviet Military Aid to Vietnam, 1965–1975 87 Table 5.1. Estimates of Soviet Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1975–1979 112 Table 5.2. Estimates of Soviet Military Aid to Vietnam, 1975–1979 113

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

D uring the course of my graduate studies, it quickly became clear that the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Cold-War-era Southeast Asia was underresearched, and a fruitful area for investigation. This book, which is largely based on my Ph.D. dissertation, examines what is arguably one of the most underappreciated subplots of the Cold War; specifically, how the Sino-Soviet conflict influenced Beijing’s and Moscow’s relationships with their comrades in Hanoi, and how those relationships, in turn, intensified the conflict. While Cold War history may strike some as an uninteresting retreat into the past, with little relevance for the contemporary era, I have found the opposite to be true. This narrative is alive with forceful personalities, friction between alliance partners, wars between former communist comrades, and much more. Arguably, China’s behaviour during the period under examination also provides us with an insight into how it might conduct its foreign policy in the twenty-first century. I would like to use this opportunity to thank all of those who have, in various ways, played a part in this book. Both of my dissertation advisers at Columbia deserve particular mention. As my primary dissertation adviser, Andrew Nathan encouraged me to rigorously pursue the various arguments contained in the text. His probing questions and wise counsel were critical in shaping the final product in myriad ways. Thomas Bernstein’s encyclopedic knowledge

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

of the schisms in the international communist movement was invaluable, as was his advice throughout graduate school. My dissertation committee, comprising Charles Armstrong, Thomas Bernstein, Mark von Hagen, Andrew Nathan, and Jack Snyder, offered insightful ideas for revision, many of which have found their place in this book. The Department of Political Science and the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University provided critical support for this book. In addition to providing a vibrant intellectual home, both were sources of generous financial support, which greatly facilitated my research. This included a number of Columbia University President’s Fellowships, a Weatherhead East Asian Institute C. Martin Wilbur Fellowship, and a Weatherhead East Asian Institute V. K. Wellington Koo Fellowship. The Weatherhead fellowships allowed me to undertake, at the kind invitation of Professor Su Hao, an extended research and teaching stint at the Foreign Affairs University in Beijing during 2002–3, and to make a data collection trip to the Universities Services Centre (USC) for Chinese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Jean Hung and the staff at the USC were very helpful in facilitating my research. Zhang Qingmin of Beijing University was a valuable and patient source of advice with respect to the Chinese-language sources cited in the text. I would also like to express my appreciation to various colleagues, friends, and teachers who played a less direct but nonetheless significant role in the journey that this book reflects. These include Frank Scott Douglas, Karl Jackson, M. L. R. Smith, Dorothy Solinger, and John Tai. Thank you Brian, Chia Yi, Jerome, Raymond, Ted, and Walter for your friendship and support, both during my searching experience of 1991 and at other more tranquil times. A word of appreciation is due to Anne Routon at Columbia University Press, who recognized the value of the manuscript and efficiently moved it through the various stages of production. The anonymous reviewers for this manuscript made a number of very important suggestions for revision. Their contribution is significant and deserves emphasis. This book would not have been possible without the unfailing love and support of my father, Dr. Khoo Chong Yew, and late mother, Ellen Khoo née McLaughlin. They have been a model for me in so many ways, and I dedicate this book to them. My siblings, Stephen, Sharon, and Brenda, were consistently encouraging during the ups and downs of my journey through graduate school. Finally, my wife, Karen, patiently and sacrificially persevered during the writing of this book over the last decade. This book would have been impossible without your love and support. Without you and Ellena, this book, and the larger career of which it is a part, would be meaningless.

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COLLATERAL DAMAGE

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1 CHINA’S COLD WAR ALLIANCE WITH VIETNAM Historical and Theoretical Significance

From the 1950s through the early 1970s, the Chinese and Vietnamese communists shared a common ideology and a strategic interest in opposing American containment policy in Asia. During this period relations were sufficiently close that Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh characterized the Chinese and Vietnamese communists as “comrades plus brothers [tongzhi jia xiongdi].” By all accounts, Ho’s characterization of bilateral relations was an accurate one. At a time when China was strapped for resources, Beijing made a significant financial contribution to the Vietnamese communists’ war efforts, against first the French and then the Americans. Chinese estimates place the total value of Beijing’s economic and military aid to their Vietnamese allies during the period 1949–1978 at approximately $20 billion. However, with the onset of the Second Indochina War, or Vietnam War (1965–1975), the Sino-Vietnamese alliance relationship began to deteriorate, culminating in a border war in 1979. The former allies were about to begin a period of confrontation that was to end only in 1991, and that became known as the Third Indochina War. The termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and subsequent border war of 1979 comprised a pivotal development during the Cold War, at once

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CHINA’S COLD WAR ALLIANCE WITH VIETNAM

reflecting and deepening divisions within the communist bloc. However, the fundamental cause of these developments remains a continuing source of debate among area studies specialists, historians, and political scientists who study the Cold War. This book seeks an answer to the following question: Why did the seemingly close alliance between Beijing and Hanoi degenerate from close cooperation to intense conflict? In examining these developments, I will argue that the fundamental cause for the intense conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations lay in developments within the Sino-Soviet relationship. In this respect, the de facto termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s set the stage for intense competition between Beijing and Moscow that was played out on a global scale. As the Sino-Soviet conflict increased, both sides competed for influence over their Vietnamese comrades in Hanoi. With the gradual strengthening of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship during the course of the Second Indochina War (1965–1975), an attendant increase of conflict occurred in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The final straw for the Chinese came in the post-1975 era, with the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance in November 1978. When the Vietnamese subsequently invaded Cambodia, with the aim of overthrowing the Chinese-aligned Khmer Rouge regime, the Chinese viewed that act as a casus belli. Chinese retaliation was swift, if less than sure. The border war of February 1979 extracted a heavy toll in terms of deaths and casualties on both sides. That said, why should we be interested in another study of the interactions between China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam? There are two reasons. First, this book seeks to contribute to an important and emerging debate on the fundamental cause of the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Scholars writing during the Cold War, but with limited access to Chinese sources, argued that the Sino-Soviet conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s had a significant impact on China’s foreign relations. In this view, the conflict transformed the Soviet Union from a close ally into the central threat facing China. Consequently, China viewed its relations with the Vietnamese communists primarily through a Soviet prism. As the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese communists increased cooperation during the period of the Vietnam War, an attendant increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict occurred, eventually leading to a rupture in relations in the 1978–1979 period. In contrast, the recent literature on China’s foreign relations, which has had the benefit of greater access to Chinese sources, has tended to minimize the centrality of the Soviet factor in Chinese Cold War era foreign policy. Representative of this trend in the literature are a number of relatively recent and influential studies, by Chen Jian,

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Qiang Zhai, and Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge. These studies, while not ignoring the Soviet factor, have in effect de-emphasized its centrality in Beijing’s foreign policy, and more specifically, its policy toward the Vietnamese communists. Chen contends that conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations was caused principally by Mao’s pursuit of an ideologically based foreign policy of revolution promotion and the Chinese leadership’s culturally determined sense of superiority over the Vietnamese. Separately, Zhai and Nguyen posit that a variety of issues at the individual, domestic, regional, and international level of analysis explain Beijing’s relations with the Vietnamese communists. Drawing on Chinese-language sources released since the 1990s, this book presents a view contrary to the one expressed in the recent literature on Chinese Cold War foreign policy. Specifically, it will be argued that the threat represented by the Soviet Union was the central and overriding concern of Chinese foreign policy–makers, a fact that was strongly reflected in SinoVietnamese relations. In effect, increasing Sino-Soviet conflict following the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s provided the critical context for an increase in Soviet cooperation with the Vietnamese communists, and was the fundamental cause of the cracks in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance that were to manifest themselves more fully in the period following the end of the Vietnam War, eventually resulting in the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 and the Third Indochina War (1979–1991). As part of this investigation into the Beijing–Hanoi– Moscow triangle, important questions about what occurred during this period are reexamined. For example: What was the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the course of the Vietnam War? Did the Chinese betray their Vietnamese comrades when they entered into a rapprochement with the U.S. in 1972? Did the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972 cause the Sino-Vietnamese conflict of 1979? Why did the Sino-Vietnamese alliance collapse in the post-1975 period? In explaining the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, what was the relative role of the Soviet factor, as opposed to a variety of bilateral issues such as disputes over ideology; land and maritime borders; the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam; and Vietnam’s bid to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia and Laos? Why did Beijing and Hanoi enter into a rapprochement in the late 1980s? The second reason that we should be interested in this study is theoretical in nature. Along with the de-emphasis of the state-centric Soviet threat has come another shift in the literature. Specifically, and paralleling a broader shift in studies of the Cold War, the recent literature on Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War era has found realist theory wanting. Thus this book also has an

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equally important theoretical aim, which is to engage the arguments advanced by non-realist interpretations of Chinese Cold War era foreign policy, and to propose a causal theory of Chinese foreign policy premised on the core assumptions of realist theory. In this respect, this study does not find persuasive the view advanced in the recent literature that China is a social state whose behavior is determined primarily by nonmaterialist variables, Rather, this study contends that the People’s Republic of China is a neorealist state whose international behavior is fundamentally determined by concepts emphasized by neorealist theory. Accordingly, this analysis accepts the following assumptions: (1) states operate in a defined environment, the international system, where the organizing principle of the system is anarchic; (2) the central actors in the system are states that are concerned with their own survival; (3) the concern for survival necessitates a reliance by each state on its own efforts; (4) states can be abstracted and analyzed as unitary rational actors;  (5) the security dilemma is viewed as playing a significant role in international relations; (6) states are viewed as seeking to maximize relative gains; (7) states are assumed to be security maximizers rather than power maximizers. This study also aims to add depth to an already existing theory of Chinese foreign policy known as “principal enemy” theory. The core insight of the principal enemy approach, that “the friend of my enemy is my enemy,” is pure realism. Originally put forward by Peter Van Ness in 1970, this perspective posits that Chinese policy toward any particular state during the Cold War is a function of that state’s relationship with what Beijing considers to be its principal enemy, rather than ideological criteria. Other analysts have utilized the principal enemy approach in studies of specific bilateral relationships involving China during the Cold War. J. D. Armstrong has adopted this perspective in examining China’s relations with Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tanzania. David Mozingo has used it in his analysis of China’s relations with Indonesia, while Melvin Gurtov has studied China’s relations with Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand. We will apply the logic of this argument to China’s relations with the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, attempting, in essence, to demonstrate how Vietnam, by aligning itself with China’s principal enemy, the Soviet Union, became China’s secondary enemy. A case study approach is adopted. In this respect, this book represents an attempt to look at the entire period from 1964 to 1991, systematically argue the principal enemy thesis in social scientific terms, and rectify methodological problems extant in previous attempts to explain the

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relationship between Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Alternative explanations are investigated.

CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS FOR SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT There are three broad explanations that can be used to explain the conflict in, and the eventual termination of, the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. The first explanation focuses on specific bilateral issues as the basic cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. The second focuses on China’s principal enemy during the secondhalf of the Cold War, the Soviet Union. The third involves an influential theory of alliances known as known as balance of threat theory.

Specific Bilateral Issues The first explanation for conflict in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance locates the cause in disputes over bilateral issues within the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. In this respect, any one of three issues has been emphasized in the literature: conflict over the Chinese diaspora in Vietnam; Sino-Vietnamese border disputes; and the frictions generated in Sino-Vietnamese relations by Mao’s ideologically based cultural ethnocentricism. Porter and Loescher argue that the failure of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance was a consequence of disagreements over the treatment of the ethnic Chinese community in Vietnam. The mass expulsions of Vietnamese with Chinese ethnic origins certainly strained bilateral relations. However, this appears to have been an exacerbating factor rather than a fundamental cause of bilateral conflict. An examination of the timing of Beijing’s decision to raise the Chinese diaspora issue with the Vietnamese leadership supports this conclusion. The exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam began as early as spring 1977, yet Beijing only took action a year later, when relations had reached a crisis point. This time-lag suggests that a state’s broader political relationship with China mattered more to Beijing than how the overseas ethnic Chinese were treated by their government. In this respect, one can contrast Beijing’s reaction to the persecution of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia and Vietnam. The Chinese diaspora in Cambodia was treated in a particularly egregious manner, and were subject to mass killings by the Khmer Rouge. Yet the Chinese government did absolutely nothing to protest, let alone alleviate their plight. The reason for China’s decision to

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ignore the ethnic Chinese factor in Sino-Cambodian relations, but to emphasize it in Sino-Vietnamese relations, is geopolitical in nature. Simply put, Phnom Penh was a supportive ally, while Hanoi was seen by Beijing as an emerging threat to its national security. Another issue cited as the cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict concerns bilateral border disputes. Chang Pao-min has posited that land and maritime border disputes were responsible for the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Again, territorial disputes appear to be a symptom rather than the cause of conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations. With respect to the maritime border issue, as early as 1974 Sino-Vietnamese disputes had emerged over the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands. On the issue of the land border issue, according to Beijing, Hanoi allegedly perpetrated more than two thousand border violations from 1975 to 1977. However, only in the later part of 1977 and 1978, when Vietnam moved into closer alignment with Moscow, did the Chinese publicly raise land and maritime border issues as a point of contention in bilateral relations, and openly threaten the Vietnamese. The more recent literature on Sino-Vietnamese relations has emphasized a different sort of explanation that, while also essentially bilateral in nature, focuses on a nonmaterial cause, specifically, ideology. In a recent and influential work on Chinese Cold War era foreign policy that deals with the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, Chen Jian finds realism, with its focus on material factors and the major powers in world politics, to be a less than compelling explanatory tool for analyzing Chinese foreign policy during this period. He notes: “One may refer to the escalating Sino-Soviet confrontation, which made the maintenance of solidarity between Beijing and Hanoi extremely difficult.” Instead, for Chen, frictions in Sino-Vietnamese relations developed primarily as a result of Mao’s pursuit of an ideologically based foreign policy of revolution promotion. These frictions were transformed into a serious source of conflict as a result of the Chinese leadership’s insistence on viewing Sino-Vietnamese relations through the prism of a culturally determined and ethnocentric Central Kingdom–vassal relationship. Chen argues that Chinese leaders’ search for “Vietnamese recognition of China’s morally superior position,” and specifically, “a modern version of the relationship between the Central Kingdom and its subordinate neighbors” set in train a process that led to “the final collapse of the [Sino-Vietnamese] ‘alliance between brotherly comrades.’ ” Two issues merit comment. First, by focusing so heavily on developments on the Chinese side of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship to explain conflict

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in Sino-Vietnamese relations, Chen has arguably minimized the critically important role of the Soviet Union. This is not to discount the tensions in SinoVietnamese relations that Chen describes. Rather, it is both to argue that these tensions would have been kept in check if not for the Soviet Union’s role in Sino-Vietnamese relations, and to emphasize the centrality of the Soviet factor in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Second, and more generally, notwithstanding Chen’s emphasis on ideology as a more solid basis for understanding the dynamics of Chinese Cold War era foreign policy, it is not clear that this is indeed the case. Since Chen’s work is arguably the key text to appear on China’s Cold War foreign relations in the last decade, an extended comment is necessary. Chen contends that a basic change in Beijing’s ideological evaluation of American and Soviet imperialism allowed the Sino-American rapprochement to occur. In this interpretation, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Beijing viewed the Soviet Union as the leading imperialist in world politics and the United States as the number two imperialist. Was the rapprochement caused primarily by developments in the ideational realm? To answer that question, we need to clarify what caused the Chinese to see the Soviets as greater imperialists. Was it the nature of Soviet social-imperialism, or was it something more basic, such as the material threat presented by the Soviet Union—in particular, the Maoist regime’s fear of being overthrown by the Soviets (as will be argued below)? It somewhat weakens Chen’s argument that, by his own admission, the Chinese had viewed the Soviets as imperialists since the early 1960s, when the SinoSoviet split occurred. It was only in August 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Moscow’s subsequent announcement justifying military intervention in other socialist states, that the Chinese denounced the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist state. In other words, only when the Soviet Union became a strategic as opposed to a merely ideological threat did the Chinese communists declare their Soviet counterparts as their number one adversary. A further point concerns Chen’s argument that there was a “deeper” cause for the Sino-American rapprochement. Chen argues the case for the causal role of ideology in explaining the Sino-American rapprochement when he contends that “in terms of the relations between ideology and security concerns, the Sino-American rapprochement was less a case in which ideological beliefs yielded to the security interests than one in which ideology, as an essential element in shaping foreign policy decisions, experienced subtle structural changes as a result of the fading status of Mao’s continuous revolution.” Yet at another point in the analysis it is clear that, for Chen, ideology is important in

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the rapprochement precisely because its role in Chinese domestic and foreign policy has been substantially reduced. Thus Chen Jian argues that: “In a deeper sense, Beijing was able to pursue a rapprochement with Washington because, for the first time in the PRC’s history, Mao’s continuous revolution was losing momentum.” If it was the decline of ideology and the resultant conduct of bilateral relations on the basis of national interest that led to the Sino-American rapprochement, it is not clear how different Chen’s argument is from the basic realist understanding of this development that he sets out to critique.

Principal Enemy Theory The second broad theory explaining conflict in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance emphasizes the critical role played by a “principal enemy,” namely, the Soviet Union. There are three variants of this theory in the literature. Building on Van Ness’ research, Robert Ross utilizes the concept of a principal enemy to explain conflict in this alliance. Ross argues that increasing Chinese concern over Vietnam’s cooperation with the Soviet Union’s policy toward China (from 1975 to 1979) caused the deterioration and finally the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Two points can be made concerning Ross’ account, which since its publication in the 1980s has rightfully served as the authoritative text on Sino-Vietnamese relations in the period 1975–1979. The first relates to the empirical realm. The dependent variable is the transition from cooperation to conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. However, this bilateral relationship was quite conflictual before 1975. Doubts are therefore raised about Ross’ selection of the post1975 period as the start of the study. This is particularly critical given that John Garver has used a variety of Chinese language sources to make the argument that Sino-Vietnamese relations had already deteriorated in the years 1970– 1973, in tandem with Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s. A second issue concerns the fact that although Ross does establish co-variance between his variables, he examines only one time period, 1975–1979, when Chinese concern over Vietnamese cooperation with Soviet policy increases, causing an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. While Ross presents a convincing case for this period, he does not examine what happens when China’s concern for Vietnam’s Soviet policy decreases. Doing so would have strengthened the argument. Accordingly, we will examine in detail China’s relations with the Vietnamese and Soviet communists over six time periods. In five of those time periods Sino-Vietnamese conflict increases, and in one it decreases.

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A second variant of principal enemy theory is offered by Eugene Lawson. Lawson argues that China and Vietnam’s respective policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union were significant in influencing Sino-Vietnamese relations from 1965 to 1975. Ultimately, the Chinese sought rapprochement with the United States and the Vietnamese sought closer ties with the Soviets. This dynamic proved incompatible with an amicable alliance relationship, because the Chinese viewed the Vietnamese as supporting their adversary, the Soviet Union. The key issue with this work is its overemphasis on chronicling Beijing and Hanoi’s respective relations with Moscow and Washington and a corresponding lack of examination of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship itself. The neglect of systematic analysis of this bilateral relationship means that Lawson is unable to convincingly argue his contention that differing SinoVietnamese attitudes toward the U.S. were a particularly important cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. A third variant of principal enemy theory can be seen in Anne Gilks’ analysis of developments in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance from 1970 to 1979. For Gilks, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in the 1970s operated within the broader context of Sino-Vietnamese-Soviet relations, and the tensions that accompanied the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s. According to Gilks, China feared a consolidation of Vietnam’s relations with Beijing’s enemy, the Soviet Union. This generated intensifying security dilemma dynamics in SinoVietnamese relations, particularly when post-1975 frictions began to develop between the Chinese-aligned Cambodia and Vietnam. In this perspective, both Hanoi and Beijing perceived their basic security interests to be incompatible. Hanoi saw control over Cambodia as necessary to guarantee its security. For its part, Beijing perceived a pro-Chinese Cambodia as fundamental to thwarting a Soviet policy that used Vietnam as a tool to encircle China and undermine its security. The analysis that follows is similar to Gilks’ in its identification of incompatible security goals as the key to understanding the disintegration of the SinoVietnamese alliance. That said, there are three important and significant differences. First, this work draws on a wider variety of English and non-English sources, most of which were made available only after Gilks’ book was published in 1992. Second, the time period of this study is selected with a view to providing a more comprehensive account of the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on China’s relations with Vietnam. Gilks’ account focuses on the period from 1970 to 1979. We cover the period from the de facto termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1964 through to the end of the Cold War in 1991. Third, this study

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differs from Gilks’ in terms of its theoretical aims. Gilks’ study is concerned with demonstrating the relevance of the concept of security dilemma to the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangular relationship. This study adopts a broader theoretical agenda in examining the utility of realist and constructivist-based explanations for the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance.

Balance of Threat Theory A final possible explanation for the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance is an influential theory of alliance formation and termination, Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory. Walt argues that states balance not against powerful states, but rather against states that are threatening. Here the level of threat is the primary determinant of alliance formation and dissolution. Walt measures the independent variable, threat level, in a number of ways. In his view, threat is composed of four components: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. The greater a state’s aggregate power, as measured by its population, technical prowess, and industrial and military capability, the greater the potential threat it poses. The closer a state and the more aggressive the perceived intent, the higher the threat level. Geographic proximity is measured in terms of distance. Additionally, the higher the level of offensive power a state possesses, the higher the threat level. Offensive power is measured by the level of a state’s “offensive capabilities.” Aggressive intentions are measured in terms of perceptions of intent. Walt’s dependent variable is alliance formation or dissolution. Balance of threat theory suffers from two major theoretical problems that limit its application to our case. First, it is in many instances indeterminate. Thus, when applied to post-1975 Sino-Vietnamese relations, the theory could be plausibly used to predict that in 1975, because of geographic proximity and offensive power, Vietnam posed a threat to China. Alternatively, at the same time, the theory could also plausibly predict that because of a relative disparity of aggregate power in respect to China, Vietnam did not pose a threat to China. Second, to the extent that balance of threat theory defines threat primarily in terms of intentions, and not material capabilities, it is tautological. Of the four components of threat, in practice, perceptions of intent comprise the critical component in measuring Walt’s independent variable, threat level. As he notes, in the assessment of threats, “perceptions of intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices.” Specifically, in explaining the importance of intentions in alliance termination, Walt notes that “if an alliance

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member becomes increasingly aggressive, then the alliance itself is less likely to endure.”An application of Walt’s theory to the Sino-Vietnamese alliance will illuminate this point. When applying this theory to the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, balance of threat theorists would presumably argue that the high level of threatening intent that Hanoi and Beijing perceived from each other in the period 1975–1978 led to the collapse of the alliance. Yet mutual perceptions of a high threat level from alliance partners represent the collapse of an alliance. Hence the tautological nature of the theory, when intentions are emphasized in applying the theory.

THE ARGUMENT This book adopts a realist-based theoretical approach in advancing the argument that to fully appreciate the basic dynamics driving China’s policy toward Vietnam, we have to look beyond the Sino-Vietnamese relationship and examine wider developments in the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Vietnamese relationships. After the effective termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s, the baseline for Sino-Soviet relations was conflictual. In analyzing the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangle, a number of variables suggest themselves (see fig. 1.1 for diagram). For our purposes, Sino-Soviet

Soviet-Vietnamese Co-operation Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (IV) (DV) X Sino-Soviet Conflict (AC) Period: 1964–68, 1968–1972, 1973–75, 1975–79, 1980–85 Soviet-Vietnamese Co-operation Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (IV) (DV) X Sino-Soviet Conflict (AC) Period: 1986–1991 Note: AC = Antecedent Condition; IV = Independent Variable; DV = Dependent Variable. figure . The Dynamics of the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Triangle

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conflict is the critical antecedent condition. The independent variable is Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. The dependent variable is the direction of conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Two subhypotheses (H1a, H1b) capture the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangle. Restated as Hypotheses: H1a: Given the antecedent condition of increasing conflict in Sino-Soviet relations, if there is an increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, then this will cause an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. H1b: Given the antecedent condition of decreasing conflict in Sino-Soviet relations, if there is a decrease in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, then this will cause a decrease in Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

The counterhypothesis (H2) is that Chinese foreign policy was driven primarily by bilateral dynamics. While there are a number of variants for the bilateral thesis, these have previously been convincingly countered by Robert Ross. I will therefore test the hypothesis that the source of increased conflict in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance lay in Vietnam’s attempt, contrary to China’s wishes, to consolidate its influence over its immediate periphery (Cambodia and Laos). This hypothesis serves as the central thesis for the work of a number of specialists who have written on Sino-Vietnamese relations in the English language literature, but it has not been systematically evaluated. Selection of this hypothesis is also appropriate because official Chinese and Vietnamese accounts of the conflict, while acknowledging the role of the Soviet Union in the SinoVietnamese conflict, still emphasize this issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Restated as Hypotheses: H2a: If Vietnam attempts to increase its control over the states in its immediate periphery, then there will be an increase in conflict in SinoVietnamese relations. H2b: If Vietnam attempts to decrease its control over the states in its immediate periphery, then there will be a decrease in conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations.

METHODOLOGY This book adopts a case-study analysis of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. A conscious attempt is made to ensure that the research design is not indeter-

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minate. First, to ensure that there are more observations than inferences, the number of observations within this study is increased by dividing the study into six time periods. The bulk of this analysis is concerned with analyzing four periods: 1964–1968, 1968–1973, 1973–1975, and 1975–1979. We will also briefly examine two others (1980–1985 and 1986–1991) in a short section in the conclusion. Second, the number of independent variables used to explain the Sino-Vietnamese conflict is reduced to two. In the narrative chapters of this book, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict is analyzed in terms of whether the basic cause lay in specific issues in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, or was a consequence of wider developments relating to the Sino-Soviet relationship and Soviet-Vietnamese relations. We will undertake a detailed process-tracing examination of the evolution of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance from the period of cooperation, beginning in 1964, through the escalating conflict in the 1975–1979 period. Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Third Indochina War and the period through the end of the Cold War will also be examined in a section in the concluding chapter. This is done to increase our confidence in the causal relationship that has been identified. It should be noted that this study is a crucial case study. A significant strand in the literature on the Sino-Vietnamese conflict locates its causes as lying within the bilateral Sino-Vietnamese relationship itself (where the Soviet Union does not play the central role). Thus, explanations for Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the literature focus on essentially bilateral issues ranging from territorial disputes to disagreements in the cultural or ideological realm. If it can be convincingly argued that the cause of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was not these issues, but reflected the critical role of the Soviet Union and more specifically, an increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, then the explanation offered here would have passed a hard test. Embarking on a single-case study does raise some issues that need to be highlighted. The theory developed will still have to be tested against China’s behavior in its other Cold War alliances. Additionally, since I do not read either Russian or Vietnamese, I have had to rely on English-language sources when analyzing Vietnamese and Soviet foreign policy. That said, a major contribution of the book is the extensive use of secondary (and to a lesser extent) primary Chinese language materials that have become available since the early 1990s. These materials were obtained during a teaching and research stint at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing, and were supplemented by sources acquired on a research trip to the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

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Some comment on the sources is relevant at this point. An important resource has been a two-volume study of Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War that was published in 2001. It provides a comprehensive and focused account of the interactions between the Chinese and the Soviet leadership. Another source, a restricted-access book published in 1992, covers the evolution of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance from 1950 to the end of the Cold War. I have also made use of a collection of selected speeches and articles on SinoVietnamese relations from the 1949 through to the mid-1980s. These volumes are designated “for internal circulation only,” and provide a comprehensive overview of the relationship. Also valuable is a volume produced by the Cold War International History Project that contains translated conversations between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders. Additionally, I have used a three-volume history of Chinese foreign relations from 1949 to 1978 that was published by the Chinese foreign ministry between the years 1994 and 1999. Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet relations are covered extensively in this collection. With respect to primary accounts of events, the writings of Chinese officials Wu Xiuquan and Wu Lengxi have been useful in reconstructing events during the 1960s. With respect to primary documents, these are necessarily much more limited. At appropriate junctures, I have drawn on conversations involving senior Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai that were published in the 1990s. The use of the above-mentioned Chinese language publications will, I believe, allow for a more detailed and nuanced understanding of Chinese foreign policy as it was enacted during the Cold War.

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2 BREAKING THE RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT Sino-Soviet Alliance Termination and the Chinese Communists’ Vietnam Policy, 1964–1968

The escal ating Sino-S oviet conflict  that followed S oviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 was a critical development in the Cold War. It marked the beginning of an extended period in which China and the Soviet Union actively participated in a rivalry for influence within and without the communist world. Perhaps the most significant consequence of this rivalry was the de facto termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance, a development that altered global and regional power relations. Not least among the effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict was its impact on Beijing and Moscow’s relations with the Vietnamese communists during the Vietnam War. This chapter investigates the dynamics of trilateral relations during the period from October 1964 to May 1968. We open with a review of two key developments preceding Zhou Enlai’s November 1964 trip to Moscow: the fall of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and China’s successful test of an atomic bomb. Following a discussion of the trip itself, the subsequent escalation of Sino-Soviet conflict is examined. The Chinese sought to prevent North Vietnam from becoming another component in a ring of American and Soviet encirclement on China’s periphery. For their part, the leaders in the Kremlin felt compelled to make up on ground lost to Beijing in North Vietnam during the

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BREAKING THE RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT

latter years of Khrushchev’s term of leadership. As the war between Hanoi and Washington escalated, the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese communists increasingly cooperated in the areas of economics, diplomacy, and military strategy. Chinese dissatisfaction with close Soviet-Vietnamese relations spilled over into Sino-Vietnamese relations, and an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict occurred. In addition to tracing out the above-mentioned explanation for trilateral relations, this chapter will also examine an alternative explanation for conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations during the 1964–1968 period that focuses on the role of the Laos.

SETTING THE STAGE: KHRUSHCHEV’S FALL AND CHINA’S ATOMIC TEST The United States’ assumption of a more active military role in Vietnam put the spotlight on the communist camp. The Chinese had just gone through a bitter rhetorical dispute with the Soviets, issuing a string of nine polemics between 6 September 1963 and 14 July 1964. The American intervention in Vietnam, far from serving as a stimulus for greater Sino-Soviet cooperation, galvanized Beijing and Moscow to compete for Hanoi’s loyalty. Two events occurred that set the stage for an escalation of Sino-Soviet conflict during Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s November 1964 trip to Moscow. The first was the fall of Khrushchev on 14 October 1964 and the subsequent ascension of a new Soviet leadership that, while differing on the likelihood of success, was open to exploring the idea of more positive relations with China. The second was the successful Chinese test of an atomic weapon on 16 October. There is disagreement in the literature on the role of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Khrushchev’s fall. In an extensive study of Soviet domestic and foreign policy written during the Cold War, Adam Ulam observed that although domestic political factors were cited by Khrushchev’s successors as responsible for his fall, foreign policy failures, including his China policy, probably received some consideration in the decision to replace the Soviet leader. A 1991 study that makes use of Russian sources, including some memoirs of Soviet officials involved in the plot to overthrow Khrushchev, reaches a similar conclusion. In contrast, more recent scholarship, utilizing original documents from a critical 13 October Presidium meeting, argues that while there was some criticism of Khrushchev’s China policy, it was not explicitly mentioned as a reason for his ouster. Whatever the specific reasons for Khrushchev’s fall, and the role of the China issue in it, the Soviet leader’s ousting provided an opportunity to review

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the Sino-Soviet relationship. On this issue there is evidence to suggest that opinion in Moscow varied. Some members of the Soviet leadership, such as Yurii Andropov, the head of the Communist Party liaison department, were skeptical about improving relations. Others were initially interested in at least a limited rapprochement with Beijing. Thus the chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Aleksei Kosygin, refused to accept the inevitability of a SinoSoviet split. He noted: “We are communists and they are communists. It is hard to believe we will not be able to reach an agreement if we meet face to face.” Others, such as First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, did not take an immediate stance. The Chinese leadership under Mao had a radically different perspective on bilateral relations. At this point in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union sought one of two absolutist aims: (1) a total Soviet surrender in the Sino-Soviet dispute, or, failing that, (2) a termination of the relationship between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties. Not to put too fine a point on it, by 1964 Mao wanted leadership of the communist bloc. If he could not achieve that objective, he would proceed to wreck the Sino-Soviet relationship. In this respect, Mao’s perspective is consistent with the idea that state leaders view the control of institutions as a power resource. Chinese sources that were released in the 1990s allow us to reconstruct Beijing’s response to Khrushchev’s fall in greater detail. On the night of 14 October, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Stepan Chervonenko, contacted the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party (dangzhongyang bangongting). Yang Shangkun, director of the Sino-Soviet department, instructed Wu Xiuquan, a Soviet expert and Russian-language speaker then serving as deputy director of the international liaison department, to meet the Soviet ambassador. Ambassador Chervonenko informed Wu that a triumvirate consisting of Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksei Kosygin, and Nikolai Pordgorny had taken over from Khrushchev. From 15 October through 4 November, high-level Chinese meetings were convened daily to discuss the appropriate Chinese response to Khrushchev’s fall, which was described by one of the participants in these discussions as an “earth-shaking” event. While we do not know the specific date on which Mao summed up the discussion, we know that he did so by saying that there were three possible trajectories for the Soviet leadership to take. The first was that the Soviets had changed from revisionists to Marxist-Leninists. In Mao’s view, this was unlikely. Second, the Soviets could now become worse than Khrushchev. This was also deemed unlikely. According to Mao, Sino-Soviet relations were already so

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bad that it was difficult to envision a further deterioration. Mao noted that the Soviet Union had already declared its intention of convening a conference of communist states in December 1964 to expel China from the socialist camp. Mao also considered as unlikely a number of other Soviet actions: the termination of state-to-state relations between the Soviet Union and China, the abolition of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, or a war between the two states. According to Mao, a worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, while not impossible (bushi meiyou keneng), was not likely at the present point in time (zai muqian qingkuangxia, zhezhong kenengxing biijiao xiao). The third possibility comprised a middle course of action. Here the Soviets would take the revisionist road, but in terms of practice and tactics, there might be some changes. Of the three, Mao felt that the third possibility was the most likely. To size up the new Soviet leadership, Mao proposed that Chinese premier Zhou Enlai lead a delegation to Moscow for the forty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution. On 28 October Zhou formally proposed Mao’s idea to Chervonenko. The Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was enthusiastic about a Chinese visit, which was interpreted as “a show of support for the post-Khrushchev leadership” and a way “to use Khrushchev as a scapegoat for past conflicts.” Subsequently, on 31 October, Chervonenko was given instructions to extend an official invitation to the CCP. As these events unfolded, a significant development occurred in China’s strategic nuclear weapons program. On 16 October 1964 the Chinese successfully tested an atomic weapon. The test heralded the rise of a more confident China, willing to compete with its former alliance partner not just in the ideological realm but also in the military sphere. The acquisition of nuclear capabilities was a long-standing interest of Mao’s. In April 1956, just two months after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Mao had reaffirmed a January 1955 decision to develop a nuclear weapons program, pointing out that “if we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb.” Mao’s concerns were both confirmed and heightened by the signing, on 25 July 1963, of the Limited Test Ban Treaty by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Were the Chinese to accept the terms of the treaty, China’s quest for nuclear capabilities would have been effectively stymied. According to Wu Xiuquan, deputy director of the international liaison department of the CCP, the Chinese clearly perceived this to be the intent of the treaty. The Chinese perception of hostile intent on the part of the treaty’s signatories made a successful nuclear test, which occurred on 16 October 1964, a

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strategic necessity. Nuclear weapons were the offensive component of Chinese defense policy, while the development of a Third Front, or Third Line (san xian), was the defensive component. The Third Front was approved by Mao on 12 August 1964, just days after the alleged Gulf of Tonkin incident. The development of a Chinese nuclear capability had little pacifying effect on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Indeed, nuclear weapons were a divisive issue, both while China and the Soviet Union were allies and after the Sino-Soviet split. Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua has emphasized disputes over the transfer of nuclear technology as the most important cause of the split. A retired Soviet intelligence officer, Victor Gobarev, argues that “one of the principal causes of the [Sino-Soviet] split was China’s insistence on pursuing their nuclear weapons program at any cost.” Moreover, Moscow became progressively nervous about what a nuclear-armed China might do with such a capability. According to Mikhail Kapitsa, a former Soviet deputy foreign minister, Mao’s seemingly blasé attitude to possible American use of nuclear weapons against China as a result of Beijing’s initiation of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 greatly disturbed Moscow. Kapitsa reports that the Soviets viewed Mao as someone who was “too irresponsible for the possession of the ultimate weapon.” This conclusion led Moscow to terminate its 15 October 1957 nuclear technology–sharing agreement in June 1959. Indeed, China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons after the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance appears to have given decision-makers in Beijing greater confidence that they could engage in provocations at the conventional level. A Chinese study of the Sino-Soviet Cold War relationship has pointed out that the state of Sino-Soviet border relations during the Cold War reflected general trends in the overall Sino-Soviet relationship. The study noted that as SinoSoviet relations deteriorated, the number of border clashes increased accordingly, from 1,000 in the January 1960–October 1964 period to 4,189 during October 1964–March 1969. Beijing initiated the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict even though both sides were confirmed nuclear states.

Zhou’s Moscow Trip From 5 to 13 November, Zhou Enlai, accompanied by Marshal He Long, Kang Sheng, and Wu Xiuquan, visited Moscow with a delegation of between fifty and sixty members. The Chinese chose to send representatives who had not played a particularly divisive role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Foreign Minister Chen Yi therefore did not make the trip. That said, in a not-too-subtle mes-

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sage to the Soviets on the day Zhou arrived in Moscow, pictures of the 16 October Chinese atomic bomb detonation were printed in the People’s Daily and other Chinese newspapers. The Soviets duly noted this hint. The visit began on a bad note. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s speech on 6 November reiterated Moscow’s peaceful coexistence policy toward the West, endorsed the 1963 partial test-ban treaty, and listed Yugoslavia as a socialist country. Worse was to come. According to the Chinese, on 7 November, at a reception in the Kremlin, Soviet defense minister General Rodion Malinovskii told He Long, “We have already gotten rid of Khrushchev; you ought to follow our example and get rid of Mao Zedong. That way we will get along better.” He immediately reported this to Zhou Enlai, who protested to Brezhnev. In a meeting with Zhou on 11 November, Anastas Mikoyan made clear that there was no difference of opinion between the new leadership and Khrushchev on the question of the basic causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute. During talks between the two sides the Soviets requested a cessation of public denunciations, if only for a short while. To this the Chinese replied that since the new Soviet leadership was steadfastly continuing the Khrushchev line, it would not be possible for the Chinese to halt their criticisms. The Soviet leadership’s call on 9 November for an improvement of state-to-state relations was thus a dead letter from the start. The Chinese team arrived back in Beijing on 14 November and was greeted by the Chinese leadership at the airport. On 21 November 1964 the Chinese published a lengthy editorial in the Red Flag discussing Khrushchev’s shortcomings. It predicted rocky Sino-Soviet relations. The editorial stated: Khrushchev has fallen and the revisionist line he enthusiastically pursued is discredited. . . . Nevertheless, the course of history will continue to be torturous. Although Khrushchev has fallen, his supporters—the U.S. imperialists, the reactionaries and the modern revisionists—will not resign themselves to this failure. These hobgoblins are continuing to pray for Khrushchev and are trying to “resurrect” him with their incantations, vociferously proclaiming his “contributions” and “meritorious deeds” in the hope that events will develop along the lines prescribed by Khrushchev, so that “Khrushchevism without Khrushchev” may prevail. It can be asserted categorically that theirs is a blind alley.

From the Chinese perspective, the real significance of Khrushchev’s fall lay in the ascension of a new leadership (practicing “Khrushchevism without

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Khrushchev”) that was not prepared to change any of his fundamental policies. While none of the new Soviet leaders were specifically singled out for castigation, thus suggesting some moderation on the Chinese side, the stage was set for an escalation of conflict. Broader developments in world politics, specifically the escalation of war in Vietnam, provided an additional venue for China and the Soviet Union to pursue their burgeoning conflict.

Kosygin’s Visits to Beijing in February 1965 Even as the United States stepped up preparations for the introduction of significant numbers of troops into South Vietnam, the Chinese and Soviets were unable to put aside their differences. In early February 1965 Kosygin, in his capacity as chairman of the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministers, made two trips to Beijing. The purpose of the visits was to sound the Chinese leadership out on three issues: coordination of aid to the Vietnamese communists via the concept of “United Action,” an agreement to limit Sino-Soviet polemics, and Chinese participation in a conference of communist parties. Kosygin succeeded partially on the first objective, but failed in the other two. In his first visit, on 5–6 February, Kosygin made a stopover visit in Beijing en route to Hanoi. There he met Zhou Enlai. On 5 February Zhou told Kosygin that he had previously issued a warning to the Soviets to discard Khrushchevism so that both sides could find some common ground. However, Zhou added, the Soviets had decided to carry out Khrushchev’s idea of convening an international conference of socialist states. In Zhou’s view this would inevitably mean a complete rupture in party-to-party relations. On 6 February Zhou reiterated his request that the Soviets not convene an international conference of socialist states. On the same day, on his way to the Beijing international airport, a member of the Soviet delegation, Yurii Andropov, told Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi that in a concession to Chinese sensitivities, the Soviets had compromised on the content as well as the date of the upcoming conference. Chen Yi replied that Chinese participation in this conference would amount to capitulation (touxiang). On his way back to Moscow, Kosygin stopped over in Beijing, on 10–11 February. In a meeting with Mao the Soviet leader specifically asked for a cessation of polemics. Mao rejected this request in a provocative manner. Mao responded bluntly, saying, “As for the proposal to halt open polemics, we are opposed. Heaven knows when there can be a cessation!” He added that “anything less than ten thousand years of open polemics is not acceptable.”

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Moving on to the issue of Zhou’s warning to the Soviets not to hold an international conference of communist parties, Mao taunted Kosygin by encouraging the Soviets to go ahead with the conference, saying that the Chinese fully approved. Mao also reportedly asked Kosygin whether any future attack by a third party on China would be treated by the Soviets as an attack on the Soviet Union. Kosygin did not reply. Mao understood that an affirmative answer would mean a substantive restoration of the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, which because of the Sino-Soviet conflict of the early 1960s had effectively ended. An agreement to coordinate the transportation of Soviet aid by land to North Vietnam was the only tangible positive result of Kosygin’s trip. Mao was fully aware that to totally obstruct the passage of Soviet aid through China would inflict severe damage to the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Accordingly, he agreed to allow the transport of Soviet economic and military aid by train through China. However, the Chinese leader rejected a Soviet request for an air corridor for the transit of supplies to North Vietnam. On 30 March 1965 the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement whereby Soviet economic and military aid could be transported by land through China to North Vietnam. This was the main avenue for the flow of Soviet supplies into Vietnam. The simultaneous acceptance of a rail corridor and rejection of an air corridor suggests that Beijing was at once interested in controlling the supply of Soviet shipments to Vietnam and minimizing the opportunities for Soviet espionage. The Chinese were intent on making no other concessions. Mao refused to countenance coordinated “United Action” between China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Simply put, Mao viewed the Soviets as an ideological and potential strategic threat to China with whom fundamental compromise was not possible. Documents released in 1996 show that Mao carefully edited statements that appeared in the Renmin ribao and other newspapers opposing the Soviet Union’s convening of an international conference of communist states on the Vietnam War. The Soviets then made a number of public proposals that had already been rejected in meetings with the Chinese. On 3 April the Soviets sent a letter to Beijing requesting that a conference be convened with their North Vietnamese counterparts. The Soviets’ avowed purpose was to discuss trilateral cooperation between Hanoi, Beijing, and Moscow. A fortnight later, Moscow made a specific request for Chinese cooperation in assisting Hanoi’s war effort. The Soviet requests were the following: (1) transit of 4,000 Soviet troops through China; (2) use of airfields in China to allow Soviet planes to defend North Vietnam; and (3) access to a corridor in China’s air

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space. In a letter drafted on 10 July and personally approved by Mao on 11 July, the Chinese rejected the Soviet requests and accused Moscow of using this issue to exert control over China. Cooperation was to be on Chinese terms. To drive home the point, on 11 November 1965, the Chinese published an extensive commentary criticizing the Soviet Union’s United Action proposals. The Chinese cited Soviet collusion with the Americans to dominate the world as the basis for rejecting these proposals. Throughout the entire period of the transport of Soviet equipment, squabbling occurred over claims of Chinese looting and obstruction of these shipments.

INCREASING COOPERATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND HANOI The increasing Sino-Soviet conflict outlined above had a significant impact on Soviet-Vietnamese relations. It caused the new Soviet leadership to take a more nuanced and effective approach to undermining Chinese influence in North Vietnam. Rather than making the Vietnamese choose between Beijing and Moscow (as Khrushchev did), the new Soviet leadership worked to increase cooperation with their Vietnamese counterparts. Given the urgent requirement for assistance in the face of a rising American threat, this change in Soviet policy was welcomed by Hanoi. There was a dramatic and sustained increase of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in the areas of Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military aid to North Vietnam. Khrushchev’s basic approach toward the Vietnamese communists’ from 1962 to his fall in October 1964 was to insist that Hanoi take a firm stand on the side of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Ilya Gaiduk nicely sums up Khrushchev’s approach to Vietnam: As the Sino-Soviet dispute sharpened, Khrushchev increasingly viewed the outside world through the lens of his quarrel with Mao Zedong. A follower of the traditions of the Bolsheviks, he categorized other communist leaders according to their readiness to align with either Moscow or Beijing, and the ambiguous and ambivalent position of the North Vietnamese communists in the Sino-Soviet dispute accordingly led to Khrushchev’s growing suspicion about their real intentions. He regarded with disdain Ho Chi Minh’s efforts to find a compromise and openly derided them. Khrushchev had a “litmus test of loyalty” for North Vietnam as well as for other countries: “If the DRV could not be counted as an ally against China, then the relationship should be downgraded.”

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Rather than insisting, as Khrushchev did, on Vietnamese fealty in the SinoSoviet dispute, the new Soviet leadership pulled back from overtly pressuring the Vietnamese to choose sides, even while increasing assistance to Hanoi. The Soviets deftly exploited Chinese intransigence. Their United Action proposals were clearly designed to put Beijing in the position of rejecting cooperation, thus appearing as an impediment to Hanoi’s war efforts. This “aid as a wedge” strategy proved to be a much more effective way of increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict. In November and December 1964, at two meetings of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, there was a discussion of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. While we do not know the specific contents of the discussions, we do know that a more active Soviet policy emerged soon after in the form of Kosygin’s February 1965 visit to Hanoi, and the establishment of a de facto Soviet-Vietnamese alliance relationship. A harbinger of this more active policy toward the Vietnamese communists came on 24 December 1964, when the Soviet Union invited the North Vietnamese–backed National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam (otherwise known as the Viet Cong) to open up a permanent mission in Moscow. This move restored some symmetry to the Soviet relationship with the Vietnamese communists and their affiliates in the South. Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese had recognized the NLF immediately after its establishment in December 1960. Soviet-Vietnamese relations received a boost with the visit of Soviet premier Kosygin on 6–10 February 1965. On two counts it was a watershed event in Soviet-Vietnamese relations. First, events during and immediately after his trip signaled the expansion of military conflict in Vietnam. Kosygin’s visit coincided with a 7 February National Liberation Front raid on a U.S. Air base at Pleiku in which 8 Americans were killed and 120 were wounded. Also on 7 February, American national security advisor McGeorge Bundy, who was in South Vietnam during the Pleiku attack, was in the process of outlining “a program of measured and limited air action” against North Vietnam called Operation Rolling Thunder. The NLF raids provided the basis for American and South Vietnamese retaliatory attacks on territory north of the seventeenth parallel, which divided Vietnam. Vietnamese communist counterattacks took place. Second, the visit resulted in a new level of Soviet interest and commitment to North Vietnam. Kosygin was accompanied by Yurii Andropov, who oversaw relations with other communist parties. Also present in the Soviet delegation was Vasilii Kuznetsov, first deputy foreign minister and former ambassador to China. Three top military officials were present: Konstantin Vershinin,

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commander in chief of the Soviet air forces and deputy minister of Defense; Colonel-General Evgenii Loginov, minister of civil aviation; and ColonelGeneral Grigorii Sidorovich, deputy chairman of the state committee of the Council of Ministers for foreign economic relations, whose responsibilities included foreign aid issues. Kosygin’s entourage also included a team of Soviet missile experts. A missile agreement was subsequently concluded during North Vietnamese leader Le Duan’s mid-April 1965 trip to Moscow. The official agenda dealt with Soviet military and economic aid to Hanoi, as well as the Sino-Soviet dispute. On 10 February Kosygin and North Vietnamese prime minister Pham Van Dong agreed to a nine-point communiqué that stated, among other things, that the Soviet Union could “not remain indifferent to ensuring the security of a fraternal socialist country” and would give the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) “necessary aid and support.” In a clear reference to Beijing, both sides also declared in the communiqué that “the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement is an imperative condition for the victory of the working class in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.” Following the onset of American bombing operations in Operation Rolling Thunder on 2 March and the first large-scale introduction of American troops in South Vietnam in Danang on 8 March, the joint communiqué was approved by the CPSU Central Committee on 26 March 1965. It was regarded by the Soviets as a serious military commitment to Hanoi. In July 1965 Hanoi and Moscow signed an agreement to boost economic and military ties. There was a further increase in cooperation following Kosygin’s trip. For the Vietnamese communists, the necessities of the growing conflict with the Americans made acceptance of Soviet assistance essential. The type of aid offered by the Chinese was ill-suited for the Vietnamese communists’ operational requirements. Hanoi was interested in adopting a more aggressive strategy against the Americans that at once relied on more advanced and heavy military technology, and de-emphasized the Chinese-style “people’s war” approach, which relied on light arms. The Soviets responded positively to these requests, a point reaffirmed by recently released documents from the Russian archives. For its part, following the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow was keen to capitalize on this opportunity to increase cooperation with the Vietnamese communists. Clearly there was an imperative for Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation on both sides. A progressive and sustained increase in Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to the Vietnamese communists occurred from April 1965 through the summer of 1968 and beyond.

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Moscow’s United Action Proposals and Aid to Hanoi In the first half of 1965 the Soviets made a number of attempts to mobilize socialist states to hold various meetings and issue statements designed to highlight solidarity with their Vietnamese comrades. These attempts were invariably opposed by the Chinese. As indicated above, Kosygin tried on two separate stopovers in Beijing in early February 1965, both before and after a trip to Hanoi, to obtain a joint Sino-Soviet agreement to assist the Vietnamese communists. Upon Kosygin’s return to Moscow, on 16 February, the Soviets issued a proposal to convene an international conference on the situation in Vietnam. Interestingly, the Chinese switched their positions on the idea of an international conference once the Soviets expressed support for it. As late as 13 February the Chinese were pushing for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Vietnam. On 18 February, two days after the Soviet proposal, Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi expressed categorical opposition to the idea of negotiations as a means of resolving the conflict. On 1 March the Soviets convened a consultative meeting attended by nineteen communist parties, which the Chinese opposed. (The Vietnamese communists did not attend.) A communiqué released by the participants in a meeting on 10 March urged unity and support for the Vietnamese communists. This document also called for preparations for an international conference of communist parties at a “suitable time.” On 3 April a Soviet proposal for a trilateral Sino–Soviet–North Vietnamese meeting to discuss cooperation was turned down by Beijing, a point later publicly noted by the Vietnamese. A fortnight later, Soviet proposals for joint action on activities such as the airlifting of supplies to Vietnam were rejected. A shift occurred in Hanoi’s stance toward Moscow during this period. On 10 April 1965 Le Duan and General Vo Nguyen Giap, while on a visit to Moscow, endorsed the Soviet proposal for a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese conference to coordinate weapons shipments to Hanoi. The Soviet Union viewed its closer relations with the Vietnamese communists with some satisfaction. At a meeting on 19 April in honor of a visiting delegation from Mongolia, Premier Kosygin noted that Soviet-Vietnamese negotiations had “brought about positive results and helped to work out coordinated positions on the problems of forms and means of the struggle against the aggressive policy of American imperialism, of further strengthening the defensive capacity of the socialist Vietnam as well as of a settlement of the problems of Indochina on the basis of the Geneva accords.” Newly released documents from the Soviet embassy in Hanoi testify to Soviet satisfaction at changes in the Vietnamese communists’ posture toward

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the Soviet Union, a change the Soviets attributed to increases in the quality and quantity of Soviet aid to their Vietnamese counterparts. Thus, on 9 July 1966, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Hanoi noted that “the great and constantly increasing aid of the Soviet Union has contributed to changes in the attitude of the DRV.” In this respect, the Soviets were generous with their economic and military aid. One clear turning point was the spike in aid once the Soviets decided to compete with the Chinese over the Vietnamese communists. While the figures quoted below are estimates and need to be treated with caution, they provide a broad idea of Soviet aid to the Vietnamese communists. According to figures calculated by Douglas Pike, from 1960 to 1964, before the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in North Vietnam, Moscow gave an estimated total of $400 million. This increased to an estimated $2.3–2.8 billion in the 1965–1968 period. This aid can be broken down into economic and military components. From 1965 to 1968 total Soviet economic aid ranged from approximately $918 to 988 million. Soviet military aid to Vietnam surpassed its economic aid. In the period from 1965 to 1968, Hanoi was more interested in military aid. American intelligence detected its first evidence of Soviet equipment being used in the summer of 1965. In the period from 1960 to 1964, Pike estimates total Soviet military aid to North Vietnam as somewhere in the range of $125–190 million. For the period from 1965 to 1968, total Soviet military aid to Hanoi lay in the range of $1.4–1.8 billion. By 1966, Moscow was providing Hanoi with the bulk of its military aid. In 1968 the military component of Moscow’s aid to Hanoi’s total foreign military aid receipts amounted to two-thirds of the total and was worth $392 million. Also, Soviet specialists advised the Vietnamese on the use of military equipment. The Central Intelligence Agency estimated in September 1965 that between 1,500 and 2,500 Soviet military specialists were based in North Vietnam. The agency posited that the majority of the Soviet personnel were either pilots or experts in the use of surface-to-air missiles. Additionally, Vietnamese were sent to the Soviet Union for military training. Estimates put the number of Vietnamese officers undergoing training in Soviet military colleges in the thousands. Some of these officers were sent to South Vietnam upon completion of their Soviet training stint, a fact Moscow was aware of. It is important to note the significance of the changing role of the Soviet Union as a military benefactor to the North Vietnamese. Although the Soviets had been supplying the Vietnamese military assistance since 1953, the total amounts were relatively small. The Chinese had been the predominant supplier of military aid to the Vietnamese. This state of affairs had its roots in Liu

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Shaoqi’s 1949 visit to Moscow. Shi Zhe, a translator for Liu, has recounted a 27 July 1949 meeting in Moscow between Stalin and Liu where the Soviet leader asked the Chinese to take charge of the promotion of revolutionary activities in Asia while the Soviets assumed responsibility for the promotion of revolution in the West. Vietnam was deemed by Stalin to be in China’s sphere of influence. By 1965 the situation had changed drastically. The Sino-Soviet conflict had a clear impact on China’s relationship with Vietnam. While the Vietnamese resisted Soviet pressure to publicly refute anti-Soviet rhetoric on the part of the Chinese, a line had been crossed: no longer did China have a free hand in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. They would now have to compete with the Soviets.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS The expanding cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi was closely monitored by the Chinese leadership. Beijing’s response was twofold. First, to compete with the Soviets, the Chinese increased cooperation with Vietnam. The Chinese provided large amounts of invaluable economic and military assistance to Hanoi. The threat of a massive Chinese military intervention also served as a deterrent to an American ground invasion of North Vietnam. By Hanoi’s own admission, Chinese aid played a critical contribution toward the Vietnamese communists’ eventual success in subduing the South. The second Chinese response to Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation was demonstrated in the increasing Chinese anxieties about the growing Soviet influence in Vietnam delineated above. This led to a steady increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Thus, Chen Jian notes that by 1966 “sharp differences had emerged . . . between Beijing and Hanoi as the result of Hanoi’s improving relations with Moscow.”

Chinese Assistance to the Vietnamese Communists Chinese aid to the Vietnamese communists took two forms: (1) material aid (as shown in tables 2.1 and 2.2), and (2) the deterrent threat of massive intervention. Chinese aid to North Vietnam was channeled through two committees that were established to coordinate China’s Vietnam policy. The Leading Group on Vietnamese Affairs was a seven-person body that was charged with the implementation of Chinese policy toward Vietnam. Until his purge in December 1965, General Luo Ruiqing was the head of this committee. Thereafter Li Xiannian was in charge of the group. Assisting the Leading Group was the Group in Charge of Supporting Vietnam. Deputy chief of staff of

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the People’s Liberation Army General Yang Chengwu was in charge of the group, with General Li Tianyou acting as his deputy. Both Yang and Li were also in the Leading Group. In early April 1965, while en route to Moscow, Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap visited Beijing with a request for assistance. In a meeting with Liu Shaoqi on 8 April, a request was made by the Vietnamese for Chinese pilots, troops, and combat engineers. The Chinese leader responded positively to the Vietnamese request. Acting on Mao’s instructions, Liu told the Vietnamese: “It is our policy that we will do our best to support you. We will offer whatever you are in need of and we are in a position to offer.” The official Chinese Foreign Ministry account of this period records that from 1964 to 1969, China’s total aid to North Vietnam rose to $180 million. During their approximately four-year stint in North Vietnam, Chinese estimates indicate that PLA personnel operating anti-aircraft weapons shot down 1,707 airplanes, damaged 1,608 planes, and captured 42 American pilots. More than 1,100 Chinese soldiers died and 4,300 were wounded in Vietnam. Chinese records indicate that between August 1964 and November 1968, 383 sorties of American warplanes flying in 155 groups violated Chinese airspace. The Chinese responded by flying 2,138 sorties. Throughout the Vietnam War the Chinese Air Force was not directly engaged in combat in North Vietnam, although there where instances where Chinese aircraft engaged in hot pursuit into North Vietnam. table 2.1. China’s Military Aid to North Vietnam, 1964–1968

Guns Artillery pieces

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

80,500

220,767

141,531

146,600

219,899

1,250

4,439

3,362

3,984

7,087

25,240

114,010

178,120

147,000

247,920

Artillery shells (in thounsands)

335

1,800

1,066

1,363

2,082

Radio transmitters

426

2,779

1,568

2,464

1,854

Bullets (in thousands)

2,941

9,502

2,235

2,289

3,313

Tanks

16

—

—

26

18

Ships

—

7

14

25

18

Aircraft

18

2

—

70

—

Vehicles

25

114

96

435

454

Uniforms (in thounsands)

—

—

400

800

1,000

Telephones

Source: Li Ke and Hao Shenzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), 416.

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table 2.2. China’s Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1965–1975 Item Remittances Food Cotton Cotton yarn Cotton cloth Cotton blankets Chemical fertilizer

Total amount $254,620,000 24,366,000 tons 26,000 tons 30,600 tons 75,000,000 meters 1,900,000 meters 70,600 tons

Steel

185,100 tons

Coal

100,000 tons

Asphalt

40,000 tons

Natural oils

41,000 tons

Paper

95,500 tons

Automobiles Boats

4,200 units 334 units

Tractors

2,430 units

Construction machines

1,238 units

Railway cars Railway passenger carriages Bicycles

107 units 2,200 units 477,000 units

Source: Shi Lin, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingjijhezuo (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), 58.

Chinese deterrence of the expansion of an American ground offensive into North Vietnam was another tangible and invaluable form of assistance to Hanoi. The Sino-American relationship during the Vietnam War met the requirements of a pure deterrence situation. Chinese officials made determined efforts to send out deterrent messages to the Americans. In response to events in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, the Chinese promised increased assistance to Hanoi. On 6 August 1964 the Chinese government declared, “America’s aggression against the DRV is also aggression against China, and China will never fail to come to the aid of the Vietnamese.” To bolster the deterrent threat of Chinese intervention in the Vietnam conflict, Beijing signed a military assistance agreement with Hanoi in December 1964. The agreement called for Beijing to send infantry and artillery personnel from the People’s

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Liberation Army (PLA) to North Vietnam. Significantly, this would then allow Vietnamese troops to be deployed against the Americans in South Vietnam. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official history of Chinese diplomacy since 1949, Zhou Enlai attempted to convey China’s deterrent threats to the United States through Pakistan’s president, Ayub Khan. On 2 April 1965 Zhou conveyed an oral message to President Khan. Zhou stated that: (1) China would not provoke a war with the United States; (2) the Chinese meant what they said and would honor international obligations they had undertaken; (3) China was prepared. In a 31 May meeting between British charge d’affaires Donald Charles Hopson and Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi, Chen delivered a similar message to the British diplomat. The Chinese foreign minister noted that: (1) China would not provoke a war against the United States; (2) what China said counted; (3) China was prepared; and (4) if the United States bombed China that would mean a war and there are no limits to war. Chen noted that President Khan’s scheduled visit to Washington had been canceled and requested that the British deliver the message to the American government. Zhou Enlai also openly discussed China’s four points at a conference in Bogor, Indonesia, during his trip to Indonesia on 16–26 April. At that conference Zhou stated that China’s intervention in “the Korean War can be taken as evidence” that it would intervene in Vietnam if the situation demanded such action. To bolster this deterrent threat, China sent an estimated total of 320,000 PLA personnel to North Vietnam from 1 August 1965 to 20 March 1969. The maximum number of Chinese deployed at any point in time during this period was 170,000. As Xie Yixian explicitly points out, the purpose of these troop deployments was to deter the United States from attacking North Vietnamese territory. In effect, the Chinese viewed North Vietnam as a buffer zone they were prepared to use force to defend. The threat of a possible Chinese intervention against American troops in Vietnam was one of the factors that deterred a large-scale American invasion of North Vietnam. This comes out clearly in a conversation between U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow in May 1967. Rostow stated his opinion that he did not “believe communist China would fight us if we invaded the northern part of North Vietnam.” McNamara responded by saying that with respect to “U.S. ground actions in North Vietnam, we would expect China to respond by entering the war with both ground and air forces.” Indeed, high-level North Vietnamese officials have gone on record in noting China’s role in preventing an American ground

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invasion of North Vietnam. Luu Doan Huynh, in a discussion with Allen Whiting in 1993, observed that during the course of the Vietnam War, Chinese anti-aircraft units in North Vietnam “served to demonstrate to Chinese and Vietnamese that China would support the Vietnamese war of resistance and to act as deterrence against attempts by U.S. troops to invade North Vietnam.”

SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT: THE SOVIET FACTOR Over the course of the period 1964–1968, even as Beijing vehemently opposed what it saw as a joint Soviet-American attempt to dominate world politics, China increasingly focused on the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, as its main threat. As Chinese author Li Danhui points out, “From the mid1960s onward, in their deliberations about the main threat facing China, the [Chinese] leadership determined that the relative threat posed by the Americans had decreased, and that defending itself against the Soviet Union had become its primary objective.” This shift in Chinese threat perceptions allowed Beijing to reach the informal understanding with Washington described above, whereby Beijing informed Washington in April 1965 that as long as U.S. and South Vietnamese troops did not cross the seventeenth parallel, it would not send combat troops to North Vietnam. As China’s perception of its principal enemy increasingly focused on the Soviet Union, the burgeoning Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation described above led to increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict. From the evidence that we have of direct conversations between Chinese and Vietnamese officials, we can trace a picture of a relationship increasingly under strain because of Chinese anger at the growing Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet Union. As for the Vietnamese side, there is less in the way of direct quotations from North Vietnamese officials indicating their real feelings about the Chinese. This is not surprising since the Vietnamese did not want to jeopardize the aid they were receiving from China by defending the Soviets. Still, some contemporaneous evidence of Vietnamese dissatisfaction is available for the 1964–1968 period. Sino-Vietnamese conflict occurred over: (1) the issue of Soviet material aid to North Vietnam, and (2) the extent of Soviet influence over Hanoi’s war strategy, which we can further divide into battlefield tactics and negotiations. Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Soviet material aid had its origins early in the Vietnam War. Sometime between August 1964 and the end of 1964, Deng Xiaoping made a secret visit to Hanoi. A Vietnamese communist source claims that Deng offered a substantial increase in Chinese aid, on the condi-

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tion that the Vietnamese reject Soviet aid. After the Vietnamese declined this offer, the Chinese closely watched the elaboration of Soviet-Vietnamese ties described above. As Soviet material assistance to North Vietnam increased, Chinese warnings about the Soviets followed in tandem. On 1 March 1965 Zhou Enlai, citing previous instances of Soviet espionage in countries where Soviet assistance had been provided, warned Ho Chi Minh of such dangers. Zhou even suggested that relations between China and North Vietnam could suffer as a result of increased Soviet assistance in North Vietnam. Zhou told Ho: The new Soviet leaders are following nothing but Khrushchevism. It is absolutely impossible for them to change. . . . We oppose [Soviet] military activities that include an airlift using 45 planes for . . . weapon transportation. We also have to be wary of the military instructors. We have had experience in the past with their subversive activities in China, Korea, and Cuba. We, therefore, should keep an eye on their activities, namely their transportation of weapons and military training. Otherwise, the relations between our two countries [China and North Vietnam] may turn from good to bad, thus affecting cooperation between our two countries.

The Chinese persisted in this anti-Soviet line. In a meeting in Beijing on 9 October 1965 between Zhou and Pham Van Dong, Zhou criticized the Soviets and recommended that Hanoi not accept Soviet aid. Zhou pointed out to Pham: During the time Khrushchev was in power, the Soviets could not divide us because Khrushchev did not help you very much. The Soviets are now assisting you. But their help is not sincere. The U.S. likes this very much. I want to tell you my opinion. It will be better without Soviet aid. . . . I do not support the idea of Soviet volunteers going to Vietnam, nor [do I support] Soviet aid to Vietnam. I think it will be better without it. . . . [As to Vietnam] we always want to help. In our mind, our thoughts, we never think of selling out Vietnam. But we are always afraid of the revisionists standing between us.

While it may be argued that Zhou was simply pointing out the reality of Soviet intentions to split the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, the fact remains that the Vietnamese had to rely on the Soviets’ aid in their struggle with the United

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States. The Vietnamese communists could be excused for interpreting Zhou’s advice as detrimental to their cause of unifying Vietnam under communist auspices. The Chinese were relentless in their criticism of the Soviets. In a meeting with Ho Chi Minh in Guangdong province on 8 November 1965, Zhou Enlai suggested that “the purpose of Soviet aid to Vietnam [is] : (a) to isolate China, (b) to improve Soviet-U.S. relations, (c) to conduct subversive activities as well as acts of sabotage, make problems in China, and maybe also in Vietnam.” On 23 March 1966 Zhou Enlai told Le Duan: After Kosygin returned from Hanoi [in February 1965,] the Soviets used their support to Vietnam to win your trust in a deceitful way. Their purpose is to cast a shadow over the relationship between Vietnam and China, to split Vietnam and China with a view to further controlling Vietnam to improve their relations with the U.S. and obstructing the struggle and revolution of the Vietnamese people.

As the Chinese leadership monitored the turn from Hanoi’s estrangement with Moscow during Khrushchev’s tenure toward a posture of close alignment, one particular incident in late March–early April 1966 caught Beijing’s attention. Vietnamese leader Le Duan, while leading a Vietnamese delegation to the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU in Moscow from 29 March to 8 April 1966 (a meeting that was boycotted by the Chinese), referred to the Soviet Union as his “second motherland.” While we can debate whether Le Duan’s words were taken out of context by the Chinese, the fact of the matter was that they struck a raw nerve with them. Recently released documentation from the Soviet embassy in Hanoi notes immediate Chinese retaliation. The Chinese reportedly reduced their aid to Hanoi during the congress. Commenting on this development, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Hanoi noted that “the Vietnamese communists hinted to Soviet representatives that they consider the Chinese attitude as reprisal for their political flirtation with the Soviet Union.” The Chinese dissatisfaction concerning Vietnamese cooperation with the Soviet Union was to deepen and cause a further increase in the SinoVietnamese conflict. In a meeting in Beijing on 13 April 1966 attended by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Le Duan, the tensions that had emerged regarding the Soviet Union boiled over, as seen in the following quotation:

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Deng Xiaoping: You have spoken about truth as well as mentioned fairness. So what are you still afraid of? Why are you afraid of displeasing the Soviets? I want to tell you frankly what I now feel: Vietnamese comrades have some other thoughts about our methods of assistance, but you have not yet told us.

Later on in this same conversation, Le Duan acknowledged that the key issue in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was how to assess the Soviet Union. Le Duan: We don’t speak publicly about the different opinions between us. We hold that Soviet assistance is partly sincere, so neither do we ask whether the Soviets [will] sell Vietnam out nor [do we] say the Soviets slander China in the matter of transportation of Soviet aid. Because we know that if we say this, the problem will become more complicated. It is due to our circumstances. The main problem is how to judge the Soviet Union. You are saying that the Soviets are selling out Vietnam, but we don’t say so. 

The Vietnamese expressed their unhappiness at China’s pressure tactics in ways that had a powerful impact, all the more so because they were subtle. The Soviets viewed the Vietnamese greetings at the forty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 1966 as “an interesting reaction to Chinese attempts at blackmail.” In contrast to the Vietnamese greetings the year before, which were initialed by Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and Pham Van Dong and addressed to their respective counterparts in the Chinese Communist Party, the greetings were exchanged between the respective Central Committees and contained no signatures. In any case, even after Beijing and Hanoi’s respective positions had been made clear, Chinese officials persisted in highlighting negative Soviet motives. On 10 April 1967 Zhou Enlai told Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong, “The Soviets want to have access to China’s ports not only for shipments of aid to Vietnam but for other ulterior motives as well.” On 13 May 1967 Chinese deputy foreign minister Qiao Guanhua remarked to Vietnamese ambassador Ngo Minh Loan that “the Soviet proposal for air transport has bad intentions and is a conspiracy.” The basic problem for the Chinese was that the Vietnamese did not view the Soviets in the same way as the Chinese did. Moreover, the strident Chinese response to the Soviet role in Vietnam increasingly drew Hanoi’s attention to China’s obstructionist actions. While we should treat with caution

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such post-hoc views, it is nevertheless worth noting the Vietnamese claim that at the time they were outraged at Beijing’s efforts to “sabotage” United Action between Moscow, Beijing, and Hanoi. A 1979 Vietnamese publication that reviewed the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Cold War argued as follows: In order to make Vietnam dependent on China, the Chinese rulers did their utmost to prevent every united action. . . . On February 28, 1965, they rejected the Vietnamese draft of February 22, 1965, for a joint statement by the socialist countries condemning the United States for intensifying its war of aggression in South Vietnam and for unleashing war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In March 1965, they rejected the Soviet proposal that the Communist parties of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam meet to discuss joint action in support of the Vietnamese people’s struggle against the U.S. aggressors. In April 1965, on two occasions, they rejected the Soviet proposal for united action to ensure the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This explained why they rejected the Soviet proposal to set up an airlift via China and build airfields on Chinese territory to defend the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In February 1966, Chairman Mao Zedong rejected the idea of creating a united international front in support of Vietnam as suggested in the course of high-level Sino-Vietnamese talks. In March 1966, Chairman Mao Zedong again rejected the suggestion for the founding of a united international front in support of Vietnam against the U.S. imperialists made by the Japanese Communist Party at highlevel talks with the Chinese Communist Party. . . . Instead, the Chinese authorities wanted to set [up] what they called the World People’s Front under their control.

Sino-Vietnamese differences also emerged over Soviet influence on Hanoi’s strategy against the United States. There were two dimensions to Hanoi’s strategy—the first concerned battlefield strategy, and the second related to the role of negotiations with the United States. In both areas Sino-Vietnamese conflict emerged because of Soviet involvement in North Vietnamese strategy. From Hanoi’s perspective, Soviet aid was critical to the development of its battlefield strategy. Specifically, the influx of heavy military equipment after 1965

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allowed for a shift in Vietnamese communist strategy from a predominantly defensive guerilla war strategy to that of an offensive large-unit regular force strategy. In response to the rising Soviet influence over Hanoi’s war strategy, the Chinese took an increasingly critical approach to the way the war was fought. In this respect, the publication in the 3 September 1965 issue of the People’s Daily of Chinese defense minister Lin Biao’s “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” was an important policy statement by Beijing. It represented an important divergence in Vietnamese and Chinese views of military strategy against the United States. Lin Biao’s article argued that the U.S. intervention meant that the conflict in Vietnam was no longer a civil war, but a war of resistance against U.S. imperialism. It followed that since the U.S. rather than the South Vietnamese regime was now the main enemy, the tactics adopted by the Vietnamese communists were flawed and had to be altered. With respect to the military dimension, the Chinese believed that mobile warfare was inferior to protracted guerilla war. On the political side of the conflict, Beijing favored a united front strategy that sought active cooperation with non-communist elements in South Vietnam. Significantly, the article stated that the war would be won only if the Vietnamese communists relied primarily on their own resources and fighting spirit. Here the communist bloc states played a supportive role. More generally, it was felt by the Chinese that the Vietnamese were not applying the seven basic rules of “people’s war,” which included: the adoption of party-led united front tactics; the critical role played by the formation and defense of base areas; the adoption of a guerilla war tactics before that of mobile warfare; the importance of self-reliance in achieving victory; and the concomitant secondary role played by allies in the Vietnamese struggle. China’s views on the conduct of the war met with disfavor in North Vietnam. Hanoi felt that an offensive strategy imposing heavy casualties on their American adversary would eventually wear down domestic support for the war in the United States and lead to an American withdrawal. North Vietnamese strategists could not have missed the fact that Lin Biao’s advice was of little direct relevance to the Vietnamese situation. In his rendition of the CCP’s success against the Japanese in World War II, Lin completely omitted the role of the Soviet Union and the United States in crushing the Japanese. Lin’s treatise comprised, at best, well-intentioned but misleading advice offered as wisdom. At worst, it was a case of the Chinese allowing the politics of the Sino-Soviet conflict to influence the Vietnamese communists’ preferred choice of strategy against the Americans. That Hanoi viewed Beijing’s advice to adopt

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a protracted war strategy as deleterious to its national interests is indicated by a speech given by Le Duan a few months later, in May 1966. At an army conference, Le Duan remarked: It is fortuitous that in the history of our country, each time we rose to oppose foreign aggression, we took the offensive and not the defensive. . . . Taking the offensive is a strategy, while taking the defensive is only a stratagem. Since the day the South Vietnamese rose up, they have continually taken the offensive.

Hanoi’s choice of battle strategy against the Americans had implications for the balance of Vietnamese dependence on its alliance partners. An offensive strategy that relied on more technologically sophisticated heavy weaponry and large-unit forces implied a reliance on the Soviets more than the Chinese. In the final analysis, the Vietnamese increased their dependence on the Soviets because, in their view, that was an adjustment necessary for defeating the Americans. This strategic adjustment caused problems in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Simply put, from the Chinese perspective, the Vietnamese were embracing serious errors in both the theoretical and tactical realms. Le Duan’s use of offensive strategy at this early stage in the Vietnamese-American conflict was a theoretically deficient method for waging war in that it deviated in important ways from Mao’s doctrine of protracted people’s war. That it relied for its success on Soviet heavy weaponry and large-unit mobile tactics for its practical implementation compounded Hanoi’s error in Chinese eyes. The differences in war strategy reached their apotheosis with the launch of the Tet Offensive on 30–31 January 1968. The offensive was the culmination of nearly a year of meticulous planning. It involved an attack on sixty-four of the largest population centers in South Vietnam on a single night. In all, two hundred separate attacks occurred in the first forty-eight hours. According to the Official History of the Vietnamese People’s army (Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam), in preparation for the Tet Offensive an extensive analysis was made of the progress in the war against the Americans. In May 1967 the Communist Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) held its fifth conference in South Vietnam. It affirmed the need for a “General Offensive–General Uprising” otherwise known as the Tet Offensive. The COSVN report was reviewed by the North Vietnamese Political Bureau in June 1967. Preparations for the offensive were set in motion in late July. In October the Political Bureau met and made a final decision to launch the Tet Offensive. However, only

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in December did the Political Bureau issue a resolution calling for the war to enter the stage of “decisive victory.” In early January 1968 the Political Bureau’s resolution was passed.  The Chinese view was that the Tet Offensive was a failure. The Vietnamese communists lost an estimated 85,000 troops out of a total of 195,000 that participated in the five waves of attacks that occurred over a seventeen-month period. A dip in bilateral relations occurred after Tet. From the launch of the offensive in late January 1968 to Ho Chi Minh’s funeral in September 1969, Hanoi continued to send delegations to Beijing, but there was no reciprocity. No Chinese delegation, either official or unofficial, went to Hanoi during this period. Sino-Vietnamese conflict also arose over the issue of negotiations with the Americans. In internal discussions, Chinese officials disapproved of negotiations. An internal circular dated 19 August 1965 noted that: “The North Vietnamese practice on peace talks is different from ours. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has never completely closed the door on peace negotiations, this is creating an opportunity for the imperialists, the revisionists, and the reactionaries and increasing their illusions about pressing the DRV into peace talks.” The decision to enter negotiations reflected Hanoi’s belief, which converged with that of the Soviets, that by 1967 military methods had to be supplemented by battle in the diplomatic field. In the North Vietnamese vernacular, a strategy of “talking while fighting” was necessary. The Chinese felt strongly that negotiations were of little value. Mao told Pham Van Dong during an April 1968 trip to Beijing that “what could not be achieved on the battlefield would not be achieved at the negotiation table.” Mao failed to see the logic behind Hanoi’s integration of battlefield and negotiating strategy. The main objective of the Tet Offensive had been to force the Americans to the negotiating table. Unlike the Chinese, the Soviets had been supportive of negotiations, but had met resistance from Hanoi, which felt that the time was not right for talks. After the Tet Offensive, Hanoi seized the opportunity offered by President Johnson’s 31 March 1968 announcement of a partial ending of U.S. bombing and accompanying call for a peace settlement based on the 1954 Geneva Agreements. On 3 April Hanoi accepted the American offer of negotiations. Talks began in Paris on 13 May 1968. The Chinese were furious. There was no mention of the negotiations in the Chinese press during this period. Eventually, after a heated exchange on 17 October 1968 between Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi and the Vietnamese communists’ chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho, the Chinese realized that the Vietnamese were determined to pursue

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negotiations. On 19 October the Chinese Xinhua news agency acknowledged the negotiations. Nearly a month passed before Mao, in a conversation with Pham Van Dong on 17 November, expressed approval of Hanoi pursuing negotiations even as it continued fighting the Americans. Taken at face value, it would appear that the Chinese and Vietnamese had a fundamental difference of opinion. Yet closer inspection shows that their two positions were not that far apart. Even as the Vietnamese communists prepared for negotiations after the Tet Offensive, Ngyuen Van Linh maintained that “the decisive factor lies in the battlefield.” That position could have easily been articulated by any prominent Chinese Communist party official. The sources of Chinese opposition to the talks were several. First, this stance reflected Chinese pre-rapprochement (with the U.S.) era concern that the Vietnamese communists would negotiate a favorable outcome at a time of American weakness. Consider the following exchange between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong: Zhou Enlai: According to us, at present, your acceptance of [U.S. president Lyndon] Johnson’s proposal for a limited cessation of U.S. bombing of the North is not good timing and is not advantageous. We are insistent on that judgment. . . . So, when Johnson was facing the most difficult moment . . . you accepted his proposal. This act disappointed the world. Pro-American circles were happy. . . . You had accepted partial cessation of bombing and then accepted the place for talks which was not Phnom Penh. You, therefore, compromised twice. You are not initiating, but to the contrary, are losing the posture for initiating. . . . The key factor is the war itself. Victory is decided by the war. But, so far as negotiation is concerned, we are still holding on our point of view, namely that you have lost your initiative and fallen into a passive position. Pham Van Dong: You have stated your opinion in a constructive way, and we should pay more attention to it. Because, after all we are the ones fighting the U.S. and defeating them. We should be responsible for both military and diplomatic activities. Thank you very much for your opinion. We consider it for our better performance, for our victory over the U.S.

Second, their disapproval of negotiation reflected Chinese opposition to the Soviet and U.S. support for this position. At this point in the Cold War, Beijing was at loggerheads with both superpowers and feared collusion against China. Indeed, in April 1968, as Zhou reviewed Beijing’s strategic situation,

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he saw a qualitative deterioration, with both the Soviet Union and the United States tightening a ring of encirclement around China. Zhou noted, “For a long time the U.S. has been half-encircling China. Now the Soviet Union is also encircling China. The circle is getting complete, except [the part of] Vietnam.” The fact that both Moscow and Washington supported negotiations to settle the conflict in Vietnam raised Chinese fears of collusion and the specter of the double encirclement of China. And so on 3 April 1968, when the Vietnamese responded to President Johnson’s 31 March offer to enter into negotiations, Sino-Vietnamese tensions became more evident. The Vietnamese, still dependent on Chinese aid, had to restrain themselves as the Chinese bluntly critiqued Vietnamese policy that, in Beijing’s view, reflected Moscow’s increasing influence on Hanoi. On 29 June 1968 Chinese anger at Hanoi’s decision to participate in the Paris peace negotiations became apparent. Zhou Enlai told a Vietnamese delegation led by Pham Hung that the Vietnamese had been deceived by the Soviets in entering into negotiations with the U.S. in Paris: That you accepted holding talks with the U.S. put you in a passive position. You have been trapped by the Soviets. Now, Johnson has the initiative. . . . That you accepted their [the U.S.] partial bombing [proposals], and agreed to talk to them has bettered their present position compared with the one they were in in 1966 and 1967. . . . It is the fault of the Soviets. For long, the Soviets have been the U.S.’s henchmen and lent them a helping hand to oppose the world’s revolutionary people. . . . We have made a list of mistakes committed by the Soviets. We would like to convey it to President Ho Chi Minh for his consideration.

THE LAOS FACTOR IN SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS, 1961–1968 The preceding analysis has maintained that Sino-Soviet conflict is the basic cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. An alternative explanation is that SinoVietnamese conflict was caused principally by bilateral issues. In this respect there are a number of issues in Sino-Vietnamese relations that can be used to test the relative cogency of the bilateral thesis. Possible issues include disagreements over the Vietnamese communists’ choice of military strategy, Chinese dissatisfaction over Hanoi’s stance on negotiations with Washington, and Sino-Vietnamese competition for influence over Laos. Due to space constraints, we have selected for examination the role of Laos in Sino-Vietnamese relations. By virtue of its geographical proximity to China and Vietnam, Laos

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is a natural area of competition between Beijing and Hanoi. In this sense, SinoVietnamese conflict over Laos is an “easy” test for the bilateral thesis to pass. Conversely, it is a “hard” test for the principal enemy thesis to pass. That said, an examination of the timing of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Laos strongly suggests that the Soviet factor is a more convincing explanation of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. As the bilateral thesis would lead us to expect, the Chinese had concerns about Vietnamese communist influence in Laos that stretched back to the early 1950s, when the concept of an “Indochina Federation” comprised of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam was advocated by Hanoi. Laos was the subject of a special conference in Geneva from May 1961 until July 1962, in which a total of thirteen states participated, including the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. The Chinese were aware of the strong Vietnamese influence in Laos and were suspicious about Hanoi’s influence with the pro-Vietnamese Pathet Lao. However, the preponderance of the evidence is consistent with the thesis advanced throughout this chapter. Because the Soviet Union was not at this point in time competing for influence with the Chinese, SinoVietnamese relations concerning Laos were cooperative, even good. During the Geneva negotiations, the Chinese cooperated closely with Hanoi to preserve the Pathet Lao’s interests. Beijing also actively supported changes on the ground that affected the outcome of negotiations in Hanoi’s favor. For example, while negotiations were deadlocked, the Chinese provided critical logistical support to the Pathet Lao in their capture on 6 May 1962 of Nam Tha, which was fifteen miles south of the Chinese border, from rightist forces led by General Phoumi Nosavan. The fall of Nam Tha weakened Nosavan’s position in the negotiations and resulted in an increase in the number of cabinet positions held by the Pathet Lao in the new tripartite government composed of rightists, neutralists (under Prince Souvanna Phouma), and the Pathet Lao. China and Vietnam both share a border with Laos and notwithstanding the natural tendency for Sino-Vietnamese sphere-of-interest conflicts over Laos, the fact remains that Beijing’s concerns about Vietnamese influence in Laos reached a crisis point only in September 1968, following a progressive increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. In October 1963 the Pathet Lao leader Kaysone Phomvihane visited Beijing and suggested that China assist in ways of improving the Pathet Lao’s party and army work, as well as developing its base area in Sam Nuea. Cooperation continued from October 1963 till September 1968. Despite the strong North Vietnamese presence in Laos and influence over the Pathet Lao, no substantive disagreements occurred between the

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Chinese team and the North Vietnamese. This was to change. In September 1968 Sino-Vietnamese conflict increased because of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and its effects were to be felt in Laos. As a result of pressure from Hanoi, Kaysone Phomvihane asked Li Wenzheng, the head of the Chinese team in Sam Nuea, to return to China. This was taken by Beijing as a signal that its presence was no longer desired by the Vietnamese. The incident increased Sino-Vietnamese tensions. It would be remiss to deny that some level of Sino-Vietnamese conflict during the 1964–1968 period was caused by specifically bilateral issues. The intensity of Sino-Vietnamese interaction during this period provided some opportunity for conflict. For example, on 8 April 1965, during a visit to Beijing, Le Duan met Liu Shaoqi. Liu made a broad commitment to provide military and economic aid to Hanoi. Le Duan noted that the Chinese pilots were needed for four specific purposes: “to restrict American bombing to areas south of the 20th or 19th parallels; to defend the safety of Hanoi; to defend several main transportation lines; and to raise the morale of the Vietnamese people.” Liu’s commitment was further fleshed out from 21 to 22 April 1965, when North Vietnamese defense minister General Vo Ngyuen Giap met with PLA chief of staff General Luo Ruiqing and his first deputy chief of staff General Yang Chengwu to discuss the details of military assistance. In early June, North Vietnamese chief of staff Van Tien Dung and Luo Ruiqing further elaborated on the scope of Chinese military assistance to North Vietnam. As part of this agreement, it was decided that Chinese pilots would be sent to assist the Vietnamese. However, the Chinese had a change of heart on the issue of supplying pilots to North Vietnam. According to Hanoi, on 16 July 1965 the Chinese reneged on the pilot issue. Beijing declared that the time was “not yet ripe” to send pilots to Vietnam. This was an issue that caused significant dissatisfaction in Hanoi and led to the Vietnamese relying more on the Soviets for air defense. Ironically, during the Korean War the issue of the Soviets reneging on the promise of providing immediate air support to the Chinese was a source of anger in Beijing. The Soviets eventually provided air support in January 1951, two and a half months after the Chinese entry into the Korean War. John Lewis Gaddis has observed that “the roots of the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 lie in what we can now see to have been the fragmentation of the SinoVietnamese alliance during the late 1960s and early 1970s.” The evidence presented in this chapter allows us to locate the origins of the Sino-Vietnamese war at an even earlier period than Gaddis has suggested. More specifically, this

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study contends that the roots of the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 are to be found in the 1964–1968 period. In this respect, a critical change in Chinese threat perceptions occurred during the period of our analysis. In mid-June 1965 Chinese leader Zhou Enlai identified the main threat to China as coming from the Americans, who, he claimed, were continuing their attempt, first begun with the Korean War, to encircle China. However, by 1966 the principal threat to China had begun to change from the United States to the Soviet Union. This chapter has explored how, over the course of the period from 1964 to 1968, Vietnam became an important arena in which the Sino-Soviet conflict was played out. The more active Soviet policy toward North Vietnam following the downfall of Khrushchev increased Moscow’s relative influence in Hanoi. We must therefore revise previous characterizations of Soviet-Vietnamese relations as “basically stable and superficial.” The relationship during this period was at once deeper and more cooperative than such a characterization suggests. The switch in Soviet policy following Khrushchev’s fall also heightened Chinese anxieties about the Vietnamese communists, who in the short run benefited greatly from the Sino-Soviet conflict, in the form of increased aid. That is not to say that Hanoi had an easy time in its diplomacy with Beijing and Moscow. To put it bluntly, the Vietnamese communists had no choice but to navigate the shoals of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Eventually a choice had to be made, and the Vietnamese choose the Soviets over the Chinese. Moscow had begun to turn the strategic tables on Beijing. The Soviets were increasing their influence in North Vietnam, and the Vietnamese communists were no longer as dependent on the Chinese. The next chapter will examine in closer detail how Chinese fears of encirclement by the Soviets in Vietnam were to play out in 1968–1973, our next study period.

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3 A WAR ON TWO FRONTS The Sino-Soviet Conflict During the Vietnam War and the Betrayal Thesis, 1968–1973

In early September 1968, on the o ccasion of the t wenty-third anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), Mao Zedong declared to the Vietnamese ambassador at a banquet in honor of the occasion: “Your struggle is our struggle [nimen de douzheng shi women de douzhen]. The Vietnamese people have the powerful backing of seven hundred thousand Chinese; the vast Chinese territory is Vietnam’s dependable rear-area [kekao houfang].” By the time the United States and the Vietnamese communists signed the agreement to end the conflict in Vietnam on 27 January 1973, however, there had been a qualitative deterioration in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. This chapter examines and explains how this deterioration came about. More precisely, we will argue that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia represented a fundamental turning point in Sino-Soviet relations and, by extension, the Cold War. This act instantly transformed the Soviet Union into Beijing’s principal enemy. Accordingly, as the Vietnamese communists drew increasingly closer to the Soviets, a significant increase in conflict occurred between the Chinese and the Vietnamese communists. The analysis that follows will demonstrate how this dynamic played out in two separate examples: the first focuses on the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968; the second examines

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the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969. In both instances there was a subsequent increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, which then caused an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. This chapter will also evaluate two major alternative explanations to the thesis that has been advanced above. First, it has been argued, both in the academic literature and by Vietnamese communist officials, that the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, which began in 1968 and culminated in President Nixon’s February 1972 visit to China, represented a betrayal of the Vietnamese by the Chinese, and that that was a significant factor in the deterioration of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship which in turn manifested itself in the later Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979. It will be argued that although the Chinese did betray their Vietnamese comrades, this was not the fundamental cause of the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance in the late 1970s. Second, we will examine an argument that focuses on a specifically bilateral issue—namely, Sino-Vietnamese rivalry for influence in Cambodia— as the main cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA Developments in Sino-Soviet relations during the period examined in the previous chapter (1964–1968) established a baseline of conflict in Sino-Soviet relations. It is from this baseline that an acceleration of Sino-Soviet tensions occurred following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Moscow’s intervention in Czechoslovakia was an attempt to reverse domestic reforms in a Warsaw Pact ally. Ironically, it was Moscow that initially promoted reforms in Prague as part of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization drive. Beginning in 1962, Czechoslovakian leader Antonin Novotny was pressed by Khrushchev to conduct a review of purges targeted against Slovak communists from 1949 until 1954. However, the pace and depth of reform went too far for the Kremlin. By the end of 1966, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) had removed all the high-level cadres who had been appointed by Novotny and his predecessor, Klement Gottwald. In December 1967 the CSCP Central Committee requested Novotny’s resignation as head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Subsequently, at a Central Committee meeting on 3–5 January 1968, Alexander Dubcek was appointed first secretary of the CSCP, while allowing Novotny to remain as president. Novotny’s resignation on 21 March and the publication of a liberal “program of action” by the CSCP in April alarmed Moscow. On 6 May Soviet leader Brezhnev warned that the action program was “opening possibilities for the restoration of

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capitalism in Czechoslovakia.” A series of meetings between Warsaw Pact leaders in Dresden (March), Moscow (May), and Warsaw (mid-July) ratcheted up pressure on the leadership in Czechoslovakia. A turning point was reached at the Warsaw meeting on 14–15 July. At Brezhnev’s suggestion, a document, later dubbed the “Warsaw Letter,” denounced the “Prague Spring” and called for a reversal of initiatives promulgated in Czechoslovakia. The letter evoked widespread disapproval in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Politburo tentatively decided at a series of meetings on 19, 22, and 26–26 July that unless there was a basic change in the trajectory of events, a fullscale invasion would be launched sometime in middle to late August. Czechoslovakian officials failed to offer convincing reassurances during bilateral meetings with the Soviets in Cierna nad Tisou at the end of July and at a wider Warsaw Pact meeting in Bratislava on 3 August. Subsequent developments were to prove decisive. A telephone discussion occurred between Brezhnev and Dubcek on 13 August in which the latter admitted that the stipulations of the 3 August agreement were unlikely to be adhered to. Brezhnev then cabled the Soviet ambassador Stepan Chervonenko, previously the Soviet ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, with the instructions to meet Dubcek. This failed to elicit a positive response. The stage was set for Operation Danube, a Sovietled multilateral intervention, which commenced on midnight of 20–21 August. An estimated total of between 420,000 and 480,000 troops from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland seized control of the power structures in Czechoslovakia within hours of entering the country. On 12 November 1968, at the fifth congress of the Polish United Workers Party, Brezhnev provided a rationale for the Soviet Union intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leader stated: When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country . . . this is no longer merely a problem for that country’s people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.

Brezhnev’s statement justifying the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia became known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine and was widely seen as providing a basis for possible future intervention in other socialist states. Certainly, as their subsequent reaction would demonstrate, the Chinese leadership felt that way.

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Beijing’s response to the Soviet intervention was one of unqualified condemnation. In the 23 August issue of the People’s Daily, new terminology was used to describe the Soviet Union. In a departure from previous characterizations of the Soviet Union as a revisionist superpower, the People’s Daily now referred to the Soviet Union as a “social-imperialist” superpower. On the same day, while attending a function celebrating the Romanian national day, a state that despite its Warsaw Pact membership was increasingly at odds with Moscow on a variety of issues, Zhou Enlai repeated the “social-imperialist” reference in his speech. He argued that the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed that the leadership of the Soviet Union had “degenerated into social-imperialism and social-fascism.” Zhou further remarked that there should be no illusions about the nature of the Soviet Union: “That a big nation should have so willfully trampled a small nation underfoot serves as a most profound lesson for those harboring illusions about U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.” Why did the Chinese respond so vociferously to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia? First, as Zhou stated in his Romanian national day speech, the Chinese perceived a qualitative change in the nature of the Soviet threat to China’s allies in Eastern Europe. If the Soviets could invade Czechoslovakia, then the distinct possibility existed that other socialist states in Eastern Europe could also be targeted. In particular, Beijing was concerned that Albania and Rumania, the two states in Eastern Europe that still maintained strong ties with China, could be possible Soviet targets. To reflect this concern, the Chinese altered their vocabulary with respect to Moscow. As indicated above, the term “social-imperialism” was now used to characterize the Soviet Union. To drive home this point, a 30 August issue of the People’s Daily investigated the origins of the term. The article pointed to the invasion of Czechoslovakia as an instance of social-imperialism. Second, and related, the ferocity of the Chinese response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia reflected Beijing’s fears that China itself could be the target of a Soviet strike. This possibility was particularly worrying for Beijing. On 17 September the People’s Daily noted that the Chinese Foreign Ministry had protested against Soviet violations of Chinese airspace. The Foreign Ministry statement stressed that the occurrence of these incidents after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was “absolutely not coincidental.” The Chinese clearly had a problem on their hands. States typically deal with threats by either external or internal balancing, or a combination of both strategies.

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However, China’s capabilities in both these respects were limited. External balancing against the Soviet threat via an alliance with other states was an option that had been foreclosed by China’s own actions and ideological proclivities in the preceding years. Following the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s, China effectively had a policy of opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, as a result of Beijing’s own decision since the 1960s to accentuate the role of ideology in its foreign policy, only a handful of mid-ranking and smaller states in the international system were favorably disposed to China. By 1968, China faced a situation of heightened isolation from other states. Conventional internal balancing against the Soviets was also problematic for China. The continuing Chinese support of North Vietnam’s war effort diverted scarce resources that could otherwise have been used to counter the Soviet threat. Despite the repatriation of Chinese troops previously stationed in North Vietnam, China was still committed to providing substantial economic and military assistance to Hanoi. Bereft of powerful external allies and committed to supporting the Vietnamese communists, Mao was now in a real bind, one which called for innovative solutions.

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE COOPERATION FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INTERVENTION In contrast to its impact on the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia resulted in an improvement in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. The Vietnamese communists clearly endorsed the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. On the 21 August, the same day as the invasion, Vietnamese radio characterized the intervention as a “noble” act. On 22 August the prominent North Vietnamese publications Nhan Dann and Quan Doi Nhan Dann endorsed the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Both published the full text of the Soviet announcement of its invasion of Czechoslovakia on their front pages. On 26 August the full text of a 22 August Pravda editorial article stating the rationale for the invasion was published in the North Vietnamese press. The rationale for Hanoi’s endorsement of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was elaborated in a speech by Premier Pham Van Dong on the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary celebrations of the establishment of the DRV on 2 September. Pham framed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as an example of an action that was necessary to defend socialism in that country. Pham then implicitly linked the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia to the defense of socialism in the rest of the world. Significantly, Pham defended the principle of Soviet intervention in other socialist states for the purposes of

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thwarting its overthrow by domestic counterrevolutionaries, the U.S. and its allies. Pham argued: The danger to the very existence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has required that the Soviet Union and four other socialist countries in Europe— Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland—take all measures, including the use of military forces, to foil the intervention of the U.S. imperialists and the West German revanchists in collusion with the counterrevolutionaries in Czechoslovakia, to defend socialism in Czechoslovakia, to defend the Czechoslovak Communist Party, to maintain the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the Warsaw Treaty and in the Socialist camp, and to safeguard peace in Europe and the world.

The Soviets were delighted with Hanoi’s response to the Soviet-led invasion. In an editorial in the 2 September 1968 issue of Pravda, the Soviets took note of Hanoi’s support for Moscow’s intervention in Czechoslovakia. The editorial observed: The DRV has approved the action of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to rebuff counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia. The Vietnamese working people, who wage a severe struggle against imperialist aggressors, understand full well the perfidy and meanness of subversive activity against socialist countries.

Why did Moscow and Hanoi react as they did to each other’s actions? For Moscow, Hanoi’s support of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia was seen in the light of its potential to become another link in an emerging and larger Soviet encirclement policy directed against China. The Soviet Union already had close ties with a number of states bordering China. Moscow had been developing close ties with India since the late 1950s and had adopted a neutral posture in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, a position the Chinese viewed as treasonous. The Soviet Union’s relationship with Mongolia was close enough that the leadership in Ulan Bator had allowed the deployment of Soviet troops along the Sino-Mongolian border beginning in 1966. Additionally, Moscow also had an alliance treaty with China’s neighbor North Korea, although this was counterbalanced by the fact that China also had a similar treaty with Pyongyang. Significantly, Hanoi’s support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was influenced in large part by a pattern of increasing Soviet diplomatic support,

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and a corresponding relative lack of support in Beijing. On the diplomatic front, there had been a convergence of views between Hanoi and Moscow on strategy to be utilized in the war against the Americans. Specifically, as discussed in the previous chapter, by early 1968, the Vietnamese had come to the conclusion that the optimal strategy for achieving victory in its core foreign policy priority, its conflict with the U.S., was via a strategy of “negotiating while fighting.” The premise of this strategy was that the Vietnamese communists would continue to conduct a war against the Americans even while negotiations on ending the war were pursued in Paris. Hanoi found much more support for this strategy in Moscow than Beijing (which objected to negotiations at this stage). The Soviets were supportive of Hanoi’s 3 April 1968 decision to enter into negotiations with the United States. Indeed, as far back as 1965, the Soviet Union had been an advocate of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Vietnam even as it had continued to provide military and economic assistance to Hanoi. Hanoi’s support for the Soviet intervention was a way of repaying a key ally for its support. As will be discussed later, it was also a means to maintain and obtain increased levels of Soviet support. Interestingly, in contrast to previous views of the Soviet Union as an uninformed partner, the Soviets were not surprised by the Vietnamese communists’ decision to enter into negotiations with the United States. Indeed, as early as February 1968 the Soviets had intelligence from the KGB that the Vietnamese were working toward a political solution to their conflict with the U.S. The KGB provided the Soviet leadership with information relating to the Vietnamese Politburo discussions from 2 to 6 April 1968. The most likely source of this KGB information was within the Vietnamese Politburo.

BEIJING CRITIQUES HANOI ’ S POLICY TOWARD MOSCOW The Vietnamese decision to support the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia increased conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Chinese leaders critiqued Hanoi’s endorsement of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Beijing’s dissatisfaction at Hanoi’s response to the Soviet intervention was made clear in Mao’s message to the Vietnamese communist leadership on the occasion of the North Vietnamese National Day on 2 September 1968. In his message the Chinese leader was explicit in pointing out that the Soviet Union was as great a threat to Hanoi as the United States. Mao opined that Washington and Moscow were in collusion and cautioned against the dangers of cooperation with the Soviets. He warned the Vietnamese communists:

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Through its co-ordination with the Vietnamese peoples, the current Soviet revisionists are seeking to get the Vietnamese peoples to give up their struggle with the Americans. The leading clique in the Soviet Union has long since become the accomplice of the American imperialists.

Mao’s advice was at odds with Hanoi’s policy of active cooperation with the Soviet Union. It highlighted in stark terms the predicament the Vietnamese communists faced during the entire period from 1965 until 1975, during which they had to conduct a war against the U.S. even while their two closest allies viewed each other as mortal enemies. Mao’s message was reinforced by Zhou Enlai, who delivered a scathing critique of the Soviet intervention at the North Vietnamese National Day celebrations in Beijing on the same day. Zhou devoted the majority of his speech to denouncing the Soviet Union’s “fascist aggression.” On the issue of Soviet aid and assistance to Vietnam, Zhou accused the Soviets of pursuing “a policy of sham support but real betrayal.” Then Zhou delivered a clear wake-up call to the leadership in Hanoi, declaring that “it is high time all those who cherish illusions about Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism woke up!” When this quote is seen in the context of contemporary developments in North Vietnamese relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, the warning to Hanoi is clear. Hanoi had entered into peace talks with the U.S. and had endorsed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. A closer examination of Zhou and Pham’s speeches on 2 September confirms the clear difference of opinion that existed. Whereas Zhou argued that the Soviet Union had “completely destroyed the socialist camp,” Pham characterized Moscow’s action in Czechoslovakia as defending the socialist camp. A definite deterioration in relations occurred. At the Chinese National Day celebrations on 1 October, Hanoi’s delegation to the event was ranked behind that of the Australian Communist Party. In an important sense, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia could not have come at a worse time for Sino-Vietnamese relations. Bilateral relations were already strained because of Beijing’s existing anger at Hanoi over the latter’s decision (made in April 1968) to enter into negotiations with the Americans in Paris. As we explored in the previous chapter, both Moscow and Beijing viewed these negotiations largely through the prism of Sino-Soviet relations. Since the start of the large-scale hostilities in Vietnam in 1965, to counter Beijing, Moscow favored Hanoi entering into negotiations with the U.S. even while it provided logistical and tactical support for the Vietnamese war effort. Beijing rejected the Soviet idea of Hanoi entering into negotiations

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as a ploy designed to increase Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Hanoi’s subsequent adoption of a strategy of “negotiating while fighting,” while in rhetoric a position distinct from either of its communist allies, in practical terms was a coup of sorts for Moscow. The China’s subsequent reaction to the Vietnamese communists’ decision to participate in the Paris peace negotiations only exacerbated its relations with the leadership in Hanoi. Not only did the Vietnamese communists not find support for their “negotiating while fighting” position from their Chinese counterparts, but the Chinese communists in fact adopted a very critical attitude. From April to October 1968, the Chinese were adamant that the North Vietnamese leadership was making a serious error in entering negotiations with the U.S. In separate meetings in Beijing between Zhou Enlai and Pham Hung; Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong; and Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, and Xuan Thuy, the Chinese made their position clear to their Vietnamese allies in frank discussions. The Vietnamese subsequently claimed in 1979 that on 9 October 1968, the Vietnamese vice minister for foreign trade met a Chinese leader who was quoted as delivering a threat to the effect that if Vietnam negotiated with the Americans, this would affect Chinese aid to Hanoi. The Chinese official is reported to have said: “If Vietnam wants to reach a compromise with the United States, using Chinese aid for the fight against the Americans with a view to negotiating with them, Chinese aid would then become meaningless.” The implicit threat of a withdrawal of Chinese aid is clear. It is necessary to ask why the Chinese were so adamantly opposed to Vietnamese participation in negotiations with the Americans, which after all was supposed to be a step toward ending the Vietnam War and, by implication, would remove an American threat along China’s borders in Southeast Asia. The reason for Chinese anger lay in its increasing concern about the Soviet Union. This can be seen in the content of discussion between Chinese and Vietnamese officials. In a meeting on 17 October between Hanoi’s chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks, Le Duc Tho, and Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi, Beijing’s displeasure at Moscow’s influence over Hanoi’s foreign policy is clear. Chen Yi harshly critiqued the North Vietnamese for being overly influenced by the Soviets in the Paris peace talks. An excerpt of this discussion highlights the increasing conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations over the Soviet Union. Chen Yi: In our opinion, in a very short time, you have accepted the compromising and capitulationist proposals put forward by the Soviet revi-

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sionists. So, between our two parties and the two governments of Vietnam and China, there is nothing more to talk about. Nevertheless, as President Ho has said, our relationship is one of both comrades and brothers; we will therefore consider the changes of the situation in November and will have more comments. Le Duc Tho: On this matter we will wait and see. And the reality will give us the answer. We have gained experience over the past fifteen years. Let reality justify. Chen Yi: We signed the Geneva accords in 1954 when the U.S. did not agree to do so. We withdrew our armed forces from the South to the North, thus letting the people in the South be killed. We at that time made a mistake in which we shared a part. Le Duc Tho: Because we listened to your advice. Chen Yi: You just mentioned that in the Geneva conference, you made a mistake because you followed our advice. But this time you will make another mistake if you do not take our words into account.

On 17 October it was reported that Beijing threatened to sever diplomatic ties with Hanoi if they did not break diplomatic ties with the Soviets and halt negotiations with Washington. On 19 October the Chinese press made its first public reference to the Paris talks. Hanoi stuck to its position despite Beijing’s tough stand. Eventually, on 17 November, the Chinese provided rhetorical support to Vietnamese participation in talks with the United States. Mao gave his support for Hanoi’s decision to participate in talks with Washington during a meeting with North Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong in Beijing.

ASSESSING BEIJING’S ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE HANOI TO ABANDON NEGOTIATIONS In a major Chinese assessment of Sino-Vietnamese relations from 1950 to 1990 that was published in 1992, the point is stressed that the Chinese provided “valuable advice” during the Vietnam War era. Specific reference is made to Beijing’s advice that there could not be any success in the Paris peace negotiations unless there was success on the battlefield. In the light of the foregoing discussion and quotations, this particular portrayal by the Chinese of their contribution to Hanoi’s eventual victory is an inaccurate one. The fact of the matter is that the issue of whether the Vietnamese communists should negotiate with the U.S. was a point of competition between Beijing and Moscow.

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Beijing initially did not approve of negotiations between the Vietnamese communists and the Americans. Even after the Paris peace negotiations began on 13 May 1968, the Chinese leadership tried its best to persuade the Vietnamese communists to abandon these negotiations. Only when it was clear that Beijing could not prevent the Paris peace negotiations from occurring did Mao agree to these negotiations in his November 17, 1968, meeting with Pham Van Dong. Not only was the Vietnamese decision to negotiate a victory of sorts for Moscow, but Beijing (correctly) feared that Moscow would gain increased influence over the North Vietnamese leadership in the course of the Paris negotiations. More recent Chinese scholarship has explicitly recognized the Vietnamese reliance on the Soviets during the course of the Paris peace negotiations as an issue in the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. The Chinese’ subsequent claim, that Vietnamese communists’ victory in the Vietnam War was not due in part to a dual strategy of “negotiating while fighting” but to the Vietnamese communists’ adherence to Mao’s concept of “people’s war,” in effect does three things: (1) diverts attention away from the obstructionist role that the Chinese were playing with respect to the Vietnamese pursuit of their preferred strategy at the Paris peace negotiations; (2) minimizes the extent to which the Chinese placed the requirements of undermining the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet conflict above that of supporting their Vietnamese ally; and (3) reconceptualizes the North Vietnamese “fighting while negotiating” strategy as being consistent with Mao’s “people’s war” strategy.

One question remains to be answered. Why did China eventually approve of the negotiations? Given the intensity of Beijing’s opposition to Hanoi’s decision to enter into negotiations with Washington, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese had a sudden change of viewpoint on this matter. More likely, Beijing continued to oppose negotiations but recognized that the Vietnamese communists were intent on entering into negotiations with the Americans. In this respect, Mao’s approval of the North Vietnamese decision to negotiate with the Americans was a concession to the reality that the Chinese were unable to veto Hanoi’s decision on this matter. While the Chinese could not impose their preferences on the Vietnamese communists, they were nevertheless able to inflict costs on them. The Chinese subsequently proceeded to sanction the Vietnamese communists for their decision to side with Moscow on the

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negotiations issue. In the first half of 1969 Beijing supplied only slightly more than 30 percent of the aid it had promised to provide. Military aid for the year 1969 was reduced by 50 percent from the previous year’s level. Beijing also began to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in November 1968, the same month Mao informed Pham Van Dong of his putative support for Hanoi’s decision to negotiate with Washington. By 7 July 1970, all Chinese support troops had returned to China.

THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES OF 1969 In 1964 Mao had viewed a Sino-Soviet war as unlikely. By 1966 he had changed his mind. Following the signing of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty, Mao expressed, in a meeting with several of his marshals, his view that Moscow would attack within two years. Mao’s fatalism on this point, combined with the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations described above, may explain why in the winter of 1968–69 Mao set in motion preparations to launch an ambush on the Zhenbao Islands in the Ussuri River. The preventive strike that was initiated on Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border on 2 March 1969 is difficult to reconcile with claims that Mao acted with caution when dealing with the Soviets on the Sino-Soviet border issue. Indeed, a recent study identifies a pattern wherein Chinese decision-makers use force before a perceived “window” of opportunity closes, even when China confronted stronger states, as in this case. In any event, in the short term, Moscow responded with retaliatory strikes, which it carried out on 15 March. Subsequently, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev tried to contact Mao on the Kremlin-Zhongnanhai hotline, but bizarrely, the operator refused to put the call through. On the night of 21 March Premier Kosygin called on a separate foreign ministry hotline and informed a Chinese foreign ministry official that he wished to speak to Zhou Enlai. This was followed up with an identical message from Kosygin, delivered by the Soviet charge d’affaires in Beijing, to the Chinese Foreign Ministry at midnight. Zhou passed these messages to Mao, who responded before daybreak. Mao authorized the Foreign Ministry to inform the Soviet charge d’affaires that Moscow should make a formal proposal through standard diplomatic channels. At the same time Mao instructed Zhou to begin preparations for negotiations. On 29 March the Soviets proposed to reopen border talks that had stalled in 1964. During the Ninth Party Congress, which was held 1–24 April, Lin Biao, Mao’s designated successor, prevaricated

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on the Soviet border talks proposal, saying that the Chinese side was “considering its reply.” The border incidents, which had steadily increased since 1960, continued throughout the summer. Reflecting the upsurge in tension, Mao instructed the Central Military Commission (CMC) Administrative Group to hold a forum on war preparation. Mao told his generals not to worry if the Soviets launched atomic bombs against China, since “we, too, have atom bombs.” Each side leveled charges of border violations against the other. Publicly admitted clashes occurred on 10–11 June. On 12 June the Soviets made another request for talks. In mid-June, Mao approved a CMC Administrative Group request to prepare the general staff and general logistics departments for war. On 8 and 20 July border clashes occurred again. Amid the escalating tension, a report by four marshals pointedly concluded that the Soviets had made China their main enemy, but that full preparations had been made to defeat any enemy who invaded China. Further clashes on the border occurred in August. The most serious clash occurred at Lake Zhalanashkol on the Chinese border with Kazakhstan on 13 August. The Soviets decided that the implicit threat of a nuclear strike was required. If the Soviet actions were intended to force the Chinese to the negotiating table, in the short run, at least, they only exacerbated Chinese fears of a preemptive attack and added to war hysteria on the Chinese side. In that same month, Soviet bomber units were transferred from Eastern Europe to the Russian far east, and practice was conducted on striking targets in northwest China, where Chinese nuclear facilities were located. The Soviets informed their Eastern European allies that a strike would be conducted against the Chinese. This information was then deliberately leaked to foreign intelligence. On 13 August a mid-level Soviet official asked an American official about the likely American reaction to a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. On 28 August Mao ordered the creation of the National Civil Air Defense Leading Group, which was tasked with responsibility for China’s air defenses and evacuation procedures. That very day, Mao issued an “Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Regions.” The order—the name of which was simplified to the “August 28 Order”—came complete with nine articles that specified China’s conduct in the impending conflict. It was the culmination of a month of mounting fears of war. These fears were no doubt intensified by news that General Andrei Grechko, the Soviet defense minister responsible for executing the invasion of Czechoslovakia the year before, had threatened to punish China with a nuclear attack.

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The Soviets were evidently not prepared to escalate any further. On that score, developments on the Vietnamese side were to provide the opening for a de-escalation of the immediate conflict. On 3 September 1969 the Vietnamese president, Ho Chi Minh, died. Zhou Enlai and General Ye Jianying went immediately to Hanoi. However, such was the sense of crisis on the Chinese side that they did not even stay the night. In the midst of the crisis, on 5 September, the U.S. informed the Soviets that they “could not fail to be deeply concerned” by any escalation of the crisis. Soviet Premier Kosygin was also in Hanoi for the funeral and waited in Hanoi for an overture from the Chinese. He eventually gave up waiting, but while en route back to Moscow he was informed that the Chinese wanted to meet with him in Beijing. Kosygin’s plane headed for Beijing. The Chinese paranoia was such that it was feared that Kosygin’s plane was a “Trojan horse.” Mao instructed Zhou to have military units placed on high alert and specified that several specialist battalions secure the airport. A meeting nevertheless occurred on 11 September between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai at the international airport in Beijing. They discussed a number of border-related security issues, including conflict reduction measures and the reconvening of border negotiations. However, no specific date was set for a resumption of talks. Disturbingly for the Chinese, in a 16 September article in the Moscow English newspaper the Evening News, a journalist with close ties to the Soviets hinted that Moscow might launch an attack on Lop Nor, the site of China’s nuclear weapons complex. The Brezhnev Doctrine was mentioned in the article. The Chinese Politburo met on September 16, 18, and 22 to discuss the content and implications of Zhou’s meeting with Kosygin. One significant consideration in Chinese minds was the effect of the airport meeting on the U.S. On 18 September Zhou sent a secret message to Kosygin proposing a nonaggression agreement. On 23 September an underground test was conducted by the Chinese. Zhou received a letter from Kosygin on 26 September that suggested resuming border negotiations on 10 October. However, Chinese concerns were raised by the absence of any mention of the mutual conflict reduction measures agreed to at the Zhou-Kosygin airport meeting, and which were reiterated in Zhou’s message. This was interpreted as evidence of malign Soviet intensions. The crisis had still not ended. Chinese preparations for a Soviet attack continued. The CMC ordered the transfer of elite units to the northern region of China. The total number of infantry deployed in the North was increased by 20 percent. On 29 September a three megaton thermonuclear weapon was tested. The Chinese felt they needed more time to complete the repositioning

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of their military forces before the negotiations. On 29 September the Foreign Ministry requested a change of date for the negotiations from 10 to 20 October. On 30 September 1969, concerned that the Soviets might launch a surprise attack on the Chinese National Day on 1 October, Defense Minister Lin Biao ordered the Chinese military to be placed at its highest level of alert status. When a Soviet attack failed to materialize, Chinese suspicion turned to the upcoming arrival of Soviet a delegation of negotiators for border discussions on 20 October 1969. The delegation was viewed as a possible Soviet ploy to disguise an attack on China. On 7 October 1969 China formally announced that it would agree to restart the stalled 1964 negotiations with the Soviet Union. On 14 October Zhou received Kosygin’s letter confirming that the Soviet negotiators would arrive on 20 October. China was still uncertain about Soviet intentions. A secret report allegedly from Moscow claimed that the Soviet plane carrying Kosygin was to be fitted with nuclear-tipped air-tosurface missiles. Mao decided that he would go to Wuhan while his designated successor Lin Biao went to Suzhou. Party and government officials who remained in Beijing, such as Zhou Enlai, were positioned in an underground command center under the Hundred Hope Mountain (Bai Wang Shan) in Beijing’s Western hills. At 1700 hours on 18 October, from his new base in Suzhou, Lin issued another order to prepare for a surprise Soviet attack. The order was sent to Huang Yongsheng, chief of general staff, who transmitted the message to General Yan Zhongchuan, the operations chief at the advanced command post. Formally entitled “Urgent Directive regarding Strengthening Combat Readiness to Prevent an Enemy’s Surprise Attack,” it comprised six points specifying instructions to deal with a Soviet attack. The Second Artillery, which comprised China’s strategic missile forces, was placed on full alert. At this point, in what can only be called an inexcusable breach of protocol, Yan rewrote the six points in the order into four parts and collectively termed them the No. 1 Order. This added a degree of confusion since the first part of the rewritten documentation was also called No.1 Order. Once the rewriting had been done, Yan instructed that the document be sent to Huang for final approval. However, Huang had by that time gone to sleep, having taken sleeping pills. Given that it was 9:30 at night and the Soviet plane was already en route to Beijing, Yan sent out all four parts of “Vice-Chairman Lin’s No. 1 Order.” Serious issues were raised by this process, in which such an important order was mishandled. Their resolution would have to wait for the broader turmoil in Sino-Soviet relations to pass.

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The entire Chinese polity was now poised for a Soviet attack, which did not come. On 20 October Zhou Enlai reasserted his position. He drove to the advance command post under the Hundred Hope Mountain and took control of the crisis operation. On October 20 1969 Sino-Soviet border negotiations began in Beijing. No Soviet attack had occurred. Six months after the initial clash, the two sides finally agreed to settle the border conflict through talks rather than force.

THE SOVIET UNION’S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS As Sino-Soviet conflict increased, the Soviets sought to pry the Vietnamese away from the Chinese. In this respect, the main tool used by the Soviets was economic and military aid. Since 1965 the Soviets had been steadily increasing their economic and military aid to the Vietnamese communists. Immediately after Hanoi gave its support to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Moscow provided a boost in aid. In late November 1968 a number of new military and economic agreements were signed between Hanoi and the Soviet Union for the year 1969. According to a Soviet official publication released in 1972: “The agreements provided for large Soviet deliveries of foodstuffs, petroleum products, transportation means, complete plant, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemical fertilizers, arms ammunition and other commodities indispensable for strengthening Vietnam’s defenses and developing its economy.” Additionally, Hanoi requested a change in the configuration of its aid from Moscow from 1969 onward. More economic aid was sought. While estimates vary among analysts, there is an identifiable trend, beginning in 1969 and lasting until the mid-1980s, of the Soviet Union giving a substantial secular increase in economic aid. Hanoi’s alignment with Moscow was necessary to ensure the continuance, and possibly the increase, of this support. In contrast to the trend of increasing Soviet-Vietnamese support, Chinese military aid to North Vietnam peaked in 1968 and declined in 1969 and 1970 (before increasing from 1971 through 1973).

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE COOPERATION ON THE PARIS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS Even as Moscow’s economic and military aid to Hanoi increased, there was a growing convergence of perspectives on the part of Moscow and Hanoi. Throughout the entire period of the Paris peace negotiations, from 1968 to

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1973, close consultation occurred between Moscow and Hanoi on the appropriate negotiating strategy for Hanoi to adopt with the Americans. The primary avenues for Soviet-Vietnamese communication were meetings between Soviet diplomatic staff based in Paris and the Vietnamese negotiating team for the U.S.-Vietnamese talks. The Soviets were provided with extensive and detailed information on the official discussions, as well as details of the informal talks. The Soviets worked to defend their perceived interests in the negotiations, intervening to pressure the Vietnamese communists at times. On other occasions the Soviets conveyed Hanoi’s positions to the Americans. An example of this dynamic can be seen in the role played the by Soviet ambassador to North Vietnam, Ilia Shcherbakov. Shcherbakov was informed by Vietnamese diplomats on the latest developments in the Vietnamese talks with the U.S. He provided advice on possible Vietnamese proposals and explained the Soviet position. Similarly, the Soviet ambassador to France, Valerin Zorin, maintained close ties with the Vietnamese delegation. It was a victory of sorts for the Soviets over the Chinese when in January 1970, at the eighteenth plenum of the Third Central Committee of the Vietnamese Worker’s Party, the party adopted as its primary goal the pursuit of diplomatic and political struggle on the same level as military struggle. Indeed, as early as 1968 the Soviet ambassador to Hanoi had begun to see an emphasis being placed by the Vietnamese on tripartite military, political, and diplomatic struggle as opposed to the purely military struggle approach that the Chinese were advocating. This was the first time the Vietnamese communists had formally placed the diplomatic channel on par with that of the military. At the plenum, the Paris peace talks were stressed as critical to the efforts of the Vietnamese people in their conflict with the U.S. Significantly, Soviet officials were given prior notice of this development. This was regarded by the Soviets as a retreat by Hanoi from pro-Chinese positions. While Moscow admittedly had other reasons for increasing cooperation with the Vietnamese communists, such as improving Soviet-U.S. relations, its relations with Hanoi were viewed primarily through the prism of Sino-Soviet relations. For Moscow, a strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese alliance was its way of punishing Beijing for its continuing opposition to the Soviet Union. Any improvement in Soviet-Vietnamese relations was seen as reducing Chinese influence over the Vietnamese communists. Thus, as relations between the Soviets and the Vietnamese communists strengthened, the Soviet embassy in Hanoi sent a telegram to Moscow advocating a number of steps, with suggestions of “including North Vietnam in the Soviet orbit, of gradually reorienting

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DRV policy away from Beijing, and toward Moscow, and of increasing Hanoi’s influence in Southeast Asia.” By May 1971 internal Soviet documents stated Moscow’s intentions of making Hanoi a partner in extending Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. One top-secret document stated that: Now when the PTV [Soviet acronym for the Workers’ Party of Vietnam] has been strengthened on the way to independence, when the party course is developing, in general [though still slowly] in a favorable direction for us, when the DRV has become the leading force in the struggle of the peoples of Indochina, we will possess relatively more opportunities for establishing our policy in this region. It is not excluded that Indochina may become for us a key to all Southeast Asia. In addition, in this region, there is nobody, so far, we can lean on, except the DRV.

LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET-VIETNAMESE ALIGNMENT Notwithstanding the improving Soviet-Vietnamese ties, there remained constraints on Soviet influence over the North Vietnamese. Hanoi still wished to maintain some distance from Moscow. One report from the Soviet embassy in Hanoi in 1970 reflected this position nicely. The document stated that “the Vietnamese comrades have remained in the previous position of incomplete confidence in the USSR, based on the thesis formulated earlier: do not spoil or aggravate relations with the Soviet Union, but do not draw closer to it with complete confidence.” The Vietnamese communists still needed Chinese assistance in the conflict against the Americans, and could not afford to alienate Beijing by fully throwing in their lot with Moscow. Thus, Truong Nhu Tang, minister of justice in the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government, has observed that though Hanoi was increasingly partial toward the Soviets, particularly after the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, its actual policy was to not commit to the Soviets against the Chinese. The two hundred fifty to three hundred Soviet military advisors who were based in North Vietnam were strictly restricted to providing military advice. Hanoi was careful not to reveal information about tactics and strategy in utilizing the equipment that was supplied by the Soviets. Another example of the Vietnamese communists’ continuing desire not to be too close to the Soviet Union was its non-endorsement of a Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system. In June 1969, at the Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow, Soviet leader Brezhnev announced that: “The course of

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events places on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.” The significance of this proposal was its emphasis on state-to-state relations with Asian states rather than the promotion of revolution against them. This was in direct contrast to the Chinese approach of promoting revolution. Certainly the Americans saw a clear difference in the Chinese and Soviet perspectives. Documents released in late 2004 reveal that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency viewed the Soviet Asian collective security proposal as an initiative designed to forestall the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia. In a 12 August 1969 National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA expressed the view that the proposal was “an effort to capitalize on an anticipated reduction in Western presence, and at the same time, to prevent any significant Chinese gains in its wake.” Whatever the case, the fact remains that notwithstanding Soviet claims that the proposal was not aimed to isolate China, the timing of its announcement (just after the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes) suggests that it was indeed a Soviet attempt to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities. Indeed, Beijing saw the Soviet collective security proposal as designed to undermine the Chinese position in Southeast Asia. Hanoi did not send a delegation to this conference and made no response to Moscow’s call for a collective security proposal.

SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT OVER THE SOVIET UNION ’ S ROLE IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS There was an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict because of the increased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. Notwithstanding subsequent Chinese arguments that Beijing was unclear about Hanoi’s strategic intentions in entering into the Paris peace negotiations, the record indicates otherwise. Beijing was at once clear-eyed and genuinely unhappy with Hanoi’s decision of entering into the Paris peace negotiations. The Chinese were dissatisfied about Soviet influence over Vietnam’s negotiating position in the U.S.-North Vietnamese Paris peace talks and saw the talks as a valuable opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its influence on Vietnamese foreign policy. Thus, in bilateral talks, the Chinese vigorously opposed the Vietnamese communists’ participation in the Paris peace talks. As the close consultation between the Vietnamese and Soviets in Paris discussed above indicates, Beijing’s fears were justified. The Chinese attempted to use economic and military aid as a diplomatic tool to get the Vietnamese communists to abandon negotiations. Aid to Hanoi was first decreased in 1969. When Hanoi did not respond as Beijing wished,

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aid was further reduced. In a 21 April 1969 meeting with Pham Hung, Zhou Enlai stressed the principles of independence and self-reliance. Then in August 1969, according to the Vietnamese communists, Beijing explicitly linked the provision of further aid to a de-emphasis on or abandonment of negotiations with the Americans. When Hanoi ignored Beijing’s position and went ahead with negotiations, Beijing countered with a drop in aid to North Vietnam. A 1979 Vietnamese white paper states that in 1969 Beijing cut its overall aid by 20 percent in 1969. For the year 1970, Hanoi states that the Chinese “reduced aid by 50 percent compared to 1968 levels.” More detailed analysis by Chinese military experts indicates a decline in eight of the nine categories of Chinese military aid in the years 1969 and 1970. It should be noted that a change in Chinese policy subsequently occurred from 1971 to 1973, and will be explored later in this chapter. The Chinese “linkage” approach, tying its aid to Hanoi to Beijing’s preferred stance of a de-emphasis or abandonment of Vietnamese negotiations with the Americans, did not work. Shut out of Soviet-Vietnamese exchanges on the Paris peace negotiations, Beijing made a virtue out of necessity. This comes across in a 7 September 1969 conversation that Zhou Enlai had with the chairman of Romania’s Council of Ministers, Ion Gheorghe Maurer. According to Zhou, China did not intervene in the Paris peace negotiations for two reasons. With regard to the Paris talks, we have never intervened partly because the DRV makes its own decisions and partly because the Soviet Union has intervened. We do not give any attention to whether the talks proceed smoothly or slowly. The Soviet Union is using the Vietnam issue, the Middle Eastern issue, the West Berlin issue, and the China question as its trump cards in bargaining with the United States.

The Chinese dissatisfaction at their lack of influence over the Vietnamese in the Paris peace negotiations and the concomitant prominent role of the Soviets is explicitly acknowledged by Qu Xin, a Chinese specialist on Sino-Vietnamese relations. Qu Xin notes that China’s lack of influence was epitomized by the fact that the Vietnamese communists only notified their Chinese counterparts two hours before the formal declaration of the final agreement in 1973. Ultimately, however, the Chinese erred in expecting that their aid would cause the Vietnamese to adopt a stance on Paris peace talks that was similar to the Chinese one. In this respect, the Chinese failed to appreciate the role of the Paris peace negotiations in Hanoi’s overall strategy against the Americans. Ne-

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gotiations were utilized as a tactic to further Hanoi’s strategic objectives. For example, the North Vietnamese offer to hold discussions just prior to the Tet Offensive was an attempt to lull the Americans into a temporary sense of complacency. Beijing, by failing to appreciate this crucial point, and by persisting in their efforts to get their Vietnamese allies to abandon talks and conduct a strategy of protracted war, appeared doctrinaire to the point of placing their interests in opposing the Soviets ahead of the Vietnamese communists’ interests. This cost Beijing a significant amount of credibility among the Vietnamese communists. By the end of 1970 it was becoming increasingly clear that developments in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship were tied tightly to the status of corresponding developments in Sino-Soviet and the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. A recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency study of Chinese foreign relations during the Cold War, completed on 12 November 1970, made the following conclusion: Though some of the immediate danger has been removed from the situation, the Sino-Soviet dispute remains the single most important bilateral concern for Beijing. At the same time, it conditions and determines many aspects of the Chinese posture in dealing with other Communist states, the Third World, and the West.

The ultimate recipients of this Central Intelligence Agency report were President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. They fully appreciated that Beijing’s problems with Moscow created an opportunity for the United States to exploit. This point comes through in the following quote from Henry Kissinger’s memoirs, which discusses the impact of the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 on U.S. policy toward China. Kissinger notes: The new [Nixon] administration had a notion, not yet a strategy, to move toward China. Policy emerges when concept encounters opportunity. Such an occasion arose when Soviet and Chinese troops clashed in the frozen Siberian tundra along a river of which none of us had ever heard. From then on ambiguity vanished, and we moved without further hesitation toward a momentous change in global policy.

We shall discuss the relationship of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement to the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangle in the next section.

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THE ROLE OF CHINESE BETRAYAL IN THE TERMINATION OF THE SINO-VIETNAMESE ALLIANCE The discussion so far has focused on the role of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship as a causal variable in explaining Sino-Vietnamese conflict. It is necessary to examine the role of another possible causal variable, namely SinoAmerican rapprochement, as a possible cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. According to this alternative explanation, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, Beijing reacted to the increased Soviet threat by entering into a rapprochement with Washington. This eventually led to an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the termination of the alliance. What are we to make of this argument? There is indeed a strong case to be made that increasing Sino-Soviet conflict did lead to Sino-American rapprochement. Chinese and American analyses of Beijing’s foreign policy during this period regularly argue this case. However, did the Sino-American rapprochement, which was a betrayal by Beijing of Hanoi, cause the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance? This chapter will argue that the causal link between Sino-Soviet conflict and Sino-American rapprochement is strong. However, Sino-U.S. rapprochement, while admittedly leading to some increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict, did not cause the termination of the SinoVietnamese alliance.

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND SINO-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT The escalation of conflict in Sino-Soviet relations described above caused a fundamental reassessment of Chinese foreign policy, in the form of SinoAmerican rapprochement. Domestic mobilization was inadequate as a counter to the Soviet threat to Chinese security. American assistance was needed. In a meeting with members of the Cultural Revolution Leading Group on 15 March 1969, Mao acknowledged that “now we are isolated and no one shows interest in us.” Seeking a way to counter the increased Soviet threat following the declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968 and subsequent border clashes in 1969, Mao looked to the possibility of using the United States as a balancer against the Soviets. After the CCP’s Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, a group of four marshals was tasked to study the international situation and make recommendations. From 7 June through 10 July the marshals held six meetings. On

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11 July their report was presented to Zhou Enlai. Xiong Xianghui, Zhou Enlai’s assistant, and Yao Guang, head of the European and American division in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, were tasked to assist the marshals. (Xiong subsequently published an account of his experiences as well as the text of the marshals’ report.) The marshals argued that the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to China than did the U.S. The report stated: “The Soviet revisionists have made China their main enemy, imposing a greater threat to our security than the U.S. imperialists.” In discussing Sino-American rapprochement, it is pertinent to note that recent analysis based on Chinese memoirs and documents released since the 1990s strongly suggests that there was little substantive opposition within the Chinese leadership to Mao’s plan for a rapprochement with the United States. In any case—and fortuitously for Mao—during this same period the newly elected U.S. presidential candidate Richard Nixon was seeking to engage China in balancing the Soviet Union. Writing in Foreign Affairs just over a year before he was elected in December 1968, Nixon expressed interest in new approaches toward China. Nixon was interested in Sino-U.S. rapprochement primarily for two reasons: (1) to reduce the U.S. presence in Vietnam, and (2) to align the U.S. with China against the Soviets. After reading Nixon’s inaugural speech in January 1969, Mao authorized its publication in the People’s Daily.

DID SINO-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT CAUSE THE SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT IN 1979? Even if Sino-Soviet conflict did lead to Sino-U.S. rapprochement, what was its effect on Sino-Vietnamese relations? The literature does note that the rapprochement served to foster the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Jonathan Pollack points out that “Vietnam’s relations with China were the first and perhaps the most important casualty of the Sino-American rapprochement, underscoring Hanoi’s subsequent conviction that enhanced relations with Moscow would be crucial to deflecting growing political pressure from Peking.” A more recent study of Sino-American relations during the 1961–74 period argues that “the [Sino-U.S.] rapprochement played a key role in the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations over the 1970s, culminating in the war of 1979.” However, it is instructive and illuminating to move beyond the observation of a generalized deleterious effect of the rapprochement on Sino-Vietnamese relations to explore the exact effect the rapprochement had

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on Sino-Vietnamese relations. While it is clear that the rapprochement had a corrosive effect on relations, it will be argued that the rapprochement was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the termination of the alliance.

THE QUESTION OF CHINESE BETRAYAL According to the Oxford English Dictionary, betrayal is defined as: “A violation of trust or confidence, an abandonment of something committed to one’s charge.” The Vietnamese communists felt that their Chinese comrades had a charge to pursue a policy toward the U.S. that did not undermine Hanoi’s strategy vis-à-vis Washington. From Hanoi’s perspective, given that the Vietnamese communists were fighting for their survival, this was a reasonable expectation. The Vietnamese thus felt betrayed that the Chinese entered into a rapprochement with the U.S. It is true, as Luthi has argued, that the Chinese (and for that matter the Soviets) actually increased military aid to Hanoi during the 1971 to 1973 period, and that this facilitated the Vietnamese communists’ massive Easter Offensive in March–June 1972. The crucial point on the question of whether there was a betrayal was not levels of aid per se, but the whether the Vietnamese believed that their allies had taken actions that undermined their position with respect to the Americans. On this point, as will be elaborated below, the Vietnamese communists believed at the time that they had been betrayed, and told the Chinese so. Lucien Pye has correctly argued that the Chinese betrayed the Vietnamese communists by entering into a rapprochement with the United States. He notes: “The ultimate act of Chinese betrayal of a beleaguered ally was Mao’s decision to invite Dr. Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon to Peking while Vietnam was still fighting the war and stubbornly holding out in the peace negotiations.” That being said, it is also easy to see why the Chinese betrayed the Vietnamese. Beijing was simply prioritizing its own national security interests, and placing the need to obtain an American ally to counter a growing Soviet threat above that of its commitments to the Vietnamese. The question we are concerned with answering is this: Did the Chinese betrayal of their Vietnamese comrades through the Sino-American rapprochement cause the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance? The rapprochement policy adopted by the Chinese had a negative effect on the SinoVietnamese alliance, as we will explore below. However, on the central question of whether the rapprochement caused the termination of the alliance, the existing evidence suggests not. Rapprochement was neither necessary nor suffi-

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cient for the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. The termination of the alliance was not an inevitable byproduct of the Sino-American rapprochement. A whole series of independent events and decisions needed to take place in the post-1975 period for the termination of the alliance to occur. Hanoi had legitimate reasons to be outraged at Chinese rapprochement with the U.S., and they duly expressed these to the Chinese. In a meeting between Zhou Enlai and Vietnamese leaders Le Duan and Pham Van Dong in Hanoi on 7 March 1971, Zhou was told that “support to the peoples’ revolutionary struggles cannot be sacrificed for the sake of relations between governments. Only traitors do that.” In a 16 July 1971 Vietnamese Workers’ Party Politburo meeting, it was agreed that the Sino-American rapprochement was a “torpedo” against Hanoi and had played a significant role in increasing Nixon’s chances of re-election in the Presidential elections later in the year. Indeed in mid-July 1971, when he informed the Vietnamese leadership of the planned summit meetings between President Nixon and Chairman Mao that were to take place the following year, Zhou Enlai had to deal with a critical response from the Vietnamese leadership. Zhou was told by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong that “the Nixon visit is . . . against the interests of Vietnam.” Hanoi’s feeling of betrayal was compounded when Pham Van Dong visited Beijing for a week in late November. Pham requested that the Chinese rescind the invitation to Nixon to visit China, but the Chinese refused to do so. General Wang Youping, the Chinese ambassador to Hanoi (1969–1974) at the time, described the basic dynamics along these lines: “The Vietnamese leadership was very unhappy, [and] there was veiled criticism in their discussions [with the Chinese].” It is therefore not surprising that in his discussions with the Chinese, Pham Van Dong overtly praised Moscow’s contribution to Vietnam’s struggle against the Americans. Following Pham’s return to Hanoi, critical references were made in the North Vietnamese press to developments in Sino-American relations. An editorial in the North Vietnamese communist party paper Nhan Dan, entitled “The Nixon Doctrine Will Come to Nothing,” made clear the Vietnamese dissatisfaction with the trajectory of Sino-American relations. In a sign of their continuing dissatisfaction, the Vietnamese did not turn up for the annual Chinese New Year celebration at the Chinese embassy in Hanoi on 21 February 1972. When Zhou visited Hanoi in early March 1972, immediately after Nixon’s visit, he faced charges from the Vietnamese of “throwing a life buoy” to “a drowning Nixon.” During talks with Zhou, Le Duan highlighted the ominous implications of the rapprochement for Hanoi, stating that “now that

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Nixon has talked to you, they will hit us even harder.” Given Vietnamese disappointment over Nixon’s visit to China (and his planned trip to Moscow in November that year), it is understandable why Hanoi was suspicions of the Chinese (and Soviets) and attempted to conceal the forthcoming Easter Offensive from them. Notwithstanding the tensions described above, we should be cautious in overemphasizing the effect of Beijing’s rapprochement with Washington as a causal factor in the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. The first reason for doubting that Sino-U.S. rapprochement was responsible for subsequent Sino-Vietnamese conflict is the significant fact that the Soviets engaged in a similar policy toward the U.S. that year. Recent research on Soviet Cold War foreign policy has revealed that the Soviet leadership decided that Hanoi should not be allowed to have a veto over Moscow’s relations with Washington. Yet there was no significant long-term effect on the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance of Soviet détente with the U.S. The question is then why, in the late 1970s, the Chinese were accused by the Vietnamese of betrayal for their actions in 1972, but the Soviets were not. The answer to this question resides in developments in the geostrategic sphere in the post-1975 period. After all, objectively speaking, if the Chinese communists are deemed to have betrayed their Vietnamese comrades by entering into a Sino-U.S. rapprochement, then the Soviets also “betrayed” Hanoi by engaging in a policy of détente toward the U.S.  Hanoi was the victim of a double betrayal by its allies in Beijing and Moscow. We can debate the issue of whether the Vietnamese perceived either Chinese or Soviet betrayal as being the more egregious. On that point, it can certainly be argued that the Chinese betrayal was greater than the Soviet betrayal. China’s rapprochement with the U.S. arguably had a more deleterious effect on Vietnamese security than the Soviet Union’s détente policy. While both China and the Soviet Union provided material aid, by virtue of its geographical position, as explored in the previous chapter, Chinese “aid” also consisted of its unique deterrent threat of escalating its support to the Vietnamese communists. Sino-U.S. rapprochement reduced the credibility of the Chinese threat of military intervention in retaliation against U.S. escalation in Vietnam. Indeed, this very dynamic occurred during the Nixon administration’s postrapprochement aerial campaign and mining of Haiphong harbor. So Hanoi was correct to make a distinction between Soviet-U.S. détente and Sino-U.S. rapprochement. However, the critical point is that Hanoi felt that both its allies, by seeking better relations with Washington at a crucial point in the Vietnamese conflict

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with the U.S., had engaged in an act of betrayal. Evidence buttressing this position includes the fact that soon after Nixon’s visits to Beijing and Moscow, which occurred in February and May 1972 respectively, the Vietnamese communists expressed equivalent dissatisfaction against the policies that their Chinese and Soviet allies had adopted toward the United States. A 17 August 1972 Nhan Dan editorial critiqued the policies of socialist countries who had pursued conciliatory policies toward “imperialist” countries. The article noted: With regards to socialist countries, the defense of peace and peaceful coexistence cannot be disassociated from the movement for independence, democracy and socialism in the world. For a country to care for its immediate and narrow interests while shirking its lofty internationalist duties not only is detrimental to the revolutionary movement in world but will also bring unfathomable harm to itself in the end. The vitality of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism manifests itself in revolutionary deeds, not in empty words.

Relatedly, a second critique of the argument that Sino-U.S. rapprochement caused Sino-Vietnamese conflict relates to the issue of temporality. There is a considerable time lag between Sino-U.S. rapprochement, which occurred in 1972, and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, which became clear in 1978, after the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance treaty was signed. The serious Sino-Vietnamese conflict that erupted after fall 1978, and which led to a border war in early 1979, was not inevitable. Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter 5, the period between 1975 and 1978 witnessed numerous attempts at the resolution of differences between Hanoi and Beijing. To cite one important example, immediately after the Vietnamese victory over the Americans, Vietnamese leader Le Duan made a trip to Beijing from 22 to 28 September 1975. Relatively recently released documents from Russian archives reveal that a key aim of the trip was to improve Vietnam’s relations with China. Hanoi’s attempt failed as the Chinese “openly and officially” took umbrage at the increasingly close relationship between Hanoi and Moscow. More broadly, if these overtures had been successful, the Sino-Vietnamese alliance would have endured in spite of the betrayal of 1972. In the end, it was a conscious decision on the part of the Vietnamese to align with the Soviets and with Soviet aid, to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia and Laos. This caused Sino-Vietnamese relations to precipitously decline. As indicated above, rapprochement was neither necessary nor

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sufficient for the termination of the alliance. Nevertheless, the Sino-American rapprochement did have a corrosive effect on the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. The corrosive “rapprochement effect” worked in two ways in the post-1972 period: first, the rapprochement promoted Vietnamese interest in resisting Chinese influence; second, it reduced subsequent Vietnamese restraint in cooperating with the Soviet Union.

“ WE FELT THAT WE HAD BEEN STABBED IN THE BACK”: THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF THE BETRAYAL ARGUMENT While the betrayal of the Vietnamese communists by the Soviet and the Chinese did not lead to the collapse of Vietnam’s alliances with either state, it did yield two positive things for Hanoi.  First, Hanoi showed itself to be adept strategically, utilizing Beijing and Moscow’s sensitivity to Vietnamese charges of betrayal as leverage to elicit greater aid from its Chinese and Soviet allies. The Vietnamese communists had already benefited from Chinese and Soviet sensitivities to charges of betrayal. In 1971, the year preceding President Nixon’s visits to Beijing and Moscow, both China and the Soviet Union significantly increased military aid to Hanoi. Hanoi had an interest in playing up its feelings of abandonment and betrayal as a means of extracting even more aid from Beijing and Moscow. In March 1972, as both Beijing and Moscow adopted conciliatory policies toward Washington, Hanoi complained about both Chinese and Soviet policy toward the U.S. Thus, the North Vietnamese minister of foreign trade, Phan Anh, argued that the Soviets and Chinese “have succumbed to the Machiavellian policy reconciliation with U.S. imperialists . . . who are attempting to lure us into the path of compromise.” Hanoi’s efforts at using the “betrayal card” worked. Chinese military aid was increased again in 1972. Indeed, in 1972 and 1973 Beijing delivered more military aid than in the previous two decades. Second, the betrayal argument proved to be a very useful tool for the Vietnamese to mobilize their population against the Chinese threat in the post-1979 period. The events of 1972 were reinterpreted to suit the requirements of post1979 political discourse in Vietnamese communist politics. Thus, after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, the Vietnamese communists argued in their 1979 white paper that Sino-U.S. rapprochement was “a milestone on Peking’s path of overt betrayal of the Vietnamese revolution, not to mention the Indochinese revolution and world revolution.” The white paper argues that this Chinese “betrayal” was repeated in an increasingly hostile Chinese policy toward

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Vietnam in the period 1975–1979. Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap goes even further, linking post-1979 Sino-Vietnamese hostilities all the way back to the Vietnam War. Giap argues: The Chinese government told the United States [during the Vietnam War] that if the latter did not threaten or touch China, then China would do nothing to prevent the attacks [on Vietnam]. It was really like telling the United States that it could bomb Vietnam at will, as long as there was no threat to the border. . . . We felt that we had been stabbed in the back [my emphasis]. . . . Later when the United States began systematically to bomb North Vietnam, the Soviet Union proposed to send air units and missile forces to defend Vietnam. It was the Chinese leaders that had prevented it from doing so. We had to resolve the situation in a way which would not affect our war of resistance against the Americans. For this reason we could not publicly denounce the Chinese, nor could we reveal the Soviet proposal. . . . After Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué, this showed that the Chinese leaders were clamoring for an American presence in Southeast Asia, even in South Vietnam. When we recount all these events and link them to the war in the Southwest [i.e., Cambodia] we can see the treachery of the Chinese.

In 1982 the Vietnamese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach repeated the betrayal charge: After Nixon’s visit to China, Mao Tse-tung told Prime Minister Pham Van Dong that his broom was not long enough to sweep Taiwan clean and that ours was not long enough to get the Americans out of South Vietnam. He [Mao] wanted to halt unification and force us to recognize the puppet regime in the South. He [Mao] had sacrificed Vietnam for the sake of the United States.

CHINA ADJUSTS ITS STRATEGY: DRIVING A WEDGE IN SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS Chinese strategy toward Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation did evolve in a more sophisticated direction over time. Notwithstanding Beijing’s efforts, it was clear that Hanoi and Moscow were becoming increasingly close, raising the specter of a direct Soviet threat from the North, and the indirect threat manifest in Soviet encirclement through its increasing cooperation with Hanoi. In this

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respect, during the period 1964–1968 Chinese efforts at limiting the expansion of Soviet cooperation with the Vietnamese communists exacerbated conflict in Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations. A change in tactic occurred on the part of Beijing. China sought to create Soviet-Vietnamese conflict by means of driving a wedge between the two. It did this by increasing its military and economic aid to Hanoi  and by urging Hanoi to request more aid from Moscow, in the hope that the latter could not meet these requests. This change in approach was also driven by the need to wind down the conflict in Vietnam so that the consolidation of the Sino-American rapprochement against the Soviet Union could occur. From 1971 until 1973 Beijing provided more military aid than it had during the entire twenty years previously. In terms of economic aid, Chinese estimates indicate that in the period 1971–1975, Chinese aid to North Vietnam constituted 40.4 percent of China’s total aid budget. Even as the process of Sino-American rapprochement occurred, China intensified its reconstruction of North Vietnam’s critical transportation links, which were being destroyed by American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail. In December 1970 Zhou Enlai dispatched the vice minister of foreign trade, Li Qiang for an onsite inspection to enable the Chinese to better understand Vietnamese requirements. The Chinese subsequently sent more than a thousand engineers, technicians, and laborers to assist the war effort. The Chinese repaired seven highways (1,234 kilometers) and constructed nine new roads in North Vietnam. Additionally, reflecting the fact that Indochina was a single strategic theater, the Chinese were responsible for constructing highways (1,229 kilometers) and roads (825 kilometers) in Laos. These transport links in North Vietnam and Laos were used to transport Chinese aid in the Vietnamese war effort. The second adjustment of Chinese policy was a recognition of the need to be less obstructionist and to scale down the Sino-Soviet conflict over aid to the Vietnamese communists. China actually urged the Vietnamese to expedite Soviet aid to North Vietnam through China. In January, February, and March 1972 China signed agreements with respect to the transportation of supplies to Vietnam from a number of countries, including Bulgaria, East Germany, Romania, and the Soviet Union. At that point the Chinese sought to facilitate the swift flow of supplies. Chinese calls to the Vietnamese to press the Soviets were reiterated in a 20 May 1972 meeting between Zhou, Le Duan, and Ngo Thuyen, the Vietnamese ambassador to China. The Chinese asked the Vietnamese communists to open up new supply routes. Beijing even increased, from forty-six to sixty, the maximum number of Soviet personnel who were

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allowed at any one time to escort the supplies through China. On one occasion Zhou even consented to a Soviet request to allow four hundred unarmed Soviet military personnel to accompany Soviet supplies to Vietnam. On 18 June 1972 a meeting between Zhou and Le Duc Tho produced an agreement that allowed ships from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Eastern European states to utilize Chinese ports on their way to North Vietnam. This was followed up on 10 July with a further agreement specifying the types of goods that could be shipped. The Chinese even agreed to the shipment of Soviet helicopter equipment to the port of Zhanjiang, where they could then be trial-tested at Zhanjiang airport. Amid American bombing and sealing off of Vietnamese ports in the first half of 1972, the Chinese also agreed to Vietnamese requests that aid from Soviet and other communist bloc states be stored in China.

BILATERAL ISSUES AS A POSSIBLE CAUSE OF SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT Another possible alternative explanation for Sino-Vietnamese conflict involves bilateral issues in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. There is some evidence of a specifically bilateral Sino-Vietnamese rivalry for influence in Cambodia. Thus, Prince Nordom Sihanouk remarked on 28 February 1970 that if the U.S. tired of fighting in Vietnam and withdrew from Southeast Asia, “We [Cambodia] would be obliged, despite ourselves, to become satellites of China. That is, if the Vietnamese communists permit it, because it seems that they consider Cambodia, just like Laos, their own preserve.” Very soon after the Cambodian monarch made the statement, while on a visit to Moscow, he was overthrown in a 18 March 1970 coup by the American-backed general Lon Nol. Notwithstanding Sihanouk’s comments, a close examination of events in this period reveals Sino-Vietnamese rivalry over Cambodia to be relatively muted. There was little specifically bilateral Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Cambodia per se. To the extent that the Chinese were involved in Cambodian issues it was primarily because of fear that the Soviets would exploit the situation. Indeed, as noted above, Sihanouk was in Moscow when the Lon Nol coup took place. Upon hearing of the coup, Soviet premier Kosygin offered Soviet military assistance to Cambodia even while expressing confidence that China would not be as forthcoming. Thus, Kosygin noted: You can have absolute confidence in the Soviet Union’s backing of your struggle. . . . You will see how it will be with the Chinese. They helped you

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A WAR ON TWO FRONTS

while you were in power in Phnom Penh but now that you are no longer in power, you will see what they will do!

The prince went from Moscow to Beijing, where Zhou Enlai received him at the airport. Precisely to counteract Soviet influence, the Chinese sponsored an Indochinese summit conference in Guangzhou in April 1970 to organize opposition to the Lon Nol regime. The Cambodian opposition, formally called the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK), was nominally headed by Prince Sihanouk. GRUNK was based in Beijing  and included the Khmer Rouge, the Hanoi-trained Khmer Viet Minh, and a group called the Sihanoukists. Pham Van Dong represented the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This chapter has argued that the Chinese viewed their relationship with the Vietnamese communists primarily through the prism of a deteriorating SinoSoviet relationship. When Hanoi and Moscow consolidated relations after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Sino-Vietnamese relations declined. Similarly, when the Vietnamese and Soviets increased cooperation in the Paris peace negotiations and Hanoi accepted increased Soviet military and economic aid after the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969, SinoVietnamese conflict increased. Pushing the analysis a little further, the argument advanced here necessarily implies that at any point in time after the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the early 1960s, the key to understanding Chinese foreign policy on any issue requires a thorough investigation of the Soviet stance on that same issue. For example, contrary to Chinese rhetoric after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Chinese were not in principle opposed to military intervention by communist states in other communist states. Indeed, the Chinese had previously supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. To borrow from the four marshals, it was because the Soviet Union had made China their “main enemy, imposing a greater threat to our security than the U.S. imperialists,” that China condemned the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even on the issue of negotiations with the Americans to end the Vietnam War, the Soviet factor occupies as significant a role as the United States. Prior to 1972, China’s fear of collusion between the Soviet Union and the U.S. drove its opposition to Hanoi’s participation in talks with Washington. Beijing’s opposition to negotiations prior to 1972 damaged its credibility in Hanoi. Its conversion to the negotiations in 1972 (after Sino-American rapprochement

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77

and attendant reduction in Chinese fear of collusion) was a further blow to Beijing’s relationship with the Vietnamese communists. In 1972 the Chinese advised the Vietnamese communists to negotiate with the United States, even while insisting that they were faithful to the principle of people’s war. On 31 December 1972 Zhou Enlai told North Vietnamese leader Truong Chinh that the Vietnamese communists “ought to approach the negotiations seriously in order to produce results.” It is reasonable to assume that the subsequent positive Chinese reaction to the January 1973 agreement rubbed further salt in Hanoi’s wounds. As a result of the events that we have explored in this chapter, when the Sino-Soviet conflict escalated in the post-1973 period the Vietnamese were more open to a closer alignment with the Soviets, which in turn led to increased Sino-Vietnamese conflict. However, contrary to the implication of the betrayal thesis, the history of China’s interaction with the Vietnamese communists in the pre-1973 period did not make post-1973 Sino-Vietnamese conflict inevitable. It was the particular course of events in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Vietnamese relations that were to exercise a critical influence. We shall now examine these developments.

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4 THE POLITICS OF VICTORY Sino-Soviet Relations and the Road to Vietnamese Unification, 1973–1975

By the time the Paris Agreement was concluded in l ate January 1973, the Chinese and the Soviets had come to view each other as inveterate adversaries. Not surprisingly, bilateral relations in the period from 1973 until 1975 were characterized by increasing conflict. Given this state of affairs, there were increasing incentives for Moscow to further develop its relationship with Hanoi through economic and military assistance. The accompanying increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation had the effect of heightening Chinese fears about encirclement on its southern periphery. Beijing then adopted a strategy that was designed to balance against the increasingly Soviet-aligned Vietnamese. This included increased Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and preventive action over disputed islands in the South China Sea. The effect of these actions was to lead to increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict. In short, the period between the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973 and the fall of Saigon in April 1975 witnessed a repeat of the causal patterns that had characterized the 1964–1968 and 1968–1973 periods. In this respect, this chapter will show how increasing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation—and in particular, Vietnamese receptivity to Soviet foreign policy—caused an increase in SinoVietnamese conflict.

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ADVERSARIES PAR EXCELLENCE The increasing Sino-Soviet conflict over the period from the signing of the Paris Peace Accords at the end of January 1973 to the fall of Saigon at the end of April 1975 was a consequence of actions taken in both Beijing and Moscow. On the Soviet side, despite its claims of being interested in establishing relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and the normalization of relations, Moscow’s actions were designed to coerce and punish China for its perceived anti-Soviet stance. Even as the Soviets pursued a policy of détente with the Americans, they sought to undermine the Chinese position; for instance, on the issue of border negotiations the Soviet posture was to offer talks even while improving the operational ability of its forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese, however, bore an approximately equal responsibility for the increasing SinoSoviet conflict. Beijing’s response to these events, as seen in Zhou Enlai’s report to the Tenth Congress of the CCP in August 1973 and in Deng Xiaoping’s 1974 speech at the United Nations, was to solidify its hostile posture toward the Soviet Union. Beijing also consolidated its ties to the United States as a means to check Soviet power. “Our Country’s Most Threatening Enemy”7 At the start of 1973 the Chinese were exercised by the Soviet threat. In a memorandum to President Nixon following his mid-February 1973 trip to Beijing to establish an American liaison office, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger observed that Mao and Zhou were “obsessed by Moscow’s intentions.” Soon after, in a 30 March 1973 article edited and printed by the propaganda division of the political department of the Kunming military region, Zhou Enlai declared that “Soviet revisionism [is] our country’s most threatening enemy.” In another article in the same month, Zhou repeated this point when he noted: “That we oppose the two superpowers is a slogan. The essence lies principally in opposition against this most actual enemy, Soviet revisionist socialimperialism, and in combat against this social-imperialism.” The Chinese premier’s views, stated in internal memoranda and reports, were aired publicly in his 24 August 1973 report to the Tenth National Congress of the CCP. Significantly, Zhou responded in this report to Moscow’s June 1973 overture, in which the Soviets suggested that the principle of peaceful coexistence, rather than international proletarianism, should serve as the foundation of Sino-Soviet relations. In addition, it was proposed to the Chinese that both

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sides sign a nonaggression treaty. The proposal essentially restated Brezhnev’s public statement of 21 March 1972. In response, Zhou appeared to offer an olive branch when he stated in his Congress report that “the Sino-Soviet controversy on matters of principle should not hinder the normalization of relations between the two states on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.” As a practical illustration of how peaceful coexistence would work in bilateral relations, Zhou highlighted the existing border disputes between Moscow and China, stating that “the Sino-Soviet boundary question should be settled peacefully through negotiations free from any threat.” The Soviet response came from Brezhnev in a speech at Tashkent on 22 September. The Soviet leader pointed to a significant discrepancy between China’s rhetoric of wanting peace and negotiations and its actual deeds, which indicated the opposite conclusion. The Soviet leader noted: We have already declared that we are ready at this time to develop relations with the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, if Peking does not deem it possible to go farther in relations with a socialist state. The Soviet Union not only proclaims its readiness to do so but also translates it into the language of concrete and constructive proposals—on the non-use of force, on the settlement of border questions, on the improvement of relations in various fields on a mutually advantageous basis. I can inform you, comrades, that recently, we decided to take another step that convincingly shows the Soviet Union’s goodwill and constructive approach toward the question of the development of relations with the P.R.C. In mid-June, 1973, the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government officially proposed to the Chinese leadership that a non-aggression treaty be concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C, the text of which would contain a commitment by both sides not to attack one another using any type of weapons on land, on the sea or in the air, and also not to threaten such an attack. How did the Chinese side react to such a proposal? It is indicative that the P.R.C. leaders, while continuing to make noise all over the world about the “Soviet menace” allegedly impending over China, did not deign to respond to this perfectly concrete proposal by the Soviet Union. (Stir in the hall.) So, words about the normalization of relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence are a good thing, of course, but it is concrete deeds that are of decisive importance. Needless to say, neither slander

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against another country nor attempts at interference in its internal affairs can be regarded as such deeds. We have a different understanding of the basis of peaceful co-existence. [Italics added.] If the words about the normalization of relations uttered at the 10th P.R.C. Congress have any serious significance and are not just empty propaganda or verbal camouflage, they should be followed by appropriate deeds. Definitive conclusions can only be drawn on the basis of real facts.

What Brezhnev did not mention was that the Soviet Union had assembled a formidable force on the Sino-Soviet border. At the end of 1972 Moscow had more then forty military divisions in place there. Moreover, as a consequence of the 15 January 1966 Soviet-Mongolian treaty, Soviet troops covered the entire length of China’s northern border. In 1973 these quantitative Soviet capabilities were supplemented by qualitative improvements in the realm of communications and redeployment capabilities. The adjustments ensured that the troops on the Sino-Soviet border were on the same operational level as Soviet troops in Europe. In respect to the maritime sphere, the Soviet fleet in the Pacific and Indian Oceans experienced significant growth during this period and was equipped with nuclear submarines for the first time. The Soviets were in a position to inflict severe punishment on the Chinese since, as Lewis and Xue note, prior to 1975 the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) was unable to conduct an active coastal defense. A Chinese statement on the Sino-Soviet boundary question came quickly. In an interview with C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times that was published on 29 October, Zhou responded to the Soviets. He asserted that, in a meeting at the Beijing international airport in 1969, Premier Kosygin had agreed to negotiate a new border treaty. Furthermore, Zhou claimed that both sides had agreed to avoid clashes and withdraw military forces from all disputed parts of the border area. He argued that the Soviets had not fulfilled their end of this agreement. Significantly, the Chinese had not previously indicated that the Soviets had accepted the Chinese proposal during the airport meeting. In effect, Zhou was saying that the Soviets had not given in on certain core demands of the Chinese, which were: (1) that Moscow pull back its forces from disputed territories; (2) that the nineteenth-century treaties that defined the border should be acknowledged as “unequal”; and (3) that Moscow’s position in the negotiations should reflect (the Chinese view) that both the nineteenth-century treaties and the actual situation on the ground could not serve as the basis for discussion.

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The End of the “Socialist Camp” and the Rise of Three Worlds The increasing conflict in Sino-Soviet relations was symbolically expressed in China’s attempt to advance an alternative conceptualization of the international system that was at its core an attack on the Soviets. Zhou had devoted a subsection of his Tenth Party Congress speech to a discussion of the role of the Third World in world politics. This was to be developed further by Mao in early 1974. In a discussion in Beijing with Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda on 22 February 1974, Mao characterized the international system as being divided into Three Worlds (sange shijie huafen). Mao’s perspective was formally presented to the world in a speech delivered by Deng Xiaoping at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 April 1974. In the speech Deng declared the end of the socialist camp. Deng observed that “as a result of the emergence of [Soviet] social-imperialism, the socialist camp which had existed for a time after World War Two is no longer in existence.” Where then did China belong? China was placed squarely in the category of the Third World, which was distinct from the superpowers that constituted the First World and from the industrialized states of Western Europe and Japan, which belonged to the Second World. According to Deng: “China is a socialist country, and a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World.” From this vantage point, criticism was in turn leveled at both the United States and the Soviet Union. Deng observed that “the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are vainly seeking world hegemony . . . [they] are the biggest exploiters and oppressors of today.” It was clear to Beijing that of the two superpowers, Moscow posed the greater threat to the world. Deng noted that “in bullying others, the superpower which flaunts the label of socialism is especially vicious.” This superpower, Deng contended, was practicing “socialism in words and imperialism in deeds,” and used “economic cooperation” as a means of economically exploiting its partners. In this respect, Deng concluded that Moscow had “gone to lengths rarely seen even in the case of imperialist countries.” Deng was affirming a strategic decision taken by the Chinese, and underpinned by the four marshals’ 1969 report, which argued the case for tilting toward the United States as a way to balance against the Soviets. The Soviets were clearly perceived, in Zhou Enlai’s words, as China’s “most threatening enemy.” The adoption of this position necessarily had implications for SinoVietnamese relations. And though Deng declared that the socialist camp no

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longer existed during his speech at the U.N. in 1974, the Vietnamese held a different view. In the joint statement released at the end of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong’s visit to Moscow in July 1973, the imperative of strengthening “the unity of the communist movement” was stressed.

CHINA EMBRACES REALPOLITIK: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION As discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese moved toward a rapprochement and de facto alliance with the United States in order to deal with the Soviet threat. The benefits to the Chinese of cooperating with the Americans were straightforward and real. Despite engaging in détente with the Soviets, the Americans were now also providing a counterbalance to the Soviets. The Chinese were no longer facing the might of the Soviet Union alone. The American disapproval of a Soviet attack against China was known to the Soviets, and represented a tangible benefit of the evolving Sino-American relationship. For example, recent research has indicated that the possibility of a Soviet strike on Chinese nuclear facilities still existed as late as 1973. When the Soviets approached the United States about a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear facilities, Kissinger informed the Chinese that in May 1973 Brezhnev had suggested the option of “joint action against Chinese nuclear facilities.” On 10 November 1973, during a visit to Beijing, Kissinger told Zhou Enlai that the Soviets “want us to accept the desirability of destroying China’s nuclear capability.” Kissinger also informed the Chinese that he had directed the Department of Defense to develop options for an American nuclear response to a Soviet strike. The Americans also provided valuable security intelligence to China on the Soviet Union. Robert MacFarlane, the CIA intelligence chief in Beijing, observed that the intelligence provided to the Chinese: Involved not only [information on Soviet] strategic nuclear forces, but also conventional army, navy and air forces positioned on the Chinese border and in ocean seas. In addition, the U.S. would brief the Chinese on extensive Soviet military aid program to dozens of countries and guerilla movements around the world, including Vietnam.

A comprehensive analysis of the Sino-American rapprochement must necessarily focus on analyzing not just its benefits, but also its costs. The costs to the Chinese of the Sino-American rapprochement included: (1) a loss of

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flexibility in dealing with the U.S. and (2) the damage inflicted on the SinoVietnamese alliance. First, as a consequence of its reliance on the United States to check the Soviet threat to China, Beijing (and Moscow, for that matter) suffered a loss of flexibility in its foreign policy. This reality was recognized by the Americans. In a national intelligence estimate written on 25 October 1973 and marked “secret,” the CIA noted that “the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing now affects virtually every aspect of their foreign policies, and on balance, has exacted a heavy price from each of them in their dealings with other nations. Their attention and resources have been diverted from other problems to deal with what has become a high priority for each—containing the influence of the other.” Moreover, the report predicted that “the fundamental issues and basic clashes of interest which separate the two powers appear so profound as to ensure the prolongation of a competitive and adversary relationship” (italics in original). One important implication of this loss of flexibility was that China had to accommodate itself to the vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics. For example, Beijing had expected that rapprochement would lead to the expeditious establishment of diplomatic relations during Nixon’s second term. However, the combination of President Nixon’s resignation on 9 August 1974 and the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975 ensured that there would not be a swift normalization of Sino-American relations, because the domestic political costs to the Ford administration of seeking normalized relations were simply too high. Nor was there to be a break in U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Again because of domestic political considerations, the Ford administration was unwilling to make further concessions on the Taiwan issue. China was unable to impose significant costs on the United States for these acts. A second cost to China of its cooperation with the U.S. against the Soviets lay in the damage inflicted on Sino-Vietnamese relations. As we examined in the previous chapter, the rapprochement had an undeniably adverse impact on the Vietnamese communists’ view of China. In this respect, there was both a short-run and a long-run cost to the Chinese imposed by their cooperation with the Americans. As we shall examine in greater detail later, the distrust generated by the China’s pursuit of its interests via a rapprochement with the U.S. made Hanoi more convinced that Beijing would like to see the continued division of Vietnam. Because of the understandable Vietnamese communist perception that Beijing had betrayed Hanoi with the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, specific decision-makers such as Le Duan became even more

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amenable to rejecting Chinese advice on strictly implementing the Paris Peace Agreement and delaying unification for five to ten years. Thus, in a real sense the rapprochement gave impetus to the Vietnamese communists to hasten unification. Longer-run costs were to emerge after 1975. The Sino-American cooperation from 1973 until 1975 contributed to the belief that the Chinese were not particularly reliable. The Chinese were to pay for this in the post1975 period in the form of a weakened Sino-Vietnamese relationship. (However, it should also be pointed out that détente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. also meant that Soviet-Vietnamese relations suffered from a similar dynamic.)

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE COOPERATION For the period 1973–1975 there is a relative paucity of evidence for making a definitive claim about what caused Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. A survey of the relevant literature on Soviet-Vietnamese relations revealed no direct or “smoking gun” quotations from American, Chinese, Soviet, or Vietnamese sources that indicate that it was either the Sino-Soviet conflict or the Soviet-U.S. conflict that drove the Soviets to increase their cooperation with the Vietnamese communists. Thus our argument here is necessarily tentative and qualified. It definitely needs to be supplemented by empirical evidence as and when that evidence becomes available. We should however, make an attempt at evaluating the relative merits of different hypotheses in explaining Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. The argument that it was Soviet-U.S. conflict that drove Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation is relatively weak because this is precisely the period when Washington’s relations with Moscow were, relatively speaking, at their best point during the Cold War. This was the period of détente and the “strategic triangle.” While détente did not necessarily mean that the Soviets would give up an opportunity to score a quick gain over the United States, in broad terms, this was the time when such an event was least likely to occur. Soviet-U.S. conflict was decreasing, and there were fewer incentives for the Soviets to increase cooperation with the Vietnamese communists because of their rivalry with the United States.  In contrast, the argument that Sino-Soviet conflict was an antecedent condition for Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation emerges as relatively more convincing. We do have evidence of increasing Sino-Soviet conflict (delineated in the preceding sections) and a clear pattern of increased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation (which we shall present below). Thus, while we cannot definitively

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say that the increasing Sino-Soviet conflict was an antecedent condition for increased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, it remains our best possible explanation for explaining why the Soviets continued to increase their military and economic aid to the Vietnamese communists. During the years 1973–1975 Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation took the form of increased Soviet economic aid and a reduced, but still substantial, level of military aid. Table 4.1 indicates the outlines of Soviet economic aid to Vietnam from 1973 until 1975. Economic aid increased in this period. This reflected a general trend wherein Soviet economic aid increased steadily throughout the entire period of the North Vietnamese war with the Americans, from 1965 until 1975. In fact, according to figures below, Moscow’s annual economic aid to Hanoi at the end of the Vietnam War (in 1975) was approximately two to three times the level it had been at the beginning (in 1965). This suggests that Moscow was indeed using aid as an instrument to increase its influence on Vietnamese foreign policy in the post-1975 period. Also generous, but at lower levels, was Soviet military aid. As detailed in table 4.2, Moscow provided a steady, though decreasing, supply of military aid

table 4.1. Estimates of Soviet Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1965–1975 Year

Pike

Trung

CIA

85

—

150

—

1965

278

1966

150–165

1967

200–240

200

200

1968

290–305

240

700

1969

290–385

250

250

1970

320–345

345

345

1971

310–370

315

370

1972

300–330

365

350

1973

350–390

470

—

1974

400–450

480

—

1975

450–500

520

—

Figures are in U.S.$ millions. Source: Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 190. Figures originate in Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 139; and Thai Quang Trung, “The MoscowHanoi Axis and the Soviet Military Build-Up in Southast Asia,” Indochina Report (Singapore), 8 Oct. 1986, 14.

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table 4.2 Estimates of Soviet Military Aid to Vietnam, 1965–1975 Year

Pike

CIA/DIA

Trung

1965

210–270

—

210

1966

360–455

—

360

1967

505–650

—

505

1968

390–440

—

290

1969

175–195

—

220

1970

110–205

100–105

170

1971

115–165

190–200

215

1972

300–375

480–490

450

1973

150–180

210–225

230

1974

170–245

150–155

460

1975

123–150

—

280

Figures are in U.S.$ millions. Source: Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 118, 124. Figures originate in Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 139; Thai Quang Trung, “The Moscow– Hanoi Axis and the Soviet Military Build-Up in Southeast Asia,” Indochina Report (Singapore), 8 Oct. 1986, 14; and United States Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Communist Military and Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1970–74 (Washington, D.C.: 5 March 1975).

for the 1973–1975 period. It should be noted that though Soviet military aid declined, it was still relatively high. If conservative estimates are used, Moscow’s aid to Hanoi was higher in the years 1973 and 1974, after the Paris Peace Agreement, than it was in the years 1970 and 1971.

The Dynamics of Cooperation The estimates of economic and military aid detailed above paint a broad picture of Soviet assistance to Hanoi. What purposes was this aid intended to serve? The key goal for Hanoi during this period was to achieve unification by decisively defeating its adversaries in Saigon. We shall now examine the evolution over the years 1972–1975 of Hanoi’s strategy toward securing victory over the South Vietnamese regime and show how Soviet support was tailored to support this goal. After a short period of roughly six months in which Hanoi adopted a defensive and reactive policy toward the South Vietnamese regime, and was publicly declaring, even to its own population, that the years 1974–1975 were a time of recuperation and consolidation of previous efforts, it reverted to an offensive policy designed to push for a unified Vietnam.

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In July 1973, at the Twenty-first Plenum of the Vietnamese Workers (VWP) Party Central Committee in Hanoi, a resolution was passed that called for the use of military force to hasten victory by means of a relentless series of offensive campaigns. This should not be surprising since, as we showed in chapter 3, despite the heavy casualties associated with such a strategy, this had been Hanoi’s modus operandi as far back as the Tet Offensive in 1968. The People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in the official history published in Vietnamese in 1988, has identified the resolution as an important shift in policy. The resolution was explicitly designed to repudiate the understandings reached in Paris, although one should quickly add that Hanoi claimed that it was responding to violations perpetrated by the South Vietnamese military, known formally as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In a mid-October meeting in Hanoi, the party then passed resolution twenty-one, which confirmed the change in policy. Significantly, the Vietnamese communists stated that force was to be used not just where a violation of the cease-fire had occurred, but at any point of vulnerability for the ARVN. The resolution proclaimed that “whatever the situation, we must maintain the offensive strategy line.” In March 1974 the VWP’s Central Military Party Committee reaffirmed the need for an offensive strategy to be adopted against the increasingly beleaguered ARVN. The committee declared: The Vietnamese revolution may have to pass through many transitional stages, and can only gain victory through revolutionary violence—carrying out popular uprisings, relying on our political and military forces, or in the event that big-scale war returns, carrying out revolutionary warfare to gain complete victory. The revolution in the South must hold firm to the concept of an offensive strategy. . . . We must resolutely counterattack and attack, keep the initiative in all respects.

The adjustment in strategy produced results. One former National Liberation Front (NLF) military official noted that in this period an important shift occurred in the military balance between the opposing sides. According to this official: “We understood clearly that Saigon wanted to do away with the Paris agreement and settle the conflict on the battlefield, but the balance of forces was shifting in our favor because of our superior political and moral position.” The NLF then reached a critical conclusion: “The [Nguyen Van] Thieu regime had relied on military strength and technological superiority to hide its political weakness, but by March 1974 we had taken away the advantage.”

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By autumn 1974 it was clear that the South Vietnamese military was in disarray. At this critical point, Moscow provided both symbolic and material support to ensure that Hanoi’s momentum was maintained. To emphasize Soviet support for Vietnam, on 19–27 December 1974 a military delegation led by the Soviet chief of general staff, general, and first deputy defense minister Viktor Kulikov visited Hanoi. The ostensible reason was to visit on the occasion of the thirteenth DRV Army Day. China did not send a delegation. Coinciding with the Kulikov visit were the annual negotiations on Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Strong circumstantial evidence suggests that the Soviet general participated in these negotiations, which, in a departure from previous practice, were conducted in Hanoi and not in Moscow. Significantly, the negotiations were conducted as the Vietnamese politburo was meeting (from 18 December 1974 to 8 January 1975) to chart a two-year campaign that was to culminate in a general offensive in 1976. An increase in Soviet aid was approved during the negotiations. With that aid, the prospects of victory increased. Thus, Le Duan stressed at the meeting that an “opportune moment” for victory had arrived: “We must seize it firmly and step up the struggle on all three fronts: military, political and diplomatic.” It was decided that the final assault to take control of the South was to occur in 1975 and not, as planned, in 1976.

The Timing and Origins of Soviet-Vietnamese Cooperation In discussing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation during the 1973–1975 period, it is instructive to relate our discussion to the existing literature. Stephen Morris has critiqued the previous literature on Vietnamese relations with the Soviet Union, claiming that it detects a Vietnamese tilt toward the Soviet Union beginning only in the year 1978. Morris argues that “the Vietnamese communists had clearly indicated by the early 1970s that they were tilting toward the Soviet Union in their foreign policy ‘general line.’ This tilt persisted throughout the last five years of the Vietnam War.” As evidence, Morris has examined Hanoi’s position on five issues that divided China and the Soviet Union from 1968 until 1975. This chapter locates the timing of the Vietnamese tilt toward the Soviets not in 1968–1975, as Morris does, but at an even earlier date. As we have argued in chapter 2, a substantial increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation can be identified as early as 1964. This is an important distinction. If Hanoi’s tilt toward Moscow can be located as early as 1964, then we can proceed to analyze the causes of the Soviet-Vietnamese tilt in the 1964–1968 period. In this respect,

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the analysis in chapter 2 has attempted to show that the Soviet-Vietnamese tilt was critically influenced by the escalating Sino-Soviet conflict of the early 1960s, which was itself caused by the Sino-Soviet alliance termination in the early 1960s. Moreover, Morris has too quickly dismissed the most logical explanation for the Vietnamese tilt toward the Soviet Union, which originates in a straightforward national security rationale. Morris argues that “North Vietnam’s tilt toward the Soviet Union makes little sense from the sole perspective of national security. . . . By tilting, Hanoi was abandoning political balance (between the Soviet Union and China).” Here Morris assumes that Hanoi’s national security interest lay in maintaining a “political balance” between Moscow and Beijing in the 1973–1975 period. However, as argued below, the need for “political balance” vis-à-vis Hanoi’s communist allies was trumped by a desire to win the war against the South Vietnamese relatively quickly, and to unify the country under communist auspices. This had been an overriding goal of the Vietnamese communists, arguably since as far back as 1925. From Hanoi’s perspective, the litmus test of Beijing and Moscow’s worth as allies was the support they would be able to provide to achieve a relatively swift victory over the Saigon regime. In the initial period after the Paris Peace Agreement of January 1973, Moscow, like Beijing, counseled restraint. This was the clear message conveyed in a December 1973 visit to Hanoi by S. Niyazbekov, deputy chairman of the Presidium and member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In his banquet speech Niyazbekov called for “ultimately” achieving “peaceful unification of Vietnam.” Yet as events on the ground increasingly turned in Hanoi’s favor during 1974, the Soviets were willing to render the appropriate assistance. This made clear strategic sense for the Soviets. As an extra-regional entity bent on undermining Chinese power in the region, it had every reason to seek a strong, unified Vietnam in as expeditious a time frame as possible. In this respect, the only actor that could impose significant costs on the Soviet Union was the United States. However, after the Paris Peace Accords the U.S. had basically adopted a posture of retrenchment from South Vietnam and was ill-positioned to fundamentally affect developments in North Vietnam’s ongoing conflict with the South. With President Nixon’s resignation on 9 August 1974, and the imposition by Congress in December 1974 of limits on loans the U.S. Export-Import Bank could extend to the Soviet Union, there were limited restraints and costs to the Soviets of actively supporting Hanoi.

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SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT The increasing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation delineated above led Beijing to hedge against the prospect of a unified Vietnam and to adopt actions that were antithetical to North Vietnamese interests. First, with respect to Cambodia, the Chinese began to increase support for the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge. Second, with respect to disputed territories in the South China Sea, China seized control of islands occupied by South Vietnamese troops in January 1974. This action obviated immediate Sino–North Vietnamese conflict by presenting Hanoi with a fait accompli. The Chinese actions in Cambodia and the Spratly Islands were immediately perceived by Hanoi as deleterious to Vietnamese interests and as conduct unbecoming an alliance partner. Subsequently there was an increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Throughout 1974–1975 there was increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict over these previously dormant land and sea border issues.

China’s Increased Support for the Khmer Rouge In response to the Soviet attempt to incorporate North Vietnam into its policy of encirclement, the Chinese responded with a counter-encirclement strategy. In this respect Cambodia was China’s natural ally. It was a relatively weak state that was contiguous to the larger and stronger Vietnamese state. When the most powerful actor in the Cambodian resistance, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (KCP)—otherwise known as the Khmer Rouge—looked for a partner to meet its goal of keeping in check Vietnamese influence in Cambodia, China was willing to tentatively cooperate, although on its own terms. We should note that Chinese cooperation at this point in time was restrained by the consideration that too firm an embrace of the Khmer Rouge would precipitate the consolidation of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. In this respect, it is necessary to briefly recount developments in Cambodia from 1970 onward. As noted in the previous chapter, the event that established the terms of cooperation and conflict for all actors was the March 1970 coup that resulted in General Lon Nol overthrowing the Cambodian monarch Prince Sihanouk. The Chinese responded by sponsoring an Indochinese summit conference in Guangzhou in April 1970. The conference participants were united in their opposition to the Lon Nol regime. Participants included: the Chinese government, the Vietnamese communists, and the Cambodian

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opposition, formally called the Royal United National Government of Kampuchea (GRUNK), which was nominally headed by Prince Sihanouk and based in Beijing. GRUNK included the Khmer Rouge, the Hanoi-trained Khmer Viet Minh, and a group called the Sihanoukists. At this point, the Khmer Rouge regarded cooperation with Hanoi as an expedient for gaining control over Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists’ use of eastern Cambodia as a base to infiltrate South Vietnam was a mixed blessing for the Khmer Rouge. While it ensured some level of North Vietnamese support for the Cambodian resistance against Lon Nol, Hanoi’s involvement also invited the attention of the Americans, and indeed the Americans began heavy bombing in Cambodia that lasted from late April through the end of June 1970. Even as North Vietnamese cooperation with the Khmer Rouge occurred, hostility was not far beneath the surface. Reports emerged that Khmer Rogue forces had fired on North Vietnamese troops from behind while they were in battle against Lon Nol’s forces. In a party congress in September 1971 the Khmer Rouge declared the Vietnamese communists to be their country’s “acute enemy.” Beginning in 1971, clashes between Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese military forces in Cambodia were reported. Also during the 1971–1973 period, Khmer Rouge forces were carrying out killings of North Vietnamese troops based in Cambodia. As the momentum built toward a North Vietnamese victory, Beijing began to focus greater attention on the Khmer Rouge. Up until late 1973, Beijing’s policy toward limiting Soviet and Vietnamese influence in Cambodia had rested mainly on supporting Prince Sihanouk. By early 1974 the Khmer Rouge had assumed a greater role than Sihanouk in Chinese policy. On 2 April 1974 Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge official who also held the post of deputy prime minister of the GRUNK and commander in chief of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), met with Mao. Khieu also met Premier Zhou Enlai on 3 April and Vice Premier Li Xiannian in two separate meetings on 2 April and 4 April. Pol Pot had visited Beijing in 1965–1966 and 1970, and this was the first significant meeting between a Khmer Rouge leader and Mao since 1970. Moreover, while we do not know the content of their discussions, the fact that two meetings were held with Li suggests that Khieu’s visit was a significant one. A hint of the nature of Khieu’s discussions may be provided by the fact that soon after the visit, on 26 May 1974, Beijing signed an agreement with the Khmer Rouge–led forces for free military equipment and related supplies. Beijing may also have linked approval of its own aid to Hanoi for 1975 to Hanoi’s agreement to grant aid to the Khmer Rouge. Hanoi

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sent Le Thanh Nghi to Beijing in October 1974 to discuss Beijing’s aid package for 1975. A Sino-Vietnamese aid agreement was signed on 26 October. Two days later, a Khmer Rouge representative, Ieng Sary, visited Hanoi and an aid agreement was initialed.

Chinese Action Against South and North Vietnam Increased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation also caused China to adopt a more proactive policy with respect to islands in the South China Sea that were loosely administered and controlled by the South Vietnamese government. In this view, China anticipated North Vietnam’s invasion of South Vietnam and wanted to annex the islands before Vietnamese unification made such action at once more difficult and more costly to achieve. On 20 July 1973, soon after the Paris Agreements were signed, the Saigon government issued permits for a number of international companies, including Shell, Exxon, and Mobil, to explore for offshore petroleum reserves in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (known in Chinese as nan Zhongguo hai). On September 6 Saigon incorporated ten of the Spratly Islands into its administrative system via an executive order. Over the course of the next three months, as drilling operations began, five of these islands were physically occupied by ARVN troops. Sometime during the fall of 1973 the Chinese established a physical presence around Duncan Island in the eastern part of the Crescent Group. In November an ARVN patrol detained a Chinese fishing vessel. The Chinese countered by establishing a camp, occupied by two armed crews, on Duncan Island in mid-December. On 9 January 1974 the crews moved to Robert Island and planted flags on Money Island. On 11 January 1974 Beijing denounced Saigon’s September declaration and its subsequent activities in respect to the Spratly (nansha qundao) and Paracel (xisha qundao) Islands. Significantly, the statement represented the first time China linked its territorial claims to offshore islands with maritime rights. On 15 January Saigon announced the incorporation of the Paracel Islands and dispatched a destroyer to the area, which proceeded to fire at Chinese fishing craft in the vicinity of Robert Island. On 17 January a second ARVN ship arrived and proceeded to shell the Chinese. On 18 January President Nguyen Van Thieu issued an order to take over the western part of the Crescent Group. The situation subsequently escalated. On 19 February the first armed clashes between PLA and ARVN units occurred in the Paracel Islands. On the morning of 20 February three islands in the western part of the Crescent Group were seized

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by the Chinese, who met little resistance. The ARVN troops on Money and Robert Islands had to be evacuated. The Foreign Ministry reported later that day that the People’s Liberation Army had successfully launched a defensive counterattack in response to an illegal South Vietnamese seizure of some Chinese-owned Paracel Islands. In fact, the episode represented a conscious Chinese decision to secure control over the Crescent Group of islands, which comprised the southwest region of the Paracels. This was a combined air and amphibious assault that was personally supervised by Marshall Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping from the general staff office of the Central Military Commission. While the immediate target of the Chinese action was South Vietnam, in reality the Chinese were also engaged in a warning action against North Vietnam. Since 1971, courtesy of Soviet aid, Hanoi had been exploring for oil in the area. Upon learning of the results of these exploratory surveys in December 1973, North Vietnam’s vice foreign minister had proposed talks with the Chinese to delineate the nearby Gulf of Tonkin (beibu). The January 1974 confrontation between China and South Vietnam was probably designed to consolidate Chinese control over the nearby Paracel Islands ahead of these talks. In fact, Hanoi and Beijing agreed on 18 January 1974 to negotiations, even as the Sino–South Vietnamese conflict in the Paracel Islands was occurring. On 1 February Saigon retaliated by seizing six Spratly Islands. There was no comment by Hanoi on Saigon’s activities. Years later, in an interview with Far Eastern Economic Review reporter Nayan Chanda, Vietnam’s ambassador to France was to declare that the Chinese seizure of the Paracels was the “first act of armed aggression against Vietnam.”

ASSESSING CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY While the Chinese embrace of the Khmer Rouge and its preventive action with respect to the Paracel Islands may have been an understandable Chinese reaction to encirclement fears, the strategy nevertheless backfired. Why was this the case? We have already noted the North Vietnamese perception that the balance of forces against the South had swung in its favor by early 1974. While Hanoi was interested in unification as an issue on its own merits, the Chinese actions described above added urgency to Hanoi’s desire to conquer the South. Thus, on 20 July 1974, at an important military planning meeting at Do Son beach, Le Duan was clear on why Hanoi had to expedite unification. The North Vietnamese leader noted that there were “other countries which are trying to

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gain influence in this area” and that “even though they did not speak about their strategy, all have secret strategies regarding the Southeast Asian region.” While the Vietnamese communist leader did not specifically list China, in the context of contemporary developments in Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relations it is inconceivable that China was not one of the countries he was thinking of. In this respect, Le Duan asserted the need for realizing the gains made on the battlefield to push for a swift victory. He did this when he stated that unification had to be achieved before the situation could be reversed. A unified Vietnam with a population of fifty million would not be an easy target for any prospective invader or interventionist. . . . We had to win and win comprehensively before the Saigon administration could react and organize and before any country could intervene.

Le Duan’s insistence on pressing ahead in the battlefield and letting the diplomacy settle itself later was a theme that resonated with many of his comrades. In taking this position, Le Duan was skillfully engaging in an act of political mobilization. He was playing on the widespread belief on the Vietnamese communist side that in 1954 the hard-earned gains against the French on the battlefield had been significantly reduced in the diplomatic bargaining in Geneva. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho provides us with further evidence of the reluctance of the Vietnamese communists to rely on their communist comrades in Beijing and Moscow to determine their political fortunes. In a discussion with Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary on 7 September 1971, Le stated: “We [the Vietnamese communists] will always remember the experience of 1954. Comrade Zhou admitted his mistakes in the Geneva conference of 1954. Two or three years ago, comrade Mao also did so. In 1954, because both the Soviet Union and China exerted pressure, the outcome became what it became.” Zhou Enlai himself acknowledged his role in the division of Vietnam. In the early 1970s, when asked by New York Times reporter Harrison Salisbury to comment on China’s role in a possible settlement to end the Vietnam War, Zhou was clear. He stated that he would not repeat his 1954 effort to “put pressure” on the Vietnamese communists, having been “personally responsible for urging the Vietnamese to go along with the [Geneva] agreement.” Indeed, in August 1971, when asked if China would want to mediate between Washington and Hanoi, Zhou stated clearly: “We don’t want to be a mediator in any way. We were badly taken in during the first Geneva conference.” The “betrayal at

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Geneva” idea was later to prove a useful mobilization tool against the Chinese after the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979.

Sino-Vietnamese Maritime and Land Border Disputes The Chinese perceived their actions in Cambodia and the Paracel Islands as being self-defensive and intended to increase the country’s security. However, the real effect of Chinese actions was to make the North Vietnamese less willing to compromise. Hanoi responded to Beijing’s actions by becoming more assertive over Sino-Vietnamese land and maritime border disputes. On 15 August 1974 negotiations regarding the maritime border dispute took place in Beijing at the level of the deputy foreign minister. According to the official history of China’s foreign relations, Hanoi’s declared position at the beginning of these negotiations was very different from the position it had claimed in December 1973, when both sides had agreed to enter into talks. According to Beijing, in December the Vietnamese had agreed with the Chinese that the Gulf of Tonkin had not been delineated. When negotiations began, however, the Vietnamese shifted their position and declared that according to a 1887 Sino-French agreement, the 108˚ meridian line set the sea boundary. This then allowed the Vietnamese to claim control of more than two-thirds of the gulf as their bargaining position for the negotiations. The Chinese expressed their surprise at the discrepancy, and proceeded to refute the Vietnamese. However, according to the Chinese, the Vietnamese maintained their “absurd position.” Not surprisingly, the talks broke down in November. As a further indication of the increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict, Hanoi and Beijing both reported an increase in incidents along their land border in the year 1974. Hanoi claimed that there were 179 incidents while Beijing reported 121. This contrasts sharply with the lack of border disputes in the period before 1974. Indeed, a meeting with Pham Van Dong on 10 June 1977 Li Xiannian remarked that prior to 1974 border disputes had been negligible. With the maritime border talks stalled, Chinese attention focused on the Sino-Vietnamese land border. On 18 March 1975 Beijing proposed that negotiations be held. However, on 12 April Hanoi cited its involvement in the final stages of the war against South Vietnam as a reason to postpone negotiations. Yet just a day before, on 11 April 1975, even as Hanoi was preparing for a final assault on Saigon, the North Vietnamese took over six of the Spratly Islands hitherto held by Saigon and claimed by the Chinese. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a formal statement asserting Chinese sovereignty

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over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. At the end of May a Vietnamese map was issued that claimed the entire Spratly Islands area as Vietnamese. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnamese takeover of Saigon on 30 April 1975, Sino-Vietnamese relations were strained.

Strategic Logic and Perverse Effects Both Beijing and Hanoi were to subsequently claim, after the 1979 border war, that acts taken in the 1973–1975 period increased bilateral conflict. In a white paper on Sino-Vietnamese relations that was published in 1979, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry claimed: “From 1973 onwards, the Chinese authorities were increasing their acts of provocation and territorial encroachment in the northern border provinces, in an attempt to weaken the Vietnamese people’s efforts for the total liberation of South Vietnam.” Similarly, the Chinese point to the disputes that escalated in 1974–1975 over the Spratly and Paracel Islands as an important factor in the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. These claims, while accurate, should nevertheless not prevent us from stepping back to appreciate a more fundamental point. Specifically, the core issue for Beijing was how to keep a tight rein on Hanoi in the face of its increasing cooperation with Moscow during this period. If the Soviet factor were removed from the equation, there was no reason why, with a little skillful diplomacy, a modus vivendi could not have been worked out between Beijing and Hanoi. However, precisely because Soviet involvement was a reality, the Chinese had to react strategically. In this respect, the adoption of clear strategic thinking by the Chinese resulted in adverse effects on Chinese interests. Take for example, the key issue of Vietnamese unification. Because of the increasing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, Beijing was understandably ambivalent about a swift unification of Vietnam under Hanoi’s tutelage, which would potentially increase Moscow’s influence in southeast Asia. At a minimum, China’s interests lay in an extended delay of a North Vietnamese victory. Such a delay would perpetuate a divided Vietnam and, from the Chinese perspective, cause the Vietnamese communists to rely less on the Soviets and more on the Chinese to achieve an eventual unification. The difficulty for Beijing was how to explain to the Vietnamese that it favored this outcome, without pushing them into the arms of the Soviets. Indeed, Beijing was not able to adequately explain itself to its counterparts in Hanoi. For example, Beijing’s official position was that while it shared in the Vietnamese communists’ desire for eventual victory and unification, there were

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sound practical reasons for Hanoi to adhere to the Paris Peace Agreements and respect the status quo ante, thus obviating any option of a “quick win.” The Chinese position was conveyed to the Vietnamese during Le Duan’s early June 1973 visit to Beijing. During the banquet held in honor of the Vietnamese, Zhou called for “strict implementation of the Paris Agreement.” On 5 June 1973, during a private meeting between Zhou Enlai, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Le Thanh Nghi, the Chinese premier counseled patience. Zhou noted: In the period after the Paris Peace Agreements, the Indochinese countries should take time to relax and build their forces. During the next five to ten years, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should build peace, independence and neutrality. In short, we have to play for time and prepare for a protracted struggle.

The Vietnamese communists had fought too long and borne too many hardships to consent to Chinese advice. In this context, the Soviets were now viewed by Hanoi as assisting the Vietnamese communists. Thus, in April 1973, soon after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, the DRV deputy prime minister, Le Thanh Nghi, told the Soviet ambassador to Hanoi that the future of the Vietnamese communists was intimately linked with that of the Soviets. Le expressed the view that “successful building of socialism in the DRV will exert great influence on all countries of southeast Asia. In connection with this, the authority and influence of the Soviet Union in this region will be strengthened as well.” In contrast, Chinese actions were seen as self-serving. Given the Vietnamese communist view noted above, Chinese actions taken to preserve the regional status quo as it existed at the time of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 had backfired. For example, as a natural corollary of the Chinese view that a divided Vietnam would be a feature of southeast Asia’s international relations for the next five to ten years, Beijing persisted in making a sharp distinction between the South Vietnamese People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). In this respect, Beijing was prepared to back up its words with concrete action. On 19 July 1973 the PRC signed an economic agreement with the PRG. Even as relations between Hanoi and Beijing were deteriorating during this period, PRG president Nguyen Huu Tho was feted during his November visit to Beijing. The Chinese committed themselves to an additional no-strings-attached aid package for the year 1974. Unfortunately, what was considered by the Chinese as generous diplo-

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macy was seen as malign in intent and designed to perpetuate the status quo of a divided Vietnam, which the Vietnamese communists were fundamentally committed to overturning. Once Beijing had established a reputation for self-serving behavior in the Vietnamese communists’ minds, even sincere gestures of support were interpreted by them as cynical in intent. To illustrate this point, it is worth noting that on the eve of the fall of Saigon the Chinese sought to expedite the shipment of much-needed humanitarian supplies to Saigon. In an April 1975 banquet in Beijing held for the PRG, Vice Premier Li Xiannian announced that a cargo ship loaded with medicine and food was ready to set sail for Saigon. The head of the PRG delegation later recorded his impressions of this gesture. He noted: The implicit meaning of this announcement was not lost on any of those present, from North or South. . . . They [the Chinese] were plainly using this opportunity to express their feelings about Hanoi’s already serious romance with the Soviets. At the same time, they were signaling to the PRG that they were open to independent contacts.

While the Chinese press reported that Chinese aid was “enthusiastically welcomed” by the Vietnamese communists and the people of South Vietnam, the reality was that the two sides were drifting further apart. Commenting in his memoirs on the Chinese perspective toward Vietnam in the immediate aftermath of the Paris Peace Agreement in February 1973, Henry Kissinger observed that: “[A] unified communist Vietnam dominant in Indochina was a strategic nightmare for China.” This chapter has sought to show how this nightmare became a reality.

Alternative Explanation In examining the years from 1973 until 1975, William Duiker argues that “relations between China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) continued to deteriorate during the final years of the war.” By 1975, “Beijing and Hanoi were on a collision course, although the depth of the mutual antagonism was unknown to the outside world.” The question is what put them on a collision course. Was it primarily bilateral issues in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship? Or was it developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship that were central to their conflict?

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Of the various issues in Sino-Vietnamese relations discussed above, ranging from Sino-Vietnamese border and maritime disputes to the issue of Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge, it is worth noting that all of these were relatively minor. They only took on significance because of the Soviet factor. Let us first examine the land border issue. In a September 1975 discussion in Beijing with Le Duan, Deng Xiaoping, in a moment of candor, characterized the land border disputes with the Vietnamese in the following conciliatory manner: “It is nothing but a dispute here about a few mu of land, and a dispute there about a few mu of land. I don’t think the disputes are large, and the problems can be solved easily.” This statement strongly suggests that bilateral border conflicts were not an irreconcilable source of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Indeed, as we will explore in the next chapter, the Sino-Vietnamese territorial conflict escalated precipitously as Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation increased further after 1975. Similarly, it should be noted that with respect to our bilateral counterhypothesis, in principle there was no reason why an arrangement could have been made to neutralize the Cambodian issue as a source of conflict in SinoVietnamese relations. China only began to show serious interest in the Khmer Rouge sometime between November 1973 and April 1974. As outlined in our discussion on Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, this is the exact period when the Soviets stepped up their aid to the Vietnamese as described above. China did not necessarily oppose a Vietnamese communist victory in the war against the South. What Beijing opposed was a Vietnamese victory that was a result of Soviet largesse, and that would allow Moscow to increase its sway over the Hanoi. In the face of a clear attempt by the Soviets in 1974 to bankroll a victory for the Vietnamese communists though their superior material resources, the Chinese responded by supporting a Khmer Rouge victory in neighboring Cambodia. Chinese aid was important during the crucial final phase of the Khmer Rouge assault on Phnom Penh. Beijing’s assistance was provided with the intention of preserving Chinese influence in Cambodia, and acting as a check on the Soviet-backed Vietnamese. Subsequently, as described above, Khmer Rouge representative Khieu Samphan met Mao in Beijing and a generous military agreement was signed. This aid ensured that the final phase of the Khmer Rouge campaign against the Lon Nol was won as a result of Chinese aid.

THE PRICE OF VICTORY Anne Gilks has observed that “the [Sino-Vietnamese] alliance ceased to function with the Vietnamese victory on 30 April 1975.” What caused this out-

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come? It has been argued in this chapter that as a result of conflict in SinoSoviet relations going back to 1964, decision-makers in both Beijing and Hanoi had progressively come to view each other through an “adversary prism.” In the subsequent period from 1973 until 1975, the events that unfolded entrenched mutual perspectives. As a consequence of escalating Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviets sought to undermine the Chinese position in southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. In this respect, Moscow seized on the different opinions that developed in Beijing and Hanoi with respect to the Paris Agreement, which unraveled almost immediately. As the fragile peace established by the Paris Peace Agreement collapsed in the face of escalating conflict between the North and South Vietnamese, the Soviet Union stepped in to increase economic and military cooperation with Hanoi. The Vietnamese communists welcomed Soviet assistance to achieve an expeditious victory, even if they were cognizant of the fact that Soviet motives were driven both by a desire to spread revolution in southeast Asia and by a compulsion to punish its adversary, China. In the face of increasing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, there were two basic problems in Chinese policy toward Vietnam. First, Chinese policy was simply not flexible enough. Instead of adroitly reacting to the Vietnamese communists’ success on the ground, the Chinese insisted on adherence to the Paris Accords. Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese were slow to appreciate the fact that the tide of the war had turned in the Vietnamese communists’ favor. When it became clear in early 1975 that Hanoi was sweeping to victory, the Chinese were no longer an active participant in the Vietnamese communists’ strategy for victory. For instance, when the planning for the final stages of the war was being made by the Vietnamese communists in December 1974–January 1975, the Chinese were not present, while the Soviets were. Not surprisingly, the Chinese communists were perceived by the Vietnamese communists as less than supportive. Second, the Chinese confused what was desirable with what was achievable. The preferred Chinese outcome was not for a “quick-win” strategy on the part of the Vietnamese communists. Rather, the Chinese wanted a “no-win” or, at a minimum, a “slow-win” that would result in a divided Vietnam that was dependent on Beijing. The Chinese were rightly concerned that a unified Vietnam aligned with the Soviet Union would adversely affect Chinese interests in the region. As China’s concerns about the Vietnamese communists’ alignment with the Soviet Union increased, it was predictable that Beijing would seek to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and attempt to defend

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its claims to areas in the Gulf of Tonkin and the islands in the South China Sea. These were signals by Beijing to Hanoi that increasing cooperation with Moscow would entail costs. However desirable a Vietnamese “slow-win” was to the Chinese, this was a strategy that, ironically, depended on the ability of the South Vietnamese to contain the North Vietnamese military juggernaut and the American willingness to provide financial assistance. More fundamentally, however, the Chinese “slow-win” strategy fell victim to American domestic politics. Once domestic politics did not allow the Ford administration to sustain the Saigon regime, the North Vietnamese were able to sweep away all before them. At the end of April 1975 Vietnamese communists had achieved victory over the Saigon regime. This victory had come at a cost for the Chinese, as their relations with the Vietnamese communists had sunk to their lowest point ever. The next chapter will explore how relations further deteriorated, eventually resulting in the Sino-Vietnamese border war of early 1979.

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5 THE END OF AN “INDESTRUCTIBLE FRIENDSHIP” Soviet Resurgence and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1975–1979

From the Chinese perspective,  the defining features of the post–Vietnam War period, namely, American retrenchment and a corresponding assertiveness in Soviet foreign policy, were adverse developments. However, adversity did not lead to appeasement, let alone capitulation. Quite the contrary. Rather than concede to rising Soviet power, the Chinese continued their basic stance, evident since the early 1960s, of opposing Moscow. Amidst the increase in Sino-Soviet conflict, the newly independent Vietnam became the focus of increased Chinese and Soviet attention. Beijing and Moscow encountered a leadership in Hanoi that, while generally more inclined to support the Soviet Union, was also weary of antagonizing China. Eventually, in exchange for Moscow’s support in establishing a Vietnamese sphere of influence over Laos and Cambodia, Hanoi aligned itself firmly with Soviet encirclement policy against China. Sino-Vietnamese conflict ensued. This chapter will explore this process. We will also investigate alternative explanations for significant events in this critical period of the Cold War era, including the formation and termination of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance; the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance; and the Sino-Vietnamese border war of early 1979.

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THE END OF AN “INDESTRUCTIBLE FRIENDSHIP”

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IN THE POST-1975 ERA The perceived American failure in Vietnam had significant immediate (if at times unintended) effects on world politics. One particularly important effect was its contribution to a more assertive Soviet foreign policy during the 1975–1979 period. Soviet assertiveness was reflected most prominently in three spheres: the Soviet military threat to China; Soviet policy toward the Third World; and Soviet-U.S. relations. Increasingly, the Chinese feared that a lack of American response to Soviet gains in these areas would allow Moscow to consolidate a favorable international position and punish China for its opposition to Soviet policy. The result of Soviet actions, and the attendant Chinese alarm, was an escalation of Sino-Soviet conflict. This section reviews Soviet policy with respect to military deployments against the Chinese in the Russian far east, and Soviet policy in the Third World. It then moves on to review Chinese concerns at the relative balance in Soviet-American relations, showing how it produced an increase in Sino-Soviet conflict.

Soviet Strategic Deployments in the Russian Far East The Soviet threat to China in the post-1975 period was reflected starkly in the military sphere. Over the course of the Sino-Soviet conflict, there was a significant increase in Soviet military capabilities in the Russian far east. At the outset of the conflict in 1964, the Soviets had an estimated dozen understrengthened divisions in that region. This situation was to change. The most significant aspect of the Soviet buildup was the deployment of several Soviet divisions on the Sino-Mongolian border by 1967, a development made possible by the Soviet-Mongolian alliance treaty of 1966. Subsequently there was a rapid expansion of Soviet forces in the period after the 1969 border clashes. Between 1969 and 1972 the deployment of Soviet forces along Sino-Soviet and SinoMongolian border doubled, from 21 divisions to 45. A slowdown in the quantitative aspect of the Soviet buildup subsequently occurred from 1973 until 1977. During this period the emphasis was on upgrading Soviet forces and strengthening alliances with other states on China’s periphery. In 1976 the Chinese and the Soviets each had approximately 300,000 men deployed on their border. While there was a rough numerical equality in conventional forces, the Soviets were overwhelmingly superior to the Chinese in terms of tactical and

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strategic nuclear forces. In 1975 China had approximately 430 operational nuclear delivery vehicles, compared to the Soviet total of 4,735. Although Moscow had to utilize the majority of these in deterring Washington, the discrepancy between the two sides was still sufficiently large for the Russians to be able to inflict catastrophic damage on the Chinese. Beginning in 1978, there was a further bolstering of the Soviet military posture directed against China, when the Soviets deployed the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) for the first time in the Soviet far east. The SS-20 was a major improvement over the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles it replaced. Unlike its predecessors, the SS-20 was mobile, improving its survivability. Its maximum range of 5,000 kilometers was an improvement over the SS-5 (4,100 kilometers), and the SS-4 (2,000 kilometers) Significantly, each SS-20 missile had three multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. As a result, the number of Soviet IRBMs warheads in the far east increased markedly. A further aspect of the improvement in Soviet strategic deployments against China in its far east region related to the Backfire bomber. The Backfire bomber was able to perform nuclear, conventional, anti-shipping, and reconnaissance missions. Its combat radius, at 5,500 kilometers, was nearly twice that of its predecessor, the Blinder. Significantly, this afforded the Soviets the capability to reach targets in all of China, Northeast Asia, most of Southeast Asia, and parts of North America. Additionally, the threat posed from Soviet fighter aircraft was the culmination of a six-fold increase in that category of Soviet capabilities from 1965 (210 aircraft) to 1978 (1,200 aircraft). And finally, from the mid-1960s through to the late 1970s the Soviets had focused on improving the operational capabilities of the Soviet Pacific fleet. The Soviets were not averse to brandishing their capabilities to intimidate the Chinese. In April 1978 Soviet leader Brezhnev and defense minister Ustinov made a prominent visit to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Disturbingly, from the Chinese perspective, Brezhnev witnessed military exercises that were modeled on a Sino-Soviet war. At the same time, a particularly large Soviet joint military operation involving air force, naval, and marine units was conducted in Northeast Asian waters. By 1979, a reorganization of the Soviet military command structure had been effected for the Soviet far east region. A highly publicized Soviet military exercise in Mongolia in spring 1979 again served to emphasize the Soviet military threat to China. In an important sense, the developments of spring 1979 represented the culmination of a broader strategy of Soviet encirclement directed against China.

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The Soviet Union and the Third World The direct threat posed to China by the Soviet Union was supplemented by another kind of threat: Soviet success in the Third World. The Vietnamese communists’ takeover of Saigon on 30 April 1975 marked the beginning of a period of significant Soviet success in the Third World. Moscow was now reaping the benefits of investments that had been made in the preceding decade. Beginning in the mid-1960s, in a departure from a previous policy of vigorous support for non-communist nationalists in the Third World, the Soviets had begun to aggressively support more orthodox Marxist-Leninists. Friendship treaties were signed with Somalia (1974), Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), and Ethiopia (1978). Soviet support included the provision of military equipment and tactical advice from Soviet advisors working on the ground. Soviet-aligned and financed Cuban troops were introduced into Africa. By one estimate, there were Cuban troops in a total of sixteen African and Middle Eastern states during this period. The results were palpable. As one study of Soviet policy in the Third World during this period has concluded: The principal lessons of [the Vietnam] war for the Kremlin were not about the limitations of military power but about its manifest political utility. The fall of South Vietnam, in fact, marked the beginning of a highly successful strategic offensive by the USSR in the Third World. Between April 1975 and January 1979, there occurred no less than seven successful armed seizures of power or territory by pro-Soviet Communist or radical leftist parties in the Third World. Pro-Soviet revolutionary regimes came to power as a result of violent conflicts or coups in South Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Cambodia. Soviet arms played a role in the majority of these instances.

The Chinese viewed the Soviet success in Africa with alarm, but due primarily to resource constraints, its support of anti-Soviet forces in that continent was limited to rhetorical condemnation of Soviet activities there. In February 1976 the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeated the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). On 6 February 1976 the Peking Review reproduced a People’s Daily article condemning the successful Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola’s civil war. Similarly, the Chinese provided rhetorical support for the

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efforts of the Somalis against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Ethiopians. To the consternation of the Chinese, the Soviet-Cuban intervention effort tipped the balance against the Somalis. The Soviets and Cubans also supported a coup in South Yemen that brought to power a pro-Soviet leadership. A border war was subsequently initiated by South Yemen against North Yemen. Beijing was even more alarmed at Soviet policy in a part of the Third World that was closer to China, namely, Asia. As discussed in detail in chapter 3, on 7 June 1969, at the meeting of the International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Brezhnev announced a proposal for an Asian collectivesecurity system. This proposal was made in the context of contemporary developments in Asia that were favorable to the expansion of Soviet interests in the region. These included the British announcement on 17 July 1967 that they were pulling out east of Suez, and Nixon’s declaration in Guam on 25 July 1969 that there would be a retrenchment of the American presence in Asia. The subsequent defeat of the American-backed South Vietnamese forces in 1975 provided an opportune moment for the resuscitation of the Asian collectivesecurity concept by the Soviets. The concept was promoted in their diplomatic interactions with the non-communist states that formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was the Chinese who reacted most vigorously against the collectivesecurity concept. In a 15 August 1975 article in the Peking Review, the concept was subjected to critical scrutiny. The Chinese took note of Soviet rhetoric that attempted to portray its collective-security proposal as consistent with ASEAN’s efforts to establish Southeast Asia as a “zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality” (ZOPFAN). In the view of the Chinese, the collective-security proposal was patently a mechanism for the expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Thus the article stated that: The “Asian collective security system” dished up by the Soviet socialimperialists under the signboard of “peace” and “security” is designed to serve nothing but the Kremlin’s policies of aggression and expansion. It is contrived for the purpose of contending with the United States for hegemony in Asia, dividing the Asian countries, and bringing small and medium-sized countries into their sphere of influence.

Chinese concerns were particularly marked regarding the American attempt to achieve détente with the Soviets; these were aired even before the end

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of the Vietnam War. In his 1974 Three Worlds’ speech at the United Nations, covered in the previous chapter, Deng had warned that attempts to achieve détente with the Soviets were illusory. Deng argued that: In the final analysis, the so-called “balanced reduction of forces,” and “strategic arms limitation,” are nothing but empty talk, for in fact there is no “balance,” nor can there possibly be “limitation.” They [the U.S. and the Soviet Union] may reach certain agreements, but their agreements are only a façade and a deception.

As Deng’s comments suggest, the Chinese viewed Soviet-U.S. détente as a misnomer and a serious strategic error. It was a misnomer because the disarmament talks that were the concrete manifestation of détente were aimed at reducing increases, rather than achieving absolute reductions. It was a strategic error because the Chinese did not perceive any restraining effect of détente on Soviet policy. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Soviets as having exploited the process to achieve strategic nuclear parity with the Americans and even, in some categories of nuclear capability, a superior position. The Chinese assessments of this period of the Cold War took note of the gains the Soviets achieved from 1963 through 1975, despite the signing of various treaties, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the SALT I Treaty in 1972, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1974. China feared the use of détente by the Soviets to achieve gains at U.S. expense that would then be translated into a heightened Soviet threat to China. Thus, in reviewing the one-year anniversary of the 1975 Helsinki Agreements, cited as a successful outcome of détente by some American and European analysts, the Chinese continued to stress the dangers of compromise with the Soviets. Approximately a month before Mao’s death, the 9 August 1976 issue of the Peking Review highlighted the dangers of appeasing the Soviets. It is worth quoting an extended excerpt here to allow an appreciation the Chinese view of détente: Facts prove that the “détente” touted by the Kremlin is nothing but a move to cover up the traces of its arms drive and war preparations, its expansionist activities against Western Europe and contention with the United States for hegemony. It is precisely because of this that the “détente” offensive mounted by the Soviet Union is a real threat to Western Europe indeed. . . . For the Soviet Union, “détente” is clearly a means of attack, a lethal instrument that

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kills insidiously. It is fraught with danger for Western Europe. “Détente” has not gotten the Soviet Union to withdraw one single soldier from the European region, still less stopped the Soviet war chariot of aggression and expansion in its tracks. . . . “Détente” can in no way check Soviet expansionist acts, much less get the Soviet revisionists to give up their wild ambition of European hegemony. The attempt to use “détente” to keep Soviet expansionism in check, the belief that the Soviet Union, as the [U.S.] “Sonnenfeldt” doctrine makes out, would be satisfied with its so-called “organic relationship” with Eastern Europe and would not attack Western Europe, are polices of appeasement which Soviet expansionist activities over the past year have proved illusory.

And while China feared that the U.S. might be exploited by the Soviets via détente, it also feared that détente was a possible mechanism by which the Americans could exploit China. Beijing developed a critique of Washington’s policy toward Moscow that utilized the metaphor of “Munich.” The Chinese claimed that just as British prime minister Neville Chamberlain had made concessions to Hitler’s Nazi Germany at the Munich conference in September 1938 during a period of British weakness, the Americans were making concessions to the Russians at a time of American weakness. However, in the Chinese critique of American policy, there was an insidious twist to the plot. In the Chinese view, the U.S. was seeking détente in Europe in order to turn Soviet energies and resources toward the East, and China more specifically. This was a major source of Chinese distrust of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s pursuit of détente with the Soviets during the Nixon administration. After the renewed American skepticism of the Soviet Union during the Ford administration in 1974–1976, the Chinese were taken aback by the initial complacency of the Carter administration’s Soviet policy, which was only corrected in 1978. 

Increasing Sino-Soviet Conflict It is in the context of Chinese perceptions of Soviet military activities directed against China on their border; Moscow’s activism in the Third World; and its achievement of significant gains because of détente with the United States that we should understand the increasing Sino-Soviet conflict during this period. The first opportunity for any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations during this period came with Mao’s death in September 1976. This event led to a number of conciliatory gestures by Moscow, which were made in the hope that the

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Chinese leader’s passing might lead to a new Chinese leadership in Beijing that was interested in improving bilateral relations. The Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, signed a book of condolences at the Chinese embassy in Moscow on 13 September. Soviet polemics ceased for a while. Addressing the Soviet Central Committee on 25 October, Brezhnev noted that: The improvement of our relations with China is our constant concern. . . . I must emphasize that we consider that there are no problems in relations between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China which cannot be solved in a spirit of good-neighborliness. We shall continue to act in this spirit. Everything will depend on the position adopted by the other side.

On 27 October a formal statement of congratulation was sent by Brezhnev to Hua Guofeng to congratulate him on his appointment as chairman of the CCP. It was rejected on the grounds that party-to-party ties did not exist. Relations took a turn for the worse. Negotiations stalemated on the Sino-Soviet border disputes from 30 November 1976 to 28 February 1977. The first verbal attack by a high-ranking Soviet official occurred on 22 April 1977. SinoSoviet conflict quickly picked up. The Peking Review published an article on 15 July 1977 declaring that “Soviet-social imperialism” was “the most dangerous source of world war.” In August 1977, at the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, Hua Guofeng stressed the threat posed to China by the Soviets and blamed Moscow for the deterioration of bilateral relations. To further drive home the point that the new Chinese leadership was committed to Mao’s anti-Soviet policy, an extended commentary on the chairman’s Three Worlds’ theory was published on 1 November 1977. In the article the Soviet Union was portrayed as a greater threat than in Deng’s 1974 United Nations speech. It was argued that compared to the United States, the Soviet Union was “the more ferocious, the more reckless, the more treacherous and the more dangerous source of world war.” A number of reasons were given for this, including the fact that while the United States had overextended itself and had to adopt a defensive strategy, the Soviet Union was still on the upsurge and had adopted an offensive strategy. Even relative Soviet weakness in the economic sphere as compared to the Americans was seen as a source of threat. In the Chinese view, since Soviet economic strength was relatively underdeveloped, it had to depend on military means to achieve its goals. Subsequent developments were to confirm the trajectory of increasing conflict in Sino-Soviet relations. On 24 February 1978 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union proposed that a meeting be held with the

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Chinese. It was suggested that a joint statement be issued declaring that the Soviet Union and China would “build their relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence, firmly adhering to the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and the renunciation of the use of force.” The official Chinese reply, delivered on 9 March 1978, dismissed the Soviet proposal as “worthless.” It should be noted that Chinese and American perspectives on the Soviet Union increasingly converged, a fact that was reflected in the establishment of SinoU.S. diplomatic relations in January 1979.

INCREASING SOVIET ECONOMIC TIES TO VIETNAM The Soviets responded to the intensification of Sino-Soviet conflict outlined above by increasing their economic ties to Vietnam. In May 1975, immediately after the Vietnamese communist victory over the South Vietnamese, the Soviets cancelled all Hanoi’s debt to Moscow. This was valued at $450 million. In April 1976, during a visit by Soviet deputy prime minister Ivan Arkhipov, a broad commitment to increase Soviet economic assistance to Vietnam was made. In December 1976, on the occasion of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Fourth Congress, Moscow pledged a significant commitment to Hanoi’s 1976–1980 five-year plan, promising to contribute $11–13 billion, twice the amount it had made to the Vietnamese communists’ previous five-year plan. The burgeoning economic ties can also be seen in the overall Soviet-Vietnamese trade levels, which rose each year from 1976 until 1979. The estimated total level of bilateral trade for 1976 was $392.8 million. This jumped to $548.1 million in 1977, and $668.9 million in 1978. By 1979 the figure was $905.3 million. This increased to $942.5 million in 1980. Not surprisingly, Vietnam had a trade deficit with the Soviet Union from 1976 through 1980. Apart from a blip from 1976 to 1977, when the figures trended down from a deficit of $224.0 million to a deficit of $195.9 million, the trade deficit rose. For 1978, the deficit was $223.9 million. Then it increased to $455.3 million in 1979, and $457.7 million in 1980. Soviet largesse was particularly welcome to the leadership in Hanoi. In the post–Vietnam War era, Vietnam’s leadership, at least initially, had economic development as one of its top priorities. Vietnamese communist party chief Le Duan announced soon after the defeat of the South Vietnamese that “Economics is in command.” The increasing economic ties culminated in Vietnam’s admission to the Soviet-led COMECON on 29 June 1978 at the organization’s meeting in Bucharest. A formal treaty of admission was signed on 5 July. This represented the successful completion of the process that had been started by

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table 5.1. Estimates of Soviet Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1975–1979 Year

Pike

Trung

NATO

1975

450–500

520

450

1976

560–750

560

500

1977

570–1000

560

500

1978

700–1000

700

500

1979

800–1000

800

500–750

1980

2.9–3000

1000

500–570

Figures are in U.S.$ millions. Source: Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 190. Figures originate in Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 139; Thai Quang Trung, “The Moscow–Hanoi Axis and the Soviet Military Build-Up in Southeast Asia,” Indochina Report (Singapore) 8 Oct. 1986, 14; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Soviet Economic Relations with Selected Client States in the Developing World, document C-M (82)71, 14 Oct. 1982.

the Vietnamese in mid-1977. Membership in COMECON provided economic benefits such as access to a preferential exchange rate in intra-bloc trading. COMECON took over some aid projects in Vietnam that had been abandoned by China. Estimates of Soviet economic aid to Vietnam during this period vary, and should be treated with caution, but the more important point is the general one that Soviet aid was substantial. The table below provides a range of estimates of Soviet economic aid. The Soviets also increased their military ties to Vietnam. For the Soviets, an alliance with Vietnam was a critical piece in its evolving and long-standing Soviet encirclement policy against China. The Soviets had already made alliances with Mongolia (1966) and India (1971). In 1971 they began pressing for a formal alliance treaty with the Vietnamese. With the unification of Vietnam in 1975, Moscow raised the issue of access to Cam Ranh Bay and the possibility of forming an alliance. The Soviets were turned down on both issues. Lacking access to Vietnamese sources, we can only speculate that Hanoi was concerned that being too close to the Soviets would undermine its postwar relations with the United States and China. Undeterred by this rejection, the Soviets offered military aid to consolidate relations. With the caveat that these figures need to be treated with caution, the figures we have indicate that Soviet military aid to Vietnam during the 1975–80 period was substantial, as shown in table 5.2.

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Table 5.2. Estimates of Soviet Military Aid to Vietnam, 1975–1979 Year

Pike

1975

123–150

25

1976

44–50

30

1977

75–125

100

1978

600–800

190

1979

890–1,400

1980

790–905

NATO

1,500 240–280

Figures are in U.S.$ millions. Source: Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 118, 124. Figures originate in Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 139; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Soviet Economic Relations with Selected Client States in the Developing World, document C-M (82)71, 14 Oct. 1982.

The Origins of the Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance As illustrated above, the Soviets provided significant amounts of aid to facilitate Vietnam’s postwar economic reconstruction and security needs. We shall evaluate the security dimension in the origins of the alliance in closer detail in this section. Simply put, the Vietnamese found that they needed Soviet support to establish a sphere of influence over Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists’ idea of Indochina as a sphere of influence can be traced back to 1930; even then, it owed as much to Moscow as it did to the initiative of the Vietnamese communists. Interestingly, in 1930 the Vietnamese communists themselves were preoccupied with fostering revolution in Vietnam and were reluctant to be in charge of the revolutionary agenda for their Laotian and Cambodian neighbors. In 1930, following a Comintern directive, the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was formed under the leadership of the Vietnamese communists. Even the ICP designation was chosen by the Comintern. All of the 211 founding members of the ICP were Vietnamese. In 1931 a party periodical followed the line set by Moscow and emphasized that: Although the three countries [Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam] are made up of three different races, with different languages, different traditions, different behavior patterns, in reality they form only one country. . . . It is not possible to make a revolution separately for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

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In August 1945, three months after the defeat of the Japanese and as France was struggling to reassert control over Indochina, the ICP was disbanded in order to emphasize the nationalist nature of the opposition against French colonialism in each of the Indochinese nations. The Vietnamese communists were reconstituted under the Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP). Simultaneously the party announced the creation of two fraternal parties: the Lao Independence Party and the Revolutionary Cambodian People’s Party. However, the Kremlin continued to believe that the fortunes of the Vietnamese communists were linked with that of the Laotian and Cambodian communists: in late 1951 a top-secret VWP directive asserted that “later on when conditions permit . . . the revolutionary parties of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos will be reunited to form a single party.” As the Vietnamese communists fought the French in the First Indochina War, revolutionary ideals and the strategic rationale linking the fates of the three Indochinese states converged. This was acknowledged by top Vietnamese officials. During the war against the French, General Vo Nguyen Giap made the following assertion: Indochina is a strategic unit, a single theater of operations. Therefore we have the task of helping to liberate all of Indochina . . . especially for reasons of strategic geography, we cannot conceive of a Vietnam completely independent while Cambodia and Laos are ruled by imperialism.

This view was restated in nearly identical terms thirty-five years later when General Le Duc Anh noted in the Vietnam People’s Army magazine: The peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea . . . must build ties of special solidarity, strategic alliance and close combat coordination according to a common strategic plan. . . . Indochina is a single battlefield. 

This view of the close relationship between the national security of all three Indochinese states was expressed in more historical terms by a Vietnamese Army daily in 1979: For more than a century now, history has always linked the destinies of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. When one of them is invaded or annexed, the independence and freedom of the rest are also endangered, making it impossible for them to live in peace. Therefore, the enemy of one country is

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also the enemy of all three countries. To maintain unity among themselves and to join one another in fighting winning victories—this is the law of success in the revolutions of the three countries.

Given the foregoing, it is little surprise that in the post-1975 period Hanoi claimed to enjoy a “special relationship” with Phnom Penh and Vientiane. The “special relationship” appears to have meant at least two things: (1) that the governments in Phnom Penh and Vientiane would never take a major decision without first clearing it with Hanoi; (2) that there continued to exist an organized group within the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia that was pro-Vietnamese. In June 1976 Party General Secretary Le Duan, in a speech to the Vietnamese National Assembly, described the special relationship that exists between Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane as “the primary and basic content of our foreign policy.” The Soviets were aware of Hanoi’s intentions of establishing a sphere of influence in Indochina. As early as February 1973, just after the Paris Peace Agreement, the Soviet ambassador to Hanoi expressed clearly his perceptions of the Vietnamese communists’ intentions in a report to Moscow. The ambassador stated that: The program of the Vietnamese comrades for Indochina is to replace the reactionary regimes in Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh with progressive ones, and later when all Vietnam, and also Laos and Cambodia, start on the road to socialism, to move toward the establishment of a Federation of the Indochinese countries. This course of the VWP flows from the program of the former Communist party of Indochina.

Notwithstanding the increasingly close ties that Vietnam enjoyed with Moscow in the post-1975 period, Hanoi would have preferred to establish control over Indochina without relying on the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese communists had long prided themselves on their ability to maintain independence and flexibility in their foreign policy. A formal alliance with the Soviet Union would invariably place greater strictures on Hanoi’s foreign policy options. Now, however, an alliance with Moscow was necessary to establish a sphere of influence over Indochina. Hanoi succeeded in establishing control over Laos rather easily, without Soviet support. Soon after the Pathet Lao’s victory in Laos in the summer of 1975, ties with Vietnam were strengthened. An agreement covering aid, trade, trans-

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portation, and education was signed in June 1975. In February 1976, just two months after the Lao People’s Democratic Republic was founded (2 December 1975), Lao prime minister Kaysone Phomvihan headed a high-level delegation to Hanoi. One important outcome of the visit was the unambiguous declaration that Laos fell under Vietnam’s sphere of influence. The joint statement released after the meeting used the significant term “special relationship” to describe Lao-Vietnamese ties: The special relationship . . . is the great, constantly consolidated and enhanced comradeship between two Parties which both issue from the Indochinese Communist Party. . . . The special, pure, consistent, exemplary, and rarely-to-be-seen relationship that has bound Vietnam to Laos constitutes a factor of utmost importance that has decided the complete and splendid victory of the revolution in each country.

Both sides agreed to the continued stationing of 30,000–40,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and the construction of an all-weather road linking Laos to the Vietnamese port of Haiphong. This road ended the traditional Laotian dependence on transit routes through Thailand for imports and exports. The new dispensation was formalized in a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was signed in July 1977.

INTENSIFIED CONFLICT The increase in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation led to a steady increase in SinoVietnamese conflict. While conflict simmered around a number of contentious bilateral issues, China did not make these bilateral issues a litmus test for SinoVietnamese relations; rather, the concern was the Vietnamese position on the Soviet Union. Once Vietnam made the decision to align itself clearly with the Soviet Union in the first quarter of 1978, Sino-Vietnamese conflict over bilateral issues escalated. In February 1979 the Chinese launched a border war against Vietnam. On 30 April 1975 Saigon fell to the Vietnamese communists. On 2 May, at a celebration of this historic event in Beijing attended by the Vietnamese ambassador, Chinese representative Marshall Ye Jianying, while extolling the role of Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in Hanoi’s victory, made no mention of the Soviet contribution. This silence did not reflect a lack of concern. On the contrary, the Soviet Union’s role in post-1975 Southeast Asia was upper-

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most in the Chinese leadership’s thinking. On 7 June 1975, in discussions with visiting Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos, Deng Xiaoping warned of the dangers of “letting the [Soviet] tiger through the back door while repelling the [American] wolf through the front gate.” The Chinese were caught in a dilemma at this early stage of the post-1975 era. Uncertain about Vietnam’s ultimate intentions, they neither committed to Vietnam’s economic and military development, which could ultimately backfire in creating a stronger adversary in Southeast Asia, nor treated the Vietnamese communists as a full-fledged Soviet ally. The Chinese ambivalence toward the Vietnamese communists diminished the aid they were prepared to offer in this period, which then in turn negatively affected Vietnamese perceptions of the Chinese. In August 1975, in an important trip to seek economic assistance, the Vietnamese vice premier and chairman of the State Planning Commission, Le Thanh Nghi, visited Beijing en route to Moscow. Beijing and Hanoi were unable to reach an agreement on a Chinese aid package to Vietnam. On 22–28 September Le Thanh and Le Duan visited Beijing, in a second attempt to obtain an economic agreement. Documents in the Soviet archives that contain the post-visit Vietnamese report state that the Vietnamese wanted to assure the Chinese that they were interested in maintaining good relations with both Moscow and Beijing. This message did not resonate with the Chinese, who did not approve of such straddling. Deng reminded his Vietnamese visitors: “The superpowers are the greatest international exploiters and oppressors. . . . Today, more and more people realize, opposing superpower hegemonism is an important mission facing the people of every nation.” By contrast, in Le Duan’s speech at the same banquet, a clear difference on the Soviet Union could be detected. In his speech Le Duan did not share the Chinese view of the Soviets. The Vietnamese leader made no mention of the Soviets. Instead, he pointed out that in the present period, it was the Americans that were the source of neocolonialism and were responsible for the difficult task facing the Vietnamese in rebuilding their country. Moreover, in a move that would not have gone unnoticed by his hosts, Le Duan implicitly acknowledged the Soviet Union’s role in the Vietnamese communists’ success over the Americans. He pointed out the Vietnamese success was due to “the contributions of other socialist countries.”  Given the developments above, it is not surprising that little progress was made during talks. On 23 and 24 September the Vietnamese visitors engaged in discussions with Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian. Two economic agreements were signed, although it should be noted that there was no offer of a

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grant or nonrefundable aid. Moreover, no military aid was provided. A significant topic of discussion concerned Soviet objectives in the South China Sea. On 18 September, just prior to the visit, the People’s Daily published six photographs of the Spratly Islands. Seen in the context of Sino-Vietnamese differences over the Spratly Islands discussed in the previous chapter dealing with the 1973–1975 period, it is not surprising that there was dissatisfaction on the Vietnamese side. At the end of the trip, no joint communiqué was issued, nor was the customary reciprocal banquet hosted by the Vietnamese side. Le Duan left earlier than planned. Seizing an opportunity afforded by their relatively stronger economic position compared to the Chinese, the Soviets were more generous. During Le Duan’s October visit to Moscow, the Soviets agreed to provide $3 billion in aid for the period 1976–1980. Of this total, $1 billion was grant aid. Le Duan signed an economic agreement on 30 October. Moreover, in contrast to the tension that characterized Le Duan’s China trip, the Chinese must have noticed the effusive praise bestowed on the Soviets in the joint communiqué released at the end of the Vietnamese leader’s trip to Moscow. Significantly, this communiqué approved of the Soviet policy of détente. As the development of Sino-Vietnamese relations stalled and SovietVietnamese relations gradually tightened, statements by high-level Vietnamese officials exacerbated relations. In an interview with Swedish journalist Erik Fierre in July 1976, Hoang Tung, a member of the Central Committee of the VCP, deputy chairman of the Propaganda Commission, and editor of the party’s daily paper, Nhan Dan, was clear about the convergence of Soviet and Vietnamese interests in checking Chinese influence in Southeast Asia: During the war, it was vital for Vietnam that both China and the U.S.S.R. helped Vietnam to the full. Today, it is no longer so vital for this country to follow that policy. . . . Anyway, the political and cultural pressure from the north [i.e., China] must be removed. Therefore, the rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. plays a very important role for Vietnam today. There is a tangible strong Soviet interest coinciding with Vietnamese interests—to reduce Chinese influence in this part of the world.

Hanoi’s tilt toward the Soviets was evolving, although it also did not want to antagonize the Chinese. Accordingly, throughout 1976 an independent trend can be detected in Vietnamese foreign economic policy. Hanoi had chosen not to join COMECON as yet, but instead became a member of the International

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Monetary Fund and sought economic assistance from Japan and the United Nations. A turning point in Sino-Vietnamese relations came at the Fourth Vietnamese Workers’ Party Congress, held in December 1976. It was the first congress to be held since September 1960, when the decision had been made to launch the war in South Vietnam. This congress has been described by one Chinese survey of Sino-Vietnamese relations as indication of Hanoi “establishing a line of opposing China and throwing one’s lot in with the Soviet Union, while at the same time, clarifying [Vietnam’s] policy of an Indochina federation.” Hoang Van Hoan, Politburo member since 1956, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and former ambassador to China from 1950– 1957, lost all his positions in the party. Hoang, who was later to flee to exile in China after the 1979 war, claimed in 1987 that those who did not agree with Le Duan were purged at this congress. Indeed, former Vietnamese ambassadors to China—Ngo Minh Loan, Ngo Thuyen, and Nguyen Trong Vonh—lost their positions as alternate members of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party. In mid-April 1977, after a disappointing response from Western countries to Vietnamese requests for economic aid, Hanoi took its first step toward joining COMECON, requesting membership in COMECON’s International Bank for Economic Cooperation, as mentioned above. It obtained admission in late May. These developments elicited Beijing’s displeasure. In early June General Giap, while visiting Beijing after a trip to Moscow, did not receive a standard welcome as required by protocol. On 7 June Pham Van Dong arrived in Beijing from Moscow. In his 10 June meeting with Li Xiannian, frank discussions occurred on a range of issues including anti-China statements made by senior Vietnamese officials; maritime and land border disagreements; and the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Li made it clear that China was disturbed by the Vietnamese cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Chinese nevertheless were open to reversing the decline in relations. Li Xiannian’s stated purpose for raising these issues was in order that “a solution will be found to these problems through a comradely and in-depth conversation so that the revolutionary friendship and unity between our Parties and countries can be upheld and enhanced.” The Chinese watched closely as Soviet-Vietnamese ties tightened. A little more than three weeks later, Le Thanh Nghi visited Moscow to sign economic agreements. On his return to Hanoi, he stopped over in Beijing, where he had a lukewarm meeting with Li Xiannian, who did not grant any new economic

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aid. On 30 July 1977, approximately two weeks after the signing of a LaosVietnamese defense treaty, Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua, in a speech peppered with references to “Soviet revisionism,” repeated Deng Xiaoping’s Soviet tiger metaphor. Huang proceeded to explicitly warn the Vietnamese about the consequences of a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

THE CAMBODIAN VORTEX AND SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS The state of Cambodia assumed immense significance in Southeast Asia’s post1975 strategic dispensation. The preservation of a Chinese-aligned Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia was Beijing’s way of demonstrating its commitment to resisting the Soviet-backed Vietnamese in Southeast Asia. That said, Beijing also endeavored to restrain the Khmer Rouge in its policy toward Vietnam. From late 1977 to early 1978 the Chinese sought to mediate the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict. For their part, the Vietnamese viewed a compliant Cambodia as crucial to its security, but would have preferred to achieve that goal through means other than war. As events developed, the Chinese and the Vietnamese were unable to prevent war between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. This subsequently drew in their respective allies, the Soviets and Chinese. The Khmer Rouge had a history of antagonism (including kidnappings and assassinations) against the Vietnamese communists that stretched back to 1971. Indeed, in a Kampuchean Communist Party conference in September of that year, Vietnam was identified as an “acute enemy.” These underlying hostilities escalated in the post-1975 period. In May 1975, just a month after the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh, maritime border clashes occurred. A meeting on 11 June between Pol Pot and Le Duan secured a tentative cessation of conflict. Border negotiations were initiated in April 1976 but suspended the next month. Conflict between Hanoi and Phnom Penh increased as Pol Pot sought to consolidate his position within the Khmer Rouge by beginning to purge members who had ties to Vietnam. In January 1977 a new campaign of attacks was initiated against Vietnam. Six Vietnamese provinces were attacked. Border-liaison committee meetings that had been operating since 1975 ceased. In April, following Pol Pot’s consolidation of power against rivals within the Khmer Rouge, there was an intensification of conflict on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. On 17 April 1977 Ieng Sary asserted that Phnom Penh would “not join any regional association or be allied with any country.” On 30 April Vietnamese reports claimed that the Khmer Rouge had infiltrated “division-size” forces up to 10 kilometers

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into Vietnam, killing innocent Vietnamese civilians. In late April and May 1977 Vietnamese forces were deployed on the border. On 7 June Hanoi sent a confidential letter to Phnom Penh seeking a “high-level meeting” between the two governments. The Cambodian response on 18 June demanded a mutual withdrawal of troops, and the creation of a demilitarized zone. Neither side was interested in compromise. In July the leadership of the Eastern Military Region of Cambodia asserted that compromise was not possible with Vietnam because Hanoi had “a dark scheme to conquer our land and destroy the Khmer race.” Throughout summer, there was an increase in conflict.

China Reacts China sought to support its ally against Vietnamese pressure. In a significant reversal from past practice, in 1977 the Chinese press began to oppose cooperation between Phnom Penh and Hanoi. At the same time, the Chinese were careful not to be too firm in their support, for fear of pushing the Vietnamese toward the Soviets. Beijing still hoped that by restraining Chinese cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, it could minimize Vietnamese incentives to cooperate with the Soviet Union. In January, when the initial border clashes occurred, Nuon Chea, a high-ranking Khmer Rouge official, was quoted by the Chinese Xinhua news agency as saying that “our army and people will certainly defeat whatever country that dares to invade us.” Again in late April, China provided low-level support to Phnom Penh. At a reception in Beijing in late April, Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua pointedly praised the success of the Pol Pot led–Khmer Rouge leadership in thwarting the sabotage attempts of “foreign and domestic enemies.” In the context of the recent hostilities, Hua further declared that Beijing and Phnom Penh were “close comrades-inarms.” Yet, in a signal to both Phnom Penh and Hanoi to exercise restraint, Beijing was quiet for approximately ten weeks between February and April, at the time when Phnom Penh would have most required Chinese support.

Increasing Tensions Amid the rising Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, and after a year of political purges, particularly of veteran Indochina Communist Party members within the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot announced the existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) on 27 September 1977. The issue of Cambodia’s relations with Vietnam was expressed symbolically even over the issues of the date of the

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founding of the CPK and whether its roots lay in the ICP. Rather than dating the birth of the CPK from 30 September 1951, when the ICP split to form three separate national parties, Pol Pot dated the party’s first congress as falling on 30 September 1960, when he created the Workers’ Party of Kampuchea. By this act, Pol Pot disavowed any lineal descent from the ICP and, by implication, Vietnam’s leadership of the Indochina region. From Hanoi’s perspective, Pol Pot’s declaration was a rebuff to Vietnam and marked a turning point. Hanoi realized that any attempt to control Indochina would necessitate the removal of Pol Pot. In a Vietnamese message to the CPK on 28 September 1977, the concept of a special Vietnamese-Cambodian relationship was stressed. The term “special relationship” appeared three times in the short message. In a clear sign of Phnom Penh’s displeasure at Hanoi’s characterization of bilateral relations, the reference to a “special relationship” was deleted when broadcast in Cambodia.

The Point of No Return Relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh were at boiling point. Vietnamese general Giap visited the border in late July and early August 1977. In September Cambodian artillery shelled Vietnamese border villages. Infantry attacks were conducted on villages in Dong Thap and Tay Ninh provinces, killing more than one thousand Vietnamese civilians. The Vietnamese responded with a series of limited counterattacks into Cambodia. Despite these events, a not insignificant portion of the American intelligence and some prominent Southeast Asian experts in the U.S. academic community were skeptical that Vietnam would invade Cambodia. For their part, the Chinese tried to restrain the Khmer Rouge in their relations with the Vietnamese. At the end of September 1977 Pol Pot visited Beijing just as border hostilities between the Vietnamese and Cambodian were starting again. The Khmer Rouge leader was criticized by the Chinese for his border policy. The Chinese leader Hua Guofeng encouraged the Khmer Rouge leader not to exacerbate relations with the Vietnamese communists. Hua told Pol Pot: We do not want the problems between Vietnam and Cambodia to get worse. We want the two parties to find a solution by diplomatic means in a spirit of mutual comprehension and concessions. However, we are in agreement . . . that the resolution of the problem via negotiations is not simple. One must be very vigilant with the Vietnamese, not only in diplomatic terms but even more when it comes to defending the leadership brain, which is the most important problem.

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The Chinese were actively trying to cool down relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. While Pol Pot was in Beijing, the Chinese arranged for Vietnamese deputy foreign minister Phan Hien to visit and meet Pot twice. The meetings were not successful, with the Vietnamese reporting afterward that the Khmer Rouge delegation was only interested in an apology for Vietnamese aggression and attempts to overthrow their leadership. At a news conference in late October Deng Xiaoping stressed that the conflict between Phnom Penh and Hanoi needed to be resolved through negotiations by both parties themselves. In an indication that the Chinese were trying to be impartial, Deng stressed that “we ourselves do not judge what is just or erroneous.” As hostilities continued along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, a watershed in Sino-Vietnamese relations was reached during Le Duan’s visit to Beijing on 20–25 November 1977. Le Duan had just led a delegation to Moscow to attend the ceremonies for the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution. According to the official Chinese Foreign Ministry history of Chinese foreign relations, Le Duan was interested in additional Chinese aid. In response to this request, Chinese leader Hua Guofeng noted that “on various issues we both have differences in principle [yuanze fenqi].” As a consequence, Hua asserted that “a few disputes have intensified [zhengduan jihua]” and the SinoVietnamese relationship had “deteriorated.” Citing economic difficulties that China had been experiencing in the previous few years, Hua told Le that Beijing was unable to agree to the aid the Vietnamese leader was requesting. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry account, upon hearing Hua’s response, Le declared: “On various questions, our two countries have different viewpoints, [but the] most important difference relates to how we view the Soviet Union and the United States.” In his banquet speech Le Duan issued a stern message to his Chinese hosts and implicitly criticized the Chinese as a reactionary power: The Vietnamese people’s most pressing wish is to live in peace; and while establishing and strengthening friendly cooperative relationships, to be able to contribute to the peace of regional and global peace; and at the same time, they are determined to not allow imperialism and any reactionary powers to violate their independence and freedom.

As was the case in Le Duan’s visit to China in 1975, the Vietnamese did not host a customary reciprocal banquet. The next day the Xinhua news agency published a condemnation of COMECON, to which Vietnam had recently applied for membership.

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Soon after Le Duan’s visit to Beijing, the Chinese continued to seek to mediate between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. On 3 December 1977 Vice Premier Chen Yonggui led a delegation to Cambodia. In the context of the tensions on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, Chen’s lack of strong support for Phnom Penh’s defense policy efforts was a rebuke of sorts. Indeed, the statements by his Khmer counterparts at the farewell banquet for Chen indicate strongly that it was taken as such. Soon after Chen’s trip, rising tensions caused by Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnamese territory culminated in a massive Vietnamese attack against Cambodia. Hanoi issued instructions to prepare for a massive attack on Cambodia involving an estimated force of between 30,000 and 60,000 troops; this occurred on 16 December. Six Vietnamese divisions invaded Cambodia. Phnom Penh broke diplomatic relations with Hanoi at this time. China sought to act as a restraining influence. On 9 January and again on 20 February 1978, Vietnamese vice foreign minister Phan Hien visited Beijing for discussions with the Cambodian government. In between these visits, on 18 January 1978, Zhou Enlai’s widow, Vice Premier Deng Yingchao, visited Phnom Penh in an attempt to get negotiations started. She met with strong resistance. Despite Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent statement that conflicts in Asia should be dealt with by means of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” it was clear that China’s mediation had not been successful. Events moved quickly, with Beijing and Hanoi set on a collision course over Cambodia. By early 1978 Vietnamese officials and So Phim, the Khmer Rouge party head in the strategic eastern zone of Cambodia, had begun to discuss plans to overthrow Pol Pot by means of a military uprising backed by Vietnam. In mid-February 1978, at the Fourth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee of the VCP, a proposal was approved to remove the Pol Pot regime by means of a general uprising. The Vietnamese strategy was foiled by the Khmer Rouge and So Phim’s forces came under attack over the next few months. So Phim eventually committed suicide and his lieutenant Heng Samrin fled to Vietnam, where he formed the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), which was to play a part in the subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Chinese saw the hand of the Soviet Union behind Vietnam’s actions. Indeed, throughout the period covered below, the Soviet press encouraged Vietnamese opposition to China. Not surprisingly against the backdrop of continuing Cambodian-Vietnamese border clashes, on 19 January 1978 Xinhua argued:

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Moscow has long been seeking a dominating position in Southeast Asia and trying to bring the region into its “system of collective security in Asia.” Now it is resorting to the same trick in dealing with the conflict between Kampuchea [Cambodia] and Vietnam. Obviously Moscow itself has stirred up troubles and added fuel to the conflict, yet it, by every possible means, spreads rumors to slander China. By doing so, Moscow vainly hopes to divert people’s attention and cover up its strategic purpose of establishing domination in the region.

Subsequent developments in Vietnamese policy toward its ethnic Chinese minority convinced Beijing that Hanoi was determined to pursue a policy of alignment with the Soviet Union, in opposition to China. At the Fourth Plenum of the VCP in February 1978 the decision was taken to abolish capitalist trade in South Vietnam and to invade Cambodia. Since the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam occupied a significant role in the economy of South Vietnam, they bore the brunt of the decision. On 23 March 1978 Hanoi announced that all private enterprises would be nationalized. In a campaign characterized by the use of violence, by midApril the Vietnamese authorities had seized more than thirty thousand private enterprises in the South, the vast majority of which were owned by ethnic Chinese. The crackdown spurred a mass exodus, both across the SinoVietnamese border in the North and into the South China Sea. Compounding the desperate financial situation of the ethnic Chinese, on 23 April Hanoi announced plans to unify the currencies of north and southern Vietnam. The previous currencies in use in North and South Vietnam were to be traded in for the new unified currency at an unfavorable rate of exchange. Beijing finally responded publicly to the crisis on the 30 April, expressing concern for the refugees and indicating that it was monitoring the situation. On 30 April, as Sino-Vietnamese tensions escalated during the ethnic Chinese exodus from Vietnam, a coup in Afghanistan installed a pro-Soviet leader, Nur Mohammed Taraki. The regime was recognized by Vietnam on 3 May. Viewed from Beijing, this was the Soviet Union taking another step in its encirclement of China. On 3 May the separate currencies in Vietnam were unified, provoking a further flow of refugees. In another case of the Soviets making provocative moves during a time of maximum crisis, on 9 May Soviet forces penetrated into Chinese territory, on the pretext of pursuing a Soviet citizen. Soon after this incident Soviet naval forces moved toward Southeast Asia, and in late May they conducted maneuvers in the South China Sea.

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In the face of an increasing exodus, Beijing announced on 26 May that it was dispatching ships to Vietnam to retrieve these fleeing ethnic Chinese. Unfortunately, since Hanoi insisted that the ships use ports in the Cholon district of Ho Chi Minh City, they were inaccessible to those wanting to leave. The ships eventually returned to China without having picked up any ethnic Chinese. Deng Xiaoping stated bluntly that “Vietnam is leaning toward the Soviet Union, which is the enemy of China.” On 16 June China announced that it was closing its consulate in Ho Chi Minh City as well as Vietnam’s consular offices in the Chinese cities of Guangzhou, Kunming, and Nanning. It was in the context of escalating Sino-Vietnamese conflict in midsummer 1978 that the VCP met at its fifth plenum and approved a new plan to launch an invasion to overthrow the Pol Pot regime. Vietnamese cadre were told in June 1978 that Vietnam was planning to attack Cambodia. On 28 June 1978, for the first time, Vietnam was referred to by the Chinese press as a “ ‘Cuba’ in Asia,” the implication being that like Cuba, Vietnam was actively cooperating with Moscow’s foreign policy in the Third World. On 29 June Vietnam was formally admitted into COMECON.  At the end of June there was a substantial increase in Chinese military aid to Cambodia. For their part, the Vietnamese were building up their forces along the border with Cambodia. Preparations for a Vietnamese invasion were widely reported in the international and Chinese press. On 3 July 1978 Beijing halted all aid to Hanoi. This was the final suspension in a staged process. Then, in late July through early August, Khmer Rogue defense minister Son Sen visited Beijing. Sino-Vietnamese talks in August and September on the overseas Chinese issue stalled. A line had been crossed. As Robert Ross notes, “for the Chinese leadership, the issue was no longer how to minimize Vietnamese security cooperation with the Soviet Union but how to prevent Vietnamese cooperation with Soviet encirclement of the PRC from extending into Kampuchea [Cambodia].” The Vietnamese were determined to oppose Chinese efforts to limit Hanoi’s influence in Cambodia. On 10 September, in a speech in Hanoi celebrating the thirty-third anniversary of the Vietnamese declaration of independence in 1945, Pham Van Dong vividly described China’s use of “the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique” as a tool to undermine Vietnam’s security. Pham further added that this had been a concerted strategy since 1975 and that the Vietnamese people could no longer tolerate it. In a September 1978 meeting in Hanoi between Vietnamese leader Le Duan and the Soviet ambassador to Vietnam, Le stated his intention “to solve fully this question [of Cambodia] by the beginning of 1979.” He

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further stated that the initiative lay with Vietnam since the Chinese would need to station at least ten divisions in Cambodia to deter a Vietnamese attack. According to Le, for the Chinese to transport these troops to Cambodia by sea was a “very difficult matter.” It was but a short step to a formal Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. On 3 November 1978, the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. The subsequent Vietnamese offensive against Cambodia took place between mid-November and 13 December. China prepared the international community for a vigorous Chinese response to the newly consolidated Hanoi-Moscow axis. Relations with Japan and the ASEAN states were strengthened. Deng Xiaoping visited Tokyo in August 1978, where he signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Significantly, it contained an “anti-hegemony” clause that was directed against the Soviet Union. Then in November, to counter Southeast Asian trips made by Vietnamese deputy foreign minister Phan Hien in July, and Pham Van Dong in September, Deng made a tour of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Deng was particularly concerned with securing Thai support for the Chinese containment policy against the Vietnamese.  The diplomatic work having been initiated, China took a hard line against Vietnam. A 13 December note from Beijing to Hanoi warned that there were “limits on China’s forbearance and restraint.” On 25 December 1978, in the People’s Daily, Hanoi was warned again: There is a limit to the Chinese people’s forbearance and restraint. . . . China means what it says. We wish to warn the Vietnamese authorities that if they, emboldened by Moscow’s support, try to seek a foot after gaining an inch, and continue to act in this unbridled fashion, they will decidedly meet with the punishment they deserve. We state this here and now. Don’t complain later that we’ve not given you a clear warning in advance.

As the People’s Daily was being read in China that very morning, about 150,000 Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia, in the second phase of the Vietnamese assault. By 7 January 1979 the Vietnamese had seized Phnom Penh. Estimates suggest that 10,000 Vietnamese and 15,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers were killed. In the third phase, the Vietnamese moved northwest, and with the capture of Sisophon, had taken the Khmer Rouge’s main supply route to Thailand. The fourth and final phase lasted from the end of January though March and involved the consolidation of Vietnamese gains and defense against counterattacks.

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Following the Vietnamese invasion, while visiting the United States from late January through early February 1979, Deng Xiaoping informed the Carter administration that Vietnam would pay a price for its actions. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Deng told his American hosts that the Chinese “consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson.” True to Deng’s words, soon after his return to China the Chinese launched a war against Vietnam.

A BID FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY? The alternative explanation to the argument made here would be that SinoVietnamese conflict was primarily caused by conflict over Hanoi’s bid to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia. A number of analysts have pointed to Vietnam’s drive to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia as the key reason behind the increase in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. It is important to note that these authors do not say that the Soviet factor had no role in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Rather, by focusing their analysis heavily on SinoVietnamese competition in Cambodia, these authors imply, to varying degrees, that the Soviet factor was a secondary cause of conflict in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In contrast, it is argued here that the Soviet factor is the central cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Our review of the evidence suggests that the Soviet factor is the key that unlocks the puzzle of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. If Hanoi had not had Moscow’s backing, in all likelihood it would not have attempted to realize its long-sought aim of establishing control over Cambodia. The timing of events suggests this conclusion. The fact remains that Hanoi only invaded Cambodia (in late December 1978) after it had entered into an alliance with Moscow in November 1978. Additionally, when the Vietnamese did pull out of Cambodia in the late 1980s, it was primarily because the Soviet Union had decreased its support for the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. All this suggests a strong case for the importance of the Soviet factor in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. An examination of the events between the Vietnamese invasion and its retrenchment from Cambodia suggests a further, and even stronger case for the Soviet factor in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. To accomplish a foreign policy goal, a state requires resources. Given Hanoi’s post-1975 domestic economic difficulties, from an operational perspective the Vietnamese would only have been able to sustain an occupation of Cambodia over an extended period of time

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if it had Soviet diplomatic, military, and economic support. In this respect, as seen in the copious evidence cited in the previous section that discusses Soviet military and economic aid to Vietnam, the Soviet role was critical in the pursuit of a policy of intervention in Cambodia. Indeed, Thayer and Thakur argue that “Vietnam’s . . . treaty with the Soviet Union may be viewed as an insurance policy designed to protect Hanoi from China. The treaty was timed to precede Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. . . . [and was] designed to deter a full-scale Chinese response.”

THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER WAR OF 1979 Thus far we have delineated the causal mechanism that led to the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and explored its relative cogency against a bilateral argument. We shall now turn to the Sino-Vietnamese border war. This study would be incomplete if it did not move on to address a number of other questions. First, why did Sino-Vietnamese war occur? Second, what are the explanations for China’s use of force in this instance? How does this case relate to the general literature on China’s use of force? Before we address these questions, let us first consider the actual events.

The War Itself Recent research using Chinese language sources suggests the need for a revision to existing understandings of the timing of the Chinese decision to take military action, which appears to have been made later than initially thought. It has previously been claimed that a definitive Chinese decision to inflict a lesson on the Vietnamese was made in July 1978. Others have conjectured that the decision was made at a Central Work Conference between 10 November and 15 December. Recent Chinese sources suggest that it was only on 7 December that an affirmative decision was taken by the Central Military Commission (CMC). On 8 December the CMC issued an order to the Guangzhou and Kunming military regions to be prepared for a two-week attack on Vietnam beginning on 10 January 1979. On New Year’s Eve, Deng Xiaoping formally, and successfully, proposed a war against Vietnam at a CMC conference. At that meeting, the date of the military operation was made contingent on a report on the operational readiness of the attack force. At a meeting of the CMC in Deng’s home on 22 January, the CMC changed the timing of the war, based on this report, to the middle of February. On 11 February,

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two days after Deng’s return from a watershed trip to the United States, an enlarged Politburo meeting decided to launch the offensive against Vietnam on 17 February. The Sino-Vietnamese War lasted from 17 February to 16 March 1979 and involved an estimated 472,000 Chinese troops against 50,000 Vietnamese troops. This represents a ratio of more than 9 Chinese troops to every 1 Vietnamese. The campaign involved a three-staged process. The first stage lasted from 17 to 25 February and involved the seizure of the regional capitals of Cao Bang (northeast) and Lao Cai (northwest), and the towns of Cam Duong (northwest) and Dong Dang (northeast). The second stage involved an offensive against the strategically located Lang Son (in the northeast) and Sa Pa and Phong Tho (both in the northwest). Lang Son was the focus of an assault by six Chinese divisions, beginning on 27 February, in which the Chinese had a overwhelming superiority of 10 to 1. The northern part of the city was captured on 2 March, followed by the southern part on 5 March. The third stage involved a mopping up operation followed by a withdrawal on 16 March.

Alternative Explanations The effects of the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 were significant. As William Duiker has observed: The Sino-Vietnamese conflict [of 1979], and the events that led up to it, had a major impact on the structure of international politics in Asia. The war not only brought a definitive end to an alliance [the Sino-Vietnamese alliance] . . . it also led to a realignment of the regional power balance and threatened, for the first time in more than a decade, to bring the Great Powers to the brink of confrontation in Southeast Asia.

Duiker’s quote naturally leads us to a question: Why did the Sino-Vietnamese War occur? It is one thing to terminate an alliance, and a totally different thing to enter into a war. Let us examine the Sino-Vietnamese war from the perspective of neorealist theory, which is compatible with principal enemy theory. Neorealist theory—with its emphasis on the concept of anarchy, changes in the material distribution of power, the pursuit of security, and the consequent operation of the security dilemma—set the broad perameters for SinoVietnamese conflict. In Waltz’s neorealist theory, states seek to maximize their security in the context of the uncertainty generated by the structural con-

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dition of anarchy. Wars occur via the security dilemma, as security–seeking states respond to shifts in the distribution of aggregate power to prevent exploitation. Waltz has argued that neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought. We therefore need to consider how the broad perameters noted above interacted with specific circumstances to explain the war. Shifts in the balance of power in post-1975 era reflected in immediate circumstances on the ground, explain China’s heightened sense of threat vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The newly unified Vietnam created a major new player in the post-1975 Asian dispensation. Hanoi’s minimum security requirement in this period was to carve out secure borders. The establishment of a sphere of influence was a desirable but secondary goal. As described above, these twin goals were accomplished easily enough in Laos. The situation with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was an entirely different matter, wherein the Chinese-aligned Khmer Rouge adopted a belligerent posture toward its larger and stronger neighbor. The Chinese, while hardly pleased with Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnam, were focused on the larger strategic picture. Viewed from Beijing, the Vietnam communists, by progressively aligning themselves with the Soviets, were contributing to Soviet capabilities and bolstering the Soviet policy of encirclement of China. China therefore sought to restrain Vietnam’s tilt toward the Soviet Union by threatening to increase its cooperation with the Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese decision to invade Cambodia in December 1978 led China to retaliate by launching a border war against Vietnam in 1979. Chinese decisionmakers sought to demonstrate to the Vietnamese and the Soviets that China was prepared to use force and diplomacy to limit Vietnamese and, critically, Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. From the period from 1979 to 1991 Beijing entered into close cooperation with the Khmer Rouge and the ASEAN states (and to a lesser extent the United States) in an ultimately successful effort to contain Vietnamese and Soviet influence in the Southeast Asian region. The conflict in Cambodia was, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has characterized it, “the first case of a proxy war between the Soviet Union and China.”

Strategic Cultures and Material Incentives A further question concerns China’s use of force against the Vietnamese in 1979. How does this study relate to previous analyses of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war in this respect? Does this study modify or reaffirm the previous literature on China’s use of force?

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Before we can reach an answer to these questions, we will have to briefly review the existing literature, which can be distilled along two lines of argument. The first is a strategic culture argument. John Fairbank talks of a longstanding pacifist tradition rooted in the Confucian-Mencian strategic culture. Here it is argued that for cultural reasons, the Chinese are very reluctant to use force. Alternatively, a more recent cultural-based argument by Alastair Iain Johnston reached a very different conclusion on this subject. Johnston argues that Chinese decision-makers have internalized a parabellum, or hard realpolitik, strategic culture. Using the Ming dynasty as a testing ground for his theory, Johnston finds that Ming policymakers consistently adopted a contingent parabellum strategy in which they favored more coercive, offensive strategies when those options were available to them. Defensive strategies were adopted as a second-best option. Johnston concludes that this parabellum strategic culture is similar to traditional Western conceptions of realpolitik behavior. In his more recent research, Johnston finds that this pattern has continued in the post-1949 era. Thus it is argued that from a comparative perspective, China was more prone to use force than any other major powers except for the United States. Moreover, once in a militarized dispute, Beijing was the most likely to escalate to a high level of violence. In particular, Johnston agues that China’s use of force has been “more risky, more militarized, and less connected to specific political demands than was once believed. It has, in some cases, been less than successful, exposing China to unexpected security threats.” More recently, Scobell has proposed a hybrid of the two versions of the strategic culture model outlined above, arguing that the Chinese embrace a “cult of the defensive” that is an amalgamation of two strategic cultures. Here, the realpolitik strand that readily embraces the use of force as an instrument of policy is intertwined with a Confucian strand that abjures its use. Scobell makes the case that many Chinese decision-makers and analysts “believe profoundly that the legacy of Chinese civilization is fundamentally pacifist, [but] they are nevertheless very willing to employ force when confronting crises.” The second broad perspective on China’s use of force adopts a calculative unitary rational actor model. Here China responds to the incentives extant in the international system and reacts in an interactive fashion to the behavior of other states. Represented most prominently in the work of Allen Whiting, the argument is that Chinese decision-makers stress the utility of defensive and limited wars conducted within well-defined spatial and temporal bound-

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aries. In this perspective, China uses force in a controlled manner, and has been relatively successful in coordinating its use of force with diplomatic tools in the pursuit of clearly defined political objectives. In an important qualification that sits uneasily with his general perspective outlined above, Whiting notes that China has also engaged in actions that have increased the risk of war, even when dealing with a nuclear-armed adversary. In this respect, Whiting’s work converges with more recent research on China’s use of force that draws on Chinese materials in stressing the high-risk propensity of Chinese decision-makers. In this section we will evaluate these different views of China’s use of force with reference to the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979. This chapter has argued that the Soviet factor was the key consideration for Chinese decision-makers, who had a clear understanding of their strategic choices. In its use of force against the Vietnamese communists, this study finds that the Chinese used coercion in a rational way, and as a last resort, for the political objective of inflicting high costs on Hanoi for participating in a Soviet encirclement of China. At the same time, Beijing was cautious in not wanting to provoke Soviet intervention. In this respect, the Chinese were receiving daily intelligence (including satellite imagery) from the Americans on Soviet deployments on the Sino-Soviet border. Care was taken to limit the attack on Vietnam. First, the Chinese decision to use force did not reflect any aversion or reluctance concerning the use of military instruments of statecraft, as reflected in the Mencian-Confucian variant of the strategic culture perspective. As detailed above, when Hanoi’s willingness to serve in a Soviet encirclement policy aimed against China was made manifest, Beijing showed no reluctance in punishing Vietnam with the use of force and diplomatic counter-encirclement. Indeed, according to one Chinese analyst, the use of force in this instance was a matter of clear national and even regional interests. Second, contrary to Johnston’s argument, the Chinese appear to have been cautious in their use of force, taking great pains to avoid unnecessary escalation. Chinese decision-makers took extensive diplomatic actions to prepare the region and the international community for the attack. From August 1978 through January 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States to lay the diplomatic groundwork for the invasion. Significantly, in order not to provoke a retaliatory Soviet attack, Beijing signaled to Moscow that the use of force against Vietnam was to be limited in scope and duration. Thus the official Chinese Xinhua news agency declared on 21 February 1979 that:

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We do not want a single inch of Vietnamese territory. . . . After counterattacking the Vietnamese aggressors as they deserve, the Chinese frontier troops will strictly keep to defending the border of their own territory.

Deng Xiaoping explicitly reiterated this point the next day. On 26 February 1979, when the conflict was in progress, Deng again reaffirmed China’s limited goals in a statement to the international press. According to Deng, China’s “objective is a limited one—that is, to teach them [the Vietnamese] that they could not run about as much as they desired.” Only PLA ground forces were used in the operation. Furthermore, as explicitly indicated on separate occasions by both the Chinese government and Deng, no attempt was made to move beyond more than fifty kilometers into Northern Vietnam or to attack Hanoi. Third, consistent with Scobell’s “cult of the defensive” argument, China justified its use of force as an instance of defensive behavior. Thus, the quote cited above by the official Chinese Xinhua news on 21 February 1979 clearly describes China’s use of force against Vietnam as a defensive act. Fourth, Allen Whiting’s description of China’s use of force as “controlled” and marked by “co-ordination with diplomatic and political moves” is also consistent with this instance of China’s use of force. As noted above, Beijing made sure to send out signals to the Soviets that China’s use of force would be limited in scope and intended to deliver a punishment to the Vietnamese. Comments by Soviet diplomats strongly suggest that they understood these Chinese signals, thus confirming this aspect of Whiting’s analysis. That said, the fact that the Chinese coordinated their diplomatic and political moves with the Soviets says nothing about the performance of the PLA, which was not impressive. The Chinese military was shown to be ill-equipped and lacking in battle experience. Although the Chinese captured five key Vietnamese cities as well as other minor ones, their “blows” to the Vietnamese were softened by the poor performance of the PLA. Chinese casualties were extremely high for a three-week war. A recent and authoritative study of the 1979 war notes that casualty figures vary in Western sources, being estimated at between 25,000 and 40,000 killed. Chinese sources list 6,900 fatalities and 15,000 wounded. These problems were magnified because the Chinese were facing a foe, the People’s Army of Vietnam, that was battle-hardened and skilled in their craft. Indeed, Vietnamese troops were attacking China throughout the period of China’s invasion. For example, even as the major battle of the campaign was beginning on the 27 February, at Lang Son, Vietnamese attacks were being conducted in Napo county, Guangxi province.

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Writing soon after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, Harlan Jencks specified the inadequacies of the PLA in this war, which had the contrary effect of solidifying Vietnam’s status as a major regional power.

In this particular war, it may be generalized that Vietnamese quality beat Chinese quantity almost across the board. It did so (1) because of limiting terrain; (2) because of the limited time imposed for both political and climactic reasons; and (3) because of China’s inability to employ effectively the forces it did have as a result of short comings in CI. and in personnel qualification and training and because of organizational problems. Finally, Vietnam emerged from the conflict as a very strong middleweight regional military power.

Stephen Morris has argued that “an examination of the objective military and economic situations of China and Vietnam in mid-1975 would not have led one to predict that either nation was interested in becoming embroiled in any further conflicts in Indochina.” Similarly, Anne Gilks argues that “the war in 1979 was a conflict that neither China nor Vietnam wanted and that could not be foreseen in April 1975 [when the Vietnamese communists took over Saigon].” The analysis in this chapter suggests otherwise. The escalating Sino-Soviet conflict was the lighted match that found a haystack in the SinoVietnamese relationship. In reaction to a more assertive Soviet foreign policy after 1975, Sino-Soviet conflict escalated and Hanoi drew closer to Moscow for a variety of predictable and objective economic and military-strategic reasons. This led to increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Initially, Hanoi sought to continue a balancing game of taking aid from both Beijing and Moscow, as it had done for the preceding decade. Chinese decision-makers were not prepared to indulge their Vietnamese counterparts. With the end of the Second Indochina War and the subsequent partial U.S. retrenchment in post-1975 East Asia, Beijing was left to deal with a rising Soviet threat. Faced with competing demands for allegiance from Beijing and Moscow, Vietnam chose the latter. Why was this the case? Hanoi was clearly swayed by Soviet economic and military largesse. The Soviets, who saw Vietnam through the prism of the Sino-Soviet conflict, were more able and willing to provide for Vietnam in respect to both its economic and its intrinsic national security defense requirements. In exchange, the Vietnamese became a participant in Moscow’s encirclement policy against China.

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With the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance in 1978, Moscow’s relations with Hanoi were made substantially stronger than they had been in 1975, when this chapter began. During the post-1975 period, Hanoi endorsed the Soviet position on détente and increased military cooperation with the Soviets. The increased Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation led to significant SinoVietnamese conflict and culminated in the Chinese invasion of Northern Vietnam in January–February 1979. The war between Vietnam and China ended any previously existing belief that the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was “a friendship that is indestructible.” The upshot for the Chinese was that since 1964, the Soviets had made significant gains in their containment of China. Moscow had secured alliance treaties with critical states on China’s periphery, including Mongolia (in 1966), India (in 1971), and Afghanistan (in 1978). The Soviet-Vietnamese alliance that was signed on 2 November 1978 represented yet another Soviet success in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

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6 WHEN ALLIES BECOME ENEMIES

The Sino-S oviet dispu te and de facto termination of their alliance were major developments in the international relations of the Cold War. They form a key component in any account of why the Soviet-led communist vision of international order was ultimately unsuccessful in its competition with the alternative vision led by the United States. Despite its manifest importance, the multiple consequences associated with the termination of the SinoSoviet alliance have not been sufficiently explored in the literature. This book is part of an emerging literature that has sought to make some headway in filling this gap. We have done so by exploring one consequence of the termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance, namely, its effect on the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. This chapter aims to perform four tasks. First, it will summarize the contributions of this book. Second, it will demonstrate how the causal mechanism elaborated in the text can be extended to cover the period from 1979 to 1991. Third, we will examine the criteria that were used by China in designating a principal enemy during the Cold War. Fourth, in the section on a future research agenda, we will examine the applicability of principal enemy theory, in its capacity as a variant of realist theory, to Chinese foreign policy in the Cold War and post–Cold War era, with an emphasis on Beijing’s relations with the United States and states in the Asian region.

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WHEN ALLIES BECOME ENEMIES

EXPLAINING THE TERMINATION OF THE SINO-VIETNAMESE ALLIANCE Qiang Zhai has observed that the “rise and fall of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance is one of the most crucial developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia in general and Chinese foreign relations in particular.” This book agrees with Zhai and has sought an answer to the question of why the Sino-Vietnamese alliance “fell” or was otherwise terminated. In this respect, three contributions are made to the existing literature on Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War. First, we have shown that a bilateral explanation is unsatisfactory in explaining conflict in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Second, using both Chineseand English-language materials that have emerged since the early 1990s, this book has attempted to illuminate a critical, yet still remarkably underexplored dimension of the Cold War: intra-alliance politics between the Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese communists during the second half of the Cold War. In this respect, we have delineated an alternative causal mechanism, rooted in neorealist theory and which we call principal enemy theory, to explain developments in China’s relationship with the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese communists from 1964 to 1991. Finally, a third contribution of this book consists of the outlining of four paths through which alliance termination and subsequent conflict between former alliance partners can impact international politics.

Bilateral Explanations for the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance The main competing explanation to the one advance in this book is that the source of increased conflict in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance was located in a particular bilateral issue. This counterhypothesis attributes the cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict to Vietnam’s attempt, contrary to China’s wishes, to consolidate its influence over its immediate periphery (Cambodia and Laos). Specifically, it points to Sino-Vietnamese competition for influence in Laos (in the 1960s) and Sino-Vietnamese competition over Cambodia after Lon Nol’s coup in Cambodia in 1970, and again in the post-1975 period, as the explanation for escalating Sino-Vietnamese conflict. With respect to competition in Laos as a cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, contrary to the implication of this thesis, the fact remains that the Vietnamese were open to a substantial Chinese presence in Laos for the bulk of the 1960s. The Chinese were involved in road-building activities and also advised the Laotian communists, the Pathet Lao on party and army work. Palpable Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Laos occurred only in September 1968. Why

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is this? The timing is important here. As we saw in chapter 3, in August 1968 China and Vietnam disagreed over the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Sino-Vietnamese differences over the Soviet intervention affected Vietnamese perceptions of Chinese involvement in Laos. In September 1968, as a result of pressure from Hanoi, Pathet Lao leader Kaysone Phomvihane asked Li Wenzheng, the head of the Chinese team in Sam Nuea, to leave Laos. This increased tensions in Sino-Vietnamese relations. On the issue of Cambodia, a state that is contiguous with Vietnam and in close proximity to China, the evidence suggests that Sino-Vietnamese differences on this issue would have been manageable if not for the Soviet factor. Viewed from a bilateral Sino-Vietnamese perspective, there is a “natural” potential for Sino-Vietnamese sphere-of-influence conflicts over that country, particularly in the fluid period following Lon Nol’s coup in March 1970. Yet the fact remains that there was fairly limited Sino-Vietnamese conflict over this issue. Hanoi was even a participant in the Indochina conference that China organized soon after Lon Nol’s coup. The reason for the limited Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Cambodia from 1970 until 1975 lies in the fact that the Soviets did not take substantive steps to encourage the Vietnamese communists on this issue. This changed in the post-1975 period. While Sino-Vietnamese conflict simmered around a number of contentious bilateral issues in the post-1975 period, including the Sino-Vietnamese land and maritime borders, the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and Vietnamese designs on Cambodia, the key for China was Vietnam’s stance toward the Soviet Union. We have dealt with issue of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam as well as the Sino-Vietnamese land and maritime borders in chapters 1, 4 and 5, and will focus here on why Cambodia was an issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations after 1975. The view that it was the Vietnamese attempt to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia that accounts for the escalation of Sino-Vietnamese conflict is not persuasive. It overlooks a critical question: where did the Vietnamese acquire the will and the capability to defy China’s warnings on this issue? The answer lies in the Soviet factor. However much Hanoi may have wanted to establish a sphere of influence over Indochina, it would not have dared to go against Beijing’s wishes, overthrow the Pol Pot regime, and proceed to establish control over Cambodia had it not been for the presumed deterrent effect of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance that was codified in a treaty in November 1978. The critical role of the Soviet factor is obscured by a focus on the purely bilateral context of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over Cambodia. This is an important point since the timing of events that preceded the Vietnamese invasion

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(in 1978), and retrenchment from Cambodia (in the late 1980s), suggests that the role of the Soviet Union is central to developments. Specifically, in both instances, the Soviet Union was of paramount importance in influencing the course of Vietnamese policy toward Cambodia. A more convincing explanation for Sino-Vietnamese conflict is outlined in chapter 5. Such an explanation, informed by principal enemy theory, places the Sino-Vietnamese conflict against the larger backdrop of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In this interpretation, the Chinese viewed the intensification of Moscow’s material and diplomatic cooperation with Hanoi as constituting a strategy to consolidate a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. In this respect, Vietnam with its foreign policy was seen as another piece in a larger Soviet encirclement policy aimed at China. Within this context, China used Cambodia to demonstrate its commitment to resisting the Soviet-aligned Vietnamese. Thus, from December 1977 onward one can see increasing material and diplomatic support on the part of Beijing for the Khmer Rouge. When the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invaded Cambodia on 25 December 1978, China was primed to retaliate. A drastic escalation of Sino-Vietnamese conflict occurred, as seen in the border war of 1979.

Principal Enemy Theory The political theorist Isaiah Berlin has pithily observed that “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Following the SinoSoviet split of the early 1960s, China’s decision-makers (and Mao in particular) were like Berlin’s hedgehog: they knew one big thing—that the Soviets were a serious threat and needed to be dealt with as such. This caused the Chinese to reject the counsel of allies who advocated an amicable resolution of the SinoSoviet conflict. How did the Chinese come to see the Soviets not just as an ideological threat, but as their principal strategic adversary? And how did this development affect Sino-Vietnamese relations? As described in chapter 2, the period from Zhou Enlai’s Moscow trip in October–November 1964 to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was a watershed period in Sino-Soviet relations. In Chinese eyes, this period marked the transition of the Soviet Union from ideological rival to that of China’s foremost strategic threat. Against the backdrop of escalating conflict in Sino-Soviet relations, both sides faced the large-scale introduction of American ground troops into South Vietnam in early 1965. Uneasy Sino-Soviet cooperation occurred over the transport of military and economic aid to North

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Vietnam through Chinese territory. However, as we have attempted to show in chapter 2, the Vietnam War was not just a war between the United States and the Vietnamese communists, but also the main arena in which the Sino-Soviet conflict played itself out. This statement implies that without the Sino-Soviet competition in Vietnam, China would have invested less in Hanoi’s war effort against the Americans. Thus, Chinese aid to the Vietnamese was motivated not just by a desire to serve as a deterrent against an American ground invasion on North Vietnam, but by a need to compete with the Soviets. The official Chinese Foreign Ministry account of this period records that from 1964 until 1969, China’s total aid to North Vietnam came up to $180 million. Approximately 320,000 Chinese troops served mainly in a service and support capacity in North Vietnam over the period from 1965 through 1968. The increasing Soviet role in Vietnam led to a steady increase in SinoVietnamese conflict. We have shown in chapters 2 and 3 that the Chinese were particularly angry at the Vietnamese for increasing their dependence on the Soviets. This increased dependence was manifested in the areas: (1) the level of Soviet material aid to North Vietnam, and (2) the extent of Soviet influence over Hanoi’s battlefield tactics and posture toward negotiations with the Americans. In both these areas the Chinese gradually began to lose influence to the Soviets, and Sino-Vietnamese conflict increased accordingly. The threat posed by the Soviets to the Chinese communists transformed itself into an existential strategic threat when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and defended their actions by reference to what would later be called the Brezhnev Doctrine. The subsequent Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 escalated tensions further and called for a drastic Chinese response. This took the form of a rapprochement with the United States, which culminated in President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972. As shown in chapter 4, the Paris Peace Agreements of 1973 did not mean an end to Sino-Soviet conflict, and its related effects on Soviet-Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese relations. In fact, Sino-Soviet conflict escalated. The Soviets capitalized on the faltering South Vietnamese war effort to materially facilitate the North Vietnamese march to victory. As Soviet military and economic assistance increased, the Chinese were increasingly sidelined. Concerned with the post–Vietnam War configuration of regional power, the Chinese began in 1974 to seriously look at the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia as a means to check the Vietnamese communists’ rising position in Indochina. The key event that shaped the trajectory of triangular politics between Beijing, Hanoi, and Moscow was the North Vietnamese victory over the South Vietnamese in late April 1975.

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The Vietnamese communists were correct to see their victory over the South Vietnamese in 1975 as an extremely significant event in the history of the Cold War, one that had multiple effects in both the international and the regional spheres. As described in chapter 5, one result was an increase in conflict within the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The Vietnamese victory reflected a broader surge of Soviet activism and intervention in the Third World. This fact was fully understood by the Chinese, who were exasperated by the insufficiently robust American and European responses to Moscow’s gains in this arena. With U.S. retrenchment from Southeast Asia, the Chinese had to assume America’s role as regional container of the Soviets. As Vietnam grew increasingly close to the Soviets, Beijing’s relations with Hanoi became more fraught, as we have described. Conflict simmered around a number of contentious bilateral issues, including land and maritime border disputes, and the Vietnamese treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. However, China did not make these bilateral issues a litmus test for Sino-Vietnamese relations. Rather, as described in chapter 5, the critical test for Vietnam was its position in regard to the Soviet Union. Here China had real cause for concern. Hanoi’s entry into the Soviet-controlled COMECON in May 1977 was symptomatic of the increasingly close economic ties that developed after 1975. In the 1975–1980 period, Soviet aid to Vietnam was substantially increased, from $450 million in 1975 to $3 billion by 1980. Economic ties were supplemented by generous military aid. Military aid was increased from $150 million to $905 million. Cambodia became the arena in which the Sino-Soviet conflict played itself out by proxy. The Chinese maintained a non-negotiable policy of ensuring the continued existence of an independent Cambodia that was aligned closely to China. The Soviets were committed to the Vietnamese, who in turn wanted Cambodia firmly in its sphere of influence, and would not compromise. Accustomed to spectacular success over the French and the Americans, and now aligned closely with the Soviets, the Vietnamese were not about to have their designs of consolidating a sphere of influence over Laos and Cambodia thwarted by China and the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, why should they have had to compromise with the Chinese? To the Vietnamese, the Chinese were still recovering from the self-inflicted wounds of the Cultural Revolution. China’s economy was weak, a fact even cited by the Chinese as a reason why they could not provide more aid to the Vietnamese in the post-1975 period. Moreover, in the second half of the 1970s the Vietnamese appeared to be riding the revolutionary “wave of the future,” and

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an alliance with the ascendant Soviets seemed appropriate. The potential for the Vietnamese to carve out a robust sphere of influence in Southeast Asia appeared to be promising, and was reflected in the increased fears among the states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The particular context of the Cold War Sino-Soviet rivalry led to a competition for Vietnamese allegiance. In turn, Hanoi’s tilt toward, and eventual alliance with Moscow over Beijing caused intense Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Therein lay the cause of the termination of Sino-Vietnamese alliance; the genesis of the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979; and the Third Indochina War from 1979 until 1991.

The Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Triangle and the Consequences of Alliance Termination We have ruled out the alternative bilateral based-explanation and shown how principal enemy theory applies to the case at hand. Drawing on the narrative presented in the preceding chapters, we can outline four paths through which alliance termination and subsequent conflict between former alliance partners can impact international politics. First, continuing conflict between former alliance partners can spill over, in unexpected ways, to these states’ relations with other states they both are allied with. As we saw for the 1964–1968 period, small states such as North Vietnam that are aligned to larger and feuding former alliance partners—in this case China and the Soviet Union—have the potential to substantially increase their state power by astutely playing their larger partners off against one another. As the materially “weakest” in the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangle, the Vietnamese communists were able to use that position to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict and, to obtain larger amounts of military and economic assistance than they would have if the Sino-Soviet conflict either did not exist or was not as intense. Hoang Van Hoan, a former Vietnamese ambassador to China who defected to China after the 1979 border war, noted that at the 1964 October Revolution celebrations in Moscow, the Vietnamese communist representatives on that occasion, Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho, were making full use of divisions between Moscow and Beijing to obtain increased aid. Le and Pham told the Soviets that Russian assistance was needed to reduce Chinese influence in Vietnam. The effects on world politics of, to use Robert Keohane’s phrase, a “small ally” manipulating its larger and ostensibly more powerful alliance partners can be quite significant and needs to be examined more closely. In this respect,

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the 1964–1975 period of our study is an example of how a materially “weak” North Vietnam was able to rely on what John Mearsheimer has called “clever strategies” vis-à-vis its feuding alliance partners to help it score a victory over the United States, a much more powerful state than North Vietnam in material terms. Chinese academic Li Danhui has observed that Soviet and Chinese “aid to Vietnam was rather large, its effect was also very marked. Whatever the contradictions between the Soviet Union and China or the degree of conflict, Vietnam was the final beneficiary.” Second, continuing conflict between former alliance partners can have an important effect on international politics in that there exists the potential for escalation and war between them. This possibility is particularly ominous when both states are nuclear states. In this respect, despite the fact that China had acquired a nuclear capability in October 1964, Mao still had an acute sense of vulnerability to nuclear coercion by the Soviets and the United States. Thus, on 28 November 1968 Mao told the visiting Australian Communist Party leader E. F. Hill that despite China’s possession of nuclear weapons: “Our country in a sense is still a non-nuclear power. With this little nuclear weaponry, we cannot be counted as a nuclear country. If we are to fight a war, we must use conventional weapons.” Mao’s sense of vulnerability did not lead him to adopt caution in China’s policy toward the Soviets. Quite the opposite. As described in chapter 3, Mao approved the initiation of border clashes with the Soviets beginning on 2 March 1969. As a result, there existed the real possibility of a Soviet strike against China’s nuclear weapons facilities, as well as the possible use of Soviet nuclear weapons against China. In chapters 3 and 4 we have recounted two occasions, in 1969 and 1973, when the Soviets approached the United States about the possibility of a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Ilya Gaiduk, a Russian Cold War historian, has noted that the Soviets were gravely disturbed by China’s unpredictable behavior during the Cultural Revolution and were concerned about Beijing’s possible use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Soviets seriously considered destroying these weapons, either alone or in condominium with the U.S. On both occasions, American opposition to Soviet actions played an important part in deterring Moscow from taking such action. A third route by which continuing conflict between former alliance partners can have an impact world politics is when one of them decides to align with a state on the former alliance partner’s periphery, as part of an encirclement strategy. Retaliation is likely to take place. A process of encirclement and

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counterencirclement is also likely to be set in motion. These dynamics occurred in November 1978 when Moscow and Hanoi signed a military alliance treaty. China viewed this as Vietnamese complicity in the Soviet Union’s encirclement strategy and decided to launch a war in February 1979. The Chinese also aligned with a state on its former alliance partner’s periphery as part of an encirclement strategy. Beijing did this on two occasions. From 1975 onward, the Chinese formed an alliance with the Khmer Rogue in Cambodia to contain the Vietnamese. Beijing repeated this pattern of behavior when it formed a close alliance with the Thais to check Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia in the 1980s. Arguably, the effects of the Cold War era Sino-Vietnamese conflict have continued into the post–Cold War era. The Chinese spurned Vietnamese offers of alignment at a significant and secret meeting in Chengdu, China, in September 1990 and relations, while improving, invariably continue to occur against the backdrop of the failed Cold War era alliance. Fourth, the Sino-Soviet conflict set the critical context in which the Chinese viewed increasing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. Increasingly intense Chinese fears of Vietnamese defection were in evidence, as the Vietnamese cooperated with the Soviet Union in what was a systematic wedge policy designed to crack the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Beijing grew increasingly concerned at Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation and feared that the Vietnamese would defect from the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. At the same time, Hanoi’s increasing cooperation with Moscow’s policy reflected its own security-based fears of increasing Chinese cooperation with the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. These dynamics led to increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the eventual termination of the alliance.

THE SINO-SOVIET-VIETNAMESE TRIANGLE IN THE 1980S Up to this point, we have discussed the 1964–1979 period. In this section, we will undertake a short discussion of the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangle in the 1980s as a postscript to the main text. After a brief discussion of SinoSoviet relations from 1979 to 1985, wherein Sino-Soviet relations stagnated, we will turn to the Mikhail Gorbachev period. Here we will demonstrate how our theory operates when causal developments operated in the opposite direction. Thus, as Sino-Soviet conflict decreased after 1985, there was a decrease in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. This led to a decrease in Sino-Vietnamese conflict and resolution of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1990–1991.

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Prelude to Rapprochement: Sino-Soviet Relations from Brezhnev to Chernenko During the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership through the tenure of his successors, Yurii Andropov (November 1982–February 1984) and Victor Chernenko (February 1984–February 1985), some signs of improvement in SinoSoviet relations appeared. Fundamentally, however, relations were mired in a quagmire. The Chinese made the first move toward the Soviets soon after the SinoVietnamese border war. The occasion for this initiative was the stipulation in the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 1950 that the option of renewal was to be discussed after thirty years. While the alliance had effectively been dead since Zhou Enlai’s trip to Moscow in late 1964, the Chinese used the occasion to emphasize that relations were at a cul-de-sac. According to the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, General Wang Youping, on 3 April 1979 Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua informed the Soviet ambassador to Beijing that the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty would not be renewed. The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially terminated on 30 April 1980. A brief opening for the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations occurred on 24 March 1982, when Brezhnev delivered a conciliatory speech at Tashkent. The Soviet leader called for an improvement in bilateral relations: We are prepared to reach an agreement, without any preliminary conditions, on measures acceptable to both sides to improve Sino-Soviet relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s interests, non-interference in each other’s affairs, and mutual benefit, and needless to say, not to the detriment of any third countries. This offer extends to economic, scientific, and cultural as well as political relations, as the two sides become ready for these or other specific steps in any of these spheres.

In response, the Chinese identified “three obstacles” to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. They were: (1) the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, (2) the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and (3) the extensive Soviet military presence on the Sino-Soviet border. Sino-Soviet rapprochement was linked to the Soviets’ ability to make concrete concessions on these issues. This did not happen. Brezhnev made another call for improved relations later in the year. On 26 September, he called for the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet leader remarked that: “[W]e consider the normalization and

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gradual improvement of relations between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China on a basis, I would say, of common sense, mutual respect, and mutual advantage to be a very important matter.” The Chinese response came in the form of Premier Zhao Ziyang’s reiteration of the need for the Soviets to remove the “three obstacles.” The death of Brezhnev in November 1982 and the ascendance of Yurii Andropov to the post of general secretary brought about no fundamental change in Sino-Soviet relations. There was an expansion of economic relations, but otherwise the Soviets made no concession on the three obstacles. The Soviet policy on containing China remained in place. If anything, the limited momentum achieved in bilateral relations was reversed following Andropov’s death. Sino-Soviet polemics reemerged and persisted throughout Chernenko’s tenure. In fact, the Soviets even increased the number of divisions on the Sino-Soviet border from forty-six to fifty-three. With respect to Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Chinese were very clear, in their own minds, that the Soviets were the key to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Cambodia. In an April 1980 interview with Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Nayan Chanda, Chinese vice foreign minister Han Qianlong stated that: “It is only when the Soviets can no longer support the Vietnamese that a political solution to the crisis will be possible.” While Sino-Soviet relations languished, the Chinese were deadly serious about punishing the Vietnamese. In a revealing incident a few months before, on 9 December 1979, Deng Xiaoping admonished Japanese prime minister Masayoshi Ohira for Japan’s demands for a quick Vietnamese withdrawal. Deng was quoted as saying: “It is wise for China to force the Vietnamese to stay in Kampuchea [Cambodia] because they will suffer more and more and will not be able to extend their hand to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.” Deng’s determination to mete out retribution to the Vietnamese overrode the scruples that troubled some of the ASEAN leaders. In a July 1984 ASEAN ministerial meeting, the option of “retiring” some of the more egregious Khmer Rouge leaders from the antiVietnamese CGDK was discussed. Upon hearing of this, Deng threatened to terminate Chinese aid. For China, the overriding objective of punishing the Vietnamese had to take precedence over other considerations. Thus Deng was quoted as saying during a meeting with the CGDK coalition in Beijing in October 1984: “I don’t understand why some people want to remove Pol Pot. It’s true that he made some mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors.”

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Gorbachev and the Sino-Soviet Rapprochement The real watershed in Sino-Soviet relations occurred with the arrival of a new Soviet leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the post of general secretary of the CPSU in March 1985. In a speech on 11 March 1985 Gorbachev laid out the rationale for improved Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet leader cited four reasons for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. First, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement could serve as the basis for a revived socialist bloc. Second, such a move would minimize American influence over China. Third, Gorbachev anticipated that China’s reforms would strengthen the Chinese economy. In this respect, it was better to negotiate with China on border disputes while it was relatively weak. Fourth, the success of his broader policy toward Asia depended on China’s cooperation. The Chinese responded positively, if tentatively, to Gorbachev. On 17 April 1985 Deng Xiaoping made a distinction between the Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay, which he did not object to, and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, which he did. This was a significant reversal of the previous Chinese position on the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay. Subsequently, the Soviets made a few piecemeal attempts at improving bilateral relations. On 8 January 1985 the Soviets renewed Brezhnev’s long-standing call from the early 1970s for the Chinese to sign a non-aggression treaty. The following April, in a meeting with Chinese deputy foreign minister Qian Qichen, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed a Sino-Soviet summit conference. These overtures were rejected by the Chinese, who repeated the need to address the three obstacles. A significant development in bilateral relations was to come in a speech delivered by Gorbachev at Vladivistok on 28 July 1986. The Soviet leader initiated a fundamental change in the Soviet Union’s China policy by making significant concessions on two of the three obstacles. First, Gorbachev announced a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Then, turning to the issue of the deployment of Soviet troops along the Chinese border, Gorbachev declared a significant reduction of troops along the Sino-Mongolia border. Additionally, he made a concession to the Chinese on the issue of the principle involved in settling the demarcation of the Ussuri River in the Zhenbao Island area along the Sino-Soviet border. On the third obstacle, the issue of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, Gorbachev simply noted that the “normalization” of Sino-Vietnamese relations was within the purview of “the sovereign affairs of the governments and leaderships of the two countries.” On

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5 August Deng Xiaoping responded by stating that Gorbachev’s speech contained “positive elements.” A month later, in a 2 September interview with American television correspondent Mike Wallace, Deng ventured that if the Cambodian issue was resolved, he would “meet Gorbachev anywhere in the Soviet Union.” Notwithstanding the continued stalemate over the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the speech set the stage for a decrease in Sino-Soviet conflict. Conflict reduction occurred swiftly as the Soviets made concrete progress on the three obstacles. For the first time since 1978, Sino-Soviet border talks were resumed in February 1987. By 1987 a preliminary agreement had been reached on the eastern part of the border. In February 1988, ahead of the upcoming meeting on the Afghanistan issue in Geneva, the Soviets announced that a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan would begin on 15 May 1988 and be completed within ten months. On 14 April 1988 the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan were initialed. In August 1988, at a deputy foreign ministers’ meeting, the Soviet side conceded for the first time that Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia was necessary for the resolution of the Cambodian issue. Substantial progress was being made on all of the three obstacles. Following a visit to Moscow by Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen in December 1988, it was agreed that a Sino-Soviet summit would take place in 1989. Critically, Beijing’s agreement to hold the Beijing summit was contingent on the condition that the Soviets press the Vietnamese to fully withdraw from Cambodia. Deng insisted that the Soviets would have to resolve this issue before the Chinese would agree to a summit. In February 1989 the first direct Sino-Soviet negotiations on Cambodia were held in China and produced a joint statement. It was now clear that the Vietnamese would withdraw by September, leaving a skeletal force, which itself would eventually be withdrawn. Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing could now proceed, and occurred on 15–18 May 1989. A milestone had been reached. The Sino-Soviet summit marked the end of the Sino-Soviet conflict that had raged since the early 1960s.

Soviet Realpolitik, Vietnamese Retrenchment, and Sino-Vietnamese Rapprochement The decrease in Sino-Soviet conflict caused a decrease in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation on the Cambodian issue. This opened the door for Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement. In two important ways, Moscow constructed its diplomacy to be consistent with Beijing’s preferences and at variance with Hanoi’s, rep-

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resenting, in this sense, a decrease in cooperation with Hanoi. First, Moscow compelled Hanoi to accept a post-Vietnamese occupation political process in Cambodia that included Beijing’s ally, the Khmer Rouge. Second, Moscow successfully pressured the Vietnamese to retrench from Cambodia. The first problem that the Soviets had to address in dealing with the Vietnamese related to how Hanoi defined its national security interests in Cambodia. Hitherto, Hanoi had required a guarantee that the Khmer Rouge would not be able to return to power. The problem was that Beijing held a diametrically opposed view, that the Khmer Rouge, its ally in Cambodia, had to be involved in any political process in Cambodia. Simply put, the Soviets had to pressure the Vietnamese to accept an agreement on national reconciliation that included the Khmer Rouge. They endeavored to do so. During both Shevardnadze’s visit to Hanoi in March 1987 and the trip of the new Vietnamese secretary-general, Nguyen Van Linh, to Moscow on 17–22 May 1987, the issue of a national reconciliation process in Cambodia and a prompt Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia was discussed. After receiving a lukewarm Vietnamese response during Linh’s visit to Moscow, the Soviets bypassed Hanoi to deal directly with the Phnom Penh government. Facing a fait accompli, the Vietnamese were compelled to accept the Soviet view of national reconciliation at a Soviet-sponsored meeting of Indochinese foreign ministers in Phnom Penh from 26 to 28 August 1987. Moscow was also critical in securing a timely Vietnamese retrenchment from Cambodia, a task that was made easier by Le Duan’s death on 10 July 1986. The Vietnamese were already planning to draw down their forces in Cambodia in 1984–1985, but it was Soviet pressure that was critical in causing and maintaining the Vietnamese retrenchment. As Womack has noted, “from 1985–89, Vietnam pursued a two-track policy of promising to withdraw but at the same time reserving its option of re-occupation if its security demanded it.” What undermined the success of this two-track policy and prevented any backtracking by Hanoi on retrenchment moves was the total lack of Soviet support for such a position. Thus the Vietnamese noted that Moscow was studiously neutral following the eruption of Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the South China Sea beginning on 14 March 1988. On 26 May 1988 Hanoi announced a withdrawal by December of 50,000 of their 100,000 troops stationed in Cambodia. In April 1989, ahead of the May 1989 Sino-Soviet summit in Beijing, it was announced by Hanoi that the remaining Vietnamese troops would return to Vietnam by September 1989. Thakur and Thayer note the role of Soviet pressure in this development:

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As a result of the Sino-Soviet normalization process, which culminated in a summit in [Beijing in] May 1989, Vietnam came under sustained Soviet pressure to make concessions over Cambodia. On the eve of the [Sino-Soviet] summit, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw all its regular military units from Cambodia by September without preconditions.

Following the Vietnamese pull-out from Cambodia, the Soviets informed the Vietnamese in November 1989 of their intention to dramatically reduce military assistance and pull out of Cam Ranh Bay. In December 1989 the Soviets began their retrenchment from Vietnam. By 1992 there had been a complete withdrawal of all Soviet personnel. The Soviets maintained a distinction between their economic cooperation and their military cooperation with the Vietnamese. In contrast to military cooperation, economic cooperation increased during the 1985–1990 period. At a summit meeting between Le Duan and Gorbachev on 26 June–1 July 1985, the Soviet Union actually increased its aid. Moscow doubled its assistance for the VCP’s fourth five-year plan (1986–1990). An agreement to postpone payment on existing debts was signed. In addition, separate agreements were initialed on trade, economic and technical cooperation, and state planning. In December 1986, to finance the five-year plan, the Soviets made a commitment to provide 8–9 billion rubles worth of loans at generous rates. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by September 1989 signified the end of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation against China. Accordingly, this caused a decrease in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. In April 1989 Hanoi announced that by the end of September, all of its troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia. In December 1988 China proposed that a meeting at the viceministerial level be held in January 1989. A secret summit meeting was held in Chengdu, Sichuan province, in September 1990. Key participants on the Chinese side included Premier Li Peng and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin. The Vietnamese were represented by Premier Do Muoi and Party Secretary Nguyen Van Linh and Pham Van Dong. Normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations occurred in November 1991, when a summit meeting was held in Beijing. It should be noted that the normalization ceremonies were held only after the United Nations’ Agreement on Cambodia was approved in Paris on 23 October 1991.

Competing Explanations In an examination of the 1980–1991 period, a possible alternative to the principal enemy argument offered above is that the decrease in Sino-Vietnamese

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conflict originated in developments within the bilateral relationship, rather than in developments in Sino-Soviet relations. Along these lines, it has been argued that it was the Vietnamese attempt to establish and maintain a sphere of influence over Cambodia that was the cause and consolidator of SinoVietnamese conflict. A corollary of this view is that when Vietnam decided that it was no longer able to maintain its presence in Cambodia and retrenched, Sino-Vietnamese conflict decreased. This explanation is an incomplete one in that it obscures the underlying dynamics of the situation. Specifically, such an interpretation leaves unexamined the critical issue of the Soviet role in underpinning the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and Moscow’s role in the Vietnamese decision to withdraw from Cambodia. The fact of the matter is that absent a significant reduction in Soviet aid, and given the continuing existence of Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it is unlikely that the Vietnamese would have retrenched from Cambodia, but once the Soviets reduced their commitment to aid the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, retrenchment was inevitable and inexorable. Attention to the issue of the timing of Vietnamese retrenchment from Cambodia reveals that the bilateral thesis suffers from an additional weakness. If bilateral issues such as the Vietnamese treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam or Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes were indeed the cause of the decrease in Sino-Vietnamese conflict, we would observe these issues being resolved before the decrease in conflict. However, the historical record indicates otherwise. As indicated above, the Chinese and the Vietnamese re-normalized diplomatic relations at a ceremony in Beijing in November 1991. Only after that time did the bilateral issues slowly begin to be addressed. Thus, in interviews conducted in Hanoi after the Sino-Vietnamese summit, Carlyle Thayer noted that: Outside of the satisfaction of having attained [Sino-Vietnamese] normalization, of relations . . . Vietnam was disappointed at the limited results. . . . The summit was essentially conducted on Chinese terms, and Vietnam had to await the results of further negotiations on various issues. . . . These issues included the status of the ethnic Chinese who fled Vietnam for Southern China in the late 1970s, unresolved land and maritime territorial disputes, and repayment of outstanding Vietnamese debts.

Another possible alternative explanation for a decline in Sino-Vietnamese conflict could be a straightforward one, of Soviet retrenchment. Here the

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argument is that simple Soviet overextension in its Cold War competition with the United States caused the Soviet Union under Gorbachev to abjure competition with the U.S., and retrench by scaling back on Moscow’s alliance commitments to its various allies, of which Vietnam was a prominent example. In this view, Soviet retrenchment led Moscow to decrease cooperation with Hanoi. In turn, these developments led to a decrease in Sino-Vietnamese conflict. The scale of Soviet overextension had become clear by 1986. In a series of Politburo meetings over the course of that year, it emerged that defenserelated expenses constituted up to 40 percent of the budget. This already high expenditure on defense did not include aid to allies within and without the Warsaw Pact. Politburo members were taken aback upon learning that the annual cost of aid to Vietnam was 40 billion rubles. This type of explanation should be seen not as a rival explanation to principal enemy theory but rather as a complement. The Soviet retrenchment argument can easily be seen as one of the factors that led to the decrease in Sino-Soviet conflict. This then caused a decrease in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, with attendant dampening effects on Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

EXPLAINING ENEMY DESIGNATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR It is appropriate at this juncture to take a step back and ask the question: On what basis did the Chinese choose the Soviets as their principal enemy? What was the underlying cause of this decision? To answer this question, a review will be made of two broad explanations that utilize as their focus ideology and material capabilities.

Ideological Revisionism One possible explanation for why China identified the Soviet Union as its principal enemy would be to focus on perceived differences over ideology— and more specifically, the Soviet Union’s ideological revisionism—as the basic causal factor. Thus, the Chinese communists stated on 6 September 1963, in what was to be the first of nine polemics, that the Soviet Union’s violations of “revolutionary principles” and its departure “from the path of MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism” had led to “revisionism.” Accordingly, the Soviets “passionately sought collaboration with U.S. imperialism.” This made the Soviet Union China’s enemy.

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Ideology is an appealing and understandable choice to use as an explanation of how China chooses a principal enemy. After all, in the quote above, the Chinese themselves described their opposition to the Soviet Union in ways that emphasized Moscow’s ideological revisionism. However, there are significant problems presented by the use of ideology as a causal variable. First, a common ideology is as likely to lead to cooperation as to conflict. Given these varying outcomes, we have to be extremely circumspect before embracing ideology as a causal factor in explaining China’s identification of the Soviet Union as its primary enemy. For example, in 1962, just before the de facto termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance, one of the most astute observers on Sino-Soviet relations, Donald Zagoria, nevertheless argued that a common ideology made a Sino-Soviet split unlikely. He noted that the Sino-Soviet “joint commitment to an international revolutionary process which they believe is their duty to aid, their shared determination to establish communism throughout the world, sets limits on conflict between the two.” Yet, as the historical record shows, the Sino-Soviet conflict quickly escalated in 1963 and the alliance was a de facto dead letter after Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow in late 1964, immediately following Khrushchev’s ouster. Second, it is not clear what “ideological revisionism” means and who has the authority to adjudicate the issue. Even at the time of the Chinese accusations of Soviet ideological revisionism, it was nevertheless the case that a significant percentage of the socialist bloc, particularly those in Europe, did not agree with China on this point. Moreover, a reasonable argument could be made that China—less than a decade after China was leveling accusations of ideological revisionism at the Soviet Union in its rapprochement with the United States—was making the same sort of compromises with U.S. “imperialism” that it had accused the Soviets of committing. Yet, in entering into a rapprochement with the U.S., it is clear that most of the Chinese leadership did not consider themselves to be guilty of ideological revisionism. The putative relationship between ideology and conflict and cooperation is in all probability a spurious one. Chinese accusations of Soviet ideological revisionism were a smokescreen that masked other, more fundamental features in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Ideology, while giving a sharp “edge” to the SinoSoviet conflict, arguably was a multiplier of conflict rather than a fundamental cause of conflict. As it stands, this analysis agrees with Richard Lowenthal’s assessment (written during the Cold War) that “the Sino-Soviet dispute never was a primarily ideological conflict: In origin it was, as it still is, chiefly a conflict of interests between a ‘superpower’ and a rising regional power, both of

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which originally sought to justify those interests within a common ideological framework.” Not to put too fine a point on it, from an analytical perspective, the reason the Sino-Soviet conflict is a significant issue of research in Cold War studies, and international relations more generally, is not because these were states that were of a particular ideological ilk. Rather, it is significant because it was a conflict between two states that were materially significant actors. As a consequence, their conflict had significant effects on world politics. This bring us to an alternative, materially based explanation of principal enemy designation in Chinese foreign policy.

Neorealist Theory, Principal Enemy Designation, and Post-1949 Chinese Foreign Policy On what basis did China designate a particular state as its principal enemy during the Cold War? Here it will be argued that principal enemy theory is perfectly compatible with neorealist theory, and that in turn neorealist theory is of greater utility than ideational-type explanations. In this respect, the post-1949 behavior of the People’s Republic of China can be most accurately characterized as that of an archetypal neorealist state. According to Waltz’s neorealist balance of power theory, under the structural condition of anarchy, states live in a situation of uncertainty and seek to maximize their security. They do this by adopting internal and external strategies to balance against the most powerful state in the international system, defined in terms of material capabilities. The Chinese were acutely attuned to the material distribution of power in the international system at all stages of the Cold War. Thus, in the immediate period after World War Two, they appreciated that the structure of the international system was bipolar. The crucial questions for the Chinese at the beginning of the Cold War were therefore the following: What kind of national security strategy should China adopt vis-à-vis the poles in the international system? Stated more simply, which state was China’s principal enemy? In this respect, China’s principal enemy was, as neorealist theory would suggest, the state that wielded the most significant material capabilities in world politics. This was the United States. In this crucial respect, despite a far from smooth pre-1949 relationship, an alliance with the Soviet Union made strategic sense. As the other, albeit weaker pole in the international system, the Soviet Union had, by 1949, acquired an

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operational nuclear weapons capability and was actively balancing against the U.S. Critically, it was willing to provide support to China. On the domestic front, Moscow was willing to actively assist the CCP in rebuilding the Chinese state along socialist lines. On the international front, the Soviets, on the basis of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, provided a deterrent against an attack by the United States. From a Chinese perspective, post-1945 U.S. actions made it particularly threatening. The U.S. had actively supported the KMT in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and had consolidated relations with Japan, China’s historical rival in Asia. From a neorealist perspective, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was an attempt to maximize Chinese security in the face of the moves by its principal enemy, the U.S., to take concrete steps to mobilize its aggregate and offensive power along China’s geographical periphery via a containment policy. Chinese security concerns were compelling enough to override complex personal relations between the Chinese and Soviet communists. Beginning with the formation of the CCP through to the Chinese Civil War, the relationship between the CPSU and their Chinese counterparts had been an ambivalent one. This was reflected in persistent Chinese concerns about the Soviet Union’s commitment to China in the run-up to the signing of an alliance treaty. Even when it was clear that an alliance would be signed, Chinese doubts were reinforced by hard Soviet bargaining on the details of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, which was eventually initialed in February 1950. The strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance was almost immediately put to the test against the United States. In late 1950, as the Korean communists’ initial success in the Korean War turned into a major strategic reversal, the Chinese were compelled to intervene, battling the Americans to a stalemate. In reaction to Chinese actions, and as part of a “wedge” policy, the U.S. then actively applied pressure on China in an attempt to split Moscow from Beijing. Such was the tenacity of the U.S. in enforcing an economic embargo against the Chinese that it was willing to incur strained relations with its allies to ensure that maximum pressure was maintained. The general U.S. posture was proportionate to the threat to U.S. security interests posed by communist China. The Chinese were at once threatened by the U.S. and particularly threatening to noncommunist states in the Asian region. The alliance with the Soviets had a multiplier effect on Beijing’s power resources and prestige in Asia. Indeed, the Soviets and the Chinese reached agreement on a division of labor. The Chinese were responsible for establishing a sphere of influence in Asia, while the Soviets led the communist bloc. Thus John Garver is surely right when he points

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to the salutary role of U.S. containment policy in preventing a significant swath of Asia from coming under Chinese influence at this point in the Cold War. In any case, facing a very real American threat, it became increasingly clear that alliance with the Soviets did not meet Chinese security concerns. To the Chinese, the Soviets, in pursuit of their own interests, appeared too willing to pursue a self-styled “peaceful coexistence” policy toward the Americans during the Eisenhower administration. Chinese abandonment fears intensified. The Chinese hedged against these fears by developing a nuclear weapons programme in the mid-1950s, only a few years after the Sino-Soviet alliance was formed. Thus, the ideological disputes that raged between the Chinese and Soviets in the early 1960s were an effect, rather than a cause, of a struggle for leadership that had its fundamental roots in strategic differences to adopt against the U.S. enemy. As was recounted in chapter 2, the alliance was frayed beyond repair by 1964. However, increasing conflict did not mean that China and the Soviet Union were necessarily destined to become enemies. As outlined in chapter 3, it was only in August 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine reserving the right to use force to overthrow socialist regimes, that the Soviet Union became China’s principal enemy. At that point, China began to characterize the Soviet Union as a “social-imperialist” state, rather than as a straightforward revisionist superpower. The Brezhnev Doctrine was followed by a Soviet proposal in June 1969 for the creation of an Asian collective security system, which was directed against China. The year 1969 was also characterized by Sino-Soviet border conflicts that raised the real possibility of Soviet intervention to attempt to overthrow Mao’s regime. Thus, the recent literature has vividly recounted how in late 1969, Chinese leaders made extensive preparations for a Soviet attack on Beijing. Given the chaos and destruction into which Mao’s ongoing Cultural Revolution had thrown China, Soviet intervention might very well have worked. In other words, it was only when the Soviet Union became its principal strategic threat, as opposed to merely an ideological threat, that the Chinese communists declare their Soviet counterparts as their principal enemy. In this respect, the Soviets were at this point a strategic threat to both the Chinese and the United States. By the late 1960s Moscow had achieved nuclear parity even while the U.S. was bogged down in the Second Indochina War. A watershed had been reached as the Soviets seized the initiative in the Cold War. Beginning in the 1970s, Moscow proceeded to launch a surge in the Third World.

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As neorealism would expect, China and the U.S. proceeded to work together to balance a resurgent Soviet Union.

A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR PRINCIPAL ENEMY THEORY: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND REALISM It has been claimed that realist theory does not perform satisfactorily in explaining Asia’s international relations, and that new analytical frameworks are needed to analyze the region’s dynamics in the twenty-first century. This book takes a contrary perspective. As we have argued, realist-based principal enemy theory serves as a key to unlock the door of China’s strategic behavior. Principal enemy theory serves as a fruitful explanatory tool in analyzing the basic causal variables in Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War and beyond. The logic of principal enemy theory specifies that once China has designated a state as its enemy, it will rationally calibrate its relations with other states on that basis. Conflict or cooperation will follow. This book has located the source of Sino-Vietnamese conflict in Vietnamese cooperation with China’s principal enemy, the Soviet Union. During the period from 1964 until 1991, China’s security-based concern regarding the Soviet Union served as the litmus test in assessing Beijing’s posture toward third parties. Thus the Vietnamese communists became China’s secondary enemy by virtue of that country’s increasing alignment with the Soviet Union. On this score, principal enemy theory is consistent with neorealist theory. Neorealist theory argues that states seek to maximize their security and assess other states in relation to their material capabilities. By progressively aligning themselves with the Soviets during the period 1964–1991, the Vietnam communists contributed to Soviet capabilities via a policy that attempted to encircle China and threaten its security. With respect to a future research agenda, the range of principal enemy theory can be extended to cover the origins of Cold War era Sino-Soviet conflict. Using the logic of principle enemy theory, the following causal mechanism suggests itself. The United States was China’s principal enemy during the 1950s. China was concerned with maximizing its security, which was undermined by increasing Soviet-U.S. cooperation. As a consequence, there was increased Sino-Soviet conflict. Tensions in Sino-Soviet relations arose over the appropriate strategy for the communist bloc to adopt vis-à-vis the U.S. The differences in the Soviet and Chinese views were epitomized in the distinctive reactions that each side had to the Soviet breakthroughs in successfully testing an

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intercontinental ballistic missile and launching Sputnik I in 1957. In response to these developments, Beijing pressed Moscow to use its relative advantage to actively oppose the U.S. In this respect, Mao declared at the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow that the “East Wind prevailed over the West Wind,” and suggested that a nuclear war was winnable. In contrast, at this stage of the Cold War the Soviets were content to pursue a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the U.S. in particular and the West more broadly. This view can be contrasted with the thesis advanced recently by Lorenz Luthi, which locates the most important source of Sino-Soviet conflict in the realm of ideology. We can also explain China’s relations with other states during the Cold War according to the logic of principal enemy theory. This book seeks to add to a rich body of existing work written during the Cold War era that uses the concept of a principal enemy to analyze China’s relations with specific states. Scholars have previously utilized this concept to conduct case studies of China’s Cold War era relations with a variety of states, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Vietnam. There is clearly scope for further research into principal enemy theory and Chinese Cold War era foreign policy. In this respect, there are at least two possible routes that further research can take. The first would be to engage in a detail-rich single case study (of which this volume is an example). In this respect, a welcome development would be a study of China’s relations with other key Asian, European, and Latin American states. A second route would be to adopt a multiple case, cross-regional study of China’s relations with specific states in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Whether one adopts a single or multiple case study approach, the realist-based principal enemy thesis can be tested against either or both a bilateral thesis and a thesis that emphasizes nonmaterial causes of Chinese foreign policy such as ideas, norms, or culture.

Principal Enemy Theory, Realism, and Sino-U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (1991–2009) We are now sufficiently familiar with principal enemy theory that we can attempt to discuss its wider applicability to Chinese foreign policy in the post– Cold War era. Our study of principal enemy theory occurred in a bipolar Cold War context. The question remains: Do the Chinese have a principal enemy in the post–Cold War era? The answer is “not yet.” That said, for Chinese leaders and strategists, the U.S. is China’s most likely principal enemy. In that

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respect, a review of Sino-American relations in the post–Cold War era is instructive. Even before the Cold War ended, Sino-American tensions were in evidence over the Tiananmen Square protests and the subsequent crackdown. This trend continued through the first two years of the Clinton administration, as the U.S. linked the granting of “most favored nation” (MFN) trade status to improvements in China’s human rights record in 1993–1994. The Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995–1996 followed. As relations were recalibrated following this episode, the Chinese concern with U.S. foreign policy mounted with the U.S.-led NATO intervention in the ex-Yugoslavia in 1999. Tensions escalated following the inadvertent American strike on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The election of the George W. Bush administration in 2001 saw an initial spike in conflict as the strength of American unipolarity became increasingly clear (and Chinese hopes of multipolarity faded). The EP-3 incident that year focused global and, in particular, regional attention on what could go wrong if the Sino-American relationship deteriorated. Sino-U.S. relations have improved since then, but this is in no small part due to that fact that the U.S. has been preoccupied with the war on terror. That said, American concern with China’s rise has been a major factor in leading it to invest in new and existing alliance relationships with key regional states, which the Chinese correctly view as largely targeted at them, even if it has been described in terms of maintaining regional stability. Thus, the U.S.Indian relationship warmed significantly during the Bush administration. The U.S.-Japanese alliance has expanded even as Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated at a time of increased economic interdependence. The same generalization characterizes a much less publicized but important U.S. relationship in Asia, namely the U.S.-Singaporean relationship. This increasingly close relationship has clearly not gone unnoticed in Beijing. When the prime minister–designate Lee Hsien Loong made an unofficial visit to Taiwan in 2004 ahead of assumption of his new post, a vociferous Chinese response ensued, complete with threats of economic sanctions. Critically, Taiwan remains the core immediate security issue for Chinese military planners in the early twenty-first century. Here the U.S. commitment to preserving Taipei’s security via the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and the Japanese interest in preserving the regional status quo based on the TRA and the U.S.-Japanese security alliance have had the practical effect of reinforcing the status quo of Taiwan’s independence from China. Some point to China’s behavior in the post–Cold War era as evidence of the failure of realist theory. Yet, from a realist-based principal enemy perspective,

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it is not a mystery to explain China’s behavior. China is simply acting strategically while on the ascent. While there is unipolarity at the structural level, in East Asia the regional structure is distinctly bipolar, with China and the U.S. as peer competitors. China has relied on its booming economy to systematically modernize its military and strategically consolidate its position in mainland Asia (even as the U.S. maintains a dominant position in maritime Asia). China’s regional parity with the U.S. is publicly welcomed by diplomats from the ASEAN states. In private, a more ambivalent reality is in evidence. ASEAN diplomats have found that in their deliberations on issues that affect relations with China, consensus has been hard to reach, as member states try to read China’s signals on specific issues under discussion. Recognizing such dynamics, one senior ASEAN diplomat was quoted as saying: “A lot of ASEAN countries clearly take into consideration what the Chinese think—and information quietly gets leaked back to Beijing on who’s on their side. ASEAN nations are trying to figure out what China wants ahead of time.” In this context, principal enemy theory makes a clear prediction: As China’s upward trajectory continues, Beijing will judge states, and in particular key states in different regions, according to whether they align with the U.S. or China. States that cooperate closely with the U.S. will have relatively conflictual relations with China. Conversely, states that do not cooperate closely with the U.S. will have relatively low levels of conflict in their relationship with China.

Principal Enemy Theory and the Future of Sino-U.S. Relations in East Asia The foregoing discussion has described the dynamics of Sino-U.S. relations from 1991 until 2009. Looking to the future, if China’s economy continues to grow at a faster rate than the U.S. over an extended period, and barring the emergence of a third pole, at some point in the future we will face the extension of bipolarity from the regional to the structural level. Should this come to fruition, the Chinese and the Americans will become “enemies by position,” just as the Soviets and the U.S. were during the Cold War. However, as our review of the post–Cold War Sino-American relations suggests, we will not need to wait for bipolarity to arrive to see tensions in bilateral relations. Whatever one’s view in the debate on which variant of polarity is the most stable, if we accept that the current global structure is a unipolar one, it is not difficult to see how the transition from unipolarity to bipolarity that is represented by China’s rise could be punctuated by conflict. This could occur over any number of issues, both during the transition process to parity and when structural bipolarity is realized.

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The Chinese leadership has struggled to appropriately characterize its own strategic trajectory, a point reflected in the substituting of the phrase “peaceful rise” in favor of “peaceful development.” Claims by the Chinese leadership and academics (both in China and in the West) that its development as a major power will be a pacific one should be treated with caution, if not skepticism. As Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer point out, the historical record regarding the rise of new poles has been characterized by conflict and there is no reason to believe that China will be an exception. It is not even necessary to impute hostile intent to China in order to appreciate that its development toward polar status will lead to increased levels of conflict in Asia and beyond. As Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen note, if we use the U.S. rise in the nineteenth century as a template, with its numerous interventions in the affairs of states in Latin America, then it will be unsurprising if China’s rise has similar effects, leading to greater levels of conflict. Conflict varies on a continuum, from the types of Sino-U.S. sparring seen in the various Cold War and post–Cold War Taiwan Straits crises, to war, as seen during the Korean War. The fact that the history of Sino-U.S. relations since 1949 readily yields examples along this spectrum is a cause for circumspection in predicting the level of conflict in future Sino-American relations. While we cannot be definitive about the exact level of conflict associated with China’s rise, one thing we can expect is more conflict. Robert Jervis has pointed out the need to consider multiple effects in our analysis of international politics. He argues: “In a system, the chains of consequences extend over time and many areas: the effects of action are always multiple.” The increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict from 1964 through the mid-1980s was one of the multiple effects of the de facto termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance. We may add that not only are the effects of actions in international politics multiplied, they are often also unexpected. In this respect, it is likely the case that Mao could not have foreseen that his active role in exacerbating the Sino-Soviet conflict would set in motion a sequence of events that had such a deleterious impact on China’s relations with Vietnam. Even if it was unforeseen before the fact, we can now nevertheless outline in much greater detail than before developments in the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese triangle. This book has attempted to show that the relevant actors in Beijing, Hanoi, and Moscow methodically and strategically worked to pursue their state’s interests as they defined them. In the case of China, its behavior corresponded with what we have called principal enemy theory. Here, because

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of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the subsequent Soviet threat to China, Moscow became Beijing’s principal enemy. As a consequence, the Chinese viewed the Vietnamese communists’ continuing and deepening cooperation with the Soviet Union with increasing displeasure. The situation came to a head after the Vietnamese triumphed over their adversaries in the South in 1975. Ultimately, the Chinese and Vietnamese both had a non-negotiable position on Cambodia. China sought Cambodia’s independence from Vietnamese control, while Vietnam insisted on establishing a sphere of influence there. This led to the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance of 1978, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war. A decade-long Sino-Soviet proxy war occurred in Cambodia. Ultimately, it was only when the Soviets became convinced that their fundamental interests lay in reducing conflict with China that the Cambodian problem was resolved. The Soviets pressured the Vietnamese to retrench from Cambodia. Once that act was accomplished, the Chinese and Vietnamese were finally able to reach an agreement on normalizing relations in November 1991.

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NOTES

1.

CHINA’S COLD WAR ALLIANCE WITH VIETNAM: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE

1.

Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Robert Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origins of American Containment Policy in East Asia (New York: Norton, 1982). Yunnansheng Dongnanya yanjiusuo Kunming junqu zhengzhibu lianluobu, Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxishi ziliao xuanbian (Kunming: Yunnan Dongnanya yanjiusuo, 1984), vol. 4, 932. According to Ho Chih Minh, Vietnam’s relations with China were marked by “deep affection, (since they are) comrades and brothers [Yue Zhong qing yi shen, tongzhi jia xiongdi],” cited in Du Dunyan and Zhao Heman, eds., Yuenan Laowo Jianpuzhai shouce (Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 1988), 102. The protagonists in the First Indochina War (1946–1954) were the Vietnamese communists and the French. The Second Indochina War (1965–1975) primarily involved the Vietnamese communists, the Americans, and their South Vietnamese allies. Du and Zhao, eds., Yuenan Laowo Jianpuzhai shouce, 109. See also Qu Xing, Zhongguo waijiao wushinian (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2000), 417–418. Following Walt, I define an alliance as “a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states. Although the precise arrangements embodied in different alliances vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some

2.

3.

4. 5.

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1. CHINA’S COLD WAR ALLIANCE WITH VIETNAM

specified set of circumstances. This concept includes both formal alliances—where the commitment is enshrined in a written treaty—and informal as hoc agreements based either on tacit understandings or some tangible form of commitment, such as verbal assurances or joint military exercises.” Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39.1 (1997): 157. Chinese military support for the Vietnamese communists is well documented in Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars. 6. For a recent analysis of the Third Indochina War see Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972–79 (London: Routledge, 2006). 7. An examination of Sino-Soviet rivalry in different regions of the world can be found in Herbert Ellison, ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982). 8. The classic work on Sino-Soviet relations is Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–61 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). See also Ellison, ed., Sino-Soviet Conflict; Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–63 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). For an account that places the conflict within the broader context of the Soviet bloc, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1967). 9. Robert Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 10. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 11. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars. 12. Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 2–3. 13. Chen, Mao’s China, 6–10, 237. 14. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 221–222; Lien-hang T. Nguyen, “The SinoVietnamese Split and the Indochina War, 1968–1975,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 12. 15. While the literature does highlight the fact that aid from Beijing and Moscow was of great assistance in Hanoi’s prosecution of its war against the Americans, and that the Vietnamese were autonomous actors pursuing their own interests, insufficient emphasis has been placed on how strategic and skilled the Vietnamese were in capitalizing on Sino-Soviet divisions. This work will attempt to show that the Vietnamese communists were particularly adept at leveraging on the divisions between Beijing and Moscow, to extract significant amounts of economic and military aid in their war against the Americans. 16. For the argument that the Chinese did not betray their Vietnamese comrades, see Lorenz Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal: Beijing, Moscow and the Paris Negotiations, 1971– 1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11.1 (2009): 57–107. 17. It will be argued that contrary to the claims of some academics and a number of prominent Vietnamese communist officials, the Sino-American rapprochement did not cause the termination of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance.

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18.

19.

20. 21.

22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

28.

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It will be argued that the resolution of the Sino-Soviet conflict, exemplified in SinoSoviet rapprochement during the second half of the 1980s, was the fundamental cause of Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement. Among others, see Thomas Risse-Kappen et al., eds., The End of the Cold War and International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 539–576; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); John Mueller, “What Was the Cold War About? Evidence From Its Ending,” Political Science Quarterly 119.4 (2004–2005): 609–631. Chen, Mao’s China, 6, 239, 241; and Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 221. For further discussion on the approach to causality adopted in this book see Steven Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7–48. In developing a theory of Chinese foreign policy, this study agrees with Elman’s view that we can use neorealism as a theory of foreign policy. A theory of foreign policy “makes determinate predictions for dependent variable(s) that measure the behavior of individual states.” Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?,” Security Studies 6.1 [1996]: 7–53. Alastair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). In this sense, this study is a case study in a broader debate on which theoretical research programme is most persuasive in explaining China’s foreign policy. For the constructivist view of Chinese foreign policy see Johnston, Social States. For the neorealist view, see Michael Ng-Quinn, “Effects of Bipolarity on Chinese Foreign Policy,” Survey 26 (1982): 102–130; Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1997), xv. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 91–92. This is otherwise known as the self-help principle in the international relations literature. As Waltz argues, “Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order” (Waltz, Theory, 111). Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration in World Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Waltz, Theory, 10–11. For discussion of the concept of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Co-operation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30.2 (Jan. 1978): 167–214; and Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50 (Oct. 1997): 171–201. For defensive realism and the security dilemma, see Waltz, Theory, 186–187; Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18.4 (spring 1988): 619–620. For offensive realism and the security dilemma see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 35–36. For a sampling of the relative gains debate, see David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For an excellent discussion see John C. Matthews, “Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter,” International Security 21.1 (summer 1996): 112–146.

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29. This is the assumption of state behavior associated with defensive realism. See Waltz, Theory, 126–127; Robert Jervis, “Realism in World Politics,” International Organization 52.4 (autumn 1998): 981; Jeffrey Taliafero, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25.3 (winter 2000/2001): 128–161; David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23 (1997): 5–26. 30. This is the assumption behind state behavior in classical realism and offensive realism. For classical realism see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). For offensive realism, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy. 31. I would like to thank one of the reviewers for pointing this out. 32. See Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 65. 33. J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 36. 34. David Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949–1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). 35. Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia: The Politics of Survival (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). 36. Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 49–88; Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and the Theory of Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–137; John Geering, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” American Political Science Review 98.2 (May 2004): 341–354; Gary King et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 37. In this respect, in all the chapters principal enemy theory is pitted against a bilateral theory of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Additionally, in ch. 3 a plausible alternative explanation that focuses on issues outside of the bilateral Sino-Vietnamese relationship will be examined. Here we will also evaluate the argument that the Sino-American rapprochement caused the escalation of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. 38. Gareth Porter, “Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis,” in David W. P. Elliot, ed., The Third Indochina Conflict (Boulder: Westview, 1981), 101–105; G. D. Loescher, “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute in Historical Perspective,” Survey 24.2 (1979): 125–141. 39. Chang Pao-min, “The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute,” Asia-Pacific Community 8 (1980): 150–158. 40. Huang Guoan et al., Zhong Yue guanxi shijianbian (Guangxi: renmin chubanshe, 1986), 257. 41. Chen, Mao’s China, 239, 241. 42. Ibid., 236. 43. Ibid., 6–10, 236–237. 44. Ibid., 236–237. 45. Ibid., 237. 46. Ibid., 243.

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47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

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169

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 242. Ibid. Ibid., 243. Relatedly, one can make a third observation. On what basis was Mao acting in pursuit of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement? Even if one accepts, for the sake of argument, Chen’s point that Chinese domestic politics and, in particular, ideology’s role in Chinese domestic politics matters in influencing Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution era, it is necessary to ask how much of a role ideology played in Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, was it domestic ideological concerns or international factors that were most influential in determining the Sino-American rapprochement? The fact of the matter is that when the goals of the Cultural Revolution clashed with China’s international security imperatives, the latter set of concerns prevailed. While the Cultural Revolution continued until his death, Mao basically wound it down when Sino-Soviet tensions peaked in 1969 and the fear of a Soviet attack and/or invasion escalated. The subjugation of domestic political goals to international imperatives is perfectly consistent with the realist view, and arguably provides a stronger explanation for the Sino-U.S. rapprochement than an explanation that focuses on ideology in domestic Chinese politics, as Chen’s argument does. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 9. Ibid., 12, 245. John Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Sino-American Rapprochement,” Political Science Quarterly 96.3 (1981): 445–464; John Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971 (Boulder: Westview, 1982). Additionally, working from Russian archival material that was obtained after the Soviet Union collapsed, and hence unavailable to Ross, Stephen Morris makes a strong case that Hanoi had already began to tilt toward the Soviet Union in the late 1960s; Steven Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 143–166. Arthur Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968), 33–38. These time-periods are: 1964–1968, 1968–1973, 1973–1975, 1975–1979. We will also briefly examine two further time periods, dealing with the years 1980–1985 and 1986–1991 in the concluding chapter. Eugene Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1984), 6. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 6–7. Robert Ross, review of The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, China Quarterly 104 (Dec. 1985): 728–729. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 305. Anne Gilks, The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992), 4, 7–8. The point of departure for security dilemma theory is that states operate in an anarchical international environment where there is no international sovereign. Because

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64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77.

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

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states cannot be certain that others do not have aggressive intentions, they will take the necessary measures to defend themselves. These defensive actions are perceived by other states as being offensive in nature, causing them to react by building up their military capabilities. In the process of attempting to bolster their security, a “spiral” effect of escalating conflict is created and perpetuated. Ultimately, all states feel more insecure. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58–113. Gilks, Breakdown, 8. Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Walt, Origins, 22. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 25. Measured by whether a state enters into an alliance with a second state against a third state that is perceived to be a threat. Alastair I. Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 261–318. Threat perceptions play a prominent role in Walt’s analysis. Walt, Origins, 25, 265. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure,” 159. Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 9–10. Ross, Indochina Tangle. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars; Qiang Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV During the Vietnam War,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 138; William Duiker, “Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War,” Problems of Communism 37 (Nov.–Dec. 1989): 88; William Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986), 92–93; Stephen Hood, Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1992), xvi, 158. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth About VietnamChinese Relations Over the Last Thirty Years (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979); Guo Ming, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1992). The states referred to are Cambodia and Laos. See King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 118–123. Ibid., 121. Ibid., 123. See Eckstein, “Case Study,” 118–119. I spent the Sept. 2002–May 2003 academic year at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing. The trip to Hong Kong was made in July 2003. Xu Xiaotian et al., Xin Zhongguo yu Sulian de gaoceng wanglai (shang, xia) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2001).

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171

85. Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi. 86. Chengdu Junqu zhengzhibu lianluobu Yunnan sheng kekuan Dongnanya Yanjiusuo, ed., Yenan wenti zhiliao xuanbian, 1975–1986, vols. 1–2 (Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 1987); Guo Ming et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian 1949–1978, vols. 1–3 (Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 1986); Yunnansheng Dongnanya yanjiusuo Kunming junqu zhengzhibu lianluobu, Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxishi ziliao xuanbian, vols. 1–7. (Kunming: Yunnan Dongnanya yanjiusuo, 1984). 87. Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations Between Chinese Leaders and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 (Working Paper 22) (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998). “77” rather than “seventyseven” is used by the authors in the book title. 88. Pei Jianzhang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949–1956 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994); Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998); Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1999). 89. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957-69, 59–72, 201–202. 90. Wu Xiuquan, Huiyi yu huainian (Beijing: zhonggong dangxiao chubanshe, 1991); Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966, vols. 1 and 2 (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999). 91. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987–1998), vols. 11–13; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shibian, Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 (Beijing: zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shibian, 1997); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiaoshi yanjiushe, Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 528–529. 2.

BREAKING THE RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT: SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE TERMINATION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS’ VIETNAM POLICY, 1964–1968

1.

The title for this chapter is taken from Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s mid-1965 comment: “Our [China’s] assistance to Vietnam is to break the ring of encirclement and defend the country” (cited in Wang Xianggen, Zhonguo mimi da fabing: Yuan Yue kang Mei shilu [Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1992], 161). A discussion of Mao’s immediate reaction to Khrushchev’s speech can be found in Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enen yuanyuan (Jiangxi: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1999), chap. 13. For a discussion of the Chinese reaction in the English literature, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 1: Contradictions Among the People, 1956–57 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 139–156. For analysis of the escalating Sino-Soviet relations before the de facto termination of the alliance, see Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–61 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). For a more recent account that draws heavily on Chinese language sources see Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

2.

3.

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172

4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

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For contemporary analysis of the escalating Sino-Soviet after the de facto termination of the alliance see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1967), 397–432; and Herbert Ellison, ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982). For a more recent analysis of this issue in the English language literature, see Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–63 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), and Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split. For a relatively recent analysis by Chinese analysts see Li Danhui, ed., Beijing yu Mosike: Cong lianmeng zouxiang duikang (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002). Kenneth Waltz takes a different view; see Kenneth Waltz, “Intimations of Multipolarity,” in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin, eds., The New World Order (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 4. In mid-October 1964 Khrushchev was ousted, setting the stage for a dramatic shift in Moscow’s policy toward Vietnam. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiaoshi yanjiushe, Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 427–429. Ilya V. Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy Toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 200–201, 205–211; King Chen, “North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1962–64,” Asian Survey 4.9 (1964): 1023– 1036; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 122–128. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 127; Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961–1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 360–364. Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73 (Praeger: New York, 1974), 693–694. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 630. William J. Tompson “The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev,” Soviet Studies 43.6 (1991): 1101–1121. Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 285–286. Constantine Pleshakov and Vladislav Zubok, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). Ibid., 288–296. For discussion of other Soviet elites who favored an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations see Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War, from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 197. Cited in Zubok, A Failed Empire, 195. Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 288. Ibid., 285, 352. Ibid., 245. Edward Mansfield, “International Institutions and Economic Sanctions,” World Politics 47.4 (July 1995): 600. Wu Xiuquan, Huiyi yu huainian (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 374–376.

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22. Ibid., 375. 23. Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), vol. 2, 833; Sun Qimin, Zhong Su guanxi shimo (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998), 536. 24. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966, vol. 2, 839. 25. Ibid., 838. 26. Ibid. 27. For the Chinese deliberations after Khrushchev’s fall and Mao’s proposal of the trip see Wu, Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966, vol. 2, 833–840; Xu Xiaotian et al., Xin Zhongguo yu Sulian de gaoceng wanglai (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2001), vol. 2, 696–706. 28. Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 287. 29. This view is expressed by Oleg Troyanovskii, the last ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. See ibid., 288. 30. Ibid. 31. See William Harris, “Chinese Nuclear Doctrine: The Decade Prior to Weapons Development, 1945–55,” China Quarterly 21 (Jan.–March 1965): 87–95; Jonathan Pollack, “Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, 1964–9,” China Quarterly 50 (April– June 1972): 244–271; Zhang Shuguang, “Between ‘Paper’ and Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons,” in John Lewis Gaddis et al., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 194–215. 32. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 38–39. 33. Mao, “On the Ten Major Relationships” [April 25, 1956] in Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tsetung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), vol. 5, 288. Speaking in 1983, Deng Xiaoping commented that China’s possession of a nuclear deterrent “had forced the superpowers not to use nuclear weapons against China.” He further noted that “China only wants to adhere to [this] principle: we [must] have what others have, and anyone who wants to destroy us must be subject to retaliation”; see John Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 233. 34. On 20 July 1963, the same day a tentative agreement was reached on the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, which had started on 6 July 1963, were terminated sine die. See Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 246; and MacFarquhar, Origins, vol. 3, 357–358. 35. Wu, Huiyi yu huainian, 372. 36. Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, chap. 8. For Hanoi’s positive response to the Chinese nuclear test see Guo Ming et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian 1949–1978 (zhong) (Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 1986), 664–667. 37. The Third Front was an attempt, during the period from 1964 to 1971, to develop a self-sufficient industrial base in the remote southwest and western regions of China. See Lorenz Luthi, “The Vietnam War and China’s Third-Line Defence Planning

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174

38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

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Before the Cultural Revolution, 1964–1966,” Journal of Cold War Studies 10.1 (winter 2008): 26–51. Li Danhui and Barry Naughton emphasize the superpower condominium as a reason for the Third Line while differing on the relative weight that China assigned to each state in the construction of the Third Front. For Li, as early as June 1964 the Soviet threat was relatively more dangerous than the American one; Li Danhui, “Zhong Su guanxi yu Zhongguo de yuan Yue kang Mei,” Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 5.3 (1998): 115. For Naughton, the relative weight of the American and Soviet threat was about equal until 1966, when, following the signing of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty, the Soviet threat was treated as more serious than the American one; Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” China Quarterly 115 (Sept. 1988): 351–386. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 141–142. Ibid., 132. Lyle Goldstein’s interview with Shen Zhihua in Beijing, cited in Lyle Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969,” Political Science Quarterly 118.1 (2003): 57. Victor Gobarev, “Soviet Policy Toward China: Developing Nuclear Weapons, 1949– 1969,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12.4 (1999): 31. Mikhail S. Kapitsa, Na Raznykh Parallelyakh-zapisiy Diplomata (Moscow: Kniga i Biznes, 1996), 63 (cited in Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?,” 57). The nuclear technology–sharing agreement was signed just weeks before the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1957; Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 11–15. William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), 18. Lyle Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” China Quarterly 168 (2001): 985–997; Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?,” 53–79. Xu et al., Xin Zhongguo yu Sulian, vol. 2, 765. See “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Sino-Soviet Border Issue,” Renmin Ribao, 25 May 1969 (cited in Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1.1 [2000]: nn. 7 and 50). Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island,” 987–988. For Wu’s recollections of the Moscow trip see Wu, Huiyi yu huainian, 374–381. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 427; MacFarquhar, Origins, vol. 3, 364–366. Oleg Borisov and Boris Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 260. William Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–65 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 62–63. Xu et al., Xin Zhongguo yu Sulian, vol. 2, 700. A similar quote can be found in MacFarquhar, Origins, vol. 3, 365.

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55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76.

77.

78.

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175

Wu, Shinian lunzhan, vol. 2, 875; Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969 (dierjuan) (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998), 259. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin, 1957–1969, 259. Ibid., 260. Pei Jianzhang, ed., Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun (dierji) (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1996), 259. “Why Khrushchev Fell,” Hongqi 21–22 (21 Nov. 1964) (reproduced in Griffith, SinoSoviet Relations, 1964–65, 387–392). Ibid., 392. Robert Schulzinger, A Time For War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 154–181. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969, 265; Sun, Zhong Su guanxi shimo, 548–550. Sun, Zhong Su guanxi shimo, 548. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969, 264–265. Ibid., 261. Xu et al., Xin Zhongguo yu Sulian, vol. 2, 742. Ibid. Ibid., 742–743. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, vol. 2, 914. Ibid. Mao said: “Women wanquan zancheng. Danshi, women bu canjia jiu shi liao [We are in complete agreement. However, we will not participate]” (ibid., 917). K. S. Karol’s account of a 9 November 1966 interview with Zhou Enlai (cited in Ross Terril, “The Siege Mentality,” Problems of Communism 16.2 [1967]: 3). Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969, 265. Yang Kuisong, Changes in Mao’s Attitude Toward the Indochina Wars, 1949–1973 (Working Paper 34) (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2002), 31. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 150. See Li Danhui, “The Sino-Soviet Dispute Over Assistance for Vietnam’s AntiAmerican War, 1965–1972,” in Priscilla Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 296. For the total amount of Soviet materials transported via China to Vietnam by means of this mode of transportation during the 1965–75 period, see Li Ke and Hao Shenzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), 413–414. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969, 267; Lowell Dittmer, SinoSoviet Normalization and Its International Implications (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 334. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 11, 346–350, 394–395; Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi, 1949–2001 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2002), 241–242.

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79. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 11, 394–395. 80. “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action.’ ” Peking Review 8.46 (11 Nov. 1965): 10–21 (reproduced in Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 455–470). 81. Xie, ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi, 1949–2001, 241. 82. Xie Yixian, Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 1949–1979, 3rd ed. (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 346–348; Li, “The Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 296–304. 83. This is the Chinese understanding as well. See Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 3rd ed., 343. 84. Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Dee, 1996), 9. 85. W. R. Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism Between Russia and China, 1956–1969 (Athens: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1980), 76–78. 86. Cited in Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam, 210. Interestingly, Mao had a similar view of the Vietnamese communists; see Yang, Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude, 24–25. 87. For an excellent discussion of the use of wedge strategies in international relations see Timothy Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain,” Security Studies 17 (2008): 1–38. 88. Zhang Xiaoming, “Communist Powers Divided,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 86. 89. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 20. 90. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 83. 91. For a Chinese account of Kosygin’s visits to Beijing see Wu, Shinian lunzhan, 913–921. 92. Kosygin was personally insulted by fact that the American attacks occurred while he was in Hanoi, and even brought up the issue during a meeting with American vice president Hubert Humphrey eleven months later, on 17 January 1966; see D. J. Sagar, Major Political Events in Indo-China, 1945–1990 (Oxford: Facts on File, 1991), 70. 93. This program was approved by President Johnson on 13 February. The first American attack in this campaign occurred on 2 March and the first of two American battalions subsequently arrived in Danang on 8 March; Sagar, Major Political Events in Indo-China, 71. 94. R. S. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, vol. 3: The Making of a Limited War, 1965–66 (London: Macmillan, 1991), 31. 95. The 10 February Vietnamese attacks occurred at Qui-Nhon; Smith, Vietnam War, vol. 3, 31. 96. Ibid., 57. 97. Ibid., 54. 98. As cited in Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 30. 99. As cited in Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 78. 100. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), 414–416. 101. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 77–78.

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177

102. Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 103. 103. See document no. 11, unofficial translation of the letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the SED Central Committee, in Lorenz Luthi, “Twenty-Four Soviet Bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1964–1966,” CWIHP Bulletin 16 (2008): 381–384. 104. Borisov and Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations, 266–267. 105. Yang, Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude, 32. 106. Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 315–316. 107. Ibid., 315. 108. Ibid. 109. Donald Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 140. 110. See translated version of document in Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 393–395. 111. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, 140. 112. Ibid., 141. 113. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth About VietnamChinese Relations Over the Last Thirty Years (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979), 37–38. 114. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, 141. 115. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 38–39; Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, 50. 116. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 39. 117. Ibid. 118. Document no. 21, cited in Luthi, “Twenty-Four,” 393. 119. Ibid. 120. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 58–72. More detailed estimates can be found on the Web site of the Central Intelligence Agency; see http://www.foia.cia.gov/nic_vietnam _collection.asp. 121. From 1965 to the beginning of 1967, Hanoi received approximately $1.5 billion from the socialist bloc. Of this, Moscow contributed 36.8 percent while China contributed 44.8 percent. Over the course of 1967, the Soviet contribution exceeded 50 percent of all aid from the socialist bloc (including China as part of the bloc). Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 58, 264n. 4. 122. See also Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 118, 190. 123. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 138. 124. Ibid., 139. 125. Ibid. See also Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations, 190. 126. Ibid., 59. 127. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 139. 128. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 79. 129. Ibid., 59. 130. Ibid., 61. 131. Ibid. 132. Ibid., 59–60.

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133. Ibid., 60. 134. Ibid., 5; Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 33. 135. Sergei Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 61–75. 136. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 412. See also Bo Yibo, “The Making of the ‘Leaning to One Side’ Decision,” Chinese Historians 5.1 (1992): 57–62. 137. Document no. 22, cited in Luthi, “Twenty-Four,” 397. 138. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 81. 139. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 232. 140. Ibid., 220. 141. Other members of this committee included Li Xiannian, Politburo member and vice premier responsible for economic affairs; Bo Yibo, Politburo member and vice premier in charge of economic planning; Liu Xiao, deputy foreign minister; Yang Chengwu, deputy chief of staff, People’s Liberation Army; Li Qiang, minister of foreign trade; Li Tianyou, also a deputy chief of staff, People’s Liberation Army. 142. Chen, Mao’s China, 357. 143. Ibid., 220. 144. The North Vietnamese delegation also visited Beijing on their way back from Moscow; see Smith, Vietnam War, vol. 3, 92–97. 145. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming, 415; Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 (Cold War International History Project Working Paper 22) (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars), 85. On that same day, Hanoi released its four-point response to President Johnson’s call for “unconditional discussions.” See Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 37–38. 146. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming, 415. 147. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 35. Another Chinese estimate places the total value of its economic and military aid to Hanoi during the Vietnam War period at $200 million. See Deng Lifeng, “Huan Yue kang Mei shulue,” Dangdai Zhongguo shiyanjiu 19.1 (2002): 92. 148. Deng Liqun, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui gongzuo (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1988), 759. 149. Zhang Xiaoming, “The Vietnam War: A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Military History 60.4 (1996): 759. 150. Zhang, “The Vietnam War: A Chinese Perspective,” 744–745. 151. Ibid., 745. 152. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), 38. The four conditions of a pure deterrence situation exist when: (1) in a relationship between two hostile states the officials in at least one of them are seriously considering attacking the other or attacking some area of the world the other deems important; (2) key officials of the other state realize this; (3) realizing that an attack is a distinct possibility, the latter set of officials threaten the use of force in retaliation in

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153.

154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

160.

161. 162. 163. 164.

165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

170. 171. 172. 173. 174.

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179

an attempt to prevent the attack; (4) leaders of the state planning the attack decide to desist primarily because of the retaliatory threats. Chen Jian and James Hershberg, “Reading and Warning the Likely Enemy: China’s Signals to the United States About Vietnam in 1965,” International History Review 27.1 (March 2005): 47–84. As cited in Xie Yixian ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi, 1949–2001 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2002), 229. Ilya Gaiduk, “Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations, 1964–73,” CWIHP Bulletin 6–7 (1995/96): 250. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 36; Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 445. Chen, Mao’s China, 217. Ibid. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 446–450. For specific comments that were reiterated in a meeting between Zhou and Indonesian first vice prime minister Subandrio on 28 May in Guangzhou, China, see Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 88. Ibid. For examination of China’s involvement in the Korean War see Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960); Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Zhang Shuguang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–53 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995). Li Deng et al., eds., Jianguo yilai junshi baizhuang dashi (Beijing: zhishi chubanshe, 1992), 222. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969, 37–38. Xie, Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 1949–79, 337. Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975); Allen Whiting, “China’s Role in the Vietnam War,” in Jayne Werner and Davis Hunt, eds., The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1993), 71–76; John Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War,” Parameters 22.1 (1992): 73–85. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, 194. Whiting, “China’s Role in the Vietnam War,” 73. Xie, Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 1949–79, 343. Li Danhui, “Zhong Su guanxi,” 116. William Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986), 49. For further evidence that China had reached an understanding with the United States, see Frank E. Rogers, “Sino-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1964–66,” China Quarterly 66 (June 1976): 293–314. Li, “The Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 290. Ralph Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, vol. 2: The Struggle for South-East Asia, 1961–65 (London: Macmillan, 1985), 349. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 33. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 78. Ibid., 89–90.

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175. Ibid., 90. 176. Ibid., 93. 177. Wang Xianggen, Zhongguo mimi da fabing: Yuan yue kangmei shilu (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1992), 236; Chen, Mao’s China, 232. 178. Document no. 21, cited in Luthi, “Twenty-Four,” 393. 179. Ibid. 180. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 94. 181. Ibid., 96. 182. Document no. 21, cited in Luthi, “Twenty-Four,” 393. 183. Ibid., 393–394. 184. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 101. 185. Ibid., 123. Furthermore, according to Qiao, “They [the Soviets] make use of their aid to Vietnam in order to control the situation and cooperate with the United States to force Vietnam to accept peace negotiations” (ibid., 122). 186. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 38. 187. Ibid., 37–38. 188. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 65. 189. This article was also printed in English in the Peking Review as Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” Peking Review 8.36, 3 Sept. 1965, 9-30. For an analysis of this document see David Mozingo and Thomas Robinson, Lin Piao on “People’s War”: China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, Nov. 1965), 1–22. 190. For further discussion see David P. Elliot, “Hanoi’s Strategy in the Second Indochina War,” in Luu Doan Huynh and Jane Werner, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993), 70–71. 191. Duiker, China and Vietnam, 50. In 1979, after the Sino-Vietnamese border war, Le Duan commented that “[W]e have never had a defensive strategy”; Christopher E. Goscha, trans., “Document: Comrade B on the Plot of the Reactionary Chinese Clique Against Vietnam,” CWIHP Bulletin 12/13 (2001): 283. 192. On this point see John Garver, “The Tet Offensive and Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” in Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, eds., The Tet Offensive (Westport: Praeger, 1996), 47–48; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 177–178. 193. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 86. 194. Ibid., 91. 195. Ibid. 196. Cited in Ang Cheng Guan, “Decision-Making Leading to the Tet Offensive, 1968: The Vietnamese Communist Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary History 33.3 (1998): 344–345. 197. Ang, “Decision-Making,” 345. 198. Ibid., 345. 199. Ibid., 350. 200. Ibid., 351. 201. For an assessment of the general Chinese view of Vietnamese military strategy during the Vietnam War see Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 108–111.

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181

202. Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 126–135. 203. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 109. 204. Cited in Qiang Zhai, “Opposing Negotiations: China and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–1968,” Pacific Historical Review 68.1 (1999): 38–39. 205. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 524 206. Robert Brigham, “Vietnam at the Center,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 107. 207. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 73–107. 208. North Vietnam selected as its chief negotiator Xuan Thuy, who had previously been president of the Vietnam-Chinese Friendship Association; ibid., 156–157. 209. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 138–140. 210. Mao’s comments to Pham can be found in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu zhongong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushe, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 580–583. 211. Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 145. 212. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 126–129. 213. Ibid., 130. 214. Ibid., 138. 215. Namely, people’s war as opposed to large-scale unit warfare. See Lawson, SinoVietnamese Conflict, 79–116. 216. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 155–175. 217. Ibid., 120–122, 180–181. 218. Laos shares a border with both Vietnam and China. 219. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and the Theory of Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 7, 79–137. 220. MacAlister Brown, “The Indochinese Federation Idea,” in Joseph J. Zasloff, ed., Postwar Indochina: Old Enemies and New Allies (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1988), 77–102; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 109. 221. Two documents were signed at the end of the Geneva conference. The first declared Laos a neutral state. In the second, a protocol to the first, the thirteen signatories agreed to respect the neutrality of Laos and to withdraw all foreign military personnel. Sagar, Major Political Events, 54 and 59. 222. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 109. 223. Ibid., 108. 224. Ibid., 121. 225. Ibid., 180–181. 226. Quan Yanshi and Du Weidong, Gongheguo mishi (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1990), 250–251. 227. Chen, Mao’s China, 218–219. 228. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 85. 229. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 133–134.

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230. Chen, Mao’s China, 219–220; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 134–135. 231. This charge was repeated in the late 1980s by a Vietnamese official; see Whiting, “China’s Role,” 73. Many Chinese scholars who write about this period of Sino-Vietnamese relations do not portray the Chinese as reneging since the agreement reached between Hanoi and Beijing called for air support only in the case of a large-scale ground invasion by either Americans or South Vietnamese. Since this did not occur, there was no act of reneging. For example, see Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming, 417. 232. This charge is made by Hanoi in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 37. 233. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 135. 234. Chen, Mao’s China, 58. 235. Ibid., 60. 236. See Gaddis’ foreword in Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, x. 237. Wang, Zhonguo bimi da fabing, 161. 238. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 158. 239. Thomas Christensen, “Worse than a Monolith: Disorganization and Rivalry Within Asian Communist Alliances and U.S. Containment Challenges, 1949–69,” Asian Security 1.1 (2005): 80–127. 240. Reflecting back on Hanoi’s diplomacy toward Beijing and Moscow during the Vietnam War years, Luu Doan Huynh, a former North Vietnamese diplomat, noted in 1997, “We had problems with our allies. We needed Soviet and Chinese support as a deterrent against further U.S. aggression, but we never wanted to depend on Moscow or Beijing”; Robert Brigham’s May 1997 interview with Luu Doan Huynh, former Lao Dong diplomat and Senior Fellow at Hanoi’s Institute for International Relations, cited in Brigham, “Vietnam at the Center,” 98. 241. Robert Brigham has observed that “it was not until 1968, and the opening of peace talks (in May 1968), that Hanoi finally took the decisive step toward the Kremlin” (ibid.). 242. It should be noted that the Vietnamese alignment with the Soviet Union did not preclude suspicion on both sides; see Gaiduk, Soviet Union, 215–216. 243. For a recent reassessment of the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979 see Zhang Xiaoming, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” China Quarterly 184 (Dec. 2005): 851–874. 3.

A WAR ON TWO FRONTS: THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE BETRAYAL THESIS, 1968–1973

1.

Yunnansheng Dongnanya yanjiusuo, Kunming junqu zhengzhibu lianluobu, Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxishi ziliao xuanbian, vol. 4, 933–934. The agreement to end the war is formally known as the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.” A copy of that document can be found in D. J. Sagar, Major Political Events in Indo-China, 1945–1990 (Oxford: Facts on File, 1991), 110–111. Vojtech Mastny, “Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?,” Diplomatic History 29.1 (2005): 149–177.

2.

3.

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3. A WAR ON TWO FRONTS

4. 5.

6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

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183

See Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 1–4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth About VietnamChinese Relations Over the Last Thirty Years (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979), 44–50; Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961– 1974: From Red Menace to Tacit Ally (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 182; Jonathan Pollack, “The Opening to America,” in John K. Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Cambridge History of China 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 422, 426. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 112; Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). The following reconstruction of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia is drawn from Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Carole Fink et al., eds., 1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 111–171; Ouimet, Rise and Fall, 9–37; Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Rothschild, Return to Diversity, 168. Ouimet, Rise and Fall, 20. Cited in Ouimet, Rise and Fall, 20. Kramer, “Czechoslovak Crisis,” 145. Ibid., 147. Ibid., 151. Ibid., 148–150. Ouimet, Rise and Fall, 31–32. Kramer, “Czechoslovak Crisis,” 153. Ibid., 155–156. Cited in Ouimet, Rise and Fall, 67. Thomas Christensen also notes this particular implication of the Brezhnev Doctrine for China; see Thomas Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,” in Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 69. See also Kramer, “Czechoslovak Crisis,” 167–170. Eugene Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1984), 169. “Total Bankruptcy of Soviet Modern Revisionism,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service (China), 23 Aug. 1968, A5–8. Kramer, “Czechoslovak Crisis,” 119–120. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiaoshi yanjiushe, Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 528–529; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shibian, Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shibian, 1997), 252–253; Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 56.

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184


24. “Chinese Government and People Strongly Condemn Soviet Revisionist Clique’s Armed Occupation of Czechoslovakia,” Peking Review Supp. 34, 23 Aug. 1968, 3–4; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (China), 26 Aug., A1–3. 25. “Chinese Government and People Strongly Condemn,” 4. 26. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 61. 27. “Social Imperialism,” Peking Review 36, 6 Sept. 1968, 12. The article was originally published in a 30 Aug. issue of the People’s Daily. 28. M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 208. 29. Cited in Fravel, Strong Borders, 208. 30. “Internal balancing” refers to a state’s attempts to increase its capabilities by mobilizing and/or using its own resources more efficiently. “External balancing” refers to efforts to increase its security by cooperating with other states. A classic example of external balancing would be the formation of alliances. 31. John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1993), 133–165. 32. Thomas Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China’s Inner Asian Frontiers,” in John K. Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Cambridge History of China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 15:248. 33. Li Ke and Hao Shenzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), 416. 34. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 51–55; Hanoi Radio VNA Domestic Service, 21 Aug. 21, 1968, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Asia-Pacific), 21 Aug. 1968, K5. 35. Nhan Dann was the North Vietnamese communist party paper while Quan Doi Nhan Dann was the military paper. 36. Pravda editorial article, 22 Aug. 1968, “The Defense of Socialism Is a Supreme International Duty,” in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Soviet Union), 23 Aug. 1968, A14–36. 37. See Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 52. 38. Pham’s speech can be found in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Asia-Pacific), 3 Sept. 1968, K1–13. 39. Editorial, “The People of Vietnam Will Win!” Pravda, 2 Sept. 1968 (cited in Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War [Chicago: Dee, 1996], 177). 40. See map in Garver, Foreign Relations, 88. 41. Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1975), 130–131; Moscow later signed an alliance treaty with India on 9 Aug. 1971. 42. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 18–19, 27, 248. 43. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 95. 44. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 149. 45. Mao’s message to the Vietnamese leadership can be found in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987–1998), vol. 12, 549.

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46. Ibid. 47. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 216. 48. “Premier Chou En-lai Makes Important Speech,” Peking Review 36, 6 Sept. 1968, 6–7; Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 58–73. 49. “Premier Chou En-lai Makes Important Speech,” 7. 50. Ibid. 51. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York: Praeger, 1974), 61. 52. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 169–170. 53. Daniel Papp, Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, Washington (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1981), 116–117. 54. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 172–173. 55. This meeting occurred on 29 June 1968. Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 (Cold War International History Project Working Paper 22) (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars), 137–138. 56. Zhou and Pham Van Dong held various meetings from 13 until 19 April 1968; see ibid., 123–129. 57. Zhou, Chen Yi, and Xuan Thuy met on 7 May 1968; ibid., 134–135. 58. Ibid., 123–140. 59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 42. 60. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 138–140. 61. Ibid., 139–140. 62. Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 139. 63. Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 27. 64. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu zhongong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushe, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995), 580– 583. The full text of Mao’s discussion with Pham can be found in Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 147. 65. Guo Ming, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1992), 65. 66. Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian, 67–69. 67. Sagar, Major Political Events, 89. 68. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 580–583. 69. Qu Xing, Zhongguo waijiao wushinian (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2000), 426. 70. Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian, 68. 71. Li Danhui, “The Sino-Soviet Dispute Over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-American War, 1965–1972,” in Priscilla Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 291.

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72. Li, “Vietnam and Chinese Policy Toward the United States,” in William Kirby et al., eds., Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 183. 73. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming, 426. 74. Between June 1965 and March 1969, a total of approximately 320,000 Chinese troops entered Vietnam. At their peak, there were 170,000 troops in Vietnam. Qu Aiguo, “Zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai Yuenan zhancang de junshi xingdong,” in Li Danhui, Shen Zhihua, and Yang Kuisong, eds., Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng (Xianggang: Tianti yuanshu youxiang gongshi, 2000), 183. 75. Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), vol. 2, 839. 76. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 48. 77. Ibid., 49. 78. In interviews conducted by Lyle Goldstein, Chinese scholars have acknowledged that Beijing sought a confrontation with Moscow. Jiang Yi points out that: “It is clear that Chinese leaders intentionally orchestrated this conflict. [Mao] did not want a war, but he did want a large-scale clash. . . . Soviet troops were completely unready.” Li Danhui observes that: “Already in 1968, China began preparations to create a small war on the border.” Yang Kuisong notes that: “There were already significant preparations in 1968, but the Russians did not come so the planned ambush was not successful.” Lyle Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?: The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969,” Political Science Quarterly 118.1 (2003): 58–59. See also Lyle Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” China Quarterly 168 (2001): 985–997; Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union.” 79. Zhang Shuguang has argued that Mao “exercised a great deal of caution when China was faced with . . . the Soviet threat from the northern border during the late 1960s”; Zhang Shuguang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real’ Tigers: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons,” in Gaddis et al., eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, 214. 80. Christensen, “Windows and War,” 52, 69–71. 81. A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977), 49; Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union,” 257, 260–261. 82. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 50. 83. Ibid. 84. Lin Biao, “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review 18, 30 April 1969, 33. 85. Border incidents increased greatly from the Jan. 1960–Oct. 1964 period to Oct. 1964– March 1969; see “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Sino-Soviet Border Issue,” Renmin Ribao, 25 May 1969 (cited in Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1.1 [2000]: n. 7, 50). 86. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 53. 87. Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union,” 266.

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187

88. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 53. 89. Ibid. 90. Victor M. Gobarev, “Soviet Policy Toward China: Developing Nuclear Weapons, 1949–1969.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12.4 (1999): 46. 91. Ibid. For a Chinese viewpoint regarding Soviet nuclear threats against China see Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi, 1949–2001 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2002), 246–247. 92. See Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 55. 93. Gobarev, “Soviet Policy Toward China,” 46. 94. Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?,” 60; Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 170; Barnett, China and the Major Powers, 50. 95. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 56. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid. 98. Cited in Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?,” 61. 99. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 58. 100. Ibid., 57. 101. Cited in Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 170. 102. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 58. 103. Zhou’s letter can be found in Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 462–464. The English translation can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998): 171–172. 104. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 60. 105. Ibid. 106. Yang, “Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” 39–40. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 59. 107. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 59. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid., 61. 112. Ibid. 113. Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union,” 274. 114. Ibid., 62. 115. Mao left for Wuhan on 14 Oct., while Lin Biao was to depart for Suzhou on 17 Oct. 116. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 62. 117. This episode is covered in detail in ibid., 63–72. 118. Ibid., 64. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid., 65. 122. Ibid., 65–66. 123. Ibid., 69. 124. The subsequent talks dragged on throughout the Cold War.

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125. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 190–191 (for Soviet economic aid) and 118 (for military aid). 126. USSR-Vietnam: A Lasting Solidarity (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1972), 11–12. 127. Ibid. 128. Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations. 129. Ibid. 130. See table detailing PRC Military aid to Hanoi from 1964–1975 in Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming, 416. As Qiang Zhai notes, Li and Hao were military history researchers at the Military Science Academy of the PLA at the time they authored the book. The book was subsequently banned in China because it revealed classified information. Recent Russian scholarship also shows that Soviet aid to Vietnam increased substantially after 1965. 131. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 221. 132. Ibid., 220–221. 133. Ibid., 182. 134. Ibid., 220–221. 135. Ang, Ending the Vietnam War, 37–38. 136. Cited in Stephen Morris, The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow (Working Paper 25) (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999). 137. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 216. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid., 216–217. 140. Cited ibid., 217. 141. Cited ibid., 215. 142. Truong claims: “I know the Party had long ago decided to form an alliance with the Soviet Union. The movement in this direction started in 1969, and the passing away of Ho Chi Minh paved the way for officially making the decision. However, there was no open declaration because Chinese assistance was still needed.” Cited in Li, “SinoSoviet Dispute,” in Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 313. 143. Cited in Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 204. 144. Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese, 106; Arnold L. Horelick, “The Soviet Union’s Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members,” Pacific Affairs 47.3 (autumn 1974): 269–285. 145. Report on Communist and Workers’ Parties’ Conference, June 1969 Kommunist, June 1969 cited in Lesek Buszynski, Soviet Policy and Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986), 42 146. Buszynski, Soviet Policy and Southeast Asia, 40. 147. National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948–1976 (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, 2004), 543. 148. Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 1949–79 (disanban) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 468. 149. Smyser, Independent Vietnamese, 106.

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189

150. Xie Yixian argues that “the Chinese government did not express any opinion [about Hanoi participating in the Paris peace talks] because it was unclear about North Vietnam’s strategic intentions” (Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 1949–79, 343). 151. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 221. 152. Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976, vol. 3, 293. 153. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 42. 154. Ibid. 155. Ibid. 156. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming, 416. 157. Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” in Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 305. 158. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 538–539. 159. Qu, Zhongguo waijiao, 426. 160. Ibid. 161. Wallace Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press), 198–204. 162. National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon, 591. 163. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 171. 164. For various Chinese accounts of Sino-American relations during the late 1960s through the 1970s see Gong Li, Kua Yue honggou: 1969–1979 nian Zhong Mei guanxi de yanbian (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992), 124–127; Xiong Xianghui, “Dakai Zhong Mei guanxi de qianzou,” Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 42 (1992): 56–96; Li Danhui, “Zhong Mei huanhe yu yuan Yue kang Mei: Zhongguo waijiao zhanlue tiaozhen zhong de huan yinsu,” Dang de wenxian, 2002 no. 3: 67–77; Li Danhui and Shen Zhihua, “Zhong Mei hejie yu Zhongguo dui Yue waijiao,” Meiguo yanjiu, 2000, no. 1: 98–116; Qiang Jiang, ed., Pingpang waijiao muhou (Beijing: Dongfang, 1997). For authoritative English-language accounts of Sino-American relations during this period, see Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992). See also “New Evidence on the Sino-American Opening: ‘All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos’: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69,” introduction and annotation by Chen Jian and David Wilson, CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998): 155–175. 165. For a contrary argument see Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal.” 166. See Christensen, “Windows and War,” 71. 167. Cited in Li Jie, “Changes in China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. Relations,” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 311. 168. Jin Chongji, ed., Zhou Enlai Zhuan (si) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 2044–2068. 169. The marshals were Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen. 170. Xiong, “Dakai Zhong Mei guanxi de qianzou.” Excerpts of the report can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998): 166–168, 170–171.

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171. Xiong, “Dakai Zhong Mei guanxi de qianzou,” 72. 172. Xia in fact argues against an influential view in the literature that opposition to the Sino-American rapprochement existed within the Chinese leadership. According to Xia, Chinese documents and memoirs that have been released since the 1990s suggest strongly that neither Lin Biao nor other radical leaders played any appreciable role in, or mounted any opposition to, China’s policy toward the United States. Xia Yafeng, “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1968– February 1972,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8.2 (2006): 2–28. 173. Xia, “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement,” 25. 174. Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 46 (Oct. 1967): 111–125. 175. Wenhua dageming yanjiu ziliao, vol. 2 (Beijing: National Defense University, 1988), 517. Reprinted in CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998): 161. 176. Pollack, “Opening to America,” 422, 426. 177. Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 182. 178. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. 179. For the argument that the Chinese did not betray their Vietnamese comrades; see Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 57–107. For increase in Chinese aid to the Vietnamese communists in 1971 see 61; for the increase in 1972 see 70, 77, 180. Another analyst who does not see the Chinese betraying the Vietnamese communists is Chinese Cold War historian Li Danhui. In her analysis of the Sino-American rapprochement, she notes that: “China avoided damaging the interests of its ally, Vietnam” (Li, “Vietnam and Chinese Policy,” in Kirby et al., eds., Normalization, 205). 181. Lucien Pye, “The China Factor in Southeast Asia,” in Richard Solomon, The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 229. 182. The use of a counterfactual thought experiment may be helpful. Notwithstanding the Chinese betrayal of their Vietnamese comrades in 1972, if North and South Vietnam had remained divided through the post-1975 era, it is highly plausible that the SinoVietnamese alliance would have continued. On the use of counterfactual thought experiments in social science research, see Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 25–26. 183. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 179. 184. Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 68. 185. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 179. 186. Li Danhui, “Zhong Mei huanhe yu yuan Yue kang Mei—Zhongguo waijiao zhanlue tiaozhenzhong de huan yinsu,” Dang de wenxian 3 (2002): 72. 187. Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 75. 188. Yun Sui, Chushi qiguo jishi: jiangjun dashi Wang Youping (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1995), 135. 189. Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 74–75. 190. Chris Connolly, “The American Factor: Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–72,” Cold War History 5.4 (2005): 518. 191. Ibid., 80. 192. Guo, Zongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 103. 193. Cited in Li, “Vietnam and Chinese Policy,” 198.

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191

194. Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 92. 195. Taking a very different position from the one outlined here, Stephen Morris has argued that the Vietnamese were willing to overlook Soviet détente with the U.S. but not Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. According to Morris, the Vietnamese made a distinction between “compromise with principles” and “compromise without principles.” He argues that: “The Vietnamese saw the Soviet relationship with the West as cunning and strategically sound from an orthodox communist perspective. The Vietnamese saw Chinese rapprochement with the West as motivated by shortterm national interest. The whole concept of ‘Chinese betrayal’ makes sense not by reference to North Vietnamese national security, but by reference to Vietnamese political culture” (Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 162–163). The argument presented in this chapter is that in their relations with the Vietnamese communists, the Soviets, like the Chinese, were driven by the concept of national interest, defined primarily in terms of national security. 196. Zubok notes that in this instance “state interests triumphed over ideological passions” (Zubok, A Failed Empire, 220). 197. George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 (New York: Wiley, 1979), 242. 198. See Nguyen, “The Sino-Vietnamese Split,” 24–25. Luthi does not subscribe to the betrayal thesis but he does note that “the DRV was less hostile to U.S.-Soviet détente than to U.S.-Chinese rapprochement” (Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 73). 199. I thank one of the reviewers for making this point. 200. Nguyen T. Lien-Hang has neatly summarized Hanoi’s perspective: “To the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam], then, its allies were once again positioning themselves to sell out Vietnam’s struggle for their own ends. On an ideological level, the VWP [Vietnamese Worker’s Party] no longer . . . believed in the ideological commitment of its allies to international proletarianism. Hanoi was convinced that Beijing and Moscow’s policies towards its struggle were dictated by geostrategic calculations under the veneer of ideological solidarity” (Nguyen, “The Sino-Vietnamese Split,” 22). 201. Cited in Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions (Stanfordville: Coleman Enterprises, 1979), vol. 2, 569–570. 202. The contents of a Vietnamese-authored report that was forwarded to the Soviets is cited in Stephen Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese triangle in the 1970s,” in Roberts, ed., Beyond the Bamboo Curtain, 419. 203. Ibid. 204. The quotation in the header to this section comes from Vietnamese communist general Vo Ngyuen Giap. Giap’s comments were made in an interview with Miguel Rivero, Verde Olivo (Havana), 10 Feb. 1980, and are cited in Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 87–88. 205. See Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 305; Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 60, 62. 206. DRV minister of foreign trade Phan Anh in an interview with Aziya Afrika Segodnya (Moscow, March 1972), cited in Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 96. 207. Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 77.

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208. Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 305. 209. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 21–25, 45, 79. Sino-U.S. rapprochement is cited as the “second betrayal” of Vietnam. The first betrayal is the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The third betrayal is China’s post-1975 policy toward Vietnam. 210. Ibid., 79. 211. Cited in Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 87–88. 212. Ibid. 213. See Ngyuen Co Thach’s interview in FBIS Daily Report (Asia-Pacific), 17 March 1982, K2. 214. A concise overview for the period 1965–1969 can be found in Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 291–304. 215. Crawford, “Wedge Strategy.” 216. Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 305. 217. Ibid., 305–307. 218. See discussions between Zhou En Lai and Le Duc Tho on 12 July 1972, and between Mao and Nguyen Thi Binh on 19 Dec. 1972, in Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 182–185. 219. Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 305. 220. Shu Guang Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States–China Confrontations, 1964–68,” in Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 271. 221. Ibid., 270. 222. Ibid. 223. Ibid. 224. Ibid. 225. Notwithstanding the improvements elaborated below, it should be noted that disputes and suspicions did not evaporate; see Li, “Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 308–311. 226. Ibid., 306. 227. Ibid. 228. Ibid. 229. Ibid. 230. Ibid. 231. Ibid. 232. Ibid. 233. Ibid. 234. Ibid. 235. Ibid. 236. Note that I am examining Cambodia as a bilateral issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations. It is of course arguable that Cambodia can be interpreted as a multilateral issue involving three states: Cambodia, China, and Vietnam. 237. Cited in Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 220. 238. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 58; Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 48–49. 239. Thus, Goscha notes: “What needs to be underscored . . . is that the Chinese were not supporting the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese between 1965 and 1973, and

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4. THE POLITICS OF VICTORY

240.

241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252.

253.

perhaps not until early 1975. The Chinese and Vietnamese negotiating positions (on the Paris Peace Accords), contrary to what the Khmer would say later, were not that different in 1973” (Christopher E. Goscha, “Vietnam, the Third Indochina War, and the Meltdown of Asian Internationalism,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 172). Nordom Sihanouk, My War with the CIA: Cambodia’s Fight for Survival (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 24–25; Zhai, “China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970–1975,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 381. Sihanouk, My War with the CIA, 27. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 187. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 56–58. Ibid., 80. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 36–39. Ibid., 54–55. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 190–191. Qu, Zhongguo waijiao, 426. Garver, Foreign Relations, 126–127; Chen, Mao’s China, 68–69. Xiong, “Dakai Zhong Mei guanxi de qianzou,” 72. Garver, Foreign Relations, 70–74. Guo ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian, 68. For the argument that the Chinese changed their view on Hanoi compromising with the United States between 11 May 1971 and 18 July 1971 in order to end the Vietnam War see Ang, Ending the Vietnam War, 78. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 659.

4.

THE POLITICS OF VICTORY: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE ROAD TO VIETNAMESE UNIFICATION, 1973–1975

1.

Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). For Chinese perceptions of the Soviets see A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), 80; for Soviet perceptions of the Chinese see Vitaly Kozyrev, “Soviet Policy Toward the United States and China, 1969–1979,” in William Kirby et al., eds., Normalization of U.S.China Relations: An International History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 269. At the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU in 1971, Brezhnev expressed his view that relations between Beijing and Moscow should be normalized. Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 94. Kozyrev, “Soviet Policy Toward the United States and China, 1969–1979,” 272–276. “Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” FBISChina, 31 August 1973, B1–B13; “Chairman of Chinese Delegation Teng Hsiao-ping’s Speech,” Peking Review 17.16, 16 April 1974, 6–11.

2.

3.

4. 5.

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193

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194

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

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Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 84–85, 90–91. Zhou Enlai quoted in King Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds: A Foreign Policy Reader (White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1979), 158. As cited in Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 142. Zhou Enlai quoted in “The Kunming Documents” in Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds, 151–152. “Chou En-lai’s Report on the International Situation, March 1973,” Issues and Studies 13.1 (1977): 125. “Report to the Tenth National Congress,” B1–13. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 357. Harry Harding, “The Domestic Politics of China’s Global Posture,” in Thomas Fingar, ed., China’s Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 102. Brezhnev proposed that “relations should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.” See “Brezhnev’s Speech to the Trade Unions,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 24.12 (19 April 1972): 8. “Report to the Tenth National Congress,” B9. Ibid. “Brezhnev Speaks at Tashkent Ceremony,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press 25.39 (24 Oct. 1973): 4–5. Kenneth Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1978), 22–23. Sergey S Radchenko, The Soviets’ Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split Working Paper no. 42 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003), 1–30. Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, 23. Ibid. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 224. Cyrus Sulzberger, “Chou Attacks Russians for Delaying Border Pact,” New York Times, 29 Oct. 1973, 1. Harry Harding, “The Domestic Politics of China’s Global Posture,” in Thomas Fingar, ed., China’s Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 103. See “Statement of Government of People’s Republic of China,” and “Document of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China,” in Peking Review 41, 10 Oct. 1969, 3–4, 8–15. Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, 19. There were other disputes between China and the Soviet Union in 1974, ranging from Soviet espionage in China to the arrest of a Soviet helicopter crew after their helicopter crashed in China. In January 1975 the Chinese unveiled a new constitution that had deleted references to Sino-Soviet friendship. In March the Sino-Soviet border

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27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

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195

negotiations ended without agreement. See Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 41–43. “Report to the Tenth National Congress,” B8. Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978 (Disanjuan) (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1999), 6–10; Qu, Zhongguo waijiao wushinian, 370– 376; Gong, Kua Yue honggou, 222–241; Xie Yixian, Zhongguo waijiaoshi, 1949–1979, 441–452; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu zhongong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushe, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995), 600–601; Ministry of Foreign and Party Literature Affairs and Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 454. “Chairman of Chinese Delegation,” Peking Review 17.16, 16 April 1974, 6–11. “Chairman of Chinese Delegation,” 6. According to Deng Xiaoping’s presentation of this theory at the United Nations’ General Assembly on 19 April 1974, “The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World.” Ibid. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 6. Ibid. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 8. Xiong, “Dakai Zhong Mei guanxi de qianzou,” 56–96. The marshals were Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen. Excerpts of the report can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998): 166–168, 170–171. Zhou Enlai quoted in Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds, 158. USSR-DRV: Friends and Brothers (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1973), 9. Barnett, China and the Major Powers, 880. For contrasting interpretations of the Soviet Union’s approach to détente with the United States see the differing perspectives represented by Raymond L. Garthoff on the one hand, and Harry Gelman and Richard Pipes on the other. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994); Gelman, Brezhnev Politburo; Richard Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente (Boulder: Westview, 1981). Cited in Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–74: From Red Menace to Tacit Ally (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 235. Cited in William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow (New York: New Press, 1998), 171. Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 171. James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 65.

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196


46. As cited in Mann, About Face, 65. 47. David Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 174–175; For the broader argument that any assessment of Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War must take into account costs as well as benefits see John Garver, “The Opportunity Costs of Mao’s Foreign Policy Choices,” China Journal 49 (2003): 127–142. 48. National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon, 620–621. 49. Ibid., 623. 50. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 72–73. 51. Mann, About Face, 68–70. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid., 69. 54. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 91. 55. James Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 (Cold War International History Project Working Paper 22) (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1998), 187–188. 56. See Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992). 57. See Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation; for triangular relations between Beijing, Moscow, and Washington from the 1970s see Robert Ross, ed., China, the United States and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy-making in the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: 1993); Gerald Segal examines the emergence of the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle in the 1960s in Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982). 58. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and détente of the 1970s,” Cold War History 8.4 (2009): 427–447. 59. See the low-end figures for all three sources in table 4.2. 60. Le Duan, Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977), 333–334. 61. See the English translation of the official history of the North Vietnamese military, formally known as the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Merle Pribbenow, trans., Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press), 340. 62. American intelligence sources estimate that the Vietnamese communist casualties during the three phases of the Tet Offensive were somewhere in the region of 85,000 troops out of a total of 195,000 troops. Ang, Ending the Vietnam War, 17. 63. Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 340–341. 64. Ang, Ending the Vietnam War, 147. 65. Robert Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 120; Gareth Porter, “The Paris Agreement and Revolutionary Strategy in South Vietnam,” in Joseph Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, eds., Communism in Indochina (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), 69; William Turley, The Second Indochina War (Boulder: Westview, 1986), 161. 66. Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy, 120.

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67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92.

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197

This organization operated as a high-level planning body and was an intermediary between the Party leadership and the military. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 335. Cited in Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy, 121. Cited in ibid. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 335–341. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 120. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 259–260. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 339. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 120. General Van Trien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 21–23, 25. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 339. Ibid. See Morris’ citations in Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 273, n. 1. Ibid., 167. These are: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; Soviet-German détente of 1970; the attempted communist coup in Sudan; the military coup in Portugal in 1974–1975; and the struggle for Angola in 1975. According to Morris, in contrast, Hanoi took no position on the following issues: the Soviet proposal for an Asian Collective Security arrangement first aired in June 1969; the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971; and the ideological disputes between the Soviet Union and China. Ibid., 143–166. Ibid., 143. Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict; Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 165. In offering his own explanation for the origins of the Vietnamese tilt toward the Soviets (and away from the Chinese), Morris posits that: “Hanoi’s decisions can best be explained with reference to the political culture of its political elite. Both the formal aspects of this revolutionary culture (its ideological precepts) and its informal aspects (its paranoid world-view) are vital to an understanding of the perceptions and values that guided Hanoi’s foreign policy.” Ibid., 166. William Duiker, “Building the United Front: The Rise of Communism in Vietnam, 1925–54,” in Zasloff and Brown, eds., Communism in Indochina, 5. “Niyazebekov Banquet Speech,” FBIS-Asia and Pacific, 3 Jan. 1974, K5. Schulzinger, A Time for War, 305–327. Gelman, Brezhnev Politburo, 148–151; Schulzinger, A Time for War, 317–327. “Hedging” refers to the simultaneous adoption of both balancing and integrative mechanisms toward an actor in the international arena. See Robert Art, “Europe Hedges its Security Bets,” in T. V. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 184. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 23–26. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 58; Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 48–49.

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93. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 56–58. 94. To keep an eye on Sihanouk’s activities in Beijing the Khmer Rouge stationed Ieng Sary there in late 1971 as its special representative from the interior. Ibid., 80. 95. The Khmer Rouge were formally known as the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP). For a concise discussion of the Cambodian communism see Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 36–39. 96. Ibid., 54–55. 97. The complexity of the Khmer Rouge relationship with the Vietnamese communists is shown by the fact that even though they despised the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge continued to depend on aid from Hanoi during the 1973–75 period. North Vietnamese aid played an important part in the fall of Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975. Sheldon Simon, “The Role of Outsiders in the Cambodian Conflict,” Orbis 19.1 (spring 1975): 209–230. 98. Duiker, Communist Road, 312–313. For contrary views of the impact of the Vietnam war on Cambodia, contrast R. B. Smith “Cambodia in the Context of SinoVietnamese Relations,” Asian Affairs 16 (1985): 281 and Ben Kiernan, “The Impact on Cambodia of the U.S. Intervention in Vietnam,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993), 216–229. 99. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 61. 100. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 56. 101. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 80. 102. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 55–62. 103. Zhai, “China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970–1975,” in Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 391. 104. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 699–700; Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 126. 105. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong, 700. 106. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 39. 107. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 212. 108. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 125–126. 109. Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxishi ziliao xuanbian vol. 5, 1229–1230. 110. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 126. 111. Lo Chikin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes (London: Routledge, 1989), 54. 112. Marwyn Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Meuthen, 1982), 99. 113. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 99. 114. Ibid. 115. Fravel, Strong Borders, 280. 116. Huang Guoan et al., Zhong Yue guanxi shijianbian (Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1986), 241–244; Li Deng, Xiao Li, and Wang Libing, Jianguo yilai junshi baizhuang dashi (Beijing: zhishi chubanshe, 1992), 261–263. 117. Fravel, Strong Borders, 280. 118. Ibid., 282; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 100–101. 119. Ibid., 283.

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199

120. Guo, eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 1949–1978 (xia), 907–909; Xiandai Zhong Yue vol. 5, 1250–1251. 121. The other group is the Amphirite group in the Northeast region of the Paracel Islands. Fravel, Strong Borders, 273. 122. Ibid., 272. 123. John Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,” China Quarterly 132 (Dec. 1992): 1003. 124. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 113. 125. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 61. 126. John Garver, “China’s Push,” 1005; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 107. 127. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 113. 128. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Collier Books, 1986), 21. 129. As cited in Ang, Ending the Vietnam War, 155. 130. As cited in ibid. 131. According to Hanoi, there were three betrayals perpetrated by the Chinese against the Vietnamese from 1954–79. The first was at Geneva in 1954; the second betrayal occurred from 1965–75, and was played out in China’s supposed undermining of the Vietnamese communists’ war against the United States; the third betrayal involved a combination of Chinese actions after 1975. These included China’s alleged use of economic, political and other means to undermine national construction in Vietnam after 1975. This was followed up by China’s assistance to Khmer Rouge military attacks on Vietnam, and China’s own border war with Vietnam in 1979. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 25, 60, 79, 82–83. 132. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 180–181. 133. Cited in Qiang Zhai, “China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,” China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 113. 134. See Seymour Topping, Journey Between Two Chinas (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 152. 135. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 21–25. 136. Li Deng et al., Jianguo yilai junshi baizhuang dashi (Beijing: zhishi chubanshe, 1992), 261–263. 137. On 31 Dec. 1973 Hanoi claimed that in 1955 the Chinese had laid railway tracks three hundred meters inside Vietnamese territory. 138. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 61. 139. Ibid. 140. Huang et al., Zhong Yue guanxi shijianbian, 242. 141. Ibid. 142. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 61. 143. Ibid. 144. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 114. 145. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 210. 146. Beijing Xinhua Yinshuachang Yinshua, Zhong Yue bianjie chongtu de zhenxiang (Beijing: renmin huoban chubanshe, 1979), 5.

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147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152.

153.

154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

168. 169. 170. 171. 172.

173. 174.

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Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 102; Garver, “China’s Push,” 1005. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 62. Chang, Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 28. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Truth, 57. Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian, 103. Even though they initially favored adherence to the Paris Peace Accords, once it was clear that the Agreement could not hold, the Soviets were not ambivalent about a Vietnamese communist victory. See discussion in this chapter; see also Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 198–100. “Speech by Comrade Chou En-lai,” Peking Review 16.23, 8 June 1973, 8; Daqian yinshua gongshi yinshua, Huanying Yuenan xieding de qianding (Xianggang: Xianggang sanlian shudian, 1973), 14. Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, 187–188. Ilya Gaiduk, “The Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1954–75,” cited in Peter Lowe, ed., The Vietnam War (Houndmills, Bastingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 149–150. See Zhou Enlai’s remarks to visiting North Vietnamese delegation in ibid., 187–188. The PRG was created in 1969 to act as a provisional government in South Vietnam. See Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy, 85–91. Gilks, Breakdown, 105. Guo et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 1949–1978 (xia), 820–825. Zhou Enlai waijiao dashiji, 693–694. Gilks, Breakdown, 121. Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a Vietcong (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985). Guo, eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi, 1084–1085. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 57. Duiker, China and Vietnam, 58. Ibid., 61. Cited in Gilks, Breakdown, 152. The Chinese Foreign Ministry account of Deng’s exchange with Le Duan is similar. See Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 62–63. Gilks, Breakdown, 125–126. Zhai, “China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970–1975,” in Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 392. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 126. Ibid., 129. Robert Horn, “Sino-Soviet Relations in an Era of Détente,” Asian Affairs (May/ June 1976): 287–304; Lesek Buszynski, Soviet Policy and Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986), 40–96. Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 336; Asselin, A Bitter Peace, 184; Huanying Yuenan xieding de qianding, 14. For a discussion of the unraveling of the Paris Peace Agreements, see Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 329–350; Gareth Porter, “The Paris Agreement and Revolutionary Strategy in South Vietnam,” in Zasloff and Brown, eds., Communism in Indochina, 57–78.

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175. Huanying Yuenan xieding de qianding. 176. Schulzinger, A Time for War, 314–327. 177. Ibid., 318–327; Duiker, Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 339–350. 5.

THE END OF AN “INDESTRUCTIBLE FRIENDSHIP”: SOVIET RESURGENCE AND THE TERMINATION OF THE SINO-VIETNAMESE ALLIANCE, 1975–1979

1.

Liu Shaoqi, in a speech at the Mass Rally in Da Binh Square, Hanoi, on 12 May 1963, characterized the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in the following terms: “Our friendship has a long history. It is a militant friendship, forged in the storm of revolution, a great class friendship that is proletarian internationalist in character, a friendship that is indestructible” (Joint Statement of Liu Shaoqi and President Ho Chi Minh [Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1963], 19). Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978 (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1999), 1. Robert McMahon, “What Difference Did It Make? Assessing the Vietnam War’s Impact on Southeast Asia,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 189–203. William Hyland, “The Sino-Soviet Conflict: The Search for New Strategies,” in Richard Solomon, ed., Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1979), 40. Thomas Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China’s Inner Asian Frontiers,” in John King Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 15:257. Harry Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk Taking Against China (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1982), vii. Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 24. Gelman, Soviet Far East Buildup, 65. See table detailing conventional force levels in Robinson, “China Confronts,” 297. See table detailing nuclear force levels in ibid., 300–301. Ibid. Ibid. Gelman, Soviet Far East Buildup, 75–78. Ibid. J. J. Martin, “Thinking About the Nuclear Balance in Asia,” in Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986), 62. Martin, “Thinking About the Nuclear Balance in Asia.” Ibid., 63–65. Ibid., 64. Paul F. Langer, “Soviet Military Power in Asia,” in Donald Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 269. Langer, “Soviet Military Power,” 269–270.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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202


21. 22. 23. 24.

Gelman, Soviet Far East Buildup, 75. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 125. Ibid., 77. Allan Cameron, “The Soviet Union and the Wars in Indochina,” in Walter Raymond Duncan, ed., Soviet Policy in Developing Countries (Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger, 1981), 63. Donald Zagoria, “Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World,” Foreign Affairs 57.4 (spring 1979): 737–739. The Soviet-Somali treaty was abrogated on 11 November 1977, after the Soviets provided the Ethiopians with military assistance. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978,187. Ibid., 186. Bruce Porter, The USSR in Third-World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 53. Porter, USSR in Third-World Conflicts, 54–56; Steven Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third-World Conflicts (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), 97–98. Porter, USSR in Third-World Conflicts, 55. Ibid., 29–30. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 186–189. Hosmer and Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third-World Conflicts, 81–88. “Big Exposure of Soviet Revisionists’ Colonial Expansion in Angola,” Peking Review 19.6, 6 Feb. 1976, 8–9. “Soviet Military Intervention Provokes World Indignation,” Peking Review 21.8, 24 Feb. 1978, 20–22. Hosmer and Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third-World Conflicts, 88–94. Ibid., 96–97. Lesek Buszynski, “The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia since the Fall of Saigon,” Asian Survey 21.5 (1981): 536. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 295–297; Buszynski, Soviet Policy and Southeast Asia, 49. Buszynski, Soviet Policy and Southeast Asia, 99. “Soviet Social-Imperialists Covet Southeast Asia: The ‘Asian Collective Security System’ Is a Pretext for Expansion,” Peking Review 17.33, 15 Aug. 1975, 20–21. Donald Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 70–71. “Soviet Social-Imperialists Covet Southeast Asia,” 21. Ibid. Xie, ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi, 1949–2001, 300–301. Ibid., 301. See table tracking Soviet gains vis-à-vis the Americans in various categories for 1969–1975 in ibid., 300. Robert Ross notes the danger of détente from the Chinese perspective: “The danger for China was clear—détente might well be the cover for a Soviet attempt to pressure China to end its opposition to Soviet foreign policy, and the U.S. interest in

25. 26.

27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

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49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

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continued stability might deter Washington from offsetting the Soviet threat”; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 29. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, rev. ed., 526. Jen Ku-ping, “What does the Situation Show One Year after the European Security Conference?,” Peking Review 19.32–33, 9 Aug. 1976, 11–13. I thank one of the reviewers for making this point. For an analysis of the literature and debate surrounding this issue see Robert J. Beck, “Munich’s Lessons Reconsidered,” International Security 14.2 (1989): 161–191; Gerhard Weinberg, “Munich After 50 Years,” Foreign Affairs 67.1 (fall 1988): 165–178. By 1974, it was clear to the Ford administration that détente was not serving as a constraint on the Soviet Union. See Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 76. Ibid., 92–119. Ibid., 120–125. Alan Day, ed., China and the Soviet Union, 1949–84 (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1985), 129. Sun, Zhong Su guanxi shimo, 632. Day, ed., China and the Soviet Union, 130. Ibid. Ibid. “Soviet-Social Imperialism: The Most Dangerous Source of World War,” Peking Review 20.29, 15 July 1977, 4–10, 21. Sun, Zhong Su guanxi shimo, 637–638. Day, ed., China and the Soviet Union, 133. Ibid., 133–134. Ibid., 134. Ibid. Cited in ibid. Cited in ibid., 135. For further discussion on President Carter’s movement toward an increasingly adversarial view of the Soviet Union and the role of his national security advisor in supporting that shift, see Cecile Menetrey-Monchau, “The Changing Post-War U.S. Strategy in Indochina,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 71– 75; Zbigniew Brezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983). Saigon fell to the Vietnamese Communists on 30 April 1975. Sagar, Major Political Events in Indo-China. Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations, 60, 194. Ibid., 194. Ibid., 60. Ibid. Varying estimates of Soviet aid to Vietnam can be found in ibid., 190. Quoted figures are cited in Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 135. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Douglas Pike, “The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Southeast Asia,” in Herbert Ellison, ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), 200.

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78. Romania and Poland objected to Vietnam’s admission, arguing that it would be an economic burden to the organization. See also Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 211. 79. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 129–133. 80. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 209–211. 81. Ibid., 211; Pike, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, 131. 82. Ibid., 123. 83. Ibid., 126. 84. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Collier, 1986), 257. 85. The existing literature on Vietnamese-Laotian relations is consistent with the view that the Vietnamese consider Laos as a legitimate sphere of Vietnamese influence. See MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930–1985 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 243–267; Peter F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 176–177. 86. It should be noted that as far as the Vietnamese-Cambodian relationship is concerned, the power-based sphere of influence argument above is at odds with the political cultural thesis proposed by Stephen Morris. Morris argues that: “Vietnamese ambition for direct imperial domination [over Cambodia] did not derive simply from the fact that it was more powerful than Cambodia. . . . The Vietnamese desire for direct control over Cambodia can be explained only insofar as it has been derived from cultural impulses. . . . Broadly speaking, a particular historically unique and complex [Vietnamese] political culture, not any purportedly universal motives of states, determined the objectives of Vietnamese state policy” (Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 234–235). 87. Porter, “Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis,” in Elliot, ed., The Third Indochina Conflict, 106. 88. MacAlister Brown, “The Indochinese Federation Idea,” in Joseph J. Zasloff ed., Postwar Indochina: Old Enemies and New Allies (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1988), 85. 89. Brown, “The Indochinese Federation Idea,” 89. 90. Ibid., 79. 91. Cited in Douglas Pike, “Communist vs. Communist in Southeast Asia,” International Security 4.1 (1979): 30. 92. Brown, “The Indochinese Federation Idea,” 81. 93. Cited in Chanda, Brother Enemy, 123. 94. Pike, “Communist vs. Communist,” 81. 95. William Duiker, “China and Vietnam and the Struggle for Indochina,” in Zasloff, ed., Postwar Indochina, 157. 96. Cited in Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia. 97. In the 1975–1978 period, Vietnamese leader Le Duan visited Moscow five times. Le visited Moscow in Aug. 1975, Feb. 1976, Oct. 1977, June 1978, and again in Nov. 1978 to sign the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty. In contrast, he visited Beijing two times, once in

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98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116.

117. 118. 119.

120. 121. 122. 123.

124. 125. 126.

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Sept. 1975 and again in Nov. 1977. On both occasions, the customary reciprocal farewell banquet was not held by the Vietnamese. See Ross, Indochina Tangle, 65, 149. Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese. Cited in Gilks, Breakdown, 159. Alexander Woodside, “Nationalism and Poverty in the Breakdown of SinoVietnamese Relations,” Pacific Affairs 52.3 (1979): 386 For developments leading up to the takeover of Saigon see Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 329–350; For a translation of the Vietnamese communists’ account of the military aspects of this period see Pribbenow, trans., Victory in Vietnam. Ye Jianying’s speech can be found in Guo et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao (xia), 917–920. Cited in Ross, Indochina Tangle, 49. Guo et al., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao (xia), 927–931. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 63. Guo et al., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao (xia), 950–962. Cited in Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 171–173. Guo et al., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao (xia), 956. Ibid., 960. Ibid., 959. Ibid., 960–961. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 109; Chang, Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 29. Chang, Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 28. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 65. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 153. Another economic agreement was signed on 18 Dec. 1975. The October agreement was for long-term ten-year aid while the December agreement was for economic aid and technical assistance. Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 128. Yuenan wenti ziliao xuanbian, 1975–1986, vol. 1, 26–32. Ibid. Beijing xinhua yinshuachang yinshua, Zhong Yue bianjie chongtu de zhenxiang (Beijing: renmin huoban chuban, 1979), 3–4; Huang et al., Zhong Yue guanxi shijianbian, 246–247. Zhong Yue bianjie chongtu, 3–4. Chanda, Brother Enemy, 182–185. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 89–92. At the Congress, the Vietnamese Worker’s Party name was changed to the Vietnamese Communist Party. William Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon (Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, 1980), 17. Huang et al., Zhong Yue guanxi shijianbian, 247. Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon, 17; Ross, Indochina Tangle, 93. Huang Wen Huan (with editorial assistance from Hou Hanjiang and Wen Zhuang), ed., Canghai yisu: Huang Wenhuan geming huiyi lu (Beijing: jiefangjun chubanshe,

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206

127. 128. 129.

130. 131.

132. 133. 134. 135. 136.

137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156.

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1987), 322–328. Le Duan was promoted from first secretary to secretary-general. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 93. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 93. Ibid., 120–122. It should be noted that Hanoi was also pursuing the option of obtaining aid from the U.S. as well as normalizing diplomatic relations with Washington. See Cecile Menetrey-Monchau, “The Changing Post-War U.S. Strategy in Indochina,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 71–75. Ibid., 128. See Zhong Yue bianjie chongtu, 1–12. The full transcript of the meeting was subsequently published in English in the Beijing Review after the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979: “Memorandum on Vice Premier Li Xiannian’s Talks with Pham Vandong,” Beijing Review 22.13, 30 March 1979, 17–22. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 129. “Memorandum on Vice Premier Li Xiannian’s Talks with Pham Vandong,” Beijing Review 22.13, 30 March 1979, 22. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 131–132. Ibid., 132. The treaty was signed on the 17 July 1977. For analysis of Vietnam’s relationship with Laos see Carlyle Thayer, “Laos and Vietnam: The Anatomy of a ‘Special Relationship,’ ” in Martin Stuart-Fox, ed., Contemporary Laos (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), 245–374. Huang Hua, “Problems with Indochina, Albania and Yugoslavia,” in Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds, 270–271. Ibid., 272. In September 1977 and again in January 1978, China supplied Cambodia with military equipment. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 156–157. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 55–68. Ibid., 56. Edward C. O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War (New York: Routledge, 2007), 34. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 35. Ibid., 35–36 Ross, Indochina Tangle, 133. As cited in Ross, Indochina Tangle, 135. Ibid., 134. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 36. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 136. Ibid. Ibid. Cited in ibid., 135. Cited in ibid. Ibid., 136–137. Sagar, Major Political Events in Indo-China, 132. David Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party? Notes and Comments,” Pacific Affairs 56.2 (summer 1983): 288–300.

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157. Eero Palmujoki, Vietnam and the World: Marxist-Leninist Doctrine and the Changes in International Relations, 1975–93 (London: Macmillan, 1997), 94. 158. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 148. 159. Ibid., 134. 160. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 36. 161. Interview with Professor Karl Jackson (Johns Hopkins University) in Washington, D.C., in April 2005. Jackson was a participant in Central Intelligence Agency discussions with academics on Vietnamese intentions with respect to Cambodia. 162. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 157. 163. Ibid., 158. 164. Cited in Christopher E. Goscha, “Vietnam, the Third Indochina War, and the Meltdown of Asian Internationalism,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 174. 165. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 159. 166. Ibid. 167. Cited ibid., 160. 168. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978, 66–67; Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 184–185. 169. Wang, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 66. 170. Ibid. However, some agreements were reached during this period. On 3 Nov. 1978 and 10 Jan. 1979, agreements were signed on science and technology as well as goods and payment. 171. Ibid., 67. 172. Guo et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 970. 173. Hsin Ping, “Drawing Together Under Moscow’s Pressure,” Xinhua, Nov. 1977, in FBIS-PRC, 21 Nov. 1977, A3–A5. 174. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 160–161. 175. Ibid. 176. Stephen Herder, “The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict,” Southeast Asian Affairs 1979 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, 1979), 176–185; Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 85. 177. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 36. 178. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 156. 179. Ibid. 180. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 188–189. 181. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 158, 162. 182. Ibid., 163. 183. Ibid. 184. Duiker, China and Vietnam, 78. 185. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 201. 186. Ibid. 187. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 179. 188. Commentary, “Why Is the Soviet Union Spreading Lies and Slanders On the Incident of Armed Conflicts in Kampuchea?” Xinhua, 19 Jan. 1978, FBIS-PRC, A8–A9. This article is reproduced in King, ed., China and the Three Worlds, 283–285.

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189. For a review of China’s policy ethnic Chinese living outside of China, and Southeast Asia in particular, see Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005). 190. Duiker, Roots of Conflict, 73–74. 191. Ibid., 74. 192. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 195. 193. Ibid., 177. 194. Ibid., 197. 195. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 181. 196. Ibid. 197. Ibid. 198. Ibid., 184. 199. Cited in ibid., 187. 200. Guo et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 999–1000. 201. Porter, “Vietnamese Policy,” in Elliot, ed., Third Indochina Conflict, 113. 202. Interview between Vietnamese Communist defector Bui Tin and Steven Morris. Cited in Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 108. 203. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 189. 204. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 212. 205. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 193. 206. Ibid., 207–208. 207. Guo et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 1094; Ross, Indochina Tangle, 187. 208. The first curtailment was in February 1977; the second was in June 1977; and the third was in November 1977. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 102–103, 150. 209. Ibid., 193. 210. Qu, Zhongguo waijiao, 430–432. 211. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 189. 212. Yuenan wenti zhiliao xuanbian, 1975–1986, vol. 1, 134–135, 137. 213. Ibid., 134–137. 214. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 108. 215. Ibid., 109. 216. Ibid., 213–215; Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 184–187. 217. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 38. 218. A Chinese account of Deng’s visit can be found in Xie, ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi, 1949–2001, 314–315. 219. Ross, Indochina Tangle, 221–222. 220. For further examination of Deng’s discussions with Thai prime minister Kriangsak Chamanand that relies on Vietnamese accounts see Christopher E. Goscha, “Vietnam, the Third Indochina War, and the Meltdown of Asian Internationalism,” in Westad and Quinn-Judge, eds., Third Indochina War, 178–179. 221. Guo et al., eds., Xiandai Zhong Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 1014. 222. Ibid., 1020–1021. 223. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 39.

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224. 225. 226. 227.

228.

229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245.

246. 247. 248. 249. 250.

251.

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209

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Brezinski, Power and Principle, 409. What exactly the “lesson” the Chinese meant to teach the Vietnamese in military terms was not spelled out in any detail, and was ambiguous. On this point, see King Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987), 95; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 142. Duiker, “Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War,” 88; Duiker, China and Vietnam, 92–93; Hood, Dragons Entangled, xvi, 158; Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship” in Gardner and Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam, 138. Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations, 123. This section draws heavily from recent research on the Third Indochina War. See O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, and Zhang, “China’s 1979 War.” Chanda, Brother Enemy, 261. Zhang, “China’s 1979 War,” 857. Ibid. Ibid., 858. Ibid., 860. Ibid. O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 48. Ibid., 58–60. Ibid., 61–63. Ibid., 55–58, 74–88. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 863. Duiker, China and Vietnam, 89. Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18.4 (spring 1988): 619. Waltz, “Origins of War,” 619–620. Note that we are now using Waltz’s theory as a theory of foreign policy. See Elman, “Horses for Courses.” Waltz himself disagrees with such an interpretation of his theory. See Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6.1 (1996): 54–57. Waltz, “Origins of War,” 620. Richard Betts, “Vietnam’s Strategic Predicament,” Survival 37.3 (1995): 61–81. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 16, 88–115. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 119–143. For a detailed discussion of ASEAN’s response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia see Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), 89–121. Bernard K. Gordon, “The Third Indochina Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 65.1 (fall 1986): 66–87; Jeffrey Race and William Turley, “The Third Indochina War,” Foreign Policy 38 (1980): 92–116.

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252. Cited in Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts, 33. 253. For a critique of the concept of strategic culture see Jack Snyder, “The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor,” in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/ USSR (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), 3–9. 254. John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of Chinese Military experience,” in Frank Kiernan and John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1974), 6–7, 11, 25. 255. See copious citations of such literature in notes 12 through 21 in Johnston, “China’s Militarized Intestate Dispute Behavior,” 6–7. 256. Drawing on the results of a detailed analysis of the Seven Military Classics in which he uses cognitive mapping and symbolic analysis, Johnston concludes that for operational purposes, Chinese strategic culture is actually more appropriately characterized as a parabellum or hard realpolitik one. (“Parabellum” stands for the wellknown concept “si pacem para bellum,” translated as “if you want peace, prepare for war.”) 257. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 216. 258. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 107. 259. Johnston, “China’s Militarized Intestate Dispute Behavior 1949–92,” 1–30. 260. Ibid., 28. 261. Ibid., 8. 262. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 27–32. 263. Moreover, as one strategic culture advocate admits, “Clear, irrefutable proof of a causal link between strategic culture and deployment of armed force, however, is probably impossible” (ibid., 38). 264. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, 232. 265. Ibid., 206. 266. In particular see, Allen Whiting, “The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People’s Republic of China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 402 (July 1972): 57. 267. See Whiting, Chinese Calculus, 233–235; Steven Chan, “Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessments from a Perspective of Conflict Management,” World Politics 2 (1978): 405–409. 268. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, 236–244. 269. Johnston, “China’s Militarized Intestate Dispute Behavior,” 8; Thomas Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security 17 (summer 1992): 122–154; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Allen Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” International Security 26 (fall 2001): 103–131. 270. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 96–117. With respect to the specific military objective vis-à-vis Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping was ambiguous. See ibid., 95. 271. Mann, About Face, 100. 272. However, as Harlan Jencks has noted: “Although the attack was to be limited, the Chinese initially did not define just what the limits were. About a week after the in-

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273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279.

280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285.

286.

287. 288.

289. 290. 291. 292.

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vasion began, as it became clear that the PLA would not win the anticipated lightning victory, Vice-Premier Wang Zhen disclosed that Chinese forces would not go into the Red River Delta” (Harlan W. Jencks, “Lessons of a ‘Lesson’: China-Vietnam, 1979,” in Stephanie Neumann and Robert Harkavy, eds., The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World [Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985], 1:140). Qu, Zhongguo waijiao, 435. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 126. Cited in James Mulvenon, “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1979 SinoVietnamese Border War,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 16 (fall 1995): 78. Cited in Mulvenon, “Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” 79. Cited in ibid., 73. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 126. Ibid., 79. The Chinese were also making a virtue out of necessity. As Jencks notes, at the time of the 1979 war, the PLA only had one operational surface to air missile, the CSA-1. The range of that weapon is 50 kilometers. Jencks, “Lessons of a ‘Lesson’: China-Vietnam, 1979,” in Neumann and Harkavy, eds., Lessons of Recent Wars, 144. Xinhua, 17 Feb. 1979, in FBIS, PRC, 21 Feb. 1979, A5–A7; Also see Mulvenon, “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” 73, n. 21. Li Deng et al., eds., Jianguoyilai junshi baizhuang dashi (Beijing: Zhishi chubanshe, 1992), 280–290. Cited in Mulvenon, “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” 78. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, 233–234. Duiker, China and Vietnam, 86. See O’Dowd, Last Maoist War, 45–88; Chen, China’s War With Vietnam, 116–117; Gerald Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 211–230; Jencks, “Lessons of a ‘Lesson’: China-Vietnam, 1979,” in Neumann and Harkavy, eds., Lessons of Recent Wars, 139–160. For a more positive Chinese account see Li Deng et al., Jianguoyilai junshi baizhuang dashi, 280–284. These provincial capitals were: Lai Chau, Lao Cai, Ha Giang, Cao Bang, and, most significantly, Lang Son. See Jencks, “Lessons of a ‘Lesson’: China-Vietnam, 1979,” in Neumann and Harkavy, eds., Lessons of Recent Wars, 144. As Chen King notes, there are several conflicting accounts of the casualties sustained. For Chen’s assessment see Chen, China’s War With Vietnam, 113–115. Zhang cites a Western source as listing the number of killed in the region of 25,000 soldiers with a further 37,000 wounded. Zhang, “China’s 1979 War,” 866. Ross notes that “the (Chinese) casualty rate was very high, especially for such a brief conflict–at least 10,000 and as many as 40,000 Chinese died in the three-week war” (Ross, Indochina Tangle, 232). Ibid., 867. Douglas Pike, PAVN: The People’s Army of Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986). Jencks, “Lessons of a ‘Lesson’: China-Vietnam, 1979,” in Neumann and Harkavy, eds., Lessons of Recent Wars, 144. Ibid., 157.

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293. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, 167. 294. Gilks, Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 131 295. Adam Ulam has described Soviet foreign policy in this period as one of “expansion behind the facade of détente.” Adam Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 154. 296. “Joint Statement of Liu Shaoqi and President Ho Chi Minh,” 19. 297. The Soviet Treaty with Afghanistan was signed on 5 Dec. 1978. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 996. 6.


1.

The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty that was signed in Moscow in 1950 was valid for thirty years. Thus, while the Sino-Soviet conflict had rendered the alliance treaty null and void by the early 1960s, from a legal perspective, the treaty remained in effect until 1980. For a relatively recent reassessment of the Sino-Soviet alliance from 1945 until 1963 see Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–63 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998). See also Li Danhui, ed., Beijing yu Mosike: Cong lianmeng zouxiang duikang (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002). Thus, Zbigniew Brzezinski has declared that: “The [Sino-Soviet] dispute stands out as the most monumental failure of the capacity of the Communist ideology to create a stable international order, thereby refuting one of the most cherished utopias of committed Communists. Moreover, the specific conduct of the two principal Communist parties did not provide the other ruling Communist leaderships with an edifying example of how to overcome their own national prejudices for the sake of proletarian internationalism” (Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, 2nd ed. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967], 432). See for example, Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Westad, Brothers in Arms; Priscilla Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); and Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972–79 (London: Routledge, 2006). Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1. The literature on Cold War Alliance politics is still disproportionately focused on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. See for example, Mastny’s review of the literature on Cold War alliance politics. Vojtech Mastny, “Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (2005): 149–177. Laos is contiguous with China and Vietnam. William Duiker, “Understanding the Sino-Vietnamese War,” Problems of Communism 37 (Nov.–Dec. 1989): 84–88; Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict, (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986), 92–93; Steven J. Hood, Dragons

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

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6. WHEN ALLIES BECOME ENEMIES

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23. 24.

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Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1992), xvi, 158; Qiang Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV During the Vietnam War,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 138. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 109. Ibid., 120–122. Ibid., 180–181. It should be noted that between 1970–78, the Chinese assisted the Laotians in building roads in Northern Laos; ibid. Quan Yanshi and Du Weidong, Gongheguo mishi (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1990), 250–251. R. B. Smith, “Cambodia in the Context of Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” Asian Affairs 16 (1985): 273–287. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 192. Ibid., 190–192. Stephen Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 65–66. See Mastny, “Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?” Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (New York: Viking, 1978), 22. One example of this dynamic can be seen in Sino-Indonesian relations during the early 1960s. In a letter to Mao in Oct. 1963 during the period of the nine Chinese polemics against the Soviets (between 6 Sept. 1963 and 14 July 1964), Indonesian leader Sukarno urged the Chinese leader to resolve the Sino-Soviet dispute by means of negotiations. Mao summarized Sukarno’s advice as being consistent with the principle of “striking enemies while being in harmony with one’s allies [duiyi xuhe, duidi xuda].” The Chinese leader claimed to be in agreement with Sukarno on this principle and that China was committed to strengthening the Sino-Soviet alliance. However, contrary to his stated views in the letter to Sukarno, Mao saw neither virtue nor merit in compromise with the Soviets. Mao refers to the contents of Sukarno’s letter in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987–1998), vol. 10, 421–422. Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960). Wang ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969, 35. Another Chinese estimate places the total value of its economic and military aid to Hanoi during the Vietnam War period at $200 million. See Deng Lifeng, “Huan Yue kang Mei shulue,” in Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu 9.1 (2002): 92. Zhang Xiaoming, “The Vietnam War: A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Military History 60.4 (1996): 759. Thus, VCP secretary-general Le Duan declared in May 1975 that: “The victory of Viet Nam, therefore, is not only a victory of national independence and socialism in Viet Nam, but also has a great international significance, and an epoch-making character. It has upset the global strategy of US imperialism” (Le Duan, Selected Writings [Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977], 534).

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25. Donald Zagoria, “Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World America and Russia: The Rules of the Game,” Foreign Affairs 57.4 (1979): 733–754; Steven Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982); Bruce Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 26. Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 139. 27. Ibid. 28. Guo, ed., Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 114. 29. Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19.1 (1994): 96–98. 30. Sheldon W. Simon, “China, Vietnam and the Politics of Polarization,” Asian Survey 19.12 (1979): 1711–1188. For a detailed discussion of ASEAN’s response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia see Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), 89–121. 31. William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964); Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–65 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967). 32. Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy 2 (1971): 161–182; Lewis W. Snider, “Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where Do We Begin?,” Comparative Political Studies 20.3 (Oct. 1987): 314–356. 33. Huang Wen Huan, Canghai yisu: Huang Wenhuan geming huiyillu (Beijing: jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987), 209. 34. Keohane, “Big Influence.” 35. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 58. 36. Li Danhui, “Zhong Su zai yuan Yue kang Mei wenti shang de maodun yu chongtu,” 413, in Niu Jun and Zhang Baijia, eds., Lengzhan yu Zhongguo (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002). 37. For further elaboration on this point see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 78; Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly 39 (1995): 405–425; Douglas M. Gibler and John A. Vasquez, “Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495–1980,” International Studies Quarterly 42.4 (1998): 785–807. 38. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). 39. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 40. Conversation between Mao Zedong and E. F. Hill on 28 Nov. 1968, document no. 2 in Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1969,” CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998): 159. 41. Lyle Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” China Quarterly 168 (2001): 985–997.

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42. Victor M. Gobarev, “Soviet Policy Toward China: Developing Nuclear Weapons, 1949–1969,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12.4 (1999): 1–53; Lyle Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969,” Political Science Quarterly 118.1 (2003): 53–79; Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island.” 43. As cited in Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?,” 62. 44. Douglas Pike, “Communist vs. Communist in Southeast Asia.” International Security 4.1 (1979): 20–38. 45. Michael Chambers, “ ‘The Chinese and the Thais are Brothers’: The Evolution of the Sino-Thai Friendship,” Journal of Contemporary China 14 (2005): 599–629. 46. Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 208. 47. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29.3 (2004/2005): 64–99. 48. Timothy Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain,” Security Studies 17.1 (2008): 1–38. 49. Womack, China and Vietnam, 208. 50. Yun Sui, Chushi qiguo jishi: Jiangjun dashi Wangyouping (Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1995), 249. 51. “Brezhnev Pays a Visit to Tashkent,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press 34.12, 21 April 1982, 6. 52. Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 76. 53. “Brezhnev Speaks at Ceremony in Baku,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press 34.39, 27 Oct. 1982, 4. 54. Wishnick, Mending Fences, 76. 55. Ibid., 78. 56. Ibid., 77. 57. Ibid., 82. 58. Ibid., 79. 59. Chanda, Brother Enemy, 379. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., 394. 62. The Cambodian coalition government was formed on 22 June 1992 at the encouragement of ASEAN. It was headed by Prince Sihanouk and included three Khmer resistance groups: the group led by Prince Sihanouk; Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. 63. Chanda, Brother Enemy, 394. 64. Wishnick, Mending Fences, 98–101. 65. For an overview of Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev era see William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 252–292. 66. Lesek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), 64–65. 67. Ibid., 66. 68. Ibid., 67.

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69. “Gorbachev Accents Soviet Role in Asia,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 38.30, 1986, 1–8, 32. For an analysis of divisions within the Soviet Union on the appropriate policy toward China and Vietnam see Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 69–71. 70. “Gorbachev Accents,” 8, 32. See Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 137. 71. For further details see John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1993), 307. 72. “Gorbachev Accents,” 8. 73. Cited in Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 75. 74. Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization, 239–240. 75. Wishnick, Mending Fences, 102. 76. Following the preliminary agreement on the eastern section in 1987, a comprehensive agreement on the eastern section of the border was signed in 1991. An agreement on the western section was signed in 1994. Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1997), 49, 53. 77. Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 138. 78. Wishnick, Mending Fences, 102–103. 79. Robert Ross, “China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy,” Asian Survey 31.12 (Dec. 1991): 1177. 80. Ross, “China and the Cambodian Peace Process,” 1174. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid., 1176. 83. Wishnick, Mending Fences, 104–105; “Sino-Soviet Communiqué,” in “Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to China, 15–18 May 1989” (Moscow: Novosti, 1989), 60–64. 84. In Nathan and Ross’ characterization, Gorbachev’s visit “formally ended the SinoSoviet conflict” (Nathan and Ross, Great Wall, 50). 85. It should also be noted that the practical politics of achieving a national reconciliation in Cambodia required at least some Khmer Rouge involvement. Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 84–85, 123, 127. 86. Essentially this meant that there was a quadripartite interim ruling authority in Cambodia before United Nations sponsored elections were to be held. This authority included the pro-Vietnamese People’s Republic of Kampuchea led by Hun Sen. The other three elements were previously united under the CGDK coalition. They included Son Sann’s KPNLF, elements loyal to Prince Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge; ibid., 88. 87. See Quinn-Judge, “Vietnam’s Cambodia Decade,” 226. 88. Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 122. 89. Ibid., 123. 90. Ibid., 123–124. 91. Ibid., 124. 92. Womack, China and Vietnam, 207. 93. Troung Chinh took over but was replaced by Nguyen Van Linh in Dec. 1986. Hood, Dragons Entangled, 78. 94. Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 79–82, 85–86.

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95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114.

115. 116.

117.

118. 119. 120.

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Ibid., 88. Womack, China and Vietnam, 203. Ibid., 207; Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 138. Ibid., 138. Womack, China and Vietnam, 206. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), 79. Ibid., 131. The following units were returned to the Soviet Union: A company of naval infantry with its logistical equipment; an entire squadron of MIG-23s; 8 Tu-16 Badger Bombers; 2 Tu-95s and 2 Tu-142Fs. Soviet submarines were also withdrawn. Relatedly, flights between Vladivostok and Cam Ranh dipped. Ibid. Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, 89–98. Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations, 197; Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization, 240. Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations, 197. Ibid. While research for this chapter did not reveal any “smoking gun” quotes, it is plausible that once Soviet preferences on Vietnamese military retrenchment in Cambodia were known to the leadership in Hanoi, the high level of economic dependence of the Vietnamese economy on the Soviet Union may have served as an extra incentive to retrench. Ibid. Nayan Chanda, “Summit in the Offing,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 Oct. 1988, 17–18. Womack, China and Vietnam, 207. Ibid., 208. Ibid. Hood, Dragons Entangled. One observer observes that in the early 1980s “the Vietnamese definitely had ambitious long term plans for economic integration” with Cambodia. Quinn-Judge, “Vietnam’s Cambodia Decade,” 217. Ibid., 225. For an analysis of the Beijing summit see Carlyle Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest,” Asian Survey 43.6 (1994): 522–524. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” 523. This is an application of the general argument found in Geir Lundestad, “ ‘Imperial Overstretch,’ Mikhail Gorbachev, and the End of the Cold War,” Cold War History 1.1 (2000): 1–20. See also William Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 19.3 (1995): 96. Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Economic Constraints and the End of the Cold War,” in William Wohlforth, ed., Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 273–309. Zubok, A Failed Empire, 299. Ibid. Of course, the Soviets also viewed the Chinese as ideological revisionists.

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121. The nine polemics were issued by the Chinese between 6 Sept. 1963 and 14 July 1964. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origin of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961–1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 361. 122. “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and ourselves—Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1) September 6, 1963,” cited in Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, 398–399. 123. Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, 8. 124. Ibid. 125. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift; Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations. 126. This conclusion applies also to the Third Indochina War. As Sophie Quinn-Judge has observed: “For all the Communist parties involved in the Third Indochina conflict, national interests took precedence over internationalist socialist solidarity” (QuinnJudge, “Vietnam’s Cambodia Decade,” 211). 127. See Richard Lowenthal, “The Degeneration of an Ideological Dispute,” in Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, eds., China, the Soviet Union and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions (Boulder: Westview, 1982), 59. 128. The concepts of bandwagoning and balancing are used by Waltz to describe opposite behaviors. Bandwagoning means to join the stronger side, while balancing means to join the weaker side. Waltz notes: “If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would not see balances forming but a world of hegemony formed. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning is the behavior induced by the system” (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126). 129. In Waltz’s own words, “balances of power recurrently form” (ibid., 128). 130. Ibid., 106, 127–128. 131. Bo, “The Making of the ‘Leaning to One Side Decision.’ ” 132. Gareth Porter, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 133. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 134. Deborah Kaple, “Soviet Advisors in China in the 1950s,” in Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms, 117–140. 135. See Sergei N. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), for Article 1 of the treaty text, located on pages 260–261. 136. Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 137. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 7–30. 138. David Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); For an excellent discussion on why a Sino-U.S. rapprochement was not possible in the second-half of the 1940s see John Garver, “Little Chance,” Diplomatic History 21.1 (winter 1997): 87–94.

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139. Westad, Decisive Encounters, 168, 232. 140. Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 141. Niu, “The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” in Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms, 47–89. 142. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 110–129. 143. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu; Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners. 144. John Lewis Gaddis, “The American ‘Wedge’ Strategy, 1949–1955,” in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Assessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 157–183. See also Jeffrey Engel, “Of Fat and Thin Communists: Diplomacy and Philosophy in Western Economic Warfare Strategies toward China (and Tyrants Broadly),” Diplomatic History 29.3 (2005): 445–474. 145. Thus, Jeffrey Engel notes that: “Embargos work best if widely enforced, yet Washington’s incessant efforts to make others toe the American line in this arena ultimately strained relations with its closest allies and proved particularly damaging to the Anglo-American special relationship” (Engel, “Of Fat and Thin Communists,” 447). 146. For Stalin’s view on the respective roles of the Soviet Union and China in Europe and Asia respectively see Gaddis, We Now Know, 67. 147. Garver notes: “Much more of Asia would probably have been subjected to the rigors of the Marxist-Leninist experiment without U.S. containment of revolutionary China in the 1950s.” John Garver, “Polemics, Paradigms, Responsibility, and the Origins of the U.S.-PRC Confrontation in the 1950s,” Journal of American East Asian Relations 3.1 (1994): 21. 148. Soviet interests in pursuing such a policy are described in Allen Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” in Fairbank and MacFarquhar, eds., Cambridge History of China, 14:478–538; Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms. 149. Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” International Organization 49.1 (1995): 48. 150. Avery Goldstein, “Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China’s National Experience,” in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results) (London: Cass, 1993), 213–255. 151. Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 169. 152. Buszynski, Soviet Policy and Southeast Asia, 41–44. 153. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 44–74; Yang, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” 21–52. 154. A similar dynamic occurred in Sino-American relations. Even though the U.S. was an ideological threat in the post–World War Two period, it was only in 1950, when the Americans became a strategic threat by intervening in the Korean Peninsula that they became China’s principal enemy. 155. Roger Kanet, “The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for ‘Wars of National Liberation,’ ” Cold War History 6.3 (2006): 336–352.

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156. David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27.4 (2003): 57–85. 157. MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 10. 158. Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 1, 345–352. 159. Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia; Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia; Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy; Ross, Indochina Tangle. 160. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies; Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000); Robert Ross, “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23.4 (1999): 96; Bruce Gilley and Andrew Nathan, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, rev. ed. (New York: New York Review Books, 2003), 5. 161. Harding, A Fragile Relationship. 162. David Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989– 2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 163. John Garver, Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 164. Lampton, Same Bed. 165. Michael Pillsbury notes that the Chinese leadership “has had an almost unchanging assessment of an ‘inevitable’ multipolar future” (Pillsbury, China Debates, xxiv–xxv). 166. Thus, one anonymous diplomat from an unnamed ASEAN state that remained quiescent during the crisis noted the lesson to be drawn at the time of the incident: “This new incident shows that even with all its problems we still need the United States, Basically, our choice is between a hegemon in Washington or a hegemon in Beijing. We’re still choosing the U.S.A.” (John Pomfret, “Jiang Caught in Middle in Standoff,” Washington Post, 8 April 2001, 1). 167. For an assessment of the George W. Bush administration’s Asian policy see T. J. Pempel, “How Bush Bungled Asia: Militarism, Economic Indifference, and Unilateralism Have Weakened the United States Across Asia,” Pacific Review 21.2 (2008): 547–581. For a response (and counterresponse) see Michael J. Green, “The United States and Asian After Bush,” Pacific Review 21.5 (2008): 583–594; T. J. Pempel, “A Response to Michael Green,” Pacific Review 21.5 (2008): 595–600. 168. Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 29.1 (2005–2006): 119–130. 169. Ashley Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship,” International Security 30.4 (2006): 113–151; Sumit Ganguly and Dinshaw Mistry, “The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,” World Policy Journal 23.2 (summer 2006): 12. 170. For a concise summary of the Japanese view of China’s rise see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 136–143, 190. 171. Author’s interview in New York in June 2005 with professor from the Foreign Affairs University (Beijing).

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172. Barry Wain, “A David-and-Goliath Tussle,” Far Eastern Economic Review 167.31, 5 Aug. 2004), 20–21; Jason Leow, “China Signals Free Trade Area Talks May Face Setbacks,” Straits Times, 4 Aug. 2004. 173. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 247–280. 174. Nick Bisley, “Securing the Anchor of Regional Stability? The Transformation of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance and East Asian Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30.1 (2008): 73–98. 175. Chinese feelings on the Taiwan issue, and its reaction to the implicit Japanese role in preserving the status quo that maintains Taiwan’s separation from mainland China, can be seen in former Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing’s comments to his Japanese counterpart in 2005. “I would like to say calmly to Japan, the Taiwan issue is a domestic affair and a matter of life or death to us. It is dangerous to touch China’s matter of life or death” (Howard French and Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan’s Rivalry with China Is Stirring a Crowded Sea,” New York Times, 11 Sept. 2005, 4). 176. David Kang, China Rising: Peace Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 79–93. 177. For an important critique of power transition theory as applied to the literature on China’s rise. See Jack Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 11–33. 178. Ross, “Balancing in East Asia,” 283–286. 179. Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 29.1 (2005): 145–167. 180. Cited in Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 140. 181. For an extensive review of China’s economy since 1949 see Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 182. That is how Raymond Aron characterized the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), xxi, 138, 282. 183. After initial disagreeing that the post–Cold War system was unipolar, Kenneth Waltz has come to that conclusion. See Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18.2 (1993): 37; Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25.1 (200): 27. 184. Scholars still debate whether the Cold War was stable. The stability of bipolarity is one of the core arguments made by Kenneth Waltz; see Waltz, Theory. For an alternative view of bipolarity see Dale Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,” in Benjamin Frankel, eds., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Cass, 1996), 29–89. 185. The term “peaceful rise” was adopted in 2003, and then dropped in spring 2004 in favor of “peaceful development.” See Evan S. Medeiros and Bonnie S. Glaser, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise,’ ” China Quarterly 190 (2007): 291–310.

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adversary prism, 101 Afghanistan: Geneva Accords on, 149; as obstacle in Sino-Soviet rapprochement, 146, 148, 149; Soviets and, 106, 125, 136, 149, 212n297 Africa, Soviet Union and, 106–107 aid to Khmer Rouge: by China, 100, 126, 131, 140, 147, 206n139; by North Vietnam, 93, 198n97 aid to Laos, by China, 74, 138, 213n12 aid to South Vietnam, by China, 98–99 aid to Third World by Soviets, 106–109 aid to Vietnamese communists by China: air support denied, 43, 182n231; amount of aid given, 1, 29–30, 31, 74, 178n147, 213n22; committees for coordination of, 28–29, 178n141; competition with Soviets and, 27–28, 141; conditioned on rejection of Soviet aid, 32–33; as deterrent to U.S. ground invasion of North Vietnam, 28, 30–32, 70, 141, 178– 179n152, 182n240; economy of China

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and, 142; exploitation by Vietnam of Sino-Soviet conflict, 143–144, 166n15; as ill-suited for operational requirements, 25; increased as strategy to end Vietnam War, 74; military aid, 28–29, 30–32, 43, 56, 64, 74, 141, 182n231, 186n74; needed by Hanoi, 62, 188n142; as percentage of overall aid, 177n121; reduced in response to alignment with Soviets, 112, 126, 208n208; reduced in response to Le Duan’s embrace of Soviets, 34; reduced in response to peace talks, 41, 53, 55–56, 63–64; requested by Vietnamese, 29, 43; Sino-American rapprochement, and levels of, 68, 72, 74; Soviet threat to China and, 49, 141; for transportation improvements, 74; as wedge strategy toward Soviet-Vietnamese relations, 74 aid to Vietnamese communists by Soviets: adjustment of Chinese strategy on, 74–75, 192n225; air corridor request

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aid to Vietnamese communists (continued) through China denied, 22–23, 26, 36, 73; air support, 43, 75; amount of aid given, 27, 60, 86–87, 177n121, 188n130; claims of Chinese looting of, 23; and Czechoslovakia intervention, Hanoi support for, 50–51, 60; as deterrent, 182n240; exploitation by Vietnam of Sino-Soviet conflict, 143–144, 166n15; as improving relations with Vietnamese, 26–27, 86; and Kosygin visit to Hanoi, 25; land transport through China, 22–23, 74–75, 140–141; military advisors, 27; military personnel, 75; military training in Soviet Union, 27; missile agreement, 25; and offensive policy of 1973, 89; oil exploration via, 94; as percentage of overall aid, 177n121; role of, in Vietnamese success over U.S., 117, 141; seaports in China, 75; and self-interest of Soviets, 101; and SinoSoviet conflict, 32–37, 44, 60, 74–75, 86, 100, 143–144, 180n185, 192n225; Soviet-American détente as betrayal, and levels of, 68, 72; storage of material goods, in China, 75; “United Action,” Chinese refusal of, 21, 22–23, 24, 26–28, 36; wedge strategy of, 24. See also aid to Vietnam (post-1975) by Soviets aid to Vietnamese communists, international, 74–75, 112, 118–119 aid to Vietnam (post-1975) by Soviets: Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict facilitated by, 128–129, 152; cost of, annual, 153; economic aid, 111–112, 118, 119, 135, 142, 151, 205n116, 217n107; and encirclement policy, Vietnam as participant in, 135; and end of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 151; military aid, 112–113, 135, 142; military aid, withdrawal of, 151, 217n102; reduction of, and end of Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, 128, 151, 152–153; sphere of influence of Vietnam and, 115

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Albania, 48 alliances: defined, 165–166n5; international impact of continuing conflict between former partners, 143–145; intra-alliance politics as focus of text, 138, 213n6; level of threat and, 170n70. See also specific alliances Andropov, Yurii, 17, 21, 24, 146, 147 Angola, 106, 197n81 Arkhipov, Ivan, 111 Armstrong, J. D., 4 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 88, 89, 93–94 Aron, Raymond, 221n182 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 107, 127, 131, 143, 147, 161, 215n62, 220n166 “August 28 Order” (China), 57 Australia, 52, 144 Backfire bomber, 105 balance of threat theory, 10–11, 170nn70,72 Berlin, Isaiah, 140 betrayal of Vietnamese: defined, 68; and Geneva Agreement, 95–96, 192n209, 199n131; Sino-American rapprochement as, 68, 70–71, 72–73, 190n180, 191nn195,198,200; Soviet-American détente as, and tolerance of, 70–71, 191nn195,196,198,200; three betrayals by China, overview of, 199n131; and Vietnam War, 73 Betts, Richard, 162 bilateral dynamics and Sino-Vietnamese relationship, 5–8, 138; border disputes, 6, 100; Cambodia and, 128, 138, 139–140, 152; Chinese diaspora in Vietnam, 5–6; conflict and, 99–100, 116, 142; decrease in conflict and, 151–152; hypothesis of, 12; ideology, 6–8; Laos and, 41–43, 138–139, 213n7 Bingham, Robert, 182n241 border disputes: bilateral dynamics and, 6, 100; Sino-Indian (1962), 50; Sino–South

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INDEX

Vietnamese, during 1973–1974, 93–94; Sino-Soviet (1969), 19, 56–60, 63, 65, 66, 104, 141, 157, 186nn78,79,85, 187n124; and Sino-Soviet conflict, ongoing, 19, 97, 104, 110, 133; Sino-Soviet, during 1972–1973, 80, 81, 194–195n26; and Sino-Soviet rapprochement, 146, 147, 148, 149, 216n76; Sino-Vietnamese, 94, 96–97, 100, 152; South China Sea islands and, 93–94, 96–97, 102, 118, 199n121. See also Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) Bo Yibo, 178n141 Brezhnev Doctrine, 47, 58, 66, 141, 157 Brezhnev, Leonid: on Asian collective security proposal, 62–63, 107; attitude toward the West, 20; calls for nonaggression treaty, 80, 148; and Czechoslovakia intervention, 46–47; death of, 147; and military exercises, 105; and peaceful coexistence proposal to China, 79–81, 110–111, 194n13; and proposed strike against Chinese nuclear facilities, 83; and Sino-Soviet border disputes (1969), 56, 58; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 17, 20, 110; and Sino-Soviet improved relations, 146–147; in triumvirate after Khrushchev, 17 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 128, 131, 212n3 Bulgaria, 47, 74 Bundy, McGeorge, 24 Bush, George W., 160 Cambodia: Chinese diaspora in, 5–6; Chinese policy and aid, 91–93, 100, 126, 131, 140, 147, 206n139; coalition government of 1992, 215n62; Lon Nol coup and regime, 75–76, 91–92, 100, 139; national reconciliation, 150, 216nn85–86; as North Vietnamese base to infiltrate South Vietnam, 92; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict during 1970–1975 period, 46, 75–76, 91–93, 103, 138, 139–140, 192–193nn236,239; Soviet

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aid to, 75–76; United Nations’ Agreement on (1991), 151; and Vietnamese sphere of influence (1970–1975), 71, 75, 103, 113–115, 152, 217n112. See also Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict (post1975 period); Khmer Rouge Cambodian People’s Party, 114 Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict (post1975 period): antagonism against Vietnamese communists, 120; bilateral thesis and, 128, 138, 139–140, 152; border conflicts (1977), 120–121, 122, 124; casualties of, 127; Chinese aid to Vietnam during, 123, 126, 207n170, 208n208; Chinese intention to punish Vietnam, 128, 131, 147, 209n227; Chinese mediation of, 120, 122–123, 124; Chinese support of Khmer Rouge, 100, 121, 126, 131, 140, 145, 147, 206n139; Chinese troops, difficulty of transporting to, 127; Chinese use of Cambodian threat to control Vietnam, 126–127, 131; Chinese warning against invasion, 120, 127; maritime border clashes, 120; negotiations to resolve, 120, 121, 123, 124; occupation of Cambodia, 128–129, 146, 148–149; as proxy war, 131, 142, 163; and purges of Khmer Rouge, 120; Soviet aid to Vietnam as facilitating, 128–129, 152; Soviet pressure on Vietnam to withdraw, 150–151, 152, 163; and Soviet-Vietnamese relations as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 124–125, 126–127, 128–129, 139–140, 147, 163; timing of, and Soviet-Vietnamese treaty signed, 127, 128, 129, 139–140; Vietnamese invasion (1978), 2, 122, 125, 126–128, 128–129, 131, 139–140, 204n86, 207n161; and Vietnamese political culture thesis, 204n86; Vietnamese retrenchment from Cambodia, 128, 140, 149, 150–151, 152, 163; and Vietnamese sphere of influence, 122, 128, 131, 139, 142–143. See also Cambodia; Khmer Rouge

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Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet presence at, 112, 148, 151, 217n102 Carter, Jimmy, 109, 128 Chanda, Nayan, 94, 147 Chang Pao-min, 6 Chen Jian, 2–3, 6–8, 28, 169n52 Chen King, 211n287 Chen Yi, 19, 21, 26, 31, 39, 53–54, 189n169, 195n37 Chen Yonggui, 124 Chernenko, Victor, 146, 147 Chervonenko, Stepan, 17, 18, 47 China: airspace violations of, 29, 48; Cultural Revolution, 66, 142, 144, 157, 169n52; economic boom in post–Cold War era, 161; economic reforms of, 148; and ethnic Chinese exodus from Vietnam, 125–126, 152; and fear of Soviets, 48–49, 53–54, 55, 56, 104, 157; and ideologically based foreign policy, 6, 7–8, 49, 169n52; and internal and external balancing, 48–49, 155, 184n30, 218n128; and islands in South China Sea, 93–94, 96–97, 102, 118, 199n121; isolation of, 49, 63, 66, 157; and Khmer Rouge (See Cambodia; CambodianVietnamese conflict; Khmer Rouge); military capacity of (post-1975 period), 104–105, 211n279; as neorealist state, 155; “people’s war” strategy of, 36–39, 55, 77; rise of, in post–Cold War era, 160–162, 220n166, 222n185; and South Vietnamese People’s Revolutionary Government, aid to, 98–99; strategic culture and, 132, 133–134, 210nn256,263; and Taiwan, 84, 160, 221n175; Third Front, 19, 173–174nn37–28; as Third World, 82, 195n31; unitary rational actor model and, 132–133, 134; U.S. embargo against, 156, 219n145. See also aid to Vietnamese communists by China; Czechoslovakia intervention by Soviets; nuclear weapons and China; People’s Liberation Army (PLA); Sino-

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American rapprochement (1972); Sino-Soviet alliance, de facto termination of; Sino-Soviet conflict; Sino-Soviet rapprochement; Sino– Vietnamese conflict Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), 156 Christensen, Thomas, 162 CIA (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency), 63, 65, 83, 84, 207n161 Clinton, Bill, 160 Cold War: bipolarity and stability of, 221n184; and Czechoslovakia intervention, 45; enduring effects of conflicts of, 145; Sino-American tensions and, 160–161; Sino-Soviet conflict and, 15, 19; and Sino-Vietnamese alliance rise and fall, as crucial to, 138; Soviet initiative in (1970s), 157–158; Soviet “peaceful coexistence” with U.S. and others, 157, 159; Soviet retrenchment, 152–153; Third Indochina War and, 1–2; and Vietnamese communist victory, importance of, 142, 214n24. See also alliances; containment policy of U.S.; encirclement; SinoAmerican relationship; Sino-Soviet conflict; Sino-Vietnamese conflict COMECON, 111–112, 118, 119, 123, 126, 142, 204n78 Communist parties: international conference in support of Vietnam, 21, 22, 26, 36, 175n71; international order sought by, failure of, 137, 212n3 Communist Party (Australia), 52, 144 Communist Party (Cambodia), 114, 120, 121–122. See also Khmer Rouge Communist Party (China), 35, 156 Communist Party (Czechoslovakia), 46–47 Communist Party (Indochina), 113–114, 115, 121–122 Communist Party (Japan), 36 Communist Party (Laos, Pathet Lao), 42, 114, 115–116, 138, 139 Communist Party (North Vietnam), 38–39 Communist Party (South Vietnam), 38–39

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INDEX

Communist Party (Soviet Union), 34, 156 Communist Party (Vietnam), 61, 69, 88, 114, 119, 124, 125, 126, 191n200, 205n123 Confucian-Mencian strategic culture, 132, 133 containment policy of U.S., 1, 156–157, 219n147. See also encirclement Cuba, 33, 75, 106, 126 Cultural Revolution, 66, 142, 144, 157, 169n52 Czechoslovakia intervention by Soviets: and bilateral thesis, 7; Brezhnev Doctrine and, 47, 141; Chinese condemnation of, 48–49, 51–52, 76; Hanoi support for, 49–51, 52; and Laos issue timing in Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 139; Operation Danube, 47; reforms leading to, 46–47; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 7, 43, 45, 46, 76, 141, 157; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 43, 45, 51–54; and Sino-Vietnamese relations, 49–51; and Soviets as principal enemy of China, 76, 141, 157 Deng Xiaoping: and aid to Vietnam, 32–33, 117; anti-Soviet line of, 34–35, 79, 117, 120; and Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, 123, 128, 147; and Japanese alliance, 127; on nuclear deterrent, 173n33; and peaceful coexistence, 124; and SinoSoviet rapprochement, 148, 149; and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 129–130, 133–134; on socialist camp, end of, 82–83; and South China Sea islands, 93; on Soviet alignment of Vietnam, 126; Three Worlds speech, 82, 108, 195n31 Deng Yingchao, 124 dependent variable(s), in definition of foreign policy theory, 167n21 deterrence: of China, by SovietVietnamese treaty, 129; defined, 178–179n152; nuclear weapons and, 19–20, 105, 173n34; Soviet aid as, in Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict,

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139; Soviet aid as, in Vietnamese War, 182n240; by Soviet nuclear arsenal, 105; of U.S. attack on China, by Soviet Union, 156; of U.S. ground invasion of North Vietnam, Chinese aid as, 28, 30–32, 70, 141, 178–179n152, 182n240. See also encirclement Do Muoi, 151 Dubcek, Alexander, 46, 47 Duiker, William, 99, 130 Dung, Van Tien, 43 East Germany, 47, 74 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 157 Elman, Colin, 167n21 embargo against China, U.S., 156, 219n145 encirclement: Cambodia and counterencirclement, 91, 94; as choice in continuing conflicts with former alliance partners, 144–145; and Hanoi endorsement of Czechoslovakia intervention, 50; and Paris peace talks, Chinese resistance to, 40–41; South China Sea islands and, 93, 94; Soviet ties in Asia and, 50, 73–74, 78, 136, 184n41; spring 1979 Soviet military developments and, 105; by U.S., 44; Vietnam aligning with Soviets on, 103, 112, 116, 119, 125, 126, 131, 135, 140, 145, 158; Zhou Enlai on, 40–41, 44, 171n1. See also deterrence enemies “by position,” 161, 221n182 Engel, Jeffrey, 219n145 EP-3 incident (2001), 160 Ethiopa, 106, 107 external balancing, 48–49, 184n30 Fairbank, John, 132 Fierre, Erik, 118 First Indochina War (1946–1954), 1, 114, 165n3 Ford, Gerald: and Sino-American rapprochement, 84; and Soviet détente policy, 109, 203n53; and unification of Vietnam, 102

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foreign policy theory, defined, 167n21 France, 1, 114, 165n3 Gaddis, John Lewis, 43 Gaiduk, Ilya, 23, 144 Garver, John, 8, 156–157, 219n147 Geneva agreements: Afghanistan, 149; Laos, 42, 181n221; Vietnam, 54, 95–96, 192n209, 199n131 Giap, Vo Nguyen, 26, 29, 43, 73, 114, 119, 122 Gilks, Anne, 9–10, 100–101, 135 Gobarev, Victor, 19 Goldstein, Lyle, 186n78 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 148–149, 153, 216n84 Goscha, Christopher E., 192–193n239 Gottwald, Klement, 46 Grechko, Andrei, 57 Gromyko, Andrei, 110 Group in Charge of Supporting Vietnam, 28–29 GRUNK, 92 Gulf of Tonkin, 94, 96, 102 Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964), 19, 30, 94, 95, 101–102 Gurtov, Melvin, 4 Han Qianlong, 147 hedging, defined, 197n90 He Long, Marshal, 19, 20 Helsinki Agreements (1975), 108 Heng Samrin, 124 Hoang Tung, 118 Hoang Van Hoan, 119, 143 Ho Chi Minh: on “comrades plus brothers,” 1, 165n2; death of, 39, 58, 62, 188n142; and greetings to Chinese Communist Party, 35; Khrushchev and, 23; Zhou’s warnings to, about Soviet aid, 33, 34 Hopson, Donald Charles, 31 Hua Guofeng, 110, 122, 123 Huang Hua, 120, 121, 146 Huang Yongsheng, 59 human rights issues, 160 Humphrey, Hubert, 276n92

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Hungary, 47, 76 Hung, Pham, 41 Huynh, Luu Doan, 32, 182n240 ideological revisionism: and Chinese view of Soviets, 17–18, 20, 33, 48, 52, 67, 79, 120, 153–154, 157, 218n121; and designation of China’s principal enemy, 153–155, 157, 159, 218nn120,121,126, 220n154; as a multiplier rather than basic cause of conflict, 154, 218n126; and Sino-American rapprochement, 154; and Soviet view of China, 218n120 Ieng Sary, 93, 95, 120, 126, 198n94 India: border war with China (1962), 50; and Pakistan, 197n81; Soviet relationship with, 50, 112, 136, 184n41; U.S. relationship with, 160 “Indochina Federation,” 42 Indochina, Vietnamese sphere of influence and, 71, 75, 103, 113–116, 122, 128, 131, 139, 142–143, 152, 204n85, 217n112 Indochinese summit conference (1970), 91–92, 139 Indonesia, 213n20 Indo-Pakistani war (1971), 197n81 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), 105 internal balancing, 48–49, 184n30 Jackson, Karl, 207n161 Japan: and Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, 147; China relations with, 127, 160; defeat in World War II, 114; Hanoi seeking aid from, 118–119; Soviet relations with, 133; and Taiwan, 160, 221n175; U.S. relations with, 156, 160 Jencks, Harlan, 210–211nn272, 279 Jervis, Robert, 162 Jiang Yi, 186n78 Jiang Zemin, 151 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, and Vietnam War, 39, 40, 41, 176n93, 178n145 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 132, 133, 210n256

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INDEX

Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), 124 Kang Sheng, 19 Kapitsa, Mikhail, 19 Kaunda, Kenneth, 82 Keohane, Robert, 143 KGB, 51 Khan, Ayub, 31 Khieu Samphan, 92 Khmer Rouge: aid to from North Vietnam, 93, 198n97; ASEAN plan to retire some members of, 147, 215n62; bombing of by U.S., 92; Chinese close cooperation with (1979–1991), 131; Chinese policy and aid, 92–93, 100, 121, 126, 131, 140, 141, 145, 147, 206n139; in coalition government of 1992, 215n62; formal name of, 91, 198n95; and national reconciliation, 150, 216nn85–86; North Vietnamese relationship with, 92, 93, 198n97; in opposition to Lon Nol regime, 76, 92, 100; and Prince Sihanouk, 198n94; purging of members, 120. See also Cambodia; Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict (post-1975 period) Khmer Viet Minh, 92 Khrushchev, Nikita: continuation of policies of, 20–21, 33; de-Stalinization drive of, 15, 18, 46; fall of, 15, 16–18, 20–21, 44, 154, 172n6; and litmus test of loyalty, 23; and Vietnam, 15–16, 23–24, 34 Kissinger, Henry, 65, 68, 79, 83, 99 Korea, 33 Korean War: China involvement in, 43, 156; and deterrence in Vietnam War, 31; encirclement and, 44; Soviet aid and, 43; and U.S. as principal enemy of China, 220n154; and U.S. economic embargo against China, 156, 219n6 Kosygin, Aleksei: Beijing visits of, 21–22, 26, 81; Hanoi visit of, 24–25, 34, 176n92; and Sino-Soviet border dispute (1969), 56, 58, 59; on Sino-Soviet conflict, 17; on Soviet aid to Cambodia, 75–76

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Kulikov, Viktor, 89 Kuznetsov, Vasilii, 24 Lao Independence Party, 114 Laos: defense treaty with Vietnam (1977), 116, 120, 206n136; Geneva conference on, 42, 181n221; Lao People’s Democratic Republic founded, 116; Sino-Vietnamese relations and, 41–43, 103, 138–139, 181n208; transportation development, 116; transport links built by China, 74, 138, 213n12; and Vietnamese sphere of influence, 71, 75, 103, 113–116, 131, 142–143, 204n85; Vietnamese troops stationed in, 116 Lawson, Eugene, 9 Layne, Christopher, 162 Leading Group on Vietnamese Affairs, 28–29, 178n141 Le Duan: and aid from China (post-1975 period), 117–118, 123, 207n170; and aid from Soviets, 35, 74, 118, 151; and Cambodian conflict, 120, 126–127; on China as reactionary power, 123; death of, 150; on economics as priority, 111; Gorbachev summit with (1985), 151; and greetings to Chinese Communist Party, 35; and military vs. diplomatic solutions, 95; missile agreement with Soviets, 25; Moscow visit (1965), 26; Moscow visit (1966), “second motherland,” 34; on need for unity in communist movement, 83; and offensive of 1973, 89; and Paris Peace Accords, 84–85; promotion in Communist Party, 205–206n126; purges of party under, 119; request for Chinese assistance, 29, 43; and Sino-American rapprochement, 69–70; on special relationship with Laos and Cambodia, 115; on strategy, 38; and unification of Vietnam, 94–95, 98, 214n24; Zhou’s warnings to, about Soviet aid, 34 Le Duc Anh, 114 Le Duc Tho, 39, 53, 75, 95, 143

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Lee Hsien Loong, 160 Le Thanh Nghi, 93, 98, 117, 119 Lewis, John W., 81 Li Danhui, 32, 144, 174n38, 186n78, 190n180 Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), 18, 20, 108, 173n34 Lin Biao, 37, 56–57, 59, 190n172 Linh, Nguyen Van, 40, 150, 151 Li Peng, 151 Li Qiang, 74, 178n141 Li Tianyou, 29, 178n141 Liu Shaoqi, 27–28, 29, 43, 201n1 Liu Xiao, 178n141 Li Wenzheng, 43, 139 Li Xiannian, 28, 92, 96, 99, 117, 119–120, 178n141 Li Zhaoxing, 221n175 Loan, Ngo Minh, 35, 119 Loescher, G. D., 5 Loginov, Evgenii, 25 Lon Nol coup and regime, 75–76, 91–92, 100, 139 Lowenthal, Richard, 154–155 Luo Ruiqing, 28, 43 Luthi, Lorenz M., 68, 159, 191n198 MacFarlane, Robert, 83 Malaysia, 127, 147 Malinovskii, Rodion, 20 Mao Zedong: on Czechoslovakia intervention, 51–52; death of, 109–110; and desire for leadership of communist bloc, 17; and division of Vietnam, 95; and fear of Soviet attack on China, 157; ideologically based foreign policy, 6, 8–9, 169n52; on international conference of socialist states, 22, 175n71; on isolation of China, 66; and Khmer Rouge, 92; and Kosygin visits to Beijing, 21–22, 175n71; and litmus test of loyalty, 176n86; and Nixon’s inaugural speech, 67; and nuclear weapons, 18, 19, 57, 159; and peace talks, 39, 40, 54, 55, 56; “people’s war” doctrine, 38, 55;

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and Sino-American rapprochement, 66, 67, 68, 69, 169n52; and Sino-Soviet border disputes, 56, 57, 58, 186nn78–79; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 17, 79, 157, 162; on Soviet leadership possibilities after Khrushchev, 17–18; on Soviet request to end polemics, 21; and Sukarno’s advice to resolve conflict with Soviets, 140, 213n20; on support for North Vietnam, 45; and Third Front, 19; Three Worlds theory, 82, 108, 110, 195n31; and United Action aid by Soviets, 22–23, 36; and Vietnam War, 73; and Zhou delegation of 1964, 18, 20 Marcos, Ferdinand, 117 Maurer, Iion Gheorghe, 64 McNamara, Robert, 31 Mearsheimer, John, 144, 162 methodology, 12–13; sources, 9, 13–14; time periods, 8, 9, 13 Middle East, Soviet Union and, 106 Mikoyan, Anastas, 20 Mongolia, 50, 56, 81, 105, 112, 136, 148 Morris, Stephen, 89–90, 135, 169n55, 191n195, 197nn81,85, 204n86 Mozambique, 106 Mozingo, David, 4 Munich metaphor (Nazi Germany), 109 Nam Tha, fall of, 42 Nathan, Andrew, 216n84 National Civil Air Defense Leading Group (China), 57 National Liberation Front (NLF, Viet Cong): Chinese recognition of, 24; Pleiku attack, 24, 176n92; Soviet recognition of, 24 NATO, 160, 213n6 Naughton, Barry, 174n38 neorealism. See realist theory and neorealism Nguyen Co Thach, 73 Nguyen, Lien-Hang T., 3, 191n200 Nie Rongzhen, 189n169

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Nixon, Richard: re-election of, 69; resignation of, 84, 90; on retrenchment of U.S. presence in Asia, 107; and Sino-American rapprochement (trip to Beijing, 1972), 46, 65, 67, 68, 69–70, 71, 73, 84, 141; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 79; and Soviet-American détente, 70, 71; and Vietnam War, 70 Niyazbekov, S., 90 North Korea, 50 North Vietnam: aid to Khmer Rouge, 93, 198n97; Czechoslovakia intervention supported by, 49–51, 52; oil exploration by, 94; and peace talks, 39–41, 178n145, 181n208, 182n241; and South China Sea islands, 94, 96–97, 102. See also betrayal of Vietnamese; South Vietnam; unification of Vietnam; Vietnam (post-1975); Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1965–1975) Nosavan, Phoumi, 42 Novotny, Antonin, 46 nuclear weapons and China: capacity, 105, 157; deterrence and, 19–20, 105, 173n34; Limited Test Ban Treaty and, 18, 20, 173n34; Moscow’s nuclear technology–sharing agreement, termination of, 19, 174n44; and SinoSoviet alliance, termination of, 19; and Sino-Soviet border dispute (1969), 57, 58–59, 144; Soviet strike on facilities, proposed, 57, 83, 144 nuclear weapons and Soviet Union: capacity, 105, 157, 158–159; détente policy and, 108; development of, 155–156; threat to strike China’s nuclear facilities, 57, 83, 144 Nuon Chea, 121 Ohira, Masayoshi, 147 oil exploration, 93, 94 Pakistan, 31, 197n81 parabellum strategic culture, 132, 210n256

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Paracel Islands, 93–94, 96–97, 102, 199n121 Paris Peace Accords: Chinese advice for restraint, 84–85, 90, 98; collapse of, 101; Hanoi resolution for offensives (1973) as violation of, 88; levels of Soviet aid to Hanoi following, 87; Moscow advice for restraint, 90, 200n152; signing of, 79; Sino-Soviet conflict accelerated following, 141; unification of Vietnam and, 84–85; and U.S. entrenchment, 90. See also Paris peace talks Paris peace talks: and Chinese aid reductions to Hanoi, 41, 53, 55–56, 63–64; Chinese approval of, 40, 54, 55, 56, 76–77; Chinese claim Hanoi intentions not clear, 63, 189n150; Chinese public acknowledgment of, 54; Chinese threat to sever diplomatic ties with Hanoi, 54; encirclement fears of China and, 40–41; four-point response to President Johnson, 178n145; Hanoi policy prioritizing, 61; and motivations for Tet Offensive, 39, 65; negotiators, 53, 181n208; and Sino-American rapprochement, 68; Sino-Soviet conflict and, 54, 76; SinoVietnamese conflict and, 32, 39–41, 51, 52–56, 63–65, 76–77, 192–193n239; Soviet Union as advocate of, 51; SovietVietnamese relations and, 51, 55, 60–62, 63, 182n241 Pathet Lao, 42, 115–116, 138, 139 PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam), 88, 134 peace talks. See Paris peace talks People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), 88, 134 People’s Liberation Army (PLA): deployed in North Vietnam, 30–31, 43, 56, 182n231, 186n74; maritime conflicts and, 81; and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 134–135, 211nn272,279; South China Sea islands and, 93–94 Pham Hung, 53, 64

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Pham Van Dong: and aid from Soviets, 143; and border disputes, 96; and Cambodian opposition to Lon Nol, 76; and Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, 127; and China’s use of Cambodia conflict, 126; and Czechoslovakia intervention, 49–50, 52; and greetings to Chinese Communist Party, 35; Kosygin agreement, 25; and Mao on peace talks, 39, 40, 54, 55, 56; and Mao on Vietnam War, 73; on need for unity in communist movement, 83; and Sino-American rapprochement, 69; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 119; and Sino-Vietnamese normalization, 151; on unforeseeable effects of victory over Americans, 222n191; and unification of Vietnam, 98; and Zhou on peace talks, 40, 53; Zhou warnings against Soviet aid, 33, 35 Phan Hien, 123, 124, 127 Phomvihane, Kaysone, 42, 43, 116, 139 Phouma, Souvanna, 42 Pike, Douglas, 27 Pillsbury, Michael, 220n165 Poland, 47 political cultural thesis, 204n86 Pollack, Jonathan, 67 Pol Pot: Chinese attempts to control Vietnam through, 126; Chinese attempts to mediate with, 122–123; and conflict with Vietnam, 120; establishment of Cambodian Communist Party, 121–122; Mao meetings with, 92; overthrow of, plans for, 122, 124, 126, 147; purges of party by, 120. See also Khmer Rouge Pordgorny, Nikolai, 17 Porter, Gareth, 5 Portugal, 197n81 power resources, control of institutions as, 17 principal enemy theory, 138; Cambodia and, 140; Cold War era and China’s relations with other states, 159; Cold

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War era Sino-Soviet conflict, 158–159; defined, 4; and future of Sino-U.S. relations, 161–162, 221–222nn182–185; ideological revisionism as explanation of China’s designation of enemy, 153–155, 157, 159, 218nn120,121,126, 220n154; Laos and, 41–43; neorealist theory as explanation of China’s designation of enemy, 155–158, 155n128, 219nn145,147, 220n154; and post–Cold War era SinoU.S. relations, 159–161, 220nn165–166; and rational calibration of relations, 158; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 158; Soviet Union becoming principal enemy of China, 32, 44, 45, 76, 79, 82, 110, 140–143, 153–158, 162–163; U.S. as principal enemy of China, 37, 155–157, 158, 219nn145,147, 220n154; variants of, 8–10, 169–170nn55,63. See also realist theory and neorealism Pye, Lucien, 68 Qian Qichen, 148, 149 Qiao Guanhua, 35, 180n185 Quinn-Judge, Sophie, 3, 218n126 Qu Xin, 64 realist theory and neorealism: applications of, in analyzing China’s foreign policy, 158–162; assumptions underlying, 4, 130–131, 158; bandwagoning, 218n128; defined, 155, 218n128; as explanation of China’s designation of principal enemy, 155–158, 155n128, 219nn145,147, 220n154; hypothesis of, 11–12; internal and external balancing, 48–49, 155, 184n30, 218n128; as premise of text, 4, 167nn21,23; recent literature rejecting, 3, 6, 158; and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 130–131; and Soviet-Vietnamese alliance as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 158; as theory of foreign policy, 209n245. See also principal enemy theory

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realpolitik strategic culture, 132, 133–134, 210n256 revisionism. See ideological revisionism Romania, 48, 64, 74 Ross, Robert, 8, 12, 126, 202–203n48, 211n288, 216n84 Rostow, Walt, 31 Salisbury, Harrison, 95 SALT I Treaty (1972), 108 Scobell, Andrew, 132, 134 Second Indochina War. See Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1965–1975) security dilemma theory, 9, 169–170n63 self-help principle, 4, 167n25 Shcherbakov, Ilia, 61 Shen Zhihua, 19 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 148 Shi Zhe, 28 Siforovich, Grigorii, 25 Sihanouk, Prince Nordom, 75, 76, 91–92, 198n94, 215n62 Singapore, 127, 147, 160 Sino-American rapprochement (1972), 3, 166n17; and aid levels, 68, 72, 74; benefits of, 83; as betrayal of Hanoi, 68, 70– 71, 72–73, 190n180, 191nn195,198,200; bilateral issues as explanation of, 7–8; corrosive effect on Sino-Vietnamese relations, 72; costs of, 83–85; decision for, by Chinese, 66–67, 82, 189n169, 190n172; and deterrent of U.S. on Soviet strikes, 83; and deterrent represented by Chinese aid, 70; domestic policies of U.S., and delay of normalized relations, 84; and foreign policy, loss of flexibility in, 84; ideological revisionism and, 154; intelligence sharing by U.S., 83; media converage in Vietnam, 69, 71; and mobilization of Vietnamese population against Chinese, 72–73; national interests of China and, 68, 191n195, 191n200; neorealist theory predicting, 158; and nuclear facilities of China, 83; realist

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view of, 8, 169n52; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 66–67, 141; and Sino-Vietnamese border war (1979), 67, 72–73, 192n209; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 46, 66, 67–72, 84–85, 190n182, 191n195; and Soviet-Vietnamese relations, 69, 70, 71–72, 191nn195–196; time lag before Sino-Vietnamese conflict erupted, 71. See also Sino-American relationship; Soviet-American détente Sino-American relationship: Chinese fear of collusion, 51–52, 76–77; Chinese threat perception shift from U.S. to Soviet Union, 32, 44, 110; containment policy, 1, 156–157, 219n147; deterrence in Vietnam War, 70, 83; diplomatic relations established, 111; foreign policy of U.S., Chinese concern about, 160, 220n165; human rights issues, 160; intelligence-sharing with China on Soviets, 133; in 1979–1991 period, 131; principal enemy of China, U.S. as, 37, 155–157, 158, 219nn145,147, 219n154; principal enemy of China in post–Cold War era, likelihood of U.S. as, 159–161, 220nn165–166; principal enemy theory and the future of Sino-U.S. relations, 161–162, 221–222nn182–185; regional parity of China with U.S., 161; unipolarity vs. multipolarity vs. bipolarity and, 160, 161–162, 220n165, 221nn183–184. See also Sino-American rapprochement (1972) Sino-Indian border war (1962), 50 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1978), 127 Sino-Soviet alliance, de facto termination of, 15; aims of Chinese for, 17, 157; and competition for influence over Vietnam, 2; as deterrent to U.S. attack on China, 156; division of labor in, 156; goals of original treaty, 155–157; isolation of China following, 49; multiple consequences of, importance

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Sino-Soviet alliance (continued) of, 137, 162, 222n191; multiplier effect on China’s power and prestige, 156; and nuclear-weapon pursuit by China, 19; official termination of alliance, 146; signing and duration of original treaty, 156, 212n1; and Zhou visit to Moscow, 15, 18, 19–20, 146, 154. See also SinoSoviet conflict; Sino-Soviet rapprochement (post-1985 period) Sino-Soviet border dispute (1969), 19, 56–60, 63, 65, 66, 104, 141, 157, 186nn78,79,85, 187n124 Sino-Soviet conflict: and Asian collective security proposal, 62–63, 107, 125, 157, 197n81; attack on China by Soviets, fear of, 157; and Chinese consolidation of anti-Soviet hostility, 79, 104; Chinese rejection of counsel for amicable resolution, 140, 213n20; as critical antecedent condition, 11–12, 85–86; as critical context, 3, 145, 166–167nn15,17,18; criticism of and nine polemics on Soviet Union, by Chinese, 16, 20, 21, 28, 48, 147, 153, 213n20, 218n121; criticism of and polemics on China, by Soviets, 110, 147; and Czechoslovakia intervention, 7, 43, 45, 46, 76, 141, 157; death of Mao and, 109–110; decrease in post-1985 period, and decrease in SinoVietnamese conflict, 149–151; diplomatic relations severed, 126; disputes of 1974, 194–195n26; economic weakness of Soviets and, 110; and foreign policy of China, generally, 76, 84; and foreign policy of Soviet Union, generally, 84, 135; formal ending of, 149, 216n84; and international conference of communist parties, 21, 22, 26, 36, 175n71; and Khrushchev, fall of, 16–18, 20–21; and Kosygin visits to Beijing, 21–22, 26, 175n71; maritime sphere, 81; military buildup in Russian far east (post1975 period), 104–105; and military exercises, 105, 125; and Moscow’s aid

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to Hanoi, 32–37, 44, 60, 74–75, 86, 100, 143–144, 180n185, 192n225; neorealist theory and, 158–159; non-aggression treaty, calls for, 80, 148; and Paris peace talks, 54, 76; peaceful coexistence, Soviet proposal for, 79–81, 110–111, 124, 194n13; peak of, and ideologically based foreign policy, 169n52; and SinoAmerican rapprochement, 66–67, 141; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 65, 76– 77; and Soviet punishment of China for anti-Soviet stance, 79, 101, 104; Soviets designated principal enemy of China, 32, 44, 45, 76, 79, 82, 110, 140–143, 153–158, 162–163; Soviets penetrating China’s territory (1978), 125; and SovietU.S. détente, 107–109, 202–203n48; strategy advice by China to North Vietnam and, 37–38; and Third World, China as, 82, 195n31; and Third World, Soviet policy in, 104, 106–109, 142, 157. See also border disputes; nuclear weapons; principal enemy theory; Soviet-Vietnamese relations as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict Sino-Soviet rapprochement (post-1985 period): Brezhnev’s calls for, 146–147; as cause of Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement, 145, 147, 167n18; China’s “three obstacles”, resolution of, 146, 147, 148–149; economic expansion, 147; Gorbachev and, 148–149; languishing of, 147; non-aggression treaty, Soviet calls for, 148; Soviet Union’s four reasons for, 148; summit meeting (1989), 149, 150–151, 216n84. See also SinoSoviet conflict Sino-Vietnamese alliance, failure of, 138; balance of threat theory and, 11; cause of (see Sino-Vietnamese conflict); and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 130; with Vietnamese victory in Saigon, 100. See also bilateral dynamics Sino-Vietnamese conflict: aid to South Vietnamese People’s Revolutionary

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Government by China and, 98–99; and battlefield strategy against U.S., 25, 32, 36–39, 55; and Cambodia (post1975) (See Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict); and Cambodia (pre-1975), 46, 75–76, 91–93, 103, 138, 139–140, 192–193nn236,239; cause of (see Soviet-Vietnamese relations as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict); “Cuba of Asia”, Vietnam accused of being, 126; Czechoslovakia intervention by Soviets and, 43, 45, 51–54; end of, 151; enduring effects of, 145; ethnic Chinese exodus from Vietnam, 125–126, 152; increasingly distant ties in post-1975 period, 118–120, 204–205n97; Laos and, 41–43, 103, 138–139, 181n208; and negotiations (peace talks) by North Vietnam with the U.S., 32, 39–41, 51, 52–56, 63–65, 76–77, 192–193n239; selfserving behavior of China and, 98–99; and Sino-American rapprochement as betrayal, 68, 70–71, 72–73, 190n180, 191nn195,198,200; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 65, 76–77; in South China Sea (1988), 150; as unforeseen, 162, 222n191; unification of Vietnam and, 103. See also aid to Vietnamese communists by China; aid to Vietnamese communists by Soviets; bilateral dynamics; SinoVietnamese relations; Sino-Vietnamese War (1979); Soviet-Vietnamese relations as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict Sino-Vietnamese relations: bilateral thesis on re-normalization of, 151–152, 217n112; as “comrades plus brothers,” 1, 165n2; as “indestructible friendship,” 136, 201n1; re-normalization of (1991), 151, 152, 163; secret summit meeting (1990), 151; Soviet retrenchment from Vietnam and, 152–153. See also SinoVietnamese conflict Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 2–3, 129; casualties of, 134, 211nn287–288;

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conduct of, 130, 133–134, 211– 212nn272,279,286–288; decision to attack Vietnam, 129–130; diplomatic preparation for, by China, 131, 133–134; duration of, 130; effects of, 130; intention to punish Vietnam, 128, 131, 133, 134, 209n227; neorealist theory in explanation of, 130–131; roots of in 1964–1968 period, 43–44; and SinoAmerican rapprochement, 67, 72–73, 192n209; Soviet factor in, 131, 133–134, 135, 136, 145, 212n295; as stain on SinoVietnamese relations, 222n192; strategic culture argument on, 132, 133–134, 210nn256,263; troops involved, 130; as unforeseeable, 135; unitary rational actor model, 132–133, 134; Vietnamese incursions into China during, 134; weakness of Chinese military, 134–135, 210–211nn272,279,286–288 socialist camp, end of, 82 Somalia, 106, 107 Son Sann, 215n62 Son Sen, 126 So Phim, 124 South China Sea: islands of, border disputes and, 93–94, 96–97, 102, 118, 199n121; Sino-Vietnamese conflict of 1988, 150; Soviet military exercises in, 125 South Vietnam: and islands in South China Sea, 93–94; oil exploration and, 93; PRG (South Vietnamese People’s Revolutionary Government), 98–99, 200n157; Saigon, fall of, 93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 106, 116. See also unification of Vietnam; Vietnam (post-1975); Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1965–1975) Soviet-American détente: China opposing, 107–109, 202–203n48; Nixon and, 46, 65, 67, 68, 69–70, 71, 73, 84, 141; SinoVietnamese relations suffering after, 85; Vietnamese willingness to overlook, 70–71, 191nn195,196,198,200

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Soviet-German détente (1970), 197n81 Soviet-Mongolian alliance treaty (1966), 56, 81, 104, 112, 136 Soviet Union: Asian ties of, 50, 56, 61–63, 184n41; assertive foreign policy of 1975–1979 period, 104; bilateral explanations and, 7; at Cam Ranh Bay, 112, 148, 151, 217n102; as enemies “by position” with U.S., 161, 221n182; as First World, 82, 195n31; military capacity of (post-1975 period), 104–105; “peaceful coexistence” policy proposal with China, 79–81, 110–111, 124, 194n13; “peaceful coexistence” policy with U.S. and others, 157, 159; as principal enemy of China, 32, 44, 45, 76, 79, 82, 110, 140–143, 153–158, 162–163; SinoJapanese alliance and, 127; as “socialimperialists,” 7, 48, 82–83, 110, 157; and Third World, policy in, 104, 106–109, 142, 157; U.S. policy of, in 1950s, 157, 158–159. See also aid to Vietnamese communists by Soviets; Czechoslovakia intervention by Soviets; nuclear weapons and Soviet Union; Sino-Soviet conflict; Soviet Union détente policy; Soviet-Vietnamese alliance Soviet Union détente policy, 212n295; with Germany, 197n81; Sino-Soviet conflict and, 106–109, 202–203n48; Vietnamese endorsement of, 118, 136. See also Soviet-American détente Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, 2; resistance by Vietnamese against treaty, 112; signing of, 71, 126; and Sino-Soviet rivalry, 136; Soviet policy creating, 24; suspicions in face of, 182n242; timing of treaty signing, and Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 127, 128, 129, 139–140 Soviet-Vietnamese relations: Cambodia policy of China and, 91; character of, 44; as choice by Vietnam, 44, 142–143, 182n241; Czechoslovakia intervention and, 49–51, 52; and détente policy of

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Soviets, endorsement of, 118, 136; and détente policy of Soviets, willingness to overlook, 70–71, 191nn195,196,198,200; eagerness of Soviets to encourage, 15–16, 24–25, 25, 44, 61–62; increasingly close ties in post-1975 period, 115, 118, 204–205n97; joint communique (1965), 25; Kosygin visit to Hanoi, 24–25, 176n92; Le Thanh Nghi commitment to, 98; limitations on alignment, 62–63, 112, 188n142; missile agreement, 25; Paris peace talks and, 51, 55, 60–62, 63, 182n241; retrenchment of Soviets from Vietnam, 151, 152–153, 217n102; and Sino-American rapprochement, 69, 70, 71–72, 191nn195–196; Sino-Soviet conflict and, 61, 74, 85–86, 89–90, 101, 197n81; Soviet pressure on Vietnam to accept national reconciliation in Cambodia, 150; Soviet pressure to withdraw from Cambodia, 150–151, 152, 163; Soviet satisfaction with, 26–27; Soviet-U.S. conflict as argument for growth of, 85; sphere of influence of Vietnam and, 115; and strategy of North Vietnam in war, 37–38, 51; timing and origins of Hanoi tilt to Soviets, 89–90, 197nn81,85; trade levels and, 111; wedge strategy of Chinese toward, 73–75. See also aid to Vietnamese communists by Soviets; Soviet-Vietnamese relations as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict Soviet-Vietnamese relations as cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 16, 28, 65, 78, 141–143; Afghanistan coup regime recognized by Vietnam, 125; aid from China reduced, 117–118, 119–120, 123, 207n170; aid from China suspended, 126, 135, 208n208; alignment of Vietnam with Soviets, 71, 77, 103, 112, 116, 119, 125, 126, 131, 135, 140, 145, 158; alliance signing and, 71, 136; bilateral issues and, 116, 128; Cambodia in Vietnamese sphere of influence, 71, 75, 103,

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113–115, 122, 128, 131, 139, 142–143, 152, 217n112; and Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict (post-1975), 124–125, 126–127, 128–129, 139–140, 147, 163; COMECON membership of Vietnam, 119, 123, 126, 142; decrease of relations leading to decrease of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 149–151; fear of Soviet intentions, 116–117; independence of Vietnam and, 103; Laos in Vietnamese sphere of influence, 71, 75, 103, 113–116, 131, 142–143, 204n85; and Laos issue, timing of, 138–139; neorealist theory and, 158; principal enemy of China, Soviets as, 32, 44, 162–163; and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 131, 133–134, 135, 136, 145, 212n295; Third World policy of Soviets, Vietnam cooperating with, 126; umbrage taken by Chinese, 71 Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. See SovietVietnamese alliance Spratly Islands, 93–94, 96–97, 102, 118 Sputnik, 159 Stalin, Joseph, 15, 18, 28, 46 strategic culture, 132, 210n256 Sudan, 197n81 Sukarno, 213n20 Sulzberger, C. L., 81 Taiwan, 84, 160, 221n175 Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 160 Taiwan Straits crisis (1958), 19 Taiwan Straits crisis (1995–1996), 160 Taraki, Nur Mohammed, 125 Tet Offensive (1968), 38–39, 40, 65, 88, 196n62 Thailand: Chinese alliance with, 145; Chinese fear of Vietnamese designs on, 147; Chinese seeking support from, 127; end of dependence of Laos for transit routes, 116 Thakur, Ramesh, 129, 150–151 Thayer, Carlyle, 129, 150–151, 152

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Thieu, Nguyen Van, 88, 93 Third Indochina War (1979–1991), 1; and ideology as a multiplier rather than basic cause of conflict, 154, 218n126; Sino-Soviet conflict and, 3. See also Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) Third World: Soviet successes in, as threat to China, 104, 106–109, 142, 157; theory of, 82, 108, 110, 195n31 Tho, Nguyen Huu, 98 Three Worlds theory (Mao), 82, 108, 110, 195n31 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), 108 Thuyen, Ngo, 74, 119 Tiananmen Square protests, 160 Truong Chinh, 77 Truong Nhu Tang, 62, 188n142 Ulam, Adam, 16, 212n295 unification of Vietnam: cancellation of debt by Soviets, 111; China’s heightened sense of threat and, 131; Chinese actions adding urgency to desire for, 94–95; Chinese desire to delay, 84–85, 91, 93, 97–98, 100, 101–102, 197n90; Kissinger on, 99; offensive policy of Hanoi (1973) to secure, 87–89; as overriding goal, 90; Paris Peace Accords and delay of, 85; Saigon, fall of, 93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 106, 116; and Sino-Vietnamese conflict, 103; Soviet aid to Hanoi and, 90. See also Vietnam (post-1975) United Kingdom: deterrence threats communicated through, 31; and Munich concessions, 109; removal from Asia, 107 United Nations’ Agreement on Cambodia (1991), 151 United States: aid sought by Vietnamese (post-1975 period), 206n129; Asian alliances in post–Cold War era, 160–161, 220n166; and Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, 122, 128, 131, 207n161; containment policy on China, 1, 156–157,

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United States (continued) 219n147; diplomatic relations with Vietnam (post-1975 period), 206n129; domestic politics of, and China rapprochement, 84; domestic politics of, and unification of Vietnam, 102; as enemies “by position” with Soviet Union, 161, 221n182; as First World, 82, 195n31; retrenchment in post-1975 Asia, 103, 107, 135, 142; and Sino-Vietnamese war (1979), 129–130, 131, 133; and Soviet proposal to strike China’s nuclear facilities, 57, 83, 144; Soviet relations with, 1975–1979 period, 104; and Taiwan, 84, 160, 221n175; view of Sino-Soviet conflict, 84; view of Soviet Asian collective security proposal, 63; vision for international order, success of, 137, 212n3; war on terror, 160. See also Sino-American rapprochement (1972); Sino-American relationship; SovietAmerican détente; Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1965–1975) Van Ness, Peter, 4, 8 Vershinin, Konstantin, 24–25 “Vice-Chairman Lin’s No. 1 Order,” 59 Viet Cong. See National Liberation Front (NLF, Viet Cong) Vietnam (post-1975): Afghanistan coup regime recognized by, 125; capitalist trade abolished, 125–126; COMECON membership and, 111–112, 118, 119, 123, 126, 142, 204n78; currency unification, 125; encirclement of China, alignment with, 103, 112, 116, 119, 125, 126, 131, 135, 140, 145, 158; and ethnic Chinese minority, 125–126, 152; international aid sought by, 119, 206n129; and International Monetary Fund, 118–119; and islands in South China Sea, 118; offers to align with China, 145; purges of Communist Party, 119, 143; sphere of influence over

C5407.indb 266

INDEX

Laos and Cambodia, 71, 75, 103, 113–116, 122, 128, 131, 139, 142–143, 152, 204n85, 217n112. See also aid to Vietnam (post-1975) by Soviets; CambodianVietnamese conflict; Sino-Vietnamese conflict; Soviet-Vietnamese alliance; unification of Vietnam Vietnamese Worker’s Party, 61, 69, 88, 114, 119, 191n200, 205n123; Central Military Party Committee, 88, 197n67 Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1965–1975): aerial campaign and mining of Haiphong harbor, 70; airspace of China violated in, 29; American failure in, effects of, 104, 107, 142, 214n24; Chinese military personnel in, 28–29, 30–32; deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations and, 1, 2; Easter Offensive (March–June 1972), 68, 70; Hanoi resolution for offensive campaigns (1973), 87–89; Ho Chi Minh trail, bombing of, 74; international conference of socialists states on, 21, 22, 26, 36, 175n71; Operation Rolling Thunder, 24, 25, 176n93; Pleiku attack, 24, 176n92; protagonists of, 165n3; Saigon, fall of, 93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 106, 116; Sino-Soviet conflict and, 3, 166n15; Soviet military advisors and, 27; strategy of North Vietnam in, 25, 32, 36–39, 51, 55; strengthening of SovietVietnamese relations in, 2. See also aid to Vietnamese communists; Paris peace talks; unification of Vietnam; Vietnam (post-1975) Vonh, Nguyen Trong, 119 Wallace, Mike, 149 Walt, Stephen, 10–11, 165–166n5, 170n72 Waltz, Kenneth, 130–131, 155, 167n25, 209n245, 218n128, 221nn183–184 Wang Youping, 69, 146 Wang Zhen, 211n272 Warsaw Pact, 46–47, 153, 213n6 Westad, Odd Arne, 3

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INDEX

Whiting, Allen, 32, 132–133, 134 Womack, Brantly, 150 Wu Xiuquan, 17, 18, 19 Xia Yafeng, 190n172 Xie Yixian, 31, 189n150 Xuan Thuy, 53, 181n208 Xue Litai, 81 Xu Xiangqian, 189n169 Yang Chengwu, 29, 43, 178n141 Yang Kuisong, 186n78 Yang Shangkun, 17 Yan Zhongchuan, 59 Yao Guang, 67 Ye Jianying, 58, 94, 116, 189n169 Yemen, 106 Yugoslavia, 20, 160 Zagoria, Donald, 154 Zhai, Qiang, 3, 138, 188n130 Zhang Shuguang, 186n79 Zhang, Xiaoming, 211n288 Zhao Ziyang, 147

C5407.indb 267

267

Zhenbao Island, 148 Zhou Enlai: and aid to Vietnamese, 74, 75; anti-Soviet line of, 33–34, 35, 52, 82; and border disputes of 1972–1973, 81; and Cambodia, 76; on Czechoslovakia intervention, 52; and death of Ho Chi Minh, 58; and deterrence threat, 31; and division of Vietnam, 95; on encirclement, 40–41, 44, 171n1; and Khmer Rouge, 92; and Kosygin visits to Beijing, 21; Moscow visit (1964), 15, 18, 19–20, 146, 154; and Paris Peace talks/ agreements, 40, 41, 53, 64, 77, 98; and peaceful coexistence proposal, 79–80; and Pham on unforeseeable effects of victory over Americans, 222n191; and proposed Soviet strike on nuclear facilities, 83; and Sino-American rapprochement, 67, 69–70; and SinoSoviet border dispute (1969), 56, 58, 59, 60; and Sino-Soviet conflict, 79; and Third World, China as, 82 Zorin, Valerin, 61 Zubok, Vladislav, 191n196

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Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance

Collateral Damage

Collateral Damage