Cognition, Vol. 3, No. 1

Editorial board

Azuma of Education. University, Bunkyo-ku, Japan

Jerome S. Bruner Center for Cognitive Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A.

Merrill Garrett Department of Psychology, M.I.T. EIO-034, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A.

Paul Bertelson Laboratoire de Psychologie Experimentale, UniversitP Libre de Bruxelles II 7, Av. Adolphe Buyl, B-1050 Bruxelles, Belgique

Noam Chomsky Dept. Modern Languages and Linguistics, MI-T., Cambridge, Mass. 02139, .!%S.A.

Pierre Greco Laboratoire de Psychologie, 54, bvd. Raspail, F- 75006 Paris, France

Hiroshi Fact&v TokyoHongo, Tokyo,

T. G. R. Bower Dept. of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 60, Pleasance, Edinburgh EH8 9TJ, Great Britain

Peter D. Eimas Walter S. Hunter Laboratory of Psychology, Brown University, fiovidence, R. I. 02912, U.S.A.

Ned Block Dept. of Philosophy, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass. 02139, US.A.

Gunnar Fant Lab. of Speech Transmission, Royal Institute of Technology, S-1 0044 Stockholm 70, Sweden

Frarqois Bresson Laboratoire de Psychologie, 54, bvd. Raspail, F- 75006 Paris, France

Jerry Fodor Dept. of Psychology, MI. T. El O-34 Cam bridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A.

Roger Brown Dept. of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138, U.S.A.

Kenneth Forster Dept. of Psychology, Monash University, CTayton, Victoria 3168, Australia

Jean-Blaise Grize, 1, Ghan temerle, Neuchdtel, Suisse

David T. Hakes Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, Tex. 78712, U.S.A.

Henry Hecaen Directeur d’Etudes, Ecole Pratique des Hau tes Etudes, Unite’ de Recherches Neuropsychologiques, I.N.S.E.R.M., 2, rue dillesia, F- 75014 Paris, France

Michel Imbert Laboratoire de Neurophysiologic, College de France, Il. place Marcelin Berthelot, F- 75005 Paris, France

A. R. Luria Faculty of Psychology, University of Mosco w, 13, Frunze Street, Moscow G.19, U.S.S.R.

Robert Shaw Center for Research and Human Learning, University of Minneso taI Minneapolis, Minn. 554.555, U.S.A.

John Lyons Dept. of L~~ist~es, Adam Ferguson B&ding, Edinburg~l EH8 9LL, Great Britain

Dan I. Slobin Department of Psychology, Un~versit_vof ~liforn~, Berkeley, #hf. 94720, U.S.A.

James Jenkins Center for Research and Human Learninn, University of M&neso ut, Minneapolis, Minn. 55455, U.S.A.

Humberto Maturana Eseuela de Medicina, Universidad de Chile, A. Sanartu 1042, Santiago, Chile

Jan Smedslund Jnstitute of Psychology, Universitet i Oslo, Box 1094, Oslo 3, Norway

Daniel Kahneman Dept. of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Je~salem, Jerusalem, Israel

John Morton Applied Psychology Unit, 15, Chaucer Road, Grmbridge CB2 2EF. Great Britain

B&be1 Inhelder Institut des Sciences de PEducation, Universite de Geneve, CHV1211 GenPve 14, Suisse Marc Jeannerod Laboratoire de Neuropsychologie Expertmentale, Doyen Lepme, F-69500 Bran, Frame

Jerrold J. Katz Dept. of Philosophy, MLT., Gzmbridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A. Edward Klima Dept. of Linguistics, La Jolla, University of California, San Diego, Calif 92031, USA. Eric H. Lenneberg Dept. of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 14850, U.S.A. Atexei Leontiev Faculty of Psychofogy, University of ~us~ow, 13, Fnrnze Street, Moscow G.19, U.S.S.R. Wilhelm Levelt Psychological Laboratory, Nqmegen University, Erasmuslaan 16, Ngmegen, Netherlands

George Noizet Laboratoire de Psychologie Experimentale, F-13 Aiw en Provence, France Domenico Parisi fstituto di Ps~c~log~a, Consigho Nazionale delle Ricer&e, Piazzale delle scienze 7, Rome, Italy Michael Posner

Dept. of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore. 9 7403, K S.A. Nicotas Ruwet Dept. de L~~~isti~u~, Centre Univ. de Vincennes, 12, Rue de Tourelle F - 75012Paris, France Harris B. Savin Dept. of Psychology, University ofPennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 U.S.A.

Sidney Strauss Department of ~d~i&ationa~ Sciences, Tel Aviv Unive~ity, Ramat Aviv, Israel Alina Szeminska Olesiska S/3, Warsaw. Poland Yoshihisa Tanaka Dept. ofPsychology, University of Tokyo, ~nkyo~u, Tokyo 123, Japan Hans-Lukas Teuber Dept. of Psychology, M.I.T. EIO-034, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, (I.S.A. Peter Wason ~y~holin~~tics IJniversity College London, Research Unit, 4, Stephenson Way, London NW1 2HE. Great Britain Hermina Sinclair de Zwart Centre d’Epistemologie GPnPtique, Universitd de Geneve, CH-1211 Geneve, St&se

1

Interactional

aspects of cognitive organization*

JONAS LANGER University

of California,

Berkeley

Abstract Further propositions are formulated towards a comprehensive structural developmental theory of cognitive change, begun in Langer (1969a, 1969b). Here, the analytic focus is upon: (a) 7he organization of the subject’s assimilatory operations and accomodatory figurations; (b) the intrinsic coordinations between the theoretical and empirical cognitions constructed, respectively, by these two kinds of functional structures; and (c) the cognitive developmental changes produced by instrinsic coordinations. Derivative empin’cal hypotheses are considered in light of findings summarized here and elsewhere. The development of any sequence of psychological stages is an interactive process of equilibrating the intrinsic functional structures of the organism with the extrinsic structures of the environment &anger, 1969a, Ch. 5). A variety of approaches has been used to study the interactive process. Typically these approaches have established external disparity - usually produced by an experimenter or a teacher - between the child’s existing level of conceptions and the actual physical or social character of the environment. To illustrate, the experimental situation may be designed to establish a disparity between the child’s predictive judgment of the outcome of a physical deformation of an object and his observation of the actual outcome. Often, this type of approach presumes that such external disparity is reflected by intrinsic ‘cognitive conflict’ when in fact there is little if any theoretical basis, and usually no independent empirical evidence, for the presumption. In most of these situations the more parsimonious assumption is that the external disparity remains just that - external to the child’s conceptual operations - and is therefore not cognized as anomolous. Our approach has been to focus upon intrinsic disequilibrium as a source of the * Expanded version of national conference on of the Child, Urbana, while the author was Rockefeller Universitv.

a paper presented at the The Natural Curriculum March 1969, prepared a Visiting Scholar at 1970, and supported in

part by USPHS Grant HD 03617 on The Intergenerational Studies in Development and Aging at the Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley.

Cognition

3/I),

pp. 9-28

10

Jonas Langer

development and interiorization of mental operations (Langer, 1969b). This has included inquiring into how interactive disparity between intrinsic (organismic) and extrinsic (environmental) functional structures may perturb the existing cognitive organization of the child. This required studying how interactive disparity may provide the occasion for perturbative feedback and the intrinsic disequilibrium necessary for conceptual transformation to a more advanced stage. Consequently, these efforts have been partially directed towards distinguishing, theoretically and empirically, between external disparity and intrinsic disequilibrium. The equilibration model implies the hypothesis of progressive or regressive cognitive transformation when intrinsic disequilibrium or disparity has been demonstrated by independent means. Only then does the theoretical expectation follow that the energetic conditions are present for the formation and interiorization of more or less advanced mental operations and concepts. In order to examine intrinsic disequilibrium more closely, two major theoretical parameters of equilibrating intrinsic functional structures were proposed, an organizational and an energetic parameter &anger, 1969b). An additional distinction was then made between two complementary aspects of the organizational parameter. The first is the interaction between the organism’s systems of action, and the second is the interaction of the media in which acts and the environment are embodied. The present essay is directed towards some further analyses of these two interactive aspects of the organizaThese analyses will be guided by developmental tional parameter of equilibration. considerations that are relevant to learning and education.

1. Figurative and operative functional

structures

Previously we were led to the conclusion that intrinsic integration within functional structures may lead to progressive cognitive alterations, while intrinsic segregation may result in temporary regressive-like cognitive effects (Langer, 1969b). Here we shall explore the transformational consequences of intrinsic interaction between two classes of functional structures. These we shall call accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations. Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969a, 1969b; Piaget, 1969) has most clearly articulated the differences between two kinds of structures, figurations and operations. Figurations are the basis for the range of action schemata that cognitively apprehend, extract and reproduce aspects of the physical and social environment. The action schemata involved include components of perception, speech as an expressive medium, imagery and memory. Basically, figurative acts are directed towards reproducing empirical information. Operations are the basis for the range of action schemes that construct logical transformations. These logical schemes of transformation operate upon environmental events or upon one’s own logical operations. Logical operations are directed toward producing conceptual knowledge.

Interactional aspects of cognitive organization

11

Piaget (Piaget, 1951; Piaget and Inhelder, 1966; Piaget, 1967) has proposed that figurative and operative structures are like two parallel streams that have their genetic origins in the same source, the sensorimotor structure of schemata that develop during the first two years of life. The proposal of parallel streams suggests that operative structures of conception do not derive from figurative schemata of perception, speech, imagery or memory. Reciprocally, figurative structures do not derive from operative schemes. Furthermore, figurative structures do not derive from each other but have their individual sources in sensorimotor schemata. For example, imagery is not a derivative of perception but rather of deferred sensorimotor imitation (Piaget, 195 1; Piaget and Inhelder, 1966). Perception, itself, is a derivative of immediate sensorimotor fixations and not deferred sensorimotor imitation (Piaget, 1969). Piaget (1969) draws a strong division between the operative and figurative structures that develop after the sensorimotor stage. Operative structures are constructive while figurative are not. Operative structures produce logical concepts. Figurative structures reproduce environmental configurations. This hypothesis led Piaget and his colleagues to examine the influence of operative conception upon perception (Piaget, 1969), imagery (Piaget and Inhelder, 1966) and memory (Piaget and Inhelder, 1968). They have also somewhat examined the influence of figurative speech upon operative conceptions (Sinclair, 1967). Piaget (1950) also makes a strong distinction between structure and function. Operative, but not figurative, structures are variant. The functions of assimilation and accommodation are invariant throughout life. The variant operative structures (of intuitive, concrete and formal operations) form the discontinuous sequence of stages that composes cognitive development. The invariant functions of assimilation and accommodation provide cognitive development with its continuity. The theoretical formulation @anger, 1964, 1969a, 1969b, 1970a 1970b, 1970~) adopted here makes two fundamental assumptions. First, all developmental processes are continuous and discontinuous. Second, all cognitive activity is constructive. Consequently it follows that both operative and figurative structures are constructive systems and that the development of both structures and functions is marked by continuity and discontinuity. The special sense in which figurative activity is constructive is that it consists of extractive judgment and/or expressive representation about environmental configurations selected for interaction by the subject. And that interaction is always reconstructive, never merely impressionistic and/or mimetic. Psychological structures and functions are but complementary aspects of a constructive organism whose development is a dialectical process of maintaining its continuous integrity while elaborating discontinuous forms. The central thesis is that the organization of a person at any given stage of his development is that of a multi-leveled network of finctional structures. Each stage is the progressive transform of the functional structures that composed the stage out of which it materialized. Thenetwork of each stage is composed of two major sets of functional structures that

12

Jorzas Langer

construct knowledge. One set is composed of accommodatory figurations (to mix Piaget’s metaphors) while the other set is composed of assimilatory operations. Accommodatory figurations are the intrinsic bases for action systems directed towards constructively extracting and representing empirical ~formation. Extracting schematic knowledge, such as information about the appearance, reality and pre~ctab~ity of the physical and social enviro~ent, is accomplished by systems of action such as attending, examining, selecting, verifying and discriminating. Expressing the knowledge achieved by these extractive means is accomplished by symbolic embodiments in a variety of media that have representational and communicative value. Assimilatory operations are the intrinsic bases for the action systems directed towards constructing theoretical knowledge or understanding. First approx~ations to theoretical understanding are obtained by performing mental transformations upon the information and representations achieved via aceommodatory figurations. Higher-order logica conceptions are first constructed in adolescence by perfor~ng mental operations upon the first-order mental tr~sformations. There are three logically possible relations between accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations. The first is that they are totally different and unrelated. The psychological implication of such a dualistic theory would seem to be that they are mentally segregated functional structures which do not interact with each other. Therefore, they set no limits to each other’s operations and development. It is difficult to find serious representatives of this kind of dualistic theory of normal mentation, at least in Western thought. Rather, evidence of such a split is more likely to be taken as symptomatic of abnormal mentation (e.g., Werner, 1948). A second possibility is that of theoretically reducing one set to the other. There has been little attempt to reduce all psychological phenomena to assimilatory operations, except possibly by radical subjective idealists. There have been comprehensive attempts to reduce all mental phenomena to accommodatory ~gurations. Gestaltists and phenomenologists have typically reduced mentation to figurative perception. Michotte (1963) attempted to reduce the cognition of causality to its perceptual components. More recently, Bower (1967) has been using a similar reductionistic approach in studying object permanence. In these theories concepts are usually considered to be epiphenomenal or distorted forms of percepts. AlternativeIy, sensationists and social learning theorists have attempted to reduce psycholo~cal phenomena to sensory impressions and/or to motoric imitations (e.g., Bandura and Walters, 1963; Bandura, 1969). The third theoretical possibility, and the one taken most seriously here, is partial communication between accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations. The major implication for a theory of mental organization is that each type of functional structure may interact with the operations and development of the other. It is hypothesized, and later we shall present evidence in support of the hypothesis, that the nature of the interaction will differ depending upon the developmental stage of the person. In principle, the person’s stage consists of both his operational and figurational levels of development; but, in research practice, the assessment is usually limited to diagnosing one

Interactional aspects of cognitive organization

13

or the other. It is assumed that the interaction takes an informational form. This means that the development of each type of functional structure has logical implications for, but not direct causal effects upon, the operations and development of the other. From the present perspective of genetic epistemology, the evolution of these two sets of functional structures is the cognitive basis for the history of ideas, whether social, ethical, aesthetic, physical or logical. Accommodatory figurations construct our empirical facts and assimilatory operations construct our theoretical knowledge. This epistemological perspective seeks to supersede the academic and traditional categorization of mental faculties and phenomena such as perceptual, conceptual, linguistic, mnemonic and learning. Useful as they may have been when viewed in historical perspective, these categories have seemed artificial and psychologically unreal ever since Kant wrote his Ch’tique of pure reason. In their place we therefore propose accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations that construct facts and theory, whether physical or social. The theoretical task before us is to formulate the general rules of constructing information and concepts, whether perceptual, conceptual, linguistic, mathematical, logical, etc. The study of cognitive development, then, becomes in great measure an inquiry into the development of these two sets of functional structures, their genetic relations and their organizational (systems) interactions. From the perspective of genetic psychology, the developmental relation between accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations is an orthogenetic process (Werner, 1948; Langer, 1970a). The basic organization of the sensorimotor stage is a global fusion of assimilatory operations (such as playful transformations) and accommodatory figurations (such as imitative reproductions). The observable result is syncresis of perception, action and affect. The sequence of stage development, starting with the sensorimotor stage, is marked by progressive differentiation and integration of these functional structures. The orthogenesis of accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations constitutes a central feature of the intrinsic equilibration that is the source of stage development, i.e., progressive alteration of functional structures. The general hypothesis is that the operation of one system of action may lead to the feedback of information that modifies its underlying functional structures. In turn, this may result in intrinsic disequilibrium between it and other functional structures. This is a necessary condition for progressive reorganization and feed-forward to the child’s schemes of action. The manifest result should then be some observable modifications and advances in intelligent acts and their products, constructed facts and theories.

2. Actions in interaction The issues are twofold, organizational and developmental. The general organizational issue is to determine the results of interaction between functional structures for the

14

Jonas Langer

formation of any given functional structure. The general developmental issue is to determine whether the results of interaction lead to some change, whether progressive or regressive, in any given functional structure. Here the organizational and developmental considerations will be limited to the unidirectional implications of accommodatory figurations for assimilatory operations. The next four sections will outline some of the ways in which we have been investigating the problem experimentally. Specifically, each section will be devoted to the discussion of one figurative means of mentally extracting or representing empirical information about physical and social objects and the consequences of such empirical activity for the construction of operational concepts. The first three figurative means are primarily extractive. They are imitating an observed event, comparing one’s predictions about the result of a physical deformation with one’s observation of the actual outcome and comparing one’s observations of the way things appear with one’s observations of the way things really are. The fourth figurative means is primarily representational and involves symbolization of empirical presentations and reasonings about them. In the concluding section we will consider some of the educational implications of our findings.

3. Imitation We begin with and give most attention to the implications of imitation for cognitive development. The reason is that imitation is the most radical form of figuratively accommodating physical and social information. The psychological literature on imitation may be classified into two groups: The first group considers imitation as a type of behavioral phenomenon. Like all other behavioral phenomena, imitative phenomena are the product of other mechanisms such as conditioning and reinforcement. As such, one should be able to plot an ontogenetic growth curve for imitative behaviors. The second group considers imitation as a mechanism that produces behavior. For example, Miller and Dollard (1941) hypothesized that imitation is a secondary drive to behave. As such, imitation is a mechanism for the acquisition and growth of behavior. But imitation itself should not show an ontogenetic growth curve: It is a universal mechanism of learning. From the genetic epistemological point of view (Cassirer, 1953; Kohlberg, 1969; Langer, 1969a; Piaget, 1967; Werner, 1948) imitation represents perhaps the purest case of figurative accommodation, that is, directly extracting and reproducing aspects of the physical and social environment. Functionally, imitation represents the subject’s radical form of accommodating to objects. Structurally, it represents his radical form of Iiguratively schematizing parts of environmental configurations. Entailed in this epistemological analysis is a broad-gauged definition of imitation. Imitation may involve all or some of the following components: Following, tracing, selecting, getting an impression of and reproducing parts of physical or social objects or events. Thus defined, imitation plays a

Interactional

aspects of cognitive organization

15

significant part in the construction of object permanence (Cassirer, 1944; Piaget, 195 I), in the intersensory identification of form (Zaporotchets, 1965), etc.’ Imitation has its developmental roots in sensorimotor activity. Its original precursory form may be that of contagious activity. Piaget (195 1) reports observations in which his one- to six-day&d infant cried in response to hearing other infants cry or Piaget simulating crying sounds. The infant did not cry in response to other sounds of equal intensity. Clearer manifestations of precursory imitative activity is found by one month. Many observers report co-action by this age. For example, Zazzo (1953) found the following circular reaction. An infant sticks his tongue out, then the observer sticks his tongue out, the infant follows by sticking his tongue out, and so the cycle may continue for three or four co-active units. It should be observed that co-action seems to be found at this age only when (1) the neonate initially performs an act already present in his sensorimotor repertoire and (2) the social environment imitates the infant’s act. This leads to the hypothesis that the neonate’s co-action is already guided by a constructive schema in which the imitator is cognized (albeit in a nonconscious form) by the neonate as performing acts which are analogous to results that the neonate has already obtained himself. Deferred imitation, the most advanced form of sensorimotor imitation, develops around a year-andone-half when children begin to reproduce aspects of the performance of, or characteristics of, previously observed but presently absent physical or social models. Of special interest from the constructivist point of view are two features of deferred imitation: (1) The delay between the observation and the reproduction and (2) the often-times partial and transformed nature of the reproduction. These features are sufficient to suggest that the child’s schema already involves imaginal and memory components that guide his selective reproduction. Between the ages of two to seven years the child is relatively intuitive and egocentric. Piaget (195 1, p. 73) therefore hypothesized that, although somewhat influenced by his operative level of understanding, ‘the child often imitates without being aware of it, merely through confusion of his activity or his point of view with those of others’. During this stage the primary determinant of the child’s imitative activity is his figurative structures. The intuitive child’s imitation is marked by three features: (1) It is relatively automatic and nonconscious; (2) it is relatively direct and nonanalytic; and (3) it is relatively indiscriminate and nonselective. Between the ages of seven and eleven, with the development of concrete operations, imitation comes under greater sway of the child’s operative structures. Consequently, imitation becomes increasingly conscious, selective, analytic and discriminate. 1. We have already noted that accommodatory figurations are complemented by assimilatory operational functional structures. We should briefly add that perhaps the most pure form of assimilatory operations is play (Piaget, 1951: Werner, 1948). Functionally, play represents

the subject’s radical form of assimilating objects, that is, transforming the environment. Structurally, play represents his radical form of operatively constructing meaning and attributing significance to the environment.

16

Jonas Langer

From the perspective of social learning theory (e.g., Bandura and Walters, 1963; Bandura, 1969) the Piagetian hypothesis about the two- to seven-year-old (1) attributes too much rationality to the process of imitation and (2) underestimates the importance of imitation for development. Social learning theory makes two basic claims about imitation. The first is a behavioral claim. The claim is that as a behavior imitation is composed of two phases, an acquisition phase and a performance phase. The acquisition phase consists of the child observing a model (and probably storing a memory trace of the sensory impression). The performance phase consists of the child overtly reproducing his observation (and depends upon the schedule of reinforcement to the child or the model). The second claim is about the mechanism of development. The claim is that imitation is the mechanism of much, if not most, of the child’s behavioral development, particularly his social development. Furthermore, imitation is the mechanism by which all novel social behaviors are acquired by the child. The empirical basis for the behavioral claim is observational and experimental. Many observers have reported that young children may imitate in what appears on the surface to be an automatic fashion. Recently, these observations have been poured into an experimental mold. Numerous variations on the theme have been performed in the last ten years, but the following procedure used by Bandura and his colleagues seems paradigmatic. A child is brought into a room in which some toys are scattered and where an adult model is beating up a hobo doll. After performing this act the model leaves the room saying, ‘I’ll be back in a few minutes. You can do anything you want while I’m gone. I’ll have a prize for you when I get back’. The basic finding is that four- to six-year-old children imitate the model’s performance while he is gone. Our theoretical perspective led to a reinterpretation of the significance of such findings and the experimental design on which they are based. Essentially the reinterpretation was that four- to six-year-old children understand what they have been presented (in the bobo doll situation) as an implicit message, but an instruction nevertheless, to reproduce the presentation. Based upon this reinterpretation we performed an experiment (Kuhn and Langer, 1968) in which we introduced two additional variables to the standard procedure, an ontogenetic variable and an instructional variable: A. Age: Groups of three-year-olds (XC 3; 10) and four-year-olds (x= 4; 10) were tested. The expectation was that the threes would not understand the standard social-learning instructions as an implicit message to reproduce as compared to the fours. B. Instructional: In addition to replicating the social-learning condition, positive and negative explicit conditions were tested. The most explicit positive and negative conditions were the same as the implicit condition except that before leaving the room the model added that the child should or should not do ‘exactly what I did’, depending upon the condition. These two variables yielded three basic findings. First, very few of the three- and four-year-olds reproduced the model’s performance in the implicit condition. Second, the

fours imitated somewhat more than the threes. There was no difference in the reproductive behavior of the threes and fours in the explicit conditions, whether positive or negative. Third, almost all threes and fours reproduced in the positive explicit conditions. Almost none of the threes and fours reproduced in the negative explicit conditions. Taken together, the force of these findings is to seriously question the behavioral claim of social learning theory that imitation is an arational, automatic process of acquisition and performance. These findings also suggest that even the Piagetian hypothesis underestimates the constructive rationality that guides the young, intuitive child’s reproductive activity. Now let us consider the mechanism claim of social learning theory, namely, that imitation is the mechanism for the acquisition of novel behaviors and growth. With respect to progress from one developmental stage to the next, the claim rests empirically upon the findings of a study by Bandura and McDonald (1963). Taking off from an early work by Piaget (1968) on the ‘Moral judgment of the child’, Bandura and McDonald categorized children’s moral judgments into predominantly low judgments based upon consequences or predominantly high judgments based upon intentions. They tested fiveto eleven-year-odds on pairs of stories. Using modeiing as a training technique, ~andu~ and McDonald report about a 30% change in the children? judgments from their predominant category of response to their minor category of response. In a replication and extension of this study (Cowan, Langer, Haevenrich and Nathanson, 1969) two major findings emerged. First, it was extremely difficult to categorize many of the children’s judgments on the posttest. It was only possible to classify clearly the judgments based upon consequences as low. The rest of the judgments ranged vastly in their characteristics. These judgments were unclassifiable using the Bandura and McDonald two-category system. This makes much sense in light of Kohlberg’s (1963) extensive reanalysis of moral developments as involving many more stages and aspects than phenomenal consequences and intentional motivation. Second, even when we used the invalid procedure of arbitrarily assigning high scores to the children’s uncategor~zable judgments, the finding is a change of only about 30%. Almost 50% of the children’s judgments remained at their initial pretest level. These findings suggest that the children were confused by the apparent discrepancy between their own judgments and those of the model. This does not mean that their cognitive organization was transformed by imitation. Rather, it poses the possibility that such discrepancy may feed back different conceptual knowledge. That is, the presented discrepancy plus the (inferred) childrens’ confusion may provide the appropriate interactive conditions for figurative accommodation to anomolous social information. In turn this may perturb the existing cognitive organization if the developmental jump is a small elaboration. From the present epistemolo~~al perspective, then, modeling becomes a method of presenting conceptual objects at a less advanced, equal or more advanced level than the child’s own cognitive level. The purpose is to determine whether these conceptual objects

18

Jonas Langer

have any implications for the subject’s cognitive activity. This purpose is twofold. The first is to determine the effects of disparity and nondisparity upon the subject’s cognitive progress and regress. The second IS to determine the optimal range of disparity for generating intrinsic disequilibrium that may lead to progress. We already know that modeling conceptual disparity results in small progress in some subjects’ production of moral concepts (Turiel, 1966, 1969). We also know (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan, in press; Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) that when presented with reasoning by a model, subjects are able to recapitulate in their own words the model’s reasoning as long as it is below the level or the same level as the subject’s stage. They are able to recapitulate some but not all reasoning one stage above their own stage. Subjects are not able to recapitulate reasoning two stages above their own stage. One general conclusion that may be drawn from these findings on the effect of modeling on production and recapitualation is that the subject can imitate, with some fidelity, reasoning that is not new to him. However, he tends to assimilate reasoning that is new to him (that he has not himself previously produced) to his own structural stage. Thus, these findings seriously question (even more so than the findings of the Cowan et al., 1969 study) the mechanism claim of social learning theory that imitation leads to the development of novel moral behavior. We still did not know, however, whether modeling conceptual disparity would also result in some small progress when the concepts are more clearly the direct products of operative assimilation. This required investigating the implications of figuratively accommodating conceptual disparity for the production of purely logical concepts, rather than the more social concepts involved in moral judgments. The first investigation focused upon classification (Kuhn, 1969, 1972). FOUL- to eight-year-olds were divided into four groups and were presented with models dealing with classification problems (taken from Inhelder and Piaget, 1964) at different levels (--1 , 0, +l , +2) in relation to the children’s predominant level. Very little change was found. To the extent that change was observed, the children who were presented with small conceptual disparity in the progressive direction (tl) were most affected. Substantial progressive disparity (+2) resulted in even less change. And most of that change was not to the models’ t2 level but to the tl level. This particular finding is especially significant for the understanding of imitation because these subjects had not observed +l performances. Small regressive disparity (-1) resulted in the least change. Thus, the findings so far on both moral and logical concepts suggest that a model may present reasoning to a child whose form and content is novel to the child. If the form of the modeled concept is at the same level as the child’s conceptual stage (0), then novel content transfer is possible. If (a) the form is at a more advanced level than the child’s stage and (b) the structural disparity is within the limits of figurative accommodation (+I but not +2), then (c) interactive conditions for organizational progress are present. The central developmental and educational problem then becomes that of working out in a more refined fashion the limits of interactive disparity that can be transformed into

Interactional aspects

intrinsic disequilibrium (where modeling presenting conceptual disparity). 4. Appearance

becomes

ofcognitive

organization

one of the figurative

techniques

19

for

and reality

Imitation comes closest to the definition of extractive activity as direct representation of empirical knowledge, whether social or physical. A less direct but still extractive means for obtaining information about the empirical character of the environment is to compare the way things look with the way they really are. Consider the horizontal-vertical illusion. The vertical strip looks ionger. But if you take the strips apart and place one on top of the other you see that they are really equal in length. This is, then, an empirical way of evaluating the validity of judgments and may therefore play an important role in the logical concepts formed. As an initial approximation it seems reasonable to make three structural comparisons between the characteristics of figuratively accommodating configurations, such as perceptual illusions, and operatively assimilating events, such as physical deformations. These three refer to presentational, judgmental and ontogenetic features of cognitive structures (cf., Piaget, 1969): A. As environmental or experimental presentations, illusory configurations do not involve any actual deformation of a property of a static, single-state configuration. As presentations, deformation events, such as those presented in the well-known conservation tests, always involve two states in which the initial state is deformed into a resultant state. The presentation is a dynamic, multiple-state event. B. As judgments, illusions are the product of the accommodatory distribution of visual fixations upon the configurations. The mental products are percepts, such as the percept that one line is longer than another. Such percepts are probabilitic: The magnitude of the illusory effect fluctuates from moment to moment, and the subject is never completely certain of the accuracy of his judgment. As judgments, conservations are the product of assimilatory operations. Such concepts are necessary in the sense that the judgments are all or none - either the lines must logically be the same despite the observed deformation or they do not have to be the same. The judgmental difference between illusions and conservations is consistent with the comparative findings (Piaget, 1969) that: (1) Five-year-old children perceive one of two lines as a bit longer in a single-state illusion task when conceiving their length as unequal in a parallel multiple-state conservation task; while (2) eight-year-olds perceive one of the lines as much longer in an illusion task but conceive their length as equal in a parallel conservation task. Thus, the perceptual illusion increases during the same ontogenetic period in which the conceptual distortion disappears. C. As ontogenetic phenomena, illusory judgments persist throughout life. The change is merely quantitative, that is, the magnitude of some increase with age while that of others decrease. Illusory judgments persist notwithstanding the distinction that is

20

Jonas Lunger

acquired at about seven between subjective appearance and empirical reality. The illusory experience persists in the horizontal-vertical illusion, for example, even when the observer is fully aware that he is viewing an illusion. As ontogenetic phenomena, judgments of nonconservation are no longer produced after the equilibration of concrete logical operations at about eleven years old. The change is qualitative, that is, conceptions of nonconservation are completely rejected as illogical, and conservation concepts are substituted as logically necessary and universal. Nor is there any persistence of the subjective experience of nonconservation. This analysis of the functional structures of illusory and deformation phenomena was the basis for testing a series of experimental conditions @anger and Strauss, 1972).* They were designed to examine the systematic relations of (1) the acquisition of the empirical distinction between appearance and reality, with (2) the development of the logical operations of identity. The results are most pertinent. First, children who were diagnosed on the pretest as at the stage of intuitive operations did not change their nonconservation concepts. Successful training in discriminating between the appearance and reality of (a) perceptual illusions or (b) conceptual distortions did not induce progress in conservation judgments in the training group as compared with a control group of intuitive children. Second, some children who were diagnosed, on a pretest, as at a transitional stage (between the intuitive and the concrete operational stage) seemed to profit from the training procedure. Training may lead to advances in understanding the relations between the subjective appearance and the empirical reality of physical phenomena. However, such an advance in accomodatory figurations does not induce parallel progress in the assimilatory operations of intuitive children. It seems rather to feed back to the nascent concrete operations of some transitional children who have already developed partial concrete operational structures. Of course, the claim can be made for many types of training strategies that intuitive children are less susceptible and transitional children are more susceptible to cognitive change (cc, Strauss, 1973). Nevertheless, it is of no small interest to our considerations that one of the training strategies which may interact with the assimilatory operations of the transitional child, if not the intuitive child, involves accomodatory figurations.

5. Prediction

and outcome

A partially related and a most promising figurative means of accommodating empirical information is to evaluate hypotheses in light of data. Such verification activity often leads to reformulation in our empirical knowledge. Furthermore, it seems plausible that such empirical knowledge feeds back to the organization of assimilatory operations, leading in certain crucial instances to conceptual reorganization, Thus, viewing certain 2. The reader concerned with the literature on appearance/reality will recognize the difference

between the present position and Shanks (1965a, 1965b).

and that of Braine

Interactional

aspects of cognitive organization

situations may mislead the child into focusing upon empirical variables that he would be better off excluding from his logical calculations in certain conceptual situations. The reason would seem to be that the character of the presentation leads to the figurative accommodation of empirical misinformation that feeds back to the child’s operations. Some possible methodological consequences are that screening the pouring of liquid in a conservation task may facilitate conservation conception (Bruner, 1966) and presenting class-inclusion problems in a verbal rather than pictorial form may facilitate part-whole reasoning (Wohlwill, 1968). In order to look at the independent and interactive effects that these two factors prediction/outcome and screening - might have upon the operative conception of conservation, four training conditions were investigated (Strauss and Langer, 1970): Prediction and screening; prediction and no screening; prediction, outcome and screening; prediction, outcome and no screening. The relevant findings were: (1) Whatever progressive change occurred in the intuitive children as a result of the various experimental conditions, the control children have caught up by the second posttest. (2) The transitional children seem to profit from the various conditions and maintain some advantage over the control children through the second posttest. (3) Prediction and outcome experience without screening seems to be most effective with both intuitive and transitional children. (4) Screening without prediction and outcome experience is not effective with intuitive children; it may be effective with some transitional children. Thus, the prediction and outcome activity seems to be more influential in changing assimilatory operations than screening. The implications of prediction and outcome experience for the alteration of operative assimilation seems to be limited to the transitional child who has already partially developed concrete operations. It does not seem to change the assimilatory operations of the child who is at the stage of intuitive operations. Experience in comparing predictions with outcomes and in relating appearance with reality are, at least in part, ways of teaching children empirical verification procedures. The evidence so far suggests that if they have any implications for the formation of assimilatory operations they only influence the disequilibrated, that is, partial functional structures of transitional children. There are at least three plausible reasons why the purely intuitive children in these experiments were not affected. First, the verification procedures do not involve active or spontaneous experimenting on the part of the subject but rather only permit following what the trainer is doing. Second, the verification procedures do not lead to any strikingly observable anomalies that would perturb an intuitive child’s existing accommodatory figurations. Third, the intuitive child’s functional structures are not competent to appreciate the cognitive significance of the empirical verification procedures he is experiencing. A study by Coie (1969) provides some preliminary hints on these issues. Older (elevenyear-old) but not younger (seven-year-old) children seem able to profit from active verification procedures. The older children’s level of verification activity is more advanced

22

Jonas Lunger

on a somewhat anomalous event, regardless of whether they predicted correctly or incorrectly. The more advanced their level of verification activity, the greater the progressive change in their subsequent level of explaining the event.

6. Symbolic medium So far we have focused upon three means of sccommodatory figurations that may be considered as primarily systems for extracring empirical information. We have paid special attention to some of the implications that these means may have for assimilatory operations. Now we will turn to some parallel considerations, but we will focus upon a means of accommodatory figurations that is primarily representational. Previously (Langer, 1969b) we reported some work on the interaction between the medium in which a conceptual problem is presented and the medium in which the child represents the problem and thinks about it. Here we will also be concerned with the unidirectional implications of the medium in which a conceptual problem is presented for the child’s assimilatory operations. To begin with let us consider some research on the development of classificatory activity. Jennings (1969) examined class-inclusion reasoning when the presentation of the objects to be considered were embodied in either the pictorial or the verbal medium. The pictorial condition took the form, for example, of presenting subjects with pictures of six roses and two violets and asking ‘Are there more flowers or more roses?’ In the comparable verbal condition the subjects were zimply asked ‘If I had six roses and two violets, would I have more flowers or more roses?’ Kindergarten (x= 5; 11 years) and first-grade (x = 7; 1 years) boys were tested. The childrens’ classificatory reasoning was examined for both the operational level of their solutions and their explanations. Consider their solutions first. Kindergarten children produced more correct concrete-operational type solutions to the verbal than to the pictorial forms. Although the difference is not statistically significant, it is in the direction of replicating Wohlwill’s (1968) findings. However, the frequency of correct concrete-operational type solutions produced by first graders is about the same for the pictorial and verbal forms. Now consider the childrens’ operational level of explanation. Only the first graders produced concrete-operational explanations for their solutions. Concrete-operational explanations occurred more frequently on the pictorial than the verbal presentations. A child’s explanation was judged to be concrete operational in accordance with the Inhelder and Piaget (1964) criterion of a solution that is justified in terms of subordinate/superordinate or part/whole relations, such as ‘cuz dogs and horses are both animals’. Finally, consider these two results together. It appears that the medium of presentation influences the operational level of the explanations of seven-year-olds but not that of their solutions. Conversely, the medium seems to influence the level of solutions of

Itlteractional aspects

ofcognitive

organization

23

kindergarten children but not that of their explanations. There are numerous methodological problems with the studies mentioned so far. A central methodological problem for the theory of cognitive development is to distinguish between (a) the presentational medium in which conceptual problems are posed and (b) the symbolic medium in which the cognizer represents the presentation. Consider a brief illustration. The screening procedure used in some investigations (e.g., Frank in Bruner, 1966) were designed, at least in part, to vitiate ikonic representation by the children and to induce them to symbolize verbally. It is true that they cannot perceive the water level behind the screen. But there is no way of knowing that the children are not imagining the water level; and imaging is a mode of ikonic representation. As a matter of fact screening is the type of technique used by Piaget and Inhelder (1963, 1966) in order to study the child’s mental imagery. We know from their extensive investigation of this problem that the visual imagery which the child produces is usually no more advanced than his operational stage of competence. Consequently, if the screening technique leads the intuitive child to figurative imagery then it should not have a facilitative effect upon his assimilatory operations. Recall that this is precisely what we found for intuitive children on the screening without prediction and outcome condition: It had no progressive effect on operational conservation reasoning (Strauss and Langer, 1970). The issue, then, is a delicate one that has important theoretical ramifications, particularly with respect to the organizational relations between assimilatory operations and accommodatory figurations. It poses delicate problems because it is immensely difficult to control the medium of representation in which the child thinks. The ideal empirical approach would be to systematically investigate the consequences for cognitive competence and performance (i.e , comprehension, production and appreciation; cf, Langer, 1969~) of the intersection of the: (A) Medium of presentation - pictorial, practical, gestural (signs), verbal, notational, with the (B) medium of representation - graphic, gestural, imaginal, verbal, notational. The intersection of the presentation and symbolic media would then be considered in relation to the structure of the problem: (C) Figurative - empirical (D) operative - logical. It should, of course, be remembered that few problems are purely figurative or operative but can be posed so as to be predominantly one or the other. An earlier paper @anger, 1969b) reported some of our work along these lines. To give a brief additional illustration, consider part of one follow-up study conducted by Schwartz (1970). The study investigated the effect of the child’s drawing the verbal presentation of a set of objects prior to questioning versus after questioning. The questioning was on his logical conceptualization of a class-inclusion problem about the objects. What is most interesting to note for our purposes is that sixth-grade subjects seemed to correctly solve the problem at a concrete-operational level almost twice as

24

Jonas Langer

frequently if they drew the verbal presentation before being questioned about it (17 out of 20 Ss) than if the drawing followed questioning (10 out of 20 5’s). Such results suggest that the medium of presentation and representation does not have the primary significance for intellectual development attributed to it by Werner and Kaplan (1963) and Bruner et al. (1966). On the other hand, the forms of symbolic activity seem to have greater significance for the development of assimilatory operations than that attributed to them by Piaget (e.g., Piaget and Inhelder, 1966). In general, operative assimilation is the primary system of intellegence, and figurative accommodation is the secondary system. As such, operative assimilation should have greater implications for figurative accommodation than the reverse. As we have seen, however, the medium of presentation has some significant differential influence upon the solution of and reasoning about crass-inclusion problems depending upon the age of the child. Furthermore, the medium of representation effects the formation of logical class-inclusion concepts depending upon the child’s stage of producing such concepts.

7. ConcI~ions The findings summarized here and elsewhere (Langer, 1969b, 1970a, 1970b) permit the formation of a number of hypotheses on the development and organization of functional structures. In turn, they lead to certain hypotheses about education. The d~e~~~~e~~a~ hypothesis is that the organization of the child’s stage sets Limits to his interaction with his environment. This means that the or~a~zation of functional structures at each stage is resistant to extrinsic inducement to alterations in its intrinsic stage sequence and rate of development. Extrinsic experience and training should have minimal effects upon progressive or regressive development. To the extent that the child assimilates extrinsic inducements to change, he is most susceptible to movement in the same direction as his natural progress to one stage ahead of his predominant stage level. Reciprocally, (a) the child is most resistant to regressive movement in the opposite direction of his natural intrinsic development, that is, to one stage behind his predominant stage level, and (b) the child cannot skip any of the stages in the sequence of development. This developmental hypothesis also implies that the functional structures of a given stage must be at least partially present for interaction to lead to learning, in the triple sense of consolidating, elaborating and generaliz~g these functional structures. This is the reason why empirical training such as relating predictions to outcomes and comparing appearance to reality remains extrinsic inducement for the intuitive child. Such empirical training can have little implication for his development of concrete operations. It is also part of the reason why such empirical training may lead to some progress in the transitional child since he is in ~sequ~ibrium, and he has already partially developed the functional structures of the more advanced stage.

Interactional aspects

of cognitive

organization

25

The organizational hypothesis is that cognition is a multi-leveled network of functional structures. The first corollary hypothesis, that this network is composed of two major sets of functional structures, assimilatory operations and accommodatory figurations, has already been considered at the outset of this essay. The second corollary hypothesis, that the network of functional structures is multileveled, has not yet been described directly. This is the hypothesis that ‘stage mixture’ (Turiel, 1969) or mixture of functional structures is the intrinsic source of development &anger 1969b, 1970b). Not all the functional structures are at the same developmental level. Some accommodatory figurations may be more developed than other accommodatory figurations and assimilatory operations. More important for cognitive development, some assimilatory operations may outstrip and regulate other functional structures. This constant state of intrinsic disequilibrium or dynamic equilibrium is the source of self-generated development. A third corollary hypothesis is that the network of functional structures is not only multi-leveled, but it is also an open gridwork (Langer, 1970b). The gridwork radiates outward to interact with the physical and social environment. For structural and adaptive reasons this interaction leads to discrepancies between parts of the gridwork and parts of the environment. This constitutes the interactive basis for organizational disequilibrium. The optimal conditions for progress would then be an intersection of intrinsic and interactive disequilibrium. These conditions of relating structural form to empirical content seem to be met when (1) the person is in a transitional phase, that is, a multi-leveled state of functional structures, and (2) the person is engaged in a variety of figurative accommodatory activities that provide him with empirical information. It is the feedback and feed-forward between form and content that leads to developmental and organizational change. An educational hypothesis flows from this developmental and organizational analysis. Children and adolescents diagnosed to be in a transitional phase, where they have already partially developed more advanced funtional structures than those of their dominant stage, are somewhat susceptible to progressive elaboration of their more advanced functional structures via a variety of empirical training procedures. But the findings point in the direction that the progress can only be a small step and is probably not very stable, at least when the procedures are short-term as in the studies described here. An important educational consideration is the apparent discrepancy between the genotypical potential for cognitive development and its phenotypical actualization. The theory of cognitive development asserts genotypic development to a stage of formal, logical operations and principled moral judgments @anger, 1969a, 1970~). The crosscultural data on moral development indicate that individuals in all cultures actually develop to the level of conventional morality that precedes the stages of principled morality (Kohlberg, 1969). The rate of attainment varies somewhat between cultures. Fewer than a third of all people progress further to the level of principled morality. The cross-cultural data on logical development indicate that individuals in all cultures develop

26

Jonas Langer

to the level of concrete operations that precedes the stage of formal operations (Dasen, 1972). Again, the rate of progress varies somewhat between cultures. It has not yet been ascertained precisely what proportion of the population continues progressing to the stage of formal operations, but it is likely that not more than half do so (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan, in press). Apparently, then, all people actualize their potential for concrete logic and conventional morality regardless of whether their rate of progress is a bit faster or a bit slower. More significant, and much more disturbing, is the fact that most people do not actualize their potential for principled morality and, possibly, formal logic. This fact points to an obvious educational conclusion. The primary goal is not to focus upon accelerating the rate of developmental progress. The goal is to focus upon actualizing adolescents’ genotypic potential for formal logical and principled moral thinking and action. A promising approach is to build upon the adolescents’ competence to benefit from active verification procedures and his intrinsic state of structural disequilibrium. It just might turn out that children will actualize to the concrete operational and conventional moral stages regardless of the education they obtain. On the other hand, the kind of education adolescents are given might have a much greater effect upon their development - particularly whether they actualize their potential for formal operations and principled morality.

REFERENCES

Bandura, A., and McDonald, F. J. (1963) Influence of social reinforcement and the behavior of models in shanina children’s moral judgments. J. abn. sol. Psychoi., 67, 274-281. -and Walters, R. (1963) Social learnirgand personality development. New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston. (1969) Social-learning theory of identiticatory processes. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization. Chicago., Rand McNally. Bower, T. G. R. (1967) The development of object permanence: Some studies of existence constancy. Pert. Psychophy., 2, 411--418. Braine, M. D. S., and Shanks, B. L. (1965a) The development of conservation of size. J. verb. Learn. verb. Beh., 4, 227-242. and Shanks, B. L. (1965b) The conservation of a slope property and a proposal about the origin of the conservations. Can. .I. Psychol., 19, 197-207.

Brainerd, C. J., and Allen, T. W. (1971) Experimental inductions of the conservation of ‘first-order’ quantitative invariants. Psychol. Bull., 75, 128-144. Bruner, J. S. et al. (1966) Studies in cognitive growth. New York, Wiley. Cassirer, E. (1944) The concept of group and the theory of perception. Phil. phenom. Res.. 5, l-35. _ _ -- (1953) Philosophy of svmboli: forms. New Haven, YaleVUniversity Press.- Originally published in 1923. Coie, J. D. (1969) An ontogenic study of the use of explanation and related verification activities. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. Cowan, P. A., Langer, J., Heavenrich, J., and Nathanson, J. (1969) Social learning and Piaget’s cognitive theory of moral development. J. Pers. sot. Psychol., 11, 261-214. Dasen, P. A. (1972) Cross-cultural Piagetian research: A summary. J. cross-cult. Psychol. 3,23-39.

Interactional

Inhelder, B., and Piaget, J. (1964) Early growth of logic in the child. New York, Harper & Row. Jennings, J. R. (1969) The effect of verbat and pictorial presentation on class inclusion competence and performance. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley. Kohlberg, L. (1963) The development of children’s orientation toward a moraI order. Vita Hum., 6, 11-33. (1969) Stage and sequence: The developmental approach to socialization. in D. Go&n (Ed.), Handbook of socialization. New York, Rand McNafiy. Kuhn, D. (1969) Patterns of imitative behavior in children from 3 to 8: A study of imitation from a cognitive-developmental perspective. Unpublished doctorai dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. -(1972) Mechanisms of change in the development of cognitive structures. Child Devel., 43,833-844. -and Langer, J. (1968) Cognitive devefopmental determinants of imitation. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley. -Langer, J., Kohlberg, H., and Haan, N. (in press) The development of formai operations in logical and moral judgments. J. gen. Psychol. Mono. Langer, J. (1964) Implications of Piaget’s talks for curriculum. J. Res. Science Teach., 2, 208. 213. (1969a) Theories of development. New York, Halt. Rinehart & Winston. (1969b) Disequilibrium as a source of development. In P. H. Mussen, J. Langer and M. Covington (Eds.1, Trends and issues in developm>rttal. psychology. New York, Holt, Rinehart &Winston. (1969c) (1969c) Some structural aspects of the development of moral conduct. Paper presented at the meetings of SRCD. (1970a) Werner’s comparative organismic theory. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Gzrmichael’s manual of child psychology. New York, Wiley. (19’70b) Mental regeneration. in M. Wohns and M. Gottesman (Eds.), Group care. New York, Gordon. (1970~) The development of the individuaf. Chapter 10 in Psychology today: An introduction. Del Mar, California, CRM.

aspects

of’ wgnitive organization

27

-- - and Strauss, S. (1972) Appearance, reality, and identity. Cog., 1, 105--128. Michotte, A. (1963) The perception of causalify. New York, Basic Books. Miller. N. E.. and Dollard. J. (19411 Social learning and imitation. ’ New’ Haven, Yale University Press. Plagct, J. (1950) Psychology of intelligence. New York., Harcourt, Brace & World. (1951) Play, dreams and imitation in childhood. New York. Norton. (1967) Biologie et ‘connaissance. Paris, Galhmard. -- (1968) The moral judgment of the child. New York, Free Press. Originally published in 1932. (1969) The mechanisms of perception. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published in 196 1. and Inhelder, B. (1969a) Mental images. In P. Fraisse and J. Piaget (Eds.), h’xperimental psychology: VII. Intelligence. New York, Basic Books. and Inhelder, B. (1969b) Intellect~Iral operations and their development. In P. Fraisse and J. Piaget (Eds.), Experimental psychology: VII. Intelligence. New York, Basic Books. and Inhelder, B. (I 966) L ‘image mentate chez i’enfant. Paris, P.U.F. and Inhelder, B. (1968) Memotie et intelligence. Paris, P.U.F. Rest, J., Turiel, E., and Kohlberg, L. (1969) Level of moral development as a determinant of preference and comprehension of moral judgments made by others. J. Pers., 37.225-252. Schwartz, C. (1970) Developmental aspects of class inclusion. Unpub~sh~d doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. Sinclair, H. (1967) Acquisition du langage et development de la pensee. Paris, Dunod. Strauss, S. (1973) Inducing cognitive development and learning. Cog., 1, 329-357. and Langer, J. (1970) Operational thought inducement. Child Devel., 41, 163-175. Turiel, E. (1966) An experimental test of the sequentiality of developments stages in the child’s moral judgments. J. Pers. sot. PsychoI.. 3,611.-618.Turiel, E. (1969) Developmental processes in the child’s moral thinking. In P. H. Mussen, J. Langer and M. Covington (Eds.), Trends and issues in developmental psy-

28

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Langer

cho[ogy. New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Werner, H. (1948) Comparative psychology of mental development. New York, International Universities Press. Werner, H., and Kaplan, B. (1963) Symbol formation. New York, Wiley. Wohlwill, I. F. (1968) Children’s responses to class inclusion questions with verbally and pictorially presented items. Child Devel., 39,449-467.

Zaporotchets, A. V. (1965) The development of perception in the preschool child. Mono. sot. Rex child Devel., 30 (2), 822 101. Zazzo, R. (1953) The behavior of new-born anencephalics with various degrees of anencephaly. In J. M. Tanner and B. Inhelder (Eds.), Discussions on child develop men& Vol. 1. New York, IUP.

RbumP Dans cet article I’auteur avance des propositions pour completer la theorie du developpement structural du changement cognitif que Langer a prksente en 1969. L’analyse se centre ici sur a) l’organisation des operations d’animation et des representations d’accomodation; b) les coordinations intrinseques entre les approches cogni-

tives theoriques et empiriques respectivement construites avec les deux formes de structures fonctionnelles; c) les changements dans le developpement cognitif dus aux coordinations intrinseques. Des hypotheses theoriques d&iv&es sont etudies dans le cadre des ddcouvertes resumees ici et ailleurs.

2

Conservation

of weight in infants*

PIERRE MOUNOUD University

of Geneva

T. G. R. BOWER University

of Edinburgh

Abstract Conservation of weight can be defined as the ability to affirm that the weight of an object remains invariant during the transformations of the form of the object. It is known to be achieved at a conceptual level at about 9 years of age. The behavior of infants seems to indicate that between 6 and 18 months of age they develop a sensorimotor form of conservation.

1. Introduction Piaget (1937, 1941a, 1967) has described the development of the concept of conservation in children between 4 and 14 years of age. At the beginning of this period children are incapable of affirming that the volume, weight or substance of an object is independent of its arrangement in space. If such a child is shown two identical balls of plasticine, he will agree that there is the same amount in each and that they weigh the same. If one ball is then rolled out into a sausage shape, with the child watching the transformation, the child will typically say that there is more plasticine in the sausage than in the remaining ball and that the sausage will weigh more than the ball because it is longer or that there is less plasticine and the sausage will weigh less because it is thinner. The child does not realize that weight, volume and substance are invariant under transformation of shape. At the end of this stage of development, children are aware of this invariance during transformations. These acquisitions originate in the sensorimotor behavior of the baby. The baby elaborates through his actions what the child between 4 and 10 years elaborates by means of his thought processes (Piaget, 1937, 1941a, 1967). Consequently, it is important to study the way in which this construction is effected at these more fundamental levels (Mounoud, 1971,1973). * This research was supported by M. R. C. Grants Nos. G969/559/C and G912/982/C. Cognition 3(l), pp. 29-40

30

Pierre Mounoud and T. G. R. Bower

Conservation or the lack of it must have effects on the success or failure of simple, everyday behavior. Consider the act of picking up an object and transporting it to the mouth, an act that children engage in from the age of six months or so. For that act to be performed successfully, the child must adjust the force of his grip to the weight of the object - if the grip is too light, the object will slip out of the hand; if too strong, the object may be crushed. In order for the baby to transport various different objects to his mouth with accuracy, he must appropriately adjust the tension of his arm muscles to the weight of the objects. He must relate the variations in size and form with variations in weight and also must recognize that transformations of observable aspects of the object or of the distribution of its elements do not entail a modification of its weight. Most children in most cultures play with plastic substances ~ playdoh, plasticine, flour and water or plain clay - whose shape changes in the course of the play, leaving weight, volume and substance unchanged; every time this happens the child is faced by a conservation problem at a behavioral level. While conservation of weight at the concrete operational stage is evidenced at 8 or 9 years, casual observation would indicate an awareness of conservation in behavior well before that age. The experiments to be reported here were designed to make such observations in a systematic way. The results indicate that conservation, realized through actions, is achieved during infancy by the age of 18 months. Conservation of weight was selected for study. As was mentioned above, accurate transport of an object requires at least two adjustments to the weight of the object, the degree of muscular contraction of the arm and the force of the grasp. Before testing for conservation of weight it is necessary to ensure that the relevant behaviors have certain other characteristics. First of all the subject must show a differentiated response to weight; if a subject simply applies the same pressure or arm tension every time any object is presented, giving the same response on every occasion regardless of weight, there is no point in testing for conservation since conservation behavior would necessarily appear. Suitable response differentiation can be demonstrated by adaptive changes in response to a single object. The first time anyone, even an adult, is presented with an unfamiliar object which is not part of a set, there is no basis on which to judge the weight of the object. The weight might be overestimated or underestimated, but only by purest fluke could even an adult correctly gauge the weight of such an object. On repeated presentations, however, force of grasp and arm tension should adjust to the weight of the object. To be relevant to conservation, such adjustments must be anticipatory and based on visual information. Thus the improvement in performance must be specific to objects which can be identified as the same on the basis of visual information, so that anticipation of weight is made prior to actual manipulation of the object. However, adapted responses to a single familiar object do not demonstrate sufficient capacity to make conservation testing worthwhile. Before beginning conservation testing it is necessary to establish that the adaptation is based on visual size. An infant could adapt to a single object, demonstrating perfect behavior, by recognizing the object on the

basis of pattern or markings on it. If the relevant pattern or mark were invariant under the shape transfarmation, then we would necessarily obtain conservation behavior with no need for attainment of the concept that weight is invariant under shape transformations. Only if the visual basis for adapted behavior is seen size is conseffation testing meaningful. One can only demonstrate that seen size is the basis of adaptation to the weight of a single object if there is some transfer of adaptation to a new object of the same material but different size. If the baby adapts to an object of size x and weighty, one could then give him an object of size 2x and weight 2y. Ideally there would be no error at alf on first presentation of 2x, if seen size were the basis of the adaptation, An acceptable criterion of performance would be that the error on first presentation of 2x be no greater than the error on the last presentation ofx. A minimal criterion would be that the error with 2x for a group given experience with x would be that they showed an error indicating greater expectation of weight than a group given no previous experience ofx. In the context of behavior this could mean a lessened drop of the arm on taking 2X. If these criteria are met one can proceed to test for conservation behavior. A paradigm for test would be to adapt the subject to a particular object and then to transform the object. If there is conservation of weight, the first response after transformation should ideally show no errors, or no greater error than the last response prior to transformation. To summarize then, it is necessary before testing for conservation to ensure that the subject is capable of differentiated adaptive responses to weight, which are anticipatory and based on seen size. If these criteria are met one can proceed to conservation testing. In the context of the two adjustments necessary for accurate transport of an object, error as used above means a drop or elevation of the arm on tak’lng an object or else application of too little grasp force to hold an object or more force than is required to hold the object.

2.1 Subjects Six groups of five infants experiment.

aged between

6 and

Ifi months

served as subjects

in this

2.2 Procedure The objects used in the arm tension experiment were a series of brass rods, all 2.5 cm in diameter, of length 2.5 cm, 5.0 cm, 7.5 cm and 10.0 cm, whose weights were 110 grams, 220 grams, 330 grams and 440 grams, respectively. They constituted the seriation set. The third cylinder in this series (330 gr.) was paired with a visually identical hollow cylinder weighing 100 gr. There was also an object which could be transformed, a

32

Pierre Mounoud and T. G. R. Bower

15 .O cm high 2.5 cm diameter brass rod, weighing 550 grams, hinged in the center so that it could be doubled over and locked to make a double rod 7.5 cm high. An additional transformable object that was occasionally used consisted of a lump of playdoh that had lead bearings concealed in it. This object could be rolled into a ball or a sausage without revealing the lead. Its weight was 250 grams, its volume 50 ccs. Subjects were initially given the seriation set in ascending and then descending order (item 1). Each object was presented several times in a row, followed by the next in the series, again presented several times in a row. Objects were presented by hand in such a way that the infants were forced to reach out to take them. The arm could thus drop, raise or rest stable. The item involving the illusory identity between the two cylinders (item 2), consisted of presenting three times in succession the heavy cylinder (item 2a) and immediately after presenting the hollow cylinder (item 2b). (Response to this sequence tells us whether or not the infant expects visually identical objects to weigh the same.) After this substitution item has been presented, the transformable object was introduced, either fully extended or doubled (item 3). After three presentations it was transformed with the infants watching and then presented again. This terminated the experiment, save for a few infants who were given a conservation test with the playdoh object. Behavior was recorded on videotape. The measure adopted was the amplitude of hand drop or hand elevation on presentation of an object, measured by comparing the position of the hand on taking the object with its position 250 msecs later. The time interval was chosen to ensure that we were obtaining a measure of anticipation, our assumption being that 250 msecs was too short a time to allow for recovery from an initial error. Response to item 1 was intended to tell us whether the baby was capable of adapted, differentiated responses to weight. Items 2a and 2b were intended to tell us whether or not these responses were cued by visual size, while item 3 was the conservation test.

2.3 Results The arm drop measure worked well, except for infants of 11-13 months (see Figs. 1,2 and 3). We would expect that if the infants were able to adjust their reaching and grasping behavior for the same object when it is given several times in succession, there would be a diminution in the amount of arm drop or arm elevation between the first and last presentations of the same object. Table 1 gives the results for item 2a. They indicate that at all the ages there was such an adjustment.’ 1. Rather than taking the object and then transporting it, as the younger and older babies do, infants in the age range 11-13 months integrated taking and transport into a single movement. This made it impossible to use the simple arm-drop measure. A measure based on path

and speed of movement would be required, and it would be difficult to give a simple quantitative measure of the aberrant trajectories produced. It is not therefore possible to include the data from this age group in Table 1.

33

Conservation of weight in infants

Table 1.

Age

Mean drop (-) or elevation (+) on first presentation of object (item 2a)

Mean drop (-) or elevation (+) on third presentation of object (item 2a)

6 months 7 months 8 months 9.5 months 15 months

-50 -35 -10 -20 -30

-20 -10

_

0 +15 -15

t* 5.0 6.25 4.0 9.84 4.75

P