Clive Caldwell, Air Ace

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Clive Caldwell Air Ace PGS

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Clive Caldwell, Air Ace

Kristen Alexander


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First published in 2006 Copyright © Kristen Alexander 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email: [email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Alexander, Kristen, 1963–. Clive Caldwell, air ace. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 978 1 74114 705 6 ISBN 1 74114 705 0 1. Caldwell, Clive. 2. Australia. Royal Australian Air Force—Biography. 3. Air pilots, Military—Australia— Biography. 4. World War, 1939–1945—Aerial operations, Australian. I. Title. 940.544994092 Maps on pages viii–x reproduced with permission from the Australian War Memorial Index compiled by Russell Brookes Set in 11.5/14 pt Bembo by Midland Typesetters, Australia. Printed and bound in Australia by Griffin Press 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


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Contents

Acknowledgements Prologue General note Introduction

iv xi xv xvii

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

1 20 39 54 71 87 102 120 137 154 171 187 205

The Budding Fighter Pilot Shadow Shooting Sweeps and Convoys Operation Crusader Shark Squadron Interregnum Darwin Defence The Day the Planes ‘All Fell into the Sea’ Australia’s Highest Scoring Fighter Ace Fighter Pilot, Manqué Morotai The Barry Inquiry Court-martial and Beyond

Epilogue Appendices A: Highlights of Caldwell’s flying career B: Air Board Order ‘N’ 548 of 1944 C: Group Captain Caldwell’s Request of 9 April 1945 for Termination of Commission D: Particulars supplied by Group Captain Caldwell of his allegations on 13 April 1945 E: Terms of Reference under Air Force Regulations for the Barry Inquiry F: Charge Sheet—24 December 1945 G: Award citations H: Aircraft flown by or encountered by Caldwell during his flying career Notes Bibliography Index

223 229 236 237 239 241 243 245 246 249 280 294


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Acknowledgements

I have been privileged to accept the assistance of many people. Without these, this biography would not have happened and it would have been a much poorer effort. I am grateful to those who shared their memories, and I appreciate the time they took to either write or speak with me: Bobby Gibbes,Ted Sly, Jim Grant,Archie Wilson, Stan Plowright, Milton Howard, Dick Hutchinson, Paul Tillery, Jack Sheridan, Bruce Read, Leo Dairos, Bob Neale, Max Brinsey, John Bailey, Adam Gillespie, Norman Mulcahy, David Robertson, Tom Lewis, Ross Cox, Frank Parsons, Geordie Kerr, Cedric Merz, Roy Pearce, Kevin Warburton, Murray Brown, John Burnett, Alex Henshaw, Allan Righetti, Geoff Sloman, Syd Taylor, Alan Stewart and Ken Fox. Of these, I would particularly like to express my deepest gratitude to Bobby Gibbes for providing me with access to his personal papers; to Jim Grant, who unstintingly provided background information on Darwin’s 1943 air war and welcome comments on an early draft of my ‘The Day the Planes “All Fell Into the Sea”’ chapter; and to Archie Wilson, who graciously responded to my many emailed questions and who read an early draft of the section relating to 250 Squadron. Some people, unfortunately, will never know how much I valued their assistance and this is a particular sadness to me. Ross Williams, Peter Quinn, Laurie Hill, Fred Woodgate and August Graf von Kageneck were all ill when they shared their stories with me. Despite this, Peter and Laurie both made a point of contacting me shortly before they died, and I enjoyed lengthy correspondences with both Fred and August until their deaths. I fondly remember the day I spent with Ross and his iv


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Acknowledgements

wife Elizabeth—I enjoyed their hospitality and Ross’ reminiscences of Caldwell. Thank you and vale Ross, Peter, Laurie, Fred and August. I also thank those family members who shared stories and records of their relatives. My thanks go to Frankie Whittle, Dorothy Hill,Alan James, Stephen Tatham, Rick Lindmark, David Freedman, Don Clark and Suzanne Falkiner. I am especially grateful to Roz Davies who chatted with me for many hours about her father, Doug Doyle, and her memories of the early business operations of Caldwell, her father and George Falkiner. As a member of the Military Historical Society of Australia, I am privileged to know a group of people who willingly and untiringly assist researchers. I especially thank Col Simpson for planting the seed for this book and Brad Manera for helping it to take root; Ric Pelvin for his constructive criticism and for the loan of his unpublished paper on the First Tactical Air Force; Anthony Staunton for assistance in burying furphies and information on awards; and Jim Underwood and Graham Wilson for happily answering many questions over the years. I have taken advantage of many publicly held records and I commend the services provided by, and the staff of, the Australian War Memorial’s private records, sound collection, art and heraldry sections and research room; the Northern Territory Archives Service; the National Library of Australia; the National Archives of Australia; the National Screen and Sound Archive; and the National Archives of the United Kingdom. I would also like to thank Peter Radtke of The Aviation Historical Society of the Northern Territory Inc., who personally provided me with access to the records of the Society and shared some of his memories of Clive Caldwell. In particular, I extend my thanks to current and former staff members of the Office of Air Force History: Janet Beck, Mollie Angel, David Wilson and Mike Nelmes. I also thank the following who have provided me with access to records and other information: Alf Bell, honorary secretary of the 250 Squadron Association; Ray Hart, honorary secretary of the Spitfire Association; Rex Ruwoldt, honorary secretary of Darwin Defenders 1942–45 Inc.; Peter Ellis, JP, honorary secretary of the Albion Park RSL Sub-Branch; John Forestier and June Smith; Bob and Misako Piper; Buz Busby; Colin Burgess; Patrick Tillery; Paul Trickett; Arthur Cooper; Bill Baker of the Aviation Historical Society of Australia;Anne Stevens and Katharine Stuart of Trinity Grammar School; Ily Benedek of Sydney Grammar School; Peggy Kennedy of the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ); Mike Stowe of Accident-Reports.com; and Bill Douglass. v


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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E

My sincere thanks go to those friends who happen to be experts in their particular fields of interest who gave me untold hours of their precious time by reading my manuscript through its many drafts. Thank you Jill Sheppard, Dave Gray, David Wilson, Peter Ilbery and Bob Livingstone for your attention to detail and for your critical approaches to my work. From Allen & Unwin, I thank Ian Bowring for his assistance and for taking a chance on a first-time author. In particular, I thank Colette Vella and Joanne Holliman for their thoughtful editorial assistance and Raf Rouco for his eagle-eyed typo spotting. One person above all others paid me the honour of assisting me with my manuscript almost from the beginning. He unfailingly and patiently answered my queries, provided guidance, corrected the many typos (and tore out his hair as he saw yet again my abuse of some of the most basic grammatical rules), helped me bury the latest bone-of-a-furphy when I had finally finished chewing on it, supported and encouraged me through yet another crisis of confidence, and offered many, many sound suggestions. My profound thanks to Lex McAulay. Without the support of Mrs Jean Caldwell I would not have written this book. From the first moment that I contacted her and told her of my desire to celebrate her husband’s military achievements, she offered me consideration and courtesy, assistance, support and insight into her husband’s mind. She also willingly shared her own memories and provided me with a long-term loan of her records and photographs. I thank Mrs Caldwell for her gracious assistance and for entrusting me with her husband’s story. Finally, my husband David. There are not enough words (or word limit!) for me to truly express my gratitude for his love, support and good cooking over the past four years, and so, I dedicate this book to him. Thank you, my love.

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For David


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The North-western area (including Darwin and Halmaheras). (Odgers, Air War Against Japan, 1957)


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Clive Caldwell Air Ace PGS 22/5/06 12:16 PM Page x

The Western Desert. (Herington, Air War Against Germany and Italy, 1954)


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Prologue

In April 2002, my husband David and I were flipping through an Australian Book Auctions’ catalogue and came across an item that sparked our interest.The lot included letters and photographs relating to ‘Group Captain Clive Robertson Caldwell DSO, DFC and Bar, Polish Cross of Valour’. Caldwell was a fighter pilot who achieved the highest Australian score of aircraft destroyed in the Second World War. In addition, he became an ace in both the Middle East and Pacific theatres. Despite this, there had not been much written about him other than brief inclusions in general histories, the odd chapter here and there in books on fighter aces and some specialist journal articles.This collection seemed both interesting and important, so we bid for it, and were successful. The letters were written by Caldwell to his friend Ernest Richardson Slade-Slade. Slade, as he was known, and Caldwell were friends long before the war and their friendship continued until Caldwell’s death. In these letters, Caldwell told of his experiences with 250 Squadron RAF. One letter, written in early July 1941, referred to a number of actions during which Caldwell obtained his first officially recognised victories. The other letter was written just after Christmas 1941, and it dealt with some of his experiences in the latter part of that year. The letters were fascinating, and the brief glimpses they offered of Caldwell’s career were tantalising. I knew then that I wanted to find out more about this man. I am a member of the Military Historical Society of Australia. At that time I was ACT Branch Secretary and responsible for the speaking calendar. I decided to slot myself in and speak about Caldwell’s early xi


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experiences in north Africa. In July 2002, less than three months after obtaining the letters, I gave my first talk to the Society. It was well received, and afterwards Col Simpson, the ACT Branch President, suggested that ‘there’s a book there’. A seed was planted. The Society’s then Vice President, Brad Manera, then convinced me that I should present a paper on Caldwell at the Society’s 2002 Biennial Conference. I continued my research, reworked that initial paper, and in October 2002 I spoke again about Caldwell’s early experiences as a fighter pilot. That paper was later published in the Society’s journal—the first of my three papers on various aspects of Caldwell’s career published in Sabretache. Col’s seed had slowly taken root and was establishing itself. The more I read and heard about Caldwell, the more I wanted to learn about his contribution to the war effort, and the more I wanted to share my knowledge with others. I continued my research but now I had the goal of a biography in mind. At one stage, Caldwell had thought about writing his own story and he jotted down some notes to that effect, including what looks like an opening paragraph: . . . If it were possible, I would like to give a background to the story of my . . . months as a fighter pilot in the Middle East, but I realise that nothing I could say would give the readers who have never been in the desert, or never known the experience of killing and fighting, a true picture of the desert and the men I knew and served with.1

He eventually abandoned this idea, stating, ‘I have refrained steadfastly from writing anything myself ’.2 He continued to maintain this position and this is a great shame, as no one can tell a story quite like the owner of the story, and Caldwell did have the ability to do it justice. Flight Lieutenant W.D.G. Robertson, the editor of the RAAF magazine Wings, thought Caldwell commanded ‘an easy and very readable style’.3 Caldwell could also be extremely lyrical, and this is seen clearly in his 1942 RAF broadcast ‘The Desert is a Funny Place’. Not only did Caldwell decide against writing his own story, but he actively resisted the idea of a biography—he rebuffed enquiries from publishers and authors alike. He told his friends and family categorically that he did not want one written. He offered only a few interviews to private researchers and he believed, for the main part, that many authors had set out to use him for personal gain. ‘Some authors don’t seem to xii


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care as long as they make the story sound all right according to their idea of it. It doesn’t matter whether in doing so they hang one up like a mouse by the tail or not!’4 With that in mind, I embarked on this biography with much trepidation. From the beginning, however, Caldwell’s widow, Mrs Jean Caldwell, offered me support and encouragement, as well as access to her memories, papers, photographs and her personal scrapbook, which records sixty years of her husband’s life through the eyes of the media. She also read through a number of drafts as well as my articles about her husband’s career. I am grateful for her assistance and ongoing interest in my work. Much as I have enjoyed working on Caldwell’s biography, every now and then I would get nervous and lose confidence in my ability to complete it. Often it would become just too difficult. But after speaking with Caldwell’s long-time friend, Bobby Gibbes, one day, I became determined to bring my self-imposed task to fruition. Bobby, himself a well-decorated former fighter ace, told me that he was at the RAAF Academy at Point Cook when the word came through that Caldwell had died. He went into the mess and spoke to a young Pilot Officer there and mentioned that ‘Killer’ Caldwell had just died. The young Pilot Officer responded,‘Who’s he?’ Bobby then spoke with some of the maintenance people and passed the news on to them as well. They did not know who Caldwell was either. Bobby had assumed that they’d all heard of Caldwell, and on that sad day it was a blow to him that they had not.5 Whenever I lost confidence or momentum, I recalled this story and it would give me the impetus to carry on, to ensure that Caldwell’s achievements and contribution to Australia’s air force history were recognised. I submitted Bobby’s story to Spitfire News and the then editor, Bruce Read, published it. In that piece, I also mentioned my occasional difficulties in putting together this biography. Milton Howard, who had served under Caldwell at Darwin in 457 Squadron, read this and wrote encouragingly to me to let me know that he had learned from experience the wisdom of breaking ‘mammoth tasks into bite-sized chunks’. He told me that, as a punishment for some minor misdemeanour, he had been given the task of hand-rubbing all the camouflage paint off the wings and fuselage of Caldwell’s personal Spitfire—he had been told that it was to make the aircraft fly faster. Rather than feel disgruntled that he had been set a punishment, he felt so honoured and privileged to be working on Caldwell’s aircraft that he rubbed just a little bit at a time, to make the job last longer.6 xiii


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Working on Caldwell’s biography has been an honour and a privilege. When I suffered the inevitable lapses of confidence, I would recall Bobby’s story and, like Milton, I have taken this task a little bit at a time. My aim has been to celebrate Caldwell’s military career, and I hope that those who read this will be as captivated by his character, personality and deeds as I am, and will come to appreciate Caldwell’s contribution to Australia’s war effort.

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General note

During the course of this work, I have drawn on Caldwell’s letters, writings, speeches and interviews, as well as letters and interviews with those who knew him. In reproducing these, I have been guided by Dorothy Sheridan’s attitude to editing in her classic work, Wartime Women: An anthology of women’s wartime writing for Mass-Observation 1937–45. Mass-Observation was a pioneer social research organisation that recruited a team of observers and a panel of volunteer writers to study and record the everyday lives of ordinary people in Britain. Sheridan noted that much of the writing for Mass-Observation was done in difficult conditions, often in haste and without the opportunity to go over the text and correct mistakes. Acknowledging this, Sheridan corrected spelling and ‘improved’ some punctuation. I consider that Caldwell’s letters, combat reports and notebook fall into Sheridan’s ‘difficult conditions’ category, and while interviews with Caldwell and others were not conducted in difficult circumstances, freeflowing speech generated by recollection often needs a little tidying up. And so, I have corrected and shaped, where appropriate, in the interests of easy reading. Like Sheridan, I have cut out repetition or digressions and, as is the usual practice, this is indicated by an ellipsis (three dots). My interpolations are represented by square brackets. I have found a great deal of variation in the spelling of place names, so, for consistency, I have relied on the spelling in the Australian War Memorial’s Official History of the Second World War, Australia in the War of 1939–1945. xv


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Notes on measurements In keeping with Caldwell’s time, all weights and measurements are given in their imperial form. Length

1 inch = 25.4 millimetres 1 foot = 12 inches = 304.8 millimetres 1 yard = 3 feet = 914.4 millimetres 1 mile = 5280 feet = 1.61 kilometres Weight

1 pound = 16 ounces = 0.454 kilograms 1 ton = 2240 pounds (the metric tonne is virtually equal) Volume

1 gallon = 4.546 litres Speed

1 mile per hour = 1.61 kilometres per hour

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Introduction

It resolves itself to this—use your head before your guns.Always attack. Always be aggressive and determined. Never relax that attitude. Be decisive and quick.1 Clive Robertson Caldwell was a fighter pilot with both the Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force. He was 6 feet 21⁄2 inches tall, with dark complexion, dark hair and brown eyes. He has been described variously as a little like General de Gaulle, ‘tall as a young tree, and as lean and springy, hair black as a raven, broad square shoulders, clean-cut features, and a certain dignity, a certain assurance’;‘tall and lean of stature and strong limbed’; gigantic, and one of the strongest men in the RAAF; and ‘. . . tough and dark, with sharp aquiline features, flashing eyes and a stern but loquacious mouth’.2 Caldwell joined the first Australian Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) course and was the first trainee from there to become a Flight Commander. He was the first to become a Squadron Commander and was also the first graduate to rise to the rank of Group Captain. And he was wholly Australian-trained. He was officially attributed with 271⁄2 victories and became Australia’s highest scoring fighter ace during the Second World War. He was also the top scorer in North Africa and the leading P–40 ace. In addition, he became an ace in both the Middle East and Pacific theatres—the only Australian pilot to become a two theatre ace. The term ‘ace’ was first introduced by the French during the First World War and it denoted a pilot who was credited with five or more xvii


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victories in air-to-air combat. It became a term that was well understood in both France and the United States of America. The Royal Air Force, however, did not support the classification so it was not officially recognised and many British and Commonwealth pilots never fully understood the term. When Christopher Shores and Clive Williams were researching Aces High (1994) they found that a good number of pilots thought the term related only to those high scorers who had been feted by the press and who had become household names. Even those who had claimed seven or eight destroyed, for instance, did not consider themselves to be aces. When Robert Stanford-Tuck wrote his foreword to the original edition of Aces High he encapsulated the British attitude to the ace designation as something not quite sound; certainly not something to brag about. To him, the term ‘fighter ace’ always seemed ‘to conjure up the mental picture of some gay, abandoned, almost irresponsible young pilot leaping into his aircraft and tearing off into the sky to chalk up victories like knocking off glass bottles in the circus rifle range’. But Stanford-Tuck, himself a high-scoring ace, highlighted the falseness of this image of the fighter pilot. He stated that after a fighter pilot’s first combat, he was only too aware that ‘air fighting on the scale of the last war was a cold, calculating, cat and mouse type combat which required great preparation, lightning reactions, first-class team work and above all, cool decisive leadership’.3 Caldwell developed his own brand of ‘lightning reactions’ and ‘cool decisive leadership’ to become a successful fighter pilot and leader. As well as successfully shooting down enemy aircraft, Caldwell believed that he could reasonably claim to have killed or wounded over one thousand men in the air and on the ground during his first year as a fighter pilot. He believed that this high tally was worth it, if it meant disrupting enemy forces for a week or even a few days.4 With his score quickly mounting, he acquired the sobriquet ‘Killer’, which appeared to aptly sum up his activities. There are a number of versions of how Caldwell’s nickname originated. According to Bob Whittle, who flew with Caldwell in 250 Squadron, RAF, he and Caldwell had intercepted a group of German Junkers Ju 87 Sturzkampfflugzeug (Stuka) dive-bombers returning from a raid. Caldwell flew alongside an aircraft he had set on fire and called out, ‘Burn, you bastard’. This was heard over the radio and Caldwell’s nom de guerre was born. Archie Wilson, also a 250 Squadron pilot, recalls that xviii


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Introduction

the nickname became well and truly entrenched as a result of Caldwell’s diligent ground strafing.5 Caldwell, however, had a different version of the origin of his nickname. In 1958, he claimed that he acquired his nickname: because I advocated shooting [them] in the parachutes and ground strafing . . . Yes, I did a lot of strafing. It was war. Our job was to win and we had to do as much damage to the enemy as possible. I considered it necessary to shoot them in the parachutes, but there was no blood lust or anything about it like that. It was just a matter of not wanting them back to have another go at us. I never shot any who landed where they could be taken prisoners.6

Dedicated fighter pilots were a breed apart. The heroes of the Great War skies were thought of as ‘Knights of the Air’, and in this context they were popularly expected to display a ruthlessness tempered with chivalry. The pilots of this new war were expected to act in the same manner. Archie Wilson acknowledged that Caldwell had an aggressive demeanour with a ruthless streak when roused.7 Caldwell’s ruthlessness, however, was not tempered with chivalry, but then nor was it tainted with lust or glee in killing.As time passed and sensibilities changed, the idea of shooting parachutists became difficult to accept. Many considered the practice with abhorrence.Although Caldwell accepted that it was his duty to kill during the war, his story of how he gained his nickname evolved. By 1982, he was recalling that the tag ‘Killer’ derived simply from his philosophy prompting the many air-to-ground operations that he advocated, planned and carried out with worthwhile results.8 Caldwell’s nickname quickly made its way into popular imagination through numerous news articles during the war years and beyond and this nom de guerre stayed with him all his life. His wife Jean acknowledged that there was a certain element of endearment and tribute about the use of the nickname. For instance, when Caldwell agreed to enter the Anzac House Appeal Pin-up Man contest, he was promoted as ‘an outstanding figure’ and ‘an air killer of enemy fliers’.A publicity handbill stated that he was ‘popularly known and admiringly referred to as “Killer” Caldwell’ and it entreated people to vote for ‘Killer’ Caldwell. There was also a certain amount of propaganda value in the nickname. Caldwell, along with other successful pilots from the Middle East and European theatres, was presented to the public as a hero, as a killer of xix


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the enemy.‘Killer’ was a fitting name for a successful fighter pilot and the alliteration with his surname worked well. As part of this propaganda, even his friends were guilty of using the tag. In a series of broadcasts by fellow 250 Squadron pilot John Waddy, he referred to Caldwell continually as ‘Killer’, rather than ‘Killer’ Caldwell. There was no need to elaborate. The public knew who he meant.9 It is over sixty years since Caldwell became a public figure and people still remember him as ‘Killer’. Many remember him with admiration and respect.Although Caldwell used his nickname to describe himself when he took his turn as the 250 Squadron diarist, he eventually considered it with antipathy—he disliked the name and its implication that he was not just someone who was doing his duty, but a killer. It was reported as early as August 194210 that Caldwell did not like being called a killer but the nickname was media property by that stage and the press would not relinquish it. Ross Williams, who flew with 452 Squadron under Caldwell in Darwin, recalled one story about Caldwell and his unfortunate nickname. Caldwell was back in Sydney on leave and was having a quiet drink with two or three friends. A drunken Army private rolled up to him and said, ‘I believe they call you “Killer”.’ The way that he said it was full of malevolence, and was certainly an insult. Caldwell denied the nickname, but the drunk would not be put off. This, after all, was the famous ‘Killer’ Caldwell. Slurring his words, he declared, ‘Yes! They call you “Killer”,“Killer”’, and punched Caldwell in the face. Caldwell, who believed that ‘men of self esteem do not turn away from a fight’,11 returned the punch and knocked the private down. Caldwell and his friends then left the bar. As Ross said when he recalled the story, ‘This sort of notoriety is a strange thing.’12 Strange and, for Caldwell, unwelcome. Caldwell’s nom de guerre clung to him until his death and, in the memories of many, beyond death. In its 9 August 1994 obituary, the Sydney Morning Herald mentioned that Caldwell deplored ‘Killer’ and could never shake it off but, sadly, the newspaper used the nickname in its headline. It also used a wartime photo of Caldwell aiming his service pistol, which, although emphasising his talent as a crack shot, reinforced the image of a killer.13 The duty of killing is something that is taught in training.The prevailing doctrine was that the fighter pilot’s job was to kill. It was a case of kill or be killed. The killer instinct, however, is not something that can be xx


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taught. It is something that the fighter pilot acquires when he enters combat for the first time. The quicker he acquires this, the better his chances of surviving.14 Caldwell may have been considered a ‘Killer’, with a highly developed killer instinct, but there was a cost—he had to harden himself to the experience. He fully recognised that the rules had changed in a state of war and eventually learned that: to kill a man is no worry.At first you think about it a little, but you soon get over that. It’s your life or theirs.This is war.You do what you have to do and then forget it. All rules of civilian life are suspended and [you] find yourself doing and thinking all manner of things that you never thought you could do.15

Caldwell once explained that ‘one has a detached feeling when he sits in an aircraft firing at a man on the ground . . . The man below has no reality as a human being. He is just a target, and it is your sole purpose to knock him over.’16 But Caldwell knew that in setting aside the normal emotions and usual expectations of civilised behaviour ‘the human mind, faced with a situation that is too much for it, protects itself with a dull coating of indifference—to everything except the immediate problem of . . . survival. It becomes drained of emotion, emptied of all feeling for others.’17 Caldwell developed a killer instinct that was based on a sound fighting philosophy, and he propounded this to his fellow fighter pilots: I’ve come to the belief that there are usually several methods of killing the other fellow if you think of what you are doing. My idea is that he must be shot down, but preferably in such a way that you will not be shot down yourself in doing it. It resolves itself to this—use your head before your guns. Always attack. Always be aggressive and determined. Never relax that attitude. Be decisive and quick.18

In many respects, this philosophy governed Caldwell’s life. He was a clear-headed decision-maker and he was a high achiever, whether it was in sport, air-fighting or business. He was uncompromising in his beliefs and attitudes and when he determined upon something, he fixedly set about obtaining it. But Caldwell did not hold exclusively to this unrelenting philosophy. It was mitigated by loyalty to those who served xxi


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under him during the war and to his family and friends. He was fairminded and generous and enjoyed the respect and friendship of many. Caldwell was only one of the many Australians who answered the call to defend their country during the Second World War. He was one of many who felt the effects of the war throughout his life, and he was one of the many who left tangible evidence of his involvement. Caldwell entered Trinity Grammar School in 1922 and left in 1924 to attend Sydney Grammar School. On 15 August 1990, Trinity marked the 50th Anniversary of the end of the War in the Pacific with a moving commemoration ceremony that included readings of poems, letters and diaries. Andrew Filmer, a Year 10 student, spoke about Caldwell. In his conclusion, he acknowledged the significance of Caldwell’s contribution to the defence of his country: Unfortunately, war appears as a natural event in this world. Would we here all be potential fighters, willing to give up our safety and comfort for an idea, such as he did? Could we knowingly commit ourselves to fear, danger and death? Indeed, when all is said and done, this may be the nature of Caldwell’s heroic deeds, an ordinary man who did extraordinary things in an extraordinary war.19

Caldwell willingly committed himself to fear, danger and death. He saw himself first and foremost as a fighter pilot and his desire to prosecute the war in this way constantly created tension with his leadership responsibilities. He was so successful as a fighter pilot that it is calculated he achieved a total score of at least twenty-five to twenty-six destroyed and two to four shared destroyed, eleven probably destroyed, twenty-five to twenty-eight damaged and two destroyed on the ground. Official recognition of claims was extremely strict, however, and at the end of the war Caldwell was officially attributed with a score of 271⁄2.20 In carrying out his heroic deeds, he became Australia’s highest scoring fighter ace of the Second World War. . . . the personal experiences related in the pages that follow may not be without interest.21

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ONE

The Budding Fighter Pilot

I only had one wish—to escape the horror of the incineration and death that seemed inevitable inside the next few minutes or less.1 Caldwell was born on 28 July 1910, almost three years after his parents, John Robert Caldwell and Annie Selina Smiles, were married. It was an interesting year—the closing year of the Edwardian Era; the year the earth passed through the tail of Halley’s Comet and, perhaps auspiciously for an infant who would grow up to become Australia’s greatest fighter ace of the Second World War, a year of significant aviation achievement. In January 1910, Hubert Latham broke the world aviation record for altitude when he reached 3000 feet. This record would soon be far surpassed and by 1943 Caldwell would fly his Spitfire Vc at altitudes in excess of 20 000 feet. In March 1910, Fred Custance, in his Blériot monoplane made the first successful powered flight. His triumph was robbed by Eric Weiss, better known as escape artist Harry Houdini, who, just one day later on 18 March, received all the publicity for three successful flights in his Voisin biplane. In May, American aviator Glenn Curtiss, soon to become known as the father of naval aviation and one of the founders of Curtiss-Wright, the company that would produce the Tomahawk and Kittyhawk fighters that Caldwell would fly so successfully, flew 150 miles, with only two stops, in the space of five hours. His actual flying time was two hours and forty-five minutes, and he achieved almost 60 miles an hour—a world record for that distance. On the day before Caldwell’s birth, British aviator Claude ‘Claudie’ Grahame-White prophesised that within six months, aeroplanes would be able to travel at 1


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the rate of 100 miles per hour, and would ultimately attain 300 miles an hour. Although an ambitious prediction in those early days of aviation, Grahame-White’s prophesy had been exceeded by the time Caldwell climbed into the cockpit. Just over thirty years later, Caldwell would fly Allison-engined Tomahawks in the Western Desert with maximum speeds of 345 miles per hour, and over Darwin he would achieve diving speeds in his Spitfire of about 400 miles per hour. Just six days after Caldwell’s birth, at Mia Mia in Victoria, in his self-designed and -constructed aeroplane, John Duigan became the first man to successfully pilot an Australian-built heavier-than-air aircraft. Caldwell’s mother was thirty-five when her son was born, and he would be her only child. Caldwell took after his mother in looks and Annie was greatly proud of her son: over the years, she compiled a scrapbook of Caldwell’s youthful sporting achievements. The Caldwells were a close family and the young Clive did not have to suffer the absence of his beloved father at the outbreak of the Great War. John Caldwell was forty-four when the Austrian heir apparent was assassinated in Sarajevo, thus precipitating the worldwide conflict.The enlistment age for the Australian Imperial Force ranged from nineteen to thirty-eight. There were exceptions—senior officers and some warrant and noncommissioned officers were older, many men in their forties and fifties put their ages down, and many a young boy put his age up when he heard the call to enlist. But there was no pressure for John Caldwell to leave his family and his career with the English, Scottish and Australian Bank (ES&A Bank).2 He joined the bank in 1888, and at the time of his marriage in 1907 he had worked his way up to an accountant. In May 1914, John was appointed manager of his own branch and the family moved to Albion Park, south of Wollongong. Those early links to Albion Park were not forgotten by Caldwell when, in 1944, he became the patron of the newly formed Albion Park sub-branch of the Returned Soldiers, Sailors & Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia.3 In Albion Park the Caldwells lived in the bank’s attached manager’s residence and young Clive soon started his education at the local public school. Although he was too young to be impacted significantly by the worldwide conflict, news of the war dominated newspapers and, like many a boy, his young ears were filled with stories of heroic deeds and the daring achievements of the new fighter aces. Later, he would read about the aces on both sides—Ball, McCudden, Bishop, Collishaw, King Cowper, Udet, Immelman, Richthofen and others.4 2


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The Caldwells did not stay long in Albion Park. In 1917, the family returned to Sydney when Caldwell’s father became the manager of the Balmain branch of the ES&A Bank. Balmain is one of Sydney’s oldest working-class suburbs, and it was the birthplace of many of Sydney’s ferries. The Caldwells lived in that bank’s attached residence, and in the year that Captain Robert Little, Australia’s highest-scoring fighter ace of the Great War, tackled eleven German Albatross scout biplanes singlehandedly and outmanoeuvred them for thirty minutes, Caldwell started school at Balmain Public School. Like many schools at the time, Balmain Public School became involved in some sort of war work, and it held concerts and organised displays to help raise money for relief funds for Belgian orphans. In later life, Caldwell was known as an excellent marksman: his shooting skills had been nurtured while he lived in Balmain. There was a shooting range on the bank premises and employees were required to have adequate shooting skills in the event of a robbery. Young Caldwell had access to the bank’s pistol and would frequently take advantage of the shooting range, developing sound shooting skills. One of Caldwell’s friends at this time was Alec Grant, the son of the local physician and surgeon, Dr W. Brodie Grant, who lived in nearby Rozelle. Alec would join in the practice sessions, and he credited Caldwell with teaching him to shoot.5 Caldwell was eleven when he commenced at Trinity Grammar School on 7 February 1922. During his time at Trinity, he demonstrated a diversity of sporting skills, winning a number of athletics and swimming prizes and playing rugby and cricket. He then enrolled at Sydney Grammar School in June 1924. There, he received the 1926 English Prize, served on the games committee and joined the 1st IV rowing team in 1927. In February 1925, John Caldwell transferred to the Waverley branch of the ES&A Bank and held the manager’s post there until December that year, when he took over as manager of the Pitt Street, Sydney, branch. At around this time the Caldwells left bank premises and moved to their own home,‘Wongarbon’, in Bellevue Hill. Caldwell continued his education at Sydney Grammar after the move, but left in May 1927, before he turned seventeen. His father wanted him to take up banking, but Caldwell did not want to work in a bank. He was not sure of his future career path but he knew that he was not suited to the regimental life of banking. He wanted excitement, challenge and freedom and this was reflected in his desire for speed and 3


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adventure, as witnessed by the day the seventeen-year-old Caldwell took a low-set, streamlined car out for a jaunt to Newcastle. He swung onto a long, open stretch and at full throttle pushed the car to its ultimate speed. He reached 98 miles an hour. He felt the exhilaration of speed and the control of a powerful machine, but when he pulled over, he regretted that he could not squeeze out the extra two miles to make the round hundred.6 He finally gave in to pressure from his father and took a position in the Exchanges Department of the Bank of New South Wales. Rob Norman joined the bank later in the same year and recalled that Caldwell was ‘big, strong, aggressive, wild and mischievous . . . He was always looking for someone to test his strength by wrestling, scuffling or any other way. He did not get many takers.’7 While working with the bank, Caldwell had to carry out compulsory military training. This scheme had been in place for a number of years and was not suspended until after the Scullin Labor Government came to power in October 1929. Caldwell joined the 1st Cavalry Division Signals. In mid-1930, a military gymkhana was held, which the State Governor, Sir Philip Game, attended. Caldwell, as part of the militia team, celebrated a victory in the 120-yard hurdles, where, in a clipping that his mother proudly pasted into her scrapbook, he was likened to ‘a winged bird, skimming the hurdles and hardly seeming to touch the earth as he [sped] onwards’.8 Caldwell was a natural athlete and spent much of his leisure time on the athletic track, running for the East Sydney Amateur Athletics Club. He went to Melbourne for the 1929–30 Australian Championships in January 1930, where he participated in the high jump and javelin throw but was unplaced in both events. Third place-getter in the javelin throw was Anthony ‘Nick’Winter, the 1924 Olympic Triple Jump champion. Caldwell and Winter kept in contact and in 1943 Winter presented Caldwell with a unique dress ring purportedly made from a piece of steel souvenired from Richthofen’s shot-down aircraft. Caldwell loved sport, was good at it and maintained a lifetime enthusiasm for it. On his application for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), he noted in relation to ‘sports and games in which most proficient’ that he had represented his school in swimming, rowing, football and rifle shooting, had state and national representation in athletics, was a fair heavyweight boxer and was a member of the Royal Sydney Golf Club. He also added that, at present, ‘tennis, golf and swimming are all that time permits’.9 4


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For Caldwell, sport was a respite from the drudgery of the bank. He did not enjoy working at the bank, but he stuck it out until 1931 when he finally decided that banking and his temperament did not agree. Unfortunately, Caldwell’s bank records do not appear to exist and it is not certain exactly when in 1931 he left, or what precipitated his departure when Australia was suffering from the effects of the Depression and Sydney itself had entered the 1930s with 125000 out of work. What is known is that 1931 was a year of great grief for Caldwell and his father. Annie Caldwell had been ill with breast cancer for some time and she died at home in September 1931. Her death was a severe blow to her 21-year-old son and his grief was so strong that for a number of years after her death he could not settle down. Perhaps the difficulty of his mother’s final illness or her actual death was the impetus to escape the tedium of the bank. Whatever the reason, Caldwell put in his resignation. His last morning at the bank, a Saturday, had an almost surreal quality to it. His workmates beavered away as usual, but Caldwell could only think of his impending freedom—freedom from the figures, the routine and the sameness. He almost pitied those whom he felt were condemned to a working life without variety or excitement. He reached for the old-fashioned bank revolver, a contingency measure against robbery, pointed it away from the other employees and pulled the trigger. He walked out with a smile on his face as the shot reverberated around the room.10 The Depression had seriously impacted employment and it was no surprise that Caldwell could not find work immediately. He was still moved by grief for his mother, but he found some respite in sport. He participated in the 1931–32 Australian Championships held in January 1932 at the Sydney Cricket Ground. Here, he came fourth in the 440-yard hurdles. Caldwell was selected to compete with the Australian Olympic track team in Los Angeles in July/August later that year. His father, who had retired from the bank in August 1930, wanted to travel with his son at his own expense, but the Australian Olympic committee would not permit any relatives to accompany the team. Rather than leave his still-grieving father behind as the first anniversary of his wife’s death approached, Caldwell pulled out of the games.11 Caldwell had still not found a job and the memory of his mother’s illness and death played heavily on his mind. John Caldwell thought that a change of scenery might help and he spoke with his friends the Warners, owners of ‘Talwood’ cattle station near Goondiwindi in Queensland. 5


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The Warners agreed to take Caldwell on so John and his son travelled to Queensland. John soon returned while Caldwell stayed and worked as a jackeroo and junior overseer on the property until 1933.The fresh air and hard work helped Caldwell regain his equilibrium. His grief subsided and, despite his all-too-frequent tiredness after a day in the saddle, he enjoyed his time on the station, as well as the picnics and swimming parties when friends came up to visit. Energised from his Queensland experiences, Caldwell returned to Sydney. Soon afterwards, he went into business with Jim Doyle. They operated a garage in Darlinghurst Road near the fire station, selling and servicing motor cars. It was not the best time to be running your own business—even though the more serious effects of the Depression were lessening, for many, money was still tight. Rob Norman recalled that when things were particularly tough, Caldwell would report to Leichhardt Stadium and take part in some of the preliminary boxing matches, winning the occasional five-pound purse, a sizeable amount in those days. On one occasion, he boxed several rounds with the then Australian heavyweight champion, Ron Richards, and Caldwell was still standing at the finish. Fearful of damaging his amateur status in golf, Caldwell always fought under an assumed name.12 As Caldwell and his partner attempted to make a success of their business, John Caldwell fell ill. He had arteriosclerosis and chronic renal disease. To compound matters, John had a serious stroke. He lost the power of speech and required constant care. John’s money was tied up in his property. He owned some houses in Newtown, as well as the family home, and Caldwell did not have the power-of-attorney to either sell these or draw from his father’s bank account. Caldwell was devoted to his father and insisted on keeping him at home throughout his illness, but the constant nursing and high specialist fees could not be met from the garage business. Caldwell needed a steady and stable job so he took a job with the MLC Assurance Company. He worked there until he joined the RAAF. He put in long, hard hours at MLC, working his way up from salesman, inspector and special service officer positions to that of senior inspector, where he was responsible for a division of salesmen. The regular hours and steady wage meant that Caldwell was able to continue caring for his father at home. While Caldwell juggled his insurance job and his nursing duties it was becoming increasingly obvious that war was imminent and he recognised his duty to enlist. He was ‘considerably irritated by Hitler’s 6


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behaviour and the general conduct of the so-called master race—whom I didn’t regard as such—and was quite willing to try and help prove to the contrary’. But there was also the feeling that ‘there was a great game to be played, and I certainly wanted to play my part in it’.13 As for how he would play his part, he knew that he would not be joining the Army—he did not want to be a ‘footslogger’. Perhaps this was a legacy of his period of compulsory service and, like many, Caldwell could have been influenced to a degree by his boyhood reading. He had read much of the exploits of British and German Great War aces. ‘Like most boys I thought that this was the thing—how to be one such as they. I could picture myself there, rolling through the clouds, shooting them down and becoming a fighter ace!’14 Royal Australian Air Force cadet training was carried out at Point Cook near Melbourne, with courses running for twelve months. Despite recognising the excitement of air battle and the invitation to adventure that the coming war presented, Caldwell would not leave his ill father. When John died in February 1938, Caldwell was still not able to enlist because of the need to settle his father’s affairs. Even so, he prepared himself for the inevitable—he learned to fly. He joined the Royal Aero Club located at Mascot aerodrome, where his friend, Bob Wingrove, was an instructor. Whenever he was a bit short of money, Wingrove would persuade Caldwell to have a lesson and, by the time war broke out, Caldwell had acquired a total of ten or eleven flying hours.15 Caldwell quickly discovered he enjoyed flying. He had always loved to watch birds fly, and while flying he had the feeling of being a bird in the air. He admitted that he ‘wasn’t particularly good at it’ but this love of flying stayed with him after the war when he bought his own Stinson L5 and flew it for many years.16 The inevitable happened. Caldwell was in Brisbane on business on 3 September 1939 when Prime Minister Menzies announced that Australia was at war with Germany. Caldwell knew there would be nothing glamorous about this war, but he was determined to play his part. There was no romantic euphoria about his decision to become involved and he knew that there would not be ‘any sort of graceful adventure’.17 There was now no need to delay. His father’s affairs had been settled and the property could be managed by a third party. The next morning he sent a letter off to apply for training as a fighter pilot in the RAAF. He followed this up by formal application when he returned to Sydney. He wrote on his enlistment form that he had obtained his pilot’s licence 7


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‘solely with a view to serving with the Air Force in the event of hostilities as a pilot and lack of time up till now has prevented my advancing further with it’.18 Years later, he admitted that his pre-war flying experience didn’t seem to have any influence in his selection for the RAAF. ‘They didn’t seem to take any notice of that. It didn’t seem to make any effect. It was too little to matter.’19 There was an age limit for fighter pilots and, at twenty-nine, Caldwell knew that ‘it was darned near too late for me’,20 so he asked his friend Eddie Samuels, a chemist, to professionally amend the date on his birth certificate. Samuels did and on 19 October 1939, Caldwell arrived at 2 Recruitment Centre at Erskine House with the altered document. The Corporal there looked at Caldwell’s certificate, and then at Caldwell. He recognised Caldwell as he was a keen follower of athletics. He stated that Caldwell was older than the certificate indicated. Caldwell quickly replied, ‘No, you’re getting me confused with my older brother, B.C. Caldwell. I’m C.R. Caldwell, and Cliff is three years older than me. We both went to Grammar and I think you’ve got the two of us mixed up!’ The Corporal still thought there was something fishy going on, and said so, but Caldwell told him that it was not his place to cross-examine him. He had been asked to produce a birth certificate, and he had. The Corporal didn’t challenge Caldwell further, which was just as well, as Bruce Cliff Caldwell (no relation) was in the same class as Caldwell at Sydney Grammar.21 Caldwell’s brashness and an apparently indisputable birth certificate got him into the RAAF, but he would have to wait some time before his training commenced. War was not the only thing on Caldwell’s mind as he waited impatiently to begin his air force training. He was in love. Jean McIvor Main was the second daughter of George and Mary Main. Main was a well-known pastoralist and the chairman of the Australian Jockey Club (AJC). The Mains lived on a property outside Illabo, near Cootamundra, but went up to Sydney frequently. Their elegant, blue-eyed, fair-skinned, blonde and classically beautiful daughter often featured in the social pages. Caldwell had first met Jean while she attended Ascham School and he Sydney Grammar. Jean was a school friend of Patricia and Babs Long Innes, the daughters of Justice Reginald Long Innes. The Long Innes family lived at Darling Point and had a holiday home, Woodlands, at Medlow Bath, where they frequently hosted house parties. On one occasion both Caldwell and Jean had been invited to spend a holiday at 8


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Woodlands where they met for the first time, starting a friendship that spanned over a decade before they married. After school, Jean had returned to the family property, Retreat. Three years later, she decided to train as a nurse but George Main, with his strict Scottish background, initially objected when his daughter wanted to leave home. He relented only because Jean would be chaperoned in the nurses’ quarters, and he and his wife frequently came to Sydney on business or for the Easter and Spring racing carnivals. Jean moved to Sydney to start her training at Wootton Private Hospital in Darlinghurst. When she qualified, she worked as a theatre sister at the Bona Dea Private Hospital at Darling Point. As soon as war broke out, Jean signed up as an Army nurse but she never had the opportunity to serve as she married before she was called up. While Jean was training and, later, working in Sydney, she would often attend dances at Government House, go to parties and the races, or spend an afternoon at the skating rink with her friends, Patricia and Babs Long Innes, Bob Wingrove and Caldwell. As time passed, Jean and Caldwell grew closer together. When his father died in 1938, Caldwell confided his grief to Jean and their bond grew stronger. When Caldwell returned to Sydney from Brisbane, he asked Jean to marry him. She agreed and their engagement was announced in January 1940. Two months later, Caldwell was advised that he had been accepted by the RAAF as a cadet officer for pilot training. Within two weeks, he discovered that all on his course were destined to become instructors for the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS), the scheme whereby Britain’s dominions would jointly establish a pool of trained air crew for service with the Royal Air Force (RAF). Caldwell had been dining at the Australian Club with Jean and her parents when the Minister for Air, James Fairbairn, came up to their table. Conversation soon turned to Caldwell’s training and Fairbairn mentioned that Caldwell’s class would in fact end up as instructors: This was very disturbing news of course, and I was determined to get myself into the Empire Air Training Scheme; those were the pilots being posted overseas into operational squadrons. Five days later, I was allowed to resign from the Air Force—not an easy job! But I finally convinced them that my application in joining had stated clearly that I was to be trained as a fighter pilot, and on completion to be posted to operations and not to be left out of it all as an instructor. I told them that in accepting this it was a contract 9


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between us, and I should at least have the option. I was quite genuine in wanting to go to the war, and finally they let me resign—under pressure of course!—at the same time as accepting my application for the EATS.22

Caldwell knew it would not be long before his training commenced. He wanted to be married before he went overseas, so Jean and he agreed to a brief engagement. At Easter, Jean’s nursing colleagues at Bona Dea both congratulated the couple and farewelled Jean at a cocktail party held at the nurses’ residence. Caldwell and Jean married on 13 April 1940 and theirs was the first wedding to take place in the church at Dirnaseer, which was built on land that George Main had given to the adjoining soldiers’ settlement. The church was decorated with roses and delphiniums, which complemented Jean’s outfit. They had been arranged by Mrs Douglas Close of Wagga Wagga, a friend of Mary Main, and Margaret Waddell, a school friend from Ascham. Margaret also played the organ. Margaret later wrote to the Ascham Charivari that the wedding ‘was the event of the season’.23 Jean wore an afternoon frock of light blue angora with a matching coat, a summer felt hat and accessories of deep cyclamen. On her shoulder she fastened a spray of orchids. Her only jewellery was a bracelet and earrings, gifts from her bridegroom. Jean was given away by her father and was unattended. The best man was Mervyn Finlay. The reception was held at the Main’s nearby property, Retreat. In a touching gesture, Caldwell later commissioned Jean’s sister Agnes, a gifted artist, to create a permanent reminder of the day by painting a picture of the church. After the reception, the Caldwells drove to Canberra and spent their first night at the gracious Hotel Canberra at Yarralumla. Autumn in Canberra is stunning, with crunchy fallen leaves and a soft, golden light. But autumn in Canberra can be cold, and the night the Caldwells spent there was no exception. It was a freezing night and a fire had been laid in their room. As a boy, Caldwell had joined the Scouts for a time and had received a badge for firelighting. However, his firelighting skills were not apparent this evening. He struggled hard, but failed to light this fire. Shortly before their arrival in Canberra, Captain Bracegirdle, the Military and Official Secretary to Governor-General Lord Gowrie, was advised that the Caldwells would be overnighting at the Hotel Canberra. When Gowrie had been the Governor of New South Wales from 1934 to 1936, George Main had often entertained him as part of 10


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his AJC duties and the Mains had frequently attended functions at Government House in Macquarie Street. Lord Gowrie was delighted at the opportunity to renew his acquaintance with Jean and to meet her new husband. The invitation to take morning tea with the Governor-General was a great surprise and the Caldwells enjoyed the morning they spent at Government House. Caldwell later recalled that he got to know Gowrie very well during that visit.24 Although the newlyweds appreciated the invitation, they were mildly disappointed that they had to delay their departure for Jervis Bay until that afternoon. When they finally arrived at the coast, the weather was good to them. It was much milder than at Canberra and there was no further need for Caldwell to try out his firelighting skills. They spent their days fishing, playing golf and sharing time with friends. One friend invited them for a trip out on his cruiser. Caldwell donned a shark-catching harness and successfully landed two sharks. Jean was quite successful at trolling, and in one honeymoon snap she proudly showed off her catch. Their time in Jervis Bay was all too brief, however, and they soon returned to Sydney. The Caldwells had only just arrived back from their honeymoon when Caldwell was ordered to report to 2 Recruit Depot at Richmond on 27 May 1940. Two weeks later, on 10 June 1940, Caldwell and ninety-four other pilot trainees from Richmond arrived at 2 Initial Training School, Bradfield Park, Lindfield. The trainees had to attain a certain technical standard and successfully complete a course that included mathematics, science, signals, armament, anti-gas, hygiene and aircraft recognition. The new recruits also embarked on a rigorous training program that focussed on physical fitness and there were plenty of route marches throughout the area. There were even the occasional stints on guard duty. Rifle drill figured highly on the training agenda, as did learning King’s Regulations and Air Force Orders, and who and how to salute. Adam Gillespie, who trained with Caldwell at Bradfield Park and later at Mascot, recalled that their first drill instructor was a permanent RAAF type who did not appear to like the trainees very much. One day, after a hard session drilling, the instructor halted the group on an ant bed. The trainees were expected to remain standing at attention until dismissed. After a while, Caldwell became fed up and just walked off saying, ‘We don’t have to put up with this’. Brushing ants from their trousers, the entire group followed him. 11


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Leave periods were tantalisingly brief. Some of the recruits took advantage of the hospitality of many of the kind people on the North Shore but Caldwell spent his time with Jean or friends, including a break with the Long Innes family at Woodlands, their holiday home at Medlow Bath. At the end of the training period, the trainees appeared before a Category Selection Board. The board took into account the trainee’s medical classification, background, and examination results and then decided whether he would go on to pilot, air observer or wireless operator/air gunner training. With his doctored birth certificate, Caldwell may just have squeezed under the fighter pilot age limit, but there was no guarantee that he would be selected for pilot training. Happily he was and he commenced pilot training at 4 Elementary Flying Training School, Mascot, on 25 July 1940. The school’s headquarters was in the Royal Aero Club’s Clubhouse, so Caldwell felt on familiar turf. Caldwell was one of the oldest in his group and had an air of the leader about him. He also displayed a tendency towards the maverick, which hinted at things to come. Adam Gillespie recalled that one day, some of them decided they would sleep in. Luck was not on their side—they were caught, lost their weekend leave and had to peel potatoes. Caldwell decided he would cut the potatoes into squares and that evening square potatoes were served up for dinner. Gillespie recalled that, as they lay on their bunks that evening talking over the day’s events, Caldwell announced that being in the Air Force was like any other business and that he would become a group captain one day. At the completion of their training on de Havilland DH 82 Tiger Moth basic trainers at Mascot, the young pilots set about celebrating. Caldwell topped the course and a gathering was held to present him with the course trophy. Gillespie recalled that, after the presentation, Caldwell had to give a speech which started off,‘Making a speech is like having a baby. Easy to conceive but hard to deliver.’The ensuing celebration went off very well. Caldwell accrued the required fifty hours on Tiger Moths—twentyfive dual and twenty-five solo.25 He then went to 2 Service Flying Training School at Forest Hill near Wagga Wagga and commenced his service training on 23 September 1940. Group Captain Frederick Scherger commanded the school and Caldwell recalled Scherger’s welcoming speech to the trainee pilots as they lined up in front of him: 12


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He said,‘From the spelling of my name, which I expect you’re familiar with now, you’ll realise that my antecedents are German. Now . . . the Germans are very discipline minded people, and by the time you leave here, you’ll understand what discipline is, too . . . They tell me that they call you people Empire Air Scheme . . . Looking at you, I think Empire Air Scum might be more appropriate.’ Couldn’t have had a heavier silence. So, I thought, well now, here’s a welcoming thing. These are the people that want us to come here and do the fighting for them.

Caldwell once reflected that ‘at no stage was I really comfortable in the RAAF’26 and he attributed this to Scherger’s less than welcoming speech, and perhaps Scherger’s style of command. Forest Hill was soon nicknamed ‘Scherger’s Concentration Camp’. Although he usually took a lenient tone with light-hearted escapades, Scherger was strict in his demands on cadets’ conduct off the camp area, and would allow them only one night a week in town. Much of Caldwell’s training at Forest Hill involved time in the Link trainer, which was used to train pilots ‘flying blind’ at night, or in cloud, but actual flying was carried out in the two-seater Wirraway advanced trainer. Caldwell recalled that the only incidents of note during his training were a successful dead-stick landing as a solo pilot and, as a passenger, a cartwheel landing with the Wirraway finishing on its back.27 He flew about a hundred hours on Wirraways, with about seventy-five of these solo. Caldwell appreciated his training on Wirraways. He believed that they ‘had a fair amount of inbuilt viciousness and I think if you can fly a Wirraway satisfactorily under all conditions, you can fly any of them’.28 Bobby Gibbes, however, recalled a time when Caldwell demonstrated that he could not always fly a Wirraway satisfactorily: ‘I was sitting in the back of a Wirraway with him one day when he almost stalled it coming in to land and I kept out of his aeroplane from then on’.29 Of the ninety-four pilots from Richmond who had arrived with Caldwell at Bradfield Park, only a few received their wings together at Forest Hill. Some had been scrubbed, some sent to bomber training, and some to fighter training elsewhere. Some, like Caldwell, went on to become successful fighter pilots. Many died. Losing comrades, family and friends is a natural consequence of war and Caldwell, as with so many others, had to learn to put his emotions aside in order to continue doing his duty towards the enemy. But Caldwell was not immune to the 13


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loss of his friends and in a moment of quiet reflection once wrote, ‘I’ve seen a lot of my friends go. In fact so many of them have died that I’m not quite sure who’s alive and who isn’t.’30 Before completing their service training, Caldwell and his fellow recruits were asked to indicate their preference for posting. Caldwell wanted to go to England. He thought that the equipment there would be better than in the Middle East, and that he would have the advantage of advanced training at an operational training unit before posting to a squadron (at that stage, there were no operational training units in the Middle East). He also thought it would be more civilised living in England than in the desert.‘So, of course, they posted me to the Middle East! All they did was send half of us there and half to England—it didn’t matter what you said at all.’31 Caldwell received his flying badge in November 1940 and, on 12 January 1941, he was granted his commission with the rank of Pilot Officer (on probation). The next day he was posted to 2 Embarkation Depot, Bradfield Park. Here, Caldwell and his fellow pilots were housed while they awaited their overseas posting. Like others destined for overseas service, Caldwell was granted a brief spell of embarkation leave. Caldwell and Jean had been married less than twelve months and much of that time had been spent apart.They made good use of those last days together, and Jean gave her husband a number of gifts, including a silver whisky flask that he carried on all his flights. Other gifts, such as a wristlet watch, cuff links and trinkets, were lost. One gift especially reminded Caldwell that he was constantly in his wife’s thoughts— underneath the pocket flaps of his flying suit Jean embroidered a garland of colourful hearts and flowers.32 Caldwell and his fellow aircrew left Bradfield Park on Monday 3 February 1941. A party of 191, including pilots, observers and wireless operator/air gunners left by bus for Lindfield Station where they entrained for Woolloomooloo. Dressed in full uniform and carrying their kit bags, clearly emblazoned with ‘RAAF’ and their service numbers, they crowded into cramped second-class carriages. At the wharf, they were addressed by Sir Donald Cameron, the chairman of the RAAF Recruiting Drive Committee.The Department of Information photographer was present, and he captured shot after shot of the waiting aircrew. Rows of smiling and expectant faces. Finally, with kit bags on shoulders, the aircrew moved in single file along the wharf 14


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and boarded the waiting Aquitania. Caldwell and his fellow aircrew were not the only ones to embark that day. The nurses of the 2/7th Australian General Hospital were also heading for the Middle East, and they entertained the waiting troops with a number of popular songs before departure. Aquitania had sailed to Australia as part of Convoy US9, along with the Mauretania, Nieuw Amsterdam and Queen Mary. This was the first convoy dispatched in 1941. Mauretania was sent to Melbourne to take on board troops there, and Queen Mary and Aquitania stayed in Sydney to embark their troops. Escorted by HMAS Hobart, Queen Mary and Aquitania departed Sydney in the early afternoon on 4 February. Crowds were cheering and waving flags all the way down the harbour, with ‘a flotilla of small boats following our ships down Sydney Harbour as a farewell escort’.33 They arrived in Fremantle on 9 February and, now escorted by HMAS Canberra, the convoy departed three days later. The Queen Mary detached from the convoy on 16 February and, escorted by HMS Durban, headed to Singapore, carrying the ill-fated 8th Division troops as well as members of the Australian Army Nursing Service.The rest of the convoy headed towards Ceylon and India. HMAS Canberra, which was replaced as escort by HMS Leander, was given a rousing farewell from the cheering troops. The convoy was due to arrive in Bombay on 22 February and a farewell dinner was held on Aquitania the evening before, with Captain W.C. Battle, the officers and crew wishing, ‘God speed, victory and safe return’ to their passengers.34 The troops took some shore leave in Bombay and Caldwell travelled around, drinking in the exotic sights. The Caldwells were destined to spend their first wedding anniversary apart, and Caldwell wanted to find a special gift for Jean. On a trip to Deolali he was looking through the local bazaar when he found the perfect one. He purchased a walnut box, intricately carved with curlicues and birds of paradise. The box was accompanied by a letter detailing his adventures so far. Jean was thrilled to hear that her husband was well, and excited to receive such an exotic gift from a faraway place. This first gift from abroad is still a treasured possession. While in India, Caldwell also bought a black antelope handbag he had had made especially for Jean. He saved this until his return and Jean was later photographed displaying the bag.35 It would be some time before Jean heard from her husband again, and she would anxiously await news. While Caldwell was overseas, Jean went back to 15


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live on the family property near Illabo. During this time she did some private nursing and voluntary secretarial work at the Cootamundra Army Drill Hall. She kept up with all the newspaper and radio news of the war, but she keenly felt the distance between Australia and the rest of the world. She wrote constantly and at great length to her husband. One day, she came across the 14 June 1941 issue of the Australasian. In a photographic spread of troops and nurses embarking from Sydney and Melbourne, her sharp eyes spotted her husband standing at the rear of a group photo.The photos had just been released by the censor for publication. No names were printed, just the caption,‘Nurses, soldiers, airmen were leaving for service overseas. Many of them have been in hard action since these pictures were taken.’ After the brief Indian stopover, the troops transferred to six smaller ships and the new convoy departed Bombay on 26 February, powering towards Suez. Caldwell disembarked in Egypt on 24 March 1941. This was the first Australian group from the Empire Air Training Scheme to arrive in the Middle East for combat duty. The newly arrived air crew were given a brief period of leave, and Caldwell took advantage of it by exploring Cairo. Cairo was completely different from anything that Caldwell had ever seen. It was vibrant, noisy and was full of a miasma of the unwashed and unsanitary, as well as the heady ambrosia of spices and exotic perfume. Life tumbled from the buildings and cluttered the streets. All about, the streets were congested with hundreds of street-sellers moving noisily wherever the moneyed military gathered. If someone wanted to buy something, anything, someone would be there to sell it. Caldwell changed his money into local currency and roamed the Mouski Bazaar, taking in the sights, colour and strange smells of the narrow, crowded streets. Shops abounded, crammed full of every imaginable commodity. Caldwell wrote to Jean as often as he could but his letters were often censored. Like many others, the Caldwells numbered each letter to know if any went missing or were received out of order. Unfortunately, letters from the desert arrived infrequently and were often delayed. Some letters went astray. Caldwell seldom had leave, but when he did he would seek out a special gift for Jean from the exotic bazaars. On one visit to Cairo, he purchased a beautiful jade set, as well as other rings and bracelets.The only gift that he posted home was the wooden box from Deolali. He soon realised that the chance of mail going astray or to the bottom of the ocean was high, so he did not entrust these to 16


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the post, preferring to keep them safe until his return, so that he could present them to Jean when they were reunited. During his period of disembarkation leave Caldwell stayed at Shepheard’s Hotel with Jim Kent, Donald Munro and Dave Gale and there they experienced the elegant charm of an Imperial establishment. The four had met at Richmond and trained together at Bradfield Park, Mascot and Forest Hill, and they had also travelled to the Middle East together. They would all soon be posted to 250 Squadron RAF. Shepheard’s stood on a broad street overlooking the Nile. Its rooms were large and luxurious, and the price of one was on a par with what an officer’s mess anywhere in the region would charge. It was located near Middle East Headquarters and military types were constantly coming and going. Visitors could relax at a marble table under the high-domed ceiling and be fussed over by the hotel servants. Shepheard’s was a bastion of oldworld luxury and a welcome sight after a long sea voyage. Late one afternoon, the four pilots saw a Hindu palm reader in the long bar who offered to tell their fortunes. Perhaps it was the effects of too much drink because none of the pilots really believed in that sort of thing, but they decided to accept the offer and find out about their glittering careers as fighter pilots. The palm reader took each aside and spoke with him individually. Caldwell was the last. The others had already been told that they would soon see much action, and Caldwell expected to hear something similar. But this was not the case. He was told that ‘each of your friends will be killed while flying with you—and very soon. You will have harsh experiences and will suffer wounds. But you will survive this war and live beyond seventy years.’ This prediction proved true. ‘Each of the other three was soon to be killed flying with me in the Western Desert in June and July 1941 . . . For them, the great game was soon over.’36 In late 1940, the Western Desert Force,37 the British Commonwealth Army unit commanded by General Sir Richard O’Connor, had been particularly successful chasing the badly organised Italian colonial army across Cyrenaica. Bardia, Tobruk and Benghazi were taken, and the British had advanced to the borders of Tripolitania, before halting. The RAF had proven superior to the Regia Aeronautica, the Italian Air Force, and had given it a severe mauling, especially on its own airfields. The British and Commonwealth land forces were not able to advance further as they suffered from overstretched communications and supply 17


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lines, and with the relocation of some RAF squadrons to Greece, the desert fighter force was weakened. General Erwin Rommel, recently despatched by Hitler to assist the failing Italian Army in Libya, used his highly mobile and fresh forces to hit back at the much-weakened and exhausted British lines. The first Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 27 (I/JG27) arrived in early April to support Rommel with its Messerschmitt 109 single-engined fighters.38 This was the first German fighter unit in the desert, and it flew its first operation on 19 April. The Gruppe had formed during the first weeks of the war and had participated in both the battles of France and Britain. It had suffered considerably during the Battle of Britain but had gained significant combat experience. There were only three squadrons, each equipped with the Hawker Hurricane I, available to support British and Commonwealth land forces—3 Squadron RAAF, 274 Squadron RAF and 73 Squadron RAF. 73 Squadron had been involved in the Battle of France and had carried out night fighting over London for a period before relocating to the Western Desert in November 1940. In March, it had been at Tobruk, patrolling the harbour and taking its fair share of Italian and German raiders. This situation quickly changed as German Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers, Junkers Ju 88 high-speed bombers and Messerschmitt ME 110 heavy two-engined fighter deployments quickly took their toll. By the end of April, only Tobruk was still in British hands. The Germans of I/JG27 with its ME 109s quickly established superiority over the Hurricane squadrons. The Hawker Hurricane I, which had been used successfully against the Italian fighters, was no match for the ME 109.The Hurricane was at a height disadvantage and, even at low altitude, the ME 109 had superior climbing performance. It could also outrun a Hurricane in level flight. The Hurricane had a manoeuvrability advantage, but usually only the most expert German fighter pilots would engage in a dogfight.Although 73 Squadron gained some successes against I/JG27 it was almost always outnumbered. By 21 April, 73 Squadron was down to only five aircraft. Caldwell was charged with taking a replacement aeroplane to 73 Squadron. He arrived with his Hurricane and stayed for a couple of weeks. Although he was not formally attached to 73 Squadron, he flew with it on a number of operations. The 73 Squadron pilots were experienced and Caldwell knew that he was not up to their standard.39 He had not been in the desert very long, 18


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and was not used to flying in desert conditions. Despite this he was not given much time to familiarise himself with the Squadron’s Hurricanes: They gave me a book to read, showed me where the gun button was . . . [said] keep along the coast—you’ll be pretty right in the end—until you see a lot of puffs of small clouds in the sky. That’s the time that you become interested!40

In the days before operational training units, this approach to training was not uncommon in the desert. In many cases, lack of time and serviceable aircraft meant that training flights and any sort of instruction were uncommon. It was up to the new pilot to succeed as best he could. During his short stay with 73 Squadron Caldwell was mainly engaged on strafing operations but also escorted bombers, participated in sweeps and engaged the enemy. Strafing involved diving on troops, transport and buildings. Caldwell would fire his guns until he was about 10 feet from the ground. Then he would fly upwards for just enough height and then downwards again for another run. At the same time, however, the enemy gave all it had—machine guns and anti-aircraft guns. Strafing was dangerous and involved dexterity and skill. During one early morning strafing session, Caldwell was hit by the enemy. His starboard wing had a big hole in it and, when he attempted to land on Tobruk aerodrome, the wheels would not come down and he crashed. The Hurricane’s main fuel tanks were close to the cockpit. In combat, there was a very real fear of the aircraft igniting, and the pilot being incinerated. Caldwell was fully aware of this possibility and he was terrified.‘I’d already seen . . . people being shrivelled up like tissue paper in flames, and I thought that this is going to happen to me at any moment now . . .’ His tongue stuck to the roof of his mouth and he felt his heart pounding. ‘I only had one wish—to escape the horror of the incineration and death that seemed inevitable inside the next few minutes or less. I was panting, dripping sweat and very tired.’ Caldwell was never able to rid himself of this experience—it stayed with him all his life and he often dreamt that he was still in that cockpit.41

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the best contribution I was able to make to the cause1 On 8 May 1941, Caldwell joined 250 Squadron RAF. The Squadron, originally formed in August 1918 during the Great War, had been occupied with coastal reconnaissance duties over the Bristol Channel and its approaches and was disbanded on 15 May 1919. In June 1940, 112 Squadron’s K Flight moved to the Sudan with ten obsolete Gloster Gladiator fighters for the defence of the Sudan and Eritrea and officially gained squadron status on 1 April 1941 as 250 Squadron. The Squadron diarist recorded that,‘it may seem a funny date to form on but we hope we will be given a chance to make the Germans and Italians look fools’.2 Caldwell had arrived in the Middle East at a time when the British and Commonwealth military position was deteriorating.A revolt in Iraq had been suppressed and Tobruk still held firm, thus preventing an immediate invasion of Egypt by Axis forces, but British attempts to recapture Sollum and Capuzzo had failed and relations with the Vichy French in Syria were worsening. By the end of May, Crete had fallen. In Cyrenaica, Crete and the Dodecanese, the Axis had taken bases from which Alexandria, the Suez Canal, dumps and depots in the Delta, and the main British disembarkation port at Suez could all be attacked in strength. Despite the worsening situation, things were initially relatively quiet for 250 Squadron because it was converting to the Tomahawk IIB, to become the first Tomahawk squadron in the Middle East.The single-seat Tomahawk, one of the P–40 series of aircraft, was designed by the 20


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Curtiss Airplane Division of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation. It was fitted with a liquid-cooled Allison engine. It was of all-metal stressedskin construction and designed for tactical reconnaissance and as a ground-attack fighter. It had a maximum speed of 345 miles per hour at 15 000 feet, a cruising speed of 270 miles per hour and a rate of climb of 2650 feet per minute. It had a range of 730 miles and a service ceiling of 29 500 feet. The P–40 series was constantly modified, especially with armament, and various models had .50-calibre, .30-calibre or .303-inch guns fitted in the wings and nose. Compared with the German ME 109, which was operating in the Middle East at the time, the Tomahawk was of inferior speed and rate of climb but it was reliable and manoeuvrable, and it operated effectively at low levels, making it perhaps the best fighter available at that time to the British forces for the harsh desert conditions. Looking back, Caldwell acknowledged that the Germans had the superior aircraft in height and speed, but even so, ‘I liked the Tomahawk, and thought it was a very good plane . . . It’d take a tremendous amount of punishment—violent aerobatics as well as enemy action’.3 Despite the inferior speed, the Tomahawk was a sufficient match for the ME 109E to the extent that the Luftwaffe pilots pressed for an early arrival of the improved F model. If the Tomahawk had a fault in Caldwell’s eyes, it was its armament.4 When Caldwell arrived at 250 Squadron, he had only about 157 total flying hours, and no real fighter training. There were no operational training units in Australia or the Middle East at that stage and, as far as fighter techniques were concerned, ‘the fact . . . that you could fly a Wirraway . . . was about as far as it went, and then you hoped for the best after that’.5 Looking back, Caldwell acknowledged the difficulties in preparing for combat: . . . the difficulty in assessing what’s taking place in aerial combat, until you’ve done it, is quite strange. It’s all very well listening to people talking about it or imagining it, but when it takes place it’s quite different and a little while too before you get the score. If you’re lucky enough to survive long enough to pick up the idea then gradually the luck factor is overcome by some experience.6

Despite his limited experience, Caldwell was interested to get into combat ‘to see how I’d perform and see how I’d get on’.7 As was the norm, 250 Squadron had a minimalist technique to acquaint raw fighter 21


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pilots with combat situations—they would ‘just chuck you in and see how you go . . . we just went and gave it a go, hoped for the best’.8 Initially based at Aqir in Palestine, 250 Squadron became operational on 11 May when a detachment of ten pilots and aircraft was ordered to participate in the defence of Alexandria. Caldwell did not, however, accompany these pilots—he stayed behind and had to content himself with some practice sessions on the Tomahawk to familiarise himself with the aircraft and to get an idea of his new surroundings. He quickly discovered that flying in the desert had its own special challenges: . . . it’s like nowhere else on earth.There are no landmarks in the desert, and the heat makes such a haze that there’s no horizon at all.You’ve got nothing to fly on. I’ve often been up at say 18 000 feet with reasonably good visibility. I could see an aircraft six or seven miles away all right. But below me was just haze. You’re sort of waffling through the air, working on your instruments and your general sense of the levelness of your wings. But if you’re not careful you can easily be flying with one wing down. Navigation, of course, is easy if you are anywhere near the coastline, because you know what to look for from the shape of the coast. But when you move inland, as you must necessarily do when you start operations, you have to land on places which are just simply parts of the desert. You search for the darned thing, and land, and while you’re doing that you’ve got to take very great notice of the shade and colour of the ground—dark patches and light patches, and so on.You’ve got to memorise all that for future use . . .9

Many pilots were superstitious and would carry some sort of good luck charm or talisman with them at all times. Caldwell was no exception.As his talisman, he carried a photo that Jean had sent him soon after he arrived in the Middle East. It was a postcard-sized reproduction of the one that Woman magazine had taken when their engagement had been announced. It was a favourite of his, and he carried it with him at all times. He also had a mascot.‘Jean’ was printed on the metal frame of his machine-gun sight: ‘You see, I can read my wife’s name every time I get an enemy aircraft in my sights. It helps me shoot straight.’10 With his talisman safely on board, Caldwell quickly adapted to the Tomahawk and grew to love flying it: I thought it was a very nicely designed aeroplane. It handled beautifully, it had almost no vice, certainly it was a little difficult to control in terminal 22


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velocity. Very steep dive, but it was very fast also. Faster down hill than almost any other aeroplane with a propeller on it. And very clean, and it would stand a lot of punishment.11

Which was just as well, because fellow 250 Squadron pilot, Archie Wilson, considered that Caldwell tended to be rough on the controls of his aircraft, to the extent that he was not entirely suited to tight formation exercises. However,Wilson also believed Caldwell was always in complete control and was gifted with an outstanding ability as a marksman.12 As well as getting used to flying in desert conditions, Caldwell had to get used to living in the desert: . . . it’s a seven-days-a-week job for months on end, and there’s nowhere to get away to. Alexandria is the nearest city—you get a couple of days there every two or three months. Everybody, of course, lives in tents. The day starts half an hour before dawn.The engines are warmed up and uncovered. Breakfast is somewhere around 7 o’clock or 7.30 for the airmen, who line up with their plates, and it’s dished out to them—some sort of porridge, not too good because it’s made with water that’s well chlorinated and usually brackish, and tea made with the same stuff, which although you get used to it is hardly drinkable. Lunch is the same sort of thing—a slice of bully-beef with hard biscuit, and you can have margarine, and of course more ‘chi’ again—that’s Arabic for tea . . . And even bully-beef—it’s wonderful what you can do with bully-beef when you try. You can have bully-beef with sand, without sand (sometimes), fried, stewed, curried, hot or cold—quite a variation. And there’s the grand day when they get a load of eggs up. You can have them hard-boiled, or soft-boiled, fried, or poached. You can do a lot with eggs.13

After France fell to Germany in 1940, the French in Syria supported the Vichy Government.The Vichy forces were hostile to the British, but even so, Middle East Command initially decided to take no action against Syria or Lebanon as long as they did not become bases for enemy activity. The British were concerned, though, that the situation could change and, as anticipated, the Vichy soon gave the Germans permission to use Syrian airfields.Accordingly, the British decided to invade Syria to negate Axis influence. Caldwell’s Squadron was now called upon to assist with the invasion of Syria. Having missed out on the defence of Alexandria, he was 23


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anxious to commence operations with 250 Squadron.This sortie was up for grabs among the Australian pilots so they decided to play a hand of poker for the privilege. When the cards were shown, Caldwell, who would become a skilled and successful poker player during the course of the war, had a flush—the winning hand.14 On 12 May 1941, Caldwell carried out his first sortie with 250 Squadron, escorting bombers to Palmyra airfield in central Syria, located on the oil pipeline between Lebanon and Iraq.As a result of ground strafing, Caldwell set one enemy aircraft on fire, and damaged one other.15 Three days later, Caldwell and Flying Officer Frederick Aldridge escorted eight Bristol Blenheim bombers of 84 Squadron to Syria to seek out more German aircraft. Aldridge spotted a French MoraneSaulnier 406 fighter, but this eluded them in a heavy sea mist. Caldwell and Aldridge then lost the Blenheims in the mist and had to return to base. Four of the Blenheims managed to bomb Rayak airfield but, other than killing one French officer and wounding some troops, no further damage was done.16 There was very little French fighter reaction to the British raids.This meant that 250 Squadron’s fighter detachment could be released and, on 16 May, Caldwell and Flying Officer Gordon Wolsey took two Tomahawks to Cyprus to defend against air attack. They were escorted by a Blenheim I of 211 Squadron, which was also carrying guns and ammunition to the British and Commonwealth forces stationed at Nicosia.17 Caldwell scrambled four times during his brief period on Cyprus, with no interceptions. After a dawn patrol to Turkey, Caldwell and Wolsey returned from their Cyprus detachment on 24 May to a Squadron that was preparing to transfer to Lake Maryut the next day, from where it would engage in shipping escort patrols and the defence of Alexandria. Caldwell did not leave for Lake Maryut immediately—he stayed to attend the funeral of fellow Australian pilot, Sergeant George Pyke, who died after a short illness. Caldwell rejoined the Squadron on 30 May.18 Caldwell made up for lost time when he arrived, flying from Alexandria to Crete to escort ships evacuating from Crete, on 31 May. This involved long flights over water: No one likes flying long distances over the sea in single-engined machines. I must say I am no exception. As soon as one leaves the coast of Egypt and heads north over the Mediterranean, he always imagines that the engine is 24


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starting to run rough or that it is not running quite as sweet as usual, and we were always very pleased to sight land again on our return. I am quite a fair swimmer but I don’t think I’d make much progress if I came down in the middle of the Mediterranean. It was exciting work covering the evacuation of Crete.

Exciting, and dangerous: We had no rubber boats—just those . . . life preservers that would keep a fellow up a couple of hours. If he got in any sort of a fight out over the sea he usually used up so much gas that he couldn’t get back to Egypt and had to bale out, hoping a destroyer would pick him up . . . Of course, a few months later when we were operating deep in the desert a hundred miles or so from the sea, they sent us some perfectly lovely little rubber dinghies— which weren’t much good in the sand!19

On his return from Crete, Caldwell carried out routine patrols and gun tests with no contact with enemy aircraft. Perhaps the only moment of excitement in the opening days of June 1941 was just after he took off for the patrol on 2 June when his Tomahawk’s canopy was carried away. Four days later, 6 June, proved much more exciting. As Flying Officer Jack Hamlyn’s no. 2, Caldwell went on a defensive patrol over the Suez Canal, Ismailia and Port Said. On his return, Caldwell noted in his flying log that he and Hamlyn shared in the destruction of a Cant Z.1007 three-engined bomber of the Regia Aeronautica. Despite Caldwell’s entry in his flying log, this incident is not referred to in the Squadron’s Operations Record Book or the Squadron Diary, and there does not appear to be a combat report for it. Most accounts, including diary and combat reports, indicate that the destroyed Cant Z.1007 was shared by Hamlyn and Sergeant Tom Paxton on 8 June and that that was the first air combat victory by a Tomahawk.20 Given that Caldwell recorded later victories with ‘confirmed’ noted against them in his flying log, it must be assumed that this claim was never verified. However, as far as Caldwell was concerned, it was ‘a small success. It was a little overdue I felt as I had been chasing its tail all over Transjordan, Syria, Cyprus and Turkey down as far as the Dodecanese.’21 The Squadron received a signal on 11 June to move to Sidi Haneish South, where, apart from a short period in early September, it would be based until mid-November 1941. It was taken off operations to facilitate 25


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the move, but the move was not an easy one. 250 Squadron was down on personnel, lacked equipment and it was not known if there would even be enough tentage when it arrived at its new location. The situation improved, however, with equipment, personnel and three new Tomahawks arriving shortly afterwards. The British offensive, code-named Battleaxe, was about to commence. Headquarters 204 Group advised the squadrons that on 15 June the Army would be advancing to attack the enemy near Capuzzo ‘with the intention of defeating him in that neighbourhood and then relieving our forces in Tobruk’.22 Total air strength included five fighter squadrons, six light–medium bomber squadrons, one tactical reconnaissance squadron and one heavy bombing squadron. The fighter squadrons, including 250 Squadron, were to provide protection for the advancing forces. Axis strength consisted of ME 109s from I/JG 27 and 7/JG 26, ME 110 long-range fighters of III/ZG 26, two Gruppen of Ju 87s, some Ju 88s of LG 1 and about seventy Italian fighters and twenty-five bombers. Unfortunately, the push was not successful—no territory was gained and the three days of heavy fighting resulted in large losses of tanks and aircraft. In a week of the heaviest air fighting so far in African skies, 250 Squadron also suffered the loss of lives and aircraft. During this time, Caldwell carried out practice interceptions and patrols ‘once or twice without seeing a darn thing and on a couple of occasions we had a short chase and an indecisive action with some Jerries but no blood on either side’. He wrote to his friend Ernest SladeSlade (who was known as Slade) that on 16 June: The air became pretty busy. We lost a plane that day on a patrol, and had a bit of skirmishing but though we damaged a couple couldn’t get a confirmation of one even. This confirmation is pretty tough—you have to give your word that you saw it actually hit the ground and two other independent reports saying the same are required before it’s OK, so that, if you are over enemy country, as we mostly are, it’s not easy to get the two independents even if you do see it all yourself . . .

On 18 June, Caldwell took off at dawn and: had to land again with electrical trouble. The other seven pushed on and when I got off again fifteen minutes later, they were some sixty miles on their way.Anyhow, I knew where we were to go and what needed doing, so 26


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I pushed along on my Pat Malone to give a bit of a personal performance. Being a bit scared of the Jerries getting me, I kept pretty low down in the seat skirting the Gulf of Sollum and cutting across the wire23 just below Bardia and hitting the road, Bardia to Tobruk, about five miles west of B[ardia]. Flying at about fifteen feet at 250 mph, I suddenly came on two lorries. As I closed toward [them], the crews jumped out and dived into the ditch at the roadside. I opened fire on the first truck at about 500 yards and then suddenly another chap popped out of the second truck. I gave the rudder a touch and knocked him off like a ninepin. He fairly leapt into the air and came down flat on his back in the road! Well I turned and gave the lorries another splash just to fix [them] for sure, then put a burst across the three Jerries lying in plain view in the ditch and so did them in. About ten miles further along, I found five lorries all dispersed in a circle and had a go at them, putting three out of action. In the meantime, they opened up with machine guns and a bit of tracer was flying about. I had a stab at one gun post and silenced that, fixing the two gunners and pushed off toward Tobruk. On the way I found an odd one about and gave them a short one-second burst with few results.24

Of the soldier who ‘fairly leapt into the air and came down flat on his back in the road’, Caldwell later recalled, ‘It was just as though he had been hit by a terrific wind. He was lifted forward in a kind of flat floating jump. Then he lay still.’25 He noted in his flying log that he had damaged five trucks and killed sundry personnel on this day. This was the day 250 Squadron suffered its first losses. It was also the day it was generally accepted that Operation Battleaxe was a failure. And it was the day Caldwell and the Squadron acknowledged that there was no place for chivalry in this war. After being hit by flak, Flying Officer Jack Hamlyn was forced down forty miles east of Tobruk and, with badly blistered feet and stories of encounters with friendly Arabs, he rejoined the Squadron on 4 July. On the way home, the other seven Tomahawks were jumped by four ME 109s over the Sollum–Sidi Barrani area. Caldwell engaged one without success.The Germans’ shooting was much more successful with Oberleutnant Redlich, Leutnant Remmer and Unteroffizier Steinhausen shooting down Pilot Officer Donald Munro, Sergeant John Morton and Flight Sergeant Clifford Sumner.26 Flying Officer Gordon Wolsey saw one Tomahawk go down in flames and, about twenty minutes later, Caldwell saw a fire near the beach between 27


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Sollum and Sidi Barrani, which may have been the same aircraft: ‘I bowled several over en route and dived over the cliff down near the water across the gulf and cut the shore at Bug Bug passing the remains of a burning plane as I did so’.27 Caldwell also saw a pilot bale out. The parachute opened and the pilot floated down towards the sea. Then Caldwell could only watch as two Messerschmitts dived on his falling comrade. The first fired, but missed and zoomed away. A stream of bullets from the second hit the helpless pilot as he swung in the cords of his parachute. Then there was stillness.The body drifted down towards the sea.The parachutist was Donald Munro, one of the three pilots with whom Caldwell trained. He was also one of those about whom the Hindu fakir had made his predictions at Shepheard’s Hotel. His body was later recovered, riddled with bullets.28 The Squadron diarist believed that the act of shooting down a parachutist with no means of retaliation or escape was a vile trick,‘but it leaves us with no doubt as to procedure next time’.29 Perhaps Caldwell’s steely commitment to shooting enemy parachutists stems from Munro’s death. After he watched his defenceless friend descend, he turned back along the coast to take his revenge. He made: another attack at the still parked five trucks and catching one chap mucking about with an engine, so of course he went unserviceable too. As I passed the original two lorries the four blokes were still there and hadn’t wriggled so no doubt they were good and cold. Well, as I got near Bardia the road goes to the right towards Sollum, and I thought it might be a bit of a shock to the Jerries if I buzzed through the middle of their big do at Bardia, so keeping right down on the deck, I ducked over the rise and was right in the middle of them before I hardly knew it myself. Well they fired all sorts of things at me but beyond a few in the tail, I came to no grief—their shooting was lousy.30

There was little time to mourn and Caldwell was soon back in his Tomahawk for ‘a bit more of this strafing stuff and an odd high patrol but without anything of note turning up, just a few touch and dive away stuff and no decisive action either way’.31 Caldwell was not a natural fighter pilot. He acknowledged that he was not an instant success and once confessed that it took about thirty sorties 28


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before he scored his first air-to-air combat victory.32 He was starting to get restless and his dearth of air victories was disturbing him. His odd behaviour was noticed by the Squadron diarist, who wondered if the desert was affecting Caldwell as he insisted on opening his ration tin of tobacco by cutting chunks from the bottom of the tin. Caldwell’s strange behaviour continued as he wrote rude letters to RAF Aqir regarding his pay book which hadn’t turned up. He started flying alone in the desert and began to develop a reputation as a lone wolf. He took any opportunity to strafe enemy ground forces but was not always successful even at this air-to-ground firing. Caldwell was used to succeeding in whatever he turned his hand to—athletics, golf, insurance sales—and he was frustrated by his lack of verified claims. On one occasion, on an escort to Derna, he saw a motorcycle despatch rider heading in the same direction and decided to shoot him. He aimed and missed—he had shot over and beyond. He eventually hit the despatch rider but realised that he had to practise air shooting as often as he could. In the end, he discovered an effective shooting technique almost by accident: We had been doing a fair amount of strafing and this morning we’d been strafing up round the Bardia–Tobruk road, and I was reflecting on my failure to do any successful shooting in the air, although I’d been engaged in a number of air combats at this stage . . . We’d refuelled and rearmed at Sidi Barrani which is an advanced landing group for our purpose, our main base being back at Sidi Haneish. Having done so we now took off to go back to our base, flying low, to save being jumped or surprised by an attack from the sun. The sun being now only a bit above the horizon, the shadows of the aircraft were well behind them, over the clear-cut desert, and I was one of the two weavers or outriders behind the Squadron . . . I noticed the shadows were quite clear there, running over the desert. It occurred to me that if I could hit the shadow, I could hit the aircraft by simply transposing the relative position. By firing at the shadow I could see the dust go up . . . So I turned the guns on and my reflector sight on and opened fire on the shadow well back and found my . . . burst was over and behind it. I tried it again, just a quick squirt on the trigger, you know, half a second burst. Same thing. By the time I’d had about six of these one second bursts I found that I was beginning to correct my shooting.And so quite obviously this was the answer.33 29


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Caldwell had hit upon a foolproof method of shooting practice. He and tent mate Pilot Officer Archie Wilson often discussed the merits of this initiative as well as how they could introduce it officially into the Squadron’s training program. Caldwell eventually decided the best way would be to show his Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader John Scoular, how shadow shooting worked. Scoular was impressed with the method and reported Caldwell’s technique to Headquarters. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief RAF Middle East,Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, was so impressed by the method he sent a directive to all fighter squadrons in the desert to adopt shadow shooting. Despite this, training in shadow shooting was not carried out in all quarters and it was not until Caldwell was leading 112 Squadron that Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Maori’ Coningham reinforced the original direction for the desert squadrons to adopt this technique.34 The salt pans of the Western Desert were perfect for shadow shooting and Caldwell put in as much practice as he could. He considered that shadow shooting was ‘the best contribution I was able to make to the cause’35 and he developed an uncanny and extremely successful gunnery technique. It obviously worked. In 1943, when Caldwell was Wing Leader of 1 Fighter Wing in Darwin, Sergeant Jack Sheridan, an armourer with 457 Squadron, found during his daily inspection that both the gun-sight electric bulbs on Caldwell’s aircraft were unserviceable. He sent for replacements and when Caldwell arrived to take off, Sheridan asked him if he would mind waiting a few minutes until the replacement gun-sights were fitted. Caldwell replied, ‘That’s OK Sergeant, I never turn the bloody things on’. Sheridan repaired the gunsights anyway, and, while doing so, it occurred to him that Caldwell was so skilled he did not need to use the gun-sight any more.36 As the primary exponent of shadow shooting and an acknowledged gunnery expert, Caldwell was later called upon often to comment on various aspects of his success against the enemy. In particular, he spoke about the importance of effective shooting. In 1944, he gave some tips to the Air Cadets on aerial combat entitled,‘Think Fast—and Shoot First’. He illustrated the importance of shooting by recalling an example of bad shooting that he had seen just a few weeks before: I was messing about with some Jap fighters escorting their bombers. I was after one chap when I saw coming down on my starboard side a Zero bent on having a go at me. He was coming straight on . . . pointing straight at my 30


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face. I could see his guns opening fire and the flashes, but I knew that he couldn’t do much damage. Obviously he was shooting straight at me, and his bullets would be going well past my tail, because by the time his bullets arrive I would be well past the spot he was aiming at . . . In the air you’ve got to allow for deflection, range, line of flight, speed, skid, and anything else that comes into aeronautics.37

Caldwell felt very strongly about the importance of good gunnery skills and in a Wings article entitled ‘Hope Does Not Help’, he startled his readers by opening the article with: The fighter pilot, with no idea of how to shoot, who couldn’t ‘knock a sick parrot off a perch with a pick handle’ so to speak, is nothing less than a potential loss flying about the sky, and virtually, an expensive but useless passenger in a squadron. In fact, he is worse than useless.38

When Caldwell first realised the significance of shadows in developing his gunnery skills, he was acting as weaver. Owing to their good eyesight, Caldwell and Pilot Officer Archie Wilson were the two usual weavers at that time. Caldwell believed that this was not a satisfactory tactic, and did not appreciate the way the RAF: fiddle[d] round with these kinds of close formation where almost everybody’s in each other’s road. And you depend for security and safety on two other aeroplanes about 1000 or 1500 feet about and behind, weaving backwards and forwards. Usually . . . the warning came by seeing one or both the weavers spinning past in flames to show that you are now under attack, because this really was a dangerous position. Now you can see how this happens. You’ve got say twelve aeroplanes, you’ve got ten of them flying around in fairly close formation watching each other rather than anybody else because they were afraid to run into each other in trying to keep close formation. Therefore the leader’s about the only one who’s doing any watching, so you’ve got one pair of eyes instead of ten pairs watching out. The two weavers are not doing any watching—they’re trying to watch backwards and forwards across the rear of the formation to save it being attacked out of the sun.39

Despite the inadequacies of the tactic, Caldwell recognised that, ‘it was an honoured position for obvious reasons. It was assumed you had 31


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good eyes and were quick and you would probably survive’. However, the role of weaver was dangerous, and the rate of loss was high. Caldwell was luckier than many, but even so, he was often jumped and it was a chilling realisation that ‘nobody can come to your rescue, nobody can help you’.40 The main problem was that when a squadron was attacked, the weavers had to join the tail end of the formation and they proved a favourable—and often easy—target for the German pilots. Once it was acknowledged that Battleaxe was a failure, a stalemate developed. Both forces strove to build up their supplies before the next offensive began.At the same time, Rommel, who was promoted to Field Marshal on 22 June 1941, appreciated that before he could advance further into Egypt, he would have to capture Tobruk, which was still determinedly held by the Australians. During this period, there was little activity by ground forces and, other than the usual sweeps and bombing raids, the bulk of the British and Commonwealth air activity was escorting supply convoys. During this period Caldwell took every opportunity to strafe. He also put in considerable time shadow shooting, and it would only be a matter of time before he scored his first air victory. On 25 June, he and nine other aircraft ‘had the job of escorting bombers to Gazala to do up the ’drome there. First day a surprise, and we got away scot free and did a little ground strafing on the way home for good measure’ and the next day ‘the old Jerry was waiting for us in force’. There had been some ‘intelligence before we left that a lot of German kites had been on patrol all day and a lot more on advance ’dromes at readiness so we sort of expected it’.41 The Blenheims successfully bombed the aerodrome and the Tomahawks were heading homeward when the enemy fighters arrived: . . . down they came on us like bombs. In the first rush no one was hurt and they carried on away down in their dive. As we got near Tobruk the [antiaircraft defences] opened up and we shifted away a bit, then they arrived in force and about forty machines got going on us. I was sort of flopping about all over the sky trying to get fixed and having a shot now and then as one flashed by. I got on one chap’s tail and was just going along well when I heard a couple of sharp taps and saw some holes appear in my wing and tracer slipping by just beside the cockpit so I deduced that one must be on my tail and took plenty of violent action to spook him off. When I 32


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recovered from the shock I was at about 9000 feet42 and more or less unattached. Then just below me, out of the general ruck . . . a ME 109 quickly flew straight and level, so I winged over and dived on it. He saw me and dived too, but I managed to close to about 150 feet and let him have the lot. We raced on down, me firing like hell and as we got truly low, I began to pull out and he just kept right on, hit the ground and exploded with a hell of a flash.43

The dogfight took place in the Capuzzo area, and Caldwell’s target crashed in flames about three miles west of Capuzzo. He had accrued forty-seven hours on Tomahawks and his diligent practice had finally resulted in his first acknowledged victory. The other pilots recall that he screamed into his radio-telephone with the excitement of it all. When Caldwell returned to base, he reviewed the damage and found that ‘I had sixteen holes in the old crate and the wireless shot away just over my head, so I was a bit lucky’.44 Looking back on his first victory, Caldwell admitted that: I felt a bit sorry for him. I think he’d tried hard, hadn’t seen me in time—by the time he did see me he was pretty heavily damaged.And, of course, on an occasion like that you keep on at him . . . And he only had one, or maximum two, other people with him, and they were also fully occupied. So there was nothing very spectacular about it, but I was glad to have done it, I don’t know why.45

Caldwell took to the air three times that day and in another encounter damaged a ME 109. There does not appear to be a combat report for this and it is not mentioned in the Squadron diary or Operations Record Book. Overall, it was a good day for 250 Squadron, with the diarist recording that ‘the patrol came back in twos and threes, with stories of bringing down ME 109s and [Fiat G–50 Freccia fighters], also beating up a staff car, all of which was most exciting’. To counter the Squadron’s success, however, Flying Officer Monteith and Pilot Officer David Gale were shot down by Oberleutnant Franzisket and Oberfeldwebel Kowalski. Monteith was taken prisoner, but Gale, another of Caldwell’s companions from his training days, who had heard the fakir’s prediction, was killed.46 Things were quiet until 30 June when 250 and 73 squadrons jointly escorted a Tobruk shipping convoy. Without the Navy’s commitment to 33


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supplying the beleaguered Tobruk fortress, along with the support of its air escorts, the Australians who defended the fortress could not have held out.The cargo runs carried more than 5000 tons of supplies each month and the Axis air forces knew full well that the sea was the only way in. ‘Bomb Alley’, as the last forty miles of the voyage became known, could not be given adequate air cover, and it was a favourite haunt of the German Stukas and the Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 bombers. As far as Caldwell was concerned, the toughest job for the pilots in North Africa was escorting the boats carrying supplies to beleaguered Tobruk: The Huns, of course, could sink the boats with their dive-bombers if they could get at them and, since we only controlled the coast as far as Sidi Barrani, and they held it all the rest of the way, the sailing of the boats had to be timed so that they could reach Tobruk in the evening, discharge their cargo in the middle of the night and start back on time so that we could pick them up with an escort of planes at the crack of dawn . . . So every evening, just before dusk, was the critical period. The boats would be off, Axis-held dive-bombers would circle around overhead, the Jerry fighters would dive at us, hoping to break up our formation and get us into a dogfight.You see, if we broke formation or got into a dogfight, we used up our gas and had to go home early and that would leave the field open to the dive-bombers—so there we would be flying around at 300 miles an hour doing figure eights over a lot of barges that were doing about ten knots. Those were the longest hours I ever spent in an aeroplane.47

True to form, there were a number of clashes above the convoy with losses on both sides, but ‘it was expected . . . that the real attack would come in the evening as they neared Tobruk and this Squadron was to have the honour of that last hour’s patrol’.48 According to the Squadron diarist, their seven Tomahawks,‘put up a great show’. Caldwell wrote to his friend Slade that he: arrived over the ships at 5 pm as requested at 20 000 feet and began our patrol. Almost immediately three 109s were seen . . . about a mile away, waggling about almost as if to attract us. Then we saw . . . nine more 109s about 5000 feet above them waiting for us to take the bait. We began to circle over the ships, keeping a good eye on the boys of the crooked cross . . . and then darn me if the air below didn’t seem to come alive with planes. A bunch of about twenty-five Ju 87 dive-bombers with an escort of some 34


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thirty 109s and G–50s were hurtling along . . . with a flight of some six or seven ME 110s out to the left of them. There was no time to piddle about now, so we half rolled and dived on [them].The 87s kept on and started in on the ships while the fighters both from above and below set on us. I picked on a 110 on the outside and after a bit of a chase about, drew smoke from his starboard engine, then after one more burst he suddenly dived straight into the sea. There was such a hurry and scurry on that it was hard to tell what was what. Anyway, after an odd dash here and there and a bit of [a] look at the bombing which was going great guns, I managed to pick a couple of G–50s who were touching about down lower . . . After an unsuccessful dive on the G–50s I got right up underneath a 109 and saw my bullets go into it. He wheeled over and dived, but I don’t think was properly fixed.Then I saw two more kites go hurtling down, had a look at the bombing on the ships and decided to pop down and have a dig at the Ju 87s who were having such a lovely time with the unfortunate ships and destroyers. By now some of the ships had been hit and relays of 87s with fresh loads were coming on the scene. Well I sort of got into the circle as they dived, bombed, climbed and circled for a new attack. I picked a bloke and waited while he dived then got him flush as he climbed up the other side. He turned and began to go down with a streak of white smoke coming out. I fastened onto him and shoved in another burst for good measure. Saw him burst into flames and go down over the sea about half [a] mile from the largest ship. I ducked back into the circle again and right away caught a fellow as he was turning in on his approach to dive. After the first burst he straightened up, then began also to go down in a shallow dive, so I hung on his tail and gave him a bit more and saw the tell-tale white stream back from him. I had a bit too much speed on and had to pull out to the side to avoid bumping into him just after my last burst. I was quite close, about a wing span out to the side and above him and could see the pilot sitting in an absolute furnace in the cockpit, just being roasted. He went into the sea and no doubt it cooled him off, but would be a little late I think. I felt so good about this, that I was just going back for another when a couple of nasty looking 109s came after me. I had a quick look round to see where the remainder of our bunch were, couldn’t see any, so put the nose over and dived full bore round behind one of the destroyers and headed for the German shore about twenty miles away. I managed to shake them off, looked at my clock, saw it was eight minutes to six and near tea time so kept right on going. Just as I got near Bardia, right down over the water so that I couldn’t be dived on, I saw some figures . . . so I just turned aside 35


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for a moment and though they spread out, managed to bowl one bloke over.49

Caldwell made it home for dinner, and later that evening ‘the intelligence people rang me up and confirmed my three for the day as well as four others shot down by other fellows of our lot’.50 Caldwell was credited with two confirmed Ju 87s from the Luftwaffe’s II/StG2, which were piloted by Leutnant Wagner and Unteroffizier Walz.Although Caldwell’s account to Slade does not mention it, nor even his own flying log, he and fellow Australian, Sergeant Bob Whittle, were both responsible for bringing down one of the ME 110s and they were each credited with a half share. Caldwell’s combat report, however, does indicate that Caldwell and Whittle, who had experienced his first combat, were both responsible.51 Despite not indicating the share in his flying log or to Slade, Caldwell had a high opinion of Whittle’s abilities as a fighter pilot and some time later tried to show Whittle just how highly he esteemed his abilities. In 1942, when Caldwell was commanding 112 Squadron, the Air Officer Commanding, Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, asked him who he considered to be the best pilot in the desert. Caldwell told him that, in his opinion, Whittle, a much under-appreciated fighter pilot, was the best. The next thing he knew, Whittle came to him in a towering rage and accused Caldwell of being responsible for posting him to instructional duties at 73 Operational Training Unit. Caldwell told him that he had no idea that this was the intention behind Coningham’s enquiries. Whittle was not mollified. Caldwell’s compliment to his abilities had proven to be backhanded—he would no longer fly on desert operations.52 As well as Caldwell and Whittle’s victories that day, Flight Lieutenant Richard ‘Dickie’ Martin brought down two G–50s, and Pilot Officer Stanley ‘Stan’Wells claimed another ME 110.That evening, the Squadron celebrated the victories ‘to a certain extent’.53 To a certain extent only, because the Squadron’s success was again clouded by tragedy. The Squadron diarist recorded that ‘unfortunately we lost a sterling type in [Pilot Officer] Kent who was seen going down out of control without a tail, thus ends a most promising career and we all feel his loss’.54 Jim Kent was the last of Caldwell’s friends from his training days in Australia to fall victim to the fortune-teller’s prediction. Kent had written some letters before he died, among which was one to his mother, and Caldwell posted these the next day. It would be some time 36


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before Kent’s family received official confirmation of his death and his mother wrote to Caldwell asking for definite news of Jim. Caldwell responded almost immediately, advising that ‘it is with the most sincere regret that I have to tell you he was killed in an air engagement against superior numbers’. Caldwell described the engagement and went on to add that during the brief space of time before the Tomahawks had split up and lost contact with each other ‘one of our machines was seen to be shot down out of control and it was not until I landed back at the ’drome that I knew it was Jim’s aircraft’.55 Although he did not admit it to Mrs Kent, Caldwell had seen her son’s aircraft go down just as he was about to dive on the G–50s: ‘As I looked at them, one of our four Tomahawks whistled past on its way down with no tail and hit the sea in a hell of a splash’.56 Realising that it would offer little comfort, but perhaps some satisfaction, Caldwell told Mrs Kent that ‘seven enemy machines and pilots were destroyed before the engagement finished and the attack was beaten off, while a number more were seriously damaged’. Caldwell went on to say: Jim and I were very good friends and his loss is felt very keenly, not only by myself, but by the entire Squadron. Quite apart from my personal regard for him I had a great admiration of his ability as a pilot as did our [Commanding Officer], a man of considerable experience, but in an affair such as this, against unfavourable odds, it is more a question of luck rather than ability that governs the result.57

For Caldwell, however, skill, as well as luck, was fast becoming a factor in his success. During June, the results of Caldwell’s diligent shadow shooting practice became evident with his first confirmed victories. He told Slade that ‘at present I am leading by two victories though we have quite a good bag’.58 He later summarised this time for some radio broadcasts: This was a very busy period for us and I am afraid we had quite a few casualties. We were flying from dawn to dusk escorting bombers as far into enemy territory as Gazala and escorting barges of food and supplies into beleaguered Tobruk, making fighter sweeps over enemy territory, ground strafing his roads, his aerodromes and his encampments. We were all bound to have fairly severe losses in this kind of work and I am not exaggerating or 37


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boasting when I say the enemy’s losses in the air were considerably greater than ours and the morale of our pilots was very high.59

Pilot morale may have been high, but privately, Caldwell acknowledged the price that the Squadron was paying for its contribution to British and Commonwealth success in the desert: Of the original twenty-six pilots in this outfit we now have eleven left. Of course we have had some new ones come in . . . [but] some of the new ones have also gone in the meantime.We got two new Australian pilots four days ago, we now have but one of the two left, the other bloke got bumped off yesterday.60

The two Australian pilots who were posted to the Squadron on 28 June were sergeants Arthur Thomas ‘Tom’ Mortimer and Richard Nitschke. The lost pilot was Mortimer. Caldwell attended his funeral at Maaten Bagush on 4 July.61 What Caldwell did not tell Slade was that he was there when the crash occurred. Pilot Officer Archie Wilson had taken Mortimer up for a practice dogfight, but Mortimer began to spin at about 5000 feet and never came out of it.62 The memory of dragging ‘old T from the flames of his burning aircraft at Haneish’63 remained with Caldwell all his life, and a fresh recollection was something that he could not share with Slade.

38


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THREE

Sweeps and Convoys

I didn’t think it could ever happen to me.1 The desert held much that was beautiful in Caldwell’s eyes and as he took off on yet another sortie, he was aware of its shifting beauty. But in this time of war, the desert often revealed a darker, more sinister complexion. Sidi Rezegh, east of Tobruk, was at one stage witness to the thickening ‘black haze floating idly in the red rays of the sun’.2 From a distance, he could hear ‘the hum of the planes—pulsing as the Hun always do as if the motors are out of tune with each other’.3 And he could feel the fear of death:‘was this to be the last trip? And would I ever see the sun rise again to flood the earth with its splendour. I paled [at] the very thought of death at that moment.’4 Despite its darker side, the desert worked its way into Caldwell’s heart: The desert is a funny place: it gets a hold of you. During the heat of the day it’s just barren and featureless, absolutely miles and miles of nothing—just little patches of shrubs about knee-high. But in the dawn and at sunset the lighting effects are amazing. In the evening, just after the sun finally disappears, a wonderful green light shows all around the western horizon. It lasts for about two minutes, while all the brilliant colours given off by the dust in the atmosphere, gold and brown and purple and so on, come out vividly and then fade away.And then the green light fades away, and the stars come out. I’ve never seen that green light anywhere else. You don’t get it in the Sahara or the Gobi Desert. Apparently it’s unique to the Western Desert. You get the same sort of thing at dawn.There’s a gold and red glow, and all 39


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of a sudden the sun jumps up above the horizon. If you’re flying over the Mediterranean at dawn the sea changes in colour as you watch it, from emerald green to azure blue and deep blue. It’s really beautiful. And then there’s the background of the desert along the coastline, looking so golden and fresh and clean in the dawn. Even the dirty tents below you look clean.5

July 1941 did not offer many opportunities to hear the hum of enemy aircraft—it was a relatively quiet month, with 250 Squadron almost entirely engaged in convoy escort. But for Caldwell, there was one action highlight. On 7 July, he and five others from 250 Squadron co-operated with other squadrons in a sweep over the Bardia area. Caldwell experienced engine trouble and became separated from the formation. He continued on his own and ended up shooting down one of two Italian Fiat G–50 single-engined fighters that had been returning to their base.The G–50 crashed one mile south of the Bir Taieb landing ground, twenty-five miles west of El Adem. On the way home, he strafed some vehicle parks near Sollum and killed a number of enemy soldiers. He was credited with the G–50. Caldwell was the only one from 250 Squadron who encountered enemy aircraft on this occasion and the other pilots suspected that he had deliberately given them the slip. They weren’t convinced when he insisted that the engine trouble had cleared itself after he had turned back, and that he then couldn’t find the formation. When he finally returned to the mess, although relieved that he had safely returned, the other pilots ignored him. As Carel Birkby tells it in his history of 250 Squadron, Caldwell came ‘clattering in flamboyantly, gesticulating as always, calling for a drink . . . and tumbling out his story of how he pranged a G–50’. He was surprised by the casual way that he was treated by the mess. No one was interested. Drink in hand, he repeated his story. ‘His comrades raised their eyebrows and hummed disbelievingly.’ He insisted that he could pinpoint the downed Italian Fiat G–50 but his companions only ‘referred to bulls and used other Service terms indicative of incredulity’.6 Caldwell was disconcerted by the apparent lack of interest in his exploits so he told his companions that he had seen a large number of German tanks near Sollum. Someone, in a bored tone, said that he should phone the Air Officer Commanding and tell him all about it. Caldwell did and he and the Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader John Scoular, were promptly ordered to Headquarters to report. 40


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Sweeps and Convoys

As a consequence of Caldwell’s adventures, a heavy attack was planned on the tanks. The Squadron diarist got in the last word though, with a backhanded compliment that hinted at their feelings about his lone-wolf tactics:‘Good show, but don’t run about by yourself again’.7 Life had been too quiet for some time now, and the Squadron diarist spoke for all when he hoped ‘for a definite improvement in our affairs’ after Air Vice-Marshal Coningham took the first steps towards developing a tactical air force. The first Wing formed was 253, which included two squadrons of Hurricanes and one of Blenheims. Shortly after, 258 Wing, which included 250 Squadron, was formed and was initially tasked with operations over the frontline.The new structure did result in improvements and the diarist was happy to report on 15 July that patrols would now be done with a minimum of twelve aircraft. Unfortunately, however, it took a little time before the Squadron obtained sufficient Tomahawks. Caldwell took a few days leave at the end of July. He returned in early August 1941 to carry out nothing more exciting than routine gun and air tests and constant convoy and ground patrols. On these he achieved some success, but not an outright official victory—he damaged one ME 109 on 3 August while patrolling the Bardia–Capuzzo area and another on 10 August during a sunset patrol. Despite his lone-wolf escapade of the previous month, he displayed some leadership potential and was tasked with leading a dawn patrol on 14 August. He shot down a ME 109, which he noted as a probable in his flying log. He claimed a half share in a Fiat G–50 on 16 August and damaged another ME 109 on 18 August. He caught enemy fire over a shipping convoy on 23 August, which damaged his aircraft, forcing him to land at Tobruk. The damage was serious enough to warrant a two-night stay, so he didn’t return to base until first light on 25 August. Later that day, while patrolling over the Navy, he damaged another ME 109.Three days later, again escorting ships, Caldwell claimed another probable from an encounter with sixteen ME 109s. Caldwell, tested, patrolled, and shot his way through August, all the while honing his skills. The success he wanted—albeit with a cost— came on 29 August, the day that he would later refer to as ‘my own blackest moment’.8 On this occasion, ten Tomahawks were sent to patrol over a convoy north of Sidi Barrani and they encountered I/JG27. Caldwell was acting as weaver when he was attacked by two ME 109s: 41


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. . . apparently simultaneously, one coming from astern, the other from port side, neither of which I saw personally. Bullets from astern damaged tail, tail trimming gear, fuselage and starboard mainplane; while the aileron on that side was destroyed and a sizeable hole made in the trailing edge and flap some four feet inboard from the aileron, evidently by cannon shells, a quantity of splinters from which pierced the cowling and side of the cockpit, some entering my legs and right side. Fire from the port side, seemingly almost full deflection shots damaged the fuselage, a number of bullets entering my left shoulder and hip, small pieces of glass embedding in my face, my helmet and goggles being pulled askew across my nose and eyes— no doubt a near miss.9

A near miss, perhaps, but it didn’t end there. The aircraft spun out of control and he blacked out while pulling out of the dive. He recovered to see flames in the cockpit. German ace Leutnant Werner Schroer of I/JG27, who had shot at Caldwell, saw the flames and returned to base, claiming a victory. Caldwell considered baling out but the fire, which he thought had been caused by petrol, died out. He decided to remain in his Tomahawk: I was feeling a bit sore myself, feeling a bit sick—from fright and one thing and another—but I thought I was pretty safe. I got in across the coast at Sidi Barrani. I thought I could just pop her down near the shore and swim a bit. I didn’t think the enemy would bother about me, seeing me dive down, but all of a sudden streams of smoke started to go past me, two 109s were after me—they’d followed me down. I thought,‘Well, I’ve bought it this time definitely’. I did what I could, but a bullet hit the wing again, and that didn’t help me very much, and I must have been about a quarter of an hour with those blokes chasing me and skidding, and me all the time trying to turn and watch them and the sweat just dripping out of my helmet with fright and hard work. And then one of them did a silly thing. He got a little bit over-confident, and when I turned once he just turned round and overshot me, and I put a burst into his belly and he went into the sea. The other chap let me go. It was just on dark, and he probably wanted to go home and was out of ammunition.10

Caldwell would later claim that ME 109 as a probable, and it would eventually be confirmed destroyed. But for now: 42


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I had a long way to go home.We had a refuelling party just at that spot, but they hadn’t a doctor or facilities and I had to fly thirty miles back in the dark, not feeling too good; but I managed to get in all right with the old kite.The other chaps had seen me skimming past them with a lot of smoke going out of the cockpit so they thought I was badly alight, especially as it was pretty gloomy down by the sea, and they were in the sun. Of course a fighter squadron doctor doesn’t get much practice, so he was quite bucked up when I appeared.11

When Caldwell finally landed, blood was running down his leg, filling his boots, and his left arm was covered with blood.12 He was pulled out of his cockpit and, after the squadron doctor got in some practice, was taken to hospital. Caldwell may have admitted that he thought he had ‘bought it’, but in a photo that he sent to his friend Slade, he brushed the incident off in a more blasé manner. In the photo, he was standing in front of his Tomahawk. On the back he wrote, ‘The holes in myself are at the moment covered with plaster only for the snap which was taken for Jean’s benefit but anyhow I wasn’t hurt worth a damn’.13 He knew that Jean would have been anxious for proof that he was well, as Headquarters had sent her a cable informing her that her husband had been wounded in action. There was a gap in the Squadron diary for the next couple of weeks while 250 Squadron relocated to a new landing ground at Sidi Barrani. A new scribe took control of the diary and filled in some of the gaps of the previous days. He described Caldwell’s 29 August experiences and included Caldwell’s only known reflection on the incident: ‘I didn’t think it could ever happen to me.’ His editorial interpolation, obviously speaking from experience, was ‘Like bloody hell!’ At some point, however, Caldwell wrested the pen from the scribe’s hand and added a final comment: Sum total of the affair. Killer collected three wounds, the aircraft lost one aileron, one rudder control, one flat tyre, one flap u/s and holed, approx one hundred small holes plus five large ones, was on fire, which was extinguished. In return one ME 109F destroyed.

The sum of the affair did not end there, of course. As well as his collection of wounds and his aircraft’s hundred or so small holes, Caldwell 43


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achieved a much more significant totalling that day. This was the day on which he became an ace—he had achieved five confirmed victories. Just twelve months earlier Caldwell had been flying Tiger Moths at 4 Elementary Flying Training School, Mascot, and preparing square potatoes for dinner. Now, after 131 hours 40 minutes total flying time with 250 Squadron, he had become an experienced fighter pilot in one of the harshest combat environments that the war had to offer, with five confirmed victories, three half shares, six damaged, one probable and one unconfirmed.14 His perseverance in developing his gunnery skills clearly indicated his desire to excel as a fighter pilot and to carry out his duty well. Other factors in his survival and operational successes were his physical alacrity and sharp-eyed situational awareness from his background in sports, his self-confidence and growing combat maturity, his increasing self-discipline, and his ability to assess his own faults and recognise his inexperience. Caldwell’s efforts of 29 August resulted in his being awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. The citation, which appeared in the London Gazette on 26 December 1941, stated: ‘This officer has performed splendid work in the Middle East operations. He has at all times shown dogged determination and high devotion to duty which have proved an inspiration to his fellow pilots . . .’15 Squadron Leader Scoular would be posted from the Squadron in early September but, before he left, he noted in Caldwell’s flying log that Caldwell was an ‘extraordinarily keen fighter pilot who is apt to let his keenness get the better of him. Needs more practice in leading and will turn out a very good pilot. At the moment he is purely an individualist.’ No doubt the ‘individualist’ comment related to Caldwell’s lone-wolf actions, which were frowned upon.The lone pilot was a problem for the formation commander, who would not be able to locate him, and an easy target for the enemy—a waste of resources. Caldwell’s lone-wolf tendencies indicated his impatience with rigid formation flying as well as his personal desire to carry out his duty of killing as many of the enemy in the air and on the ground as was possible. But Caldwell’s inclination to individual action was in a sense compounded by the RAF’s prevailing fighter style. The typical formations flown by the RAF fighters at the time were not conducive to flying and fighting as a team, with mutual support given and accepted, as in the later ‘finger four’ formation (which the Luftwaffe had been using successfully). RAF pilots generally flew 44


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watching the leader, and the weavers, as Caldwell often was, were basically on their own. Despite the ‘individualist’ comment, Scoular clearly recognised Caldwell’s commitment to improving his flying and gunnery skills, and to carrying out his duty effectively. He had also recognised Caldwell’s leadership potential and, within two weeks, Caldwell would be given command of one of the flights. Wounds salved, Caldwell was back in the air after only a short stay in hospital.As September opened he carried out a number of strafing runs, but operations were interrupted when the Squadron was ordered to move back to Sidi Haneish. Caldwell quickly made up for lost time in the air. On 8 September, while strafing Gambut aerodrome, he set one enemy aircraft on fire and killed approximately five personnel, and the next day he accounted for two motor vehicles and some more personnel in the Sidi Azeiz area. Caldwell took command of K Flight on 12 September and would be promoted to acting Flight Lieutenant on 25 September. He celebrated his new command by taking a day off flying duties to visit his fellow Australians of 3 Squadron RAAF, who had recently moved into the area. He had little time to relax, however. There was considerable activity on 14 September as Rommel decided to send a reconnaissance thrust towards Sidi Barrani. In response, 250 Squadron sent ten aircraft to escort a number of Glenn Martin Maryland bombers on a raid. The Squadron diarist thought that ‘this resulted in a complete balls-up, but “Killer” Caldwell and Sergeant Whittle did a patrol over the advancing Huns and saw aircraft take off from the mudflats to intercept the raid’. Caldwell was attacked by a ME 109 but avoided harm to himself while damaging two enemy aircraft. For some time now, the Staffeln of I/JG27 had been withdrawing to Germany to re-equip with the later model ME 109F.This aircraft was an improvement on the ME 109E, and German pilots had been pushing for some time for the upgrade in hopes of better combating the Tomahawks. The ME 109F had a more powerful engine than its predecessor, a maximum speed of 390 miles per hour at altitude and improved armament. British and Commonwealth squadrons underwent some change during this period as well. The new Wing structure was firmly bedded down, and several more bomber squadrons arrived. On 16 September, Caldwell took over as Squadron scribe, imbuing his entries with humour and often a fair degree of sarcasm, until another 45


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diarist took over in November. The Squadron enjoyed a couple of rare days off on 18 and 19 September, but Caldwell noted in the diary that this was due more to the state of the unserviceable aircraft,‘rather than to the benevolence of those who control our destinies. Most of the pilots have really relaxed while a few of the more rugged types went bathing in the afternoon.’16 Bathing in the sea was a much anticipated event. The fine dust remorselessly infiltrated clothes and hair and the flying environment was hot and sweaty. Water was tightly rationed in the desert, and everyone in the Squadron received a gallon a day. Half of that went to the cookhouse and the rest was used for washing and shaving: You shave every second or third day, and then there’s cleaning teeth and washing. So if you want a bath you’ve got to save up—and that takes you about a week probably. But then everybody smells the same, so it doesn’t matter. It cancels out.17

There may have been no flying duties, but a confrontation with ‘the enemy’ ensued nonetheless. The Squadron’s new Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader Edward ‘Teddy’ Morris, dropped a bathing party off and: . . . we were astonished to find that a certain part of the beach, which, if anyone’s, is certainly ours, by virtue of custom and long usage, has been wired off against us by some itinerant [anti-aircraft] commander who claims he’s a Lieutenant Colonel, which claim is supported by the depth and extent of the dug-out and general safety precautions around his tent. Having pointed out our lack of elementary courtesy in cluttering up his beach, and demonstrated the risks to which we exposed his officers because of important papers said to exist in their tents, into which it was obvious we were on the point of forcing our way, this battle scared, bottle scarred, damn it, battle scarred warrior comforted us with the assurance that we were all in this together which we take to mean he is behind us—no distance stated.18

The pilots were about to push for their bathing rights, but gave up when the Lieutenant Colonel invoked the threat of Headquarters and ‘other mysterious powers’. Excitement continued when they returned to spend a quiet night in the mess (not, of course, allowing themselves to become ‘bottle scarred’, or bottle scared for that matter). New .303 guns had arrived to replace the .30-calibres and the pilots 46


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looked ‘forward to a big percentage of our gun trouble disappearing’.19 To gain the measure of the new weaponry, Caldwell conducted an air test on 21 September. That evening, ‘a popular fallacy has again been disproved and a number of drops of rain fell—maybe there was once corn in Egypt?’20 Caldwell may have regretted his facetiousness as more rain was to be encountered over the next few days and not just a few drops. Heavy rain in the desert could be a nuisance and uncomfortable. Water would drip ‘from the sides of the tents and [form] muddy pools on the ground. Rivulets ran down the wadis furrowing deep into the soil.’21 On one occasion, when a storm lashed the desert, Caldwell heard the rain beat the canvas and saw ‘the flash of distant guns [light] up the scudding clouds. The gunfire intensified as a grey light crept over the desert. It was raining dismally and a plume of black smoke rose above the place.’22 Despite the rain, the Squadron tried out a new formation which Caldwell sarcastically recorded, ‘for its first trial, wasn’t too bad and is thought [it] will be quite as effective as any other known method of bewildering the pilots in moments of stress’.23 Most of the pilots went to visit their South African friends of 2 Squadron SAAF for dinner and a party on 22 September. There they also met up with some of the captains of the ships over which they had spent much time protecting. It was a good night; fortunately, there was no early morning calls as ‘a lot of people were still feeling a bit weak after last night’.24 The ‘weakness’ must have abated by afternoon as they had to carry out a patrol, but may have returned after ‘they pushed off en masse to drink the wine of the country at the expense of No. 238 Squadron, next door. Another convivial evening’.25 Caldwell encountered ME 109s on both 24 and 25 September but experienced no luck in increasing his score. His score may not have increased but his frustration certainly did and he let his sarcasm fly when he recorded that day’s efforts: Ten aircraft left during the morning . . . to refuel and from there to carry out patrols of the ships, finally landing at Sidi B for the night. Certainly the progress we make as a result of experience is a wonderful thing. What I mean is the progress of our refuelling organisation. There, if you like, is something wonderful. Any lover of efficiency who looks on our achievements in this sphere must feel his heart glow and his right ventricle expand with the pericardiac stimulus of permissible pride. Just think of it—one shagged out bowser to fill and service four squadrons.26 47


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Caldwell was up and off at first light on 26 September to yet again experience the frustration of bad planning.This time, 250 Squadron was supposed to witness an artillery shoot near Sidi Omar: ‘It was a nice morning for flying, clear and cool, and if the artillery had turned up might have been practical’.27 Caldwell’s flying log indicates that he damaged a ME 109 sometime that morning but he does not refer to it in the Squadron diary. On 27 September, along with twelve aircraft from 3 Squadron RAAF, 250 Squadron sent ten Tomahawks to escort nine Maryland bombers of 21 Squadron SAAF to Bardia. The bombers failed to adhere to the set plan and broke their formation, ‘thus unnecessarily exposing themselves to attack and at the same time making it more difficult for us. Two of them were shot down in flames.’28 Once again, Caldwell had been weaver. He observed enemy aircraft taking off from Menastir and Gambut aerodromes, as well as others climbing for height out to sea. He also noted several ME 109s above them and warned the leader by radio. He saw Sergeant Humphries carry out an attack on one enemy aircraft: . . . which was subsequently seen to go down, the pilot baling out over the sea. One Maryland burst into flame and went down into the sea, possibly as a result of [anti-aircraft] fire, which was fairly [near] and accurate in respect to height. None of the crew was seen to get out. The bombers having now left the area, six aircraft led by the CO, with myself weaving behind, lost height on a course of approx 140 deg, crossing the coast again near Bug Bug.At a position approx fifteen miles SSE of Bug Bug, at a height of 6000 feet we were attacked from out of the sun by two ME 109s F type, two more giving them cover from above. Their approach was unobserved until they were almost within range, and as I gave warning, they opened fire from about 200 yards, diving past. One attacked me, his tracer passing over my fuselage, the other attacking [Pilot Officer Stan] Wells on the outside of the vic [formation]. I managed to turn in on this machine and carried out an attack from above on his starboard beam, firing about a few seconds bursts of all guns and seeing several explosive bullets hit the engine cowling and forward parts of the fuselage near the cockpit. The [enemy aircraft] pulled steeply up past my nose at a distance of not more than thirty yards, and I lost sight of it, while PO Wells’ machine went down in flames and exploded on hitting the ground.29 48


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Pilot Officer Stan Wells was shot down by Oberleutnant Redlich, who claimed his 24th victory. Sadly, Wells was due to go on leave the next day.‘So passes another fine chap’.30 Caldwell originally thought that the ME 109 was only damaged, but it was later confirmed destroyed by the soldiers who saw Pilot Officer Wells shot down. On this advice, Caldwell amended his flying log.31 On 28 September, Caldwell and five other Tomahawks from 250 Squadron provided top cover for 33 and 112 squadrons and the Royal Navy’s fighter squadron. They were escorting eighteen Marylands over Bardia again. This was a ‘most successful show—all aircraft returning’.32 Caldwell later noted that he ‘saw a 109 climbing up from below him and fighting down a strong sense of unreality managed to shoot it down’33 off Sidi Haneish. This was a surprising turn of events because Luftwaffe pilots had the luxury of picking and choosing their attacks, and if they did not have the advantage of height they would normally fly past without engaging: The pilot of the ME obviously did not see me, and I fired my first burst with all guns at a range of about 350 yards, and got in a second burst at a range of less than 200 yards. The [enemy aircraft] continued on its steep climb for a brief space, then appeared to fall off the top in an uncontrolled manner, going down in a long curve at a sharp angle.34

Caldwell’s claim for this ME 109 was later confirmed. He scrambled on 29 September and carried out a shipping patrol the following day. He claimed a damaged ME 109 but was critical of the planned duration of the operation. The nine aircraft were ordered to patrol over the ships for one hour fifty minutes. However, the patrol time, combined with the fifty-minute flight to the coast and the additional twenty-five minutes required to get back to the landing ground to refuel, would result in dangerously low fuel levels.The weavers were not able to make the landing ground. They had to land at Sidi Barrani to refuel. The others only just made it to the landing ground. ‘Truthfully may it be said—they know not what they do.’35 As Flight Commander, Caldwell now had to pay more attention to the battle situation in the air. Not only had he to take account of his own actions, but he was responsible for the other pilots in his flight. His combat reports indicate that his situational awareness was becoming acute—he was able to quickly assess the state of affairs and make 49


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decisions with little delay. He was also beginning to wear his new responsibilities well. But as his own fighter and leadership skills further developed, he became increasingly impatient with what he saw as failures in planning and systems and sheer incompetency. He was never one to suffer fools and his frustration was vented to some degree in the Squadron diary. Regardless of what Caldwell considered to be the inadequacies of higher command, however, the efforts of the Squadron were recognised—the Air Officer Commanding sent a personal signal to the Squadron in appreciation of its work over the last days of the month. He stated his admiration for the Squadron and considered that this ‘Tobruk season’ had had as much success as the last one. Caldwell valued this high-level praise and pasted a copy into his flying log.36 On 3 October, 250 Squadron was released from operations for two weeks so that new arrivals could be trained ‘in the arts of war’.37 Caldwell and Squadron Leader Morris took advantage of the standdown to have a few days leave in Cairo, and they set off by car after lunch. ‘Two hours later the car returned without them as they had got tired of the idea—the drive, not the leave—and taken the rest of the trip from Bagush by Lockheed C–60 Lodestar. Nothing but the best.’38 Cairo was a welcome relief from desert life. First stop was Shepheard’s Hotel, with its access to refinement, a good bath, a good meal and English newspapers. Squadron Leader Morris took only a short break, returning on 6 October. Caldwell, however, stayed on and enjoyed Cairo life until 11 October. The day after he returned Caldwell carried out some practice formations and attacks. K Flight acted as the attackers and outsmarted B Flight. There was no flying planned for the afternoon, so a swimming party was formed.The next day, six aircraft stood-by from dawn and carried out, in Caldwell’s eyes, a fruitless scramble over Mersa Matruh. Still Caldwell felt impatient at both the dearth of operations and the incompetence of the operational planners.Yet again, he experienced frustration at ineffective planning when, on 14 October, ten aircraft were ordered to carry out a shipping patrol and the order was cancelled after the pilots had taken off.They were then ordered off again ‘by some hopeless incompetent in the guise of an intelligence officer’.39 A quiet day on 15 October presented Caldwell with just an air test, but the evening proved a ‘reasonably successful show’40 when a group consisting of Squadron Leader Morris and Caldwell visited 238 Squadron’s mess. There was some sort of tension in the air and a fair 50


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bit of steam was let off. In the ruckus that ensued, an unnamed Wing Commander broke his leg, someone sustained cuts to the face and head, Flying Officer Jack Hamlyn strained a knee, a major broke a rib, and a number of shock and abrasion cases resulted. ‘Doc’s eyes fairly gleamed with anticipation at stages of the “do”, while an Air Commodore was seen on the floor about a dozen times inside half as many minutes.Very satisfying.’41 The next day, Caldwell noted in the Squadron diary that those who had attended the party all ‘look at bit weak’. A red-letter day for Squadron conviviality occurred on 17 October, the day that the Sergeant pilots became members of the officers’ mess. It was generally agreed to be ‘a very sound arrangement’.42 The idea of merging the two messes originated at 3 Squadron RAAF. Squadron Leader Peter Jeffrey believed that all flying personnel should be together as much as possible so they could discuss tactics and operations, share opinions and ideas and gain a united viewpoint. Numerous bomber command accounts touch on the disruption brought about when a returning crew headed to separate messes, rather than sharing a postsortie meal or drink together. In many crews, the pilot was a Sergeant pilot. On operations he was responsible for all decisions, in effect outranking his officer crew members in the air, but on the ground was of lower rank. Jeffrey instituted the joint mess at 3 Squadron and this worked well for his pilots. On 11 October, Air Vice-Marshal Coningham had dined at 3 Squadron and he fully approved of the combined pilots’ mess. Eventually the idea spread throughout RAF squadrons in the Middle East. Caldwell particularly took to the idea and appreciated the rationale behind it. Later in the war, as Wing Leader of 1 Fighter Wing, he instituted a combined mess at Darwin.43 Since the stalemate of Operation Battleaxe, both the Axis and British and Commonwealth forces had been rebuilding their forces. The Axis wanted to capture Tobruk, a vital resupply port, and from there eventually take the Suez Canal zone. At this stage, however, Hitler’s invasion of Russia was underway, so Rommel’s forces did not have priority. As a consequence, the Axis forces were slower to rebuild. By November, however, both sides were in a position to mount new land offensives. The British and Commonwealth land forces timed Operation Crusader to commence on 18 November, but the air component commenced as early as 14 October, albeit on a small scale. Tasked for offensive action over Cyrenaica, 258 Wing, which comprised 112 and 250 squadrons, 51


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3 Squadron RAAF and 2 Squadron SAAF, escorted bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. All these operations were aimed at weakening enemy air strength by attacking shipping, supply organisation and lines of communications, as well as winning air superiority over the Bardia– Tobruk–Maddalena triangle. In addition to offensive operations, 250 Squadron still carried out vital shipping protection. Although 250 Squadron was ready to participate in the increased air activity on 18 October, Caldwell was critical of its efforts. After lunch, twelve aircraft were sent to carry out another shipping patrol. Six of them seemed to have no problem carrying out their orders. The other six, however,‘seemed to have run about the sky like stray pups attaching themselves to anyone who looked inoffensive, and getting either ignored or hunted away by them’.44 The ‘stray pups’ managed to get to the patrol line about five minutes after their time was up and ‘it was pathetic to see how they clung to the others on the way home—taking no risks obviously’.45 Caldwell, who was more focussed than the ‘pups’, claimed one damaged ME 109. He noted in his flying log that it was almost a probable, but blamed the ships for not verifying it. Spleen vented, Caldwell was heartened the next day when Coningham visited and gave ‘some interesting dope on the present and future plans of our forces in the Western Desert. It would appear that there is a good time coming.’46 Caldwell certainly had a ‘good time’ over the next few days. Not only had he participated in a number of shipping patrols and engaged ME 109s on three occasions, but on 21 October he ‘officially became a Flight Lieutenant and drinks were had as requisite’.47 Just twelve months earlier he had still been in training with the rank of Leading Aircraftman. On 23 October, Caldwell participated in a dawn shipping patrol. Later that day, he carried out a solo ground strafe operation, damaging two vehicles in the Bardia–Capuzzo area, setting one alight and killing the crew. This proved important from an intelligence perspective as Caldwell saw four dummy tanks in the Sollum–Buq Buq area. Caldwell knew that his machine-gun bullets would not penetrate the steel tanks, but target practice should never be wasted and he thought perhaps that the rattle of the bullets would disconcert the tank crews. He selected his target and opened fire with all his guns. Then he noticed something strange.The tank was smouldering where his bullets had struck.This did not make sense, so he half-circled back, and came in closer. He saw that the tanks were not made of steel, but of hessian and the ‘guns’ protrud52


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ing from the turrets were only wooden poles. He headed back to base and reported the news to Army Intelligence.48 Given that both sides were preparing for their next thrust, it would have been of considerable interest to Intelligence if Rommel was using dummy or decoy tanks. Despite this new information, Caldwell had his wrists firmly slapped by the Squadron for yet another example of lone-wolf tactics and noted with chagrin that ‘this sort of thing is not considered a good show and must not be done’. He spent the evening in the mess, ‘by the light of an oil lamp . . . settling weighty problems till about dawn’.49 Or perhaps partaking of a little liquid consolation for his wrist slapping. Over the next few days, there was the usual complement of fighter sweeps, gun tests and formation practice with one notable incident. On a patrol over ships on 26 October, Caldwell’s aircraft was damaged in an enemy action. He force-landed while on fire near Sidi Barrani and jumped out after the aircraft touched down on its belly.The aircraft then exploded but Caldwell was unharmed. Caldwell received a blast from the past on 28 October when Flight Lieutenant Rose arrived on attachment to 250 Squadron. Rose had been one of Caldwell’s instructors, and he ‘found a number of his expupils from Wagga . . . here—now seasoned fighter pilots and able in their turn to help him with their experience in the ways of the wily Hun’.50 Although Caldwell was speaking generally about Rose’s former pupils, this comment clearly indicates that he recognised that he too had become a seasoned fighter pilot who was able to pass on his own experience. Unfortunately for the seasoned pilot, October ended with Caldwell adding only one damaged enemy aircraft to his list of claims. However, the long hours on shipping patrols had certainly paid off for the Squadron on at least one occasion, with recognition coming from Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder in appreciation of the ‘powerful fighter effort produced at short notice and maintained for so many hours to cover the withdrawal of HMS Gnat’.51

53


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FOUR

Operation Crusader

. . . I’ve been as busy as hell ever since the push started . . .1 November 1941 opened with continuing preparations for Operation Crusader. Caldwell flew most days but did not see any enemy action and, like most pilots, was anxious to get back into battle. Not all pilots were as anxious as Caldwell to do battle, however, and to them Caldwell displayed an uncompromising attitude. He was extremely condemnatory of those who evidenced cowardice or a shirking of duty or, as it was known at the time, lack of moral fibre (LMF). He had no patience or sympathy for them, and was highly critical of two of 250 Squadron’s ‘socalled pilots’ who arranged to have themselves posted elsewhere, and of the ‘other bright lad’ who managed to get himself grounded.‘When they go away, the distinct haze of yellow that pervades the place recently will no doubt go with them.’2 LMF was totally alien to Caldwell’s nature. He had a clear sense of duty, and his duty was to fight and fight well, regardless of any personal scruples. Later, however, as he became a more experienced leader, Caldwell would recognise that a reluctance to do battle was not always related to cowardice. He grew to appreciate that his pilots had different limits and some might not be able to cope with the strain of constant aerial combat. He recognised the importance of the combined pilots’ messes in providing an environment where LMF could be noticed at an early stage. He would spend as much time as he could relaxing with his men in the mess, ever-alert to the signs of stress. ‘You find it out if you’re drinking with a fellow. You find the little slips . . .’3 He knew that he 54


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had to find out who was not coping: ‘it’s better to find out sooner, rather than keeping going—willing and all as he may be in trying to cover up’.4 On 10 November, Caldwell took six aircraft to Bagush to escort an official party, which was going to Landing Ground 110.They were then to remain there for twenty-four hours on local defence. Unfortunately, the escort did not go quite as planned with Second Lieutenant Norton crashing his machine as he landed right in front of the official party. Luckily, Norton was unharmed. Pilot Officer Cole arrived later that day to take Norton’s place, but his engine seized before he could taxi off the runway. ‘Two [aircraft] done for in one day—up to our best standard, surely.’5 Although no reason is given for Norton’s crash-landing, this day’s efforts highlight two factors that continually hindered Tomahawk squadrons in the desert—serviceability and flying problems. The desert conditions were not conducive to smooth aircraft maintenance and 250 Squadron’s diary is littered with references to crashes, unserviceability and general aircraft problems. Caldwell’s photo albums include a number of shots of damaged (and not by enemy action) aircraft. Caldwell often indulged in a sarcastic diary comment if yet another problem interrupted operational effectiveness—for example, on 11 November, when seven pilots left to collect seven new aircraft, three had to stay overnight ‘as the planes were, of course, not ready for delivery’.6 This would have been even more frustrating given that the land component of Operation Crusader was due to start in one week and the Squadron’s new pilots required familiarisation on the Tomahawks.‘As much practice flying for the new boys as was possible was done during the day without more damage than a couple of bent retractor links.’7 Caldwell found the Tomahawk to be a sturdy aircraft, ‘very strong, and no tricks about them’8 but the Tomahawk took some getting used to. Tomahawk pilots had their fair share of landing overshoots and other mishaps such as the bent retractor links of 250 Squadron’s ‘new boys’, Norton’s crash-landing and Sergeant Mortimer’s crash after spinning out in early July. Before the operational training units had been established, fresh pilots, like Caldwell, were just shown the Tomahawk and let loose with only the briefest familiarisation before becoming operational. To make matters worse, technical manuals and instructions were slow to arrive. And even those who had supposedly been converted to Tomahawks were treated with suspicion as the then Squadron diarist’s comment of 22 June indicates: ‘Two new Sergeant Pilots have been 55


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posted to us—they are said to be operational on Tomahawks, but knowing the [operational training unit]—we doubt it’. Caldwell may have vented his frustration in the Squadron diary, but this period also saw his growing maturity as a Flight Commander. Fellow Australian, Pilot Officer John Waddy, had recently joined 250 Squadron and for some time before his first operational flight, Caldwell took him aside and quietly told him what to expect during an air battle. Caldwell was fully aware from his own experience how little support was offered to new pilots. In fact, pilots rarely spoke of their battle experiences. Perhaps they were afraid they would be accused of boasting or line-shooting, as it was commonly referred to in pilots’ messes. Perhaps they just wanted to put the memories behind them so they could get on with the job next time. Whatever the reason, new pilots were disadvantaged because of the almost institutionalised reluctance to pass on battle experiences. Caldwell was different. He would speak about his experiences and he was often accused of line-shooting.As a responsible Flight Commander, he now wanted his new pilots to have some knowledge of operational flying. During his own first dogfight his ‘mouth and throat were dry. I had to keep working my tongue to make the saliva run. It was the first time I had been attacked by enemy fighters and I just didn’t know enough to cope.’9 Caldwell quickly learned how to cope but he would still ‘sometimes get a touch of the jitters’ when ‘waiting about on the ground before you take off, but once in the air you are all right.You have no time to think about anything else once you sight enemy aircraft.’10 Waddy carried out his first operational flight as Caldwell’s No. 2. He stayed on Caldwell’s tail but found the mêlée overwhelming and was surprised to see the enemy so close. He started swearing at Caldwell, but Caldwell did not hear him as his radio was off. Aircraft from both sides were whirling all around and, in his inexperience, all he could see was a blur. Soon, though, the only aircraft he could see was Caldwell’s Tomahawk, so he stuck to it. When they landed, Waddy asked Caldwell what had happened. Caldwell replied that it had been a pretty good dogfight, while it lasted.Waddy admitted later that he did not have a clue about what was happening at the time.11 However, he had the sense to stick to Caldwell and to learn from his experience, as well as adding to his own. Operation Crusader was officially launched on 18 November. It was the British and Commonwealth forces’ biggest offensive so far in the 56


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desert campaign, and the greatest planned since the start of the war.The Eighth Army had recently formed and the relief of Tobruk was its principal objective at this stage. To support the ground forces, the Western Desert Air Force provided twenty-eight squadrons.The Wings had been reorganised operationally and a squadron mobility scheme had been put in place which resulted in 258 and 262 Wings moving forward to Sidi Barrani, and then on to Maddalena, without ceasing operations. This ability to carry out fluid movement ensured that the Western Desert Air Force, as it was now known (the precursor to the Desert Air Force), was in effect the RAF’s first Tactical Air Force. Once the campaign opened, Caldwell ‘was as busy as hell’12 and participated in a number of sweeps and direct air support for the Army. He engaged ME 109s on three occasions, before a success on 23 November.13 He flew two operations that day. In the first, 250 Squadron provided ten Tomahawks as top cover over South African troops who were advancing on Sidi Rezegh. The Squadron encountered a mixed formation of six German Junkers Ju 88 high-speed bombers escorted by twelve ME 109 single-engined fighters and twelve Italian Fiat G–50 fighters. Sergeants Hards, Cable and Whittle of 250 Squadron each claimed a ME 109 during the twelve-minute engagement. Caldwell also shot down a ME 109 in flames. Two other probables were claimed by the Squadron. It was not all success, however, as Sergeant Donald Palethorpe14 was shot down and Squadron Leader Morris’ aircraft was damaged. Later that day, Caldwell and four others from 250 Squadron were providing top cover to escort nine Blenheims to the Trigh Capuzzo. They were attacked all the way to the target.A number of losses on both sides eventuated. German ace Hauptmann Wolfgang Lippert, Gruppenkommandeur of II/JG27, was also flying that day. Lippert was an experienced fighter leader. His combat career began in the Spanish Civil War where, flying with the German Condor Legion, he claimed four victories. He also flew in the 1940 campaigns against France and Britain, and in the Balkans and Russia in 1941. He was credited with a total of twenty-nine victories in these campaigns. Caldwell was in the Ben Eira area when: I observed other aircraft above and below . . . one of which turned to attack our formation. I was able to turn head on up to this attack and saw the [enemy aircraft] open fire at a range of about 300 yards. Opening fire at 57


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the same time [as] myself the [enemy aircraft] pulled out of its dive and I was able to put [in] a very satisfying burst with all guns as he did so. He fired a short burst at nothing at all, half turned over and went down steeply. I followed him over, but had to pull away quickly as a result of which I spun my machine, recovering too harshly, and flicked over the opposite way, losing sight of the [enemy aircraft], and finally regaining full control at about 4500 feet.While trying to climb back to the formation, I observed a fire on the ground and saw a ME 109 dive through the rear of the escort to below my level. As he pulled out of his dive to regain height in the apparent safe region at the rear, I was able to turn on to him and deliver an attack. He saw me and turned down and my first burst was from the rear quarter above at a range of about 400 yards. He went to ground level then flying directly into the sun. I was able to close the range to approx. 200 yards and chased for a period of two to three minutes firing five bursts in all. My reflector sight was useless against the glare, and I was using my ring and bead sight. Two fragments came away from the [enemy aircraft], which was still flying with apparent efficiency when last seen.15

Caldwell did not see the aircraft, piloted by Lippert, go down to the ground. He recorded a damaged in his flying log but this was later confirmed destroyed. Lippert baled out and broke both his legs. He was found by British troops and taken to a Cairo hospital. Gangrene set in and after several days both legs were amputated, but he died of an embolism within minutes. He was buried by the British with full military honours. Caldwell ‘had the good fortune to be leading the squadrons that were in the “do”’ and thought that ‘the show generally right from the start has been fairly tough with plenty of flying time and plenty of air fighting for us . . . I am proud and happy to say that my Squadron was the spearhead of the air striking force, having been in the desert longer this one stretch since last June than any other outfit.’16 He was also proud of the fact that, although ‘our own losses have been severe—we are now merely a remnant—we have destroyed more of the enemy than any other squadron during this push’.17 Despite his pride in his Squadron’s abilities, he also had a healthy respect for the enemy. He recognised that the Germans were very stubborn and even though it seemed as if the Western Desert Air Force had air superiority at the time, ‘the German fighters still put up a tough resistance’.18 He knew, too, that German reinforcements would arrive soon and more of his comrades 58


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would die:‘still a lot more of us will have jumped into the silence before we reach Tripoli’.19 For all Caldwell’s personal success and pride in his Squadron’s performance, it was obvious by 23 November that the Crusader operation was going awry. The tanks had suffered heavy losses and Rommel had seized the initiative by sending his armoured columns racing towards Egypt. By nightfall that day, all forward RAF squadrons had been recalled, and some 175 aircraft congregated at Maddalena. The German column swept by only 10 miles northward, thus missing a prime opportunity to wreck RAF fighter strength. As Caldwell evacuated to Maddalena, he strafed some of the advancing tanks. He was responsible for a damaged ME 109 on 26 November, a shot down ME 109 on 28 November which he noted as a probable, and another probable on 30 November. He was pleased that he had been ‘in nearly all the engagements my Squadron had and at the same time being able to notch off some more to add to the score plus some that got away but I feel won’t fly again for some time if ever’.20 However, he felt that he was unlucky in that on two occasions he had definitely shot the enemy down but he was unable to get corroboration. The Squadron had been on the move constantly and, since the opening of Crusader, it had moved from Sidi Barrani to Fort Maddalena, Tobruk and then to Gazala. By Christmas, it would be at Mechili. On one occasion, Caldwell landed half an hour after the Germans had evacuated their aerodrome and salvaged an enemy officer’s dress dagger. This was a handsome souvenir. It came complete with its silver scabbard and the blade was of stainless steel with a silver-mounted ivory handle. The cross guard was adorned by the German eagle with outstretched wings, its claws holding a wreath which encircled the swastika. The dagger, however, was not destined to stay permanently in Caldwell’s possession. It disappeared during his trip to America in 1942 but was later returned, only to be stolen from his home in 1974. December opened with Caldwell on local defence patrol and carrying out some fighter sweeps. In one of these,‘MEs pecked once or twice but would not engage’21 and on 2 December he again engaged a 109 but without success. If it was success he was looking for, he found it on 5 December, in perhaps the most brilliant air action of the desert campaign. With Caldwell leading, twelve aircraft from 250 Squadron, which flew as top cover, and ten from 112 Squadron took off for a patrol of the 59


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El Gobi–El Adem area. Fifteen miles south of El Adem, they encountered approximately forty German Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and over thirty escorting fighters.The German fighters were targeted by 112 Squadron and 250 engaged the bombers: The Stukas were flying in sections of three tight echelons left, the sections also fairly close and were an easy target. No. 250 Squadron went into line astern behind me and as No. 112 Squadron engaged escorting enemy fighters, we attacked the Ju 87s from the rear quarter . . . At about 300 yards I opened fire with all my guns at the leader of one of the rear sections of three, allowing too little deflection, and hit No. 2 and No. 3, one of which burst into flames immediately, the other going down smoking and went into flames after losing about 1000 feet. I then attacked the leader of the rear section on the port side of the enemy formation from below and behind, opening fire with guns at very close range. [Enemy aircraft] turned over and dived steeply with the root of the starboard wing in flames. As I was closing in again from astern the leader of the section of No. 2 that I was about to attack, jettisoned his bombs, executed a steep climbing turn to the right, and was immediately shot down by a Tomahawk. I fired a short burst at the other Stuka which dived away . . . I was able to keep behind him at about 2000 feet. I opened again at close range, the [enemy aircraft] caught fire at the root of the port wing and crashed in flames near some dispersed [motor transports] . . . number of troops running to avoid the crash. Other troops on the ground waved to me as I circled at about 300 feet before climbing back again. At under 2000 feet approx I was able to pull up under the belly of one at the rear holding the burst until very close range. The [enemy aircraft] dived gently straight ahead streaming smoke, caught fire and then dived into the ground.As I turned away from this I observed either a G–50 or MC200 [Macchi MC.200 Saetta fighter] about 500 feet above and to one side, and pulled round to see. I opened fire at close range to find all my guns fail, except one .50 which fired about 4 shots before stopping.The [enemy aircraft] pilot must have seen me at this stage as he executed a very brisk cut-away down and back. Another [enemy aircraft] of the same type appeared to be about to attack me but turned away . . . I experienced several stoppages with my guns, the explosive and incendiary especially, but the .50 worked very well throughout. During the engagement I saw about a dozen aircraft go down, either in flames or with smoke trails behind them, some of which exploded on hitting the ground. I observed three aircraft explode in the air being blown to pieces . . . Stukas jettisoned their bombs before reaching their target.22 60


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Caldwell later attributed his success this day not necessarily to his own skill, but to the flaws of the German battle tactic. The Germans were flying in close formation, and as one was shot down, another moved in to take his place. Caldwell believed that they were ‘great chaps for regimentation . . . and when they’ve been told to do a thing a certain way, they do it. That made it much easier for us to aim.’23 Caldwell’s firing spree took about 18 seconds, and he accounted for five Stukas. The Squadron also acquitted itself well in this ‘Stuka party’. Sergeant Whittle accounted for two and a probable, Sergeant Cable two and a damaged, Pilot Officer Creighton scored one Ju 87 and damaged a ME 109 and Flight Lieutenant Rose got a probable. 112 Squadron also did well. Later that day, the 250 Squadron diarist noted, ‘Not a bad “do”’.24 But for all this success, the squadrons did not go unscathed: Pilot Officer Neville Duke of 112 Squadron received a wound from an explosive shell, Pilot Officer Cole of 250 Squadron was wounded and shot down and sergeants Gilmour 25 and Greenhow,26 both of 250 Squadron, were killed. The next day,Air Vice-Marshal Coningham sent a signal to Squadron Leader Morris and congratulated the Squadron on ‘a grand day’s fighting’. He also asked Morris to personally pass on his congratulations to Caldwell on his ‘great success’.27 It was certainly a ‘grand day’s fighting’ for Caldwell—if he had not already attained ace status, he would have become an ace-in-a-day. For this action, Caldwell was awarded the bar to his Distinguished Flying Cross.28 The news of the ‘Stuka party’ was greedily grasped by the correspondents and within days articles such as, ‘Australian Pilot’s Success’, ‘“The Killer” Bags 5 Axis Planes’,‘Athlete’s Five Enemy Planes’ and ‘Australian’s Big Air Tally’ appeared.29 One brief article that appeared in an Egyptian paper was captioned ‘This RAF pilot recently created the magnificent record of shooting down no fewer that [sic] five Ju 87s in one fight over Libya’.30 This article also had a photo of Caldwell which would have been a perfect illustration for Stanford-Tuck’s ‘gay, abandoned, almost irresponsible young pilot’31—Caldwell had adopted a cavalier and almost smug stance. These articles were also among the first to bring Caldwell and his nom de guerre to the attention of the public:‘He is called “the Killer” by his comrades . . . His enemies do not get a chance to call him anything.’32 They tended to portray Caldwell as cocky and selfassured, again reinforcing the negative image of the ace, even if not actually using the term.33 61


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The articles played up Caldwell’s achievement and, where they mentioned them, the achievements of the other pilots.They made much of their contribution to overcoming the enemy, as was de rigueur in news articles of the time—enthusiastic reporting or blatant propagandising of successes was good for the public morale. A new media legend was born, and Caldwell was to feature in the press many times before the war ended. He would be eagerly sought after by journalists and would be the subject of many Department of Air press releases. At about this time the Luftwaffe’s III/JG27 arrived in the desert. It had had great success in the Battle of France and had also served over Malta and Russia. Its Gruppenkommandeur was Hauptmann Erhard Braune and the Staffelkapitäne of 9 Staffel was Oberleutnant Erbo Graf von Kageneck. Von Kageneck was JG27’s leading pilot, as well as one of the highest scorers in the Luftwaffe. Now in his sixth campaign, he had flown on operations in France, over England, in the Balkans, over Malta and in Russia. He was credited with sixty-seven victories, including forty-eight in Russia, and had been awarded the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves. By 9 December, Rommel had abandoned his positions around Tobruk and retreated towards Cyrenaica. The relief of Tobruk and the German retreat were great morale boosters for the British and Commonwealth forces, and their air contingent did much to increase that morale by bombing retreating German troops. However, the bombers of the Western Desert Air Force were constantly harassed by the Luftwaffe and their escorts were often made up of pooled resources as fighter squadrons were very low on serviceable aircraft. Caldwell and 250 Squadron did not have long to rest on their laurels of 5 December. On 14 December, eight of their Tomahawks encountered a mixed formation of Ju 88s and ME 109s and Caldwell claimed a damaged ME 109. Over the next few days, he claimed a probable ME 109 on a patrol sweep, a damaged ME 109 on a sweep of the Gazala–Tobruk area and another probable ME 109 while escorting bombers. As Rommel’s forces retreated, British and Commonwealth forces advanced and, on 21 December, 250 Squadron arrived at Mechili, where the landing grounds were located near an old fort. Mechili had only recently been taken over by the British and Commonwealth land forces and Caldwell wandered about the area where ‘there were a goodish 62


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number of bodies strewn about the place’.34 Caldwell saw a ‘trail of blood in the dirt although dust was kicked over it’. He came close enough to smell putrefying flesh and, forever imprinted on his memory, was the image of the blanket, ‘wet and oozing with the swelling trunk and bits of body inside. Hordes of flies . . . crawling into the folds and clustering on the wet patches to feast on the unburied dead.’35 Caldwell was out escorting bombers the next day and shot down two ME 109s, one of which was confirmed by an advancing British column. He also strafed a retreating enemy column. Then Caldwell enjoyed a respite from operations on the evening of 23 December when he attended a farewell party in the 3 Squadron mess for Peter Jeffrey and Alan Rawlinson, who were headed back to Australia.The break was only a brief one as he was scheduled for an afternoon operation on Christmas Eve, when twelve Tomahawks from 250 Squadron were tasked with escorting Blenheims to Agedabia:36 Those of us whose names are on the ‘blood list’ are crowded in the ops room being briefed for the ‘do’. It is a fairly average western desert day for that time of the year. Broken cloud . . . at medium height with a cold gusty wind carrying the dust-grit with it in scuds and spirals. The ops room is a hole in the ground about five feet deep by some twelve feet square. A piece of old tarpaulin covers the business end of it and flaps continuously and drearily as the dust swirls in eddies under it.37

The desert chill could certainly get to you. Often at night Caldwell could not get warm as the icy wind infiltrated his tent: ‘I was miserably cold and we shivered for a long while before we drifted into an uneasy doze’.38 On at least one occasion he thought longingly of home as a means of escaping the bitter conditions. He thought of the ‘fire in the lounge at home with the dogs dozing in front of it. I was hungry and miserable and I knew from looking at the other fellows that I was dirty, muddy and unshaven’.39 But on this chill day, home and warmth were a long way away, and 250 Squadron had another operation to carry out. He gathered up his gear and left the ops room. He saw ‘gaunt and vicious’ Tomahawks as they stood dispersed off the edge of the aerodrome, ‘their long dusty snouts pointing upwards’. Wasting no time, he climbed into his Tomahawk and took off.40 Caldwell was not scheduled to lead this formation but, shortly after take off, the leader suffered engine trouble and Caldwell assumed 63


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command, even though his own Tomahawk was also experiencing engine trouble. The engine did not clear as he progressed and he hoped that it would not decide to quit while he was over enemy territory as it ‘would be a pity to miss out that way and become a POW for Christmas’.41 As they neared their target at Agedabia, Caldwell was surprised the German fighters had not put in an appearance, as they usually arrived well before they came near the target.What Caldwell did not realise was that JG27 had serious serviceability problems that day. However, the antiaircraft guns were providing a good barrage.‘Looking down the flashes of the guns look harmless enough but the bursts of the shells still follow with us and one of the bombers is on fire and losing height.’42 Despite the barrage, the other bombers found their target and Caldwell looked below to see a mass of dust and smoke from the exploding bombs. Caldwell’s engine was getting worse and he found himself lagging behind when the German fighters arrived. Caldwell revved and boosted as high as he dared, but the aircraft vibrated from the roughness of the engine and he lagged further.The Germans seemed to avoid him, which he thought strange as a ‘straggler is always considered pretty easy meat’.43 Only seven or eight ME 109s attacked the main formation and the Tomahawks turned to meet the attacks. Caldwell lagged even further behind and smoke came from his exhaust: Two of the ME’s have evidently decided to give me their exclusive attention and are above and behind on either side of me.To one side a fire is burning fiercely on the ground, a column of black smoke mushrooming about it—a Tommy or a ME. One ME dives for my tail and I have to pull round to face him but dare not touch my throttle to open it any further. We both fire and apparently both miss. The other Hun, taking advantage of his partner’s attack, is also coming in. Pulling under his attack I dive in the direction of our formation hoping to get beneath it . . . The [first] ME has . . . gone back up and flying abreast of each other the other Tomahawk and myself tail after the rest, the slim black shapes of the MEs sliding along beside the clouds above us. The puffs of smoke from my exhausts are more frequent and the engine seems to stagger—the rev counter needle swinging wildly.44

The Germans were still above and they attacked together.The Tomahawks turned to the left and opened fire, but they could see no results. 64


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‘The MEs flash past and are gone.’45 Caldwell returned to base and as he came in to land, the engine stopped for good. He bounced a bit, but made a safe landing.Although Caldwell did not appear to hit any enemy aircraft during combat, when he wrote up his afternoon escort operation in his flying log, he claimed a damaged ME 109. It was later determined that the German pilot may have been Oberleutnant Erbo Graf von Kageneck.46 Hauptmann Erhard Braune flew around the downed von Kageneck at low altitude and saw that he was lying on the left wing of his aircraft, pointing to the lower part of his stomach. Braune saw some Axis soldiers coming towards von Kageneck so he returned to base. Von Kageneck had been shot numerous times. Two pieces of shrapnel were lodged in his right leg, one bullet had hit him in the right kidney and another had emasculated him.47 He died on 12 January 1942 in a Naples hospital and was buried with full military honours.48 The Squadron had been anticipating the arrival of a special Christmas treat. They had had a whip around and made arrangements to send the money to Alexandria to purchase a quantity of pork, but ‘to our consternation the pork has not arrived but hopes are high that the following morning will see it here’.49 Night began to close in and: The outlines of the old fort are softening in the fading light and the dark clouds in the west are edged with bright gold and silver as we walk from the ops room across the rising ground to the camp. The mess is two ridge pole tents laced together and open at one end. The wind has risen a bit and is colder. The whirling dust penetrates everywhere and everything, getting into the bully beef and into the tea. Two replacement Tomahawks have flown up from base during our absence and brought every available space filled with liquor, so at any rate we can put on a bit of a party.50

As is often the way, the news of the liquor supplies spread along the grapevine and pilots from nearby squadrons turned up and soon the tents were crowded with dusty figures in battle dress, sweaters and Irvine jackets, drinking and chattering away. By ten, the more enthusiastic drinkers were sent to bed or from whence they came, and about midnight, ‘those of us still going manage to unearth some tinned stuff reserved for private consumption on some suitable occasion and, with the help of the primus, have what we reckon to be a pretty good supper’.51 65


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Christmas Day dawned cold, with rising dust and an overcast sky. The Squadron had an early start and, along with a South African fighter squadron, took off on a sweep of the Haseiat–Agedabia sector. The weather got worse as they progressed and there was no sign of enemy aircraft. Squadron Leader Morris started to sing Christmas carols over the radio and the carolling soon degenerated into bawdy songs and facetious remarks. Caldwell thought that this would ‘bring the Huns in swarms’ but, ‘whether due to the lousy day or suspicion of a trap, we complete[d] the trip without sighting the Hun in the air’.52 Caldwell landed after one hour and forty minutes in the air, full of anticipation for a Christmas pork lunch, but it still had not arrived. There had been a report that the pork had actually landed at Msus, which was to be the next landing ground as they advanced westward and the enemy retreated further. Pilot Officer John Waddy volunteered to retrieve it but he returned empty-handed. He was then told that it was at another location so he set off again to find it.Again, he returned emptyhanded. While he was gone, the Squadron had received word that the pork was now definitely at Msus, so Waddy took off yet again. He returned after an hour or so to announce to those eagerly awaiting their increasingly delayed Christmas lunch the sad news that the pork had arrived, but it had turned green.Waddy and some of the skeleton crew at Msus buried the pork with due ceremony, erecting a cross on the spot to the effect,‘Here lies 250 RAF Squadron’s Christmas Dinner 1941’.53 So Christmas lunch, on that cold and windy day, was cold bully and biscuits, well-salted with sand and no liquor to wash the sand down because they had drunk it all the night before—a far cry from the elegant Christmas dinner with hors d’oeuvres, oyster cocktails and champagne that Caldwell had shared with Jean the year before at the Royal Sydney Golf Club. Caldwell and the others in the Squadron settled down for an afternoon of doing nothing, but after a while he and Flight Lieutenant Bary accepted an invitation from Squadron Leader Morris to join him in a drink with the Commanding Officer of the nearby anti-aircraft defences. There they shared some very good Scotch and returned at dusk to the news that they had orders for a show at first light on the next morning. That was Christmas: There has been nothing to make Christmas a different day from any other except the question of the pork we did not have. Still they say the anticipa66


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tion is usually better than the event itself, and why should there be anything different about Christmas, things being as they were and are? Just the same, the pork would have been good, Christmas or not.54

Caldwell was in the air again on Boxing Day. He saw some enemy fighters, which ‘would not play with us’.55 During three separate sorties on 27 December he had contact with the enemy and on his last reconnaissance flight escaped from six ME 109s by low flying. He had some good results in the last days of the month from strafing Agedabia aerodrome, where he set on fire two Ju 87s on the ground, and also fired upon unprotected troops, who were retreating. On 30 December, he took his last strafing flight with 250 Squadron and blew up a few motor transport, ammunition and petrol trucks and the ‘odd personnel’.56 The closing days of 1941 brought news that recognised Caldwell’s growing talents as a fighter pilot and operational leader. On Boxing Day, his Distinguished Flying Cross and Bar awards were gazetted simultaneously and the Department of Air advised the media that this was a ‘unique honour to an Australian airman’.57 The citation stated that Caldwell ‘continues to take his toll of enemy aircraft . . . He flies on every possible sortie against the enemy, often leading our formations, and displays at all times an aggressiveness of spirit and a determination and devotion to duty of the highest order . . .’58 On 28 December, Caldwell was notified that he was to take command of 112 Squadron. Before Caldwell left 250 Squadron, Squadron Leader Morris wrote in his flying log:‘An exceptional fighter pilot whose leadership and skill in combat have been of the highest order’. Caldwell had obviously taken Squadron Leader Scoular’s ‘purely an individualist’ comment to heart. Just over one year ago, EATS trainee Caldwell had only just been awarded his wings. Now, within four months of Scoular’s comment, he had taken over command of K Flight, had his leadership skills endorsed by the new Commanding Officer, and had been promoted acting Squadron Leader (with effect from 6 January 1942). He was the first Empire air trainee to become a Flight Commander and the first to become a Squadron Leader. Bobby Gibbes recognised this achievement as, ‘a darned good effort. Twelve months ago he was an LAC, and now an acting Squadron Leader. He has about 14 confirmed.’59 Caldwell made his mark with 250 Squadron but he was not universally liked. There was a certain amount of rumblings by the ‘regulars’ 67


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about the EATS graduate who had proven himself as a successful fighter pilot and who had become a Flight Commander in four months. For them, it was a case of too much, too far, too soon. Archie Wilson had seen how Caldwell had been treated with aloofness at a club in Alexandria and put this down to ‘a petty case of antipathy towards wartime volunteers by a few who suffered from a delusion of superiority and of a twinge of jealousy perhaps’.60 It is possible Caldwell’s success may have been tolerated and jealousy put aside if he had shrugged off his achievements modestly. But Caldwell was guilty of contravening one of the great unwritten laws of the RAF (and of the RAAF, modelled so closely on the RAF). He was guilty of shooting a line, or line-shooting—habitually boasting, exaggerating or talking excessively on a subject. Caldwell was naturally proud of his successes and to him—as well as RAF and RAAF public relations—they represented a tangible record of his contribution to the war effort. But his natural ebullience grated and he was treated with disdain by many of his comrades. For instance, when he visited 3 Squadron after his promotion to acting Flight Lieutenant, the 250 Squadron diarist sarcastically noted that Caldwell,‘from his own account had the whole squadron sitting at his feet listening with deferential awe to his tales of convoys, sweeps and the wily ME 109’. Caldwell struggled to curb his natural enthusiasm and constantly battled to maintain a balance between discussing his experiences so that new pilots such as John Waddy could benefit from his knowledge, and exalting them to all and sundry. His personal battle was exacerbated by the fact that as a successful fighter pilot he soon attracted considerable media interest, which required him to tell and re-tell his story. Many journalists commented on his modesty,61 but others, such as Kenneth Slessor, did not see Caldwell’s reticent side. Slessor referred to Caldwell as a ‘tall, lanky, close-moustached, easy-smiling typical Australian, by no means averse to talking about his exploits’.62 Caldwell, of course, had his own opinion about the debate. At one time, he copied some pages from Roderic Owen’s The Desert Air Force. In this, Owen states that Caldwell ‘was a cool machine for destruction with no doubts as to his own efficiency, with little of the usual modesty as to his achievements’. Caldwell noted beside this that he ‘also did not suffer from the popular view of false modesty’.63 Perhaps Caldwell never really managed to rein in his line-shooting tendencies and, if he were inclined to try, the persistent media attention made it more difficult. As a successful EATS graduate with an inclination to line-shoot, Caldwell 68


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invited unpopularity and his unpopularity was confirmed by the way he chose to carry out his duty to prosecute the war. Although there was a certain chivalry which indicated that helpless parachutists were not shot, Caldwell steeled himself to shoot them lest they return to account for himself or his comrades. Perhaps he felt a sense of vengeance as he remembered the death of Donald Munro, but he admitted only that ‘I killed only of necessity and with regret’.64 Often, his disregard of chivalry pitted him against the mess. In his history of 250 Squadron, Carel Birkby noted that: In battle he was without fear and without compassion; and yet there were strange contradictions in his fierce, fighting nature. ‘I believe in total warfare,’ Caldwell would announce, challenging the mess.‘Germany started it. Right. I’m prepared to help end it. The bastards asked for total war. Let’s give it to them.’ Somebody would protest, perhaps a whole crowd of the pilots. They would maintain that there must be some rules in civilised warfare. Killer would come back: ‘Bull! There’s no such thing as civilised warfare.’65

Archie Wilson was one who did not consider that there was anything untoward with Caldwell’s professional attitude. He believed that Caldwell: was a courageous and highly competent fighter pilot who served his country with dedication and distinction . . . Whatever the facts regarding his personality and conduct . . . I do not consider there exists grounds to warrant valid criticism of his operational philosophy—indeed he achieved and survived on the application of his own choice of air fighting tactics that were well thought out, and he contributed valuable ideas to improve deflection shooting and defensive manoeuvres—often methods not given proper attention in [operational training units], but essential to prepare inexperienced pilots . . . 66

There were certainly those who respected Caldwell. When John Waddy joined 250 Squadron in November he recognised Caldwell as an experienced pilot and appreciated the time he took to talk about the nature of operational flying. Bob Bennett, Caldwell’s batman67 from the time Caldwell joined 250 Squadron until he left to join 112, said of his time with Caldwell that ‘there’s nothing I’ve been prouder of ’.68 69


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Ultimately, however, Caldwell was not concerned with popularity. He wanted to do the best job he could and, where possible, he nurtured the less experienced pilots so that they could do so as well. His diligence as a fighter pilot and his abilities as a leader were recognised and he was promoted rapidly. He may not have been popular and respect from some might have been grudging but it mattered little to Caldwell. It was more important to throw himself wholeheartedly into winning the war:‘to be able to truly say I have fought a good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith’.69

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FIVE

Shark Squadron

. . . he just looked . . . like a carpet hit with a stick . . . He just stopped and died . . . he just stopped like a shot duck, and down he fell in flames.1 Caldwell took command of 112 Squadron on 6 January 1942. This Squadron had performed home defence duties during the Great War and was disbanded in June 1919. It reformed as a fighter squadron for Middle East service in May 1939. By the time Caldwell joined it, 112 Squadron had well lived up to its motto ‘Swift in Destruction’, and had proven a formidable foe, flying firstly Gladiators, then Tomahawks. It was known as the Shark Squadron and a shark’s mouth was painted on its aircraft. At the end of 1941, it began re-equipping with the Curtiss Kittyhawk I and continued with its tradition of painting the viciouslooking teeth on its aircraft. With its large air intake beneath the propeller spinner, the Kittyhawk was even better suited to the paint scheme than the Tomahawk. Caldwell was not sure whether the sharks’ mouths ‘frightened the enemy in the air or not, but they certainly looked good to us that way’.2 The Kittyhawk was similar to the Tomahawk but it incorporated a number of improvements. The RAF model, equivalent to the USAAF P–40E, had a more powerful Allison engine, a larger radiator slung under the nose, better rearwards vision for the pilot and an increase in armament to six .50-calibre machine guns, all in the wings. The extra power increased the rate of climb, but maximum speed remained virtually the same. Looking back, Caldwell favoured the Tomahawk, but he was impressed by the Kittyhawk’s 71


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armament and he appreciated the Kittyhawk’s climbing speed. Ultimately, however, he believed that the armament was the only thing about the Kittyhawk that was superior to the Tomahawk. The British and Commonwealth forces by now had reached the limit of the Crusader offensive. Communication and supply lines were stretched to the limit and several Army units were pulled back in order to re-equip. Despite being ordered to rest his troops, Rommel began a limited advance but the Western Desert Air Force was not able to counter this thrust—in early January 1942, the desert fighter squadrons had relocated from Msus to Antelat but, after recent rains, it was found that the landing grounds were not suitable as the dispersal area turned into a quagmire and bivouacs flooded. On 21 January, RAF Headquarters decided that the fighter squadrons had to move back to Msus because of the state of the landing ground. The rain held off and, with the help of the Army, a strip of runway was made more or less useable. Caldwell was the first from 112 Squadron to take off so he could test the state of the runway but he stayed overhead to cover the other pilots as they took off. The rear party was shelled by the Germans as they departed, but all the aircraft made it to Msus safely. Once there, the advance party was told to be ready to leave again at dawn. Over the next few days, a number of sweeps were carried out and Caldwell noted good results against trucks loaded with personnel. He also caught some tanks refuelling and set the bowsers on fire. Rommel’s advance forced the weakened British forces to retreat.The Axis forces reached Msus on 25 January and the desert fighter squadrons were forced back to Mechili. Retreat for 112 Squadron did not go smoothly. Firstly, it had difficulty getting its remaining aircraft airborne because of the condition of the aerodrome. To make matters worse, the mess trucks broke down and all of the mess equipment, some pilots’ kits and all of the headquarters tents had to be abandoned. Rommel caught the British forces off balance and made a sudden thrust northwards, resulting in the fall of Benghazi on 29 January. The squadrons retreated, again leaving XIII Corps of the Eighth Army without air cover. The last few days of the month saw 112 Squadron reorganising to take account of recently changed air operations. Overall, Caldwell’s time in the air was limited during January and he had only minor success. On a sweep on 26 January, he damaged one ME 109 and, on other occasions, knocked out some trucks and personnel while carrying out some ground strafing. 72


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During and after Crusader, the fighters and light-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force had concentrated on the many tactical targets offered by the massed Axis forces moving along the roads as well as their makeshift camps. Now, as the enemy forces were more dispersed, fewer opportunities were available to the Western Desert Air Force. Fighters were now diverted to defensive activity over the Gazala line, to where the Eighth Army had withdrawn, or were required to protect their own bases and Tobruk. The light-bombers once again focused on attacking the German airstrips but, for the main part, air activity during this period was hampered by dust storms. February opened with intensive flying practice. A severe dust storm blew up on 2 February but it cleared and ground strafing was carried out. The next day, along with 238 Squadron RAF and 3 Squadron RAAF, 112 Squadron moved to Gambut, one of the dustiest places in the desert. Living up to its reputation, a heavy dust storm ensured no operations until 5 February. Caldwell encountered a number of dust storms during his time in the desert: The sand storms you hear about are usually not sand storms at all; they’re dust storms caused by the churning up of all the transport and tanks, and so on. A sand storm proper is rather rare. Planes taking off create a miniature sand storm of their own. From above you can see the sand streaming out behind them for a quarter of a mile. And if he’s anywhere near, you bet the enemy can see it too. So we all get into the habit of taking a good look round before we take off. If Jerry is anywhere about, he’ll see it and come down quick.Taking off through a dust storm, you’re absolutely blind from the time you take off, except that you can see other aircraft thirty or forty yards away: you’ve got to fly by your instruments through this brown mass. I’ve known it go up to 11000 feet. But then you break through, and you’re all right except that you’ve got no view of the ground at all.You have to fly on your compass to where you’re going. On the way back, you’ve got to come down through it to find your aerodrome. If you’re near the coastline, you work along it until you see some point that’s familiar to you, and then you take a bearing and continue to fly low—ten or twelve feet—until you see tents or something, and hope you recognise them. But you can’t afford any mistakes—going at 300 miles an hour, twelve feet above the ground, would be just too bad.3

After the dust cleared, Caldwell was back in the air again, leading eight aircraft on a ground strafe on 6 February. Road traffic was not 73


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heavy but he successfully knocked out some enemy soldiers and three trucks. By 10 February, the Germans had advanced to Tmimi, where they halted. They had recaptured a large portion of western Cyrenaica. Both forces then began to rebuild their supplies and a line appeared, over which they faced each other for the next few months. This line extended from Gazala on the coast and ran southward towards the fort of Bir Hacheim. Eight Polish pilots joined 112 Squadron between 8 and 10 February. They had been flying transport aircraft or delivering aircraft from the West African base at Takoradi. Although necessary tasks, these did not satisfy the Polish pilots who, according to Caldwell, were ‘good pilots and desperately keen to kill Germans’.4 There was a great need for pilots in the desert and they volunteered to fly fighters. RAF publicity was not going to let this photo opportunity pass. The Egyptian Mail informed its readers that ‘Polish fighter pilots have joined the Allied air armada in the Battle of Libya’ and under the caption, ‘And then I got him . . .’, Caldwell was shown seated in the middle of a group of eagerly listening Polish pilots as he demonstrated aerial tactics for them.5 Caldwell initially had some problems with his Polish pilots. They were reluctant to speak English and he didn’t want this to compromise his other pilots during combat. He knew that ‘one of the worst things you can do with the Poles is not to let them fly, they want to fly all the time’,6 so he threatened to ground them. This ploy was successful and the Polish pilots started to speak English. They were soon allowed on operations and Caldwell never doubted their commitment. Caldwell grew very fond of his Polish contingent and valued their bravery. He was also sympathetic to their earlier experiences and appreciated the depth of feeling they had against their enemies, including the Russians. This was not, however, appreciated by RAF Headquarters, which decided to post five Russian observers to 112 Squadron. Caldwell was fully aware of the effect the Russians would have on his Polish pilots; so vehement was their hatred that Caldwell told Headquarters that he could not guarantee the Russians’ safety if they were posted there. He managed to have the orders rescinded, believing that ‘at least we’ve saved a massacre’.7 Although Caldwell was committed to flying whenever he could, he now had obligations to Headquarters as well as to his own pilots. He thrived on the new responsibility and settled down quickly and efficiently to what he called ‘the desk side of it’.8 But whenever he could, 74


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he flew, leading his men into battle, and advising, training, teaching and sharing his experience. The downside of his leadership responsibilities was that, other than a couple of damaged 109s, Caldwell had not managed to increase his score since joining 112 Squadron. Perhaps to his chagrin, he missed out on a perfect opportunity on 14 February 1942. In the ‘St Valentine’s Day Massacre’, ten Kittyhawks, led by the Australian, Pilot Officer John ‘Jack’ Bartle, scrambled with eight aircraft from 3 Squadron RAAF to meet an approaching enemy formation of bombers and escorting fighters. The enemy fighters were targeted by 112 Squadron, which was so successful that just about everyone involved either scored victories or claimed a damaged aircraft. Neville Duke, who claimed 11⁄2 MC200s of 363 Squadriglia, recorded this as a ‘great Day. Best engagement yet . . . I enjoyed myself more than I have ever done before.’9 Great day, indeed. Neither squadron suffered losses and they accounted for twenty enemy aircraft from an estimated thirty-two. Caldwell, however, had to content himself with strafing some trucks on the Mechili Road later that day. There was not much flying over the next few days as the Squadron moved to El Adem and then back to Gambut. Caldwell flew a patrol of the Hacheim–Gazala area on 20 February where he engaged some ME 109s, but his real opportunity for success came the next day. The weather had been bad for a few days with rain, low clouds and the inevitable sand storms that reduced visibility. At midday on 21 February, six ME 109s of I/JG27, led by Hauptmann Gerhard Homuth, with leutnants Hans-Arnold Stahlschmidt and Hans-Joachim Marseille (who were all Luftwaffe fighter aces) as section leaders, took off to patrol over Acroma. Caldwell was leading the formation that consisted of 112 Squadron RAF and 3 Squadron RAAF. They were in the West Gazala–Acroma area when they sighted: a flight of Messerschmitts passing across us about a couple of thousand feet up and we immediately started to climb full boost and maximum revs. Having seen them first and being a little bit further forward—I was slightly ahead, slightly higher than the rest of the two formations, and as these fellows were in a left hand turn in line astern, step down, I thought I could reach that fellow at the back bottom if only I could hold the aircraft up against the gun backlash.Anyway, I put it over the port wing and dropped a couple of hundred feet and pulled it up and as soon as I was vertically up opened fire, which gave me no bullet drop of course and got about a two 75


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second burst away and hit the last machine of the Messerschmitt Fs flush, and he just looked . . . like a carpet hit with a stick . . . He just stopped and died.There it was. Like a puff, a heavy puff of dust . . . he just stopped like a shot duck, and down he fell in flames.10

Leutnant Stahlschmidt was the victim of this exceptional display of shooting. He was flying cover but fell well behind. He saw the Kittyhawks climbing from below, but he did not consider them to be a danger: Suddenly there was a frightful banging noise and my whole aircraft vibrated. It felt like cannon strike! Nothing like that had ever happened before. Damn! Someone had opened up on me from behind and I hadn’t even seen him . . . My Messerschmitt was turning around uncontrollably, gasoline was pouring into the cockpit, smoke was everywhere and I found myself in a crazy inverted spin. I spun down through the British fighters and heard over the radio, ‘Which idiot let himself get shot down?’ It was Homuth calling.11

At the time, Caldwell thought that Stahlschmidt had crashed behind British lines, and perhaps had even died. Caldwell later learned that this was not the case—Stahlschmidt, credited with fifty-nine victories, was killed on 7 September 1942 in a combat south of El Adem— but Caldwell thought that he was ‘very close to it indeed’12 after their encounter. Homuth later told Stahlschmidt how Caldwell’s aircraft had ‘hung briefly on its propeller and fired just one burst’. Both Homuth and Marseille considered that it was a ‘fabulous shot’.13 Caldwell followed up his success by damaging a ME 109 in the Tobruk area on 23 February. Later that day, the Squadron received a visit from Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, who had lunch with them and representatives from the BBC, who wanted to grill Caldwell about the ‘epic battle’ of 14 February. Although he had not participated in it, he was able to give the Squadron’s role full justice and impressed his interviewer, who later sent him a photo indicating his ‘very great admiration and in memory of happy meetings . . .’14 Caldwell once admitted that he had been ‘involved in a number of crashes, many being my own fault’.15 One such crash occurred on 25 February, much to the chagrin of the Wing’s Commanding Officer, 76


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Group Captain Kenneth ‘Bing’ Cross and the medical officer. The medical officer (MO) had just joined 112 Squadron and he had never been in an aircraft. He felt badly about this and pestered Caldwell to rectify the matter. Soon, a two-seater Miles M.14 Magister trainer, which Group Captain Cross had acquired for his own personal use, arrived and it soon saw duty for the MO’s virgin flight: Sitting on our parachutes, the MO in the front seat and I in the back, and both sticking well up above the fuselage, off we went.To save time climbing for height, I foolishly flew out over the rim of the deep escarpment, thus gaining a free 600 feet. A couple of gentle stall turns went well with the passenger signalling for something more exciting. I thought a little negative pressure would be a mild start. The engine stopped immediately. Try as I might—and some of it was pretty severe for the MO, but he appeared to enjoy it—nothing had any effect. The country to which we were now committed for landing was terrible—very rough and thickly strewn with huge boulders and very large blocks of broken stone. The prop was windmilling, but of course no engine noise. I called to my passenger to hold off with both hands against the crash pad, and demonstrated it for him. For some reason he chose to hang on to the sides of the seat instead, but I had no time to go further into that: I was able to wipe off the undercart by side-slipping into a great rock. Still under control, we then plunged into a narrow gap between other large rocks, taking both wings off. The aircraft slewed and hit a big boulder at a sharp angle, causing the loss of prop and entire engine.We then hit a small rubble area very hard, shedding the whole tail assembly, with just the bare fuselage coming to rest with my passenger out cold.

At one stage, Caldwell thought that they might end up looking like ‘strawberry jam’ and, after they landed, he was worried that the MO had broken his neck. He touched the MO’s cheek and he awakened. Caldwell asked him why he hadn’t hung on like he asked: ‘Well,’ he said, ‘I thought you were going to do a trick’. I asked him what more of a trick he wanted than what had just occurred—and with no expense spared, so to speak. I told him he was well aware the engine was stopped, and as he could see the terrible landing zone, he must be a clot. Not at all, he said. The engine, 77


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on the contrary, was going very well as he could plainly see the prop turning; as to the unsuitability of the landing zone, well, yes, it did look pretty rough, but he understood that I was supposed to be a good pilot, so how was he to know that I was going to make such a cock of it as to crash the aeroplane and probably kill us both . . . A very poor performance indeed in his view . . . He wasn’t comforted on the steep walk home, as we carried our parachutes, when I pointed out that in less than five minutes’ total flying time he had now gained more experience than many had in 1000 hours and more.

Luckily, they did not have to walk all the way back to camp. They walked up to the top of the hill to 3 Squadron and cadged a lift home from Bobby Gibbes.16 Neville Duke noted that the whole incident aroused quite some interest and ‘the beer flowed pretty freely after this’.17 Caldwell recalled afterwards that Cross was not pleased at the results of the joy-ride but there were no serious repercussions because, sometime around then, Cross insisted on making his first flight in a Kittyhawk, resulting in two damaged aircraft. Caldwell was never specific about what happened but he did admit that he was ‘critical of the Group Captain’s performance’.18 In 1961, Caldwell and Cross met up again and the ghosts of their respective crashed aircraft arrived at the banquet. Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Cross was in Australia and on 21 June he visited the AFC and RAAF Club in George Street, Sydney. Caldwell and Cross had not seen each other for nineteen years but recognised each other instantly. It was all laughter on that occasion as Cross accused Caldwell of being the ‘rogue who pranged my brand-new kite . . . a pretty little Magister’ and Caldwell recalled how Cross borrowed his ‘terrific Kittyhawk, one of the best fighters that ever twirled a prop’ and ‘blitzed up the runway shedding pieces on the way, then ploughed through another kite parked at the other end’.19 March 1942 opened with another reorganisation of the Western Desert Air Force. Groups were formed of three Wings each, and 112 Squadron became part of 239 Wing, 211 Group, along with 3 Squadron RAAF, 450 Squadron RAAF and 250 Squadron RAF. Since the stabilisation of the front at Gazala, RAF fighter and light-bomber activity had fallen off, giving an opportunity to refresh troops, rebuild strength and get the maintenance up to date.As a consequence, Caldwell and the rest 78


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of 112 Squadron would soon relocate to Sidi Haneish and have a fortnight’s leave. Bad weather was the norm for the first half of March, with storms and heavy rain resulting in reduced activity.Almost immediately 112 was grounded because of the inclement weather. Despite the conditions, Caldwell flew a sweep of the Hacheim–Gazala area on 5 March, during which his aircraft was damaged through enemy action. The next day he damaged a ME 109 during a patrol over the Gazala–Tobruk area. The Squadron moved back to Gambut Main aerodrome on 9 March and during the morning, Caldwell and eight other Kittyhawks scrambled to intercept a Ju 88. It became clear that this was a decoy as it was followed by four ME 109s carrying bombs.These were dropped on Gambut Main and hit a Hurricane from 238 Squadron. Caldwell claimed a probable ME 109 during this action. For some time, Caldwell had been concerned about the effectiveness of the Blenheim bombers.These were obsolete two-engined aircraft that could carry only a small bomb-load and flew so slowly that it was difficult for fighters to escort them effectively. Caldwell spoke to Air-Vice Marshal Coningham. Ever alert to opportunities to improve his own effectiveness as a fighter pilot and to better prosecute the war, Caldwell had heard of the successful use of a Hurricane that had been converted for fighter-bomber duties. Nicknamed the Hurribomber, it had been used initially at Malta in September 1941, and by 80 Squadron in the Western Desert in November 1941. Caldwell suggested that the Kittyhawk be adapted in a similar manner. Coningham approved the idea and a Kittyhawk was soon fitted with an external bomb rack which Caldwell was to test. For the test flight, the Kittyhawk’s windscreen was painted with lines down its side. This would help ascertain the angle of fire. The propeller tips were painted yellow so that Caldwell’s escorts could see by what margin the bomb missed them. The bomb was also painted yellow so that it could be clearly seen. On 10 March, with a brightly painted 250-pound bomb, Caldwell took off in the brand new ‘Kittybomber’. The test was carried out over the sea with Air-Sea Rescue in attendance in case the released bomb took away the propeller, resulting in a crash. Caldwell had some concerns about his safety so he opened the hood of his cockpit and ensured that his parachute ripcord was ready before he went into his dive. He admitted later that he felt ‘just a little prickly round the nape of 79


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the neck’.20 The bomb missed the airscrew by only a narrow margin, but Caldwell thought that everything was ‘all OK’.21 The dummy test was a success and so a live test was carried out that afternoon.22 Exhilarated by the initial tests, Caldwell led an escort of Blenheims to Derna the next day where he downed one ME 109 and damaged another. After he returned, he sent word that he wanted to see Neville Duke. He appeared a bit gruff and asked Duke if he had anything on his mind. The thought of a couple of parties crossed Duke’s mind, but he did not think that they would have resulted in a carpeting. Caldwell then winked at Duke and produced a DFC ribbon. Duke stood drinks at lunch time to celebrate and the congratulations and good wishes, along with the beer, flowed well into the night.23 Caldwell had been drinking long and hard all day as well, and at sunset he announced he was going to drop a bomb. Proving the truth of his own maxim—‘Drink no good to fly on’24 because of the resultant state of high optimism—Caldwell took a 250-pound bomb and dropped it on the enemy’s aerodrome at Martuba. He missed the parked aircraft that he had been aiming for and ‘blew up a truck load of unfortunate fellows who were scurrying away for cover’.25 He met with no resistance: ‘I think they were surprised to see a Kittybomber’.26 No doubt Caldwell’s repair crew was surprised as well when they had their first opportunity to work on the Kittybomber after Caldwell put his machine on its nose when he taxied in after landing. Caldwell found out on his return that RAF Headquarters had been angrily telephoning all of the landing grounds demanding to know what that mysterious, lone Kittyhawk had been doing over Martuba. Caldwell then telephoned Headquarters to confess he had been making a final test of the Kittyhawk bomber and that it had worked. Apparently, news of the success soothed the ruffled feathers at Headquarters. The possibilities for the Kittyhawk in its new role of offensive operations were quickly appreciated and 112 Squadron’s Kittyhawks were modified as soon as possible. But, although the Kittyhawk was far from being outclassed as a fighter, and its new battlefield interdiction role ensured it remained a force with which to be reckoned, Spitfires would soon be available for more effective desert operations. On a tactical reconnaissance to Martuba,27 Caldwell accounted for a probable ME 109, but he achieved more positive results on 14 March during 112 Squadron’s last operational sortie before going on leave. Daylight bombing operations were renewed when Douglas Boston 80


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medium bombers blasted the enemy landing ground at Martuba. A number of direct hits were scored on the aerodrome and two buildings were left in flames. Caldwell led twelve Kittyhawks from Gambut in an attempt to intercept enemy fighters that had been shadowing Western Desert Air Force bombers on their return from Martuba. The Kittyhawks were flying two banks of three pairs. They were at about 10 000 feet when they first saw the enemy above, just coming out of cloud. Sergeant Zdzislaw Urbanczyk was flying No. 2 to Caldwell. Caldwell attacked and his target: flipped violently from side to side and was seen to go straight down and crash. I claim this 109F as destroyed and shared with Sergeant Urbanczyk. Climbed and attacked M202 [Macchi MC.202 Folgore] at cloud base. He pulled up violently as I saw tracer go into fuselage. He went vertically into cloud but a parachute came down a few seconds later. This undoubtedly came from the M202 as there was no other fighter action in this area at the time. I claim this M202 destroyed.28

Caldwell later remarked that the Macchi MC.202 ‘just folded up when I had given him a good burst’.29 March had been quiet for Caldwell, spending only fifteen hours thirty minutes in the air, so he welcomed these victories as he had been ‘hoping to get another in the bag before I shook the dust of the desert off my foot. There were plenty of enemy aircraft about today and I got my chance.’30 The Squadron then moved to Sidi Haneish and after a pay parade, the pilots were released on leave. While the base party busily fitted bomb racks to the Kittyhawks and repaired the Squadron vehicles, Caldwell shook the dust of the desert from his feet in Alexandria and Cairo, enjoying eating and drinking sessions with his pilots. He had the obligatory bath, shave, hair cut and general clean up and greatly enjoyed the benefits of civilisation. One of the highlights of a visit to Cairo was the El Gezira Sports Club, set on an island in the Nile, with vast grounds accommodating a number of polo grounds, tennis courts, a swimming pool, cricket grounds, a croquet lawn, a hockey ground, golf links, expansive manicured gardens, a YMCA sports club and even a skating rink. It was an exclusive club and British and Commonwealth officers were offered honorary membership. Caldwell took advantage of the facilities and enjoyed many a quiet drink in the wicker armchairs of the Lido Bar, overlooking the water. 81


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Perhaps, during those lazy afternoons, he mused over an extraordinary event that had occurred earlier that month: . . . I was flying in the Gazala area, west of Tobruk. The spectacular storm conditions and cloud formations that day seemed familiar. Even as I recognised the setting, I had the feeling that I had lived through this identical experience before—and in the not-too-distant past. Yet I couldn’t remember where or when. I was utterly convinced, however, of the sequence that would follow . . . Sure enough, just as I had anticipated, the flock of enemy fighters appeared round a cloud column to port. They were right on cue. The ensuing performance was an identical repeat of the earlier action. It was like the re-run of a film, or a dream which had become real . . . I felt that, as I had already been given a preview I knew the outcome. Yet I could change none of it . . . I’ve heard people mention somewhat similar occurrences so perhaps they were not uncommon. However, for me, this was a strange and eerie experience. Nothing like it had ever happened to me before, nor was it ever repeated.31

This experience was akin to the time that the fortune-teller predicted the deaths of his three comrades. At first he had thought the predictions were a joke but, when his third friend was lost, he ‘was, by that time, pretty early convinced that there was something perhaps in it’. He was not overly religious but ‘I must say that I seemed to be comforted from time to time by the idea that I understood, or thought I understood, what I was doing. Of course, if you are the survivor, you are getting some help from somewhere—so I think.’32 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder had recently asked Caldwell if he were operationally tired and needed a rest. Caldwell advised him that he was ‘perfectly happy, and perfectly all right’.33 Darwin had been bombed on 19 February, and shortly afterwards the Australian Government started making plans to bring back Australian fighter pilots for the defence of Australia. Caldwell’s desert tour was due to end and Australia wanted him back. Caldwell was reluctant to return to Australia as he still believed that he had a significant contribution to make to the desert war.34 Tedder agreed and promised Caldwell that he could lead the planned Spitfire 82


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Wing:‘you can pick any of the pilots you like from the Desert Air Force. It doesn’t matter, you can have Squadron Leaders, Flight Commanders, Flight Lieutenants . . .’35 Over the next few days, Caldwell sounded out pilots that he wanted with him, including Neville Duke. Duke recorded in his diary that, ‘I am apparently one of the types picked to go on the Spits. Quite an honour I think, as everyone is clamouring for them.’36 Towards the end of March, Caldwell was advised that he would be awarded the Polish Cross of Valour as the Polish Government was anxious to show its appreciation for his gallant co-operation with its pilots. This was a great honour for Caldwell as it was the first award of its kind to be made by the Polish Government-in-exile to a member of the dominion air forces.37 Caldwell was proud of this award:‘It’s a very nice decoration, very pleasant to have, you know, just simply for valour’.38 When his Polish pilots were advised of the award, one of them carved an ivory replica of the Polish eagle for Jean Caldwell, which she wore as a fob. There was little air activity during April as no battles were scheduled, which was just as well, as the Squadron had to line up for daily parade practice in preparation for the presentation of the Squadron Crest by Air Vice-Marshal Coningham on 14 April. The presentation was a great formal occasion and after march-past, Coningham gave a general address in which he complimented 112 Squadron on its fine record. He paid particular attention to the unfailing loyalty of the ground staff, recounted highlights of Squadron history and announced the current score of 1351⁄2 confirmed, 24 probably destroyed and 39 damaged. After the formalities, the Squadron was treated to a long-delayed Christmas dinner, but no-one was allowed post-prandial relaxation as they had to strike camp immediately afterwards and move to Gambut No. 1 Satellite to prepare for a return to operations. By this stage, Caldwell had heard the disappointing news that he would not, after all, be taking over as leader of the desert Spitfire wing. One shipload of Spitfires had been sunk and others designated for the Middle East had been diverted to Malta. Only one Spitfire squadron— 145 Squadron RAF—had arrived and it would not be operational until 1 June 1942. Caldwell asked Tedder if he could remain with 112 Squadron but Tedder advised that arrangements had already been made for his replacement—the demands from Australia were becoming too strident to ignore. In recognition of Caldwell’s service in the desert, Tedder recommended him for the Distinguished Service Order, but the recommendation was not successful. 83


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Before he left, Caldwell was able to increase his score with one more ME 109. On 23 April he scrambled to Tobruk and engaged Stukas and their escorting ME 109s. He originally claimed a probable but it was later confirmed destroyed. Caldwell officially ceased desert operations on 27 April, but he still managed to participate in a number of sweeps and strafing runs in the first days of May. Reinforcing his belief in the importance of strafing to harass the enemy, he accounted for some troops and trucks and a machine-gun post before he left. Caldwell’s last desert flight was at sunset, a time he particularly loved, when the lighting effects captured his imagination. Reflecting on his time in the desert squadrons, Caldwell wrote that he had enjoyed his time with 250 Squadron, flying ‘more operations with it than any other unit and [where he] had more good fortune’. His favourite, however, was 112 Squadron, as that had been his first command.39 Caldwell developed a real bond with his comrades and those whom he commanded. He experienced a genuine sadness at leaving those he had grown close to: ‘. . . it was almost like leaving a family—I was leaving so many chaps that I knew and was friendly with. Because of the conditions out there, you do get to know everybody, and there’s an extraordinarily good feeling amongst everybody.’40 During his period in the desert, Caldwell saw the RAF change its tactics and the way in which it used its fighter aircraft.Whereas the Luftwaffe used the ME 109 almost solely as a fighter in fighter units, the RAF used the P–40 Tomahawk and Kittyhawk in all roles, from fighterbomber escort and ground attack and, later with the Kittyhawk, as a dive-bomber. Caldwell once even commented that a fighter pilot in the Middle East was regarded by the Army as a maid-of-all-work.41 The RAF developed from an amateurish organisation in the early days of the Middle East campaign to a modern wielder of tactical airpower, which laid the basis for the overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by the Allied forces in Europe in the final months of the war. Caldwell’s contribution to the Western Desert Air Force, with the development of shadow-shooting and the innovation of the Kittybomber, was substantial. Tedder was well-known for being supportive of those under his command and valued innovation. Caldwell thrived under those conditions. Caldwell grew from the lone-wolf fighter pilot, given to wandering around on his own, to a disciplined fighter. Squadron Leader Scoular clearly saw Caldwell’s leadership potential, despite his lone-wolf tendencies, and Squadron Leader Morris acknow84


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ledged his leadership in combat to be of the highest order. Tedder also praised Caldwell’s leadership abilities and endorsed his flying log on 8 May with the comment, ‘An excellent leader and a first-class shot’. Despite this high praise, however, not everyone was enamoured with Caldwell’s leadership style in the air at that time. Bobby Gibbes, who took command of 3 Squadron in February 1942, admitted that he ‘wasn’t all that impressed with Clive in the desert’.42 He considered Caldwell led too fast and was not as sympathetic as he could have been to his pilots if they could not keep up. Caldwell’s aggressive leadership style in the air, however, certainly paid dividends for 112 Squadron. During Caldwell’s period as commander, living up to its motto of ‘Swift in Destruction’, 112 Squadron accounted for eighteen destroyed and three shared enemy aircraft. Caldwell knew how important it was to ensure that his new pilots were operationally prepared, and one of his prime tasks as a leader was to impress on his junior pilots that you could never underrate the Germans. Finally appreciating the dangers of his own lone-wolf behaviour, he became ‘a stickler for flight discipline’. As Caldwell had in the past, the new pilots wanted to fly on their own and he warned that ‘the Germans were good at thinking up traps, so I used to have a notice printed up in the place, “Use your head, then the guns”—just to remind them’.43 Leading Aircraftman Bob Neale was a Rigger with A Flight and served with 112 Squadron for four years. He recalled that 112 was a happy Squadron and that Caldwell had been held in high esteem by all its members.44 Billy Drake, who took command of 112 Squadron in May 1942, recognised that ‘the formidable Clive “Killer” Caldwell, a determined, personable and highly talented Australian, who had become virtually a legend during his own tour in the desert’ was ‘quite an act for me to follow’.45 Caldwell’s official score when he left the Middle Eastern theatre was 1 20 ⁄2 enemy aircraft destroyed. He was the top-scoring desert fighter pilot and the most successful P–40 pilot of the war. He spent fourteen months in the desert and, although life was difficult and uncomfortable, he loved the desert’s grandeur. He thought it was a ‘proper place to fight a war. There was nothing else to think about’ and that it was ‘an ideal fighting area . . . because there’s virtually no civilian content at all. And it’s very clear to see: you can see everything that’s happening on the ground.’46 85


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Before leaving the region Caldwell again washed the last of the desert dust away and enjoyed the pleasures of Cairo. One morning, he awoke in his hotel room to find four Polish pilots standing at the end of his bed. Naturally, he was surprised to see them as only days before he had left them when he had farewelled 112 Squadron. The Polish pilots had also finished their stint with 112 Squadron and declared that,‘Our orders are to fly with you. If you go to England—well, we go to England too.’47 The Polish pilots were to be disappointed. Caldwell was scheduled to take a publicity detour to America before heading to England and his Polish pilots could not accompany him. Caldwell left the Middle East on 12 May 1942. An episode was finished, a segment of life had been completed to be laid away in the dim storehouse of memory.The African coast was already a streak on the horizon. It blended into the greying sky. It was absorbed into the darkness fading into it as night chased over the waters.48

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The most significant thing about the Boomerang was its name, because of the complete unlikelihood of it ever returning should it meet any enemy aircraft.1 Caldwell left Egypt with four Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Air Force pilots to participate in a publicity tour of America. The tour included visits to aircraft factories and was mainly to promote the importance of American aircraft in the war effort. Like Caldwell, Flying Officer Ian Spencler of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Squadron Leader John Alexander of the RAF, Flight Lieutenant Eric White, RAF, and Pilot Officer Lloyd Warriner, RCAF, had all flown in the Middle East. The trip from Egypt was long and tiring with stopovers at Khartoum, Lagos, Accra and Sierra Leone. From Sierra Leone, they crossed the Atlantic to Natal in Brazil. Flying north, they stopped briefly at Trinidad and Puerto Rico before finally arriving in Washington, DC.2 The main purpose of the American tour was to visit aircraft factories to buoy up the workers and thus step up production. It was only a brief trip, but many publicity opportunities were crammed in, and the pilots even met President Roosevelt. Despite fatigue from the long air-haul, the public appearances started almost immediately with a press conference. America had been at war for less than six months by this stage and Americans were interested to hear about their war experiences, given that many American pilots would soon be encountering the Germans and Italians. Caldwell 87


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believed the American pilots would find that the Germans still had a lot of fight left in them. The general opinion of the Italian pilots, however, was not as high, as they unanimously burst out laughing at the mention of Italian pilots.3 Caldwell did not doubt the courage of the Italian pilots, but he later indicated that he believed the Italian pilots were more showy than formidable.4 Caldwell and the other pilots then attended an afternoon cocktail party given by Mrs Sydney Cloman and her niece, Natalie Keeney Phillips. According to eminent society gossip columnist Igor Cassini,5 Caldwell was surrounded by the feminine contingent as a result of his deeds in the Western Desert, rather than just because of his good looks. He may have been surrounded by a bevy of admiring beauties, but this was not just a social outing. He was questioned constantly about his exploits in the desert. The pilots were given a quick tour of Washington and, accompanied by British Ambassador Lord Halifax, viewed a Royal Air Force exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution. From Washington, DC, Caldwell and the other pilots travelled by train to New York. New York was a heady experience for Caldwell. Sydney at that time had very few multi-storey buildings, and even those were nothing in comparison with what New York had to offer with the art deco marvel of the Empire State Building, complete with its gargoyles depicting Chrysler car ornaments and a spire modelled on a radiator grille; the seventy-storied RCA Building; and the vast Rockefeller Centre, which dwarfed the nearby 2-ton statue of Atlas. The RCA Building on the corner of 5th Avenue and 49th Street was the largest Rockefeller building and the first built. The British Press Service had its New York offices here and Caldwell and his comrades addressed another press conference on the premises.Again they lined up to face the cameras and when questioned about what was needed most for the Allied cause they replied ‘fighters, fighters and more fighters. Bombers, bombers and more bombers’.6 Caldwell particularly praised the Curtiss-Wright aircraft that he had flown so successfully:‘We like the P–40s and their successors best.They’re no trouble to handle and we’ve been able to out-manoeuvre the best that Germany could send over.’7 Caldwell spoke of his exploits in the desert and attributed the success of one operation to the manoeuvrability and firepower of the P–40s, as well as the skill of the pilots and the tactics employed.8 Caldwell was later asked to return to the Rockefeller Centre, the home of New York Broadcasting, to take part in a News From Home broadcast. The state-of-the-art studio contrasted dramatically with 88


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the makeshift recordings he did for the BBC in the desert, and he enjoyed its facilities as he told his audience about his experiences flying American aircraft in the Middle East. Caldwell left America for the United Kingdom on 29 May 1942 and arrived in London the next day. As he relaxed in his London flat, Caldwell fielded questions about his various desert successes. These interviews stirred up his storytelling abilities and prepared him for his forthcoming broadcast for the BBC’s Sunday Night Postscript program.9 The BBC began this radio series in 1941 and RAF personnel were invited to make anonymous broadcasts telling of their own experiences. Caldwell’s broadcast went to air on 8 June 1942 and he regaled his audience with stories of desert life, combat with the Germans, an assessment of the German as an enemy, and his own impressions of flying in the desert and the beauty that he experienced there. He also spoke of the comradeship that was such an important factor of life in a desert squadron and highly praised his Polish pilots. This praise was noted; the next day there was a brief article in the News Chronicle which opined that the RAF would warmly approve of the compliments paid by Caldwell to his Polish pilots. The Daily Mirror commented that his talk was ‘vivid and amusing . . . dismissing the men’s ordeals with humour’.10 Caldwell did not have much time to relax in London as he was shortly to return to active duty. Before he left the Middle East, Tedder had organised for Caldwell to spend time attached to a Spitfire Wing in England to gain invaluable experience flying Spitfires. Caldwell was loosely attached to the Kenley Wing as a supernumerary pilot.11 RAF Station Kenley was located in Surrey, 4 miles south of Croydon, and it was one of the key fighter stations in the Battle of Britain. It was one of the three main sector stations in 11 Group, covering the area south-east of London. Kenley, an established peacetime station, was well set-up with accommodation wings, lounge, snooker and games rooms and a well-stocked bar. It was a great contrast to Caldwell’s desert accommodation and he enjoyed his experience there. The nearby pubs and clubs provided relaxing facilities, Croydon sported a cinema, Barnstead had an open-air pool, and tennis and golf were available at the Coulsdon Court Golf Club. London was a quick trip away and Caldwell often visited the Continental Brasserie and other clubs or hotels. Despite the civilised amenities, Caldwell’s heart was still in the desert. Some time after he returned to Australia, Caldwell asked a trainee pilot where he would like to go for his advanced training. 89


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The young pilot replied that he preferred Canada. ‘Take my tip and go to the Middle East if you can’, replied Caldwell. ‘There’s nowhere like it.’12 The weather was overcast when Caldwell arrived at Kenley Wing on 9 June 1942, the day after his BBC broadcast. It was too dull for operations, but Caldwell was still able to climb into his first Spitfire—the Mark Vb—and make a number of familiarisation flights. The Mark Vb was fitted with two 20mm Hispano cannons and four .303 machine guns. Caldwell appreciated the Spitfire—it was a much more elegant aircraft than the Tomahawk or Kittyhawk.‘A Spitfire is a special thing in itself, you know—beautiful aeroplane to fly.You should do well in a Spit, only so bloody poorly armed.’13 The terrain over which he flew could not have been more different from the desert. Perhaps the scars of the bombing raid over Kenley the year before, clearly seen when circling to land, reminded him of bombed Alexandria, but the permanence of the concrete runways and square hangars was as different from the makeshift desert strips as could be imagined. The vivid colours of the desert had also given way to the softer hues of Surrey Woods, Coulsdon Court Golf Course and the surrounding towns and villages of Surrey.And it was only a short hop to the barbed-wired coast, where the water was a far cry from the stunning emerald, azure and deep-blue waters of the Mediterranean. When the weather cleared, Caldwell participated in sweeps of the Abbeville–St Omer–Calais area and to Calais, Lille, Cherbourg and Dieppe, as well as patrols to Beachy Head and Dungeness. He engaged a ME 109 and some Focke-Wulf FW 190 fighters near Lille, and a few days later, over the Le Havre–Dieppe area, he engaged an FW 190. During a sweep to Boulogne on 23 June, and while escorting bombers to Abbeville on 4 July, he again engaged ME 109s and FW 190s. On 2 July, while strafing near St Omer, he had three runs over a passenger train and hit the carriages and engine. Caldwell was not confined to the Spitfire Mark Vb. On 27 June, he flew to Duxford and tried out the Spitfire Mark IX, which he considered had proved itself ‘superior to anything the Germans have been able to put in the air—even the Focke-Wulfe 190s’.14 He returned to Duxford the next day for some general flying in the Mark IX. He carried out his last operation with the Kenley Wing in the Spitfire Mark Vb—a rhubarb over the French coast on 12 July, which involved pairs of aircraft looking for ground targets. Rhubarbs were often carried out in 90


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bad weather, making the low-level strafing quite hazardous and the selection of targets difficult. During his brief sojourn with Kenley Wing, Caldwell gained thirtythree hours’ experience on Spitfires and, although his flying log does not indicate it, New Zealander Wing Commander Edward Preston ‘Hawkeye’ Wells allowed him to lead his Wing on at least one occasion. Caldwell appreciated Wells’ generosity in allowing him the opportunity to gain experience with Kenley Wing. ‘With a closer-minded fellow I probably wouldn’t have . . . So I was very lucky.’15 During operations over France Caldwell discovered that the FW 190 was superior to the Spitfire Mark Vb. And while the scale of the operations in which he participated were larger than in the desert, there was less opportunity for individual action. Despite participating in operations as often as he could and, on occasion, encountering the enemy, Caldwell did not increase his score while flying with the Kenley Wing. His experience with the Wing, however, was a good preparation for his later role as Wing Leader of 1 Spitfire Wing. After persistent urging by the Minister for External Affairs, Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, Churchill agreed to send Australia the three Spitfire squadrons that would comprise this new Wing: 54 Squadron RAF, 452 Squadron RAAF and 457 Squadron RAAF. The squadrons left Liverpool on the Stirling Castle on 20 June, the day that Caldwell participated in a sweep of Cherbourg.They arrived at Port Melbourne on 13 August while Caldwell was on his second trip to America. Although Caldwell had already received and was wearing the ribbon, he was officially presented with the Polish Cross of Valour by exiled Polish President General Sikorski in a ceremony in London. Caldwell was not able to linger long in London as he was due to return to the United States. Before he had left America in May, Lord Halifax had arranged with him to return to test-fly Curtiss-Wright fighter aircraft to assess their suitability for long-range escort duty on daylight bomber raids over Europe. In addition, Caldwell would visit the Curtiss-Wright factories to talk to the workers. After he landed in America, Caldwell travelled by train and arrived in Buffalo, NY, on 5 August, where he was met at the station by representatives of Curtiss-Wright who took him to his hotel where he had breakfast and freshened up.16 After a brief rest he was taken to the smaller of the Curtiss-Wright factories, No. 1 Plant. The plant’s general manager then took him on a tour of inspection. Caldwell had been invited to 91


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address the plant employees, so a raised speaker’s platform with a microphone had been erected outside. Two shifts of workers massed around it as Caldwell spoke to the crowd. Hundreds of people listened attentively to him for about fifteen minutes as he talked about the effectiveness of the Tomahawk and Kittyhawk against the enemy and the importance of American aircraft in the war effort. He also spoke of his experiences in the desert and of his trust in his own abilities to fly well and shoot down the enemy. Caldwell emphasised the importance of having faith in your own abilities:‘A man has every right to have faith in himself. If he hasn’t, he can’t expect it from others.’17 Caldwell later modestly reported that his talk ‘appeared to go over quite well’.18 Caldwell and the rest of the official party then went to the No. 2 Plant. There he met the president of the company, Mr Burdette S. Wright, and the rest of the company executives.After lunch, they toured the plant and Caldwell viewed the assembly lines. Caldwell then flew the factory’s latest model, the Curtiss-Wright P–40F Warhawk fighter. After landing, Caldwell changed back into his uniform and addressed another crowd of employees. This time the company band played and some of the new aircraft, flown by the Curtiss-Wright test pilots, performed aerobatics at low altitude. The next morning, Caldwell again visited the No. 2 Plant and toured the section that produced the C–46 Commando freight-carrying aircraft. Caldwell was offered a flight, along with a number of other observers, in one of the C–46s that was undergoing an Army acceptance re-flight.The Commando was piloted by Herbert O. Fisher, a Curtiss test pilot, with First Lieutenant John P. Begley, USAAF, as second pilot. After the hourlong test-flight, they prepared to land but the landing gear went down only to a three-quarters position. Fisher and Begley attempted to rectify the problem but were not able to and, after about eight hours circling above Buffalo Airport, Fisher finally decided to make a belly landing. A normal landing was effected with the gear still in the three-quarters down position. As the weight of the aircraft settled on the wheels, the landing gear was pushed into the retracted position. Only light damage was suffered by the aircraft but there were no injuries to the passengers.19 While Fisher and Begley had attempted to repair the landing gear during the eight hours of circling, Caldwell had taken over as second pilot and Burdette S. Wright later issued him with a letter to certify ‘the eight hours of exposure afforded you as co-pilot in the Curtiss Commando C–46 type of airplane under the tutelage and frequently 92


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(while he was in the basement) physically over Herbert Fisher, Chief Pilot, on 6 August 1942 in the immediate vicinity of the Buffalo (New York) Municipal Airport’.20 After the landing, the pilots and passengers repaired to Wright’s office to discuss the afternoon’s events and to continue the previous night’s discussion on fighter aircraft development. Despite spending most of the day in the C–46, Caldwell enjoyed his visit to Curtiss-Wright and was impressed by the efficiency of the factories. Before he left, Wright presented him with a chromium model of a P–40E and a cigarette box of tooled leather, featuring a P–40E in flight. Caldwell then flew to Indianapolis to visit the General Motors factory that produced the Allison engine, which was used by both Tomahawks and Kittyhawks. As with the Curtiss-Wright factories, Caldwell was very impressed with the efficiency of the plants. He was also interested in the research work that was being done to produce more efficient engines. After he left, Caldwell stayed in Washington for a few days to complete his report, and was shanghaied into participating in a war-bond drive. After his commitments in the east were completed, Caldwell flew to Los Angeles. This trip took four days, with stopovers in Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth and Juarez in Mexico. Caldwell spent some time in Los Angeles and during this time he tested the P–51 Mustang fighter at the North American Aviation facility near the edge of the Los Angeles Municipal Airport. Caldwell thought that the Curtiss Warhawk that he had flown earlier was ‘an ideal aeroplane in many ways’ but now found that it ‘didn’t handle as well as the Mustang’.The North American P–51 Mustang was originally designed in response to a British specification and production began in mid-1941. Caldwell found the Mustang ‘a beautiful aeroplane to fly. A long-range, very strong aeroplane. Very fast. Wonderful firepower.’21 While on the west coast, Caldwell spent some time with Los Angeles Times journalist Bill Henry, who took Caldwell on a tour of Warner Bros. studio. Together they watched Fredric March while he rehearsed a scene for his title role in The Adventures of Mark Twain—with a sip of coffee, without a sip of coffee, with this inflection, with another inflection . . . over and over again. Caldwell met March later in his dressing room and was asked what he thought of the process.The man, who had spent many interminable hours hanging around dispersal tents and who had on many occasions dodged death over the desert, commented that it seemed ‘a frightful strain on the nerves’. 93


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They also visited the stage where Louis Milestone was directing Helmut Dantine (the actor who played the Nazi pilot in Mrs Miniver) in The Edge of Darkness. Dantine was Austrian and before 1938 he was the leader of an anti-Nazi youth movement in Vienna. When the Germans took over, he was put in a concentration camp for three months, after which his parents sent him to live with an American friend. His German-sounding accent was put to good use by Hollywood and again he was appearing as a Nazi officer. He questioned Caldwell eagerly about what the Nazis in the desert were like. Caldwell confided to Henry after Dantine returned to the set, ‘You know, I had a hard time not saying that they were all pretty much like him.’ The meeting with Dantine in his Nazi costume triggered a contemplative reverie for Caldwell: Most of the Nazis when you have them over to the squadron mess after you shoot them down are pretty awkward—inclined to brag and be difficult— they can’t understand why anybody wants to fight them and that sort of thing. But one we shot down had a different idea—probably his own idea and not the regular thing. He said it didn’t make much difference to him because in six months Hitler would be beaten by Russia’s winter and then we’d all have to worry about Russia. Anyhow, this was unusual for a Nazi!

After their trip to the studio, Henry drove Caldwell back to his hotel. As they headed back up over the pass that took them to Hollywood, Caldwell looked up to see a huge Boeing B–17 Flying Fortress bomber roaring overhead, then a Lockheed P–38 Lightning fighter flew past. Apart from the warplanes, the scene was peaceful, the view almost idyllic. Henry commented to Caldwell that it hardly looked as if there was a war on at all. Caldwell nodded in agreement and then added unexpectedly, ‘Good thing too—war’s bad enough for the chaps who have to fight it. Personally, I can’t see much use making it any worse than necessary for the others.’ Bill Henry’s journalistic connection with Caldwell did not end with this trip. On 26 January 1943, a day when Caldwell was carrying out exercises with 1 Fighter Wing over the Darwin area, Henry reported that Caldwell had been shot down in flames in New Guinea. Shortly after, he corrected his mistake and announced that Caldwell was alive and well. He admitted that he was both embarrassed and delighted at the same time, and that it was ‘one of those occasions on which it is a real 94


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pleasure to be wrong!’22 Henry was not the only one who heard a rumour that Caldwell had died. Jean’s sister Agnes was working as a Voluntary Aide in Alice Springs. By the time she heard the story, it had metamorphosed considerably, with the appalling news that he had had his head chopped off by the Japanese. Devastated, she phoned Jean, but Jean knew that her husband was not dead and assured Agnes that the story was false. After his official testing duties were completed, it took a while for Caldwell to get a flight back to Australia. He filled in this time on the west coast attending cocktail parties, taking afternoon tea at Alcatraz where the San Quentin Glee Singers put on a turn for the visitors, spending some time lounging around the pool with his new Hollywood friend, actor Nigel Bruce,23 and carrying out interviews. One interview was with John Burton from Californian radio station KFI. Caldwell told many of the same stories of his exploits in the desert (he must have been word perfect by now) but Burton was granted a rare privilege. Caldwell allowed him to read through his flying log and gave him permission to quote from it. Burton did so over the air and quoted the high accolades from Morris and Tedder. As a successful Australian fighter pilot, serving in British squadrons and flying American aircraft, Caldwell took on the role of an Allied ambassador during this interview. When Burton asked him how the Australian, English and American troops mixed, he responded, ‘Couldn’t be better. Plenty of horse-play of course, but they’re all out together to do the one main job—to lick the Axis.’ Caldwell then went on to add, almost impatiently, ‘We’ve got no antiAmerican or anti-British nonsense in the armed forces. It’s high time that all Allied civilians became as unified in their aims and actions as the Allied armed forces.’24 Burton later forwarded a copy of the broadcast transcript to Caldwell and concluded his covering note with the comment that Caldwell ‘must be thrilled at the thought of seeing your wife’.25 It had been eighteen months since the Caldwells had seen each other and Caldwell was looking forward to returning home. He made good use of the waiting time during those last days in America and had amassed a supply of gifts for Jean that he knew would delight her considering the rationing Australians were enduring. Jean Caldwell was waiting anxiously for her husband’s homecoming. There had been some reports in the press indicating that Caldwell 95


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had already arrived back in Australia. The Daily Telegraph reported on 27 August that Caldwell had returned, and the Wagga Advertiser of 28 August erroneously reported that, on hearing of his arrival back in Australia, Jean’s ‘first reaction was to pack her bags and leave for Sydney but changed her mind pending receipt of official information’.26 Given the reports, and the fact that she had heard nothing definite, Jean made some enquiries and Lieutenant Colonel Victor E. Bertrandias USAAF, who was en route to set up the Townsville Air Depot, sent her a note advising her that he had recently seen her husband in San Francisco and that he had been waiting for transportation by air. Bertrandias advised Jean that her husband was fine and fit and that he sent his love and told her that it would be only two weeks or so before he returned—he was just waiting on space for him in an aircraft.27 Jean received a telegram from Air Board the next day confirming that her husband had not yet arrived in Australia,28 but reports of his arrival were still wildly circulating. On 7 September, Woman carried an article indicating that he had already returned and the report gushed that ‘even now, [ Jean] can’t believe he’s back’.29 Just over nineteen months after he had left Australia on the Aquitania, Caldwell arrived at RAAF Amberley on 14 September 1942. It had been a long trip via Honolulu, Christmas Island, Canton Island, Noumea and Fiji. Rather than the welcome he expected, the first person he met was Group Captain Robert Simms, who accused him of being absent without leave for the last four months and informed him that he would be dealt with in Melbourne.After he arrived in Melbourne on 17 September, Caldwell was called in to see the Deputy Director of Personnel. Caldwell had left the Middle East as a Squadron Leader and had been wearing this rank during his American tours. He was still wearing it.The Deputy Director asked him why he was dressed up like that, and told him to remove the stripes.30 Caldwell was attempting to remove the offending stripe when he was called into the Director’s office. The Director was less concerned about Caldwell’s rank (and did not even refer to the supposed unauthorised absence) than lining Caldwell up for a press conference. Later that afternoon, Caldwell was speaking to the Movietone and Cinesound cameras and ‘Meet Squadron Leader Clive “Killer” Caldwell, DFC and Bar’ was released into the cinemas the following week. An uncomfortable looking Caldwell stood in front of the cameras and said how glad he was to be back again and expressed the hope that he would soon be flying against the Japanese and have some luck against them.31 96


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As soon as he was able, Caldwell phoned Jean. She was staying with her family at Retreat which was located close to the RAAF base at Cootamundra, so Caldwell managed to borrow a Tiger Moth and flew from RAAF Laverton direct to Cootamundra. However, before he arrived home, he had to run the gauntlet of the station commander. Perhaps in his anxiety to get home quickly, Caldwell was a bit sloppy with his landing.The station commander, who had always stressed to his trainees the importance of landing into the wind, gave orders for ‘that trainee’ to be sent to the orderly room as soon as he came in. Shortly afterwards, the ‘trainee’, wearing his great coat, arrived. Despite Caldwell being a ‘local’ by marriage and his photo appearing in numerous newspapers over the last few months, the commander did not recognise him and asked for his name. Caldwell gave his name. ‘Not THE Caldwell?’ When Caldwell replied in the affirmative, the station commander exclaimed, ‘Good God man, you landed down the wind and without lights!’ The station commander eventually settled down but Caldwell’s return home was delayed while he tested the hospitality of the officers’ mess.32 Caldwell finally arrived home to a warm and excited welcome. He showered his wife with gifts from the Cairo bazaars and America. Little did he realise when he purchased his gifts, that it would not be his wife alone who would take delight in them. After her husband’s return, Jean Caldwell was interviewed by The Sunday Sun and described her husband as having ‘as quick an eye for the right target in the shops as in a raid over the desert’.33 And then she described the gifts that he had brought back for her. From New York he had purchased Schiaparelli lipsticks, and from Hollywood a make-up brush such as that used by film stars. From Los Angeles he selected perfume, and from San Francisco, he found nylon stockings which ‘according to rumour . . . will do anything but wear out’.34 Caldwell and Jean spent a few days together at Retreat—after the long time apart, the protracted delays of his return, and his cool welcome in Brisbane, a retreat was what they needed. However, there was little peace and quiet in the country.The early and frequent reports of Caldwell’s return had generated hundreds of letters from friends and admirers and those who did not write either phoned or wired. Such was the volume of letters and telegrams that the postal facilities at nearby Bethungra were seriously strained. The phone was constantly ringing—even reporters phoned, ironically ensuring that the quiet holiday about which they were reporting was interrupted. To the Daily 97


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Telegraph reporter who phoned, Caldwell stated that he wanted ‘to knock the pace down to stalling speed for the next fortnight . . . A horse and buggy with a top speed of six miles an hour and a ceiling of five feet will about do me.’35 The Caldwells had only a few days of semi-seclusion before Caldwell had to visit Sydney on business. No sooner had he and Jean arrived than the press was once again on their doorstep. It was reported that his first action on arriving at the Australia Hotel was to borrow a paper in order to find out how ‘the boys’ were doing up north.36 Caldwell’s gift-giving did not cease after his arrival. Truth noted that he had been ‘consistently “saying it with orchids” to his charming blonde wife’ and Jean was often photographed with a spray of orchids pinned to her shoulder, reminiscent of the arrangement she wore on her wedding day.37 Continually bedogged by the media,38 the Caldwells engaged in a hectic social whirl that included interviews, various receptions, catching up with friends, and a board meeting at MLC Assurance, Caldwell’s former employer. After the MLC meeting, Caldwell and Jean attended a reception held in Caldwell’s honour. MLC was proud of its former employee and past editions of The EMELSEE included accounts of Caldwell’s ‘outstanding air-deeds’ and a report of his award of the DFC and Bar. After congratulating him on ‘receiving such unique and well-deserved decorations in recognition of his daring, skill and bravery’ the editor noted that, ‘knowing Clive Caldwell as we do, we are certain that a “bag” of 12 enemy planes is nowhere near his own self-set “quota” and that we may expect to hear of further “completions” by him as the fight goes on’.39 At the reception, the company secretary, Mr H.A.Vaughan, reiterated Caldwell’s successes and then presented the Caldwells with a gift from the employees. In his acceptance speech, Caldwell announced, much to the amusement of the crowd, that in some ways ‘he would rather fly than sell insurance’. But he humorously admitted that insurance salesmanship did have some advantages. One clear advantage was that the worst that could happen to a salesman was that he would be thrown out the door: ‘A salesman had more chance of achieving a happy landing from the altitude he attained at the end of a client’s boot than from a wrecked plane in the clouds.’40 The humour of Caldwell’s speech overshadowed the bleak allusion to the tragedy of air warfare. However, any possible thoughts of sadness were pushed aside as Caldwell met up with former associates. One friend whom he was particularly pleased to see was Mervyn Finlay, 98


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the well-known Sydney solicitor who was best man at the Caldwell’s wedding. Wherever the Caldwells appeared in public, it seemed the press was there. Even when they were quietly lunching at Prince’s, Caldwell was photographed signing autographs for Voluntary Aides Sheila Moss, the Australian ice-skating champion, and her sister Shirley.41 Caldwell completed his business and other social commitments and he and Jean returned to the country. Finally, they were afforded some peace. Caldwell’s two weeks leave passed quickly and on 5 October he was posted to 2 Operational Training Unit as a flying instructor. His promotion to temporary Flight Lieutenant had come through with effect from 1 October 1942, but he would be carrying out his new duties as acting Squadron Leader. Before it moved to Mildura in May 1942, 2 Operational Training Unit had formed at Port Pirie on 6 April 1942. It was commanded by Wing Commander Peter Jeffrey, former commander of 3 Squadron RAAF in the Middle East, with Squadron Leader Alan Rawlinson, also a former commander of 3 Squadron, as its Chief Instructor. Initially, many of the instructors were former 3 Squadron pilots, but other pilots returning from Europe and the Middle East spent non-operational tours as instructors there. Instructors posted to 2 Operational Training Unit at the same time as Caldwell included flight lieutenants Wilfred ‘Woof ’ Arthur and Richard ‘Doug’ Vanderfield, both highly skilled pilots who had attained ace status. Because of his experience on Kittyhawks, Caldwell was appointed as instructor of the Kittyhawk flight. He also received his share of instruction as he learned about Japanese tactics and the performance of their aircraft in preparation for his posting to 1 Fighter Wing later that year. Caldwell was impressed with the school, particularly with the standard achieved by Jeffrey in such a short period of time.42 Caldwell spent only three weeks as an instructor and was replaced by Flight Lieutenant Clive ‘Bardie’ Wawn, another skilled pilot, who had served in both the United Kingdom and New Guinea. Caldwell’s instructing career was curtailed so he could once again perform as a test pilot. For some time, the RAAF had been interested in an anti-gravity suit to delay blackouts during manoeuvres. The Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G Suit Mark 1 had been designed by Dr Frank Cotton, a senior research fellow at the National Health and Medical Research Council, who had built the first human centrifuge in 1940. 99


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On 9 October 1942,Air Board requested that 2 Operational Training Unit carry out tactical trials on the anti-g suit in a Kittyhawk and Caldwell was one of the pilots. On 25 October, he made two flights wearing the suit. The resulting report noted that the pilot did not black out and was able to carry out more violent manoeuvres, which were limited only by the structural strength of the aircraft. It also noted that a pilot protected by the suit could get a greater performance out of the aircraft. Based on these tests, it was strongly recommended that the suit be produced for immediate distribution to frontline squadrons. Nine months later, in July 1943, when Caldwell was commanding 1 Fighter Wing, the pilots of 452 Squadron used the suit and made favourable reports. The next step was testing them in battle conditions. Caldwell advised Headquarters, North-Western Area, that there were not enough suits available to realistically test them. At that stage, of the six suits sized to fit individual pilots, only five were serviceable and more suits might become unusable after practice flights. Caldwell noted that there were no guarantees that all or any of the six aircraft fitted to operate the suits would be serviceable at the critical time. He also pointed out that with the current system, 452 Squadron might not be on readiness the next time a Japanese raid took place and it was an unfair impost to keep 452 on readiness constantly. Given these factors, he recommended ‘every effort should be made to equip the Squadron with sufficient material to enable a section at least to operate on a normal basis’.43 Headquarters later agreed with this recommendation, however by that stage the Japanese raids over Darwin had almost ceased, and the anti-g suit was never used in operations over Darwin. In October 1942, Caldwell was requested to form a special flight to test the CA–12 Boomerang Interceptor.The Boomerang had been designed by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) as a response to the threat of a potential Japanese invasion of Australia. Initial tests by CAC were promising and in June 1942 the Department of Air requested a comparative handling trial between a Boomerang, P–40E Kittyhawk and P–400 Airacobra fighter. The pilots were Squadron Leader Alan Rawlinson, Flight Lieutenant Wilfred Arthur and Captain A.W. Lunde, USAAF. Their report of the Boomerang’s handling capabilities was generally positive.44 The next step was to assess the Boomerang’s suitability for frontline operations.To prepare himself for this role, Caldwell carried out a number 100


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of familiarisation and fighter instruction flights. Working with Flight Lieutenant Doug Vanderfield and Squadron Leader Birch, Caldwell set up the test flights with three Boomerangs.They had to fly them as hard as they could go in circumstances approximating battle in order to assess the capabilities from the perspective of an operational pilot. They quickly discovered the Boomerang did not live up to its role as an interceptor fighter. There were problems with its ability to climb in battle and in a high-powered dive the instrument panel vibrated so badly that Caldwell could not read his air speed indicator.45 Over a four-week period, Caldwell accumulated about forty hours in the Boomerang, carrying out a number of tests—Boomerang against Boomerang, Boomerang against Kittyhawk and Boomerang against Spitfire. Continually, the Boomerang came out second best. The most embarrassing test came when Caldwell, Vanderfield and Birch arranged a co-operation exercise with 18 Squadron NEI-RAAF, located at RAAF Fairbairn in Canberra. It was equipped with North American B–25 Mitchell two-engined medium bombers, which proved to be too fast for the Boomerang.46 The initial test report was particularly scathing. In all, thirty-five modifications were suggested to the airframe, cockpit controls and instruments, electrical works, engine and armament. The report concluded that ‘the Boomerang, as an operational fighter aircraft, has no feature to recommend it’ but that it could be used for training, as a ‘cat’s-eye’ night fighter, for fighter protection of rear areas that could be attacked only by unescorted bombers, and ‘in the event of an invasion or other major disaster, when all aircraft would be used’.47 Caldwell’s disdain for the Boomerang as an effective fighter got the better of him and he included a final paragraph to the effect that ‘the most significant thing about the Boomerang was its name, because of the complete unlikelihood of it ever returning should it meet any enemy aircraft’. This comment drew the ire of Air Vice-Marshal George Jones, who declared that ‘cheap attempts at humour at the expense of the Australian war effort, by recently returned pilots from overseas theatres of war was not, repeat not, appreciated’.48 Jones demanded that the offending paragraph be deleted and the report re-submitted. It was.49 Caldwell’s test pilot career ended with the Boomerang but there was no regret. He was very pleased that he was going to a Spitfire Wing and he felt sorry for those pilots who would eventually be posted to Boomerang squadrons.

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It must be appreciated that no two engagements or all the circumstances surrounding them are the same . . .1 Headquarters 1 Fighter Wing was formed at Richmond in New South Wales on 7 October 1942 under the command of Group Captain Alan ‘Wally’ Walters. Its role was to co-ordinate the activities of 54 Squadron RAF and 452 and 457 squadrons RAAF, the three Spitfire squadrons that had arrived from England on 13 August.Their presence in Australia was a result of the efforts of Minister for External Affairs Dr Herbert Vere Evatt. Evatt had travelled to Washington and London during April and May 1942 in order to secure Australia’s defence. In Washington he gained some loose assurances from the Americans and on this basis announced to Prime Minister Curtin that his mission was a great personal victory. He still needed something more concrete, however, and he hoped to obtain this in London. In London, however, he quickly realised, and admitted, the difficulty of pressing Australia’s claims in the Allied councils of power. Although the British were highly reluctant to commit assistance to Australia’s defence, Evatt was desperate to salvage something of the mission so he continued to press for British fighter aircraft. In particular, he wanted the Spitfire. The RAF Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, was extremely reluctant to divert aircraft and personnel to the Australian cause and pointed out to Evatt that current and forthcoming stocks of tropicalised Spitfires were required by both Malta and the Middle East. Portal also suggested that it would be more sensible to 102


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negotiate with the Americans for more Kittyhawks, which could be operated by local pilots. Even if Evatt favoured the idea, negotiations with the Americans for more Kittyhawks could only be on a future agenda and he wanted the aircraft that had been declared the world’s best fighter now. He wanted the aircraft that had held the Luftwaffe at bay during the Battle of Britain. He wanted the Spitfire, and he wanted Spitfire pilots. Eventually, he received his Spitfires and the personnel to fly them, but at the expense of British retention of the 9th Division and accelerated delivery of military supplies from Britain. Despite these serious failures, Evatt announced in his cable to Curtin his success in securing ‘two crack RAAF Squadrons’ and ‘a first class RAF squadron’ with aircraft of the ‘most modern character’. Evatt’s success was not initially made public. The departure of the Spitfire squadrons was arranged in secrecy and their final destination was only revealed to squadron personnel just prior to embarkation. Despite a media call arranged at RAAF Station Laverton on 2 September to witness the first flights made in Australia by the newly arrived Spitfires, photos and film were embargoed and news articles forbidden as the Government was anxious to obtain the maximum advantage of the element of surprise. Public announcements were to be delayed until ‘we are absolutely certain that the enemy is aware of the presence of these aircraft in Australia’.2 To further emphasise the element of secrecy, the Government requested that the Spitfires be referred to as Capstans, after a popular brand of cigarette, with Marvel engines. The squadrons complied with this request and even for some time after the secrecy provisions were lifted, their aircraft were still referred to as Capstans in their records. Caldwell was posted to 1 Fighter Wing on 23 November 1942. The Wing would take over the defence of the Darwin area from 76 and 77 squadrons RAAF, which had in turn taken over from the 49th Fighter Group USAAF. As the Wing prepared to move north, Caldwell and his pilots spent time becoming familiar with the Spitfires and working together on squadron and wing exercises. He quickly settled into his new role of Wing Leader. Over the next few days Caldwell familiarised himself with the Supermarine Spitfire Mark Vc. The Spitfires sent to Australia were the tropicalised versions with a Vokes air filter beneath the nose. This allowed for more efficient filtering of the induction air when operating in sand or dust.While Caldwell loved the elegance of the Spitfire, he did 103


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not have a high opinion of the modifications and their impact on the performance of the aircraft. He led wing and squadron exercises constantly over the first few weeks of his appointment. His initial wing exercise did not go as smoothly as he had hoped and provided an occasion for ribbing from his pilots and a rather red face. While he was leading the Wing someone noticed that he had forgotten to pull up his wheels after takeoff. Snide hints that something was amiss were exchanged over the radio but Caldwell was left in the dark. After some more jokes at his expense, it finally dawned on him what was wrong and he retracted the wheels. He later admitted to Flying Officer Reginald ‘Ross’ Williams of 452 Squadron that ‘anyone can be stupid, and there I was under a certain amount of duress!’3 He was the victim of much good-natured chiacking in the mess afterwards, but wore his red face with grace and appreciated the humour of the situation. Caldwell flew almost every day to meld the three squadrons into a finely tuned Wing.This was not an easy task.Although they had travelled to Australia together on the Stirling Castle, the British and Australian squadrons did not mix. Demarcations based on nationality were exacerbated when the squadrons were dispersed to separate strips soon after they arrived. While 54 Squadron stayed at Richmond, 452 Squadron moved to Bankstown and 457 to Camden. Later at Darwin, they were also located at separate strips. A dinner was held in the officers’ mess at Richmond Station on 29 December which provided an opportunity for wing personnel to become better acquainted. But the official guests almost missed the dinner. Earlier that day, Minister for Air Arthur Drakeford had been inspecting Air Force installations in Victoria. He and the rest of the official party, which included Dr Herbert Vere Evatt and Air ViceMarshal George Jones, then set out by aircraft for Richmond. On the way, visibility deteriorated and a leaking oil pipe covered the aircraft cabin windows with a film of grease. The aircraft was forced down hundreds of miles from Richmond. The official party was able to commandeer a small aircraft from a nearby aerodrome and finally arrived in time. Group Captain Walters presided over the official guests, 130 officers and sergeant pilots of Headquarters and the three squadrons comprising the Wing. The evening was enjoyed by all and before it concluded, the official party wished the Wing good luck and happy hunting during its forthcoming Darwin posting. 104


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The Wing departed Richmond in three parties by land, sea and air. Caldwell and Group Captain Walters joined the pilots flying their Spitfires inland under the escort of a Lockheed Lodestar transport aircraft.4 Darwin was a very different locale from Caldwell’s previous postings. It was hot, but not the dry heat of the desert with its clear, cool, often chilly, nights. Here, enervating, oppressive humidity prevailed, with daily thunderstorms resulting in mud and mildew. Caldwell was not fond of high temperatures—with or without humidity—and he had endured some discomfort during Richmond’s hot summer. One attempt to alleviate the heat there resulted in laughter for his comrades and embarrassment for the WAAAF who brought him his morning cup of tea. She surprised both Caldwell and herself when he awoke pyjama-less after a particularly hot and close night.5 There was no relief from the high temperatures in the early weeks in Darwin, and Caldwell developed a skin condition that made shaving difficult. As a result he soon sported a beard. Since the civilian evacuations of late 1941 and 1942, Darwin had become a military town. While the infrastructure may have been better than in the desert in some instances, the roads here were in a state of disrepair from the heavy military traffic and the erosive deluges, and the airstrips at Strauss and Livingstone, from which Caldwell flew with 452 and 457 squadrons, were little more than widenings of the main highway surrounded by fairly heavy timber. The distance from major centres was also a problem. Travelling time ate into operational leave periods considerably—there was no quick train trip to Brisbane or Adelaide for a brief respite from combat conditions—and supplies and spare parts always took too long to arrive. Just as there was difficulty acquiring the Spitfires in the first place, now there would always be problems acquiring parts, but the repair units excelled in making aircraft serviceable despite the problems associated with the environment. Caldwell found the war in the North-Western Area was also very different from his previous experiences. In the desert, the Air Force operated in support of the Army. Many of Caldwell’s desert operations were offensive, or involved escort and protection of ships and bombers, and operations took place almost every day, weather permitting. Here, these tasks were the responsibility of other squadrons and 1 Fighter Wing was tasked exclusively with the defence of military installations in the area.The Australian population may have been led to believe that the North-Western Area squadrons were there for the defence of Australia, 105


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but the main reason for their defensive operations was something quite different. In February 1942, President Roosevelt had ordered General Douglas MacArthur to abandon his army in the Philippines and assume the office of Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area, with Headquarters in Australia. At this stage, the North-Western Area lay on the flank of General MacArthur’s main concentrations in New Guinea and it had to be protected to ensure the success of MacArthur’s projected offensive. Soon after he arrived in Darwin, Dr Evatt sent Caldwell a personal telegram advising him that his acting rank of Wing Commander had been processed and would be gazetted shortly. It would take effect from 1 January 1943. Caldwell was itching to get back into combat, and was looking forward to leading the Wing against the Japanese. Since February 1942, fifty Japanese air raids had been carried out over the Darwin area and it was a reasonable assumption that his opportunity would come soon. But the Japanese attack plan changed about this time. There had been three raids in November 1942, but then nothing until late January 1943. The Japanese forces were under orders to make monthly attacks on Merauke and Darwin, and they preferred heavy raids at intervals rather than small but frequent attacks. Caldwell missed his first opportunity when Raid 51 took place on 21 January. Although the aircraft and most of the personnel of 1 Fighter Wing had arrived, the Wing was not operational and the defence was carried out by four Kittyhawks. Neither they nor the Japanese suffered any losses. The Wing’s first success against the Japanese occurred on 6 February, when a Mitsubishi Ki–46 Army Type 100 command reconnaissance aircraft, code-named Dinah, was shot down by Flight Lieutenant Bob Foster of 54 Squadron. Both Foster and his No. 2, Flight Sergeant Mahoney, saw the Dinah hit the water in flames and there was later an air of ‘general jubilation’, with the 54 Squadron diarist recording this as ‘a memorable day’.7 The Japanese sent another reconnaissance aircraft over the next day but it was not sighted until it had finished its task and was on its way home. The Government still had not announced the presence of the Spitfires and, despite this incursion providing a probable confirmation to the Japanese of their presence, the public announcement was delayed further. Caldwell was committed to his role of Wing Commander Flying and during his time with 1 Fighter Wing he flew as often as possible, both in training and on operations. He went on readiness with each squadron, 106


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sharing the boredom of waiting for something to happen, and the excitement of a scramble. During February 1943, he went on readiness with 54 Squadron and, although there was no more Japanese activity for the rest of the month, he arranged flying practice sessions, including shadow shooting, gun tests, and wing practices. February, however, was characterised by a number of bouts of foul weather and flying practice was often cancelled. According to the 54 Squadron diarist, 19 February was the worst day so far. It had rained continuously with visibility reduced to only a few yards. If the Spitfires could not fly, neither could the Japanese, and he noted that ‘even the reccos seem to be holding off ’.8 Despite flying as often as weather permitted, the pilots were at risk of boredom from the dearth of serious activity and the unfavourable weather. Caldwell, too, used to constant sorties against the enemy, began to feel frustrated.When he first returned to Australia he was interviewed by the Directorate of Public Relations and the text of this interview was taken up by a number of newspapers over the following days. In the press release subtitled,‘Grim Ambition of Fighter Ace’, Caldwell, perhaps foolishly, spoke of his ambition to beat the score of Wing Commander Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan RAF, who at that stage topped the list of Empire airmen with thirty-two confirmed victories. He also mentioned that ‘when my non-operational tour of duty is over I want to have a smack at the Japs and their Zeros’.9 It was beginning to look like it would be some time before he had a chance to increase his personal score. A potential opportunity arose on 21 February when the Dutch ship Maetsuycher, which had transported the Wing’s ground crew to Darwin, was travelling up the west coast from Fremantle. Word came through that she had been spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and she expected to be attacked. Caldwell and five pilots from 54 Squadron took off to patrol the Maetsuycher’s convoy and to engage any attackers. Before they arrived in the area, however, a Japanese bomber had already dropped its bombs, but no casualties or damage had occurred. The Spitfire pilots decided to stay overnight at Drysdale River Mission in Western Australia. The landing strip at Drysdale had a bad surface but the pilots did not discover this until Caldwell, who was the first to land, bent his propeller at about 90 degrees and his Spitfire went over on its nose. To ensure no further damage he kept ‘the other five Spits in the air . . . until we managed to get some ropes and used them like a skipping rope effect to hold the tails down while they landed, otherwise they would also have had bent airscrews’.10 There were no 107


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repair facilities so, with the assistance of a 9-pound hammer, the propeller was roughly straightened out. There were no further sightings of enemy aircraft and despite the non-professional repairs, Caldwell and his party returned home safely, although in Caldwell’s case it was a rough ride with severe vibration from the unbalanced blades.11 Excitement and tension began to mount from 26 February. The 54 Squadron diarist recorded a ‘great flap this evening’ as a result of a report that indicated Timor had been heavily reinforced by the Japanese.12 All available aircraft were ordered for readiness and the period of heightened alert continued after a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft was seen off the coast. It had been raining solidly for two days and it was assumed that the bad weather deterred the reconnaissance aircraft from coming closer. 54 Squadron attempted to scramble two Spitfires but the bad weather forced them to land almost immediately. In preparation for Japanese activity over the area, Caldwell had been briefed that during the forthcoming air battle he had to use a variety of tactics, including climbs, dives and turns at various speeds in order to check ‘the comparative handling qualities of the [Spitfire and Zero] and also to check on the welter of information—misinformation and reports concerning these aircraft which had been made available to all pilots before moving to Darwin’.13 The Mitsubishi A6M Reisen Navy Type 0 fighter took part in almost every major action in which the Japanese Naval Air Force participated. It was highly manoeuvrable and had an exceptional range. The Allies codenamed the Reisen ‘Zeke’, but quite early on the Reisen’s official designation was known, and it eventually became better known to the Allies as the Zero, with Zeke and Zero becoming interchangeable. Even Caldwell used both terms to describe this effective fighter. Although Spitfire and Zero were yet to meet in Australian skies, much intelligence had already been gathered by the Allies about the abilities of the Zero and its pilots. Taking advantage of the Zero’s manoeuvrability at lower speeds, Zero pilots favoured dogfighting. Responding to this, the 49th Fighter Group USAAF developed the more successful dive-pass system of attack, whereby height was gained, and a high-speed attack was carried out, after which the pilot was to break away by diving or spiralling out of attacking range, and then climb again for another highspeed attack. The Australians, however, treated the American assessments as suspect to a certain degree. Caldwell, for instance, believed that ‘some of the reports were so imaginative that the pilot making them had obvi108


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ously forgotten that it was a piston-engined, winged aircraft flown by a human about which he wrote and endowed them with the qualities of a humming-bird’.14 Even when information came from one of their own, it was sometimes treated with suspicion. Group Captain Patrick ‘Paddy’ Heffernan, Station Commander RAAF Richmond, recalled ferrying a Beaufighter to Port Moresby. While there, he was able to take advantage of the information gathered by the Americans from a captured intact Zero. On returning to RAAF Richmond, he called the Spitfire pilots together to pass on the information and to warn them that, based on its lower wing loading, the Zero was much more manoeuvrable than the Spitfire, but that a Spitfire could out-climb the Zero. Heffernan recalled that his information was treated with disdain.15 The Wing’s first encounter with the Zero would be an important test of the Spitfire’s effectiveness as a defensive weapon. The weather improved as March opened and Caldwell soon had an opportunity to take his first ‘smack at the Japs’ and to bring his score closer to that of Sailor Malan’s, as well as to assess the relative merits of the Spitfire and Zero. Tuesday 2 March 1943 was a fine day. There was scattered cloud and visibility was fair but hazy and the 54 Squadron diarist considered that the fine weather heralded some ‘exciting doings’.16 Because of the anticipated enemy action the Wing was on readiness, and both Caldwell and Group Captain Walters were on readiness with 54 Squadron. If they were scrambled, Walters was to fly as Caldwell’s No. 2. When the enemy aircraft were first detected, they were about 120 miles north-west of Darwin. Both 54 and 457 squadrons scrambled three minutes later and the twenty-six Spitfires, led by Winco Section, comprising Caldwell and Walters, were instructed to rendezvous at 15 000 feet over Port Patterson. As they approached the rendezvous, the Spitfires had to turn 180 degrees to the east in order to avoid flying directly below the enemy aircraft. If they had continued as originally instructed, they would have been in an ideal position to be jumped by the enemy. The Spitfires then climbed to 26 000 feet and turned south towards the Batchelor–Coomalie area, as it looked as if this might be the target. Coomalie Creek was the home of both 31 (Beaufighter) Squadron and 1 Photo Reconnaissance Unit. Despite assuming that Coomalie was the target, the Japanese aircraft had not actually been sighted and at this point tracking problems meant that their course was not being plotted. 109


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In an attempt to get a visual on the enemy aircraft, the Spitfire sections were sent in various directions. By the time interception was made, however, 457 Squadron’s sections, which had been sent north, were too far away to participate in the action. At 2.34 p.m., four Zeros came in low and strafed Coomalie Creek. Two others dived on the strip from 20 000 feet. As the enemy aircraft headed home, Winco Section and the four aircraft from 54 Squadron’s Red Section were sent to intercept them.There were still problems with the tracking equipment and the intercept directions were relayed from Army gun crews.When Caldwell spotted the enemy aircraft he had been airborne one hour fifteen minutes. His own tanks showed less than 30 gallons which, he thought, would exceed that of the other Spitfires. At combat revs and boost, the Spitfire Mark Vc used petrol at a rate of 70 to 90 gallons per hour. Despite his remit of ‘climbs, dives and turns’ in order to test the capabilities of the Spitfire against the Zero, Caldwell knew that fuel consumption was going to impact on his tactics. Caldwell had only about twenty minutes flying time left, and they were about 40 miles from base. Accordingly, his tactics ‘were governed primarily by [their] pressing shortage of petrol’.17 Caldwell flew his formation 3000 feet directly underneath the enemy No. 3 Section as he knew that this would provide the Japanese pilots with only three options. The Zeros directly above would have to ‘either turn on their back and attack vertically downward, a difficult shot and easily avoided, loop fully, as they are credited with doing so freely, thus coming behind us, or [carry out] a losing-height turn onto our tails’.18 Whatever the Japanese decided to do the Spitfire pilots would have sufficient warning to counter the Japanese manoeuvre. The Spitfires were about 20 miles west-north-west of Point Charles: When abreast of No. 1 Section [enemy aircraft], I dived to attack at a steep angle from full abeam breaking to the rear in a wide climbing turn to port and was followed into the attack by the rest of my formation. The No. 3 Section of the enemy, the top cover, appeared slow to appreciate the significance of the move and failed to get [into] position behind us in time to be dangerous. No. 2 [enemy aircraft] Section moved across to intercept us directly, but were not successful in doing so and the break to the rear gave us enough clear air momentarily to assess the altered position and, at the end of the zoom, I found I was well up in height in relation to the Zekes which had lost height after us.A diving head-on attack was refused by a Zeke which 110


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broke downward before coming to range. This was repeated in the case of another Zeke a few minutes later. I observed several Zekes fire on me and took necessary action, others not seen may have fired, but the shooting was bad, despite liberal use of tracer and the attempts at correcting aim were poor. Engaging in turns with a Zeke at about 260 mph [indicated air speed] and pulling my aircraft as tight as possible, the Zeke did not come dangerously close, until the speed began to drop about the completion of the second turn. Breaking severely downwards to the inside of the turn, I experienced no difficulty in losing the Zeke. My engine cut momentarily in this manoeuvre. I observed Zekes to loop, to half roll and fire whilst on their backs, which, though interesting as a spectacle, seemed profitless in dogfighting.19

The engagement lasted eight minutes and Leading Aircraftman Geoff Sloman, a RAAF clerk in the 54 Squadron orderly room, remembered it well. He had heard the anti-aircraft fire and saw the Spitfires attacking ‘with a vengeance’. Damage to the defenders was limited. 31 Squadron suffered a destroyed Beaufighter and minor injuries to two airmen. Squadron Leader Eric ‘George’ Gibbs, the leader of 54 Squadron’s Red Section, had machine-gun fire hit his Spitfire, which damaged the glycol system and the radiator. Sloman noticed that as well as the bullet holes in the body of his aircraft, Gibbs had one near his headrest and Sloman concluded that he was lucky to get back.20 Caldwell claimed one Zero and one light-bomber destroyed; Gibbs claimed a destroyed Zero; and Pilot Officer Bob Ashby claimed a probable light-bomber. It was later learned that four enemy aircraft failed to return to their base and that the anti-aircraft gunners at Coomalie Creek claimed a hit on a Zero, from which pieces were seen to fly off. As well as the serious business of notching up success against the enemy, this day also saw some amusing incidents. At one stage, Group Captain Walters had an aircraft on his tail. He thought it was a Spitfire and did not pay much attention to it until it started shooting. He warned Caldwell to duck away but when he saw the tracer, he knew he was the target and not Caldwell. When he eventually landed safely, he was inspecting the damage to his aircraft when Caldwell came up to him to give him a serve:‘You silly old so-and-so.You want to look after your own skin instead of worrying about someone else’s!’21 Perhaps this was just over-concern on Caldwell’s part for his Commanding Officer but in watching Caldwell’s tail, Walters was acting as a diligent No. 2. This was not the only amusement of the day. Although 452 Squadron 111


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did not participate in the interception, flying officers Adrian ‘Tim’ Goldsmith and Ross Williams were on readiness at Strauss. They heard that Coomalie Creek strip had been strafed and decided to go and have a look.They hopped into their waiting Spitfires and flew to Coomalie. For a bit of fun, they decided to fly low over the strip. They assumed everyone on the ground would recognise the unique shape of their Spitfires with their squadron markings, but the next thing they knew, personnel were diving into the bushes—they thought that the Japanese had returned for a second attack. Williams and Goldsmith thought it all a bit of fun and returned to Strauss. Williams and Goldsmith may have thought it was a bit of fun, but 31 Squadron’s Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader Charles Read, did not. Before the errant Spitfire pilots knew it, they were parading before the Air Officer Commanding, Air Commodore Francis Bladin. Caldwell was also present and he spoke for the impetuous pilots. He managed to present a balanced view of the situation and the two pilots quietly accepted the lesser punishment of pay book endorsement, rather than the court-martial that had been threatened initially.22 After the ‘amusements’ of the day, Caldwell compiled his Spitfire/ Zero comparison report, and stated that the enemy tactics were ‘unsound and based on false and/or lack of experience’. As a result of this engagement Caldwell concluded that the Spitfire was: a superior aircraft generally, though less manoeuvrable at low speeds. In straight and level flights and in the dive, the Spitfire appears faster. Though the angle of climb of the Zeke is steeper, the actual gaining of height seems the same, the Spitfire going up at a lesser angle but at greater forward speed—an advantage. No difficulty was experienced in keeping height with the Zekes during the combat. I believe that at altitudes above 20 000 feet the Spitfire, in relation to the Zekes is an even more superior aircraft in general performance.23

Caldwell’s report confirmed the earlier assessments of Zero manoeuvrability but because the limited fuel capacity restricted the tactics used by the Spitfires, it could not serve as a full appraisal of the Spitfire’s capabilities against the Zero. Only minimal damage had resulted from the raid and the Spitfires could claim victory in their first clash against the Zero. Caldwell had also scored his first victories against the Japanese—and a double victory, at that. 112


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From the description given by the Spitfire pilots, the 1 Fighter Wing intelligence officer, Flying Officer Alister McLean, determined that the light-bombers were Nakajima B5N, Navy Type 97 carrier attack bombers, code-named Kate. It did not seem as if any bombs were dropped so McLean assumed that, as they had been known to carry extra fuel tanks, they had done so on this occasion. McLean determined that as the Kates did not take any evasive action and because they were escorted by Zeros, they were being used to transport expert observers and/or photographers in order to study the tactics and performance of the Spitfires. It was concluded, therefore, that the Japanese were well and truly aware that the Spitfire had been added to Australia’s arsenal. For those who flew and worked with the Spitfires, however, there was little doubt that the Japanese had long known of their arrival on Australian soil. The Spitfires’ unique shapes would surely have been noted as their pilots carried out practice flights in Laverton, Richmond and Darwin over the preceding months. Jim Grant’s younger brother was visiting his uncle who lived in the Richmond area and he told his older brother, at home on leave, of how he saw the Spitfires while they were flying in the area. In line with the current secrecy provisions, Jim said, ‘No you didn’t.They were Capstans!’24 Caldwell later recalled that the attempts at secrecy were not really successful: You may recall hearing mention of Tokyo Rose announcing the arrival of the Spitfires at Darwin and making the following joke: ‘They call them Capstans. Anyway, whether they’re plain or cork they’ll burn just the same.’ Why, even the newspaper boys in Sydney, of course, like everybody else, well recognised the elliptical wing shape of the Spitfires.25

The Tokyo Rose rumour soon spread and the Government enquired as to whether there had really been a Japanese broadcast referring to Capstans in connection with Australian operations. Department of Information enquiries concluded that ‘although it cannot be stated definitely that no such reference has been made, it is confidently believed that there has been no such reference’.26 The Government may not have been convinced by the Tokyo Rose rumour that the Japanese were aware of the presence of the Spitfires, but Flying Officer McLean’s conclusions regarding the sightseeing Kates on 2 March were readily accepted—the Government would now announce the presence of the Spitfires in Australia, as well as boasting a successful defence. 113


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On 4 March 1943, Prime Minister Curtin announced in hyperbolic terms that Spitfires were in action over Darwin. The announcement was designed to boost Australian morale, and headlines such as ‘Famous Aces Man Spitfires: Strong Addition to Air Power’ and ‘Spitfires Here: Hit Japanese at Darwin’, along with reports that the Members of the House of Representatives cheered at the prime minister’s announcement, did much to achieve this aim.27 Following the announcement, the Department of Air’s Directorate of Public Relations was busy building public confidence in Australia’s Spitfire defence by putting out bulletins relating to the Spitfire pilots. A number of newspaper articles and photos featuring the Spitfires and their pilots followed. Spitfires (although not the Darwin ones) were even used in an aerial display in support of a war loan rally.28 In his announcement, Curtin exaggerated the success of the Spitfire victories, and this, combined with the steady publicity, set the Spitfire Wing up for a mighty fall if anything should go wrong.29 The 2 March raid, the 52nd over the Darwin area, highlighted a number of areas that needed to be addressed and one of the most significant was the deficiencies of the RDF (radar) system. If the enemy forces approached at low-level, they could not be plotted. The higher they approached, the further away they could be plotted. Once a track was plotted, however, it could be easily lost. Even if the raiders came in comparatively high, and then dived for ground strafing or low bombing attacks, the enemy track would be lost immediately. Caldwell and Walters were concerned about the lack of accurate plotting information once the raiders were over land. There was not much they could do about the RDF equipment, but they developed a plan whereby information about the location of enemy raiders could be continually fed to fighter sector control during a defence. Under the plan, each squadron would be required to always have at readiness a half section called Yellow Section. Yellow Section 54 Squadron was to patrol at low altitude between Darwin and Hughes strip, on the alert for low-flying enemy aircraft. Similarly,Yellow Section 452 Squadron was to patrol between Hughes and Batchelor–Coomalie. When they sighted the enemy aircraft, they were to report position, height and track to 5 Fighter Sector Control.They had to tail the enemy force, continually passing on information, which would then be fed to the defenders. Yellow Section 457 Squadron was to fly low to avoid detection, and would be vectored by the Fighter Sector Controller 114


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towards the incoming enemy formation until it actually saw it. They would then follow the formation, passing information to the Controller. In effect, these aircraft were not required for combat, they were to act simply as highly mobile reporting stations. The plan was soon disseminated within the Wing and 5 Fighter Sector Control and effected during the next raid.30 Monday 15 March was a typical bright, almost cloudless day. There was no haze and visibility was excellent. Caldwell was not enjoying the morning. He was at Berrimah receiving medical treatment for some of his old desert wounds. The first plots of enemy raiders were detected at 10.34 a.m. and it was initially thought that they represented another reconnaissance aircraft. It soon appeared as if a full-scale raid was taking place and a message was sent through to Caldwell. He was told that Squadron Leader Ray Thorold-Smith and five other pilots from 452 Squadron had been at Darwin for night flying and five of them were already airborne, returning to Strauss. In a fateful decision, Caldwell instructed Thorold-Smith to take over as Wing Leader, saying that he would join the Wing if he were able. Caldwell sped by car to the RAAF aerodrome. Despite his haste, he only managed to become airborne just as the enemy raiders were unloading their bombs over Darwin. He saw the black smoke from the burning oil storage tanks billowing upwards and, climbing at full throttle and high revs, set a course of 270 degrees from Darwin, hoping to make contact with the raiders on their homeward run. This was not to be and he returned to base. 5 Fighter Sector Control instructed Thorold-Smith to lead the Wing and to rendezvous with the other sections of the Wing over Hughes strip. However, the Wing was badly straggled and rendezvous had not been effected when Thorold-Smith was advised that the enemy was approaching Darwin. Thorold-Smith immediately set course to intercept and climbed rapidly. Despite not having a height advantage it appeared as if he was attempting to break up the bomber formation. Problems arose when two pilots from his section dropped back with oxygen problems and 54 Squadron did not fly the agreed battle formation. Thorold-Smith was shot down and no one took over as leader. All aircraft then operated independently and dogfighting broke out. Some success did result, with six bombers and two fighters shot down. Unfortunately, however, the bombers did get through, dropping about a hundred bombs. Two oil tanks were set on fire and two were damaged, the US Army Headquarters received a direct hit, some other buildings 115


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and workshops were damaged, the railway line received six hits and power and telephone lines were disrupted. Nine military personnel and five civilians were injured and three Spitfire pilots, including ThoroldSmith, were lost. Four Spitfires were destroyed.31 Later that day, Caldwell and other pilots went out to search for Thorold-Smith in the Point Charles area. Caldwell was in the air almost two hours, alert to even a glimpse of an oil slick that would hint at a submerged aircraft or the billowing of parachute silk; perhaps an inflated dinghy, or the remains of the crashed aircraft. But there was no sign.The next day 452 Squadron received a message that an aircraft had been seen crashing after a shallow dive on a bearing of 230 degrees and 8 miles from Flagstaff Hill. Caldwell and three other pilots took off to search the area.Again, the search proved fruitless.Thorold-Smith would not return. The Committee of Adjustment gathered his personal possessions for his family. There was no sign of his monogrammed wallet, which usually contained his prayer book. It was later suggested that perhaps he was carrying it with him during combat. A small comfort to a religious family who had lost their son and brother.32 With the death of Thorold-Smith, Caldwell lost another friend. In a rare tribute—Caldwell did not do this for other friends who were lost—he noted ‘Smithy Killed’ in his flying log. Although ThoroldSmith was younger, they had much in common. They were both good at sport and committed to defeating the enemy. They both had a good sense of humour and joked around together. Jim Grant recalled that ‘Thorold-Smith was a big bloke, outgoing, good-looking, all those things that Clive was too. They got on well.’33 Thorold-Smith had trained with Caldwell at Richmond and Bradfield Park but went to Narromine and Calgary in Canada for his more advanced training. He was posted to England on completion of his training and he joined the newly formed 452 Squadron in mid-1941. He quickly proved a good shot against the Germans and was promoted to Flight Commander in October. Within three months, he had scored six and one shared destroyed and one damaged and was awarded the DFC. In March 1942, he was appointed Commanding Officer and his flying ability was assessed as exceptional. When Caldwell and Thorold-Smith met again at Richmond,ThoroldSmith, speaking for his squadron, commented ‘we think you fly very fast!’ Caldwell responded, with humour, that the Spitfire ‘was made to fly very fast!’34 They quickly renewed their friendship and enjoyed a number of 116


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good, but sometimes painful times over the next few months. Caldwell later recalled that: Whenever we’d come home from a show or a bash, he’d always make a playful dive at me, and I’d always hit the deck. He was half a stone heavier than me, and knew how to use that extra weight. I was weary of being rubbed in the concrete and dirt, I’d lose inches of skin and before it was halfway grown again, he’d take another dive at my legs, and off would come some more skin.35

Thorold-Smith was well liked and his loss was felt by many, and not just within his own squadron. Leading Aircraftman Geoff Sloman believed that his loss was ‘a blow to the Spitfire Wing, as he was an excellent pilot and a popular CO’.36 The 457 Squadron diarist recorded that Thorold-Smith’s loss ‘was a blow to all members of this Squadron’.37 Soon after, Minister for Air Arthur Drakeford announced that he had ‘learned with very deep regret that Squadron Leader Thorold-Smith had failed to return from the interception in which he had been engaged’.38 452 Squadron felt the loss greatly. It had lost a good and fair commander who had led it to victory against the Germans. Pilots like ‘Bluey’ Truscott and ‘Bardie’ Wawn had been posted to other squadrons when Australia recalled many of her Spitfire pilots, but Thorold-Smith stayed with 452 Squadron and led it to Australia. Caldwell appreciated the effect that Thorold-Smith’s death would have on 452 Squadron and decided to take over its command until a new Commanding Officer could be appointed. He moved from RAAF Darwin to Strauss and set about improving the morale of the shattered squadron. Ross Williams believed that it was through Caldwell’s efforts that the Squadron was able to pull together again so quickly and effectively.39 Thorold-Smith’s body was never recovered but his crashed aircraft was identified in 1988. On Tuesday 20 June 1989, a grey and windy day, Caldwell, and other friends and family were given the opportunity to formally farewell Thorold-Smith in a moving memorial and plaque dedication service at Queenscliff in New South Wales.40 Caldwell was responsible for compiling the tactical appreciation, which drew on the collated reports of the participants. Whereas Caldwell was usually known for his forthrightness and his firm opinions, he declared that it was ‘with diffidence’ that he was offering criticisms of the tactics used by Thorold-Smith. Caldwell, advocate of the height 117


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advantage, was of the opinion that the Wing had not properly rendezvoused, the climb was too fast, and the attack was precipitate and made at an obvious disadvantage. He recognised that Thorold-Smith clearly did not have the advantage but he knew that Thorold-Smith was fully aware of how to conduct a successful interception. Perhaps not wanting to appear overly critical of his friend, he speculated on mitigation for Thorold-Smith’s actions: It must be appreciated that no two engagements or all the circumstances surrounding them are the same and the foregoing is a brief generalisation on some first principles only, which must necessarily be varied to meet the conditions presented to the leader at the time and the decisions made rapidly. The situation confronting Squadron Leader Smith might have contained certain aspects not apparent to others which dictated the methods employed.

He also indicated that he held 54 Squadron largely responsible for the unsuccessful interception and perhaps also for Thorold-Smith’s death when he wrote: No. 54 Squadron covering above did not fly the battle formation they have been trained to do . . . and were jumped from out of the sun . . . Also they admit that in addition they were all looking down towards the bombers. Therefore being in trouble themselves they were unable to give the expected cover to Squadron Leader Smith and sections below him.

Later, in a hand-written annotation to this report, Caldwell added that Thorold-Smith ‘was an experience[d] and very able fighter pilot and so must have been convinced of the need to make the attack he did despite being at a clear disadvantage’.41 The rest of March and April proved long, hot and boring for Caldwell and the Wing.There was little enemy activity other than a small number of reconnaissance flights. Group Captain Walters went on leave and Caldwell took command of the Wing. Daily flying was limited to shadow shooting, Army co-operation exercises, and practice, practice, practice. These exercises were limited, however, with time in the air usually restricted to less than an hour. 118


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The pilots soon became bored and restless. The dearth of enemy activity was frequently commented on by 54 Squadron’s diarist and his concluding remarks for April summed up the general feeling of boredom: ‘Today marks the end of an exceedingly dull month from an operational point of view. Whole days have passed without a single incident to help out the diarist.’42 Caldwell could not abide boredom. He needed action. He flew when he could; he played sport and engineered his own amusements when there was nothing else on offer. Peter Quinn, who was in charge of the Wing’s Pontiac utility and Chevrolet truck, recalled that Caldwell would often commandeer one of the vehicles for his own use. ‘He loved to drive and broke all the rules.’43 On other occasions, when the pilots ran out of the clay pigeons that they used for shooting practice, Caldwell would appropriate the less favoured gramophone records and use those instead.When it was obvious that there would not be a raid the next day, Caldwell and his pilots would indulge in some high-spirited drinking and singing sessions.44 It would be almost seven weeks before the lull was interrupted.

119


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EIGHT

The Day the Planes ‘All Fell into the Sea’

Any mention of Spitfires at Darwin usually brings the sort of stupid response, ‘Oh yes, didn’t they get the hell beaten out of them by the Japs’ or ‘they all fell into the sea out of petrol or something’.1 Sunday 2 May 1943 dawned clear and bright with only a breath of wind. The perfect early morning flying conditions were enjoyed by Flying Officer Tim Goldsmith of 452 Squadron, who carried out some shadow shooting practice, and 457 Squadron, which carried out an early morning squadron formation exercise. But the peace of the day was soon interrupted by the sound of sirens heralding the arrival of Japanese bombers and their escort of fighters on their 54th raid over the Darwin area. The Japanese formation had taken off from Penfui airfield near Koepang in Dutch Timor. The first plots were detected by 38 Radar Station at Cape Fourcroy on Bathurst Island at 9.26 a.m. They were very weak and it was initially thought that a single aircraft was on its way. The plots soon became clearer and it became obvious that a heavy formation was approaching. The formation was led by Lieutenant-Commander Suzuki Minoru and comprised twenty-five bombers from the 753rd Kokkutai and twenty-seven Hap and Zero fighters from the 202nd Kokkutai of the 23rd Kokusentai. The Hap closely resembled the Zero, but had square wingtips. The Allied codenamed it after General ‘Hap’ Arnold, who, funnily enough, did not appreciate having a Japanese aircraft as a namesake. The Hap was therefore renamed the Hamp, but this never really caught on. It finally 120


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became known as the Zeke 32 when the Allies realised that the Hap was not a new type of aircraft. Caldwell received the message at 9.40 a.m. that the Wing was to scramble and rendezvous at 10000 feet above Hughes strip. As well as Wing Leader, Caldwell was acting as 452’s leader. Thirty-three Spitfires scrambled: ten from 54 Squadron, eleven from 457 Squadron and twelve from 452 Squadron. Rendezvous was effected after about twenty minutes. 5 Fighter Sector Control advised Caldwell that a formation of twenty or more bombers, escorted by a large number of fighters, was approaching from west-north-west at approximately 20000 feet, and that the target was believed to be Darwin. The Wing turned starboard and climbed rapidly into the sun towards Darwin. When the Wing reached 22000 feet, the Controller informed Caldwell that enemy bombers were near Point Charles, but at about 25000 feet. The Japanese fighters were above the bombers, but the Controller was unable to determine their height. Caldwell turned the Wing to port and continued to climb rapidly with the sun to starboard, with Darwin below on the port beam. When the Wing was about 10 miles north-east of Darwin, at 26000 feet, the enemy bomber formation was sighted above West Point at 10.00 a.m. The bombers crossed the harbour, and when Caldwell saw the escorting fighters above the bombers at 27000 feet, he knew the Wing was not in a position to attack advantageously and advised the controller accordingly. Caldwell assessed that there ‘was nothing on the harbour that mattered, and I saw no reason whatever why we should lose any Spitfires at all, for these reasons of going in with a disadvantage if we didn’t have to’.2 Accordingly, he decided to continue climbing for height, letting the bombers continue on their way, and then attack them on their way out. The Mitsubishi G4M Navy Type 1 attack bombers, code-named Betty, were 26000 feet above the RAAF aerodrome at Darwin when they commenced bombing at 10.15 a.m. Their fighter escort was at 31000 feet. The Spitfire Wing had attained only 30000 feet. About one hundred bombs were dropped on the RAAF side of the railway line and in the scrub on the south side of the road. One fell about 50 yards east of the operations block, resulting in some minor damage; another caused a small crater on the roadway; shrapnel and blast effects caused slight damage to huts and dislocated the electric light pole. Some damage was done to the high tension and reticulation power lines; a 121


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20-foot section of water pipeline was shattered; phone lines were downed and some damage was done to the underground cable. One person was injured. After bomb release, the Japanese turned right. The Spitfire Wing levelled at 32500 feet. It had now attained its maximum advantage and turned west, moving to intercept the Japanese aircraft as they crossed the coast on their way out. The Wing was briefly in a sound formation, until 54 Squadron lost position and dropped astern. As the enemy crossed the coast just east of Point Blaze, 452 and 457 squadrons were well positioned to attack, but 54 Squadron did not close the gap and was still not in a position to participate in the co-ordinated attack that Caldwell had planned. Eight minutes elapsed before 54 Squadron came into position. Once this happened, the attack commenced: 54 Squadron was instructed to attack the fighter cover and 457 Squadron was to attack the bombers with 452 following them, keeping their tails clear and engaging as many fighters as possible as well as covering 457’s withdrawal back up on the sunward side. At about 400 miles an hour, 54 Squadron’s pilots hurtled their Spitfires down in an almost vertical dive. Squadron Leader George Gibbs managed to catch one enemy fighter by surprise and Flying Officer George Farries was the only other from 54 Squadron to claim a destroyed. In total, the Squadron claimed one damaged bomber, two destroyed fighters, one probable fighter and three damaged fighters. Immediately after Gibbs sent his Japanese fighter smoking to the sea, the Japanese formations broke up and dogfighting commenced. As 54 Squadron was diving to attack the fighters, 457 Squadron’s pilot attacked the Bettys.Their angle of their dive was about 70 degrees, with a speed of about 400 miles an hour. The Japanese fighter escort turned to face 457 head-on, successfully diverting its attack. As with 54 Squadron, dogfighting broke out. Squadron Leader Kenneth ‘Ken’ James claimed one fighter destroyed, and one probably destroyed and two damaged aircraft were claimed. No bombers were brought down by 457 Squadron. After 457 Squadron attacked, Caldwell led 452 Squadron into the battle. Diving steeply, he attacked a Zero at close range. He had problems with his cannons, his aircraft slewed starboard and he missed the Zero. He broke up sharply and was attacked by two Zeros, one of which commenced firing. Caldwell dived under them, but another came up behind him, and Pilot Officer Kenneth ‘Ken’ Fox fired upon it until it 122


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turned away.3 Fox then engaged another Zero, but his Spitfire was hit in the engine and he baled out. Flying Officer Goldsmith destroyed a bomber but was then attacked by a Hap. His controls were shot away and he too baled out. Caldwell destroyed a Zero and a Hap and 452 Squadron claimed two probably destroyed Zeros and a damaged Hap. The battle was fought keenly by the Spitfire pilots and the engagement lasted twenty minutes. Caldwell had been airborne for one hour and fifty-five minutes. As the air battle raged, those on the ground followed the action closely, including Leading Aircraftman Geoff Sloman: And there they were . . . in good formation and heading straight for Darwin. Not a Spit in sight and the ack-ack opened up, but was nowhere near the target today . . . Then about 25 past 10 we saw a Spit with glycol simply pouring from it, and a few seconds later the pilot turned [it] on its back and baled out.4 The Spit came circling down and down with its inimitable roar of the motor and crashed nearby. There were a few anxious moments as it looked like landing in our camp.We heard the bombs drop and saw columns of dust towards Darwin. A sudden burst of ack-ack and the crash of bombs made [me] dive for the trench in no slow manner. The aircraft we saw circling low over the ’drome were base cover, and had been airborne only a few minutes when the bombers came over. Interception was made after the bombs had been dropped and we on the ground took a very dim view of this fact. Dogfights continued for a considerable distance out to sea.5

From a Japanese perspective, the raid was a success. They claimed twenty-one shot down and four probables. No losses were acknowledged. The fighters were successful in protecting the bombers, and the bombers reached their target. Although major damage was not done, nuisance value was certainly created. In his Appreciation of Factors Governing Results, Caldwell, giving credit where it was due, stated that ‘the enemy fighters . . . did an excellent escort job and were well and determinedly flown, supporting each other in a manner generally suggestive of experienced and practised pilots used to working together. Their deflection shooting was good on the average.’ 6 From the Wing’s perspective, the engagement was not a success, and that evening a conference was held at Wing Headquarters to discuss the day’s events, the result of which, according to 54 Squadron’s diarist, ‘was not regarded as satisfactory’.7 Caldwell considered that his plan was 123


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initiated successfully but, despite the Wing’s advantage of sun, height and speed, results were not up to expectations. Only nine enemy fighters were engaged by 54 Squadron, four of 457’s aircraft did not penetrate to the bombers and 452 Squadron’s Spitfires were fiercely engaged by Japanese fighters. Although tasked with protecting 457, some of 452 Squadron’s pilots penetrated to the bombers. Ultimately, and despite Japanese records to the contrary, the Wing claimed one bomber destroyed and one damaged. Five fighters were claimed destroyed and eleven fighters were claimed as probables and damaged. On the Wing’s debit side, Flying Officer Alexander McNab of 452 Squadron and Flying Officer Gordon Gifford of 457 Squadron were killed and fourteen Spitfires were destroyed or damaged—of which only three could be directly attributed to enemy action. In his report, Caldwell noted a number of factors which militated against the Wing’s success. As well as Japanese experience and skill, Caldwell listed armament failure and technical faults, the limited experience of a number of the pilots, the tactics used, and the Spitfires’ limited fuel capacity. Although thirty-three pilots scrambled, only twenty-nine engaged. Mechanical problems were experienced almost immediately (in fact, mechanical problems had dogged the Wing since the Spitfires first arrived in Australia). Pilot Officer Norman Robinson of 457 Squadron returned to base owing to engine trouble before engagement.8 The problem was soon solved and Robinson took off as part of the base cover a little later. Flying Officer Mackenzie of 457 Squadron experienced radio failure ten minutes after rendezvous and returned to Livingstone. Sergeant Fox of 54 Squadron crashed with a glycol leak due to over revving, and Sergeant Cavanagh, also of 54 Squadron, crash landed due to engine failure. Both Fox and Cavanagh survived. As well as mechanical problems before engagement, a number of pilots experienced problems which only manifested once the air battle commenced. For example, Flying Officer Ross Stagg of 452 Squadron experienced problems with his propeller constant speed unit, which resulted in engine failure and he had to bale out. Flight Sergeant William ‘Bill’ Hardwick of 457 Squadron experienced a similar problem and baled out over the sea. Both pilots survived. Hardwick and Stagg may not have been the only ones who experienced airscrew problems. After the air battle, Flying Officer Alexander McNab of 452 Squadron had joined up with Flying Officer Ken Barker 124


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and Flight Sergeant Bruce Little, both of 457 Squadron, and they headed home together. Little noted in his combat report that McNab was ‘pointing down into his cockpit as though in trouble’. He then pulled up suddenly, spiralled down and landed on the water. He sank almost immediately. Barker and Little circled around but there was no sign of McNab.9 Flying Officer Gordon Gifford of 457 was also lost at sea after the air battle and the cause was not known.10 There is an interesting footnote to the airscrew issue. When Alex Henshaw, chief test pilot at Supermarine’s Castle Bromwich factory, wrote his memoir, Sigh for a Merlin, he recalled: On some of the tropicalised Spitfires with Rotol airscrews fitted, we had an engine rev problem . . . These airscrews had the pitch range but they suffered with control valve trouble which causes the airscrew to stick in fine pitch if the throttle was snapped back in a steep climb and then snapped open again as the machine dived.This happened to one of my service pilots . . . I had difficulty in getting action from the manufacturers to remedy this defect . . . but in the end they confirmed that all the airscrews would be modified at the maintenance units before delivery to squadrons. Later these same Spitfires were in action against the Japs and flown by Australian pilots and in one action so many Australians were lost that I sincerely hoped to God the airscrews had not been responsible for this disaster.

The Wing’s Spitfires did not have the Rotol airscrews but, even so, when he read this, Clive Caldwell wrote to Henshaw and advised him that a number of aircraft had been lost through engine failure due to excessive revs. Henshaw wrote back and told Caldwell that that information had ‘come as a shock to me for although I suspected something like this may have happened—it was like an evil thought, you pushed it to one side’.11 Mechanical problems and the skill of the Japanese pilots in combating the defenders were not the only reasons why the Spitfire Wing was not overly successful that day.Weaponry problems had plagued the Wing since its arrival in Darwin and were again apparent during Raid 54. Shortly after engagement, Squadron Leader Ron MacDonald of 452 Squadron retired when all of his guns froze and failed to fire. Of the twenty-nine pilots who engaged, sixteen experienced weaponry problems of some description. This included those who were successful in destroying or damaging Japanese aircraft. Of those who claimed 125


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victories, flying officers Farries of 54 Squadron and Blake of 457 Squadron were the only ones who had no weaponry problems at all. The overall combat experience of the Wing’s pilots was just as significant as aircraft problems during the 2 May defence. Caldwell noted that of the ninety-five pilots on strength for the Wing, only thirty-seven had had fighter combat experience prior to coming to the area. Of these, he was of the opinion that only half a dozen could be classed as ‘experienced’, and that only three pilots, including himself, had experience against escorted bombers. When the decision was first made to bring the Spitfire squadrons to Australia from England, the pilots were hailed as being highly experienced. 54 Squadron had had a long and noble history, and both 457 and 452 squadrons had flown in offensive operations over France and Belgium. But a large number of 54 Squadron’s pilots had been posted before the Squadron came to Australia. 452 Squadron had been resting on the Isle of Man since March 1942. Some of its most experienced pilots had been posted and returned to Australia to help form the Australian Kittyhawk squadrons. When the Wing arrived in the North-Western Area in late January 1943, many of the pilots had been out of operations for up to ten months, and for those pilots who had operational experience, most had not had direct fighter to fighter combat. After Raid 54, the squadrons’ intelligence officers made assessments of the defensive experience of those pilots involved in the air battle. Only thirteen of the thirty-three pilots who scrambled were thought to be highly experienced. Eight had no experience in defensive operations. Compounding the limited experience was the fact that a number of experienced pilots were not available because they were either on leave or down south on official business. These included the usual flight commanders of both 54 and 457 squadrons, and Flying Officer John Bisley, an ace of the Malta campaign. As well as the pilots’ experience, the way they engaged in combat militated against success during this raid. One fighter technique favoured by British and Commonwealth pilots with experience in the Middle East and Europe was dogfighting. Pilots such as Caldwell, Goldsmith and Bisley had gained considerable skill and success with this against the Germans. Dogfighting was practised at the operational training units and the Spitfire pilots also included dogfighting in their practice flights between the raids. But as for dogfighting against the Zero, the Spitfire had its limitations, as did every other Western fighter design. 126


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The Spitfire was superior to the Zero in most instances, but it was less manoeuvrable at the low speeds Zero pilots favoured for dogfighting. To gain the advantage against the Zero, the 49th Fighter Group USAAF developed the dive-pass system of attack, whereby height was gained, and a high-speed attack was carried out, after which the pilot was to break away by diving or spiralling out of attacking range, and then climb again for another high speed attack. Unfortunately, the Spitfire pilots had had little opportunity to use the repeated dive-pass attack in battle: during their defence on 2 March 1943 they had been airborne for about one hour and fifty minutes and Caldwell was concerned about shortage of petrol. After Squadron Leader Thorold-Smith’s loss during Raid 53 on 15 March, no-one took over as leader, so all aircraft operated independently and dogfighting broke out. Some success came of independent actions during Raid 53, but the piecemeal method of attack of 15 March was criticised in the raid postmortems because the ‘sections, flights and squadrons intercepted the enemy in “penny packets” with the result that little damage was done and they were heavily out-numbered’.12 Accordingly, for any future defence, Caldwell was ordered to hold for a co-ordinated attack after obtaining maximum advantage. Caldwell initiated the dive-pass attack method during Raid 54, but he delayed the co-ordinated attack. One reason was because 54 Squadron was slow to move into position. This was because Squadron Leader Gibbs thought Caldwell was going to alter his original plan. Caldwell did not, and the attack was delayed some eight minutes before Gibbs followed orders and attacked. But because of this delay, 54 Squadron was in such a position that its pilots had to carry out an almost vertical dive in order to bring the target into view. Gibbs noted that this method of attack was easy to do with a section of aircraft, but ‘exceedingly difficult to accomplish with a squadron of aircraft, line abreast, battle formation’; and ‘this method of attack, being unfamiliar, plus sections’ endeavours to keep position and no doubt excitement (in some pilots’ case, first combat) had a serious effect on their aiming’.13 The 54 Squadron pilots were not the only ones who had problems with the steep attack dive. Flying Officer Evans of 452 Squadron, who was later assessed as having some experience, initially carried out a divepass attack. He was hoping to intercept the bombers but encountered fighters. Although he passed one at great overtaking speed, he found himself in a position to attack a second Zero. He fired, with no visible 127


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results, and then climbed again. Evans saw Flying Officer Mawer, also of 452 Squadron, turning with a Zero but had too much speed to deliver a good attack on that Zero. So he fired on another and claimed a probable. At that point, he broke away and joined in a dogfight. The final aspect that mitigated against success was limited fuel capacity. Dogfighting used fuel quickly as did the dive-pass attack, to the extent that engagements often had to be broken off due to fuel shortage. The Spitfire Mark Vc was a small aircraft with limited fuel capacity. By delaying the attack until the enemy aircraft were on their way home and waiting for 54 Squadron to get in position, Caldwell knew that his pilots would be getting low on petrol.Within ten minutes of engaging, Caldwell warned all pilots to check their fuel and if short, to break away and head for home. He directed them to use low revs and advised the course. The warning was reinforced by 5 Fighter Sector Control on a number of occasions after Caldwell’s initial warning. But fuel was not consumed purely through dogfighting or rapid dive attacks. By waiting until the bombers were on their homeward course, the air battle moved far out over the sea, thus taking the Spitfires further from base. Five Spitfires were either destroyed or severely damaged due to low fuel.A number of aircraft were lost when they ditched.Thankfully, all of the pilots who ended up in the water as a result of running out of fuel were rescued. Geoff Sloman recalled that when they were told that a number of pilots were running short of fuel, they were asked to pray for them as they would have to go down over the sea.14 Despite breaking off because of low fuel supplies, seven pilots, including Caldwell, landed safely. The problems that militated against success for the Wing were serious, and were certainly discussed in great depth over the succeeding days. However, the problems gained heightened significance from the way in which they were reported, initially by General MacArthur’s Headquarters, and then by the Australian media. On 3 May, General MacArthur’s Headquarters provided the press with Communiqué 386, which received almost as much interest as the raid itself. It briefly advised the details of the raid and defence, and concluded with the contentious statement: ‘Our own air losses were heavy.’ Headlines over the next few days included, ‘Heavy Air Losses at Darwin’,‘Spitfire Losses at Darwin’, and ‘Fierce Air Battle Over Darwin: Reverse Suffered by Spitfires’. The Sun opened its article by stating that ‘after a long succession of air victories over Darwin, our Air Forces 128


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suffered a severe reverse’.15 As well as commenting on the air battle, the journalists paid considerable attention to the communiqué itself, with a number of accounts indicating that it was not the custom for MacArthur’s Headquarters (GHQ) to be so frank in revealing setbacks. In its editorial on 4 May entitled ‘The Air Reverse at Darwin’, the Sydney Morning Herald acknowledged the ‘shock of surprise’ at the announcement. Just two months earlier, Prime Minister Curtin had announced with much fanfare that the Spitfires were in action over Darwin. Now it appeared as if the Spitfire pilots had collectively fallen from their pedestal. The Herald summed up the public expectation of a strong and successful defence: There was every reason to believe that latterly, especially with the establishment of Spitfire forces as part of the defensive equipment, the [Darwin] station had become so strong as to make air attacks from the neighbouring islands unprofitable to say the least. The heavy raid on March 15 raised doubts on this score, and misgiving will be increased by the result of Sunday’s engagement.

The Herald called for a strict examination of the defence, as the ‘relative reverse suffered by the Spitfires in the present instance is sufficiently marked and unexpected to call for a strict examination of its causes’.16 In its editorial of 4 May, Sydney’s Sun called for an ‘official inquiry’ into the cause of the loss ‘of a disproportionate number of Spitfires’.17 Overall, media reaction was harsh, and public confidence in the Spitfire defence was shaken. A bit of public relations back-pedalling was required and by 5 May the media had been offered a seemingly plausible excuse for the loss of so many Spitfires. That day’s GHQ Communiqué stated that ‘heavy weather has seriously interfered with all the air activities to the north for the last fortnight’.18 The Argus reported that ‘The bulk of our Spitfire losses . . . were caused not by enemy action, but by a freak of bad weather which caught our planes after the action had been broken off.’19 The Herald noted that General MacArthur’s Headquarters had revealed that the aircraft losses ‘were caused largely by a headwind which caught our fighters far out to sea’.20 But the day was fine and almost still. Ken Fox, who flew with 452 Squadron on the day, later stated that ‘it was a perfect day; the weather had nothing to do with our losses’.21 As far as a headwind was concerned, Caldwell later commented 129


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that ‘the weather on the day was fine. The wind was 5–7 knots from the west-southwest, consequently a tail wind home. What there was of it.’22 The media reports soon reached the Wing, and were not received well. The 54 Squadron diarist, taking umbrage at the erroneous reports of ‘heavy’ losses, wrote that ‘it seems stupid to give the enemy credit, by implication, for a good deal more than they actually achieved’.23 Geoff Sloman thought that it was ‘bad taste of the Americans to publish statements in haste concerning our losses’.24 General Kenney’s assessment was particularly galling: We lost thirteen [sic] Spitfires, seven of which were shot down; three landed at sea from engine failure; and three chased the Japs too far to sea and had to land in the water when they ran out of gas. Just what I had feared had happened. The Aussies had tried to outmanoeuvre the Nip fighters in the air. It couldn’t be done, even with the highly manoeuvrable Spitfire. I sent Bostock to Darwin to talk with the kids and tell them that, if they didn’t stop that dogfighting business, I’d send them to New Guinea to serve with the Americans and learn how to fight a Jap properly. The Aussies who had been fighting the Nips for the past year or so were all sore at the Spit crowd for not taking advice. I guess they had to learn the hard way.25

At some stage, Kenney made his feelings known to Caldwell, who said to Kenney ‘that if they knew more about it, I suggest they get a replacement for me. I’d be happy to go back to the European War. But they didn’t.’26 Air Commodore Bladin noted that the squadrons were not happy with the news reports and thought that the ‘alarmist tendency of the press and radio references was having a bad effect on the combat pilots’. He asked Air Vice-Marshal Bostock to correct the statements.27 On 12 May, the Minister for Air wrote to the Prime Minister concerning MacArthur’s Communiqué. Drakeford pointed out that the announcements were ‘quite inconsistent’ with previous policy and drew Curtin’s attention to the ‘undesirableness of disclosing such information to the enemy, and to the possible adverse reactions of such public announcements on combat generally’.28 Curtin consulted with MacArthur and advised Drakeford of MacArthur’s observations. He stated that important information had not been revealed to the enemy. He also advised that MacArthur had acknowledged that a particular impression may have been gained from the way the losses had been reported, but, ultimately, it was the truth. In 130


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direct contrast to the ‘bad weather’ communiqués, Curtin advised Drakeford that the policy of General Headquarters was to base the communiqués on fact. Curtin finally (and high-mindedly) advised that ‘to follow any other course would do more to undermine the morale of the public and air personnel than to be as frank as possible . . .’29 The Advisory War Council sat on 13 May. Amongst other things, the latest Japanese raid was discussed, and in particular the aircraft losses.The Council decided that Air Vice-Marshal Jones should make a full report of the action. Jones flew to Darwin to gather information and submitted his report to the Council on 3 June. At no stage did he seek Caldwell’s opinion. Jones looked at the Wing’s losses and dealt with Spitfire maintenance and ground organisation. He also considered fuel consumption and the fault in the pitch changing mechanism of the propellers. Jones reported that ‘all equipment is, in fact, in first class condition’. He discovered that it had been maintained as scheduled and additional work had been carried out where specific problems arose. What he did not address, however, was the fact that, more often than not, maintenance staff had to innovate to solve their mechanical problems so that they could keep aircraft serviceable. He found that engine failures were not due to faulty maintenance but to the relative inexperience of the pilots in handling such airscrews under combat conditions, and advised that the pilots had been told how to overcome this problem. As far as the ground organisation was concerned, Jones found that it was all working smoothly, with adequate warning of the raid, speedy scramble, and efficient fighter control. On the problem of fuel consumption, Jones concluded that four of the pilots exceeded their safe range because of their ‘keenness and excitement in combat’ and the ‘adverse wind’. Despite meteorological evidence to the contrary, his blaming the ‘adverse wind’ indicates not only that Jones was swayed by MacArthur’s Communiqué and subsequent media reports, but that he did not actually consult with those who flew that day. Jones also concluded that, in manoeuvring for a favourable position, Caldwell had held his attack for too long, resulting in the Spitfires being drawn further from base.‘In this, the Wing Leader placed too much reliance on individual pilots who, for the most part, were in combat for the first time.’ Jones’ criticism of Caldwell was reiterated later in the report when he stated that ‘the fact that a number of aircraft ran out of fuel can only be attributed to an error of judgment on the part of the Wing Leader, bearing in mind the inexperience of a number of his pilots’.30 131


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In waiting for 54 Squadron to move into position, Caldwell did delay the attack, so, on the face of it, Jones’ criticism of Caldwell’s tactics may be justified. But if Caldwell ordered 457 Squadron to attack the bombers without 54 in position to engage the fighters, there may well have been more Spitfire casualties. Despite the delay in attacking and the subsequent problems with the angle of the dive, 54 Squadron, even with its largely inexperienced pilots, was responsible for two destroyed fighters, a damaged bomber, one probable fighter and three damaged fighters; and no pilots or Spitfires from 457 Squadron were lost to the Japanese. But Jones’ criticism in relation to the number of pilots who ran out of fuel is unjustified. Caldwell and 5 Fighter Sector Control warned the pilots to be watchful of their fuel situation, and to break off if necessary. But the Spitfire pilots were excited and Squadron Leader George Gibbs acknowledged this excitement: after having been warned by Fighter Sector and Winco, [they] have no excuse whatsoever, except that of excitement, and their desire to press home an attack on the enemy; in two cases their first combat. Complete realisation has, it is thought, now been inculcated both by their recent experience and their Squadron Commander’s personal endeavour, that the petrol consumption almost trebles itself in combat.31

Jones also noted that although three belly-tanks were supplied with each aircraft, the supply was insufficient—the tank had to be dropped before engagement commenced, and replacement tanks had to come from the United Kingdom. Despite these problems, Jones would ensure, that, in future, 30-gallon tanks would be carried on all occasions, and a further supply would be obtained. A number of aspects of Jones’ report rankled. Caldwell replied to Jones’ criticism of his actions by claiming that the pilots had been properly directed during the engagements, and if they had obeyed their instructions they would have reached base safely. Caldwell was also angry because Jones did not directly consult him about the Wing’s defence. Throughout his life, Caldwell and others who flew on that day maintained their anger over the way the Wing had been treated after Raid 54. In particular, Caldwell resented Jones’ comments and the fact that Jones did not attempt to support the Spitfire Wing in any way.‘I regret to say that our own Chief of Air Staff [ Jones], without bothering to check the facts . . . abandoned us. And we were disgusted.’32 Towards the end of his life, Caldwell wrote: 132


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Any mention of Spitfires at Darwin usually brings the sort of stupid response,‘Oh yes, didn’t they get the hell beaten out of them by the Japs’ or ‘they all fell into the sea out of petrol or something.’ This is about the measure of appreciation of the efforts of some [ninety-five] young pilots, very few of them really experienced as hardened fighter pilots, a few with a little experience of fighter operations and the others totally unblooded, who were sent to defend the North-Western Area of Australia against a fanatical and well-equipped enemy.33

Misinterpretations continued over the years to fuel that anger. In 1987, in his contentious article about the Spitfires in Australia entitled ‘Debacle’,Vincent Adams-Winter wrote that ‘twenty-three . . . aircraft all came down in the sea after running out of fuel’.34 In his 1988 autobiography, George Jones spoke of his report on the raid and stated that the adverse wind had been a factor in the loss of aircraft and implied that Caldwell’s tactics were at fault.35 One of the more interesting comments came from Flight Lieutenant Bob Foster of 54 Squadron who was on leave when the raid took place. His comments indicate how easily incorrect information can be believed or remembered. Foster had heard about the communiqué which led to the erroneous reports after the event, and commented years later that ‘. . . everyone was a bit upset about it. Because it was badly worded. And I say, I don’t think we were routed by the Japs at all. I’m sure that it was more the weather that was the cause of the trouble.’36 A bit of bad reporting certainly went a long way. Jones may have been critical of Caldwell’s leadership and concerns about the Wing’s defence may have been aired by the press, but, in following the designated strategy, Caldwell put the Wing in the best position to allow for maximum success against the Japanese. Unfortunately, there were a number of factors at play that were not within his control. Caldwell remained confident in his battle strategy and always believed that he had led his Wing appropriately. Group Captain Walters took leave from 24 April and during this time Caldwell commanded the Wing. Walters returned on 11 May and, after a brief handover period, Caldwell was only too delighted to return Walters’ command and head south for his own short period of leave. Because of a persistent skin infection brought on by the uncomfortable heat, Caldwell found shaving difficult and he sported an untidy beard. The true reason for his beard was not generally known and the waggish 133


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1 Fighter Wing diarist, noting Caldwell’s departure, put the beard down to a shortage of razor blades and that he had forgotten to shave it off in his excitement to get away on leave.37 Heading south from Darwin’s isolation was not an easy task. Flying by Douglas C–47 Dakota transport aircraft, it took two days for Caldwell to reach Brisbane, flying via Daly Waters, Cloncurry and Charleville. Tired and crumpled, he was to stay overnight in Brisbane, where he received a ‘meagre welcome’.38 After he arrived at his hotel, he headed towards the public telephones so that he could call Jean and let her know that he had arrived safely. A porter approached him and asked him if he were an Australian and if so, he could not use the public telephones as they were reserved for other officers—American officers. Despite wearing his RAAF uniform with prominent Wing Commander rank, pilot’s wings and medal ribbons, Caldwell was not recognised as an Australian officer. Despite numerous news articles and photos since the 2 May raid, including recent ones where his own personal score was highlighted and he had talked up the attributes of the Spitfire, Caldwell was not recognised. Caldwell refrained from complaining about his ‘welcome’ but no doubt an embarrassed porter and hotel management would soon read of the treatment meted out to the ace RAAF pilot with 241⁄2 victories to his credit—a score which was higher even than any American pilot’s anywhere at the time. Caldwell stayed in Brisbane long enough to connect with a service flight heading south and he arrived in Sydney on 16 May, to a welcome reunion with Jean. Jean was the not only one waiting for him.The newshounds were also there and the couple posed for photos at the hotel at which they were staying. Photos and articles appeared over the next few days and the public soon learned that Caldwell was looking thinner than when he was last in Sydney and that his hair was greying at the temples.39 But Caldwell wanted more than his health reported. He continued his up-beat publicity of both the Spitfire and his Spitfire Wing, in an attempt to counter the negative reports in the wake of Raid 54.‘Zeros are good planes and well-flown, but they are not as good and never will be as good as Spitfires’, he told the eager journalists. He added that ‘Spitfires can dive and climb faster than Zeros’, and graphically described the Japanese bomber that burned ‘beautifully’ and which could still be seen blazing even after it hit the sea.40 He reminded the journalists that ‘although our losses were reported as heavy, actually in combat we defeated the Japs by two to one’.41 134


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* The strain of the last few months was starting to take its toll on Caldwell. The journalists had already noticed that he was thinner and greying around the temples. When action against the Japanese eventuated, his tactics were closely scrutinised, dissected and reported. Caldwell had strength in his convictions and was always convinced that his actions and tactics were appropriate, but, as a committed leader, he felt keenly the mood of his pilots and the initial adverse reaction to Raid 54 angered him. Scrutiny of his tactics, however, was not the only thing that had angered him over the preceding months. There was a personal problem that was just as worrying. Since February 1942, all civilian British subjects over sixteen years of age had been required to register as part of the Manpower Regulations. The services soon benefited considerably from the new regulations as well as recruitment campaigns, but there were gaps in essential civilian employment. Early in 1943, the Manpower Directorate launched an intensive publicity campaign to encourage voluntary transfer to essential employment. In addition to this, many people who were not already in employment or the services were required to update their registration cards. These included childless married women aged between eighteen and thirty-five.At thirty-one, Jean Caldwell fell into this category. While Caldwell was overseas, Jean carried out some private nursing and voluntary secretarial work at the Cootamundra Army Drill Hall. She also helped out on the family property when labour was short and became involved in rural-based charity work. As a former nurse, Jean would have been a perfect candidate for civilian hospitals suffering from a shortage of nurses. Caldwell, however, like many other husbands at the time, totally opposed compulsory employment or military service for his wife. Caldwell was sympathetic to the national needs but, after his sojourn in England, he was only too aware that there was ‘nothing approaching a total war effort’ in Australia. Until there was, ‘I must strongly object’. Caldwell had already noted the ‘weakening of morale and enthusiasm’ of men in his Wing whose wives were similarly affected. Caldwell was deeply concerned about the threat of compulsion and tried to pull strings to ensure that Jean was exempted.42 It soon became apparent that Jean Caldwell would not be compelled into essential work but, rather than a result of Caldwell’s efforts, it is more likely that her non-compulsion was the result of the Government’s reluctance to issue direction orders. In 1943, an election year, direction 135


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orders across all categories averaged only 290 per month. Married women with dependants and other family responsibilities were exempt and, for the main part, other married women were not directed unless special circumstances prevailed. Eventually, Caldwell was able to lay his concern aside. Jean continued with her self-appointed duties and, when Caldwell was posted to Mildura later that year, she was able to remain nearby to offer him her continued support and love as a respite from his war responsibilities. Caldwell returned to Darwin on 29 May. His skin condition had cleared and his now beardless state was commented upon by the 1 Fighter Wing diarist who put it down to a ‘surplus of razor blades down south or ——’.43 The alternative was unspecified but no doubt referred to a wife who preferred a clean-shaven escort. The month of June proved itself continually fine and hot and Caldwell flew as often as possible but, as in the preceding months, this was mainly training and test flights. These, however, were soon curtailed as the Spitfires were fast demonstrating wear and their engines required major overhauls. Replacement parts were still in short supply so, as the month wore on, aircraft use was largely restricted to essential training and tests. Caldwell’s skin condition may have cleared, but he was experiencing a condition much more insidious. He was becoming bored with this posting. He thrived on battle conditions and in Australia he was not getting enough combat. Compared with the desert, Darwin was deathly boring: ‘The only thing wrong with combat in Australia is there is not enough action.’44

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NINE

Australia’s Highest Scoring Fighter Ace

I remember this particular occasion for the failed good intent, those sinister shapes homing on the bodies in that lonely sea, and the easy prize which proved to be my last ‘confirmed’ of the War.1 On 17 June 1943 1 Fighter Wing scrambled to intercept a Japanese Dinah reconnaissance aircraft that flew above the range of the antiaircraft guns. The Spitfires did not make contact, but two days later Japanese radio traffic indicated a build-up of enemy aircraft at Koepang. It was anticipated that an air-raid would occur the next day.2 The Wing was placed on alert and when the sirens sounded, Caldwell and his team were ready. Sunday 20 June was a typical Darwin ‘dry’ day: hot, relatively still, cloudless and with maximum visibility. When the alert sounded for the 55th raid over the Darwin area, Caldwell and forty-five other pilots took off in Spitfires which, following Jones’ report on the Raid 54 defence, had been newly fitted with auxiliary belly-tanks.As well as Wing Leader, Caldwell was acting as 457’s leader.After seventeen minutes in the air he experienced total radio failure. He moved over towards 457’s deputy leader, Flight Lieutenant Peter Watson, and opened his hood. By waggling his wings and pointing to his transmitter, he indicated that his radio was unserviceable and that he wanted Watson to take control of the Wing. Watson understood, so Caldwell then moved towards the back of Red section and continued with the formation. Although Caldwell had indicated that he wished Watson to take the lead, he was not able to 137


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communicate this to 5 Fighter Sector Control. When the Controller could not raise Caldwell over the radio he ordered Squadron Leader Gibbs to take the lead. Shortly afterwards, Gibbs suffered airscrew problems and had to return to base. As a proper Wing rendezvous had not been effected, Watson suggested that the squadrons operate individually. The squadrons climbed in a northerly direction to heights varying from 28000 to 29500 feet. 54 Squadron sighted the enemy at 27000 feet near the Roman Catholic Mission at Bathurst Island. The Spitfires adopted battle formation, the long-range tanks were jettisoned and 452 and 54 squadrons attacked simultaneously, but 457 did not sight the enemy until after it had turned towards Darwin. Caldwell reported that: The first indication I had [of] enemy aircraft in the area was when the aircraft of No. 457 Squadron, then south west of Darwin, turned to port and attacked. I did not then observe the enemy aircraft but seeing [anti-aircraft] fire, dived, following at the tail end, but on seeing the bombers, found that I was not in a position to attack and did not fire. I zoomed back to the sunward side of the formation and climbed. When in a favourable position on the up-sun side of the bombers I again failed to locate them, but subsequently observed them heading towards Bynoe Bay. At this time my height was 21000 feet. As I was crossing to make an attack on the starboard beam of the bombers several Zekes passed above, below and on either side of me. I took immediate violent evasive action and broke round and climbed steeply into [the] sun. Shortly afterwards I dived to attack one of the fighters but was turned into by two others from head-on; taking a fleeting shot at one aircraft which passed under me. I did not observe any results. I made several other attempts to attack these fighters but on each occasion my attempt was aborted by other Zekes turning in towards me. I climbed above and finally made an attack from out of [the] sun on a fighter below me. I fired a 21⁄2 second burst with both guns and cannon from very close range. During the attack both my cannons ceased firing. I then broke upward into [the] sun and observed this fighter descending out of control and subsequently saw it strike the water . . .3

Caldwell claimed the Zero destroyed and also noted in his flying log a probable Betty. Previous raids had been carried out by Japanese Navy aircraft but this raid had been made by the Japanese Army Air Force and there was some 138


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confusion as to what bombers were used by the Japanese, with varying reports from the Spitfire pilots and other witnesses.4 In addition, opinions varied about the exact number of the bombers. Japanese sources indicate that the first enemy incursion, originating from Koepang, comprised twenty-two Nakajima Ki 43–11 Army Type 1 fighter Hayabusas, code-named Oscar, of the 59th Sentai escorting 18 Mitsubishi Ki 21 Army Type 97 heavy bombers, code-named Sally, of the 61st Sentai. Later that morning, another formation dropped its bombs on and strafed Darwin airfield and Winnellie. These nine Kawasaki Ki–48 Army Type 99 two-engined light bombers, codenamed Lily, of the 75th Sentai had flown the entire distance from Lautem at below 1000 feet so that they would not be detected by radar. Despite encountering the enemy as they approached the coast, rather than on the way out as in past raids, a number of Japanese bombers from the first wave made it through the defence and dropped their bombs, causing some damage. In the first bombing run, three soldiers were killed and eleven were wounded. All bombers of the second wave made it through the defence. Pilot Officers Willie ‘Bill’ Nichterlein and Anthony ‘Tony’ Ruskin-Rowe, both of 452 Squadron, were killed and their Spitfires destroyed.5 One other Spitfire was severely damaged. Several other aircraft were damaged by machine-gun fire but all were repairable. Despite this, the Wing had a successful morning. Nine bombers were destroyed and eight damaged, and five fighters were destroyed with two damaged. To date, this was the RAAF’s most successful encounter over the Darwin area, and it was lauded as a success. Headlines such as The Sun’s ‘Japs Smashed Over Darwin: 12 Planes Down, 10 Crippled’ and the Sydney Morning Herald’s ‘Japanese Rout in Darwin Raid. Spitfires’ Big Tally’6 did much to allay earlier concerns about the ability of the Spitfires to defend Australia. The Spitfire Wing was once again the darling of the Australian press, and public confidence was on the rise. As well as a significant success for the Wing, Raid 55 was important for Caldwell. The fighter that he shot down was his fifth over Darwin. He had achieved ace status in the Middle East and he was now an ace of the Pacific War. He had become an ace five times over and an ace in two different theatres of war. This was a unique achievement for an Australian pilot. Caldwell still may have been behind Sailor Malan, but at 251⁄2 victories he was, by a clear margin, Australia’s highest scorer, and would remain so. Caldwell was still peeved by MacArthur’s attitude 139


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towards his defence during Raid 54 and would not accept MacArthur’s telegram of congratulation after this raid,7 but he was delighted to accept Air Commodore Bladin’s message congratulating all concerned in ‘yesterday’s decisive win’ and himself personally for ‘notching his QUARTER’.8 Bladin was not the only one pleased with Caldwell’s actions that day. Group Captain Walters used this day’s victory and the quarter-century score as the basis for his glowing recommendation for Caldwell’s Distinguished Service Order. He praised Caldwell both as a leader of skill and fine example and highlighted his personal achievements as a fighter pilot: Wing Commander Caldwell has flown over 475 active operational flying hours and has carried out over 300 operational sorties. His personal score of enemy aircraft destroyed has now passed twenty-five, five of which are Japanese shot down since his return to Australia. His courage, determination, skill and his undoubtedly outstanding ability as a leader are an inspiration to his Wing and worthy of the highest praise.9

Walters may have been impressed with Caldwell’s leadership and fighting skills, but not all were. In 1945, Walters suggested that Caldwell look at his own confidential file. There Caldwell found a statement by Air Vice-Marshal George Jones which exacerbated the increasing bitterness that Caldwell felt for Jones. Jones had annotated Walters’ recommendation for Caldwell’s DSO with the comment, ‘This officer is an Empire Air Trainee and as such is considered already sufficiently decorated and is to receive none more regardless of further service.’10 Caldwell took this as a personal insult, and as an insult to all Empire Air Trainees. He never forgave Jones for it. Caldwell may have scored his quarter-century during Raid 55, but he was not alone in achievements. Group Captain Walters had scored his first victory against the enemy. Walters was pleased with his effort but Caldwell warned him not to get too carried away with his success as he believed that both his victory and the fact that he had been flying into combat would be frowned upon by many in the RAAF.11 At that stage it was not known that Walters’ posting south was in train and when Walters was notified of it a few days after the raid, Caldwell was convinced that there was a link between Walters’ victory and his posting. 140


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Before Walters flew south to take command of 5 Service Flying Training School in Uranquinty, he endorsed Caldwell’s flying log that Caldwell had ‘demonstrated outstanding ability as Wing Leader and individually as a fighter pilot. Has at present over 25 confirmed victories to his credit.’ Caldwell was well-pleased with Walters’ opinion of him, but his overall opinion of RAAF commanders was not high and Caldwell felt restricted in an environment where innovation, imagination and flexibility were not encouraged. To him, however, Walters was an exception. He thought that Walters commanded the Wing well and fairly. He admired Walters and liked him, too. Caldwell knew that he was losing a good commander but it had not occurred to him initially to ask who was going to replace Walters.When Walters asked him if he wanted to know the replacement, he replied that he did not care.As long as he was allowed to lead it, it was of no concern to him. Walters then announced that Caldwell was to command the Wing. Caldwell declared that he was not going to do ‘secretary work like that, running round like a clerk’s job . . .’12 But the decision was made, and Caldwell was to command. Walters was a well-regarded Commanding Officer, and the 54 Squadron diarist summed up the entire Wing’s feelings when he wrote that ‘to the great regret of the Wing, Group Captain Walters, the CO, is leaving tomorrow on posting to the south’.13 Caldwell was appointed temporary Commanding Officer on 24 June 1943, the day that Walters left the area. He carried out his new duties as commander but, in contrast with his new duties as CO of 112 Squadron, he did not settle to the ‘the desk side of it’.14 He now objected to the added paperwork and administrative duties and appointed someone else to look after the administration. Now, he saw that his main duties were as a fighter pilot and Wing Leader. As June came to a close, enemy activity increased. It appeared as if the combat dry was over. Two days before Walters was posted south, the Wing scrambled to meet an incoming Japanese force. Caldwell thought that the Spitfires were in a good position but, even so, no interception was made as the enemy aircraft turned back west of Bathurst Island.The Wing continued on readiness as it anticipated that a raid would occur soon. After its failed raid on 22 June, the 59th Sentai of the Japanese Army Air Force was transferred to New Guinea.Any further raids would again be initiated by the Japanese Naval Air Force and a small one took place on the morning of 28 June. 141


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Nine bombers, escorted by nine fighters, were 150 miles north-west of Darwin when they were detected by radar. Forty-two Spitfires took off, led by Caldwell. 1 Fighter Wing turned to intercept the bombers over Darwin, and as it passed over Darwin Caldwell observed antiaircraft fire aimed at the bombers. Almost immediately it began to burst in front of and beside the Spitfires. Caldwell requested that 5 Fighter Sector Control contact the gunners and ask that they desist as their fire would interfere with the Wing’s attack. Caldwell then instructed 452 to attack the bombers, 457 to attack the fighters and 54 Squadron to make a second attack on the bombers: At this stage the enemy aircraft appeared to turn away to starboard over the harbour on to the west and fly away on that course.The Wing proceeded to lose height with the intention of attacking: 452 and 457 squadrons proceeding as instructed.At this point fighters were observed above and in the sun on our starboard rear quarter and I turned with 54 Squadron to engage these fighters. Coming from the sun it was very difficult to determine their exact type other than they were fighters and four or five in number. When on the point of opening fire from head-on I observed that my target was a Spitfire and I was warned by another member not to fire as his was also a Spitfire. These Spitfires passed us going in the opposite direction and I then turned to port and flying west and losing height, attempted to over-take the enemy formation with view to attacking it. Flying on vectors and information received from Control . . . and from Yellow Section, I continued with a section of four aircraft at heights in excess of 20000 feet to a point some forty to fifty miles NW of Cape Fourcroy on a line passing twenty [to] twenty-five miles west of it, but without sighting any enemy aircraft.15

Ultimately, only 457 Squadron was able to engage the enemy. Four fighters were destroyed and two bombers probably destroyed. Although Caldwell’s combat report indicates that he did not encounter the enemy, he noted in his flying log a probable Betty and he was credited with this as a destroyed in the 1 Fighter Wing Operations Record Book. This claim was not officially recognised. One Spitfire was destroyed as a result of a force-landing but the pilot was not hurt. The bombers dropped their bombs but little damage resulted. During May and June, US Fifth Air Force had been moving its B–24 Liberator bombers into the Northern Territory. The Liberators were 142


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used for targets deep in Japanese occupied territories, as well as ones closer to Australia, such as at Penfui in Dutch Timor. During June the newly arrived Liberators had carried out fifty operations against the Japanese.The Japanese had sent a reconnaissance aircraft over on 27 June and it had focussed on the Fenton area where the Liberators were based. On 30 June, twenty-seven Betty bombers and their escort of twenty Zeros and Haps targeted the Liberators at Fenton. Thirty-eight Spitfires were ordered to intercept. Caldwell led 457 Squadron and the Wing rendezvoused without delay over Sattler. 457 Squadron was in the centre of the Wing formation, 452 on the starboard and 54 on the port side. The Wing changed course a number of times in order to intercept the approaching enemy force. Finally, when the Wing was positioned onto a parallel course up-sun, above and abreast of the bombers, Caldwell directed 54 Squadron to attack the bombers from ahead on the front quarter. Initially, 452 was to engage the fighter escort and, if that was successful, turn its attention to the bombers. Caldwell, leading 457 Squadron, would attack the bombers from the port front-quarter. The squadron leaders indicated that Caldwell’s directions were understood and that they were ready and in position to attack. The Wing had the advantage of height with the sun behind, so Caldwell gave the order to attack. The first to attack was 54 Squadron. Shortly after, on the port side of the bomber formation, Caldwell turned over slowly to starboard and dived from head-on at the bomber on the extreme left of the enemy formation: I opened fire at about 600 yards retaining my deflection by depressing my nose steeply. My cannon stopped firing shortly after I opened fire and for the remainder of my subsequent engagements the fault remained unrectified. I broke down past this bomber to starboard. Whilst in the process of diving to attack I observed one Zeke turn towards me diving on my port side. I did not see him fire but observed intense return fire from the enemy bomber formation. Before opening fire with my guns I pressed the cameragun button for photographic purposes. I saw flashes on the port side of the bomber which I attacked between the wing roots and engine but it was difficult to distinguish the number and severity of strikes as most of the return fire was coming from this region.As I broke away below and to starboard I was attacked from behind from the rear quarter by a Zeke with a white spinner and jet black cowling which was visible in my rear vision mirror. A considerable amount of tracer and fire . . . passed me; this was 143


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apparently from the bombers. I jinked under the fire, pulled steeply round in a right hand turn and moved back in a left hand climbing turn into sun, regaining height above the bombers some three miles distant above on the up-sun side. I then turned and flew parallel until again in front of the bombers and came in for a second attack diving and opening fire from underneath the wing on the port side of a bomber in the leading formation whilst I was still climbing. At this stage my machine guns only were functioning and though I closed to approximately ten yards before breaking I did not observe the result. As I broke away and turned to climb into sun I came up below a Zeke which was turning and climbing after a Spitfire. I opened fire at about 250 yards range and the Zeke broke upwards, to starboard and over whereupon I pulled over and dived after it, firing a 2⁄3 seconds burst from about 300 yards range. I pulled sharply away to starboard as avoiding action in anticipation of being attacked and swung to port to observe the action of this fighter. I continued to dive after it and when at about 5000 feet it began to emit a trail of white smoke which continued until it struck the ground and burst into flames. Regaining height I observed another fighter at 15000 feet and turning across to meet him my approach must have been observed as he turned and dived steeply away towards the coast; I could not recognise it. I was unable to make further contact with the bombers though I could see them in the distance flying on a westerly course. I regained height to 20000 feet in pursuit—they were then flying at about this height or slightly lower—but was unable to overtake them.16

Caldwell was credited with a damaged Betty and a destroyed Zero. His score was now 261⁄2 destroyed. In total, the Wing accounted for four bombers destroyed, four probably destroyed and five damaged bombers, as well as three fighters destroyed and one damaged. The Wing itself did not go unscathed. Pilot Officer James ‘Jimmy’ Wellsman of 54 Squadron and Flying Officer William ‘Jack’ Lamerton of 452 Squadron were killed and, in addition to their two destroyed Spitfires, five other Spitfires were destroyed.17 The Wing’s success against the enemy force on this occasion belied a number of problems. Although the squadron leaders had indicated that they understood Caldwell’s instructions, it soon became obvious that 452 Squadron had misunderstood when it attacked the bombers without first engaging the fighters. The result of this was that the Spitfires themselves became the subject of a well-coordinated attack by the 144


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enemy fighters. Many of the Spitfire pilots were then engaged exclusively by the enemy fighters and were not able to press home further attacks on the main bomber formation. Squadron and section cohesion was also lost. Another problem with the defence was that the attacks by the three squadrons concentrated on the port extremity of the bomber formation and many pilots actually attacked the same aircraft. This meant that the enemy’s centre and starboard formations were neglected. Some of the bombers made it through to Fenton, where a number of aircraft were destroyed or damaged. Two men were injured on the ground and there was also some damage to equipment and installations. The Wing’s defence had suffered as a consequence of the deteriorating condition of the Spitfires. As with Raid 54, engine malfunctions accounted for some of the Spitfire problems, with one being destroyed due to a severe glycol leak after engagement and two aircraft forcelanding due to glycol leaks. In addition, many instances of weaponry failure were evident. Caldwell noted in his combat report that the Wing was ‘being severely handicapped because of the reduced rate of climb, ultimate height, and speed at all heights which is attributed to a considerable loss in efficiency in a number of aircraft which are operating with worn engines’.18 For some time, 1 Fighter Wing had been making demands for replacement aircraft, and engineering officers were seriously worried about the availability of replacements as there had been rumours that there were too few aircraft available to make up for the Wing’s losses. By the end of June, the Wing’s strength was at low level and Air Commodore Bladin signalled Air Vice-Marshal Jones asking for an immediate delivery of twenty-two aircraft and a number of replacement engines. Deliveries were promised. In all, June 1943 proved to be the busiest month for 1 Fighter Wing and the Wing diarist recorded that it had been the most successful month since formation. The relative frequency of combat resulted in increased morale and combat effectiveness of the pilots, as well as increased morale of the ground staff ‘who look forward to [the raids] and go to work heartily in anticipation of them’.19 Despite the frustration of ageing aircraft, mistaken identities and misunderstood directions, Caldwell continued to prove himself an able defender. The heightened enemy activity in the last days of June did not foreshadow an active July.Two reconnaissance aircraft were sent over in early 145


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July and the 58th raid was mounted by the Japanese on 6 July. This raid proved to be the last Japanese raid in strength over Darwin. Caldwell was again flying with 457 Squadron, and his tactics in this defence were different in that he initially relied on 452 and 54 squadrons to attack the bombers and fighters, while he held 457 in reserve in order to observe the results of their engagement, thus enabling him to take advantage of opportunities as they arose. Despite the limitations of worn aircraft, 452 and 54 squadrons were successful in stopping a number of bombers from attacking Fenton. Some bombers, however, did get through and pattern-bombed the Liberator dispersal area. Caldwell then ordered two sections of 457 Squadron to attack. He maintained his watching brief and followed the bombers as they returned to the coast. When they crossed Cape Ford, losing height to about 15000 feet, Caldwell attacked from head-on one bomber that was flying below and in front of the main formation. Then, pulling up, he engaged one of the escorting fighters. He did not observe any damage as a result of these attacks. He was not able to press the attack as two more fighters turned on to him and he had to take evasive action by breaking below and behind. Caldwell’s oxygen had been exhausted for some time and he had begun to feel the effects so he returned to RAAF Darwin. He had been airborne for almost 21⁄2 hours and his fuel was fast running out. Squadron losses were heavy, with the worn and ageing engines again taking their toll on both pilots and aircraft. Despite this, the Wing accounted for eight destroyed, two probably destroyed and three damaged of the twenty-seven bombers that flew over the area. In addition, two fighters were destroyed. Bladin again signalled south demanding an immediate delivery of the outstanding Spitfires. The first replacements arrived on 10 July and the 54 Squadron diarist commented wryly that it was ‘not before time, as what with losses and worn out aircraft, it is as much as we can do to raise a flight, let alone a Squadron just now’.20 Some false alarms, a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft (which was duly shot down by Squadron Leader Ken James of 457 Squadron), and a number of training flights were the only opportunities for Caldwell to fly during July. After the fourth false alarm and the resultant Wing scramble on 25 July, Caldwell noted in his flying log that 5 Fighter Sector Control was ‘getting very grumpy’. The lack of combat and personal flying time was just as annoying and frustrating to him, and the comment could quite easily have applied to himself. 146


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With little flying taking place in July and early August, the squadrons devoted much time to sport. A number of tournaments were held and events were enthusiastically contested. On Friday 30 July, Caldwell invited Flight Lieutenant Frederick ‘George’ Hardwick and Leading Aircraftman Jack Brander (who had fought the ‘Alabama Kid’ and KO’d welterweight champions Ron McLaughlin and Hockey Bennell) to put on an exhibition boxing match. George Hardwick was a respectable amateur boxer, boxing for the University of Sydney before the war. Like Caldwell, he had also boxed under an assumed name so as not to affect his amateur status. Hardwick recalled they ‘turned on a pretty good show’ and the exhibition was one of the best sporting days he had ever had. After the match, Caldwell invited the pugilists to his tent, hosting them to gin and squash, and they talked of their shared interest in sport and boxing until late into the night. When the conversation turned to their war experiences, Caldwell shared something of his overseas combat success and also spoke of his determination to defend against the Japanese. Caldwell greatly impressed Hardwick.‘A wonderful man he is, one of the really great, an inspiration to all under him and his tenacity and courage is proverbial here . . . his experiences are marvellous.’21 The sporting theme continued into August and a gala sports day was held on 11 August. Although Caldwell was acting as judge for a number of events, his men insisted that he participate. Wearing his flying boots, Caldwell obliged by joining in and claiming the honours in the high jump, clearing the bar at 4 feet 8 inches. Although not a world record— as would be expected if you took the jump in flying boots—Caldwell was later reported as facetiously considering that this was his ‘chief pride’, even over and above his victory score.22 When not involved in sporting events, Caldwell filled his non-flying time playing host to official visitors, such as RAAF public relations staff, Wing Commander Charlton, the senior intelligence officer of RAAF Command,Air Vice-Marshal Anderson, Group Captain Grice and Wing Commander Peter Jeffrey. On a number of occasions, Caldwell and the Wing intelligence officer, Flight Lieutenant Frank Quinn, delivered several lectures at the Catholic Services’ Club in Darwin. They proved immensely popular and when Caldwell delivered his ‘Spitfires Over Darwin’ lecture the club was filled to capacity an hour before the set starting time. The crowd continued to build and spread outside so a platform was improvised on the club’s sports ground so that those 147


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outside could also hear Caldwell speak. Caldwell was running late so British correspondent Bill Courtenay entertained the waiting troops with coloured cinema films that had been taken of his recent travels throughout Australia. When Caldwell arrived, he was given a great ovation and ‘in his own inimitable way he gave his admiring audience a vivid description of a fighter pilot’s activity defending Darwin’.23 The Sun sent a journalist and ‘special photographer’ to the Darwin area in August to record the activities of the Wing. The photographer took a number of shots of Caldwell and his ground staff and one was run with the headline ‘Ace Holds Attention’. It was captioned that he is the ‘subject of hero worship by his ground staff as he relates details of a flight from which he has just returned’.24 Sergeant James ‘Jim’ Grant was one of the photographed ground staff, and although he will not deny that there was a certain amount of hero worship from ground staff, his recollection of the photo session is a little different from The Sun’s depiction. As the supervisor of the team that serviced the instruments for 457 Squadron’s A Flight, Grant’s encounters with Caldwell were infrequent and, on this particular day, there was no real need for Grant and Caldwell to be in the same general area. The photo shoot was a publicity exercise pure and simple—Grant believed that it had been set up by the newspaper, perhaps as a boost to recruitment or morale. Although Caldwell hadn’t ‘just returned’ from a flight, he obliged the photographers by kitting up in his flying gear. There was a general call for bods to appear in the photo. Most, including Grant, made themselves scarce. But then it occurred to Grant that his family down south would probably see the article, and if he were in the photo, they would know he was all right. So he emerged from his hiding place and appeared in the shot.This thought also occurred to the other ‘admiring’ ground staff so they too emerged from hiding and presented themselves as a motley crew garbed in an assorted array of boiler suits, shorts and swimming trunks.25 On 17 August, which the Wing diarist recorded as ‘a memorable day for the Area’,26 the Japanese 70th Direct Control Squadron sent over three separate Dinah reconnaissance aircraft, all of which were shot down by 457 Squadron. Later that day, the 202 Naval Squadron sent over one of its own Dinahs on a separate reconnaissance operation.27 It did not know about the Army’s reconnaissance attempts and, as such, was unaware of the fate of those other Dinahs. Caldwell was having afternoon tea with 452 Squadron when he was scrambled. Flight Sergeant Paul ‘Paddy’ Padula was his No. 2. 148


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Caldwell was at 32 000 feet at a point between Darwin and Gunn Point when the controller advised that the Dinah was just entering the anti-aircraft area at Darwin and was heading west. Initially, Caldwell could not see the Dinah so he asked the guns to open fire. Caldwell was certain that ‘they’d never hit him . . . but you’ll see the puffs behind him. Sure enough, there’s about eight or ten big black bursts of the 4 × .50s and . . . there he is out in front of them, going for his life.’28 At this stage, the Dinah was at about 26000 feet and flying straight, level and very fast. Losing height towards the Dinah, Caldwell overtook it about 20 miles from the coast. He opened fire at 200 yards with all of his guns, and he closed to within 50 yards. He observed strikes on the port side of the Dinah’s fuselage, the starboard engine and the tail unit. The starboard engine and fuselage immediately caught fire and some pieces of debris hit his own aircraft. Caldwell could have easily finished the Dinah off—it was an easy target—but rather than take it himself he thought of Padula who, despite some opportunities, ‘had not as much so far as put a dent in an enemy aircraft’. He remembered the encouraging effect of his own first score and ‘thought it might perhaps be worth more overall were he to get his first one now’.29 Over the radio, he told Padula that he would lead in to below and behind the Dinah and pull aside for Padula to take the shot. Padula did so, but missed. Caldwell told Padula to open fire again—they would both shoot at the same time, get a picture of the hit aircraft and claim a half share each. But by this stage, Padula could not see the Dinah. Pulling back in behind the Dinah, Caldwell opened fire from 100 yards range and the port engine was set on fire. Caldwell saw pieces of fuselage flying from it. The Dinah: . . . continued to fly on his course but there were signs of difficulty in maintaining control. I flew behind it for several miles; it was now burning at three points and trailing white smoke. Height at this juncture was 24000 feet. Pulling behind the [enemy aircraft], I opened fire again from about 200 yards in a rear quarter attack. This attack was made for practice purposes and I was certain that it was only a matter of time before the [enemy aircraft] would be completely burnt. From the attack I observed strikes on the starboard wing and fuselage and from the wing root back. A fourth attack was made with machine gun only and I observed tracer entering the port side of the fuselage, following which the [enemy aircraft] staggered badly and lost 3000 feet of height and recovered. I pulled out and flew in a 149


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position 400 yards to starboard to watch [the] final results. Shortly afterwards the [enemy aircraft] again began losing height, first gradually and then steeply until I was obliged to dive at 360 mph [indicated air speed] in order to retain my position abreast of the [enemy aircraft]. During my descent I was losing height at the rate of 7000 feet per minute. The [enemy aircraft] appeared to make an attempt to level out momentarily and hit the water at a point 20 miles due west of Cape Fourcroy. I photographed the splash with my camera-gun . . .30

The Dinah was piloted by Sergeant Tomihiko Tanaka, the observer was Sergeant Shinji Kawahara and it carried an extra passenger. When the aircraft crashed into the sea, Caldwell circled over the debris and observed: three bodies in the water, two of which had partially opened parachutes attached. In the water I observed what appeared to be a partially inflated dinghy. I attempted to photograph this. One body was that of a large man in a black flying suit and helmet; he was lying spread-eagled on top of the water, face upward and I gained the impression that he was still alive.31

Caldwell advised 5 Fighter Sector Control of the possible survivor and continued to circle the bodies and wreckage at about 30 feet. But then he saw the first sharks appear and he felt the Merlin engine run less smoothly. ‘Was there a patron saint of fighter pilots? If so, I didn’t know his name. I muttered a quick prayer, addressed it to whom it might concern, and set off for Strauss.’ He always remembered this occasion ‘for the failed good intent, those sinister shapes homing on the bodies in that lonely sea, and the easy prize which proved to be my last “confirmed” of the War’.32 This ‘easy prize’ took Caldwell’s official wartime score to 271⁄2. There was much celebration that night as Caldwell and the Spitfire boys recalled the day’s efforts. The general public later shared in their jubilation when a Department of Information photo of ‘members of a Spitfire Squadron in Darwin drink[ing] to the continuation of their success’ was distributed to the press.33 Air Commodore Bladin sent his congratulations ‘on your 100 per cent de-lousing Fenton.Appreciate the pageant.’34 After successfully accounting for all four reconnaissance aircraft on 17 August, the night raid of 20/21 August was an anticlimax for both the Wing and Caldwell. Despite the half moon and hazy conditions, which 150


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gave much trouble to the enemy pilots as they attempted to locate their targets, bombs were dropped in the Fenton, Pell and Coomalie areas. Although he was airborne for one hour and fifty minutes, Caldwell did not sight any enemy aircraft and the Wing was not able to make an interception. Caldwell left for a brief period of operational leave on 28 August. As usual, part of his leave was taken up by journalists who made much of his official score of 271⁄2 and noted that he was now third or fourth (depending on which newspaper you read) on the Allied claim list.35 Caldwell once again expressed the hope that he would top Sailor Malan but also ensured that the success of all of his pilots was highlighted by the journalists. As far as he was concerned, his pilots were so skilled that ‘if the Japanese had come over more often, I’m sure my boys would have greatly exceeded the Battle of Britain averages’. In addition, he spoke of the frustrations experienced by his pilots and, by implication, himself: . . . after my pilots emerge from one combat feeling they have the Japs all sewn up, they have to sit on the ground for some time waiting for them to come again. It’s just like a boxer who keeps winning by a knock out. He must fight regularly to retain his form.36

As well as talking up the achievements of his pilots, Caldwell issued a plea for additional air crew. ‘I can recommend the job. Shooting down enemy aircraft is about the only sport you can play sitting down. Maybe that is why it appeals to me so much.’37 Caldwell returned from leave on 3 September. Wing Commander Peter Jeffrey visited the Wing and, two days later, he and Caldwell attended a conference at Headquarters where they discussed their new postings. Caldwell had been advised a few days previously that he was to be posted to 2 Operational Training Unit as Chief Flying Instructor and Jeffrey was to take command of 1 Fighter Wing. This news was not welcomed by Caldwell. His recent comments in the press about topping Sailor Malan’s score clearly indicated that he wanted to stay in an operational posting. Caldwell’s last weeks with 1 Fighter Wing were anticlimactic. On 7 September the Wing engaged a heavily escorted reconnaissance aircraft. Headquarters North-Western Area had decided that Flight Lieutenant Bob Foster of 54 Squadron should be given his first opportunity to lead the Wing and Caldwell led 452 Squadron’s Green Section. 151


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Caldwell was instructed to patrol over Port Patterson, where the other squadrons’ green sections would rendezvous. The rendezvous was not effected and only three aircraft from 54 Squadron joined Caldwell in the patrol. Caldwell returned to base without sighting the enemy. Under Foster’s leadership the Wing’s defence was less than creditable. Pilot Officer Ken Fox opened his combat report of that day’s engagement by stating that the ‘Wing was led into a perfect position to be bounced by the enemy formation, which they smartly took advantage of ’.38 This and Caldwell’s scathing comment in his flying log that Foster led the Wing in a ‘disgraceful manner’ summed up the general feeling of the Wing regarding this operation. Caldwell scrambled for two false alarms a few days after and other than some local flying, his last outing with 1 Fighter Wing was when he led a formation on 24 September. Wing Commander Jeffrey arrived the next day and received his briefing from Caldwell.That evening, Caldwell formally bade farewell and departed the next day. In his recommendation for Caldwell’s Distinguished Service Order, Group Captain Walters had stated that ‘As Wing Leader his personal courage, determination and leading are admired by all ranks of No. 1 Fighter Wing’. These were not just empty words. Leading Aircraftman Frank Doherty, who worked in the operations room, thought that Caldwell was the coolest man he had ever heard in combat.‘To hear him directing his Wing, getting into correct position for attack, was an education in calmness. He made it all sound as though he were marshalling a cricket team to take the field on a lazy, warm Saturday afternoon.’39 Ross Williams believed that the Wing was a very good environment in which to work and he credited Caldwell’s leadership abilities with this. Ken Fox found him to be an outstanding pilot and leader.40 Peter Quinn, at one time Caldwell’s driver, was later stationed at Coomalie and he recalled that when Caldwell visited Coomalie, he would often have a meal with the other ranks rather than sit with the officers.41 War photographer Bert Rodda reported to the Adelaide News after he returned from a tour of the northern stations that Caldwell was ‘the idol of the boys up north’. Rodda wrote that Caldwell mixed and joked around with his ground staff as much as he did with his pilots; that his ground staff would do anything for him; and that they would not leave the aerodrome until Caldwell had returned from battle.42 Caldwell reciprocated the feelings of his pilots and ground staff. 152


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Despite on-going Spitfire serviceability problems, he could not fault the work of his ground staff and praised them personally and publicly. Later that year, Caldwell wrote a letter to the editor of Wings magazine in praise of his ground staff. He wrote that he never failed ‘to give full marks to the ground staff blokes.We feel they are close relatives . . . Our ground staff treat aircraft with the care they would give domestic pets. They’ve got real affection for the aircraft they service.’43 This attitude resulted in Caldwell coming to the defence of one particular ground staffer. John Burnett was a fitter armourer with 452 Squadron. He recalled how during one of the raids over Darwin, a pilot had lined up a Japanese aircraft and attempted to shoot him down, but the guns failed to function. When he landed, this pilot abused the armourers, blaming them. Caldwell came up to him and explained that at 30000 feet the guns would freeze. Caldwell then got a little rubber hammer, hit the gun and everyone witnessed the ice fall off.44 Caldwell valued the contribution of the members of the Wing, and he never forgot it. Shortly before Caldwell died, Jim Grant asked him to write the foreword to his book, Spitfires Over Darwin 1943: No. 1 Fighter Wing. He wrote that he was ‘glad of this further opportunity to say yet again how proud I was to have been with such men as the pilots and other personnel of No. 1 Fighter Wing at Darwin in 1943’.45 Leadership was only one of Caldwell’s responsibilities. He saw himself as first and foremost a skilled fighter pilot who drew on his experience in developing the Wing’s fighter tactics, and he maintained his drive for perfection as he continued his personal onslaught against the enemy. During his time with 1 Fighter Wing, Caldwell flew and scored with each squadron and he achieved ace status in his second theatre of combat. He had now become Australia’s highest scoring fighter ace and, by the end of the war, the closest Australian scorer was Adrian ‘Tim’ Goldsmith with 161⁄4 victories. And all this within 21⁄2 years of Caldwell’s first combat operation.At this time, Caldwell was by far the leading Allied ace in the Australian area. Many of the highest-scoring Americans had not yet made many claims and, by the end of the war, with far more opportunities in combat than the Darwin Spitfires, combined with sturdier aircraft and excellent logistics support, only two had surpassed Caldwell’s score.46

153


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TEN

Fighter Pilot, Manqué

My ideas of being usefully employed are where I [have] the opportunity of fulfilling my own particular role, that is of active fighter pilot.1 Caldwell was initially posted to 2 Operational Training Unit Mildura as Chief Flying Instructor, but on 2 October 1943 he was appointed Chief Instructor. Although he did not welcome transferring from an operational area, life at Mildura had its compensations. As the crow flies, Mildura was relatively close to Illabo, where Jean Caldwell was living with her family.Whenever opportunity allowed, Caldwell would borrow an aircraft and fly over to visit. Norman Mulcahy, who was released from his Army training to assist with the wheat harvest, recalls Caldwell’s lunchtime expeditions. Norman was working on a neighbouring property and would often see Caldwell land in the next paddock and taxi up to the homestead. After lunch, Caldwell would take off and circle around very low a couple of times to farewell those watching below.2 On one occasion Jean decided to visit her husband. She travelled by bus from Cootamundra to Balranald, stayed overnight and then took the mailman’s car to Mildura. The trip was uncomfortable and long, with the mailman taking his convoluted journey delivering mail to all the outlying properties and towns on his route. The next time Jean wanted to visit, Caldwell flew down to collect her so she could fly to Mildura, sitting in the back of his Wirraway with a flying helmet on! Caldwell would often record second pilots or passengers in his flying log and this occasion was no exception—JMcIC (Jean McIver Caldwell) stands recorded as Caldwell’s passenger on 29 February 1944. 154


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As well as its proximity to Jean, Mildura had another important attraction—it was a much more congenial location than Darwin. 2 Operational Training Unit was close to a well-established country town that welcomed RAAF visitors to its homes and facilities. During his posting, Caldwell enjoyed the company of many friends from both the Middle East and Darwin, including Flight Lieutenant Ross Williams, Squadron Leader John Waddy and Squadron Leader Bobby Gibbes. Gibbes arrived at the end of January 1944 and he recalled that the mess life was rather hectic at times, with some of the pilots letting their hair down. One subject of mess high jinks was the Hitler Trophy.This was a caricature of Hitler mounted inside a wooden toilet seat and fixed to the mess wall. The legend of the Hitler Trophy had spread far and wide and the competition to steal it was intense. This proved a popular game and much ingenuity was displayed in both trying to protect it and to make off with it.Adam Gillespie, who trained with Caldwell at Bradfield Park and Mascot, was by this time posted to 1 Operational Training Unit Sale. Like so many before them, Gillespie, along with two cohorts, attempted to purloin it. Like so many before them, they had no success. And it was no wonder.‘Clive had installed two rifles pointing to the toilet seat with strings attached to the triggers so if anybody pulled the trophy from the wall the guy was in for a big surprise.’3 Caldwell may not have wanted another post as instructor, but he took his job seriously and on at least one occasion made this patently clear. Shortly after his appointment as Chief Instructor, Flight Lieutenant Peter Isaacson brought Q for Queenie, the first Lancaster bomber to fly to Australia, to Mildura to help encourage subscriptions to the Fourth Liberty Loan Appeal. These intense publicity exercises were designed to raise public funds for the national defence and they became a significant means for those on the home front to contribute to the war effort. Caldwell had already experienced these appeals during his trips to the United States and had participated extensively in RAAF publicity exercises during leave periods, but he had little patience when they conflicted with his duties. Members of the public were encouraged to view Q for Queenie and the War Loan Committee organised a rally to raise funds. Caldwell was requested to speak at this rally. The function was held in the Mildura picture theatre and Caldwell climbed the stage to address the crowd. Ross Williams recalled that on this occasion Caldwell was annoyed at having been 155


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taken away from his duties and was impatient with the hoopla of the exercise. Rather than passionately persuading the audience to subscribe to the appeal, he bluntly announced:‘If you’re going to give, then for Christ’s sake, give!’ He then stalked off the stage, to the embarrassment of the organisers.4 Despite this tactless outburst, Caldwell was not always reluctant to carry out public relations duties. Group Captain Thomas Curnow, now Commanding Officer of 5 Service Flying Training School Uranquinty, would often ask 2 Operational Training Unit Mildura to send across a flight for their graduation ceremonies. Caldwell found himself flying to Uranquinty for this purpose at least twice. Ross Cox was to graduate 38 Course on 16 December and 2 Operational Training Unit Mildura sent six aircraft to Uranquinty for the occasion. He watched as Caldwell led the three Spitfires, and Squadron Leader John Waddy, who was a Kittyhawk instructor at the time, led the three Kittyhawks. They made a great display of aerobatics and concluded by doing a dummy strafe of the aerodrome. When they had finished, the Spitfires were to break to the right, and the Kittyhawks were to break to the left.Waddy, however, broke to the right, thus crossing Caldwell’s path. Caldwell was not happy. After they landed, he marched up to Waddy and yelled, ‘You nearly killed me!’ Ross had come over to have a closer look at the Spitfires and Kittyhawks and heard what was going on between Caldwell and Waddy. In no uncertain terms, Caldwell was ‘telling Waddy off ’. Caldwell was not one to hold a grudge with a friend and, eventually, everything was sorted out. The visiting pilots enjoyed lunch in the pilots’ mess, where Cox gave the welcoming speech, and flew back to Mildura later that afternoon.5 In December 1943, Caldwell, along with John Waddy, lent support to a RAAF recruitment drive and a year later a portrait that had been especially commissioned by Woman magazine was used for WAAAF recruitment advertising.6 Most of Caldwell’s public relations duties were planned well in advance, but in January 1944, when Caldwell was off course and the Goulburn branch of the Volunteer Air Observers Corps (VAOC) rendered assistance to him, the RAAF public relations people took advantage of the situation to generate some favourable publicity. Caldwell had been at Forest Hill aerodrome and he had to fly Flight Lieutenant Bradbury to Bankstown. The weather was ‘filthy’ and Caldwell’s Wirraway had no radio but Bradbury had to get to Bankstown urgently, so they set off: 156


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Visibility was nil, so at the risk of being considered a pretty bad navigator, I don’t mind admitting that when I got a glimpse of Moss Vale, while flying above it at 600 feet, I was well off track. I had used up a lot of fuel and what I had left would never get me to Sydney, so the only alternative was to turn back. I was about thirty miles north-east of Moss Vale when I decided to return and refuel at Goulburn . . . Right on my estimated time I sighted the town, circled it twice at 300 feet, and came down safely on the emergency landing ground. We climbed out and made for a telephone, where I got on to the local exchange to ask where I could get some fuel.To my surprise I was told that the local VAOC knew of my arrival and was already looking after the fuel situation—all we had to do was stand by . . . Within a very short time local members were at the ’drome with refuelling facilities, and helped us to fill up the tanks. I discovered that they knew almost as much of my movements as I did myself. My course had been plotted the whole way, and they knew that I had turned for Goulburn when north-east of Moss Vale. They also knew I was in a Wirraway, and the fact that I had a passenger, as a double issue of lunch—both in sandwich form and bottled—was sent out to us with the petrol.The VAOC had notified the Forest Hill aerodrome of our return and landing at Goulburn. They also notified Bankstown, and obtained an accurate weather report, which was of considerable help when we took off and continued our journey, this time following the coastline. The whole thing was an exceedingly good show, and saved me a lot of worry—and my passenger eventually got to Sydney in time.7

Caldwell knew that as Chief Instructor he was in a very strong position to influence the new generation of fighter pilots. John Bailey was doing a conversion course onto Kittyhawks soon after Caldwell arrived. He was in a classroom and Caldwell walked in unannounced. Caldwell told the lecturer that he would just sit in the back of the class and listen for a while. Eventually, he asked to say a few words. He told the pilots to listen closely to the instructors as they were experienced men who had learned their tactics the hard way. He also stressed that they were never to forget that ‘Rule number one for a fighter pilot is— stay alive! It costs a lot of money to train you, so you are valuable, and we can’t afford to lose you. Don’t try to be a bloody hero—stay alive!’ Caldwell’s attitude impressed Bailey, and he never forgot his advice.8 Caldwell was not all seriousness, however.There were times when his sense of humour got the better of him. Bobby Gibbes recalled a time 157


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when Caldwell was speaking with a young Boomerang trainee. The trainee asked Caldwell what to do if he was attacked by enemy fighters. Caldwell’s opinion of the Boomerang was not high and he responded that the Boomerang had a big roomy cockpit so the trainee should undo his harness and run around the cockpit! ‘I don’t think he improved the morale of the poor old trainee pilot. But that was Clive.’9 Caldwell made an impression both inside and outside the classroom. Laurie Hill was posted to 2 Operational Training Unit Mildura in 1943 after completing his recruit training. He was initially a cook’s assistant in the sergeants’ mess before transferring to the catering store. On the night of the Air Force Ball, Hill was waiting at the main entrance of the station in the hope of catching a lift when a staff car pulled up next to him. A voice from the car said ‘Do you want a lift into town, son?’ Hill gratefully accepted and when he climbed into the car discovered the voice belonged to Caldwell. ‘I was just a lowly AC1 at the time and found it out of my depth to converse with an officer. However, he made it easy as he made conversation all the way into town.’ After Caldwell dropped him off, Hill snapped him his best salute and headed for the dance. As a side note, Hill joked that Caldwell must have thought he was flying a Spitfire as he was ‘certainly low flying’: they made it into town in about four minutes!10 Like Caldwell, Bobby Gibbes served as both Chief Flying Instructor and Chief Instructor at 2 Operational Training Unit. After he arrived in January 1944, he and Caldwell discussed their concern that too many trainee pilots were failing. They had discovered that while some of the newly qualified pilots had their flying badges, they were not keen on graduating as fighter pilots and going to a war zone. So Gibbes and Caldwell decided to visit the nearby service flying training schools and meet with the trainees, assess them, make clear what the life of a fighter pilot entailed, and ‘pre-select’ those that they considered suitable. Bobby recalled that the hand-picking resulted in a ‘better class’ of pilot coming through and the 2 Operational Training Unit failure rate dropped markedly.11 Caldwell and Gibbes were proud of their efforts to improve the quality of fighter pilots coming through the school and for maximising their graduates’ chances of inflicting loss on the enemy. Caldwell was also proud of his discovery of shadow shooting as an effective means of target training and the fact that it had become standard practice at operational training units. However, despite the clear benefits of this system, many deaths occurred. 158


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In an attempt to reduce training accidents at 2 Operational Training Unit Mildura, pilots training over Lake Victoria were not permitted to go below 500 feet, but even this was not enough to prevent mishaps. In early 1944, shadow shooting was deleted from the training syllabus. Caldwell was extremely critical of the decision: The fact that an occasional pilot misjudges distance and speed so far as to destroy himself should not be allowed to condemn a practice that has unquestionably resulted in the destruction of hundreds of enemy airplanes and personnel . . . A fighter pilot who cannot shoot down the enemy when given the opportunity is merely a potential loss and an expensive but useless passenger in this service . . . If the one feature toward which the entire training and effort of a fighter pilot aims is removed, it seems futile to continue to waste time and money on teaching him the negative principles of how merely to avoid being himself shot down by the enemy. That effect can be obtained with greater facility and more economically by keeping him on the ground, where he would be of quite as much use.12

At about this time, General George C. Kenney, Commander of the Allied Air Forces, wanted to establish a forward base to extend the range of bombers in the North-Western Area. Selaru Island, 250 miles north of Darwin, had a Japanese airfield. Kenney planned an amphibious assault to seize it and then extend and improve the runway. Early in March, the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command,Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, provided Kenney with a draft plan for Australian air support: the RAAF would provide two fighter wings—one of Kittyhawks, the other of Spitfires—as well as ancillary wings. To this end, the two RAF Spitfire squadrons, 548 and 549, which had been training in Queensland since December 1943, would transfer to Darwin and release 452 and 457 squadrons so that they could participate in the task force. The projected date of the operation was 15 June 1944. By this time, Caldwell was getting impatient with his instructional duties. In March 1944, he applied for a posting to England for operational duties. Air Vice-Marshal George Jones ordered Caldwell to Melbourne and told him that this posting was not possible. Jones wanted Caldwell to establish the new Spitfire wing that would participate in the Selaru operation. Jones told Caldwell that he was sorry he could not go back overseas, but he believed this job would be much better. He told Caldwell he had the highest priority for supplies, equipment and organisation 159


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in the RAAF and that everything he wanted would be expedited. Although this posting had the potential to be interesting from an administrative perspective, Caldwell did not want it. Caldwell still had ambitions to increase his score and he felt that he would have a better chance in the European theatre. It was already obvious that Japan was not interested in Darwin as a target and that future operations outside Australia would continue to be dominated by the Americans—RAAF fighter squadrons in the region had had very little opportunity to engage enemy aircraft while the air war was controlled by General Kenney. USAAF squadrons equipped with the P–38 Lightning and P–47 Thunderbolt fighters were accumulating many victories, but even so, only two men had over twenty victories and, of these, Neel Kearby, with twentytwo victories, was killed on 5 March 1944. Dick Bong was now the leading US ace, with twenty-two of his eventual forty victories. Tommy McGuire, with thirty-eight victories, would be the only other pilot to surpass Caldwell’s total. It was obvious to Caldwell that there would be very little likelihood of increasing his score in this theatre. Despite this, Jones told Caldwell that he believed this would be a big show and that Caldwell would get more air fighting in the new operations than if he returned to Europe. Caldwell did not believe this, but realised that there was no hope of getting an overseas posting. Although he was disappointed that he was not allowed to go to Europe, he accepted, after pressing Jones for a commitment that the posting would be for nine months only. Jones then indicated that Caldwell would be withdrawn at the end of his tour and the posting would not be extended. Despite Jones’ assurances, it became apparent very soon that Caldwell would not get more air fighting. He became extremely bitter at missing an opportunity to return overseas: I feel that I wasted a year of time in connection with No. 80 Fighter Wing and its movements and operations . . . Had I had another posting back overseas instead of wasting my time at Darwin, I would have been in the invasion of France where we would at least have been pretty fully occupied, and of which I claim I am capable.13

Caldwell focussed his bitterness on Jones and never forgave him for not releasing him. But Caldwell’s bitterness did not entirely rest on his unfulfilled desire to fly in Europe. Despite his increasing leadership and administrative responsibilities, Caldwell still saw himself first and 160


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foremost as an active fighter pilot. As far as he was concerned, ‘my ideas of being usefully employed are where I [have] the opportunity of fulfilling my own particular role, that is of active fighter pilot’,14 and he could not fulfil that role in the South-West Pacific Area. Caldwell left 2 Operational Training Unit in April to form 80 Fighter Wing and Squadron Leader Bobby Gibbes took over as Chief Instructor. Before leaving Mildura, the Liberal Democratic Party of Australia invited Caldwell to nominate as a candidate in the forthcoming New South Wales State election. This party labelled itself ‘The People’s Party’ and its policy was to promote a more liberal democracy, where the freedoms of both the individual and the state would be preserved.The party was keen to obtain nominations for parliamentary candidates from the widest possible basis and looked to men who possessed courage, honesty and a love of their country. They also wanted men who were capable of clear thinking and who could readily express themselves and their ideas. Caldwell was just the party’s type and had been suggested to the executive as a potential candidate. Despite his obvious public popularity, Caldwell had not entertained thoughts of entering parliament. If he felt constrained by the RAAF he would experience complete frustration at the strictures of party policy and parliamentary behaviour. He was flattered, but he had an immediate reason for declining the offer. He advised the party’s president and founder, Captain Ernest K.White, MC, that he could not accept ‘in view of absence on ops’.15 Caldwell returned to Darwin on 14 May 1944 and 80 Fighter Wing Headquarters officially became operational the next day. Unfortunately, planning for the Selaru operation had stalled. Caldwell, however, still carried on with his preparations. One of his first acts was to host a conference in order to discuss the role and functions of the Wing in the proposed operations. Caldwell was then called away to Melbourne and returned via Sydney where he was able to spend some time with Jean. It was only a rushed visit but the newshounds were out and about and the Caldwells were photographed having lunch at Prince’s on 24 May.The next day, John Baird, the artist of the portrait that was featured on the 28 February 1944 cover of Woman, presented that portrait to Caldwell. Caldwell’s new operational posting was announced at this time, as well as the fact that he was currently sixth on the Allied list of fighter aces. Headlines included ‘RAAF Ace Back in Fight’ and ‘Caldwell Returns to the Fray’,16 and more than one reference was made to his 161


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enthusiastic desire to increase his score.With the stalled Selaru plans, the irony of these comments was lost on the public, but not on Caldwell. He returned to Sydney later to attend an investiture ceremony at Admiralty House to receive his Distinguished Service Order and Distinguished Flying Cross and Bar. Spitfire Mark VIIIs began to be delivered to the squadrons from June and, when he returned to Darwin, Caldwell carried out some familiarisation flights in his new personal Spitfire. Caldwell loved the Mark VIII. He admired its clean lines and elegance. It did not have the Vokes air filter and, as such,‘didn’t have any of the detrimental results. So I was all for the Mark VIII.’17 It may have been an improved aircraft in Caldwell’s eyes, but he was still not happy about what he thought to be its lack of effective armament. In June 1943, as Wing Commander Flying, 1 Fighter Wing, he had suggested to Group Captain Walters that the Spitfire armament be improved by substituting the troublesome 20mm armament with two of the reliable .50-calibre machine guns in each wing. Caldwell’s suggestion was rejected but he decided to take matters into his own hands with his Spitfire Mark VIII, replacing his 20mm cannons with .50-inch Browning machine guns, which were standard in the US service. ‘I was very impressed with the result. I didn’t have anyone to kill with the damn things, but just the effect of them, and the aeroplane held them.’18 Air Vice-Marshal George Jones did not appreciate Caldwell’s innovation and he ordered Caldwell to restore the Spitfire’s original armaments. Caldwell returned to Darwin and arranged for the modifications to be removed, but he was not pleased. Perhaps it is just as well that Caldwell restored the correct armament. Fred Woodgate, an aircraft electrician serving with 54 Squadron, noticed Caldwell’s modifications when he was changing a burnt-out landing lamp and was fascinated by them.Years later, when Fred was researching his history of 54 Squadron, he decided to find out if Caldwell’s armament modifications were sound. He discovered that, at that time, the Spitfire’s wing would have required considerable strengthening to enable the use of higher powered armaments—heavier metal would have to be used, otherwise the whole thing might shudder to bits, especially during the stress of a high-speed dive. But any stiffening of the wing would necessitate increasing the overall weight of the aircraft, and this, in turn, would have an adverse effect on manoeuvrability. This was one occasion on which 162


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Caldwell’s habitual search for innovation and improvement would not have paid off.19 Despite the stalled planning for the Selaru operation, Caldwell still had hopes that it would come off, but a major blow came when 61 Works Wing was transferred from Darwin to New Guinea. This meant that there was no unit available to carry out the necessary construction work for the invasion.Another setback happened when the vital amphibious equipment could not be supplied. MacArthur officially shelved the plans on 7 June, deciding the operation could wait until after the invasion of Mindanao. This was not communicated to Caldwell and he continued his preparations for the projected Selaru assault. Men and equipment continued to arrive and his pilots trained in the new Mark VIII Spitfires. It was some time before it became apparent that the Selaru operation would not occur and he was justifiably peeved. I was ‘deluded seven times in that operation . . . it finally faded out without any communication on the subject. It just faded away. Eventually we realised it was not going to happen about the end of August.’20 This left 80 Fighter Wing without a purpose. There was no prospect of operations and there was little the men could do but train. Air Commodore Alan Charlesworth, now Air Officer Commanding NorthWestern Area, reported that 80 Fighter Wing was giving him some concern as it had nothing to do. He believed that its morale was still high, but there was the danger that it would fall unless the men were given an active role in the war. He strongly urged Bostock to either employ 80 Fighter Wing on active operations in some other theatre or remove it to a southern location so that its personnel could rest. Released, albeit unwillingly, from the immediacy of operations, Caldwell was able to leave Darwin more often and he soon found himself co-opted for an important fundraising drive. During 1944, the Returned Soldiers, Sailors & Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia (RSS&AILA) launched its appeal to raise £150000 to meet the cost of erecting a new building to be called the Anzac House Rehabilitation and Service Centre. Fundraising activities included concert parties, raffles, cabarets, dances and balls as well as the ‘Miss Sydney’ competition. The competition proved very popular and from this came Mrs Ella Mawer’s idea for the ‘Popular Pin-up Man’ contest. It attracted a broad range of notable candidates, including former Prime Minister William Morris ‘Billy’ Hughes (who, about to turn 80, had been nominated by the Commonwealth Youth Group); well-known singer Peter Dawson, 163


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who recorded the Anzac House song which had been especially composed for the appeal; Sergeant Frank Coghlan, a well-known trumpeter of the 9th Division; and popular radio men John Dunne and Harry Yates. The candidate nominated in June 1944 by the Women’s Auxiliary Combined Service Sub-Branch of the RSS&AILA was ‘an outstanding figure’ and a ‘man of action against the Japanese’: Wing Commander Clive Caldwell.21 Caldwell took his nomination seriously. He enjoyed his involvement and lent his support to various fundraising activities in his name. The Anzac House Button Day was held on 18 August and the Clive R. Caldwell button proved very popular. The ‘Pin-up Man’ was crowned at a coronation ball on 11 October. Caldwell came third and was pleased to be involved in the fundraising activities for the benefit of exservicemen. Fundraising was a rewarding challenge, but Caldwell still had a Wing to run. Caldwell’s pilots had noticed that 1 Fighter Wing was carrying out operations and they agitated to participate. These operations were carried out at the Spitfire’s extreme range and Caldwell was concerned by the distance, the risk and their relative value. He believed that there was a certain amount of morale lifting behind 1 Fighter Wing’s operations. His pilots had not been in the area for quite as long as (now) Group Captain Peter Jeffrey’s and he ‘did not consider that their morale was of such a nature as to justify on my part involving them in that type of risk’.22 He refused to carry out any similar operation or endorse any move to carry out such operations. Despite his concerns, however, his pilots continued to agitate. When Jeffrey took 1 Fighter Wing to Selaru on 5 September Caldwell decided to go with them to ascertain once and for all if the operations were practical and worthwhile. Unfortunately, the winds were stronger than indicated on the weather report and he did not reach Selaru. Instead, he reached Babar Island and carried out a square search. He encountered no enemy aircraft or anti-aircraft fire but did do some strafing. Meanwhile, Jeffrey was carrying out a strafing run on Tanimbar Island. After Caldwell and Jeffrey returned to Darwin, they discussed the operation, and Jeffrey told Caldwell he believed the whole trip was a waste of time, as was Caldwell’s reconnaissance of Babar Island. Jeffrey said that ‘the only reason he had done it was to save the morale of his pilots going completely down the drain’.23 Caldwell agreed that the sortie was of no operational benefit. He was also convinced that the risk 164


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far outweighed any morale-lifting benefits and he decided he would not allow his pilots to engage in potentially dangerous and worthless operations. That, for the time being, was the end of the matter—80 Fighter Wing would not take part in operations from Darwin. Caldwell did his best to keep morale up and his pilots carried out regular training, averaging between nineteen and twenty hours in the air per pilot per month. It was a difficult situation, but Caldwell handled it well.When Flight Lieutenant Edward ‘Ted’ Sly was posted to 457 Squadron as a flight commander, he recognised Caldwell as ‘an excellent leader’ and valued how Caldwell ‘continually [planned] the security and safety of his men’.24 Morale soared when Caldwell was told that 80 Fighter Wing would soon transfer to an operational area. An important aspect of General MacArthur’s push towards Mindanao was taking Morotai Island, halfway between New Guinea and Mindanao, so that it could be used as a staging post to the Philippines. Allied control would also mean that enemy forces on nearby Halmahera would be bypassed. The Morotai taskforce left Aitape on 15 September and Morotai was taken shortly after.The RAAF expected that 10 Group would participate in the forthcoming push to the Philippines, but General Kenney had recently reorganised his command. He decided that the Fifth Air Force would be the assault force for most forthcoming operations; the smaller Thirteenth Air Force would be assigned mainly supporting roles; and the RAAF 10 Group would be relegated to garrison duties in New Guinea. When Air Vice-Marshal Bostock noticed that 10 Group had been dropped from current operations instructions, he decided to personally press for a reinstatement of RAAF involvement in the advance against the enemy. He consulted the Prime Minister, who reminded Bostock that MacArthur was in charge of RAAF operations in the South-West Pacific Area. As long as the Australian Government acknowledged MacArthur’s directions, there would be scope for a tactical air force to provide support to Allied land forces, including major Australian land forces. In recognition of the mobile nature of its new role, Curtin agreed that 10 Group should have a name change. The First Tactical Air Force (First TAF) officially came into being on 25 October 1944. Bostock spoke with Brigadier-General Royden E. Beebe Jr, Chief of Staff of the recently formed Far East Air Force, who agreed that 10 Group would remain in Noemfoor and be allotted to the Thirteenth Air 165


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Force.This was not quite what Bostock wanted, but it was better than the proposed New Guinea garrison duties. Beebe also agreed that every effort would be made to keep the 10 Group units together as a tactical air force. Bostock also urged Beebe to allow the transfer of 80 Fighter Wing to Morotai, where it would later fall under 10 Group. Beebe agreed. Since it had been taken, Morotai had developed into a major base, with the Americans using it as a staging post for Leyte and other operations in the area. The Japanese had withdrawn most of their aircraft to the Philippines but still maintained bases on Halmahera, Ceram, Ambon and the Vogelkop Peninsula, so that they could stage nuisance raids on the Allied forward bases. Morotai itself had undergone a number of Japanese raids. Caldwell and his men were heartened by the news that they would move to Morotai in November.To Caldwell, 80 Fighter Wing had a very powerful potential and now there was a possibility that that potential would be realised. Caldwell had little time to prepare his Wing for its overseas deployment and he flew to Noemfoor Island on 16 October to discuss the move’s operational requirements with Air Commodore Arthur ‘Harry’ Cobby, who was in charge of 10 Group. Caldwell returned to Darwin and a few days later encountered a welcome addition to the Wing—Bobby Gibbes. Gibbes had completed his posting at 2 Operational Training Unit and would now carry out the duties of Wing Commander Flying.25 On 8 November, Caldwell was advised that 80 Wing was to move to Morotai as soon as possible, under the command of First TAF. On 25 November, Caldwell received official notification that he had been granted the rank of Group Captain, with effect from 7 August. In less than four years, the former EATS trainee was an acting Group Captain. Shortly afterwards, Caldwell was photographed proudly displaying his office sign, which had been quickly amended to reflect his new rank. But Caldwell could not revel in the excitement of his promotion—he left on 26 November to carry out a reconnaissance of Morotai to ensure everything would be in readiness for the move. While there, Caldwell met Group Captain Gerald Packer, one of Air Commodore Cobby’s staff, to discuss the problems associated with establishing camp and quarters for the Wing, given the shortage of material and equipment on Morotai. These shortages would impact on the Wing’s operational readiness, and Caldwell and Packer also discussed how this problem could be overcome. Caldwell was pessimistic 166


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and thought there was ‘little likelihood of the position being any better than estimated. If anything, it would probably be worse, because of delays that occurred with shipping and air transport, all of which were overcrowded at that time.’26 These problems had come about because MacArthur had been depriving the Australians of shipping (and soon his own ships would be subject to Kamikaze attacks, which inflicted serious damage and losses to all classes of vessel) and Air Vice-Marshal Jones controlled RAAF air transport squadrons, forcing Air Vice-Marshal Bostock’s headquarters to submit requests for their use. On his recent trip to Noemfoor, Caldwell had noted the prevalence of liquor as a currency for equipment and cigarettes, and a culture of purchasing liquor for personal use. He soon learned that the situation on Morotai was no different. The culture was so entrenched that trading ‘was not a noteworthy enough situation to cause comment. It was so general, in my opinion . . . It was going on in a completely free and extensive manner.’27 The ‘free and extensive’ trading was in contravention of Air Board Order ‘N’ 548 of 1944.28 The ABO specifically related to the RAAF in the Pacific Area, outside the Australian mainland. It restricted the availability of liquor supplies to RAAF canteen services and prohibited the export and import of liquor into any place in the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia. It prohibited the purchase of liquor by any RAAF member except from a unit mess or canteen, and the sale of liquor otherwise in the course of duty. It also prohibited the use of RAAF transport, including aircraft, to carry liquor outside the mainland (except liquor ordered by RAAF Canteen Services). Caldwell spoke with a number of American officers and quickly ‘formed the opinion that I would be in a much better position to get a considerable amount of essential equipment and other stuff of which we were short if I were in a position to give any liquor to obtain it’.29 At that stage, he was not aware of the Air Board Order prohibiting liquor outside mainland Australia so, now that he knew the accepted currency, he had to set about acquiring ‘funds’ to establish his Wing’s camp as soon as he returned to Darwin. As well as stockpiling his normal canteen issue and his entertainment allowance, Caldwell was able to purchase some bottles of liquor from a few army friends from their private stocks. He soon built up a small supply that he could bring with him to Morotai. Before he departed for Morotai, Caldwell’s batman, Corporal Kenneth Parker, was helping 167


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Caldwell pack some of the accumulated bottles pending their transportation to Morotai. Caldwell noted to Parker that the liquor was of considerable value, and if it were up at Morotai it would be worth a lot of money. Caldwell later maintained that this was not a suggestion that the liquor he was taking to Morotai would be sold.30 The Wing’s move was imminent and would be carried out in stages. Headquarters would leave on 9 December and Caldwell would lead 452 Squadron a few days later, followed shortly after by 457 Squadron. The main party would follow by ship in January. Wing Commander Gibbes would not be accompanying the Wing at this stage as he was recovering from a recent aircraft accident. The official photographers arrived and took a number of unit photographs, including one of Caldwell in front of his personalised Mark VIII Spitfire. Shortly before, Air Commodore Cobby had specifically ordered that Caldwell’s score be painted on the aircraft for the photograph.31 There was much to do before he left Darwin, but Caldwell made time to visit a local cattle station to arrange supplies for the officers’ mess at Morotai. Stan Plowright, who served with 60 Operational Base Unit, which was attached to 80 Fighter Wing in Darwin and Morotai, recalled that Caldwell arranged for about fourteen or sixteen big steers to be killed and transported to Morotai. The beasts were rounded up and slaughtered there in the yard, and then skinned and loaded into a refrigerated van. The steak-to-be was carried by transport aircraft which flew across in flights of three at 10 000–12000 feet to keep it cold. Unfortunately, something went wrong. Either the carcasses had not been hung long enough before they were refrigerated or the temperature during transit had not been stable, because by the time it arrived at Morotai all of the meat had spoiled.32 A great deal of attention was paid to the flight plan before departure. Even with their long range belly-tanks, the Spitfires had only a maximum endurance of about four hours. Accordingly, the flight was planned over a number of refuelling stages. In addition, care had to be taken to minimise time flying over enemy territory. The party would stopover at Gove, Merauke and Noemfoor. Caldwell’s party was originally scheduled to leave for Morotai on 15 December but was delayed because of bad weather. The weather was much better the next day and Caldwell and the twenty-four Spitfires of 452 Squadron departed Darwin, escorted by three B–25 Mitchells from 2 Squadron RAAF, a Catalina flying boat and two C–47 transports, which, as well as carrying 168


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ground staff and equipment, also carried Caldwell’s liquor stocks. The total number of personnel, excluding pilots, conveyed by the airlift was 191. Caldwell led the Spitfires in two formations of twelve each side of the leading Mitchell. Soon after take-off, one Spitfire pilot experienced a faulty auxiliary tank and had to return to base but caught up at Gove.The trip to Merauke was uneventful but there was a tragedy on landing. The Spitfires’ range had been affected by severe head winds and some Spitfires were running very low on fuel. Flight Lieutenant John Sturm could not get his flaps down, and radioed this to Caldwell. Caldwell advised him not to land—he had to wait until last. Sturm radioed back that his fuel was too low and he prepared to land. The combination of limited cockpit view when Sturm raised his Spitfire’s nose and the increased speed from a flapless landing was disastrous. Warrant Officer Murray Tune was the co-pilot of the leading Mitchell and he saw the events unfold with ‘all the drama of a Hollywood silent movie’. The next Spitfire ended up in a ditch at the side of the strip.Then, to the dismay of those watching, the third Spitfire headed straight towards Sturm’s Spitfire, ‘its propeller chewing into the cockpit of the crippled plane. With a huge sheet of flame the latter’s fuel tank exploded, the resulting cloud of smoke rose into the air, nearly reaching our height.’33 Sturm was killed instantly.34 The pilot of the second Spitfire escaped with only a few cuts and bruises, but the pilot of the third had two broken legs and some minor injuries. The control tower ordered the other Spitfires to stay airborne but Caldwell requested a single short landing procedure as all the Spitfires were now very low on fuel. The Controller gave clearance but warned them to keep to starboard at the end of the runway. Caldwell and the remaining Spitfires landed safely. The flightworthy Spitfires and their escorts took off next morning for the 700-mile flight to Noemfoor. There were no Allied bases between it and Merauke. Ten minutes short of the Spitfires’ critical point, the weather deteriorated and they had to return to Merauke. Again, there were problems on landing when the fourth Spitfire to land suddenly and violently turned to port, ending with its nose in a ditch. This time, fortunately, the strip was clear and the others landed safely. The C–47s, with a greater fuel capacity than the Spitfires, found a break in the weather and made it to Noemfoor. However, they were ordered to return to Merauke as the ground crew had to carry out the Spitfires’ daily inspection, so a stand-down was declared on the following 169


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day.The next day proved uneventful and the party arrived at Noemfoor. It was decided that eight Spitfires would remain in Noemfoor in reserve. The others took off for Morotai on 21 December, flying in and out of rainstorms, with zero visibility as they approached the landing strip. Light rain was falling and a large thunderstorm was building up. As well as the Spitfires there were about forty or fifty other aircraft in the air so, as the Spitfires had about an hour’s fuel left, they circled for some time before landing. Caldwell and the first Spitfires of 80 Fighter Wing had arrived at Morotai.

170


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ELEVEN 1

Morotai

. . . the targets we were attacking [and] the jobs we were doing were of fairly minute value . . .2 As soon as Caldwell and his pilots arrived, they were in the air carrying out night defence patrols. For the first time, 80 Fighter Wing was on operations. The Wing was primarily responsible for Morotai’s night fighter defence. This involved a standing patrol of two aircraft, from an hour before dusk until an hour after dawn. Caldwell initially agreed with this arrangement and welcomed the opportunity to get back into worthwhile work. As there had been seventy raids over Morotai, Caldwell and his pilots assumed that this level of Japanese activity would continue.They had high expectations of success against the Japanese and their first taste of success came quickly. During a late night patrol on Christmas Eve, a Japanese bomber was detected at 20000 feet above Morotai airfield. The searchlights were trained on the bomber and Flying Officer Jack Pretty attacked.The antiaircraft gunners ceased their fire but the enemy bomber was kept in the searchlights. Sergeant Paul Tillery, of the US 31st Infantry Division, and his fellow infantrymen were sitting on top of their pillboxes on ‘Nightmare Hill’.They could clearly see the tracer bullets as the aircraft fired at each other and they yelled out to the Spitfire pilots, ‘Get him, get him!’ Tillery saw the enemy bomber burst into flames and fall into the ocean just off the island. Much cheering and hand clapping could be heard from all along the pillboxes.3 The watching Americans were not the only ones calling out to 171


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Pretty. As the enemy raider was trapped by the searchlights, Caldwell was heard roaring over the radio: ‘Hold him, hold him. Give the boy a chance.’ Then, as the raider spun down in flames he yelled, ‘He’s got him! He’s got him!’4 This was Pretty’s first and only victory, and Caldwell was as proud and as excited as if it were his own. It was an exciting Christmas present for the Wing and it was treated as a portent of better things to come. The next day, Major-General St Clair Streett, the Commander of the US Thirteenth Air Force, sent a signal to 80 Fighter Wing thanking it for the ‘flaming Christmas present’.5 This victory was just what the RAAF needed to announce the presence of Caldwell and the Spitfires in the Halmaheras, and considerable coverage was given to Pretty’s victory and the long awaited return to operations. The press highlighted the ‘RAAF’s Vital Job Up North’; announced that Cobby and Caldwell, ‘Australia’s two greatest air aces’, were working together in the Halmaheras; and stressed to the public that the ‘Hunchasing Spitfires Now Hunt Japs’.6 Caldwell received an unfair share of media attention, partly overshadowing Pretty’s effort.To engender public interest and excitement in Australia’s participation in the Halmaheras, Caldwell’s photo was used constantly in articles relating to operations up north over the next few days.7 Morotai has a tropical climate and when Caldwell arrived it was in the rainy season. At that time, Morotai was crowded. The Americans had entrenched themselves since the September assault. The island had become an important and busy shipping point and the two major airfields, Pitoe and Wama, were constantly in use. When they were passable, the roads constantly hosted troop movements. They hadn’t improved by the time Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes arrived in March. He found Morotai to be ‘one hell of a muddy place . . . Roads slippery as the devil. The jeeps and trucks don’t drive round here. They just slip and skid their way along. Odd vehicles hopelessly bogged off the side of the road every few hundred yards.’8 The Wing’s living facilities and infrastructure were basic. Flight Lieutenant Ted Sly thought that the living conditions were terrible.9 There were no water facilities at the camp site; no piping for water reticulation; no tanks, water trailers, or pumps; no facilities for digging through the coral; and no facilities for digging latrines. There were no transport facilities and, as the camp was located over a mile away from the strip, itwas obvious that they would need something more than just a jeep and a jeep trailer to move the pilots and ground staff. Given Air 172


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Vice-Marshal Jones’ earlier promises that he could have whatever resources he needed to establish his Wing’s accommodation, Caldwell was not impressed.10 However, he had expected that he would have limited resources so, following up on his recent conversations with the Americans, he broke into his liquor stocks and proceeded to barter his way to better facilities. Caldwell carried out much of his business with a nearby American naval unit. This unit was well equipped and, initially, Caldwell’s men washed and showered there. He borrowed a bulldozer at the rate of a bottle of gin per day to clear their camp site. Caldwell obtained six convertible water tanks and the cherry picker to lift them onto trestles. The tanks cost a bottle of whisky each and the cherry picker a bottle of gin.The Americans hauled water for the Wing until Caldwell obtained a boring plant so they could dig a bore and obtain their own water. He also borrowed power hammers so they could get through the coral in order to conform to health procedures for latrines and such. Caldwell obtained much assistance and equipment from this American unit.11 The barter system proved so effective that, when Caldwell returned to Darwin in late January to arrange for the balance of the Wing’s equipment and 79 Squadron’s relocation to Morotai, he stressed to Wing Commander Gibbes that he would need a good supply of liquor on hand in order to do business with the Americans and that he should acquire as much as he could. He told him of the amounts both he and Squadron Leader Stuart Harpham, of 60 Operational Base Unit, had given away in return for services and equipment from the Americans and emphasised the fact that the same situation would apply when the rest of the Wing moved to Morotai. Caldwell also mentioned to Gibbes that he should ensure he had a good supply of alcohol for his own needs as it was likely he would be on the island for longer than Caldwell. Caldwell did not disguise from Gibbes that there was a ready market for surplus alcohol if Gibbes had been disposed towards selling it, although he did not suggest that Gibbes should engage in selling.While he was in Darwin, Caldwell arranged for another quantity of liquor to be transported to Morotai by an American aircraft, and for a larger quantity to be shipped over with the rest of the Wing’s equipment. Caldwell’s original intention was to trade alcohol for goods and services but he soon recognised that he could obtain personal benefit from selling off some of his stock. He knew that he would not receive any reimbursement or acknowledgement from the RAAF for using his 173


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own supplies in exchange for service and equipment, so he had no qualms about organising a quasi-reimbursement to himself. In addition, given that trading was so rife that there was an established price for contraband liquor, he would be able to build up his own personal bank balance. Caldwell needed to do this for two reasons. First, he wanted to prepare a nest egg for his eventual release from the RAAF after the war and, second and more importantly, he needed to maintain his own financial independence. On his father’s death, Caldwell had inherited some property and the mortgage to go with it. As an insurance broker before the war, he could easily meet the mortgage payments. However, after he had enlisted, his pay dropped considerably. After he returned to Australia in 1942, Caldwell applied to the District Court for a reduction or suspension of interest on the mortgage. Although Caldwell made it clear that he had made a heavy financial sacrifice by enlisting, Judge Clancy determined that Caldwell’s case was ‘misconceived and should be dismissed’. In making his decision, Judge Clancy noted the argument of Mr H.A. Henry, acting for Caldwell’s bank, who indicated that Caldwell should not be given relief because ‘his wife is the daughter of a man in comfortable circumstances’.12 The decision was certainly not a welcome one, but the implication that he should rely on his wife’s financial backing was a blow to Caldwell’s pride. In addition to his mortgage commitments, Caldwell’s financial priority was to ensure that he would never be reliant on Jean or her family, or even assumed to be reliant. The first opportunity for Caldwell to recoup some of his liquor expenses came on Christmas Day. Some Americans came into the camp asking if there was any liquor available. Caldwell’s batman, Corporal Kenneth Parker, decided to ask Caldwell about selling some of his stocks. Parker said to Caldwell that if he wanted to sell any of his supply, Parker could place it. Caldwell gave Parker two bottles and he sold it for the going rate of about £12 a bottle. He gave Caldwell the takings and sometime later Caldwell gave him a commission of about ten per cent. Parker sold liquor for Caldwell about three or four times a week until about 12 January 1945. Caldwell stopped selling through Parker when, using some of the alcohol from Caldwell’s own stocks, Parker became drunk and had his money stolen from him. Parker stated that this was a consequence of a brawl, but Caldwell maintained that when he saw him soon after, Parker did not display 174


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any physical signs of having been involved in a brawl. Caldwell lost confidence in Parker and decided not to sell through him again. He would not sell liquor through anyone else until late February when Leading Aircraftman Charter, a steward attached to 80 Fighter Wing, came to him and asked if he had any liquor available for sale. Unfortunately, the ‘flaming Christmas present’ did not portend more action. Despite Caldwell’s claim that ‘we’re here, and we’re open for business anywhere, at any time, and against all comers’, the Japanese raids ceased shortly after the Spitfires arrived. It took some time for hope to dry up, however, and Caldwell flew almost daily on patrols and night defence.13 Flight Lieutenant Ted Sly recalled the first time Caldwell took Squadron Leader Bruce Watson and himself out over a Japanese strip. Caldwell led, and Sly and Watson followed. Caldwell went in and out quickly, but Sly and Watson caught the Japanese fire. Sly was not overly impressed and later said, ‘I was fingering my gun thinking I might give Clive a burst. Because you’re going in there and everything but the kitchen sink’s being thrown at you and old Clive’s in and out!’ But Sly soon realised Caldwell knew what he was doing. Caldwell told them that ‘I just wanted to show you boys what it’s like’.14 With the Japanese raids dwindling, it became apparent that the Spitfires would have to be deployed to another role. It was suggested that the Wing take on a standing night patrol over the Celebes. Caldwell disagreed with this suggestion because the transit time to get to and from the Celebes would exceed the actual time taken for the patrols and would result in unsustainable wear on the aircraft. In addition, there were dangers involved in actually getting to the Celebes because of the prevailing weather conditions. Other than local patrols, the Spitfires could only carry out nearby strafing activities because of their limited range.This fitted into the First TAF’s overall framework of neutralisation and destruction of both the enemy and enemy installations, but Caldwell quickly became dissatisfied with this use of his Spitfire Wing. Three aircraft were lost on strafing activities in January and Caldwell believed that the time spent in strafing was not likely to produce a return that would justify the loss of an aircraft. As he had found at Darwin, the risks far outweighed any operational benefit. Ultimately, he felt that:

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the targets we were attacking [and] the jobs we were doing were of fairly minute value because of the restrictions placed upon our aircraft, the limited range, the fact that we did not carry bombs and . . . [the] limitation to watercraft sweeps and defence of Morotai . . . I feel from my own experience that No. 80 Wing was a waste of money and a waste of time.15

In addition to his dissatisfaction with the Wing’s role, Caldwell was frustrated by the operations of First TAF and the overall operations of the RAAF. He did not believe that First TAF operations were effective and, for the main part, he found them wasteful. His own personal experience with First TAF showed that its provisioning and basic administration were inefficient, and he soon discovered that First TAF’s situation was representative of the RAAF as a whole. He always took an interest in the RAAF’s broader operations and he frequently analysed the intelligence reports so that he could obtain the latest information on the RAAF’s tactics and strategies. From his own experience, from talking to his comrades and from studying the intelligence reports, he formed the opinion that RAAF operations in the Pacific were ineffectual and wrong, and that its sphere of operations was second rate. Overall, he believed that, after almost six years, the RAAF had not effectively prosecuted the war. Caldwell’s growing dissatisfaction with his Morotai posting was exacerbated by the ever-present aircraft problems. Because the Spitfires and their spare parts had to come from England, and were subject to the vagaries of wartime shipping, the RAAF had constant problems maintaining serviceability. Caldwell had experienced many mechanical problems with the Spitfires during operations in Darwin, with a number of deaths directly attributed to these problems, and he had raised these issues on numerous occasions. But the problems continued. Caldwell was also frustrated on a more personal level—he was dissatisfied with the way his skills as a fighter pilot were being used. He was quite prepared to continue in the Air Force as long as there was a useful role for him. He did not want to be just ‘a member of a service, wearing a uniform, sitting round and not doing anything to justify the continued absence’16 from his wife and from his own personal aims and ambitions. Unless there was some useful appointment for him, he was at the stage where he was anxious to return to civilian life. Caldwell’s posting was due to cease in mid-February, so in early February he met with Air Commodore Cobby to find out if a replacement had 176


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been found for him, and to discuss a more suitable posting. Cobby had heard nothing and sent off a signal to RAAF Headquarters in Melbourne. Cobby was advised that Caldwell was to remain with First TAF until September. Caldwell had originally told Air Vice-Marshal Jones that he did not want an extension of his tour, and he told Cobby of this. Cobby advised that Jones would be coming through in two or three days and that Caldwell should speak with him then about the matter. Caldwell met with Jones and Cobby. By this stage, Jones would have been well aware that his original promises to Caldwell about this posting had not been realised and Caldwell emphasised to Jones and Cobby that he believed that he had just wasted his time over the last few months. He had not had the promised air fighting. He did not regard any future operations as being worthwhile and he wanted to be posted out as soon as possible. He knew that there was very little available to him at his current level and explained to Jones that the sort of thing he would have liked would be the command of RAAF Richmond, or some other posting of that ilk—if there was nothing that he could do usefully, he would at least like to be comfortable. Jones stated that there was very little that would be available to Caldwell on the mainland. Caldwell did not ask to be released from the RAAF at this meeting but he did mention that, given he considered the RAAF’s air war was over, he ‘would like to get out of the service’.17 Caldwell also told Cobby and Jones that his pilots were ‘brassed off ’ because they could not get a ‘worthwhile job to do’.18 Caldwell was told that the future, with the impending Oboe operations—a series of joint operations designed to retake Borneo—would bring more interesting work for him and his pilots. Caldwell, however, was not convinced and continued to press for a posting back to the mainland. Caldwell was not the only senior pilot disillusioned with the nature of operations and their inherent danger to pilots. Group Captain Wilfred Arthur of 81 Wing had also come to the conclusion that the operations he was carrying out were not worthwhile—that the returns were outweighed by the costs in almost every case. He believed ‘we were wasting time, endangering people’s lives and wasting valuable bombs and ammunition’.19 Arthur asked his intelligence officer, Flight Lieutenant Tyler, to prepare a balance sheet from operational reports from the preceding three months. The purpose of this balance sheet was to show the expenditure in pilots, aircraft, petrol, bombs and ammunition weighed against the damage reported on the enemy. 177


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Arthur met Air Commodore Cobby in January 1945 to discuss the balance sheet, and to plead the case that the operations were not worthwhile. Cobby looked at the figures and said they were interesting, and asked for copies of the balance sheet, relevant operational instructions and the intelligence appreciations.Arthur left the meeting believing that something positive would result. Cobby passed the balance sheet to his staff who showed him that the situation was not as bad as Arthur made out. Cobby told them to inform Arthur of this, but Arthur heard nothing. Once Arthur realised that Cobby was not going to take any action, he concluded that the operations were carried out with the connivance of First TAF.At that point,Arthur began sounding out others of like opinion and went to Morotai to find out if any other senior people there were interested in making a stand. The first person Arthur spoke to on arriving at Morotai was Wing Commander Kenneth Ranger. Ranger was closely involved with planning for the Oboe operations. Ranger and Arthur had known each other previously in New Guinea. Since his return from New Guinea, Ranger had been discontented with the RAAF, as well as with the current Oboe planning. Arthur found in Ranger someone who was particularly sympathetic to his own discontent and a ready ally in action. During Arthur and Ranger’s first discussion, they canvassed ways in which they could correct the state of affairs. They both felt strongly about the situation and thought about putting in their resignations, but they knew that if just two people tendered their resignation, it would have no practical effect. They knew, then, that they needed to enlist the help or sympathy of others.Arthur ‘wanted people who would be quite prepared to go right through with the business’.20 He believed that part of ensuring that best result was getting Caldwell involved. Arthur had previously spoken to Caldwell on a number of occasions about the worthless operations and he knew Caldwell was sympathetic to his opinions. Arthur particularly wanted Caldwell because, ‘I knew that if he did understand it, he would go as far as he possibly could to back up his opinions’.21 Wing Commander Gibbes and part of 79 Squadron arrived on Morotai on 9 March. The ship carrying the rest of 80 Fighter Wing’s personnel and vital equipment, as well as more liquor supplies for Caldwell, arrived a few days later. Soon after he arrived, Gibbes took temporary command of the Wing as Caldwell flew to the Philippines to negotiate participation of some of his Spitfires in a series of comparative 178


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trials with captured Japanese fighters and American fighters that was to be carried out by the Allied Technical Air Intelligence Unit. Caldwell agreed to provide four Spitfires and pilots for a three-week period. Arrangements were completed and Caldwell and his pilots, along with their escort and a C–47 transport which carried their equipment and supplies, departed on 23 March for Clark Field. After about two hours, Caldwell and his air party encountered a serious storm and attempted to battle their way through it.They lost the navigating aircraft and, after two and a half hours and missing Clark Field totally, landed exhausted at Dulag, a rough satellite landing ground. Caldwell’s engines were dead. He had been in the air four hours and forty minutes and he was out of fuel. He had almost not made it. Dulag had fuel facilities so they were able to carry on to Clark Field the next day. Before Caldwell had left Morotai, he had loaded the C–47 with a large quantity of liquor wrapped in sisalkraft to hide it from prying eyes. He also carried bottles in his Spitfire’s gun and cannon magazines.Three cases of the liquor had been a gift to Caldwell from Lieutenant Colonel Forrest Brissey of the 380th Bomb Group. Brissey was now in Manila and, as Caldwell’s pilots knew him too, Caldwell thought it would be a nice gesture if they all shared the gift together. Caldwell also planned to use his supplies for hospitality and to gain the use of jeeps and other equipment. In addition, he had received half a promise that they might be able to acquire a Japanese fighter to take back with them. Caldwell also thought he might be able to sell some of the bottles to help recoup his costs in providing alcohol for trade. He soon realised that this would not be easy on crowded Clark Field. The trials were originally expected to be carried out over a threeweek period but, once they arrived, Caldwell discovered that the captured Japanese aircraft were not yet ready for testing and the whole exercise would now take more than four weeks. Caldwell was not prepared to endure this extended period.As a consequence of Caldwell’s urging to be posted south, Wing Commander Glen Cooper had arrived at Morotai on 21 March to relieve Caldwell. Caldwell was now anxious to return and hand over his duties to Cooper. Caldwell left his personalised Spitfire behind so Flight Lieutenant Ted Sly could use it in the trials, and he returned to Morotai by Beaufighter. Sly took up Caldwell’s Spitfire, which was fitted with longrange fuel tanks, to test that there were no air pockets when switching 179


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from an empty tank to a full one. As soon as he switched tanks, the engine spluttered and stopped. He then switched off the electrical circuits. He did not have enough height, so he could not jettison the long-range tank. He turned back to Clark Field and landed with a full load of fuel, but Caldwell’s Spitfire did not survive the landing. It broke in two, and Ted Sly ‘can still see the 20mm cannons, sticking out of the ground like carrots, owing to the angle I hit the ground’.22 Sly was not seriously injured, and had to spend only a short spell in an American hospital. Caldwell never let Sly forget what he had done, and for many years after, if Sly walked into a club where Caldwell was already at the bar, Caldwell immediately would announce:‘Here he is—this is the bloke that spread CR–C across Clark Field!’23 Caldwell landed back at Morotai on 28 March and, expecting that he would soon be returning home, was surprised to hear that he would be appointed as Task Force Commander (Air) of the Oboe operations. Despite wanting to leave the theatre, Caldwell was not convinced that these operations would be successful and had concerns about the landing facilities—he believed that the airstrip was unsuitable for the scale of the operations. He was also worried that the supply lines would not be effective. He ‘felt that it was likely, getting further afield all the time as we were, that the supply of essentials would not be sufficient to maintain an operational commitment which we hoped to do in relation to the AIF’.24 Caldwell flew to Tarakan later that day ‘to confirm my estimate of the place and the associated problems of landing and securing it and those of proper air cover’. What he saw confirmed his belief that the air operations as planned would be a disaster. When he returned, he spoke with Cobby and Jones. He stressed that he believed the air component of the invasion would not be successful and that he did not want to have anything to do with it. Jones told Caldwell that he was a tactical leader only and that there were strategic aspects that did not concern Caldwell. Regardless of this, Caldwell felt that ‘to justify the trust of those whom I led in the air it was essential I have confidence in what was planned and its reasonable prospect of success’. Caldwell declined the appointment.25 Caldwell prepared to return to Australia and officially handed over his command to Wing Commander Cooper on 31 March. He still had a large supply of alcohol and, as was traditional when departing a posting, he would dispense a good supply to his pilots and unit commanders and make appropriate farewell gifts. However, he would still have a large 180


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stock left even after this and he could not take it with him to the mainland. He decided to sell it off. It was Easter time and Leading Aircraftman Charter asked Caldwell if he could sell some bottles on his behalf. Caldwell agreed and Charter, along with Corporal Ken Parker and Leading Aircraftman John Fitzroy, took the alcohol and sold it in the American camps. The next day Charter asked Caldwell for more to sell and Caldwell provided him with a large quantity and arranged for the use of a jeep to transport it. Charter, Fitzroy and Parker arrived at the American camp and Parker stayed with the jeep while the others took the liquor to the Americans. Long after they were expected back, it occurred to Parker that something had gone wrong. Parker went to Caldwell the next morning and told him that he thought Charter and Fitzroy had been apprehended by the service police. (Caldwell had not known before this that Fitzroy had been involved.) Caldwell thought that this was quite likely and asked Squadron Leader Rupert Dixon to phone around to verify if this was the case. Caldwell was concerned that the men had been apprehended, but he was also worried that perhaps they had been injured in some way. The men could not be located. The RAAF service police denied that they had Charter in custody, but Caldwell did not believe them. If Charter was in custody, Caldwell assumed that he would soon receive a visit from the service police, and he decided to remove his remaining stocks from his tent. There was a slit trench behind Dixon’s quarters so he asked if he could put it there, and if Dixon could keep an eye out for it. Dixon agreed, so Caldwell ordered a truck to move the alcohol. On 2 April, Caldwell was interviewed by Flying Officer Albert Schweppes, the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal, about providing alcohol to Charter and Fitzroy. Caldwell initially denied that Charter and Fitzroy were acting for him. Schweppes then conducted a search and located the stashed supplies. Later that day, Cobby sent Caldwell notification that, as a result of the investigation into his alleged trading, he had been suspended from his duties as Commanding Officer of 80 Fighter Wing. Cobby, or whoever actually wrote the letter, was unaware that Caldwell had already handed over to Wing Commander Cooper. Caldwell was again interviewed by Schweppes on 7 April and confirmed this time that he had supplied alcohol to Charter on a number of occasions. Caldwell, caught up in his own problems, was not so distracted that he could not look out for his men. Caldwell was at the officers’ mess shortly after his interviews with Schweppes and he sent word to Leading 181


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Aircraftman Stan Plowright to bring his personal jeep to the mess. Plowright stopped in front of a ‘strictly no admittance’ sign and walked up to the guard’s hut to let him know that he had brought Caldwell’s jeep. Just as he was telling the guard this, Caldwell appeared, so Plowright yelled out, ‘Sir, I’ve got your jeep.’ Caldwell waved to Plowright and responded,‘Good, bring it up.’ Plowright jumped back into the jeep and drove up to Caldwell, but the guard ran out and put him under arrest because he was out of bounds. Plowright called out to Caldwell, who walked down and put a hand on the sentry saying,‘I’ll handle this’. And he did. Stan Plowright would always be grateful for Caldwell’s intervention and never forgot it.26 On 9 April 1945, Caldwell prepared a statement that referred to the charges laid against Charter and Fitzroy. He indicated his own involvement in liquor transactions, but in an attempt to indicate that liquor transactions were condoned in First TAF, he stated that: ‘To my own certain knowledge and to the certain knowledge of others, a number of senior RAAF officers, including some senior to me in rank and appointment, have sold and traded liquor hereabouts . . .’ The next day, Caldwell was charged under Section 40 of the Air Force Act on five counts of ‘Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Air Force Discipline’ relating to his liquor transactions in contravention of Air Board Order ‘N’ 548 of 1944 (the Order). A court-martial was convened for 18 April. Because Caldwell’s defending officer, Flight Lieutenant John Davoren, could not attend, the trial did not commence until 21 April. Davoren then requested that the trial be adjourned so that he could prepare his defence and, because of operational requirements that made it impossible for the court to reconvene, Caldwell was released from arrest without prejudice to re-arrest and the court would be reassembled some time in the future. In response to Caldwell’s statement of 9 April, Cobby formally required Caldwell to provide details of his allegations. Caldwell provided that statement on 13 April 1945.27 In this statement, Caldwell alleged that he was aware of a number of specific instances involving trading and importing alcohol, including by Air Commodore Francis Bladin, now Deputy Chief of Air Staff. He also indicated that Cobby himself was witness to one instance relating to a liquor transaction. Caldwell’s allegations were treated very seriously. The Secretary of the Department of Air, Melville Langslow, MBE, wrote to the Secretary of the AttorneyGeneral’s Department to advise him of the nature of Caldwell’s 182


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allegations and the fact that they formed the basis of his defence, namely that he was not guilty of ‘conduct to the prejudice’ because Cobby and other senior officers had, by their actions and conduct, openly engaged in similar behaviour, thus abrogating the effect of the Order. Langslow, who was not a lawyer, was of the opinion that, if Caldwell’s allegations were correct, he had a sound defence to his charges and this could lead to acquittal. Langslow believed that it would be unfair for Caldwell to prove his allegations because he would not be able to force witnesses to answer questions where they might incriminate themselves. Langslow believed that in all fairness an independent inquiry should be set up to investigate the allegations before Caldwell’s court-martial could proceed any further. Langslow advised that the Minister for Air, Arthur Drakeford, had approved the establishment of an inquiry under the National Security (Inquiries) Regulations into the allegations made by Caldwell, and sought a recommendation for a suitable person, preferably a judge, to conduct the inquiry. Langslow also requested that the terms of reference be drafted. Because of the seriousness of the charges, Langslow stated that the inquiry should start at the earliest possible date. It was decided shortly after that John Vincent Barry KC would be appointed as commissioner to the inquiry.28 During this period, Group Captain Arthur was still sounding out officers who would support a stand against the RAAF. Despite his problems, Caldwell was still committed to taking a stand and he did not see that his impending court-martial would preclude him from participating as he did not consider that they were related. Caldwell suggested that Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes, Squadron Leader Bert Grace and Squadron Leader Doug Vanderfield would probably be interested, so Arthur spoke to them.Vanderfield suggested that Squadron Leader John Waddy would also be interested. Arthur now had a committed group— all members were dissatisfied with the current operations of the First TAF, and most of them had other experiences within the broader RAAF which added to their current exasperation. They had a number of immediate service links as well as varying degrees of friendship and common service links, and they decided to restrict the group’s numbers. Caldwell explained that the common factor upon which the group was based was: the fact that we did know each other very well; we had mutual confidence and mutual experience, which we believe has demonstrated sufficiently, to 183


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us at any rate, that the RAAF is not doing its job as it should . . . It would have been very easy indeed to have swelled this into a question of some thousands. It would have been very inadvisable to have done so, because it would have only excited a lot of people who had not yet formed an opinion based on careful thought in the matter.29

The members of the group frequently discussed the matters among themselves, depending on who was around at the time, but there were only three occasions on which they all met as a group to discuss their plans for action. The first meeting occurred on 6 April 1945 and was held at Squadron Leader Harpham’s quarters as it was the most central venue. Harpham had not been approached to join before this meeting, but after he arrived, he found that he was sympathetic to the views expressed and decided to join the protest. Arthur, Ranger and Caldwell were leading figures in the discussion. Arthur covered the operational aspects, Ranger covered administrative shortcomings and Caldwell urged immediate resignation, but the majority was not convinced that this was the right time.The meeting broke up with nothing conclusively planned but Arthur noted that Caldwell, ‘put our feelings fairly well when he said whatever we have to lose out of this, is nothing compared to what we probably risked before. Compared with risking our life, that was probably small.’30 The next meeting was called for 14 April 1945. It came about because the Oboe operations were starting shortly and they would be split up as a group.Accordingly, they wanted to make final arrangements before they were separated. However, they did not want to take action until after the Oboe operations. When Caldwell moved his liquor supplies behind Dixon’s tent, he had also hidden some of Gibbes’ supply, and Gibbes too had been investigated and charged with attempting to sell liquor. Gibbes’ court-martial was scheduled for 19 April and Arthur recognised that Caldwell and Gibbes’ involvement with the group could be interpreted as being an attempt to divert attention from their liquor problems.31 Despite his pending court-martial, Caldwell still expected to be posted out of the area and they agreed to a course of action that hinged upon his departure to Australia on leave.When Caldwell arrived back in Australia, he was to sound out the Minister for Air and the Honourable Joseph Abbott, member for New England. He would then write to each of the others, informing them of the results of the interviews. They 184


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would then each send Caldwell a telegram, ‘Many happy returns of the —th’. At that point, they would simultaneously submit their requests for permission to terminate their commissions. The dates of the ‘Happy Returns’ telegrams were to be the dates of the receipt of Caldwell’s letters and of the requests for termination of their commissions. This commitment to a plan of action had been strongly influenced by Ranger’s growing dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, the First TAF Headquarters staff regarding the equipment that would be taken by the RAAF on Oboe 1, the invasion of Tarakan. Ranger had become very vocal in his disagreements relating to the Oboe operations and had openly expressed them at a planning conference on 15 April.Arthur and Ranger then thought that it would be likely that they might be posted from the area sooner than originally anticipated so they arranged another meeting for 19 April. Flight Lieutenant Davoren, representing Caldwell in his court-martial, arrived on 19 April and the group invited him to join the meeting. Caldwell raised the subject of his court-martial. He indicated that it might be perceived that there could be a possible connection between any action that the group might take and his court-martial. The others agreed that there was no connection between the stance they wanted to take and the proceedings against Caldwell. Davoren asked if all of the officers were aware of the seriousness of their intentions. They assured him that they were not acting frivolously and that they had carefully considered the consequences of any action that they might take. The group decided that it had to act now, so the plans of the previous meeting were changed. The officers would submit their resignations immediately. Davoren then wrote the applications for permission to resign. The applications were all identically worded and indicated that they were to take effect immediately.They then submitted their applications the next day. Cobby was surprised at this action and he interviewed all of the applicants except Caldwell. He decided not to interview Caldwell because of the impending court-martial, and because of what he believed to be Caldwell’s threatening letter, which included Cobby in its allegations. Cobby was not able to discover why the officers wanted to resign, so, given the pending Tarakan operation, he decided to advise Air Vice-Marshal Bostock. Bostock arrived on 21 April 1945 and, supporting Cobby’s stance, interviewed everyone but Caldwell. The next day, Bostock sent a signal to RAAF Headquarters. Some of the key points in this signal were that Bostock believed the morale 185


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throughout First TAF to be ‘at a dangerously low level’; that seven officers had submitted their resignations, with no reasons, and that despite his interviewing them, no reasons were forthcoming; ‘that the attitude of the seven officers . . . is a reliable index to the widespread dissatisfaction which pervades the whole TAF’; and that there was a general belief that ‘TAF HQ staff is incompetent, arrogant to a degree . . . and is generally unhelpful’.32 Bostock requested that Air Commodore Frederick Scherger relieve Cobby, and that Cobby’s staff, Group Captain William Gibson and Group Captain Robert Simms, should be replaced.33 Shortly after, Air Vice-Marshal George Jones arrived on the island and interviewed the officers separately. Again Caldwell was left out of the interviews. General George Kenney had been alerted to the situation by Bostock and he also came to the island to interview the seven officers. After Jones had completed his investigation he indicated to Drakeford that he agreed with Bostock’s request to replace Cobby, Gibson and Simms. Arthur and the other officers felt vindicated by this result but it was not the only thing that they wanted for their efforts. They also wanted an inquiry into the operations of the First TAF in particular and the RAAF in general. Caldwell had been growing more and more anxious to return to the mainland since the adjournment of his court-martial. He was not being interviewed as part of the investigation into the resignations and he was without a posting. Transport south was a problem, but he and Gibbes, who had also been posted south, finally arranged a lift to Darwin in a Catalina flying boat captained by Wing Commander Robin Gray. Soon after take-off, Gray told them that they had had a lucky escape— a marker boat had been out of position and, while Gray thought they had been flying over clear water, they had actually just skimmed over a reef near the headland. The rest of the trip went well and Caldwell was soon back in Australia and reunited with Jean.

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TWELVE 1

The Barry Inquiry

I am not at all surprised at the result of the Inquiry, because, apart from the liquor trading, there were more serious issues involved.2 The press had been advised as early as 17 April 1945 that Caldwell was to be court-martialled for a charge related to illegal trading, but no specifics of the case were released. In its 21 April edition, Smith’s Weekly announced that Caldwell’s suspension from duty related to liquor transactions. It also reported that the Air Board was apparently ‘most gravely disturbed at the situation’ and that it feared public and political opinion. A number of short reports about Caldwell’s charges and impending court-martial appeared over the next few days but the public reaction, if any, was only lukewarm. There were no requests for censure and no strident requests for more information.3 Public reaction, however, heated up when the first stories relating to the joint resignations appeared. The fact that eight RAAF officers, including aces, public identities and well-decorated heroes, had jointly resigned for no stated reason was enough for the public, but the Daily Telegraph4 soon acknowledged that interest had been accentuated because Caldwell was involved. Smith’s Weekly5 immediately demanded a public statement from Drakeford, and parliamentarians such as Australian Flying Corps hero, Group Captain Thomas White, and Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Brigadier Eric Harrison, requested more information. Senator Hattil Foll, the former Minister for Information, Mr William Morris ‘Billy’ Hughes and officials from ex-services organisations all demanded an open inquiry into the resignations.6 187


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Air Vice-Marshal George Jones considered that a service inquiry would be appropriate to look into the reasons behind the resignations and had been proceeding along those lines. Before the inquiry into liquor trading and Caldwell’s allegations was formally announced, Drakeford made a statement to the House. On 15 May, he stated that Caldwell’s court-martial had been suspended because of his allegations implicating other personnel, and announced that John Vincent Barry KC had been appointed as commissioner of an inquiry to investigate these matters. He stated that ‘Mr Barry will commence his Inquiry immediately upon terms of reference sufficiently wide to embrace any matters in issue or anything reasonably incidental to them’.7 The press took this to mean that the inquiry would focus on the resignations. Caldwell was not actually aware that an inquiry was going to be held until he read about it in the Sydney papers a few days before it commenced. He quickly went to Melbourne to find out more about it. Publicly, he favoured an open inquiry and expressed pleasure at Barry’s appointment: ‘It looks as if things are moving along in the right direction.’8 He made no comment about how the inquiry would deal with his allegations and his liquor trading. The ‘Inquiry into Certain Questions Related to ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944 and Certain Questions Relating to Applications for Permission to Resign their Commissions by Eight Officers of the Royal Australian Air Force’ (the Barry Inquiry) opened to great public excitement on 16 May 1945 at RAAF Headquarters in Melbourne. Both the press and parliamentarians alike had called for an open inquiry, and Flight Lieutenant John Davoren, who was conducting Caldwell’s defence, informed Barry that Caldwell also wanted the Inquiry to be open to the public because he believed that considerable publicity had already been given to some of the matters to be covered in the Inquiry and ‘he feels that, in justice to himself, his own attitude, as will be indicated by evidence on his part, should receive equal publicity’.9 Despite the numerous requests for a public inquiry, Barry decided to hold it in private because current operations would be discussed. Although Caldwell would have preferred to conduct his defence in public, he had recognised that it was likely that the Inquiry would be held in camera and had stated earlier that if the Inquiry was closed to the public,‘he was confident everything would be done to ensure that the Inquiry was a most exhaustive one, so that the truth would emerge’.10 188


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The Inquiry was initially established under National Security Regulations. Clauses 1 to 7 of the terms of reference specifically referred to liquor trading and importation and were designed to cover as broadly as possible both Caldwell’s actions and his allegations that other unnamed and named members of the RAAF were involved in similar activities. In his Statement to the House, Drakeford did not specifically mention that the Inquiry would cover the resignations of the officers, but Clause 8 of the final terms of reference, dated 11 May 1945, stated that the resignations would be inquired into, but only as they related to Caldwell’s actions.11 Editorials, such as ‘What is Wrong in the RAAF’ and ‘To Probe Unrest in RAAF’, focussed on the reasons why the eight officers sought permission to resign.12 They revealed that the airmen had grievances relating to valueless operations and they called for an investigation to reveal the extent to which the RAAF was to blame for these grievances. It would not be feasible for Barry to inquire into the whole RAAF and, although the RAAF did not particularly want this sort of scrutiny, Drakeford agreed to an extension of the original terms of reference. Shortly after it opened, the Inquiry was extended under Air Force Regulations to enable Commissioner Barry to conduct his enquiries outside Australia, and the terms of reference were also broadened to inquire into the operations of the First TAF, but not those of the RAAF as a whole. The relevant period covered by the Inquiry was 1 August 1944 to 1 May 1945, inclusive. For ease of reference, the Inquiry became known as the Barry Inquiry. Over the years, the stance taken by the eight officers became known as the ‘Morotai Mutiny’. This latter phrase, however, was not publicly known at the time and it did not gain popular currency until many years later. As the main instigator of the ‘Morotai Mutiny’, Commissioner Barry questioned Group Captain Arthur about his reasons for his actions. Arthur was then asked, ‘This gets very close to mutiny, does it not’, and Arthur responded, ‘Yes. I meant to make as big a fuss as I possibly could with the object of getting the position corrected.’13 Arthur may have agreed that the stand was close to mutiny, but he did not seriously entertain the thought that he and his comrades might stand trial on that charge because he believed that if they ‘lay ourselves open to any charge of mutiny, we might lessen the force of what we were doing . . . It occurred to us, but we did not seriously think, or I did not, anyhow, that we would be charged with mutiny.’Arthur conceded that it was possible that some might consider that their conduct was mutinous, 189


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and also claimed that they were prepared to commit mutiny, in the true sense of the word, as a final resort.14 It seems as if the popular title for their actions comes from the aide memoir that Arthur drew up, which detailed the group’s claims and aims. This was originally headed ‘Morotai Mutiny?’ The word ‘Morotai’ was eventually crossed out and a question mark followed ‘Mutiny’.15 Barry evidently satisfied himself that the eight officers had no real intentions towards mutiny, and he did not comment on the potentially mutinous actions in his Report. Caldwell was one of the first witnesses to the Barry Inquiry and over the next few months he gave evidence seven times. His first appearance lasted three days. In his report, Barry followed the basic thrust of the allegations detailed in Caldwell’s 13 April statement, but he also dealt with the matters Caldwell raised in his 9 April statement. Caldwell knew that his alleged breaches of the Air Board order would be treated seriously, and he felt that he might be discriminated against in any future action and indicated this in his 9 April statement: . . . while I quite understand that it is the intention to take disciplinary action against me I feel entitled to ask you to protect me against discriminating punishment . . . This operational tour, in its absence of true operations, has been a big disappointment to me and I am not reassured by the prospects of appointments available to me at home. Therefore, if it is fact that this incident is the opportunity to make an example of me, I respectfully request that my commission be terminated.16

Barry carefully considered Caldwell’s suggestion of potential discrimination and earnestly inquired into the reasons why Caldwell would have felt that way. Caldwell told Barry that he thought that his liquor trading would probably be ‘seized on in some quarters as “well, he has left himself open now, this is it”’. He felt that ‘had it been a Group Captain . . . with more conventional views, he would not have been court-martialled’.17 Caldwell believed that on many occasions he had been treated badly. Group Captain Robert Simms, who was on Cobby’s staff, was responsible for his ‘unwelcome’ when he returned to Australia in 1942. Simms also, according to Flight Lieutenant Frank Quinn, former 1 Fighter Wing intelligence officer, had accused Quinn of incorrectly crediting Caldwell with ungained victories. Simms denied that he 190


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had made this statement, but their strained relationship was obvious during the Barry Inquiry, with Caldwell alluding to unresolved difficulties between them during Caldwell’s Darwin postings. Certainly Caldwell maintained his dislike of Simms long after the war and thought him ‘a mean spirited little coot with plenty of ability and a nasty nature’.18 Given their difficulties, and the fact that Simms would be the convening officer of his court-martial, it was not unreasonable for Caldwell to believe that he might be treated less than fairly. However, despite his opinions and feelings, ultimately Caldwell could not substantiate why he felt that he would be discriminated against. As well as carefully investigating Caldwell’s suggestion of discrimination, Barry also paid particular attention to Caldwell’s requests to resign or terminate his commission.Although Caldwell had jointly submitted a request for permission to resign his commission with Group Captain Arthur and the other six officers, he had requested something similar in his 9 April statement. Caldwell had earlier hinted that he would like to resign his commission to Jones and Cobby but by doing so in this context it seemed as if he were trying to escape from the ramifications of the liquor trafficking charges. In a sense he was. He knew that if he were court-martialled,‘it could hardly be without public comment’ and that it would bring distress to his wife and embarrassment to both her and himself. On a more practical level, he also felt that if, as was possible, he were to be reduced in rank: I would not be doing a very useful job in the Air Force and I might as well be out of it. That might be a fair contention for the Air Force. If I can be useful as a Group Captain I would hardly be working at maximum capacity as a Flying Officer, and therefore would be better out of the Service, and that purpose could be achieved without scandal either way and without undue fuss . . . I felt that it might easily be the wish on the part of some people for me to get out of the service.19

Despite Caldwell’s assessment, there was no provision for resignation of commission during wartime, and the RAAF was not disposed to place Caldwell on the reserve list and let him shuffle off quietly. The fact that he had already requested permission to resign made Barry suspect Caldwell’s motives in the joint application. Flight Lieutenant Davoren carefully prepared Caldwell’s defence against the liquor trading charges and, for the main part, based it on the 191


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Judge Advocate General’s ruling in two similar court-martials. The first case was where Squadron Leader Kenneth Grant was charged under Section 40 of the Imperial Air Force Act with conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline in that he sold liquor to an airman at Port Moresby in November 1943.At that time, there was no Air Force Regulation or Air Board Order prohibiting the introduction of alcohol by RAAF agencies or personnel into operational areas outside Australia.The Judge Advocate General determined that, in the absence of some civil law or order prohibiting the sale, Grant had not been guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. Since then, there had been a number of Air Board Orders relating to liquor importation to operational areas outside Australia, the most recent being ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944. At the time Caldwell carried out his liquor trading, he was not aware of that latest order, which had not been promulgated in the First TAF routine orders. To his knowledge, then, he had been acting in an environment where there was no civil law or order prohibiting his actions. The Grant ruling was important for Caldwell’s case because it had created the impression that unless liquor transactions could be shown to be in disregard of a specific prohibition or to amount to engaging in trade, they would not fall within Section 40 of the Air Force Act. Davoren also drew on the Judge Advocate General’s ruling in the Cook case. Here, Squadron Leader Harold Cook had been charged with a number of offences, including a charge under Section 40 of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline in that he had bought and sold liquor and cigarettes while he commanded 33 Squadron. Because of a material misdirection on a question of law by the Judge Advocate, the Judge Advocate General advised that the finding could not be confirmed. Among other things, the Judge Advocate General stated that the transactions were only illustrative of the general conditions within New Guinea; that they involved the use of RAAF aircraft; and that the importation and sale were carried out with the knowledge and approval of senior officers. The Judge Advocate General’s opinion was that Cook could not be found guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline if he engaged in activities of which his seniors were aware. This opinion created the general impression that, if senior officers indulged in certain behaviour in apparent breach of an order, that order would be abrogated. Before Barry detailed the results of his Inquiry and his findings on the terms of reference, he took great care in describing how he saw the 192


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current legal position of the matters covered by ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944 as well as Section 40 of the Air Force Act and how they impinged on Caldwell’s activities and his allegations. In doing this, he established an interpretative framework based on an alternative interpretation of precedent court-martials. The result of this was that he demolished Davoren’s defence strategy. First, Barry considered that the Judge Advocate General’s ruling in the Grant case was erroneous. He was of the opinion that Section 40 was designed in the widest terms and, accordingly, it was immaterial that there was no civil law or Air Board order prohibiting sale or import of alcohol.20 Barry saw that the essential aspects of the case were that the price at which the sale occurred was grossly exorbitant, the vendor was an officer, and the purchaser was a leading aircraftman. Barry thought that the transaction amounted to profiteering by an officer and that was plainly disruptive to discipline. It was his opinion that in these circumstances the court-martial would have been entitled to convict Grant of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. Barry also did not agree with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General in the Cook case. Once again, he found that profiteering existed and that, properly directed by the Judge Advocate, a court-martial would have been entitled to convict Cook. Barry decided that it would afford no defence to show that officers senior to the accused had used RAAF facilities to import alcohol for their own consumption. Barry noted that there was considerable demand for liquor by American personnel who had ready supplies of cash but no liquor within their own forces, and that they were prepared to pay high prices for liquor that was brought into the area. RAAF officers were generally the only ones who had the wherewithal to purchase and import spirits and Barry stated that ‘the mere fact that there were established market prices indicated there was extensive trading in spirits for cash’. He noted that the majority of witnesses agreed that trafficking was extensive. He also acknowledged that the conditions in the South-West Pacific Area were uncomfortable, harsh and monotonous and the ‘almost universal custom’ of importation had no adverse effect on discipline and assisted ‘in some degree to alleviate the trying conditions of service in the South-West Pacific Area’. As long as it was for personal use, Barry had no problem with importation. He also accepted that there were instances where exchanges of liquor for equipment and services with the Americans took place and that it had ‘been very 193


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general and I am disposed to think there is no practicable way of preventing it, and that it would be impossible to enforce effectively any order prohibiting it’. Barry reasoned that, although personal importation was technically a breach, it was not something that was really supposed to have been covered by the Order, and so was not actually a breach. Despite Barry’s interpretation, the Order specifically stated which actions were forbidden or allowed—it did not include an exemption for personal consumption or use. Barry’s interpretation disregarded the accepted method of legal interpretation that the meaning and the purpose are to be ascertained from the text. His interpretation here made it virtually impossible for Davoren to prove that the behaviour of senior officers within First TAF had abrogated the effects of the Order. Barry noted that where importation had been proven, it was, aside from Caldwell’s and Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes’ importations, largely for personal consumption or gratuitous disposal. Barry’s interpretative framework provided that, although technically a breach of the Order, this behaviour was allowable and of no adverse consequence to discipline. But personal importation was only one aspect of the Order. The Order also applied to selling alcohol, and Barry believed that selling for profit was in a totally different category from importation for personal consumption or gratuitous disposition. Barry believed, ‘it would be hopeless to argue that a disregard of the prohibition against importation could amount to such contempt of the order that the prohibition against sale ceased to be operative’. Barry’s questioning of Caldwell clearly indicated that he was concerned by the fact that Caldwell had been engaged in profiteering and he thought that the profits made were grossly exorbitant. Barry noted that there was an essential difference between Caldwell’s actions and those alleged by him in his 13 April statement. Barry considered that Caldwell had indulged in profiteering through the agency of lower-ranked airmen but his allegations had not touched on other instances of profiteering. He had just provided examples of importation. Other than Gibbes, Caldwell did not name any other officer who had sold alcohol for cash, and he did not want to make any allegations relating to selling for cash. He stated in his testimony that he did not wish to pursue this. Basically, Caldwell could not prove that his transactions occurred within a condoned culture of profiteering—after all, who would admit to profiteering—and he did not attempt to do so. Instead, 194


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he used the lesser, and more generally occurring, actions of personal importation as the basis of his allegations. Barry, however, would not accept Caldwell’s attempt to shift the focus away from profiteering. He inquired exhaustively in order to ascertain if other instances existed. He even detailed two officers of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch to make inquiries at Townsville and Cairns, the two possible sources of supply; and examined bank accounts and paybooks of a number of officers. Other than Caldwell and Gibbes, Barry could find no other evidence of selling within First TAF. Barry further disregarded Davoren’s defence strategy when he drew on the legal standard of general application. He stated that the issue was not whether the conduct charged was prejudicial to good order and Air Force discipline within a particular unit or formation but its application to the Air Force as a whole. The governing legislation was Air Force legislation and, accordingly, the behaviour examined had to be seen in the context of the broader Air Force, rather than the narrower First TAF. But Caldwell’s allegations referred to officers within First TAF and the terms of reference had been framed to specifically refer to the First TAF and not the RAAF in general. Accordingly, Davoren ran his defence in relation to actions carried out by First TAF officers. The majority of witnesses to the Inquiry were members of First TAF. With Barry applying the standard of general application in a situation where the behaviour of only a specific section of the RAAF was being investigated, Davoren’s defence could not succeed.21 In addition, Barry determined that, where senior officers were also found to have engaged in conduct that might have been calculated to prejudice good order and Air Force discipline, their involvement could only be used for mitigation of punishment or to establish extenuating circumstances—it could not be used as defence. Ultimately, then, Barry rejected every aspect of Davoren’s defence and, indeed, the defence itself. Under the first term of reference, Barry was obliged to investigate whether any member of the First TAF purchased, imported, sold or otherwise disposed of alcohol in breach of the Order, and the quantities involved. He found that practically every officer of First TAF who had been called as a witness admitted to bringing liquor into the South-West Pacific Area from the Australian mainland. He recognised that this was a general practice but was satisfied that the alcohol was for their own personal consumption, or for consumption by their friends. He named 195


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members of First TAF who had purchased liquor in breach of the Order; who had imported liquor for consumption by themselves or friends; who had imported in breach of the Order but only for consumption in messes; and who had sold liquor for cash or exchanged for commodities. Barry found that a number of senior officers were in breach of the Order to some degree. These included Air Commodore Cobby, group captains Gibson and Simms and Wing Commander Cooper. Only Caldwell and Wing Commander Gibbes were found to have imported liquor for both personal consumption and sale. Caldwell’s assertions in relation to this term of reference were proven. The second term of reference required Barry to determine whether Air Commodore Cobby had been aware of any purchases, importations, sales or disposals of alcohol and what he had done about it. Caldwell did not specifically name Cobby in his 9 April statement, but it is likely that the catch-all statement ‘a number of senior RAAF officers, senior to me in rank and appointment, have sold and traded liquor hereabout . . .’ implied a reference to Cobby. In his 13 April statement, Caldwell provided specific details of Cobby’s involvement. Caldwell indicated that Cobby was present when Air Commodore Bladin’s pilot spoke of his failed attempt to trade whisky for cigarettes; he related a second-hand story that involved Cobby’s aircraft taking alcohol to Morotai; and he stated Wing Commander Leslie Jackson had a large cheque from Cobby to pay for a prospective liquor purchase. Barry found that Cobby was not aware of any purchases of alcoholic liquor in breach of the Order. He also found that, other than the sales of liquor by Caldwell,Wing Commander Gibbes, Corporal Parker, Leading Aircraftman Charter and Leading Aircraftman Fitzroy, which were all revealed as a consequence of Flying Officer Schweppes’ investigation, Cobby was not aware of any sales of liquor in breach of the Order. Barry also found that Cobby was not aware of any other disposals of liquor. In addition, Barry found that Wing Commander Jackson did not have any cheque from Cobby and, although Cobby was present when Bladin’s pilot raised the subject of his failed attempt to trade whisky for cigarettes, Barry could find no evidence to support Caldwell’s allegations about Bladin. Cobby may not have been aware of purchases and sales of liquor, but Barry found that he was aware of a number of importations after the fact and that he took no disciplinary steps in relation to them.These included importations by both of his staff members, Gibson and Simms. Barry also 196


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found that Cobby himself had arranged to import liquor, namely two cases of beer, in breach of the Order.When he arranged this importation, Cobby was aware of the provisions of the Order, but he thought that the Order related to trafficking in liquor and that his importation, being of a personal nature, did not contravene the spirit of the Order. Ultimately, Barry determined that Caldwell’s claim that Cobby was involved with liquor trading was only borne out to a certain extent. Under the third term of reference, Barry had to determine if Air Commodore Bladin had imported any liquor into the area and, if he had done so, whether he had sold it for cash, exchanged it for any commodity, or disposed of it in any other way.The basis for this term of reference was an incident that Caldwell witnessed during a poker game in Cobby’s quarters at Command House. Caldwell alleged that Squadron Leader Colin Lindeman had spoken to Bladin about his failed attempt to trade alcohol for cigarettes. Barry noted some inconsistencies between Caldwell’s allegation in his 13 April statement about Squadron Leader Lindeman and his testimony. He noted that the verbatim conversation did not coincide with the two accounts that he had made under oath. Despite the discrepancies, Barry was satisfied that Caldwell, who had been a ‘most candid witness’, had given a truthful recollection of the incident. He determined that the most significant evidence of Caldwell’s truthfulness was that it would have been unlikely that Caldwell would write a false description of the Command House incident to Cobby who had also been present at it. However, Caldwell’s account was not corroborated by any other witness. Despite close questioning of all witnesses, Barry found that this allegation against Bladin had not been substantiated. The term of reference in relation to Bladin extended further than just the Command House incident and Barry found that on one occasion Bladin imported four bottles of whisky and four bottles of gin. Bladin was not aware at the time that he brought this alcohol into the area that he was breaching the Order. Barry also found that Bladin did not sell any liquor for money but had disposed of his imported liquor gratuitously. Barry also investigated another incident relating to Bladin. Acting on an anonymous tip-off, Customs officers went to Hut 11 at Essendon aerodrome on 23 January 1945.There, they found over 40000 American cigarettes in a number of loose cartons and a large tin. The customs officers were of the opinion that the cigarettes had not been there very long and Barry found that the only aircraft returning from the north on that day was the Hudson in which Bladin and Lindeman were 197


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passengers. Barry investigated this incident carefully to ascertain who owned the cigarettes and if Bladin was involved. From the evidence before him, he inferred that the cigarettes had arrived on the Hudson on which Bladin was a passenger but, despite close questioning, Barry could ascertain no direct evidence that Bladin or Lindeman knew that the cigarettes were on the aircraft. Nor could he find who had been responsible for removing them and placing them in Hut 11. The fourth term of reference required Barry to determine if Air Commodore Hippolyte De La Rue had imported any liquor into the area and, if he had done so, whether he had sold it for cash, exchanged it for any commodity, or disposed of it in any other way. Despite the implication in Caldwell’s 13 April statement that he knew of the incident where Air Commodore De La Rue exchanged whisky for an American carbine, Barry found that Caldwell had no personal knowledge of the exchange and that he was only relying on his memory of what Squadron Leader John Toohey had told him in a conversation. Barry was not able to ascertain if Caldwell’s memory of that conversation was faulty or if Toohey gave an account that he was not prepared to repeat under oath during the Inquiry. However, he was satisfied that Caldwell honestly believed that his allegation was true. De La Rue testified that he did acquire a carbine as a gift, and his account was substantiated by Air Commodore Cobby, Group Captain Gibson and De La Rue’s personal assistant. Barry found that Caldwell’s allegation was unsubstantiated, but he did find that De La Rue had imported six bottles of gin and that he disposed of them gratuitously. Under the fifth term of reference, Barry had to investigate whether alcohol had been imported from the mainland of Australia in RAAF aircraft to areas in which units under the command of First TAF were located. If this had occurred, he also had to determine who had done so, by what aircraft and the quantities involved. From the evidence provided, he saw that the system of checking and inspecting aircraft within the First TAF was insufficient to prevent any determined person from bringing alcohol into the area. Barry recognised that many personnel had taken advantage of this situation.Although it was not possible to gain evidence that would reveal the true extent of this, practically every witness was asked whether they used RAAF aircraft to import liquor and many officers, including Bladin, Cobby, De La Rue, Gibson, Simms, Gibbes, Arthur and Caldwell, candidly admitted that they had. Accordingly, Barry found that these officers had imported liquor from mainland 198


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Australia in RAAF aircraft in breach of the Order. Barry also found that Caldwell’s specific allegations of transporting alcohol to the area by RAAF aircraft had been substantiated. The sixth term of reference required Barry to determine if Cobby had been aware of any instances where alcohol had been imported in RAAF aircraft and, if he had been so aware, what had he done about it. Barry found that Cobby had been aware of eight instances of importation of liquor using RAAF aircraft, other than the importation in his own aircraft in April 1945. Cobby did not regard any of those importations as being in breach of the Order and he did not take any disciplinary action in respect of any of these importations. With the seventh term of reference Barry had to determine whether Caldwell’s allegations were true and, if so, whether senior First TAF officers, other than Caldwell, had abrogated the effect of the Order. Barry defined ‘abrogate’ as ‘put an end to’ or ‘set aside’ and indicated that, legally, the Order would remain binding until it was revoked by the legislative agency that had made it, or the legislative provisions from which that agency’s authority derived had been repealed. Neither of these events had occurred, so Barry interpreted this term of reference as imposing on him the duty to determine whether the substantiated allegations had resulted in the Order being so disregarded that Caldwell’s conduct could not be to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline. Although Caldwell’s allegation in relation to Air Commodore Bladin could not be substantiated and there was no evidence to support the allegation about Air Commodore De La Rue’s carbine, Barry found that a number of Caldwell’s allegations were true. He found that the allegations concerning Gibbes, Cobby’s use of his own aircraft for importation, Group Captain Gibson’s importation by Beaufort, and the importations by Kittyhawk flights were true. He also accepted that Caldwell was given a sum of money at Noemfoor to take back to Darwin to pay for the alcohol imported by Gibson, and that Gibson asked Caldwell to arrange with Group Captain Watson to send a supply of liquor from Darwin. Despite finding that these allegations were true, ultimately Barry found that ‘the senior officers of the First TAF other than Group Captain Caldwell did not by their actions and conduct abrogate the effect of ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944 so far as First TAF is concerned’. The eighth term of reference required Barry to determine whether the applications by eight RAAF officers for permission to resign their commissions in the RAAF were in any way connected with Caldwell’s 199


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disciplinary proceedings or the operational activities with the First TAF between 1 November 1944 and 19 April 1945, inclusive. Barry recognised that the nature of First TAF’s role was: Undoubtedly a conditioning factor of great importance in the state of affairs that developed . . . Inevitably it produced a feeling of being in a backwater, as it were, far removed from the progress of the Pacific war. This feeling was not dissipated by knowledge of the forthcoming operations against the enemy in Borneo. I have no doubt that a considerable amount of effort was expended by the Wings within First TAF on useless targets.

Vindicating their stand, Barry found that the officers were entitled to conclude that the operations upon which they were engaged were wasteful and unnecessary. He was satisfied that,‘upon the facts known to them . . . Group Captains Arthur and Caldwell, and Squadron Leaders Gibbes, Waddy and Grace sincerely believed, upon the information at their disposal, that the operations which they have described at length in their evidence were of no real value in the prosecution of the war’. In addition, he found that the two main factors that brought about the condition in First TAF were the operations carried out by the Wings and the attitude of group captains Simms and Gibson. He concluded that, as Air Commodore Cobby had been unaware that a state of discontent and dissatisfaction had developed and existed, he had failed to maintain proper control of his command. Accordingly, Barry was satisfied that the applications by Arthur, Ranger, Gibbes, Waddy, Grace, Vanderfield and Harpham to resign their commissions were not connected with Caldwell’s disciplinary proceedings or the matters referred for inquiry in the other terms of reference. He considered that the immediate cause of their applications for permission to resign their commissions was their dissatisfaction with the operational activities of First TAF. In determining the reasons behind Caldwell’s application to resign, Barry paid particular attention to Caldwell’s 13 April statement. He found that the disciplinary proceedings against Caldwell were one of the reasons for his initial request to terminate his commission, and his later application for permission to resign his commission. Barry also considered that, while Caldwell was greatly disappointed by the absence of any opportunity to provide real operational service with First TAF and believed that the operations carried out by First TAF were of no great 200


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value, his motivating factor was his feeling that the RAAF offered no prospects for him rather than any strongly held disapproval of the operational activities of First TAF. The final term of reference was a catch-all—if Barry came across anything else that was relevant, he could inquire into it.As Barry had already dealt with any other relevant matters in the first eight terms of reference, such as the Essendon cigarettes, there was nothing to report on here. When questioned, Caldwell did not deny his behaviour. He frankly admitted to importing, selling for profit and exchanging liquor for equipment and services, but he did not believe that his behaviour was contrary to Air Force discipline. Unfortunately, he could not prove that his behaviour was nothing extraordinary in a culture that appeared to him to condone breaches of the Order. He could not prove this because of lack of evidence in some instances and because Barry had interpreted away the main platforms of his defence, as well as the defence itself. The end of the war did not bring about the end of the Barry Inquiry. The last day of sitting was 27 August 1945. During the course of the Inquiry, evidence had been taken in Melbourne,Townsville, Morotai and Leyte. In all, 107 witnesses were examined under oath and 137 exhibits were tendered. Barry completed his 72000-word report on 14 September 1945 and referred it to the Minister for Air, Arthur Drakeford. As well as his findings in relation to the terms of reference, Barry had also looked at the general conditions of the RAAF, the command situation and other administrative matters. Drakeford referred the report to the Air Board. He requested that the Air Board review the report and advise him of its recommendations for disciplinary action. Before referring the report, Air Vice-Marshal Jones decided to pass it to the Air Member for Personnel, Air Commodore Joseph Hewitt, for consideration. Hewitt later recalled that, in reality, Jones did not expect him to take any actions on Barry’s findings, and he did not give the report priority.22 Hewitt recommended that disciplinary action should be taken against Caldwell, but he did not stop there. Barry had noted that, except in Caldwell’s case, disciplinary action had been carried out where it was justified and possible. Hewitt, however, did not fully agree with Barry’s position. He believed that it was impossible to ignore that liquor importation had been permitted, and that those importations had been on a large scale. In his report to Jones recommending further action he stated that: 201


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If there had been no forbidden importations, there would have been little opportunity for trafficking. Consequently, the failure to enforce the Order in respect of importation must have provided a basis which permitted trafficking to take place. The Commissioner has found that Air Commodore Cobby was aware that liquor was imported and took no disciplinary action . . . Furthermore, Air Commodore Cobby imported three [sic] cases of beer to Morotai in his own aircraft. At the time he was aware of the provisions of the ABO ‘N’ 548/44. The Commissioner said ‘there can be no doubt, however, that his action was a breach of ABO “N” 548/44 . . .’ Air Commodore Cobby as AOC was charged with the enforcement of Air Board Orders within his Command, and it was quite improper for him to openly breach such an Order, or to permit others to do so. If he had carried out his duties, and enforced the Order in this respect, trafficking would have been made much more difficult, if not prevented.23

Hewitt decided that Cobby must accept responsibility for what had occurred within his command, and that the Air Board should hold him responsible for a ‘grave dereliction of duty’. Hewitt believed that there was no alternative but to terminate Cobby’s appointment. In addition, for their part in the widespread discontent within the First TAF, Hewitt also recommended the termination of Gibson’s and Simm’s appointments.24 Despite recommending that Caldwell’s disciplinary hearing should go ahead, Hewitt’s opinion of Cobby’s culpability in relation to personal importation of liquor and failure to stamp out trafficking within his command actually vindicated Caldwell’s stance that he had been operating within a culture that had condoned trafficking. When Barry’s report had landed on his desk, Hewitt had ‘reflected how much more palatable the situation would have been for me had a service inquiry been convened in the first instance . . .’25 Given Hewitt’s opinion of Cobby’s blameworthiness and that a RAAF inquiry would have been unlikely to dismiss the Judge Advocate General’s recent findings in similar liquor trafficking cases, perhaps Davoren’s defence strategy would have been accepted by a service inquiry. The Air Board considered the Barry Report on 5 October. Despite the issues raised by Barry relating to the conditions within the RAAF it did not consider that there was any need for a general review of the situation. It decided that there was no doubt that the disciplinary proceedings that had been initiated against Caldwell should be reinstituted and 202


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The Barry Inquiry

that these should be carried out.Air Board decided that, instead of terminating their appointments, Cobby should be demobilised and that Gibson and Simms should be censured. Hewitt, however, dissented, and reiterated the reasons he had earlier provided to Jones. Drakeford agreed with Hewitt’s position and asked the Air Board to review its decision. The Air Board did so, but did not consider that there was any reason to vary its previous decision. Drakeford, however, considered Hewitt’s original recommendations in relation to Cobby, Gibson and Simms were fully justified and endorsed them on 5 November 1945. As the war was over and Hewitt was responsible for overseeing the massive demobilisation of RAAF personnel, it would have been easy for him to ignore Caldwell’s charges and simply demobilise him. It would also have been easy for him to put aside his own opinions on the culpability of Cobby, Gibson and Simms and agree to the Air Board’s desire to demobilise and censure. But he did not take the easier course. Perhaps there was an element of personal consistency behind his stance—he had taken responsibility for stamping out liquor trading when he had been Air Officer Commanding 9 Operational Group. Whatever his reasons, the fact that he did not make exceptions from discipline for Caldwell, Cobby, Gibson or Simms indicated that he was treating all fairly and without discrimination. Hewitt’s treatment of Caldwell, considered along with Langslow’s earlier concern that Caldwell should be given procedural fairness by ensuring an outside Inquiry into his allegations, indicated that, up to this point, Caldwell had actually been treated fairly and without discrimination by the RAAF. The Air Board made the Barry Report available to the public on 19 October 1945. One carbon copy of the 227-page report was made available to print journalists and the ABC at RAAF Headquarters in Melbourne. Journalists huddled over the document and rushed off fragmentary and misleading stories to their editors. Because the terms of reference had not been made known to the press before the Inquiry was closed to the public, no-one realised that the main emphasis of the Inquiry was liquor trading, rather than the state of the RAAF and the reasons for the resignations. The majority of the press reaction related to this, and The Bulletin was not alone in its belief that the RAAF had apparently got off lightly. It believed that there was a case for the thorough overhaul of the RAAF. It thought that it was the duty of Cabinet to see that the whole matter of RAAF discipline and administration was ‘thoroughly sifted and any weaknesses rectified’.26 203


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Barry’s findings may not have supported the majority of Caldwell’s allegations and he may have found that the actions of the senior officers had not abrogated the Air Board Order, but this was of little concern to Caldwell now that the Inquiry was over. In his mind, his liquor trafficking was of only minor significance. The major issue to him was his increasing discontent with the RAAF and his significantly reduced role in any worthwhile operations. His support of Group Captain Arthur was a concrete and dramatic way of expressing his discontent. Barry may have found that Caldwell’s discontent was only one of the reasons for his joining with Arthur, but to Caldwell his discontent was long-running and any personal reasons that Barry might have considered of more weight had only sprung from and were exacerbated by his general frustration with the RAAF. To Caldwell, the most important result of the Inquiry was that Barry had justified the actions of himself and the other officers in attempting to resign: I am not at all surprised at the result of the Inquiry, because, apart from the liquor trading, there were more serious issues involved. The fact that 22 RAAF officers, including myself, were implicated in liquor trading is only a small matter, because up north, practically everybody was doing a bit of trading from time to time. Our willingness to engage the enemy or to do operational flying was never questioned. The main point brought out was the widespread dissatisfaction about the restricted operational activities of the RAAF at Morotai. His finding that the eight resignations were connected with the general feeling prevailing about the First TAF is reassuring. I am pleased that we all know now where we stand, despite the great deal of unfavourable publicity this matter has been given.27

When his liquor trading had first been discovered, Caldwell had been concerned about the effects of negative publicity on himself and Jean, but the only negative publicity seemed to be at the expense of the Air Board and the RAAF. Caldwell’s personal standing in the community was still high, and on 23 October he was the honoured guest at the Diggers’ Ball, which had been reinstated to Junee’s social calendar after its wartime hiatus. Caldwell was introduced by Mr H.J. Parker, the president of the Junee Sub-branch of the RSS&AILA, who congratulated him on his wartime achievements. After Caldwell officially opened the ball, four hundred dancers took to the floor and people from all across the district celebrated war’s end and the Allied victory.28 204


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THIRTEEN 1

Court-martial and Beyond

In view of the adverse finding of the Court in relation to the first charge, and the similarity of the charge just read, I plead Guilty . . .2 After the Barry Inquiry concluded, Caldwell applied for discharge from the RAAF and hoped that he would be released quickly and quietly. He was already considering his postwar career options and was looking forward to putting aside the frustrations of his enforced inactivity of the last few months. However, as a consequence of Air Commodore Hewitt’s recommendations, Caldwell would not receive a quiet discharge. On 31 October, he went to 2 Personnel Depot Bradfield Park and was handed a charge sheet, which differed from the April 1945 charges, and advised that his court-martial would proceed at an unspecified date. Shortly after, the Directorate of Public Relations announced the news and stated that the court-martial would be open to the public, including the press.3 Caldwell was growing increasingly impatient with the whole process. All he wanted now was to get on with his life. He did not believe that he was guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline because of his liquor trading. He believed that his liquor trading was venial when placed within the larger context of widespread trafficking.There was a going rate for illegal liquor in the area and, in his Inquiry, Commissioner Barry had acknowledged this. Caldwell became just one more operator among, apparently, many. But his life would be put on hold yet again while a service tribunal determined whether or not he was culpable. Caldwell conferred with Mr Jack Cassidy BA LLB KC, who would act for him during the court-martial. Cassidy, a well-regarded King’s 205


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Counsel, was also the vice president of the NSW Liberal Party and a fellow member of the Australian Club. He attempted to secure the assistance of (now) Squadron Leader John Davoren in preparing his case, but RAAF Headquarters initially refused the request, only to relent after much pressure had been exerted by Cassidy. Caldwell took his time supplying the names of his defence witnesses, partly in an attempt to delay the trial. On 14 December, he was advised that the charges notified in October would be replaced by a single charge and that the trial would take place on 4 January 1946. Caldwell’s solicitors had been given a strong impression that the trial would occur on 22 January 1946 and all had been working towards this day. Cassidy would be out of the state for some time before then, and Caldwell had planned on spending Christmas in the country with Jean’s family. Further confusion for Caldwell’s defence arose when the prosecuting officer, Flight Lieutenant Reginald Pluck, advised on Christmas Eve that the single charge had now been replaced by four separate charges.4 Caldwell was considerably annoyed by the continual changes as well as the prosecutor’s apparent inability to settle on a specific set of charges. He was particularly disconcerted that his Christmas plans were to be interrupted by the earlier trial date.Above all, he was angry at the RAAF. He advised that the new date was not convenient but was told that if he did not attend, someone would be sent to arrest him. Caldwell rashly remarked,‘if you send someone to arrest me I will shoot them’. Caldwell left it to his solicitors to negotiate a new trial date and went to the country for Christmas as planned. He later recalled that he ‘wasn’t going to let those bastards upset my Christmas and New Year’.5 However, Caldwell’s desire for a delayed start date was not wholly related to irritation that his plans for a peaceful Christmas were being disrupted. Caldwell had known since October that his court-martial was imminent, but the varying charges made it difficult to develop an appropriate defence. All along, the charges had focussed mainly on his trafficking, but the final charges now focussed on Caldwell’s selling through the agency of junior airmen, Corporal Parker and Leading Aircraftman Charter. Given Barry’s opinions relating to trafficking, and the fact that the majority of charges over the past few months had focussed on trafficking to some degree, it would have been assumed that the final charges would relate to trafficking. The fact that they did not seems to indicate that Pluck recognised that trafficking would be more difficult to prove than agency. Trading involved continuity—it was 206


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carried out over a period of time—and it involved profit. Caldwell’s alleged transactions with Parker and Charter were only for very limited periods. The longest period, where Parker was involved, was for just two weeks. Continuity would be difficult to establish. Although Barry did not consider that the Order had been abrogated by the actions of senior officers, Air Commodore Hewitt believed that Air Commodore Cobby had clearly breached the Order and had fallen down on his duty because he did not stop trading in the area. Pluck would have assumed Cobby would be called as a defence witness and it would be too risky for the prosecution if Cobby’s actions were recounted at the trial. Barry had determined that abrogation could only be used for mitigation; by focussing on trafficking, Pluck would be allowing a testimony that would support such a claim. Agency, however, would appear to be an easier option as both Parker and Charter had admitted to selling Caldwell’s liquor, and the issue of agency had been sidestepped by Barry. The easier option for Pluck, however, meant that Caldwell’s defence would need to be restructured and there was now little time to prepare the defence for this new raft of charges. Despite the best efforts of Caldwell’s solicitors, the trial date was not changed. His court-martial opened on 4 January 1946 in the Bradfield Park picture theatre, which had been barricaded off and was strongly guarded. Caldwell arrived at Bradfield Park where he was met by Cassidy and a barrage of cameras. He was escorted into the court. There he faced the President of the court, Air Vice-Marshal S.J. Goble CBE DSO DSC;Air Commodore J.P.J. McCauley CBE; Group Captain S.A.C. Campbell; Group Captain J.A. Cohen DFC; and acting Group Captain B.R. Pelly OBE.The Judge Advocate was Squadron Leader J.X. O’Driscoll. The prosecuting officer was Flight Lieutenant Pluck. Caldwell was asked if he had any objections to the members of the court and he stated that he did not, but Cassidy stated that this could not be taken to mean that Caldwell assented to the jurisdiction of the court. Cassidy then called for an adjournment. He was concerned about the confusion arising from the continually changing charges which had impacted on the defence’s preparations. He was also concerned by the undue haste displayed in pursuing the trial at a time when most witnesses were unavailable and during the usual legal holiday. Despite protests from Pluck, Goble agreed to an adjournment until 16 January. When the trial resumed, Cassidy requested that the charges be dealt with separately. The first charge related to a different period from the 207


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later charges, and related to sale through a different airman. This was a usual practice where charges were distinctly different and was only rejected if the request was considered unreasonable. Pluck protested this request, but O’Driscoll decided it was reasonable and directed the court accordingly. Goble granted Cassidy’s request.The significance of separating the charges was that evidence in relation to Parker would not be compounded by that relating to Charter. The prosecution called only two witnesses, Parker and Flight Lieutenant Schweppes, who had conducted the initial investigations into the liquor trading at Morotai. Parker’s statement, taken by Schweppes at Morotai, had been tendered as evidence, and Cassidy’s cross-examination of Parker concentrated on the inconsistencies in Parker’s account and his hazy recollection of some incidents. His short cross-examination of Schweppes was limited to the clarification of just a few points, which included Schweppes’ recollection that Caldwell had told him during their interview at Morotai that at no time had he asked the airmen to sell liquor for him—they had always come to him. After Cassidy concluded his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court asked Caldwell if he would be giving evidence. Caldwell declined this right and indicated that he had made a statement through his counsel. Declining this right was an important strategy. As a highly decorated officer, with an outstanding war record, Caldwell was perceived as having a good character. Cassidy would attempt to show that a man of Caldwell’s good character could not have engaged in behaviour to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline. By not appearing as a witness, this record could not be impugned in any way. If Caldwell were found guilty, Cassidy could then refer to Caldwell’s unchallenged good character when seeking mitigation in sentencing. Caldwell’s statement basically reiterated much of what he had written in his 9 and 13 April 1945 statements and included some extra information that had come out of the Barry Inquiry. In addition, in a hand-written note at the end of the statement, Caldwell emphatically denied the conversation that Parker had alleged had occurred in Darwin. Cassidy then outlined his defence which was designed to demonstrate that Caldwell’s behaviour, which he had admitted to, was not conduct to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline. Despite the different emphasis in this trial, and the extra time to address the charges, Cassidy’s defence did not differ markedly from the defence run by Davoren during the Barry Inquiry. Cassidy called eight witnesses for the defence—Gerald 208


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Greaves, a former Flight Lieutenant with 82 Squadron who testified that he had seen liquor being loaded into Cobby’s personal aircraft; Stuart Harpham, former Commanding Officer of 60 Operational Base Unit, who testified to the difficulties in obtaining equipment and infrastructure and how he, acting on Caldwell’s advice, brought liquor to Morotai and traded it for equipment; Air Vice-Marshal Jones, a reluctant witness who admitted that he had not acted upon a report of a rumour that his personal pilot had conveyed liquor for sale in the islands in Jones’ own aircraft; Squadron Leader Neville Palmer, Jones’ personal assistant, who had reported the rumour about Jones’ pilot; Group Captain Gerald Packer, who attested to Caldwell’s high order of efficiency, and also stated that he was aware of trading in the islands; and Air Commodore Cobby, Group Captain Gibson and Group Captain Simms, who all testified to Caldwell’s efficiency and the high discipline within 80 Fighter Wing.The selection of Cobby, Gibson and Simms might have appeared surprising, and Cassidy referred to that fact in his closing arguments. Cassidy admitted that he had subpoenaed them and, despite it not being in their own best interests to support Caldwell, they had still attested to the good order of Caldwell’s Wing and his personal efficiency. In addition—and here Cassidy acknowledged the importance of Cobby’s evidence— despite the fact that trading had been carried out, it had not in any way prejudicially impacted on the discipline of Caldwell’s Wing. The prosecution and defence witnesses appeared over 16 to 17 January and closing arguments were heard on 17 January. In summing up, Cassidy reminded the court of past rulings in similar cases where proof that conduct had been to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline depended upon the circumstances of the case, which included both the place where the offence took place and the time it occurred. He also reminded the court especially of the Cook case. He pointed out that Caldwell’s transactions had taken place only over a two-week period and had begun during the Christmas celebrations, and that, as far they knew, no-one had known that Caldwell was connected with the sales. He pointed out that Jones’ reluctance to respond to questioning could be interpreted in two ways: that, even though he had been aware that his pilot might have been trafficking liquor, he did nothing; or his view was that disobedience of ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944 was not a matter of particular importance. Either way, it seemed that the standard in the Air Force community was that enforcement of that Order was not a vitally important matter. 209


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Cassidy concluded by pointing out the unlikelihood that Caldwell, with his outstanding record, would consciously do something that would interfere with his proven capacity for leadership, and his ability to inspire his men. He pointed out that there were no external signs that Caldwell’s actions had been prejudicial and asked how behaviour over a brief twoweek period could be prejudicial to good order and discipline. O’Driscoll reminded the court that he had indicated throughout the trial that he was not prepared to wholly accept Cassidy’s tactic of having witnesses state that they were satisfied that Caldwell’s discipline and discipline in his Wing were so high that the mere breach of the Order could not affect Air Force discipline. This was a great blow to Cassidy’s defence. On a more positive note, however, O’Driscoll also highlighted the point of law that Parker was an accomplice—if Caldwell had broken the Order, so had Parker. He noted that if Parker had been caught out in a breach, human nature being what it is, it would be possible to consider that, in an effort to exculpate himself, Parker would take the easy course of saying that what he had done, he had done with his Commanding Officer’s knowledge and at his request. Accordingly, he suggested that the court should bear this in mind when determining what weight should be given to Parker’s evidence, but at the same time should not forget to seek corroboration from both Caldwell’s and Schweppes’ evidence. In addition, O’Driscoll reminded the court that the only evidence they had that Caldwell did not have prior knowledge of the Order was his unsworn statement. Finally, O’Driscoll stated that the whole question to be considered was whether the circumstances that had been disclosed in the evidence were such as to show either an abrogation of the Order or else to show that a breach constituted an offence under Section 40. When the court reopened on 18 January it went into camera for 75 minutes. When the hearing resumed, Caldwell was brought forward and Goble stated that the court would proceed with the hearing of the other charges. Caldwell knew what this meant. If a defendant had been found not guilty, he would have been advised immediately. If found guilty, the usual practice was to withhold the verdict until the Air Board had confirmed it. Caldwell had been found guilty. While this sunk in, Pluck requested that the fourth charge should be the next one heard.This one related to Caldwell’s selling whisky and gin through the agency of Leading Aircraftman Charter. Cassidy made no objection to the request and Goble agreed to the application. 210


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Caldwell stood stiffly to attention while the charge was read out. When Goble asked if he were guilty or not guilty of the charge, Caldwell, speaking in a calm, clear voice, stated that ‘in view of the adverse finding of the Court in relation to the first charge, and the similarity of the charge just read, I plead Guilty’.6 If Cassidy’s defence had not been able to elicit a not guilty verdict on a similar charge, it was not worth attempting to fight this one. O’Driscoll then questioned Caldwell closely to ensure that Caldwell understood the effects of his plea: that he was admitting that he had sold liquor through Charter; that he was admitting to conduct to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline; and that witnesses could not now be questioned, but a summary of evidence would be read to the court. Caldwell stated that he understood all this. After Caldwell pleaded guilty, Pluck announced that he would not proceed with the second and third charges. Before the court determined appropriate punishment, Cassidy sought mitigation. He reminded the court that the sales were not continuous; that the first sales had occurred when Caldwell was preparing to leave the area and that all told he had only sold twenty to twenty-five bottles; and that hundreds of other people in the area had engaged in trade. Cassidy stated that Caldwell’s selling had not impacted on his personal discipline, his devotion to duty and the discipline of his men, and that it had never been his intention to undermine discipline, nor had this ever been one of his characteristics. Finally, Cassidy asked the court to consider Caldwell’s actions in relation to the current circumstances. The aim of punishment was punitive or to be used as a deterrent. Given that the war was over, and Caldwell was on the point of demobilisation, there would be no deterrent effect, so what use would it serve if Caldwell’s reputation was besmirched with a reduction in rank? Cassidy asked the court to consider reprimand as an appropriate punishment. The court then retired to consider Caldwell’s punishment. Caldwell left the court. Whatever the decision, Caldwell would not be advised until it had been confirmed by the Air Board. The press had been following the court-martial closely, announcing evidence as it was disclosed, and lost no time in reporting Caldwell’s dramatic plea.7 Although he admitted his guilt, for the main part the press treated Caldwell kindly. In its 19 January editorial, the Daily Telegraph asked ‘so what?’ to Caldwell’s guilty plea at the ‘climax to a long witch-hunt’. ‘He is not the only one—as every airman knows.’ It asked if Australians were satisfied that the trial and the investigations which preceded it: 211


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adequately represent the feeling we should have for a man who, with the utmost fearlessness, offered his life to defend us when courage counted more than small breaches of the regulations . . . Far worse offenders against the good order and discipline of the nation have escaped scot-free.Australia will take a big view of Caldwell’s foolish mistake—if its generosity equals the generosity with which he served us when things were tough.8

The Australian public appeared to agree that the big view should be taken. A number of letters to the editor were written, such as ‘Pilloried Hero’, where the writer stated ‘Australia will never let Clive Caldwell down. To his country, he’ll always be tops’; ‘Don’t Whip our Heroes’, where the author referred to the ‘embarrassing publicity being given heroes like Bennett and Caldwell’ and wondered if somebody was ‘jealous of their fine war records’; and ‘Scapegoat for Many’, where the writer was disgusted with the action taken against Caldwell.9 Early in the afternoon of 1 February 1946, Caldwell and his legal adviser were collected from the Australian Club by RAAF car. They were taken to Bradfield Park where Caldwell was paraded before Wing Commander A.R. Brown, the commander of 2 Personnel Depot. Brown advised Caldwell that he had been found guilty on the first and fourth charges. This was no surprise to Caldwell. The surprise came when Brown informed Caldwell that he was to be reduced in rank to Flight Lieutenant. The court-martial finding was released to the press that afternoon10 and it made the evening papers. Caldwell refused to publicly comment on the verdict. On one level, Caldwell’s punishment appeared fair and reasonably consistent—Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes had been accused of attempting to sell liquor at Morotai and, after pleading guilty, he had been reduced in rank initially to Flight Lieutenant before Air Commodore Cobby varied it to Squadron Leader. But the war was now over and, as pointed out by Cassidy, there was no longer any need for punishment to act as a deterrent. In this context, it seems odd that the court did not merely reprimand Caldwell. As far back as 9 April 1945, Caldwell had been concerned that he would experience some sort of discrimination in punishment. The Barry Inquiry may not have found evidence to prove Caldwell’s belief in discrimination but, in his address in mitigation of punishment, Cassidy hinted that discrimination might occur if the court let itself be swayed by the fact that senior officers, who 212


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might be friends and old associates, had been criticised during the defence. Cassidy asked that those criticisms be clearly erased from their minds, and reminded the court that ‘punishment is not a matter to lash out, punishment is a matter to be considered on logical principles’. It seems that, at even this late stage, Caldwell’s belief in discrimination was well-founded. Certainly Bobby Gibbes believed that Caldwell had been savagely treated and that the RAAF was attempting to cut down the tall poppies called Caldwell and Gibbes.11 Caldwell pleaded guilty, although ultimately he did not believe that he was guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and Air Force discipline. He would have to suffer the consequences of the court’s decision, but he would not accept it because, as Cassidy pointed out at the beginning of the trial, Caldwell did not assent to the jurisdiction of the court. The service court declared Caldwell guilty but the ‘court of public opinion’ brought home a different verdict.Yet again, the public response supported Caldwell. The Sun’s editorial the next day remarked that Caldwell’s demotion was ‘the climax of a very sorry episode’. The RSL attacked Caldwell’s demotion and Mr J.C. Neagle, its NSW state president, thought that Caldwell’s demotion was a ‘shabby reward’ for his heroic record. Mr N.B. Love, president of the Air Force Association, a veteran of two wars and a former RAAF Wing Commander, believed that Caldwell’s reduction in rank was particularly harsh.12 Journalist Lawson Glassop’s letter to the editor, entitled ‘Victim of Spleen’ summed up the public’s attitude: It is obvious to me, and must be to thousands of other Australians, that Flight Lieutenant (formerly Group Captain) ‘Killer’ Caldwell is the victim of jealousy, spite and spleen. Admittedly Caldwell is guilty of an offence against regulations, but how many other airmen and soldiers have been guilty of the grave crime of trading . . . [Glassop went on to relate how many civilians were guilty of black-marketeering, scalping, and bribery of railway officials for train seats.] Yet Caldwell, a gallant Australian who shot down 271⁄2 enemy planes, is publicly humiliated and reduced in rank because he sold a few bottles of liquor. He, like many other returned men, must wonder whether this country and its corruption were worth fighting for. As The Telegraph says, the court-martial has given its verdict, but Caldwell need not fear that he has lost the respect and gratitude of the vast majority of Australians.13 213


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Caldwell received support from the public and the press as well as his family and friends and, on one occasion at least, the support of a friend crossed from the private arena to the public. Bobby Gibbes wrote a tribute to his friend entitled, ‘There’s No Glamour in Air Warfare!’, which was published in the Sunday Telegraph on 10 February 1946. He wrote: Although my last six years have not all been pleasure, I have gained much and loved the fellowship of the grandest bunch of chaps on earth. One of the grandest and greatest of these men is not yet out. He is Group Captain Clive Caldwell . . . Caldwell is a man who is grand in every sense of the word, a gentleman and a true friend . . . Let us never forget that Clive Caldwell is one of the greatest Australians this war has produced.

The paper edited out Gibbes’ original concluding paragraph, but it clearly indicates that he knew that he was not alone in his admiration for Caldwell: Let us never forget that Clive Caldwell is one of the greatest Australians this war has produced. He is not only a national figure but a man who is admired and respected by the whole of the Allied nations and was known and feared by our enemies when we were at war. We needed men of his calibre then. We do now . . . Let us give him our loyalty and our unbounded respect. I thank God we had a Caldwell, and that we have him still.14

The support of the public and his friends during and after the court-martial was heartening and Caldwell soon saw that, to many, his wartime achievements would not be overshadowed by the liquor trading. He was particularly grateful to Bobby Gibbes, and thought his article an excellent one and a ‘tremendous help’. The court-martial was a wretched time for the Caldwells and both felt the strain.15 Caldwell and Jean went to the country after he had received the verdict and enjoyed the quietness, a welcome respite after the stress and hubbub of the last few weeks:‘. . . I got home here about midday Friday last feeling a bit clapped out after a strenuous five weeks in Sydney . . . Since then I have been loafing, as I always do here.’ Caldwell and Jean alternatively loafed about and walked for hours across the paddocks, talking quietly and planning their future.16 214


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The Caldwells had taken a flat in Point Piper and it would be available from 4 March. Caldwell heard that his discharge papers were waiting for him but decided that he would not collect them until he returned to Sydney.17 The press speculated that Caldwell would appeal the court-martial decision, and some reports indicated that his appeal had been prepared and lodgement was imminent.18 Caldwell told Bobby Gibbes in confidence that Cassidy wanted him to appeal as he believed that it was a certainty that the Governor-General would remit his punishment to a reprimand. Caldwell, however, did not want to appeal. It was time to move on.19 Although Caldwell wanted to get on with his life, it was some time before he could settle on a career path. While he was waiting for his discharge, he had made some inquiries among business contacts, but demobilisation had been going on for some time and many of the better or more interesting positions had already been secured by others. Perhaps, too, the spectre of the court-martial impacted on his job prospects. Caldwell’s thoughts soon turned towards starting his own business. He had become a fine leader during his RAAF career and his ever-evident entrepreneurial skills indicated that he would be well suited to a business career.The environment in postwar Australia seemed as if it would be more conducive to someone starting out in business than during the Depression and Caldwell was confident of success. Unfortunately, he did not have enough capital to start up on his own, but this problem was soon solved. During the war, Caldwell’s path had crossed Douglas Doyle’s. Doyle was a well-respected wool buyer and exporter with considerable business acumen. Doyle introduced Caldwell to the well-known and affluent businessman and grazier, George Falkiner. Doyle had recognised Caldwell’s entrepreneurial abilities and considered that they would combine well with his own business skill and Falkiner’s financial backing. A partnership was formed. The partnership’s first commission was from two major mining companies. They were to purchase and bring back Douglas C–47 Dakota transport aircraft that had been abandoned by the Americans in the Philippines. So Caldwell returned to Manila and with business completed, he prepared to return to Australia. Before he left, he decided to take a test flight in one of the Dakotas.A Filipino guerrilla shot at him and one of the bullets pierced the hydraulic line to the brakes. Another 215


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left a clean hole in the rudder. The aircraft was repaired and fortunately no other problems occurred.20 In addition to the Dakotas, Caldwell purchased several small Stinson L5 Sentinel two-seaters on his own account, which he brought back to Australia inside the Dakotas. He sold all but one, which he kept for himself. But aircraft were not the only things that Caldwell brought back from the Philippines. Just as he thoughtfully searched for items in the Egyptian bazaars for his wife, Caldwell did not overlook Jean on this trip. Among other things, he purchased some unusual straw clogs with carved heels decorated with felt figures and a matching straw handbag. Jean proudly wore them at a meeting at Randwick race meeting soon afterwards. Caldwell was still receiving media attention, and the first time he and Jean flew their Stinson down to Cootamundra to visit Jean’s family, they made the papers.21 He kept the Stinson for a number of years at Bankstown Airport, and he and Jean had great fun flying it around. But Bobby Gibbes tells of one postwar flying expedition, this time in George Falkiner’s Waco biplane, which perhaps reinforces Caldwell’s claim that he ‘wasn’t particularly good at [flying]’.22 Caldwell, Falkiner and John Waddy were coming into Mascot aerodrome on 12 May 1946, and Caldwell said,‘George, I’ll show you how to do a short landing’.The wheels clipped the fence and the Waco flipped onto its back. Falkiner and Waddy crawled out but Caldwell remained inside for a time. Falkiner asked what he had been doing and Caldwell replied, ‘I’m picking up all the money that fell out of my pockets!’23 Four fire engines rushed to the scene, but, although it had damaged wingtips, a bent propeller and a crumpled tailplane, the Waco did not catch fire. Apart from minor bruising, none of the occupants was injured. Caldwell told the press afterwards that ‘it was just one of these things that happen sometimes.A great gust of wind caught us as we were coming in, and over she went.’24 Falkiner exacted retribution from Caldwell, demanding that he host a party for all their friends at their favourite nightclub. Caldwell’s collected coins came in handy as he stood drinks for the crowd.The highlight of the party was an iced cake with a miniature aeroplane crashing into it. Caldwell was not going to live down this accident in a hurry, but he enjoyed the night (at his expense) and the good natured banter (again, at his expense).25 Caldwell, Falkiner and Doyle had many and varied business interests. They became involved in the development of the Buckhurst units in 216


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Double Bay, and they bought up surplus parachutes to use the silk for two-piece swimming costumes which, on at least one occasion, were modelled to prospective purchasers by Doyle’s young daughter, Rosalind. Later, they imported straw from Manila to make women’s hats, but this would not be a successful venture as customs put such a high price on the straw that they had to abandon the idea. Later, Doyle amicably dropped out of the partnership but Caldwell and Falkiner continued, focusing on importing and exporting. One unusual enterprise had all the hallmarks of Caldwell’s entrepreneurialism and his own brand of risk-taking. David Robertson was managing director of the company that handled Caldwell and Falkiner’s shipping. One day, Caldwell and Robertson were lunching at the Royal Automobile Club of Australia and Caldwell produced a trade magazine with an article about breeding giant New Zealand white rabbits. David had a property at Castle Hill and after considerable research they decided to set up a rabbit farm there to supply studs for backyard breeders.There were many such farms in America and throughout Europe but this would be the first in Australia. Myxomatosis had recently been introduced to eradicate the Australian rabbit population and the venture could proceed only if the rabbits were inoculated against myxomatosis. The CSIRO supplied them with the inoculations so their stock was protected. The venture showed some promise, but Caldwell was caught up in his other business activities and more and more of the responsibility for managing the rabbit farm fell to Robertson, who did not really have time for it. So they decided to sell the business. Shortly afterwards, the CSIRO stopped providing the inoculation serum.They had sold out just in time.26 Caldwell then concentrated on more orthodox enterprises and, when he and Falkiner harmoniously dissolved the partnership sometime afterwards, he carried on with the burgeoning importing and exporting business, specialising in fabrics. He became a successful businessman, always building on his entrepreneurial skills and with a continual desire to do things better—skills that were well developed during the war years. After the war, accommodation in Sydney was difficult to find. The Caldwells were not able to move into the house that Caldwell had inherited from his father as the existing tenants could not be evicted. They initially settled into the little flat at Point Piper, but they did not have a long lease on it.They then lived in a succession of temporary flats, 217


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including the Astor, for short periods. George Falkiner lent them his house ‘Tokay’ on Victoria Road in Bellevue Hill twice, for periods of about six months.They acquired their first real home in 1948 when they moved to a small flat on the waterfront in Double Bay.There they stayed until 1959, when they purchased the land on which they were able to build their own house. Ever the perfectionist, Caldwell was actively involved in the design process from the beginning and engaged a succession of architects before he was happy with the final design. He wanted his home to be just right. The end result was a beautiful and gracious house with panoramic views of Sydney Harbour; a haven from the parry and thrust of the business world; his own retreat where he could enjoy peace with his wife; his long desired, long awaited home, where he lived until his final illness. The Caldwells did not have children but Caldwell had a genuine fondness for children. He developed a strong relationship with Jean’s niece and nephews and genuinely touched the lives of at least two other children. In 1949, Caldwell flew to Singapore on business. Marc Forestier, who was in charge of the Aircraft Maintenance Branch at the then Department of Supply was on the same aeroplane. During their trip they talked a fair bit about Marc’s ten-year-old son, John, and his keenness for flying. Caldwell remembered the conversation and after he returned from Singapore he wrote to young John. He told John that he had written especially to add some photos of Spitfires to his collection and he enclosed three photos of the Spitfire Mark VIII, which ‘I think are good’. He had obtained these especially for John from the Department of Air. Caldwell also said that when next he was in Melbourne, after John’s father had returned to Australia, they would arrange for the two of them to meet and ‘have a bit of a yarn about flying’. These were not empty words.They did meet and talked at great length about planes and flying.27 Ken Parker, who, as Caldwell’s batman, had sold some bottles of liquor on Caldwell’s behalf at Morotai, was a close family friend of Rick Lindmark. Parker visited the Lindmarks often and regaled them with his war stories, including some stories about Caldwell. Every year, before Anzac Day, they would sit around the kitchen table—‘Uncle’ Ken telling his stories and young Rick listening avidly. Anzac Day was Uncle Ken’s special day. Rick grew up with Clive Caldwell being a family ‘name’ and a hero to him. One year,Anzac Day was a bit different and very special for Rick. In 1969, Caldwell led 1 Spitfire Wing in the Anzac Day March, and ex-Wing members came from all over Australia for the parade. Rick 218


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marched with his Uncle Ken and, after the march, he went with Ken to speak with Caldwell. Rick had no knowledge of the affairs on Morotai, nor of his Uncle’s involvement. If Caldwell had any lingering feelings about Parker and his contradictory testimony in both the Barry Inquiry and his court-martial, he did not let the young boy see it. He greeted Parker as an old friend and when Parker introduced Rick to him, Caldwell spoke with him. Rick no longer remembers those words, but he remembers that Caldwell was kind and not patronising, and he remembers the pride he felt when speaking with his hero, as well as the pride he felt that his Uncle knew him. Rick ‘felt fantastic’ that day and considers that this was one of the greatest things that ever happened to him.28 Caldwell was well decorated during the war and, although he appreciated the honour that had been accorded him, especially in the case of the Polish Cross of Valour, he admitted to war correspondent Kenneth Slessor that he was out to get as many decorations as he could, because they would be his only assets in peacetime.29 However, these did not prove assets when he was looking for a job after the war. Instead of an asset, Caldwell’s awards became something he kept in a bag and tossed into a drawer. He did not wear his awards for many years after the war, not even when he led 1 Spitfire Wing in the Anzac Day March in 1969. They did not see the light of day until 1979, when the Air Force Association and the Bank of New South Wales Sub-branch of the RSL combined to put on a photographic exhibition, featuring Australian fliers trained under the Empire Air Training Scheme. The exhibition included one of the Bank’s most famous employees, Clive Caldwell.The exhibition triggered many memories for Caldwell. He remembered the comradeship, and his thoughts turned to his friends who survived— including John Waddy, who also featured in the exhibition—and those who did not return. But even above friendship, was the way in which so many came together to do battle with the enemy: Looking back, the really extraordinary thing was how so many people of totally different backgrounds, personalities and abilities could have achieved such a unity of purpose in the air. We have never seen anything like it since. 30

The organisers wanted to include some memorabilia, so the secretary of the Sub-branch, Mr R.D. Leonard, asked Caldwell if they could borrow his medals. Caldwell obliged, and they arrived unmounted in a 219


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brown paper bag. Caldwell said that, ‘I am afraid I have never worn them.They have been lying around in a drawer for years.The important thing about decorations is that some who deserved them didn’t get any. But men who flew together know all about this.’31 Caldwell eventually mounted his decorations and wore them proudly and they are now on display on the medals pillar in Anzac Hall at the Australian War Memorial. Caldwell enjoyed the company of friends and maintained many friendships and connections that began in the war years. He was a member of many clubs and enjoyed sitting, drinking and sharing stories with the other members. He was a member of the Imperial Services Club for many years and would regularly meet up with John Waddy (who gratefully benefited from Caldwell’s quiet words of advice before his first air battles and later went on to become a long-term member of the NSW Parliament), Ross Cox (who had witnessed Caldwell bawl out Waddy at Uranquinty school), and Alex Fitzsimons (who was also at Uranquinty on that day). They called themselves the ‘Tuesday Club’ and they met regularly for a great number of years. Ross recalled that Caldwell resigned from the Imperial Services Club at one stage because it decided that it would no longer stock his favourite brand of whisky, but he did not resign from the ‘Tuesday Club’. He continued to meet his friends as their guest.32 One thing that stood out for Caldwell’s friends was his sense of humour. Fred Woodgate recalled one Spitfire Association reunion when Caldwell was wearing a crew-neck pullover of a bluish purple shade. Fred laughingly told Caldwell that, with that pullover, he had mistaken him for a Bishop. Caldwell, with a broad grin on his face, replied, ‘If I were a Bishop, I’d liven you mob up!’33 Former NSW Premier Thomas Lewis recalled the time Ve Waddy asked him and Caldwell to be pallbearers at Group Captain John Waddy’s memorial service. Caldwell came up to him to take his place and, after exchanging pleasantries, he injected a little humour into the sombre occasion, by stating: ‘You take the starboard.’34 Caldwell’s friends were not the only ones to enjoy his sense of humour. In 1962, he addressed one of the largest gatherings seen at the Leichhardt Rotary Club. Caldwell claimed that he had been ‘rail-roaded’ into speaking and started off by stating that he did not know what to talk about. However, to the delight of those gathered he soon ‘laid us in the aisles by telling us in a modest fashion some of his humorous experi220


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ences as a fighter pilot in the Mediterranean and the Pacific’. But Caldwell knew when to rein in his humour. ‘In spite of his jocular references to his exploits, all present soon realised that Clive was a deepthinking man of strong convictions, who concluded his address by giving us his views on the horror and futility of war.’35 Caldwell loved reading and read poetry, drama, fiction and nonfiction extensively. He was known to interrupt an interview to discuss a recently read and admired book.36 He read especially about the war years, including accounts of the Allies and those of his former enemies, as well as memoirs penned by his friends. He would scribble comments and criticism on scraps of paper, or jot down the odd literary quote, and some of these remain, scattered throughout his private papers. He was a stickler for accuracy and would often annotate his books or an article, agreeing or disagreeing, and would not hesitate to take a journalist to task if he muddled the facts in an article that related to his own experience. Vincent Adams-Winter was not the only one who experienced Caldwell’s ire when errors were presented as fact!37 Caldwell developed prostate cancer but, even when he succumbed to the ravages of the cancer, his mind was as clear and sharp as ever. He attended the 1994 Anzac Day reunion of the Spitfire Association held at the Royal Automobile Club of Australia in Sydney. He sat at the official table and he welcomed those who wanted to have a few words with him.When it was time to leave, Fred Woodgate took Caldwell’s arm and navigated him through the steps and stairs of a difficult building: The car was waiting, door opened. I helped Clive to the car, and then I suddenly realised, this could be the last time I see him, so . . . I stood stiffly to attention and saluted him, just before the car took off. My action was prophetic. He passed away later that year.38

Caldwell died peacefully on 5 August 1994 after a painful illness. He was cremated quietly, with only close friends and family at the service. To maintain his privacy, his death was announced very simply after the cremation. Caldwell had specifically requested that there be no memorial service. But the public and personal accolades could not be stopped. Numerous obituaries appeared in the Australian and English press; Shane Stone, the leader of government business in the Northern Territory Parliament delivered a tribute to Caldwell during the Adjournment Debate on 13 October 1994; Peter Collins, leader of 221


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the opposition, honoured Caldwell as part of the NSW Parliament’s commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, and hailed him as ‘a beacon of physical and moral courage in the crucible of war’;39 Spitfire News published a moving tribute to Caldwell; and many a former comrade raised a quiet glass to his memory.40 Their memories were of the courageous and dedicated leader who had been acclaimed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as ‘an excellent leader and a first class shot’. But Caldwell always saw himself first and foremost as a fighter pilot. His innovative skills led to his discovery of shadow shooting, which he believed to be his most important contribution to the war in the air. In a short period of time he evolved from a green pilot facing his first combat to a fine leader who commanded the respect of those he led: in less than four years, the former EATS cadet had become an acting Group Captain. Just as he was the first Empire Air Trainee to become a Flight Commander and the first to become a Squadron Commander, he was also the first graduate to rise to the rank of Group Captain. He had been officially attributed with 271⁄2 victories and was the leading P–40 ace, an ace in two theatres and a five-times ace. Most significantly, he was Australia’s highest scoring fighter ace of the Second World War. Milton Howard, who had so long ago felt honoured and privileged to hand-rub the camouflage paint off the wings and fuselage of Caldwell’s personal Spitfire, was one of the many who never lost their admiration and respect for Caldwell. He believed that ‘Caldwell was a great and colourful man, one of the first of the earthy new leaders who gave us the Air Force we are so proud to remember’.41 That ‘great and colourful man’, with his remarkable wartime achievements, holds an important place in many hearts and in Australia’s wartime history: ‘His courage, determination, skill and his undoubtedly outstanding ability as a leader are an inspiration to his Wing and worthy of the highest praise.’42 . . . I have fought a good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith.43

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Epilogue

Mankind will never live in peace until we overcome the natural savagery that exists in all of us, propels us in wars, perhaps soon to our own destruction . . .1 As predicted by the palm reader so long ago, Caldwell lived a long life. But was this ‘a prophecy fulfilled—or just odd coincidence?’2 He was secure in the love of his wife, the respect of business associates, friends and comrades, and the admiration of many. When he remembered his wartime companions and those who served under him, it was with pride. When he reflected on his experiences with 1 Fighter Wing, ‘it often occurred to me . . . how proud I was of the company I kept’.3 But when he reflected on the RAAF as an organisation and on George Jones in particular, it was with increasing bitterness. He was especially bitter about Jones’ comment that, as an Empire Air Trainee, he was sufficiently decorated and was to receive no further awards. He never forgave Jones and summed him up as a ‘negative type—a masterpiece of negation’.4 Despite wanting to put it all behind him at the time, he became very bitter about the court-martial decision, and acrimony continued to grow. The war was over and yet he had suffered a punishment that was senseless in the extreme. It was a blow, but Jean recalls how he bore the punishment with courage, and of the pride she felt in this courage. But she would weep when she thought of what the RAAF had done to her husband and the legacy of everincreasing embitterment. Despite his bitterness, however, Caldwell was proud of his wartime achievements and he did not regret any of his actions. During the war, 223


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he hardened himself to the experience of killing. He became detached and covered his mind with a ‘dull coating of indifference’.5 After the war, he maintained this detachment to a degree, but he was deeply affected by his wartime experiences. Over the years, his attitude to killing changed considerably. Before, during and after the war, Caldwell enjoyed shooting.The Caldwells frequently visited Jean’s family property at Illabo and Caldwell would often go out shooting. He acquired a great collection of guns, including a German Mauser, a souvenir from the war. But over the years, it gradually occurred to him that shooting for the sake of it was a waste. He began to see that shooting small animals for pleasure was a ‘poverty-stricken outlook’ and eventually he gave it up. He would not even shoot a rabbit. He felt that he was ‘trying to compensate a bit for my earlier stupidity of killing them just for the sake of killing them, to demonstrate what a good shot I was’.6 He kept his great gun collection, often carrying a personal favourite, but after a time, he did not use them. His war experiences left a deep scar. He suffered nightmares and the fear he felt when trapped in his Hurricane never left him. In his dreams, he smelt burning aircraft and he remembered his friends who had died in battle. He would often think of the fortune-teller’s prophesy and he would recall his three friends who fell victim to that prophecy. Nor did he escape the prophesy. He may have survived the war and lived a long life, but he had also suffered the foretold wounds—both physical and psychological. Eventually, that once-strong barrier of indifference broke down and, perhaps faced with his own mortality, knowing that for him, the ‘great game’ would soon be over, Caldwell realised and accepted the full consequences of his wartime actions. On Christmas Eve 1941, Caldwell damaged a ME 109. It did not appear during the air battle that he had hit any of the enemy aircraft on which he fired, but he later noted a damaged aircraft in his flying log. It was later determined that the downed pilot was probably German ace Erbo Graf von Kageneck but, naturally, there was no way that Caldwell could have had any knowledge of whom he had brought down that day. Early research indicated that von Kageneck had been downed by the Hurricanes of 94 and 260 Squadrons7 but an accidental encounter in Australia over forty years later led von Kageneck’s brother, August Graf von Kageneck, to conclude that Caldwell had been responsible for shooting his brother down. Von Kageneck had been reading the December 1984 edition of 224


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Jägerblatt, the journal of former German fighter pilots of the Second World War. In this edition, Heinrich Rosenberg, a former comrade of Erbo, described a trip he had made to Australia, and told of the occasion when he had been invited to dine at the Imperial Services Club. There, Rosenberg met Caldwell and they discussed the fighter tactics that they had used during the war.As well as strongly advocating shadow shooting as an important gunnery technique, Caldwell rigorously stressed the effectiveness of shooting from below and behind. He believed that shooting from these positions was easier because on: your own aircraft, the gun platform is steadier on the climb than in a dive. It is easier to see the enemy aircraft and its line of flight against the sky and clouds, than against the ground or water when its disruptive upper side camouflage to some extent distracts your eyes. You are more likely also to be unobserved when below, and the enemy aircraft is in plain view at all times, not tending to disappear under your nose. Any avoiding action he may take can be clearly observed, and the risk of over-shooting, losing sight of him, and ending up with him on your tail should he suddenly throttle off is not likely. In addition, he is more vulnerable to damage from below—petrol tanks, auxiliary gears, lower part of the pilot’s body and legs, undercarriage, etc.8

Caldwell’s mention of shooting from below sparked a memory for Rosenberg: ‘I immediately thought of our Squadron Leader Erbo v.K. who had been shot by a Curtiss and very heavily wounded.The shooter was, as we could fix now, Squadron Leader [sic] Caldwell . . .’ When August Graf von Kageneck read this, he recalled his brother’s last letter to his mother where he described his final dogfight, explaining that ‘I was literally hit from below’. As far as he was concerned, this confirmed Rosenberg’s conclusion. But rather than stirring up feelings of enmity, this new knowledge moved von Kageneck to write to Caldwell two days before the 43rd anniversary of Erbo’s death to tell him that he believed that Caldwell was the one who shot down his brother: Isn’t it a curious story? Of course I’ve not the slightest hostile feeling for you, on the contrary, we are all glad that this awful slaughter has come to an end . . . But to find almost four and a half decades later the person who was—in all honour—responsible for the death of my brother, is a strange hazard, a hazard only possible by the very special character of the individual fighting in the air.9 225


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Caldwell responded to von Kageneck almost immediately, and agreed that it was indeed a curious story,‘and I think a rather sad one’: Die lust der zerstürung. Mankind will never live in peace until we overcome the natural savagery that exists in all of us, causing us to kill all creatures great and small, propels us into quarrels, wars, perhaps soon to our own destruction. Thus it was that your distinguished brother and I, absolute strangers in a strange land, but operational in that now distant tragedy called World War Two, were there doing what we were on that particular Christmas Eve. It is an odd feeling to be now given this insight into what was, until your letter, a purely impersonal and inconclusive brief encounter so long ago.10

Caldwell gave von Kageneck details of his flying log entry for that Christmas Eve sortie. ‘It was the confirmation that [we] had been waiting for. No error was possible. Each dogfight was perfectly identifiable in the limited air space of an air battle.’11 Von Kageneck recognised that a bond had been forged between himself and Caldwell, ‘like two satellites who cross each other somewhere in space’ and felt that ‘the trace of this encounter will remain for a long while in my life’.12 ‘The trace of this encounter’ remained, too, with Caldwell. On 23 May 1990, von Kageneck published the story ‘An Iron Cross in my Desk, and Memories of an Ace’ in the International Herald Tribune. The story tells of his brother’s last flight and how he was shot down by Caldwell. In a coincidence to match that first one of von Kageneck discovering Caldwell’s involvement in the death of his brother, Caldwell was on a business trip and, while he waited for his flight at Rome airport, bought the Tribune and read the article.13 His acknowledgement that he had been responsible for the death of Erbo Graf von Kageneck had a profound effect on Caldwell. His intimate knowledge of Erbo’s death gave him an opportunity to come in contact with the human side of the enemy. His victories had always been impersonal, the result of a finger on the firing button, and there could be no knowledge of the person behind the target. Now he knew about the young man whom he had brought down on Christmas Eve 1941. He had experienced forgiveness and received an acknowledgement of an honourable encounter from a one-time enemy. But he was not able to welcome such personal knowledge, or accept exoneration 226


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in all cases. There was one particular wartime action that continued to perturb him. After he shot down the Dinah reconnaissance aircraft on 17 August 1943, he circled closely over the Japanese crew-members in the water. One lay spread-eagled on top, his face upturned, and Caldwell gained the impression that he was still alive. When he thought of that day, he remembered the failed attempt to assist his No. 2, Paddy Padula, to his first victory, and he recalled ‘the easy prize which proved to be my last “confirmed” of the War’. But he was troubled by the ‘sinister shapes’ of the sharks, homing in on the three bodies in the lonely sea.14 In 1988 he was informed of the names of the Japanese crew-members,15 but this was not welcome news—he did not want the incident to be personalised. It made it more difficult to bear the image of the crew member who was perhaps still alive as the sharks circled. The memory of it, now made so much more personal, troubled him even more. In 1992, the members of 70th Direct Control Squadron organised a pilgrimage to Australia in order to honour their dead comrades who were buried in Australian soil. The large group consisted of veterans, family members and friends and included Miyoko Takeuchi and Noriyo Itoh, the wife and daughter of Sergeant Shinji Kawahara of 202 Naval Squadron, the observer in that Dinah aircraft. They visited the Japanese War Cemetery at Cowra and planted trees in the beautiful and scenic Japanese Gardens, a living symbol of peace and reconciliation. Miyoko and Noriyo, who was born in January 1943 and had never known her father, had just discovered that it was Caldwell who had shot down Kawahara’s aircraft. As a personal act of reconciliation, they wanted to meet Caldwell and convey their forgiveness for his actions. Like August Graf von Kageneck, they felt no rancour towards him. But where Caldwell was able to accept the insight that von Kageneck offered, he was not able to bring himself to meet Sergeant Kawahara’s wife and daughter. When Noriyo returned to Japan, she wrote to Caldwell and briefly told him of her trip to ‘comfort the war dead’. She regretted that she did not have the opportunity to meet him and wanted him to know that: I know that it is the war that is to be blamed and I have no feeling to be hateful to you any more. I wish you would live a long healthy life instead of my father from the bottom of my heart.16 227


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Despite this gift of reconciliation, Caldwell was not able to come to terms with this incident. The memory of the spread-eagled body and the upturned face could not be dimmed by forgiveness. He continued to close himself off from the memories that Miyoko Takeuchi and Noriyo Itoh evoked, but as time went by, he became more disturbed by the death of Erbo Graf von Kageneck. It played on his mind, and at various times he talked about it to one of the stewards at the Royal Sydney Golf Club. Caldwell discussed the article and August Graf von Kageneck’s letters with him and was often visibly distressed at the memories that they brought forth. When Ken Llewellyn interviewed Caldwell in 1993, they touched on the subject. Caldwell was very ill at the time, and he misremembered Erbo’s actual wounds, but his distress is evident. On listening to the interview, it is clear that he broke down as he spoke of Erbo’s death.17 The ‘dull coating of indifference18 had broken down irrevocably.

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Appendices

APPENDIX A: Highlights of Caldwell’s flying career The following is based on Caldwell’s claims list which was revised by Christopher Shores in his Aces High, vol. 2 (with reference to Caldwell’s flying log and official records).Accumulated flying hours are taken from Caldwell’s flying log.There are some discrepancies in Caldwell’s adding up and they have not been corrected here. Only officially recognised victories have been bolded below. Serial numbers of aircraft flown by Caldwell on individual operations (e.g. AK367) are at the right of the table. 1941 10 May 12 May

15 May

Flying with 250 Squadron RAF in Tomahawk IIB. First practice flights in Tomahawk IIB—two flights of 25 minutes and 45 minutes duration. AK367 First operation with 250 Squadron—escorting bombers to Palmyra airfield in central Syria.As a result of ground strafing, he set one enemy aircraft on fire and damaged a second. At this stage Caldwell had accrued a total of 1 hour and 55 minutes experience on Tomahawks. AK369 Escorting bombers to Syria where they were to bomb transport carriers on Damascus aerodrome—note in flying log that three enemy aircraft were damaged and probably one destroyed on the ground. AK374

Caldwell finished May 1941 with 21 hours on Tomahawks. He had accumulated a total solo flying time of 190 hours 35 minutes. 6 June

1 ⁄2 Cant Z.1007. Caldwell noted in his flying log that he and Flying Officer Jack Hamlyn shared this Cant Z.1007. This incident is not referred to in the operations record book or the squadron diary and there does not appear to be a combat report for it. Most accounts, including diary and combat reports, indicate the Cant Z.1007 was

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26 June

30 June

shared destroyed by Hamlyn and Sergeant Tom Paxton on 8 June and it was the first air combat victory by a Tomahawk. AK349 ME 109. Caldwell’s first official victory. Escorting bombers to Gazala. The German pilot was Leutnant Heinz Schmidt of JG27. By this stage Caldwell had accrued 47 hours on Tomahawks. When he reviewed the damage to his Tomahawk, he found that he ‘had sixteen holes in the old crate and the wireless shot away just over my head’. AK419 ME 109 damaged. There does not appear to be a combat report for the operation, which occurred later on 26 June. It is not mentioned in the Squadron Diary or Operations Record Book. AK419 2 × Ju 87s. Flown by Leutnant Wagner and Unteroffizier Walz of II/StG2. AK346 1 ⁄2 ME 110. Escorting a Tobruk convoy. In the operations record book Caldwell is credited with a half share, with Sergeant Bob Whittle, whereas in his flying log he lists it as an individual victory. His combat report indicates that it was a shared victory. AK346

Caldwell flew 27 hours and 55 minutes on Tomahawks during June 1941, taking his total solo flying time on Tomahawks to 48 hours 55 minutes. His total flying time was 212 hours 55 minutes. 7 July

12 July

G–50. Caldwell was separated from the rest of the Squadron during a sweep over the Bardia area. His flying log indicates this occurred on 9 July but both his combat report and the Operations Record Book lists it as 7 July. He also noted in his flying log that he killed fourteen personnel as well as damaging some enemy vehicles. AK346 ME 109 Damaged. AK376

During July, Caldwell added 19 hours 20 minutes flying time on Tomahawks and his total solo flying time had accumulated to 232 hours 35 minutes. 3 August 10 August 14 August

16 August 18 August

25 August 28 August

ME 109 damaged. AK416 ME 109 damaged. AK511 ME 109 probable. This may have occurred on 13 August. Caldwell appears to have overwritten the dates 12–14 August and the squadron diary states a standby at dawn on 14 August but no operational flights, whereas on 13 August there was a ‘flap in the morning’. AK504 1 ⁄2 G–50. During a patrol at sea off Bardia. AK504 ME 109 damaged. Caldwell’s flying log indicates that this occurred on 19 August but the Operations Record Book lists it on 18 August. AK504 ME 109 damaged. AK493 ME 109E. Caldwell’s flying log has both ‘probable’ and ‘confirmed’ crossed out and leaves it as unconfirmed. It was subsequently classified as a probable. AK493

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Appendices 29 August

ME 109F. Convoy patrol north of Sidi Barrani. Caldwell had now attained ace status as he had shot down five enemy aircraft. The half shares did not count towards ace status, but his total score was now six. He had flown 131 hours 40 minutes with 250 Squadron. AK493

By the end of August, Caldwell had 65 hours on Tomahawks, and his total flying time was 297 hours 35 minutes. 14 September 26 September 27 September 28 September 30 September

2 × ME 109s damaged. ME 109 damaged. ME 109F. Escorting bombers to Bardia. ME 109F. Escorting bombers to Bardia. ME 109 damaged.

AK498 AK324 AK324 AK324 AK324

Caldwell flew 68 hours 20 minutes in September and achieved a total flying time of 365 hours 45 minutes. 18 October

26 October

ME 109 damaged. Caldwell noted in his flying log that this was almost a probable and blamed the ships for not confirming it. AK498 Caldwell’s aircraft was damaged in action and caught fire. He forcelanded and the aircraft exploded just after he landed. AK452

Caldwell’s flying hours were much reduced in October and he only flew 30 in Tomahawks, taking his grand total to 395 hours 55 minutes. 11 November 23 November

26 November 28 November 30 November

ME 109F damaged. AK498 ME 109F. Morning patrol over South African troops advancing on Sidi Rezegh. AK498 ME 109E damaged. Escorting bombers to the Trigh Capuzzo. Caldwell recorded these actions on 22 November, but the Operations Record Book states they occurred on 23 November. Luftwaffe records also indicate they occurred on 23 November.The Operations Record Book recorded the second claim as destroyed, and while it is known that Hauptmann Wolfgang Lippert, Gruppenkommandeur of II/JG27, baled out, Caldwell recorded it as damaged. AK498 ME 109F damaged. AK498 ME 109 probable. AK498 ME 109 probable. AK498

Caldwell flew 44 hours 25 minutes on Tomahawks during November, which brought his grand total to 440 hours 20 minutes. 5 December

5 × Ju 87s. Patrol of El Gobi–El Adem area.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 14 December

17 December 18 December 19 December 22 December 24 December

28 December

ME 109F damaged.The Operations Record Book lists claims for two ME 109s damaged on this date, while only one is mentioned in the flying log. AK498 ME 109F probable. AK498 ME 109 damaged. AK498 ME 109 probable. AK498 ME 109F. Escorting bombers to Agedabia. AK498 ME 109E. AK498 ME 109F damaged. Caldwell’s account of this sortie, entitled ‘Middle East Xmas’, indicates that he was again escorting bombers to Agedabia but his flying log states that he was in the Fort Mechili–Msus area. It was not until many years later that Caldwell discovered that he had destroyed the aircraft flown by Erbo Graf von Kageneck of III/JG27. AK498 2 × Ju 87s on fire on the ground. AK498

Caldwell flew almost 45 hours in December for a total flying time of 585 hours and 15 minutes. He had a score of sixteen victories with 250 Squadron. His last operation with 250 Squadron was a strafing run on 30 December 1941, flying AK498. He blew up some motor transport, petrol and ammunition trucks, and accounted for some ‘odd personnel’. 1942 5 January 8 January 13 January 26 January

Flying with 112 Squadron RAF on Kittyhawk IA; and with Kenley Wing on Spitfire Mark Vb and Mark IX. First flight in Kittyhawk IA, from Kasfareit to Mersa Matruh, of 1 hour 30 minutes duration. AK658 ME 109 damaged. AK658 ME 109 damaged. AK658 ME 109 damaged. AK658

At the end of January 1942, Caldwell had flown 35 hours 35 minutes on Kittyhawks, and his total flying hours had reached 620 hours 10 minutes. 21 February

23 February

ME 109F. First victory with 112 Squadron. Patrol of the Gambut–El Adem area. Leutnant Hans-Arnold Stahlschmidt of I/JG27 crash-landed, a victim of the ‘“fabulous shot” so called’. AK658 ME 109F damaged. AK658

Caldwell carried out mainly strafing activities and patrols during February and closed the month with a total of 24 hours 30 minutes in the air. His total flying hours had reached 645 hours 20 minutes. 6 March 9 March

10 March

ME 109F damaged AK900 ME 109 probable. The Operations Record Book lists one damaged on 8 March, whereas Caldwell’s flying log lists one damaged on 6 March and a probable on 9 March. AK900 Test flight in the Kittybomber. AK900

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Appendices 11 March

12 March

14 March

1

⁄2 MC 202

ME 109F. Escort of bombers to Derna. AK968 ME 109F damaged. AK968 Test flight in the Kittybomber with live ammunition. Dive-bombed and strafed Martuba aerodrome. AK900 ME 109F probable. Caldwell’s flying log indicates this occurred on 12 March but the operations record book indicates that it occurred on 13 March. AK766 ME 109F/MC 202. North-west of Tobruk, while intercepting enemy fighters shadowing Western Desert Air Force bombers on their return from Martuba. Caldwell claimed that he destroyed a ME 109F but it was a MC 202 from 6º Gruppo of the Regia Aeronautica. AK772 Caldwell records in his flying log that the pilot of the MC 202 baled out and became a POW. He makes no mention of this claim being shared, but it is clearly indicated in his combat report that this victory was shared with Sergeant Urbanczyk. AK772

Caldwell flew only 15 hours 30 minutes in March before the Squadron was relieved on 15 March. His total flying time was now 660 hours 50 minutes.At this point, he ceased recording his ‘grand total’ in his flying log, and only totalled his hours as a solo pilot. 23 April

ME 109. On a scramble to Tobruk, near Bir Hacheim. This was originally recorded as a probable but was later confirmed destroyed. AK766

Flying time in April 1942 was 8 hours 15 minutes. Total flying time was 669 hours 5 minutes. 6 May

Caldwell’s last desert flight was a sweep and sunset patrol of the front line. It was ‘completed without incident’. He had now flown 603 hours as a solo pilot. On leaving the desert, Caldwell had attained 201⁄2 victories. AK793

During June and July 1942, Caldwell flew 30 hours 10 minutes on Spitfires with Kenley Wing. He flew mainly on the Spitfire Mark Vb, but flew 3 hours 25 minutes on the Spitfire IX. Caldwell did not record serial numbers of these aircraft in his flying log. 1943

2 March

Flying with 1 Fighter Wing RAAF on Spitfire Vc and Mark VIII. Note: RAF serial number appears first, followed by RAAF serial number. BS295/A58–20, BS234/A58–95 and JL394/A58–210 were all ‘personalised’ and bore the marking CR-C. Zero. Thirty miles west-north-west of Point Charles. BS295/A58–20 Light-bomber. The Wing’s intelligence officer later determined that this was a Kate. BS295/A58–20

Caldwell flew 28 hours 25 minutes during March 1943, and 19 hours 10 minutes during April.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 2 May

Zero. Forty-sixty miles north-west of Darwin. Hap.

BS234/A58–95 BS234/A58–95

Caldwell flew 11 hours 50 minutes on Spitfires during May 1943. 20 June

Zero/Oscar. South-west of Darwin. There was much confusion as to the type of enemy fighter aircraft used that day and Caldwell’s claim of a Zero should be read as an Oscar. BS295/A58–20 Betty probable. BS295/A58–20

On this day, Caldwell became a two theatre ace after attaining five victories in the Pacific theatre. He also received recognition for achieving his ‘quarter’, when the destruction of the Japanese fighter took his score to 251⁄2. 28 June

30 June

Betty probable. Although Caldwell’s combat report indicates that he did not encounter the enemy, he noted in his flying log a probable Betty and he was credited with this as a destroyed in the 1 Fighter Wing Operations Record Book. It was not officially recognised. BS234/A58–95 Zero. Forty miles west of Batchelor. BS295/A58–20 Betty. Caldwell appears to have originally recorded this as a damaged, crossed that out and wrote probable, then crossed that out and ticked damaged, indicating that this Betty was only damaged. BS295/A58–20

Caldwell flew 33 hours 5 minutes on Spitfires in June and 25 hours 40 minutes during July 1943. 8 August

17 August

Caldwell flew his new Spitfire Mark VIII, JL394/A58–210, for the first time. He transposed the letters of the prefix in his flying log, recording it LJ394. Dinah. Twenty miles west of Cape Fourcroy. This ‘easy prize’ was Caldwell’s last victory. His official score was 271⁄2 victories.This Dinah was from 202 Naval Squadron—Sergeant Tomihiko Tanaka was the pilot and Sergeant Shinji Kawahara was the observer. When the aircraft crashed into the sea, Caldwell observed three bodies floating in the water. JL394/A58–210

Caldwell flew 17 hours 45 minutes total on Spitfires in August and 8 hours 10 minutes in September before he was posted from 1 Fighter Wing. When he left the NorthWestern Area he had attained 953 hours 55 minutes solo flying time. Caldwell’s flying log indicates that his ‘last op’ was 25 March 1945, when he flew Spitfire Mark VIII MT675/A58–528 from Manila to Bataan and Corregidor. This was the Spitfire that Flight Lieutenant Ted Sly crashed on Clark Field. Caldwell’s last wartime flight was a reconnaissance from Morotai to Tarakan on 28 March 1945. He had flown 1209 hours 50 minutes during daylight and, while on night operations on Morotai, he had accumulated 37 hours night flying.

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Appendices Caldwell’s final entries in his flying log were three Wirraway flights (23 and 24 June and 26 October 1945). On the final page of his log, he ‘signed off ’ with the statement ‘496 sorties 1116 op hours Finished with RAAF’, and totalled his operational sorties— 394 in the Middle East, 38 in England and 64 in the South-West Pacific. Caldwell’s official score at the conclusion of the Second World War was 271⁄2 victories, and this was indicated by the ‘scoreboard’ painted onto his Spitfire Mark VIII. However, many postwar sources have attributed him with a total of 281⁄2. In his revised claims list in Aces High, Vol. 2, Christopher Shores accords Caldwell with circa twenty-five or twenty-six and two to four shared destroyed, eleven probables, twentyfive to twenty-eight damaged and two destroyed on the ground.

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APPENDIX B: Air Board Order ‘N’ 548 of 1944 (relating to restriction of liquor supplies in the Pacific area) 1. As from 1st August, 1944, restricted liquor supplies will be available from RAAF Canteen Services Unit to all units in the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia. 2. The supply, control and distribution of alcoholic liquor to the units mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Order is vested exclusively in RAAF Canteen Services Unit, which will promulgate instructions relating to ordering procedure, method of distribution, payment of accounts, quantitative restrictions, selling prices, and other matters incidental to the supply, distribution and control of alcoholic liquor. 3. RAAF Canteen Services Unit will be responsible for the supply of alcoholic liquor to unit messes, and canteens of the units mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Order which will dispose of it to personnel in accordance with the instructions promulgated from time to time in RAAF Canteen Services Liquor Instructions. 4. Unit messes and canteens of the units mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Order shall not purchase or obtain any alcoholic liquor except through RAAF Canteen Services Unit. 5. No member shall export to or import into any place in the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia any alcoholic liquor. 6. The purchase of alcoholic liquor by any member in any place in the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia, except from a unit mess or canteen, is prohibited. In this paragraph, ‘purchase’ means any acquisition of alcoholic liquor for a monetary or any other consideration. 7. The sale of alcoholic liquor by a member otherwise than in the course of his duty in any place in the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia is prohibited. In this paragraph ‘sale’ means any disposition of alcoholic liquor to any place in the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia except liquor ordered by or for RAAF Canteen Services Unit. 8. The provisions of this Order shall not apply to requirements of liquor for medicinal purposes, which shall be obtained and forwarded in accordance with normal supply procedure. 9. ABO ‘N’ 426/44 is hereby cancelled.

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Appendices

APPENDIX C: Group Captain Caldwell’s Request of 9 April 1945 for Termination of Commission I wish to refer to the charges laid against two airmen of No. 80 Fighter Wing, viz, LAC Charters and LAC Fitzroy for selling liquor about ten days ago. Also to the insinuation that I have organised trading in liquor on the island and that other officers are involved. The facts are as follows: Before No. 80 Fighter Wing came here I made a trip of enquiry and ascertained that for much camp equipment and general camp and unit supply services we would be largely dependent on Americans and that such assistance would be more ready if we could reciprocate with gifts of liquor. This was borne out by subsequent events. Accordingly, when No. 80 Fighter Wing Advance Echelon came on by air in December last I and at least one other officer brought liquor, paid for out of our own pockets, which was designed to be used as described above and for our own consumption. A considerable quantity of this supply was given to American units to procure for us many essentials for erection and running of Wing units which we could not get from the RAAF. On [a] quick trip back to Darwin, I obtained a further small quantity, a proportion of which was used in the same way. During this period, LAC Parker, my batman, approached me with the suggestion that he could sell some liquor for cash. From experience I considered there was little likelihood that the RAAF would reimburse me for what I had privately outlaid in its interests, and under the circumstances it seemed reasonable to recover on the same basis. A small quantity of liquor was sold through LAC Parker. Such sales ceased when this airman was found very drunk in the company of two American soldiers one morning, they and others having used liquor taken by Parker from my store. I am informed that LAC Parker told the Service Police he was beaten up and robbed on that occasion.This is in direct contradiction to his statement at that time and the circumstances. Several witnesses were present and LAC Parker scouted any suggestion that he had been subjected to ill-treatment. He bore no marks on his face or above the waist line and was most anxious to be allowed to spend the rest of the day with his American friends who were to be seen waiting for him just outside the camp. When the main body of No. 80 Fighter Wing came over, they brought with them some cases of liquor for me and another senior officer of No. 80 Fighter Wing whose name naturally I am reluctant to disclose. Part of this was bought through ordinary channels and some was procured for us by senior RAAF officers. Almost immediately, however, I received notice of my posting back to Australia on completion of operational tour. I now owned more liquor than I could use myself or was needed for farewell gifts, etc, so when LAC Charters who was acting as a batman asked me would I sell some to or through him I agreed. As in the case of LAC Parker, he was acting of his own volition and I gathered obtained some benefit for himself. I did not know LAC Fitzroy in the matter. That must have been a private arrangement between them. However, for the actions of both airmen in this case I readily accept responsibility and ask that leniency be extended them. It was the above referred to liquor that was found at No 80. Fighter Wing camp site, less than half owned by me, the remainder belonging to another or others. Squadron Leader Dixon, my SOA, who has been suspended by you, apparently on

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E its account, was in no way interested in the liquor found either as regards ownership, sale or proceeds. He merely, at my request, kept an eye on its safety. He is therefore completely innocent in spirit if not in letter, and I ask that he be reinstated to remedy an injustice. For myself, I am aware that there is an ‘N’ order against selling liquor here. But so far as I know First Tactical Air Force (RAAF) have not repeated same in their Routine Orders, nor issued any instruction on the matter. Moreover, to my own certain knowledge, and to the certain knowledge of others, a number of senior RAAF officers, senior to me in rank and appointment, have sold and traded liquor hereabouts, in some cases removing from the area goods and war supplies thus obtained such as arms, ammunition, cigarettes, etc, of which instances can be proved. My offence therefore seems venial and while I quite understand that it is the intention to take disciplinary action against me I feel entitled to ask you to protect me against discriminating punishment. I regret my actions, particularly where involving others. This operational tour, in its absence of true operations, has been a big disappointment to me and I am not reassured by the prospects of appointments available to me at home.Therefore, if it is fact that this incident is the opportunity to make an example of me, I respectfully request that my commission be terminated. Your attention is invited to the fact that this matter has occupied already over one week and I should like to be advised of the probable further delay involved in my proceeding home on leave. You are at liberty to use this statement against me.

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Appendices

APPENDIX D: Particulars supplied by Group Captain Caldwell of his allegations on 13 April 1945 As ordered I enclose particulars of cases affecting Senior Officers and Junior Officers Not in 80 Fighter Wing. As regards certain Junior Officers in 80 Fighter Wing who to my knowledge here sold and/or imported liquor, it could easily be suggested that I was implicated as an accessory because of my knowledge. Particulars of such cases therefore [are] not included and as regards them, I ask that the order be waived. Early this year [sic] the visit of the DCAS Air Vice-Marshal Bladin [sic] to Morotai, the following officers were playing poker in the quarters of the AOC, First TAF, RAAF: Air Vice-Marshal Bladin [sic] Air Commodore Cobby Group Captain Gibson Group Captain Caldwell Wing Commander Myers Flight Lieutenant Quinn Towards the end of the evening, Squadron Leader Lindeman, the pilot of the DCAS’s aircraft came into the room and said, ‘I haven’t been able to do too well on the cigarettes—there’s a shortage on the island and they’re not anxious to trade’. ‘I’ve got some for you but there is still a couple of bottles of whisky that I could not do any good with, shall I leave them here’—or words to that effect. The DCAS changed the conversation. Squadron Leader Lindeman again referred to the whisky which he placed on the floor, and to the bad trade conditions. Flight Lieutenant Quinn has since remarked on the matter to me on several occasions. Wing Commander Gibbes, No. 80 Fighter Wing, has told me that he had admitted to the Service Police that he has brought in certain liquor and has sold some of it. Squadron Leader Grace, No. 82 Squadron, has told me that the Operations Officer saw a Lockheed aircraft bearing the AOC’s flag unload a quantity of liquor at the strip about three days ago. Wing Commander Sinclair told me that about four days ago a pilot told him (Wing Commander Sinclair) at Biak, that he was flying the AOC’s aircraft and that they were then returning to Morotai from the mainland with a load of ‘grog’. Towards the end of 1944,Wing Commander Jackson brought a flight of Kittyhawks from Noemfoor to Darwin and he returned to Noemfoor with each aircraft loaded in every available space, with liquor. I saw the liquor loaded into the aircraft and watched them take off. I saw the AOC’s cheque (Air Commodore Cobby) for a large amount which Wing Commander Jackson said was to pay for whatever liquor they could purchase in NWA. Squadron Leader Grace was a member of this flight. On a later occasion Wing Commander Jackson, who proceeded south from Darwin, Wing Commander Cresswell and several other officers came by Kittyhawk from Noemfoor to Darwin, and left Darwin on the return journey with a good supply of liquor which I saw loaded into the aircraft. On both occasions I was told that the liquor was obtained from the Canteen Services through NWA HQ at the request of TAF RAAF HQ. Wing Commander Sinclair is aware of these circumstances and was present when

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E Wing Commander Jackson made the request to Group Captain Watson, at NWQ HQ, quoting this authority. On a previous occasion Group Captain Gibson and Wing Commander Myers came to Darwin in a Beaufort from Noemfoor to get particulars of No. 80 Fighter Wing. I returned to Noemfoor with them in the Beaufort, which contained a number of cases of liquor which I saw unloaded at Noemfoor. When I returned from Noemfoor to Darwin in company with Squadron Leader MacDonald of RAAF Command a few days later, in two Beaufighters, I was asked by TAF HQ to see Group Captain Watson SOA. NWA HQ and ask him to arrange for the Beaufighters to get a supply of ‘grog’ to bring back, for which purpose, the pilot in charge was carrying £100, to pay for it. Group Captain Watson, when approached, said he was getting tired of First TAF, RAAF sending over to Darwin for ‘grog’ and that it was being overdone. He refused to assist and I believe no liquor in any quantity was obtained. I also delivered to Group Captain Watson on this occasion an amount of approximately £100 from TAF HQs in respect to the liquor taken in the Beaufighter referred to above. Squadron Leader MacDonald is aware of these circumstances. Air Commodore De La Rue on an occasion during 1944, visited Dutch New Guinea and returned to Australia with an American Carbine, which he stated he acquired in exchange for one bottle of whisky. Squadron Leader Toohey, now of TAF, RAAF, has knowledge of this incident.

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Appendices

APPENDIX E: Terms of Reference under Air Force Regulations for the Barry Inquiry IN PURSUANCE of the powers conferred by regulation 23 of the Air Force Regulations, I, Arthur Samuel Drakeford, the Minister of State for Air, HEREBY APPOINT— JOHN VINCENT BARRY, ESQUIRE, KC to inquire into, and report to me on, the following matters, being matters in relation to the discipline and good government of the Air Force, namely: 1. Whether any member and, if so, what members, of the First Tactical Air Force, RAAF, at any time and, if so, at what times, between the first day of August 1944, and the first day of May 1945, (both inclusive) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the specified period’) purchased, imported or sold or otherwise disposed of alcoholic liquor in breach of ABO ‘N’ 548/44 and, if so, what quantities of such liquor were so purchased, imported, sold or otherwise disposed of, and when and by whom; and by what means, was such liquor imported. 2. If alcoholic liquor was so purchased, imported, sold or disposed of by members of the said First Tactical Air Force, whether the Air Officer Commanding the said Force was aware of all or any of such purchases, importations, sales or disposals and, if he was aware of any such transactions, whether he took any and what steps in regard thereto. 3. Whether Air Commodore F.W. Bladin in or between the months of January and March 1945, exported to or imported into any place within the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia any and what quantity of alcoholic liquor. If so, whether any, and what quantity of, such liquor was— a. sold to any and what person for any and what sums of money; b. exchanged with any and what person for any and what commodities; or c. disposed of in any other and what manner. 4. Whether Air Commodore H.F. De La Rue, CBE DFC, in or about August or September 1944, exported to or imported into any place within the Pacific Area outside the mainland of Australia any and what quantity of alcoholic liquor. If so, whether any and what quantity of such liquor was— a. sold to any and what person for any and what sums of money; b. exchanged with any and what person for any and what commodities; or c. disposed of in any other and what manner. 5. Whether at any time and, if so, at what times, during the specified period alcoholic liquor was, in breach of ABO ‘N’ 548/44, imported from the mainland of Australia in RAAF aircraft to areas in which units under the command of First Tactical Air Force, RAAF, were located. If so, in what quantities, when, by whom and by what aircraft. 6. If alcoholic liquor was so imported in RAAF aircraft, whether the Air Officer Commanding the said First Tactical Air Force was aware of all or any of such importations and, if so, whether he took any and what steps in regard thereto.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 7. Whether the allegations contained in a statement attached to a memorandum dated the 13th April, 1945 addressed to the Air Officer Commanding the First Tactical Air Force, by Group Captain C. R. Caldwell, DSO, DFC and Bar, Polish Cross of Valour, or any and which of them are true and, if so, whether senior officers of the said Force other than Group Captain C. R. Caldwell by their actions and conduct abrogated the effect of ABO ‘N’ 548/44 so far as the said Force is concerned. 8. Whether the applications by the undermentioned officers for permission to resign their commissions in the RAAF were in any way related to or connected with: a. all or any of the matters abovementioned or with the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings instituted against Group Captain C. R. Caldwell, by the Air Officer Commanding the said First Tactical Air Force, which resulted in Group Captain Caldwell being arraigned before the Field General Court-martial at Morotai on the 21st April, 1945; or b. operational activities with the said First Tactical Air Force between 1st November, 1944, and 19th April, 1945 (both inclusive)— Group Captain C. R. Caldwell, DSO, DFC and Bar, Polish Cross of Valour Group Captain W. S. Arthur, DSO, DFC Wing Commander R. H. Gibbes, DSO, DFC and Bar Wing Commander K. Ranger Squadron Leader J. L. Waddy, DFC Squadron Leader B. A. Grace, DFC Squadron Leader R. D.Vanderfield, DFC Squadron Leader S. R. Harpham 9. Any matters bearing on, incidental to, connected with or related to the matters abovementioned or arising in the course of the Inquiry and related to the disposal of alcoholic liquor by members of the RAAF in any place in the said Pacific Area during the specified period. DATED this twenty fourth day of May 1945. (SGD) ARTHUR S. DRAKEFORD. Minister of State for Air.

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Appendices

APPENDIX F: Charge Sheet—24 December 1945 The accused, Squadron Leader (Acting Group Captain) Clive Robertson CALDWELL (402107), DSO, DFC and Bar, Polish Cross of Valour, No. 2 Personnel Depot, RAAF, Bradfield Park, an Officer of the Royal Australian Air Force, is charged with:

FIRST CHARGE ORDER AND SECTION 40, AIR FORCE ACT

CONDUCT TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND AIR FORCE DISCIPLINE in that he at Morotai Island, between 22 December 1944 and 15 February 1945, when Officer Commanding No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters, improperly and contrary to his duty engaged in the selling of alcoholic liquor, namely, whisky and gin, through the agency of No. 5139 Corporal Parker, K, an airman member of No. 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit, a unit under the command of No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters.

SECOND CHARGE SECTION 40, AIR FORCE ACT

CONDUCT TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND AIR FORCE DISCIPLINE in that he at Morotai Island about the end of February 1945, when Officer Commanding No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters, improperly and contrary to his duty sold alcoholic liquor, namely, four bottles of gin, to No. 146207 LAC Charter, G C, an airman member of No. 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit, a unit under the command of No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters.

THIRD CHARGE SECTION 40, AIR FORCE ACT

CONDUCT TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND AIR FORCE DISCIPLINE

in that he at Morotai Island about the end of February 1945, when Officer Commanding No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters, improperly and contrary to his duty sold alcoholic

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E liquor, namely, two bottles of whisky, to No. 146207 LAC Charter, G C, an airman member of No. 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit, a unit under the command of No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters. FOURTH CHARGE SECTION 40, AIR FORCE ACT

CONDUCT TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND AIR FORCE DISCIPLINE in that he at Morotai Island on or about 31 March 1945, and 1 April 1945, when Officer Commanding No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters, improperly and contrary to his duty engaged in the selling of alcoholic liquor, namely, whisky and gin, through the agency of No. 146207 LAC Charter, G C, an airman member of No. 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit, a unit under the command of No. 80 (Fighter) Wing Headquarters.

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Appendices

APPENDIX G: Award citations DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS This officer has performed splendid work in the Middle East Operations. He has, at all times, shown dogged determination and a high devotion to duty which have proved an inspiration to his fellow pilots. On one occasion during a patrol, he was attacked by two Messerschmitt 109s. His aircraft was badly damaged while he himself received wounds on his face, arms and legs. Nevertheless, he courageously returned to the attack and shot down one of the hostile aircraft. Flight Lieutenant Caldwell has destroyed at least four enemy aircraft.

BAR TO DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS This officer continues to take his toll of enemy aircraft. One day in December, 1941, Flight Lieutenant Caldwell led his flight against a number of Junkers 87s and, during the combat, he personally shot down five of the enemy aircraft, bringing his total victories to twelve. POLISH CROSS OF VALOUR Granted in appreciation of his buoyant co-operation with Polish pilots when commanding fighter squadron Middle East. First Award of its kind to be made by Poles to member of Dominion Air Force. DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER Wing Commander Caldwell, on completion of his flying training in January, 1941, was posted overseas, served with much distinction and was credited with the destruction in combat of 201⁄2 enemy planes. He returned to Australia in September, 1942, and was subsequently posted to No. 1 Fighter Wing where by his confidence, coolness, skill and determination in the air, he has set a most excellent example to all pilots in the Wing. His skill and judgement as a leader are outstanding. On 2nd March, 1943, he led a formation of six fighters against a force of enemy fighters and bombers totalling twice that number, and was responsible personally for destroying two. On 2nd May, 1943, during an attack by enemy raiders, through failure of his radio, he was obliged to hand over the lead of the Wing, as he was unable to receive directions from Sector Control. In spite of this, however, he searched for and found a portion of the raiding force and succeeded in shooting down one of the enemy. Wing Commander Caldwell has flown over 475 active operational flying hours and has carried out over 300 operational sorties. His personal score of enemy aircraft destroyed has now passed twenty-five, five of which are Japanese shot down since his return to Australia. His courage, determination, skill and his undoubtedly outstanding ability as a leader are an inspiration to his Wing and worthy of the highest praise.

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APPENDIX H: Aircraft flown by or encountered by Caldwell during his flying career RAF/RAAF/USAAF Bell P–39 Airacobra single-seater fighter originally ordered by the RAF but, when it was realised that the P–39 had minimal performance characteristics without a turbocharger, 250 were sent to Russia, about 200 were transferred to the US Army Air Force in Britain and another 200 or so were sent back to America and designated as P–400 Airacobra because it had a different armament. Boeing B–17 Flying Fortress four-engined heavy bomber. Bristol Blenheim two-engined light bomber. Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation CA–12 Boomerang single-engined interceptor and ground-attack fighter. Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Wirraway single-engined two-seater advanced trainer which was also used as a frontline fighter. Consolidated B–24 Liberator four-engined heavy bomber. Curtiss-Wright C–46 Commando two-engined cargo transport aircraft. When it entered service in July 1942 it was the USAAF’s largest and heaviest two-engined aircraft. Curtiss-Wright P–40 Tomahawk single-engined tactical reconnaissance and groundattack fighter. Caldwell scored sixteen official victories in the Tomahawk over six months. Curtiss-Wright P–40 Kittyhawk was similar to the Tomahawk, but incorporated a number of improvements including a more powerful Allison engine, a larger radiator slung under the nose, better rearwards vision for the pilot and an increase in armament to six .50-calibre machine guns, all in the wings. Caldwell scored 41⁄2 official victories in the Kittyhawk over two months. The P–40F Warhawk was a further variant in the ‘Hawk’ series and was the USAAF designation of the RAF’s Kittyhawk II. De Havilland DH 82 Tiger Moth single-engined two-seat basic trainer. Douglas Boston two-engined medium bomber. Douglas C–47 Dakota two-engined cargo transport aircraft, military version of the civilian DC–3. Gloucestershire Aircraft Company Gloster Gladiator single-engined fighter. Glenn L. Martin Company Martin Model 167 Maryland two-engined attack bomber (designated Maryland by the British). Hawker Hurricane single-engined fighter. Lockheed C–60 Lodestar two-engined medium-range personnel transport. Lockheed P–38 Lightning

two-engined high-altitude fighter.

Miles M.14 Magister RAF two-seater trainer.

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Appendices North American B–25 Mitchell two-engined medium bomber. North American P–51 Mustang single-engined fighter. Republic P–47 Thunderbolt single-engined high-performance fighter/bomber. Stinson L5 Sentinel two-seater liaison and communications aircraft. Supermarine Spitfire single-engined manoeuvrable fighter with thin elliptical wing that made it capable of very high speeds. Caldwell flew the Vb, Vc, VIII and IX variants and scored a total of seven official victories using the Vc (six) and VIII (one). LUFTWAFFE Focke-Wulf Fw 190 single-engined fighter that was developed into many variants as a pure fighter, a ground-attack fighter/bomber, and close-support aircraft. Junkers Ju 87 Sturzkampfflugzeug (Stuka)

two-seater, single-engined dive-bomber.

Junkers Ju 88 three-seater single-engined high-speed bomber also used as a reconnaissance aircraft and nightfighter. Messerschmitt Bf 110 (ME 110) long-range, heavy two- or three-seater, two-engined fighter. Messerschmitt Bf 109 (ME 109) single-seater, single-engined fighter. Perhaps the most famous German aircraft of all time. Caldwell encountered both the 109E and 109F variants. REGIA AERONAUTICA Cant Z.1007 three-engined bomber that was a mainstay of the Regia Aeronautica during the Second World War. Fiat G–50 Freccia was the first single-seater monoplane fighter designed and flown in Italy. Macchi MC.200 Saetta single-engined fighter. Macchi MC.202 Folgore single-engined fighter, a direct descendant of the MC.200 Saetta. Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 three-engined aircraft that was perhaps the most important Italian bomber of the Second World War. VICHY FRENCH Morane-Saulnier 406 single-engined fighter obsolescent by the outbreak of the war. JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE Kawasaki Ki–48 Army Type 99 two-engined light bomber, code-named Lily. Mitsubishi Ki–46 Army Type 100 two-engined command reconnaissance aircraft, code-named Dinah.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E Mitsubishi Ki 21 Army Type 97

two-engined heavy bomber, code-named Sally.

Nakajima Ki 43–11 Army Type 1 single-engined fighter Hayabusa, code-named Oscar. JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCE Mitsubishi A6M Reisen Navy Type 0 single-engined carrier fighter. The Allies codenamed the Reisen ‘Zeke’, but quite early on the Reisen’s official designation was known, and it eventually became better known to the Allies as the Zero, with Zeke and Zero becoming interchangeable. Mitsubishi A6M3 Reisen Navy Type 0 model 32 single-engined carrier fighter. First code-named Hap, then Hamp and finally Zeke 32, when the Allies realised that the Hap was not a new type of aircraft. Mitsubishi G4M Navy Type 1 two-engined attack bomber, code-named Betty. Nakajima B5N, Navy Type 97 single-engined three-seater carrier attack bomber, code-named Kate.

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Notes

Prologue 1 2 3 4 5 6

AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook Burgess,‘Our Australian Aviators’, Transit, 1983 Caldwell papers, letter Robertson/Caldwell, 20 December 1943 Burgess, Transit AR, interview Gibbes/Alexander, 2003 AR, letter Howard/Alexander, 2004

Introduction 1 Waters, Valiant Youth, 1945, p. 22 2 Respectively: NAA SP300/3, 3253046; AR, Wilson/Alexander, 2002–05; Brogden, Sky Diggers, 1994, p. 101; and Birkby, Close to the Sun, 2000 (CD-Rom) 3 Both definition of ace and discussion, as well as extract from Robert StanfordTuck, are drawn from Shores and Williams, Aces High, 1994, pp. 4, 6–10. Robert Roland Stanford-Tuck scored 27 and two shared destroyed, one and one shared unconfirmed destroyed, six probables, six and one shared damaged. 4 The ‘thousand men’ claim, AWM PR00514; and ‘disrupting enemy forces’ comment. Australasian Post, 10 February 1983 5 Bob Whittle story recalled by Archie Wilson—AR, Wilson/Alexander, 2002–05 6 Australasian Post, 14 August 1958 7 AR, Wilson/Alexander, 2002–05 8 Caldwell’s notes on draft of Burgess, ‘Transit’, 1983 9 AWM PR84/364 10 Sunday Sun, 30 August 1942 11 AWM PR00514,‘Haj’ notes 12 AR, Williams/Alexander, 3 March 2003 13 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1994

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 14 ‘Fighter Pilot’, Salt, October 1942, p. 2. This article attributes Caldwell as an ace with the killer instinct. It also adds that Caldwell had earned the nickname ‘Killer’ from his comrades and that ‘it is recorded that “his enemies do not get a chance to call him anything”.’ 15 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook 16 Melbourne Herald, 27 November 1943 17 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook 18 Waters, Valiant Youth, 1945, p. 22 19 Other records, Caldwell Archive, Sydney Grammar School 20 Christopher Shores’ revised list of Caldwell’s score, based on both Caldwell’s flying log as well as squadron and other contemporary records. Shores, Aces High, Vol. 2, 1999, p. 57. Details of Caldwell’s claims appear at Appendix A. 21 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook

Chapter One: The Budding Fighter Pilot 1 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook 2 The ES&A Bank was founded in 1852 and in 1970 it merged with the ANZ Bank Ltd to form ANZ Banking Group Ltd. 3 Caldwell was invited to become patron of the Albion Park Sub-Branch in 1944. Although ‘appreciative of the offer, particularly as I feel sympathetic towards the efforts and ideals of the League, being fully aware of the fine work they have done in the past and no doubt will continue to do in the future’, he declined because he expected to be fully occupied on operational flying until the end of the war and for some time afterwards.The sub-branch would not take ‘no’ for an answer, and asked Caldwell to reconsider his decision. Caldwell did and advised that he would accept. OPHR, Caldwell/Albion Park RSL Sub-Branch letters 4 Burgess, Transit 5 AR, Grant/Alexander, 2003–05 6 Sunday Sun, 30 August 1942 7 Caldwell papers, Westpac staff Newsletter c September 1994 8 Caldwell papers, scrapbook compiled by Mrs Annie Caldwell 9 NAA A9300, Caldwell’s service record 10 Sunday Sun, 30 August 1942 11 George Golding won the 440-yards hurdles at the 1931–32 Australian Championships and, unlike Caldwell, went on to compete in the 1932 Olympic Games. Caldwell’s RAAF application form states that he had been selected for the Australian Track Team, 1932. Additional details from Henry (commencing, ‘We were discussing the desert . . .’), Los Angeles Times, c August 1942. Despite not attending the Olympics, Caldwell’s Olympics connection was reported by the Daily Telegraph (English) ‘Athlete’s Five Enemy Planes’, 8 December 1941, which referred to Caldwell as an ‘Olympic Hurdler’. 12 Caldwell papers, Westpac Staff Newsletter c September 1994. A similar story appears in Peter Firkins’ The Golden Eagles, 1980, pp. 175–6. Details of the Ron Richards bout from Sunday Sun, 30 August 1942.

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Notes: Chapter 1 13 AWM S0356 14 Burgess, Transit 15 NLA TRC 537. On his enlistment form, however, Caldwell claimed that he had a total of forty-one hours: thirty-two hours solo and nine hours dual, flying on DH82 Tiger Moths and DH60 Gipsy Moths and gaining A licence No. 2782. Bob Wingrove became an instructor with the RAAF during the war. 16 Caldwell often said he did not particularly like flying, and many of his friends and associates believed this was the case. Mrs Caldwell told me of his love of flying in September 2002, and this clearly contradicts that belief. Caldwell did admit, however, that he ‘wasn’t particularly good at [flying]’ in AWM S0356. 17 AWM S0356 18 NAA A9300, Caldwell’s service record 19 NLA TRC 537 20 Burgess, Transit 21 Burgess, Transit; Mrs Caldwell supplied details of the friend who amended Caldwell’s birth certificate; Sydney Grammar records indicate that Bruce Cliff Caldwell, who joined the RAAF on 30 March 1942, was in the same year as Caldwell. 22 Lucas, Out of the Blue, 1985, p. 39 23 Caldwell papers, scrapbook, undated article from Ascham Charivari, 1940 24 Lord Gowrie served in both the Sudan, where he won the Victoria Cross, and the First World War. He gave his full support to the services in this war. Among his many engagements, he inspected the operational training unit at Mildura in October 1942 while Caldwell was posted there as a flying instructor. In 1943, Lord Gowrie undertook a tour of inspection of the Allied forces in the North-Western Area and New Guinea. He spent some time in Darwin when Caldwell was serving there, and their connection strengthened as a result. 25 Caldwell’s flying log AWM PR00514 does not have any details from his training period. Hours recorded on type come from OAFH ‘Caldwell—Australia’s EATS Ace’, 30 July 1945. 26 This quote and the above ‘Empire Air Scum’ reminiscence are both from AWM S0356. 27 AWM PR00514, typed career notes 28 NLA TRC 537 29 AWM S01646 30 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook 31 Burgess, Transit 32 In a series of photographic portraits taken by Vincent Leslie Baker in Darwin in 1943 (Caldwell’s papers), Caldwell is wearing this flying suit. In one of the photos, the flap of the right-hand side pocket is lifted, revealing the embroidery. Caldwell’s flying suit is now in the collection of The Aviation Historical Society of the Northern Territory Inc. 33 AWM PR00514,‘Seven men of Gascony’ notes 34 Caldwell souvenired his menu card with the Captain and crew’s good wishes and a number of his fellow travellers signed it, including Jim Kent.At the farewell dinner, Caldwell dined on a variety of hors d’oeuvres, cold consommé, poached whitefish, chilled asparagus, roast quarters of lamb with mint sauce, green peas, marrow and

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35 36 37

38

39 40 41

boiled and roast potatoes, and roast turkey. There was also a cold buffet that included ox tongue, boiled ham and salads.To conclude the meal, there was dessert and coffee. See, for example, The Sun, 24 September 1942; Sunday Sun, 27 September 1942 AWM S01650; Lucas, Out of the Blue, p. 40 The Western Desert Force, commanded by Major-General Richard O’Connor, was a British Commonwealth Army unit stationed in Egypt.At the start of the war it consisted of the 7th Armoured Division and the Indian 4th Infantry Division. It was retitled XIII Corps on 1 January 1941 and later became the nucleus of the famous 8th Army, which was formed in September 1941. Jagdgeschwader is a fighter formation. Normally there were three Gruppen in a Geschwader (Geschwader denotes a formation). Gruppen are referred to by a Roman numeral preceding the type and number of the Geschwader.Thus, I/JG27 is the first Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 27. Technically, the German fighter types at this time were prefixed by Bf, and the 109 type is correctly known as the Bf109. This was because, although the aircraft was designed by Willi Messerschmitt, it was produced by Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (Bf ). Later in the war, when Messerschmitt took over the organisation, the aircraft used the prefix ‘Me’. Modern aviation literature uses the correct prefix, but Allied pilots knew the aircraft as Messerschmitts and would refer to them as ‘Messers’ or ‘MEs’. Contemporary sources such as combat reports, operations record books and squadron diaries, and squadron histories, such as 3 Squadron at War, use the Me or ME prefix. Caldwell consistently referred to the German fighters as ME 109s or MEs in his combat reports and flying log. In radio talks and when he took over as the 250 Squadron scribe, he referred to them simply as ‘109s’. Although technically incorrect, in deference to Caldwell I will use the designation ‘ME 109’ in this account. At this time, the Germans were using the ME 109E variant, and later would use the ME 109F variant. NLA TRC 537 NLA TRC 496/1 All direct quotes in this paragraph from AWM S0356. Despite the terror of the incident and the memories it invoked years afterwards, Caldwell spoke of the episode with levity at the inaugural conference of the Aviation Historical Society of Australia: I remember this particularly . . . the exuberance of a very friendly ack-ack gunner who charged immediately to my rescue with a very sharp little entrenching tool with a view to digging me out. I was very alarmed because of the determined look on his face, he was obviously going to dig. I had the canopy back fortunately, my head was about three inches from the ground, with a strong smell of 100 octane and a very hot engine, and all the switches still on. You remember, the big thing is you go through the formality of switching off. I thought I wouldn’t just in case the switches weren’t fully connected and make a little spark. Nevertheless, this chap charged at me . . . and hit the canopy with a very resounding smash indeed which was only about that far from the side of my face . . . I urged him to go and get a body of strong men and walk the tail up for me, which he happily did and I scrambled out. His gun sergeant approached me and said ‘I didn’t like the way

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Notes: Chapter 2 you spoke to the lad, like.’And I said,‘Sergeant, I was a little overwrought, you must forgive me.’ And he said ‘we don’t normally talk like that’. And if you’ve heard the north country fellows talking, you’d wonder why he’d even bothered to complain about what I’d said! NLA TRC 496/1

Chapter Two: Shadow Shooting 1 Moffatt, Australasian Post, 10 February 1983 2 NAUK Air 27/1503. This informal record of squadron life is known variously as the line-shoot book/pilot’s mess log/Squadron diary, but I will refer to it as the Squadron diary.The Squadron scribe changed over time and there is no record now of each individual scribe; however, Caldwell’s handwriting is clearly identifiable. 3 NLA TRC 537 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 ibid. 7 AWM S01650 8 ibid. 9 Caldwell,‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, 1943.This book is a small selection of over 900 broadcasts by RAF officers and airmen between March 1942 and May 1943. Stories are not attributed to individuals; rather, they stand as representative of experiences. Robin Brown in Shark Squadron, 1994, pp. 63–4, quoted from this broadcast, indicating that it was Caldwell who wrote this account. 10 Lambert, Woman, 7 September 1942. The story of the mascot also appeared in a number of newspapers that employed John Hetherington as their war correspondent, including The Sun, Adelaide Advertiser and Melbourne Herald c 31 March 1942. 11 NLA TRC 537 12 AR, Wilson/Alexander, 2002–05 13 Caldwell ‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, 1943, pp. 98–9 14 Duffield,‘Only “The Killer” is Left to Fight On’, Evening Standard, 6 April 1942 15 The 12 May sortie is recorded in Caldwell’s flying log—AWM PR00514—and appears as his first operational flight with 250 Squadron. It is not referred to in the Squadron Diary or Operations Record Book.This is probably because most of the Squadron had withdrawn to the Delta by this stage. 16 It is not certain at what point Caldwell and Aldridge returned to base but Caldwell’s log indicates that he damaged three enemy aircraft and probably destroyed one on the ground.This achievement is not recorded in the Squadron diary. 17 Caldwell recorded only the barest minimum of information in his flying log. On this occasion a little more precise detail is known, thanks to the crew of the Blenheim from 211 Squadron. Here, the Blenheim pilot was Sergeant Jock Marshall, the observer was Sergeant Nobby Clark and Sergeant Bill Baird was the wireless operator/air gunner. Baird noted that they left Aqir at 09.30, taking 11⁄2 hours. They returned to base at 15.30, taking the same time. Clark’s navigation notes, with his pencilled map of the southern coast of Cyprus, showing landmarks for Nicosia and Larnaca, stated ‘Colour-Red Track 342, 200 miles coast–coast’.

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18

19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34

Red was the colour required for the Very pistol flare cartridge that was fired on arrival for recognition. Track 342 was the course to be made, in degrees for setting on the pilot’s compass. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Pyke, Sergeant George Arthur, 402022. RAAF. 24 May 1941.Age 20. Son of Goodman Joel Pike and Lillian Melba Pyke, Newcastle, NSW, Australia. L32, Ramleh War Cemetery. Caldwell papers, News from Home, May 1942.Text was adapted and recorded for an Australian broadcast at about the same time. See, for instance, Brown, Desert Warriors, 2000, p. 20; and Shores and Ring, Fighters Over the Desert, 1969, p. 42. Shores, Aces High, Vol. 2, 1999 p. 57 notes the discrepancy and in Those Other Eagles, 2004, Shores reiterates in Hamlyn’s record that his half share of the Cant Z.1007, his first claim with 250 Squadron, was the first of the war in a Curtiss P–40 Tomahawk aircraft. The Squadron diarist wrote that, ‘The first real action we have had [was] when “B” flight took off on an interception and old Ham [Jack Hamlyn] and Sgt [Tom] Paxton shot down a Cant Z.1007’. AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Headquarters 204 Group Operation Order No. 4, 14 June 1941 (copy in Squadron diary—NAUK Air 27/1503) The ‘Wire’ was the barbed-wire fence that divided Egypt from Libya. Events of both 16 and 18 June AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Hetherington, Melbourne Herald, 27 November 1943 Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Morton, Sergeant John Alexander Andrews, 1252180, Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. 18 June 1941. Age 20. Son of John Hall Morton and Louise Morton. Column 243, Alamein Memorial. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Sumner, Flight Sergeant Clifford Maitland, 526931, Royal Air Force. 18 June 1941. Age 23. Son of John and Helena Sumner, of Walton, Liverpool. 6. H. 2 Halfaya Sollum War Cemetery, Egypt. Caldwell frequently referred to Buq Buq, west of Sidi Barani, as ‘Bug Bug’—AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Munro, Pilot Officer Donald Alexander Ronald, 402130, RAAF. 18 June 1941.Age 23. Son of Donald Cuthbert and Clementine Munro, of Moree, NSW, Australia. Plot 17, Row E, Grave 3, Halfaya Sollum War Cemetery, Egypt. NAUK AIR 27/ISO3, 250 Squadron diary AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 ibid. McCarney, Daily Telegraph, 28 May 1983 NLA TRC 537 Coningham advised that: One or two enemy pilots shot down recently have praised our aircraft and flying but they say that with few exceptions our shooting has not been good or many more of them would have been shot down.They think our pilots open fire at too long a range, thereby giving warning; often when they are close they miss completely. Squadron Leader Caldwell of No. 112 Squadron, who is perhaps our best shot, found that he reached his standard by firing at the shadow of his aircraft when flying over the desert . . . Wing Commander Morris confirms the value of

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Notes: Chapter 2

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

this practice and he has been training the whole of No. 250 Squadron on these lines — AHSNT, Coningham,‘Air Firing Practice’ Postagram, 13 April 1942. It should be noted that 3 Squadron RAAF saw the benefits of shadow shooting from an early stage. It spent two months at Rayak from July 1941 and Bobby Gibbes recalls that they carried out ‘a great amount of added training in dogfighting, aerobatics, formation flying and in shadow shooting’. Gibbes, You Live But Once, 1994, p. 53 Moffatt, Australasian Post, 10 February 1983 Jack Sheridan, letter, in Spitfire News, no. 82, March 2005 Caldwell, Air Cadet, January 1944 Caldwell, Wings, 25 April 1944 NLA TRC 537 ibid. AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Squadron records indicate that thirty Axis fighters were encountered, and that Caldwell shot down the ME 109 from 21000 feet. AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 ibid. AWM S01650—JG27 records indicate that this was a ME 109E flown by Leutnant Heinz Schmidt. My thanks to Lex McAulay for pointing this out. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Gale, Sergeant David James Ross, 402114. RAAF. 26 June 1941. Age 24. Son of Leslie Ross Gale and Mary Jenny Gale, of Killara, NSW, Australia. Awarded Royal Humane Society’s Medal. Column 246. The Alamein Memorial, Egypt. Henry, Los Angeles Times, 18 August 1942 AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 ibid. ibid. The Operations Record Book (NAUK AIR 27/1501) indicates the shared victory, but the Squadron diary indicates that Caldwell and Whittle each shot down a ME 110. NLA TRC 537 NAUK AIR 27/1503, 250 Squadron diary Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Kent, Pilot Officer James Frederick Stamford, 402124. RAAF. 30 June 1941. Age 27. Son of Harold Frederick and Winifred Irene Kent, of Haymarket, NSW, Australia. Column 245, The Alamein Memorial, Egypt. NAA A705/163/40/22 402124, Caldwell/Mrs Kent AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 NAA A705/163/40/22 402124 AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Caldwell papers, News from Home, May 1942 AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Mortimer, Sergeant Arthur Thomas Lort, 407247. RAAF. 3 July 1941. Age 20. Son of Henry James Mortimer and Eliza Maud Mortimer, of Waikerie, South Australia. El Alamein War Cemetery. Egypt, Plot A IV, Row E, Grave 22.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 62 AR, Archie Wilson/Alexander, 2002–2005—Wilson considered Mortimer was a victim of inadequate instruction during flying training. 63 AWM PR00514,‘Seven Men of Gascony’ notes

Chapter Three: Sweeps and Convoys 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

NAUK AIR 27/1503 Squadron diary AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook ibid. ibid. Caldwell ‘The Desert is a Funny Place’,1943, p. 99 Birkby, Close to the Sun, 2000 edition (CD-Rom) Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) indicates this occurred on 9 July, but both the Squadron diary (NAUK AIR 27/1503) and Operations Record Book (NAUK AIR 27/1501) indicate that this occurred on 7 July. Caldwell,‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, 1943, p. 101 NAUK AIR 27/1504, Caldwell’s combat report Caldwell,‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, 1943, p. 102 ibid., p. 102 Australasian Post, 8 March 1962 AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 Shores, Aces High, p. 56 NAA A9300, Caldwell’s service records (see Appendix G for full text) NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry. Caldwell, ‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, 1943, pp. 98–99—Archie Wilson took a photo of Caldwell having his weekly wash down using what little water he had saved from his daily ration of water. Someone commandeered the Squadron diary to paste another photo of Caldwell emerging from the Mediterranean with naught but a small towel protecting the vulnerable bits and captioned it ‘Killer Caldwell still holds his own’. This photo, with slightly different caption, is reproduced in Shores and Williams, Aces High, 1994, photo section. NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry. In the original handwritten diary, ‘battle scared, bottle scarred’ is crossed through. The comments are perfectly readable and the additional ‘damn it’ indicates that Caldwell is having a further dig at the officious Lieutenant Colonel. NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid. AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook ibid. NAUK AIR 27/1503, 250 Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.—Caldwell was never one to suffer fools or disorganisation gladly, and this and the above passage perfectly illustrate this.

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Notes: Chapter 4 28 28 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48

49 50 51

ibid. NAUK AIR 27/1504, combat report NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Wells, Pilot Officer Stanley Anton, 89781. RAF (VR) 250 Squadron. 27 September 1941.Age 30. Son of Frank C. and Nellie Anton Wells, of Weston, Ontario, Canada. Column 241,The Alamein Memorial, Egypt. NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid. NAUK AIR 27/1504, combat report NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry AWM PR00514, flying log NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. For origins of the combined mess, see Watson and Jones, 3 Squadron at War, 1959, p. 35; for Caldwell’s reaction, see NLA TRC 537 NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid. ibid. ibid.—it must have taken some time for the news of Caldwell’s promotion to filter through as his service record notes that he became acting Flight Lieutenant on 25 September 1941—NAA A9300, service record. Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) and the Operations Record Book (NAUK AIR 27/1501) record this event as 23 October, indicating that the diary was not written up on a daily basis. Caldwell’s diary descriptions (NAUK AIR 27/1503) of this event are spread over the 22 and 23 October entries. Both quotes NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid. Caldwell pasted this message from 262 Wing Headquarters into his flying log (AWM PR00514). HMS Gnat was torpedoed off Bardia by the German submarine U-79, blowing off 20 feet of her bow. Still seaworthy, she was towed to Alexandria on 24 October by HMS Griffin.

Chapter Four: Operation Crusader 1 2 3 4 5 6

AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 28 December 1941 All three quotations from NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry NLA TRC 537 ibid. NAUK AIR 27/1503, Squadron diary, Caldwell entry ibid.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24

25

26

27 28 29

30 31

ibid. AWM S01650 Hetherington, Melbourne Herald, 27 November 1943 Hetherington, Egyptian Mail, 28 March 1942 AWM PR84/364 AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 28 December 1941 Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) records that this occurred on 22 November. His combat report (NAUK AIR 27/1504) is dated 23 November and the Operations Record Book (NAUK AIR 27/1501) records these as occurring on 23 November. Luftwaffe records also indicate that they occurred on 23 November. My thanks to Lex McAulay for pointing this out. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Palethorpe, Flight Sergeant Donald Moir: RCAF. 23 November 1941. Son of Harold John L. and Mary Anne Palethorpe of Wenatchee,Washington, USA. Column 246,The Alamein Memorial, Egypt. NAUK AIR 27/1504, combat report AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 28 December 1941 ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. AWM PR00514, flying log NAUK AIR 27/1504, combat report Washington Post, 23 May 1942—Caldwell’s sense of humour was apparent in this interview.When asked if the Nazi pilots did any damage to the British, he answered ‘Oh, yes, when they crashed, several of them fell on our trucks directly below them. Scored direct hits.’ It seems as if the Squadron diary for the last weeks of 1941 is no longer extant and it is not known if Caldwell was still the scribe. The last entry in his hand is 13 November 1941. Carel Birkby quoted portions of the diary in Close to the Sun, 2000 edition (CD-Rom), and this quote comes from that source. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Gilmour, Sergeant Pilot James Ross, 1365007. Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. 5 December 1941. [Age and next-of-kin details not recorded.] 1.F.11 Knightsbridge War Cemetery, Acroma. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Greenhow, Sergeant Edmondson Peter, 1059800. Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. 5 December 1941.Age 19. Son of the Revd. Edmondson Nelson Greenhow, M.A., and of Kathleen Clare Greenhow (nee Cumber), of Torteval Rectory, Guernsey, Channel Islands. Column 243, The Alamein Memorial, Egypt. Caldwell papers, scrapbook NAA A9300, service record—see Appendix G for citation Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1941; Caldwell papers, unattributed clipping in scrapbook; Daily Telegraph (English), 8 December 1941; Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1941 Caldwell papers, unattributed clipping in scrapbook See ‘Introduction’ for discussion on Stanford-Tuck’s quote; photo from Egyptian newspaper (which Caldwell sent to Slade-Slade) appears in Duke, War Diaries,

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Notes: Chapter 4

32 33

34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

1995, facing p. 59, captioned ‘Squadron Leader C.R.“Killer” Caldwell DFC RAAF in his “Don’t mess with me stance”’. Caldwell papers, scrapbook, undated Melbourne Herald article For example: ‘he was busy putting five more little Vs on his machine . . .“It was a piece of cake,” he said . . .“It must have been an amazing battle for our troops on the ground. I saw them dancing like dervishes near two flaming wrecks and waving their arms to us.”’ Egyptian Mail, 8 December 1941; Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1941, included a similar story about the dancing dervishes, but did not include the ‘piece of cake’ quote. AR, Caldwell/Slade-Slade, 28 December 1941 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) indicates the escort occurred on 22 December 1941, but Caldwell’s article, ‘Middle East Xmas’, Wings, 21 December 1943, clearly indicates that it occurred on Christmas Eve. As indicated in note 24, the Squadron diary for this period does not appear to be extant; nor does Caldwell’s combat report. Caldwell, Wings, 21 December 1943 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook ibid. Caldwell, Wings, 21 December 1943 ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. Early research by Shores and Ring, Fighters Over the Desert, 1969, indicated that von Kageneck was downed by Hurricanes of either 94 or 260 squadrons but in Aces High, 1994, Shores and Williams suggest Caldwell downed von Kageneck. Doubt, however, still exists and Weal, Jagdgeschwader 27, Afrika, 2003, credits a Hurricane of 94 Squadron with shooting down von Kageneck. Von Kageneck, Erbo, Pilote de chasse, 1999, pp. 9–10. Von Kageneck’s funeral was attended by General-Oberst Günther Korten, a personal staff officer of Goering. He was buried at the Chiesa di Campo, at Poggioreale. Caldwell, Wings, 21 December 1943 ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. AWM PR00514, flying log ibid. OAFH, DPR, bulletin no. 998, 17 December 1941 NAA A9300, service record—see Appendix G for citation Caldwell’s ‘firsts’ as a wholly Australian trained EATS trainee were well-publicised by the Department of Air when he returned to Australia in 1942. Refer OAFH, DPR, bulletin no. 1691, 18 September 1942 and Gibbes, You Live But Once, 1994,

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60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

p. 107.At that stage, Caldwell actually had sixteen official victories. Gibbes was not far behind Caldwell as far as promotion was concerned. He took over as 3 Squadron’s Commanding Officer just two months later. At this stage, too, he had achieved ace status and a very respectable score of 51⁄4 destroyed, 8 damaged and 3 probables. AR, Wilson/Alexander, 2002–05 For example, see ‘“Killer” Airman’s Modesty’, The Sun, undated 1942 (Caldwell papers scrapbook). Igor Cassini noted that ‘The greater the hero a man is the more normal, the more modest he is generally’. He considered that this certainly applied to Caldwell as he noted how modestly Caldwell answered his questions, Times and Herald, Washington, DC, 21 May 1942. In his opinion column after Caldwell’s death, long-time friend David McNicoll commented that Caldwell ‘was a remarkable and modest man . . . He never sought publicity, he did not take part in marches, hated being photographed and never gave interviews’, The Bulletin, 23 August 1994. Semmler, The War Diaries of Kenneth Slessor, 1985, p. 385 AWM PR83/97 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook Birkby, Close to the Sun, 2000, edition (CD-Rom) AR, Wilson/Alexander, 2002–05 Officer’s servant Birkby, Close to the Sun, 2000, edition (CD-Rom) AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook

Chapter Five: Shark Squadron 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14

NLA TRC 537 Caldwell papers, News from Home, May 1942 Caldwell,‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, pp. 100–1 ibid., p. 101 Caldwell papers, scrapbook, unattributed article AWM S01650 ibid. Caldwell papers, text of unattributed article based on a number of interviews with Caldwell Duke, War Diaries, p. 65 NLA TRC 537 Barbas, Planes of the Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, vol 2, 1985, p. 149 OPHR, Caldwell/Dairos, 4 August 1986 Barbas, Planes of the Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, 1985, p. 151—a friend indicated his interest in this incident and Caldwell copied a couple of accounts for him and, on one, annotated his opinion of Stahlschmidt’s brush with death on this occasion. On the accounts which referred to the ‘fabulous shot’ Caldwell made the annotation ‘The “fabulous shot” so called’—OPHR Caldwell/Dairos, 4 August 1986. Caldwell papers, photo album

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Notes: Chapter 5 15 NLA TRC 496/1 16 Long extracts from Lucas, Thanks for the Memory, 1998, pp. 92–3; ‘Strawberry jam’ comment and recollection that Bobby Gibbes was the chauffeur from NLA TRC 496/1; Brown, Shark Squadron, 1994, p. 59, states that the medical officer was Flying Officer C. Joseph; in Thanks for the Memory, Caldwell records that it was Flight Lieutenant Moss; in NLA TRC 496/1 Caldwell claims that the squadron doctor was a ‘very nice fellow’, Reg Solomon. Gibbes does not mention this incident in his autobiography—perhaps this is understandable given that that was the day that he ‘got the shock of my life’ when he was advised that he was taking over as Squadron Leader of 3 Squadron RAAF, which would have certainly overshadowed his impromptu role as chauffeur to a couple of beat up joy-riders—Gibbes, You Live But Once, 1994, p. 115. 17 Duke, War Diaries, p. 65 18 Quoted in Brown, Shark Squadron, p. 59 19 There were obviously no hard feelings over the incidents as photos of the June 1961 event in both the Daily Telegraph and Wings attest: they show Caldwell and Cross smiling and laughing as they ‘duel with loaded cauldrons’ after Cross had been initiated into the Club custom of drinking beer from a brandy balloon— Castle, Daily Telegraph, 22 June 1961; Wings, August 1961. 20 Hetherington, The Sun, 17 June 1942 21 AWM PR 00514, flying log 22 Interestingly, although Caldwell claims that he was responsible for the idea of the Kittybomber, RAF public relations advised war correspondent Kenneth Slessor in June 1942 that ‘“Killer” Caldwell was not connected with Kittybomber development at all, but it was true that Australians had been largely responsible—they pioneered Kittyhawks themselves in the Middle East’—Semmler, The War Diaries of Kenneth Slessor, 1985, p. 401. James Aldridge, however, reported that it was Caldwell’s idea to try out the Kittyhawk as a Kittybomber. Melbourne Herald, 13 July 1942 23 Duke, War Diaries, 1995, p.72 24 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook; Caldwell’s emphasis 25 Caldwell papers,‘Kittyhawks and Boomerangs’, 1976 26 ibid.; Neville Duke’s diaries indicate that the solo bombing of Martuba occurred on 12 March, but both Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) and the Operations Record Book (NAUK AIR 27/873) indicate it was 11 March—Duke, War Diaries, 1995, pp. 72–3. 27 Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) records this as occurring on 12 March, but the Operations Record Book indicates that it took place on 13 March. NAUK AIR 27/873 28 NAUK AIR 27/877, combat report—Caldwell’s claims were verified but postwar research indicates that the ME 109F was in fact another MC202 (MC202s were from 6º Gruppo of the Regia Aeronautica). 29 Caldwell papers, unattributed RAF press release 30 ibid. 31 Lucas, Out of the Blue, 1985, pp. 148–9—Caldwell submitted this story to Lucas when Lucas called for stories relating to luck in air warfare, but Caldwell did not give a specific date for the event, only that it occurred in March 1942. 32 AWM S01650

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 33 NLA TRC 537 34 About this time Caldwell was interviewed by John Hetherington, who asked him about his eventual return to Australia. Despite wanting to stay in the desert, Caldwell stated that ‘I am delighted. I feel that my experience in the Middle East will enable me to pull my weight in helping to smash the Jap . . . I’ve a special job here but I hope to be on my way as soon as that is finished.’ This interview appeared in a number of papers including The Sun, The Adelaide Advertiser and Melbourne Herald, c 31 March 1942. 35 NLA TRC 537 36 Duke, War Diaries, p. 75 37 Permission was sought from the Australian Government before the award was conferred and, later, for Caldwell to wear the award. The Government had no objections and the Minister for Air regarded the proposed award with very great appreciation; NAA A816, 66/301/265—see Appendix G for citation. 38 AWM S01650 39 AWM PR00514, typed career notes 40 Caldwell,‘The Desert is a Funny Place’, p. 98 41 NAA DPR A8681 bulletin no. 1693, 20 September 1942 42 AWM S01646 43 Caldwell,‘The Desert is a Funny Place’,1943, pp. 102–3 44 AR, Neale/Alexander, 2002 45 Drake with Shores, Billy Drake, 2002, p. 41 46 NLA TRC 537 47 Standard, 10 July 1942 48 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook

Chapter Six: Interregnum 1 Caldwell papers,‘Kittyhawks and Boomerangs’ interview, 1976 2 Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) indicates that they landed on 23 May, but the Washington Post 23 May 1942 and a press release from the Washington branch of the British Press Service (Caldwell papers) indicate the pilots participated in the press conference on 22 May, and Igor Cassini in his Times and Herald article published on 21 May refers to an afternoon cocktail party that Caldwell attended. 3 Caldwell papers, scrapbook unattributed news article, 23 May 1942 4 ‘I’m sure they were brave enough—they were keen on aerobatics. You would see them—they would be above you, you know, and doing some very spectacular aerobatics.What that was supposed to do, perhaps impress you as to how dangerous they were. But one wouldn’t question their courage.’ AWM S01650 5 Cassini, Times and Herald, 21 May 1942 6 New York Times, 26 May 1942 7 New York Sun, 26 May 1942 8 ibid. 9 Published the following year as ‘The Desert is a Funny Place’ in chapter VIII, ‘Wings Across Africa’, Over to You: New broadcasts by the RAF, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1943

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Notes: Chapter 6 10 News Chronicle, 9 June 1942; Daily Mirror, 9 June 1942 11 This was not an official attachment and Caldwell does not appear on the list of postings during June 1942—see Operations Record Book, RAF Kenley (NAUK AIR 28/419). Caldwell did not record aircraft identification details in his flying log (AWM PR00514) so it is not possible to identify the squadrons he flew with. It should be noted that Caldwell’s flying log does not accord with the Kenley Operations Record Book. It is possible that, in order to maximise his flying opportunities, he flew operations from nearby stations, such as Biggin Hill. 12 The Bulletin, 20 January 1943—earlier, in NAA A8681 DPR bulletin 1691 of 18 September 1942, Caldwell was quoted as saying, ‘I enjoyed flying in the Middle East, and if I had to continue to fly abroad I should prefer to be in the Middle East to anywhere else. Flying conditions are bad at times, but I like being a cog in a desert squadron’s full-out war effort.’ 13 AWM S01650—despite the beauty of the aircraft, Caldwell was never happy with the Spitfire’s armament. 14 Caldwell papers, radio broadcast with John Burton, 23 August 1942 15 AWM S01650 16 Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) does not indicate how he travelled to America from England. It appears that Caldwell may have filled out his flying log some time later as the dates in it do not correspond to other records of this trip to America. For instance, he indicates that he tested the Warhawk on 29 July, but his report of his visit to the Curtiss-Wright factories indicates that the test took place on 5 August 1942; and his flying log indicates that the landing accident with the Commando C–46 occurred on 31 July, but his report and a statement from Burdette S. Wright indicate that this occurred on 6 August. 17 Brogden, Sky Diggers, c 1944, p. 104 18 Caldwell papers, ‘Report of a Visit . . . to the Curtiss-Wright Corporation . . .’ 5–8 August 1942 19 Caldwell flew in C–46 Commando No. 8, Air Corps 41–5166. While the C–46 was circling, Curtiss Public Relations contacted United Press, and a photographer appeared to capture the alighting pilots and passengers. Burdette Wright was there on the tarmac to welcome them, and he congratulated Fisher on the landing. It was later ascertained that the gear had failed to lock in the down position because the flared end of a 5⁄16 inch dural line on the firewall of the right engine nacelle had broken off and was also found to be 3⁄8 inch too short in length. Accident Report and associated papers re C–46 Commando No. 8, Air Corps 41–5166 from Accident-Reports.com Military Aviation Incident Reports. 20 Despite Wright’s certification, the accident reports all indicate that First Lieutenant Begley was the second pilot. On the accident reports, Caldwell was listed as a passenger. Accident-Reports.com 21 NLA TRC 537 22 Caldwell papers, scrapbook—details of trip to Hollywood and Caldwell quotations from Henry, ‘By the Way’ (commencing, ‘When the only clue you have . . .’); Los Angeles Times, undated (c August 1942); details of Caldwell’s ‘death’ from Los Angeles Times, 26 January 1943 and Henry, ‘By the Way’, Los Angeles Times, undated (c January/February 1943) 23 Caldwell spent four days in Bruce’s company in San Francisco and, as a memento,

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24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48

Bruce gave him some stills from Sherlock Holmes Saves London (the working title of the film released later that year as Sherlock Holmes and the Voice of Terror). Perhaps hinting at a liquid good time, Bruce scrawled on one of the photos. ‘Yes thanks, we’d like a double whiskey & a double brandy!!’ Caldwell papers photographs Caldwell papers, radio broadcast with John Burton, broadcast on KFI California, 23 August 1942 ibid. Daily Telegraph, 27 August 1942; Wagga Advertiser, 28 August 1942 Caldwell papers, Bertraindias/Jean Caldwell, 1 September 1942 ‘Sq Ldr Caldwell has not repeat not yet arrived in Australia.’ Caldwell scrapbook. Woman, September 1942 It was the usual thing for pilots returning from an overseas posting to surrender their higher acting rank (and the pay that went with it).This became the subject of great public concern and agitation when popular fighter pilot ‘Bluey’ Truscott returned to Australia and was forced to surrender his rank. He became the leading figure in a test case and eventually Minister for Air Drakeford ordered the retention of acting rank for veterans of the air war. National Screen and Sound Archive, 83334, ‘Meet Squadron Leader Clive (Killer) Caldwell DFC and Bar’ Caldwell papers, scrapbook, Adelaide Advertiser, undated (c September 1942)—this anecdote was later published in Kings of the Clouds, 1943, p. 43, with some extra dialogue between Caldwell and the station commander: ‘You might have wrecked the officers’ mess.’ ‘Yes Sir.’ ‘And wrecked your plane, and killed yourself.’ ‘Yes Sir.’ ‘Oh, hang it all, Caldwell, what about a drink?’‘Too right, Sir.’ Caldwell’s friend Slade sent him a copy of Kings of the Clouds and, ever one to amend errors, Caldwell crossed out the additional dialogue with the annotation, ‘All bloody cock’. The Sunday Sun, 27 September 1942 Caldwell papers, scrapbook, unattributed news article Daily Telegraph, undated (c September 1942) Sydney Morning Herald, 24 September 1942 Truth, 4 October 1942 See, for instance Daily Telegraph, 24 September 1942 and The Sunday Sun, 27 September 1942 The EMELSEE, 9 January 1942 Daily Mirror, 26 September 1942 Daily Mirror, 24 September 1942 NLA TRC 537 NAA A1196/33/501/24 NAA A11093/452/A46, Part 1 Caldwell papers, Kittyhawks and Boomerangs’ interview, 1976 Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) indicates that these tests took place on 12 to 15 November, but the Operations Record Book for 18 NEI-RAAF Squadron (OAFH) indicates that thirteen fighter aircraft arrived on 15 November 1942. NAA 11093/452/A46 Caldwell papers,‘Kittyhawks and Boomerangs’ interview, 1976

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Notes: Chapter 7 49 Despite Jones’ ire at Caldwell’s comments, Jones later admitted that the Boomerang had ‘proved very disappointing from a fighter point of view’. OAFH, Transcript of Evidence p. 1752

Chapter Seven: Darwin Defence 1 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s Tactical Appreciation of Raid 53, 15 March 1943 2 The bulk of this section dealing with Evatt’s overseas mission is drawn from Day, The Politics of War, 2003, chapters 26 and 27; quotes from Evatt’s cable to Curtin cited on p. 334. Details of press embargo from NAA A1196/6, 43/501/28 3 AR, Williams/Alexander, 2003 4 Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) indicates that he arrived at Darwin on 19 January, but 1 Fighter Wing Operations Record Book (OAFH) indicates that he arrived on 17 January. 5 AR, Williams/Alexander, 2003 6 AWM PR83/97, Dr Evatt’s telegram 7 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book 8 ibid. 9 NAA A8681 DPR bulletin no. 1691, 18 September 1942 10 Caldwell papers, cassette recording of Clive Caldwell’s notes on Fred Woodgate’s first draft of Lion and Swans, 27 November 1984 11 The 54 Squadron Operations Record Book (OAFH) records this event as occurring on 21 February 1943; Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) records it as 6 March. 12 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book 13 Caldwell papers, Caldwell, undated draft letter to Flying Magazine, c 1953 14 ibid. 15 Roylance, Air Base Richmond, 1991, p. 84 16 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book 17 AWM PR00514, Caldwell,‘Spitfire v Zero’ report, 2 March 1943. This report also appears on NAA 1196, 1/501/505, which contains other Spitfire/Zero comparative reports. 18 ibid. 19 ibid. 20 Both quotes from Geoff Sloman’s ‘Memoirs’ quoted in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992 p. 131. 21 ibid. 22 AR, Williams/Alexander, 2003 23 AWM PR00514, Caldwell,‘Spitfire v Zero’ report, 2 March 1943 24 AR, Grant/Alexander, 2003–05 25 Caldwell papers, Caldwell/Woodgate, 27 November 1984 26 NAA A1196/6 43/501/28 27 ‘Famous Aces Man Spitfires’, Daily Telegraph, 5 March 1943; ‘Spitfires Here’, Caldwell papers, scrapbook, unattributed article (Daily Telegraph article referred to the cheering members)

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 28 See for example, NAA A8681, DPR bulletin no. 2133, ‘Noted Spitfire Group’, 4 March 1943; No. 2134, ‘Noted Spitfire Pilots Home to Fight Japanese’, 4 March 1943; No 2247, ‘Spitfires to Fly Over City in Aerial Display in Support of Loan Rally’, 14 April 1943; Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1943 29 As Alan Powell stated, ‘Heaven help No. 1 Spitfire Wing when it made its first mistake’—The Shadow’s Edge, 1992, p. 183 30 Caldwell papers, Primrose ‘Plan for Interception of Enemy Reconnaissance Aircraft’, 11 March 1943. Primrose stated that the plan ‘may well be called the “Walters–Caldwell” plan’. 31 Flight Sergeant Albert ‘Bert’ Cooper, 54 Squadron, was killed in an attempt to bale out; Pilot Officer Francis ‘Frank’ Varney, 54 Squadron, crashed and survived, but died the next day; Flying Officer William ‘Bill’ Lloyd, 452 Squadron, baled out and was rescued, but his Spitfire was destroyed. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Cooper, Flight Sergeant Albert ‘Bert’ Edward, 940030, Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve.Age 28. 15 March 1943. Son of Richard and Elizabeth Cooper, of Gomalwood, Staffordshire, England; husband of Doris Cooper. G.B.1.Adelaide River War Cemetery. Varney, Pilot Officer Francis ‘Frank’ Leslie, 142861, Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. 16 March 1943. Son of Francis Earnest and Doris Varney; husband of Eileen Veronica Varney, of Crawley, Sussex, England. G.C.10. Adelaide River War Cemetery. 32 See NAA A705, 163/58/35 for details of Thorold-Smith’s personal possessions. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register:Thorold-Smith, Squadron Leader Raymond ‘Ray’ Edward, 402144, Royal Australian Air Force. Age 24. 15 March 1943. Son of Joseph Patrick and Beatrice Mary Thorold-Smith, of Sydney, New South Wales. Panel 6. Northern Territory Memorial,Adelaide River War Cemetery. 33 AR, Grant/Alexander, 2003–05 34 AR, Williams/Alexander, 2003 35 NAA SP300/3,3253046 36 Geoff Sloman,‘Memoirs’, quoted in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, p. 133 37 OAFH, 457 Squadron Operations Record Book 38 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 1943 39 AR, Williams/Alexander, 2003 40 It may never be certain what caused Thorold-Smith’s death but it seems as if he may have been suffering the effects of oxygen deprivation.The detachment had been night flying at Darwin, a short flight from Strauss. There were problems with the oxygen filling equipment at Darwin at the time and the usual practice was to fill up again when they returned to Strauss. In this case, however, they did not. Two of the detachment pancake-landed because of lack of oxygen and it is generally believed that Thorold-Smith experienced the euphoria associated with oxygen deprivation. See Grant, Spitfires Over Darwin 1943, chapter 4, for a discussion of this raid and likely explanation for Thorold-Smith’s death; for more details of Fred Woodgate’s ‘personal crusade’, Thorold-Smith’s last sortie and the identification of his crashed plane, see Grant,‘Beware the Ides of March or Beyond Reasonable Doubt’, Spitfire News, March 1992. 41 AWM PR00514, Tactical Appreciation, 15 March 1943 42 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book

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Notes: Chapter 8 43 AR, Quinn/Alexander, 2002 44 AR, Grant/Alexander, 2003–05

Chapter Eight: The Day the Planes ‘All Fell into the Sea’ 1 Much of this chapter has been taken from my presentation to the Biennial Conference of the Military Historical Society of Australia in October 2004—the text of this appeared in Sabretache, March 2005. Quote in chapter title and header quote both from Clive Caldwell in his foreword to Grant, Spitfires Over Darwin 1943, 2003, p. vii. 2 Caldwell papers, Caldwell/Woodgate, 27 November 1984 3 AR, Fox/Alexander, 2005—Caldwell was forever grateful for Fox’s protection that day and thanked him on many occasions over the years. 4 This was Sergeant Peter Fox of 54 Squadron who crashed with a glycol leak before engagement—his aircraft was destroyed but he survived. 5 Geoff Sloman,‘Memoirs’, quoted in Woodgate, Lions and Swans, 1992, pp. 138–9 6 AWM PR00514, Appreciation of Factors Governing Results 7 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book 8 Fuel/armament report on NAA A11231/1, 5/72/INT indicates engine trouble; Grant, Spitfires Over Darwin, 2003, p. 77, indicates faulty oxygen supply. 9 OAFH, Darwin Air Raid Records, Combat Reports Little and Baker 10 Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: McNab, Flying Officer Alexander ‘Sandy’ Charles, 405420, Royal Australian Air Force. Age 24. 2 May 1943. Son of Dudley Alexander McNab and Jean Christina McNab; husband of Margaret Enid McNab, of Peachester, Queensland. Panel 7 Northern Territory Memorial, Adelaide River War Cemetery. Gifford, Flying Officer Gordon ‘Joe (for King)’ Lindsay Charles, 402740, Royal Australian Air Force. Age 24. 2 May 1943. Son of Charles Edward and Lena Gifford, of Goulburn, New South Wales. Panel 6 Northern Territory Memorial, Adelaide River War Cemetery. 11 Henshaw, Sigh for a Merlin, 1999, p. 94; AWM PR00514 Henshaw/Caldwell; AR, Henshaw/Alexander, 2003—Henshaw wrote to me reinforcing how strongly he felt about the matter at the time, but was unable to recall how much of the problem was ever resolved. 12 The origin of this criticism, cited by Odgers, Air War Over Japan, 1957, p. 48, is not stated. 13 NAA AA A11231/1 5/72/INT 14 Geoff Sloman,‘Memoirs’, quoted in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992, p. 138 15 ‘Heavy Air Losses at Darwin’, The Sydney Sun, 3 May 1943; ‘Spitfire Losses at Darwin’, The Argus, 4 May 1943;‘Fierce Air Battle Over Darwin’, The Age, 4 May 1943 16 ‘The Air Reverse at Darwin’, Sydney Morning Herald editorial, 4 May 1943 17 The Sun, editorial, 4 May 1943 18 ‘Weather Hampers Air Activity’, The Argus, 5 May 1943 19 ‘Spitfires Caught in Storm’, The Argus, 5 May 1943 20 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 1943

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 21 Grant, Spitfires Over Darwin, 2003, p. 69. The meteorological report indicated 9/10 cirrus and cirro stratus at 30000 feet with only a trace of Alto cirrus and Alto stratus. No bad weather was heralded by those clouds. Surface winds ranged from 5 to 10 miles per hour and up to 20000 feet was 15 to 25 miles per hour—NAA A11231/1, 5/72/INT 22 Caldwell papers, Caldwell/Woodgate, 27 November 1984 23 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book 24 Geoff Sloman,‘Memiors’, quoted in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992, p. 139 25 Kenney, Kenney Reports, 1987, pp. 239–40 26 NLA TRC 537 27 Odgers, Air War Against Japan, 1957, p. 49 28 NAA A5954/69, 524/2 29 ibid. 30 Quotes and detail in this and previous two paragraphs from Jones’ report on NAA A5954/69, 524/2 31 ibid. 32 Caldwell papers, undated,‘Spitfires over Darwin’ interview. 33 Clive Caldwell, foreword to Grant, Spitfires Over Darwin, 2003, p. vii 34 The Contact article elicited much response through letters and phone calls. Ultimately, the author had to apologise in writing for the errors of his article and the journal issued an apology to Caldwell—see Adams-Winter, Contact, vol. 42, no. 1, 1987; Contact, vol. 43, no. 1, 1988 35 Jones, From Private to Air Marshal, 1988, pp.101–2 36 NTAS NTRS 226, TS49 37 1 Fighter Wing Operations Record Book 38 Caldwell papers scrapbook, ‘Meagre Welcome for ACE RAAF Pilot’ unattributed article 39 Daily Telegraph, 17 May 1943 40 The Sun, 17 May 1943 41 Daily Mirror, 17 May 1943 42 Caldwell papers, letter, 31 March 1943 43 1 Fighter Wing Operations Record Book 44 Daily Telegraph, 17 May 1943

Chapter Nine: Australia’s Highest Scoring Fighter Ace 1 Caldwell, ‘Enemy Destroyed (The Last Confirmed)’, in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992, p. 238 2 Both Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) and 1 Fighter Wing diary (OAFH) indicate that two reconnaissance flights came on 18 June; 54 and 457 squadrons’ Operations Record Books (OAFH) and Odgers, War Against Japan, 1957, p. 59, indicate one reconnaissance on 17 June. 3 AWM PR00514, combat report 4 The Wing’s senior intelligence officer clearly indicates the confusion as to identification in the consolidated combat report (AWM PR00514). It was not until

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5

6 7

8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

wreckage was discovered that the origin of the raiders was confirmed—see Hata, Izawa and Shores, Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1931–1945, 2002, p. 41, for Japanese formations and numbers. Given this, Caldwell’s reference to ‘Zekes’ in his combat report should be read as ‘Oscars’. Commonwealth Graves Commission register: Nichterlein, Pilot Officer Willie ‘Bill’ Everard, 416104, Royal Australian Air Force, 452 Squadron. Age 23. 20 June 1943. Son of the Revd. Otto Sylvius Nichterlein and Marie Helene Nichterlein, of Glen Osmond, South Australia. Panel 7, Northern Territory Memorial, Adelaide River War Cemetery. Ruskin-Rowe, Pilot Officer Anthony ‘Tony’ Thomas, 411389, Royal Australian Air Force, 452 Squadron. Age 24. 20 June 1943. Son of Harry and Vera Elizabeth Ruskin-Rowe, of Double Bay, New South Wales. F.A.7, Adelaide River War Cemetery. The Sun, 21 June 1943; Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 1943 Caldwell papers,‘Spitfires Over Darwin’ interview—‘Both General Kenney [who] was again now favourably disposed towards us, and General MacArthur saw fit to send me personally a telegram of congratulations which I wouldn’t receive.’ AWM PR00514—Caldwell pasted this telegram into his flying log NAA A9300—see Appendix G for full citation The original does not appear to be extant; however, Caldwell made a handwritten copy of Jones’ annotation and gave a copy to Bobby Gibbes—Gibbes papers. Despite Walters flying as often as he could with the wing, Caldwell urged him not to bring the fact to the attention of Headquarters. After Walters scored his victory, he went for an interview at Headquarters. On his return, he told Caldwell that he had been posted. Caldwell replied, ‘I thought you bloody well would be [posted]. I told you never to tell them there what you are doing. They don’t know and they resent this—there are group captains thick on the ground at the Headquarters everywhere. They won’t like you butting in and doing this sort of thing.’ AWM S01650 AWM S01650 OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book Caldwell papers, text of unattributed article based on a number of interviews with Caldwell. AWM PR00514, combat report ibid. Commonwealth Graves Commission register: Wellsman, Pilot Officer James ‘Jimmy’ Charles, 142859. Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, 54 Squadron.Age 22. 30 June 1943. Son of Cecil James Wellsman and Amy Wellsman, of Twickenham, Middlesex, England. G.C.15 Adelaide River War Cemetery. Lamerton, Flying Officer William ‘Jack’ John, 407900. Royal Australian Air Force, 452 Squadron. Age 23. 30 June 1943. Son of Mrs. W.B. Lamerton; husband of Mrs. R.H. Lamerton, of Glenelg, South Australia. F.A.4. Adelaide River War Cemetery. AWM PR00514, combat report OAFH, 457 Squadron Operations Record Book OAFH, 54 Squadron Operations Record Book PR Stephen Tatham, letter Hardwick/Brown, 2 August 1943

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46

The Sun, 31 August 1943 Caldwell papers, scrapbook, undated clipping noted as from ‘RC paper’ The Sun, 11 August 1943 AR, Grant/Alexander, 2003–05 OAFH, 1 Fighter Wing Operations Record Book For additional details of these reconnaissance operations, see ‘Death of a Dinah’, in Piper, The Hidden Chapters, 1995. NLA TRC 537 Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992, p. 238 AWM PR00514, combat report ibid. Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992, p. 238 See, for example, Daily Telegraph, 21 August 1943 AWM PR00514, Bladin’s ‘delousing’ signal The Sun, 31 August 1943, and Adelaide Advertiser, 1 September 1943, indicated Caldwell was third on the Allied claims list but an unattributed article included in AWM PR00514 indicates that he was fourth. Interestingly, neither article refers to the fact that he was the highest scoring Australian fighter pilot. Daily Mirror, 31 August 1943 ibid. OAFH, Pilot Officer Ken Fox, combat report Adelaide News, 1 September 1943 AR, Fox/Alexander, 2005 AR, Quinn/Alexander, 2002 Caldwell papers, scrapbook, Bert Rodda, Adelaide News, undated Caldwell, letter to the editor, Wings, 7 December 1943 AR, Burnett/Alexander, June 2003; Read, Spitfire News, April 2004—I sent John Burnett’s story to Spitfire News. Bruce Read, the then editor and ‘an old armourer’ himself, commented that ‘Spitfire armament with faulty hot air heating ducts, were known to be the cause of stoppages, but it’s doubtful that any Spitfire has returned from a flight iced up to the extent the ice could be knocked off with a rubber hammer’. Bruce thought the story had been over-embellished somewhat. Years of retelling may have dimmed some of the essential facts of this story, and perhaps John was guilty of embellishment and embroidery, but his recollection is a treasured one, and one thing is clear: his story is testament to the admiration that he held for Caldwell. Caldwell in Grant, Spitfires Over Darwin, 1943, 2003, p.viii The two leading US aces at this time were Tommy Lynch with sixteen victories and Dick Bong with fourteen.

Chapter Ten: Fighter Pilot, Manqué 1 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 99 2 AR, Mulcahy/Alexander, 2003 3 AR, Gillespie/Alexander, 2003—the toilet seat was purported to have originated

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4

5 6

7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

from the MacArthur–Onslow home in Camden. For further details of the Hitler Trophy, see Lever, No. 2 OTU RAAF Mildura and No. 8 OTU RAAF, 1999. AR, Williams/Alexander, 2003. Isaacson and Q for Queenie visted Mildura 13–14 October 1943. See Warner, Pathfinder, 2002, for details of Isaacson’s tour in Q for Queenie, which covered 25000 miles and included the infamous buzzing of the Sydney Harbour Bridge. AR, Cox/Alexander, 2004 The portrait by The Sun war correspondent John Baird featured, in colour, on the 28 February 1944 cover of Woman and was based on sketches that John had made while Caldwell was in Darwin during 1943. According to Baird, Caldwell was fairly elusive but obliging enough about sittings when tamed. Baird presented the portrait to Caldwell in May 1944 (preliminary sketches are held by the Australian War Memorial). The portrait reappeared in full-page advertising as part of a WAAAF recruitment drive—see, for example, the Australian Women’s Weekly, 9 December 1944. This was not the only time that Caldwell’s portrait had been painted. In 1943, Gordon Bennett entered his portrait of Caldwell in the Archibald Prize. This was the year when William Dobell controversially won the prize with his portrait of Joshua Smith. When Caldwell was at Mildura he was painted by Harold Freedman, a RAAF war artist in the Pacific. According to Freedman, Caldwell sat day after day sweltering in his flying suit, serene and uncomplaining in the high temperatures. This portrait was prominent in the Australian Academy of Art exhibition in Melbourne in July 1944. Freedman actually completed two portraits: one was acquired by the Australian War Memorial in 1947, and Freedman kept the other for his own collection. Woman, 31 January 1944; The Sun, 26 May 1944; Caldwell papers, list of entries for the Archibald Prize, 1943; Sunday Sun & Guardian, 16 July 1944; AR Freedman/Alexander, 2002 ‘“Killer” Caldwell and the VAOC’ in VAOC Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 3, May 1944—the ‘rescue’ was also reported in ‘Unexpected Aid for “Killer” Caldwell’, Army News, undated (Caldwell papers, scrapbook);‘Spotters Air “Killer” Caldwell Forced Down at Goulburn’, Sunday Sun, 25 June 1944 AR, Bailey/Alexander, 2003 AR, Gibbes/Alexander, 2003 AR, Hill/Alexander, 2003 AR, Gibbes/Alexander, 2003 AWM PR00514,‘Shadow shooting’ correspondence OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 116 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 99 AWM PR00514, correspondence from Liberal Democratic Party Caldwell papers, scrapbook, Daily Telegraph, undated; unattributed Melbourne paper AWM S01650 ibid. AR, Woodgate/Alexander, 2003–04—my thanks to Fred Woodgate for allowing me to draw on his research and recollections for this story. OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 2100 Caldwell papers, Anzac House Appeal OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 109 ibid.

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 24 Sly, The Luck of the Draw, 2003, p. 89 25 Gibbes was promoted to temporary Wing Commander on 1 July 1944. Caldwell had a high opinion of the abilities of his friend:‘After [Gibbes] came to the Western Desert in 1941, he and I flew, although in different squadrons, on many operations together. I very early recognised the quality of this resolute and very courageous man who became, I’m happy to say, an admired friend. I was delighted of course, in 1944, when he was posted to No. 80 [Fighter Wing] as Wing Commander Flying, to be second in command and my Deputy Wing Leader.’ Caldwell papers, Caldwell/ Woodgate, 27 November 1984 26 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 52 27 ibid., p. 67 28 See Appendix B 29 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 51 30 Parker did not support Caldwell’s recollection of this event. According to Parker, Caldwell told him that ‘there is money to be made in liquor at Morotai and if you would like to sell some for me you can make some money’, or words to that effect. Caldwell denied that he had made this or a similar statement.While acknowledging that for the most part Caldwell had disclosed his liquor importations and transactions frankly during his Inquiry, and as well as noting that Parker’s recollection of this occasion was the only aspect of Parker’s statement that Caldwell had challenged, Commissioner Barry chose to believe Parker’s version of events. This is in spite of the fact that Parker was less than truthful on at least one other occasion in his evidence at the Inquiry. NAA, CP389/2/1, Statement by Corporal Parker, 3 April 1945, Appendix to Report of the Inquiry; OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 913 31 This photo featured in many contemporary newspapers and was used many times after the war, including in Bartlett and Meeking, Pictorial History of Australia at War 1939–45, 1958, and Fitzgerald, Victory, 1995, p. 59, which was published to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. It was also one of the photos selected for Caldwell’s tribute in Spitfire News, March 1995, pp. 7–13. 32 AR, Plowright/Alexander, 2003 33 This and above quote from Tune, Darwin Defenders, June 2003 34 Commonwealth War Graves Commission register: Sturm, Flight Lieutenant John ‘Johnny’ Ridgeway, 407133, Royal Australian Air Force. Age 26. 17 December 1944. Son of William Charles Frederick and Agnes Emma Ottilie Sturm, of Seaton Park, South Australia. B.D.12. Townsville War Cemetery. Although this detachment consisted of pilots from 452 Squadron, Ted Sly notes in his autobiography that Sturm had been ‘borrowed’ from 457 Squadron— Sly, The Luck of the Draw, 2003, p. 95.

Chapter Eleven: Morotai 1 Much of the chronology of this chapter is drawn from OAFH, Transcript of evidence. 2 ibid., p. 295

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Notes: Chapter 11 3 AR, Tillery/Alexander, 2005; www.kilroywashere.org 4 Both of these quotes were disseminated in NAA A8681, DPR bulletin no. 4583, 6 January 1945, and were included in articles such as ‘RAAF Ace Cheers Young Pilot’s First “Kill”’, The Argus, 8 January 1945, ‘Very Pretty’, Australian Women’s Weekly, 27 January 1945. 5 AWM PR83/97 6 Respectively, Daily Mirror, 15 January 1945; Daily Mirror, 22 January 1945; Caldwell papers, scrapbook unattributed article 7 Even Caldwell’s pet parrot Nelson got into the publicity act. After his return to Australia, Caldwell acquired a pet parrot from Bathurst Island. He became quite attached to Nelson, even showering with him. The official photographers snapped him with Nelson, who became ‘the most photogenic parrot ever to come from Bathurst Island’ and a number of these photographs were published in the newspapers. Caldwell took Nelson with him to Morotai, but unfortunately the change of climate did not agree with the bird. Either it was a slow news day or Nelson had captured the imagination of the Australian public, because on 27 February 1945, the Department of Air announced the death of Nelson:‘Unable to adjust himself to the climate of the Northern Hemisphere, Nelson . . . died on Morotai Island . . . he fretted and fell sick after a month in the Halmaheras, and eventually his life was ended by a “mercy killing”’—NAA DPR bulletin no. 4806, 27 February 1945. 8 Sinclair, Sepik Pilot, 1971, p. 64 9 AR, Sly/Alexander, 2003 10 It was not just 80 Fighter Wing that had difficulty obtaining supplies—Air Commodore Cobby later stated that Caldwell would not get the equipment and supplies that he needed because ‘we did not have it . . . We gave him what help we could, but we were short’—OAFH, Transcript of evidence, pp. 2262–63. Although he stated that First TAF gave what help it could, Cobby did not consider that he was responsible for providing Caldwell with what he needed to establish 80 Fighter Wing on Morotai. He stated that First TAF did not carry a store, so it could not provide equipment. As far as Cobby was concerned, Caldwell was responsible for obtaining what he needed himself. In Cobby’s opinion, Caldwell ‘arrived deficiently’ and it was his own fault. He also felt that if Caldwell had felt so strongly about the poor organisation involved in the move, he should have resigned before leaving. 11 Ted Sly was one of the many who appreciated Caldwell’s endeavours to improve their accommodation. He commented that the pilots would have had only tents if Caldwell had not organised the wooden mess—AR, Sly/Alexander, 2003. 12 Daily Telegraph, 18 December 1942 13 Wings, 20 February 1945. This article also claimed that Caldwell had flown twenty operations in his first twenty days in the Halmaheras; Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514), however, only notes eighteen operations, but this is close enough to make an effective journalistic claim! 14 AR, Sly/Alexander, 2003 15 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 295 16 ibid., p. 117 17 ibid., p. 107 18 ibid., p. 108

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29

ibid., p. 474 ibid., p. 495 ibid., p. 496 Sly, The Luck of the Draw, 2003, p. 106 AR, Sly/Alexander, 2003. Caldwell’s personalised Spitfire was A58-528. OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 138 Caldwell’s belief that that the air component of the Tarakan invasion would not be successful was verified by events. The RAAF’s co-ordination and planning was sloppy, and it seriously underestimated the time it would take to have the airstrip operational—see Stanley, Tarakan, 1997. The role of Task Force Commander (Air) was later filled by Group Captain Arthur. There is no indication of Caldwell’s brief appointment as Task Force Commander (Air) of the Oboe operations on his service record—NAA A9300. In his personal papers at AWM PR00514, Caldwell refers to this appointment and how he entered the room as an Air Commodore but left as a Group Captain (PR00514, Caldwell, note to solicitor, 28 March 1989). A similar account by Caldwell appears in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, 1992, p. 239. In AWM S01650, Caldwell refers to his appointment as an ‘air commode [sic], a flying pisspot’. Despite this, there is some doubt about this appointment. Caldwell’s flying log (AWM PR00514) records his flight to Tarakan on 28 March 1945. He provided his opinion of the Tarakan operation on p. 138 of the Barry Inquiry’s ‘Transcript of evidence’ (OAFH), and his evidence on the following page indicates that he advised his position in relation to the Tarakan operation before the operation was undertaken. In his evidence at Caldwell’s court-martial, Cobby stated that he had considered Caldwell as Task Force Commander in January and February 1945 but that by March he had decided to offer the position to someone else. Both Caldwell’s accounts and Cobby’s evidence at the court-martial indicate that Caldwell was indeed considered for the appointment, but Cobby does not confirm that he actually offered the appointment to Caldwell. The dates do not match up but Caldwell often made mistakes in his flying log and his evidence at the Barry Inquiry indicates that specific dates were not his forte—for instance, he claimed that he had returned to Australia from Europe on 8 October 1942—but his evidence, as well as his very detailed combat reports, indicate that he clearly remembered what occurred at a particular event. Given the above, it can be concluded that Caldwell was offered the appointment of Task Force Commander but, given that Cobby himself was an Air Commodore, and Arthur filled the role as a Group Captain, it would be unlikely that Caldwell was offered the appointment at Air Commodore rank. AR, Plowright/Alexander, 2003 OAFH, Exhibit 8 to the Barry Inquiry. See appendices C and D for these statements. NAA A472, W2772A OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 140. At that time, Caldwell and Gibbes were attached to 80 Fighter Wing and Grace and Waddy were attached to 78 Wing. Arthur assumed command of this Wing, after commanding 81 Wing, in early April 1945.Vanderfield’s 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit operated in conjunction with the fighter wings to which these six officers were attached. Ranger was attached to Headquarters First TAF. Caldwell, Waddy, Gibbes and Arthur had served in the Middle East. Caldwell and Waddy were both in 250 Squadron, Gibbes and Arthur

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Notes: Chapter 12

30 31

32 33

served in 3 Squadron, and Caldwell and Gibbes were squadron leaders in the same wing. Caldwell, Gibbes, Arthur and Waddy were all at 2 Operational Training Unit Mildura together after they returned from overseas. Caldwell and Gibbes became friends (a friendship that lasted until Caldwell’s death), as did Caldwell and Waddy (Caldwell was godfather to Waddy’s daughter). Arthur and Ranger knew each other in New Guinea and, although different ages, had the common bond of attending the same school. Vanderfield, Grace and Gibbes knew each other before going overseas. Grace and Vanderfield served together in England and were both posted to Malaya. Caldwell and Vanderfield test-flew the Boomerang together and Caldwell dealt with Vanderfield frequently in Darwin when both 80 Fighter Wing and 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit were stationed there prior to transfer to Morotai. OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 498 Even though Gibbes had not arrived at Morotai by the date of one of the charges, he pleaded guilty to the three charges and his rank was later reduced to Squadron Leader. Gibbes had only planned to sell his liquor stocks ‘in view of my imminent posting and my upset at the apparent unfairness of my treatment by Air Board [re not being given Commanding Officer after Caldwell’s posting] instead of donating it to the officers’ mess.’ Gibbes, You Live But Once, 1994, p. 227 Bostock Signal quoted in NAA CP389/2/1 Report of the Barry Inquiry, pp. 136–7 Perhaps Caldwell gained some small satisfaction when he heard that Group Captain Simms would be replaced. It was Simms, after all, who had accused him of being absent without leave when he arrived in Australia in 1942.

Chapter Twelve: The Barry Inquiry 1 Much of this chapter’s chronology is based on the Barry Report (NAA CP389/2/1); unless indicated otherwise, quotes are also from this report. 2 Sunday Telegraph, 21 October 1945 3 Daily Telegraph, 17 April 1945, is an example of early reporting on Caldwell’s charges; Smith’s Weekly, 21 April 1945. See Melbourne Herald, 23 April 1945, and Daily News Perth, 23 April 1945, as examples of lukewarm reports. 4 Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1945 5 Smith’s Weekly, 5 May 1945 6 Daily Mirror, 14 May 1945 7 Drakeford, Hansard, House of Representatives, 15 May 1945, extract on OAFH 36/501/637 8 Daily Mirror, 14 May 1945 9 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 2 10 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1945 11 The terms of reference under Air Force Regulations, dated 24 May 1945, appear at Appendix E. The terms of reference went through a number of drafts, with one of the earliest ones indicating that focus of the inquiry was firmly on Caldwell’s allegations.

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16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23 24 25 26

27 28

The Sun, 14 May 1945; Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1945 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 484 ibid., p. 496 OAFH, Exhibit 127 to the Barry Inquiry. Arthur was asked about the title and in particular why the ‘Morotai’ had been struck out. He did not remember why he struck out the word ‘Morotai’, and thought he had included it in the first place because ‘the alliteration must have appealed to me’. He explained he had used a question mark in the title ‘because I thought that is probably what it would become . . . known as’. OAFH, Transcript of Evidence, p. 2137 OAFH, Exhibit 8 to Barry Inquiry OAFH, Transcript of Evidence, p. 170 AWM S0356 OAFH, Transcript of evidence, p. 295 In his report, Barry drew on an observation relating to a similar section in the Army Act to illustrate his opinion here. In Heddon v Evans 1919, McCardie, J. observed that ‘Section 40, it will be noted, is worded in the broadest possible way. It covers many things which are not susceptible of clear definition or exhaustive examination. It may include numerous acts of omission and commission which are not covered by either the spirit or the letter of the large number of preceding sections which create specific offences.’ Conveniently, however, in dealing with the assertions of the eight officers that there were problems within the wider RAAF as well as the TAF, Barry stated that he only had the power to report on incidents within First TAF. Hewitt, Adversity in Success, 1980, p. 290 OAFH 36/501/617 ibid. Hewitt, Adversity in Success, 1980, p. 290 The Bulletin, 24 October 1945. In its 11 November 1945 edition, the Sunday Telegraph acknowledged that Barry had been the ‘victim of unwitting justice’ when it, in good faith, had criticised his report. It acknowledged that its criticism had been based on the misleading and fragmentary news stories that had resulted from the difficult conditions imposed by the Air Board when it allowed only one carbon copy report to be shared between the journalists. It then reported in more depth Barry’s findings and the issues that Barry had considered during the Inquiry. In its opinion piece, the Sunday Telegraph blamed the Air Board for either deliberately or stupidly imposing the ‘trivial Inquiry into sly-grog’ onto the Inquiry into the resignations. Sunday Telegraph, 21 October 1945 Junee Southern Cross, 26 October 1945

Chapter Thirteen: Court-martial and Beyond 1 The court-martial narrative (including details of and quotations from Cassidy’s defence) is taken from NAA A471/1 79104 with added detail from contemporary news articles. 2 NAA A471/1, 79104

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Notes: Chapter 13 3 4 5 6

7

8 9

10 11 12 13

14

15

16 17 18 19

NAA A8681 DPR bulletin no. 5636, 15 November 1945 See Appendix F AR, Radtke/Alexander, 2003–05 A number of newspapers quoted Caldwell’s guilty plea, including The Sun, 18 January 1946 (‘Caldwell Pleads Guilty to Trading in Liquor’), which also referred to Caldwell standing stiffly to attention; and Truth, 20 January 1946 (‘“Killer” Drops Bombshell’) which also referred to Caldwell standing stiffly to attention and speaking in a calm and clear voice. The Sun, 18 January 1946, announced that Caldwell had ‘dramatically pleaded guilty’; Daily Mirror, 18 January 1946, had as its front-page headline ‘Caldwell’s dramatic admission of guilt’; Truth, 20 January 1946, referred to the ‘dramatic plea’ which ended the trial with ‘sensational abruptness’. Daily Telegraph, 19 January 1946 ‘Pilloried Hero’, E.C. Lyons, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1946; ‘Don’t Whip our Heroes’,‘Ex-N.X’, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1946;‘Scapegoat for Many’,‘Fair Go’, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1946 NAA A8681 DPR bulletin no. 5737,‘Caldwell Court-martial Finding’, 1 February 1946 ‘Savagely treated’ comment in Sinclair, Sepik Pilot, p. 74;‘tall poppies’ comment AR, Gibbes/Alexander, 2003 ‘RSL Attacks Demotion’, The Sun, 2 February 1946;‘“Shabby Reward” for Heroic Record’, Daily Telegraph, 2 February 1946 Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1946. Glassop was no stranger to controversy. During the war, he served in the Middle East where he worked on an army newspaper. He became a war correspondent during the Korean War. He is perhaps best known for his classic war novels, We Were the Rats and The Rats in New Guinea. We Were the Rats, published in 1944, was banned as obscene by the NSW Government in 1946, with the appeals judge considering much of it to be ‘just plain filthy’—Oxford Companion to Australian Literature, 2000, p. 316. Gibbes, Sunday Telegraph, 10 February 1946; draft of ‘There’s No Glamour in Air Warfare’, courtesy of Bobby Gibbes. Bobby told me in 2003 that those comments still hold true, and always would—AR, Gibbes/Alexander, 2003. The effects of that strain were apparent for some time. On 17 March 1946, Truth photographed Caldwell and Jean dancing cheek-to-cheek at Romanos shortly after they returned to Sydney from the country and Jean particularly looked tired and strained. Thankfully, the strain did not last long. Gibbes papers, letter Caldwell/Bobby Gibbes 14 February 1946 Caldwell collected his papers when he returned to Sydney and was demobilised with effect from 5 March 1946. See, for example, Caldwell papers, scrapbook, Truth, undated article, c February 1946; Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1946 Caldwell wanted this matter kept in confidence because he did not want the ‘news hounds’ to get a hold of it—Gibbes papers, letter Caldwell/Bobby Gibbes 14 February 1946. He may have been the propaganda darling over the last few years, and enjoyed much praise of his fighting achievements, as well as press support during the court-martial, but he now wanted to cut those ties. The press, of course, never forgot Caldwell and his wife’s scrapbook continued to expand as his business

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20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43

achievements were reported.The memory of the court-martial eventually dimmed and when the press referred to Caldwell it was usually as Group Captain Clive ‘Killer’ Caldwell. For further details relating to the Dakotas, see Wings, 1 March 1947. The commission was also referred to in Wagga Advertiser, 26 October 1946. Cootamundra Daily Herald, 3 April 1947; Jim Macdougall, ‘Contact’ column, The Sun, April 1947 AWM S00356 AR, Gibbes/Alexander, 2003 Sunday Sun and Guardian, 12 May 1946 AR, Suzanne Falkiner/Alexander, 2004 David Robertson was unable to pinpoint the exact dates of this enterprise, but the rabbit farm was certainly operating in 1959 when, in his ‘Today’s Birthdays’ segment, Ray Castle referred to Caldwell’s latest enterprise—Daily Telegraph, 28 July 1959. OPHR, Letter Caldwell/John Forestier, 6 December 1949 AR, Lindmark/Alexander, 2003; see Daily Telegraph, 23 April 1969, for details of Anzac Day march Semmler, The War Diaries of Kenneth Slessor, p. 385 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1974 ibid.—it appears, however, from photos published in Wings, November 1969 and May 1970, that Caldwell did wear his miniatures to important functions such as the film review of The Battle of Britain and the 50th Anniversary Dinner of the Australian Flying Corps and Royal Australian Air Force Association. AR, Cox/Alexander, 2004 AR, Woodgate/Alexander, 2003–04 AR, Lewis/Alexander, 2003 The Explorer, 23 August 1962 For example, Caldwell stopped his interview with Fred Morton to discuss a significant passage in Shores and Rings, Fighters Over the Desert, 1969. A little later in the interview he referred to William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid.The Secret War 1939–1945, which he had recently read and had found most interesting— NLA TRC 537 Refer to Chapter Eight for details of Adams-Winters’ articles AR, Woodgate/Alexander, 2003–04 Collins’ speech reprinted in The Parliament of New South Wales Remembers, 1996 Spitfire News, March 1995 AR, Howard/Alexander, 2004 Citation for Distinguished Service Order—NAA A9300: Caldwell’s service record, see Appendix G for full citation AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook

Epilogue 1 AWM PR00514—letter Caldwell/August Graf von Kageneck, 5 February 1985 2 Lucas, Out of the Blue, p. 40 3 Woodgate, Lion and Swans, p. 4

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Notes: Epilogue 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 16

AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook ibid. AWM S01650 Shores and Ring, Fighters Over the Desert, p. 82 Caldwell, Wings, 25 April 1944 AWM PR00514, August Graf von Kageneck’s letter to Caldwell, 10 January 1985. On 23 May 1990, Von Kageneck published the story, ‘An Iron Cross in my Desk, and Memories of an Ace’ in the International Herald Tribune, which tells of his brother’s last flight and how he was shot down by Caldwell—see copy AWM PR00514. AWM PR00514, letter Caldwell/August Graf von Kageneck, 5 February 1985 Von Kageneck, Erbo, Pilote de Chasse, 1999, p. 225 AWM PR00514, Caldwell/August Graf von Kageneck, 21 March 1985 AWM S0160 Caldwell, ‘Enemy Destroyed (The Last Confirmed)’ in Woodgate, Lion and Swans, p. 238 OAFH, letter Caldwell/Piper, 18 March 1988 PR Stephen Tatham, undated letter Noriyo Itoh/Caldwell AWM S01650 AWM PR00514, Caldwell’s notebook

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Bibliography

Primary resources Australian War Memorial (AWM) Private records PR00514 Group Captain Clive Caldwell, DSO, DFC and Bar, Polish Cross of Valour • flying log • notebook and other writings (including note to solicitor, 28 March 1989, which includes details of Tarakan operation,‘Seven Men of Gascony’ notes,‘Haj’ notes and typed career notes) • correspondence Henshaw/Caldwell • correspondence from the Liberal Democratic Party • ‘Shadow Shooting’, Chief Instructor, No. 2 Operational Training Unit, Mildura, to Commanding Officer, No. 2 Operational Training Unit, Mildura, 8 February 1944 • correspondence and related papers, Caldwell/August Graf von Kageneck • Caldwell’s combat and other individual and consolidated combat reports, tactical appreciations, and other reports relating to 1 Fighter Wing (including ‘Spitfire v Zero’ report, 2 March 1943) • Air Commodore Bladin’s ‘de-lousing’ signal • Wing Commander T. Primrose, Commanding Officer, No. 5 Fighter Sector, RAAF Darwin,‘Plan for Interception of Enemy Reconnaissance Aircraft’, 11 March 1943. PR83/97 Caldwell, Clive (Group Captain, DSO, DFC and Bar, 80 Fighter Wing, RAAF) • Caldwell’s annotated extract from Roderic Owen’s The Desert Air Force • Dr Evatt’s telegram congratulating him on his promotion to Acting Wing Commander • General Streett’s ‘flaming Christmas present’ signal PR84/364 Group Captain John Lloyd Waddy OBE, DFC • wartime radio broadcasts

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Bibliography PR91/010 Flight Lieutenant F.A. Quinn, RAAF Eastern Area Intelligence • 1 Fighter Wing combat and intelligence reports

Sound collection S01650 Clive Robertson Caldwell/Ken Llewelyn Oral History Recording, 8 February 1993 (transcript) S00356 Susan Bogle/Clive Robertson Caldwell interview, 28 May 1983 S01646 Wing Commander Gibbes/Ken Llewelyn Oral History Recording, 12 February 1993 (transcript)

The Aviation Historical Society of the Northern Territory Inc. (AHSNT) Papers and photos from the Aviation Historical Society of the Northern Territory Inc., Caldwell Collection, including Air Vice-Marshal A.A. Coningham,‘Air Firing Practice’ Postagram, 13 April 1942

National Archives of Australia (NAA) A9300 Series Service records • Caldwell, Clive Robertson 402107 • Thorold-Smith, Raymond Edward 402144 • Munro, Donald Alexander Ronald 420130 • Kent, James Frederick Stamford 402124 • Gale, David Ross 402114 A816, 66/301/265 Award of Polish Decoration to S/Ldr C.R. Caldwell RAAF A11231/1, 5/72/INT No. 1 (Fighter) Wing—Intelligence—Enemy air raid No. 54 A5954/69, 524/2 Enemy Air Raid on Darwin A2682/1,Volume 6 Advisory War Council Minutes May–June 1943 A1196, 1/501/505 Report on Trials Conducted between Spitfire 5c and Mark 2 Zero SP300/3, 3253046 Radio talk presented by ABC war correspondent, John Elliott ‘Clive Caldwell (Fighter pilot)’ A471/1, 79104 General Court-martial Group Captain Clive Robertson Caldwell, DSO, DFC A472,W2772A RAAF First Tactical Air Force—Dealings with Alcoholic Liquor A1196, 33/501/24 Tactical Use of Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G Suit Mark 1 A1196/6, 1/501/474 Allotment of Spitfire Squadrons from UK Nos. 452 and 457 RAAF & No. 54 RAF A1196/6, 43/501/28 Aircraft—Publicity—Spitfires 1944

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E A816, 6/301/417 Announcements of presence in Australia of Spitfire Squadrons A5954, 231/11 Aircraft for RAAF—Allocation of Spitfire Squadrons from United Kingdom A8735/1 and A8681 Various Department of Air, Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) bulletins A11093, 452/A46 Part 1 RAAF Command Headquarters—Boomerang Aircraft— A46—CA12 A705, 163/40/22 402124 Pilot Officer, Kent, James Frederick Stanford [Stamford]— Casualty—Repatriation A705, 163/58/35 Thorold-Smith, R.E. [Raymond Edward] Squadron Leader 402144—Casualty file CP389/2/1 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Dealings with Alcoholic Liquor by RAAF Personnel in the Pacific Areas—Report by J.V. Barry Esq. KC (Commissioner) of an inquiry into certain questions relating to ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944 and certain questions relating to applications for permission to resign their Commissions by Eight Officers of the Royal Australian Air Force (the Barry Report)

National Library of Australia (NLA) Biographical cuttings Clive Caldwell, Australia’s leading fighter pilot of World War II TRC 537 Interview with Group Captain C.R. Caldwell, Australian fighter pilot in World War II. Sound recording: interviewer, Fred Morton, 1977 TRC 496/1 Speeches at the 1976 conference dinner of the Victorian Branch of the Aviation Historical Society in Wodonga, Victoria. Sound recording by Fred Morton (note: fragment only of Caldwell’s speech)

Northern Territory Archives Service (NTAS) NTRS 226,TS49 Bob Foster—oral history interview, conducted by Alan Powell, 1984

Department of Defence, Air Power Development Centre, Office of Air Force History (OAFH) Personal file Clive Robertson Caldwell • news articles • letters, including letter Caldwell/Bob Piper, RAAF Historical Section, Department of Defence, 18 March 1988 • various Department of Air, Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) bulletins • ‘Caldwell—Australia’s EATS Ace’: interview with Group Captain Clive (‘Killer’) Caldwell at Melbourne, by Flight Lieutenant Lindsay (narrator) and Warrant Officer G. Hartigan (assistant narrator), 30 July 1945

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Bibliography Operations record books • 1 Fighter Wing • 80 Fighter Wing • 452 Squadron RAAF • 457 Squadron RAAF • 54 Squadron RAF • 38 RDF Station • 5 Fighter Sector Darwin • 18 NEI-RAAF Squadron Darwin air raid record Including Raid 54 map, other pilots’ combat reports and intelligence reports Transcript of evidence ‘Inquiry into Certain Questions Related to ABO ‘N’ 548 of 1944 and Certain Questions Relating to Applications for Permission to Resign their Commissions by Eight Officers of the Royal Australian Air Force’ (Transcript of evidence) Exhibits to the Inquiry 36/501/617 ‘Inquiry into Certain Questions re ABO B 548/44 and other matters by Mr J V Barry KC’ 36/501/637 ‘Inquiry into Certain Allegations relating to Trading in Liquor and Kindred Matters in the First TAF and Northern Area’

ScreenSound Australia/National Screen and Sound Archive Film 83334 Meet Squadron Leader Clive (Killer) Caldwell, DFC and Bar

The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK) Air 27/1501 250 Squadron Operations Record Book Air 27/1503 250 Squadron Diary Air 27/1504 250 Squadron Combat (Fighter) Reports Air 27/873 112 Squadron Operations Record Book Air 27/877 112 Squadron Combat (Fighter) Reports Air 28/419 SHQ Kenley Operations Record Book

Privately held records Private records of Mrs Jean Caldwell (Caldwell papers) • scrapbook of news articles • scrapbook compiled by Mrs Annie Caldwell • photo albums (including that compiled by Mrs Annie Caldwell) • text of the recording for News from Home program, May 1942 • text of unattributed article based on a number of interviews with Caldwell

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E • • • •

• • • • • • • • • •

• • •

unattributed RAF press release cassette recording of Caldwell’s interview with Ken Llewelyn, 8 February 1993 cassette recording of Clive Caldwell’s notes on Fred Woodgate’s first draft of Lion and Swans, 27 November 1984 ‘Kittyhawks and Boomerangs’ interview (this cassette interview has no header information but it appears to have been conducted by Fred Morton at the inaugural conference of the Aviation Historical Society of Australia Conference in 1976) cassette recording of undated interview of Caldwell and unknown interviewer ‘Spitfires Over Darwin’ Caldwell’s letter, 31 March 1943, to Group 605, RAAF, objecting to his wife’s compulsory manpower registration Caldwell, undated draft letter to Flying magazine, c 1953 letter from Flight Lieutenant W.D.G. Robertson, editor of RAAF magazine Wings: Official magazine of the RAAF, to Caldwell, 20 December 1943 Westpac Staff Newsletter undated (c September 1994) list of entries for the Archibald Prize 1943 Anzac House Appeal: Vote for Killer Caldwell promotional flier, various invitation cards and appeal button Caldwell’s submission:‘Spitfire Armament’.Wing Commander Flying, No. 1 Fighter Wing to Officer Commanding No. 1 Fighter Wing, 13 June 1943 press release from the Washington branch of the British Press Service Clive Caldwell, ‘Report of a Visit Made by Squadron Leader C.R. Caldwell to the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Buffalo NY, and the Allison Division of the General Motors Corporation, Indianapolis, Indiana, 5–8 August 1942’ letter from Burdette S. Wright to Clive Caldwell, 7 August 1942 letter to Mrs Jean Caldwell from Lieutenant Colonel Victor E. Bertrandias USAAF, 1 September 1942 transcript of radio broadcast with John Burton, broadcast on KFI California, 23 August 1942

Private records of Wing Commander R.H. Gibbes, OAM, DSO, DFC and Bar (Gibbes papers) • copy of Caldwell’s ‘already sufficiently decorated’ extract • draft of ‘There’s No Glamour in Air Warfare’ • letter Caldwell/Bobby Gibbes, 14 February 1946 • newspaper articles relating to the Barry Inquiry and Caldwell’s court-martial Private records (PR) Stephen Tatham • letter Flight Lieutenant Frederick ‘George’ Hardwick/Betty Brown, 2 August 1943 • undated Letter Noriyo Itoh/Caldwell Other privately held records (OPHR) • letter Caldwell/John Forestier, 6 December 1949; courtesy of John Forestier • letter Caldwell/Frank Harding, 30 May 1988; courtesy of Mrs Nan Harding • Caldwell’s notes on the draft of Burgess, Colin,‘Our Australian Aviators, Part Eight. Group Captain Clive R. “Killer” Caldwell’, Transit: Qantas Cabin Crew Magazine, vol. 3, no. 1, 1983; courtesy of Colin Burgess

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Bibliography • • •

• •

Caldwell’s comments on draft of Jim Grant’s Spitfires Over Darwin 1943: No. 1 Fighter Wing, TechWrite Solutions, South Melbourne, 2003; courtesy of Jim Grant extracts from Bob Whittle’s flying log; courtesy of Mrs Frankie Whittle correspondence Caldwell/Leo Dairos, 4 August 1986, and copies of book extracts annotated by Caldwell (including the ‘“fabulous shot” so called’ annotation); courtesy of Leo Dairos Caldwell letters to the Albion Park RSL Sub-Branch; courtesy of Peter Ellis, JP, Honorary Secretary Richard Pelvin, unpublished paper on First Tactical Air Force; courtesy of Richard Pelvin

Author’s records (AR) • •

• • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

correspondence and conversation Mrs Jean Caldwell/Alexander from 4 September 2002 continuing through to 2006 Caldwell portfolio acquired April 2002 by Alexander/Fax which includes letters to Ernest Richardson Slade-Slade, 4 July 1941 and 28 December 1941, photos and news articles correspondence and emails Archie Wilson/Alexander, July 2002 and continuing through to 2005, and photos letter Bob Neale/Alexander, 25 September 2005 email David Freedman/Alexander, 2 Oct 2002 correspondence and conversation Peter Quinn/Alexander, December 2002 emails and correspondence August Graf von Kageneck/Alexander 2002 through to 2004, copies of August Graf von Kageneck’s correspondence with Caldwell about Erbo Graf von Kageneck, English translation of Erbo, Pilote de Chasse, and photos interviews Jim Grant/Alexander, 20 January and 3 March 2003, conversations continuing through to 2005 interview Ross Williams/Alexander, 3 March 2003 email John Bailey/Alexander, 21 March 2003 conversation Rick Lindmark/Alexander, March 2003 correspondence Roy Pearce/Alexander, March–April 2003 and photos correspondence Alex Henshaw/Alexander, April 2003 interview Flight Lieutenant E.L.L. Sly DFC MID/Alexander, 6 May 2003 interview Wing Commander R.H.M. Gibbes, OAM, DSO, DFC and Bar/ Alexander, 8 May 2003 correspondence Adam Gillespie/Alexander, 9 and 19 May 2003 conversation and correspondence Hon Thomas Lewis, AO/Alexander, May 2003 letter Norman Mulcahy/Alexander, 28 May 2003 conversation John Burnett/Alexander, 1 June 2003 letter Laurie Hill/Alexander, 2 June 2003 correspondence and conversations Fred Woodgate/Alexander, June 2003– December 2004, and interview, 12 August 2003 conversation Alan James/Alexander, July–August 2003 conversation Stan Plowright/Alexander, 14 August 2003 letter Milton Howard/Alexander, April 2004

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E • • • • • • • • •

email and conversation David Robertson/Alexander, April and July 2004 emails Suzanne Falkiner/Alexander, August 2004 conversation and emails Roz Davies/Alexander, October–November 2004 conversations and emails Peter Radtke/Alexander, 2003 to 2005 conversation Ross Cox/Alexander, October 2004 letter Captain Ken Fox/Alexander, January 2005 email Paul Tillery/Alexander, 13 March 2005 conversation Stephen Tatham/Alexander, June 2005 emails Bruce Read, former editor of Spitfire News, 2004 to 2005

Other records • • • •

Caldwell Archive,Trinity Grammar School; courtesy of Anne Stevens and Katharine Stuart Caldwell Archive, Sydney Grammar School; courtesy of Ily Benedek John Robert Caldwell’s Staff Record, E/34/1 Staff History Cards 1921–49, English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd, ANZ Group Archive Accident Report and associated papers re C–46 Commando No. 8, Air Corps 41–5166 from Accident-Reports.com Military Aviation Incident Reports; provided by Mike Stowe, November 2002

Secondary sources Newspapers and newsletters Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 1910 Ascham, Charivari, 1940, undated article Daily Telegraph (English), 7 December 1941 ‘Australian’s Big Air Tally’, Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1941 ‘Athlete’s Five Enemy Planes’, Daily Telegraph (English), 8 December 1941 ‘Australian Pilot’s Success’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1941 Daily Telegraph, 8 December 1941 Egyptian Mail, 8 December 1941 The EMELSEE, 9 January 1942 John Hetherington,‘Australian Shoots down 19 Planes’, Egyptian Mail, 28 March 1942 The Sun, The Adelaide Advertiser and Melbourne Herald, c 31 March 1942 Peter Duffield,‘Only “The Killer” is Left to Fight On’, Evening Standard, 6 April 1942 Igor Cassini,‘These Charming People’, Times and Herald,Washington, DC, 21 May 1942 Washington Post, 23 May 1942 ‘Curtiss Plane Praised by Ace’, New York Sun, 26 May 1942 New York Times, 26 May 1942 Daily Mirror, 9 June 1942 News Chronicle, 9 June 1942 John Hetherington,‘Ace Felt Hot & Bothered In Dive-bombing Test’, The Sun, 17 June 1942 Standard, 10 July 1942

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Bibliography James Aldridge,‘RAF Finds an Answer to Stukas’, Melbourne Herald, 13 July 1942 Bill Henry,‘P–40 Wins High Praise’, Los Angeles Times, 18 August 1942 Bill Henry,‘By the Way’ (commencing,‘We were discussing the desert . . .’), Los Angeles Times, undated (c August 1942) Bill Henry,‘By the Way’ (commencing,‘When the only clue you have . . .’), Los Angeles Times, undated (c August 1942) ‘Air Ace “Killer” Caldwell Back’, Daily Telegraph, 27 August 1942 ‘“Killer” Caldwell—Eagerly Awaited by Wife at Illabo’, Wagga Advertiser, 28 August 1942 Sunday Sun, 30 August 1942 Joyce Lambert,‘“Killer” Comes Home to his Wife’, Woman, 7 September 1942 ‘Keen Interest Up North’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 September 1942 Daily Telegraph, 24 September 1942 The Sun, 24 September 1942 Daily Mirror, 24 September 1942 Daily Mirror, 26 September 1942 Sunday Sun, 27 September 1942 Daily Telegraph, 18 December 1942 ‘Fact, Not Fiction: Air Ace Caldwell’, The Bulletin, 20 January 1943 ‘Leading Australian Ace Lost as Foe Plane Bag Reaches 24’, Los Angeles Times, 26 January 1943 Bill Henry,‘By the Way’, Los Angeles Times, undated, (c January/February 1943) ‘Famous Aces Man Spitfires: Strong Addition to Air Power’, Daily Telegraph, 5 March 1943 ‘Spitfires Now in Action Against Japanese’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1943 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 1943 ‘Heavy Air Losses at Darwin’, Sydney Sun, 3 May 1943 ‘Fierce Air Battle Over Darwin: Reverse Suffered by Spitfires’, The Age, 4 May 1943 ‘Spitfire Losses at Darwin’, The Argus, 4 May 1943 ‘The Air Reverse at Darwin’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 May 1943 Sydney Sun editorial, 4 May 1943 ‘Spitfires Caught in Storm’, The Argus, 5 May 1943 ‘Weather Hampers Air Activity’, The Argus, 5 May 1943 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 1943 Daily Mirror, 17 May 1943 Daily Telegraph, 17 May 1943 The Sun, 17 May 1943 ‘Japs Smashed Over Darwin: 12 Planes Down, 10 Crippled’, The Sun, 21 June 1943 ‘Japanese Rout in Darwin Raid. Spitfires’ Big Tally’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 1943 ‘Ace Holds Attention’, The Sun, 11 August 1943 Daily Telegraph, 21 August 1943 Daily Mirror, 31 August 1943 The Sun, 31 August 1943 The Adelaide Advertiser, 1 September 1943 Adelaide News, 1 September 1943 John Hetherington,‘Killer’, Melbourne Herald, 27 November 1943 Woman, 31 January 1944

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E Woman, 28 February 1944 ‘“Killer” Caldwell and the VAOC’, VAOC Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 3, May 1944 The Sun, 26 May 1944 ‘Spotters Air “Killer” Caldwell Forced Down at Goulburn’, Sunday Sun, 25 June 1944 Sunday Sun & Guardian, 16 July 1944 Australian Women’s Weekly, 9 December 1944 The Argus, 8 January 1945 ‘RAAF’s Vital Job Up North’, Daily Mirror, 15 January 1945 ‘Australia’s two greatest air aces’, Daily Mirror, 22 January 1945 Australian Women’s Weekly, 27 January 1945 Daily Telegraph, 17 April 1945 Smith’s Weekly, 21 April 1945 Melbourne Herald, 23 April 1945 Daily News Perth, 23 April 1945 Smith’s Weekly, 5 May 1945 Daily Mirror, 14 May 1945 ‘To Probe Unrest in RAAF’, Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1945 ‘What is Wrong in the RAAF’, The Sun, 14 May 1945 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1945 Sunday Telegraph, 21 October 1945 The Bulletin, 24 October 1945 Junee Southern Cross, 26 October 1945 Sunday Telegraph, 11 November 1945 Daily Mirror, 18 January 1946 ‘Caldwell Pleads Guilty to Trading in Liquor’, The Sun, 18 January 1946 Daiy Telegraph, 19 January 1946 ‘“Killer” Drops Bombshell’, The Truth, 20 January 1946 ‘Don’t Whip our Heroes’,‘Ex-N.X’, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1946 ‘Pilloried Hero’, E.C. Lyons, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1946 ‘Scapegoat for Many’,‘Fair Go’, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1946 ‘RSL Attacks Demotion. “Shabby Reward” for Heroic Record’, Daily Telegraph, 2 February 1946 Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1946 Bobby Gibbes, ‘There’s No Glamour in Air Warfare’, Sunday Telegraph, 10 February 1946 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1946 The Truth, 17 March 1946 Sunday Sun & Guardian, 12 May 1946 Wagga Advertiser, 26 October 1946 Cootamundra Daily Herald, 3 April 1947 Jim Macdougall’s ‘Contact’ Column, The Sun, undated, April 1947 Barnes,‘Ace “Killer” Talks to Post’, Australasian Post, 14 August 1958 Ray Castle, Daily Telegraph, 28 July 1959 Ray Castle, Daily Telegraph, 22 June 1961 ‘The Day that Death said No!’, Australasian Post, 8 March 1962 The Explorer, the Official Bulletin of the Rotary Club of Leichhardt, 23 August 1962

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Bibliography Daily Telegraph, 23 April 1969 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1974 Pauline Moffatt,‘Shooting Down Shadows!’, Australasian Post, 10 February 1983 Geoff McCarney, ‘“Killer” Caldwell Greatest Flying Ace Receives Fresh Honours’, Daily Telegraph, 28 May 1983 August Graf von Kageneck,‘An Iron Cross in my Desk, and Memories of an Ace’, International Herald Tribune, 23 May 1990 ‘“Killer” Caldwell, WWII Fighter Ace’, obituary, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1994 David McNicholl, The Bulletin, 23 August 1994 Westpac Staff Newsletter undated (c September 1994)

Books and articles Adams-Winter, V., ‘Debacle: The story of the spitfires in Australia’ in Contact, vol. 42, no. 1, 1987, p. 12 (see also Contact, vol. 42, no. 2, 1987, pp. 27–8 for follow-up Letters to the Editor; and Contact, vol. 43, no. 1, 1988, for apologies to Caldwell) Alexander, K.,‘Caldwell’, Spitfire News: Journal of the Spitfire Association, no. 80, April 2004 —— ‘Cleaning the Augean Stables: The Morotai Mutiny’ in Sabretache:The journal and proceedings of the Military Historical Society of Australia, vol. XLV, no. 3, September 2004 —— ‘The Day the Planes “All Fell Into the Sea”’ in Sabretache:The journal and proceedings of The Military Historical Society of Australia, vol. XLVI, no. 1, March 2005 ——‘Don’t call me “Killer”: Clive Robertson Caldwell in the Western Desert May–December 1941’ in Sabretache:The journal and proceedings of the Military Historical Society of Australia, vol. XLIV, no. 1, March 2003 Alford, B., Darwin’s Air War 1942–1945:An illustrated history,Aviation Historical Society of the Northern Territory, Winnellie, 1991 Ambrose, B., One Family’s War, privately published, Windemere, Tasmania, c 1987 Ashworth, N., How Not to Run an Airforce! The higher command of the Royal Australian Air Force during the Second World War, Air Power Studies Centre Fairbairn, 2000 Aviation Heritage: The journal of the Aviation Historical Society of Australia, vol. 7, no. 5, November/December 1976 Barbas, B., Planes of the Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, vol. 2, Kookaburra Technical Publications, Melbourne, 1985 Bartlett, N. (ed. vol. 1) and Meeking, C. (ed. vols. 2–5), Pictorial History of Australia at War 1939–45, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1958 Bekker, C., The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Macdonald & Co, London, 1967 Birkby, C., Close to the Sun:The story of the Sudan Squadron Royal Air Force, 250 Squadron Association, UK, 2000 edition (CD-Rom) Book of Political Philosophy, Policy, Constitution,The Liberal Democratic Party of Australia ‘The People’s Party’, Sydney, 1943 Bowyer, C. and Shores, C., Desert Air Force at War, Ian Allan, London, 1981 Brogden, S., Sky Diggers: A tribute to the RAAF, Whitcombe & Tombs, Melbourne (c 1944) Brown, Russell, Desert Warriors: Australian P–40 pilots at war in the Middle East and North Africa 1941–1943, Banner Books, Maryborough, 2000

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E Brown, Robin, Shark Squadron: The History of 112 Squadron RFC, RAF 1917–1975, Crecy Books, 1994 Burgess, C., ‘Our Australian Aviators, Part Eight—Group Captain Clive R. “Killer” Caldwell’ in Transit, Qantas cabin crew magazine, vol. 3, no. 1, 1983 Butlin, S.J. and Schedvin, C.B., War Economy 1942–1945: Australia in the war of 1939–1945, Series 4 (civil) vol. IV, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977 Caldwell, C., ‘The Desert is a Funny Place’ in chapter VIII, ‘Wings Across Africa’, Over to You: New broadcasts by the RAF, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1943 —— ‘Ground Staff ’ inWings: Official magazine of the RAAF, Directorate of Public Relations RAAF,Victoria, vol. 2, no. 6, 7 December 1943 ——‘Hope Does Not Help’ in Wings: Official magazine of the RAAF, Directorate of Public Relations RAAF,Victoria, vol. 3, no. 2, 25 April 1944 —— ‘Middle East Xmas’ in Wings: Official magazine of the RAAF, Directorate of Public Relations RAAF,Victoria, vol. 2, no. 7, 21 December 1943 —— ‘Think Fast—and Shoot First’ in Air Cadet, January, 1944 Copley, G., Australians in the Air, Rigby Limited, Adelaide, 1976 Day, D., The Politics of War:Australia’s War 1939–45: From Churchill to MacArthur, HarperCollins Publishers, Australia, 2003 Dennis, P., Grey, J., Morris, E., and Prior, R., with Connor, J., The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1999 Dornan, P., Nicky Barr: An Australian Air Ace, a story of courage and adventure, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002 Drake, B. with Shores, C., Billy Drake: Fighter Leader, the autobiography of Group Captain B. Drake DSO, DFC & Bar, DFC (US), Grub Street, London, 2002 Duke, N., Test Pilot, Grub Street, London, 1992 ——(ed. Franks, N.), The War Diaries of Neville Duke DSO, OBE, DFC (Two Bars),AFC, Czech Military Cross 1941–1944, Grub Street, London, 1995 ‘Fighter Pilot’ in Salt: Authorised education journal of the Australian Army, vol. 5, no. 15, October 1942 Firkins, P., The Golden Eagles: Air heroes of two world wars, St George Books, Perth, Western Australia, 1980 Fitzgerald, A., Victory: 1945 war & peace, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1995 Flint, P., RAF Kenley:The story of the Royal Air Force station 1917–1974,Terence Dalton, 1990 Francillon, R.J., Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War, Naval Institute Press, USA, 1987 Garrisson, Air Commodore A.D., Australian Fighter Aces 1914–1953, Air Power Studies Centre and Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1999 Gibbes, B., You Live But Once:An autobiography, self-published, 1994 Gilbert, M., A History of the Twentieth Century Volume One, 1900–1933, HarperCollins Publishers London, 1997 Gillison, D., Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942: Australia in the war of 1939–1945, series 3 (Air), vol. 1, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962 Grant, J., Spitfires Over Darwin 1943: No. 1 Fighter Wing, TechWrite Solutions, South Melbourne, 2003 —— ‘Beware the Ides of March or Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ in Spitfire News: Journal of the Spitfire Association, no. 56, March 1992 Halley, J.J., The Squadrons of the Royal Air Force & Commonwealth 1918–1988, Air-Britain (Historians) Ltd, Tonbridge Kent, 1988

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Bibliography Hata, I. and Izawa, Y., Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, Airlife, England, 1990 Hata, I., Izawa, Y., and Shores, C. Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1931–1945, Grub Street, London, 2002 Henshaw, A., Sigh for a Merlin:Testing the Spitfire, Crecy, 1999 Herington, J., Australia in the Air War of 1939–1945: Air war against Germany and Italy 1939–1943, Australia in the war of 1939–1945, series 3 (Air), vol. III, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1954 Hewitt, J.E., Adversity in Success: Extracts from Air Vice-Marshal Hewitt’s Diaries 1939–1948, Langate Publishing,Victoria, 1980 Horner, D.M., High Command: Australia’s struggle for an independent war strategy, 1939–1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992 Houghton, G.W., They Flew Through Sand: Notes and sketches of a RAF officer in the Western Desert, R. Schindler Publishing, Cairo, 1942 Ilbery, P., Hatching an Air Force 2SFTS, 5SFTS, 1 BFTS Uranquinty and Wagga Wagga, Banner Books, Maryborough, 2002 Jones, G., From Private to Air Marshal: The autobiography of Air Marshal Sir George Jones, Greenhouse Publications, Richmond,Victoria, 1988 Kenney, G.C., General Kenney Reports: A personal history of the Pacific War, Office of Air Force History, Washington DC, 1987 Kings of the Clouds, Frank Johnson, Sydney, 1943 Lever, J., No. 2 OTU RAAF Mildura and No. 8 OTU RAAF Parkes: A history of the RAAF’s fighter pilot operational training units, The Sunnyland Press Victoria, 1999 Lucas, L. (ed.), Wings of War:Airmen of all nations tell their stories 1939–1945, Hutchinson, London, 1983 ——Out of the Blue:The role of luck in air warfare 1917–1966, Hutchinson, London, 1985 ——Thanks for the Memory: Unforgettable characters in air warfare 1939–45, Grub Street, London, 1998 Luck, P., This Fabulous Century, New Holland Publishers, Sydney, 1999 McAulay, L., Against All Odds: RAAF pilots in the battle for Malta, 1942, Century Hutchinson, Sydney, 1989 McCarthy, J., A Last Call of Empire: Australian Aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air Training Scheme, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988 Morley-Mower, G., Messerschmitt Roulette:The Western Desert 1941–42, Phalanx Publishing, USA, 1993 Obernaier, E., Ritterkereuz Trager der Luftwaffe 1939–48,Verlag Dieter Hoffmann, 1966 Odgers, G., Air War Against Japan 1943–1945: Australia in the War of 1939–45, series 3 (Air), vol. II, Australian War Memorial, 1957 Owen, R., The Desert Air Force, Hutchinson, London, c 1948 The Parliament of New South Wales Remembers: Australia Remembers Commemoration 1945–1995,Thursday, 23 November, 1995, Parliamentary Archives and Parliamentary Education and Community Relations Section, Parliament of NSW, 1996 Partridge, E., A Dictionary of RAF Slang, Michael Joseph, London, 1945 Piper, R., The Hidden Chapters: Untold stories of Australians at war in the Pacific, Pagemasters,Victoria, 1995 Plowman, P., Across the Sea to War: Australian and New Zealand troop convoys from 1865 through two world wars to Korea and Vietnam, Rosenberg Publishing, NSW, 2003

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E Powell, A., The Shadow’s Edge: Australia’s Northern War, Melbourne University Press, 1992 RAAF Historical Section, Units of the Royal Australian Air Force:A Concise History, vols. 1 to 10, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995 The RAAF in the Southwest Pacific Area 1942–45:The Proceedings of 1993 History Conference Held in Canberra on 14 October 1993, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993 RAF Middle East:The official story of air operations in the Middle East, from February 1942 to January 1943, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 1945 Rawlings, J.D.R., Fighter Squadrons of the RAF and their Aircraft, Macdonald, London, 1969 Rayner, H., Scherger:A biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger KBE CB DSO AFC, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1984 Robertson, J., Australia at War 1939–1945, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1981 Roylance, D., Air Base Richmond:The story of the RAAF base on the Hawkesbury, RAAF Base Richmond, 1991 Semmler, C. (ed.), The War Diaries of Kenneth Slessor: Official Australian correspondent 1940–1944, University of Queensland Press, 1985 Sheridan, D. (ed.), Wartime Women: An anthology of women’s wartime writing for MassObservation 1937–45, Heinemann, London, 1990 Shores, C., Dust Clouds in the Middle East:The air war for East Africa, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Madagascar, 1940–42, Grub Street, London, 1996 ——Aces High, vol. 2, Grub Street, London, 1999 ——Those Other Eagles: A tribute to the British, Commonwealth and free European fighter pilots who claimed between two and four victories in aerial combat, 1939–1982, Grub Street, London, 2004 Shores, C. and Ring, H., Fighters Over the Desert: The air battles in the Western Desert, June 1940 to December 1942, Neville Spearman, London, 1969 Shores, C. and Williams, C., Aces High:A tribute to the most notable fighter pilots of the British and Commonwealth Forces in WWII, Grub Street, London, 1994 Sinclair, J., Sepik Pilot: Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes, DSO, DFC, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1971 Sly, E., The Luck of the Draw: Horses, Spitfires and Kittyhawks, self-published, NSW, 2003 Smith, J.R. and Kay, A., German Aircraft of the Second World War, Putnam, London, 1978 Spitfire News:The journal of the Spitfire Association, no. 62, March 1995 Spitfire News:The journal of the Spitfire Association, no. 82, March 2005 Stanley, P., Tarakan:An Australian tragedy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997 Stephens,A., Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, strategy and doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921–91, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre/Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992 Stephens, A. and Isaacs, J., High Fliers: Leaders of the Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1996 Tune, M., ‘Spitfires in the Pacific’ in Darwin Defenders 1942–45 Inc. Newsletter, vol. 5, no. 2, June 2003 von Kageneck, A., Erbo: Pilote de Chasse, Perrin, 1999 Warner, D., Pathfinder: In the air–on the ground, the Peter Isaacson story, Crown Content Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 2002

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Bibliography Waters, J.C., Valiant Youth: Men of the RAAF, F.H. Johnston Publishing, Sydney, 1945 Watson, J. and Jones, L., 3 Squadron at War, DAF 3 Squadron Association, Sydney, 1959 Weal, J., Aviation Elite 12: Jagdgeschwader 27,Afrika, Osprey Publishing Limited, Oxford, 2003 Wickham, S., We Wore Blue:A Diary of RAAF Service, self-published, NSW, 2000 Wilde, W.H., Hooton, J., and Andrews, B., Oxford Companion to Australian Literature, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000 Wilson, S., The Spitfire, Mustang and Kittyhawk in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Sydney, 1988 ——Wirraway, Boomerang and CA–15 in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Sydney, 1991 Wings: Official magazine of the RAAF, Directorate of Public Relations RAAF, Victoria, vol. 4, no. 10, 20 February 1945 Wings: Official journal of the AFC & RAAF Association (NSW Division), 1 March 1947 Wings: Official journal of the AFC & RAAF Association (NSW Division), vol. 13, no. 3, August 1961 Wings: Official journal of the AFC & RAAF Association (NSW Division), vol. 21, no. 4, November 1969 Wings: Official journal of the AFC & RAAF Association (NSW Division), vol. 22, no. 2, May 1970 Woodgate, F., Lion and Swans: The continuing story of No. 54 Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force, with detailed account of spitfires in Darwin, 1943–1945, and background notes to 1992, self-published, Collaroy Beach, 1992 Wynn, H., Desert Eagles, Air Life Publishing, Shrewsbury, 2001

Websites ADF Aircraft Serial Numbers, RAAF A58 Supermarine Spitfire [9 June 2005] Athletics Australia [15August 2003] Balmain Public School [14 October 2005] Commonwealth War Graves Commission: Debt of Honour Register [19 October 2005] Kilroy Was Here: Remembering the war years <www.kilroywashere.org> [11 March 2005] National Archives of Australia <www.naa.gov.au> Pacific Spitfires members’ only website [11 June 2005] World War II Nominal Roll

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Index Note: A number of officers changed rank during the course of the narrative.Accordingly, the highest rank obtained during the course of the narrative has been used for officers.

aircraft bomber 79–80 reconnaissance 21, 26, 106, 108, 148, 227, 246, 247 see also individual aircraft Albion Park 2–3 Albion Park RSL Sub-branch 2, 250 Aldridge, Flying Officer Frederick 24, 253 anti-gravity suit 99–100 Aquitania 15, 96 Arthur, Group Captain Wilfred 99, 100, 177–8, 183–6, 189–90, 191, 198, 200, 204, 274, 275, 276 Ashby, Pilot Officer Bob 111 Bailey, John 157 Barker, Flying Officer Ken 124–5 Barry Inquiry 187–204, 205, 208, 212, 219, 241–2 Barry, John Vincent 183, 188, 241 Bartle, Pilot Officer John ‘Jack’ 75 Beebe, Brigadier-General Royden 165–6 Begley, First Lieutenant John P. 92, 263 Bertrandias, Lieutenant Colonel Victor E. 96 Bisley, Flying Officer John 126 Bladin, Air Commodore Francis 112, 130, 140, 145, 146, 150, 182, 196–8, 199, 239, 241 Blenheim bombers 24, 32, 41, 57, 63, 79, 80, 246 bomber aircraft 79–80 Bong, Dick 160, 270 Boomerang aircraft 100–1, 158, 246 Bostock, Air Vice-Marshal 130, 159, 163, 165–6, 167, 185–6 Brander, Leading Aircraftman Jack 147 Braune, Hauptmann Erhard 62, 65 Brissey, Lieutenant Colonel Forrest 179 Brown, Wing Commander A.R. 212 Bruce, Nigel 95, 263–4 Burnett, John 153, 270 Burton, John 95 Cable, Sergeant 57, 61 Caldwell, Annie Selina 1, 2, 5 Caldwell, Clive Robertson 1 Fighter Wing 99, 100, 102, 103, 151, 153, 162, 175–6 2 Initial Training School Bradfield Park 11, 13, 14, 17, 116, 155

294

2 Operational Training Unit 99–100, 151, 154–5, 161 2 Personnel Depot Bradfield Park 205, 207, 212, 243 2 Recruit Depot Richmond 11 2 Service Flying Training School Forest Hill 12–13 4 Elementary Training School Mascot 12, 44 73 Squadron 18, 19, 33 80 Fighter Wing 161, 163, 165, 166, 171, 172, 176 112 Squadron 20, 30, 36, 49, 59, 60, 61, 67, 71–86, 141, 232, 254 250 Squadron xi, xviii, xx, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 78, 84, 229, 231, 232, 252, 253, 254, 274 air victories 25, 29, 33, 35–6, 37, 40, 41, 48–9, 57, 58, 59, 60–1, 62, 63, 75–6, 81, 83, 84, 138, 139–40, 144, 149–50, 151, 153, 224–8 amended birth certificate 8, 12 American tour 87–9, 91–5, 140 Anzac House Appeal Pin-up Man contest xix, 163, 164 award citations 44, 61, 67, 91, 140, 152, 162, 219, 245 born 1, 2 character xix, 3–4, 7, 11, 12, 13–14, 44, 54, 61, 68–9, 107, 152–3, 155–6, 157–8, 220–1, 226–8 charge sheet 243–4 commands 112 Squadron 71 court-martial 182, 183, 186, 187, 188–204, 205–20 crashes 76–8, 216 Darwin 102–19, 120–36, 237–53 death 221 discharge 205 EATS xvii, 9–10, 16, 219, 222 education xxii, 3 fighter ace 44, 61, 139, 153 financial situation 174 first dogfight 56 first sortie 24 First Tactical Air Force (TAF) 165–6, 175–8, 184–6 first victory 33


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Index Flight Commander 49–50, 56 Flight Lieutenant 52, 99, 212 and flying 7–8, 216 flying career highlights 229–35 fortune-teller’s prediction 17, 36, 82, 224 Group Captain 166 joins RAAF 7–8, 9–10 Kenley Wing 89–91 leadership 44–5, 49–50, 54–5, 56, 67, 74–5, 84–5, 140, 152–3 liquor transactions 167–8, 173–5, 179, 181–6, 187, 188–204, 205, 239–40 lone-wolf actions 29, 41, 44, 53, 84, 85 marriage 10 Middle East xvii, 14, 16–19, 20, 23–6, 32–8, 84–6 nickname ‘Killer’ xviii–xx, 61 North Africa xvii physical appearance xvii pilot training 12 postwar life 216–22 promotions 45, 99, 106, 166, 180 public relations duties 68, 107, 114, 147, 155–6, 163 RAAF training 11 reduced in rank 212, 213 request for termination of commission 185, 237–8 returns to Australia 96–7 Royal Aero Club 7, 12 Shepheard’s Hotel 17, 28, 50 Spitfire Wing 82–3, 89, 90, 91, 101 sport 3, 4–5, 6, 147 Squadron Leader, acting 99 sweeps and convoys 39–53 Talwood cattle station 5–6 talisman 22 victories xvii–xviii Wing Commander 106 working life 4, 5–6, 215–17 Caldwell, Jean McIvor xiii, xix, 8–9, 10–11, 12, 14, 15–16, 17, 22, 43, 66, 83, 95–6, 97, 98–9, 134, 135, 136, 154, 155, 161, 174, 186, 204, 214, 216, 223, 277, 278 Caldwell, John Robert 1, 2–3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 174, 217 Cassidy, BA LLB, KC, Jack 205–6, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215 Cavanagh, Sergeant 124 Celebes 175 Charlesworth, Air Commodore Alan 163 Charter, Leading Aircraftman 175, 181, 182, 196, 206–7, 208, 210–11, 237, 243, 244 Cobby, Air Commodore Arthur 166, 168, 172, 176–7, 178, 180, 181, 182–3, 185–6, 190, 191, 196–200, 202–3, 207, 209, 212, 239, 273, 274

Collins, Peter 221–2 Coningham, Air Vice-Marshal 30, 36, 40, 41, 50, 51, 52, 61, 76, 79, 83, 254 Cook, Squadron Leader Harold 192, 193, 209 Cooper, Flight Sergeant Albert ‘Bert’ 266 Cooper, Wing Commander Glen 179, 180, 181, 196 court-martial 182, 183, 186, 187, 188–204, 205–20 Cox, Ross 156, 220 Creighton, Pilot Officer 61 Cross, Group Captain Kenneth ‘Bing’ 77, 78, 261 Curtin, John (Prime Minister) 102, 103, 114, 129, 130, 131, 165 Curtiss–Wright fighter aircraft 1, 21, 71, 88, 91–3, 246 C–46 Commando 92, 246, 263 Kittybomber 79–80, 84, 232, 233, 261 Kittyhawk aircraft 71–2, 79–80, 84, 246 Tomahawk aircraft 20–1, 22–3, 55–6, 63–4, 84, 229, 246 Darwin 102–19, 120–36, 237–53 Davoren, Squadron Leader John 182, 185, 188, 191, 192–3, 194, 195, 202, 206, 208 de Havilland DH 82 Tiger Moth 12, 44, 97, 246, 251 De La Rue, Air Commodore Hippolyte 198, 199, 240, 241 Dixon, Squadron Leader Rupert 181, 184, 237 dogfighting 18, 33, 34, 38, 56, 108, 111, 115, 122, 123, 126–7, 128, 130, 225–6, 255 Doherty, Leading Aircraftman Frank 152 Douglas Boston bomber 80, 246 Doyle, Douglas 215, 216, 217 Doyle, Jim 6 Doyle, Rosalind 217 Drake, Billy 85 Drakeford, Arthur (Minister for Air) 104, 117, 130–1, 183, 184, 186, 187–8, 189, 201, 203, 241, 242, 264 Duke, Pilot Officer Neville 61, 75, 78, 80, 83, 261 Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) xvii, 9–10, 13, 16, 67, 140, 219, 222, 223 Evatt, Dr Herbert Vere (Minister for External Affairs) 91, 102–3, 104, 106 Falkiner, George 215, 217, 218 Farries, Flying Officer George 122, 126 fighter ace xi, xiii, xvii, xviii, xxii, 1, 2, 3, 7, 42, 44, 57, 61, 75, 99, 107, 126, 139, 153, 161, 222 fighter pilots xviii–xxi dogfighting 18, 34, 56, 108, 115, 122, 126–7, 128, 225–6

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E line-shooting 56, 68 shadow shooting 29–31, 37, 84, 107, 118, 158–9, 222, 225 shooting enemy parachutists xix, 28, 69 Filmer, Andrew xxii Finlay, Mervyn 10, 98–9 Fisher, Herbert O. 92–3, 263 Fitzroy, Leading Aircraftman John 181–2, 196, 237 Fitzsimons, Alex 220 Forestier, John 218 formation flying 29, 31–2, 44–5 weavers in 29, 31–2, 45 Fort Maddalena 59 Foster, Flight Lieutenant Bob 106, 133, 151–2 Fox, Pilot Officer Kenneth ‘Ken’ 122–3, 129, 152 Fox, Sergeant (54 Squadron) 124 Freedman, Harold 271 Gale, Pilot Officer David 17, 33, 255 German aircraft 18, 45, 84, 91, 247 pilots 87–8 Gibbes, Wing Commander Robert ‘Bobby’ xiii, 13, 67, 78, 85, 155, 157, 158, 161, 166, 168, 172, 173, 178, 183, 184, 186, 194–5, 196, 198, 199–200, 212–13, 214–16, 239, 242, 255, 260, 261, 272, 274–5, 277 Gibbs, Squadron Leader Eric ‘George’ 11, 122, 127, 132, 138 Gibson, Group Captain William 186, 196, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 209, 239, 240 Gifford, Flying Officer Gordon 124–5, 267 Gillespie, Adam 11, 12, 155 Gilmour, Sergeant Pilot James 61, 258 Glassop, Lawson 213, 277 Goble, Air Vice-Marshal S.J. 207–8, 210–11 Goldsmith, Flying Officer Adrian ‘Tim’ 112, 120, 123, 126, 153 Gowrie, Lord (Governor-General) 10–11, 251 Grace, Squadron Leader Bert 183, 200, 239, 242, 274–5 Grant, Sergeant James ‘Jim’ 116, 148, 153 Grant, Squadron Leader Kenneth 192, 193 Gray, Wing Commander Robin 186 Greenhow, Sergeant Edmondson 61, 258 Halifax, Lord (British Ambassador) 88, 91 Halmaheras viii, 165, 166, 172 Hamlyn, Flying Officer 25, 27, 51, 229, 230, 254 Hards, Sergeant 57 Hardwick, Flight Lieutenant Frederick ‘George’ 147 Hardwick, Flight Sergeant William ‘Bill’ 124 Harpham, Squadron Leader Stuart 173, 184, 200, 209, 242

Hawker Hurricane aircraft 18–19, 41, 79, 224, 246 Heffernan, Group Captain Patrick ‘Paddy’ 109 Henry, Bill 93–5 Henshaw, Alex 125, 267 Hewitt, Air Commodore Joseph 201–3, 205, 207 Hill, Laurie 158 Howard, Milton xiii, 222 Italian aircraft 18, 247 Army 17–18 pilots 87–8 Itoh, Noriyo 227–8 Jackson, Wing Commander Leslie 196, 239–40 James, Squadron Leader Kenneth ‘Ken’ 122, 146 Japanese aircraft Dinah 106, 137, 148–50, 227, 234, 247 Zero 108–12, 126–7 Japanese Army Air Force 138, 141, 247–8 Japanese Naval Air Force 108, 141, 248 Jeffrey, Group Captain Peter 51, 63, 99, 147, 151, 152, 164 Jones,Vice-Marshal George 101, 104, 131–3, 137, 140, 145, 159, 160, 162, 167, 173, 177, 180, 186, 188, 191, 201, 203, 209, 223, 265, 269 Kawahara, Sergeant Shinji 150, 227, 234 Kearby, Neel 160 Kenney, General George C. 130, 159, 160, 165, 186, 269 Kent, Pilot Officer James ‘Jim’ 17, 36–7, 251, 255 Lamerton, Flying Officer William ‘Jack’ 144, 269 Langslow, Melville 182–3, 203 Lewis, Thomas 220 Lindeman, Squadron Leader Colin 197, 198, 239 Lindmark, Rick 218–19 line-shooting 56, 68 Lippert, Hauptmann Wolfgang 57–8, 231 liquor bartering/selling 167–8, 173–5, 181–6, 187, 188–204, 205, 239–40 Little, Flight Sergeant Bruce 125 Lloyd, Flying Officer William ‘Bill’ 266 Lockheed P–38 Lightning 160, 246 MacArthur, General Douglas 106, 128–9, 130, 131, 139–40, 163, 165, 167, 269 MacDonald, Squadron Leader Ron 125 McGuire, Tommy 160 Mackenzie, Flying Officer 124 McLean, Flying Officer Alister 113 McNab, Flying Officer Alexander 124–5, 267 Main, Agnes 10, 95 Main, George 8, 9, 10, 11

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Index Main, Jean McIvor see Caldwell Main, Mary 8, 10, 11 Malan, Wing Commander Adolf ‘Sailor’ 107, 109, 139, 151 Martin, Flight Lieutenant Richard ‘Dickie’ 36 Mawer, Ella 163 Mawer, Flying Officer Granville 128 Mechili 59, 62, 72, 75 Messerschmitt 109 18, 21, 26, 45, 84, 247 Middle East 14–15, 16–19, 20–1, 23–6, 32–8 Operation Battleaxe 26, 27, 32, 51 Operation Crusader 51, 54–70, 72, 73 sweeps and convoys 39–53 Western Desert Air Force 57, 58, 62, 72, 73, 78, 81, 84 Miles M.14 Magister 77–8, 246 Minoru, Lieutenant-Commander Suzuki 120 Monteith, Flying Officer 33 Morotai Island 165, 166–8, 170, 171–86, 196, 201, 202, 204, 208, 209, 212, 218–19, 239, 242, 243–4 Morotai Mutiny 189–90 Morris, Squadron Leader Edward ‘Teddy’ 46, 50, 57, 61, 66, 67, 84, 95, 254 Mortimer, Sergeant Arthur 38, 55, 255, 256 Morton, Sergeant John 27, 254 Mulcahy, Norman 154 Munro, Pilot Officer Donald 17, 28, 29, 69, 254 Neale, Bob 85 Nichterlein, Pilot Officer Willie ‘Bill’ 139, 269 Nitschke, Richard 38 Norman, Rob 4, 6 North American P–51 Mustang 93, 247 Norton, Second Lieutenant 55 Oboe operations 177, 178, 180, 184, 185, 274 O’Driscoll, Squadron Leader J.X. 207–8, 210, 211 Operation Battleaxe 26, 27, 32, 51 Operation Crusader 51, 54–70, 72, 73 Packer, Group Captain Gerald 166, 209 Padula, Flight Sergeant Paul ‘Paddy’ 148, 149, 227 Palethorpe, Sergeant Donald 57, 258 Parker, Corporal Kenneth ‘Ken’ 167–8, 174–5, 181, 196, 206–7, 208, 210, 218–19, 237, 243, 272 Paxton, Sergeant Tom 25, 230, 254 Plowright, Leading Aircraftman Stan 168, 181–2 Pluck, Flight Lieutenant Reginald 206–8, 210–11 Polish pilots 74, 83, 86, 89, 245 Pretty, Flying Officer Jack 171–2 Pyke, Sergeant George 24, 254

Quinn, Flight Lieutenant Frank 147, 190, 239 Quinn, Peter 119, 152 radar 114–15 Ranger, Wing Commander Kenneth 178, 184, 185, 200, 242, 274–5 Rawlinson, Squadron Leader Alan 63, 99, 100 Republic P–47 Thunderbolt 160, 247 Robertson, David 217, 278 Robinson, Pilot Officer Norman 124 Rose, Flight Lieutenant 53, 61 Rosenberg, Heinrich 225 Royal Air Force 54 Squadron 91, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 151, 152, 162 73 Squadron 18–19, 33 112 Squadron 20, 30, 36, 49, 59, 60, 61, 67, 71–86, 141, 232, 254 250 Squadron xi, xviii, xx, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 78, 84, 229, 231, 232, 252, 253, 254, 274 274 Squadron 18 weaponry 46–7 Royal Australian Air Force 1 Fighter Wing 99, 100, 102, 103, 137, 151, 153, 162, 175–6 2 Operational Training Unit 99–100, 151, 154, 155, 158–9, 161 3 Squadron 18, 48, 51, 52, 63, 68, 73, 78, 85, 99, 255, 260, 261, 275 10 Group 165–6 80 Fighter Wing 161, 163, 165, 166, 171, 172, 176 452 Squadron xx, 11, 91, 100, 102, 104, 114, 115, 117, 120, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 129, 139, 144, 148, 151, 153, 168, 272 457 Squadron xiii, 30, 91, 102, 104, 105, 109, 110, 114, 117, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 132, 138, 142, 143, 146, 148, 159, 165, 168, 272 Air Board Order ‘N’ 548 of 1944 167, 182, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 209, 236, 241–2 First Tactical Air Force (TAF) 165–6, 175–8, 184–6, 189, 195–6, 199–201 officer dissatisfaction with operations 176–8, 184–5, 189, 200, 202–4 officer resignations 184–6, 187–8, 191, 200, 202–4 South-West Pacific Area 165 Ruskin-Rowe, Pilot Officer Anthony ‘Tony’ 139, 269

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C L I V E C A L DW E L L , A I R A C E Samuels, Eddie 8 Scherger, Air Commodore 12–13, 186 Schroer, Leutnant Werner 42 Schweppes, Flying Officer Albert 181, 196, 208, 210 Scoular, Squadron Leader John 30, 40, 44, 45, 67, 84 Selaru Island 159, 161, 162, 163, 164 shadow shooting 29–31, 37, 84, 107, 118, 158–9, 222, 225 Sheridan, Sergeant Jack 30 shooting enemy parachutists xix, 28, 69 Sidi Barrani 29, 34, 43, 45, 49, 53, 57, 59 Simms, Group Captain Robert 96, 186, 190–1, 196, 198, 200, 203, 209, 275 Slade-Slade, Ernest xi, 26, 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 258, 264 Sloman, Leading Aircraftman 111, 117, 123, 128, 130 Sly, Flight Lieutenant Edward ‘Ted’ 165, 172, 175, 179–80, 234, 272, 273 Smiles, Annie Selina see Caldwell Spitfire Association 220, 221 Stagg, Flying Officer Ross 124 Stahlschmidt, Hans-Arnold 75–6, 232, 260 Steinhausen, Unteroffizier 27 Stinson L5 Sentinel 7, 216, 247 Stone, Shane 221 Streett, Major-General St Clair 172 Sturm, Flight Lieutenant John 169, 272 Sumner, Flight Sergeant Clifford 27, 254 Supermarine Spitfire aircraft 1, 2, 80, 82, 83, 89–91, 101, 102–3, 105, 106, 107–14, 116–17, 120, 121–34, 136, 137–9, 141–7, 150, 156, 158, 159, 162–3, 164, 168–70, 171–2, 175, 178–80, 218, 234–5, 247 armament 162–3 Mark VIII 162, 163, 168, 234 Mark IX 90, 232 Mark Vb 90–1, 232 Mark Vc 1, 103, 110, 128, 233, 247 serviceability 153, 176 Sydney Grammar School xxii, 3, 8, 251 Takeuchi, Miyoko 227–8 Tanaka, Sergeant Tomihiko 150, 234 Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur 30, 53, 82, 83, 84–5, 89, 95, 222 Thorold-Smith, Ray 115–18, 127, 266

Tillery, Sergeant Paul 171 Tobruk 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 32, 33–4, 37, 41, 51–2, 57, 59, 62, 73, 84 Toohey, Squadron Leader John 198 tracking systems 114–15 Trinity Grammar School xxii, 3 Truscott, Squadron Leader Keith ‘Bluey’ 117, 264 Tune, Warrant Officer Murray 169 Tyler, Flight Lieutenant 177 Urbanczyk, Sergeant Zdzislaw 81, 233 Vanderfield, Squadron Leader Richard ‘Doug’ 99, 101, 183, 200, 242, 274–5 Varney, Pilot Officer Francis ‘Frank’ 266 Vichy Government 20, 23 von Kageneck, August Graf 224–6, 227 von Kageneck, Oberleutnant Erbo Graf 62, 65, 224, 225–6, 228, 232, 259 Waddy, Squadron Leader John xx, 56, 66, 68, 69, 155, 156, 183, 200, 216, 219, 220, 242, 247–5 Walters, Group Captain Alan ‘Wally’ 102, 104–5, 109, 111, 114, 118, 133, 140–1, 152, 162, 266, 269 Watson, Flight Lieutenant Peter 137–8 Watson, Group Captain 199, 240 Watson, Squadron Leader Bruce 175, 199, 240 Wawn, Flight Lieutenant Clive ‘Bardie’ 99, 117 weavers in close formation flying 29, 31–2, 45 Wells, Wing Commander Edward Preston ‘Hawkeye’ 91 Wells, Pilot Officer Stanley ‘Stan’ 36, 48–9, 257 Wellsman, Pilot Officer James ‘Jimmy’ 144, 269 Western Desert Air Force 57, 58, 62, 72, 73, 78, 81, 84 Whittle, Bob xviii, 36, 45, 57, 61, 230, 255 Williams, Flight Lieutenant Reginald ‘Ross’ xx, 104, 112, 117, 152, 155 Wilson, Pilot Officer Archie xviii, xix, 23, 30, 31, 38, 68, 69, 256 Wingrove, Bob 7, 9, 251 Winter, Anthony ‘Nick’ 4 Wirraway 13, 21, 154, 156–7, 235, 246 Wolsey, Flying Officer Gordon 24, 27 Woodgate, Fred 162, 220, 221, 266 Wright, Burdette S. 92, 263

298

Clive Caldwell, Air Ace

Ace

Matt Caldwell: Texas Tycoon

Zack, Ace

Caldwell, Erskine - Tobacco Road

Matt Caldwell: Texas Tycoon

The Caldwell Effect

The Ace

Atkins, Ace

Zack, Ace

Smokin' Ace

Smokin' Ace

Circus Ace

Red Ace

Earthbound Ace

Ace Killer

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Lullaby - Ace Atkins

Lullaby - Ace Atkins

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

The Scarlet Ace

Zack and Ace

Ace, Noel - Soul Tattooed

Ace, Noel - Soul Tattooed

'Ace'' Any Test

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Clive Caldwell, Air Ace

Ace

Matt Caldwell: Texas Tycoon

Zack, Ace

Caldwell, Erskine - Tobacco Road

Matt Caldwell: Texas Tycoon

The Caldwell Effect

The Ace

Atkins, Ace

Zack, Ace

Smokin' Ace

Smokin' Ace

Circus Ace

Red Ace

Earthbound Ace

Ace Killer

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Lullaby - Ace Atkins

Lullaby - Ace Atkins

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

The Scarlet Ace

Zack and Ace

Ace, Noel - Soul Tattooed

Ace, Noel - Soul Tattooed

'Ace'' Any Test

Clive Cussler

Clive Cussler

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