Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations? (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series)

Clash or Coopera tion of Civiliza tions? T he International Political E conomy of N ew R egionalisms S eries The In...

Author: Wolfgang Zank

26 downloads 822 Views 2MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Clash or Coopera

tion of Civiliza

tions?

T he International Political E conomy of N ew R egionalisms S eries The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms series presents innovative analyses of a range of novel regional relations and institutions. Going beyond established, formal, interstate economic organizations, this essential series provides informed interdisciplinary and international research and debate about myriad heterogeneous intermediate level interactions. Re.ective of its cosmopolitan and creative orientation, this series is developed by an international editorial team of established and emerging scholars in both the S outh and N orth. It reinforces ongoing networks of analysts in both academia and think-tanks as well as international agencies concerned with micro-, meso- and macro-level regionalisms. Editorial Board T imothy M. S haw, Institute of International R elations at T he University of the West Indies, S t A ugustine, T rinidad & T obago Isidro Morales, T ecnologico de Monterrey, E scuela de Graduados en A dministracion (E GAP ), Mexico Maria N zomo, Permanent Mission of the R epublic of Kenya to the United Nations Office in Geneva N icola Phillips, University of Manchester, UK Johan S aravanamuttu, Institute of S outheast A sian S tudies, S ingapore F redrik S öderbaum, S chool of Global S tudies, Göteborg University, S weden and UN U-CRIS , Belgium Recent titles in the series (full listing continued at the back of the book) N ew Perspectives on Globalization and A ntiglobalization Prospects for a N ew World O rder? Edited by Henry Veltmeyer E urope-A sia Interregional R elations A Decade of ASE M Edited by Bart Gaens Governing R egional Integration for Development Monitoring E xperiences, Methods and Prospects Edited by Philippe De Lombaerde, Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen

Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations?

O verlapping Integration and Identities

Edited by Wolf gan g Z an k Aalborg University, Denmark

© Wolfgang Z ank 2009 A ll rights reserved. N o part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Wolfgang Z ank has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents A ct, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Published by A shgate Publishing L imited A shgate Publishing Company Wey Court E ast S uite 420 Union R oad 101 Cherry S treet F arnham Burlington S urrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 E ngland USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Clash or cooperation of civilizations? : overlapping integration and identities. - (T he international political economy of new regionalisms series) 1. E ast and West 2. Pan arabism 3. Pan-A fricanism 4. A rab countries - R elations - E urope 5. E urope - R elations - A rab countries 6. Mediterranean R egion - E conomic integration I. Z ank, Wolfgang 303.4'82174927'04 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clash or cooperation of civilizations? : overlapping integration and identities / [edited by] by Wolfgang Z ank. p. cm. -- (T he international political economy of new regionalisms series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7407-8 (hardcover) 1. Culture conflict--Africa, North. 2. Culture conflict--Middle East. 3. Social integration--Africa, North. 4. Social integration-Middle E ast. 5. Civilization, Western. 6. Civilization, Islamic. I. Z ank, Wolfgang. HN 781.Z 9S 62 2008 303.48'261056--dc22 IS BN 978 0 7546 7407 8

2008029511

Contents List of Figures and Tables List of Contributors List of Abbreviations Acknowledgments 1 Introduction: O verlapping Identities and Integration Processes in the Mediterranean Basin Wolfgang Zank 2 A Clash of Civilizations inside the MENA Countries? Islamist versus S ecular Civil S ociety and the F ailure of Pro-democracy Policies Francesco Cavatorta

vii ix xi xiii 1

27

3 Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: T he R approchement of T urkish Islamic E lite with the West Ihsan Dagi

43

4 T he A lliance of Civilizations: T he S panish A pproach to Bridging the Divide between Islam and the West Koussay Boulaich and Søren Dosenrode

65

5 O bstacles to A frican Unity – A Deutschian Perspective Søren Dosenrode 6 T he Gradual E uropeanization of N orth A frica: F rom “A rab S ocialism” to a “S take in E U’s Internal Market” Wolfgang Zank 7 E uropean S ecurity and the “Clash of Civilizations”: Differences in the policies of F rance, Germany and the UK towards the Mediterranean and the Middle E ast Peter Seeberg 8

Citizenship and Cultural Clashes: T he Cartoon Crisis and Changing N otions of Citizenship Jakob Feldt

83

109

147

167

vi

9


“E nriched by O pen Borders and a L ively V ariety of L anguages, Cultures and R egions”: Cooperation and Integration in the E U in spite of Cultural Diversity Wolfgang Zank

183

10 S ome Concluding R emarks on O verlapping Integration in the Mediterranean Basin Wolfgang Zank

207

Index

219

L ist of F igures and T ables Figures 5.1 S ecurity communities in the Integration Process 5.2 T ypes and numbers of regimes in A frica 5.3 Ongoing violent conflicts in Africa 5.4 Political and cultural indicators of the SA CU countries

85 95 96 102

Tables 5.1 Country trade structure by main region of destination, in 2005 US dollars at current prices in millions 5.2 E conomic and geographic indicators of the SA CU countries 6.1 A lgeria’s foreign debt burden from 1982 to 1992 6.2 T he N orth A frican E uro-Mediterranean A ssociation A greements 6.3 S ocial indicators for N orth A frican countries

92 104 124 133 135

This page has been left blank intentionally

L ist of Contributors Koussay Boulaich, was born in Ceuta and attended secondary school in Morocco (E l Pilar). H e studied Political S ciences and International R elations in Madrid (Complutense), S trasbourg (Institut d’E tudes Politiques) and at the College of E urope, Bruges, where he wrote his thesis ‘L ’A lliance des Civilisations: un projet ambitieux pour le futur de la PES C?’. H e is now working for the S panish N ational A ssociation of Political S ciences and S ociology. Francesco Cavatorta is lecturer in International R elations and Middle E ast Politics at the S chool of L aw and Government, Dublin City University. H e has published numerous articles on democratization in the Middle E ast and N orth A frica. H e is the author of The International Dimension of the Failed Algerian Transition. Democracy Betrayed? (Manchester University Press 2009, forthcoming). H e is currently visiting professor at the Center for Contemporary Middle E ast S tudies, University of S outhern Denmark where he is working on a project examining civil society in the A rab world. Ihsan Dagi is Professor of International R elations at the Middle E ast T echnical University in A nkara, and the editor-in-chief of the quarterly Insight Turkey. H e has been a F ulbright F ellow at Georgetown University and a H uman R ights F ellow at the Carnegie Council on E thics and International A ffairs. Professor Dagi is the author of Turkey between Democracy and Militarism (2008). Søren Dosenrode is Jean Monnet Professor for E uropean Politics and director of the Centre for Comparative Integration S tudies at A alborg University, Denmark. H is latest publications include Approaching the EUropean Federation? (A shgate 2007). Jakob Egholm Feldt is an A ssistant Professor at Centre for Contemporary Middle E ast S tudies at the University of S outhern Denmark. H is primary research interests include cultural encounters and clashes in and between E urope and the Middle E ast. T heoretically his work is located within Cultural S tudies. R ecent publications include ‘H istory and Peace E ducation in Israel/Palestine’ (Rethinking History, Vol. 12, no. 2, 2008) and The Israeli Memory Struggle: History and Identity in the Age of Globalization (University Press of S outhern Denmark, 2007). Peter Seeberg is A ssociate Professor, PhD, H ead of Department and Director of S tudies at Centre for Contemporary Middle E ast S tudies, University of S outhern Denmark. H e has taught Middle E ast S tudies at the University of S outhern


Denmark and University of Århus. H e has published on E U and the Middle E ast, A rab nationalism, migration issues and ethnic minorities in E urope and Denmark. H is most recent books are EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and Security (ed.) (University Press of S outhern Denmark, 2007) and New Media in the Middle East (Centre for Contemporary Middle E ast S tudies, University of S outhern Denmark, 2006), co-edited with Jakob F eldt. Wolfgang Zank is A ssociate Professor for E uropean S tudies at A alborg University. H e has published on S candinavian problems, on socialist economies and transition to market economies, on social and cultural integration processes, and on various subjects of E uropean Integration.

L ist of A bbreviations AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party] A oC A lliance of Civilizations APR M A frican Peer R eview Mechanism A U A frican Union CEAO Communauté Économique de l’A frique de l’O uest CFA Communauté F inancière d’A frique; Cooperation F inancière en A frique Centrale CFSP Common F oreign and S ecurity Policy E CB E uropean Central Bank E CJ E uropean Court of Justice E CO WAS E conomic Community of West A frican S tates E CS C E uropean Coal and S teel Community E CU E uropean Currency Unit EE C E uropean E conomic Community EI B E uropean Investment Bank E MP E uro-Mediterranean Partnership E MU E conomic and Monetary Union ENP E uropean N eighbourhood Policy EPA E conomic Partnership A greement ERAS MUS E uropean Community A ction S cheme for the Mobility of University S tudents ES DP E uropean Defence and S ecurity Policy E U E uropean Union FE MISE F orum E uro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Économiques FIS F ront Islamique du S alut FLN F ront de L ibération N ationale FP F elicity Party GAFTA Greater A rab F ree T rade A rea GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GMP Global Mediterranean Policy GNP Gross N ational Product HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HL G H igh-level Group IMF International Monetary F und JDP Justice and Development Party [T urkish A KP] ME DA Mesures d’A ccompagnement

xii


MENA Middle E ast and N orth A frica MEPI Middle E ast Partnership Initiative MUSIA D Müstakil Isadamlari Dernegi [Independent A ssociation of Industrialists and Businessmen] NATO N orth A tlantic T reaty O rganization NEPA D N ew Partnership for A frica’s Development N GO N on-Governmental O rganization NSP N ational S alvation Party OA U O rganization of A frican Unity PJD Parti de la Justice et du Développement PS D Parti S ocialiste Destourien RE C R egional E conomic Community SA CU S outhern A frican Customs Union SA DC S outh A frican Development Community SAP S tabilization and A ssociation Process UAR United A rab R epublic UK United Kingdom UMA Union du Maghreb A rabe UN United N ations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNH CR UN H igh Commissioner for R efugees VP V irtue Party WP Welfare Party WE U Western E uropean Union WTO World T rade O rganization

A cknowledgments T he contributors to this book met in A alborg on 23–24 A ugust 2007 at a workshop, organized by the CCIS , the Center for Comparative Integration S tudies. We discussed the papers and all felt that we could learn a lot from each other and profit from the others’ comments. The workshop was financially supported by the Obelske Familiefond, A alborg. O n behalf of the participants I express our gratitude. I also thank Ms Marianne H øgsbro for assisting in organizing the workshop and Ms E lin L arsen for her professional help in editing this book. Wolfgang Z ank


Chapter 1

Introduction: O verlapping Identities and Integration Processes in the Mediterranean Basin Wolfgang Z ank

Four Overlapping Projects T he emergence of new patterns of institutionalized international cooperation and even integration seems to be a world-wide phenomenon, from Mercosur in S outh A merica over the E uropean Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council to ASEAN in S outheast A sia. In this context, the Mediterranean Basin is particularly interesting, given the point that several collective identities and integration processes overlap. O ne of these is E uropean integration. Most countries on the northern shores, from Gibraltar to Cyprus, have become members of the E uropean Union; T urkey will presumably do so in some years. But E uropean integration has also had an impact on the other Mediterranean countries, and with the launch of its E uropean N eighborhood Policy in 2004, the E U has openly declared that it wants to influence events in these countries and bring them closer to itself. But in the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, collective identities seem to point at different patterns of integration, and with other partners than the E U. Point one, all these countries are predominantly A rab countries. Pan-A rabism as a grandiose nationalist ideology about creating one big Arab nation “from the Ocean to the Gulf”, quite flourishing in previous decades, seems to be dead for all practical purposes. But at a lower-key level, a Pan-A rab identity is alive, and it can support common initiatives and cooperation. T he A rab L eague, for instance, has organized numerous active sub-organizations, not the least in the cultural field. Occasionally, the Arab League was able to formulate common positions at high-politics level, for instance the 2002 A rab Peace initiative. T here has also been some progress towards economic cooperation, for instance the project of creating a Greater A rab F ree T rade A rea, or the A gadir T reaty between E gypt, Jordan, Morocco and T unisia. A s will be explained below, the prospects for some more practical A rab cooperation seem to be better than before. Collective identities are here understood as only covering a “we-feeling.” A s will be explained in more detail in Chapter 9, a “we-feeling” does not imply that the people sharing it are culturally homogenous.


But the N orth A frican countries, save Morocco, are also members of the A frican Union. T heir governments document thereby an attachment to a continental A frican identity. T o create integration among the A frican countries has proven to be very difficult. But a re-launch of African unification led to the foundation of the A frican Union (A U) in 2002 and has produced new institutions and new common activities (Z ank 2007). Currently the A U musters 53 member states, and the level of ambition, at least when measured by declaration and speeches, seems to be high. A s the example of E gypt’s Gamal A bdel N asser has already shown, a confessed Pan-A rab could at the same time work for more continental A frican unity. But how exactly does Pan-A fricanism and Pan-A rabism rhyme? Does more progress towards, for example, A frican unity not imply a weakening of Pan-A rab ties, and vice versa? A ll countries in N orth A frica and the Middle E ast are also predominantly Muslim countries, and Islam has a privileged status in these countries. Political Islamism is strong, albeit to various degrees. T he rise of political Islamism has been debated extensively, and the idea of a “Clash of Civilizations”, as expressed for example, in the well-known book by S amuel P. H untington (H untington 2002), could gain plausibility exactly because many Islamists indulged in violent antiWestern rhetoric and activities. T he 9/11 attacks on the N ew York World T rade Center and the Pentagon seemed to confirm the “Clash of Civilizations” in a very tragic and very spectacular way. But as we will see, political Islamism does not necessarily imply an anti-Western and anti-democratic course. A lso important in our context, an Islamic identity can support patterns of international cooperation and even integration. It can go along with Pan-A rabism to quite some extent, given the point that the A rab countries are predominantly Muslim countries. A rabic is the language of the Koran, and the Prophet lived and worked in areas which now belong to S audi-A rabia. But nonetheless, the Islamic umma is a much wider community and most of its members are actually nonA rabs. T he biggest Muslim country is Indonesia, with an estimated population of about 235 million people. N ext comes Pakistan with close to 170 million people. A lso in India there are more Muslims (perhaps 135 million) than in any A rab country. E gypt, the most populous one, “only” counts about 80 million. A n Islamic identity, if translated into common political activity and institutions, points therefore mainly towards closer cooperation with S outh and S outheast A sia and with some sub-S aharan A frican countries. T his has to some extent materialized in numerous forms. Just to mention one example, the O rganization of the Islamic Conference counts 57 member states. T his makes it the second-biggest international organization, after the United N ations, and its numerous standing committee and sub-organizations create wide networks of cooperation. Can the processes of E uropean integration, A rab cooperation, A frican unification and Islamic consolidation all co-exist and proceed at the same time? Or is conflict unavoidable? Will exactly this overlapping of cooperation and integration and the concomitant dilution of borders between societies not provoke clashes? Does it not imply undermining identities and cultural values? Will it

Introduction

perhaps be confronted by well-entrenched political and economic interests? T his is the overarching subject of this book. H owever, before I present the contributions of this anthology, I want to explore the above-mentioned processes in more detail. In this context a historical overview might be helpful. From Pan-Arabism to Arab Cooperation Today, the European side is comparatively unified, whereas the states of the Maghreb and the Mashreq are only loosely integrated. T urkey is mainly leaning towards E urope and not to her Muslim neighboring countries. But at the end of the 18th century, the situation was kind of reversed: T he E uropean countries were divided and often at war against each other, whereas the whole eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, from Greece down to the borders of Morocco, belonged to the huge O ttoman E mpire. Islam was the common religion of most O ttoman subjects, T urks and A rabs alike, so there seemed to be a high degree of cultural commonness. But in the 19th century the empire steadily declined, due to internal and external forces. Under Mehmet A li E gypt became independent “in all but name” (Goldschmidt 1988, 21). In 1830, F rench troops landed near A lgiers and began the conquest of A lgeria. A fter some decades, at the outbreak of the F irst World War, the whole of N orth A frica was under E uropean domination, either as colony (A lgeria, L ibya), or under the somewhat milder form of a Protectorate (E gypt, T unisia, Morocco). T he remaining O ttoman E mpire itself was profoundly penetrated by the Western powers. A s the O ttoman E mpire decayed, dissatisfaction spread, not the least among educated A rab subjects, thereby creating the basis for the nascent A rab “awakening.” It was fuelled by many sources, an important one being the competition over appointments: A rabic speakers began to demand more autonomy for their provinces, and thus more autochthon recruitment for bureaucratic positions (Kramer 1993, 175f) – a very familiar pattern at the rise of 19th century nationalisms. A rabism was centered in Damascus where its followers began to organize. It was accompanied by an A rabic literary revival. T his, however, was not automatically translated into political Arabism, but the policy of Turcification after the Young–T urkish R evolution and the beginning of Z ionist settlement in Palestine contributed much to politicizing A rab intellectuals. S till, however, before 1914 A rabism remained mainly a politically rather weak intellectual movement. Many of its followers felt a vague admiration for the liberal democracies of F rance and the United Kingdom. Matters changed profoundly with World War I. T he S ultan and Caliph in Istanbul, nominally the religious head of the Umma, sided unwisely with Germany. H e tried to politicize religion and declared the H oly War against the A llies (Jihad not being a phenomenon only of the end of the 20th century). S uccess was limited. T he classical study in this context is H roch (1985).


T he British were more successful at playing the national card and offering “A rab independence”. T hey found an ally in a local ruler, S harif H usayn of Mecca; in 1916 he ignited the A rab R evolt against O ttoman rule. H usayn had reasons to believe that the A llies would support the construction of a vast A rab kingdom on the A rabic-speaking territories of the O ttoman E mpire. T he insurgents could establish contacts with A rab societies in Damascus and were reinforced by A rab officers who deserted from the Ottoman Army (Kramer 1993, 178). These patterns show a certain parallel with German or Italian “unification”, where a military power (Prussia, Piedmont) could expand with the support of nationalist organizations and officers in neighboring areas. In the end, the E mirs F aysal and A bdallah, sons of S harif H usayn and leaders of the A rab revolt, turned out to be no Bismarcks or Cavours. While A rab insurgents, in tandem with the British army, moved northwards, the British and F rench governments signed the so-called S ykes-Picot A greement which divided the N ear E ast into A llied zones of domination. A dditionally, in 1917, F oreign Minister A rthur James Balfour expressed British support for a Jewish “national home” in Palestine in order to garner Jewish support. A fter the collapse of the O ttoman E mpire, in 1920, the Allied powers finalized their negotiations in San Remo. Faysal, who in the meantime had installed himself as A rab king in Damascus, was expelled by F rench troops; in parallel, the British authorities allowed more extensive Jewish settlement in Palestine. S mall wonder: A rab nationalists, originally also inspired by Western liberalism, became ardent enemies of the West. T he new masters of the Middle E ast, in particular the British, showed some flexibility: in 1921, as a gesture of compensation, they made Faysal king of the new country of Iraq. A bdallah became king of T ransjordan, a piece of territory cut off from the British mandate territory of Palestine. H owever, in the 1920s the main face of E uropean imperialism was brute repression for many A rabs, almost throughout the A rab world. T he most gruesome case was presumably the crushing of L ibyan resistance by the troops of F ascist Italy between 1922 and 1932. Deportations, concentration camps, mass executions and air raids, including the use of poison gas, cost about 100,000 lives, about one eighth of the population. S panish troops also used poison gas to a great extent when repressing the rebellion of the R if Kabyles under A bd el-Krim in northern Morocco (Mattioli 2003, 317– 9). F rench troops suppressed armed rebellions in S yria and L ebanon (H eller 1981, 108); British forces did so in Iraq. H owever, as Martin Kramer (Kramer 1993, 182f) put it: […] the very geography of imperialism created a potential bond of solidarity between the A lgerian and the S yrian, the E gyptian and the Iraqi. In time, a growing number of E gyptians and N orth A fricans began to see themselves as A rabs. Paradoxically, the empires of Britain and F rance linked together A rabic-speaking lands which had enjoyed few if any organic ties in Ottoman times, inspiring for the first time the idea of an Arab world from the A tlantic O cean to the Gulf.

Introduction

In the 1930s, Pan-A rabism spread rapidly, propagated by a growing A rab press and by nationalist teachers in an environment of advancing literacy. A t the same time, modernization and urbanization loosened traditional ties and thereby reduced resistance to the new nationalist ideology. Schemes for Arab unification abounded. However, the course of practical politics went quite differently when independence came, around World War II . T he A rab mandate territories or colonies became independent one by one, within borders mainly drawn by the imperialist powers. S ome countries (Morocco, E gypt) have been political communities with own institutional traditions for a long time, whereas others, for instance S yria or T ransjordan, were political artifacts. H owever, artifacts or not, after their independence they all had their own governments, elites, institutional settings and symbols of statehood. T hese ruling elites had one overruling interest, namely staying in power, and they coolly defended their interests, Pan-A rab rhetoric notwithstanding (Kramer 1993, 183f). T his feature is the dominant one still today: T he A rab world is divided into sovereign states, with comparatively little cooperation among them, and with no common supra-national level of legislation, jurisdiction or decision making above them. It is true, in 1945 seven A rab countries (E gypt, Iraq, T ransjordan, L ebanon, S audi-A rabia, S yria and Yemen) formed the A rab L eague, with a permanent secretariat in Cairo. But this was a strictly intergovernmental organization where government representatives met and negotiated, but with no power of interfering into internal affairs. A rticle 8 made this explicit (A rab L eague): E very member S tate of the L eague shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other S tates of the L eague, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those S tates, and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.

T his principle is still valid, and although the A rab L eague became the forum for some cooperation (see below), it never came near a unified Arab state. However, the humiliating war with Israel in 1948 created another change in Pan-A rabism: Intellectuals and young officers blamed corrupt, selfish governments and weak political and social structures for the defeat; in order to vitalize A rab society, these governments had to be overthrown. T his did not remain just rhetoric, given the point that the officers had real power. One by one, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, then Algeria and L ibya came under revolutionary military rule. Quite advanced developments towards pluralism and parliamentary rule in, for instance, E gypt were cut off. L and reform, nationalization, import-substitution industrialization, and bureaucratic planning destroyed market processes to a high extent even in countries which did Iraq became formally independent in 1932, E gypt in 1938 (effectively after World War II ). S yria, L ebanon and T ransjordan became sovereign in 1945, L ibya in 1951, T unisia and Morocco in 1956 and finally Algeria in 1962. Also, for example, Kuwait gained independence rather late (1961).


not fall prey to military rule, like Morocco or T unisia. T his policy severed many economic links with the West – but also among the A rab countries themselves. A s will be explained in more detail in Chapter 6, exactly the economic policy of A rab socialism, rhetorically accompanied by heavy doses of Pan-A rabism, contributed strongly to isolating A rab societies from each other. At first it looked like the opposite: In 1958, Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), presented to the world as the first step to a wider Arab unification. However, this experience was short-lived; in Damascus in 1961 a military coup re-installed S yrian sovereignty. In fact, in S yria the “union” was perceived as a thinly-veiled – and incompetent – E gyptian domination. Perhaps two features should be highlighted, if we want to compare these developments with more successful forms of integration (see below): Point one, both countries were not ruled in a constitutional legal manner. Instead, opaque dictatorial rule with a high level of arbitrariness was in place. After unification Syria had to experience E gyptian arbitrariness, with no legal guarantees against abuses. F urthermore, the social structure and the economic policy were not compatible. In 1958, N asser’s E gypt had progressed much more on the road towards “A rab socialism” than S yria. S yrian consumers and business interests felt as if they were pressed into a straight-jacket (E tzioni 2001, 113–18). In my view, lack of legality and incompatible economic structures were the main factors making this union a fiasco. The fact that the two countries were quite similar from a cultural point of view did not create a sufficient basis for a lasting union. Up until the 1970s, there were more schemes of unification: Iraq with Jordan, E gypt with L ibya, and E gypt with S udan (H eller 1981, 126). But they did not come near realization. The only success story in this respect has been the unification of N orth and S outh Yemen in 1990. But this was more a Yemenite than a Pan-A rab unification, and unlike the UAR of 1958 it was not presented as a first step to greater A rab unity. In the 1970s, E gypt, under N asser the standard bearer of Pan-A rabism, also pioneered the way away from it, to a more pragmatic policy. T he main key words in this context were the expulsion of the S oviet advisors and the pro-Western re-orientation of her foreign policy, the gradual opening and privatizing of the economy and not the least the Camp David T reaty with Israel in 1979. T he peace with Israel led to the temporary exclusion from the A rab L eague – instead of being united, the A rab World was utterly divided. A rab state leaders stopped talking about Pan-Arabism. For many years only Libya’s Gaddafi went on – only to shift to Pan-A fricanism at the end of the century. H owever, in some intellectual circles the ideological dream of one big nation has survived, albeit with little impact. A lso economic integration, in spite of some openings, has remained low. A t the beginning of the 21st century, trade among the countries of N orth A frica and the Middle E ast only amounts to about 5 percent of the GDP of the region (E uropean Central Bank 2004, 71). We might end the story here and adhere to the verdict of the Economist (2001): “A rab summit meetings are notoriously long on talk and short on substance.”

Introduction

H owever, this would be too simple. O n the one hand, many intellectuals actually live in a Pan-A rab reality: T hey write in journals that are read “from the O cean to the Gulf”, they meet in conferences all over the A rab World (Kramer 1993, 194). T he TV station A l-Jazeera, founded in 1996, has a truly Pan-A rabic audience – and for the first time TV watchers got an opportunity to see Arabic programs which were not under the control of their own governments. F urthermore, the A rab L eague, now with 22 member states, did not become a federation, but it did produce some results. It has assisted in shaping school curricula, supported literacy campaigns, encouraged youth and sports programs, preserved old manuscripts and organized translations of modern technological terminology. T his was practical Pan-A rabism, albeit on a smaller scale. A s already mentioned, the members states were at times able to agree on common political positions, such as the A rab Peace Initiative, adopted at the Beyrouth summit in 2002 and endorsed again in R iyadh in 2007. It also built up a series of sub-organizations such as an A rab A ir Carriers O rganization, the International Confederation of A rab T rade Unions, or the A rab Monetary F und. A t the summit of A mman in 1997, 17 member states adopted a declaration on a Greater A rab F ree T rade A rea (GAFTA ), essentially a program of mutual tariff reductions. A corresponding treaty came into force in 2005. Progress has been somewhat limited, not the least because the treaty does not specify precisely enough which products can be exempted from the liberalization program. T he participating countries submitted a list of almost 600 commodities where the rules of free trade should not apply. E nforcement mechanisms are also week (Miller and Mishrif 2005, 15f), but some tariff reductions have taken place, and more are likely to come. F urthermore, there are some promising initiatives which comprise sub-groups of the A rab world. O ne is the A gadir A greement on F ree T rade, more comprehensive than the GAFTA agreement and signed and ratified by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. T hese are also the countries which have made most efforts towards opening their economies, and they have shown the most interest in cooperation with the E U. T he E uropean Union actively supports the A gadir process. A nother promising initiative is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981 and comprising six A rab countries at the Persia Gulf, with the secretariat in R iyad. S o far this is the most advanced arrangement in the A rab World. A customs union could be established in 2003, and currently the member states are set to progress to monetary union by 2010 (E uropean Central Bank 2004, 71). In general, the prospect of more practical cooperation and also some more institutionalized integration in the A rab world is perhaps better than previously, due to the turn away from ideological Pan-A rabism to more pragmatic politics and more open borders. T he communality of language and religion is likely to support trade, investment and migration, the more open the borders become. S ome spill-over effects from this type of transaction into the political sphere are likely. H owever, progress towards integration, if it comes, will presumably rather happen


with smaller groupings such as the A gadir group or the Gulf Cooperation Council and only to very limited extent at the level of the A rab L eague. Pan-Africanism and its Re-Launch T he other grand project which has had an impact on the Mediterranean Basin has been Pan-A fricanism. T he overall assessment can perhaps be somewhat similar to Pan-A rabism: T he practical results have been much more modest than the pioneers have hoped for, and as a combative, anti-imperialist ideology, as voiced for example, by Ghana’s Kwame N krumah, in parallel with N asser’s version of Pan-A rabism, it is practically dead. H owever, efforts towards A frican integration increased significantly at the turn of the millennium and more progress is likely to come. African politicians faced similar obstacles to unification as their Arab colleagues when independence came. A s Julius N yerere explained in 1997 (N yerere 2006, 22): Prior to the independence of T anganyika, I had been advocating that the E ast A frican countries should federate and then achieve independence as a single political unit. I had said publicly that I was willing to delay T anganyika’s independence in order to enable all the three mainland countries to achieve their independence together as a single federated state. I made the suggestion because of my fear – proved correct by later events – that it would be very difficult to unite our countries if we let them achieve independence separately. Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats of the United N ations, and individuals entitled to a 21-gun salute, not to speak of a host of ministers, prime ministers and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping A frica balkanised.

Nyerere’s observation seems to fit other areas of Africa as well. The idea of giving united independence to five French West African territories was soon destroyed by Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast (Duffield 1984, 120f). Only a rump federation of S oudan (Mali) and S enegal existed shortly in 1960 but fell apart quickly. In British West A frica there were several regional arrangements at the time of independence: T he West A frican Currency Board, West A frican Court of A ppeals, West A frican Cocoa R esearch Institute, West A frican A irways Cooperation. T hey were soon abolished. Interestingly, this was mainly the work of Ghana’s Kwame N krumah, otherwise perhaps the most vocal proponent of Pan-A fricanism. N krumah argued that regional arrangements were antithetical to real Pan-A fricanism. In E ast A frica politicians such as Uganda’s Milton O bote argued and acted in a similar way (Duffield 1984, 124). From a European point of view these arguments were strange, given the point that in E urope integration was pioneered by a few countries which took concrete steps towards integration

Introduction

in limited functional fields (see below). They thereby paved the way to the larger and much closer union of today. In 1963, the by then independent A frican countries founded the O rganization of African Unity OAU). The defining idea was African unity on a continental scale. T his was a substantial turn of Pan-A fricanism, previously a movement of black solidarity on a racial basis. Black A frican and A rab relations have suffered from heavy historical burdens such as slavery (they partly do so today, slavery is not yet extinct). However, the OAU bridged this divide, all five North African countries joined. T he common historical experience of colonialism (and the alleged necessity to stand united against the former colonizers) was evoked as a basis for a continental A frican unity. However, the common experience of colonialism was not sufficient when it came to formulating a positive program of common action. Given the point that the ruling elites of the countries had no inclination to share power, the OA U, as the A rab L eague before, could only be constructed as a strictly intergovernmental body, as a forum of deliberation and bargaining, but with no supranational competencies. In all respects, the A frican countries went into diverging directions. Most former F rench West A frican countries kept close ties with Paris and maintained for instance their currency unions with F rance (the franc CFA , technically two arrangements). Many other countries, for instance Ghana, opted for “anti-imperialism” and experimented with socialism and import-substitution strategies (with results as disastrous as in N orth A frica, see Chapter 6). S till in 1987 seven sub-S aharan countries could be categorized as socialist systems (Z ank 2007, 23). T his implied as everywhere little cooperation with the neighbors. Botswana remained democratic the whole period after independence, some other countries, for example, Ghana, regained democracy, but many others fell pray to dictatorship or authoritarian rule. S till others disintegrated into failed states. A gainst the background of such heterogeneity, it cannot come as a surprise that the OA U did not make much progress. It cannot be said that it did not have practical impact. It could, for instance, organize some common support for independence movements in the Portuguese colonies or for the AN C in S outh A frica under apartheid. But these were actions against outer enemies, they did not bring about much integration. From 1999 onwards, however, African unification experienced a kind of renaissance, which in a comparatively short span of time led to the replacing of the OA U by the much more promising A frican Union (A U). T he “renaissance” came about mainly due to the initiatives of S outh A frica’s T habo Mbeki and N igeria’s O lusegun O basanjo. In his efforts to reshape the A frican image, not the least with a view to investment, Mbeki made the promotion of democracy a key aspect of S outh A frica’s foreign policy (T ieku 2004, 254). T his left its impact on the Constitutive A ct of the A U. With a different emphasis, but perfectly compatible with Mbeki’s Morocco left in 1984 because the OA U did not recognize her occupation of West S ahara and sided with the Polisario.

10


view, O basanjo was concerned with security and stability as common A frican problems. But interestingly, also Gaddafi belonged to the pioneers of the relaunch. H e invited for instance the A frican leaders to an extraordinary summit in S irte, in September 1999. Gaddafi wanted to overcome Libya’s isolation, into which he had brought the country by his support for terrorism. T he other A rab leaders had not shown much support for him, so Gaddafi turned Pan-African (Tieku 2004, 261). With his high-flying and at times harshly “anti-imperialist” rhetoric and with his ideas about the “United S tates of A frica”, he is perhaps the last ruling representative of the ideological Pan-A fricanism of previous decades. The AU was officially inaugurated in Durban on 9 July 2002. As the only A frican state Morocco stayed outside, but it has, however, developed some patterns of cooperation. T he A U is still essentially an intergovernmental organization, but it has more competences than the OA U, and furthermore, some arrangements at least have a supranational potential. Its institutional set-up resembles in many aspects the E uropean Union, the linguistic similarity between A U and E U being no coincidence. The EU also provides financial assistance to the institutions of the A frican Union and supports the A U peace-keeping forces. T he “supreme organ” of the A U is the A ssembly where the heads of states and governments meet at least once a year. More specified issues such as transport or trade are dealt with at the E xecutive Council where ministers meet. T hese meetings are prepared by a Committee of Permanent R epresentatives who are nominated by the governments. A n A frican Commission, seated in A ddis A baba, manages the administrative issues of the A U. A parliament and an E conomic, S ocial and Cultural Council have advisory rules. T he principle of non-interference into member states affairs was retained, but Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU contains an important modification, stating a “right of the Union to intervene in a Member S tate pursuant a decision of the A ssembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. T he Peace and S ecurity Council of the A U, with 15 elected members, can direct peacekeeping operations. F urthermore, the A frican leaders endorsed the strategy of a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPA D) as an A U initiative. Part of it is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APR M). T hereby the governance of A frican countries can be made subject to official scrutiny – a significant departure from the official indifference which was practiced in the times of the OA U (Z ank 2007, 4). T he E U Commission wrote in 2005 (E uropean Commission, 2): “A frica is on the move … T he birth of the A frican Union (A U) and NEPA D, the reinforced role of A frica’s R egional E conomic Communities (RE Cs) and the emergence of a new generation of leaders at national level have changed A frica.” T his is certainly true. T he more robust structure of the A U gives a more stable frame for negotiations and deliberations. In 2005, the A U suspended Mauretania’s membership after a military coup. T his decision contributed perhaps to the government accepting elections in 2007. In 2005, an A U peace-keeping force was sent to Darfur, and in 2007 Ugandan troops arrived in Somalia, as the first wave of an AU force.

Introduction

11

Consequently, the AU has produced the first results. However, there are still severe limitations. Unlike the EU, there is no field of policy where the African states explicitly have transferred sovereignty to the A U level. T he parliament cannot make laws; its role is only advisory. A mechanism such as the Peer R eview Mechanism is voluntary, so many countries simply abstain. A n A frican Court of Justice is planned, but it is hard to imagine that it will be empowered to make binding decisions in the near future. Consequently, when compared with the E U, the level of integration is low. But it does not have to remain so. A s in the A rab world, economic integration is not very developed. T he A frican countries export to the rest of the world, but they do not trade with each other, S outh A frica and her neighbors being somewhat the exceptions. T he transactions among A frican countries will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5. T here is a range of regional arrangements, fourteen so far, which should promote closer cooperation, for instance E CO WAS in West A frica and SA DC in southern A frica. But most of them suffer from non-compliance, institutional weakness and often bad governance in the member states. 47 of the 53 A U members are actually members of more than one regional arrangement, up to three or four. T his produces many inconsistencies and conflicts. A relative success story, however, has been the three monetary unions, i.e. the two CFA unions and the Common Monetary Area in South Africa. These countries have benefited from lower inflation, lower interest rates and smaller inflation differentials in comparison with other parts of A frica (E uropean Central Bank 2004, 72). Interestingly, the CFA unions were often denounced as relicts of colonialisms, and they suffered defection of some countries after independence. But in the 1980s and 1990s, they have experienced some enlargement: Mali rejoined in 1984, E quatorial Guinea, formerly S panish, joined in 1985, and in 1997 the former Portuguese colony Guinea Bissao adhered. T hese were actually some of the few real advances in economic integration so far. The economic balkanization of Africa has often been identified as a serious development obstacle, not the least by the E U. T he traditional preferential trade agreements became incompatible with the WTO standards, and by 1 January 2008 they had to be replaced. T he E U proposed a combination of targeted support and free-trade agreements with groups of African, Pacific and Caribbean States, socalled E conomic Partnership A greements (EPA ). A ccording to these the A frican countries should open their markets for 80 percent of the commodities over 15 years (Mandelson 2007, 1). T he E U has already made 99.5 percent of their exports exempt from all duties and quotas (Mandelson 2008, 1). A n EPA would open these countries more towards the E U and the world at large, but also, and crucially, towards the neighboring countries in the group. H owever, such an EPA agreement could only be signed with the Caribbean states before deadline. In the other cases only interim agreements are in place so far. S upposedly, they will lead to proper regional EPA s: Pushed by the E U, some A frican states will presumably make real progress towards economic cooperation with their neighbors.

12


The Many Faces of Islamism In relation to Pan-A rabism and Pan-A fricanism, Islamism sits somewhat oddly. We can define it as an overarching category which groups a huge variety of movements and policies under one heading. T hey have a program of transforming their societies along the rules of Islamic law in common. Islamism is therefore first and foremost about internal politics within Muslim countries, not necessarily about regional integration. H owever, asserting a Muslim identity also implies strengthening the importance of the “imagined community” of the Muslims of the world. T his community is congruent with neither continental A frica nor the A rab L eague. F urthermore, Islamist governments such as S audi A rabia have actively worked for more cooperation among the Muslim countries so the idea has had practical results. It produced institutionalized cooperation, albeit in a strictly intergovernmental form, in the above-mentioned O rganization of the Islamic Conference with its 57 member countries and numerous sub-organizations and committees. F urthermore, some movements have endeavored at making the Muslims of the world unite in common actions such as the Jihad against S oviet troops in A fghanistan, and organizations such as H izb ut-T ahrir work for the re-establishment of the caliphate, uniting all Muslims under one spiritual and worldly leadership: A truly ambitious project, the immensity of space and populations taken into consideration. In many countries Islamists have attained dramatic success. Many governments changed legislation along Islamist lines, and Islamist movements could gain widespread popular support. Comparatively small extremist groups have organized acts of horrible terrorism, in A lgiers, Cairo and Baghdad as in Paris, L ondon or N ew York. Islamism has often been perceived as being radically anti-Western, and in numerous cases it has been so. Directly and explicitly, or at least implicitly when introducing legislation which has been contrary to basic Western values, for instance in the field of gender equality. Anti-Western Islamism has perhaps not been very successful at building bridges among Muslims. But it could at least obstruct the cooperation of Muslims with the US or with E urope. S o in our context, is Islamism mainly a divisive force, set to fuel the “Clash of Civilizations”? H owever, perhaps it is important to emphasize how heterogeneous Islamist movements and policies actually are. T he most spectacular case was presumably the Iranian revolution in 1979. A pro-A merican despot was downed by a popular insurrection and replaced by an anti-A merican theocracy. H owever, no other Muslim country experienced something similar. T he revolution could win because for a crucial span of time very heterogeneous forces acted in unison under Khomeini’s leadership: Islamist intellectuals, pious bourgeoisie and impoverished urban youth (Kepel 2003, 179). O nly after the revolution, when the new power structures were in place, did this coalition fall apart. T he Iranian success at coalition building in 1979 could not be repeated elsewhere. Benedict A nderson introduced this term in order to characterize national communities.

Introduction

13

We find a very different type of Islamism in power in Saudi Arabia. In this case a traditional autocracy has built its legitimacy on Wahhabitism, a local and very strict variant of Islam. A fter 1973, the S audi government could endow Wahhabitism with an unprecedented international standing, thereby buttressing its claim that the S audi way of interpreting the holy scripts is the authentic one. The Saudis could gain influence by spending billions of petrodollars on proselyte activities. F urthermore, they controlled the holy places of Mecca and Medina. In addition, many migrants came to S audi A rabia, experienced relative wealth and became pious in a S audi way (Kepel 2003, 117–23). T he relation between R iyadh and T eheran can best be described as cold war, S audi A rabia having done its best to contain the Iranian revolution. T his shows that Islamism in power has actually been a divisive force among Muslims, due to the heterogeneity of Islam and Islamism. Perhaps remarkable from a Western point of view: T he S audi variant of Islamism is utterly undemocratic, and it has led to human rights abuses on a large scale. But it has been perfectly compatible with a pro-Western, not the least pro-US foreign policy. Yet another different case is Pakistan. In 1979, the year of the Iranian revolution, the military dictatorship under General Z ia ul-H aq introduced a wide range of S haria legislation. In this case the ruling elite used Islamism in order to garner support and legitimacy among Islamist intellectuals and the pious bourgeoisie (Kepel 2003, 161f). A lso this type of human-rights violating Islamism has been compatible with a pro-Western foreign policy. In Malaysia Islamist legislation was mainly an exercise in order to discipline and integrate the poorer Muslim population into Malaysian society where Indians and in particularly the Chinese have been privileged. T he Islamization of the Malaysian banking sector can perhaps best be seen as a business gimmick, in order to channel the savings of Muslims away from foreign banks and into those under the control of the Mahathir government (Kepel 2003, 147–61). If we now refocus on the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean: In all of these countries, from T urkey to Morocco, there have been strong Islamist movements. In T urkey they won the elections and formed a constitutional government, and in the Gaza S trip H amas, backed by an election victory, could seize power. A lso in other cases Islamists faired strongly at elections. T he A lgerian Front Islamique du Salut actually won the first round of the parliamentary elections in 1991; in January 1992 the second round was cancelled by the intervention of the military. The Islamist movements experienced a breakthrough towards mass influence in the 1970s. In the literature this is often attributed to the military disaster of 1967 against Israel which discredited the secular regimes. I find this thesis only partially convincing. Certainly, the defeat discredited Pan-A rab leaders. But after 1973, A nwar el-S adad could let himself be celebrated as the “H ero of the Crossing”, and he regained S inai. A nd how could the war in 1967 have destabilized the A lgerian regime which did not participate in it? Besides, in A lgeria Islamists began to radically oppose the regime comparatively late, after 1982 (Kepel 2003, 260);

14


they gained mass influence after the revolt of October 1988. From my point of the view the economic collapse of A rab socialism has been much more important than the war of 1967. A fter all, these regimes, in A lgeria and elsewhere, strangled economic growth and were helpless in the face of unbearable social problems in the overcrowded urban agglomerations. T hey led their countries into bankruptcy and were at the same time repressive and corrupt (we discuss the economic problems in more detail in Chapter 6). S mall wonder that these conditions resulted in widespread discontent and hatred. Islamism could give a voice to this: T he regimes have brought misery because they have betrayed Islam by worshipping secularism or imported ideas such as socialism. S ayyif Qutb, an E gyptian Islamist ideologue whom N asser let execute in 1966, stated that Pan-A rabism was deeply un-Islamic because the A rabs have no privileged standing within the wide family of Islam; the A rab revolt of 1916 against O ttoman rule had already been an error because the A rabs sided with the British against their T urkish fellow Muslims (Kramer 1993, 192f). Islamists could thereby explain the depressing social conditions and offer seemingly authentic, i.e. not imported solutions. F urthermore, the Islamists actively dealt with social problems and organized support on a large scale whereas the state bureaucracies were passive. T he autocratic regimes had to embark on a (often slow and inconsistent) reform course, politically and economically, but they stayed in power. T he overall picture in the A rab countries is a remarkable stability of autocratic rule, with the exception of L ebanon. R epression to various degrees played an important role. H owever, it would be too simple to attribute the survival of the regimes to repression alone. O n the one hand, they introduced some doses of Islamism in their own policies, in order to take the wind out of the opposition’s sail. F urthermore, the Islamist movements faced grave problems in maintaining unity because they were composed of very heterogeneous components. T he A lgerian FIS , for instance, was already on the decline when the military intervened, and it disintegrated the following years (Kepel 2003, 395–97). T he actions of horrible terrorism to which radical Islamist groups resorted, from Casablanca to Cairo, could only alienate large sections of the pious populations from Islamism. In general, the 1990s were not goods years from an Islamist point of view. What seemed to be success at the first glance, such as the Islamist take-over in S udan by means of a military coup, and the conquest of Kabul by the various A fghan Islamists groups, contributed heavily to discrediting Islamism; at the turn of the millennium, the movement was in a deep crisis. T hese were at least the conclusions of one of its most renowned thinkers, A bdel Wahhab al E ffendi (Kepel 2003, 557). T urkish Islamism turned out to be a particularly interesting case. E fforts to create an Islamist party date back to 1970 when N ecmetin E rbakan founded the Party of N ational O rder. It was dissolved by the authorities the following year, an experience E rbakan had to gain three times. H e was in favor of industrialization, but also openly hostile towards the West, in particular the E uropean E conomic Union, which in his view represented the trinity of F reemasonry, Jewishness and Z ionism (Kepel 2003, 530). O ther Islamists simply perceived it as a Christian

Introduction

15

club. When he was prime minister in 1996, E rbakan did his best to create an “Islamic Common Market”, a program which the Islamist E mployers’ A ssociation Müsiad had proposed for many years. A ccompanied by a strong Müsiad delegation E rbakan travelled to Iran and Indonesia, to N igeria, E gypt and L ibya. With no success (Kepel 2003, 546). H owever, when the Islamists came to power again in 2002, now as the Justice and Development Party (its T urkish acronym being A KP) under T ayyip E rdogan, one of its priorities was to pave the road towards E U membership. T he A KP has been an ardent champion of democratization, and it reformed T urkish legislation considerably in this sense – often against the stiff resistance of the traditionalist Kemalist establishment. T his remarkable metamorphosis of an Islamist movement into a pro-democracy and pro-E uropean force will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 3. H ere we may ask: Is the T urkish A KP but a particular case, due to the specifics of the Turkish situation? Or are similar developments possible in the other southern and eastern Mediterranean countries? A re they perhaps already under way? A n optimist (from a Western point of view) may point at the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Dévelopment, which presents itself, many say: convincingly, as a moderate and democratic party, and which actually bears the same name as the T urkish A KP. A lso other Islamist movements claim to be democratic. Many observers inside and outside these countries remain highly skeptical (see Chapter 2). S till, do we perhaps witness a process which is similar to the Communist Parties of Italy, F rance or S pain, once being S talinist F undamentalists, but becoming genuine democrats later on? At any rate, in my view the Turkish AKP is the final refutation of the hypothesis that democracy and Islam are necessarily antipodes, allegedly due to some intrinsic and immovable characteristics of Islam. T he point that a political party is inspired by religious thinking should not in itself create democratic problems. A fter all, E uropean countries such as Belgium, Germany or Italy have been governed by religiously-inspired parties for decades. T he crucial point is, of course, whether a religiously-inspired party respects constitutional rules. More specifically in our context, the question whether Islamism can become a constitutional and, if not pro-E uropean, then at least not anti-E uropean force, is perhaps the key question when it comes to the problem of whether or not we can expect more cooperation or more clashes across the Mediterranean. European Integration along and across the Mediterranean Sea F inally, the project of E uropean integration has had an impact on the Mediterranean Basin. Mainly on the northern shores, but to quite some extent also on the southern and eastern countries. In stark contrast to the A rab L eague, the A frican Union or the O rganization of the Islamic Conference, the E U has widely progressed to a kind of federation where substantial policy fields have been transferred to a supranational level. T his E U level of competencies pertained originally mainly to the economic

16


sphere, in particular to problems of the common market and consequently common external commercial policy. But every treaty revision brought an extension of the supranational sphere, for instance to the fields of migration and asylum policy. O n this supranational level there exists a bicameral legislative system where the council of ministers represents the member states and the E uropean parliament the population at large. In the council Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) has replaced the principle of unanimity in most cases, i.e. single member states do not have a veto position any more. E U legislation is superior to national legislation, and it has direct effect for the citizens; they can go to court if their rights according to E U law are infringed. T he E U Commission has a monopoly of initiating legislation in most fields. It shall perform the role of a strategic thinker, but it also fulfills administrative tasks. A E uropean Court of Justice can effectively decide disputes over the interpretation of E U law. It thereby interferes deeply with the internal affairs of the member states. Most member states participate by now in the E conomic and Monetary Union (E MU), share one currency and have delegated monetary policy to the E uropean Central Bank (E CB). H owever, when it comes to the Common F oreign and S ecurity Policy (CFSP ) and the E uropean S ecurity and Defence Policy (ES DP), cooperation is still mainly intergovernmental. In case the Lisbon Treaty becomes ratified, CFSP and ESDP will become fully incorporated into a unified treaty structure. But strategic decisions will still require unanimity, and the role of the Parliament or the Court of Justice will remain rather weak (albeit somewhat strengthened in comparison with the N ice T reaty of 2001). T he E U will get a kind of foreign minister, although the position will not be called so anymore, after the F rench and Dutch voters trashed the original Constitutional T reaty. T he creation of an E U diplomatic service is also part of the reform, and the central institutions of the E U will get a greater say in foreign policy. But it will still remain essentially intergovernmental. In some cases the E U could formulate a common strategy, for instance towards A frica. It has also successfully organized a number of peace-keeping missions, from Macedonia and Congo to A ceh, Indonesia. H owever, E U strategies are rather broad guidelines, and in numerous fields there is no EU policy at all. This makes EU foreign policy much less integrated than economic policy, a point which has often created inconsistencies. O n many occasions ambitious national leaders have started solo initiatives, which could create irritations, to say the least, because they do not seem to rhyme with the task of finding common EU solutions. One example was the project of a “Mediterranean Union”, forwarded by N ikolas S arkozy during the F rench presidential election campaign. A ccording to his original ideas, it should comprise only the countries bordering the Mediterranean, and should have regular institutions of its own. Many politicians feared it might undermine common E U policies such as the Barcelona Process or the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy. O thers saw it mainly as a device to create “something” which could serve as an alternative to T urkish E U membership. In March 2008 the German Chancellor A ngela Merkel and others could make S arkozy declare that the Mediterranean Union would include all E U member states, not only the Mediterranean ones, and

Introduction

17

that it would develop within the frame of the Barcelona Process. T his meant a substantial down-grading if compared with S arkozy’s original rhetoric. A t the time of writing (May 2008) the character of the intended MU is still unclear. It seems it will be nothing but a regular summit where the heads of state and governments, plus working groups at lower levels – something which the Barcelona process has been already providing for. A t times some E U countries actually worked against each other, the most drastic example being the US -led invasion of Iraq in 2003. H owever, all in all, the area of common E U foreign policy has been expanding, stronger institutions and decision-making procedures have evolved, and capabilities have been growing. We might say that the E U is in the process of “hardening” into a foreign political actor. In a comparative international perspective the E U is the project of regional integration which has progressed most, by far. N ot one member has ever left; on the contrary, there has always been a queue of membership hopefuls, and the constitutional structure of the E U has proven to be basically stable. In our context perhaps particularly important: T he E U members have been democratic constitutional states right from the beginning, i.e. the E uropean Coal and S teel Community of 1952. Democracy and rule by law have also been conditions for new members. During the first enlargement with the UK, Ireland and Denmark it was not necessary to emphasize this. But in A pril 1978 the E uropean Council made this point explicit and declared that “respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member S tate are essential elements of membership in the E uropean Communities” (S mith 2003, 109f). T his was a signal to the new democracies of Portugal, S pain and Greece that they had a membership perspective, provided they consolidated democracy. Because of the basic characteristics of democratic constitutional law, every step of E uropean integration needed an unbroken chain of democratic legitimacy from democratically elected parliaments. T he whole E U construction had to be in concordance with the principles of democratic legitimacy and rule by law. In this context democracy and rule by law are seen essentially as a question of rules, in the tradition of Max Weber: F reely elected representative bodies make the laws and can transfer sovereignty to a supranational level, whose institutions again have democratic legitimacy, either directly, such as the E uropean Parliament, or indirectly because democratically elected national governments have appointed them. Democratic legitimacy of this kind has proven to be an enormous factor for stability, for nation states and for the E U. A different question is, of course, whether the decision-making procedures in modern states or in the E U correspond to an ideal of democracy in the sense of “rule by the people”, participation of the citizens etc. T here has been a long discussion about a “democratic deficit” of the EU, not the least due to its complicated structure which makes it very difficult for citizens to follow what is going on. But this does not alter the fact that all E U decisions are ultimately based on an unbroken chain of procedural democratic legitimization.

18


T his made the E U a very different type of integration than the United A rab R epublic of 1958–61. T he UAR was, it is true, legitimized by a referendum, but the result was an autocratic structure. T he principle of democracy has also marked a stark contrast to the OA U (and still the A U) where dictators of all kinds have been welcome. In contrast to the A rab L eague or OA U, the E U member countries shared a basic consensus on economic policy right from the beginning: T hey have all been open market economies. T here have been many differences in, for example, tax policy or social-policy arrangements. But these were but variations of a basic model which we might call “capitalism-cum-welfare-state”. T he basic consensus among the E U countries has actually expanded over time and became in many respects institutionalized or even “treatyfied”. This pertains for instance to price stability as the overarching aim of monetary policy. T he binding rules which govern the Internal Market are very detailed by now. Open market economies have a strong tendency to integrate. Efficiency and thus profitability can be enhanced by sophisticated international divisions of labor. O pen market economies have therefore turned increasingly interdependent. T his could be seen worldwide. In a setting such as the E U it has reinforced the drive for more integration, for instance, when the business community demanded common action in order to remove trade obstacles. It was exactly the program of establishing the Internal Market without non-tariff barriers which paved the way to the effective transition from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the council. Once the principle of free movement of persons was established, a common policy on asylum and migration became almost a necessity. Intergovernmental arrangements could not solve this problem, so it had to be managed at the supranational level (H ix 2005, 353–6). T hese types of spill-over effects can hardly explain E uropean integration completely. But they have added much to its momentum. By contrast, the protectionist bureaucratic systems which many A rab and A frican countries adopted after independence isolated them from each other. T he E uropean Union gradually expanded along the shores of the Mediterranean Basin. F rance and Italy belonged to the group of six who in 1951 signed the T reaty of Paris and established the E uropean Coal and S teel Community (E CS C). T he same group founded the E uropean E conomic Communities (T reaty of R ome, 1957). Greece joined in 1981; Portugal and S pain did so in 1986. T hereby important markets for the countries of the other side of the Mediterranean became regulated by the E U. F urthermore, the new countries, S pain in particular, endeavored to T he case with the A U is slightly ironic, because in 2002 all A frican countries were accepted as members, they being dictatorships or not. But when Mauritania thereafter shifted to dictatorship by military coup, its membership was suspended. T his also holds for the countries which have not joined the E MU, such as S weden or the UK. F or the sake of simplicity I write the E uropean Union, although for many years it was a E uropean E conomic Community.

Introduction

19

place Mediterranean problems on the E U agenda. T he Barcelona Conference in 1995 was a major result in this context. T he big enlargement of 2004 brought Cyprus, Malta and S lovenia into the club. Malta may serve as an example for the long-term attraction of the E U: Its native language has been S emitic, and in the 1970s Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, in symbolic solidarity, made teaching in Arabic obligatory. Colonel Gaddafi proposed unification with Libya. But the EU won over T hird-Worldism. T he case of T urkey is particularly interesting. A lready in 1963, the E U countries declared her to be a potential member. But the question practically passed into oblivion, not the least because of military coups in A nkara. In 1999, however, the European Council (again) officially declared Turkey to be a candidate country, to be assessed by the same criteria as the accession countries of central and E astern E urope. F inally in 2005 accession negotiations were opened. T here is considerable resistance against T urkish membership in many E U countries. H owever, given the point that the membership promise was given repeatedly by the highest institution of the E U, and also taking into consideration that T urkey actually has made dramatic, though not yet sufficient progress towards fulfilling the criteria, I find it highly likely that T urkey will become a member. It is also in itself remarkable that a democratically elected and re-elected T urkish government under Islamist leadership actually wants membership. In this big Islamic country the attraction of E urope is stronger than any form of Muslim identity or Pan-T urkism. Will the process stop there? Morocco applied in 1987 and was rejected. Will she apply again? T he possibility or even probability that she will do so in the future has been repeatedly discussed off the record, and R abat has followed a conspicuously pro-E uropean course. What about Israel? T he idea has already been voiced in the Israeli Press. If these are speculations about the future: T he E U has already had a rather strong impact on the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. F or instance, N orth A frican countries have had more transactions with E urope than with other A frican countries (see Chapter 5). A nd in the context of the Barcelona Process rather dense networks of dialogue and cooperation have been established. When launching the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy (ENP ) in 2004, the E U promised these countries cooperation and aid across practically all issues, and not the least a “stake in the Internal Market”. E U market regulations and product standards are often highly complex. When non-E U countries want to export to the E U, they have to adopt these standards. T his means that they have to adapt their legal and administrative systems. E uropean tourists come to these countries in huge numbers and they presumably bring along lots of cultural contraband. However, it would be erroneous to see this exclusively as a one-way traffic where the EU influences the Muslim countries, but no influence the other way round. E conomic cooperation implies a two-sided partnership. Many Muslim immigrants work in E U countries, thereby contributing to their material wealth and their cultural richness but also giving rise to xenophobic sentiments. T he prospect of T urkish membership has been the subject of engaged debates, and

20


it forces upon the E U a thorough-going debate about its own character. Ideas about Christianity as the cultural basis of E uropean Integration, as voiced, for example, by the pope and many Christian Democrats, are severely challenged by this prospect. In general, more interaction between the Muslim World and E urope might create mutual irritations and controversies, for instance about headscarves in F rench schools or about cartoons of Prophet Mohammed in Danish papers. The Contributions in this Book A s this short overview has shown, the problems of overlapping identities and integration processes are complex. We cannot claim to have comprehensive answers at hand. But we can offer some perspectives on the matter from various angles. T he next two chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, deal with the development of Islamism. A s we have seen, this phenomenon occupies a central place when it comes to the question of whether we can expect closer cooperation across the Mediterranean or not. F rancesco Cavatorta, Dublin and Damascus, sees a “Clash of Civilizations” inside the countries of N orth A frica and the Middle E ast, more precisely a conflict between Islamist and secular Civil Society. In his view, this is closely linked to the failure of pro-democracy policies. In the literature the development of Civil S ociety is often depicted as one, not to say the decisive factor which brings about the transition of a country to democracy. But in N orth A frica and the Middle E ast (except T urkey) progress towards democracy seems to have stagnated. T his cannot be explained by a “weak” civil society; on the contrary, it is vibrant and dynamic. But in these countries civil society is divided between a secular and an Islamist part. T he forces of civil society can only rarely unite against the authoritarian regimes because their values are so fundamentally different. T hey are also deeply divided by mistrust, in particular on the secular side towards the Islamists. T he secular camp cannot properly press for free elections for fear that the Islamists would win and then suppress liberal values. Under this constellation the regimes can play the elements of civil society off against each other and perpetuate authoritarian rule. E uropean (and A merican) policies have actually made the situation worse because they one-sidedly supported the secular part of civil society. T hereby they deepened the cleavage inside Civil S ociety and unwillingly contributed to maintaining authoritarian rule. Ihsan Dagi, A nkara, is more optimistic on the behalf of democracy. H e writes about the Islamic E lite in T urkey and the West. A t least in T urkey, Islamism has proven to be dynamic. O riginally, also in the O ttoman E mpire and then T urkey Islamist thinkers had an anti-Western outlook. T hey perceived concepts such as democracy or human rights as anti-Islamic. T his picture has, however, changed dramatically. Islamist intellectuals began to differentiate between the West as such and the oppressive form of Westernization, as practiced by the Kemalists from 1923 onwards. In the 1990s, Islamist thinkers increasingly perceived the E uropean Union and its support for human rights as an ally against the repressive traits of the

Introduction

21

old regime. T he A KP became the major political force to drive forward the process towards an application for E U membership and towards proper democracy. It initiated many reforms which aim at making Turkey fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, the Kemalists have turned into E U skeptics and try to conserve old power structures. T he T urkish developments are followed closely in many parts of the A rab world and have an impact on the whole region where similar trends can be seen. E xamples of cultural clashes regularly capture the headlines of the media. But there have also been many important initiatives to build bridges between cultures and religions. F or instance, 138 high-ranking Islamic religious leaders and scholars, among them two Iranian A yatollahs and the grand muftis of Bosnia, E gypt and R ussia, sent an open letter calling for dialogue with the Christians. Pope Benedict XVI invited representatives of the group to the V atican, to the rage of Islamist extremists (Dinmore 2007). T he E U Parliament declared 2008 to be the “Year of Intercultural Dialogue” and has started a raft of initiatives such as festivals or debates. T he most encompassing initiative of this kind is the “A lliance of Civilizations”, launched jointly by S pain and T urkey at the United N ations in 2004. T his is the subject of Chapter 4, written by Koussay Boulaich, S panish N ational A ssociation of Political S cience and S ociology, and S øren Dosenrode, A alborg University. A s the S panish Prime Minister Z apatero explained, “a wall of misunderstandings” might arise between the West and the A rab World, with a clash of civilizations as a consequence. UN Secretary Kofi Annan responded positively to the initiative and appointed a H igh L evel Group in order to analyze misunderstandings and to develop practical approaches to address this problem. T he Group forwarded a report in November 2006 and identified four axes of work: education, youth, immigration and the media. T he initiative has been maturing into institutionalization and practical activities. T he authors trace the development on the basis of original material such as interviews or working documents and present an assessment of the results so far. In Chapter 5 Søren Dosenrode looks at African unification and its obstacles. H e applies Karl Deutsch’s “transactionalism”, one of the classical integration theories. When introducing the theory he places particular emphasis on the factors which might lead to “security communities”. H is empirical material sheds light on the development of intra-regional trade and physical communication facilities. T hereafter, Dosenrode analyzes whether essential requirements of pluralistic security communities are in place (compatible values, responsiveness of governments to each other’s needs and predictability of government behavior). In general, conditions for a full-fledged continental African unity are not in place. In particular the divide between N orth A frica and S ub-S aharan A frica seems to be very difficult to bridge. The author proposes the construction of regional zones of peace as the way forward, starting with smaller groupings such as the S outh A frican Customs Union (SA CU). Whereas S øren Dosenrode looked at N orth A frica and the Mediterranean “from the south”, I (Wolfgang Z ank, A alborg) do so “from the N orth” in Chapter

22


6. But the views are quite compatible. I apply a long-term perspective and see a development of gradual “E uropeanization”, meaning a process which makes the societies of N orth A frica increasingly similar to those in E urope. T his has also led to an increasing cooperation between N orth A frica and the E U and its member states. In this perspective the turning point was the demise of “A rab S ocialism” and Import-S ubstitution S trategies and the gradual transition to open market economies. T his process is far from completed, in particular not so in A lgeria and L ibya, but it has in itself made the countries of N orth A frica more similar to the E uropean models. A t the same time it has led to increased cooperation, in particular in the economic sphere. During the 1990s, the social and economic development was disappointing but has become quite dynamic and sustainable during the last years. T he E U has supported this process, in the beginning mainly through preferential trade agreements, currently through the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy which encompasses wide policy fields. In particular Morocco and Tunisia have cooperated very closely with the E U. Many networks have been established. S o far progress towards democratization has been disappointing from a E uropean point of view, but processes of modernization and towards pluralism and rule by law are traceable. A t least under the perspective of modernization theories, in the medium term prospects for democracy seem to be good. T his would mean another important step on the way to more E uropeanization. A lso Peter S eebeck, Center for Middle E ast S tudies in O dense, has in Chapter 7 “a northern perspective”, but he points out different things than the author of the previous contribution. S eebeck focuses on the ability of the E uropean Union to influence matters as a foreign political actor on the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean S ea. Concrete political activities and not structural factors, as in the previous two contributions, are his subject. H e analyzes the policies of F rance, Germany and the United Kingdom towards Iraq, the Maghreb, the Mashreq and Turkey. In all these sub-regions he finds a substantial divergence of priorities and aims among the major E U powers. A s a consequence of this lack of unity, the E U has not been able to influence matters significantly, in spite of its position as the largest donor. T he insistence of the E U on democracy and human rights did not produce changes of the authoritarian political regimes; the E U remained “a payer and not a player”. T he differences between Chapters 6 and 7 when assessing the impact of the E U can perhaps be explained by the different character of the E U itself: H ighly integrated in terms of economic and external commercial policy, but still in the process of “hardening” into a foreign-policy actor. T he on-going interaction and even integration between E urope, N orth A frica and the Middle E ast also has an impact on the E U itself. In the view of Jakob F eldt, likewise Center for Middle E ast S tudies, O dense, the increasing networks of people, of economic transactions and policies do not create more understanding or community of purposes, as, for example, contended by Karl Deutsch (see Dosenrode’s contribution, Chapter 5). T he outcome can as easily be cultural polarization. N ot the least due to migration across the Mediterranean S ea (an important aspect of integration), notions of national and E uropean identities have

Introduction

23

become re-articulated during the last 10–15 years. A fter a theoretical discussion, mainly of authors such as Chantal Mouffe, R ichard R orty and Carl S chmidt, F eldt focuses on the Cartoon Crisis and its repercussions in Denmark. Concepts such as “Danishness” or “Danish values” have become strengthened and have left its political mark in re-definitions of citizenship. Of all the contributions in this volume, Chapter 8 places most emphasis on the “clash aspect” when civilizations overlap. In Chapter 9, I discuss similar problems as Jakob F eldt does. But I come to rather different conclusions: Cultural overlaps and integration have indeed often produced frictions, but these were usually temporary. A s the discussions at the Convention about the Constitutional Treaty have shown, it is not possible to define a E uropean identity on the basis of a particular cultural heritage or Christian values. Europe has always been culturally much diversified, and is so today. In contrast to previous times, there is today a basic consensus as regards some principles such as democratic procedures, rule by law or human rights. It is exactly this system of rules which allows actors of divergent backgrounds to cooperate. O nce these comparatively few principles are respected, integration and cooperation have become possible in spite of many cultural differences. A lso some Muslim countries have moved in this direction, T urkey did so the most. Modernization theory has predicted such moves. In case T urkey will reliably settle for democracy and rule by law, there is no reason not to accept her as an E U member. In contrast to Peter S eeberg in Chapter 8, I see this development as being highly likely. T he accession of T urkey will make the “true” character of the E U apparent, namely being a community based on some political and constitutional principles, but otherwise culturally open and diversified. In the last chapter I take up various threads of our problematique and try to combine them to a common picture. I land firmly on the side of “cooperation of civilizations”. T he considerations in this chapter are, of course, my own and not necessarily those of the other authors. References A rab L eague, Pact of the A rab L eague of S tates, http://www.mideastweb.org/ arableague.htm. Economist (2001), “T he A rabs’ chat-show”, 31 March, p. 39. Dinmore, Guy (2007), “Muslims further inter-faith dialogue”, Financial Times, 22 December, p. 4. Duffield, I. (1984), “Pan-Africanism since 1940”, Crowder, Michael (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 8 from c.1940 to c.1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 95–141. E tzioni, A mitai (2001), Political Union Revisited: On Building Super-National Communities (L anham, MD: L exington Books).

24


E uropean Central Bank (2004), “E conomic Integration in S elected R egions O utside the E uropean Union”, Monthly Bulletin, O ctober, pp. 67–84. E uropean Commission (2005), “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the E uropean Parliament and the E uropean E conomic and S ocial Committee”, EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development, Brussels, 12 October 2005, COM (2205) 489 final. Goldschmidt, Jr. A rthur, (1988), Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press). H eller, E . (1981), “Die arabisch-islamische Welt im A ufbruch”, Wolfgang Benz and H ermann Graml (eds), Weltprobleme zwischen den Machtblöcken. Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert III (Fischer Weltgeschichte Band 36), (F rankfurt-M.: F ischer T aschenbuch V erlag). H ix, S . (2005), The Political System of the European Union, second edition, (Basingstoke and N ew York: Palgrave). H roch, M. (1985), Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). H untington, S amuel P. (2002), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (L ondon: T he F ree Press, S imon & S chuster). Kepel, Gilles (2003), Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme (Paris: Gallimard). Kramer, M. (1993), “A rab N ationalism: Mistaken Identity”, Daedalus, S ummer, pp. 171–206. Mandelson, Peter (2007), S tatement by Commissioner Peter Mandelson following the General A ffairs and E xternal R elations Council (GAER C), Brussels, 10 December 2007. . Mandelson, Peter (2008), Peter Mandelson speaking to the E uropean Parliament Development Committee, Brussels, 28 January. . Mattioli, A . (2003), “E ntgrenzte Kriegsgewalt. Der italienische Giftgaseinsatz in A bessinien 1935–1936”, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3/2003, pp. 311–37. Miller, R . and A . Mishrif (2005), “T he Barcelona Process and E uro–A rab E conomic R elations: 1995–2005”, MERIA: The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 9, N o. 2, June). N yerere, J. (2006), “Without unity, there is no future for A frica”, New African, F ebruary, pp. 20–23. S mith, K.E . (2003), “T he E volution and A pplication of E U Membership Conditionality”, Cremona, M. (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (O xford: O xford University Press), pp. 105–40. T ieku, T .K. (2004), “E xplaining the Clash and A ccommodation of Interests of Major A ctors in the Creation of the A frican Union”, African Affairs, 103, pp. 249–67.

Introduction

25

Z ank, Wolfgang (2007), “A Comparative E uropean V iew on A frican Integration – Why it has been much more difficult in Africa”, CCIS Research Series, A alborg, 2007, 28 pp, .


Chapter 2

A Clash of Civilizations inside the MENA Countries? Islamist versus S ecular Civil S ociety and the F ailure of Pro-democracy Policies F rancesco Cavatorta

Introduction In a seminal article from 2003, Kupchan convincingly argued that “A merica today arguably has greater ability to shape the future of world politics than any other power in history” (Kupchan 2003, 205). While Kupchan went on to say that the United S tates was squandering this opportunity, the starting assumption retained its validity and underpinned the subsequent policy choices of the US administration with respect to the Middle E ast and the challenge of Islamist radicalism. T he decision to invade Iraq to transform the political, economic and institutional structures of the entire Middle E ast and N orth A frica (MENA ) rested precisely on the assumption that American power, and specifically hard power, was capable of such a feat if there were sufficient political will behind it. The hypothesis was that once Iraq had been conquered and S addam eliminated, the United S tates would set about constructing a new domestic order centred on the renaissance and development of Iraqi civil society. In turn, such a civil society would produce and strengthen democracy. T he failed Iraqi adventure proves that the original assumption, namely that A merica was all-powerful, has been wrong. In addition, it contributed to strengthening political authoritarianism in the region rather than weakening it, and it increased the appeal of Jihadism rather than defeating it. F inally, from the ashes of war and occupation, a liberal minded civil society did not develop. T he upshot of the failure of hard power to provoke a wave of democratizations in the MENA has been a partial embracing of the Bush administration of the concept and the practices of soft power (N ye 2004). In this respect, the United S tates seems to implicitly recognize that the E uropean Union’s approach to democratization in the Middle E ast and N orth A frica has had much greater potential for success as it was based on both long-term positive T his research has been made possible by a grant (number HR /05/20) from Irish A id, Department of F oreign A ffairs, Dublin, Ireland.

28


engagement with regimes in the region through multilateral frameworks and on the development and growth of an independent civil society. T he strengthening of the Middle E ast Partnership Initiative (MEPI ) and the launch of the Broad Middle E ast Initiative can be understood in this context, although they have so far failed to deliver (Dalacoura 2005). S ince the mid-1990s, the E uropean Union has for its part been promoting democratization, good governance, economic development and human rights through the E uro-Mediterranean partnership, launched in Barcelona in 1995. T he partnership was conceived as a framework within which the E uropean Union could engage A rab states (and Israel) to “make” them reform from within through positive financial inducements, material aid and osmosis of norms. An important pillar of the partnership was and still is the development of an independent civil society, which once solidified would make democratizing demands on the ruling elites and provoke an irreversible transition to democracy. Despite the amount of material resources and political capital invested in the partnership, the Barcelona process has failed to deliver when it comes to democratization, protection of human rights and good governance (Youngs 2003). If anything, some countries, such as T unisia and Morocco, are probably more authoritarian today than they were when the E uro-Med partnership was launched. T hus, some analysts argue that the “Barcelona process has been classified as a diplomatic rather than substantive success” (E chague and Youngs 2005, 234). T he failure of both hard power and soft power to achieve the stated objective of democratization in the area is a particularly interesting puzzle for both academics and policy-makers because it seems to suggest that external actors and their pro-democracy policies have no role to play in affecting the domestic game of democratization. O bviously, supporters of both strategies would claim that insufficient time has elapsed to draw final conclusions about their effectiveness or would argue that the two strategies have not been pursued with the necessary intensity to attain the goal. S uch arguments are, however, quite spurious. It is very difficult to see how the Iraqi adventure could have a positive outcome on processes of democratization in the region when it has radicalized both the MENA ruling elites clinging to power and the violent radical groups bent on overthrowing what they perceive to be absolutely illegitimate regimes, therefore turning the question of access to power into a zero-sum game. It is equally difficult to see how another decade of engagement through the E uro-Med Partnership or another similar institutional set-up (i.e. the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy) would resolve the glaring contradictions between goals and tactics that characterize such institutional arrangements. Both strategies, either by error or by design, neglect a number of important domestic factors that explain not only why they fail to generate sufficient momentum for genuine processes of transition to democracy, but are actually detrimental to their occurrence. T his paper focuses its attention on the promotion of civil society activism on the part of external actors in an effort not only to provoke change, but also with the objective of demonstrating that there is no

A Clash of Civilizations inside the MENA Countries?

29

clash of values, and therefore of civilizations, between the West and the Muslim world. F ar from arguing that external actors have no impact on the domestic game of democratization, this study argues that their influence is very important and structures the game in a critical manner. In particular, this research postulates that there is an over-reliance on a narrow conceptualization of civil society as an engine for democratic political transformation, which does not take into sufficient account the diverging interpretations of both the concept and the practice of it that exist among MENA domestic actors. In turn this leads to policies that reinforce the perception of the existence of a clash of civilizations rather than achieving the stated opposite goal. Pro-democracy strategies based on the development of civil society fail to generate the type of change that the promoters would like to see because they reinforce a domestic “clash of civilizations” between sectors of society with diverging and ultimately irreconcilable objectives. T he chapter draws empirical evidence from a number of countries in the region because the trend is quite similar across the Middle E ast and N orth A frica. H owever, such trend seems to be more pronounced in N orth A frica, particularly in the former F rench colonies. T his is possibly due to the fact that they have been very much involved in the E uro-Med Partnership, have a very high dependence on both the E uropean Union when it comes to foreign aid and trade and finally, have a strong secular intellectual legacy (laicité) left from the time of colonialism. Democratization and Civil Society: The Middle East and North Africa In western liberal thinking, civil society, understood as “the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market” (H awthorne 2004, 1), has a very close association with democracy and democratization (McL averty 2002). S tudies on processes of democratization often highlight the strong link between the growth in civil society activism and democratic transformations, pointing to the role of independent civil society organizations in demanding, through their ability to mobilize citizens, increased governmental accountability and significant institutional reforms on the basis of the rights of the individual. T hus, S ardamov (2005, 380) states that “building a robust civil society is […] postulated as a precondition for democratization and democratic consolidation.” S tudies on established democracies also point to the vitality of civil society activism as being central to the survival of democratic institutions. S cholars such as Putnam (2000) argue that a decrease in civil society activism and the consequent decrease in social capital lead to a weakening of trust and interest for democratic engagement. T he empirical evidence from E astern E urope and L atin A merica seems to support the notion that “without a well developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy” (E ntelis 1996, 45). T hus, the role of S olidarity in Poland, of the Civil F orums in H ungary and Czechoslovakia and of the trade unions in Chile

30


and A rgentina has been emphasized as being central to the process of transition to democracy in the respective countries. T he prominent role of civil society in explaining processes of democratization has come under critical scrutiny over the last decade, as a number of significant theoretical inconsistencies emerged (Carothers 1999/2000; E ncarnación 2006), and as the supporting empirical evidence was critically revisited (T empest 1997; Grugel 2000). Despite the emergence of such a literature, sceptical of both the theoretical validity of the concept of civil society and of its practical contribution to the policy processes involved in transitions, civil society remains a central feature in studies of democratization and in policy-making because it still seems very difficult to imagine a successful democracy or process of democratization that does not rest on a vibrant civil society. T hus, while the criticism of the concept and its employment has certainly been useful in highlighting problems and inconsistencies, civil society is still an important part of the story when it comes to analyzing how transitions might occur and develop. T his is particularly the case in the Middle East and North Africa, where the insignificant role of political parties (Willis 2002) has left to civil society actors the role of opposition to the different regimes. F or a long time many observers were of the opinion that the MENA countries distinctively lacked in civil society activism because such activism was subsumed in the efforts of the newly independent regimes to build a solid nation-state. O ver time however, civil society organizations, “for ideological as well as practical reasons, came to reject state corporatist institutions as inefficient, corrupt and antidemocratic” (Pratt 2007, 127). T oday, civil society activism represents the greatest challenge to authoritarianism in the region and the most important opposition figures no longer come from the cadres of established political parties, but from the ranks of civil society organizations engaged in issues of democratization, human rights and governmental accountability. E ven Islamist parties can be better conceived of as social movements rather than parties in the E uropean or A merican tradition (Wiktorowicz 2004). T he number of genuinely independent civil society actors has been vastly increasing since the early and mid1990s in most MENA countries. A s regards Morocco for instance, H owe (2005, 160) argues that “the explosion of volunteer organizations around the country is one of the most important transformations that has occurred in Moroccan society in recent years”. It would therefore seem that the strategy of encouraging the growth of further civil society activism to spark a process of democratization will eventually pay off. T his, however, ignores the complexities of civil society activism in the countries in the region. F ar from being simply the liberal haven that supporters of civil society envisage it to be, the realm of civil society in the MENA is very much a terrain of contestation between different types of social institutions where the liberal notion does not entirely apply. T here are a number of different views on the state of civil society in the Middle E ast and N orth A frica, but they can be subsumed under three schools of thought. T here are scholars such as A bootalebi (1998) and Yom (2005) who still argue that


31

the present conditions, despite the obvious increase in the numbers of civil society organizations, are not much different from past ones, when the state dominated civil society actors and manipulated their existence. Civil society organizations are too weak to truly challenge the state and are quite simply ineffective. T his might be true if the reference is circumscribed to associations with an avowed secular and liberal ethos in the E uropean intellectual tradition, but this is quite a narrow and Western oriented understanding because it excludes from the analysis Islamist social and political organizations, due to the misleading assumption that they cannot be part of civil society because of their inherently anti-democratic nature. O ther scholars such as Berman (2003) believe it is a mistake to argue that civil society is weak in the region. Berman’s analysis finds that there are numerous secular and Islamist organizations operating independently of the state and challenging it on a number of key issues related to governance and human rights. Contrary to the strictly liberal interpretation of Yom and A bootalebi, Berman argues that civil society per se should not have any normative trait attached to it and that Islamist groups should be taken into account. S he therefore states that civil society in the region is strong. H owever, she also argues that it is “uncivil” because of the predominance of Islamist organizations, which, again by definition, have an anti-democratic and anti-liberal ethos. T hus, civil society is strong, but cannot perform the same function as in E astern E urope and L atin A merica. O ther scholars still, such as Brumberg (2002) and Cavatorta (2006), challenge the notion that it is possible to determine a priori the nature of any civil society and political actor operating under the constraints of authoritarianism. T hus, while accepting Berman’s point about the misplaced and exclusively liberal normative emphasis on civil society, they reject the idea that civil society in the MENA should be automatically labelled “uncivil” because of the dominant role of Islamist organizations. T he existence of a particular subculture inspired by a perceived authoritarian ideology should not be seen in isolation, but in the context of the wider society where competing ideas are exchanged (Brumberg 2002). A ccepting that only secular civil society organizations represent the values of democracy and democratic reform while the Islamist ones simply represent the values of another form of authoritarianism is misleading, as the following analysis will demonstrate. Irrespective of the school of thought one subscribes to, all recognize that civil society activism fails to have a significant influence on the ruling elites. This lack of effectiveness on the part of civil society groups, particularly when civil society is the only realm of genuine opposition, is surprising if one considers the findings in the literature on transition to democracy. Civil Society Activism: Islamist and Secular Organizations A ccording to the theoretical framework of the transition paradigm, once an authoritarian regime begins to liberalize, opposition actors, who had been formally excluded and repressed, begin to take advantage of the new openings

32


in order to reclaim a role in a process that is supposed to lead to the formulation of new rules of the political and institutional game. S uch opposition actors, be they political parties or civil society organizations, might subscribe to radically different ideologies and might have substantial policy differences, but ultimately they are drawn to cooperate with each other because of the constraints of operating under the same authoritarian system, which, in theory, they should all wish to dismantle. T hus, irrespective of their differences, they tend to form a rather unified front in the face of the ruling elites because they all need the removal of the authoritarian player as a pre-condition for exercising their influence in society and shaping the future of the country. S haring a common diagnosis of the ills of the country, namely authoritarianism, they work together to end it. O nce the authoritarian player is removed and the common goal achieved, they are bound to emphasize again their ideology and policy differences, which usually leads to the dissolution of the united front or umbrella organization they created. O nce the unitary stances disappear due to the setting-up of new institutions, the different groups establish political parties or official social movements competing with each other for political power or social influence. There is much empirical evidence to substantiate such theoretical claims even though in some cases it took a significant amount of time before groups acknowledged and acted on their common goal. In his analysis of the Czechoslovakian transition to democracy, O lson points out that all the opposition groups and formations “were submerged […] in the formation of the Civic F orum of Prague, and the Public A gainst V iolence in Bratislava. Both were amorphous reform groupings, united for the single purpose of removing communists from power. H aving quickly achieved their goal, they as quickly lost the source of their cohesion” (1997). T he same trend towards unity could be seen in Poland where the social democratic opposition was joined by both conservative and liberal Catholic activists within the umbrella opposition group established prior to the arrival of Solidarność on the scene. F urthermore, Solidarność itself was a collection of different groups with different agendas, but with the common intent of removing the communists from power (S tokes 1993). T he subsequent divisions within the movement testify to the heterogeneity of the trade union and its leaders. S imilar trends are found in L atin A merican transitions. It should be expected that such tendency towards unity of intent despite ideology and policy differences would hold true in all contexts where the authoritarian regime lacks legitimacy, where openings of some sort exist and where opposition actors formally subscribe to a political platform and course of action aimed at regime change. S uch conditions are certainly present in the MENA , as political developments over the last two decades demonstrate. Moreover, in accord with the theoretical expectations, there is some evidence indicating that Islamist and leftist parties at first and then Islamist and secular social movements later attempted to generate such forms of organized cooperation. In A lgeria, a number of leftist opposition parties and the Front Islamique du Salut worked together for some time in the mid-1990s to provide a solution to the civil war through the S aint E gidio peace plan and platform for political reform (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997).


33

In Morocco, secular and Islamist civil society organizations cooperated in order to make the government more accountable on issues such as the protection of human rights for political prisoners and freedom of the press (Cavatorta 2006). In E gypt, the “Islamists are part of the pro-democracy Kifaya coalition” (Pratt 2007, 134), which includes a number of secular, liberal and leftist associations and personalities. In addition, E gypt has a history of co-operation between the Muslim Brotherhood and some leftist parties (Pratt 2007). Jordan (Clark 2006), T unisia (L abidi 2006) and S yria (N ivat 2006) also experienced similar co-operative trends. H owever, unlike other transition countries in the past, such co-operative trends are short-lived, un-systematic and largely ineffective when it comes to pushing for more significant political reforms. Co-operative trends tend to emerge when specific ad-hoc and localized issues affecting both Islamist and secular groups need to be dealt with, such as protecting political prisoners from being tortured or claiming increased freedom of the press. S uch co-operation often does not go beyond marching together, signing petitions or going on hunger strike. When alliances are actually formalized, as in the case of E gypt, they tend to break down relatively quickly, with groups returning to the formulation of individual strategies. Ultimately all co-operative efforts have been ineffective in so far as they have failed to generate sufficient resources and momentum to demand a radical change from the ruling elites. Jamal (2007) argues that the authoritarianism of the system itself generates dynamics that impede collaboration, but, while there is some truth to the argument, it should be asked why in non-A rab contexts this did not have a significant impact and alliances were formed. In any case, authoritarianism in the region still persists. T his is all the more puzzling since the language of all groups, be they secular/liberal, leftist or Islamist, is very similar and centred on democracy, human rights, accountability, freedom and anti-imperialism. A deeper analysis of the relationships between Islamist and secular groups reveal that a much stronger competitive trend exists, which stops them from fully co-operating; despite their supposed common interest and the similarities in their discourses (Cavatorta and E lananza 2008). S uch a competitive and therefore divisive trend undermines the potential of civil society to play a more significant role in the process of liberalization that many countries have gone through in recent years. It should be recognized that it is somewhat problematic to divide the realm of civil society in the region in two solidly distinct camps (Islamist and secular) because members can float in one or both directions and because “contamination” takes place. In addition, there are many examples of divisions within each camp when it comes to the question of co-operation with entities from the other camp. T hus, as Garon (2003) pointed out in the T unisian case, secular groups have been divided over the issue of cooperating with Islamists against the authoritarian regime. T he same divisions can be found within the Islamist camp, where moderates and radicals are also at odds over the question of cooperating with groups holding different beliefs. H owever, such a distinction in two camps is analytically useful because, ultimately, the secular and Islamist camps have ideological views and

34


tactical considerations that are conflicting and irreconcilable. There are two factors that account for the predominance of the competitive trend over the co-operative one between the two camps. The first factor has to do with ideological beliefs and differences. As in other post-colonial societies, two different ideological poles of reference uneasily coexist in the MENA : an imported E uropean liberal secularism and an Islamism which is based on indigenous traditions and interpretations. O n matters related to democracy, democratization and human rights, these two poles of reference differ quite substantially and form the ideological underpinnings of the politicized groups that are active in civil society. Both ideological referents claim that a “new”, more democratic and more just society can be built if the prescriptions of their respective ideology are correctly followed and implemented. O n the one hand, the secular camp tends to emphasize individual human rights and the secular nature of governance. T heir opposition to authoritarian rule does not stem from the belief that society needs to be radically transformed; it simply needs to adapt to the requirements of modernity, keeping in line with the social and political developments of E uropean countries. T he secular/leftist camp does not challenge the secular nature of governance and simply aims to introduce a higher degree of democratic procedures and protection for individual human rights to reflect such secular nature more thoroughly. A ll that would be upheld by the rule of law. S uch rule of law should make it very clear that there is a distinction between private and public religion. S ecular-leftist-liberal groups, particularly in N orth A frica, are very much influenced by the French concept of laicité, which calls for the absolute separation between Church and S tates. T heir role is therefore to make Islam retreat to the private realm and drive it out of policy-making. T he Islamist camp, on the other hand, tends to reject the very idea that there is only one version of modernity and modernization. In fact the vast majority of Islamist scholars and ideologues are very critical of the type of modernity that the West embodies. T hey do not wish for Muslim societies to follow the same path, particularly not when it comes to the separation of religion and political rule. Most of them emphasize democracy and human rights, but the bases upon which such concepts are understood are radically different from the liberal understanding. T hus, instead of aping Western modernity, Muslims should “revert back to the teachings of Islam” and the notions it provides in order to construct a new society that is certainly rational, but where the spiritual and the divine also have a place; only through spiritual connections can society truly be just and well balanced. T heir role is to make Islam fully public and use it as the reference for public policy-making. A t the practical level, the type of activism that the two camps are involved in through the numerous associations that have been created over the last decade is also very different in terms of the ends they wish to achieve. T rue, there are a number Both Islamism and liberalism are treated as political ideologies, although their proponents would probably claim that they are not ideologies, but only reflect the nature of society.


35

of similarities in the programmes and activities they run, such as the provision of social services, marches in favour of popular international causes or campaigns on specific political issues (fighting corruption features quite highly on the agenda of both camps). But the final objectives of both camps cannot be reconciled. A Westinspired ideology of political liberalism and social democracy such as the one that secular groups adopt, ultimately clashes with the creation of an Islamic state. S ecular groups and associations envisage the progressive transformation of their societies into ones similar to the E uropean model. T he Islamist groups and movements instead envisage the creation of a society where the spirituality of Islam will rescue citizens with its principles of social justice and moral behaviour and reject secularism. Clark convincingly states that “Islamists actively attempt to establish alternative institutions […] to those of the secular state in order to demonstrate the viability and superiority of Islamism in the face of a struggling secular state” (2004, 5). A s mentioned above, both camps make references to democracy and human rights, but their ideologies of reference have a very different understanding of both concepts and their daily practice. F or example, as Pratt argues, “women’s rights activists are concerned about cooperation with Islamist groups because they believe that an Islamic state represents one of the greatest obstacles to women in gaining equal rights” (2007, 138). S imilar arguments could be made on the wider issue of “state regulation of sexuality”. T here are also issues related to the status of religious minorities (the Jews of Morocco for example) or linguistic ones (the T amazigh-speaking population of A lgeria). F inally, the ultimate goal of the creation of an Islamic state leads secular figures to be mistrustful of Islamists who are believed to use the language of democracy as a ploy to get into power. A s one prominent secular Moroccan activist argued (Interview with author, 2005), “the surge of Islamist activism is a danger for democracy in Morocco because the vast majority of the different components of Islamism do not believe in the universal values of representative democracy. T hey just want to use it to come to power.” Browers (2005) recently wrote that Islamism should be treated seriously as an ideology. T his is not only because of the power of ideas in general, but because behind these ideas there is a coherent political project of radical transformation, which on many issues opposes the liberal democratic view that is at the heart of E uropean societies and is at the heart of secular and liberal groups in the region. It is therefore not surprising that there is a fundamental lack of trust between the two camps: their respective visions of what the future should be are very different. Ultimately, how can one reconcile the belief of Islamists that the endpoint of any transition to democracy is the establishment of Islam in power with the positions of those who claim that Islam should in fact be relegated to the private sphere, just as Christianity is in established Western democracies? A s Ihsan Dagi highlights in his contribution on T urkey in this volume (Chapter 3), such a clash is not inevitable and not inscribed in the DNA of either Islamist or secular actors. T he Islamists in T urkey have come quite a long way using liberal notions to change T urkish society and re-affirm values that were said to be incompatible with Islamic teachings. The other countries in the region, however, have gone through a radically different

36


historical process of modernization and their Islamism is in many ways much more radical and, crucially, anti-imperialist than the T urkish one. T hus, the T urkish case might be the exception in the reconciliation between Islamism and liberalism rather than the regional pioneer. T he second factor accounting for the predominance of the competitive trend is simply tactics. E ven if we were to discount ideological differences in explaining the absence of meaningful and effective cooperation, the analytical tools of rational choice would come to the rescue. In transitions elsewhere, it was almost impossible for opposition actors to know a priori what their level of popular support would likely be once free and fair elections were called. T he incentive to cooperate despite ideology and policy differences stemmed from the fact that the priority for all groups was to eliminate the authoritarian actor from the game and then play the game of democracy between them in almost total darkness when it came to measure their actual level of support in society. F or the actors involved, this scenario does not exist in the Middle E ast and N orth A frica. T he events of the past two decades, ranging from the E gyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral successes in the 1980s to the landslide victory of the Islamic F ront in A lgeria in 1991 and from the spectacular electoral advances of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development in 2002 to the victory of H amas in January 2006 in the Palestinian elections, provide ample evidence of the strength of Islamism at the ballot box. T he recent relative set-back of the Moroccan PJD in the 2007 legislative elections should be interpreted in the context of very poor turn-out, as Moroccan citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with irrelevant electoral contests and prefer to support Islamist organizations such as the Justice and Charity Group that advocate boycotting elections. A cross the region, electoral victories were only partially meaningful from an institutional and policy-making point of view, but their political impact has been extremely significant because it shows that Islamism as a political project enjoys credibility and popular support. T he same cannot be said for either the ruling parties, which are largely discredited, or, more importantly, for the other opposition parties, largely secular in orientation and enjoying the overt support of civil society actors with a secular and liberal ethos. In some cases, civil society activists, such as the A lgerian women rights defender Khalida Messaoudi, ran for office, but success was very limited. Given the poor performances of secular and leftist parties throughout the region, it should not come as a surprise that cooperation with Islamists is a very contentious issue. Most activists in the secular camp are convinced that in free and fair elections Islamist movements would do extremely well. A nd they are afraid of the potential institutional and legislative changes that Islamists would introduce. T hus, it would not make sense for secular/ liberal groups to strike up solid alliances with Islamists, knowing that they would not benefit from a genuine process of democratization. Instead, it would help a much feared competitor into power. T his leads a number of them to rally to the regime on a number of issues, making it easier for the ruling elites to implement policies of “divide and conquer”. In this scenario it is also no surprise that Islamist


37

movements in recent times have proposed cooperation to the secular elements within the ranks of the opposition. Islamists as well believe that they are the ones who would benefit from democratization and therefore can only gain by creating alliances with smaller movements to put pressure on the ruling elites. H owever, they are not hard-pressed about it and would only follow that course of action on their own terms. When it comes to the Islamists’ strategy, they seem to consider coalition-building as a welcome development if done on their own terms, but there is no incentive to truly compromise on certain issues given that they expect to win free and fair elections hands down, which will give them the opportunity to dominate new institutions. In addition, Islamist groups already “dominate” society (Berman 2003) and therefore can afford to be patient and wait for political changes to come. In the words of the leader of the E gyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the movement does not have very much to do but to continue its activities to islamicize society and eventually the state, and political power will fall into their hands (Al Ahram Weekly 2005). T hus, coalition building does not take place because, unlike in other transitional contexts, all actors are convinced that they know what the outcome of the first free and fair elections, the ultimate founding moment of a new “democracy”, would be. Whether this actually reflects reality is irrelevant because in this case perceptions are decisive. In conclusion, the combination of ideological divergence and tactical thinking does not allow for effective and durable cross-ideological cooperation between Islamist and secular groups. T hese divisions, apparent at the institutional party level, but, more significantly, in the realm of civil society, facilitate the task of the authoritarian regime. It can remain in power despite its lack of political legitimacy and its relatively weak position. T he ruling elites can thus continue their strategies of dividing and conquering the opposition. T his strategy is due not only to the resources available to them, but also to the divided nature of civil society. When difficult decisions need to be made regarding the future course of the country, the secular and liberal elements prefer to stick with what they know, i.e. the current regimes, rather than make a leap of faith and join the Islamists. T he cases of A lgeria at the time of the military coup and of Morocco after the Casablanca bombings are quite telling in this respect. T he divided nature of civil society, however, does not on its own account for the failure of democratization. T he pro-democracy policies that external actors implement in the region also contribute to this, due to their contradictory nature and ideological bias. S uch policies tend to greatly reinforce, intentionally or not, the existing divisions and are therefore detrimental to the stated goal of democratization. It is only through this combination of external and domestic factors that one can explain the absence of democracy in the region (Cavatorta 2004).

38


The Failure of Democratization, External Actors and Civil Society A s outlined in the introduction, the development of civil society in an authoritarian country with the aim of provoking regime change has been a pillar of Western pro-democracy strategies for some time. F rom the early days of Solidarność in the 1980s to the help provided to S erbian opposition groups against the rule of Slobodan Milošević in early 2000, both political legitimacy and material resources were given to those actors claiming to strive for the democratization of the political system and for the respect for human rights. Despite the criticism of the policy for its weak theoretical underpinnings and its over-estimated practical outcomes, the United S tates and the E uropean Union, as a unitary entity and through its member states, continue to this day to support the implementation of such policy to the chagrin of a number of commentators who see this policy as futile (Cook 2005). T hese days the target is the A rab world, where, it is postulated, the growth of a weak civil society will eventually lead to democratization and, ultimately, to regional and international stability. T he problem of the MENA , however, is not the weakness of civil society per se, but its divided nature and, from the perspective of western countries, its Islamist nature. F or ideological and realpolitik reasons, there is the inability and the unwillingness to provide material resources and political legitimacy to Islamist opposition groups that have the better chance of successfully challenging the regimes in power. F rom an ideological perspective, there is the inability to conceive of the possibility of creating an Islamic democracy, and this prevents policy-makers from dealing with Islamist groups and associations. In this respect, the declarations of a number of Islamist movements and their associated charities and N GO s regarding their support for democratic procedures and human rights, including socio-economic ones, are not taken seriously. T his occurs because both the United S tates and the E uropean countries cannot conceive of a democracy where a religion is effectively established into power. T his runs contrary to their historical experience of democracy, which calls for a clear separation of church and state in order to build a modern country. F or liberal E urope and A merica, the combination of Islam and democracy is a contradiction in terms and therefore the political project of Islamists, despite their challenge to the authoritarian rulers, is “uncivil” because it will inevitably lead to another form of authoritarianism and a further restriction of personal liberties. F rom a realpolitik perspective, there is also an unwillingness to provide Islamists with the necessary resources to succeed because of their political stances on a number of key international issues. In this case the problem does not seem to be linked with the domestic policies that Islamists would implement once in power, but with the foreign policy they would adopt. A fter all, both the E uropean Union and the United S tates manage to have very friendly relationships with Saudi Arabia, where official Islamism is the pillar of highly regressive domestic policies. T he problem seems to be with the international policies and stances that Islamists in power would take with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear proliferation and access to natural resources. It is


39

difficult to determine whether ideological differences matter more than realpolitik factors or vice versa, but to a certain extent this is irrelevant when discussing the consequences of the decision to marginalize Islamism in opposition. Providing political legitimacy and funds to civil society organizations involved in democratization in other parts of the world has been reasonably successful because the vast majority of those opposing the regimes in power were treated as equally legitimate opposition actors. It follows that domestic coalition building was externally stimulated in order to maximize efficiency of action. In the case of the MENA , however, there is an a priori absence of equal legitimacy for civil society groups. T his leads to a very narrow interpretation of who really embodies the true spirit of civil society as understood in a strictly liberal context. E xternal actors implement discriminatory policies in terms of funding and legitimacy in favour of those associations that are ideologically closer to their position rather than the ones that might have the most impact on regime change. T hus, foreign funding and political legitimacy have increased the separation between Islamist and secular-liberal groups through the exclusion of the former from any engagement and through the inclusion of the latter into the so-called “democratic” camp. T his has not been the case in T urkey where for instance the E U did engage with an Islamist government. T he attitude towards MENA Islamists is problematic because it confers democratic legitimacy to actors and personalities that in the past have not really proven their democratic credentials (Cook 2005). In addition, it explicitly denies Islamists their democratic credentials. F inally, foreign funding has channelled resources to Westernized sectors of the population, creating a professionalized caste of civil society operators that are entirely dependent on foreign funding for jobs and status. While Islamist organizations are also largely run by and for the middleclasses (Clark 2004), they still manage to have more connections with the poor and disenfranchised than their secular counterparts. T he long-term political project of the secular groups does not find much support among ordinary citizens any longer, particularly among the poorer sections of society. T hus, the provision of foreign funding and political legitimacy reinforces the “cultural” divisions within civil society because Western donors privilege sectors of the population that are already “converted”, at least on paper, to the cause and values of liberal democracy, and they neglect organizations that might have more impact on the general population, but do not share the same values, or at least do not interpret them in the same manner. T he E U recently awarded 11 million dirham to Moroccan civil society organizations for a number of specific projects in the realm of good governance and human rights, but all of them are either secular groups with limited popular influence or groups linked to the government. A similar trend is at work in T unisia, where 700,000 euros over 5 years have been handed out. See official EU website: . See official EU website: .

40


A s mentioned above, the outcome of such a policy is that external promoters of democracy work with civil society groups that have a very narrow base of support and little political legitimacy. Islamists have then an easy task in pointing to the lack of “operational autonomy” (Wang 2006) of their secular counterparts. T his, in turn, leads to increased divisions and clashes over “values”, leaving the door open for the authoritarian state to reaffirm its power. As the external exporters of democracy become increasingly aware of the lack of progress in terms of building up a civil society that reflects their values and interests, they continue to rely on discredited ruling elites for short-term stability and short-term gains. Conclusion T his chapter postulated that the failure of democracy to take hold in the region is partly due to the divisions that exist within civil society between secular/liberal elements and Islamist ones. Such divisions are then reflected at the political level, where parties of different ideological beliefs and policy preferences do not seem to be able to effectively cooperate to dismantle the existing authoritarian structures. T he problem therefore does not seem to be the weakness of civil society per se, but its internal divisions, as the principal actors have radically different and opposing visions of what A rab societies should look like in the future. T his state of affairs permits the authoritarian leadership to play on these divisions and allows them to implement very effective strategies of divide and conquer in order to stay in power. When the secular and liberal left was the challenger, as in the 1970s, the ruling elites favoured the growth of Islamism as a counterweight. When Islamism is perceived to be the greatest threat, as is currently the case, the ruling elites can ultimately count on the support of the secular and liberal elements of society who are much more uneasy about Islamists than they are about the incumbents. T he competitive trend between the two camps within civil society is the dominant one because of both ideological differences and tactical considerations. It is very much reinforced by the attitudes and policies of the international community, which does not seem to be able to reconcile itself with the rise of Islamism as a demand from vast sectors of A rab society for more political pluralism and greater accountability. Instead, Western donors treat Islamists as a threat even when the movement in question is clearly non-violent, and they support liberal and secular associations and groups that do not have much support among ordinary citizens and that, ultimately, tend to betray the very ideals of democracy by siding, possibly reluctantly, with authoritarian ruling elites when such elites are threatened. T he processes of integration at work in the Mediterranean have increased misunderstandings and tension rather than reducing them. With the exception of the T urkish case, the E uropean Union has been unable or unwilling to build bridges with political Islam and does not seem to have the will to change course. T his generates increased frustration among Islamists, leading to a re-affirmation of exclusive identities, which further accentuates divisions. T hus, the contradictions and double standards of democracy


41

promotion favour those who argue that civilizations do indeed exist and are bound to be in conflict with each other over fundamental values. This might not in fact be the case at the theoretical level because both Islamists and their opponents utilize the same discourse of democracy, human rights and freedom, but it becomes the reality under realpolitik pressures. References A bootalebi, A . (1998), “Civil society, democracy and the Middle E ast”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2:3. A vailable at . Berman, S . (2003), “Islamism, R evolution, and Civil S ociety”, Perspectives on Politics, 1:2, 257–72. Browers, M. (2005), “T he secular bias in ideology studies and the case of Islamism”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 10: 1, 75–93. Brumberg, D. (2002), “Islamists and the Politics of Consensus”, Journal of Democracy, 13:3, 109–15. Carothers, T . (1999/2000), “Civil S ociety”, Foreign Policy, 117, 18–29. Cavatorta, F . (2004), “Constructing an O pen Model of T ransitions. International Political E conomy and the F ailed Democratization of N orth A frica”, Journal of North African Studies, 9:2, 1–18. Cavatorta, F . (2006), “Civil S ociety, Islamism and Democratization. T he Case of Morocco”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44:2, 203–22. Cavatorta, F . and E lananza, A . (2008), “Political opposition in civil society. A n analysis of the interactions of secular and religious associations in Jordan and A lgeria”, Government and Opposition, 43:4, 561–78. Clark, J. (2004), Islam, Charity and Activism (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press). Clark, J. (2006), “T he Conditions of Islamist Moderation: unpacking crossideological cooperation in Jordan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38:4, 539–60. Cook, S . (2005), “T he right way to promote A rab reform”, Foreign Affairs, 84:1, 91–102. Dalacoura, K. (2005), “US Democracy promotion in the A rab Middle E ast since S eptember 11: a critique”, International Affairs, 81:5, 963–79. E chague, A . and Youngs, R . (2005) “Democracy and H uman R ights in the Barcelona Process: Conclusions of a Workshop at FRI DE , Madrid, 14–16 January, 2005” Mediterranean Politics, 10:2. E ncarnación, O . (2006), “Civil S ociety R econsidered”, Comparative Politics, 38:3, 357–76. E ntelis, J. (1996), “Civil S ociety and the A uthoritarian T emptation in A lgerian Politics: Islamic Democracy V s. the Centralized S tate” in N orton (ed.). Civil Society in the Middle East (L eiden: Brill).

42


Garon, L . (2003), Dangerous Alliances: Civil Society, the Media and Democratic Transition in North Africa (L ondon: Z ed Books). Grugel, J. (2000), “R omancing Civil S ociety: E uropean N GO s in L atin A merica”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42:2, 87–107. H awthorne, A . (2004), “Is Civil S ociety the A nswer?”, Carnegie Papers, 44, 1–24. H owe, M. (2005), Morocco. The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges (N ew York: O xford University Press). Impagliazzo, M. and Giro, M. (1997), Algeria in Ostaggio. Tra esercito e fondamentalismo, storia di una pace dif.cile (Milano: E d. �� Guerini e A ssociati). Kupchan, C. (2003), “T he rise of E urope, A merica’s changing internationalism and the end of U.S . primacy”, Political Science Quarterly, 118:2, 205–31. Jamal, A . (2007), Barriers to Democracy (Princeton N J: Princeton University Press). L abidi, K. (2006), “L a longue descente aux enfers de la T unisie”, Le Monde Diplomatique, 53: 624, 10–11. McL averty, P. (2002), “Civil S ociety and Democracy”, Contemporary Politics, 8:4, 303–18. N ivat, A . (2006), Islamistes. Comment ils nous voient (Paris: F ayard). N ye, J. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public A ffairs Publishing). O lson, D. (1993), “Democratization and political participation: the experience of the Czech R epublic”, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds). Pratt, N . (2007), Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Boulder, CO : L ynne R ienner). Putnam, R . (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (N ew York: T ouchstone). S ardamov, I. (2005), “Civil S ociety and the L imits of Democratic A ssistance”, Government and Opposition, 40:3, 379–402. S tokes, G. (1993) The Walls Came Tumbling Down. The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (O xford: O xford University Press). T empest, C. (1997), “Myths from E astern E urope and the L egends of the West”, Democratization, 4:1, 132–44. Wang, S. (2006), “Money and Autonomy: patterns of civil society finance and their implications”, Studies in Comparative International Development, 40:4, 3–29. Willis, M. (2002), “Political Parties in the Maghrib: the illusion of significance”, The Journal of North African Studies, 7:2, 1–22. Wiktorowicz, Q. (ed.), (2004), Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN : University Press). Yom, S . (2005), “Civil S ociety and Democratization in the A rab world”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9:4. A vailable at . Youngs, R . (2003), “E uropean A pproaches to S ecurity in the Mediterranean”, Middle East Journal, 57:3.

Chapter 3

Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: T he R approchement of T urkish Islamic E lite with the West Ihsan Dagi

Introduction T he terrorist attacks on the World T rade Center and the Pentagon on S eptember 11, 2001 and the ensuing “crusade” waged by the US president George W. Bush against “terrorism” have brought back the relationship between Islam and the West to the fore of global politics. September 11 and its aftermath seemed to have confirmed the view that Islam and the West are destined to conflict with each other. The occupation of A fghanistan and Iraq by A merican forces, terrorist acts in L ondon and Madrid committed by persons who had connections with radical Islamist cells and growing Islamophobia in Western E urope have all reinforced mutual distrust. H owever, a unique development that went against this common current has taken place in T urkey. T urkish Islamic elite have abandoned their historic antiWesternism and became the most enthusiastic supporters of T urkey’s accession to the E uropean Union after 1999 when T urkey was declared a candidate. Being historically shaped by an opposition to the West and the Westernization policies of the T urkish republic, Islamic elite seem now to have embraced their historical “other”, the West. T he changing position of T urkish Islamic elite, the dynamics and outcomes of which will be explained in this article, is a significant sign for the possibility of rapprochement between Islam and the West in the post-S eptember 11 context despite the prevalence of a clash of civilizations perspective. Islam and the West: The Background Modern Islamic identity has historically positioned itself in opposition to the West and Westernization. Given the history of the relationship between the two especially in the last two centuries the rejection of the West and Westernization was the key to constructing a distinct and defiant Islamic identity from an Islamic point of view. T he challenge of the West was taken as a matter of survival since the Islamic lands were penetrated by E uropean powers politically, militarily and economically

44


by the 19th century. It was also raising questions about the ability of Islamic civilization to produce wealth, power and science in the modern age (Ulken 1966, 207). T hus, from the 19th century onwards the Islamic scholars, statesmen and intellectuals had attempted to understand and respond to the Western challenge the Islamic world faced. Islamic civilization seemed to be declining if not defeated. T he Islamic scholars of the early modern period felt the agony of defending the faith against the view that Islam was to blame for the underdevelopment of Islamic communities. T he pioneers of Islamic revivalist thought such as N amik Kemal, Jamal ad-din A fghani, S aid H alim Pasa, Mohammad A bduh, R ashid R ida, and Mehmet A kif were, on the contrary, of the view that the Muslims were left behind because they deviated from the true belief of Islam, which triggered a soulsearching for the revival of Islamic civilization that turned out to be the beginning of reconstructing an Islamic identity in modern times (Mardin 1962; R ahnema 1994). In short, modern Islamic political identity was a construction in response to the Western penetration into the Muslim world and resulting humiliation of Muslims. In due course the West was imagined as the source of all problems encountered by the Muslims; it was evil and materialistic, powerful but decadent, advanced in technology but backward in morality, degenerating and destroying Islamic civilization (Commins 1994; T ripp 1994; Bulac 2001, 41–43). T he new encounter with the West that resulted in colonization of Islamic lands by E uropean states from the 19th century onwards was worsened by the policies of Westernization carried out by local elite in response to the challenge of the West. O nce the late O ttomans realized the decline of their state vis-à-vis the rising power of the E uropeans they embarked on a process of adopting “Western” ways that presumably made the West “great” (L ewis 1968, 45–72; R ustow 1973, 94) It started with the Westernization of the army, then of administration and finally daily lives. T his history of Westernization, in essence, was a history of the question of how to respond best to the Western challenge in military, political, economic and cultural/civilizational realms. Westernization was basically the attempt of a declining power to revive and catch up with the rising Western civilization. Westernization that disseminated the “illness of the West” into the Islamic world was another grand challenge that revoked the modern Islamic thinking and identity. Westernization presuming the possibility of a civilizational shift was viewed by the conservatives as rejection of Islam. With the “threat of Westernization” the West was also opposed on the ground that it provided a source of inspiration, a framework of justification for forced Westernization and secularization policies in Islamic communities at the hands of the Westernizers (Dagi 2005).

Particularly A bdullah�� Cevdet�� who called for major reforms in Islam in his journal, Ictihad, was very critical of Islam as an obstacle to development and progress (H anioglu 1981; H ourani 1980, 12).

Beyond the Clash of Civilizations

45

T his double pressure of the West and Westernization was particularly evident in the case of T urkey where the Kemalist Westernizers introduced with the declaration of the republic in 1923, radical reforms inspired from the West, the result of which was the exclusion of the Islamic groups from the political and social centers. T hus the opposition to exclusionary Westernization of the Kemalist center turned out to be a matter of survival for Islamic institutions and elite. S uch a perceived existential threat constituted the basis of an Islamic identity formation in T urkey that went against the Westernizers as well as the West itself in the republican era (Dogan 1986). In sum, the Islamists’ rejection of the West and of Westernization was during the republican era reinforced by the Kemalist project, inspired by the Western models, of re-forming society and politics along a secularist line eroding the influence of Islam in public and political spheres (Yavuz 1996; Mardin 1971). Rethinking the West and Westernization: The EU as a Catalyst In recent years though, Islamic elite have started to see the West and Westernization in a different way. F irst of all the trauma of the early modern encounter has been overcome; Muslims have grown confident in their relationship with the West after the years of modernization and economic development. T he West is still viewed powerful, but also vulnerable as proved by the 9/11 and the inability of the US to dictate its will on Iraq after 2003. S cience and technology are no longer thought to be under the monopoly of the West in this age of globalization in which knowledge seems fluctuating across borders. Turkey is no longer an agricultural country but 80 percent of its more than 100 billion US D export is industrial products. It is not a country of the sick man of E urope as named in the late 19th century but a country with the biggest army in the NATO after the US and the 16th greatest economy in the world. T his self-image has helped to overcome a historical inferiority complex towards the West. S econd, the experience of the T urks living in E urope demonstrated that it is possible, after all, to be in the West, part of the West and still remain as Muslim. T hird, Islamic groups, under the pressure of the authoritarian Kemalist institution, view the E U as an opportunity to curb the power of those Kemalist/ secularist centers. F ourth, in this context Islamic groups realized that the demands of the E U for greater democratization, respect for human rights and a restrained role of the military in politics overlap with their practical priorities: the E U accession process turned out to be a relief for Islamic groups bullied by the Kemalists/secularists. F ifth, following the 9/11 and the A K Party’s ascendance to power in T urkey the new justification for Turkey’s membership in the EU, namely the alliance of N amed after the founder of the T urkish R epublic, Mustafa Kemal A taturk. F or his life and reforms, see Kinross, 1964.

46


civilization argument, led the Islamic groups embrace the E U accession project: T urkish membership is no longer presented as the accession of a successful “secular” model in the Middle E ast, but of a “Muslim” democratic country with capabilities of bridging Islam and the West. T he latter embraces and presumes a “Muslim identity” of Turkey, whereas the former reflected Turkey’s republican departure from the past/Islam. E U accession did not envisage a civilizational shift anymore. T o play the role of a bridge between Islam and the West, a T urkish Islamic identity was required. T he identity was no longer abandoned but preserved. Consequently, the E U membership process served as a catalyst for Islamic circles to revisit their historical view of the West and Westernization as adversaries. Mainstream Islamic circles in social realm, in politics and business turned to be strong adherents of T urkey’s E U membership, a goal they used to oppose as part of their anti-Westernism. T his departure of Islamic elite from a conventional antiWestern position may constitute a ground for a uniquely different Islamic identity in the 21st century, disproving the thesis of a clash of civilizations, and despite of the fact that 9/11 has encouraged sweeping generalizations about the clash perspective. Continuing accession negotiations with an eventual full-membership perspective sends strong signals to the rest of the Islamic world, namely that E U member countries do not seek conflict on civilizational ground, but cooperation. S uch an attitude on the part of E uropeans is likely to take the T urkish case of rapprochement into other Islamic communities who closely watch the process of T urkey’s integration into the E U. T hus it seems that in a broader rapprochement between Islam and the West, T urkey’s E U integration may be a catalyst to see that cooperation is working and fruitful for both sides. It would be wrong to assume that this is a local phenomenon. It may have broader implication for the whole Islamic world. T urkey’s E U accession is supported by many A rabs. It is seen as a test whether the E U is a Christian club or not, or whether the EU is interested in cooperation or conflict among the civilizations. The impact of the rethinking can also be traced in the influence of the A KP in the region. Its leaders called for transparency, accountable government and pluralism in various platforms in the Middle E ast, including meetings of the O rganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). T he Muslims in the region seem receptive of the identity of the A KP which is based on democracy, human rights and pro-globalization and pro-E U policies. Moreover, there are some moderate Islamic parties like the A KP of Morocco that view the A KP of T urkey as a successful model synthesizing Islam, democracy, market economy and pro-E U policies. T he changing attitude of Islamic elite such as politicians, intellectuals and businessmen towards the West via the E U is one of the greatest historical shifts in modern T urkish history, with implications on the broader Islam-West relations.


47

Political Elite: From the Welfare Party to the Justice and Development Party With T urkey’s transition to multi-party politics and the electoral victory of the Democratic Party in 1950, peripheral Islamic groups who were forced to go underground in the early republican period found a channel of representation within a center-right and pro-Western political party. But following the 1960 military intervention Islam’s political appeal led to an independent political movement detached from center-right politics at the end of the decade. The first such a political party, the N ational O rder Party, was established by N ecmettin E rbakan in 1970, but it was closed down by the Constitutional Court in the following year on the grounds that it exploited religion for political purposes. A year later the N ational S alvation Party (NSP ) was established by the same group. Managing to get about 10 percent of the votes in the 1970s the NSP never asserted to be an “Islamist” or “Islam-oriented” party since this would have caused the Constitutional Court to close down the party. But the NSP claimed to represent the “national view” (E rbakan 1975), understood by many as Islam. T he NSP differentiated itself from other political movements with its critical stand towards the West, T urkey-West relations and the history of T urkish Westernization. T he leadership believed that Westernization was understood by the early republican leaders as a denial of traditional (Islamic) values, attitudes and institutions (T oprak 1981, 104). T he party categorically opposed T urkey’s engagement with the West, including the E uropean E conomic Community, which was depicted as a “Christian club”. T he leaders of the party believed that historically, culturally and geographically T urkey did not belong to the Western world, instead it shared its past, values and institutions with the Islamic world (Ceylan 1996, 99). A n Islamic economic integration scheme, Islamic defense organization and an Islamic currency were proposed by the party leaders. F or the NSP it was Westernization policies that resulted in the abandonment of the Islamic world and laid the ground for T urkey becoming an all-season ally of the West. Making a linkage between Westernization and western oriented foreign policy, in its foreign policy agenda the NSP proposed a rapprochement with the Islamic world. S uch a policy had been excluded from the foreign policy agenda during the republican period. But according to the NSP , T urkey belonged to the E ast/Islamic world, a world that had to be mobilized to balance the power and pressure of the West (Ceylan 1996). H ere one should not miss the point that even the pro-Islamic world orientation of the party derived largely from the perceived need to resist and respond to the West. T he Islamic world was conceived as an alternative not on its own but as a means of balancing the power of the West. T he NSP leadership severely criticized the last two hundred years of T urkeyWest relations and the perception and imitation of the West by Westernizers. T hey set for a confrontation not only with the West but also with the local history of Westernization, formation of the new T urkey along this line and the leading actors

48


of this process, the Westernizers described as “the lackeys of the West”. T hus not only Western influence in Turkey but also the actors, institutions, process and objectives of Westernization were questioned in the name of authenticity, i.e. Islamic civilization, historical confrontation between the “cross and the crescent”, and the search for power vis-à-vis the West. The influence of the West had to be eliminated to build a “national order”. Before the 1995 general elections E rbakan proclaimed that once they came to power they would put an end to the process of Westernization and to T urkey’s customs union with the E U, which he described as a “Christian club” (Milli Gazete 1995). T he West was conceived as “the mother of all evils”, and as such it represented the absolute “other”. In this way, the “national self” was to a very large extent created through the otherness of the West. N ot only the NSP but also the identities of the other political parties, institutions or individuals in T urkey were thought to be determined by their stand on the West and the “Western question”. A t the end they were described either as advocating the “national view” or as being imitators of the West (Dagi 1998, 23). T he NSP was closed down in 1981 along with other political parties by the military regime. In the process of transition to multiparty politics in 1983 a new party named the Welfare Party (WP) was founded by a group of people close to E rbakan who had been banned from politics; the ban was lifted in 1986. A gradual electoral rise of the WP continued into the 1990s and culminated in the local elections of 1994 in which the party captured the mayor offices of Istanbul and Ankara, and in the 1995 general election in which it came first with 21 percent of the votes. E rbakan, as leader of the Welfare Party, formed a coalition government with the center-right T rue Path Party in June 1996. F irst time in the republican history a pro-Islamic political party came to power as a major force, holding a prime ministerial position (Yavuz 1997; O nis 1997). But the rise of the WP to power led to strong reactions from the military, some sectors of civil society and the Istanbul capital in the name of secularism. T he military, aligning with some sectors of civil society and the media, launched a campaign against the “Islamist challenge”, i.e. the WP in government, an event known as the “F ebruary 28 process”, named after a N ational S ecurity Council meeting that took place on this date. T he military-dominated NS C had adopted a resolution ordering the government to “reinforce the secular character of the T urkish state and to eliminate the Islamist threat”. T he government was asked to maintain the official dress code and to uphold the ban on headscarves in government offices and universities, to introduce compulsory eight year elementary school education, thereby practically closing down the middle school sections of country-wide Imam H atip S chools (prayer leaders and preachers’ schools). T he government was also asked to cut down the number of Imam H atip S chools, believed by the military to be breeding ground of Islamism, to impose strict control over Qur’anic courses and student dormitories run by religious groups and foundations, to establish a section within the Prime Minister’s office to investigate reactionary/Islamic


49

activities in the bureaucracy, and to pass a law to fire civil servants engaged in Islamic activities. T he NS C decision of F ebruary 28 was in fact an ultimatum to the WP-led government which itself was described as a threat. A “N ational Policy Paper” prepared by the N ational S ecurity Council the Islamic challenge was cited as the number-one threat, more dangerous and immediate than the secessionist Kurdish nationalism (Hurriyet 1997). A s part of the clampdown on the WP, T ayyip E rdogan, the popular mayor of Istanbul, was trialed and put in prison for inciting hatred when he read a poem ironically belonging to the nationalist ideologue of the early republic, Z iya Gokalp. A fter being forced to step down from the government in July 1997 the WP was banned by the constitutional court in January 1998 on the grounds that it had become the source of anti-secular activities. F ollowing the closing down of the WP the party cadets, including its members of parliament, re-emerged in the V irtue Party (VP ) which differed from its predecessor in many respects, the most important one was its new approach to the West and to modern political values. T he party now started to advocate T urkey’s membership in the E U (in contrast to its former view of the E U as a Christian club) and asked the government to introduce political reforms to meet the Copenhagen political criteria as laid down by the E U. T he VP leadership stressed the importance of meeting the E U standards on democracy and demanded a civic constitution that would meet the Copenhagen political criteria for individual rights and freedoms (Hurriyet 2000). T he VP seemed to have abandoned its opposition to the West and to have made western political values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law part of its new language. Calls for democracy, human rights and the rule of law became the characteristics of the VP strategy in order to pursue the political struggle in the post-F ebruary 28 process, during which its predecessor party had been closed down and its leader banned from politics. Democracy was no longer questioned because it had been an off-spring of Western civilization, and of values and institutions that allegedly were alien to T urkey and the Islamic civilization. O n the contrary these were very actively sought after. In this new language modern/Western political values and the West itself were no longer opposed to Islamic political identity represented by the VP . T his was symbolized in an ironic way by the decision of E rbakan to take the case of the WP closure and his ban from politics to the E uropean Court of H uman R ights. What he asked in effect was to be judged by a Western institution, the E uropean Court of H uman R ights, and according to “Western values” as incorporated in the E uropean Convention of H uman R ights. A lthough the E CHR eventually turned down E rbakan’s application on the grounds that the WP posed a threat to democracy, and that “democracies are entitled to protect themselves”, the fact that E rbakan as a political leader who had established his entire career on anti-Westernism sought For 28 February decisions of NSC see Briefing (1997), Salt (1999) and Yavuz (2000).

50


justice in a E uropean institution is indicative of the Islamists’ rethinking of the West in the late 1990s. A fter a poor performance in the 1999 general elections in which the VP came third with 15 percent of the popular vote, the party engaged in an internal debate about the leadership and political direction. T his process led to a division between the old guards close to E rbakan and the young members of the parliament led by T ayyip E rdogan who asked for a renewal of leadership, ideology and public image. S oon the VP was closed down as well by the constitutional court in June 2001 on the grounds that it had become the center of anti-secular religious activities like the preceding Welfare Party. A fter this decision the movement split into two. While the so-called traditionalists established the F elicity Party (FP ) the young T urks’, under the leadership of T ayyip E rdogan, formed the Justice and Development Party (JDP). General elections took place a year later in which the FP got only 2 percent of the total votes. T his showed that the WP/FP line had lost its ability to represent Islamic sentiments and groups. But the new JDP gained a great success in the elections of 2002, with 34 percent of the popular vote capturing almost 2/3 of the seats in the parliament. Its nearest contender, the R epublican People’s Party had 19 percent (O zel 2003; O nis and Keyman 2003). After nearly five years in office the JDP vote jumped to 47 percent in the elections on 22 July 2007, a rare victory in T urkish democracy. T he main opposition party, the CHP , could only score 21 percent despite an election alliance with the Democratic L eft Party. T he party of the Islamist old-guards, the FP , received again only 2 percent of the votes. T he emergence of the JDP with a different leadership, program and political language exemplifies the transformation of Islamic political identity as experienced in the 1990s. T he JDP claimed to be a political party that is not religion-centric but gravitates around a “social center”. T he leadership departed sharply from the WP/ VP and instead referred to the Democrat Party of the 1950s, the Justice Party of the 1960s and the Motherland Party of the 1980s, all being mass political movements on the center-right that ruled the country with majority in the respective periods (Milliyet 2001). In the 2007 election campaign the JDP further highlighted its roots in the political tradition of the center-right. In the campaign A dnan Menderes of the Democrat Party, T urgut O zal of the Motherland Party and T ayyip E rdogan of the JDP were advertised as the “stars of democracy” and the “men of the nation”. Moreover before the July 2007 general election, in an attempt to demonstrate its “centrist” preferences, the JDP could present 18 prominent personalities, including 5 women, as new party members. T hey were mainly prominent social democrats and liberal figures, some former politicians, academics and professionals,who joined the JDP despite a strong wave of nationalist sentiments which shook the nation in mid-2007.

T he T urkish acronym is A KP. F or an early description of E rdogan as a moderate politician, see H eper (1997, 37).


51

O verall the JDP leadership seemed to have departed not only from the leadership of the old Islamic circles but also from their ideology. It claimed that the party stands for “democratic conservatism” and acknowledged the end of ideologies, including Islamism, in the age of globalization (Hurriyet 2001; Milliyet 2001). The name of the party program of the JDP reflected the priorities of the new movement: T he “Democracy and Development Programme”. T he position of the JDP on E U membership differs fundamentally from any conventional Islamic stand. E U membership is regarded as a natural outcome of T urkey’s modernization history; “meeting the Copenhagen political criteria is an important step forward for the modernization of the country” (JDP E lection Declaration 2002). R ight after the N ovember 2002 elections JDP leader E rdogan declared that their priority was to speed up the process to get T urkey into the E U, which he had once called a Christian Club (S mith 2003). In order to demonstrate his commitment to E U membership, E rdogan asked, during a visit to Italy in late 2002, for a Catholic marriage between T urkey and the E U. The first JDP government between 2002 and 2007 introduced fundamental reforms on the Kurdish issue, human rights and civil-military relations with various harmonization packages passed by the parliament. F urthermore, it made politically risky compromises to resolve the long-standing Cyprus dispute. E ventually the JDP government succeeded in opening accession negotiations with the E U on 5 O ctober 2004, a historical milestone on T urkey’s march for Westernization by anchoring T urkey in E urope. T he process was eased when the JDP leadership realized that the E U demands for democratization and human rights overlapped with their own search for protection against the Kemalist establishment, including the military and the judiciary (Dagi 2006). T he pro-E U stand of the JDP was motivated by the observation that the more T urkey was distanced from the West and the E U in particular, the stronger was the tutelage of the army that treated the JDP as an anomaly and a threat. T he expectation was that the interventions of the army in politics would be significantly lessened as a result of further democratization which in turn had already been set as a precondition for T urkey’s entry into the E U; a Kemalist state ideology guarded by the army could not be sustained, if T urkey were to become an E U member. T hus the need to forge an alliance with the West vis-à-vis the Kemalist establishment at home led the JDP leadership to develop a new and positive stand on the West, on T urkey’s E U membership and on the integration of T urkey into global structures and processes (Dagi 2006; H arputlu 2003). T his presents a radical break with the traditional Islamic stand that used to be based on a strong anti-Western and anti-E uropean position.

S ee also the party program at <www.akparty.org.tr/program>, and E rdogan’s speech at the international symposium on conservatism and democracy in Uluslararasi Muhafazakarlik ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu (A nkara, 2004) pp. 7–17.

52


Islamic Intellectuals and the West: From Ideology to Pragmatism Islamist intellectuals of the 20th century conceived Islam as a comprehensive social theory capable of explaining and resolving all problems encountered by the Muslims. Similarly, the Turkish Islamists under heavy influence of the writings of S ayyid Qutb and al-Mavdudi were convinced that the formation of an Islamic society anew was possible through the agency of the state. T he rise of the power of Islam in T urkey as an ideology to explain the problems and to propose solutions coincided with the demise of all political ideologies, including socialism and nationalism that were heavily oppressed by the 1980 military coup. Being the only vibrant ideological movement in T urkey in the 1980s prompted among the Islamists a strong self-confidence. Out of growing self-confidence and pressurized by the perennial issues of the West and Westernization, the Islamists sought to develop an alternative “Islamic way of thinking” that excluded modern political values like human rights and democracy which were considered being the products of the West, against which their identity was set. Moreover, as the pro-western Kemalist republic excluded them from having a share in political power and economic benefits distributed through the patronage of the state the Islamists had distanced themselves from modern/western political values appeared advocated by the Kemalists who were inspired and aligned by the West. H owever, the 1990s witnessed a transformation of Muslim intellectuals as they experienced the overwhelming pressure of the Kemalists/secularist establishment that denied access to all forms of Islamist expression in the public sphere. T he Islamist intellectuals lost their hope for the possibility of an Islamization of politics and society (Dagi 2004). Pressurized, traumatized and marginalized, the Islamist intellectuals, including their prominent representative A li Bulac, declared that the idea of an Islamic state had failed (Duzel 1999; Metiner 2004). S triving for recognition, which would also mean protection, from the secular circles led by the military and the judiciary, the Islamist intellectuals could not afford to present their uniqueness by sticking to an Islamic explanation of current issues with a constructed Islamic terminology but instead embraced modern concepts/values like democracy and human rights. T he alternative to the Kemalist regime was no longer searched in Islam but in modern political concepts and institutions. T he E U’s pressures to further democracy, human rights and pluralism after 1999 seemed an opportunity for the Islamists who were searching for protection vis-à-vis the Kemalist establishment. T his made the Islamist intellectuals “revisit” their historic question of “how to accommodate with the West”. Despite disappointments, fears, suspicions, accusations of double standards and hypocrisy the Muslim intellectuals came to reconcile with the West which is now seen as the occasional ally in the face of Kemalist pressures at home (H arputlu 2002). Western/modern notions like democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and institutions like the E U and the E uropean Court of H uman R ights by the late 1990s appeared as new-found allies.


53

What made the Islamists “rethink”? Many attribute the transformation of Islamists to the “F ebruary 28 process” which was a military-led campaign in the name of secularism that brought down the pro-Islamic Welfare Party coalition government that served between June 1996 and June 1997. T he WP, after being ousted from the government, was closed down in 1998, Islamic social institutions, including associations and foundations, were intimidated, and the so-called Islamic capital was targeted. Islamic political, social and economic networks were put under significant pressure. The days of self-confidence had gone (Akdogan 2003). Intellectual fantasies of the 1980s to Islamize modern terms, life styles and the polity came to an end. T he Islamists have found themselves on the defensive against the excessive pressures they had to face from the Kemalist/secularist establishment. A n example of the way in which the Islamists adopted the new “defensive” language could be seen in the headscarf debate. In the 1980s Islamic scholars and intellectuals argued that it was part of the Islamic duties of Muslim women to cover their heads. T hey engaged in debates with the secularists and the then President E vren, who claimed that wearing a headscarf was not obligatory in Islam, on the subject. But in the late 1990s, particularly after the 28 F ebruary military intervention, in public debates the Islamists refrained from defending the right to wear a headscarf in universities and Imam H atip S chools on Islamic grounds as the headscarf was portrayed by the secularists as a political symbol against the Kemalist regime. Wearing a headscarf began to be defended with references to the idea of human rights and international human rights conventions. S ome, including the wife of A bdullah Gul, the current president, who was expelled from the university for wearing a headscarf, appealed to the E uropean Court of H uman R ights on the grounds that their fundamental rights had been breached by the state policy in T urkey. A lthough these cases were turned down by the E CHR , the mere fact that they were brought to Strasbourg reflected not only pragmatism, but also the willingness of Islamic circles for a rapprochement with the West and Western institution. Hayrettin Karaman, a scholar and influential columnist in the Yeni Şafak daily, has often given examples from F rance and the E uropean Court of H uman R ights, but not from conservative Islamic countries to ground the right for the girls to wear a headscarf at universities (Karaman 2001; Karaman 2002b; Karaman 2002d; Karaman 2002e). H e described university authorities who imposed the ban on headscarves as “non-modern” and “reactionary” (terms usually used for the Islamists) who do not respect international human rights conventions (Karaman 2003a; Karaman 2003b). In defense of the headscarf, the right to education, the principle of non-discrimination and international human rights conventions are often referred to, but not Islam which Karaman otherwise always has asserted as the absolute source of reference. T his is because universal norms and values have been discovered to be protective of Islamic groups and their identity. In order to preserve the particularities of Islam/Islamic identity they need, and therefore

54


utilize, the universal. A s a result they depart, consciously or unconsciously, from an Islamic self-referentialism to a “universalist language” of rights. A li Bulac, a leading Islamic intellectual, favors a “social consensus” (a modern concept) as a way to resolve the problem of the headscarf. T he basis of such a consensus is to present the headscarf as part of “freedom of religion” and basic democratic rights. T he search, however, for a social consensus implies that it can be sought on a non-religious/secular ground, that is liberal rights theories and not the language of obligation within Islam. A most dramatic change of approach among the Islamist intellectuals occurred concerning the EU and Turkey’s membership in it, with significant implications for their perception of the West and T urkey’s Westernization. T hey used to describe the E U as a “Christian club” and, derived from the Islamic notion of Umma, called for a union of Muslim nations. But by the late 1990s the Islamic intellectuals had become the most enthusiastic defenders of the E U integration process. T his shift of perspective was to a large extent motivated by an expectation that Islamic circles would be better off, in case T urkey became an E U member. Bulac makes it absolutely clear why the Islamic circles and he himself turned out to be the new supporters of the E U: T o enjoy basic rights and freedoms and the rule of law, E U membership is a necessity … We need a state that adheres to the rule of law and respects basic rights and freedoms of its citizens … T he E U will bring about this … F or many this is the sole meaning of the E U membership (Bulac 1999; Bulac 2000).

Islamic circles thus realized the importance of “external dynamics” that have historically eased T urkey’s march towards democratization which was expected to open up new life space for the Islamic groups. A s they could not break the “oppression” of the “bureaucratic/Kemalist/secular center” on their own, they look up to the E U to dissolve the authoritarian state apparatus (Bulac 2000a; Bulac 2000b; Bulac 2000c; Bulac 2002a; Bulac 2002b; Bulac 2002c). F or H ayrettin Karaman the support to join in the E U is motivated by a search for material improvement and escape from “the oppression” of the state (Karaman 2002a; Karaman 2002c). Karaman raised a fundamental question for the Islamic groups: “If there is no way to protect Muslim identity under the circumstances in Turkey, it is justified to enter the EU; then it even becomes an imperative.” To see the E U as a shield to protect the Muslim self, not a threat to it, is a fundamental departure from a conventional view that portrays the West/E U in adversarial terms. Karaman raises some other questions to those Muslims who oppose the E U. “Is T urkey not a country whose democracy and secularism (freedom of religion and thought) are problematical? Is T urkey not going to enter into a group of countries T his is the exact answer the current Prime Minister T ayyip E rdogan gives as a solution to the headscarf problem at universities.


55

whose democracy and form of secularism are healthier and proper?” H ere, he finds Europe worth imitating and emphasizes their examples of democracy and secularism. H e goes on asking; “Can T urkey resolve her problems on her own without cooperating with the external world? H ow realistic is this?” H e notes that a union with the Muslim world is certainly preferable, yet the efforts in this direction since the late 19th century have not brought the Muslims nearer to this objective. H e concludes that “if you think that you cannot survive without the E U, then accession would be Islamically justified, and the Muslims are to decide this” (Karaman 2002c). T o appreciate the degree of change in his discourse it is good to remember his stand on the West in the early 1990s: In order to be developed and powerful again we must stop trying to be Westernized and instead try to be like ourselves … We must overcome the identity crisis that we have suffered for years … O ur identity is Islam. We should stop imitating the West; be, behave and live like a Muslim (Karaman 1992, 411).

In short, it was expected from an Islamist perspective that the E U process would reduce the power of the nation state with its Kemalist ideological apparatus that has oppressed any collective identity, including Islamism, viewed as threatening the imagery of a unified and homogenized Turkey. Yet as the E U-T urkey relations become fragile and the road to full membership long and tough, the Islamist intellectuals also express their disappointment. T heir irritation is related to issues like the open-endedness of the negotiations, the obstacle of eventual referendums even if negotiations are successfully concluded, the Cyprus issue and the unfair E uropean attitude towards the T urkish side on this, and a growing anti-Islamic wave in E urope. Islamist intellectuals are also disillusioned because the “state of Muslims has not improved over the years, despite the fact that they have given huge support for the E U process, without which the government would not have been able to take the necessary reforms” (Bulac 2006a; Bulac 2007a, b). T o sum up, recently in T urkey some Islamic intellectuals have been referring to the wisdom of integration into the E U and of upholding modern political values like human rights and democracy, which are no longer denounced by references to their “western origins”, having no relevance for Islamic communities. T he postIslamist intellectuals, who de-emphasize political claims of Islam, seem to have understood that to speak the language of plurality, rights and democracy in current domestic and international circumstances would present a powerful and legitimate alternative to the Kemalist establishment (A kdogan 2003; H arputlu 2003; H arputlu 2002). T herefore, instead of presenting an Islamic alternative against a secular/Kemalist regime, the post-Islamists have settled with a secular/modern/ Despite the recent fall in the E U support among the T urkish people, and despite new stumbling blocks for eventual membership like the F rench opposition, Bulac still maintains his support for membership, yet calls for a plan B (Bulac 2006b; Bulac 2007a).

56


plural model, out of the conviction that the Kemalist order could be undermined by modern political values, principles and institutions. Islamic Business Elite and the West: The Case of MUSIAD T he Islamic business elite is represented by the MUSIA D (Independent A ssociation of Industrialists and Businessmen), founded in 1990 as a union of mainly small and medium-sized enterprises. T he membership of the MUSIA D has reached over 3000 firms, scattered around Turkey outside Istanbul. With an Islamic interpretation of capitalism, MUSIA D has been advocating, instead of a greedy and selfish homo economicus, a notion of homo Islamicus, a man with entrepreneurial spirit and yet morality; a moral entrepreneur, an Islamic Calvinist (ESI R eport 2005; A das 2006, 127). T he MUSIA D became visible after the electoral victory of the WP in the 1995 parliamentary elections as the economic base of support for the WP. But when the F ebruary 28 process started, the MUSIA D members were singled out as the representatives of Islamic capital, and as such marginalized and targeted. In June 1997, the general staff headquarter issued a list containing firms behind the rise of Islamist activities; they were all members of the MUSIA D. T he companies on the list were banned from running for public bids for military contracts (Bugra 1998, 534). T his was clearly aimed at damaging the “credibility” of these companies in the market. T he companies that have joined the MUSIA D are relatively new; most of them came into existence mainly after the 1980s. T he emergence of this new Islamic/ conservative capital coincided with the early neo-liberal policies in T urkey. In the 1980s, the government initiated various economic reforms in order to enhance free market economy, including privatization and liberalization, and it embarked on an export-led development strategy. It seems that the new A natolian-based conservative/Islamic capital significantly benefited from these policies. In a way it seems that these companies found an avenue for growth when national and international competition was high. It is no surprise now to see the MUSIA D defending these two attributes of the new T urkish economy: A free and competitive T urkish market with less state intervention (the state intervenes in favor of the “big capital”), and an opening to the world economy (in a closed economy the state will remain capable of destroying the Islamic capital on ideological grounds) (Demir et al 2004). F ree markets and an open economy are security valves and protection for the Islamic capital against the arbitrariness of the Kemalist/ideological state. According to Ziya Onis, MUSIAD’s view of the EU is “qualified and defensive, highly instrumental” (O nis 2001). In the early 1990s, the MUSIA D was an opponent of T urkey’s custom union with the E U. A s a group known as the A natolian tigers they had great sympathy for the A sian tigers with a communitarian and conservative development strategy. During the WP coalition government in 1996–1997 the organization was supportive of the government’s opening to the


57

F ar E ast, an indication of its aspiration for an “eastern model” (Bugra 2002, 193). It was inspired by the eastern traditionalism and communitarianism in its search for alternative modernities. But as the MUSIA D members were stigmatized during the F ebruary 28 process, they woke up to issues of broader rights, deeper democracy and wider social and intellectual coalitions, as well as to the political requirements of the E uropean integration. In parallel to the process of rethinking T urkish politics and the West in the late 1990s, like the other Islamic elite, the Islamic business community adopted a more positive attitude to the E U. T he MUSIA D asks for full E U membership and regards anything short of it as unacceptable (Hurriyet 2002) While earlier focusing merely on religious rights, with the late 1990s they discovered that in order to defend those rights they had to embrace a broader notion of democracy and human rights. Based on this repositioning they issued reports on democratization and the E U issues along with the T USIA D, the T urkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s A ssociation (MUSIA D 2000). T he MUSIA D supported the harmonization laws right from 1999 onwards. It regarded the Copenhagen criteria for E U membership as an opportunity for T urkey’s transformation, while emphasizing the need to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy. T he MUSIA D has come to support the democratization process and political reforms, as required by T urkey’s E U membership bid in the post-1999 period. F or the MUSIA D economic reforms are necessary, but not enough to move the T urkish economy forward. In a liberal fashion regarding the 1982 constitution as a straightjacket for T urkey’s economic, social and political development, the MUSIA D called for a new constitution that should be based on the modern notion that the state exists in order to serve the people. T hey expect from a new constitution a more representative system in which the will of the people will be superior to the will of the bureaucracy (MUSIA D 2007, 89). T he enactment of a new constitution, which will be a democratic and civic one that guaranties every individual’s rights independent of her or his thoughts and beliefs, became an urgent matter for the MUSIA D. F reedom of religion and conscience, freedom of entrepreneurship, freedom of thought and expression and freedom of association should be guaranteed without any distinction as to thought, belief, social class and status. T he MUSIA D also criticizes the conservatism of pro-status quo forces that are afraid of losing their privileges in the process of democratization and increasing economic competition. Such a position reflects the confidence of the MUSIAD circles in themselves. Out of this self-confidence they opt for free competition in politics as well as in the economic sphere. In this context, the MUSIA D advocates a neo-liberal position of scaling-down the state, with the expectation that this would “reduce the weight of the bureaucracy over the system”, by bureaucracy is meant the Kemalist/secularist bureaucratic center represented by the military, the judiciary and the universities, who historically have favored “secular big capital”. T he MUSIA D calls on the state to withdraw from economic activities. T he state cannot be a rule maker, the arbiter and the competitor at the same time. T he MUSIA D also advocates a public-administration reform based on participation,

58


transparency, accountability and sensitivity to basic rights and freedoms. Public administration should be reorganized in a more decentralized and less interventionist fashion in which the local authorities will be empowered vis-à-vis the center. T he MUSIA D is very critical of the way in which the state is organized and functions. T he organization claims that the supremacy of the rule of law has not been consolidated because state authorities do not function in harmony with the “universal principles and norms of the law”. In line with this rather radically reformist stand the MUSIA D declared after the July 2007 elections that the government’s homework in its new term should include deepening democratization, continuing the opening of the T urkish economy to the world, further strengthening welfare by development and public sector reform (Yeni Şafak 2007). T hese claims indicate MUSIA D’s priorities in the years ahead. A s time passed without a clear membership perspective for T urkey despite the beginning of formal negotiations for full membership, MUSIA D has become rather skeptical of the E U. T hey claim that the E U is doing injustice to T urkey that has fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and even made great progress towards meeting the Maastricht criteria. In response to the debate in T urkey before and during the E uropean Council meetings for the last 11 years the chairman of MUSIA D referred to December as the month of torture for T urkey. T he growing feeling is that negotiations are not progressing as wished and expected. While supporting E U membership the MUSIA D is also asking the government to develop a “plan B” in case the E U process gets derailed (NTV MS BN C 2006). In an EU report the MUSIAD warned that there are significant political problems between the two sides including the Cyprus question, derogations, the open-ended character of the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot attitude, the A rmenian genocide claims etc. MUSIA D warns that the E U has never been fair to T urkey and met its promises. It emerges from its 2005 report that MUSIA D’s skepticism towards the E U has grown. T he E U was criticized for focusing on the minority issues but being silent on the problems faced by the headscarved women (S abah 2005). Despite this criticism and skepticism MUSIA D asserts that T urkey’s E U vision should be maintained. T he E U-based external anchoring is viewed as necessary to sustain the dynamics of change unleashed by the E U integration process. A t the bottom line MUSIA D is of the conviction that the E U membership process will positively contribute to T urkey’s social, economic, cultural and political development, democratization and civilianization and its claim for a rightful place in the world (MUSIA D 2007). In MUSIA D’s view, the problem remains whether the West is prepared to take T urkey in as a country with an Islamic identity. Conclusion T he T urkish case demonstrates that the assertion of an Islamic identity was not directed against the West per se, but at the way in which Westernization was carried out with its exclusionary means and outcomes. In the post-1999 period it became


59

clear that a traditional top-down modernization model that excluded the Islamic periphery was no longer applicable, and that further Westernization in terms of E U membership now challenged the power of the center (i.e. the Kemalist/secularist elite). Westernization was therefore regarded emancipatory for the conservativeIslamic periphery, and the way in which Islamic circles approached the West and Westernization was transformed. A s the Kemalists, represented mainly by the military and the judiciary, increased their pressure on the Islamic social, political and intellectual groups, the dynamics of the E U integration process induced the Kemalist state-center to soften its grip over different identities (ethnic or religious), including the Islamists, through democratization and respect of human rights. T he Kemalist center came to believe that it would no longer be possible to maintain an ideological/Kemalist state in the process of the E U integration. T he Kemalists thus started to question the ultimate result of Westernization, that they had initiated in the republican era, and of democracy and human rights, out of concern that these modern political values were detrimental to their power position vis-à-vis the competing political groups. Understanding the predicament and isolation of the Kemalists in the West correctly, the Islamic groups adopted a pro-Western/pro-E U stand, and developed a new political language based on democracy and human rights that enabled them to build an alliance with the Westerners who wanted to see T urkey reformed. A s such, the attitude of the Islamic groups towards the West seems to be positional, depending on the position of their historical rival, the Kemalists/ secularists. T hus, as the Kemalists abandoned the banner of Westernization and pro-Western stand, the Islamic periphery has taken up their place in an attempt to isolate their arch enemy and to use the new international alliance they established with the West in order to weaken the Kemalist/secularist center. In short that is to say that the opposition of the Islamic groups to the West and Westernization has not been doctrinal and ontological but political and practical. In this the E U membership process with the dynamics unleashed after 1999 has served as a catalyst. A nyhow, the changing position of Islamic elite on the West is a clear break from their very tradition, which used to be based on an open “crusade” against the West, deep suspicions about modern political values (including democracy and human rights) and criticism of the T urkish history of Westernization. T his opens up new possibilities for the coexistence of Islam and the West. However, it should be finally noted that the rapprochement between Islamic elite and the West depends to a very large extent on the continuation of T urkey’s accession negotiations for full membership of the E U. T he willingness of T urkish Islamic circles to accept “inclusion” into the West/the E U would certainly be disrupted and disappointed if the E uropean “Christians” appeared to pursue a policy of “exclusion”. If the E uropeans refused T urkish membership on cultural/ civilization grounds, it would be perceived as an adherence to a clash of civilization perspective. T he E U is on trial. It should not fall victim to such a development and

60


instead give T urkish Islamic elite a chance to prove that a modern Islamic identity is not necessarily bound to be anti-western. References A das, E .B. (2006), “T he Making of E ntrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic S pirit of Capitalism”, Journal of Cultural Research, Vol. 10, N o. 2. A kdogan, Y. (2003), “Degisimin ve Donusumun T eorik Z emini”, Bilgi ve Dusunce, Vol.1, N o. 4, January, pp. 12–14. Bulac, A . (1999), “N icin A B”, Zaman, 11 December. Bulac, A . (2000), “A B’yi ne kadar taniyoruz”, Zaman, 26 O ctober. Bulac, A . interviewed with N ese Duzel, N . (1999), interview with A li Bulac, Radikal, 21 A ralik. Briefing (1997), “R ecommendations of the S tate Council meeting and Comment”, 10 March, p. 4. Bugra, A . (1998), “Class, Culture and the S tate: A n A nalysis of Interest R epresentation by T wo T urkish Business A ssociations”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, N o. 4. Bugra, A. (2002), “Labour, Capital and Religion: Harmony and Conflict Among Constituency of Political Islam in T urkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, N o. 2. Bulac, A . (2000a), “T urkiyenin ev odevleri”, Zaman, 16 F ebruary. Bulac, A . (2000b), “Bir hukukcu ile A B sureci”, Zaman, 10 June. Bulac, A . (2000c), “Keskin viraj”, Zaman, 18 N ovember. Bulac, A . (2001), Cagdas Kavramlar ve Duzenler, Istanbul, Iz Yayincilik, 17th Print. Bulac, A . (2002a), “S adece Idam ve A nadil mi?”, Zaman, 27 F ebruary. Bulac, A . (2002b), “Cumhuriyet ve Demokrasi”, Zaman, 10 S eptember. Bulac, A . (2002c), “2005 iyidir”, Zaman, 11 December. Bulac, A . (2006a), “A B’ H ukumet ve S ecim”, Zaman, 24 June. Bulac, A . (2006b), “A B’nin O zel S tatusu, A BD’nin rahatsizlig”, Zaman, 28 June. A . Bulac, A . (2007a), “S ecimler ve A B F aktoru”, Zaman, 30 July. Bulac, A . (2007b), “�� A K parti E lestirisi”, . Ceylan, H .H . (ed.) (1996), Erbakan ve Turkiye’nin Temel Meseleleri (A nkara: R ehber Yayinlari). Commins, D. (1994), “H asan al-Banna”, in R ahnema, A . (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (L ondon: Z ed Books), pp. 125–52. Dagi, I. (1998), Kimlik, Soylem, ve Siyaset: Dogu-Bati Ayriminda Refah Partisi Gelenegi (A nkara: Imge Yayinlari). Dagi, I. (2004), “R ethinking H uman R ights, Democracy and the West: PostIslamist Intellectuals in T urkey”, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, N o. 2, 2004.


61

Dagi, I. (2005), “T ransformation of Islamic Political Identity in T urkey: R ethinking the West and Westernization”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, N o. 1. Dagi, I. (2006), “T he Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Discourse of H uman R ights in the S earch for S ecurity and L egitimacy”, in Yavuz (2006). Demir, O . et al. (2004), “A natolian T igers or Islamic Capital: Prospect and Challenges”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, N o. 6. Dogan, M. (1986), Batililasma Ihaneti (Istanbul: Beyan Yayinlari). E rbakan, N . (1975), Milli Gorus (Istanbul: Dergah Yayinlari). ESI R eport (2005), Islamic Calvinism: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia, S eptember, at , H anioglu, S . (1981), Bir Siyasal Dusunur Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Donemi (Istanbul: Ucdal N esriyat). H arputlu, A . (2002), “Islamcilarin Bati T ahayyulu”, Bilgi ve Dusunce Vol. 1, N o. 1, pp. 23–7. H arputlu, A . (2003), “T urkiye’de Islamciligin Donusumleri ve Yeni Politik Durum”, Bilgi ve Dusunce, Vol. 1, N o. 4, January, pp. 15–18 H eper, M. (1997), “Islam and Democracy: T oward a R econciliation?”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, N o. 1, 1997, pp. 32–45. H ourani, A . (1980), Europe and the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press). Hurriyet (1997), 4 N ovember. Hurriyet (2000), 4 May. Hurriyet (2001), 7 July. Hurriyet (2002), “Is dunyasi umudunu Kopenhaga bagladi” . Karaman, H . (1992), Islamin Isiginda Gunun Meseleleri, III . Karaman, H . (2001), “Basortusu Yasagi ve AIH M”, Yeni Şafak, 14 O ctober. Karaman, H . (2002a), “A B ve Islamcilar”, Yeni Şafak, 15 March. Karaman, H . (2002b), “Basortusu Yasagini AIH M O naylamadi”, Yeni Şafak, 31 March. Karaman, H . (2002c), “A B H akkinda”, Yeni Şafak, 28 July. Karaman, H . (2002d), “Imam H atipli Kizlar”, Yeni Şafak, 2 December. Karaman, H . (2002e), “Baskanin A ciklamasi”, Yeni Şafak, 22 December. Karaman, H . (2003a), “Cagdasi, gerici rektor ve yardimcisi”, Yeni Şafak, 31 January. Karaman, H . (2003b) “A yrimci YO K ve R ektor”, Yeni Şafak, 2 F ebruary. Kinross, L . (1964), Ataturk: The Birth of a Nation (L ondon: Weidenfeld and N icolson). L ewis, B. (1968), The Emergence of Modern Turkey (O xford: O xford University Press.

62


Mardin, Ş. (1962), The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press). Mardin, Ş. (1971), “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, N o. 2, pp. 197–211. Metiner, M. (2004), Yemyesil Seriat, Bembeyaz Demokrasi (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap). Milli Gazete (1995), 4 December. Milliyet (2001), 15 July. MUSIA D (2000), A nayasa R eformu ve Yonetimin Demokratiklestirilesi, Istanbul. MUSIA D (2007), . NTV MSN BC (2006), 11 December 2006 O nis, Z . (1997), “T he Political E conomy of Islamic R esurgence in T urkey: T he R ise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, Issue 4, pp. 753–54. O nis, Z . (2001), “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative A nalysis of T urkish Business A ssociations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, N o. 2 O nis, Z . and E .F . Keyman (2003), “T urkey at the Polls: A N ew Path E merges”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, N o. 2, pp. 95–108. O zel, S . (2003), “T urkey at the Polls: A fter the T sunami”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, N o. 2, pp. 80–94. Pasa, S .H . (nd.) Buhranlarimiz (Istanbul: T ercuman Yayinlari). R ahnema, A . (ed.) (1994), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (L ondon: Z ed Books). R ustow, D.A . (1973) “T he Modernization of T urkey in H istorical and Comparative Perspective” in K. Karpat (ed.), Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis (L eiden: Brill). S abah (2005), “Müsiad’in A B R aporu”, . S alt, J. (1999), “T urkey’s Military Democracy”, Current History, F ebruary, pp. 72–8. Smith, H. (2003), “New breed of politicians start to find their feet”, The Guardian, 10 March. T oprak, B. (1981), Islam and Political Development in Turkey (L eiden: E .J. Brill). T ripp, C. (1994) “S ayyid Qutb: T he Political V ision”, in R ahnena, A . (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival, pp. 154–83. Ulken, H .Z . (1966), Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi (Istanbul: Ulken Yayinlari). Yavuz, M.H . (1996), “T urkey’s Imagined E nemies: Kurds and Islamists”, The World Today, Vol. 52, N o. 4, pp. 99–101. Yavuz, M.H . (1997), “Political Islam and the Welfare (R efah) Party in T urkey”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, N o. 1, pp. 63–82.


63

Yavuz, H . (2000), “Cleansing Islam F rom the Public S phere”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, N o. 1, F all, pp. 21–40. Yavuz, H . (ed.) (2006), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (S alt L ake City: Utah University Press). Yeni Ş afak(2007), .


Chapter 4

T he A lliance of Civilizations: T he S panish A pproach to Bridging the Divide between Islam and the West Koussay Boulaich and S øren Dosenrode

Introduction In his influential article from 1993, Clash of Civilizations?, and later in the book from 1996, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, S amuel P. H untington paints a dim view of the world’s future predicting an age where civilizations clash, not due to different ideologies but due to different religions. T he brutal act of terrorism, committed on S eptember 11, 2001 (“9/11”) gave H untington’s works an aura of prophecy, as did the following acts of terrorism in Madrid, L ondon, and Bali. But H untington’s realist “prophecy” was countered by a liberalist inspired “vision” of building an A lliance of Civilizations (A oC) launched in 2004 as a joint S panish-T urkish initiative at the United N ations. T his vision of a way to bridge the gap between the Western World and the Muslim World is the topic of this chapter, and as S pain played the crucial role in this project as initiator, a special focus will be on S pain. T he motives of the initiative were spelled out by the S panish Ministry of F oreign A ffairs (Ministerio de A suntos E xteriores): T he intention of this initiative is to increase world awareness to the risks that a wall of misunderstanding may arise between the West and the A rab/Islamic world, and thus the threat of a “clash of civilizations” may become a reality … A t the same time, the initiative seeks to encourage governments and leaders to establish appropriate measures on a global scale, especially in the political and cultural fields, in order to prevent the present divide between the West and the A rab/Islamic world from becoming entrenched, and perhaps jeopardize international peace and stability.

A ccording to the same document, there have been “signs of rejection of A rab and Islamic values, which are seen by many to be intransigent and a threat to their way of life” – not exactly the best prerequisites for peace and understanding. O nce the A lliance was presented to the international community, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed a High-Level Group (HLG) of internationally known persons, drawn from all regions and civilizations. T hey represented various sections of civil society, academia, the media and policy making.

66


A mong them were, for instance, the former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, S enior R abbi A rthur S chneier, N ew York, the S outh-A frican bishop Desmond T utu, and the former F rench foreign minister H ubert V édrine. T he HL G was chaired jointly by the S paniard F ederico Mayor, professor of biochemistry and a former director general of the UNES CO , and the T urk Mehmet A ydin, a professor of philosophy and minister of state. T he aim of this H igh-L evel Group has been to analyze the current situation between the Western and Muslim societies and to present some solutions to potential problems. A fter several months, in N ovember 2006 the HL G came forward with a report which singled out four essential axes of work: education, youth, immigration and the media (A lliance of Civilization 2006). When Ban Ki-Moon succeeded Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the United N ations, he supported the continuity and development of the A lliance of Civilizations. Ban Ki-Moon appointed Jorge S ampaio, the former Portuguese President, as the UN S pecial R epresentative for the A lliance, thereby indicating that the A lliance of Civilizations remained high on the UN agenda. In accordance with the conclusions of the HL G R eport, in June 2007 S ampaio presented the A oC implementation plan for the period 2007–2009, according to which the first AoC A nnual F orum was to take place in Madrid in January 2008, with a particular focus on youth-related issues. T hese developments demonstrate the formal support of the international society for this S panish-T urkish initiative not only in words, but also in deeds, by institutionalizing it and allocating UN -resources to it. In this chapter, we will be analyzing why and how the S panish government took the initiative to launch the A lliance of Civilizations. In this context we will use the foreign policy systems approach of Michael Clarke and Brian White as analytical framework (Clarke and White). In the second part we will address the problem why the A oC was launched at the United N ations and not in an E U forum, given the point that the latter constitutes the main axis of S panish foreign policy. A nd why was T urkey selected as a partner? A lso the E U support for the A lliance of Civilizations will be looked into. In the concluding part we will present some theoretical considerations, try to assess the practical impact of the A oC and to give a tentative assessment of this initiative. The Reasons behind the Alliance of Civilizations: Why Spain? A ccording to the foreign policy systems approach of Clarke and White, “the idea of decision making does not refer only to the making of conscious choices, but also to a range of personal, organizational, institutional and environmental factors which also help account for the flow of events” (Clarke and White 1989, 28). T hey apply the traditional Framework for Political Analysis of David E aston to the foreign policy system. In their view, a foreign policy system “will have inputs, processes and outputs; like any machine or organism there is some sort of fuel or stimuli at one end, a process which responds to such inputs to transform them or react to them, and an end product of some description which constitutes the

The Alliance of Civilizations

67

performance of the system” (Clarke and White 1989, 28). In accordance with this framework, we classify the factors that influenced the Spanish decision to launch the A oC in external and internal factors. T he external ones, in particular since 9/11, have characterized international society and this way influenced Spain. The internal factors influenced Spanish politics directly. External Factors T he Iraq war was an external element that broke the traditional S panish foreign policy model, based on the consensus between the major political parties. Under José Maria A znar’s leadership, S pain joined the US -led invasion of Iraq, in defiance of international law, leaving Spanish society divided. During the election campaign, Z apatero promised the withdrawal of S pain’s troops in case he won the elections. O nce elected prime minister – the very day he was sworn in – Z apatero announced the withdrawal of the S panish troops. T his decision, taken fast but in accordance with the electoral promise, led to a freeze in S pain’s transatlantic relationship. Yet this shift in S panish foreign policy, as rapid as it may appear, was entirely consistent with the traditional foreign policy of democratic S pain since its consolidation under the premiership of F elipe Gonzalez. The government also followed this model during the first six years of the A znar period (1996–2002). A ccording to the model, the N orth-A tlantic relationship has been a priority for S panish foreign policy, but on an independent basis rather than as submission, as in the last period of A znar’s time of prime minister. N aturally, Z apatero’s shift was not well seen by the administration in Washington, and S pain’s bilateral relations with the USA suffered severely. T hus the S panish initiative can also be looked at as an attempt to boost her international reputation after having offended the world’s greatest power. Besides the Madrid bombings and the S panish debate on the Iraq war, there were some other international factors that influenced the world view of the S panish prime minister, when he presented his A oC proposal to the international community and in the time afterwards: T he 9/11 attacks, the Mohamed cartoon debate (after the first launch of the AoC), the London terrorist attacks (also after the launch of the A oC) and without doubt, the Casablanca bombings in S pain’s southern neighborhood, Morocco. S een from Madrid, the stability of S pain and E urope is closely linked to the situation in Morocco and in the Mediterranean. T he situation in the Middle E ast is yet another factor that worries the S panish government, due to the close links with the above-mentioned regions (for further discussion of this point see below). Internal Factors T here is no doubt that the events of 11 March 2004, the Madrid train bombings that killed 191 people and injured 2,050, considerably marked all of S panish society and consequently also shaped the views of the S panish prime minister when he

68


presented the A lliance of Civilizations. A ll of a sudden foreign political support to a US -led action abroad had severe costs at home. T he electoral program of Z apatero’s S ocialist Party – the elections took place on 14 March 2004, three days after the Madrid bombings – did not contain a reference to the A lliance of Civilizations. A mbassador Maximo Cajal, adviser to the prime minister for the A lliance of Civilizations and one of the persons who elaborated the foreign policy program for the elections, confirmed to one of the authors that it was indeed the events of 11 March 2004 that were behind Z apatero’s decision to launch this initiative (Boulaich, interview Cajal). A lready before the 11 March attacks, the two main political blocks in S pain (the Partido Popular and the Partido S ocialista O brero E spañol) were in disagreement over the Iraq war of March 2003. A fter his election Z apatero wanted to give a comprehensive response to the problems which dominated the international agenda, namely terrorism and the rising tendency in Western societies to see Islam as being synonymous with terrorism. A ccording to Cajal, the A oC initiative thus reflected the “prime minister’s vision to overcome this fracture at the national level as well as at the international level”. A s Cajal pointed out, the “conciliatory character of the prime minister” also played an important role. In this view, the Madrid bombings were the main reason for the launch of this global initiative. S pain had been attacked by terrorism and, in the wake of it, Islam was increasingly equated with terrorism. T he A oC has therefore been an initiative whose main objective has been mutual understanding. E xtremist visions should be reduced through intercultural dialogue and through the building of bridges between our societies. The Mediterranean region: a priority for Spanish foreign policy T he Mediterranean region, being her immediate neighborhood, has been important for S pain for centuries, and as long S pain has shown engagement towards the A rab world and the Mediterranean region in particular. T his can be explained by security interest in a wide sense, due to S pain’s geographic and geostrategic situation, but also by the A rab past of the region of A ndalusia and S pain’s historical self-perception as a bridge between the A rab world and the West. T his idea was consolidated when S pain entered the E uropean Community, and it became a solid focus of S panish foreign policy. A n important aspect of S pain’s involvement with the A rab world has been her engagement for a peaceful solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The Madrid Conference of 1991 is an example of this. For the first time, Palestinians and Israelis agreed to embark on a new era in their bilateral relations in order to create stability for the region. It was symbolic in this context that this conference was held in the S panish capital, with the presence and support of the two superpowers, the US and Russia. For the first time in the post-Cold War era, Americans and Russians together were supporting an initiative with the objective of peace and stability in this region. In this light, the A oC represents a consistent step within the long-term S panish policy of attaching great importance to the A rab–Western relations.


69

In fact, the report written by the A oC H igh-L evel Group especially mentioned the Palestinian issue as “a major factor in the widening rift between Muslim and Western societies” (A lliance of Civilizations 2006, 17). Given the importance and urgency of finding a solution to this crisis, André Azoulay and H ubert V édrine, both members of the HL G, prepared a special paper on this issue at the end of the report. E ver since its entry into the E uropean club in January 1986, the Government of F elipe Gonzalez endeavored to place the A rab–Mediterranean dimension as a priority on the E uropean foreign policy agenda. T he E uro-Mediterranean agreements (E uro-Mediterranean Partnership) were launched during the S panish Presidency of the Council of the EU in 1995, again confirming Spain’s particular support for this region. T he E uro-Mediterranean Partnership is based on three pillars of cooperation with the countries concerned: the political and security pillar, the economic pillar and the intercultural pillar. T he Barcelona Declaration states that “the participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region is a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal” (Barcelona Declaration). T he measures under the economic pillar are aiming at establishing a free trade area by 2010. T he third pillar dedicated to intercultural dialogue, has been somewhat on the same wavelength as the A lliance of Civilizations. In the Barcelona Declaration the signatories underlined that “the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other”. Incidentally, at that time the S panish F oreign Ministry was lead by Javier S olana, the current H ighR epresentative for the E U’s Common F oreign and S ecurity Policy. H owever, the A lliance of Civilizations has been an initiative that has been seeking to go much beyond the Barcelona Process. T he latter connects only the E U with a group of 12 countries. T he A lliance, however, is a global initiative open to the whole international community. T he Group of F riends of the A oC consists by now (2008) of 74 countries and international organizations that are officially supporting the objectives of the A lliance. A mong them are e.g. Iran, S yria, the O rganization of the Islamic Conference, also the United Kingdom and the United A rab E mirates, but not the United S tates of A merica. S o far, the A oC has been an initiative that has followed the traditional lines of S panish foreign policy. “In essence, the call for an A lliance is a call to all of those A dviser to King Mohammed VI of Morocco. F ormer F rench foreign minister. S ee R icardo Gomez (2003) or Dosenrode and S tubkjær for detailed analysis of the E U’s Mediterranean involvement. T he date, however, has become unrealistic, see the contribution by Wolfgang Z ank, Chapter 6, in this volume.

70


who believe in building rather than destroying, who embrace diversity as a means of progress rather than as a threat, and who believe in the dignity of humankind across religion, ethnicity, race, and culture” (Ministerio de A suntos E xteriores, 9). With this in mind, it seems appropriate here to make reference to two institutions created recently in Madrid by the F oreign Ministry: La Casa Arabe (the A rab H ouse) and La Casa Sefarad (the S efarad H ouse). In the words of Gema Martin Muñoz, the Director General of the Casa Arabe and expert on the A rab world, this institution “was created with the aim to become an active instrument which should contribute at strengthening and consolidating the multifaceted relations with the A rab and Muslim countries, from political institutions and business communities to cultural and intellectual milieux. It should develop as a point of reference for the study and the knowledge of the present reality and the history of these countries” (Martín Muñoz, 3). She confirmed to one of the authors that “after the 11th March attacks, there has been a widespread consciousness of the need to solve the terrorist problem […] and to build closer ties between our societies, in order to enable a better mutual understanding […]” (Boulaich 2007, interview Martín Muñoz). La Casa Sefarad illustrates the commitment of the S panish government towards the Jewish community. Created in December 2006, the main objective of this institution has been to deepen “the study of the Jewish legacy as an integral part of the S panish culture” (Casa S efarad) and thereby to function as a bridge between the non-Jewish parts of S panish society and Jewish culture. A ll in all, an initiative such as the A oC corresponded well to the traditional efforts of S panish policy, aimed at creating and consolidating a framework of dialogue and cooperation. When it comes to the question who were the persons who mainly influenced the creation and further development of the initiative, Maximo Cajal pointed out that this problem is “one of the mysteries of the A lliance […]” (Boulaich 2007, interview Cajal). A s already mentioned, he attached much weight to the “conciliatory vision of the Prime Minister”. H owever it is likely that Z apatero’s “vision” was complemented by the expertise of the S panish diplomat Miguel A ngel Moratinos, the current Minister of F oreign A ffairs. Moratinos enjoys great international prestige and is respected by both A rabs and Israelis, due to his engagement when he was the E U S pecial R epresentative for the Middle E ast. Currently (2008), when large mental distances and signs of incomprehension make themselves felt between the two cultures, the work of Moratinos could acquire a key role, given the point that he has been the face and voice of the A oC. F rom a E uropean perspective, the A rab world remains a priority for the external action of the E uropean Union. T he cross-cultural dimension of the Barcelona Process and the southern dimension of the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy represent two key aspects of E U policy, aimed at promoting stability in the region, also for the benefit of Europe. This initiative seeks to foster a strategic partnership with these countries, however, without any perspectives of integration


71

into the E U itself. T he E uro–A rab relations have become a mature relationship. In this context, the EU has been the main axis for Spain in the configuration of its foreign policy. A ltogether it is possible to sum up that in 2004 S pain was in a situation where an act of terrorism had been conducted by foreigners, where the traditional alliance with the US had not protected her, and where the potential for unrest in the Mediterranean region seemed to grow. O n this background the S panish government was under pressure to act. The first action was to distance herself from the US , the second to launch an initiative which was different from the A merican strategy of military intervention, namely dialogue. T he next question would then be: In which frame should the initiative be launched? The Choice of the UN and not the EU: The Alliance as a Global Initiative When launching the AoC, Prime Minister Zapatero affirmed in his speech to the UN General A ssembly (Ministerio de A suntos E xteriores, 23f): O ver the last thirty years we, S panish women and men, have learned much about and from terrorism. We soon learned about its iniquity. We have learned what it is about. We have learned how to defy it, how to withstand its blows with courage and dignity. We have learned how to fight it. Precisely because of this, because we have been experiencing it for thirty years, we S paniards deeply sympathised with the suffering of the A merican people on 9/11. We knew how they felt. We know how they feel. H ere in N ew York I would like to convey the S panish people’s heartfelt solidarity with this great A merican nation. […]T hus, in my capacity as representative of a country created and enriched by diverse cultures, before this A ssembly I want to propose an A lliance of Civilizations between the Western and the A rab and Muslim worlds.

But why then did Z apatero launch this project at an international level and not at the E U level? A s we have seen, the E U itself has actively been incorporating intercultural dialogue into its external action, in particular in the context of the Barcelona Process and, more recently, the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy. T he A nna L indh F oundation in A lexandria (E gypt) is just one example of the practical activities of the EU in the intercultural field. The EU is increasingly strengthening its actorness and is gradually becoming an effective foreign policy actor acting outside the E U borders with more than 14 civil and military peacekeeping operations (cf. Dosenrode, 2007 Chapter 9). A ccording to the E uropean S ecurity S trategy, “as a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross N ational Product (GNP ), the E uropean Union is inevitably

S ee also the contribution by Wolfgang Z ank in this volume, Chapter 6. F or a divergent view see Chapter 7 in this volume, by Peter S eeberg.


72

a global player” (E uropean Council, 1). In our context, the participation in the Middle-E ast Quartet clearly shows the involvement of the E U in the region. But in spite of the strong E U engagement with the A rab world, S pain chose the forum of the United N ations and not the E U to launch the A oC, for the following reasons: The first explanation is that the EU might not be considered a good platform in the first place. The European Union has already undertaken great efforts in this field. Indeed, as Rafael Dochao Moreno, a leading EU civil servant in charge of the E uro-Mediterranean dialogue, pointed out to one of the authors, “the Barcelona process is already an A oC”. (Boulaich 2007, interview Moreno), thus there would be a risk of mixing up and confusing the initiatives. A dditionally there were other important reasons for not choosing the E U as frame: •

• • •

T he Barcelona process, which includes similar measures, has only been a moderate success exactly within the so-called “chapter on Policy and S ecurity” and “S ocial, Cultural and H uman R ights Chapter” – much more has been achieved within the area of economic cooperation. T hus this frame hardly looked attractive in 2004. T he E U might not be looked upon with great enthusiasm by certain (Muslim) states, thus a global initiative within the UN -framework could go down much easier. T he E U is basically a regional organization with strong global interests. T hus the choice of a global organization, like the UN , seemed more appropriate. A solid UN -framing could assure for the two initiators, S pain and T urkey, a stability the rotating presidency of the E U would not. A lso they would be able to stay in control more easily.

A second line of explanation is rooted in the co-patronage of the A oC with T urkey. S pain and T urkey have been leading this initiative jointly from its beginning. T urkey has E U membership aspirations, but is not a member. Consequently, launching the A oC together with T urkey as an E U initiative was not possible. But why did Spain launch the AoC together with Turkey in the first place? A ccording to Cajal, three aspects can explain this strategic choice: T urkey’s strong desire for access to the E U; the moderate-Islamic character of its government and its geostrategic situation. A nd one should perhaps add that if S pain had launched the initiative alone or with E uropean partners, it could have looked as if it was a “Western” initiative, aiming at securing Western interests. T urkey’s endeavors to become an E U member and S pain’s support for these created a good basis for cooperation. T urkey is a very useful example of a basically Muslim country with a reasonably developed democracy (though there are still severe problems concerning freedom of the press, minority rights, a military system which claims United S tates, R ussia, the E uropean Union and the United N ations.


73

the right to interfere in the governance of the state etc.). T he S panish government also wanted to support the position of the government of the E rdogan government. Maximo Cajal underlined again the importance of personality; in this case that of R ecep T ayyib E rdogan. The final aspect is Turkey’s geostrategic situation as a country with one foot in E urope and another one in A sia. In this respect similar to S pain, T urkey is a country between two worlds and is by some seen as a bridge between two cultures – although T urkey’s tacit alliance with Israel and its membership of NATO has never allowed it to play a significant role in the Muslim world. Still, Turkey is an important country for an initiative such as the A lliance of Civilizations. A third explanation points at the status of S pain in the international system. S panish foreign policy is often visualized as being oriented along four axes which determine her external action: T he E uropean Union as the main axis; the special relationship with L atin-A merica, due to a common history; the transatlantic relationship (despite its current cooling), and finally the Arab World and its Mediterranean dimension. T hus the wide geographical scope of external action distinguishes S pain from other medium powers, which in turn can help explain the launch of a global initiative. Using old connections could give S pain diplomatic goodwill as a result of the initiative, no matter whether it would be a success or a failure. T aken together, these aspects help explain why the A oC has been designed from the beginning as a global initiative and not as a purely E uropean one. S till, the role of the E U needs to be looked into. The European Union and the Alliance of Civilizations Spain is the initiator of the AoC, its first High Representative is a former Portuguese Prime Minister (Jorge S ampaio), and the A oC is made to diminish threats very similar to those perceived by the E U, so how does the E U then look upon the A lliance of Civilizations? R hetorically the E U does support the objectives of this initiative, which as mentioned, to a large extent correspond to those stipulated in the Barcelona process. T hus it would be hard to do otherwise. A ccordingly, after the summit of June 2006 the A ustrian presidency stated (Presidency Conclusions 15/16 June 2006, 11): T he E uropean Union will continue to actively promote the dialogue between cultures and civilizations through all existing mechanisms, including the Barcelona Process, the A nna L indh F oundation and the A lliance of Civilizations. Particular emphasis will be given to the role that free media and civil society as well as their promotion can play in this regard.

A fter the presentation of the conclusions of the H igh-L evel Group of the A oC in N ovember 2006 the E uropean Union expressed its support for the HL G report. Kirsti L intonen, the F innish ambassador to the UN , speaking on behalf of the E U

74


in December 2006, declared that the “E uropean Union welcomes the A lliance of Civilizations report as an important contribution to the common platform of unity, recommending a practicable program of action for states – at national, regional and local levels – international organisations and civil society” (E U 2006). S he underlined that “our collective answer to extremism must be a united effort that reinforces common values, universal principles, tolerance and understanding”. L intonen also declared the support of the E U as to the content of the conclusions of the H igh-L evel Group: “T he recommendations by the A lliance in the four categories Media, E ducation, Youth and Migration are very relevant for the implementation of the Plan of A ction. T he implementation of these recommendations through political and other measures would be a positive contribution to overcoming the existing divides among cultures and societies in general, and particularly, as stressed in the R eport of the H igh L evel Group, among Western and Muslim societies”. Javier S olana, the H igh R epresentative for the Common F oreign and S ecurity Policy (CFSP ) of the E U and former socialist foreign minister of S pain, wrote a letter to S ampaio congratulating him on his recent appointment as UN S pecial R epresentative for the A oC, and promised close cooperation and support for the time to come. T he letter was written the day after the appointment and states (S olana 2007): I have followed the work of the H igh-level Group on the A lliance of Civilizations since it was launched by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005 and which has been co-sponsored by the Prime Ministers of S pain and T urkey. I agree with the thrust of the group’s report and look forward to further discussions on how to implement the recommendations. It is both important and urgent to try to build bridges between societies, promote dialogue and forge the political will to peaceful co-existence between different cultures and religions. I do not believe that a “clash of civilizations” is imminent or inevitable, but rapid globalization certainly increases the need for intercultural dialogue and respect. T he gist of the A lliance of Civilizations project is in line with a number of E U initiatives in the field of promoting intercultural dialogue and understanding. And I look forward to engaging with my good friend Jorge S ampaio on how to take this and other related initiatives forward.

H owever, the relationship between the E U and the A oC will also largely depend on future Council Presidencies. In the second half of 2007, the President of the E U Council and the UN S pecial R epresentative for the A oC came from the same country, and one of the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency was to strengthen the E uro-Mediterranean relationship: “We also seek to develop a fresh approach towards the entire Mediterranean region. Its strategic relevance to the E U is clear.


75

T he instruments already at our disposal need to be properly applied, in particular those of a financial nature, but there is a need to think beyond them. It is necessary to intensify our political dialogue with partners on the S outhern and E astern borders to respond to challenges that require common solutions. S tability in both regions is interlinked.” (Portuguese Presidency, 10). However, the Slovenian Presidency (first half 2008) did not show much enthusiasm towards the A oC, and taking a quick look at the few projects launched within the A oC framework, only one E uropean state has made a “national strategy” (S pain; the other two states being T urkey and N ew Z ealand). It remains to be seen, what the F rench presidency (second half 2008) will produce, but as the parts of the A oC idea contains elements similar to President S arkozy’s plan of a “Mediterranean Union”, one might fear little or no interest from his side to a project which may be considered a rival to his own. S till, there are a number of concrete projects with E uropean participation, and in December 2006 the E uropean Council and Parliament decided to design 2008 as the “E uropean Year of Intercultural Dialogue” (E uropean Council and Parliament), and such an initiative harmonizes very well with the ideas behind the A lliance of Civilizations. S o why is the enthusiasm not larger? O ne main reason has been touched upon already. T he Barcelona process includes very similar elements to the A oC. T hus supporting the A oC wholeheartedly would imply moving resources from the cornerstone of the E U’s Middle E ast and Mediterranean policies. A dditionally, it would increase the possibility of bad coordination. A nother reason for the E U’s seemingly reluctant approach may be sought in the fact that the fields of “Policy and Security” and “Social, Cultural and H uman R ights” have not been very successful until yet but are seen as important to the process as a whole. T his was stressed at the “re-launch” of the Barcelona process in 2005, one year after the launch of the A oC. T he Union as such can not be interested in supporting a similar “competing” project, not under its control and with the heavy risk of overlapping and bypassing. Besides, the negative experiences from the Barcelona process may in general discourage the Union; within the E U frame one had the same aims and also an “economic carrot” and still it did not work out well. O n the other hand, the A oC’s advantage, seen with E U eyes could exactly be that it lifts the issues out of an old frame, and places them in a new without past defeats. T ime will show whether the Union embraces the A oC or not, but the prospects are not very encouraging.

Countries which qua their foreign political tradition, like e.g. Denmark and N orway should be positively inclined towards the initiative have also been reluctant in their support; Denmark has supported the Voluntary F und with 200,000 US dollars, and N orway with only 50,000.

76


Organization and the First Proposals to Bridge the Divide T he task – to reconcile civilizations and to prevent a “clash” – is huge and important and it was embraced by the UN without hesitation. A secretariat has been set up at UN -headquarters in N ew York for the period 2007–2013, and a H igh R epresentative has been appointed. A dditionally, a group of friends and a so-called “Voluntary T rust F und” will support the secretariat. A s mentioned previously, the former Portuguese President Jorge S ampaio has been appointed High Representative, thus securing a profile of high international standard. But it must be added, that S ampaio is also the UN S ecretary General’s S pecial E nvoy to S top T B, an important but time-consuming task which is bound to divide his attention from the work of the A oC. T he core of the A oC is the secretariat in N ew York. It is staffed by about 10 persons, all with a university degree and at least two-thirds of them have PhD degrees. T he annual budget has been 3.7 million US dollars in recent years. T he budget and the manpower is not insignificant, but hardly enough to organize larger project. T hus the approach has been to act as facilitator, and to create advisory bodies and networks: 1. T he “Group of F riends” meets at various levels (ambassadorial, ministerial) and has the character of a “mini general assembly” where the members or “friends” are briefed on the activities of the A oC (cf. A oC homepage); they also “[…] meet regularly to discuss partnerships and joint strategies in support of the A lliance of Civilizations objectives” (A oC H omepage). 2. T he H igh L evel Group under joint S panish – T urkish chairmanship has 20 members, from 11 regions. T his being the intellectual engine of the A oC providing ideas for projects and actions. “T he H igh-level Group guides the work of the A lliance of Civilizations, assessing the forces that contribute to extremism, and recommending collective action to counter these forces” (A oC homepage). 3. O n an ad hoc basis the A oC calls for “A lliance of Civilizations F ora”; the first was held in Madrid in January 2008. (AoC Homepage): […] the F irst A lliance of Civilizations F orum convened political leaders, representatives of international and regional bodies, religious leaders, youth, corporate executives, civil society groups, and foundations for open dialogue on reducing polarization between nations and launching joint initiatives to promote cross-cultural understanding globally.

The financial resources are supposed to come from donations, for instance to the Voluntary T rust F und (A oC H omepage): T he primary objectives of the T rust F und are to support: a. the projects and activities of the A lliance of Civilizations; b. the activities and outreach initiatives undertaken


77

by the High Representative in his official capacity; and c. the AoC Secretariat’s core operational and human resources needs.

T he approach to facilitate and create networks and a fund sets the limits, as it depends on the individual member-states or “friends’” interest in the A oC, and as indicated, the interest is limited in many cases. The High Level Group Recommendations T he recommendations of the H igh L evel Group from 2007 contain proposals for practical actions in four major fields: Education, Youth, Migration and Media. T hese recommendations “are addressed to the UN system, S tates, including their parliaments and all levels of governments (national, regional, local and municipal), intergovernmental organizations; non-governmental organizations and societies at large” (A lliance of Civilizations 2006, 33). Based on the conclusions of the HL G report, the Action Plan summarizes in its first part the objectives of the Alliance, namely (A lliance of Civilizations 2007, 6) 1. Develop a network of partnerships with S tates, international organizations, civil society groups, and private sector entities that share the goals of the A lliance of Civilizations, to reinforce their interaction and coordination with the UN system; 2. Develop, support, and highlight projects that promote understanding and reconciliation among cultures globally and, in particular, between Muslim and Western societies. T hese projects should be related to the four main fields of action of the Alliance: youth, education, media and migration; 3. E stablish relations and facilitate dialogue among groups that can act as a force of moderation and understanding during times of heightened crosscultural tensions. Beginning with the first meeting in Madrid in January 2008, there will be an institutionalized A nnual F orum of the A lliance of Civilizations. T he aims are as follows (ibid., 7): 1. Identify problems, new challenges and opportunities and exchange information good practices; 2. Consolidate and increase partners’ commitment to the objective of the A lliance and maintain and reinforce high level commitment to the initiative; 3. Create and seize opportunities for advocacy, communications activities and social mobilization; and 4. R eview progress and monitor implementation of the Programme of A ction.

78


Unfortunately the results are yet meager, at the time of writing. But that might just be the central problem of the A oC: a lack of commitment beyond rhetorical support. Concluding Remarks: A Practical Policy for Bridging the Divide between Islam and the West? T he A lliance of Civilizations has slowly matured within the framework of the international organization par excellence: the United N ations. T his shows the global nature of this initiative and, at least to some extent, the support of the international community. T he S eptember 11th attacks in N ew York mark the beginning of a new era in international society, at least seen with Western eyes. A rab-Muslim values were perceived to be increasingly rejected in Western societies, up to a point of creating a generalized tension that according to some observers could undermine international stability. S amuel H untington’s “prophesy” concerning diverging religion and culture as a reason for conflicts seemed to come true. The war in Iraq, the situation in the Middle E ast, the Mohammed caricature debate and the attacks in Bali, S harm el S heik, Casablanca and L ondon are further examples of this tension. But it was the March 11th 2004 attacks in Madrid that made the S panish prime minister launch the A lliance of Civilizations. Its objectives and the strategic choice of T urkey as co-patron make the A lliance of Civilizations an ambitious project. It was presumably no coincidence that it was S pain that started this initiative, given the point that she is a medium power where the relationship with the A rab world has been one of the main axis of her foreign policy. But also her geographical position close to the potential conflict area was a factor. S pain presented this global project to the international community and not in the framework of the European Union. But the EU supports the AoC officially. F or its part, the E uropean Union mainly organizes her relations with the A rab world through the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy and the E uro-Mediterranean Partnership, the latter having been introduced on the E U agenda during the S panish Presidency of the Council of the E U. But the E U has not supported the A oC wholeheartedly, perhaps out of fear of diluting the Barcelona process, or simply out of skepticism. H owever, the A lliance of Civilizations goes much beyond the Barcelona A greements. It is not straightforward to locate the reasons behind the A oC in the realm of theories of International R elations, should one wish to do so. T aking a “realist” or a “liberal” point of departure gives rather different results. In part the A oC might be explained within the frames of international interdependency (a liberal approach) and security policy in a wide sense (a realist approach). R educing the dangers of terrorism has been one openly declared aim of the initiators. A lso the aim of contributing to stability in the A rab and Muslim world can by seen as security policy, given the point that S pain’s own stability can be negatively affected


79

by instability in the Mediterranean world. In this sense we might see Z apatero simply as a rational self-interested actor, and this would square nicely with the assumptions of many standard theories. H owever, this type of explanation, while containing some relevance, would hardly be sufficient. The Spanish initiative cannot be understood without taking cultural and historical factors into account. O f particular importance has been the well-established self-perception of S pain as a bridge between cultures, and as a country whose historical heritage contains a strong A rab component. F urthermore, the relationship with the A rab world has been an important axis for S panish foreign policy. Consequently, S panish politicians and diplomats have a high level of awareness of developments there. Generalizing the concern for the relations with the Muslim world, and not just the A rab world, and launching the initiative at a global level was perhaps mentally relatively easy for S pain, given the traditionally wide geographic reach of her foreign policy. A strictly rational-choice explanation would also miss part of the picture if we look at the main aim of the initiative more specifically: It is about reducing misunderstandings between the cultures. T he politicians behind the A oC obviously saw misunderstandings as an important factor and problem in its own right, which should be dealt with by particular political measures. H owever, misunderstanding as an important factor in its own right does not harmonize very well with rational-choice based theories, here S ocial Constructivism has perhaps more to contribute. It is currently not yet possible, using the terms of David E aston, to assess the “output” of this initiative. It is a long-term project, and the practical work has hardly started. H owever, the fact that it has been possible to unite so many countries and governments behind such an initiative is remarkable as such. It is a powerful signal when high-ranking politicians from Western and Muslim countries jointly deliberate how they can improve understanding across cultural divides. A nd there are not many political fora such as the H igh-L evel Group where, for instance, an Iranian A yatollah and a R abbi from N ew York cooperate. In a world where TV and the internet, after all, have a reach into even remote villages, photos from an event such as the A nnual F orum can have a strong symbolical and thereby political impact. Besides, the envisaged activities in “axes of work” such as education, media or youth will surely have some effect – admittedly difficult to assess. H owever, not everyone is equally positive about the A lliance of Civilizations. Might not the main effect simply be creating promotion possibilities for authoritarian regimes such as Iran or S yria? S een in this light it does not come as a surprise that the Bush administration decided not to participate, which meant that an international key actor almost demonstratively distanced itself from the project. N or is there consensus in S pain. T he People’s Party, the second strongest political force in S pain, has been highly critical. T he former Prime Minister A znar claimed in a conference at the H udson Institute in Washington that the A lliance was “stupid and incomprehensible” (El País 2006). A dding to this the strained resources and the reluctant support of e.g. the E U and many of the “friends”, criticism of being

80


unrealistic and utopian has been inevitable. O nly time can show whether the A oC will succeed or not. But Professor F ederico Mayor Z aragoza, one of the chairmen of the H igh-L evel Group, takes such criticism philosophically: “T he A lliance is a well-considered utopia which permits and promotes evolution. T he alternative is revolution. T he difference between a well-considered utopia and a revolutionary utopia is the ‘r’ of responsibility. In conclusion, we must be responsible utopians.” (Boulaich 2007 , interview Mayor Z aragoza). References A lliance of Civilizations H omepage, . A lliance of Civilizations (2006), A lliance of Civilizations. R eport of H igh L evel Group, 13 N ovember, . A lliance of Civilizations (2007), Implementation A ction Plan of the A lliance of Civilizations (2007–2009), . Barcelona Declaration (1995), . Boulaich, Koussay (2007), L’Alliance des Civilisations: un projet ambitieux pour le futur de la Pesc?, Masters T hesis, College of E urope, Bruges. Casa Sefarad-Israel (2007), Presentación oficial, . Clarke, M. and B. White (1989), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Cheltenham: E dward E lgar). Dosenrode, S øren and A nders S tubkjær (2002), The European Union and the Middle East (London: Sheffield Academic Press/Continuum). Dosenrode, S øren (ed.) (2007), Approaching the EUropean Federation? (A ldershot: A shgate). El País (2006), Diario Independiente de la Mañana, “E l Psoe critica la actitud ‘irresponsable’ de A znar con sus declaraciones sobre el Islam”, 23�� S eptember: . E U (2006), General S tatement – R eport of H igh L evel Group for the A lliance of Civilizations, 18 December, N ew York, . E uropean Council (2003), “A S ecure E urope in a Better World – E uropean S ecurity S trategy”, 12 December. E uropean Council (2006), Presidency Conclusions 15–16 June, . E uropean Parliament and Council (2006), “Décision du Parlement E uropéen et du Conseil relative à l’A nnée européenne du dialogue interculturel (2008)”, Journal officiel de l’Union Européenne, 18 December.


81

Gomez, R . (2003), Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? (A ldershot: A shgate). H alliday, F . (2005) “T he ‘Barcelona Process’: T en Years O n”, . H untington, S amuel P. (1993), “T he Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, N o. 3, S ummer. H untington, S amuel P. (1993), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (N ew York: S imon & S chuster). Martín Muñoz, Gema (nd), “N ace Casa Árabe y su instituto internacional deestudios árabes y del mundo muselman”, Casa A rabe, . Ministerio de A suntos E xteriores y de Cooperación (2005), Dirección General de Comunicación E xterior, Alianza de Civilizaciones. Iniciativa del Presidente del Gobierno de España sobre una Alianza de Civilizaciones, N ovember,. Portuguese Presidency of the Council (2007), “A S tronger Union for a Better World”, July–December 2007, . S olana, Javier (2007), EU High Representative for the CFSP, welcomes the appointment of Jorge Sampaio as UN Secretary-General’s High Representative for the Alliance of Civilisations, S 131/07, Brussels 27 A pril, .


Chapter 5

O bstacles to A frican Unity – A Deutschian Perspective S øren Dosenrode

T o us, A frica with its islands is just one A frica. We reject the idea of any kind of partition. F rom T angier or Cairo in the N orth to Capetown in the S outh, from Cape Guardafui in the E ast to the Cape V erde islands in the West, A frica is one and indivisible.

Kwame N krumah

Introduction In 1963, T anzania’s president Julius K. N yerere wrote an optimistic article on “A United S tates of A frica”. A dmittedly, the road would not be easy, “[…] but […] certainly it can be won if the people of A frica so determine.” (N yerere 1963, 6). A nd N yerere had reasons to be optimistic; colonization was about to end in most A frican countries, there was a certain common “Pan-A frican” ideology prevailing among many of the leaders of the new, independent states, and it looked as if Kenya, Uganda and T anzania would form some sort of federation, which could show the way for the continent. A nd it did seem “logical” to unite as a means of changing the A frican economies which were geared to extraction of surplus to the colonial counties, to economies aiming at internal, A frican growth. But in spite of several attempts – for instance the O rganisation of A frican Unity (OA U), A frican E conomic Community, and now the A frican Union (A U) – A frica is still not united. T his chapter aims at setting up an analytical frame to analyze the basis or potential for integration, and to spot some of the obstacles which may lay ahead for the African unification. In doing so the article will apply Karl W. Deutsch’s “transaction analysis”, in particular the concept of “security community”. Deutsch’s approach has the advantage that it was formed in its core in the mid1950s, that is before the E uropean E conomic Community, EE C (now E uropean Union, EU) started to dominate the field of integration studies; also the collective product Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Deutsch et al. 1957) A part from the participants at the CCIS Workshop “Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations?” held at A alborg University in A ugust 2007, I want to thank former E UCommissioner Poul N ielson for his remarks.

84


focused on a number of historical cases, potentially giving their approach a larger applicability (see below). Concretely, I will present the approach by Deutsch and his partner to integration, and then apply it in an analysis of the state of integration in A frica. T hereafter follows a section on how integration could be achieved. Karl Deutsch and Security Communities Karl W. Deutsch’s (1912–1992) name is almost synonymous with “transactionalism” as an approach to integration, and he headed a major project which lead to the seminal book “Political Community and the N orth A tlantic A rea” of 1957. A t the time of publication International R elation theory (IR ) was dominated by the realist school and its rather pessimistic view on peaceful inter-state relations – Carr and Morgenthau are examples. T hus the suggestion in the title of the work by the Deutsch group, namely that states could actually change their relations into some kind of “community” was heretical, and according to A dler and Barnett it still is (A dler and Barnett 1998, 5): ”T he concept of community represents a direct challenge to the models of security politics that have dominated the discipline for the past several decades, […]” T he core of Deutsch’s pluralistic or transactionalistic approach is the idea, that communication is what keeps social groups and communities together. Moreover, (A dler and Barnett 1998, 7): Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together […], communication processes and transaction flows between peoples become not only “facilities for attention” but factories of shared identification. Through transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and the use of physical communication facilities, a social fabric is built not only among elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of community, […]

A nd community, the we-feeling, is the focal point, the nexus of integration. A s Deutsch’s name is often named in histories of integration theory, but seldom looked into, an in-depth presentation will introduce this chapter. In their book from 1957 Deutsch and his colleagues analyze “security communities” in order to see how zones of peace may develop. T heir empirical material builds on a number of historic case studies. They defined a security community, as […] a group of people which has become ‘integrated’ and integration as ‘[…] the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population. A n exception to this is R osamond (2000, 42–8).

Obstacles to African Unity – A Deutschian Perspective

85

By A MAL GA MATION we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. T his common government may be unitary or federal. […] T he PL URALISTI C security-community, on the other hand, retains the legal independence of separate governments (1957, 5f).

Unfortunately, Deutsch and his co-authors were inconsistent in regard to the relationship between “integration” and “amalgamation”. S ometimes they treat the two as synonymous, at other times they do not (1957, 93, 114 and 200). But as this paper looks at A frican unity, and expects it to take place voluntarily, building on some sort of “we-feeling”, it is possible to consider pluralist and amalgamated security communities as stages in an over-all integration process. T hus the integration is understood here as a process, which, when it fulfils the definition above, has reached the level of security community which may be subdivided into pluralistic security communities and amalgamated security communities, with the latter as the end phase (see F igure 5.1). Using this procedural approach also allows for the use of the concepts of loosely and tightly coupled security communities, as suggested by A dler and Barnett (1998, 30). Pluralistic S C

A malgamated S C –––––––––––––► Integration Process

Figure 5.1

Security communities in the Integration Process

O ne could ask oneself, whether “amalgamated” and “pluralist” security communities were not just new labels for “federations” and “alliances” respectively of a state and some inter-governmental institution. But the concept security community is broader as it includes “[…] a group of people which has become ‘integrated’” (Deutsch et. al 1957, 5).T hus a traditional alliance made with the purpose of fending off a mutual felt threat, like the S mall E ntente 1920–38, does not qualify. T here has to be “something more”, involving the citizens of the states.

O ne reason for confusion may be that Deutsch et al. developed the concept of amalgamation in a historical perspective including, for instance, medieval dynastic projects like the H absburg dynasty, which by no means was voluntary and much less democratic. Deutsch and his group was not explicit on the relationship between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities, especially not about the change from one form to the other, but a procedural approach is not in conflict with their framework as they indicate on p. 200. A dler and Barnett are focusing on pluralistic security communities, but it would be logical to use the concepts for amalgamated security communities, too, thus allowing for a more nuanced analysis of e.g. the E uropean Union and the United S tates of A merica.

86


T his “something” is a sense of community, the “we-feeling” already mentioned. T hus a pluralistic security community is not completely intergovernmental. In their analysis Deutsch and his co-authors have subdivided their theoretical part into two chapters; the background for the formation of security complexes (1) and the integration process itself (2). The findings of their analysis of background conditions for integration, (1), which are relevant for this paper are divided in two sections; first a number of general findings, and secondly a number of “essential requirements”. Their general findings may be summarised under six headlines (Deutsch et. al. 1957, 28–43): A . H istorically pluralistic security communities are easier to construct (which seems rather logical, in particular if one uses a process approach), and they keep longer than the amalgamated ones, but the latter ones are faster to act to challenges and act more decisively. B. T hey had expected a narrow “threshold of integration”, but it turned out that it often had to be a wider “zone of transition” (Deutsch et al. 1957, 33), thus supporting the process approach to integration of this paper. C. “T he kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration […] turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling”, trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it – in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making “ (Deutsch et al. 1957, 36). D. “L arger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed.” (Deutsch et al.1957, 38). E . A successful integration process needed capabilities of the participating units (Deutsch et al, 1957, 40): “S uch capabilities relevant to integration were of two broad kinds. O ne was related to the capacity to act of a political unit – such as its size, power, economic strength, administrative efficiency, and the like. The other kind was related to the ability of a unit to control its own behaviour and to redirect its own attention.” F . “T he success of or failure of amalgamation, then depended in considerable part upon the relationship of two rates of exchange: the growing rate of claims and burdens upon central governments as against the growing – in some instances, insufficiently growing – level of capabilities of the governmental institutions of the amalgamated political community.” (Deutsch et al. 1957, 42). Deutsch and his partners are unclear about the argument for longevity; the author of this paper is of the opinion that when an amalgamated security has been established and the threshold to statehood passed, then it will be more solid than a pluralistic security community. But I agree that the process towards statehood is longer and more vulnerable.


87

On the basis of their case studies Deutsch and his co-authors identified groups of “essential requirements” for the establishment of amalgamated security communities. T hey were summarised as follows (Deutsch et al. 1957, 58): A ltogether we have found nine essential conditions for an amalgamated security community: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of strong economic ties or gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and, (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. A nd we have found indications that three other conditions may be essential: (11) a compensation of flows of communication and transactions; (12) a not too infrequent interchange of group roles; and (13) considerable mutual predictability [my italics, S D].

T urning to pluralistic security communities, Deutsch and his group found that basically only two or three of the “essential requirements” for amalgamated security communities would be essential, including compatibility of major values at the decision-making strata, the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence, and a mutual predictability of behavior (Deutsch et al. 1957, 66–7). T he other requirements were far less important. A s the pluralistic security communities involve less commitment than amalgamated ones, this does not surprise. Deutsch’s group also identified a number of factors which would either prevent or slowdown the integration respective amalgamation process, or break up an amalgamated security community (Deutsch et al. 1957, 59–65): 1. E xtensive military burdens have had a disintegrating effect. 2. T he participation of large numbers of citizens, which had not previously participated in politics, has strained the political system, especially if their participation has increased ethnic or linguistic differentiation (including a rise in political awareness of such differentiation). 3. E conomic decline, over a longer period, has tended to weaken the capability of the government and the political elite. 4. T he political elites have had to be open to new members and to be able to adjust to new circumstances, otherwise counter elites were formed eventually with disintegration as the result. 5. Unfulfilled expectations in social, economic, or political reforms could also lead to disintegration. 6. “A nother aspect of the same complex of factors was the disintegrative result of any major failure on the part of a formerly strong or privileged

88


state, group or region to adjust psychologically and politically to its loss of dominance as a result of changed conditions” (Deutsch et al. 1957, 64). In the following chapter, on integration as process, (2), especially the sections on the spread of integration movement and the considerations on the formation of political organisations are relevant for this paper (Deutsch et al. 957, 104): […] we found that the two most frequently used methods, the setting up of political institutions and the use of symbols, have no apparent decisiveness at all […] T wo other methods, on the other hand, moved up to the top of the rank-list of decisiveness. T hese are popular participation in the amalgamation movement and in the operation of amalgamated institutions, and political pluralism.

Public participation did not occur in the abortive integration schemes, but it was present in half of the successful ones (Deutsch et al. 1957, 104). In spite of the problems mass participation may cause it is basic in giving impact to the movement towards integration. T he populations in Denmark, F rance, Ireland and the N etherlands have clearly told that involving people is important, if an integration project should not be stopped. O n the other hand, Deutsch and his group also warn against the involvement of “inexperienced” populations. Creating the right form of political institutions is another factor which promotes integration/amalgamation (Deutsch et al. 1957, 114): We found that a significant role in bringing about this end was played in several of our cases by the originality and resourcefulness of proponents of amalgamation or integration in formulating practical plans for approaching union and for organizing specific political institutions to make it work.

T here are many examples of new institutional designs for new integration projects, for instance federalism in its A merican variation when the traditional confederation did not work, the Prussian-led German Customs Union (Zollverein), and later the H igh A uthority of the E uropean Coal and S teel Community, the forerunner of the E U. S urprisingly Deutsch and his group did not believe in security threats as effective motives for promoting integration among the potentially involved citizens. T hey argued that stable and well-organized governments with sufficient resources were able to manage natural catastrophes, wars or economic difficulties well (Deutsch et al. 1957, 96). I am not convinced by this argument. O f course, a well-organized state with sufficient resources will be able to cope with wars and natural catastrophes, but the number of states with “sufficient” resources to stem economic depression and wars is very small. T hat was exactly the reason why (West-) Germany and F rance founded the EE C in the 1950s. T hus it looks as if Deutsch and his authors have been deceived by their own “superpower background”. H istorically some perception of a threat against the state has been the ticker for integration projects


89

like USA , E U and Canada (Dosenrode 2007, McKay 2001). Concerns about the survival of the states have been necessary as a “starter” because of, among other reasons, the strong symbolical concept of “sovereignty”. A lthough political scientists were discussing the decline of sovereignty’s importance in the 1980s, the 1990s and onwards did show the opposite trend in real life; and integration is, often per reflex, seen as a threat to a state’s “sovereignty”. Deutsch and his group end the chapter on integration processes by stressing that the processes relevant for amalgamated security communities are also applicable for the pluralistic ones, but that one has to make allowance for the latter’s much looser organization (Deutsch et al. 1957, 115). T he single most important issue leading to the emergence of pluralistic security communities was an increasing feeling of war being an inappropriate way of solving conflicts among states (ibid.). In the conclusion of their book, they give some practical advice on advancing security communities, stressing that the first step should be attempting to make a pluralistic security community (Deutsch et al. 1957, 200): “T o pursue pluralism would not preclude eventual amalgamation, but an attempt at abrupt amalgamation might well postpone for a considerable time even pluralistic integration.” R osamond (2000, 44) sums Deutsch and the transactionalists’ approach to integration up as follows: “T he guiding hypothesis of the transactionalist work on integration was that a sense of community among states would be a function of the level of communication between states. T he route to international Gemeinschaft was the establishment of a network of mutual transactions.” What makes Deutsch et al’s contribution valuable is its broad empirical basis, but that it also its weakness, as some of the cases are very old and hardly help us today (e.g. the uniting of Wales and E ngland and the gathering of the H absburg E mpire). Deutsch is also important in so fare as culture played an important role in his research, thus preceding social constructivists like A dler and Barnett (1998) and R isse (2004); but he showed also that this concept has a right of use of its own outside that particular approach to IR . A nother interesting thing about Deutsch’s work is that it may be Euro-centric, but definitely not EC or EU-centric, as only the E uropean Coal and S teel Community existed at the time of writing. A dler and Barnett criticise Deutsch for overlooking the social relations in his search for quantitative measures. T hey claimed that he overlooked (1998, 9) “the complex and casual way in which state power and practices, international organizations, transactions, and social learning processes can generate new forms of mutual identification and security relationships”. Adler and Barnett’s criticism is partly

Independence was a goal for oppressed territories in the former S oviet Union and elsewhere. T his is the only explicit mentioning of a stepwise or procedural integration in the book.


90

correct concerning Deutsch’s too strong emphasise on quantitative data, but e.g. in Political Communities … a very large part of the analysis is actually qualitative. The State of African Integration When looking at A frican unity one major task must be peace in and among the A frican states. T hus Deutsch’s basic concept of security communities in either the amalgamated or the pluralist variation seems relevant, as it leaves room both for Pan-A fricanism of N yerere’s kind and for less ambitious versions. Deutsch look at both pluralistic and amalgamated security communities in their own right, as they both build on the basic principle, that “[…] there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch et al. 1957, 5). T he wish for A frican unity is not new. Charles A ndrain (1962, 5) dates the first use of the word “Pan-Africa” to the middle of the 19th century; it was used to indicate the basic unity of the A frican continent and the idea of a united, independent Africa. But which were the concrete motives for African unification? A ndrain’s 45-years-old analysis groups the plans and visions up till then in three groups (1962, 6–9): • • •

T hose who wish to obtain economic and social progress through pragmatic unions (examples: Union des R épubliques d’A frique Centrale, Conseil de l’E ntente); those who wish to restore a common cultural heritage from the pre-colonial era (examples: the plan to resurrect the kingdom of Mali, the plan to recreate a Greater S omalia), and those who were ideologically motivated (Pan-A frican), seeking the real independence of the continent and A frican unity (examples: the 1961 initiative to create a Union of A frican S tates).

T he few examples mentioned above – there were several others – characterize the enthusiasm and idealism of the first years after independence from the old colonial powers. O ne should notice that some of these ideas were genuinely PanA frican and others were sub-regional, eventually with the built-in possibility of enlargement.10

R osamond mentions three additional criticisms (2000, 47–48): a) that Deutsch’s approach is hard to operationalize, b) a lack of clarity about the nature of transition from integration to amalgamation (cf. above) and c) the (misreading) that increased communication would necessarily lead to perceptual changes. 10 But already from the S econd Conference of Independent A frican S tates in A ddis A baba in 1960 it was clear that the new states were divided on two key questions: the total


91

A ccording to Musonda A frican history of integration can be sub-divided in five phases (2004, 46–7): • • • • •

Pan-A fricanism as rallying point and the vision for independence; damage-control after F rance’s change of decolonization policy in the early 1960s11 and the founding of the O rganisation of A frican Unity in 1963; successful attempts at creating larger sub-regional regional schemes in the 1970s and 1980s; the establishment of the A frican E conomic Community, founded through the A buja T reaty in 1991; and the foundation of the A frican Union in 2000.

Many words have been spoken and many treaties signed since liberation swept over A frica as Mistry put it (2000, 567–68): “With the exception of N orth A frica, each sub-region has three or four separate arrangements with their own institutional infrastructure, replete with sub-regional development banks. Many countries are members of two or more arrangements not only within sub-regions but across them.” But the results have not been convincing if one looks at a number of key indicators: 1. Intra-regional trade gives a good indication on the intensity of transactions within a region. It is to be expected that interactions should be intense among states in the region if one should be able to talk of integration or pre-stages for it. H owever, a high degree of economic transactions does not itself imply that political integration is around, as the case of S witzerland and the E U clearly demonstrates.12 T able 5.1 shows the trade of a number of A frican states with A frica, their own sub-region and with Europe. The figures demonstrate that generally speaking A frican countries are economically closer tied to E urope than to A frica. T he table also shows that generally the states have stronger economic bonds to their own sub-region than to the rest of A frica, which hardly comes as a surprise. What gives food for thought is the huge discrepancy in transactions between the few intraregional/sub-regional and the many extra-regional ones. T his insight is not new, and the UN E conomic Commission for A frica (E CA ) and the A frican Union have launched plans to change these circumstances (for instance the A buja T reaty), but until now with modest results.

liberation of A frica from E uropean rule, and the question of territorial partition (should one keep the old borders or try to make new ones?) (N ugent 2004, 100–101). 11 F rance had grouped her A frican colonies in two federations, the ’F rench West A frica’ and ’F rench E quatorial A frican F ederation’. Both federations were dismantled in 1958 and the 14 territories were granted independence as independent states two years later. 12 Within the E uropean Union, intraregional trade amounts for well over 50 percent of the region’s trade (E urostat 2007, 120).


92

Table 5.1

Country trade structure by main region of destination, in 2005 US dollars at current prices in millions

Country

Africa

Own sub-region

Europe

A lgeria Cameroon E gypt Gabon Ghana Malawi Mali Morocco Mozambique S outh A frica Uganda

886 361 1,093 212 212 193 18 459 393 7,166 133

802 167 727 31 144 70 8 139 287 – 73

23,734 24,000 5,935 689 1,126 196 54 7,445 1,125 18,254 348

Source: UN CTA D H andbook.

R easons for the poor results are partly political (no compliance with the treaties agreed upon), partly due to a lack of communication facilities or infrastructure. 2. Physical communication facilities are a major concern for the E CA (2004/132) “In general, the physical links in A frica fall well short of expectations: the A frican network of infrastructure and services is still very disjointed. T ransport costs are among the highest in the world, which means a high cost of doing business and products that are not competitive in international markets. F or landlocked countries transport costs can reach as high as 77 percent of the value of export”. Mistry (2000, 554f) sums the situation up as follows: After four decades of independence, Africa’s physical infrastructure still reflects its colonial inheritance. Its transport and communications links […] are not yet designed to foster intra-A frican growth and trade. S everal A frican capitals are still better connected by air via Brussels, Paris, L ondon, R ome and F rankfurt than directly with each other. E lectricity systems and telecommunications networks have been built with national concerns in mind instead of achieving the scale of benefits of regional economy and efficiency.

3. O ther indicators of the level of transactions are migration, tourism and cultural and educational exchange. When it is easier to go to L ondon or Paris than to go to the capital of the neighboring country, it does not surprise that purely physical restraints limit the number of interactions, as does conflicts and political


93

instability. A dditionally, a free movement of people, as was agreed upon, has only been partially implemented (E CA 2004/2002). A s this short overview indicates, Pan-A frica or successful regional integration is not just around the corner. Basically it looks as if A frica does not, as region, possess the basics for Pan-A frican integration. T he reasons for the disappointing performance concerning regional integration are according to Mistry13 (2000, 557f): • • • •

Protectionism – the individual governments have tried to build up industries behind protective fences, but forgotten to abolish these fences when it was possible; “[…] aid to A frica was driven less by concerns about development than by the geopolitical agenda and priorities of donors”; T he “post-independence A frican development model.” F ailed as it was a) anti-market, b) anti-private sector and anti-property rights, and c) anti-foreign investments; The major obstacles to progress have been “the vested interests that have profited from development failure. T hese mainly include A frica’s leaderships and the state apparatus”.14

Musonda (2004) basically agrees, but widens her analysis to include political aspects as well, and she adds: a) lack of political will to establish supranational organisations, b) reliance on tariffs for fiscal revenue, c) over-ambitious goals and unrealistic frames, plus plutra, in total 14 reasons for bad performance. T hus there seems to be a certain agreement that the many initiatives have been grosso modo stillborn, with the possible exceptions of the S outhern A frican Customs Union (SA CU) (which includes a customs union and a monetary arrangement15 and can be looked at as the “hard core” of the S outhern A frican Development Community, SA DC), and the West A frican E conomic Community (francophone; acronym CEAO ). But “how would Deutsch look at the situation”? Perhaps one should start by looking at the three “essential requirements” for a pluralistic security community mentioned above, to get an indication of whether there is a basis for such a community on the Pan-A frican level. T hese requirements were: 1. compatibility of major values; 2. responsiveness; and 3. predictability. A s mentioned before, pluralistic security communities do tend to succeed under far less favorable circumstances than amalgamated ones, and they may be seen as a step towards an amalgamated security community. In pluralistic security communities, power does not matter; weak states do not have to fear attacks by stronger states, thus such a zone of peace would in itself be very positive.

13 Mistry looks primarily at economic integration, and his approach is liberal. 14 S ee Z ank (2007) pp. 11–14, for a discussion of elites’ self-interest. 15 Kyambalesa and H oungnikpo (2006, 101) questions SA CU’s success because of its small number of members.


94

1. Values The first essential requirement was compatibility of major values in the politically relevant strata. O ne such value would be Pan-A fricanism (1.a). R hetorically it is widely adhered to and is institutionalised in the A frican Union. A s already mentioned, it propagated a united and free A frica. It was a driving force among Africans fighting colonialism and many of the first generation of African statesmen. But the concept is fundamentally black-A frican, coined by black-A fricans living in Diaspora and generally not much supported by A rab–A fricans (L ibyan Mohammad Gaddafi is, rhetorically, an exception). In other words, some African states do not share the same culture and history as others. Concretely, several N orth-A frican states also pledge alliance to the A rab L eague, thus “serving two masters at the same time”. A lso some of these northern countries have a distinctively different history, when relating to the extremely sensitive questions of religion and slavetrade, i.e. as Muslims and slave-traders in contrast to the much more religiously mixed S ub-S aharan A frica which suffered from the slave-trade. T hus the S ahara may be more like a barrier between the N orth and the S outh than a bridge (see below). Culture is by no means the only explanans when looking at conflicts in Northern Africa, but it is an important one. The number of conflicts where culture plays a role is too large to be ignored, although the question is extremely sensitive, as Kwasi Prah rightly argues (2001, 3).16 Prah then lists some of the states involved in conflicts in the Afro-Arab Borderlands, as he names it (2001, 3): Sudan, Mauritania, L ibya, Mali, N iger and Chad; furthermore, there is the problem of the Berbers in Morocco, A lgeria, T unisia and L ibya, still holding on to a non-A rab identity. A s long as a certain racial superiority is claimed by one side over the other (cf. Prah 2001; de Waal 2004), it goes without saying that this is not the best fundament for a regional integration project based on mutual respect and equality. Bankie comments very strongly on the A fro-A rab relationship (2007): A s Chinweizu has told us over the years, A rabia has been in an undeclared war with A frica (A rab nationalism v. A frican nationalism) since the advent of Indo-E uropeans on continental A frica. A fricans, including Kwame N krumah, chose to look the other way and refused to factor this war into the architecture of the A frican unity movement, opting instead for continentalism, that is continental unity.

Kwasi Prah is equally clear but more modified (2000, 8):

16 “T his paper attempts to historically trace and raise issues concerning tensions in the A fro-A rab Borderlands … which are generally avoided in public discussions because too many people regard these issues as sensitive and unsuitable for discussion in polite company.” (Prah 2001, 3). Prah might be referring to people like S amir A min who nourishes a strong wish for A fro-A rab cooperation (A min 1990, esp. Chapter 7).


95

T his argument is ultimately linked to continentalism; the view that the object of A frican unity is a geographical union of the African continent. This position flies in the face of the fact that, in spite of the misleading political postures of Colonel Gadafi on African Unity, a good part of N orth A frica prefers the idea of A rab Unity, “A Unity of the A rab N ation” (Wonton-el A rab). A s Z aideh in the opening to his seminal paper on A rabism argues: “T he A rabs are a nation which has been fashioned from three elements, namely race, habitat and history”. F urther on in the same text he points out that “ .. the present A rab world, from the mountains of Persia to the A tlas, is A rab. A rab in the sense that the original A rab race has been able, by intermingling, intermarriage and propinquity, to assimilate all other peoples in the area and to A rabize them. T hese populations are therefore A rab either by origin or by derivation – they are either A rab or A rabized”. Democratic principles and the notion of the right of peoples to self-determination alone require that the aspiration for A rab Unity as a democratic vision should be acknowledged and acceded. But in similar fashion, A frican Unity should be freed from the corridors of geography, silence and trepidation, and understood more culturally and historically.

S eemingly there are large barriers to overcome before the nations north and south of the S ahara share the same values.17 A nother indicator of shared values is the form of government (1.b); if it is alike it would imply a common understanding of “form of government” among leaders of state and government. A lso here the difference is huge (see F igure 5.2 below). T aking the “Democracy index” of The Economist (2007) the variation ranges from full democratic in Mauritius,18 via flawed democratic in e.g. Botswana and N amibia, hybrid regimes in Mozambique and T anzania, to the largest group, authoritarian like in Morocco, Cameroon and L ibya. Type of Regime

F ull Democracies

F lawed Democracies

H ybrid R egimes

A uthoritarian R egimes

Number of States

1

7

12

26

Source: E conomist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2007.

Figure 5.2

Types and numbers of regimes in Africa

17 A deoye A kinsanya’s article from 1976 on ‘T he A fro-A frican A lliance: Dream or R eality?’ is still worth reading. 18 S outh A frica just missed being declared “full democracy” and heads the group of “flawed democracies” in front of e.g. Italy and Hungary. Another index, Freedomhouse’s, is more tolerant, and counts 10 democracies in A frica.


96

A n additional indicator of shared values would be the political ideology adhered to (1.c) and indicators could be e.g. a crude comparison of the basic economic form of the states like capitalism vs. plan economy/socialism. But I will not dwell on this indicator here but just remind you, that Africa is also diverse in this field (see Z ank 2007). T his tentative overview indicates that there is not an outspoken compatibility of major values among the A frican states respectively among the relevant decisionmakers. E specially the difference between N orth A frica and S ub-S aharan A frica is huge, and it is hard to see how this could change in a foreseeable future. 2. Responsiveness T he second essential requirement is the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence. T he sheer amount of inter- and intrastate violence, famines and refugees indicates that this requirement unfortunately is not fulfilled. Even in the cases where there was no violence, responsiveness in the extended Deutschian way would need economic and administrative resources not at hand in a majority of the A frican states at the moment. Place

Type

Year the con.ict began

A lgeria A ngola Congo (Z aire) Ivory Coast N amibia N igeria S omalia Uganda

Insurgency Cabinda Congo War Civil War Caprivi S trip Civil Disturbances Darfur Civil Conflict

1992 1975 1998 2002 1966 1997 1983 1980

Source: Global S ecurity.O rg,.

Figure 5.3

Ongoing violent conflicts in Africa

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sums up the situation bluntly (2007): “About half of the world’s armed conflicts and some three quarters of the UN’s peacekeepers are in A frica. T his is because millions of A fricans are still at the mercy of brutal regimes … showing no respect for human rights, or even human life.” A nd so does Kwesi Prah (2000,10): While a concert of extra-A frican powers and local authorities are attempting variously to contain these conflicts through “peace-keeping” operations, the reality of the situation is that the warring parties and contending interests are by the weeks and


97

months increasing. T he emerging scenario suggests that we may very well end up in a situation where insurgents confront partnerships of local governments and external powers supplying war materiel in an increasingly festering condition of generalised war, devastation and carnage, which will imperil even the limited existential stability we find on the continent today. While Africans want peace, it is unlikely that peace can be achieved through merely police and military activity which attempts to forcibly put a lid on the boiling conditions of war and societal breakdown that we are seeing.

3. Predictability N ot all democracies are predictable, but the democratic decision-making process makes it possible for outside observers, to predict the behaviour of the state in question at least to a certain extent. A lso some authoritarian regimes are predictable. F or instance, the E uropean concert system of the post-N apoleonic era worked rather well, and it was predictable as the states had formed a regime with a common goal: Keeping peace in E urope and the sovereigns on the thrones. A t the moment predictability, in general, is low in A frica; neither democratic governments prevail, nor does a power-based peace regime exist in A frica. O ne the contrary: A large number of states led by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian heads of state, like in L ibya or Z imbabwe, are making predictability, mutual understanding and assistance impossible among the heads of state and government. If we additionally to the “essential requirements” take a look at the general findings on integration which Deutsch and his group produced (see above), the picture grows dimmer. H istorically integration often occurred around one large state, which had the necessary capabilities (political, economical and administrative), where after it developed step by step. T he A frican Union hopes to do it vice versa, by setting up a large intergovernmental organisation without power and resources. T his approach runs the risk of creating expectations in the populations which cannot be met, and thus discrediting the whole Pan-A frican project. A dditionally, Deutsch and his colleagues warned against beginning integration by founding an organisation with a lot of symbols etc. T his may be the way men do things, but it does not work. Deutsch also drew attention to the importance of finding the right form for the organisation when the time comes for it. E xamples already mentioned were the N orth German Custom A ssociation and the E uropean H igh A uthority. T hus the question arises whether the form of the A U, a duplicate of the E U but without supranational powers, is the right thing for A frica at all?


98

T his very sketchy overview indicates that the states on the A frican continent at the moment do not possess the prerequisites needed for founding a pluralistic security community in toto. T he differences in values (culture), history, forms of government etc. are simply too large, and the economies too weak. T hus one cannot have high hopes for the latest “integration machinery”, the A frican Union, which in spite of the rhetoric surroundings is only an intergovernmental organisation without powers to pursue the path to unity.19 Quo Vadis African Unity? T he history of E uropean Integration theory dates back at least to the R enaissance and it has occupied some of the best and most visionary brains of E urope, like Pierre du Bois, A bbé de S aint-Pierre, Jean Jacques R ousseau, count de S aintS imon, N ovalis, A lexis de T ocqueville, A ristide Briand and many others. But it took hundreds of years, many wars in Europe and two world wars until the first genuine political attempt was made, uniting the coal and the steal production of two former enemies under a supranational authority; A n authority which prevented the two “heredity enemies” from starting an arms race against each other, and which created the frames for a better economy and thus less social unrest. Z ank (2007) points to the fact that A frica has chosen the reverse path towards integration, by beginning with a huge, intergovernmental institution including nearly all states on the A frican continent, whereas the E U began as a “slim” supranational organisation, consisting only of six member states. In E uropean integration the factor “time” is, and has been, important. But it is relevant to wonder how – seen from outside – A frican integration could be paced forward.

19 Z ank (2007) compares the A U to the E U and discusses the differences, for instance, that the EU has strong supranational features with the ability to make qualified majority decisions, whereas the A U is fundamentally intergovernmental, with a right of intervention in other A U-member states as the major exception (Protocol R elating to the E stablishment of the Peace and S ecurity Council of the A frican Union, esp. articles 8-10). T he E CA ’s second report on regional integration from 2006 addresses and accentuates the problems of the A U (2006, 21):

• • • •

“T he legal frameworks for A frica’s integration are ambiguous and imprecise. Continental blueprints do not match reality on the ground. R egional economic communities have independently pursued their integration agendas, and their treaties appear to take precedence over continental blueprints. N o hard and fast rules bind the regional economic communities’ integration agendas to the continent wide frameworks.”


99

Create Transactions and Democracy F ollowing Deutsch and his colleagues, transactions are important if one would like to create a security community. Without transactions like trade, general mobility or communication it is impossible to create the basis of trust, the we-feeling, needed as a substitute for power. We saw above that the level of transactions is freighting low at the Pan-A frican level, although a large number of treaties and agreements have been signed over the years to overcome this problem. Thus the first steps towards creating security communities would be to further intra-regional trade, student-exchange, intra-regional communication, basic infrastructure like airlines, roads and the like. But what does it help that you know your neighbor if he is a dictator who violates human rights, the rule of law, or does not respect property rights? T hus some kind of democracy and rule of law is needed. A nd if it is necessary for your neighbour, it is for yourself too. Musonda (2004, 62) stresses the importance of this argument when looking at the A frican past: Dictatorial regimes and leaderships that were not based on rule of law have affected many countries in A frica. T his was at times, though not exclusively, compounded by lack of democracy with one party state policies in existence. T he lack of good governance and inadequacy of good leadership spilled over to regional organizations and in many cases either undermined them or destroyed them.

In international relations theory the liberal branch claims that democracies do not go to war against democratic states. O ne important contribution is Immanuel Kant’s treatise On Perpetual Peace20 from 1795. Kant argues that citizens are much too bright to begin wars, as they themselves will have to bear the costs, economically or as soldiers (1984, 12–14). H is positive look on human nature (reasonable, rational etc.) later became combined with theories on economic interdependence (cf. H obson, Keohane and N ey) and more holistic liberal approaches (cf. F ukuyama). A common basic assumption is that democracy and peace are correlated.21 F or integration projects like the A frican one, the remarks above imply that PanAfrican unification will only be able to take place when democracy (of some kind) has been introduced in all participating A frican states (se below). A nd that does not seem easy: a major obstacle to African unification is that authoritarian regimes are not interested in introducing democracy and loosing their power and possibility to exploit their countries, as Mistry also remarks (2000, 558).22 Unfortunately, the optimism concerning democratization in A frica which prevailed at the beginning of the 1990s 20 Zum ewigen Frieden. 21 A good introduction and discussion: Kegley (1995). 22 S till there are “good stories” pointing in the right direction, like Jerry R awlings, Ghana, who began as a military dictator but led his country to democracy (N olting in A ndersen 2003, 81).

100


has not been fulfilled yet – true, many states have moved from being authoritarian to hybrid or even flawed democracies, but there are still many authoritarian regimes left (N olting 2003, 78–83). But what does give reason for optimism concerning A frica’s future, is Mbeki’s, O basanjo’s and Wade’s initiative of a “N ew Partnership for A frica’s Development”. Its aim is to link democracy to rather ambitious plans for A frica’s economic future. T he democratic element is tied to the A frican Peer R eview Mechanism where A frican leaders are expected to adhere to and to further democracy. T he ambitions are high, as one sees, when looking at Ghana which went through the peer review as the first country in 2006 (cf. Economic Commission for A frica (2006a). It looks promising that the A U plays the role of a secretariat for the A frican Peer R eview Mechanism, thereby giving the mechanism an institutional backup, and the A U a constructive part to play. No Competing Integration Schemes, No Overlapping Integration Arrangements, No Variable Geometry A nother essential prerequisite for integration is that there are no competing integration schemes (Deutsch et al. 1957, 113): “[…] they had to present eventually the practical approach to union in terms of a single political plan. E liminating rival plans was crucial.” It is logical also in our case that if one is in a situation of scarce resources, membership of several integration programs hampers effective participation. T he E CA also takes a critical point of view (2004, 41): Still, many studies on African integration have pointed to the difficulties posed by multiple regional economic communities and their overlapping memberships. In all A frican subregions several regional economic communities pursue essential identical mandates and objectives, leading to wasteful duplication of efforts. T he overlap among regional economic communities also tends to dissipate collective efforts towards the common goal of the A frican Union. Moreover, it tends to muddy the goals of integration and leads to counterproductive competition among countries and institutions.

In this context it is a serious problem that several “A frican” states are members of the A rab L eague whose goal it is to promote A rab unity.23 It is hard to be considered being seriously committed to A frican unity if one at the same time promotes A rab cooperation and unity.24 23 ”T he A rab world stretches from the A tlantic coast of northern A frica in the west to the A rabian S ea in the east, and from the Mediterranean S ea in the north to Central A frica in the south, covering an area of 14.2 million square kilometers.” 24 Mistry also pleads for a reduction of integration schemes, but focuses on economic integration (2000, 567): “E conomic integration is unlikely to work without concrete attempts to rationalize the number of currencies in use throughout A frica.”


101

T hus it should be obvious that membership of the A frican Union and some sub-regional integration plan excludes membership of competitive arrangements; potential members would have to make a choice: O ne regional and one subregional arrangement only. Like Units A lready H enri de S aint-S imon insisted that units wishing to integrate had to be alike, and that they had to be democratic (1952 [1814], 50). In other words the units wanting to integrate have to share the same basic values, to be organized in the same way and adhere to the same economic model, to a higher or lover degree, depending on the ambitions of the integration plan. In E urope states wishing to join the E uropean Union will have to adopt the Copenhagen Criteria on democracy and rule by law, administrative capacities and economic model, in order to become a “like unit”.25 Z ank (2007, 24) argues likewise that “like units” must apply to economic systems; either some kind of market economy or some kind of centrally planned, socialist system. Both systems need a number of preconditions to work and they cannot be mixed. T hus democracy and similar economic systems are necessary for successful integration. Conclusion: Small Zones of Peace as the Way Forward T heoretical considerations as well as empirical facts indicate that Pan-A frican integration “top-down” does not thrive well. T he prerequisites for successful PanA frican integration are not there (the level of transactions is far too low, no like units, not enough democracies), nor is the political will. T he question is whether a “bottom-up” approach would be a possible way forward? A beginning could be to create security communities or zones of peace on a sub-regional level among like units, of predominantly democratic nature. O ne such zone could be southern Africa, more specifically Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and 25 “T he Copenhagen E uropean Council in June 1993 spelled out the conditions for E U membership known as the Copenhagen Criteria. T hese require that candidate countries have to have:

• • •

stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (political criterion); functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the E U's internal market (economic criterion), and the ability to take on all the obligations of membership, i.e. the entire body of E U law and policy known as the acquis communautaire, and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (acquis criterion)” (F ederal F oreign Office).

Freedom House Classification

Democratic System

Language

Religion

Former colonial power

Liberation

Botswana

F ree

Bantu

Peaceful

F ree

E nglish Bantu

A pprox 50/50 T raditional/ Christian Mainly Christian (93%)

UK

L esotho

UK

Peaceful

N amibia

F ree

E nglish

Mainly Christian

Germany/S outh A frica

V iolent

S outh A frica

F ree

UK

Conflict

N ot free

E nglish Bantu A frikaans E nglish Bantu

Mainly Christian (80%)

S waziland

Democratic Multiparty S ystem Democratic Multiparty S ystem Democratic Multiparty S ystem Democratic Multiparty S ystem A uthoritarian in transition

Mainly Christian

UK

Peaceful

Figure 5.4

Political and cultural indicators of the SACU countries


Country

Sources: .


103

S outh A frica. T hese countries are also members of the S outh A frican Customs Union (SACU). However, the fifth SACU member Swaziland is rather different, but it is very small by comparison and cannot influence matters inside SACU very much. SACU is a fairly small organisation with a specific functional task (customs union), not unlike the E uropean Coal and S teel Community from 1952. A very schematic overview of some basic cultural factors and major values (see F igure 5.4) indicate that Botswana, L esotho, N amibia and S outh A frica share central basic values like political rights and civil liberties, although they are only awarded the rank 2 and not 1 in F reedom H ouse’s analysis. S till, this is enough to give them the status of being free countries. T hey also have a common colonial past under the British crown (directly or indirectly), have E nglish as a common language and are influenced by the Christian faith. Altogether a number of factors giving these four states of SA CU a basis for a security community; the small S waziland is not (yet?) a democracy but shares the language, religion and the colonial past with the others. S waziland can presumably later also to be taken on board (see below) T his makes it look more reasonable to use SA CU as a starting point for deeper integration rather than the SA DC which also includes bigger countries such as A ngola, Mozambique or Z imbabwe which are not free states, i.e. states where human rights and democracy are not respected and which have no established genuine democratic tradition to fall back on. In addition, some of the SADC members have another colonial past and different official language cultures such as F rench or Portuguese. Since Namibia’s independence in 1990 there have not been conflicts among the SA CU countries, and their existing partnership, which includes an agreement on sharing the revenues from the common customs, has worked well. T his indicates that Deutsch’s second essential requirement, the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence is fulfilled. Concerning predictability, the Anglo-Saxon influence of the shared colonial past and the adherence to democracy and rule of law gives four of these five states a common ground. T his should also guarantee a reasonable predictability between the leaders of the four states. A ltogether Deutsch’s three essential prerequisites for creating a pluralist security community seem to be present, but they do not in themselves ignite an integration process. More and increased transactions in the form of, for instance, intraregional trade, exchange of students or tourism are needed. T hese factors can only be promoted if the political will is there, i.e. the will to prioritize SA CU. T his would also, again leaning on Deutsch, include attempts to create popular support for such a project. S outh A frica would be the natural part to take on the role as primus inter pares and driver of the project, a role the country is quite familiar with. But it would have to give priority to SA CU over e.g. SA DC, in order to drive the integration process and to avoid the usual pitfall of A frican regional integration, the spreading of resources over several integration projects instead of focusing on one. A lso

104

Table 5.2 Country


Economic and geographic indicators of the SACU countries

GDP in billion US$, 2005 Botswana 9.0 L esotho 1.4 N amibia 5.0 S outh A frica 239.4 S waziland 2.0

GDP/capita US$, 2005 4,944 644 2,505 5,093 1,763

Population in Size in square million km 1.7 600,370 2.2 30,350 1.9 825,418 4.7 1,221,037 1.2 17,363

Source: US E nergy Information A dministration, .

one has to question whether the sheer size of S outh A frica is too overwhelming. L ooking at some economic and geographic indicators, F igure 5.5, one clearly sees the difference. O n the other hand, S outh A frica’s “volume” has the advantage that it is clear who is primus in SA CU and thus there is no quibbling over that. A lso S outh A frica’s role as one of A frica’s most important and powerful states gives SA CU a certain importance seen from the outside. A dditionally, it would make an enhanced SA CU attractive for other states, like the EE C and E U have been. T he SA CU member S waziland has democratic problems but is allegedly about to implement a new constitution which would promote democracy. But it still lies way down on the F reedom H ouse list, and this does not make it an immediate partner for deeper integration. H owever, the four other SA CU members could choose to form a closer integration among themselves where S waziland remains outside in the beginning, but with a membership perspective. S uch a candidacy for a membership in a stronger SA CU could help “motivate” S waziland’s leaders to implement the new constitutions, not only de jure, but also de facto, in the same way as the E ast E uropean candidates for the E U had to live up to the Copenhagen Criteria. T hey made tremendous progress within various areas such as solving neighborhood conflicts, introducing minority rights and human rights in general, or restructuring their economies. T he importance of keeping a high standard must not be neglected; letting in a new member that does not fulfil the criteria would endanger the whole project, and E uropean experience shows that the eagerness to adapt falls radically when a full membership has been obtained, as the cases of Bulgaria and R umania demonstrate. Consequently, other potential members of a new SA CU such as the other SA DC countries26 would have to undergo drastic developments before they could join.

26 A ngola, Democratic R epublic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, T anzania, Z ambia and Z imbabwe.


105

A nother potential Z one of Peace would be in West-A frica and could include the three F rench-speaking and democratic countries Benin, Mali and S enegal which already cooperate in the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UE MOA ), together with Burkina F aso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, N iger, and T ogo. T hey have a common currency, the franc CFA , all of them share a common “L atin” past as F rench colonies, (with the exception of Guinea-Bissau which was Portuguese) and all are members of the L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. Using Karl Deutsch’s approach as a framework for structuring this chapter has highlighted some of the obstacles to A frican integration, such as the disastrous heterogeneity of the governmental systems of the A U member states, the cultural heterogeneity, and so forth. O n the other hand, some of Deutsch’s insights have given inspiration to consider the alternative of creating sub-regional security communities of “like units”, zones of peace. S till, this does not change the fact that Deutsch and his group did not give substantial advice as to how one could strengthen transactions between units; being like is not enough. T his could be the topic of another article. In general, Deutsch’s approach has proven to be a fruitful framework for this analysis and it could possibly be used for similar analysis in other regions. A Vision for African Unity T he differences (culture, government etc.) between N orth and S outh are by far too large for an all-A frican project for the time being – even S ub-S ahara is too diverse for an all encompassing project to begin with. T hus the vision of this paper would be democratic zones of peace which over time could spread and cover all of A frica. T he reason for spreading would be the success of the zones, in other words social learning, but a precondition for that would be the achievement of peace and prosperity. T hus the way forward, leaning on de S aint-S imon and on N yerere, would be step by step (the same way as the E uropean Union, in fact) with strong and democratic states taking the lead; not a large organization like the A U. Its role could come later, and here, too, Deutsch’s suggestion, to create institutions fitting the tasks and not just copy others, is relevant. African unification is not an easy project, but it is not impossible either. References A dler, E . and M. Barnett (eds) (1998), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A min, S . (1990), Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure (T okyo: United N ations University Press, and L ondon and N ew Jersey: Z ed Books L td). .

106


A kinsanya, A . (1976), “T he A fro-A frican A lliance: Dream or R eality?”, African Affairs, Vol. 75, N o. 301 (O ctober). A ndersen, U. (ed.) (2003), Afrika – Eine Einführung (S chwalbach Wochenschau: V erlag). A ndrain, C.F . (1962), “T he Pan-A frican Movement: T he S earch for O rganization and Community”, Phylon, F irst Quarter, 1962, vol. XXIII , no. 1, pp. 6–17. A nnan, K. (2007), “A nnan slams A frican regimes”, 23 July, 7:00 am AEST , A BC N ews, Bankie, B.F . (2007), “S outh S udan in S udan-S ituationA nalysis”, Briefing Document. . Carr, E .H . (1939), The Twenty Years Crisis (L ondon: Macmillan). Deutsch, K.W (1968), The Analysis of International Relations (E nglewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice-H all). Deutsch, K.W. et al. (1957), �� Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (N ew Jersey: Princeton University Press). Dosenrode, S . (ed.) (2007), Approaching the EUropean Federation? (A ldershot: A shgate). E conomic Commission for A frica (2004), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. . E conomic Commission for A frica (2006), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I. Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities . E conomic Commission for A frica (2006a), Ghana Undergoes Landmark Peer Review . E urostat Year Book 2006–07, . Federal Foreign Office (Germany), . F reedom H ouse (2007), Country Reports 2007 . F ukuyama, F rancis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man (N ew York: T he F ree Press). H obson, J.A ., (1988), Imperialism – A Study (L ondon: Unwin H yman). Kant, I., [1795] (1973), Zum Ewigen Frieden (S tuttgart: Philipp R eclam V erlag). Kegley, C.W. (ed.) (1995), Controversies in International Relations Theory (N ew York: S t. Martin’s Press). Keohane, R obert O . and J. N ye (1989), Power and Interdependence (Glenview, IL :S cott, F oresman/L ittle). McKay, D. (2001), Designing Europe (O xford: O xford University Press). Kyambalsa, H . and M.C. H oungnikpo (2006), Economic Integration and Development in Africa (A ldershot: A shgate). Meredith, M. (2005), The Fate of Africa (N ew York: Public A ffairs). Mistry, P.S . (2002), “A frica’s R ecord of R egional Co-operation and Integration”, African Affairs, 99, pp. 553–73.


107

Morgenthau, H .J. (1948), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (N ew York: A lfred A . Knopf). Musonda, F .M. (2004), Regional Integration in Africa – A Closer Look at the East African Community (Bâle, Genève and Munich: H elbing & L ichtenhahn). N olting, A .K., Demokratisierung und Demokratisierungshilfe, in Uwe A ndersen, (2003). N ugent, Paul (2004), Africa Since Independence (Basingstoke: Palgrave). N yerere, Julius K. (1963), “A United S tates of A frica”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, N o. 1, March, pp. 1–6. Prah, K.K. (2000), African Unity, Pan-Africanism and the Dilemmas of Regional Integration, Paper presented to the S outhern A frica R egional Institute for Policy S tudies (SARIPS ) A nnual Colloquium, H arare 24–28 S eptember . Prah, K.K. (2001), Race, Discrimination, Slavery, Nationalism and. Citizenship in the Afro-Arab Borderlands. With particular reference to the Sudan . R isse, T . (2004), “S ocial Constructivism and E uropean Integration”, in Wiener, A . and T . Diez (eds) (2004), pp. 159–76. R osamond, B. (2000), Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave). S aint-S imon, H ., Comte de [1814] (1952), Selected Writings (O xford: Basil Blackwell). UN CTA D Handbook of Statistics . Waal, A . de (2004), “Who are the Darfurians? A rab and A frican Identities, V iolence and E xternal E ngagement”, Contemporary Conflicts . Wiener, A . and T . Diez (eds), European Integration Theory (O xford: O xford University Press). Z ank, W. (2007), “A Comparative E uropean V iew on A frican Integration: Why it has been much more difficult in Africa than in Europe”, CCIS Research Series –Working Paper N o 4. .


Chapter 6

T he Gradual E uropeanization of N orth A frica: F rom “A rab S ocialism” to a “S take in E U’s Internal Market” Wolfgang Z ank

Introduction: Gradual Europeanization T he relationships between the N orth A frican and the E uropean countries have not always been easy. Bitter legacies of colonialism have left their mark, and after independence many N orth A frican politicians worked for schemes of A rab or African unification, often in an “anti-imperialist” perspective. In the 1950s and 1960s, for leaders such as E gypt’s Gamal A b’dal N asser or A lgeria’s A hmed BenBella the S oviet Union appeared to be an almost “natural” ally. In the following decades, various Islamic movements have gained strength, and their programs of asserting a cultural “authenticity” have been in contrast, if not outright opposition to the West. N onetheless the countries of N orthern A frica have experienced a process of E uropeanization. By this term I understand a development which makes their societies increasingly similar to the models in place in the E uropean Union, and which also leads to an increasingly close cooperation between the E U countries and N orth A frica. A lready by now the cooperation across the Mediterranean S ea is far more developed than patterns of Pan-A frican, Pan-A rab, Pan-Maghreb, or Pan-Islamic cooperation. E uropeanization does not exclude, say, more Pan-A frican cooperation. Pan-A frican arrangements will presumably remain less intense and less binding, and they will proceed only, if constructed in a way which is compatible with E uropeanization. In the long run, a process of N orth A frica applying for E U membership is not unlikely (Morocco actually did so already once, in 1987). T his presupposes, of course, also a development towards democracy. In this respect, I am optimistic in the long-run. T he driving force behind E uropeanization has not been love for the former colonial powers. R ather it has been the gravity of the E U market and the requirements of modernization which have pushed N orth A frica this way. In this perspective, the turning point was the collapse of “A rab S ocialism” and “Import S ubstitution S trategies”. T hereafter, the ruling elites, by pursuing what they have I follow the transcription, when possible, as applied in Murphy (1999).

110


seen as their own interest, have steered their countries gradually towards E urope. T hat they did so gradually, and not more decisively, has been the root of many problems. But the direction has been clear. Currently, (2008) it appears that the worst problems are actually over. We have to differentiate between the N orth A frican countries of course. Morocco and T unisia have been front-runners of E uropeanization. A t the other end of the spectrum is Colonel Mu’ammar Gaddafi’s Libya. But also Libya and Gaddafi have moved towards Europe, active engagement in the launch of the A frican Union notwithstanding. The Emergence of “Arab Socialism” and “Import Substitution Industrialization” A lgeria had to endure the horrors of the War of Independence (1954–1962), but in the four other countries of N orth A frica, political decolonization proceeded relatively smoothly. E gypt became formally independent already in 1936 (with still important prerogatives for the United Kingdom). L ibya was released into independence in 1951, and the F rench Protectorates over Morocco and T unisia ended in 1956. In these cases, traditional elites held strong positions, as it was symbolized by the fact that these four countries were monarchies when entering independence. L inks with the former colonial powers remained strong, and in none of these countries did the leading politicians initially aim at a break with the West. A lso the T reaty of Évian, ending the A lgerian war, contained many clauses which provided for close ties with F rance (and thereby, indirectly, with the E uropean Union). H owever, after some time, E gypt, A lgeria, L ibya and T unisia embarked on comprehensive exercises of “A rab S ocialism”. Political multi-party pluralism was abolished or at least severely restricted. T he state acquired a dominant role in the economic sphere. Morocco, not proclaiming “socialist” policies, at least followed a policy of Import S ubstitution Industrialization. In this way the countries of N orth A frica experienced a societal development which was distinct from the development in Western E urope. In fact, besides Morocco, the A frican countries adopted a model which was quite similar to the S oviet model. T he political and economic links to the countries of Western E urope were substantially reduced. We will examine the countries in turn. Egypt pioneered the development. A fter the S econd World War, there was parliamentary rule, multi-party pluralism and freedom of the press, the leading political force being the liberal Wafd party, led by members of the traditional elite, landowners and businessmen. But on 23 July 1952 a group of nationalist officers seized power. T hey had ideas of modernizing and rejuvenating E gypt, but were divided as to what this meant. T he group under N asser prevailed and established F or the sake of simplicity, I consistently write E uropean Union. T he correct term, as regards 1962, would be E uropean E conomic Community.

The Gradual Europeanization of North Africa

111

a full-fledged dictatorship with one-party rule. Already one month after the coup the government decreed a land reform by which land was distributed from large estates to peasants. T he main aim was political, namely to destroy the economic position of the traditional land-owning elite, and thereby the basis of the Wafd and other old-regime parties (Goldschmidt 1988, 92). By reducing the fees which the peasants had to pay for the use of land, the government could gain political legitimacy. By then about 60 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture which generated 35 percent of GNP and 90 percent of exports (O lsen 1993, 45). S tepwise the government introduced tight state control over agriculture. S tate-led cooperatives were endowed with the monopoly of giving agricultural credit and selling seeds and artificial fertilizers. The purchase of agricultural products was centralized, resulting in low prices for the peasants (O lsen 1993, 51). T his opened a new income source for the state which the officers used to enlarge the army and to embark on an ambitious program of industrialization, to be led by the projected A swan Dam. T he nationalization of the S uez Canal in 1956 and of foreign property after the ensuing British-F rench-Israeli attack added further sources of state income. More money could be mobilized by foreign loans, e.g. dollar credits from China. In 1957 state planning agencies such as the E conomic Development O rganization were founded. T hey could set up new companies and dispense state funds to them (Goldschmidt 1988, 117) F inally, the July L aws of 1961 brought comprehensive socialism: Industries such as textiles, tobacco, pharmaceuticals and shipping and all banks and insurance companies were nationalized, others were strictly regulated; the maximum amount of land to be owned by a private person was reduced from 200 to 100 feddans, the area above to be distributed to landless peasants (Goldschmidt 1988, 117). Within the short time of nine years E gypt was completely transformed. T he power of the traditional elites was destroyed, but so were also the institutions of parliamentary rule, freedom of the press and multiparty pluralism. Instead there was a dictatorship and only one party; the economy was dominated by state ownership, and economic processes were coordinated by the state bureaucracy. T his rapid development towards a new model was not planned for in 1952. “A rab Socialism” was rather an ex-post ideological justification for improvised measures intended to create economic development (O lsen 1993, 18). In 1956, N asser shifted ideology from E gyptian nationalism to Pan-A rabism (Olsen 1993, 17), which seemed to show first tangible results in 1958, with the foundation of the United A rab R epublic between E gypt and S yria. S oviet and Chinese credits and eastern E uropean arms deliveries seemed to indicate a drift against the West. The official line was, however, non-alignment, a movement of which N asser was one of the most vocal spokesmen. H owever, neutralism and Pan-A rabism had strong “anti-imperialist”, i.e. anti-Western connotations. A t that time this was only plausible for some A rabs, given the legacy of colonialism, the O ne F eddan is equal to 1.038 acres (Goldschmidt 1988, 171).

112


support of the West for Israel, the joint F rench-British-Israeli attack on E gypt in 1956, and the atrocities of the A lgerian war. A fter independence in 1962 Algeria also embarked on “A rab S ocialism”. T he country had suffered horribly during the war 1954–1962, which most probably cost almost 500,000 lives (Stora 2001, 111). In addition, the subsequent flight or expulsion of nine tenths of the F rench population implied huge losses of human capital and financial assets. And in the beginning there was no political stability. T he summer of 1962 actually saw a civil war between fractions of the N ational Liberation Front (FLN). It was the border army, a regular fighting force of some 40,000 men under Colonel H ouari Boumedienne, stationed during the war in T unisia and Morocco, which decided the matter in favor of A hmed Ben Bella. In 1965 Boumedienne himself took power after a bloodless military coup. The first step towards social transformation was the confiscation of French property. F arms which were vacant after their F rench owners had left, were taken over by committees of farm workers, others were made “vacant” by the expulsion of the colons. Many large holdings were first occupied by the military and were then nationalized. T hese agricultural properties were regrouped into large socalled “self-managed”, de-facto state-run, units. By 1968, they comprised almost all modern agriculture. A lthough they employed only 115,000 permanent workers, less than a tenth of the active agricultural population of 1.3 million, they produced some 60 percent of the agricultural output. A similar process comprised “vacant” businesses in industry and commerce (S tora 2001, 133f). F rom May 1966 onwards Boumedienne engineered successive waves of nationalization: Mining operations, insurances, the banks, the distribution networks of petroleum products, construction materials, fertilizers, or metallurgy. T he process culminated on 24 F ebruary 1971, with the “de-colonization” of the petroleum sector: A ll deposits of natural gas and crude oil and all pipelines were nationalized. In addition, the state took over 51 percent of the F rench oil companies E rap (later ELF ) and Compagnie F rançaise des Pétroles. N ationalizations ended formally in 1974 (S tora 2001, 154f). T he revenues from gas and oil and foreign lending provided the A lgerian state with huge sums. T he means were invested centrally, in order to promote rapid industrialization, the emphasis being on heavy industry and basic industries. Consumption industries were relegated to later phases. A nother government priority was “cultural revolution”, aimed at raising the educational level (of both sexes) and “A rabizing” it, for instance by importing teachers from E gypt and S yria. F inally, on N ovember 8, 1971, by decree from above Boumedienne started an “agricultural revolution” on land which was not previously F rench-owned. By 1975, some 5,300 cooperatives were formed on 2.8 million acres, involving some 90,000 peasants. E mployment in state-run “selfmanaged” agriculture had risen to 170,000 persons (S tora 2001, 56). A s in E gypt, the majority of small holders were subject to close government steering of input deliveries and product prices, and as in E gypt, the transformation of agriculture also had clear political aims. A s Boumedienne stated: “E ither the agrarian


113

revolution will succeed … or we will end up with a new A lgerian bourgeoisie that will perhaps be tougher and more vile than the colonial bourgeoisie that used to exploit us” (Moore 1984, 592). F urthermore, as regards foreign policy A lgeria declared a policy of nonalignment and relied on S oviet arms deliveries. R elations with F rance often went through severe crises, e.g. when A lgeria in 1964 broke the Évian T reaty by leaving the franc zone and introducing the dinar. Diplomatic relationships with the United S tates were broken off between 1967 to 1974, and on many issues A lgerian diplomacy was at loggerheads with Western powers (Moore 1984, 609). Libya also experienced profound social transformation. A fter Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had led a successful military coup and downed King Idris I on 1 S eptember 1969, he declared himself a close follower of N asser. In the 1970s there was actually a (still-born) agreement to form a new United A rab R epublic, integrating E gypt, L ibya and S yria. Yet another version of A rab S ocialism was implemented, with nationalization of the petroleum industry and central economic steering. T he remaining Italian settlers were expelled. F or many years private business was outright forbidden. In comparison to the small population, oil revenues have been extremely high, and this gave Gaddafi an unprecedented room for maneuver, making his regime a kind of “loose cannon on the deck”. Suffice perhaps to mention his support for acts of international terrorism such as the bombing of an US airliner over L ockerbie, S cotland (1988) and of a F rench liner over Nigeria in 1989. Despite Gaddafi’s Pan-Arab and later Pan-African rhetoric, relations with the neighboring countries were often extremely tense, leading e.g. to war with Chad. In 1986, the United S tates froze L ibyan assets and banned commercial transactions as retaliation for Gaddafi’s support of terrorism. After Gaddafi refused to extradite the L ockerbie bombers, the United N ations declared an arms and air embargo and banned oil equipment (Countrywatch 2006, L ibya, 10). In contrast to her neighbors, L ibya never signed a trade or association agreement with the E uropean Union, nor did she take part in the Barcelona Process or the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy (see below). T his high degree of isolation has made L ibya a very special case. However, Gaddafi’s involvement in the launch of the African Union showed an endeavor to create new contacts, and also towards the West and the E uropean Union things have been changing (see below). A lso Tunisia turned to A rab S ocialism, albeit in a rather moderate way. In contrast to the countries mentioned before, however, T unisia’s ruling elite retained an essentially pro-Western outlook after independence. T he F rench Protectorate, established in 1882, was a relatively mild form of foreign rule, and many T unisians, in the words of E mma C. Murphy, were “surprisingly favorable towards the F rench administration. T hey took into consideration that F rance was introducing the values and techniques of modernization” (Murphy 1999, 44). A lso the pro-

114


independence party Neo-Destour, founded in 1934, was not against Western ideas of modernization. It was led by new elite, many of them having a F rench university education. T he N eo-Destour modeled itself partly after the F rench S ocialist Party and supported organized labor (Murphy 1999, 47). S uccessfully it marginalized other parties and the traditional elite. A t the elections for the Constituent A ssembly (25 March 1956) the N eo-Destour gained 98 out of 98 seats. Its leader H abib Bourguiba became Prime Minister and in July 1957 President, on which occasion he simply overtook the sovereign powers of the Bey of T unis. T he party was centralized under his rule and de-facto merged with the state hierarchy. O ther parties were banned in 1963, at elections to the N ational A ssembly there was only one candidate per seat (Murphy 1999, 61, 63). A ssociations such as trade unions or agricultural unions remained legal, but became subordinate to the party. In 1961, the party changed its name to Parti Socialiste Destourien (PS D) and embarked upon nationalization, import substitution and agricultural collectivization (Murphy 1999, 55). Ahmed Ben Salah, a former trade-union official, became minister for finance and planning and tried to press forward a comprehensive agenda of regulation of industry, commerce, prices and credit. A new commercial code entitled his ministry with the right to issue regulations for each commercial sector and to define the development requirements across sectors. However, the program met considerable internal resistance, for instance by commercial and agricultural associations. In 1969, the World Bank refused to finance Ben Salah’s collectivization program, which undermined his position. F inally, a revolt of the peasants of O uardine, once a stronghold for the independence movement, marked Ben S alah’s political end. Presumably, the peasants did not demonstrate completely spontaneously, also members of the ruling elite had acquired landed interests in the region (Moore 1984, 593). E mma C. Murphy summarized: “T he PS D had learned that it could not impose enormous social change at a rapid pace from the top … and at the same time retain its incorporative and homogeneous character” (Murphy 1999, 57). T he cooperatives were dismantled, some state-owned land was sold and the private sector was explicitly acknowledged. H owever, rowing back from socialism was slow. T his left T unisia with a system characterized by one-party rule, corporatist inclusion of associations, a heavy state sector and still many regulations such as administered prices. Private business could, however, operate more freely than in the neighboring countries. Morocco’s development was somewhat different. T he traditional monarchy remained in power, and there was no revolution. T wo attempts at a military coup (1972 and 1973) showed that a trajectory like E gypt’s was possible, but both coups failed. T he monarchy encouraged pluralism and political competition up to a certain extent and used the support of traditional rural notables as a counterweight to the nationalist Istiqlal Party which represented mainly modern F rench-educated Neo-Destour, in contrast to the Destour (Constitution) Party of 1920, which included members of the traditional elite, who could not exploit the new educational opportunities and found themselves excluded from power (Murphy 1999, 45f.).


115

bourgeois groups (Moore 1984, 571 and 588). King H assan II , who had studied law at the University of Bordeaux, drafted a constitution which was endorsed by a referendum in 1962. H owever, the legislative elections did not produce a stable majority of the king’s flavor, and in 1965 he declared a state of emergency, which kept open political life in suspense for many years, with increasing police repression. T he stability of the regime depended on a balance between traditional and modern forces, and this was therefore reflected in the development strategy. In the words of Clement H enry Moore: “Industrialization at the expense of the countryside, or even agrarian reform, had to be ruled out because such policies would have endangered the royal control of the countryside exercised through traditional notables” (Moore 1984, 591). N or did comprehensive nationalizations enter the agenda. H owever, the guiding line for economic policy was Import S ubstitution Industrialization: Moroccan industries and agriculture were to be protected; a dense network of regulations, price controls and subsidies enmeshed economic life. In the 1970s, Morocco moved some way towards “A rab S ocialism”. Phosphate, her main export commodity, was under control of a state monopoly, the Office Chérifien des Phosphates. Between 1973 and 1975, the price jumped from $14 to $68 per ton, and the sudden rise lured the state into a massive spending program. 215 new state-owned firms were created until 1977 and the share of public expenditure doubled from 20 to 40 percent just between 1973 and 1977. E mployment in the public sector ballooned from 50,000 in 1960 to 500,000 in the early 1980s (S ater 2007, 82). S entiments of A rab identity were widespread, and for the regime Islamic traditions were important as a source of political legitimacy. T he government spent many efforts on A rabizing the education system (which consisted of separate lines, one in A rabic and one in F rench). In 1973 the king sent military units to S yria to fight on the Golan Heights against Israel. However, reverence to Arab traditions and Pan-Arabism did not imply hostility to the West. Dominant French influence was balanced by turning towards the United S tates, not to the S oviet Union. A s regards Pan-A fricanism, Morocco left the O rganization of A frican Unity (OAS ) in 1984 (and later did not join the A frican Union, A U). T he move was triggered by the West Sahara conflict. Hassan II claimed that Morocco had historic rights to this territory and annexed it in 1975 when S pain gave up colonial rule. But A lgeria and the OA U supported the West S aharan independence movement Polisario. T he conflict is not settled today. The distance to Pan-Africanism created another feature which distinguished Morocco from the other N orth A frican countries. T hese have been at least nominal members of OA U and A U, A lgeria and L ibya even being actively engaged in building the A frican Union. T he four countries which adopted “A rab S ocialism” built up systems which shared some important characteristics. T he political system was a dictatorship, buttressed by one-party rule. T he military played a central role, either directly or behind the scenes. Most of industry and commerce was nationalized. T he state bureaucracy was to coordinate the major economic processes; the operation of

116


market processes was highly restricted. Many important prices were regulated, and the state controlled most foreign trade and capital movements. In agriculture state-farms and cooperatives played an important role, but the majority of the agrarian population consisted of freeholders (who, however, worked under tight state control). T hese features made the A rab S ocialist countries similar to the S oviet Union, or rather, to socialist Poland. T he analogy to Poland also holds as to other aspects. F or example, the Polish and the N orth A frican regimes had to face a strong religious opposition; Islamism in N orth A frica and the Catholic Church in Poland. T he strong role of the military also constitutes a parallel: When enforcing dictatorship, the Polish communists used the army as their main instrument (Prażmowska 2004, 122); and in 1981, the military took over. Yet another parallel: When the regimes eventually saw themselves forced to raise the prices of food and other necessities, violent riots broke out which could be suppressed only at the cost of numerous lives. In Poland this happened in 1970 and 1976. A s to N orth A frica see below. As we will see soon, many problems of economic efficiency were similar and Poland and the N orth A frican countries ended in heavy foreign debt burdens. It might seem at first glance rather surprising that similar outcomes could come up in regional settings, which were so different from a cultural point of view. I know of no systematic comparative analysis that explains why four N orth A frican countries, and many more in the T hird World at large, opted for a socialist system with rigid state control. But a few keywords seem to explain this development to quite some extent. O ne factor was presumably the Great Depression in the interwar period which had shown that economic interdependence within the capitalist world economy could imply severe risks. F urthermore, going on with the market economies of the colonial period would have implied strong economic ties with the former colonial powers. F rom a nationalist point of view, state-controlled socialism seemed to open the way to “proper” decolonization and “economic independence”. In the 1950s and 1960s, numerous scholars, also in the Western world, were deeply skeptical about free trade or open market economy and many of them held important international positions. T he UN E conomic Commission for L atin A merica under R aúl Prebish consistently advocated policies of “own ways” and “Import Substitution Industrialization” and so did many highly influential dependencia theorists such as F ernando H enrique Cardoso, Celso F urtado or E mmanuel A rghiri. In the context of N orth A frica, of particular importance was Gérard Destanne de Bernis (University of Grenoble), who became advisor for the A lgerian and T unisian government. In his analysis, the economic systems of countries such as A lgeria were in colonial time outwardly oriented and inwardly disorganized. T he state could remedy such as situation by promoting investment in industries industrializantes, which through upward and downward linkages had propulsion effects for the economy as a whole (S tora 2001, 152). In addition, in the 1950s and 1960s the S oviet Union commanded high prestige in many places, not the least due to the victory in World War II . Did the


117

S oviet Union not prove that state-controlled socialism was the way to successful industrialization and political strength? N ot only N orth A frican, but also many other T hird-World leaders thought in such terms, for instance, Ghana’s Kwame N krumah (R ooney 1988, 177f). Was S talin’s philosophy of exploiting the rural masses for the purposes of industrialization not vindicated by his later successes? Theoretical Considerations on Arab Socialism and Transition to a Western Model In the first decades after independence, the North African countries built up socialist systems; later on (see below) they slowly changed course towards Western open market models. Before we proceed with the concrete development, some abstract considerations on socialist and capitalist systems are perhaps helpful. I follow to quite some extent the H ungarian economist János Kornai (Budapest and H arvard). T his author has had perhaps the most profound impact on academic thinking about the political economy of socialist systems. H e also developed a useful model of the main characteristics of socialist and capitalist systems (Kornai 2000). On a high level of abstraction, Kornai identified three aspects as being essential for the socialist system: • • •

the undivided power of the Marxist-L eninist party, a dominant position of state and quasi-state ownership, and preponderance of bureaucratic coordination.

Basically, these characteristics were in place also in N orth A frica, provided of course that we modify the first one. It does not make much sense to label the regimes in N orth A frica as “L eninist”. It was much more the military than the party leadership that was in command. H owever, also these regimes demanded a power monopoly. T hey wanted to command the economic resources of the country and they did not respect private property. T hey shared these points with the parties in the Soviet orbit. Modified this way we may say that Kornai’s three essential characteristics were in place in N orth A frica. In Kornai’s analysis, once these political characteristics were in place, they systematically generated a set of economic phenomena, first and foremost the “soft budget constraint”. A s a rule, in a capitalist system a company operates under “hard” budget constraints: E xpenses must be balanced by receipts, otherwise the company goes bankrupt. T his also implies that companies have to react to price changes rather promptly. If, say, the price of its main product declines systematically, the company has to find new products or at least alter the existing one. When prices of important inputs, say, electricity, rise, the company has to “Bureaucratic” is to be understood in the sense of Max Weber, referring to a hierarchically and functionally structured administration.

118


shift to technologies which demand less energy. By contrast, in socialist systems the budget constraints for state-owned companies have been soft: L osses were covered by the state budget. Consequently, companies reacted much slower to changing prices; they could go on making losses for many years, until the whole system went bankrupt. A s we shall see, the phenomenon of the “soft budget constraint” has been very salient also in N orth A frica. It still is today to quite some extent (see below). A problem closely related to the soft budget constraint is the absence of meaningful prices. In market economies, high prices usually indicate shortages. This means capitalists can earn higher profits when they start producing commodities in short supply. Prices therefore have an important signaling and incentive function. T he better the price mechanism operates, the better competition works. In a long-term perspective with a given technology, prices approximately reflect the amount of labor which was necessary to produce the commodity in question. But in a socialist economy, the market is absent, or at least heavily distorted. T here is no mechanism to generate meaningful prices and exercises of bureaucratic calculations have been futile – in all socialist systems. T he N orth A frican systems never completely abolished markets and market prices. But also there the price mechanism has been heavily distorted, by regulations, subsidies, tariffs, and the like. T his is also a problem which is not completely solved today (see below). In the S oviet orbit, again according to Kornai’s analysis, companies maximized physical output (“quantity drive”), i.e. they enlarged production until they hit a physical production barrier, for instance lack of inputs, energy, or labor supply. T herefore, every company was short of something. S hortage became a general feature of the systems of the S oviet orbit. E veryone who had something to offer was therefore in a strong position (“seller’s market”). T his applied also to the labor market because companies employed as many as possible. O pen unemployment disappeared rather quickly. Instead there was widespread unemployment on the job. Investment decisions were done by “plan bargaining” between elite groups behind the scenes. T his is, of course, a short description of long discussions which have kept economists busy for more than two centuries. Standard textbooks depict prices reflecting constellations of supply and demand. Under conditions of perfect competition, prices will find a longterm equilibrium where the profit rate is equal in all businesses. This long-term price equilibrium is independent of demand movements and reflects only the technical conditions of production. H owever, also machines or raw material are produces of human labor. Under certain conditions (perfect competition and a given profit rate), it can be shown that the prices in a capitalist system are roughly proportionate to the amount of labor which was necessary to produce the commodities in question. T hey are strictly proportionate when the profit rate equals zero. The higher the profit rate becomes, the more prices will diverge from proportionality. I refer here in particular to Piero S raffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities and to the discussions which this book provoked.


119

A s to the last points, the N orth A frican countries were not properly in correspondence with Kornai’s model. T he soft budget constraint was in place and so were strong tendencies towards a “quantity drive”. But the process was far from complete and nowhere in N orth A frica was unemployment eradicated, on the contrary. Job creation has usually been behind population growth which was much higher than in most parts of the S oviet orbit. In N orth A frica agriculture was still dominant in terms of employment. If continued for longer time, A rab S ocialism would presumably have produced S oviet phenomena on the labor market as well, but the N orth A frican countries did not proceed this far. S ummarizing we might say: A rab S ocialism shared important features with the S oviet/Polish model, but compared to E astern E urope not all elements of the socialist model were fully developed. H owever, the similarities between the N orth A frican systems themselves (except Morocco) and the similarities between N orth A frica and the Polish/S oviet system remain striking. In my view, these similarities can best be explained by the “affinity of the elements of the socialist system”, again a term coined by Kornai (Kornai 1992, 365–68). T he following quote by Kornai, formulated with a view to the S oviet O rbit, summarizes in fact also the N orth A frican situation quite accurately (Kornai 1992, 366): T o apply a chemical analogy, the phenomena [of socialist systems, WZ ] exhibit affinity; they attract and require each other. The monolithic structure of power, petrified ideological doctrines, almost total domination of state-ownership, direct bureaucratic control, forced growth, shortage, and distrustful withdrawal from most of the world (to mention just the main groups of phenomena) all belong to each other and strengthen each other.

The mechanisms by which this affinity works are multi-fold. We can e.g. point at the necessity of imposing strict controls over trans-border transaction once a regime starts confiscating the assets of wealthier groups; otherwise capital would rapidly flow out of the country. Once private capital accumulation is destroyed as an engine for investment, the state has to replace it – needing ever more means for investment. Under these conditions the private sector, not the least in agriculture, becomes an easy target for state-driven exploitation. A blossoming free private sector cannot be tolerated because e.g. higher private wages would destroy the wage policy in the state sector. If not outright abolished, the private sector must at least be strictly regulated. T hese systemic necessities have been working irrespectively of the cultural characteristics of the country in question, from the S oviet Union over E gypt to Ghana. T he major characteristics of the system were not intended in any of these cases when the first steps were taken. But all the steps to comprehensive and allencompassing control had to be taken, necessarily so, if the non-capitalist character of the system was to be maintained.


120

T he systemic features of socialism, with central steering and strict border controls, can also explain why there was so little practical cooperation among Arab states, in spite of the high-flying rhetoric on Pan-Arabism or Pan-Africanism. Instead of common endeavors among A rab or A frican friends, freed at last from the bondages of colonialism and its divisive tactics, we saw the “distrustful withdrawal from most of the world”, including the immediate neighbors. Comprehensive “A rab S ocialism” with its encompassing system of controls and exploitation could be enforced only by dictatorial command from above. It is no coincidence that the three ruling Colonels Nasser, Boumedienne and Gaddafi could push their countries furthest on this road. In comparatively “civilian” T unisia socialism soon met insurmountable internal opposition. In Morocco it was excluded from the outset. H aving no democratic legitimacy, the N orth A frican rulers had to rely on “output legitimacy”, mainly economic success. Under these conditions economic failure was bound to have dramatic political effects. T hese were compounded by the fact that A rab socialist systems were prone to generate widespread corruption: T he numerous points of bureaucratic control created equally numerous points of corruption possibilities. A free press, presumably the most effective antidote against corruption, did not exist. In the S oviet Union the strictly centralized Communist Party could presumably for many decades exercise enough control to keep open corruption at low levels. It gained high pitch only when the Communist Party disintegrated. But in N orth A frica parties such as the A lgerian FLN were never effectively centralized; far from preventing corruption they were one of their main loci. A ll in all, small wonder that “A rab S ocialism” was a phenomenon of rather limited duration. T o understand the development after the demise of A rab socialism, we should also consider the rival capitalist system. A gain according to Kornai, the three essential characteristics of capitalism have been: • • •

a political power friendly to private property, a dominant position of private property, and preponderance of market co-ordination.

T hese three characteristics create a set of related economic phenomena. T o these belong the above-mentioned hard budget-constraints and the responsiveness to prices. T here are no chronic shortages; everything can be bought (albeit often at a high price). Production is constrained by demand (“buyer’s market”) and it fluctuates with the business cycle. Unemployment is chronic. “Capitalism” with these characteristics is obviously a very broad category. It covers countries as diverse as S weden, Japan or the United S tates. But they all actually share Kornai’s characteristics. H owever, Kornai omits one essential point, namely the existence of a state which, true, does not steer production and investment, but performs a long row of essential economic functions such as ensuring legal stability, education or social security. A lso e.g. banking supervision or ensuring the respect for health standards are important state functions. In countries such as


121

Denmark the state distributes more than 50 percent of GDP, Germany or F rance come close to it. It is therefore misleading to say that a transition from socialism to capitalism have implied a “minor role” for the state. In capitalism the state performs other tasks than in socialist systems, but its role is actually “major”. In a way, the term “capitalism” is a misnomer. We should rather speak of “openmarket-economy-cum-welfare-and-regulatory-state”. In order not to deviate from established terminology, I continue to use “capitalism”. S ocialist systems can be stable for decades. Capitalist systems have also proven to be stable. Can systems “in between”, i.e. systems which combine important characteristics from both systems be viable? T here has been an extensive debate about this question (Z ank 2001, 9–11). S ystems in between are possible, but they are unavoidably badly performing hybrids. S trong theoretical arguments and overwhelming experience, e.g. from the futile efforts at immanent reform in H ungary, Poland or the S oviet Union prior to 1989, have shown this. Many social and economic problems of N orth A frica in the last decades have actually been rooted in an incomplete transition which has produced badly-performing hybrids, as will be explained in more detail below. A long row of conditions has to be fulfilled before a market economy can work efficiently. One central point is the hard budget constraint. Theoretically, it could be introduced also for state-owned companies. H owever, when the state owns the companies, decisions about e.g. reducing the work force become heavily politicized. Usually they are avoided or at least delayed, the losses again being covered by the state. Dominant private ownership is therefore a condition for hard budget constraints. In N orth A frica, privatization has made some progress, but e.g. in A lgeria state ownership and non-transparent soft budgets constraints are still heavy problems (see below). As a rule, market economies have to be open in order to work efficiently. As long as there are high tariffs or other protectionist devices, local producers can rather easily form a cartel, if they do not get an outright monopoly. F ree trade across the borders requires a convertible currency, otherwise the economic actors cannot import freely. A convertible currency requires a rather stable monetary and fiscal policy. The North African countries have all moved in these directions, but still in an incomplete way. In N orth A frica a particularly burdensome problem has been price subsidies. A s in Poland prior to 1990, food, fuel and other items of daily consumption have been sold at artificially low prices, supported by the state. The ruling elites hoped to garner political legitimacy this way, and social concerns are often forwarded to defend them. This has been, however, an extremely inefficient way of doing social policy. When e.g. fuel is subsidized, also the rich people can fill cheap gasoline into the tanks of their luxury cars. Furthermore, artificially low prices stimulate additional consumption, instead of giving an incentive to economize. T herefore, many observers have advocated for a long time to abolish price subsidies and to use the money instead for targeted social assistance, for health care and primary education. A s Z ine el A bidine Ben A li, T unisia’s president after Bourguiba,

122


explained it in 1989: S ubsidies “already absorb a quarter of the state’s current spending … enough to build 150 secondary schools or eight dams a year” (Murphy 1999, 106). But cuttings have often provoked furious resistance throughout N orth A frica, with tragic results in A lgeria (see below). S till today, price distortion and waste through subsidies is a substantial problem, albeit to a lower extent than previously. Will the transition to open market economies be accompanied by political change towards democracy? Presumably. T rue, historically many countries with a capitalist system have been under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. T his is also the reason why Kornai (see above) named “political power friendly to private property”, and not democracy, as the major political characteristic of capitalism. H owever, a process of modernization unleashes powerful forces for democracy. A s R onald Inglehart put it (Inglehart 2000, 92): It tends to transform a society’s social structure, bringing urbanization, mass education, occupational specialization growing organizational networks, greater income equality, and a variety of associational developments that mobilize mass participation in politics. R ising occupational specialization and rising education lead to a workforce that is independent minded and has specialized skills that enhance its bargaining power against elites … E conomic development is also conducive to cultural changes that help stabilize democracy. It tends to develop interpersonal trust and tolerance, and it leads to the spread of post-materialist values that place high priority on self-expression and participating in decision making.

A ll these processes have already had a great impact on N orth A frica. We can add to Inglehart’s list that a transition to capitalism, everywhere, has implied much more open borders, a process which contributes to undermining authoritarian rule. It follows from these considerations that the long-term prospects of democracy are good once a process of modernization has been properly started – clearly the case in N orth A frica. E mpirically the hypothesis of a correlation between democracy and modernization gains much plausibility by the observation that virtually all highlydeveloped countries are democracies (democracy here understood as a system of constitutional rules). Many countries which have experienced substantial economic growth and modernization have actually progressed from authoritarian rule to democracy, e.g. S outh Korea, T aiwan, and most S outhern A merican countries. More in N orth A frica’s neighborhood, we might point at S pain, Portugal, Greece and T urkey. T he N orth A frican countries themselves are at least in relative terms more democratic than, say, in the 1970s (see below). A fter these at times highly abstract theoretical considerations, we can now return to the study of concrete developments.


123

The Demise of Arab Socialism S ocialism and public sector growth gradually lost its attraction for N orth A frican leaders. A s already mentioned, in Tunisia Bourguiba ended Ben S alah’s push for full socialism already in 1969. In 1974, E gypt’s A nwar-al S adat opted for a policy of Infitah, opening, in order to attract foreign investment. The beginning of economic opening happened in tandem with the spectacular turn in foreign policy, away from the S oviet Union and towards cooperation with the West. In Morocco, the five-year plan for 1973–78 appeared to give up import substitution for a policy of export-led growth (Moore 1984, 603), and in 1978 King H assan II addressed the problem of an over-costly public sector and urged for reform and privatizations. A lgeria also began to change course from 1979 onwards. H owever, in all these countries the speed of change was slow. T he Moroccan bureaucracy delayed privatization for many years (S ater 2007, 83). E gypt saw little foreign investment in the 1970s, and in T unisia the public sector continued to expand. By 1970 there were 185 state-owned enterprises, in 1982 nearly 300 (Murphy 1999, 90). Problems continued to accumulate, in particular foreign indebtedness. F inally the N orth A frican countries (except L ibya) ran into severe debt crises which they could solve only with the help of the International Monetary F und (IMF ), the World Bank and other foreign donors. T he IMF credits were conditional on a S tructural A djustment Program, in order to address the root causes of the debt burden. We follow the way into the crisis in more detail in the case of Algeria, where it had the most tragic results. In the beginning, the socialist drive for industrialization, backed up by high oil revenues, seemed to be very successful, not the least after the first oil crisis in 1973 had tripled oil prices. Investment rates climbed up to levels which were among the highest in the world, up to 42 percent of GDP in 1973 and 50 percent in 1977 (S tora, 155). F rom 1977 to 1982 the production of raw steel tripled to 1.2 million metric tons. In 1974, the production of tractors began, five years later 4,900 units left the conveyor belts. E lectricity generation rose from 4,000 to 6,000 gigawatthours between 1977 and 1980. The new factories were mainly “turnkey” plants, but the difficulties in running the sophisticated technologies were usually underestimated. T he production units were often overextended; many ran at only 30 to 40 percent of their capacity. S tockpiling infrastructure and marketing were severely underdeveloped. Many plants experienced heavy cost overruns and became huge financial sinks (Stora 2001, 156). In fact, the costs of the new plants were not even studied carefully before construction. Instead it was assumed that even when running at losses, a new steal industry would contribute positively to economic development, by saving foreign currencies, and because of its industralisants effects on the surroundings (Moore 1984, 602). T his way, Destanne de Bernis’ ideas could be used to justify soft budget constraints and “quantity drive”. In fact, the A lgerian way of industrialization depended heavily on imports of technology, equipment


124

and components. A bout 70 percent of the investments and about as much of the running costs required foreign exchange (Moore 1984, 603). In parallel to the process of building up loss-making industries, the agricultural sector became impoverished. In the “self-managed” sector, previously the modern sector of A lgerian agriculture, in the years 1966–74 investment had a level of only 38 percent by comparison, which was needed to maintain the equipment. Prices and “salaries” in agriculture were frozen for ten years, in order to provide towns and industry with cheap commodities; factories were erected on 370,000 acres of good agricultural soil. This mishandling of agriculture magnified the rural exodus with a magnitude of 100,000 persons per year, which in turn exacerbated the problems of urbanization and housing. A gricultural production stagnated at low levels; even during the war it was higher. In combination with a growing population this meant rapidly falling alimentary self-sufficiency, 70 percent in 1969 and down to 30 percent in 1980. T he gap had to be closed by imports which required much foreign currency (S tora 2001, 157). By contrast, in the inter-war period wine exports were actually A lgeria’s major export revenue. A ll in all, A lgerian agriculture had been hit by three severe blows: • • •

T he exodus of the F rench farmers with their know-how and assets; socialist experiments which, as everywhere, destroyed incentives, and severe mishandling of agriculture in terms of investment and salaries.

In the 1970s and 1980s all N orth A frican countries, with the exception of the extremely oil-rich L ibya, ran into severe debt-problems. In the case of A lgeria, the figures developed as follows: Table 6.1

Algeria’s foreign debt burden from 1982 to 1992

S ervicing debt, as percentage of exports of goods and services Debt as percentage of GDP

1982

1985

1988

1992

30.7

35.7

78.7

77.0

40.2

32.5

46.8

68.0

Source: S tora 2001, 187.

T he non-oil sectors hardly contributed to exports due to weak performance and an over-valued dinar. T he high exchange rate of the dinar was a kind of state subsidy for food because it made agricultural imports cheap. But at the same time it destroyed the export possibilities of A lgerian producers. Practically all foreigncurrency income came from oil and gas, e.g. 97 percent in 1993 (S tora 2001, 187). This only worked in the first half of the 1980s, when the oil price fluctuated


125

between 30 and 40 dollars. But in 1985 it fell sharply and this resulted in the demise of A lgerian socialism. T he regime has been aware of the mounting crisis for long. F rom 1980 it began introducing economic reforms. The new five-year plan, in sharp contrast to previous strategies, gave priority to agriculture, light industry and social infrastructure. Most of the 70,000 nationalized farms were divided into smaller units and sold to private owners. A grarian prices were increased. T he big stateowned industrial holdings were also divided and got more autonomy in order to make them more flexible and market-oriented (Stone 1997, 95). Cutting public expenditure and price subsidies became unavoidable. T he regime had already lost much legitimacy due to its repressive character and widespread corruption. Discontent was widespread and led to numerous strikes. Islamism was on the rise and Berber activists vigorously challenged the regime’s definition of Algeria as only A rab. O n O ctober 4, 1988, about 5,000 young demonstrators protested violently against price rises and scarcities of basic necessities in Bab el-O ued, an overpopulated and impoverished quarter of A lgiers. T he riots spread across the country. Finally the army opened fire. Phenomena of this kind were no Algerian particularity. T unisia and Morocco had experienced “bread riots” in 1984, and in Poland price rises had triggered riots in 1970 and 1976, repressed also there by the use of arms. H owever, in A lgeria the scale of the riots and the brutality of repression were extraordinary. It is estimated that up to 500 people died, 3,500 were arrested, and many of them were tortured (S tone 1997, 64). T he “Black O ctober” initiated far-ranging political change. A lready on 10 O ctober President Chadli Bendjedid announced a referendum for a new constitution. A few weeks later he published a plan for political reform, implying the end of the power monopoly for the FNL , free municipal and legislative elections and the independence of the “mass organizations.” A t about the same time as Poland, A lgeria seemed to be on a course to democracy. But in A lgeria it was mainly the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) that profited from the new openings. In June 1990, the FIS gained a triumphant victory at the municipal elections and at the first round of legislative elections (26 December 1991) it left the FLN and a secular socialist party far behind. It was set to gain a massive majority after the second round. But there was no second round. T he army intervened, cancelled the second round, replaced President Chadli by a committee under Mohammed Boudiaf, declared a state of emergency and arrested the FIS leadership. Many Islamists took to the arms. T he unfortunate country once again had to live through many years of brutal guerrilla warfare. Whole villages were slaughtered; there were presumably some 200,000 victims. T he Armée Islamique du Salut did not declare a “truce” before O ctober 1997. Gradually political life normalized again. T he army made L iamine Z éroual acting president in January 1994 and in N ovember 1995 he gained some legitimacy by winning presidential elections with 61 percent of the votes in the first round, against three competitors (Stora 2001, 223f). His successor Abdelassiz Bouteflika

126


won the elections in 1999 and 2004, legislative multi-party elections took place from 1997 onwards. But this does not mean that A lgeria became democratic. T he president wields extensive competencies, a proper division of power does not exist, the judiciary is subject to political influences, and the parliament has no real power of control. T here are restrictions on the freedom of information, and the elections are subject to influences and manipulation. The military withdrew from the front stage, but retains a veto power (Bertelsmann 2006, A lgeria, 4–6). A s the other N orth A frican countries, A lgeria became a case of “electoral authoritarianism.” Mouloud H amrouche, named prime minister in O ctober 1989, envisaged a full transition to market economy, by generalizing the autonomie de gestion of state companies, supporting private sector growth and allowing foreign companies to enter the A lgerian economy. But he met stiff resistance in the FNL and the trade unions. Particularly controversial was the decision to give foreign companies the possibility to take over 49 percent of the shares in oil fields in order to infuse new technology and capital into A lgeria’s hydrocarbon industry, which had been severely underperforming since the nationalization of 1971 (S tone 1997, 99f). F or many years the A lgerian regime had imprudently tried to avoid a comprehensive solution of the foreign-debt problems by taking up new shorttermed loans at high interest rates. But in 1993, prognoses for the following year showed that all foreign-exchange earnings had to be used to service the debt, leaving virtually nothing for imports. T urning to the International Monetary F und (IMF ) and the World Bank could no longer be avoided. T he IMF made loans dependent on a policy which addressed the root causes of the growing indebtedness, implying first and foremost a devaluation of the dinar, but also cuts in public expenditure, higher charges for public services, higher A lgerian interest rates and privatizations. F inally, in A pril 1994 the dinar was devalued by 40.17 percent, and on June 1 the foreign debt, some 26 billion dollars, was restructured (S tora 2001, 187, 266), facilitated by a stand-by agreement with the IMF . A s the authors of the A lgeria chapter of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index wrote, the program “resulted in macroeconomic stabilization, but at an incredibly high social cost; from 1994–2004 up to 600,000 jobs were lost and a large informal sector developed” (Bertelsmann 2006, A lgeria, 3). But it was not the S tructural A djustment Program which created these costs. T hey were generated by the economic policy before 1994. T here was no alternative to macroeconomic stabilization because A lgeria, lavishly endowed with natural resources, was simply bankrupt. A s were Poland, the S oviet Union or the German Democratic R epublic by about the same time. T he program laid the ground for a return to economic growth and it brought A lgeria some steps away from the old system. E ver since the A lgerian government has continued on the path to an open market economy, albeit slowly. In the new millennium, rising oil and gas revenues removed much pressure, but also weakened incentives for further reforms. We will take the current problems up below. A fter 1990, the models of A lgeria and Poland began to diverge substantially. O n January 1, 1990, the S olidarity government introduced a comprehensive reform package of price liberalization, foreign trade liberalization, currency convertibility,


127

reduction of subsidies and macroeconomic stabilization. T he program aimed at economic reform, but also at a fast break with the old power structures. A fter two years of transition recession (the shortest in the former S oviet orbit) growth resumed strongly, and has done so ever since. Democratic rights and procedures and division of power are firmly in place. In Algeria, however, the old elite remained in power, and they preserved many features of the old system. A lso the other N orth A frican countries, except L ibya, faced ever-growing debt burdens and had to ask the IMF and the World Bank for help. Egypt’s opening after 1974 did not lead to sufficient foreign investment, foreign debt grew. Western experts criticized in particular the enormous subsidies for oil, gasoline, electricity and food. A lso the E gyptian currency was overvalued and the system with various exchange rates created many distortions. F inally in 1987, the E gyptian government signed an arrangement with the IMF and received 150 million dollars. T he Western donors, organized in the “Paris Club”, agreed to a restructuring of E gypt’s debt. H owever, a year later Cairo declared that it could not realize the reforms at the agreed speed, for fear of social unrest. T he IMF suspended further loans temporarily. But Cairo implemented some reforms on its own initiative and the Central Bank devalued the E gyptian pound. In 1991, a new agreement with the IMF opened the way for new loans, conditioned on further reform such as cutting subsidies and implementing one exchange rate, to be determined by the market forces. In order to mitigate the social consequences of the cuts, a special “S ocial Fund” was founded, financed by the IMF, the World Bank, some EU member states and Gulf states (O lsen 1993, 61–4). E ver since, the E gyptian government has kept a slow, but rather steady reform course towards market economy and towards proper welfare state arrangements. In Morocco from 1978 onwards King H assan II urged for public sector reform and privatizations, but a reluctant bureaucracy could resist implementation. H owever, in 1983 the falling phosphate prices brought Morocco to near-bankruptcy. In S eptember 1983, R abat signed an agreement with the IMF , the World Bank and the major creditors, conditioned on a S tructural A djustment Program. H owever, resistance from parts of the bureaucracy and trade unions and fear of social unrest also made Morocco a slow transformer. Privatization began in earnest in 1988 but experienced serious delays (S ater 2007, 82f). T he Tunisian government had ended its course towards socialism already in 1969. T ourism and workers’ remittances created new sources of foreign-currency revenue. H owever, the T unisian economy continued to be burdened by a huge public sector, many loss-making state-owned enterprises, heavy costs for price subsidies and a growing debt burden. A lso the new E U textile tariffs after 1977 hit T unisia hard. In the 1980s, the T unisian oil reserves approached depletion, oil and phosphate prices were falling. In the summer of 1986, foreign-exchange reserves could at one point in time cover just four days of imports. T he crisis “jolted the government into reforms for which many had been arguing” (Murphy 1999, 96). A revised budget was designed in cooperation with the IMF , and in S eptember 1986 T unisia signed arrangements with the IMF , the World Bank and

128


the major creditors. Many of the reforms had been discussed in T unisia already for a long time, so implementation was smoother than in the neighboring countries. T he World Bank came already in 1986 to relatively optimistic conclusions: “[I]t is expected that, as the set of programmed reforms is implemented, the economy will witness steady growth, with manageable deficits” (Murphy 1999, 97). This prognosis was basically correct. T he reforms implied the lifting of import restrictions and of the rule that investment decisions needed state approval; many prices of manufactured goods were deregulated. F ood prices were raised by between 10 and 15 percent (partly disguised by a re-weighting of the standard baguette). A s compensation, a N ational Program for A ssistance to N eedy F amilies provided direct assistance for families below the poverty line. By 1991, there was a food surplus for the first time since independence. S upported by new World Bank and IMF loans, T unisia embarked on a rather steady reform course. In 1993 T he IMF summarized the development as follows (Murphy 1999, 130): T unisia’s progress in its structural and macroeconomic adjustment efforts during 1986– 1992 provides a prime example of the successful transformation of an economy from one heavily regulated by government to one based on market orientation and from inward-looking to export-oriented one.

T unisia experienced steady progress thereafter and is today (2008) the most developed N orth A frican economy. S tandards of living and social indicators such as life expectancy and literacy are the highest in N orth A frica (see T able 6.3) and approach the levels of the poorer E U member states. A s regards indicators of “business climate”, T unisia is also the top performer in the region, ranking even higher than some E U member states (E uropean Commission 2005, 55) Libya has been a particular case in many respects. T he political system has been remarkably stable, not the least due to relatively favorable social conditions caused by the oil richness. T here is no poverty in L ibya, understood the way that no L ibyan has to live for less than a dollar a day. Unlike the other N orth A frican countries, L ibya has never asked the IMF for support. But interestingly, many of the trends we have seen in the other countries are also traceable in L ibya. After his military coup in 1969, Gaddafi originally followed a Nasserist policy, with one-party rule, A rab socialism and comprehensive nationalization. F or a while even private property as such was under attack. F rom 1975–76 onwards the political system was changed to “the state of the masses”, Jamahiriya. It consists of two sectors, the R evolutionary sector and the “Jamahiriya sector. In the formally democratic Jamahiriya sector people can elect representatives, legislators and leaders, from local up to central level. H owever, the 12-person R evolutionary Command Council and R evolutionary committees on all the lower levels can veto all decisions; no one can be elected without their endorsement. H owever, in the economic sphere a development to market economy and openness is traceable. A ttacks on private property ceased and were reversed, e.g.


129

by returning houses to their former owners. In 2004, ownership of more than one accommodation was legalized. A first private bank was allowed in 1996; currently the whole sector is set to be privatized. T he government encourages collective ownership, which ideologically fits socialism, but it also facilitates business creation. A list of 360 state-owned companies, to be privatized, was published in 2004. T he same year subsidies for cooking oil and other items of daily consumption were cut. In 2002, the over-valued L ibyan dinar was devaluated and standardized, the central bank follows a consistent non-inflation policy. In 2001, Gaddafi criticized the bloated state apparatus (with yet few results), and also foreign investment became easier (Bertelsmann 2006, L ibya). F oreign oil companies were nationalized or left in 1986, after the imposition of US and then UN sanctions. T hese were lifted in 2003, and the oil companies are returning. In the spring of 2007, BP signed a gas exploration deal with L ibya, worth 669 million euro. T he agreement coincided with a visit by Britain’s Prime Minister T ony Blair, according to whom the deal was “unthinkable” only a decade ago. “T he relationship between L ibya and Britain has completely transformed in the past three years” (Bream and H all). S omething similar can be said in general, given the point that Libya has stopped financing terrorism, paid compensation to the victims, discontinued endeavors to build weapons of mass destruction and has re-established diplomatic relations to all E U member countries. It participates as an observer in the Barcelona Process and has expressed its intention to intensify cooperation. In A ugust 2007, after L ibya had released Bulgarian medics, a new set of agreements could be signed (see below). T he shift to cooperation in foreign policy and towards market economy has been accompanied by moderate steps towards more political liberalism. A ll in all L ibya also seems to follow in the same direction as the other N orth A frican countries, albeit with delay. T he whole region of N orth A frica has therefore seen a move towards open market economies and away from A rab S ocialism, Import S ubstitution Industrialization and inward-oriented strategies. T his move was by itself a process of E uropeanization, understood the way that it brought the socio-economic, and to a more limited extent also the political characteristics of the N orth A frican countries, closer to the models which are in place at the N orthern shore of the Mediterranean. F urthermore, the transitions in N orth A frica dramatically improved the possibilities for and interest in closer cooperation between the E uropean Union and N orth A frica because there are by now dramatically more possibilities for private-sector cooperation across the Mediterranean. In parallel to this, the E U, originally mainly an organization for economic cooperation for six E uropean countries has enlarged considerably in geographical terms and as regards the fields of cooperation. Gradually, it became a foreign-political actor on an increasing number of issues. In particular towards the Mediterranean countries, it developed a common will to influence matters and created new instruments for this end.

130


The Development of EU’s Mediterranean Policy T he T reaty of R ome (1957) placed responsibility for the Common Commercial Policy and the regulation of the external tariff at community level. T hereby, one important set of foreign-policy instruments became supranational, although the treaty otherwise did not contain foreign-policy provisions. F urthermore, the T reaty of R ome opened the possibility for “association” to the union. It should involve “reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures”, but was otherwise unspecified. Association agreements were signed with Greece and T urkey in 1962 and 1963, mainly in order to bind them closer to Western E urope. T he agreements were of unlimited duration, should lead to a full customs union, and both states became recognized as potential members, albeit in the case of T urkey in more vague formulations. In 1970 and 1972, the E U signed association agreements with Malta and Cyprus as well. T he E U offered closer economic cooperation to other Mediterranean countries, but without any references to customs union or membership. In 1965, Morocco and T unisia accepted negotiations, i.e. the two countries which were ruled by proWestern elites. F urthermore, unprocessed agricultural export to the community was a vital part of their export revenue. H owever, the negotiations were protracted. In 1965–1966 F rance, the major spokesman for these countries in the E U, blocked most of the community business during the “E mpty Chair” crisis. F urthermore, the government in R ome rose in defense of the S outhern Italian citrus fruit producers. A modest trade agreement with some trade preferences for Morocco and T unisia was finally reached in 1969; Italy received side payments in the form of 18 million E CU to improve the production of olive oil and citrus fruits, and a price cushion for citrus fruits. H owever, apart from this kind of details, there was hardly any involvement of public opinion or of interest groups. By that time Mediterranean policy had low priority in the E U context (Gomez 2003, 26–30 and 39). T he H ague S ummit in 1969 and the launch of E uropean Political Cooperation the following year gave rise to increased foreign-policy cooperation of the E U member states, in the first place on a strictly inter-governmental basis. After the Paris S ummit in 1972 the E uropean Commission, at the request of the member states, developed a comprehensive policy framework, the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). A ccording to this paper, the E U should sign “Cooperation A greements” will all Mediterranean non-member states. T he long-term objective was a Mediterranean F ree T rade A rea (a vision not shared by many N orth A frican leaders at that time). T he agreements should also include provisions about technical cooperation and technology transfer, capital movements, migration and environmental and financial cooperation. More specifically, the GMP envisaged giving the Mediterranean countries free access to the E U market for industrial products, except textile and refined petroleum. Maghrebi agricultural exports should have improved access; customs duties were to be lowered by 20–80 percent. L oans and grants from the E U budget and the E uropean Investment Bank (EIB) should supplement the development aid of the member states, and finally,


131

Cooperation Councils and committees should institutionalize a dialogue between the E U Commission, the member states and the Mediterranean non-members. Internal and external factors had contributed to giving the EU a stronger profile in this field: After the shift from de Gaulle to Pompidou, France became more in favor of a multilateralization of her own relations with T hird World countries. In 1973, the A rab-Israeli war and the following oil embargo underlined the importance of the A rab World. In fact, under the Global Mediterranean Policy a network of 13 new agreements (cooperation, trade or association) were created up until 1977. In addition, negotiations with a view to membership were under way with Greece, Portugal and S pain. T ogether these arrangements covered all Mediterranean countries, except A lbania and L ibya, the two very revolutionary (read: completely non-cooperative) countries in the region. T he three Maghreb countries A lgeria, Morocco and T unisia signed cooperation agreements in A pril 1976, E gypt followed slightly later (January 1977). F rom this point in time these countries had free access to the E U market as regards industrial products, apart from textile and refined petroleum products. A s to agriculture, the E U tariffs were lowered between 30 and 100 percent for 86–89 percent of the agricultural exports. Compared with the agreements in 1969, Morocco and T unisia gained tariff reductions of 30–40 percent for their exports. T here were, however, also new quantitative restrictions on wines, tinned sardines, potatoes, oranges and tomatoes. In the view of E berhard R hein, a former Director General of the Commission’s DG1, the GMP was “the first example of a coherent piece of Community foreign policy” (Gomez 2003, 34). T his was possible because the member state governments had essentially convergent views and interests. F urthermore, within the GMP trade negotiations were quite central, and this was already a community prerogative. In this constellation the Commission could gain an important role as “policy entrepreneur”. T he asymmetric character of the agreements had a paradox result: N orth A frican countries could rather freely export to the E U, with a few restrictions, but not so towards each other because they all maintained heavy restrictions at their borders. S imilar problems could be found many places in A frica and L atin A merica. T he main victims of T hird-World protectionism have been other poor T hird-World countries. In 1981, Greece joined the E U, Portugal and S pain did so in 1986. T hese countries had agricultural exports similar to the Maghreb countries and they strengthened the protectionist lobbies in F rance and Italy. In the end, the agricultural exports of the E U associates remained constrained to quotas which were calculated on the basis of production levels between 1980 and 1984. T his was a period of drought in the Maghreb. O n the positive side, Greece, S pain and Portugal had to abolish their industrial tariffs on N orth A frican exports at the latest by 1996; their agricultural tariffs were substantially lowered. N evertheless, the remaining restrictions implied heavy burdens for the N orth A frican countries which were by that time in deep economic crisis. Morocco actually applied for E U membership in

132


July 1987, presumably, as R icardo Gomez sees it, “more a sign of frustration than a serious attempt to join” (Gomez 2003, 37). Between 1980 and 1989 E U imports from N orth A frica, L ibya included, increased from 17.2 to 22.8 billion E CU, the E U exports to N orth A frica rose from 17.6 to 23.6 (E uropean Commission 2005, 31). Morocco could more than double her exports to the E U (from 1.4 to 3.1 billion euro, T unisia raised them by two thirds (from 1.4 to 2.3 billion). H owever, also these countries as well as E gypt, registered trade deficits with the union. Only the huge oil exporters Algeria and L ibya made surpluses with the E U. F urthermore, E urope’s trade with other parts of the world grew stronger than the trade across the Mediterranean. Consequently, the new agreements were not sufficient in themselves to generate much dynamic growth that could alleviate the serious social problems of the 1980s. T he rise of Islamic movements across the region signaled grave threats to political stability, with serious security consequences for E urope as well. F or F rance, S pain and Italy the region became a foreign policy priority. However, making it an EU priority was difficult by the end of the 1980s, given the point that the E U agenda was overloaded with the preparation of the Maastricht T reaty, with monetary union and the dramatic events in Central and E astern E urope. A t least, E U’s larger Mediterranean countries, holding the presidency in 1989 and 1990, could ensure that new Commission proposals did not get completely lost. T he program envisaged a revision of the 12 existing agreements and proposals for a “R edirected Mediterranean Policy (R MP)” with a view to opening more market access in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textile. In fact, in 1990 all quantitative limitations on textile imports from Mediterranean countries were lifted. F urthermore, the funds from the E U budget and the EI B for Mediterranean partners were nearly tripled for the fourth generation of financial protocols (1992–1996). T he part of E U aid which was directed at debt-servicing, support for structural adjustments and macro-economic reforms was made conditional on adherence to the IMF programs. F inally, as an innovative trait, 2.3 billion E CU were provided for projects to improve “decentralized, horizontal or regional cooperation” (Gomez 2003, 49–51). A gainst the background of the antiWestern tones of the Pan-A rab rhetoric of previous years, it seems ironic that the E U wanted to support practical Pan-A rabism. H owever, the low level of trade and integration among the associates was seen as a major impediment to development and thus to political stabilization of the region. In fact, in 1989 a seemingly promising attempt at practical integration was started, the A rab Maghreb Union (Union du Maghreb A rabe, UMA ), comprising A lgeria, L ibya, Mauritania, Morocco and T unisia. T he program was quite ambitious, envisaging a free-trade zone by 1992, thereafter a customs union, a full common market by 2000 and then a monetary union. T he E U was very supportive (Murphy 1999, 118f). But as many similar A frican projects, the UMA never got The figures overstate the development somewhat because they are calculated on current prices and because the E U grew from nine to 12 members.


133

off the ground. In fact, in A ugust 1994 the Maghreb became more divided than ever when A lgeria closed her land border with Morocco, a reprisal after Morocco demanded visa for A lgerian citizens, caused by incidents of Islamic terrorism (S tora 2001, 267). In 1993, the E U opened negotiations with Morocco and T unisia for a new generation of agreements, the E uro-Mediterranean A ssociation A greements. S imilar negotiations started with all Mediterranean countries, plus Jordan, but not L ibya. T hese agreements became the main policy instrument for the E U policy, in 1994 grouped in one single framework, the so-called “E uro-Mediterranean Partnership”. T he treaty signed with T urkey in 1995 was the most comprehensive one, establishing a custom union with the E U. T he others were to contain the establishment of free trade in industrial goods after a transition phase of usually 12 years. These agreements signaled the official end of any strategies of “ImportS ubstitution Industrialization”. A ll agreements were also to contain provisions about energy policy, transnational crime and immigration. T he problem of more access for agricultural exports into the E U provoked, as usual, protracted controversies within the E U. F or instance, Germany and the N etherlands protested when the Commission offered a quota of 5000 tons of cut flowers to Morocco. The Portuguese government worried about Moroccan tomato concentrate and canned sardines. L isbon gave in only after the Commission promised extra funding from the S tructural F unds to modernize the canning industry and new controls on the marketing of Moroccan imports (Gomez 2003, 57–59). By now (2008) the agreements with the N orth A frican countries, except L ibya, are ratified. However, things are moving also as regards Libya. In October 2007, the E uropean Council, recognizing the substantial progress in the relations with T ripoli, asked the Commission to draft a mandate for negotiations with L ibya with a view to concluding a comprehensive framework agreement. T he Commission did this in F ebruary 2008. Table 6.2

A lgeria E gypt Morocco T unisia

The North African Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements Signed

In force as from

22 A pril 2002 25 June 2001 26 F ebruary 1996 1 July 1995

1 S eptember 2005 1 June 2004 1 March 2001 1 March 1998

Source: N souli 2006, 9f; E uropean Commission 2006, 40.

In N ovember 1995, the Barcelona Conference opened a new multi-lateral approach. Prime movers on the E U side were F rance, Italy and in particular S pain. T he decisive deal was struck at the E ssen S ummit in 1994 when S pain’s


134

Prime Minister F elipe Gonzalez accepted the eastern enlargement in exchange for Germany endorsing a strong political gesture and more money for the S outh (Gomez 2003, 70 and 88n11). In Barcelona 27 governments, E U member states and Mediterranean non-members endorsed a declaration and an extensive cooperation program among governments and non-state actors. T he participation of Israel, L ebanon, the Palestinian A uthority and S yria provided the conference and the following process with a unique character because it has been the only forum where representatives from these countries have met regularly. T he declaration had three major headings which provided the basis for the working program (Barcelona Declaration 1995, 3f and 7): • • •

Political and security partnership: E stablishing a common area of peace and stability; Economic and financial partnership: Creating and area of shared prosperity, and Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

T he Barcelona Process should thereby promote democracy, human rights, rule by law and close economic cooperation built on open market economies. R egular meetings and contacts on all levels – ministers, students, representatives of religious institutions or media – should foster mutual understanding. A E uro-Med conference of foreign ministers in V alencia in A pril 2002 enlarged the list by the themes of combating terrorism and migration. But when observers assessed the results of the Barcelona process 10 years after its start, the comments were rather pessimistic, in particular in the field of political and security partnership (Jünemann 2005, 8). T he major reason was the deterioration of the Middle E ast peace process which made the A rab countries refuse discussions on security matters with Israel. Democracy made little progress, and many A rab regimes regarded topics such as human rights or support for N GO -meetings as interference in their internal affairs. Also discussing terrorism was very difficult, given the point that there was no common definition of terrorism. On the other hand, the contacts have multiplied, numerous fora, workshops and new networks have been created; the long-term effects may be significant. At lower levels regular communication continued even in the field of security policy. According to Anette Jünemann, a socializing effect has taken place and created a “spirit of partnership” (Jünemann 2005, 8). T he economic chapter contains an explicit aim of creating a common F ree T rade A rea “covering most trade” by 2010. T ariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products were to be abolished, trade in agricultural products and services were to be liberalized reciprocally. T he E U set aside 4.685 billion E CU for financial assistance, to be supplemented by EIB loans and bilateral contributions from the member states. T he date became unrealistic because of the long transition periods in the association agreements, but progress has been real and is by now part

Table 6.3

Social indicators for North African Countries

A lgeria E gypt Morocco T unisia

1985–1990

1997–2003

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 1985–1990 1997–2003

67 63 63 70

71 69 69 73

54 76 66 41

Source: N souli 2006, 7.

35 33 36 19


L ife expectancy at birth (years)

Primary school enrolment rate (%) 1985–1990

1997–2003

93 84 57 94

95 90 90 97

136


of ratified treaties. The figures for financial aid mentioned in the declaration were not realized, but the E U spending did increase substantially. F rom 1995 to 1999 the E U disbursements corresponded to 0.2 percent of the aggregate GDP of the recipient countries, in the period 2000–2004 it was 0.5 percent (N souli 2006, 5). Most E uro-Mediterranean countries managed to regain macroeconomic stability, inflation rates fell throughout the region, budgets deficits and foreign debts came under control. S ocial indicators improved practically across the board: T he improvements were, of course, not only due to the closer cooperation with the E U. But it has presumably contributed to it. F or many years economic growth was, however, not sufficient to reduce the income gap between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean. In the 1990s N orth A frica actually fell behind, relative to the E U average. In the new millennium, however, the income gap narrowed when N orth A frican growth rates went considerably up. Current economic growth seems to be robust. A ccording to the IMF , real GDP can be expected to grow in 2008 between 4.9 percent (A lgeria) and 6.9 percent (E gypt). Unemployment has continuously been a substantial problem, even in oil-rich Libya. For many years the creation of new jobs has been insufficient in catching up with the growing population. A fter 2002, however, aggregate employment rates rose again. Population growth is comparatively low by now, but because of the numerous young age cohorts the working force will still continue to grow. H owever, from about 2013 onwards the situation will become easier. A ll in all it seems that N orth A frica is through the worst. T he cooperation between the E U and N orth A frica gained a new quality with the launch of the “E uropean N eighbourhood Policy” in 2003. T hereby the E U policy towards the Mediterranean countries and most of the new E ast E uropean neighbors came under one framework with common principles and with privileged funding. T he E U openly wants to promote social and political change towards democracy, rule by law and market economy. A s E U Commissioner Benita F erreroWaldner put it: “T he core principle of the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy is very simple – we want to extend the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the E U’s members to our neighbours. Why? Because our neighbours are important to us” (F errero-Waldner 2006 a, 2). O r in the words of Javier S olana, E U’s H igh R epresentative for CFSP , “if these regions [North Africa and the Middle East, W.Z.] are unstable, E urope will not be able to live in security” (Gomez 2003, 1). Quotes of this kind abound, according to E U leaders the promotion of stability has for long been the overriding aim of E U’s external policy. In contrast to the Barcelona Process, the ENP targets every country individually. T he E U and the country in question elaborate so-called A ctions Plans together, having a duration of between three and five years, where they identify reform priorities which the EU will then support financially, with technical assistance or otherwise. T his is voluntary insofar as no country is obliged to accept this type of assistance. R eform progress becomes monitored by the E U Commission which A s estimated in May 2008.


137

publishes a comprehensive country report and then regular Progress R eports about the implementation of the A ction Plans. T his is, of course, a kind of interference and again a new twist on E U policy. T he most novel aspect of the ENP is the offer of a “stake in the Internal Market” and the participation in E U programs. In December 2004, Commissioner F errero-Waldner could announce the launch of the first package of Action Plans. In North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia, the traditional front-runners in cooperation with the E U, were on the list. T he others were Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian A uthority, Ukraine and Moldova. T he A ction Plan with E gypt was adopted in March 2007. A lgeria is more reluctant. T he A ssociation A greement with its pledge to free trade did not come into force before S eptember 2005, seven and half years later than neighboring T unisia. A country report for A lgeria is under development, but it is not certain that an ENP -A ction Plan can be agreed upon in the near future. T he term “stake in the Internal Market” has to be given precision during the process, but it will presumably have far-reaching consequences. Basically it will mean assistance in adapting to the complex market regulations of the E U, in joining standardization bodies and in improving the exchange of information. T he potential gains seem to be substantial, but not all the consequences might be equally welcome. Just to mention one point, it will imply the abolishment of the relicts of A rab S ocialism because proper integration into E U’s market presupposes ending state aid to companies and this will presumably cost jobs. T he project of the Internal Market was built on a two-pronged approach, mutual recognition of standards and harmonization, i.e. the formulation of E U-wide rules. In particular harmonization can have negative impacts for third world countries. It might restrict trade more than tariffs because a norm can function as a simple binary arrangement, “access” or “non-access”. FE MISE , a E uro-Mediterranean network of economic institutes, created under the Barcelona Process, has tried to assess some economic consequences (FE MISE 2006, 18–67). In T elecoms, E gypt, Morocco and T unisia can expect price falls of almost 30 percent if they adopt the whole legislation and institutional model in place in the E U. In transportation, in particular in the highly protected air transport, efficiency gains could also be very high, but they might also result in the loss of symbols of national sovereignty: “[W]ho would take the risk to propose the privatization of R oyal A ir Maroc?”(FE MISE 2006, 41). If N orth A frican countries open retail trade to big E uropean chains, the customers can expect a higher diversity of the products, better quality and lower prices. But this would also mean a strong pressure on small shops. In this sector most informal employment has been created, most enterprises directed by women are to be found there, so the social consequences of a market opening can be severe. Liberalizing capital movements across the borders could improve the financing conditions considerably, in particular for smaller companies. A t least in the case of T urkey, opening the banking sector for foreign competition and adopting �� F orum E uro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Économiques.

138


the E uropean institutional and regulatory system can reduce interest rates and boost GDP by 2 percent (FE MISE 2006, 40). But capital movements can lead to severe financial crises, as numerous cases have shown, not the least Turkey in 2000. L iberalizing presupposes therefore effective regulatory and supervisory bodies and stable macroeconomic conditions. E gypt has already liberalized capital movements substantially. Morocco and T unisia are proceeding this way, with the assistance of the IMF , whereas in A lgeria important restrictions are still in place (FE MISE 2006, 49). If the E U and the N orth A frican countries proceed with liberalizing services, this will presumably imply changes in migration policies because services, much more than trade in manufactured goods, depend on the movement of people. More in general, the workforce of the E U will soon decline due to demographic changes. A ccording to the Commission, the E U-25 could loose some 20 million workers between 2010 and 2030 (FE MISE 2006, 51). A llowing more immigration from the neighboring countries would be an obvious solution to this problem. E nergy ranks high on the E U agenda. In July 2006, a treaty establishing an E nergy Community entered in force. It created a single regulatory space for electricity and gas and extended it to S outheast E urope. A lbania, Bosnia and H erzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo/Unmik, Macedonia, Montenegro and S erbia agreed to adopt the E U acquis on energy, environment, renewable energy and competition. T he E nergy Community has several common institutions such as a Ministerial Council, but they have no supranational competencies. T hereby the others have a voice, but it is the E U that makes the decisions. Moldova, N orway, T urkey and Ukraine have applied to join (Gstöhl 2007, 17). T he A ction Plans with E gypt, Morocco and T unisia envisage the gradual integration of these countries into the gas and electricity market of the E U, the long-term goal, as Commissioner F errero-Waldner put it, is a “E uro Mediterranean E nergy Common H ouse” (F errero-Waldner 2006 b, 5). A s this survey shows, a participation in the Internal Market of the E U, also if only partial, will have many repercussions. T here is a fundamental asymmetry in this construction because the rule-makers for this market, the main supervisory bodies and the dispute-settlement institutions such as the E uropean Court of Justice are all E U institutions. Countries outside the E U have to adapt. T hey might, however, gain some influence by lobbying in the EU institutions and will presumably try this to an increasing extent. Currently, (2008) the process of adaptation to the E uropean model seems to continue systematically, albeit with differences from country to country. Morocco seems to be fastest mover. In the ENP Progress R eport from December 2006 the E U Commission assessed that during the last two years “relations between the E U and Morocco have been significantly strengthened across the board” (European Commission 2006 b, 2). N umerous initiatives aimed at the modernization of the state, democratization and national reconciliation and at the promotion of social and economic development “place Morocco firmly on the path to reform”. On the long list of activities are


139

new legislation on political parties, the modernization of the justice system and a national action plan on human rights. A new law against torture was adopted in 2005. T he macroeconomic situation is stable, privatization continues, and there is a strong inflow of foreign direct investment. The Central Bank is independent, having monetary stability as the main aim. A number of new cooperation agreements with the EU have been finalized, e.g. on Morocco’s participation in the Galileo satellite program and in air services. N egotiations aimed at liberalizing trade in services and the right of establishment and likewise further liberalizing the trade in agricultural products, processed products and fisheries were launched in 2006. V arious technical subcommittees “met regularly and effectively”. A lso in foreign policy the cooperation is intensifying. T hree meetings of enhanced political dialogue at T roika level took place and Morocco is involved in the ES DP discussions. As the first country she designated a contact point with the EU council and she also participates at the E U military operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and H erzegovina. Tunisia is a consistent reformer in the economic field but not so in the political sphere. Budgetary and monetary policies are prudent and regulatory convergence with the E U is “satisfactory”. Income per capita has grown steadily, most households are home owners, and the basic amenities of modern life are available for most T unisians. “Good progress has been made with tariff dismantling; T unisia should be ready two years before schedule”, with a few delays from the T unisian side as to processed agricultural products and fishery products. “The Consumer Protection Act, the Decree on Import and E xport Controls and the F ood S afety A ct are in process of being aligned with E U L aw.” T unisia is also making some progress as regards social rights, but social dialogue is still “too often prohibited by the authorities, including collective bargaining.” A nd as to human rights and political freedom, “there has been little progress on freedom of association and freedom of expression. T he activities of independent civil society (N GO s, political movements, trade association) have also been obstructed” (E uropean Commission 2006c). Egypt has also witnessed a rather steady economic growth, albeit from a much lower level than T unisia. Poverty is still widespread. T he government has made “impressive progress with its privatization programme”, comprising also the Bank of A lexandria, one of the four largest state-owned banks. T he Central Bank has been made independent; in 2005 it signed a cooperation agreement with the E uropean Central Bank, in order to build up an efficient banking supervision system. As provided for in the A ssociation A greement, tariffs on industrial products are in a process of dismantling. N egotiations for a further liberalization of agricultural products and services are under way (E uropean Commission 2006 a, 67f). T he new A ction Plan with the E U contains cooperation initiatives across the board, also in fields such as improving efficiency and transparency of the administration, strengthening the rule of law or “raising the participation” in elections. H owever, so far there has been little progress in the political sphere. Presidential elections have been non-competitive, legislative elections are heavily engineered, and founding

140


a party needs state approval. Important groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood do not receive it. Algeria is comparatively slow, both on economic reform and on enlarging cooperation with the E U. T he state sector is still dominant, progress in privatization has been restricted, and the private sector gets hampered by a bad “business climate”. Compared with the neighboring countries, it is very difficult to enforce contracts, pay taxes, to start a business or to get credit. T he mainly state-owned banks lend money mostly to loss-making state-owned enterprises, 39 percent of all loans were non-performing. H owever, the 2005 budget law was a turning point because it introduced the aim of systematically reducing the non-hydrocarbon deficit. The previously hidden subsidies via the state-owned banks were included in the budget, a major step towards transparency. T he A ssociation A greement entered into force in September 2005 and the first tariff cuts were implemented. After 12 years there will be free trade with the E U (E uropean Commission 2006a, 38–43). Cooperation in other fields is smaller than with the above-mentioned countries. But A lgeria has accepted e.g. E U assistance in modernizing her judicial system or IMF assistance as to reforming the budget process. T here is no danger that the deep crisis of 1994 will be repeated, foreign exchange reserves cover two years of imports. But as in many other cases, the high oil revenues seem to be a problem rather than a gift (“resource curse”). A s experts of the E U Commission have formulated it: “H uge government windfall revenue created by the recent oil price increases removed any incentive for policymakers to reform while spurring public demands for consumptive expenditure” (E uropean Commission 2005, 84).10 T his case seems to be similar for Libya. T rue, “the trend of the late 1990s toward increased private enterprise and foreign investment – and thus a freemarket economy – has become irreversible, according to official views” (Bertelsmann 2006 [L ibya], 1). But there are no formal relations with the E U. In 1999, L ibya was invited to participate in the Barcelona Process, and in 2004 it declared an intention to do so but no formal request has been made yet. H owever, numerous contacts have been established. In April 2004, Gaddafi visited the EU Commission, on which occasion Commission President R omano Prodi declared: “[T ]his is the result of 5 years of personal contacts and discussions between the two of us” (Prodi 2004). R ecently a big blocking stone was removed when the Libyan regime, after many years of EU pressure, freed five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestine physician, sentenced on – obviously absurd – charges that they had intentionally infected children with HIV virus at the hospital in Benghazi. Many years of negotiations preceded a seemingly complex deal between L ibya, the E U and national governments. T he F rench government also signed a contract of delivering nuclear technology and arms to L ibya, which provoked many critical comments. N onetheless, as A ndrew Moravcsik, of Princeton University, put it:

10 It is an obvious exaggeration to say that the windfall revenues removed “any” incentive for reforms.


141

T he liberation of the nurses was “a victory for a decade-long E uropean strategy of engaging rather than invading countries such as L ibya” (Moravcsik). Concluding Remarks We have seen a slow but systematic movement of the countries of N orth A frica towards E urope, in term of closer cooperation and of making their systems more “E uropean”. T he main driving force behind this process has been the search for economic advantage. S ocialism and Import-S ubstitution Industrialization have proven to be non-viable strategies, as everywhere. T he leading elites have understood that their rule depends on economic growth and that economic growth presupposes institutional arrangements such as respect for private property and the coordination of economic processes mainly by market processes. They have also understood that, as a rule, efficiency requires participation in an international division of labor. T his by itself enabled much closer cooperation between N orth A frica and the E U countries. It has also created much better conditions for intra-A rab cooperation. In 2004, E gypt, Jordan, Morocco and T unisia signed the A gadir A greement for free trade among them which entered in force in July 2006. T his is one of the few cases of A rab integration which was implemented. It is no coincidence that the four participating countries are relatively open and have the closest contacts with the West. E conomic growth also requires new gender roles. It is a strong barrier to development if half of the population is prevented from entering the labor market. Gender roles in N orth A frica have been changing towards the patterns known in E urope. T his process has been strongly supported by the governments of all N orth A frican states, which introduced equal-rights principles into their legislation and built up education systems with high enrolment rates of women. T he general level of education and literacy has been rising substantially. E conomic growth also requires stable juridical systems with e.g. the possibility of enforcing contracts, and efficient bureaucracies with low corruption. The North A frican states are working on these matters with E U assistance (except L ibya). T he political systems are not democratic but have changed substantially already. T here are parliaments and multi-party elections. T his is progress in comparison to the regimes in the 1970s; more groups have a voice in the official system. T he regimes often justify the restrictions of democracy with the need to combat terrorism and Islamism which they often claim to be identical. But the T urkish A KP has proven that a party of Islamist orientation can be democratic and even be a strong promoter of democratic reforms. T he Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Dévelopment (PJD) will presumably be another example. E conomic development and the turn towards open market economies have improved the conditions for democratic progress substantially. N o government can control the free flow of information, at best (worst) they can distort it. Attempts by e.g. the T unisian government to stimulate the development of information

142


technology, and at the same time restrict the access to the internet, are blatantly incompatible. F urthermore, persons with fortunes and/or skills now have a choice. T hey can move. T his in itself puts restrictions on political repression. People with financial or human capital are necessary allies for the governments when it comes to economic growth. T o them the presidents or the king have to listen and this means a constant press for reform, for instance to strengthen rule by law. A ll governments have learned, after severe crises, that macroeconomic stability, reasonable fiscal policy and low levels of inflation are necessary for economic growth. F iscal and monetary stability has also had civilizing effects on the political process, for instance by making government expenditure more transparent; hidden expropriation via inflation is hardly possible anymore. Furthermore, the regimes want to make their countries attractive for investment. T his also requires progress in transparency and legal security. Ultimately, political stability can only be secured by progress in democracy and human rights. O nly they can provide a government with a stable source of legitimacy. Progress, at least incremental, is visible in many places in N orth A frica, not only in Morocco. In 2007, for instance, the authorities legalized the “Party of the Democratic F ront” in E gypt, a liberal alternative to H osni Mubarak’s N ational Democratic Party (H ermann 2007). F urthermore, the reform of the A lgerian budget has had a democratic quality because it strengthened the possibility of the parliament to monitor the administration; previously the hidden subsidies via the state-owned bank were largely given in darkness. Moreover, the E U is gently but consistently pushing for reforms and it has many advantages to offer. When it comes to external policy advice, there is by now a wide field of consensus. The EU Commission, the member state governments, the IMF and the World Bank all promote opening, transition to market economies and concomitant institutional reform (“monomics”). Gone is the fascination of the S oviet Union or “alternative” development. T rue, there are still some Western academics that advocate “third ways” and oppose “globalization”. But in contrast to the 1960s they have little influence, hardly surprising in the view of the experiences described above. T here is, of course, also resistance against E uropeanization in N orth A frica. S ome sections of Islamism oppose the West out of ideological reasons. Bureaucratic conservatism is another factor, and so are pressures from groups which might encounter economic losses, at least in the short term. T o them belong e.g. some categories of producers or employees in state-owned companies. Given the point that the gains of E uropeanization presumably outweigh the losses by far, compensation for these groups is possible. The EU finances, for instance, vocational training and re-training; certainly the best way to deal with problems of this kind. H owever, the major “resistance” forces seem to be oil and gas because they allow regimes to postpone reforms. T he cases of A lgeria and L ibya illustrate this quite well. But oil and gas run out at a certain point in time. T here is the question of whether E uropeanization is compatible with other types of regional integration and identity. When it comes to A rab integration in


143

practical terms, as exemplified by the Agadir Agreement, the EU has actually been supportive. We might even see practical, functional integration as a kind of E uropean export, given the point that the E U mainly developed exactly along such lines. S een this way, practical Pan-A rabism is perfectly compatible with E uropeanization. T he case is similar with Pan-A fricanism which has experienced a re-launch with the founding of the A frican Union (A U). T he E U supports A frican integration both at a continental and at a regional level. Many A frican leaders, most important perhaps S outh A frica’s T habo Mbeki, have outlined A frican policies aimed at institution building, improving governance, democracy and peace keeping. If this kind of A frican policy will have a substantial impact on N orth A frica, it is perfectly compatible with E uropeanization. S een from an E U perspective, closer cooperation within the A U will be as unproblematic as, say, N ordic cooperation has been before. But there is also another type of Pan-A fricanism or Pan-A rabism, represented previously by leaders such as N krumah or N asser who sketched grandiose schemes of united fronts against Western “imperialism”. In practice it meant digging trenches instead of building bridges. This type of Pan-A fricanism is, of course, not compatible with Europeanization. Gaddafi’s rhetoric sometimes still contains remembrances, e.g. when he talks about forming one A frican government with a single army and a single currency “in order to resist against the West” (Bernard 2007). But Gaddafi’s proposals are as unrealistic as the corresponding ones by N krumah in 1963. I see this type of anti-West Pan-A fricanism as relicts of the past. As we have seen, in practical terms Gaddafi has moved as well. T he integration between N orth A frica and the E U is much denser than the contacts across the S ahara.11 T he A U is still a rather weak intergovernmental arrangement, the agreements are formulated in very general terms and until now there is not yet much progress in practical terms. By contrast, there is a plentitude of precise agreements across the Mediterranean on a huge variety of issues with very practical results. T he legislation of the N orth A frican countries was heavily impacted by this process. N umerous networks have been established. N ot the least the E uro-Mediterranean economic cooperation is much more intense than exchange across the A frican borders. T his is partly due to the protectionist legacy of many A frican states. In addition, many A frican countries have been poor and that means that they have not been very attractive markets. T herefore, most N orth A frican business men have had to concentrate on E urope, their most important market. T he gravity of market forces, functional requirements of economic growth, the first-mover advantage of the EU and the eventually rather consistent policy of the E U, all these factors conspire to make E uropeanization have an impact on N orth Africa presumably much more than progress at African unification. T he current situation is highly asymmetric, the N orth A frican countries becoming increasingly influenced by EU decisions in which they themselves have 11 S ee also S øren Dosenrode’s contribution in this volume, chapter 5.

144


no right of co-decision. T he only proper way to solve this dilemma would be proper E U membership, theoretical though as it sounds today. F or N orth A frica it would bring obvious advantages such as possibilities of influence, full access to the E U market, free movements of persons and participation in E U’s regional policy. Seen from the EU: Enlargement has proven to be the most efficient way to shape and stabilize neighboring regions; stability in N orth A frica has been an overriding EU aim. Therefore, I do not find the following scenario, found in Le Monde, unlikely: In 2027 the E U will confront many new problems and controversies. T urkey’s membership had been blocked by negative referenda in F rance, but now, in 2027, it looks as if the next referendum will be positive. S pain blocks the start of accession negotiations with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine because the others will not start similar negotiations with Morocco … (F erenczi). References Barcelona Declaration (1995), adopted at the E uro-Mediterranean Conference 27–28 N ovember 1995. Bernard, Philippe (2007), “Mouammar Khadhafi prône la creation ‘d’États-Unis d’A frique’”, Le Monde, 4 June, 5. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2006), country reports on A lgeria, E gypt, Morocco, L ibya and T unisia. Breem, R . and H all, B. (2007), “L ibya takes step back into world fold with $900m BP gas deal”, Financial Times, 30 May, p. 1. Countrywatch, L ibya (2006), Country R eview. E uropean Commission (2005), Directorate-General for E conomic and F inancial A ffairs, Occasional Papers, N o. 17, “10 Years of Barcelona Process: taking stock of economic progress in E U Mediterranean partners”. E uropean Commission (2006a), Directorate-General for E conomic and F inancial A ffairs, Occasional Papers, N o. 25, “E uropean N eighbourhood Policy: E conomic R eview of ENP Countries”. E uropean Commission (2006b), ENP Progress Report. Morocco, SE C (2006), 1511/2, Brussels, 4 December. E uropean Commission (2006c), ENP Progress Report. Tunisia, SE C (2006), 1510, Brussels, 4 December. FEMISE Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2006, Cairo and Marseille. F erenczi, T . (2007), “V ingt ans après, l’Union en 2027 …”, Le Monde, 20 A pril, p. 2. F errero-Waldner, B. (2006a), “T he E uropean N eighbourhood Policy: bringing our neighbours closer”, speech/06/346, 6 June. F errero-Waldner, B. (2006b), “O pening A ddress”, Conference: T owards an E U E xternal E nergy Policy to A ssure a H igh L evel of S upply S ecurity, S peech/06/710, Brussels, 20 N ovember.


145

Goldschmidt Jr., A . (1988), Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State (Boulder, CO : Westview Press and H utchinson). Gomez, R . (2003), Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? (A ldershot: A shgate). Gstöhl, S . (2007), “Political Dimensions of an E xternalization of the E U’s Internal Market”, EU Diplomacy Papers, 3/2007, College of E urope, Bruges. H ermann, R . (2007), “L icht am H orizont. E ine gewichtige Parteineugründung in Ägypten, und Gamal Mubaraks Chancen schwinden”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 June, p. 12. Inglehart, R . (2000), “Culture and Democracy”, H arrison, L .E . and H untington, S .P. (eds.) (2000), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (N ew York: Basic Books), pp. 80–97. Jünemann, A . (2005), “Z ehn Jahre Barcelona-Prozess: E ine gemischte Bilanz”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 45, pp. 7–14. Kornai, J. (1992), The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Socialism (Princeton N J: Princeton University Press). Kornai, J. (2000), “What the Change of S ystem F rom S ocialism to Capitalism Does and Does N ot Mean”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, N o. 1, Winter, pp. 27–42. Moravcsik, A . (2007), “T riumph in L ibya for tough choices of soft power”, Financial Times, 31 July, p. 9. Moore, C.H . (1984), “T he Maghrib”, in Crowder, M. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 8 from c.1940 to c.1975, pp. 564–610. Murphy, E .C. (1999), Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (Basingstoke: Macmillan). N souli, S aleh M. (2006), “T he E uro-Mediterranean Partnership T en Years O n: R eassessing R eadiness and Prospects”, International Monetary F und. O lsen, G.R . (1993), Egypten. En økonomisk og politisk oversigt (Copenhagen: Danida Udenrigsministeriet). Prażmowska, A.J. (2004), Civil War in Poland, 1942–1948 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). R ooney, D. (1988), Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World (L ondon: I.B. T auris & Co L td). Prodi, R.(2004), “Statement by President Prodi during visit of Colonel Gaddafi to the E uropean Commission”, 27 A pril. S ater, J.N . (2007), Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco (N ew York: R outledge). S tone, M. (1997), The Agony of Algeria (L ondon, H urst & Company). S tora, B.(2001), Algeria 1830–2000. A Short History, translated by J.M. T odd (Ithaca, N Y: Cornell University Press). Z ank, W. (2001), “T he T ransition to Capitalism in E astern E urope – S ome T heoretical Controversies”, S eries of O ccasional Papers 30, E uropean R esearch Unit, A alborg University. .


Chapter 7

E uropean S ecurity and the “Clash of Civilizations”: Differences in the policies of F rance, Germany and the UK towards the Mediterranean and the Middle E ast Peter S eeberg

… even where there were clear differences between member states, the very pervasiveness of the machinery of E U coordination demonstrated itself capable of grinding out common positions and smoothing the roughest edges of national diplomatic tensions (…) T he relationship between prominent national-level E uropean initiatives and collective EU instruments often contained a finely balanced mix of divergence and convergence (Youngs 2006, 228).

Introduction It is the ambition of this chapter to discuss differences between F rance, Germany and the UK regarding foreign policy and security relations towards the Mediterranean and the Middle E ast. I will argue that only a limited amount of convergence between the E U states can be seen as far as foreign policy aspects of security are concerned. The main reason is the independent and often conflicting policies of the states in the E uropean Community “power-triangle”, F rance, Germany and the UK. T he article focuses on these three large E U states, but other E U-states are included where this is relevant and meaningful. By contrast, when it comes to inner security we see the E U-states adapting to each other – by inner security I primarily refer to the securitization of the problems regarding immigrants from the Mediterranean area and the Middle E ast living in the E uropean states. T here seems to be a consensus at the E U-level about a necessity of working together on issues concerning inner security – a consensus which has been strengthened after 9/11 and the tragedies of Madrid and L ondon in 2004 and 2005. Gradually counter-terrorism and immigration control has been linked together in political discourses in E urope. N arratives about a “Clash of Civilization” experienced a revival. T his chapter takes its point of departure in research about the E U and the Mediterranean that I have carried out over the last years. In this connection it

148


has become clear to me that the concepts of security and migration, intertwined in many ways, have become high politics among the E uropean political leaders (S eeberg 2007a). I have elsewhere more thoroughly analyzed the relation between security and migration focusing on the integration policies concerning immigrants (S eeberg 2007b). T herefore this article primarily focuses on the policies of the E U states with regard to the foreign and security policies of F rance, Germany and the UK, paying less attention to the migration dimension of the inner security reality of the three states. It has been claimed that a general convergence can be seen in the foreign policies of the E U member states (Dosenrode 2002; Dannreuther 2004; S mith 2004; King 2005; Youngs 2006). A nthony King furthermore claims that even though Germany, F rance and Britain pursue foreign and security policies independently of each other, and despite setbacks like the F rench and Dutch referendums on the Constitution T reaty of the E uropean Union in 2005, they “are converging on a strategic consensus, if not on a precise strategic concept” (King 2005). In opposition to this I argue in this chapter that A nthony King’s conception may have validity with regard to policies concerning the internal security conditions of the E uropean states, but only to a minor degree when it comes to policies which address security issues and challenges outside the E uropean community. I furthermore claim that King exaggerates the extent of strategic convergence between the three large E uropean states, thereby implicitly overestimating the degree to which the E U is becoming a foreign policy actor in relation to the Mediterranean and the Middle E ast in general. T he foreign and security policy divergence will be demonstrated by comparing and examining the foreign policies of F rance, Germany and Britain related to the E U framework as regards cases from the Mashreq, the Maghreb and T urkey. T he cases have been chosen in order to show in different ways how the leaders of the three large E U states pursue agendas that in some instances converge, but which as an overall tendency are in opposition to each other. T hese differences have negative consequences for the development of the E U as a foreign policy actor. There are fluctuations in these matters depending on which political parties or coalitions are holding power in the three countries at a given time, but nonetheless long term trends point to a low degree of unity as far as the E U’s international actorness in relation to the Middle E ast is concerned. A t the same time these cases are relevant in relation to the migration issue, thereby the issue of inner security in the E U relating to migrants from the Middle E ast that are staying in the E uropean countries. T he reason for this is the fact that the Mashreq, the Mahgreb and T urkey are all large producers of migrants, albeit in very different ways; the Mashreq including Iraq being producers of huge refugee groups and the Maghreb and T urkey being the largest producers of working migrants to Europe (Kadioglu 1993; Akgündüz 1994; Kirişci 2007). T he F rench historian Gilles Kepel claims in his The War for Muslim Minds that Europe is (or at least will become) a battlefield for the future of global Islam: “Before 9/11, E urope had provided a sanctuary where A l Qaeda’s planners could

European Security and the “Clash of Civilizations”

149

complete preparations for the world-shattering operation they had conceived in the mountains of A fghanistan. But with events in Madrid in spring 2004, E urope emerged as the primary battlefield on which the future of global Islam will be decided” (Kepel 2004, 241). H is far-reaching conclusions may seem exaggerated, but there is hardly doubt that in recent years the immigrant population of E urope has been subject to a securitization not being seen before in the history of E urope. R elations between the E U on one side and the Mashreq, the Maghreb and T urkey on the other side are therefore highly significant and important to discuss in this context. The case of T urkey is important beyond the issue of becoming a member of the E uropean community or not (Collyer 2006). In two ways: firstly because of the importance of the migration issue especially for Germany having more than 2 million T urkish immigrants inside her borders, secondly because if T urkey is to become a member of the E U, Iraq and Iran will be immediate neighbours of the E U. I do not claim that there is full consensus regarding inner security in E urope. T here are several examples of lack of agreement between the E U-level and the individual member states regarding migrants in a security perspective. T he securitization of political Islam since 7 July 2005 in E ngland, not surprisingly, diverts from the situation in several other states within the E U. R ichard F alk claims in a seminal article (from 2002) that 9/11 fundamentally altered our calculations about the future of global governance: “Whether the impact of mega-terror attacks on the World T rade Centre and the Pentagon initiate a civilizational war between the West and Islam is highly uncertain at this time, but what seems beyond doubt is that the substantive and symbolic harm inflicted on the United S tates by O sama bin L aden’s al-Qaida network, a non-state enemy with visionary goals, forever changes our sense of historical context and of the nature of war and power” (F alk 2002, 51). N o doubt, the bombings of S eptember 11 caused the US to change its foreign policy towards the Middle E ast more than anything else. George W. Bush and his S ecretary of S tate Condoleezza R ice have stressed that it was a genuine value driven change of policy, in the words of R ice in her famous speech at the A UC in Cairo, 20 June 2005: “F or 60 years, my country, the United S tates, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle east – and we achieved neither. N ow, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.” For the US this was hardly anything but an ex-post justification of the invasion in Iraq two years earlier, as discussed by Dietrich Jung (Jung 2006). T he rhetoric has been adopted by G8 leaders as well, and for a long time it has been part of the narrative about democracy promotion in the Middle E ast by the E U, as demonstrated among others by Gillespie and Youngs (Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Pace 2006). A lready in 1991 the E U committed itself by a resolution of the Development Council to place democracy promotion at the heart of its foreign policy – together with a focus on human rights (Youngs 2006; S eeberg 2007a).

150


A s pointed to by Gillespie and Youngs, during the 1990s resources allocated by the E U for democracy and human rights projects more than tripled (Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Youngs 2002). But when it comes to democracy promotion, there are several important differences between E U’s ambition in the Mediterranean and towards the former communist states in Eastern Europe which in the first half of the 1990s had gone through a process of democratization and development. F irst of all, the E U could see a future for the states in E astern E urope as a part of the E U. A lready at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, i.e. relatively shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Poland, H ungary and other countries were officially given a perspective to become EU members after a relatively short period of time. T he states at the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean have never been considered being potential members of the E uropean community, even though Morocco did apply for membership back in the late 1980s (and was turned down). A nd secondly the states in E astern E urope were relatively homogenous whereas the states south and east of the Mediterranean are much more politically and economically differentiated. F or decades there have been differences between states in southern E urope and states in northern E urope about the priorities of E U foreign policy. T he turn of the millennium and 9/11 led to changes concerning these differences. T he states in the south of the E U were still mostly focused on the countries south of the Mediterranean and, not the least, the migration issue. But the states in the north of the E U which during the 1990s had been mainly concerned about the former communist Central and E astern E urope began also to focus on the Mediterranean perspective, which could be seen by the different national programs having ambitions in this direction. T he F rench extended, through their development ministry, a program for democratic assistance to the A rab states. T he German and the British governments established new departments within their ministries of foreign affairs to deal with challenges in connection with the Islamic world. A nd S weden and Denmark launched new initiatives with ambitions about promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law in the A rab world (Youngs 2006). T he policies of democracy promotion became increasingly the centre of focus within the overall E uropean-Mediterranean framework, and the question of immigrants in E urope was included in the narratives of the programs, often related to the growing Muslim population in E urope. Discourses of multiculturalism and citizenship became high politics, and it seemed that Britain, F rance and Germany were reconsidering their formerly different but rather consequently pursued policies of integration of immigrants – all three countries moving towards a higher degree of consensus within this highly controversial field. In this perspective it is meaningful to speak of a convergence between the large E U-states. T he securitization which especially after 9/11 and the Madridbombings has spread through the political discourses on Islamic fundamentalism or immigration adds a dimension of similarity to the issue of internal E uropean security not seen before in the history of the E U (Youngs 2006; S eeberg 2007b).


151

By accentuating the coupling between migration and security a new status became ascribed to the migration phenomenon. O ne can, as Michael Collyer points out, discuss whether this did not happen much earlier (Collyer 2006). Barry Buzan and the so-called Copenhagen school has claimed this already back in the beginning of the 1990s. H owever, in spite of that it seems that the phenomenon has changed character in the sense that the discourse of security has become dominant in recent narratives about the duality between migration and security. With the launching of the N eighbourhood project the E U signaled that the relation between E urope and the surrounding world is a relation between a dominant actor and individual participating and cooperating states in the areas surrounding the E U. T he project has a security dimension, which suggests that the cooperation is about managing the security interests of the E U – on terms set by the E U. T he N eighbourhood agreements make it clear to the signatories that it is necessary to combat the terror threat together with the E U (H olm 2005; Dannreuther 2007; S eeberg 2007b). T he original Barcelona setup and its negative conditionality did not in the same way stress demands as regards human rights and democracy in relation to security. Just as the recent coupling between migration and security was not as explicit as it is to day. But at the policy level this has empirically and theoretically become generally accepted since then. S ecurity has become the dominant factor behind the E uropean foreign policy – nationally and at the E U level. Within the latter the Middle E ast is important. T herefore, in the following I will discuss cases from the Mashreq, the Maghreb and T urkey as examples of foreign policy issues, where diverging interests between the three large E U states have had consequences in the sense that the ability of the E U to function as an efficient foreign policy actor became affected. Differences in the Policies Towards the Mashreq-Region Taking Lebanon as the first case, the differences between the European states are profound. A fter the war between Israel and the H ezbollah in 2006, Italy and after a slow start first of all France played an important role in the international discussions about the future of L ebanon, whereas Germany and the UK did not intervene. The transatlantic conflict, reinforced by the Iraq discussions in the UN in autumn 2002 was smoothened already before the L ebanon war in 2006. H alf a year before the assassination of H ariri in F ebruary 2005 the UN S ecurity Council passed resolution 1559 stating that foreign troops (from S yria) should leave the country, and that all militias including the military wing of H ezbollah should be disarmed. Interestingly enough the resolution, passed on 2 S eptember 2004, was introduced by France and the US – working together in the UN for the first time since the confrontations before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. T he F rench government wanted to maintain – in front of the international public – that F rance

152


sees itself as a state with special interests and special responsibilities towards L ebanon and S yria, originating from the times of the F rench mandate before World War II . T he US interests in the matter were related to the situation in Iraq, about containing Syria, fighting Hezbollah and thereby reducing the foreign policy influence of Iran in the Levant. In this way, the French influence in Lebanon has also had significant consequences for the relation to Syria, towards which Germany and the UK held a low profile. T his means that the foreign policy interests of these two countries are primarily expressed at the multilateral level, through the E U Partnership and N eighbourhood initiatives. But for S yria neither a N eighbourhood Policy A ction Plan nor a Country R eport has been produced so far. In the S trategy Paper 2007–2013 and the N ational Indicative Programme 2007–2010 it is claimed: “Co-ordination between donors has improved considerably, but remains ad hoc and ineffective. T his is mainly due to the insufficient investment of major donors in the co-ordination process and the lack of strategy of the S yrian government” (Union 2007). T he Commission Paper shows that the three large E U-states have contributed to donor projects in Syria in very different ways. The breakdown of the financial allocations by donor shows that F rance has contributed 51.3 million euros, Germany 75.9 million euros (of which the main part, 63.8 millions, is directed towards water projects), whereas the UK has not contributed at all (Union 2007, 60). T he historical relations between the E uropean states and Israel are to a large extent influenced by the role of the Holocaust in European history – and the H olocaust has a more than controversial status in the A rab world (N ordbruch 2004). For obvious reasons the official German discourse about Israel has for a long time been affected by the tragedy of the H olocaust – and it still is. When German President H orst Köhler visited the Knesset in January 2005, he repeated the German obligation towards Israel and said: “E nsuring that Israel can live within internationally recognized borders, free of fear and terror, is an incontrovertible maxim of German policy. My country has proven this time and again through its actions. Germany will always stand by Israel and its people” (Köhler 2005). T his is part of the reason why the attitudes of Germany, F rance and the UK towards Israel differ. But added to this is the traditional F rench pro-A rab policy, which already back in the first decades of the history of the European Community influenced the European policy towards Israel. France played also an important role in initiating the V enice declaration of 1980, which Israel has always considered to be far too pro-A rab or pro-Palestinian (L esch 2006; R abil 2006). A gainst this differentiated reality the E U–Israel A ction Plan may be a diplomatic break-through, but it is at the same time vague on a number of highly contested issues, or simply not mentioning these. Del S arto concludes in an analysis of the A ction Plan: “T he discrepancy between the laudable rhetoric that demands the respect for human rights and international law on the one hand, and the acceptance of some general and ambiguous phrases in a document with Israel on the other, does not increase the E U’s credibility” (Del S arto 2007, 72).


153

If the A ction Plan is to become more than a meaningless document, political leaders, as Del S arto argues, will have to develop the necessary political will to make this happen (Del S arto 2007). It can be added that the agreement can have negative consequences for the Middle E ast Peace Process. F irstly: A greeing on an Action Plan between Israel and the EU can mean that it might be difficult for the E U to put pressure on Israel in its relations towards the Palestinians. S econdly: Israel might insist that issues which have been agreed upon already as having implications for the relation between Israel and the Palestinians would be impossible to renegotiate (Del S arto and S chumacher 2005). O n the other hand the A ction Plan might improve the historically poor relations between Israel and E urope, as claimed by Dannreuther (Dannreuther 2006): T he Action Plan offers Israeli firms greater access to European programs and policies, and this could create a reason for Israel to recognize the E U as a negotiating partner in the Middle E ast Peace Process and maybe even to enter a dialogue over WMDproliferation. This is important because as long as the Action Plan is not efficient it will not challenge the dominant role of the individual foreign policies of F rance, Germany and the UK. T he A l-A qsa Intifada can be interpreted as the violent struggle for international approval of Palestinian sovereignty (Jung 2004). S till there is a long way to a Palestinian state. H ardly anything but the case of Palestine demonstrates the inefficiency and overall dilemma for the EU. In quantitative terms Palestine represents the most significant engagement of all EU donor activities. But in qualitative terms the outcome has been insignificant – the Road Map was a E uropean initiative, but in reality it never succeeded (Youngs 2006). Differences between the large E U powers are part of the reason for this. T he L evant region is in many ways a special case in the Middle E ast – also as regards the relations between the region and the E U. L ebanon and Israel and to a certain degree S yria have relations to the various E uropean states in a complex pattern, which rather than being part of the solutions to the problems in the area are part of the problems (S eeberg 2007c). A s shown there are differences between F rench, German and UK policies in relation to S yria and L ebanon. N onetheless some progress has been made at the multilateral level. In January 2007 L ebanon and the E U signed an A ction Plan within the framework of the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy, the ENP . T he implementation documents of the ENP are a number of earlier agreements and documents in relation to L ebanon, first of all the Country Report of March 2005. Furthermore, a background paper (the Country S trategy Paper 2007–2013, following up on the paper covering 2000– 2006) has been produced as well as an attached N ational Indicative Programme for the period 2007–2010. T hese are the central documents and the background for the A ction Plan launched in 2007. More strategic dimensions are only implicitly to be found in the documents. T hey contain either background analysis or tangible descriptions of ways in which problems might be solved. T he background analysis in the Country R eport represents a rather thorough analysis of the difficult situation in Lebanon at the

154


end of 2006. T he problems after the war in July and A ugust are described with the emphasis on the political aspects. T he implications for human rights and rule of law are also covered as preconditions for reform. A lso the widespread corruption which erupted during the civil war, and which since then has never for real been reckoned with, is described. T he around 400,000 Palestinian refugees in L ebanon are mentioned too, and the report criticizes that they have free access only to parts of the labor market and that their access to education and other public services is also restricted. But the foreign policy dimensions are only expressed as far as the economic aspects are concerned, the E U being a willing donor when it comes to the reconstruction efforts of L ebanon. V ery little is said about the challenges concerning the influence of the Arab states in Lebanon. Also the role of Iran and its influence on the status and power of H ezbollah are only indirectly touched upon. Generally speaking the regional and international dimensions are absent – there are very few reflections on the political and social development in the Mashreq and its consequences for the overall situation in the Middle E ast. T he launch of the A ction Plan has hardly contributed to changing the image of the E U in the Middle E ast – with its comprehensive focus on issues ranging from fighting terror to water management or even dialogue within the field of sports. And it can be added that a low media profile of the launching process is combined with a noticeable rhetoric cautiousness and political correctness. T he small Mediterranean state has during the last years witnessed an almost chaotic political situation characterized by dire economic difficulties and political turmoil – partly as a result of the political strengthening of H ezbollah following the war against Israel in July–A ugust 2006. T he E uropean states have not contributed much to solve the situation. F rench President Jacques Chirac tried to boost his reputation in Lebanon (he was a close friend of Rafik Hariri) and the rest of the world by hosting the Paris III talk which resulted in 7.6 billion US $ in donor funding for the reconstruction of L ebanon (S eeberg 2007c). It was obvious after the war that several states in the West were eager to show to the L ebanese leaders that L ebanon was not forgotten by its traditional friends. S till help from the West and especially from the US can be a double-edged sword. T he unpopularity of the US is so widespread and outspoken that it can and often will be used by political opponents. In this case – though only to a certain degree – a donor-conference in Paris is in many ways far from L ebanese every-day life. T urning to the eastern part of the Mashreq, Iraq, the disagreements between the E U states go back at least to the 1990s. T his became apparent during the attacks initiated by the Clinton administration in 1998, the so-called Desert F ox operation. A s R ichard Youngs pointed out: “In the brief military engagement of O peration Desert F ox in 1998 – which took place after S addam withdrew cooperation from UN weapon inspectors – the UK was the only E uropean state to join the United S tates in carrying out bombing raids” (Youngs 2006, 34). F or the E U Iraq belongs to a part of the Middle E ast which is often termed the third dimension, beyond the Partnership and the N eighbourhood policies


155

respectively. Obviously this dimension is less clearly defined or institutionalized (Dannreuther 2007). Iraq can be seen as a case where the disagreements between the E U states are extraordinarily obvious. Iraq is a problematic case to analyze, first of all because the deteriorating situation since the invasion in March 2003 implies that it is not meaningful to speak of a foreign policy of the Iraqi state. S ince the fall of S addam H ussein Iraq can no longer be characterized as a state entity or for that matter as an international actor. This means also that relations towards single foreign states can be identified only to a limited degree which makes it impossible to distinguish between Iraqi interests in relation to F rance, Germany or the UK. During the ongoing transition period relations of this type are in practice suspended. T here is a certain historical logic to it. Iraq was never anything but three O ttoman provinces not having shared a common history as a political community – as stressed by Charles T ripp: “N owhere has the fragmentary and contested nature of Iraq as a state been more marked than in the question of Iraq itself” (T ripp 2002, 174). Under S addam H ussein during the long period from 1979 to 2003, the E U had no important overall political or contractual relations with Iraq, and its role was largely limited to implementing UN S ecurity Council sanctions which were strongly supported especially by F rance. T he E U was, however, an important actor in the humanitarian field. From 1992 onwards, the Community was the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Iraq. T he E U policy towards Iraq has been formulated in very general terms. T he Commission has worked out a strategy for the E U engagement in Iraq pointing to the E uropean interest in seeking influence on the process in post-Saddam Iraq based on three key areas, as mentioned in the homepage of the E uropean Commission: • • •

T he development of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq. The establishment of an open, stable, sustainable and diversified market economy. Iraq’s political and economic integration into its region and the international system.

F or the realization of these objectives the Communication which was endorsed by the E uropean Council of 17–18 June 2005 (Union 2005) sets out an action framework allowing for progressively closer E U–Iraq relations at a pace determined by the progress of the political transition and the security conditions in the country (Union 2007). S ince the invasion the E U has been providing 718.5 million euros in order to help reconstruction work, thereby contributing with almost half (46 percent) of the total amount received by the International R econstruction F und F acility for Iraq (IRFFI). There seems to be consensus within the EU on the financial assistance to Iraq, so the disagreements concern mainly the military intervention – or the A merican policy towards the Middle E ast after the attacks in N ew York and

156


Washington on S eptember 11th 2001. T he lack of trans-A tlantic consensus goes, as shown by Kotzias and L iacouras, further back (Kotzias and L iacouras 2006). T he E uropean division concerning Iraq became apparent during talks in NATO and in the UN before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (S chmidt 2004). T he attack on Iraq in 2003 was conducted by a coalition of forces from different countries, some of which were NATO member countries and some were not, but NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or in its conduct. S till there were discussions within the organization, and Canada, F rance and Germany were against the invasion. In the UN a dramatic process took place during the last months of 2002, where especially the F rench foreign secretary Dominique de V illepin argued against a military intervention without a solid UN -mandate behind it. When the invasion took place in March 2003, E urope like the rest of the world was split, as described by R ichard Youngs: “… at one level, E uropean policy toward Iraq divided into two groups, coalition members and non-coalition states (…) F or coalition members, Iraq’s democratization – or at least something that could be presented as such – was increasingly seen as an exit strategy. F or non-coalition members, the coalition’s exit was pressed as a step toward democratization and the development of a more inclusive international strategy to aid that process” (Youngs 2006, 63). T ogether with the US the UK led the invasion. T he US deployed more than seven-eighths of the soldiers in the occupying coalition, with the majority of the other troops coming from the UK and the rest made up from several other allies. T he coalition of the willing contained several other E U countries, but not Germany or F rance. Britain chose to bandwagon the US by seeking UN support or even cover for what the US seemed set on doing, thereby gaining foreign policy strength for itself. Germany and especially F rance chose the opposite – leading the effort within the UN-member states to avert military action in Iraq. A significant negative result for the E U was a disappointment on behalf of the E uropeans among the A rab elites, but also in the A rab “street”. Irrespective of the different policies of the E uropean states, they are all facing the consequences of the chaotic situation in Iraq and in connection with that the complex issue of the Iraqi migrants. A ccording to UNH CR reports more than 4 million refugees are dispersed between Iraq, S yria, Jordan and other countries in the Middle E ast, many of them trying to get resettlement in E urope or N orth A merica (UNH CR 2007). T he phenomenon is adding to the security agenda in E uropean foreign and security policy which becomes increasingly dominated by the migration issue (L utterbeck 2007).


157

Europe and the Maghreb-Region A lso as regards the Maghreb one of the highly important issues is migration – and with very different repercussions for F rance, Germany and the UK. It was one of the main purposes of the EMP to reduce the flow of migrants from the Middle E ast and A frica towards E urope (Dosenrode 2002; R ibas-Mateos 2004; A ubarell and A ragal 2005; Matthiessen 2005). T his aim was pursued through attempts to block the flow via physical means (Lutterbeck 2006), but also through supporting economic growth in the Partnership countries, in the belief that a raised standard of living would result in a lower propensity to migrate. T his notion is in principle correct, but might not fit the facts of northern Africa, simply because more resources allocated to the Maghreb states in reality could result in more migration; it takes higher standards of living than those in N orthern A frica to reduce the propensity to migrate – a rather banal point which seems to have been neglected in E uropean discussions about the possible effects of aid to developing countries. There are two other important aspects of the migration issue, the first one being that the Maghreb states are potentially functioning as transit areas for huge numbers of migrants from other parts of A frica – even A frica south of the S ahara (S ørensen 2006). T he second important issue is the question of the means that the E U is developing to deal with the problem, as described by Carling. T hese contribute to an increasingly close cooperation and to what has been termed a collaborative approach. But at the expense of the immigrants, many of whom are clandestine (L utterbeck 2006; Carling 2007; L utterbeck 2007). T he phenomenon of clandestine immigrants is increasingly viewed as a security challenge to E urope – both in an economical perspective (maintaining a welfare system for all citizens) and in a more ideological sense (the question of the national identities of the E uropean nation-states). But it is hardly meaningful to speak of a E uropean consensus within this policy area, in spite of the developing S chengen-system and its potential effects with regard to making local immigration pressures a problem for the whole E uropean community – irrespective of the fact that traditionally the Maghreb has been a F rench sphere of interest. T he common E uropean interest is expressed in the E U-Morocco A ction Plan of December 2004. The migration issue is in this context described as a field of opportunities which could be opened by “information campaigns in Morocco on legal migration opportunities to the EU, including family reunification, equal treatment for and integration of migrants”. But at the same time Morocco must accept the obligation “to exchange information and dialogue on illegal migration” and assist “in implementing the strategy to combat illegal immigration” (Union 2004). It has been rather controversial that the E uropean Community has been supportive and uncritical towards the incumbent regime in A lgeria, thereby bringing itself in conflict with opposition movements in Algeria and in the other states in N orthern A frica. During the British E U Presidency in 1998 the British F oreign S ecretary R obin Cook claimed that there was no evidence of any involvement

158


of the A lgerian security forces in massacres in A lgeria. T his was probably as incorrect as it was typical for the E U approach towards the almost permanent crisis in A lgeria in the 1990s. T he Barcelona meeting in 2005, celebrating the 10 years anniversary of the launching of the Barcelona process, saw T ony Blair stating that by far the most important dimension of the E uro-Mediterranean Partnership was about security in Europe. It is difficult to identify German or British foreign policies in relation to the Maghreb, but maybe the British foreign policy is more directly present. Germany is represented in the Maghreb by some of the large German companies investing there – mostly in A lgeria. A ll in all the F rench policy toward the area south of the Mediterranean dominates the picture – compared to Germany and the UK as well as to the rest of E urope. T here have been some contradictions between Germany and F rance in the sense that Germany has expressed wishes to make the E U ME DA program dependent on the protection of human rights. T hese demands have not been supported by F rance, which therefore was accused by Germany of being duplicitous in its foreign policy (Garcia and L arramendi 2002). T he attempts to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the states south and east of the Mediterranean have not been a huge success in general, nor in the Maghreb specifically. One of the reasons has, of course, to do with the tragedy in A lgeria in the 1990s. But this is not the whole explanation. A s shown by Gillespie and Whitehead, political progress in Morocco and T unisia has not been helped forward by the way in which the E MP has been promoted in the region: “T op-down democracy promotion would imply more E U insistence at governmental level that E MP activity must be made visible in N orth A frican societies and greater determination to prevent N orth A frican regimes from blocking or diverting bottom-up democracy promotion activity” (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002, 198). S umming up, the foreign policies of the three large E U-states in the region are very different. F rance still dominates the picture, while the UK has been active at the rhetorical level. Germany is by and large politically passive in the Maghreb. T here have been some controversies between F rance and Germany, but they have first and foremost to do with fundamental issues concerning the allocation of ME DA means. Turkey, the European Promises and the Privileged Partnership During the Cold War T urkey’s value to the West derived from a geographical location that offered a southern flank which could contain the main enemy of NATO and the West, an expansionist Moscow. T urkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 – the country became a member of the alliance during the Korean war and for a long time served as a loyal partner in the military setup of the US -led alliance


159

with nuclear missiles deployed on its territory together with NATO air and naval forces and surveillance facilities overlooking south-western parts of the USSR . T he fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR and its puppet regimes in the eastern part of E urope completely changed the role of T urkey. But long before that T urkey had applied for membership in the E U. T urkey became a member of the Council of E urope in 1949, applied for full membership of the E C in 1987, became an associated member of the WE U in 1991 and entered a customs union with the E U in 1995. But it was not until the H elsinki summit in 1999 that Turkey was declared an official candidate country. Later on, in 2004, the European political leaders decided to open accession negotiations with T urkey which started on 3 O ctober 2005. Parallel to the issue of accession to the E U new discourses concerning a possible new role for T urkey as a mediator between a Muslim world and the West have emerged – accentuated by the dominant, moderate Islamist A K-Party. T he A KP has since the elections of N ovember 2002 dominated T urkish politics and has carried out a large amount of reforms which bring T urkey closer to the E U. T he A KP is explicitly E U-oriented and insists on being Kemalist and loyal to every aspect of modern, secular T urkey. S till parts of the secular elite in T urkey are skeptical as to the authenticity of A KP’s Kemalist loyalty. T he E uropean political leaders perceive the question of T urkish membership of the E U in different ways, but it is hardly meaningful to claim that there is a recurrent pattern in the different national E uropean attitudes towards T urkey. T hus the German Chancellor Gerhard S chroeder pledged support to T urkey in her endeavours to join the E uropean Union whereas A ngela Merkel has been more ambiguous. S he has stated that she will stick to the promises to T urkey in spite of her being close to S arkozy’s skeptical attitude. But she has also stated the opposite. R ichard Youngs shows that the German opinions began to sharpen against T urkey during the last elections: “CDU leader Angela Merkel clarified that her party favored a ‘privileged partnership’, not full entry – thus indicating that German elections in 2006 could derail accession negotiations” (Youngs 2006, 212). T he F rench President Jacques Chirac signed all the declarations of the E uropean Council where T urkey was declared to be a candidate country, to be assessed along the same criteria as the other accessions countries. H owever, in particular at the end of his term his comments of T urkish membership became increasingly ambiguous. H is successor N icolas S arkozy has been rather consistently negative. In his election campaign he promised that he would try to stop T urkish accession negotiations and instead plead for a “privileged partnership”. A nd during the campaign leading up to the F rench R eferendum on the E U constitution in 2005 S arkozy stated, that “Israel and L ebanon have more E uropean values than T urkey (…) I’m not against the T urks or Muslims, but I’m not for the E U membership of an A sian state. I don’t want to see the Kurdish, H ezbollah and Palestine problems As to the development of the AKP and its conflicts with the secular elites, see also the contribution by Ihsan Dagi in this volume, Chapter 3.

160


become E uropean problems. I don’t want a E urope, which will be neighbouring Iraq or Iran” (Interview 2005). T he interesting point here is the way in which S arkozy juxtaposes concepts of T urks, Muslims, H ezbollah and possible problems in E urope in case T urkey becomes an E U member and furthermore, that he does not want Iraq and Iran as neighbours. O f course this was a polemical comment coined in a hectic election process, but S arkozy has since then maintained that he is determined to work against full membership for T urkey. H e is in concordance with most of his compatriots and probably also with the majority of the population of E urope as a whole (R uizJimenez and T orreblanca 2007). O pinion polls have shown that most F rench are opposed to T urkish membership. S ome polls in F rance have put opposition as high as 90 percent of the population (Youngs 2006). By contrast, T ony Blair and Gordon Brown have both consistently been advocating T urkish membership, in agreement with the US attitude. T he British and US consensus is similar to the agreements on the issue of Iraq – and different from the F rench-US agreement on several issues related to L ebanon. T he British attitudes are probably to some degree a result of the close cooperation of the UK and the US during the last years. T his has also to do with another issue dividing the E U power-triangle, namely the issue of free trade. T he UK under T ony Blair and Gordon Brown has been advocating free trade and in line with this also supported T urkish accession. By contrast, S arkozy has been trying to launch a campaign within the E U against free, liberal trade in and out of E urope, thereby arguing against what used to be one of the foundations of the EE C when it was inaugurated back in the late 1950s, and which has been re-launched in connection with the negotiations about a new E U constitution. T urkish foreign policy has been dividing the E uropean states. T urkey has followed a strong pro-US foreign policy, as did Britain, but she has also had a tight alliance with Israel, thereby bringing the E uropean states in opposition to each other, not the least because of the traditionally predominant pro-A rab of F rance (Dorronsoro 2004). Due to the PKK issue, the alliance with Israel etc. T urkey has problematic relations with the A rab world, which also affects the relation between T urkey and the West (Bonner 2005). T he division of the E uropean states as regards T urkey leads at the same time to an internal division in T urkey, as discussed by Dorronsoro. T he process of deep transformation connected to the accession process will no doubt provoke tensions in T urkey which from time to time might even dominate T urkish domestic politics. T he much-quoted fears of a “train crash”, the term coined in 2006 by O llie R ehn, E nlargement Commissioner of the E U a year after the opening of the accession talks, will probably be a reality for a long time. T urkey has travelled a long and bumpy road, as Dietrich Jung states in a short analysis of the prospects for T urkish membership (Jung 2007), and nothing suggests that it is going to be less bumpy in the future.


161

A manda A kcakoca analyses this in an EP C paper where she claims that if the Cyprus issue was “moved from the equation, the situation would be very different but, as things stand, this decades-old problem will continue to cast a shadow over A nkara’s relations with the E U (A kcakoca 2006, 26). S he further claims that it will be of utmost importance to keep the pace as far as the reform process is concerned. Because of the accession talks, which mean that T urkey is not part of the ENP , an A ction Plan has not been negotiated. Instead the ongoing reforms gradually change the conditions for T urkey–E U cooperation. A nother tremendously important issue in the E uropean discussions about T urkish access to the E U is the question of T urkish migration to E urope. A s shown by Koc and Onan the Turkish migration to Europe has had significant consequences for the T urkish economy – even though the most striking result of their research seems to be that migrants’ remittances are generally used to satisfy basic consumption needs in T urkey (Koc and O nan 2004). If the negotiations between the E U and T urkey lead to restrictions on migration the phenomenon will loose effect, thereby contributing to questioning the advantage of membership seen from a T urkish viewpoint. Under all circumstance this perspective seems to become a reality. T he population of T urkey is ageing faster than in other Middle E astern countries (Behar 2006). Maybe this means that in the long run a continued T urkish migration towards E urope is unrealistic. F urthermore there seems to be a declining propensity to migrate towards E urope (Krieger and Maître 2006). T he discussions about migration and security will take another course if the considerable T urkish migration towards E urope will be reduced in the coming decades. F urthermore, the T urks in E urope are unevenly distributed. R ather few can be found in E ngland, a larger group in F rance, both countries nothing compared to the more than 2 million T urks in Germany. Conclusion T his chapter has examined the divergences between F rance, Germany and the UK in relation to foreign and security policy towards the Mediterranean and the Middle E ast and claims that the three largest E U-states are to some degree pursuing their own foreign policy interests and are thereby blocking the E U from becoming an efficient foreign policy actor. The article demonstrates the point by examining the policies of the three states as regards cases from the Mashreq, the Maghreb and T urkey. T he Barcelona process, the initial E U policy for the Mediterranean with its central building stone, the E uropean Mediterranean Partnership of 1995, does not seem to have generated convincing results for the E U. Instead it has constrained the E U in progressing towards becoming an important foreign policy actor in the Mediterranean and the Middle E ast. It is somewhat early to evaluate the N eighbourhood Policy but so far the results do not seem to be altering the picture.

162


Europe is still far from becoming an efficient foreign policy actor, one of the main reasons being contradictions between the three large E U member states, F rance, Germany and the UK. In relation to L ebanon and S yria in the Mashreq region the F rench role is more active than the German and the British. T here are historic reasons for that rooted in Middle Eastern history in the first half of the 20th century, but also the fact that the UK has been closer to the US and in its foreign policy has played an important role in the division of the E uropean “power-triangle.” T he article points at the restricted perspectives in the general E U policy towards the Mashreq, as expressed for instance in the ENP A ction Plans for L ebanon and Israel. Iraq – widening the scope beyond the Mediterranean but still being part of the Mashreq – confirms the general impression of European disagreement. The British bandwagoning with the US put Germany and France out of influence in the first place, but also the development in Iraq in the years after the invasion in March 2003 has contributed to the E uropean disagreement. T he Iraqi tragedy has created a gigantic flow of refugees inside and outside of Iraq contributing to the overall picture of the Middle E astern states as large-scale producers of migrants. T he Maghreb shows F rance in a dominant role. During the tragic civil war A lgeria experienced F rench and also E uropean non-interference. T his had consequences for the overall Maghreb–E U relations characterized in Morocco and T unisia by F rench dominance and German and British passivity. T he Barcelona Process was to a high degree launched in order to improve relations with the Mahgreb but the E U did not succeed with its ambitions in this region. F inally T urkey presents itself as another example of E uropean disunity. Presumably T urkey will never become a full member of the E uropean Community. Due to F rench and German opposition, T urkey will probably negotiate a privileged partnership some time in the future, and the E U, breaking its promise to T urkey, will demonstrate once again being irresolute, not the least as a consequence of the contradiction between the main powers within the E uropean community. A s shown, migration is important in connection with the overall theme of this chapter because it has become a dominant security issue. Migration was from the beginning of the Barcelona process a core theme of the Mediterranean project, but it has since then been subject to a radical securitization in the E uropean states. E ven though the states of the E U do not have identical interests as to migration they seem to be moving ahead towards convergence regarding the inner security of the E U. A t the same time we see a new convergence of integration policies concerning immigrants in E urope, legitimized with reference to a necessity of being capable of protecting the E U and its citizens from security threats (Boswell 2007). T he securitization process is problematic because the E uropeans, by showing that their main concern is the inner security of E urope, are loosing credibility as a foreign policy actor in the Middle E ast and the Mediterranean. T his adds to the general conception in the Middle E ast that the West practices double standards and that European foreign policy is inefficient (Seeberg 2007a).


163

A s a solution to the political shortcomings and moral dilemmas of globalization R ichard F alk advocates an inter-civilizational and inter-religious dialogue and underlines that a global moral regime should support attempts in this direction (F alk 2002). When the US launched its new strategic doctrine of pre-emptive defense, the reaction by the key E uropean governments and the E uropean public opinion demonstrated their attachment to international law and institutions “…as precious guarantors of an international order which they do not want to see cast aside by the sole remaining superpower (…) T he result was disunity and a severe setback for the E U’s goal of a Common F oreign and S ecurity Policy ” (F awcett 2005, 324). E urope is practicing what might be called a foreign policy of “social engineering” trying to become an important player on the international political scene. T he E U is the largest donor in the Mediterranean and in Iraq, but does not have influence in proportion to that. And the EU is, bilaterally and multilaterally, pursuing policies that insist on democracy promotion, human rights and rule of law without seriously changing anything in the Middle E ast with its autocratic and undemocratic regimes. The reason is first and foremost that the “power-triangle” of the EU does not constitute a political centre in the E uropean community. T he three largest states in the E uropean community are carrying out their own, independent foreign and security policies, building on traditional foreign policy and security interests. T he result is that E U’s international actorness in relation to the Middle E ast remains at a rather low level. In the Mediterranean and in the wider Middle E ast the picture of E U as “payer not player” is maintained together with a huge credibility gap. References A kcakoca, A . (2006), “E U-T urkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment?”, E uropean Policy Centre. EPC Issue Paper (50). A kgündüz, A . (1994), “L abour Migration from T urkey to Western E urope 1960– 1974. A n A nalytical R eview”, Capital and Class (51). Behar, C. (2006), “Demographic Developments and Complementarities: A geing, L abor and Migration”, Turkish Studies 7(1): 17–31. Bonner, A . (2005), “T urkey, the E uropean Union and Paradigm S hifts”, Middle East Policy 12(1): 44–72. Boswell, C. (2007), “T he S ecuritisation of Migration: A R isky S trategy for E uropean S tates”, DIIS Brief, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International S tudies. Carling, J. (2007), “E uropean S trategies for R educing ‘Unwanted Immigration’”, DIIS Brief, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International S tudies. Collyer, M. (2006), “Migrants, Migration and the S ecurity Paradigm: Constraints and O pportunities”, Mediterranean Politics 11(2): 255–70.

164


Dannreuther, R . (2006), “Developing the A lternative to E nlargement: T he E uropean N eighbourhood Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review 11(2): 183–201. Dannreuther, R . (2007), “R ecasting the Barcelona Process: E urope and the Middle E ast”, in S eeberg, P. (ed.) (2007), EU and the Mediterranean. Foreign Policy and Security (O dense: University Press of S outhern Denmark). Del S arto, R .A . (2007), “Wording and Meaning (s): E U–Israeli Political Cooperation according to the ENP A ction Plan”, Mediterranean Politics 12(1): 59–75. Del S arto, R .A . and T . S chumacher (2005), “F rom E MP to ENP : What’s at stake with the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy towards the S outhern Mediterranean?” European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 1–22. Dorronsoro, G. (2004), “T he E U and T urkey: between geopolitics and social engineering”, Dannreuther, R . (2004), European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy (N ew York: R outledge). Falk, R. (2002), “The first normative global revolution? The uncertain future of globalization”, in Mozzafari, M. (ed.), Globalization and Civilizations (L ondon: R outledge). F awcett, L . (2005), International Relations of the Middle East (O xford: O xford University Press). Garcia, B.L . and M.H .d.L . L arramendi (2002), “S pain and N orth A frica: T owards a ‘Dynamic S tability’”, in Gillespie, R . and R . Youngs (eds), The European Union and Democracy Promotion. The Case of North Africa (L ondon: F rank Cass). Gillespie, R . and R . Youngs (2002), “T hemes in E uropean Democracy Promotion”, in Gillespie, R . and R . Youngs (eds), The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa (L ondon, F rank Cass). Gillespie, R . and L . Whitehead (2002), “E uropean Democracy Promotion in N orth A frica: L imits and Prospects”, in Gillespie, R . and R . Youngs (eds), The European Union and Democracy Promotion. The Case of North Africa (L ondon, F rank Cass). H olm, U. (2005), “E U’s N eighbourhood Policy: A Question of S pace and S ecurity”, DIIS Working Paper, Copenhagen, Danish Institute F or International S tudies. Interview (2005), “F rance admits opposition to T urkish E U membership”, Journal of Turkish Weekly (21 May). Jung, D. (2004), The Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Jung, D. (ed.) (2006), Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Jung, D. (2007), “T urkey’s F uture: E U Member or ‘Islamist R ogue S tate’?”, DIIS Brief, Copenhagen, DIIS : 8. Kadioglu, R . (1993), “T he H uman T ie: International L abour Migration”, in Balkir, C.A .M. (ed.), Turkey and Europe (L ondon: Pinter Publishers). Kepel, G. (2004), The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA : H arvard University Press).


165

Kirişci, K. (2007), “Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration”, Mediterranean Politics 12(1): 91–7. Koc, I. and I. O nan (2004), “International Migrants’ R emittances and Welfare S tatus of the L eft-Behind F amilies in T urkey”, International Migration Review 38 (1): 78–112. Kotzias, N . and P. L iacouras (2006), EU–US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Krieger, H . and B. Maître (2006), “Migration T rends in an E nlarging E uropean Union”, Turkish Studies 7(1): 45–66. Köhler, H . (2005), Address by Horst Köhler, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Knesset I. M. o. F. A. . L esch, D.W. (2006), The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (N ew York: Perseus Books Group). L utterbeck, D. (2006), “Policing Migration in the Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics 11(1): 59–82. L utterbeck, D. (2007), “Policing the Mediterranean Borders: T he H uman S ecurity Implications”, in S eeberg, P. (ed.), EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and Security (O dense: University Press of S outhern Denmark). N ordbruch, G. (2004), “R einterpreting H istory: Perceptions of N azism in E gyptian Media”, in Jung, D. (ed.), The Middle East and Palestine. Global Politics and Regional Conflict (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Pace, M. (2006), Meddling with the Mediterranean: The Politics of Regional Identity (A bingdon: R outledge). R abil, R .G. (2006), Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East (Westport, CN : Praeger S ecurity International). R uiz-Jimenez, A .M. and J.I. T orreblanca (2007), “E uropean Public O pinion and T urkey’s A ccession: Making S ense of A rguments F or and A gainst’, European Policy Institute Network, Working Paper (16): 48. S chmidt, M. (2004), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). S eeberg, P. (2007a), EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and Security (O dense: University Press of S outhern Denmark). S eeberg, P. (2007b), “‘Unity in Diversity’, S ecurity and Migration: T he Changing E uropean F oreign Policy and S ecurity A genda in the Mediterranean”, in S eeberg, P. (ed.), EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and Security (O dense: University Press of S outhern Denmark). S eeberg, P. (2007c), “F ragmented L oyalties: N ation and Democracy in L ebanon after the Cedar R evolution”, Centre for Middle East Studies Working Paper Series 8: 1–31. S ørensen, N .N . (ed.) (2006), Mediterranean Transit Migration (�� Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International S tudies).

166


T ripp, C. (2002), “T he F oreign Policy of Iraq”, in H innebusch, R . and A . E hteshami (eds), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (L ondon: L ynne R ienner). UNH CR (2007), (N ew York: UNH CR ). Union (2004), EU-Morocco Action Plan. Commission of the E uropean Union. Union (2005), Precidency Conclusions 16 and 17 June 2005. 10255/05. Union (2006), External Relations. Overview. EU Policy objectives in Iraq, , E uropean Commission. Union (2007), Syrian Arab Republic. Strategy Paper 2007–2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007–2010, Commission of the E uropean Union. Youngs, R . (2002), “T he E uropean Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean. A N ew or Disingenuous S trategy?”, Democratization 9(1): 40–62. Youngs, R . (2006), Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11, (L ondon: L ynne R ienner).

Chapter 8

Citizenship and Cultural Clashes: T he Cartoon Crisis and Changing N otions of Citizenship Jakob F eldt

Introduction T he notion of culture or rather, as it is in practice, “cultural politics” is and will continue to be a central aspect of regional integration between E urope and the Middle E ast. Cultural politics reaches into domains that on the surface do not signal “culture“, for instance issues of rights, duties and not the least citizenship. E conomic integration, migrations, security and the media have changed the networks of relations between the peoples of E urope and the Middle E ast and have caused a wide range of responses that within E urope have led to renegotiations of issues connected to the status of citizens, justice and patterns of loyalty. In this contribution I will take a look at how E uropean–Middle E astern cultural integration affects cultural politics in E urope. In order to illustrate this I will draw on examples from the Danish context that I work within. O ne of the examples will be the internationally notorious Cartoon Crisis and the other will be the development of a new program for integration in Denmark that also includes a new concept, namely that of “active citizenship”. I consider the relation between these issues as following: E uropean–Middle E astern integration in its many aspects puts pressure on the normative and commonsensical perceptions of cultural politics in E urope (and in the Middle E ast, of course, but that will not be the theme here) which leads to cultural clashes. T hese clashes are many and varied and they have been highly visible in all the E uropean states for at least 20 years. Mostly, these clashes are between the national culture of the E uropean states and immigrant Muslim populations. T he Cartoon Crisis is an example of such a cultural clash. T hese cultural clashes eventually lead to a variation of new cultural policies primarily within integration policy, educational policy but also welfare policies and changes in citizenship perceptions and citizenship education. T he overall headline of these developments is global and regional integration and diversification.

L aclau and Mouffe call it organic crisis, and I consider this concept as being the general description of what cultural clashes is a part of (L aclau and Mouffe 1985).

168


O n the surface it might seem quite contradictory to speak of cultural integration between the Middle East and Europe and of increased diversification at the same time. N evertheless, I will argue that the cultural integration of Middle E asterners in European society has played a significant part of the experience of diversification that is evident to large parts of the E uropean population. S o how can it be that integration leads to diversification and then to changes of the cultural politics of citizenship? A re one of the prices of regional integration between the Middle E ast and E urope political and civic turmoil over cultural issues? T he answer can be quite simple. It is because integration within areas of commerce, media, security and population does not necessarily lead to cultural integration. T he lacking behind of cultural integration and the development of a new type of cultural politics highlight the cultural politics that is behind the existing notions of citizenship, loyalty or community and therefore we see an increased focus on identities of states, communities, civilizations and religions as a central aspect of regional integration. T he vastly expanding literature on citizenship deals with these problems from a variety of perspectives. H ow do and how should states and societies respond to the exposure of culture as a central element of citizenship which traditionally has been regarded as a matter of legal status involving a number of rights and duties? It seems that the technical and rational logic of integration is confronted with sensibility issues such as culture and identity that leads to significant changes of the notion and legal construction of citizenship. In my own working and living context, Denmark, this has been a central topic of political and popular debates for some 15 years which resembles the general pattern over most of E urope. T he perspective forwarded in this contribution is highly skeptical towards the dominant rationalist optimism of modernization theories on regional and global integration. S uch perspectives often ignore or belittle reality in the sense that they consider the cultural sentiments of people to be illusions while economic integration is real. Modernization theories mostly follow the technocratic reason of bureaucrats and are very normative indeed towards an undefined goal of “modernization” or “integration”. It is in such perspectives we find “democratization in the Middle E ast” or “A frican integration”. T hings that do not exist in reality. In this chapter, I deal with the imagination of togetherness as a social fact and the cultural clashes and policies derived from E uropean–Middle E astern integration as a real experience for millions of E uropeans, immigrants and old E uropeans alike. Citizenship and Integration A ccording to E rnesto L aclau and Chantal Mouffe, we have an organic crisis in a society when there is an excess of floating elements that cannot be integrated or rejected by already existing discourses in this society. In the discourse-theoretical vocabulary floating elements are signs (meanings) that cannot be placed in A version of such a rather optimistic modernization theory on integration can be found in the next contribution, Chapter 9, by Wolfgang Z ank.

Citizenship and Cultural Clashes

169

a meaningful relation with the dominating structures of meaning and meaning production (discourses) in society and at the same time are too numerous to be placed in equivalence with other signs already placed outside meaningful conversation. S uch a situation leads to cultural crisis because a struggle will take place between attitudes and strategies for making sense and coping with the floating elements (the new situation that needs explanations and normative strategies). Immigration of Middle E astern Muslims to E urope coupled with regional and global integration of economy, commerce, media, security etc. has in my mind led to such a crisis. Citizenship has become a matter of sensibility where it used to be a matter of rationality, i.e. the extension of status and rights, not the extension of culture. A s mentioned, citizenship has through modern history been an instrument of extension of status, rights and responsibilities to increasingly more people in society thereby vastly expanding the number of owners of social properties (Peled 2007). T his development of citizenship to encompass virtually all inhabitants in the various E uropean states, a development which culminated in the 1960s and 1970s, is intimately linked to the development of the modern liberal democracy. L iberalism’s emphasis of rights, the rule of law, the sanctity of private property, individual liberty, market economy and the absolute universality of these elements provided us with the modern citizenship based on rights of which the most important from a citizen point of view must be the rule of law in the sense of all men being equal in front of the law. But not only the rule of law makes a society liberal. T he law has to be anchored in individual liberty and private property. T he perspective of liberalism implicates that citizens have the right to be free and that the rule of law protects citizens from each other but more importantly, it protects the citizen from the state. Basically, this means that there are limits to what can be changed in liberal societies. T here are fundamentals that come before freedom and these are what liberals consider the conditions for a meaningful understanding of the concept of freedom, namely individual liberty, private property and market economy. L iberalism simply states that all men are free and equal. It has no boundaries, it is completely universal and it contains no concept of the “people” or “culture” apart from negative definitions such as “communities of free men” or “liberal culture” which in principle can embrace everyone who accepts the liberal rule of law. L iberalism (and capitalism) is the social system behind the modern citizen, and it has provided the modern citizen with the right to be free, own things and to be protected against the state. It has not provided citizens with an identity or a community and not even a people. Considered from the perspective of liberalism, there should be no problem whatsoever with the extension of citizenship to new immigrants since all men are free, equal before the law and have the right to be protected from the state. T he tensions in society caused by migrations, labor conflicts, ethnic and racial conflicts and the like are from a liberal perspective essentially police matters, breaches of law and order. N o such liberal society has ever existed as far as I am aware of, but nevertheless liberalism is the legal cornerstone of the modern concept of citizenship. T he empires and states of the Middle E ast have never developed similar notions of citizenship, though most

170


post-colonial Middle E astern states have imitations of E uropean constitutions that in principle make their populations citizens with rights and responsibilities. T he development of modern democracy is not automatically linked to the evolution of liberal societies (Mouffe 2000). Democracy can have and has had very many different shapes. Its cornerstone is that there exists such a thing as demos, a people, which implies a limiting of the domain within which we can find a democracy. In a nutshell, the existence of a people implicates the existence of other people in other states and non-people, aliens, within states. Demos, the people, is both limited and sovereign at the same time, to use Benedict A nderson’s words (A nderson 1991, 6). Both the limitation of the people and the sovereignty of the people are not in principle compatible with liberalism because liberalism is universal and the people cannot reign over the basic principles of the liberal state, i.e. the people is not fully sovereign. Democracy then requires a limitation which liberalism does not. Democracy cannot work in a cultural void because the people are ultimately a collective subject; something more than just the total number of human beings within a state. In the end, the liberal democracy is a contradiction (Mouffe 2000). It is a limitation of democracy and a limitation of liberalism but the contradiction has worked well to integrate almost all people as citizens and into “the people” of the E uropean states. R egarding modern citizenship democracy provides the cultural politics not provided by liberalism. T he aspect of citizenship that has to do with identity, of belonging to a positively defined people, has become an issue that through the success of national educational programs, welfare programs, and other homogenization processes has been left to the nationalists of Western states, only to resurface recently in mainstream politics as a direct outcome of regional, if not global integration. T he cultural aspect of citizenship, identity, keeps the people limited and sovereign, but this aspect has not earlier been recognized in the formalities of citizenship in most states. In Denmark, which I will discuss later, citizenship has until recently not officially demanded a Danish identity of its bearers (Korsgaard 2004). It “simply” required the fulfilling of a set of conditions of which none were explicitly cultural. S o what we witness in these years can also be coined as a radicalization of the inherent clash between liberalism and democracy caused by increased pressure on the commonsensical cultural politics of democracy. T his pressure primarily comes from the immigration of Middle E asterners to E urope, but it is also, as Mouffe points out, caused by the economic policies of neo-liberalism (Mouffe 2000, 17–35). In the balance between liberalism and democracy, since the 1980s the scale has turned to liberalism which makes it increasingly difficult to follow politics of redistribution of wealth and property. T his makes it harder for people to see what politics and participation actually accomplish since most political parties flock in the middle where they follow basically the same economic policy. Immigration and integration policies naturally I am aware that numerous sociologists and political analysts proclaim that politics is about “values”, not classical “interests”, but I believe they are mistaken. T hat politics is increasingly about values is in itself a sign that liberalism weighs heavier than democracy.


171

move to the centre of cultural politics because they build up the most obvious pressure on the cultural homogeneity that the people represent. Democracy’s turf, the will of the people, can only unfold on cultural issues. Immigration, integration, education, art and sports are areas where politicians willingly “listen to the people” while economy, employment, housing, foreign policy and redistribution are areas preferably run without public interference. In a sense the prevalent liberal economic policies define the problems caused by immigration and particularly by the integration of Middle E astern Muslims in E uropean society as cultural politics. It becomes impossible to deal with these problems within areas of social policies, redistribution and education because these areas also become regulated by the market and furthermore, such policy areas are generally viewed with suspicion by liberals. E ven a traditionally progressive national educational system such as the Danish one has gone through a reform process since the end of the 1990s towards increased nationalization of humanistic subjects and a radically increased focus on tests. T here is no doubt that this reform process has been provoked by an abstract fear of loosing “national identity” because of immigration and globalization. T hus education has shifted from being the most important integration institution into an institution for preserving a particular image of the Danes. T he last 10–15 years of liberal policy in Denmark has relegated democracy to be about the identity and culture of the people. A s Mouffe and others have pointed out, this is an expression of a democracy under pressure (Mouffe 2000). Under the prevalent socio-political conditions, the immigration and integration of Middle E asterners to E urope has become the icon of an organic crisis in society. Citizenship basically has two essential components which are rights/duties and identity/culture. T his broad division of citizenship still works even though researchers and activists have recently advocated all kinds of citizenship such as ethnic citizenship, religious citizenship, sexual citizenship and the like which all really figure under the identity/cultural dimension of citizenship (e.g. Isin and Wood 1999). It is impossible to distinguish clearly between the legal dimension and the cultural dimension of citizenship because the legal rights/duties dimension has been regulated regularly also for cultural reasons. F urthermore, the legal dimension of citizenship is also considered to be educational which means that when a person is endowed with citizenship it is because he/she lives according to acceptable norms such as providing for oneself, speaking the native language and being a law-abiding person. N evertheless, in states such as Denmark this type of indirect educational policy is no longer considered effective enough, and the state has proceeded to direct cultural politics towards Muslim immigrants in particular. T hus citizenship has in principle an integrative effect on people. In the period of expansion of citizenship from 1850–1980 to encompass virtually all people No leading politician finds it possible to change things in society. Societies based on market economy just have to be regulated, preferably as little as possible, which is one of the cornerstones of liberalism. Politics can only be about values then because the rest is a matter of technical regulation.

172


inhabiting the various Western states, the state and its population were integrated economically and culturally. T he state so to speak institutionalized its population by making the population part of the state, and the state needed as many working responsible citizens as possible. People came to identify with the state and it became them (Gellner 1983; S mith 1991). In H omi Bhabha’s words, the location of development and the location of culture became the same (Bhabha 1995). T his overlapping of the state, of development and culture represents the most radical degree of integration between state and people. Citizenship is meant to overarch all other loyalties and it represents the symbolic integration between the individual and the state. Citizenship is not only an abstract, rational declaration, it also has a substantive ground which is identity and that is why people all over the West react to the immigration and integration of Middle E asterners. It is important to note that these reactions are varied and should not all be related to nationalism or racism. Many reactions and attitudes are also oriented towards the development of inclusion strategies but the common denominator is that immigration and integration are either problems or challenges to national and regional togetherness from a mainly empirical point of view. N o matter how perfectly the Middle E astern Muslims in the West live up to the objective criteria for achieving citizenship, we will still experience the same problems over the issue of the identity of the people, of the collective subject. T his identity is the substantive ground of citizenship that gives the democratic nature of the Western states its legitimacy. Carl S chmitt pointed this out already in 1926 in his critique of the liberal democracy but it seems to be forgotten in most of the recent debates, apart from occasional tirades from the demagogues of the far right who think that substantive identity can only derive from history, race or religion (S chmitt 1985). T he point is that the substantive ground of collective identity, of citizenship, is not rational. It is not scientific, based on rules, or logical argument. It is based on sentiment. I wish to stress here that there is no reason why this sentiment, this feeling of togetherness and belonging, should be racial or religious. Basically it is an imagined bond between rulers and ruled and in between the ruled which gives legitimacy to the rulers, the state, and the law in a democracy. Put crudely, it is extremely hard from a sentimental point of view to understand what the bond between a Muslim ghetto where life is a true copy of Damascus, A mman or even a refugee camp in L ebanon and the Western state consists of. I claim that we in the Western states do not understand this relation as a bond but as philanthropy. We help people in need because we are humanists and because we are bound by the universals of liberalism. T he liberal, humanist credo compels us to give these people citizenship after a number of years, but we cannot see the bond anyhow. T he integration of Middle E asterners in the West emphasizes the uneasy struggle between the liberal and the democratic in our societies. A t this point I wish to state that I believe that all communities are political and sentimental at the same time. T hough not the subject of this chapter, I will claim that the problem with integration of Middle E asterners to a large degree is caused by the lack of recognition by Westerners that their communities are political and sentimental, not empirical.


173

Citizenship and integration are linked together as the end and as the process towards that end. A s I have tried to explain, this is by no means a straightforward process driven by rules and objective criteria but by a struggle that sometimes seems to be existential. Carl S chmitt declares that democracies are fundamentally homogenous regarding the substantive ground of citizenship and identity, and that they are bound by necessity to eradicate what is different (S chmitt 1985, 9). Difference can be eradicated by a variety of means of which education and integration policies are the most widely used in these years, though imprisonment and expulsion are becoming increasingly popular. T hat these latter strategies gain ground is evidently a sign of crisis. T he unwanted are no longer regarded as being within a shared symbolic world and therefore capable of betterment, instead they are labeled as enemies of the good life. T hese unwanted people are mostly Muslim immigrants from the Middle E ast or A frica. With the way Western identities are currently articulated, it is only natural that E uropean–Middle E astern cultural integration leads to an organic crisis of Western society. T his crisis is radically deepened by the success of the liberal market oriented economy, which minimizes the arena of democratic politics to mainly cultural issues. T he same liberal socioeconomic development seems furthermore to weaken the general understanding of the political nature of the identity aspects of citizenship. Identity is gradually becoming more empirical and thus no longer an area for politics which makes it very difficult to integrate as a Middle Eastern Muslim with brown skin and black eyes. When discussing E uropean–Middle E astern integration it is important to consider that politics is not necessarily rational. T he effect of this integration on E urope is mainly within cultural politics of which citizenship is a highly central part. Citizenship has a substance beyond rules, and this substance is severely challenged by the integration of Middle E asterners in E urope. T his challenge is not caused by any empirical identity of e.g. Danes or Germans facing an empirical identity of, say, Muslim A rabs but by the current perception of collective identity as non-political. Before I proceed to discuss the Danish situation in some detail, I will shortly discuss a classical distinction which is central to the struggle between in this case the state of Denmark including the majority of its population and the majority of Middle E astern immigrants (as well as other immigrants), namely the distinction between justice and loyalty. Justice and Loyalty – Richard Rorty’s Version In his recent collection of essays R ichard R orty discusses philosophy as a kind of cultural politics (R orty 2007). T he point of departure for the essays is that we can change the way we understand and feel about things by talking about them in new and different ways. T hings simply become different if we speak about them in a different way, and philosophy’s role in cultural politics is accordingly to bring about new ways to speak about things. We do not solve problems, they disappear when we contextualize things in new ways, and new problems arise which might

174


have more positive effects on our living together in the world. T his perspective is absolutely central to R orty’s thinking, and therefore it is only natural that his work ends with a book on cultural politics. O ne of the essays deals with the classical distinction between justice and loyalty. T his distinction has been prominent in philosophy since Kant, and it has paved its way into political theory and sociology at least since the beginning of the 20th century. It is basically the same distinction the classical sociologists made between “Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft” (T önnies), “organic–mechanic” (Durkheim) or “traditional–rational” (Weber). T he distinction is a way to say that some relations are held together irrationally by sentiment and others are held together rationally by way of agreement. Justice is in principle universal, and it is the hallmark of the well-ordered liberal society where all people are equal in front of the law. S uch societies have institutions to make sure that discrimination does not take place, and they advocate international justice through the international system, in particular the UN , international courts and human rights agencies. L oyalty on the other hand is considered to characterize nationalist, authoritarian or developing states that either legitimize themselves through sentiment or are so weak that family, clan or religious loyalties are decisive in social relations. S ocieties in the West are normally considered to be just and societies of the Middle E ast parochial in the meaning of regulated by loyalties. We find the distinction in the debates on integration of Middle Easterners in Europe as a meeting or cultural encounter between rational E urope and the traditional Middle E ast, and we demand the immigrants to quit their traditional loyalties and replace them with justice. R orty asks the simple question, “what if justice is just a larger form of loyalty?” (R orty 2007, 42). If such a thing as justice exists as procedures among people that are always right, then justice is metaphysical and not historical. If we recognize justice as historical and bound to particular developments in human society, then the idea of universal justice is contextual and accordingly “just” an idea produced culturally by people. R orty writes: N on-Western societies in the past were rightly sceptical of Western conquerors who explained that they were invading in obedience to divine commands. More recently, they have been sceptical of Westerners who suggest that they should adopt Western ways in order to become more rational. (T his suggestion has been abbreviated by Ian H acking as ‘Me rational, you Jane’) (R orty 2007, 54).

I concur with R orty when he states that then justice must be a larger form of loyalty. Justice is a type of loyalty that is expanded to a lot of people bound by a different sentiment than e.g. a religious or ethnic sentiment. Justice is most often loyalty towards liberalism and democracy and therefore a justice split between the universal liberal ideas and the people as a limited collective subject. N evertheless, it is not essentially different than all other types of loyalty. T he substance of democracy is a sentiment that produces loyalty towards the state and creates a R orty died recently.


175

bond between rulers and ruled. In principle loyalty can be extended to all living things, but when we experience pressure or feel that our societies are in a state of cultural crisis, loyalty becomes less and less abstract. Most of us would shelve larger loyalties (justice) if our loved ones were in need of help, almost no matter what they had done or no matter that other people needed help also. T here are thick loyalties and thin loyalties, but only loyalties and not justice (Walzer 1994). S uch a re-description of the justice–loyalty distinction might assist us in seeing the effects of E uropean–Middle E astern integration on cultural politics in a different light, in particular if we acknowledge that the liberal democracy consists of a balance between the two ideas, not a unity. A s this balance has tipped towards liberalism and diminished democracy to cultural politics, it seems that the somewhat paradoxical effect of regional integration is the weakening of the larger loyalties. We increasingly find the sentimental community of the “we rationals” against both the “you Jane” communities of immigrants and the proper Middle E ast. A s mentioned earlier, this weakening of larger loyalties and the intense occupation with cultural politics in the West is a symptom of the organic crisis brought about by increased E uropean–Middle E astern integration. In the following I will draw on my experiences in one of the most notorious Danish immigrant neighborhoods, Vollsmose in O dense. T his neighborhood has for many years been a prominent example of cultural clashes in the Danish integration debate. With similar neighborhoods in Copenhagen and A arhus, Vollsmose in O dense has become an icon of the problems of immigration and integration, and as such a greenhouse of integration policies and controversies. Cultural Politics in the Ghetto Between F ebruary 2006 and May 2007 I participated in and occasionally coorganized several seminars and public meetings in the immigrant neighborhood Vollsmose in Odense, Denmark. Some of these meetings were financed by the E U as “Citizen E mpowerment Projects”, others by local schools and immigrant integration groups. T he subject of the meetings was citizenship and the Cartoon Crisis and the participants were the staffs of the various integration groups in Vollsmose and interested local people. O bviously, most of the participants were immigrants and highly engaged in the cultural politics surrounding the discussions of integration and Islam. My part in these meetings was to speak about citizenship, inspire and hopefully bring about new perspectives and reflections. Personally, I used the opportunity to listen to and discuss with the people who do the integration work on the ground and with people enrolled in integration programs. In the following, I will draw on two meetings in particular, one closed seminar about the I wish to thank the people in the integration sector of Vollsmose, O dense for being open to all kinds of friendly discussions. I do not think they will agree to some of my statements in this paper but hopefully it will lead to further debate.

176


Cartoon Crisis with the staff of a local school and a public meeting about a new declaration of citizenship issued by the Danish government. T he Cartoon Crisis provoked cultural debates in Denmark of huge proportions (S løk 2008). T he debates were mostly about the differences between the traditional liberal Danish public sphere and the culture of the Muslim immigrants. In detail, particularly aspects such as freedom of speech, respect, tolerance and recognition were debated. T he situation that the cartoons of Muhammad provoked in the Middle E ast and A sia was of course also debated, but it is important to bear in mind that the local Danish controversy over the cartoons was a very different thing than the violent outburst in the Middle E ast and A sia. In Denmark we experienced no violence or mass demonstrations over the cartoons but instead a cultural debate almost exclusively among Danish intellectuals. “T he Muslim immigrant point of view” was either represented by the intellectuals or by a handful of more or less self-proclaimed Muslim leaders. T hese few “Muslim spokesmen” circulated in the media and travelled to the Middle E ast to gather support for their cause against Jyllands-Posten, i.e. the paper which published the cartoons, and the state. T his journey was an incredibly foolish move, politically speaking, because it seemed to prove to the Danish public that these “Muslim spokesmen” were not loyal to Denmark. A fter their journey had been scrutinized in the press, there was no “Muslim position” in the debates at all. A nyhow, the Cartoon Crisis was very important to Muslim immigrants in Denmark and no doubt that many felt that Jyllands-Posten intentionally ridiculed their religion with the endorsement of the Danish government. T he school staff was interested in basic questions such as “what does this crisis mean?” and “what shall we do about it?” T hey more or less agreed that both JyllandsPosten and the Danish government were the bad guys and that the issue was not freedom of speech but a concerted effort to culturally and politically marginalize Muslims in Denmark. F reedom of speech functioned as a thin veil hiding ethnonationalist sentiment and even latent racism in very influential segments of Danish society. T hat the cartoons in Jyllands-Posten were not buried in contempt by the rest of Denmark evidenced to most of the school staff that the cultural climate in Denmark was ethnocentric and latently racist. T he judgment was that the Cartoon Crisis would severely damage integration efforts because it showed that Muslims cannot be equal citizens since their prophet is a public joke. T he staff of the school did, of course, approve of freedom of speech and even that everything could be made fun of, but these rights should be used in a “responsible” manner. I interpret this to mean two things. F irstly, that the staff had their eyes on the consequences considering the general cultural climate towards Muslims in Denmark. T hat means they thought the publication of the cartoons was a politically bad idea if the I have to make it clear that according to my position Jyllands-Posten intentionally ridiculed Muhammad but I find that completely legitimate in a liberal democratic society. I participated in periods on a daily basis in the media debates over the cartoon crisis with this basic position.


177

integration of Muslims is an important political goal for Denmark. S econdly, they did not realize the full consequences of freedom of speech, namely that nothing can be collectively sacred in a liberal society apart from the liberty to say what we want. F rom the liberal perspective the real desecration was the idea that JyllandsPosten should have been reprimanded by the government. T his quite clearly shows two contradictory perspectives resembling the distinctions elaborated on earlier in this paper. In terms of inclusion and homogeneity of as many people as possible in a substantive togetherness, the cartoons were a politically bad idea because they exposed a massive split between loyalties. It exposed an internal Danish “we rationals, you Jane” split. A t the same time, the idea purported by Muslims and many Danish leftist intellectuals, but also by “responsible” liberal-conservative leaders such as the former F oreign Minister Uffe E llemann Jensen that JyllandsPosten should not have made fun of Muhammad pressured the liberal dogma that individuals and the press can make fun of whom they want. What is the most important principle to adhere to in such a case? T he school staff recognized this troublesome dilemma but from their vanguard position working among primarily immigrant Muslims of Middle E astern origin the democratic perspective, meaning the inclusion of Muslims in the substantive ground of the demos, weighed much heavier than a “luxury” right to step on people already lying down. F rom their perspective integration clearly meant integration into the cultural substance of society though they articulated the situation as though the Muslim immigrants were treated unjustly. T he feeling of injustice led to a police notice by Muslim organizations towards Jyllands-Posten. T he debate did not, as I perceived it, have room for friendly struggles over Danish cultural politics. T here were only friends and enemies, not adversaries within the same substantive political community. T he Cartoon Crisis radically recharged a widespread concern for the nature of the substantive ground of democracy in Denmark, often called “Danishness”, a concern which the school staff experienced from their work among the suspected enemies of “Danishness”. A t a public meeting in Vollsmose a few months later, I was invited to speak about citizenship and the new declaration of integration issued by the Danish government. I came with a critical attitude to the new declaration because I consider it a brilliant example of “we rationals, you Jane” thinking and because we already have laws against criminal behavior. Therefore I do not find it liberal, democratic or necessary to make ethnic or religious minorities sign declarations against criminal behavior. A t the same time I came with a critical attitude towards what I expected to be an automatic opposition to the new declaration from the inhabitants of Vollsmose. I expected that people attending such a meeting would be against the declaration because it came from the government, but that they would agree with its content. I suggested at the meeting that we in the room created an alternative declaration of integration after group discussions but before we took a look at the declaration from the government. I suspected that we would come T he declaration can be read in a number of languages at this site: www.nyidanmark.dk.

178


up with more or less the same declaration. T he new declaration of integration from the Danish government uses the concept of the “active citizenship”, implying that it is no longer enough to be a law-abiding citizen; you also have to act, i.e. to culturally behave in a certain way. T he new declaration was issued in A pril 2006 and revised in F ebruary 2007 and it contains a number of statements that immigrants with their signature have to agree to. T here is no legality to the declaration, but it is a “moral commitment”. T he statements of the declaration circulate around liberal cultural values and active participation in Danish society. A mong other things immigrants have to sign that they are aware of the fact that it is against the law to hit women and children, discriminate between men and women, discriminate against minorities, including sexual minorities, and to support terrorism. F urthermore, immigrants have to sign that they will cooperate with schools and other public institutions and actively seek information about the Danish language, culture and history, and finally that they are aware that a good life in Denmark entails active participation in society. T o my mind this effort by the government is primarily directed at Muslim civil society in Denmark which is permanently under a not unjustified suspicion of discriminating against women, not cooperating with public institutions, discriminating against other minorities and supporting what the Danish state considers terrorism. N ot surprisingly, most of the participants at the public meeting in Vollsmose considered the Danish policy towards Muslim immigrants and the Danish foreign policy towards the Middle E ast to be exclusionary and directly hostile even before we had debated the new declaration of integration at all. A fter several hours of debate in small groups we tried to put together an alternative declaration of integration which more or less included the same elements as the one issued by the government. E verybody in the room agreed to basic liberal principles such as equality between the sexes, non-violence, active participation, the unlawfulness of terrorism, the importance of knowledge of the Danish language, culture and history and ideally envisaged themselves as active citizens contributing to society. What is the problem then? O f course, the problem is to a certain degree different understandings of the concepts at stake such as equality, participation and terrorism, but the most important problem is that of difference. T he declaration of integration is experienced by Muslim immigrants as an attack on their empirical identity and presence and not as an invitation to the substantive ground of Danish democracy. Many Muslim immigrants automatically read between the lines that Denmark and the Danes are afraid of Islam, are racists or have a very narrow idea of the good life based on the concept of “Danishness”. O f course, Muslims immigrants from the Middle E ast are just as petit bourgeois as the Danes but this homogeneity is hidden behind empirical differences in religion and ethnicity. A conflict over empirical issues is bound to be existential and it produces very aggressive feelings. I do not wish to portray it here as though Muslim immigrants are innocent victims of hostile Danish policies. T he lack of recognition of the political nature of communities by Muslim immigrants from the Middle E ast is to my mind even more widespread than among E uropeans. Many Muslims do believe that it should be against the law


179

to draw Muhammad, and they very concretely believe that the Koran is the words of A llah which means that they are more loyal to Islam than to democracy. T here are definitely subversive groups among Muslims which give reason for reflection but such groups also exist among Christian E uropeans, and the phenomenon is thus a reason for general concern. I did not meet such people at the meetings in Vollsmose which is not very surprising considering the topic of integration and citizenship. T he people at the public meeting thought just as the school staff that Muslim immigrants were treated unjustly in Denmark. T hey felt criminalized in advance by the new declaration of integration, though they found its pedagogical ideal of the good life in Denmark agreeable. What I found through these meetings in Vollsmose can be summarized by the following: Muslim immigrants in Vollsmose and most of the people employed there in the integration sector feel that the Cartoon Crisis was a direct blow at their integration in general, and more specifically at their efforts of integration into the cultural substance of Danish society. T he crisis showed that Denmark did not consider them as part of this substance but as targets of cultural attacks which they could link to interregional and even global conflicts with the Middle East and the Islamic World. L iberal democratic fundamentals such as freedom of speech were basically considered to be a thin veil to disguise the ethnocentric nature of Danish cultural politics. F urthermore, the new declaration of integration was perceived along the same lines. Integration was simply considered a euphemism for exclusion, though the citizenship model described in the declaration was agreeable. We find here a micro-cosmos of the effects of E uropean–Middle E astern integration within cultural politics. What is considered an empirical pressure on the cultural substance of democracy or even togetherness in general leads to intensified cultural politics along empirical lines. T he number of outsiders inside E urope increases, but so do the initiatives of cultural politics to preserve E urope’s empirical identity. T he number of substantive members of the Danish and E uropean democracies falls measured against the actual number of people inhabiting E urope. O n the other hand, the freedoms of liberalism in E urope count for all people, no matter if they are integrated or not (Joppke 2007; Peled 2007). T he Vollsmose meetings give indications that the problem with integration is not liberal rights but cultural politics. T he loyalties of people are increasingly local, regional and global at the same time, and what is considered thicker and thinner loyalties are different to different segments of the population (A ppadurai 1996). T he Danish state in effect demands loyalty through the new declaration of integration and the concept of active citizenship, though it claims to be a liberal state. Meanwhile the Muslim immigrants in Vollsmose demand justice on a local, regional and global level. T he roles seem to be turned upside down. T he “we rationals” demand loyalty and the “you Janes” demand justice which is paradoxical if we were to uphold the distinction between justice and loyalty, or rational-traditional.

180


Final Comments In the last 10–15 years the cultural clashes within E urope between Muslim immigrants, mainly from the Middle E ast, and the older E uropean populations have increased significantly empirically, but so has their significance within cultural politics. T he direct reason for the present emphasis on cultural clashes between E uropeans and Middle E asterners is evidently the presence and integration of large numbers of Middle E asterners in the E uropean societies. T hus, the increased regional integration between E urope and the Middle E ast has also a cultural dimension which in many ways works contrary to the more technical integration in other areas. T he result of the regional integration within cultural politics is seemingly not increased positive, popular co-existence and the dissolution of ethnocentric patterns of loyalty among E uropeans and Middle E asterners. We do not see an expansion of political liberalism and a larger “modern common bond” to unite E urope and the Middle E ast, but rather the opposite. Cultural concerns and identity politics are top features politically and popularly in both the Middle E ast and E urope. Islamism and extreme anti-Western attitudes also within secular political movements in the Middle E ast are prominent all over the region, and the same picture more or less counts for E urope where concerns for national and E uropean identity are so widespread that only the far left still advocate multiculturalist policies. S urely, the reasons for the increased focus on cultural clashes and cultural politics in general are not only to be found in E uropean–Middle E astern integration but also, as elaborated on earlier in this paper, in the current balance between liberalism and democracy in E urope. T his balance seems to have produced a wide consensus on liberal economic and social policies, which have more or less confined immigrant and integration issues to cultural politics. This cultural politics is intended to have a conservational character instead of a constructivist character that I think has to do with a widespread feeling of pressure against what is conceived as the togetherness of society; and what I with Carl S chmitt have called the substantive ground of democracy. F rom the perspective of how cultural politics is presently articulated in E urope, it is natural that the immigration and integration of Middle E asterners is widely experienced as a threat to the E uropean liberal democracy. We have to recognize that legitimate politics, democracy and the feeling of togetherness are not rational choices; they are sentimental and based on loyalty to something substantive that we identify with. T hough all communities are political and imagined, we presently tend to consider them empirical. T his is not a threat to European–Middle Eastern integration, but definitely a threat to political and social stability in E urope in the longer run. T he almost total unity between state and people that we have seen after the S econd World War is being undermined because relatively fewer people are part of the substantive ground of democracy. I believe Yoav Peled has a point when he predicts a post-citizenship society where society is extended to most people but where equal rights, duties and participation will stop being a paradigm (Peled 2007). A s A ppadurai and


181

others have argued, loyalties are now globalized, and we have to consider these imagined social facts just as cemented as the traditional loyalty towards the nation state and liberal democracy (A ppadurai 1996). T his we saw quite clearly during the Cartoon Crisis and the following declaration of integration issued by the Danish government. T he cultural politics of this crisis in Danish society became a battle of and for loyalties. Modern, rational, mechanic Denmark asked loyalty from its immigrants while the traditional, irrational, organic Muslim immigrants demanded justice not only locally but even regionally and globally. With R ichard R orty and Michael Walzer we should deem the loyalty–justice distinction false and instead take a look at thick and thin loyalties. T he classical democratic citizenship is about the extension of thick loyalty between the state and people on a political basis. E uropean–Middle E astern integration pressures the political basis of this loyalty. Cultural clashes like the Cartoon Crisis are signs of this pressure leading to culturally defined concepts of citizenship which in effect limit the classical citizenship. References A ppadurai, A . (1996), Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Bhabha, H .K. (ed.) (1985), Nation and Narration (L ondon: R outledge). Gellner, E . (1983), Nations and Nationalism (O xford: Blackwell). Isin, E .F . and P.K. Wood (1999), Citizenship and Identity (L ondon: S age Publications). Joppke, C. (2007), “T ransformation of Citizenship: S tatus, R ights, Identity”, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 11, N o. 1, 37–48. Korsgaard, O . (2004), Kampen om Folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år, Gyldendal. L aclau, E . and C. Mouffe (1985), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (L ondon: V erso). Mouffe, C. (2000), The Democratic Paradox (L ondon: V erso). Peled, Y. (2007), “T owards a Post-Citizenship S ociety? A R eport from the F ront”, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 11, N o. 1, 95–104. R orty, R . (2007), Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). S chmitt, C. (1988[1926]), The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge, MA : MIT Press). Sløk, C. (2008), “Defining the Core Values of Danish Society: The Danish Cartoon Crisis 2005/2006”, British Journal of Sociology (forthcoming). S mith, A .D (1991), National Identity (L ondon: Penguin Books). Walzer, M. (1994), Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (N otre Dame, IN : University of N otre Dame Press).


Chapter 9

“E nriched by O pen Borders and a L ively V ariety of L anguages, Cultures and R egions”: Cooperation and Integration in the E U in spite of Cultural Diversity Wolfgang Z ank

Enlargements and the “Turkish Specter” A fter the sixth enlargement, the E uropean Union counts 27 member states with a population of 483 million inhabitants. T his is more than the USA and R ussia together. Croatia will probably follow in a few years, and also with T urkey (70 million people) membership negotiations have been opened. A ll West-Balkan states have been recognized as candidate countries. It is unlikely that the row will stop there. A t least, the governments of Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia have already declared their wish to join. E ach enlargement has increased the diversity of the Union: Geographically, socially, and culturally. A nd in particular T urkey’s future membership has been discussed very controversially. F ormer E uropean top-politicians such as V aléry Giscard d’E staing or H elmut S chmidt have objected vigorously. (Giscard, 2004; S chmidt, 2004). Giscard formulated the problem as follows: Progressive enlargement has led to increasing unease. E uropeans need to strengthen their identity. N o “E uropean patriotism” can exist until E uropean citizens realise they belong to a single entity […] T urkey has developed its own history and its own culture, which deserve respect. H owever, the foundations of E urope’s identity, so vital for the cohesion of the E U today, are different. T urkey’s accession would change the nature of the E uropean project […] Morocco would probably be tempted to follow T urkey’s example. T his could result in a process of permanent enlargement, destabilising the operations of the E uropean system and removing its original rationale […] If the only solution E urope can come up with is allowing entry to the union or antagonising its partners, the E U is doomed to slide into a regional version of the UN […]

T his is a substantially enlarged and revised version of an earlier paper of mine (Z ank 2006).

184


In many respects, Giscard analyses the problems convincingly: E nlargement has produced unease (and will do so in the future); the prospect of permanent enlargement is a realistic scenario; T urkey’s accession will alter the nature of the E uropean project; and certainly, E uropean patriotism cannot develop without the feeling of belonging together. H owever, his conclusion, that T urkey ought not to become a member, is not justified. Nor will further enlargement make the EU degenerate into a kind of UN . A t the core of the problem lies perhaps the point that Giscard (and many others) has an inappropriate idea of E uropean Identity. F urthermore, he (and many others) takes a mistaken view on the implications of diverse cultural traditions for the political stability of the E U. Certainly, culture is important. But it is important to specify which cultural characteristics are politically important in our context. S imply pointing at the existence of some cultural differences is not enough. We notice en passant, that Giscard does not specify which aspects of T urkish culture will make this country an EU-misfit also in the future. He underlines that for him religion is not the issue. Many others, however, have stated that Islam and E U’s normative bases are incompatible. In 1996, S amuel P. H untington even predicted a Clash of Civilizations, not the least between the West and Islam with its “Bloody Borders” (H untington 1996, 254–9). F rom this point of view, incorporating a big Muslim state into the E U must be like placing dynamite at the foundations of the whole structure. Giscard did not explain what he means by “identity”. But he tried at least to specify its “foundations” (Giscard): T he E uropean Convention [under Giscard as its president, W.Z.] sought a clearer definition of the foundations of this identity: the cultural contributions of ancient Greece and R ome, E urope’s pervasive religious heritage, the creative enthusiasm of the R enaissance, the philosophy of the age of Enlightenment and the contributions of rational and scientific thought. T urkey shares none of these.

T his statement is surprising in many respects. F or instance, he seems to think that there have never been scientists in T urkey, or e.g. engineers in the O ttoman E mpire. Giscard seems also to be unaware of the fact that in medieval times Islamic scholars, who became part of the O ttoman heritage, worked on the basis of classic antique philosophy; others contributed significantly to the progress of e.g. mathematics. H owever, the most important point in this context is the fact that the E uropean Convention, which under his presidency drafted the Constitutional T reaty, exactly did not succeed in finding a definition of a cultural European identity. S ome Convention members, various religious groups and even Pope John Paul II lobbied actively for an explicit reference to Christianity or God in the Preamble of the T reaty (N orman, 83). But this proposal could not muster a majority. It would indeed have been strange to build a E uropean Constitution on Christianity, given the point that such a statement would have symbolically excluded the Jews, the millions of Muslims who are already citizens of E U member states, or the atheists.

Cooperation and Integration in the EU

185

S ometimes those who favored a reference to religion spoke e.g. of a JudeoChristian heritage (T inq). T his would include the Jews but still exclude Muslims and many others. Besides, the question whether the E U is a Christian club has politically been answered negatively a long time ago. A lready in 1963, when signing an A ssociation A greement, the E U leaders recognized T urkey as eligible for membership (Gomez, 27). A nd in December 1999, at the E uropean Council meeting in H elsinki, the heads of states and governments declared solemnly: “T urkey is a candidate S tate destined to join the union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate S tates.” (E uropean Council 1999, paragraph 12). A t the Copenhagen summit on 12–13 December 2002, when finalizing the negotiations of the eastern enlargement, the E U leaders explicitly recalled their decision from H elsinki. T he E uropean Council strongly welcomed “the important steps taken by T urkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria” and acknowledged “the determination of the new Turkish government to take step on further reforms.” In case Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria by 2004, the E U was set to “open accession negotiations without delay” (E uropean Council 2002, paragraph 18 and 19). Consequently, when Giscard, S chmidt and many others in 2004 voiced principal objections against T urkey’s membership, they came many years too late. F urthermore, in the context of the S tabilization and A ssociation Process (SAP ), in 1999 the E U promised candidate status to the West-Balkan countries, provided that the conditions were met (V achudova 151). A mong them was A lbania, another predominantly Muslim country. Cultural Diversity and Political Identity It is presumably no coincidence that Giscard talks about “foundations of E uropean identity” without being able to specify this “identity”. T he debate on these matters, also in academia, has often been remarkably nebulous. Let us start with some conceptual clarifications. I define culture, in this point following S amuel P. H untington, “as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society.” (H untington 2000, xv). A subset of culture is collective identities. T he most relevant in our context are N ational and E uropean Identity. F or the sake of convenience, I consistently write E U, although it was a E uropean E conomic Community by that time. Giscard erroneously states that the declaration in 1963 contained only a promise to T urkey to be integrated into the Common Market, something which in his view became fulfilled by the custom union of 1995. He overlooks that in 1963 the EU had already built up substantial supranational legislation and decision making (see below) to which T urkey did not get access to in 1995. Besides, the political architects of the R ome T reaty of 1957 saw it explicitly as a first stepping stone to a political union.

186


A lso N ational Identity has often been discussed in an often rather nebulous way. As with the term “nation”, a commonly accepted definition does not exist. I propose, in a first step, to distinguish between “national” and “ethnic identity” and use the term nation or national identity only in connection with a modern state, or to put it slightly differently, with a land which is organized as a political community. For the sake of simplicity I restrict the discussion to Europe in the first place. We can state that the citizens of a modern E uropean state, or at least their vast majority, share a group-feeling. T his group feeling is usually symbolically expressed by items such as the flag or by persons such as the monarch or the national football team. In many cases the citizens of a modern E uropean state are also united by a national standard language which, apart from being a means of communication, also becomes a national symbol. T he examples of S witzerland or F inland show, however, that a common standard language is not a necessary condition for this group-feeling. T his group-feeling and its symbols can be conveniently summarized under the term N ational Identity. It should perhaps be emphasized: According to this definition, national identity covers only a group feeling (and the related symbols). T his group feeling is not based on common values or norms or other cultural features. T he reference to a state is important in this context because historically states have formed national identities and merged various groups into (new) nations. T he modern state with its institutions, not the least the education system, has created and continuously supported this national group feeling. A s the modern state, also national identity in this sense is historically a rather recent phenomenon. In the words of E ric J. H obsbawm: “T he basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity” (H obsbawm 1992, 14). Border changes have often produced situations where people can identify with a land, although they are not living there (any more). Indigenous minorities such as the Danes south of the German-Danish border or H ungarians in R omania can serve as examples. Multiple identities are possible, and actually frequent. T o revert to the case at the German-Danish border, a person can e.g. feel as a loyal German citizen and nevertheless feel attached to Denmark and e.g. speak Danish at home. H istorically, however, a mismatch between the actual border of a country and the borders of group-feelings has often created severe conflicts. During the interwarperiod in Europe there were dozens of conflicts of this kind. They still exist in the E urope of today, but at a much smaller scale. A lso migration movements have often produced situations where people came to live in a country, but identified with another. I propose to treat these cases as modifications of the general definition of national identity as the group feeling which has been uniting the citizens of a country with a state. T here are numerous other groups with feelings of belonging (i.e. identity) that do not have a country and state on their own. We can point at e.g. Basques in S pain or S orbs, an indigenous S lavonic minority in Germany. F or these cases I propose to use the term “ethnic identity”, not national identity. Multiple identities, e.g. feeling as Frisian (an ethnic identity in this definition) and as German (national identity)


187

are possible and frequent. Particular ethnic identities are usually politically rather unproblematic in contemporary E urope, an exception being the Basques (rather: a section of the Basque-speaking population in three S panish provinces). T he matter is a completely different one in huge parts of A frica: T he A frican states are rather young and were until now not properly able to socialize their citizens into national identities. Instead, often ethnic identities from pre-colonial times, which divide the citizens of the state in question, and which often cross state borders, have been more important in peoples’ minds. R eturning to E urope: F or roughly two hundred years, the idea of a nation has been surrounded by powerful mythological constructions. O ne has been that the nation (in particular one’s own) has been “very, very old”, another being that the members of the nation have been culturally united by a set of common values, beliefs, or orientations. T he idea that nations have been culturally homogeneous for a long time has been widespread. But this is plainly mythological. T o quote again H obsbawm: “[…] any nation of even middling size had to construct its unity on the basis of evident disparity” (H obsbawm 1992, 91) E ugen Joseph Weber, in his seminal study Peasants into Frenchmen, underlined the massiveness of this process (Weber, E ., 485): T he famous hexagon can itself be seen as colonial empire shaped over the centuries: a complex of territories conquered, annexed and integrated in a political and administrative whole, many of them with strongly national or regional personalities, some of which were traditions that were specifically un- or anti-French … By 1870 this had produced a political entity called F rance – kingdom or empire or republic – an entity formed by conquest and by political or administrative decisions formulated in (or near) Paris.

Weber explicitly likens these processes inside F rance with colonial processes in e.g. A frica, as described by F rantz F anon in his The Wretched of the Earth (Weber, E ugen, 491) T he violence so prominent in F anon’s pages was rare in nineteenth century F rance … But otherwise F anon’s account of the colonial experience is an apt description of what happened in the L andes and Corrèze. In F rance as in A lgeria, the destruction of what F anon called national culture, and what I would call local or regional culture, was systematically pursued. Insofar as it persisted, it was plagued by inertia and growing isolation.

H owever, also after having gained national unity, and also after the national “wefeeling” has been rooted among the population at large, modern nations have invariably exhibited huge discrepancies of values, norms and orientations: R eligious versus secular, democratic versus authoritarian, socialist versus liberal or conservative, xenophobic versus open, or more recently, materialist versus post-materialist. T his I have dealt with these problems more extensively as regards the case of Germany, Z ank 1998.

188


has, of course, led to numerous conflicts. But the existence of conflicts is no tragedy. T he important point is that they ought not to escalate. N ation states have exactly been able to develop mechanisms to regulate conflicts in a peaceful way. T o these mechanisms belong explicit legal norms, independent courts, the monopoly of force for the state, and, more recently, democratic rules which have provided modern states with a hitherto unparallel level of political legitimacy. Interestingly, the mythology of the culturally-homogenous nations is also widespread in academia. N ot seldom is it possible to encounter authors who have won high acclaim by works on nationalism where actually essential tenets of nationalist mythology were reproduced uncritically. In some cases, even crude national stereotypes can be sold as studies on “national identity” (Z ank, 2004). S mall wonder that many people talk and think in terms of national stereotypes and generalizations, the “best” one perhaps being: “T he Danes are awful generalizers” (Z ank 2004). I presume that much of the current unease about “E uropean Identity” and the cultural diversity within it stems from a mistaken comparison with nation states. If someone erroneously is of the opinion that nation states have been culturally homogeneous, then the E U might erroneously be seen as something completely new because of its diversity. But it is more a question of optics and myths, given the simple point that nations never have been culturally homogenous. O nce this elementary point is understood, the cultural diversity within the E U appears much less dramatic. A nd the basic question is not so much of “how much diversity can the E U tolerate”, but rather: “What kind of arrangements must be in place so that we can cooperate in spite of diversity.” A problem which is related to the mythological perceptions of nations is what I would call the structuralist fallacy: T he uncontrolled assumption that cultural patterns always form a coherent and well-connected entity. But at least for modern times, this is patently not the case. People might e.g. speak the same language and have nevertheless completely divergent values and beliefs. O r conversely, people might share the same religious beliefs, e.g. Catholicism, and speak completely different languages. People might even have very similar religious beliefs and nevertheless are on practically all other fields culturally very different, culture, to repeat, to be understood “as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society.” F or instance, Christianity is a case in point. T here has never been such a thing as one “Christian culture”, or specific “Christian values”. The Bible is an extremely heterogeneous text, containing exhortations such as “L ove thy enemies!”, or conversely: “H appy shall be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rocks” (Psalm 137). T oday, most Christians will presumably answer that the N ew T estament is the relevant part of the Bible. But historically Christians have more often than not used parts of the O ld T estament. A nd by selecting appropriate parts of the Bible and interpreting them, it has been possible to justify whatever kind of behavior. A nd historically, Christians have displayed all kinds of behavior. Suffice perhaps to mention that


189

Christians have conquered cities and butchered all inhabitants (as happened to Jerusalem in 1099), or that Christians have traded slaves for many centuries. O r to give more recent examples: In 1946, after a murderous pogrom in the Polish town of Kielce, representatives of left-wing parties asked a parish priest in Kalisz to say to his parishioners that God had created Jews as well as Christians. F ather Martuzalski answered: “L ice were also created by God, but still we kill them.” A nd A ugust H lond, Cardinal and Primate of A ll Poland, warned in 1945 at a mass meeting that a betrayal of Catholic principles would provoke divine punishment, as it was the case with the Jews who, in H lond’s view, during the war became drastically smitten by God for their sins (Prażmowska, 165f). A lso today being a Christian in itself does not say much about values and norms and behavior. For instance, a president can pray daily and nevertheless find it legitimate to start an unprovoked war. Giving this diversity, one might speak of “Christian cultures”, plural, and pointing at some uniting elements such as a belief in Jesu resurrection. But when it comes to values and norms and attitudes and behavior, such an aggregation is meaningless. T he same is true about Islam. T herefore, it would have been empty from a content of view, had the Convention introduced a reference to God or Christianity in the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty. Of course, it is possible to find a rather consistent set of norms and values if we refer to particular Christian institutions, for instance the official doctrine of the Catholic Church today. H ad the Convention included a passage to “Christianity, as interpreted by the leadership of the Catholic Church” into the preamble, this would have given a clear meaning. H owever, giving an unelected religious body a power of interpretation would have been in striking contrast to elementary constitutional principles. It has exactly been secularization, the separation of political decisionmaking and legislation from religious authorities, which has been one of the key characteristics of E uropean history during the last centuries. S ecularization has intellectually been a produce of E nlightenment. Could one identify a E uropean Identity by referring to the ideas of this movement? Giscard, above, did so, and L iberals and S ocial Democrats at the Convention actually proposed to insert such a reference into the preamble of the Constitution (Meyer, 14f). But this proposal could not muster a majority either. T his made sense because violent reactions against E nlightenment belong to E urope’s cultural heritage as much as E nlightenment itself. E urope has always been culturally much diversified. A Definition of European Identity O f course, something unites the E U. We may look at the Constitutional T reaty and find out what actually could be agreed upon. We quote the Preamble at length: T he reader might object that at a national referendum in F rance and in the N etherlands a majority rejected the Constitutional T reaty, which therefore is something which is not

190

Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations? DRA WIN G INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of E urope, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, BELIEVIN G that E urope, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good of all inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world, CONVIN CE D that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of E urope are determined to transcend their former divisions, and united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny, CONVIN CE D that, thus “United in diversity”, E urope offers them the best chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the E arth, the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope, DETER MINE D to continue the work accomplished within the framework of the T reaties establishing the E uropean Communities and the T reaty on the E uropean Union, by ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis […].

A s we can see, E urope’s “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance” remains unspecified, and it is only a source of inspiration. No one is excluded. Right in the very first sentence reference is made to universal values such as democracy, equality and rule by law. T his is exactly not a regional, geographically-bordered identity, but an open one which in principle allows for the permanent enlargement which Giscard dreaded. E xplicitly the union is “open to culture and learning”, which I interpret as meaning: open to the culture of others and learning from others. O f course not unconditionally, the emphasis on democracy or rule by law implicitly precludes “learning” from religious fundamentalists (see below). But apart from this point, the text carefully, as E U declarations in general (Wæver, 210), does not contain a border to others. T here is no cultural “O thering” which previously has been such a frequently-used tool when it came to creating e.g. agreed upon. But the member state governments, all of them democratically-elected, signed the treaty, so at least at elite-level there is agreement. F urthermore, the “non”-voters in F rance presumably did not reject the Preamble, but rather voted “non” because in their view the treaty favored certain policies which they disliked. T hus 46 percent of the F rench no-voters declared that the treaty allegedly “aggravates unemployment in F rance”, making this consideration the main reason for the negative decisions (L e Cœur, 2005). But this has nothing to do with the principles of the Preamble.


191

national identities. If there is a hint of the “other” in the preamble, it is E urope’s own pre-1945 past (“E urope, reunited after bitter experiences”). T he universal character of the project is hammered out in the sentence that the E U strives for peace and justice “throughout the world.” In this endeavor the peoples of E urope are determined to become “united ever more closely” and to forge a “common destiny”. H owever, no cultural homogenization is intended; on the contrary, the catchword is “united in diversity”. A similar picture emerges if we examine the text of the Berlin Declaration, which the heads of states and governments signed in March 2007 at the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Germany 2007). The first paragraph stresses that the “individual is paramount. H is dignity is inviolable”. T his is almost literally taken from the first paragraph of the German Basic Law. Peace and freedom, democracy and rule of law are the aims to be mentioned in the first place. Cultural diversity is again highlighted: “We preserve in the E uropean Union the identities and diverse traditions of its Member S tates. We are enriched by open borders and a lively variety of languages, cultures and regions.” In the second paragraph the E U is presented as a common response to challenges which do not stop at national borders. T he “others” are mentioned more explicitly than in the preamble: “We stand up for liberties and civil rights also in the struggle against those who oppose them.” But again, the “others” are not geographically, nationally or culturally defined, except in the sense that they break the general principles of the E U. T he enemy can well be geographically E uropean, as evidenced by the sentence: “R acism and xenophobia must never again be given any rein.” A s in the preamble to the Constitutional T reaty, the main “other” is E urope’s own past: “E uropean integration shows that we have learnt the painful lessons of a history marked by bloody conflict.” But how can the “peoples of E urope”, of which the Constitutional T reaty speaks, forge a common destiny and embark on ambitious endeavors such as striving “for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world” if they are culturally so diverse? T he key point is that the peoples of E urope in their vast majorities, despite their diversities in numerous spheres, have reached a consensus on certain procedural questions. These formalities are essential. The first important formality is democracy. Not only, but first and foremost, is democracy a political system based on a set of certain rules. T o these belong the principles of freedom of speech and organization, equal franchise for the adult population and regular elections to representative bodies. T he majorities in these representative bodies are entitled to make the laws. H owever, the power of the majority is not Here the prefix “re-” is interesting. Actually, Europe was never united before, so it can become “united”, but not “reunited”. H ere, for once, an element coming from nationalist mythologies might have entered the text. It has been a standard myth in nationalist movements that their aim was to “re-establish” a kind of natural order of things. F or instance, Italian nationalism labelled itself as “risorgimento”, re-emergence. But prior to 1861 Italy was never united, the unified Italy was a completely novel construction.

192


unrestricted, basic rights or human rights protect everyone. L aws which are generated through these mechanisms of representative democracy are perceived as legitimate. E xecutive power is also invested with legitimacy when it is based on a similar mechanism. “R ule by law” is the twin of democracy, understood in the way that independent courts decide when democratically-generated laws have been violated, and it is the democratically-invested executive which enforces the laws. T his kind of legitimacy, in Max Weber’s words, derives from “a positive statute in whose legality one believes”. H istorically, there have been many forms of political legitimacy, e.g. based on tradition or/and religion. F or many centuries, E uropean rulers invoked religious legitimacy (“We, by the grace of God, king xy of country z”) and claimed obedience by referring to S t Paul’s teaching that there is no authority on earth which is not invested by God. But modern democracy has broken this nexus between legitimacy and religion. God was replaced by the above-mentioned rules. Democratic legitimacy is historically a rather young phenomenon. But on numerous occasions it has already proven its ability to generate strong support among the population at large, and it could produce much more political and social stability than alternative systems. A nd here we have a cultural feature which is common for the peoples of the E uropean Union: A ll the member states are democracies, so this is an essential part of E uropean commonness. We might say, of E uropean identity. But this aspect is not something exclusively E uropean; Japan or A ustralia or Indonesia are democracies too. Measured along this yardstick, in principle they could become E U members. H owever, the E uropean Union is historically something unique in as such as the principles of rule by law and democratic legitimacy also govern the relations among the member states to a substantial extent. On important policy fields decision-making and legislation became even transposed to the supra-national level, making the member-states subordinate to the E U-level. L aws and decisions of the E U are mainly done by three bodies, the Council of Ministers, the E uropean Parliament and the Commission. A ll three bodies are invested through democratic procedures, either directly (the parliament) or indirectly; the Commission gets appointed by democratically-elected governments. S een from this formal point of view – and to repeat, formalisms are essential – there is no such thing as a “democratic deficit”. T he body of E U-legislation is very large by now, some 90,000 pages. A nd as the E uropean Court of Justice (E CJ) has made clear early on, the E U-legislation is superior to national legislation; in case of contradiction the national laws have to be altered. T his is actually formulated rather strongly, namely that every E U-norm trumps any national norm, even constitutional law (H altern, 181). F urthermore, E U legislation has “direct effect”, it provides the citizens with rights which they �� “L egitime Geltung kann einer O rdnung von den H andelnden zugeschrieben werden: a) Kraft T radition: Geltung des immer Gewesenen; … d) kraft positiver S atzung, an deren L egalität geglaubt wird.” (Weber, 19).


193

can invoke at the courts, both against the national administrations (vertically) and towards other citizens (horizontally). Due to these characteristics, E U law is completely distinct from International L aw and akin to the constitution and legislation of a federal state. We recall in this context that the E CJ has “constitutionalized” the treaties a long time ago, i.e. given them the legal quality of a constitution. Calling the treaty which was signed in 2004 a “Constitutional T reaty” or even “Constitution” has therefore been a misnomer. It was just another treaty in a long row, and when it comes to institutional changes, not the most revolutionary one. Many political scientists have been quite bedeviled by the fact that the E CJ could formulate such dramatic principles as “primacy of E U law” or “direct effect”. S ome talked about a “judicial rewriting of the T reaties” or de facto amendment (H altern, 181). O thers wondered why member states have tacitly accepted such a development. I adhere to a more “legalistic interpretation”: If some basic legal principles are incorporated into the treaties, they have a wide range of implications because legal systems have to be consistent. T he E CJ did not “rewrite” the treaties but made their implications overt. T he room for discretion has been rather limited. Could the E CJ have decided otherwise in principle? Is it possible to make a treaty that e.g. establishes the principle of free trade in goods and transfers decisionmaking on this field to a supra-national level, and thereafter allow member states to introduce national legislation which impedes this free movement? Is the principle of superiority of E U law not an unavoidable consequence of the R ome T reaty? S upposed, of course, you really want to make this arrangement work. Denying the principle of superiority of E U-law would be tantamount to letting the whole construction unravel, letting it “degenerate into a kind of regional UN ”, to use Giscard’s expression. But this exactly did not happen, and no influential actor has any intention to ever let it happen. A bove we encountered the problem that we cannot revert to e.g. Christianity if we want to find a body of consistent norms and values. Nor could we find it in the Koran, or whatever traditional cultural heritage. But we can find it now in the body of E U law. T he E U institutions and the E U legislation is a rather new cultural construction. But it is a common E uropean construction, constructed by applying rules and principles which are common to all E U member states. Quantitatively, the bulk of E U legislation regulates economic matters. But this should not obscure the fact that the basis of E U law is H uman R ights. Interestingly, originally the treaties did not mention H uman R ights. It was again the E CJ to make it overt that all legal acts of the E U have to respect them, given the point that the constitutions of the member states have been based on them (H altern, 185). H uman T echnically, there is one difference, namely that only regulations have immediately direct effect both horizontally and vertically; directives only have vertical effect. H owever, they provide citizens with horizontal effect when they become transposed into national law. A nd if a country fails to transpose the directive into national law, the citizen can go to court in order to demand transposition.

194


R ights are something common for E U-E urope; they are part of a common cultural identity. H owever, there were some ambiguities because the national constitutions did not define Human Rights in exactly the same way. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has removed these ambiguities and also defined some new Human Rights. T he Charter become incorporated into the L isbon T reaty and will be legally as soon as it becomes ratified. Poland and the United Kingdom, however, negotiated an opt-out close in this respect. F urthermore, already the N ice T reaty introduced a provision that a member state can be expelled if it does not respect H uman R ights. T herefore, in a concrete and legally-binding way H uman R ights are at the core of the E uropean Identity. This allows us finally to define European Identity: “The common adherence of the peoples of E urope (or at least their vast majority) to the principles of democracy, rule by law and H uman R ights, and the common endeavor to establish a set of consistent and explicit norms which cover the whole community and regulate a substantial part of human behavior inside the community. O lder political units such as nation states voluntarily subordinate themselves to the new community on many important fields.” T he willingness to let national sovereignty be subordinate to the common law, at least in some fields, is an essential part of this European identity. Also this is a rather new phenomenon, and it makes the E uropean Union unique, until now at least. A nd exactly this point reveals a basic difference between E U-member states and the USA : In the US the idea of unrestricted national sovereignty and the concomitant refusal to sign binding commitments which might compromise it, still commands wide support among the A merican public at large, and it also became a clearly-expressed policy axiom of the Bush administration. This feature makes a country such as the US a cultural misfit as regards a union such as the E U. T he E U is about overcoming anarchy in international relations; the US (at least the Bush administration) wants to perpetuate anarchy and secure for herself a hegemonic position within it. O f course, with a view to the stability of the E U it will only be positive if the feeling of belongingness does not only rest on abstract agreements but also finds more emotional support. The prospects are not bad in this respect. Just to mention one important point, the construction of common institutions has created a commonness of fate and experience. Whether you like them or not, decisions taken in Brussels affect your life across the Union. T here is also already a substantial amount of common E uropean political discussion, political controversies have for long trespassed the borders of the national arenas. A nd perhaps most important, in daily life and work the patterns of cooperation and division of labor have become E uropeanized. T his is mainly the case for the elite, but increasingly also for nonelite people. And finally, history is in a process of revision. At the beginning of the 19th century history started as a predominantly national discipline where the (imaginary) roots of the nations were “detected” in a very distant past, this way giving food to the above-mentioned national mythologies. But now new traditions


195

are invented, books on European history begin to flood the bookshops. This will strengthen the feelings of E uropean belongingness. Certainly, there have been many historical developments which in former centuries have crossed the political borders inside E urope: T he coming of Christianity, R eformation, E nlightenment, Industrialism, L iberalism, S ocialism, and also N ationalism. T his gives a huge reservoir of historical experiences which have been common to many people throughout E urope. But it should not make us forget the diversity and conflicts. Politically, the detection of common European “roots” can serve quite different purposes. Suffice perhaps to mention that the recourse to Carolingian “traditions”, so important for the E U in the 1950s, was actually invented by the N azis. A division of the Waffen-SS, composed of F rench volunteers, was called Charlemagne. Pointing at common traditions might support a E uropean identity. But it does not rest upon it. T he foundation of E uropean identity is the common acceptance of some abstract principles. Making Diversity Compatible with Stability The paradox that the peoples of the EU become culturally ever more diversified, and at the same time “ever more united” is solved in this way: A consensus on the basic principles of democracy and rule by law is indeed indispensable for the stability of the union. But apart from these comparatively few basic principles, the E U-citizens can culturally be as diverse as they please. F or instance, the E U can be the home for an infinite number of religions and confessions, exactly because the legitimacy of its laws and decisions does not depend on religion. Provided that the adherents of these religions adhere to the democratic consensus as sketched above, there is no problem if people act politically out of religious inspirations. Countries such as Italy or Germany have been governed by religiously-inspired parties for decades, and currently such a party is in charge in e.g. A nkara. Being a home for a rich variety of cultural and religious currents does not make the EU a singular case. Suffice perhaps to look at the USA, a country of enormous cultural diversity, which nevertheless is rather stable and successful in many respects. A nother interesting case is the Indian R epublic, ethnically, religiously and culturally divided by deep horizontal and vertical cleavages, with some 110 spoken languages, 17 of them having official status. There are sometimes eruptions of violence, but comparatively, for a developing country, the amount of democratic

Jakob F eldt sees this point quite differently (Chapter 8 of this volume). F ollowing authors such as Carl S chmitt, he sees democracy based on a cultural ”substantive ground” and by necessity set to eradicate differences.

196


stability is remarkable. A s T homas Meyer underlined, referring not the least to India: Political Identity does not presuppose cultural identity (Meyer, 52).10 In addition to the general principles of democracy and rule by law, the E U has created a huge body of economic legislation. When the Preamble of the Constitutional T reaty spoke of “ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis”, I see this as a common pledge to safeguard and perhaps enlarge this legislation. We might call the basic principles underlying the economic legislation “open borders inside the E U”, “regulated competition” and “equal opportunities”. T his implies not to obstruct the possibilities of others by retorting to means such as tariffs, hidden state-subsidies or non-tariff barriers. T his basically creates a win-win situation. If you cannot protect your producers against competition from another E U-member, other governments can neither obstruct the market access for your producers. A ccording to dominant beliefs (which became dominant because of overwhelming experience), this is conducive to economic prosperity. H owever, the project of the common market means much more, and it is profoundly political: A consensus on the principles of open borders inside the E U and supranationally supervised competition neutralizes a huge source of potentially very destructive conflicts. History is littered with tariff wars or political confrontations, where economic measures were used in order to hurt other countries. We do not have to look very far outside of the EU in order to find problems of this kind. Just to mention a recent example: A ccording to Marian L upu, the president of Moldavia’s parliament, R ussia had introduced an embargo on Moldavian wine exports. O vernight exports fell by a third, tens of thousands of rural producers and employees in the business lost their income. T his way Moscow wanted to exert pressure in connection with the dispute over T ransnistria (L upu). A political behavior of this kind is virtually impossible inside the E U. It should perhaps be emphasized: A consensus on open borders inside the E U, regulated competition and equal opportunity does not imply unrestrained neoliberalism or demolishing welfare states. A s in particular the N ordic countries have shown: You can have a very open economy and a stable currency and at the same time build up ambitious welfare-state arrangements.11 N ever before have the N ordic welfare states been so well-equipped as today, and at the same time exactly these countries are economic top-performers. Just to give one example, in 2006 the E conomist Intelligence Unit compiled a world-wide list of “business environment”. Denmark and F inland are on places number one and two (E conomist 2006). Whether ambitious welfare-state arrangements are desirable or not remains 10 Basically I share Meyer’s ideas as to this point, but I think his often strict juxtaposition of the concepts of political identity and cultural �� identity�� is not appropriate. I prefer to see, for example, the basic consensus on democratic principles and the we-feeling of a community as cultural �� variables�� too. S een this way, political identity requires some shared cultural identity, but it can otherwise be stable also in the presence of a high amount of cultural diversity. 11 I have tried to demonstrate this as regards the case of Denmark, Z ank 2002.


197

politically contested and the questions still remain essentially to be decided on the national level. T here is no E U-wide consensus on this, apart from general remarks such as the one in the Berlin Declaration that the “E uropean model combines economic success and social responsibility”. According to dominant beliefs open markets are beneficial for all in the long run, but there have been many losers in the short run: S hipbuilders, coalminers, textile workers and many more. A gain according to dominant beliefs, it does not make sense artificially to prolong the lifetime of uncompetitive industries by subsidies or tariffs; it is better to use the money instead for creating new employment and for retraining laid-off workers. H owever, in a system such as the E U it is even forbidden to give subsidies or to use tariffs in order to protect industries. S mall wonder that many people who fear for their jobs look with unease at the E U system. I subscribe to the view that it is an illusion to think that a government could save uncompetitive jobs for a longer time span. But this illusion, at least implicitly, is presumably rather widespread, and in the light of this illusion the E U might be seen as job-killer. T his was presumably the main reason behind the F rench “no” to the Constitutional T reaty (L e Coeur). A nd for the same reason, for many years to come the E U will be watched with suspicion by large sections of the population. The Criteria of Membership H istory is full of examples of unions which broke apart. Could this happen to the E U? I do not think so. My view is grounded, point one, on the fact that membership in the Union is voluntary. Conditions for membership are clear, and if a country cannot subscribe to them, then no one forces it to join. T his is a substantial difference to e.g. the S oviet Union. F urthermore, if a country wants to withdraw from the E U, then the Constitutional T reaty and now the L isbon T reaty contains a procedure to regulate this eventuality. In my view, it will presumably never be applied (see below); its main function is to underline the voluntary character of E U membership. Until now at least, the problem has been the reverse one: N o one wants to leave, but more countries want to join than the Union is willing to accept. Why has the E U been so attractive? Because the replacement of anarchy in international relations by a voluntary, negotiated and democratically-legitimized legal order has been in the interest of every one. T his legal order is a “public good” of immense value. T he E U has become an area of unprecedented stability, peace and calculability. N o one has the slightest interest in putting these achievements at risk. L eaving the union would also create huge economic costs. If e.g. Italy would leave the E U and E MU, the insecurity about her economic policy would almost immediately entail steeply rising interest rates on the financial and capital markets; this would be very expensive, given the country’s public debt at 104 percent GDP. It is therefore not only the cultural consensus on democracy, human rights and rule by law which makes the union attractive and provides her with cohesion: A lso

198


the powerful forces of self-interest in stability, calculability and economic benefits work in this direction. Countries that want to join the EU have to fulfill certain conditions. At the Copenhagen S ummit in June 1993, which opened the way to eastern enlargement, they were formulated in this way (E uropean Council 1993, 7.A .iii): Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposed the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. T he Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of E uropean integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.

T he last criterion – capacity to absorb – has sometimes been overlooked in the academic literature. But currently the concern for the absorption capacity is presumably a major factor which explains why the E U-leaders are so reluctant to talk about further enlargement.12 T he criteria are formulated in a rather general way, but they provide orientation. A nd in the course of eastern enlargement the Commission, which was charged with the task of monitoring the progress of the candidate countries, formulated a huge set of specifications. Seen in the light of the criteria and the close monitoring by the Commission prior to any accession, the controversy about T urkey’s membership and her alleged “otherness” seems to be vastly exaggerated: Either Turkey will fulfill the criteria, or she will not. A ll member states, by then presumably 28, will have to agree, and the E uropean Parliament must give its assent. O n repeated occasions the T urkish government has declared its wholehearted support for the values and principles of the Union, and as the E U-leaders have declared, T urkey has made substantial progress. If someone like Giscard voices principles objections against T urkish membership, he must base his judgment on the following assumptions: 1. “S omething” will unavoidably prevent T urkey to become consolidated as regards democracy, human rights and the other conditions, and at the same time, 2. all E uropean heads of state, all national parliaments and the E uropean Parliament in say, 2015, would accept T urkey’s accession in spite of serious shortcomings as regards the membership criteria.

12 In March 2006 a group of members of the E uropean Parliament adopted a report compiled by E lmar Brok, German Christian Democrat according to which the absorption capability under present conditions is “insufficient” (Minder and Parker).


199

In fact, I regard both assumptions as untenable. T his leaves the simple alternative: Either Turkey will fulfill the criteria, or she will not. Modernization as an Ally of the EU Project T here is one strong set of theoretical arguments which gives reason to be optimistic as regards T urkey’s (and other countries’) democratic qualities in the future: A ccording to modernization theory, democracy and the level of economic development are strongly connected. T his view gains plausibility by the simple fact that all countries at high levels of economic development are democratic. T here are also good theoretical reasons to believe that this connection is not just a casual correlation. In the words of R onald Inglehart, economic development “tends to transform a society’s social structure, bringing urbanization, mass education, occupational specialization, growing organizational networks, greater income equality, and a variety of associated developments that mobilize mass participation in politics” (Inglehart, 92) In particular rising specialization and more education produce a workforce that is independent minded. E conomic development is also conducive to cultural change which will stabilize democracy, e.g. by promoting interpersonal trust, tolerance and post-material values. S een in this light, economic development leads to a syndrome of predictable cultural changes and thereby, as to some key values, to an increasing cultural convergence. T he convergence happens exactly on those variables which are the most relevant ones as regards the stability of the E U. We can add that this cultural convergence also implies gender roles. S till a few decades ago also in Western and N orthern E urope most women wore a headscarf and had to accept motherhood and housewife as their main roles, with at best temporary periods on the labor market. Powerful political forces such as the Christian Democrats tried their best to perpetuate this state of affairs. N evertheless, the picture has changed dramatically. A nd if these countries have not yet implemented the principle of equal opportunities for both sexes completely, they have at least progressed a long way. T he same tendencies, with a time-lag, can be observed in T urkey and even, at a beginner stage, in countries such as Iran and S audi-A rabia. T his can be seen, on the one hand, as an aspect of ideational modernization where the principle of equal rights and equal opportunities occupy a central place. But it can also be seen as simply functional: If a society prevents half of its population from entering the labor market, it obstructs economic growth. Consequently, if forces such as the T aliban try to petrify traditional gender roles, they can be successful for some time, but they cannot have a strong economy. But the governments of most Islamic countries want to have economic growth, and consequently sooner or later they are forced to follow the West also on the field of gender roles. T his point is quite important for the stability of the E U, given the point that the principle of equal opportunities and the abolishing of discrimination mechanism figures prominently on the political and juridical agenda of the EU.

200


A gain, the normative ideas of the E U and economic self-interest (and observable trends) combine nicely. Modernization theory is not uncontested. I believe it is a rather strong theory, if not used schematically, and if seen as describing long-term developments. It seems to fit quite well to Turkey: This country has been developing economically; it became more urbanized, more specialized, and better educated. A nd if currently her democratic credentials are still imperfect, one can also say, relatively speaking: T urkish democracy has made much progress. S et-backs cannot be excluded. But I see in particular the point that T urkish Islamism has become a democratic and proE uropean force13 as an indicator that T urkey is set on a long-term process towards democracy. S ome societies have started modernization much earlier or much faster than others. In this context I regard it as an important research topic, following L awrence E . H arrison, to focus “on the role of cultural values and attitudes as facilitators of, or obstacles to, progress” (H arrison, xxi). It is perfectly possible that cultural factors have retarded T urkey’s way to modernity. T hese cultural factors can then contribute to our understanding why T urkey came relatively late. But on the other hand it is obvious that no cultural factors can possibly have prevented T urkey entering the road to modernity because the country has already progressed substantially, and currently the T urkish economy develops at a high growth rate. T his, to repeat, entails further cultural change. We can refer to representative material in this context. Jürgen Gerhards and Michael H ölscher have used the data of the “World V alues S urvey” to fathom cultural differences in the E U and T urkey. We concentrate on support for democracy. Measured by acceptance rates to questions such as “we should have a democratic political system” or “democracy is better than any other form of government”, there is wide consensus. A ctually T urkey, with rates of 92 and 88 percent, lies very close to the average of the old E U-15, and higher than most of the countries of the 2004 enlargement. Interestingly, measured by these two questions, support for democracy is weaker in the United Kingdom (87 and 78 percent) than in T urkey (Gerhards and H ölscher, 210). H owever, people do not always answer consistently, and support for democracy can be controlled by an alternative question: “S hould the military govern?” 25 percent of the T urks agree, thereby revealing a preference for authoritarian rule. But the T urkish value is still below R omania (28 percent) and not too distant from Poland (18 percent). A gain, the United Kingdom scores relatively high with 7 percent (Gerhards and H ölscher, 211).14 13 F or the development of T urkish Islamism see also the contribution by Ihsan Dagi in this volume, Chapter 3. 14 A uthoritarian propensities can also be measured by the question: “We should have a strong leader who doesn’t have to care about parliament and elections.” H owever, I regards this formulation as ambiguous. Is this strong leader supposed to be a dictator? O r is it a democratic politician whose support is so strong that he can concentrate on governing, without constantly having to look at election dates? Due to these ambiguities, I do not


201

Gerhards and H ölscher have also applied multiple regression analysis on these data. A s it turns out, the degree of modernization15 is a factor which can strongly explain the variations in the answers. By contrast, the influence of religion or confession is weak and ambivalent. A lso the duration of democratic rule does not play a role. A s already hinted at by the remarks about the UK, the idea that support for democracy should be particularly strong in countries with long democratic traditions, is not supported by the data. Modernization theory gives reason to look at Turkey’s possibilities to fulfill the E U-membership criteria with some optimism, and consequently coming membership is likely. H owever, it is not given that this will happen within the next decade. Currently, there are two major problems in T urkey which could cause significant delays. The one is the Kurdish question. An escalation of violence with perhaps larger T urkish military interventions in Iraq could actually lead to a freeze in all membership negotiations for many years. A fter all, a satisfactory settlement of minority problems is a central membership condition. F urthermore, the current efforts from part of the Kemalist establishment to outlaw the A KP might produce serious disturbances of democratic political life in T urkey and thus block further reform policies for quite some time. H owever, problems if this kind will hardly prevent a long-term development towards further modernization and thus towards increasing E U-compatibility of T urkish society. A similar logic works also in the case of say, Ukraine or Georgia, or other membership-hopefuls. We can therefore expect that an increasing number of EU’s neighbors will reach the level to fulfill the membership criteria. I find it likely that they then also would like to become members. I therefore also find it likely that the EU will go on expanding, and that it will get new neighbors. In this perspective, it does not make sense to speak about a finalité of the process, or of the “borders” of the E U. T he borders will remain variables. T his is also a reason why many citizens will continue to regard the E U with some unease: Most people prefer stable frames around them. But it is likely that it will be seen as something acceptable, without any real alternative. Ernst Haas, some fifty years ago by giving his formal definition of political integration, made in fact a remarkable prognosis (H aas, 16): Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. T he end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.

Given the point that co-operation and interaction presumably will increase across the national borders, I find it likely that the shifting of loyalty which Haas observed regard affirmative answers to this question as an appropriate indicator of authoritarian propensities. 15 Measured by the H uman Development Index and the level of education.


202

will spread to larger sections of the population. I interpret the rather articulated elitepopulation divide as regards E uropean integration, which we currently can observe in practically all member states16, mainly as a time-lag: F irst the elite changed, the population at large will follow. T his does not imply just harmony. A s within national systems such as the US , there will be many controversies about how to develop the community further. But abolishing or leaving the union will not be on the agenda. A t the same time, we should not carry the analogy with traditional nation states too far. Certainly, in a way the E U can be regarded as a federation. It has transferred substantial policy fields to the federal level, there is a decision-making and legislative system in place, and national administrations and police forces are obliged to secure compliance. But the idea of a federation might create the impression that the E U is heading towards a kind of equilibrium, with a constitution which clearly defines the competencies of the various levels for a long time to come, with clear outer borders, and with symmetric rights and obligations for every citizen. But it is not likely that the E U will ever reach such a state. Currently, we have a rather “messy” state of affairs, a union in various circles and power structures: T here is a core of countries which belong both to the E MU and to the S chengen space. S ome E U members are inside S chengen but outside E MU, others are outside both. T hree countries are part of the E uropean E conomic S pace but not of the E U. T wo countries have entered membership negotiations and receive particular aid and support programs, whereas others are subject to the S tability and A ccession Programme (for the West Balkans). Bosnia is a kind of E U protectorate. T he E uropean N eighborhood Policy is constructing a set of dialogue mechanism, market accession and aid programs, and so, in yet another way, does the E U policy towards the A CP-countries. A ll these aid programs are subject to conditionality and therefore represent a kind of (hopefully beneficial) interference. The currencies of the 14 A frican CFA countries are formally tied to the euro. T here seems to be agreement on the elite level that the institutional setting should be altered, and the L isbon T reaty contains a blueprint for change. Currently (2008) it appears likely that it will be ratified. But it is not likely that this will be the last alteration. A lso the E MU will probably evolve further. F or instance, the eurogroup, i.e. the deliberation forum for the EMU minister of finances, might partly become a decision-making body, for instance as regards bodies such as the IMF , the World Bank or the G-8 summits. A s said above, the many changes are a source of unease. But change is also the characteristic of a learning institution in a changing world. Conclusion A s every political community which issues laws and makes binding decisions, the E U needs a common cultural identity which unites its citizens and provides the 16 F or data, see e.g. H ix 2005, p. 165.


203

system with legitimacy. T his cultural identity of the E U consists of comparatively few principles, namely democracy, human rights, rule by law and the common endeavor to replace anarchy on the international arena by a system of explicit and binding rules among nation states. A part from such a consensus on some principles, the E U can be a home for wide-ranging cultural diversity. In particular, religious diversity is no problem, provided of course that the religious citizens respect the above-mentioned principles. R eligious fundamentalism which places religious texts (or rather: certain interpretations of religious texts) above democracy and human rights is not E U-compatible. But neither in T urkey nor in A lbania is fundamentalism a major political force. T he freedom of wide-ranging cultural diversity is even a condition for the stability of the E U. A ttempts at cultural homogenization would provoke bitter tensions. Making prognoses is of course problematic. But modernization theory predicts that we can expect a set of predictable cultural changes on some fields when societies develop economically. T his cultural convergence happens exactly in the fields which are essential for the stability of the EU. References Cremona, M. (ed.) (2003), The Enlargement of the European Union (O xford: O xford University Press). Economist (2006), 8 A pril, p. 106. E uropean Council (1993), Copenhagen 21–22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions. E uropean Council (1999), H elsinki: Presidency Conclusions, Press R elease: Brussels (11 December 1999) – N r. 00300/99. E uropean Council (2002), Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December, Presidency Conclusions. Gerhards, J. and M. H ölscher (2005), Kulturelle Unterschiede in der Europäischen Union: Ein Vergleich zwischen Mitgliedsländern, Beitrittskandidaten und der Türkei (Wiesbaden: V erlag für S ozialwissen-schaften). Germany (2007), Presidency of the E uropean Union, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome. Giscard d’E staing, V. (2004), “A better E uropean bridge to T urkey”, Financial Times, 25 N ovember, p. 13. Gomez, R . (2003), Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? (A ldershot: A shgate). H aas, E .B. (2004 [1958]), The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (N otre Dame, IN : University of N otre Dame Press). H obsbawm, E .J (1992), Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, S econd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Canto). H altern, U. (2004), “Integration T hrough L aw”, Wiener/Dietz, pp. 177–96. H arrison, L .E . (2000), “Introduction”, in L .E . H arrison and S .P. H untington, Why Culture Matters (N ew York: Basic Books), pp. xvii–xxxiv.

204


H arrison, L .E . and S .P. H untington (eds) (2000), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (N ew York: Basic Books). H ix, S . (2005), The Political System of the European Union, S econd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). H untington, S .P (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (N ew York: S imon & S chuster). H untington, S .P. (2000), “F oreword: Cultures count”, in L .E . H arrison and S .P. H untington: Culture Matters (N ew York: Basic Books), pp. xiii–xvi. Inglehart, R . (2000), “Culture and Democracy”, in L .E . H arrison and S .P. H untington, Culture Matters, pp. 80–97. L e Cœur, P. (2005), “L a crainte pour l’emploi est la raison principale du rejet de la Constitution par les F rançais”, Le Monde, 31 May 2005, p. 4. L upu, M. (2007), (Interwiew mit ...), Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 May, S . 8. Meyer, T . (2004), Die Identität Europas: Der EU eine Seele? (F rankfurt a.M.: S uhrkamp). Minder, R . and G. Parker (2006), “MEP presses E U entry case for Bulgaria and R omania”, Financial Times, 3 A pril. N orman, P. (2003), The Accidental Constitution: The Story of the European Convention, E uroComment, Brussels. Prażmowska, A.J. (2004), Civil War in Poland, 1942–1948, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). S chmidt, H . (2004), “Bitte keinen Grössenwahn. E in Beitritt der T ürkei würde die europäische Union überfordern”, Die Zeit, 25 N ovember 2004, S . 3. T incq, H . (2007), “L e pape Benoît XVI appelle à réagir contre ‘l’apostasie’ de l’E urope”, http:///www.lemonde.fr, 27 March. V achudova, M.A . (2003), “S trategies for Democratization and E uropean Integration in the Balkans”, Cremona, M. (ed.) The Enlargement of the European Union (O xford: O xford University Press), pp. 141–60. Wæver, O . (2004), “Discursive A pproaches”, Wiener/Dietz, pp. 197–216. Weber, E .J. (2002 [1988]), Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914 (S tanford University Press, net edition). Weber, M. (1976 [1922]), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Fünfte, revidierte Auflage ... herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann, 1. Halbband (T übingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul S iebeck)). Wiener, A . and T h. Dietz (eds) (2004), European Integration Theory (O xford: O xford University Press). Z ank, W. (1998), The German Melting-Pot: Multiculturality in Historical Perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Z ank, W. (2002), “E MU – A Defence Mechanism for the N ordic Welfare S tate”, in S øren Dosenrode (ed.), Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union: The European Challenge (A ldershot: A shgate), pp. 221–46.


205

Z ank, W. (2004), The Power of Nationalist Mythology: A Critique of Important Authors on Nationalism Who Became Captured by the Ideology They Wrote About (E. Gellner, A. Smith, and Particularly L. Greenfeld), SPIRIT Discussion Paper, A alborg University . Zank, W. (2006), “The Expanding EU: Ever more diversified people become ‘united ever more closely’”, CCIS -R esearch S eries, Working Paper N o. 1, A alborg, 25pp.


Chapter 10

S ome Concluding R emarks on O verlapping Integration in the Mediterranean Basin Wolfgang Z ank

F inally, we can take a question from the introduction up again: A re the simultaneous processes of overlapping integration and identity assertion compatible or will they produce conflicts? As we have seen in the previous chapters, we can find both conflicts and cooperation. However, I mainly see a rather stable trend towards more cooperation. Conflicts do occur, but they do not seem to change the direction of developments. A s we have seen, the E uropean Union supports the institutions of the A frican Union financially. The EU also provides assistance for efforts at practical Arab cooperation, for instance for better cross-border infrastructure or smoother customs procedures. It is therefore evident that the E U leadership does not see more practical African or Arab unification as a threat. On the contrary, seen from Brussels the heavy problem on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean has been balkanization because it blocks development. Underdevelopment in the regions to the south and southeast of E urope is seen as a problem also for the E U. F urthermore, practically all governments of the countries around the Mediterranean want to improve cooperation, albeit to a varying degree. Even Gaddafi has moved considerably and signed a wide range of agreements; relations with L ibya have improved dramatically. After all, Gaddafi was previously a financer of antiWestern terrorism. It was indeed strange to see pictures of him visiting the L ouvre, while outside the building relatives of victims of his terrorism (the bombing in 1989 of a F rench airliner over N igeria) demonstrated. Gone are the days when rows of dictatorial regimes in the Mediterranean Basin styled themselves as antiimperialist and tried to gain legitimacy by confiscating Western property. Political rhetoric and practical policies of governments have significantly changed towards cooperation, practically throughout the whole region. T his is even true for the Palestinian PLO , though not for H amas and H ezbollah. But we can see these movements as special cases, due to the still unsolved problems at Israel’s borders. A lso S yria has not really been cooperative when it came e.g. to L ebanon (to put it mildly). But in relative terms, improvements in the relation with the E U can be noticed, and in general the regime in Damascus has signaled a wish to come to terms with the West, including Israel. T he reasons for the shift towards more cooperation in the last decades have been multifold. O n the one hand, E urope has changed. T he E uropean countries

208


are no longer colonial powers. T hey do not occupy the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean any longer; all these countries have by now been sovereign for decades. It is true; some E uropean countries have participated in the ill-advised A merican occupation of Iraq. But this has been something different than the colonialism of previous times; the aim has been a new democratic Iraq, not making Iraq a colony again, at least not in formal terms. When colonialism ended anti-colonialism also lost its meaning. A s we have seen, both Pan-A rabism and Pan-A fricanism were previously strongly shaped by the colonial experience and the perception of colonialism being a common enemy. With independence this common enemy was gone and the common past of being once colonized turned out to be insufficient as a basis for unification. Both movements had to redefine themselves and they were only partially successful. During the fight for independence anti-Western ideologies “made sense” because they fuelled militancy. But after independence ideologies of this type made much less sense; when it comes to developing the country militancy is not needed, but rather calm work. F urthermore, the maintenance of anti-Western ideologies could actually block many possibilities for fruitful cooperation. It took many decades before this lesson sank in properly. But by now it seems to have taken roots even in L ibya. A nother important factor was the demise of the S oviet Union. Under the conditions of the Cold War leaders such as N asser could successfully play off one side against the other. T his possibility does not exist anymore. T he rise of China might have compensated for the loss of the S oviet Union to some extent. But the relations of the West with China are much less confrontational than West-E ast relations were during the Cold War, and this has reduced possibilities for playing one side off against the other. T he demise of the S oviet Union also demolished a socio-economic model which for many years seemed to be a working alternative to the Western systems. “A rab S ocialism” and “Import S ubstitution Industrialization” were to quite some extent inspired by the S oviet Union (and pre-reform China). H owever, these models failed. E xperiences from all over the world, in N orth A frica and elsewhere, seem to have shown: E conomic dynamism requires markets, respect for private property and rather open borders. When private property is not respected, people lose many incentives, capital will seek away, and foreign investments do not come. When the borders are closed by protectionism, possibilities for an international division of labor cannot be used and inefficient national monopolies strangle competition. T he precise degree of economic openness can still be discussed; it might make sense to protect some industries or to restrict the movement of short-term capital. But restrictions of these kinds should be exceptions and economic openness the general rule. T hese basic lessons seemed to have been learned practically all over and certainly so by the governments around the Mediterranean; they have all been moving towards increased economic openness. Countries such as A lgeria can be seen as a kind of laggard in this respect, but the direction of movement has been the same as in the neighboring countries.

Some Concluding Remarks on Overlapping Integration

209

T his development has been of enormous importance for our subject. When borders become open and property is guarantied, the processes of market economies create dense networks of cross-border cooperation. In contrast to the heydays of A rab S ocialism, the A rabs of today are much less insulated from each other, now they can create new patters of cooperation among themselves and with E urope. Cooperation creates win–win situations. It is instructive to look shortly to the F ar E ast, where the economies of Japan, S outh Korea, T aiwan and China are closely interwoven by now. T here has not been much political cooperation or integration among these countries yet, but they have followed compatible, open development policies. In N orth A frica and the Middle E ast similar processes could have started during the last years, albeit still hampered by many relicts of the A rab-socialist past. Certainly, the opening of economic systems has always entailed the risk that some groups may loose out. But the solution to this problem has been the build-up of welfare-state arrangements, not perpetuating protectionism. T here have been and there are still today many fears that the opening of economies will obstruct social policy. But this has been an error: In order to finance welfare states, the underlying economy must be efficient and this means open. The Nordic countries can serve as illustrative examples. T hey have ambitious welfare-state arrangements, with free health care for everybody, free education, generous unemployment subsidies and tax-financed pension rights for everyone. The state redistributes more than half of the GDP. T he N ordic countries have experienced robust growth during the last many years, their state budgets are in surplus and inflation rates low. At the same time their economies have been very open to trade and capital movements: A necessary condition for their efficiency. Welfare states and open market economies are no enemies, on the contrary (Z ank 2002). In the Mediterranean, more economic cooperation will probably produce more political dialogue with the E U, presumably even more integration. T his is not the least due to the fact that the E U market is so important for the whole region, and it is highly regulated. T he E U has already become a global norm setter; many countries have overtaken E U norms. Particularly the countries at the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean are under pressure to adapt to E U standards in order to reap the benefits of a “Stake in the Internal Market” which the EU has offered them. F urthermore through the various A ssociation A greements and A ction Plans with its F ree-T rade clauses, co-operation projects, aid packages and dialogue the EU has already had a significant impact on all of the Mediterranean non-member countries, albeit to a varying degree. T he “front-runners” Morocco and T unisia also participate in a row of E U programs such as the student-exchange scheme ERAS MUS and Morocco even takes part in the E U peace-keeping mission in Bosnia and in the Galileo satellite program. It is likely that the Mediterranean non-members will increasingly try to influence EU decisions in fields which are of particular importance for them. This requires constant dialogue in order to be informed in due time. T he Mediterranean non-member countries, governments and private business, will presumably also

210


strengthen their representations in Brussels considerably, in order to be able to lobby in the various E U institutions. T his way the elites in the Mediterranean non-members will to some extent re-focus their activity towards Brussels, thus actually strengthening the integrative drive with E urope. T his is a kind of parallel to processes which E rnst B. H aas studied in the six E U pioneer countries already in the early 1950s under the E uropean Coal and S teel Union (H aas 2004[1958]). T o be sure, the E U has had an impact on N orth A frica and the Middle E ast only in some fields, mainly on economic (and thereby social) matters. The direct political influence of Europe is still rather weak. As Peter Seeberg has shown (Chapter 8), the three biggest E U-countries F rance, Germany and the United Kingdom have followed divergent policies and have divergent interests on various issues. T his makes the development of common policies difficult or even outright impossible, the most salient example being the invasion of Iraq in 2003. H owever, we can also see this as a variation of the glass-of-water problem: We might say the glass is half empty because there are still so many fields where the EU has no common policy and thus hardly any influence. But we might also say that the progress achieved so far towards a common foreign policy and even a common security and defense policy has been truly remarkable, with the development of binding common foreign-policy strategies and common activities such as a peacekeeping mission. We are here, after all, in the sphere of “H igh Politics” and at the very center of state sovereignty. Many scholars, not the least those coming from the “R ealist S chool” in International R elations, have predicted that in foreign policy we would never see any integration at all. S een this way the glass is actually already astoundingly full. We might add that it goes on getting fuller. Suffice perhaps to mention that the L isbon T reaty envisages the creation of a common diplomatic service and the creation of a rather powerful H igh R epresentative for F oreign A ffairs and S ecurity Policy. We can therefore expect that the impact of the E U will come to make itself increasingly felt also in other fields than markets and economic processes. T he transition to open market economies in the A rab countries has also had an impact on our subject in other ways. S upposedly, it will make the A rab economies much more efficient. The positive growth rates of the last years, as opposed to the 1980s and 1990s, seem to confirm this. In combination with the falling population pressure – in itself a sign of development – we can expect a substantial easing of social conditions. Given the point that the rise of militant fundamentalism was connected with severe social problems in the urban agglomerations, we may also expect fewer recruits for radical Islamism. Market economies can reduce radicalism also in another way: In market economies ambitious young people can do something in order to improve their situation. T his is not to say that market economies are just and fair in every respect; they are not and certainly not so in the still rather opaque systems of N orth A frica and the Middle E ast. But in previous decades the bureaucracies of A rab S ocialism were simply strangling most kinds of activities, and in comparison with the past, opportunities have multiplied, not the least for young people. Presumably this has already affected the recruiting possibilities for radical Islamism and it will do so even more in the future. T o


211

quote Gilles Kepel, the governments in A lgiers and Cairo seem to calculate that Islamism is soluble dans le marché, dissolvable in the market (Kepel, 453). But under the conditions of open market economies it also becomes increasingly difficult to maintain authoritarian rule. People and ideas can move much freer. The dilemma of the Ben A li regime in T unisia is telling: It wants to make T unisia competitive in the field of Information Technology, and at the same time it tries to restrict access to the internet. Market forces build up a slow but systematic pressure for reducing arbitrary rule. If private property is not respected, wealth owners and specialists will go and investors will not come. If a regime cannot confiscate anymore, its possibilities for arbitrary rule are already reduced considerably. F urthermore, investors and qualified personal dislike corrupt administrations, biased courts and opaque rules. N ot listening to them is not an option for the governments, because if not listened to they might leave. T he more a market economy develops, the more the business community will grow in size, and the more there will be important actors to pressure for clear rules and efficient legal systems. The business community is presumably a much stronger force for reform than Civil S ociety. T he interests of business do not necessarily point towards democracy in the first place, but rather towards clear rules and stability. H owever, stability requires that governments are seen as legitimate, and democratic rules haven proven to be the strongest source of legitimacy. T herefore, the probability is high that reform processes which are started in order to make a market economy work will eventually end in democracy. F or these reasons I am more optimistic as to democracy in the longer run than F rancesco Cavatorta is (Chapter 2). H e has diagnosed the existence of a rather strong Civil S ociety which according to many scholars should create good conditions for democracy. In the case of the A rab countries, however, Civil S ociety is deeply divided into a secular and an Islamist part. T herefore, unlike the situation in many other countries it is unable to unite in a common struggle for democracy. In his view, Western interference made things even worse because by discriminating against the Islamist part of Civil S ociety the dividing gap within Civil S ociety was deepened. But according to the definition which he uses, Civil Society is “a zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market”. Consequently, the business community does not belong to Civil S ociety. But it is exactly the business community which in my view has a great potential to bring about change towards rule by law and eventually democracy. Certainly, the development would be much faster if Civil S ociety and Business Community would unite demanding democracy, and therefore it is a tragedy that Civil S ociety is so divided. In this sense I share Cavatorta’s analysis. Modernization theory, as discussed in the last chapter, predicts also that economic development will be accompanied by a concomitant cultural change towards values which are supportive of democracy. T his cultural change also affects Islamism, in effect, it has already done so.

212


Modernization theory claims a connection between democracy and the level of the GDP. Of course non-oil GDP because only the non-oil GDP reflects the change to a more differentiated and educated society. If we omit the oil states A lgeria and L ibya, then the T urkish GDP per capita is considerably above the other Muslim countries in the Mediterranean Basin, at a rate of about 5 to 3. O nly T unisia ranks slightly higher than T urkey. A s we have learned from Ihsan Dagi’s contribution (Chapter 3), the T urkish Islamists have undergone a profound change towards democratic and pro-E uropean values. Is T urkey’s political system and T urkey’s version of Islamism perhaps more democratic because T urkey is the most developed society in this row? A s the exception T unisia shows, there is no automatism which translates a higher GDP directly into a democratic system. But the correlation between GDP and democracy is nevertheless remarkable in this case. I see this as a point which strengthens Ihsan Dagi’s claim that the A KP is not just the product of a particular T urkish constellation, but that it is actually a pioneer, to be followed in other Mediterranean countries. In the whole region we have seen a trend towards more pragmatism, more openness and more rule by law. R ule by law within the states, but also increasingly among them. In the case of the E U this is particularly so. But as the growing network of agreements and treaties between the E U and the non-member states shows, there is also much more rule by law across the Mediterranean S ea. T he A gadir T reaty is an example of a seemingly working agreement among A rab states. A ll this reduces the uncertainty among the countries involved considerably; the possibilities for trustful cooperation across cultural divides grow. In the Mediterranean Basin there is, of course, always one caveat to make: Israel and Palestine. The still unsolved Palestine conflict can create new tensions across the region at any time. A lasting solution does not seem to be at hand. A s we have seen, the conflict has severely burdened the multi-lateral Barcelona Process. But it did not stop the process towards more cooperation across the Mediterranean S ea. It has not even prevented closer economic cooperation between Israel and E gypt and Israel and Jordan. Consequently, it is not likely that the Palestine conflict will produce a reversal of the general trend. But, as Jakob F eldt has shown in Chapter 8, does more interaction across the cultural borders not unavoidably provoke irritations and conflicts? Certainly. In the time of writing (F ebruary 2008) a remake of the Cartoon Crisis took place, with Danish flags burning again in Khartoum and elsewhere. I agree with him, more integration, not the least more migration (of which we presumably will see more across the Mediterranean) questions values and identities which are emotionally deeply rooted. But I see irritations and conflicts of this kind as being temporary, in particular under the rather well-ordered and stable conditions of the E U countries. People have to become used to new realities and any adaptation process takes some time, but then emotions cool down again. Just to give one example, in the 1960s the influx of “guest workers”, notably Italians, made xenophobic sentiments in West Germany rise steeply. H owever, after some time Italians were widely accepted. But then new immigrant groups such as T urks became the targets of


213

aggressions. But already in the beginning of the 1990s the sentiments of the population at large changed to positive attitudes towards the T urks as well (Z ank 1998, 208–14). S imilar processes can be seen in many cases. N ew things usually pass through a circle from irritation or even outrage to acceptance and then perhaps even positive appreciation. More specific as to our main subject: Integration is also about creating newer, larger identities, accepting new people to become part of the club. S uch a process of creating “we”-feelings with a wider range has never been easy, but it is no historical novelty. If many cases of irritation or outrage are unavoidable when integration processes cross cultural divides, then it is of utmost importance whether political elites want to politicize and re-enforce them. A s we have seen, A rab leaders do not do this anymore. Moreover, as initiatives such as the A lliance of Civilizations show (see Chapter 4 by Kousssay Boulaich and S øren Dosenrode), there are initiatives at top levels to actively create better understanding and mutual respect. A lso the Barcelona Process and the E uropean N eighbourhood Policy have contained many initiatives for dialogue. Their effect is difficult to assess, their impact can be felt presumably only in the longer run. But the mere fact that political and religious leaders in all countries around the Mediterranean S ea actually work for better intercultural understanding is a remarkable fact. This is actually a historical novelty; the existence of cultural conflicts is not. T here are cultural differences between E urope, A frica, the A rab and the Muslim world which on numerous occasions have produced cultural clashes, and they will do so in the future. H owever, the number of cultural differences and conflicts inside E urope and inside the Muslim and A rab world and A frica has always been simply enormous. During the last decades there have been many more and gruesome conflicts deeply inside the Muslim World and inside A frica than at the borders with Europe. The most horrible conflict was the Congo War 1998–2002, with about four million dead. T his is about the magnitude of World War I. T he second great horror was the war between Iraq and Iran, two Muslim countries. H orror number three was the war in A lgeria in the 1990s. Western E urope has been much luckier after 1945. But the point is not that there have been no conflicts, no irritations, and no cultural differences in Western E urope. A s I have tried to argue in the previous chapter, the essential point is that E urope has built up mechanisms that allow for peaceful cooperation in spite of cultural differences. T his can only work if a basic consensus about some rules is in place. But once such as consensus is in place, differences do not produce violent conflicts. The existence of conflicts is no tragedy, as long as they do not escalate and are fought out in a peaceful way. Mechanisms to make this possible are effective in the E U countries but not yet fully so in N orth A frica and the Middle E ast. But these countries have also moved in this direction. Interestingly, there are more binding agreements and treaties in place across the Mediterranean than among the A rab, Muslim or A frican countries. T his means that numerous conflicts across the Mediterranean Sea can be solved in a much more civilized manner than many conflicts in Africa or the Middle East. The

214


borders between E urope, A frica and the A rab world have therefore become much more peaceful than before and much more peaceful than the borders between, say, Chad and S udan. When more cooperation and more mechanisms to regulate conflicts come about, it is positive for everybody. It is no threat to E U interests if this happens to a greater extent among A rab, Muslim or A frican countries. S een in this light the overlapping integration processes are no problem. O verlapping integration would be a problem if the aim in all cases was to construct new states. Indeed, it would not work if one tried at the same time to construct an “A rab nation from the O cean to the Gulf”, the “United S tates of A frica” and a new caliphate, while also bringing T urkey into the E U. But outside the E U I do not see a real movement towards a new state. Unlike the E U, the A frican Union, the A rab L eague or the O rganization of the Islamic Conference have remained strictly intergovernmental forms of cooperation and it is not likely that this will change in the near future. More specifically to Africa, as Søren Dosenrode points out (Chapter 5), the level of transactions among A frican states is rather low, in particular when it comes to transactions across the S ahara. Prospects for deeper integration on a continental level are not good at the moment. If we might see more integration, it will most likely encompass only limited a number of states, for instance the countries of the S outh A frican Customs Union (SA CU). T his type of practical and democratic integration which Dosenrode proposes would certainly be compatible with more cooperation and even partial integration with the E U. A nother area of stronger potential for integration is the Gulf region. T he progress of the Gulf Cooperation Council towards customs union and presumably monetary union can perhaps even be seen as steps towards a new federation. But this process does not overlap with the E U. Besides, there is also much cooperation between the E U and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Just to give one example, the E uropean Central Bank is assisting in creating the monetary union at the Gulf. Also in this case I see compatibility or at least non-conflictuality with European integration. A mong the four projects discussed her, the E U is the one which has progressed most towards integration and towards building stable common institutions which can generate and enforce common decisions and rules. E U integration has also made itself felt at the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, mainly in socio-economic and some legal matters (see Chapter 6) whereas the A U or the A rab L eague have not had such an impact on E urope. Why has the E U been more successful in this respect than the A rab L eague or the A frican Union? T he answer seems to flow rather straightforward from the propositions above: The E U pioneering countries were democratic countries with rule by law. T herefore, they could deepen political cooperation on the basis of common constitutional principles. O ther democratic states could join later. By contrast, A frica and the A rab states (and the Muslim world in general) have seen a huge variety of political systems with little or no common constitutional ground. T he E U pioneers have been open market economies which all wanted to deepen cooperation. F or them there


215

was no detour via state-bureaucratic systems with closed borders which blocked practical integration with the neighbors. L ast but not least, the E U pioneers have been highly-developed countries with sophisticated divisions of labor and strong business communities and interest organizations. In such a setting, as highlighted already by neo-functionalist theorists such as E rnst B. H aas, spill-over effects are much more likely to happen: O nce a new center is created, e.g. interest groups will point at fields of insufficient integration and start demanding more practical common solutions to common problems. By contrast, in lesser developed countries with e.g. still significant subsistence economy or at least rather crude patterns of division of labor and weak business communities, these kind of spill-over effects are much less likely. And not to forget, by now the EU can harvest many firstmover advantages. T oday there is, for instance, a dense network of E U market regulations to which others have to adapt, and they do it one by one. T here is no alternative system of, say, A frican or A rab market regulation, let alone a common Muslim market. A ll these factors together conspire to load the dices heavily in favor of the E U project when it comes to the question of which of the integration projects will prevail in zones of overlapping. “Prevail” is here understood as constructing binding agreements and stable institutionalized forms of cooperation. Measured along this yard stick I expect much more integration among the E U and the countries at the other side of the Mediterranean than inter-A rab or inter-A frican integration. T his is not to say that more progress at A frican, A rab or even Muslim integration will not be possible in the future. But I find it highly likely that such progress would happen in the Mediterranean Basin in a form which is compatible with the E U. E U-compatible integration does not imply new borders to the E U. T o give some examples: If the A rab countries should make substantial progress towards creating the Greater A rab F ree T rade A rea it would be fully compatible with the E U as long as this does not imply new common A rab tariffs towards the outer world because this would torpedo the E U-sponsored Mediterranean F ree T rade A rea. If the A rab countries, perhaps financed by petrodollars, engaged in a comprehensive project at improving cross-border traffic among Arab countries, this would be fine from an E U point of view. T he E U actually provides aid for such activities. If the A rab countries multiplied their common efforts at raising literacy and book production in A rabic, the E U would welcome it. T he E U actually supports education efforts. S uppose the Muslim countries could improve dialogue on religious matters and organize more common efforts for, say, the building of mosques in poor areas, no E U interest would be hurt. It could even be seen as a contribution to combat terrorism because it would presumably reduce the room for radical versions of Islamism. If the A frican Union became stronger at implementing its principles inside the member countries, every politician in Brussels would be delighted. T o I have described the different conditions for A frican and E uropean integration in a more detailed way (Z ank 2007).

216


sum this point up, there are numerous possibilities for strengthening cooperation and even integration among A rabs, A fricans or Muslims which could easily go alongside the E U project. Besides, non-E U types of integration which are compatible with the E U are not something new. Suffice perhaps to mention the Nordic Council, an intergovernmental form of cooperation on various issues. A lready in 1952, i.e. much earlier than the E U, the N ordic countries succeeded in creating a common labor market and a passport union; N ordic citizens could travel freely without passports among the member countries. In 1973, Denmark joined the E U without having to leave the Nordic cooperation. Some five decades after the Nordic countries also the E U introduced passport-free travelling in several steps, the S chengen zone was expanded beyond the E U borders so that the N ordic non-members could be incorporated. T herefore the non-E U countries Iceland and N orway are part of it, whereas the United Kingdom, as so often having chosen an opt-out, is not. During its development the E U has successfully crossed various cultural divides: T he F rench-German antagonism was transformed into close cooperation early on. It played no major role whether a country has been predominantly Catholic or Protestant. T he line between L atin and O rthodox Christianity – according to H untington a fault line between distinct civilizations (H untington 2002, 45 and map 1.3) – was bridged with the E U-accession of Greece in 1981 and the membership of R omania and Bulgaria in 2007. T he E U has also already crossed the border to the Muslim world and has had a strong impact on a big Islamic country, T urkey; T urkish membership is likely. A nother Muslim country, A lbania, has also been declared a candidate country. A ccession negotiations have not yet begun, but they are likely to start in a few years. In a more distant future, I also see an accession of e.g. Morocco to be more likely than not. T he E U could expand geographically across many cultural borders and at the same time deepen coordination. N ot because E urope has become culturally uniform, but because the E U has successfully constructed mechanisms which allow cultural differences to flourish, provided a few basic principles remains intact. T hese mechanisms, at least some of them, will presumably be further extended across the Mediterranean S ea, although membership is not an issue in the near future. References H aas, E .B. (2004 [1958]), The Uniting of Europe:. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (N otre Dame, IN : University of N otre Dame Press). H untington, S .P. (2002), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (L ondon: S imon & S chuster). Kepel, G. (2003), Jihad. Expansion et decline de l’islamisme (Paris: Gallimard). Z ank, W. (1998), The German Melting-Pot: Multiculturality in Historical Perspective (Basingtoke: Macmillan and N ew York: S t. Martin’s Press).


217

Z ank, W. (2002), “E MU – A Defence Mechanism for the N ordic Welfare S tate”, in S øren Dosenrode (ed.), Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union: The European Challenge (A ldershot: A shgate), pp. 221–46. Z ank, W. (2007), “A Comparative E uropean V iew on A frican Integration: Why it has been much more difficult in Africa than in Europe”, CCIS Research Series –Working Paper N o 4. http://www.ccis.aau.dk/research/2012439.


Index A bd el-Krim 4 A bdallah, E mir of T ransjordan 4 A bduh, Mohammad 44 A fghani, Jamal ad-din 44 A frican Union (A U) 9–11, 83, 91, 97f, 100, 115, 143, 214f. A frican Peer R eview Mechanism (APR M) 10 A gadir A greement 1, 7f, 141, 143, 212 A kif, Mehmet 44 A l-Jazeera 7 A l-Quaida 149 A kcakoca, A manda 161 A KP, Justice and Development Party (T urkey) 15, 21, 46, 50f, 151, 159, 201, 212 A lbania 131, 138, 185, 203, 216 A lgeria “A gricultural R evolution” 112 “A rab S ocialism”, as practiced inA lgeria 112f, 123–7 civil society 32, 36f Destanne de Bernis, advisor 116, 123 E U, relations with 110, 112, 131–33, 137, 157f foreign debt 124 FLN 120 F rance, relations with 162, 187 hydrocarbon industry 112, 126, 142 IMF program 126f Islamism 13f, 36f Morocco, relations with 112, 133 Pan-A fricanism, A lgerian support 115 social indicators 135 transition to market economy 123–7, 138, 140, 142 trade structure 92 A lliance of Civilizations (A oC) 21, 65–81 A malgamated S ecurity Communities 85 A ndrain, Charles 90 A ngola 86, 103

Annan, Kof�i 21, 65f, 74, 96 A rab “A wakening” 3 A rab L eague 1, 5–8, 94, 100, 214 A rab Maghreb Union (Union Maghreb A rabe, UMA ) 132f A rab S ocialism 6, 14, 22, 109–115, 117–129, 137 authoritarianism 27, 30–3, 126 A znar, José Maria 67, 79 Balfour, A rthur James 4 Barcelona Declaration 134 Barcelona Process 16f, 19, 28, 69–75, 78, 113, 129, 134, 136f, 140, 151, 161f, 212f. Ben A li, Z ine el A idine 121, 211 Ben Bellah, A hmed 109f Ben S alah, A hmed 114, 123 Bendjedid, Chadli 125 Berman, S . 31 Bertelsmann T ransformation Index 126, 129, 140, 144 Blair, T ony 129, 158, 160 Bosnia and H erzegovina 21, 138f, 202, 209 Botswana 9, 95, 101–4 Boulaich, Koussay 21, 213 Boumedienne, H ouari 112, 120 Bourguiba, H abib 114, 121, 123 Bouteflika, Abdelassiz 125f Brown, Gordon 160 Bulac, A li 52, 52, 54f Bush, George W. 27, 43, 149, Bush administration 79, 194 Buzan, Barry 151 Cajal, Maximo 68, 70, 72, 73 Cameroon 92, 95 capitalist system, criteria according to Kornai 120f Cardoso, F ernando E nrique 116 Cartoon Crisis 23, 167, 175–7, 179, 181

220


Casa Arabe 70 Casa Sefarad 70 Cavatorta, F rancesco 20, 31, 211 Chirac, Jacques 154, 150 Christianity, “Christian culture” 188f Citizen E mpowerment Projects 175 citizenship 23, 150, 167–81 and integration 168–173 Civil S ociety 20, 27–43, 46, 64, 73f, 76f, 139, 178, 211 Clarke, Michael 66f “Clash of Civilizations” 2, 20f, 29, 43, 46, 65, 74, 184 Collective Identities 185–89 see also E uropean Identity, Muslim identity, national identity CFA (Communauté F inancière d’A frique; Cooperation F inancière en A frique Centrale) 9, 11, 104, 202 Congo (Z aire) 96, 104, 213 Constitutional T reaty 16, 23, 184, 189–91, 193, 196f. Cook, R obin 157 Copenhagen criteria 101, 197–9 Copenhagen school 151 Copenhagen summit 1993 150, 198 Copenhagen summit 2002 185 cultural convergence 199–203 cultural diversity and political identity 185–9 cultural identity 202 cultural politics 167 Cultural R evolution 112 Cyprus 19, 51, 55, 58, 130, 161 Dagi, Ihsan 20, 35, 212 “Danishness” 23, 177f Dannreuther, R . 153 Del S arto, R .A . 152f democracy as system of rules 17, 191f “substantive ground” of 172 democratic legitimacy 17, 39, 192 democratization, progress towards and prospects of 22, 27–31, 40f, 45, 51, 54, 57–9, 99, 138, 150, 156, 199–203, 211f demos 170, 177

Denmark 196, 216 cultural clashes and citizenship 167–181 Destanne de Bernis, Gérard 116, 123 Dorronsoro, G. 160 Dosenrode, S øren 21, 213f Deutsch, Karl W. 21, 83–90, 93, 103, 105 E aston, David 66, 79 E conomic Commission on A frica (E CA ) 91, 100 E conomic Community of West A frican states (E CO WAS ) 11 E conomic Partnership A greement (EPA ) 11 E gypt 5 A gadir A greement 1, 7f, 141, 143, 212 E U, relations with 131–133, 136–38 Islamism 32f, 36f, political system 110f, 142 social indicators 135 socialism 110f trade structure 92 transition to market economy 123, 127, 139 United A rab R epublic 1958–61 6 electoral authoritarianism 126 E mmanuel, A rghiri 116 E nergy Community 138 ERAS MUS program 209 E rdogan, T ayyip 15, 49–51, 54, 73 ethnic identity 186 E uro-Mediterranean Partnership 28, 69, 78, 133, 158 E uropean Convention 23, 184, 189, E uropean Convention on H uman R ights 49 E uropean Court of H uman R ights (E CHR ) 49, 52 E uropean Identity 23, 180, 184–195 E uropean Investment Bank (EI B), 130 E uropean Union (E U), A lliance of Civilization, E U relation to 73–5 basic principles 15–18, 189–95 BerlinDeclaration 191 Charter of F undamental R ights 194 Common F oreign and S ecurity Policy (CFSP ) 16, 74, 136

Index Constitutional T reaty, Preamble 190 democratization, E U approach 27f, 38–40 enlargements 17, 19, 144,183–5, 190, 198 ERAS MUS program 209 E uropean Court of Justice (E CJ) 192f E uropean N eighborhood Policy (ENP ) 1, 136–8, 153, 161f, 202 E uropean S ecurity and Defence Policy 16, 139 E uropean S ecurity S trategy 71 legislation, supranational 192f L ibya, relations with 113, 140f Mediterranean policy 130–141 membership criteria 101, 197–9 S tabilization and A ssociation Process (SAP ) 185 T urkey, E U-relations and accession process 19, 21, 43–63, 130, 133, 137f, 144, 158–62, 183–5, 198–203, 216 E uropean Year of Intercultural Dialogue 75 E uropeanization 22, 109f, 129, 141–3 F alk, R ichard 149 F anon, F ranz 187 F aysal, King of Iraq 4 “F ebruary 28 process” 48f, 53, 56f F eldt, Jakob 22f, 195, 212 F errero-Waldner, Benita 136–8 F orum E uro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Économiques (FE MISE ) 137, 138 F rance 3f, 9, 18, 53, 88, 91, 113, 121, 130–3, 144 foreign policy towards N orth A frica and the Middle E ast 22, 147f, 153, 156–8, 160–2 F ront Islamique du S alut (FIS ) 13f, 32, 125 F urtado, Celso 116 Gabon, trade structure 92 Gaddaf�i, Muammar 6, 10, 19, 94, 110, 113, 120, 128, 129, 140, 143 Germany 15, 88, 102, 121, 133f, 212

221

foreign policy towards N orth A frica and the Middle E ast 22, 149–53, 156, 158, 161f, 195, 210 Gerhards, Jürgen 200f Ghana 9, 92, 99, 119 Gillespie R , 149f, 158 Giscard d’E staing, V aléry 183–5, 189f, 193, 198, 203 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Greater A rab F ree T rade A rea (GAFTA ) 7, 215 Group of F riends (of the A lliance of Civilizations) 69, 76 Gonzalez, F elipe 67, 69, 134 Gul, A bdullah 53 Gulf Cooperation Council 7f, 214 H aas, E rnst 201, 210, 215 H amrouch, Mouloud 126 H amas 13, 36, 207 H ariri, Rafik 151, 154 H arrison, L awrence E . 200 H assan II , King of Morocco 115, 123, 127 headscarf debate 53f, 199 H ezbollah 151f, 154, 160, 207 high-level group of the A oC 65f, 69, 73f, 76, 79f H izb ut-T ahrir 12 H obsbawm, E ric J. 186f H olocaust 152 H ölscher, Michael 200f human rights 13, 17, 20–3, 28, 30–5, 38f, 41, 45f, 49, 51–3, 55, 57, 59, 72, 75, 96, 99, 101, 103f, 134, 139, 142, 149–52, 154, 158, 163, 174, 192–4, 198, 203 H untington, S amuel P. 2, 65, 78, 184f, 204, 216 H usayn, sharif of Mekka 4 Import S ubstitution Industrialization 110 infant mortality inN orth A frica 135 Infitah 123 Inglehart, R onald 122, 199 International Monetary F und (IMF ) 123,126–8, 132, 136, 138, 140, 142, 202 International R econstruction F und

222


F acility for Iraq (IRFFI ) 155 Intra-R egional T rade 91f Iran and A lliance of Civilizations 66, 69, 79 and H izbollah 154 revolution in1979 12 Iraq 4–6, 17, 27f, 43, 45, 67f, 78, 148f, 151f, 154–6, 160, 162f, 201, 208, 210, 213 Islamic Identity 43 Islamism overview 2, 12–15, 20f, Islamism and civil society and democracy inthe MENA countries 34–41 Islamism and the West 43–46 T urkish political Islamism 47–51, 58–60 T urkish Islamism and the E U 52–56 48, 51, 55 Islamic business elite inT urkey 56–58 inA lgeria 125, 141, 142, transition to market economy as antidote 200f Israel and Barcelona Process 134 E U, relations with 19, 134, 137, 152f, 162 F rance, relations with 152 Germany, relations with 152 Madrid Conference 1991 68 T urkey, alliance with 160 Italy 4, 18, 51, 95, 130–3, 151, 191, 195, 197 Ivory Coast 96 Jensen, Uffe E llemann 177 Jordan A gadir A greement 1, 141 E U relations with 133, 137 Jihad, Jihadism 3, 12, 24, 27 Jung, Dietrich 149, 160 Justice and Development Party [Parti de la Justice et du développement] (PJD), Morocco 15, 36, 61, 141 Justice and Development Party, (A KP) T urkey 15, 21, 46, 50f, 151, 159, 201, 212 Justice–loyalty distinction 173–5 Jyllands-Posten 176f

Kant, Immanuel 99, 174 Karaman, H ayrettin 53–5 Kemal, N emik 44 Kepel, Gilles, 148f, 211 Ki-Moon, Ban 66 King, A nthony 148 Köhler, H orst 152, Kornai, János 117–22 Kramer, Martin 18 Kupchan, Charles 27 laicité 29, 34 L aclau, E rnesto 168, L ebanon 5 Barcelona Process 134, E U, relations with 153f, 162 F rance, Germany, UK and 151–6, 162 L esotho 101–4 liberalism and citizenship 169–73 L ibya border conflicts 94 E U, relations with 110, 113, 129, 131–3, 140f, 208 Jamahiriya sector 128 Pan-A fricanism, support for 10, 94, 115 political regime 95, 97, 128 socialist system 113 terrorism, support for 113, 129, 207 transition to market economy 123, 128f, 142 life expectancy inN orth A frica 135 L intonen, Kirsti 73f L isbon T reaty 16, 194, 197, 202, 210 L oyalty 167f, 173–5 Maghreb, policy of the three major E uropean powers towards it 157f Malta 19, 130 Mali 92, 94, 104 Malawi 92, 104 Malaysia, Islamism in 13 Mauritania 10, 18, 94, 132 Mayor Z aragoza, F ederico 66, 80 Mbeki, T habo 9, 99, 143 Mediterranean Union 16, 75 Merkel, A ngela 16, 159, Messaoudi, Khalida 36

Index Meshreq, policy of the three major E uropean powers towards it 151–6 Mesures d’Accompagnement (ME DA ) 158 Meyer, T homas 196 Middle E ast Partnership Initiative (MEPI ) 27 migrants, migration 13, 19, 147–50, 156f, 161f, 168f, 171, 173, 181, 212f Mistry, P.S . 91–3, 99f, modernization theories 23, 168, 199–203, 211f Morocco A gadir A greement 1, 7f, 141, 143, 212 Berber 94 E U, relations with 19, 22, 109, 130–3, 137–9, 142, 144, 157f, 162, 184, 209, 216 Import S ubstitution Industrialization 110, 114f, 123, 127 Islamism 32, 35, 37 Pan-A fricanism, leaving OA U, not entering A U 2, 9f, 115 political system 28, 95, 110, 114f S pain, relations with 67, S panish repression of A bd el-Krim revolt 4 social indicators 135 trade structure 92 transition to market economy 123, 127 West Sahara conflict 115 Mouffe, Chantal 23, 167–8, 170–1 Mozambique 92, 95, 103f Murphy, E mma 109, 113f, 127 MUSIA D 15, 56–8 Muslim Brotherhood 33, 36f, 140 Muslim Identity 12, 19, 46, 54 Musonda, F .M. 91, 93, 99 N amibia 95f, 101–4 N asser, Gamal A b’dal 2, 6, 8, 14, 109–11, 120, 143, 208 N ational Identity 171, 186–8 N ational O rder Party 47 N ational S alvation Party (NSP ) 47f nationalist mythology 187f N ew Partnership for A frica’s Development (NEPA D) 10 N igeria 96

223

N krumah, Kwame 8, 83, 94, 117, 143 non-tariff barriers 18, 134, 196 N yerere, Julius 8, 24, 83, 94, 105, 117, 143 O basanjo, O lusegun 9f, 99 Officice Chérifien des Phosphates 115 O nis, Z iya 56 organic crisis 168f O rganization of A frican Unity (OA U) 9f, 18, 83 O rganization of the Islamic Conference (OI C) 2, 12, 46, 69, 214 O ttoman E mpire 3f Pakistan 2 Islamism in 13 Palestine 3f, 153, 159, 212 Palestinian A uthority 134, 137 Pan-A fricanism 2, 6, 8–11, 90f, 94, 115, 120, 143, 208 Pan-A rabism 1f, 3–8, 14, 111, 120, 132, 143, 208 Parti de la Justice et du développement (Morocco) 15, 36, 61, 141 Parti S ocialiste Destourien (PS D) 114 Pasa, S aid H alim 44 Peled, Yoav 180f Prah, Kwesi 94, 96 Pratt, N . 35 Pluralistic S ecurity Communities 21, 85–9, 93, 97 compatibility of major values as requirement 94–6 responsiveness as requirement 96f predictability as requirement 97f Poland 29, 32, 116, 121, 125f, 150, 189, 194, 200 Portugal 17f, 122, 131 post-citizenship society 180f “power triangle” of F rance, Germany and the UK 147, 160–3 primary school enrollment inN orth A frica 135 Qutb, S ayyit 14, 52

224


R ealist S chool inInternational R elations 84, 210 R egional E conomic Communities (RE Cs) 10, 98, 100 R ehn, O llie 160 R hein, E berhard 131, R ice, Condoleezza 149 R osamond, Ben 84, 89 R ida, R ashid 44 R orty, R ichard 23, 173f, 181 rule by law, rule of law 17, 22f, 34, 49, 52, 54, 58, 99, 101, 103, 134, 136, 139, 142, 150, 154, 158, 163, 169, 190–2, 194–6, 198, 203, 211f, 214 S ampaio, Jorge 66, 73f, 76 S arkozy, N icolas 16f, 75, 159f S audi A rabia 2, 5, 12f, 38, 199 S chmidt, H elmut 183, 185 S chmitt, Carl 23, 172f, 180 secular civil society 20, 31–7, 39f secularization 189 securitization 147, 149f, 162 security communities 21, 84–90, 93, 99, 101 S eeberg, Peter 23, 210 social constructivism 79 socialist system 9, 101, 117–21 soft budget constraints 117–9, 121, 123 S olana, Javier 69, 74, 81, 136 S omalia 10, 96 S outh A frica 9, 11, 92, 101–4, S outh A frican Development Community (SA DC) 11, 103f S outhern A frican Customs Union (SA CU) 21, 93, 101–5 S oviet Union 109, 116f, 119–21, 123, 126, 142, 197, 208 S pain 17–19, 21, 131–3, 144, and the A lliance of Civilization 65–81 “S take inthe Internal Market” 19, 137f, 209 structuralist fallacy 188 S udan 6, 14, 94, 214 S waziland 101–4 S ykes-Picot A greement 4 S yria 5

A lliance of Civilization, S yria’s participation 69, 79 Barcelona Process and 134 E U, relations with 152f, 207 F rance, Germany, UK 151–6 L ebanon, S yrian presence 151f United A rab R epublic with E gypt 6, 111, 113 T aliban 199 tariffs, tariff policy 7, 18, 93, 118, 121, 127, 130f, 134, 137, 139f, 196f, 215 terrorism 43, 65, 68, 71, 78, 113, 129, 134, 141, 147, 178, 207 T ransactionalism 21, 84–90 T ransjordan 4f T unisia A gadir A greement 1, 7f, 141, 143, 212 Civil society 33 E U, relations with 22, 39, 127f, 130–3, 137–9, 158, 162, 209 Islamism 33 Political system 28, 113f, 139, 141, 158, 211f social indicators 135 socialist policies 113f, 121–3 transition to market economy 121–3, 127f T urkey A lliance of Civilizations, T urkey’s participation 21, 66, 72–5, 78, E U, relations with 19, 21, 43–63, 130, 133, 137f, 144, 158–62, 183–5, 198–203, 216 F rance, Germany, UK, relations with 148f, 158–163 Islamism 13, 20f, 35, 35–63 Kemalism, Kemalists 21, 45, 52, 59 Modernization theory, T urkey inthe light of 23, 122, 199–203, 212 N ational S ecurity Council (NS C) 48f Turcification 3 T USIA D 57 Uganda, 83, 92, 96 Ukraine 137f, 144, 183, 201. Union Maghreb A rabe (UMA ) 132

Index Union Économique et Monétaire O uestA fricaine (UE MOA ) 104 United Kingdom (UK) 3, 17f, 69, 102, 110, 194, 200f, 210, 216 foreign policy towards N orth A frica and Middle E ast, 22, 147f, 151–8, 160–2 United N ations S ecurity Council 155 R esolution 1559 151 V enice Declaration 152 V irtue Party (VP ) 49f Vollsmose 175–9 Voluntary T rust F und 76 Wahhabitism 13

225

Weber, E ugene Joseph 187 Weber, Max 17, 117, 174, 192 Welfare Party (WP) 48, 53 Westernization and T urkey 20, 35–63 White, Brian 66f World T rade O rganization (WTO ) 11 World V alues S urvey 200 Yemen 5f Youngs, R ichard 147–50, 153f, 156, 159, 160, 164, 166 Z ank, Wolfgang 22, 93, 98, 101, Z apatero, José L uis R odríguez 21, 67f, 71, 79 Z éroual, L iamine 125


T he Interna tional Politi cal Ec ono my of N e w R e gionalis ms S eries Full series list

Cruising in the Global E conomy Profits, Pleasure and Work at Sea Christine B.N. Chin

T he L imits of R egionalism NAFTA ’s L abour A ccord Robert G. Finbow

Beyond R egionalism? R egional Cooperation, R egionalism and R egionalization in the Middle E ast Edited by Cilja Harders and Matteo Legrenzi

L atin A merica’s Quest for Globalization T he R ole of S panish F irms Edited by Félix E. Martín and Pablo Toral

T he E U–R ussian E nergy Dialogue E urope’s F uture E nergy S ecurity Edited by Pami Aalto

E xchange R ate Crises in Developing Countries T he Political R ole of the Banking S ector Michael G. Hall

R egionalism, Globalisation and International O rder E urope and S outheast A sia Jens-Uwe Wunderlich

Globalization and A ntiglobalization Dynamics of Change in the N ew World O rder Edited by Henry Veltmeyer

E U Development Policy and Poverty R eduction E nhancing E ffectiveness Edited by Wil Hout

T wisting A rms and F lexing Muscles H umanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective Edited by Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Timothy M. Shaw

A n E ast A sian Model for L atin A merican S uccess T he N ew Path Anil Hira E uropean Union and N ew R egionalism R egional A ctors and Global Governance in a Post-H egemonic E ra. S econd E dition Edited by Mario Telò R egional Integration and Poverty Edited by Dirk Willem te Velde and the Overseas Development Institute Redefining the Pacific? R egionalism Past, Present and F uture Edited by Jenny Bryant-Tokalau and Ian Frazer

Asia Pacific and Human Rights A Global Political E conomy Perspective Paul Close and David Askew Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in S outhern A frica Volume III – T he R ole of the Military in S tate F ormation and N ation-Building Edited by Peter Batchelor, Kees Kingma and Guy Lamb Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in S outhern A frica Volume II – N ational and R egional E xperiences Edited by Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma

Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in S outhern A frica Volume I – Concepts and Processes Edited by Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma R eforging the Weakest L ink Global Political E conomy and Post-S oviet Change in R ussia, Ukraine and Belarus Edited by Neil Robinson Persistent Permeability? R egionalism, L ocalism, and Globalization in the Middle E ast Edited by Bassel F. Salloukh and Rex Brynen T he N ew Political E conomy of United S tates-Caribbean R elations T he A pparel Industry and the Politics of NAFTA Parity Tony Heron T he Political E conomy of Interregional R elations ASEAN and the E U Alfredo C. Robles, Jr. T he N ordic R egions and the E uropean Union Edited by Søren Dosenrode and Henrik Halkier Multi-L ayered Governance in the Global A ge Edited by Thomas L. Ilgen T he N ew R egionalism in A frica Edited by J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum Comparative R egional Integration T heoretical Perspectives Edited by Finn Laursen T he Political E conomy of a Common Currency T he CFA F ranc Z one S ince 1945 David Stasavage E uro-Mediterranean S ecurity A S earch for Partnership Sven Biscop

N ew and Critical S ecurity and R egionalism Beyond the N ation S tate Edited by James J. Hentz and Morten Bøås Japan and S outh A frica in a Globalising World A Distant Mirror Edited by Chris Alden and Katsumi Hirano Development and S ecurity in S outheast A sia Volume III : Globalization Edited by David B. Dewitt and Carolina G. Hernandez Development and S ecurity in S outheast A sia Volume II : T he People Edited by David B. Dewitt and Carolina G. Hernandez Development and S ecurity in S outheast A sia Volume I: T he E nvironment Edited by David B. Dewitt and Carolina G. Hernandez Global T urbulence S ocial A ctivists’ and S tate R esponses to Globalization Edited by Marjorie Griffin Cohen and Stephen McBride T hailand, Indonesia and Burma in Comparative Perspective Priyambudi Sulistiyanto Political A spects of the E conomic and Monetary Union T he E uropean Challenge Edited by Søren Dosenrode R econstituting S overeignty Post-Dayton Bosnia Uncovered Rory Keane Crises of Governance in A sia and A frica Edited by Sandra J. MacLean, Fahimul Quadir and Timothy M. Shaw

Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations? (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series)

Beyond Regionalism? (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms)

The Role of the European Union in Asia (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms)

The Clash of Civilizations (1996)

Globalization and the 'New' Semi-Peripheries (International Political Economy Series)

The New Political Economy of Russia

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Business And Religion: A Clash of Civilizations?

The Political Economy of New Slavery (Palgrave Texts in International Political Economy)

Constituting International Political Economy

The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Health for Some: The Political Economy of Global Health Governance (International Political Economy Series)

Inter-American Cooperation at a Crossroads (International Political Economy)

The Crisis of International Cooperation

New Political Economy

The Political Economy of Work (Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy)

Routledge Encylopedia of International Political Economy

The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?

Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy

Routledge Encylopedia of International Political Economy

The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa (International Political Economy)

For a New Critique of Political Economy

China and the Global Political Economy (International Political Economy)

The International Political Economy of Transformation in Argentina, Brazil, and Chil (International Political Economy)

New Dialectics and Political Economy (Political Science & International Relations)

Authority in the Global Political Economy (International Political Economy)

Models of Political Economy

Encyclopedia of political economy,

Discipline in the Global Economy?: International Finance and the End of Liberalism (New Political Economy)

Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations? (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series)

Beyond Regionalism? (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms)

The Role of the European Union in Asia (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms)

The Clash of Civilizations (1996)

Globalization and the 'New' Semi-Peripheries (International Political Economy Series)

The New Political Economy of Russia

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Business And Religion: A Clash of Civilizations?

The Political Economy of New Slavery (Palgrave Texts in International Political Economy)

Constituting International Political Economy

The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Health for Some: The Political Economy of Global Health Governance (International Political Economy Series)

Inter-American Cooperation at a Crossroads (International Political Economy)

The Crisis of International Cooperation

New Political Economy

The Political Economy of Work (Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy)

Routledge Encylopedia of International Political Economy

The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?

Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy

Routledge Encylopedia of International Political Economy

The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa (International Political Economy)

For a New Critique of Political Economy

China and the Global Political Economy (International Political Economy)

The International Political Economy of Transformation in Argentina, Brazil, and Chil (International Political Economy)

New Dialectics and Political Economy (Political Science & International Relations)

Authority in the Global Political Economy (International Political Economy)

Models of Political Economy

Encyclopedia of political economy,

Discipline in the Global Economy?: International Finance and the End of Liberalism (New Political Economy)

Recommend Documents