Civilization Past & Present, Volume C (from 1775 to the Present) (11th Edition) (MyHistoryLab Series)

CIVILIZATION PAST

&

P R E S E N T

E L E V E N T H

V O L U M E

C

FROM

1775

E D I T I O N

TO

T H E

P R E S E N T

Civilization Past & Present E l e v e n t h

E d i t i o n

Palmira Brummett U N I V E R S I T Y OF T E N N E S S E E

Robert R. Edgar HOWARD

UNIVERSITY

Neil J. Hackett ST. L O U I S U N I V E R S I T Y

George

Ft

Jewsbury

C E N T R E D ' É T U D E S DU M O N D E R U S S E É C O L E DES H A U T E S É T U D E S EN SCIENCES

SOCIALES

Barbara Moîony SANTA CLARA U N I V E R S I T Y

T H I S B O O K HAS B E N E F I T E D F R O M T H E C O N T R I B U T I O N S O V E R MANY E D I T I O N S O F T H E F O L L O W I N G A U T H O R S :

T. Walter WaUbank (Late) Alastair M. Taylor Neis M. Bailkey Clyde J. Lewis

New York Boston San Francisco London Toronto Sydney Tokyo Singapore Madrid Mexico City Munich Paris Cape Town Hong Kong Montreal

Executive Editor: Michael Boezi Senior Acquisitions Editor: Janet Lanphier Senior Development Editor: Dawn Groundwater Development Editor: Adam Beroud Executive Marketing Manager: Sue Westmoreland Media and Supplements Editor: Kristi Olson Senior Media Editor: Patrick McCarthy Production Manager: Eric Jorgensen Project Coordination, Text Design, and Electronic Page Makeup: Electronic Publishing Services Inc., NYC Photo Research: Photosearch, Inc. Cover Designer/Manager: Nancy Danahy Cover Image: Portrait of Rani Jindan Singh by George Richmond © Christies's Images/CORBIS. Manufacturing Buyer: Roy Pickering Printer and Binder: Courier Corporation Cover Printer: Coral Graphic Services For permission to use copyrighted material, grateful acknowledgment is made to the copyright holders on pp. C-l-C-3, which are hereby made part of this copyright page.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Civilization past & present / Palmira Brummett... [et al.].— 11th ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-321-23613-0 — ISBN 0-321-23627-0 — ISBN 0-321-23628-9 1. Civilization. I . Brummett, Palmira Johnson CB69.C57 2005 909—dc22

2004029985

t

Copyright © 2006 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanicalf photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Printed in the United States of America. Visit us at http://www.ablongman.com. ISBN 0-321-23613-0 ISBN 0-321-23627-0 ISBN 0-321-23628-9 ISBN 0-321-31775-0 ISBN0-321-31776-9 ISBN 0-321-31777-7

(complete volume) (Volume I) (Volume II) (Volume A) (Volume B) (Volume C)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10—CRK—07 06 05 04

x

Detailed Contents Haiti: The First Successful Slave Revolution The Latin American Revolutions 635

633

DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

C H A P T E R 24 Asia, 1815-1914 India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan

706

The Island of California 625 India 708 Southeast Asia 712 China: The Long Nineteenth Century 715 Japan: Modernity and Imperialism 721

DOCUMENT

Letter from Abigail Adams

633

DOCUMENT

Simón Bolívar, Proclamation to the People of Venezuela 638

DOCUMENT

The Great Revolt of 1857-1858

711

DOCUMENT

C H A P T E R 22

Lin Zexu on the Opium Trade 718

Industrialization DOCUMENT

Social, Political, and Cultural Transformations 642

"The Beefeater"

The Industrial Revolution: British Phase 644 The Industrial Revolution: Continental Phase 645 Industrialization and the Workers 649 The Middle Classes 654 Science, Technology, and the Second Industrial Revolution

659

Cultural Responses to the Age

662

DOCUMENT

Industrialization and Children 651

C H A P T E R 25 L a t i n America Independence and 1825-1945 726

Dependence,

Challenges to Latin American States After Independence 728 Twentieth-Century Latin America 737 The Colossus to the North: The United States and Latin America 742 DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT

Mrs. Beeton's Book of Household Management (1861) 656

Civilization and Barbarism 733 DOCUMENT

Newspaper Advertisements for Runaway Slaves in Brazil 735

C H A P T E R 23 Africa and the M i d d l e East D u r i n g the Age of European I m p e r i a l i s m

722

DOCUMENT

672

European Conquest of Africa 674 European Technology and the African Response to Conquest 678 The Mineral Revolution i n South Africa and the Anglo-Boer War 681 Colonial Rule i n Africa 682 The Ottoman Empire Refashioned 690 Persia and the Great Power Struggle 701 DOCUMENT

That Was No Brother 676 DOCUMENT

A Middle Eastern Vision of the West 697 DOCUMENT

Halide Edib: Education, Generation, and Class in the Late Ottoman Empire 699

José Marti's Observations on the United States and Cuba 744

GLOBAL ISSUES

G E N D E R

748

C H A P T E R 26 Politics and Diplomacy i n the West, 1815-1914 750 The Vienna Settlement and the Reassembling of Europe 752 1848: The Revolutionary Year 756 Prussia, German Unification, and the Second Reich 759 The Decline of Austria 764 France: The Second Empire and the Third Republic 765 Italy to 1914 768

Detailed Contents The United Kingdom 769 The United States 774 Russia i n Reform and Revolution 781 The "Eastern Question" and the Failure of European Diplomacy to 1914 787

xi

C H A P T E R 29 Forging N e w Nations i n Asia, 1910-1950 864 China: Revolution and Republic 866 Korea: From Monarchy to Colony 872 Nationalism i n Southeast Asia 874 India: The Drive for Independence 878

DOCUMENT

Bismarck and the Ems Dispatch 762 DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

DOCUMENT

An American View of the World in the 1820s

776

Lu Xun and China's May Fourth Generation 868 DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

DOCUMENT

"With Malice Toward None": Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address 779

What's in a Name? Siam or Thailand? 877 DOCUMENT

Gandhi and "Truth-Force" 880 CHAPTER 27 C H A P T E R 30

W o r l d War I and Its E c o n o m i c and Political Consequences 796 World War I 798 The Allied Peace Settlement 808 Economic Disasters 814 Politics i n the Democracies 818 The Western Tradition i n Transition: Changing Certainties 825

E m e r g i n g N a t i o n a l Movements i n the M i d d l e East and Africa f r o m the 1920s to 1950s 884 The Middle East Divided 886 The Challenge to Colonial Rule i n Africa Pan-Africanism 898 World War I I and Its Aftermath

901

DOCUMENT

Memorandum of the General Syrian Congress

DOCUMENT

Diary of Private Tom Easton 804

895

889

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT

John Maynard Keynes on Clemenceau 809

We Have Not Come as Conquerors, But as Liberators 893 DOCUMENT

The Awakening of a Pan-African Spirit 900 CHAPTER 28

DOCUMENT

The USSR, Italy, Germany, and Japan Democratic Failure and Authoritarian Government in the Interwar Period 832

C H A P T E R 31

Revolutions i n Russia, 1917 and 1928-1939 834 Fascism 845 Italy and Mussolini 847 The German Tragedy 851 Japan 858

World War I I Origins and Consequences, 1919-1946 908 The Troubled Calm: The West i n the 1920s 910 The Epoch of the Aggressors 912 World War I I 921 Postwar Settlements 934

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT

Stalin and State Terror 844

Erich Maria Remarque, The Road Back 911

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT

The New German Woman 856

The Hossbach Memorandum 918

DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

Wishful Thinking: A Nazi Tourism Map

Pass Laws and African Women in South Africa 904

DOCUMENT

857

The Nazi Death Camps 932

xii

Detailed Contents

GLOBAL ISSUES

C H A P T E R 34

W A R A N D

The M i d d l e East, Africa, and L a t i n America Since 1945

I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW

938

The Struggle for Survival

The Middle East: Religion and Politics

C H A P T E R 32 The Bipolar W o r l d Cold War and Decolonization,

1945-1991

940

Competing Economic Models 942 The Cold War: 1945-1962 943 Vietnam and Afghanistan 948 Gorbachev and the End o f the Cold War Decolonization

1002 1004

Africa: The Search for National I dentities 1017 Latin America: Reform, Repression, or Revolt 1028 DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

Borders and Identities: The UN Partition Plan 1006

955

956

DOCUMENT

Ayatollah Khomeini, Message to the Pilgrims 1013

DOCUMENT

The Truman Doctrine 945

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT

The Village That Has "Eaten Itself Limb by Limb" 1021

Khrushchev's Address to the Twentieth Party Congress 948 DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

Massive Retaliatory Power, 1954

950

C H A P T E R 35 Asia Since 1945 Political, Economic, 1040

C H A P T E R 33 The United States and Europe Since 1945 Politics in an Age of Conflict and Change Technological and Social Changes The United States 967 Western Europe 974 Eastern Europe 985

962

964

The Soviet Union and the Russian Republic 993 Interdependence i n a Changing World

DOCUMENT

997

Mao on Communism in China 1045 DOCUMENT

Nehru and the Two Sides of Kashmir 1065

Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 967 DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT

Benazir Bhutto at Harvard 1069

Martin Luther King Jr., "Beyond Vietnam, A Time to Break Silence" 969 DOCUMENT

DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS

The Euro Comes to Greece 986

Revolutions

The Peoples Republic of China and Other Chinese Countries 1042 Japan: From Defeat to Dominance to Doubt 1050 Korea: A Nation Divided 1055 Southeast Asia 1058 The Subcontinent 1063

DOCUMENT

Jean Monnet on European Unity 976

and Social

Credits Notes Index

C-l N-l 1-1

xiv

Chapter Opening Image Descriptions

World War I I i n Europe, 1939-1945 World War I I i n the Pacific, 1939-1945 Cold War Alliances The Vietnam War Successor Republics of the Soviet Union Europe i n 2004 The Former Yugoslavia After 1991

922 933 952 953 956 977 991

The Middle East, 2004 Palestine Africa, 2004 HIV Prevalence i n Africa Latin America, 2004 Civil War i n China, c. 1947 Asia, 2004

1004 1006 1018 1020 1030 1043 1059

War and International Law

938

Global Issues Slavery Gender

584 748

Discovery Through Maps The Heliocentric Cosmos of Copernicus The Myth of the Empty Land The Island of California An American View of the World i n the 1820s Wishful Thinking: A Nazi Tourism Map

529 577 625 776 857

What's i n a Name? Siam or Thailand? Massive Retaliatory Power, 1954 The Euro Comes to Greece Borders and Identities: The UN Partition Plan

877 950 986 1006

Chapter Opening Image Descriptions CHAPTER 18 The fury and force of the French Revolution came from people such as these Parisian women advancing on Versailles, October 5, 1789. They were about to bring the K i n g , the Queen, and the entire National Constituent Assembly back to Paris, and the reality of the Revolution.

CHAPTER 19

This street scene by Masanobu shows theaters, teahouses, restaurants, shops, and a female street vendor selling fish.

CHAPTER 21 A man of political and military genius, Toussaint Louverture led the Haitian people i n their successful struggle for independence.

CHAPTER 22

Europeans usually bought slaves for the trans-Atlantic slave trade at specific locations along the west and central African coast. I n Merchant Slaves of Goree, the French artists Grasset de St. Sauveur and Christian Labrousse depicted European and African slave traders negotiating the sale of slaves at Goree, an island off the coast of Senegal.

Here i n the Soho Engineering Works, Birmingham, England, visitors have come to observe how the steam engines invented by James Watt are made. Note the absence of m o d e r n safety equipment and standards.

CHAPTER 20

CHAPTER 23

Large Perspective View of the Theater District in Sakai-cho and Fukiya-cho by Okumura Masanobu (1686-1764). Japan's cities were bustling centers for the arts, culture, and mercantile activities d u r i n g the Tokugawa period. Artists captured the excitement of urban life i n prints depicting what they called the "floating world."

Menelik I I , the emperor of Ethiopia, stands i n the middle of his Generals. Crowned emperor i n 1889, Menelik carried out campaigns of conquest while maintaining his kingdoms autonomy i n the face of European imperialism. Ethiopia became a symbol of African independence i n the black world.

Chapter Opening Image Descriptions

xv

CHAPTER 24

CHAPTER 29

The arrival of Western gunboats and merchants i n Asia in the nineteenth century usually initiated a period of economic and military domination. For the Japanese, the arrival of Commdore Perry i n 1853 served as the beginning of a revolutionary change that made them competitors with the West by the end of the century.

I n 1937, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist forces united to fight against the Japanese forces occupying China. The alliance held u n t i l the defeat of Japan, when the Communists and Nationalists resumed their struggle for control of China. The Communists would ultimately prevail by 1949. Here men from the 73rd Red Division of the 15th Army Corps offer a communist salute.

CHAPTER 25 Diego Rivera, detail from Dream of a Sunday Afternoon in the Alameda. Rivera painted his 50 feet long x 15 feet high mural inside the Hotel del Prado, w h i c h is close to the Alameda Central Park i n downtown Mexico City. The full mural depicts events from Mexican history from the time of the Aztecs up through the Mexican Revolution. The center panel shows the artist as a boy walking through the Alameda w i t h his symbolic parents, the artist José Guadalupe Posada (the man i n black on the far right) and one of Posada's most famous creations, "La Calavera Catrina" (the skeleton dressed as a woman). Behind the youthful Rivera stands Frida Kahlo, the artist's future wife.

CHAPTER 26 For the Germans, the proclamation of the Second Reich by William I at Versailles i n the Hall of Mirrors, 1871, was a way to pay back the French for two centuries of invasions. For the French, it was an insult that would be repaid i n the same place 48 years later i n the dictated Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I .

CHAPTER 27 British machine gun unit at the Somme, 1916. The Battle of the Somme was one of the bloodiest engagements of World War I . I n an effort to relieve pressure on the French army under siege at Verdun, the British attacked the fortified German lines at Somme. After four months of fighting which included the use of poison gas, aerial bombardment, and the first ever deployment of tanks, the British had only managed to advance eight-miles. The cost i n human lives: 420,000 British, 195,000 French, and 650,000 Germans. A l l this is a war that would not protect liberal values i n Europe, but instead serve to initiate another, even deadlier war a generation later.

CHAPTER 30 Veiled Egyptian women demonstrate i n the streets of Cairo for voting rights for women i n 1922.

CHAPTER 31 I n 1937, at the height of the Spanish Civil War, a woman marches toward the southern front i n Madrid to j o i n w i t h the Republican army fighting against General Francos nationalist forces. Supported by arms and advisors from Nazi Germany, the nationalists would prevail i n a bloody conflict that would serve as a prelude to World War I I .

CHAPTER 32 President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev meet at the Vienna Summit, June 3, 1961. A series of conflicts between Washington and Moscow i n the early 1960s, including the erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis, brought the two superpowers close to nuclear war.

CHAPTER 33 On March 11, 2004, Islamic militants i n a loose affiliation w i t h al Qaeda and opposed to the United States' occupation of Iraq, which was then supported by Spain, bombed trains i n multiple locations throughout Madrid. The bombings killed more than 190 commuters.

CHAPTER 34 Long lines of people wait to vote i n Soweto, as South Africa holds its first election open to all its citizens, i n 1994.

CHAPTER 28

CHAPTER 35

Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler watch a Nazi parade during the Italian dictator's visit to Germany i n 1937. Mussolini and his Italian compatriots invented fascism, but it was Hitler and the Nazis who would realize the totalitarian ideology's most murderous potential by initiating World War I I and the Holocaust.

I n the late 1980s, many Japanese women were inspired by the growth i n political representation by women i n local and national government. Here, women supporting feminist candidates march through Tokyo w i t h a large banner exclaiming: "Through the power of women, we w i l l change politics!"

To the Instructor The eleventh edition of Civilization Past & Present continues to present a survey of w o r l d history, treating the development and growth of civilization as a global phenomenon i n which all the worlds culture systems have interacted. This new edition, like its predecessors, includes all the elements of history—social, economic, political, military, religious, aesthetic, legal, and technological—to illustrate that global interaction. One of the most significant changes i n the eleventh edition is the addition of o u r new Asian scholar and co-author, Barbara Molony. Barbara is a professor of history at Santa Clara University and is director of Santa Clara's Program for the Study of Women and Gender. Well-versed i n m o d e m Asia, she significantly revised the book's Asian chapters. With the accelerating tempo of developments i n business, communication, and technology, every day each part o i the world is brought into closer contact w i t h other parts: economic and political events that happen i n even the most remote corners of the w o r l d ; affect each of us individually. A n appreciation for and an understanding of all the civilizations of the w o r l d must be an essential a i m of education. Thus; the eleventh edition of Civilization Past & Present emphasizes w o r l d trends and carefully avoids placing these trends w i t h i n a Western conceptual basis?fp|jlg

CHANGES TO ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT The eleventh edition maintains the many strengths that have ma.de.Civilization Past & Present a highly respected textbook. As the authors revised the text, they relied on the latest historical scholarship and profited from suggestions from adopters of the text and reviewers. Maintained throughout this compelling survey are a fluid writing style and consistent level of presentation seldom found i n multi-authored texts. While the text retains the basic organization of its predecessors, all chapters have been reviewed and revised i n light of the globalization of today's changing world. The authors have carefully evaluated, revised, combined, and rewritten chapters to provide balanced coverage of all parts of the world throughout history. One of the major changes i n the eleventh edition is a new chapter, "Latin America: Independence and Dependence, 1825-1945" (Chapter 25). This new chap-

ter provides detailed coverage of Latin America, including the political, social, and economic challenges following independence and into the twentieth century and relations between the L a t i n American nations and the United States. : " Other chapter changes are as follows: • -Chapter 1: "Stone Age Societies and the Earliest ~ Civilizations of the Near East" provides coverage ' of human prehistory, Egyptian civilization, and the development of smaller Near Eastern states. • Chapter 2: "Ancient Chinas-Origins to Empire: ; . From Prehistory to 220 c.E." and Chapter 3: "Ancient India: From Origins to 300 c.E." both include expanded coverage of gender and social history. • Chapter 6: "Byzantium and the Orthodox World: Byzantium, Eastern Europe, and Russia, 325-1500" has been revised to stress the independent development of East Rome and includes enhanced information on the development of the Balkan States. • Chapter 9: "The European Middle Ages: 476-1348 c.E." combines the tenth edition's Chapter 9 and Chapter 10, examining the political, religious, and ' social history of the entire European Middle Ages in one chapter rather than two. • Chapter 10: "Culture, Power, and Trade i n the Era of Asian Hegemony, 220-1350" and Chapter 13: "East Asian Cultural and Political Systems, 1300-1650" have been thoroughly, revised and expanded, w i t h particular attention to gender and social history • • Chapter 14: "European Cultural and Religious Transformations: The Renaissance and the Reformation 1300-1600" combines the tenth edition's Chapter 15 and Chapter 16, exploring the political, . religious, and social connections between the : European Renaissance and Reformation i n one chapter rather than two. • Chapter 15: "The Development o f the European ji State System: 1300-1650" is a new chapter that examines the growth of the European nationstates from the late Middle Ages through the religious wars of the seventeenth century. • Chapter 17: "Politics i n the First Age of Capital¬ ism: 1648-1774: Absolutism and Limited Central Power" places more emphasis on the social crises of the first phase of capitalism. • Reorganized Chapter 18: "New Ideas and Their Political Consequences: The Scientific Revolution, :

XVI

m

m

To the I n s t r u c t o r the Enlightenment and the French Revolutions" combines the tenth editions Chapter 19 and w i t h content from Chapter 22, as the authors believethat intellectual transformations represented by the Enlightenment are directly connected to the political upheavals of French Revolutions and so should be discussed as such i n one chapter. A recast Chapter 19: "Africa, 1650-1850" provides detailed coverage of Africa, including the Atlantic Slave Trade, Islamic Africa, the settlement of South Africa by Africans and Europeans, and state formation i n the east and northeast of the continent. A recast Chapter 20: "Asian and Middle Eastern Empires and Nations, 1650-1815" examines political, social, and cultural developments across Asia, including the Ottoman Empire, Persia, India, China, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Chapter 21: "The Americas, 1650-1825: F r o m European Dominance to Independence" offers expanded treatment of the Haitian Revolution. Reorganized Chapter 22: "Industrialization: Social, Political, and Cultural Transformations," focuses exclusively on the social, ideological, religious, and cultural effects of the Industrial Revolutions i n Great Britain, Continental Europe, and the United States.* Chapter 23: "Africa and the Middle East During the Age of European Imperialism" provides expanded coverage of Islam and Christianity i n Africa during the colonial era. Chapter 24: "Asia, 1815-1914: India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan" provides expanded coverage of Asian civilizations, w i t h particular emphasis on gender and social history. Chapter 26: "Politics and Diplomacy i n the West: 1815-1914" combines the tenth editions Chapter 23 and Chapter 27, examining the political changes i n Europe between the Congress of Vienna and World War I i n one chapter rather than two. Expanded Chapter 28: "The USSR, Italy, Germany, and Japan: The Failure of Democracy i n the Interwar Period" adds coverage of Japan. A recast Chapter 29: "Forging New Nations i n Asia, 1910 to 1950" examines political and social transformations i n China, Korea, Southeast Asia, and India. A recast Chapter 30: "Emerging National Movements i n the Middle East and Africa, 1920s to 1950s" explores the rising tide of nationalism i n Africa and the Middle East following World War I through the start of the Cold War. Expanded Chapter 31: "World War I I : Origins and Consequences, 1919-1946" adds coverage of

xvii

the postwar settlements that followed the defeat of the Axis powers i n 1945. • Reorganized Chapter 32: "The Bipolar World: Cold War and Decolonization 1945-1991" prefaces its examination of the Cold War by examining the competing economic systems of the United States and the USSR. I t also provides a more detailed treatment of decolonization and its relationship to the Cold War. • Reorganized Chapter 33: "The United States and Europe Since 1945: Politics i n an Age of Conflict and Change" n o w stresses the relationship between technology and social change i n the United States and Europe and also provides expanded coverage of the Soviet U n i o n and the Russian Republic. • Reorganized Chapter 35: "Asia Since 1945: Political, Economic, and Social Revolutions" integrates coverage of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. The eleventh edition of Civilization Past & Present is a thorough revision i n both its narrative and its pedagogical features. I t is intended to provide the reader w i t h an understanding of the legacies of past eras and to illuminate the way i n w h i c h the study of w o r l d history gives insight into the genesis, nature, and direct i o n of global civilization. Given the growing interdependence of the world's nations, the need for this perspective has never been greater.

NEW SPLIT The split for the two-volume edition has changed for the eleventh edition: Volume I , To 1650, contains Chapters 1-16; Volume I I , F r o m 1300, contains Chapters 12-35. The start of Volume I I at 1300 accommodates those courses that cover materials beginning earlier than 1650. The eleventh edition also includes a threevolume split edition for schools operating on the quarter system: Volume A, To 1500, contains Chapters 1-11; Volume B, F r o m 500-1815, contains Chapters 9-20; and Volume C, F r o m 1775, contains Chapters 18-35.

FEATURES AND PEDAGOGY The text has been developed w i t h the dual purpose of helping students acquire a solid knowledge of past events and, equally important, of helping them think more constructively about the significance of those events for the complex times i n w h i c h we now live. A number of pedagogical features—some well tested i n earlier editions and lightly revised here, and a few new ones—will assist students i n achieving these goals.

25

CHAPTER

Latin America Independence and Dependence, 1825-1945

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

Challenges to Latin American

Twentieth-Century Latin America

States After Independence

The Colossus to the North:

DOCUMENT: Civilization and

The United States and

Barbarism

Latin America

DOCUMENT: Newspaper

DOCUMENT: José Marti's

Advertisements for Runaway Slaves

Observations on the United States

in Brazil

and Cuba

1840 1840 Pedro II crowned emperor of Brazil 1B36-1S4B Mexican-American War

A

1879-1880 Conquest of !be Desert. Argentina

rule. Brazil retained a monarchy but with constitutional restraints.

1879-1883 Chile defeats Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific

fter 1 8 2 5 the former Spanish and Portuguese holdings in Latin America were divided among nine new political units. Republics were established in the former Spanish colonies of Mexico, Guatemala, Gran Colombia, Peru, Bolivia,

Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile, while Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish The challenges for these newly independent states involved creating new gov-

ernments, preserving stability and order, and promoting economic growth. The legacies of colonial rule, however, were hard to shake off. Independence brought few

i860 1B67 French expelled from Mexico

1880 1888 Brazil ends slavery 1898 Spanish-American War

changes in who controlled the economy or in the stark inequalities between rulers and ruled. Latin American economies continued to be dominated by people of European descent who controlled large landholdings and exploited the labor of Indian peasants and African slaves. The technological advances of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the United States were slow to be applied to Latin American economies. Economies remained centered on the export of agricultural products

1900 1911 Beginning of Mexican Revolution 1912 Electoral Reform law passed in Argentina 1914 Opening of Panama Canal

such as sugar, coffee, hides, and mineral resources such as silver and gold in

1920

exchange for manufactured goods.

1929 Women granted vole in Ecuador

The region did manage to avoid the imperialistic partitions and outright annexations by European powers that later plagued Africa, China, and Southeast Asia. This did not mean that Latin American states were in a stronger position economically. Powers such as Britain and the United States replaced Spain and Portugal and took control of external trade. They were also the primary sources of external loans and investment in key sectors of the economy.

1934 Lazaro Cardenas becomes president oI Mexico 1937 Anastoslo Somoza seizes control of Nicaragua 1938 Army under Gen. Vargas stages coup in Brazil

728

C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T

Creole—A person of Spanish descent bom in Latin America, peninsulares—Spanish-bom colonists in Latin America, caudillo—A military or political strongman who based his rule on personal authority and patronage.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the conservatives had more influence over the shaping of political systems. The colonial political culture of autocracy and patronage was a poor foundation for developing would-be democratic republics. The emphasis on executive power inspired presidents, generals, landowners, and church officials to wield authority w i t h arrogant disregard for public opinion and representative government. The colonial economic system, based on raw materials rather than industry, encouraged concentration of land and other forms of wealth i n a few hands. The church, w i t h its vast properties, monopoly on education and welfare agencies, and command over cultural life, complicated the politics of every new nation. I n addition, the new stales were afflicted by the aftermath of the wars o f independence. Some of the most productive areas were devastated. Hatreds and divisions remained, and civil wars were a common occurrence. Many men who had fought the royalists remained armed, predisposed to a life of violence and pillage, and likely to group themselves about caudillos. I n many ways the caudillos operated i n the same style as Spanish administrators who preceded them. Another challenge facing the new states was that of ethnic and racial diversity. I n 1825 there were 15 to 18 m i l l i o n people i n the former Spanish Empire. About 3 m i l l i o n of them were of European descent, the wealthiest and most educated population. That figure remained constant u n t i l the last t h i r d of the nineteenth century, when immigration from Europe increased drastically. There were about the same number of mestizos (mes-TEE-zohs), who scorned the native population but were not accepted by whiles. Their numbers steadily increased, as d i d their ambition. During the nineteenth century, at least half of the population i n some states was Indian. Deprived of the small protection once offered by the Spanish crown, they either sank into peonage or lived i n semiindependence under their tribal rulers. And i n Brazil and most of the Caribbean islands, blacks were a large majority. Conflicts of interest quickly developed between these broad racial groups, particularly between the Creoles and the mestizos. The pernicious effects o f these divisive factors were played out i n each nation. The social and legal status of women remained unchanged after independence, despite their participation i n independence struggles as nurses, spies, couriers, hosts of political meetings i n their homes, donors of financial support, and even fighters. The new civil codes that were introduced were based on Spanish legal tradition that reinforced patriarchal authority i n homes and i n public settings. Married

enlightened despotism—A political system in which a monarch, an autocratic ruler, ora privileged elite governs with the aim of improving (he lives of their subjects.

mestizo—A person of mixed Indian and Spanish descent.

CHALLENGES TO LATIN AMERICAN STATES AFTER INDEPENDENCE • Why did the caudillos hold so much power in Latin American nations throughout the nineteenth century? For most o f the new L a t i n American nations the decades after winning independence were a time of challenge and disappointment. The Creoles {KREEols) who had dominated the independence movements were inexperienced and unable to make the political compromises necessary to govern new countries. They quarreled among Latin Americans ^ peninsulares (Spanisht

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s

e

l

v

e

s

a

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h

e

Obtam , , , , independence born colonists). I n many cases the Creoles soon

lost power to military leaders, or caudillos (kahDEE-yohs), whose armed gangs struggled for power in a confusing and chaotic series of upheavals. A growing sectionalism accompanied these coups. Large states broke up into tiny republics, which i n turn were threatened by localism. The successors of the great liberators that had led the independence movements could not maintain control of their new nations because there was no consensus as to the type of political system—a centralized or a federal structure—they desired. The Creole elite was divided over the nature of the states they wished to create. The conservatives wanted to preserve the old order and the authoritarian structures that had been i n place under colonial rule. They preferred to keep close relations between the Catholic Church and state and d i d not want to challenge the church's wealth and power. Liberals, borrowing precepts o f the Enlightenment, believed i n individual rights such as freedom o f speech, thought, and religion and the sanctity of property. They argued for independent legislatures and judiciaries that w o u l d make governments more accountable to the people. They called for separating church and state and taking control of education from the church. They supported free trade and allowing market forces rather than the state lo govern the economy. However, when liberals were faced w i t h a choice between implementing their ideals and dealing w i t h the harsh realities on the ground, they were unprepared to give up their privileges and often supported state systems that resembled enlightened despotism.

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Women had Tew legal rights and were subordinate to their husbands.

Economic Developments After independence, Latin American elites were confident that once they escaped the grip of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, ihey would develop not only stable political systems but healthy economies. That optimism soon faded as leadership rivalries, regional splits and civil unrest, and ideological and racial divisions frustrated economic development. The elites continued to concentrate wealth in a few hands, and turned to the caudillos to protect their interests. Most Latin American stales suffered economic decline in the initial decades of independence. Independence wars had an adverse impact on production in silver mining in Mexico, Pern, and Bolivia; ranching in Argentina and Uruguay; plantation agriculture in Venezuela; and manufacturing i n Ecuador and Mexico, There was little new investment from w i t h i n Latin America as many peninsulares returned to Spain or moved to Cuba and the church withheld its money. Landowners turned inward, preferring to remain selfsufficient rather than producing crops and goods for domestic or international markets. With little revenue coming in, governments had to borrow heavily from Europe. As a result, they had to devote much of their customs revenue and export duties to paying off external debt rather than building up infrastructure such as roads, bridges, railways, and harbors. With little industrial development taking place, Latin American nations were integrated into Europe's industrial economy but in a subordinate position. They became providers of raw materials such as copper, tin, hides, and agricultural products such as sugar, coffee, and tobacco. Most nations relied heavily on the export of one Or two products and (bus were at the mercy of intei nationa! prices. When the price of a product was high, their economies d i d well, but when the price declined, they suffered. Latin America imported manufactured goods from Europe such as textiles and machinery, but it was slow to introduce new technologies such as the steam engine, which was only introduced in Latin America in the mid-nineteenth century. The mining and textile sectors still heavily depended on outdated technologies. Britain was by far the leading foreign investor in Latin America until World War I . After colonial rule, Britain quickly recognized the newly independent states, negotiated commercial and navigation treaties, and took the place of Spanish and Portuguese businessmen in controlling the export trade. The British economic empire in Latin America was not based on formal control or direct intervention in the internal affairs of countries. Instead, British businessmen con-

Al tilt: tlOfl of the twentieth century, Latin America remained largely free of direct political control by Europe and the United States. Instead. Europe and the United States maintained an economic dominance over the region.

centrated their investments in key sectors of the economy such as railways and mines and exerted their dominance over commerce to influence the decisionmaking of local politicians.

Mexico Mexico suffered a half-century of turmoil after attaining independence in 1821. Agustin Iturbide's empire lasted less than a year, to be replaced by a federal republic. I n 1833 stale legislatures elected as president General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna (1795-1876), who eventually served in the office on 11 different occasions. He was a controversial figure. To his supporters he was the "Defender of the Homeland"; to his detractors he was the "Traitor of the Nation." Under his rule he attempted to establish a professional army drafted from Mexico's citizens to put down rebellions by regional caudillos. He also led Mexico into t w o disastrous wars to the n o r t h . I n 1836 a group of proslavery Anglo-American settlers had proclaimed independence Tor Texas. Santa Anna's army defeated them at the Alamo, killing all the defenders, but lost

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disastrously al San Jacinto shortly (hereafter. Texas was eventually annexed to the United Slates in 1845. Although he was disgraced bv the loss of Texas, Santa Anna made several more comebacks. Yet, some ten years after losing Texas, he was drawn into a war with the United States (1846-1848) which resulted i n another defeat, the loss of much more land, and even greater humiliation for Mexico. Santa Anna followed these losses up by selling southern New Mexico and Arizona to the United States for $15 million. By the time Santa Anna was toppled for the last time in 1855, Mexico had lost almost half its territory to its neigh­ bor to the north. An attempt to establish a more representative gov­ ernment came under the leadership of Benito J u á r e z (1806-1872), a Zapotee Indian who set out to implement a reform program known as the Reforma. Juarez and the liberals planned to establish a more democratic republic, destroy Plan de Avala the political and economic force of the Catholic Church, and include the mestizos and Indi­ ans in political life. A terrible civil war followed their anticlerical measures; it ended in 1861 with Juarez's apparent victory. Later, European powers invaded when Mexico was unable to meet the payments on its debts, and a French puppet regime was installed with an Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian as emperor. J u á r e z Refurma The name for Benito Juarez's relorm program that advo­ cated rcslricling the powers of the Catholic Church, establishing ılırım, r.ıiu insl itutions and giving more political powei to mestizos.

mobilized resistance against the French and, aided in 1867 by pressure from the United States, his forces drove French troops from Mexican soil. J u á r e z again set out to institute the Reforma, and Served in office until his death in 1872. A coup in 1876 brought a mestizo, Porfirio Díaz (DEE-ahs; 1830-1915), to power. Diaz, who Served as president from 1877 to 1880 and again From 1884 to 1911, stabilized Mexico under his firm rule. An adept political manager, he was a master of patron-client relations and balancing the interests of regional caudillos w i t h the Mexico City elite that filled his administration. His primary strategy was to maintain order while building a strong economy. He reorga­ nized the army and slashed the numbers of soldiers; he relied more on an upgraded police force to keep order and rid the countryside of bandits. Dia/.'s efforts succeeded in attracting large amounts of foreign investment, especially from the United States. American firms took control of the production of minerals such as gold, silver, lead, copper, and zinc. About one-third of foreign investment flowed to rail­ way construction, which boomed during this period and had profound consequences for Mexico's political and economic life. The new railways stimulated har­ bor expansions and the creation of new towns and regional identities. It also spurred the commercializa­ tion of land near railway lines as large hacienda own­ ers expanded their land holdings at ihe expense of small landowners. Diaz relied on the científicos or technocrats for advice on managing the political and economic sys-

MexiCO anil the Untied Stales, 1846-1853. By the mid-nineteenth century, Mexico had hist almost one-half of its territory to the expanding United States either by war or sale.

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pendent nation were less promising. Spanish colonizers had largely neglected the area because of its lack of minerals. However, Argentina was blessed w i t h the bustling port city of Buenos Aires, whose energetic population sought to encourage European capital and commerce, and the pampas (PAM-puhs), plains that stretched Tor several hundred miles from Buenos Aires into the interior. The pampas, which contained rich agricultural land that was ideal for cattle ranching, were divided into large estancias. The large ranch owners relied on the support of their clients, the gauchos (GOW-chohs)—the independeniminded cowboys and bandits whose way of Hie has been romanticized in literature and folklore. The gauchos were largely mestizos w h o were tied to their horse culture. Argentina's politics were centered around the conflict between landowners who favored a federal system that preserved their powers and the supporters of centralized government (known as unitarios) who mostly lived in Buenos Aires. However, from 1829 to 1852, Argentine politics were not controlled by either faction but by a caudillo, Juan Manuel de Rosas, a wealthy landowner and rancher who relied on gaucho support. Although a federalist, as governor of Buenos President Poifirio Diaz sought to stabilize and modernize Mexico, Aires province, he had no hesitation about stamping km his tenure as president from 1877-1880 and 1884-1911 was his personal authority on every aspect of political life. He favored the interests of the ranching elite, and he essentially a dictatorship and established the conditions for the Mexican Revolution. paid l i p service to the legislature. He d i d not even bother to issue decrees or laws. He went so far as to require Catholic priests to wear the symbol of his followers, a red ribbon, while they conducted Mass. lem. The cientificos wanted to modernize Mexico based on the American model. They poured money into education, expanding free education to all Mexieslancia—A large estate or cattle ranch in Spanish America. cans and encouraging literacy programs, Diaz's rule, though outwardly conforming to the constitution, was a dictatorship. If there was much encouragement of arts and letters, there was no liberty. The Indians sank lower and lower into peonage these years. I n spite of the anticlerical laws of the Juarez period, the church was quietly permitted to acquire great wealth, and foreign investors exploited Mexico, creating a long-lasting animosity towards foreigners.

Argentina Until the 1970s, Argentina was probably the wealthiest Spanish-speaking country in the world. Its beginnings as an inde-

The gauchos were romanticized in Argentina in much the same way that the cowboys were in the United Stales.

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I n 1852 de Rosas was overthrown by an uneasy alliance of Justo José de Urquiza, a former ally of de Rosas, and the ttnilarios of Buenos Aires. A constitution that was remarkably durable was adopted i n 1853. I t provided for a central administration but with many powers delegated to the provinces. However, it gave power to a president to intervene i n the affairs of provinces or depose provincial governors i f they d i d not uphold the central government. Urquiza headed a confederation of interior provinces, while Buenos Aires went its own way until a war between the two resulted i n a victory for Buenos Aires and the unification of the country i n the 1860s. Although subsequent presidents were limited to one term each, they generally d i d not rule i n a democratic manner. Domingo Sarmiento (sar-MY-EN-toh), who had been impressed w i t h free public American education while serving as Argentina's minister to Washington, D.C., d u r i n g the American Civil War, promoted a dramatic expansion of state-sponsored education during his presidency from 1868 to 1874. I n 1879-1880, General Julio Roca launched the "Conquest of the Desert," which was actually a campaign to expel nomadic Indian tribes i n the southern pampas and neighboring Patagonia. Roca was elected president the same year the war concluded, while the vanquished Indians saw their lands parceled out as a reward to soldiers who had participated i n the campaign or bought up by large landowners at cheap prices. European immigrants who d i d not have the resources to purchase the land were restricted to working as labor tenants on the estancias. The I n d i ans were placed i n reservations similar to those i n the United States. As a consequence Argentina never saw the development of a peasantry or experienced any pressures for land reform from below. In the late nineteenth century Argentina benefited from a booming economy that grew at least 5 percent a year between 1880 and World War I . Railway construction into the interior opened up production i n the pampas, which contain perhaps the most fertile land in the world for growing wheat and lush grazing land for cattle and sheep. I n the first half of the nineteenth century, cattle ranches primarily exported hides and beef jerky, which was mainly sold to feed slave populations i n Brazil and the Caribbean. Argentina's beef industry dramatically took off w i t h the development of steamships and the introduction of refrigerated ships around 1880 that made i t feasible to transport enormous quantities o f fresh beef to Europe. Wool and wheat were two additional exports. Sheep farming did not require large numbers of additional labor(< ' mqiiest of (he Desert—A military campaign in 1879-i880 led by General Julio Roca against Indian tribes that opened up large areas of Patagonia and the southern pampas for settlement by large estate owners.

ers, but wheat farms d i d . They depended on new immigrants for labor because the gauchos, wedded to their horses, refused to take up the plow. The intimate commercial relationship with Britain and other European countries, which lasted until after World War I I , affected nearly every aspect of Argentine life. Foreign money, especially British capital, helped develop a sophisticated infrastructure; port facilities, railroads, light industry, and urban conveniences were among the most advanced i n the world. The expansion of the economy required a major increase i n workers, and that was provided by a huge influx of European i m m i g r a n t s b o t h to the rural areas as labor tenants and wage laborers and to Buenos Aires as workers i n meatpacking plants, i n the service sector as dockworkers, and i n the government civil service. Between 1870 and World War I , 3 m i l l i o n immigrants—almost one-half were Italians and 32 percent were Spanish-speaking—' arrived i n Argentina. They made up almost one-third of Argentina's population. The i m m i g r a t i o n policies were consciously designed to "Europeanize" the country. I n Argentina and other countries such as Brazil, elites shared a c o m m o n belief that Europeans were superior to indigenous people and African slaves and that the immigrants came w i t h the work ethic and entrepreneurial skills so lacking i n local communities. Many of the immigrants settled i n Buenos Aires, w h i c h steadily grew i n size. By 1936, its population was 2.5 million, which made it the third largest city in the Western Hemisphere after New York and Chicago. Despite its location on a monotonous plain beside a muddy estuary, it developed into a beautiful and vibrant city. Although all sorts of architectural styles were found i n buildings, members of its upper class identified w i t h Paris and promoted the construction of wide boulevards. They emulated the European gentry, living grandly i n French-styled palaces and closely following Paris fashion trends. The character of Buenos Aires was also shaped by the massive settlement of new immigrants. They comprised two-thirds of the population of Buenos Aires in 1914. Most of the immigrants were workers and lived either i n slums on the city's outskirts or i n dilapidated tenements around the city. By and large, these workers were single males w i t h few prospects for finding marriageable partners. They frequented the brothels that were found i n every part of the city. Prostitution was legal at this time and operated under the protection of the police and prominent politicians. From the brothels came a sensuous dance, the tango. The lyrics of tango songs reflected the i m m i g r a n t men's rootIessness and loneliness as well as their misogynistic views of "loose" women. The tango gained widespread acceptance i n Argentina after professional dancers

Document

Civilization and Barbarism

A liberal Argentine politician Domingo Sarmiento (1881-1888) fled the regime of Juan Manuel de Rosas in the 1840s. While in exile he wrote Facundo (1845), a biographical account of the life of General Don Facundo Quiroga, a provincial caudillo and rival to de Rosas. Sarmiento contrasted the barbarism of the caudillos, which he attributed to the lack of sound government and their anarchism, with the civilized behavior found in liberal political systems. Characterizing the pampas as the source of Argentine barbarism and the gauchos as the epitome of cultural backwardness, he maintained that European immigration was necessary to modernize and civilize Argentina.

I

n the Argentine Republic, it makes one feel pity and shame to compare the German or Scottish colonies to the south of Buenos Aires w i t h the towns existing i n the interior. I n the first, the little houses are painted, always clean i n front, adorned with flowers and nice little shrubs; the furnishings, simple but complete; the dishes made of copper or t i n , always shining; the bed with nice curtains; and the inhabitants i n constant motion and action. Milking cows, making butter and cheese, some families have been able to amass colossal fortunes, retiring to the city to enjoy its conveniences. The native town is the disgraceful reverse side of the coin; dirty children covered i n rags, living amid packs of dogs; men stretched out on the ground, i n utter inactivity; filth and poverty everywhere; a little table and leather chests, the only furnishings; miserable huts for habitation; notably for their generally barbaric and neglected appearance. This misery, which is now disappearing as a feature of the rural, pastoral areas doubtless motivated the words wrested out of Sir Walter Scott by spite and the humiliation of the English forces: "The vast plains of Buenos Aires," says he, "are populated solely by Christian savages, known by the name of / gauchos"—that is, gauchos—"whose principal furnishings are horses' skulls, whose food is raw meat and water, and whose favorite pastime is racing horses until they burst." Unfortunately, adds the good gringo, "they preferred national independence over our cottons and muslins." I t would be good to make a proposal to England, just to see how many yards of linen and how many pieces of muslin it would give to own the plains of Buenos A i r e s . . . . The man of the city wears European dress, lives a civilized life as we know i t everywhere: i n the city, there are laws, ideas of progress, means of instruction, some municipal organization, a regular government, etc. Leaving the city district, everything changes i n aspect. The man of the country wears other dress, which I will call American, since it is common to all peoples; his way of life is different, his needs, specific and limited. They are like two distinct societies, two people strange to one another. And more still: the man of the country, far from aspiring to resemble the man

of the city, rejects w i t h scorn his luxuries and his polite manners; and the clothing of the city dweller, his tailcoat, his cape, his saddle—no such sign of Europe can appear i n the countryside w i t h impunity. All that is civilized i n the city is blockaded, banished outside of it, and anyone who would dare show up i n a frock coat, for example, and mounted i n an English saddle, would draw upon himself the peasants' jeers and their brutal aggression.... With young manhood [of the gaucho] comes complete independence—and idleness. Here is what I will call the public life of the gaucho begins, for his education is now finished. We must see these men as Spanish only i n language, and i n the confused religious notions they maintain, to be able to appreciate their indomitable, haughty character, born of the struggle of man w i t h savage nature, of rational man w i t h the brute. We must see these heavily bearded faces, these grave, serious countenances like those of Asian Arabs, to judge the pitying disdain inspired i n them by the sight of a sedentary city dweller, who may have read many books but does not know how to pull down a fierce bull and kill it; who would not know how to provide himself with a horse i n the open country, on foot and without help from anyone; who has never stopped a tiger, facing it with a dagger i n one hand and a poncho wrapped around the other to stick i n its mouth, while he runs it through the heart and leaves it lying at his feet. This habit of triumphing over all resistance, of always proving himself superior to nature, challenging and conquering it, develops a prodigious feeling of individual importance and superiority. Questions to Consider 1. What are the qualities that Sarmiento associates with gauchos? 2. Is there a connection between Sarmiento s point of view on European culture and the massive immigration from Europe that took place in the late nineteenth century? 3. Are there any similarities or differences between Sarmientos depiction of the gauchos and those of cowboys in other cultures? From Domingo Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism, trans. Kathleen Ross (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 52-58.

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and amateur bands adopted i t ; it w o n even more respectability as it was popularized i n Europe just before World War I . After the war p r o s t i t u t i o n was banned i n Argentina, and the tango moved from brothels to cabarets. The content of the lyrics shifted to express the confusion men felt at the growing assertiveness and independence of women. One tango song expressed this sentiment: Before women were feminine, now fashion has thrown all that out. Before only the face and foot showed, but now they show all there is to be seen. Today all the women seem to be men, they smoke, drink whisky, and wear pants.

1

W i t h the spread of radios i n the 1930s, tango songs also developed a mass following among women.

Brazil The former Portuguese colony of Brazil maintained its u n i t y and escaped the turbulence and disorders _ . that befell its Spanish-speaking neighbors, p=£=3| probably because it had achieved independence w i t h o u t years o f warfare and military dominance and because i t enjoyed the contiMil leñarían ism nuity and legitimacy afforded by a respected in Brazil monarchy. The first emperor of an independent Brazil, Pedro I (r. 1822-183!), promulgated a constitution i n 1824 that emphasized his own powers and also provided for a General Assembly. The elite were split into t w o factions. The Portuguese party represented Portuguese-born conservatives who favored the monarchy, while the Brazil party consisted of liberal, southern landowners who sup-

ported reducing the power o f the monarchy and enhancing provincial autonomy. An economic crisis forced Pedro I to abdicate i n 1831. His Brazilian-bom 5-year-old son was placed under a regency u n t i l he was old enough to take the throne as Pedro I I i n 1840. For almost the next halfcentury, t w o issues—the future of slavery and the monarchy—dominated his reign. I n the early years of his reign Pedro I I enjoyed considerable support from political factions and the imperial army, but support for h i m and the monarchy shifted dramatically during Brazil's five-year war with Paraguay i n the late 1860s. The war saw a significant shift i n the size of the army w i t h officers demanding more say i n the government. Toward the end of the war the emperor tried to l i m i t the influence of the liberals by dissolving the cabinet and relying on conservative advisers. I n response, the liberals began agitating for reform and even questioning the legitiy macy of the monarchy. Even the Catholic Church retreated from its support for the monarchy. Although there was disaffection from a variety of quarters, the move to overthrow Pedro ultimately came from military officers and republicans who forced the emperor to abdicate without much resistance i n 1889 and leave for exile i n Portugal.

The End of Brazilian Slavery Nearly all L a t i n American countries abolished the slave trade shortly after independence, but slave labor remained the central institution of the economies of Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Britain applied pressure on Spain to end the slave trade to Cuba and Puerto Rico i n 1820, but as Cuba became the world's largest exporter o f sugar i n the 1830s, thousands of new slaves continued to be imported. Between 1820 and 1865, about half a m i l l i o n slaves were added to Cuba's slave population. In Brazil slaves provided cheap labor for the fazendas or sugar plantations on its northeast coast, (he coffee plantations of the southeastern provinces, and the cattle ranches of the southern provinces. Working conditions on the plantations were very brutal and the slave mortality rate was high. Many more slaves died

Brazilian slaves working in a fazenda or sugar plantation. Tlie slave trade continued unabated in Brazil until British diplomatic and military pressure forced the emperor to end the trade in 1851. It would take another 37 years, however, before slavery was finally abolished within the country in 1888.

t Document

Newspaper Advertisements for Runaway Slaves in Brazil

In nineteenth century Brazil, slaves fleeing their masters was a common occurrence. Because of the costs of replacing slaves who often had skills, slaveholders went to great lengths to recapture them. They ran newspaper advertisements describing in great detail the slaves who had fled and offering substantial rewards for their return or recapture. These descriptions offer insight into the nature of slavery and the reasons why slaves sought to escape from their masters.

$100,000 Reward

F

led on December 3 of this year from the plantation of Major Antonio de Campos Freire one of his slaves named José of the Benguella nation (though he says he is a Creole) from 25 to 30 years of age w i t h the following characteristics: short i n stature, thin, wellmade body, dark color, face rather long, pale jaw, almost no beard, lips rather full, round head, and is i n the habit of going abut w i t h long hair, small eyes, long eyelashes, good teeth, nose medium large, speaks i n a refined, humble, and insincere way, may have some old and small marks of punishment on his buttocks. He is a master blacksmith, also knows how to work with copper; also a master at killing ants w i t h his bellows. He is accustomed to getting drunk and i n that condition becomes violent. He took some work clothes, a poncho w i t h a yellow lining, a firearm, a hat of rough straw; and whenever he runs away he usually claims to be free and changes his name. Whoever captures h i m and takes h i m to his master w i l l receive 100$000 reward, i n addition to expenses, which w i l l be paid separately. , O Mercantil (Rio de Janeiro), January 13, 1845

Fled or was led astray a black girl [moleca] named Maria of the Cacange nation, who appears to be about 14 years of age and still does not have breasts/ black color and thin, wore a dress of white calico w i t h ribbons and pink flowers. The said girl was missing yesterday afternoon when she went to the Campo de Santa Anna to get water, and i t appears that she was crying there because someone had stolen her water bucket. Whoever brings her to the Rua de Santa Anna No. 47B, upper floor, will be satisfactorily rewarded, or even someone who gives information about her so that her owner can get her back. Diario de Rio de Janeiro, December 31,1847 Fled from J a r a g u â from the custody of Mr. Mariz on the 21st of the current month the slave Izidoro, m u latto, 18 years old, tall, long hair; at the sugar mills of Garcatorta and Villa do Norte this slave has a father and relatives; it is very possible that he went to those places; he fled w i t h manacles on his hands and should have some marks on his feet as a result of

wearing irons for some days. We appeal to anyone who captures h i m to deliver h i m i n Maceio to Mr. Antonio Texeira Pinto i n the Cambona, and he w i l l be well rewarded. Maceio, December 22, 1855. O Noticiador Alagoano (Maceio), December 30, 1855 200$000 reward to anyone who captures and brings to the Boa-Vista plantation i n the district of Lorena, province of Sao Paulo, the mulatto Camillo, who ran away on the 14th of the present m o n t h and belongs to Major Manoel de Freitas Novaes. Also w i l l pay all expenses of the journey, etc., up to the time o f delivery, the aforementioned mulatto having the following features: about 45 years of age, tall i n stature, speaks w i t h a high voice and always looks frightened, has some teeth missing i n front and lettering on his forehead and on the palms of his hand w h i c h says: "Slave of Dona Fortunata," always wearing on his head a cap or handkerchief to hide the letters o n his forehead. He wore trousers of woven cloth, a waistcoat of black cloth, a shirt of calico or shirt cloth, and a cloth jacket and poncho. He likes to boast that he is free. He is a master carpenter, sailor, and a coffee, cane sand hydraulicwork machinist.... All authorities and planters are asked to help capture the said slave, and not to trust the submissiveness w i t h which he tries to deceive people of good faith i n order to get away. Diario de Rio de Janeiro, March 24, 1872 Questions to Consider 1. Do these advertisements give you any insights into why slaves fled their masters? 2. What do the advertisements tell you about how slaves acted around white people? 3. Many slaves in the southern United States escaped through the "underground railroad." Was there a similar network in Brazil? How do you think slaves survived in Brazil once they escaped? From Robert Edgar Conrad, Children of God's Fire: A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1984), pp. 362-365.

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than were b o m i n the slave population i n Brazil, and new shipments of African slaves were constantly required to replenish the labor force. As coffee production increased for the N o r t h American and European markets in the 1840s, the main port for slave imports shifted from Bahia (bah-EE-ah) i n the northeast to Rio de Janeiro i n the south. A l t h o u g h B r i t i s h investments i n Brazil's economy were extensive, the B r i t i s h government was opposed to slavery and tried to prevent ships from bringing additional slaves into Brazil. Britain signed a treaty w i t h Portugal i n 1815 b a n n i n g the slave trade above the equator. I n 1826 the British negotiated an agreement w i t h Brazil to end the slave trade by 1830, but this had little effect. Slavers—with the open support o f the B r a z i l i a n government—found ways to evade B r i t i s h antislavcry squadrons and brought over 500,000 slaves from Africa i n the 1830s and 1840s alone. Unlike the United States, there was little division w i t h i n Brazil's ruling elite about the necessity for slavery. I t was popularly accepted at this time that there was no alternative to slave labor. The elite argued that African slaves were much better off in Brazil than they had been i n Africa and that their living standard was better than European peasants. Emperor Pedro I , however, was personally opposed to slavery. Pedro I I freed his o w n slaves i n 1840, but concern for his own position made h i m cautious about taking on the plantation aristocracy over the issue of slavery. Abolitionist sentiment was slight, and even the handful of abolitionists d i d not argue for an immediate end to slavery. I n 1850 the B r i t i s h government brought the issue to a head by instructing its navy to aggressively blockade the Brazilian coast and enter Brazilian waters i f necessary. The emperor was faced w i t h a choice of defying the British and risking a war or abolishing the trade. The following year he decreed an end to the slave trade. The institution of slavery, however, lingered on w i t h i n the country for almost more four decades. Influenced by the American Civil War, Pedro I I began considering ways of reducing the number of slaves rather than freeing them outright. Drawing on the experience of abolition i n Cuba and former Spanish colonies, he proposed a measure providing that the children o f slave mothers would no longer be defined as slaves, but it was not until 1871 that the measure was implemented. Even then, these children were kept in servitude to their mothers' owners u n t i l they reached 21. The Brazilian government was also reluctant to set all of the slaves free because of the expense of compensating slave owners for their losses. Because of the 1871 measure, the slave population shrank from 2.5 million i n 1850 to 1 million i n 1874. To make up for the lost labor, plantation owners

The End of Slavery in Brazil 1826

British treaty with Brazil to end slave trade

1840

Emperor Pedro I I frees personal slaves

1850

End of slave trade to Brazil

1863

Emancipation Proclamation in United States

1871

Children of slave mothers no longer defined as slaves

1885

Slaves over age of 60 freed

1886

End of slavery in Cuba

1888

Emancipation of slaves in Brazil

/ actively recruited European immigrants i n the belief that they would be more productive workers and better consumers than freed slaves. Most of the several hundred thousand immigrants who arrived i n the 1870s were from southern Europe and worked on coffee plantations. Another law i n 1885 gave freedom to all slaves over the age o f 60. Finally, on May 13, 1888, two years after Cuba freed its slaves, Pedro ended Brazilian slavery w i t h o u t any compensation going to the slave owners. Emancipation, however, d i d not dramatically undermine the power of the plantation owners or improve the status and work condition of freed slaves. A poem o f the era aptly captured the plight of freed slaves. Everything in this world changes. Only the life of the Negro remains the same; He works to die of hunger, The 13th of May fooled him. 2

Other Latin American Nations Political turmoil, geographical handicaps, and racial disunity all played a part in the development of the other new nations i n Latin America. Bolivia, named so hopefully for the Liberator, Simón Bolívar, underwent countless revolutions. Peru's course was almost as futile. The state of Gran Colombia dissolved by 1830, and its successors—Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador—were plagued by instability and civil wars. Paraguay endured a series of dictatorships, and Uruguay, created i n 1828 as a buffer between Argentina and Brazil, long suffered from interventions by those two countries.

CHAPTER 25 • Latin

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Nitrates being loaded at Pisagua, the northernmost nitrate port of Chile. Control of the valuable export trade could occasionally lead to war, as it did in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) in which Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia.

An exception to the prevailing pattern of political chaos was the steady growth of the republic of Chile. I n 1830 Chile came under the control of a conservative oligarchy. Although this regime proved to be generally enlightened, the country was kept under tight control for a century and was ruled for the benefit of the large landlords and big business. Central America narrowly escaped becoming part of Mexico i n 1822. After a 15-year effort to create a Central American confederation, Guatemala, E l Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica asserted their independence. Except for, Costa Rica, where whites / comprised the bulk of the population, racial disunity delayed the development of national feeling. On the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic, after decades of submission to the more populous but equally underdeveloped Haiti, maintained a precarious independence. The other Caribbean islands remained under foreign dominance—British, Dutch, Spanish, or French—and served their European masters as a source of raw materials—especially coffee, sugar, and tobacco—and later as coaling stations for their steam-powered navies.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA • Why did liberal politicians throughout Latin America have such difficulty successfully implementing their programs?

Limited Political and Economic Reform At the end of the nineteenth century, politicians who professed to be liberals were ascendant i n many Latin American nations such as Mexico, where Porfiro Diaz ruled for over three decades, and Argentina, where General Julio Roca and a series of politicians who represented the small landowning CASESTUDV elite took command of government. The politiBrothers cal power of the liberals seemed to place them in Arms: in a position to bring about genuine reform, but Comparative this was not to be. Ultimately, the liberals were Politics and Revolution more concerned w i t h stability and order than they were to their own political ideals. Most notably, the liberals failed to live up to the principles of political accountability and free market economics. Instead, acting against these principles, they expanded the powers of the executive office of government—making this office less accountable to voters and the other branches of government. The liberals, who desired to break Latin America's dependence on the export of raw resources to Europe and the United States, also established government enterprises to oversee key industries such as oil and steel or raised tariffs on imported goods to protect local manufacturers. While liberal politicians failed to bring about sweeping change i n L a t i n America, new groups became more assertive i n political life at this time. Indian peasants and immigrant workers, mostly from Europe, formed organizations to advance their causes. I n Argentina immigrant workers brought w i t h them

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Argentine suffragists casting symbolic ballots in the 1920s—women would not earn equal voting rights with men until 1947.

the ideas of European anarchists, socialists, and communists and founded new organizations and trade unions. The growing middle class of professionals, small businessmen, and shopkeepers sought a voice in government circles. The vote was gradually extended to more men i n many countries, although voting rights meant very little when elections were fraudulent or rigged. Although women's groups had raised the issue of women's suffrage for many years, the movement gained momentum after World War I when American women won the right to vote i n 1920 and women's organizations such as the National Council of Mexican Women and the Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women were founded in a number of countries. These organizations not only raised the issue of voting rights, but also other women's issues such as legal reforms, access to education, and divorce. Because their efforts were often ignored at the national level, they turned to organizations associated with the Pan American movement to raise their case with governments. Suffrage rights were placed before such bodies as the American Association for the Advancement of Women and the International Conference of American States. Finally, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, a handful of states introduced the vote for women but often

For reasons having little to do with advancing women's interests. In Ecuador ( 1929) a conservative ruling elite adopted the vote as a way to broaden its support in the face of continued threats from radical military officers who had staged a coup in 1925. In Brazil (1932) women took advantage of a new reform-minded administration, although both men and women lost the vote after a military coup in 1937. In Uruguay (1932) another ruling elite, threatened by the prospect oi new male immigrants winning the vote, extended the vote to women because they thought they would be much more conservative and more likely to preserve the status quo. In ihe late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Latin American economies exported more crops and mineral resources to Europe and the United States in exchange for manufactured goods. Large-scale road and railway construction, often financed by external investors, helped fuel this expansion. Increased crop production, however, was often at the expense of Indians whose land was either bought o r confiscated by large landowners. This was a major cause of peasant uprisings in many countries and a contributor to Ihe Mexican Revolution of 1910 Little was done in Latin American economies to diversify their exports and create industries. The vol-

CHAPTER 25 - Latin America ume of exports expanded, b u t most n a t i o n a l economies were monocultures tied to a few exports. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the D o m i n i c a n Republic relied on sugar; Uruguay and Argentina on w o o l , beef, and wheat; Chile o n nitrates and copper; Bolivia on t i n , B r a z i l on rubber, coffee and sugar; and Central American states on coffee and bananas (hence, the o r i g i n of the t e r m banana republic). I t was not u n t i l the 1930s that some countries such as Brazil began to promote i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n t h r o u g h protecting local industries by raising tariffs o n imported goods.

The Mexican Revolution The Mexican Revolution was the first major revolution of the twentieth century and, along w i t h the Russian revolution of 1917, i t set a precedent for later revolutionary movements throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The seeds for the Mexican R e v o l u t i o n were sown during the long rule of Porfirio Diaz. I n 1910 he had been president of Mexico for most of the previous 33 years. While his rule may have ushered i n a period of unprecedented political stability and economic growth, his policies also laid the foundation for a revolution. Economic growth had come at a cost. Foreign investors had flocked to the country and had taken control of key sectors of the economy such as mining and agriculture. I n the last years of Diaz's rule, a downturn i n the American economy and drought and famine i n Mexico had an adverse impact on the provinces of northern Mexico. Many workers lost their jobs i n mines, farms, ranches, and textile factories. Significant strikes took place among railway and textile factory workers. Peasants deeply resented the loss of their land to commercial landowners. Food riots broke out i n some cities. Although the 80-year-old Diaz had been a master of patronage and buying off competing interest groups, he refused to leave office of his o w n accord and he made no provision for a peaceful succession. The beneficiaries of his rule were growing concerned about the future. The cientificos wanted to create a national political party, while regional caudillos wanted to hold on to their narrow power bases. Although Diaz easily w o n reelection i n 1910, this time he had to fend off a strong challenge from the son of a wealthy property owner and industrialist named Francisco Madero (1873-1913). After the election he Plan of San Luis Potosi—A manifesto issued by Francisco Madero in 1910 that called on Mexicans to overthrow the Diaz regime and supported democratic rights and land reform.

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jailed Madero and numerous opposition members for refusing to recognize his regimes legitimacy. Madero moved to San Antonio, Texas, from where he m o b i lized opposition to Diaz. I n late 1910 he issued the Plan of San L u i s Potosi, w h i c h called for democracy, workers' rights, and land reform. His manifesto inspired many groups i n Mexico w h i c h launched a rebellion against the Diaz regime. Madero—along w i t h E m i l i a n o Zapata (zah-PAH-tah; c. 1877-1923), leader of mestizos and Indians i n the south, and Francisco "Pancho" Villa (VEE-yah) and Pasqual Orozco (oh-ROHS-koh), leaders w i t h peasant, cowboy, and farm labor support i n the north—carried out the first phase of the revolution. I n 1911 Madero crossed the border into Mexico and, w i t h the tacit support of the U.S. government that turned a b l i n d eye to his army buying weapons from American arms dealers, established a provisional government. As the rebel force gained strength, Diaz realized his time was up and negotiated a peaceful exit. As he went to his exile i n Paris, he warned: "Francisco Madera has unleashed a tiger; now lets set i f he can tame i t . " Diaz's words were prophetic. Madero easily w o n a democratic election and tried to establish his o w n rule. B u t he d i d not reward key supporters such as Villa and Zapata and his proposed reform o f stateowned l a n d was a failure. A Mexican bank and an American businessman ended up buying most of the l a n d Madero had opened up because the peasants d i d not have the resources to purchase i t . His m i l i tary chief of staff and a former supporter of Diaz, General Victoriano Huerta, turned on h i m and had h i m assassinated after j a i l i n g h i m i n 1913. B u t Huerta's rule lasted less t h a n a year before he was forced to resign. 3

The Mexican Revolution 1910

Madero issues Plan of San Luis Potosi

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Ousting of Porfiro Diaz

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Overthrow of Victoriano Huerta

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Overthrow of Francisco Madero

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End of Civil War

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New constitution adopted

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Emiliano Zapata assassinated

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Pancho Villa assassinated

1934

Land Reform by Lázaro Cárdenas

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Emiliano Zapata served OS the leader of revolutionaries who desired land reform and political change in the south of Mexico.

The power vacuum in Mexico Cily touched off a civil war that pitted the revolutionary forces of Villa and Zapata against Venustiano Carranza (k;ihiRAHN-sah) (1859-1920) and his leading general, Alvero Obrcgon (OH-hray-GOHN). The latter were staunch nationalists, bul since they theZocaio" ' ' radical than Villa and Zapata, they Mexico City won the grudging support of the U.S. governU L

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ment, which supplied them with modern weapons and a m m u n i t i o n . The Americans had intervened before against Villa in 1915 after he staged a raid into New Mexico and later sent in an expeditionary force under General John Pershing that ultimately galvanized widespread opposition From Mexicans. Pershing's units returned to American soil a dismal failure. Carranzas forces eventually wore down the resistance of Villa and Zapata, who operated from their respective strongholds in the north and south. The cost in human life was immense. An estimated one million people died in this phase of the revolution. Indeed, few leaders ol the revolution died peacefully. Zapata was assassinated in 1919 and Villa lour years later. In 1917 Carranza wrote a progressive new constitution that provided for a strong president that could not be reelected after a six-vear term, an independent judiciary, the right of the government to expropriate land, state control of all resources below the ground such as water and oil, the separation of church and state and the ending of religious education, the legalization of trade unions, an 8-hour work day, and the right of women to divorce. The latter was a major change for a country where marriage was the norm and women were expected to live contentedly in maledominated households. Many of these provisions, however, were not implemented in the short term. Carranza was the first of three successive presidents who came from Sonora Province in northern Mexico. All were substantial landowners and were reluctant to carry out the revolution's goals. In the early 1920s President O b r e g ó n initiated a modest redistribution of 3 million acres of land to peasants, but subsequent presidents did little to advance the goals ol the revolution until Lazara Cárdenas held the presidency b o m 1934 to 1940. He opened up 44 million acres of land to peasants by using the ejido, a traditional Indian institution that held land communally for all the people in a community; 800,000 peasants benefited from the land reform. C á r d e n a s nationalized railroads in 1937 and look on the American companies that controlled oil production the following year. He expropriated their holdings and established a state monopoly over o i l . Although the American companies appealed to the Roosevelt administration to intervene against Cárdenas, Roosevelt, who was promoting a "Good Neighbor" policy, worked out a compromise in which the

ejido—The .system of communal ownership of land thai was practiced by Indian societies before the arrival of the Spanish. Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRt)—The political parly founded in 1929 that dominated M'.inan political life until the end of the twentieth centurv.

CHAPTER 25 • Mexican government compensated the oil companies for their losses. Finally, Cárdenas strengthened his party's political machinery. He established a principle that a president had to step down after his 6-year term was over, and that he could choose a successor in consultation with party bosses. Cárdenas renamed the party the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana or Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM). Renamed the Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) in 1946, this party dominated Mexican political lite for the rest of the century.

Brazil After the fall of the monarchy in 1889, the new United States of Brazil patterned its federal structure on the U.S. Constitution. But stability was elusive and the nation underwent civil unrest and military upheavals, much like those experienced bv other Latin American countries. The centers of power were Sao Paolo and its coffee plantations that contributed about 30 percent of Brazil's GNP and Minas Gerais (MEE-nahs zhee-RAIS), which was dominated by large ranches. Between them these provinces produced almost all the presidents from 1894 to 1930. The republic was also stable because the army removed itself h orn politics. Foreign capital continued to enter the country, and, w i t h the end of slavery, i m m i g r a t i o n from Europe increased. Between 1872 and 1930, 2 million i m m i grants arrived in Brazil. Brazil's most important export was coffee, but when ihe industry slumped in ihe 1920s because of

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overproduction and a steep dip in the price of coffee, Brazil had to take on a large amount of foreign debt. After the Wall Street crash of 1929, the demand for coffee dropped even further and the price tumbled from 22.5 to 8 cents a pound. With the economy in tatters, the Brazilian military intervened, maintaining that it had the responsibility to save the country from the misruie of civilians. The army installed Getiilio Vargas (VAHR-gahs) as president; in 1937, he proclaimed the Estudo Novo ("New State"), which was little more than a military dictatorship. Democratic rights were suspended and trade unions were brought under state control. The Vargas regime's main economic strategy was industrialization through import substitution. The state protected certain sectors such as manufacturing, mining, oil, steel, electricity, automobile production, and light aircraft by imposing high duties on imports.

Argentina Argentina's political system was authoritarian w i t h some trappings of democracy. Liberal politicians, primarily drawn from the landowning aristocracy known as the "Oligarchy," dominated Argentina's political affairs. The 1800 individuals who owned most of the land believed in their right to run government. In the executive offices they made decisions among themselves and regularly ignored the legislature. Elections were rife w i t h fraud and vote buying. It was claimed that even the dead came to life to cast their ballots on election days.

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Twentieth-century Argentine politics were a struggle between the economic power o f the landowning elite and the electoral clout of the urban working and middle classes. A decisive shift i n electoral politics came after a reform law was passed i n 1912 that provided for universal adult suffrage for males over the age o f 18, a secret ballot, and compulsory voting. The reform was designed to co-opt the g r o w i n g middle class into the political system, but the Radical party that represented the middle class w o n the next election. Although the Radical party i n i t i a l l y reached out for the support o f the w o r k i n g class, they became antilabor after harshly repressing a general strike i n 1919. Many w o r k i n g class immigrants were d r a w n to socialist ideas. Anarchists and syndicalists were i n i tially responsible for organizing among the working class, but after World War I , they lost ground to the Socialist party, w h i c h advocated bringing about change through the electoral process, and the Communist party, which directed its energies on building workers' organizations. Argentina's economy faltered d u r i n g the Great Depression, prompting the military, which had stayed aloof from politics, to stage a coup i n September 1930. Two small army units took over the presidential palace w i t h little opposition. The military, which had become an independent institution w i t h no loyalty to any political party, tried to establish a broad-based political party to r u n the country. However, they proved to be no more effective than civilian politicians. Civilian politicians regained control of the government before the military intervened again i n 1943.

THE COLOSSUS TO THE NORTH: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA • Why did the United States repeatedly intervene in Latin America from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s? Although the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declared Latin America off-limits to European colonization, the United States d i d not have the political or economic power to enforce its policy for many years. Instead, throughout most of the nineteenth century, B r i t a i n , through its economic activities, continued to have the most influence i n the region. American interests i n Mexico and Cuba, however, increased i n the mid-nineteenth century after the Mexican-American War and as American sugar interests intensified their desire to

annex Cuba to the United States. American investors also began to look to Central America i n their efforts to locate a faster route from the eastern United States to the newly opened gold fields of California. As American economic power grew i n the last few decades of the nineteenth century so too did American influence i n Latin America. Both American and Latin American business elites generally profited from these arrangements. President Theodore Roosevelt oversaw the introduction o f what has been called "dollar diplomacy" that coordinated the activities of American foreign investors and the U.S. Department of State to obtain and protect concessions for investors. From 1890 this policy won for American businesses concessions for products such as sugar, bananas, and oil from more than a dozen Latin American republics. Between 1897 and 1914 American investment i n Latin America shot up from $1,641 m i l l i o n to $304.3 m i l lion. Much of this investment was i n minerals and oil, and Latin American products such as cereals, cotton, sugar continued to be exported to Europe since the United States already produced these goods. The growing importance of the United States was demonstrated i n a border dispute between Britain and Venezuela i n 1895. When B r i t a i n delayed subm i t t i n g the issue t o a r b i t r a t i o n , the U.S. State Department took the initiative and delivered a blunt note to L o n d o n w a r n i n g the B r i t i s h that refusal to accept arbitration would have grave consequences. The State Department noted U.S. dominance i n the Western Hemisphere and boasted that America's geographical position protected i t from European pressures. B r i t a i n was preoccupied w i t h the Boers i n South Africa, the Germans in Europe, and the French in the Sudan and thus c o u l d not argue too strenuously against the message. They agreed to resolve the dispute through arbitration. I n 1902-1903 Venezuela again became the subject of American concern. A dispute between Venezuela and a coalition formed by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy provoked the three European powers into blockading the Latin American country and even firing on some of the coastal fortifications to remind the Venezuelan dictator of his obligations to some of their nationals. President Roosevelt at first stood by, watching Venezuela take its punishment. He then became suspicious of German motives and began to match threat w i t h threat, forcing the Europeans to back down and place the issue into international arbitration. I n 1898 the United States went to war w i t h Spain over the way the Spaniards were ruling Cuba; the misdollar diplomacy—A term associated with American foreign policy of the early twentieth century ' ' used economic power to advance foreign policy goals and American business inlerests. n a

CHAPTER 25 - Latin America

lAIN'E EXPLOSION CAUSED BY BOMB OR TORPEDO i tapl. Sigsbee and Cónsul-General Lee Are in Doubt—The World Has Sent < Special lug, With Submarine Divers, to Havana to Find Out—Lee Asks ; for an Immediate Court of Inquiry—260 Men Dead i J SUPPRESSED DESPATCH TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE CAPTAIN SAYS THE ACCIDENT I A S MADE POSSIBLE BY AN ENEMY. ;. t C . Pendleton. Just Arrived from Havana, Says He Overheard I . * There o l a [Tot to Blow Up (tie Slup—Cap" I Zalin,*!, tlie Dynamite txpeit. and Ottier Experts Keport to The WonVJ that ttie Wreck Was Not; ' Accidental--Washington OítKrals Ready for Vigorous Actton if Spanish Responsibility ' GinBeStti)wri~DivmtoffeSentDov.iltor^ »r~«'^''t-''ani»v't«»'s ' * A

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independence i n w h i c h the Cubans were obliged by law to acknowledge the right of the United States to intervene for the "preservation of Cuban independence" and the "maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty." The United States also retained land at Guantanamo (gwahn-TAH-nah-moh) Bay where a military base was established. These and other restrictions on Cuban independence were embodied i n the Piatt Amendment (1901) to the new Cuban constitution. Piatt Amendment—An amendment to a congressional bill named after Senator Oliver Piatt that gave the United States the authority to intervene in Cuba to maintain order and its independence, to keep land at Guantanamo Bay, and to prevent Cuba from making treaties that gave another nation power over Cuba's internal affairs.

American newspapers' coverage of the war with Spain favored the government's imperial ambitions.

treatment of the Cubans also affected American business interests, especially i n the sugar industry. The pretext for the war came when the American battleship Maine was blown up i n Havana's harbor w i t h the loss of 260 crewmen. American President McKinley justified the war " i n the name of humanity, i n the name of civilization, and on behalf of endangered American interests." Although the U.S. m i l i t a r y worked cooperatively w i t h Cuban rebels to defeat Spain, the rebels d i d not participate i n the peace negotiations that established an American protectorate ruled by the U.S. military. Reconstruction favored American business interests, b u t i t also addressed the threat posed by yellow fever, established a system of state education, and introduced local and national government structures w i t h adult male suffrage. Victory i n the brief, dramatic, and well-publicized Spanish-American War w o n the United States recognition as a w o r l d power and possession o f a conglomeration of islands i n the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean. The United States annexed Puerto Rico and placed the Philippines, w h i c h were halfway around the world, under American rule. Sensitive to accusations of imperialism i n Cuba, i n 1903 the U.S. government offered Cuba an imperfect, closely tutored

A hero of the Cuban independence movement, José Marti gave his life to thecause, dyingin 1895, threeyears before the United States intervened in the struggle and went to war with Spain.

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Born in Havana, Cuba, José Marti (1853-i895) was a major figure in the Cuban independence struggle against Spain from his youth lo his death in 1895 leading a force in the second Cuban war for independence. As a young person he was deported from Cuba for his antigovemment views on several occasions s •. and lived in Spain, Mexico, and Central America before moving to the United States in 1880. He wrote columns for Latin American newspapers on his observations of every aspect of American life, including its political culture, corruption, literature, democratic values, and the contrasts between the rich and the poor. In this letter Marti published in the New York Evening Post (March 25, 1899), he responded lo attacks in a Philadelphia newspaper, the Manufacturer, on Cubans, especially those living in the United Stales.

his is not the occasion lo discuss the question of the annexation of Cuba. I t is probable that:no self-respecting Cuban would like to see his country annexed to a nation where the leaders of opinion share towards h i m the prejudices excusable only to vulgar jingoism or rampant ignorance. No honest Cuban will stoop to be received as a moral pest for the sake of the usefulness of his land i n a community, where his ability is denied, his morality insulted, and his character despised. There are some Cubans who, from honorable motives, from an ardent admiration for progress and liberty, from a prescience of their own powers under better political conditions, from an unhappy ignorance of the history and tendency of annexation, would like to see the island annexed to the United States. But those who have fought in war and learned i n exile, who have built by the work of hands and mind, a virtuous home i n the heart of an unfriendly community, who by their successful efforts as scientists and merchants, as railroad builders and engineers, as teachers, artists, lawyers, journalists, orators and poets, as men of alert intelligence and uncommon activity, are honored wherever their powers have been called into action and the people are just enough to understand them, those who have raised, w i t h their less prepared elements, a town of workingmen where the United States had previously a few huts i n a barren cliff, those, more numerous than the others, do not desire the annexation of Cuba to the United States. They do not need it. They admired this nation, the greatest ever built by liberty, but they dislike the evil conditions that, like women i n the heart, have begun i n this mighty republic, their work of destruction. They have made of the heroes of this country their o w n heroes, and look to the success of the American commonwealth as the crowning glory of mankind, but they cannot honestly believe that excessive individualism, reverence for wealth, and the protracted exultation of a terrible victory are preparing the United States to be the typical nation of liberty, where no opinion is to be based i n greed, and no tri-

umph or acquisition reached against charity and justice. We have the country of Lincoln as much as we have the country of Cutting. We are not the people of destitute vagrants or im- .' mora! pigmies that the Manufacturer is pleased to picture nor the country of petty talkers, incapable of action, hostile to hard work, that, i n a mass w i t h the other countries of Spanish America, we are by arrogant traveîei-s and written represented to b e . . . . . The Cubans have, according to the Manufacturer, "a distaste for exertion"; they are "helpless," "idle." These "helpless," "idle" men came here twenty years ago empty-handed, with very few exceptions; fought against the climate; mastered the language; lived by their honest iabor some in affluence, a few i n wealth, rarely i n misery; they bought or built homes; they raised families and fortunes; they loved luxury, and worked for it; they were not frequently seen in the dark roads of life; proud self-sustaining, they never feared competition as to intelligence or diligence In Philadelphia the Manufacturer has a daily opportunity to see a hundred Cubans, some of them of heroic history and powerful build, who live by their work i n easy comfort. I n New York the Cubans arc directors i n prominent banks, substantial merchants, popular brokers, clerks of recognized ability, physicians with a large practice . . . the "senora" went to work; from a slaveowner she became a slave, took a seat behind the counter, sang i n the churches, worked button-holes by the hundred, sewed for a living, curled feathers, gave her soul to duty, withered i n work her body. This is the people of "defective morals." :

Questions to Consider 1. According to Marti, what arc some of the strengths and weaknesses of the United Stales? 2. What insights do you gain from Marti's letter about the . experiences of Cuban immigrants in the United Slates? From Philip Foner, ed.. Our American Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence by José Marti (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 226-241.

CHAPTER 25 • Latin America Over the next several decades the United States sent i n the marines on numerous occasions to put d o w n revolts or deal w i t h corrupt governments. Panama also came under American influence through the U.S. desire to b u i l d a canal through the isthmus. The idea to b u i l d a canal to connect the Pacific and Atlantic oceans had been discussed for several centuries, but it was not u n t i l the 1870s that Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal, formed a company to b u i l d such a canal. The effort collapsed i n 1893 because of a lack of capital. The United States revived the idea of a canal after the Spanish-American War when the U.S. Navy took stock of the new American empire and developed the concept of a two-ocean navy. I n 1901 the B r i t i s h ceded to the U n i t e d States the exclusive right to control any canal that might be dug through the isthmus. For $40 m i l l i o n the United States bought the rights of de Lesseps' company. A lease was negotiated w i t h Colombia, through whose territory the canal w o u l d be built, but that country's senate refused to ratify the treaty, claiming the compensation was too small. Roosevelt is reputed to have responded, " I did not intend that any set of bandits should h o l d up Uncle Sam." The isthmus erupted i n rebellion, encouraged and funded by Mjgg| American officials of the New Panama Canal Company. The new republic of Panama SSSHM seceded from Colombia i n 1903 and promptly concluded a treaty that ceded a 10-mile-wide Cana^ l " perpetuity" to the U n i t e d States. The canal opened i n 1914, and the Canal Zone remained i n effect an American colony u n t i l another treaty eventually b r o u g h t A m e r i c a n control to an end 85 years later. As Latin American states broke away from Spain i n the early nineteenth century, its liberal elites had looked up to the United States as a model for progress and political evolution. By the end of the century, when the nation began wielding a "big stick" to keep these states i n line, the United States came to be known as the "Colossus of the North." The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 stated that the U.S. government reserved the right to collect the debts owed by L a t i n American nations to outside nations. On numerous occasions the U.S. government subsequently intervened to quell civil unrest, to overthrow governments not operating i n American interests, and to install strongmen who served American business investors. ma

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I n Nicaragua, where the American-owned United Fruit Company was a major investor, the U.S. government regularly dispatched troops to put down civil unrest. I n the late 1920s and early 1930s Augusto Sandino (san-DEE-noh) led a spirited resistance to U.S. soldiers. Nicaragua's National Guard killed h i m i n 1934 and the Guard's commander, Anastosio Somoza (soh-MOH-zah), seized control of the government three years later. The government remained a family enterprise u n t i l 1979 when the Sandinistas, a rebel group that took its name i n Sandino's memory, ousted the Somozas. American policy took a t u r n after a pan-American conference i n Havana i n 1928 i n w h i c h L a t i n American countries criticized A m e r i c a n interventions i n H a i t i and Nicaragua i n the 1920s. President Herbert Hoover proposed an end to interventionist policies and the creation of a "Good Neighbor" policy that stressed cooperation and trade ties. Hoovers policy was refined by his successor, F r a n k l i n Roosevelt. His administration rejected the Piatt Amendment and the Roosevelt Corollary and emphasized building mutually beneficial relations through improving trade and investment. Although Roosevelt's administration still attempted to influence the outcome of events i n trouble spots, i t also showed restraint when the Mexican government nationalized the o i l industry i n the 1930s.

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The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904—A corollary of President Theodore Roosevelt to the Monroe Doctrine that stated that the United States had the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations in cases of political instability or where they built up large debts to foreign nations.

CONCLUSION One of the major questions confronting L a t i n American countries from the early years of independence to W o r l d War I I was whether they w o u l d r e m a i n under d i c t a t o r i a l rulers or i n t r o d u c e democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . After independence autocratic rulers and caudillos dominated the political scene, but i n the late nineteenth century p o l i t i c i a n s w h o supported liberalism appeared to be i n the ascendancy. L i b e r a l p o l i t i c i a n s gave the impression that they supported the establishment of elected, representative systems. A l t h o u g h m a n y p o l i t i c i a n s professed t h e i r support for l i b e r a l ideals, they usually preferred order and stability rather than r e f o r m and change. They concentrated power i n the hands of strong executives and were reluctant to open up political systems to peasants, workers, and women. Their c o n t r o l , however, broke d o w n i n the 1930s

United Fruit Company—An American-based company established in 1898 that became a major producer of tropical fruits such as bananas and pineapples and had significant economic interests in Central American countries.

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because few politicians were capable of coping w i t h the economic crisis o f the Great Depression. M i l i taries, w h i c h had previously refrained from direct involvement i n government affairs, then began to intervene i n such countries as Argentina, B r a z i l , Chile, Guatemala, Peru, E l Salvador, Honduras and Cuba. The military's role i n government was to be a recurrent issue after World War I I . Latin American nations were also challenged by economic problems. After independence Latin American economies were dependent on exporting crops and mineral resources to first Europe and then the United States. However, i n the last decades of the nineteenth century, many Latin American economies experienced steady g r o w t h because of the strong demand for their minerals and crops i n Europe and N o r t h America. There was little reason to change this relationship because i t was cheaper for Latin American nations to i m p o r t manufactured goods t h a n i t was to produce their own. However, after World War

I , the demand for L a t i n American goods dropped sharply as Britain's position as an international power declined and the United States d i d not import goods such as cotton, sugar and beef that duplicated what American farmers and ranchers were producing. The Great Depression of the 1930s further reduced the demand for Latin American products and sent shock waves through its economies. Latin American nations were divided over what the best path to development was, and the issue continues to be hotly debated until the present One of the basic lessons learned by Latin American nations was that the political independence of the early nineteenth century d i d not necessarily lead to economic development i n the twentieth century. This was a hard lesson that was also learned and relearned throughout the twentieth century i n newly independent nations i n Asia, the Middle East, and Africa as European colonial powers granted freedom to their former colonies.

Suggestions for Web Browsing

House of the Spirits, trans. Magda Bogm (G. K. Hall, 1986), traces four generations of women i n twentieth century Chile. Carlos Fucntcs's The Death of Artemio Cruz, trans. Alfred MacAdam (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991), chronicles the life of a man who was a leader of the Mexican revolution but who becomes corrupt as he becomes a leading businessman.

You can obtain more information about topics included i n this chapter at the websites listed below. See aiso the companion website that accompanies this text, http://www.ablotigman.com/ brummett, which contains an online study guide and additional resources. Mexico: From Empire lo Revolution http://www.getty.ed u/a r t/exh i bition s/past/ a r t_m exi co2. html

Based on the Getty Research Collection, this website includes visual images on Mexico's history from ¡857 to 1923. Included are albums, postcards, photographs, and cabinet cards. The images include leaders as well as ordinary people and railways, bridges, roads, buildings and monuments. Spanish-American War i n Motion Pictures http://memory.iM.gov/ammern/sawhtml/sawhorne. html

This site contains 68 short films produced by the Edison Company and the Mittotope and Biograph Company during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its aftermath. Some were based on footage shot in Cuba and the Philippines, but others were staged in New Jersey. The website highlights the importance of film for shaping American perceptions and policies towards global issues.

Literature and Film Some of the best novels on this period examine the lives of generations of families i n different settings. Isabel Allende's

Gabriel Garcia MaTquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude (Perennnial, 2004) examines the lives of the Buendias family in Macondo, Colombia. Elena Poniatowska's Until We Meet Again {Pantheon Books, 1993) focuses on the life of a peasant woman from the Mexican Revolution to the post-World War I I era.

Suggestions for Reading General works on Latin American history include Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modem Latin America, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2001); David Bushnell and Neil! Macauley, The

Emergence of Latin America in the 19th Century, 2nded. (Oxford University Press, 1994); Edwin Williamson, Penguin History of Latin America (Penguin Press, 1992); and Tulio Hatperin-Donglii,

The Aftermath of Revolution in Latin America (Harper and Row, 1973), and The Contemporary History of Latin America, trans. John C. Chastecn (Duke University Press, 1993). Specific studies on Latin American nations include Hugh Thomas, Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom (Da Capo Press, 1998); David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982 ( I . B.Taurus. 1986); E.Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil, 3rd ed. (Columbia University Press, 1993); Michael Meyer and William Sherman, The Course of Mexican History, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1987);

CHAPTER 25 - Latin America RalphL^eWcKxlwardJr.,CenfrrJ,4meri^ ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and James Dunkerley, Power in ihe Isthmus: A Political History of Central Latin America (Verso, 1988). Latin America's economic history is treated in Stephen Haber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind;

747

Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, ¡800-1914 (Stanford University Press, 1997). A study of Catholic Church-state relations is J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-ecclesiastical Relations (University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

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GENDER What role has gender played in history?

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The signing of ¡he Nineteenih Amendment, 1920.

ender—the social rales, relations, and practices constructed around male and female reproductive differences^—has shaped human cultures since its very origins. Though gender has been with us from the start, our notions of masculinity and femininity have been anything but immutable. Indeed, over the centuries, the social roles, relations, and practices assigned to men and women have proved to be historically and culturally variable, subject to the influence of religion, ideology, economics, and other factors. This variability has been particularly evident in three areas: sexuality, labor, and women's rights. The influence of gender on sexuality concerns a range of topics, most notably marriage and reproduction, but also methods of achieving sexual pleasure, sexually transmitted diseases, and forbidden and encouraged sexual practices. Because of the singular importance of reproduction for humanity, most societies have attempted to control sexuality, usually through the state, religious institutions, or social custom. Marriage, as the most fundamental and durable of human social relationships, has stood at the forefront of attempts to regulate sexuality. Historically, most marriages have involved one husband and one wife, but this hasn't always been the case. Marriage could also be a relationship between one husband and more than one wife, as in religions like early Judaism, Islam, or nineteenth-century Mormonism, or in countries like China until the early twentieth century. Marriage could also involve one wife w i t h several husbands, as in some areas of Tibet, or in sequential marriages to brothers in Judaism. I n Africa, some societies permitted the marriage of women as "husbands" to other women as "wives." Throughout the world until modern times, marriages and the children they produced have been used to cement political or economic alliances, with little concern for the marital partners' emotions or sexual feelings. Indeed, the political and economic significance of marriage usually meant that parents arranged most marriages rather than the prospective husbands or wives. Most of the great world religions have attempted to establish acceptable sexual practices. In so doing, most defined subordinate gender roles for women, made female adultery a special concern, created rituals for purification surrounding women's menstrual cycles, and defined and prohibited sexual deviance. As nations and states were strengthened in the early modern period, the secular authority of the state usually stepped in for the religious authorities and attempted to regulate sexuality. In addition to marriage and other areas, states were concerned with the regulation of the socially disruptive practice of prostitution and the devastating effects of sexually transmitted diseases. Eugenics laws in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe, the United Stales, and Japan sought to control diseases such as syphilis, especially where it intersected with prostitution. In the late twentieth century, new sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV raised issues around the regulation of sexuality, particularly same-sex practices. Expanding globalization in recent decades has permitted people and pathogens to move with great speed, and ihe nature of sexuality has allowed the global reach of something as local and intimate as sexually transmitted diseases. Concerns about these diseases, whether at an individual, government, or religious level, all involve issues of gender. Considerations in the area of labor include the gendered workplace; the impact on gender of the transition h orn nomadic societies to agricultural ones; the gendered division of labor as the Industrial Revolution encouraged the transition from farm to fac-

Global Issue: Gender tory; gender dimensions of the international movement of people and labor under slavery, colonialism, and voluntary migration; and men's and women's different roles in labor movements and resistance. The early stages of industrialization in New England, for example, moved young women and girls into textile mills, shoe factories, and other mechanized workshops from what had been a cooperative economic and production unit on the farm or in an urban artisan workshop. Wives, husbands, and children in the preindustrial lamily had earlier worked side by side, often performing gender-differentiated but equally important jobs. The Industrial Revolution increasingly separated home and workplace. Soon, women came to be identified with the home, and men's and women's primary places—the home for married middle-class women, the workplace for all adult men—became gendered. Economic patterns in the West and Japan led to the transition of the family from a cooperative economic and production unit to a place of consumption rather than pirxluction, occupied by a mother whose gender role did not include paid labor while the father/husband occupied the public economic sphere. In more recent times, gender continues to be central to the international labor market. Contemporary factories in the developing world preferentially employ women and girls, whose pay is routinely less than men's. Employment alters the relationship of women to their families and to society at large. I n many cases, the migration of women and girls within their own countries to export-processing zones leads to demographic shifts. In Indonesia, girls' power within their families has increased with their exposure to new ideas within their factories, not to mention their economic contribution to their families. Female labor has also been a large component of international migration. Women's rights are another important focus of gender. Gender was deeply implicated in the creation of the modern nation-state, with masculinity defining the meanings of citizenship and public participation. Modern constitutions devised in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries articulated a gendered notion of the slate. Yet, most also spoke eloquently about the rights of citizens. The contrast between the rhetoric of democracy and its gendered practice gave rise to feminist demands for inclusion in the state. At the same lime, gendered social and economic inequalities, such as the legislated subordination of wives to their husbands, harsh conditions in the workplace, and opportunities for education limited by women's gender, gave rise to feminist resistance to the state. I n areas under colonial rule, women's rights were closely related to nationalist and anti-imperialist movements, though postcolonial, independent states have, ironically, all too often rejected women's rights as too closely tied to the ideology of their former colonial masters. During the last two or three centuries, the movements we call "feminism" have, thus, been defined by an interesting

749

interaction of simultaneous struggle for inclusion in the state and resistance to the state and society. As early as 1700, Englishwoman Mary Asteil, referring to women's legal subordination to the male family head, responded to the newly emerging political theory that called for (male) citizens' rights against absolute monarchs by declaring, " I f all men are born free, how is it that all women are b o m slaves?" Almost 100 years later, Frenchwoman Olympe de Gouges reacted to the profoundly gendered revolutionary concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity embodied in The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen by writing a feminist challenge, The Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen. She was executed not long afterward. Englishwoman Mary Wollstonecraft echoed many of de Gouges's themes in her Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), which called for equality in education, the family, and political rights. This call for equal trealment in law set the stage for the suffrage and women's rights movements first in England and the United States and in Asia and Latin America later. I n England, John Stuart M i l l wrote eloquently on women's rights and ran for public office on a rights platform. His words were particularly noted by feminist reformers in Japan and elsewhere. The most concerted feminist rights efforts were undertaken in the United States in the nineteenth century. The Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 brought together Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Frederick Douglass, and many others who adopted the "Declaration of Rights and Sentiments" that demanded equality of rights of citizenship and social participation. The U.S. movement was not a unified movement, however. It was characterized by differences over issues of racial justice, class differences, and the role of government in either protecting women or granting them equal rights (the "equality" vs. "difference" debate). The final push for the vote through the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (1920) represented a concerted effort to overcome differences to accomplish that goal. Likewise, feminist activism around the world has struggled with divisions regarding the adoption of Western feminist ideas, the tensions over Marxist and liberal approaches, and feminism's relationship to cultural, ethnic, and religious differences. Though historians have only recently discovered gender as a "useful category of analysis," gender has long been central to our lives, from political debates over marriage and civil rights to feminist calls for protection from labor or sexual exploitation. 1

Questions 1. Why has marriage, differently defined in various cultures and times, been a central institution in most societies? 2. How has the demand for women's political rights been tied to the rise of the modern nation? 3. How has recent globalization affected gender and disease? Gender and labor? Gender and human rights?

Politics and Diplomacy in the West, 1815-1914

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

1810

The Vienna Settlement and the

The United Kingdom

1814-1315 Congress of Vienna

Reassembling of Europe

The United States

1H19 Carlsbad Decrees in Germany; Peterloo Massacre in Great Britain

1848: The Revolutionary Year Prussia, German Unification, and the Second Reich DOCUMENT: Bismarck and the Ems

Dispatch The Decline of Austria

DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS: An

American View of the World in the 1820s DOCUMENT: "With Malice Toward None": Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address Russia in Reform and Revolution

France: The Second Empire and

The "Eastern Question" and the

the Third Republic

Failure of European Diplomacy to

Italy to 1914

1914

W

estern politicians struggled to keep up with and take advantage of the economic and social transformations triggered by industrialization in the nine-

teenth century. Their political responses ranged from democratic reform to

autocratic reaction and were influenced by the new ideas of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism. After the popular revolutions of 1848, each nation in Europe experienced an increase in centralized state power and, concurrently, a growth in the polit-

1830 1830s British reforms In Parliament; beginning of Chartist movement 1830 Paris riots against Charles X: uprisings In Belgium and Poland; Mazzinl begins Young Italy Movement 1839 Belgium recognized as an independent "perpetually neutral" state

1840 1845 Potato crop failure in Ireland results In widespread famine 1847 Marx and Engels finish their Communist Manifesto 1848 Revolutions sweep Europe; French Second Republic proclaimed; election of Louis Napoleon

ical voice of common people. In response to national ambitions and popular

1850

pressures, Reaipolitik—realism in politics—became a prevalent theme in Western

1852 Louis Napoleon proclaims France's Second Empire: Georges Haussmann initiates urban renewal of Paris

politics, figuring largely in the unification movements of both Germany and Italy. By the end of the nineteenth century there was a clear division between the nations that were the most efficient at mastering political change—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and other nations that struggled to stabilize their political and social infrastructures—most notably, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Elsewhere in the world, the peoples of Asia and Africa confronted the threat of European colonization and imperialism. Europeans extended their global domina-

1853-1856 Crimean War

I860 1861 Kingdom of Italy proclaimed: Tsar Alexander II issues Emancipation Proclametlon; start of American Civil Waf 1867 The Ausgleich, creation of the AustnyHungarian monarchy

tion through emigration—during the nineteenth century millions took part in the

1870

greatest mass movement of human beings up to that point in history. Europeans

1870-1871 French defeat in Franco-Prussian war. Paris Commune, proclamation of the Unification of Germany

also established colonies for economic gain through the exploitation of natural and human resources. The opportunistic, short-range focus of Reaipolitik blinded Europeans to their larger, long-term interests, however, and the century of European dominance came to an end in 1914 with diplomatic failure and the outbreak of World War I. The destructive forces then unleashed in Europe rippled out across the world and in time would bring an end to European hegemony.

1SS0 1881 Tsar Alexander II of Russia assassinated 1888 Kaiser Wilhelm II becomes emperor of Germany

1900 1905 Russian Revolution; October Manifesto issued

1910 1914 Irish Home Rule bill passed; general strike in Italy; start of World War I

751

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THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT AND THE REASSEMBLING OF EUROPE •

How successful were the diplomats at Vienna in negotiating a peace settlement that prevented another continental war?

Once Napoleon was "safely" exiled to Elba in 1814, representatives of all the European powers except the Ottoman Empire gathered in September at Vienna. They had the imposing task of building a new political and diplomatic structure for Europe after a quarter century of wars and revolutions. The factor that had brought the British, Prussians, Austrians, and Russians together—Napoleon—was gone, and wartime unity dissolved into peacetime pursuit of self-interest.

The Congress of Vienna Work went slowly during the 10-month span of the Congress of Vienna. The leaders who gathered at

Vienna—Lord Casllereagh of Great Britain, Count von Hardenberg of Prussia, Prince Klemens von Mettemich of Austria, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, and Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand of France—met in small secret conferences to decide the future of Europe. Melternich (MET-ter-nick) came to dominate the conference, as much by his diplomatic skills as by his ability to impress on the participants ihe need lor stability. The Congress dealt w i t h numerous issues: the status of France, the new political boundaries, the response to liberal and national altitudes sweeping the continent, ihe fate of the powers who had losl territory during the previous 25 years, and the future of dispossessed dynasties. The solutions proposed were moderate. France was allowed to return to its 1792 boundaries; however, after Napoleons return and the One Hundred Days, the allies cut back the boundaries and imposed penalties. They virtually ignored ihe democratic, liberal, and nationalistic forces in favor of a more traditional solution to the upheavals of the previous 25 years. The events since 1789 had drastically altered the map of Europe. For example, ihe 1000-year-old Holy Roman Empire had disappeared. In an attempt to restore some balance, the Congress followed Tour principles: legitimacy, encirclement of France, compensation, and balance of power. The Congress ruled that royal houses that had been expelled— such as the Bourbons in France, Spain, and Naples; the House of Savoy in Sardinia-Piedmont; and the House of Orange in ihe Netherlands—-would be placed back

Prince Klemens von Metternich, portrait by Sir

Thomas Lawrence. At the height of his power during the Congress of Vienna. Mettemich was largely responsible for the balance of European power agreement worked out by the Congress.

CHAPTER 26 • Politics on their thrones. The redrawn map of Europe resembled the 1789 configuration, except that the Holy Roman Empire remained dissolved. I n its place were the 39 states of the German Confederation, dominated by Austria. The redrawing of boundaries created a protective belt of states around France to make future aggression more difficult. The principle of compensation ensured that no important power suffered a loss as the result of the Congress's work. Austria was compensated for the loss of land i n the Low Countries by gaining territory i n Italy and along the Adriatic. Sweden received Norway i n return for permitting Russia to keep Finland. The desire to construct an effective balance of power remained at the center of the Congress's attention. Each nation had its own idea of what constituted a proper balance, and soon the British and the Austrians found themselves arrayed against the Russians and the Prussians. Russia's ambitions i n Poland almost broke up the conference because Britain feared that an enlarged Russia would threaten the balance of power. Prussia wanted all of Saxony, which justified Austria's fears of the growing Berlin-based state. While the four wartime allies split, the clever French representative Talleyrand negotiated a secret treaty binding the French, Austrians, and British to pledge mutual assistance to restrain the Russians and Prussians. Although the Congress has been criticized for ignoring the democratic impulse i n Europe, i t has been praised for crafting a general settlement of a complex series of problems, especially compared to the work of the vengeful Allies at Versailles after World War I . The representatives were not totally, blindly reactionary, however; many of the changes of the previous 25 years were retained. The 40 years of general peace that followed, flawed though they may have been, are testimony to the success of Mettemich and his colleagues i n gaining stability. But, by ignoring the forces of change expressed i n the new ideologies, the representatives at Vienna ensured the ultimate failure of the system they created.

The Congress System The Vienna negotiators set out to coordinate their policies to maintain stability. The first proposal for postwar consultation was symbolic and quixotic. I n the fall of 1815, Tsar Alexander I proposed the formation of a "Holy Alliance" to be based on "the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace." No one was quite sure what the tsar meant by this pact, but every ruler i n Europe signed i t except the British king, the Turkish sultan, and the pope. Castlereagh dismissed the Holy Alliance as "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." I n November 1815, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain signed the Quadruple Alliance, w h i c h became the Quintuple Alliance when France joined i n

and Diplomacy in the West, 1815-1914

753

1818. Under this agreement, the powers pursued their goals through what came to be known as the Congress System a concert of the European powers to maintain order, peace, and stability by keeping an eye on France and maintaining the balance of power. This was the first truly functional experiment i n collective security i n European history. The Congress System's dedication to the 1815 status quo was challenged i n 1820 and 1821 by nationalistic and liberal revolts i n Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Latin America. The most violent revolutions occurred i n Spain and Italy. Spanish liberals rebelled against the misgovernment of the restored Bourbon king, Ferdinand V I I , and their insurrection spread to the army, w h i c h mutinied. The general uprising that followed forced the king to give i n to the liberals' demands for a constitution and representative government. The Spaniards' success sparked rebellions i n Naples and Sicily, governed by the Neapolitan Bourbon king, Ferdinand I . The Italian revolt ran much the same path as that i n Spain, and w i t h m u c h the same result: a constitution based on the Spanish model. M e t t e m i c h arranged for the Congress allies to meet at Troppau (tro-POW) i n 1820, Laibach i n 1821, and Verona i n 1822 to deal w i t h the uprisings. Ferdinand I came to Laibach, supported Congress System intervention, and reneged on granting a constitution; Austrian troops invaded Italy and placed h i m back on his throne. I n 1822 the Congress allies met to consider the Spanish problem, and the French volunteered to restore the status quo. They sent their armies i n to crush the liberals. The repression of the revolts i n Spain and Italy marked the high point of the Congress System's success. Britain began its withdrawal from the Continent into "splendid isolation" i n 1820, and the ardent support of B r i t i s h liberals for the 1821 Greek revolt against the Turks further weakened London's interest i n cooperating w i t h its former allies. When the Congress System discussed restoring the Spanish king's authority i n Latin America, the British objected. Further, U.S. President James Monroe warned the Europeans i n 1823 that their intervention into the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an unfriendly act. By the middle of the decade, the Congress System had withered to an Austrian-Russian alliance i n w h i c h Mettemich set the agenda and the Russians acted as the policemen of European power.

Return of the Bourbons The restored Bourbon monarch Louis X V I I I (r. 1814, 1815-1824) was an unhappy choice for the French Congress System—An alliance of the signatories of the Vienna settlement dedicated to maintaining the status quo in Europe after 1815.

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throne. The new king, a brother of the guillotined Louis X V I , was ill-equipped to lead France out of a quarter century of revolution and Napoleonic charisma. Dull and unpopular, he had been the target of a Talleyrand epigram that "the Bourbons have learned nothing and forgotten nothing." Nonetheless, he tried to hold the country together by blending elements of the revolutionary period w i t h remnants of the Old Regime. Unfortunately, the mixture helped create the instability that plagued the country throughout the century. For 9 years, he suffered the fate of moderates trying to navigate between t w o extremes: the right wing assailed h i m for giving too much to the middle classes, while the liberals and radicals said that he had not gone far enough in his policies. Louis was succeeded by his brother, Charles X (r. 1824-1830), who cared nothing about maintaining political balance. Charles did not accept any of the changes since 1789. I n 1829 he announced that he "would rather saw wood than be a king of the English type." So out of tune was he with the times that i n July 1830 he drove the usually submissive legislature to the point that it refused to support his proposed ultrarovalist ministry. When elections went badly for h i m , he issued a set of lavvs censoring the press and further l i m i t i n g the already heavily restricted right to vote. These repressive acts drove liberals, radicals, and their journalist

allies to revolt. They barricaded the narrow streets of Paris with overturned carts, boxes, tables, and paving stones. Fighting behind these obstacles and from rooftops, they held off the army. Three days later, a less reactionary faction took power after Charles fled across the Channel to Great Britain—the refuge for most political exiles, left or right, during the nineteenth century. The new government represented the upper middle classes and the landed gentry and stood as a compromise between the republicans—led by the aging Marquis de Lafayette, hero of the American Revolution—and the relatively liberal monarchist supporters of the Orleans branch of the Bourbons. The new king, Louis Philippe (r. 1830-1848), who claimed the title of "citizen king," predictably supported the interests of the wealthy. Louis Philippe took great pains to present a bourgeois image of himself. He received the crown from "the people" and replaced the white Bourbon flag w i t h the revolutionary tricolor. However, Louis Philippe's policies consistently favored the upper bourgeoisie and gentry and shut the workers and middle classes out of the political arena. Of the 32 million French citizens, only 200,000 wealthy male property owners were allowed to vote. Workers protested that the government was ignoring their interests. Louis Philippe and his advisers were more interested in pursuing a policy of divide and conquer and ignored most suggestions for reform. Restrictive legislation was passed in 1835 to control the growing radical movement. The government kept control, but under the calm surface serious pressures were building. By 1848 France faced a serious crisis.

Eugene Delacroix's Liberty Leading ihe People, painted in 1830, presented a romantic vision of the popular demand for social reform and the violence in the streets it wrought.

CHAPTER 26 - Politics

The French Influence in Belgium and Poland The Paris uprising of 1830 encouraged liberals across the Continent, but only i n Belgium were there any lasting results. The Vienna Congress had placed the Belgians under the Dutch crown, but this settlement ignored the cultural, economic, religious, and l i n guistic differences between the two people. The Belgians were primarily Catholic farmers and workers, some of w h o m spoke Flemish, which was related to Dutch, but most of w h o m spoke French. The people of the Netherlands were Dutch-speaking protestants and, for the most part, seafarers and traders. Belgian liberals asked the Dutch king, William I of Orange, to grant them their o w n administration i n August 1830. When he refused, r i o t i n g sprouted i n Brussels, which the Dutch troops were unable to put down. After expelling the troops, the Belgians declared their independence and drew up a liberal constitution. W i l l i a m asked i n vain for help from Tsar Nicholas I . The principle of legitimacy as a pretext for intervention was dead. Stalemate ensued u n t i l the summer of 1831 when the Belgian national assembly met i n Brussels and chose Prince Leopold of SaxeCoburg-Gotha (saks-KO-burg-GO-ta) as king. Eight years later the international status of the new state was settled. Belgium was recognized as a "perpetually neutral" state. The French rebellion had an impact i n Poland, where Poles i n and around Warsaw rose up i n the name of liberal and national principles. After the Congress of Vienna, Poles i n this region gained a special status. The area known as Congress Poland had its o w n constitution and substantial local autonomy. The winds of change and the repressive tendencies of Tsar Nicholas I combined to push the Poles i n t o rebellion i n the winter of 1830-1831. The rebels suffered from internal division, and the numerically and m i l i t a r i l y superior Russians crushed them. Their major accomplishment was to tie down the Russian troops, w h o m Nicholas wanted to send to help the Dutch king, for six months and perhaps save the Belgian revolution.

German and Italian Nationalism The forces of nationalism influenced central Europe from the tip of Italy through the Habsburg lands of central and eastern Europe to the Baltic Sea. Napoleon had performed a great, though unwitting, service for German and Italian nationalists by his direct governing i n the area and also by revising the European map. After 1815, the region knew the positive effects of a different style of governing and was divided into a much more rational set of political units.

and Diplomacy in the West, 1815-1914

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Metternich had ensured that the Vienna Congress made Austria the dominant partner i n the German Confederation. To preserve his country's dominance both i n the Confederation and throughout the Habsburg monarchy, he knew that he had to fight continually against nationalism. The currents of Romanticism found forceful expression i n the works of German poets and philosophers and i n lectures i n German classrooms. Nationalism and liberalism found many followers among the young. For example, a great patriotic student festival took place i n October 1817 (the threehundredth anniversary of the Reformation) at Wartburg, where Luther had taken refuge. Liberal students burned reactionary books on a great bonfire to protest their discontent w i t h the status quo. Protests spread both openly and secretly i n the Burschenschaften (BOUR-shen-shaft-en; "liberal societies"). Metternich moved harshly against the students. He pushed the Carlsbad Decrees (1819) through the Diet of the German Confederation. These acts dissolved student associations, censored the press, and restricted academic freedom. However, the decrees failed to stop the forces of liberalism and nationalism, which grew during the next 20 years. Italy, w h i c h M e t t e r n i c h saw as a "geographical expression" and not a nation, also posed special problems. The Congress o f Vienna, i n accordance w i t h the principles of legitimacy and compensation, had returned Italy to its geographical status of 1789, divided into areas dominated by the Bourbons, the Papal States, and the Austrians. This settlement ignored the fact that, i n the interim, the Italians had experienced more liberty and better government than ever before. The return to the old systems was also a return to high taxes, corruption, favoritism, and banditry. I t was perhaps ironic that this fragmented, individualistic land should produce the most notable Romantic nationalist i n Europe, Giuseppe Mazzini. After the Austrians put down the Italian revolutionary movements i n 1820 and 1821, Mazzini began to work actively for independence. I n 1830 he was implicated i n an unsuccessful revolution against the Sardinian royal government and t h r o w n into j a i l for six months. Once released, he went to London and started a patriotic society that he called Young Italy. This organization sent appeals to students and intellectuals to form an Italian nationalist movement. The reactionaries, however, continued to resist the nationalists. Metternich also feared nationalism i n the Habsburg realm, a mosaic composed of many different nationalities, languages, and religions. I f nationalism and the desire for self-rule became strong among the Magyars, Czechs, southern Slavs, and Italians, the Habsburg Empire w o u l d fall apart. Nationalism Young Italy—A society created by Giuseppe Mazzini dedicated to the unification of Italy.

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threatened the Germans who controlled the empire yet constituted only 20 percent of its population. By understanding the complex and combustible nature of the region i n which Metternich exercised his power, his dread of democratic government and nationalism and his obsession w i t h maintaining the status quo can be understood. Liberalism and nationalism would destroy his power. I n a w o r l d that was rapidly industrializing, Metternichs power rested on a backward system. Only in Bohemia and the areas immediately around Vienna was there a middle class. The great majority of the inhabitants were peasants, either powerless serfs, as in Hungary, or impoverished tenant farmers who owed half of their time and twothirds of their crops to the landlord. Government was autocratic, and the regional assemblies had little power and represented mainly the nobility. The social, political, and economic structures were extremely vulnerable to the winds of change that came in ¡848.

1848: THE REVOLUTIONARY YEAR • What forces led to the destruction in 1848 of the international order created at the Congress of Vienna in 1815? As it had before, France once again opened a revolutionary era, and the events there set a precedent for what was to occur throughout Europe in 1848. The overthrow of the old order came first in Paris in February and then spread to Berlin, Vienna, Prague, Buds, and Pest in March. Never before had France— or Europe—seen such a fragmented variety of political and social pressures at work at the same time. Romantics, socialists, nationalists, members of the middle class, peasants, and students could all agree that the old structure had to be abandoned, but the ideology espoused by each group envisioned a different path to that goal and a separate view of what the new world should be. Louis Philippe fled Paris, Metternich abandoned Vienna, and the Prussian king, Frederick William IV, gave in. But the movements in France and elsewhere fell apart as soon as they had won because of their diversity, lack of experience, and conflicting ideological goals.

France and the Second Republic The pressures building since 1830, strengthened by economic depression in 1846 and 1847, erupted in Paris d u r i n g February 1848. W i t h i n the seemingly harmless social arena of the grand dinner party or banquet, liberals and socialists argued for electoral

Revolutionary Outbreaks, 1815-1848 1820-1821

The Germanies, Spain, Italy, Latin America, Greece

1825

Russia

1830

France, Belgium, Poland

1848

France, Prussia, Italy; the Habsburg monarchy: Austria. Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia, Romania

reforms and an end to corruption while they ate and drank at the table. When the government tried to prohibit a banquet scheduled for February 22, the opposition threw up more than 1500 barricades to block the narrow streets of Paris. Violence broke out, and republican leaders look the opportunity to set up a provisional revolutionary government and proclaimed the introduction of universal manhood suffrage. Louis Philippe fled to exile in England. The new government, the Second Republic, had a brief (1848-1851) and dreary existence. Neither the new leaders nor the voters had any experience with representative government. The forces that united to overthrow the king soon split into moderate and radical wings. The first group wanted middle-class control w i t h i n the existing social order, while the latter faction desired a social and economic revolution. By the summer the new government faced a major crisis over the issue of national workshops sponsored by the socialist Louis Blanc (BLON; 1811-1882). The workshops were to be the stale's means to guarantee every laborer's "right lo work." The moderate-dominated government voiced its belief in Blanc's principle of l ull employment, but the leaders gave the plans administration to men who wanled to ridicule it. As a result, the workshops became a national joke. Laborers were assigned make-work jobs such as e a r n ing d i n from one end of a park to the other on one day and then carrying it back the next. The disbanding ol the workshops incited a violent insurrection known as the June Days. The unemployed workers raised a red flag as a sign of revolution—the first lime that the red flag had been used as a symbol of the proletariat. With the cry of "bread or lead," the demonstrators rebuilt the barricades and tried to overthrow the government The bloodiesl fighting Paris had seen since the Reign of Terror gave the insurgents far more lead than bread, and the movement was crushed. After that, the bourgeoisie and the workers would be on the opposite ends of the political spectrum.

CHAPTER 26 .

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Germany and the Frankfurt Assembly The example of the French February revolution quickly crossed the Rhine River and spread to Central Europe. At public assemblies throughout Germany, patriotic liberals demanded unification. Rapid changes came with minimal casualties, largely because of the humane response of the Prussian king, Frederick William IV. When his subjects erected barricades in Berlin on March 15, he decided to make concessions rather than unleash further violence and bloodshed. He ordered the regular army troops out of Berlin and tried to make peace w i t h his "dear Berlin¬ ers" by promising a parliament, a constitution, and a united Germany. Upon learning of this development, the rulers of the other German states agreed to establish constitutional governments and guarantee basic civil rights. The Frankfurt Assembly opened its first session on May 18. More than 500 delegates attended, coming from the various German states, Austria, and Bohemia. The primarily middle-class membership of the assembly included about 200 lawyers, 100 professors, and many doctors and judges. Popular enthusiasm reached a peak when the assembly's president announced, "We are to create a constitution for Germany, for the whole Frankfurt Assembly—The meeting held in 1848 to write a constitution for Germany.

empire." The assembly deliberated at length over the issues of just what was meant by Germany and what form of government would be best for the new empire. Some debaters wanted a united Germany to include all Germans in Central Europe, even Austria and Bohemia. Others did not want the Austrians included, for a variety of religious and political reasons. Another issue of contention was whether the new imperial crown should be given to the Habsburgs i n Vienna or the Hohcnzollerns in Berlin. Germany's history changed tragically when the Assembly failed to unite and bring a liberal solution to political problems. From May to December, the Assembly wasted lime in splendid debates over nonessential topics. As the participants talked endlessly, they threw away their chance to take decisive action and contributed to the failed dreams of 1848. Gradually, the conservatives recovered from the shock of the spring revolts and began lo rally around their rulers, exhorting them to undo the reformers' work. In Prussia Ihe king regained his confidence, ihe army remained loyal, and the peasants showed little interest in political affairs. The Berlin liberals soon found themselves isolated, and the king was able to regain control. Even though the antiliberal forces were at full tide, the Frankfurt Assembly continued ils work. It approved the Declaration of ihe Rights of ihe German People, an inspiring document that articulated the

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progressive political and social ideals of 1848. I n April 1849 the Assembly approved a constitution for a united Germany that included an emperor advised by a ministry and a legislature elected by secret ballot. Austria refused to j o i n the new union. When the leadership of the new German Reich ("nation") was offered to Frederick W i l l i a m , he refused to accept it, later declaring that he could not "pick up a crown from the gutter." After this contemptuous refusal, most of the Assembly's members returned home. Outbreaks against the conservative domination continued, but the Prussian army effectively put them down. Thousands of prominent middle-class liberals fled, many to the United States.

Italy The news of the revolutions in Paris and Vienna triggered a rash of uprisings on the Italian peninsula. I n Sicily, Venice, and Milan, revolutionaries demanded an end to foreign domination and despotic rule. I n response, K i n g Charles Albert of Sardinia voluntarily granted a new liberal constitution. Other states, such as Tuscany, also issued constitutions. I n the Papal States, meanwhile, reform had begun as early as 1846. Absolute government in Italy almost disappeared. As in the rest of Europe, the liberal and nationalist triumphs and reforms were quickly swept away by the reactionary tide. The Austrians regained their mastery in the n o r t h of Italy in July when they defeated Charles Albert at the decisive battle of Custozza. Another defeat a year later forced him to abdicate in favor of his oldest son, Victor Emmanuel EL Austria helped restore the old rulers and systems of government in Italy to their pre-1848 conditions. The final blow to the Italian movements came i n November 1848 when Pope Pius IX, who had begun a program of reform, refused to j o i n i n the struggle against Catholic Austria for a united Italy. His subjects forced h i m to flee from Rome, and the papal lands were declared a republic, w i t h Mazzini as the head. The pope's flight prompted a hostile reaction from conservative Europe, and the French sent i n an army to crush the republic i n July 1849. When the pope returned to Rome, he remained bitterly hostile to all liberal causes and ideas until his death in 1878.

bureaucratic system" and spoke of the "pestilential air blowing from the Vienna channel house and its deadening effect upon all phases of Hungarian life." He demanded parliamentary government for the whole ol the empire. In Vienna Kossuth's speech inspired some Austrian students and workers to demonstrate in the streets. The movement soon gained the force of a rebellion, and the frightened Austrian emperor forced Metternich, the symbol of European reaction, to resign. Meanwhile, the Hungarian Nationalities Diet advocated a liberal, parliamentary gov- Within «ie ernment under a limited Habsburg monarchy. Haosburg Empire The Vienna-controlled Danubian region, that mosaic of nationalities, appeared to be on the verge of being transformed into a federation. The empire's diversity soon became mirrored in a characteristic of the revolutionary movements, as the various nationalities divided among themselves. The Hungarians wrote a new constitution that was quite liberal, calling for a guarantee of civil rights, an end to serfdom, and the destruction of special privileges. In

The Habsburg Monarchy The events of 1848 took a tragic toll in the Habsburg lands. When the news of the February uprising reached Vienna, Prague, and Budapest, reformers immediately called for change. In Budapest, the nationalist liberal Lajos Kossuth (la-YOS KOS-sut; 1802-1894) attacked the Habsburg ruler's "stagnant

The leader of the. Hungarian revolutionary movement Of 1848. Lajos Kossuth, gave a liberal constitution to his people hut blocked the hopes of neighboring nations such as the Serbs. Croats, and Romanians.

CHAPTER 26 - Politics and Diplomacy in the West, 1815-1914 theory, all political benefits guaranteed i n the constitution were to extend to all citizens of Hungary, including non-Magyar minorities. The emperor accepted these reforms and promised, i n addition, a constitution for Austria. He also promised the Czechs i n Bohemia the same reforms granted the Hungarians. By summer the mood suddenly shifted. German and Czech nationalists began to quarrel, and the Magyars began to oppress the Slavic nationalities and Romanians after they i n t u r n demanded their o w n political independence. Divisions among the liberal and nationalistic forces gave the conservatives i n Vienna time to regroup and suggested to them the obvious tactic to regain their former dominance: divide and conquer the subject nationalities. I n June, demonstrations broke out i n the streets of Prague, barricades were t h r o w n up, and fighting began. The Austrians lobbed a few shells, Prague surrendered, and any hope for an autonomous kingdom of Bohemia ended. I n Hungary, Kossuth announced that he would offer civil rights, but not national independence, to the minority nationalities under his control. I n protest, the South Slavs under the Croat leader Joseph Jellachich (IO-sef ye-LA-chich; 1801-1859) attacked the Magyars, and civil war broke out. The Austrians took advantage of the situation and made Jellachich an imperial general. Following his attack against the Magyars, he was ordered to Vienna, where, i n October, he forced the surrender of the liberals who controlled the capital. By the end of the year, the weak and incapable Emperor Ferdinand I abdicated i n favor of his nephew, Franz Joseph—who would rule until 1916. The Austrians began to repeal their concessions to the Hungarians, arguing that their new emperor was not bound by the acts of his predecessor. The Magyars, outraged by this maneuver, declared complete independence for their country. The Austrians, aided by 100,000 Russian troops sent by Tsar Nicholas I and the leadership of the Croatian general Jellachich, defeated the Hungarians in a bloody and'one-sided struggle. I n the summer of 1849 Kossuth fled the country, and the Hungarian revolution reached its tragic conclusion.

PRUSSIA, GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND THE SECOND REICH • How did Bismarck manage to unify Germany when the surrounding states of western and eastern Europe were all opposed to unification? After 1848, w i t h one exception, Prussia went from strength to strength. Facing a different range of prob-

759

Steps to German Unification 1862

Bismarck appointed prime minister

1863

Russian-Prussian accord on Poland

1864

War with Denmark

1866

War with Austria; establishment of North German Confederation

1870

War with France

1871

Proclamation of the Second German Empire (Reich) at Versailles

lems i n a m u c h more unified state, K i n g Frederick William issued a constitution i n 1850 that paid lip service to parliamentary democracy but kept real power i n the hands of the king and the upper classes. The Berlin court wanted to form a confederation of northern German states, without Austria. This plan frightened the Austrians and made the Russians uneasy as well. A meeting of the three powers at Olmiitz i n 1850 forced the Prussians to withdraw their plan. Instead, the 1815 German Confederation was affirmed, w i t h Vienna recognized as the major German power. The embittered Prussians returned to Berlin, pledging revenge for the "humiliation of Olmiitz." Despite this diplomatic setback, Prussia gained success i n other areas. Berlin kept the Austrians out of the Zollverein (ZOLL-ver-ine), the customs u n i o n of German states, and fought off Austria's efforts to weaken i t . The Prussian government, dominated by the nobles, was modern and efficient, especially when compared w i t h that i n Vienna. The Prussians extended public education to more of their citizenry than i n any other European state. At the start of the 1860s a new ruler, William I (r. 1861-1888), came to power. He had a more permissive interpretation of the 1850 constitution and allowed liberals and moderates the chance to make their voices heard.

Bismarck as Prime Minister A stalemate occurred i n 1862 when K i n g W i l l i a m I wanted to strengthen his army but the Chamber of Deputies would not vote to provide the necessary funds. The liberals asserted the constitutional right to approve taxes, while the king equally strongly expressed his right to build up his forces. As the king struggled w i t h this constitutional crisis, he called Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) home from his post as Prussian ambassador to France and made h i m prime minister.

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Bismarck advised the king to ignore the legislature and collect the needed taxes without the Chambers approval. Bismarck knew the necessity of armed strength in order to gain Prussia's diplomatic goals. Ironically, his later military victories would gain him the support ol many of the liberals w h o m he had encouraged the king to defy. Bismarck's entry on the scene in B e r l i n strengthened not only the king but also the hopes of all who wanted a united German stale. Unification appealed to virtually all segments of German society, from the liberals to the conservatives, such as the historian Heinrich von Treitschke (HlNE-reesh fon TRlTE-shki), who slated, "There is only one salvation! One state, one monarchic Germany under the Hohenzollern dynasty." Berlin, through its leadership of the Zollverein, sponsorship of the confederation of n o r t h e r n German states, and efficient bureaucracy, was the obvious choice for the capital

of a unified German slate. W i l l i ihe arrival of Bismarck, the Prussians gained the necessary leadership for unification. The prime minister was a master of the art of R e a l p o l i t i k . He had ihe intelligence to assess ihe actual state of conditions, the insight lo gauge ihe character and goals of his opponents, and the talent to move skillfully and quickly. Unlike most of his colleagues, he was an expert image maker, so effective that historians have used his epithet "blood and iron" to describe his career. Few statesmen have ever accomplished so much change with such a comparatively small loss of life in a controlled use of war. Bismarck was a savvy politician who knew that force was the final card to be played, one to be used as the servant of diplomacy and not as its master. Reatpolilik—The nineteenih-ceniurv tise ol Machiavel lis notion that the ends just il y the mi-ans.

The Hoheuzollems, based hi Berlin, began the process of linking their widely spread territories in ihe seventeenth century. Napoleon contributed to a consolidated Gennan stale through his rearrangement oj the map after his mil'tturv conquests, and Bismarck completed the unification oj Germany by ¡871.

CHAPTER 26 - Politics Some historians have attributed his successes to luck, whereas others have deemed them products of genius. A n example is his approach to Russia. Bismarck knew that he would have to solidify relations w i t h Russia, and he achieved this i n 1863 by promising the Russians that he would aid them i n all Polishrelated problems. Giving up virtually nothing, he gained a secure eastern flank and proceeded to set up three wars that brought about German unification.

The Danish and Austrian Wars I n 1864 Bismarck invited Austria to j o i n Prussia and wage war on Denmark. The cause of the conflict was the disputed status of two duchies, Schleswig and Hol¬ stein, bordering on Prussia and Denmark and claimed by both. The two Germanic powers overwhelmed the modest Danish forces and split the duchies: Austria took Holstein, and Schleswig went to Prussia. With his eastern and northern flanks stabilized, Bismarck set out to isolate Austria. Italy was already hostile to the Austrians and remained so when Bismarck promised i t Venetia i n return for its assistance i n the future war. He encouraged the French to be neutral by i n t i m a t i n g that Prussia m i g h t support France should i t seek to widen its borders. Severe domestic crises w i t h the Hungarians absorbed Austria, w h i c h soon found itself isolated. The Prussian leader provoked war w i t h Vienna by piously expressing alarm at the manner i n w h i c h the Austrians were r u l i n g Holstein and sending troops i n t o the province. Austria took the bait, entered the war, and was devastated by the Prussians at the battle o f Sadowa. I n this Seven Weeks' War, the Prussians avenged the "humiliation of Olmiitz" of 1850. Prussia offered a moderate peace settlement that ended the o l d German Confederation. I n its place Bismarck formed the N o r t h German Confederation, w i t h Austria and the southern German states excluded. Prussia annexed several territories, including Hanover, Mecklenburg, and other states north of the Main River, i n this penultimate stage i n the unification of Germany.

The War with France After 1867 Bismarck turned his attention westward to France and Emperor Napoleon I I I (1808-1873). The French leader had allowed himself to be talked into neutrality i n 1866 because he anticipated a long war between his German neighbors that w o u l d weaken

and Diplomacy in the West, 1815-1914

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them both and because he hoped to expand into the neutral state of Belgium. I n August 1866, Napoleon approached Bismarck for his share of the fruits of victory, but the German leader refused to agree to French demands. Frustrated and offended, Napoleon I I I insisted that Prussia approve France s annexation of Luxembourg and Belgium. I n a crafty move, Bismarck invited the French envoy to B e r l i n to put these demands into w r i t i n g but still avoided giving a definite response. Four years later, Bismarck sent the document to the B r i t i s h i n order to gain their sympathy for the upcoming war w i t h the French. After Frances active participation i n the Crimean War, there was no chance that Russia would come to Napoleons aid. Bismarck let the Austrians k n o w about France's cooperation w i t h the Prussians during the 1866 war, and Italy was not about to help Napoleon I I I after his activities i n 1859. By 1870 France was isolated. I t was simply a question now of Bismarck maneuvering the French into war. The immediate controversy centered on the succession to the Spanish throne left vacant after a revo l u t i o n had overthrown the reactionary Queen Isabella. The Spaniards asked Leopold, a Hohenzollern prince, to become the constitutional king of their country. France saw this as an unacceptable extension of Prussian influence, and Leopold w i t h drew his candidacy. B u t this was not enough for Paris. The French sent their ambassador to Ems, where the Prussian k i n g was vacationing, to gain from h i m a pledge that he w o u l d not again p e r m i t Leopold to seek the Spanish throne. The king refused to agree to this unreasonable request. After the interview, he directed that a message be sent to Bismarck, describing the incident. Bismarck altered the message of this Ems dispatch to give the impression that the French ambassador had insulted the Prussian king and that the king had returned the insult. The r u m o r was leaked to the press and infuriated b o t h the Germans and the French. France declared war i n July. The two countries' forces appeared to be evenly matched i n equipment, but the Germans had a better-trained and more experienced army. I n 2 months the Prussians overwhelmed the French, delivering the crowning blow at the battle of Sedan, where the emperor and his army were surrounded and forced to surrender. Troops of the combined armies of the German states besieged the north of France for 4 months before the final French capitulation. By the Treaty of Frankfurt i n 1871, France lost Alsace and a part of Lorraine to Germany and was required to pay a large indemnity. The call for revenge of France's defeat and h u m i l i a t i o n became a major issue i n French politics.

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Document

Bismarck and the Ems Dispatch

Bismarck knew how to manipulate public opinion through press leaks and doctored documents. See how he altered the Ems dispatch to achieve his goals vis-à-vis France.

I

made use of the royal authorization communicated to me through Abeken, to publish the contents of the telegram; and in the presence of my two guests I reduced the telegram by striking out words, but without adding or altering, to the following form: After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince ol Hohenzollern had been olliciallv communicated to the imperial government of France by the royal government of Spain, the French ambassador at Ems further demanded of his Majesty the King that he would authorize h i m to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King bound himself for all future time never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollems should renew their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French ambassador again, and sent to tell h i m through the aide-de-camp on duty that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador. The difference in the effect of the abbreviated text of the Ems telegram as compared with that pro-

duced by the original was not the result of stronger words but of the form, which made this announcement appear decisive, while Abeken's version only would have been regarded as a fragment of a negotiation still pending, and to be continued at Berlin. After I had read out the concentrated edition to my two guests, Moltke remarked: "Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." Questions to Consider 1. How does Bismarck's altering of the Ems dispatch reflect his role as a master of Realpolitik? 2. Do you think government leaders are justified in manipulating truth to gain their political actions? In your lifetime have you seen an example of this? 3. What role do governmental "leaks" such as that of the Ems dispatch play today? From Bismarck: The Man and ihe Siaiesman, trans. A. J. Bullet (1899).

The Second German Reich The Second Reich came into existence at a ceremony in January 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors al the Palace of Versailles. There King William 1 became kaiser ("emperor") of a federal union of 26 states with a population of 41 m i l l i o n . The bicameral (two-house) legislature of ihe new empire consisted of the Btindesrat (BUN-des-raht), rep- German Unity resenting ihe tilling houses of the various stales, and the Reichstag (RIKE-slag), representing the people through ils 397 members elected bv male suflrage. Dominant power rested with the kaiser, who controlled military and foreign affairs and the 17 votes in the Btindesrat needed to veto any constitutional change. The actual head of government was the chancellor who was appointed by the kaiser and responsible lo h i m only. This arrangement allowed the chancellor to defy or ignore ihe legislature if i l served his purpose. However, he had to operate within the Judged from die fxiini of view of comparatiw manpower, the French and German armies appeared in 1870 to be equally swing. Howewr, Bundesral The upper class of the German legislature alter 1871. the Genitalis look advantage of their superiority in leadership and Reichstag—The lower house ol the bicameral German legislature experience to overwhelm the French in the Franco-Pussian War. after 1871.

CHAPTER 26 - Politics constraints of the federal state structure i n w h i c h large powers of local government were given to the member states.

Bismarck as Chancellor As chancellor, Otto von Bismarck built modern Germany on his belief i n the inherent efficiency of a state based on one faith, one law, and one ruler. He distrusted institutions that d i d not fit that tripartite formula—specifically, the Catholic Church and the Socialist party. Bismarck was more constrained i n domestic than i n foreign affairs. I t is not surprising, therefore, that he fared better i n foreign matters. The Catholic political party had sent a large bloc of representatives to the Reichstag i n 1871, and these members supported the complete independence of the church from state control, denounced divorce, objected to secular education, and questioned freedom of conscience. Many Catholics strongly supported the new dogma of papal infallibility. W i t h i n the protestant Prussian part of Germany, Bismarck introduced antiCatholic policies that triggered a conflict known as the Kulturkampf (KUL-ture-kompf; "struggle for civilization"). These so-called May Laws made it an offense for the clergy to criticize the government, regulated the educational activities of the religious orders, and expelled the Jesuits from the country. The state also required civil marriages and dictated that all priests study theology at state universities. Pope Pius I X declared these acts null and void and told loyal Catholics to refuse to obey them. Many of the chancellor's laws applied equally to protestants, who actively protested them. As opposition spread, Bismarck struck hard at the Catholics, imprisoning priests, confiscating church property, and closing down pulpits. When the tide d i d not t u r n i n his favor, he realized that he could not afford to create millions of martyrs. Showing his shrewd sense ;of power, he cut his losses, retreated, and repealed most of the anti-Catholic laws. The Social Democratic (Marxist) movement posed a greater challenge to Bismarck's rule. The party's founder, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), rejected violence as a means to gain power and instead advocated working w i t h i n the existing political structure. After his death the movement retained its nonviolent nature. The party's popularity soared when i t was officially established i n 1875, and its leaders pushed for true parliamentary democracy and wider-ranging social programs. I n 1878 Bismarck used two attempts on the emperor's life as an excuse to launch an all-out campaign to weaken the Social Democrats, even though they had no connection w i t h the assassination attempts. He dissolved extralegal socialist organizations, suppressed their publications, and threw their

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leaders i n jail. Despite these measures, the socialists continued to gain support. When he failed to weaken the socialists by direct confrontation, the chancellor changed tactics. He decided to undercut them by taking over their program. Through the 1880s, he implemented important social legislation that provided wage earners w i t h sickness, accident, and old-age insurance. He sponsored other laws that responded to many of the abuses workers encountered. Still, the Social Democrats continued to grow i n size and influence. However, by creating the first welfare state, the pragmatic Prussian chancellor defused a potential revolution.

Kaiser William II I n 1888 W i l l i a m I I , the grandson of the emperor, became head of the Reich. Just as Bismarck had dominated European affairs since 1862, the new emperor w o u l d play a key role u n t i l 1918. Here was a person who advocated a policy of "blood and iron," but w i t h out Bismarck's finesse. Where Bismarck knew the l i m its and uses of force and appreciated the nuances of public statements, William was a militarist and a bully. Serving i n a modern age, the new emperor still believed i n the divine r i g h t of kings and constantly reminded his entourage that "he and God" worked together for the good of the state. With such a contrast i n styles, i t is not surprising that W i l l i a m saw Bismarck not as a guide but as a threat. Once W i l l i a m established himself i n power, he forced Bismarck to resign i n March 1890. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany presented a puzzling picture to the world. On the one hand, the blustering kaiser made fiery and warlike statements. He encouraged militarism and the belief that "Alles kommt von oben" (ALL-es k o m m t fon 0-ben; "Everything comes down from above"). On the other hand, his thoroughly advanced country made great scientific and cultural strides. Observers of Germ a n affairs noted that one-third of the voters supported the Social Democrats, an indication of a healthy parliamentary system. A commonly held pride i n Germany's accomplishments k n i t the country together. More important than William's behavior was the fact that, by the beginning of the new century, the Germans competed actively i n all areas w i t h the British. Although Germany d i d not outproduce Britain, longt e r m projections showed that the island nation's growth had leveled out and that i n the next generation the Reich would surpass i t . The Germans dominated the world market i n the chemical and electrical industries and were making strides i n other areas. They boasted a more efficient organization of their industries, a higher literacy rate for their workers, better

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PAST A N D P R E S E N T

equality w i t h Vienna. The government in Vienna became increasingly inept.

The Dual Monarchy

Bismarck and they/mug Kaiser William II meet in 1888. Tfie tun disagreed over many issues, and in 1890 William dismissed the aged chancellor

vocational training, and a more aggressive corps of businessmen. German labor unions were less combative than the British, and the government gave more support to industry than Parliament d i d . When the kaiser demanded a navy the equal of that of England, alarm bells went off in London.

THE DECLINE OF AUSTRIA • Why did the Austrian Empire decline in power and influence after 1867? Conservative forces consolidated control in Vienna after 1848, but the Austrian Habsburgs operated from a weakened position. Their victory over the Hungarians brought only temporary comfort. The collapse of the libera] and nationalistic movements in the Habs¬ burg Empire was followed by a harsh repression that did little to address the basic political problems facing Vienna. Centralizing and Germanizing tendencies stimulated nationalist sentiments in the empire. After their losses to the French and Sardinians in 1859. the Austrians considered moving toward a federal system for their lands. The Hungarians, however, demanded

Alter the Austrians' disastrous defeat by Prussia, Franz Joseph was forced to offer the Hungarians an equal partnership with Vienna in ruling the empire. The offer was accepted, and in 1867 the constitution known a.s the Ausgleich (OUS-glike; "compromise") was enacted. This document created the Dual Monarchy, in which the Habsburg ruler was both the king of Hungary and the emperor of Austria—defined as the area that was not part of Hungary, Each country had its own constitution, language, flag, and parliament. Ministers common to both countries handled finance, defense, and foreign affairs, but they were supervised by "delegations," which consisted of 60 m e m b e r from each parliament who did not meet together, except in emergency circumstances. The Ausgleich was to be renegotiated every 10 years. By the end of the century, the Dual Monarchy contained 12 million Germans, 10 million Hungarians, more than 24 million Slavs, and 4 million Romanians, among other nationalities. Although the Germans of Austria had recognized the equality of the Hungarians, the rest of the nationalities continued to live under alien rule. Now, instead of having to deal with one dominant national group, they had to cope with two. In some cases, as in the prospering, cosmopolitan, and sophisticated area of Bohemia-Moravia, the people wanted an independent state or, at the very least, more rights w i t h i n the Habsburg realm. Other groups, such as the Serbs, sought the goal of joining their countrymen living in adjacent national states. The nationalities question remained an explosive problem for the authorities in Vienna and Budapest. The functioning of the Dual Monarchy was best symbolized by the official banknotes, which were printed i n eight languages on one side and in Hungarian on the other. In the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchv, the aristocracy governed under the Kossuth constitution of 1848. The Hungarians refused to share rule w i t h the minorities in their kingdom. A small, powerful landed oligarchy dominated the mass of backward, landless peasants. The conservative leadership carried out a virtual process of Magyarization with their minorities (imposing Hungarian culture as the desired standard) while they continually squabbled with the Austrians. In the Austrian portion, wealthy German businessmen and the landed aristocracy dominated politDual Monarchy—The Auslro-Hungarian Empire, created in 1867 by the writing of a constilulion that defined the relationship between Vienna and Budapest.

C H A P T E R 26 •

Politics

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It jell to the Habsburgs to exercise power over the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fracture zone of southeastern Europe. Then major nationalities—especially the Hungarians—presented the Vienna-based government with severe challenges.

ical life. Bui even with this concentration of power, the government was much more democratic, especially after 1907, when the two-house legislature was elected by universal manhood suffrage. Here, too, nationalism was a serious problem, and political parties came to be based not on principle but on nationality. Each nationality had to work w i t h ihe Germans, even though it mighi detest them. The nationalities frequently disliked one another, and this prevented the formation of any coalitions among them. By 1914 the Austrians had extended substantial local self-government to their subject nationalities, but this concession did little loquiel discontent. The Ausgleich functioned poorly, yet its defenders could still tell themselves that they were, after all, citizens of a "great empire." The Dual Monarchy occupied a strategic geographical location and had enough

military strength to be very influential in the Balkans. In addition, the area had great economic potential, w i t h Hungarian wheat, Croatian and Slovenian livestock, Czech banks and industry, and Austrian commerce. But Franz Joseph ruled over a disjointed conglomeration of peoples who shared only the pretension of being citizens of a great power.

FRANCE: THE SECOND EMPIRE AND THE THIRD REPUBLIC • Why was France unable to compete effectively with Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century?

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The Second Empire I n France the violence of the June Days moved the conservatives i n the countryside and the moderates i n the cities to elect Louis Napoleon, nephew of Napoleon I , to the presidency of the Second Republic i n 1848. Although he had failed miserably i n his attempts to overthrow the king i n 1836 and M s ^ S S 1840, he was sure that destiny intended great fMmittiU things for h i m . When he came back to Paris ttoMri ^ ' revolution, he was untainted by any Cavaignacinvolvement i n the June Days and appeared to British cartoon be a unifying force. a

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prince, on the Mexican throne and sent 40,000 troops to support h i m . Mexican patriots expelled the forces and i n 1867 a firing squad executed Maximilian. After 1866, Louis Napoleon met his match i n the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), when his blundering ambition contributed to a quick Prussian victory over Austria. Finally, i n 1870 he gambled on war against Prussia and lost. With this defeat, the Second Empire ended.

l e

The republic's constitution gave strong powers to the president but limited the office to a single t e r m . Louis Napoleon took advantage of the authority given h i m and his strong majority to fortify his position. He and his conservative allies dominated France for the next t w o years, becoming strong enough to overthrow the constitution i n a coup d'etat in December 1851. Louis Napoleon and his allies brutally put down the workers and peasants who opposed the coup and engineered a plebiscite that gave h i m virtually unanimous support. I n 1852 he proclaimed himself Emperor Napoleon I I I , and the Second Empire replaced the Second Republic. During its 18-year span, the Second Empire accomplished a great deal. Industrialization brought prosperity to France. Production doubled. France supported the building of the Suez Canal, and railway mileage in France increased by 500 percent. The partial legalization of labor unions and guarantee of the right to strike improved workers' conditions. Baron Georges Haussmann transformed Paris i n an ambitious urban renewal that featured broad boulevards, unified architecture, modern utilities, and i m p r o v e d traffic flow. The price for the order and stability needed to build this prosperity came i n the form of political control. The government remained, i n theory, a parliamentary regime. The emperor's agents rigged the elections to ensure a majority i n the powerless legislature for the emperor. The secret police hounded opponents, both real and potential, and the state censored the press, which accordingly rarely reported bad news. At first, the emperor brought glory to France through an interventionist and imperialist foreign policy. He continually claimed to be a man of peace, but he allied w i t h Britain i n the Crimean War, supported Count Camillo Benso d i Cavour, briefly, i n Italy, expanded French influence to ensure a foothold i n Indochina, raised the French flag over Tahiti, and penetrated West Africa along the Senegal River. Foreign affairs soured for h i m i n the 1860s when he made an ill-advised attempt to take advantage o f the confusion caused by the U.S. Civil War to establish a foothold i n the Americas. He placed M a x i m i l i a n , a Habsburg

The Third Republic The defeat of Frances Second Empire at Sedan i n 1870 gave b i r t h to the Third Republic. The humiliating peace terms stripped France of part of Lorraine and all of Alsace and imposed a huge indemnity on the country. The spectacle of the Germans crowning their emperor and proclaiming the Second Reich at Versailles, the symbol of French greatness, left a bitter taste. The stark contrast between the promised grandeur of the Second Empire and the humiliation of 1871 left a legacy of domestic uncertainty and an obsession for revenge against the Germans. Persistent class conflicts, covered over during Louis Napoleon's reign, also contributed to many years of shaky existence before the republic gained a f i r m fooling. A new and overwhelmingly royalist national assembly was elected to construct a new, conservative government after the signing of the peace w i t h the Germans. This, added to the shock of the defeat, touched off a revolutionary outburst that led to the Paris Commune of 1871. Parisians had suffered such severe food shortages d u r i n g the siege of the city that some had been forced to eat rats and zoo animals. When it turned out that their sacrifices had been i n vain, republican and radical Parisians joined forces i n part of the city to form a commune, in the tradition of the 1792 Paris Commune, to save the republic. The Communards advocated government control of prices, wages, and w o r k i n g conditions (including stopping night work in the bakeries). After several weeks of civil strife, the Commune was savagely put down. Class hatred split France further yet. Because the two monarchist factions that constituted a majority could not agree on an acceptable candidate for the monarchy, they finally settled on a republic as the least disagreeable form of government. The National Assembly approved the new republican constitution i n 1875. Under the new system, members o f the influential lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, were elected by direct suffrage. There was also a Senate, whose members were elected Communards—Parisians who lived and worked in the Paris Commune in 1871.

CHAPTER 26 • Politics indirectly by electoral colleges i n the departments. The constitution established a weak executive, elected by the legislature. The ministry exercised real power, but its authority depended on whatever coalition of parties could be assembled to form a tenuous majority i n the legislature.

Boulanger and Dreyfus The stormy tenure of the Third Republic was marked by a series of crises, including anarchist violence culminating i n a series of bombings i n 1893, financial scandals such as the notorious Panama Canal venture that implicated a wide range of leading figures, and lesser scandals. The two most serious threats were the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs. The weak and traumatized republic was both threatened and embarrassed by the public cries for vengeance uttered i n 1886 by General Georges Boulanger (ZHORZH boo-lon-ZHAY; 1837-1891), the minister of war. This charismatic, warmongering figure made a series of speeches, w h i c h he ended by emotionally proclaiming, "Remember, they are waiting for us i n Alsace." The considerable number of antirepublicans saw h i m as a m a n on horseback who would sweep away the republic i n a coup d'etat, much as Louis Napoleon had done i n 1851, and bring back French grandeur. The government finally ordered Boulanger's arrest on a charge of conspiracy, and he fled the country. Later he committed suicide. The Dreyfus case was far more serious because i t polarized the entire country, divided and embittered French o p i n i o n by the anti-Semitic fervor i t unleashed, and challenged the fundamental ideals of French democracy. Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935), the first Jewish officer on the French general staff, was accused i n 1894 of selling m i l itary secrets to Germany. His fellow officers tried him, found h i m guilty, stripped him of his commission, and condemned h i m to solitary confinement on Devil's Island, a dreadful convict settlement off the northeast coast of South America. Even w i t h the case supposedly settled, military secrets continued to leak to the Germans, and subsequently a royalist, spendthrift officer named Major Esterhazy was accused, tried, and acquitted.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus had to pass through this "Guard of Dishonor" each day on his way to the courtroom during his second trial in 1899.

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The case became a cause célèbre i n 1898 when the French writer É m i l e Zola (1840-1902) wrote his famous letter J'accuse (zha-CUES; " I accuse"), i n which he attacked the judge for knowingly allowing the guilty party to go free while Dreyfus remained in jail. The next year Esterhazy admitted his guilt, but by that time the entire country had split into two camps. On the one side were the anti-Dreyfusards—the army, church, and royalists—on the other side were the pro-Dreyfusards— the intellectuals, socialists, and republicans. The case was once again placed under review i n the military courts, and even though Esterhazy had confessed, the court continued to find Dreyfus guilty. Finally, the French president pardoned h i m , and i n 1906 the highest civil court i n France found h i m innocent. The case had greater significance than just the fate of one man. Those who had worked against Dreyfus, especially the church, would pay dearly for their stand. Many republicans believed that the church, a consistent ally of the monarchists, was the natural enemy of democratic government. They demanded an end to the church's official ties to the state. I n 1904 and 1905 the government closed all church schools and rescinded the Napoleonic Concordat, A l l ties between church and state were formally ended. After weathering 40 difficult years, by 1914, the T h i r d Republic had gained prosperity and stability. Workers had found their voice i n the country as the Napoleonic Concordant—Agreement signed between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII in 1801 reestablishing the Catholic Church as the religion of the majority of the French people. The church regained its prominence and role in education, but without its pre-1789 power and wealth.

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various trade and local union groups came together i n the General Confederation of Labor. Monarchists and other right-wing parties still had considerable influence, although the Dreyfus affair had weakened them. French republicanism had wide support across the political spectrum. Most French citizens enjoyed basic democratic rights, which they exercised through the extremely complex multiparty political system of the republic. The various ministries that were constructed from the fragile coalitions came and went w i t h bewildering rapidity. Yet France was strong and prosperous, one of only two republics among the world's great powers.

ITALY TO 1914 • What challenges did Cavourface in his efforts to unify Italy?

Italian Unification After 1848 fighters for Italian unification established their base i n the kingdom of Sardinia, where the young monarch, Victor Emmanuel I I , refused to withdraw the liberal constitution granted by his father. The prime minister. Count Camillo Benso d i Cavour (1810-1861), a liberal influenced by what he had seen i n Switzerland, France, and Britain, assumed leadership of the drive to unify the peninsula. After 1852, when he became prime minister, Cavour concentrated on freeing his country from Austrian domination. He knew, however, that Sardinia needed allies to take on the Habsburgs. To that end, i n 1855 Sardinia joined Britain and France in their fight against Russia i n the Crimean War. This step enabled Cavour to speak at the peace conference after the war, where he stated Italy's desire for unification. Cavour's presentation won Napoleon Ill's support, and the two opportunists found that they could both make gains i f they could draw the Austrians into war. They agreed that if Cavour could entice the Vienna gov¬ ernment into war, France would come to SarH f i tlinia's aid and help eject the Austrians from EkH Lombardy and Venctia. In return, France would receive Nice and Savoy from Sardinia. The plan The worked to perfection. In April 1859 Cavour lured Unification the Austrians into declaring war. The French or Italy. 1859-1870 and Sardinians defeated them at Magenta and Solferino and drove them out of Lombardy. At the same time, revolts broke out i n Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and Romagna. Napoleon was praised and proclaimed as the savior and liberator of Italy. Upon receiving his share of the agreement, Napoleon I I I reversed himself and made peace w i t h

Count Camilla Benso di Cavour mastered the arts of diplomatic maneuvering to create a unified Italy.

Austria before the allies could invade Venetia. The massing of Prussian troops on French borders as well as his second thoughts about the implications of a united Italy drove Napoleon to this move. The Sardinians were outraged, but they could do little but agree to a peace settlement. The agreement awarded Lombardy to Sardinia, restored the exiled rulers of Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and Romagna, and set up an Italian confederation i n which Austria was included. France's duplicity d i d not stop Cavour. A year later, appealing to the British, he made major changes in the peace settlement. Plebiscites were held in Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, all of which voted to j o i n Sardinia. Even w i t h the loss of Nice and Savoy to France, the addition of the three areas made Sardinia the dominant power i n the peninsula. With the consolidation of power i n the north, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) became the major figure i n the unification struggle. This follower of Mazzini, secretly financed by Cavour, led his 1000 tough adventurers, known as the Red Shirts, to conquer Sicily and Naples. He then prepared to take the Papal States.

CHAPTER 26 • Politics This move prompted Cavour, who feared that a march on the pope's holdings might provoke French intervention, to rush troops to Naples. He convinced Garibaldi to surrender his power Garibaldi to Victor Emmanuel I I , thus ensuring Sardinian Surrendering Power-British domination of the unification movement. By Cartoon November 1860, Sardinia had annexed the former kingdom of Naples and Sicily and all the papal lands, except Rome and its environs. A meeting at Turin i n March 1861 formally proclaimed the existence of the kingdom of Italy, a new nation of 22 million people. But Austrian control of Venetia and the pope's jurisdiction over Rome were problems that remained unsolved until after Cavour's death i n 1861. Italy gained Venetia i n 1866 by allying with Prussia in the Austro-Prussian war. When the Franco-Prussian war broke out i n 1870, the French could do litüe to help the pope. Italian forces took control of Rome, and i n 1871, this city became the capital of a unified Italy. The opportunistic methods used by the Sardinians have been criticized. Cavour made no attempt to hide the true nature of his policies. He once said, " I f we did for ourselves what we do for our country, what rascals we should be." He fully understood the rules of the Realpolitik game i n the post-1848 state system and played i t extraordinarily well.

The New Italian State Italy faced overwhelming problems. The Italians had to deal w i t h economic, political, and cultural differences between the northern and southern parts of the country, a lack of natural resources, and a politically inexperienced population. I t also had too many people for its limited economic base. Italy's most troubling problem, however, was the question of the papacy, which seriously weakened the state. The pope, the spiritual father of most Italians, refused to accept the incorporation of Rome into the new nation. He called himself the "prisoner of the Vatican," and encouraged—with little effect—his Italian flock not to vote. I n an attempt to satisfy the pope, the government i n 1871 passed the Law of Papal Guarantees, which set up the Vatican as a sovereign state and allocated the pope an annual sum of $600,000 (roughly the amount of money he had received from his previously held lands). Pius I X rejected the offer, but the state refused to repeal the law. Despite conflicting and unstable political parties, the new Italian state carried on an impressive program of railroad building, naval construction, and attempts at social and welfare legislation. But major problems remained, especially w i t h the peasantry i n the south. Radical political parties made their presence felt after the t u r n of the century i n the form of

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widespread strikes. I n 1900 an anarchist assassinated K i n g Umberto, who had taken the throne i n 1878. Change proceeded slowly after that, and not u n t i l 1912, a time when there was still widespread illiteracy, did the country gain universal manhood suffrage. The Italian leaders' ambition to make Italy a world power placed a great burden on the nation. Money spent on the army came at the expense of needed investments i n education and social services. National resources were squandered i n an unsuccessful attempt i n 1896 and 1912 to build an empire i n Africa. Up to the beginning of World War I , Italy faced severe economic crises and labor unrest. I n June 1914 a general strike spread through the central part of the peninsula. Benito Mussolini, editor of a socialist journal, played a key role i n this movement. Attempts to achieve compulsory education, freedom of the press, and better w o r k i n g conditions d i d little to ease the economic hardships and high taxes that had driven thousands to emigrate to the United States. The south especially suffered, because i t had not shared i n the industrial gains of the northern part of the country.

THE UNITED KINGDOM • What political and economic factors accounted for the stability of Britain during the nineteenth century?

Tory Dominance The post-Napoleonic War period was the most difficult time for Britain, as the transition back to a peacetime economy and the wrenching changes caused by industrialization made their effects felt. Some traditional workers lost their jobs due to the increasing use of machines, and i n response, workers smashed the machines and destroyed some factories. Violence broke out when some working-class groups and radicals pushed for rapid reforms. The worst incident took place i n August 1819 i n what became known as the Peterloo Massacre. I n Manchester, a crowd of 60,000 gathered at St. Peter's Fields to push for parliamentary reforms. When the army was sent to disband the meeting, several people were killed and hundreds were injured. The Tories (Conservatives), Britain's ruling party since the 1770s, were b l i n d to the hardships of the workers. They continued to react to the long-departed excesses of the French Revolution. Instead of dealing w i t h the misfortunes of the poor and the unemployed, they declared that the doctrine of "peace, law, order, and discipline" should be their guide. To that end, they pushed through a series of repressive acts after

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1815 that suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, restricted public meetings, repressed liberal newspapers, and placed heavy fines on literature considered to be dangerous. Massive conflict between the rich and poor appeared inevitable. Britain's political abuses were plain for all to see. Representation i n the House of Commons was not at all proportional to the population. Three percent of the people dictated the election of members. The rapidly growing industrial towns such as Manchester and Birmingham—each w i t h more than 100,000 citizens—had no representatives, while other areas, virtually w i t h o u t population, had them. The duke of Wellington's failure to acknowledge the need for reforms aroused the public. I n the end, the "Iron Duke" and the Tories were forced to resign when members of his o w n party voted against Wellington i n protest of the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, which gave Roman Catholics voting rights and the rights to serve i n Parliament and most public offices. The Tories were replaced by a more liberal group, the Whigs. The drive toward self-interested changes by the upper classes had begun in the 1820s, led by Robert Peel (1788-1850) and George Canning (1770-1827). These two set i n motion the British reform tradition that continued to 19)4. When Wellington was voted out of office, Lord Charles Grey (1764-1845), leader of the W h i g party, became head of government. I n 1832 Grey pushed immediately to reform Parliament.

Self-interested Reform . After being blocked by aristocratic interests, first i n the House of Commons, and then i n the House of Lords, reform bills responding to these electoral abuses were finally passed. But they became law only because K i n g William I V threatened to create enough new members of the House of Lords who would vote for the bills i n order to pass them. Grey's reform bills did not b r i n g absolute democracy, but they pointed the way t o w a r d a more equitable political system. Reformers pushed through laws that ended capital punishment for more than 100 offenses, created a m o d e m police force for L o n d o n , recognized labor unions, and repealed old laws that kept non-Anglican protestants from sitting i n Parliament. The reform tide increased i n the 1830s and 1840s. Abolitionist pressures brought about the ending of slavery i n the British Empire i n 1833. Parliament passed laws i n i tiating the regulation o f w o r k i n g conditions and hours. I n 1835 the Municipal Corporations Act introduced a u n i f o r m system of town government by popular elections. Britain's government was far from being a democracy, and i n the 1830s and 1840s, a strong pop-

ular movement k n o w n as C h a r t i s m developed. Its leaders summarized the country's needs i n six demands: universal manhood suffrage, secret voting, no property qualifications for members of Parliament, payment of Parliament members so that the poor could seek election, annual elections, and equal districts. I n 1839, 1842, and 1848, the Chartists presented their demands, backed by more than a million signatures on their petitions. But each time, they failed to gain their goals, and the movement declined after 1848. By the end of the century, however, all of their demands, except that for annual parliamentary elections, had been put into law. M i r r o r i n g the ascendancy of the middle classes, economic liberalism became dominant. A policy of free trade came to be favored because, given Britain's overwhelming economic superiority, the country could best profit from that approach. The Corn Laws' protective duties on imported grain, which had favored the gentry since 1815, no longer suited the industrializing British economy. These laws had been designed to encourage exports and to protect British landowners from foreign competition. By the middle of the century, the population had grown to such an extent that B r i t i s h farmers could no longer feed the country, and the price of bread rose alarmingly. The potato crop famine i n Ireland i n 1845 spotlighted the situation and the need for low-priced food from abroad. Repeal of the Corn Laws made possible the import of cheaper food. Soon Britain abandoned customs duties of every kind. The economy boomed under the stimulus of cheap imports of raw materials and food.

The Irish Dilemma One dilemma escaped the solutions of well-meaning reformers, that of the British role i n Ireland, which originated i n the seventeenth century. The British placed large numbers of Scottish emigrants i n the province o f Ulster in northern Ireland, which built a strong colony of protestants. I n the eighteenth century, the British passed a number of oppressive laws against Irish Catholics, taking what was left of their lands and restricting their political, economic, and religious freedom. Passage of the Act of Union i n 1801 forced the Irish to send their representatives to the Parliament i n London, not Dublin. Most of the Irish farmland at this time was controlled by parasitic landlords, w h o leased their newly gained lands i n increasingly smaller plots to more and more people. Many peasants could not pay their rent and were

Chartism—A movement active in the middle part of the nineteenth century pushing British politicians to make reforms.

CHAPTER 26 - Politics evicted from the land. The Irish lost both their selfgovernment and their livelihood. The 1845 potato famine and its aftereffects led to a tremendous decline i n population. Perhaps as many as 1 million died and 1.5 million emigrated, many to the United States. Between 1841 and 1891, the population fell by more than 40 percent, from 8.8 m i l l i o n to less than 5 million. For all of their suffering, the I r i s h gained very few concessions from London during the nineteenth century. The Catholic E m a n c i p a t i o n Act (1829) removed legal l i m i t a t i o n s from the I r i s h Church while tenants received protection from being arbitrarily evicted by British landlords. The Irish Anglican Church lost its favored position when Roman Catholics were freed of the obligation to pay tax support to a church they d i d not attend. I n the 1880s Irish peasants were given the chance gradually to regain land that had once been theirs.

Victorian Reforms I n the mid-1800s an alliance of the landed gentry and the middle classes worked together to dominate the British government and to keep the lower classes " i n their stations." The newly ascendant middle classes believed that political reforms had gone far enough, and the W h i g government o f L o r d Palmerston, who served as prime minister from 1855 to 1865, reflected this view. B u t the final t h i r d of the century w o u l d belong to the reforming politicians among the Liberals and Conservatives who had to face the fact that the complacency of government during the "Victorian Compromise" from 1850 to 1865 could not continue. Serious problems plagued the country. Only one adult male i n six was entitled to vote. B o t h parties felt the pressure to make the political system more representative. Both parties also knew that reform must come, and each hoped to take the credit and gain the resultant strength for extending the vote. Thanks to its wealth and adaptability, Britain built a truly democratic political structure by 1914. The state continued to support business even as i t became more intimately involved i n matters affecting the welfare of its citizens.

Gladstone and Disraeli Two great statesmen, W i l l i a m E w a r t Gladstone (1809-1898), a Liberal, and Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), a Conservative, dominated the first part of this period w i t h their policies of gradual reform. They alternated as prime minister from 1867 to 1880. After Disraeli's death, Gladstone prevailed u n t i l he retired i n 1894. The two leaders came from sharply contrasting backgrounds. The son of a rich Liverpool

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merchant, Gladstone had every advantage that wealth and good social position could give h i m . He entered Parliament i n 1833 and quickly became one of the great orators of his day. He began as a Conservative, working i n the tradition of the Tory reformer Robert Peel. Gradually he shifted his alliance to the newly formed Liberal party i n the 1850s, became a strong supporter of laissez-faire economics, and worked to keep government from interfering i n business. He was far more effective as a political reformer than as a social or economic one. Disraeli had few of Gladstone's advantages. The son of a Jew who became a naturalized British subject i n 1801, Disraeli was baptized an Anglican. He first made a name for himself as the author of the novel Vivian Grey (1826). I n contrast to Gladstone, Disraeli went from liberalism to conservatism i n his philosophy. He stood for office as a Conservative throughout his career and became the leader of the party. The Liberals' t u r n came first. I n 1866 they introduced a moderate reform bill giving city workers the vote. Some Conservatives opposed i t , fearful that increasing the franchise would bring the day of revolution closer. When the proposal failed to pass, political agitation and riots rocked the country. The outbreaks evidently impressed the members of Parliament; when the Conservatives came to power i n 1867, Disraeli successfully sponsored the Second Reform B i l l , w h i c h added more than a m i l l i o n city workers to the voting rolls. The measure increased the electorate by 88 percent, although women and farm laborers were still denied the vote. Even though the Conservatives passed the voter reform bill, the new elections i n 1868 brought the Liberals back to power, and Gladstone began his so-called Glorious Ministry, w h i c h lasted u n t i l 1874. W i t h the granting o f the vote to the urban masses, i t became imperative to educate their children. The Education Act of 1870 promoted the establishment of local school boards to build and maintain state schools. Private schools received governmental subsidies i f they met certain m i n i m a l standards. Elementary school attendance, which was compulsory between the ages of 5 and 14, jumped from 1 to 4 m i l l i o n i n 10 years. Other reforms included a complete overhaul of the civil service system. Previously, i n both the government and the military, appointments and promotions depended on patronage and favoritism. B u t i n 1870, this method was replaced by open examinations. The government also improved the military by shortening enlistment terms, abolishing flogging, and stopping the sale of officers' ranks. Gladstone's government successfully revamped the justice system and introduced the secret ballot. Finally, some restrictions on labor unions' activities were removed. By 1872 the Glorious Ministry had exhausted itself, and Disraeli referred to Gladstone

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Prime Minister William Gladstone introduces the First Home Rule Bill for Ireland before the House of Commons; the bill would go down to defeat.

and his colleagues in (he House of Commons as a "range of exhausted volcanoes." Disraeli's government succeeded the Glorious Ministry in 1874, and he stated that he was going to "give the country a rest." He was no stand-pat Conservative, however. He supported an approach known as Tory democracy, which attempted to weld an alliance between the landed gentry and the workers against the middle class. Even during this "time of rest," Disraeli's government pushed through important reforms in public housing, food and drug legislation, and union rights to strike and picket peacefully. Gladstone returned to power i n 1880 and continued the stream of reforms with the Third Reform Bill, which extended the vote to agricultural workers. This act brought Britain to the verge of universal male suffrage. Gladstone also secured passage of the Employers' Liability Act, w h i c h gave workers rights of compensation in case of accidents on the job. He tried to solve the Irish question, but none of the concessions made up for the lack of home rule, and the Irish patriot Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891) began to work actively to force the issue through Parliament. Gladstone introduced home rule bills in 1886 and 1893, but both were defeated. A home rule bill was finally passed in 1914. but by this time the Ulster Protestants strongly opposed the measure and prepared to resist their forced incorporation into Catholic Ireland. The outbreak of war with Germany postponed civil strife, but it was only a 2-year delay until the Easter Uprising of 1916. Not until 1921 did southern Ireland finally gain the status of a British dominion. The home rule bill never went into effect.

The New Liberals Gladstone's fight lor Irish home rule split his party and paved the way for a decade of Conservative rule i n Britain (1895-1905). Partly because of foreign and imperial affairs, the Conservatives departed from the reformist traditions of Tory democracy By 1905 the need for social and political reform again claimed the attention of the parlies. More than 30 percent of the adult male laborers earned a what amounted to sustenance wages, just

enough to survive on while employed but not enough to save any money for periods of unemployment, sickness, o r family emergency. Workers demonstrated their discontent in a number of strikes. Partly in response to ihe workers' needs and at the prompting of British socialists, the Labour party was founded in 1900, under the leadership of J. Ramsay MacDonaid (1866-1937), a self-made intellectual who had risen from humble status, and the Scottish miner Keif Hardie (1856-1915). The Liberals found themselves threatened on both their left and right flanks. They decided to abandon their laissez-faire economic concepts and embrace a bold program of social legislation. The radical Welsh lawyer David Lloyd George portrayed their program in this way: "Foui' spectres haunt the poor: Old Age, Accident, Sickness, and Unemployment. We are going to exorcise them."' Led by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, Lloyd George, and the young Winston Churchill, who had defected from the Conservatives, the Liberal party— with the aid of the Labour bloc—put through a broad program. I l provided Tor old-age pensions, national employment bureaus, workers' compensation protection, and sickness, accident, and unemployment insurance. In addition, labor unions were relieved of financial responsibility for losses caused by strikes. Members of the House of Commons, until that time unpaid, were granted a modest salary. This last act allowed an individual without independent wealth lo pursue a political career. The House of Lords tried to block the Liberal reform plan by refusing lo pass the 1909-1910 budget, which laid new tax burdens, including an income tax, on the richer classes in order lo pay for the new pro-

CHAPTER 26 grams. The Liberals and Labour fought back by directly attacking the rationale for the Lords' existence. They argued that a hereditary, irresponsible upper house was an anachronism i n a democracy. The result was the Parliament Bill of 191 I, which took away the Lords' power of absolute veto. Asquiih announced that the king had promised to create enough new peers to pass the bill i f needed (a tactic used with the 1832 Reform Bill). The Lords were forced lo approve, and thereafter, they could only delay and force reconsideration of legislation. By 1914 the evolutionary path to democracy and a modern democratic slate structure had, except for women's suffrage, been largely completed. In ihe previous generation some effort had been made lo gain the vote for women, but lo little effect. Women's suffrage was not a concern for the major parties, whose leaders for ihe mosi part felt that women's proper

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place was i n the home. At the turn of the century, the most effective group working for women's rights was the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), whose members were the first to be known as "suffragettes." The founder of the group, Emmeline Pankhurst (1858-1928), first agitated, then disturbed, and then challenged the order and stability of England in the decade before World War I . Pankhurst and her colleagues traveled and worked constantly lo make their case, and in 1910 the WSPU abandoned traditional rhetoric in favor of mass marches, hunger strikes, and property damage. I n 1913 a young suffragette martyred herself by running in front of ihe kings horse at the Derby. With ihe outbreak of the war, the WSPU backed the national effort against the Germans, and finally in 1918, women age 30 and over were granted the vote. Ten years later, they gained equal voting rights with men.

THE

GAINST

LIBERAL G B

Emmeline Pankhurst, in while scaii, a! a rally protesting a government unresponsive to women's issues. After 1910 ihe women's suffrage movement Hinted increasingly militant.

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The Dominions Supporting the United Kingdom as allies, customers, and suppliers of raw materials were its Dominions. The British Dominions became self-governing without breaking their political ties to Great Britain. W i t h the exception of South Africa, these new nations were predominantly B r i t i s h i n stock, language, culture, and governmental traditions. I n the case of Canada, however, a strong French-speaking m i n o r i t y i n Quebec, inherited from the original French regime, persisted and preserved its French heritage. I n South Africa, following a confused history of rivalry and war between the British and Dutch settlers, a shaky union was achieved. There were no complications of rival Europeans i n Australia and New Zealand, which were settled by the British i n the beginning and d i d not have to adjust to an influx of other Europeans. Both Australia and Canada attained political unity by merging a number of colonies into a single government. I n South Africa, after a bloody war w i t h the Boers ended i n 1902, the British extended the right of selfgovernment to the Transvaal i n 1906 and to the Orange Free State t w o years later. The Liberal government i n Great Britain permitted the Boer and English states to unite and form the Union of South Africa i n 1909. Only 7 years after the war, Boer and B r i t o n j o i n e d hands to create a new self-governing dominion. The first prime minister of the Union was Louis Botha (1863-1919), who had been a Boer general i n the war. Botha's primary purpose was to create neither an English nor a Boer nationality but a blend of the t w o i n a new South African patriotism held together by their shared desire to keep the black majority firmly repressed. The discovery of Australia dates back to the seventeenth century, w h e n D u t c h explorers sighted its shores. Captain Cook's South Seas voyage i n 1769, however, paved the way for British settlement. I n 1788 B r i t a i n transported a group of convicts to Australia and settled them at Sydney. From the parent colony of Sydney, later called New South Wales, five other settlements were founded. Although a majority of the first Europeans i n Australia were prisoners, most of them were political prisoners and debtors, rather than hardened criminals. After seven years of servitude, many were liberated and, as "emancipists," became citizens. Quite early i n the nineteenth century, many free settlers also came to Australia. They began to protest the d u m p i n g o f convicts i n their new home, and Britain took the first steps to end the practice i n 1840. By 1850 the Australian colonies were enjoying a liberal form of self-government. I n 1901 the six Australian colonies formed a federal union known as the Commonwealth o f Australia, which bears many resemblances to the American system of government.

About 1000 miles from the Australian mainland is a group of islands, two o f which are of particular importance. These lonely projections of British influence i n the South Pacific constitute the self-governing D o m i n i o n of New Zealand. The population of this country, which is slightly smaller than Great Britain in area, is just over 3.3 million. The earliest white settlers were convicts who had escaped from penal settlements i n Australia. The activity of other colonizers forced the British government to assume protection of the islands i n 1840, and British agents signed a treaty guaranteeing certain rights, especially land rights, to the original inhabitants, the Maoris. However, the New Zealand government was slow to grant full inclusion to the larger society to the Maoris. Canada came into English control i n 1763. London tried to ensure the loyalty of the French Canadians by issuing a royal proclamation guaranteeing the inhabitants' political rights and their freedom to worship as Roman Catholics. These guarantees were strengthened i n 1774 when the British government passed the Quebec Act, called the "Magna Carta of the French Canadian race." This act reconfirmed the position of the Catholic Church and perpetuated French laws and customs. However, there was no provision for a representative assembly, such as existed i n English-speaking colonies. The period from 1763 to 1867 is known as the formative stage o f Canada. A number of developments took place during this period: the growth of the English-speaking population, the defeat of an attempted conquest by the United States, the grant of local selfgovernment, and finally the confederation of Canada into a dominion. Fear of the United States, the need for a common tariff policy, and a concerted-effort to develop natural resources led Canadians into confederation. A plan of union, the British North American Act, was approved by the British government and passed by Parliament i n London i n 1867. This act united Canada into a federal union of four provinces. The new government had some similarities to the political organization of the United States, but it adopted the British cabinet system, w i t h its principle of ministerial responsibility. As a symbol of its connection with Great Britain, provision was made for a governor-general who was lo act as the British monarch's representative to Canada.

THE UNITED STATES • Why were the North and South unable to resolve the question of slavery in the first half of the nineteenth century and the issue of the rights of African Americans thereafter?

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Free Land and Un free People A new player entered the Western political game in the nineteenth century, the former British colony o f United States. The revolutionary movements in Europe during the nineteenth century fought aristocratic domination or foreign rule—or both. The nineteenth-century struggles in the United States were not quite the same. Instead, there were two major related problems. One was the annexation, settlement, and development of land occupied by Native Americans; the other was slavery. Free land and unfree people were the sources of the many political confrontations that culminated in the Civil War; the greatest struggle of nineteenth-century America. At the conclusion of its successful revolution in 1783, the United States was not a democracy. When the Constitution of the new nation was ratified, only one male i n seven had the vote. Religious requirements and property qualifications ensured that only a small elite participated in government. These restrictions allowed patricians from established families in the South and men of wealth and substance in the North to control the country for nearly half a century,

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presidency following a campaign that featured the slogan "Down with the aristocrats!" He was the first president produced by the West, the first since George Washington not to have a college education, and the first to have been born in poverty. He owed his election to no congressional clique but rather to the will of the people, who idolized "Old Hickory" as their spokesman and leader. The t r i u m p h of the democratic principle i n the 1830s set ihe direction for political development. With Jackson's election came the idea that any man, by virtue of being an American citizen, could hold any office i n the land. Governments widened educational opportunities by enlarging the public school system. With increased The Seneca Falls access to learning, class barriers became less Convention importanl. The gaining and keeping of political power came more and more to be tied to satisfying the needs ot the people who voted. Andrew Jackson's victories, however, symbolized the change of life for the worse for the Native Americans. After the United States gained independence,

Democratic Advances The influence of the western frontier helped make America more democratic. Even before the Constitution was ratified, thousands of pioneers crossed the Appalachian Mountains into the new "western country." I n the West, land was to be had for the asking, and social caste did not exist—one white person was as good as another—and the indigenous Native Americans came to be seen as an irritant at the least or as a danger to be fought at the most. Vigor, courage, selfreiiance, and competence counted, not birth or wealth. Ironically, throughout the nineteenth century, the West was the source of new and liberal movements that challenged the conservative ideas prevalent in the East and South, While at the same lime serving as the arena for the uprooting of the Native Americans and the destruction of their way of life. Uniil the War of 1812, democracy grew slowly. I n 179] Vermont had been admitted as a manhood suffrage state, in which all men could vote, and the following year, Kentucky followed suit; but Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana entered the Union with property and lax qualifications for the vote. After 1817 no new state entered the Union with restrictions on male suffrage except for those regarding slaves. Most appointive offices became elective, and requirements for holding office were liberalized. Andrew Jackson changed the tone and emphasis of American politics. I n 1828 he was elected to the

In many regards, Andrew Jackson was ihe first "people's president, " a national leader who looked beyond the demands of the eastern elites to the entire country. Jackson's craggy countenance prefects his inner strength and independent spirit.

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Discovery Through Maps

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An American View of the World in the 1820s

his map, adapted from The School Atlas to Accompany Woodbridge's Rudiments of Geography (1821), served to inform students of the status of "civilization" in the world. The color code establishes where the authors believed the various gradations of humanity were: from the "civilized" and "enlightened" to the "savage," with the "barbarians" and "half-civilized" in between. The mapmakers were apparently quite certain that regions where whiteskinned Christians were to be found were civilized or at least half-civilized (though they seem to have had their doubts about adherents of Orthodox Christianity i n eastern Europe). The people where Islam predominated ranged from half-civilized to barbarian. And much of China, w i t h its four millennia of culture, was classified as barbarian, owing to its "pagan" belief systems. A complacent arrogance permeates this map, with the area west of the 95th meridian, populated largely by Native Americans, declared to be a savage state, waiting patiently for manifest destiny to bring civilization. Much of Central and South America is admitted to being civilized—but not enlightened. Note also that the cartographer uses Philadelphia as the prime meridian—preferable, he surely thought,

to the more traditional but distant Greenwich, a town in England which, after all, had invaded the United Stales only a decade earlier. The map shows the dominant role played by religion in viewing the rest of the world in the first part of the nineteenth century. Later, concepts of race would dominate the American worjdview, and after 1945 the world would be seen in terms of the Cold War, those areas determined to be democratic and communistic. By the end of the twentieth century, American maps emphasized industrial capacities and potential markets. After September 11, 2001, yet another shift came as the cartographers identified zones where terrorists threatened American interests. Through their emphases, cartographers tell us as much about the spirit of an age as writers and artists. Questions to Consider 1. After studying this map, what elements do you believe moved the cartographer to identify an ar ea as civilized? 2. When you look at the globe and consider its complexity, what elements do you use to differentiate one ar ea from another? 3. What is the difference between being "civilized" and "enlightened?"

CHAPTER 26 the government had tried to deal w i t h them by placing the various tribes on reservations to control their movements and to aid them i n becoming "civilized." As the w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n of the U n i t e d States grew, and the reservation l a n d east of the Mississippi became more valuable, a policy of removal was implemented by leaders such as Jackson. The rationale behind the policy was that the Native A m e r i cans, being fundamentally incapable o f civilization, should be pushed West into the empty lands. This policy broke the treaties signed at the end of the eighteenth century, w h i c h respected the tribes as p o l i t i cally sovereign peoples. Up and d o w n the western frontier, tribes w h i c h had entertained friendly relations w i t h the United States under treaty rights, found themselves pushed out of their lands. There were tragedies such as that of the "Trail of Tears" i n 1838-1839 when 16,000 Cherokees were forced to leave their homes i n the southeast U n i t e d States. They were rounded up i n m i l i t a r y stockades where they lived under wretched conditions, and then they were forced to walk to the present-day state of Oklahoma. More than 5000 of them died during those 2 tragic years. But for the white population, simultaneous w i t h the growth of democracy came the territorial expansion of the country. The Louisiana Territory, purchased from France for about $15 m i l l i o n i n 1803 (see Chapter 21), doubled the size of the United States. I n 1844, Americans, influenced by "manifest destiny"— the belief that their domination of the continent was God's will—demanded "All of Oregon or none." The claim led to a boundary dispute w i t h Great B r i t a i n over land between the Columbia River and 54°40' north latitude. I n 1846 the two countries accepted a boundary at the forty-ninth parallel, and the Oregon Territory was settled. The annexation of Texas i n 1845 was followed by war w i t h Mexico i n 1846. I n the peace agreement signed 2 years later, Mexico ceded California, Texas, and the land between the two to the United States. As a result of these acquisitions, by 1860, the area of the United States was two-thirds larger than i t had been i n 1840. The addition of the new territories forced the issue of whether slavery should be allowed i n those areas. Paralleling developments i n Great Britain, abolitionists i n the United States, particularly i n New England, vigorously condemned slavery. Henry Clay's Missouri Compromise of 1820 permitted slavery i n Missouri but forbade i t i n the rest of the Louisiana Purchase. This settlement satisfied both sides for only a short time. The antislavery forces grew more insismanifest destiny—An early nineteenth century belief voiced by clergymen in the northeast United States that God meant for white Americans to dominate the continent.

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Territorial Growth of the United States 1803

1810-1819

Louisiana Purchase (part or all of present-day Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana) Florida Cession (parts of present-day Alabama and Mississippi; all of present-day Florida)

1818

British Cession (parts of Minnesota and North Dakota)

1845

Annexation of Texas (part or all of present-day Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado)

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Oregon Country (parts of present-day Montana, Idaho, Wyoming; all of present-day Oregon and Washington)

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Mexican Cession (part or all of present-day Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, California)

1853

Gadsden Purchase (parts of presentday New Mexico and Arizona)

tent. I n the senatorial campaigns of 1858, candidate Abraham Lincoln declared: A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Slavery was an i m p o r t a n t issue; i t served as a focus for the differences and tensions separating the N o r t h f r o m the South. However, a more fundam e n t a l cause o f conflict was that, i n a sense, the t w o sections had become separate societies. The former was i n d u s t r i a l , urban, liberal, and democratic; the latter was m a i n l y a g r i c u l t u r a l , r u r a l , conservative, and d o m i n a t e d by a planter aristocracy. The South strongly opposed the North's desire for higher tariffs, government a i d for new railroads, and generous terms for land settlement i n the West. These fundamental differences brought N o r t h and South to war. Slavery served as a potent symbol and as a m o r a l i r r i t a n t .

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Taking advantage of Napoleon's sale of the Louisiana territory, a militarily weak Mexico, and an otherwise occupied Britain, the United States was able to attain its continental limits by 1853.

The Civil War and Its Results Soon after Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as president, the slaveholding southern states seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate Slates of Amer ica. The first shot of the Civil War was fired at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, in 1861, initialing the bloodiest war of American history. Four agonizing years of conflict—in which more than half a million men died and basic elements of the Constitution and law were suspended—ended when General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse in Virginia i n April 1865. A few days later, the nation was stunned by the assassination of President Lincoln, who had just begun his second term. With the final collapse of the Confederacy before the overwhelming superiority of the Union in manpower, industrial resources, and wealth, the Civil War became the grand epic of American history in its heroism, romance, and tragedy. The victorious North used military occupation to try to force the South to extend voting and property rights to the former slaves. Eventually, this so-called Reconstruction period (1865-1877) was ended by a tacit agreement between the northern industrialists and the southern white leaders that enabled the latter to regain political control and to

deprive African Americans of their newly won rights. Later, southerners invoked social Darwinist arguments to justify their actions in denying full "blessings of freedom" to the former slaves. In the century after Reconstruction, Southern politicians deprived African Americans of their voting rights by enacting state laws or employing devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, properly qualifications, and physical threats. Racial segregation in schools, restaurants, parks, and hotels was effectively applied. Laws prohibiting interracial marriage were enacted, and African Americans were generally excluded from unions. Between 1885 and 1918 more than 2500 African Americans were lynched in the United States. As second-class citizens, free bul landless, the former slaves essentially formed a sharecroppmg class, mired in poverty, and deprived of educational opportunities. Not until the 1960s did the political steps occur that began to put into effect that which had been purchased in the sacrifices of the Civil War: full citizenship for African Americans. I f the causes and consequences of the American Civil War are complex, the all-important result was simple. It settled the issue of whether the United Slates was an indivisible sovereign nation or a collection of sovereign states. The sacrifice of hundreds of

Document

"With Malice Toward None": Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address

March 4, 1865, started out dark and rainy. Lincoln spoke only briefly, delivering the shortest inaugural address of any president, before or since. Afterward, as he took the oath of office, the sun came out. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, administering the oath, said he hoped that the sunshine would be an "omen of the dispersion of the clouds of war." Indeed it was: The hostilities lasted only a few weeks longer—but they cost Lincoln his life.

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t this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat i n detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention, and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction i n regard to it is ventured. On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an i m pending civil-war. All dreaded it—all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were i n the city seeking to destroy i t without war—seeking to dissol[v]e the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let i t perish. And the war came. One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized i n the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. A l l knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of i t . Neither party expected for the war, the magnitude, or the duration, which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. I t may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just Gods assistance i n wringing their bread from the

sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has H i s own purposes. "Woe unto the w o r l d because of offences! for i t must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by w h o m the offence cometh!" I f we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, i n the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both N o r t h and South, this terrible war, as the woe due to those by w h o m the offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers i n a Living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope—fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, i f God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn w i t h the lash, shall be paid by another drawn w i t h the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether." With malice toward none; w i t h charity for all; w i t h firmness i n the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for h i m who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan— to do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations. Questions to Consider 1. What role does religion play in Lincoln's speech? Do you see his view of God as a mild. New Testament, forgiving God or an vengeful, Old Testament God? 2. How would you characterize his speech: as a celebration of victory or as an accounting of a tragedy? 3. Put yourself in the place of a southern soldier, defeated in the war. How would you view Lincoln's speech? Put yourself in the role of a northern soldier, victorious in the war. Do you think that Lincoln was sufficiently strong in the condemning those who upheld slavery? From Richard N. Current, ed., The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 314-316.

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thousands of lives preserved the Union, but the mistreatment of African Americans remained.

Industrialization, Abuse, and Reform Between 1850 and 1880 the number of cities w i t h a population of 50,000 or more doubled. The number of men employed i n industry increased 50 percent. I n 1865 there were 35,000 miles of railroads in the country. By 1900 this was estimated to be about 200,000— more than i n all of Europe. I n 1860 a little more than $1 billion was invested in manufacturing; by 1900 this figure had risen to $12 billion. The value of manufactured products increased proportionately. I n 1870 the total production of iron and steel i n the United States was far below that of France and Britain. Twenty years later, the United States had outstripped both and was producing about one-third of the worlds iron and steel. The North's victory was a boost for industrialization as well as a result of it, and the economic revolution i n the United States that followed was more significant than the conflict itself. Railroads were built across broad prairies, and the first transcontinental line, the Union Pacific, was completed i n 1869. Settlers swarmed west, breaking treaties w i t h Native American tribes, altering the environmental balance that supported the lives of the Plains Indians, and destroying the way o f life of the original inhabitants of the land. I n the age of rapid industrialism and materialistic expansion, many who pursued profits lost sight of ethical principles i n business and i n government. William "Boss" Tweed, the chief of the Department of Public Works for the city of New York, rewarded himself and his friends so lavishly through fraudulent contracts, payments under the table, and other corrupt activities that by 1871 he had driven the city to the b r i n k of bankruptcy. Brought to trial, Tweed was convicted of stealing more than $200 million. Ruthless financiers such as Jay Gould and Jim Fisk tampered w i t h the basic financial stabiiity of the nation. The administration of President Ulysses Grant was tainted by scandals and frauds. A new rich class failed to appreciate its responsibilities to society. Corruption was a blatant feature of the new order. For roughly a century, the gospel for the new nation of America had been rugged individualism. As in Europe, governmental interference i n business was unwelcome because of the strong belief that individuals should be free to follow their own inclinations, run their o w n businesses, and enjoy the profits o f their labors. I n an expanding nation where land, jobs, and opportunity beckoned, there was little to indicate that the system would not work indefinitely. By 1880, however, the end of the frontier was i n sight. Free land of

good quality was scarce, and the frontier could no longer serve as a safety valve to release the economic and social pressures of an expanding population. Between 1850 and 1900 the United States became the most powerful nation i n the Western Hemisphere, increased its national wealth from $7 billion to $88 billion, established an excellent system of public education, and fostered the spread of civil liberties for its white citizens and other nations. But there were many disturbing factors i n the picture. Unemployment, child labor, and industrial accidents were common i n the rapidly growing cities. Slums grew and served as breeding places for disease and crime. Strikes, often accompanied by violence, exacerbated the tension between labor and capital. I n response, the wide-ranging Progressive reform movement nourished between 1890 and 1914. This movement was rooted partly in the agrarian protests against big business sparked by the Populists of the Midwest and the South. The Progressives effectively mobilized the middle classes to work to eliminate sweatshops, the exploitation of labor, and the abuse of natural resources. The success of the Progressive movement was reflected in the constitutions of the new states admitted to the Union and i n their introduction of the direct primary, the initiative and referendum, and the direct election of senators. All these measures tended to give the common people more effective control of the government. After the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act i n i 887, which introduced federal regulation over railroads, a steady expansion of governmental regulation of industry began. As president of the United States from 1901 to 1909, Theodore Roosevelt launched an aggressive campaign to break up the trusts, conserve natural resources, and regulate railroads, food, and drugs. I n 1913 President Woodrow Wilson started a militant campaign of reform called the "New Freedom." His administration reduced the tariff because it was too much the instrument of special economic privilege, enacted banking reform w i t h the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and regulated businesses i n the public interest through the Clayton Antitrust Act and the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission, both i n 1914. I n 1914 the United States had risen to the forefront o f Western nations. The country's first census, taken i n 1790, counted a population of just under 4 m i l l i o n ; by 1910 the number was 99 million. During the nineteenth century, more than 25 million i m m i grants had made their way to America. Since the days of George Washington, the national wealth had increased at least a hundredfold. Once the producer of raw materials only, the United States by 1914 was producing more steel than Britain and Germany combined. A single company. United States Steel, was

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Perry visited Japan and, by a show of force, persuaded the Japanese to open some of their harbors to Americans. By 1854 the United States was considering the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and in 1867 it purchased Alaska from Russia for the amazingly low price of $7.2 million. As productivity increased after the Civil War, the United States was forced to seek new outlets for its goods, especially now that the domestic frontier had disappeared. Foreign trade increased from $393 million in 1870 to more than $1.33 billion in 1900. During the same period, investments abroad went from almost nothing to $500 million. This economical group was instrumental in the nation's acquisition of a global empire. The United States began building a modern navy in 1883, and by 1890 the buildup had accelerated greatly. Care was taken not to alarm the country, however, and the new ships were officially known as "seagoing coastline battleships," a handy nautical contradiction. When this naval program was initialed, the U.S. Navy ranked twelfth among the powers; by 1900 it had advanced to third place. This naval strength served American foreign policy well—particularly i n Asia. In 1899 U.S. Secretary of State John Hay initiTheodore Roosevelt, one of lite mostflamboyantand effective pres- ated the so-called Open Door policy regarding China, idents in the history of the United States, provided cartoonists at an attempt to ensure equal commercial rights for the beginning of the twentieth centtny with almost unlimited postraders of all nations—including, of course, the United sibilities for caricature. Mere "T.R." is afflicting the monopolists States, a latecomer to the China trade. When Chinese who dominated the American economy. patriots fought against the intrusion of foreigners in the Righteous Harmony Fists (Boxer) Rebellion, the United States again took ihe lead in defending its new capitalized for $1.46 billion, a sum greater than the outward-lookingstance. total estimated wealth of the country in 1790. America's Latin American neighbors felt the full weight of the Western economic colossus. This drive for markets, raw materials, and outlets for surplus capThe United States and the World ital led to classic examples of economic imperialism, but both American business and Ihe elites of the local From the first, U.S. foreign policy pursued three population generally profited from these arrangements goals; national security, trade, and the spread of (see Chapter 25). democracy—and these goals remain largely intact today. During its first quarter century, the United States fought a brief naval war with France, became embroiled with Britain in the War of 1812, and sent two expeditions to the Mediterranean to deal with the RUSSIA IN REFORM Barbary pirates. These complications notwithstandAND REVOLUTION ing, Americans spent the next century developing their country. Thomas Jefferson summarized the country's • Why did Russia fail to successfully adapt to the foreign policy with these words: "Peace, commerce, political and economic transformations and honest friendship w i t h all nations—entangling occurring in Western Europe during the alliances with none." nineteenth century? When the country established new foreign contacts, it went across the Pacific. In 1844 the United States made its first treaty with China, opening certain The Failed Heritage of Catherine II ports to American trade and securing the rights of In 1815, after its victories in the Napoleonic War, RusAmerican merchants and sailors to be tried in Amerisia stood as the most powerful country in Europe. can tribunals in China. In 1853 Commodore Matthew 2

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Four decades later, i t was defeated i n the Crimean War, fought on its own territory. I t was evident to most observers, including the tsars, that Russia had neither the economic strength nor the social and political flexibility of the United Kingdom. I t could not adapt successfully to the new forces of the nineteenth century. Tsar Alexander I (r. 1801-1825) saw the need for change and understood that the major obstacles to the reform of his empire were its t w i n foundations: serfdom and autocracy. His grandmother, Catherine I I , had educated h i m i n the liberal traditions and assumptions of the Enlightenment, and for the first four years of his reign, he aggressively pursued these notions. During his reign, he attempted major reforms in the areas of education, government, and social welfare. His brother Nicholas I I (r. 1825-1855) understood the forces of industrialization, but the Decembrist Revolution led h i m to impose repressive and reactionary policies during most of his reign.

Enlightenment Dreams Alexanders experiments w i t h limited serf emancipation, constitutionalism, and federalism demonstrated his desire for change. The tsar was all-powerful i n theory, but i n reality, he depended on the nobles, who i n t u r n gained their wealth from serfdom. Carrying out the necessary reforms w o u l d destroy the foundations o f Alexander's power. The fact that his father and grandfather had been killed by nobles made h i m cautious. Further, it was his misfortune to rule during the Napoleonic wars, and for the first 15 years of his reign, he had to devote immense amounts of money and time to foreign affairs. His liberal reform plans were never carried through to completion, and not until the 1850s, when i t was almost too late, w o u l d there be another tsar willing and able to make the fundamental social and political reforms needed to make Russia competitive i n the industrializing w o r l d . I n the reactionary decade after 1815, reformers fell from favor. However, the open discussion of the need for change i n the first part of Alexander's reign, the experiences o f the soldiers returning from western Europe, and the activities of the expanding number of secret societies kept the dream of change alive. When Alexander failed to reform, the intensity of the reformers' discussions increased. Alexander died i n December 1825, and there was confusion over which of his two brothers would succeed to the throne. The days between his death and the confirmation of his younger brother Nicholas I gave a small circle of liberal nobles and army officers the chance to advance their i l l defined demands for a constitution. The officers w h o led this revolt had been infected w i t h liberal French thought. They sought to end serfdom and establish representative government and civil liberties i n Rus-

sia. On December 26, these liberals led a small uprising i n St. Petersburg. This Decembrist Revolt, as it was called, lasted less than a day and could have been put d o w n even earlier had Nicholas been more decisive. This abortive, ill-planned attempt doomed any chance of liberal or democratic reform i n Russia for 30 years.

Nicholas I and Russian Reaction The Decembrist incident shook Nicholas badly, and throughout his reign, he remained opposed to liberal and revolutionary movements. To consolidate his power, he sponsored "official nationalism," whose conservative foundations were "autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism"—the Romanov dynasty, the Orthodox Church, and a glorification of the Russian soul. He carried out a thorough policy o f censorship that included the screening of foreign visitors, publications, and even musical compositions. The government closely m o n i t o r e d students' activities and curricula i n schools and universities. Some 150,000 "dangerous" people were exiled to Siberia. Millions of non-Russians i n the empire began to experience l i m i tations on their identities through a forced adherence to Russian customs called "Russification." These activities strengthened Nicholas's immediate control and stopped potential upheaval, but he failed to address adequately the important social and political reforms Russia so badly needed. Despite his efforts to control intellectual and political currents, Nicholas d i d not succeed. Reformist activity may have been repressed, but the Russian intellectual circles were creative, tuned as they were to the works of the German philosophers and poets. I n the 1840s and 1850s a new breed of intellectuals appeared— On the Efforts of the Polish thinkers devoted to achieving liberal and People socialist political goals. Although they would not make their strength felt until after the 1860s, these thinkers, known as the intelligentsia, put down strong roots d u r i n g Nicholas's reign. Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) and Michael Bakunin {1814¬ 1876) were the pioneers of this peculiarly Russian movement. Herzen was a moderate socialist who advocated emancipating the serfs, liberalizing the government, and freeing the press. I n 1847 he went into exile i n London, where he founded his famous paper, the Kolokol ("Bell"), 10 years later. I t was widely read in Russia, supposedly appearing mysteriously on the tsar's table. Bakunin, the father of Russian anarchism,

lift

Decembrist Revolt—This, the so-called First Russian Revolution was a failed allempl by liberal nobles to oust TSar Nicholas I and to introduce a constitution to their country. intelligentsia—Intellectuals who want lo use (heir ideas to change society.

CHAPTER 26 • Politics was more radical. He believed that reform of Russia was useless and advocated terrorism. He preached that anarchy—complete freedom—was the only cure for society's ills. He too went into exile i n the West. The Russian intellectuals debated many questions, most important of w h i c h was whether Russia should imitate all aspects of European life or pursue its own tradition of Orthodoxy and a single-centered society. The question had been posed since the reign of Peter the Great. The liberal Westerners argued that i f Russia wished to survive, i t had to adopt basic aspects of the West and renounce m u c h of its o w n past. The Slavophiles on the other side of the dialogue, renounced industrial Europe and the modern West, seeing them as materialistic, pagan, and anarchic. They looked to their distant past for guidance for the future. Nicholas was able to m a i n t a i n control to the extent that the 1830 and 1848 revolutions had little influence or impact on Russia. Some aspects of industrialization were introduced—for example, the first Moscow-St. Petersburg rail line was put into operation. The government appointed commissions to examine the questions of serfdom and reform, but these extremely serious considerations were kept secret out of fear of provoking a violent reaction from the nobles or a popular uprising among the peasantry. Still, basic doubts about Russia's future remained. Dissident intellectuals, economic and social weakness, and autocratic stagnation were indicators that difficult times were i n store for the country.

The Great Reforms Russia's inept performance i n the Crimean War spotlighted the country's weaknesses and the need for reform. When Alexander I I (r. 1855-1881) came to the throne, even the conservatives among his subjects acknowledged the need for major change. The new tsar moved quickly to transform the basis of the autocratic structure—the institution of serfdom—but ran into delay from the nobility. Alexander appointed a committee, which, after 5 years of deliberation, drew up the E m a n c i p a t i o n Proclamation, issued i n March 1861. By this reform, 32 million state peasants and 20 m i l l i o n serfs, who had no civil rights, could not o w n property, and owed heavy dues and services to the nobility, began the transition to land ownership and citizenship. The government paid the landlords a handsome price for the land that was to be turned over to the Emancipation Proclamation—Called by some the greatest political act of the nineteenth century, the Emancipation Proclamation issued by Tsar Alexander II in March 1861 gave civil and property rights to 52 million state peasants and serfs. It also triggered a series of reforms that changed the military, law, education, and the economy.

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peasants. I n return, the peasants had to pay the government for the land over a period of 49 years by making payments through their village commune, the mir. The drawn-out nature of the land transfer disappointed the former serfs, who had expected a portion of the lords' lands to be turned over to them without charge. Instead, the peasants were trapped i n their village communes, w h i c h received and allocated all of the land—much of i t poor—and divided i t among the various families and p a i d taxes. Even though they were granted ownership of their cottages, farm buildings, garden plots, domestic animals, and implements, the restrictions placed on the peasants by confining them to their villages constituted a serious problem. New generations of peasants increased the population, but there was no corresponding increase i n their share of the land. The emancipation of the serfs was the single most important event i n the domestic history of nineteenthcentury Russia. I t brought about thoroughgoing reforms of the army, judiciary, municipal government, and system of local self-government. One of the most important reforms came i n 1864 when local government was transformed by the Zemstvo (ZEMST-vo) law. I n the countryside, the gentry, middle classes, and peasants elected representatives to local boards (zemstvos). These boards collected taxes and maintained roads, asylums, hospitals, and schools. The zemstvos became perhaps the most successful governmental organizations i n Russia. While Alexander I I pushed through the "Great Reforms," the revolutionary movement grew stronger. I n the 1850s the nihilist movement developed, questioning all old values, championing the freedom of the individual, and shocking the older generation. At first the nihilists tried to convert the aristocracy to the cause of reform. Failing there, they turned to the peasants i n an almost missionary frenzy. Some idealistic young men and women joined the movement to work i n the fields w i t h the peasants, while others went to the villages as doctors and teachers to preach the message of reform. This "go to the people" campaign was k n o w n as the populist, or narodnik (na-ROD-nik), movement. Not surprisingly, the peasants largely ignored the outsiders' message.

Revolutionary Response Frustrated by this rejection, the idealistic young people turned more and more to terrorism. The radical branch of the nihilists, under the influence of Bakunin's p r o t é g é Sergei Nechaev (ne-CHAI-ev; 1847-1882), pursued a program of the total destruction of the status quo, to be accomplished by the revolutionary elite. I n Revolutionary Catechism, Nechaev stated that "everything that promotes the success of

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Reaction and Response, 1881-1905 The slain tsars son, Alexander HI (r. 1881-1894), could see only that his father's reforms had resulted in increased opposition and, eventually, death. Consequently, he tried to turn the clock back and reinstate the policy of "autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism." Under the guidance of his chief adviser, Constanline Pobedonostsev (po-bied-do-NOST-sev; 1827-1907), Alexander pursued a policy ol censorship, regulation of schools and universities, and increased secret police activities. Along with renewing Russification among the minorities, he permitted the persecution of Jews, who were bullied and sometimes massacred in attacks called pogroms. The tsar may have been successful in driving the revolutionaries underground or executing ihem, and the nationalities may have been kept in their place, but under Alexander I I I , Russia lost 13 valuable years in its attempt to become economically and politically competitive with western Europe. Succeeding Alexander was his son, Nicholas I I (r. 1894-1917), a decent but weak man. He inherited and retained both his father's advisers and his father's policies. Larger forces oveiAvhelmed him. Industrialization and rural overpopulation exerted a wide range of political pressures, and the autocratic structure could not cope. Russia lacked a tradition of gradual reform and habits of compromise such as existed in England. Tsar Alexander 11 instituted sweeping reforms, including the abo- After the assassination of Alexander I I , the governlition of Russian serfdom in 1861. For many of his subjects, howment increasingly used brutal force to keep order. At ever, they were too little and too late, as this satiric depicting of the same time, it did little to help the people suffering "The Liberator" suggests. in the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. The regime worked energetically to eliminate the opposition by placing secret agents among them, the revolution is moral and everything that hinders i l launching violent assaults, and canying on diversionis immoral." The soldiers i n the battle, the revolutionary anti-Semitic activities with bands of ihugs called aries, were "doomed men," having "no interests, no the Black Hundreds. Bv attacking the opposition, the affairs, no feelings, no habits, no property, not even a tsarist government concentrated on symptoms of Rusname."' The revolution dominated all thoughts and sia's problems—political dissent and critical, social, actions of these individuals. and economic dilemmas—rather than their causes. For the 20 years after his emancipation of the The tsars tried to crush ail opposition movements, serfs, Alexander suffered under increasing revolutionrather than carry out effective reform. ary attack. It was as though the opposition saw each The Liberal party (Constitutional Democrats, or reform not as an improvement but as a weakness to be Kadels) wanted a constitutional monarchy and peaceexploited. I n Poland, the tsar had tried to reverse the ful reform on the British model. Although limited in Russification program of his father and in return saw numbers, because of the elevated social standing of the Poles revolt in 1863. Would-be assassins made a most of their members, the Kadets were a powerful number of attempts on him, and the violence expanded voice for change in Russia. throughout the 1870s as a number of his officials were The much more numerous Social Revolutionaries attacked by young terrorists such as Vera Zasulich (zacombined non-Marxisi socialism with the narodnik SU-lich; 1851-1919). Finally, Alexander was assassitradition and simplistically called for "the whole land nated i n 1881, on the very day he had approved a for the whole people." These agrarian socialists wanted

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to give the land to the peasants. However, they lacked a unified leadership and a well-thought-out program. In this troubled environment, the solutions proposed by Kai l Marx attracted a number of supporters. Marx himself did not believe that Russia would be a favorable laboratory for his theories. He expressed Surprise when Das Kapha} was translated into Russian in 1872 but was pieased when he learned of the broad impact of his theories. Many intellectuals looked to Marx to show them the way to a complete social, economic, and political revolution. Not until 1898, however, was there an attempt to establish a Russian Social Democratic party made up of radical intellectuals and politically active workers. Tile Russians did not experience the most demanding parts of industrialization until the end of the century and then on a different basis b o m that of the western European countries. Russia remained an overwhelmingly agrarian society in which the state paid for building factories by using grain produced by the peasants for export on the depressed world market. However, the urban, industrial emphasis of Marx's theories sparked debate over the way in which they applied to Russia,

Lenin and the Bolsheviks The person who would eventually apply and implement Marxist theory was V l a d i m i r Ilich Ulyanov (VLAD-i-mirEEL-ich oo-LYAN-nov; 1870-1924), who later look the name Lenin. Born in Ulyanovsk (ooLYAN-ovsk), formerly Simbirsk, a small city along the Volga River, Lenin grew up in the moderate and respectable circumstances provided by his father, a school administrator and teacher. In 1887 the government arrested and executed Lenin's brother, Alexander, in St. Petersburg on charges of plotting against the life of the tsar. Shortly thereafter, Lenin began to study the writings of Marx and their potential applications to contemporary Russia. He overcame major obstacles from tsarist officials and passed his law exams at St. Petersburg University without formally attending classes. After 1893 he began to compile theories of tactics and strategy that would form the basis of the Soviet Union throughout its 73-year existence. In 1895 a court sentenced him to exile in Siberia for his political activities. While in exile, he enjoyed complete liberty of movement in the district and could hunt, fish, swim, study, read, and keep up a large correspondence. A political ally, Nadezhda Krupskaia (na-DESH-da KRUP-ska-ia), joined h i m , and they were married. Later they translated Sidney and Beatrice Webb's History of Trade Unionism. When Lenin's exile ended in 1900, he and Krupskaia went to Switzerland, where they joined other Russian Social

Lenin, the driving force behind the Russian Revolution from which emerged the Soviet Union, spent years studying Marx's theories and adapting litem to conditions in Russia.

Democrats in exile in founding the newspaper Iskra ("Spark"), whose motto was "From the Spark—the conflagration." In applying Marx to Russian conditions, Lenin found it necessary to sketch in several blank spots. Lenin's methods differed greatly from those of western European Marxists, as d i d his theories. Lenin advocated the formation of a small elite of professional revolutionaries, the "vanguard o f the p r o l e l a r i a t . " These professionals, subject to strict party discipline, would anticipate the proletariat's needs and best interests and lead them through the oxymoronic theory' of "democratic centralism." The Social Democrats met in 1903 in London and split into two wings—the Bolsheviks (BOL-shuh-vik) and the Mensheviks (MEN-shuh-vik)—over the questions of the timing of the revolution and the nature of the party. (In Russian, bolshevik means "majority" and menshevik means "minority," the names stemming vanguard of the proletariat—The elite revolutionary group lhal would anticipate the proletariat's needs and lead them through the principle of democratic centralism.

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from a vote on party policies i n 1903 when the Bolsheviks d i d prevail. On most occasions u n t i l the summer of 1917, however, the Bolsheviks were, i n fact, i n a distinct m i n o r i t y among the Social Democrats.) The two factions differed sharply on strategy and tactics. The Bolsheviks, following Lenin's revisionist views, were prepared to move the pace of history along through democratic centralism. The Mensheviks believed that Russian socialism should g r o w gradually and peacefully i n accordance w i t h Marxist principles of development and historical evolution, and they were prepared to work w i t h i n a framework dominated by bourgeois political parties. They knew that their victory was inevitable, given the historical dialectic, and that the proletariat would play the lead role, assisted by the party. After t h e i r split i n 1903, the t w o factions never reconciled. After 1903 Lenin had little success i n changing the political conditions of Russia, beyond affecting the most sophisticated part of the workers' movement. However, he continued to make significant doctrinal contributions. Lenin recommended a socialism whose weapon was violence and whose tactics allowed little long-range compromise w i t h the bourgeoisie. However, he also saw the advantages of flexibility and encouraged temporary deviations that might serve the goals of the working class. He took little for granted and reasoned that the development of class unity to destroy the capitalists among the Russian workers might require some assistance. To that end he refined his notion of the way i n which the elite party would function. I n revolution, the elite party would infiltrate the government, police, and army while participating i n legal workers' movements; i n government, the party would enforce its dictates on the populace w i t h iron discipline. Lenin looked out at the undoubted strength of the advanced technological nations and marveled at their extension of power. I n Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916) he forecast that the modern capitalist states would destroy themselves. He argued that the wages of the workers d i d not represent enough purchasing power to absorb the output of the capitalists' factories and that the vast amounts of capital that were accumulated could not be invested profitably i n the home country. Therefore, the states would engage i n an inevitable competition for markets, resources, and capital that would drive them from cutthroat competition to outright war and their ultimate destruction. At that point, he reasoned, his elite party would be ready to pick up the pieces from the blindly selfish powers.

The Revolution of 1905 and Its Aftermath As i n 1854 at Crimea, a failure i n war—this time a "splendid little war" against Japan—exposed the weak-

nesses of the autocratic tsarist regime. Strikes and protests spread throughout the land i n response to the military failure of the Russo-Japanese War during the last days of 1904. On January 22, 1905, the Cossacks opened fire on a peaceful crowd of workers who had advanced on the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg carrying a petition asking for the tsar's help. I n response, a general strike broke out, w i t h the strikers demanding a democratic republic, freedom for political prisoners, and the disarming o f the police. Soviets— councils of workers led by the Social Democrats— appeared i n the cities to direct revolutionary activities. Most business and government offices closed, and the whole machinery of Russian economic life creaked to a halt. The country was virtually paralyzed. After a series of half-measures and stalling i n response to strikes and revolutionary activities, the tsar found himself pushed to the wall. Unable to find a dictator to impose order, he was forced to issue the October Manifesto of 1905, which promised "freedom of person, conscience, assembly, and union." A national legislature, the Duma, was to be called without delay. The right to vote would be extended, and no law could be enacted without the Duma's approval. The October Manifesto split the moderate from the socialist opposition and kept Nicholas on the throne, although he was heartbroken for having made the compromise. The socialists tried to start new strikes, but the opposition was now totally split apart. Most radical forces boycotted the first Duma meeting i n the spring of 1906. As a result, the Kadets became the dominant force. Even w i t h this watereddown representation, the tsar was upset by the criticism of the government's handling of the RussoJapanese War, treatment of minorities, handling of political prisoners, and economic policies. Claiming that the representatives "would not cooperate" w i t h the government, Nicholas dissolved the first Duma. The Russian people turned a cold shoulder to the Kadets' appeals for support. Sensing the decline of political fervor, Nicholas appointed a law-and-order conservative, Peter Stolypin (sto-LEAP-in; 1862¬ 1911), as prime minister. He assumed emergency powers and cracked down on the radicals. Unlike previous tsarist appointees, Stolypin knew that changes had to be made, especially i n the area of agriculture. Despite Nicholas's lack of support, Stolypin set up a process to develop a class of small farmers. He pushed through reforms that abolished all payments still owed by the peasants under the emancipation law and permitted peasants to withdraw from the commune and claim their shares of the land and other wealth as private property. He also opened lands east of the Urals to the peasants and extended financial aid Soviets—Councils of workers led by ihe Social Democrats in the 1905 Revolution.

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Russian Political Movements in 1905 Kadets

Liberals

Octobrists

Moderate liberals

Trudoviks

Populist Labor Party

Socialist Revolutionaries

Agrarian-based socialists— non-Marxist

Bolsheviks

Revisionist democratic centralist Social Democrats (Marxists)

Mcnsheviks

Social Democrats, Marxist fundamentalists

Monarchist right

Supporters of the tsar

Union of Russian People

Extreme right wing, anti-Semitic and antiliberal

Jewish Bund

Marxist Jewish Workers' party

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tury. U n t i l the 1750s, fear of the empire preoccupied the Austrians and the Russians. After that time, the empire went into a state of decline, and its Balkan territories became targets of opportunity for Vienna and St. Petersburg. Because of the empire s vast holdings throughout the Middle East and N o r t h Africa, the English, French, and Germans became equally involved w i t h the fate of the Ottoman Empire. There was no easy solution to the question of what to do w i t h the Turks—the so-called E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n — and there was no way to p a r t i t i o n its holdings w i t h o u t giving one state or another an advantageous position. During the nineteenth century, the European powers settled o n a policy of propping up the sultan and maintaining the fiction of the Ottoman Empire being a great power. Unfortunately, the European states failed to devise an answer to the dilemma o f what to do w i t h the power vacuum created by the decaying Ottoman Empire and how to manage the various nations of the Balkans who began their struggles for self-determination and independence.

The Balkans Awaken

An Empire in Decline

By the end of the eighteenth century, Ottoman power had substantially declined i n the Balkans, just at a time when the various peoples began to experience waves o f nationalism. I n 1799 Sultan Selim I I I acknowledged the independence of the mountainous nation of Montenegro, after its long and heroic defense of its liberty. Further proof of Ottoman weakness came i n 1804 w h e n some renegade Turkish troops i n Belgrade went on a rampage, disobeyed the sultan's orders, and forced the Serbian people to defend themselves. This i n i t i a l act of self-protection blossomed i n t o a rebellion that culminated i n the Serbs gaining an autonomous position w i t h i n the Ottoman Empire after an 11-year struggle. Turkish weakness attracted b o t h Russian and B r i t i s h interests. Russia had made a substantial advance toward the Mediterranean during the reign of Catherine I I . I n 1774 the Treaty of Kiichiik Kaynarca ( k i u - C H U K kay-NAR-tsa), the Russians gained the rights o f navigation i n the Ottoman waters and the right to intervene i n favor of Eastern Orthodox Christians i n the Ottoman Empire. The B r i t i s h protested these gains, and i n 1791, Prime Minister W i l l i a m Pitt the Younger denounced Russia for its supposed ambitions to dismember the empire. Only the c o m m o n threat o f Napoleon from 1798 to 1815 diverted Great B r i t a i n and Russia from their competition i n the eastern Mediterranean. The forces of nationalism i n Greece took advantage of the chaotic administration of the Turks i n

The Ottoman Empire had played a key role i n European history since its creation i n the fourteenth cen-

Eastern Question—The question of how to dispose of the declining Ottoman Empire.

from the state. He was well on the way to finding a solution to that most enduring of Russian problems, the peasant problem, before he was assassinated i n 1911 by a Socialist Revolutionary, who was also an agent of the secret police. Despite its reactionary tsar and nobility, Russia took major steps toward becoming a constitutional monarchy i n the years after 1905. The nation made great economic and social progress. Industrialization increased and generated new wealth. Increased political and civil rights spawned an active public life. Stolypin s death i n 1911, however, deprived the country of needed leadership, and World War I gave Russia a test i t could not pass.

THE "EASTERN QUESTION" AND THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1914 • Why were the European powers unable to come to an agreement about what to do with the Ottoman Empire?

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1821. Unlike the Serbian rebellion, the Greek revolut i o n gained substantial outside support from p h i l hellenic ("admiring Greeks") societies of Great B r i t a i n . Even though Metternich hoped the revolt w o u l d b u r n itself out, the Greeks were able to take advantage o f intervention by the Great Powers to gain their independence. During the Greek Revolt, the British feared that Russia would use the Greek independence movement as an excuse for further expansion at Turkish expense. The British intervened skillfully, and the Greeks were able to gain their independence without a major Russian advance toward the Straits—the control of which by the Turks blocked their access to the Mediterranean Sea and beyond. Tsar Nicholas I wanted to weaken the Ottoman Empire i n order to pave the way for Russia to gain control over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. So much did he want this expansion of his realm that he set aside his obligations to support the European balance of power. Britain became alarmed at this policy, and the upshot was an agreement i n 1827 i n which Britain, France, and Russia pledged themselves to secure Greek independence. Russia eventually defeated the Turks, and i n 1829 the Treaty of Adrianople gave the Greeks the basis for their independence, while Serbia received autonomy. The Danubian principalities o f Moldavia and Wallachia, the basis of the future state of Romania, became Russian protectorates. By the 1830s it became apparent that the Turks were to be an object of, rather than a participant i n , European diplomacy. The sultan's government had few admirers i n Europe, but the European powers agreed—at least for the present—to prop up the decaying Ottoman Empire rather than allow one nation to gain dominance i n the strategic area. I n 1832 Mehemet Ali, for all intents and purposes the independent governor of Egypt, attacked the sultan, easily putting d o w n the forces of the empire. To prevent the establishment of a new and probably stronger government at the Straits, Nicholas I sent an army to protect Constantinople. I n 1833 the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (un-key-AR ske-less-ee) gave Russia a dominant position over the Turks. Britain could not tolerate Russia's advantage and for the next 10 years worked diplomatically to force the tsar to renounce the treaty and sign a general agreement o f Turkish independence. This diplomatic game d i d little to improve the Ottoman Empire's condition. I n 1844, while visiting B r i t a i n , Nicholas referred to the empire as a "dying man" and proposed that the British j o i n in a dissection of the body.

The Crimean War The Crimean War, w h i c h lasted from 1853 to 1856, was a major turning point i n the course of the Eastern

Question. The immediate origins of the war were to be found i n a quarrel over the management and protection of the holy places i n Palestine. Napoleon I I I , i n a move to gain support from Catholics and the military in France, upheld the Roman Catholics' right to perform the housekeeping duties. On the other side, acting under the terms of the treaty signed i n K ü c h ü k Kaynarca, Nicholas stated that the Orthodox faithful should look after the holy places. From this obscure argument, the Crimean War eventually emerged, as the Great Powers all intervened in the discussions to protect their interests. The tsar's ambassador to the Turks tried to use the dispute to improve Russia's position in the region, while the British told the sultan to stand firm against the Russians. After the Russians occupied the Danubian principalities i n an attempt to show the Turks the seriousness of their demands, the Turks declared war on the Russians i n October 1853. By the next summer the French, Sardinians, and B r i t i s h had joined the Turks. Napoleon I I I saw the w a r as a chance to enhance his dynasty's reputation, and the Sardinians found an opportunity to gain allies i n their drive for Italian unification. Under the impact of antitsarist public opinion, the British took steps to stop the Russians. The stated aim of all the allies was, of course, the defense of the sultan. A combination of the allies' military strength and the tsarist forces' inefficiency stalemated the Russians. Austria, a former close ally of Russia, took advantage of Russia's difficulties to extend Austrian influence into the Balkans. The Russians sued for peace, and the Treaty of Paris (1856) once again attempted to resolve the Eastern Question. Rather than deal w i t h the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty affirmed its integrity and Great Power status. The Black Sea was to be a neutral body of water, and the Straits were closed to foreign warships. The treaty declared that no power had the right to intervene on behalf of the sultan's Christian subjects. Russian control of the principalities was ended. The Crimean War momentarily stopped the Russian advance into the Balkans and toward the eastern Mediterranean, but the problems posed by the "sick m a n of Europe" remained. Further, the various Balkan nations became even more inflamed with the desire for self-rule.

The Unanswered Question I n the generation after the Crimean War the problems posed by the disintegrating Ottoman Empire became more severe. To the north, the Russians, who could do little militarily i n the Balkans during this period of intense internal reforms, broadcast the message of panSlavic solidarity to their "Orthodox" brothers i n the Balkans. The Austrians, their appetites whetted by their

CHAPTER 26 • Politics part i n the Crimean War, kept a wary and opportunistic eye on developments i n the Balkans. British loans to the Turks cut into the Turkish tax base and led to the destruction of the indigenous Ottoman textile industry. I n addition, w i t h the completion of the Suez Canal i n 1869, the eastern Mediterranean came to be even more essential to British interests. Finally, the Germans began to increase their influence i n the area after 1871. Nationalism further complicated the unresolved Eastern Question. The Bulgarians, w h o had been under the Turkish yoke since the fourteenth century, started their national revival i n the late eighS H 9 teenth century. By the 1860s they had formed •BBSi liberation movement, w h i c h was strengthi U i U a ened i n 1870 when the Turks gave permission Oppression them to found the Bulgarian Exarchate, a a

t

in Bulgana

°

Bulgarian wing of the Greek Orthodox faith. This permitted the Bulgarians to establish their churches wherever there were Bulgarian people, a clear invitation for the expansion of the Bulgarian nation. The Bulgarians took strength from the example of the Romanians, who, after centuries of Turkish dominance and a quarter century as a Russian protectorate, had gained their independence i n 1861, largely as a result of great power influence. Also, during the 1860s, the Serbian leader Michael Obrenovich (o-BREN-o-vich) had worked toward a Balkan union against the Turks. A m i d this maneuvering and ferment, the Turks were unable to strengthen their rule over areas theoretically under their control. The crisis came to a head i n 1875 when peasants revolted i n the district of Bosnia, a Turkish-governed province populated by a religiously diverse group of Slavs. Following this insurrection, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Turks. I n the summer of 1876, the Bulgarians revolted, but the Ottoman forces put down the rebellion. When highly emotional accounts of the Turkish massacres were published i n western Europe, the incident became known as the "Bulgarian horrors" and drew British attention to the Balkans. The pan-Slav faithful i n St. Petersburg and Moscow were naturally thrilled at the exploits of their "little brothers," and money and volunteers flowed southward. The series of nationalistic uprisings i n the improperly governed Ottoman provinces had captured the attention of the Great Powers, and by the end of 1875 the Eastern Question was once again the main focus of international diplomacy. The "sick man of Europe" was still strong enough to devastate the Serbs and Montenegrins i n battle. The insurgents were forced to sue for peace, a move that drew Tsar Alexander I I and the Russians into war w i t h the Ottomans i n 1877. After a hard-fought campaign, the Russians broke through early i n 1878 and were close to achieving their final goal of taking Constantinople when the sultan sued for peace.

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The resulting Treaty of San Stefano i n March 1878 recognized the complete independence of Serbia and Romania from theoretical Ottoman sovereignty and reaffirmed Montenegro's independence. A large Bulgarian state was set up, nominally tributary to the Ottoman Empire but actually dominated by Russia. The Straits were effectively under Russian control, as the Bulgarian state would have a coast on the Aegean. The Eastern Question was almost solved by the Russians. Britain and Austria, however, correctly perceived a major shift of the balance of power i n Russia's favor, and the two of them forced a reconsideration of the San Stefano treaty at the Congress of Berlin i n June and July 1878. Held under the supervision of Bismarck, the self-styled "honest broker," the congress compelled Russia to agree to a revision of Bulgaria's status. The large state created i n M a r c h was broken into three parts: the northernmost section w o u l d be independent, paying tribute to the Turks, while the other two parts would be under Ottoman control. Austria got the right to "occupy and administer" the provinces of Herzegovina and Bosnia. The congress turned back the Russian advance, stymied the national independence movement, and did little to urge Turkey to put its house i n order. The Austrian gains caused great bitterness among the Serbs and Russians, a mood that added to the tension i n the Balkans. The Eastern Question remained unanswered, and the Balkans remained an arena of local nationalistic conflicts that would appeal to the imperialistic designs of the Great Powers, especially the Russians and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Appearances and Realities By 1900 Europeans had many reasons to be optimistic about the future. The growth produced by the previous three generations seemed to support the sturdy belief i n progress. There was a substantial amount of unity: Europe was Christian, Caucasian, capitalist, industrialized, and i n command of the world. Europeans shared the same vibrant Western traditions, and even the rulers of the various states were all related to one another. As i f to symbolize w o r l d changes, there were new ways to organize international communication, defuse conflicts, and maintain peace. As early as 1865, a meeting was held i n Paris to coordinate the use of telegraph lines and to establish a unified rate structure. Ten years later, the Universal Postal Union was set up to handle the world's mail. To protect the rights of authors, an agreement was drawn up i n 1886 for an international copyright union. Scholars and statesmen worked to strengthen international law, the rules of warfare, and the use of a r b i t r a t i o n . A significant example o f this was the opening of the Hague Conference i n 1899. The Russ-

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RUSSIA

In the spring of 1878, ihe Russians believed thai they had imposed their solution to the Eastern Question in the Treaty of San Stejano. The other European powers disagreed and forced a revision of San Stefano in the Congress of Berlin a few months later. Ultimately, the Eastern Question would remain unanswered until World War I redrew the map of Europe and the Middle East.

ian foreign minister invited the Great Powers to the Dutch city to discuss arms reduction. Although no progress was made on disarmament, the conference did reform the rules of war by improving the treatment of prisoners, o u t l a w i n g the use of poisonous gas, and defining the conditions of a state of war. I n addition, an international court of a r b i t r a t i o n , the Hague Tribunal, was established, staffed by an international group of jurists. Appearance before the court was voluntary, as was acceptance o f its decisions. The effectiveness of arbitration as a means to solve problems could be seen in the ten years before the war. Various powers signed 162 treaties that pledged the signatories to arbitrate disagreements such as boundary decisions and conflicts over fishing rights. Alfred Nobel, the Swedish manufacturer of dynamite, personified the contradictions of the age. This international producer of explosives established a peace prize two weeks before his death i n November 1 896. Andrew Carnegie set up the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and built a peace palace at The

Hague to be used for international conferences. It was finished just weeks before the outbreak of World War I . All of these developments encouraged believers in progress to envision a peaceful future. They pointed out that all of the wars i n the nineteenth century had been generally local and short. They reasoned that if war should break out i n the future, the murderous new technologies would ensure that they would not be lengthy or costly. Some social Darwinists asserted that humanity might well evolve beyond the stage of fighting wars altogether. These optimists conveniently ignored the brutal, lengthy, and costly reality of the American Civil War, in many ways the first modern, industrial war. They also ignored the reality that the European state system and military industrial complexes took on a life and momentum of their own.

The End of Bismarck's System From 1870 to 1890 the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, dominated European diplomacy. He built a

CHAPTER 26 - Politics rational balance-of-power-based foreign policy devoted to the diplomatic isolation of France by depriving i t of potential allies. He reasoned that the French would try to take revenge on Germany and regain Alsace and Lorraine, but he knew they could do little without aid from the Austrians or Russians. I n 1873 Bismarck made an alliance, known as the Three Emperors' League or Dreikaiserbund (dri-KAI-ser-bund), w i t h Russia and Austria-Hungary. Conflicts between the Austrians and Russians i n the Balkans soon put a strain on the league, and at the Congress of Berlin (1878) Bismarck was forced to choose between the conflicting claims of Vienna and St. Petersburg. He chose to support Austria-Hungary for a number of reasons, including fear of alienating Great Britain i f he backed the Russians. I n addition, he felt that he could probably dominate Austria more easily than Russia. This momentous shift paved the way for a new arrangement. I n 1879 Bismarck negotiated the Dual Alliance w i t h the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; i n 1882 a new partner, Italy, joined the group, which was now called the Triple Alliance. The choice of Austria over Russia d i d not mean that Bismarck abandoned his ties w i t h the tsars. I n 1881 the Three Emperors' League was renewed. Rivalries between the Dual Monarchy and Russia i n the Balkans put an effective end to the arrangement, and the Dreikaiserbund collapsed for good i n 1887. Bismarck negotiated a separate agreement w i t h Russia

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called the Reinsurance Treaty, i n w h i c h b o t h sides pledged neutrality—except i f Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria—and support of the status quo. Under Bismarck's shrewd hand, Germany kept diplomatic control for 20 years. Bismarck chose his goals carefully and understood the states w i t h which he worked. He made every effort to avoid challenging Britain's interests and to continue isolating France. As a result, Germany was not surrounded by enemies. The chancellor kept from alienating Russia while maintaining his ties w i t h Austria. I n the 1890s, however, the rash actions of the new kaiser, William I I , destroyed Germany's favorable position. He dismissed Bismarck i n 1890, took foreign policy into his o w n hands, and arrogantly frittered away the diplomatic advantages the chancellor had built up. France had been attempting to escape from its isolat i o n for some time and had begun, through its bank loans, to make i m p o r t a n t inroads into Russia even before Bismarck retired. When the kaiser allowed the Reinsurance Treaty to lapse, the Russians decided to look elsewhere. France leapt at the chance, after 20 years, to secure a strong ally. I n 1894 the Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary found itself confronted by the Dual Alliance of Russia and France. Germany's worst fears had come to pass: I t was now encircled by enemies.

Britain Ends Its Isolation Major Dates in European Alliances 1872

The Three Emperor's League (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia) formed

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Dual Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary) formed

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Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) formed

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Bismarck resigns; Reinsurance Treaty with Russia lapses

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Germany decides to build fleet to compete with British navy

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French-Russian Alliance

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Russia joins Britain and France to form Triple Entente

At the end of the nineteenth century, B r i t a i n found itself involved i n bitter rivalries w i t h Russia i n the Balkans and i n the Middle East and w i t h France i n Africa. During the Boer War, all of the Great Powers i n Europe were anti-British. However, the supremacy of the British fleet helped discourage intervention. As the new century began, L o n d o n became concerned that its policy of splendid isolation might need to be abandoned. I n these circumstances, the most normal place for Britain to t u r n would be to Germany. On the surface nothing seemed more natural than that these two dominant European powers should adjust their national interests to avoid conflict. From the 1880s to 1901 both sides made several approaches to investigate an "understanding" between the major sea power, Britain, and the strongest land power, Germany. Tradition and dynastic relations spoke i n favor of a closer tie between the two. By 1900 Berlin and London may have competed i n economic and imperialistic terms, but they were far from any major strife i n any either area. The t w o countries could not, however, come together formally. Even though important figures on

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both sides could see the advantages o f an alliance, strong forces worked against this development. German and British interests did not match sufficiently to permit equal gain from an alliance. The kaiser's numerous bellicose statements and clumsy actions (such as his meddling i n B r i t i s h colonial affairs by sending a telegram to South Africa's president, Paul Kruger, i n 1896) offended many British leaders. Germany's expanding influence i n the Middle East and the Balkans worried the British, as did Germany's tremendous economic progress. Most threatening for London was Germany's plan to build a fleet that would compete w i t h Britain's. I n 1900 Germany initiated a huge naval program providing for, w i t h i n a 20-year timetable, a fleet strong enough to keep Britain from interfering w i t h German international goals. The British believed that the Germ a n program was aimed directly at them. For the island nation, the supremacy of the Royal Navy was a life-or-death matter. Since food and raw materials had to come by sea, it was crucial that the navy be able to protect British shipping. Challenged by Germany, Britain looked elsewhere for allies. I n 1904 officials from London and Paris began to settle their differences and proclaimed the Entente Cordiale ("friendly understanding"), setting aside a tradition of hostility dating back to the Hundred Years' War. The entente and an alliance w i t h Japan i n 1902 ended Britain's policy of diplomatic isolation and brought it into the combination that would be pitted against Germany's Triple Alliance. I n 1907 London settled its problems w i t h Russia, thereby establishing the Triple Entente. The British made no definite military commitments in the agreements w i t h France and Russia. Theoretically they retained freedom of action, but they were now part of the alliance system.

The North African Crises In the decade before World War I , Europe experienced a series of crises on its peripheries, none o f which vitally threatened the Great Powers' survival individually. However, because of the alliance system, the incidents increased tensions and brought Europe ever closer to war. The first serious test came i n 1905 over Morocco. France sought control o f this territory i n order to establish a continuous line of dependencies from the Atlantic across the N o r t h African coast to Tunisia. Carefully timing their moves, the Germans arranged for the kaiser to visit the Moroccan port of Tangier, where he declared that all powers must respect the independence of the country. The French were forced to give up their immediate plans for taking over Morocco and to agree to Germany's suggestion that an

international conference be called at Algeciras (1906) to discuss the matter. At this meeting the Germans hoped for a split between the British and French. This d i d not occur. On the contrary, all but one of the nations i n attendance—even Italy—supported France rather than Germany. Only Austria-Hungary remained on the kaiser's side. The conference agreed that Morocco should still enjoy its sovereignty but that France and Spain should be given certain rights to police the area. I n 1911 a second Moroccan crisis escalated tensions. When France sent an army into the disputed territory, ostensibly to maintain order, Germany responded by sending the gunboat Panther to the Moroccan port of Agadir. Great Britain came out with a blunt warning that all of its power was at the disposal or France i n this affair. A diplomatic bargain was finally struck i n w h i c h France got a free hand i n Morocco and Germany gained a small area i n equatorial Africa. The two rival alliances managed to avoid war over Morocco. The illusion of progress was maintained—until the alliance system reached the breaking point i n the Balkans. It was in the conduct of diplomacy that the perils of progress took their greatest toll. The vastly stronger states operated more and more under their own views of social D a r w i n i s m , building huge defense establishments while ignoring important crises such as those around the declining Ottoman Empire. The Europeans' appetites, egos, and military forces had begun to exceed the terrain left to be taken i n the world. The new mass politics, w i t h its popular press, superpatriotic appeals, and blatant aggressiveness, could not adapt easily to the new situation. A century of grabbing territory and r e p r i n t i n g maps showing broader swatches of the globe in the national colors had spoiled the Western states and distorted their foreign policies. The results would bring an end to European dominance.

CONCLUSION The French and Industrial Revolutions changed the Western world far beyond the comprehension of the leaders gathered at Vienna i n 1814. The Congress of Vienna placed a framework of stability on Europe, while accepting many of the changes since 1789. However, it d i d not deal w i t h the new political forces of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism. This soon became evident w i t h the epidemic of revolutions i n the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s. I n 1848 the legacy of the French Revolution and the process of industrialization combined to overpower the political structures of France,

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Germany, Italy, and the Habsburg Empire. The 1848 revolutions enjoyed brief, spectacular successes and tragic, lasting failures. The leaders of the revolutions had little or no experience, and they acted under a total infatuation w i t h their ideals. The force of nationalism, so powerful an enemy of autocracy, soon proved to be a fragmenting force among the various liberated nationalities. These factors doomed the idealistic revolutionaries and introduced a new range of political alternatives, such as unification i n Italy, the Second Empire i n France, and the construction of a unified German state. Russia and B r i t a i n avoided the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, the first through a policy of repression that failed to respond effectively to its overwhelming problems and the second because of an improving standard of living and a flexible, self-interested middle class. For the rest of the century their paths would diverge, as England would grow to establish a world empire while the Russians would struggle w i t h reform and repression until the 1905 Revolution, which would finally bring an end to autocracy. Across the Atlantic, the United States profited by a massive influx of immigrants and became a leading Western power, after enduring a savage and tragic civil war. For the British and the Americans, the t r i u m p h of liberalism consolidated the control of industrialization i n the hands of the middle classes, who i n t u r n dominated the political arena. The United Kingdom, through its political stability and continued economic growth, provided an improv-

ing standard of living and a flexible, self-interested middle class and established a world empire. I n Europe, the German Second Reich came to be the most powerful country on the Continent and challenged the United Kingdom for commercial supremacy. The French consolidated their power after their military and diplomatic defeat i n 1870. Thereafter, until 1914, despite the ramshackle nature of the Third Republic and its scandals, France had power and influence. The Italians had achieved unification under the leadership of Cavour and Sardinia, but unification d i d not bring miraculous improvements i n the lives of the Italian people. The Habsburg Empire, after nearly 20 years of trying to deal w i t h its fractious nationalities, redefined itself as the Dual Monarchy i n 1867. I t managed to hold together until the outbreak of World War I . The European states were unable to answer the most i m p o r t a n t challenge facing them throughout the nineteenth century, and that was what to do w i t h the Ottoman Empire—once a w o r l d power that held title to far more t e r r i t o r y t h a n i t could effectively govern. I n the political vacuum that developed i n the Ottoman-dominated part of Europe—the Balkans— the subjugated nationalities began to c l a i m their independence under their respective banners of nationalism. Crises erupted on the European peripheries of the Ottoman E m p i r e i n the 1830s, 1850s, 1870s, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the countries that had made so m u c h progress domestically were failing to maintain stability internationally.

Suggestions for Web Browsing

Revolutions of 1848 http://www.pvhs.chico.kl2.ca.us/~bsilva/projects/revs/ 1848time.html

You can obtain more information about topics included i n this chapter at the websites listed below. See also the companion website that accompanies this text, http://www.ablongman.com/ brummett, which contains an online study guide and additional resources. Nationalism and Music http://acc6.its.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~phalsall/sounds/fnlandia.micl

Through articles and sound files, this site discusses how early-nineteenth-century music reflected growing nationalist feelings in Europe. Marx-Engels Internet Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/index.htrn

Extensive site on both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels offers biographies, a photo gallery, letters, and additional web links. The Revolution of 1848 i n France http://history.hanover.edu/texts/frl848.htm

Site includes original source documents from the Revolution of 1848 in France.

Extensive site offers an overview, timeline, biographies, and essays about the revolutions of 1848. Life of the Tsars http://www.Alexanderpalace.org/catherinepalace/Alexander.html

Images portraying the luxury of life for the tsars in the nineteenth century. The Lewis and Clark Expedition http://www.peabody.harvard.edu/Lewis_and_Clark/default.html

Lewis and Clark brought back an enormous collection of material, which is housed at the Peabody Museum at Harvard. U.S. Intervention i n Latin America http://www.smplanet.com/imperialism/teddy.html

Site offering a wide range of images, movies, and sound bites regarding intervention in Latin America, particularly the issues surrounding the Panama Canal project.

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Theodore Roosevelt htt p://www.tbeodore toosevelt.org/ A website that touches ail aspects of Roosevelt's life and work, including a fine collection of political cartoons. Benjamin Disraeli http://projects.vassar.erI_/punch/Lockwood.html Benjamin Disraeli was a controversial figure in British history, as can be seen in the cartoon on this website. Links to William Gladstone and the political setting of the time ate also found here. Nineleenth-Century Austria and Germany htt p://www.fordham . edu/hal s a 11/mod/ mod sbook 22. htm I A rich crossroads of information about nineteenth-century Austria and Germany is offered by the Internet Modern History Source Book, which contains documents, maps, and images. Nineteenth-Century Europe in Photos http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/histoty/core/pics Website providing access to a vast array of historical images of the era.

Literature and Film The nineteenth century was the golden age of the European novel, and across the West, there were powerful talents portraying (lie complexity and drama of their times. Victor Hugo's Les Misérables (1862) is a masterpiece of a book, the subject of both films and musicals. Charles Dickens captured the courage and challenge of the first part of the nineteenth century in England in books such as Great Expectations (1860-1861), A Christmas Carol (¡843), Hard Times (1845), Bleak House (1852), and David Copperfield (1849-1850). Jane Austens Pride and Prejudice (1813), Sense and Sensibility (1811), and other novels give an insight into upper-middle-class life and are also the bases of a number of films. The prolific Honoré de Balzac provided detailed portraits of the often cruel social practices of France after the Revolution and Napoleon. Old Goriot (1835), Cousin Belle (1846), and Colonel Chabert (1832) are among his more impressive works. In Russia, Nikolai Gogol skillfully captured the absurdity of the serf system in his Dead Souls (1842) and The Inspector General ( 1836). Ivan Turgenev accomplished the finest presentation of generational conflict in his Fathers and Sons (1862). Leo Tolstoy published his epochal War and Peace in the 1860s, followed by a number of other important works, including Anna Karenina (1873-1876). Perhaps the greatest Russian novelist, Fedor Dostoevski, in bis finest novel. The Brothers Karamazov (1879-1880), described Russia under wrenching transition in the wake of the Great Reforms. His study of human behavior in Crime and Punishment (1866) remains one of the finest psychological novels in any language. As were other great titles above, the Russian novels have been presented in several films. Herman Melville's classic, Moby Dick (1851), gained instant acceptance as a major contribution to world literature. The Public Broadcasting System has produced superb studies of the United Stales in the nineteenth century, available in VHS presentation. See the series on Lincoln (1995), Ken Bums's treatment of the Civil War (1990), and the study of the West and Lewis and Clark (2004). A searching and dramatic portrayal of

the struggle for freedom among African Americans is the Roots of Resistance—A Story of the Underground Railroad (1995). Edward Zwick directed a stunning portrayal of African Americans fighting for their freedom in the Civil War in Glory (Columbia/Tristar, 1989). As mass education spread and literacy became more widespread, writers went in two separate directions. Poets began to imitate the symbolist work of Paul Verlaine, Selected Poems (Oxford University Press, 2000), and Stéphane Mallarmé, Collected Poems (University of California Press, 1996), or the popular and widely read works of Rudyard Kipling. See the edition of Kipling's Kim, ed. Edward Said (Viking, 1992) fora fine discussion of his work. Other titles by Kipling include Just So Stories (1902), Rikki-Tikki-Tavi (part of The Jungle Book), The Jungle Book (1894), and Tlie Man Who Would Be King (1889), which became the subject of a fine film of the same name. A person who staked out his own route was the visionary H. G. Wells, who wrote The Time Machine (1895), The Invisible Man (1897), and Tlie War of the Worlds ( 1898). Other writers became powerful spokesmen for justice, such as Emile Zola, who led the drive to defend Alfred Dreyfus. His Germinal (Viking, 1997), one in a series of 19 related novels, stands as one the most important novels at the turn of the century. In the United Stales, Mark Twain continued his prolific work, but he was joined by authors such as Theodore Dreiser making strong social commentary in his book Sister Carrie (¡900). Ida Tarbell set the foundations for investigative journalism with her The History of Standard Oil Company (1904), a work that was widely read. Werner Herzog's Fitzcarraldo (New World Pictures, 1982) portrays a man with an obsession to establish a trading network along the Amazon and to build a world class opera house there. Claude Berri's Germinal (Sony Pictures Classics, 1994) brings Zola's novel to the screen. The diplomatic style of Teddy Roosevelt is captured in John Milius's The Wind and the Lion (Columbia, 1975). The Public Broadcasting System has produced a number of documentaries dealing with the period in the United States: TR, The Story of Theodore Roosevelt (AMEI-999-FXA, 1998), Not for Ourselves Alone: The Story of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony (NFOA-DXO-FXA, 1999), Tlie Richest Man in the World: Andrew Carnegie (AMEI-093-FXA, 1997), and America 1900 (AMER-X10I-FXA, 1998).

Suggestions For Reading For a general background to the period see Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Jonathan Sperber, The European Revolution 1841-1851, New Approaches in European History (Cambridge University Press, 1994). David Blackbourn's The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany 1780-1918 (Oxford University Press, 1998) traces the emergence of Prussia as the unifying force. Italian unification is the subject of Derek Bayies' The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (Allen & Unwin, 1982). Theodore Zeldin's superb study, France 1848-1945, 4 Vols. (Oxford University Press, 1973-1975), provides the necessary context to understand that tempestuous century in France. A notion of the complexity of the nationalities question in eastern Europe can be found in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Ledcrcr, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (University of Washington Press, 1969). J. N. Westwood's£i[„Hrance„ii„ Endeavor: Russian History 1812-1992 (Oxford University Press, 1993) is the best one-volume survey. A good overview of the history of the UK during this time is David Thomson's England in

CHAPTER 26 • Politics and Diplomacy in the West, 1815-1914 the Nineteenth Century (Penguin, 1991). For the economic and social changes taking place in nineteenth-century America see James L. Huston, Securing the Fruits of Labor: The American Concept of Wealth Distribution, 1765-1900 (Louisiana State University Press, 1998). Matthew S. Anderson's The Eastern Ques-

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tion, 1774-1923 (St. Martin's Press, 1966) remains the best single-volume study of the issue that led to the outbreak of World War I . Joachim Remak's The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1997) is a solid analysis of Europe's diplomatic failure.

27

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World War I and Its Economic and Political Consequences

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

World War I

Economic Disasters

DOCUMENT: Diary of Private Tom Easton

Politics in the

The Allied Peace Settlement

The Western Tradition

Democracies

DOCUMENT: John Maynard Keynes on

in Transition:

Clemenceau

Changing Certainties

1905

E

1909 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina

urope's global dominance was brought to an end in August 1914 by a combination of forces—militarism, rival alliances, imperialism, secret diplomacy, and bellicose nationalism. When World War I came to an end four years later, over

10 million soldiers from around the world lay dead on Europe's battlefields, a generation of the best and bravest. Four empires—the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman—either faded away or disappeared entirely. No part of the world remained untouched by these upheavals. The European pow-

ers recruited soldiers from their colonies. From Senegal to India to Australia to New Zealand hundreds of thousands of soldiers went to fight and die in the European war.

1910 1912 and 1913 Balkan Wars 1914 Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife assassinated; World War I begins 1916 Battles of Verdun and the Somme 1917 United States enters World War I; Britain pledges support for Jewish homeland in Palestine in Balfour Declaration

called to the front. The world economy lost what little equilibrium it had and went into

1918 Wilson issues Fourteen Points; Russia signs Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany; armistice signed ending World War I

a manic cycle of inflation and depression that devastated nations around the globe

1919 Treaty of Versailles

The warring forces waged battles in both East and West Asia, while Asians and Africans went to work In the European countries to replace workers who had been

between 1929 and 1932. World War I, the "Great War"—the war that was to "make the world safe for democracy"—left a legacy of physical damage, economic disruption, and doubt that threatened the liberal advances of the nineteenth century. The horrible costs

1920 1924 Dawes Plan; first Labour government in Britain 1929 U.S. stock market crashes

of the war made the triumph a hollow one for the democratic victors. After the ini-

1930

tial taste for revenge had been satisfied, revulsion for war became widespread.

1930-1940 Global depression

The economic dislocation caused by inflation and depression sapped the strength of the middle classes, the traditional defenders of democracy, and paved the way for extremist dictators.

797

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WORLD WAR I • How did European alliances make war all but inevitable? As we saw in Chapter 26, the diplomatic structure created by Bismarck, based on a Central Power alliance w i t h Vienna and Rome, began to come apart in the 1890s. The blustering foreign policy of the Kaiser drove England, France, and Russia—three countries that had never worked together—to form the Triple Entente (on-tahnt) in 1907. The two alliances found themselves at odds over the crises in North Africa but managed to avoid going to war. The Central Powers and the Triple Entente entered into World War I i n August 1914, however, because of their inability to deal w i t h a series of conflicts in the Balkans.

The Balkan Crises During the nineteenth century, Russia and Austria competed as they expanded their influences into the

Balkan holdings of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the last part of the nineteenth century, the two openly disagreed on the question of Macedonia, the building of railroads through the peninsula, and boundary revisions. Vienna and S t Petersburg were particularly at odds over the question of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HERTS-ah-GOH-vee-nah). The Austro-Hungarian monarchy had administered the two areas since the 1878 Congress of Berlin, much to the Russians' and Serbs' displeasure. The Russian Foreign Minister, Count l/.volskii (EEZ-volskee), initialed talks with Vienna in 1908 to resolve the situation. I n an inexplicable move, he proposed that Russia would approve the Austro-Hungarians to annex the two areas in return for increased Black Sea rights for the Russian navy. The Austrians were pleased to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the Russians never got their part of the bargain. Serbia was outraged by the incorporation of more Slavs into the Habsburg domain and expected its Slavic, Orthodox protector, Russia, to do something about it. The Russians had been badly bruised in their

Vienna

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 19)1

RUSSIA

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SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 1914

'.

At the end oj the nineteenth century fas well as the twentieth), the Balkans were a cauldron of conflicting national memories and ambitions. In the second decade of the twentieth century the Balkans mirrored the weakening of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires.

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E oootctnts^ occiBMlon.'' Italian 1913

a

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CHAPTER 27 -

World War I and Its Economic and Political Consequences

799

war with Japan and the Revolution of 1905. Aside himself satisfied with his gains, and looked forward to from making threatening noises, they could do little to a direct challenge of Austria. block the annexation, especially i n the face of GerThe spark that set off World War I was struck on many's support for Austria-Hungary. June 28, 1914 w i t h the assassination of the heir to After 1908, tensions remained high in the Balkans. the Austrian throne, Archduke Francis FerThe Austrians looked to increase their advantage, dinand. The archduke and his wife were visknowing they had the full backing of Germany. Serbia i t i n g the t o w n o f Sarajevo (SAHR-ah-YAYsearched for revenge, while Russia found itself backed voh) in Bosnia, which his realm had recently into a corner. After the failure of Izvolskii's efforts, the annexed. While they were d r i v i n g through Russians had to support their Balkan allies or lose the narrow streets i n their huge touring car, their influence. a 19-year-old Bosnian student named Gavrilo In 1912 Serbia and its neighbors, including Greece Princip (PRIN-chip), one of seven young terand Bulgaria, formed an alliance with the objective of rorists along the route, shot them. Princip had been expelling the Turks from Europe. The First Balkan War inspired by propaganda advocating the creation of a began later in the year and came to a quick end with the greater Serbia and was assisted by Serbian officers defeat of the Turks. Each of the Balkan allies had its serving in a secret organization, the Black I land. The own particular goals in mind in fighting the Ottomans. direct participation of the Serbian government was When the Great Powers stepped in to maintain the balnever proved; even so, the Belgrade authorities were ance, problems arose. likely to have been involved, at least indirectly. Serbia had fought for a seaport on the Adriatic and thought it had gained one with the defeat An illustration fror» Le Journal de Paris depieting the Serhian terrorist of the Turks. However, the Italians and Austrians Gavrilo Princip assassinaling Archduke Francis Ferdinand and Iiis wife, Sophie, in Soru/evo on June 28, 1914. blocked Serbia's access to the sea by overseeing the creation of Albania in the Treaty of London of 1913. Denied their goals, the Serbs turned on their former allies, the Bulgarians, and demanded a part of their spoils from the first war. Bulgaria refused and, emboldened by its successes in the first war, attacked its former allies, starting the Second Balkan War. The Serbs were in turn joined by the Romanians and the Turks. The Bulgarians were no match for the rest of the Balkans and signed a peace that turned over most of the territory that they had earlier gained. The Turks retained only a precarious toehold in Europe, the small pocket from Adrianople to Constantinople. Had the Great Powers found a way to place a fence around the Balkans and allow the squabbling nations to work out their differences in isolation, the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 would have had little signilicance. As it was, however, the combative Balkan nations added to the prevailing state of tension between the two competing alliances, whose policies clashed because of their conflicting choices of allies in the Balkans. In effect, the tail wagged the dog, as the alliances reacted to every flare-up in the turbulent peninsula.

\ssassination ai Sarajevo By the end of 1913, no permanent solution had been found to the Balkans' problems. Austria was more fearful than ever of Serbia's expansionist desires. Serbian ambitions had grown along w i t h its territory, which had doubled as a result of the recent wars. The Serbian prime minister declared

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Threatening the generally held views of inevitable progress at the beginning of the twentieth century were the unanswered Eastern Question in the Balkans and the lingering conflicts over dividing up the prize of North Africa.

The legal details of the case were lost in Vienna's rush to put an end to the problem of Serbia. Count Leopold von Berchtold (BERK-told), the foreign m i n ister, believed that the assassination in Bosnia justified crushing the anti-Austrian propaganda and terrorism coming from the Serbs. The kaiser felt that everything possible must be done to prevent Germany's only reliable ally from being weakened, and he assured the Austrians of his full support. Berchtold received a "blank check" from Germany. Vienna wanted a quick, local Austro-Serbian war, and Germany favored quick action to forestall Russian intervention. On July 23 the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry presented an ultimatum to the Serbs. Expecting the list of demands to be turned down, Berchtold insisted on unconditional acceptance w i t h i n 48 hours. Two days later, the Austro-Hungarian government announced that Serbia's reply, though conciliatory, was not satisfactory. The Austrians immediately mobilized their armed forces.

The Alliances" Inevitable War The Germans began having second thoughts and urged their ally in late July to negotiate w i t h Rus-

sia—which was anxiously following developments. Russia realized that i i the Austrians succeeded in humbling the Serbs, Russia's position i n the Balkans would suffer irreparably. The French, in the meantime, assured the Russians oi their full cooperation and urged lull support for Serbia. The British unsuccessfully advised negotiation. Europe had reached a point of no return: The Austrians had committed themselves to the task of removing an opponent, and the Russians could not permit this removal to happen. Neither side would back down, and each had allies ready to come to its aid. Fearful that Serbia would escape from his clutches, Berchtold succeeded on July 27—in part through deception—in convincing the Habsburg emperor Franz Josef (frahnz YOH-sef) that war was the only way out. The next day, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war against Serbia. As the possibility of a general European war loomed, Berlin sent several frantic telegrams to Vienna. The German ambassador was instructed to tell Berchtold that "as an ally we must refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration because Austria does not respect our advice." Had the Germans spoken to their ally in such tones a month earlier, war might have been 1

CHAPTER 27 •

World War I and Its Economic

avoided. But Austria's belligerence moved the Russians to act. The tsar ordered mobilization on July 30, 1914. Germany was caught i n a dilemma that Bismarck would never have allowed. Surrounded by potential enemies, the Germans had to move decisively or face defeat. The Russian mobilization threatened them, because i n the event of war on the eastern front, by treaty, there would also be war on the western front. The best plan for Berlin, one that had been worked out since the beginning of the century by the Chief of the General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen (vun SCHLEEFen), was to launch a lightning attack against France, which could mobilize faster than Russia, crush France, and then return to meet Russia, which would be slower to mobilize. To allow Russian mobilization to proceed without action would jeopardize this plan. The Germans set into effect their long-planned strategy to gain European dominance on July 31. They sent ultimatums to St.'Petersburg and Paris insisting that the Russians stop their mobilization and demanding a pledge of neutrality from the French. Failing to receive satisfactory replies, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1 and on France two days later. On August 2 the German ambassador i n Brussels delivered an ultimatum to the Belgian government announcing his country's intention to send troops through Belgium, in violation of the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. The Belgian cabinet refused to grant permission and appealed to the Triple Entente for help. A majority of the British cabinet did not want war, but with the news of the German ultimatum to Belgium, the tide turned. Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding that Belgian neutrality be respected. Germany refused, and on August 4 Great Britain declared war. Because Germany and Austria-Hungary were not waging a defensive war, Italy declined to carry out its obligations under the;Triple Alliance and for a time remained neutral. In-late August Japan joined the allies. Turkey, fearing,Russia, threw i n its lot w i t h the Central Powers—which, by the end of 1914, consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Diplomats tried desperately to avert a general war. Through confusion, fear, and loss of sleep, the nervous strain among them was almost unbearable. Many broke down and wept when i t became apparent they had failed. Grey himself noted i n his autobiography that one evening, just before the outbreak of the war, he watched the streetlights being l i t from his office window and remarked: "The lamps are going b u t all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again i n our lifetime." 2

Total War Although the terrible struggle that racked the w o r l d from 1914 to 1918 was fought mainly i n Europe, i t is

and Political

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rightly called W o r l d War I . I n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European powers had competed across the globe; however, never had so many fighters and such enormous resources been brought together i n a single conflict. Altogether, 27 nations became belligerents, ranging the globe from Japan to Canada and from Argentina to South Africa to Australia. The Central Powers mobilized 21 m i l l i o n men. The Allies eventually called 40 m i l l i o n men to arms, including 12 m i l l i o n Russians. The t w o sides were more equally matched than the numbers would indicate, however. Since the Russian divisions were often poorly equipped and ineffectively used, the Allies' apparent advantage was not great. I n addition, i n the German army, the Central Powers boasted superb generalship and discipline. Another advantage was that the Central Powers fought from a central position and were able to transfer troops quickly and efficiently to various fronts. The Allies had the advantages of greater resources of finance and raw materials. Britain maintained its naval dominance and could draw on its empire for support. I n addition, because Germany was effectively blockaded, the United States, even though officially neutral for most of the war, served as a major source of supplies for the Allies. The warring nations went into battle i n a confident mood. Each side was sure of its strength and felt it had prepared carefully. Each nation's propaganda machine delivered reassuring messages of guaranteed victory. All expected that the war w o u l d soon be over—probably by Christmas—and concluded i n a few decisive battles. They based t h e i r t h i n k i n g on precedent—but they chose the w r o n g precedent. They assumed that the next w a r w o u l d be i n the model of the efficient Bismarckian wars of the 1860s. Instead, the war came to resemble that of the bloody, four-year-long American Civil War, the first industrialized war.

The First Two Years of War All of the general staffs had been refining their war plans for years. The Germans knew that Allied naval supremacy would cut them off from needed sources abroad. They realized that they were potentially surrounded and that, according to the Schlieffen Plan, they should strike a quick knockout blow to end the war. They aimed to push the Belgians aside and drive rapidly south into France. The plan then called for the German forces to wheel west of Paris, outflank the French forces, and drive them toward Alsace-Lorraine, where they would be met by another German army. Within six weeks the French would be destroyed, caught between the western hammer and the eastern anvil. Meanwhile, a small German force would be holding the presumably

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These German soldiers, shown here huddled in their trench along the western front, try to find a moment of rest during a lull in the war oj attrition.

slow-moving Russians on the eastern front, awaiting the arrival, via the excellent German rail system, of the victorious western forces. The plan nearly worked. The Germans marched according to the plan until they got so close to Paris that they could see the lop of the Eiffel Tower. They were hurled back by a bold French offensive through a gap that opened between their armies in the first Battle of the Marne, fought between September 5 and 12. With the assistance of a small British expeditionary force and Parisian taxi drivers who provided transportation, the French then marched north in a race with the Germans to reach and control the vital ports along the English Channel. After much desperate fighting, the enemies established battle positions that stabilized, thus creating the western front, a solid line

of opposing trenches that stretched from the Channel to near the Swiss border. For the next four years this line of trenches would be the scene of a grisly w a r o f a t t r i t i o n , as the Allies Pilots of thefirstgeneration offighteraircraft in World War I made good use of their maneuverability and fire power, as seen in this and the Central Powers launched desperate attacks, hoping to gain the decisive "breakthrough" victory dogfightover the Western Front. that would end the war. The struggle was made all the more bloody by powerful artillery such as the German's gigantic "Big Bertha," more deadly machine guns, silent and devastating clouds of poison gas, and two new weapons: the tank and the airplane. Single battles along that line of death killed more soldiers than those lost by the North and the South combined during the four years of the American Civil War. The other part of the German scheme that did not go according to plan was the unexpected speed with which the Russians mobilized. They penetrated deeply into East Prussia and overran the Austrian province of Galicia. However, confused leadership resulted in two catastrophic Russian defeats in East Prussia, and Germany never again d u r i n g the war faced a serious threat on its eastern frontier. By the end of 1914 all sides knew that they were trapped i n a new type of war, one of horrible consequences. Single battles claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, and the loll d u r i n g the first few months of the conflict ran as high as 1.5 million dead and wounded.

war of attrition—A war in Which there are no decisive, conclusive battles. Rather, the two sides grind away at each other until one side is exhausled and gives up.

CHAPTER 27 •

World War 1 and Its Economic

In 1915 the British attempted a major campaign to force open the Dardanelles, closed by Turkey when it joined the Central Powers. This plan, attributed to Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, was designed to open up the sea route to Russia, which was badly in need of war supplies, and to take the pressure off the western front. After heroic and costly attacks, Allied Australian and New Zealand troops, known as Anzacs, were forced to withdraw from their landing positions on the Gallipoli (ga-LIP-po-lee) peninsula in European Turkey. Another major Allied setback in 1915 was the defeat of the Russian forces in Poland. More than 1.2 million Russians were killed and wounded, and the

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Germans took nearly 900,000 prisoners. Although Russia somehow remained i n the war and fought well against the Dual Monarchy, it was no longer a concern for the Germans. These defeats generated rising criticism against the tsar's government, and Russian morale deteriorated. Serbia was the next Central Powers' v i c t i m . I n September 1915 Bulgaria, still aching from its defeat in the Second Balkan War, entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Surrounded by enemies, Serbia was helpless, and resistance was quickly crushed. The Austrians had finally gained their goal of the previous summer, but in the context of the continental tragedy, this achievement no longer seemed significant.

The contrast between the fixed boundary between the Allies and the Central Powers, marked by trenches on the west, and the fluid lines of the eastern front are evident from this map. As much as the Central Powers were blockaded by British control of the North Sea, so too were the Russians blocked by Turkish control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and the Germans' control of the Baltic.

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The Allies' only bright spot i n 1915 was Italy's entiy into their ranks. Italy had remained neutral i n August 1914 when i t had defected from the Triple Alliance, of which i t had been at best a token member. Italy joined the Allies following promises made i n a secret treaty i n London that promised the Italians huge concessions of territory once victory had been attained.

Stalemate The Allies' strategy on the western front was to restrict attacks to a few concentrated assaults i n France, thus saving manpower and at the same time concentrating on their naval blockade. Denied badly needed imports, strategists assumed, the German war effort would be seriously weakened. Countering this tactic, the German high command under General Falkenhayn (FALK-en-

hine) launched a massive offensive against the strategic fortress of Verdun (vair-DUN) i n February 1916. After their defeat i n 1871 (see Chapter 26), the French had transformed Verdun into a network of 20 forts with powerful artillery, of which the fort of Douaumont (doo-OH-mon) was the most important. Verdun had repulsed the Central Powers'attack in 1914, but the Germans pulled back about 10 miles and set up lines of observation posts and logistical support. So sure were the French of the invincibility of this position that they moved some of their artillery and soldiers to other sites deemed more important. Falkenhayn began i n the late autumn of 1915 to build up his strength opposite Verdun, and, night after night, trains arrived loaded with men and matériel. Bad weather forced the Germans to delay their attack, but finally at 7:15 on the morning of February 21, more than 1000 German cannons along a

=CTM,i;s

>ocument

^Diaiy.of Private Tom Easton

British enlisted man Tom Easton recorded the horrors of the battle of the Somme in gripping detail.

beautiful summer morning, though we'd had a Lbit of rain earlier. The skylarks were just singing away. Then the grand mine went up, i t shook the earth for nearly a minute, and we had to wait for the fallout. The whistles blew and we stepped off one yard apart going straight forward. We were under orders not to stop or look or help the wounded. Carry ... on i f you're fit, i t was. Men began to fall one by one. One officer said we were OK, all the machine-guns were firing over o u r heads. This was so u n t i l we passed our own front line and started to cross N o Man's Land. Then trench machine-guns began the slaughter from the La Boiselle salient [German positions]. Men fell on every side screaming. Those w h o were unwounded dare not attend to them, we must press on regardless. Hundreds lay on the German barbed wire which was not all destroyed and their bodies formed a bridge for others to pass over and into the German front line.. There were few Germans, mainly i n machine£3 gun posts. These were bombed out, and there were fewer still of us, but we consolidated the lines we had taken by preparing firing positions on the rear of the trenches gained, and fighting went on all morning and gradually died down as men and munitions on i • ; both sides became exhausted.

When we got to the German trenches we'd lost all our officers. They were all dead, there was no question of wounded. About 25 of us made it there. Yes, as we made our way over the latter stages of the charge, men dropped all around like ninepins. Apart from machine-guns, the German artillery was also very active, great sheets of earth rose up before one. Every m a n had to fend for himself as we still had to face the Germans i n their trenches when we got there. I kept shouting for m y MOTHER to guide me, strange as it may seem. Mother help me. Not the Virgin Mother but my own maternal Mother, for I was then only 20 years of age. - ' Questions to Consider 1. How do the combat memories of Private Tom Easton compare with images of war that you have seen in films? Name a movie you have seen that gives an impression of battle similar to that described above and a movie that shows the "glory" of combat. 2. What was "No Man's Land?" 3. How does this passage illustrate the tragedies of trench warfare? From Michael Kcrnan, "Day of Slaughter on the Somme," Washington Post, June 27, 1976. Copyright © 1976 by the Washington Post. Reprinted by permission.

CHAPTER 27 •

World War I and Its Economic

6-mile front fired the first of thousands of shells that descended on Verdun i n a bombardment that lasted ten hours. Then the German infantry advanced, equipped with flamethrowers. The battered ' and outnumbered French forces fought back bravely and, despite losing some fortified positions, denied the Germans the rapid victory they had desired. This stout resistance gave the Allies time to throw hundreds of thousands of men into the battle, which would rage into the summer and fall. Falkenhayn, who had gambled all on a quick victory, was replaced by Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who decided to abandon the attack on Verdun. The French reclaimed the forts they had lost by the end of the year. The slaughter brought on by massed artillery and infantry charges between the trenches was horrible. The total loss i n the battle of Verdun came to 700,000 men. To ease the pressure against Verdun, the British army on July 1 began an offensive along the Somme River along the western front. Despite their having fired 2 million shells, the attackers' losses on the first day of the battle were catastrophic: 60 percent of the officers and 40 percent of the soldiers— 60,000 men i n all. Despite these awesome fig1916 Debut ures, the attacks—with the British making the of the first use of tanks i n August—continued for three British Tank months without any substantial gains. General Haig, stymied by the tenacious German resistance, decided to stop the offensive i n November. Total German casualties at the Somme were about 550,000, while the British and French lost about 650,000—a staggering 1.2 million men dead or wounded. The only major naval engagement of the war, the battle of Jutland (May 31-June 1, 1916), reaffirmed British control of the seas. Taking enormous risks, the Germans maneuvered brilliantly. They could afford to gamble because defeat would i n no way worsen their position. The British fleet, however, had to act cautiously and absorbed greater losses. Nevertheless, the Germans finally retreated to their base and remained there for the rest of the war. Only i n their submarine warfare d i d the Germans enjoy success on the high seas during the war. On the eastern front i n 1916 the Russians continued their generally successful campaigns against the Austro-Hungarian forces. But the Germans were always there to save their allies from destruction. Romania, impressed by the Russian victories, finally joined the Allies and launched an attack on the Austrians. After an initial success, the Romanians were soon knocked out of the war by a joint German-Bulgarian invasion.

The Home Front At the end of 1916, after more than two years of fighting, neither side was close to victory. Instead, the war had

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turned into a dreary contest of each side trying to bleed • the other into submission—a far cry from the glories promised by the propaganda of 1914. War was no longer fought between armies; it was fought between states, and every citizen and office of the state participated. On the home front, rationing was instituted to ensure sufficient supplies for soldiers at the front. As men went off to fight, women took over their jobs i n the workplace. Intensive propaganda campaigns encouraged civilians to buy more bonds and make more weapons. Nations unleashed a barrage of propaganda inciting total hatred of the enemy, belief i n the righteousness of the cause, and unquestioned support for the war effort. Civil liberties suffered, and i n some cases, distinguished citizens were thrown into prison for opposing the war effort. I n Britain, for example, the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell was imprisoned for a short time for his paciftstic views. Governments took over control of their national economies and gambled everything o n a victory i n w h i c h the loser w o u l d pay all the expenses incurred i n the war. The various states outlawed strikes and rigidly controlled currencies and foreign trade. At the beginning of the war, all was flag waving and enthusiasm. Even the international socialist movement, whose policy i t was to promote international proletarian unity, fell v i c t i m to the rabid patriotism that infected the Continent. Workers of one country were encouraged to go out and k i l l workers of the enemy country i n the name o f the state. There was great idealism, sense of sacrifice, and love of country. At first there was no understanding of the horror, death, and disaster that comes w i t h modern, industrialized war. The British poet Rupert Brooke caught the spirit i n his poem "The Soldier": 1

If I should die, think only this of me: That there's some corner of a foreign field That is forever England. There shall be In that rich earth a richer dust concealed; A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware, Gave, once, her flowers to love, her ways to roam, A body of England's breathing English air, Washed by the rivers, blest by suns of home.

3.

But this early idealism, this Romantic conception of death i n battle, gradually changed to one o f w a r rationing—A process instituted to control the distribution of resources such as food, clothing, gasoline, sugar, etc. to ensure a sufficient supply during a time of shortage or great need, propaganda—Publicly disseminated information that has been manipulated to further one's own cause and to damage that of one s opponent.

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As the men marched off to war. women left their homes to work in war-related industries. These women are working in a British munitions factory.

weariness and total futility- This growing mood is best seen in the poetry of the young British officer and poet Wilfred Owen, himself a victim on the western front: What passing-bells for those who die as cattle? Only the monstrous anger of the guns. . . . No mockeries for them; no prayers nor bells. Nor any voice of mourning save the choirs, — The shrill, demented choirs of wailing shells; And bugles calling for them from sad shires* By the end of !9t6 a deep yearning for peace dominated Europe. Sensing this mood, leaders on both sides put forth peace feelers. But these halfhearted overtures achieved nothing. Propaganda was used effectively to continue the war and support for it. The populations of the warring slates were made to believe that their crusade was somehow divinely inspired. In reality, the Dual Monarchy and France fought for survival; Russia, Germany, and Italy all fought to improve their respective positions in Europe; while Britain fought to save Belgium and a renewed balance of power on the Continent.

Allied Fatigue and American lintry In 1917 British and French military strength reached its highest point, only to fall precipitously. Allied com-

manders were hopeful that the long-planned breakthrough might be accomplished, but a large-scale French attack was beaten back, with huge losses. Some French regiments mutinied rather than return to the inferno of "no-man's land" between the trenches. The British sacrificed hundreds of thousands of men without any decisive results in several massive offensives. The Allies also launched unsuccessful campaigns in Italy. Aided by the Germans, the Austrians smashed the Italian front at the Battle of Caporetlo (1917), an event vividly described by Ernest Hemingway in A Farewell to Arms. Italian resistance finally hardened, and collapse was barely averted. The growing effectiveness of the German submarine menace deepened Allied frustration. By 1917 Allied shipping losses had reached dangerous proportions. I n three months 470 British ships fell victim to torpedoes. Britain had no more than six weeks' stores of food on hand, and the supply situation became critical for the Allies. As i l turned out, the very weapon that seemed to doom their cause, the submarine, was the source of the Allies' salvation: Germany's decision to use unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States openlv into the war. The Americans had declared their neutrality in 1914 when President Woodrow Wilson announced that the American people "must be impartial in thought as well as in action." The events of the next

CHAPTER 27 • World War I and Its Economic

Steps Toward American Entry into World War I 1914

1914-1917

President Wilson proclaims neutrality "in thought and action"; British blockade Germany—including cable Allied war bond drive

1915

German submarine sinks Lusitania

1916

Wilson reelected under slogan "He kept us out of war"

1916-1917 1917

Increased German submarine activity, plots with Mexico Wilson asks Congress to declare war on Germany (April 6)

two years showed that this w o u l d not be the case. American sentiment was overwhelmingly w i t h the Allies from the first. Frances help to the colonies i n the American Revolution was warmly recalled. Britain and America were closely tied by language, literature, and democratic institutions. Because B r i t a i n cut off communications between Germany and the United States, British propaganda and management of the war news dominated U.S. public opinion. Another factor predisposing the United States to the Allied cause was Germany's violation of international law i n the invasion of Belgium. This buttressed the widely held view created by the kaiser's saber-rattling speeches that the Germans were undemocratic, unpredictable, and unstable. These attitudes were reinforced by the fact that the United States had made a substantial investment i n the Allied war effort. As the war progressed, i t became apparent that the British blockade would perm i t American trade to be carried on only w i t h the Allies. Before long American factories and farmers were producing weapons and food solely for Great Britain and France. Industry expanded and began to enjoy a prosperity dependent on continued Allied purchases. Between 1914 and 1916 American exports to the Allies quadrupled. Allied bonds totaling about $1.5 b i l l i o n were sold i n the United States i n 1915 and 1916. I t was quite apparent to the Germans that there was little neutrality on the economic front i n the United States. What triggered the U.S. entry into the war on the Allied side was the German submarine tactics. Blockaded by the British, Germany decided to retaliate by halting all shipping to the Allies. Its submarine campaign began i n February 1915, and one of the first vic-

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tims was the luxury liner Lusitania, torpedoed w i t h the loss of more than 1000 lives, including 100 Americans. This tragedy aroused public opinion i n the United States. I n the fall of 1916, Wilson, campaigning w i t h the slogan "He kept us out of war," was reelected to the presidency. Discovery of German plots to involve Mexico i n the war against the United States and more submarine sinkings finally drove Wilson to ask Congress to declare war against Germany on April 6, 1917. Submarine warfare and a wide range of other causes brought the president to the point of entering the war. Once i n the conflict, however, he was intent on making the American sacrifice one "to make the w o r l d safe for democracy." Wilson's lofty principles caused a great surge of idealism among Americans.

Germany's Last Drive The United States mobilized its tremendous resources of men and matériel more rapidly than the Germans nans had believed possible w h e n they made their calculated risk to increase submarine warfare. Nonetheless, the Central Powers moved to try to gain a decisive victory before U.S. aid could help the Allies. S « u The fruitless offensives of 1917 had war I, exhausted the British army, and the French had 1914-1919 barely recovered from their mutinies. The eastern front collapsed w i t h the February-March revolut i o n i n Russia. Eight months later, Lenin and the Bolsheviks took power i n Russia and began to negotiate for peace. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk early i n 1918, Russia made peace w i t h Germany, giving up 1.3 million square miles of territory and 62 million people. Freed from the necessity of fighting on the east, the Germans unleashed a series of major offensives against the west i n the spring of 1918. During one of these attacks, a brigade o f American marines symbolized the importance of U.S. support w h e n they stopped a German charge at C h â t e a u - T h i e r r y (shahT O H teeah-REE). The Germans made a final effort to knock out the French i n July 1918. I t was called the Friedensturm (FREED-en-sturm), the peace offensive. The Germans made substantial gains but d i d not score a decisive breakthrough. By this time the German m o m e n t u m was slowing d o w n , and more than a m i l l i o n American "doughboys" had landed i n France. The final German offensive was t h r o w n back after a slight advance. W i t h the aid of U.S. troops. Marshal Ferdinand Foch (FOSH), the supreme Allied commander, began a counterattack. The badly beaten and continually harassed German troops fell back i n rapid retreat. By the end of October, German forces had been driven out of France and Allied armies were advancing into Belgium. The war of fixed positions separated by no-man's

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land was over. The Allies had smashed the trench that settlements would have to be approved by the peodefenses and were now in open country. ple affected. As events transpired, however, the losers By October 1 the German high command had were refused seats at the peace conference. The leadalready urged the kaiser to sue for peace, and three ers of the new German Weimar (VI-mar) Republic had days later, the German chancellor sent a note to Presno choice but to sign a dictated settlement—an act that ident Wilson seeking an end to hostilities. Wilson simultaneously discredited the republic among the responded that peace was not possible as long as GerGerman people and served as the first step toward many was ruled by an autocratic regime. The GerWorld War I I . man chancellor tried to keep the monarchy by instituting certain liberal reforms, but it was too late. Revolution broke out in many parts of Germany. The Idealism and Realities kaiser abdicated and fled to the Netherlands, and a republic was proclaimed. The destructiveness of World War 1 made a fair peace While Germany was staggering under the continsettlement impossible. The war had been fought on a ual pounding of Foch's armies, the German allies were winner-take-all basis, and now it was time lor the Censuffering even greater misfortunes. Bulgaria surrentral Powers to pay. At the peace conference the winning dered on September 30, and Turkey a m o n t h later. side was dominated by a French realist, a British politiAustria stopped its lighting with Italy on November 3. cian, and an American idealist. The French represenNine days later, the Habsburg Empire collapsed when tative was the aged Premier Georges Clemenceau Emperor Charles I fled Vienna to seek sanctuary in (KLEM-on-soh); representing Britain was the Prime Switzerland. Minister David Lloyd George; and the U.S. representaAt five o'clock on the m o r n i n g of November 11, tive was President Woodrow Wilson. The three were 1918, in a railroad dining car in the Compiegne (komjoined by the Italian prime minister, Vittorio Orlando, PIEN) Forest, the German delegates signed the peace who attended to make sure his country gained adeterms presented by Marshal Foch. At eleven o'clock quate compensation for its large sacrifices. These four the same day, hostilities were halted. Everywhere men made most of the key decisions, even though most except in Germany, the news was received with an outburst of joy. The wor ld was once The "Big Four" at the Versailles Peace Conference were, left to right, Prime Minis more at peace, confronted now with the task ter David Lloyd George of Britain. Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy. Preof binding up its wounds and removing the mier Geoiges Clemenceau of France, and President Woodrow Wilson of the United scars of combat. Delegates from the Allied Slates. Representatives from Gernwny were excluded from the negotiating tables. The Big Four became the Big Three when Orlando withdrew abruptly because the nations were soon to meet in Paris, where the conference refused to give Italy all it demanded. peace conference would be held.

THE ALLIED PEACE SETTLEMENT • Why was it so much more difficult for the victorious Allies to guarantee a long period of peace than the leaders meeting a century earlier at the Congress of Vienna? In November 1918 the Allies stood triumphant, after the costliest war i n history. But the Germans could also feel pleased at thai moment. They had fought well, avoided being overrun, and escaped being occupied by the Allies. They could acknowledge they had lost the war but hoped that President Wilson would help them. In February 1918 Wilson had stated that his governing principles would be that there would be no victimization of the defeated and

CHAPTER 27 •

World War I and Its Economic

of the interested nations and factions i n the world were represented i n Paris, except for the Russians. Clemenceau had played a colorful and important role i n French politics for half a century. He had fought continuously for his political beliefs, opposing corruption, racism, and antidemocratic forces. He wanted to ensure French security i n the future by pursuing restitution, reparations, and guarantees. Precise programs, not idealistic statements, would protect France. The two English-speaking members of the B i g Three represented the extremes i n dealing w i t h the Germans. Lloyd George had been reelected i n December on a program of "squeezing the German lemon u n t i l the pips are squeaked." He wanted to destroy Berlins naval, commercial, and colonial position and to ensure his own political future at home. I n Janu-

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ary 1918 President Wilson had given Congress a list k n o w n as the F o u r t e e n Points, describing his plan for peace. Wilson wanted to break the w o r l d out of its t r a d i t i o n of armed anarchy and establish a framew o r k for peace that would favor America's traditions of democracy and trade. At the peace conference this shy and sensitive m a n communicated his beliefs w i t h a coldness and an imperiousness that offended his colleagues. The Great War had not been a "war to end all wars" or a war "to make the world safe for democracy." The United States had hardly been neutral i n its loans and shipments of supplies to the Allies before 1917. I n Fourteen Points—President Woodrow Wilson's program to establish and maintain peace after World War I .

John Maynard Keynes on Clemenceau

The British economist John Maynard Keynes served as a staff member of the British delegation negotiating in Paris at the end of the First World War. He caught the spirit of the peacemakers at Versailles in Tlie Eco¬ nomic Consequences of the Peace. His portrait of Clemenceau is especially revealing.

H

e felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens—unique value i n her, nothing else mattering; but his theory of politics was Bismarck's. Fie had one illusion—France; and one disillusion— mankind, including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. His principles for the peace can be expressed simply. I n the first place, he was a foremost believer i n the view of German psychology that the German understands and can understand nothing but intimidation, that he is without generosity or remorse i n negotiation, that there is no advantage he w i l l not take of you, and no extent to which he w i l l not demean himself for profit, that he is without honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore you must never negotiate w i t h a German or conciliate h i m ; you must dictate to h i m . On no other terms w i l l he respect you, or w i l l you prevent h i m from cheating you. But i t is doubtful how far he thought these characteristics peculiar to Germany, or whether his candid view of some other nations was fundamentally different. His philosophy had, therefore, no place for "sentimentality" i n international relations. Nations are real things, of w h o m you love one and feel for the rest indifference—or hatred. The glory of the nation you love is a desirable end—but generally to be obtained at your neighbor's expense. The poli-

tics of power are inevitable, and there is nothing very new to learn about this war or the end i t was fought for; England had destroyed, as i n each preceding century, a trade rival; a mighty chapter had been closed i n the secular struggle between the glories of Germany and of France. Prudence required some measure of lip service to the "ideals" of foolish Americans and hypocritical Englishmen; but it would be stupid to believe that there is much room in the world, as i t really is, for such affairs as the League of Nations, or any sense i n the principle of self-determination except as an ingenious formula for rearranging the balance of power in one's o w n interest.

Questions to Consider 1. Do you find the description of Clemenceau to be favorable or critical? How do you feel about Clemenceau's views of the Germans, as reported by Keynes? 2. Do you find Clemenceau, and his views of the nation as reported by Keynes, to be an example of Rcalpolitik as practiced by Bismarck? Explain your answer. 3. What do you believe Clemenceau's views of President Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations were? From John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920).

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fact, during the war the financial and political center of balance for the w o r l d had crossed the ocean. The Americans made a rather abrupt shift from debtor to creditor status. The United States had entered the war late and had profited from it, and Wilson could afford to wear a rather more idealistic mantle. The Europeans had paid for the war w i t h the blood o f their young and the coin of their realms. The Allies now looked forward to a healthy return on their investment. The extent of that harvest had long been mapped out i n secret treaties, copies of which the Bolsheviks released for the world to see.

Open Covenants, Secret Treaties Wilson wanted to use his Fourteen Points as the basis for a lasting peace. He wanted to place morality and justice ahead of power and revenge as considerations in international affairs. The first five points were general and guaranteed "open covenants openly arrived at," freedom of the seas i n war and peace alike, removal of all economic barriers and establishment of an equality of trade among all nations, reductions i n national armaments, and readjustment of all colonial claims, giving the interests of the population concerned equal weight w i t h the claim of the government whose title was to be determined. The next eight points dealt w i t h specific issues involving the evacuation and restoration of Allied territory, self-determination for minority nationalities, and the redrawing of European boundaries along national lines. The fourteenth p o i n t contained the germ of the League o f N a t i o n s , a general association o f all nations whose purpose was to guarantee political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. When Wilson arrived i n Europe, the crowds on the streets and the victorious and the defeated nations alike greeted h i m as a messiah. His program had received great publicity, and its general, optimistic nature had earned h i m great praise. The victorious Allies came to Paris to gain the concrete rewards promised them i n the various secret treaties. Under these pacts, which would not come to public knowledge u n t i l the beginning o f 1919, the Allies had promised the Italians concessions that would t u r n the Adriatic into an Italian sea, the Russians the right to take over the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits and Constantinople, the Romanians the right to take over large amounts of Austro-Hungarian territory, and the Japanese the right to keep the German territory of Kiaochow i n China. I n addition, the B r i t i s h and French divided what was formerly Ottoman-controlled Iraq and Syria into their respective spheres of influence. As for Palestine, on NovemLeague of Nations—International peacekeeping and humanitarian organization created in 1919 at the Paris peace conferences.

ber 2, 1917, the British—with the agreement of President Wilson—in the declaration by Lord Arthur James Balfour, stated that "His Majesty's government looks favorably on the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people." L o r d Balfour went on to affirm that nothing would be done that would "prejudice the civil and religious rights" of the non-Jewish communities i n Palestine. Wilson refused to consider these agreements, which many of the victors regarded as IOUs now due to be paid i n return for their role i n the war, but the contracting parties i n the treaties would not easily set aside their deals to satisfy Wilson's ideals. Even before the beginning of formal talks—negotiations that w o u l d be unprecedented i n their complexity—the Allies were split. Lloyd George and Clemenceau discovered early that Wilson had his price, and that was the League of Nations. They played on his desire for this organization to water down most of the 13 other points. They were also aware that Wilson's party had suffered a crushing defeat i n the 1918 elections and that strong factions i n the United States were drumm i n g up opposition to his program.

The League of Nations When the diplomats began full meetings, the first issue was the formation of the League of Nations. Wilson insisted that the first work of the conference must be to provide for such a league as part of the peace treaty. After much negotiation, the covenant was approved by the full conference i n April 1919. To gain support for the League, however, Wilson compromised on other matters. Many of his Fourteen Points were repudiated, but he believed that an imperfect treaty incorporating the League was better than a perfect one without it. The covenant of the League of Nations specified its aims: "to guarantee international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." To achieve this goal, Article iO, the key section of the document, provided that . .. the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfdled. The League o f Nations was the first systematic and thorough attempt to create an organization designed to prevent war and promote peace. Though u l t i mately unsuccessful, i t was a valiant effort to curb the abuses of the state system while maintaining the individual sovereignty of each member of the community of nations.

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The League's main organs were the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat Dominated by the Great Powers, the Council was the most important body. I l dealt with most of the emergencies arising in international affairs. The Assembly served as a platform from which all League members could express their views. I l could make recommendations to the Council on specific issues, but all-important decisions required the unanimous consent of its members, and every nation in the Assembly had one vote. Two important bodies created by the covenant of the League were the Permanent Court of International Justice (the World Court) and the International Labor Organization (ILO).

Redrawing German Boundaries After establishing the League, the diplomats got down to the business of dealing w i t h Germany. France reclaimed Alsace-Lorraine, and plebiscites gave parts

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of the former German Empire to Denmark and Belgium. The French wanted to build a buffer state, made up of former German territory west ol the Rhine, to be dominated by France. The Americans and the British proposed a compromise to Clemenceau, which he accepted. The territory in question would be occupied by Allied troops for a period of 5 to 15 years, and a zone extending 30 miles east of the Rhine was to be demilitarized. In addition, the French claimed the Saar basin, a rich coal-mining area. Although they did not take outright control of the area, which reverted to League administration, they did gain ownership or the mines i n compensation for the destruction of their own installations in northern France. I t was agreed that after 15 years a plebiscite would be held in the area. Finally, Wilson and Lloyd George agreed that the United States and Great Britain would, by treaty, guarantee France against aggression.

In the aftermath of World War I, Europe lost four empires—the Russian, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German—and gained a number of successor stales, each unhappy with its new boundaries.

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I n Eastern Europe the conference created the "Polish corridor," which separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany, i n order to give the newly created state o f Poland access to the sea. This raised grave problems, as it included territory i n which there were large numbers of Germans. (The land i n question had been taken from Poland by Prussia i n the eighteenth century.) A portion of Silesia, north of the new state of Czechoslovakia, was also ceded to Poland, but Danzig, a German city, was placed under League jurisdiction. All i n all, Germany lost 25,000 square miles inhabited by 6 m i l l i o n people—a fact seized on by German nationalist leaders i n the 1920s.

The Mandate System and Reparations A curious m i x t u r e of idealism and revenge determined the allocation of the German colonies and certain territories belonging to Turkey. Because outright annexation w o u l d look too m u c h like unvarnished imperialism, i t was suggested that the colonies be turned over to the League, which i n t u r n would give them to certain of its members to administer. The colonies were to be k n o w n as mandates, and precautions were taken to ensure that they would be administered for the wellbeing and development o f the inhabitants. Once a year, the mandatory powers were to present a detailed account o f their administration of the territories of the League. The mandate system was a step forward i n colonial administration, but Germany nevertheless was deprived o f all colonies, w i t h the excuse that i t could not rule them justly or efficiently. As the Treaty o f Versailles (ver-SIGH) took shape, the central concept was that Germany had been responsible for the war. Article 231 of the treaty stated explicitly: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies. Britain and France demanded that Germany pay the total cost of the war, including pensions. The United States protested this demand, and, eventually, a compromise emerged i n which, w i t h the exception of Belmandates—A grant of authority from the League of Nation to a state to set up a government and other institutions in former German colonies. Treaty of Versailles—During the peace conferences to end World War I , the actual negotiations with the various Central Powers took place at selected suburbs around Paris.The conference dealing with Germany took place at the former residence of French kings, Versailles.

gium, Germany had to pay only war damages, including those suffered by civilians, and the cost of pensions. These payments, called reparations (implying repair), were exacted on the ground that Germany should bear responsibility for the war. Although the Allies agreed that Germany should pay reparations, they could not agree on how much should be paid. Some demands ran as high as $200 billion. Finally, it was decided that a committee should fix the amount; i n the meantime, Germany was to begin making payments. By the time the committee report appeared i n May 1921, the payments totaled nearly $2 billion. The final bill came to $32.5 billion, to be paid off by Germany by 1963. The Allies required Germany, as part of in-kind reparations payments, to hand over most of its merchant fleet, construct 1 million tons of new shipping for the Allies, and deliver vast amounts of coal, equipment, and machinery to them. The conference permitted Germany a standing army of only 100,000 men, a greatly reduced fleet, and no military aircraft. Munitions plants were to be closely supervised. The treaty also called for the kaiser to be tried for a "supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties," thus setting a precedent for the Nuremberg tribunals after World War U. Nothing came of this demand, however. The kaiser remained i n Holland, protected i n his exile by the Dutch government.

Dictated Treaties Before coming to Paris in April 1919 to receive the Treaty of Versailles, the German delegation was given no official information about its terms and thus no opportunity to debate points it found to be unjust. Allied governments stated that "Germany and its people were alone guilty." The Weimar delegation had no alternative but to sign. The continued blockade created great hardships i n Germany, and the Allies threatened an invasion if the Germans did not accept the peace. The treaty was signed on June 28, the fifth l i e Mas* anniversary of the assassination of Archduke /Ms-German Francis Ferdinand, i n the Hall of Mirrors at VerCartoon sailles, the same room where the German Reacting to tlie Treaty of Empire had been proclaimed. As one American Versailles wrote, "The affair was elaborately staged and made as humiliating to the enemy as it well could be." The Allies imposed equally harsh treaties on Germany's supporters. The Treaty of St. Germain (1919) w i t h Austria recognized the nationalist movements of the Czechs, Poles, and southern Slavs. These groups had already formed states and reduced the remnants of the former Dual Monarchy into the separate states 5

reparations—Payments demanded from Germany to pay for the costs of the war.

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of Austria and Hungary. Austria became a landlocked country of 32,000 square miles and 6 m i l l i o n people. I t was forbidden to seek Anschluss (ON-schlus)—union w i t h Germany, of Germany Italy acquired sections of Austria, South Tyrol, and Austria Trentino (with its 250,000 Austrian Germans), and the northeastern coast of the Adriatic, w i t h its large numbers of Slavs. To complete their control of the Adriatic, the Italians wanted a slice of the Dalmatian coast and the port of Fiume (fee-YOU-may). That city, however, was the natural port for the newly created state of Yugoslavia, and i t had not been promised to the Italians i n 1915. Wilson declared the Italian claim to be a contradiction of the principle of self-determination, and the ensuing controversy almost wrecked the peace conference. The issue was not settled until 1920, when Italy renounced its claim to Dalmatia and Fiume became an independent state. Four years later i t was ceded to Italy. By the Treaty of Sèvres (SEV-ruh) (1920), the Ottoman Empire was placed on the operating table of power politics and divided among Greece, Britain, and France. An upheaval i n August 1920 i n Constantinople led to the emergence of the Nationalists under Mustafa Kemal, who refused to accept the treaty. Not u n t i l July 1923 did Turkey's postwar status become clear i n the milder Treaty of Lausanne (loo-ZAHN), which guaranteed Turkish control of Anatolia (see Chapter 30). Hungary (Treaty of Trianon, 1920) and Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly, 1919) did not fare as well as Turkey in dealing w i t h the Allies. The Hungarians lost territory to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Bulgaria lost access to the Aegean Sea and territory populated by nearly 1 m i l l i o n people, had to pay a huge indemnity, and underwent demilitarization. The eastern European states that profited from the settlements proved to be useful allies for France i n the first 15 years of the interwar period. Those that suffered were easy prey for the Nazis i n the 1930s. Anschluss—Union between Austria and Germany.

Peace Treaties Ending World War I Versailles St. Germaine Neuilly Sèvres

Trianon

Germany (1919) Austria (1919) Bulgaria (1919) Turkey (1920 refused; Lausanne 1923) Hungary (1920)

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Evaluating the Peacemakers The treaties ending World War I have received heavy criticism from diplomatic historians, especially when compared w i t h the w o r k o f the Congress of Vienna. The peace that emerged brought only weariness, new disagreements, and inflation. Russia was completely disregarded. The new Bolshevik government (see Chapter 28), i n its weak position, indicated a willingness to deal w i t h the West on the issue of prewar debts and border conflicts, i f the West w o u l d extend financial a i d and w i t h d r a w its expeditionary forces. The anti-Bolshevik forces i n Paris d i d not take the offer seriously. By missing this opportunity, the Allies took a course that had tremendous consequences for "the long-term future of both the Russian and the American people and indeed of mankind generally." Many commentators have laid the genesis of World War I I just one generation later at the feet of the Paris peacemakers. Other critics p o i n t out that the United States' reversion to isolationism doomed the w o r k of the conference. Furthermore, there were never any broad plans made for European economic recovery. 6

The Costs of the War I t is impossible to give a true accounting of the costs of any war because there is no way to calculate the contributions that might have been made by the individuals killed i n battle. About 2 to 3 m i l l i o n Russians died, and more perished i n the 1918-1921 civil war. Among the other major participants, almost 2 m i l l i o n Germans, over 1.5 m i l l i o n French, close to 1 m i l l i o n English, 500,000 Italians, 1.2 m i l l i o n Austro-Hungarians, and 325,000 Turks died i n battle. These figures do not count the wounded, whose lives may have been shortened or altered as a result of their injuries. Furthermore, the young paid the highest price: Scholars estimate that Germany and France each lost over 15 percent of their young men. Estimates of the financial drain of the war range between $250 billion and $300 billion i n early 1920s dollars. These figures do not bring home the depth of the wars impact on trade, shipping, and monetary stability. Belgium, for example, lost over 300,000 houses and thousands of factories, and 15,000 square miles of northeastern France were i n ruins. H o w does one calculate the cost of taking the 75 m i l l i o n men who were mobilized away from their jobs and their homes? H o w can the mental carnage inflicted on the combatants and their families be measured? No balance sheet can measure the psychological toll of the conflict on the women and children who had to bear the tension of fear and loneliness for their loved ones at the front.

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Political institutions felt the effects of the war i n different ways. The German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Empires crumbled and disappeared from the historical stage. Replacing them were uncertain republics or dictatorships. The colonial empires that remained were weakened, and indigenous nationalist movements made substantial progress. The roots of the economic problems that plagued Europe after the war—agricultural overproduction, bureaucratic regulations, and protectionism—could be seen before 1914. Compounding these factors were the traditional challenges encountered i n shifting from a w a r t i m e to a peacetime economy, especially that of demobilizing m i l l i o n s of soldiers and b r i n g i n g them back into the labor market. Finally, the globe reeled under the blows of an influenza outbreak that ultimately killed twice as many people as the w a r did. The epidemic was both a tragic conclusion to the war years and a tragic first step t o w a r d the future.

ECONOMIC DISASTERS • In what ways did the First World War destroy global economic equilibrium? One o f the most serious problems facing the survivors of World War I was the confused and desperate s i t u a t i o n o f the w o r l d economy. M u c h of the direct and indirect cost o f the w a r had been covered by borrowing, and now the bills were coming due i n a w o r l d unable to pay them. The lasting results o f the war touched many areas. The conflict altered global trading patterns, reduced shipping, and weakened Europe's former economic dominance. The various peace treaties m u l t i p l i e d the number of European boundaries, w h i c h soon became obstacles to the flow of goods, especially i n the successor states o f the Habsburg monarchy and i n Poland. Rail and communications lines had to be reconfigured to reflect the interest of newly created states.

The Debt Problem During the war, a radical change had taken place i n Europe's economic relationship w i t h the United States. I n 1914 the United States had been a debtor nation for the amount of $3.75 billion, owed mostly to Europe. The w a r totally reversed this situation. The United States lent billions of dollars and sold tons of supplies to the Allies. B r i t i s h blockades kept the United States from being able to deal w i t h the Germans, precluding further profits, but by 1919 Euro-

Postwar Economic Events 1919-1923

Inflation^ lion (except in Britain and Czechoslovakia) hoslovakia) •

1922 1923-1924

Great Britain pledges to moderate debt collections - . : German hyperinflation

1924

Dawes Plan for liberalized reparations •>. and loans for German recovery

1929

U.S. stock market crash (October 29)

. ,1930-1940 . Great Depression

peans owed the United States more than $10 billion. This tremendous debt posed what economists call a transfer problem. The international obligations could be paid only by the actual transfer of gold or by the sale of goods. Complicating the picture, Allied powers i n Europe had also lent each other funds, w i t h the British acting as the chief banker, lending more than 1.7 billion pounds sterling. When the Allies' credit dried up, they turned to the United States for financial help. Even though Britain owed huge sums to U.S. financiers, it remained a net creditor of $4 billion because of money owed it by European debtors. France, by contrast, stood as a net debtor o f $3.5 billion. I n addition to its o w n w a r debts, the French government suffered greatly when the Bolsheviks renounced repayment of the tsarist debt, amounting to some 12 billion francs— one-quarter of France's foreign holdings. Some o f the Allies argued that the inter-Allied debts were political, that all of them had, i n effect, been poured into a c o m m o n pool for victory. These people wondered h o w France's c o n t r i b u t i o n i n the lives o f its young men could be figured into the equation i n terms of francs, dollars, or pounds. They proposed that, w i t h victory, all debts should be canceled. The United States, w h i c h had gone to Paris w i t h a conciliatory spirit toward Germany i n the treaty negotiations, changed its tune when dollars and cents were involved. This attitude was best expressed i n a remark attributed to American president Calvin Coolidge, who expected full repayment, when he is alleged to have said: "They hired [borrowed] the money, didn't they?" Beneath the extremes o f these positions were the understandable motives of getting out of paying a huge debt o r gaining from the payment of debts owed.

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Weimar Germany: Debt, Reparations, and inflation Reparations complicated Germany's debt problem and the challenge of converting the country back to a peacetime economy. In the first three years after the war the German government, like other European states, spent much more than its income. This policy was masked by "floating debts . . . İn other words, by the printing press." The mark, which had been valued at 4.2 to the dollar in 1914, went to 75 in July 1921, to 186 in January 1922, to 402 i n July, and to 4000 by December of that year. The situation became so seri­ ous i n the summer of 1922 that Great Britain pro­ posed collecting no more from its debtors—Allied and German alike—than the United States collected from Britain itself. Such "statesmanship" was prompted by the fact that London had gained what it wanted from the peace settlement: Germany's navy was destroyed, Germany's merchant ships were transferred as repa­ rations, and Germany's empire was gone. No more could be squeezed out. Britain saw that Germany would not be able to meet its reparations payments. Without those pay­ ments, the victors would not be able to make their own payments on the inter-Allied debts, especially debts owed to the United States. Although the United States insisted that there was no connection between the inter-Allied debts and German reparations, nego­ tiations were carried on, and debt payment plans were sei up with 13 nations. No reductions were made i n principal, but in every case the interest rate was radi­ cally decreased. Still, the total amount owed came to more than $22 billion. At the end of 1922 the Germans asked for a delay in their reparations obligations and then defaulted on some payments. In response, in January 1923, French troops, supported by Belgian and Italian contingents, marched into the rich industrial district of the Ruhr, undeterred by American and British objections. This shortsighted French move contributed nothing to the solution of Europe's problems and played into the hands of radical German politicians. Encouraged by the Berlin government, German workers defied the French army and went on strike; many ended up in jail. The French toyed for a while with the idea of establishing a separate state in the Rhineland to act as a buffer between Germany and France. Chaotic conditions in ihe Ruhr encouraged the catastrophic inflation of the German currency to make up for the loss of exports and to support the striking workers. The value of the mark to the dollar went from 7200 in January 1923 to 160,000 i n July to 1 million in August to 4.2 trillion i n December. During the worst part of the inflation, the Reichsbank had 150 7

Inflation in Germany during the 1920s grew so drastic that the German mark became nearly worthless. It was cheaper, for exam­ ple, for this German woman to start fires with marks than to use them to purchase kindling.

firms using 2000 presses running day and night to print banknotes. To get out of their dilemma, the Ger­ mans made an effective transition to a more stable currency by simply abandoning the old one. The French, i n return, gained very little benefit from the occupation.

Inflation and Its Consequences All European nations encountered a rocky path as they attempted to gain equilibrium after the war. Britain had minimal price increases and returned to prewar levels w i t h i n two years after the signing of the Versailles treaty. On the Continent price and monetary stability came less easily. Only Czechoslovakia seemed to have its economic affairs well i n hand. France d i d not stabilize its currency until 1926, when the franc was worth 50 to the dollar (one-tenth its value i n 1914). I n Austria prices rose to 14,000 times their prewar level until stability of sorts came in 1922. Hungary's prices went to 23,000 times pre­ war level, but this increase is dwarfed by Poland's (2.5

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m i l l i o n times prewar level) and Russia's (4 b i l l i o n times prewar level). Inflation had massive social and political consequences, most notably i n Germany. Millions of middleclass Germans, small property owners who were the hoped-for base of ihe new Weimar Republic, found themselves caught i n the wage-price squeeze. Prices for the necessities of life rose far faster than income or savings. As mothers wheeled baby carriages full of money to bakeries to buy bread, fathers watched a lifetime of savings dwindle to insignificance. Pensioners on fixed incomes suffered doubly under this crisis. The bourgeoisie, the historical champions of liberal politics throughout Europe, suffered blows more devastating than those o f war, since inflation stole not only the value of their labor but also the w o r t h of their savings and insurance. Where the middle classes and liberal traditions were strong, democracy could weather the inflationary storm. But i n central Europe, where they were not—especially i n Germany, where the inflation was worst—the cause of future totalitarianism received an immense boost. Alan Bullock, a biographer o f Adolf Hitler, wrote that "the result o f inflation was to undermine the foundations of German society i n a way which neither the war nor the revolution of 1918 nor the Treaty o f Versailles had ever done."

Prosperity of a sort returned to Europe. As long as the circular flow of cash from the United States to Germany to the Allies to the United States continued, the international monetary system functioned. The moment the cycle broke down, the w o r l d economy headed for the rocks of depression. One economic historian has written: In ¡924-31 Germany drew some one [billion] pounds [sterling] from abroad and the irony was that Germany, in fact, received far more in loans, including loans to enable her to pay interest on earlier loans than she paid out in reparations, thus gaining in the circular flow and re-equipping her industries and her public utilities with American funds in the processes in the 1920s before repudiating her debts in the 1930s. 9

Danger Signs

After 1923, the liberal application of U.S. funds brought some calm to the economic storm. Business was more difficult to conduct because protectionism became more and more the dominant trait o f international trade. A u t a r k y , the goal of gaining total economic self-sufficiency and freedom from reliance on any other nation, increasingly became the unstated policy of many governments. Nonetheless, production soon reached 1913 levels, currencies began to stabilize, and the French finally recalled their troops from the Ruhr. Most significant, i n September 1924 a commission under the leadership of U.S. banker Charles Dawes formulated a more liberal reparations policy i n order to get the entire repayment cycle back into motion. Dawes's plan, replaced in 1929 by the Young plan (named for its principal formulator, U.S. businessman Owen Young), reduced installments and extended them over a longer period. A loan of $200 million, mostly from the United States, was floated to aid German recovery. The Berlin government resumed payments to the Allies, and the Allies paid their debt installments to the United States— w h i c h i n effect received its own money back again.

The system broke down i n 1928 and 1929 when U.S. and British creditors needed their capital for investments i n their own countries. Extensions on loans, readily granted a year earlier, were refused. Even before the U.S. stock market crash on October 29, 1929, disaster was on the horizon. Few people i n America could admit such a possibility during the decade, however. The United States had become the commercial center of the world, and its policies were central to the world's financial health. The United States still had an internal market i n the 1920s w i t h a seemingly inexhaustible appetite for new products such as radios, refrigerators, electrical appliances, and automobiles. This expansion, based on consumer goods and supported by a seemingly limitless supply of natural resources, gave the impression of solid and endless growth. Tragically, the contradictions of the postwar economic structure were making themselves felt. The cornerstones of pre-1914 prosperity—multilateral trade, the gold standard, and interchangeable currencies— were crumbling. The policies of autarky, w i t h high tariff barriers to protect home products against foreign competition, worked against international economic health. Ironically, the United States led the way toward higher tariffs, and other nations quickly retaliated. American foreign trade declined seriously, and the volume of w o r l d trade decreased. There were other danger signals. Europe suffered a population decline. There were 22 million fewer people i n the 1920s i n the western part of the Continent than had been expected. The decrease i n internal markets affected trade, as d i d the higher external barriers. Around the globe, the agricultural sector suffered

autarky—The program of tolal economic self-sufficiency.

depression—A lime of stagnant economic activity in which high unemployment occurs.

3

Temporary Improvements

CHAPTER 27 •

World War ! and Its Economic

from declining prices during the 1920s. At the same time that farmers received less for their products, they had to pay more to live—a condition that negatively affected peasants in Europe and Asia and farmers and ranchers in the United States. In the hopes of reaching a wider market, farmers around the world borrowed money to expand production early in the 1920s. Temporarily, the food surplus benefited consumers, but across the world, agricultural interests suffered from overproduction. Tariff barriers prevented foodstuffs from circulating to the countries where hunger existed. By the end of the decade, people i n Asia were starving while wheat farmers in Whitman County, Washington, dumped their grain into the Snake River and coffee growers in Brazil saw their product burned to fuel steam locomotives. Many farmers went bankrupt, unable to keep up with payments on these debts. The countryside preceded the cities into the economic tragedy.

The Great Crash

and Political

Consequences

817 10

explained than the depression lhal followed i t . " Overspeculation, loose controls, dishonest investors, and a loss of confidence in the ever-upward market trend can be identified as causes lor the crash. Further' causes can be traced to the inequitable distribution of wealth, w i t h the farmers and wor kers left out while the top 3 percent of Americans grew incredibly rich and irresponsible. Industrial overexpansion was fueled by speculators buying stock "on margin," with insufficient cash backing for the investments. In addition, the government's hands-off policies permitted massive abuses to take place unchecked. The international impact of the crash can be explained by the involvement in the U.S. market of investors and bankers from a number of countries, the interdependent world economic structure, the peculiar Allied debt and reparations structure, the growing agricultural crisis, and ihe inadequate banking systems of the world. Some economic historians believe lhal the cycle of highs and lows hit a particularly vicious low point in 1929. Crashes had occurred before, but never w i l h such widespread repercussions over such a long period of lime. I n the United Stales, slock prices declined one-third overall within a few weeks, wiping out fortunes, shattering confidence in business, and destroying consumer demand. The disaster spread worldwide as American interests demanded payment on foreign loans and imports decreased. The Kredit¬ Anstalt (kre-DIT an-SHTALT) bank of Vienna did not have enough money to fill demands for funds from French banks and failed in 1931. This collapse set in motion a dominolike banking crisis throughout Europe. Forecasts by Washington politicians and New York financiers that the worst was over and that the

Because of America's central position in the world economy, any development on Wall Street, positive or negative, reverberated around the globe. The United Slates, with roughly 3 percent of the world's population, produced 46 percent of the globe's industrial output. The country was too shortsighted to use its newfound power wisely. Its financial life in the 1920s was dominated by the activities of daring and sometimes unscrupulous speculators who made the arena of high finance a precarious and exciting world of its own. The businessmen creating this world were not pursuing long-term stability. Their blind rush for profit led to America's crash, which in turn sparked a world disaster. Bankrupt investor Waiter Thornton attempts to sell his car for S100 following the stock marEven before the slock market ket crash of October 29. 1929. "Black Thursday." crash, Wall Street had been showing signs of distress, such as capital shortfalls, excessively large inventories, and agricultural bankruptcies. But nothing prepared financiers for' the disaster that struck on October 29, 1929— Black Thursday. By noon Wall Street was caught in a momentum of chaotic fear, and stock prices began plummeting. The end ol the trading session hailed the initial hemorrhage of stock values, but the damage was done. The economist John Kenneth Galbrailh has written: "On the whole, the great stock market crash can be much more readily

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w o r l d economy was fundamentally sound after a "technical readjustment" convinced nobody. There would be no easy recovery.

The World Depression By 1932 the value o f industrial shares had fallen close to 60 percent on the New York and B e r l i n markets. Unemployment doubled i n Germany, and 25 percent of the labor force was out of work i n the United States. The middle classes, which had invested i n the stock market, saw their The Great investments and savings wiped out. I n nation Depression after nation, industry declined, prices fell, banks collapsed, and economies stagnated. I n the western democracies the depression heightened the feelings of uneasiness that had existed since 1918. I n other countries the tendency to seek authoritarian solutions became even more pronounced. Throughout the world, people feared a future marked by lowered standards of living, unemployment, and hunger. The middle classes on the Continent, which had suffered from inflation d u r i n g the 1920s, became caught i n a whiplash effect d u r i n g the depression. Adherence to old liberal principles collapsed i n the face o f economic insecurity, and state control of the economies increased. Governments raised tariffs to restrict imports and reverted to command economies, an expedient usually reserved for wartime. As conditions deteriorated, fear caused most governments to look no farther than their own boundaries. Under the competing systems of autarky, each nation tried to increase exports and decrease imports. After almost a century o f free trade, modified by a comparatively few protective duties levied d u r i n g and after World War I , Great Britain finally enacted a high tariff in 1932 w i t h provisions to protect members of its empire. I n the United States, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff o f 1930 increased the value-added duty to 50 percent on a wide variety of agricultural and manufactured imports. Another technique to increase exports at the expense of others was to depreciate a nation's currency—that is, to reduce the value of its money. When Japan depreciated the yen, for example, a U.S. dollar or British pound could buy more Japanese goods. I n effect, lowering the yen reduced the price of Japanese exports. I n most cases, however, devaluation brought only a temporary trade advantage. Other nations could play the same game, as the United States d i d i n 1934 when i t abandoned the gold standard and reduced the amount of gold backing for the dollar by 40 percent. The debt problem that grew out of the war worsened during the depression. I n 1931 President Herbert

Hoover gained a one-year m o r a t o r i u m on all intergovernmental debts. The next year, European leaders meeting at Lausanne practically canceled German reparations payments i n the hope that the United States would make corresponding concessions i n reducing w a r debts. The Americans, for a variety of domestic financial and political reasons, refused to concede that there was a logical connection between reparations and war debts. As the depression deepened, the debtors could not continue their payments. France refused outright i n 1932; Germany after 1933 completely stopped paying reparations; Britain and four other nations made token payments for a time and then stopped entirely i n 1934. Only Finland continued to meet its schedule of payments. Families had at least as many problems i n paying their bills as the governments of the world. Factories closed down and laid off their workers. Harvests rotted i n the fields as the price of wheat fell to its lowest price i n 300 years and other agricultural commodities suffered similar price declines. The lives of the cacao grower along Africa's Gold Coast, the coffee grower i n Brazil, and the plantation worker i n the Netherlands East Indies were as affected as those of the factory worker i n Pittsburgh, Lille, or Frankfurt. The 1929 crash occurred i n an economic framework still suffering from the dislocations of World War I . I t began a d o w n t u r n i n the w o r l d economy that w o u l d not end u n t i l the w o r l d armed for another global conflict. Whether the depression ended because of World War I I or whether the w o r l d would have eventually recovered on its o w n is a question that will always be debated. The weaknesses i n American stock market operations were by and large addressed i n a series of reforms. From the major banks to the soup lines i n villages, the depression had profound implications for politics. The combination of inflation and depression threatened representative government. Unemployed and starving masses were tempted to turn to dictators who promised jobs and bread. The hardships of economic stability, even i n countries where the liberal tradition was strongest, led to a massive increase i n state participation i n the daily life of the individual.

POLITICS IN THE DEMOCRACIES • What were the effects of the economic crises on democratic governments between the war? During the interwar period, there was a loss of belief in the genius of big business and free market capitalism in most parts of the world, as business itself had to turn

CHAPTER 27 •

World Weir I and Its Economic and Political

more and more to the powers of the state to survive. After 1918, parliamentary government—the foundation of all that the liberals of the nineteenth century had worked for—came under attack everywhere. For the most part, only in Scandinavia—in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—did representative government operate smoothly throughout the inlerwar period. Economic prosperity prevailed there throughout the 1920s, and the depression was less severe than in Britain, France, or the United States. Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium also maintained relatively high standards of living and kept their governments on the democratic road. But in the 20 years after peace came to the West, Britain, France, the United States, and most of the other democracies exhibited lethargy and shortsightedness in the face of fascist aggression.

Inlerwar Western Society: Mass Escapism and Despair

Consequences

819

took place in Paris in 1895 and soon after in London and New York. Even though another 20 years passed before feature-length films were produced, movies were an immediate success, attracting an infinitely larger audience than live performances could ever reach. By the 1920s, movies had become the most popular, most universal art form of the twentieth century. From the theaters of Main Street, USA, to the private projection rooms of the Kremlin, artists such as Charlie Chaplin and Marlene Dietrich became universal favorites. Technology touched the common people in many ways and vastly expanded leisure possibilities. Henry Ford's affordable Model T made automobiles widely accessible and opened up the w o r l d to those who cared to drive. I n cities, virtually every home had electricity, which powered bright lights, refrigeration, and other conveniences. Radio brought drama, sports, and news into millions of living rooms. And the new technology vastly increased access to music. Through radio and phonograph records millions of people discovered jazz, formerly the special preserve of black musicians and their audiences. Louis Armstrong and his trumpet and Paul Whileman and his band became known worldwide. At the same lime, Rosa Ponselle, A r i u r o Toscanini, and other figures from the opera and concert world became celebrities known to millions more than could ever have seen them perform in person.

After the devastating losses of the War and during the political and economic crises of the 1920s, the urban working and lower middle classes found escape in the popular cultural products of their countries. More leisure lime and money enabled them to fill the music halls and public sporting arenas. They would rarely be found in the concert halls, art galleries, or serious bookstores. Rather, they The German actress. Marlene Dietrich, became an internal tonally known celebrity read the penny press and the dime through her performances in films such as The Blue Angel. novel, both of which featured simple vocabulary and easy-to-follow information and plots. The penny press served many functions: to inform, entertain, and sell goods. Sensationalism, whether the confessions of a "fallen woman" or the account of some adventurer, was the main attraction ol the dime novel. Comic strips first appeared in central Europe in the 1890s and then spread rapidly throughout the Western world. By the interwar period, mass culture offered relief from the bad news of the time. A number of technological advances—coated celluloid film, improved shutter mechanisms, reliable projectors, and a safe source of illumination—were combined to introduce the cinema—motion pictures, or movies—to the world. These developments seem to have come together almost simultaneously in Fiance, Britain, and the Uniled States. The firsl public motion picture performances

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The combination o f increased leisure time, greater mobility, and improved communications led to the development of the modern "star" system i n sports and entertainment. Sports, including football in its N o r t h American and European forms, bicycle racing, cricket, baseball, and boxing, captured the popular imagination. As times became more difficult and front-page news turned g r i m after World War I the world's citizens could find some diversion i n reading about their boxers—Jack Dempsey, Max Schmeling, and Georges Carpentier. I n the United States golfers and baseball stars became better k n o w n and better paid than presidents. While the masses escaped, the elites found little hope. Among writers, Franz Kafka (1883-1924) perhaps best captured the nightmarish nature of the post—World War I world. I n works such as The Metamorphosis and The Trial, he portrayed a ritualistic society i n which a we 11-organized insanity prevails. Rational, well-meaning individuals r u n a constant maze from which there is no exit, only more structures. Many sensitive artists and writers cast serious doubt on the Renaissance notion that "man is the measure o f all things." Writers such as Thomas M a n n (1875-1955) i n his Magic Mountain gave testimony that the Western world had gone very far off course, and the best that could be hoped for was survival. Historians worked under the profound influence of Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West. The book, finished one year before the defeat of the Central Powers, was more widely quoted than read. I n i t the German historian traced the life span of cultures, from b i r t h through maturity to death, and identified the symptoms of the West's demise. Other writers expressed a similar fascination w i t h the death of their civilization, but perhaps more significant was that people i n the West knew Spengler's name and general message. And they found the pessimistic tone justified by events.

Britain, 1919-1939 The 1920s was not a tranquil decade for Great Britain. The country endured a number of social and political crises tied to the bitter labor disputes and unemployment that disrupted the nation. Neither Liberals nor Conservatives could do m u c h to alter the flow of events immediately after the war. From 1919 to 1922, David Lloyd George led a coalition, but it broke apart, leading to the division and decline of the Liberals. From May 1923 to January 1924, Stanley Baldwin led an unsuccessful Conservative government. Ramsay MacDonald formed the first Labour government and became the first socialist prime minister. For ten months he and his party pursued a program to introduce socialism slowly and w i t h i n the democratic framework. H i s move to recognize the newly established Soviet Union (USSR) was controversial.

When the London Times published the so-called Zinoviev (zi-NOH-vee-EF) letter, a document i n which the Communist T h i r d International supposedly laid out a program for revolution i n B r i t a i n , the public backlash defeated the Labour government i n the October 1924 elections. For the next five years, the Conservatives under Baldwin held power. After renouncing the treaties the Labour cabinet had made w i t h the USSR, the Conservatives set out on a generally unsuccessful and stormy tenure. Britain returned its currency to the gold standard i n 1925, a policy that led indirectly to an increase in labor unrest. The government struggled through a coal strike and a general strike i n which more than 2.5 million of the nation's 6 million workers walked out. Baldwin reduced taxes on business, but this move d i d little to remedy the deflationary effect of a return to the gold standard. I n May 1929 Labour under MacDonald won another victory. Once again, the Labourites resumed relations w i t h the Soviet Union and attempted their measured socialist program. The effects of the depression, however, condemned MacDonald and his government to failure. I n two years, exports and imports declined 35 percent and close to 3 m i l l i o n unemployed people roamed the streets. Labour could do little to address the basic causes of the disaster; i n fact, no single party could. When MacDonald's government fell i n 1931, i t was replaced by a national coalition government dominated by the Conservatives. The coalition government initiated a recovery program featuring a balanced budget, limited social spending, and encouragement of private enterprise. By 1933 a substantial measure of prosperity had been regained, and productivity had increased by 23 percent over the 1929 level. To achieve this comeback, some of what remained of laissez-faire policy was discarded. The government regulated the currency, levied high tariffs, gave farmers subsidies, and imposed a heavy burden of taxation. The taxes went to expanded educational and health facilities, better accident and unemployment insurance, and more adequate pensions. As for the rich, they had a large portion of their income taxed away, and what might be left at death was decimated by inheritance taxes. I t was ruefully declared that the rich could hardly afford to live, much less to die. During the 20 years between the wars, Britain's political parties lacked forward-looking programs. The parties seemed unable to measure up to the demands of a difficult new age. I n the empire, demands for home rule grew during the inlerwar period, especially in India, Sri Lanka, Burma, and Egypt. A n ominous trend was the growing antagonism between the Arab inhabitants o f mandated Palestine and the Jewish Zionist immigrants. Yet these issues would not come to a crisis until after World War I I .

CHAPTER 27 •

World War I and Its Economic

Happier developments could be seen in the attainment of home rule by the Irish Free State (the southern part of Ireland) in 1921 and Britain's recognition in the Statute of Westminister (1931) of a new national status for the dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa). Collectively, the four states were then known as the British Commonwealth of Nations and would be held together henceforth only by loyalty to the crown and by common language, legal principles, traditions, and economic interests. For most of the dominions, democratic traditions for the white populations survived the pressures oi" the depression, even though they were painfully susceptible to the effects of the world slump.

Interwar France France suffered from World War 1 the most of any of the democracies; loss of lives as a proportion of the population and direct property damage were enormous. More than two out of every ten French men died. Years later, the nation, which had historically experienced less rapid population growth than other European states, still felt the war's heavy losses. Victory did not address any of France's basic political problems. The French labored under much the same political and social stagnation after 1918 as it had before 1914. The economic impact of the war and the social disruptions that occurred during and after the conflict exacerbated these conditions. A dangerous inflation plagued France and undermined its rather shallow prosperity. The multiparty system hampered the parliamentary structure of the Third Republic, and the governments formed from shaky coalitions. The exhausted country lacked vitality and a sense of national purpose after gaining revenge against the Germans. After 1919 the British wished to withdraw from continental Europe to look after their imperial interests, and the United States shrank back into isolationism. Working from a dispirited domestic base, France had to bear the burden of overseeing international affairs on the Continent. Overall, with the exception of the counterproductive occupation of the Ruhr, the French carried their duties well i n the 1920s. I n the next decade, however, France retreated into the socalled Maginot (MAH-zhi-noh) mentality, named after the construction of the Maginot Line, a supposedly impenetrable line of fortresses to the east. The depression struck France later than it d i d other countries, but i n some ways the damage was greater. French leadership was no more astute than that of the other democracies before and during the depression. For a while, France managed to maintain a false prosperity from the 1920s, partly because of its large gold holdings; but by the early 1930s, it suffered much the same fate as the other countries. Tourism dried up, contributing to the already rising unem-

and Political

Consequences

82 1

ployment rate and budget deficits. In the face oi these problems, the French earned the additional financial burden of rearming to face a renewed German threat. Ministry after ministry took power, only to collapse a few months later. Citizens became impatient with the government, especially when the press exposed corruption in high places. One of the more shocking scandals was that surrounding the schemes of Alexander Stavisky, a rogue who had bribed officials and cheated French investors out of some 600 million francs. When the ministry in power in December 1933 refused to authorize an investigation after Stavisky's assumed suicide, thousands of angry citizens took to the streets of Paris in protest. I n February 1934 right-wing mobs tried to storm the Chamber of Deputies. The outcome of this affair was a new government, the National Union, a rightist coalition that endured strikes and avoided civil war for the next two years. France was becalmed. The leftists were unable to reorganize their forces quickly to gain control, and the rightists failed to deal with either domestic or foreign problems. I n the spring of 1936 the leftist Popular Front look power. This coalition, under the leadership of L é o n Blum (1872-1950), won a national election and set in m o t i o n a program to b r i n g socialist reforms to France's struggling economy. Blum's government tried to reduce the d o m i n a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l

Léon Blum served as Prime Minister of the French Popular From in 1936-1937, a lime of diplomatic and economic upheaval.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T

r u l i n g elite over the finances of the country o n the one hand, and on the other, to work w i t h the Communists to help block the growing fascist influences. The cooperation w i t h the Communists caused serious problems, i n c l u d i n g the usual one o f h o w to work w i t h the Soviet-dominated party without being captured by i t . Many French voters refused to support the Popular Front for fear that i t m i g h t c o m m i t France to fight against Germany for the benefit o f the Soviet Union. I n foreign affairs the Popular F r o n t w o r k e d closely w i t h Great B r i t a i n and supported the work of the League o f Nations. I t also attempted to appease Germany, though i t remained hostile to Italy. D u r i n g the Spanish c i v i l war (1936-1939), fearing civil war at home, Blum's government, along w i t h the B r i t i s h , declared neutrality i n the face of fascist aggression. I n this atmosphere of social, economic, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l t u r m o i l , B l u m was unable to govern successfully. Further, an epidemic of sit-down strikes involving some 300,000 workers embarrassed the government. Gradually, laws introducing a 40-hour workweek, higher wages, collective bargaining, and paid vacations were enacted to satisfy many of labor's demands. I n a d d i t i o n , the government extended its c o n t r o l over the Bank o f France and instituted a public works program. B l u m navigated as best he could, favoring the worker against monopoly and b i g business while avoiding the totalitarian extremes of fascism and c o m m u n i s m . After only a year i n office, however, he was forced to resign. The unfavorable trade balance, huge p u b l i c debt, and unbalanced budget brought down the Popular Front government. France swung back to the right w i t h a government that ended the 40-hour week and put down strikes. The National Union and the Popular F r o n t mirrored the w i d e n i n g split between the upper and lower classes. The workers believed that the Popular Front's reforms had been sabotaged and that a France ruled by a wealthy clique deserved little or no allegiance. Conversely, some business owners and financiers were horrified at the prospect of communism and openly a d m i r e d Hitler's fascism. Soviet and German propagandists subtly encouraged the widening of the gulf. While the French quarreled and France's econ o m i c strength declined, Germany—regimented and w o r k i n g feverishly—outstripped France i n the manufacture o f armaments. There were no leaders to b r i n g France together, and the pieces were i n place for the easy and tragic fall of the c o u n t r y to German troops at the start of World War I I i n the spring o f 1940.

Eastern Europe W i t h the exception o f Finland and Czechoslovakia, democratic governments fared poorly i n eastern Europe i n the interwar period. By 1938 most of the states retained only the false front of parliamentary forms. Real power was exercised by varying combinations of secret police, official censors, armed forces, and corrupt politicians. Except i n the western parts of Czechoslovakia and among the Jewish communities, there was a welcoming attitude toward the German National Socialists (Nazis) and their programs. Most of these countries had an unhappy legacy of oppression by powerful neighbors, minority problems, economic weakness, and peasant societies. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Albania had not existed as states before 1933. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria had been on the losing side i n World War I and paid dearly for that alliance i n the treaties ending the war. Romania, which had been among the victors, gained large amounts of land and also a number of non-Romanian minorities. For the first decade after World War I , the small countries of eastern Europe had the opportunity to develop without undue external influence or interference. However, the exclusivist, aggressive, and perhaps paranoid nationalism that dominated each nation thwarted any possibility of regional cooperation. The peace treaties had settled few of the problems plaguing the area and instead constructed a series of arbitrary political boundaries that brought far more conflict than accord. The countries i n the region all sought autarkist solutions to their economic problems by erecting huge tariff barriers, which only served to emphasize the states' weaknesses. Among the eastern European states, Czechoslovakia, w i t h its combination of a strong middle class, accumulation of capital, technology base, and high literacy rate, had the greatest potential for successful democratic government. Four hundred years of Austrian domination had not crushed the Czech national spirit. After the collapse of the Dual Monarchy i n November 1918, the Czechs joined w i t h the Slovaks, who had been under Hungarian domination for 1000 years, to establish a republic. The new state possessed a literate and welltrained citizenry and a solid economic base, and it managed to avoid the roller-coaster ride of inflation in the immediate postwar period. Its solid financial institutions, advanced industry, and a small-farmbased agricultural sector made i t an island of prosperity. Like the other eastern European successor states, it had serious m i n o r i t y problems. But of all the new states, Czechoslovakia extended the most liberal policies toward minorities. By the time of the

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depression, Czechoslovakia showed every indication of g r o w i n g i n t o a mature democratic country. The depression, however, heavily affected the country's export trade and h i t especially hard i n the textile industry, which was centered in the German-populated Sudetenland (soo-DAY-ten-land). By 1935 the economic blows had made the area ripe for Nazi agitation and infiltration. After Czechoslovakia, Poland had the best chance of the successor stales to form a democratic government. The Poles, however, had to overcome several problems: a border conflict w i t h the Soviet Union, the d i l e m m a of the Polish C o r r i d o r to Danzig, minority issues, and the fact that Poland had been partitioned for over a century. When ihe country was reunited after the war, the Poles chose to i m i tate the constitutional system of the French T h i r d Republic. The multiplicity of parties, a weak executive, and the resultant succession of governments led to political paralysis until 1926, when Marshal Josef Pilsudski (1867-1935) led a m i l i t a r y revolt against the Warsaw government. For the next nine years Pilsudski imposed his generally benevolent rule on the country. After his death in 1935, a group of colonels ruled Poland, and they permitted the formation of several protofascist organizations. By the time the Poles turned back toward a more liberal government in 1938, it was too late. For

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three years they had played up to the Nazis, and now they stood isolated before Hitler's advance. Problems w i t h being trapped between powerful neighbors plagued the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which came into existence in 1918. The democratic governments o f these countries endured much political and economic strife before they eventually gave way to dictatorial forms of government to survive w i t h the Nazis. The Balkan states of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece were buffeted by the ambitions of Italian imperialism, economic upheaval, and political corruption. Disintegration seemed a real possibility for Yugoslavia in the 1920s, but the conglomerate state stubbornly attempted to hold together the six major ethnic groups w i t h i n its boundaries. K i n g Alexander established himself as dictator in 1929 and ruled until 1934, when he was assassinated by Croatian separatists. Thereafter, the rising Nazi state drew parts of economically depressed Yugoslavia into its orbit, deeply splitting the country. By the end of the 1930s, both Greece and Albania were ruled by dictators. Romania, another of the Balkan states, gained greatly from World War I , doubling its area and its population. Although the state had great economic potential, the government was unable to impose a stable rule d u r i n g the interwar period. Severe problems w i t h minorities and peasants and foreign control of the economy foiled the attempts of moderate politicians to rule, u n t i l , by the 1930s, fascist groups wielded a large amount of influence. I n 1938 K i n g Carol tried unsuccessfully to counter the pro-Nazi forces i n Romania. Two years later the country lost one-third of its territory and population to the Bulgarians, Russians, and Hungarians, and Carol fled to Spain.

Portugal and Spain

Democracy waned in the uncertain years afler World War I us people turned increasingly toward more authoritarian leaders whom they hoped would bring them stability and prosperity.

D u r i n g the i n t e r w a r p e r i o d , economic problems, aristocratic privilege, and peasant misery w o r k e d against successful democratic or p a r l i a m e n t a r y government in the Iberian peninsula. After the end of World War I , Portugal endured ten years of political indecision u n t i l A n t o n i o de Oliveira Saiazar (1889-1970), a professor of economics, became minister of finance in 1928. After helping straighten out some o f the country's financial problems, Salazar became Portugal's premier and virtual dictator. He m a i n t a i n e d Portugal's close ties w i t h B r i t a i n while lending assistance to right-wing elements in Spain. None of the political parties could deal adequately with Spain's problems in the 1920s. Revolts and strikes

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plagued the country until 1931, when the king abdicated and left the country. At the end of the year a new liberal constitution was adopted, and a republic was proclaimed. The new constitution was extremely liberal, but il had the support of neither the left nor the right. Mob violence and the threat of military coups continually harassed the republic. By 1936 ihe peasants and workers were beginning to take matters into their own hands. At the same time, ihe military, under Generalissimo Francisco Franco, sought to pursue its own political ends. I n July the army made its move and attacked the republican government. This marked the start of a civil war in Spain, a war that in retrospect seems inevitable because of the country's indigenous social antagonisms.

The United States The United States emerged from World War I as the strongest country in the world. But while other states iooked to Washington to continue to play a political and d i p l o m a t i c role in the w o r l d , the U.S. government turned i n w a r d , away from the international scene. Americans shelved Wilson's wartime idealism, ignored the League of Nations, and returned to domestic politics. At the same time, however, American businessmen played an active role i n international business until 1929: Not until the 1980s would a larger percentage of American financial activities take place abroad. During the 1920s, three Republican p r e s i d e n t s Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover—benefited from the well-being of the country and the generally carefree spirit of the times. Although refusing to join the League of Nations, the United Slates did participate in the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922 to limit the race in warship construction, the Dawes and Young plans for economic stabilization, and the Kellogg-Briand pact ( 1928) to outlaw war. Harding's domestic policies were marked by protectionist economics, probusiness legislation, and scandal. Alter Harding died suddenly in 1923, the widespread corruption of his administration was exposed. His vice president, Coolidge, easily weathered the storm and, after his 1924 election, advocated high tariffs, tax reduction, and a hands-off policy on federal regulation of business. Onlv nagging problems in the agricultural sphere detracted from the dazzling prosperity and honest government that marked his administration. In the 1928 presidential elections, Herbert Hoover—a successful mining engineer who had directed Belgian relief during the war, had been present at the Versailles negotiations, and had overseen the Russian relief plan in ihe early 1920s—overwhelmed

Tim Grunt Depression and the environmental disaster that accompanied it, the Dust Bowl, devastated the American economy and brought ruin to hundreds of families. Dorothea Lange's photograph of a migrant mother captured the love, strength, patience, and pain of the mothers that held those families together.

the governor of New York, Alfred E. Smith, the first Catholic to be nominated for president. When Hoover took office in 1929, he had the support of a Republican Congress and a nation enjoying unbounded industrial prosperity. It would be his incredibly bad luck to have to deal with and be blamed lor the worst depression the United States has ever experienced. By 1932 Americans fell the tragic blows of ihe Greal Depression—25 percent unemployment, 30,000 business failures, numerous bank collapses, and a huge number of foreclosed mortgages. Hoover tried unprecedented measures to prop up faltering businesses with government money, devise new strategies to deal w i t h the farm problem, and build confidence among the shaken citizenry. Yet he failed to shift the tide of the depression. Indeed, some observers note that the only force that brought an end to the crisis was the arrival of the World War I I . In the 1932 elections Franklin D. Roosevelt, only the third Democrat elected to the presidency since 1860, defeated Hoover by assembling a coalition of labor, intellectuals, minorities, and farmers—a coalition the Democratic parly could count on for nearly a

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half century. The country had reached a crisis point by the time Roosevelt was inaugurated i n 1933, and quick action had to be taken i n the face of a wave of bank closings. Under Roosevelt's leadership, the N e w Deal—a sweeping, pragmatic, often hit-or-miss program— was developed to cope w i t h the emergency. The New Deal's three objectives were relief, recovery, and reform. M i l l i o n s of dollars flowed from the federal treasury to feed the hungry, create jobs for the unemployed through public works, and provide for the sick and elderly through such reforms as the Social Security Act. I n addition, Roosevelt's administration substantially reformed the banking and investment industries, greatly increased the rights of labor unions, invested i n massive p u b l i c power and conservation projects, and supported families w h o were i n danger of losing their homes or w h o simply needed homes. The Democrats' programs created m u c h controversy among those who believed that they went too far t o w a r d creating a socialistic government and those who believed that they d i d not go far enough t o w a r d attacking the depression. Hated or loved, Roosevelt was i n control, and the strength and leadership he provided were unparalleled i n the interwar democracies.

Interwar Latin America The huge w a r t i m e demand for L a t i n A m e r i c a n m i n e r a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l products resulted i n an economic boom that, w i t h a m i n o r contraction, continued on into the 1920s. However, the area's crucial weakness remained—its economic dependence on only a few products. A m o n g L a t i n America's 20 republics, B r a z i l based its prosperity o n coffee, Cuba depended on sugar, Venezuela on o i l , Bolivia on t i n , Mexico on o i l and silver, Argentina on wheat and meat, and the various Central American countries on bananas. Another problem was land distribution. On many large estates conditions resembled medieval serfdom. Because the Catholic Church was a great landowner, certain members of the clergy combined w i t h the landed interests to oppose land reforms. D u r i n g the 1920s, Mexico spearheaded the movement for social r e f o r m i n L a t i n America. A series of governments, each claiming to be faithful to the spirit of the 1910 revolt, sought to gain more control over the vast o i l properties r u n by foreign

New Deal—President Franklin D. Roosevelt's series of programs to deal with the effects of the depression.

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investors. The government solved the agrarian probl e m at the expense o f the large landowners. These changes were accompanied by a wave o f anticlericalism. Under these attacks, the Catholic Church lost m u c h property, saw many churches destroyed, and had to w o r k t h r o u g h an underground priesthood for a time. Mexico exerted a strong influence over other L a t i n American countries. Between 1919 and 1929, seven nations adopted new, liberal constitutions. I n a d d i t i o n , there were g r o w i n g demands for better economic and social opportunities, a breakdown of the barriers that d i v i d e d the few extremely r i c h f r o m the many abysmally poor, and improvements i n health, education, a n d the status o f w o m e n . Above a l l there was an increasing desire for more stable conditions. Because of their dependence on raw-material exports, the L a t i n American countries suffered a serious economic crisis d u r i n g the Great Depression. Largely as a result o f the disaster, revolutions broke out i n six South American countries i n 1930. During the 1930s, the "colossus of the north," the United States, attempted to improve its relations w i t h L a t i n America and to stimulate trade. The Good Neighbor policy, originated i n Hoover's administration and begun i n 1933, asserted that "no state has the right to intervene i n the internal or external affairs of another." Less pious, but more effective, was the $560 m i l l i o n w o r t h of inter-American trade that the new policy encouraged. Rivalries among industrialized nations for the L a t i n American market became intense d u r i n g the 1930s. Nazi Germany concluded many barter agreements w i t h Latin American customers and at the same time penetrated the countries politically by organizing German immigrants into pro-Nazi groups, supporting fascist politicians, and developing powerful propaganda networks. W h e n w a r came, however, most of Latin America lined up w i t h the democracies.

THE WESTERN TRADITION IN TRANSITION: CHANGING CERTAINTIES • Some historians believe that the First World War delivered a death blow to classic Western Civilization. Looking at the changes in science, literature, and the arts, do you agree? The w o r l d was i n the process of change even before World War I . All of the basic definitions were changing. At the dawn of twentieth century, science made

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great strides, and such figures as Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Ivan Pavlov, and Sigmund Freud enlarged understanding of the universe and the individual. Even before the war, which had dealt a deathblow to the nineteenth-century legacy of o p t i m i s m , these physicists and psychologists pointed out that the old foundations and beliefs on which the European world rested had to be rethought.

Science and Society At the beginning of the twentieth century, the basic view of human nature changed. The Russian scientist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) gave the study of psychology a new impetus. I n 1900 he carried out a series of experiments in which food was given to a dog at the same lime that a bell was rung. After a time the dog identified the sound of the bell with food. Henceforth, the sound of the bell alone conditioned ihe dog to salivate, just as if food had been presented. Pavlov demonstrated the influence of physical s t i m u l i on an involuntary process in all animals. The psychology of "conditioned reflexes," based on Pavlov's w o r k , achieved wide popularity, especially in the United States, as the basis for behaviorism, w h i c h considered the human as analogous to a machine responding mechanically to s t i m u l i . Behaviorism stressed experimentation and observational techniques and d i d m u c h to create relatively valid intelligence and aptitude tests. I t also served to strengthen the materialist philosophies o f the period. Probably the most famous and controversial name associated w i t h psychology is that of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Placing far greater stress than any predecessor on the role of the unconscious, Freud pioneered ihe theory and methods of psychoanalysis. This theory is based on the idea that human beings are born w i t h unconscious drives that from the very beginning seek some sort of outlet or expression. Young children often express their drives i n ways that violate social conventions for proper behavior. Parents typically forbid these behaviors and punish children for p e r f o r m i n g them. As a result, many innate drives are repressed—pushed out of conscious awareness. Repressed drives, however, continue to demand some k i n d of expression. Freud believed that many repressed drives were sublimated, or channeled i n t o some k i n d of tolerated or even highly praised behavior. psychoanalysis—A method of dealing with emotional problems in which the psychoanalyst encourages his patients to speak and reveal their innei most thoughts and dreams—especially dealing with events din ing their infancy.

Albert Einstein overturned the Newtonian universe of order and replaced it with his special theory of relativity, which provided new ways to view time and space. He is shown here with his wife.

Freud was particularly interested in psychological disorders, and he treated emotional disturbances by encouraging patients to bring back to the surface deeply repressed drives and memories. By making patients aware of their unconscious feelings, Freud hoped that they would understand themselves better and be able to respond more effectively to the problems they faced. Freud used the techniques of free association and dream interpretation to explore how unconscious feelings might be related to patients' symptoms. He believed that many of his patients' symptoms resulted from repressed sexual and aggressive drives. Freud's theories have had a tremendous influence not only on the science of psychology but also on our culture as a whole, although his theories were falling out of favor as the twentieth centuryended. The old Newtonian understanding of the world changed. The scientific giant of the first half of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein (1879-1955) contended i n 1905 thai light is propagated through space i n the form of particles, which he called photons. Moreover, the energy contained in any par-

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ticle of matter, such as the photon, is equal to the mass of that body m u l t i p l i e d by the square o f the velocity of light (approximately 186,300 miles per second). This theory, expressed i n the equation E=mc , provided the answer to many mysteries of physics. For example, questions such as h o w radioactive substances like r a d i u m and u r a n i u m are able to eject particles at enormous velocities and to go on doing so for millions of years could be examined i n a new light. The magnitude of energy contained i n the nuclei of atoms c o u l d be revealed. Above all, E=mc showed that mass and energy are equatable. I n 1906 Einstein formulated his special theory of r e l a t i v i t y , w h i c h set out a radically new approach to explain the concepts of time, space, and velocity. Ten years later Einstein proposed his general theory, i n w h i c h he incorporated gravitation i n t o relativity. He showed that gravitation is identical to acceleration and that light rays would be deflected i n passing through a gravitational field—a prediction confirmed by observation of an eclipse i n 1919 and by various experiments carried out i n the American space programs i n the 1960s and 1970s and the Hubble telescope i n 1994. The theory of relativity has been subsequently confirmed i n other ways as well. The conversion of mass into energy was dramatically demonstrated i n the atomic bomb, which obtains its energy by the a n n i h i l a t i o n of part of the matter of which i t is composed. Einstein's theories upset the Newtonian views of the universe. Einstein's universe is n o t Newton's three-dimensional figure o f length, breadth, and thickness. I t is, instead, a four-dimensional spacetime c o n t i n u u m i n w h i c h t i m e itself varies w i t h velocity. Such a cosmic model calls for the use o f non-Euclidean geometry. Einstein's theory changed scientists' attitude t o w a r d the structure and mechanics of the universe. On a broader scale, his relativistic i m p l i c a t i o n s penetrated many o f the philosophical, moral, and aesthetic concepts o f the twentieth century. The fundamental discoveries i n physics came before World War I . The B r i t i s h physicist Ernest Rutherford (1871-1937) advanced the theory i n 1911 that each atom has a central particle, or nucleus, which is positively charged. Rutherford's argument repudiated the belief that the atom was indivisible. On the Continent, discoveries w i t h even greater consequences were being made. German physicist Max Planck (1858-1947) studied radiant heat, which comes from the sun and is identical i n nature w i t h light. He 2

2

relativity—A radically new approach to view time and motion.

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found that the energy emitted from a vibrating electron proceeds not i n a steady wave, as was traditionally believed, but discontinuously i n the form of calculable "energy packages." Planck called each such package a quantum; thus the quantum theory was born. This j o l t to traditional physics was to prove extremely valuable i n the rapidly growing study of atomic physics. Planck and Einstein investigated the infinite extent of the external universe, w i t h a massive impact on the state of knowledge. At the same time, the equally infinite extent of the universe k n o w n as the m i n d also began to be studied i n greater depth than ever before.

The Transformation of Literature and Music Romanticism had broken the classical molds and opened the way for diversity i n forms, styles, and themes. Romantics followed their emotions, while realists advocated a more objective way of portraying the w o r l d by stressing accuracy and precision. By the end of the nineteenth century a new movement, modernism—fragmented, disorganized, and united only i n its reaction to the past—came to hold sway among Europe's writers, artists, and musicians. By the beginning of the twentieth century, modernism freed the w r i t e r from all rules o f composit i o n and f o r m and a l l obligations to communicate to a large audience. Poetry was especially affected by this new tendency. Toward the end of the century, i n reaction to the demands of realism, French poets S t é p h a n e M a l l a r m é (1842-1898) and Paul Verlaine (ver-LEN; 1844-1896) inaugurated the symbolist movement. Poetry rather t h a n prose best f i t the symbolists' goal o f conveying ideas by suggestion rather than by precise, photographic word-pictures. I n a sense, a l l m o d e r n l i t e r a t u r e stems f r o m the symbolist movement. By increasing the power of the poet to reach the readers' i m a g i n a t i o n t h r o u g h expanded combinations o f allusion, symbol, and double meaning, symbolism gave new obscurity to the w r i t t e n w o r d . M o d e r n i s m affected music as i t had affected poetry and art. The French composer Claude Debussy (de-BYEU-see; 1862-1918) tried i n his music to i m i tate what he read i n poetry and saw i n impressionist paintings. He engaged i n "tone painting" to achieve a special m o o d or atmosphere. This device can be heard i n his "symphonic poem" Prelude to the Afternoon of a Faun, w h i c h shocked the musical w o r l d when i t was first performed i n 1894. The impressionist painters had gained their effects by juxtapos-

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ing widely different colors. The composers juxtaposed widely separate chords to create similarly brilliant, shimmering effects. Before 1914, a number oi other composers had also been rebelling strongly against lyrical Romanticism and engaged i n s t r i k i n g experimentation. Breaking w i t h the "major-minor" system of tonality, which had been the musical t r a d i t i o n since the Renaissance, some o f them used several different keys simultaneously, a device known as polytonality. Outstanding among such composers was Igor Stravinsky (1882-1971), who was less concerned w i t h melody than w i t h achieving effects by means of

polytonality, dissonant harmonies, and percussive rhythms. Other composers, such as the Austrianborn Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951), experimented w i t h atonality, the absence of any fixed key. Schoenberg developed the I2-tone system, an approach in which compositions depart from all tonality and harmonic progressions while at the same time stressing extreme dissonances. Stravinsky's and Schoenberg's music may strike the first-time listener as harsh and unpleasant, but these experiments with polytonality and atonality were symbolic of their time, when the old absolute values were crumbling— a time of clashing dissonance.

Not only was Pablo Picasso the most prolific aitist oi the twentieth century, but he also taught the public over the course of his long life that there was a number of different ways that one could see and portray traditional subjects, as in Les Demoiselles d'Avignon 119071. Pablo Picasso, "Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, Paris" (June-July 1907). Acquired through the Lillie P. Bliss Bequest (333.1939). © The Museum of Modem Art/Licensed by ScalaJArt Resource, NY. ©2003 Estate of Pablo Picasso/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.

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Changes in the Visual Arts The Spanish artist Pablo Picasso (1881-1974) and others helped develop the school called c u b i s m . Cubists would choose an object, then construct an abstract pattern from i t , giving the opportunity to view i t simultaneously from several points. Such a pattern is evident i n m u c h of Picasso's work, including the pivotal Les Demoiselles D'Avignon (lay dayMWAH-sels dah-veen-YON; 1907). D u r i n g the interwar period Picasso modified his cubist style and became a public figure through paintings such as Guernica (GWEHR-nee-kah), a m u r a l that captures vividly the human horrors of the destruction o f a small town i n Spain by fascist air forces during that country's civil war. Henri Matisse (1869-1954) continued to exercise a major influence on young painters through his abstract works. Another movement that came out of the 1920s was surrealism, led by artists such as Georgio de Chirico (KIR-e-KOH; 1888-1978) and R e n é Magritte (mah-GREET; 1898-1967). The proponents of this approach saw the subconscious m i n d as the vehicle that could free people from the shackles of modern society and lead them to total creative freedom. They felt an affinity w i t h "primitive art" and its close associations w i t h magical and mythological themes. They exalted the irrational, the violent, and the absurd i n human experience and saw World War I as proof that rationality did not exist and that, therefore, neither did artistic standards. Salvador Dali (1904-1989) perhaps indicated his convictions about the artistic establishment and the society i t represented when he gave a lecture on art while wearing a diver's helmet. M a n Ray (1890-1976) and Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968) took the themes of irrationality and anti-traditionalism to their extremes i n the artistic movement k n o w n as Dada.

Architectural Pioneers Alexandre Gustave Eiffel (1832-1923)

Planned and built the tower that bears his name for the 1889 Paris International Exposition

Walter Gropius (1883-1969)

One of founders of the Bauhaus movement; built avant-garde exposition hall in Cologne

Louis Sullivan (1856-1924)

Chicago architect who chose function over form in his skyscrapers

Frank Lloyd Wright (1867-1959)

Greatest twentiethcentury American architect

established a highly influential school of functional art and architecture, the Bauhaus, i n 1918. One of Louis Sullivan's pupils, Frank Lloyd Wright (1867-1959), originated revolutionary designs for houses. One feature of Wright's structures was the interweaving of interiors and exteriors through the use of terraces and cantilevered roofs. He felt that a building should look appropriate on its site; i t should "grow out of the land." His "prairie houses," w i t h their long, low lines, were designed to blend i n w i t h the flat land of the Midwest. Much of what is today taken for granted i n domestic architecture stems directly from Wright's experiments at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Architecture I n the decade prior to World War I , an "international" style of architecture, which broke sharply w i t h tradition, developed i n Germany. This style, which stressed the use of various techniques from the machine age, was particularly well suited to early-twentieth-century industrialization. I n 1914 one of the outstanding leaders of this movement, Walter Gropius (GRO-pei-us; 1883-1969), designed an exhibition hall i n Cologne that emphasized horizontal lines, used glass, exposed staircases, and did not hide its functionalism. Nearly a century later, this hall is still regarded as contemporary. Proponents of this new movement i n architecture

cubism—An art form that permits the portrayal of a subject from several different points of view simultaneously.

CONCLUSION Germany's rapid economic growth, military buildup, ambitious foreign policy, and inability to control its Austro-Hungarian ally helped bring the normally competitive European economic arena to a crisis i n the summer of 1914. By violating Belgian neutrality and declaring war on Russia and France, Germany stood as the state most responsible for the outbreak of the First World War, a fact for which i t was severely punished i n the Treaty of Versailles. Its actions had provided the spark to the volatile environment of the aggressive state system and set i n motion four years i n which the science, wealth, and power of Europe were concentrated on the business of destroying much of what the Continent had accomplished i n the previous century.

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After the war, the non-European w o r l d took advantage of the exhaustion o f the colonial powers to increase their drives t o w a r d n a t i o n a l independence. I n the M i d d l e East, Arab national ambitions had flared i n 1916 i n t o a revolt against O t t o m a n rule. The i m m i g r a t i o n o f European Jews to Palestine led to conflict between Arabs and Jews, w h i c h was to increase as t i m e passed. The peoples of N o r t h Africa, the Middle East, India, southeastern Asia, and Oceania were gathering strength i n their battle to oust the Europeans and govern themselves.

I n the huge c o l o n i a l area south o f the Sahara, Africans were beginning to stir restlessly against European rule. Even China, t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d for centuries, turned to revolution to regain the power and prestige it had lost during the era of imperialism. A l t h o u g h Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) w o n an internal power struggle and organized the government, the c o u n t r y remained poor and weak. Meanwhile, Japan embarked o n its amazing technological, i n d u s t r i a l , and m i l i t a r y g r o w t h and became a w o r l d power.

Suggestions for Web Browsing

The Great War http: //www. pitt.edu/- pugac hev/gre atwar/ww 1. htm! Vast site devoted to all aspects of World War I.

Journals 1928-/939 (University of Illinois Press, 2000) give a window into the tumultuous age of the 1930s in Paris. American writers—such as F. Scott Fitzgerald—The Great Gatsby (1925) , This Side of Paradise (1920), The Beautiful and the Damned (1922); Ernest Hemingway—A Farewell to Arms (1929), For Whom the Bells Toll (1940), The Sun Also Rises (1926) ; and Sinclair Lewis—Ma in Street (1920), Elmer Gantry (1927)—dealt with lost idealism and hypocrisy in their works. Films have been made of each of the American novels that arc listed above, in addition to All Quiet on the Western Front (Universal, 1930).

World War I http: //www. wo rldwarl.com/ Another extensive site on all aspects of World War 1.

Suggestions for Reading

You can obtain more information about topics included in this chapter at the websites listed below. See also the companion website that accompanies this text, http://www.abIongman.com/ brummett, which contains an online study guide and additional resources.

The Great Depression http://history.searchbeat.com/greatdepression.htm Tim SearchBeat Guide to the Great Depression offers resources on the Great Depression. Spanish Civil War htt p://www. s pa r tacu s .schoo Inet.co. u k/S pan i sh-CM I-War. htm Extensive site includes links to maps, history, and biographies regarding the Spanish civil war. Museo Picasso Virtual: Online Picasso Project http: //www.tam u.edu/mocl/picasso/ Extensive online project, in multiple languages, offering a tour of the life, family, travels, and works of this twentiethcentury master.

Literature and Film As noted in the chapter, (his period was an incredibly rich period for novels, films, and poetry. The person who best captured the era's complexity and perversity was Franz Kafka; see a collection of his work in The Complete Stories of Kafka (Schocken Books, 1995). One of the finest novels about war ever written was Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front (many editions). Alexander Solzhenitsyn's August 1914 (Bantam, 1974) is an important piece of literature describing Russia's entry into the war. The poet T. S. Eliot captured the deceptions of the age in poems such as "The Wasteland" and "The Love Songs of J. Alfred Prufrock" (see Collected Poems: 1909-1962, Harcourt, 1963). Andre Gide's

The most accessible general study of the war is Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (Henry Holt, 1996). Alistair Home, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 (Penguin, 1994) deals with a key event in the war. Paul Fusscll captures the brutal nature and impact of the war in The Great War and Modern Memory, 25lh anniv. ed. (Oxford University Press, 2000), On the crisis in the French army, see Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry (Princeton University Press, 1994). See Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Hopkins, 1957), regarding the U.S. president's participation at Paris. The responsibilities of winning the war are discussed in William Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt. The Burden of Victory: France, Britain, and the Enforcement of tiie Versailles Peace, 1919-/925 {University Press of America, 1995). For a recent analysis of Weimar's social and economic crises, sec Richard Bessel, Germany After the First World War (Clarendon Press, 1993). Charles P. Kindelberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939,rev.cd. (University of California Press, 1986), covers the global perspective of the 1930s. Charles S, Maier surveys the social and political consequences of the difficult interwar period in Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I (Princeton University Press, 1988). For events in the successor states, see Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Tivo World Wars (University of Washington Press, 1974). John Stevenson provides a good survey of British life between the wars in Social Conditions in Britain Between tlie Wars (Penguin, 1977). For developments in France in the 1930s, see John T. Marcus, French Socialism in the Crisis Years, 1933-1936 (Praeger, 1963). For the United States, see William E. Leuchtenberg, Tlie FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy (Columbia University Press, 1995).

CHAPTER 27 •

World War I and Its Economic and Political Consequences

An understanding of the interwar scene can be gained from reading some of the biographies of the participants. See, for example, Albrecht Fôlsing, Albert Einstein: A Biography, trans. Ewald Osers (Viking, 1997); Meryle Secrest, Frank Lloyd Wright: A Biography (University of Chicago Press, 1998); Ian Gibson, The Shameful Life of Salvador Dali (Norton, 1998); and

831

Michael Oliver, Stravinsky (Phaidon, 1995). Michael Fitzgerald, Making Modernism: Picasso and the Creation of the Market for Twentieth-Century Art (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995), details the pioneering work of Picasso in exploiting the huge market for art among the ever-increasing upper middle classes.

The USSR, Italy, Germany, and Japan

Democratic Failure and Authoritarian Government in the Interwar Period

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

Revolutions in Russia: 1917 and

The German Tragedy

1928-1939

DOCUMENT: The New German Woman

DOCUMENT: Staiin and State Terror

DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS: Wishful

Fascism

Thinking: A Nazi Tourism Map

Italy and Mussolini

Japan

1910 1913 Mussolini becomes editor of socialist newspaper Avanti 1912-1931 Taisho Democracy in Japan

1915 191S

A

fter the final shots of World War I were fired and the last peace treaties were signed, an uneasy 20-year period of peace began. The victorious Allies made

their transitions from wartime to peacetime economies, and the United King-

dom, France, and the United States tried to resume their usual political pursuits. But it was impossible to return to a normal, pre-1914 life. The world had changed.

Woodrow Wilson had foreseen the global suffering caused by World War I to be a pre-

Twenty-One Demands

1917 February-March Revolution overthrows Romanov dynasty; October-November Revolution overthrows provisional government; Communist rule established 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: World War I ends; revolutions in Germany 1919 Weimar Constitution adopted; Weimar Republic begins

lude for a world "made safe for democracy." Instead, the war's aftershocks and the

1920

destruction of global economic stability shook democratic governments to their core,

1921 Mussolini elected to Chamber of Deputies, established National Fascist party

as we saw in Chapter 27, and aided the development of nondemocratic rule in Russia, Italy, and Germany. Japan, like the European governments of the prewar period,

1922 Fascists march on Rome; USSR formed

entered a period of increasing democratization in the immediate post-1919 era, but

1923

Hitler s P u t s c h fails

disillusionment with International cooperation following the breakdown of the world

1924

Lenin dies

economy in 1929 and the rising tensions on the Asian continent turned Japan toward militaristic, nondemocratic rule in the late 1930s as well. To the democratic nations watching the developments in these four countries in the 1930s, the USSR, Italy, Germany, and Japan seemed to have had greater suc-

1925 1925 Universal Manhood Suffrage in Japan 1928 Stalin Institutes first fiveyear plan

cess in mobilizing their economies. Their respective political programs seemed, to some in the West, to inspire their populations to work harder and accomplish more. Important public figures in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—in

1930 1931 Manchurian Incident

despair at the seeming weakness of their own systems—praised the methods and

1933 Hitler elected chancellor of Germany, proclaims Third Reich

the results of the dictators. As Italy, Germany, and Japan invaded other countries and

1937

ignored the League of Nations, the democratic world stood still, as if stunned by what was happening {see Chapter 31). When the Germans signed treaties with Japan in 1936 and 1940, Italy in 1937 and 1940, and the USSR in 1939. it seemed as if the nondemocratic forces had built up an unstoppable momentum.

War with China (Japan)

1940 1940

Tripartite Pact

1940 Trotsky assassinated in Mexico

Each of the nondemocratic powers pursued Its own, unique path in the 20-year period between the world wars. The Bolshevik victory in 1917 in Russia led to the imposition of a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist strategy on the governing of the USSR. Italy and Germany developed a new ideology, fascism, during the interwar period. In Japan, military-dominated cabinets easily destroyed democratic institutions that had only

833

834

C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T recently emerged. Each of these countries went through the failure of democratic institutions (however brief in Russia), severe economic problems, governmental change leading to one-party control, and finally state mobilization of the masses. Even though they arrived at their political systems In different ways, the governments of the USSR, Italy, Germany, and Japan developed antidemocratic, antiliberal, anti-freetrade policies, and each limited individual freedom for its citizens. Though they signed treaties with one another, in the end, most saw their' national strength dependent on their own military expansion and rejected the multilateral world order championed by the democracies after World War I.

REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA: 1917 AND 1928-1939 • How did each of the two revolutions—the November ¡917 Revolution of Lenin and the 1928-1939 changes imposed by Stalin— transform Russia? Russia entered the w a r i n August 1914 i n a buoyant and patriotic mood. I t took oniy t w o months to dampen i n i t i a l o p t i m i s m and to expose the army's weakness and the tsarist government's corruption and inefficiency. By the middle of 1915, drastic losses (more than 2 m i l l i o n casualties) and food and fuel shortages lowered morale. Strikes increased among the factory workers d u r i n g 1916, and the peasants, whose sons were dying i n large numbers and whose desire for land reform was being ignored, became discontented. The enormous costs of Russia's participat i o n i n World War I and the incompetence of the government led i n March to the first Russian Revolution of 1917, and the end of the Romanov dynasty.

The First, "Spontaneous" 1917 Revolution A spontaneous event from below sparked the 1917 Russian Revolution. I n the first part of M a r c h , a strike broke out i n a Petrograd factory. By March 8, sympathy strikes had virtually paralyzed the city. At the same time, a bread shortage occurred, w h i c h brought more people into the streets. Scattered fighting broke out between the strikers and protesters on one side and the police on the other. Tsar Nicholas I I ordered the strikers back to work and dismissed the Duma (parliament) on March 11. His orders touched 1

off the revolutionary crisis. The Duma refused to go home, and the strikers defied the government and held mass meetings. The next day the army and police openly sided w i t h the workers. Three events occurring between March 12 and March 1S marked the end of the old regime. On March 12 the Duma declared the formation of a provisional committee (renamed the Provisional Government on March 15) to serve as a caretaker administration until a Constituent Assembly could be elected to write a constitution for the future Russian republic. On the same day, Marxist socialists and Socialist Revolutionaries i n Petrograd formed the Soviet ("council") of Workers' Deputies (renamed three days later the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). Nicholas abdicated on March 15 i n favor of his brother Michael, who turned down the throne the next day in favor of the Provisional Government. After more than three centuries i n power, the Romanov dynasty ceased to rule. For the next six months Russia proceeded under a system Leon Trotsky, the great Marxist theoretician and revolutionary, described as "dual power"—the Provisional Government and the Soviet. The moderates and liberals i n the Provisional Government quickly produced a program of civil rights and liberties that gave Russia a springtime of freedom i n 1917, the likes of w h i c h the country had never known before and would not experience again for 70 years. From the first, however, the Provisional Government was hampered by its temporary nature: I t refused to take permanent action on major issues until the Constituent Assembly, elected by all Russians, could convene to write a constitution. Soviet—A council. First used in Russia during the 1905 Revolution when the Social Democrats organized Soviets (councils) of workers.

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AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN EUROPE IN THE MID-1950S Communist regimes O

Fascist regimes Anti-Democratic regimes

•

I

ICO

•-

so

The sell-proclaimed democracies may have won World War I, but ihey lost the peace. By ihe end of the 1930s, ihey were greatly outnumbered by fascist, authoritarian, and communist regimes.

The Soviet was dominated by the M e n s h e v i k wing of the Russian Social Democratic party along with the Socialist Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks closely followed Marx's teachings and believed that a liberal, bourgeois phase of history had to run its course. Even though they had greater popular support than the Provisional Government, they refused to take power. They did not believe 1917 to be the historically proper moment, as defined by Marx's theories, and they doubted their own capacity to maintain order. After the fall of the tsar, power passed to those who could not or would not rule. Menshevik—The Russian Social Democrats meeting in London split into (wo wings in 1903—the Bolsheviks (the majority) and the Mensheviks (the minority)—reflecting horn the results of a vote on party policies. The Mensheviks went on to become the most powerful branch of the Social Democrats in Russia until 1907. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, finally gained power in November 1917.

From the first, the dual power system functioned in a contradictory and ineffective way. On March 14 the Soviet issued its first law. Order No. I , w h i c h placed the r u n n i n g of the army on a democratic basis, through a committee structure. Soldiers were to obey only those orders that agreed with the official position of the Soviet, w h i c h wanted peace. At the same time, the Provisional Government insisted on living up to Russia's commitments to the Allies, carrying out the war, in hopes of gaining the Bosporus, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles from the crumbling Ottoman Empire. As the months wore on, the position of moderates in both parts of the system weakened, and all the involved parties became discredited. The Provisional Government put off calling the Constituent Assembly and thereby deferred any possibility of finding solutions to the problems Russia faced. It continued to

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D PRESENT

End of the Romanov Dynasty: The February-March Revolution of 1917 Ali dates are according to the Gregorian calendar, which replaced the Julian calendar in use in Russia at the lime. March 8

Sympathy strikes paralyze city

March 11

Tsar orders strikers back to work, dismisses Duma

March 12

Army and police disobey orders; Duma declares formation of provisional committee—Provisional Government on March 15; Socialists proclaim formation of Soviet of Workers' Deputies—Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 15

March 15

Tsar Nicholas I abdicates, passes power to his brother, Michael

March 16

Michael renounces power, empowerment of Provisional Government

pursue the war to "honor its commitments" and to gain the prizes promised i n the secret treaties. The Provisional Government's actions, combined w i t h the refusal of the Mensheviks to take control for ideological reasons, meant that the masses, who suffered from economic hardships or fought and died on the front lines, could find little consolation i n either branch of dual power. By July the liberals and moderates had given up the reins of power. Alexander Kerensky (1881-1970), who had been the only real revolutionary i n the original cabinet, became the head of the Provisional Government. He was i n an impossible situation. Leftists accused the Provisional Government o f heartlessly pursuing the war, while rightists condemned it for tolerating too many leftists. I n the meantime, the Soviet extended its organization throughout Russia by setting up local affiliates. Through the summer, however, the Soviets lacked the forceful leadership they needed to take control of the country.

The Second, "Bolshevik" Revolution of 1917 I n 1917 Lenin returned to Russia from exile i n Switzerland, intent on giving the revolution the leadership i t lacked. He had spelled out his tactics and

ideas i n the previous decade, and his disciples i n Russia, the Bolsheviks, had built up a core of supporters i n the factories and the army. As late as December 1916, he had stated that the revolution would not occur w i t h i n his lifetime. Four months later, working through Swiss contacts and w i t h German assistance, he returned to Russia. The Germans gave h i m transportation and financial support i n the hope that he would cause widespread chaos, forcing Russia to withdraw from the war. From the moment he stepped off the train i n Petrograd on the evening of April 16, Lenin tried to control the revolution. He proposed immediately stopping the war against Germany and starting one against "social oppressors." He called for giving all power to the Soviets and nationalizing all land. He also pushed for calling all Social Democrats, of whatever persuasion, communists. Lenin badly misjudged his audience, and the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries rejected his program. During the summer and fall of 1917 the Provisional Government and the Soviet continued their misgovernment. Kerensky tried to rule through a series of coalitions i n which the political balance continually shifted to the left. By the middle of July, after a moderately successful offensive against the Ausirians, soldiers began to desert i n large numbers rather than face a useless death i n World War I . The Russian front, along w i t h the army, disintegrated. I n the capital, the Mensheviks persisted i n refusing to lake power through the Soviet: The historical time was not right. As i f to match the ineptness of dual power, the Bolsheviks made an ill-conceived attempt to take power. The move backfired, and Lenin was forced to flee in disguise to Finland. After surviving the Bolshevik crisis, Kerensky faced a new threat from the right when General Lavr Kornilov tried to "help" the government by sending his troops to the capital. Kerensky and the Soviet interpreted this action as a right-wing counterrevolutionary move and mobilized to head it off. Kornilov's ill-advised maneuver failed, and ironically, he weakened the people he wanted to help. Between March and October 1917 the force of the revolution ground to bits all of Russia's structures and parties, from monarchist to Menshevik. The economic system fell apart as the rhythms of planting and commerce were disrupted by the uproar. To the people caught i n this chaos, the moderates' political dreams, the Mensheviks' revolutionary timing, and the Bolsheviks' schemes for the seizure of power were all totally irrelevant.

Bolshevik—The branch of the Social Democratic party, led by Lenin, that governed Russia after 1917. The official name came to be the Communist party.

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*4

K. N. Aksyonov's portrayal of V. I. Lenin's arrival at the Finland Station in Petrograd, received by an adoring throng, idealizes what in fact was a difficult time for the Bolshevik leader, in April 1917.

The actual revolution took place far away from the politicians and "great men." The army withered away as mass desertions and the execution of officers became commonplace. I n the countryside the peasants began carrying out land reform on their own, expelling landowners and killing those who would not leave. In the cities workers began to take over factories. The Russian Empire broke apart from internal conflicts, the continued pressure of war, and the rising spirits of the nationalities who had been oppressed for centuries. Only the Bolsheviks seemed to have an answer to Russia's crisis; even their slogans, such as "Peace, Land, and Bread," reflected what was already happening. Furthermore, they had the discipline and adaptability to take advantage of events. By October 1917 the Bolsheviks had discarded their slogan, "All Power to the Soviets." Frankly, Lenin, the unchallenged Bolshevik leader, now controlled the Petrograd Soviet. After much hesitation, he decided to move on November 6. The Military Revolutionary Committee, led by Leon Trotsky and supported by the Communistdominated crew of the battleship Aurora, took control of the communications and police centers in Petrograd. With the exception of sporadic fighting around the Winter Palace, Trotsky's military forces had little trouble. They arrested all members of the Provisional Government who could be found. Kerensky escaped

from the capital in a car flying the U.S. flag. Lenin then found himself leading a party of more than 200,000 people (an increase from 23,600 in February), which claimed control of a state with more than 170 million inhabitants.

Power, Allied Intervention, and Civil War The Bolsheviks assumed power over a war-weakened, revolution-ravaged state that was in terrible condition. Lenin's takeover split the Soviet itself when the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries refused to participate. Lenin had a bare majority at the Soviet's first postrevolutionary meeting. In the free elections held in December to form a Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks received just one-fourth of the votes. Yet such details as democratic representation d i d not stop Lenin. He proceeded to rule Russia. The Bolsheviks immediately put through decrees to declare peace and settle the land question. I n the meantime, his cadres imposed their control over Moscow and the other cities in the country. Lenin then began to lay the foundations for a single-party dictatorship that endured until 1991. When the Constituent Assembly convened in Petrograd on January 18, 1918, and proved that it would not be a

838

C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D PRESENT

tool for Lenin, the Bolsheviks closed it down at bayonet point the next day. By dissolving the Constituent Assembly, Lenin crushed all remnants of the briefly flowering democracy. This decisive step sealed the fate of the Mensheviks and most other opposition leftist parties. Not for 71 years would there be contested elections, open criticism of the central power, and the possibility of a potential democratic opposition. Almost immediately the revolutionary government came under attack from the White forces, the Allied Expeditionary Forces, and the new Polish state. The Whites, a powerful but fragmented group of antiBolsheviks, responded to the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by attacking the revolutionary government. The resulting Civil War would claim as many casualties in three years as the country had lost in World War I , The Allied Powers sent several small expeditionary armies to Russia for the stated purpose of controlling matériel they had sent the former tsarist army. In reality, they helped the Whiles. Lenin also had to make peace with Germany and after two months of negotiations concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918). This agreement drastically reduced the territory under Russian control and made the centers of government much more exposed to attack. I n reality, Lenin sacrificed territory over which

he had no control and took his country out of a war it could not fight. The Allies, still at war with Germany, feared (hat the Bolsheviks were i n a conspiracy with the Germans, especially after the terms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty became known. They also hoped that i f Lenin could be overthrown, the Whiles might reopen fighting against the Central Powers. The last of the expeditionary forces, the Japanese, did not leave until 1922. War broke out between Russia and Poland over a disputed boundary. From its new capital at Moscow, the Red (Bolshevik) government took all means to defend the revolution. Lenin's forces reimposed the death penalty (it had been abolished in all areas—except in the Russian army at the front—by the Provisional Government) and unleashed a reign of ten or. The Red Army and the Cheka (secret police) systematically destroyed the enemies of the revolution as well as individuals who were only lukewarm in their support of the new regime. Prison camps and repressive terror harsher than any since Ivan IV dominated life in the Russian slate. I n July 1918 the former tsar and his family, under house arrest since the outbreak of the revolution, were herded into the cellar of the house in which they were being held and were executed. They would not receive their final burial until 1998.

.-> (V .. TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK. I91R ATLANTIC Of

BAN

Russian territorial losses \

Germany took advantage of Russian weaknesses after the 1917 revolution to deprive the revolutionar\ stale oj much of its economic hose and territory. Not only did ihe fledgling Moscow-based communist slate face intervention hy the Western Allies in 1918, hut it also had a war wilh the newly reunited Polish slate over the western borderlands formerly controlled by the tsars.

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After the Central Powers surrendered in November 1918, Allied intervention in Russia ceased, and the Bolsheviks concentrated their energies against the Whites. Trotsky turned the Red Army into a disciplined, centralized force. The disorganized and dispersed While opposition, whose units ranged from Siberia to the Caucasus to Europe, could not match the Red forces. Taking advantage of their shorter supply lines, ideological unity, and dislike of Allied intervention, the Bolsheviks put an end to White resistance by 1920. The Whiles were united on few issues besides their hatred of the Bolsheviks. After their defeat, nearly a million of them scattered across the globe.

Theory. Reality, and the State Lenin had no hesitation about revising Marx's doctrines to fit Russian conditions. He had long opposed all democratic parliamentary- procedures, especially the concept of an officially recognized opposition party. He advocated instead a revolutionary "dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t " under Bolshevik leadership. The new order would rule in accordance with "democratic centralism," in which the vanguard party would anticipate the best interests of the masses and rule for them. Lenin altered certain aspects of the Marxist concept of the historical process. He accepted the view that the proletarian-socialist revolution must be preceded by a bourgeois-democratic revolution. He interpreted the March 1917 events as the first democratic revolution and his own coup d'etat in November as the second, or proletarian-socialist, revolution. This approach drastically shortened the historical process by which the bourgeois stage was to run its course. Lenin justified dissolving the Constituent Assembly on the grounds that a higher form of democratic principle had now been achieved, making the assembly superfluous. The November Revolution had vested all power in the Russian Republic in the people themselves, as expressed in their revolutionary committees, the Soviets. The new state acted in many spheres. In policies reminiscent of Robespierre's tenure during the French Revolution, the new government attacked the church, changed the calendar (adopting the Gregorian and rejecting the Julian system), and simplified the alphabet. The Cheka enforced ideological unity with a level of t e n o r that set the standard for later Soviet secret police organizations. In the first six years after Lenin seized power, there were three major developments relating to the Communist party, the name adopted by the Bolsheviks in 1918. First, all other parties were suppressed. Second, proletariat—In Marxist theory, the proletariat is Ihe politically classconscious portion of the working classes who would move to achieve the socialist revolution.

Russian children help carry ihe propaganda for Stalin's campaign for collectivization of agriculture. The banner reads, in part, "Everybody to the collective farm!" These happy faces belie the tragedy resulting from the collectivization program in which millions fell victim to slaughter or starvation.

the function of the partv was changed from that of carrying out the revolution to that of governing the country. Third, w i t h i n the party itself, a small elite group called the P o l i t b u r o , which set policy, consolidated power in its hands. Among the members of the first Politburo were Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. The second major organ of the parly was the Secretariat for the Central Committee, which oversaw the implementation of policy into practice. The state itself became known as the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR). As the Moscow-based Communist government extended its authority after the civil war, the jurisdiction of the RSFSR grew. I n 1922 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed, consisting of the four constituent socialist republics: the RSFSR, the Ukraine, White Russia (Belorussia), and Transcaucasia; and the USSR would soon expand to reflect the multinational nature of the Eurasian state. Although it appeared that the state exercised sovereign power, the USSR actually was governed by the Communist parly. So great d i d the authority of the Communist party become over the formation and administration

Politburo—The small, elite group o( the Communist party that established policy.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T

of policy that, before Lenin's death i n early 1924, i t could be said that party and slate were one. Consequently, whoever controlled the party controlled the state, and in the new Soviet stale the key person would be Joseph Stalin.

War Communism and the NEP From 1918to 1921 Lenin tried to apply undiluted Marxist principles to eliminate private ownership o f land; nationalize banks, railways, and shipping; and restrict the money economy. This policy, k n o w n as war communism, was widely unpopular. The peasants, who had just attained their centuries-long goal of controlling their own land, d i d not like the prospects of collectivization and the surrender of their surplus grain to the state. Many workers d i d not want to be forced to work in factories. Former managers showed little enthusiasm for running enterprises for the state's benefit. In the early months of 1920, the new government faced its most dangerous crisis to date. Six years of war and civil strife had left Russia exhausted. Industrial production was 13 percent of what i t had been i n 1914. Crop failures, poor management, and transy I ' T g | portation breakdowns contributed to the disas¬ ter. Famine brought more than 20 million people ftlllflik&ii to the brink of starvation. The government was Lenin Calls for forced to ask for help, and organizations such as Electrification Herbert Hoover's American project to bring relief

I

of AH Russia

_

.

,

,

,

,

^

:

,

,

. .

to Russia helped the country through the crisis, but not before some 5 million people died. Internal chaos, i n addition to controversy w i t h Poland over disputed borders, further plagued Lenin's government. From 1918 to 1921 other areas of the former Russian Empire—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia—chose to go their o w n way. I n February 1921 sailors at Kronstadt, formerly supporters of the regime, rebelled against the Bolsheviks and were massacred by the Red Army. Lenin said that the revolt "illuminated reality like a flash of lightning," and chose to make an ideological retreat. War communism was a total failure. Lenin decided that it was necessary "to take one step backward i n order to go two steps forward." He explained that Russia had tried to do too much too soon in attempting to change everything at once. He also noted that there had not been a firestorm of complementary communist revolutions sweeping the globe. The outbreaks i n Germany and Hungary had been brutally quashed. Russia stood alone. Compromise was necessary to survive, and besides altering his diplomatic front abroad, he recommended a return to certain practices of capitalism, the so-called New Economic Policy, or NEP. This retreat from war communism lasted u n t i l 1928 and allowed the Soviet state to get on its feet. 2

Peasants were relieved from the wholesale appropriation of grain. After paying a fixed tax, they were permitted to sell their surplus produce in the open market. Private management could once again run firms and factories employing fewer than 20 employees. Workers in state industries received a graduated wage scale. Foreign commerce and technology were actively sought. These compromises proved to be highly beneficial, and the Soviet economy revived. Ideological purists criticized the policy and pointed out that private businesses and the kulaks, as the ambitious peasants who accumulated property were called, profited greatly. Lenin's concessions and compromises gave the Communists time to regroup and recover, and the Russian people gained muchneeded breathing space. Lenin emphasized the absolute necessity for the party to "control the commanding heights of the economy." The state continued to manage banking, transportation, heavy industry, and public utilities. The NEP was Lenin's last major contribution. I n broken health since surviving a would-be assassin's bullet i n 1918, he worked as much as he could until his death in January 1924.

Trotsky Versus Stalin A weakness of all dictatorships is that there is no welldefined mechanism to pass power from one leader to the next. Lenin was the one person i n the party who possessed unchallenged authority and whose decrees were binding. After his death, Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin, rivals w i t h conflicting policies and personalities, fought for power. Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), born Lev Davidovich Bronstein, was a star i n the political arena. He was a magnificent, charismatic orator; an energetic and magnetic leader i n all areas; and a first-rate intellectual and theoretician. He turned to Marxism as a teenager and, like Lenin, had been exiled to Siberia for his revolutionary activities. He participated i n the major events of Russian social democracy. Trotsky was a member of the Iskra (EES-craw) group of Russian exiles i n Zurich, had been present i n London i n 1903 and opposed Lenin in the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, played a key role i n the 1905 Russian Revolution, and was an essential figure i n the 1917 revolutions and the Civil War. His egocentricity and arrogance contrasted sharply w i t h the shrewd and cunning nature of his less colorful but more calculating rival. Joseph Stalin (1879-1953), born i n Georgia as Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (zhu-GOSH-veckulaks—Farmers in the USSR who owned major farm implements or employed others.

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841

the better organizer and the more skillful manipulator lee), labored for [he revolution in obscurity. While Trotof people. Slaying in the background, Slalin, Ihe modsky played the star, Stalin worked behind the scenes. est "helper," played the game of "divide and conquer" Trotsky was a crowd-pi easing orator; Stalin, when he as members of the Politburo fought among themspoke in Russian (his second language—Georgian was selves. By 1926 party members realized thai Slalin had his First), was not an inspiring speaker. Admitted to a consolidated his position and had the full support of seminary to be trained for the priesthood, the young the party apparatus. By the end of that year, Trotsky Stalin was later expelled for radical opinions. I n the and other opponents were removed from ihe Polityears before the revolutions Stalin served the Bolsheburo. By 1929 Stalin was referred lo as the "Lenin of viks by robbery to gain funds for the parly's organizatoday." Stalin's supporters occupied the key posts in tion and propaganda activities. I n all ways he faithfully both government and parly, and he became the chairsupported Lenin—unlike Trotsky, who had not been a man of the Politburo. By 1940 he had eliminated all of uniformly obedient disciple between 1903 and 1917. the old Bolsheviks, including Trotsky, who was exiled Stalin was exiled east of the Urals a number of times and finally struck down by an assassin in Mexico, on before he returned to Petrograd in 1917 lo play an Stalin's orders. active role in the events of that year. He knew his own More than just an opportunist or a super-bureaustrengths and weaknesses. He aiso formed his opinion crat, Slalin had his own ideological views on (he future of Tiotsky rather early on, characterizing him in 1907 of the country. Tiotsky and others had believed, along as "beautifully useless." w i t h Lenin, lhal the USSR could not survive indefiAfter the 1917 revolutions, Stalin did much of the nitely as a socialist island in a capitalist ocean. It was less glamorous organizational work of the party; he the duty, they held, of Russian Communists to push for was also responsible for dealing w i t h the various revolution elsewhere. Slalin, less a theorist than a politnationalities. While others in the Politburo dealt with ical realist, viewed the idea of a w o r l d revolution as ideological questions or fought the civil war, Stalin premature. He correctly noted that Marxism had made created a network of people—loyal to him alone— little headway outside the USSR, despite the existence who worked in the bureaucratic apparatus and came of what, from the Marxist standpoint, were advantalo be known as apparatchiks (ap-pa-RAT-cheeks). With and through them he controlled ihe bureaucracy. I n 1922 Pravda ("Truth"), the official party newspaper, carried a brief announcement that the Central Committee had confirmed Stalin as general secretary of the secretariat, a position that became the most powerful in the Soviet Union. After Lenin's death, Stalin moved to construct a new secular religion for the Soviet Union, Leninism, formed in 1924 and powerful for more than 60 years. The mark of faith came lo be unquestioning loyalty to Lenin. The city Uaim(1920) of Petrograd, for example, vs. Stalin was renamed Leningrad. (19311 Stalin became Lenin's St. Peter, despite Lenin's criticism of both Trotsky and Stalin in his purported last w i l l and testament. (Although written in 1922, it was not widely published until Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashi'ili, fourth from ihe right in thefirstrow, chose lo cult himself the 1950s.) Stalin ("steel"} and came close to gaining totalitarian control of the USSR during the 1930s EH the competition with Tiot- working through his chosen men of the apparatus, the apparatchiks, pictured with hint here, sky, Stalin won because he was many of whom would remain in power for a halfcentitry.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T

geous conditions for revolution i n Germany and Italy. Stalin called for a new policy of building up socialism in a single state. (Lenin had once hinted at that alternative i n 1921.) He put an end to the NEP and began taking "two steps forward"—with brutal and far-reaching results.

Stalin's Economics: Revolution from Above, 1928-1939 Russia had begun industrialization at a late date and from the 1890s on was continuously aware of its backwardness. The drastic destruction of World War I and the Civil War reversed much of the progress that had been made, and by the late 1920s Stalin was deeply concerned w i t h the country's economic weakness i n the face of foreign invasion. He ordered a radical overhaul of the entire country and society designed to make 50 years' progress i n ten. The NEP was scrapped i n 1928, and Stalin imposed collectivization of agriculture and a series of five-year plans calling for heavy industrialization. Long working hours and a six-day workweek were instituted i n an attempt to revolutionize the Soviet Union's economic structure. For the first time i n history, a government controlled all significant economic activity through a central planning apparatus. This was an attempt to remove the old market-based system and replace it w i t h new framework. To drive the entire population along, Stalin strengthened his secret police so that they could force the nation through what w o u l d be a decade of convulsive internal struggle. By 1939 Stalin had consolidated his persona! dictatorship, at the cost of 10 to 20 million lives.

War on the Peasants Stalin wanted to transform the peasants into a rural proletariat, raising food on state and collective farms, not on their o w n plots. He had little doctrinal help from Marx, who had not considered that the revolut i o n he forecast could take place i n a peasant-dominated society. Marx left little guidance about what to do w i t h the peasants beyond mention of collectivized agriculture. He had assumed that capitalism w o u l d convert peasants into day laborers before the socialist revolution took place; hence farming would continue, except that now the state would o w n the farms. Lenin's war communism programs had failed, yet Stalin went back to them as he drew up his guidelines to transform agriculture. The major problem he faced was to convince the peasants to surrender their private lands, which they had finally got i n 1917, to the state and collective farms.

Under Stalin's program, the state farms, sovkhoz (sof-HOHS), would be owned outright by the government, w h i c h would pay the workers' wages. The collective farms, kolkhoz (KOLK-hohs), would be created from land taken from the kulaks and from the peasants who w o u l d voluntarily accept the government's decree to merge their own holdings. Kolkhoz members w o u l d w o r k the land under the management of a board of directors. At the end of the year each farm's net earnings would be totaled i n cash and i n kind, and the members w o u l d be paid on the basis of the amount and skill of their labor. The theoretical advantages of large-scale mechanized farming over small-scale peasant agriculture were obvious. I n addition, the government intended the reforms to permit the more efficient political education of the peasants. Further, the new programs would liquidate the kulaks, successful farmers who owned more property than their neighbors and who represented a d i s t u r b i n g element on the socialist landscape. The vast majority of peasants disagreed violently w i t h Stalin's a g r i c u l t u r a l program. They d i d not want to give up their land. One of the party leaders, Lazar Kaganovich, noted that "women i n the countryside i n many cases played the most 'advanced' role i n the reaction against collective farms." When the peasants d i d not flock to the government's banners, Stalin ordered harsher methods. When the class war between the poor peasants and the kulaks did not lake place, he sent the secret police and the army to the villages. The transition to collectivization was carried out under some of the most barbarous and b r u t a l measures ever enacted by a government against its own people. I n the tragedy that followed, millions of people, especially i n the Ukraine, died from direct attack, from famine, or i n work camps. By a decree i n February 1930 the state forced about 1 m i l l i o n kulaks off their land and took their possessions. Many peasants opposed these measures, slaughtering their herds and destroying their crops rather than hand them over to the state. I n 1933 the number of horses was less than half the number there had been i n 1928, and there were 40 percent fewer cattle and half as many sheep and goats. After nine years of war on the peasants, however, 90 percent of the land and 100 million peasants were i n the collective and state farms. 3

The Five-Year Plans Stalin introduced the system of central planning i n 1928. He and his advisers assumed that by centralizing all aspects of the allocation of resources and removing market forces from the economy, they could

CHAPTER 28 ensure a swift buildup of capital goods and heavy industries. The five-year plans, which began i n 1929, restricted the manufacture of consumer goods and abolished capitalism i n the forms permitted under the NEP. Citizens were allowed to o w n certain types of private property, houses, furniture, clothes, and personal effects. They could not own property that could be used to make profits by hiring workers. The state was to be the only employer. The first five-year plan called for a 250 percent increase i n overall industrial productivity. The state and police turned their entire effort to this goal. Even i n the chaos that occurred—buildings were erected to house nonexistent machines, and machines were shipped to places where there were no b u i l d i n g s growth did take place. The party cited statistics to prove that the plan had been achieved i n four and one-half years. Whether these were accurate or not—and they have been vigorously challenged—Soviet industry and society were totally transformed. The costs were disastrous, but Stalin portrayed the Soviet Union as being i n a form of war w i t h the world, and w i t h o u t strength, he pointed out, the USSR would be crushed. The second five-year plan began i n 1933 and sought to resolve some of the mistakes of the first. The government placed greater emphasis on improving the quality of industrial products and on making more consumer goods. The t h i r d plan, begun i n 1938, emphasized national defense. State strategies called for industrial plants to be shifted east of the Urals, and efforts were made to develop new sources of o i l and other important commodities. Gigantism was the key, as the world's largest tractor factory was b u i l t i n Chelyabinsk (chel-EE-AH-binsk), greatest power station i n Dnepropetrovsk (dnie-pro-PET-rovsk), and largest automobile plant i n Gorki. The plans achieved remarkable results. I n 1932 Soviet authorities claimed an increase i n industrial output of 334 percent over 1914 levels; 1937 output was 180 percent over that of 1932. But the high volume of production was often tied to mediocre quality, and the achievements were gained only w i t h an enormous cost i n human life and suffering and massive damage to the environment. At first the burdensome cost of importing heavy machinery, tools, equipment, and finished steel from abroad forced a subsistence scale of living on the people. These purchases were paid for by the sale of food and raw material i n the world's markets at a time when the prices for such goods had fallen drastically. |~SjS^L I n the rush to industrialize, basic aspects of Marxism were set aside. The dictatorship of the proletariat increasingly became the dictaStalin Demands torship over the proletariat. Another ideologiIndustriaiization cal casualty was the basic concept of economic R a p i d

The USSR, Italy, Germany, and Japan

843

egalitarianism. I n 1931 Stalin declared that equality of wages was "alien and detrimental to Soviet production" and a "petit bourgeois deviation." So much propaganda was used to i m p l a n t this twist that the masses came to accept the doctrine of inequality of wages as a fundamental communist principle.

The Great Purges During the 1930s, Stalin consolidated his hold over the Communist party and created the political system that w o u l d last u n t i l the ascent to power of M i k h a i l Gorbachev i n 1985. Stalin established an all-powerful, personal, dictatorial rule by doing away w i t h all of his rivals, real and potential, i n purges. He also took the opportunity to remove all scientific, cultural, and educational figures w h o d i d not fit i n w i t h his plans for the future. By 1939 Stalin had destroyed what was left of the Russian revolutionary tradition and replaced i t w i t h the rule of his people—the apparatchiks—who lived well i n comparison w i t h the rest of the Soviet population. The long arm of the secret police gathered i n thousands of Soviet citizens to face the kangaroo court and the firing squad. All six original members of the 1920 Politburo who survived Lenin were purged by Stalin. Old Bolsheviks who had been loyal comrades of Lenin, high officers of the Red Army, directors of industry, and rank-and-file party members were liquidated. M i l lions more were sent to forced labor camps. I t has been estimated that between 5 and 6 percent of the population spent time i n the pretrial prisons of the secret police. Party discipline and fear prevented party members from turning against Stalin, who controlled the party. The w o r l d watched a series of show trials i n w h i c h loyal Communists confessed to an amazing array of charges, generally tied, after 1934, to the assassination of Sergei Kirov, Leningrad party chief and one of Stalin's chief aides. Western journalists reported news of the trials to the w o r l d while the drugged, tortured, and intimidated defendants confessed to crimes they had not committed. By 1939 fully 70 percent of the members of the Central Committee elected i n 1934 had been purged. Among officers i n the armed forces, the purges claimed 3 of 5 army marshals, 14 of 16 army commanders, all 8 admirals, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 divisional commanders, 221 of 397 brigade commanders, and roughly one-half of the remaining officers, or some 35,000 men. A large portion of the leadership of the USSR was destroyed. I n a sense, the purges culminated i n Mexico w i t h Trotsky's assassination i n 1940. The lessons of the purges were chilling and effective. The way to succeed,

844

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. «'HAH-mad AH-lee JIN-nah; 1876-1948), had originally been a prominent member of the Congress parly. Jinnah, once dubbed by Indian nationalists the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity," became alienated by what he considered Hindu domination of the Congress and its claim to be the sole agent of Indian nationalism. The Muslim League began to advance the "twonation theory," and, in 1933, a group of Muslim students at Cambridge University circulated a pamphlet advocating the establishment of a new slate in Soulh Asia lo be known as Pakistan. This leaflet was the opening act of what later became a bloody drama. I n 1939 the Muslim League emphatically denounced any scheme of self-government of India that would mean majority Hindu rule. Britain's declaration that India was at war with Germany i n September 1939 rekindled angry memories of World War I when India's aid was thanked only by increased British repression. While Nehru and other Indian nationalists sympathized with B n L u n in its struggle against Nazi Germany, they demanded equality with Britain as a necessary condition of coming lo its aid. Denied independence, Indian leaders ordered the provincial ministries of Congress to resign in protest. Muslim leader's such as Jinnah saw this as an opportunity for independent action by Muslim areas, which thev had demanded of Congress for the past decade. Gandhi's entreaties to Jinnah to remain united against imperialism went unheeded. When a British delegation tried to get Gandhi lo agree to allow Muslim areas to opt out of an Indian dominion to be formed after World War I I , Gandhi would not budge, instead launching the "Quit I n d i a " movement in 1942. Other Indian nationalists created an army of the thousands of Indian soldiers the British had lost in Singapore when the Japanese captured the city. While many Indians supported England during the War, others, later viewed as heroes of Indian nationalism, did not. In the vears after' World War I I , Britain looked lor a way out ol India, but the rise of sectar ian violence Ouii India—Militant movement started in 1^42 to eliminate BriiUli III

It'.

CHAPTER 29 made them hesitant to leave. Negotiations repeatedly broke down, and i n the end, India was partitioned into predominantly H i n d u India and predominantly M u s l i m Pakistan. Bloodletting was not over, as many millions died i n the 1947 transition to independence.

CONCLUSION Between the two world wars, imperialism went on the defensive before the rise of nationalism i n Asia. I n the opening decades of the twentieth century, Japan, as noted i n Chapter 28, served as the model of the successful Asian nation-state; i t made amazing progress in industrialization and implemented a constitutional government. By 1919 the island nation had become one of the world's leading powers. Although China was not, strictly speaking, part of the colonial world, i n many ways this vast land was under the indirect influence of the Great Powers. Chinese Nationalists, led by Sun Yat-sen, overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established a republic. After years of conflict among rival factions, Jiang Jieshi consolidated power i n the Guomindang regime. The

Suggestions for Web Browsing You can obtain more information about topics included in this chapter at the websites listed below. See also the companion website that accompanies this text, http://www.ablongman.com/ brummett, which contains an online study guide and additional resources.

Forging New Nations in Asia, 1910-1950

883

nascent Chinese Communist movement, under Mao Zedong, survived W o r l d War I I to go o n to b u i l d a nation i n the post-1949 era. Other East Asian countries also undertook nation-building, often using the rhetoric of national strength and people s rights learned from the imperialists, to get r i d of foreign d o m i n a t i o n . Koreans, Indonesians, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Burmese, and Malays all built nationalist movements on a combination of indigenous and Western t h i n k i n g about independence. Many were bitterly disappointed i n Western hypocrisy over the issue of self-determinat i o n of nations. I n the end, W o r l d War I I destroyed both Western and Japanese imperialism i n East and Southeast Asia. India also exposed colonial hypocrisy. I t became a model of democratic nationalism under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi. He preached a message of nonviolence and civil disobedience to force B r i t a i n to grant a substantial measure of self-government to the Indians. Ultimately, W o r l d War I I also dissolved B r i t i s h imperialism i n India. Though Indians had worked the longest and hardest of all nationalists to build a nation since the 1880s, however, sectarian differences tore independent South Asia apart i n 1947, creating two nations, India and Pakistan.

Hawaii Press, 1980). Ding Ling's short stories depict the quest for women's liberation. See Ding Ling, / MyselfAm a Woman, ed. Tani Barlow (Beacon Press, 1989). For a satire of modernization in 1930s Vietnam, see Vu Trong Phung, Dumb Luck (trans. Nguyen Nguyet Cam and Peter Zihoman, University of Michigan, 2002). Gong Li's 1991 film, Raise the Red Lantern, depicts the struggle for autonomy of an educated young Chinese woman in a polygamous household of the 1920s.

History of China http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/toc.html This is the table of contents for the University of Maryland's exceptionally broad coverage of sites for Chinese history, in- Suggestions for Reading cluding documents, images, and explanatory texts. For an overview of Chinese history, see Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Cambridge, UniverModern India sity Press, 1996) and Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modhttp://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/gthursby/ind/history.htm ern China (W.W. Norton, 1999). Wang Zheng's Women in the Chinese Enlightenment (University of California Press, 1999) is Extensive list of history sites dedicated to India. an excellent study of progressive women in the interwar period. Gandhi Harry J. Benda and John A. Larkin, The World of Southeast http://www.gandhimuseum.org/papers.html Asia (Harper & Row, 1967), and D.S. Sar Desai, Southeast Asia: An extensive collection of Gandhi's writings compiled by In- Past and Present (Westview, 1989), provide good general coverage of Southeast Asia. For Vietnam, see Hue-tam Ho Tai, dia's National Gandhi Museum. Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1992). On Korea, see Carter J. Eckert, Korea Old and New (Harvard University Press, 1990). Literature and Film Gandhi's autobiography makes fascinating reading: Mohandas Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Chinas greatest fiction writers of the early twentieth century, Lu Truth, trans. M. Desai (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). New and Xun and Ding Ling, portray the tensions in the struggle for jusaccessible histories of India include John Keay, India: A History tice in the modernizing state. Lu Xun's short stories are arguably (Grove Press, 2000) and Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metthe best and most accessible examples of May Fourth literature. calf, A Concise History of India (Cambridge University Press, 2002). See Lu Xun, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories (University of

C HA P T ER

30

Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from the 1920s to 1950s

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

• The Middle East Divided

• Pan-Africanism

DOCUMENT: Memorandum of the

DOCUMENT: The Awakening of a

General Syrian Congress

Pan-African Spirit

DOCUMENT: We Have Not Come as Conquerors. But as Liberators • The Challenge to Colonial Rule in Africa

F

• World War II and Its Aftermath DOCUMENT: Pass Laws and African Women in South Africa

1910 ifty years of aggressive expansion by the West had spread European ideas, factories, and colonists to much of the world. Those African and Middle Eastern societies that were not directly colonized by European powers were nonetheless

1312 African National Congress established In South Africa 1917 Balfour Declaration

dramatically influenced by the politics, cultures, and economies of imperialist Western

1920

states. It was in the period between the world wars and immediately afterward that

1920 Mandates established. Treaty of Sèvres

many of these societies adopted—or had imposed on them—the nation-state model of political organization. Ouring this period certain African and Middle Eastern peoples who had been subordinated to Europe began to gain their political independence. But European imperialism is only one element, albeit an important one, of the evolution of African and Middle Eastern states in this time frame. This era also witnessed a dramatic movement of people from the countryside to the city, with the accompanying social and economic turmoil. The modernization processes that gained

1923 Turkish Republic recognized 1925 Pahlavi dynasty established In Iran

1930 1933 Ibn Sa'uO grants oil concession to Standard Oil 1935 Italian

invasion

of Ethiopia

momentum in the nineteenth century in the realms of industrialization, education,

1940

transportation, and communication remained vigorous. The automobile and the air-

1945 Rlth Pan-African Congress. Manchester. England

plane, though still exciting innovations, became facts of life. New leaders emerged, and there was a radical transformation in systems of government, law, economics,

1950

and traditional social values. While many areas of Africa and the Middle East retained

1951 Outbreak of Mau Mau Rebellion, Kenya

their traditional agrarian economies, others lost or abandoned traditional modes of economic organization. Often the transformation caused dramatic changes in the lives of individuals and families within a single generation—when rural girls were forced into factory or domestic labor in the cities or when men migrated across the ocean to seek work, for example. World War I and its aftershocks strengthened independence movements in Africa and Middle East, in part because the power of the dominant imperial states—Britain, France, and Germany—had been diminished by the war. Nationalist campaigns, present in embryonic form in most of the colonies before the war. grew rapidly in virtually all of the European possessions and mandates. India's independence movement and Mohandas Gandhi's tactics of nonviolence were an inspiration to African political leaders. Across the Middle East and Africa, nations struggled to redefine themselves, adapt to global economic reorganization, and throw off the yoke of European domination.

885

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THE MIDDLE EAST DIVIDED • What impact did the outcome of World War I have on Middle Eastern politics? World War 1 dramatically altered the political, cultural, and geographical configuration of the Middle East. Before the war, the Middle East was divided primarily into two large agrarian empires, the Ottoman and the Persian (or Iranian). Most of the North African Muslim states had, by this the°Mioaie ' ' f 't under the control of European East After overlords. North Africa's premier cultural cenwonowari Egypt, was seized by the British in 1882; France had gained control of Tunis and Algiers; and Italy took parts of Libya from the Ottomans in 1911. After World War I , Persia (hereafter called Iran), which had remained neutral, maintained its territorial integrity. But the centuries-long rule of the Ottoman Empire i n the Middle East was swept t

m

t e r ;

e

a

e n

away, and its territories were parceled out among the victors. The peoples of the Middle East in the ensuing period can be divided between those who remained independent and those who were governed by Britain and France. That division would prove critical in the evolution of the modem nation-states of the region.

The War Years The events of World War I cannot be understood without a grasp of the competing interests involved. There had long been speculation over who might get what, when (and ¡0 the Ottoman Empire fell. The Russians coveted a Mediterranean pint. 4fc 'i The British wished to dominate the area around ^ H I H j ^ B the Suez Canal, the sea route to their Indian ^¡„«,9 empire. The French had long-standing connec1920s tions along the eastern Mediterranean coast, which they aspired to control. The Germans wanted a

After World War I the British and French controlled Egypt, Palestine. Syria, and Iraq. Transjordan had a special status under Emir Abdullah.

CHAPTER 30 • Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from the 1920s to 1950s

The Middle East Between the Wars 1917

Balfour Declaration

1919

Wafd-led rebellion in Egypt

1920

Mandates set up in conquered Ottoman territory

1923

Sa'd Zaghlul becomes first prime minister of Egypt

1923-1938

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rules the Turkish Republic

1925

Pahlavi dynasty established in Iran (Persia)

1932

Ibn Sa'ud's new state named kingdom of Saudi Arabia

base i n the eastern Mediterranean and some N o r t h African territory as well. Perhaps the most hotly contested territory of all was the city of Jerusalem, not a rich or strategic city but sacred to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Jerusalem had been under Ottoman rule for centuries, but i n the early twentieth century a new set of claimants to Jerusalem, the Zionists, had emerged on the world stage. Prompted by a long-standing military liaison w i t h the Germans, and at the urging of Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers i n the war. The British then used their conquered territory i n Egypt as a staging base for military operations against the Germans and the Ottomans. To mobilize support, they also made a series of conflicting agreements concerning the disposition of Ottoman territories. British H i g h Commissioner Sir Henry McMahon i n Cairo began correspondence w i t h Sharif Husain of Mecca (1856-1931), guardian of Islam's holy places. The British told Husain that i n the event of an Arab revolt against the Ottoman regime, Britain would recognize Arab independence. About the same time, i n 1916, Britain, France, and Russia signed the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. I t provided for the division of Syria and Iraq between Britain and France, with Russia receiving parts of Asiatic Turkey. Palestine was to be placed under an international administration. These great powers were dividing up the spoils of war before they had w o n them. Zionists—Supporters of a movement to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Sykes-Picot Agreement—A secret agreement concluded in 1916 between Britain and France that divided the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence.

887

Believing that the British were promising h i m an Arab state, Husain launched a revolt i n 1916. The Arab forces were commanded by his t h i r d son, Faisal (1885-1933). The Arab Revolt was not particularly large (most Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman regime), but i t was tactically significant and a blow to Ottoman prestige. I t also garnered a lot of attention i n the Western press, which crafted a romantic adventure story around the exploits of a B r i t i s h officer, T. E. Lawrence (1888-1935), "Lawrence of Arabia," who fought alongside the Arabs. The Ottoman forces fought well during the war, but the empire was short o f money, supplies, and a m m u n i t i o n ; i t could not match B r i t i s h firepower. When the Ottoman forces were defeated i n Syria i n October 1918, the Ottoman sultan was forced to sign an armistice. The British allowed Faisal to march into Damascus, the capital of Greater Syria, where he began to set up his o w n administration. I n M a r c h 1920 the General Syrian Congress, w i t h high hopes for the b i r t h of a new Arab state, proclaimed Faisal king of Syria. W h e n Faisal attended the postwar Paris Peace Conference to plead the cause of Arab independence, however, he found he had no real standing. I n A p r i l 1920, at the San Remo Conference, i t was decided to t u r n over all Arab territories formerly i n the Ottoman E m p i r e to the Allied powers to be administered as mandates. Syria and Lebanon were mandated to France, I r a q and Palestine to B r i t a i n . Husain's dream o f a large and independent Arab state was thus short-lived. The French, i n line w i t h the SykesPicot Agreement, marched troops into Damascus i n July 1920 and forced Faisal to relinquish his newly established kingdom. To mollify their former allies, the B r i t i s h later established Faisal as king of their mandate i n Iraq and set up his brother Abdullah as ruler of a desert province based i n Amman and carved out of the mandate for Palestine. This new territory was called Tran¬ sjordan. These two episodes demonstrate the gamelike quality of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The people of I r a q had no desire for a Hashemite king from Arabia, and there was no logic to the lines d r a w n around Transjordan except that i t was a sparsely populated territory that neither the B r i t i s h nor the Zionists particularly wanted. But these things were imposed on the region and its people to serve British interests. The Husain-McMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement were not the only significant promises made during the war. The promise w i t h the mandates—Former territories and colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire that were placed under the administration of major powers such as Britain and France. The mandate system was overseen by the League of Nations.

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The sons oj Sharif Husain of Mecca were rewarded by the victors for their assistance in World War I. Faisal Iseated left), a leader oj the Arab Revolt, was first named king of Syria and then king of Iraq after the French forced him out of Damascus. He is shown here with his brothers, Abdullah teenier), king of Transjordan. and Ali (right), who briefly ruled the Hijaz.

broadest ramifications was the B a l f o u r Declaration, which in 1917 promised British support to Zionists in their aspirations for a Jewish "National Home" i n Palestine. The Zionist movement—that is, the p o l i t i cal movement aimed at establishing a Jewish state preferably in the "Holy Land" of Palestine—geared up in the late nineteenth century as the persecution of Jews continued in Russia and anti-Semitism spread in Europe. In 1897 the W o r l d Zionist Organization was founded under the leadership of Theodor Herzl (see Chapter 28). Following Herzl's death in 1904, leadership of the Zionist movement was assumed by Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), a Russian Jew who had become a British subject. An intimate intellectual friendship developed between Weizmann and the English statesman A r t h u r James Balfour (1848-1930), who came to support the Zionist program. That association culminated in the Balfour Declaration, which was designed to mobilize Jewish support for Britain during World War I : Balfour Di-eta rat ion—A statement that Öle British foreign minister, Arthur Balfour issued in 1917 promising British support t - Zi~nifits for a Jewish "national homo" in Palestine.

iEs Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine Or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. The carefully worded statement did not specify what the nature of such a Jewish "national home" w o u l d be. The population of Palestine, according to British estimates, was only about 9 percent Jewish at the lime, but the Balfour Declaration referred to ihe majority Arab population of Palestine only as "the existing non-Jewish community." Many European and American Jews were fearful that the establishment of a Jewish state would subject them to further discrimination in or even expulsion from their own countries. Nor was the indigenous Jewish population in Palesline necessarily in sympathy w i t h the Zionists, who were considered by many as European outsiders. Nevertheless, the Balfour Declaration provided a great boost to Zionist aspirations in Palestine.

CHAPTER 30

Document

Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from the 1920s to 1950s

889

Memorandum of the General Syrian Congress

World War I and its destruction of the old empires paved the way for the rise of Arab nationalism. This memorandum of the General Syrian Congress sounded themes that would be heard throughout the twentieth century. It reflects fear of Zionist encroachments, admiration of the United States as a defender of selfdetermination, and dismay at the social Darwinistic assumption that the Syrians were among those peoples not yet ready to rule themselves. Despite the desires of the congress, the French soon deposed Emir Faisal as ruler of Syria and took control of the area. Note that Palestine was considered part of Greater Syria as it had been under Ottoman rule.

e the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting i n Damascus on Wednesday, July 2nd, 1919, made up of representatives from the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided w i t h credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us.

thought of colonization and has no political ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economic assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not exceed 20 years. 5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such does not prejudice our complete independence and unity of our country and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.

1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for ; Syria., . 2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safeguarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Faisal, who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full confidence and entire reliance.

6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.

W

3. Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power. 4. In the event of the rejection of the Peace Conference of this just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey to colonization and believing that the American Nation is farthest from any

The war and the treaties that followed exacted a high human cost. Besides those killed i n the war, thousands of Ottoman citizens starved. The Armenian population was greatly reduced by Ottoman massacres. When the victors divided Ottoman territory, they did so

7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots [that is, Jews living in Syria] shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities. Questions to Consider 1. Why do the members of the Congress prefer to be under a mandate of the United States if they cannot be free? Why are they opposed to France having any power over ••••• Syria?

2. Why do the delegates here make a point (in no. 3) of comparing themselves to the Bulgarians, Roumanians, and Greeks? 3. Was U.S. President Wilsons ambition of putting an end to conquest and colonization realistic? Why or why not? From Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 780-781.

w i t h little consideration for natural ethnic or linguistic affinities. Families were separated and now had to develop new "national" identities; one branch of a family might reside i n the new British mandate of Palestine and another i n the new country of Transjordan. Over a

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million Turks and Greeks were uprooted from their homes in forced population transfers after the war. The Young Turk Revolution had imagined a nation based on a multilingual, multiethnic, multireligious citizenship. The new nations and mandates, instead, divided citi­ zens along those same lines.

Mustafa Kemal and the New Secular Model of Turkey The intention of the victors was to partition the Ottoman lands among the French, the Italians, the British, and the Greeks. The hated capilula• * I lions. . . led b> the Young Turks, were restored. When World War I ended, the sultan dismissed the Ottoman parliament, British The Decline warships patrolled the Bosporus and the Dar­ of the danelles, and the Greeks occupied Izmir i n Ottoman Empire western Anatolia. The once great Ottoman Empire was dismembered and humiliated, group of Ottoman patriots, however, rallied around Mustafa Kemal (1880-1938), hero of the Gal-

As preSiditit of sin Jhrkich Republic /;•;:,,; its bs^vwinS unid fits death in 1938. Mustafa Kemal instituted many civil and cultural reforms. He was called Atattirk, "Father Turk."

lipoli campaign in World War I . After the Ottoman defeat, he had been sent by the sultan to demobilize the Turkish troops in Anatolia. Disregarding instruc­ tions, Kemal, along with a group of other officers, reor­ ganized the troops and defied the Allies. From their base in eastern Anatolia and later Ankara, these men formed their own government, electing Kemal as pres­ ident. They upheld self-determination for all peoples, including the Turks, and proclaimed I he abolition of all special rights enjoyed by foreigners in Turkey. Kemal and his forces "liberated" Izmir from the Greeks, thus reestablishing Turkish control over western Anatolia, and gained the support of the new Soviet U n i o n and France. B r i t a i n , exhausted by the war, was unwilling to mobi­ lize a major initiative to slop them. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal established himself in power, abolishing the sultanate and declaring Turkey a republic in 1922. The Allies agreed to a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, recognized Turkish sovereignty. The Turkish heartland, Anatolia, remained intact, and no repara­ tions were demanded. Thus Turkey was resurrected as an independent nation-state and escaped the fate of the Arab provinces of the empire, which became mandates under Britain and France. The circumstances of Turkey's founding gave Mustafa Kemal tremendous power and prestige; he was viewed as the "savior" of the new country. That power and prestige enabled him to dominate Turkish politics and implement a series of radical secularizing reforms. This forceful leader, later called Atatürk, or "Father Turk," established a new democratic constitution, but he regarded autocratic rule under a single political party as a necessary stage in raising his people to the level of education and social well-being that democra­ tic government and parliamentary rule required. Com­ mitted to Westernization and secularization, he based his model oi progress on the European nation-state. Ataturk's reforms radically transformed Turkish society. He closed down the popular sufi orders and the traditional religious schools. Determined to enforce the separation of church and state, he abolished the Islamic Sharia law and replaced it w i t h a civil code based on a Swiss model. Kemal also banned the traditional male head­ gear, the fez. The Fez was a symbol of Ottoman identity, and many Turks resented the anlifez industrialization law as an instance of unjust government inter­ vention İn people's personal lives and an affront to Islam as well. Atatürk did not try to legislate women's dress, but he did campaign actively for Western-style education and attire for women. In 1935 women were given the vote in Turkey and permitted to run for seats in the national assembly. Perhaps Atatürk's most drastic reform was chang­ ing the Turkish script from the Arabic to the Latin

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CHAPTER 30 • Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from alphabet (the same alphabet used i n Britain, France, and the United States). Turkey's leader believed that this radical change would turn his country toward the West, make i t truly modern, and divorce i t from its traditions linked to the Ottoman monarchy. Thousands of teachers had to be trained i n the use of the new script; governInstanbui documents, printing presses, textbooks, Turkey newspapers, and street signs had to be changed. The alphabet reform permeated almost all aspects of everyday life; more than any other, this reform decisively divorced Turkey from its past. By the time Atatiirk died i n 1938, Turkey was a new and different nation. m

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tion d i d not succeed i n Iran to the same degree that i t did i n Turkey. Iran was no longer at the mercy of foreign loans, but neither was i t free of foreign intervention. The British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company held a concession dating from 1901 to exploit Iranian oil. I n 1933 the shah renegotiated his country's agreement w i t h the company, but Iran still received only 20 percent of the oil revenues. To counteract British influence, the shah cultivated ties w i t h Germany, but when World War I I began, Iran remained neutral. Fearful of German intervention, however, Britain and Russia again used m i l i tary force to intervene i n Iranian affairs.

Arabia Iran Iran remained neutral i n World War I , but Qajar rule did not long survive the war. The Russian occupation was ended by the 1917 revolutions, but the British had discovered o i l i n western Iran shortly before the war and were determined to protect their o i l concession. As a result, there was widespread antiforeign sentiment i n the region, provoked i n part by B r i t i s h attempts to dominate Iranian economic and foreign policy. Iran, meanwhile, was economically devastated, and the Qajars could not control the tribal chiefs i n their provinces. Under these chaotic circumstances, Reza Khan, a commander of the nation's Cossack brigade, began a campaign i n 1921 to take over the government. By 1925 he had succeeded, persuading the assembly to depose the Qajar shah. The shah was already i n Europe, having found i t expedient to follow Reza Khan's "suggestion" that he take a "vacation." Reza Khan thus founded a new dynasty, the Pahlavi dynasty. Like Mustafa Kemal i n Turkey, the new shah combined a constitutional system w i t h an authoritarian regime. He launched a program of modernizing and secularizing reforms modeled on Kemal's. He adopted a new legal system, thus weakening the power of the ulama, and opened the secular Tehran University i n 1935. Reza Shah imposed Western dress for males, but he went even further i n 1936, banning the veil for women. This law, and the shah's insistence that his officials bring their wives to mixed-sex entertainments like dinners and balls, caused an uproar. I t violated long-standing customs of modesty. Many older women, accustomed to the veil, were terribly embarrassed and refused to leave the house. Some officials said they would rather divorce or lose their jobs than expose their wives and daughters to the eyes of strange men. Radical reform based on Western models was thus not necessarily welcome; i t often violated social custom. Reza Shah was successful i n many of his modernizing and economic reforms, but seculariza-

Like Turkey and Iran, Arabia remained independent i n the aftermath of World War I . The B r i t i s h controlled the Persian Gulf and preserved a series o f treaty arrangements w i t h local shaykhs along the southern and eastern coasts of Arabia. But the victors saw no particular profit i n trying to control the bulk of the Arabian peninsula; its mostly forbidding terrain was sparsely populated, and i t had no apparent strategic or natural resource value. Sharif Husain was discredited i n the eyes of many Muslims because he had collaborated w i t h the British and proclaimed himself "caliph" after the war. He retained control of the Hijaz for a time, but while his sons ruled i n Transjordan and Iraq, he was soon to lose power i n Arabia. The m a n w h o w o u l d rule Arabia and unite the tribes was Abd el-Aziz i b n Sa'ud (sah-OOD; 1881¬ 1953). I b n Sa'ud was a t r i b a l chief w h o had seized the city of Riyadh i n 1902 and from that base launched a campaign to unify the peninsula under his rule. Like his predecessor a century before, I b n Sa'ud established himself as both a successful warrior and defender of the puritanical Wahhabi doctrine that aimed to purge Islam of all innovations. I n 1924 he captured the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which have remained under Sa'udi rule ever since. B r i t a i n recognized the new king i n exchange for his recognition of their special position i n the Gulf. The new state was officially named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia i n 1932. I b n Sa'ud preserved some of the Arabian customs of consultative rule and based his authority on royal decree legitimized by the consent of the ulama. Unlike the other Middle Eastern states, his kingdom had no constitution; the law of the land was the Sharia, Islamic law. Saudi Arabia was impoverished but i t was free, unlike most of the Arab provinces. It was a sparsely populated nation composed mostly of commercial cities and seminomadic tribes. The lives of its people and the country's economic situation began to change i n 1933 when the king granted a concession to the Standard Oil

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Company (later known as Arabian American Oil). Oil was discovered i n 1938 but did not become a significant factor in Arabia until after World War I I .

Egypt Egypt and most of N o r t h Africa had been subordinated to European rule before World War I . Nationalist movements were agitating for independence across N o r t h Africa but, as i n India, Britain and France had no intentions of granting real independence to these conquered territories. That w o u l d not be achieved until after World War I I . D u r i n g W o r l d War I , Egypt was ruled by the British high commissioner and was forced to participate m i l i t a r i l y and economically i n the war, w h i c h caused great hardship. I n 1918 some p r o m i n e n t Egyptians, led by Sa'd Zaghlul (c. 1860-1927), formed the W a f d ("Delegation") and asked the high commissioner to let them represent Egypt at the Paris Peace Conference. The request was denied. The Wafd then mobilized popular support throughout the country, culminating i n widespread rebellion i n 1919. Students joined workers demonstrating i n the streets for independence. The British put down the demonstrations by force but conceded to popular pressure by allowing Zaghlul and others to attend the peace conference. This series o f events began a long period, lasting into World War I I d u r i n g w h i c h the Wafd was the d o m i nant party i n Egyptian politics. In 1922 the B r i t i s h declared Egypt independent, but (as had been the case in 1920s India) i t was a hollow victory for Egyptian nationalists because Britain retained control over defense, foreign affairs, the economy, the Sudan, and the Suez Canal. The capitulations remained i n place, and British troops remained i n Egypt. I n the 1923 elections the Wafd w o n an overwhelming victory and Zaghlul became the first Egyptian prime minister. The khedive, a descendent of Muhammad A l i , became "king," but England continued to dominate the political life of Egypt. The nature of this relationship is illustrated by the mutual defense pact England forced on Egypt i n 1936 and by its reoc¬ cupation of the country after World War H . One interesting ramification o f European influence and educational institutions in Egypt was the emergence of a women's movement. Led by upperclass Egyptian women, often w i t h Western-style educations, the Egyptian Feminist Union was founded in 1923. I t took an active role i n the nationalist struggle and advocated rights for women: suffrage, education for girls, and marriage reform. The founder of the Wafd—An Egyptian political party founded in 1918 that challenged British rule.

union, Huda Sha'rawi, is famous for publicly removing her veil i n the Cairo train station after returning from a feminist congress in Europe. At this time, the women's movement i n Egypt remained mostly an urban phenomenon. Most of Egypt's population was a rural one of villagers and peasants—they were little affected by many o f the social and political movements i n Cairo and Alexandria. Another highly significant movement that began in Egypt in this era and continues to have influence to the present day is the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d . The Brotherhood was founded i n 1928 by Hasan a!-Banna, a teacher and member of the uiama. Hasan a!-Banna called for the restoration of the Sharia, but the Muslim Brotherhood was not a movement of purification i n the same way that the Wahhabi movement i n Arabia was. Rather, the Brotherhood was a movement of religious, social, and political reform. I t developed ^ .a>— social programs such as adult education, j o b n T t i training, and free clinics; it had ;i special attrac¬ tion among the poor and became popular i n ^mHHtm both the cities and the countryside. With its message of traditional Islamic law and values, Egypt combined w i t h social services and respect for modern technology, the Brotherhood had a powerful appeal; chapters rapidly spread beyond the borders of Egypt. The Brotherhood stands as an early and visible example of a modem Islamist movement, one that took into consideration the people and their culture as well as the demands of "modernity." a n d

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The Mandates Unlike Egypt and the stales of N o r t h Africa, the rest o f the Arab w o r l d had been, at least nominally, under Ottoman control u n t i l World War I . The treaties after the war gave Britain the mandates for Iraq and Palestine (out o f w h i c h Transjordan was carved) and France the mandate for Syria, w h i c h it divided into Syria and Lebanon. One historian has called the mandate system "little more than nineteenth-century imperialism repackaged to give the appearance of self-determination." Mandates were territories, and their people, who were considered incapable of selfrule, were to be governed by "more advanced" nations u n t i l such time as they were able to govern themselves. The mandate system was a reflection of social D a r w i n i s m , w h i c h ranked various societies on the basis of a hierarchical civilizational ladder. The European victors, o f course, considered themselves to be at the top of that ladder. 1

Muslim Brotherhood—An organization founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood promoted religious, political, and social reforms and sponsored social programs.

CHAPTER 30 • Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from

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We Have Not Come as Conquerors, But as Liberators

As the Ottoman Empire was partitioned, the British were given responsibility for three provinces that were arbitrarily united as Iraq. As British troops entered Baghdad on March 19, 1917, Lieutenant General Stanley Maude issued a proclamation to the city's inhabitants assuring them of the benevolent intentions of the British. .

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n the name of my King, and i n the name of the peoples over w h o m he rules, I address you as follows:— . • Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy, and the driving of h i m from these territories. I n order to complete this task, I am charged w i t h absolute and supreme control of all regions i n which British troops operate; but our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. Since the days of Halaka your city and your lands have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunk i n desolation, and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned i n bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered i n distant places.'.'.'. It is the wish not only o f my King and his peoples, but it is also the wish of the great nations w i t h whom he is i n alliance, that you should prosper even as i n the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science, and arts, and when Baghdad city was one of the wonders of the world. Between your people and the dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest. For 200 years have the merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together i n mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and the Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for 20 years made Baghdad a center of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British i n Persia and Arabia. Therefore the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place i n your country now or i n the future. But you people of Baghdad, whose commercial prosperity and whose safety from oppression and i n vasion must ever be a matter of the close concern to the British government, are not to understand that i t is the wish of the British Government to impose

upon you alien institutions. I t is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized and that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are inconsonance w i t h their sacred laws and their racial ideas. . . . Many noble Arabs have perished i n the Cciuse of Arab freedom, at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. I t is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered i n vain. I t is the hope and desire of the British people and the nations i n alliance w i t h them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth, and that it shall bind itself together to this end in unity and concord. O people of Baghdad remember that for 26 generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another i n order that they might profit by your dissensions. This policy is abhorrent to Great Britain and her Allies, for there can be neither peace nor prosperity where there is enmity and misgovernment. Therefore I am commanded to invite you, through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate i n the management of your civil affairs in collaboration w i t h the political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may be united w i t h your kinsmen i n North, East, South, and West i n realizing the aspirations of your race. Questions to Consider 1. What was the experience of Iraq with British rule? Did the British act as conquerors or liberators? '•••••2. How did British rule compare with Ottoman rule over •. /'Iraq?'. . • From "The Proclamation of Baghdad," Readings, War, Harper's Magazine (online edition), December 4, 2003, http://www.harpers.org/ProclamationBaghdad.html.

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Iraq was not a country at ali but a mandate w i t h a highly diverse population carved out of three Ottoman provinces. For the British, I r a q was a link between their strategic bases i n the Persian Gulf and their oil interests i n Iran. When British troops reached the capital, Baghdad, i n 1917, they announced that they had come as liberators and not conquerors. However, a few months after the San Remo conference, the jailing of a shaykh sparked an insurrection that spread to a third of Iraq and took the British three months to put down. The B r i t i s h then brought i n the outsider Faisal to rule. He was crowned k i n g as the band played "God Save the King," an ironic statement on imported B r i t i s h culture. Britain retained control of finances and the military, and Iraq was declared a constitutional monarchy. Faisal's government had considerably greater autonomy than the French allowed Syria, and i n 1932 Iraq became independent. I t was, however, independence w i t h strings attached. Britain retained air bases i n the country and had negotiated a 75-year lease to exploit Iraqi oil. During World War I I , British forces reoccupied the country, a clear reminder that Iraqi freedom was i n part a function of British strategic interests. The French brought i n a large m i l i t a r y force to enforce their rule i n Syria. There they divided the territory i n such a way as to emphasize and exacerbate religious and ethnic differences and to favor the Christian community. Lebanon's population was predominantly Arab but religiously divided among Christians (Maronites were the largest group), Muslims (Sunni and Shi'ite), and Druze (originally a heterodox offshoot of Shi'ite Islam). The French carved Lebanon out of the Syrian mandate i n order to set up a majority Christian state that would retain close ties w i t h France even after independence. France kept tight control over its mandates, prompting widespread rebellion i n Syria from 1925 to 1927. Syria remained without real political representation and w i t h o u t independence u n t i l after World War I I . Conversely, i n Lebanon, the French set up a constitutional regime i n 1926, but election to office was based on religious affiliation, and France kept control o f foreign and military affairs. When World War I I began, France suspended the constitution. I n the end, the French withdrew only grudgingly from Syria and Lebanon i n 1943. They left Lebanon w i t h a system o f religiously based politics that has plagued the nation ever since.

The Question of Palestine The mandate for Palestine was unique from its beginning because Palestine was not just another territory. It was the Holy Land—an object of Jewish, Christian, and M u s l i m fervor—and consequently, a focus of

w o r l d attention. The British had to contend with the demands of the Zionists, w h o felt they had been promised Palestine by the Balfour Declaration, and w i t h the majority Palestinian Arab population, who wanted independence. The Ottoman government had tried to prevent the Zionists' acquisition of land i n Palestine, w i t h little success. Once Palestine became a British mandate, the Jewish population was granted certain privileges—not necessarily because of British sympathy for the Zionists but because the Zionists were Europeans, not "Orientals." Thus they were allowed their own flag; Hebrew was made one of the official languages of the mandate; Jews i n service to the British were paid more than Arabs; and the Zionist community, the Yishuv, was allowed to a r m itself while the Arab community was not. Many of the early Zionists were proponents of socialism, an ideology that manifested itself i n the founding of communal farms called kibbutzim ( k i BOOTS-im). I n this context it is important to remember that the struggle between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs was not primarily a struggle over religion (many of the Zionists were secular Jews, and the Arabs were Muslim, Christian, or secular); it was a struggle over land. The British failed i n trying to balance their own interests w i t h those of the Arabs and Zionists, Unlike other mandates, Palestine never had an assembly or a constitution. Instead, the British advanced a series of abortive proposals, trying to satisfy both sides but tending to favor the Zionists. The Arab population was not unified; its leaders lacked connections i n Britain and failed to mobilize the same organizational power as the Zionists. The most visible Arab leader was Hajj A m i n al-Husayni, the chief Islamic jurist of Jerusalem, but he d i d not speak for the whole Palestinian community. Waves of Jewish immigration between 1919 and 1926 seemed to confirm the fears of the Arab population that the British meant to deliver Palestine into the hands of the Zionists. I n 1929 Jews and Arabs clashed over activities at the Wailing Wall (a remnant of Solomon's Temple i n Jerusalem and part of the sanctuary of the Dome of the Rock, a sacred Muslim shrine). Then, the rise of Hitler prompted a dramatic exodus of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. Many were not Zionists, but restrictive immigration quotas i n countries like the United States made Palestine a reasonable option for emigrating Jews. The enormous influx Yishuv—A Hebrew word meaning "settlement" that the Zionist movement used to refer to Jewish settlers in Palestine before it became Israel. kibbutzim—A type of agriculture'establishcd by Jewish settlers in Palestine in which agricultural land and resources are owned by the community and in which all decisions are made collectively by the community.

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Jewish immigrants arriving by sea to the British controlled mandate of Palestine in the 1930s. For Jews, immigration to Palestine represented one of the few options they had to escaperisinganti-Semitism in central and eastern Europe. For the Palestinians, Jewish immigration coupled with British colonial rule represented a European effort to divest them of their land.

of immigrants between 1933 and 1936 further alarmed the Arab population, prompting a revolt that included demonstrations, rioting, and mass strikes. The revolt was aimed both at the Zionists and at the British administration; the British crushed i t after six months but could not crush the frustration and hostility that prompted i t . As i n other countries where large-scale immigration occurs, the Palestinians, most of whom were small farmers, were afraid of being dislocated from their lands and jobs. I n 1937 the British Peel Commission found that the mandate could not satisfy its contradictory objectives; i t recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab state and a Jewish state. Britain would control a corridor stretching from the Mediterranean to Jerusalem. This recommendation was rejected by both sides; i t also prompted another Arab rebellion that lasted u n t i l 1939. The rebellion symbolized the intractability of the Palestine question; i t was a portent of more violence to come. Throughout the 1930s, the "Palestine question" provoked heated discussion i n many parts of the world. Zionists argued that Jews had a historical right to the Holy Land, that they had been promised a state by the Balfour Declaration, and that Jewish colonization constituted a "democratic and progressive" influence i n the Middle East. The Palestinians responded that Palestine had been their country for more than a 1000 years and declared that the Balfour Declaration did not bind them because they had not been consulted i n its formulation. They asked how any people could be expected to stand idly by and watch an alien

i m m i g r a n t group be transformed from a m i n o r i t y into a majority. For the Palestinians, the Zionists were yet another variety of European imperialism i n a particularly virulent form. W i t h the threat of war looming i n 1939, Britain eagerly sought to regain Arab goodw i l l and thereby strengthen its position i n the Middle East. I t issued a "white paper" declaring that i t was Britain's aim to have as an ally an independent Palestine, to be established at the end of 10 years, w i t h guarantees for both Palestinian and Jewish populations. D u r i n g this 10-year period land sales were to be restricted. Jewish immigration would be limited to 75,000 people over 5 years; and then, no more immigration would take place without the consent of the Palestinians. That, of course, was an unfulfillable promise; no one could yet imagine the full extent of Hitlers atrocities. After the war, the Zionists would achieve their Jewish state i n Palestine, but the Palestine question would not be resolved.

THE CHALLENGE TO COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA • Were there significant differences between African protest movements challenging colonial rule before and after World War II? By World War I European nations had taken control of Africa and the armed resistance of Africans had ended. However, colonial rule was harsh and Africans explored other ways o f voicing their many grievances—forced conscription during World War I and forced labor to build roads and railways, the demand for cash crops such as cocoa and groundnuts i n rural areas, competition from European businesses that undercut African entrepreneurs, excessive taxes, higher prices on goods after World War I , attacks on African cultural institutions, and discrimination against African civil servants i n appointments and promotions.

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Although colonial rule was built on European domination and control, the economic and social changes that colonialism stimulated—urbanization, transportation, and Western education—ironically laid the foundations for African challenges to colonial rule. Urbanization brought many Africans from different areas to cities, where they interacted and communicated w i t h each other and developed new identities. Transportation such as buses and trains carried rural migrants back to their villages with news, fresh ideas and different political views. Western education in government and mission schools created a literate elite that could read and write and follow discussions on nationalism and independence elsewhere in Africa and the world. This elite established dozens of newspapers (mainly in the British colonies} such as the Lagos Weekly Record, the West African Pilot, and Imvo Zabanlsttndtt ("African Opinion") that vigorously criticized white rule. Literate Africans read the black press and then disseminated news and opinions to a much wider network of people. The initial challenges to colonial rule were often based on local grievances. Protest organizations were

usually based on kinship, ethnicity, or regional identities and look up issues that advanced their particular interests and improved economic conditions. However, once Africans began to recognize that their grievances were shared more widely they explored creating organizations that embraced larger numbers of people and ethnic groups. They began to think in terms of nationalist movements that covered a whole colony. An urbanized educated and professional elite (lawyers, doctors, clerks in the civil service, teachers, traders, commercial fanners, and clergy) dominated the early African nationalist movements. They were well-read and aware ol what was happening in other parts of the w o r l d , and they borrowed their concepts of nationalism From European examples that emphasized the concept ol a nation state. European nations had gone through a long process 61 developing national identities, but African colonies were arbitrarily created bv European colonizers and did not have common identities. Political movements in British colonies before World War 11 were moderate. They did not call for independence from European colonizers but for the

After colonial rule was firmly established in Africa, the only change in possessions came after World War I, Germany's four colonies were placed under the League of Nations, which established a mandate system for other colonizers to administer the territories.

CHAPTER 30 « Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from the 1920s to 1950s

Africa 1912

Founding of African National Congress in South Africa

1935

Italy invades Ethiopia

1944

Formation of ANC Youth League in South Africa

1945

Fifth Pan-African Congress

1951

Beginning of Man Mau rebellion in Kenya

redress of specific grievances. Even when they criticized aspects of colonial rule, they made sure to express their loyalty to the British crown. In 1920 African professionals in the British colonies of Gold Coast (later Ghana), Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone established the N a t i o n a l Congress o f B r i t i s h West Africa (NCBWA). Its most prominent spokesperson was J. E. Casely-Hayford, a Gold Coast lawyer The NCBWA favored using constitutional methods to achieve gradual change and protected its members' National Congress of British West Africa—An organization founded in 1920 by African professionals in Wesl Africa lo give greater influence to educated Africans in colonial decision-making.

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interests by calling for improved education and for new constitutions in which they would be allowed to join Legislative Councils that advised British officials. They wrongly thought the British would allow the Councils lo evolve tnlo Parliaments. Although the challenges of elite organizations were usually restrained, some of their protests ended in violent confrontations. In Kenya the East African Association (EAA), a largely Kikuyu organization, was formed lo protest against forced labor, pass laws, high taxes, and reductions in black wages. In March 1922, its leader, Harry Thuku, was arrested in Nairobi for agitation. Demonstrators that gathered outside his jail charged the police, who then shot and killed 56 people. The EAA was banned the following year. The Portuguese and Belgians effectively clamped down on dissent in their colonies, while the French encouraged Africans in their colonies to follow a path the French designed. One element of French policy was to assimilate a small number of Africans and give them full rights as French citizens. By 1926, about 50,000 of 13 m i l l i o n Africans i n France's African colonics were French citizens. Mosl oi them lived in Senegal, where Tour communes had elected a single deputy lo the Chamber of Deputies in Paris since the nineteenth century. Europeans and Creoles had represented ihe communes until the 1914 election, the first time a secret ballot was used and the first time an African, Blaise Diagne, was elected to ihe Chamber of

The first African elected to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1914, Blaise Diagne (in howler hat on the right) was the highest elected African official in the French colonies until after World War II,

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Deputies. A former customs official, Diagne had served in French colonial outposts in the Caribbean and Southeast Asian. He remained in the Chamber of Deputies for the next two decades and was the highest elected Alrican official i n the French colonies until after World War I I . He advocated racial equality and dignity for Africans, but not an end lo French rule. He successfully challenged a colonial decree that severely limited the number of French citizens in the colonies b u l onlv bv agreeing to recruit Africans into the French army after the outbreak of World War I

PAN-AFRICANISM • Wluir was the impact of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia on black opinion around the world?

international agency, rather than under the rule of one of the victorious powers, such as Britain. Du Bois's primary rival in the Pan-Africanist movement was Marcus Garvey (1887-1940). who i m m i grated from Jamaica to the United States in 1916 and founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association. A charismatic showman, Garvey won a mass following not only in the United Slates but also in the Caribbean, Great Britain, and many pans of Africa. Rallying his followers around the popular slogan "Africa for the Africans," he called for black self-awareness, economic self-sufficiency, and Africa's immediate independence. He founded the Black Star shipping line to repatriate blacks lo Africa. His activities drew the ire ot the Amer ican government, which jailed him on tax evasion charges and deported him in 1929. He spenl the resl ol his life in Jamaica and Britain, An evenl that galvanized black opinion throughout the world was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. As the

The African challenge to colonial rule was strengthened by international support from Pan-Africanism. This was a movement that grew out of the shared experiences of blacks in many parts of the world with European domination through the slave trade, racism, and colonialism. Although Pan-Africanism's primary aim was to unify and strengthen blacks, its leaders disagreed about who their main audience was. Some Pan-Africanists limited their message exclusively to Africans in sub-Saharan Africa, while others appealed more broadly to Africans throughout the continent or to blacks throughout Africa and the African diaspora, including the Caribbean and the Americas. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the leading lights of the Pan-Africanist movement were blacks of the diaspora such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. Born and raised in Massachusetts, Du Bois (1868-1963), an organizer of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and editor of its magazine. The Crisis, was most comfortable in intellectual circles. He asserted the right of blacks to participate in national governments and advocated the eventual self-rule of African countries. He was a prominent force behind a series of pan-African conferences held in Europe and the United Stales. One of the congresses, with representatives from 15 countries attending, was convened in Pai is in 1919. The congress coincided with the Versailles Peace Conference, and Du Bois urged the gathering lo place the former German colonies under an African diaspora—Consists of all the individuals and communities Scattered around the world who claim African descent. National Association for Ihe Advancement of Colored People

tNAACP)—An organization lounded in 1909 to improve ihe legal, educational, economic, and political lives of African Americans.

The Jamaican-horn Marcus Garvey was a fiery Pan-Africanist. After sealing in me Harlem neighborhood oj New York City in ¡916. he won a large Mack following not only in ihe United Stales hut throughout the world.

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credit. But the effect of the sanctions was minor because oil—without which no modern army could fight—was not included in the list of prohibited articles. France and Britain gave only lukewarm support to the sanctions because they did not want to alienate Italy. The United Slates, which had not joined the League, and Germany, w h i c h had left it by that time, largely ignored the prohibitions. Only outraged public opinion, moved by newspaper photographs showing barefooted Ethiopians fighting the modem Italian army, drove the governments to even the pretense of action. A quarter of a m i l l i o n poorly trained and inadequately armed Ethiopian soldiers were no match for the mechanized Italian army. The Ethiopians could field only 13 unarmed planes against the Italian air force, which had no compunction about using poison gas. I n July 1936 when sanctions were removed, Haile Selassie, an emperor w i t h o u t a country, went to live in exile in Britain until the Italians were driven out in 1941. Ethiopia's downfall had a s t i r r i n g impact on black nationalists all over the w o r l d . When Kwame N k r u m a h (in-KROO-mah), a nationalist from the Gold Coasi arrived in London and heard of the invasion, he said, "At that moment it was almost as i f the whole of London had declared war on me personally. . . . My nationalism surged to the fore." Groups of blacks in the United States and B r i t a i n founded organizations lo support the E t h i o p i a n w a r effort and later began to take on the larger issue of European colonialism. Crowned emperor of Ethiopia in 1930, Hade Selassie 11892-1975) As World War I I was drawing to a close, several gained international attention when his country was invaded by llaly in 1935. Haile Selassie's reign extended until 1974, when he hundred black delegates met in Manchester, England, was overthrown hy a military coup. for the F i f t h Pan-African Congress. Pan-African veteran Du Bois attended, as well as the Afro-Caribbean organizers of the Manchester congress, C. L. R. James, only African stale beside Liberia that survived ihe George Padmore, and Ras Makonnen. However, the scramble for Africa, Ethiopia—and its emperor, Haile most influential participants were Africans such as Selassie (Hl-le se-la-SEE)—symbolized Africa's indeNkrumah and Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, who pressed pendence and freedom. Elhiopia fell victim, however, the congress lo adopt resolutions demanding immelo the expansionist designs of the Italian dictator Bendiate freedom in Africa bv any means necessary. They ito Mussolini, who sought an Italian East African resolved that " i f the Western world is still determined empire and revenge for the Italian defeat at Aduwa in to rule m a n k i n d by force, then Africans, as a last 1896. Late in 1934, fighting broke out between the resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to Ethiopians and the Italians, and in the following year, achieve Freedom, even i f force destroys them and the Mussolini's forces used the pretext of a skirmish on the w o r l d . " Henceforth, the struggle for African indepenItalian Somaliland border lo invade the country. dence was to be waged not i n European centers of Emperor Haile Selassie made a dramatic appearance power but in Africa itself as l e a d e r such as Nkrumah before the League of Nations to appeal for help. Before and Kenyatta returned home to lead the independence he could speak, however, he had to endure the catcalls struggles in their countries. and whistles of the Italian journalists in the hall. The League tried lo arrange for arbitration. Unconvinced by the shameless Italian argument that Ethiopia, Fifth Pan-African Congress—A meeting of pan AfricanisLs held in not Italy, was the aggressor, the League voted to proManchester. England in 1945 that called for the immediate indehibit shipment of certain goods lo Italy and lo deny it pendence of African colonies. 2

3

•

Docmnent;™^^

of a Pan-African Spirit

In the period before World War I I , pan-African ideas spread rapidly throughout the black world. In this passage from his autobiography, black South African writer Peter Abrahams {b. 1918) recounts the profound impact of African-American political ideas and music and culture on his personal development. After leaving South Africa in 1940, he lived in England and attended the Fifth Pan African Congress in 1945. In the 1950s he moved to Jamaica, where he still resides. maf" $i • • ;^-*i**^iM£P'''vssiC'-•' T" found the Bantu Men's Social Centre on the outer X r i m of Johannesburg, on the way to Langlaogte and the white mountains of sand that towered be¬ yond i t . It was a huge building that stood i n its own grounds. I hesitated uncertainly on the pavement till two well-dressed black men speaking English passed me and went i n . I followed them. There was a passage that widened into a rectangular hall. Doors led off to right and left. On the first door on the left was the word: "Secretary." The two men passed that and entered the second door on the left. I knocked on the door marked "Secretary." From the other side of the huge door that faced the passage came a deep voice, touched w i t h the velvet quality of organ notes, singing a familiar song. The organ notes stopped. Another, lighter voice, without the magic quality of the first, sang the same words, tried to make them sound the same, but failed. Then the magnificent voice sang a little more of the song. And again the lighter voice repeated i t . I f only the lighter voice would leave the other alone! Others must have shared my feeling, for a man came out of the door where the two had gone i n earlier. He pushed the great door open. I saw part of a huge hall. "Hlubi, man!" the man called. "The fellows want to hear Robeson. Turn it up!" "All right." Black men appeared from everywhere and stood i n silence. That was a black man, one of us! I knew i t . I needed no proof. The men about me, their faces, their bearing, carried all the proof. That was a black man! The voice of a black man! "Some voice, heh, son?" a man said to me. "Yessir!" "He's an American Negro," the m a n said, and moved away. .. I followed h i m through the door where the greatest number went. It was a long room, spacious, and w i t h big windows that let in light. I moved over to the bookshelves. I wanted to touch the books, but held back. Perhaps it was not permitted. Typed slips showed what each shelf held: novels, history, sociology, travel, Africans, political science, American Negro literature . . . I stopped

there, American Negro literature. The man had said Robeson was an American Negro. A man got up and came over. He ran his finger along the American Negro literature shelf and took out a book. "Excuse me. Can I look at these?" "Of course," he smiled. T reached up and took out a fat black book. The Sottb of Black Folk, by W. E. B. Du Bois. I turned the pages. I t spoke about a people i n a valley. And they were black, and dispossessed, and denied, I skimmed through the pages, anxious lo take it all in. I read: "For this much all men know: despite compromise, war, struggle, the Negro is not free." "The Negro is not free." . . . I remembered those "Reserved for Europeans Only" signs; I remembered no white boys ever carried bags at the market or ran from the police; I remembered my long walks in the white sections of the city, and the lavatories, and the park benches, and the tearooms . . . "The Negro is not free." But w h y had I not thought of i t myself? Now, having read the words, I knew that I had known this all along. But u n t i l now I had had no words to voice that knowledge. Du Bois's words had the i m pact of a revelation. Elsewhere I read: / have seen a land right merry with the sun, where children sing, and rolling hills lie like passioned women wanton with harvest. And there in the King's Highway sat and sits a figure veiled and bowed, by which the traveler's footsteps hasten as ' they go. On the tainted air broods fear. Tliree centuries' thought has been the raising and unveiling of that bowed human heart, and now behold a century new for the duty and the deed. The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the colourdine. Questions to Consider 5 1. Why were African Americans such as Paul Robeson and W. E. B. Du Bois an inspirational example for black South Africans? 2. As you examine the events of the last century, how do you respond to Du Bois's assertion that the primary problem of the twentieth century is the color line? From Peter Abrahams, Tell Freedom: Memories of Africa. Copyright © 1966 by Peter Abrahams. Reprinted by permission of Curtis Brown, Ltd.

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ers were captured and sent to German prisoner-of-war camps in which they were treated poorly. The Vichy government then declared that Frances colonies were neutral and that no more African soldiers would be recruited. The only African governor, Felix Eboué, was also the lone governor to oppose this decision and support the Free French. In the British colonies, African soldiers joined the British army in huge numbers and served as combat troops and supply carriers i n many theatres of war. British West Africa contributed 167,000 soldiers, while British East Africa provided 280,000 men. On the other hand, South Africa's while rulers were wary of exposing blacks to modern weapons and restricted their black units' service to laborers. African units assisted the Allies in driving the Italians out from Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia; the Germans from North Africa and southern Europe; and the Japanese b om Burma, where African troops adapted well to the tropical environment. Helping to defeal the Japanese army was significant because the Japanese had driven out the British and French from their colonies in Southeast Asia. The experiences of African servicemen exploded the m y t h of European invincibility and superiority. They served as equals and interacted with white soldiers, many of whom were uneducated. They saw Europeans living i n abject poverty and fighting one another. Many African servicemen, who returned home w i t h expectations of employment and better conditions and treatment, were disillusioned by the lack of change. They took a more critical view of cololinrto kenyatta I1894-1978), president of Kenya African Union. nial rule and were prepared to confront it by joining The British arrested him in 1952 and charged him with conspir- nationalist parties. One returned serviceman expressed ing to organize the Man Man rebellion. He was finally released in his feelings in a biting parody of Psalm 23 he submit1961. He served as independent Kenya's first prime minister from ted to a Gold Coast (Ghana) newspaper: 1963 until his death.

WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH • What influences did World War 11 have on African political thought? World War II made a dramatic impact on the lives of many Africans whose political consciousness was raised and who began posing questions about the continuation of colonial rule. These changes stimulated new and more aggressive African nationalist movements to challenge colonizers after the war and to begin the process of ending colonial rule. The people whose lives were most directly affected by the war were African soldiers. When Germany invaded France in May 1940. about 80,000 Africans from French colonies were serving in France. About a quarter lost their lives in the fighting, while many oth-

The European merchant is my shepherd, And I am in want; He maketh me to lie down in cocoa farms; He leadeth me beside the waters of great need; The general managers and producers frighten me. Thou preparedst a reduction in my salary In the presence of my creditors. Thou anointest my income with taxes; My expense runs over my income And 1 will dwell in a rented house for ever! 4

African politicians also began questioning the motives of Britain and France for involving them In the war. The Allies claimed that they stood for democracy and racial equality in the stiuggle against fascism and racism. A clause of the Atlantic Charier of 1941 stipulated that the Allies supported "the r ight of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they all live." Many Africans interpreted this to mean that steps would be taken to assure their independence 5

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pendence struggle in India and Burma. Some such as Nkrumah in the Gold Coast and Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) became disciples of Mahatma Gandhi and his philosophy of nonviolent civil disobedience. African politicians were very direct about their goals. They wanted self-rule without delay. In Tanzania anticolonial protest after World War I I was fuelled by unpopular British agricultural policies that were deeply resented by African peasants. Initially protests were organized along ethnic and regional lines, but as local groups realized that a national front was necessary, they supported the founding of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) i n 1954. TANU's leader was Julius Nyerere, a teacher trained in Scotland and England. TANU effectively used the UN Trusteeship Council established to monitor colonial administration in the former mandated territories of the League of Nations. One case TANU brought to the Trusteeship Council involved 3000 African farmers in the M e m district who were losing their land to white settlers. While political organizations developed in each British colony, the pace of political activities in the French colonies was tied to political developments in France. The French Constituent Assembly elected in 1945 contained five African delegates (in the total of 64 from French colonies) out of 586 delegates. The African deputies allied w i t h the left-wing Socialists and Communists, which had a majority in the Assembly, but in 1946, conservative parties won a majority in fresh elections and adopted a new constitution that closed the door on African independence and weakened the provisions for French citizenship in the colonies. African deputies organized a meeting in Bamako, M a l i , to discuss how to respond, but they split because of divisions in the French left. One group supported the Communists, which backed independence for the colonies, while the others allied with the Socialists, which opposed the Bamako meeting. Participants in Bamako established the Rassemblement démocratique africain ("African Democratic Assembly" or RDA), an alliance of individual parties from each of the colonies. A leading member was Felix HouphouëlBoigny, a wealthy planter and a communist, but after colonial officiais began a wave of repression against the RDA, H o u p h o u ë t retreated from his opposition to the French government. Most African nationalist movements, even when they engaged in confrontational protests against colonial officials, did not turn to armed resistance to b r i n g about change. I n colonies such as Algeria, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, A passionate advocate of African unity, Ktvame Nkrumah was ihe leader of Ghana '$ drive for independence from Great Britain and and Kenya in which armed resistance developed, it Served as its first president from 1957 until his overthrow by the was usually associated w i t h the presence of Euromilitary in ¡966. pean settlers and the expropriation of African land. after the war, but Churchill let it be known that he was not prepared to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire. On the other hand, President Roosevelt openly opposed imperialism and expressed his concerns for African lights. His position was critical in a postwar world in which the influence of Britain and France was greatly reduced and two nations with no African colonies, the United States and the Soviet Union, became the major global powers. The political parties that African politicians organized after the war were of a different character than prewar organizations. They were mass parties that had full-time organizers and reached out to urban and rural people. Parly leaders closely watched the inde-

C H A P T E R 30 •

Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from the 1920s to 1950s

In Kenya, a small community of about 60,000 white settlers was concentrated i n the fertile highlands north of Nairobi, where they look huge chunks of land, especially from the Kikuyu people (see p. 689), White farmers were vocal about protecting their interests and lobbied British officials to put off any political concessions to Africans. The Kikuyu were split into moderates, who preferred continued negotiations, and radicals, who wanted immediate action, even i f It meant taking up arms. The moderates were represented by Jomo Kenyatta who had returned home after World War I I to take up the leadership of the Kenyan African Union. The radicals formed the Land and Freedom Army (more Land and Freedom Army—More popularly known as Mau Man, this army was established by Kikuyu radicals in Kenya to attack while settlers and British colonial officials.

903

popularly known as Mau Mau). lis supporters went through mass oathing ceremonies i n which they totally c o m m i t t e d themselves to the movement. When their rebellion broke o u l in 1951, they not only attacked Europeans but also Africans who remained loyal to the B r i t i s h . Mau M a u lighters killed a handful of whites as well as over 1000 loyalists who supported the B r i t i s h by j o i n i n g Homeguard units. Women played prominent roles in Mau Mau not only as fighters, but also as spies, i n t e l l i gence gatherers, and carriers ol supplies and food to guerrillas in the forests. To quell the rebellion, ihe British launched a ruthless cotinlcrinstirgency campaign and detained 80,000 people, including Kenvalla, in jails and camps. The Br itish suspected h i m of masterminding Mau M a u , although he actually had no links to it. After hostilities ended in 1955, the British kept a state of emergency in

Langata Detention Camp, Kenya, 1954. As part of its connterinsitrgency tactics, the British established detention camps such as Langata to imprison Mau Mau rebels as well as other opponents such as Jomo Kenyatta.

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i

fcDocument ^*?^Pass^Lavvs and African Women in South Africa

A key way in which the while minority maintained its dominance in South Africa was through pass laws that controlled where adult Africans could live, seek work, and move in white areas. In 1912, after African women in the Orange Free State province protested against these laws by organizing demonstrations and writing petitions, the government backed down and rarely enforced these laws against women. However, in January 1956, (he government announced that African women had to join men and carry passes. This decision provoked tremendous resistance from black women. However, the government continued to enforce the law for another three decades.

Petition of the Native i and Coloured Women of the Province of the Orange Free State 11 March, 1912 To the Right Honourable General Louis Botha, PC, M.L.A., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, CAPE TOWN, Sir, The petition of the undersigned humbly showeth:— 2. That your petitioners, as inhabitants of the said Province, are under a burden of having to carry Residential Passes in terms of Section 2 of Law 8 of 1893 (Orange Free State Statutes). 3. That this law is a source of grievance to your petitioners in that:— (a) It renders them liable to interference by.; any policeman at any time, and in that way deprives them of that liberty enjoyed by their women-folk in other Provinces. (b) It has a barbarous tendency of ignoring the consequences of marriage in respect of natives, especially the right of parents to control their children, a right which parents ought to exercise without interference from outside, and the effect of its operation upon the minds of our children is that it inculcates upon them the idea that as soon as they become liable to comply with the requirements of the law, their age of majority also commences, and, can, therefore, act independently of their parents. (c) It is an effective means of enforcing labour and throws to pieces every element of respect to which they are entitled; and for this reason it has no claim to recognition as a just, progressive and protective law, necessary for their elevation in the scale of civilization; moreover it does not improve their social status.... Wherefore your petitioners humbly pray that the Right Honourable the Prime Minister may be pleased:— 1. To grant them immediate relief from this burdensome .: . law by introducing a Bill in Parliament repealing i t . . . .

Lilian Ngoyi, Presidential Address to the African National Congress Women's League, Transvaal, November 1956. . Hardly any other South Africa Law has caused so much suffering and hardship to Africans as the pass laws. Hardly any other measure has created so much suffering and racial friction and hostility between black and while. Any policeman may at any time demand to see your pass and failure to produce it for any reason means imprisonment or a fine. It makes it permissible to violate the sanctity and privacy of our homes. An African, sleeping peacefully in his house, may be woken up at night asked to produce one and failure to do so may lead to his arrest and imprisonment even though he has committed no crime whatsoever. The pass law is the basis and cornerstone of the system of oppression and exploitation in this country. It is a device to ensure cheap labour for the mines and the farms. It is a badge of slavery in terms whereof all sorts of insults and humiliation may be committed on Africans by members of the ruling class. It is because of these reasons that the Congress has always regarded the pass laws as the principal target of the struggle for freedom.... Only direct mass action will deter the Government and stop it from proceeding with its cruel laws.... STRDDOM, STOP AND THINK FOR YOU HAVE AROUSED THE WRATH OF THE WOMEN OF SOUTH AFRICA and that wrath might put you and your evil deeds out of action sooner than you expect. Questions to Consider 1. What do we learn from these documents about the impact of passes on African women and African family life? 2; Compare the language and lone of the petition of 1913 and Lilian Ngoyi's speech 40 years later. In both cases what do they tell you about the state and style of black protest at that time and African attitudes towards the white government? From M. J. Daymond et a!., eds.. Women Writing Africa: The Southem Region (Witwatersrand University Press, 2003), pp. 159-16! and242-243.

CHAPTER 30 • Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from the 19

905

effect u n t i l 1959 and d i d not release Kenyatta u n t i l 1961. Two years later he became the first president of an independent Kenya. South Africa had a m u c h larger w h i t e populat i o n than Kenya, b u t Black South African protest was distinct f r o m other African nationalist movements because i t d i d not challenge a colonial ruler. Britain had pulled out from formal control when the Union of South Africa was established i n 1910 and handed over power to Afrikaner and English settlers, who began passing discriminatory laws. The p r i m a r y o p p o s i t i o n to w h i t e rule was the South African Native National Congress, founded i n 1912 (and renamed the A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Congress (ANC) i n 1923) to b r i n g Africans from all black ethnic groups together i n t o one organization. Led by Africans educated i n Christian mission schools, the ANC i n i t i a l l y had modest goals. African leaders d i d not immediately call for black m a j o r i t y rule. They wanted blacks to be treated as equals w i t h whites and to remove discriminatory laws. They concluded that waging armed struggle was futile, and they sought change t h r o u g h nonviolent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means such as signing petitions, m a k i n g representations to the government, and even sending delegations to the B r i t i s h government to pressure the South African government to change legislation. The B r i t i s h government, however, was deaf to a l l their appeals. The ANC's first president was a Congregational minister named John Dube (1871-1946), who, while receiving his education at Oberlin College i n the United States, became a disciple o f the American educator Booker T. Washington and his philosophy of industrial education for advancing blacks. After returning to Natal, Dube founded his o w n school, Ohlange Institute, modeled on Washington's Tuskegee Institute. He also started up a Zulu/English language newspaper. Women were not represented i n the ANC's leadership, but there were prominent women activists. One was Charlotte Maxeke (1874-1939), who also had studied at Ohio's Wilberforce College i n the 1890s, where she was a student of W. E. B. DuBois. On her return to South Africa, she and her husband founded a high school, Wilberforce Institute, sponsored by the African Methodist Episcopal Church. She had an avid interest i n social welfare issues and, as President of the Bantu Women's League, she led a campaign against pass laws.

W i t h only a few thousand members, the ANC's challenge to white rule was very restrained until World War I I , when tens of thousands of Africans, who streamed into the urban centers like Johannesburg to take up jobs, became involved i n protests over housing shortages, the h i g h costs of transportation, and pass laws. Sensing this mood of militancy, a younger generation of politicians formed a Youth League w i t h i n the ANC i n 1944 to push their elders to challenge white rule more aggressively. The Youth League's first president was Anton Lembede, a lawyer. He died i n 1947, but other Youth Leaguers such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo continued to play important roles as resistance leaders for over a half century. Opposing the ANC was a narrow form of nationalism advocated by many Afrikaners. The ANC aimed at b r i n g i n g together Africans f r o m many different ethnic groups i n a c o m m o n body, while Afrikaner nationalists focused exclusively o n unifying and mobilizing Afrikaners. I n 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated N a t i o n a l Party w o n the w h i t e election and began implementing the r i g i d system of racial separ a t i o n k n o w n as a p a r t h e i d . ANC Youth Leaguers responded by forcing a change of ANC leadership i n 1949 and pressing the movement to adopt a Program of Action that advocated direct action such as strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience. During the 1950s, as the ANC engaged i n mass protests against apartheid laws, its membership rose to over 100,000.

African National Congress (ANC)—A political organization founded in 1912 in South Africa to promote equal rights for black people and to abolish discriminatory laws and segregation.

apartheid—An Afrikaans word meaning "separateness," it was the policy of rigid racial segregation introduced by the National party in South Africa after 1948.

CONCLUSION F r o m W o r l d War I to the years after World War I I , imperialism went on the defensive before the rise of nationalism i n the Middle East and Africa. Independence movements against European dominance took root and flourished. I n the Islamic heartlands, one traditional empire, Qajar Persia, maintained its territorial integrity but witnessed the establishment of a new dynasty, a new name, and a program of modernizing reforms. The other, the Ottoman Empire, was broken up i n the aftermath of the war and divided among independent states and mandates controlled by Britain and France. Arab nationalists bitterly contested European control i n the mandated areas, while Zionists, aspiring to a Jewish homeland, challenged both the British and the indigenous Arab populace for control of Palestine. The

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mandates i n the Arab territories stood i n stark contrast to the independent states of Arabia and Turkey, the latter redeemed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. I n the background of these political struggles, a new economic factor, oil, emerged as a resource that would later b r i n g untold riches to some parts of the Middle East. But oil w o u l d not become a p r i m a r y factor i n global politics until after World War I I . African nationalists were not dealing w i t h the breakup of existing empires but w i t h challenging the European imperial presence. They sought to replace colonial rule w i t h self-government and to bring about the political and cultural resurgence of a people whose way of life was challenged by Western imperialism.

Their political activity took place at the village, regional, national and international levels, where the pan-African movement drew supporters from the black diaspora i n North America, the Caribbean and Europe. World War I I , like World War I , had a dramatic impact on Africa as well as France and Britain, which came out of the war w i t h less influence i n the w o r l d . The efforts of nationalist movements gained momentum after the war and forced the French and B r i t i s h to consider granting independence to their colonies much sooner than they planned. During the 1950s and 1960s most B r i t i s h and French colonies w o n their independence, thus setting the stage for the independence of the rest of Africa i n the last decades of the twentieth century.

Suggestions for Web Browsing

of Egypt under British occupation and its struggle for independence in Palace Walk (Doubleday, 1990) and Midaq Alley (Doublcday, 1975). Abdel Rahman al-Sharqawis Egyptian Earth (Saqi, 1990) is a tale of peasant life and the dilemmas of war during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Cbinua Achebes trilogy—Things Fall Apart, No Longer at Ease, and Arrow of God—traces a Nigerian family through the span of the colonial period (Anchor, 1989-1994). Modikwe Dikobe's The Marabi Dance (Heinemann, 1984) is a novel set in a black township in South Africa in the 1930s that highlights popular culture and the urbanization of black migrant workers. Buchi Emecheta's The Joys of Motherhood (George Braziller, 1980) treats the difficulty of being a woman in African society and under British colonial rule. Films include Black and White in Color (Warner Home Video, 1976), a satirical treatment of a skirmish between French and German colonials in West Africa at the outset of World War I . Based on a novel by Joyce Cary, Mister Johnson (Artemis, 1991) is a portrait of an African clerk who faces numerous problems adjusting to his role as a civil servant under colonial administration in Nigeria.

You can obtain more information about topics included in this chapter at the websites listed below. See also the companion website that accompanies this text, http://www.ablongman.com/ brummett, which contains an online study guide and additional resources. Internet Islamic History Sourcebook: The Islamic World, 1918-1945 Imp: //www.ford ham.edu/halsall/islam/islamsbook. htm I # I si a m ic% 20Nationalism Online source for links about the history of the Middle East, 1918-1945. Internet African History Sourcebook: The Fight for Independence http: //www.fo rdham .ed u / h a I sa I l/africa/af ricasboo k. h tml # Online source of links about the African struggle for independence. Includes sources such as the Manifesto of the Second Pan African Congress, 1922, Historical Documents Archive African National Congress http ://www. anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ This archive contains hundreds of documents and biographical profiles relating to the history of the African National Congress, founded in 1912 to protest segregation and white ride in South Africa.

Literature and Film For an interesting combination of fiction and memoirs on Arab society sec Siham Tergeman, Daughter of Damascus (University of Texas Press, 1994), and Hanna Mina, Fragments of Memory: A Story of a Syrian Family (University of Texas Press, 1993) an autobiographical novel, both on Syria; see also Fadia Faqir, Pillars of Salt (Interlink, 1997), set in Jordan. Driss Chraibi's Mother Comes of Age (Three Continents Press, 1994) is a wonderful autobiographical novel about a middle-aged Moroccan woman coming to terms with technological and ideological change in the WWII era. Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz writes

Suggestions for Reading A lucid and balanced survey of the modern Middle East is William Cleveland, A History of the Modem Middle East (Westview, 2000). A study of the nature of change in the Islamic world is John Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, 1994). For a good introduction on the mandate for Palestine, see Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict, 4th ed. (St. Martin's Press, 2000). On the years of World War I and the British role, see the account by David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (Avon Books, 1988). On the history of the Jewish people see Raymond Schcindlin, A Short History of the Jewish People (Oxford University Press, 1998). Ann M. Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine (Cornell University Press, 1979), traces the rise of Arab nationalism in Palestine. On the emergence of Turkey and of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, see Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (Routledge, 1993). On Iran in this era, see Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between

CHAPTER 30 • Emerging National Movements in the Middle East and Africa from Two Revolutions (Princeton University Press, 1982). For a nice summary on Egypt, see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modem Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 1986). For the Iraq mandate, see Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932 (Ithaca Press, 1976). African protest and nationalist movement during the colonial era are examined in the series UNESCO General History of Africa, Vols. 7 and 8 (University of California Press, 1985). Black

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protest against white rule in South Africa is examined in Vols. 1 and 2 of Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964 (Hoover Institution Press, 1971). The Mau Mau rebellion is treated in David Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau, 1945-1953 (Ohio University Press, 1988). The Pan-Africanist movement is assessed in Imanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement (Methuen, 1974).

World War II

Origins and Consequences, 1919-1946

1 I

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

• The Troubled Calm: The West in the 1920s DOCUMENT: Erich Maria Remarque, The Road Back • Epoch of the Aggressors

DOCUMENT: The Hossbach

Memorandum - World War II DOCUMENT: The Nazi Death Camps • Postwar Settlements

1920 1922 Germany and the USSR conclude Rapallo Pact

1930

T

he victorious Allied states went their separate ways after World War I. The United States refused participation in most postwar diplomatic activities but remained active in international business. Great Britain withdrew from the Continent of

Europe and looked after the Commonwealth and empire. Italy plunged into five years

of governmental failure, leading to Mussolini's takeover. France was left holding the responsibility for overseeing democratic interests in Europe. In the first decade after the war. statesmen with global vision made serious attempts to control conflict through international organizations and treaties limiting arms and outlawing war. The economic disasters of the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression at the end of the 1920s, however, forced the democracies to look inward. At the same time, aggressive nations took advantage of the democracies' retreat to advance their interests: Japan invaded Manchuria and. later, China and Southeast Asia; Italy attacked Ethiopia, and Germany expanded its influence in Central Europe. Burdened by domestic concerns and the memories of the losses in World War I, the representatives of the democracies tried unsuccessfully to reason with the militarists. World War II, which started in July 1937 in Asia, reached Europe in 1939. From 1937 to 1945 the world experienced slaughter and destruction on an unprecedented scale. New and horrible technologies ravaged the globe as large bombers carried the war to civilians hundreds of miles behind what used to be known as the front line in Europe and Asia. While fighting his enemies, Hitler made use of industrial technology to try to exterminate the Jews in a genocide that has come to be known as the

1931 Japan invades Manchuria

1935 1936 Germany occupies the Rhineland: Hitler and Mussolini torm the Rome-Berlin Axis; Germany and Japan sign Antr Comintern Pact 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War; Spanish Republic tails; Franco becomes dictator 1937 Japan invades China; World War II begins in Asia 1938 Anschluss with Austria; Munich Pact 1939 Germany and Russia sign nonaggression pad: Germany invades Poland; World War II begins in Europe

1940 1940 France falls to the Axis 1941 Lend-lease Act; Atlantic Charter: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor; United States enters war 1943 Russians defeat Germans at Stalingrad

1945 1945 Germany surrenders: U.S. drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders

Holocaust. In the Pacific theater, primitive means of warfare—hand-to-hand combat— joined technologically sophisticated methods—advanced aerial warfare launched from aircraft carriers—in the military actions between the Americans and the Japanese. For perhaps 20 million other Asians in Japan, China, and Southeast Asia, death came from starvation and from the skies in the form of bombing, including the only uses of nuclear weapons in the world's history. After nuclear weapons made direct conflicts between great powers unthinkable, war took on a new form. A bipolar Cold War between the USSR and the United States ensued, in which Moscow and Washington avoided fighting each other directly but competed worldwide through every other method.

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THE TROUBLED CALM: THE WEST IN THE 1920S • Why were the European democracies unable to maintain the advantage they had gained in winning World War I? The aftershocks of W o r l d War I overwhelmed the interwar period. The horror, expense, and exhaustion of the tragedy haunted losers and winners alike. Many of the younger generation had died and political leadership fell to either the old or the untried. It was i n this uncertain environment that the League of Nations began its work.

The League of Nations The League's record from 1919 to 1929 was modest, neither one o f failure n o r one o f t r i u m p h . Such threats to peace as disputes between Sweden and Finland and between B r i t a i n and Turkey were resolved. W h e n a major power defied the League, however, as i n the case of Italy's quarrel w i t h Greece over Corfu, the organization could do nothing. The refusal o f the United States, the world's strongest democracy, to j o i n weakened the League's peacekeeping possibilities. Through no fault of the League's, little progress was made i n the field of disarmament; however, the League had a distinguished list of accomplishments i n other areas. I t supervised the exchange and repatriat i o n o f prisoners of w a r and saved thousands o f refugees from starvation. I t helped Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary secure badly needed loans. The League also provided valuable services i n administering the region of the Saar Basin and the Free City of Danzig. I t investigated the existence of slavery i n certain parts of the w o r l d , sought to stanch traffic i n dangerous drugs, and stood ready to offer assistance when disasters brought suffering and destruction. I n the intellectual and cultural realm the League published books and periodicals dealing w i t h national and international problems of all kinds and f r o m its o w n radio station broadcast i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the field o f health. Unfortunately, the League's excellent record i n these areas has been obscured by its failure to m a i n t a i n a lasting peace.

Europe. I n 1919 the French pursued a very simple but difficult foreign policy goal: absolute security. Since the Napoleonic grandeur a century earlier, the French had seen their power and authority diminish while German economic and military strength had increased. Twice i n 50 years, Germany had invaded France, w i t h horrendous results. France spent m u c h of the postwar decade trying to guarantee its o w n safety by keeping Germany weak. I n the first five years after the armistice, the French wanted to impose m a x i m u m financial penalties on the Germans. I n 1923, assisted by the Belgians, they occupied the Ruhr region i n a move that had immense short- and long-range implications (see Chapter 27). Some historians have seen i n this act the first step toward World War I I because it hardened the German desire for revenge. Even though the Dawes Plan eased the situation, the French attitude divided the former Allies and provided ammunition to German ultranationalists. The r i f t between the French and the Germans was papered over i n Locarno, Switzerland, i n 1925. I n the Locarno Pact, Germany, Great B r i t a i n , France, and Italy agreed to guarantee the existing frontiers along the Rhine, to establish a demilitarized zone 30 miles deep along the east bank of the Rhine, and to refrain f r o m attacking one another. The problems along France's eastern frontier would be dealt w i t h by international guarantee (although the B r i t i s h d o m i n i o n s stated t h e i r disagreement) and U.S. money. Germany received, and accepted, an i n v i t a t i o n to j o i n the League o f Nations, a symbolic act that seemed to indicate its r e t u r n to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y . S t i l l , the Locarno Pact addressed only Germany's western frontier and left unresolved the controversial issues of the territories of the newly formed and contentious nations of eastern Europe. Another well-meaning but ultimately ineffectual agreement was the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), developed by U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand. This pact, eventually signed by 62 nations, outlawed war as an instrument o f national policy but omitted provisions to enforce the agreement. The Paris government had l i t t l e faith i n the Covenant of the League of Nations as a guarantee of France's survival. The French, instead, depended more and more on their o w n diplomats. They tried to construct a wall of allies along Germany's eastern

The French Quest for Security Because the United States chose to play a limited role in international affairs and Great Britain returned to its traditional focus on the empire and the Commonwealth, France assumed the leadership o f postwar

Kellogg-Briand Pact—An international treaty named after the American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand that outlawed war. Sixty-two nations signed the treaty, which had little effect because there were no enforcement provisions.

CHAPTER 31 •

Document

World War I I

911

Erich Maria Remarque, The Road Back

Erich Maria Remarque, who wrote so eloquently of the horrors of war in All Quiet on the Western Front, compcllingly expressed the despair and frustration of German veterans in The Road Back. In the discussion of the inflation and the bitterness of his "brother," he captures the mood that helped Hitler gain power.

D

emonstrations i n the streets have been called for this afternoon. Prices have been soaring everywhere for months past, and the poverty is greater even than it was during the war. Wages are insufficient to buy the bare necessities of life, and even though one may have the money it is often impossible to buy anything w i t h it. But ever more and more gin palaces and dance halls go up, and ever more and more blatant is the profiteering and swindling. : Scattered groups of workers on strike march through the streets. Now and again there is a disturbance. .A. rumour is going about that troops have been concentrated at the barracks. But there is no sign of it as yet. Here and there one hears cries and counter-cries. Somebody is haranguing at a street corner. Then suddenly everywhere is silence. A procession of men i n the faded uniforms of the front-line trenches is moving slowly toward us. It was formed up by sections, marching i n fours. Big white placards are carried before: Where is the Fatherland's gratitude?—The War Cripples are starving. It was no good to go on assuming that a common basis for all the different groups and classes i n Germany could be found. The break between them became daily wider and more irreparable. The plebiscite of the Right "against the Young Plan and the war-guilt lie" proved just as unsuccessful as those arranged i n former years by the Left, but the poison of the defamatory agitation remained i n the body of the community, and we watched its effects w i t h anxiety. In my own family the political antagonism was growing past endurance. I n October Fritz had finished his apprenticeship i n an old-established export house, at the precise moment when the firm went bankrupt— a minor incident compared with such events as the breakdown of the Frankfurt General Insurance Company and the Civil Servants' Bank or the enforced re-

frontier that w o u l d simultaneously s u r r o u n d the Germans and isolate the Soviet U n i o n . As long as Germany was weak and dependent on Western loans, France could operate as the major diplomatic power on the Continent. B u t even i n the 1920s,

organization and amalgamation of the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto-Gesellschaft, which all happened i n the course of the year and dangerously damaged the whole economic life of Germany. Yet for my brother the bankruptcy\)f his firm overshadowed all other happenings, since i t meant that he lost his job. His three years' training was i n vain—there was n o t a single export firm which was not forced to dismiss as many of its employees as possible. "Yes, that's just it—millions! I f it isn't my fault, whose fault is it? I tell you—your friends, the French, the English, the Americans, all those damnable nations who inflict on us one dishonorable penalty after the other—they are to blame for all this. Before the war the whole w o r l d bought German goods. M y firm exported to Africa, to the German colonies. Hundreds of thousands we turned over every year. But they have robbed us of our colonies, of all our foreign markets. They have stolen the coal mines i n the Saar and i n Upper Silesia, they squeeze millions of marks out of our bleeding country. We'll never rise again unless we free ourselves by another war." "Don't be foolish, Fritz. Things are bad i n the whole world." " I don't care about the world, I care only about Germany, which you and your pacifists have delivered into the hands of our enemies. I despise you, you are not worthy to call yourself a German." Questions to Consider 1. What were some of the most important elements in the creation of German anger after World War I? 2. Whom docs Fritz blame for his situation? Do you agree? 3. In Fritz's point of view, after his argument with the author, who is worthy to call himself German? From Erich Maria Remarque, The Road Back. Copyright © 1931 by A. G. Ullstein; copyright renewed © 1958 by Erich Maria Remarque. All rights reserved.

France lacked the strength or the vision to lead Europe. When Germany and Italy began to flex their muscles i n the 1930s, France—even w i t h B r i t i s h help—responded to fascist aggression from a posit i o n of weakness.

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Soviet and German Cooperation The Soviet Union and Germany, the t w o diplomatic outcasts of the 1920s, quickly forged a w o r k i n g relationship that was useful to both o f them. The USSR had isolated itself by signing the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, nationalizing foreign property, and repudiating foreign debts as w e l l as by espousing its communist ideology internationally. Probably the greatest barrier was the ideological one, as expressed through the activities o f the Third Communist International, or Comintern. That body, organized in 1919, was dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism throughout the world. I n the 1920s the Comintern spread communist propaganda, established Communist parties, and infiltrated labor unions and other working-class groups throughout the world. Even after Lenin had given up hope for an immediate w o r l d revolution and started to normalize relations w i t h the West, the Comintern encouraged radicals who had broken off from moderate socialist groups to organize Communist parties. Communists of all countries became members of the Comintern, meeting i n congresses held i n Moscow and setting up committees to coordinate their activities. Communist parties were different from other national political groups because they owed their allegiance to an international organization rather than to the nations i n w h i c h they resided. By 1922 the Soviet Union was pursuing a twopronged foreign policy. One approach used the Communist parties abroad to achieve ideological goals, as in China, where the Communists worked together w i t h Jiang Jicshi's Nationalists u n t i l 1927, when they were forced to develop an independent movement (see Chapter 29). The other approach worked through normal international channels for traditional economic and diplomatic goals, generally i n Europe. From the time Lenin left Switzerland to return to Petrograd w i t h Berlin's assistance, the Soviet Union enjoyed a m u t u a l l y advantageous relationship w i t h Germany. At the beginning o f the V<J205, the two nations ratified secret agreements allowing for j o i n t military training enterprises. Their first major open diplomatic contact came at Rapallo, Italy, i n 1922, where they renounced the concept of reparations. I n the Rapallo Pact, the Germans and Russians agreed to cooperate i n a number of areas. Germany was extremely bitter about the treatment it had received at Versailles; the Soviets had faced Allied intervention Treaty of Brcst-Litovsk—The treaty between the USSR and Germany signed in March 191S in which peace was declared between the two countries and the USSR gave up more than a million square miles of land and more titan 60 million people. Third Communist Internationa]—The Comintern, organized in 1919, was an organization dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism.

Soviet-German Relations, 1917-1939 1917

I 1918 1919-1922

Germans financially support Bolsheviks Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

"

:•

Wei mar-Soviet secret joint military agreements •

1922

Rapallo Pact formalizes GermanRussian cooperation

1926

Rapallo Pact extended five years

• 1933-1937

Staiin unsuccessfully advocates common front against Germany

1933-1937

Hitler speaks out against USSR, signs Anti-Comintern Pact

1938-1939

Renewed secret negotiations between Moscow and Berlin

1939

USSR-German nonaggression pact

during their civil war. It naturally followed that a main feature of the foreign policies of both countries would be either to ignore the Versailles settlement or to escape from its consequences. Both countries shared the ambition to dominate Poland, against whom the USSR had fought at the beginning of the decade. Although, as Lenin perceptively noted, Russia wanted revolution while Germany sought revenge, the two nations cooperated closely until 1933. Then, after a six-year gap, they cooperated again i n the NaziSoviet nonaggression pact. The Weimar government under Guslav Stresemann wanted to rearm but was forbidden to do so by the Versailles treaty. Stresemann backed the cooperation between his government and the Soviet Union to build up Gentian military m i g h t Berlin supplied technical a i d to the USSR while German pilots and specialists went on maneuvers in Russia. Even after the proclamation of the so-called spirit of Locarno, the two nations worked w i t h each other. I n 1926 the Rapallo Pact was renewed for another five years.

EPOCH OF THE AGGRESSORS • Why did Great Britain, France, and the United Stales not take a more vigorous stand against Japanese, Italian, and German aggression before J 939?

CHAPTER 31 The awful toll taken by World War I convinced the democracies that never again should humanity have to endure such a tragedy. Multilateral efforts, especially the League of Nations, were made to prevent the kinds of alliances that were blamed for the inevitability of that war. By the mid-1930s, however, governments i n Tokyo, Rome, and Berlin viewed multilateralism as weak and ineffective and saw the era as opportune for taking unilateral approaches to expansionism.

Japan Invades Manchuria,

1931

Throughout the 1920s, Japan's foreign policy was characterized by multilateral agreements and treaties. The Washington Conference system (see Chapter 29) tied Japan diplomatically to Western democracies. At the same time, close economic ties w i t h those countries aided trade and economic growth. When, at the end of the 1920s, rogue members of the Japanese m i l itary stationed along the Japanese-owned railroad i n Manchuria tried to implement their own foreign policy i n opposition to what they called Tokyo's "weakkneed" cooperation w i t h the West, they failed to gain much support i n Japan. But the Great Depression discredited global multilateralism i n the eyes of many i n Japan, making the call for a Japanese-dominated economic sphere i n northeast Asia and a unilateral approach to national security increasingly attractive i n the 1930s. When another group of Japanese soldiers set off a bomb on the South Manchurian Railroad on September 18, 1931, Tokyo was thrust into conflict i n Manchuria, triggering military action against Nationalist Chinese forces there. A Japanese puppet state was established i n Manchuria i n 1932. China appealed to the League of Nations, which condemned the aggression, but Japan's withdrawal from the League i n 1933 indicated the limits of its ability to guarantee world peace. Some historians consider this the beginning of what they call "Japan's 15-year war." I n 1930 the Washington Conference system had taken a h i t when the Japanese Prime Minister was assassinated for trying to continue the cooperative policy of reductions i n naval buildup. Although Japan did not have the funds to begin building up its navy i n the early 1930s, by the middle of the decade, the government felt released from the arms limitations negotiated i n 1922 at Washington and 1930 at London. There was, however, no unified point of view among Japan's leaders. Many government leaders were not interested i n escalating continental expansion by military means, though they were firmly committed to increasing Japanese economic penetration of China i n the 1920s and 1930s. The Japanese army focused on the Soviet Union as a potential threat,

World War I I

913

while navy leaders w o r r i e d about the United States and England. Even on the eve of World War I I , the army and navy took opposing points of view. Japan's business leaders desperately wanted to preserve trade ties w i t h the West as well as w i t h Asia, and American business interests were committed to supporting good relations w i t h Japan even i n the late 1930s when American church groups and others raised the alarm about b r u t a l actions by the Japanese m i l i t a r y i n China. The Japanese Foreign M i n i s t r y i n the 1930s claimed to be perplexed that the Western countries told Japan to roll back its imperialist attacks on Asia while failing to grant independence to their o w n colonies. The situation i n East Asia d i d not seem to present itself i n black and white terms at first. One important link among Japanese, even those who wished to m a i n t a i n multilateral ties, was an increasing belief that Japan would have to rely on its own resources for national security. And that, i n turn, led to an acceptance, at first grudging and later more enthusiastic, of Japanese military expansionism. The Chinese Nationalists responded to Japan's creation of the Manchurian puppet state by boycotts of Japanese goods. Shanghai, which had large settlements controlled by foreign forces, most notably England but also Japan and other treaty powers, staged a particularly effective boycott i n 1932. The local Japanese commandant demanded an end to the boycott, and a small skirmish broke out between Chinese and Japanese troops. The commandant took this as an insult and retaliated by bombing Chinese troops i n a congested urban area. Though the Tokyo government objected to these actions and did not escalate military

Aggression and Democratic Nonresponse, 1931-1938 1931

Japanese invade Manchuria

1932

Japanese attack Shanghai

1934-1935

Italians invade Ethiopia

1935

Remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany

1936

Spanish General Francisco Franco rebels against the government of republican Spain

1937

Japanese begin full-scale war in China

1938

German Anschluss with Austria; dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in the wake of the Munich Accords

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actions around Shanghai at that time, the United States and England expressed shock and Chinese nationalists became determined to drive the Japanese out of Shanghai. At the same time, in North China, Japanese forces undertook much more aggressive action. The same forces based in Manchuria who had engineered the Manchurian Incident in 1931 decided they needed more security on the border w i t h North China. They began a gradual but steady encroachment on Chinese territory in 1933. The Chinese Nationalist government at Nanjing, more concerned about consolidating its political control in China than about Japanese actions in the north, signed an agreement called the Tanggu (TONG-geu) truce establishing a demilitarized /one around Beijing and extending Japanese control to the Great Wall in May 1933. By 1935, Japanese forces i n North China, hoping to create a buffer zone between the Nationalists and the Japanese slate in Manchuria, pushed further into North China. Jiang Jieshi (ZHANG SHIE-shi), leader of the Nationalists, was preoccupied with IIK- Communists, and did little to oppose the Japanese forces at first (see Chapter 29). Following the December 1936 truce between the Communists and Nationalists, China presented a united front. Jiang now joined the struggle against Japan. In Japan, right-wing young officers had allcmpled to overthrow the Japanese government, which they viewed as loo capitalistic, too liberal, too individualistic, and too modern. They staged a massive coup on February 26, 1936. Though these rebels were cut down by the Emperor's command that they return to their barracks as well as the training of the big guns oi naval warships in Tokyo Bay on their positions, the real loser was the civilian government. Alter 1936, either military officers or defense-oriented civilians took over the reins of government in Tokyo. I n June 1937, one of those civilians. Prince Konoe Fumimaro (fu-mee-mah-roh), became Prime Minister. When a small skirmish between Japanese and Chinese soldiers at Marco Polo Bridge in North China broke out on July 7, 1937, Konoe authorized Full-scale war In August. Chinese bombers hit the Japanese settlement in Shanghai, and Japanese commanders swiftlv retaliated, moving down the Yang/.i River and reaching Nanjing bv December 1937. The Japanese soldiers com-

Air abandoned Chinese bab\ cries oui during the J t t p t M M attack on Nanjing.

mitted brutal carnage in Nanjing in the winter of 1937-1938 (see Chapter 29 on the Rape of Nanjing). Interestingly, the generals who had been the architects ol the war in Manchuria were dismayed over the war in China, believing lhat Japan's national interests were best setved by defending Korea, Manchuria, and North China against the Soviets. But Konoe did not agree. He declared that Japan would never negotiate with Jiang and the Nationalist Chinese government, and in November 1938, declared a "New Order in East Asia." The New Order's objectives were to expel Western interests, defined as "Anglo-American imperialism," from East Asia and establish a self-sufficient economic bloc including Japan, Manchuria, and China, "havenot" nations lhat had been excluded from their place in the world by the West. Three years later, Konoe attempted to give concrete form to the "New Order'* policy by proclaiming a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosp e r i l y Sphere," a Japanese-dominated economiczone Irom which Japan could procure raw materials and markets lor its industry and expanding population as well as for production of munitions. The "New Order in East Asia" had its domestic counterpart in Greater East Asia Co-Pros peril) Sphere—The pmjecled Japancsodominaled colonnl z.ine. mosl importantly unhiding Manchurii ind China, that would enable Japan to be self-Miffidem economically.

CHAPTER 31 policies to promote "national spiritual mobilization," an effort to get people to conserve energy and food and to reject decadent and wasteful habits like permanent waves and fancy kimono; the obliteration of independent unions, women's groups, and political parties and their replacement with government-run groups; and rationing and controls on scarce commodities. As for foreign policy, Japan had few friends. The United States ended its long-time commercial treaty with Japan in 1939 to protest Japan's actions in China, selling the stage for U.S. embargoes first of iron and steel in the summer of 1940 and then of oil in the summer of 1941, following Japan's entry into southern Vietnam (with the assent of the Vichy French government). In 1936, Japan had signed its first treaty with Nazi Germany, the Anti-Comintern Pact. This was followed by a briei war against the Soviets in 1939; the Tripartite Pact (with Germany and Italy) against the United States in September 1940: and a neutrality pact with the Soviets in April 1941. The German invasion ol the Soviet Union d i d more to relieve Japan of its fear of the Russians than the neutrality pact, and Japan then moved troops into southern Vietnam in preparation for operations against the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Dependent on U.S. oil, Japan had two options in the summer of 1941—give in to America's conditions for negotiating a return of oil shipments, which meant abandoning all the gains on the continent, or invade the oil-rich Dutch East Indies.

Italy Attacks Ethiopia While Japan pursued continental expansionism, Italy set out to claim a prize it had failed to take in 1896— Ethiopia, one of only two independent states left in Africa. Late in 1934, fighting broke out between the Ethiopians and (he Italians, and in the following year, Mussolini's forces invaded the country. Emperor Haiic Selassie made a dramatic appearance before Ihe League to appeal for help. Before he could speak, however, he had to endure the catcalls and whistles of the Italian journalists in the hall. The League tried to arrange for arbitration. Unconvinced by the shameless Italian argument that Ethiopia, not Italy, was the aggressor, the League voted to prohibit shipment of certain goods to Italy and to deny it credit. But the effect of the sanctions was m i n o r because oil—without w h i c h no modern army could fight—was not included in the list of prohibited articles. France and Britain gave only lukewarm support to the sanctions because they did not vvanl to alienate Italy. The United Stales, which had not joined the League, and Germany, which had left it Tripartite Pact—The agreement Japan signed with Germany and Italy in 1940 against the United States.

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915

kalian forces occupying Ethiopia at die beginning of World War II. Rome's investment in African conquest produced negligible returns.

by that time, largely ignored the prohibitions. Onlv outraged public o p i n i o n , moved by newspaper photographs showing barefooted Ethiopians fighting the modem Italian army, drove the governments to even the pretense of action. Using bombs, mustard gas, and tanks, the Italians advanced swiftly into Ethiopia and crushed Haile Selassies army. Meanwhile, the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March helped shift international attention away from the conflict in Africa. The whole sorry story ended in July 1936 when sanctions were removed. Haile Selassie, an emperor without a country, went to live in Britain, the first of several royal exiles who would be forced from their thrones in the next decade.

The Rhineland and the Axis Soon after taking power, Hitler canned out the revisions the Germans wanted in the Versailles Treaty. He also won his country's support by seeking revenge against the Allies. As George F. Kennan noted at the time, "The man is acting in the best traditions of German nationalism, and his conception of his own mission is perhaps clearer than that of his predecessors because it is uncomplicated by any sense of responsibility to European culture as a whole." During his first two years in 1

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power, Hitler paid lip service to peace while increasing the tempo of rearmament. I n March 1935 he negated the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty and a year later reoccupied the Rhineland. The move, which Hitler described as producing the most nerve-racking moments of his life, sent German troops marching boldly into the Rhineland i n defiance o f the Versailles treaty and the Locarno agreements. The Germans could not have resisted had the British and French moved i n response. But London did nothing, and Paris mobilized 150,000 troops behind the M a g i n o t (MAZH-ee-noh) l i n e but did no more. H i t l e r later confessed that had the French advanced against h i m , "We would have had to w i t h draw w i t h our tails between our legs, for the military resources at o u r disposal would have been totally inadequate for even a moderate resistance." The League's weak response to the Japanese invasion of China and the Italian attack on Ethiopia, combined w i t h the feeble British and French reaction to German reoccupation of the Rhineland, encouraged the aggressors and served as a prelude to the format i o n of the Axis alliance. U n t i l H i t l e r gained power, Germany had been w i t h o u t close allies. After the Ethiopian crisis and the League sanctions, Italy and Germany began to work more closely together. I n 1936 they formalized the friendship i n the Rome-Berlin Axis, and one year later, Mussolini followed Hitler's lead by withdrawing from the League of Nations. Japan, the third major member of the Axis, joined forces w i t h Germany i n 1936 i n the Anti-Comintern Pact. A year later, Italy also joined i n that agreement, which effectively encircled the Soviet Union. Relations between Moscow and B e r l i n had cooled after 1934, and the Soviet Union now became the object of anticommunist rhetoric. Many right-wing leaders i n the West hoped that the "Red menace" w o u l d be taken care of by Hitler and his allies. AH i n all, 1936 was a banner year for Hider. He had gained allies, pleased his own people by remilitarizing the Rhineland, learned the weakness of the democratic powers and the League, and gained international prestige from his successful staging of the Olympic Games. He also found a successful device to distract potential opponents' attention: the Spanish Civil War. 2

The Spanish Tragedy By 1936 the five-year-old Spanish republic was disintegrating. I t had brought neither prosperity nor stability to Spain. Reactionary forces had tried to gain control of the government while left-wing groups had

resorted to terrorism. The liberal approach had failed, and i n the summer of 1936, the army revolted against the legal government i n Madrid. General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) commanded the insurgents, who included i n their ranks most of the regular army troops. Mussolini strongly backed Franco, and the rightist forces expected a quick victory, many groups, however, stood by the republic, and they put up a strong resistance against the insurgents, stopping them at the outskirts of Madrid. By the end of 1936, each side had gained the backing of a complicated alliance of forces. Franco had the support of the Italians, who sent large numbers of planes, troops, and weapons, and the Germans, who tested their latest military technology against the republicans. The republic gained the support of the Soviet Union, which sent arms, "advisers," and other supplies, as well as a large contingent of disorganized but idealistic antifascist fighters, including a number from Britain and the United States. The insurgents capitalized on Soviet support for the republic, and Franco pronounced his cause to be strictly an anticommunist crusade—a cunning oversimplification of dubious validity, considering that the communists were never i n control of more than a snippet of republican Spain, and that for only a few months in 1938 u n t i l Stalin decided to pull his support. While Spain bled, suffering more than 700,000 deaths, outside forces took advantage of the tragic situation for their own selfish purposes. The democratic powers—Great Britain, France, and the United States—attempted to stay out of the conflict. Britain d i d not want to risk a Continental war. France suffered from interna! divisions that made its leaders fear that their country, too, might dissolve i n civil war. The United States declared its official neutrality. Instead of permitting arms to be sent to the recognized, legally constituted republican government, which had the right"^under international law to purchase weapons for self-defense, Britain and France set up a nonintervention system by which the nations of Europe agreed not to send arms to either side. Only the democracies adhered to this arrangement, which was meant to limit the scope of the conflict. The various dictators continued to send support to their respective sides. After the last holdout, Barcelona, fell i n March 1939, the Spanish republic was no more. Franco, at the head of the new state, gained absolute power, which he held u n t i l his death i n 1975. The Spanish Civil War was a national catastrophe that left permanent scars on the country's people.

Appeasement Maginot line—A supposedly impenetrable line of fortresses constructed by France along its eastern frontier between Switzerland and Belgium in the 1920s.

I n 1937 Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940) became Britain's prime minister. Years before he took office,

CHAPTER 31 • the British had tried to achieve d é t e n t e w i t h the Germans, backed by an air force w h i c h concentrated its resources on bombers. Chamberlain tried a new strategy: a defense policy based on a fighter air force and centered solely on protecting B r i t a i n . He wanted to reassure Germany, acknowledge her legitimate complaints, and reach the settlement of outstanding issues peacefully by recognizing mutual interests and establishing well-defined spheres of influence. Chamberlain's name came to symbolize the policy of appeasement, the policy of meeting German demands and grievances without demanding f i r m reciprocal advantages and asking instead only for future "mutual understandings." Chamberlain took the direction of foreign policy on his own shoulders i n his attempt to explore every possibility for reaching an understanding w i t h the dictators. He dedicated himself to an effort to ease international tensions despite/snubs from those he wished to placate and warnings from his military and foreign policy advisers. He based his policy on the most humane of motives—peace—and on the most civilized of assumptions—that Hitler could be reasonable and fair-minded. By showing good faith and by withdrawing from any possibility of being able to wage war on the Continent, Chamberlain froze himself into a position of having to avoid war at any cost. His policies were strongly supported i n B r i t a i n and throughout most of the British Commonwealth. France had shown that i t w o u l d not move m i l i tarily without British backing, and under Chamberlain, the entente w i t h France was p u t on the back burner, a development that h u r t French resolve. The democratic world became uneasily aware of its growing weakness i n comparison w i t h the dictators. As the European balance of power shifted, the small states began to draw away from the impotent League of Nations. The prestige of the Axis blossomed. Some nations tried to make deals w i t h Germany and Italy, while others, including the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, withdrew into the shelter of neutrality and "innocent isolation." I n eastern Europe, semifascist regimes became the order of the day, as the states i n that unhappy region lined up to get i n Germany's good graces. I n 1934 Poland had signed a nonaggres¬ sion pact w i t h Germany. Belgium gave up its alliance w i t h France. I n eastern Europe, only Czechoslovakia remained loyal to Paris. Hitler became increasingly aware of the opportunity presented by Britain's "peace at any price" policy and the decline of the French alliance system. On détente—A state of reduced tensions between two countries, appeasement—The policy of meeting German demands and grievances without demanding firm reciprocal advantages and asking instead only for future "mutual understandings."

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November 5, 1937, i n a meeting at the Reich Chancellery i n Berlin that lasted for more than four hours, H i t l e r laid out his plans and ideas for the future. According to the notes of the meeting taken by Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, the F ü h r e r gave a statement that was to be regarded " i n the event of his death, as his last w i l l and testament." "The aim of German policy," Hitler stated, "was to make secure and to preserve the racial c o m m u n i t y and to enlarge it. I t was therefore a question of space. Germany's future was w h o l l y conditional u p o n the need for space." The answer to that question was force, w h i c h was to be applied i n the next six years, because, after 1943, German technological and m i l i tary superiority w o u l d be lost. Hossbach noted that "the F ü h r e r believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs." Historians s t i l l debate the importance of the Chancellery meeting. Hitler's message was not favorably received by the m i l i t a r y staff present, since they knew full w e l l that Germany was i n no shape to fight. Yet the significance of the message can be found i n the wholesale changes i n personnel H i t l e r introduced at the end of 1937 and i n the contrast i t affords to the views of Chamberlain. The p r i m e m i n ister wanted peace at any price. The F ü h r e r wanted space at any price. 3

Toward Austria and the Sudetenland When Hitler announced the military reoccupation of the Rhineland i n the spring of 1936, he stated, "We have no territorial demands to make i n Europe." He lied. By 1938, w i t h the German army growing i n strength and the air force becoming a powerful unit, the F ü h r e r began to implement one of his foreign policy goals—placing the German-speaking peoples under one Reich. The first step on that path was to unite Austria and Germany i n the Anschluss ( 0 N schleus; "joining"). I n 1934 the Nazis had badly bungled an attempt to annex Austria. Two years later, softening-up operations began again, and by 1938, intense pressure had been levied against Austrian chancellor K u r t von Schuschnigg to cooperate w i t h B e r l i n . After a stormy meeting w i t h Hitler i n February, Schuschnigg restated his country's desire to be independent, although concessions would be made to Germany. He called for a plebiscite i n M a r c h to prove his p o i n t . Outraged at this independent action, Hitler ordered Schuschnigg to resign and to cancel the vote. B o t h actions were taken, b u t H i t l e r sent his forces i n t o Austria anyway. Anschluss—The German word for "joining."

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te-Documen^ ^

•

Two years before the outbreak of World War I I , Adolf Hitler recapitulated his goals in a secret meeting. Colonel Friedrich Hossbach took down Hitler's comments.

T

he aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community and to enlarge it. I t was therefore a question of space. ; The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space i n Europe, con-' , stituted a tightly packed racial core such as was n o t . to be met i n any other country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than i n the case of other peoples.... "•;•:•• Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space, and such ; a solution could be sought, of course, only for a foreseeable period of about one to three generations. : and using public opinion and free elections lo I \ neutralize opponents while building a new f f l f l f l f l l power base. After being named president in ""JJ^^ ™ October 1988, he set out to reform that most Gorbachev secret and powerful of all Soviet institutions, on the Need the KGB, urging its new leaders to imitate the fwEconomtc u c i u r e of the American CIA. Until 1989 the Supreme Soviet was a carefully preselected rubber-stamp body. Real power was concentrated in the Council of Ministers, headed by a prime minister. In elections in March and April 1989, many powerful officials were voted down, even though they had run unopposed. The Congress of People's Deputies, which was to meet annually and be reelected every five years, replaced the old Supreme Soviet. The Communist party posed a special problem for Gorbachev, a dedicated Leninist. It was so inflexible that Gorbachev had lo diminish its role after the July 1990 party congress. Thereafter, no major party member sat on the Politburo, w i l h the exception of the Soviet president The party became subordinate to the state, losing its leading role. Millions gave up their parlv memberships after 1989, manv of them going to work in city and republic governments, where there was greater opportunity. Gorbachev invoked glasnost and perestroika lo jump-start the moribund economy. Although gross domestic product figures continued to indicate that the Soviet economy was the second largest in the world, the realily was that the infrastructure was undermined by outmoded technologies, inefficient factories, a dispirited and underemployed workforce, and environmental disasters. Unlike the Chinese, who had in 1978 started their economic reforms in the countryside so as to ensure an adequate supply of food, Gorbachev relied on a more Leninist, democratic centralist approach and failed miserably. The Communist party, which Lenin had seen as the elite cadre that would anticipate the needs of the proletariat for the proletariat, had been turned by Stalin and his successors into an institution of privilege of, by, and for the party. Everything went bad at once for Gorbachev. As economic conditions deteriorated, he increased concessions to party hard-liners and bureaucratic oppor1

s(r

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tunists, buying time to hold power. I n the spring of 1991, hundreds of thousands of people marched in the streets of Moscow to protest the premier's retreat from liberalism. Separatist protests increased in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as in Georgia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. Standards of living throughout the nation plummeted. On August 19, while Gorbachev was on vacation in the Crimea, an eight-man "state emergency committee" made up of leaders of the KGB, the military, the interior department, and other offices of the central government—all appointed by Gorbachev— mounted an attempt to take power. Gorbachevs vice president announced that his leader was ill and that a state of emergency was lo be imposed lor six monlhs. The attempted coup was immediately denounced by Boris Yeltsin (b. 1931), who had been popularly elected President of the Russian Republic and who barricaded himsell inside the offices ol the Russian parliament building in Moscow. He instructed all army and K G B units not to obey the coup leaders' orders. The next day 50,000 people t i n n e d out in Moscow to face down tanks sent by the central government. Larger groups mobilized in Leningrad and Kishinev. Several units of K G B and army forces refused to obey the central command's orders, and the coup began to unravel. By August 21 the crisis was over, and Yeltsin had emerged as the man of the hour. Six days after the attempted coup, the reality of the situation became clear. Gorbachev resigned as leader of the Soviet Communist party and recommended dissolution of the Central Committee. Yeltsin claimed control of party archives and KGB records, and across the Soviet Union, in a vast revolution, the Communist party—after 74 years of almost total power—was cut off from all its vanguard toles in running the country. In

On August 19, 1991, president of the Russian Republic Boris Yeltsin stands atop an armed carrier in Moscow to read a statement urging people to resist the attempted hard-line coup.

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addition, the party had to surrender its wealth and property to the parliaments of the various republics. Gorbachev remained as president of the Soviet Union, at least until popular elections Break-up of could be held. But the USSR itself would last the Soviet only four more months, ending its 69-year exisUnion tence on December21, 1991. Itwas replaced by a smaller and looser confederation, the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Republic After August 1991, Boris Yeltsin was the most important Russian politician. Like other leaders at the end of a revolution, he found that a change i n government did not remove the terrible problems facing Russia such as inflation, budget deficits, and declining living standards. To deal w i t h these problems, Yeltsin set i n motion programs of privatization and the construction o f a new infrastructure for international trade and commerce. There were also serious problems with ethnic minorities—especially i n Chechnya. Almost immediately, Yeltsin had to deal w i t h opposition from the apparatchik-laden Congress of People's Deputies, elected under the old Soviet model. The Congress consistently blocked Yeltsin's attempts to implement a series of market-oriented economic reforms, such as liberalizing prices on most nonfood goods. I n addition, Yeltsin faced problems from deputies who accused h i m of caving i n to Western pressures i n both domestic and foreign policy. The Russian president remained personally popular; however, this had little effect on the Congress, which continued to block his initiatives. Yeltsin's contest w i t h the parliament reached a stalemate i n September 1993. When the Congress threatened to take m u c h of his authority away, he responded by dissolving the Congress and calling for new elections i n December. He then sent troops to surround the parliament building—the Russian White House—and told deputies that they w o u l d have to leave the building by October 4. These actions provoked widespread criticism throughout Russia, and leaders of 62 out of 89 regional councils called for Yeltsin to remove the troops. On October 3, forces opposing the president look over the office of the mayor of Moscow and attacked the state television center. To an audience watching these events live on international television, it was remarkable that only 62 people died i n the fighting. The next day, Yeltsin sent tanks and artillery against the Russian White House and battered the resisters into submission. Yeltsin's forces and a new constitution barely carried the vote i n the December elections, w i n n i n g enough seals i n parliament to prevent the opposition from being able to impeach the president. To maintain power in the face of an extremist coalition that was

seemingly held together only by its opposition to Yeltsin, the president took a centrist course, advocating a rebirth of the Great Russian state, damping down essential programs to produce a privatized economy, and distancing himself from the West i n foreign affairs—especially the extension of early NATO membership lo the former eastern European states and Western intervention i n disintegrating Yugoslavia. Aided by substantial American support i n financing and carrying out his campaign, Yeltsin was reelected in 1996, defeating the leader of the Communist party. Russia's economy during the Yeltsin years proved unable to make the comparatively rapid change to a market system, as had the economies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The ethnic and social diversity of the continent-sized state made a "cold turkey" transition to the market system difficult. For the large majority of the Scientists Russian people, the change from a communist Examine Russia's to a modified free market system brought no Economy and improvement to their lives. Cities such as St. Environment Petersburg began to lose population as residents 1991-1993 moved out lo villages where they winterized huts and became full-time gardeners. For two-thirds of Russia's citizens, the quality of life declined more than 50 percent i n the ten years after 1991. But for a few young, well-connected individuals, Yeltsin's haphazard privatization allowed them to gain control of Russia's basic resources of nickel, aluminum, natural gas, and oil. Russia has proven oil reserves of nearly 55 billion barrels, barely one-fifth that of Saudi Arabia, but substantial nonetheless—enough to allow Russia to be the second largest oil exporter i n most years. The young capitalists, who became known as oligarchs, gained control of the basic resources of the country for around ten percent of their real value between 1993 and 1996. Thereafter, they took advantage of the disarray and corruption of Yeltsin's government to avoid most of the taxes they should have paid. By 2003, 17 of the world's richest men were Russian oligarchs between the ages of 36 and 54. One of them, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who controlled Yukos Oil, was the twenty-sixth richest person i n the world at that time. Yeltsin's i l l health and the popular perception that lie was the tool of the Russian "mafia" combined to force h i m to step down at the end of 1999. I n preparation for that event, he named Vladimir V. Putin— one of his aides, a former K G B officer, and head of that group's successor, the Federal Security Bureau (FSB)—to be the prime minister of Russia in the summer of 1999. On the last day of the year, Yeltsin formally resigned and named Putin the acting president.

Vladimir Putin Presidential elections in March 2000 confirmed Putin as president. He inherited the host of problems Yeltsin

CHAPTER 33 had not solved: massive corruption i n all spheres of political life, control of major economic sectors by the "mafia" and the oligarchs, slow economic growth, the war i n Chechnya, and other problems dealing w i t h national groups w i t h i n the Russian Federation. I t became immediately apparent that he would be a different kind of president than Yeltsin. His major immediate goal was reassert the power of the political center in Moscow over the provinces. He used to good effect the concern over terrorist incidents i n Moscow—tied to the renewed warfare i n Chechnya—and his control over the most important newspapers and television stations to muster support for his position. Within the government, he began to dismiss members of the former Yeltsin team and to replace them w i t h colleagues from the former KGB and other security agencies. By 2004 he had broken the "mafia" and the o l i garchs, imprisoning Mikhail Khodorkovsky and forcing other oligarchs to leave the country. For this, and other reasons, Putin has a popularity rating above 80 percent i n Russia. He has successfully recentralized power. More efficient courts seem to be succeeding i n reducing the widespread corruption that had flourished i n the 1990s. There has been a large increase i n tax collections. Russia's economy has stabilized, and in 2001-2003 the country experienced a considerable economic growth. The Duma acts more and more like a western representative assembly. Critics i n the West still p o i n t out that Putin achieved these results by clearly undemocratic means. His party, United Russia, had a virtual monopoly on television screens i n the r u n up to the presidential elections i n March 2004. Writers and reporters who knew too m u c h or criticized too openly were murdered by unknown assailants. Popular television stations have been silenced and commentators deemed too independent have lost their jobs. Still, w i t h i n Russia, the president enjoys broad support. Russia has a long way to go. I t continues to fight a demographic crisis that has men dying at an average age of 61, 12 years sooner than men i n Western countries and a lowering birthrate. Economically, President Putin has stated that Russia's goal was to equal the GDP rate of Portugal by 2015, a difficult task given that Russia's GDP at the end of 2004 was $8900, $10,000 behind the Portuguese level. Still, after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Russian president used his friendly relationship w i t h the American president, George W. Bush, to make economic and foreign policy gains, especially i n regard to the use of force to put down opponents along his southern frontiers. I n the successor states along Russia's western border, economic and political developments ranged from the tragic i n the Caucasian republics to the corrupt and inefficient i n Ukraine and Belarus. Kiev had nuclear weapons, untapped economic potential, and a disastrously corrupt and inept government. I n July 1994 the

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Western powers offered to loan Ukraine $4 billion and to aid i n the rebuilding or replacing of the damaged Chernobyl nuclear power plant. B u t Ukraine's economy continued to l i m p along despite a new constitution i n 1996 that gave President Leonid Kuchma the power to impose major structural reforms. Belarus, under its Stalinist leader Alexander Lukashenka, is marching resolutely backward, crushing domestic political opponents and lashing out at international critics. Like Moldova and the Ukraine, Belarus's economy is i n a tragic state, and only energy imports from Russia keep its infrastructure intact. Moldova took heroic measures to introduce the discipline and quality needed to compete i n the international market at the beginning of the 1990s but now ranks as the poorest country i n Europe. It was only the imposition of Russian arms that brought a tenuous peace to the Caucasus. Armenians and Azeris battled over control of Nagorno-Karabakh; Georgians and Abkhazians and roving bands of independent mercenaries fought over long-disputed lands. And i n the Chechnya region of Russia, a full-scale war between Moscow and Chechen separatists i n 1995 and 1996 ended w i t h an armed truce that left the Chechens in control of vital oil and gas pipelines. The war reignited two years later, and the Russians resumed their brutal response against a combined force of mujahideen, Arab fighters, and the local population. The Chechens have spread their struggle from the Caucasus into bomb attacks i n Moscow and provincial capitals. I n Central Asia, the countries of Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan made little progress toward pluralistic democratic structures. The presidents of these countries, such as Nursultan A. Nazarbayev (na-zar-BAI-ev) i n Kazkahstan, gained power early i n the 1990s and spend little time encouraging the development of a democratic opposition, preferring instead to enrich their o w n friends and family—as they had during the former USSR. The rich petroleum and mineral deposits, however, made them important players i n the post-1991 global economic scene. Their importance became even greater during the military action i n Afghanistan i n the fall of 2001 i n w h i c h they extended landing rights to the American forces, i n return for less international scrutiny.

INTERDEPENDENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD • Has globalization made the Unites States richer and more secure, or more wealthy, yet more exposed to danger? As the twenty-first century began, i t was evident that global interdependence placed pressures on private

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citizens and political leaders. On the one hand there was the struggle by non-Western i n d i v i d u a l s to maintain their cultures and values i n the face of the on-rushing Western-dominated globalization. On the other hand, political leaders everywhere found themselves more and more at the mercy of internat i o n a l currents over w h i c h they had l i t t l e c o n t r o l : globalization, terrorism, global warming, and pollut i o n . The Internet, satellite television, and cell phones j o i n e d traditional media such as radio and newspapers to inundate people on all continents w i t h a flood of information. There were a few i n d i viduals isolated from the on-rushing tide o f interdependence. B u t there were no p o l i t i c a l leaders—neither George W, Bush or V l a d i m i r Putin—who claim to be control of events.

The Global Economy After 1945 the world experienced unprecedented economic growth and development and increasing interdependence. But trade flows changed. The international monetary system of exchange rates pegged to the dollar and the fixed price of gold lasted until 1971, when trade imbalances led to gold outflows from major importing nations such as the United States. President Richard Nixon dealt a fatal blow to the Bretton Woods system by severing the link between gold and the dollar. His move opened the way for "floating rates," the determination of exchange rates by market mechanisms. This policy change aided multinational firms, headquartered i n one country but w i t h operations throughout the world, because, by shifting operations, they could take advantage of exchange rate differences to reduce cost. I n response, countries whose economies depended on the export of raw materials began to band together in an attempt to affect the price of their goods, because the price of their goods determined the value of their currency. The o i l embargo of the 1970s imposed by the OPEC countries, originally intended to punish the nations that supported Israel i n the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, dealt a serious blow to international stability. Quadrupling their prices, the OPEC nations gained i n wealth at the expense of oil-importing nations. Poor oil-importing nations borrowed on international markets to finance their o i l purchases. Banks i n the United States, Europe, and Japan made substantial loans to countries i n eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa—whose total debt by the end of the 1970s topped $1.3 t r i l l i o n . Brazil's debt was nearly $100 b i l lion; Mexico's was close to $90 billion. To ensure their survival, nations such as Brazil, Hungary, and Poland allowed World Bank personnel to impose regulations on domestic economic policy i n return for loans, an unprecedented sacrifice of national sovereignty to an international body. Nonetheless, nonpayment by the

debtor nations threatened to topple the world's banking structure as it became apparent that these poor nations could not repay their loans. The debt crisis of the 1980s pressed the I M F to the l i m i t . Debts continued to be rescheduled, but the largest debtors showed an everdeclining ability to pay. I n January 2002, Argentina faced a severe economic and political crisis as it was unable to pay even the interest on its foreign debts and faced draconian solutions to stabilize its economy. This situation, and the w o r l d recession of 1978-1985, had different effects on different parts of the globe. Unemployment soared around the world, especially i n the less developed countries, which were also plagued w i t h rising population rates. I n the United States the recession contributed to huge trade deficits and federal budget deficits. The United States was the first nation to recover from the recession, largely by generating a huge national debt and borrowing heavily from foreigners. A creditor since 1917, the United States now became a debtor nation. I n the late 1980s the United States momentarily lost its financial dominance to the Japanese, who themselves would later be challenged by Asia's "Four Tigers"—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Sin-

Global Economic Milestones 1944

Bretton Woods Conference plans peacetime economy

1945

International Monetary Fund, World Bank chartered

1947

General Agreement on Tariffs and >i Trade established ^

.

.

.

.

•;;>•:•':-•••••

•••

•

1948

Marshall Plan in Europe

1949

COMECON instituted

1950

Dodge Plan instituted in Japan

1971

President Nixon takes dollar off gold standard

1973-1974 •V 4 i 1980s

. ,

OPEC oil crisis Banking crises in Latin America and eastern Europe i

1987

U.S. stock market crash

1989

USSR and Soviet Bloc abandon ï central planning model •

'

.-

. >

'3

•

1995; World Trade Organization established 1997-1998 2002

ian economic crisis Asian Euro introduced

v.;

CHAPTER 33 • gapore. New technologies and cheaper labor overseas produced high-quality items that cost less than U n ­ manufactured goods. Competition was especially severe for Americans in the advanced technology and automobile markets until the early 1990s. The resulting foreign trade deficits increased the desire for protectionist legislation in the 1980s, espe­ cially in the United Slates. Many congressional mem­ bers argued that Japanese İrade restrictions and subsidies harmed U.S. agricultural and technological exports while American markets remained relatively open to foreign imports. The GATT mechanism was pushed to the breaking point. In 1989 the United States invoked Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to levy sanctions against India, Brazil, and Japan lor unfair trade practices. By the end of the 1990s Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia faced serious economic problems as a combination of vastly overvalued real estate investments, currency speculation, and cor­ ruption led to a collapse of those countries' curren­ cies and fears of a meltdown of the Asian economic system that would threaten the global economy. Once again the I M F stepped into the crisis w i t h its pre­ scriptions of closing d o w n weak banks and busi­ nesses, austerity budgets, and fiscal conservatism. Also, the United States plunged billions of dollars into the region to stabilize the situation. The Asian crisis had a damaging effect on the new capitalist economies o i the former Soviet Bloc. Russia's inabil­ ity to lake the serious steps lo reform its economy and the crooked nature of its economy made the Russian market rickety even before the Asian crisis. Westerners found themselves on the horns of a dilemma: whether lo let Russia suffer through its cri­ sis w i t h the possibility that the democratic experi­ ment might fail or to pour more billions oi dollars in with (he knowledge that most of it would never help most ordinary Russians anyway. Given the turbulence of the previous half century, however, the loundation established at Bretton Woods allowed the world to avoid the inflation and depression that marked the 1920s and 1930s. The long-running Uruguay Round of the GATT talks, İn which ihe United Stales worked with 115 other states lo updalc the GAIT rules, ended successfully in December 1993. This led to the establishment of the W o r l d Trade Organization (WTO), a streamlined approach to continuing the light against trade barriers that had been successfully waged by GATT since World War I I , which in 2001 admitted China into its tanks. At the same time, the interdepen­ dence of the world economy made it impossible to isoWorld Trade Organization (WTO)—Tin: sin.Lessor organization to GATT (tlx' General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs), established in 1995. As with ils predecessor, the organization curried on the light against trade barriers.

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late the economic shocks produced by ihe September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and its effects. Also, the recession i n the United Slates thai began alter two quarters of negative economic growth in 2001 affected the entire world, leading lo increased unemployment, declining profits, and decreased invest­ ment in research for new products. The economic interdependence produced a num­ ber of shared transformations. Global economic growth produced an affiliated global challenge lo the environ­ ment. A population explosion led to the demand For more resources and raw materials. In response, the ruin forests of Southeast Asia and Soulh America—essential for the recycling of air-and water—wer e being destroyed at a rapid rale. Technological advancement made fish­ ermen more efficient, and they began to reduce the essential stocks of the worlds' fisheries. Larger indus­ tries, especially in Mexico, China, and Brazil, created more pollution of the air and water. The North Ameri­ cans—who consumed 20 times as much water' as South Americans—through their automobile-based lifestyles

With the end of the Cold War and the decade of WOTS in lite former Yugoslavia, illegal immigration from eastern Europe and the Balkans Itecame a serious issue, especially for the Italians. MOWN here is a boatload of Albanian refugees being turned away at Brin¬ disi Itah in March 1997.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST AMD PRESENT

added to ihe forces producing global wanning and the holes in the ozone layer. Economic interdependence and the demand for more workers brought women massively into the workforce. Even though labor-saving devices permitted housework to be done in one-tenth the lime, the traditional family underwent a fundamental change. The advances in the equality of women with men were not everywhere the same, but it is not to be doubted that a social revolution is taking place. As the world becomes more interdependent, it also becomes more vulnerable. The magnelic lure oi one-fourth of the world being rich while three-fourths of the world remains poor has produced a demographic movement not seen since the nineteenth century. National boundaries have become porous, a development which favors the work of terrorists. AlQaeda may have been acting more lo destabilize governments in the Middle East—especially oil-rich Saudi Arabia—when it struck at the United Stales on September 11, 2001. The statements of Osama bin Laden say precious liltle about poverty. But it cannot be doubted that as long as the disparity between the rich and the poor remains, and grows, the capitalist world will be the target of more attacks. All of the advanced military technology of the United States and its allies in the war against terrorism cannot remove the fact that in striking at violence, the rich countries are attacking the symptom of a crisis, not the cause.

Environmental

Challenges

Increased consumption of resources through generation of electricity, transportation, and manufacturing processes has threatened the world's environment. I n this new, interdependent world, the postwar international economic growth and the technological revolutions generated an unwelcome by-product: pollution. The UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 produced no serious negotiations but d i d sound the call that environmental problems know no national boundaries. Since then, a number of international congresses and conventions have discussed the damage of global pollution: the destruction of air quality, the damage to the oceans, and the threat to the world's supply of drinking water. For every victory in the war against p o l l u t i o n such as meaningful programs to preserve the oceans' capacitv to replenish their fish, local campaigns to reclaim polluted lakes and rivers, and new technology to cut ihe damage to the environment of automobiles— there were setbacks in other areas. Global warming and the destruction of the ozone layer posed serious dangers to the world's increasing population ranging from increased rates of skin cancer to the threat of rising levels of the world's oceans that threatened cities such as Venice. It is difficult to deal with the damage created

Although there are debates over the causes of the global wanning that is taking place, satellite images such as this prove that there is no doubt that the holes in the protective ozone layers are becoming larger, as are the threats to the planet's people.

when modern industry and technology generate byproducts that destroy the environment and, at an equivalent pace, the planet's forests. The slashing and burning of forests in Southeast Asia and the Amazon basin threatened the earth's natural capacity lo replenish the water supply and Ihe cleanse (he air. Massive environmental problems plagued the former Soviet Bloc, especially i n Central Asia where the fourth largest body of fresh water in the world—the Aral Sea—is in process of disappearing. The abysmal conditions in which the centrally planned economies left eastern Europe and Russia overwhelmed planners and reformers. The capitalist world has yet to work out the conflict between economic development and environmental safety for itself, let alone the peoples of the former Soviet Bloc and the developing world. Admittedly tentative steps to control the process of global warming such as the Kyoto protocol could not gain, for example, the participation of ihe United States, which valued its economic development over global approaches to shared problems.

CONCLUSION The United States, experiencing its longest-running economic growth cycle, still faces the challenges of making its pluralistic system work and preserving ils basic civil liberties in the face of the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001. Its investments in anliterrorist campaigns and the Iraq and Afghan wars have led to a federal budget

CHAPTER 33 deficit of close to $500 billion and a dependence on imported capital, to the tune of $1 billion a day. I f Europe can continue to work out the old problems of political and cultural particularism, its economic union holds the promise that i n the twenty-first century, as i n the nineteenth, economic power w i l l return to the Europeans. Its success w i l l depend on its being able to integrate the states of eastern Europe. I n 1989 the Soviet Union disintegrated i n a revolutionary change not seen since 1848. After 15 years the results were varied. The former Soviet republics i n the north entered the European Union, after gaining their independence. Those to the south faced corruption and ethnic conflict. I n general, except for the top

The United States and Europe Since 1945

1001

10 percent, the Russians endured a general decline i n the quality of life but seemed to be adapting to their new system of democracy under Putin. All of these political entities must adapt to meet the changing challenges of technological development and the changes i n the role of women and the family. The pressures of globalization demand increasing efficiencies from the countries of the "North," as many jobs move to the developing w o r l d . Maintaining the r i c h diversity of national identities i n the face of a globalized culture perpetuated almost exclusively by American media also poses a challenge. And w i t h all that, international concerns for the degrading of the environment remain acute.

Entertainment, 1957) captured the apocalyptic nature of the time. Oliver Stone provided a compelling, particularist viewpoint You can obtain more information about topics included in this of America in JFK (Warner, 1991), Nixon (PBS, 1995), WallStreet chapter at the websites listed below. See also the companion (Twentieth Century Fox, 1987), and Born on the Fourth of July website that accompanies this text, http://www.ablongman.com/ (Universal, 1989). Sam Mendes held a magnifying glass up brummett, which contains an online study guide and additional against the tensions and fractures of American families in the resources. Academy Award-winning American Beauty (Universal/MCA, 1999). Spike Lee's Malcolm X (Warner, 1992) traced a leader's NATO Official Home Page saga. Michael Wadleigh's Woodstock (Warner, 1970) caught a http://www.nato.int movement's life at its apogee. Joel Schumacher's St. Elmo's Fire Official documents for the rapidly changing European scene (Columbia/Tristar, 1985) provides a window into the lives of an in the 1900s. idealistic generation's process of coming to terms. Gary Ross's Pleasantville (New Line, 1998) is a time warp into the conformity The European Union of the 1950s. Alan J. Pakula's All the President's Men (Warner, http://www.eurunion.org 1976) examines the reporters who brought down a president. Information on events within the European Union. Barry Levinson's Wag the Dog (New Line, 1997) lays bare the role of spin doctors in American political life. Woody Allen's Annie The New European Politics of the 1990s Hall (MGM/UA, 1977) sparred with the concept of romantic love. http://nwl.newsweek.com/nw-srv/inetguide/guide 2023877.html A new kind of politics emerged in Europe during the 1990s— the so-called third way between traditional socialism and Suggestions for Reading conservatism. Prime Minister Tony Blair exemplifies that For a fine new synthesis see John R. McNeill, Something New path and his career can be traced on the site. Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (W. W. Norton, 2001). On the profound transformaLiterature and Film tion in women's roles in the twentieth century, see the classics by Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Vintage, 1989), and Thomas Wolfe's novels and essays—for example, The Bonfire of Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (W. W. Norton, 2001). the Vanities (1987) and Radical Chic & Mau-Mauing the Flack Catchers (1970)—cast a cynical eye on the realities of the 1960s At the end of the 1980s, Joseph S. Nye Jr. wrote a magisteand 1970s. Neal Stephenson's Snow Crash (1992) opened up new rial analysis of the United States' role in Bound to Lead: The horizons in the writing of science fiction. John Updike's and NorChanging Nature of American Power (Basic Books, 1989). Most man Mailer's novels and short stories show as much about their of the postwar presidents have produced memoirs. evolution as the countries. Marguerite Duras dealt with love in The resurgence of western Europe is dealt with in J. Robert a difficult time in The Lover (1984) and Hiroshima Mon Amour Wegs, Europe Since 1945 (St. Martin's Press, 1991). Michael (1959). John le Carré brought the spy novel to new heights in Emerson et al., The Economics of 1992: The E.C. Commission's Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974) and The Spy Who Came in fromAssessment of the Economic Effects of Completing the Internal the Cold (1963). The Oxford Don J. R. R. Tolkien brought the epic Market (Oxford University Press, 1988), is a wise assessment of into the late twentieth century in his work on the Hobbits in his the challenges and promises of the united Europe. Easily the trilogy. Heinrich Boll was awarded the 1972 Nobel Prize for his best coverage of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe contribution to German literature, particularly his novel of Geris Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (Oxford Univerman life from World War I (1914-1918) through the 1970s, sity Press, 1993). Gruppenbild mit Dame {Group Portrait with Lady; 1971). Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (Random House, 1998), captures the human tragedy of the Yugoslav In film, the Italian Frederico Fellini dealt with the insanicrises. J. L. H. Keep's Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet ties of the nuclear age in La Dolce Vita (Republic, 1960) and Union 1945-1991 (Oxford University Press, 1995) is the best genAmarcord (Home Vision Entertainment, 1974), a portrayal of eral study of the factors bringing an end to the USSR. A new comgrowing up in Fascist Italy, which had a contemporary relepilation of articles on the political situation in Russia after 1991 see vance. In France François Truffaut led a new wave of French Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov, eds., Between film makers with films such as Jules et Jim (Fox Lorber, 1962) Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political and the film version of Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 Reform (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). (Universal, 1966). Ingmar Bergman's Seventh Seal (Home Vision

Suggestions for Web Browsing

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 The Struggle for Survival

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

The Middle East: Religion and

Africa: The Search for National

Politics

Identities

DISCOVERY THROUGH MAPS: Borders

DOCUMENT: The Village That Has

and Identities: The UN Partition Plan

"Eaten Itself Limb by Limb"

DOCUMENT: Ayatollah Khomeini,

Latin America: Reform,

Message to the Pilgrims

Repression, or Revolt

1940 1948 State of Israel proclaimefl; National party wins white election in South Africa and Institutes apartheid

1950

T

he Middle East and Africa comprise new countries created after 1945 when the old European empires disappeared, while the nations of Latin America won their independence in previous centuries. Whatever their origins, during the Cold War,

these nations served as an arena for competition between Washington and Moscow: some of its leaders were successful in manipulating that contest to their own advan-

1957 Ghana becomes first subSaharan nation to gain Independence; Suez Canal Crisis 1959 Cuban revolution brings Castro and the communists to power

1960 i 9 6 0 Eighteen African nations gain independence 1967 Arab-Israeli War

tage, and others were not. In addition to the Cold War, political leadership, population pressure, health crises, external debt, and economic dependence were major

1970

factors in the evolution of Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African nations in the

1973 Military coup overthrows Salvador Allende in Chile

second half of the twentieth century. At the turn of the century the vast majority of the nations of the developing world remained trapped by poverty, overpopulation, and the indifference of the developed world. More than 92 percent of the world's population (much of it in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America) lived in areas where per capita GDP (gross domestic product) did not exceed $3000. Different factors (varying by place) accounted for this widespread backwardness, among them: corrupt leadership, the dominance of a peasant subsistence economy, the residual effects of colonialism, the lack of capital, the lack of education, rising fuel prices, inflation, inadequate health care, and overpopulation. Large areas of each of these three regions are sparsely populated, isolated, and lacking in adequate transport systems. Conversely, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East all contain exceptionally large cities that have become magnets for rural tn-migration in the last 50 years. Millions of people have left stag-

1976 SowetO uprising in South Africa 1979 Iranian Revolution; start of I ran-Iraq War

1980 1980 Zimbabwe institutes black majority rule

1990 1994 Nelson Mandela elected president of South Africa; Rwandan genocide; creation of NAFTA 1995 Islamic party wins election In Turkey 1995 Vicente Fo* elected as president of Mexico

nant rural areas for densely populated urban megacenters that are plagued by crum-

2000

bling infrastructure, air and water pollution, and joblessness. The end of the Cold War

2000 Vicente Fot elected as pre si Pent of Mexico

and the increased threat of terrorism, however, have signaled a worldwide reconfiguring of economies, governments, allegiances, and identity politics. Whether the nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America will benefit or suffer from that evolving set of circumstances remains to be seen.

1003

1004

C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T Eastern nations and drawn world attention to the region in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center, w h i c h was carried out by the radical Islamist group al-Qaeda. Decolonization was a gradual process. Although some of the Arab states were granted independence in the interwar period, the mandate powers, Britain and France, retained a significant military and economic presence. During World War I I , England reoccupied Iraq and used Egypt as a staging ground for its war effort. Only in the generation after the war did all the nation-states of the Middle East truly gain their independence. I n the meantime, the arrival of European Jews seeking refuge in the area after the war, Zionist mobilization (which aimed at the establishment of a Jewish stale i n Palestine), and Great Power political pressure led to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This touched off a bitter conflict between the

THE MIDDLE EAST: RELIGION AND POLITICS • Why have Islamist movements become popular in so many Muslim countries? Four major factors conditioned the evolution of the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century: the creation of the state of Israel, decolonization, the exploitation of oil resources, and the Cold War. (The latter three factors, it is Important to note, also characterized regions of Africa and South America.) Toward the end of the century, a fifth element, the growing popularity of Islamist movements, has challenged Ihe established secular governments of Middle Islamist—Political groups that advocate government based on a strict interpretation of Islamic religious and Segal tenets.

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All the national borders oj the Middle East have been drawn after World War I. National identities have evolved since that time and regional allegiances have taken on a variety of configurations.

Israeli-occupied territory

CHAPTER 34 •

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

new state and its Arab neighbors, who viewed Israel as a symbol of continued European imperialism i n the region. Israel's creation provided a homeland for Jews brutalized by the Holocaust, but i t produced an immediate refugee problem as thousands of Palestinian residents fled or were driven from their homes. I t also created the dilemma of how a Westernized state w i t h a significant Muslim and Christian population could also be a Jewish state. Israel was then, and remains, one of the most significant factors i n Middle East politics, although its relationships w i t h the Palestinians and w i t h each of its regional neighbors have evolved along significantly different lines. I n the aftermath of the creation of Israel, a determined group of Egyptian army officers decided to free Egypt from the British yoke once and for all. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt helped lead the revolution that overthrew King Faruq i n 1952, made Egypt a republic i n 1953, and ended British control over the Suez Canal. Nasser became a hero of Arab nationalism -c~*and of the Nonaligned Nations movement i n the context of the Cold War, playing the United States and the Soviet Union against each other. MM He envisioned Egypt becoming a dominant The Modern power i n the Arab w o r l d , the M u s l i m w o r l d , Middle East and Africa, but many of his ambitious modernizing schemes failed, as d i d his attempt to merge Egypt and Syria into one Arab state. Egypt and Israel formed the two poles around w h i c h the Arab-Israeli conflict was to revolve i n the decades to come.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict I n 1947, plagued by Zionist terror tactics, B r i t a i n referred the question of the mandate for Palestine to the United Nations. The resulting p a r t i t i o n plan, w h i c h gave most of the territory of Palestine to the Jews, was rejected by the A r a b League. As w i t h its precipitous withdrawal from (and partition of) India about the same time, Britain responded to the deteriorating situation i n Palestine by announcing the end of the mandate. I n the ensuing chaos and civil war, the armed and well-organized Zionist community seized Palestine and proclaimed the independent state of Israel i n May 1948. Conscious of its hostile surroundings, the fledgling Israeli state took steps to become militarily, economically, and politically strong. The success of those efforts became quite evident i n 1956 when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. As allies of the B r i t i s h and French, the Israelis retaliated and overwhelmed the Egyptians i n a war for control of the canal. InterArab League—An organization of 21 Arab states formed in 1945 to coordinate policies on economic affairs, communication, social and health issues, and international affairs.

1005

The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948

State of Israel proclaimed; Arab states attack

1956

Israel joins Britain and France in war on Egypt for control of Suez Canal

1964

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded

1967

Israel wins Arab-Israeli war (Six-Day War), occupies conquered territories; UN Resolution 242

1973

Egypt and Syria attack Israel (Yom Kippur War)

1977

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat talks peace in Jerusalem

1978

Camp David Accords

1982

Israel invades Lebanon

1993

Israel and Palestinians negotiate limited autonomy for the Palestinians

2001

Ariel Sharon becomes prime minister of Israel; new Palestinian intifada

national pressure applied by the United States, the USSR, and the United Nations forced the Israelis to withdraw from their territorial gains. But Israel's successful partnership w i t h the old colonial powers was a slap i n the face to the Arab states, still smarting from their failure to prevent Israeli statehood i n 1948. External pressure, however, brought only a temporary reprieve from hostilities. The issues of Palestinian rights and statehood, the security of the state of Israel, and free access to the Suez Canal continued to be contested, monopolizing the attention of foreign policy makers i n the region, as well as i n Moscow and Washington. I n 1967 Nasser sought a military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict by m o b i l i z i n g his forces and those of the Arab states surrounding Israel, requesting the withdrawal of U N peacekeeping forces, and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's access to the Red Sea. Israel retaliated, and w i t h i n 72 hours, had completely overwhelmed and humiliated Nasser and his Arab allies. When a cease-fire was arranged after only six days of fighting, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, including the east bank of the Suez Canal, East Jerusalem, the west bank of the Jordan River, and the tactically important Golan Heights inside Syria. Meanwhile, the Palestinians, disillusioned by the failure of the Arab states to liberate Palestine, had begun to mobilize to fight Israel on their o w n . The

T

he borders of new nations can be planned and mapped, but those plans and maps are often radically different from ground-level realities. The United Nations' partition plan for the British mandate of Palestine is a case in point. After World War I I , the Zionists in Palestine began aggressively to push for the establishment of a Jewish state. Violence i n the mandate, created out of the Ottoman Empire by the treaties of World War I , escalated between 1944 and 1947. Then Britain's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, reflecting Britain's loss of control i n the area, referred the "Palestine Question" to the United Nations. The U N created a special committee in 1947 that proposed the end of the mandate and its partition into one Arab and one Jewish state, with Jerusalem as a special internationalized city. The proposal was accepted by Zionist leaders and rejected by Arab leaders. After hard lobbying by U.S. President Harry Truman, the partition plan passed in the UN General Assembly. But the plan, shown on this map, never became a reality. Britain's planned withdrawal from Palestine caused a panic i n the mandate. Zionist forces seized the initiative, gained control of Palestine, and proclaimed an Israeli state on May 14, 1948.

The drawing of borders i n the Middle East for mandates after World War I , and later for nationstates often d i d not take into account the identities or wishes of the people living there. But the drawing of these borders ultimately did create new national identities, like those of Israelis and Jordanians, residents of newly created states. Others, like the Palestinians, were dispossessed by the new boundary lines and began a struggle for their own nations and "national" identities. The UN partition plan for Palestine was designed by a committee that spent only five weeks in the mandate. It had to take into account the political, religious, and strategic interests and demands of many competing parties outside of Palestine. The resulting map was an awkward patchwork of divided territories. Over 50 years later the ultimate shape of the map of Israel is still contested. Questions to Consider 1. Look at a series of maps of this region beginning in 1900; how frequently have the boundaries changed? 2. The mandate for Palestine was a small territory and not rich. Why did so many groups and states have an interest in what happened there? 3. What factors prevented the creation of a Palestinian state out of the mandate for Palestine?

CHAPTER 34 • The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 Palestine L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (PLO) was founded i n 1964. A secular umbrella organization aiming to establish an independent Palestine, i t rejected the idea of an Israeli state. The PLO was given added impetus by the Six-Day War, a t r i u m p h for Israel but a disaster for the Palestinians. The conquest of the occupied territories created new waves of refugees and made the Israelis masters over a large and unwilling population. N o w Israel had three types of residents: Jewish citizens, Palestinian citizens ( M u s l i m and Christian) w i t h second-class citizenship status, and individuals under military occupation who had no citizens rights. The U N responded to the 1967 war w i t h Resolution 242, which recognized Israel's right to exist but ordered the return of the occupied territories. Arguing both that they were essential for the defense of Israel and that they constituted part of the Promised Land, the Israelis refused to give up the territories and launched a program of Jewish settlements designed to make the newly conquered lands indelibly Jewish. These territories thus became the focal point of an ongoing struggle between Israel, the Palestinians, and the surrounding Arab states. The Arab states each pursued their o w n national agendas and Cold War alliances, but they were united i n their opposition to Israel. After 1967 the PLO worked to organize resistance to Israel. I t supported political activities, schools for Palestinians, work programs, and military and guerrilla training. Tensions mounted as attacks by Palestinian guerrillas were met w i t h Israeli counterattacks. The Soviet Union was a major supplier of arms, aid, and technicians to the Arab states. The United States provided arms and aid to some Arab states but committed itself to the existence of Israel, investing b i l lions of dollars a year i n aid. That support was a reflection of American perceptions that Israel, as a "Western" state founded by European immigrants, was a natural ally, but i t also reflected the support of many Americans for the Judeo-Christian tradition and biblical promises of a return to Zion. Realizing the danger of a Soviet-American confrontation i n the Middle East should a new round of war explode, Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR explored ways to bring the contending parties to agreement. Acceptance of a cease-fire i n the summer of 1970 gave some hope for a settlement, but the situation deteriorated a few months later when Israel charged Egypt w i t h cease-fire violations. Then Nasser died suddenly, which was a great blow to the Egyptian people, and Egypt needed time to reestablish itself under a new leader, Anwar Sadat. But soon overt

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—A group founded in 1964 whose goal was to establish an independent state of Palestine.

1007

conflict between Egypt and Israel resumed. On October 6, 1973, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, the Egyptians and Syrians launched a coordinated attack on Israel. For the first few days, the Arabs held the initiative, but Israeli forces counterattacked, crossing the Suez Canal into Egypt and driving to w i t h i n 25 miles of Damascus, the capital of Syria. I n some of the most concentrated armored combat since World War I I , thousands of lives were lost and 1800 tanks and 200 aircraft were destroyed. During the fighting, the United States organized a large airlift of arms to Israel, and the Soviets responded w i t h troop movements. Soviet and American leaders, however, averted a possible showdown through consultations, and the U N arranged a ceasefire. I n January 1974, Egypt and Israel signed a pact, providing for m u t u a l troop withdrawals, the return of the east bank of the canal to Egypt, a U N buffer zone, and an exchange of prisoners. Fighting continued between Israel and Syria i n the strategic Golan Heights area. The Yom Kippur War and its spin-offs were costly for the Middle East. Israel spent $5 b i l l i o n and suffered 5000 casualties i n addition to an ever-increasing rate of inflation generated by war expenses. Arab casualties were more than five times the Israeli losses. But whereas the Israelis came to a sober realization of their demographic and financial limitations, the Egyptians came out of the war w i t h improved morale.

Oil Politics As the Cold War was gaining momentum and the state of Israel was establishing itself, a new economic weapon was emerging i n the Middle East. Oil had first been exploited by the British i n Iran early i n the twentieth century. I n 1933 I b n Sa'ud, sovereign of the newly constituted kingdom of Saudi Arabia, granted an o i l concession to the American O i l Company (ARAMCO). Bahrain began exporting o i l i n 1934 and became the first Gulf state to develop an oil-based economy. Oil was soon discovered i n Arabia and i n the kingdom of K u w a i t (a B r i t i s h protectorate from the end of World War I until 1961). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states now control at least 50 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. But major production d i d not gear up u n t i l after World War I I , and foreign companies tended to control the revenues and organization of Middle Eastern oil resources i n the 1950s. Their dominance began to change i n 1960 when the Organizat i o n of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to gain control over their o i l output and pricing. For these states, o i l began to mean global power. Oil also meant an influx of foreign workers for

1008

C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D PRESENT

the petroleum-producing states: Western technical workers. South Asian laborers, and workers from neighboring Middle Eastern states seeking higher wages. These workers were part of a world phenomenon of migration for labor that intensified in the twentieth century, affecting The SaudiAfrica and Latin America as well as the Middle Aramco -50/50" East. While foreign technical workers enjoyed Agreement excellent wages and a high standard of living, foreign domestics often worked under conditions reminiscent of slave labor. Neither group was well integrated into their host Middle Eastern societies. In 1973, OPEC's Arab member slates deployed the oil weapon in the aftermath of the October ArabIsraeli war. Saudi Arabia placed an embargo on oil shipments to the United Stales, and the Arab oil-producing states cut production, creating panic i n the industrialized world and long lines at gas pumps. The embargo symbolized a new balance in systems of world power, i t harshly affected the Japanese and the Western Europeans, who respectively received 82 and 72 percent of their oil from the Middle East. The United States, which imported only 11 percent of its oil supplies from the Middle Easl, suffered substantial disruption in its economic activity, and a shocked American public began to rail against Saudi "oil shavkhs." The embargo was lifted in 1974. but the industrialized nations had been forced into a greater appreciation of oil as a world-class weapon wielded by states that otherwise had little leverage in world politics. Oil prices have fluctuated since then and have risen in recent years. OPEC has used its control over price and production levels to gain for its member states a greater voice i n world affairs. Indeed, OPEC serves as a model for newly independent o i l producing nations among the oneLime Soviet republics that hope to use current and projected oil r esources as lever age to gain a share of world economic and political power.

Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, standing besidi b S president Jnn,,i\.-Corfu' shakes hands with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Carter had invited Begin and Sadat to a summit meeting a! Camp David in September 1978 tti work nut a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. This agreement was celebrated in the West, but it failed to produce the hoped-for resolution to the ArabIsraeli conflict.

Egyptian-Israeli Détente In September 1975, Egypt and Israel reached an agreement by which additional territory in the Sinai peninsula was returned to Egvpt and both sides resolved not to resort to force. The United States agreed to provide up to 200 civilian technicians to maintain a precautionary warning system between the two sides. Washington also committed additional arms and financial support to Israel and Egypt (who are still the two largest recipients of U.S. aid). In late November 1977, President Anwar Sadat initiated a dr amatic shift in regional affairs when he flew to Jerusalem to conduct peace talks with Israeli leaders. Sadat, born of a peasant family, had excelled in school and entered the Royal Military Academy. He had worked with other officers to rid Egypt of British domination and in the coup to expel King Faruq. A loyal follower of Nasser, Sadat succeeded him as president in 1970, Thereafter, he gravitated increasingly into the U.S. sphere, eventually ordering the 18,000-member corps of Soviet military and technical advisers out of his country. Sadat faced serious problems at home, brought on by a falteting economy and a rapidly increasing population. These problems led to severe riots, sparked by runaway inflation. In part as a result of these internal conflicts, Sadat came to believe that Egypt's most compelling need was for peace and recovery. The United States strongly supported Sadat's peace overtures, and President Jimmy Carter invited

CHAPTER 34 •

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

Sadat and Israel's prime minister, Menachem Begin, to meet at Camp David, outside Washington, i n September 1978. After intense negotiations, the three leaders produced a framework for peace. Israel agreed to return all the Sinai to Egypt, but no definite agreement was reached on the status of the West Bank, where 1 m i l l i o n displaced Palestinians lived. I t was proposed that negotiations should begin to set up an elected self-governing authority for the Palestinians and to end the Israeli military government. The Camp David Accords recognized that the Palestinian question was inextricably linked to the question of Middle East peace. Nonetheless, while Egypt and Israel have maintained a sometimes precarious peace, the Palestinian question over two decades later has not been resolved, and the final status of the West Bank remains a critical issue. Sadat and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize i n 1978. The Sinai was returned to Egypt and the Suez Canal opened to Israeli ships. I n 1980 the two nations opened their borders to each other, exchanged ambassadors, and began air service between the countries. But Sadat was viewed as a traitor i n the Arab world, and Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, losing the dominant position i n the region that Nasser had secured for i t .

Separate Destinies: The Evolution of Turkey and Lebanon Once nation-states were created i n the Middle East, they evolved i n very different ways. Some became rich as a result of the exploitation of oil; others remained poor. Most developed secular governmental systems; others, like Saudi Arabia, retained the Sharia (Islamic law) as the basis of their political and legal systems. I n the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern states chose sides, cultivated alliances, or tried to remain aloof. A good example of the divergent ways i n which Middle Eastern states evolved is found i n the cases of Turkey and Lebanon. The former became a model of Western-style secularism i n the Middle East; the latter was devastated by civil war, rooted i n religionbased politics and the dislocations caused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike much of the Middle East, Turkey escaped the fate of becoming a tributary of Britain or France after World War I . Its attainment of independence early i n the century and the success of Ataturk's radical secularizing reforms made Turkey a model of sorts for those who envisioned Western-style, secular government as the proper course for Middle Eastern nations. Yet Ataturk's transformation of the institutions of government, education, religion, and law did

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not eliminate Islam as a powerful force i n Turkish society. After Ataturk's death Turkey entered an inevitable period of readjustment, d u r i n g w h i c h i t struggled to reach an equilibrium between its religious and cultural traditions on the one hand and the Westernized secularism of Atatürk on the other. Turkeys first multiparty elections were held i n 1946, and i n 1950 the opposition Democratic party won a substantial majority of the votes. One of its first acts was to legalize the call to prayer i n Arabic, reverting to a traditional practice that Atatürk had outlawed. Over time other aspects of the secularizing policies of Atatürk were moderated, reflecting the religious sentiments of much of the Turkish populace, which is 99 percent Muslim. Despite these changes, however, Atatürk remains a dominant figure i n the Turkish public imagination, and the Turkish government, particularly the military, remains committed to secularism. The tensions between secular nationalism and the cultural and religious practices of the population are not, of course, unique to Turkey. Indeed, such tensions have marked the evolution of the world's nations i n the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What makes the case of Turkey particularly remarkable is the short time frame i n which Atatürk enacted his radical secularizing reforms. After World War I I both Turkish and Iranian sovereignty were threatened by Soviet expansionism, w h i c h drove each state i n t o the U.S. camp. From the late 1940s on, the United States perceived Turkey and I r a n as strategic bulwarks against the Soviet Union and poured military Voices of and economic aid i n t o both. Turkey permitProtest ted the Americans to establish military bases on its territory and built up its own military w i t h U.S. aid. Although i t remained an i m p o r t a n t ally of the Americans throughout the Cold War period, that relationship was seriously strained i n the 1960s and 1970s w h e n the United States supported Greece i n the struggle for the Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Since that time, Turkey has explored closer relations w i t h other Middle Eastern states (including Israel) and is seeking to establish itself as a regional power and as a broker i n relations between Europe and the newly constituted Central Asian republics spun off from the Soviet Union. Since the 1950s, Turkey has retained its secular, democratic, multiparty government, although coups i n 1960, 1971, and 1980 each brought interludes of m i l i t a r y rule. Turkish society now faces a series of challenges ranging from devastating inflation and devaluation of its currency to an undeclared civil war w i t h elements of its Kurdish population i n the eastern provinces to new political challenges mounted by Islamist parties. I n the 1990s the Turks elected their first female prime minister, Tansu Ciller, leader of the True Path

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party, and Turkey's first Islamist prime minister, Necmetlin Erbakan, a member of the Refah party. These elections suggest the divergent strains in Turkish politics. The Refah party, which promised a series of Islamic reforms, won substantial victories i n 1994 in the major centers of Istanbul and Ankara. This populist party, w i t h its appeal to Islamic values and Its vigorous social programs, struck a sympathetic chord, especially among the poor and the millions of rural Turks who had recently migrated to the large urban centers. Refah won the 1995 national elections by a slim margin and ultimately constructed a precarious coalition government w i t h Erbakan as prime minister from 1996 to 1997. But the military, interpreting Refah's successes as a threat to Turkey's secular system of government, maneuvered to oust Erbakan, and in 1998 the Turkish High Court outlawed the Refah party. In 2002, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development parly won a two-thirds majority in Parliament and Recep Erdogan, who had been jailed in 1999 for encouraging religious hatred, was selected as Prime Minister. This lime the military refrained from directly involvement in the political process. One of the first acts of the new government was to refuse the U.S. military access to Turkey's military bases to launch the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Unlike Turkey, Lebanon became a mandate of the French after World War I , and that era of colonial rule indelibly marked its evolution as an independent state. Lebanon's capital, Beirut, was once one of the mosl beautiful and affluent cities in the Middle East, a cen-

ter for commerce and a crossroads of cultures and religions. But in the 1970s, it became an arena in which competing factions played out their ambitions. First, Lebanon became a battleground in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yassir Arafat had been driven out of Jordan in the early 1970s. It set up its headquarters in Lebanon and stepped up demands for Israeli withdrawal from the wesl bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip, both captured by Israel during ihe 1967 war. The PLO wanted an independent Palestinian stale and, in pursuit of that goal, launched guerrilla raids from its bases in southern Lebanon and encouraged demonstrations lo harass Israeli authorities. I n response, beginning i n 1978, Israel made repeated incursions into Lebanese territory to strike back at the PLO bases. Civil war added to Lebanon's troubles. This small, ethnically mixed nation, its area slightly less than that of Connecticut, is divided among Muslim, Christian, and Druse factions. The Druze originated as a Shi'ite splinter group in the medieval era; they now constitute a separate religious faction. Syria and Lebanon had been declared independent in 1941, but the French relinquished control only grudgingly and waited five years to withdraw their troops. When they left, they set the stage for political and religious violence. The Christians held a slight majority in Lebanon, and France wanted to ensure the continuity of that Christian dominance. So they sei up a political system for Lebanon based on confessional politics—political office allocated by religious affiliation. Under this system, the various factions maintained for a time a somewhat precarious balance. But high Muslim birthrates—in addition to the influx of Palestinians after the creation of Israel, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and civil strife in Jordan in the early 1970s—tipped thai balance. The Christians, initially supported by Syria, fought the Muslim and Druze factions in the streets of Beirut until an October 1976 ceasefire. The cost was 25,000 dead, thou-

f

Tansu Ciller green supporters in Istanbul in ¡998. Although this photo shows the prime minister dressed couser\'ati\-ely in a headscarf, Ciller was educated in the United Stales and, like manv Turkish women routm'Jy wzars "Western" style professional clothing. The headscarf in Turkey has, however, become a symbol of women'srightto choose their dress and their identity.

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sands more wounded, and sections of the city gutted. The country's once flourishing economy was at a standstill. I n the summer of 1981, PLO forces i n southern Lebanon fired rockets into Israel, w h i c h responded w i t h massive air attacks on Palestinian strongholds i n Beirut. Hundreds of civilians were killed. I n the summer of 1982, the Israelis invaded the city, surrounding Muslim-held West Beirut. Under siege, the PLO agreed to evacuate Beirut i n September, under the direction of a French, Italian, and U.S. multinational contingent. But after this multinational force departed, the violence resumed; the newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel, a Christian, and 26 of his colleagues were killed by a bomb. I n apparent response, Christian militiamen, unchecked by the Israelis, massacred over 1000 Palestinian men, women, and children i n two refugee camps. Although the Israeli invasion forced the PLO out of Lebanon, the state remained a battleground, and Israel supported an occupied buffer zone i n southern Lebanon until the end of the twentieth century. I n the succeeding decade, the skeletal outlines of bombed buildings, shadowy videotapes of hostages, and pictures of young and old darting through streets to avoid gunfire made Lebanon a symbol to the w o r l d of the costs of civil strife. Many of Beirut's citizens fled during the course of the civil war; others remained hopeful that an equilibrium could once again be reached. Although the civil war eventually ended, Syria capitalized on the chaos to extend its power over parts of Lebanon, and Israel i n the 1990s continued periodic air strikes. Today Beirut has i n many ways recovered from the civil war. Lebanon remains, however, tainted by intercommunal violence, its uneasy position vis-à-vis Syria, and the deep-seated hostilities that the Arab-Israeli conflict has produced.

The Iranian Revolution Iran, w h i c h had served as an area of competition between the British and the Russians since the nineteenth century, became a bone of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War I I . Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ascended the Iranian throne i n 1941 after the Allies forced his father to abdicate for supporting Germany i n World War I I . After the war, he asked foreign troops to w i t h d r a w from his country. But the continued presence of Soviet troops on his borders, the aggressive activities of the Iranian Communist party (Tudeh), and a shared interest i n exploiting Iranian o i l moved the shah increasingly into the U.S. camp as the Cold War geared up. By the early 1950s, Pahlavi had gained a reputation as an American ally who wished to continue the traditions of authoritarian monarchy but who was, politically, rather weak.

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Meanwhile, some segments of the I r a n i a n popul a t i o n were chafing under the m o n a r c h y and the continued c o n t r o l o f I r a n i a n o i l by B r i t a i n . They found a hero i n a member o f the traditional landed class named M o h a m m a d Mosaddeq (MOS-a-dek). Elected Prime Minister, Mosaddeq i n 1953 advocated a set of liberalizing reforms and nationalizat i o n of I r a n i a n o i l . His program directly challenged the shah, w h o fled the country. B u t the United States had committed to Pahlavi as a Cold War ally and saw Mosaddeq as a threat. I t boycotted I r a n i a n oil, used the CIA to support a m i l i t a r y coup that overthrew Mosaddeq i n 1954, and helped restore the shah to power. For the next 25 years, I r a n rested f i r m l y w i t h i n the o r b i t o f the U n i t e d States, a valuable source o f o i l and a b u l w a r k against Soviet expansion. I n r e t u r n , the Americans supplied the shah's arsenal. Mosaddeq remained under house arrest and became a symbol of I r a n i a n resistance to b o t h Western imperialism and kingly authority. The shah attempted a rapid modernization of his country, but his so-called White Revolution threatened the integrity of Iranian culture. Pahlavi imagined h i m self a benevolent father, dragging an u n w i l l i n g and ignorant I r a n into the twentieth century. B u t many Iranians saw h i m as brutal dictator and a Western pawn. The presence of over 100,000 foreigners (especially oil industry technicians and military advisers) i n the country, i n c l u d i n g 47,000 Americans, alienated many Iranians, who perceived the shah as undermining both Islam and Iran's political and economic base. Opposition to the shah's rule spread widely i n the 1970s, from militant communists to Shi'ite clergy to discontented nationalists. Inflation angered the business classes and the laborers. Peasants who were disenchanted w i t h the shah's land reforms and who had swelled the ranks of impoverished migrants i n the capital city, Tehran, also resented the shah's rule. The plight of these peasants and their resentment toward the shah, w i t h his fancy palaces, lavish celebrations, and affluent, Westernized retainers, is graphically depicted i n children's stories by the I r a n i a n author Samad Behrangi. I n one of those stories, a ragged and hungry village boy, who has come to Tehran w i t h his father to find work, describes the fancy neighborhood where the rich, Westernized Iranians live. / came to the streets where there wasn't any smoke or dirty smell. The children and adults all had clean, fresh clothing. Their faces shone.... Whenever I came to such areas, I thought I was sitting in a theatre and watching a movie. I was never able to imagine what kind of food they ate, how they slept or spoke, or what kind of clothing they wore in such tall, clean houses. 1

The boy and his father ultimately decide to go home, t h i n k i n g i t better to starve i n the village sur-

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rounded by family and friends than to starve homeless and alone i n the city. The characters in Bchrangi's sto­ ries symbolized the suffering of many of the Iranian people despite Iran's o i l wealth and the shah's West­ ernizing reforms. To stem the growing opposition to his regime, the shah launched a reign of terror. The storm broke i n January 1978 when large numbers of students demon­ strated in the streets. Many were killed and wounded by the shah's troops. Strikes and demonstrations spread throughout the country u n t i l they became a revolution. The army and secret police (SAVAK) proved helpless i n the face of the revolt. I n January 1979 the shah fled the country, seeking asylum i n the United States, then i n Panama, and finally in Egypt, where he died i n 1980. The main objective of the disparate factions par­ ticipating i n this revolution was to get rid of the shah. Once that task was accomplished, the coalition broke down and the Shi'ite clergy used its organizational apparatus to gain ascendancy. The diffuse and wide­ spread revolution found its focus i n the aged Ayatol¬ lah Ruhollah K h o m e i n i (ko-MAY-nee), a Shi'ite holy man who had been exiled i n 1963 for speaking out against the shah. From Iraq and then from Paris, he had carried on an incessant propaganda effort directed at the shah's "godless and materialistic" rule. Khome­ ini's rhetoric struck a sympathetic chord among Ira­ nians offended by the shah's anti-Islamic reforms, ostentatious lifestyle, and "selling out" of Iran's resources to the West. When the shah was finally forced out, Khomeini returned i n t r i u m p h to I r a n where, by popular man­ date, he took up the reins of power. The monarchy was abolished, and Iran became a republic w i t h a single-house parliament {the Islamic Consul­ tative Assembly). Khomeini promptly banned Western music on radio and television, Ayatollah tCıcmei.ıi "provocative" bathing suits, liquor, and a broad range of other items deemed "un-Islamic." Consolidating his power after the revolution, the Aya¬ tollah retained Iran's constitutional government but based it firmly on the Sharia (Islamic law). He then changed the c u r r i c u l u m and textbooks of Iran's schools to reflect the ideology of the new regime. The implementation of sexual segregation i n the schools and the mandatory re-veiling of women i n public pro­ voked a reexamination, and considerable debate on the status (and proper place) of women in society. Khomeini viewed the United States as the "Great Satan," a power intimately associated w i t h the abusive rule of the shah and a symbol of imperialism, materi­ alism, and godlessness. He encouraged the expression of anti-American sentiments. I n November 1979 a mob of young Iranians stormed and seized the U.S. embassy and took 53 hostages, w h o m they held for

over a year. This act and other consequences of the revolution alienated I r a n from its previously warm relations with Western powers, who were fearful of the implications of Islamic rule and of the potential for dcstabilization of the Middle East. Iran's regional neighbors were also alarmed at Khomeini's rise to power, fearing that he might export his Islamic revolution. I n the aftermath of the revolu­ tion, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, hoping for a speedy victory over a weakened Iran, attacked Iranian airfields and oil refineries i n September 1980. This attack provoked a war that devastated the Iranian economy, already severely disrupted by the revolution. The financial drain of the war helped force the Irani­ ans to release the U.S. hostages i n return for the United States' release of Iranian assets frozen in response to the hostage taking. The Iran-Iraq war dragged on for nearly a decade until an armistice in 1989—brought on by exhaustion. It had been a war of attrition i n which both sides suf­ fered enormous losses. The Iranians employed all of their resources, including 12- and 13-year-old boys, i n attacks against the well-ensconced but smaller Iraqi army. The Iraqis violated the accepted international rules of combat by using chemical weapons. K h o m e i n i died i n June 1989, but the idea of Islamic revolution lived on. Iran became a worldwide model for people disenchanted w i t h secularism and interested i n new state formations that might com­ bine representative government w i t h traditional reli­ gious culture and law. Within Iran, as i n Turkey after the death of Atattirk, a period o f adjustment was inevitable. While the new Islamic government better reflected the religious and cultural beliefs of many Iranians, a government controlled by the mullahs (Islamic religious authorities) was too conservative, too restrictive, or too religious for many segments of the Ayatollah society. Iran also has a very youthful pop­ Khomeini's ulation; i n 1991, 44.3 percent were under Vision o l Islamic age 15 and 71 percent under age 30. I n Government 1997, w i t h strong support from young people, women, and intellectuals, Mohammad Khatami (a moderate member of the ulama) was elected pres­ ident by a nearly 70 percent vote. Khatami advocated a less restrictive interpretation of Islamic law, fewer restrictions on the media, and the opening up of rela­ tions w i t h the West. His election (and reelection in 2001), i n w h i c h women voters played a prominent role, reflects the struggle going on i n Iran over the social and political interpretation of the 1979 revolu­ tion. As Khatami pushes for further liberalization and reform i n government, Iranian journalists and film­ makers are testing the limits of censorship w i t h a vibrant and satirical press and film industry. Mean­ while, the enormous Iranian student population—

CHAPTER 34 • The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

Document

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Ayatollah Khomeini, Message to the Pilgrims

The following message was written in September 1978 while Khomeini, in exile in Iraq, was preparing to leave for Paris. An appeal for solidarity of all Muslims with the Iranian people in their struggle against the shah, it circulated among those making the sacred pilgrimage to Mecca. It was translated into Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, Malay-Indonesian, French, and English. The Saudi Arabian government was fearful of Khomeini's brand of Islam, and many Muslims felt little affinity for the Ayatollah's Shi'ite beliefs. But Khomeinis call to support oppressed peoples against the forces of imperialism and despotism was calculated to strike a sympathetic chord worldwide among all Muslims suffering under repressive regimes or Western dominance.

X T o w that it is the season of Pilgrimage to the saJ - X c r e d House of God and Muslims have come from all over the world to visit God's House, i t is necessary that they pay attention to one of the most i m portant aspects of this great gathering while they are performing the noble rites of the hajj, and examine the social and political circumstances of the Islamic countries. They must inform themselves of the hardships that their brothers i n faith are suffering and strive to relieve those hardships, i n accordance w i t h their Islamic and moral duty For fifty years Iran, which has about thirty million Muslims, has been i n the grip of the Pahlavi dynasty, a self-proclaimed servant of foreign powers. During those fifty dark years, the great people of Iran have been writhing under police repression, suffocation, and spiritual torture. The Shah has given foreigners all the subterranean wealth and vital interests belonging to the people. He has given o i l to America; gas to the Soviet Union; pastureland, forests and part of the oil to England and other countries. The people have been deprived of all the necessities of life and kept i n a state of backwardness. The imperialist system has taken control of the army, the education, and the economy of our country.... Now that our people i n recent years have awakened, risen up to gain their rights, and cried out against oppression, they have been answered w i t h machine guns, tanks, and cannons. The massacres that have occurred i n the cities of Iran i n recent months are a cause of shame to history. W i t h the support of America and w i t h all the infernal means at his disposal, the Shah has fallen on our oppressed peo-

male and female alike—is engaging i n its o w n persistent revolution, demonstrating for more freedoms and pushing back the veil required by law for women i n public places. However, reformist advances i n recent years were dealt a severe blow i n the parlia-

ple, turning Iran into one vast graveyard. General strikes engulf the country.... Martial law has cast its sinister shadow over the people, and his mercenaries and commandoes are busy killing young and old, men and women. I have not been permitted to continue my activity i n any Islamic country, my activity that consists of conveying to the w o r l d the cry of my oppressed people. Because I must at all events fulfill m y religious and ethical duty, I have been obliged to leave the Islamic world i n the hope of alerting human society to the suffering of the oppressed people of Iran. Now, O Muslims of the world, show concern for the problem of Iran, and convey to the world the cry of thirty m i l l i o n oppressed Muslims. The Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet, Muhammad] (peace and blessings be upon h i m ) is reported to have said: "He who arises i n the morning and gives no thought to the affairs of the Muslims is not a Muslim." O God, I have conveyed the message, and peace be upon those who follow true guidance.

Questions to Consider 1. How does Khomeini characterize the regime of the shah? 2. What language does he use to draw a picture of the plight of the Iranian people? Is it effective? 3. In Khomeini s view, what is the role of foreign countries in contributing to the suffering of the Iranians? From Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Kitomenmi, trans. Hamid Algar (New York: Kegan Paul, 2002). Copyright © 1980 by Mizan Press. Reprinted by permission.

mentary election of 2004 when the Council of Guardians, w h i c h screens candidates, disqualified over 2000 reformists from participating i n the elect i o n . As a result, those opposed to reform w o n an overwhelming victory.

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Mubarak improved Egypt's relations with other moderate Arab states as he struggled w i t h his country's overwhelming economic problems, brought on by a mushrooming population along the Nile and chronic problems of corruption w i t h i n the authoritarian regime. Mubarak solidified his position, maintained Sadat's foreign policies, and has proved remarkably durable after 20 years in office and significant challenges from Islamist factions. In Israel, huge outlays for defense drove the inflation rate to average over 50 percent in the last part ol the 1980s. The Israelis came to depend more and more on aid from the United Stales, whose annual announced subsidies exceeded $3 billion a year. Meanwhile, w o r l d and American public opinion became increasingly sympathetic to the Palestinians as their intifada ("uprising") within Israel drew harsh Israeli responses extensively covered on world television. Indeed, from the Iranian Revolution to the Palestinian intifada to the Persian Gulf War, television coverage began to play an increasingly influential role in the crafting of Middle Eastern politics. While committed to Israel's security, the United States, especially during the administration of President George H . W. Bush (1989-1993), continued to aid friendly Arab states who opposed Israel. This was particularly the case with Saudi Arabia, the main supplier of American oil imports. The United Slates sold the Saudis large quantities of sophisticated weapons and sent the U.S. Navy to keep the Persian Gulf oil shipPro-Iranian Muslims in Lebanon raise theirhands in salute to the ment lanes open during the latter stages of the IranIraq war. Ayatollah Khomeini daring a symbolic funeral held in Beirut to honor the deceased Iranian spiritual leader. Khomeini had become Iraq, a country w i t h immense oil reserves and an important world symbol of self-determination and opposition agricultural potential, had expended huge sums on the to Western dominance. For some Muslims he was a hero; many others, however, rejected Khomeini's brand of Islam and found his war with Iran. Under Saddam Hussein, the Iraqis had conservatism, subordination of women, and intrusive moral con- developed extensive military capabilities. Saddam, trol unpalatable. whose secular nationalist Ba'th parly regime had vigorously suppressed all political opposition in Iraq, imagined himself filling the power vacuum left in the Middle East by Nasser's death. But his aspirations to Toward a New Balance nuclear power were set back when ihe Israelis During the first part of the 1980s, Egypt remained an bombed his nuclear reactor in 1981. During the Iranoutcast among Arab countries because of its d é t e n t e Iraq war, more than a million people died in the fightwith Israel. In October 1981 a small group of Islamic ing, and ihe Iraqi leader used chemical weapons on militants assassinated Sadat while he was reviewing a Iraqi Kurdish villagers to intimidate the large Kurdish military parade. Shortly before his death, he had minority in northern Iraq. ordered a crackdown on the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , Soon after the Iran-Iraq war ended, Saddam Husw h i c h opposed his reconciliation w i t h Israel and sein launched another offensive in [he region. In Egypt's increasingly secular nature. August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded and overran the oilSadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, pledged to conrich nation of Kuwait. This aggressive act, and its tinue Sadat's commitments and welcomed U.S. supimplied threat to Saudi Arabia, produced an immediport in dollars and weapons. During the 1980s, Muslim Brotherhood—An Organization founded in 192B in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood promoted religious, political, and social reforms and sponsored social programs.

intifada—In Arahic, "shaking off." The name given to two separate Palestinian uprisings against Israel in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, the first between 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 9 3 and the second from 2 0 0 0 through the publieation date of this text.

CHAPTER 34 • The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 ate response. The fear that i f Iraq took the Saudi oilfields, i t would control one-third of the global o i l reserves moved the U N Security Council to impose a series of strict sanctions on Baghdad. The Soviet Union and the United States, both former patrons of Hussein, lined up i n opposition to the Iraqi dictator. For the next six months the UN, led by a coalition assembled by the United States, increased pressure on Saddam Hussein by imposing sanctions and embargoes on his country. The Iraqi leader received the support of the PLO and Jordan, but m u c h of the Arab w o r l d viewed his aggression w i t h fear and anger. When sanctions and embargoes failed to move Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, an American-led 26-nation coalition (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) began heavy bombardment of Iraq i n January 1991. A month later the allies launched a land offensive that, i n 100 hours, evicted Iraq's soldiers from Kuwait and left the coalition i n possession of one-fifth o f Iraq. This smashing of Iraq's forces represented a post-Cold War reconfiguration of Middle Eastern alliances. I t was clear that each nation-state i n the Middle East was pursuing its o w n agenda and that pro-U.S. or proSoviet designations were no longer adequate to explain Middle Eastern policy. Kuwait had been redeemed, but Saddam Hussein remained firmly i n power. He brutally put down uprisings by Shi'ite groups i n the south of Iraq and by Kurds in the north. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled and became refugees. Wartime o i l spills and o i l wells torched by the retreating Iraqis left an ecological disaster i n the Gulf region. Although soundly beaten, Saddam Hussein was a survivor. For over a decade after the Gulf War, he successfully resisted postwar, U.N.-mandated weapons inspections and maintained a tight grasp on Iraqi politics. The suffering of ordinary Iraqis under a prolonged international boycott was terrible. After the U.S. government overthrew the Taliban regime i n Afghanistan i n 2002 for its support of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network, i t focused its attention on Iraq. Claiming that the Hussein regime was a threat to regional and global stability because of its weapons of mass destruction and its support for international terrorism, the administration of President George W. Bush pushed ahead without a U N mandate and organized a coalition that toppled Hussein i n a short war i n 2003. The campaign split Americas traditional allies, w i t h Britain, Spain, Italy, and Japan supporting the United States, and France, Germany, and Canada refusing to participate. The aftermath of this second Gulf War has been messy. Insurgents have organized a resistance against coalition forces and and it remains uncertain whether a stable government i n Iraq w i l l emerge. Once the battles of the first Gulf War were concluded, diplomatic activity i n the major capitals of

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the w o r l d prepared the way for conferences that were expected to b r i n g peace to the region. A step i n that direction took place i n September 1993 when PLO leader Yassir Arafat and Israeli leader Yitzhak R a b i n met i n Washington to sign an agreement to t u r n certain parts of the occupied territories over to the Palestinians i n r e t u r n for guarantees of peace for Israel. Secret negotiations had brought the bitter enemies together. The PLO, isolated f r o m m u c h o f its financial support because o f its backing o f I r a q and challenged by the increasing popularity of Islamist factions, saw the negotiations as perhaps a last chance to m a i n t a i n a position i n the Middle East and gain a foothold for a future Palestinian state. Israel saw an o p p o r t u n i t y to construct a peace that w o u l d fragment its opponents and b r i n g some relief to an Israeli populace weary of war. The agreement set up a 5-year-long framework of l i m i t e d autonomy for the Palestinians i n Jericho and the Gaza Strip and continuing negotiations for a permanent solution. The Palestinian A u t h o r i t y assumed control over certain designated areas. For the first t i m e Palestinian schools were p e r m i t t e d texts that openly taught t h e i r pupils about "Palestine." B u t the settlement proved largely unworkable. Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli right-wing extremist i n 1995; and many Palestinians have become disillusioned w i t h their l i m i t e d gains under the new administration. The Israeli government has refused to alter its policies promoting Jewish settlements (which have increased by 60 percent since 1993) i n the occupied territories and has stepped up its annexation of Palestinian lands around Jerusalem. Suicide bombings by Palestinian factions i n Tel Aviv and Jerusalem have terrified Israelis and helped derail peace negotiations. I n 1998 Israelis celebrated 50 years of Israeli statehood, while Palestinians remained frustrated i n their hopes for independence. Both peoples remain deeply divided over the limits of Palestinian autonomy and over the future character of the Israeli state. Those divisions manifested themselves at the beginning of the new millennium through increased violence i n the occupied territories and a reassertion of the Palestinian intifada. Frustrated by the failure to achieve peace and security, Israelis i n 2001 elected the aging warhorse Ariel Sharon as prime minister. A war hero, L i k u d party stalwart, ardent proponent of Israeli settlement i n the occupied territories, and principal engineer of the invasion of Lebanon, Sharon promised Israel security and strong leadership. To the Palestinians, however, Sharon, whom they hold responsible for the refugee camp massacres i n 1982, is a symbol of Israeli intransigence and their dashed hopes for a Palestinian state. Arafat's control

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST AND PRESENT

Israel has been erecting a controversial security fence between Israel and Palestine's West Bank. Israel claims the fence is necessary to prevent Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel and killing civilians, whit: Palestinian officials maintain that Israel is ixpaudmg lis borders by building parts of the fence on Palestinian land.

over the Palestinian Authority was weakened by infighting and corruption, and the situation in Israel and Palesline devolved into civil war. Following Arafat's death in late 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected president ol the Palestinian Authority in early 2005. The attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001 compounded the anxiety of Israel and the Palestinians alike. Israel is concerned that U.S. efforts at forming a w o r l d alliance against terrorism w i l l enhance the bargaining power of Arab states at Israel's expense. The Palestinians fear that they will be tarred with ihe broad accusation of "supporters of terrorism" and hence lose what little bargaining power they have. Meanwhile, islamist groups in the region point to U.S. support for Israel and the continuing plight of the Palestinians as a primary justification for the World Trade Center attack.

Islamist Pactions After three generations of independence, some segments of Middle Eastern society have become disillusioned w i t h the promises of Western-style secular nationalism. Their hopes for prosperity and freedom under the new national regimes have often failed to

materialize, and their frustration has Found expression in support for Islamist movements. These movements, which assert the central role of Islam in culture, politics, and law, are not a new phenomenon (and they are not limited to the Middle East). They have their roots in the Islamic reform movements—the Muslim Brotherhood, for example—-of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But Islamist factions have been given impetus in recent decades by the success of the Iranian Revolution, the economic failures of secular regimes, and the corruption of moral and family values associated by some Muslims with the importation of Western culture. In the context of widespread poverty and political strife, some Islamist factions have gained support in the Middle East, particularly among the poor. These factions span a broad range of ideological and political positions. They may advocate a return to "traditional" piety and communal values, a rejection of Western consumerism and cultural imperialism, a more significant role Tor fslam in schools and government, or a discarding of secular rule altogether. Oflcn they augment their political base of support by providing social services such as adult education, job training, and relief services. The assassination of Sadat in Egypt and the victories of the Refah parly in

CHAPTER 34 •

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

Turkey are indicators of the success of Islamist rhetorics among certain segments of the Middle Eastern populace. So too is the popularity of Hamas among Palestinians. Hamas is an Islamist party that rejects Israel and advocates the implementation of Sharia law. I t became increasingly popular during the intifada as many Palestinians became disenchanted w i t h PLO leadership. Radical variants of Islamism came dramatically to the fore i n world consciousness i n 2001 when members of the al-Qaeda network—a clandestine, international, terrorist organization financed by the wealthy Saudi national Osama b i n Laden—launched an attack on the World Trade Center i n New York and the Pentagon i n Washington, D.C. B i n Laden, a m u l t i m i l l i o n aire adopted a form of m i l i t a n t Islam (that most Muslims reject) as a young man and joined other Musl i m volunteers fighting a holy war against Soviet troops from Afghanistan i n the 1980s. F r o m his bases i n Afghanistan (see Chapter 32) and elsewhere he trained young men to die as "martyrs" i n attacks against nations he considered "enemies of Islam." Originally, b i n Laden's primary target was Saudi Arabia, whose ruling regime he criticized for impiety, corruption, and allowing U.S. troops on Saudi soil during the Gulf War. But, increasingly, the United States, as world hegemon, has become his primary target. Most Muslims have denounced al-Qaeda's activities as unIslamic, but some have responded w i t h sympathy to bin Laden's charges that the United States is an intrusive and greedy imperial power that has backed the persecution of Palestinians and Iraqis. Governments i n the Middle East fear b i n Laden's repressive and extremist interpretation of Islam, a puritanical and violent interpretation that rejects their legitimacy and preaches their overthrow. Most administrations i n the Middle East remain committed to secular rule, as do many citizens of Middle Eastern states. But the successes of Islamist factions i n the area are a reflection of a worldwide process of self-examination among peoples suffering from economic deprivation, critical of the systems imposed during the period of Western imperial dominance, and interested i n incorporating their own cultural traditions and values more directly into the institutions of government, education, and law.

AFRICA: THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITIES • What was the legacy of European colonialism Africa?

in

I n 1945 there were four independent African nations; at the end of the century, there were 53 sovereign

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states. The critical years were from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1960s, when dozens of African states w o n their independence. Africa's postindependence leaders generally embraced K w a m e Nkrumah's dict u m to "seek ye first the political kingdom." They were optimistic that once they had t h r o w n off the shackles of colonial rule, they could b u i l d viable nation-states and tackle the poverty and underdevelopment that gripped the continent. But their optimism was shortlived as they underestimated the long-term impact of the colonial legacy and the fragility of the new states. The disillusionment of many Africans w i t h their newly independent states is captured i n the lament of Joshua Nkomo, a veteran leader of the freedom struggle i n Zimbabwe: "The hardest lesson of m y life has come to me late. I t is that a nation can w i n freedom w i t h o u t the people becoming free." One of the most pressing problems the new states faced was how to b u i l d and maintain national unity among different and sometimes antagonistic religious, cultural, regional, and ethnic groups. I n most cases, the new African states were not the product of a long historical process such as took place i n Europe. Most African boundaries were arbitrary creations of the imperialists and had little relation to the people who lived there, Nigeria, for example, was k n o w n as the "linguistic crossroads of Africa" because i t encompassed hundreds of diverse ethnic groups, all competing for a share of national resources. When African countries founded the Organization o f African U n i t y (OAU) i n 1963, however, they decided to m a i n t a i n existing boundaries rather than to open up conflicts by redrawing them. I n most newly independent countries, the men w h o led the freedom struggle took over the reins of power. However, politicians had little experience w i t h r u n n i n g governments, political parties were i m m a ture, and civil cultures were weak. The authoritarian governing styles of colonial rulers shaped the outlooks of many politicians, w h o d i d not tolerate opposition parties. A democratic culture d i d not take root, and power became increasingly concentrated i n the hands of executive presidents w h o often proclaimed themselves "president for life." There was little difference between a president's pronouncements and official policy. Civilian leaders i n many African countries did not last long, however, because soldiers were prepared to stage coups against governments. African armies are generally small, but they have the means to topple civilian governments w i t h ease. Soldiers usually justi2

Organization of African Unity (OAU)—An organization founded in 1963 to promote African unity and economic cooperation between member states and to advance Africa in science and technology, defense and security, and education and culture. It had 53 members and was replaced in 2002 by the African Union.

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When African nations gained their independence, they maintained the boundaries drawn by European colonizers in the late nineteenth century. Eritrea, which won its independence jrom Ethiopia in 1993 after a long war, is the only African nation to secede successfully Iron; an existing country.

lied a Coup by portraying themselves as guardians of the public interest who were saving their country from corrupt and inefficient politicians. As in Nigeria, they also intervened to protect regional interests. More than half of all African states have experienced military takeovers in the past four decades. Between 1952 and 1985, independent African slates experienced 54 military coups. A common cycle was for the military to stage a coup, return to the barracks in favor of civil-

ians, and ihen intervene again. One of the few African states to sustain a multiparty system is Botswana, which succeeded i n fostering political diversity, despite living for many decades in the shadow of neighboring white regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, however, a second wave of independence has swept through Africa. Grassroots people and civic organizations around the continent have stepped up their calls lor democratic

CHAPTER 34 .

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

Africa 1957

Independence of Ghana

1963

Creation of Organization of African Unity

1975

Intervention of United States and USSR in Angolan Civil War

1976

Soweto uprising in South Africa

1990

Release of Nelson Mandela from prison

1994

Genocide in Rwanda

2000

Election of Olesegun Obasanjo as President of Nigeria

government, and some promising steps have been made toward implanting democratic rule. Since the late 1980s, Africa has witnessed dozens of elections. Some of them have installed genuine democratic governments, while others have been manipulated by autocratic rulers and military officers trying to stay i n power. Both Islam and Christianity rapidly expanded over the last century. I n most African countries Christians and Muslims coexist peacefully, but i n countries such as Nigeria and Sudan, religious rivalries have been divisive. The Sudan has been i n the throes of a long civil war because its central government, dominated by Muslims who live i n the north of the country, has discriminated against southerners who are either Christians or adhere to indigenous African religious beliefs. Another critical part of the colonial inheritance was that independent African nations were saddled w i t h underdeveloped economies that were closely tied to their former colonial rulers. I n the 1960s African countries depended on primary products such as minerals and crops for about 80 percent of their exports. That dependence has not changed appreciably since then. Thus the health of African economies is still largely dependent on the prices their raw materials receive i n world commodity markets. Some African nations, such as Kenya and the Ivory Coast, adopted the view that the capitalist path was the correct path to development and prosperity. They modeled their policies after western Europe and the United States, encouraged foreign investment and private businesses, and promoted rapid industrialization. Other African leaders took the attitude that African economies, because of their marginal position i n the global economy, were doomed to perpetual underdevelopment and poverty. They tried to break their states' dependency on the West by adopting socialism and developing close relations w i t h the Soviet Union or China. African socialism typically

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meant state ownership of public enterprises, mines and industries, and banks and insurance companies, but socialist policies came i n many varieties. Some states, such as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique, practiced an orthodox brand of Marxism, while others, such as Tanzania, experimented w i t h a socialism based on African communal values. Regardless of the path taken, most African economies have not prospered. The nations of Africa i m p o r t more goods than they export, they have to import food to feed their o w n citizens, they have not attracted significant amounts of foreign assistance and foreign investment, and they have been plagued by enormous debts to lending institutions. African states devote about four times as m u c h on repaying debts as they do on providing health services. The net result is that most African states had GDPs smaller than the endowments of top Ivy League universities. Thirty-two of the 47 countries classified by the World Bank as "least developed" are i n Africa. And the poorer countries are even poorer than they were i n the 1960s. I n the first decades after independence, most African states retained close ties w i t h their former colonial rulers economically and politically, leading some observers to charge that independence was really another form of colonialism, or neocolonialism. Of the former colonizers, France retained a unique status i n its former colonies. French culture and language persisted among African elites, and France maintained its financial, technical, and military links. The French military intervened on several dozen occasions to rescue African leaders under fire from their o w n people. Francophone (French-speaking) African leaders usually paid more attention to their ties w i t h France than to those w i t h the OAU. By the 1980s, African states were shackled w i t h enormous debts, declining standards of living, and sluggish economies. GDP growth rates i n the 1980s averaged only 2.1 percent per year, while the populat i o n growth rate increased to 3.1 percent per year. As a result, since the mid-1980s, African governments have shifted their ties w i t h their former colonial rulers to international lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank and I M F cure for ailing African economies has been Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that compei African governments to

neocolonialism—The control exerted by developed nations over developing nations, usually former colonies that are still dependent on their former colonizers in economic and/or cultural areas even though they are politically independent. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)—Economic policies such as selling off state-owned enterprises and devaluing currencies that countries must follow to qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans and to make loan repayments on existing debt owed to commercial banks and the World Bank.

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promote market economies, liberalize foreign invest­ ment codes, and sell off state-owned enterprises to the private sector. More than two-thirds of African countries have adopted SAPs, but the cure has often been worse than the illness. The condi­ tions for loans—currency devaluations, an end World Bankto the subsidies of staple foods, and wage Supported freezes-—have imposed enormous pressures Day Care on governments to carry out highly unpopular policies that have provoked protests. Some countries and individuals have benefited from SAPs, but many others have suffered. Women and children have suf­ fered the most from these policies as various govern­ ment support programs for food staples, education, and health care have been ended. The gravest challenge confronting many nations in Africa and the world is the AIDS (acquired i m m u n ­ odeficiency syndrome) pandemic, which infected an estimated 34 million Africans and killed 12 million in the last 20 years of the twentieth century. One death in five i n Africa is attributed to AIDS, and an esti­ mated 6000 Africans are dying of AIDS every day. I n some countries, funeral parlors are staying open 24 hours a day.

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AIDS has particularly been devastating in south­ ern Africa, where life expectancy is expected to decline to age 47 by 2005. AIDS spread rapidly in the region because thousands of migrant laborers move from urban to rural areas, condoms have not been exten­ sively used, people are already infected with other sex­ ually transmitted diseases or have weak immune systems because of malnourishment, and AIDS suf­ ferers are ostracized i f their condition is publicly known. AIDS has adversely affected every aspect of African life, ranging from agriculture, where farmers stricken with AIDS can no longer till their fields, to the commercial sector, where businesses have to train many more workers because a certain percentage of the staff are out w i t h AIDS-related illnesses, and to African governments, which find it very difficult for their health care systems and providers to cope with the staggering cost of treating so many AIDS patients. In recent years, cheaper generic drugs have made it possible for more countries to provide antiretrovirals to their citizens. Some African countries such as Senegal and Uganda have had more success in keeping AIDS rates lower because their political and religious leaders have

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The spread of AIDS over ihe lets! two decades has hit the hardest in die continent oj Africa, This map shows the estimated percentages of those infected with the HIV virus in African countries in 2000.

Document

The Village That Has "Eaten Itself Limb by Limb'

In 2000 the global estimate for HIV/AIDS deaths was 3 million. HIV/AIDS deaths number about 20,000 annually in North America, while the figure for sub-Saharan Africa is 2.4 million. This is the equivalent of two World Trade Center/Pentagon tragedies each and every day. Besides its toll on human life, HIV/AIDS has left a profound mark on social and economic life and has become a major threat to human security. The following newspaper article comments on the impact of HIV/AIDS on a village in Zimbabwe.

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n Charumbira village i n Masvingo province, Zimbabwe, Wednesday is a sacred day. According to custom, it is the chiefs chosen day and no one is allowed to work i n the fields or dig—unless it is a grave that's being dug up. All women are to remain at home while the men gather under a barren fig tree to discuss matters arising i n the village. However, this custom has changed over the past two years. Now every Wednesday, 200 to 300 widows meet under the fig tree, to learn how to live w i t h the HIV/AIDS virus. The widows, whose husbands began dying of HIV/AIDS i n the late 1980s, have now come together to form a support group that w i l l help them to cope with the impact of HIV/AIDS. The group has been further divided into smaller groups of 30 to 40 women who meet regularly and visit each other to share their experiences or pay visits to the sick. The groups also help children w i t h food and money for school, i n families where both parents have died. Each group chooses three or four people to go for training, and on their return to impart their newly acquired knowledge about HIV/AIDS and how to live w i t h it. Although many women i n the village have not been tested for HIV/AIDS, most believe they are HIVpositive. M i r i r o Mukeda (30), whose husband died a few weeks ago, believes she is also infected. " I was still sleeping w i t h Jacob when he fell sick, and unless there is some miracle, there is no doubt that I am i n fected w i t h AIDS as well." Another widow, Susan Charumbira (44), who lost her husband 12 years ago, says villagers have been avoiding talking about AIDS. The cause of death is left to speculation. "People never wanted to talk about it, but my husband was HIV-positive, and I don't know how I have lived to this day. I thought I was going to die, and so was my child, who was then only one and half years. It is difficult to believe he is now finishing high school. However, I am getting sickly these days," she says, touching blisters on her face. According to Maget Madenga, also a widow, and one of the leaders and founders of the support group, the idea of a support group started i n 1994, but could not take off because many widows feared to be associated with AIDS and they refused to j o i n . " I t was

only two years ago, that women started facing financial problems i n sending children to school and feeding them, that started turning to support groups." AIDS has destroyed the economic base of the village and provoked changes i n its social fabric. M u pazi Tsveta (76), one of the village elders, has lost four sons to the pandemic and now has to care for their four widows and children. "The village has eaten itself limb by limb and it is now hanging on the balance," he says. "Once the women start to die there w i l l be no village to talk about anymore." "It is difficult to establish how many people have succumbed to the pandemic i n Charumbira." Tsveta stretches out his fingers, only to lose count after a few names, and all he can say is, "Pasi radya [the land has swallowed up countless villagers]." Chief Fortune Charumbira says all men who were between the ages of 20 and 45 i n 1990 have now died and most of them have left children and wives. A survey done by a local secondary school, M u davanhu, shows that at least 18 students i n a class of more than 40 pupils have no fathers. "It was after we saw an increasing number of very bright pupils dropping out of school, missing lessons and losing concentration that we decided to look into the matter," says deputy principal Reason Tsvakiwa. Tsvakiwa says HIV/AIDS is causing major disruptions i n school. Children can no longer afford to pay school fees and as a result the school has resorted to fundraising to keep operations running. "Being a teacher has become more than classroom work. We have to ensure the school has m i n i m u m resources to continue operating. Sometimes teachers contribute from their own salaries to help children who come to school on an empty stomach." Questions to Consider 1. What impact is HIV/AIDS having on family and social structure in this village? 2. What docs this article tell you about the challenge of combating HIV/AIDS in rural areas? From Scotch Tagwiyeri, "The village that lias 'eaten itself limb by limb,'" Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg, South Africa), March 12, 2001.

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vigorously supported frank public education programs on how to deal w i t h the disease.

North Africa France's two protectorates i n N o r t h Africa, Tunisia and Morocco, gained independence i n a relatively peaceful way i n 1956. I n sharp contrast stands the transfer of autonomy to Algeria. France had invested millions of dollars i n the development of this territory, largely for the benefit of French immigrants who, by 1960, constituted about one-tenth of the population. Although Algeria was an integral part of France and sent representatives to die French National Assembly, resentment against foreign control grew among the Muslim majority. Following a mounting campaign of violence, revolution broke out i n 1958. After four years of savage warfare whose repercussions brought down the French Fourth Republic, Charles de Gaulle paved the way for Algeria's independence i n 1962. Most of the 1 m i l l i o n Europeans living there left the scarred and battered country for France. The F r o n t for N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n (FLN), which led the independence struggle, ruled together w i t h the , armed forces for the first three decades of Algeria's independence. Abundant o i l and natural gas reserves attracted foreign investment and sustained a dramatic expansion of agri"The Wretched i d industry. I n the 1980s a sluggish of the Earth"

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economy and social unrest forced the government to introduce political reforms and allow the first m u l t i p a r t y elections for local government i n 1990. When parliamentary elections were held i n 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) w o n an unexpected victory over the F L N . However, the military intervened, voided the elections results, and banned the FIS. General Liamine Zeroual w o n elections w i t h o u t the FIS participating i n 1995, but his government has not been able to reach a settlement w i t h opposition parties or to slow bloody war between the m i l i t a r y and radical Islamists i n which tens of thousands of people have been brutally murdered. I n 1999 an election was boycotted by the main opposition parties. Libya made the transition from Italian colony to independent nation i n 1951 following a period of French-British supervision. Inspired by Nasser's revolution in Egypt, a group of young army officers led by Colonel M u a m m a r al-Qadhafi (gha-DAH-fee) overthrew the monarchy i n 1969. As "leader of the revolution," Qadhafi has remained Libya's head of state, promoting a jainahiriya {"state of the masses") philosophy, a blend o f socialist and Islamic ideas. Because Front for National Liberation (FLN)—A political organization established in 1954 that led the Algerian struggle for independence from France.

he opposed the formation of political parties and parliamentary democracy, Qadhafi established a government based on people's committees and popular congresses. I n 1977 Libya proclaimed itself the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Oil revenues have been the main source of Libya's economic growth, financing industrial development and paying for social programs, housing, health care, and education for many of its citizens. Qadhafi's regime nationalized all foreign-owned property, but declining oil prices led to the opening up of the private sector i n the 1990s. Libya's oil wealth allowed Qadhafi to promote an idiosyncratic foreign policy based on pan-Arab nationalism and support for revolutionary movements such as the PLO. Libya's intervention in Middle Eastern and African Affairs led to confrontations with western European nations and the United States, which accused Libya of sponsoring international terrorism. When Libyan agents were implicated after bombs exploded on a Pan American Airlines flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, and a French UTA flight over Niger, the U N imposed a trade and international flight embargo on Libya. The embargo was lifted i n 1999 after Libya handed over the accused bombers of the Pan American flight for a trial i n the Netherlands in which one of the bombers was convicted. After the United States ousted Saddam Hussein's regime i n Iraq in 2003, Qadhafi committed Libya to give up advanced weapons systems and has been rewarded w i t h increased cooperation from the United Stales and European states.

Middle Africa Ghana was the first n a t i o n south of the Sahara to gain independence. I n 1957 Kwame N k r u m a h (c. 1909-1972), its p r i m e minister, was the idol of African nationalists for championing African unity, and his newly freed n a t i o n was the symbol of freedom and democracy i n Africa. But i n the year after taking power, N k r u m a h Kwame began to muzzle the press and i m p r i s o n the opposition. I n 1964 he made Ghana a one- Nkrumah on African Unity party state. As he developed into an outright dictator, he embarked on ruinous economic policies such as a showy hydroelectric dam and support of a large m i l i t a r y establishment. Nkrumah's controlled press called h i m the "Great Redeemer" and "His Messianic Majesty," while his economy slid downh i l l under the weight of extravagant spending and corruption. In 1966 a group of army officers seized control of the country. Eager to speed economic recovery and restore some semblance of political freedom, the army leaders permitted the return to parliamentary institutions in 1969. Ghana thus became

CHAPTER 34 .

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

Ihe first African country to return to multiparty government after being under military rule. During the 1970s, another military junta staged a coup, but by the end of the decade, civilian rule had been restored. In 1981 the military under Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings (b. 1947) resumed control until 1996, when Rawlings was elected president in multiparty elections. Ghana made a major step towards entrenching democratic rule when Rawlings stepped down following elections in 2000 that brought John Kufuor into office. When it gained independence in 1960, Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, offered the greatest promise of a prosperous and stable future among all new African states. It had several thousand welltrained civil servants, more than 500 doctors, an equal number of lawyers, a substantial body of engineers and urban professionals, and vibrant universities. It was endowed w i t h a variety of important natural resources, especially oil. Between 1962 and 1966, a series of crises—disputed elections, corruption, and crime waves—undermined the government's stability. I n 1966 military officers took control of the country in a bloody coup. The following year, Ibo groups in southeastern Nigeria seceded and proclaimed the independent Republic of

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Biafra (bee-A-frah). The Nigerian government launched military offensives as well as an economic blockade against the rebel state. Hundreds of thousands, especially children, died of starvation. In 1970 Biafra surrendered and was reincorporated into Nigeria. After 13 years of military rule, civilian government was restored in 1979, along with a new constitution patterned after that of the United Stales. Designed to prevent a return of the ethnic and regional feuds that had wrecked the first republic, the new constitution created a federal system providing for the allocation ol powers between a central and 19 slate governments. However, following a sharp drop in petroleum prices, the military intervened again in 1983 and banned all political parties. In the early 1990s, it appeared lhai the military was preparing to hand over power to civilians. Bui after newspaper publisher Moshood Abiola (ah-beeOH-lah) was elected president in 1993, the governing military council declared the election results null and void, and jailed Abiola. Following the deaths in 1998 of Abiola in prison and of military strongman Sani Abacha, military leaders allowed elections and a return to civilian rule. I n the 1993 and 2003 elections, Olesegun Obasanjo (oh-bah-SAHN-joh) was elected

A child soldier of the Liberia Peace Council, one of the factions that fought for power in Liberia's civil war between 1997 and 2003. In many civil wars around the world, children have been forced into combatant roles as they have been separated from their families and kinfolk.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D P R E S E N T

and reelected president. As an army general, Obasanjo had served as head of state under a military government from 1976 to 1979, but he had distinguished himself then by advocating the return of government to civilians. Abacha also jailed h i m i n 1995 for three years. Obasanjo's major task is creating national unity in the face of regional, ethnic, and religious rivalries and ensuring that o i l revenues are distributed more evenly around the country. By contrast, the Democratic Republic o f the Congo, a country as large as western Europe but lacking any ethnic o r political unity, has made little progress toward creating a stable political environment. I n 1959 the Belgian colonizers, i n the face of general protest and serious rioting, promised independence. When self-government came the next year, 120 political parties representing regional and ethnic interests contested elections. The new government lacked unity and stability. A civil war broke out almost immediately, and Katanga province, which produced 70 percent of the country's mineral wealth, seceded. At the request of the Congolese government, U N peacekeeping forces intervened to restore order and quell the Katanga secession, which they d i d by 1964. The government still lacked coherence, and the army commander, General Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko (1930-1997), staged a coup i n 1965. He renamed the Congo Zaire, but his style of rule mirrored that of King Leopold of Belgium a century earlier. M o b u t u was a "kleptocrat": He and his elite bilked the mineral-rich country o f billions of dollars while leaving their people w i t h one of the lowest per capita incomes i n the world. Mobutu cleverly played Cold War politics and w o n support from the West by portraying himself as a b u l w a r k against c o m m u n i s m . When the Cold War ended, Mobutu made halfhearted attempts at negotiating w i t h opposition groups for a democratic constitution. His regime was finally toppled i n 1997 by an insurgency led by Laurent Kabila, who was supported by several neighboring states^In t u r n , Kabila spent most of his energy dealing w i t h a rebel force sponsored by several neighbors, Uganda and Rwanda, until he was assassinated i n 2000. Although his son succeeded h i m and the war shows signs of ending, Congo's future is not vety promising. Northeastern Africa, k n o w n as the H o r n of Africa, consisted o f Ethiopia, Somalia, and several small states. I t became geopolideally significant after 1945 because of its p r o x i m i t y to the sea-lanes o f the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. After Emperor Haile Selassie (1892-1975) returned to Ethiopia following the expulsion o f the Italians i n 1941, he kept the anachronistic feudal system largely i n place. I n the 1960s, i n the face of student and ethnic protests, the emperor failed to move decisively on land reform or reduce the dominance of his Amhara ethnic group i n

government. The crisis that led to his downfall began w i t h a famine i n 1973 that killed an estimated 200,000 people. Blame was pinned on his government for mismanaging drought relief, and strikes, student unrest, and scandal among the royal family all combined to b r i n g success to a m i l i t a r y coup that dethroned the emperor i n 1974. The new military rulers were bitterly divided among moderates and radicals. Following three years of disputes, the radicals, led by Mengistu Haile Meriam (b. 1937), seized control. Their governing council, the Dergue, immediately set to abolishing the country's feudal system, transforming Ethiopia into a socialist state w i t h a Stalinist one-party system. The council nationalized businesses and land, introduced collective farms, censored the media, imprisoned opponents, and executed at least ¡0,000 opponents. The Dergue then turned to addressing a host of secessionist movements i n Ogaden, a province adjacent to Somalia, and Eritrea, which had been governed first by the Italians and then by the British until being absorbed into Ethiopia i n 1961. Somalia had taken possession of Ogaden i n 1977, but the next year the Ethiopians broke w i t h their longtime American allies and signed a treaty w i t h the Soviet Union that gave them $1 billion i n aid, 17,000 Cuban troops, and up-to-date weapons. The Ethiopians launched a counteroffensive and pushed the Somalis back. In the late 1970s the Dergue also became bogged down i n protracted wars w i t h Eritrean and Tigrean guerrillas, who were fighting for independence i n provinces bordering each other. When Eritrea won its independence i n ¡993, it was the first case i n which an African state successfully seceded. Mengistu finally began to loosen his tight grip on the country. He reversed disastrous economic policies and moderated his political line. However, his efforts were too little and too late to make any difference. Tigrean rebels toppled his regime i n 1991 and have governed the country since then. Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged i n t w o brief b u t bloody wars after 1998 over an unresolved border dispute. Although a cease-fire is i n effect, relations between the two countries remain tense. In Somalia, where clan rivalries dominated national politics, Siad B a r r é (b. 1919) maintained himself and his M a r é h a n clan i n power for several decades by manipulating clan rivalries. However, insurgencies, droughts, and refugees contributed to the collapse of the B a r r é regime i n 1991, and a civil war between clans broke out. Food shortages i n the rural areas of southern Somalia led to some 300,000 dying of starvation. Televised pictures oí dead and dying infants moved the international community to action, and i n 1992 a U N peacekeeping force intervened to facilitate food relief.

CHAPTER 34 • The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 What started out as a humanitarian crusade, however, ended i n disaster when the U N force attempted to disarm w a r r i n g Somali factions and stabilize the situation. A number of U N and American troops lost their lives attempting to disarm the soldiers of one of the clan leaders, Mohammed Aydeed. The American contingent of the U N force was w i t h d r a w n i n 1994 and the remaining U N forces a year later. Since then, unity talks between clan leaders have faltered and no faction or coalition has been able to form a cohesive central government. One of the most tragic events i n recent African history was the genocide that took place i n Rwanda i n 1994 as H u t u extremists massacred an estimated 1 m i l l i o n Tutsis. This tragedy had been i n the making during the colonial era. German and Belgian colonial officials had reinforced Tutsi dominance over the Hutus by favoring Tutsi chiefs, replacing H u t u chiefs w i t h Tutsi chiefs, and compelling the H u t u to provide forced labor for the colonial economy. Catholic missionaries compounded the problem by catering to the Tutsis and excluding Hutus i n their schools: ; Antagonisms between the Hutus and the Tutsis intensified. Before Rwanda's independence i n 1962, the Tutsi monarchy was deposed and some Hutus took vengeance and massacred thousands of Tutsis. After independence, the H u t u majority took power and excluded Tutsis from political life and discriminated against them. Many Tutsis fled into exile i n neighboring states. After 1972, the dominant figure i n H u t u politics was a military officer, Juvenal Habyarimana (hah-byah-ree-MAH-nah; 1936-1994), who seized power i n a military coup i n 1972 but who w o n elections from 1983 on. I n 1990 a Tutsi-led rebel force invaded Rwanda from Uganda, sparking off a civil war that forced thousands of refugees to flee the country. Habyarimana and the rebels negotiated a transitional government, but i n April 1994, as Habyarimana and the president of Burundi were returning from peace talks, a rocket from an u n k n o w n source shot d o w n their plane, killing them both. H u t u extremists who opposed Habyarimana's negotiations w i t h the Tutsi rebels blamed his death on a Tutsi conspiracy. They methodically incited violence against the Tutsis. Mobilizing H u t u militia groups, k n o w n as interahamwe (in-terah-HAHM-way), and the presidential guard, they launched a reign of terror against Tutsis and any H u t u moderates who opposed them. Within a few months, their genocidal campaign had killed hundreds of thousands and forced more than 2 m i l l i o n refugees into exile. I n the chaos the Tutsi-led rebels seized power and interahamwe—Literally, "those who work together"; Hutu militia groups that helped carry about the Rwandan genocide against the minority Tutsi and moderate Hutus. '••

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ousted the Hutu-dominated regime. Many Tutsi and H u t u refugees have returned to Rwanda, and the government led by Paul Kagame has attempted to reconcile the ethnic factions.

Southern Africa I n southern Africa i n the 1950s and 1960s, white-ruled regimes resisted the calls for black majority rule, and African nationalist movements turned to armed struggle to bring about change. Self-governing white regimes i n Rhodesia and South Africa dug i n their heels and defied the "winds of change" to the north. Portugal clung to its African colonies because they were profitable and enhanced Portugal's prestige i n the w o r l d and because large numbers of Portuguese, especially the rural poor, had emigrated to the African colonies after World War I I . Frustrated by the lack of political change, African nationalist movements launched wars of liberation i n the Portuguese colonies i n the early 1960s. By 1970, Portugal was committing over 40 percent of its budget and more than 150,000 soldiers to the African insurgencies. A decisive moment came i n April 1974 when the Portuguese military, weary of the protracted African wars, revolted against the dictatorship that had ruled Portugal for nearly 50 years. The new military junta quickly concluded settlements w i t h African political movements i n Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The last two gained independence w i t h little difficulty as power was transferred to the leading party. Freedom for Angola was complicated by superpower rivalries and three Angolan political parties contesting for power. Following the granting of independence i n 1975, the parties were supposed to share power i n a government o f unity, but bloody strife broke out between them. The United States covertly assisted the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), while the Soviet Union and Cuba backed the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA). When the South African m i l i tary invaded i n support of UNITA, the Cubans sent troops to aid the MPLA. The South Africans pulled back their forces, but a civil war continued between UNITA and the MPLA and their external backers for the next two decades until UNITA's leader, Jonas Savi m b i , was killed i n 2002. Savimbi's death created the possibility of stability, although the future of this o i l r i c h country is unclear. Zimbabwe, the successor to Rhodesia, also suffered a painful war. I n the 1960s, some 250,000 whites ruled more than 5 m i l l i o n Africans i n Rhodesia. I n 1965 the white m i n o r i t y declared its independence from Great Britain, which declared that i t would not recognize Rhodesia's independence until full political

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Robert Mugabe has been Zimbabwe's only president since its independence in I9S0. Although he has stated that he will step down as president in 2008. his policies since the mid-1990s have contributed to a sharp decline in Zindiabwe's economy.

lights had been granted to the African majority. Britain did not send troops to end the rebellion, but neither a trade embargo imposed by Britain nor economic sanctions levied by the U N could force the whites to give up power. In the earlv 1970s, Britain and Rhodesia negotiated an agreement that would have allowed whites to maintain power indefinitely. But the agreement foundered because Alrican nationalists were virtually unanimous in their opposition to it. In the mid-1960s, Alrican nationalists launched a guerrilla war to overthrow white rule. A decade later the war intensified. Zambia and newly independent Mozambique allowed guerrillas to infiltrate into Rhodesia, while South African troops joined Rlmdesian forces in search-and-destroy missions, often crossing the borders into neighboring countries. While leaders struck a bargain w i t h several black leaders that placed blacks in political leadership but protected white privilege and landholdings and allowed whites to maintain control of the civil service, army, and police. Black factions led by Joshua Nkomo (1917-1999) and Robert Mugabe (b. 1924) boycotted the elections held in April 1978 and continued the war. Alter Britain brought all the parties together for fresh negotialions and brokered a settlement, new eleclions were held in April 1980, and Mugabe won a decisive victory. Mugabe was elected president of the nation, renamed Zimbabwe, and in four subsequent elections, entrenched himself and his political party in firm command of the government. Mugabe changed his ideology from Marxist socialism to markel socialism, and he promoted pragmatic reforms rather than a radical transformation of the economy and society. The most sensitive issue has been the continued control of a small number of while farmers over the best land. In the first decade of his rule, Mugabe's government bought some white farms but usually for the benefit oi ihe government's ruling elite. However, in recent years, as Mugabe tost support among urban Africans and war veterans of the freedom struggle, he tried to appeal lo rural Africans bv unleashing bands ol ihugs to seize while farms and turn them over to the landless poor. As a result, Zimbabwe's economy has plum-

meted and millions of Zimbabweans have sought refuge in neighboring states. South Africa was the dominant actor in the region, and its while minority defied the winds of change the longest. I n 1948 ihe Alrikaner-dominaled National party won a surprise victory in while elections and began implementing its policies of rigid racial separation known as apartheid. Parliament passed hundreds of new laws entrenching inequality. The Population Registration Act separated South Africans according to arbitr ary racial classifications. The Group Areas Act segregated residential and business areas in cities along racial lines. The cornerstone of apartheid was its program of territorial segregation, based on ihe historical fiction that all racial groups belonged to distinct nations and that Africans belonged to ten "autonomous" stales known as Bantustans, or homelands. These bogus states, carved out of land of little value lo white Souih Africans, were, not surprisingly, poor and underdeveloped, forcing a constant exodus of blacks to find employment on while farms and in urban areas as migrant workers. Those who could nol find work and housing and meet other requirements were classed as illegal immigrants and shipped back to the homelands. Millions of people, almost all of ihem black, were forcibly moved from their homes to achieve the apartheid vision. In the 1960s ihe Bantuslans were offered self-governing status and, i n the mid-1970s, full indepenBantustans—An official name lliar die Sonlh Alrican government gave in rhe l°50s In land reserves occupied hy ihe Africans These reserves comprised aboul l l ' i t ihe country's imal land The government later changed the name lo "homelands."

CHAPTER 34 -

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

dence. Four homelands accepted it, but—because recognition meant conceding that Africans were no longer citizens of South Africa—no count I T outside South Africa recognized their independence. I n the 1970s, the government began experimenting w i t h piecemeal reforms to prolong white domination into the next century. Laws were repealed prohibiting sexual relations and marriages across the color line and segregating racial groups in public places. In 1984 a new constitution established a tricameral parliament that featured legislative bodies for whites, Indians, and Coloureds (people of mixed-race ancestry) but pointedly left out Africans. The reforms, however, came too late to satisfy most blacks. Black political groups had waged nonviolent protest campaigns for many decades. Thus, when new laws required African women to start carrying passes, 20,000 antiapartheid women of all races marched on the prime minister's offices in Pretoria in 1956 to present petitions. They sang a song composed for the occasion that became an anthem for women's groups: "Now you have touched the women.... You have Struck a l ock. You have dislodged a boulder. You will be crushed." As these and other protests persisted, the government banned the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanis! Congress tn 1960. Their members responded by forming underground groups and turning to armed struggle. The government ruthlessly clamped down on the opposition, wielding new laws that allowed detention without trial. Many opposition leaders such as Nelson Mandela (b. 1918) were imprisoned for lengthy jail terms, while others were forced into exile to organize resistance from African stales to the north. Resistance was dampened for a few years u n l i l black workers and students renewed the protest. In r^ft—' 1976 black students rebelled against the govJ-J^ eminent s education policies, which prevented most blacks from acquiring skills. When police and soldiers clamped down on their A White , protests, thousands of youths left the country Apartheid to lake up ihe armed struggle. When the ANC and PAC renewed their guerrilla activities, South Africa launched a campaign of destabilization against southern African countries that supported them. To bring regional stales into line, the South African government applied a variety of economic pressures, unleashed cross-border raids against ANC bases in neighboring states, and supported antigovernment guerrillas in Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho. The cost of the wars and economic destabilization to southern African countries has been estimated at close to $1 billion. By the late 1980s. South Africa was under pressure on a number of fronts to end apartheid. International economic, arms, and sporting sanctions were !

1027

hurling and isolating the country, The economy was stagnating, new government programs were at a Standstill, and repression of antiapartheid activists was not silencing opposition. Moreover, time and demographics were on the side of the black majority, whose members were gaining clout in trade unions and the economy. Without a decisive break from its apartheid past, long-term prospects for change without considerable bloodshed looked remote. F. W. de Klerk (b. 1936), who replaced Botha as president i n September 1989, made a bold move in early 1990 by legalizing all banned political parties and freeing Mandela, the symbolic leader of many South African blacks, from almost three decades of imprisonment. De Klerk, who had not been known as a reformer, and Mandela, the inveterate foe of apartheid, were unlikely partners. However, they and their negotiating teams began the arduous process ol dismantling apartheid and preparing the way for the writing of a new constitution. They had to contend with ultraright-wing whites that disrupted meetings and hoped lo polarize the counlrv as well as conservative blacks that warned to prevent an ANC government. Although thousands died i n political conflicts leading up to the elections of April, 1994, amazingly, ihe elections proceeded w i t h few problems. The ANC

:

Nehon Mandela and Frederik W. de Klerk led the negotiations that brought about an end to white majority ride and elections in South Africa in 1994. Mandela was elected president, andde Klerk served for three years as a deputy vice president.

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decisively w o n the election, and Mandela was inaugurated as president, w i t h de Klerk serving as a vice president (he stepped d o w n in 1997). A crisis that a decade earlier seemed destined for a tragic end had been resolved through compromise and democratic elections. Mandela's government concentrated on healing the divisions between whites and blacks and tackling apartheid's legacy of inequality i n housing, health care, l a n d r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , education, and water resources. Mandela stepped d o w n , and i n the 1999 and 2004 elections the ANC and President Thabo Mbcki stayed i n power. South Africa has one of the highest percentages of HIV-positive people i n the w o r l d , but Mbeki's government was slow to address the disease u n t i l 2003 when it introduced a treatment program. While the South African government was undergoing its own transformation, it was moving to grant independence to Namibia i n 1990. A German colony until 1919, the area was known as South-West Africa and administered as a mandate by South Africa under the supervision of the League o f Nations. Following World War I I South Africa treated South-West Africa as one of its provinces and refused to transfer its jurisdiction to the U N , w h i c h had formally ended South Africa's mandate i n 1966. Inhabited by 1 m i l l i o n blacks and 100,000 whites, Namibia contained valuable mineral deposits, but even more important, it served as a buffer against the tide of liberation in black countries to the north. I n 1985 South Africa concluded an agreement with a coalition of blacks and whites for a form of selfrule, but it refused to negotiate w i t h the South-West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), w h i c h had been waging a guerrilla war from neighboring Angola and Zambia since the late 1960s. The stalemate was broken i n the late 1980s when Cuba agreed to w i t h draw its troops over several years from neighboring Angola. South Africa likewise offered to withdraw and then worked w i t h the United Nations to oversee a transition to independence. Elections were held i n 1989 w i t h SWAPO w i n n i n g nearly 60 percent of the vote. SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma held the presidency for three terms until he agreed to step down in 2004. Namibia has maintained its commitment to democracy and has held national and local elections on a regular basis.

LATIN AMERICA: REFORM, REPRESSION, OR REVOLT • What has been the impact of external debt on the economies of Latin American countries over the past 25 years?

After World War I I Latin America shared many of the problems experienced by the developing countries of the w o r l d outside Europe. For- , merly competitive economies—such as those M l i l M of Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil—fell far America behind rapidly advancing areas, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Whether in countries of primarily European stock (Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile), dualistic Indian-Spanish societies (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico), racially diverse societies such as Brazil and Venezuela, or single-crop economies such as those of Central America, Latin America faces serious challenges.

The Perils of the Postwar Era The years since 1945 witnessed many economic challenges and much political instability and social unrest in the region. For example, until an opposition party candidate was elected president in Mexico in 2000, the only countries with continuously elected governments after 1950 were those dominated by a single major party. Between 1950 and 1966 a total of 14 governments were forcefully overthrown, and dictatorial rule was imposed on more than half the Latin American population. However, in the last two decades, many military regimes have handed over the reins of government to civilian politicians. The political instability and the seeds of social upheaval spring from appalling socioeconomic disparities. Latin America has the most uneven distribution of income in the world. Educational and health services are inadequate, and literacy rates remain low. Life expectancy for L a t i n American males is around 55 years—17 years less than i n the United States and Canada. The population increases by about 2 percent yearly. By 1990 the region's population topped 500 million. Because agricultural productivity is inefficient and low, millions of people have moved from the rural areas to urban centers. Shantytowns on the edges of large cities house thousands amid filth, disease, hunger, and crime. Mexico City and Sao Paulo, Brazil, two of the world's largest cities, boast populations of about 20 million people. Latin American countries have faced serious economic challenges. After World War I I their principal economic strategy was to reduce reliance on European and American goods by producing their o w n manufactured goods. This strategy faltered, however, Pope John Paul 11 because i t d i d not create many jobs and Address because there was not a large enough consumer market for locally produced goods. I n addition, the economic health o f many Latin American states depended on the world market prices for one or two

CHAPTER 34 « The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 leading exports such as copper, wheat, and coffee. I n the 1960s, as the international prices for these products declined, economies stagnated. A recent problem of Latin American states is a crippling external debt. With the fivefold rise i n the price of oil following the 1973 Arab-Israel war and another jump in 1979, governments turned to international banks for loans as a way of stimulating their economies. The debt Latin American states owed to banks rose from $27.6 billion i n 1970 to $231 billion i n 1980 and to $417.6 billion dollars i n 1990. Many Latin American states found it very difficult to pay off the interest on the debt, let alone the debt itself. Many of those that agreed to structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made some progress i n paying or restructuring debt repayments. For some Latin American countries, the debt forced them to improve transportation and communications and make their economies more attractive to foreign investment, but for others such as Argentina, the debt has led to enormous economic hardships and political instability. Over the last two decades the international drug trade has plagued many Latin American states, w h i c h have served as producers of cocaine and heroin or as centers for distribution to N o r t h America, Europe, and Asia. Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico are major producers of drugs, while Central America and the Caribbean are important intermediaries for shipping drugs to N o r t h America. The coca bush and opium poppy grow wild, especially i n the foothills of the Andes Mountains. Small farmers i n less-developed areas are reluctant to give up their production because they provide important sources of income. The drug trade has presented a major challenge to governments because i t creates a parallel economy

Latin America 1946

Election of Juan Peron as president of Argentina

1947

Establishment of Organization of American States

1959

Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba

1960

Brasilia becomes capital of Brazil

1968

Mexico City hosts Olympic games

1973

Overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile

1999

American transfer of Panama Canal to Panama

2000

Election of Vicente Fox as president of Mexico

1029

that is not under their control and because i t leads to lawlessness as guerrilla groups and drug cartels finance themselves on its profits. Bribery and corruption have undermined the police, soldiers, judges, and politicians. Officials who combat drug traffickers have been targeted for assassination. I n Colombia the government declared war on the drug cartels centered i n the cities of Medellin and Cali, but even after their leaders were jailed or killed, smaller cartels sprouted up i n their place. The United States, i n cooperation w i t h L a t i n American governments, scored some successes i n the war on drugs through seizing illegal drug shipments and convincing growers to shift from coca or o p i u m to alternative crops. I n Colombia, small growers have been encouraged to produce coffee. But w i t h the price of coffee slumping i n 2001, some growers returned to coca production.

The Yankee Factor A key element i n L a t i n America is the relationship between the United States and its neighbors. American economic involvement i n Latin America remains massive. American companies continue to employ about 2 m i l l i o n people, pay 25 percent of the regions taxes, and produce one-third of its exports. I n the aftermath of World War I I , Latin America was not significant to American policymakers, who focused their attention on rebuilding the economies of Europe and Japan. However, as American fears of the spread of Soviet influence escalated, the United States paid increasing interest to keeping L a t i n American nations i n its orbit. The O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A m e r i c a n States (OAS) was created i n 1948 to bring 35 N o r t h and South American countries together for foreign policy consultations. The United States pressured Latin American states to abolish their Communist parties and break off diplomatic relations w i t h the Soviet Union. All except Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay did so. The United States signed bilateral defense pacts w i t h governments that forged closer ties between the American military and Latin American military elites. Finally, the United States assisted i n overthrowing regimes whose policies were perceived to be threatening American interests. I n 1954 the CIA aided i n ousting Guatemala's president, Jacobo Arbenz, because his land reform policies were opposed by the United Fruit Company, an American corporation and Guatemala's largest landowner.

Organization of the American States (OAS)—An organization composed of North and South American states originally founded as the International Union of American Republics. It changed its name to the OAS in 1948 and now has 35 members. Its primary objectives are to promote peace and security, representative democracy, conflict resolution, and economic development among member states.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST AND P R E S E N T

Although most Latin American nations won their independence in the nineteenth century, they have struggled to free themselves oi authoritarian regimes and to pursue economic stability and growth in the shadow of the United States, which has long dominated the region.

CHAPTER 34 •

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since ¡945

1031

As part of its warOn illegal drugs, ihe U.S. government has cooperated With Latin American nations to stop drug production at its source. This photo shows a plane spraying defoliant on a Colombian plantation growing poppies, the source of opium.

was tried in an American court on charges of drug trafficking and is currently serving a lengthv jail term in Florida.

South America

Alter ilie failure of llie American-sponsored invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961 (see Chapter 32), President John F. Kennedy initiated the Alliance for Progress to improve the quality of life and strengthen democratic institutions i n Latin American nations. The United States pledged $20 billion, to be matched by the other members of the alliance, but the Alliance failed by 1970 as little economic growth took place and the United Stales backed military regimes that took over in many Latin American countries. One long-standing source of discord between the United Stales and Latin America was removed in 1978 when the U.S. Senate approved the treaty that returned the Panama Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama in 1999 while safeguarding American interests in the area. This agreement, negotiated over a period of 14 years under four American presidents, was a sign to some thai the United States was eager to improve relations with its neighbors. However, there were some excesses the United Stales would not tolerate: Allegations thai Panamanian President Manuel Noriega cooperated in drug running and overturned democratic elections moved U.S. President George W. Bush to order an American military invasion of Panama to oust Noriega in December 1989. Noriega Alliance for Progress—A U.S. governraenl assistance program initiated in 1961 by h i s idem John !• Kennedy aimed at Improving relations between Ihe United Slates and Latin American nations bv promoting democratic government and economic development and addressing economic inequalities.

In the period after World War I I , many countries of South America followed a similar pattern. Civilian governments were overthrown by military elites, who blamed civilian politicians for economic failures and corruption. However, in the last two decades, most states have made ihe transition from military to civilian rule, although the new democracies remain fragile. Brazil is the world's fifth largest country and South Amer ica's largest country, comprising almost half of the continent's land surface. Although Brazil's plantations historically had been the mainstay of its economy, its contributions to Brazil's GDP have declined to about one-lhird. Brazil is the world's largest producer of coffee and exports a range of tropical products such as bananas, cacao, black pepper, and palm oils. Brazil has lessened its imports of gasoline by processing sugar cane and cassava and converting them into ethanol. Although Brazil maintained democratic rule in the decades after World War fl, its military loomed in the backgr ound and often served as a power broker. President Juscelino Kubitshek (1953-1961) built on a strong sense of Brazilian nationalism by promoting ihe idea that Brazil was destined lo play a major role as a global power. Developing the Brazilian interior was a major priority, and one of Kubitshek's boldest decisions was to move the capital 600 miles from Rio de Janeiro to an underdeveloped region in the center of the country, Brasilia became Brazil's capital in 1960. The delicate balance between civilian politicians and ihe military broke down during the presidency of JoaoGoulart (1961-1964). A populist, Goulart's policies appealed to the left but alienated some of Brazil's most powerful groups: large landowners, who resisted Goulart's land reform for peasants, and senior military officers, who opposed his proposal lo create a ttade union for soldiers. In 1964 the military ousted Goulart and, clamping down on dissent, recognized only two parlies—one representing the government and the

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST AND PRESENT

Other the opposition. They suppressed a guerrilla movement active between 1969 and 1973. Although the regime's economic policies encouraged rapid economic growth from 1968 to 1974. the "Brazilian miracle" faded by 1980 as inflation reached more than 100 percent and foreign debt escalated. I n 1982 the foreign debt reached $87 billion, the highest in the world at the time. A return lo civilian rule in 1985 did not stabilize the economy. Inflation ran oui ol control, reaching 1585 percent in 1991 and almost 2500 percent in 1993. Although President Fernando Cardoso, elected ^ in i w 4 and reelected in 1998, curbed inflation bv linking a new currency the real, to the U.S. dollar, the Brazilian government has not conBrail I s trolled huge budgel del icits and currency Constitution dev aluations, which slowed economic growth. ol 1988 Argentina's political system following World War 11 was dominated by military-civilian rivalries and bv the personality and policies of Juan Perdn Ipay-ROHN), a middle-aged army colonel who w on the 1946 election. Peron's most loyal following came from

urban workers whose wages he increased. His charismatic second wife, Eva (popularly known as Evita), a former radio actress who died at 33 in 1952, headed the Peronisl Women's Party, which appealed to working class and poor Peron and Postwar women. Her party established centers lhal proPopulism vided many services for women—day care, free legal and medical advice, and meeting halls. In the 1952 election women voters gave Juan Perón a resounding 64 percent of their votes. Perón also favored stale control of the economy and developed the industrial sector at the expense of rural areas, where heel and wheal had been traditional mainstays of ihe economy. Perón's clashes with the Catholic Church brought about his downfall, Perón alienated Catholic leaders by legalizing divorce and placing church schools under state control. In 1955, the military removed him from power. Although P e i ó n was in exile and military officers ran government, his Perónist followers continued to influence Argentina's political life. Perón returned -

Chile's military regime in the 1970s rounded tip thousands of its opponents and summarily executed many of them. Demonstrations by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo became a constant reminder lo the Chileans and the international community of the human rights abuses o\ Chile's military rulers. Here. Argentine supporters carry on the vigil in Buenos Aires.

CHAPTER 34 •

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945

from Spain to recapture the presidency i n 1973 elections. After his death a year later, his t h i r d wife Isabel succeeded him, but she d i d not have the same flair for politics. After the military expelled her i n 1976, they took brutal steps to stifle dissent. About 10,000 to 20,000 people "disappeared" after being picked up by security squads. The M o t h e r s o f the Plaza d e l M a y o sought information on the fate of their missing relatives and children by carrying on a lengthy vigil at the plaza i n front of the presidential palace. I n 1982, the military junta made a major blunder by asserting a long-standing claim to the Falkland Islands (called the Malvinas by Argentina), a British possession. After invading the islands, the Argentine army was easily defeated by the B r i t i s h i n a 70-day war. As a consequence, the discredited Argentine m i l itary restored the government to civilian hands. Carlos Menem s election i n 1989 marked the first time since 1928 that a transfer was made from one sitting president to another w i t h o u t m i l i t a r y interference. Menem, however, had to placate the military by issuing pardons to former members of the m i l i t a r y junta implicated i n human rights abuses. Menem also addressed economic problems by adopting neoliberal policies of privatizing state-owned corporations and linking a new Argentine currency, the peso, to the American dollar. His policies brought economic stability i n the short r u n . Inflation, w h i c h had reached 150 percent per year at the beginning of his term of office, dramatically dropped to 4 percent by 1994 and the GDP grew at a healthy rate. I n 1997, however, a recession h i t and unemployment grew to 14 percent. Financial t u r m o i l plagued Menem s successor, Fernando de la R ú a , elected i n 1999. I n late 2001, his administrations inability to pay off a debt of $132 billion to foreign and domestic creditors caused a major crisis. He resigned and was quickly followed by four other presidents. The government declared bankruptcy and dramatically devalued the peso. I n the post-World War I I period, Chile sustained a healthy democratic system w i t h a number of political parties vying i n elections. The Christian Democrats, who controlled government i n the 1960s, promoted moderate reforms to give more land to peasants and attempted to gain more ownership of the copper industry, w h i c h was dominated by American corporations and accounted for about 80 percent of Chile's exports i n the early 1970s. The 1970 presidential election was a closely contested race w i t h three parties splitting most of the

The Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo—A group of Argentine mothers who began demonstrating in 1977 every Thursday at the Plaza del Mayo in front of the presidential palace. They were challenging the military government to explain what happened to their children who disappeared at the hands of the government.

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vote. Although the Communist-Socialist candidate, Salvador Allende (al-YIN-day), took office w i t h only 36 percent of the vote, he immediately implemented a socialist agenda, redistributing landholdings and nationalizing important sectors of the economy: the copper, steel, and coal industries and 60 percent of private banks. His policies prompted strong opposition from the business sector and especially from U.S. interests. Allende's rule came to a bloody end i n a 1973 coup. Military leaders, w i t h covert financial assistance from the CIA, ousted the president, who died—by his own hand—when the army laid siege to the presidential palace. The new regime, led by General Auguste Pinochet (PEE-noh-SHAY), dissolved Congress, suspended the constitution, banned all political parties, and clamped d o w n on opposition groups. Pinochet's free-market policies—reducing tariffs, government subsidies, and the size of the civil service—appealed to property and business owners. On several occasions he called plebiscites to endorse his continued rule, but i n 1988, the political opposition united to mobilize voters to vote no to continued military rule. When moderate politician Patricio Aylwin took office i n 1989, he had to carry out a difficult balancing act—investigating human rights abuses under the military regime, while keeping the military content. A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established to record the experiences of the several thousand people killed by the m i l i t a r y and compensate families of victims. The Commission d i d not have the authority to prosecute the guilty. Hence, Pinochet, who was implicated i n the killings, was not put on trial, and he continued to wield influence as head of the armed forces u n t i l his retirement i n 1998. That same year, he was arrested i n Great B r i t a i n at the request of Spanish authorities who held h i m accountable for crimes against Spanish citizens i n Chile i n 1973. Pinochet was eventually allowed to r e t u r n to Chile and was given i m m u n i t y to prosecution since he retained a seat for life i n the Chilean Senate. The economic policies of Aylwin and his successor, Edwardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, worked to promote Chiles economy at 6.7 percent per annum from 1990 to 1998. Chile s economy slowed to less than 1 percent i n 1999, however, and the economy has remained sluggish.

The Caribbean I n the Caribbean the British successfully ushered i n independence i n the West Indies—Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and numerous other colonies became sovereign nations. Although most of these states have maintained m u l t i p a r t y systems, they remain economically weak because of their lack of capital and their reliance on exporting a few crops or m i n -

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unemployment rate has consistently remained at between 20 to 30 percenl. Since independence in 1962, Jamaica's main political rivalry has been between the Jamaican Labour party (JLP) and the People's National party (PNP). The PNP's most prominent leader, Michael Manley, served as president over two periods. In his first term (1972-1980) he preached "democratic socialism" and advocated a Strong role for the state in the economy. He was also a prominent spokesman for Third World causes. Manley was succeeded by the JLP's Edward Seaga whose policies were more sympathetic to private enterprise and who favored U.S. interests. As Jamaica's economy faltered, however, Manley was reelected in !989asamoderate and an advocate of free-markei policies. Although he retired because ol poor health in 1992, his successor, Percival Patterson, maintained the PNP in power. Cuba's modern history has been dominated by its revolution of 1958. Before the revolution, Cuba had been controlled by a former army sergeant, Fulgencio Batista, who had ruled on his own or through civilian presidents since 1934. Cuba's economy largely depended on sugar exports and American investment, and Cuba's capital, Havana, was a haven for American tourists (and gangsters), lured by gambling casinos. Cuba's revolutionary movement was led by Fidel Castro (b. 1926). The son of a well-to-do sugar cane farmer-, Castro was introduced lo revolutionary politics while a law student at the University of Havana. In July 1953 he organized a disastrous attack on a garrison at Santiago. After serving Argentina's economy collapsed in 2001, and its government took the drasticstep ofdeclaring bankruptcy. Many of its citizens took to the a short prison term, he lied to Mexico and plotstreets to protest the government's mismanagement oj the economy. ted a return. He and his rebel band of 80 sailed on ihe Granma In late 1956, but they were nearly all killed when they landed in Orients Province. Castro and a small band of rebels escaped lo the Sierra Maestra Mountains in southeast Cuba from which ends. Although 12 nations of the Caribbean encourage they waged a guerrilla war. With popular support Tor regional integration through the Caribbean C o m m u Castro's movement growing and Batista's National nity a n d C o m m o n M a r k e t (Caricom), established in Guard collapsing, Batista abruptly fled after his 1973, most Caribbean states send the bulk of their annual parly on New Year's Eve. Castro's rebels exports to the United Slates and Canada. A key source marched unopposed into Havana. of revenue is tourists from Latin America and North Although he billed himself as a nationalist reformer America, but because so few jobs have been created, when he took power, Castro moved sharply to the left there has been a massive emigration of people to the and eventually proclaimed himself a Communist. His United Stales and other countries. rhetoric became stridently anti-American. Jamaica, which gained its independence in 1962, Shortly after John Kennedy became the U.S. has a more varied economy than most Caribbean president in 1961, the United States supported nations. While the sugar industry has declined, an ill-fated invasion by Cuban exiles at the Bay tourism, citrus fruits, and bauxite exports have become of Pigs off ihe southern coast of Cuba. By then, ihe mainstays of the Jamaican economy. However, the the Cuban government was forging close ties Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom)—An with the socialist bloc, especially ihe Soviet Union. organization founded in 1973 ro serve as a forum for promoting Castro's policies were dogmatically socialist. He democracy and human lights and to encourage multilateral discusbuilt up the Communist parly and jailed thousands of sions on issues ol common concern such as trade, regional security, opponents, including former comrades. His governand transport. It has 15 members.

CHAPTER 34 « The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 ment seized American property and nationalized businesses. I t also addressed social problems and launched successful campaigns to eradicate illiteracy and to provide basic health to the lower classes. Educational and health standards rose appreciably, as d i d living conditions among the peasants, who constituted the great majority of the population. The professional and m i d dle classes, however, suffered losses i n b o t h living standards and personal liberties, and many hundreds of thousands fled to the United States. After the U.S. government imposed a r i g i d trade embargo on Cuba, Cuba was d r a w n even closer to the Soviet Bloc and exported m u c h of its sugar crop i n exchange for o i l , food, and other subsidies. I n 1975 some 16 members of the OAS voted to end the embargo, and the United States intimated a desire for détente. This last possibility was made remote w i t h the intervention of thousands of Cuban troops and advisers supporting pro-Soviet regimes i n Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. By the mid-1990s, global political changes had created new challenges for Castro. Cuba's role overseas ended w i t h peace talks i n Angola. The Soviet Union could no longer afford the luxury of propping up Castro's faltering economy and virtually abandoned him. His version of Marxism-LeninTorres and ism was shared only by N o r t h Korea. Castro, Liberation however, defying predictions that his regime Theology would quickly collapse, extended his rule by modifying certain of his policies. He invited Pope John Paul I I to pay a state visit i n 1998 and allowed Christmas to be celebrated as a public holiday for the first time i n three decades. He tolerated some private enterprise, especially i n the area of attracting foreign tourism, although that did not benefit many Cubans. He eased the impact of the American economic boycott against Cuba by improving trade ties w i t h Latin American, Caribbean, and European nations. Although the American government has generally taken a hard-line stance toward Cuba, there are slight differences from one branch of government to another. The U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act i n 1996 to punish non-American businesses operating i n Cuba; several years later, the Clinton administration eased restrictions on humanitarian assistance and medicines being sent to Cuba. George W. Bush's administration has resumed tightening the embargo. One of the world's poorest countries, Haiti passed through a series of military rulers and dictators after World War I I . I n 1957, F r a n ç o i s Duvalier, popularly known as "Papa Doc," seized power. He used the police, military and secret police, k n o w n as the Tontons Macoutes, to terrorize opponents. Declaring himself president for life, he looted the state treasury for his personal enrichment. After his death i n 1971,

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his son, Jean-Claude or "Baby Doc," served as president u n t i l he was forced out of office and fled the country i n 1986. There have been many obstacles to creating democratic institutions i n H a i t i . I n February 1991 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest, was elected president. Seven months later, the army expelled h i m . I n response, the U N imposed an oil and arms embargo on the country, w h i c h led to a compromise, under which Aristide would be allowed back i n the country. When the compromise collapsed, a wave of reprisals and random murders swept the country and led to the frantic exodus o f thousands of Haitians on fragile craft to avoid punishment. By autumn 1994 after the coup leaders refused to give i n to international demands for Aristide's return, the United States and its Caribbean allies negotiated the departure of the coup leaders and restored Aristide to power—but only after he agreed not to r u n for reelection. After Aristide's party's candidate, R e n é Préval, succeeded h i m as president i n 1996, Aristide grew dissatisfied w i t h Préval s performance and formed his o w n p o l i t i c a l party, La Fanmi Lavalas. I n 2000 Aristide captured the presidency i n elections boycotted by the opposition parties. I n 2004, after a rebellion against Aristide erupted, he was forced to leave the country. However, w i t h an unemployment rate of 70 percent and a per capita annual income of $250 i n H a i t i , any successor has to cope w i t h a difficult situation.

Mexico and Central America W i t h a population of around 100 m i l l i o n people, Mexico is the largest Spanish-speaking country i n the world, is the fourteenth largest country i n the world, and has the eleventh largest w o r l d economy. F r o m 1950 to 1995, the number o f people living i n urban centers rose from 10 m i l l i o n to 69 million. Mexico's political life for most of the twentieth century was dominated by the Partido Revolucionaro Institucional (PRI; Institutional Revolutionary party). Although the PRIs roots were i n the Mexican revolut i o n of the early twentieth century, the post-World War I I PRIs policies largely favored middle-class and urbanized citizens. Until the 1980s, the primary political competition was between factions of the PRI. The sitting president, chosen every six years, had enormous powers because he selected his successor and nominated party officials. The PRIs near monopoly over the political system began to weaken i n the 1980s. One factor was a major earthquake that struck Mexico City i n 1985, killing an estimated 7000 people. The PRI was blamed for not

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conducting an aggressive rescue mission and for allowing violations of construction regulations. PRI rule was also shaken bv economic problems. Despite oil discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico in the 1970s that generated $13 billion in earnings in 1981 and made Mexico the fifth largest petroleum exporter in the world, Mexico's economy could not overcame a slump in oil prices in 1981. By 1982 Mexico's debt amounted to $90 billion, and it was unable to repay its creditors. It had to be bailed out by the U.S. government and international financial institutions. Although Mexico's economy eventually recovered, another debt crisis was narrowly averted in 1994. In recent years, Mexico's economy has benefited from the creation of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Responding to the development of the European Union and the possibility ol a unilied Asian market, the United States pushed lor the creation of NAFTA, which was put into effect on January 1, 1994, after Canada, Mexico, and the United Stales ratified the agreement. This agreement marked one of the great successes of Mexican president Carlos Sali-

nas as NAFTA expanded Mexican exports going lo the United States and attracted American investment. In 1999 almost 90 percent of Mexican exports went to the United States. Despite this success, the PRI's control Steadily declined after 1994. During the presidential campaign of 1994, the PRI's candidate was assassinated. The brother of former pr esident Carlos Salinas was arrested for his complicity in the murder and, eventually, was convicted. Afterward, Carlos Salinas decided it was prudent for h i m to move lo Ireland. The PRI government laced a determined guerrilla movement in Chiapas, a southern province w i t h widespread poverty. In 1997 the PRI lost its absolute majority of Mexico's congr ess to opposition parlies for the first time in over 50 years. Then, in ihe 2000 presidential election, Vicente Fox Quesada, the candidate for an opposition coalition Alliance for Change, defeated the PRI's Francisco Labaslida 44% lo 37%. Fox's election was historic because it marked the first time that a candidate of the PRI had lost a national election.

The election of Vicente Fox as Mexico's president in 2000 brought an end to the dominance of the Parlido Rc\-ohtcionam Institutional in Mexican politics for the most of the twentieth centttn:

CHAPTER 34 • The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Since 1945 I n contrast to Mexico's political stability, most Central American states underwent long periods of turmoil as guerrilla movements challenged oligarchies that controlled most of the land and political systems. I n Nicaragua three generations of dictators from the Somosa family ruled the country from 1937 to 1979 before Anastasio Somosa had to resign i n the face of a popular uprising and the collapse of his national guard. The successor government was an uneasy coalition between representatives of business and the guerrilla movement, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (named after a guerrilla leader of the 1930s, César Sandino). I n 1984 the Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega, w o n an election and began i m p l e m e n t i n g socialist policies. However he was staunchly opposed by the Reagan administration, w h i c h imposed an embargo on Nicaragua i n 1985 and began funneling support to a counterrevolutionary group called the Contras. A peace accord was signed i n 1987, and national elections were held i n 1990. The N a t i o n a l Opposit i o n Union, a coalition o f anti-Sandinista parties, won that election and all subsequent ones as the L i b eral Constitution party. Despite charges of government corruption and a slumping economy, the ruling party candidate Enrique B o l a ñ o s w o n the presidency i n 2001, beating back a vigorous challenge from Ortega. El Salvador also struggled through a bloody civil war i n the 1970s and 1980s. The war erupted when Napoleon Duarte, who w o n the election i n 1972, was denied the presidency. The m i l i t a r y took on leftist guerrillas of the Farabunde M a r t i National Liberation Front (FMLN). Death squads from both right and left brought terror to the countryside. The warfare ended i n 1991 when the government signed a peace agreement w i t h the F M L N . A right-of-center party, the National Republican party, has ruled the country since then. Because of the war, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorean immigrants left for the United States. I t is estimated that they send back over a billion dollars a year to their families i n E l Salvador.

CONCLUSION All the countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, from richest to poorest, have been affected by decolonization, the Cold War and its conclusion, the technological revolution, and shifts i n the global economic system. All of them entered the modern era i n a period of European dominance that often provoked violent encounters. Many face major economic and demographic issues that find expression i n political instability. The creation of new nation-states after

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World War I I as imperial powers withdrew from territories such as Palestine and Nigeria created massive refugee problems or inflamed ethnoreligious tensions i n ways that have significantly shaped—and continue to shape—the destinies of nations of the Middle East and Africa. I n the Middle East the politics of oil have reconfigured global economic relations and split the region very dramatically into haves and have-nots. Cold War divisions of the p o l i t i c a l space no longer split the region into p r o - U n i t e d States, pro-Soviet, and "neutral" states; rather, new configurations of allegiance based on economics, ideology, and strategic interest (including varied relationships to Israel) are still emerging. Meanwhile, conflicts over the right to selfdetermination and the degree to w h i c h Islam w i l l have an integral role i n national identity, law, and government have taken center stage as the IsraeliPalestinian struggle devolves into civil w a r and as Islamist movements ( t h r o u g h peaceful and violent means) move to more directly challenge the legitimacy of secular governments. African nations succeeded i n gaining their independence from European colonizers and white-settler regimes i n southern Africa. However, they have been plagued by a host of problems i n creating viable nation-states—regional, religious, and ethnic factionalism, dictators and m i l i t a r y coups, Cold War rivalries, lack of trained administrators, and weak physical infrastructures. F r o m the 1990s to the present, h i g h H I V / A I D S rates ravaged many African countries, k i l l i n g m i l l i o n s of people. I n a d d i t i o n , despite Africa's abundant natural resources, most African countries are economically underdeveloped and have high rates of poverty. Despite the challenges of independence, a growing number of African nations have introduced democratic political systems and policies that have improved their economic performance. Unlike African nations, L a t i n American states have not had to create new national identities. They still face daunting challenges i n b u i l d i n g nations, however. F r o m the 1950s to the 1980s, many L a t i n American governments were burdened w i t h the repressive rule of dictators and military regimes, but most have turned to democratic systems i n the last few decades. Their societies remain divided between a wealthy few and the poor masses. These disparities provided a r i c h o p p o r t u n i t y for revolutionaries i n nations such as Cuba, E l Salvador, and Nicaragua. Although some Latin American states have attempted to develop their o w n self-sustaining economies, the region's accumulation of massive debts and its cont i n u i n g reliance on the export of o i l or agricultural products have not dramatically shifted its vulnerability and dependence on the United States and other industrialized powers.

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Suggestions for Web Browsing You can obtain more information about topics included in this chapter at ihe websites listed below. See also the companion website that accompanies this text, http://www.abIongman.com/ bmmmett, which contains an online study guide and additional resources. Internet Islamic History Sourcebook The Islamic World Since 1945 http ://www.fo rdtiam.edU/halsall/islam/islamsbook.html# The Islamic World Since 1945 Extensive online source for links about the history of the Middle East since 1945, including country studies, international affairs, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Internet African History Sourcebook: Modern Africa http: //www.fo rdham. edu/h al s a 11 /af tica/af ricasb oo k. html # Detailed online source for links about the history of Africa since 1945, including primary documents regarding country studies, continuing imperialism, international affairs, and gender and sexuality. Internet Modern History Sourcebook: Latin America http: //www.fo rdham. edu/h al s a I l/mod/mod sboo k55. html # Detailed online source for documents regarding specific countries, common themes and issues, and indigenous peoples.

Literature and Film Elias Kboury, The Kingdom of Strangers (University of Arkansas Press, 1996), is a rich interweaving of stories set in war-ravaged Lebanon and Palestine. Samar Attar, Lina: Portrait of a Damascene Girl (Three Continents, 1994), is a memoir oflife and family in the Syrian capital seen through ihe eyes of a young girl. Gbolam-Hossein Sa'edi, Fear and Trembling (Three Continents, 1984), is a critique of politics, society, and Westernization by one of Iran's premier literati. Yusuf Al-Qa'id, War in the Land of Egypt (Interlink, 1998), is an interesting and antiwar presentation of the effects of the 1973 war on an Egyptian village. Samad Behrangi, The Little Black Fish and Other Stories, 2nd ed. (Three Continents, 1987), tells tales of the poor, set in Tehran and in Iranian villages under the shah's rule. Shusha Guppy, The Blindfold Horse: Memories of a Persian Childhood (Beacon, 1988), is the memoir of an elite young woman growing up in an increasingly Westernized Iran. Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude (Perennial, 2004) deals with a century of life in a small town. Octavio Paz's Labyrinth of Solitude (Viking Penguin, 1985) addresses the creation of Mexican identity in the twendelh century and relations between Mexicans of Native American and European ancestry. Isabel Allendc's House of the Spirits (Alfred A. Knopf, 1986) portrays the life history of a poor woman who rises lo wealth and influence. Chinua Achebe's A Man of the People (Anchor, 1989) is a biting social commentary on the personal and political corruption of African leaders. Mariama Ba's So Long a Letter (Heinemann, 1989) treats the struggles of a middle-aged woman in a Muslim society after her former husband dies. Set in the apartheid era of South Africa, Andre Brink's A Dry White Season (HarperCollins, 1979) deals with a conservative Afrikaner teacher coming to terms with the brutalities of white oppression and the challenges of black resistance. Tsitsi Dan-

garemba's Nervous Conditions, 3rd cd. (Seal Press, 2002) is the story of a young African woman seeking education in whitedominated Zimbabwe in the 1960s. A Veiled Revolution (Icarus Films, 1982), directed by Marilyn Gaunt, presents the voices of Egyptian women in the 1970s on the issue of veiling. The Battle of Algiers (Stella Productions, 1965), directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, is a feature film on Algeria's struggle for independence. The Palestinian People Do Have Rights (Icarus Films, 1979), is a UN documentary on the plight of the Palestinian people after (he creation of the state of Israel. But You Speak Such Good English (30 Bird Productions, 1999), directed by Marjan Safinia, is a short and humorous documentary on Iranian expatriates and their children growing up in London. Mapantsula's (California Newsreel, 1988) lead character is an African gangster faced with the painful choice of becoming a police informant or supporting the freedom struggle in South Africa. Xala (California Newsreel, 1975) is Ousmanc Sembenes satirical portrayal of the African elite in Senegal. Lumumba (Zeitgeist Video, 2001) recounts the rise of nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba to become Congo's first president in 1960 and his assassination a year later. Two documentaries treat recent African evenls. Hopes on the Horizon (Biackside, 2001) examines African struggles for democracy in the 1990s, while Mandela's Fight for Freedom (Discovery Networks, 1995) covers South Africa's transition from apartheid in the 1980s to the first democratic election in 1994. A Cuban-produced film. Memories of Underdevelopment (New Yorker Films, 1973), is an honest portrait of a well-off young man who grapples with the implications of the Cuban revolution. La Historia Oficial (The Official Story; Fox Lorber, 1985) is an Argentine film about a family who learns that their adopted child was taken from "disappeared" family. The Buena Vista Social Club (Artisan Entertainment, 1999) is a documentary on Cuban popular music of the 1940s and 1950s featuring legendary performers.

Suggestions for Reading A good survey of the Middle East in the late twentieth century is William Cleveland, A History of the Modem Middle East (Westview, 2001). The best survey of the Arab-Israeli conflict is Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th ed. (St. Martin's Press, 2000). On the United Nations' original partition plan, see Waller Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., Tiie Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, 5lli ed. (Penguin, 1995). An insightful book on Iran is Said Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford University Press, !988). On Turkey, see Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (Routledge, 1993). Daniel Yergin, Tlte Prize (Touchstone Press, 1991), is a beautifully written and acutely analytical study of the impact of oil on politics and diplomacy in the world. A general study on contemporary African political and economic development is William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, 3rd ed. (Indiana University Press, 1997). Recent developments in specific African countries are covered inKinfe Abraham, Ethiopia (Red Sea Press, 1994), and Paul Beckett and Crawford Young, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (University of Rochester Press, 1997). Rwanda's genocide is examined in Ferga! Keane, Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey (Viking, 1995). Afrikaner politics and the construction of the apartheid system are covered in Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid Stale and the Politics of the National Party, ¡948-1994

CHAPTER 34 • The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America,Since (Ohio University Press, 1996). The African challenge to apartheid is treated in Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, Vols. 3 and 5 (Indiana University Press, 1997). The ending of apartheid and the transition to democratic rule in South Africa is covered in Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (University of Chicago Press, 1996) General studies on Latin America include Leslie Bethell, ed., Latin America: Economy and Society Since 1930 (Cambridge University Press, 1998). In the 1990s, scholars have focused on the transition from military to civilian governments. Among the

1945

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key studies is John Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America (Lynne Rienner, 1999). A general study on Mexican politics is Roderic Al Camp, Mexico: Politics in Mexico, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1996). A specific study on Brazil is Javier Martinez-Lara, Building Democracy in Brazil: The Politics of Constitutional Change, 1985-1995 (St. Martins Press, 1996). A recent work on Cuba is Miguel Angel Centeno and Mauricio Font, eds., Toward a New Cuba: Legacies of a Revolution (Lynne Rienner, 1997). American foreign policy toward Latin America is examined in Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Harvard University Press, 1998).

C II A P T E K

35

Asia Since 1945 Political, Economic, and Social Revolutions

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

• The People's Republic of China and Other Chinese Countries DOCUMENT: Mao on Communism in

China • Japan: From Defeat to Dominance to Doubt

Korea: A Nation Divided Southeast Asia

1940

The Subcontinent

1947 India and Pakistan become independent

DOCUMENT: Nehru and the Two Sides of Kashmir DOCUMENT: Benazir Bhutto at Harvard

1949 People's Republic of China established; Republic of Indonesia formed

1950 1950-1953 Korean War 1952 U.S. occupation of Japan ends; Japanese obtain political independence 1958 Mao initiates Great Leap Forward

I

n post-World War II Asia, a complex range of concerns faced those who had sur­

1960

vived the war—decolonization, the Cold War, the rise of new technologies, and the

mid-1960s to mid-1970s China's Cultural Revolution

need to come to terms with the legacy of the wartime years, as well as the devel­

opment of nations based on the nationalist thought incubated in the previous decades. Japan examined the negative aspects of the type of state building that it had embarked on in the early decades of the twentieth century when it had joined the modern imperialists. Nation-building has not occurred painlessly. Wars of decolonization took place against the backdrop of the Cold War, turning them into proxy wars for the United States and Soviet Union while inflicting the greatest carnage on the former colonial states. Armistices failed to bring lasting peace, as retribution along ideological or eth­

1968 Suharto becomes Indonesian bead of state

1970 1971 Civil war in East Pakistan leads to war between Pakistan and India; Bangladeşli formed out of East Pakistan 1978-1985 Deng Xiaoping introduces market reforms to China 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

nic lines continued for some decades. In 1945, few could possibly imagine that the devastated lands of East Asia and the religiously divided lands of South Asia would reassert themselves as pivotal players in the global economy by the end of the twen­ tieth century—as they had 300 years earlier. Asia's nations are linked to the rest of the world through military, environmental, and economic globalization. An economic crisis in East Asia in 1997 spread viruslike across the Eurasian landmass. President George W. Bush's decision to protect U.S. steel in 2002 (later rescinded) had an immediate effect on Asian steel makers. Holly­ wood has had a profound effect on Asian filmmakers while India's "Bollywood" is start­ ing to find a bigger share of the market in the West. Chinese and Japanese films routinely find large Western audiences. The World Cup of Football (soccer) hosted by South Korea and Japan drew the gaze of the world in the spring of 2002, just as the talents of the latest Japanese and Korean baseball phenoms intrigue American sports fans. In the geopolitical realm, international terror organizations as well as interna­ tional movements for human rights cross boundaries from Asia to Europe to North America. Politics and economics in Asia matter deeply to countries at great distances

1980 1984 Indira Gandhi assassinated 1988 Benazir Bhutto becomes first woman elected to lead Pakistan 19B9 Tiananmen Square Massacre in China

1990 1998 Hindu nationalist BJP wins Indian elections

2000 2001 China enters WTO 2001 United Slates Invades Afghanistan, ousting the Taliban regime 2002 East Timor gains independence from Indonesia 2004 Congress Party wins elections in India

from Asia. India-Pakistan relations affect the whole world; North Korea's nuclear pro­ grams alter the East Asian balance of power; and the state of Japan's economy affects the global economy.

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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER CHINESE COUNTRIES • Why has China shifted course so frequently in its post-J 949 quest for political integration and economic growth? Announcing that the "Chinese people have now stood up," Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China on October I , 1949. Decades of war and revolution were then to give way to nationbuilding. But the trajectory o i China's nation-building i n the next half-century was anything but smooth. Moving from land reform and industrial reconstruction, to collectivization and communization, and later to increasing market incentives, economic development made frequent changes i n course. I n the realm of foreign policy, China shifted from a close relationship w i t h the Soviet U n i o n and a bitter enmity w i t h the United States to a rupture o f relations w i t h the former and a rebuilding of ties w i t h the latter. And China's approach to human rights i n free expression, artistic license, women's rights, and other social and cultural areas often changed direction.

The Communist Victory Between 1927 and 1937 the Nationalist or Guomindang {G WAW-min-dang) government of Jiang Jieshi

China ... 1949 1950-1952 1950

Founding of People's Republic of China Land Reform program Marriage reform

1956-1957

Hundred Flowers campaign

1958-1961

Great Leap Forward

1960-1989

Sino-Sovict rupture in relations

1966-1976

Cultural Revolution

1972

Nixon goes to China

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Death of Mao, arrest of Gang of Four

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Deng Xiaoping introduces Four Modernizations . Tiananmen demonstrations

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Hong Kong reverts to China

(jee-AHNG jeh-SHEE; also known as Chiang Kaishek) had initiated useful reforms i n the areas under its control. The Japanese war i n China prevented the expansion of those policies to the rest of the country. At the end of World War I I , Jiang insisted that Japanese forces surrender only to the Nationalists. But the Soviets, who had declared war on Japan i n the last week of the Pacific War, held Jiang's forces out of Manchuria while the Russians plundered Japanese investments there. I n the meantime, Mao Zedong's Communist forces moved into Manchuria. The Nationalists appeared to be much stronger than the Communists, having larger numbers of troops and a government recognized by the rest of the world. Jiang sent 500,000 Nationalist troops to Manchuria. The tensions between the Communists and Nationalists threatened to reopen the civil war i n China, and United States President H a r r y S. Truman sent the U.S. Army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, to China to mediate between the two sides. Newly appointed as American secretary of state, Marshall returned home i n January 1947, his mission a failure. I n his final report he blasted extremists on both sides for failing to make peace. Jiang felt confident i n his rejection of the American's advice. His armies swiftly moved to capture Communist strongholds. I n July 1947, however, the tide of war had changed. Jiang's assassination of Nationalist critics, the Guomindang's brutal suppression of the Taiwanese, and the failure of the economy eroded support for the Nationalist government, I n addition, Jiang's army—poorly equipped, miserably paid, and suffering low morale—began to disintegrate. The Communists began to capture city after city i n mid-1947, frequently facing only token resistance. Economic problems added to Jiangs military dilemma. The Nationalists had been unable to rebuild the economy after 1945, and inflation soared. The U.S. dollar was worth 93,000 Chinese dollars on the black market. Serious riots broke out, and i n Shanghai thousands of workers went on strike. By the end of 1947, the Nationalist forces went into retreat, and i n 1948 the Nationalist presence i n Manchuria collapsed. The complete defeat of Jiang's armies occurred i n 1949 when Mao's "People's Liberation Army" captured the major cities i n China. Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, and by the middle of 1950, Mao ruled all of mainland China's 550,000,000 people. Jiang's Nationalists fled to the island of Taiwan. Right-wing Americans, influenced by the antiCommunist demagoguery of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, charged that liberals and "fellow travelers" (anyone who espoused social aims similar to the Communists') had lost China.' I n fact, U.S. American military aid to China during World War I I totaled $845 m i l l i o n ; from 1945 to 1949 it came to

CHAPTER 35 - Asia Since 1945 slightly more lhan $2 billion. It is extremely doubtful whether additional American military aid to China would have changed the final outcome of the civil war. The bulk of the Nationalist forces had lost the w i l l to fight; in any case, China was not America's to "lose." The period from 1949 to 1952 was one of consolidation of power and structuring of the new state. China had been at war for decades—first the struggles among the warlords, followed by the war against Japan, and finallv the civil war of the late 1940s. A new state that could start rebuilding was a top priority. At first, China was divided into provinces, some to be under direct central government control and some to be ruled as "autonomous regions." Mao Zedong's administration extended to Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan. In 1950 his armies moved into Tibet. The Beijing government continued to seek to regain ihe traditional holdings of the Qing Dynasty, including the lands gained by Russia during the nineteenth century. Such a policy caused serious problems not only for the Soviet Union but also for Vietnam, Burma, and India. Relations with the United States deteriorated during this period and were put on a Cold War footing until the 1970s. The United Stales supported Jiang in his struggle against the Communists, but relations

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declined even farther with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The United Slates began to give massive economic and military aid to the Nationalists on Taiwan, and when U.S. forces in Korea moved toward the Chinese border, China entered the Korean War. U.S.-China relations hardened into complete opposition for the next two decades. Mao's domestic policies were intended to build support among the masses of the Chinese population. He called for a program of reform that was moderate compared to later initiatives. It included, on the one hand, state control of large businesses and redistribution of farm land from landlords to the tenant farmers who tilled the land, and on the other, protection of small private concerns, rapid industrialization under state control, and increased benefits to labor, such as social insurance. Though the elimination of private ownership was an ultimate Communist goal, Mao needed the support of technical and manufacturing specialists to rebuild China's economy. He considered members of the "national bourgeoisie," as he called capitalists without ties to the Guomindang or to the Western and Japanese imperialists, to be i n i tially helpful.

Mao's Government After 1949, Mao used his version of Marxism to change the whole order of Chinese society from its traditional patterns. He concentrated power in the Chinese Communist party (CCP), which was led by the party's C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e . Though democratic forces were at first tolerated, they were soon subsumed under the power of the CCP, w h i c h held all major civil and military positions. The day-to-day work of the Central Committee fell to a smaller Politburo, headed by Mao, who was also Chairman of the CCP and head of the government of the PRC. The new government brought both inflation and c o r r u p t i o n under c o n t r o l . Mao's interest i n r u r a l reform dated back to the 1920s, so early on, he turned his attention to the plight of the countryside. Since more than 70 percent of farmland was owned by 10 percent o f the landlords, the government encouraged angry landless peasants to confiscate large holdings and redistribute them. This process included violent actions against large landlords, but it was very popular w i t h the bulk of the formerly land-poor peasants. O w n i n g t h e i r o w n land, peasants increased p r o d u c t i v i t y and allowed for a surplus that would be shifted to industrial development. The land-to-the-tiller policy was a successful policy. But it was not to last.

In 194?, Mao's Communist forces were engaged in a civil war with the Nationalist government's army.

Central Committee—Body of approximately 300 members elected by CCP National Congress held every 5 years. The Centra] Committee selects the ruling Politburo.

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Women heading ofj lo work on a collective farm, around 1965. made up about hall the agrarian work force at that time. As China's economy modernized in later decades, women played an even greater role in farming when men headed ofj to factory and oilier jobs.

Mao Zedong's interpretation of Marxism was different from most other Marxists' views. While Marx had slated thai people's ideology was strongly influenced bv their class identity, Mao believed that individuals could change their ideology much more quickly. Wanting to move lo a more Communist slate, Mao believed he could change people's outlook overnight by changing their material circumstances. As peasants became small holders with the land reform of 1950-1952, they could be encouraged to embrace communism, he figured, by moving first, in 1953, to "mutual aid teams" which allowed farmers to pool their machinery and resources, then, from 1955 to 1957, to full collectivization of farms. Nearly all peasants were made members of rural collectives in which all labor, farm equipment, and land were controlled by the slate. Mao made plans for the industrial sector as well. A Soviet-style 5-year plan for economic development in industry was initiated i n 1953. The Russians sent machinery and thousands of advisers. The Chinese made impressive advances in heavy industry, and the success of the first plan led to a second 5-vear plan. But Mao was distressed thai the industrial sector had outpaced the agrarian sector. After all, China's revolution was led by peasants, and it would not do to have farmers' livelihoods fall behind those of urban workers. Mao also expressed concern about inequalities between average workers and the privileged party bureaucrats. Thus, in 1956 and 1957, he urged intellectuals and others lo speak out against bureaucratic corruption. Dubbed the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, Mao's efforts were at first ignored by frightened intellectuals. Later, promised freedom of speech, many spoke out. Mao cracked down severely, purging hundreds of thousands from their jobs, jailing countless others, and destroying the fledgling literary and artistic worlds. When Mao announced his Great Leap Forward in 1958, no intellectuals dared to criticize its obvious shortcomings. collectivi/ation—Merging oi previously privately held [arms into one large unil owned jointly and larmed collectively. Hundred Flowers—Movement urging intellectuals lo speak out against corruption, first encouraged and larer repressed by Mao. Great Leap Forward—195S-196I attempt lo equalize output of industrial and agricultural sectors by forming rural communes, requiring all lo work and providing extensive sOClil Services, lis failure led to starvation.

Mao launched the Great Leap Forward with a huge propaganda campaign and galvanized millions of urban and rural workers into a frenzied effort to tremendously increase the production of steel, electricity, and coal. Thousands of small backyard furnaces sprang up to produce steel. The Chinese boldly predicted that they would surpass British industrial capacity in 15 years. In the countryside Mao installed "people's communes." The stale created some 26,000 of these units, each averaging 5000 households, or about 25,000 people. The heads of the communes collected taxes and ran schools, childcare centers, dormitories, communal kitchens, and even cemeteries in a massive social experiment. Mao tried to convert peasants into a rural proletaria! paid in wages. Unlil the late 1970s, almost all land, dwellings, and livestock were effectively owned by the communes. Among the few benefits of the other-wise failed policy of the creation of the communes were improvements in distribution of medical care and literacy. The Great Leap Forward ultimately proved disastrous for China. Central planners erred in allocating resources and capital, and farm production dropped dangerously. The steel and iron produced in the rural backyard furnaces turned out to be unusable. Farmers were often left without the tools to produce ihe food they and the urban population requir ed. From 1959 to 1961 Chinese industry lacked essential raw materials, and millions of people went without adequate food. Between 1960 and 1962, a combination of bad weather and chaos bequeathed by the failure of the Great Leap resulted in malnutrition and the premature death of between 16 and 30 million people. At the same time that the Great Leap was failing, the Soviet Union withdrew its technological and financial

CHAPTER 35 - Asia Since 1945

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Mao on Communism in China

Mao Zedong adapted Marxism to China.'After paying tribute to the Soviet Union in a speech delivered in 1949, he stated his goals for the future.

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ommunists the world over are wiser than the bourgeoisie, they understand the laws governing the existence and development of things, they understand dialectics and they can see farther. The bourgeoisie does not welcome this t r u t h because it does not want to be overthrown. As everyone knows, our Party passed through these twenty-eight years not i n peace but amid hardships, for we had to fight enemies, both foreign and domestic, both inside and outside the Party. We thank Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for giving us a weapon. This weapon is not a machine-gun, but Marxism-Leninism.... The Russians made the October Revolution and created the world's first socialist state. Under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, the revolutionary energy of the great proletariat and labouring people of Russia, hitherto latent and unseen by foreigners, suddenly erupted like a volcano, and the Chinese and all mankind began to see the Russians i n a new light. Then, and only then, did the Chinese enter an entirely new era i n their thinking and their life. They found Marxism-Leninism, the universally applicable truth, and the face of China began to change.... There are bourgeois republics i n foreign lands, but China cannot have a bourgeois republic because she is a country suffering under imperialist oppression. The only way is through a people's republic led by the working class.. . . Twenty-four years have passed since Sun Yatsen s death, and the Chinese revolution, led by the Communist Party of China, has made tremendous advances i n both theory and practice and has radically changed the face of China. Up to now the principal and fundamental experience the Chinese people have gained is twofold: 1. Internally, arouse the masses of the people. That is, unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty

support. Indeed, this marked the beginning of a SinoSoviet split that rivaled the Cold War tensions as a threat to w o r l d peace. Soviet premier Khrushchev's attack on Stalin i n 1956 was taken by Mao as an implicit criticism of himself; the Soviets' refusal to help China take back Taiwan and the Soviets' support

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bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, form a domestic united front under the leadership of the working class, and advance from this to the establishment of a state which is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. ;

2. Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front. To sum up our experience and concentrate i t into one point, i t is: the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants/ This dictatorship must unite as one w i t h the international revolutionary forces. This is our formula, our principal experience, our main programme.... The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it. The situation both at home and abroad is i n our favor, we can rely fully on the weapon of the people's democratic dictatorship, unite the people throughout the country, the reactionaries excepted, and advance steadily to our goal. Questions to Consider 1. How was Mao's application of Communism different from that of the leaders of the Soviet Union? 2. Why are the Communists wiser than the bourgeoisie, according to Mao? 3. What is a "democratic dictatorship?" Is this an oxymoron, or a viable concept? From Mao Zedong, "In Commemoration of the 28th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China, June 30, 1949," in Selected Worlcs, Vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 411-423.

of India, which had given refuge to Tibet's Dalai Lama and others fleeing Chinese suppression i n Tibet, sealed the break. A three-power Cold War scenario—Russia, China, and the United States—emerged, complicating international affairs and p r o m o t i n g proxy wars around the world for the next three decades.

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Faced w i t h these crises, Mao, who had championed the Great Leap Forward, was bypassed by more pragmatic leaders in the Communist Part, especially Liu Shaoqi (lee-00 show-CHEE) and Zhou Enlai (JOH en-LAI). The government radically changed its economic policy in 1961. In the communes, which were not yet dismantled, social experimentation and centralized control were somewhat relaxed. Working conditions were improved, and private plots in which peasanls were allowed to keep or sell the crops and animals they raised were used as incentives to increase agricultural production. Between 1961 and 1964, industry also recovered, and the discovery of petroleum provided new energy sources. China made advances in light industry, especially in consumer goods and cotton production. Signs of technological progress included the detonation of a nuclear device in 1964 and of a hydrogen bomb in 1967.

The Cultural Revolution and International Recognition By the early 1960s, an ideological schism had widened between Mao and the longtime comrades who signaled the rejection of his more rigid ideology by referring to Mao as an "ancestor"—revered and even

worshipped but ignored in everyday life. Moderates advocated gradual social change and economic development, while radicals like Mao sought to pursue the drastic restructuring of Chinese society. Mao believed that many in the Communist party had lost their revolutionary zeal. When a historical play written by a government official was taken as a thinly veiled criticism of Mao, the revered ancestor struck back, calling on supporters in the army and especially among young people to attack the party leadership for their conservatism. High school and college students fell under the spell of Utopian Maoism, forming themselves into bands called Red Guards, determined to wipe out what they considered old fashioned art, ideas, and even the old guard of the CCP. Top leaders like Liti Shaoqi were arrested— he later died in prison—universities were closed, and scholarship ceased. Young people replicated the fabled "Long March" and wenl down to the countryside to live among the peasants, most of whom where not flattered by the Red Guards' adulation but rather resented having to take care of city slickers. Placing political purity above economic growth and applying Maoist ideas from Quotations from Chairman Mao (nickRed Guards—Du ring the Cultural Revolution, school-age youth inspired bv Mao to attack vestiges of pre-1949 Chinese life ind culture.

CHAPTER 35 - Asia Since 1945 named the "Little Red Book"), the Red Guards hampered production and research. Their rallies and demonstrations disrupted the entire educational system. "Redness" (ideological purity) was favored over technical expertise. Only nuclear research was spared the attacks of the anti-intellectual Red Guards; guarded by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), the nuclear labs were a protected space. The effects of these events, called the Cultural Revolution, were dire. By 1967, industrial production had plummeted and basic education and most research had ceased; some areas of the country were approaching anarchy. Eventually, Mao called on the PLA to bring the Red Guards under control, restore order, and put an end to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Premier Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), Mao's longtime associate, gradually helped to restore the country's industrial productivity. The r e t u r n to p o l i t i c a l stability was more difficult, but Zhou managed to hold the country together w h i l e rival factions i n t r i g u e d for power. Zhou removed China from the diplomatic isolation i n w h i c h i t had resided since 1958. He responded to a diplomatic initiative made by the Nixon administration i n 1971 and moved closer to the United States, motivated perhaps by the armed border ».;;--;JF^? clashes w i t h the Soviet Union that had begun |S^~~~^L ° along the A m u r River. I n 1971, the M l | M | l | United Nations voted to seat the PRC rather than the Nationalist government of Taiwan. Communique, The American policy shift signaled to other 1972 nations, such as Japan and some NATO countries, that the United States would not object to the restoration of diplomatic relations w i t h the PRC. The United States recognized the PRC and w i t h drew diplomatic recognition of Taiwan i n 1979. I n addition, China sought to develop its industrial capacity through the use of foreign technology and to bring in foreign currency through both an expanded banking system based i n the British crown colony of Hong Kong and the development of a tourist industry. t

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Deng Xiaoping's Pragmatic Reforms After Zhou and Mao died i n 1976, politicians jockeyed for control with varying intensity. Leading the most militant faction, known as the Gang of Four, was Mao's widow, Jiang Qing (jee-AHNG CHING; 1914-1991), who was overthrown, disgraced, and brought to a tele-

Cultural Revolution—Maoist movement, 1966-1976, to destroy traditional culture and modern "bourgeois" culture; founded on Utopian, revolutionary dreams. Gang of Four—Four of the many leaders of the Cultural Revolution who were blamed for the failures and brutality of that movement. The group included Mao's widow.

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vised show trial i n 1980. Jiang, as one of the leading ideologues of the Cultural Revolution, was blamed for its excesses. The trial of the Gang of Four deflected blame for the Cultural Revolution to a few people, thereby paving the way for the advent of a more moderate, pragmatic group of officials led by Deng Xiaoping (DUHNG show-PING). Deng was a political survivor whose roots i n the party went back to the 1920s. He endured political exile and the Cultural Revolution to introduce his variant of reform Marxism, i n w h i c h the party kept cont r o l of the "commanding heights" of the economy. Aided by his moderate chief lieutenants, H u Yaobang (HOO yow-BAHNG) and Zhao Ziyang (JOW zeeYAHNG), Deng introduced a pragmatic series of economic reforms called the F o u r Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science, and defense). The first major move to introduce a more market-oriented economy came i n the countryside i n 1978. The party allowed greater personal profit for the peasants, and this resulted i n a vast increase i n productivity. I n d i vidual peasants gained access to the land through a long-term rental scheme to t i l l farms as their own. I n 1982, communes were stripped of their political authority and replaced by cities, towns, and villages. The incentive-based plan gave China a grain surplus i n 6 of the next 7 years. W i t h an increased food supply and a contented peasantry, Deng i n 1985 encouraged the i n t r o d u c t i o n of market incentives i n the cities, w i t h the goal of gaining similar economic gains there. To foster more rapid development, Deng permitted the entry of . Western experts and technology, a process called the "Open Door Policy." Western, especially American, influence grew i n the cities i n China during the 1980s, along w i t h foreign trade and an influx of other foreigners. The government continued to keep the cost of medicine low and supplemented wages w i t h accident insurance, medical coverage, day care centers, and maternity benefits. The standard of living i n China improved, but the removal of price controls on food and other staple items led to inflation. Even w i t h economic progress, the standard of living i n China remained far below the standards i n industrialized countries. The educational system changed drastically under the Communists. I n the 1930s, only 20 percent of the people had been literate. By 2001, the figure had risen to 81 percent. Across China a crash program of schooling was initiated, and "spare-time" schools w i t h workstudy programs for those unable to attend school full time were established. Thousands of Chinese students emigrated abroad to study, including some 200,000 to the United States. Four Modernizations—Vigorous program designed by Deng Xiaoping to reject vestiges of the Cultural Revolution by embracing Western methods in military, science, industry, and agriculture.

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Deng had worked lor the economic liberalization of his country but failed to sponsor similar reform on the political front. Students and workers began to express discontent w i t h inflation, corruption, and a lack of democracy in China. I n December 1978, a young worker was arrested lor calling for a fifth "Modernization"—democracy. The newly liberalizing state did not know how to deal with ideological diversity. Greater opportunities for expression alternated with periods of crackdowns in the next decade. New ideas flowed into China in the 1980s—music from Japan, movies irom Hong Kong, and literature from around the world. By the end of the 1980s, even relations with Russia were improving. As the world's media were gathering in Beijing to witness the historic restoration of ties between the Soviet Union and China in the spring of 1989, students were carrying out massive demonstrations for democratization. In the spring of 1989 students across China demonstrated in honor of the liberal politician Hu Yaobang, who had died in March, The demonstrators went on to criticize Deng's government. The protest reached a climax in May and June when thousands oi demonstrators calling for democracy occupied the ceremonial center of modem China, Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Both the students and the government were aware of the historic l i m i n g of their demonstrations—May 4, 1989, was the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement that also started with demonstrations in Tiananmen. The whole world was watching. The parly split over how to deal w i t h the protesters and their supporters, sometimes numbering 1 million strong. Zhao advocated accommodation, but the hard-line prime minister, L i Peng ( L E E PUHNG), called for a crackdown. By the end ol May, the students had won the enthusiastic support of the workers and citizens of Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu. I n June the People's Liberation Army, using tanks and machine guns, cleared the square and the surrounding area of the student demonstrators. More than 3000 people were killed in the massacre. Premier Zhao Ziyang, who had counseled a moderate approach to the demonstrators, was forced from office. Jiang Zemin (jee-AHNG z u h - M I N ; 1926 ), who replaced him, continued economic liberalization and international ties, but also continued his policy of strict political controls.

A Beijing citizen faces down a convoy of tanks rolling down the Avenue of Eternal Peace during the prodemocracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.

China in the 1990s and Beyond During the 1990s, China's export trade expanded dramatically, and foreign economic interests increased their activities in China. Economic ties between the Chinese and the United Stales grew rapidly, and China enjoyed most favored nalion trading status w i t h the United Slates. It maintains a high level of trade w i t h Europe and Japan but of even greater importance are its ties w i t h Taiwan and Singapore. Inflationary pressures resulting from rapid economic growth threatened to create major social problems for the Chinese Communist leadership. At the same time, the Chinese continued to construct enterprise zones along the coast in which the most modern technology was used by Chinese businesses working closely with world banking and commercial interests for joint profits. Beijing joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) In 2000. Culture blossomed in the 1990s and 2000s. Rock stars delighted Chinese audiences; public intellectuals founded journals on a variety of subjects from fashion to environmentalism; painters used techniques from a variety of traditions and showed their works around the world; architects created new urban cityscapes. Chinese filmmakers gained an international audience of millions, even as many filmmakers had to fight censorship. Chinese arlisis worked throughout Asia, Europe, North America, and Australia, enriching cultural styles wherever they went. The Communist party remained fairly strong, counting around 52 million members in 1992, even though fewer than 10 percent ol those applying for

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rights to land under the land reform policies of 1950-1952. The Great Leap Forward, for all its economic disasters, enhanced women's equality by expanding their opportunities to earn money, even though women did not earn equal pay lor equal w o r k . Slogans such as "Women Hold Up Half the Sky" suggested the goal of gender equality d u r i n g the Cultural Revolution. And yet women were not treated equally, despite laws and policies. Ding Ling (see Chapter 29) was persecuted for demanding that the PRC recognize gender as a category as important as class. When Deng Xiaoping instituted the Four Modernizations in 1978, he called for limiting family size to one child per family in order to enhance economic growth. Important though population control was, the burden of implementing it fell on wives. Pressured by their families to produce sons—sons were greatly favored over daughters— wives were often punished for giving Chilli s One b i r t h to daughters. Baby girls were at Child Family Policy times abandoned or killed, and their families thought they could try again to have a boy. Infanticide was illegal, but some families tried to circumvent the law. Modem ultrasound technology has made infanticide less common because it permits sex-selective abortion—also illegal but still practiced. As a result, China today faces the twin crises of female infanticide and of loo many boys. Manv men will never many and the government fears the consequences of an explosion in the population of adolescent boys. The one-child policy has been relaxed, and two Despite astounding economic modernization over the past 20 years, Chinachildren are permitted in rural areas and unlimremains a country of startling contrasts. Here the very latest in electronic goods ited children in ethnic minority areas, but overare transported by a traditional three-wheel bicycle. all, the sex ratio remains greatly unbalanced. Jiang Zemin stepped down as General Secretary of the CCP in 2002, and his replacement, party membership were admitted. When Deng XiaopHu Jintao (HOO jin-TOW; 1942-), seems to take a siming died in 1997, China had weathered the transition ilar approach lo the development of a market econin leadership and had become a world power in the omy while maintaining political controls. Economic twenty-first century, a full member of the World Trade liberalization did, however, help society become someOrganization, and an active participant in the w o r l d what more liberal. Individuals' homes, cars, and other coalition against terrorism. possessions became increasingly important. Some There is a great disparity, however, in the benefits of tensions common lo industrial societies have begun lo the new, market economy between those living along the be felt, however. The water has also become dangerspecial economic zones on the Pacific coasts and those ously polluted, the air so dirty that a permanent haze living in the interior. Among the 1.25 billion Chinese are envelopes the cities, and deforestation so pervasive those who, living in cities such as Guangzhou, have that desertification has spread in the northwest. China profited from participating in the globalized economy. will have to rigorously address these problems as its Opportunities for women remain a major issue economy grows. in China. The 1950 Marriage Law was a significant China in the coming years faces several major chaladvance for Chinese women, offering them legal freelenges, including reducing the disparities in income dom within marriage. Men as well as women earned between coastal and interior areas; deciding how lo

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deal w i t h the ethnic m i n o r i t i e s , especially i n Tibet and i n the northwest provinces where the Uigurs want an autonomous status; responding to environmental degradation; widening democratic opportunities i n a globalizing society; and expanding and equalizing the rights of women, from infancy through education, employment, marriage, motherhood, and old age.

Hong Kong The leaders i n Beijing planned i n 1984 to restore Chinese authority over Hong Kong when its lease to Great Britain ran out i n 1997. The PRC promised that Hong Kong would retain its o w n laws for 50 years after the transfer, but democracy advocates are s S S S already feeling an erosion of their rights. The PRC would like lo continue to use Hong Kong " f, as an economic engine i n the Southeast, and Jti

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states—it continues to be economically and militarily strong. With its considerable wealth, Taiwan is able to arm itself w i t h the most up-to-date weapons. At the same time, it exists under the protective umbrella of the United States. Although economic relations between Taiwan and China have been warming as the natural logic of business opportunities and a shared cultural background encourage financial and tourist ties, strategic tensions remain, and, i n fact, have increased as Taiwanese politicians call for abandoning the old notion of "one China" i n favor of recognizing two Chinas. By 2000 Taiwan's gross national product had reached $386 billion, an average annual per capita income of close to $17,400. By comparison, the growing economy of the PRC produced a gross national product o f $4.5 trillion, w i t h a per capita income of $3,600. One-fifth of the PRC's imports and exports are w i t h Taiwan, and investors from Taiwan outpace those from other countries.

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so must juggle its desire t o r control w i t h the need for economic liberalization. The former British colony, roughly six times the size of the District of Columbia, has remained an economic powerhouse. The 7.2 m i l l i o n citizens enjoy a per capita GDP of $25,400 as they pursue economic activities ranging from high lech industries to banking to clothing manufacture. Hong Kong continues to profit from its position as an economic bridge between the capitalist world and the rest of China, despite the competition from Guangzhou and Singapore. Beijing exercises an increasingly tight control over the city, and i n return, the local officials try to anticipate the demands of the capital, especially i n questions of immigration.

Taiwan Taiwan had experienced modern economic development under Japanese colonialism. Though many of Taiwan's leading intellectuals were wiped out by the Chinese Nationalists i n 1947, Taiwan was later rebuilt w i t h Nationalist funds, U.S. aid, and Japanese investment. The Guomindang government has been on Taiwan since 1949. I n 1975, Jiang Jieshi died. His son, Jiang Jingguo (jee-AHNG jing-GWAW; 1910-1988), then took over and encouraged high tech development. After China regained sovereignty over Hong Kong i n 1997 and Macao i n 1999, the Beijing government renewed its efforts to extend control over Taiwan. China tried to influence the 2000 presidential elections, but to no avail, as the Independent party led by President Chen Shui-Bian (CHEN shwee-bee-AHN; 1951-) and feminist Vice President L u Xiulian (LOO-shoo-IceA H N ; 1944-) gained power. While Taiwan labors in diplomatic obscurity—recognized by few nation-

Singapore Singapore, part of the British Empire in Malaya, was a magnet for Chinese immigration i n its colonial era. Geographically distant from China and not under any form of political control by China, its majority Chinese population nevertheless makes it a culturally Chinese stale. Decolonization i n the 1950s produced ethnic violence before Singapore gained its independence from Malaysia i n 1965. The tiny city-state has been dominated by ihe Peoples Action party since independence and by the PAPs leader, Lee Kwan Yew, until 1991. Lees rule was characterized by stability brought on by a conservative Confucian-based government and high economic growth. What the city-state lacked in political freedoms, i t made up for w i t h a high standard of living for its 4.3 m i l l i o n inhabitants—a per capita GDP of $26,500 i n 2001. The economy consistently registers a growth rate of more than 4 percent.

JAPAN: FROM DEFEAT TO DOMINANCE TO DOUBT • Did postwar Japanese prefer growth at any cost over protection of the environment, women's rights, consumer benefits, and improvements in the workplace? On August 28, 1945, just three weeks after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an advance party of 150 Americans, the lead group of a substantial army of occupation, landed i n Japan.

CHAPTER 35 -

Japan 1945-1952

American Occupation of Japan

1947

Reverse course in Occupation

1955

Formation of Liberal Democratic party

I960

Demonstrations against U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

I970s-1980s Trade tensions with United Stales 1989-199Ü

Beginning of recession

Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur soon arrived to preside over Japans transition from one military authority to another. The Japanese had successfully recast their infrastructure d u r i n g the Meiji Restoration. They would make another massive—and successful—adjustment after 1945.

Asia Since ¡945

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semicolonial areas were removed from Japanese control. Millions of soldiers, sailors, and colonists, some of them with no home in Japan, were forced to return to the home islands. Others were taken prisoner by the Russians and died in Siberian gulags. The military was demobilized, reservist organizations disbanded, and key wartime military and civilian leaders were placed on trial. Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki (TOH-joh hee-DEH-kee) and six o f his colleagues were executed. Two hundred thousand governmental and business leaders were blocked from resuming their jobs, though many were able to go back to work when the Americans left in 1952. For a while, industries were dismantled for reparations, particularly by the Russians in Norlheasl Asia, but this practice was soon stopped. The linal authority d u r i n g the Occupation was the American military, but day-to-day administration was carried out by Japanese bureaucrats. While most o i the institutions of government were purged, the bureaucracy was little affected, and daily life could get back to n o r m a l more quickly. Every document had to be translated into English for ihe Occupation's approval, and as a result, the records of this lime

Postwar Japan The Americans were convinced that a program of demilitarization and democratization would create a new Japan. Many believed that Japan would become a peaceful agrarian country. Little did the Americans, very few of whom had any knowledge of Japan, imagine thai ihe program ol change was just what Japan needed to emerge in two decades as one of the great economic powers. Japan's democratic movements and quest for modernity in the years before the war had already accustomed many to the kinds of values and institutions necessary for rapid reconstruction. Despite the beliefs of the members of (he U.S. Occupation, democracy and individualism, though suppressed during the war, were not unfamiliar concepts to many Japanese. Significantly, defeat itself opened up an opportunity to start afresh. Social inequalities were leveled when rich and poor alike were homeless and without food. When Japan rebuilt, it built from the bottom up. Unii! ihe lasl two decades, class differences in postwar Japan were far smaller than those in other industrialized countries. The devastation of the war had another effect: Disillusioned w i t h their own wartime leaders, the Japanese offered no resistance to ihe Occupation. The Occupation—nominally international but in reality dominated by the Americans—cut Japan's territorial possessions back to the four main islands. Korea was decolonized, and Manchuria and other

Homeless and without food, Japanese widows and children struggled to Survive in the bleak months after Japan's surrender. It would take a decade for Japan's economy to recover to its prewar level.

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period, stored i n the U.S. National Archives, are unusually rich and detailed. Unlike the case of Europe, the Americans d i d not pay for the rebuilding of Japan's industrial infrastructure. I n the first winter after the end of the war, Japan faced massive starvation and disease. The Americans did supply food and medicines, but most people still had to resort to the black market to survive. One of the first public policies changed was civil rights for women. The feminist activists or the prewar era lost no time appealing for women's rights to the Prime Minister. Knowing that the Occupation w o u l d soon demand those rights, he granted them to the feminist petitioners. The Women voted for the first time i n the elections constitution f j j 1945 p hi N Year's message to D

A p r

o r

s

e

w

the people of Japan, the emperor stated that he was not divine, a concept some though not all Japanese had believed. I n the next few months, a new Constitution was written, ostensibly by the Japanese, but i n reality by a committee of Americans, one o f w h o m was a 21-year-old young woman, Beate Sirota (Gordon). The Constitution was promulgated i n 1947 and modified the Meiji-era document i n several important ways: The people rather than the emperor were sovereign; two fully elected houses of Parliament were the governing body at the national level; the Supreme Court had the r i g h t o f j u d i c i a l review; all rights were made absolute, not reversible as i n the Meiji document; and A r t i c l e I X renounced war as a way to settle international disputes. Social changes included a new educational system based on the American pattern of decentralized public schools, w i t h textbooks rewritten to delete militant nationalism. Almost all schools were open to boys and girls, and both sexes could attend universities. Admission was to be based on merit, but in later years, merit came to be measured by passing exams based on extensive memory w o r k . Another i m p o r t a n t social change was the constitutional guarantee of equal rights of men and women; while often ignored i n practice, the Constitution may be used to demand rights i n a court of law. Labor unions were once more permitted to exist. The Americans at first encouraged them as a way of liberating labor from wartime restrictions. By February 1947, however, the Americans cracked down on some labor activists and outlawed a planned general strike, claiming to be concerned that a strike w o u l d slow Japan's economic recovery. Cold War fears, however, especially o f the impending victory of the CCP i n nearby China, were the major reason why jg4

T

'

Article IX—Article in Japans 1947 constitution outlawing war and the use of force as a way to resolve international tensions.

the Occupation prevented the strike; the unions were seen as moving too far to the left. The era of unbridled democratization, lasting from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1947 came to an end i n what contemporaries called the "reverse course." To be sure, democratic changes d i d continue even after February 1947. Two key areas of economic change also had social implications. Perhaps most important, especially i n the creation of a conservative rural electorate, was land reform. As i n China, land was taken from rich landlords and given to poor tenant farmers. B u t the process was m u c h more benign, and wartime agricultural policies had already begun the shift i n ownership of land. The other major change was the forced dismantling of the large industrial combines k n o w n as zaibatsu. The Americans believed that small enterprises w o u l d foster compet i t i o n , improve economic g r o w t h , and ensure fairness. By 1947, the "trust-busting" policy was seen as slowing economic recovery and was stopped. I n time, many of the large firms regrouped, but i n new ways that avoided breaking the Jaws against economic concentration. Recovery was also slowed by devastating inflation. The Occupation instituted a policy of deflation, w h i c h threw many workers out of their already tenuous jobs. The real recovery came when the Americans began to place orders for equipment to be used i n the Korean War. As a result of the Cold War i n Europe and the Communist invasion of South Korea i n 1950, Japan became the United States' principal ally in the Pacific. Despite Soviet opposition and without the participation of the USSR, a peace treaty was signed i n 1951 and went into effect the next year, giving Japan full political independence. A security pact between Japan and the United States allowed Americans to station troops i n Japan. The Socialist party and the Japanese peace movement continued to protest against that pact as damaging to Japan's national sovereignty i n subsequent years.

Political and Social Change Conservatives have consistently, w i t h brief interruptions, controlled the Japanese government. I n 1955, responding to a merger of two Socialist parlies, two conservative parties merged to form the Liberal Democratic party, which was friendly to big business, favored modes! rearmament, and backed the alliance w i t h the United States. Allied w i t h professional civil servants and business interests, i t was sufficiently strong to endure periodic charges of corruption for the next 38 years. The Socialist party, the major opposi-

CHAPTER 35 • Asia Since 1945 lion, demanded retention o f Article I X , opposed the 1952 security pact with the United Slates, and Favored neutrality in foreign affairs. The small Communist parly was vocal but weak. In the first hall of the postwar era, rural voters tended to vote for conservative candidates, while most urban areas had Socialist mayors. Many people voted for their local candidate less for reasons of ideology and more because the candidate had a record of gelling things done for his (or, rarely, her) constituency, The new system was flexible enough to absorb ihe radical transformation Japan has experienced in the pasl half-century, although charges of corruption brought the political system to near-paralysis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1994 alone, there were three prime ministers, including a Socialist. After a halt-century, reformers seemed ready to shake off the legacy of ihe Liberal Democratic party and attack problems in the economy, politics, and society. Bui ihe Liberal Democratic party showed considerable tenacity and kept power, leading a coalition government under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (KOH-eeZOO-mee JUN-ee-chee-ROH).

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Rapid urbanization and industrialization posed enormous social challenges. Rural areas lost population while city populations—and consequent environmental problems—-skyrocketed. W i l h more than 23 million people, the Tokyo metropolitan region became one of ihe largest urban areas in the World. The cities of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya occupied only 1 percent of the country's land area b u l contained over onefourih of the country's population. In a headlong rush to rebuild, pollution affected Japan more seriously lhan any other industrial country in the 1960s. Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato (EEkay-clah HAH-yah-toh) promised the Japanese people that he would double per capita income w i t h i n a decade. The Japanese were dispirited by the government's parliamentary maneuvering and strong-arm reaction to demonstrations against the renewal of ihe U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, and to regain popular support, the Prime Minister focused on satisfying consumer needs. W i t h i n 7 years, the GDP had doubled and Japanese enjoyed televisions, cars, and more comfortable, though still cramped, homes. Factories churned out these products, refineries produced

Outside id the massive megalopolis that stretches from Tokyo to Osaka, smaller cities such as the one pictured here integrate urban and fanning districts in an environmentally conscious mix.

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oil, and m i n i n g dug up hillsides. By 1970, industrial waste produced deadly mercury poisoning, and the air was so foul that authorities told Tokyo children to stay indoors and not breathe the air. I n 1970, the Japanese people had had enough. A t what price should middleclass lifestyles be bought? I n the early 1970s, Japan therefore took the international lead i n overcoming pollution, producing less polluting cars, requiring antipollution devices on smokestacks, and requiring recycling at home. Urban living also caused traditional values and attitudes to change. Parental authority and family ties weakened as young married couples, forsaking the traditional three-generation household, set up their own homes. The stresses and strains o f urbanization were reflected i n student riots and i n the appearance, for the first time i n Japanese history, of juvenile delinquency. International influences—seen i n fashions, television, sports, and beauty contests and heard i n rock music—became embedded i n Japanese culture. Today, high fashion and popular culture alike are as likely, i f not more so, to originate i n Japan as i n Europe or the United States. The early 1950s were a time of intense labor strife and union clashes w i t h industrial management. But by the 1960s, as the economy was booming, labor became more complacent. A cooperative spirit developed between labor and management as long as jobs were plentiful. Male workers worked long hours, and in exchange, were promised lifetime career security. Industrial concerns seemed to be characterized by a kind of harmony. Young people, however, more interested i n meeting the individual needs o f their families, began to question unstinting dedication to their companies. Men claimed they wished to spend more time w i t h their families, and w o m e n workers were under intense social pressure to care for their families i f they had children. This trend toward individualism began i n the 1970s, parallel to the questioning of growth at the expense of the environment or personal health. And i t certainly accelerated i n the 1990s when corporations themselves went back on the promise of j o b security as Japan faced economic recession. Guaranteed lifetime employment came increasingly under challenge. Corporate paternalism had to be discarded to satisfy the demands o f efficiency. Slowly but surely, the communalism that had dominated Japanese life weakened under the impact of economic and cultural individualism. Perhaps the greatest changes were those affecting women. Before World War I I , many Japanese women were part of the workforce, especially young women. The poor worked i n textiles, domestic service, farming, or the sex trades, and middle-class women worked in offices, department stores, nursing, and teaching. But no women had full civil rights. There was an

active movement for women's civil rights, but like other movements i t was suppressed i n the 1930s. After 1945 women gained the right to own property, sue for divorce, pursue educational opportunities, and vote. Despite the existence of these rights, women still faced an uphill battle toward equality. Women were socially expected to shoulder the entire burden of taking care of the home, leaving little opportunity to obtain more than a part-time, underpaid j o b w i t h no benefits. A series of legal challenges, the passage of equal employment legislation and family care leave laws, convenience foods, and other home aids have made i t somewhat easier for women to enter the workforce. By 2002, women constituted 50 percent of the nation's workforce—although an even thicker glass ceiling prevailed i n Japan than i n other industrialized countries, preventing w o m e n from reaching lop management positions. More than 30 percent of women high school graduates attended postsecondary institutions. Politics has been even harder for women to break i n t o . Japan has fewer w o m e n members of parliament than most advanced industrial countries. Feminists speak out about continuing inequalities. But what may be most telling is the extraordinarily low birthrate. Japanese society still places barriers on mothers' full participation i n the workforce. Schools assume mothers w i l l be home d u r i n g the day, and companies hesitate to hire mothers for fear of absenteeism. So, many women never many, and those who do m a n y have one or no children. Japan's birthrate, the world's lowest, is below replacement level. The government is concerned about the graying of the population as Japanese live longer—Japan also has the world's greatest longevity-—and few young people are coming along to replenish the social security funds to support retirees.

Economic Dominance and Doubt Japan's developmental trajectory from the early postwar years shows a shift from anxiety about survival, to growth at all costs, to responsible balancing of health and other h u m a n needs w i t h wealth, and finally to worrying about the outsourcing of jobs and the rise of serious global competition. Japan encountered serious obstacles i n its path to economic development. Farmland is scarce, and Japan is self-sufficient only in rice. It has to import m u c h of its other food for its population {126 million by 2001) and most of the raw materials for its industries. The Korean War i n 1950 gave Japan an initial boost, as American forces spent lavishly. I n 1950 the GDP was $10 b i l l i o n . The 1973 o i l embargo and subsequent price increases hit Japan hard. Inflation skyrocketed, economic growth plunged, and for a while, the balance of trade was negative.

CHAPTER 35 - Asia Since 1945 Japans business managers made the necessary adjustments for recovery. By the end of the 1970s, the Japanese built half the worlds tonnage i n shipping and had become the world s biggest producer of motorcycles, bicycles, transistor radios, and sewing machines. The Japanese soon outpaced the United States i n automobile production and drove the American domestic television industry virtually out of business. After the October 1987 U.S. stock market slide, Tokyo temporarily became the world financial center, as it dominated banking. I n the late 1980s, the Japanese began to watch uneasily as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, using the Japanese formula of a strong and disciplined workforce and efficient use of new technology, became effective competitors i n the w o r l d market. South Korea especially launched a direct challenge to Japan i n the high-technology and automotive markets. Recession i n Japan was not as serious as i n some Asian countries, but it h i t hard after 1991 because of the overinflated prices for stocks and real estate i n the 1980s. A vastly overpriced real estate market—at one time, the listed real estate value for Tokyo alone exceeded the value of the entire United States; a weakening management structure, w i t h a parade of industrial chiefs solemnly apologizing for r u n n i n g their firms into r u i n and atoning by resigning from their companies; and a disastrous series of bad loans that ruined several large banks brought the nation to the brink of a financial crash. Japan's annualized GDP fell 5.3 percent i n the first three months of 1998—and that i n a part of the globe that saw the annualized GDP of South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, who imitated the Japanese policy of export at any cost, fall by 20 percent i n 1997. The yen continued to decline against the dollar into 2002. As Japan entered another recession, observers held their breath to see i f the Japanese government would take the necessary steps to put its financial structure i n shape. But the Japanese economy remained one of the world's strongest. Japan's per capita GDP i n 2001 was $36,280, compared w i t h $27,280 i n the United States. I n recent years, the recession has ended, and the yen has recovered against the dollar. While the Japanese economy may not be the model i t once seemed, Japanese culture and the arts are now at the forefront. I n the area of popular culture, Japanese anime sets the standard for postmodern youth culture. Japanese architects' buildings are found throughout the world. Writers such as Yoshimoto Banana (YOH-shee-MOH-toh bah-NAH-nah; 1964-) and other young women and men are the pop writers of the youth generation. Unlike the writers, filmmakers, and painters of earlier generations, the work of these artists is part of a global culture that need not be interpreted as Japanese. 2

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KOREA: A NATION DIVIDED • Will economic and political differences continue to outweigh the Korean desire for reunification? After Japans surrender on August 15, 1945, Koreans, who had been anticipating l i b e r a t i o n from foreign rule, were deeply disappointed. Japanese colonial rule was replaced by American occupation i n the south and by Soviet i n the north. The Soviet Union, which had maintained neutrality w i t h Japan throughout World War I I , entered the war after the United States had dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. I n the next days, Russian forces moved i n t o Northeast Asia—Manchuria and Korea had been under Japanese control—and when the Japanese surrendered, the Russians joined the Americans i n accepting that surrender. Koreans, eagerly awaiting independence, felt betrayed. The departing Japanese occupying force actually handpicked its successor. They chose the populist (but noncommunist) Yô U n - h y ô n g ( Y O H oonhee-ONG), who negotiated a treaty ensuring that the Japanese would not be part of any Korean peacekeeping. The new leader set up the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) i n Seoul, w h i c h attempted to make itself into a national government. Local self-governance committees sprang up throughout Korea, ready to take up local administrat i o n as the Japanese departed. The CPKI convened a meeting of representatives of these committees i n September 1945.

The Politics of Decolonization, Occupation, and Division The CPKI proclaimed the formation of the Korean People's Republic o n September 6, 1945. Its agenda was decolonization. I n addition to land reform that

Korea 1948

North Korea and South Korea created

1950--1953

Korean War

1961- -1979

Pak Chönghöi rules as president

1980--1988

Chön Tuwhan as president

1988

Seoul Olympics, beginning of democratization

1994

Death of Kim Ilsöng; rule by his son Kim Jongil

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would take land away from the Japanese and those who had collaborated w i t h them, to nationalizing such major industries as mining and railways, and to establishing labor laws to protect adult and child labor, the CPKI worked to remove from civilian administration those Koreans who had benefited from Japanese colonial power or who had held positions i n the colonial government. This government was rejected by both the American and Soviet occupying forces, who divided Korea at the 38th parallel and proclaimed that Korea would be under American and Soviet "trusteeships" until it could govern itself. The U.S. government of occupation outlawed the Korean People's Republic and set up another foreign government of occupation, the United States Army Military Government i n Korea (USAMGIK). Koreans were bitterly disappointed not only by the loss of selfgovernment so soon after they had gained it, but also by the fact that the U.S. forces relied on those the Koreans considered collaborators w i t h the Japanese colonialists. The U.S. forces gave positions of authority to collaborationist Koreans who had already been purged by the people's committees. Over 80 percent of police officers i n the Korean National Police i n October 1945 had worked for the Japanese Government General as police officers, the most detested arm of the state. The following February, i n P'yóngyang (pee-ongYAHNG) i n the Soviet sector, the guerrilla fighter General K i m Ilsóng ( K I M il-SONG; also spelled "Il-Sung") was proclaimed head of the Interim People's Committee. I n the South, U.S. authorities established a Republic of Korea (ROK) i n August 1948. The Americans chose the anticommunist Syngman Rhee, an octogenarian who had been involved in anticolonial actions at the dawn of the Japanese occupation i n the early twentieth century, as the first president of the ROK. I n response, the Soviets proclaimed K i m Ilsong to be Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) which the Soviets created. Then, i n late 1948, the Soviet Union ended its occupation of Korea, and d u r i n g the following spring, American troops withdrew from south of the 38th parallel. Both governments—the R O K and the DPRK—claimed jurisdiction over the entire country. W i t h i n 2 years, the two new governments were e m b r o i l e d i n a Korean civil war that lasted from 1950 to 1953 (the war is technically not over, as only an armistice has been signed). T h i s war led to the devastation o f a people barely beginning to recover from c o l o n i a l rule. D u r i n g those 3 years, families were divided, and over 1 m i l l i o n Koreans were killed, wounded, kidnapped, or declared missing. The destruction of industrial infrastructure and housing by incendiary bombing along w i t h the numbers of refugees i n camps can be measured, but the psycho-

logical damage caused by this warfare is just beginning to be understood. Cold War tensions produced conflicting views of the start of the war, though recent archival findings increasingly corroborate the view that northern forces, encouraged by the Soviet Union, crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea on June 25, 1950. Washington immediately called for a special meeting of the U N Security Council, whose members demanded a ceasefire and withdrawal of the invaders. The Soviet delegate was boycotting the council at the time and was not present to veto the action. When North Korea ignored the UN's demand, the Security Council sent troops, led by General Douglas MacArthur who had recently been directing the U.S. occupation of Japan, to help the South Korean government. Three years of costly fighting followed, i n what the U N termed a "police action." Led by the United Stales, United Nations forces, which suffered over 140,000 casualties, repelled the northern forces, who were supported by the USSR and later the People's Republic of China. After Stalin's death in March 1953 and a U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons against China, an armistice was signed in July 1953. A new border between the two parts of the country was established near the 38th parallel. Until that time, more than 2 million Koreans, mostly civilians, were killed.

North Korea and South Korea Since its inception, N o r t h Korea has been a familial dictatorship of General K i m Ilsong until his death in 1994, followed by his son K i m Jongil. The general and his son perfected the art of the cult of the personality i n their dictatorships. N o r t h Korea is the last of the totalitarian states built on a Stalinist model of constant mobilization against external enemies and of continuous economic mismanagement. Despite its investments i n long-range nuclear missiles and nuclear research, North Korea cannot feed itself. Only international food aid has stopped a massive famine. Although the state has achieved full literacy among its population, it prohibits contact with outside ideas and influences. There are elections, but there is only one party, the Korean Workers party—no opposition parties are tolerated. The record of this regime, aside from impressive mass demonstrations of love for the regime for the benefit of visiting foreigners and constant mobilization, has been to create the most centrally planned, autarchic economy i n the world, which is in a state of near collapse from lack of investment i n needed infrastructure. The dictators have made the decision to invest upward of one-third of their economy i n the military, while their country faces malnutrition and

CHAPTER 35 . declining standards of living. The GDP i n North Korea in 2000 was $1000; the GDP for South Korea, $8600. The economic condition of N o r t h Korea is very weak. The collapse of Communist governments i n Eastern Europe and Russia meant that N o r t h Korean goods no longer had ;a market; thus N o r t h Korea s "self-reliance" policy collapsed, leading to famine. Moreover, N o r t h Koreas diplomatic actions have recently been highly suspect, exacerbating its selfimposed isolation. Movements for reform that are increasingly common i n the South, such as human rights initiatives, women's rights and student movements/and environmental concerns, are unheard of i n the DPRK. South Korea has had an entirely difference experience since the 1953 armistice. The first years of the postwar ROK were marked by poverty, homelessness, and a failed economy. Foreign aid kept South Koreans from starving. The South Korean government of the 1950s was characterized by favoritism and corruption. President Syngman Rhee maintained control w i t h the aid of the National Security Law of 1948, w h i c h allowed for the imprisonment of tens of thousands of suspected communists. His 1959 extension of the National Security Law outlawed all criticism of his regime. The following year, however, Rhee met his downfall. Popular dissatisfaction w i t h the president was expressed i n massive demonstrations by university and high school students. After over 100 students were killed by police firing point-blank into their crowd, Rhee had no choice but to resign. He was followed by the democratically elected Chang Myong (CHAHNG mee-ONG), who was overthrown by a m i l itary coup i n 1961. The Pak Chonghoi (PAHK chuhng-hoo-EE; also spelled "Park Chung Hee") era of m i l i t a r y rule followed. The "Korean-style democracy," of Paks junta, lasting from 1961 until 1979, contained no democratic elements. I n 1961, South Korea was placed under martial law, and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was established. By the time martial law was ended i n 1963, the KCIA system of domestic and international surveillance was well established. Once order had been established, Pak's priority was economic growth. To that end he rounded up "illicit profiteers" and adopted a practice from the Chinese Cultural Revolution—convicted businessmen were paraded through the streets, w i t h signs that said, " I am a corrupt swine," " I ate the people," and other denunciations. He also instituted "Export Day," which celebrated family, filial piety, and loyalty. Although one key phrase was "treat employees like family," Pak's success had more to do w i t h industrial planning under the direction of the central Economic Planning Board, a concept borrowed from the colonial Japanese i n Manchuria and from postwar Japan.

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I n the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea underwent a rapid economic growth, labeled an "economic miracle" by several observers. The nation earned an important portion of international trade i n the areas of ship-building, automobiles, computers, and insurance, a*****?, Pak supported the economic dominance of I B y i ^ J chaebol (CHAI-bol)—industrial/banking/mar- B W H keting combines. These chaebol had close ties to ^HHlMm , „ , , . , , South Kore; the government. Paks export-oriented approach was not invulnerable to the ups and downs of U.S. Auto the global trading cycle, however. I n 1972, the combination of recession and depression, i n part due to Americas protectionism regarding textiles, preceded the declaration of a state of emergency. Pak suspended the constitution and banned all political parties and exercise of civil liberties. I n place of the freedoms he had suspended, Pak called for a "revitalizing" (yushin) including the new "yushin c o n s t i t u t i o n . " The new order, an obvious dictatorship, was followed by arbitrary arrests, forced confessions under torture, and detentions i n prison. Neither politicians, religious leaders, professors, nor students escaped punishment. I n response to Paks repressions, a student movement, supported by intellectuals, workers, and ordinary housewives, gained i n momentum. By 1979, demonstrations by students and workers were out of control, and the Pak dictatorship was brought to a violent end. After arguing about political means of bringing dissent under control, Pak's KCIA director K i m Jaekyu shot and killed Pak and the head of his presidential security force. Jockeying for power following Pak's assassinat i o n led to victory of yet another j u n t a under General Chon Tuwhan (CHON doo-WAHN; also spelled "Chun Doo-whan," 1931-), more state repression, and another r o u n d o f demonstrations. The 1980 K w a n g j u (KWAHNG-joo) u p r i s i n g began w i t h student demonstrations against martial law and led to an insurrection d u r i n g w h i c h Kwangju citizens seized weapons i n order to drive out paratroopers responsible for atrocities. Within little more than a week, up to 2000 people had been killed. The leading opposition leader, K i m Taejung ( K I M DAI-joong; also spelled " K i m Dae Jung," 1925-), was sentenced to death. Under Chon there were some reforms such as the abolition of a curfew existing since the Korean War and of school uniforms that had been introduced by the Japanese colonial government. However, the pattern of state repression, including torture and violent popular unrest, continued. E n t e r s t h e

M a r k e t

chaebol—Korean economic conglomerates similar to Japanese

zaibatsu before World War II. yushin constitution—constitution written by Pak's government in 1972 that guaranteed Pak a permanent position as the president. Pak was assassinated in 1979, and the yushin constitution was replaced in 1980.

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C I V I L I Z A T I O N PAST A N D PRESENT

The peoples movement or minjung movement, which began to take shape in the early 1970s, was a leading Force in political activism. The movement provided an organizational force not only for intellectuals, students, and workers, who had already been active, but also for members of the new while-collar class. Chon, who was to become the most hated leader in postwar Soulh Korean history, responded by throwing journalists, civil servants, labor organizers, teachers, and all others suspected of sedition into "purification camps" where ihey were starved and beaten. The "Korean Model" of economic success was based on such state control, but by the mid-1980s, the Chon regime was to be challenged by labor unrest, and many Korean youths were committing suicide as a form of protest. I n 1987, a year before the Olympics were set to open in Seoul, Chon provoked another crisis by selecting a successor—and a general at that Rioting ensued, bin i l was pacified by the desire to show the world that Korea could handle a massive undertaking like the Olympics. Repression abated as No Tae'u (NOH l a i OO; also spelled "Roh Tae-woo," 1932-) the new president, calmed dissent. Greater economic and social liberalization accompanied the growth of personal income and Koreans' increasing identification as part of the middle class. In 1993, K i m Yongsam ( K I M yongSAHM; also spelled "Kim Young-sam," 1927-) became South Korea's first civilian president in 30 years. K i m Taejung, once sentenced lo death, was elected president in 1997. K i m Taejung was hampered by a strongly entrenched opposition and by the collapse of Korea's and other Asian economies in 1997. International bailouts were necessary to keep South Korea afloat. In addition, relations with Japan—with whom Korea hosted the World Cup of Football (soccer) in the summer of 2002—remained rocky. Korean women who had been abused as "comfort women" by Japanese troops during World War II gained neither an apology nor compensation for their suffering. Japanese textbooks minimizing atrocities during the war have also caused outrage in Korea. K i m Taejung nevertheless continued to try to improve relations. One long-term problem, relations between the South and North, began to be addressed. K i m Taejung and K i m Jongil began talks to open contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang in 2000 as part of South Korea's "Sunshine Policy." After that, there have been family visits and improved relations. In 2003, the North declared it had nuclear weapons capability, precipitating a change in diplomatic relations. While the ROK government under current president Roh Moo Hyun (ROH Sunshine Policy—South Korean investment in North Korea, encouragement of visits by Soulh Koreans to northern family members-. President Kim Taejung r eceived the Nobel Peace Prize for' the Sunshine Policy,

Japan and Korea cosponsored the 2002 Worid Cup competition, hoping to improve relations still ajfected by the period oj Japan's colonial control o/ Korea. Mere Korean fans urge on their national soccer team, MOO hee-OON) would like to continue improving relations, the United Stales and China are particularly concerned about the foreign policy implications of a nuclear North Korea. Soulh Korea faces a number of crucial issues in the future, including its relations with the North, the need to improve the status of women, and the recovery, after 60 years, from the humiliation of colonialism.

SOUTHEAST ASIA • What were the roles of nationalism, ethnicity, ideology, and religion in the building of Southeast Asian nations in the post-World War II era? One of the first indications that the whole structure of European imperialism would quickly collapse came in the late 1940s when Indonesian nationalists demanded a complete break w i t h the Netherlands and forces for independence began their drive for freedom in Indochina.

Modern Southeast Asia

Indonesia Immediately aller Japan's surrender, independence fighters Achmed Sukarno and Mohammed Haiia pro-

CHAPTER 35 • claimed Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945. But the Dutch would not leave, and the United Slates and Great Britain initially supported the return of the Dutch. An ugly War againsl the Dutch colonial masters then broke out. Finally in 1949, through UN mediation, the Netherlands East Indies formally became the Republic of Indonesia, achieving nationhood al roughly the same lime as the states of India and Israel. Although it is the biggest and potentially richest nation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has enjoyed little tranquility since it gained independence. Today, the state—which has the fourth largest population in the world—is 87 percent Muslim but encompasses a mixture of many cultures on more than 3000 islands, ranging from hunter-gatherers to urban professionals and intellectuals. Complicating the situation is the prominence or the Chinese minority. Chinese Indonesians, making up less than 3 percent of Indonesia's more than 200 million people, control two-thirds of the nations economy. Anti-Chi-

Asia Since 1945

nese riots and plots against the central government in Java have arisen in various places. For the first 15 years after independence, Indonesia experienced inflation, food shortages, and declining exports. Its population increased while its economy declined. A large portion of the blame for this situation rested with Indonesia's flamboyant president, Achmed Sukarno. He contracted huge Russian loans for arms, lought a costly guerrilla campaign againsl Malaysia, confiscated foreign businesses, and wasted money on expensive, flashy enterprises. Sukarno had come to power as a prominent leader in the preindependence nationalist movement. After experimenting with what he called "guided democracy" in the 1950s, Sukarno assumed dictatorial power in 1959 and declared himself president for life in 1963. Muslim students in Indonesia triggered the events thai led to Sukarno's downfall. After an attempted Communist coup in 1965, they launched attacks on Indonesians they believed lo have Communist con-

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