City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy

Contents

Proceedings ofa conference sponsored by BrownUniversity's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies

Acknowledgements

8

Editors' Preface

9

Introductory Remarks: Max Weber's "The City" Revisited,

19

WilfriedNippel PART I CONSCIOUSNESS AND REPRESENTATION Reflections of the Greek City on Unity and Division, Nicole Loraux

33

Rome : The History of an Anachronism, Timothy]. Cornell

53

The City and the "New" Saints, Chiara Prugoni

71

City and Citizen: Changing Perceptions in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, Alison Brown

93

Commentary:

Carmine Ampolo Giovanni Ciappelli

113 121

PART II CITIZENS AND THE POLITICAL CLASSES Distribution in all of Europe (including the U.K.) by Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart

Norms of Citizenship in Ancient Greece, David Whitehead

13S

The Legal Definition of Citizenship in the Late Middle Ages,

155

Diego Quaglioni Who Rules? Power and Participation in Athens and Rome, WalterEder 169 The Rulers of Florence, 1282-1530, David HerlihY

197

From Social to Political Representation in Renaissance Florence,

223

Riccardo Fubini Commentary:

Christiane Klapisch-Zuber

241

PART III POLITICS AND CONFLICT Copyright © 1991 by Franz Steiner Verlag All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press 1994 1993 1992 1991 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data applied for TSRN

0-477_1mSl~_Q

The Exercise of Power in the Roman Republic, Erich S. Gruen

251

The Dialogue of Power in Florentine Politics,]ohn M. Najemy

269

A Typology of Social Conflict in Greek Poleis, Thomas]. Figueira

289

Social Structure and Conflict in the Medieval City, Giorgio Craceo

309

Commentary:

Harry W. Pleket Ronald F Weissman

331 345

PART IV URBAN AND ARCHITECTURAL FORMS The City of Athens: Space, Symbol, Structure, Tonio Holscher

355

Urban Development in Ancient Rome and the Impact of Empire, L. Richardson jr

381

Civic Urbanism in Medieval Florence, Franek Sznura

403 419 447 453

Urbanism in Medieval Venice, Juergen Schulz Commentary:

Edmond Frezouls James Ackerman

PART V SYMBOLS AND RITUALS Symbols and Rituals in Classical Athens, Adalberto Giovannini

459

From Violence to Blessing: Symbols and Rituals in Ancient Rome, Keith Hopkins

479

Symbols and Rituals in Florence, Franco Cardini

499

The Self-Definition of the Venetian Republic, Patricia Fortini Brown

511

Commentary:

Glen W. Bowersock Marino Berengo

549 .. 555

PART VI TERRITORY, EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND EMPIRE City-State, Territory and Empire in Classical Antiquity, Kurt Raaflaub

565

The Italian City-State and Its Territory, Giorgio Chittolini

589

Diplomacy in the Italian City-State, James S. Grubb

603

Commentary:

Hartmut Galsterer Anthony Molho

619

627

Concluding Reflections, Guido Clemente

641

Index

649

To Our Colleagues in the Department of Classics and the Department of History, Brown University, most especiallyto the memory of David Herlihy

City-State, Territory, and Empire in Classical Antiquity

KURT A. RAAFLAUB

INTRODUCTION

accomplishments of classical antiquity were achieved by two city-states (Athens and Rome) that were successful builders and rulers of empires.1 The very fact that the two politically and culturally most important and thus most influential and best-known citystates of the classical world were imperial powers tends to obscure another fact, namely that both were atypical in most respects. I will argue that under the conditions prevailing in the archaic and classicalperiods of Greco-Roman antiquity - that is, the periods dominated by city-states2- few city-statesmet the basic preconditions necessary for imperial expansion; of those that did, even fewer actually built an empire; and most of these empires - or power formations - only existed for a short period of time. Thus the phenomenon to be examined in much of this chapter - empires ruled by city-states - was exceptional and possible only under extraordinary circumstances. A few preliminary remarks seem necessary. The Phoenician, Greek, Etruscan, and Italian city-states of classical antiquity clearly were not citystates in the modem sense of the word; both the "city" and the "state" components are quite inadequate. But what were they? Discussions of this question usually focus on the Greek city-state, or rather on the phenomenon that the Greeks themselves called "polis." This word became a broadly ac-

T

H E MOST REMARKABLE

1. The purpose of this chapter is to present, as much to nonclassicists as to classicists,a brief survey of the main issues raised by its topic - which obviously is very broad. Limitation of space makes it impossible to analyze all issues in sufficient detail; nor is it possible to provide detailed documentation in footnotes. Instead, in a bibliographical appendix I offer a selection of readings on most of the problems touched upon in the following discussion. 2. Both in Greece and in Italy city-states originated in the Dark Ages. They appear first in the literary (Homer) and archaeological record in the eighth century B.C., were fully developed in the course of the seventh and sixth centuries, and quickly spread widely around the Mediterranean and Black Seas in the age of colonization (c. 750-550 B.C.). Although with the ascendancy of Macedon and the Hellenistic kingdoms and with the expansion of the Roman Empire all poleis eventually lost their independence, they retained substantial elements of their local autonomy, of the traditional social and political structures, and of the cultural function of the polis. One might say that the concept of polis lost most of its meaning only in the crisis of the Roman Empire when centralization, autocratic rule, and government interference in local affairs increased dramatically, thepredominance of imperial aristocracies and the general extension of Roman .citizenship created new allegiances, and the villae of the large landlords provided new focuses of social and economic life and security.

566

Territory, External Relations and Empire

cepted technical term after Jacob Burckhardt in the first volume of his Griecbische Kulturgeschichte of 1898 acknowledged the uniqueness of the Greek - and ancient - phenomenon by consistently replacing "Stadtstaat" with "Polis." More recently, the general use of the term "polis" has met with increased criticism, particularly since there is no agreement about how to define the polis. Moreover, in his famous The Greek State, Victor Ehrenberg, although acknowledging that there were other forms of state in ancient Greece, identified the polis with the Greek state par excellence because, as he put it, it was the historically decisive form of state. Ehrenberg's book provoked an intensive debate about the polis and the Greek state, from which we have gained an increased awareness of the problems involved but no clear solution. Thus, lacking a better alternative, I will continue to use the terms "polis" and "city-state. " What, then, constituted a polis? Not necessarilyindependence - although this was normally perceived as an important asset - because, as the example of the subjected allies of Athens in the fifth century B.C. indicates, dependent communities did not cease to be considered poleis. Nor the existence of a city and the combination of urban center and territory - although this, too, clearly was a crucial feature of most larger and prominent poleis - because there were poleis without cities, poleis with several cities, and even poleis without territory. Rather, the polis was a community of persons, of place or territory, of cults and laws, and a community that was able to administer itself (fully or partly). Because the community of citizens was the primary element, the loyalty and mentality of the citizens - their identification with their community - were more important than external features. For the same reason, the polis was movable, as was demonstrated dramatically by the Phocaeans and Athenians in their confrontations with the Persians,' and by countless others who recreated their polis wherever they settled after they had emigrated from home or escaped the ravages of war. In addition, the polis was defined by emotional elements, some of which could not be replaced or re-created as easily; they are best expressed in the battle cry of the 'Athenian soldiers at Salamis (Aeschylus, Persae 402-405, tr, P. Vellacott): Forward, you sons of Hellasl Set your country freel Set free you sons, your wives, tombs of your ancestors, and temples of your gods. All is at stake: now fight!

Originally, these basic features - community of citizens, territory, cult, and law - characterized Rome and other Italian city-states as well," But when 3. Phocaeans: Herodotus 1.164-65; Athenians (the wooden walls): ibid. 7.143; 8.41; cf. 8.61-62 and 1.170-72. 4. In many respects the Etruscanand Phoenician city-states (among the latter is Carthage, another empire builder) fit this pattern as well. But there are differences that require thorough evaluation.

Raaflaub: Classical Antiquity

567

the size of Rome's territory grew enormously, large numbers of citizens were permanently separated from the center of their polis (through colonization and partial or wholesale enfranchisement of formerly independent communities), and relationships were increasingly defined in legal terms. Thus the community of citizens (cives Romani) was gradually replaced by the civitas or res publica Romana. The Roman state that emerged in the fourth and third cen~ries, though still based on the structures, concepts, and ideology of a polis, transcended the framework of the polis and became a hybrid - neither polis nor territorial state. Even more, Rome's rule over the entire Mediterranean world created conditions that were not at all representative of the city-state in classical antiquity. Still, as one of the few ancient city-states that built an empire, and the only one to succeed in maintaining it over a long period of ~e, ~ome ~ffers too much valuable insight to be ignored. Thus the following discussion Will focus on the Greek poleis prior to 338 B.C. and on Rome during the republic. CITY AND COUNTRYSIDE: PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

Throughout antiquity, the polis was characterized by "the closely interlocked town-country unit"! and the predominance of agriculture: most poleis might be described aptly as farming towns and villages rather than city-states.Indeed, the great majority of poleis were very small. Considering all available ancient and comparative evidence, scholars have estimated the average territory of the Greek polis at fifty to one hundred square kilometers, and the population at 2,500-4,500 persons, including about 450-900 adult male citizens.' Usually most citizens who cultivated the farmland of a given polis, then were able to live in the main settlement. There was no contrast between urban and rural, and political rights were distributed not according to where a citizen lived or how he made his living but according to wealth and social status. In such conditions, political participation was not problematical for those who were entitled to it. Things were somewhat different in large poleis, most markedly in Athens about which we are best informed. Most large poleis gradually developed a strong urban center with a diversified economy and a substantial body of people working in the secondary sector (commerce, manufacture, construction, and so on). Even so, the great majority of the population continued to be landowners and peasants, They lived in single farmsteads or villages, close to 5. M. I. Finley, "The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond," in id., Economy and Society in Ancient Greece (New York, 1981) 3-23, on pp. 6 and 19. 6. .Evc:nthese averag~ figures are too high because they include some exceptionally large poleis (like Athens, Corinth, Argos, Sparta, Thebes, or Samos) with territories of several hundred or thousand square kilometers and populations of several ten or hundred thousands. Some figures are given in the first part of the following section.

568

Raaflaub:C~siaalAnnquity

Territory, External Relations and Empire

their fields and often far from the urban center. Gradually, the life-style and outlook of city folk and peasants diverged and, under extreme conditions, provoked attitudes of mutual contempt or serious disagreement on important issues.' But neither in Athens nor in other large poleis was there a permanent division or tension between country and city; class conflicts, if any, were waged between rich and poor. Throughout antiquity, peasants continued to play a decisive role in the polis; as M. I. Finley puts it, "the political role of the guilds set the medieval city apart from the ancient, as the political role of the peasantry set the ancient city apart from the medieval." The value system of Greek and Roman society, whatever its relation to reality, always placed heavy emphasis on ownership and cultivation of land and, as S. C. Humphreys points out, "there was indeed a tendency in Greek political thought towards eliminating altogether the distinction between town-dwellers and countrydwellers.i" In Attica (as probably in other large poleis) the villages and rural subdivisions (demOl) enjoyed a considerable amount of self-administration (with political and religious offices and an assembly); since the late 6th century B.C. the demes kept the citizen rolls and functioned as miniature democracies. But the political life of the polis took place exclusively in the urban center; only there could the citizens exert their rights. Thus for those living far from the center, political participation could be difficult, although the political life of most poleis placed relatively low demands on the citizens. For, with few exceptions, the archaic and classical Greek and Italian polis was aristocratic or oligarchic. The leading families had their principal or secondary domicile in the center of the polis and controlled the religious and political offices and the powerful council. The assembly, comprising all citizens with full citizen rights, although theoretically sovereign, had only limited functions and made decisions on relatively few issues. Apart from the exceptional case of Athens, the political agenda normally was small, mostly limited to domestic affairs, and posed few problems. Thus political participation was easily manageable even for those citizens who did not belong to the elite. Representation therefore became an issue only under exceptional conditions: (a) if the polis required frequent involvement by many citizens, which in turn means if the political agenda was large and the range of activities of the polis exceptionally broad, if political rights were extended to substantial parts of the nonaristocratic citizen body, and if a nonaristocratic council and/or the assembly assumed a leading role in deliberation and decision making; (b) if the polis territory was so large that most citizens could not easily take part in politics and if the problem of bringing them together frequently could not be solved otherwise. 7. For example, whether or not to sacrifice the Attic countryside in the Peloponnesian War against Sparta. 8. M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973) 138; S. C. Humphreys, Anthropology and the Greeks (London and Boston, 1978) 131.

569

This last problem requires a closer look. Traditionally, there existed in the polis a close connection between ownership of land, military capacity and political rights. The hoplite phalanx, gradually introduced between about 750 and 650 B.C., bestowed equal fighting status on the aristocrats and all those nonaristocratic farmers who could afford the hoplite equipment. In a complex process of interdependent changes, the political rights of the hoplite farmers gradually were enhanced and economic capacity replaced birth as a criterion for political participation and, in some cases, access to council and office. Systems based on some form of political equality (isonomia) for the hoplites probably became fairly common in the course of the sixth century. At least in Athens and Sparta, despite major differences, the assembly was institutionalized, given more power, and made more independent of traditional aristocratic leadership. The assembly, however, could assume the role assigned to it only if a sufficient percentage of citizens was able to participate regularly in its meetings. Thus large poleis were confronted with the problem of how to make sure that its citizens could be present in the political center whenever they were needed there. One solution consisted of extending to all citizens the aristocratic privilege of living in or near the center - which at the same time separated most of them from their fields. This was Sparta's solution, possible only because its citizens (the Spartiates) were able to exploit a large work force of enslaved natives (the helots) who farmed the fields of their Spartiate owners and freed them from the necessity of working for their living. Another solution combined fairly (but not excessively) frequent meetings of the full assembly with a representative system by creating an elected council that prepared the meetings of the assembly and was capable of acting on its behalf when necessary. Whatever the powers of this council, it could represent the assembly only if it was composed of a cross-section of the entire citizen body. This was the Athenian solution, introduced by Cleisthenes at the end of the sixth century, but possibly preceded by a Solonian council and similar.institutions in other poleis,"

..

True, the concept of representation had been introduced earlier - for example, in the councils of religious leagues - but it acquired new significance when it was applied to the people's or democratic council (boule demosiet:" The system developed for this purpose by Cleisthenes was complex and sophisticated, the quota of representation remarkably high: there was one councilor per sixty to eighty citizens, and one out of every three to five 9. The Cleisthenic council probably was never more than a preparatory and executive organ of the assembly: P.]. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford, 1972) 191-93, refuting]. A. O. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955) 13-18. 10. Only the boule demosie in Chios is demonstrably older than the Cleisthenic boule: R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford, 1969), no. 8 on pp. 14-17 (575-550 B.C.); C. W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War. Trans!. Documents of Greece and Rome I (Cambridge, 2nd ed, 1983), no. 19 on pp. 23-24.

570 Territory, External Relations and Empire

citizens was elected at least once during his lifetime to this year-long, timeconsuming, and demanding office. For the Athenian boule was indeed intended to be a polis en miniature (mikra polis), representing the sovereign and governing assembly but not governing in its stead. Of course, in this as in many other respects, democratic Athens was atypical. But there is no doubt that most poleis, including very large ones, retained the "supremacy of the primary assembly" (from which in oligarchic poleis the lower classes were excluded by census or other requirements). The reason is to be found not, as J. A. O. Larsen suggests, in the belief, formulated by Greek theory in the late fifth century, "that the collective judgment of the masses was superior to that of experts," but in the fact that the polis was perceived as a community of citizens and in the intimate connection between the military and political capacity of these citizens," In Rome, on the other hand, the aristocracy was so strong and united that even the changes necessitated by the hoplite phalanx did not affect its political predominance. Moreover, already by the late fourth century, the number of citizens and the extension of territory had increased far beyond the standards set even by the largest Greek poleis, and expansion continued rapidly thereafter until in the first century B.C. all free inhabitants of Italy were enfranchised. Nevertheless, no effort was made to alter the traditional principle that the citizens could exert their political rights only in Rome. As a result, the advantages of citizenship were largely perceived in terms not of participation but of privileges and protections. Moreover, the urban masses voting in the Roman assemblies were far from representative of the citizen body at large, and crucial elections or plebiscites could be decided by large blocks of voters brought into the city for that occasion by interested parties.P FORMATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF EMPIRES

Preconditions of Empire In antiquity large territorial states and empires were usuallyruled by monarchs. The extensive military and administrative tasks required for governing an empire could best be handled by the central authority vested in a monarch. His rule was based on the army, his relatives and friends who were bound to him by close ties of kinship and obligations, and a hierarchically organized bureaucracy that was strictly tied to, and dependent on, his own person and! 11. Larsen, Repr. Gov. (n. 9) 14. On this theory: E. Braun, "Die Summierungstheorie des Aristoteles," Jamb. iUs oste1Teich. archiioL Inst. 44 (1959) 157-84; J. de Romilly, Problemes de la dbnocratie grecque (paris, 1975) 66-71. Community of citizens: V.Ehrenberg, The Greek State (New York,1960; trans), from the first Germaned. 1932) 88-102, esp. 88-92; id., Der Staat der Gnechen (Zurich and Munich, 2nd ed. 1965) 107-25, esp. 107-13; E. Meyer, Einfuhnmgin die antilte Staatskunde (Darmstadt, 1976) 68-80. 12. These and other consequences of expansion became problems and eventually explosive political issues only in the second and first centuries B.C., in the crisis of the Roman republic. Suetonius, in Augustus 46, reports a remarkable but unsuccessful attempt to introduce a system of decentralized voting (mail ballot).

Raaflaub: Classical Antiquity

571

or position," Thus large-scale territorial expansion and empire building by nonmonarchic city-states was a priori exceptional. Aristocratic or democratic poleis, in which the sovereign and governing bodies were made up of a plurality of individuals with a great variety of interests, were structurally and ideologically incapable of developing centralized bureaucracies. Instead, they required the frequent and intensive involvement of large numbers of citizens in various civil and military functions. Democratic Athens and aristocratic Rome provide impressive, although very different, examples. In Athens the number of adult male citizens increased from about 30,000 at the time of the Persian Wars to well over 40,000 at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; it fell to about 22,000 at the end of that war and rose again to approximately 30,000 in the middle of the fourth century. In his Constitution of the Athenians, Aristotle lists an amazing number of citizens who were paid by the polis for their public services. "There were 6,000 jurors, 1,600 archers, and 1,200 cavalry, and 500 members of the Boule. There were 500 guards in the docks and 50 others on the Acropolis; officesin the city occupied up to 700 men, and up to 700 were employed abroad. In addition to them, when later they were at war, there were 2,500 hoplites and 20 guard ships and other ships to carry the tribute employing 2,000 men selected by lot..." (24.3).14 Of course, not all of these were on duty every day throughout the year. On the other hand, more often than not Athens was at war, employing thousands of its lower-class citizens in its navy; even in times of peace, sixty ships patrolled the Aegean on training assignment. Finally, the combination of democracy and empire produced a flood of business for the assembly, which ended up meeting at least forty times a year - until the end of the fifth century without pay. Although attendance often was far below the quorum of 6,000 required for some particularly important issues, the sum of involvement in public service that the Athenian polis expected of its citizens is staggering. The Roman assembly played an important role in elections, legislation, and decisions on war and peace. Yet the senate' was truly the governing body 13. Typically, early efforts to extend control over several poleis originated with the arc!ta ic.tyra?ts who profited from a ~de-ra:nging "in~tional" network of relationships and ?bhganons In o~der to secure power In their own polis and extend their influence far beyond Its borders. Theil" rule was entirely personal and depended on their skill and achievement, and on the loyalty of family members and close allies. Accordingly, the power formations created by tyrants were precarious and rarely survived the second generation. See K. Raaflaub, "Expansion und Machtbildung in fruhen Polis-Systemen," in W. Eder (ed.), Staat utld Staatlif;hlteit in der frUhen rOmischen Republilt. (Stuttgart, 1990) 523-24 (with literature in n. 37), 528-29, and, in general, H.Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griedun; 2 vols. (Munich, 1967). In Rome too an early phase of influence over parts of Latium in the 6th century was connected with th; monarchy/tyranny of the Tarquins: H. H. Scullard,A History of the Roman World, 753-146 B.C. (London and New York, 4th ed. 1980) 61-62; T.]. Cornell, "Rome and Latium to 390 B.C.," Cambr. Anc. Hist; VII.2 (2nd ed. 1989) 243-57. 14. Trans!. J. M. Moore, Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975). See Moore's comment on pp. 249-50, and P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981) 300-9.

572

Territory, External Relations and Empire

that supervised the agenda and decisions of the assembly, tightly controlled public finances and foreign policy, and advised the all-powerful magistrates (see below, n. 23). The three hundred senators, and even more so the members of the senatorial elite (nobiles), were professional politicians and leaders; in their career of public office they held military, diplomatic, political, religious, and jurisdictional responsibilities; as senators, they constantly dealt with innumerable issues of domestic and foreign policy, and they did so through a network of personal patronage and obligations (clientelae, necessitudines). Accordingly, their value system was entirely focused on public service and political and military achievement. Moreover, beginning in the middle of the fourth century, an almost uninterrupted series of wars of expansion required. ever-increasing numbers of farmer-soldiers to spend increasing periods of time away from their farms in increasingly distant theaters of war. Thus in Rome, too, although clearly to a lesser degree than in Athens, substantial parts of the citizen body were frequently and intensively involved in public service. On the other hand, by leading Italy through a system of alliances, administering the provinces of the empire as military districts under permanent martial law, and continuing to exploit the aristocrats' traditional reliance on a staffcomposed of familia (including slavesand freedmen), relatives and friends, to the end of the republic the Romans were able to keep the number of stateemployed personnel remarkably low. As these examples show, a city-state's ability to sustain imperial expansion and rule usually depended on at least two major factors: (a) a large territory and citizen population, (b) the resources required either to free substantial numbers of citizens for extended service for the community or to pay for the services of noncitizens (such as mercenaries) or both. Not surprisingly, most imperial poleis in the classicalworld met both conditions, although in significantly different ways.IS To begin with, they were exceptionally large. Attica covered about 2,650 square kilometers and at times counted more than 40,000 adult male citizens. Sparta controlled about 8,400 square kilometers; its.citizen population (Spartiates) was never very large (9,000-10,000) and decreased alarmingly in the classicalperiod, but it was supplemented for military purposes by noncitizen contingents. By the end of the sixth century, Rome's territory extended over about 820 square kilometers, comparable with some large Etruscan city-states to the north and much larger than its Latin neighbors to the south. With the conquests of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, Rome's territory more than doubled in size. The number of citizens, probably well under 10,000 in 500, grew accordingly. Thus in the middle of the fourth century, before it set out to conquer Italy, Rome was by far the largest polis in central Italy. 15. Exceptions exist: for example, the short-lived predominance of the Phocians in the fourth century B.C. and the impressive Carthaginian empire were both based on large resources despite small territories. See F. Schober, "Phokis," Pauly-Wissowa's Realencyclop. der class. Alterlumswiss. 20 (1941) 487-89; W. Hoffmann, "Karthagos Kampf urn die Vorherrschaft im Minelmeer," inAufstiegundNiedergangderromischen Welt 1.1 (1972) 341-63.

Raaflaub:C~iaalAnnquity

573

Size of territory and citizen body, however, was an essential but not a sufficient precondition for the formation of an empire. For there were other poleis wi~ s~ble territories that never became imperial powers; and some of those which did had been large long before. The decisive issues can best be brought out by way of a historical digression.

Sparta, Athens, and the Formation of Power in the Archaic Period. In archaic

Gr~e and Italy wars ~ere limited in sco~e an~ purpose. Relationships among poleis were charactenzed by constant rivalries and frequent neighborhood wars f?ught mostly about land and booty. In this setting, expansion and forma~on of. power .were achieved not by subjecting the defeated but by absorbing their lands Into the territory of the victorious polis (with or without the population). Thus by the end of the archaic age, there emerged some poleis WIth exceptionally large territories but no empires in which one polis ruled over other poleis or subj~ territories. Even in the extreme case, Sparta's conquest of Messema (late eighth century s.c.), the territory and enslaved population were totally incorporated into the Spartan state; the Messenians no longer existed as a separate polis with its own structures and self-administration (in contrast, for example, to the subjected poleis of the fifth-century Athenian empire). Sparta's efforts to expand its territory even farther ended in the sixth century. Instead, it gradually formed a systemof alliances with most poleis in the Peloponnese. The Peloponnesian League was designed to protect the status quo and the m~tual interests of the allies. As the strongest partner, Sparta held an unquestioned hegemony, was very influential and did not hesitate to enforce its will and keep the allies in line. But attempts to abuse the power of th~ l~~e for Sparta's. o~ ~urposes were soon checked by the strongest allies resistance and by institutional safeguards. Thus, despite modern opinions to the contrary, Sparta did not rule over its allies: the Peloponnesian League was no Spartan empire." In fact, Sparta became an imperial power only in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, partly forced by circumstances and partly imitating the Athenian example. ' Nevertheless, for almost two hundred years after the middle of the sixth centu~, Sparta wasve'! influential in the Greek world..Supported by the authority of the Delphic sanctuary and oracle, it assumed the role of an unofficial leader, protector, and arbiter on behalf of its allies and other Greek poleis in need of help. This function, admirably demonstrated particularly in th~.Persian War.s, was based precisely on the fact that Sparta was the greatest military power In Greece but-lacked interest in expansion and was perceived as nonthreate.ning. Its professional hoplite army was permanently on duty _ and used as little as possible. This paradox is to be explained by the discrep. 16. R;aaflaub, "Expansion" (n. 13) 542-45; contra, among others, M. Steinbrecher, Der Delisch-Atttsche Seebund und die athenisch-spananischen Beziehungen in der IUmonischen Ara (Stuttgart, 1985).

574

Territory, Extemal Relations and Empire

ancy between Sparta's (relatively) small ~itize? body and .the large numb~r of helots. These provided the Spartiates With high economic status and .lelSure for public service but posed a constant threat and thus f?~ced the ~partiates to protect themselves by developing their well-kn?wn military SOCiety, ~d to resist the temptation of using their power potential for imperial expansion. As late as the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans' reluctance to get involved in conflicts abroad, as well as their lack of finan~ial re~ourc~, was a major factor in Athenian calculations.1.7 ~parta's even~al nse to imperial power was made possible only by huge subsidies from Persia and the exploitation of the "liberated" Athenian subjects. What about Athens? Although Attica was united as one polis by about the middle of the seventh century, domestic instability prevented Athe~ from realizing the power potential provided by its large territory and population. A century-long conflict with the tiny neighboring polis of Megara over the possession of Salamis was resolved in Athens' favor only in the middl~ of the sixth century. The tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons, made p~slble by factional strife and social conflicts, contributed much to suppressing such conflicts, to unifying the community, to emphasizing the centr:u religious and political function of Athens, and to inc~easmg t?e sel~-consclousnesso~ ~e citizens. After a brief recurrence of facnonal strife, this process .of political unification was decisively advanced in 507 by the reforms of Cleisthenes, by which the territory and citizen body were reorganized, the demes were given a significant role, the assembly's power was enhan~ed and the function o~ the nonaristocratic council redefined, and the hoplite-farmers were fully mte" .. grated into the political structure of the polis. These reforms, it seems, were welcomed by most citizens; consequently, they must have increased their self-confidence, unity, ~d vig~r. The ~esults were visible in victories over a triple alliance of two neighboring poleis and Sparta (506), in the decision to support the revolt of the I?nian Gre~ks against Persia (500), and, most impressively, in 490 in the Athemans' snmamg conquest of a Persian expeditionary force ~t Mar~thon. Sh~rtly thereafter they used the proceeds of newly discovered silver ~nes, to build a large fl~et in order to gain the upper hand over another neighbor and long-stan~ng rival, Aegina. Instead, this fleet became the decisive .inst~ment in sc:curmg crucial Greek victories in the second round of the Persian Wars (Salamis 480, Mykale 479) and hegemony for Athens in the Aegean i~ 478. ~hus ~til ~e Persian Wars, except for the short and unsuccessful intervention l~ Ionia, Athens' foreign policy was determined by the traditional pa~erns o~ nel~bor­ hood rivalries and wars, and by conflicts brought about by anstocranc factional

Raaflaub: Classical Antiquity

575

Athens and Rome: The First Imperial Poleis. It was only in their struggles against the autocratically governed territorial states of Asia (Lydia and Persia) that the Greeks were confronted with a political phenomenon hitherto unknown to them: the lasting subjection of a defeated polis by a ruling power connected with such obligations as obeying the orders of governors and kings, paying tribute, and supplying troops to the rulers' wars. Here the Greeks learned much about empire and imperial rule, and they soon developed the same ambivalent attitude toward empire as toward tyranny: those who held it enjoyed it and were proud of it; those who suffered under it hated it bitterly. In 478 Sparta and the Peloponnesians retired from the common war effort, and a new alliance of Greek poleis around the Aegean was formed against the Persians under Athenian leadership. Cleverly exploiting their own naval superiority, the dependence of many small poleis on their protection, and the willingness of most allies to leave the fighting to the hegemon, the Athenians gradually transformed this alliance into a vast naval empire, which at its peak comprised about two hundred poleis. Legislation and political decisions concerning these poleis and jurisdiction in capital cases were centralized in Athens; the harbor of Athens became the center of trade in the Aegean, and for decades the Athenian fleet dominated the eastern Mediterranean. Athens' power rested almost entirely on its fleet, which was rowed, apart from increasing numbers of mercenaries and occasionally slaves, by the lowerclass citizens. They were paid by the allies' (or rather, subjects') contributions (tribute), which in times of peace were also used to finance public building in Athens. Thus the proceeds from the empire provided the resources needed to employ in public serviceall those thousands of citizenswhom Aristotle mentions (Ath. Pol. 24.3). The first empire built by a polis therefore was made possible, in addition to its large territory and citizen body, by a high level of social and political integration, a combination of extraordinary efforts and favorable historical circumstances, and the availability of vast financial resources. Once these resources were secured, the process of transformation''from alliance to empire was started, and its mechanisms and advantages were recognized by the leading polis, this process developed its own dynamics and became irreversible." And once Athens had given the example, others (Sparta, Thebes) did not hesitate to imitate it. Finally, yet another basic factor should not be overlooked: by the end of the sixth century, the structures and institutions of the polis had developed to a level of rationalization and sophistication that made it possible to master the complex political and organizational tasks of controlling and administering an empire."

strife.

17. See, e.g., Thucydides 1.69-71,141-42.

18. As Thucydides demonstrates in his penetrating analysis: esp. 1.88-118 (the development of Athenian power); 1.73-78 (speech of the Athenians in Sparta); 2.60-64 (Pericles' last oration). 19. As is indicated, for example, by the complexity of Cleisthenes' reforms. This issue deserves further study.

576

Territory, External Relations and Empire

In several ways, Rome's development followed a compromise pattern between Athens and Sparta. An early phase of intensive neighborhood wars resulted in a city-state of exceptional dimension and population. In the formative years of the early republic, Rome, like Sparta, was under constant and intensive pressure (although not from a subjected slave population but from hostile neighbors on all sides). Forced by the need to survive, the Romans adopted the features of a militaristic society. As soon as the outside pressure abated they used their power potential for further expansion. Rome's victories in the Italian wars (338-270), however, resulted not in its imperial rule over the city-states and tribes of Italy but in a complex system of alliances. Unlike Sparta, Rome succeeded in keeping to itself autocratic control of foreign and military affairs, and the allies were obliged to provide troops for Rome's wars. Unlike the Athenian allies, those of Rome remained fully autonomous and did not suffer interference by the hegemon in their domestic affairs. As the head of this strong alliance system, Rome was able to establish its imperial rule over the Mediterranean world. Thus, again, the formation of an empire by a polis was the result of a combination of extraordinary factors. Here, too, successwas based on continual and intensive efforts by a large number of citizens who devoted much time to public service. Rome, however, had no helots, and the allies paid no tribute. Where did the Romans find the resources that made such service possible and attractive to their citizen-soldiers? Regular pay for the legionaries probably was introduced only during the long campaigns that became the norm during the Samnite Wars in the late fourth century." The necessary funds were provided partly by a war tax (tTibutum) levied on the citizens and partly, one presumes, by booty and the sale of war captives into slavery. Moreover, as in the case of Athens, there were considerable material incentives (booty and conquered land, to be distributed among the citizens). Finally, expansion provided the means to satisfy the long-standing economic and social demands of the lower classes and thus to resolve social conflicts within Roman society. In short, war financed both war and domestic peace, and soon war became indispensable, both for economic and political reasons -and to sustain the ideology of the senatorial elite.

Maintaining an Empire The Roman Empire lasted for many centuries. This is a truly astounding achievement. For most of the. few empires created by city-states in classical

20. The introduction of anny pay is traditionally dated (following Livy 4.59.11-60.8) to the end of the fifth century (siege of Veii); lor doubts about this early date, see C. Nicolet, TributJ4",. Recherches SMrla fiscalitJ directe SONS Ia ripubliqueromaine (BOnn, 1976) 16-19, 100; P. Marchetti, "A propos du tributJ4", romain: imp6t de quotire ou de repartition?" in Armies et (iscalitJ dims le",onde antique, Coli. nat. du CNRS 936 (Paris, 1977), esp. 117-18.

Raaflaub: Classical Antiquity

577

antiquity were short-lived. Some of the reasons will be revealed by another look at the example of Athens. Athens was relatively successful: it held on to its empire for more than half a century and might have done so even longer had it not overextended itself in the Peloponnesian War and finally collapsed from economic and physical exhaustion. In fact, the very factors on which the empire was built (the active role of the citizens and the exploitation of the allies) also contributed decisively to its short life-span, quite apart from possible flaws of democratic politics. To explain: first, as previously discussed, the maintenance of an empire by a city-state required intensive involvement in politics, administration and military service by a great number of citizens. Due to the nature of ancient warfare, defeat on both land and sea often resulted in great losses. Wars were frequent in the world of ancient poleis anyway; in particular, imperial poleis, inclined toward aggressive expansionism and likely to meet hostility on the part of the defeated and subjected, were almost constantly involved in wars. Accordingly, the possibility of heavy losses was ever present. Despite the employment of metics (resident aliens) and mercenaries, the attrition rate among Athenian citizens was severe: during the Pe1oponnesian War their number was reduced to half. Thus the ability to replenish or enlarge the citizen body was crucial, and this is where Athens failed. Greek poleis generally adopted a restrictive concept of citizenship. In Athens the criteria were made even tighter soon after democracy was fully developed. The citizens became an exclusive elite, set apart from all other members of the community by their political rights and identity. Enfranchisement was extremely limited. Losses therefore could be made up only during extended periods of peace, and the possibility of massively increasing the citizen body in order to meet greater challenges was a priori excluded. Such increases could have been effected if the Athenians had adopted a method of e~anchising the citizens of the allied poleis - at least partly or gradually. GIven the power and wealth of Athens and 'the opportunities it offered its citizens, many allies might have found this possibility attractive. Its advantages, though, were not recognized as such by the Athenians. The political identity and involvement of the Athenian citizens, their exclusiveness and elitist attitudes, democracy and empire - all were closely linked and interdependent. At any rate, since there was no possibility of integration, Athenian rule was at best tolerated for lack of a better alternative, at worst hated and, when possible, resisted. Such resistance was suppressed brutally, and Athenian domination became more systematic and oppressive over time: eventually, all but a few allies had to pay tribute' and accept Athenian interference in their domestic affairs. Thus, in order to secure the revenues from the empire, which were needed to maintain the empire, the Athenians depended on their ability to control their subjects tightly and to prevent defections. Power, success, and revenues were causally connected. Failure would decrease power, which would

578

Territory, External Relations and Empire

trigger defections and decrease revenues, which in turn would make it more difficult to restore and maintain power." In all these respects, Rome followed an entirely different policy. To begin with, Rome had a much more open society with a remarkable capacity for integrating territory and new citizens, both aristocratic and not. Throughout its history Rome made extensive and varied use of this possibility. Thus it was able to enlarge its manpower base continuously and to cope much better with setbacks and the increasing challenges posed by imperial expansion. Enfranchisement was particularly attractive to allied aristocracies, which provided crucial loyalty and support. Moreover, Rome's principle of respecting allied autonomy created reliable ties of loyalty among most Italians. The resulting, almost unbreakable alliance system, a practically unlimited supply of manpower, and the consistent and determined leadership the senate provided were decisive factors in sustaining Rome's expansive drive and imperial rule. Dissatisfaction among the allies emerged only in the second century, soon followed in Rome by efforts to curb large-scale enfranchisement. Both were caused by factors that were brought about by the empire itself, which had been built by the open and pragmatic policies pursued in earlier centuries. The same is true for the collapse of the republic in the extended crisis of the first century B.C. Thus we turn to our final question, the impact of empire. THE IMPACT OF WAR AND EMPIRE ON THE CITY-STATE AND ITS SOCIETY

Balancing Individual and CommunalInterests

As previously stated, with very few exceptions, classical imperial city-states were not monarchic but aristocratic and even democraticP Both these constitutions placed a high value on equality and the involvement of large numbers of citizens in public service; both offered many opportunities for conflict and failure, and they were hampered by the difficulty of balancing the interests of individuals, groups, and the community as a whole. Such difficulties could and did affect the city-state's imperial rule; both Athens and Rome tried in various ways to cope with these problems, which can be sketched only briefly in this final section. As a result of Athens' hegemony in the Delian League, its lower-class citizens acquired an important communal function. In most other poleis these 21. The problems posed by this vicious cycle were recognized by the Athenians themselves - or at least by Thucydides; see, for example, 2.62-64 (Pericles' last oration); 3.37-48 (Mytilenian debate); 5.84-114 (MeHandialogue). 22. One exception, apart from the early tyrants (n, 13), is Syracuse under Dionysius the Great in the late fifth and early fourth centuries; see K. F. Stroheker, Dionysios 1. Gestalt"nd Geschichte des TYTannen von Syrakus (Wiesbaden, 1958); L. J. Sanders, Dionysius 1 of Syracuse and Greek Tyranny (London, 1987).

Raaflaub:C~s;caIAnt~u;~

579

citizens, lacking the economic capacity to meet the hoplite census, counted for little, both socially and politically. In Athens, they provided much of the ~~power needed. to row the fleet; thus they permanently assumed responsibility for the security, power, and prosperity of their polis, thereby gaining the mi~~um of social prestige and acceptance that was necessary to make them politically a~eptable. as well. From the beginning, therefore, democracy was inextricably linked With Athens' naval policy and empire. As a result .of reforms realized in 462, the assembly and its supporting branches (council and popular courts) controlled not only all final decisions but th~ entire process of planning and determining policies, supervising their execution, and controlling the persons actively involved in that process: the people indeed were fully in charge. Thus a random cross-section of a few thousand .c~tizens (usually less than 10-20 percent of the entire citizen body) made deCISIOns that affected the whole polis of Athens, hundreds of poleis in the empire, and a substantial part of the world around it. Moreover, the nature of politics in classical antiquity was highly personal: often the same person made a proposal, persuaded the assembly to accept it, and was responsible for its execution, taking credit for success and blame for failure. Thus a group of increasingly professional politicians competed with each other for public recognition and leadership, trying to beat their rivals with their proposals and thereby influencing the course of foreign policy. Under these circumstances, the main problem was to prevent rash and em?tional decisions by the assembly, and to secure for the polis a consistent, rational, and responsible foreign policy - which in turn meant to provide stable and responsible leadership. Thucydides' assessment of this problem is well ~own: under Pericles, "in what was nominally a democracy, power was really 10. the hand of the first citizen. But his successors , , who were more on a level With each other and each of whom aimed at occupying the first place, adopted methods of demagogy which resulted in their losing control over the actual conduct of affairs. Such a policy, in a great city with an empire to govern, naturally led to a number of mistakes" (2.65, tr. R. Warner). To put it differently, democracy needed a strong leader to provide stability; with its excessive concern for equality, however, it could not tolerate a strong leader unless he was exceptionally skillful in presenting himself as nonthreatening and not too ambitious: a true champion of the people. Various institutional safeguards were installed in order to guarantee careful deliberation prevent illegal motions and decisions, and hold the politicians accountable for their proposals and actions. Nevertheless, abuses and emotional as well as illinformed decisions occurred, and it proved increasingly difficult to reconcile the intense competition among ambitious and often selfish individuals with the community's need of responsible leadership. Particularly during the Peloponnesian War, this built-in and virtually insoluble conflict caused several decisions that clearly were not in the community's interest and contributed much to the demise of the empire.

580

Raaflaub: Classical Antiquity 581

Territory, External Relations and Empire

Rome's army, on the other hand, always remained primarily a land army, composed of the citizens and allies who met the census requirement; democracy therefore was never an option." Moreover, the constant pressure Rome endured in the early republic must have strengthened not only the quality and importance of aristocratic leadership, but also solidarity, cohesiveness discipline, and willingness to subordinate oneself within both the aristocrac/ and the entire community. All this helps to explain cert~ p~iar features and attitudes of Roman society. Rome's later successes m foreign policy naturally contributed to bolstering even ~rth~r the leadership of se~ate and nobility." Yet in Rome, too, conflicts were inevitable between the aspirations of individual senators, the power of the magistrates, the collectiveinterests and responsibilities of the senate, and the needs of the citizens who fought in the army and voted in the assembly. Formal and informal safeguards existed in the collective discipline and code that the elite adopted, in a dense network of ties and obligations among all groups and classes, in the unwritten but powerful norms of customary law (mos maiorum), and in the checks and balances of the mixed constitution analyzed so impressively by Polybius." Nevertheless, these safeguards proved incapable of preventing decisions by the assembly that jeopardized a consistent and responsible foreign policy. For example, already on the eve of the First Punic War, an ambitious consul, Appius Claudius Caudex, persuaded the assembly with the promise of great profits to ignore the well-considered negative recommendation. of ~~ senate and vote for intervention in Sicily; his actions as a general in Sicily then prompted the outbreak of a long and arduous war with Carthage - which was hardly envisaged when this issue was discussed in Rome." No doubt, 23. Pace F. Millar's recent efforts to emphasize the role of the assembly in political practice and thus the democratic element in the Roman constitution: "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C.," ]oum. of Roman Stud. 74 (1984) 1-19, esp. 14-19' "Politics Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90 B.C.)," ibid. 76 (1986) 1-11. 'For opp~sing views, see esp, M. Gelzer, Die r5mische Nobilitiit (Leipzig 1912,-repr. Stuttgart, 1983) 49ff. =id., Kleine Schriften (Wiesbaden, 1962) 68ff. =id., The Roman Nobility (transl, R. Seager, Oxford, 1969) 62ff.; C. Meier, Res.publica ~_ (Wiesbaden 1966, r.ep~. with a new introd. FrankfurtlMain 1980) 34-63; J. Bleicken, Staatlu;be Ordnung und Frerhert in der r5mischen Republik. (Kallmfutz, 1972) 64-80; L. Burckhardt, "The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts Nobilitas and Homo novus," Historia 39 (1990) 77-99; see also K.-J. Holkeskamp, "Conquest, Competition and Consc;nsus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the Nobilitas," forthcoming. See further~ With more literature, n. 10 ofW. Eder's contribution and, particularly, E. S. Gruen's chapter In the .. . present volume. .. 24. Similarly, in the case of Athens, there was a tradition that tJ:te Persian V1~tO~les temporarily bolstered the authority of the old council on the Areopagus: Aristotle, ConstJtutton of the Athenians 23.1-2; d. Rhodes, Commentary (n, 14) 283-90; R. Wallace, The Areopagos Council, to 307 B.C. (Baltimore, 1989) 77-83. 25. Polybius 6.11-18; d. F. W. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1972) 13056 and for a critical assessment, T.J. Cornell's contribution to the present volume. , 26. Polybius 1.11-12; on the outbreak of the First Punic War, see, for example, C. Nicolet, Rome et la conquete du monde miditerrankn II: Genese d'un empire, Nouv. Clio 8.2 (Paris, 1978) 606-10 with literature on p. 483; A. M. Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision M4lr.ingand Roman Foreign Relations 284-194 B.C. (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1987) 341-45.

similar situations had occurred earlier, and they repeated themselves later with ever-greater consequences.

The Impact ofEmpire The rule over an empire necessarily affected the structures of the polis and the attitudes and "ideology" of its society. Martial capacity and achievement became part of the value system of the ruling class and of the ideology supporting the prevailing constitution. As success in war provided the ruler in a monarchy with power and legitimacy,so too in an aristocracy or a democracy martial success helped to perpetuate and legitimize the system, whereas failures threatened it. Thus, as the examples of Athens and Rome illustrate, war and imperial expansion could become indispensable and create their own dynamics. Democracy originated in Athens under exceptional conditions and remained exceptional in the Greek world. By claiming to give even the poor and humble citizens equal political rights, it was a "revolutionary" and upsetting system: at best, it was perceived as government by the entire citizen body, at worst, by the mob. Like all ancient political systems, it was more than a constitution; it was a way of life: in democratic Athens life, politics, and the policies pursued were different from those in an aristocratic polis. Inevitably, therefore, democracy was hated by those elsewhere in Greece who suffered from its aggressive policies and by those in Athens who felt deprived by it of their traditional claim to unquestioned power and leadership. Yet, on the whole, despite serious failures and setbacks, democracy was - and considered itself - remarkably successful." Thus the emotional configuration of the average lower-class citizen must have been contradictory: he was proud of the achievement of his polis and he identified with democracy; he claimed political equality with, but remained socially inferior to, his noble and wealthy fellow citizens; and he resented it that he was criticized and not taken seriously by the "better ones." In this situation he developed, as C. Meier has shown" a primary political identity," If his social status remained low, almost indistinguishable from the slaves and inferior to many metics, at least the political sphere set him apart from the noncitizens: there he had rights, he was an equal, he counted as somebody. Collective achievement in politics became crucial for his self-confidence and instrumental in demonstrating his competence, which was questioned and maligned by the opponents of democracy. The sphere to realize such achievement necessarily was that of foreign policy. Thus the Athenian citizen was all too willing to assert the power of his city and to embark on new conquests and wars. This tendency was enhanced, on the one hand, by the fact that all Athenians profited in many ways from 27. See only Pericles' comments in Thucydides 2.36 and 64, or Herodotus 5.78. 28. C. Meier, "Die politische Identitiit der Athener und das Arbeiten der perikleischen Demokratie," in id., Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen (FrankfurtlMain, 1980) 247-72 = id., The Greek. Discovery of Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990) 140-54.

582

Territory, External Relations and Empire

the empire and expected to profit even more from further expansion, and on the other, by the fierce competition among the leaders, for whom an interventionist and expansionist foreign policy provided opportunities to prove themselves and to gain influence, power, and wealth. These factors largely explain the aggressive foreign policy of democratic Athens and the character portrait drawn by Thucydides and others, which describes the Athenian citizens as totally devoted to their city, incessantly meddling in other peoples' affairs, and incapable by nature either of living a quiet life themselves or allowing anyone else to do SO.29 Thus continuing success became crucial to holding the empire together, to bolstering the self-esteem of the democratic citizens, and to providing democracy with the legitimacy needed to make it acceptable for the majority of the Athenian upper class. Conversely, when democracy suffered major failures (such as in Sicilyin 413 B.C. or at the end of the Peloponnesian War), it lost its legitimation by success and much of the support of the upper classes, and became vulnerable - although after half a century democracy was so firmly entrenched that efforts to overthrow it succeeded only temporarily (in 411/410 and 404/403). Rome's case is well known and can be summarized briefly. The Roman aristocracy early on adopted a value system that was entirely geared toward achievement in political and military leadership. Once in place, this system inevitably put pressure on Rome's foreign policy. At the same time the citizensoldiers were conditioned to accept constant warfare as necessary for the survival of the community, profitable, and thus, to some extent, desirable. Moreover, given the power of the aristocracy, the military sphere was the only one in which the nonaristocrats collectively, and upstarts individually, could assert themselves and prove their indispensability." For Roman society, therefore, wars became necessary in essential ways. This in part explains why, once the defensive wars of the early republic were over, Rome quickly got involved in an almost uninterrupted series of wars of expansion that resulted in a large empire.

29. Thucydides 1.70. For parallels in Euripides, see Raaflaub, "Contemporary Perceptions of Democracy in Fihh-Century Athens," Classica et Mediaevalia 40 (1989) 33-70, at 5152. The connection between democracy and aggressive foreign policy or imperialism has not been discussed sufficiendy in modern scholarship. 30. Which is also demonstrated by the tradition about mutinies and "military strikes" of the plebeian soldiers (SlUiessW plebis ) in the social conflicts of the early republic and by the crucial political role of the armies in the crisis of the late republic. For the former, see, recendy, K. Raaflaub, "From Ptotection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders," in id, (