China’s Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976
The Southern Tang was one of China’s minor dynasties and one of the great state...
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China’s Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976
The Southern Tang was one of China’s minor dynasties and one of the great states in China in the tenth century. Although often regarded as one of several states preceding the much better known Song dynasty (960–1279), the Southern Tang dynasty was in fact the key state in this period, preserving cultural values and artefacts from the former great Tang dynasty (618–907) that were to form the basis of Song rule and thereby presenting the Song with a direct link to the Tang and its traditions. Drawing mainly on primary Chinese sources, this is the first book in English to provide a comprehensive overview of the Southern Tang and full coverage of the military, cultural and political history of the period. It focuses on a successful, albeit short-lived, attempt to set up an independent regional state in the modern provinces of Jiangxi and Jiangsu and establishes the Southern Tang dynasty in its own right. It follows the rise of the Southern Tang state to become the predominant claimant of the Tang heritage and the expansionist policies of the second ruler, culminating in the occupation and annexation of two of the Southern Tang’s neighbours, Min (Fujian) and Chu (Hunan). Finally, the narrative describes the decline of the dynasty under its last ruler, the famous poet Li Yu, and its ultimate surrender to the Song dynasty. Johannes L. Kurz is Senior Lecturer in the History Department at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. He is the author of Das Kompilationsprojekt Song Taizongs (reg. 976–996) (2003).
Asian States and Empires Edited by Peter Lorge, Vanderbilt University
The importance of Asia will continue to grow in the twenty-first century, but remarkably little is available in English on the history of the polities that constitute this critical area. Most current work on Asia is hindered by the extremely limited state of knowledge of the Asian past in general, and the history of Asian states and empires in particular. Asian States and Empires is a book series that will provide detailed accounts of the history of states and empires across Asia from earliest times until the present. It aims to explain and describe the formation, maintenance and collapse of Asian states and empires, and the means by which this was accomplished, making available the history of more than half the world’s population at a level of detail comparable to the history of Western polities. In so doing, it will demonstrate that Asian peoples and civilizations had their own histories apart from the West, and provide the basis for understanding contemporary Asia in terms of its actual histories, rather than broad generalizations informed by Western categories of knowledge. 1. The Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1945–49 An analysis of communist strategy and leadership Christopher R. Lew 2. China's Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976 Johannes L. Kurz 3. War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740–1849 Kaushik Roy
China’s Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976 Johannes L. Kurz
First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
© 2011 Johannes L. Kurz All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kurz, Johannes L. China's Southern Tang dynasty, 937–976/Johannes L. Kurz. – 1st ed. p. cm. – (Asian states and empires) Includes bibliographical references. 1. China – History – Southern Tang kingdom, 937–975. I. Title. DS749.7.K87 2011 2010039196 951⬘.018 – dc22 ISBN 0-203-82861-5 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 978–0–415–45496–4 (hbk) ISBN 978–0–203–82861–8 (ebk)
Contents
Acknowledgements Introduction List of dynasties Map of the Southern Tang state and its neighbours List of abbreviations
vii ix xi xiii xv
1
The state of Wu
1
2
The founding of the Southern Tang and the reign of Li Bian
23
3
The reign of Li Jing
41
4
The reign of Li Yu and the decline of the Southern Tang
91
5
Epilogue
115
Notes Bibliography Index
119 129 133
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Peter Lorge, who asked me in early 2007 if I would be willing to contribute a volume on Southern Tang history to the present series. I am grateful to friends and colleagues who provided many texts that otherwise I would have found hard to retrieve while working and living in Brunei. Among these are Matthias Kaun, Head of the excellent East Asian collection at the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, Anne Labitzky-Wagner, librarian at the Institute of Chinese Studies in Heidelberg, and Birgit Mayr. Hugh R. Clark kindly sent me his draft chapter on the history of the Ten States, many years before it was finally published in the Cambridge History of China. My appreciation goes to all the scholars whose work I have drawn upon in writing this history of the Southern Tang. Their names are listed in the notes and the bibliography. Dawn Clare was so kind as to read through the first draft and eliminate the most obvious English language and style flaws. Special thanks go to my wife Doris who, over the past twenty years, has supported my interest in the Southern Tang and has read through various versions of the present book. Any remaining errors and, unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own. Johannes L. Kurz Bandar Seri Begawan, January 2011
Introduction
Pre-modern Chinese history is characterized by a succession of dynasties, starting with the Qin in 221 BC and ending with the Qing in 1911. During this period, the Chinese Empire was fragmented twice, from 420 to 589 and again from 907 to 960. The last period is called the Period of the Five Dynasties and Ten States. This designation is the result of historiographical conventions that were established by the first Song emperor, Taizu (r. 960–976), in the early Northern Song period (960–1126). Official historians of the Song accordingly had to treat only the Five Dynasties, that is, the states in the northern half of China, as legitimate predecessors of the Song, for Taizu had served the last of these himself, whereas they had to categorize those states that were located in their majority to the south of the Yangzi River as illegitimate. The present book deals with one of the most powerful and influential among the southern states, the Southern Tang (936–976). The importance of the Southern Tang within the framework of tenth-century Chinese history has long been underestimated because of the historiographical conventions of the Song. Where the northern dynasties focused on the military, the Southern Tang, especially under the first ruler, Li Bian (r. 936–943), undertook to build a civil bureaucracy, thus benefitting the peaceful development of the state. The Southern Tang Empire actively adopted the heritage of the Tang dynasty and similarly pursued a policy of cultural restoration. This policy created a pool of talented scholars versed in the literary traditions, a rich palace collection, including books produced during the Tang dynasty, as well as renowned paintings and calligraphic masterpieces. The imperial aspirations of the Southern Tang during the rule of the second emperor, Li Jing (r. 943–961), quickly dissolved under the pressure, first, from the Later Zhou (951–959) and then the Song, and the Southern Tang hence survived as a dependent kingdom only. Considering the fact that the Song dynasty employed a number of Southern Tang officials in one of the most impressive projects aimed at the restoration of the cultural heritage, and used the Southern Tang art and book collection
x
Introduction
as a foundation for its own palace collections, we may regard the Southern Tang as the true facilitator between the Tang and the Song dynasties. The impact of the Southern Tang on the early Song dynasty may explain why there is a larger number of historical works surviving on this state than on any of the other dynasties and states of the period in question. For better readability of the text, I have tried to limit the sources for the depiction of the history of the Southern Tang and have relied mainly on two chronological histories of the Chinese Empire. For the period from the founding of the state of Wu (905) to the penultimate year of the reign of the second Southern Tang emperor (959), I have drawn on the Comprehensive mirror for aid in government (Zizhi tongjian) by Sima Guang (1019–1086); for the period of the reign of the last Southern Tang ruler, from 960 to 976, I have used Li Tao’s (1115–1184) Long draft of the continuation of the Zizhi tongjian (Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian). These two major sources were, where necessary, supplemented with information taken from original primary sources that are listed in the bibliography. Chinese historical works tend to relate events in a detailed and factual manner. I have followed the original works along this line, but, where it seemed appropriate, I have quoted speech in order to liven up the text. Speeches for the most part may have been inserted by historiographers to make character flaws or superior rhetorics more evident. Thus, they may not be historically accurate, but they convey a sense of how historians understood events and actions. It is a feature of Southern Tang history that important events were connected with political or military actions, such as the take-over of power by Li Bian in 936, the war campaigns of Li Jing against his neighbours, his defensive actions against the Later Zhou in the late 950s, and the struggle of Li Yu against the Song armies in 975. Hence, these events occupy a large part of the present book, showing the rise of the Southern Tang as a major player in southern Chinese politics in the first half of the tenth century, and the declining power of this southern state in the face of increasing northern pressure towards the end of the tenth century.
Dynasties
Tang 618–907 The Five Dynasties
The Ten States
Later Liang Later Tang Later Jin Later Han Later Zhou
Wu Southern Tang Wuyue Chu Min Southern Han Former Shu Later Shu Jingnan (Nanping) Northern Han
907–923 923–936 936–947 947–950 951–959
Song 960–1279
902–936 937–976 907–978 907–951 909–945 917–971 903–925 933–965 924–963 951–979
Kaifeng
LATE R JIN
i
Hua
n
RN
a Ji
Tanzhou
SO
UT
HE
Jiangling
Jinling
Ya ng zi
TA
NG
Hu
a ain
Yangzhou
n
g
n
a
n
Qiantang
WUYUE
Hongzhou
CHU Fuzhou
MIN Quanzhou
S O U TH E RN H AN Xingwang fu
Map of the Southern Tang state and its neighbours (c. 943) Note: Dotted lines show boundaries of modern provinces
Abbreviations
These abbreviations only appear in the Notes section (pp. 119–128). JBZ JNBL JYS LNTS MNTS SGCQ SS XZZTJ ZZTJ
Jiangbiao zhi Jiangnan bielu Jiangnan yeshi Lu You Nan Tang shu Ma Ling Nan Tang shu Shiguo chunqiu Songshi Xu zizhi tongjian changbian Zizhi tongjian
1
The state of Wu
After the Huang Chao rebellion (874–884), which rocked the Chinese Empire to its very foundations, and prior to the demise of the Tang dynasty in 907, regional commanders had already gained various degrees of autonomy from the increasingly weak Tang court in Chang’an. In what historians of the Song dynasty came to label the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten States, the empire was divided largely into two parts. In the north, the heartland of Chinese culture, five dynasties succeeded each other until 960. South of the Yangzi, the situation was quite different, as the topography favoured the creation of a number of states that existed simultaneously, the last of which only surrendered to the Song in 978. One of the most successful regional warlords during the last decades of the Tang was Yang Xingmi (852–905). Coming from very humble origins, Yang had become a soldier and risen through the ranks to the position of prefect of Luzhou (in modern-day Anhui) in 883. After Gao Pian (c. 822–887), the governor of the Huainan region, had been murdered in 887, Yang Xingmi, in the ensuing fight for possession of Huainan, gained the upper hand against his main opponent Sun Ru (?–892). His position was bolstered by the court, which appointed him surveillance commissioner1 of Xuanzhou, an important city in Jiangnan that Yang had taken in the same year. The seizure of Xuanzhou set him on a course of confrontation with Zhong Zhuan (?–906), who had taken advantage of the Huang Chao rebellion to set himself up in Jiangnan. After he had finally beaten Sun Ru in 892, Yang made Guangling (Yangzhou) his headquarters, receiving the title of governor of Huainan, as well as an honorary appointment as grand mentor of the Tang emperor.2 In the following years, he expanded his power throughout Jiangnan and inevitably clashed with Qian Liu (852–932), who, at the time, held sway over part of the Yangzi delta and territories in the region of modern-day Zhejiang province. Upon Yang Xingmi’s death in 905, the territory of the state that came eventually to be known as Wu comprised, basically, the larger regions of Huainan and Jiangnan, or roughly the modern-day provinces of south Anhui, Jiangsu and Jiangxi, as well as parts of Hubei, and a total of twenty-nine
2
The state of Wu
prefectures. The northernmost town was Haizhou (near modern-day Lianyungang, in Jiangsu), and the southernmost city was Qianzhou (modernday Ganzhou, in Jiangxi). The most important city in the west was Ezhou (in the vicinity of modern-day Wuhan, in Hubei), and the most important city in the east, for its strategic location on the Grand Canal, was Changzhou. The Huai River in the north was a natural border and defence against incursions from the north, and the south was relatively well protected by the mountain ranges that separate southern Jiangxi from the states of Chu in Hunan, Southern Han in Guangdong and Min in Fujian. The border with the state of Wuyue roughly followed the Huaiyu mountain range. The Yangzi and its tributaries and canals in the northern part of the Wu territory provided easy access to the western and eastern areas, while the Gan River network in the south facilitated intraregional traffic. The borders in the west, south and east remained relatively stable until towards the end of the Southern Tang dynasty. The real concern for the Wu, as well as the Southern Tang, dynasties was always the state of Wuyue to the east, as well as the dynasties that succeeded each other north of the Huai River. The major grain cultivated then and now in Anhui, Jiangsu and Jiangxi is rice, and one of the more important natural resources found in all three provinces is copper. Because of their warm climate, the regions of Huainan and Jiangnan were ideal for the growing of mulberry trees, whose leaves are the staple food of the silkworm. In 905, Yang Xingmi was succeeded by his eldest son, Yang Wo (885–908). Yang Wo was responsible for the seizure of Jiangxi in 907, which, until this time, had been in the hands of Zhong Zhuan and his son. During his short reign, Yang Wo had to deal with incursions by the rulers of Wuyue and Chu, as well as the newly established dynasty in the north, the Later Liang, the first of the Five Dynasties. The new ruler of Wu did not submit to the emperor of the Later Liang, whom he regarded as a usurper, and made that evident by continuing the last reign title of the Tang, ‘Heavenly assistance’ (Tianyou), instead of adopting the Later Liang reign title ‘Peace initiated’ (Kaiping). Yang Wo’s tenure was threatened from the start because two of his father’s commanders, Xu Wen (862–927) and Zhang Hao, agreed to take over power from the Yang family. The two military officials had control over the army, and Yang Wo had always been suspicious of them. From the scarce evidence surviving, it appears that either Xu and Zhang would strike at Yang, or Yang would take decisive action against Xu and Zhang. Originally, Xu and Zhang had agreed to split the territory between themselves and submit to Later Liang rule. After they had murdered Yang Wo, however, Zhang Hao wanted to become ruler of the territory of Wu. This displeased Xu Wen, who feared to be murdered by Zhang. He enquired about the best course of action from Yan Keqiu (?–930), his advisor, who
The state of Wu 3
explained that Zhang Hao did not possess the qualities needed to become ruler. When Zhang Hao tried to force the leading officials into accepting his accession to the throne, Yan Keqiu stopped him by pointing out that the ministers of the Yang family surely would follow him, but that they would be more pleased if another Yang family member were appointed king. A young ruler could be more easily manipulated by Zhang, and Yang Xingmi’s officials would find this arrangement more suitable. Thus, Yang Longyan was chosen as the new ruler of Wu. Yang Longyan was the second son of Yang Xingmi and, at the time of his accession to the throne, was about nine years old. Soon after this, the relationship between Xu Wen and Zhang Hao deteriorated considerably. Li Chengsi, a close friend of Zhang Hao, suspected that Yan Keqiu was a partisan of Xu Wen, for he had spoiled Zhang’s plan to send Xu Wen away from the capital. Therefore, he talked Zhang into sending some robbers to break into Yan Keqiu’s residence to kill him, but instead they only looted the place, without murdering Yan. This incident convinced Yan that he should give his support to Xu Wen, whom he immediately advised to get rid of Zhang. Consequently, Zhang and his followers were put to death. As Xu Wen had wisely left it to Zhang and his men to murder Yang Wo, he now appeared to the people as the upright avenger of a regicide. With this, the peaceful reconstruction of the territories under the control of Wu started. Xu Wen’s adopted son, Xu Zhigao, the future first emperor of the Southern Tang, was in his early teens at the time of Xu Wen’s ascent. The early childhood years of Xu Zhigao are obscure. All sources agree that he was born in Pengcheng, in the district of Xuzhou in modernday Jiangsu province, to a commoner named Li Rong and his wife, Liu, on 7 January 889.3 The newborn received the ‘milk name’ Pengnu. As for his father, Li Rong, there exist two different narratives. Most sources say that he left his family because he was unreliable and loved to roam the countryside following his interests in Buddhism and Daoism. This, together with his frequent disappearances, earned him the ambiguous nickname Li, ‘Who follows the way’, among the people who knew him. In a text from the early eleventh century, Li Rong is depicted as a sword for hire and a local strongman. When Yang Xingmi rose to prominence in Huainan in the 890s, he joined a band of pirates who devastated the region around Haozhou on the Huai River, in modern-day Anhui, and Liangxian in Henan. When Yang Xingmi heard about these actions, he led an army against Li Rong, defeated him and took him prisoner. Yang wanted the whole family of Li Rong executed, but a monk in Haozhou, who was an acquaintance of Yang, begged for the life of the young son of Li Rong and asked to raise him as a Buddhist monk. The majority of historical texts record that his paternal uncle, Li Qiu, rescued the young boy and his mother and brought them to Haozhou.4 Soon after their arrival, the mother died, and the boy was given shelter at the
4
The state of Wu
Kaiyuan monastery in Haozhou.5 In an alternative description of events, an older sister of the little boy, who had become a Buddhist nun, had made the acquaintance of Li, the wife of Xu Wen. As Li had the same surname as the boy, she asked her husband to adopt the boy.6 This contradicts the story as told in other texts, in which Yang Xingmi, passing through Haozhou in 895, noticed the remarkable physical appearance of the boy and therefore adopted him as his son. As his own sons disliked the idea of an orphan becoming their brother, Yang asked his general, Xu Wen, to take care of the boy.7 The day before Yang’s request, Xu Wen is said to have dreamed of several tens of yellow dragons swimming in the water. He caught one of them and then woke up.8 Li cared very much about the boy and raised him like her own child.9 The boy received the family name Xu and the given name Zhigao.10 Once, Xu Zhigao accompanied Xu Wen on a military campaign, but, as he did not follow orders, Xu Wen drove him away with a cane. Xu Zhigao nevertheless returned to the Xu residence. This made Xu Wen pity the boy and like him even more. As Xu Zhigao was a precocious boy at the age of nine, and as his siblings were all much younger, he was made the head of the household when his adopted father was away on duty. When his brothers were older, they liked to go hunting on horseback in their spare time, whereas Xu Zhigao, apart from practising archery, studied characters and accounting.11 As Xu Wen doubted his military abilities, Zhigao often asked for military appointments to gain experience and, being of quick comprehension, he swiftly rose through the ranks to become division commander. After he had come of age, he married the daughter of the prefect of Shengzhou, Wang Rong. When Xu Wen once fell ill, it was Xu Zhigao and his wife who looked after him the whole time, while his adopted brothers did not take much notice of their father’s illness. Xu Wen was moved to say: ‘Alas, even though you are from a different family, I have no one who is closer to me.’12 Shortly afterwards, Xu Zhigao’s wife died, and he grieved a long time for her before he took the maid of his late wife as his main consort. Table 1.1 Adopted brothers of Xu Zhigao Xu Zhixun1 (?–918), oldest son of Xu Wen Xu Zhixun2 (?–934), second son of Xu Wen Xu Zhihui, third son of Xu Wen Xu Zhijian (?–931), fourth son of Xu Wen Xu Zhizheng (?–after 943), fifth son of Xu Wen Xu Zhi’e (?–939), sixth son of Xu Wen13
The state of Wu 5
This girl, with the family name Song, had lost her parents as well and, as a child, had drifted among the military, where she had been found by Wang Rong, who brought her home and made her a servant.14 Later, she became a maidservant of Xu Zhigao’s first wife, Wang.15 After the latter had passed away, Xu Wen suggested elevating the status of Song to main wife, as she had already borne a son, the future emperor Yuanzong. Xu Wen, accordingly, conferred noble titles on Song.16 Because of their shared experiences and fates, Xu Zhigao and his second wife were very close. According to the relevant sources, Xu Zhigao had an impressive appearance. He was tall, with a wide forehead and a prominent nose. His voice was clear and loud, and people found it hard to keep up with him because of his stride. A physiognomist observing Xu Zhigao once noticed that he had ‘a dragon’s stride and a tiger’s step’, which certainly were the attributes of a leader.17 He served Xu Wen with devotion, and it was this attitude that had impressed Yang Xingmi, who remarked once that, among the sons of all his generals, none surpassed Xu Zhigao.18 In the summer of 909, when he was about twenty years old, Xu Zhigao was transferred to be defence commissioner of Shengzhou and concurrent commander of the war junks. This unit was stationed at Shengzhou. One year later, in 910, Xu Zhigao was promoted to deputy commissioner of Shengzhou and, in this capacity, was responsible for the administration of the prefecture. A chance to earn more merits and experience was presented to Xu Zhigao when Li Yu and a few other, highly decorated officers of Yang Xingmi rebelled in early 912. They had been watching the rise of Xu Wen to power very closely and had been envious of his career, which took him from lowly company commander to head of the government. In 912, Xu Jie (861–937), on a mission to Wuyue, passed through Xuanzhou. He handed an order from Xu Wen to Li Yu, summoning him to court to pay his respects to the new king, Yang Longyan. Li Yu initially agreed to comply, but, when Xu Jie continued by saying that if he did not attend people would accuse him of rebellion, he became angry and refused to obey. He addressed Xu Jie: ‘You say that I rebel, but killing the Director of the Chancellery (i.e. Xu Wen) is not an act of sedition!’ After Xu Jie had transmitted this answer to Xu Wen, Xu Wen ordered Li Yu to be replaced, as a punishment for his disobedience. He thereupon dispatched his general, Chai Zaiyong (?–935), with a detachment of troops to make sure that Wang Tan, the newly appointed prefect of Xuanzhou, was installed there. In this campaign, Xu Zhigao served as Chai Zaiyong’s deputy. As Li Yu was not permitting anyone to enter Xuanzhou, Chai Zaiyong attacked the city, but failed to conquer it for a month. Li only gave up his resistance when his youngest son was captured and brought before the city walls. Upon Xu Wen’s order, the whole of Li Yu’s family was executed, and all the generals now knew there was no way around Xu Wen.19
6
The state of Wu
Xu Zhigao was rewarded for his service with promotion to the post of prefect of Shengzhou. He used Shengzhou to build a power base and to gather a trusted, but relatively small, group of followers and advisors. He actively recruited able men by circulating a letter calling for talented men and thus secured the services of Song Qiqiu (887–959) and Zhou Zong. The biographies of Song and Zhong yield some information about their lives prior to Xu Zhigao’s move to Runzhou modern-day Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, in 917. Song Qiqiu was the son of Song Cheng, who had organized a rebellion in Jiangxi in the 880s. As the Tang court was not able to bring that rebellion led by Zhong Zhuan under control, Zhong Zhuan was appointed governor of Hongzhou (Nanchang), and Song Cheng became his deputy. Song Qiqiu was born in Hongzhou, but lost his father when he was a little boy. He studied hard all by himself, without any teacher, and, from his readings of philosophical works, he developed a knack for politics and political strategies. Searching for employment in the province, Song attempted to make contact with Rao Dongtian, who was prefect of Luling (Ji’an, in southern Jiangxi) and happened to be a good friend of Xu Zhigao.20 Rao agreed to receive Song, and Song managed to win him as a patron, but Rao soon afterwards took up another position in Guangling. After his arrival there, he fell ill and, in his last will, he recommended Song to Xu Zhigao. Song was in dire need of help, having only limited financial means that merely allowed him to travel to Guangling. He did not know how to proceed, but fortunately, next to his room in the boarding house, lived a singing girl named Wei. When she heard him lament his bad luck, she lent him some money with which he was able to purchase a proper cap. With the respectable attire of a scholar, he went to see Xu Zhigao, and Xu welcomed him into his retinue.21 For all the help she had given him, Song made the singing girl his consort. Soon Song became Xu Zhigao’s closest advisor. Xu erected a pavilion in the middle of a pool, to which he and Song frequently withdrew to discuss matters in secret. A second building, with removable walls, served as another location for their meetings. In the building was a fireplace, and they used their fingers to write characters in the ashes. When they were finished, they erased what they had written.22 It is evident from these safety precautions that the discussions of the two men did not at all concern the running of the prefecture, but certainly centred around the establishment of Xu as an influential official within the administration of the state of Wu. Zhou Zong, a native of Guangling, entered the service of Xu Zhigao as chief steward. He once offered his advice on how to arrange the lodgings of the emperor of Wu, when the latter came to visit Jinling. Xu Zhigao found his suggestion practical and followed it, and, from then on, Zhou Zong was involved in all high-level discussions.23 Because of his direct involvement in the running of Shengzhou and his close contact with Xu Zhigao, Song Qiqiu disliked him profoundly, for Song considered himself the chief advisor to Xu Zhigao and did not want any other official to interfere.24
The state of Wu 7
Unlike his colleagues, who were often military men and not familiar with the management of districts and prefectures, Xu Zhigao made an effort to learn as much as possible about administrative work. Song advised Xu Zhigao to look after the rural population, to drill his troops and to restore buildings and fortifications that had fallen into ruin during the tenure of the previous prefects. Thus, one of Xu Zhigao’s first projects included the building of the city walls of Shengzhou in 914,27 and, in the same year, he was conferred with the title of acting minister of education. Similarly, he supported the expansion of the city into a major trading centre, and gradually Shengzhou became a wealthy city. Xu Wen noticed these developments in Shengzhou when he made a tour of his fiefdom of Qi in 917. The emperor of Wu had conferred on Xu Wen the title of duke of Qi and granted him the fiefdom in 915 as a reward for his services. The fiefdom of Qi consisted of the six prefectures of Shengzhou, Runzhou, Changzhou, Xuanzhou, Shezhou and Chizhou. Upon the advice of Chen Yanqian (?–925), one of his followers, Xu Wen made Shengzhou his headquarters and transferred Xu Zhigao to become military training commissioner of Runzhou, his own original headquarters. Even though Xu Zhigao asked to be transferred to Xuanzhou, Xu Wen insisted on him moving to Runzhou. When Song Qiqiu explained to him the advantage of being closer to the Wu capital in Guangling, Xu Zhigao acquiesced and took up office in Runzhou. Xu Wen, meanwhile, delegated all administrative matters of Shengzhou to Chen Yanqian. Chen continued the good work of Xu Zhigao, and soon people in the Jiang and Huai regions were said to have praised his achievements.28 When he took up his post in Runzhou, Xu Zhigao was given the honorary title of acting grand guardian of the Wu ruler and the position of military training commissioner of Runzhou. A chance to change his fortunes came when his adopted brother, Xu Zhixun1, the deputy commissioner-in-chief of the internal and external armies, started to behave arrogantly and erratically. Xu Zhixun1 had been left in the Wu capital to keep the royal family under control and, in addition to his high military appointment, also held a high civil administration position as joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery. In 918, Xu Zhixun1 threatened to kill Li Decheng (863–940), the military commissioner of Weiwu and magistrate of Fuzhou1. Xu Zhixun1 had learned that Li Decheng possessed numerous singing girls in his household, whom he coveted. When he requested them from Li Decheng, Li refused to hand them over, explaining that they were either too old or nursing babies. Xu Zhixun1 treated Yang Longyan with disrespect as well. When the ruler invited him to take part in a theatrical play, he subjected him to ridicule by pulling at the ruler’s cap. Some time later, he killed one of Yang Longyan’s personal aides, and Yang’s adjutants were so frightened that they did not dare tell Xu Wen about it.29
8
The state of Wu
Both Xu Zhixun1 and his younger brother Zhixun2 (?–934)28 disliked Xu Zhigao and they did not consider him a real brother, while only the third brother, Xu Zhijian (?–931), treated Zhigao with the respect due an older brother. Xu Zhixun1 threatened to kill Xu Zhigao when the latter refused an invitation to drink. When he invited Xu Zhigao a second time, he hid some men in armour to assassinate him. Xu Zhijian stepped on Xu Zhigao’s foot to warn him, and Xu Zhigao rose, excused himself by saying he needed to go to the toilet and then ran away. Zhixun1 took a sword and gave it to his aide Diao Yanneng, with the order to catch Zhigao and murder him on the road. Diao Yanneng, on horseback, easily caught up with Zhigao, showed him the sword and then returned, reporting that Zhigao had escaped. The constant menace to Xu Zhigao’s life was only removed when Xu Zhixun1 evoked the anger of Zhu Jin (867–918), a very high-ranking and powerful civil and military figure in the state of Wu. Zhu had sent his courtesans with his regards to Zhixun1 and, as in the previous affair with Li Decheng, Xu Zhixun1 wanted to make Zhu’s courtesans his own. Understandably, Zhu Jin opposed this idea, but had no means to react. Xu Zhixun1, furthermore, was very envious of Zhu Jin’s positions – Zhu was military commissioner of Pinglu, grand councillor and deputy commander-in-chief of all circuits – which he thought were higher than his. Thus, he created Jinghuai Military Prefecture in Sizhou and appointed Zhu as its head. This made Zhu even more furious, but on the outside he continued to serve Xu Zhixun1 respectfully. After Xu Zhixun1 had sent apologies for his previous actions, Zhu Jin invited him for a banquet, where he personally poured him wine. He called for his favourite courtesan to join and entertain them with her singing, and then presented Xu Zhixun1 with his favourite horse. In order to view the horse, Zhu Jin led Xu Zhixun1 into the main hall, where they met Zhu Jin’s wife. When she bowed to him and he replied with a bow, Zhu Jin hit him over the head with his official tablet and ordered his soldiers to cut off his head. The whole commotion was covered by the noise of two horses in a side room that were made to neigh and kick, so that no one outside the hall could notice what was going on inside.29 Xu Zhixun1’s retinue dispersed as Zhu Jin emerged from the hall with their master’s head. He went straight to the imperial palace to tell the Wu ruler that he had eliminated Xu Zhixun1 forever, but Yang Longyan hid his face and said he did not want to know anything about it. By this time, news of Xu Zhixun1’s murder had spread in the palace, and officials came to look for Zhu Jin, after they had locked the palace gates and called for the guards. Zhu Jin attempted to escape by jumping from the palace wall, but he broke his legs and consequently committed suicide.30 As soon as Xu Zhigao in Runzhou learnt about the events in Guangling, he led his troops across the Yangzi to restore order in the capital and the imperial palace. The proximity of Runzhou to Guangling indeed turned out
The state of Wu 9
to be advantageous. Once the unrest caused by Xu Zhixun1’s murder had subsided, Xu Wen made the ruler of Wu appoint Xu Zhigao as successor to Xu Zhixun1. With that, Xu Zhigao was now the second in command after Xu Wen, and he set out to install a capable civil administration. The people who had suffered under the mismanagement of the state by Xu Zhixun1 soon praised him for his good work.31 Song Qiqiu is credited with convincing Xu Zhigao actively to search for talented men capable of supporting him in his future endeavours. For this reason, Xu established the ‘Pavilion for receiving guests’ and invited talented men who were currently unemployed to his residence.32 In 919, Xu Wen convinced the ruler of Wu to move towards a declaration of independence from the Later Liang. Military action in and around the strategically important prefecture of Anzhou, which controlled one of the major junctions of communication, trade and transport north of the Yangzi River, in present-day Hubei, preceded the formal secession from the northern dynasty.33 The subsequent proclamation of Yang Longyan as independent ruler of the Wu dynasty was definitely a result of the loss of authority of the Later Liang. The autonomy that the Later Liang had granted the Wu state was transformed into the reality of an independent empire. In the spring of 919, Xu Wen proceeded to Guangling, at the head of all the civil and military officials, and suggested that the king of Wu adopt the imperial title, which the latter refused. Nevertheless, in the summer of the same year, Yang Longyan ascended the throne formally as king of Wu. Accordingly, the state of Wu dropped the Tang reign title ‘Heavenly assistance’ and adopted the reign title ‘Martial righteousness’ (Wuyi). Following time-honoured tradition, the new king proclaimed a general amnesty and built a temple for the imperial ancestors. Furthermore, the bureaucracy was transformed into an imperial bureaucracy, with all the necessary departments and ministries, and the royal palace was decorated with imperial insignia. Lastly, in order to show that he considered himself a successor to the Tang, the new king adopted the element ‘metal’ for his dynasty, because the Tang had ruled under the element ‘earth’.34 The model for the administration of Wu was the Tang bureaucratic system, which was introduced alongside the military establishment. Owing to the Table 1.2 Rulers of Wu Yang Xingmi, canonized as Taizu Xiaowu Huangdi (852–905), r. 904–905 Yang Wo, canonized as Liezu Jing Huangdi (885–908), r. 905–908, oldest son of Yang Xingmi Yang Longyan, canonized as Gaozu Xuan Huangdi (897–920), r. 908–920, second son of Yang Xingmi Yang Pu, canonized as Rui Huangdi (r. 920–937), r. 921–937, fourth son of Yang Xingmi
10 The state of Wu
turmoil since the start of the century, military officials had been in charge of running the state up to this point. The capital of Wu remained in Guangling. It was the seat of the government and the court of the rulers of Wu. The basic administrative organization consisted of the Three Departments, two of which were designed to serve and assist the ruler, while the third one handled the actual management of the state. The first two, the chancellery and the secretariat, prepared imperial proclamations and advised the ruler on policies; the department of state affairs controlled the six ministries, which dealt with rites, personnel, revenue, war, justice and works. The heads of the chancellery, secretariat and the department of state affairs were, by default, grand councillors and formed an advisory body for the ruler. The director and deputy director of the bureau of military affairs had command over the military. During the Tang dynasty, this office was almost exclusively staffed by eunuchs, but, during the Wu as well as the Southern Tang, its staff predominantly consisted of officials from the regular bureaucratic ranks. The local administration of the state was based on prefectures (zhou), which typically included one to three districts (xian). The prefecture was supervised by a prefect, and districts were managed by magistrates. Prefects also acted as local heads of military forces, which for the most part consisted of militia recruited from all able-bodied men within a prefecture. In areas close to enemy territory or of strategic importance, such as the borders with the northern dynasties along the Huai River, or the borders with Wuyue and Chu, military prefectures (jun) were established under military commissioners, who had regular army troops under their command. All close relatives of the Wu emperor received titles to reflect their imperial status, and Xu Zhigao was promoted to left vice director of the department of state affairs and participant in determining governmental matters.35 Xu Wen, appointed as grand preceptor of the king of Wu after the proclamation of independence, did not care much about government matters. Xu Zhigao, thus, was the de facto head of the administration and, in the following years, initiated a number of laws and reforms to further develop the state. The people, again, were so impressed with his work that they referred to him as vice director of the government.36 The Wu dynasty relied heavily on tax revenue for running the administration of the state. Taxes were collected by the districts twice annually, in summer and in autumn, and were, for the most part, paid in kind. Cash was preferred over payments in kind; however, in practice, many people still paid the summer tax in cloth and the autumn tax – after the harvest – in grain or rice. Moreover, the state could also demand forced-labour services from all men between the ages of twenty and sixty years, for public building of granaries, city walls, canals, dykes and so forth. In the Tang dynasty, the tax revenue was distributed between the imperial treasury in the capital,
The state of Wu 11
the provinces and the local prefectures. The sources provide no information on how the Wu and Southern Tang states handled taxes. As they did not introduce provinces, tax revenues may well have been split between the capital and the prefectures. Yang Longyan had been opposed to the founding of the independent state of Wu, but could not oppose the Xu family. Once he realized he was a mere puppet in the hands of Xu Wen and his sons, he turned to alcohol and, as a result of his alcohol consumption, died on 18 June 920, at the age of only twenty-four. Some of Xu Wen’s officials believed that now there was a chance to establish a new state under the rule of the Xu family, but Xu Wen rejected any such plans. Instead, on 7 July, he proclaimed Yang Pu (900–937), Yang Longyan’s younger brother, as the new ruler of Wu.37 In the second year of Yang Pu’s reign, in 921, efforts were undertaken to remedy the revenue situation of the state by introducing registers listing all arable land and its owners. Fixed taxes were set according to the size and grade of the fields, which meant that owners of first-class fields had to pay more than those holding second- and third-class fields, producing smaller harvests. The taxes had to be paid in copper cash, and, where copper cash was not readily available, gold and silver bullion were accepted. The head tax to be paid was based on payments submitted on the land tax. Song Qiqiu suggested permitting tax payments in kind, such as grain, rice and silk, as, otherwise, people would not be compelled to get the best out of their fields. As an incentive for people to resuscitate sericulture in regions previously suffering from warfare, Song furthermore wanted to raise the price for raw silk and silk fabrics and, simultaneously, to fix the price of cotton. Another measure in Song’s plan asked for the remittance of the head tax that had already been paid. The majority of the court officials rejected this plan, because district officials would lose a certain amount of their income, which they received through the taxes. Song sought the support of Xu Zhigao, the grand councillor, and Xu understood that Song wanted to strengthen the agricultural sector. He therefore readily implemented Song’s policy, and it is said that, within ten years, agriculture flourished again in Jiangnan. After the overthrow of the Later Liang in 923 by the Later Tang dynasty, its first emperor, Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu, r. 923–936), tried to impose his authority by sending orders to the Wu court, but these were not followed by Wu. Only when the Later Tang changed the tone of its letters and began to treat Wu as an opponent did the Wu ruler send an envoy with gifts to the court of the Later Tang. The follow-up official mission from Wu submitted a memorial that, in essence, acknowledged the superiority of the Later Tang over the Wu state. The address of the Later Tang ruler as emperor in the memorial emphasized the inferior status of the Wu ruler.38 Consequently, the Later Tang
12 The state of Wu
considered diplomatic missions from Wu as tribute missions. For Wu, the distinction between gift and tribute did not matter much, as long as their acceptance ensured continued peace at the northern borders. With the accession of Mingzong (Li Siyuan, r. 926–933), the superficially harmonious relationship between Wu and the Later Tang was severely tested. Gao Jixing (r. 924–928), taking advantage of the fall of the Later Liang, declared himself ruler of the state of Jingnan, which consisted of three prefectures on the middle reaches of the Yangzi. He adopted the Wu reign title ‘Obedient righteousness’ (Shunyi, 921–926), in order to secure protection from his eastern neighbour. After Mingzong had come to the throne, Gao changed his loyalty to the new dynasty and, to prove his submission, adopted the Later Tang reign title ‘Heavenly perfection’ (Tiancheng, 926–929). He then asked the court of the Later Tang to acknowledge him as prefect of these territories in 927. The court did not permit this and appointed a new prefect instead. Gao Jixing thereupon committed a major mistake by murdering a Later Tang envoy who had travelled up-river to Sichuan. As a result, the Later Tang stripped Gao of all the ranks and titles they had awarded him previously and dispatched an army against him. In support of the Later Tang attack, army units from the state of Chu in Hunan advanced on Jingnan from three different directions.39 In the face of this massive build-up of forces against him, Gao chose to defend himself behind the walls of his capital Jiangling and called on Wu for help. Wu responded by sending a detachment of naval forces.40 The Later Tang attack on Jiangling did not progress well, owing to the extreme weather conditions in this southern region during summer. Many of the northern troops, including their commander, suffered from the heat and diseases endemic to the area. Therefore, the Later Tang court appointed a new commander to renew the attack on Jiangling, but to no avail. Finally, Mingzong ordered the withdrawal of the army.41 At this time, a tribute mission of Chu returning from the Later Liang court was intercepted by Jingnan, whose troops captured presents consisting of ten fine horses and two beautiful girls. It was evident that Gao had no intention at all of giving in to the pressure from the northern dynasty, nor from his southern neighbour in Chu. Wu was the only state left to which he could offer his allegiance, and therefore he sent the horses and the girls he had taken from the Chu emissaries to the Wu court. Xu Wen did not want to confront the Later Liang and declined Gao’s offer. He explained his refusal by saying that Gao had been a long-time vassal of the northern dynasty, and that it would be difficult for Wu to come to the support of Jingnan because of the great distances involved. He nevertheless accepted the presents, but suggested that Gao should submit to the Later Tang.42 In the winter of 927, Xu Wen, on the advice of Xu Jie, wanted to replace Xu Zhigao with his natural second son Xu Zhixun2 and transfer power in
The state of Wu 13
the Wu government to him. Some years earlier, Chen Yanqian had already urged Xu Wen to name one of his natural sons as his successor in his last will, instead of Xu Zhigao. Xu Zhigao knew this and tried to persuade Chen to change his mind, but he did not succeed.43 Xu Zhixun2, for his part, was eager to assume the position of his father and sideline Xu Zhigao. He was supported by Xu Jie and Yan Keqiu, another senior minister in the Wu administration. Initially, Xu Wen had rejected the proposal, because Xu Zhixun2 lacked the stature of Xu Zhigao. Lady Chen, one of Xu Wen’s consorts, similarly scolded Zhixun2: ‘We have adopted Zhigao from when he was in poor circumstances, how can we discard him now that he has achieved wealth and influence!’ Xu Wen, before his death on 21 November 927, wanted to go to court with all the military leaders to encourage the Wu ruler to declare himself emperor. As he fell ill, he sent Xu Zhixun2 to the court with a written statement proposing the founding of an empire. When Xu Zhigao learnt about the opposition of his adopted father to his succession, he drafted a memorial to the throne, asking for dismissal from his current positions. He had been about to submit his resignation to the throne on the very day that Xu Wen died, and consequently he refrained from sending it. Xu Zhixun2, who was on his way to Guangling, hastily returned to Jinling when he learned about his father’s death. Therefore, the letter with the suggestion of him instead of Xu Zhigao as the new head of the administration never reached the throne. Yang Pu was very obedient and followed the plan designed by Xu Wen, when he assumed imperial status on 29 November 927. On 13 December, he introduced a new reign title, ‘Aspiring chastity’ (Qianzhen), and proclaimed a general amnesty. On 25 December, he conferred the title of empress dowager on his mother, Wang. Yang Pu also promoted Xu Zhigao, in a bid to keep him at bay. In addition to the positions that he already had, the Wu emperor appointed him commander-in-chief of all internal and external military matters.44 After Xu Zhixun2 had arrived in Jinling, the Wu emperor confirmed him in all the positions his father had held. This set the scene for future quarrels between Xu Zhigao and Xu Zhixun2, who were now the civil and the military head of state, respectively. Xu Zhigao, at this point, already could have taken over the state, but he hesitated and was content with the successive appointments as director of the chancellery, secretariat director, and commander-in-chief of all internal and external military matters. In addition, the emperor also conferred on him the title of duke of Xunyang, which was later changed to duke of Yuzhang. Yang Pu, in his new capacity as emperor of Wu, awarded posthumous imperial titles on his predecessors. He conferred on his immediate predecessor, Yang Longyan, the temple name Gaozu, a title usually reserved for
14 The state of Wu
dynastic founders. The reason for this was probably Yang Longyan’s proclamation of independence from the northern dynasty. An Zhonghui (?–931), minister of the Later Tang, urged his emperor to punish the disobedient Wu with a military campaign, but his suggestion was rejected.45 Early in 928, the Wu court sent envoys to the Later Tang court to clarify matters, and the Later Tang sent a diplomatic mission in response. As the Wu felt that no rites had been violated when Yang Pu proclaimed himself emperor, but An Zhonghui insisted that he had, diplomatic relations between the two states were suspended, and they regarded each other as foes.46 In the spring of 928, hostilities erupted again between Chu and Jingnan. The Chu naval forces inflicted a crushing defeat on Gao Jixing, which forced him to ask Chu for peace. To underline his peaceful intentions, Gao sent back the Chu envoy he had arrested earlier. The Chu general Wang Huan explained to his king, Ma Yin (r. 907–930), why it was necessary to leave Jingnan intact as an independent state. The strategic location of Jingnan, between the Later Tang in the north, the state of Shu to the west and the state of Wu to the east, represented a useful buffer against attacks from the three other states.47 Wu had grown suspicious of Chu’s success against Jingnan, and so naval forces were dispatched to launch a naval attack against Yuezhou. The original plan provided for a simultaneous attack on the city from Jingnan. However, Xu Dexun, grand councillor at the Chu court, set a trap for the advancing Wu forces. When they approached Yuezhou, they were attacked, not only from the front, but also from the back. The Wu detachment was utterly defeated by the Chu army, and its commanders were taken prisoner.48 After the failure of the military campaign, Wu sent envoys to negotiate a peace with Chu and asked for the return of the captured Wu generals. This peace settlement did not end the war between Jingnan and Chu though. On 28 June 928, after Gao Jixing officially asked to be recognized as a vassal of Wu again, Wu enfeoffed him as king of Qin. The Later Tang subsequently commanded Chu to renew its war with Jingnan. In the very first battle between the two armies, Gao’s nephew challenged the Chu commander to a duel, in which he was killed. As a result, Gao once more asked the Later Tang for peace.49 Three months later, in the autumn of 928, Jingnan initiated yet another campaign against Chu. This time, the Jingnan troops were able to seize Yuezhou and to take its prefect prisoner as well.50 Gao Jixing died shortly after this successful campaign, on 28 January 929, and Wu appointed his son, Gao Conghui, as his successor as military governor of Jingnan and director of the chancellery.51 Meanwhile, Xu Zhixun2 and Xu Zhigao locked horns over the succession of Li Jian, the military commissioner of Wuchang and director of the
The state of Wu 15
chancellery, in the autumn of 929. Xu Zhixun2 favoured Li Jian’s son, Yanzhong, who was his brother-in-law, but Xu Zhigao wanted Chai Zaiyong, a tested and experienced military officer, to take over. Wuchang was the westernmost military prefecture on the Yangzi and guarded Wu against potential incursions from Chu. In the end, Xu Zhigao convinced the Wu emperor to appoint his candidate, instead of Xu Zhixun2’s.52 In Jinling, Xu Zhixun2’s behaviour not only offended his own brothers, but also made Xu Jie rethink his loyalty, which he switched secretly to Xu Zhigao. Xu Zhixun2 tried again to put Xu Zhigao under pressure and remove him as the de facto head of state. He was in control of considerable military power and therefore felt strong enough to challenge Xu Zhigao’s position. Xu Zhigao’s advisor, Wang Lingmou, the internal commissioner of the bureau of military affairs in Guangling, cheered him up by saying: You have been managing the government for a long time already, and you have guided the emperor in ruling the state. Who would dare not to follow you! Zhixun2 is young and he has not spread benevolence and trust among the people because he lacks the ability to do so!53 Zhou Tingwang, a retainer of Xu Zhixun2, advised him to buy support among the court officials to prepare for a take-over from Xu Zhigao. Xu Zhixun2 thus sent Zhou to Jiangdu – the designation used for Guangling since the proclamation of the empire of Wu – to make his ambitions known. After his arrival in the capital, Zhou Tingwang visited his old friend Zhou Zong, the personal aide of Xu Zhigao. Zhou Zong pretended to switch his loyalty to Xu Zhixun2 and so learned about Xu Zhixun2’s plans. In return, Zhou Zong told him about Xu Zhigao’s designs. Zhou Tingwang then returned to Jinling, believing that he had found an ally in Zhou Zong, and reported the good news to Xu Zhixun2. Xu Zhixun2 therefore did not expect any foul play when, in late 929, he appeared for an audience at court. Xu Zhigao had waited patiently for just such an opportunity to rid himself of his opponent. One source alleges that the summons to court was a ruse by Xu Zhigao, who lodged Xu Zhixun2 in his residence and put him under guard, not permitting him to see the ruler. When Xu Zhixun2 complained about his treatment and demanded an audience with the emperor, Xu Zhigao told him: Your running of the administration (in Jinling) has been oppressive. When the emperor heard about it, he at once wanted to mete out some punishment to you. I expect you to send in an apology from my residence. Besides, I am afraid the emperor is busy. So what do you want to see him for?54
16 The state of Wu
Xu Zhixun2 accused Xu Zhigao of unfilial behaviour, saying: ‘When the late prince [i.e. Xu Wen] passed away, you did not come immediately to attend his burial, how was that possible?’ Xu Zhigao replied: ‘You were waiting with a drawn sword for me, so how could I have dared to come! You are an official, yet you don imperial robes and imperial insignia, how is that possible!’ He had learned, through Zhou Tingwang’s discussions with Zhou Zong, that Xu Zhixun2, who had been responsible for the defence of the lower Yangzi region against Wuyue, had accepted precious gifts from the king of Wuyue. These gifts consisted of vessels ornamented with phoenixes and dragons, which were symbols of royal power. As Xu Zhixun2 had not rejected these, the evidence for Xu Zhigao’s case against him – that is, the intention to murder Xu Zhigao and to assume the imperial position – appeared solid. The troops in Jinling that had originally been under Xu Zhixun2’s command were given a new commander by Xu Zhigao, and they were moved to Jiangdu. Zhou Tingwang’s role again came up when Xu Zhixun2 told Xu Zhigao that he knew what the latter was planning. Xu Zhigao ended the whole affair by revealing that he knew about Xu Zhixun2’s plans, too, and Zhou Tingwang was executed as a result.55 The Wu emperor made Xu Zhixun2 army commander and military commissioner of Zhenhai military prefecture, situated opposite Yangzhou on the southern side of the Yangzi, but he was not given permission to leave the capital for his new position, which otherwise would have required him to take up residence in Runzhou.56 Xu Zhigao wasted no time and at once took over all government matters. In the same month, on 31 December 929, the Wu emperor adopted the honorific title of ‘Sage cultivated and filial emperor’ (Ruisheng wenming guangxiao huangdi), proclaimed a general amnesty and retrospectively changed the reign title to ‘Great peace’ (Dahe).57 Xu Zhigao did not really trust Xu Zhixun2, even after he had eliminated him as a direct political opponent. At one point, he attempted to murder him with a goblet of poisoned wine, but Xu Zhixun2, wary of his adopted brother, drank wine from a different vessel. A musician named Shen Jiangao saved the ensuing awkward situation by drinking the poisoned wine and died as a consequence.58 Hence, Xu Zhixun2’s suspicions had been fully justified. In the spring of 930, Gao Conghui, ruler of Jingnan, sent envoys to the Wu court. They reported that Jingnan was to cease all relations with Wu, as the ancestral tombs of the Gao family were located in Shenzhou (in modern Henan). Gao Conghui was afraid that the Later Tang would destroy the tombs as punishment for his allegiance to Wu. As a consequence, Wu dispatched an army to teach Gao a lesson, but the campaign was unsuccessful.59
The state of Wu 17
Only two months later, Wang Zhuanzheng, the military commander of Haizhou, rebelled against Wu and defected to the Later Tang. This was a serious problem, because Haizhou was the prefecture where most of the salt traded in Wu was produced. Wang Zhuanzheng had grown disaffected when he learned that, instead of taking the place of the previous military training commissioner, Chen Xuan, he was to be recalled to Yangzhou. He therefore killed Chen Xuan, looted and destroyed Haizhou and made away with the troops under his command. Xu Zhigao assumed responsibility for this disaster and spared the life of Wang’s wife and children. Haizhou, in the meantime, had been taken by Wang Yan, who had hurried there with his troops from his post in Lianshui, about ninety kilometres to the south of Haizhou. When the situation had calmed down, Wang Yan was appointed magistrate of Haizhou. Xu Zhigao used Wang Zhuanzheng’s defection to establish better relations with the military circles that had been suspicious of him. Wang Zhuanzheng had contacted his uncle, Wang Yu, prefect of Guangzhou1 south of the Huai River (in modern Henan), about his chances of returning to Wu. Wang Yu immediately had the messenger arrested and for this loyal act was generously rewarded by Xu Zhigao. News about this spread among the military officers and the troops, and Xu Zhigao finally gained their trust, as they recognized him as a fair and just leader.60 In the spring of 931, Xu Zhigao attempted to give Song Qiqiu the position of grand councillor. Song, however, wanted to measure how essential and important he was to and within the top echelons of the administration and resigned from all his posts. He retired to Hongzhou under the pretence of attending the reburial of his father and moved to Mount Jiuhua, about two hundred kilometres north of Hongzhou, in present-day Anhui. When he asked permission to live as a recluse on the mountain, both the Wu emperor and Xu Zhigao sent letters urging him to come back. This must have pleased Song, yet he was unwilling to leave the Yingtian Monastery at Mount Jiuhua. Only when Xu Jingtong, at the behest of his father, travelled to see Song and summon him back to court did the latter finally accept. Upon his return, he assumed a high position in the department of state affairs, and the Yingtian Monastery was renamed ‘Summoning the sage’ (Zhengxian) Monastery in his honour.61 In late 931, Xu Zhigao informed the Wu court that he wanted to retire and take up residence in Jinling. The Wu emperor complied, giving him, in addition, the military commissionerships of both Ningguo and Zhenhai, the two military prefectures adjacent to Jinling. The withdrawal of Xu Zhigao can be understood as preparation for future operations, for he did not lose sight of the court. Before Xu Zhigao left the capital to take up residence in Jinling on 21 January 931, he appointed his son, Jingtong, minister of education and manager of affairs, i.e. grand councillor, in Guangling, to keep an eye on the emperor and the imperial court. Wang Lingmou and Song Qiqiu
18 The state of Wu
were given positions as left and right directors of the department of state affairs, as well as joint managers of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery, in order to assist Xu Jingtong. All three of them constituted the advisory body for the emperor of Wu. Thus, Xu Zhigao was controlling the government and the court, and it was only a matter of time before he would take power in Wu.62 In 932, he established the Institute for the Reverence of Sages (Lixian yuan) in Jinling. He was aware that a good collection of books would attract scholars at a time when knowledge was not much in vogue among many of the rulers in northern and in southern China, because of the constant wars and conflicts on Chinese territory. The book collection eventually numbered in the tens of thousands of volumes. The institute was created as a place for the collection of paintings, books, board games and musical instruments that would become the private palace collection of the Southern Tang. In addition, the institute served as a place where Xu Zhigao would withdraw to talk with scholars.63 Among the most prominent scholars that he had discussions with were Sun Cheng (?–956) and Chen Jue (?–958).64 Hailing from Shandong, Sun Cheng had passed the jinshi (or doctoral) examination during the Later Liang dynasty. To pass this prestigious examination, candidates had to possess thorough knowledge in history, philosophy and literature, as well as calligraphy. The successful candidates would be eligible for a career in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. Sun, instead of seeking official employment, pursued a career as a Daoist priest in a temple at Mount Lu. When the Later Tang was established, he left Mount Lu to become an official of the Later Tang but, being implicated in a rebellion, was forced to flee from the north. He had just reached the Huai River when his pursuers caught up with him. A man of quick wit, he kept his cool and pretended to look for lice in the seams of his clothes and gnaw them with his teeth. The pursuers were so appalled by this sight that they let him go. Once he had crossed the Huai River, spies sent out by Xu Zhigao to look out for talented men soon noticed Sun, who was disguised as a Buddhist monk and had shaved his head. They invited him to court and thus, in 926, he entered the service of Xu Zhigao.65 Chen Jue, in contrast, was a southerner from Hailing district, close to the Wu capital. He had caught the attention of Song Qiqiu, who recommended him to Xu Zhigao. After the extension of the city walls of Jinling by almost ten kilometres in 932,66 Song Qiqiu suggested that Xu Zhigao move the imperial family of Wu from Yangzhou to Jinling. Before the transfer of the imperial family, Xu Zhigao ordered the construction of an imperial palace in Jinling in 933.67 Either out of genuine concern or as a means to portray himself as a man caring for the common population – or maybe both – Xu Zhigao released all his courtesans and destroyed all musical instruments in the palace after a series of natural calamities, such as fires and floods, saying that he could
The state of Wu 19
not bear to enjoy music and entertainment when the common people suffered hardships.68 The Wu emperor, in the winter of the same year, wanted to award Xu Zhigao more titles, which Xu refused to accept, except for those he already had held previously. He rejected the title of grand preceptor of the emperor, as well as that of grand councillor, because they would have required his regular attendance at court, and that would have been running counter to his aspirations. Prior to these events, Wu Guang, a local strongman of Jianzhou1 (modern Jian’ou), in the territory of Min in Fujian, had come to Xinzhou (modern Shangrao, in Jiangxi), asking for support against Min. Jiang Yanhui, the prefect of Xinzhou, immediately dispatched his troops in an attack on Jianzhou1, without authorization from the court.69 At first, the campaign went well, and Jiang Yanhui defeated a detachment of Min forces at Pucheng, a town about eighty kilometres south-east of Xinzhou, in early 934. By this time, Xu Zhigao had learnt about the insubordination of Jiang Yanhui and ordered him back into Wu territory. Jiang obliged, for more Min troops, as well as detachments from Wuyue, were on their way to attack him. Before he was able to withdraw, the combined Min and Wuyue forces struck, and he was heavily defeated. Jiang barely escaped with his life and was lucky enough to be spared execution, for the inspector-general Zhang Zhongjin was given the blame for everything and beheaded. The reason for Jiang’s mild punishment was that he was the son-in-law of the Wu emperor, Taizu, and a good friend of Yang Meng (?–937), the crown prince of Wu. Xu Zhigao then negotiated a peace with Min that lasted until the reign of the second Southern Tang emperor. Meanwhile, the intended transfer of the court from Yangzhou to Jinling had met with official resistance, even among the supporters of Xu Zhigao, such as Zhou Zong, who warned Xu about the enormous costs as well as the changing political situation. Zhou Zong pointed out that Xu Wen had always made sure that he was residing outside the capital and the Wu court. Since that had become the norm, Xu Zhigao would have to shift his headquarters from the west, i.e. Jinling, to the east, i.e. Yangzhou. The Wu emperor therefore sent Song Qiqiu to Xu Zhigao with the order to cancel the transfer of the capital. By then, Xu Zhigao had already moved to a new residence in Jinling – on 11 February 935 – to give his old residence to the ruler of Wu.70 Xu Zhigao felt that he had to act quickly, if he wanted to usurp power, but he was uncertain about his backing among the officials, because the emperor of Wu had not committed any serious mistakes so far. Therefore, Xu believed that he could not easily orchestrate a take-over. Song Qiqiu, his closest advisor, similarly believed that the time was not yet right for an attempt to claim the throne.
20 The state of Wu
However, unlike his adopted father, Xu Zhigao was not content with merely controlling the Wu court and administration. He definitely harboured concrete plans to establish himself as ruler and remove the Yang family. The longer he waited, the less likely he would be able to carry out his plans however. Age was playing on his mind as well, for he was close to fifty years old already. One morning he remarked to Zhou Zong: ‘The state is safe and I am old, how is that?’ Zhou Zong interpreted this as a hint to begin the usurpation, and so he went to Jiangdu to inform officials at the court of the impending coup d’état. When Song Qiqiu heard about this, he immediately wrote to Xu Zhigao that the time and conditions for such a move were not yet right. He then travelled from Jiangdu to Jinling and suggested that Xu execute Zhou as a scapegoat, in a show of loyalty to the Yang family. Xu Zhigao did not follow Song’s advice to get rid of Zhou, but merely demoted Zhou and posted him to a distant prefecture. At this point, Li Jianxun (?–952) and Xu Jie interfered by stating that Xu Zhigao possessed the backing of the bureaucracy and therefore should proceed with the take-over. In addition, he should also reinstate Zhou Zong. This display of support from two influential officials showed Xu Zhigao that Song had acted out of rather personal reasons against Zhou Zong, and from this time onwards he was very wary of his former closest advisor.71 In late 934, the emperor of Wu wanted to confer a number of titles on Xu Zhigao, among them those of great grand chancellor, revered father and prince of Qi. In addition, he wanted to give him the Nine Insignia (jiuxi), which in the past rulers had bestowed on their most loyal and meritorious vassals. Xu declined all these honours. In 935, Xu Zhigao summoned his son Jingtong to Jinling. He wanted to give his second and favourite son, Jingqian (916–935), who in that year married the favourite daughter of the emperor of Wu,72 a chance to learn about government matters in Guangling. He therefore made Jingqian manager of the affairs of the Wu court and appointed Jingtong to positions he himself had held previously. Xu Jingqian received appointments as chief military commissioner of the armies to the right and the left, left vice director of the department of state affairs and participant in determining governmental matters.73 In the spring of 935, Jingqian was appointed joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery and manager of the affairs of the left and right armies. This meant that, nominally, Jingqian was now the head of both the civil as well as the military establishment in Wu. Because of his very young age – Jingqian was about nineteen at the time – Xu Zhigao summoned Chen Jue, who worked in the department of state affairs, to assist his son in his duties. He addressed Chen Jue: In my youth I have discussed matters with Song Zisong, and he gave me good advice in difficult times. Sometimes I sent Zisong back to his
The state of Wu 21
place in anger, and sometimes Zisong angrily ruffled his robe and stood up in anger. His clothes thrown in a basket, he wanted to leave through the Qinhuai Gate, but I usually had the gates of the residence closed to stop him. Now I am old and still have not achieved finishing all matters at hand. Jingqian is young and already serves as head of government, and that is why I submit my son to your instruction.74 Song Qiqiu must have welcomed this appointment, because Chen was his follower and thus he could hope to influence future developments through him. Xu Jingtong, for his part, was given Han Xizai (902–970) as advisor. Han had arrived in Wu in 926 as a refugee from the north, where his father had been implicated in an uprising against the Later Tang. In Wu, he was employed, most probably on account of his jinshi degree, as administrative assistant in a number of districts, but made not much of an impression there.75 Xu Zhigao dealt with his remaining adopted brothers quite carefully. When he learnt that Xu Zhi’e had started to use his position as military training commissioner in Runzhou to set up unauthorized trade, he was about to punish Xu Zhi’e. However, one of his advisors suggested that he dismiss the whole matter, in order not to make Xu Zhi’e a martyr for the Xu cause, especially in light of the treatment that Xu Zhixun2 had experienced after Xu Wen’s death at the hands of Zhigao. So, rather than punishing Xu Zhi’e, Xu Zhigao treated him very generously.76 Towards the end of 935, Xu Zhigao again had several high titles conferred upon him by the Wu emperor, including those of revered father, grand preceptor, great grand councillor and field marshal-in-chief. In addition, he was given his own fiefdom, Qi, which consisted of ten prefectures, as well as the title prince of Qi. Xu Zhigao declined the titles of revered father and grand councillor, but accepted the others. Refusal of the titles clearly showed that he did not want to be drawn any further into the Yang family and that he was not satisfied to be a grand councillor only. Qi, as a matter of fact, split the ‘intestines’ of the Wu state and created a state within a state, depriving the imperial family in Yangzhou of their links with the southern provinces and those on the eastern coast.77 In 936, Xu Zhigao set up a grand marshal’s headquarters in Jinling, with a proper bureaucracy structured along the lines of the civil administration, consisting of departments of personnel, revenue, rites, war, justice, works, and salt and iron. With this, Xu Zhigao had put everything in place for a take-over of power.78 His son Xu Jingtong became deputy commander-in-chief of all prefectures, defender-in-chief and vice field marshal. Song Qiqiu and Xu Jie received appointments as left and right adjutants in the headquarters of the field marshal.79
22 The state of Wu
In the summer of this year, Xu Jingqian, who had fallen ill,80 was replaced by the third son of Xu Zhigao, Jingsui (920–958), as supervisor of the Wu court. Having arranged everything for a neat take-over by planting his sons and his group of advisors in key positions, Xu Zhigao now had only to take one last step to assume the position of emperor.
2
The founding of the Southern Tang and the reign of Li Bian
In February 937, Xu Zhigao urged Li Decheng and Zhou Ben (861–937) to gather support for his usurpation. Li was the oldest and longest-serving official of Wu, and Zhou Ben, as the most senior military commander of Wu, was very popular among the bureaucracy. Li Decheng interpreted the signs of imminent change correctly and complied. Zhou Ben, however, felt he owed loyalty to the state of Wu and the Yang family. He was therefore very reluctant to follow Xu Zhigao’s order. In a conversation with his son he said: I have received great favours from the late king [Yang Xingmi]. After Xu Wen and his sons took over the administration, I have always felt sorry that I could not save the Yang family from danger. Now that I have been ordered to do this, what can I do? After his son convinced him that there was nothing he could do about the matter, he submitted a memorial to the throne, together with Li Decheng and all civil and military officials. In this memorial, they depicted the merits, achievements and abilities of Xu Zhigao and asked for the formal abdication of the emperor of Wu. Afterwards, they proceeded to Jinling to encourage Xu Zhigao to take over the throne.1 All the proceedings had been carefully planned and orchestrated by Xu Zhigao, who wanted to give his usurpation of the throne a legal front. To display his good will towards the Yang family, he gave his fourth daughter in marriage to Yang Lian (?–940), the crown prince of Wu.2 He then began reorganizing the state by building an ancestral temple and erecting altars, and he changed the name of Jinling to Jiangning superior prefecture, as befitted the capital of the new state. Xu was a thrifty man and therefore did not have a new palace built in Jiangning. Instead, he turned his official residence into a royal palace by renaming its rooms and chambers palace halls. Furthermore, he had all roofs and railings in the palace fitted with ornaments consisting of mythical creatures said to be protective against fire.3 He maintained a simple lifestyle, and it is said that, in summer, he wore sandals made from reed and that his
24 The founding of the Southern Tang
bed curtains were made from fragrant kudzu vine rather than silk gauze. Instead of a basin made of precious metal, he used a simple iron bowl to wash himself. He was very close to his wife, and this may explain why the palace ladies in his service are described as less attractive and advanced in age, wearing ordinary dresses with simple adornments.4 Xu Zhigao gave his main supporters high positions in the state. His adjutants and advisors, Song Qiqiu and Xu Jie, were made chancellors. Zhou Zong was given the position of commissioner in the bureau of military affairs. In addition to this, all other officials were given promotions according to the regulations of Wu. The army was reorganized into eight cavalry armies and nine infantry armies.5 Yang Zao, a cousin of the Wu emperor, delivered the official letter of appointment from the emperor on 20 March 937. Upon this official confirmation of his new status as king of Qi, Xu Zhigao proclaimed a general amnesty and changed the title of his wife from princely consort to queen.6 He also wanted to make his son Xu Jingtong crown prince, but Jingtong vehemently opposed the honour. Following ancient precedents, Xu Zhigao conferred the title of great ancestor martial king on his adopted father Xu Wen and gave his adopted mother the title of queen dowager. In early May, he dropped the character Zhi from his given name to illustrate that he no longer considered himself a son of the Xu family.7 Xu Gao continued to wait for a complete take-over of power, even after he had been encouraged by Wang Lingmou, one of his closest supporters in the bureaucracy.8 Xu Gao was probably right to have some reservations before taking the final step. He first had to solve the problem posed by Yang Meng. Yang Meng, the third son of Yang Xingmi, had always objected to Xu Wen’s handling of the administration of the state and had criticized Xu Wen in 919: ‘Our state is in the custody of someone else.’ Xu Wen retaliated by sending Yang Meng away from the capital to become military training commissioner of Chuzhou.9 After Yang Longyan’s death, Xu Wen had no desire to deal with an adult ruler on the throne. He disliked Yang Meng profoundly, and so, instead of Meng, his younger brother Yang Pu ascended the throne. The suggestion to take the throne himself was rejected by Xu Wen, on the grounds that he had missed the opportunity to do so at the time of the murder of Yang Wo.10 Xu Gao was as suspicious of Yang Meng and his intentions as Xu Wen had been, which is evident in an incident that happened in 934. As mentioned above,11 Jiang Yanhui had invaded Min with his troops in that year. Fuzhou, or Shaowu military prefecture as it was called then, where Meng was kept under guard, was one of the places suitable for launching campaigns against Min. It was more than likely that Jiang Yanhui and Yang Meng would meet in the course of the military campaign. Xu Gao feared that the two
The founding of the Southern Tang 25
would conspire against him in a revival of Wu under the leadership of Yang Meng. Jiang, after all, was a son-in-law of Yang Xingmi and a close friend of Yang Meng. After Jiang Yanhui’s defeat, Xu Zhigao summoned Jiang back to the capital as a general of the palace guards, to keep him under close observation.12 Yang Meng, meanwhile, was placed under house arrest in Hezhou, where he was guarded by guard commander Wang Hong and 200 soldiers.13 In the summer of 937, Yang Meng realized that Wu was doomed, and he attempted to escape by killing the commander of his guards. He then rode to Luzhou (present-day Hefei, in Anhui), a distance of over 250 kilometres. He knew that Zhou Ben was stationed there as military commissioner of Desheng military prefecture and, because Zhou was an old and highly meritorious official of Wu, he wanted to seek refuge with him. When Zhou Ben heard of his imminent arrival, he prepared to receive him, but his son Hongzuo vehemently opposed this. Zhou Ben retorted that Yang Meng was his lord and that nothing could stop him from meeting him. Zhou Hongzuo therefore closed all exits, and Zhou Ben was prevented from leaving his residence.14 Zhou Hongzuo then ordered Meng’s arrest and his transfer to the capital. Xu Gao sent a messenger with an order to kill Meng once he and his escort reached Caishi on the Yangzi River, because the presence of a Wu prince in the capital might have sparked pro-Wu support among the bureaucracy and the people. The same order also stripped Meng of all his ranks and titles and reduced him to the status of commoner, with his name being deleted from the Yang family registers. Meng’s wife and children were killed in Hezhou by guard commander Guo Cong, very likely on the orders of Xu Gao, who subsequently blamed Guo Cong for transgressing orders and banished him to Chizhou.15 Wang Lingmou, one of the earliest supporters of Xu Zhigao, held a number of influential positions, such as vice director of the chancellery and joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery. In 937, he was already old and sick and had lost his teeth, and therefore it was suggested to him that he retire, but he refused, saying: ‘The great enterprise of the king of Qi is not yet completed. How could I dare to think about retirement?’ When he felt that his end was near, he urged Xu Gao to take the throne, and died soon afterwards.16 In August 937, the Wu emperor issued an imperial order in which he ceded the throne to Xu Gao. Li Decheng, as before, led the officials from Jiangdu to Jinling, encouraging Xu Gao to complete the take-over, but Song Qiqiu did not sign the petition.17 On 23 October 937, Yang Lin, the second son of Yang Pu, delivered the state seal of Wu to Xu Gao.18 The transfer of the seal marked the final stage in the transition of power. The original state seal allegedly went back to the Qin dynasty (221–201 BCE) and was the ultimate symbol of imperial authority.19 The state seal regarded as the original Qin state seal
26 The founding of the Southern Tang
had perished, together with the last emperor of the Later Tang, in 936. Apparently, another state seal had been created in Wu, which thus passed into the hands of Xu Gao. Xu Gao ascended the throne in Jinling as emperor on 11 November 937. He showed his gratitude to his adoptive father by honouring him with the title of Martial emperor (Wu huangdi). On the same day, Xu Gao proclaimed a general amnesty and a new reign title, ‘Reaching to the origins’ (Shengyuan), and renamed the state Tang. As the Later Tang had vanished the year before, and the designation had become vacant, he adopted it readily and linked himself to the ruling family Li of the Tang dynasty. The appeal of doing so lay in the fact that the Tang was the last dynasty that had governed a unified empire. The adoption of the name Tang not only raised the status of the dynastic founder, but it also announced the potential unification of territories under one ruler. On 12 November 937, the former Wu emperor had bestowed upon him the title ‘Yielding emperor: exalted in conduct, profound in thought, and versed in the ancients’.20 The new state of Tang, later to be known as Southern Tang, adopted all the imperial trappings, such as palaces, carriages and dresses, as well as the ancestral temple, the colour of dresses, banners and so forth from the state of Wu. Two days later, on 14 November, Xu Gao conferred princely titles on his two younger adopted brothers, Xu Zhizheng and Xu Zhi’e.21 On 21 November, he sent envoys to the states of the Southern Han, Min, Wuyue and Jingnan, to inform them of his accession to the throne and the change of dynasty in the former state of Wu. Significantly, no such envoy was sent to the Later Han dynasty, which would never have entertained such a mission. The Later Han emperor, like all his predecessors and his successors within the Five Dynasties, believed that, as he controlled the original heartland of China, only he possessed legitimate claims to rule over all of China. The king of Wuyue was the first of the southern rulers to express his congratulations, through his general, Yuan Tao. In the spring of 938, Pang Shougui submitted the congratulations of Jingnan, followed by Min, whose envoy was Zhu Wenjin. Finally, Zou Yumo from the Southern Han arrived at court to convey the Southern Han ruler’s congratulatory message.22 Shortly after his inauguration, the new emperor invited his officials to a banquet in the Heavenly Spring Pavilion, which had been erected at the site of a pond of the same name. On this occasion, the first tensions among the officials appeared when Li Decheng mentioned that everyone at court, except Song Qiqiu, was merry. He produced a letter that Song had sent to him. In this letter, Song strongly advised him not to support the usurpation of the throne by Xu Gao. The emperor did not open the letter; instead, he said to Li that he had been friends with Song for thirty years and thus would not turn his back on him.23
The founding of the Southern Tang 27
In a letter sent to the Yielding emperor on 16 November, Xu Gao commanded that all the names of the palace buildings in the Eastern Capital be changed to names found in the Daoist classics. This was certainly a show of reverence to the former Wu emperor, who was fond of Daoism and Buddhism. Allegedly, he wore a dress made of feathers every time he was performing Daoist rites.24 Two days later, all twelve surviving princes of the Yang family were demoted to the rank of duke, with official ranks and salaries to support them. On 21 November 937, Yang Lian, the last crown prince of Wu and sonin-law of Xu Gao, was demoted to commandery duke of Hongnong.25 On 23 November, Zhang Yanhan (884–940), Zhang Juyong and Li Jianxun, who were all former high-ranking officials of Wu, were appointed grand councillors. Song Qiqiu, at this point, again felt he should be involved in discussions of government matters. Xu Gao had given Song the position of grand councillor, but excluded him nevertheless from any decision-making at the top level. When Song read the line ‘friends from humble days’ in an imperial proclamation, he complained that, when he had been in a lowly position, Xu Gao was only a prefect and, now that the latter had become emperor, he did not employ him as he should. The emperor assured him he would not be punished for this offence, but he still would not be called for high-level meetings. Song then suggested that the Yielding emperor be transferred from the Eastern Capital to another prefecture. He also proposed banishing Yang Lian, after annulling his marriage to the new emperor’s daughter. Xu Gao did not act upon this advice, but conferred the title of princess of Yongxing on his daughter. This caused a dilemma for the princess because, thanks to her marriage, she was a member of the Yang family, which her father had removed from its position in the state. Every time that people referred to her by her new title, she would inevitably start crying.26 Her older brothers disliked this behaviour, but her father called her a good wife. When he sent Yang Lian to Chizhou, the princess followed him there, where she died at the age of twenty-four, soon after her husband had passed away in 940. Just like the original Tang dynasty, the new state of Tang had two capitals, namely the Eastern Capital in Yangzhou, the old capital of Wu, which served as secondary capital, and the new Western Capital in Jiangning, Xu Gao’s former residence. Xu Gao’s third son, Jingsui, was appointed regent in the Eastern Capital and moved there with his officials in November 937. Xu Gao continued the rapid transformation of the Wu into the Tang state. He elevated his wife, Song, to the status of empress and conferred the title of prince of Wu on his son Jingtong who, on 11 December 937, changed his given name to Jing.27 Meanwhile, Anzhou, located north of the Yangzi, in modern-day Hubei, provided the scene for a rebellion by Li Jinquan (?–950).28 Anzhou controlled
28 The founding of the Southern Tang
the main trade and communication routes to the Yangzi from the north and the south. In 940, Li Jinquan was the military commissioner of Anzhou, and Hu Hanrong was his superior. The Later Jin emperor, Gaozu (r. 936–942), wanted to replace Hu because he was greedy and had lost the trust of both the people and the army there. In order to protect Hu Hanrong, Li Jinquan sent a letter informing the throne that Hu was unable to travel at this time. Once Jia Renzhao, the new civil governor, had arrived in Anzhou, Li Jinquan murdered him. When the emperor received news about this, he wanted to dismiss Li Jinquan and appoint Ma Quanjie, the new commander in Anlu, the prefectural centre of Anzhou. Hu Hanrong was afraid of losing the protection he enjoyed through Li Jinquan and told Li that the court was about to punish him for the murder of Jia Renzhao. Therefore, Li sent his aide Zhang Wei to the Southern Tang, offering his surrender. It was then that Xu Gao, for the first and only time during his reign, disregarded his policy of peaceful coexistence. He sent a force, under the command of Li Chengyu and Duan Chugong, to receive Li Jinquan. All went well, and Li Jinquan defected to the Southern Tang forces, but then Li Chengyu became overambitious, attacked Anlu and looted the town. The Later Jin troops caught up with the retreating Southern Tang troops and defeated them soundly at Mahuang valley. Li Jinquan managed to escape and was promptly appointed to a high military command, receiving, in addition, the military commissionership of Runzhou.29 Close to six hundred men, including their general, Du Guangye, were captured and taken to the Later Jin capital in Daliang (Kaifeng), but the emperor ordered that they be returned to the Southern Tang. Xu Gao was distressed by the loss of lives that had been incurred by the disobedience of Li Chengyu and the subsequent defeat of his army. Therefore, he decided to send Du and his men back to the north. He wrote a letter to the Later Jin emperor that explained his rejection of the Southern Tang detachment, without mentioning his own role in the whole enterprise. He blamed his generals: ‘The commanders at the border coveted merits, and they attempted to use the opportunity to take Your fortifications. Neither military regulations, nor court statutes apply to them.’ When the Later Jin emperor yet again returned them south, Xu Gao ordered war junks to prevent them from crossing south, and they were finally taken over into the service of the Later Jin.30 After this debacle, Xu Gao never again employed his forces in order to gain territory from his neighbours. It is obvious that Xu Gao was not at all inclined to use his military power to realize the unification of China that was implied in the adoption of the name Tang. The Yielding emperor felt uncomfortable living in his old palace, while a new dynasty was ruling in the same city. Therefore, he asked permission to be transferred to a new palace. Xu Gao agreed to this request and had the district magistrate’s official residence in Runzhou prepared as the new
The founding of the Southern Tang 29
domicile for the Yielding emperor and his family. The palace was named Danyang Palace, and Li Jianxun was appointed to supervise the transfer of the Yang family there. After the Yang family had been escorted to the Danyang Palace in Runzhou, they were kept under strict house arrest.31 Song Qiqiu, who felt unjustly sidelined by Xu Gao, demanded to be consulted in government matters. Xu Gao finally became very angry with Song and his constant complaints. Song, as a result, returned to his residence and, as before, awaited his punishment. One of Song’s supporters at court said to Xu Gao: ‘Qiqiu is one of your old officials and you should not expel him for a petty offence.’ Xu Gao replied: ‘Qiqiu has talents, but does not know proper etiquettes.’ Nevertheless, he sent his son Jing with a personal letter to Song, summoning him back to court. Some officials still regarded Xu Gao as a usurper of the throne that rightfully belonged to the Yang family. To eradicate all memories of the Yang family and the state of Wu, some of Xu Gao’s advisors suggested changing all the names of residences, offices, prefectures and districts that had the characters yang and wu in them. Yang Si, an official in the Eastern Capital, went so far as to ask for a change of his family name to the homophonous Yang, which means ‘sheep’. This prompted Xu Jie to admonish the ruler: Your Majesty has originally obeyed the will of Heaven and You have been complaisant when it came to the people and their wishes, and You did not take the throne by force. Wicked flatterers now turn this into a trifling matter. That is not permissible.32 After the arrival of an envoy from the state of Liao (907–1125), which was situated north of the Later Jin state, in the summer of 938, Song Qiqiu approached Xu Gao with a new plan. He told Xu Gao to give the Liao envoy lavish presents upon his departure and then to arrange his murder, as soon as he entered Later Jin territory. This way, the Liao would be led to think that their envoy had been murdered by the Later Jin and would attack them in revenge. The aim of Song’s plan was to involve the Later Jin in a war with the Liao, in order to eliminate the threat from the north. Once the two were at war, the Tang could grasp this opportunity to take over the territories that could no longer be guarded by the Later Jin. The only flaw in the plan was that Gaozu (Shi Jingtang, r. 936–942), the first ruler of the Later Jin, owed his position largely to the military support that the Liao had given him, and it was in his best interest to maintain friendly relations with them. So, for the time being, Song’s plan was shelved. In October 938, an official submitted a memorial to the throne, asking Xu Gao to adopt his ‘original’ family name Li and to build ancestral temples for the Li family.33 Xu Gao took note of the memorial, but did not yet follow its suggestions.
30 The founding of the Southern Tang
On 21 January 939, the Yielding emperor died, at the age of 38. The circumstances of his death are dubious. The accepted version of events is that envoys sent from the capital arrived at the Danyang Palace to transfer him to a new location. Without waiting for permission, they entered the Yielding emperor’s private quarters, where he was reciting sutras. Disturbed by the unexpected intruders, he grasped an incense burner and threw it at them. What happened next must be left to the imagination, for the envoys reported to the throne only that he had died, providing no further details.34 The transfer of the Yang family was consequently postponed until three years later, when they were all brought to another newly established residence, the Yongning Palace in Taizhou, a prefecture close to Yangzhou. Chu Rengui (?–941), the prefect of Taizhou, received orders from Xu Gao to isolate the Yang family completely, preventing them from seeing and marrying other people. Furthermore, as soon as the sons of the Yielding emperor reached the age of five, they were murdered.35 The final act in the tragedy of the Yang family came in the year 956, when emperor Shizong invaded Huainan, and Yuanzong, the second emperor of the Southern Tang, decided to move the family out of reach of the Later Zhou forces. During this operation, all male members of the family, numbering more than sixty, were killed by Yin Tingfan, the commander in charge.36 Thus, the Yang family had come to a very sad and ignominious end. Xu Gao suspended all court business for the appropriate mourning period of twenty-seven days and conferred the posthumous name ‘Far-sighted emperor’ (Rui huangdi) on the Yielding emperor.37 Shortly after the last Wu emperor’s death, Xu Gao’s younger adopted brothers, Xu Zhizheng and Xu Zhi’e, appealed again for the adoption of the family name Li and the building of ancestral temples. They petitioned him on behalf of all officials to undertake the necessary steps,38 and Xu Gao finally complied on 14 February. The formal adoption of the family name Li, together with a genealogy fitting an emperor, started with the bestowal of a new title on the imperial adopted father. Xu Wen was given the new designation ‘Adoptive ancestor’ (Yizu) on 24 February 939. Four days later, on 28 February, Xu Gao started the mourning period for his natural father and mother by wearing coarse mourning clothes, and his wife did the same. The rites they observed were those for recently deceased parents, even though his father had disappeared over forty years earlier. Both emperor and empress mourned for a total period of fifty-four days, that is twenty-seven days for the imperial father and twentyseven days for the imperial mother. Xu Gao’s adopted brothers, Xu Zhizheng and Xu Zhi’e, asked to participate in the mourning as members of the family, but the emperor did not give them permission, on the grounds that they did not belong to the Li family.39 Xu Gao set a precedent for his successors by refusing to adopt an imperial honorific title, which his son Jing had suggested. The emperor justified this by saying:
The founding of the Southern Tang 31
I relied on the common people in my youth. I am constantly fearful not to be up to the task and not being equal to the enterprise that [Tang emperors] Gaozu [r. 618–626] and Taizong [r. 627–649] bequeathed to me. All the high dignitaries and officials want to honour me with an imperial title which I cannot accept. I do not want to hear about this matter again.40 Thus, the historical sources refer to the Southern Tang rulers by their temple names only. Xu Gao furthermore made it a law that no in-laws were ever to be appointed to posts in the administration, nor were eunuchs allowed to participate in the running of government. With the application of these measures, the Southern Tang stood out among all the other states of its time, as the historian Sima Guang (1019–1086) notes.41 Xu Gao, around this time, also explained his future policies regarding the economy of the state in an imperial edict: ‘In former days, due to successive wars, the arable land became overgrown and was not cultivated; mulberry trees perished and thus no silkworms were hatched; day after day food and clothes were destroyed, and I was overcome with grief.’ In order to recultivate the fields and to give people incentives to work on them, a new regulation was proclaimed. According to this new regulation, people immigrating to Jiangnan received arable land that was exempt from tax payments for three years.42 Li Jing, the prince of Qi, was given the reins of the civil government on 3 March; the emperor ordered that he be informed officially of military matters only. On 12 March, the emperor finally adopted the new given name Bian and, since then, had the personal name Li Bian. The choice of his new given name was not an easy one, and he adopted it only after discussions at court concerning his earlier choices, the first of which had been Ang. This was an unfortunate choice, as Ang was the given name of the Tang emperor, Wenzong (r. 827–840). The next name in line was Huang, which happened to be the personal name of Zhu Wen (852–912), who had ended the Tang dynasty. Xu Gao then decided on the name Tan, but this was inappropriate because of its resemblance to the character Dan, the given name of Tang emperor Ruizong (r. 684–690; 710–712).43 A minor problem that arose with the arrangement for the ancestral temple of the emperor was where to place Xu Wen in the sacrificial order. Li Bian wanted to place the altars for the first two Tang emperors, Gaozu and Taizong, together with the one for Xu Wen, in the western chamber of the ancestral temple. Song Qiqiu, speaking for all officials, opined that Xu Wen ranked as a feudal lord rather than an emperor and therefore could not be given a place of sacrifice together with the two Tang emperors. Instead, the officials suggested erecting a separate shrine for Xu Wen, behind the main hall of
32 The founding of the Southern Tang
the ancestral temple. Li Bian rejected this option because Xu Wen had adopted him and he felt that, without Xu Wen, the state of Wu would not have succeeded as long as it had.44 Now that Li Bian had officially adopted the family name Li and with it the Tang imperial family, a difficult question had to be answered: Who was his direct ancestor? Li Bian chose Li Ke (?–653), the prince of Wu, as the progenitor of his family line. Li Ke was the first son of Taizong and his consort Yang, a daughter of emperor Yangdi (r. 605–617) of the Sui dynasty. Even though this line of descent linked Li Bian tightly to the south, there were some officials who were not convinced at all of the suitability of this candidate, for he had been executed for his alleged involvement in a conspiracy against the throne.45 Li Ke had had four sons, who were reduced to commoner status after their father’s death. The third son, Li Kun, who died in 702, was the father of Li Yi. Li Yi was ennobled again in 729 and had conferred on him the title prince of Wu.46 The officials suggested yet another prince of the Tang, Li Yuanyi, prince of Zheng, as a potential ancestor. Li Yuanyi was the thirteenth son of the Tang founder, Gaozu, and thus a younger brother of Taizong. His connection to Jiangnan, which was necessary for the potential progenitor of the Southern Tang imperial house, was established through his sons, some of whom had served in various positions in places along the middle reaches of the Yangzi. Although Li Yuanyi appeared to be a suitable choice as founding ancestor, he lost out to Li Ke. Li Ke’s great-grandson, Li Xian, was established as the fifth-generation ancestor of Li Bian’s father, Li Rong. The relevant authorities, probably officials from the ministry of rites, then determined the names of all the ancestors from Li Xian to Li Rong, that is the names of the grandfather and the great-grandfather, as well as the names and titles of their spouses. Li Bian calculated that the Tang dynasty had lasted 300 years, with nineteen emperors, excluding Wu Zetian and both her sons, Emperors Zhongzong (r. 684, 705–710) and Ruizong, and he doubted that tracing his ancestral descent only ten generations back was impressive enough. The authorities dispersed his doubts by doing their own calculations, according to which a generation comprised thirty years. As the emperor was born during the ‘Cultured virtue’ (Wende, 888) reign of emperor Xizong (r. 874–888), fifty years, or close to two generations, had already passed, bringing the total number of generations to almost twelve. This furthermore implied that there had been no gap in the transmission of the Tang mandate between the actual end of the Tang in 907 and their restoration in 937/939. To honour Li Ke appropriately, Li Bian conferred on Li Ke the imperial title of ‘Founding ancestor: the filial and peaceful emperor’. He also bestowed honorary posthumous titles and names on his ancestors, starting with his great-grandfather.47
The founding of the Southern Tang 33
Xu Zhizheng and his brother Zhi’e wanted to adopt the family name Li as well, in an attempt to strengthen their ties with their former adopted brother; however, their plea was rejected.48 On 2 May 939, Li Bian proceeded to perform sacrifices to Heaven and, on 4 May, he proclaimed a general amnesty.49 All civil officials received promotions, and officers and soldiers were given presents. Li Bian, moreover, extended his generosity to all farmers who, within the previous three years, had planted and cultivated 3,000 mulberry trees or more: they were given fifty bolts of silk from the imperial treasuries. Farmers who had reclaimed land of 80 mu (1 mu ≈ 5 hectares or 13 acres) or more received a payment of 20,000 copper cash, and all new fields that they cultivated were not taxed for five years.50 It is obvious that the population responded positively to these measures, and that the cultivation of fields increased significantly. On 5 June, the emperor’s younger brother, Xu Zhi’e, passed away. During this time, the Yielding emperor’s family was moved to the Yongning Palace in Taizhou and put under strict guard. Yang Gong, a cousin of the Yielding emperor, who had served as military commissioner and held a high civil position as well, feigned illness so that he could retire from his positions to join the Yang clan in Taizhou. In his stead, Yang Lian, the son-in-law of Li Bian, was appointed military commissioner of Kanghua, which he refused to accept on the grounds that he wanted to mourn for the Yielding emperor.51 Li Bian now officially wanted to name his son Jing as heir apparent. Jing rejected the honour three times, and so was given high military and civil positions, as well as the two metropolitan prefectures of Yangzhou and Shengzhou to provide his income.52 Prior to this, both Wuyue and Jingnan had sent envoys with congratulatory messages on the occasion of the sacrifice to Heaven. The emperor developed Jinling into the main capital of the dynasty by establishing an ‘Altar to the soil’ west of Xuanwu Lake, in the northern part of the city, and he followed this up with the creation of a park on Mount Zhong, where birds and animals caught in the provinces were released. In the spring of 940, Yang Lian requested permission to visit the tomb of his father and, when he had received it, he travelled there. On his return by boat, he died of alcohol poisoning. Thus, the last pretender to the throne of Wu was gone. As etiquette required, Li Bian conferred a posthumous title on him that re-elevated Yang Lian to the position of prince.53 Around the same time, the emperor decreed that requisitioned labour for public building would cease, so that people could attend to their fields. About a month later, the calendar official, Chen Chengxun, submitted a new calendar to the throne. This was a significant event, for this calendar not only fixed holidays and dates for sowing and harvesting, but also marked further the imperial status of the Southern Tang.54
34 The founding of the Southern Tang
Both the Southern Han and the Min sent missions to renew agreements with the Southern Tang, and, later in the year, a Liao envoy arrived for negotiations, presenting Li Bian with a robe made from snow-fox fur. Li Jing, in the autumn of 940, finally gave in to the wishes of his father and accepted the position of crown prince.55 On the advice of a court astrologist, who had warned Li Bian that a certain stellar constellation announced imminent disaster, he moved to Guangling, leaving Li Jing in charge of the administration of the state in Jinling. After his arrival on 25 November, he moved into the old residence of the Wu emperors and had a new audience hall built. The supply situation in Guangling turned out to be difficult, because all the rivers and canals were frozen, and provisions could not reach the capital. Li Bian thus ordered that the very old, orphans, the ill and sick were to be given gifts of rice. After he had received congratulations on his birthday, in early January, from envoys sent by the Southern Han, Min and Wuyue, he moved back to Jinling on 6 January 941, having spent a mere six weeks in Guangling.56 When an internecine war started in the state of Min, to the east of Southern Tang territory in Fujian, Li Bian attempted to negotiate a peace between the warring parties. In 940, Wang Yanxi, the ruler of Min (r. 939–944), had sent troops against his brother Wang Yanzheng, prefect of Jianzhou1 in northeastern Fujian. These troops were defeated by Wang Yanzheng, who was able to gain a large area, comprising most of northern Fujian. Li Bian saw a chance to reconcile the two brothers after they had cooperated in expelling a Wuyue army that originally had been sent at Wang Yanzheng’s request. Evidently, one of the main reasons for Li Bian’s intervention was to prevent Wuyue from gaining a foothold close to Southern Tang territory in Fujian. The Southern Tang envoy was successful in persuading Wang Yanxi and Wang Yanzheng to lay down their arms for the time being.57 In the spring of 941, Chen Jue and Chang Mengxi (897–958) were appointed director and deputy director of the court of palace attendants.58 Chen Jue, in the winter of 940, had submitted a memorial accusing Chu Rengui, the prefect of Taizhou and guardian of the Yang family, of greed. As a consequence, Chu was dismissed, and Chen was again given access to the top levels of the administration.59 Chang Mengxi came originally from the north, where he had been an official of Li Maozhen, the king of Qi (r. 901–924), and his son Li Congyan (897–946). As neither of them showed much interest in scholarly and literary activities, Chang, who was very much interested in these pursuits, left the north in 930 and came to Wu. His abilities earned him an appointment as rectifier in the court of judicial review, and, once Li Bian was in power, he made him censor and vice director in the ministry of rites. From his position there, he contributed substantially to the formulation of laws and regulations based on the Tang code. Because he was well versed in historical precedents,
The founding of the Southern Tang 35
Chang had asked for the codification of law and its proper application, arguing his case as follows: Since the times of the hegemonic rule of the Yang, the application of laws has been entrusted to mediocre officials. The ruler has had to look after trifling matters and has neglected the main principles. The old regulations should be restored to give future generations a guideline.60 Inevitably, a principled man such as Chang would disagree with a careerminded official such as Chen Jue. Li Bian, aware of Chang’s attitude towards Chen, may have believed that Chang would keep an attentive eye on Chen. As early as 937, Li Bian had sent a diplomatic mission to the Liao court in the north, announcing his accession to the throne. This delegation was received there on 17 September. Song Qiqiu had suggested forging an alliance with Liao against the looming threat of the Later Jin dynasty in the north. As the land route was blocked, Li Bian sent precious gifts – among them beautiful girls – via the sea route. This was the first of several missions that were sent to the Liao, and the Liao reciprocated by sending their own missions. By coincidence, envoys from the Later Jin arrived at the Liao court in Shangjing on the same day as the envoys from Qi.61 Gifts were offered by the Southern Tang envoys, and the Liao reciprocated with a mission that left the Liao court on 6 November. This was the start of regular diplomatic exchanges between the Southern Tang and the Liao, with a high point of three missions from the Southern Tang, in both 941 and 942.62 The envoys from the Southern Tang most likely travelled to the Liao court by sea. Occasionally, they also travelled by land, for, in 941, Li Bian requested from the Later Jin court safe conduct through their territory. The Later Jin rejected this plea, because they were only on friendly terms with the Liao, but not with the Southern Tang.63 The diplomatic relations of the Southern Tang extended to states as distant as the Korean peninsula. In the summer of 938, an envoy from the newly established kingdom of Goryeo (chin. Gaoli, 936–1392) arrived at the capital to submit tribute to the Southern Tang. In the same year, an envoy from Silla (chin. Xinluo) arrived at court and submitted tribute as well.64 Either this must have been a Silla loyalist, for the kingdom of Silla had ceased to exist in 935, or the source is mistaken in its identification of the country of origin of the envoy. A possible reason for Goryeo to enter into an alliance with the Southern Tang was to threaten the Liao, who were close neighbours of Goryeo.65 The Later Jin dynasty was not suitable as an ally for the Koreans, as the Later Jin depended on the Liao. The designation of the southern empire as Tang may also have played a role in the sending of a mission there to seek support. Another Goryeo mission arrived in Jinling in late 940, submitting local products as tribute, as the previous envoys had done.66
36 The founding of the Southern Tang
With the state in the hands of a strong ruler and an economy that was flourishing and allowed for the training of troops, many officials believed that, in order to complete the restoration of Tang rule, Li Bian should take the opportunity to invade the Later Jin. It was obvious to many people at the time that the Later Jin court was in need of Liao support – after all, the dynasty had been founded with the help of the Liao. So, if an agreement could be reached with the Liao, it seemed possible for the Southern Tang to conquer the north. Officials suggested to Li Bian: ‘Your Majesty presides over a restoration, and now that the north faces many calamities, You should dispatch the troops to restore the old frontiers of the Tang Empire.’ Li Bian did not want to hear this and explained why he did not want to go to war: As a child I grew up in the army and saw the profound damage soldiers did to the people. I cannot bear to hear words about this again. When I leave other people alone and in peace, then my people will be in peace as well. Why do you ask me to start a war then!67 As is obvious from this passage, Li Bian cared for his people and, having grown up in the tumultuous times at the end of the Tang, he did not want to risk what he had achieved. He likewise rejected the proposal, submitted by envoys from the Southern Han court in Guangdong, that they attack Chu and distribute its territory between themselves.68 On 12 August 941, a fire broke out in the living quarters of Qian Yuanguan (887–941, r. 932–941), the king of Wuyue in Hangzhou. The fire quickly spread across the imperial city and destroyed many more buildings. As a result, the king suffered a nervous breakdown and shortly thereafter died. The Southern Tang generals urged Li Bian to dispatch an invasion force to conquer Wuyue and capture its king, but Li Bian sent envoys with provisions to Wuyue. He justified this course of action by saying: ‘How can I take advantage of the calamity of other people!’69 Thus, on the one hand, Li Bian missed a chance to eliminate the most tenacious opponent of the Southern Tang, but, on the other hand, he preserved the power equilibrium in the south that hinged on the existence of a strong Southern Tang and a strong Wuyue. Both states depended on alliances with their neighbours, and the Southern Tang, especially during Li Bian’s reign, did not want to become involved in a major conflict with its northern neighbour. Conquering Wuyue inevitably would have drawn the Southern Tang into such a conflict, for the rulers of Wuyue, throughout the existence of the state, maintained their vassalage to the northern Five Dynasties. In internal politics, Li Bian behaved quite differently. He had seen how his adoptive father had outmanoeuvred the Yang family, and he himself had eliminated the Xu as a political force. As a ruler, he always feared that his
The founding of the Southern Tang 37
chancellors would one day challenge him and his family in the same way, and, to counter this possibility, he forced Li Jianxun into retirement. Li Jianxun was not only a long-serving minister of Wu, but he was the son-in-law of Xu Wen. As Li Bian was removing all Xu family members from government functions, Li Jianxun had to go as well. The proclamation that made Li Jianxun’s dismissal public, reads: Li Jianxun, Right Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs, Concurrent Vice Director of the Secretariat, Jointly Manager of Affairs with the Secretariat-Chancellery, and Chief Compiler of the National History, holds a position among the Three Dukes. Moreover, he ranks among our relatives. He has not followed rules and regulations and has dared to ignore the regular administrative process. He is dismissed and may retire to his private residence.70 Li Jianxun took the hint and resigned. Prior to this declaration, Li Jianxun had discussed the administrative system. He pointed out that issues relating to the bureaucracy should not involve officials, but should be decreed and announced by the ruler himself. As Li Bian did not immediately come up with a corresponding proclamation, Li Jianxun ordered a secretariat drafter to set up an imperial will.71 This was discovered by Chang Mengxi, who accused Li of having abused his power, and this finally gave Li Bian a justification to expel Li Jianxun from the administration. Li’s wife, the Guangde princess, went to see her adopted brother and confronted him: ‘When our father was still alive, you once wanted to have an audience with him and Master Li. So why do you abandon him today?’ Li Bian replied that his treatment of Li Jianxun had to do with matters of state and nothing at all with his personal relationship with Li Jianxun. In order to underline his good intentions, he summoned Li for an audience and presented him with gifts.72 It was only under Li Bian’s successor, Li Jing, that Li Jianxun was recalled to court. For Song Qiqiu, Li Jianxun’s resignation offered an opportunity to expand his influence within the bureaucratic apparatus in early 942. As a councillor of the left, he not only asked permission to continue as head of the secretariat, but, in addition, to be appointed head of the department of state affairs as well. The latter was managed by Li Jingsui, who was consequently dismissed from running the department of state affairs and instead given the secretariat and the chancellery. Song Qiqiu, hence, assumed his desired position in the department of state affairs. However, all three departments were under the nominal direction of Li Jing, who was to keep control of Song Qiqiu. The tenure of Song Qiqiu in his new post did not last very long, as he became implicated in a scandal that involved his personal aide, Xia Changtu. Xia misappropriated a large amount of official money, and Song, instead of
38 The founding of the Southern Tang
imposing the death penalty, pardoned him. When this was discovered, Li Bian, in a rage, had Xia beheaded, and Song, afraid of imperial anger, feigned illness and asked to be dismissed from the department of state affairs. The ruler granted this request without hesitation. Song stopped attending audiences after his dismissal, until the ruler sent his son, Li Jingsui, to console him and offer him the position of governor of Hongzhou, Song’s home prefecture. The relationship between Song and Li Bian was quite tense. On one occasion, Song, who nominally remained chancellor and grand guardian, attended a banquet given by Li Bian. When he was drunk, he reproached the ruler: ‘That Your Majesty restored the dynasty is my merit. How could You have forgotten this!’ This outburst of hurt pride was countered by an equally angry Li Bian: You came as a travelling guest to me, and now you are one of the three highest dignitaries. That suffices as a reward. But now you say to others that I have a raven beak like Goujian,73 and that it is difficult to have a peaceful and happy time with me. Didn’t you say so? Song replied: ‘I have indeed said that. When I was a travelling guest, Your Majesty was also in a lowly position. Today You can even kill me.’ Li Bian the next day wrote a letter in which he thanked Song for his outspoken words: ‘You knew my angry temper all your life. When we were young, we were close, now that we are old, we are angry at each other – what can we do!’ His appreciation of Song, however, did not go so far as to re-employ him in the central administration of the empire. In the summer of 942, Song was transferred from the capital to take up the appointment of military commissioner of Zhennan, with a residence in Hongzhou.74 In the autumn of 942, laws and legal regulations that had been compiled since 939 were finally circulated on 22 October, and, as the present reign title was Shengyuan, they were aptly entitled the Shengyuan regulations. The compilation work had begun in the autumn of 939 and involved the editing of old Wu regulations, as well as the drafting of new regulations. Both the old Wu and the new Tang regulations were applied together until the end of the dynasty.75 As Li Bian was already at an advanced age, the question of who would succeed him arose. He himself favoured his second son, Li Jingda (924–971), prince of Xuancheng, whom he preferred over all his sons. Song Qiqiu enthusiastically supported the nomination of Jingda, therefore antagonizing Li Jing. In the end, Li Jing was chosen, because he was the oldest son of the dynastic founder. Another contender for the position of heir apparent was Li Jingti, whose mother, Zhong, was a consort recommended to Li Bian by his wife, Song. When Li Bian one day visited the palace of Li Jing, he discovered his son leisurely playing an instrument, and he got so angry that he scolded him
The founding of the Southern Tang 39
every time he saw him for several days running. Zhong tried to take advantage of this and suggested to Li Bian that Jingti, despite his young age, already showed promising talents and surely was fit to rule one day. Li Bian did not accept this, but replied in anger: ‘When a son transgresses, and a father scolds him, that is a normal matter. The state is a great responsibility. How can you dare to interfere with it?’ He then ordered her to remove her hairpins and earrings and put her under house arrest in a different palace. A few months later, she had to shave her hair off and become a nun, and with that he had shown his determination to put the interests of the state over the interests of the family.76 In the instances mentioned above, Li Bian’s angry temper played a prominent role. Apart from a seemingly inherited characteristic, it was alchemy to prolong his life that made him behave ever more erratically. He had started taking a concoction mixed by the alchemist Shi Shouchong that promised longevity. The basis for this medicine was cinnabar, a mineral of reddish colour, with mercury contents. Because of its colour, this concoction was attributed magical powers. Mercury does affect the central nervous system, and this may have been the reason why Li Bian, in his last years, became so choleric that no one wanted to be near him. He also offered Shi Shouchong’s recipe to Li Jianxun, but Li Jianxun, not convinced of its efficacy, said to the ruler: ‘I have taken this only for a few days and I already feel extremely hot. What, then, is the use of taking more of it?!’ Only the most courageous and serious officials would go near Li Bian to submit matters of state. If they kept their cool in the face of imperial anger, he would usually react in a reasonable way. Otherwise, he would accuse them of any offence that came to his mind. Consequently, relations between ruler and officials became severely strained. Wang Shaoyan, a palace attendant and thus a close witness, and possibly also a frequent victim of these uncontrolled outbursts of anger, submitted a letter to Li Bian which reads: ‘Since spring has come, many officials have been accused of transgressions, and all inside and outside the palace are concerned about and fearful of You.’ Li Bian responded personally, telling Wang to make his answer known to the public.77 What he said has not been transmitted, but he was very probably replying by justifying his explosive temper as a consequence of running the government. Li Bian recognized that something was wrong with him and so he consulted the Daoist priest Wang Qixia (881–943). He asked him: ‘How can I achieve supreme peace?’ Wang replied: ‘When kings cure their mind and body, then they cure the state. Your Majesty now has not just yet discarded the lust for anger and the satisfaction of joy. So why are You talking about supreme peace!’ This clearly was a rebuff to Li Bian’s expectations and an indication that his condition was known to circles outside the palace as well. Wang Qixia was a very popular Daoist, and many people asked for his help. Prior to their meeting, Li Bian had thought about establishing a temple for
40 The founding of the Southern Tang
Wang, but Wang declined saying: ‘At present the state’s budget is lacking, so what is the use of building a temple! If burning letters to Heaven do not transform matters, real petitions should be submitted to the throne.’78 Wang shows here a very practical approach to the solution of problems that actually involves the earthly bureaucracy and not so much divine authority. Wang was a northerner who, as a prodigious child, is said to have passed a special official examination at the age of seven. In the turmoil at the end of the Tang dynasty, he fled to Wu and became the disciple of the eminent Daoist master priest Nie Shidao, settling at Mount Mao. When Li Bian took over as chancellor in Wu, he summoned Wang to Jinling and lodged him in a Daoist temple in the capital.79 In the winter of 942, Li Bian, in an imperial proclamation, defined his policies, which he hoped would be followed by his successors. Obviously, he was aware that officials in key positions lacked the knowledge necessary to run a civil administration properly. His decree reads: When the Tang dynasty lost its rule, there were many men emerging everywhere. Military men took over the administration, virtue was suppressed and did not shine any more, and I deplored this very much. I have selected learned men to serve as the Three Dukes and have done away with harsh government to present my people with a new beginning.80 Li Bian’s condition did not improve and was aggravated by the growth of an ulcer on his back.81 He had it treated by his doctor Wu Tingyu, but kept it otherwise a secret, attending to government matters as usual. The doctor could not cure the ulcer, and Li Bian finally ordered him, on 30 March 943, to summon his son Li Jing to his bed.82 Allegedly, he addressed Li Jing, as follows: In the vaults of the Dechang Palace, arms, vessels, gold, and silk are stored worth 7,000,000 cash. Guard the enterprise of the dynasty well and be on friendly terms with the neighbouring countries to protect the state. I have taken cinnabar to prolong my life, but instead I am dying before my time. Observe this and let it be a warning to you.83 In the evening of the same day, he passed away, at the age of fifty-six. Court officials, with the tacit support of the crown prince, chose not to make Li Bian’s death public immediately; instead, a statement was issued that declared a general amnesty and the appointment of Li Jing as regent.84
3
The reign of Li Jing
Prior to the passing away of Li Bian, tensions between officials had surfaced. These are evidence of the failing health of Li Bian and his consequent loss of control of the administration. When Feng Yansi (903–960) served as advisor to the crown prince, he made fun of Sun Cheng saying: ‘What abilities do you have, sir, to qualify as minister of the secretariat?’ To this blatant insult, Sun replied with alacrity: I am a modest scholar from Shandong. My writing style does not match yours, my humorous conversational style does not match yours, and my treacherous flatteries do not match yours. However, the ruler has appointed you to serve as the companion of the prince of Qi, for he wants you to guide him with benevolence and uprightness. How can you then introduce him to music, women and gambling? I have indeed no such abilities. Your qualities will suffice to bring the state close to disaster. Feng Yansi hailed from Guangling. Like many other promising young men, his first official assignment was that of assistant in the palace library. When Li Jing was made field marshal in late 937, Li Bian appointed Feng as his secretary, for he possessed considerable literary talents. He used intrigues to remove all officials serving the crown prince and ranking above him to further his own career. Moreover, he was on friendly terms with Song Qiqiu. Chang Mengxi accused Feng Yansi, Chen Jue and Wei Cen (?–956) of being mean men who should not be permitted to serve in the retinue of the crown prince, for they were corrupt and treacherous. Wei Cen was a northerner who had travelled extensively in the north until he arrived in Wu. Through Song Qiqiu, he received a position as editor in the imperial library and, through Song, he was also connected with the other officials who had been Song’s protégés. Xiao Yan was the third official to raise his voice in criticism of the group; his target was Chen Jue, and he laid out his reasons in a memorial to Li Bian. Li Bian learnt about the behaviour of Chen Jue and the others through the memorials from
42 The reign of Li Jing
Chang and Xiao, but was unable to investigate the matter further before his death.1 The new ruler, Li Jing, brought with him a group of advisers who had served under him since his days as crown prince. This new group had to fit in with the generation of officials who had served under Li Bian. Immigrant scholars from the north joined both groups, and thus the stage was set for conflicts among junior and senior officials, as well as between southerners and northerners. Historiographers since the Song dynasty have described these conflicts as ‘factional struggles’, but the evidence for concerted action by a faction led by Song Qiqiu is spurious.2 As in any other administrative situation, opinions of officials about decisions taken by the ruler varied and, at certain times, clashed. Song historiographers nevertheless had a reason to suggest the existence of a faction around Song Qiqiu, because he had recommended several men for service under Li Bian, such as Chen Jue and Wei Cen. Feng Yansi was perhaps the most influential and well-known official during Li Jing’s reign. Even though Li Jing knew of Feng’s crafty character, he kept him for his many artistic talents and his grasp of administrative matters. On 11 February 943, the last will of the late emperor was proclaimed. Sun Cheng was aware of the potential danger the newly appointed officials around Li Jing posed to the stability of the state. Because of his fears, he drafted a fake last will that called for the empress dowager Song to guide the state as a regent. The only official who protested this move was Li Yiye: The late emperor once has said: ‘Women at the helm of government are the origin of disorder.’ How would he have agreed to provide the basis for disaster? It must be a lie circulated by treacherous officials close to the emperor. The crown prince is old enough to take over and has displayed brilliant abilities. Why do you all of a sudden talk about the decline of the state? If you really proclaim this last will, I will definitely destroy it in front of all officials. Sun Cheng thus did not dare to change the last will, and it was promulgated as it had been originally drafted. Around this time, Chen Jue reappeared at court after taking several months of leave in view of Li Bian’s choleric outbursts. Xiao Yan once again attacked Chen Jue, accusing him of disrespectful behaviour by staying at home and awaiting the death of Li Bian. Accordingly, he asked for Chen’s punishment, but the throne rejected this suggestion.3 Sun Cheng’s previous concerns were justified, for Feng Yansi and his half-brother Feng Yanlu (?–971) indeed had forged an order that allowed free people to sell their children as slaves. They did this allegedly to obtain concubines and singing girls. Xiao Yan discovered the plot and said at court:
The reign of Li Jing 43
This edict definitely has been fabricated by Yansi and his cohorts, and it is not the order of the late emperor. When Yanlu was Administrative Assistant in the Eastern Capital, he submitted this suggestion, and the late emperor asked me what I thought about it. I replied: ‘When Your Majesty was Chancellor of Wu and it occurred that free boys and girls were sold, You used funds from the treasury to pay ransom for them and send them back to their homes. For this reason, You won the people’s affection. Is it really possible that now that You have ascended the throne, You turn a blind eye and You really permit the sale of children of poor people as servants to rich people?’ The late emperor concurred with my view and wanted to penalize Yanlu for his crime. I told him that Yanlu’s foolishness did not deserve to be punished. The late emperor sealed Yanlu’s document, marked it with three strokes of the brush and had it sent to the archive. I now ask to search for this document everywhere in the palace because it definitely still exists. After a search that produced more than one thousand memorials from the reign of Li Bian, Feng Yanlu’s memorial was finally found, just as Xiao Yan had predicted. As the forged order had already been issued, however, it could not be withdrawn. This incident shows that the authority of Li Jing as emperor did not reach very far and that he was not as concerned about the lot of the common people as his father was. As soon as Li Jing had officially assumed the throne, he changed the era title to ‘Guarding the great enterprise’ (Baoda). Han Xizai criticized him for this, explaining: ‘It is an ancient rule that reign titles are changed only after the year has ended. If ancient precedents are not followed, how can people be instructed?’4 When emperors died, their successors proclaimed a new reign title only at the start of the new year. Li Jing, instead, immediately changed the era name after his father’s death, only a few days into the new year. He did not heed Han’s advice, but went ahead with the same excuse as earlier, saying that the decree for the change of the era title already had been circulated. When he invited court officials to discuss matters of state after the end of the official audience, they became very optimistic about the new ruler and his apparent interest in the state. One of the very few critical voices was Li Jianxun. For him, the weakness of Li Jing as a ruler was obvious. He addressed his colleagues: Our new ruler possesses benevolence and humaneness to a high degree, and in this he is like the late emperor. His character, however, is weak and irresolute. If he is not supported by sincere men, then I fear he will not be able to protect the enterprise of the late emperor. This remark was clearly aimed at Song Qiqiu and his followers.
44 The reign of Li Jing
Feng Yansi, for instance, before the official accession of Li Jing, appeared so often to discuss matters with him, that he was annoyed and told him: ‘You have an ordinary post, why do you annoy me so much?’5 Li Jianxun suggested to Li Jing that he appoint high ministers with good standing within the administration and with a proven record of competence and abilities. They would assist him in running the state properly, because he was inexperienced in administrative matters. Li Jianxun encouraged the ruler to employ righteous officials; otherwise the decline of the state was only a matter of time. In order to remedy this situation, Li Jing appointed Song Qiqiu, the most respected of his father’s officials, as chancellor. The emperor believed that he had been instrumental in founding the empire and thought – wrongly – that he enjoyed popular and official support. He even was inclined to forget his previous animosity towards Song. At the same time that Song assumed control of the imperial secretariat, Zhou Zong, another official of the old guard, was promoted to director of the chancellery.6 Zhou Zong was not at all experienced, nor was he interested in the handling of the government, and thus he was no obstacle to the ambitions of Song Qiqiu, who strove to become the most powerful man in the state. To achieve this goal, he began to protect and support the officials who had served Li Jing when he was crown prince. This group included the two Feng brothers, Wei Cen, Chen Jue and Zha Wenhui (890–960). Zha Wenhui, recommended by Song Qiqiu, had been employed in the palace library and had served Li Jing when he was field marshal. After the enthronement of Li Jing, he rose to the position of document drafter in the imperial secretariat. Song Qiqiu used his supporters to enhance his influence in the administration and remove officials who were a threat to his ambitions. With Song’s tacit support, Feng and his cohorts recommended each other for promotions while denouncing others. Bureaucratic circles soon referred to them as the ‘Five Demons’ (wugui). Colleagues criticized them by pointing out their rapid rise through the ranks. Du Changye remarked on Feng Yanlu’s speedy career in the administration: ‘The state promotes and controls all subjects through the official rank system. If just one word receives imperial commendation and immediately leads to glory, how will people later on be rewarded, when they gain real merits?’ He certainly spoke for many of his colleagues, but his statement did nothing to change the situation. Quite the contrary, for Li Jing shortly thereafter promoted Chen Jue and Wei Cen to commissioner and vice commissioner of the bureau of military affairs, that is, heads of the military administration. As soon as Chen Jue had taken leave to mourn the death of his mother, Wei Cen denounced him. Consequently, Chen was dismissed from the bureau of military affairs, leaving Wei Cen in sole charge of the agency.7
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Before these events, Li Jianxun had taken up a post as military commissioner in Fuzhou1 (Jiangxi). This transfer away from the capital was the result of his criticism of Li Jing’s employment policy. Opponents of Song Qiqiu and his followers had lost high-ranking support with the departure of Li Jianxun. Li Jing noticed the intrigues at court and the tensions in the bureaucracy. He decided to remedy the situation by establishing the office for manifest governance within the palace grounds during the first year of his reign. The obvious purpose of this office was to advise the emperor on policies, but also, more importantly, on developments within the bureaucratic apparatus as well. Chang Mengxi, as its head, was a natural choice for a position that implied criticism of officials at all levels and unbiased reporting to the throne. As a censor, he had criticized the behaviour of Li Jing as a crown prince and demanded that he should change his ways. In addition, he called Song Qiqiu and Chen Jue treacherous officials and asked to dismiss Feng Yansi and Wei Cen as princely advisors. At the start of Li Jing’s reign, Chang became Hanlin academician, but Song Qiqiu ousted Chang. When he was crown prince, Li Jing had not appreciated Chang’s admonitions; as soon as he had become ruler, he acknowledged Chang’s upright character and appointed him to high positions.
Figure 3.1 Entrance to Li Bian’s tomb
46 The reign of Li Jing
Figure 3.2 Guardian figures at the entrance to the main chamber of Li Bian’s tomb
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Figure 3.2 continued
48 The reign of Li Jing
Yan Xu, Chang’s assistant, had no obvious factional liaisons, but he lacked political finesse. Li Jing hoped that Chang and Yan would be able to balance the various opposed groups and individuals in the administration. After the appointment of Feng Yansi, however, Chang Mengxi resigned from office out of frustration, and the emperor abolished the office for manifest governance. Feigning illness, Chang returned to his residence, where he indulged in alcohol and did not attend court audiences for the next ten years.8 Li Bian, meanwhile, was buried in the Yongling mausoleum on 28 December 943 and had conferred on him the posthumous title of Liezu.9 His honorary title was ‘Radiantly literate, augustly martial, filial and exalted emperor’.10 Before Li Bian received his posthumous title, officials in the ministry of rites discussed the correct title at length. The officials believed that, because Li Bian had claimed descent from the Tang, his posthumous title should include the term for ancestor, zong. This term appears as part of the names of the successors of founding emperors. Han Xizai offered his point of view: In the past, when an emperor lost his throne and then reclaimed it, this is what one refers to as a return to rightful rule. If someone, who previously had not held it, regained the throne, this is what one calls a restoration. The late ruler stood at the start of a restoration, and that is why he should be addressed as a founding ancestor [zu].11 His argumentation was supported by his colleague Jiang Wenyu, a ritual specialist at the court of imperial sacrifices; subsequently, Li Bian was conferred the title Liezu. Palace eunuchs had dethroned the Tang emperor, Zhaozong (r. 889–904), in 900 and replaced him with the crown prince. One year later, in 901, Zhaozong was reinstated.12 Han Xizai implied in his argumentation that Liezu had managed to restore the Tang dynasty using his own power. Zhaozong, in contrast, had been merely a puppet in the hands of the competing power groups at court and had not actively been involved in the restoration of the dynasty. About the time of Liezu’s burial, Zhou Zong tearfully complained to Li Jing that he was the target of Song and the Five Demons. Li Jing readily acted upon Zhou’s complaint and removed Song from the capital by appointing him military commissioner of Hongzhou. Song reverted to tactics he had employed successfully before to find out his standing with the emperor. He submitted a letter asking for permission to return to his old residence at Mount Jiuhua. He certainly hoped for the emperor to ask him to stay, but instead Li Jing sent Song a letter saying that he recognized Song’s ruse and that he did not intend to stop him from going. He then conferred on Song the titles of master of Jiuhua and duke of Qingyang, with the taxes of one district (Qingyang) as his livelihood.
The reign of Li Jing 49
Once Song had arrived in Qingyang, he indulged in a luxurious lifestyle. He still followed the events at court, and every time he learned that civil and military officials had noble titles conferred on them, he became angry. Li Jing had never wanted to become crown prince or emperor and, right after his accession to the throne, had decided to make his younger brothers, Li Jingsui and Li Jingda, his successors. Xiao Yan came forth saying that, since the dynasties of the Xia (ca. twenty-first to sixteenth centuries BC) and Yin (ca.1600–1045 BC), the son usually succeeded the father on the throne; this was an irreversible regulation. Xiao Yan received the support of the two princes, who both rejected the position that Li Jing had in mind for them, and, for the time being, Li Jing did not pursue his plan any further. However, in the spring of 944, he issued an imperial proclamation that read: Li Jingsui, the Prince of Qi, will take part in the decision of all government matters. Only Wei Cen and Zha Wenhui, Director and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, will be permitted to submit matters of state, and no one else will be admitted to audiences. This sent a shock wave through the bureaucracy, for it meant that now two members of the original Five Demons were in charge, and that officials of the civil administration were barred from having audiences with the emperor. For Feng Yansi and his cohorts, this offered a chance to enhance their influence in the government. With the withdrawal of Li Jing, Feng Yansi and his colleagues would be in a position of tremendous power and influence through the bureau of military affairs. Therefore, concerned officials reacted immediately after the proclamation. Xiao Yan was among the first to appeal vehemently, but in vain, to Li Jing to repeal his order. Jia Chong, inspector-in-chief of the imperial guard, went to see him in person and addressed him: I have served the late emperor for thirty years. I have seen how he received people from distant places and how he accepted them into his service. He was untiring and never negligent and there was no one even in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy who was not touched by that. Recently, when Your Majesty ascended the throne, what kind of people did You give official positions? Why have You abruptly stopped communication with the bureaucracy? I am old already, and if the order is really carried out, I will never be able to look up to Your face in audience again. Taking these stern admonitions to heart, Li Jing came to his senses. He realized the potential danger of sharing the same fate as his Wu predecessors and rescinded the order. Officials, especially after this episode, continued
50 The reign of Li Jing
to doubt Li Jing’s capacities to rule the empire in the same able way as his father had done. When the emperor invited officials to visit a new pavilion in the palace, they were all in awe of, and impressed with, its beauty. Only Xiao Yan expressed his criticism: ‘Too bad there is no well in front of this building.’ Asked what he meant by this, he replied: ‘Without a well, this cannot compare with the Jingyang Palace.’ The Jingyang Palace had been built in Nanjing by Chen Shubao (553–604, r. 583–589), the last ruler of the Chen dynasty (558–589), as part of a very extravagant park. When the victorious troops of the Sui were approaching, the emperor attempted to commit suicide by throwing himself into a well next to the pavilion. The allusion was not lost on Li Jing, but he felt that the warning by Xiao was a criticism directed at him personally and, thus, he demoted and exiled him to Shuzhou. Xiao was never afraid to speak out and he did so again when Sun Cheng, the military surveillance commissioner of Shuzhou, sent troops to guard him. Xiao confronted Sun saying: I have been punished for admonishing and not for intrigues. You, sir, however, have brought the state to the brink of danger when the last will of the late emperor was published. Is that offence not much more serious than mine? But still it is I who am put under guard today! Sun, ashamed, lifted the guard.13 During the first year of Li Jing’s reign, the rebellion of Zhang Yuxian was finally suppressed.14 This rebellion had started in the fall of the previous year (942) in the district of Boluo, in the territory of the Southern Han in modern-day Guangdong province. People claimed that a spirit had descended into the house of a commoner and talked to the people. When the villagers asked the spirit about their fortune, its predictions always turned out to be correct. Around this time, a large number of bandits gathered in Xunzhou, about one hundred kilometres to the north-east of Boluo. When they sent envoys to enquire from the spirit who to make their chieftain, the spirit answered ‘Zhang Yuxian’. As it turned out, Zhang was not only one of the most eager devotees of the spirit, but also a district clerk. He readily accepted the position the bandits offered him. He adopted the title of ‘King of the eight states of the middle heaven’ (zhongtian baguo wang), proclaimed his own reign title, ‘Eternal happiness’ (Yongle) and started building a bureaucratic system. Once he had accomplished this, he attempted to expand his territory. This, however, proved to be problematic, for, apart from basic bureaucratic knowledge, Zhang did not have any military experience. Therefore, military leadership had to depend on the talents of his generals. The Southern Han ruler Liu Bin (r. 942–943) responded to Zhang’s uprising by dispatching an army under the command of two princes. They fought Zhang Yuxian, but they suffered a heavy defeat and barely escaped with
The reign of Li Jing 51
their lives. Consequently, Zhang Yuxian and his army turned their attention to the region east of Boluo, which they pillaged and plundered. In late 942, they sacked the prefectural town of Xunzhou and killed the Southern Han prefect there, but then another army, under a more able Southern Han commander, arrived at Xunzhou in the summer and defeated Zhang Yuxian and his troops. Zhang turned to the spirit for advice, and the spirit told him to attack Qianzhou. As Qianzhou (in modern-day Jiangxi province) was in the territory of the Southern Tang, the Southern Han would no longer pursue Zhang Yuxian. Furthermore, a mountain range separated the Southern Han from Qianzhou, and it would be difficult for the Southern Han army to follow Zhang in that kind of terrain. Zhang took Qianzhou by complete surprise. At this point, his army had allegedly increased to over one hundred thousand men, and, with this, he was able to defeat all Southern Tang militia easily. He then sacked all towns and districts in the vicinity and established a palace and military headquarters in the Baiyun mountain range. From there, his troops undertook more raids. To eliminate Zhang Yuxian, Yan En, military commander in Hongzhou, was appointed general of a new detachment of troops, with orders to attack Zhang Yuxian. Bian Hao, a civil official in Jinling, received an appointment as army supervisor, to keep an eye on the general and to inform the court about the progress of the campaign. Bian enlisted the service of a local man from Qianzhou and attacked Zhang, inflicting several defeats on him. Zhang again consulted the spirit, but this time received no answer. When his followers realized that he had lost the trust of the spirit, they became terrified. Meanwhile, Bian Hao led his troops around Zhang’s camp, attacked and forced Zhang to flee. Li Tai, one of Zhang’s officers, had known from the start that the spirit was not real. He arrested Zhang and surrendered him to Bian Hao, who sent Zhang to Jinling, where he was executed in late 943. The success of Zhang Yuxian had mainly rested on his ability to communicate with the spirit directly. It is evident, too, that his followers believed in the existence of the spirit only as long as it proved efficacious. Once no more advice came forth, Zhang, as well as the spirit, was doomed. In early 944, Li Jing transferred the control of the administration to Feng Yansi and his followers, after the old guard of officials that had served his father had retired.15 Feng Yansi now officially assumed the powerful position that he may have acquired only secretly, had Li Jing not scrapped his previous idea of limiting the venue of official communication to the bureau of military affairs. Li Jing’s biggest weaknesses were his indecisiveness and his lack of confidence. They may have been the chief reasons why he wanted to relinquish power and retire from office. He was insightful enough, though, to recognize that the duty of a ruler consisted in preserving the dynasty and thus he continued as ruler.
52 The reign of Li Jing
Li Jing initially followed the instructions of his late father to maintain peaceful relations with the neighbouring states. When a civil war in the state of Min broke out, he sent envoys to Wang Yanxi, the legitimate ruler of Min, as well as to his older brother, Wang Yanzheng (r. 943–945). The rift between the two brothers occurred when Wang Yanzheng proclaimed himself king of Yin in Jianzhou1. Li Jing asked both of them to lay down arms because they were brothers. Wang Yanxi replied with a historical anecdote, while Wang Yanzheng was more straightforward, pointing out that the Southern Tang ruler had stolen the state from the Yang family and, therefore, he had no right to meddle in the affairs of Min and Yin. The peaceful course that Li Jing had followed failed, and, consequently, he broke all diplomatic relations with Wang Yanzheng.16 The success against Zhang Yuxian may have convinced Li Jing that his armies would be able to bring the rulers of Min to reason. Zha Wenhui, who submitted a memorial asking to attack Wang Yanzheng, drew him into the conflict. Zha made his recommendation based on information supplied by a friend who often had travelled into Min. The Southern Tang troops proceeded, but, on the arrival of superior forces sent by Wang Yanzheng, withdrew to await further reinforcements.17 Strengthened by these units, the Southern Tang army launched their campaign against Jianzhou1 from Chongan, a district to the north-east of Jianzhou1. The two armies faced each other at the Jianyang River, but did not fight until Wang Yanzheng, who had grown impatient, ordered an attack. The Yin commander, Yang Sigong, obliged, against the advice of Chen Wang, his second-in-command. Chen led the Yin forces across the river to confront the Tang army. The Southern Tang inflicted a heavy defeat on the Yin army, and Chen died in battle, while Yang Sigong managed to escape. When Wang Yanzheng received news of this defeat, he barricaded himself in Jianzhou1 and asked for more troops from Quanzhou1, an important port.18 The Southern Tang encircled the city and won several skirmishes against the Quanzhou1 troops. However, another Southern Tang contingent, coming from Qianzhou (in Jiangxi) to support the attack on Min, was beaten at Tingzhou. The Min general Xu Wenzhen dispersed this unit and captured one of its commanders.
Table 3.1 The rulers of Min Wang Shenzhi, r. 909–925 Wang Yanhan, r. 925–927 Wang Yanjun, r. 927–935 Wang Jipeng, r. 935–939 Wang Yanxi, r. 939–944
The reign of Li Jing 53
Even after this setback, the situation still seemed to favour the Southern Tang, because Bian Hao was able to take a town about ninety kilometres east of Jianzhou1. When news of this success reached the capital, Feng Yansi, Feng Yanlu and Wei Cen wanted to increase the war efforts. They saw a chance, not only to expand the territory of the Southern Tang, but also to earn merit for themselves and improve their own positions within the bureaucracy. Hence, they used provisions and material stored in granaries and vaults to equip an army that consisted of the units stationed in the prefectures close to Yin. Wang Yanzheng, meanwhile, had sent envoys to Wuyue to offer himself as vassal in return for military help against the Southern Tang invasion.19 The situation in Jianzhou1 became critical, and some people suggested that the commander of the city, Dong Si’an, surrender the city. Dong replied that he owed loyalty to the Wang family and that he would not give up the city. On 2 October 945, the Southern Tang finally captured the city. Dong managed to escape with his men to Quanzhou1, leaving Wang Yanzheng and his family to their fate. At the start of the Southern Tang invasion, the people in northern Fujian had hoped that their situation would improve after the demise of Wang Yanzheng. Hence, they supported the Southern Tang troops. The commanders of the victorious Southern Tang army, however, did not restrain their troops. Instead of exercising leniency and clemency over an already exhausted and starving city population, the soldiers started pillaging and burning, massacring many people. Those who survived the killings were left without shelter and died because of the cold weather. After the fall of Jianzhou1 and the capture of Wang Yanzheng, the remaining commanders of Tingzhou, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou1 all surrendered to the Southern Tang. With this, the Southern Tang held sway over almost all of the former Min territory, except Fuzhou2. The administrative seat for the newly acquired territory in Fujian was set up in Jianzhou1.20 After his arrival in Jinling, Wang Yanzheng received a military title from Li Jing. Yang Sigong, the chief advisor and chief military leader, whom the people in Yin had disliked for raising high taxes, was executed. Li Jing hoped that Yang’s execution would endear him to the people in the newly annexed territories. To show his good intentions, he appointed Wang Chongwen to the position of military commissioner of Yongan military prefecture in Jianzhou1. His benevolent administration there did much to soothe the people’s fears of an oppressive Southern Tang regime.21 In the spring of 946, Li Jingda, acting on a suggestion from one of his retainers, said to the emperor that he should not have dismissed Song Qiqiu. Li Jing followed his brother’s advice and sent him to Qingyang, to bring Song back to the capital. After his return to the court, Song was given prestigious titles such as grand mentor and secretariat director, but as before, he was not permitted to take
54 The reign of Li Jing
an active part in any decision-making. Li Jianxun, similarly, was recalled to serve as chancellor with Feng Yansi, who had been appointed vice director of the chancellery. The appointment of Feng Yansi again evoked criticism from bureaucratic circles. They considered Li Jianxun correct in the handling of official routines, but they also felt that he lacked determination. Therefore, Feng Yansi was wielding the actual power in the government. It was obvious to other officials that Song Qiqiu was soon going to influence decisions at court again through Feng, whom they regarded as Song’s partisan. Gao Yue, a northerner who had joined the bureaucracy of Wu in 937, in a memorial pointed out offences committed by Feng Yansi and Feng Yanlu. Li Jing did not accept the criticism raised by Gao, and instead demoted and exiled him.22 Meanwhile, Fujian again became an area of concern for the Southern Tang court. Wang Jixun, the prefect of Quanzhou1, tried to enter into friendly relations with Li Hongyi (?–947) in Fuzhou2. Li refused to negotiate, because Quanzhou1 had belonged under his administration before the Southern Tang campaign. He equipped an army of ten thousand soldiers, commanded by his younger brother Li Hongtong, and ordered him to seize Quanzhou1. The approaching enemy prompted Liu Congxiao (902–962), the military commander in Quanzhou1, to take quick action. He put Wang Jixun under house arrest, assumed command of the troops and successfully attacked Li Hongtong. In a letter to Li Jing, he explained his actions, and Li Jing endorsed them by recalling Wang Jixun to Jinling. At the same time, he dispatched more troops to garrison Quanzhou1. Li Jing could, nevertheless, have acted more resolutely by penalizing Liu Congxiao for insubordination. In a different theatre of war in the same area, the Southern Tang generals wanted to take advantage of their base in Jianzhou1 to take the last remaining stronghold of the old Min kingdom in the wealthy city port of Fuzhou2. Li Jing resisted the temptation to follow his generals’ ideas and was content with possession of most of the former Min territory. In the summer of 946, Chen Jue had reassumed his duties as commissioner of the bureau of military affairs. He was convinced that he would be able to persuade Li Hongyi, who ruled Fuzhou2 autonomously, to surrender. To appeal to Li Hongyi to change sides, Li Jing gave both his mother and his wife titles of nobility as consorts of state and conferred official positions on his four younger brothers. Chen Jue was to transmit the certificates to Li Hongyi, together with lavish presents of gold and silk. Li Hongyi, however, was not deceived and saw through the scheme. When he met Chen Jue, he treated him coldly and in a very rude way. Chen Jue was intimidated, did not dare mention to Li Hongyi the summons to the court of the Southern Tang and returned empty handed to Jianzhou1.23 Fearing Li Jing’s wrath, he forged an imperial order and had an officer of the imperial guard deliver it to Li Hongyi. He assumed command over the Fuzhou1 garrison (in eastern Jiangxi) and, without authorization from
The reign of Li Jing 55
Li Jing, he dispatched, not only the troops stationed in Jianzhou2 and Fuzhou1, but also those from the two border prefectures of Tingzhou and Xinzhou. As overall commander of these forces, he appointed Feng Yanlu the armysupervising commissioner of Jianzhou2 and gave him the order to lead the army against Fuzhou2.24 After these preparations, Chen explained in a memorial to Li Jing, ‘Fuzhou2 is isolated and endangered, and it is possible to subdue it in one day’, thereby stretching the truth of the situation by quite a bit. This time, Li Jing flew into a rage and he wanted to punish Chen. His advisers, among them Feng Yansi, told him that the troops were already in the field, that it was impossible to stop the campaign, and that he should send more troops in support. At first, the campaign proved successful, as Chen Jue and Feng Yanlu managed to beat a detachment of troops from Fuzhou2 at Houguan on 18 September 946. Chen and Feng then used their tactical advantage and proceeded to take the western fortifications of Fuzhou2. They suffered a defeat the next day, when Li Hongyi made a sortie and even managed to capture one of the Southern Tang generals. Li Jing eventually agreed to send more troops to Fujian. He appointed Wang Chongwen, Wei Cen and Feng Yanlu as commanders of the forces. They combined their troops to attack Fuzhou2, but Li Hongyi was doggedly defending the city walls. As the danger of defeat loomed, Li Hongyi reverted to assuming vassalage of the Later Jin dynasty in October 946 to strengthen his regime. He changed his given name, Hongyi, which the Southern Tang had conferred on him, back to Hongda and declared himself capital liaison representative of Weiwu. The change of name was not a mere gesture, but indicated that Li had switched loyalty completely. The Later Jin confirmed him as military commissioner of Weiwu, joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery and manager of the affairs in the kingdom of Min on 10 October. Shortly afterwards, on 12 October, a deserter from Fuzhou2 showed the Southern Tang troops a way to breach the fortifications. They entered the city, but they were beaten back. However, the main Southern Tang force managed to take the reinforced outer city wall. The Later Jin had given Li Hongda only titles, but no material support, and therefore he changed his name to Li Da and petitioned Wuyue for help by declaring himself their vassal.25 The military situation may have looked promising for the Southern Tang, had it not been tipped in favour of Li Da by an unexpected rebellion that diverted the attention of the Southern Tang for a short while. Lin Zanyao, the Southern Tang general commanding the city port of Zhangzhou, killed his superior. Liu Congxiao consequently led his troops in pursuit of Lin Zanyao and appointed his general Dong Si’an prefect of Zhangzhou. Dong declined the position, for the given name of his father was Zhang. Li Jing thereupon changed the name of Zhangzhou to Nanzhou,
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and thus Dong Si’an could be prefect there without committing a violation of filial piety. After the pacification of Zhangzhou, Liu Congxiao and Dong Si’an received orders to combine their forces and support the attack against Fuzhou2. On 19 November, they had the city completely encircled. Meanwhile, deliberations had been going on in Wuyue concerning the risks involved in supporting Li Da in Fuzhou2. Qian Zuo (r. 941–947), the ruler of Wuyue, was in favour of a military expedition, but was supported only by one of the eunuchs at court. Fuzhou2 presented a chance for Wuyue to restrict the influence of the Southern Tang on Fujian and to weaken their strategic position. With the complete annexation of Fujian, the Southern Tang would have had Wuyue surrounded on all sides. Furthermore, Fuzhou2 generated great wealth through the importation of precious commodities from countries in South East Asia. The possession of Fuzhou2 thus would have greatly added to the income of the Southern Tang treasuries. Qian Zuo finally decided, against the advice of his generals, to send thirty thousand troops to the rescue of Fuzhou2, on naval transports.26 They arrived there on 18 December and managed to gain access to the city, where they tried to defend the eastern Dongwu Gate with Li Da against the Southern Tang forces, but they were not able to fend them off. Therefore, they lost access to the outlying areas that had provided the city with food. Li Jing increased the forces with troops under the command of Wang Jianfeng, the prefect of Xinzhou. At this crucial point, the Southern Tang commanders started to act on their own. Wang Chongwen, supreme commander of all Southern Tang forces in the area, had no control over Chen Jue, Feng Yanlu and Wei Cen, who attempted to use the war for their own advancement. They strove to outdo each other in achieving merits and thus did not coordinate their efforts. Consequently, Li Da was able to hold out. The war had been going on longer than anticipated and was making itself felt in the treasuries of the Southern Tang as well. Du Changye, the official in charge of the ministry of personnel, checked the records and found that half of the stocks and provisions accumulated under Liezu had vanished during the last few years. Victory in Fuzhou2 was therefore of the utmost necessity to make up for the expenses the war had been incurring.27 In early 947, another detachment of Wuyue forces landed at Baixiapu, south of Fuzhou2. In order to get across the swampy banks, the soldiers had to lay out bamboo mats and they were exposed to the arrows from the Southern Tang troops in front of the southern city walls. The Southern Tang had a tactical advantage, because their enemies had to advance over difficult terrain, with no cover at all. At this moment, the jealous competition between the Southern Tang commanders turned the tide of the battle, as Feng Yanlu made a fatal decision:
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The people in the city do not surrender because they rely on these troops. We are tied with them, but do not fight openly, and that is tiring our troops. It is better to let them climb the banks and finish them off completely. We then shall not have to attack the city because it will surrender. His subordinate officer Meng Jian suggested a different plan: Since the troops from Wuyue have landed here, they can neither advance, nor withdraw. They want a battle, but now they cannot but perish. When we let them take the banks, they will certainly come at us with all their power, and if we cannot resist their vanguard, how shall we be able to annihilate them? This advice showed common sense, for the Southern Tang troops must have been battle weary after the long siege. Feng Yanlu, nonetheless, did not listen to Meng, for, with a decisive victory, his career was certain to accelerate. Therefore, he replied to Meng: ‘I will defeat them personally.’ He held his troops back and allowed the Wuyue forces to climb up the banks. Once they were there, the Southern Tang forces could not withstand their onslaught. Simultaneously, the defenders of Fuzhou2 made a sortie and, faced with an attack from two sides, Feng abandoned his troops and ran away, leaving Meng Jian to die in battle. Wang Chongwen gathered 300 soldiers at his headquarters to stop the rout, and other units positioned themselves behind him, so that the pursuing Wuyue forces wisely withdrew. Shortly after this defeat, a rumour spread that the Wuyue forces wanted to abandon Fuzhou2 and take Li Da and the remnants of his troops back to Wuyue. Several generals therefore urged Wang Jianfeng to renew the assault on Fuzhou2. Wang rejected the plea, because the army was still reeling from the crushing defeat and was no longer fit to fight. He burned his camp and left, and the forces north of the city that had not been involved in the battle consequently withdrew, as there was no chance to fight without support from the southern forces. Thus, the Southern Tang siege of Fuzhou2 ended in defeat. Feng Yanlu, ashamed of his plunder, tried to take his life with a knife, but was saved by his aides. This last battle had cost the Southern Tang about twenty thousand men and a lot of equipment; the war as a whole had also cost an enormous amount of money. Liu Congxiao returned to Quanzhou1. He had opposed the capture of Fuzhou2 because, as long as Fuzhou2 remained in the hands of Li Da, it diverted the attention of the Southern Tang court away from him and his designs. His plan was to install himself as master of Quanzhou1 and Zhangzhou, and he had no intention of tolerating the presence of a Southern Tang force in Quanzhou1. He addressed the Southern Tang general in Quanzhou1:
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Quanzhou1 and Fuzhou2 have been opponents for ages. The southern area of Quanzhou1 borders on menacing neighbours across the mountains and the sea. Its territory is limited and its soil is poor. Because armies have appeared here several times in recent years, agriculture has declined. Taxes are payable in winter and taxes are being collected in summer, with which Quanzhou1 can only support itself. How should it be possible for Quanzhou1 to provide a large army as protection here? Liu was referring to the taxes in grain that were payable after the autumn harvest, in winter, and the taxes on silk fabrics. Silk cocoons were collected in spring to produce silk threads, and thus taxes on silk fabrics were usually paid in summer. Liu alleged that Quanzhou1 could not afford to pay for the war effort of the Southern Tang and the provisioning of a large garrison. After having pointed out this issue in detail, Liu gave the Southern Tang general a banquet and then wished him a good voyage home. The general did not know how to react and chose to lead his troops out of the city. When Li Jing learnt about this event, he just let it pass and conferred a prestigious title on Liu Congxiao in return for his loyalty to the Southern Tang.28 Li Jing’s judgement of his commanders’ failure to take Fuzhou2 shows that he was quite aware of who was to blame. The first offence committed was the blatant assumption of command by Chen Jue, which had led to the outbreak of the war in the first place. The second offence concerned the fatal tactical decision by Feng Yanlu that resulted in the utter defeat of the Southern Tang forces.29 Li Jing declared all subordinate generals not guilty in order to avoid trouble within the armed forces. For Chen and Feng, the verdict was different, and discussions centred on the death penalty for them. Jiang Wenyu supported the death penalty, arguing: Since Your Majesty has ascended the throne, You have entrusted high positions to no one else but Feng Yansi, Feng Yanlu, Wei Cen and Chen Jue. They are crafty, and they are coveting power. They obstructed wise officials, they expelled loyal and good officials, they have recommended bad elements, they have disposed of people who gave admonishments, and they have even punished those who talked about them in private. People high and low were so afraid of them that they kept mum about them even when they met outside the palace. Although Jue and Yanlu are being tried, Yansi and Cen are still free. If one does not tear out the roots completely, then the branches will grow again. To give different punishments for the same crimes makes the people confused. The emperor’s perception merely lies with a few men even though he daily receives all officials in audience. In the end, he will be alone. Those outside the court control the troops; those within the court run the state.
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Jiang took his position as censor very serious and was not afraid to speak his mind. He alleged that Feng Yansi and Wei Cen were playing the emperor and that, as they were close to the emperor, they could control the court to their liking. Li Jing felt personally offended by Jiang’s memorial, and he punished him with demotion and exile. Song Qiqiu assumed responsibility for the military disaster, for he had recommended Chen Jue. As Jiang had suspected, Feng Yanlu and Chen Jue escaped the death penalty, once they had arrived in Jinling. This way, Li Jing tried to avoid another confrontation with Song and his followers. The mild penalty for the two officials mainly responsible for the failure to take Fuzhou2 provoked the criticism of Xu Xuan and Han Xizai. In their memorial to the throne, they voiced their opinion: The offences of Chen Jue and Feng Yanlu needed to be severely punished, but Song Qiqiu and Feng Yansi made pleas for them, and therefore Your Majesty has pardoned them. When acting without orders and dispatching troops does not constitute an offence, then there will be unrest in the border regions. When the loss of an army only leads to incarceration, then the troops will not fight until the end any more. We therefore ask for the execution of Chen Jue and Feng Yanlu to show respect to the army. Xu and Han were implying that the mild treatment of Chen and Feng might stir unrest among the troops stationed along the borders. After all, the Tang dynasty had declined because the court was no longer able to control the troops under the military governors. Xu and Han asked for an example of strict discipline to be set and for army regulations to be adhered to by executing Chen and Feng. The throne received their memorial, but did not follow it up with any action. The various comments on the bureaucratic situation by Jiang, Xu and Han resulted in Feng Yansi’s resignation from his posts in the central administration. He took up a position in the retinue of Li Jing’s younger brother, whereas Wei Cen was transferred to serve with the heir apparent. Encouraged by this partial success against the alleged ‘Five Demons’, Han Xizai warned the emperor several more times in memorials about Song Qiqiu and his followers, who would certainly lead the dynasty into ruin and collapse. Song dealt with Han by falsely accusing him of being an alcoholic, and Han was demoted to a lowly post outside the capital.30 After the death of emperor Gaozu and two years into the reign of his nephew and successor Shi Chonggui (r. 942–947), the Later Jin decided to break free from Liao suzerainty. Yelü Deguang, emperor of the Liao (r. 927–947), personally led his troops to bring the Later Jin under control and waged war against them from 946 to 947. In the spring of 947, he entered Bianliang
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(Kaifeng) and declared himself emperor of China. He now faced ruling an empire far more complex and difficult to manage than he had imagined.31 When news of these events reached Li Jing, he announced that northern China was the old home of his family, who had originally resided in Chang’an. The Southern Tang imperial genealogy, fabricated under Liezu, linked him directly to the Tang imperial house, which had had its roots there. He sent a letter to the Liao emperor congratulating him on the destruction of the Later Jin and asked for permission to restore the tombs of his ancestors in Chang’an. As a direct consequence of the Liao ruler’s refusal, Li Jing ordered the discussion of plans to conquer the north and reinstate unified rule under his authority. Among the active supporters of a northern campaign was Han Xizai, who earlier had argued in a memorial: If you want to revive the enterprise of your ancestors then the time is now. After the return of the Liao emperor to the north and the accession of a ruler in the Central Plain, it will be difficult to achieve this goal.32 Li Jing therefore appointed Li Jinquan as the commander of the invasion forces. At the end of April, the Liao emperor left Bianliang to return to the Liao capital at Shangqing and died shortly after entering Liao territory in May 947. Xiao Han, whom he had left behind as governor, abandoned Bianliang and fled northwards. Liu Zhiyuan (r. 947–948), founder of the Later Han (947–950), the fourth of the northern Five Dynasties, immediately moved to occupy Bianliang in June, to make it his capital.33 As the Southern Tang had not been able to bring the war in Min to a quick and successful end, the opportunity to restore Tang rule over all of China was lost. Nevertheless, the Southern Tang continued to meddle in affairs in the north. In March 948, Li Shouzhen rose in rebellion in Hezhong (in east Shanxi) and quickly managed to seize most of the surrounding areas. When forces of the Later Han attacked him, he dispatched his officers Zhu Yuan and Li Ping to the Southern Tang. They were to ask for military help in the form of an attack from the south, in order to divert the Later Han troops converging on Li Shouzhen. Zha Wenhui, grand master of remonstrance, and Wei Cen, who had been reinstated as vice minister of war, urged Li Jing to respond favourably to Li Shouzhen’s plea. He complied by sending Li Jinquan with his army to Hezhong and by appointing Liu Yanzhen, the military commissioner of Qinghuai south of the Huai River, as his deputy. Zha Wenhui and Wei Cen received appointments as army-supervising commissioner and inspector of the troops stationed at the Huai, respectively. The Southern Tang army advanced as far as the area of Yizhou in southern Shandong, in Later Han territory, and set up camp. Only the Yi River separated them from the city.
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Li Jinquan was enjoying himself at a banquet when he learnt of the presence of several hundred starved troops of the Later Han north of the river, but he refused to engage them in a fight and capture them. The Later Han troops there seemed to have been a ruse, as, later the same evening, war drums were heard from across the river, and Later Han soldiers appeared on all four sides of the Southern Tang encampment. Neither the Southern Tang officers nor the Southern Tang troops intended to fight at night in territory unknown to them, so the army withdrew to guard the important harbour of Haizhou in Jiangsu, about fifty kilometres south-east of Yizhou. The prospect of having to march all the way to Hezhong through enemy territory must have played a crucial part in Li Jinquan’s unwillingness to engage in battle. Upon his return to court, he presented himself as a successful commander, for he had managed to bring back all his forces intact. Li Jing was so frustrated with Li Jinquan’s performance that he never again entrusted Li with an active command. After this failed military operation, Li Jing sent a letter with apologies to the Later Han emperor and asked for permission to resume trade relations by allowing merchants to cross from Huainan into Later Han territory. In addition, he asked to pardon Li Shouzhen, but the Later Han did not give in to any of these suggestions.34 In late August of the next year (949), Li Shouzhen was finally defeated and committed suicide. That same year offered another opportunity for the Southern Tang to engage in conflict with the Later Han, as many rebel and bandit groups in the region north of the Huai River were willing to submit to Southern Tang rule. In March 949, Li Jing appointed Huangfu Hui, inspector-general of the spirit guard, to lead an army numbering ten thousand men from the two prefectures of Haizhou and Sizhou, in Later Han territory, to receive bandit groups that wanted to join. This campaign was initially successful, and Huangfu Hui seized Mengcheng in Anhui, but had to withdraw southwards across the Huai River when Later Han forces attacked.35 The hesitation of the commanding officer had once again precluded the possibility of extending the territory of the empire, and, once again, the commander went without punishment. After the previous ill-fated Hezhong campaign, Wei Cen had been dismissed and had become commissioner for the state farms. At the time when he returned to the state administration as deputy minister of war, Zhong Mo, a native of Hangzhou, and Li Deming were selected for duties in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Zhong originally held a position in the ministry of personnel; Li Deming came from the department of state affairs. Li Jing was impressed by their eloquence, and, hence, he appointed them to his advisory group. They did not make much of an impression on their colleagues in the bureaucracy, who thought that they owed their positions to imperial favour only, rather than to any administrative talents. Many officials considered Zhong and Li to be in league with Wei Cen.
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One of them, Fan Chongmin, was well aware of the possible risks of criticizing their appointments directly. He therefore employed Wang Jianfeng, a veteran of the Min campaign, to submit a memorial. In the memorial, Wang criticized the emperor for his selection of personnel and made an urgent appeal to employ officials of upright character only. In response, Li Jing declared that a military officer had to lead troops and had no permission to interfere in government affairs. He exiled Wang and had him killed en route. Fan Chongmin was executed publicly in the capital.36 In late 949, the Southern Tang attempted once more to gain a foothold in the region north of the Huai River by attacking Zhengyang. Zhengyang was a strategically important place that allowed for easy crossing from the north to the south. As before, the Later Han forces defeated the Southern Tang troops, which had to withdraw to the southern bank of the Huai.37 The situation in Fujian, in the meantime, had become worse for the Southern Tang. Even though they had not managed to capture Fuzhou2, Southern Tang forces were still holding Jianzhou1. They had lost direct control of the territories of Quanzhou1 and Zhangzhou to Liu Congxiao, military commissioner of the newly created Qingyuan military prefecture. Liu enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and kept his status by assuming a vassal position to the Southern Tang. Zha Wenhui was the capital liaison representative in Jianzhou1. In early March 950, a spy gave false news about the withdrawal of the Wuyue forces from Fuzhou2 and lured Zha into action against Fuzhou2. Chen Hui, prefect of Jianzhou2, consequently led his naval forces downstream and, upon reaching Fuzhou2, defeated a detachment of Wuyue soldiers who were still there, contrary to expectations. When Zha Wenhui arrived with the main force on 13 March, Chen Hui warned him, ‘The people of Min are very artful and cannot be trusted. We should erect palisades and encircle them.’ Zha did not take the warning to heart. He believed the city was his for the taking, because the Wuyue commander had given him a friendly welcome. The total failure of the earlier siege may have played on his mind as well. Therefore, he advanced with his troops without taking precautions, while Chen Hui made his units battle-ready on the riverbank. The unsuspecting Zha marched into the trap set by the Wuyue general Wu Cheng, who promptly took him prisoner. The Southern Tang army hastily retreated to Jianzhou1, having suffered many casualties. The victorious Wu Cheng transferred Zha Wenhui to Hangzhou, where the king of Wuyue pardoned him.38 A short while later, Wuyue released Zha and gave him permission to return to Jinling. As he had lost the ability to speak, Li Jing retired him, and he left court without having to take responsibility for his defeat.39 Because of Zha Wenhui’s careless handling of the situation, many men and large amounts of equipment had been lost. Li Jing displayed once again his indecisiveness, for he did not thoroughly punish an incompetent military leader.
The reign of Li Jing 63 Table 3.2 Rulers of Chu Ma Yin, r. 907–930 Ma Xisheng, r. 930–932 Ma Xifan, r. 932–947 Ma Xiguang, r. 947–949 Ma Xi’e, r. 950–951 Ma Xichong, r. 951
To the west of the Southern Tang, another civil war loomed in Chu in Hunan, a state that Ma Yin had ruled since 907 as a vassal of the Later Liang and made into an independent kingdom in 927. Shortly before his death in 947, Ma Xifan (899–947), the third ruler of Chu, ordered that his younger brother, Ma Xiguang, should succeed him on the throne. His advisors were against this choice, because they wanted Ma Xiguang’s older brother, Ma Xi’e, on the throne. Ma Xifan persisted nevertheless, and Ma Xiguang became king, but failed to eliminate Ma Xi’e. Ma Xi’e, as soon as he was safe, sent envoys to the Later Han asking for recognition as their vassal. The Later Han regarded Ma Xiguang as the rightful ruler of Chu and refused Ma Xi’e’s request. Ma Xi’e therefore turned to the Southern Tang for support, and, to underline his ambitions further, gathered an army and attacked Ma Xiguang in Tanzhou (modern-day Changsha). The Southern Tang awarded Ma Xi’e the title of chancellor, gave him the tax revenue of Ezhou prefecture on the middle reaches of the Yangzi as a gift and sent support troops under the command of He Jingzhu. After defeat in a naval battle, Ma Xiguang asked the Later Han for military help, but did not receive any support from them. Ma Xi’e finally took Tanzhou, killed his brother and his family, and declared himself king of Chu. He offered his vassalage to the Southern Tang by sending his secretary, Liu Guangfu, with tribute that he submitted on 22 March 951.40 Li Jing conferred honorific titles on Ma Xi’e and treated Ma’s envoy Liu very generously. Liu, in return for the friendly treatment, told Li Jing that the people of Hunan were tired of the rule of the Ma family and suggested that Li Jing should seize Chu and incorporate it into the Southern Tang Empire. Li Jing wasted no time and appointed Bian Hao as commander of the invasion forces stationed at Yuanzhou (modern-day Yichun, in southern Jiangxi). In February 951, a new dynasty, the Later Zhou, replaced the Later Han, and its first emperor, Taizu (Guo Wei, r. 951–954), set out to establish a strong administration. An imperial edict of 23 March 951 regulated the relations between the Later Zhou and the Southern Tang. It reads:
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We have no hostile intentions towards the Tang. Both of us station troops along the Huai River, and both of us protect our border regions. We will not permit our troops and people to enter Tang territory illegally. Merchants can travel to and fro, and there will be no restrictions on trade.41 This document assured the Southern Tang of free action against Chu and of peaceful relations with the new dynasty. The Later Zhou placed no restrictions on the trade in salt, silk and tea – a major source of income for the Southern Tang. The initial friendly relations between both states are evident in the handling of a famine that forced many people from Huainan to cross into the northern territory in search of food. His officials reported to the emperor that they did not dare refuse grain and rice to the southerners, and the emperor replied, ‘These people need to be fed. They are no different from our people. We order all provinces, districts, ports and market towns to let them buy grain.’42 In Chu, Ma Xi’e had decided to share power with Ma Xichong, another of his younger brothers. The latter thought himself a better ruler and had Ma Xi’e brought under guard to Hengshan to be executed there. The officers escorting Ma Xi’e did not carry out the orders, and Xi’e consequently assumed the title of king of Hengshan. Meanwhile, Ma Xichong took the title of king of Chu and, being afraid of his generals, who had no trust in him, secretly asked the Southern Tang for help. There is no indication that Li Jing had any qualms about changing his support from Ma Xi’e to Ma Xichong, as he dispatched Bian Hao with ten thousand troops from Yuanzhou to the west in order to capture Tanzhou. After Bian had reached Tanzhou, Ma Xichong sent provisions that reached the Southern Tang troops on 7 November 951. On 15 November, Ma Xichong offered his surrender to Bian Hao and, one day later, at the head of his younger brothers and cousins, welcomed Bian. Bian took up residence in Tanzhou on 17 November and reviewed all the Chu generals, creating a friendly atmosphere by giving them generous presents. He furthermore distributed grain stored in the imperial granaries to the people, and this action gained him the affection of the common people in Hunan. Liu Renshan, commander of the war junks, quickly eliminated remnants of Chu resistance in Yuezhou on the Yangzi on 27 November 951. With that, almost all of the former Chu territory was in the hands of the Southern Tang, but critical voices at the Southern Tang court warned about the annexation of Chu. Gao Yuan stated his concerns: ‘We have taken advantage of the disorder in Chu and thus capturing it was easy. When I observe the abilities of our generals though, I fear it will be difficult to protect our gains!’ Similarly, Li Jianxun warned: ‘This is where misfortune starts!’43 Nevertheless, Li Jing believed he had a chance now to conquer all of China. A number of officials at court shared and supported this idea. The most
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flattering of these was Wei Cen, who encouraged the emperor in his ambition and asked for a position at a time when war had not even been declared: ‘I have travelled to Yuancheng once and was pleased by its atmosphere. Once Your Majesty will have won the Central Plain, I beg for the position of Military Commissioner of Weibo (in Shandong).’ Li Jing graciously agreed to this request, showing no awareness of the actual military conditions at the time. Bian Hao, in the meantime, had ordered Ma Xichong to lead his family and officials to Jinling, and, even though Ma Xichong tried to bribe Bian to let them reside in Tanzhou, he did not alter his command. He answered Ma Xichong’s memorial as follows: Your family has been an opponent of our state for close to sixty years, but we have never had any ambition to seize your state. Now your brothers have been at war with each other, and they brought poverty and danger upon each other. If we leave two or three of you here, I fear immeasurable misery will be the result.44 The forced departure of Ma Xichong left Ma Xi’e in sole control of Hengshan. Bian Hao proceeded quickly to remove Ma Xi’e as the last remaining ruler of Chu by dispatching a force under the command of Li Chengjian, to ‘encourage’ Ma Xi’e to attend the court of the Southern Tang in Jinling. Ma Xi’e obeyed the order and left Tanzhou, and Li Jing appointed Bian as the military commissioner there.45 On 23 December, Ma Xi’e, his family, officials and remaining troops, numbering more than ten thousand people, set out for the voyage to the east. After their arrival in Jinling, Li Jing conferred the title of surveillance commissioner of the western circuit of Jiangnan on Ma Xi’e and stationed him in Hongzhou. In addition, he confirmed him as king of Chu. Ma Xichong was given the post of military commissioner of Yongtai in Shuzhou. The Southern Tang gave all former Chu officials and military officers employment, with the exception of one whose departure from Hunan had been delayed and who therefore was poisoned upon arrival in Jinling.46 The Southern Tang state was not the only party interested in securing the territory of Chu. Li Jing and his officials had mainly focused their attention on the northern regions of Chu. In the remote south, however, the Southern Han had started a campaign to create a buffer between their northern border and the Southern Tang’s southern border. The area the Southern Han court coveted was south of the Nanling mountain range and it comprised ten prefectures. The Southern Han took advantage of the dissatisfaction of another member of the Ma family, Ma Xiyin, the youngest brother of Ma Xi’e and Ma Xichong, who was deputy military commissioner of Jingjiang and magistrate of Guilin. During the war between the two older brothers, Ma Xi’e had sent Peng Yanhui to replace Ma Xiyin as prefect of Guizhou.
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Ma Xiyin naturally disliked his dismissal and called on Xu Keqiong, the prefect of Mengzhou, situated about one hundred and fifty kilometres south of Guilin, for military assistance. Xu obliged, even though he was then under pressure from the Southern Han. He abandoned Mengzhou and seized Guizhou, after having beaten Peng Yanhui in battle. Peng Yanhui subsequently fled to Hengshan, Xu Keqiong installed himself in Guilin, and the Southern Han commander Wu Huai’en captured Mengzhou. Ma and Xu did not know how to deal with the situation and, when Wu offered them a chance to surrender, they did not take it. Instead, they abandoned Guilin at night and withdrew to Quanzhou2, about one hundred kilometres north-east from Guizhou. Thus, Wu Huai’en occupied all areas south of the Nanling mountain range and incorporated the region into Southern Han territory.47 Not satisfied with what he had achieved so far, the Southern Han ruler launched another campaign against Hunan under the command of Pan Chongche and Xie Guan. They chose as their target Chenzhou, a prefectural town about thirty kilometres north-east from Guizhou. Bian Hao dispatched forces to the relief of Chenzhou that were beaten by Pan, who consequently took the town. In order to limit further expansion of the Southern Han, Bian Hao asked for the installation of two prefects in the two prefectures of Daozhou and Quanzhou2. Accordingly, Liao Yan, a former Chu officer, and Zhang Luan received orders, on 29 January 952, to take up positions in Daozhou and Quanzhou2, respectively. The original relief of the Chu population at the fall of the Ma family quickly evaporated in the face of Southern Tang looting. The Southern Tang officials packed all the valuables found in Chu on boats and transported them to Jinling. The people in Chu realized that the Southern Tang was treating Hunan, not as a new part of their empire, but as a defeated state; otherwise they would have implemented a more civilized approach. Moreover, the Southern Tang commanders used the taxes paid and collected in Chu for the support of their own forces. When an official sent from Jinling exacted even more taxes, the local population found this unbearable. In this tense situation, Wang Shaoyan, the Southern Tang commissioner for army provisions, reduced the allowances for both officers and men in the field. Sun Lang and Cao Jin had defected from the north with general Xian Shilang in 949. They voiced their dissatisfaction about the reduction in allowances: Once we followed master Xian when he surrendered to the Tang, and did the Tang treat us not so much more generously than today as we are serving as the rank and file in Hunan! Now, when one has merits, rewards and presents are not increased, but instead, they are reduced. It is better to kill Wang Shaoyan and Bian Hao, capture Hunan, return it to the Central Plain (i.e. Later Zhou), and then plan for wealth and status!
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They gathered their followers and, on the night of 1 February 952, tried to burn down Bian Hao’s residence, but the fire died quickly. Bian Hao called for his troops, and the rebels fled to Langzhou, about two hundred kilometres north-west of Tanzhou. There they allied with Wang Kui, a former Chu general, and Sun Lang, who became his commander, promised him that he would expel the Southern Tang forces from Chu.48 In the summer of 952, Li Jing recognized the danger of the situation in Hunan. He was faced, first, with a local uprising in Langzhou, second, with an experienced military leader north of the Yangzi, and, last, with the continuing threat from the Southern Han in the south. He explained to his two chancellors, Feng Yansi and Sun Cheng, that the people in Chu had expected him to bring peace. Now, the maladministration of the Southern Tang officials in Chu had increased their worries. In order to improve the lot of the people, he wanted to end the war with the Southern Han and negotiate a peace with Liu Yan, the newly risen strong man of Chu, to whom he was willing to grant independence. Sun Cheng did not object to this plan, and Feng Yansi advocated a thorough inspection of the troops and officers stationed in Chu in order to solve the problems of command. General Hou Xun received orders to combine his forces with those of Zhang Luan in Quanzhou2 and to retake Guizhou. The Southern Han army ambushed these advancing forces, and, in the ensuing massacre, only Zhang Luan managed to escape, with several hundred soldiers, to Quanzhou2.49 The ineffectiveness of Bian Hao deepened the crisis in Hunan. One official complained in a memorial to the throne about Bian: ‘Hao does not have the abilities of a marshal, and he will certainly lose Hunan. An able marshal should be selected and the number of troops be increased in order to avoid defeat.’ Li Jing did not heed this warning and gave Bian Hao the order to take Langzhou and end the rebellion. Li Jing tested Liu Yan’s loyalty by summoning him to Jinling for an audience, which the latter refused. Liu turned to Wang Kui for advice, because he was afraid of an attack by Bian Hao, but Wang Kui assured him of the strong military position of Langzhou. He depicted Bian Hao as an incompetent protégé of Li Jing and a military leader lacking strategic understanding as well as support from both the gentry and the common people. In the autumn, Liu’s forces converged on different routes on Tanzhou. On 26 October, they attacked and captured Yuanjiang. On 28 October, the fortifications at Yiyang fell to Liu Yan, and Bian Hao urgently asked for reinforcements. None arrived in time, and Bian Hao had to defend the city walls with only the few garrison troops he had under his command. Faced with superior forces, he abandoned the city in the night of 1 November 952, and with him went all those clerks and officials that could. Wang Kui arrived in the city a day later and assumed command as head of the civil and military administration. Another rebel force seized Yuezhou, and, when news about this spread to the remaining Southern Tang officials in Hunan, they abandoned their posts. Tanzhou and Yuezhou were the two
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most important cities in Chu, and, with their loss, Southern Tang rule proved difficult to maintain. Within a short period of time, Liu Yan’s forces had managed to reconquer most of the former Chu territory, with the exception of the southern prefectures that the Southern Han had annexed.50 As soon as he had secured Chu, Liu Yan submitted to the Later Zhou to prevent any further incursion from the Southern Tang.51 Li Jing stripped Bian Hao of all his titles and positions when he arrived in Jinling and exiled him to Raozhou. Prior to these events, in early 952, the conflicts among officials at court had resurfaced, owing to the general military situation in Hunan, as well as appointments made by Li Jing. Chang Mengxi, who had returned from his self-imposed exile to become director of the ministry of finance, said, on Feng Yansi’s and Sun Cheng’s appointment as councillors, for everyone to hear: ‘The white hemp paper of the proclamation is beautiful, but it does not reach up to the memorial by Jiang Wenyu.’ The memorial Chang referred to was one that Jiang Wenyu had submitted in 947, pointing out the deficiencies of Feng and his cohorts. Sun Cheng was equally unhappy with Feng Yansi’s rise to power and he remarked, rather extremely: ‘Golden bowls and jade cups are brimming with dog shit!’52 From Chang’s and Sun’s point of view, their criticism was justified, because Feng Yansi at once started to take advantage of the less than decisive Li Jing. He suggested to him: ‘Since Your Majesty are personally taking care of government matters, I cannot display all my talents, and therefore the government work cannot be finished as it should be!’53 An emperor more confident of his power and position than Li Jing may have rejected this outrageous suggestion right away. Li Jing, however, gladly transferred the reins of government to Feng Yansi. Soon it became apparent that Feng had vastly overestimated his capabilities. He left the drafting of important documents to subaltern officials, and he did not issue orders to military commanders, so that they began acting on their own. All this added to a growing degree of confusion within the administration of the empire. In the end, Li Jing had to attend to all these matters personally. Xiao Yan disliked Feng Yansi and previously had handed in several memorials condemning Feng’s performance as chancellor. When he himself made a decision sentencing someone wrongly to death, Zhong Mo and Li Deming, the newly emerging men at court, saw a chance to oust Xiao and have him condemned to death for his offence. Surprisingly, Feng Yansi publicly stood up in Xiao’s defense: ‘Yan by mistake killed one woman, but all gentlemen at court believe that he deserves the death penalty. Yan is one of the Nine Dignitaries, is it then possible to kill him by mistake?’ According to the Tang law code, women were exempt from the death penalty, and so Xiao had indeed committed a transgression. Feng claimed, however, that Xiao’s position made it impossible to punish him. In private, Feng addressed Li Jing: ‘Yan for a long time has had a reputation of
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uprightness. You should treat him with the benevolence he deserves, when you pardon him now for what he has been accused of.’ Thanks to Feng Yansi’s intervention, Xiao Yan escaped execution, and those who heard about this considered Feng’s argumentation correct.54 In late 952, Li Jing wanted to cease hostilities on all fronts and finally bring peace to his people. His desire to continue his reign as a peaceful ruler was certainly influenced by the growing tensions with the Later Zhou. The initial good relations between the two states turned more hostile as soon as the Later Zhou emperor, Taizu, had consolidated his control over the north. Only a short time into Taizu’s reign, Murong Yanchao rose in rebellion against the Later Zhou. A member of the Later Han imperial family, Murong Yanchao had entered the service of the new dynasty in 951. Taizu sent generals Cao Ying and Xiang Xun against Murong in Yanzhou (Shandong), and Murong asked Li Jing for help against the coming attack. Li Jing agreed, and the Southern Tang detachment advanced as far as Xiapi near Xuzhou (Anhui). When the Later Zhou forces advanced, they retreated to a district south of Xuzhou, where Zhang Lingbin, the military inspector of Xuzhou, attacked them. He inflicted a heavy defeat on the Southern Tang forces that cost them more than one thousand casualties.55 Later in the same year, the Later Zhou emperor personally led an attack against Murong Yanchao, who then committed suicide. Before the attack, he released general Yan Jingquan, who had been captured at Xiapi, and sent him back to Jinling to report the following to Li Jing: ‘Rebels are a common disease in the empire. I do not think that the Tang ruler wanted to help them, and therefore I do not consider this an offence!’ The lenient approach of the emperor made Li Jing treat northern captives in a much friendlier way, and he let them go back north. Although it was evident already at this point that the Later Zhou was a formidable opponent, officials at court again discussed the idea of a northern campaign. Han Xizai rejected a campaign against the north, presenting the following argument: ‘Even though Guo (i.e. Taizu) has been in power only a short time, his rule is strong. If we dispatch our troops recklessly, they will certainly be harmed and meet with failure.’ Not least because of Han’s opposition, Li Jing chose to cancel the northern campaign. After his accession to the throne, many officials received an appointment from Li Jing based on their literary talents, and not through the examination system, which had been one of the most important means of selecting officials. Jiang Wenyu, who earlier in the year had suffered demotion for his criticism of the ‘Five Demons’, supervised, for the first time, the jinshi examination on imperial orders. Three men passed this examination with the highest distinction, and Li Jing asked Jiang, ‘What do you think about the scholars that have been selected compared to those employed under the previous reign?’ Jiang replied, ‘Under the previous reign one half of the
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candidates were appointed by the ruler, the other half was appointed upon personal presentation, whereas I have employed the utmost neutrality.’ Jiang implied that none of the previous officials aspiring to office had fulfilled his requirements for selection. His statement earned him the anger of these officials, who were successfully cooperating to remove the examination system. The Southern Tang at this time was the only Chinese state to have established an examination system. After the abolition of the Southern Tang examinations, none of the other states revived them, until the founding of the Song dynasty.56 In the autumn of 953, another dry spell hit Huainan, and the waters of the Huai River were so shallow that people could cross it on foot. Commanders in Haozhou and Shouzhou sent out troops to keep people from seeking grain on the north side of the river, but this did not stop people from going. The Later Zhou emperor, Taizu, when informed about what was happening in Huainan, said, ‘We are all one people, and I want rice to be sent across the Huai River’. With this explicit imperial approval, granaries were built, but much of the grain stored there was used to provision the troops. An imperial edict of 22 September 953 permitted people coming from Huainan to search for food, although they were not allowed to transport grain back to Huainan.57 The situation was difficult for the people in Huainan, and officials explored ways to improve the food supply. Tian Jingzhu, the prefect of Chuzhou, located on the crossing of the Grand Canal with the Huai River, made a suggestion to repair the Baishui dam. This would enable officials to assess the ownership of the fields that had been submerged by floods, and Feng Yansi supported this idea. Li Deming wanted to turn all fallow land into state-run fields and to restore all fields that farmers had abandoned during the construction of dams and canals. The subaltern officials in the area spoiled these original good intentions. Instead of developing fallow land for state farms, they seized land from the people there, who did not dare complain. Xu Xuan learned about this practice and informed Li Jing, who sent him to inspect the area in person. He immediately returned all the registered fields to their rightful owners, arousing the anger of the local officials, who accused him of having enriched himself. Li Jing, who had always had an ear open to accusations and was never able to distinguish fact from fiction, dismissed Xu and exiled him to Shuzhou. As a result, the Baishui dam was not repaired, and the flooded fields were not recultivated. After he had been recalled to the capital some time later, Xu Xuan once again brought up the matter of the examination system, which was then revived. No information survives, however, about the dates of actual examinations during Li Jing’s reign.58 Taizu’s death, in late February 954, alleviated the mounting apprehension at the Southern Tang court about the invasion plans of the northern dynasty, at least for the time being. In order to enquire about the situation at the Later Zhou court, Li Jing dispatched Han Xizai as envoy. After his return to Jinling,
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Li Jing asked him about the conditions at the Later Zhou court, but Han only talked about Zhao Kuangyin (927–976), whom he found profoundly majestic. Zhao served as commander of the palace guard and was later to assume power as Taizu (r. 960–976), the first emperor of the Song dynasty (960–1279). Han went so far as to assert that the new emperor Shizong’s (Chai Rong, r. 954–959) authority did not reach far enough to achieve unification, but that Zhao without a doubt had the talents to do so.59 In the spring of 955, Wang Pu (915–959), an official of the Later Zhou, submitted a plan to conquer all Chinese territory for Shizong. He suggested the Southern Tang as the easiest target for an attack, as it had a long border that was difficult to defend.60 Shizong approved of this strategy, against the wishes of most of his advisors. He believed that, after the defeat of the Southern Tang, the other states in the south would easily submit to his rule. Thus, he started preparing for a southern campaign and gave orders to train an army.61 Li Jing was no match for the energetic and determined Shizong. Sima Guang describes Li Jing as friendly and gentle, interested in literature and poetry, and susceptible to flattery. His administration suffered from a lack of competent officials. The irresolute character of the emperor, in conjunction with an administration torn by disputes and rivalries among its officials, put the state of the Southern Tang at a great disadvantage in its conflict with the Later Zhou. The initial successes in the wars against Min and Chu had created a false perception of a militarily strong state and made Li Jing dream about a Tang restoration by conquering the north. He had had an opportunity to do so after the demise of the last Later Han ruler and the return of the Liao emperor homewards in 947. His forces at that time were engaged in Fujian, and the Southern Tang relations with the Liao were of a diplomatic nature only. They did not provide a basis for the military cooperation that might have helped to develop a common strategy against the Later Zhou. In 955, he should have been aware of the danger threatening from Huaibei, the area north of the Huai River, after the accession of the second Later Zhou ruler to the throne, but he chose to ignore it, and so did some of the prefects in the border prefectures. Wu Yanshao, stationed at the strategically highly important prefecture of Shouzhou on the Huai River, is illustrative of this attitude. Shouzhou not only controlled the traffic on the river, but also provided access to the north for southerners and was a gateway to the south for people journeying there from the north. Every winter, the Huai River was so shallow that people could easily cross by foot to the northern side. Until 955, military commanders had sent forces to guard the northern bank of the river against potential northern intrusions. This exercise was called ‘grasping the shallows’ (ba qian). Wu thought of this as a waste of material and labour and considered the Huai River a safe border. Liu Renshan, the military commissioner of Qinghuai stationed in Shouchun, the administrative centre
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of Shouzhou, tried to persuade Li Jing to follow the old practice. He feared for the worst should the Later Zhou decide to launch an attack against Huainan, but he was not able to convince Li Jing, and thus no defences were built north of the Huai. Shizong, for his part, ordered the dykes of the Bian River, which had fallen into disrepair, to be fixed in order to guide the river to the Si River. The officer in command of the works complained that this would take a long time and that the results of dredging a new bed for the river as far as the Si River were doubtful. The emperor nevertheless told him to go on, as the dredging efforts would soon bear fruit.62 Once this work was completed, the Later Zhou would be able to transport troops rapidly from the capital to the theatre of war. News of the approaching Later Zhou army frightened the Southern Tang people. The only officer to keep his composure was Liu Renshan, who gave the forces under his command the order to follow their daily routines, which soothed the local population. To counter the offensive, Li Jing made Liu Yanzhen commander of the defensive forces, numbering twenty thousand. Song Qiqiu pointed out that Liu Yanzhen was the worst possible choice for the job, but the ruler disregarded his objections.63 Liu then led the troops in forced marches to Shouchun. Huangfu Hui, military commissioner of Fenghua and chancellor, was appointed commissioner for the relief troops, while Yao Feng was given the post of inspector-in-chief of the relief troops. Huangfu and Yao, at the head of thirty thousand troops, rushed to Dingyuan commandery in Haozhou prefecture, where they set up camp. As he did not know how to deal with the looming war, Li Jing called Song Qiqiu back to advise him. Li Gu (903–960), commander of the Later Zhou army in Huainan, prepared for the invasion of Huainan by building a floating bridge at Zhengyang. This town straddled the Huai to the west of Shouchun, and, once the bridge was finished, he crossed the Huai River. Meeting with no resistance, he sent his vanguard towards Shouchun, where it defeated the local Southern Tang troops in three encounters.64 Li Gu next proceeded to Shangyao, where he beat another Southern Tang force. Shizong set out from Bianliang on 22 January 955 to take command of the campaign in person. Li Gu, prior to the arrival of the emperor, had directed his forces in an attack on Shouzhou, but had not been able to take it. Liu Yanzhen advanced with his troops to Laiyuan market town, south of Shouchun. At the same time, a large fleet sailed to Zhengyang to attack the floating bridge and sever the support route of the Later Zhou troops in Huainan. Li Gu recognized its intention and wanted to withdraw his troops to guard the bridge, but Shizong did not agree and ordered him instead to continue his attack on Shouzhou. These orders reached Li only after he had already withdrawn to Zhengyang. Shizong ordered Li to advance yet again and take the upper course of the Huai River, which was certainly difficult to achieve, because the Southern Tang war vessels kept to the middle of the
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river, outside the range of Later Zhou projectiles. The Later Zhou forces also lacked a navy to attack them directly. Thus, Li Gu submitted a memorial to the emperor, warning him about the dangers of crossing the floating bridge towards the south. He reminded him that the river was swelling again and that, if the bridge collapsed, the emperor would be isolated in Huainan, without access to provisions and fresh troops. The emperor was not pleased with this less than encouraging depiction of the situation, but for the time being had to accept it. Shizong did not have to worry for long, for Liu Yanzhen, as soon as he had assumed command, behaved with a degree of arrogance that was only matched by his ignorance of strategy and his inexperience of leading troops in the field. He used his position to gather property and wealth to bribe influential officials in Jinling, such as Wei Cen and others. They depicted him as a very able general, whom the emperor could wholeheartedly trust. Liu Yanzhen’s subordinate generals were inexperienced, and Liu Renshan warned them not to pursue Li Gu. He wanted Liu Yanzhen to stay in his current position, so that he could be a permanent threat to any Later Zhou advance. Liu did not heed the warning and marched his army directly to Zhengyang, close to where they were roundly beaten by forces under the command of the Later Zhou general Li Zhongjin, who had just crossed the bridge. Ten thousand Southern Tang soldiers were killed, and Liu Yanzhen was beheaded, while Xian Shilang and other generals were captured alive. After the elimination of Liu Yanzhen’s forces, the Later Zhou army was able to occupy many villages south of the Huai River, and the people of Huainan now became terrified. Huangfu Hui and Yao Feng withdrew their troops to the Qingliu Pass in Chuzhou prefecture. Its prefect, Wang Shaoyan, who previously had refused to prepare for war, abandoned the prefecture.65 Shizong personally took command of the campaign after his arrival at the army headquarters in Zhengyang, on 2 March 956, and immediately replaced Li Gu with Li Zhongjin. On 4 March, he arrived under the walls of Shouchun and camped on the northern side of the Fei River, giving orders to encircle the city completely. Then he shortened his supply lines by moving the floating bridge downriver from Zhengyang to Xiacai market town. On 5 March, all the able-bodied men from several prefectures north of the Huai River were ordered to attack the city walls, and they did so relentlessly. The one lifeline the troops in the city had was the Huai River, and, hence, ten thousand soldiers were ordered to guard the vessels moored at Mount Tu, situated at a bend in the Huai River, about seventy kilometres east of Shouzhou. This potential threat to the floating bridge was eliminated several days later, when Zhao Kuangyin was ordered to attack the Southern Tang camp there. Zhao defeated the troops at Guokou, the confluence of the Guo River and the Huai River close to Mount Tu, and in the process captured more than fifty war vessels, which he incorporated into his forces.66
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To make matters worse for the Southern Tang, Wang Kui, who had been instrumental in ousting the Southern Tang from Hunan, on orders from Shizong, launched an attack against Ezhou, the western outpost of the Southern Tang Empire. Li Jing wanted He Jingzhu to move the people living outside the city of Ezhou within the safety of the city walls, to protect them from the advancing Wang Kui. He Jingzhu objected and claimed that he would rather find death in battle with his troops and the people outside the city, and that he would not hide behind the city walls. The floating bridge was finally moored at Xiacai on 16 March. On 18 March, Later Zhou forces defeated more than three thousand Southern Tang troops at Shengtang, about ten kilometres south of Shouzhou, capturing some of the commanding officers in addition to more than forty war vessels. Huangfu Hui and Yao Feng were still holding Qingliu Pass, and, to remove them, Zhao Kuangyin engaged them with a frontal attack while leading another detachment round the back, attacking from there. Under pressure from two sides, Huangfu Hui gave up his original defensive position and withdrew to Chuzhou proper, where he was about to destroy the bridges leading to it when Zhao Kuangyin arrived at the city with his cavalry. At the sight of Zhao, Huangfu Hui offered to give battle outside the walls, and Zhao Kuangyin agreed. Once Huangfu Hui appeared on the battlefield, Zhao shouted that he was there only to catch Huangfu, and so no one obstructed him. He caught up with Huangfu, hit him hard on the head with his sword and took him prisoner.67 As there seemed to be no way to resist the onslaught of the Later Zhou, Li Jing tried to negotiate an armistice in order to save his empire from complete ruin. To this end, he sent an officer with a letter to the Later Zhou emperor that read: The emperor of the Tang sends this letter to the emperor of the Great Zhou to ask to rest the arms. He is willing to serve as the older brother to the emperor, and to pay annual tribute of commodities to help pay for the troops. Shizong did not accept the offer and instead directed more troops to attack Shouzhou. This time, the attack proved more successful. The Later Zhou captured some of the river fortifications and began to irrigate the water of the north-western moats into the Fei River. To convince Li Jing of the hopelessness of his situation, Shizong returned Huangfu Hui and other prisoners of war to report on what was going on. The severely injured Huangfu Hui told Li Jing that when he had still served the Later Jin he had fought the Liao, but he had never met as resolute an opponent as Zhao Kuangyin. Several days later, he died of his wounds. Adding to the grave military situation was another bold manoeuvre by the Later Zhou. Shizong had learned that Yangzhou was unprepared for war, because Li Jing relied
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heavily on his Huainan defensive positions along the Huai River. Hence, Shizong dispatched Han Lingkun (923–968) to conduct a surprise raid on Yangzhou, but warned him not to harm the common people. By this time, Li Jing was finally convinced that the time had come for more serious negotiations than the half-hearted attempt he had made previously. The negotiators this time were Zhong Mo and Li Deming. They were carrying a document with them in which Li Jing asked for peace and referred to himself as a vassal of the Later Zhou. As tribute and token of his sincerity, he submitted imperial robes, herbal medicines, gold and silver vessels, silk fabrics and brocades, as well as cattle and rice wine as provision for the troops. On 1 April, Zhong and Li arrived at the Later Zhou camp at Shouzhou to confer with Shizong. To stop them short in their attempt to talk him into a favourable deal, Shizong addressed them sternly: Your ruler calls himself a descendant of the Tang house, thus he should know the proper etiquettes are varying from country to country. He is separated from me by a river only, but has never sent envoys to establish good relations and instead only communicated with the Liao via the sea. Thus, he has abandoned China and served the barbarians. Where are the proper etiquettes in this kind of behaviour? Are you here to try to talk me into an armistice? I am not one of the foolish rulers of the Six Dynasties, so how could you ever think to change my attitude with your talk? You may return and tell your ruler: ‘Come quick and see the emperor, kowtow before him and apologize for your transgressions, and then there will be no problem.’ If he does not comply, then I will have a personal look at the city walls of Jinling and use its granaries and residences to feed my troops, and your ruler will have nothing to regret anymore! Stunned by this outburst of imperial anger, the two Southern Tang envoys did not dare say anything.68 On 4 April, Han Lingkun reached Yangzhou with the vanguard and, unnoticed by the defenders, slipped into the city with several hundred cavalry. When its military commander, Jia Chong, finally realized the Later Zhou vanguard was already in the city, he set residences and houses on fire and abandoned the city. Feng Yanlu, the magistrate of the city, tried to do likewise by putting on a disguise. He donned the robe of a Buddhist monk, shaved his head and hid in a temple. He was recognized, however, and taken prisoner.69 As the Later Zhou forces advanced, Li Jing decided it was time to remove the family of the late Yielding emperor of Wu from their prison in Taizhou, east of Yangzhou, to Runzhou, east of Jinling and south of the Yangzi.70 It is quite likely that Li Jing was afraid the Later Zhou would use the Yang family members to stir anti-Li feelings within the population and
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employ one of the Yang to replace the Li. It was probably these political considerations that led Li Jing to instigate the elimination of the Yang family. As the neighbouring districts of Yangzhou quickly fell to the Later Zhou, Li Jing tried to find help from the Liao and sent a messenger with a secret letter. Frontier guards intercepted the messenger and the letter, and thus Shizong learned of Li Jing’s plans. On 12 April, Wuyue started the campaign against the Southern Tang with strikes at Xuanzhou (in south-eastern Anhui) and Jiangyin on the lower course of the Yangzi. The local Southern Tang commander there surrendered to Wuyue with his troops and the people under his care and led them into Wuyue territory.71 In the western theatre of war in Hunan, the situation seemed to improve for the Southern Tang. Wang Kui, who was supposed to attack Ezhou, turned his army around to face rebellious forces. In the ensuing battle, Wang was beaten and killed.72 As the Later Zhou armies increased their pressure on Shouzhou, Li Jing increased his efforts to negotiate a peace. To this end, he dispatched Sun Cheng and Wang Chongzhi to meet Shizong at Shouzhou. Sun had been chancellor and now received another appointment as honorary director of education, elevating him to one of the highest dignitaries in the state; Wang Chongzhi was the minister of rites. Before the Southern Tang envoys left the capital, Sun Cheng revealed his thoughts about the whole endeavour to Feng Yansi. Sun believed it was the duty of Feng, as senior chancellor, to head the mission. Furthermore, he felt giving up the state established by Liezu was a clear betrayal of the late emperor. To his deputy, he confided he would most probably not survive the mission and advised Wang to make provisions for the survival of his family. On 25 April 957, Sun Cheng and Wang Chongzhi arrived at the Later Zhou encampment near Shouzhou. They handed over a letter written by Li Jing, together with lavish gifts. Li Jing apologized for not having recognized the true emperor of China. He acknowledged the superiority of Shizong, while admitting that he had illegitimately acquired imperial status. He also renounced the claim to rule over all of China.73 Shizong did not honour this offer with an answer. In the meantime, the Later Zhou occupied more cities along the Huai. Near the end of April, Shizong ordered Sun to advance to the city walls of Shouchun and command Liu Renshan to surrender the city. When Liu recognized Sun, he greeted him, and Sun addressed him: ‘You have received generous favours from our state, therefore you may not open the gates and let in the bandits.’ This was contrary to what Shizong had expected, and he confronted Sun angrily. Sun replied, ‘I am a Chancellor, how could I order a Military Commissioner to stage a rebellion?’ After his fury over this incident had subsided, Shizong realized the loyal attitude of Sun, but did not give him permission to return to Jinling.
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Li Jing next offered to relinquish the imperial title, in addition to the cession of six prefectures and all the taxes collected that year, in exchange for an armistice. Shizong did not agree to this new offer, for he had already conquered half of the territory between the Huai and the Yangzi, and his generals continued to capture more and more towns. Li Deming suggested to Shizong that, The Tang ruler does not know that Your Majesty’s troops are so numerous; I wish You would grant me five days on my life. I will return and explain this to the Tang ruler, so that he will cede all territory north of the Yangzi. Sun Cheng made sure that Wang Chongzhi accompanied Li Deming back to Jinling to deliver a factual report on the military situation. Shizong handed Li and Wang a letter for Li Jing in which he declared that, should Li Jing follow his commands, he would certainly cease hostilities. While Li Jing gratefully acknowledged these first signs of imperial mercy, he was not at all pleased with the exuberant way Li Deming described Shizong and his army. Li urged the ruler to cede all territory in Huainan to the Later Zhou. Song Qiqiu believed this to be unnecessary and told Li Jing so. Feeling the emperor swaying towards Song’s interpretation of the situation, Li Deming exaggerated the facts in order to make his point, until no one at court believed him anymore. Chen Jue and his colleague Li Zhenggu (?–958), who were the heads of the bureau of military affairs, in particular had always hated Li Deming as a bureaucratic upstart and now saw a chance to eliminate him. They forced Wang Chongzhi, who had supported the description of the situation delivered by Li, to change his own report, by drawing a much more favourable picture. They then proceeded to depict and denounce Li Deming as a traitor. Li Jing was immediately enraged and had Li executed right away.74 After an initial delay that was due to disputes at the court of Wuyue about how to proceed, its king finally launched another attack against Changzhou on Southern Tang territory. This potentially endangered Runzhou, the prefecture east of Jinling, where the crown prince of the Southern Tang, Li Hongji (?–959), was commander-in-chief. Because of his inexperience in battle, Li Jing wanted to replace him with a senior military commander; however, a subordinate general alleged that, if the prince should be withdrawn from the troops, trouble was certain. Hence, Li Hongji remained in command. He proved to be very efficient as a field commander, assigning each commander his own unit and preparing defences to withstand the Wuyue assault force. Chai Kehong, who people thought completely lacked any of the qualities that had made his father Chai Zaiyong a well-respected figure in the army, received the post of commander of the relief forces. He had spent most of
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his time drinking and gambling with his friends and had not paid any attention to his job in the palace guards. Upon a petition sent by his mother to the throne, Li Jing gave Chai the command over a force of several thousand old and weak men, as the seasoned troops were all fighting in Huainan. Li Zhenggu, the commissioner of the bureau of military affairs, did not want to waste any good equipment on Chai’s forces and made matters difficult for Chai by supplying him with broken arms and armour. Because of Chai’s incessant complaints about this, Li ordered him back to the capital to replace him with Zhu Kuangye, a commander of one of the palace guard units. Li Hongji threw his weight in support of Chai and told him to advance and fight, believing that he could overcome the Wuyue army. The trust Li Hongji put in Chai paid off, as he at once defeated the Wuyue army at Changzhou, killing more than ten thousand of the enemy.75 The Southern Tang finally had found an able commander to challenge the Later Zhou, and Chai Kehong consequently asked for more troops to relieve Shouzhou, but he died of unknown causes before he was able to pit his abilities against those of the Later Zhou generals. Chai’s unexpected death proved fatal for further Southern Tang military operations. Li Jing made his brother Li Jingda field marshal of all forces and appointed as his subordinates Chen Jue and Bian Hao, both of whom had poor service records. The only voice at court bringing forward criticism at this very dangerous command set-up was Han Xizai’s. However, as before, the ruler did not heed his warnings. The shortage of able-bodied men and officers became more alarming after the Southern Tang had suffered several crushing and costly defeats at the hands of the Later Zhou, and so men were levied and appointed in Fujian. The search for officers yielded Xu Wenzhen who, after the war in Min, had entered Southern Tang service and been made military commissioner of Yongan; the commander of Jingjiang, Chen Decheng, son of Chen Hui; and Zheng Yanhua and Lin Renzhao from Jianzhou1, all of whom were appointed as generals.76 The fortunes of the Later Zhou invasion changed dramatically in the summer. The Southern Tang general Lu Mengjun led a force of more than ten thousand in forced marches from Changzhou to Taizhou. He captured the city and left Chen Decheng as the garrison commander, while he proceeded to strike at Han Lingkun in Yangzhou. Han, who had not received any reinforcements, abandoned the city and fled, but Shizong sent him back with more troops. He gave him a stern warning that the legs of any soldiers deserting Yangzhou for the safety of the north bank of the Huai River would be broken. This threat worked well, as Han recaptured the city. Shizong, meanwhile, personally appeared at Shouchun for another attempt to breach the city’s defences, but heavy summer rains impeded progress, flooding the army camp with several feet of water. This led to massive losses in
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equipment and provisions and forced Shizong to withdraw the army from its position to Haozhou, east of Shouzhou. Han Lingkun’s victory over Lu Mengjun and his force at the eastern city walls of Yangzhou mitigated this setback to a certain extent.77 At this time, Li Jingda had crossed the Yangzi and, at Liuhe, a place about fifty kilometres to the west of Yangzhou, put up a line of defensive works running for ten kilometres. He arranged his forces behind the palisades and then waited for things to happen. Zhao Kuangyin advocated leaving the initiative to Li Jingda, because he had twenty thousand men under his command and outnumbered the Later Zhou forces in the area ten to one. Li Jingda lost his patience after several days and, relying on his superior numbers, launched an attack that Zhao repulsed brilliantly with his cavalry. More than half of the Southern Tang troops perished, and the remaining units fled southwards. With this defeat, the Southern Tang had lost vast numbers of experienced soldiers; therefore, militias were levied in several places and thrown into battles that were easily won by the Later Zhou commanders. When a new floating bridge at Guokou was completed, Shizong moved there from Haozhou and wanted to advance at once to Yangzhou. His advisors urged him not to proceed immediately, because the troops were already weary and provisions were low, and so he desisted from attacking the city. On 17 June, Shizong left the campaign in the hands of Li Zhongjin and returned north; he had spent three months with the army. Shouchun gained some respite from the continued siege when Li Renshan struck at an unsuspecting Later Zhou general. The Southern Tang troops killed several hundred enemy troops and destroyed their siege equipment.78 Li Jing was again looking for an able army commander, when Zhu Yuan submitted his thoughts on the military situation in the form of a strategic plan. Li Jing believed Zhu’s plans were feasible and ordered all generals to renew their attacks on the enemy and retake all the cities lost in Huainan.79 This campaign quickly bore fruit, as Zhu Yuan first recaptured Shuzhou and then Hezhou, while Li Ping seized Qizhou. The common people in Huainan helped the speedy advance of the Tang army greatly. They first had welcomed the Later Zhou, as they were suffering from harsh taxes and hoped for better treatment from the invaders. Their hopes were shattered when the Later Zhou forces burned fields and looted houses, treating the local population as prey. People abandoned their fields and villages and withdrew to mountains and swamps, where they organized militia armed with field tools and armour made from paper, which earned them the epithet the ‘White armour army’ (baijia jun). With their support, the regular Tang forces were able to take many towns and districts back from the Later Zhou. Newly raised forces camped at Mount Zijin, from where they were to respond to fire signals in Shouchun. The Southern Tang military commanders asked their ruler to take advantage of the favourable situation created by the weakened condition of
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the Later Zhou army and its withdrawal from some of the major towns. Song Qiqiu, again, exerted his influence over the ruler and advised against this reasonable demand. He declared that a pursuit of the withdrawing troops would increase the anger of the Later Zhou, and Li Jing preferred this strategy to that of his commanders. It is evident that, after a series of defeats, he doubted whether his generals could carry out a successful offensive. Thus, he ordered them to stay in their respective defensive positions and to not launch attacks on the Later Zhou troops. As a result, the Later Zhou continued in their siege of Shouchun, where the situation became increasingly difficult. Li Jingda’s remaining forces were stationed in Haozhou, about ninety kilometres to the east and thus too far away to be of any help to Shouchun. As Chen Jue was in virtual command of the army, Li Jingda did not exercise any power over it. Therefore, officers did not dare demand to use the army to attack the Later Zhou at Shouchun. It was obvious that the Southern Tang forces could not match the Later Zhou army in open battle, and so the Southern Tang commanders relied heavily on their naval forces, where they still held an advantage over the Later Zhou. Lin Renzhao attempted to destroy the floating bridge at Xiacai by setting boats on fire and letting them drift in the direction of the bridge. Unfortunately, the wind turned, and the burning boats were endangering Lin’s troops; for this reason, he had to retreat. The Later Zhou general Zhang Yongde (928–1000), who had noticed the vulnerability of the bridge to this kind of attack, spanned the river with iron chains and fastened big logs to them to prevent further attacks. When the Southern Tang navy attacked the next time, on 28 November, Zhang ordered soldiers who were good swimmers to swim to the war vessels at night and link them together secretly with an iron chain. As soon as this had been accomplished, Zhang attacked from the riverbank and sank many of the now immobile ships.80 When Shizong returned from the army to Kaifeng, Sun Cheng and Zhong Mo accompanied him. He treated them generously and invited them to join imperial audiences, together with officials of the imperial secretariat. The emperor often talked with them over cups of rice wine, enquiring about the Southern Tang. Sun invariably only replied, ‘The Tang ruler is awed by Your Majesty’s divine martial prowess and serves Your Majesty without any second thoughts.’ The emperor accepted this as the truth, until Li Zhongjin produced a letter sent to him by Li Jing. The latter had taken notice of the poor relationship between Li, who was the brother-in-law, and Zhang Yongde, who was the son-in-law of emperor Taizu of the Later Zhou. He hoped to create a rift within the Later Zhou army by enticing Li Zhongjin with the offer of huge financial rewards while he also denounced Shizong. Once Shizong had read through the letter, he immediately summoned Sun Cheng and confronted him with the contents of the letter, accusing him of lying. Sun, unflinchingly, only asked to be executed. Once again, he was pressed for information on Jiangnan and, once again, he did not provide any.
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On 21 December, he was transferred to the metropolitan prison, where an official interrogated him for the last time. As he kept silent, the official announced that his execution was imminent. Sun was pleased with that decision; he readied his dress and his official tablet, ruffled his clothes and put his cap straight. Bowing towards the south, he said, ‘I respectfully dedicate my death to my country’. All those who had come with him, numbering about one hundred persons, were executed with him. Only Zhong Mo avoided the death penalty because, unlike Sun, he provided information on the Southern Tang state and court. The emperor merely demoted him in rank and exiled him. Once Shizong recognized Sun Cheng’s loyalty and steadfastness, he recalled Zhong to the capital and gave him a position at court.81 The Later Zhou stepped up their operations in early 957 by calling all ablebodied men from several prefectures to Xiacai for forced labour.82 Li Jing, consequently, sent another emissary, Chen Chuyao, to the Liao with a considerable sum of money, using the maritime route. He tried to persuade them to attack the Later Zhou from the north to create a distraction, but the Liao were unwilling to commit their army and did not permit Chen to return.83 The beleaguered city of Shouchun had been under siege for more than a year, and its provisions were running out. Li Jingda attempted again to bring relief troops to the city by dispatching Xu Wenzhen, Bian Hao and Zhu Yuan with a large number of men from his headquarters at Haozhou. They advanced as far as Mount Zijin, where they built ten fortified positions arranged like ‘pearls on a string’. With fire arrows, they signalled the defenders of the city at dawn and at nightfall, and they also tried to build a paved path to the city in order to bring food there. They had almost reached it when Li Zhongjin attacked them, killing about five thousand troops and capturing two of the stockades. Liu Renshan, commander of Shouchun, wanted to die in battle, as he had fallen ill and was looking for an honourable death. He was about to transfer command to Bian Hao when Li Jingda intervened, not giving him permission to fight. On the Later Zhou side, generals warned the emperor that the Southern Tang forces were still very strong. They doubted that they could fend off an attack by these relief forces and therefore advocated an armistice with the Southern Tang to rest and reorganize the army. In contrast to these negative comments, Li Gu told the emperor that, if he were personally to lead the siege of Shouchun, the spirits of the troops would be raised again. The city’s defences were on the verge of collapse and, ultimately, it would take only one more major effort to capture it.84 In Kaifeng, the emperor had ordered Southern Tang war captives to instruct some of his forces in naval battle and the construction of war vessels, to make up for this great deficiency in the Later Zhou forces. Later Zhou soldiers were trained for several months and acquired the necessary skills and experience. When they appeared for the first time in battle on the
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Huai River, the Southern Tang naval commanders were taken completely by surprise. Shizong took the advice of Li Gu and left Kaifeng on 21 March, reaching Xiacai on 31 March. On the night of 4 April, he crossed the Huai River and arrived before Shouchun. On 9 April, he put on his armour and moved to the defensive position of the Southern Tang forces at Mount Zijin. He ordered Zhao Kuangyin to attack, and Zhao was able to interrupt the supply line of the Southern Tang between Mount Zijin and Shouchun. Shizong, content with this success, returned to Xiacai. This situation called for concerted action from the Southern Tang side. However, at this crucial time, the Southern Tang army was distracted by a personal conflict between Chen Jue and Zhu Yuan. Chen Jue had always been jealous of men more capable than he was and was anxious to protect his position as second in command of the Southern Tang forces in Huainan. In several memorials to Li Jing, he alleged that Zhu Yuan could not be trusted, as he was a northerner with northern sympathies, and that he harboured plans to defect to the Later Zhou. Li Jing believed these reports and replaced Zhu Yuan with Yang Shouzhong, the military commissioner of Wuchang. After Yang’s arrival from Ezhou at the headquarters of Li Jingda at Mount Zijin, Chen Jue called Zhu Yuan to Haozhou to strip him of his command and troops. Zhu Yuan, once he learnt about his dismissal, was stopped from committing suicide by one of his aides, who advised him to defect to the Later Zhou. The Later Zhou army renewed their attack and seized the remaining fortifications, taking the Southern Tang generals Xu Wenzhen, Bian Hao and Yang Shouzhong prisoner in the process. The total Southern Tang casualties are said to have numbered close to forty thousand. When Li Jing lamented the decline of his state after this heavy defeat, he burst into tears. Li Zhenggu, instead of consoling him, addressed him very rudely: ‘Your Majesty should lead the troops in the fight against the enemy, and not cry tears! Have You had one drink too much and has the wet nurse not yet come to comfort You?’85 Li Jing became angry, but did not punish Li Zhenggu for his insulting remark. The battle for Shouchun continued for another two weeks until finally, on 23 April, Shizong received the surrender of the city. Liu Renshan could no longer oppose those among his officers who wanted to end the siege. He had to be carried on a litter outside the city gates to meet Shizong, who ordered him to be carried back and cared for.86 The fall of Shouchun was the ultimate blow to Southern Tang efforts to cling to the Huainan region. However, resistance did not cease completely. In June 957, Guo Tingwei, a military officer stationed in Haozhou, undertook a raid with war vessels against the floating bridge and managed to defeat a Later Zhou commander in battle, who barely escaped with his life. For his achievements, Guo was promoted to military training commissioner of Chuzhou and overall commander of the naval forces on the upper course of the Huai River.87
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Hostilities ceased in the summer and were resumed in the autumn. The most important part of the Southern Tang defences, after the fall of Shouchun, centred on Haozhou. In late November 957, Zhao Kuangyin reached the city, and Shizong followed on 2 December. Guo Tingwei, who meanwhile had assumed command of Haozhou, on 5 December, sent a letter to Shizong in which he explained, My family lives in Jiangnan. If I surrender at once, I fear that the Tang will summarily punish my whole family. I therefore beg Your permission to send a messenger to Jinling to arrange for my family’s safety. Afterwards I will surrender. Shizong agreed to this, for another Southern Tang flotilla, intent on bringing help to Haozhou, was operating on the Huan River east of Haozhou.88 In the following weeks, the Later Zhou forces took in rapid succession Yangzhou, Chuzhou, Sizhou and Shuzhou. When the Jinghai military prefecture at the eastern end of the Yangzi fell to the Later Zhou, they were finally able to establish a direct link with Wuyue.89 Even after suffering heavy losses, Li Jing and his officials still wanted to maintain their independence vis-à-vis the Later Zhou. Li Jing changed the reign era in the first month of 958 from ‘Guarding the great enterprise’ to ‘Resurgence’ (Zhongxing) and then, on 28 March, from ‘Resurgence’ to ‘Established peace’ (Jiaotai).90 It is difficult to measure how far this show of determination convinced the court and the people, for Li Jing so far had lost Huainan, or one-third of the Southern Tang territory, consisting of fourteen prefectures, sixty districts and a population of 226,574 households, to the Later Zhou.91 Li Jingsui rejected the honour of successor that Li Jing had offered him, and Li Jingda resigned as field marshal, pointing out that he had failed his country in this post. Li Jing now formally installed his eldest son Li Hongji as heir apparent, and Li Hongji immediately removed his uncle’s officials from the retinue in the residence of the crown prince. Shortly afterwards, the Later Zhou army reached the northern bank of the Yangzi, and Li Jing, who was afraid of their crossing the river to attack Jinling, was more than willing to negotiate a peace, even if it meant giving up Huainan and the imperial title for good. Chen Jue went as envoy to the headquarters of Shizong at Yingluan, where he arrived on 6 April, and reported that Li Jing offered to cede his throne to his son Hongji, who henceforth would be a vassal of the Later Zhou. Chen Jue, furthermore, declared that he would send a messenger to Jinling to return with a document in which Li Jing would hand over the last four Huainan prefectures remaining under Southern Tang rule. The Yangzi, in the future, would serve as the border between the Later Zhou and the Southern Tang.
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Shizong agreed, and, once the messenger had reached Jinling, Li Jing composed a document in which he no longer referred to himself as emperor of the Tang, but merely as the ruler of the state of Tang. He officially surrendered all territory in Huainan and submitted the tax income of a whole year as tribute. With this, the war in Huainan was over, after three years of constant fighting. The Southern Tang ceased to exist as an independent empire and, from then on, served the northern dynasty as a vassal state. In return for the surrender of Huainan and the abolishing of the imperial title, Shizong ordered the states of Hunan, Wuyue and Jingnan to stop all military action against the Southern Tang. He moreover encouraged Li Jing, in a letter given to Chen Jue on 11 April, to remain on the throne and not to abdicate in favour of his son.92 Having discarded his imperial title, Li Jing changed court etiquette and bureaucratic titles. He dropped the component ‘king’ of the character of his given name, to indicate that he no longer considered himself ruler; furthermore, he thus avoided violating the taboo on the use of the character for the given name of Guo Jing, the father of the Later Zhou founder. He commanded the destruction of all imperial insignia and that officials should address him in official documents as ruler (guozhu) only, and no longer as emperor. The state formerly known as Tang now assumed the designation of Jiangnan, the old geographical term describing the ‘region south of the river’, i.e. south of the Yangzi. Submission to the Later Zhou included adopting their reign title as well as their calendar. The major ministers, Feng Yansi, Yan Xu and Chen Jue, all resigned from their original positions to assume lower posts. On 25 May 958, Shizong sent Feng Yanlu and Zhong Mo to Jinling to present imperial robes, jade belts, money and the Later Zhou calendar as gifts to Li Jing. Feng and Zhong previously had been emissaries of the Southern Tang, and the Later Zhou had conferred positions on them; it must have felt quite awkward, both for them and for Li Jing, to meet each other on this occasion. Li Jing dispatched Chen Jue to explain to the throne that, after the cession of Huainan, Jiangnan had no more access to salt. Therefore, he asked to retain one of the salt-producing prefectures in eastern Huainan. Shizong denied this request, but he granted Jiangnan an annual amount of three hundred thousand bushels of salt.93 Li Jingsui had been appointed as field marshal of the army in the western circuit of Jiangnan and chief military commissioner of Hongzhou. The relationship between Li Jingsui and his deputy Li Zhenggu was overshadowed from the start by Li Zhenggu’s disrespect for his superior. He behaved in such an arrogant manner that even the mild and forgiving Li Jingsui could not bear it for long. He wanted to arrest Li Zhenggu, put him on trial and execute him, but his advisors advised against this. Li Hongji, after a promising start as military leader, did not fulfil Li Jing’s expectations. On one occasion, Li Jing hit the crown prince with a
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polo mallet and remarked angrily, ‘I should call back Jingsui as my successor to the throne!’. Because Li Hongji worried that his father would really dismiss him as crown prince and reinstall Li Jingsui, he used Yuan Congfan to eliminate his uncle by poisoning him. Yuan Congfan was the chief steward of Li Jingsui and had become estranged when his master wanted to execute his son for a minor offence. The chance to exact revenge came on 17 September. On that day, Li Jingsui, thirsty after playing polo, drank a goblet with a poisoned drink given to him by Yuan. Li Jing did not know the circumstances of the death of his younger brother and conferred the title of ‘Royal younger brother’ and the posthumous name of ‘Accomplished and cultured’ (Wencheng) on Li Jingsui. On 8 November 958, Li Jing sent Yin Chongyi to deliver a congratulatory message on Shizong’s birthday.94 On 30 November, Shizong dismissed Feng Yanlu from his service and sent him back to Jinling, accompanied by Xu Wenzhen, Bian Hao and other prisoners of war. Li Jing did not employ them again, as they had failed in their service to him by losing battles.95 Li Jing’s confidence suffered another blow when a report from the bureau of astronomy reached him that read, ‘There is a change in the celestial pattern. The ruler should avoid the throne to avert disaster’. As he felt responsible for the situation the state was in and had never wanted to deal with government matters anyway, he said at court, ‘Difficulties are right now abundant, and I wish to be released from looking after the myriad matters of government. I want to calm down and find some peace. But who can I entrust the state to?’. Chen Jue and Li Zhenggu had waited for an occasion like this. Li Zhenggu offered his advice: ‘Duke Song has been the founding official of the state. If Your Majesty are tired looking after the myriad matters of government, why do You not entrust the state to him?’96 Chen Jue supported Li by saying, Song Qiqiu has once helped Liezu to take over the state, and so the great enterprise was realized. He is a state founding minister. Delegate matters of government to him, and he will bring peace to the border regions. You will be able to travel to remote places and follow the traces of kings long departed. This is the chance of a lifetime for You.97 A stronger monarch would have responded with penalties for the two officials, but Li Jing called for Chen Qiao, a secretariat drafter, to write a decree along the lines of Li’s and Chen’s suggestions. When Chen Qiao learnt what he had to draft, he implored his sovereign: If Your Majesty signs this document, then all officials who want to see You in audience, will instead be referred to Qiqiu. You will not have authority even over one single subject or one tiny parcel of land.
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If Your Majesty cedes the administration of the state, You are forgetting all the hardships the late emperor has suffered when he restored the great enterprise. Your Majesty has been personally witnessing how the Yielding Emperor was once held prisoner in the Danyang Palace. One day You will cry tears wishing to be an old rustic, but You will not be allowed to become one.98 Li Jing said to him, ‘So you also recognize that this is not possible?’, and with that, he withdrew the decree.99 Apparently, he had been suspicious of the motives of Chen Jue and Li Zhenggu and had only needed confirmation from an official not allied with Song Qiqiu. After Zhong Mo had returned from the Later Zhou court to Jinling, he explained to Li Jing that Song had conspired with Chen Jue and Li Zhenggu against the ruler. He strongly advised Li Jing to execute all three of them. He did so, not only out of concern for Li Jing, but also because he saw an opportunity to avenge the death of his friend Li Deming, which had been orchestrated by Song and his followers. Li Jing did not act upon Zhong’s advice straight away, but very soon he was forced into action. Chen Jue, who also had been at the Later Zhou court, delivered a message from Shizong to Li Jing ordering the execution of Yan Xu for his prominent role in the resistance against the Later Zhou. Li Jing doubted this alleged order from the northern emperor, for he knew that Chen and Yan had been opponents in the past. In order to find out the truth of Chen’s statement, he had Zhong Mo submit a letter to Shizong in which he incriminated himself as the main culprit, exonerating Yan Xu. Shizong was very surprised when Zhong Mo filled him in on what had transpired at the court of Jiangnan. Originally, he had wanted to eliminate Yan Xu, but now that he learned the circumstances, he said to Zhong Mo, ‘If the facts are like this, Xu is definitely a loyal minister. I am ruling the empire, how could I teach people to kill a loyal minister?’. Yan Xu therefore escaped capital punishment, and Li Jing finally became determined to eliminate Song Qiqiu and his followers. He asked Shizong for permission to pursue this course, but Shizong left the matter entirely to Li Jing, because he considered it an internal affair of a vassal state. In early January 959, Yin Chongyi, upon orders from Li Jing, drafted a decree that listed the crimes of Song Qiqiu, Chen Jue and Li Zhenggu and set the punishments for these offences. Song Qiqiu was permitted to return to his old residence at Mount Jiuhua and to keep all his titles and ranks; Chen Jue was demoted to ‘erudite of the national university’ and exiled to Xuanzhou; and Li Zhenggu was stripped of all his titles and privileges and was given the right to commit suicide. Li Jing sent a report of these proceedings to the Later Zhou court.100 After arriving at Mount Jiuhua, Song was incarcerated in his home, and all the windows and doors were walled up. He received food through a hole
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in the wall and he allegedly complained to his family, ‘I once submitted the plan to hold the family of the Yielding emperor at Taizhou as prisoners, and thus it is fitting that I receive the same punishment.’ Then he hanged himself. In order to illustrate the evil nature of Song, Li Jing conferred the negative posthumous name ‘Disgraceful and erroneous’ (Choumiu) on Song. His old opponent Chang Mengxi, who on several occasions had attacked Song and his followers at court and had pleaded with Li Jing to punish Feng Yansi and Wei Cen, had withdrawn from official duty under the pretext of illness and had died in 956. After receiving news of Song’s death, Li Jing remarked to his entourage: ‘Chang Mengxi all his life wanted to kill Qiqiu, and I regret that I cannot make him see this now!’ He did not need to fear Song Qiqiu any more, and so it was safe to appoint Chang, posthumously, left vice director of the department of state affairs.101 Although Shizong had granted Li Jing permission to repair the walls and moats of Jinling, Li Jing felt no longer safe there. Just across the Yangzi lay Later Zhou territory, and the constant threat of another Later Zhou invasion, in addition to the fact that only a stretch of water separated him from the northern neighbour, made Li Jing uncomfortable. He therefore looked for another capital, located at a greater distance from the Yangzi. His choice fell on Hongzhou. When he had made up his mind to relocate there, he had his officials discuss the benefits of such a move. Most officials did not want to move as they had become used to the luxury of Jinling, with only Tang Hao strongly supporting a transfer. Before the transfer from Jinling to Hongzhou could be realized, however, regulations for the set-up of the new capital needed to be formulated. One major problem was the lack of cash, because the war had depleted the coffers of the empire considerably. Zhong Mo, therefore, wanted to mint big coins, which would be equivalent to fifty copper coins. Han Xizai, alternatively, wanted to save copper by minting iron coins. Li Jing, faced with two options, did not know which one to follow, but Zhong Mo finally convinced him, and thus big coins were minted. As a result, the ‘Ever-incirculation’ coin (Yongtong quanhuo) was produced, the value of which was equivalent to ten copper coins. Apart from the new coins, a coin of a smaller denomination, equivalent to two copper coins, was also circulated. This one was called the ‘currency of the Tang kingdom’ (Tangguo tongbao). Both of these new coins were used, together with coins of the Kaiyuan period (713–742) of the Tang dynasty. On 8 October 959, Li Hongji passed away and was given the posthumous title ‘Martial prowess manifest’ (Wuxuan). This sparked criticism from Zhang Ji (933–997), a lowly official from a district close to Jinling. He argued that, as the crown prince had been filial, he should have conferred on him a posthumous name that reflected this, and not one that reflected his military achievements only. In the end, the name was changed to ‘Culture presented’ (Wenxian).102
88 The reign of Li Jing
Zhong Mo, now the most senior official at court, had taken great pride in his position as emissary of both the Later Zhou and the Southern Tang rulers and assumed an air of arrogance. He had managed to get control of all three administrative departments of the Southern Tang and thus achieved a position that Song Qiqiu had previously coveted. He had attempted to become aide to the crown prince as well, a position that certainly would have brought him closer to the highest position in the state once the crown prince succeeded to the throne, but his application was rejected. Nevertheless, he managed to have Yan Shi, one of his closest followers, appointed as remonstrance secretary. This position entailed the scrutiny of all written documents submitted to the throne. Through Yan Shi, Zhong was able to ward off and block any opposition to him. As Tang Hao had also been involved in Li Deming’s death, Zhong Mo accused him of corruption face to face. Tang, understandably, was feeling quite apprehensive and was looking for a way out of his predicament. He learned through informants that Zhong had met several times with Zhang Luan at night, behind closed doors. Zhang was a commander of one of the military units guarding the capital and a friend of Zhong. The close relationship between the two men raised the spectre of conspiracy and rebellion, and Tang seized a chance to hit back at Zhong by reporting to Li Jing: Mo’s and Luan’s dispositions are different, but they are much too close and improperly intimate. Mo has served several times as envoy to the court in the north and Luan is a northerner. I fear that they have rebellious plans. To underline his point, he also denounced the monetary policy advocated by Zhong Mo: ‘People fake the Ever-in-circulation Currency a lot, and there are many who are violating the law.’ People did not trust the new coins, and some took advantage of the unfamiliar currency to forge it. As a result, people collected and kept the familiar copper cash, which led to a rapid decline in the value of the new coins. For the time being, Li Jing took no action against Zhong Mo. When he announced his intention to appoint Li Congjia as the new crown prince, Zhong Mo opposed his choice. Zhong explained that Li Congshan, Li Jing’s favourite son with whom he had served as envoy to the Later Zhou, was more qualified than Li Congjia. Li Jing became angry and proceeded as he had intended. In November 959, Zhong Mo, without authorization, ordered Zhang Luan to patrol Jinling with his troops. This confirmed Tang Hao’s previous allegations about Zhong’s ambitions. Li Jing immediately proclaimed a royal decree exposing Zhong’s offences. Accordingly, Zhong and Zhang were both demoted, and, after they had reached their respective places of exile, were killed.103
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In late 959, Hongzhou was officially renamed Nanchang superior prefecture and declared the new Southern Capital (Nandu). Two officials, He Jingzhu, military commissioner of Wuqing, and Chen Jishan, minister of war, were appointed to act as capital liaison representative and governor in Nanchang, respectively, until the arrival of the court. Around this time, the relations between the Southern Tang and the Liao came to an abrupt halt, when the Southern Tang prefect of Taizhou, who had been left in office after the take-over of Huainan by the Later Zhou, murdered a Liao envoy. The Liao thought that the Southern Tang had betrayed them and broke off contact forever.104 The transition from the Later Zhou to the Song dynasty occurred in early 960 with the remarkably peaceful take-over of power at court by Zhao Kuangyin, the commander of the guard troops. The Southern Tang ruler clearly saw no opportunity to take advantage of the new situation in the north, for he willingly pledged his service to the new northern dynasty. The loyalty of Li Jing as a vassal of the Song was soon tested. Li Zhongjin, the military governor of Yangzhou, who had been instrumental in the Later Zhou campaign in Huainan, rebelled against the new dynasty. The Song armies, under the personal command of Taizu, quickly put down the rebellion. The presence of the Song army on the north bank of the Yangzi made Li Jing nervous, and thus he dispatched his son, Li Congyi, and Feng Yanlu as envoys. After their arrival in the Song capital, they paid for a banquet for the emperor and his officials.105 When Taizu reproached Feng for having helped a rebellious subject, Feng replied that the emperor had only heard half of the story. Taizu asked him to explain in more detail, and Feng said: The envoy of Zhongjin previously had been lodged at my house and our ruler ordered me to tell the envoy: ‘When a man cannot accomplish his ambition, then there is certainly rebellion to occur, but there are times when that is possible, and others when it is impossible. When His Majesty had just taken the throne, the minds of the people were unsettled, and war erupted in Shangdang. At that time, you did not rebel. Now the minds of the people are at rest and the borders are quiet, and you want to fight the elite troops of the empire with a mob of a few thousand soldiers? How could we support you?’106 Taizu probed Feng’s attitude further by inquiring, ‘This may be true, but all of my generals urge me to take advantage of my victory and cross the Yangzi. What do you think about that?’. Feng, far from being impressed by the threat, replied instead with a warning: Your Majesty possesses divine martial spirit, and You can command six armies against our insignificant state. How could a petty state such
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as Jiangnan dare to resist the heavenly might? However, its ruler still has several ten thousand guard soldiers who were all the private soldiers of the late ruler and they have sworn an oath to perish together. If Your Majesty is able to overcome several ten thousand men in bloody battles, then Your Majesty will be successful. Moreover, You have to consider the winds and waves of the Great River. Advancing carelessly and not capturing cities, You will have to withdraw for want of supply lines. This should also be of concern to the great state. Taizu broke out laughing and said, ‘I have only made a joke, how could I ever take your rhetorics seriously?’.107 In reality, as flimsy as Feng’s warning may have been, the prospect of having to fight south of the Yangzi certainly was not very appealing to Taizu, who had other strategic plans, such as conquering the states of Jingnan and the Later Shu first.108 The subsequent annexation of Sichuan, in fact, proved to be a very costly campaign for the new dynasty. Even after Taizu had left Yangzhou in early 961, Li Jing found the presence of Song troops unnerving. Prior to Taizu’s return to Kaifeng, he had his officials again discuss the transfer of the capital and consequently left Jinling. About a month later, in late March or early April 961, Li Jing arrived in Hongzhou. He had left Jinling in the hands of Li Congjia, the new crown prince. As soon as Li Jing reached Hongzhou, he disliked it a lot, for it was neither as spacious, nor as comfortable as Jinling. Used to grand residences, most officials found it hard to maintain their lifestyle in a place that did not have many splendid buildings and, within a short time, they started to complain about Hongzhou. Li Jing was so frustrated that he wanted to execute those officials who had encouraged the change of capital.109 He could not punish Tang Hao, the main supporter of the transfer of the capital, for he had died upon arrival in Hongzhou. Then Li Jing fell ill and was no longer able to eat anything but sugar cane juice. He longed to go back to Jinling, and became so depressed of the sight of Hongzhou that one official had a partitioning wall set up to block the ruler’s view. In his last will, he specified the size of the tumulus he wanted to be buried in and its location in the Western Hills, close to Hongzhou. On 13 August 961, he passed away at the age of forty-six. Ironically, his final orders were not followed, just like so many other orders he had given during his lifetime. Against the deceased’s wishes, the crown prince had his corpse transported back to Jinling in early 962. On 27 February 962, Li Jing was laid to rest in the Shunling Mausoleum,110 and he received the temple name Yuanzong.
4
The reign of Li Yu and the decline of the Southern Tang
The third ruler of the Southern Tang, Li Yu, was born to empress Guangmu, née Zhong, and he was the younger brother of Li Hongji. From early on, his older brother Hongji disliked him. Because of this, he tried hard to appear inconspicuous, focusing his considerable talents on poetry, painting and music. He was very fond of books and learning, passions that were supported by his father, who had inherited a love of books from his father as well. Yu had the child name Zhongguang; upon reaching adulthood, he received the given name Congjia. As the sixth of Yuanzong’s eight sons, he was unlikely to inherit the throne, but his older brothers all died when they were in their teens, among them Li Hongmao (932–951) and Li Hongji. After Li Hongji’s death, Li Yu assumed the position of crown prince. When Yuanzong transferred the capital to Nanchang in 961, he installed Li Yu officially as heir apparent and as regent in Jinling. After Yuanzong’s death and Zhong Mo’s demise, Li Congshan made an attempt to gain the throne of Jiangnan. He urged Xu You, the chancellor, to hand him the last will of the deceased ruler. Xu You, however, refused to do so and sent the document to Li Yu in Jinling. Furthermore, he notified Li Yu of his younger brother’s unlawful behaviour. Previously, Li Yu had been fond of his brother and had treated him generously by conferring the title of prince of Han upon him. Once he heard from Xu You about the violation of the regulations, however, he demoted Li Congshan to duke of Southern Chu.1 Out of the group of officials that had served his father, only a few had survived the transition from empire to vassal state in the crucial years from 958 to 960. The removal of Zhong Mo further reduced the number of experienced officials available to Li Yu. The alleged members of Song Qiqiu’s faction in 961, such as Feng Yansi and Chen Jue, were either dead or had disappeared from the political stage at the time of Li Yu’s accession to the throne. Similarly, only very few of the opponents of Song Qiqiu were still active, among them Han Xizai and Xu Xuan. As Li Yu came to the throne a very short time after he had become crown prince, he had not had
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the opportunity to build a circle of trusted advisors, and thus he had to rely on officials who had served under his father. Li Yu’s main advisors were Yan Xu, Tang Yue and Zhang Ji. Yan Xu was a prominent figure in the Southern Tang administration and had been active there since the 930s. He was related by marriage to the ruling house and was thus an uncle of Li Yu. He owed his career to his father Yan Keqiu, who claimed the yin privilege for his son. Sons of high officials were given this privilege of easier access to official positions, and in Yan’s case this meant that he did not have to go through the examination system. When his father passed away in 930, Yan Xu asked Han Xizai, who had already gained a reputation as a talented calligrapher and scholar, to compose the epitaph for the deceased. As an incentive, he gave him money and a young singing girl, hoping that Han would not only emphasize the achievements of his father, but his own as well. However, Han merely listed the offices that Yan Keqiu had held during his career and mentioned not much else. When Yan Xu complained about this basic enumeration of administrative posts, Han sent back all the presents, including the singing girl, but did not change the text. Han Xizai’s friend Jiang Wenyu also composed a poem ridiculing Yan Xu. It was entitled ‘About a crab’, and its surviving fragments give us a clear indication how officials felt about Yan: On the outside it has many legs, on the inside not one inch of gut . . . It has a big mouth, and every time it loses its way, bubbles form on its face. It has a halberd and armour fixed to its chest, but they constantly jam, so that it has to move sideways.2 This poem depicts Yan as boastful, indecisive and evasive. One must take into consideration that both Han Xizai and Jiang Wenyu were graduates of the official examination system, and their disrespect to Yan Xu in great part may have been due to him having been promoted without comparable credentials. Tang Yue was the name Yin Chongyi adopted in 960 in order to avoid violating the taboo name of the deceased father of the Song emperor. He was something of a newcomer, who only had begun his career under Yuanzong. After the war, Yuanzong sent Tang as envoy to the court of the Later Zhou, and Shizong treated him very generously. Upon his return, Yuanzong ordered him to assist and advise Li Yu, together with Yan Xu.3 Zhang Ji had attained the jinshi degree under the Southern Tang and he had come to the attention of Yuanzong during the discussion of the posthumous name for the late crown prince, Li Hongji. This earned him promotion to the position of censor, and he served as secretary to Li Yu. Tang and Yan were much older than Li Yu, whereas Zhang was almost his age. He rose rapidly through the bureaucratic ranks into some of the highest offices available in the state of Jiangnan.
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After a long period of mourning for his deceased father, Li Yu proceeded along well-established lines by promoting his consort, Zhou (937–964), to queen of the kingdom, and his mother, Zhong, to queen dowager. As the queen dowager’s father’s given name was Taizhang, she was not given the regular title taihou, but that of ‘Sage respected queen’ (shengzun hou), in order to avoid a taboo violation. Li Yu himself abandoned his original given name Congjia and assumed the given name Yu. At the same time, he conferred new titles on his brothers and ordered that, each day, two officials of rank four to nine, who were holding no posts, should come to the audience to be given assignments. Li Yu tried to emulate his energetic grandfather in controlling the bureaucratic apparatus at the start of his reign. Only a few years into his reign, however, he left most of the decision-making to his advisors, on whom he relied in almost all affairs. Feng Yanlu, vice minister of the secretariat, was given the task of announcing Li Yu’s accession to the Song court in Kaifeng. Li Yu willingly adopted the Song calendar and the Song reign title and very closely followed the provisions of the treaty the Southern Tang had negotiated with the Later Zhou. In reply, Taizu sent an imperial decree and, from then on, Li Yu was a recipient of orders, which meant that he no longer could sign orders on his own behalf and authority. In the late autumn of 961, a Song envoy was sent with condolences and gifts to Jinling, and, one month later, a Song official arrived with a congratulatory message on the occasion of Li Yu’s accession to the throne.4 In the following years, Li Yu observed all the customs that befitted his status as vassal of the Song, and he was always anxious to preserve the precious little autonomy the Song permitted him. He frequently sent tribute to the Song court, in the hope that, by providing the Song with enormous payments of silk, gold and silver, he could retain his status and postpone the unavoidable annexation of his state into the growing Song Empire. The state that he inherited from his father in 961 was much smaller than it had been at the height of Southern Tang power in the early 950s. Huainan had become annexed by the Song state, and territories in Hunan and Fujian had been seized by local warlords, who only nominally were vassals of Jiangnan. For these reasons, the continuous tribute payments to the Song put a heavy strain on the coffers of the state. As a vassal of the Song, Li Yu was required to exchange the imperial yellow robe, which was due the legitimate emperor of China only, with a purple-coloured robe. Whenever he received an official from the Song, he slipped into the purple robe. After the departure of the envoy, he put back on the yellow gown, thus pretending that, at least at his court, he still held an imperial position.5
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The only noteworthy incident that occurred in 962 was caused by Liu Congxiao. Liu perceived the move of the Southern Tang capital to Hongzhou as a challenge to his own position in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou1. Therefore, he sent his son Shaoji with generous presents to Hongzhou; at the same time, he let the king of Wuyue know of his willingness to submit to his rule. Taizu sent Liu Congxiao many presents when he heard of Shaoji’s presence in Hongzhou. Before they reached him, Liu Congxiao died, and his younger son, Shaozi, assumed command. Shortly afterwards, an envoy from Wuyue appeared in Quanzhou1, and Chen Hongjin, a military officer, mistook Shaozi’s intention to talk to the Wuyue envoy as treason. For that reason, he took Liu Shaozi prisoner, sent him to Jinling and appointed another officer, named Zhang Hansi, as the new governor. He, himself, acted as deputy to Zhang.6 Because Zhang was unable to attend to administrative matters owing to old age, Chen Hongjin was in de facto control. Zhang’s sons resented Chen and staged a mutiny, trying to murder Chen, who survived by sheer luck and killed them instead.7 In the autumn of 963, Chen Hongjin declared himself deputy military commissioner of Qingyuan and magistrate of Quanzhou1, Nanzhou and other prefectures, and pledged his loyalty to the Song court.8 This did not please Li Yu, and he described Chen Hongjin, in a letter to the Song court, as untrustworthy. However, Taizu stood by his decision and confirmed Chen Hongjin in his position. With that, the Southern Tang had lost yet another region that they had once controlled. In early January 964, Li Yu tested the benevolence of Taizu by asking him for permission to sign decrees and letters with his own name. This was refused outright.9 Prior to this, the Song court had ordered that all officers and troops from the north who had been held in Jiangnan were to be released and returned to the north. At the same time, those people of Yangzhou who had been transferred to regions south of the Yangzi during the war with the Later Zhou were to be resettled in Yangzhou.10 The relations between the Song and the Southern Tang appear to have grown more unfriendly as Taizu conquered and annexed formerly independent territories. Vassal rulers such as Li Yu or Liu Chang (r. 958–971) of the Southern Han certainly became increasingly aware of the possibility of a unification of the empire under the Song. Taizu possessed the military power as well as the leadership talents necessary to realize his vision of a unified empire under one ruler. Under these circumstances, imperial vestiges as they still existed in Jinling were to disappear rapidly. When Li Bian had moved the capital from Yangzhou to Jinling, he merely turned existing structures into residences for the royal family and the bureaucracy by adding on roof decorations. Li Yu had these roof decorations removed, in order not to offend the northern officials, but kept them for later reinstallation.11
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In the spring of 964, Jiangnan issued iron coins together with the copper coins that were already circulating. The plan was to increase the share of iron coins in the economic system to 60 per cent. However, people held the iron coins in low esteem and hoarded the copper coins, which led to a decreased value of the iron coins and an increase in the value of the copper coins. By the end of the year, one copper coin was worth ten iron coins, and, after the surrender of Jiangnan in 976, the number of copper coin strings amassed in its provinces amounted to 600,000–700,000.12 In the same year, Li Yu ordered Han Xizai to conduct official examinations. The Song did not interfere with the examination process, and so Han passed a total of nine men, including Feng Zun,13 the son of Feng Yanlu. Li Yu doubted the results and gave Xu Xuan the task of re-examining five of the candidates, among them Han’s disciple Shu Ya (?–1009). Afterwards, he personally conducted another examination of the five men, and they failed again. The failure of his disciple and his obvious rigging of the examination results did not lead to any punishment of Han Xizai, however. The economic conditions of the Jiangnan state grew more difficult after the Song initiated a new trade policy in the autumn of 964. Merchants from the north were not allowed to cross the Yangzi to trade in Jiangnan, and, in addition, a general tax on commodities, payable in gold or silver, was introduced. According to the new regulations, merchants from the south had to pay for commodities and goods in hard currency, and Jiangnan was gradually drained of gold and silver.14 Towards the end of the year, Li Yu’s first wife, Zhou, had died, shortly after Li Yu’s second son, Zhongxuan, had passed away. Zhou, daughter of Li Bian’s trusted aide Zhou Zong, had been artistically talented and had come to the attention of Yuanzong through her expert playing of the pipa, the Chinese lute. In addition to her artistic skills, she possessed knowledge of the Classics and history and was also versed in poetry. She was therefore a suitable match for Li Yu. Overcome with grief at the loss of her son Zhongxuan, she fell ill. Li Yu personally looked after her, but she passed away on 12 December 964, at the age of only twenty-nine. He mourned the loss of his wife very deeply and felt remorse, because he had started a relationship with her younger sister while she was still alive. Earlier that year, the queen had noticed her younger sister in the palace. When she asked her when she had arrived in the palace, her sister, being naïve, answered that she had been there for several days already. This displeased the queen so much that she was angry with her husband for the remaining days of her life. After the passing of the queen, Li Yu composed a dirge for her and had it inscribed in stone. He also made sure that her favourite pipa was buried together with her. He did not take a new wife until after the death of his mother, Zhong, in 965. He buried her beside her husband, Yuanzong, in the Shunling mausoleum.15
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By the end of the year, Li Yu conferred the title queen of state on Zhou, his second wife. He consulted his advisors to find out if there were any historical precedents for wedding ceremonies. After all, he wanted to elevate the younger sister to the same status as her older sister. Xu Xuan and Pan You (938–973) discussed this difficult ritual problem, and both of them were at odds about whether music should be used in wedding ceremonies or not. Xu rejected music on the basis of historical precedents, whereas Pan advocated it on the basis of there being no precedents at all. After a prolonged exchange of arguments against and in favour of music, Li Yu handed the matter over to Xu You for a final decision. Xu You, cousin of Yuanzong and uncle of Li Yu, had been acting as grand guardian of the heir apparent prior to Li Yu’s accession to the throne. During Yuanzong’s reign, he gained access to the palace because of his family relationship with the emperor.16 Xu You leaned towards Pan You’s interpretation, because Pan, at that time, was in favour with Li Yu, and Xu hoped to fulfil what he thought were Li Yu’s expectations.17 In 968, Tang Yue was promoted to vice director of the department of state affairs and joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery and, thus, had reached the highest possible appointment. Bureaucratic circles did not receive the news of this appointment well. Zhang Ji voiced his concerns most vociferously. Tang Yue previously had recommended Zhang Ji for service, and Zhang received a position as academician of the hall of splendour, which put him in the position of close political advisor to the ruler. The hall was located in the palace park and allowed Li Yu to discuss matters of state with Zhang Ji whenever he wished and without having to use the regular meeting hall.18 Certainly a man of great abilities, Zhang also liked to point out the shortcomings of his colleagues to Li Yu, and he flattered his ruler, too. When Tang’s sons were given appointments in the government, Zhang alleged that the promotion of Tang’s sons was due to the influence of their father. He straightforwardly called Tang Yue incapable, untalented and unfit to fulfil the requirements of the job. This criticism was noted, but no action was taken against Tang. Zhang was dismissed for his outrageous accusations, only to be recalled a short while later.19 When Li Yu returned from a hunt at Mount Qinglong near Jinling in 969, he rested at the court of judicial review, where he personally examined legal cases and pardoned many people who had been imprisoned there. Han Xizai criticized him severely for this meddling in official affairs, acting certainly on behalf of a growing number of officials who had asked the ruler numerous times to carry out culprits’ punishments. Even when people had already been sentenced, they very often did not receive any punishment.20 Han Xizai was not the only official who found fault with the conduct of affairs by Li Yu. Zhang Xian, an investigating censor, submitted a memorial
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in which he claimed that the public was speaking negatively about Li Yu. Officials had obviously expected the ruler, once he had married, to turn to government matters again, but he still spent a lot of time at the music bureau within the palace grounds, where female entertainers performed on stage.21 This, in itself, would not have been so bad, but Li Yu rewarded the musical entertainers lavishly. Zhang’s memorial reads: You have built extensive buildings for the instruction of musical entertainers, and you have given them large residences. You have sent one regulation after another teaching ordinary people parsimonious behaviour, but you live in palaces with parks that contain so many extraordinary corners. People in all circuits talk about your giving Yuan Chengjin, the Commissioner for the Palace Music School, the residence of Meng Gongchen, the Vice Director of the Ministry of Revenue. In the past, Emperor Gaozu of the Tang wanted to appoint the ‘dancing barbarian’ An Chinu as Gentleman Cavalier Attendant (in 618) and became the laughing-stock of the whole court. Even though you have not appointed Chengjin as Vice Director, you still gave him the residence of a Vice Director as a present, and that is comparable to the matter outlined above. Zhang used a historical precedent to warn Li Yu about the consequences of honouring a lowly eunuch with the residence formerly inhabited by a high official. He targeted the luxurious lifestyle of Li Yu in his memorial, too. The ruler accepted the admonishment and rewarded Zhang, but he did not change his earlier directive concerning Yuan Chengjin.22 At the start of 970, orders were issued to renovate all Buddhist temples, and both Li Yu and his wife dressed in Buddhist garments to pray and do worship.23 Indulgence in religion further expressed Li Yu’s escapist nature, another characteristic that he had in common with his father. Both Yuanzong and Li Yu were, at times, unwilling to deal with serious government matters and tried to avoid administrative work by either engaging in poetry and the arts, as did Yuanzong, or immersing himself in religion, as did Li Yu. Li Yu earlier had built a Buddhist temple in the imperial park that housed several hundred monks and nuns, many of whom had formerly been concubines and female palace officials. This environment gave Li Yu muchneeded respite, and he is said to have dressed in a Buddhist robe whenever he went to the temple to pray there. His officials did not have access to the temple, but when they heard that some of the monks behaved in a less than pious way, they asked for them to be punished. Li Yu did not have them physically punished, but ordered them to kowtow to the Buddha. Because of Li Yu’s devotion to Buddhism, many people in the country adopted Buddhism, and even some of the high officials practised fasts or became vegetarians in order to venerate the Buddha.24
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In the summer of 970, You Jianyan (912–970) succumbed to illness.25 You Jianyan had started his career in the service of Li Bian, before the founding of the Southern Tang, and became a Hanlin academician after Li Bian’s usurpation. During Yuanzong’s reign, he held the position of minister of personnel, not least because he did not become involved in the bureaucratic conflicts of the time. For this reason, we do not hear much about him until the time of the transfer of the capital to Nanchang, when Yuanzong made him advisor to Li Yu in Jinling, an appointment that You Jianyan only very reluctantly accepted. In 963, he was promoted to right vice director of the department of state affairs and held that position until 970, when he was given the highest post available, that of left vice director of the department of state affairs. You was very critical of people who sought to be promoted because of their connections with high ministers, and he regularly turned them down. Because of his honest attitude, many officials had great respect for him, but they all agreed that he lacked knowledge of the principles of bureaucracy.26 In September of the same year, Han Xizai passed away. Li Yu had admired Han and had appointed him earlier, in 968, as director of the department of state affairs.27 He believed him to be a straightforward official, who possessed excellent talents in poetry and calligraphy, too. However, his abilities were much overshadowed by his personal conduct. Han had several dozens of singing girls in his household, and when he invited friends to his residence, the girls would come out and mingle with them. As Li Yu wanted to make him chancellor, he warned Han, in a letter, of imminent transfer to the Southern Capital unless he changed his lifestyle. This threat at first seemed to work, for Han got rid of the girls and asked the ruler to spare him demotion to Hongzhou. After Li Yu had granted this, the singing girls returned gradually to Han Xizai’s residence, and thus Han did not become chancellor. Li Yu wished to promote Han Xizai at least posthumously, and, after a successful search for precedents, Han had conferred on him the title of grand councillor. All court business was suspended for three days in mourning for Han. As Han had spent all of his income on the girls in his household, Li Yu personally covered the costs of his burial.28 To honour Han further, Li Yu commanded that he be buried in Guangling next to the tomb of Xie An (320–385), a famous minister of the Jin dynasty (265–420).29 In order to prove his loyalty to the Song in the autumn of 970, Li Yu had Pan You draft a memorial of several thousand characters addressed to the ruler of the Southern Han. In the document, he referred to the long-standing, friendly relations between the two states and continued by explaining that the Southern Han, with the previous occupation of Hunan by the Song, had a new neighbour. He recommended submitting peacefully, as that held more rewards for Liu Chang than starting a war he would definitely lose. Interestingly, the letter also referred to suggestions made by officials at the
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Southern Han court that might encourage resistance based on the topography of the Southern Han. Pan You went on to point out that neither the mountain ranges in the north, nor the sea to the east posed any obstacles to the might of the Song armies, and he closed by saying that Liu Chang should think about all this thoroughly.30 Li Yu dispatched Gong Shenyi to the Southern Han court with this letter, but Liu Chang at the time had no intention of submitting to the Song, for he felt safe. After Gong’s arrival in the Southern Han capital, Liu Chang had him imprisoned. He sent a very rude letter to Li Yu, who passed it on to the Song emperor, in order to let him know about Liu Chang’s attitude. Li Yu, at this time, distanced himself completely from the administration of the state, the fall of which became imminent as the Song state was gaining ever more power. Some officials felt that actions should be taken to prevent the complete decline of the state. Lin Renzhao, who in late 970 was in charge of the Southern Capital and was one of the few successful Southern Tang generals, sent a secret memorial to the throne that read: None of the Song garrisons in the prefectures of Huainan exceeds one thousand men. In recent years the Song destroyed the state of Shu, and now they are about to attack Lingbiao (i.e. the Southern Han). This is a march of several thousand li31 that will wear out their troops. I ask permission to lead several myriads of troops northwards towards Shouchun to conquer Zhengyang, for I am thinking of our people there and believe that it is possible to recover the old territory north of the Yangzi. If they bring in relief troops, I will hold the defensive positions and guard them, and their army will not be able to break through. On the day when I start the attack, I beg You to inform the Song court that I have arisen in rebellion. If the matter comes to a successful end, then our dynasty will be enjoying its benefits; if I am defeated, then You can execute my family. This way, it will be clear that Your Majesty does not harbour two minds. Lin based his plan on the overstretched supply lines of the Song army. These had become exposed, but had never been interrupted during the previous campaigns, and they were going to become overextended again in the war against the Southern Han. To make up the numbers for the invasion forces of the Southern Han, the Song had been forced to reduce the garrisons in Huainan dramatically. Lin wanted Li Yu to raise an army and entrust him with its command. He then would retake Huainan, before the Song forces were able to return from their southern campaign. Li Yu was too afraid to take the risk and did not act upon Lin’s advice, even though Lin had suggested to him a way out by assuming all responsibility for an eventual failure. Taizu launched the campaign against the Southern Han late in 970,
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without interference from the Southern Tang, and after several months of fighting overcame Liu Chang in 971. Shortly after Lin Renzhao had submitted his ideas to Li Yu, Lu Jiang, another official, similarly believed that the situation was favourable for a strike against the Song. Lu Jiang, upon recommendation by Chen Qiao, first had been employed in the bureau of military affairs. Following Chen’s orders, he recruited men to make up for naval losses suffered in the war against the Later Zhou. He proved to be very efficient and repelled several attacks by naval forces from Wuyue, and he furthermore disrupted the transport of salt from the coastal region to Wuyue. He then suggested to Li Yu that they destroy Wuyue’s naval power to prevent it joining ranks with the Song in a future attack. Li Yu refused to follow this plan, because he did not want to become involved in a war with an ally of the Song. As an alternative, Lu suggested spreading the rumour that the two prefectures of Xuanzhou and Shezhou, which were close to Wuyue territory, were in rebellion. Li Yu then should ask Wuyue for military help, and, when their troops had arrived, Lu would make sure of their destruction, in the wake of which Lu would invade Wuyue. As before, Li Yu did not think that an invasion and consequent destruction of Wuyue were possible.32 He sent his younger brother, Li Congqian, to Kaifeng with more tributes than ever before. This mission must again be seen as an attempt to prove his worth as a loyal subject. In the summer of 971, Li Jingda, Li Yu’s uncle, died. Li Jingda might have assisted him with more advice, but, as it was, Li Yu from then on had to rely completely on his close aides. After he had witnessed the fall of the Southern Han to the Song armies in late 971, Li Yu became very frightened and increased his efforts to demonstrate his complete obedience to the Song. He felt compelled to do so, as the Song established a military prefecture in Hanyang (in modern Hubei province) and thus occupied another strategically important locality that would make an invasion of the remaining Southern Tang territories easy.33 Li Yu at this time dispatched Li Congshan as envoy to the Song court to report that he had adopted the humble title of ‘Ruler of Jiangnan’ and renounced the title ‘Ruler of Tang’. Moreover, he asked to be no longer addressed with his title, but merely with his personal name, like any other subject of the Song. Li Congshan discretely handed over a large amount of silver to the chancellor, Zhao Pu (922–992), in order to secure his support. Zhao reported this to Taizu, who told him to accept the silver and to send his thanks to the Jiangnan envoy. When Li Congshan came to meet Zhao, he was given more silver than he had originally submitted. It now dawned on Li Yu and his entourage that it would not be possible to maintain semiautonomous rule, despite the payment of large sums of money.34 From a merchant who had travelled there, Li Yu learned that the Song were preparing a fleet of river boats in Jingnan, but he did not take the
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merchant’s advice to make a preemptive strike against this fleet, which obviously was built with the explicit intention to attack Jiangnan.35 Instead of adopting an aggressive policy, as suggested by Lin Renzhao and Lu Jiang, Li Yu preferred to continue sending tribute and presents to the Song court. One of the missions in the spring of 972 carried goods from Champa (Zhancheng, in central modern-day Vietnam), Java (Shepo) and Arabia (Dashiguo) that had been sent to Jinling previously.36 Taizu, consequently, decreed that, in the future, the three countries should no longer submit presents to Jiangnan, but send them to the Song court. It seems that some countries were still unaware of the change in the political landscape of China and that, heretofore, the Southern Tang, for at least some of them, still represented the Chinese Empire. Interestingly, several months earlier, envoys from the state of Srivijaya (Sanfoqi) on Sumatra had arrived at the Song court to submit local products as tribute.37 Among the various states in mainland and insular South East Asia, there apparently existed no exchange of information on the Chinese Empire. Taizu’s command proved efficient, as, early in the following year, a Champa envoy arrived to pledge the submission of Champa to the Song, and, in 973, an envoy from Arabia appeared at the Song court as well.38 It is fair to assume that the goods included camphor, sandalwood, rosewood, incense and most likely exotic animals as well. All of these items were much sought after in China and were traded as luxury goods.39 In 972, administrative offices and agencies in the state of Jiangnan received new names, in order to distinguish them from the imperial administration of the Song and to further display Jiangnan’s status as a vassal. In line with this, all royal ceremonies were abolished, and decrees from the ruler were now simply called orders, while the imperial secretariat and the imperial chancellery were renamed the left and right princely administrative offices. The roof ornaments on the palaces and residences were discarded for good, and princely titles held by the immediate members of the ruling family were changed into lower ducal titles.40 Despite this show of respect to the Song, Zhang Bi conducted official examinations, which resulted in the passing of three successful candidates. After Zhang Ji complained that Zhang Bi had overlooked talented men, the ruler told Zhang Ji to supervise yet another examination, which produced four more graduates.41 Li Congshan, the Southern Tang envoy in the Song capital, travelled to Jinling with an imperial order for Li Yu to appear in person at the Song court. Li Yu ignored the order and increased his tribute payments to Kaifeng.42 In the autumn of 972, Li Yu arranged for the murder of Lin Renzhao, thus depriving himself of the one commander who possessed imagination and was capable of strategic thinking. Taizu was weary of Lin Renzhao, whose plan he must have heard about through the Southern Tang envoys. He thus set a plan in motion to destroy Lin. The opportunity to do this came sometime
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later, when one of Lin’s servants, who was paid by the Song, stole a portrait of Lin and handed it over to the Song. When the Southern Tang envoy arrived in Kaifeng, the officials who received him showed him the portrait and told him that Lin Renzhao had sent it himself as a sign of his service to the Song. They then led him to an empty residence, which they said was Lin’s.43 At the time, Huangfu Jixun and Zhu Lingyun were conducting all military affairs and, as they were jealous of Lin Renzhao’s plans, they welcomed the elimination of a potential rival. Once the envoy had informed Li Yu of the apparent treason by Lin, the ruler had him murdered without hearing him out first. Taizu, in yet another attempt to bring Li Yu to Kaifeng, selected Lu Duoxun (934–985) as his envoy. Lu arrived at the southern court in the summer of 973 to investigate and examine conditions in Jiangnan. He won the trust of Li Yu and, when he was about to take leave, asked him to provide charts and other relevant information on the prefectures of Jiangnan for an alleged cumulative gazetteer of the empire. Li Yu immediately ordered the necessary material to be provided. Equipped with this material, Lu Duoxun suggested to Taizu that he wage a campaign against Jiangnan, taking advantage of the very valuable information Li Yu had released so carelessly.44 In the winter of 973, Pan You sent a memorial to the ruler in which he pointed out the inadequate handling of the state by the high-ranking ministers, at a time when the survival of the dynasty was at stake. As his first memorial did not have any effect, he sent in six more memorials, each being more critical than the preceding one. In the end, he was dismissed from almost all posts and therefore requested permission to retire completely. After his dismissal, he sent in a last memorial, in which he used historical precedents to caution the ruler not to employ inferior officials. It was evident that Pan You targetted people such as Zhang Ji and others who were at the helm of the state, and in turn they did everything to denounce Pan You. Soon a pretext was found to blame Pan. The only official whom Pan previously had recommended for higher positions was his good friend Li Ping. Li Ping was a northern refugee who had entered the service of the Southern Tang in 948. As Li Ping had been a Daoist priest on Mount Song, and Pan You was very much attracted to Daoism and obscure rites, he had befriended Li Ping. Li claimed to be able to communicate with immortals and told Pan that Pan’s father had become an immortal official. This endeared him further to Pan, who, at his house, had a room where they could secretly perform Daoist and other rites. Li Ping suggested that Li Yu return to the old well-field regulations and force rich landlords to return land to the poor people they had bought it from. He also wanted to establish registers of people and cattle, as prescribed in the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli), one of the classics, and to have the people cultivate mulberry trees. As Li Yu was interested in old agricultural customs, he appointed Li Ping head of the court of the national granaries. Once in power, Li Ping created
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a lot of opposition at court, as well as among the population, for he pursued his policies in a way that was perceived as being too urgent and too ambitious. When this came to the notice of Li Yu, he dismissed him. Pan You then attempted to have Li Ping appointed as the head of the department of state affairs, thus antagonizing senior court officials. They submitted a memorial accusing Pan of excessive criticism and of worshipping demons together with Li Ping. Subsequently, Li Ping was arrested and sent to prison, where he hanged himself; Pan You committed suicide when he received news of his imminent arrest.45 By the autumn of 973, Taizu was determined to end autonomous rule in Jiangnan. He refused permission to grant Li Congshan home leave, and his envoy Liang Jiong mentioned to Li Yu that Taizu wanted him present for the winter sacrifices. Still, Li Yu did not respond at all to this invitation.46 The next Song envoy, Li Mu (928–985), brought a direct order from Taizu: ‘I am about to worship at the Altar to Heaven in the second winter month and want you to inspect sacrificial animals with me.’47 It appears that, after meeting with Li Mu, Li Yu pondered surrender to the Song, but Chen Qiao and Zhang Ji interfered and encouraged Li Yu not to travel to Kaifeng.48 Li Yu thus rejected the order, feigning illness and pretending not to be worthy of such an honour.49 He sent his brother Li Congyi with yet more money and presents to the Song court, and, once the latter had arrived at the capital, like Li Congshan, he was not given permission to return.50 Taizu had enough of Li Yu’s charades and dispatched his generals to execute a rapid strike at Jiangnan with forces that had been readied for this in Huainan. He briefed them thoroughly in order to avoid the kind of massacre that had accompanied the conquest of Shu in Sichuan in 965 and told Cao Bin (931–999), their overall commander, not to harm the local population. Cao Bin proceeded to attack Jiangnan from his base in Jingnan in early November 974, at the same time as Li Mu left Kaifeng to travel to Jinling.51 He advanced to Chizhou, which he captured on 22 November 974. From there, he launched an attack against Wuhu and against Dangtu, which surrendered on 5 December. Then the army proceeded to Caishiji, where it camped for the time being.52 A defector called Fan Ruoshui, who was a native of Chizhou and who had failed to pass the official examinations of the Southern Tang, helped the advancing Song army. Fan suggested building a floating bridge across the Yangzi. He had measured the width of the Yangzi at Caishiji and found it to be the ideal place for a crossing from north to south. Taizu ordered the court of academicians to examine Fan and his abilities, and, not surprisingly, he passed with honours. Fan had left his family in Jiangnan and, as he was afraid they would suffer if the Southern Tang learned of his plan, he asked Taizu to save them. Taizu sent an order to Li Yu to hand over Fan’s relatives, and Li acted accordingly. Only then, and after promoting Fan to
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grand master admonisher, did Taizu set the plan for the building of the bridge in motion.53 Despite the scepticism of some court officials about the feasibility of the project, Taizu ordered officials in Jinghu, the former state of Jingnan, to begin with the construction of big war vessels and smaller boats. The latter were to be used for the assembly of the floating bridge. When carpenters arrived with floats and the smaller crafts at Caishiji, the water level of the Yangzi was too low, and thus the construction site was relocated to Shipaikou (in modern Anhui province).54 After the bridge had been built and tested, it was finally moored at Caishiji, about one hundred kilometres south-west of Jinling. The bridge gave the Song armies rapid and easy access from the north to the south and enabled them to advance quickly to advance on Jinling. Fan Ruoshui was rewarded with an appointment as magistrate of Chizhou.55 In the first major battle at Caishiji, the Song forces under Cao Bin defeated twenty thousand Southern Tang troops and captured one of their army commanders. This was one of the very rare encounters in which the Southern Tang army employed cavalry, for they otherwise relied on naval forces and infantry. In previous years, the Song court had sent warhorses as gifts to Jinling on a regular basis. The Song army captured around three hundred of them at Caishiji.56 The state of Wuyue had dispatched an army in an attack on the eastern prefectures of Changzhou and Runzhou as soon as the Song army had seized the city of Wuhu and Xiongyuan military prefecture. Li Yu thus addressed a personal letter to the king of Wuyue, trying to persuade him to stop the attack. The letter read: If I am being removed now, do you think you will still be there tomorrow? One day the emperor will take over the territories he handed over to you as reward for your merits, and you will be just a commoner in Daliang. The king of Wuyue forwarded this letter to the Song court and continued his campaign against the Southern Tang.57 There was much truth in what Li Yu said, for Wuyue eventually surrendered to the Song in 978. Officials at the Southern Tang court had hoped that, like every year in spring and in summer, the Yangzi would be fast flowing and troublesome, but in this specific year the river remained calm.58 Li Yu had firmly believed that to build a bridge across the Yangzi was impossible. Zhang Ji supported Li Yu’s view: ‘Since the first recorded events, there has never been anything like that. This bridge certainly never will be finished.’ Li Yu responded, ‘I also think that it is just child’s play.’ He then dispatched Zheng Yanhua with ten thousand marines and Du Zhen with another detachment of ten thousand regular troops to combine in an attack on the advancing Song army.
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On the western frontier, up the Yangzi River, the situation was looking bleak for the Southern Tang as well. There, Li Shu, magistrate of Hanyang military prefecture, fought a battle on the Yangzi against Southern Tang troops from Ezhou and defeated them. He also captured some forty vessels, which were added to the growing Song fleet. Meanwhile, Zheng Yanhua and Du Zhen had approached their target at Caishiji. When Du Zhen engaged the Song army in battle, Zheng Yanhua did not launch his attack as planned, and Du’s detachment suffered a heavy defeat. The bridge at Caishiji, though threatened, thus remained as the major means of transportation from north to south. In a show of defiance, Li Yu commanded that the Song reign title ‘Opened treasure’ (Kaibao) be dropped, and that the cyclical designation of the year, jiaxu, be used in all official and private documents. As the reserves in the treasuries of the state had dwindled, people who gave financial and material support for the war effort were awarded official positions.59 The first act of Fan Ruoshui, in his new capacity as magistrate of Chizhou, was to destroy a contingent of four thousand troops from Jiangnan on the borders of the prefecture. In the western theatre of war, on the middle reaches of the Yangzi, general Wu Shouqian led his force into the area of Wuchang military prefecture, where he attacked the Southern Tang forces, numbering over ten thousand. He killed about seven hundred of them and conquered one of their fortifications. The next major engagement between the Song and the Jiangnan forces occurred at the Li River, about seventy kilometres south of Jinling. Zhang Xiong, the commander of the Southern Tang forces, was a native of the Huai area. During the war with the Later Zhou, he had assumed command of one of the irregular army units, the so-called ‘Righteous army’ that local people had formed to resist the enemy invasion. Yuanzong promoted Zhang to general-in-chief of all militia units in recognition of the many successes he had achieved against the Later Zhou. After Huainan had been ceded, the ruler posted Zhang to Jiangnan to serve as head of two districts. Under Li Yu, Zhang was further promoted to commander-in-chief. As the Song forces approached Jinling, Zhang admonished his sons: ‘I am certainly going to die in these hard times for the state. If you do not follow me in death, then you are disloyal and unfilial.’ On 22 February 975, he led his sons and ten thousand troops against the Song forces under the command of Tian Qinzuo, who roundly defeated them. Zhang Xiong was captured and executed, and his sons were killed in battle.60 Fan Ruoshui continued his successful campaign by dispatching a detachment on 26 February in an attack on Xuanzhou prefecture, about one hundred and thirty kilometres east of Chizhou. The troops from Chizhou gave battle to the Southern Tang troops stationed there and defeated them.
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As Li Yu and his officials realized that defeating the Song army in the field was close to impossible, the Song army, under the command of Cao Bin, arrived north of the city on 3 March 975.61 This situation prompted Li Yu to undertake personnel changes. Huangfu Jixun was appointed overall military commander, and administrative and government matters were entrusted to Chen Qiao and Zhang Ji. Xu Yuanyu, a grandson of Xu Wen, and Diao Kan (945–1013) were made palace edict recipients, with orders to report on all matters. One of their first acts was to erect a partition screen in the audience hall when more and more messengers with bad news arrived, so that Li Yu would not be disturbed.62 Li Yu did not attend at all to the most pressing matters of state, but instead withdrew into his palace to devote his time to discussions of the Book of changes (Yijing) with Daoist priests and the recitation of sutras with Buddhist monks.63 No plans were made for the defence of Jinling, because the ruler and his officials relied on the strength of Jinling’s fortifications. Xu and Diao also ordered the palace gates locked and the palace guarded, so that no one inside the palace would learn of the activities going on outside, when the Song army was already besieging the city. Orders to the troops and edicts to the administration were no longer issued by the bureau of military affairs and the imperial secretariat, but came from the Clear Mind Pavilion. This institution was located in the northern part of the imperial park in Jinling, next to the palace of diligent governance. It had been built on the recommendation of Xu Miao, junior mentor of the heir apparent, and Xu You, grand guardian of the heir apparent. The clear mind pavilion served as a residence for the imperial cousins Xu Yuanyu, Xu Yuanji, Xu Yuanyu and Xu Yuanshu, who were all vice directors or assistants in the palace library.64 The four cousins thus rose from relatively lowly positions to positions very close to the ruler. As no military reserves had been rebuilt after Yuanzong’s surrender, and the main army suffered defeat at Caishiji, militia were levied to defend the dynasty. All men, except those too old or too young, were recruited to serve. Interestingly, since Yuanzong’s reign, recruits for the naval forces had been chosen from among the annual winners of the dragon boat races held in late spring or early summer. The White armour army of the war with the Later Zhou was revived, and many common people, of their own accord, turned their field tools into weapons to oppose the Song. As they had done twenty years earlier, they used paper to protect their body. However, their military effectiveness was very small, and they were disbanded, together with all other militia units whose military value was similarly dubious.65 The Song troops therefore arrived unopposed at the city gates of Jinling in early April and laid siege to the city proper. The commander of the vanguard, Pan Mei (925–991), led his troops across the Qinhuai River and defeated the last Southern Tang troops – said to have numbered more than one hundred
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thousand men – that were waiting underneath the city walls of Jinling. He also fended off a last attempt made by the defenders to reach and destroy the floating bridge. In a previous battle on 26 March, Cao Bin had defeated ten thousand Southern Tang troops at Bailuzhou, killing more than half of them and taking several hundred of them prisoner, while also capturing over fifty war vessels. Two days later, taking advantage of his victory, he was able to breach the outer wall of Shengzhou.66 Li Yu had relapsed into the lethargy that was such a prominent feature of his rule. Zhang Ji had reassured him that the days of the siege were numbered, as the Song army was already exhausted. It would only be a matter of time until the Southern Tang forces were able to drive the Song army away. Li Yu gladly believed this comforting lie and ordered that official examinations be arranged. These produced altogether thirty successful candidates, who all received the jinshi degree within the besieged city.67 About a month later, the Wuyue army started their attack on Changzhou, a city south-east of Jinling that the Wuyue rulers had coveted for a long time. Its prefect was originally inclined to resist, but the Wuyue military commander convinced him to surrender the city without giving battle at all. Before committing the army to the war, Chancellor Shen Huzi had warned the Wuyue ruler, saying, ‘Jiangnan serves as a buffer behind which we are protected. Now you are yourself removing this buffer; how will you protect our state in the future?’.68 The king did not listen and dismissed Shen, whose words turned out to be a realistic assessment of things to come. After the state of Jiangnan was gone, Wuyue had a direct border with the Song, and, for the Song, it was then much easier to exert pressure on Wuyue. Having taken Changzhou, the Wuyue army proceeded to Runzhou, on the junction of the Grand Canal and the Yangzi, less than a hundred kilometres east of Jinling. Liu Deng, the prefect of Runzhou, had been a companion of Li Yu since his days as crown prince, and Li was very fond of Liu. When he bid farewell to Liu on the day he left for Runzhou, he said to him, ‘You have never been separated from me, and I find it difficult to part with you. However, this is an enterprise where you can really support me.’ Liu was quite moved by this demonstration of royal affection. He went home, gathered all the family valuables and submitted them to the court. The Wuyue forces had not yet dug in at Jingkou (modern-day Zhenjiang), when Liu’s military advisors suggested striking at them immediately. Apparently Liu, contrary to his outward gestures of loyal service, had already thought about defecting. He maintained that it would be better to let the enemy set up a camp at Jingkou and, in the meantime, make plans for their destruction. In response to this plan, Li Yu sent Lu Jiang with eight thousand marines from Jinling, and he managed to break through the siege and enter the city.
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For more than a month, Liu and Lu held the city, but they were eyeing each other with suspicion. Liu wanted to surrender and so he said to Lu, ‘Spies report that the capital city’s siege turns harder with each day. Once the capital is no longer protected, how are we to guard this place?’. Lu was aware of this possibility as well and he replied, ‘You are the guarding commander and you cannot abandon the city and run away, but I can go to the capital to help those in distress.’ This reaction was what Liu had hoped for, and he gave Lu permission to leave. After Lu’s departure, it was easy for Liu to convince his officers and soldiers of the benefits of surrender, and thus he opened the gates of Runzhou to the enemy on 17 October 975.69 With the surrender of Runzhou, the Wuyue army was able to join the Song in the siege of Jinling. Now, for the first time, Li Yu made an inspection of the city gates and, when he saw the enemy army camping all around Jinling, he became very fearful and called for Huangfu Jixun, the supreme commander of all Southern Tang forces. Huangfu Jixun had started his career in the service of his father Huangfu Hui, who had joined the Southern Tang from the north in 946. Huangfu Jixun owed his rapid promotion mostly to the fact that all the experienced generals were either dead or prisoners of war. As commander-in-chief, he was interested less in military matters than in wealth and a luxurious lifestyle. Once Jinling had come under siege, he thought to protect his property and not fight to the last, and thus he sent his younger brother to an audience with Li Yu to persuade the ruler to surrender. One of his uninspired decisions cost Li Yu his personal bodyguard, a troop of more than one thousand men, which Huangfu posted at the city gates, where they all were promptly taken prisoner by the Song. When Li Yu asked Huangfu to join discussions about the military situation, he refused to attend, and finally Li Yu had enough of Huangfu Jixun. He left him to the troops outside the palace, and the soldiers, who hated Huangfu intensely, dismembered him, so that ‘not even one hair’ of him was left.70 While the troops had their revenge, the general situation was deteriorating steadily. Li Yu called on the last remaining Southern Tang commander, Zhu Lingyun, the military governor of Zhennan, who was stationed up-river from Jinling. Li Yu had reservations about Zhu’s qualities as a military leader and his chances of interrupting the Song supply line by destroying the floating bridge, and he asked Xu Xuan’s opinion. Xu replied that Zhu Lingyun provided the only and last hope for the salvation of the state and encouraged the use of arms. Zhu had a large force of militia troops at his disposal and commanded a vast number of war vessels. As these were not enough for the transport of troops, big rafts were made that held about one thousand men. With this force, Zhu intended to attack and destroy the floating bridge at Caishiji.71 As he approached the bridge, he set oil on fire to burn the bridge, but the wind turned, and, instead, his own vessels were destroyed and his troops
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dispersed. He himself was taken prisoner.72 Thus, the last hope for relief was gone, and the people in Jinling began to starve, as a bushel of rice was sold at a price of ten thousand copper coins and the dead were piling up in the streets.73 As all regular means of resistance had been exhausted, Li Yu, in desperation, tried at least to negotiate an armistice to buy some more time. Zhang Ji recommended the rhetorical skills of Zhou Weijian, a Daoist priest who hailed from Fanyang and resided in the Ziji Temple in Jinling. Zhou Weijian accompanied Xu Xuan to the Song capital, with clear orders to talk Taizu into an armistice; they arrived there on 30 October 975. Some officials warned Taizu about the persuasiveness of Xu and Zhou, but Taizu did not care about their warning. When Xu was permitted to address the emperor in an audience, he started his speech by saying, ‘Li Yu has not committed a crime, and Your Majesty has released an army without a cause’. He explained that the Song had committed an offence when they had attacked a state that had provided annual tribute on a regular basis. Taizu wanted to know what Xu meant by that, and thus Xu continued: Your Majesty is like Heaven and like a father. Heaven shields Earth, and a father protects his son. Yu has submitted tribute for more than twenty years and has served as an inferior to a superior, like a son serves his father. He never has been guilty of a transgression, how then could he have been attacked? He went on to explain how loyally the state of Jiangnan had served the emperor. When he had finished his speech, Taizu asked him, ‘Are you saying that father and son belong to two different families?’. With this, he had completely outmanoeuvred Xu Xuan. After they had spent several days at the capital, the two Southern Tang envoys then departed from Kaifeng on 10 November, to return to Jinling.74 Li Yu almost immediately sent them on another mission to the Song court. They reached Kaifeng on 8 December 975. Xu Xuan explained that Li Yu had fallen seriously ill, and that he served the Song emperor wholeheartedly. Because of Jiangnan’s good service in the past, he asked for treatment of Li Yu as a vassal and for an end to the hostilities. Taizu did not like the way Xu Xuan spoke to him and became angry. He threatened Xu with his sword drawn and, quite the soldier, shouted at him, ‘You do not have to make so many words if Jiangnan really has not committed whatever offence. But how is the empire to rest when it is disturbed by the snoring of someone else?’. Taizu next focused his attention on Zhou Weijian. Zhou defended himself against the imperial wrath by telling Taizu, I originally lived on a mountain and did not have any ambition to advance as an official, but Li Yu has forced me to come here as an envoy. I have
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earlier heard that at Mount Chongnan many powerful medical herbs are growing, and one day I would like to go there to live as a recluse. Taizu granted him his wish and let him go to Mount Chongshan.75 Zhang Ji still encouraged resistance and, to that end, turned for help to the Liao. Like so many years earlier, during the reign of Yuanzong, a messenger received orders to cross enemy territory and go to the Liao capital to ask for help. As soon as he had crossed into Song territory, he was intercepted by the border patrol,76 and thus the last hope for the survival of the dynasty was gone. The energy and the will of the defenders had been severely depleted when, on 2 January 976, the city of Jinling finally fell to the Song.77 In a display of utmost loyalty to the dynasty, generals Guo Yan, Ma Zhengxin and his younger brother Chengjun led several hundred soldiers out of the city, where they all died fighting.78 The attitude of the two councillors, Chen Qiao and Zhang Ji, who both had advocated continued resistance in the face of defeat, could not have been more different. Chen Qiao went to see Li Yu and advised him to kill his whole family and then to seek death in battle, but Li Yu rejected the idea. Instead, he wanted Chen to accompany him to the Song capital, an idea that Chen in turn rejected, arguing: I have served as high minister and now that the state is in this situation, I cannot even make up for it with my death. When I die, I will be blamed for resisting the imperial order, so that Your Majesty does not have to harbour any anxious thoughts. With that, he left for the audience hall where he hanged himself, after he had ordered two servants to hide his corpse, so that it would not fall into the hands of the Song.79 Zhang Ji, in contrast, gathered his belongings and his family and moved them to the palace, where they would be safe. He explained to the ruler that he saw it as his duty to give counsel, and that he could serve him better alive than by committing suicide: Together with Chen Qiao, I have held the reins of government, and now that the state is perishing, I should perish with it. But I am also thinking that if Your Majesty is going to court, who will give You advice then? Therefore I will not die, but I will continue to serve You. Li Yu then led all his officials to surrender to the Song, kneeling down at the main palace gate and offering a memorial to the commander-in-chief stating submission.
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Cao Bin received his surrender and then took precautions against any looting of the palace and, on the orders of the emperor, he also made sure that Li Yu and his family were not physically harmed by the victorious troops. Cao told the last Southern Tang ruler to make an inventory of the things he wanted to bring with him on the voyage north and warned him that, once he had made the list, he could not bring anything more. Liang Jiong and Tian Qinzuo challenged Cao Bin’s decision to let Li Yu return to his palace and get dressed for the voyage north, as no officer then could claim the reward for his capture. Furthermore, they knew that firewood had been gathered in the palace on the orders of Li Yu, who initially had planned to set all buildings on fire and to die in the flames. Cao replied that, if he had not surrendered, it would not have been possible for any officer to capture Li alive. Li Yu gave all his gold to his officials, who all, except for Zhang Bi, accepted these last gifts from their master. Cao Bin tried to limit the ransacking of Jinling as far as possible and even started a search for missing children and women who might have been taken by Song soldiers. However, he did not insist on a proper inventory of granaries and vaults, and soldiers and sailors only had to register the contents of their bags, nothing else. Many men could have hidden their loot that they had taken from the people in Jinling and were not held accountable.80 On 6 February, Li Yu arrived in Kaifeng, and, on 10 February 976, Cao Bin officially reported the Jiangnan campaign over.81 Taizu received the formal surrender of Li Yu and his retinue of brothers, sons and officials at the Mingde Gate, where they had been awaiting him in white clothes. He pardoned them all, set them free and gave them all presents according to their rank. Taizu certainly did not have any intention of killing the royal family as, several years earlier, he had had a residence built for the first of the southern rulers to surrender to him.82 Because Li Yu arrived at court two years before the Wuyue ruler, he was assigned this palace. The territory conquered in the Jiangnan campaign comprised a total of nineteen prefectures and three military prefectures, with 108 districts and 650,565 families. Taizu dealt leniently with this newly acquired territory and its people, because of his experiences in Sichuan ten years earlier.83 After Li Yu’s arrival in the capital, Taizu confronted Xu Xuan with serious accusations. Xu replied, ‘I was a high official of Jiangnan. After the surrender of the state, I should receive the death penalty, and I should not be asked anything else.’ Taizu, impressed by Xu’s loyality, refrained from punishing him. Li Yu was given the title of Marquis of disobedience, which was clearly a pun intended by Taizu to humiliate the former ruler.84 The brothers and sons of Li Yu, as well as the other male members of the royal clan, all had military titles conferred on them. The lenient treatment the royal family received extended to the officials of Li Yu as well. The positions Taizu conferred on them were, of course, lower than their previous
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ones, but at least they were given a chance to become part of the Song bureaucracy. Thus, Tang Yue became a supervisor of the household of the heir apparent, and Xu You and Xu Xuan entered the Song service as directors of the court of the watches of the heir apparent and were assigned to serve under Tang Yue. Zhang Ji and Wang Kezhen (929–989), a Southern Tang jinshi of the examinations of 951, were made companions of the heir apparent.85 Taizu decreed that the southern officials had to wear green official gowns to make them more easily discernible at court.86 He further humiliated Li Yu, who had resisted him for such a long time, by ordering Li Yu’s wife, Zhou, to become part of his harem.87 The situation for Li Yu changed slightly for the better with the accession to the throne of Taizu’s younger brother, Zhao Kuangyi, in 976. The new emperor, Taizong (r. 976–997), did away with the title marquis of disobedience and conferred instead the title of duke of Longxi on Li Yu.88 This may well have been in recognition of Li’s genealogy, because Longxi was a place identified with the Li family, who had been eminent in Tang politics. Short of means, in 977 Li Yu asked Taizong for financial support and was granted a regular salary and a sum of three million copper coins. Still, the second Song emperor also felt that Li Yu needed to be reminded of his inferior position. On one occasion, when Taizong visited the newly established library building, he invited Li Yu, together with the last ruler of the Southern Han, to accompany him. Taizong addressed Li Yu: I have heard that in Jiangnan you liked to read books and what is held here comes for the most part from your old book holdings. Now, that you have submitted to the legitimate dynasty you surely want to read books, don’t you? Li Yu could only bow his head and thank him. As a matter of fact, the holdings of the Northern Song library to a large extent comprised books held formerly in the Southern Tang library. These were among the first items that the Song shipped to Kaifeng, as soon as the war with Jiangnan had ended. Li Yu died on 14 August 978, at the age of forty-two, one day before his birthday. Prior to this, Xu Xuan, on orders from Taizong, had visited Li Yu in his residence to find out about his mood. Li Yu was very happy to see one of his old officials and led him inside personally, holding him by the hand. Once they had sat down, Li Yu uttered a sigh of remorse about the killing of Pan You and Li Ping. Taizong, who suspected that Xu Xuan’s loyalty was still with Li Yu, allegedly poisoned Li Yu according to some sources; however, it is more likely that Li Yu succumbed to an illness.89 Taizong suspended all court business for three days and then ordered Xu Xuan to write the obituary for Li Yu. Taizong may have been jealous of the loyalty some former Southern Tang officials displayed to their former
The decline of the Southern Tang 113
ruler. Zheng Wenbao (953–1013), for instance, the son of military commander Zheng Yanhua, had come to Kaifeng in the retinue of Li Yu. He had not been given a position in the Song bureaucracy, but he wanted to talk to Li Yu, who was heavily guarded. Thus, he disguised himself as a lowly fisherman and managed to enter Li’s residence. He encouraged him to submit fully to Taizong and to forget Jinling and his state. Although Li Yu did not heed Zheng’s well-meant advice, Zheng was praised by his contemporaries for his loyalty to both Taizong and his ruler.90 With Li Yu’s death, the history of independent rule in Jiangnan was finally over. In the thirty-eight years from 937 to 975, the Southern Tang had managed to conquer vast areas in Hunan and Fujian, only to lose them again. The dynasty had challenged the might of the Later Zhou for almost three years, and, even when the state was already declining, had resisted annexation by the Song for one year. The reigns of Li Bian, Li Jing and Li Yu during that period are an example of the rise and fall of dynasties. Li Bian, as a man with a vision, had been powerful enough to follow and realize his ideas. Li Jing tried to emulate his father, but had already come under the influence of officials and, therefore, could never make up his mind which policy to pursue. The weakest of the three rulers in terms of administration and political power was Li Yu, but, ironically, he is the one best remembered and, in fact, counts among the greatest poets in Chinese history.
5
Epilogue
Traces of the ruling family of the Southern Tang disappeared soon after the death of Li Yu. Although the Li family faded into obscurity only a few decades into the Song, the same cannot be said of some of the former Southern Tang officials, who rose to prominence in the Song bureaucracy owing to the ambitions of the second Song emperor, Taizong. Taizong was faced with an empire consisting of territories that heretofore had been ruled separately for two generations. Some of the Ten States had developed their own traditions of erudition and learning that were different from those preserved in the north. Southern scholars generally tended to be more interested in literature and literary style, whereas northern scholars stressed the importance of thorough knowledge of the Confucian classics. Only one year into his reign, in 977, Taizong ordered the compilation of an encyclopedia that eventually comprised 1,000 chapters and was entitled Imperial digest (Taiping yulan). The compilation of this work was based, to a large extent, on the participation of former Southern Tang officials. For the Southern Tang scholars, the project presented a chance to show their scholarly competence and to become accepted members of the Song imperial bureaucracy. Xu Xuan and his son-in-law, Wu Shu (947–1002), were the most wellknown literary figures within the group, and their fame is due to their specialization in a particular genre of writing that is usually identified with the Tang dynasty, the so-called ‘Records of anomalies’ (zhiguai). Xu and Wu, together with Chen Pengnian, who had also served the Southern Tang, have been dubbed ‘revivalists’ of the genre, which deals with strange phenomena and extraordinary people.1 Because of their connection with the Southern Tang court, which claimed to have succeeded the Tang and made many efforts to prove that it had a real claim to this, Xu, Wu and Chen may be regarded as having continued the writing of Records of anomalies, rather than merely to have revived it. A significant proportion of the books used for the compilation of the Imperial digest came from the Southern Tang libraries. Li Bian, from the
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start of his rule, had made it one of his priorities to search for books produced during the Tang dynasty.2 The obvious reason for focusing on Tang works was to bolster the Southern Tang claim to the Tang heritage; another reason, however, was to lure scholars to the Southern Tang court. The presence of scholars at his court gave Li Bian an opportunity to present himself as a cultured ruler. Therefore, he appeared completely different from the northern rulers, who were much more interested in military affairs. Both Li Jing and Li Yu shared the interest of Li Bian in book collecting and continued to increase the number of books held in the imperial libraries. When the Song armies were about to enter Jinling, Li Yu gave the order to burn all collections rather than cede them to the Song. Fortunately, only the collection of the Institute for the Reverence of Sages was destroyed, while the majority of books in the other palace libraries survived. Right after the surrender of Li Yu in 976, the Song emperor ordered those works that were of good quality to be transferred to the Song capital.3 These works were incorporated into the palace library of the Song and served as the core of the new collections that were begun under Emperor Taizu and continued under Taizong.4 The work on the Imperial digest had set the pattern for the other major compilations undertaken during the reigns of Taizong and his successor, Zhenzong (r. 998–1022). A good percentage of the scholars involved in the production of the Extensive records of the reign of great tranquillity (Taiping guangji), the sister companion of the Imperial digest, the Finest flowers of the preserve of letters (Wenyuan yinghua), a literary anthology, and lastly the Models from the archives (Cefu yuangui), a government handbook, were former Southern Tang officials.5 In this last of the so-called ‘Four great books’ of the Song, six out of a total of twenty compilers and editors had their family roots in the SouthernTang.6 Southern Tang erudition was not limited to the ‘Four great books’, but extended into many other areas, such as historiographical and geographical works, among which the Record of the world compiled during the reign of great tranquillity (Taiping huanyu ji) stands out. Its author, Yue Shi (930–1007), hailed from Jiangxi and began his career in the library of Li Jingda, the younger brother of Yuanzong. In 979, Yue started to gather information on all known places in the world, and he completed the enterprise in 987. Out of the original 200 chapters the work comprised, 193 are still extant today. Yue Shi demarcated the borders of the new Song Empire, firmly identifying China as the centre of the known world. The Record of the world was not only a description of the provinces and districts of the empire, but it also provided descriptions of the foreign countries and people surrounding it.7
Epilogue 117
Apart from the scholar–officials and the material cultural wealth of the Southern Tang, the Song similarly employed artists who had worked at the Southern Tang court.8 Gu Hongzhong (937–975) is the most prominent among these artists, for he is attributed authorship of the scroll entitled ‘The night revels of Han Xizai’ (‘Han Xizai yeyantu’), a famous painting that allegedly shows Han Xizai’s nocturnal amusements. The story goes that Li Yu, angered by the behaviour of Han, sent Gu to spy on Han and report what was going on inside the residence. How far this anecdote is accurate is hard to judge, but the scroll is highly recognizable, showing among the five scenes it contains a female orchestra, Han Xizai playing the drum and one of his guests playing a clapper.9 Whether out of curiosity, or out of consideration for former Southern Tang officials in his service, Taizong ordered Xu Xuan and Tang Yue to compile a history of Jiangnan. This is the only example of a history of one of the southern states written by its former officials upon imperial order. Taizong did not grant the same privilege to either Wuyue or Shu. Unfortunately, the Record of Jiangnan (Jiangnan lu), as the work was entitled, is almost completely lost, except for a few quotations in other books. Interestingly, the book sparked the creation of a number of works on the Southern Tang by other former Southern Tang figures. Zheng Wenbao wrote two works on the Southern Tang and is attributed authorship of another, while Chen Pengnian, who had entered the service of Li Yu as a young boy, was so incensed by the Record of Jiangnan that he wrote a work entitled a Different record of Jiangnan (Jiangnan bielu). Apart from the nostalgic and sentimental value of such early Northern Song texts written by former Southern Tang officials, the attraction of the Southern Tang to scholars is best illustrated in the works on its history that appeared over the course of the Song dynasty. The most important are the History of the Southern Tang (Nan Tang shu, published in 1105), by Ma Ling, and the book of the same title by Lu You (1125–1210). Both authors adopted the format of dynastic histories for their works, dealing with the reigns of the rulers in separate chapters and consecutively grouping the biographies of officials and relatives, followed by descriptions of foreign countries. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when scholars from the south came to dominate the examination system, reminiscences of the state in which arts and literature had flourished, as in no other of the Ten States or Five Dynasties, certainly became interesting and attractive to those scholars. They could look back with pride to the one state that had kept traditions of learning and knowledge alive and had enabled the new northern state of the Song easily to access, adopt and continue those traditions. Though there is no evidence for it, it may be for these reasons that, in comparison, we have so many more works on Southern Tang history
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surviving than for any other of its contemporaries. Interest in the Southern Tang did not end in the Northern Song, but continued through the Southern Song, Ming and Qing until the present day.10 The creation or recreation of provincial identities, as opposed to a national identity propagated by the central government, certainly have helped to rekindle interest in the study of the Southern Tang as one of the last periods in imperial China in which individual regions were independently ruled.
Notes
An explanation of abbreviations used in the Notes section can be found on page xv.
1 The state of Wu 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17
18
Titles and positions are translated throughout this work according to Charles O. Hucker, A dictionary of official titles in Imperial China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985). On the early history of Wu, see Hugh R. Clark, ‘The Southern Kingdoms between the T’ang and the Sung’, in Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (eds), The Cambridge history of China, Vol. 5, Part 1: The Sung Dynasty and its precursors, 907–1279 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 143–147. LNTS, 1.1. LNTS, 1.1. Chen Ting, Tangyu jizhuan, in Fu Xuancong, Xu Hairong and Xu Jijun (eds), Wudai shishu huibian (Hangzhou: Hangzhou chubanshe, 2004), vol. 10, 1.5627. JBZ, A.1a. LNTS, 1.1. JNBL, 5b; MNTS 1.1. LNTS, 1.1. JBZ, A.1a. JYS, 1.2a. JYS, 1.2b. The two youngest brothers were at the centre of a cult practised in Min, which they were said to have invaded in 945. In fact, they were never involved – at least not as combatants – in the Southern Tang invasion of Min. For a discussion of their cult, see Edward L. Davis, ‘Arms and the Tao, 1: hero cult and empire in traditional China’, in Sodaishi kenkyukai (eds), Sodai no shakai to shukyo (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 1985), 1–56, and ‘Arms and the Dao, 2: the Xu brothers in tea country’, in Livia Kohn and Harold Roth (eds), Daoist identity: history, lineage, and ritual (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 149–164. LNTS, 16.65. The JYS is the only text that suggests that Xu Zhigao married one of his adopted sisters. LNTS, 16.65. The sources say that Xu Zhigao was seven chi tall. In Tang times, a chi equaled 30 cm, and, hence, he would have been 2.10 m. The Song chi measured 31.2 cm, and so he would have grown to a height of 2.18 m. We certainly have to accept a certain measure of exaggeration, but it is fair to assume that Xu Zhigao was taller than most of his contemporaries. LNTS, 1.1.
120 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Notes ZZTJ, 268.8755 and 8757. ZZTJ, 268.8757. JYS, 4.1b. LNTS, 4.15. LNTS, 5.18. LNTS, 4.16. After this reconstruction under the Wu, the city and its walls remained almost unchanged in size and set-up until the start of the Ming dynasty. See Frederick W. Mote, ‘The transformation of Nanking, 1350–1400’, in G. William Skinner (ed.), The city in late imperial China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 131. ZZTJ, 269.8815. ZZTJ, 270.8827–8828. The pronunciation of both brothers’ names is almost the same, but the second character in the given name of the older brother is in the second tone, while the younger brother’s name is in the third tone. For a slightly different version of this story, see Richard L. Davis, Historical records of the Five Dynasties (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 352–354. ZZTJ, 270.8827. LNTS, 1.1. JYS, 1.4a and 4.2b. On the significance of Anzhou, see Wang Gungwu, ‘The middle Yangtze in T’ang politics’, in Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (eds), Perspectives on the T’ang (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 193–235. ZZTJ, 270.8843. ZZTJ, 270.8844. LNTS, 1.1. ZZTJ, 271.8855. ZZTJ, 272.8903. ZZTJ, 275.9002. ZZTJ, 275.9004. ZZTJ, 275.9005. ZZTJ, 275.9005–9006. ZZTJ, 273.8934–8935. ZZTJ, 276.9010–9011. ZZTJ, 276.9011. ZZTJ, 276.9013. ZZTJ, 276.9015–9016. ZZTJ, 276.9017. ZZTJ, 276.9020. ZZTJ, 276.9023. ZZTJ, 276.9025–9026. ZZTJ, 276.9030. ZZTJ, 276.9034. Wuguo gushi A 3081–3182. ZZTJ, 276.9034–9035. LNTS, 1.1. ZZTJ, 276.9035. ZZTJ, 276.9036. ZZTJ, 277.9040. ZZTJ, 277.9043.
Notes 121 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
ZZTJ, 277.9056–9057. ZZTJ, 277.9062. LNTS, 9.37. ZZTJ, 277.9065. JYS, 5.1a-b. ZZTJ, 278.9076. ZZTJ, 278.9084. ZZTJ, 278.9089–9090. ZZTJ, 278.9096. ZZTJ, 278.9100–9101. ZZTJ, 278.9103–9104. SGCQ, 4.84. ZZTJ, 279.9126. ZZTJ, 279.9129–9130. LNTS, 12.49. ZZTJ, 279.9132. ZZTJ, 279.9136. ZZTJ, 280.9138. ZZTJ, 280.9140. SGCQ, 3.75.
2 The founding of the Southern Tang and the reign of Li Bian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24
ZZTJ, 280.9166. ZZTJ, 280.9169. LNTS, 1.4. ZZTJ, 282.9230. ZZTJ, 281.9169. ZZTJ, 281.9169. ZZTJ, 281.9172. ZZTJ, 281.9180. ZZTJ, 270.8849–8850. ZZTJ, 271.8855. See Chapter 1, XXX. ZZTJ, 278.9101. ZZTJ, 279.9121. ZZTJ, 281.9181. Zhou Ben died shortly after these events, in the early spring of 938, never having come to terms with his inability to preserve Wu. See ZZTJ, 281.9185. ZZTJ, 281.9181. ZZTJ, 281.9181. ZZTJ, 281.9181. ZZTJ, 281.9182. On the state seal of the Han and its history, see Lothar Wagner, ‘Die ganze Welt in einem Zoll: Ein Beitrag zur chinesischen Siegelkunde (The whole world within one inch: a contribution to the lore of the Chinese seal)’. Ph.D. dissertation, Heidelberg, 1987, 157–204. The translation is from Davis, Historical records, 488. ZZTJ, 281.9182. LNTS, 1.2. ZZTJ, 281.9182. ZZTJ, 281.9182–9183.
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25 26
LNTS, 1.2. ZZTJ, 281.9183. She was the third of five sisters, who were all given titles of princesses on that occasion. See LNTS, 1.2. ZZTJ, 281.9182–9183. ZZTJ, 271.8853. ZZTJ, 281. 9213; LNTS, 10.40–41. ZZTJ, 281.9215. ZZTJ, 281.9186, and LNTS, 1.2. ZZTJ, 281.9187. ZZTJ, 281.9190. SGCQ, 3.76. ZZTJ, 282.9202. ZZTJ, 292.9541. ZZTJ, 281.9195–9196. The Annals of the Ten States (Shiguo jinian) alleges that Li Bian had arranged for the murder of the last Wu emperor, but there is no evidence for this, as the commentary in the ZZTJ notes. ZZTJ, 282.9197. ZZTJ, 282.9198. LNTS, 1.3. ZZTJ, 282.9197–9198. LNTS, 1.3. LNTS, 1.3. ZZTJ, 282.9198. Andrew Eisenberg, Kingship in early medieval China (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 209. Jiu Tang shu, compiled by Liu Xu et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), 76.2650–2651. ZZTJ, 282.9198–9199. ZZTJ, 282.9201. ZZTJ, 282.9201. LNTS, 1.3. ZZTJ, 282.9202. ZZTJ, 282.9202–9203. ZZTJ, 282.9210. LNTS, 1.3. ZZTJ, 282.9217. LNTS, 1.4; ZZTJ, 282.9218. See Edward H. Schafer, The Empire of Min (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1954), 48–49; ZZTJ, 282.9214. ZZTJ, 282.9220. ZZTJ, 282.9218. LNTS, 7.28. Hans Bielenstein, Diplomacy and trade in the Chinese world, 589–1276 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 544. Bielenstein, Diplomacy and trade, 544–549. ZZTJ, 282.9221. LNTS, 1.2. Wang Dingzhang believes that both the Liao and the Goryeo were attracted to the Southern Tang because of its good administration. He betrays here a conservative Chinese belief in the educational power of good government and its civilizing impact on non-Chinese people. See Wang Dingzhang, ‘Nan Tang san zhu de renpin ji zhengzhi’, in Tianfu xinlun, 5 (2001): 74. LNTS, 1.4.
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
66
Notes 123 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
ZZTJ, 282.9221–9222. ZZTJ, 282.9222. ZZTJ, 282.9226. LNTS, 1.4. ZZTJ, 282.9225. LNTS, 9.39. Goujian was the king of Yue, r. 496 BC to 465 BC. He is famous for his suffering at the hands of his opponent, the king of Wu, and for finally overcoming his adversary. For a recent treatment of Goujian’s story and its significance in modern China, see Paul A. Cohen, Speaking to history: the story of King Goujian in twentieth-century China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008). ZZTJ, 283.9237. ZZTJ, 283.9240; LNTS, 1.4. LNTS, 16.65. ZZTJ, 282.9230. ZZTJ, 283.9244. An earlier version of the anecdote is found in Zheng Wenbao, Jiangnan yuzai (Congshu jicheng), 1.1. SGCQ, 34.3851–3852. LNTS, 1.4. A longer version of this proclamation is found in MNTS, 1.7. Mercury poisoning leads to personality changes, but not to skin ulcers, though irritation and rashes are reported. ZZTJ, 283.9245. LNTS, 1.4. ZZTJ, 283.92.
3 The reign of Li Jing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ZZTJ, 283.9244–9245. For an analysis of these alleged factional struggles, see Johannes L. Kurz, ‘The invention of the faction in Song historical writings on the Southern Tang’, in Journal of Sung Yuan Studies, 28 (1998): 1–35. ZZTJ, 283.9245–9246. JNBL, 9a. ZZTJ, 283.9247–9248. ZZTJ, 283.9248. ZZTJ, 283.9248–9249. ZZTJ, 285.9302. The tombs of both Li Bian and Li Jing were excavated, from 1950 to 1951. The findings of the excavation are found in Nan Tang erling fajue baogao (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1957), ed. by Nanjing bowuguan. The tombs are located in Jiangning county south of Nanjing, where they are open to visitors. The translation of the title follows Davis, Historical records, 490. YHQH, 9.94. JTS, 20A.771. ZZTJ, 283.9262. Zhang Yuxian’s rebellion is described in ZZTJ, 283.9239–9255. ZZTJ, 283.9261. ZZTJ, 283.9264. On the civil war in Min, see Schafer, Empire, 48–54. ZZTJ, 284.9278–9279. ZZTJ, 284.9285–9286. ZZTJ, 284.9293–9294. ZZTJ, 285.9296–9297.
124 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
30 31
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Notes ZZTJ, 285.9298. ZZTJ, 285.9301–9302. ZZTJ, 285.9305. Jianzhou2 was a newly created prefecture, consisting of three districts that previously had been part of Jianzhou1 prefecture. See ZZTJ, 285.9308. ZZTJ, 285.9308–9310. ZZTJ, 285.9312–9313. ZZTJ, 285.9314. ZZTJ, 285. 9349–9350. For Tian Yuying, the military failures of the Southern Tang were a result of the personnel staffing in the bureau of military affairs, all of whom were civil and not military officials. See Tian Yuying, ‘Nan Tang shumi shi kaolun’, in Jiangsu keji daxue xuebao, 9.1 (2009): 23–27. ZZTJ, 286.9355–9356. For more information on the war between the Liao and the Later Jin and the subsequent occupation of Northern China, see Naomi Standen, ‘The Five Dynasties’, in Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (eds), The Cambridge history of China, Vol. 5: Part One: The Sung Dynasty and its precursors, 907–1279 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 97–103. ZZTJ, 286.9338. On this, see Davis, Historical records, 94; on Liao Taizong, see Frederick W. Mote, Imperial China 900–1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 64–67. ZZTJ, 288.9403–9404. ZZTJ, 288.9407. ZZTJ, 286.9412. ZZTJ, 288.9416. ZZTJ, 289.9419–9420. ZZTJ, 289.9428. ZZTJ, 290.9456. ZZTJ, 290.9459. ZZTJ, 290.9460. ZZTJ, 290.9466. ZZTJ, 290.9466–9467. ZZTJ, 290.9469. ZZTJ, 290.9471. ZZTJ, 290.9468. ZZTJ, 290.9471–9472. ZZTJ, 290.9477. ZZTJ, 291.9483–9484. ZZTJ, 291.9485. ZZTJ, 290.9476. ZZTJ, 290.9476. ZZTJ, 290.9476. ZZTJ, 290.9472–9473. ZZTJ, 290.9475. ZZTJ, 291.9496. ZZTJ, 291.9498. Yuhu qinghua, in Xiangshan yelu, Xulu, Yuhu qinghua, compiled by Wenying (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 9.93. Wang’s plan, entitled ‘Plan to expand the border’, is translated in Davis, Historical records, 258–260.
Notes 125 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
ZZTJ, 292.9525–9527. ZZTJ, 292.9532. JYS, 4.4b. ZZTJ, 292.9533. ZZTJ, 292.9535–9536. ZZTJ, 292.9536–9537. ZZTJ, 292.9536–9538. ZZTJ, 292.9539–9540. ZZTJ, 292.9541. On the fate of the Yang family see Chapter 2, XXX. ZZTJ, 292.9541–9542. ZZTJ, 292.9542–9543. ZZTJ, 293.9545–9546. ZZTJ, 293.9547–9549. ZZTJ, 293.9549–9550. ZZTJ, 293.9551–9552. ZZTJ, 293.9552–9553. ZZTJ, 293.9553–9555. ZZTJ, 293.9555. ZZTJ, 293.9558–9560. ZZTJ, 293.9560–9561. ZZTJ, 293.9561. ZZTJ, 293.9562. ZZTJ, 293.9563. ZZTJ, 294.9589. ZZTJ, 293.9565–9568. ZZTJ, 293.9569. ZZTJ, 293.9573. ZZTJ, 293.9573–9578. ZZTJ, 293.9577 and 293.9579. JWDS, 118.1570. ZZTJ, 294.9580–9581. ZZTJ 294.9583–9585. ZZTJ, 294.9586. ZZTJ, 294.9587. ZZTJ, 294.9589. MNTS, 17.114. LNTS, 14.59. ZZTJ, 294.9589. ZZTJ, 294.9589–9590. ZZTJ, 294.9594. ZZTJ, 294.9604. ZZTJ, 294.9604–9605. ZZTJ, 294.9606. XZZTJ, 1.28. LNTS, 11.46. XZZTJ, 1.28–29. On Taizu’s Later Shu campaign, see Peter Lorge, ‘From warlord to emperor: Song Taizu’s change of heart during the conquest of Shu’, T’oung Pao, 91.4–5 (2005): 320–346. XZZTJ, 2.40. LNTS, 2.11.
126
Notes
4 The reign of Li Yu and the decline of the Southern Tang 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
XZZTJ, 15.320. Wenying, Xiangshan yelu, xulu, Yuhu qinghua (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 3.55. SGCQ, 28.407. LNTS, 3.12. LNTS, 3.12. XZZTJ, 3.65. XZZTJ, 4.89–90. XZZTJ, 4.107. XZZTJ, 4.111–112. LNTS, 3.12. LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 5.124; LNTS, 3.12. NTJS, 5. XZZTJ, 5.130. MNTS, 6.38–40. MNTS, 8.60. XZZTJ, 9.212–213. XZZTJ, 14.310. XZZTJ, 9.201. LNTS, 3.14. On court entertainers in the Tang dynasty, see Victor Cunrui Xiong, ‘Ji-entertainers in Tang Changan’, in Sherry J. Mou (ed.), Presence and presentation: women in the Chinese literati tradition (London: Macmillan, 1999), 150–151. XZZTJ, 9.213. LNTS, 3.14. XZZTJ, 8.192–193. XZZTJ, 10.226. XZZTJ, 10.220. XZZTJ, 9.202. XZZTJ, 11.247. LNTS, 12.50. XZZTJ, 11.249. A li corresponds approximately to 400–500 metres. XZZTJ, 11.254–255. LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 12.272. LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 12.275. XZZTJ, 12.263. XZZTJ, 14.298. For a detailed study of these commodities see Edward H. Schafer, The vermilion bird: T’ang images of the south (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), esp. 165–247. XZZTJ, 13.280. LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 13.280–281. XZZTJ, 13.281, and LNTS, 3.14. XZZTJ, 14.299.
Notes 127 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
XZZTJ, 14.308–310. XZZTJ, 15.321. XZZTJ, 15.321; LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 15.323. LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 15.324. LNTS, 3.13. XZZTJ, 15.325–326. XZZTJ, 15.321–322. XZZTJ, 15.325. XZZTJ, 16.333. XZZTJ, 15.326–327. XZZTJ, 15.328; LNTS, 3.13. LNTS, 3.14. XZZTJ, 15.327–328. XZZTJ, 16.333; LNTS, 17.73. XZZTJ, 16.334. LNTS, 3.14. XZZTJ, 16.340–341. JBZ, 3.3b. LNTS, 4.14. XZZTJ, 16.334–335. LNTS, 3.15. XZZTJ, 16.338. XZZTJ, 16.345–346. LNTS, 10.41–42. XZZTJ, 16.340–341. XZZTJ, 16.349. LNTS, 3.14. XZZTJ, 16.347–348. In fact, Zhou did not go to Mount Chongshan, but he received a position as erudite of the national university. He then asked to retire from office, which the emperor granted, only to re-apply for a position afterwards. Taizong reinstated him, much to the disbelief of his contemporaries. See XZZTJ, 19.424. MNTS, 23.159. XZZTJ, 16.352. LNTS, 3.14. MNTS, 17.115. XZZTJ, 16.352–353. XZZTJ, 17.361. XZZTJ, 15.322. XZZTJ, 16.353. XZZTJ, 17.361–362. XZZTJ, 17.362. Wang Yong, Yanyi yimoulu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 4.32. Wang Zhi, Moji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 3.44. XZZTJ, 18.386. This is briefly discussed in Daniel Bryant, Lyric poets of the Southern T’ang: Feng Yen-ssu, 903–960, and Li Yü, 937–978 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), xxvii. XZZTJ, 19.432.
128
Notes
5 Epilogue 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10
Kenneth DeWoskin, ‘Chih-kuai’, in William H. Nienhauser, Jr. (ed.), The Indiana companion to traditional Chinese literature (Taipei: Southern Materials Centre, 1986), 283. LNTS, 9.37. Cheng Ju, Lintai gushi canben (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), 1.251. On this, see Wang Yinglin, Yuhai (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe), 43.15b, and Xu Song (comp.), Song huiyao jigao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), ‘chongru’ 4.15b (2237). On the different nature of the Imperial digest and the Models from the archives, see Johannes L. Kurz, ‘The compilation and publication of the Taiping yulan and the Cefu yuangui’, in Florence Bretelle-Etablet and Karine Chemla (eds), Qu’était-ce qu’écrire une encyclopédie en Chine? (What did it mean to write an encyclopedia in China?), Extrême-orient, extreme-occident: Cahiers de recherché comparatives (Saint Denis: PUV, 2007), 39–76. Kurz, Das Kompilationsprojekt, 171–214. Kurz, Das Kompilationsprojekt, 152–154. On this see De-nin D. Lee, ‘Fragments for constructing a history of Southern Tang painting’, in JSYS, 34 (2004): 1–39. The copy of the scroll extant today dates, in all probability, from the Southern Song. See Michael Sullivan, The night entertainments of Han Xizai: a scroll by Gu Hongzhong (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2008). For a discussion of historical works dealing with the Southern Tang, see Johannes L. Kurz, ‘Sources for the history of the Southern Tang’, in Journal of Sung Yuan Studies, 28 (1998): 1–35.
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Index
An Chinu 安叱奴 97 An Zhonghui 安重誨 14 ancestor (zong 宗) 48 Ang 昂 31 ba qian 把淺 ‘grasping the shallows’ 71 baijia jun 白甲軍 see ‘White armour army’ Baoda 保大 ‘Guarding the great enterprise’ (Southern Tang reign title) 43, 83 Bian Hao 邊鎬 51, 53, 63–68, 78, 81, 82, 85 Book of changes (Yijing 易經) 106 Cao Bin 曹彬 103–104, 106–107, 111 Cao Jin 曹進 66 Cao Ying 曹英 69 Chai Kehong 柴克宏 77–78 Chai Rong 柴榮 see Shizong Chai Zaiyong 柴再用 5, 15, 77 Chang Mengxi 常夢錫 34–35, 37, 41, 45, 48, 68 Chen 陳, consort of Xu Wen 13 Chen Chengxun 陳承勛 33 Chen Chuyao 陳處堯 81 Chen Decheng 陳德誠 78 Chen Hongjin 陳洪進 94 Chen Hui 陳誨 62, 78 Chen Jishan 陳繼善 89 Chen Jue 陳覺 18, 20–21, 34–35, 41–42, 44–45, 54–56, 58–59, 77–78, 80, 82–86, 91 Chen Pengnian 陳彭年 115 Chen Qiao 陳僑 85, 100, 103, 106, 110
Chen Shubao 陳叔寳 50 Chen Wang 陳望 52 Chen Xuan 陳宣 17 Chen Yanqian 陳彥謙 7, 13 Choumiu 醜謬 ‘Disgraceful and erroneous’, posthumous name of Song Qiqiu 87 Chu Rengui 褚仁規 30, 34 Dahe 大和 ‘Great peace’ (Wu reign title) 16 Dan 旦, given name of Ruizong 31 Dashiguo 大食國 (Arabia) 101 Diao Kan 刁衎 106 Diao Yanneng 刁彥能 8 Different record of Jiangnan (Jiangnan bielu 江南別錄) 117 Dong Si’an 董思安 53 Du Changye 杜昌業 44, 56 Du Guangye 杜光業 28 Du Zhen 杜真 104–105 Duan Chugong 段出處恭 28 ‘Ever–in–circulation Currency’ Yongtong quanhuo 永通泉貨 88 Extensive records of the reign of great tranquillity (Taiping guangji 太平廣記) 116 Fan Chongmin 范沖敏 62 Fan Ruoshui 樊若水 103–105 Feng Yanlu 馮延魯 42–44, 53–59, 75, 84–85, 93, 95 Feng Yansi 馮延巳 41–42, 44–45, 48–49, 51, 53–55, 58–59, 67–68, 76, 84, 91 Feng Zun 馮僎 95
134
Index
Finest flowers of the preserve of letters (Wenyuan yinghua 文苑英華) 116 ‘Five Demons’ (wugui 五鬼) 44, 48–49, 59, 69 ‘founding ancestor’ (zu 祖) 48
Jiaotai 交泰 ‘Established peace’ (state of Jiangnan reign title) 83 jiaxu 甲戌 105 jiuxi 九錫 ‘Nine Insignia’ 20 jun 軍 military prefecture 10
Gao Conghui 高從誨, ruler of Jingnan 14, 16 Gao Jixing高季興, ruler of Jingnan 12, 14 Gao Pian 高駢 1 Gao Yuan 高遠 64 Gao Yue 高越 54 Gaoli 高麗 Goryeo 35 Gaozu 高祖, Later Jin emperor 28 Gaozu 高祖, Tang emperor 31–32, 97 Gaozu 高祖, Wu emperor 13 Gaozu Xuan Huangdi 高祖宣皇帝 posthumous title of Yang Longyan 9 Gong Shenyi 龔慎儀 99 Goujian 句踐 38, 123 n73 Gu Hongzhong 顧閎中 117 Guangde 廣德 princess, adopted sister of Li Bian 37 Guangmu 光穆 empress, consort of Li Jing 91, 93 Guo Cong 郭悰 25 Guo Jing 郭璟 84 Guo Tingwei 郭廷謂 82–83 Guo Wei 郭威 63 Guo Yan 咼彥 110 guozhu 國主 ruler 84
Kaibao 開寳 ‘Opened treasure’ (Song reign title) 105 Kaiping 開平 ‘Peace initiated’ (Later Liang reign title) 2
Han Lingkun 韓令坤 75, 78–79 Han Xizai 韓熙載 21, 43, 48, 59–60, 69, 70, 78, 87, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 117 He Jingzhu 何敬洙 63, 74, 89 History of the Southern Tang (Nan Tang shu 南唐書) 117 Hu Hanrong 胡漢榮 28 Huang Chao 黃巢 1 Huang 晃 31 Huangfu Hui 皇甫暉 61, 72–74, 108 Huangfu Jixun 皇甫繼勲 102, 106, 108 Imperial digest (Taiping yulan 太平禦覽) 115–116, 128 n5 Institute for the Reverence of Sages 18, 116 Jia Chong 賈崇 49, 75 Jia Renzhao 賈仁沼 28 Jiang Yanhui 蔣延徽 19, 24–25
Li 李, wife of Xu Wen 4 Li Bian 李昪 ix, x, 31–40 , 41–43, 48, 94, 95, 98, 113, 115–116, 122 n37, 123 n9 Li Chengsi 李承嗣 3 Li Chengyu 李承裕 28 Li Congjia 李從嘉 given name of Li Yu 88, 90, 91 Li Congqian 李從謙 100 Li Congshan 李從善 88, 91, 100–101, 103 Li Congyan 李從儼 34 Li Congyi 李從鎰 89, 103 Li Cunxu 李存勗11 Li Da 李達 55–57 Li Decheng 李德誠 7, 23, 25–26 Li Deming 李德明 61, 68, 70, 75, 77, 86, 88 Li Gu 李穀 72–73, 81, 82 Li Hongda 李弘達 55 Li Hongji 李弘冀 77–78, 83–85, 87, 91, 92 Li Hongmao 李弘茂 91 Li Hongtong 李弘通 54 Li Hongyi 李弘義 54–55 Li Jian 李簡 14–15 Li Jianxun 李建勳 20, 27, 29, 37, 38, 39, 43–45, 54, 64 Li Jing 李璟 (also 靖 and 景) ix, x, 31, 34, 37–38, 40, 41–45, 48–56, 58–65, 67–72, 74–90, 113, 116, 123 n9 Li Jingda 李景達 38, 49, 53, 78–83, 100, 116 Li Jingqian 李景遷 20–22 Li Jingsui 李景遂 37–38, 49, 83, 84–85 Li Jingti 李景逷 38–39 Li Jinquan 李金全 27–28, 60–61 Li Ke 李恪, prince of Wu 吳 32 Li Kun 李琨 32 Li Maozhen李茂貞, king of Qi 岐 34 Li Mu 李穆 103
Index 135 Li Ping 李平 60, 79, 102–103, 112 Li Qiu 李球 3 Li Rong 李榮 3, 32 Li Shouzhen 李守貞 60–61 Li Shu 李恕 105 Li Siyuan 李嗣源 12 Li Tai 李台 51 Li Xian 李峴 32 Li Yi 李禕 32 Li Yiye 李貽業 42 Li Yu 李煜 x, 115–117 Li Yu 李遇 prefect of Xuanzhou 5 Li Yuanyi 李 元 裔 , prince of Zheng 鄭 32 Li Zhenggu 李徵古 77–78, 82, 84–85, 86 Li Zhongjin 李重進 73, 79–81, 89 Liang Jiong 梁迥 103, 111 Liao Yan 廖偃 66 Liezu Jing Huangdi 烈祖景皇帝, posthumous title of Yang Wo 9 Liezu 烈祖, posthumous title of Li Bian 48, 56, 60, 76, 85 Lin Renzhao 林仁肇 78, 80, 99–102 Lin Zanyao 林贊堯 55 Liu 劉, mother of Li Bian 3 Liu Bin 劉玢, Southern Han ruler 50 Liu Chang 劉鋹, Southern Han ruler 94, 98–100 Liu Congxiao 留從效 54–58, 60, 62, 94 Liu Deng 劉澄 107–108 Liu Guangfu 劉光輔 63 Liu Renshan 劉仁贍 64, 71–72, 76, 81–82 Liu Shaoji 劉紹錤 94 Liu Shaozi 劉紹鎡 94 Liu Yan 劉言 67–68 Liu Yanzhen 劉彥貞 60, 72–73 Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠, founder of the Later Han 60 Lixian yuan 禮賢院 see Institute for the Reverence of Sages Lu Duoxun 盧多遜 102 Lu Jiang 盧絳 100–101, 107 Lu Mengjun 陸孟俊 78–79 Lu You 陸游 117 Ma Chengjun 馬承俊 110 Ma Ling 馬令 117 Ma Quanjie 馬全節 28 Ma Xichong 馬希崇 63–65
Ma Xi’e 馬希蕚 63–65 Ma Xifan 馬希範 63 Ma Xiguang 馬希廣 63 Ma Xiyin 馬希隱 65–66 Ma Yin 馬殷 14, 63 Ma Zhengxin 馬承信 110 ‘Marquis of disobedience’ (weiming hou 違命侯) 111 Meng Gongchen 孟拱辰 97 Meng Jian 孟堅 57 Mingzong 明宗, Later Tang emperor 12 Models from the archives (Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜) 116, 128 n5 Murong Yanchao 慕容彥超 69 Nie Shidao 聶師道 40 ‘Night revels of Han Xizai’ (‘Han Xizai yeyantu’ 韓熙載夜宴圖) 117 Pan Chongche 潘崇徹 66 Pan Mei 潘美 106 Pan You 潘佑 96, 98–99, 102–103 Pang Shougui 龐守規 26 Peng Yanhui 彭彥暉 65–66 Pengnu 彭努 3 Qian Liu 錢鏐, king of Wuyue 1 Qian Yuanguan 錢元瓘, king of Wuyue 36 Qian Zuo 錢佐, king of Wuyue 56 Qianzhen 乾貞 ‘Aspiring chastity’ (Wu reign title) 13 Rao Dongtian 饒洞天 6 Record of Jiangnan (Jiangnan lu 江南錄) 117 Record of the world compiled during the reign of great tranquillity (Taiping huanyuji 太平寰宇記) 116 ‘records of anomalies’ (zhiguai 志怪) 115 Rites of Zhou (Zhouli 周禮) 102 Rui huangdi 睿皇帝, posthumous title of Yang Pu 9, 30 Ruisheng wenming guangxiao huangdi 睿聖文明光孝皇帝 ‘Sage cultivated and filial emperor’ 16 Ruizong 睿宗, Tang emperor 31–32 Sanfoqi 三佛齊 Srivijaya 101 Shen Huzi 沈虎子 107 Shen Jiangao 申漸高 16
136
Index
Shengyuan 昇元 ‘Reaching to the origins’ (Southern Tang reign title) 26 shengzun hou 聖尊后 ‘sage respected queen’ 93 Shepo 闍婆 Java 101 Shi Chonggui 石重貴, Later Jin emperor 59 Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭, Later Jin emperor 29, 59 Shi Shouchong 史守沖 39 Shizong, emperor of the Later Zhou 30, 71–87, 92 Shu Ya 舒雅 95 Shunyi 順義 ‘Obedient righteousness’ (Wu reign title) 12 Sima Guang 司馬光 31, 71 Song 宋, consort of Li Bian 5, 27, 42 Song Cheng宋誠 6 Song Qiqiu 宋齊邱 (also 丘) 6–7, 9, 11, 17–21, 24–29, 31, 35, 37–38, 41–45, 53–54, 59, 72, 77, 80, 85–88, 91 Sun Cheng 孫盛 18, 41–42, 50, 67–68, 76–77, 80–81 Sun Lang 孫郎 66–67 Sun Ru 孫儒 1 taihou 太后 ‘queen dowager’ 93 Taizhang 泰章 93 Taizong 太宗, Song emperor 112–113, 115 Taizong 太宗, Tang emperor 31–32 Taizu Xiaowu Huangdi 太祖孝武皇帝 9 Taizu, Later Zhou emperor 63, 69, 80 Taizu, Song emperor ix, 71, 109–112, 116 Tan 坦 31 Tang Hao 唐鎬 88, 90 Tang Yue 湯悅 92, 96, 112, 117 see also Yin Chongyi Tangguo tongbao 唐國通寳 ‘Currency of the Tang kingdom’ 87 Tian Jingzhu 田敬洙 70 Tian Qinzuo 田欽祚 105, 111 Tiancheng 天成 ‘Heavenly perfection’ (Later Tang reign title) 12 Tianyou 天祐 ‘Heavenly assistance’ (Tang reign title) 2 Wang 王, first consort of Li Bian 4–5 Wang Chongwen 王崇文 53, 55–57 Wang Chongzhi 王崇質 76–77
Wang Hong 王宏 25 Wang Huan 王環 14 Wang Jianfeng 王建封 56–57, 62 Wang Jixun 王繼勳 54 Wang Kezhen 王克真 112 Wang Kui 王逵 67, 74, 76 Wang Lingmou 王令謀 15, 17, 24–25 Wang Pu 王朴 71 Wang Qixia 王栖霞 (also 棲霞) 39–40 Wang Rong 王戎 4 Wang Shaoyan 王紹顏 39, 66, 73 Wang Yan 王巌 17 Wang Yanxi 王延曦, king of Min 閩 34 Wang Yanzheng 王延政 34, 52–53 Wang Yu 王輿 17 Wang Zhuanzheng 王傳拯 17 Wei 魏, consort of Song Qiqiu 6 Wei Cen 魏岑 41–42, 44–45, 49, 53, 55–56, 58–61, 65, 73, 87 Wencheng 文成 ‘Accomplished and cultured’ 82 Wenxian 文獻 ‘Culture presented’ 87 Wenzong 文宗, Tang emperor 31 ‘White armour army’ 79, 106 wu 吳 29 Wu Cheng 吳程 62 Wu Guang 吳光 19 Wu Huai’en 吳懷恩 66 Wu huangdi 武皇帝 ‘Martial emperor’ 26 Wu Shouqian 武守謙 105 Wu Shu 吳淑 115 Wu Tingyu 吳廷裕 40 Wu Yanshao 吳延紹 71 Wu Zetian 武則天, emperor of the Zhou dynasty 32 wuxuan 武宣 ‘Martial prowess manifest’ 87 Wuyi 武義 ‘Martial righteousness’ (Wu reign title) 9 Xia Changtu 夏昌圖 37–38 xian 縣 (district) 10 Xian Shilang 咸師朗 66, 73 Xiang Xun 向訓 69 Xiao Yan 蕭儼 41–42, 49–50, 68–69 Xie An 謝安 98 Xie Guan 謝貫 66 Xinluo 新羅 Silla 35 Xizong 僖宗, Tang emperor 32 Xu Dexun 許德勳 14
Index 137 Xu Gao 徐誥 24–31 Xu Jie 徐玠 5, 12–15, 20–21, 24, 29 Xu Jingtong 徐景通 17–18, 21, 24 Xu Keqiong 許可瓊 66 Xu Miao 徐邈 106 Xu Wen 徐溫 2–5, 7, 9–16, 19, 21, 23–24, 30–32, 37, 106 Xu Wenzhen 徐文稹 52, 78, 81–82, 85 Xu Xuan 徐鉉 115 Xu Yuanji 徐元機 106 Xu Yuanshu 徐元樞 106 Xu Yuanyu 徐元楀 106 Xu Zhi’e 徐知諤 4, 21, 26, 30, 33 Xu Zhigao 徐知誥 3–10, 12–25, 119 n15 and n17 Xu Zhihui 徐知誨 4 Xu Zhijian 徐知諫 4, 8 Xu Zhixun1 徐知訓 4, 7–9 Xu Zhixun2 徐知詢 4, 12–16, 21 Xu Zhizheng 徐知證 4, 26, 30, 33 Yan En 嚴恩 51 Yan Jingquan 燕敬權 69 Yan Keqiu 嚴可求 2–3, 13, 92 Yan Shi 閻式 88 Yan Xu 嚴續 48, 84, 86, 92 yang 陽 29 Yang 楊, consort of Tang emperor Taizong 32 Yang 羊 ‘sheep’ 29 Yang Gong 楊珙 33 Yang Lian 楊璉 23, 27, 33 Yang Lin 楊璘 25 Yang Longyan 楊隆演 3, 5, 7–9, 11, 13–14, 24 Yang Meng 楊濛 19, 24–25 Yang Pu 楊溥 9, 11, 13–14, 24–25 Yang Shouzhong 楊守忠 82 Yang Si 楊嗣 29 Yang Sigong 楊思恭 52–53 Yang Wo 楊渥 2, 3, 9, 24 Yang Xingmi 楊行密 1–5, 9, 23–25 Yang Zao 楊璪 24 Yangdi 煬帝, Sui emperor 32 Yao Feng 姚鳳 72–74 Yelü Deguang 耶律德光 59–60 ‘Yielding emperor’ 26–30, 33, 75, 86–87 yijun 義軍 ‘Righteous army’ 105 Yin Chongyi 殷崇義 85–86, 92 Yin Tingfan 尹廷範 30 Yizu 義祖 ‘Adoptive ancestor’ 30
Yongle 永樂 ‘Eternal Happiness’ (reign title of Zhang Yuxian) 50 Yongxing 永興 princess, daughter of Li Bian 27 You Jianyan 游簡言 98 Yuan Chengjin 遠承進 97 Yuan Congfan 遠從範 85 Yuan Tao 遠韜 26 Yuanzong 元宗 5, 30, 90–92, 95–98, 105–106, 110, 116 Yue Shi 樂史 116 Zha Wenhui 查文徽 44, 49, 52, 60, 62 Zhancheng 占城 Champa 101 Zhang Bi 張泌 101, 111 Zhang Hansi 張漢思 93 Zhang Hao 張顥 2–3 Zhang Ji 張洎 87, 92, 96, 101, 102–104, 106, 109–110, 112 Zhang Juyong 張居詠 27 Zhang Lingbin 張令彬 69 Zhang Luan 張巒 66–67, 88 Zhang Wei 張緯 28 Zhang Xian 張憲 96–97 Zhang Xiong 張雄 105 Zhang Yanhan 張延翰27 Zhang Yongde 張永德 80 Zhang Yuxian 張遇賢 50–52 Zhang Zhongjin 張重進 19 Zhao Kuangyi 趙匡義 112 Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤 71, 73–74, 79, 82–83 Zhao Pu 趙普 100 Zhaozong 昭宗, Tang emperor 48 Zheng Wenbao 鄭文寳113, 117 Zheng Yanhua 鄭彥華 78, 104–105, 113 Zhenzong 真宗, Song emperor 116 Zhong 种, consort of Li Bian 38–39 Zhong 鐘 see Guangmu empress Zhong Mo 諥謨 68, 75, 80–81, 84, 86–88, 91 Zhong Zhuan 鍾傳 1, 2, 6 Zhongguang 重光 91 zhongtian baguo wang 中天八國王 ‘King of the eight states of middle heaven’ 50 Zhongxing 中興 ‘Resurgence’ (Southern Tang reign title) 83 Zhongxuan 仲宣, son of Li Yu 95 Zhongzong中宗, Tang emperor 32
138
Index
zhou 州 (prefecture) 10 Zhou 周, first consort of Li Yu, 93 Zhou 周, second consort of Li Yu 95–96, 112 Zhou Ben 周本 23, 25, 121 n14 Zhou Hongzuo 周弘祚 25 Zhou Tingwang周廷望 15–16 Zhou Weijian 周惟簡 109–110, 127 n75 Zhou Zong 周宗 6, 15–16, 19, 20, 24, 44, 48, 95
Zhu Jin 朱瑾 8 Zhu Kuangye 朱匡業 78 Zhu Lingyun 朱令贇 102, 108 Zhu Wen 朱溫, Later Liang emperor 31 Zhu Wenjin 朱文進 26 Zhu Yuan 朱元 60, 79, 81–82 Zhuangzong 莊宗, Later Tang emperor 11 Zou Yumo 鄒禹謨 26