China in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Opportunities

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China in the Twenty-First Century

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China in the Twenty-First Century Challenges and Opportunities

Edited by

Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo

CHINA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Copyright © Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7975–9 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7975–8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Association of Chinese Political Studies. Meeting (19th : 2006 : University of Louisville) China in the twenty-first century : challenges and opportunities / edited by Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo for Palgrave-Macmillan Publishers. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7975–8 (alk. paper) 1. China—Politics and government—21st century—Congresses. 2. China—Economic policy—2000—Congresses. 3. China—Foreign relations—1976—Congresses. 4. China—Foreign relations—East Asia—Congresses. 5. East Asia—Foreign relations—China—Congresses. I. Hua, Shiping, 1956– II. Guo, Sujian, 1957– III. Title. IV. Title: China in the twenty-first century. JQ1516.A84 2006 320.951—dc22 2007002095 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: September 2007 10

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Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Figures

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List of Tables

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Acknowledgments

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Notes on the Editors and Authors Introduction: What Do the Chinese Intellectual Elites Expect for China in the New Millennium? Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo

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1

Part I Political Reforms 1

Statecraft in an Era of Change: Building a Harmonious Society Weixing Chen

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Beyond Technocracy: China’s Quest for Legitimacy in the Era of Hu Jintao Baogang Guo

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Don’t Judge a Country by its Cover: Governance in China Suzanne Ogden

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Part II Political Economy and Development 4

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Foreign Direct Investment and Labor Rights Protection in China: A Tale of Two Sectors Josh Eastin and Ka Zeng Political Dynamics of Mixed Economic Formation in China Guangbin Yang

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Part III Chinese Political Culture and the Media 6

Censorship and Accountability in the Chinese Media Barrett L. McCormick

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Contents

7 The Internet and Political Participation in China Bo Li and Yang Zhong

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Part IV China’s Foreign Policy 8 The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 Gregory J. Moore 9 The Legal Status of the Diaoyu Islands Kristina S. Mao

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10 The Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China: Some Recent Relations Peter R. Moody, Jr.

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Index

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List of Figures

2.1 Legitimacy of the politics of efficiency 7.1 Number of Internet users in China (per 100,000) 7.2 Average hours per week of accessing the Internet by Chinese Internet users 7.3 Main locations of accessing the Internet by Chinese Internet users 7.4 Age distribution of Chinese Internet users 7.5 Educational levels of Chinese Internet users 7.6 Occupations of Chinese Internet users

30 157 158 159 159 159 160


List of Tables

2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20 7.1 8.1

The traditional model of Chinese utilitarian justification 35 Four models of politics of equity 37 Distribution of diffuse support for China’s political regime 62 Distribution of support for specific policies (mean score [scale of 1–5]) 63 Human Development Index (HDI) rank (lower numbers are better) 67 Human Poverty Index (HPI) rank 67 Longevity: Infant mortality rate 68 Longevity: Mortality rate for those under age 5 68 Longevity: Children underweight for age 69 The impact of malnutrition, stated as a percentage 69 Population not expected to survive until age 40 69 Knowledge: Adult illiteracy rate 70 Standard of living: Percentage of population below income poverty line 70 GDP per capita 70 Annual growth rate in GDP per capita, as a percentage 70 Gini Index 71 Inequality measures: Ratio of richest 10 percent to poorest 10% 71 Telephone mainlines and cellular subscribers per 1,000 people 72 Internet users per 1,000 people 72 Gender-related development rank and index 72 Gender inequality in education—literate females age 15 and above 72 Human Development Index trends (1975–2002 and 1975–2003) 73 Percentage of news gathering by Chinese Internet users 160 “Did the United States oppose China–Taiwan reunification during the 1995–1996 period in your opinion, even under the best of circumstances (i.e., even if Taiwan were to agree, etc.)?” 178

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8.2 8.3 8.4

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10.1 10.2 10.3

List of Tables

“Does ‘international law’ (going back to the settlements at the end of World War II) recognize Taiwan as a part of China?” “Do you think China is justified in a resort to military force to reunify China if Taiwan declares independence?” Perceptual gaps and U.S. interests in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait (Question: “What U.S. interests were at stake in the Taiwan Strait such that the United States would risk war with China over Taiwan?”) Perceptual gaps and the reasons China wants Taiwan back (Question: “What were the reasons China wanted Taiwan back badly enough to risk war with the U.S.?”) Point–counterpoint: The evolution of democracy in Taiwan Blue–green polarization since 2000 Points and counterpoints after 2000

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Acknowledgments

T

he chapters in this book were presented on March 31, 2006–April 2, 2006 at the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Association of Chinese Political Studies of which Shiping Hua was the president. The conference was cohosted by the Institute for Democracy and Development and the McConnell Center for Political Leadership at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, the United States. Major funding for the conference was from the McConnell Center for Political Leadership at the University of Louisville and the Mr. & Mrs. S. H. Wong Foundation, Ltd., Hong Kong.


Notes on the Editors and Authors

Editors Shiping Hua is associate professor of Political Science, associate director of the Institute for Democracy and Development, and the director of the Center for Asian Democracy at the University of Louisville in Louisville, Kentucky. His single-authored books are Scientism and Humanism: Two Cultures in Post-Mao China (1978–1989) (The State University of New York Press, 1995), and Chinese Utopianism: A Comparative Study of Reformist Thought in Japan, Russia and China (1898–2000). He has edited/coedited five other books in English. His articles and presentations also appear in popular media, such as The Wilson Quarterly, The New York Times, and The Voice of America. Dr. Hua is the general editor of a book series with the University Press of Kentucky’s “Asia in the New Millennium.” He is professor in affiliation with China’s Peking University and Renmin University. He is also currently council chairman of the United Societies of China Studies, a coalition of five scholarly organizations of China studies based in the United States. He was Asian Policy Studies fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars–George Washington University during the 2004–2005 academic year. Sujian Guo is associate professor in the Department of Political Science and director of the Center for U.S.–China Policy Studies at San Francisco State University, editor of the Journal of Chinese Political Science, and president of the Association of Chinese Political Studies. His research interests include Chinese/Asian politics, U.S.–China relations, communist and postcommunist studies, democratic transitions, and the political economy of East and Southeast Asia. He has published more than thirty articles both in English and in Chinese. His books include The Political Economy of Asian Transition from Communism (2006), China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions (2006), and Post-Mao China: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism? (2000).

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Authors Weixing Chen is a professor of political science and chair of the Department of Political Science at East Tennessee State University in Johnson City, Tennessee. He has published books and articles and contributed chapters to books on China’s transition and reform. He serves on several editorial boards of professional journals. Josh Eastin is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arkansas. His research interests include environmental politics, foreign direct investment, trade liberalization, and Chinese economic integration. Baogang Guo is associate professor of political science at Dalton State College in Dalton, Georgia, and president-elect of the Association of Chinese Political Studies. He holds a PhD from Brandeis University and a master’s degree from Zhengzhou University. He is associate editor of the Journal of Chinese Political Science and research associate at the China Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia. His research interests include comparative public policy, political culture and political legitimacy, and Chinese and Asian politics. He is an associate editor of China Today (Greenwood Press, 2005), and has authored nine book chapters and eleven peer-reviewed journal articles. Dr. Guo’s recent publications appeared in Asian Survey,The Journal of Chinese Political Science, Modern China Studies, The Journal of Comparative Asian Development, Twenty-First Century, and The American Journal of China Studies. Bo Li is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He graduated from Peking University with a Bachelor’s Degree in law in 1997. He had worked as a marketing manager and editor for Lenovo and Sohu, respectively, before coming to the United States in 2003. Kristina S. Mao is assistant professor of political science at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois. Her areas of interest include East Asian international relations, Chinese government, society, and foreign policy, and globalization and Asian modernization. She received her PhD from the University of Arizona. Barrett L. McCormick is a professor of political science at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. His PhD was awarded by the University of Wisconsin in 1985. He has been at Marquette since 1984, except for the period of 1991–1993 spent at the Contemporary China Centre at the Australian National University. He specializes in Chinese politics, and his current research project is on media markets and the transformation of China’s public sphere. Previous projects include edited volumes and articles on U.S.–China relations (with Edward Friedman, What If China Doesn’t Democratize? [ME Sharpe, 2000]), and comparing China to Eastern Europe and East Asia (with Jonathan Unger, The Future of Chinese Socialism [ME Sharpe, 1996]). Dr. McCormick’s publications also include Political Reform in Post-Mao China (California, 1990), and articles in The China Journal, The Journal of Asian Studies, Pacific Affairs, Issues and Studies, and Twenty-First Century.


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Peter R. Moody, Jr., is professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana. His most recent books include Tradition and Modernization in China and Japan and Political Change in Taiwan and Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society. He is editor of China Documents Annual and book review editor for the Review of Politics. He has written on Chinese politics, Asian international affairs, Chinese political thought, international relations theory, and the theory of political parties. He received his A.B. from Vanderbilt University and his PhD from Yale. Gregory J. Moore is assistant professor of Political Science and East Asian Studies at Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, Florida. His research and teaching responsibilities include international relations, comparative politics, Chinese politics and foreign policy, East Asian politics and international relations (including China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan), Sino-American relations, and research methods and theory. Prior to his arrival at Eckerd College, Dr. Moore served as assistant director of the Center for China–United States Relations at the University of Denver, and taught at the University of Denver, Metropolitan State College of Denver, Renmin University of China (Beijing), and a number of other Chinese universities. He lived in China for four and onehalf years, variously teaching, studying Chinese, and doing research. He received his doctorate from the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies, his master’s degree from the University of Virginia, and his bachelor’s degree from Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota. His works have appeared in the form of essays, articles, and book chapters in the Journal of Asian Studies, the Journal of Contemporary China, Human Rights Working Papers, and Issues and Studies. Suzanne Ogden is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University in Boston and a research associate at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. She has been a visiting scholar in the Department of Oriental Studies, Cambridge University, and a Fulbright scholar on Sino-American relations and U.S.–China policy at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing (operated by China’s Foreign Ministry). She accompanied former president Jimmy Carter on a trip to China in 2001 to observe a village’s elections. Professor Ogden’s primary research focus has been the relationship among culture, development, and democratization. She has authored, coauthored, or edited numerous books and articles on China and on international relations. Her most recent books include Inklings of Democracy in China (Cambridge: Harvard University’s Asian Research Center and Harvard University Press, 2002); and, now in its twelfth edition, Global Studies: China (McGraw Hill, 2007), an introductory college text that also covers Hong Kong and Taiwan. Guangbin Yang is a professor in political science and director of the Institute of Comparative Political Systems at Renmin University of China. Dr. Yang specializes in the areas of new institutionalism politics and comparative political development as well as Chinese government and politics. He has published over

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ten papers on the theory of institutional changes in first-class journals in China. His Introduction to Political Science has been reprinted twelve times since 2000. His recently published books are Introduction to Chinese Politics and Government (2003), State Power in Chinese Economic Transition (2003), and The Forms of Governance and Rise/Fall of Nations (2005). He will soon finish the book, The Fall and Rise of China: The Institutional Changes Perspective. Dr. Yang was a visiting fellow (1992–1993) at Sussex University in the United Kingdom and a Fulbright professor (1997–1998) at George Washington University. In the fall of 2003, Dr. Yang taught a course for graduate students at the School of International Studies at Denver University. Ka Zeng is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arkansas. She is the author of Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy (University of Michigan Press, 2004) and editor of China’s Foreign Trade Policy: The New Constituencies (forthcoming from Routledge) . She has also published articles on China’s involvement in the world economy. Her research interests include international trade negotiations, foreign direct investment and trade disputes, and China’s harmonization with international law. Yang Zhong is chair of Asian Studies and professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. His main research interests include Chinese local government and politics, Chinese political culture, and Sino-U.S. relations. He has published over thirty academic articles and his articles have appeared in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Asian Survey, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Contemporary Asia, and PS: Political Science and Politics. He has also published and edited five books. His most recent book is Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below (M. E. Sharpe, 2003). He served twice as president of the Association of Chinese Political Studies (USA).

INTRODUCTION

What Do the Chinese Intellectual Elites Expect for China in the New Millennium? Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo

A

t the turn of the new millennium, American scholar Mark Borthwick dubbed the twenty-first century as the “Pacific Century,” implying that the center of the world’s political and economic arena had shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific.1 The United States now trades more with Asia than with Europe. Besides Canada and Mexico, two neighbors of the United States, and America’s two largest trading partners, are in Asia: Japan and China. The magnitude of Asia’s growth is also manifested by its size. Asia’s population is ten times that of North America, and six times that of Europe. With the relative slow growth of the Japanese economy since the 1990s, the prominence of China has become even more noteworthy. Therefore, some people have started to call the twenty-first century, “the China Century.” In comparison with Western China watchers, Chinese intellectuals during the post-Mao era tended to have a more cautious attitude toward the future of China. In the 1980s, the talk about “China being expelled from the world’s civilization” was popular.2 Post-Mao China emerged from the disastrous Cultural Revolution, which had caused the loss of 500 billion RMB, or roughly 250 billion dollars. One out of every nine Chinese was affected by persecutions during the Cultural Revolution.3 But, after the mid-1990s, Chinese intellectuals started to become more optimistic. “China has been experiencing the kind of the stability that was rare in modern history,” said Feng Lin, a prominent Chinese scholar.4 On the other hand, the rise of Asia, especially of China, occurred against the background of the relative stagnation in the West. Immediately after World War II,

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approximately 40 percent of the world’s wealth was generated by the United States. At the turn of the twenty-first century, it is about 30 percent. The relative slow growth of the West was not only in the area of economics, but also in brainpower. In 1970, the United States produced 30 percent of university student enrollments in the world. In 2000, that number dropped to 14 percent. If the current trend continues, the United States’ share of PhDs will drop from a high of 50 percent in 1970s to 15 percent in 2010. In 2010, Asia, with half of the world’s population, will produce 90 percent of the world’s scientists. In the twentieth century, the total labor force in the world was 1.5 billion. With competition from China, India, and Russia, there will soon be an additional 1.5 billion workers in the twenty-first century.5 In spite of the great expectations from some intellectual and political elites, China is faced with serious socioeconomic and political challenges. If China’s economic reform in the 1980s was described as a “riding tiger,” meaning that if China reformed its economic system, it was dangerous and if it did not, it would be even more so,6 the current situation is no less challenging. Against this background, approximately one hundred prominent Chinese scholars were interviewed to speculate about twenty-first-century China. These scholars were from the areas of politics and economics and from social and cultural circles. While their views cannot be used as representative of all Chinese intellectuals, they at least represent a significant part of the mentality of Chinese intellectuals.7 This introduction has included the views of some of these individuals about the country’s future in the new century. Political Reforms The widespread opinion among Western scholars is that, in the last two decades, China has made progress in economic reform, but not in political reform. This impression was certainly not groundless. Deng Xiaoping said, China could have direct elections after the middle of the 21st century. Now we can have indirect elections above the county level. Below the county level, we can have direct elections now. That is because we have one billion people, and the level of cultural cultivation of our people is not high enough. We can’t have direct elections now.8

In recent years, however, some Western scholars have voiced different views.9 Weixing Chen observes in the book that the fourth generation of Chinese leadership, that is, under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, for the first time since China’s economic reform is making a strategic adjustment to the development policy by trying to address questions such as economic growth for whom and for what, instead of focusing on economics for its own sake. In a similar tone, Baogang Guo remarks that after more than two decades of efficiency-driven economic reform, Chinese politics seems about to enter into a period of “politics of equity,” which is a departure from the “politics of efficiency.” While the politics of efficiency tends to focus on ways to attain a higher economic growth rate, the politics of equity focuses more on the issue of equal and fair allocation of values and political leverages.

Introduction

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Suzanne Ogden goes even further by arguing provocatively that making democratization the central paradigm for China’s government and asserting democratization as the only acceptable road for China to take has led to an unfortunate focus on this question at the expense of others, which, arguably, might shed more light on China’s successes and failures as a country. A discussion of China’s governance, stripped of all the ideological baggage associated with communism and liberal democracy, would allow for comparisons of its effectiveness as against others. Many of the same issues could be discussed— transparency, elections, legal and political reforms, decentralization, pluralization, and participation. But they could offer more insights if they were discussed as elements of governance rather than as elements of democratization. Among Chinese intellectual elites, the one who has systematically outlined the progress China has made in political reforms after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in 1979 is Li Junru, vice president of the Central Party School.10 Li argued that political reform was part of the post-Mao reforms from the first day onward. This was documented in the Political Report of the Third Plenum of the Central Party Committee in 1979. The document says, “democracy is the pretext of the liberation of thought.” Taking a holistic approach, Li said that it was not possible to separate political reform from economic reform. For instance, the People’s Commune was abolished in 1982. This was not only a step in economic reform, but also in political reform, because the People’s Commune was a combination of economic production and political organization. Li also argued that the rule of law had been part of the political process in the last two decades, pointing out that China has had double-digit growth in legislation during that time period. He said that China’s “democratic parties” are now more involved in the country’s political process, a definite change from what it was earlier. In comparison to the situation two decades ago, a more open media has also promoted political reform in China. More importantly, the Chinese government has been trying to promote democracy of society by encouraging democracy within the party. However, Li warned that although it has made progress in political reforms, China should not copy Western countries. China has a different cultural tradition and anti-selfishness is at its center. Economic Reforms As far as the general direction of China’s economic reforms are concerned, there seems to be less controversy in comparison with political reform. A relatively free market is endorsed by most Chinese economists. Some scholars even make the argument that China’s cultural tradition is a more important intellectual source for a free-market economy, which is widely believed to have had its origins in the West. Sheng Hong, a former director of the well-known “Unirule Institute of Economics” in Beijing, has remarked that the free market and Chinese traditional philosophy have a natural link. Sheng said that Chinese philosophy, especially the Taoist tradition, is one of the major intellectual sources, if not the most important intellectual one, of modern Western liberal economic

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theory, which is based on the principle of the “natural order.” The Taoist worship of the “natural” fits nicely with the liberal principle of the free market. This is a fact that the Westerners are too embarrassed to admit, he said. Modern liberal economic theory is a product of the interaction between Eastern and Western traditions and is not just the product of the West. In the twenty-first century, China is in a better position to develop modern economic theories in comparison with the West because of a closer link between modern liberal economic theory and Chinese tradition.11 In spite of what he said, Sheng seemed to express doubt about the theories of Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek, who were believed to have provided the major philosophical foundation of Western liberal economic theory. Sheng pointed out that the economic takeoff of Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 was not because the Japanese government adopted Western economic theories, meaning a free-market economy; it was war reparations with China that played a key role. After the Jiawu War (1894–1895), China’s reparations to Japan were equal to two years of Japan’s GDP and eight years of the Japanese government’s revenue. The prosperity of Western countries is partly due to the fact that they did not have the burden of overpopulation, and partly because they could migrate to the North and South Americas. Latecomers such as China didn’t have that luxury.12 Related to the population problem is food, which is a big challenge for a country like China. Farmers in the United States constitute only about 3 percent of the total population; Japan, 6 percent; Taiwan, 20 percent; and China, 80 percent. China’s per capita land is one-ninth that of the United States. In Who Will Feed China (1995), Lester R. Brown determined that China would have food shortages of 376 million tons a year by the mid-twenty-first century; and that this would have a grave impact on the world.13 In the United States, a farmer can feed sixty people; in China, he can feed only three.14 However, Chinese economists are moderately optimistic about China’s food problem, believing that it can feed its population at a lower level in the new century.15 Scholars have noted some social issues relating to economic development, which include the uneven development between the cities and the countryside, the coastal areas and the inland. During the Ninth Five-Year-Plan period (1996–2000), the average annual growth was 12 percent for Eastern China, 10 percent for Central China, and 8 percent for Western China.16 In spite of the fact that in the fifteen years from 1978 to 1993 the percentage of those who lived under the poverty line decreased from over 30 to 8.8, a peasant’s average income is one-third to one-half that of a city dweller.17 The injustice looks acute against the background that the peasantry had already paid dearly for China’s construction. During the period 1952–1986, Chinese peasants contributed 686.8 billion RMB to their country’s industrialization drive.18 This situation might change in the twenty-first century. In the mid-1990s, enterprises owned by the villages and towns constituted about one-third of China’s industry. By 2010, it could be as high as one-half if the current trend continues.19

Introduction

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Other issues such as the “gray population” and the ratio between male/female babies have also been noted. By 1995, the percentage of those who were sixty years and above in the Chinese population was already close to 10, which made China one among the seventy “gray nations” in the world.20 By 2030, China’s ratio of male/female babies might reach 135:100, a situation that may have very grave consequences.21 Against this background, the authors in this book comment on two specific issues related to China’s economic reforms at the turn of the century. Remarking on the impact of transnational corporations’ investment on labor violations, Josh Eastin and Ka Zeng argue that firms investing in high-tech industries (e.g., electronics and semiconductors) tend to engage in more sound labor practices than those that have invested in low-tech ones (e.g., textiles, shoes, apparel, and toys) due to differences in mobility, the ease with which a firm can seek out new production locations, labor cost as a percentage of the total budget, firm incentives to invest in workforce training, and access to local markets. Guangbin Yang comments on the duality of the Chinese state’s behavior: on the one hand, the state pushes hard on its capitalist-oriented market-building efforts; on the other, it retards its marketization process by tackling problems such as the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, which are created by the process itself. Social and Cultural Issues Toward the end of the twentieth century, there seemed to be a revival of Chinese traditional culture. From 1990 to 1995, about two hundred books were published on Confucianism. In the words of Zheng Jiadong, “This was the most prosperous period for Confucianism since the May Fourth Movement in 1919.”22 This situation was also consistent with the observation that since the second half of the 1990s, nationalism in China was on the rise. But most Chinese scholars are cautious about the role that traditional culture will play in the new century. Zhang Xianglong from Peking University said, “I am worried that in another 50 years, or 100 years, or 200 years, although the land of China may still be the land of China and the appearances of the Chinese may still be the same, Chinese culture will be totally lost.”23 For Dong Fangshuo, “the most serious crisis of Chinese culture is that Confucianism represents the values of the intellectual elites, while Western culture represents the value of the masses. That’s why many Chinese intellectuals such as Wang Guowei (1877–1927), Liang Qichao (1858–1927) and Yan Fu (1853–1921), who initially intended to seek solutions from the West, turned to Buddhism in the end. The Chinese lack a popular value system. That’s the most serious obstacle to modernization.”24 Regarding mass political culture, China has experienced a transition from “revolutionary zeal” to “normal lives.” Chinese society is entering a period of “routinization,” instead of “revolution,” as was the case before the Cultural Fever in the 1980s. People became successful members of society not through

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revolutionary zeal, but through well-developed work skills based on knowledge and training. A quiet, normal life is the norm now.25 Regarding the crisis of belief systems, some are looking for increasing the role of religion. It was said that of the three pillars of culture, literature, philosophy, and religion, the strongest one in Chinese tradition was literature while the next was philosophy and religion came last. China should emphasize religion in the next century.26 The tendency against utopianism, which is part of the Maoist culture, was noted among Chinese intellectual figures. In resonance of the post-Mao leadership pattern with the pragmatically oriented technocrats being in dominant position, Wang Xiaobo, a well-known writer, said that those in the social sciences are not suitable for leadership positions. Those in the natural sciences provide alternatives for people; those in the social sciences and humanities teach people how to choose alternatives and that prevents people to have their own choice.27 For Cui Jian, who is the most popular rock star in China, music should be de-politicized. The rulers want to make use of nationalism, because national interests are important to them. For musicians, human nature, not national interest, is the most important.28 Generally in line with these observations, the two authors in the book who focus on the media and the Internet both argue that Chinese society has become more pluralistic in the last two decades. Barrett McCormick observes that although there are still sharp limits to the use of Chinese media as sites for grassroots resistance to corruption and abuse of power, Chinese Internet users and media audiences may share some interests and understandings with the state, but also experience conflict and are capable of significant resistance. Similarly, Bo Li and Yang Zhong feel that interest aggregation on the Internet has successfully changed government policies and behavior. These positive outcomes have further encouraged Chinese citizens to engage in online political activities. Foreign Policy A distinct difference between Western China watchers and the Chinese scholars is that while the Westerners are generally optimistic about China’s future in the new century, the Chinese intellectuals tend to be more cautious. Westerners, even those who are not friendly toward China, are equally optimistic about China’s future because, for some, a strong and prosperous China may not be good for them. Zhang Yebai points out that while the United States may be important to China, China may not be that important to the United States. For instance, China’s trade with the United States was about 20 percent of its total world trade; for the United States, trade with China was only 6 percent.29 This situation makes those who are nervous about China’s threat appear ridiculous. Bill Clinton, former president of the United States, remarked on May 17, 1996, that the United States regards China as the most serious threat as well as the most promising opportunity.30 The well-known Chinese political scientist Wang Jisi argued that to predict China’s future based on the assumption that it will continue to grow annually

Introduction

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at the rate of 8–10 percent for the next thirty–fifty years is ridiculous. Thus, the claim that the twenty-first century is the “China Century” is groundless, in spite of the fact that in comparative terms, China has been gaining power at a more rapid rate than the United States in the last century. Although the United States became the most powerful country in the world in 1900, it took another fifty years for it to become a world superpower.31 Nevertheless, some scholars realize that China’s power cannot be judged by the most popular standards, that is, the GNP or the GDP. Zheng Jingping pointed out that the size of China’s economy looked smaller than it was in the sense that the GNP or the GDP is not accurate. Judged by the more accurate Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP, China’s economic size was four times larger than that judged by the GNP or the GDP.32 Many Chinese scholars realize the grave nature of the Taiwan issue because, for many, if China were to go to war with the United States in the new century, it would be due to the Taiwan issue. The Chinese government’s position toward Taiwan has witnessed three major transformations. From 1949 to 1978, China intended to reunify the country by “liberating Taiwan,” meaning taking Taiwan by force. From 1978 when China started the reforms to 1995 when Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University, Beijing intended to reunify with Taiwan mainly through political means. From 1995 to the present, Beijing seems to intend to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent, using force if necessary.33 The United States’ position toward the Taiwan issue has not changed much in the last two decades and will not change much in the near future. Keeping the peace in the Taiwan Strait is in the best interests of the United States, and it does not matter much if Taiwan becomes independent or remains a part of China. The U.S. strategy is sometimes described as one of ambiguity. The United States wants to keep both Beijing and Taipei in the dark as to what they would do if Beijing were to attack Taipei militarily. The logic is: If Beijing was assured that Washington would not get involved militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan, then it would be more likely to resort to force; if Taipei is assured that Washington would get involved militarily in the event of an attack from the mainland, its move toward independence would accelerate. As long as the United States is involved in Asian politics, China does not have serious strategic issues with Japan, since Japan has been largely under the security umbrella provided by the United States. China’s trade frictions with Japan are also normal. The main problem between China and Japan lies in their history. Beijing is still upset by Japan’s refusal to officially apologize to China and Japan’s attempt to whitewash the atrocities committed by the Japanese armed forces in China during World War II. The three authors in this book who deal with China’s foreign policy each focuses on a specific issue that is of vital importance to China. China’s relations with Japan over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands; China’s relations with Taiwan focusing on the 1995 bombing; and the Chinese Communist Party’s relations with the Kuomintang in recent years. Kristina Mao examines the issue of the Diaoyu Islands through existing international laws and treaties. She observes

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that Chinese domestic politics and national power weakened the Chinese position but promoted the Japanese position during the last thirty years and this will complicate the problem in the twenty-first century for China. To defend Chinese territorial integrity, Chinese leaders should take advantage of the international laws and international courts to seek justice. Commenting on the missile crisis at the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996, Greg Moore observes that the likelihood of the Taiwan issue being resolved in the near future is remote unless Chinese and American policy-makers become more adept at addressing problems of misperception, closing perceptual gaps, understanding more completely the domestic politics and interests of the other side, and acting with greater prudence in accordance with this information. Therefore, the potential for conflict over Taiwan remains high. Peter Moody observes that with the Kuomintang (KMT) out of power, radicalism fading on the mainland, and the hostility of the Taiwan government to notions of Chinese nationalism, the two parties of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the KMT may once again share common ground. The anomalies of the situation provoke speculation: Had the CPC been willing to publicly assert in a more timely fashion the line toward Taiwan that it currently takes, there may have been progress, if not toward unification, at least for stable and enduring peace between the two sides. Notes 1. Mark Borthwick, The Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998). 2. Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, He Shang (River Elegy) (Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 1988). 3. Feng Lin, ed., 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce (Prediction of China’s 21st Century) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1996), p. 9. 4. Ibid., p. 8. 5. David Gergen, U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 140, No. 24, June 26, 2006, “Great to Good?” p. 72. 6. Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 7. Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce. 8. Ibid., p. 15. 9. Yang Zhong and Shiping Hua, eds., Political Civilization and Modernization in China (Singapore: World Scientific Press, 2005). 10. Li Junru, “Zhongguo tizhi gaige zou shi” (The Trend of China’s Structural Reform), Renmin University of China, Beijing, June 12, 2006. 11. Sheng Hong, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, pp. 160–161. 12. Ibid., p. 162. 13. Lester R. Brown, Who Will Feed China: Wake-up Call for a Small Planet (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995). 14. Chen Huajiu, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 35. 15. Xia Chunlin, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 74. 16. Li Zhongjie, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 251. 17. Yu Changjiang, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 87.

Introduction 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

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Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 23. Zhuang Qianzhi and Liu Xue, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 195. Huang Qihai, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 37. Zhang Yi, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 43. Zheng Jiadong, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 734. Zhang Xianglong, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 701. Dong Fangshuo, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce. Sun Liping, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 27. Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 529. Wang Xiaobo, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, pp. 544–550. Cui Jian, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 565. Zhang Yebai, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 431. Ibid. Wang Jisi, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 424. Zheng Jingping, interview, in Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce, p. 171. Shiping Hua, ed., Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing–Taipei–Washington since 1995: Status Quo at the Taiwan Straits? (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006).


PART I

Political Reforms


CHAPTER 1

Statecraft in an Era of Change: Building a Harmonious Society Weixing Chen

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ocial harmony harks back to the heritage of traditional Chinese philosophy, but it is becoming a new theme of Chinese politics and a new goal of development for China under the fourth generation of Chinese leadership. By the official definition in Chinese, a harmonious society should be one that is democratic under the rule by law, one that is fair and just, one that is full of trust and love, one that is brimming with vitality, one that is orderly and stable, and one that is in harmony with the natural environment. 1 Hu Jintao, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), made it a strategic goal of the CCP to build a harmonious society in China. He first elaborated on the importance of building a harmonious society in a speech delivered at a meeting for provincial leaders at the Central Party School of the CCP Central Committee on February 19–25, 2005. The theme of building a harmonious society was then given particular attention during the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2005 and stressed again at the fourth session of the Tenth People’s Congress in April 2006. It was written as a concept into the Resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Central Committee. The timeline for accomplishing this goal of building a harmonious society is twenty years. Building a harmonious society is an extension of Hu Jintao’s “scientific concept of development” (kexue fazhanguan)—the essence of Hu’s pro-people approach. In contrast to the “economics growth in command” of the Jiang era, it places emphasis on social justice and development for people. It is a response by the fourth generation of the Chinese leadership to the eroded social solidarity and lack of harmony between the government and people, between the central

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government and local governments, between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural residents, and between money-making institutions/organizations and consumers. While economic growth has improved the material well-being of the Chinese society as a whole and provided new legitimacy for the CCP, it could not resolve the ills accompanying China’s economic development. Some of the ills are income disparity and the gap between the rich and the poor, uneven development between the East and the West and between the urban and rural areas, a high unemployment rate, lack of social insurance and access to human services such as education, health care, and housing, and the issue of rural development. These ills have eroded China’s social solidarity and caused disharmony in Chinese society. Many of the issues concern social justice, but at stake are the legitimacy of the CCP and order and stability of the Chinese society. Lack of harmony is the source of politics in the United States, but it is the source of instability in China. If there were harmony in the United States, there would be no politics. In many ways, American society is divided and so is American government. The two-party system definitely does not favor political harmony. Since the American government always seems to be for some people, by some people, and of some people, voters and groups often take sides on issues and identify themselves with one of the two major political parties in elections. If people are not happy about the direction in which the country is going or about government policies, coalitions will be built to change the government through election or lobbying by special interest groups. Disharmony very often concerns “who gets what, when, and how” rather than the legitimacy of the government. In contrast, people in China do not have an alternative under the one-party rule by the CCP. In the absence of institutional outlets for grievances under the one-party rule, grievances are all targeted at the party in power. When problems pile up and people are unhappy, pressure will build up on the government and the government will have to respond through statecraft. “Building a harmonious society” is thus the most recent case of statecraft. The larger issue raised by the endeavor of building a harmonious society, however, is for whom and for what China’s economic reform and growth are. To a certain extent, the success or failure of building a harmonious society concerns not only the political legitimacy of the CCP but also the Chinese path of development. Focusing on this new endeavor of building a harmonious society by the CCP, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the issues causing social disharmony; the second analyzes the causes; and the third elaborates on statecraft to build a harmonious society in China. Issues In November 2004, the China Statistics Bureau conducted a nationwide survey in China’s 31 provinces. Included in the survey were 102,309 families in 997 counties. Among them, 58,778 (57.45 percent) were males and 43,531 females (42.55 percent); 19,235 (18.8 percent) were between the ages of 16

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and 29; 52,344 (51.16 percent) between 30 and 49; 16,129 (15.7 percent) between 50 and 59; and 14,601 (14.27 percent) above 60. The number of urban residents was 48,457 (47.3 percent) and that of rural residents was 53,852 (52.64 percent). When these individuals were asked what the social problem they were most concerned with was, 18.89 percent answered “shehui fengqi” (established social practice); 17.1, crime and public security; 16.79, unemployment; 14.26, corruption; 14.55, education; and 8.39, salary issues. 2 This survey reveals some of today’s issues even though it was conducted by the government and the questions were preselected. In the process of China’s economic reform, some people have become rich but many others have been dislocated and left behind. The per capita GDP in a rich province in the East is ten times over that of the poorest province in the West. Of the lowest income families 10 percent make up only less than 2 percent of the wealth, while 10 percent of the highest income families constitute 40 percent of the wealth. The average urban resident’s income is six times more than the average income of rural residents. Even though the rural population makes up over 60 percent of China’s population, agriculture makes up only 15 percent of China’s GDP.3 Associated with income disparity and uneven development are many other issues such as access to human services, for example, health care, education, and social insurances, which, in the Chinese vocabulary, are social justice issues. Chinese socialism before the economic reform was, to a large extent, “workunit socialism,” as services and benefits were provided by the state through work units.4 With the collapse and disappearance of many old work units, especially state-owned enterprises, many urban residents have been left without health care since the economic reform. Rural populations never had health care, but there were village clinics and “barefoot doctors.”5 With the collapse of the commune system, village clinics and barefoot doctors are history. The situation for health care in the rural area is desperate, as the majority of today’s rural population does not have access to health care. In the meantime, the cost of health care has dramatically increased over the last decade. The catchy term in China that captures the situation is “kanbingnan” (difficult to see a doctor). It is difficult to see a doctor because many Chinese cannot afford the cost of seeing one without health care coverage or insurance. Since hospitals’ revenues and health care professionals’ income are associated with the medicines prescribed for patients by doctors and the treatment given to them, hospitals are in a way becoming profitmaking enterprises. Doctors always prescribe the most expensive medicine and offer treatment that the patient does not necessarily need. A common practice for surgeons in China for over a decade has been to collect “hongbao” (cash in a red envelope) from patients before surgery. All of these factors further elevate the cost of health care for patients. No wonder it is “kanbingnan.” All large and good hospitals in China are owned by the state. Yet, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), China is ranked fourth from the bottom among one hundred and ninety-one countries in terms of the fairness of its health care system and resources allocated to health care. The lack of affordable health care has certainly produced grievances among different groups of people.

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The overwhelming majority of schools from kindergarten to college in China are public, but education has become the major expense for many families due to high tuition and various fees imposed on students by schools. For years, the state has not invested enough on education. Since 1999, the number of college students tripled, reaching fifteen million, but government education appropriation has not risen accordingly. As a result, many schools have to borrow money from banks and are in huge debt. To pay back the debt, they have to impose fees on students and raise tuition. The various fees and tuition hikes are huge burdens on families. Many families simply cannot afford to send their children to school even if their children have passed national entrance exams and are enrolled in colleges. In July 2006, about one-fourth of poor students’ applications for tuition waivers were turned down and approximately seven thousand families petitioned the Chinese Ministry of Education about unaffordable education.6 The situation in the rural areas is much worse because the state does not provide any funding for education. Under the People’s Commune System before the economic reform in 1978, there were schools in almost every village. With the collapse of the commune system since the economic reform, schools in many villages have been closed. Families must pay to send their children to a school in a different village, and the incentives are not present. Elementary schools should be free but without state funding many children do not have access to education. School teachers very often are not paid for months. Schools must generate their own revenues. The widely reported firecracker accident not long ago at an elementary school in Shanxi province is a case in point. To generate revenues, the school required its students to make firecrackers at school in their spare time. Firecrackers exploded in classrooms, the school blew up, and several students died in the accident. As a result, the school principal lost his job, but the large issue of funding education was not resolved. Chinese society, like many other societies, is aging. Without pensions and social security, a large population will have to rely on themselves and their families in their retirement. With the collapse of the old system of human services and the skyrocketing expenses for health care and education, the groups that are affected the most are peasants and migrant and unemployed workers (especially former state-enterprise employees), even though grievances are also widespread among other groups such as veterans, low-income families, and college graduates. The situation in rural China, however, is more serious, for at stake are the livelihood and well-being of about seven hundred million Chinese peasants. It was not surprising then that “building a new socialist countryside” was made a historic task in the resolution passed at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP’s Sixteenth Central Committee meeting on December 31, 2005. For years, agricultural production and productivity and arable land have been decreasing. Chinese agriculture is not competitive by international standards. Despite the fact that grain prices at home are higher than international prices, there are still no incentives for peasants to be engaged in grain production. The average increase in income for peasants between 1997 and 2002 was 3.97 percent, which was 3.36 percent lower than in the previous twenty-four years. The wealth


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gap between the urban and rural areas has been widening, as mentioned earlier. At the beginning of China’s economic reform, the wealth gap between the urban and rural areas was in the ratio 2:1. It was 3.2:1 in 2004. The rural population is still very large, and over thirty million people in rural China are living in poverty, if the poverty line is based on the 1985 criterion of RMB206 yuan per capita a year, which is RMB625 yuan in 2000 and more today.7 If we add another two hundred million peasants who have a yearly income of RMB850–950 yuan, which is a little over the poverty line of RMB650 yuan, we are talking about two hundred and thirty million peasants. The old family-based agriculture is coming to a close and Chinese agriculture is no longer able to support such a huge rural population. In this situation and without state help, it is not surprising that a large rural population does not have access to human services such as education, health care, social insurance, and welfare. About 20 percent of rural children have no access to education; about 92.4 percent of peasants have to rely on themselves in their retirement without any pension fund; and 95 percent of peasants have no health insurance.8 Without financial support from the central and provincial governments, local governments in rural areas had been imposing fees on peasants and villages as revenues until 2005, which made the already bad situation worse. Resentment among peasants was widespread. Surplus of labor in the rural area is another serious issue. It is estimated that there are seven hundred million laborers in China today, and 70 percent of them are rural laborers. Under the current conditions, China’s arable land needs only one hundred million rural laborers. Business and enterprises in rural areas employ about fifty million rural labors. There are three hundred and fifty million surplus laborers in rural areas, which is 124 percent of the U.S. population.9 For the last decade, over one hundred million peasants have become migrant workers, which, on the one hand, helps relieve the huge surplus labor in rural areas and, on the other, helps bring some needed capital. Unfortunately, these migrant workers’ interests and rights are not protected. They do not enjoy the same rights as urban residents. They do not have access to human services in places where they work, including their children’s education. Many urban governments have even developed discriminatory policies such as the issuance of employment cards limiting their job opportunities in urban areas. All these issues are affecting social harmony in China. Analysis It is noted in a handbook on building a socialist harmonious society that “international experience indicates that when a country’s GDP enters a period of U.S.$1,000–3,000, various economic and social contradictions and conflicts will arise.”10 The decade of the 1960s was marked by optimism that world poverty could be conquered by economic growth but these hopes were dashed by growing unemployment and inequality in the 1970s.11 Growth with equity marked the 1970s, and the debate about the best approach to development continued in the 1980s and 1990s. Economists often assume that the problem of a

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more human society is solved by expertise and by know-how. A vast bulk of the development literature focuses on growth rates as the dues ex machine to solve all problems.12 China has been experiencing a period of high economic growth. But its economic growth is not a cure to all the problems that accompany it. China seems to be in a good position to apply expertise and know-how, considering its economic reform is state-sponsored and the government wields enormous influence over economic activities and exercises great power of political control. Yet, the problem that China is having is not just one of economic growth. What guided China’s reform between 1979 and 1992 was Deng Xiaoping’s “let few people get rich first.” After Deng Xiaoping’s “Nanxun”13 in 1992, capitalism was officially endorsed by the CCP as a strategy to promote economic growth. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, continued his predecessor’s policy by making everything revolve around economic growth. Economic growth was believed to be the “hard truth” during the Jiang era. So long as the economy continued to grow, all problems and issues would be resolved automatically. Unfortunately, many problems and issues have not been automatically resolved but are accumulating. Few people have gotten rich, and China’s economy has been growing but economic growth has not been able to cure all the ills that accompany this growth. In fact, the Jiang administration noticed some of the uneasy ills but resorted to “politics of adaptation,”14 which did not address the issues head on. If Jiang’s “three stresses” (stressing politics, political study, and political moral spirit) was aimed at establishing his power and legitimacy within the CCP, and the “three represents” (the CCP representing the most advanced culture, the most advanced forces of production, and the interest of the majority of the Chinese population) at leaving a legacy, his vision of building a “xiaokang shehui” (comparatively well-off society) was in response to the reality in post-Deng China even though no steps were taken. The fourth generation of Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao has been trying to create a new image and a pro-people one since they assumed power at the Sixteenth CCP National Congress. Building a harmonious society is their response to China’s reality after more than two decades of economic growth. At issue are China’s stability, the legitimacy of the CCP, governance in the post-reform environment, and the path of development. The trouble in China is not just the issues and problems, but also people’s perceptions of them. These perceptions matter in politics, especially when it involves a large number of people. If the perception is that the government is responsible for all these issues, then it is a real problem for the regime. Very often they do. What affects their perception involves their own situation, the widespread corruption, enormous waste by the government, unfair practices, the lack of coordination between different levels of government, and the government’s inconsistent and sporadic approaches to issues and problems. The legitimacy of the CCP was based on communist ideology and personal cult before the economic reform. With deep grievances against the political chaos and economic loss, large segments of Chinese society were alienated from the CCP by the end of the Cultural Revolution. It was evident that, after


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two decades of too much ideology, the priority for China after the Cultural Revolution was to develop its economy. A regime whose legitimacy was based on ideology was legitimate only if its policy was successful and its promises were fulfilled. Few people were likely to dispute the CCP’s legitimacy when they were sharing in the Party’s success. Ideology has died in the process of China’s economic reform. In the absence of an official ideology, the essence of Chinese politics in the post-Deng era concerns the legitimacy of the CCP. Performance has replaced ideology as the criteria of legitimacy. Economic growth has provided new legitimacy for the CCP, but the performance criteria are more than just economic growth. If many groups are not benefiting from the economic growth and they do not have access to human services as they used to, they would not think that the CCP is performing well. In addition, the legacy of egalitarianism from the Mao era is still alive in Chinese society. Inequality was after all the cause of the Chinese Communist Revolution in the first place. If the CCP claimed to represent all the people, it is not representing them very well if so many groups have been dislocated and left behind in the process of China’s reform. The large question it raises is for whom and for what China’s economic growth is under the one-party rule. After the introduction of the free-market economy since the economic reform, the CCP has been intimately involved in and has had enormous influence over China’s economic activities. Politically, China is a socialist country, as the CCP still monopolizes political power. The CCP’s intimate involvement in the economy is viewed as one of the major reasons for China’s fast economic growth.15 In a transition from a planned economy to a free-market economy under the one-party rule, the last thing that China needs is to disable the old system without installing a new one by leaving millions on their own. The question is not whether reform should be carried out but what to reform and how. To a certain extent, it is a matter of choice and priority. While developed capitalist countries in the West, including the United States, have been active in areas such as education, health care, social security, and welfare and are trying to apply principles of socialism to these areas, China is applying free-market principles to education, health care, and social welfare. Social democratic welfare societies such as Sweden often view the United States as the most negative example of what a market-oriented capitalist society represents.16 China in many ways seems much worse than the United States. All economies in the world are mixed economies. There are capitalist elements in socialist systems and socialist elements in capitalist systems. A good system should incorporate all the good elements of both systems, while a bad system is one that has many of the bad elements of both systems. If building a harmonious society intends to restore many of the roles of a socialist state in areas such as health care, education, and social welfare, the current leadership at least realizes what has been missing from the reform over the last two decades. The Chinese state has more revenue than ever before and yet it has not invested proportionately in human services to make them more accessible to the people. When power is exercised by individuals on behalf of the state in the absence of the rule of law and checks and balances in a commercial environment,

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corruption and waste by government officials are inevitable. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” will be largely defined by the result of building a harmonious society. A New Era of Statecraft China’s leadership and institutions have shown the capacity in the course of the economic reform to cope with the rapid pace of socioeconomic change and to address new issues and challenges raised by the success of reform and openness.17 The monopoly of political power by the CCP makes social–economic programs of this kind possible, though it is often reactive and driven by concerns of political stability and legitimacy. Building a harmonious society is the most recent case of statecraft and social engineering. But, different from previous endeavors, building a harmonious society looks more like a social–economic program. To answer the call of building a harmonious society, many provincial and local governments have developed a “harmony index” or “happiness index,” which includes the following categories: Social development and justice, social insurances and security, social caring, standard of living (income and housing square meters), education spending, ratio of doctor–residents, rule of law and order, trust and friendship, and environmental protection. Many of these indexes at this point are broad and vague and vary from province to province. For instance, the governor of Zhejiang province thinks that the key to the building of a harmonious society in Zhejiang is for the government to “serve the people.”18 The mayor of Chongqing believes that the key is to narrow the wealth gaps and the gaps of uneven development.19 “Pingan” (peace and security) is the slogan put forward by the governor of Shandong province,20 and institution building is viewed as the key to the building of a harmonious society by the governor of Hainan province.21 There are a lot of details to fill in; that is, what they would do and how they would do it. What has been emphasized by many governors is the importance of making overall development plans that would coordinate urban and rural development, economic and social development, human development and environmental protection, development between the coastal East and West,and domestic development and global challenges. Since many of the issues concern peasants in rural China, one of the focuses in building a harmonious society is to address the “san nong” (peasants, agriculture, and rural areas) problems, which entails both economic and political dimensions. 22 The central government has lifted fees and taxes on peasants, which is a good first step in addressing the problems, but there are many other steps to be taken and tough issues to be addressed, both economic and political. First, after over two decades of economic reform, rural infrastructure such as irrigation, roads, communication, and electricity and social undertakings such as education, health, culture, and science both require immediate attention in terms of government’s agenda setting and spending priority. The building of rural infrastructure and social undertaking is essential to resolving the san nong problems.


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Second, China should try to establish a subsidy and protection system of its own for agriculture as agriculture in Japan, the United States, and many other developed countries is subsidized and protected by the state. Again, this subsidy and protection system requires investment from the government. Third, the Household Responsibility System (HRS)23 allows peasants to lease land, but as the lease term is short, peasants are unwilling to make long-term investments. If peasants are given a “permanent lease,” they will take better care of the land and make long-term investments. Peasants have a permanent right to manage the land though it would still be owned by the state. Fourth, laws and policies should be developed to protect peasants’ rights to manage land. China’s cultivated land per head is about eight hundred square meters, well below the world average of arable land. It has continuously been losing agricultural land due to soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, and industrial and housing development. Laws and rules of this kind could help curb commercial use of agricultural land. The state should raise money in land transactions for nonagricultural purposes by imposing fees and taxes and use the money to provide human services for peasants. Fifth, it is the state’s responsibility to invest in education and guarantee teachers’ salaries in rural areas. There are about 6,700,000 rural teachers, and their yearly salary is less than RMB10,000 yuan each. Assuming that it is RMB12,000 yuan per teacher, it is RMB80.4 billion yuan, which the central government should appropriate. Local governments in more developed regions and districts could be asked to take care of the amount above RMB12,000 yuan. This is really just a matter of priority for the government, and yet it would benefit millions of children in rural areas and serve the long-term interests of China. Sixth, it is time to abolish the discriminatory household registration system and push for urbanization. The success of China’s economic reform will be largely determined by rural development as the majority of the Chinese population lives in rural areas. The free flow of the rural population has proven to be vital to China’s economy and the development of rural areas, and it is also vital to urbanization. There are over one hundred million peasant migrant workers in China, but they are discriminated against in urban areas and their rights are not protected. The elimination of HRS is a necessary step to let the population flow freely and peasant migrant workers to stay legally. In the meantime, investments should be made in building subsidized housing in urban areas for migrant workers to rent. Seventh, the cost of the existence of “xiang” and township governments outweighs the benefits in many ways. The survival and operation of these two levels of government depend, to a large extent, on revenues from peasants since many of the government officials at these levels are not on the government payroll. Despite the fact that taxes and fees are lifted from peasants, there is no guarantee as long as these two levels of government exist. Their elimination is the final guarantee for relieving peasants of any unnecessary financial burdens. In addition, they regulate the peasants more than providing help. Peasants will be better off without these two levels of government. To eliminate the xiang and

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township government would be desirable even though it is unlikely at this point. Eighth, providing health care to peasants and urban residents has been a focus of governments at different levels. For instance, Shandong province has been trying to establish a cooperative health care system, which especially targets peasants. Peasants, city/county and provincial governments each contribute a portion of the funds for health care. Efforts have been made to coordinate health care facilities at different levels and improve the condition and environment of local clinics and hospitals. The goal is to make sure that the peasants do not have to go out of their locality for treatment of common illnesses and that they need not go out of their county for serious illnesses. But there are various problems and difficulties. Many peasants do not want to join these cooperative health care programs and participants are not contributing enough at this point since it is necessary to contribute at least 1.5–2 percent of their income in order for the system to work. To establish a cooperative health care system, local governments need to make an initial investment to set it in motion. There is also the operating cost. Lack of funding and interest in all parties has been a common problem in many places since this is not a priority for many local governments. This system also involves coordinating resources and facilities. As the services provided by local clinics and hospitals are limited in meeting the needs of peasants, equipment is often outdated, and there are not enough well-trained doctors. Thus, few peasants want to visit these clinics and hospitals. More importantly, peasants do not trust the government for managing their funds as management is not transparent and there is widespread corruption. Wealth gaps, income disparities, and lack of human services also exist in urban areas. Social harmony is closely associated with the satisfaction and wellbeing of the people. The various “happiness indexes” established in different provinces are measures of people’s satisfaction and well-being. Happiness indexes are only meaningful if human services are made more available and social welfare programs and social security systems are in place. Building a harmonious society would require prioritizing developments in these areas and better communication, coordination, and cooperation between different levels of government. At this point, there is s a lot of rhetoric, but little serious action. Conclusion For over two decades, the development strategy under two generations of Chinese leadership, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, was to promote economic growth at all expense. By making “building a harmonious society” a new goal of development, the Hu–Wen administration for the first time since China’s economic reform is making a strategic adjustment to the development strategy of their two predecessors and trying to address the question of economic growth for whom and for what. It is obvious that economic growth has not benefited everybody and a large population has been dislocated and is lagging behind. Driven by politics, building a harmonious society is a response to


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both an eroded social harmony in Chinese society and the eroded legitimacy of the CCP. It is ushering in a new era of statecraft. Notes I wish to acknowledge and thank East Tennessee State University’s Research and Sponsored Programs for financial support for my research on this chapter. 1. Goujian shehui zhuyi hexieshehui ganbu duben (Readings for Cadres on Building a Harmonious Socialist Society) (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2005), p. 25. 2. See zhongguo 2004 nian guominjingji he shehuifazhan tongjigongbao (Chinese Government Statistical Bulletin on National Economic and Social Development) (China Statistics Bureau, 2004). 3. See tongchou chengxiang jinjishehuifazhan yu zenjia nongcun gonggongchanpin gonggeiyanjiu (Research Report on Coordinating Rural and Urban Social Development and Increasing Public Supply) (Jinan: Shandong Academy of Social Science, 2004). 4. See Xibo Lu and Elizabeth Perry, eds., Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 5. Peasants who were trained but not professionally for medical practice in rural areas during the Mao era. 6. Chinesenewsnet.com (August 17, 2006). 7. See Qin Qingwu, zhongguo sannong wenti de kunjing he chulu (The Difficulties and Solutions of China’s Sannong Problems) (Institute of Rural Economy, Shandong Academy of Social Sciences, 2005), p. 2. 8. Qin Qingwu, guanyu jiakuai tuijin wosheng xinxing nongcun hezuoyiliao zhidujianshe de diaoyanbaogao (Report on Pushing the New Cooperative Health Care System in Shandong Province) (Jinan: Shandong Academy of Social Science, 2005).

9. Qin Qingwu, zhongguo sannong wenti de kunjing yu chulu, p. 3. 10. Goujian shehui zhuyi hexie shehui shiyong shouce (Handbook of Building a Socialist Harmonious Society) (Beijing: China Fangzhen Press, 2005), p. 4. 11. Charles K. Wilber and Kenneth P. Jameson, eds., The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, 5th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), p. xiii. 12. Ibid., p. xv. 13. Deng Xiaoping toured the South in 1992, which marked a turning point for China’s economic reform. 14. Weixing Chen, “The Performance Criteria of Legitimacy: The Transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao,” Cross-Strait and International Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, p. 198. 15. See Jean C. Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism,” World Politics, Vol. 45, 1992, pp. 99–122; and “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy,” China Quarterly, Vol. 144, 1995, pp. 1132–1149. 16. Stephen Brooks, As Others See Us (Calgary/Canada: Broadview Press, 2006), p. 46. 17. Weixing Chen and Guoli Liu, “Building a New Political Order in China: Interpreting the New Directions in Chinese Politics,” in Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, eds., Leadership in a Changing China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 57. 18. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), March 4, 2005 (8th edition). 19. Renmin Ribao, March 5, 2005.

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20. Renmin Ribao, March 4, 2005. 21. Goujian shehui zhuyi hexie shehui shiyong shouce, pp. 147–149. 22. Yang Zhong, “New Institution Building or Muddling through in the Chinese Countryside,” in Chen and Yang Zhong, eds, p. 81. 23. China’s economic reform started with the implementation of the HRS in the rural areas, which allows peasants to lease land from the village for a certain term.

CHAPTER 2

Beyond Technocracy: China’s Quest for Legitimacy in the Era of Hu Jintao Baogang Guo

S

ince 2004, a new debate over the direction of reforms has been waged between the anti-capitalist neo-leftists and pro-market neo-liberals in China.1 The widespread public criticism of privatization and recent reforms in health, education, and social securities systems have put the neo-liberals on the defense, and the proponents of fairness and social justice have questioned the political legitimacy of the technocratic elite. Lang Xianping, a Hong Kong professor, initiated the attack on the efficiencydriven market reform by drawing attention to the massive draining of stateowned assets.2 Many neo-leftists called for drastic measures to be taken right away, such as the end of the privatization process and higher taxation on the rich. This in turn caused concern among some of the well-known neo-liberal economists. Zhang Weiying, a professor at Tsinghua University, praised the role that private entrepreneurs played in the reform process, and claimed that the widening income gap was unavoidable.3 Wu Jinglian, another well-known economist, also openly warned of the danger of targeting the new rich. For him, the main issue in China today is still the lack of equal economic opportunities.4 The current debate is about the pros and cons of these market-oriented reforms and how they ought to be implemented, as well as about a potential trade-off between “fairness” and “efficiency.” Some believe that in order to ensure fairness, the perceived benefits of the economic gains must be widely dispersed among all people, not just a few, while taking into consideration the contributions made by individual entrepreneurs.5 Despite the differences in these scholarly opinions, the presence of a reversed, T-shaped social structure,

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with a large population of low-income families at its bottom, has already drawn attention from policy-makers in Beijing.6 These influential experts, together with the new generation of scholarly officials who control Beijing’s policy-making process, have played a pivotal role in shaping China’s reform strategies. Indeed, since the 1980s China’s government can be described as a form of bureaucratic technocracy, which is characterized as rule by scientists and engineers. Many urgent problems facing China today can be linked to the neglect of human distresses and social factors by political leaders whose training is limited to science and engineering. Although technocracy is an important step toward acquiring what Max Weber has termed a rational–legal basis of political legitimacy, the lack of popular sovereignty and innate tendency toward an oligarchic rule will eventually weaken the justification of bureaucratic technocracy. This chapter will examine the role of the technocrats in efficiency-centered politics, and the rise of equity-oriented politics since 2002. It is apparent that the culture of meritocracy is dominating Chinese society today, and will continue to permeate much deeper into all levels of the overall governance structure. Yet, the relentless pursuit of efficiency by the technocrats has produced many unintended consequences, such as inequality, immorality, insecurity, alienation, rootlessness, and ruthlessness. A lot of people may have more money in their pockets, but as one movie scripts put it, they “are poor to the extent that they have nothing but money.”7 These characterizations depict a bleak picture of a seemingly directionless society, a society that treats efficiency as an end instead of a means. The basic hypothesis made in this chapter is that technocratic politics has an innate deficiency in providing equity to the society, and the equity deficiency can lead to potential crises of legitimacy. The underlining argument is that the revival of the politics of equity in recent years is the government’s response to the lopsided pursuit of the politics of efficiency. No matter what limits it may have, the new direction of Chinese politics should be considered a major breakthrough from the prolonged, yet still on-going, politics of rationalization and efficiency-maximization. As China is going through a rotation of efficiency and equity politics, we need to take a fresh new look at the cyclical pattern of Chinese political development. The Rise of Politics of Efficiency China is governed by technocrats today, as many scholars have already pointed out.8 Technocracy is a system of governance that is ruled by experts. It is based on the assumption that the elite should rule on behalf of the people and perform society’s essential tasks more efficiently.9 Experts often serve as policy entrepreneurs and govern “for the people” based on scientific and natural laws. What are deemed to be the best technical and managerial solutions are more important than what is perceived by the common sense of average persons. They claim domination over the modernization process simply by the “application of instrumentally rational techniques.”10 Technocracy is inherently elitist and

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authoritarian in nature, and its political legitimacy is based on scientism and a presumed pragmatism.11 Chinese politics was quite different and can be described as predominantly equity-oriented before 1978. The society at that time was exceedingly idealistic and ideological with equality as its core value. The elimination of exploitation and social classes was the highest goal of the social transformation led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Unlike political leaders today, the dominant political elite all had revolutionary credentials. Since the 1980s, the replacement of the revolutionary elite with the technical and professional ones has shifted the mission of China’s modernization from equity to efficiency. The elite change took several decades to complete, and was full of fierce power struggles. John Kautsky first noticed that there exist two types of modernizers in developing countries: The revolutionary and the managerial modernizers. According to him, the triumph of industrialization and modernization in a society depends on the replacement of the former with the latter.12 The former consists of “professional men, highly educated, and with cosmopolitan perspectives.”13 They are generally lawyers, journalists, teachers, students of humanities and social sciences, philosophers, novelists, and poets. These men and women have a grand vision of the future, and tend to embrace a politics of equity maximization. The managerial modernizers, on the other hand, rely more on rational rules, laws, and institutionalization.14 They tend to focus more on the politics of efficiency. The first generation of Chinese communist leaders, such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, and Mao Zedong, were revolutionary modernizers. They were motivated by a powerful Western political ideology: Marxism. These leaders were students of humanities and social sciences, and many were lawyers, teachers, journalists, and writers. They adopted a bottom-up style of populism and launched a grassroot communist revolution aimed at eradicating poverty as well as capitalism. This populist tone constituted a main part of Mao’s legacy.15 After more than two decades of bloody revolution and heroic struggle against foreign invasion, the CCP finally took over control of the political power in Beijing in 1949, and was now in charge of modernizing China. Radical transformations were carried out to create a so-called socialist society. However, the changes were designed neither to benefit everyone nor to maximize efficiency. According to Zhang Weiying, During the revolutionary process, some people will benefit, while others will not. Therefore, a revolution is not a Pareto improvement (namely no one will be worse off while someone will benefit). Even if the majority is beneficiaries and only the minority suffers, the revolution may not increase the overall social wealth. Hence, a revolution is not a Kaldor–Hikes efficiency (namely the total gain of the beneficiaries is greater than the total loss of the minority).16 (Translated from Chinese by this author.)

We will discuss the Pareto and Kaldor–Hicks efficiency later. Zhang’s view makes a good point, that is, the revolutionary modernizers are not efficiency-driven. Instead, they care most about transforming the society into a utopia-like perfect

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place with equality and justice for all. For the most part, they represent the interests of poor peasants and urban workers, and are inherently anti-capitalist and antimarket. To achieve their goals, they put a tremendous amount of energy in reorganizing the society, and turn it into a totalitarian one. Even though the modernizers believed that the central planning was superior to the market and could improve efficiency, the result was totally opposite to their idealistic wishes. Even though “cradle to grave” welfare was provided, the system was never extended to the majority of the population, namely, the rural population. Before 1978, the debate over who should govern in China was centered on the relationship between “red cadres” and “white professionals.” Elites tended to have two career choices: To became a political leader or a technocrat.17 The political leaders continued the tradition of revolutionary modernizers, and they were in the dominant position in relations with technocrats. Under Mao’s leadership, they waged military-style campaigns to speed up the modernization process. A good example of this was the Great Leap Forward. Some radicals truly believed that China could become an industrial giant overnight. In keeping with the similar expectation, some rural commune leaders even defied all scientific logic and fabricated news of a bumper harvest that went beyond anyone’s imagination. The direct result of this campaign was a three-year economic hardship for the young republic. The radicals’ attempts to modernize China fell much shorter than what they had anticipated. The next Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, who supported many of the previous radical policies of modernization, now turned to the market economy for help. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated the market-oriented reforms. Economic efficiency was given the highest priority. The doctrine of “efficiency first, and equity second” (Xiaoyi youxian, jiangu gongping) was formally adopted by the CCP in 1993.18 According to Miguel Centeno, the first sign of the coming of a technocratic era is the ascendance and penetration of the scientifically educated elite into the upper reaches of the state administrations, while there is a blurring of the line between technocrats and politicians.19 The replacement of the revolutionary elite in China was gradual, and had to be made with substantial “side payments,” which included, among many other things, bonuses and guaranteed security in housing and health care. By 1987, the technocrats were already present at all bureaucratic levels. Engineers formed 45 percent of all ministers in the central government, 25 percent of CCP provincial party secretaries, and 33 percent of governors.20 That trend has continued so that today there are higher and higher percentages of political leaders coming with scientific and managerial backgrounds. Overall, the legitimacy of this group of new elite is based on three factors: (i) a new ideology of pragmatism based on Deng’s “cat theory,” which says that a cat is a good one as long as it can catch mice. The color of the cat—black or white—is irrelevant; (ii) strong managerial skills and talents derived from college training and work experience; and (iii) a track record of impressive professional accomplishments at the grassroot level.21

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The official ideology underlining the rule of technocrats was pragmatism. It bears a resemblance with the pragmatism originated from the writings of Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, even though it is not clear if Deng had ever read any of their books.22 Pragmatism developed by Peirce and Dewey is characterized by their insistence on consequences, utility, and practicality as vital components of truth. Ontologically speaking, it objects to the view that human concepts and intellect alone accurately represent reality, and therefore stand in opposition to both formalist and rationalist schools of philosophy.23 This Chinese pragmatism originated from the debate over the criteria for truth in 1978. A well-known national newspaper, Guangming Daily, published an editorial on the subject, which provoked an immediate attack from the Maoists. Deng Xiaoping personally backed the editorial, and used it as a way to break away from the influence of Maoism.24 Like Peirce, Deng believed that no question was significant unless results of answering it had practical consequences. He insisted on not engaging in meaningless debates over major controversial issues. “The adjective preferred by technocratic leaders and administrators,” Centeno wrote, “is ‘programmatic,’ indicating that they will follow Deng Xiaoping’s oft-quoted advice to concentrate on the quality, not the color, of the cat.”25 Deng promoted professional elites to replace the populist leaders. He was hostile to populism and was determined to end all forms of political campaigns and mass movements the CCP had previously organized. The legitimacy of the technocrats is also achievement-based. Before 1979, China’s economy was largely modeled after the Stalinist command economy. In part, production and distribution were inefficient and wasteful since managers were only responsible to the fulfillment of government-set production quotas instead of market demands. Microeconomic reforms since 1978 have changed all of that. Enterprises now have to respond to supply and demand in the marketplace, and competition is fierce. Scientification of policy-making, which was first proposed by Jürgen Habermas,26 is also becoming a new slogan in the era of technocracy. To build incentives for a strong work ethic, incomes were allowed to be based on performance instead of job positions. Equalitarian principles and nonmaterial incentives were replaced by stratification of ranks and materials incentives. To manufacture products faster, better, and more costefficiently was believed to be the key to modernization. The streamlining of the government bureaucracy and the creation of a civil service system aimed at improving government efficiency were also based on a similar concern. All of these have brought about a new politics of efficiency, something that was never seen in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) before. In the political game of cost–benefits, the effort to streamline China’s economic system will inevitably touch on the interests of all stakeholders. Usually, the transition from a command to a market economy has proven to be extremely painful and is filled with instability and uncertainties. How have the decisionmakers in Zhong Nanhai managed to accomplish the process without causing a major disruption to the economy? The answer may lie in the way the strategy was laid out.

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Interestingly enough, Deng Xiaoping was not an economist, but many of his theories match with some of the important principles of economics. First of all, Deng believed that it was impossible to let everyone or every region of the country develop at the same pace or at the same time. The best strategy, according to him, was to adopt an uneven development strategy to let some individuals get rich first, and to let some areas develop first.27 The precondition of this asymmetric approach was that these developments must not lower the standard of living of the rest of the population. This idea is surprisingly similar to the so-called Pareto improvement or Pareto efficiency principle. Pareto efficiency was an idea proposed by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), and has since become an important concept in the study of economics. The basic assumption is that an allocation is Pareto efficient as long as there is no other allocation in which some other individuals are better off and no individual is worse off. A Pareto efficient outcome may be very inequitable, but it is efficient if at least one person is made better off and nobody is made worse off. A policy or action that makes at least one person better off without hurting anyone else is called a Pareto improvement. Second, Deng Xiaoping also believed that although some people will benefit more than others at the beginning, eventually everyone will benefit since the overall benefits of the reform will exceed the cost, and the relative loss will be compensated by those who have been better off. This can be done through government regulations that transfer benefits from the rich to the poor. In the end, everyone will be better off.28 This idea bears a lot of resemblance to what economists called the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency (figure 2.1). According to Nicholas Kaldor (1908–1986) and John Hicks (1904–1989), economic improvement cannot guarantee everyone will not be worse off, and that the extent to which the Pareto improvement can be applied is very limited. They believe that this problem can be solved by compensation, that is, beneficiaries can virtually make the Pareto improvement by compensating victims for a loss. Under the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, an outcome is more efficient if those who are made better off could in theory compensate those who are made worse off, and consequently, Pareto optimal outcome can be achieved.

Pareto Efficiency

Political Legitimacy

Efficiency

Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Figure 2.1

Legitimacy of the politics of efficiency.

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The practice of compensating potential losers underscores why China has been able to transform its command economy into a functional market economy without a major economic downturn while many others suffer. It is not a secret that the reformers simply “buy” their way out. Social stability or “peace and unity” is an overwhelming concern of the reformers. Therefore, deliberate efforts have been made to tighten political control. The politics of efficiency would not have worked had there been no authoritarian control. But, at the same time, different schemes of compensations, concessions, or side payments are routinely made to minimize resistance from those whose interests may be hurt by the new reform measures. To lure the old guards to retire (the most conservative elements in the CCP political system), a deal had to be made to guarantee their full privileges and standard of living. For example, according to the current official rule, a provincial level cadre does not pay premiums into his or her retirement, yet his or her retirement income can be ten times more than that of regular pensioners. To launch the long-awaited price reform on agricultural products such as food at the beginning of the reform, the government had to give most, if not all, urban residents monthly cash subsidies to make sure their purchasing power was not lowered. Similarly, in order to privatize residential housing, all occupants of public housing were provided with subsidies and a bonus to purchase them.29 This strategy has worked very well. In summary, the government in China since the 1980s can be described as a form of bureaucratic–authoritarian technocracy, which is characterized as the rule by scientists and engineers. To reduce pressure for political reform, they deliberately seek ways to transform political problems into socioeconomic ones and to minimize resistance to the market reform through economic compensations. Their hope is to de-politicize Chinese society and solve all problems though technocratic means.30 These efforts have achieved some success. But soon the technocratic elite will face new challenges. Challenges to the Politics of Efficiency The establishment of technocracy can be viewed as a positive development in modern China. In contrast with the era of Mao Zedong, policy decisions are no longer made based on merely personal experiences and wisdom; instead, scientific rationales are used to analyze problems, evaluate means and alternatives, and formulate achievable goals. Most importantly, the policy-making process has been decentralized, which leaves plenty of room to accommodate local conditions. Scientific reasoning is not the only way to validate a policy initiative; instead, the practicality of such initiatives matters the most. However, the problem is that not all governmental decisions are technical and can be made objectively. Most bureaucratic decision-making involves some subjective choices. The issues society is facing are too complicated to be solved by experts alone. If the economic reform has solved the issue of how to modernize China quickly and efficiently, the issue of who should benefit from the modernization and to whom the benefits of the reform should go is still far from clear.

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It is unfair to say the new Chinese political elite have no understanding of human values and distress. One of the contrasting differences between the reforms of the former Soviet Union and China is that the Chinese policy-makers have been cognizant of and attentive to the human distress arising from the market-oriented reforms. The fact that they frequently use the “compensation” methods proposed by Kaldor and Hicks to minimize resistance to any new policy initiative is a good example of this point. However, the compensation is not equally distributed because the process for negotiating such compensation is not fair. More often, people who have power are compensated more than those who have none. The following is a list of examples that highlights some of the problems related to the issues of unfair compensations: ●

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Urban residents are compensated more generously than rural residents. After the abolishment of People’s Communes, the subsidies the collectives provided to farmers declined sharply, causing a variety of social problems in the rural areas, such as a lack of access to health care, education, and social security benefits. Income gaps between the urban and rural residents have continued to widen, and now stands at a ratio of 3:1. It is the blue collar workers who have to shoulder most of the pains and losses for the reform of state-owned enterprises. Certainly, reform has benefited many laborers. Their absolute incomes have increased steadily, and their standard of living has also been improved. But at the same time the income gap between managers and workers, technicians and workers, workers in state-owned enterprises and those in foreign-owned enterprises have widened significantly. The sense of equality has been lost, and the phenomenon of relative poverty, a term Marx used more than a century ago, has become a harsh reality in spite of the increase in workers’ real wages.31 The number of new urban poor has been on the rise. The young, the elderly, women, and the disabled suffer the most, and constitute the largest part of the new disadvantaged groups. In 1994, there were seven million workers in poverty nationwide. The annual per capita income of their families was only sixty-two yuan, or 42 percent of the national average.32 In Liaoning province, 70 percent of unemployed were women, and nearly half of them never found a job.33 The reform’s biggest negative impact is the marginalization of workers in the workplace. The introduction of the Director Responsibility System gives managers tremendous amount of power to terminate employees, to decrease or increase employees’ pay or bonuses, and to promote employees to managerial positions. Many newly established township factories and foreign-owned factories become modern-day sweatshops. The concept of workplace equality is replaced by hierarchical structures. In privately owned and foreign-owned companies, the sense of worker mastership is totally lost. Inhuman treatment, physical abuse, compulsory overtime, high task quotas, military style rules and regulations, and arbitrary fines and punishments let workers taste the bitterness of capitalism. Suffering

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from personal insult and physical abuse, many workers are forced to go on strike.34 Migrant farm laborers receive little compensations. Over 120 million migrant laborers have been left out of the entire compensation system: No social security, no health care, and no urban household registration. They have encountered frequent problems with their wage payments. The traditional “hukou” system makes them second-class citizens in the city.35 Only onetenth of this group has any technical training, which in turn forces them to accept low-skill and low-wage jobs. Their children also have trouble enrolling in urban schools. Their rights in workplaces are almost nonexistent. Discrimination is a fact of life that these people have to deal with everyday.

As a sign of the growing social tension, the number of labor disputes is on the rise. In 1996, there were 48,121 labor disputes. In 2005, that number increased to 310,000, involving 740,000 workers. The pace of the increase is also alarming. In 1994, for example, officially there were only 19,098 labor disputes; in 1995, however, the labor department reported 33,030 labor disputes, a 73 percent increase in a single year. In recent years, the acceleration has slowed down somewhat. In 2004, there were 270,000 labor disputes. The 2005 figures cited earlier represent a 20 percent increase.36 The increasing income disparities among various population groups have challenged the legitimacy of the technocracy. Though efficiency and economic achievement continue to serve the technocrats very well as a basis for their legitimacy, the deficiency in equity-based utilitarian justification can lead to a crisis of legitimacy. This is a crisis that results from the lack of access to the political process by the new and old social groups, and the unfair process for compensation negotiation. When groups find out that their interests are not fairly represented in the political system, it is likely that they will demand more openness in the system. Political activism may arise from the lack of political access and an unfair decision-making process. However, if that outcome is negated due to continued authoritarian pressure, then alienation and frustration may occur. People at the lower social strata may turn to radical ideologies or take extreme actions to release their anger.37 The phenomenon of Falungong is one example of this kind of alienation. Currently, the legitimacy of the technocracy is still based on economic achievement and the ideology of pragmatism. However, the problem of equity can accumulate to do much damage to the technocratic elite. Unlike efficiency, the problem of a lack of equity is in the political domain, and can be solved only through more political openness and civil participation. The very nature of politics, namely, who gets what, when, and how, cannot be resolved through the market allocation process; instead, it has to be resolved through political compromise. The lack of an autonomous civil society in China has hindered the healthy development of consensual politics. The alliance between the new political and the business elites has made the unequal political representation even worse. Currently, only business groups have a limited right to organize

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into somewhat autonomous associations. Workers and peasants have no such freedom. The lopsided emphasis on efficiency has certainly weakened the utilitarian appeal of the technocrats in Beijing. There are three reasons for that. First of all, legitimacy cannot be provided by efficiency alone. Second, the lack of opportunity to participate and the existence of an unfair decision-making process limit the possibility for Pareto improvement and Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. Finally, the causes of misdistribution of equity vary greatly, and political entrepreneurship and good governance cannot assure the achievement of equity. Let’s take a closer look at each of these three problems.

Legitimacy Cannot be Provided by Efficiency Alone A study of Chinese political theory and culture reveals that utility-based legitimacy is dualistic. Although the modern concepts of efficiency and equity are unfamiliar to traditional Chinese political thinkers, the importance of utilitarian justification was very well understood and elaborated by many ancient Chinese political writers. Traditionally, Chinese political thinkers use the concepts of “li min” (利民) and “jun pin fu” (均贫富) as two core values needed for keeping a ruler’s mandate of heaven. The li min idea has three meanings. First of all, the rulers should let people do what they do the best. Whatever a government does, it should follow the natural law. For instance, the ruler should not disturb the seasons of farming.38 Second, to maximize people’s well-being is the highest goal of the government.39 When people are rich, so will be the state. Finally, the government should not take excessive profits away from the people; instead, it should leave as many profits as possible to the people.40 Overall, the li min idea is highly pragmatic. The idea of jun pin fu also has two meanings. First, excessive inequality in wealth distribution can cause instability. If the rich are left unregulated, they may become arrogant and uncontrollable. Similarly, if the poor are not provided for, rebellions may be produced.41 Second, government should take an active role in the necessary redistribution of wealth. According to many ancient political thinkers, there are two ways to deal with the problem of inequality. One is the radical redistribution through the use of force. Many peasant leaders in history believed in that approach. The other is the regulatory approach, which tolerates the inequality but requires that wealth be redistributed through taxation and regulation. In short, the idea of jun pin fu reflects the populist tradition in Chinese political culture. Table 2.1 is a summary of the traditional model of Chinese utilitarian justification. This mixed model of political legitimacy incorporates both pragmatism and populism and resembles what American social historians have termed the “republican ideal” in the pre- and post-revolutionary periods of U.S. history (1760–1860), that is, the small-scale capitalism of the household and

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Table 2.1 The traditional model of Chinese utilitarian justification Key Variable

Core Values

Measurements

Policy Choices

“天下和静在民乐” Political stability lies in the happiness of the people

利民 Benefiting people

“家给人足, 天下大治” The state will be at peace if all families and individuals are prosperous

“九功允治” There are nine policies leading toward good governance

均贫富 Equal distribution of wealth

“患不均而不患寡” People are not afraid of scarcity of wealth, but the unequal distribution of it

“行莫高于厚民” To enrich people is the highest goal of government action “不与民争利” Government should not take profits away from the people “权有无, 均贫富” Government should regulate the distribution of wealth and redistribute it if necessary “富而能夺,贫而能与” Take from the rich and give it to the poor

artisan/small-scale farming economy, which eschewed vast disparities of wealth and income in a republican society. In the contemporary context, the traditional notion of li min can be considered to be synonymous with the concept of efficiency. The notion of jun pin fu is close to the modern idea of equity. Economists have studied economic efficiency and equity for years, but mostly from a business perspective. For political scientists, the concepts of efficiency and equity can be very useful in developing a modern theory of political legitimacy. For economists, efficiency is simply the ratio between the output and input of an economy. However, for political scientists, efficiency can be used to analyze the “authoritative allocation of values.”42 Equity is always considered to be a political concept, and, therefore, is not identical with the concept of equality. While equality is a factual description of distribution, equity is a political concept based on the particular value judgment of fairness. It can either refer to fair distribution of net benefits of economic activities or equal treatment of all persons. While efficiency falls within the realm of economics, equity is a matter to be addressed by polity. One common mistake various Chinese communist modernizers make is that they all follow a lopsided strategy of modernization. The revolutionary modernizers try to maximize the ideal of equal distribution of wealth though political

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means, but end up distorting the Chinese economy and society, and sacrifice the overall economic efficiency. To overcome these problems, the reformers since the 1980s have decided to put efficiency first and allowed an uneven development. But this has led to a rapid deterioration in social and economic equality.

Limits of the Pareto Improvement and Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency The problem apparently has a lot to do with the two assumptions Deng Xiaoping made at the beginning of the reform, namely, China can provide Pareto improvement, and it can correct the problem of the Pareto inefficiency by resorting to compensation. However, the underlying logic has some flaws. The Pareto efficiency is based on the assumption that if at least one person is made better off and nobody is made worse off, the policy will be efficient. However, if the gain a winner makes is one hundred, and the gains for all others is ten, then a ten-time gap is produced. For those who benefit the least, this gap will most likely become unjust and intolerable. The majority, though still better off, has suffered from relative deprivation. While in theory Pareto improvement sounds reasonable, in reality in a country with over one billion people, it is almost impossible to guarantee no one will be worse off. A major problem with Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is the question of compensation. Kaldor–Hicks efficiency does not require that compensation actually be paid, merely that the possibility for compensation should exist, and thus does not necessarily make each party better off (or simply neutral). Kaldor–Hicks improvement is a hypothetical one: A change is considered an improvement if the assessed winners’ gain is greater than the assessed losers’ loss, regardless of whether the change would actually involve the payment of any compensation.43

The Causes of Equity Vary and There is No Magic Solution to Solve Them All Liberal reformers tend to have a very simplistic view of equity. For many of them, equity simply refers to financial transfers and can be resolved by technocrats. However, it is measured by more than just cash values. It is really about the interests of each party involved in any potential conflict. In the study of welfare economics, analysts divide equity into vertical and horizontal dimensions. Horizontal equity includes the idea that people in the same income bracket should be taxed at the same rate. It is related to the concept of tax neutrality or to the idea that the tax system should not discriminate between similar things or people, or unduly distort behavior. Vertical equity is the idea that people with a greater ability to pay taxes should pay more. If they pay more strictly in proportion to their income, this is known as a proportional tax, or flat tax; if they pay disproportionately more than other taxpayers, this is known as a progressive tax, more associated with redistribution.

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Table 2.2 Four models of politics of equity Perceived costs Perceived benefits

Distributed

Concentrated

Distributed Concentrated

Majoritarian politics Client politics

Entrepreneurial politics Interest group politics

Source: James Q. Wilson, American Government, 9th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).

Furthermore, according to political scientist James Q. Wilson, there are four distributive patterns of politics based on perceived costs and benefits (see table 2.2). The majoritarian politics involves low intensity of conflicts since both costs and benefits will be shared by all people. There is no issue of compensation. However, when benefits and costs are concentrated, the level of conflicts will be very high. Labor disputes tend to fall into this category. When costs are concentrated and benefits are distributed, the state and bureaucrat can play a major role in targeting small spoilers. Technocrats are good at entrepreneurial policy-making, which, to some extent, will help solve the problem of uneven distribution of economic wealth. However, technocrats may not be the best representatives of the interests of all people. Quite often, they can also become self-serving or even be captured by powerful interest groups. Should this occur, it will lead to corruption or unfair processes. As a matter of fact, the regime in Beijing is fighting an uphill battle to contain the rampant official corruption. Moreover, since there is often a trade-off between efficiency and equity, the technocrats may not be willing to take on the challenge of reallocating values should the pursuit of equity endanger the achievement of efficiency. The Revival of Politics of Equity The Sixteenth CCP Party Congress, held in November 2002, and the Tenth National People’s Congress, held in March 2003, completed the power transfer from the so-called third generation to the fourth. The new leaders who emerged have pledged to continue the work of reforms started two decades ago. The new leadership group continues to be made up of technocrats. All Politburo members are former engineers, and some have graduate degrees.44 Since many key leaders are protégées of Jiang Zemin, there will be some continuity in the party’s policies. In that sense, this group of people is not going to “rock the boat,” and will continue the pragmatic rule.45 However, they seem to have reached a new consensus that the reform has reached a critical point at which some breakthroughs and policy adjustments must be made. They have proposed a new development model that may produce a more harmonious society. They believe that this new model should be based not only on the continued economic growth but also on fair distribution of the growth, unlike the unrestrained and unbalanced growth of Deng–Jiang era.46 Apparently, the politics of

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equity maximization has returned to the center stage of politics, though not in its radical form. Nevertheless, the new leaders have no intention of returning to radical redistributive schemes, and no bottom-up style of populism either. Hu Jintao has undertaken many new initiatives since he took office. Many Western observers have noticed the latest wave of new policy initiatives, and they consider it to be a Chinese style of “New Deal.” Notably, Hu has returned to the ancient Chinese top-down style of populist idea. He has used the words “min ben” or “putting the people first” repeatedly in his speeches, and has proposed his “three peoples” principles.47 Premier Wen Jiabao shares similar views. According to him, “[f ]rom Confucius to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the traditional Chinese culture presents many precious ideas and qualities, which are essentially populist and democratic.”48 Both Hu and Wen want the government to respond to the common sense of the common people, and to address their social and economic concerns. Is this an end to the pragmatist ideology? Has China entered into an era of enlightened elitist rule? If so, a new breakthrough is certainly in the making. It is apparent that the top-down style of populism is proactive and led by an existing elite group within the establishment. It differs from the bottom-up populism advocated by revolutionary modernizers because it does not appeal to the people directly, and it certainly has no intention of mobilizing the public to stand up and against the establishment; instead, it calls for changes within the system. Its rise, therefore, should be interpreted as the government’s preemptive response to an emerging governing crisis. We may call this new push for populism a step forward in China’s long march toward democracy. But we must not confuse this populism with democracy. Although his philosophy of “governing for the people” has been very popular, Hu has consistently emphasized the need to strengthen and improve the capability of the party’s governance instead of weakening it. He continues to stress the need for a government “for the people” instead of “by the people.” One wonders if this represents the same old rhetoric of paternalistic benevolence advocated by Confucianism. Chinese traditional political philosophers all recognized the fundamental importance of the people. However, they insisted that the ruler is like a parent and should rule as such. Therefore, the new top-down populism we have observed still bears the strong influence of traditional paternalism. Paternalism is not true democracy; it is benevolent authoritarianism. It is based on the assumption that those people interfered with by the state will be better off or better protected from harm.49 The idea of democracy, on the other hand, is based on political equality and popular sovereignty, not on “happy slaves.”50 Under Hu’s leadership, the new administration promised new styles and new thinking to win over people’s hearts and minds. The year 2003 marked a turning point in the revival of equity-based politics. The Third Plenary Meeting of the Sixteenth CCP Party Congress convened in Beijing. The CCP adopted a resolution to perfect the market economy, and asked for a change from an uneven development strategy to a more balanced one. Given this resolution, three main areas are of particular interest to us: The protection of disadvantaged groups, the new rural construction movement, and the reform of income distribution.

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Increased Protection of the Disadvantaged Groups As we discussed earlier, the reforms so far have created many new disadvantaged groups, including migrant rural laborers. When Premier Wen found out that many migrant workers faced the problem of unpaid wages, he personally saw to it that the problem was addressed. The official figure indicates that over 334,000 million yuan (RMB) worth of wages were never paid to migrant laborers by the end of 2005. This figure is much less than the total amount of arrears of 10 billion yuan, based on an estimate made by the semi-official All China Federation of Trade Unions in China (ACFTU).51 ACFTU issued a circular calling for unionization of migrant workers so that they would be able to better protect their economic rights. The same circular also called for the governments at all levels to require employers to purchase industrial accident insurance for these workers.52 The number of homeless people or beggars is also on the rise. Traditionally, the government would detain these people and if they were from rural areas, they would be sent back home. However, the death of Sun Zhigang, a twenty-seven-year-old graphic designer in Guangdong province, on March 20, 2003, changed all of that. 53 The State Council acted very quickly to issue a new decree to abolish the system of detention for people who were homeless or without identification, and replaced it with a new system of homeless assistance. All former detention centers have now been converted to Public Assistance Stations to render assistance to people in need on a voluntary basis. The notorious household registration system is also under attack. The Ministry of Public Safety (MPS) has begun to experiment with different reform schemes at the local level. Migrant laborers can move to a city and obtain a city residency permit in many mid-sized or small cities. The unification of rural and urban household registration is well underway. Additionally, to make travel easier, the MPS has recently announced thirty measures to simplify the procedures for people who apply for household registration documents, passports, driver’s licenses, and permission to travel abroad. Citizens in most cities are no longer required to get their work unit’s permission prior to applying for travel documents for overseas travel.54 The similar requirements will soon be removed for marriage and divorce as well.55 These types of day-to-day changes have far-reaching significance. They show that individual freedom is expanding, and citizens’ rights are becoming better protected. This helps create a positive image of a kinder and gentler government. If this process continues, the government’s popularity and social support will likely be strengthened.

More Attention to Rural Development Rural development has lagged far behind urban areas. Most poor people in China live in the rural areas. Even though China has claimed to have reduced the number of poor from two hundred million to about twenty million since the 1980s, the actual number of people who are in poverty is much larger since the

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criteria for obtaining these statistics is far short of international standards. If measured by a standard income of one or two U.S. dollars a day, the number of those who are poor in China will rise significantly. Furthermore, since most of the rural developments take place in the coastal region, farmers in the central and western part of China have substantially lower incomes than their counterparts in the coastal region. Lack of health care insurance, higher dropout rates from schools due to family financial restraints, and inadequate rural infrastructures have slowed down rural development. The central government has taken a number of steps to combat rural poverty. Beginning in 2002, an attempt has been made to restore rural health care and public health systems. The goal is to put a new cooperative health insurance scheme in place and cover most rural people by 2010. In order to help peasants pay for their premiums, the central government will subsidize each participant ten yuan, and local governments will provide another ten yuan. 56 Each participant will pay ten yuan. The government subsidized amounts were doubled in 2005. 57 According to the official statistics, by the end of 2005, over 170 million peasants have already enrolled in the new program. But the benefits of the health plan are very limited, and cover mostly catastrophic illnesses. 58 Reducing the tax burden for peasants is another priority. In 2004, the central government ordered a reduction of agricultural tax rates by 3 percent from over 15 percent taxed previously, and eliminated the tax in some poor areas. Most special taxes on agricultural goods such as fruits and fishery and forestry products were also abolished in the same year (rates ranging from 8 to 20 percent). At the end of 2005, the National People’s Congress (NPC) decided to eliminate the agricultural tax altogether. This, then, unified the country’s tax code. It is apparent that a major policy shift has taken place. Peasants were no longer asked to pay the price of industrialization. As the result of the reforms, peasants saved about 120 yuan per person or 100 billion yuan in total.59 The central government, meanwhile, has to allocate 200 billon yuan to local governments in order to make up for their lost revenues. Education is another area that has caused concerns. Although the compulsory education law has been in place for twenty years, children in rural areas lag far behind those who live elsewhere in the country. While the rural population makes up about 70 percent of the total population, it receives just 30 percent of total government educational spending. More than one million children did not go to school at all, and in some areas, the school dropout rate was 30 percent.60 In June 2006, the NPC revised its Compulsory Education Law. The new law requires both central and local governments to guarantee an education budget. Education will no longer be supported primarily by local villages and rural families. The government set a goal to stop charging tuition and other fees from students in the rural areas of the middle and western part of the country in 2006. This action benefits over forty-nine million children and their families. Eventually, the same policy will apply to all areas. Additional efforts have been made to help pay for textbooks and the lodging cost for students in the poor areas as well.

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A more ambitious program was proposed in the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CCP Party Congress convened in October 2005. The goal was to narrow the gap between the urban and rural areas. In February 2006, the CCP issued its No. 1 Document of the year detailing a blueprint and some major steps to be taken to accomplish the program.61 What the government has in mind is a type of rural development based on the experience of South Korea. In the 1970s, South Korea began the implementation of its “New Rural Areas” project, and achieved tremendous success. Since then, the gaps between rural and urban areas have narrowed significantly. Beijing apparently wanted to duplicate the same experience. Fourteen large systematic projects were proposed to completely change the appearance of rural areas by 2010. In order to achieve the goal, the government has committed to steadily increase the public funds going to rural development. Fair Income Distribution In the CCP’s recommendations for making the Eleventh Five Year Plan, it proposed to regulate income distribution. The goal is to increase the income of low-income families, boost the percentage of middle class families, and effectively regulate incomes of high-income families. However, the focus is still on “the fair opportunity of employment and the fair process of income distribution” instead of equal outcomes.62 Like many other countries, Beijing has a number of options. First of all, to ensure that the process is fair, the government must look into vertical equity distribution issues, and use progressive taxation to get more money from the high-income earners. Measures already being implemented include a tax on bank savings. Taxes on real estate property and inheritance have also been discussed. Current income tax rates range from five percent to forty-five percent. However, the sources of income are so diversified that the government has trouble keeping track of all legal or illegal incomes. As for now, a new tax reporting system is being put into place, which requires all high-income earners to file tax returns periodically. To prevent tax evasion, the records of over ten million high-income earners have been put into a special database for monitoring purposes.63 In addition, all employers are now asked to deduct taxes from their employees’ wages and salaries directly. Second, the policy-makers have adopted a number of measures to reduce the tax burden of low-income earners, including the elimination of the agricultural tax in rural areas. After some heated public debate, the NPC decided to raise the individual tax exemption for all taxpayers from eight hundred yuan to sixteen hundred yuan in 2005. The beneficiaries of this change are primarily the low-income families. According to some official estimates, the percentage of blue collar workers who pay the income tax has now been lowered from 60 percent to 26 percent of the total number of taxpayers. Notably, the decision was made after the NPC held a public hearing, another sign of openness in the policy-making process. All these changes, no matter how significant they may look, are still the undertaking of policy entrepreneurs. Efficiency-minded elites are using the populist banner to speak on behalf of the silent majority. Nevertheless, the intention

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of these populists is to strengthen their own legitimacy. The workers and peasants remain powerless, and have very limited chances to participate in the process. Still, the latest effort to tackle the equity issue by the ruling elite raises many interesting questions. According to a Nobel Prize winner James M. Buchanan, in a society in which each member seeks interest maximization, the only way to achieve Pareto improvement is through consensus building by all parties whose interests are at stake. If unanimity can be achieved, the social cost will be avoided, and the Pareto optimal is achieved, even though the economic cost of the process may be high.64 Since actors perceive the game to be zero-sum, even with majority rule in a democratic decision-making process, there will still be some who consider themselves losers. The only hope for Pareto improvement, according to Buchanan, is to build a super majority to minimize the losses. Now, under the authoritarian technocracy, there appears to be mechanisms available for consensus building. First of all, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) provides a place for making “side payment” and interest aggregation. Second, the technocrats can serve as policy entrepreneurs to initial policies aimed at “compensating” the losing side. However, public trust in the technocrats has declined due to rampant official corruption. Moreover, the alliance between the technocrats and big businesses may result in monopoly privileges or rent-seeking behaviors.65 Many technocrats, especially at the local levels, are using their power to maximize their self-interest, either legally or illegally. According to Transparency International, China is now ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world measured by its Corruption Perception Index (CPI).66 It is incongruous that the system of technocracy that intends to enhance efficiency has become a source of Pareto inefficiency. Still, the use of entrepreneurial policies and the anticorruption campaigns may temporarily relieve inequality in various shapes and forms, and may even strengthen the regime’s legitimacy and the one-party rule for a time.67 Nonetheless, it will not resolve the issue of equity deficiency in the long run. The reason is simple: The unequal distribution of growth and wealth is not merely an economic one; rather it is an accumulated result of the unequal distribution of political power in the country. The lack of a well-developed civil society and opportunities to participate in the decision-making process has made the situation even worse. Many people get rich because of their political power and connections with government officials. Lack of institutionalized means for people to defend or promote their selfinterests is a major barrier to the achievement of social and economic equity. Zheng Chuguang, a member of the CPPCC, suggests that more delegates should be elected from the disadvantaged groups to fill the seats in the NPC and CPPCC, and peasants should be allowed to establish autonomous associations to defend their interests.68 In modern labor relations, the inability of official trade unions to serve as a true representative of workers has produced unbalanced labor relations with management wielding excessive amounts of power. Unless labor’s right to organize, engage in meaningful collective bargaining, and even to strike are allowed, workers will not get a fair share of the profits of the economic growth.

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In a society where people are not allowed to defend or advance their own self-interest, the Pareto improvement is impossible to attain. In another words, the politics of equity will not be able to produce equity unless there is a strong civil society and democratic politics. Conclusion The political development in modern China has shifted back and forth between two types of politics: The politics of efficiency and that of equity. While the politics of efficiency tends to focus on ways to attain a higher economic growth rate, the politics of equity focus more on the issue of equal and fair allocation of values. After more than two decades of efficiency-driven economic reform, Chinese politics seems about to enter into a period of politics of equity. Beijing’s focus is increasingly shifting toward overcoming various economic disparities such as income, regional development, and urban–rural divides. At present, it appears that the new leaders in Beijing are busy contemplating new reform schemes designed to address the innate deficiency in equity in their society. Without these reforms, the legitimacy of technocratic rule may be challenged. The revival of the politics of equity is part of the political cycle that has characterized Chinese politics in modern history. On one hand, any effort to maximize efficiency will compromise equity and invite efforts to make up the equity deficiency; on the other, any effort to enhance equity will likely have a negative impact on efficiency. The balancing act between the achievements of these two objectives may emerge as a dynamic force for political development in the continued modernization process in China, which will produce liberal and conservative groups and politics in various forms, either within the CCP or outside the party’s political apparatus. The politics of equity differs significantly from the politics of efficiency. Equity is a function of political power. An unbalanced distribution of political power will lead to political as well as economic inequality. If the institutions that produce the inequality in power and wealth are not reformed, the goal of equity will be unattainable. If so, then the goal of strengthening the regime’s legitimacy is equally unattainable. Political reform and a gradual opening up of political participation may offer a promising, yet costly, solution to the problem of equity. Politics in the last few decades is the politics of efficiency, which has given rise to technocracy in China. Technocracy has an inborn weakness in legitimacy, namely, the inability to achieve equity. Although everyone in China today is better off than they were two decades ago due to the efficiency-driving market reforms, the fact that a small number of people controls most of the economic wealth and political power suggests that equity will be a long-term issue, and that there will be no quick and easy solution. Similarly, the legitimacy of the current technocratic regime in Beijing will continue to be in question as long as the political institutions that produce equity remain untouched. The need for democratic participation will offer an institutional solution that will facilitate interest group

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bargaining and cooperation. In the end, democracy and a free-market economy have to go hand in hand in order to achieve Pareto efficiency and equity. Notes The author wishes to thank James Stevenson, Andrew Jack Waskey, Shiping Hua, and He Li for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of this chapter. 1. Li Liang and Xu Tonghui, “Di sanci gaige lunsheng shimo (The History of the Third Debate over Reform),” Southern China News Weekend Edition, March 16, 2006, available from http://gb.magazine.sina.com/nfweekend/000/2006–03-16/0017758.shtml, accessed on August 25, 2006. 2. Lang Xianping, “I am Not Opposed to Reform but Seek a New Reform Pathway,” available from http://www.langxianping.com.cn, accessed on August 8, 2006. 3. Zhang Weiying, “Lixing sikao zhongguo gaige” (A Critical Thinking of China’s Reform), Jingji Guancha Bao (Economy Observers), March 3, 2006. 4. Deng Gang, “Wu Jinglian: China’s Income Gap Stems from Unequal Opportunities,” People’s Daily, May 24, 2001. 5. Chi Hung Kwan, “The Huge Debate over Privatization and MBO—Can the Drain on the State-Owned Assets Be Justified?,” available from http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/ china/04091501.html, accessed on August 8, 2006. 6. Chinanews.com, August 7, 2006. 7. The name of the movie is called “Where is the Big Dipper?,” cited in Guangwei Ouyang, “Scientism, Technocracy and Morality in China,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 177–193. 8. Li Cheng and Lynn T. White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 121, 1990, pp. 1–35. 9. Luigi Pellizszoni, “The Myth of the Best Argument: Power, Deliberation and Reason,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 59–86, 2001, cited in Michael D. Barr, “Beyond Technocracy: the Cultural of Elite Governance in Lee Hsien Loong’s Singapore,” Asian Studies Review, No. 30, March 2006, pp. 1–17. 10. Miguel Angel Centeno, “The New Leviathan: the Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy,” Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 3, June 1993, p. 314. 11. Landon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Techniques-out-of-control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 259. 12. John H. Kautsky, “Revolutionary and Managerial Elites in Modernizing Regimes,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, July 1969, pp. 441–453. 13. Ibid., p. 446 14. Ibid., p. 446. 15. Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); James R. Townsend, “Chinese Populism and the Legacy of Mao Tse-Tung,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 11, November 1977. 16. Zhang, “Lixing sikao zhongguo gaige.” 17. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 48–75. 18. CCP, “Decisions on a Number of Crucial Issues of Establishing a Socialist Market Economy,” November 11, 1993, available from http://cpc.people.com.cn, accessed on August 9, 2006. 19. Centeno, “The New Leviathan,” p. 326.

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20. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), p. 269. 21. Michael D. Barr, “Beyond Technocracy: The Culture of Elite Governance in Lee Hsien Loong’s Singapore,” Asian Studies Review, Vol. 30, March 2006, pp. 1–17. 22. The Peirce Edition Project, The Essential Peirce (1983–1913) (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998); Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, The Essential Dewey (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999). 23. John Dewey, How We Think (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1910; reprinted, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991). 24. Hu Fuming, “Practice is the Only Criteria for Verifying Truth,” Guangming Daily, May 11, 1978, available from http://www.epicbook.com/history/practice.html, accessed on August 10, 2006. 25. Centeno, “The New Leviathan,” p. 313. 26. R. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Boston: MIT Press, 1970). 27. Deng Xiaoping, “There is no Fundamental Contradiction between Socialism and Market Economy,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, October 23, 1985, available from http://gd.cnread.net/cnread1/zzzp/d/dengxiaoping/3/048.htm, accessed on August 10, 2006. 28. Deng Xiaoping, “Summary of Speeches Made during the Southern Inspection Tour of Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, available from http://gd.cnread.net/cnread1/zzzp/d/dengxiaoping/3/118.htm, accessed on August 10, 2006. 29. Zheng, “Lixing sikao zhongguo gaige.” 30. Guoguang Wu, The Anatomy of Political Power in China (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), p. 21. 31. Baogang Guo, “From Masters to Wage Labor: Chinese Workers at the Turn of the New Millennium,” American Reviews of China Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2000, pp. 111–128. 32. Feng Tongqing, “Workers and Trade Unions under the Market Economy: Perspectives from Grassroots Union Cadres,” Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 28, No. 4, spring 1996, p. 23. 33. Anita Chan and Robert A. Senser, “China’s Troubled Workers,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1997, pp. 106–107. 34. Minghua Zhao and Theo Nichols, “Management Control of Labor in State-Owned Enterprises,” in ed., Greg O’Leary, Adjusting to Capitalism (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharper, 1998), pp. 75–100; Feng Tongqing, “Workers and Trade Unions under the Market Economy,” p. 23. 35. Fei-ling Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 36. Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Statistical Reports of Labor and Social Security Development in China, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2004, 2005, available from http://www.mloss.gov.cn, accessed on August 12, 2006. 37. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Maryland, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 67. 38. According to Dayu Mo Book of Shang, there are nine policies leading toward good governance (《尚书•大禹谟》把“六府” [水, 火, 金, 木, 土, 谷] 和 “三事” [正德, 利用, 厚生] 称为“九功”). 39. According to Yanzi Chunqiu, the love of the people is the highest ideal, and enrichment of the people is the enjoyment of rulers (《晏子春秋》“意莫高于爱民, 行莫乐于厚民”).

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40. According to Dong Zhongshu, “People will become arrogant when they are rich, and get into despair when they are poor” (⬍董仲舒,《春秋繁露•度制篇》, “大富则骄，大贫则忧;忧则为盗，骄则为暴,” “不与民争利”). 41. According to Guanzhong, “[government] should take from the rich and give it to the poor” (《管子•揆度》 “富而能夺，贫而能与.”《晏子春秋.外篇第七》 “权有无, 均贫富”). 42. David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991). 43. Reckon LLP, “Pareto Improvements and Kaldor–Hicks Criterion,” available from http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/Pareto_improvements_and_Kaldor-Hicks_ efficiency_criterion, accessed on August 12, 2006. 44. Robert Marquand, “Boomers Assuming Leadership,” Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 93, No. 197, 2001, p. 1. 45. “The Survivors Take Over,” Economists, Vol. 366, No. 8316, March 22, 2003, pp. 37–38. 46. Bruce Dickson, “Populist Authoritarianism: The Future of the Chinese Communist Party,” available from http://www.chinavitae.com/reference/conferencepapers/ Dickson.pdf, accessed on August 14, 2006. 47. Hu Jintao, “Speech at the Graduation Ceremony of the Seminar on the Theory of the Three Represents,” People’s Daily, February 18, 2003. These three principles include: “use my power for the people, link my feelings to the people, and focus my heart on the pursuit of public welfare.” 48. Wen Jiabao, “Turning Yours Eyes to China,” remarks made at Harvard University, December 10, 2003, transcripts from Harvard Gazette, December 11, 2003. 49. Lei Guang, “Elusive Democracy: Conceptual Change and the Chinese Democracy Movement, 1978–1989,” Modern China, October–December 1996. 50. Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989). 51. Xinhuanet.com, December 5, 2005. 52. The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), “Circular on Strengthening the Work of Protecting the Legal Rights of Migrant Workers,” People’s Daily, August 8, 2003. 53. Sun had been working for the Daqi Garment Co., Ltd. in Guangzhou and held both residency and identification documents, but he did not have the documents on him when he was arrested. He was put into the detention center and later was beaten to death in a police clinic. See Xinhua News Agency, “Court Reaches Final Decision on Sun Zhigang Case,” June 27, 2003, available from http://www.china.org.cn, accessed on August 14, 2006. 54. CCTV, Channel 4, August 7, 2003. 55. Duoweinews.com. 56. The CCP Central Committee and the State Council of People’s Republic of China, “Decision to Strengthen Rural Health Care Work,” Document No. 3, October 19, 2002. 57. Ministry of Health, “Notice to Speed Up the Experiment of the Rural Cooperative Health Insurance System,” available from http://www.moh.gov.cn/public, accessed on August 20, 2006. 58. Statistics Information Center, Ministry of Health, “2005 Development Report of Health Services in China,” available from http://www.moh.gov.cn/public, accessed on August 20, 2006.

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59. Xinhua News Agency, “Finance Minister Jin Renqing Called for the Abolishment of Agricultural Tax a Strategic Move,” available from http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/ 20051230/20172241843.shtml, accessed on August 20, 2006. 60. Tang Weiping, “Call for Free Compulsory Education System in Rural Areas by People’s Deputies,” Changsha Wanbao, March 3, 2004, available from http:// news.163.com/05/0306/03/, accessed on August 20, 2006. 61. CCP Central Committee, “Decisions on Promoting the Construction of Socialist Rural Areas,” February 21, 2006, available from http://www.people.com.cn, accessed on August 20, 2006. 62. CCP Central Committee, “Recommendations for the Eleventh Five Year Plan,” October 11, 2005, available from http://www.people.com.cn, accessed on August 20, 2006. 63. China News Agency, “Steady Increase in Individual Income Tax,” May 19, 2006, available from http://finance.sina.com.cn, accessed on August 21, 2006. 64. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Calculus of Consent: Logic Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962). 65. Anne Kruger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, June 1974, pp. 291–303. 66. Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2006 (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 67. Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert, “Political Reform and Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China,” ASIEN, Vol. 99, April 2005, pp. 9–28. 68. Zheng Chuguang, “Social Equity Comes from Equal Representation of Different Interests,” People’s Daily, August 25, 2006.


CHAPTER 3

Don’t Judge a Country by its Cover: Governance in China Suzanne Ogden

I

n 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared victory in its civil war, a Cold War perspective neatly divided the world into communist and anticommunist/liberal democratic poles. Each side seemed intent on winning this ideological struggle, even if it meant supporting unsavory regimes throughout the world. The West turned to the export of democracy as part of its strategy of fighting the Cold War. When China entered its period of opening and reform in 1979, the world was still in the grips of the Cold War ideological view. Although the analysis had become more complex, policy-makers in the West still framed the choice as fundamentally one between liberal democracy and authoritarian communist rule. These analytical concepts were not rethought. Rather, policy-makers merely tweaked their old ideas to adjust to extraordinary changes in China’s governance and society without a fundamental recasting of dearly held views. Throughout the 1980s, China undertook economic reforms, introduced village and district elections, reformed and rebuilt the legal system, and decentralized the governmental process. As with the opening (“kaifang”) of China, this happened in the global context of the Cold War, which itself finally sputtered to an end only in the last years of the 1980s. China’s more than twenty-five years of reform have, then, spanned the Cold War, the demise of the Cold War, and the post–Cold War periods. During this period, when “end of history” arguments suggested liberal democracy was the only viable path for states, Western analysts turned increasingly to the question of when China was going to become a truly democratic political system—a question that seemed at least temporarily answered in the negative with the brutal military crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrators in 1989. Claims to the universality of the democratization imperative remained unchallenged.

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The questions about democratization have been incessant: What are the prospects for democracy in China? What must China do to become more democratic? Indeed, how can the West make China become more democratic? Will decentralization, a market economy, a middle class, or capitalism cause China to become democratic? Assertions have grown ever more confident: An undemocratic China is a threat to the world, both economically and militarily. A liberal democratic China would be a better China, a happier China, a more developed China. Political and civil rights matter more than economic and social rights. It is important for China to become democratic because democracies don’t go to war with each other. The West barely noted that China’s leadership was at the same time just as vigorously asserting that a “virtuous” and “harmonious China” would be a better China. Their description of how to make China better has often talked the talk of democratic participation and an improved legal system; but, by in large, it had little in common with the Western democracy-promoters’ discourse. Yet, Western analysts and policy-makers have continued to talk as if China is something that must be changed to make it better, rather than including it as an equal in this conversation about its own future. China is a country to be judged and discussed, not an equal in a conversation. The work of this analyst for the last twenty-five years has likewise been caught up in the maelstrom of discussion and debate over democratization in China. Within the Cold War context, and its immediate aftermath, the idea of winning over governments to democratic rule—whether through bribes, corruption, aid, investment, war, or occupation—made sense to Western democracy-makers, especially those in the United States. But in the post–Cold War world, the contrast of values, preferences, capabilities, and contributions of the authoritarian communist versus the liberal democratic worlds are no longer so stark. To wit, democratic governments are embroiled in ever-enlarging corruption scandals, accusations of human rights abuse (including torture), and the disregard of civil rights of their own citizens. They are also guilty of disregarding the civil rights of citizens in other countries, including their right to life. Many post–World War II democracies have failed to produce development, much less stability; and a number of post-Soviet, post-socialist legislatures have been hijacked in the name of democracy. They, in turn, have failed to deliver on their promises. In this light, rather than simply repeating it, we might reexamine the questionable endorsement offered in Winston Churchill’s portrayal of democracy as “the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.” In a word, the insistence on democratization for all, and right now, has led to a clichéd intoning of the words freedom, human rights, and democracy, which provide ever more ragged clothing for the export of formulaic Western political values throughout the world. We need to be alert to the purposeful abuse of these words as a tool of foreign policy to serve our own national interests, rather than as a sincere effort to guide China in providing a better, more decent life for its people. Particularly in the twenty-first century, it is becoming increasingly evident that citizens are not necessarily more satisfied with a democratic form of

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government than an authoritarian one; and that democratic governance is not better governance for developing countries.1 Democracies in developing countries do not necessarily take better care of their populations or have better policies than authoritarian systems—at least not better than China’s. The export of American-style democracy to other states has often come at a high price, including instability and the failure of target states to develop, much less assure, sustainable development. Can anyone convincingly argue that the Chinese would be better off today if China had become a liberal democracy in 1980? Social scientists naturally want to ask about China’s form of government; but making democratization the central discourse for thinking about China’s government and asserting democratization is the only acceptable road for China to take has led to an unfortunate focus on this question at the expense of other questions that, arguably, might shed more light, and a less refracted one, on the successes and failures of China. A discussion of China’s governance, stripped of all the ideological baggage associated with communism and liberal democracy,2 would allow for viewing the effectiveness of its governance in comparison to others. Many of the same underlying aspects of democracy could be discussed—transparency,3 elections, legal, regulatory, and political reforms, decentralization, pluralization, participation; but discussing them as elements of governance rather than as elements of democratization might offer more insights. A focus on China’s governance would encourage an examination of: 1. Governmental structures and institutional effectiveness, and how the onslaught of the information age and new technology radically change the way information is processed and institutions operate. 2. Policies and the goals they set, such as poverty alleviation, the control of contagious diseases, the provision of health care, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. 3. Policies and the values they reflect, such as an “harmonious (‘hexie’) society” or a “xiaokang” society. 4. The processes by which policies are determined and implemented, such as the campaign style, decentralization, consensus among the leaders, or central dictates. 5. The quality of government officials, including their education, knowledge, training, and the values in which they are encased. 6. The quality of advisors (often academicians and business people) to the government, such as those in think tanks now attached to the top leadership; the knowledge they have, and the degree to which they are allowed to be creative, offer alternative solutions, and contest old ideas. In other words, rather than viewing “democratization” as the only acceptable course for China, we might consider instead the importance of strengthening governing institutions so as to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of regulations and laws, and so as to build social and economic development on a firm foundation.

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Every country needs to improve its governance. But, as the continual revisions of democratic theory and the policy of exporting democratization as part of developmental theory indicate, how to improve governance is not easy. First, one has to ask, improving governance for what purpose? If it is truly for the purpose of taking better care of a country’s citizens by enhancing economic and social development, then the most effective institutions and processes of governance are debatable. Second, political reforms are important for improving China’s governance, but which political reforms? And which institutions and procedures need to be reformed first? Isn’t administrative reform just as important as systemic reform? Isn’t legal reform possible without major systemic political reforms already in place, as former president Jiang Zemin argued? Even among China’s reformoriented intellectuals, there is no agreement on the answer.4 Third, to maintain legitimacy, do governments have to “deliver the goods”? Or, will a citizenry be content as long as it has a democratic political system, albeit one unable to improve their living conditions? Can we assume that the citizenry in any country under authoritarian rule (regardless of culture) would welcome democratization if the economy was already performing well, and regardless of the short-run, and perhaps even long-term, problems that are known to accompany the transition to democracies in most countries? And, regardless of the fact that some societies do not succeed in making the transition to democracy, yet have paid a high price for trying? Fourth, would a democracy be better than China’s more authoritarian system in carrying out political, administrative, legal, and economic reforms, that is, in improving governance? What is the likelihood that a government of any form— including functioning democracies—would take additional democratizing steps unless the benefits of doing so outweighed the costs? Fifth, could the strength and cohesiveness of institutions, and the cultural orientation of the citizenry be at least as important as, say, the form of government in meeting the objective of improving people’s lives? Can we assume that people living in a culture that is “authoritarian” in its basic impulses would readily embrace democracy if only its political leaders did? When we insist that China democratize, are we really asking China to abandon its communist ideology and political institutions? Or, are we asking it to change its culture? Political institutions are embedded in a particular cultural environment and must function and develop within that environment. If culture is important, we need to know the degree to which a fundamentally illiberal culture hinders the transition to democracy. Of course, cultures can and do evolve. Over time, the cultural obstacles that a deeply rooted authoritarian civilization poses to democratization can be overcome—but not necessarily. The formidable weight of China’s culture, as well as the social and demographic conditions under which cultural change must occur, impede a rapid transformation in this area. Still, we need to consider the profound importance of Chinese culture, and to inquire as to whether changing social and economic conditions, such as the polarization of wealth under economic liberalization, affect Chinese traditional cultural expectations about the government’s responsibility to the people.

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From another perspective, the Chinese may be unable, or unwilling, to relinquish certain deeply rooted Confucian elements and aspects of the political culture that are integral to China’s present institutions and policies. Whether the rich fields of Confucian values can be mined for prodemocratic or antidemocratic elements, or are simply irrelevant to the problematique of democracy, they now exist alongside of (and, minimally, are being reshaped by) the more democratic and modern values accompanying development and internationalization. China’s citizens increasingly rely on laws and associations rather than just traditional personalistic relationships to advance their interests; and the party state itself now justifies its actions through reference to laws instead of to its own moral legitimacy. Such a metamorphosis in institutional and procedural matters as well as in values is bringing change to China’s political culture, and will no doubt affect its governing structure in the years to come. Rather than evaluating China’s government along moral or ideological lines as “good” or “bad,” then, it could be compared to other governments along lines such as “more” or “less” government, competent or incompetent, strong or weak, institutional coherence, and effective or ineffective governance. Governments that are able to implement and enforce the state’s regulations and laws, while simultaneously pursuing growth and development, are more likely to gain legitimacy and trust, even as they limit corruption. Often, the leadership’s political will to implement programs and policies that support its values is a critical aspect of the effectiveness of a state’s governance. In short, rather than insisting that China needs to adopt a democratic form of governance, we need to understand to what degree China’s ideological and cultural roots, its economic, social, and demographic characteristics, its already existing institutional framework, and its leadership’s political will and competence limit, or enhance, the effectiveness and strength of its governance. To allow for consistency and comparability, an assessment of governance (including rights) in China requires that we apply the same standards, and ask the same kinds of questions we would in assessing governance in any country in the world.5 But which standards for governance can be used as the basis for assessing countries with vastly different types of societies, cultures, economies, and levels of development? By what objectives/processes/values can the effectiveness of any form of government be evaluated? For this, the standards of “human development” by which the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assesses all countries will be used. These standards for measuring human development in countries are, in reality, a measure of the effectiveness of governance. They are applied across all countries, regardless of cultures, ideologies, economies, and forms of governance. The Starting Point: China’s Present Form of Governance To describe China as an unmodified authoritarian state is misleading, since the Chinese state has taken on a number of the trappings of pluralism, civil society, economic and social rights, public participation,6 as well as democracy, albeit not a liberal one. Since the reform period began in China in 1979, the mass

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media (television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and journals) has proliferated. The mass media is lively and provides excellent entertainment; but they also expose China’s citizens to an extraordinary range of information and ideas. A 2005 Pew Research Center survey of 15 countries indicates that, in fact, the Chinese know about many of the same major international news stories as do individuals in more open societies.7 The party state has spun off all but a handful of newspapers and magazines, which are now run as commercial profit-seeking enterprises. Television and radio include a broad gamut of programming, including call-in programs and live interviews. Books and magazine articles are more likely to explore the personal than the political. Censorship continues, but it is far more narrowly focused than even fifteen years ago. The risks to those who push the boundaries too far are usually limited to a warning or a suspension—not imprisonment (“laojiao” or “laogai”) or even house arrest, as often happened in the past. In 2005–2006, the government seemed to be more determined than ever to crack down on the Internet, blocking websites and closing down blogs. Freezing Point (Bingdian), an eleven-yearold weekly supplement of China Youth Daily, was closed in January 2006, after its publication of a Chinese historian’s essay challenging the official line on imperialism in China in the late nineteenth century. (However, the reason for the closing was more likely because it was the final straw in a stream of articles that pushed the limits.) But by February 2006, a very public backlash had occurred from both the left and the right sides of China’s political spectrum. With a public censure of the closing of Freezing Point by thirteen retired but well-known communist party members, and an official complaint to the communist party by the supplement’s founder and editor, the Propaganda Department relented and allowed it to resume publication in March.8 At the same time that the government improved its ability to filter information (with help from companies based in the West, such as Microsoft and Yahoo), it continued to expand the infrastructure of the Internet to allow access to millions more users. By 2006, there were an estimated 110 million web surfers, and 20 million registered bloggers, many of whom dare to make fun of (if not directly challenge) the government, and even the cultural elite, with their edgy blogs.9 Any analyst needs to confront the question: If China’s party state really wants to constrain freedom of speech by cracking down on the Internet, why is it expanding access to the Internet at an exponential rate? In another area related to governance, the number of associations and interest groups has grown rapidly since the early 1980s. By the end of 2006, China had some 346,000 interest groups and professional associations at the county, prefectural, provincial, and national levels, (They are lumped under the label “shehui tuanti” or “shetuan.”)10 These represent a wide range of constituencies, from commercial entrepreneurs, lawyers, doctors, cooks, and women, to artists, sports clubs, television and movie producers, computer groups, “qigong” practitioners, and sportsmen. Although almost always headed by a member of the CCP, they are increasingly independent and press for the interests of their members.11 Associations and interest groups already provide the basis for the aggregation and articulation of the diverse interests of society. In contrast to the Maoist

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period, when society was seen as composed of classes, society is now viewed as comprised of a variety of interest groups. The legitimacy and desirability of interest group advocacy (as opposed to class struggle) have been recognized by the party state and are increasingly discussed in the mass media.12 Professional associations consult with think tanks, draw up legislation to be submitted to the National People’s Congress (NPC), and lobby for its passage.13 They also offer a multitude of channels for voicing public opinion. So does the proliferation of public opinion surveys and polls, which have become another tool for the government to understand the public’s preferences and make policy with it in mind.14 Rather than waiting for institutional changes to be proffered by the central party state, China is already witnessing the institutional foundations of a civil society being established from below. China’s executive branch, the State Council, has established its own think tanks to do research and make recommendations for public policy.15 The NPC and legislatures at each level, from the provinces to the townships, present bills, discuss policy, and pass laws to implement policy. Academicians who are not part of the government are increasingly consulted about a wide range of policy issues. Whatever their failings, grassroots elections (with secret ballots and multiple candidates) to rural villagers’ committees16 and urban district councils, and indirect elections to county-level people’s congresses17 have become increasingly institutionalized in the last twenty years. Even village-level communist party leaders are increasingly required to submit to electoral approval, if not actual elections. New institutions at the urban district level, including the “community congress” and property owners’ committees, have added channels for communicating local concerns and suggestions for change to the government.18 Governance and the legal system are at least in theory based on a constitution19 and laws passed by the National People’s Congress. The judicial system features courts, lawyers, judges, jurors, and investigators. The capabilities of judicial personnel have been strengthened in recent years by new regulations requiring higher educational levels, examinations, and law schools separate from political studies. Such institutions, structures, and processes might be dismissed as tools of an authoritarian system, which may in practice be cynically manipulated to serve the purposes of the state. Indeed, they often have been. To wit, both the legal system and the regulatory regimes are particularly weak at enforcement; and, the rudimentary framework for regulation of finance, development, privatization, and other areas are still being drawn up. None of this has escaped the attention of China’s leaders, much less the mass media, think tanks, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens. These are topics of immense concern, and are discussed extensively by policy-makers, advisors, academicians, and the press. Although it could be argued that the earlier-mentioned institutions have so far been weak vessels for democracy, new content is being poured into them that strengthens their capacity for governance. For example, from 1995 to 2005, China established more than twenty-eight hundred legal aid centers with the goal of providing “fair and competent legal representation” for Chinese citizens. The Chinese Ministry of Justice, with the support of China’s own legal community, has invited international NGOs (INGOs), to help develop these legal aid

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services, and to carry out a campaign to increase public awareness of the law. One such INGO, International Bridges to Justice, in a joint project with Peking University, organized more than three thousand Communist Youth League students from fourteen of China’s law schools to carry out a “Rights of Detainees” campaign to “publicize the spirit of the Constitution and enhance the concept of the rule of law.” International Bridges to Justice also partnered with National Legal Aid of China to create and then distribute nationwide “500,000 posters and brochures describing the new legal rights of the accused, including versions in Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian and Uighur.” In Tibet, prisoners were visited by lawyers from local legal aid centers and police, and prison officials, who explained their legal rights. A Chinese-style opera, performed on the streets to illustrate new rights of Chinese citizens, was created by a theater group in Guangxi Province.20 The soaring number of lawsuits suggests that China’s citizens believe in the possibility of justice in the courtroom. This is by no means to deny that, despite the remarkable advances in the legal system, many problems remain with the application of the law in China, and injustices continue to be reported. China’s institutions, in short, have now evolved to a point where they have far greater capacity to participate in governance. They are also more “democratic” than at any previous time in China’s history in the sense that there is far greater input based on public participation, there are more channels for conveying citizen preferences to the government, institutions represent exponentially more constituencies than in the past, and a broader and deeper pluralism in opinions, attitudes, and viewpoints is tolerated. The Values and Goals of China’s Policies Liberal democratic theory, like Marxism or any other theory, defines the world through a conceptual structure. “Historical progress” has a different meaning for a liberal democrat than it does for a Marxist. Similarly, many in the West cannot imagine a better government than a liberal democracy; but in China, whose major thinkers had a vision of a utopia, the Great Unity or Great Harmony (“datong”), long before the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, this is not the case. The traditional Chinese vision of a better world still pervades thinking in China today. When China’s intellectuals and leaders speak or write about their hopes for their nation’s future, elements of the notion of the Great Unity are still strongly evident. Indeed, even during Mao Zedong’s reign, when Marxist thinking was dominant, its proponents justified class struggle as a method of achieving ever higher levels of synthesis and harmony and, in the end, the unity of all the people in one classless, harmonious society. This is not to suggest that the concept of the Great Unity is completely at odds with liberal democratic thought. Rather, the point is that the Chinese have thought about the goal of governance along different lines for a very long time. It should be no surprise, then, that, just as in music, art, medicine, mathematics, physics, cuisine, and human relations, the Chinese approach the issue of

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governance from different first principles. So, when examining how Chinese think about freedom, rights, democracy, and governance, we must take this into consideration. Their perspective is inspired at least as much by culture as it is by ideology. Indeed, many of the practices and policies adopted by the Chinese communists since 1949 are rooted in culture and will not necessarily disappear if the communist party’s rule collapses. What we are seeing may not be communism but modernization, not ideology but culture, elements of which are being hijacked by the regime and cultural nationalists for their own purposes. Arguably, when it comes to challenging China’s undemocratic practices and policies, the withering away of communism matters less than cultural changes and institutional, social, and economic modernization. These, in turn, are affected by such factors as China’s position within the international community, economic and social conditions, decentralization, and economic liberalization. This is one more reason for thinking about China in as nonideological a manner as possible. An Internal Critique What sorts of standards, then, would allow for measuring effective governance in China? “External critiques” that adopt international standards could, of course, be applied to any country, regardless of ideology and type of government. However, an “internal critique” is also relevant, for it judges a society by its own standards. If China meets its own standards for justice and fairness to its people, as set by its own government, and if the Chinese population (broadly speaking) seems satisfied with these standards, then external critiques matter less. But if the Chinese government fails to meet these standards, then others are on more solid ground for criticizing the Chinese government’s failings. Let us begin with an internal critique. An internal critique does not embrace cultural relativism. Rather, it rejects the imposition by foreigners of ethnocentric and ideologically motivated concepts about the proper form of government. Such externally generated concepts have, in the case of China, conflated democracy with an anticommunist ideology, and defined a civil society as only that part of society in outright opposition to the government.21 The latter is the view of Western social science. It is not a view necessarily shared with much of the world, especially the Chinese, whose associations are as likely to work with the state as they are to challenge the state—or do both.22 What standards, then, are being raised in China’s internal critique? And, what does this tell us about the values that motivate China’s policies? Since 2003, China’s leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao has made the xiaokang society central to their pursuit of a more “harmonious” society. Given the polarization of wealth in China, it focuses on the “san nong” (peasants, villages, agriculture). The xiaokang society is a communitarian, not a utopian, idea. It does not aim for perfect equality, instead envisioning everyone being “a little bit above average” as in Garrison Keilor’s Lake Wobegon. In short the xiaokang society is a healthy society; a polarized society lacks harmony, and cannot be

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healthy. This has become the leadership’s standard, and together with China’s millennium goals, the objective of China’s policies. Centralized coordination (“tongchou”) is the policy instrument for trying to construct a more harmonious society.23 The party state is fully aware of the pitfalls of not resolving the problems of “disharmony.” It has noted, for example, that countries that in the 1970s saw their economies take off down the development road have had different results: Those that failed to resolve their “issues of social contradictions and development” found that average per capita GDP income remained below U.S.$3,000; whereas those that did resolve these issues saw their per capital GDP income reach U.S.$10,000–20,000.24 Promoting a “harmonious society” has been the key theme of domestic policy since February 2005 when President Hu Jintao stated, “A harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality . . . Without a common ideological aspiration or high moral standard, a harmonious society will be a mansion built on sand.”25 The need to achieve a harmonious society is repeated every time China’s future social and economic development is discussed, and is now equated to a “more sustainable model,” which is better able “to control social tension and improve social welfare.”26 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, promote gender equality, ensure environmental sustainability, and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and epidemics fit well with China’s own national development plans. They are, in fact, embodied in China’s plans to build “a well-off xiaokang society” by 2020, and “represent a ‘people’s agenda,’ as they focus on the kind of development that makes a visible, measurable difference in the lives of people.”27 These are developmental outcomes that the Chinese themselves want to achieve, and they have been working with the international community to do so. Do ordinary Chinese accept this definition of the goal of governance? In my conversations with Chinese, it is surprising how often they use this same vocabulary, and how strongly they seem to endorse the values and goals of a harmonious, xiaokang society. While some might wish to dismiss the acceptance of the state’s discourse about a harmonious society as merely a reflection of how well the party state packages its message, mere propaganda, they would be foolish to do so,28 for this is precisely the point. It shows the ability of the Chinese state to make its discourse on social values widely shared.29 In this respect, it may be viewed as a commentary on the strength of government institutions (and, of course, the educational system) to communicate a powerful unifying value of China’s society and the government’s goals—an ability much to be envied by most governments of developing states. An even more positive interpretation would be that the state sincerely wants to address the many problems in China that are causing disharmony. The ideas that motivate China’s internal and external policies in contrast to those that motivate “the Washington Consensus” (what Joshua Cooper Ramo has called “The Beijing Consensus”)30 provides a foundation for understanding the criteria by which China is assessing its own performance and setting its own

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goals. To summarize these ideas briefly: 1. China must have innovation-led growth—institutional and technological innovations that are one step ahead of the problems created by reform.31 2. Knowledge is the foundation stone for innovative solutions. Education of leaders and professionals is critical to creating a “climate of innovation.”32 Implicitly, knowledge requires openness—greater freedom of access to information; and it requires creative thinking, which could challenge old orthodoxies. 3. The purpose of this innovation-led growth is development that is both sustainable33 and equitable; or, in President Hu Jintao’s words, growth should help create social equity, and a harmonious society. Economic growth and China’s governance should, in short, be tools to improve society. Social change is as important as economic change. If China fails to use growth and governance for positive goals, polarization of wealth and unsustainable development, which includes development that causes environmental degradation, will lead to social, economic, and political instability.34 Marketizing the economy, together with “centralized coordination,” has served as an important tool to achieve this purpose in the last twenty-five years; but disagreement over how much further marketization should go burst into the open at the March 2006 NPC meeting. Discord was especially intense over how marketization related to privatizing “collective goods,” such as water, rural land, education, and health care, as part of the solution to problems in those areas. The lack of a democratic political system is not, in their view, the problem.35 Rather, the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao leadership has insisted the focus should be on the quality of economic growth and the “social risks of uneven development,” which could be dealt with in part through a stronger regulatory system. Leaving large swaths of the population out of development has led to disharmony. Only balanced development, and development that does not damage the environment, can be sustainable. In Ramo’s words, the Beijing consensus for development marks an important change for China, a shift from a reform process that was young and susceptible to externalities to one that is now self-fulfilling, cranking like a chain reaction and more determined by its internal dynamics than by the external pushes and pokes of things like WTO accession, nuclear proliferation rules or even mass viral epidemics. China is writing its own book now. The book represents a fusion of Chinese thinking with lessons learned from the failure of globalization culture in other places.36

In its broadest terms, then, the regime has shifted the basis of its claim to legitimacy from ideology to competence. From the Chinese perspective, competence means the ability to innovate and bring economic growth, combined with the ability to manage the chaos created thereby. In short, reform that does not disrupt social and economic stability, that produces a harmonious, xiaokang society, is important to the leadership’s claim to legitimacy.37

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This, then, summarizes the values underlying Beijing’s developmental policies. They represent the official internal critique of China today. Looking from the bottom up, however, would give rise to other questions, such as: Does the government treat its people justly? Do citizens perceive their society as just? Does the government that has provided a stable and secure society, and a more materially prosperous life to the majority of its people, gain legitimacy? One important consideration when assessing Chinese governance is that it is unlikely that individual Chinese feel as oppressed as, say, Americans might feel under similar levels of governmental control.38 For this reason, it is important to tread lightly between the extremes: On the one hand, assuming the lack of serious criticism or demands for democracy is because of satisfaction (or even an indicator of a “nation of sheep”), or is because of suppression of dissent or brainwashing; or, on the other hand, going to the other extreme of viewing all criticism of the party state, as well as street demonstrations and protests, as a sign of a desire to overthrow communist party rule. (These may reflect genuine unhappiness with policies, but the wrath is usually directed at local officials, not at Beijing.) In brief, we need to view Chinese criticisms of their government in the same way we view American, or British, or French criticism of their respective governments. Similarly, we need to recognize that although the Chinese government is authoritarian, it does pay attention to the protests and demonstrations, and changes policy in response. This is not to say it is always quick to respond, or successful when it does so, in quelling anger. However, the government understands that it cannot ignore discontent. An External Critique There is, in addition to the internal critique, an “external critique,” one that adopts standards for comparing China with other countries that rely not just on nonideological but even on noncultural categories of thinking. A utilitarian perspective permits a focus on the consequences of policies rather than ideology, the form of government, rights and freedom, or even policy tools. It is valuable for judging China’s success in developing a fair and just society, with or without liberal democratic institutions and processes. In this respect, a utilitarian approach reveals the effectiveness of China’s governance. The data and surveys in this section suggest that the form of government is less important to the Chinese people than the effectiveness of its institutions and policies; and that the Chinese adopt a utilitarian perspective on governance. This utilitarianism is accentuated by traditional cultural expectations of the government’s role as a provider, protector, and parent, as well as the materialistic, acquisitive side of Chinese culture, which has been released during the last twenty-five years of economic reforms. An understanding of the degree of legitimacy of the Chinese party state’s governance benefits by comparison with other countries. As it turns out, support for the governing political system of a country is often rather low. Indeed, the findings of “The Gallup International Millennium Survey,” (1999) which

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interviewed 57,000 adults in 60 different countries of the world representing 1.25 billion inhabitants, suggests that people throughout the world tend to be dissatisfied “with the structure and operation of democracy, both in their own country and globally.” The survey found, for example, ●

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“A universal lack of faith in governments: They are believed to be corrupt and bureaucratic. Democracies are frail in many parts of the world. Only in Western Europe and North America do a majority of citizens feel elections in their country are free and fair. Globally, two thirds say: My country is not governed by the will of the people.”39

In another study, respondents in the European Union’s (EU) original fifteen countries, almost all of which have been “liberal democracies” for decades, were asked to evaluate their level of satisfaction with democracy in their own country. Little more than a majority (54 percent) responded “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied.” And in the ten former communist states that entered the EU in 2004, most of which by then had had fifteen years to make the transition from a communist party-ruled state to a democracy, under one-third (29 percent) fell into these two categories of satisfaction.40 Further, a 2004 Latinobarometro report looked at eighteen nations in Latin America, conducting “opinion surveys of 18,643 citizens of Latin American countries, and lengthy interviews with 231 political, economic, social and cultural figures, including 41 current or former presidents and vice presidents.” Of those polled, 55 percent stated “they would support the replacement of a democratic government with an authoritarian one; 58 percent said they agreed that leaders should ‘go beyond the law’ if they have to, and 56 percent said they felt that economic development was more important than maintaining democracy.”41 The report concluded that there is widespread discontent in Latin American democracies because their elected governments have failed to provide internal security, stability, social equity, an effective legal system, basic social sevices, and economic development. This, in turn, is “eroding the foundations of democracy.” Indeed, “a majority would choose a dictator over an elected leader if that provided economic benefits.”42 Historically, Latin Americans have tended to blame their political leadership, but they now fault democracy itself. Governance, in short, has failed, even though it has a democratic form. Although democracy is a political, not an economic, system, the implicit promise of democratic governance is that the livelihoods of citizens will improve. Democracy conjures up a vision of microwaves, DVD players, cars, and cell phones. When economic well-being does not improve, people tend to blame democracy itself. Further, although human rights are better protected than in the days of dictatorships, most Latin Americans, “still cannot expect equal treatment before the law because of abusive police practices, politicized judiciaries and widespread corruption.”43 In other words, we cannot assume that countries with a democratic form of governance necessarily have greater public support than more authoritarian

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systems. Nor can we assume that because the Chinese lack freedom to criticize their government in the press, or because prominent dissidents and even reporters and editors are often harassed, if not arrested and jailed, there is little support for the CCP regime. In fact, a study by Chen Jie, based on crosssectional trend studies in 1995, 1997, and 1999 in the city of Beijing found strong popular support for the political system.44 Adopting measurements widely used in other studies for measuring regime legitimacy, Chen Jie measured “popular diffuse support for China’s current political regime” by asking respondents to measure their agreement or disagreement on a four-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree with statement, 2 ⫽ disagree, 3 ⫽ agree, 4 ⫽ strongly agree) with the following six questions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

I am proud to live under the current political system. I have an obligation to support the current political system. I respect the political institutions in China today. I feel that the basic rights of citizens are protected. I believe that the courts in China guarantee fair trials. I feel that my personal values are the same as those advocated by the government.45

The empirical results from the three Beijing surveys indicated strong support for the current political regime, ranging from a low of 66 percent for Statement 6, to a high of 97 percent for Statement 2.46 Although support declined considerably from 1995 to 1999 (almost 20 percentage points [from 86.7 to 67.0 percent] on statement 4), at least two-thirds of all respondents show regime support on every question (table 3.1). Table 3.1 Distribution of diffuse support for China’s political regime (in percent)

1. Proud to live under . . . 2. An obligation to support . . . 3. Respect political institutions 4. Basic rights protected 5. Courts guarantee fair trials 6. Personal values same as government’s47

1995

1997

1999

95.4 97.5 93.2 86.7 82.2 80.0

91.9 92.6 90.4 78.5 74.9 71.9

87.3 85.4 87.7 67.0 77.5 65.9

Note: The values show positive responses (agree and strongly agree).

At the same time, the Beijing surveys indicated that the respondents halfheartedly supported, or condemned, the government’s specific policies and performance in a variety of issue areas. In the case of specific policies, they did not hold the “regime” or the system of government as such responsible, but rather, as David Easton put it, the “political authorities”—“those who are responsible for the day-to-day actions taken in the name of a political system.”48 Further, there was not a one-to-one relationship between support for specific policies

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and support for the regime. In fact, although support for specific policies was rather middling, it did not seem to undermine the overall loyalty and support for the CCP regime and China’s authoritarian system of government (table 3.2). This is because the “diffuse support” for the regime was “comparatively stable,” emanating as it did from “entrenched emotional attachment” to the normative values and beliefs of the political regime; whereas “specific support [for policies] fluctuates more, and is . . . directed mainly toward political authorities.”49 The support for the regime’s basic values seemed to be affected by nationalism and patriotic sentiments, as well as a concern for stability; whereas the specific policy issues had to do with the quotidian affairs of people’s lives and the incumbent political authorities. The latter, “low-politics issues,” did not move together with the “high-politics issues” of overarching values, and thus do not necessarily undermine support for the political system.50 Table 3.2 Distribution of support for specific policies (mean score [scale of 1–5])51

1. Controlling inflation 2. Providing job security 3. Minimizing inequality 4. Improving housing 5. Maintaining order 6. Providing medical care 7. Providing welfare for needy 8. Combating pollution 9. Fighting corruption

1995

1997

1999

2.6 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.2

3.2 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.3

3.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.3 2.0

This finding is reinforced by the conclusions of Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu.52 Because their study is on rural China, where the vast majority of the Chinese citizenry still lives, it provides an important supplement to Chen’s Beijing findings. Bernstein and Lu’s study of taxation in rural China found that “agricultural China,” the central and Western provinces, unlike the eastern coastal provinces of “industrializing rural China,” have not necessarily benefited from the many market-oriented reforms undertaken since the 1980s. It is in agricultural China that the central government has failed to match its exactions from the peasants with their capacity to pay. Nevertheless, these excessive tax burdens have not led to a social movement. Through numerous regulations, policies, and statements, the central party state has given the peasantry the strong impression that it sided with them against exploitation by local officials. By institutionalizing village elections, encouraging those with grievances to write letters and make visits to officials, as well as allowing local protests (more than eighty thousand protests in 2005), media coverage of egregious cases, and lawsuits against officials responsible for grievances, the party state has diverted peasant anger about excessive tax burdens away from the center and toward local government officials. As Cui Zhiyuan has noted concerning rural protests, “if you listen to what the peasants are saying, they are telling the central government that the local government has violated their rights.”53

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Chen’s Beijing survey does not conclude that the support for the regime is because it is democratic. (Nor does the Bernstein–Lu study conclude that the lack of a social movement against the regime is because it is authoritarian.) Instead, Chen’s study concludes that regime support is most strongly related to nationalism (pride in China’s standing in the international community), patriotism, and stability.54 Stability is far more important to the Chinese than to citizens of most other countries. In a 2003 Roper Survey of Global Attitudes, the Chinese ranked stability as their number two social value whereas the average value of stability for the citizens of other countries surveyed was 23.55 Indeed, for most of the countries surveyed, it was not an issue at all (although Russian citizens seem to value stability and national security as much as Chinese citizens do, a fact that many believe helped ensure Putin’s reelection in 2004).56 National security and stability may, in other words, be so important to the majority of a country’s citizens that they are willing to accept the government’s curtailing of civil liberties.57 For those familiar with China’s history, especially the more than one hundred years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the reasons Chinese citizens are more concerned than most with stability, law and order is obvious. How, then, do we develop fair and consistent standards for evaluating rights and governance in China? In addition to looking at surveys done in China that measure such matters as the legitimacy of the government, we can compare how satisfied the Chinese people are with their lives as compared to people in other countries. We can also compare the performance of China’s government in providing for the welfare and dignity of its citizens with the performance of other countries. This would be a more “objective” comparison, in that the facts would speak for themselves; yet as social science researchers well know, those who objectively have greater reason to be satisfied with their lives (such as those living in wealthier states, or those in higher income brackets within their own state) are not necessarily so. We will first address the Chinese people’s own subjective assessment of their lives, and how it compares with other states; and then, turning to the UNDP data, we will look at a more objective comparison of the success of China’s government with that of other governments in addressing the needs of their peoples. Since 1999, the Pew Research Center has been conducting a project on global attitudes on various topics. The results of its surveys that have included China are pertinent to the question of how successful China’s government has been, and how fairly and equitably the Chinese believe they are treated under their system of governance, regardless of objective measurements,58 and regardless of the opinions of those living in liberal democratic countries, which are often based on how they would feel under China’s form of governance. The 2006 annual report concluded that of the fifteen countries surveyed, the Chinese were by far the most satisfied with their national conditions (81 percent, up from 72 percent in 2005). Indeed, only in three other countries were 50 percent or more of those surveyed content with their national conditions (Spain, 50 percent; Jordan, 53 percent; and Egypt, 55 percent). Turkey was at 40 percent, but all the other countries were at 35 percent or below, with India at 31 percent

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(down from 41 percent in 2005), Japan at 27 percent, and Nigeria at 7 percent.59 The World Values Survey also indicated a high level of satisfaction with China’s governance.60 In a 2005 poll conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project to measure “optimism,” the Chinese people emerged as the most optimistic (76 percent) of the peoples surveyed in seventeen countries. The composite index of optimism indicates that Indians were almost equally (75 percent) optimistic, with Americans (48 percent) and Russians (45 percent) far less so. The Chinese also indicated more satisfaction with their “personal progress over the past five years” (50 percent in 2005, up from 42 percent in 2002) than were those in other countries. (India and the United States are not that far behind, however, with 45 percent in India, and 47 percent in the United States pleased with personal progress over the past five years.61 This leads to the question of whether, in the twenty-first century, we can thrust a developing country’s government into the moral arena of liberal democratic governments, most of which govern within the context of a far higher level of development and are themselves still debating the meaning of morality and fairness, the “just” society, democracy, and freedom in the context of a rapidly changing world? Why not judge China by the standards of the liberal democratic countries of the 1960s or even the 1940s? Or, why not judge China by the standards, or the satisfaction, of its own people? Amartya Sen believes a modified utilitarianism provides insights as to the value of various societal and political forms. Utilitarianism suggests that when judging social arrangements, we consider their results and their impact on the well-being of people. Utilitarians, or “consequentialists,” believe that the value of, say, the right to private property, must be judged on the grounds of whether its consequences are positive (such as its role in promoting economic expansion) or negative (such as environmental degradation or the immiseration of those without property). If the right to free speech leads to the articulation of ethnic hatred, and even to ethnic violence, it is not an unmitigated good. Sen prefers this modified utilitarian approach because the uncompromising emphasis on libertarian rights can lead to terrible consequences. It can, in particular, lead to the violation of the substantive freedom of other citizens by preventing them from escaping avoidable mortality, being well nourished and healthy, being able to read, write, and count, and so on. The importance of these freedoms cannot be ignored on grounds of the “priority of liberty.”62 If we judge governments by their success in according “rights” that provide for a decent life and livelihood, one of the principal reason people want freedom and democracy, then we can look across all cultures and political systems to evaluate China’s governance in a comparative context. The “human capabilities” criteria promoted by the UNDP provide standards for judging whether a government has accorded sufficient rights to individuals for them to have the substantive freedom necessary to live that good life. Most of these rights fall into the category of distributive rights—those concerned with social and economic justice. Often dismissed as “secondary” or “welfare” rights, developing countries like China believe they are more important as a first step to

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a just society than are procedural rights, which emphasize civil and political justice. Indeed, distributive rights were advocated in China long before the CCP gained power in 1949. Confucianism long ago embraced them as critical to the harmony and unity of society. Even Chinese familiar with Western political thought since the early twentieth century, such as Sun Yat-sen, advocated distributive rights, as did many other early reformers and revolutionaries. They believed freedom of speech, for example, required the existence of “life capabilities.”63 The problem is the basic incompatibility of these two types of rights—the one in pursuit of freedom, the other in pursuit of equality. In most societies, the ideal of “liberty and justice for all” is far from being realized because of the difficulty of “extending the concept of basic human rights from the civil and political realm—where it originated—to the social and economic.” That is, freedom does not give a person the right to demand a job, health care, or education.64 The United Nations has itself moved toward a new definition of human rights and social justice. It declared the 1990s as the “UN Decade for the Eradication of Extreme Poverty” and has condemned acute poverty as a violation of human rights. Since the Human Development Report was first published by the UNDP in 1990, it “has defined human development as the process of enlarging people’s choices.” In the absence of a choice, the freedom to choose is meaningless. Therefore, individuals must have not only the right and the capability to choose, but also alternatives to choose from. This often requires that the government make choices available through various programs or by increasing the level of development.65 In addition to “enlarging people’s choices,” the UNDP defines human development as the capability “to lead a long and healthy life . . . to acquire knowledge . . . to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living . . . protecting personal security . . . and achieving equality for all women and men.” If we evaluate societies on the basis of such “functionings” and economic and social rights, which allow an individual to attain well-being, we can judge whether a person really has the “capability” or “substantive freedom” to make genuine choices and, therefore, “how good a ‘deal’ a person has in the society.”66 The UNDP “human development index” (HDI) and its “human poverty index” (HPI) essentially evaluate governance on a comparative basis. The standards for these indices are neither Western nor Chinese. The HDI is not predicated on communist, anticommunist, pro-Western, religious, or liberal democratic values. Instead, it attempts to measure the quality of a life within each country. As such, it is a utilitarian measure of the willingness and ability of a country’s government, regardless of its form, to address the needs and development of its citizens. This is an important point because, among developing countries, neither a democratic form of government nor an unusually high GDP per capita is necessarily correlated with a high overall HDI standing.67 Comparisons among countries reveal that the correlation of, say, increased longevity with increased GDP per capita only exists when GDP has an impact on the incomes of the poor and on increased government spending on health care. In other words, if the gains in GDP are not used to remove poverty and

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improve health care, increases in GDP per capita do not necessarily correlate with increases in life expectancy.68 Hence the discrepancies in the relative HDI and GDP per capita rankings of countries indicate their relative commitment or lack thereof to policies that advance human development. In short, policies, and the values they embrace, seem to matter more than the form of government. The HDI measures human development in three basic dimensions: Longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. By using data for “life expectancy, educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment) and adjusted income,” the HDI measures development in a country as a whole. The HPI, on the other hand, measures deprivation, “the proportion of people in the community who are left out of progress”—the unequal distribution of poverty and human development.69 Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show HDI and HPI rankings for four highly populous developing countries, with Indonesia, Egypt, and India labeled as “democracies.” As these indices suggest, within the category of “developing countries,” which includes governments that are communist, socialist, democratic, fascist, Islamic, and/or dictatorial, China has been one of the most successful in providing its people with the capabilities and social and economic rights essential to human development. China’s commitment to reducing poverty by developing human capabilities (a commitment made by an authoritarian party state with a low GDP per capita) has seemingly mattered more than being a democracy for the goal of providing people with lives of dignity. The measures of Table 3.3 Human Development Index (HDI) rank (lower numbers are better)

Country China Indonesia Egypt India

2001 Data (2003 report) 104 112 120 127

2002 Data (2004 report) 96 — — 127

2003 Data (2005 report) 85 110 119 127

Note: In 2001 data, 175 developed and developing countries compared whereas 177 compared in 2003 data.

Table 3.4 Human Poverty Index (HPI)70 rank (lower numbers are better)

Country China Indonesia Egypt India

2001 Data (2003 UNDP report)

2002 Data (2004 report)

2003 Data (2005 report)

26 33 47 53

24 — — 48

27 41 55 58

Note: In 2001 data, 94 developing countries compared whereas 103 compared in 2003 data.

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human development and well-being embodied in these indices include some of the most basic rights that people living in a liberal democratic system hope to gain and maintain through their freedom to vote and choose their leaders. Comparison of China and India is particularly relevant. Both are large, developing countries with huge populations. India has been under multiparty, democratic rule for all but a few years of the period since independence in 1947. China has been under one-party rule since 1949. They have thus had about the same amount of time to test the validity of their respective political systems in terms of providing for human development. Although each has complex conditions and cultural issues that have affected this development, it would be hard to make the case that India faced more difficulties than China. Yet New Delhi has been unwilling or unable to undertake policies to address social problems that would have helped advance human development. Indeed, democracy seems to have seriously disrupted efforts to carry out policies that would benefit the entire country, such as mandating a national language (India still has 23 official languages) controlling religious conflict, or ending the caste system in practice. India’s trade unions have acquired free range to disrupt the economy and trade. Powerful interest groups have hijacked the legislative agenda. Ineffective policies both reflect and exacerbate the lack of national unity that undermines even the best efforts of India’s government. As a result, by almost every measurement the UNDP uses in its annual Human Development Report, China’s governance has been far more successful than India’s in providing for the human development of its people. Following in tables 3.5–3.7 are some of the measurements used in calculating the HPI that indicate the basis for the existence of significantly greater poverty and lower human capabilities in India than in China. Table 3.5 Longevity: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)

1970 China India

85 127

2001

2002

2003 data (2005 report)

31 67

31 67

30 63

Table 3.6 Longevity: Mortality rate for those under age 5 (per 1,000 live births)

China India

1970

2001

2002 (2004 UNDP Report)

120 202

39 93

39 93

The figures on underweight children (table 3.7) are particularly disturbing, for they indicate that almost half of India’s children under age five (the vast majority of whom are girls) are malnourished, a fact that irreversibly impairs their future cognitive and physical development. It is particularly shameful in

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the context of a society that is producing a surplus of grain, yet is not committed to providing adequate food for its children. In 1999, 47 percent of Indian children from ages one to thirty-five months were severely or moderately malnourished; yet in that same year, India produced more than twenty-four million metric tons of surplus grain. With its storage facilities already filled to capacity, it simply let the grain rot in the field. By 2002, that surplus had increased to more than fifty-eight million metric tons of wheat and rice,71 a surplus produced thanks to government subsidies responding to the special sectoral interests of a powerful agricultural lobby rather than to national needs for a healthy society. A 2005 study by the World Bank indicated that 46.7 percent of India’s two-year olds were underweight, and 44.9 percent were stunted. China’s underweight two-year olds were a far lower percentage, 10 percent, with 14.2 percent stunted. 72 Even viewed, alone, India’s performance is shocking; but when compared with figures for sub-Saharan Africa (the average for underweight and stunted development in India is twice as high),73 it suggests that governance as it relates to policies and values and strong institutions is the culprit (table 3.8). Table 3.7 Longevity: Children underweight for age (percent under age 5)

China India

1995–2001

1995–2002 (2004 UNDP report)

10 47

11 47

Table 3.8 The impact of malnutrition, stated as a percentage74 Country

Underweight

Stunted

China India Nigeria Uganda

10.0 46.7 30.7 22.8

14.2 44.9 33.5 39.1

Following are further figures (tables 3.9–3.20) allowing us to calculate the social and economic rights, the human capacity that gives dignity to a life in China and India. Like the other figures, they reflect stronger governance in China. Table 3.9 Population not expected to survive until age 4075 Country China India

Population (in %) 7.1 15.3

Note: Reports for 2003 and 2004 unchanged.

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2003 Report

2004 Report

2005 Report76

14.2 42.0

9.1 38.7

9.1 39.0

China India

Table 3.11 Standard of living: Percentage of population below income poverty line (in 1993 PPP U.S.$, purchasing price parity U.S. dollars) $1.00/day Country China India

$2.00/day

2003 Report

2005 Report

2003 Report

2005 Report

16.1 34.7

16.6 34.7

47.3 79.9

46.7 79.9

As tables 3.12 indicates, India’s GDP per capita is less than 60 percent of China’s. Table 3.13 shows that, although India’s per capita growth rate is increasing, it is still far lower than China’s. Table 3.12 GDP per capita (in PPP U.S.$, purchasing price parity U.S. dollars)

Country China India

2001 Data

2002 Data

4,020 2,840

4,580 2,670

2003 Data (2005 report) 5,003 2,892

Table 3.13 Annual growth rate in GDP per capita, as a percentage

Country China India

1975–2003

1990–2003 (2005 UNDP report)

8.2 3.3

8.5 4.0

But how to account for China’s standing in the Gini Index, which measures the degree “to which the distribution of income (or consumption) . . . within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution?”77 Although the Gini Index clearly indicates China’s polarization of wealth between the rich and the poor is worse than India’s, it is also bad in the United States (tables 3.14 and 3.15). As the HPI indicates (see earlier tables), China actually has significantly less poverty than does India. As the HPI measures deprivation, “the proportion of people in the community who are left out of progress,” it reflects the unequal distribution of poverty and human development.78 The difference may, then, in part be accounted for by the rapid development of significant wealth in China. In the Wild West approach to entrepreneurship in China, relatively few have accumulated massive amounts of wealth, accounting for the distorted distribution among the rich and the poor. But this does not

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Table 3.14 Gini Index (lower numbers reflect greater equality) China India USA

44.7 32.5 40.8

Source: UNDP Report, 2005.

Table 3.15 Inequality measures: Ratio of richest 10 percent to poorest 10% China India USA

18.4 7.3 15.9

Source: UNDP Report, 2005.

mean that the poor in China have not participated in development at all. To the contrary, as all the development indices indicate (the HPI is a summary number for these), the poor have also benefited from development, just not as much as the wealthy have. In contrast, India’s GDP per capita is less than 60 percent of China’s, and their GDP is itself far smaller. The Gini coefficient is, then, affected by the significantly greater wealth in China, and the distortion resulting from its rapid generation. Although there may be a more equal distribution of wealth (and poverty) in India, it is a lower level of wealth that is being distributed, with a far larger percentage of the poor suffering from deprivation. Better, in other words, to earn 10 percent of a GDP per capita of, say, $6,000 per annum, than 20 percent of a GDP per capita of $2,000. This is not to deny that the implications for social instability of relative deprivation that accompanies an unequal distribution of income are well known. In the case of China, there can be little doubt that this inequality is generating social tensions and conflict. Still other objective measures of China’s governance are available. For example, the saturation rates of telephone coverage and cell phones (table 3.16) suggest the degree to which citizens in each society are able to exchange ideas, communicate, and receive information. It is indeed ironic that although the Chinese people have been exposed to a huge amount of information from the outside world (via TV satellite, the Internet [table 3.17], and international tourism and exchanges), and have had the ability to exchange information, and even organize protest movements by phone and the Internet, they have not yet mustered these technological abilities to overthrow the party state regime. Gender-related data (tables 3.18 and 3.19) reflect the critical role women play in development. Unless women have social and economic capabilities and rights (especially education and nutrition), overall national development, and the social and economic rights of future generations, are impaired. The fertility rate per woman in the period 2000–2005 was 1.7 for China and 3.1 for India as per the 2005 UNDP report.

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Suzanne Ogden Table 3.16 Telephone mainlines and cellular subscribers per 1,000 people

Country China India

Mainlines 1990/2003

Cellular 1990/2003

6/209 6/46

0/215 0/25

Source: UNDP Report of 2005 based on 2003 data.

Table 3.17 Internet users per 1,000 people Country China India

1990

2001

2003

0 0

46.0 15.9

63 17

Source: UNDP Report of 2005 based on 2003 data.

Table 3.18 Gender-related development rank and index Country China India

Rank

Index

64 98

.754 .586

Source: Rank values from 2003 data;79 index values from 2005 UNDP report based on 2003 data.

Table 3.19 Gender inequality in education—literate females age 15 and above (in %)

Country China India

2001 Data

2002

78.7 46.4

86.5 46.4

2003 (2005 UNDP Report, on 2003 data) 86.5 47.8

Finally, the following HDI trend table indicates that, contrary to statements made by some analysts, India is not necessarily catching up with China, at least not in terms of factors that matter for the development of human capabilities— or, as it turns out, to India’s electorate. The overwhelming electoral defeat of the ruling Hindu nationalist party (Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) in 2004 suggests that in spite of overall growth in India’s GDP, only some two percent of the Indian population had thus far benefited from it. The HDI trends table (table 3.20) also indicates that India is making progress, but China’s HDI trend is still higher. These UNDP figures capture the quality and value of life in these two countries. They also suggest that democratic institutions per se do not necessarily translate into greater success in providing for basic human needs, or even into the freedom to make meaningful choices. An authoritarian government with coherent institutions and a policy commitment to eradicating the root causes of

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Table 3.20 Human Development Index trends (1975–2002 and 1975–2003)

Country

1975

2002

2003 (2005 Report)

China India

.521 .416

.745 .595

.755 .602

poverty may well outperform a democratic political system bogged down in playing to special interest groups. The stark difference in success between China’s and India’s population control policies is a good example of how a more authoritarian government may at times be more capable of carrying out a policy that is better for the society as a whole. What, then, of the argument that the democratic form of government is crucial to the successful development of human capabilities, and to freedom itself? Amartya Sen has often been quoted as saying that “no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy.” He rightly decries the authoritarian rule in China that led to the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and resulted in millions of deaths from starvation and malnutrition,80 and notes that since independence in 1947, India has never had a famine. Those who cite Sen on this point, however, rarely if ever acknowledge that this is only a part of his much larger argument that although India has not experienced famine, it has not been able to eliminate persistent and remediable malnutrition, including underlying conditions that contribute to malnutrition, such as high levels of illiteracy, the inequalities in gender relations that result in higher mortality rates and inequitable access to social and economic goods and political power for women, as well as an inability to reduce fertility rates. Sen denounces the opposition parties for allowing successive governments to “get away with unconscionable neglect of these vital matters of public policy,” but also indicts the democratically elected government of India, which has chosen to ignore problems critical to the development of a fair and just society. He admits it is China’s government, not India’s, that has made policy decisions to address these issues.81 Thomas Friedman has written that although “India has the hardware of democracy—free elections,” it lacks much of “the software—decentralized, responsive, transparent local government.” India’s free elections and political system, moreover, attract “the wrong kind of people” because of “criminalization and corruption, caste and communal differences” infecting Indian politics. Although Friedman understates China’s “hardware” for democracy (apart from everything else, China does have elections at the local level), he notes that its “institutions have been better at building infrastructure and services for China’s people and foreign investors.”82 In this context, it is arguably the stronger institutions in China’s authoritarian political system, accompanied by a leadership more committed to the collective good, that accounts for its ability to make decisions in the collective national interest. It is not altogether clear that were China more democratic, in the sense of universal suffrage within a national multiparty system, with a multiparty legislature making policy, the government

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would, or even could, choose the same policy objectives; for once powerful lobbies for special interests become involved, democracies do not necessarily do what is best for the country, especially for its poorest citizens. Unfortunately, economic liberalization has been eroding the infrastructure for human development established by the Chinese government before 1979. This is especially true for China’s poorest workers and farmers, the very people for whom the revolution was fought in 1949.83 The phasing out of the “right” to a job, virtually guaranteed before economic liberalization began, has had a devastating impact on social stability and the sense of well-being among the millions of unemployed. Many Chinese are now concerned that they, too, may lose the right to employment more than they are about any other right, political or otherwise.84 Further, although the official data for the entire country indicate a substantial rise in educational levels,85 other reports indicate a decline in both rural education and health care accompanying policies of economic liberalization and decollectivization. These policies have allowed the market and crony capitalism to substitute for the state in determining the distribution of goods,86 as the state has withdrawn from its heavy commitment to social welfare and intervention in the lives of its citizens. The decline of personal security and law and order and the widespread return of crime, banditry, and sects involved in illegal activities have been the unfortunate companions to the withering away of state control. The increased polarization of wealth between coastal areas and the hinterlands, within the countryside, and between the rural and urban areas,87 is largely the result of the economic policies of the reform period, which favor freedom of opportunity and encourage the accumulation of wealth, at the expense of policies that distributed wealth more equally. Furthermore, with decentralization, the state’s capacity for redistribution has weakened.88 These are the tradeoffs and by-products of other rights gained in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, economic liberalization and the increase in wealth have allowed a substantial majority of the Chinese people to “enlarge their choices,” to experience a genuine right to choose from among a variety of goods, services, and jobs, and to enjoy better food, housing, and more time for leisure. The party state has also adopted legislation making nine years of education compulsory and continues to make serious efforts to alleviate rural poverty (i.e., the “absolute poverty” of those falling below the poverty line of one dollar per day [expressed in purchasing price parity dollars]). The 8–7 Poverty Reduction Program (the 8 refers to “the 80 million people living in income poverty, the 7 for the program’s sevenyear period” from 1994 to 2000) required a significant financial commitment by the government.89 Although China did not achieve this goal by 2000, the policy has continued into the twenty-first century.90 China has also done well in meeting the MDGs set for it in 2000. As of 2004, the UN Country Team’s report on China’s progress concluded that “China will probably achieve most MDGs by 2015,” although it also noted problems such as environmental degradation and the growing inequality and gender gaps that have accompanied its remarkable progress.91 Finally, the party state continues to carry out economic, financial, and structural reforms that make institutions more transparent, allow greater public oversight, and help open China to the outside world.

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Democratic systems are more likely than authoritarian ones to guarantee that officials are accountable to the public, but their leaders must be dedicated to the public good (and have the resources and tools required) to make accountability meaningful. Accountability matters little if a state’s elected leaders serve narrow sectoral interests. All too often, the citizens of even the most advanced liberal democracies use the political system to assert their own self-interests at the expense of community interests. Democratic institutions by their very nature are vulnerable to manipulation by the powerful and the wealthy, who use them to serve their own interests, just as economic entrepreneurs and powerful corporations often use a capitalist economic system to exploit workers and damage the environment in order to increase profits. By contrast, the Chinese have had to rely on their leaders to make policies that benefit the entire country, but in a system in which accountability seems to have been primarily to other leaders behind closed doors. Regardless of good intentions, the blame for the “20 bad years” from 1957 to 1976 falls squarely on a system that lacked true accountability to the people.92 China’s socialist system may have generally been able to put competent people into government, but it has not been able to remove bad people in a routine, predictable manner. Its preferred methods of party rectifications, mass campaigns, and class struggle have often had devastating effects on society and government. Nevertheless, since the reform era began in 1979, China’s leaders have displayed a remarkable commitment to development and making China a country that commands respect from the international community. To this end, they have also carried out political reforms that have made local leaders more accountable to the people, by the introduction of a market economy and reforms that have undercut centralized control of the country, and by a greater reliance on expertise in management and government. Compared to most large developing countries classified as democratic, in the twenty-first century, China appears to have had a more competent leadership, a more effective governmental administrative apparatus, and a greater willingness to carry out policies that advance human development. This gives us still other dimensions for assessing the performance of China’s government. Yet, in some respects, the ability of China’s government to govern the population is being eroded. Greater freedom and democracy for the Chinese people may, in fact, undermine the very conditions that are, at least for a large developing country, best for human development, and ultimately, for the advancement of a civil society. To note just one, market reforms that have brought about the decentralization of control over the economy have led to the polarization of wealth, an inability of the state to collect taxes that would pay for collective public goods, the plundering of China’s natural resources, and the destruction of the environment. Just how much state control is good for the development of China’s public sphere and the proper balance between autonomy and control are issues that the Chinese government debates daily—just as do the governments of the advanced liberal democracies. But one thing is clear: A developing China armed with a more comprehensive legal system, strong governing institutions, economic development, and peace may be better able to contend with the

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challenges to stability and order that accompany economic liberalization and democratization. China is trying to find its own way to build a just and decent society that does not rely on the theories or rationales of Western liberal democracy. It may ultimately rely on similar processes and institutions, but even here, many Chinese are trying to ensure that they are “Chinese,” not Western. Thus, Wang Changjiang, from China’s Central Party School, has advocated developing China’s own electoral system for the building of socialist democratic politics. Elections are an “indispensable part of ” a democracy and essential for turning “the will of the Party into the [will] of the people”; but they “are not a patent of the West,” and there is no reason why elections must be built on a Western-style multiparty system. The diverse interests of various groups and social strata can be encompassed within one party. Wang suggests, moreover, that because democracy, freedom, equality, and human rights have been labeled as “bourgeois,” and are seen as Western, China has kept them at arm’s length. Thus, if China were to stop viewing “electoral democracy” as Western, it would be more likely to promote elections to higher levels.93 From the other side of the political spectrum, Wang Hui, perhaps China’s best known “New Leftist,”94 makes a similar point: “Chinese modernity [can] not be a simple matter of abandoning the old and embracing the new—as it had been for both Maoists and free-market capitalists.” Chinese and Indian intellectuals must “not just imitate the West. They have to explore alternatives to the Western model of modernity.” And the same must be said about the Western model of democracy. Put together, “modernity” and “democracy” require looking to the needs not just of middle-class urbanites, but also of the broad masses of people still in the countryside who need to be ensured social and economic justice. And this requires not just elections, but also looking to what has worked in the past for them, including public health care and education, and perhaps even some level of communally based property ownership. In short, just because China’s dictatorship and planned economy had many failures in the past does not mean an unfettered free market and Western-style democracy can deliver social and economic justice to the broad masses.95 China’s political culture is, then, starting to accommodate democratic ideas and institutions. Those Chinese intent on reform are also shaping the form democratization takes. There are many voices within China—and within the party state itself—in the debate over what role Chinese culture, traditions, historical experiences, and existing political institutions should play as China democratizes and modernizes in an increasingly globalized context. The Chinese are, in short, thinking about democracy and modernity differently from the West. Today’s China is a society riddled with the tensions generated by the risks of abandoning the collective traditions that were a part of China long before the CCP came to power. At the same time, governance faces the contradictions caused by the democratizing and modernizing power of socioeconomic forces in the context of an authoritarian culture. We have only to look at Singapore, Taiwan, or Japan to see that polities can and do live with such risks and tensions; but

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given the enormous size and complexity of China and its population, the process of addressing these risks and tensions will be even more challenging. Notes 1. John James Kennedy, “Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media,” paper presented at the Nineteenth Annual Conference of the Association of Chinese Political Science, University of Louisville, March 31–April 2, 2006. 2. Even the concept of “good governance” is premised primarily on values formulated by Western liberal democracies of transparency and openness, accountability, human rights, participation, and particular legal and regulatory institutions, values, and processes. 3. “Democracies” such as Japan do not necessarily have more financial transparency than some authoritarian systems. 4. Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen . . . (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 143. 5. This chapter builds on some ideas originally presented in Suzanne Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press), 2002. 6. For an extensive discussion of public participation (including its benefits, legal context, elections, and the development of social organizations to channel public input), see Jamie P. Horsley, “Public Participation and the Democratization of Chinese Governance,” in Yang Zhong and Shiping Hua, eds., Political Civilizaiton and Modernization: The Political Context of China’s Reform (London: World Scientific Press, 2006), pp. 207–250. 7. Comparing China with India on the five major news stories considered, 93 percent Chinese and 99 percent Indians had heard of the bird flu; 78 percent Chinese and 57 percent Indians had heard of global warming; 37 percent Chinese and 50 percent Indians had heard of the Iran nuclear dispute; 38 percent Chinese and 23 percent Indians had heard of Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo abuses; and 27 percent Chinese and 21 percent Indians had heard of the Hamas elections. Pew Research Center, America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas, June 2006, http:// pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID⫽252. “Results for the survey are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International.” For China and India, “the sample was disproportionately or exclusively urban.” 8. The editor, Li Datong, and his deputy editor were, however, first demoted. They now work at China Youth Daily’s news research center, described by Li as “a club for retired cadres.” Among the prominent retired CCP members were the former chief of the Propaganda Department, Zhu Houze, and, Li Rui, the former secretary to Mao Zedong. Verna Yu (Agence France-Presse, Beijing), “For Outspoken Journalist, the Sword Is Always Hanging Overhead,” South China Morning Post, March 16, 2006, available on the Internet. 9. Ching-Ching Ni, “China’s Clash of Cultures in Cyberspace: A Blogger’s Video Spoof of a Big-Budget Film is Swept Up in the Debate over Censorship and the Freedom to Speak One’s Mind on the Internet,” The Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2006. Also see Liang Guo, “Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Five Chinese Cities: The CASS Internet Survey Report, 2005,” Research Center for Social Development,

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14. 15.

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CASS, Beijing, Nov. 2005. Funded by Markle Foundation. Based on house-to-house interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha. http://www. markle.org/downloadable_assets/china_final_11_2005.pdf. On the issue of how Chinese feel about “Should the Internet be Managed and Controlled?,” see the text of Guo’s report, p. 24. For why Chinese go online in Internet cafes, see p. 42 (and earlier in the report for general reasons). Also note that 85 percent of what is on the Internet is Mainland Chinese content; only 3 percent is overseas foreign language content. (See chart, p. 48.) “Chinese NGOs Increase to 346,000 Last Year,” posted February 4, 2007, at www.chinaelections.org. “China’s Developing Civil Society: Associations and Interest Groups,” in Ogden, Inklings, Chapter Seven. See, e.g., the argument of a reformed-minded scholar from the Central Party School, Wang Changjiang: “This is because the foundation of democracy is interest. To participate in democracy from the perspective of self-interest, inevitably, there will be conflicts between different interests, and the people would also naturally employ various means of good and bad to safeguard their own self-interests.” Wang goes on to state that “under the conditions of party politics all kinds of interests and viewpoints are reflected within the party itself . . . Sometimes a political party represents one class, but sometimes it represents several social strata and groups.” Wang Changjiang, “Zhengjue renzhi xuanzhu: Meiyou xuanzhu, meiyou minzhu,” from “Theory Weekly Section,” Beijing Ribao (Beijing Daily), September 18, 2006. Translated by Michael Huang, “No Elections, No Democracy,” and posted by China Elections & Governance, October 2, 2006, www.chinaelections.org/en. In response to the argument that China’s NGOs are always headed by a member of the CCP, and ultimately monitored and controlled by the government, and hence are not justifiably part of a “civil society,” see the comparative perspective from Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy Markers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Guilhot examines the patron–client relationship between the U.S. government and NGOs that support democratization abroad, and provides evidence to show how those NGOs, think tanks, and universities, which generate democratization theory, have been institutionally related to, indeed have collaborated with, the U.S. government. Chow Bing Ngeow, “Surveying Public Opinion in China,” Northeastern University, unpublished paper, October 2005, pp. 21–22. See, e.g., the scathing critique of China’s health care provision system in the report by the Development Research Center of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “An Evaluation of and Recommendations on the Reforms of the Health System in China (Beijing 2005),” China’s Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2005. Also available at http://www.drc.gov.cn. For an example of state-led efforts to strengthen rural governance and elections, see Xinhuanet, “China to Further Promote Rural Democracy,” www.chinaview.cn, July 11, 2004. As of August 2004, it appeared that China was considering major revisions to the election laws for People’s Congress deputies at the township and county levels. See Zuo Zhihong, “Guangdong People’s Congress Offers Suggestions for the Revision of China’s Election Law,” Express Daily Online, published September 20, 2004. Translated by Manfred Elfstrom and Yawei Liu, and posted on the website, “China’s Elections & Governance,” September 28, 2004, http://www.chinaelections.org/en/. Numerous articles here reflect the government’s efforts to increase transparency in local government and get rid of incompetent or corrupt officials.

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18. Li Fan (interviewed), “Democracy in the Making,” Beijing Review, January 2006, online at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/06-01-e/china-2.htm. Li Fan is the director of one of Beijing’s nongovernmental think tanks, the World and China Institute. 19. As of the March 2007 National People’s Congress, the constitution also included laws to protect human rights and private property. 20. Karen I. Tse, “The Legal System’s Quiet Revolution,” International Herald Tribune, February 11, 2005, http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php? file⫽/articles/2005/ 02/10/opinion/edtse.html. 21. Some Chinese intellectuals do apply an external critique that includes Western ideas, values, and theories to their own polity. On the other hand, China’s cultural nationalists are performing an internal critique of China by using Chinese values, while using Western values and theories to critique the West. 22. Ogden, Inklings, pp. 26–27, 263–275, 279–280. 23. “Comprehensive xiaokang (quanmian xiaokang) is a higher level of a ‘satisfactory’ society, and requires a per capita income greater than US$3,000.” Xiaokang policy talk was rapidly institutionalized in the Chinese system and connected to the government’s millennium goals. Tony Saich, Critical Policies Study Group, discussions, Boston, 2003, 2004, 2005. 24. “Special Realities Impeding China’s Growth, Report,” People’s Daily Online, December 7, 2004. 25. Kathleen Hwang (UPI), “China Resurrects Confucius,” August 12, 2005, http:// news.monstersandcritics.com/asiapacific/article_1040881.php/Analysis_China_ resurrects_Confucius. 26. See, e.g., a discussion at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Central Committee, where the focus was on eliminating “disharmonious” elements, such as the income disparity between rich and poor (especially between the urban middle class and the rural poor, but also regional disparities), and widespread corruption within the party. Ting Shi, “Harmony the Word at Party Meeting,” South China Morning Post, October 9, 2006. 27. United Nations Country Team in China, Millennium Development Goals: China’s Progress (Beijing: Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in China, 2004). 28. When “marching toward the market” was the motto of the day, Chinese also repeated it with great enthusiasm—not with the cynicism that took over earlier slogans, such as “Serve the people” during the Cultural Revolution. 29. A survey questionnaire done by Tianjian Shi (“Cultural Impact on Political Trust: A Comparison of Mainland China and Taiwan,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2001, pp. 401–420) concludes that there is a weak correlation of political fear (being punished for criticizing CCP and state leaders in conversations in the workplace or neighborhood) and regime support. Thus, questions that measure support for the regime weakly correlate with questions about fear of punishment for criticizing leaders. Referenced in Kennedy, “Maintaining Popular.” 30. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004). 31. Ibid., pp. 12, 14–15 for further details. 32. For example, in 2004, Chinese universities awarded twelve thousand PhDs. By 2010, it could surpass the U.S. rate of forty thousand PhDs per annum. Further, whereas in 1982 only 20 percent of China’s provincial leaders had a college education, 98 percent did just twenty years later. Those with postgraduate degrees sprinted ahead from 12.9 percent in 2001 to 29 percent just two years later. Among the fourth generation, China’s leaders under the age of fifty-four in 2002, two-thirds

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34. 35.

36. 37. 38.

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have postgraduate degrees, often from abroad. Cheng Li, “Educational and Professional Backgrounds of Current Provincial Leaders,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 8, 2003, pp. 3–4, none given, as referenced in Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, pp. 18, 20. The Chinese now refer to “clean and green GDP growth,” recognition of the enormous costs of environmental destruction and corruption that should be deducted from annual figures of GDP growth to get the real GDP growth rate. (As Ramo put it, the government’s new view is that “the color of the cat does matter. The goal now is to find a cat that is green, a cat that is transparent.” Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, p. 23.) The Ministry of the Environment, as well as the State Environmental Protection Agency, has become increasingly vocal on the need to measure GDP in a way that accounts for the costs of environmental degradation— the “green” GDP. “SPIEGEL Interview with China’s Deputy Minister of the Environment: The Chinese Miracle Will End Soon,” Der Spiegel, March 7, 2005. Interview conducted by Andreas Lorenz. http://www.spiegel.de/international/ spiegel/0,1518,345694,00.html. Among the many articles on this topic, see Jim Yardley, “China’s Next Big Boom Could Be the Foul Air,” The New York Times, October 30, 2005. In a sign that there is still an ongoing debate within the leadership, and no ideological consensus, a controversy over socialism and capitalism broke out during the NPC meeting in March 2006. The context was a draft law to protect property rights, shelved because of the challenge waged by some on the “left” (sometimes referred to as “conservatives” or “neoleftists”) who are concerned about the growing polarization of wealth and the resulting instability. The cause of this polarization is, in their view, “the country’s headlong pursuit of private wealth and market-driven economic development.” Joseph Kahn, “A Sharp Debate Erupts in China Over Ideologies,” The New York Times, March 12, 2005, pp. 1, 8. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, pp. 4–5. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 23; referenced in Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, p. 23. For example, conversations with ordinary Chinese by travelers to China suggest that the Chinese people accept the government’s policy for family planning, including the one-child policy, as well as its sometimes severe and uncompromising measures to confront avian flu. In cases such as these, they tend to see the government’s policy measures as in the best interests of the whole society, even if individuals have to make sacrifices. René Spogárd and Meril James, Governance and Democracy—The People’s View. A Global Opinion Poll, online at http://www.gallup-international.com/survey18.htm. This is an analysis of “The Gallup International Millennium Survey” (conducted in August and October 1999). The polling organization notes that of those polled, only the strongest supporters of democracy, the “Pillars of Democracy,” were satisfied with the elections and agreed the people’s will rules. However, in only eight of the sixty countries surveyed did they comprise a majority, whereas in nineteen, they constituted 25 percent or less of the electorate. To get more information, expanded numbers, and so on, email [email protected]. Robert Lane Greene and Nigel Holmes, “Will a Bigger Europe Be a Better Europe?” The New York Times, Op-Ed, April 30, 2004, p. A25. Their sources were the WHO, Eurostat, Economist Intelligence Unit, UNDP, Eurobarometer, and the World Bank.

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41. Warren Hoge, “Latin America Losing Hope in Democracy, Report Says,” The New York Times, April 22, 2004, A3. Italics added. Of the eighteen countries surveyed, all “have either introduced or consolidated electoral democracy over the past 25 years, emerging from unrepresentative one-party politics or harsh and repressive military rule. All of them hold regular elections that meet international standards of fairness and enjoy a free press and basic civil liberties.” Ibid. Latinobarometro, Opinion Publica Latinoamericana, is a private nonprofit organization that performs a public opinion survey annually. See http://www.latinobarometro.org/index.php?id⫽147. 42. Juan Forero, “Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience with Democracy,” The New York Times, June 24, 2004, pp. A1, A6. 43. Ibid., p. A6; and Hoge, “Latin America Losing Hope,” p. A3. 44. Chen Jie, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 23. The report’s conclusions are based on Seymour Lipset’s argument that “regime legitimacy is tied to affect for the prevalent political institutions in a society,” and David Easton’s argument that “diffuse support” is “affect primarily for values, norms and institutions of the regime.” In other words, regime legitimacy is based on “how well political institutions conform to a person’s sense of what is right, . . . how well the system of government upholds basic political values in which a person believes, . . . and how well the authorities conform to a person’s sense of what is right and proper behavior.” Chen is referring to Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965); and “A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, October 1976, pp. 435–457; and Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, “On the Meaning of Political Support,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, December 1977, p. 1566. 45. Chen, Popular Political Support, 23. 46. Ibid., pp. 28–29. 47. Ibid., p. 30. 48. Easton, “A Reassessment of the Concept,” p. 437. 49. Chen, Popular Political Support, pp. 4–5, 69–75, 96. 50. Ibid., pp. 8–9, 51–53. Jie Chen’s study is far more complex than presented here. He also looks at such factors as whether women are more supportive than men, the relationship of economic status and party membership to diffuse support, as well as the relevance of age and many other factors. 51. Ibid., p. 49. 1 ⫽ very poor; 2 ⫽ poor; 3 ⫽ so-so; 4 ⫽ good; 5 ⫽ very good. 52. Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 53. Cui Zhiyuan, quoted in Pankaj Mishra, “China’s New Leftist,” The New York Times Sunday Magazine, October 15, 2006. Cui Zhiyuan teaches political science at Tsinghua University. 54. Chen, Popular Political Support, pp. 98–99, 103–108. 55. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, p. 23. 56. Seth Mydans, “Russia Parliament Moves Toward Ban on Public Demonstrations,” New York Times, April 1, 2004, p. A3. 57. Note the U.S. Patriot Act, which curtailed civil liberties in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Although a number of groups vehemently protested against it, in the end, Congress overwhelmingly approved it.

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58. That is, by objective international standards of, say, per capita income, a far larger percentage live in poverty and might therefore have reason to be unhappy with their government. 59. Pew Research Center, America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas, June 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID⫽252. The total number of individuals interviewed in the fifteen countries was 16,710. “All surveys are based on national samples except in China, India, and Pakistan, where the sample was disproportionately or exclusively urban.” In China, the interviews took place in April 2006. 60. World Values Survey (2000–2001), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The survey questionnaires are also available on this site. 61. Pew Research Center, China’s Optimism: Prosperity Brings Satisfaction—And Hope. Report released on November 16, 2005, and available at http://pewglobal.org/ reports/display.php?ReportID⫽249. 62. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 66. Sen is, of course, interested in civil rights and political freedom and believes the utilitarians could attach more value to them while not ignoring their consequences for the substantive freedoms (literacy and so on) already possessed by the people. For his other concerns about the limitations of utilitarianism, see Ibid., pp. 60–66. 63. Gao Yihan, “Sheng xianfa zhong de minquan wenti” (The Question of People’s Rights in the Provincial Constitutions), Xin qingnian, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1921, pp. 5–7; trans. in Steven C. Angle and Marina Svensson, “On Rights and Human Rights: A Contested and Evolving Chinese Discourse, 1900–1949.” Contemporary Chinese Thought, Vol. 31, No. 1, fall 1999, p. 62. 64. Henry Rosemont, “Human Rights: A Bill of Worries,” in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds., Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 57. 65. This is a point also made by some Chinese academics. See, e.g., Liu Jinxi, “Minzhu xin lun” (New Arguments on Democracy), Xuexi yu tansuo, Vol. 3, 1998, pp. 83–84. 66. Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 40–41. 67. Peter P. Rogers et al., Measuring Environmental Quality in Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, and Asian Development Bank, 1997), pp. 36–37. According to the 1998 UNDP data, a country like Kuwait with a high GDP per capita drops by thirty-one places if the HDI (ranked number thirty-six in the world) rather than GDP per capita (ranked number five) is used, whereas Cuba advances by forty places in the ordinal ranking. 68. Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion; cited in Sen, Inequality Re-examined, p. 44, note 7. 69. Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 87. 70. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2003, pp. 245–247; UNDP, Human Development Report 2004; UNDP, Human Development Report 2005. These are, however, ordinal rankings, which may give the impression of larger differences between countries than may exist in terms of the percentage values of the separate “human development” rankings for each category or the combined “human development index value,” also given in the reports. For the 2003 report, based on 2001 data, out of the highest “HDI value” possible (1.00), the highest HDI value achieved by any country was Norway’s (0.944), and the lowest was Sierra Leone’s (0.275). China’s HDI value ranking was 0.721, and India’s was 0.590. This is a significant spread (of 0.131) and is about the same spread in the HDI (in the other direction) as that between China and Argentina (0.849) (whose

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73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83.

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HDI is 34). Basically, the HDI value is generated by adding the indices for life expectancy, education, and GDP per capita (expressed in purchasing price parity dollars) for each country and applying the Atkinson formula. This formula takes income elasticity into account and reflects “the diminishing value of additional income.” For an explanation and critique of the computation of the HDI value, see Rogers et al., Measuring Environmental Quality in Asia, pp. 36–38. For a technical note on how the indices were computed, see the UNDP, Human Development Report, 2003, pp. 340–346. Amy Waldman, “Poor in India Starve as Surplus Wheat Rots,” New York Times, December 2, 2002, p. A3. Virtually identical findings were reported widely in 2006. Figures for Bangladesh are even worse than India’s: 47.7 percent underweight, 44.7 percent stunted; in Angola, the figures are 30.5 percent underweight, 45.2 percent stunted; for Uganda, 22.8 percent underweight, 39.1 percent stunted. Ibid. Celia W. Dugger, “Report Warns Malnutrition Begins in Cradle,” New York Times, March 3, 2006, p. A6. Reference is to a 2005 World Bank Report. Ibid. Based on a 2005 World Bank Report. Human Development Report, 2003, p. 247. This is for years 1995–2003. Figures unchanged in 2004 Report. Data are estimates of national literacy based on censuses or surveys conducted during the years 2000–2004. As defined by the UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, “Inequality Measures”: “A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequality.” Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 87. Ibid., p. 16. Sen qualifies this view later in this work, noting that since independence, “India has been relatively free . . . of famine” (p. 103; italics added). Sen has accepted the figure of twenty to thirty million deaths uncritically. The figure is really an estimate of shortfall in expected births, which doubles the figure of the dead by including people who were never born! (Correspondence from an anonymous reviewer, based on an online Indian source, Utsa Patnaik, “Experimenting with Market Socialism,” Frontline, Vol. 16, No. 21, October 9–22, 1999). This is not to deny that, even at half the number, the level of starvation was still shocking. Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 102–103, 154, 156, 186–203. Thomas L. Friedman, “Software of Democracy,” The New York Times, March 21, 2004, Section 4, p. 11. For a series of articles on the growing inequality in income distribution and its impact, see Carl Riskin et al., eds., China’s Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001); Zizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin, Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); World Bank, Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997); and Bernstein and Lu, Taxation without Representation. In 1995 and 1996, social stability had been the primary concern of adult urban residents in eleven cities. In 1997 and 1998, unemployment became the number one concern. “1998 [Yijiujiuba] shenghuo ganshou” (Perceptions of life in 1998), online sohu.com, December 10, 1998, http://www.itc.cn.net/survey/reports05.htm.

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85. By the end of 1999, 98.9 percent of all children were enrolled in primary school with the vast majority (87.3 percent) going on to secondary school. This is a substantial increase over the 71.4 percent who went on to middle school in 1990 (“UN Report Says China’s Illiteracy Rate Down in the 90s,” China News Digest, December 13, 1999). However, these figures probably exclude the children of rural migrants living without a residency permit in the cities. The 2001 World Bank report on China is less laudatory. It concludes that although junior and senior secondary schools in major cities were providing good education, 15 percent of China’s regions had not yet attained the nine-year compulsory education target. World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Update (Washington D.C.: World Bank, March 2001), online at www.worldbank.org. 86. He Qinglian has referred to the phenomenon as a “simulated market” in which there is political not economic competition, and in which the government colludes with a mafia to rob China’s citizens of its resources (cited in Cheng Li, “Promises and Pitfalls of Reform: New Thinking in Post-Deng China,” in Tyrene White, ed., China Briefing 2000: The Continuing Transformation [Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000], p. 147). He Qinglian is a mainland economist best known for her devastating critique of China’s reforms in her book, Zhongguo de xianjing (China’s Pitfall) (Hong Kong: Mingjing, 1998; also published in Beijing). 87. Wang Xinyi, “Shouru fenpei helihua you laiyu jianchuan jizhi” (An Equitable Income Distribution Relies on Improvement of Mechanisms), Qiu shi (Seek Truth), No. 7, 1997, pp. 30–32. 88. Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, “Taxation Without Representation in China,” Harvard University, New England China Seminar, April 16, 2001. 89. United Nations Development Program, “Profile of Human Poverty,” in idem, Human Development Report, 1997, p. 50. 90. Arthur Holcombe, president, Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund, “Contemporary Tibet: Leading Social and Economic Development Issues,” Seminar, Harvard University, Asia Center, February 4, 2000. Holcombe stated that poverty alleviation policies are definitely being carried out in China’s western provinces and Tibet. This, he stated, was in contrast to rural India, where government policies are not addressing the deteriorating situation in much of India’s rural area. 91. United Nations Country Team in China, Millennium Development Goals: China’s Progress (Beijing: Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in China, 2004). For example, as of 2004, China had already achieved the goal of halving (by 2015) the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar per day (based on the 1990 figure of eighty-five million poor); was ahead of the target of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger; was “ahead of target in ensuring that all children will be enrolled in primary school by 2015”; and was “on track” in reducing “maternal mortality ratio by three-quarters by 2015” (from its 1990 base), pp. 1, 8, 10, 13. 92. This period includes anti-rightist movements, party rectifications, the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the following “three bad years,” and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. 93. Wang Changjiang, “Zhengjue renzhi xuanzhu: Meiyou xuanzhu, meiyou minzhu,” from “Theory Weekly Section,” Beijing Ribao (Beijing Daily), September 18, 2006. Translated by Michael Huang, “No Elections, No Democracy,” posted by China Elections & Governance, October 2, 2006, www.chinaelections.org/en. 94. Because of the baggage carried by the term “New Leftist,” Wang Hui prefers to be called a “critical intellectual.” Wang Hui is the editor of the influential journal Dushu (Reading), and teaches at Tsinghua University.

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95. According to Wang Hui, the increasing polarization of wealth, the “deteriorating health and education systems, as well as the arbitrary fees and taxes imposed by local party officials . . . could be laid at the feet of the ‘right-wing radicals’ or neoliberal economists who cite Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek (advocates of unregulated markets who inspired Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980’s) and who argue for China’s integration into the global economy without taking into account the social price of mass privatization.” According to Wang Hui, China’s ruling elite favors the advice of neoliberal economists; and it is their ideas that appear in the state-run media. Wang Hui, quoted in Mishra, “China’s New Leftist.”


PART II

Political Economy and Development


CHAPTER 4

Foreign Direct Investment and Labor Rights Protection in China: A Tale of Two Sectors Josh Eastin and Ka Zeng

Introduction The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on labor rights protection in developing countries has been the subject of scholarly debate in recent years. Proponents of globalization are sanguine about the impact of FDI and trade on labor standards, arguing that the internationalization of production positively affects labor protection by promoting economic growth through technology transfer and employment creation. Critics of globalization, however, contend that FDI generates a “race to the bottom,” as developing countries compete to lower wage levels and labor standards so as to lower the cost of production for multinational corporations (MNCs).1 As the interests of firms are privileged over those of workers, we should be witnessing a downward convergence in the economic and social policies of developing countries. These competing claims about the impact of FDI and trade on labor rights protection have only more recently been subject to rigorous empirical testing. However, most of these studies examine multinational production or FDI as a whole without considering the possibility that the impact of FDI could vary across sectors of economic activity.2 This chapter fills this gap in the literature and explores the potential disparity between technology-intensive and labor-intensive sectors with regard to their treatment of and respect for workers’ rights. Using China as a case study, this chapter compares the labor practices of MNCs and their subsidiaries invested in low-technology labor-intensive manufacturing (such as textile, footwear, apparel, and toy industries) and high-technology

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manufacturing (such as electronics and semiconductor industries). It will be argued that firms that have invested in high-tech industries (e.g., electronics and semiconductors) tend to engage in more sound labor practices than those that have invested in low-tech industries (e.g., textiles, shoes, apparel, and toys) due to differences in mobility, or the ease with which a firm can seek out new production locations; labor costs as a percentage of the total budget; firm incentive to invest in workforce training; and access to local markets. These theoretical arguments will be supported by an examination of the actual number of labor rights violations in each industry. Looking at a range of violations including minimum wage and overtime abuse, child labor, hazardous working conditions, and denial of freedom of association or collective bargaining rights, this chapter offers insight into how and why these violations occur in one industry more than another. China is an excellent testing ground for the impact of FDI on labor rights protection as it has become the largest destination of FDI in the world. Foreigninvested manufactured exports account for over half (51.2 percent) of total Chinese manufacturing exports and 21 percent of sales in the manufacturing industry.3 With a labor force of 760.8 million workers (as of 2003), China has a vast pool of labor to supply and support these industries.4 Unfortunately, China also has between 100 and 150 million surplus rural workers floating between the villages and cities subsisting through low-paying, part-time jobs (CIA World Fact Book). The extreme poverty faced in the vast majority of these situations and an inherent lack of local stability to promote positive community relations make them prime candidates to be violated by unscrupulous businesses intent on achieving maximum output at the lowest possible cost, regardless of the rights of workers. The importance of FDI to China’s economic development and the size of the Chinese labor force, therefore, call for a more nuanced analysis of the impact of FDI across sectors of economic activity. By identifying and publicizing the potential for abuse that currently exists in labor rights protection, this analysis ought to offer lessons for governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their effort to design and implement more effective policies for labor protection. It should also further the progress of creating concrete international norms and standards that are recognized and implemented by all multinational firms invested in the manufacturing sectors of developing countries. This chapter is organized as follows. The first part briefly reviews the literature on both the positive and negative impact of FDI on labor rights protection, identifying the need to analyze the effect of FDI by sector. The second section advances our theoretical argument about why labor rights practices may differ between technology-intensive and labor-intensive industries. These theoretical arguments are bolstered through an empirical examination of the extent of labor rights violations in two such industries in China. The chapter concludes by discussing the policy implications of its key findings. The Impact of FDI on Labor Rights Protection As mentioned earlier, the race to the bottom argument suggests that the competition among countries to attract foreign investment has negative consequences

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on the collective labor rights of workers. This competitive pressure leads to developing countries lowering local labor standards such as wage and overtime restrictions, ignoring child labor laws, engaging in antiunion activities, and removing workplace health and safety codes.5 In a recent edition of Foreign Affairs, Jay Mazur, the president of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Workers (UNITE) states, Millions of workers are losing out in a global economy that disrupts traditional economies and weakens the ability of their governments to assist them. They are left to fend for themselves within failed states against destitution, famine, and plagues. They are forced to migrate, to offer their labor at wages below subsistence, sacrifice their children, and cash in on their natural and often their personal health—all in a desperate struggle to survive.6

This argument presents a bleak picture of the effects of FDI on labor rights. However, although it seems like “conventional wisdom,” this blanket conclusion may not be quite so clear-cut. Studies have shown that aside from the economic benefits of FDI such as capital investment, newer technology, growth in the export sector, and creation of jobs and urban development, it also brings a measured increase in the quality of employment for workers through comparatively increased wages, worker education for high-skilled labor, and greater competition among firms to retain existing workers.7 In a cross-sectional time-series analysis of the effects of FDI on over ninety developing nations, it was found that higher levels of FDI are positively correlated with stronger collective labor rights.8 Going further, in an empirical study of one hundred and twenty-seven countries (including one hundred LDCs and twenty-seven high-income countries) on the relationship between FDI and worker’s rights, David Kucera found that: (i) FDI is attracted to countries with a higher civil liberties index, even though labor costs are higher; (ii) higher levels of worker unionization are positively associated with FDI inflows; (iii) FDI tends to be higher in countries with fewer instances of collective bargaining repression and greater freedom of association; and (iv) FDI is negatively associated with high levels of child (ten–fifteen-year olds) labor participation.9 The OECD has also reported that “while core labor standards may not be systematically absent from the location decisions of OECD investors in favor of non-OECD destinations, aggregate FDI data suggest that core labor standards are not important determinants in the majority of cases.”10 Thus, the evidence indicating that the lack of existing labor laws or labor protection is the primary, or even secondary, location determinant for FDI is diminished through lack of empirical evidence for this “conventional wisdom hypothesis” or race to the bottom.11 When examined in a global context, existing research suggests that perhaps FDI, on average, is attracted to locations with higher levels of political and social stability associated with a higher regard for labor protection.12 However, Brown et al. go on to note that this conclusion is largely based on cross-sectional regression analysis and therefore may apply differently to individual countries.13 While existing labor standards and laws may or may not have an impact on FDI location decisions, decreased labor cost is one obvious benefit to investing in less-developed countries (LDCs). Workers can be paid less (in real dollars),

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and made to work longer hours without the same level of protection that exists in the developed world. The term “sweatshop” has become a media buzzword describing the type and quality of factories that pervade export processing zones (EPZs) and qualified industrial zones (QIZs). The prevalence of sweatshops and the publicity they receive in the mass media has had a negative impact on public perception of LDC working conditions. In many cases, this negative publicity is justified as diligent NGOs and corporate monitors seem to continuously uncover new stories of worker mistreatment. But, as this study will examine in further depth, not all sweatshops are created equally. The Impact of Sweatshops Sweatshops have become synonymous with the manufacturing sector in LDCs relying heavily on foreign investment and export markets. The term sweatshop carries implications of harsh working conditions, long hours, and low wages, especially when compared to a similar occupation in the developed world. However, there is some debate regarding the actual, rather than the relative, work-related benefits that foreign-invested sweatshops offer. On the one hand, theoretical arguments put forth by anti-sweatshop campaigns such as the student-led anti-sweatshop movement United Students Against Sweatshops maintain that capital-hungry MNCs exploit workers in LDCs through suppression of individual labor rights such as unpaid overtime and wages, unsafe working conditions, and the employment of children. Conversely, many economists contend that because multinational-owned sweatshop positions are often among the most sought after in underdeveloped economies and because in many cases they do provide better working conditions and higher wages than either their domestic counterparts or alternative means of employment, they should not be subject to boycott or import blockage.14 Primary claims of groups such as the Academic Consortium on International Trade (ACIT), a group of leading economists, entail that any effort to eliminate sweatshops and sweatshop labor will only serve to worsen the overall standard of living in developing world economies by diminishing the few relatively well-paying jobs available and reducing the other economic benefits often brought by FDI.15 However, in response to a letter generated by the ACIT to colleges and universities asking for a removal of a boycott on university logoed apparel made in sweatshops in LDCs, the Scholars Against Sweatshop Labor (SASL), a consortium of antisweatshop economists, political scientists, and sociologists, outlined a rebuttal primarily claiming that regardless of the relativity of better working conditions foreign-invested sweatshops can provide, this is not always the case and the focus should be on the overarching unacceptability of harsh working conditions in general, and how to improve them.16 Some economists support the SASL ideology,17 but the majority of empirical research on the impact of FDI on labor rights support the conclusions of the ACIT.18 Previously, much of the furor among academics, student groups, and trade unions regarding the negative impact of sweatshops on labor rights has focused on the unacceptable working conditions in sweatshops that manufacture


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garments, toys, footwear, and other labor-intensive low-technology items.19 The public outcry over the practices in these industries has caused the formation of groups such as the Fair Labor Organization, a consortium of garment, apparel, and footwear companies assembled to insure acceptable working conditions for laborers in LDCs. Additionally, the prevalence of these low-tech sweatshops and their seeming disregard for labor rights have generated a number of NGOs directed at identifying and monitoring these factories, in hopes that increased awareness will improve overall conditions. Because of this, the primary focus of public attention has historically been on the pervasiveness and proliferation of these low-tech labor-intensive sweatshops and their disregard for the labor rights of individual workers. The public has been inundated with images of underprivileged children from Southeast Asia and Latin America sewing soccer balls and wallets to feed the fires of global capitalism. Public campaigns directed against seemingly unscrupulous multinationals, and even celebrity endorsers such as Kathy Lee Gifford, are many, and in many cases have had noticeable effects regarding the establishment and implementation of labor and environmental corporate codes of conduct.20 However, sweatshops are not limited to the low-tech industries. The myriad of electronic gadgets and gizmos that dominate our lifestyles collectively employ multitudes of workers in vast assembly operations found in many labor-abundant LDCs.21 In foreign investment havens such as China, high-technology manufacturing in industries such as personal electronics, computers, semiconductors, and automobile accessories makes up the largest share of total foreign investment.22 The “Clean Up Your Computer” campaign launched by NGOs such as the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) suggests that sweatshop conditions do exist in high-tech sectors as well. This report includes testimony and first-hand observational accounts of excessive overtime, unpaid wages, unsafe working conditions, and extensive physical and psychological pressure occurring in manufacturing plants of suppliers and subsidiaries to major computer companies such as Dell, IBM, and Hewlett Packard. Until recently, the high-tech manufacturing operations have not been observed with the same tenacity as that of the low-tech manufacturing. In the words of a worker for an independent, nonprofit monitoring organization: The situation in garments and footwear is still nowhere near perfect, but there is certainly attention being paid to the issues. The truth is that the electronics sector is guilty of the same types of abuses, but labor practices in the industry have not been put under close scrutiny the way the garments and footwear sector have been.23

Although, there is evidence that the major players in the electronics and other capital-intensive manufacturing industries are making progress toward examination and implementation of corporate codes of conduct,24 as the pressures of globalization increase competition, so does the potential for worker abuse to increase profit margins and maintain competitive advantage. The prevalence of sweatshop conditions in both labor-intensive high-tech and low-tech sectors in LDC economies raises an important question: Is there

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a disparity among labor protection practices of high-tech and low-tech manufacturing? In order to further understand the implications and effects of both high-tech and low-tech manufacturing investments on host country workers, it is important to delineate what type of foreign investment is subject to the most systematic and widespread abuse and ensure that it receives ample attention in the public media, corporate boardrooms, and halls of government. From the perspective of LDCs, as the sectoral composition of investment changes, so too should its impact on labor protection. In other words, once LDC governments are more aware as to where the most labor abuses originate, it will help them to determine what types of investment to encourage and attract. Because the term sweatshop is so negatively stigmatized and given such a blanket application to most labor-oriented manufacturing, this definition is further needed. Variation in Labor Rights Protection in High-Tech Versus Low-Tech Industries With regard to this study, the terms “high-tech” and “low-tech” might be misleading, and thus need to be further defined. As mentioned earlier, a hightech sector refers to a sector such as electronics or semiconductors, whereas a low-tech sector designates sectors such as toys, footwear, textiles, and apparel. Though it can be inferred from their representative sectors, high-tech is to be understood as that which requires a significant amount of initial investment capital to open a new operation, employs the operation of high-tech machinery requiring a relatively more skilled labor force in the manufacturing process, and employs labor as a smaller portion of the operating budget. Conversely, the term low-tech implies that which lists labor as one of the highest expenses on the operating budget, and requires a less-skilled workforce to operate the manufacturing machinery. This section outlines several reasons why MNCs in high-tech sectors may offer better labor rights protection than those invested in low-tech sectors. Mobility Mobility, the ease with which a factory can change location of production, is inherently less in a high-tech, rather than in a low-tech, industry.25 In high-tech manufacturing, establishing and retaining a specific location is more desirable because of the high costs of moving, the relative size of the operation and investment required, the retention and support of a knowledgeable workforce, and access to local markets. High-technology operations are, by necessity, much more capital intensive. They require a substantially larger investment in the production facility, relative to labor-intensive manufacturing. With the initial investment in land, building, equipment, and materials, a high-tech factory cannot move the location of operations as easily or cheaply as a low-tech labor-intensive factory. If existing labor standards are high, new labor laws passed, or enforcement of existing laws increased, high-tech firms have a much greater incentive to devote resources to


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working with the employees and local government for any dispute resolutions rather than moving to an area of lower enforcement or lower standards. A location suitable to the needs of a high-tech factory, once established, cannot be casually dismissed. This suitability of location for high-tech operations is not dictated strictly by low labor costs as evidenced in many low-tech labor-intensive industries. Local market access is also a key consideration. As reported by the Office of the Third Industrial Census in 1997, exports accounted for 71.7 percent of the total sales of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in the garment and footwear industry. This is considerably higher than the 59.1 percent reported by the electronics/telecommunications industry. FIE sales as a percentage of total sales in the high-tech industry is also reported at a higher percentage, 60.8 percent, compared to 50.8 percent in the garment and footwear industries.26 Given the difference in the average amount of FDI and the total value of each industry in China, these percentages represent a much larger amount of capital for hightech industries. This data suggest that high-tech firms value local market access for distribution of their products more than low-tech firms, which are primarily concentrated in the export sector. The importance of this market access gives high-tech firms a greater incentive to treat their employees well to ensure they retain their workforce and establish a good relationship with the public and local government. Other costs associated with high-tech factory mobility include: The cost of dismantling and moving high-tech equipment, locating and training a new workforce in the operation of the production equipment, finding a building to suit the needs of the operation, and certain intangible costs such as reaffirmation of positive local brand recognition and development of sound relations with local host governments. The combination of these costs contributes to the much greater overhead for establishing production and manufacturing. Firms investing in high-tech production and research and design (e.g., semiconductors), rather than purely manufacturing (e.g., electronics), have an even greater incentive to remain immobile. The overhead costs of moving operations, in addition to the aforementioned costs, include the reestablishment of R&D facilities and workforce. The human capital in this industry is perhaps the greatest asset, and firms have a vested interest in treating their employees well to attract and retain a solid workforce. In comparison, firms investing in low-tech labor-intensive manufacturing (e.g. textiles, shoes, apparel, and toys) generally have much smaller operations in terms of capital investment. Consequently, they have a smaller stake in the location of their operations. Because labor costs are the largest single investment, these firms have a higher incentive to seek out areas of lowest possible labor costs, or areas where labor costs can be driven down. 27 As the previous data suggest, these firms are more export-oriented and, as a result, factory location and the maintenance of a positive relationship with the public and local government are of less importance. There is little investment in worker training and so establishing a new workforce, if necessary, to save on labor expenses, is financially more desirable.

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As stated, mobility is much greater in a labor-intensive sector. Firms can legitimately bargain and ultimately threaten employees with relocating operations if they, their labor representatives, or local governments become too demanding of higher wages, less overtime, or make attempts to unionize and collectively bargain. Firms have incentives to move repeatedly to take advantage of areas with less stringent enforcement of labor rights. Additionally, MNCs in low-tech industries should be more concerned with the overall cost of labor, as labor is often the largest budget expenditure.28 Conversely, because labor is often a much smaller percentage of the operating budget in high-technology sectors, firms have much less of an incentive to seek out areas of lower labor costs.29 Employee Training Aside from the employees who occupy obviously highly specialized positions, such as those involved in research, design, and management positions, the basic production-level employee in a high-tech manufacturing operation must have a working knowledge of the production equipment in order to produce and maintain the equipment efficiently. Therefore, an educated employee becomes a much more valuable commodity and high-tech firms will be more inclined to respect their welfare as opposed to a low-tech firm that views labor as financially expendable.30 Companies that, by nature of the work, must invest time and resources to train employees in the operation of equipment often give these employees a certain amount of leverage in bargaining for employment. Through their knowledge of the operations, these employees become more valuable not only to the company in which they are currently employed, but to any other company that maintains a similar operation. Thus they are less threatened by loss of work and are more able to unionize and collectively bargain for wages, hours, and healthy working conditions. Looking at individual labor rights, other theoretical considerations to support the hypothesis include child labor, discrimination, and wages. Child Labor and Discrimination Because young women (often under eighteen) and children traditionally work at a discounted rate, they are often employed in labor-intensive sectors. This is especially true for extremely impoverished areas where labor protection is minimal or nonexistent. In Bangladesh, for example, women make up 95 percent of the workers in the garment industry. Because of little prior experience in the formal economy and physical limitations, this demographic is also more prone to exploitation and abuse, both physical and sexual.31 While the difference in wage levels between young women and children might be indicative of a difference in skill and productivity levels, surveys show that plant managers often believe that young women can be paid less because they are more passive and docile than their male counterparts.32 This is further


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justified by the opinion that women and children represent a non-crucial supplement to family income, when in fact many of these workers are single, widowed, divorced, or orphaned. These issues are gratuitously perpetuated in the labor-intensive industry because of the desire for reduced labor expenses, vulnerability of the employees, and the ability to relocate to take advantage of low labor costs and standards.33 This is also evidenced through the extremely high percentage of women working in the garment industry. Wages The desire for retention of employees, once they have become specialized in a single task, gives employers a greater incentive to pay a higher wage. The average hourly wage, including benefits, for Chinese employees in the electronics and electrical machinery industry ranges from U.S.$0.69 to 3.37. In the textile, clothing, and footwear industries, it stands at $0.18.34 This discrepancy could be caused by the difference in skill level required for each industry, or the fact that much of the labor-intensive workforce is compiled of extremely poor migrant labor that have no choice but to accept low wages. Either way, both industries employ a substantial amount of blue-collar labor, and the drastic difference in average wages indicates that labor in more capital-intensive sectors enjoys a higher standard of treatment with regard to wages. The discussion presented here suggests that due to a lower level of mobility and employee training, multinationals in high-tech sectors are likely to provide a higher level of labor protection than those in low-tech ones. The following section provides an empirical examination of labor rights protection in two such industries in support of this contention. Measurement, Data, and Methodology Measures of Labor Rights Protection Collective labor rights are a distinct subset of the larger category of human rights, and not to be confused, as the latter encompasses civil and political rights, freedom of expression, the right to life and personal safety, as well as the rights of workers. We now turn to the specific violations addressed in this study, providing a working definition for each that builds on the international norms and conventions recognized (but not always practiced) by most members of the International Labor Organization (ILO). The definitions that follow are adopted through a comprehensive look at the relevant ILO conventions,35 laws enacted by the Chinese government,36 and a report for Congress entitled Workplace Codes of Conduct in China and Related Labor Conditions that uses a comparison of eleven codes of conduct: Four multi-stakeholder codes—SA8000 (Social Accountability International), the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), the Fair Labor Association (FLA), and the Worker Rights Consortium (for producers of collegiate logo garments); six company codes—Levi Strauss, Mattel, Nike, Reebok,

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Walt Disney, and Wal-Mart; and one industry code—the International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) Code of Business Practices. Heretofore, this code comparison will be referred to simply as “The Collective Corporate Code” (or CCC).37 The combination of these definitions will give a clear picture of Chinese corporate and international perspectives on individual labor standards. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining International Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 98 spell out the organization’s fundamental goals of guaranteeing workers’ freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. These conventions collectively outline the rights of workers to form independent unions free from discrimination or negative actions taken on the part of the employer, administration, or public authority. It recognizes the need for participation in union activities outside of working hours, and grants no authority to the employer for any type of retaliation for these activities. These conventions authorize unions to bargain and negotiate on behalf of the collective worker and to give the workers rights to protect themselves from violations in their collective labor rights. Although China has not officially ratified these ILO conventions, it has created its own regulation concerning union and assembly rights in the Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China.38 This law allows for the same rights specified in the ILO conventions with one key caveat. All individual trade unions in China are set up to be subject to the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a unified national organization that is designed to respect and fight for the rights of workers. Individual unions are set up on a number of levels, each with democratically elected officials that report to the ACTFU when there is a problem. The ACTFU then acts on behalf of the workers in negotiations. The submission to a centralized national union has created some controversy as to its effectiveness as a true representative of the workers. The Collective Corporate Code reiterates the principles found in the ILO conventions with regard to the rights of workers to associate into trade unions without fear of discrimination. The SA8000 code stipulates “where the law prohibits these freedoms, the employer shall facilitate the development of parallel means for independent and free association and bargaining.” Mattel and Reebok require that grievance procedures be established. Other company codes surveyed do not address these rights, or if they do, they state that workers may join any legally sanctioned labor organization, that is, the ACTFU. The Chinese labor law stipulates that collective contracts may be negotiated between enterprise management and enterprise trade unions or workers’ congresses, but these contracts generally apply to large state-owned enterprises and issues about pay, health, working hours, and welfare are largely nonnegotiable. Child Labor Child labor is an issue that tends to spark some controversy depending on where in the world it is being scrutinized. The elimination of child labor in agricultural and production-oriented industries in developing countries is unfortunately unrealistic. Given the level of poverty faced by some families,


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children have often become a vital source of income. Total elimination could, in some cases, push these children into less desirable occupations such as prostitution and begging, thereby propagating exactly what the ILO is trying to eliminate.39 The ILO convention on minimum age requirements states that the minimum age for eligible employment “shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling, and in any case, shall not be less than 15 years.” 40 The convention allows for countries with insufficiently developed educational systems and economies to specify a minimum age of fourteen. As is often the case, though, a low-cost public school system is often not a valid alternative. To further the development of eliminating child labor, in 1999 the ILO confirmed C182, The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention. This extends the scope of the minimum age convention to define precisely what acts a child under the age of 18 is not allowed to take part in, that is, the worst forms of child labor. Specifically, they include all forms of slavery, trafficking of children, prostitution, the drug trade, or any work that is deemed harmful to the health and safety of a child. It goes on to direct the participating countries to “design and implement programs of action to eliminate as a priority the worst forms of child labor.”41 As of 2005, China has ratified only C182, The Worst Forms of Child Labor. The language in this convention that is of most interest to this study is, specifically, the prohibition of any work that is deemed “likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children.” In industries such as electronics and apparel manufacturing children, if employed, would be exposed to chemicals, equipment, and often blocked fire exits that posed a direct threat to their health and safety. The ratification of this convention directly engages the Chinese government to take all necessary steps to ensure the elimination of this practice from not only Chinese production facilities, but also from foreign MNCs in SEZs as well. The Chinese Labor Act (1994) has an amendment that prohibits the employment of anyone under the age of sixteen. For anyone under the age of sixteen to even be eligible to be recruited for an activity of “literature, art, physical culture, sport, or special arts and crafts,” the recruiting institution must undergo the formalities of examination and approval according to the relevant provisions of the state, and provide a guarantee to maintain the compulsory education mandated in the constitution. The government constitutionally mandates a minimum of nine years for education. As is the case in much of the developing world, this is not always possible because of the excessive fees charged by public schools, and the familial reliance on children’s income. The corporate codes reviewed in the CCC place restrictions on minimum age ranging from fourteen to sixteen. Nike prohibits the employment of workers under the age of eighteen. All the codes include a provision that raises the standards if either the legal minimum age or age for completing compulsory education is higher. Mattel and Reebok’s codes stipulate that identity documents must be thoroughly checked, and Mattel and The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) require that employees under the age of eighteen be exempt from hazardous duties.

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Working Hours and a Minimum Wage Working hours and minimum wage violations are recorded in the same section, due to the “cash standard” nature, and the fact that they often occur simultaneously.42 A general disregard for one, in many cases, perpetuates a disregard for the other. It is often found that by virtue of choice or necessity, the low-income, typically migrant worker sacrifices the payment of a minimum wage and must work as much overtime as possible to earn a sustainable living income. The fact that overtime is being worked also does not assure that he or she will be justly compensated for this overtime with an increase in pay. Working Hours The issue of weekly rest (i.e., the amount of personal time a worker is given per week) is squarely established and approved by the ILO, the Chinese government, the CCC, and the majority of corporate codes of conduct. The ILO established in its C14 Weekly Rest Convention (1921) that the maximum amount of time a worker is eligible to work without overtime is eight hours a day, or forty-eight hours a week. This convention specifies that the period of rest should be at least twenty-four consecutive hours during a sevenday work week, and that the weekly rest days should, whenever possible, coincide with the days established as customary by the county or district. China’s Labor Act limits normal working hours to no more than forty-four per week on average, with the normal working day being restricted to eight hours.43 Overtime is set at 150 percent of wages on normal working days, 200 percent on rest days, and 300 percent on annual holidays.44 It guarantees at least one day off per week, and arranges holidays around a fixed schedule of festivals. There are, however, a number of clauses in this labor law that allow management to extend working hours as long as the trade union or workforce has been “consulted.”45 The maximum extension of a workday is set at no more than three hours a day, or thirty-six hours a month, but Article 39 also states that “Where an enterprise cannot follow the stipulations in Section 36 and Section 38 of this Law due to its special production nature, it may adopt other rules on working hours and rest with the approval of the labor administrative department.”46 This obviously creates a large loophole in the law that could allow employers to take liberties with the amount of work an employee does in a given week. Many labor codes in the CCC prescribe a maximum of sixty hours per week, including forty-eight hours of regular work, with twelve hours of voluntary overtime or the legal maximum, whichever is lower. The SA8000 code allows mandatory overtime only if it is part of a collective agreement. All require one day off per week. Some of the codes apply restrictions to the standards “on a regular basis” as opposed to “unconditionally,” while others provide an exception to the standards under “extraordinary circumstances.” Mattel, Wal-Mart, and the International Council of Toy Industries allow for local laws to take precedence. Minimum Wage Currently there is no global standard for minimum wages in a production- oriented industry. Noted FDI scholar Theodore Moran argues that a global minimum wage could potentially cause economic catastrophes in the poorest countries with the lowest skilled workers by depriving them of the


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ability to use cheap labor as a bargaining tool when seeking investment by foreign MNCs. 47 It could also cause industries with a high cost of labor to move operations to areas of higher productivity or areas where other costs, such as shipping or resource location, would reduce the overall cost of doing business. This would deprive many poor developing countries of much needed economic investment and leave many unemployed. Thus, minimum wages have been left to the individual countries to decide. Chinese law defines “minimum wage” as the “minimum remuneration that the enterprise where a worker is employed must pay for the regular work by the worker within the prescribed working time.”48 The law stipulates that each individual employing unit shall determine its form of wage distribution and wage level according to the law and based on the characteristics of production, business, and economic results (Article 47). The law specifically states that “the State shall implement a system of guaranteed minimum wages, the definition of which will be placed under the discretion of the people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government, to be reported to the State Council” (Article 48). When determining the actual amount and potential readjustment of the minimum wage standard, the regional government has a set of standards it must comprehensively reference. The standards include: “1) the lowest living expenses of laborers themselves and the average family members they support; 2) the average wage level of the society as a whole; 3) labor productivity; 4) the situation of employment; and 5) different levels of economic development between regions” (Article 49). Lastly, Article 50 directs that wages be paid monthly, in the form of currency, and to laborers without unjustified deduction or delay. The comprehensive nature of Chinese wage laws suggests that wage controls are strictly regulated. The majority of the codes surveyed in the CCC stipulate wage levels to comply with local laws or match “prevailing industry standards.” Some multistakeholder codes such as the SA8000, ETI, and WRC include “basic needs” or “living wage clauses.” Some codes require companies to provide written pay policies to employees and keep accurate records of wages paid for each pay period. Some codes require the payment of “premium rates” for overtime, a prohibition of disciplinary deductions and withholdings, and allowance for “reasonable” deductions for housing and food. Health and Safety of Workplace Currently, there are no ILO conventions that specifically outline a set of standards pertaining to a safe workplace. While inclusion of this into the ILO “core standards” seems logical, there are difficulties involved with implementation. The fundamental goal of protecting the health and safety of the worker through a few specific practices including, but not limited to, not blocking fire exits, proper storage and disposal of hazardous waste, proper equipment to shield the worker from this waste, and appropriate training to handle complicated equipment and materials should be straightforward. But the question arises as to how to specifically establish a list of prohibited practices while accounting for

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the fact that building codes, zoning laws, and production practices vary considerably across regions and countries. The criteria for violations have too many variables to be simple. Thus no such list exists, and health and safety conditions are not usually included in a list of core standards. Chapter VI of the Chinese Labor Law (1994) stipulates that the employer “establish and perfect the system for occupational safety and health, strictly implement the rules and standards of the State on occupational safety and health, educate laborers on occupational safety and health, prevent accidents in the process of work, and reduce occupational hazards” (Article 52). It goes on to mandate that employers provide health exams for those in a hazardous line of work (Article 54), provide training and qualifications for those engaged in specialized operations (Article 55), and give the workers the right to refuse to operate if the employer is in violation of these rules. Issues covered by the corporate codes in the CCC pertain to the work environment, housing and dining areas, hazardous materials management, sanitation, fire prevention practices, and potable drinking water. The CCC refers to the local and national laws for definition of specific violations. Some industrial codes include safety switches on some of the equipment, health and safety training, first aid, regulations for exits, space, lighting, ventilation, temperature, and noise. Some codes even designate health and safety professionals to be stationed on the shop floor.49 Methodology Data on specific labor violations, as one might imagine, are not readily available, especially as China works diligently to defend its image as a model country for the reception of FDI and trade liberalization. The country’s recent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and ratification of key covenants of the ILO places it in a position of greater scrutiny under the microscope of the developed world and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and WTO. For this reason, we choose to rely solely on various monitoring organizations such as NGOs, corporate auditors, and international news sources for information on specific violations. We have compiled a list of all available NGOs involved in human and labor rights working in the region and reported all the violations found in the records of each one that pertain to the industries being examined. This data will be supplemented through an examination of the reports of relevant news sources, when data does not conflict. The specific labor violations are categorized in appendix D. Once the violations are placed in their respective category, they are then weighted based on their severity. The weighting system for individual violations is also clearly outlined in appendix D. After the violations are weighted and categorized, the results are presented in appendix A. Some of the categories of labor violations (e.g., freedom of association/collective bargaining, and worker health and safety) are broad and therefore will have subheadings under each that further specify exactly what type of violation is occurring. The methodology and template


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provided are loosely based on similar measures from Kucera.50 In determining a labor violation, we will rely solely on the tripartite definitions of violations provided in the previous section. As stated, these violations represent a cross-section of all types of labor violations. They represent both the core standards outlined by the ILO and “cash standards,” violations of a monetary nature. Results As evidenced in appendix A, the NGO Internet survey found that labor violations, especially those of a monetary nature, are more common in labor-intensive low-tech manufacturing versus labor-intensive high-tech manufacturing. Potential explanations for this variation include an increased amount of public scrutiny placed on the low-tech labor-intensive sector and the fact that low-tech manufacturing has traditionally been a major employer in the Chinese economy. Minimum wage and overtime violations were found to be dramatically more prevalent in the low-tech sector. They most often occur simultaneously. From all reports read, including unspecified reports not included in this study, violations of maximum overtime laws seem to be the most rampant and widespread problem among all of China’s labor-oriented production industries. Considering the “cash standard” nature of overtime violations, it is expected that they would follow hand in hand with minimum wage violations, and most often they do. Freedom of association and collective bargaining violations were not reported as often as expected. There were many reports of jailing those convicted of attempted independent union organization, but those were not included, as they did not pertain to the sector-specific research. When incidents of suppression of union organization by employers did occur, it was often due to the ignorance of the worker about his or her rights in engaging in union activity, or equally as common, a lack of any type of employment contract or enforcement of such. In many instances, workers reported that they had been promised a contractual arrangement upon employment, but had never witnessed any actual indication of this occurring, or any evidence of contractual obligations respected by the employer. These incidents seemed to occur equally as often in both industries. Incidents of child labor in both industries were relatively low with each only having one report of underage workers employed. This result was expected considering the existence of Chinese child labor laws, and the high rate of internal corporate monitoring for such. In most of the incidents of child labor, children were discovered using false identification and subsequently fired. Only in a few cases was it found that the employer generally disregarded all child labor laws and employed children with no papers. Although child labor definitely exists in China, it is not often associated with foreign investment in the two industries examined. It is very common in agricultural endeavors and other industries such as mining. Due to the fact that most rural schools receive no funding, and cannot “legally” charge fees for attendance, many, by virtue of necessity, resort to factory-like conditions in order to stay open. That is, they often employ

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children to work in manufacturing of labor-intensive products such as leather goods or fireworks. Incidents of health and safety violations were proportionally higher in the high-tech sectors. As shown by the graph in appendix A, these violations were the most commonly reported in this sector. Due to the labor-intensive and sometimes dangerous work done in the footwear, textile, and clothing, it was anticipated that the numbers would at least be proportionally equal; however, this was not the case. Electronics and semiconductor manufacturing has a high incidence of exposure to harsh chemicals and toxic substances that are harmful to the health of employees. Evidence of employees breathing in disruptive particles, especially in areas where metal is ground to assemble electronic components, was very common. Another extremely common violation was lack of adequate employee training in the safe operation of the equipment. In one extensive report, “Clean Up Your Computer,” all of these health and safety violations were reported in great detail, with the mention of no employee health and safety training.51 Incidents of worker deaths were more often reported in labor-intensive lowtech industries, usually due to a blocked fire escape that prevented the exit of workers from a burning factory. It should also be noted that the majority of worker injuries and industrial accidents occurred because of worker exhaustion. This is to be expected considering the rampant occurrence of overtime violations. Reports of laborers working eleven- and twelve-hour days, six–seven days a week were not uncommon. Though we did not include it in this study, it should be noted that incidents of sexual discrimination were equally common in both industries. Women most often made up the vast majority of the workforce, and in some cases constituted 100 percent of the blue-collar workforce. This might be indicative of Chinese manufacturing managements’ desire for submissive employees, that is, those that are easily harassed and mistreated, or those that are not as prone to strike. Because men usually fill the management positions, they might also have a much higher rate of promotion. Only in labor positions where physical strength was essential were men found to be predominantly employed. Conclusion Although this study is by no means conclusive, the underlying logic is important in further understanding the relationship between foreign investment and labor protection, and the bigger picture of realizing the underlying relationships facilitated through globalization. A more conclusive look into variations among foreign-invested enterprise with regard to labor protection would bolster the conclusions As stated, it is important to determine how and why there are more violations in one sector as against another. This information could help MNCs interested in investing to analyze the sectoral composition of a particular country when determining the overall health and treatment of workers. Citizens of corporations considering investments in MNC equity might take this into


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account in determining whom and what to invest in. It might also increase the desire of foreign governments to attract capital-intensive FDI or prompt host governments with much labor-intensive industry to increase monitoring of MNC behavior in low-tech industries.

Appendix A: Labor Rights Violations by Industry*

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 High-tech industries

Low-tech industries

Minimum Wage and Overtime Worker Health and Safety Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Child Labor *Based on weighted data in appendix D.

Appendix B: Human Rights and Labor Rights NGOs Used to Record Labor Violations 1. Clean Clothes Campaign 2. Chinese Human Rights Reader 3. National Labor Committee 4. China Labor Watch 5. China Labor Bulletin 6. Human Rights in China 7. Labor Rights Now 8. Cafod 9. Fair Labor Association 10. Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee 11. International Labor Rights Fund

www.cleanclothes.org www.Chinesehumanrightsreader.org www.nlcnet.org www.chinalaborwatch.org www.chinalabour.org.hk/public/main www.hrichina.org www.laborrightsnow.org www.cafod.org www.fairlabor.org www.cic.org.hk www.laborrights.org

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Links to Internet Articles 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/nike00-04.htm http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/adidas27-6-98.htm http://www.cleanclothes.org/campaign/liwa99-11-3.htm http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/china.PDF http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/03-10-China-pilot-report.pdf http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/00-10-02.htm http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/disneychart.PDF http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/bom.PDF http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/disney01-01-18.htm http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/fila.htm http://www.nlcnet.org/live/reports.php?id5110 http://www.nlcnet.org/live/reports.php?id5101 http://chinalaborwatch.org/newbalance.pdf?article_id550306 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upload/Wal-MartLungcheongReport.pdf http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file5/c/a/2006/07/16/ MNGAFK06MI1.DTL&type5tech http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/Letter%20From%20LQ%20Shoe% 20 Factory.htm http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/2006%20Editorials/07-27-2006% 20Labor%20Riot%20in%20Dongguan.htm http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/2006%20Editorials/07-27-2006% 20Labor%20Riot%20in%20Dongguan.htm http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/Urgent%20Action%20Kingmake.htm? article_id550271 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upload/kingmakerreport.pdf ? article_id550286 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/Five%20Protestors%20Convicted.htm? article_id550212 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/Pumas%20Workers%20Olympic%20Style. htm?article_id550004 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/en/web/article.php?article_id550009 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/en/web/article.php?article_id550010 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/en/web/article.php?article_id550008 http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/en/web/article.php?article_id550234 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A22507-2004Feb7? language5printer http://www.hrichina.org/fs/downloadables/pdf/downloadableresources/ToyStory4.2004.pdf ?revision_id519251 http://www.cic.org.hk/download/CIC%20Toy%20Report%20Web% 20eng.pdf http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/Electronics%20Firm%20SCMP.htm? article_id550231 http://www.csr-asia.com/index.php?p54625


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32. http://www.amrc.org.hk/alu/Alu39/013906.html 33. http://www.cafod.org.uk/get_involved/campaigning/clean_up_your_ computer/labour_rights_in_china 34. http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/en/web/article.php?article_id550008 35. http://www.asianweek.com/2001_07_20/feature_hitechsweatshops.html

Appendix C: Factory Listing Low-Tech Factories 1. Heng Yu Garment Factory 2. Yue Yen Shoe Factory 6 3. Yue Yen Shoe Factory 7 4. Yue Yen Shoe Factory 1 5. Yue Yen Shoe Factory 2 6. Wei Lei Textile Ltd. 7. Tong Ji Shoes 8. Shi Sheng Garment Factory 9. Keng Tau Handbag Factory 10. Guan Ho Sporting Goods 11. Cheong Yip Sports Products 12. Guanzhou Taiyang Sports Goods Co. Ltd. 13. Chun Si Factory 14. Huang Wu # 2 15. Pou Yen Plant F 16. Li Kai Factory # 5 17. Li Kai Di Chang

18. Lungcheong Toy Factory 19. Xing Yue Toy Factory 20. Mei Xing Shoe Factory 21. Hengli Factory 22. Stella Factory 23. Zhill Toy Factory 24. Haulin Garment Manufacturing Co. 25. Hangyi Shoe Co. 26. Guangdong Shoe Co. 27. Chang Deng Shoe Factory 28. Yong Rong Footwear 29. Gang Tai Footwear 30. Bao Yuan Footwear 31. Sang Yuan Junde Moulding Factory 32. Dongguan Elegent Top Shoes Co. 33. Xin Xing Footwea

High-Tech Factories 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Foxconn Electronics Shenzen Baoan Fenda Industrial Computime Wanheng Electronics and Technology Jinao Electronics Chengbo Digital Technology Development Flextronics LTD.

Unspecified suppliers for 8. Dell 9. IBM 10. Hewlitt-Packard 11. Merton Co. Ltd.

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Appendix D: Labor Violations Categorical Template

Labor violation and assigned weight of violation

Electronics, electronic components, semiconductors

Footwear, textiles, garments, toys

Actual

Weighted

Actual

Weighted

2 1 1

2 1 1

Freedom of association/collective bargaining (all violations weighted 1) False or nonexistent employment contracts Prohibition on union membership Afraid of joining, or no knowledge of union existence False or no union representation

1 0 1

1 0 1

1

1

0

0

Total

3

3

4

4

3 3 4

6 6 8

2 6 6

4 12 12

3 1 6 0 2 0

6 2 12 0 4 0

6 1 4 1 5 0

12 2 8 2 10 0

22

44

31

62

5 2 0 3 5 0 1

5 2 0 3 5 0 1

16 6 8 11 16 5 2

16 6 16 11 16 10 2

16

16

64

77

Child labor (all violations weighted 2) Employment of children, including the utilization of false documentation

1

2

1

2

Total

1

2

1

2

Worker health and safety (all violations weighted 2) Excess safety hazards Exposure to hazardous substances, toxic waste Instances of no worker training when working in hazardous conditions Industrial accidents Worker deaths (including suicide) Worker injuries Invasive or discriminatory body searches Working to the point of exhaustion Physical or sexual harassment Total Overtime/wages (violation weight varies) Excessive overtime ⫽ 1 Excessive fines ⫽ 1 Withholding of wages ⫽ 2 Unpaid or excessively low overtime wages ⫽ 1 Minimum wage violations ⫽ 1 Unpaid wages ⫽ 2 Withholding or refusal of employee contracts ⫽ 1 Total

Notes 1. Anita Chan and Robert J. S. Ross, “Racing to the Bottom: International Trade without a Social Clause,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 6, 2003, pp. 1011–1028. 2. For studies that assess the role of FDI on labor rights protection, see, e.g., Layna Mosley and Saika Uno, “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights,” University of North Carolina, working


3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

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paper; David Kucera, “Core Labour Standards and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Labour Review, Vol. 141, No. 1–2, 2002, pp. 31–69. Office of the Third Industrial Census, cited in Yasheng Huang, Selling China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). CIA World Fact Book website, available at ⬍http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/geos/ch.html⬎. Daniel W. Drezner, “Globalization and Policy Convergence,” International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2001, pp. 53–78. Jay Mazur, “Labor’s New Internationalism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2000, pp. 79–93. OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing Costs, Paris, 2002; Jay Mandle, Globalization and the Poor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Mosley and Uno, “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top?” David Kucera, “The Effects of Core Worker’s Rights on Labour Costs and Foreign Direct Investment: Evaluating the ‘Conventional Widsom,’” Decent Work Research Programme EP/130/2001, International Labour Organization. OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour: A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and International Trade, Paris, 1996. See Dani Rodrik, “Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About Them?” in eds. Robert Lawrence, Dani Rodrik, and John Whalley, Emerging Agenda for Global Trade: High Stakes for Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1996), pp. 35–79; Kucera (2001). Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stearn, “The Effects on Multinational Production on Wages and Working Conditions in Developing Countries,” NBER working paper 9669, 2003. Ibid. Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization; Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman, “White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy,” NBER working paper 8102, 2001; Paul Krugman, “In Praise of CheapLabor,” Slate Magazine Online, 1997, http://www.slate.com/ toolbar.aspx?action⫽print&id⫽1918; Walter E. Williams, “Sweatshop Exploitations,” 2004, available at ⬍http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/wew/ articles/04/sweatshop.html⬎. Academic Consortium on International Trade (ACIT), Anti-sweatshop Letter, 2000, available at ⬍http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/acit/Documents/AntiSweatshopLetterPage.html⬎. Scholars Against Sweatshop Labor (SASL), 2001, available at ⬍http: www.umass.edu/peri/sasl/petition.htm⬎. John Miller, “Why Economists Are Wrong About Sweatshops and the AntiSweatshop Movement,” Challenge, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2003, pp. 93–122. Brown, Deardorff, Stern (2003); Benjamin Powell and David Skarbeck, “Sweatshops and Third World Living Standards: Are the Jobs Worth the Sweat?,” Independent Institute Working Paper #53, 2004; Mosley and Uno, “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top?” For more information on garment and apparel sweatshop boycotts, see ⬍http://www.studentsagainstsweatshops.org⬎. See Michael A. Santoro, “Beyond Codes of Conduct and Monitoring: An Organizational Integrity Approach to Global Labor Practices,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2003, pp. 407–424.

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21. See Katherine Astill and Matthew Griffith, “Clean Up Your Computer,” 2004, written through CAFOD, available at ⬍http://72.14.203.104/search?q⫽cache:8Qt QO9fzHkMJ:www.cafod.org.uk/var/storage/original/application/phpYyhizc.pdf⫹ Clean⫹up⫹your⫹computer&hl⫽en⬎. 22. Huang, Selling China. 23. Cited in Astill and Griffin, “Clean Up Your Computer.” 24. Peter Burrows, “Stalking High-Tech Sweatshops,” Business Week Online, 2006, available at ⬍http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_25/ b3989077.htm⬎. 25. On this point, see Mandle, Globalization and the Poor; John H. Mutti, Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Competition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003). 26. Office of the Third Industrial Census (1997), cited in Huang, Selling China. 27. See Elliott and Freeman, “White Hats or Don Quixotes?”; Stephen Herzenberg, “In from the Margins: Morality, Economics and International Labor Rights,” in eds. Lance A. Compa and Stephen F. Diamond, Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), pp. 99–117. 28. Fabrice Hatem, International Investment: Towards the Year 2002 (Paris: United Nations/Invest in France Bureau, 1998); Peter Nunnenkamp and Julius Spatz, “Determinants of FDI in Developing Countries: Has Globalization Changed the Rules of the Game?,” Transnational Corporations, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2002, pp. 1–34. 29. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Debora L. Spar, “Foreign Investment and Human Rights,” Challenge, Vol. 42, 1999, pp. 55–67. 30. Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism; Theodore H. Moran, Beyond Sweatshops: Foreign Direct Investment and Globalization in Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002); Spar, “Foreign Investment and Human Rights.” 31. Moran, Beyond Sweatshops. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Huang, Selling China, notes that wages include all benefits. 35. For information on all ILO conventions mentioned in this study (including China), see ILOLEX @ ⬍http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/cprofiles/chinaE.htm⬎. 36. For information on all Chinese Laws mentioned in this study, see NATLEX @ ⬍http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.country?p_lang⫽en&p_country⫽ CHN⬎. 37. For information contained in the CCC listings, see Thomas Lum, “Workplace Codes of Conduct in China and Related Labor Conditions,” report for Congress, Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2003. 38. Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1994 and 2001. 39. Moran, Beyond Sweatshops. 40. ILO C138: Convention on Minimum Wages, Article 2, 1973. 41. ILO C182: Worst forms of Child Labor Convention, Article 6, 1999. 42. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003). 43. See Article 36 of China’s Labor Act, International Labor Organization, 1994, available at ⬍http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home?p_lang⫽en⬎.

Foreign Direct Investment and Labor Rights 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

See Article 44 of China’s Labor Act. See Article 41 of China’s Labor Act. See Article 39 of China’s Labor Act. Moran, Beyond Sweatshops. See Article 47 of China’s Labor Act. Lum, “Workplace Codes of Conduct.” Kucera (2002). Astill and Griffith, “Clean Up Your Computer.”

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CHAPTER 5

Political Dynamics of Mixed Economic Formation in China Guangbin Yang

Introduction In China’s economic transition, the government has been doing its best to encourage institutional innovations and protect efficient property rights; meanwhile, it also tries to protect the administrative monopoly, which has brought about negative effects for market-oriented reforms. The dilemma tests Douglas North’s state theory that the state seeks maximization of ruling rent as well as social production, and that this conflict directly checks economic growth. Further marketization reduces the conflict and strengthens national competition with the competition coming from efficient property. The policies of the state are diversified during its transition from a planned to a market economy. Usually we can see that the state pushes hard on market building while politically protecting certain economic actors, which retards the marketization process and makes it ineffective in tackling problems presented in the economic transition. What should we do to deal with this duality of the state’s behavior? Any behavior of a state—economical or social—is politically oriented. The aim of this chapter is to interpret the economic behavior of the state from a political–economic perspective, analyze its marketization conduct and the politicalization of its economic policy, give an institutional explanation of the duality of the state’s behavior, and recommend the institutional base of the state’s competitiveness. Government as an Impelling Force in the Market Economy Government plays a vital role in promoting the market economy, which has been fully demonstrated in more than twenty years of economic transition.

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The reason for the government doing this is evident—the state that controlled all the economic resources under the inefficient planned economy institution was not necessarily powerful. What is more, the difficulty in obtaining authority and legitimacy by virtue of this inefficiency endangers the state’s power. The state seeks maximization of ruling rent as well as social production, and will definitely conduct reform as long as the planned economy cannot breed any more rent and endanger the national security. While reforming, the government will always play the leading role in establishing market economy. Legitimize the “Market Economy” What kind of economic institution should be chosen in order to compromise the interests of all ranks and classes? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has finally accepted a market economy after a decade of experimentation. More than a decade of economic practice in China, together with several hundred years of experience of Western countries, demonstrated that only a market economy could lead to the maximization of social production. However, it is a painful process to choose a market economy. This is fully shown through the interest conflicts of different groups, in the form of ideological debates. This is due to the market economy being deemed a shaking force of the traditional economic institution on which the national power was based. If the CCP fails to permit its power structure, which is determined by its economy and politics, to keep abreast with people’s demands and the international environment, its regime could be severely shaken. How can the party expect its basic interests to be realized without its ruling position? Nevertheless, the adoption of a market economy to make the maximum of the social production (namely, the great development of an unpublic economy), albeit inconsistent with the traditional power structure, whose foundation is a planned economy, does not necessarily presage contradictions of different interests. After all, the maximization of social production implies more resources that the government can absorb and utilize. Although the market economy is unparalleled with the existing state power structure, it does offset the production shortage of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) on which the power structure has been based. A win-win situation between state and society had been created with the adoption of a market economy. Market choice, reflecting the fundamental national interest, could be considered as a strategy of “benefits max, cost minimum,” in contrast with the outcome of the traditional national power structure. The central government is irreplaceable in defining what the fundamental national interests are. Local governments speak for local people and bureaus for their departmental benefits, while senators speak for their electorate. Positions determine interests and ideas, which is a general rule. As the only one representing national interests, the central government is responsible for starting the market economy for the sake of national interests. The process of China’s economic reform showed that Chinese leaders are clearly market-oriented and finally brought the market institution into the constitution reflecting the national order. Amendments to the PRC

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Constitution in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004 have gradually granted the legitimacy of the “Market Economy.” Decentralization and Interest Concessions The central government launched its power decentralization and interest concessions on a large scale in the early 1980s in an effort to expedite China’s marketization. In fact, it was not simply an administrative decentralization, but a process by which the local governments gained their autonomy in governing the public economy and deciding what kind of economic institutions to adopt. By doing so, the government has greatly enhanced the marketization process, during which the autonomy accorded by the central government to the local governments has been partly intercepted by the departments owning or governing the enterprises. It was due to the existence of institutional barriers between different departments and regions. The decentralized power and conceded interests from the central government have been taken by either the “departments” or the “regions.” What makes the difference is that the local governments, under the drive of interests, would conduct institutional innovations according to their individual situations with the power they gained. The “Sunan Model,” created in Jiangsu Province, the “Wen Zhou Model” in Zhejiang Province, and the “Foreign Joint Venture Model” in Guangdong Province were successful examples of the local governments’ creativity, which are actually innovations in property right institutions or the legitimization of non-state-owned property rights. Thus, the central government and the local governments are compatible in their marketization efforts while the local governments are greatly motivated by the decentralization of power from the central government. Practical Measures in Expediting Market Economy The great endeavor in starting and prompting the market reform made by the central government can be detected from its promulgation of the “Decision on Economic Institution Reform” in 1984 and the “Resolution on Some Important Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of the SOEs” in 1999. As stated in the latter document, “a Corporation with its Corporate Governance Structure (CGS) is an effective organization of the modern enterprise system. The stockholder’s conference, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the manager should each play its proper role in order to build up an effective CGS.” To implement the CGS in China is difficult in the absence of corresponding property rights reform, which functions well in the West. According to the “Corporation Law of PRC,” only the owner can make a final decision; the directorate, who should vindicate the stockholder’s rights, makes decisions regarding the company’s objectives and operations, engages the manager, and evaluates the achievements made by the manager. The supervisor’s board is responsible for overseeing the company’s finances and the conduct of its managers and directors. However, in practice, these regulations are not observable because of

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the functional mixture of government and enterprises. Who owns the SOE? Literally, it should be the state or governments of all ranks. But the state as an owner is just an abstract conception in people’s minds, while the actual owner is the directorate whose members are nominated by the chairman. The directors and the supervisors are the underlings of the chairman of the board, which make the supervisor’s board functionless. Accordingly, the directorate is, in fact, responsible for itself instead of the owners. Therefore, it is impossible to establish effective CGSs under the institution of mixed functions between government and enterprise. More than twenty years’ reform proclaims that the central government as the supporter of the market economy has played a dominant role in propelling the institutional reform.1 However, the central government has been confronted with a series of obstacles. The state tries not to offend the powerful political forces that may threaten the power, and instead accepts inefficient property structures.2 Policies inconsistent with the market logic are then inevitable. Government as a Protector of State-Owned Enterprises Immediately after the victory of the revolution led by the CCP, a new national economic framework was established by force. The CCP then improved its political power fabric and created the new economic institution under the political control at the end. Consequently, the planned economy was in fact an outcome resulting from exogenous factors rather than endogenous ones. On the surface, there was a high degree of political and economical integration, and the economy served as the foundation of the highly centralized power of the government. But, in fact, the political power overrode the economic institution or, in other words, politics dominated the economy. The SOEs as a supportive force of the state power were always favored by the central government. Unfortunately, inefficiencies that traditionally existed in the SOEs led to the declination of the public industrial sector after the launch of the Open and Reform Policy. The SOEs are losing their traditional field to the non-SOEs, which are now booming. For example, the non-SOEs have already contributed 51.7 percent of the total GDP in 2000.3 As a result, the government’s policies are always in favor of the SOEs. First, SOEs are not allowed to go bankrupt and are even subsidized by the government. Seldom have any SOEs, especially the large ones, declared bankruptcy since the promulgation of the “Law for Bankruptcy” in 1985, which is considered a political question rather than simply a market activity. The actual owners of various SOEs are different departments of the government, and they would spare no effort to sustain the enterprises they have in order to protect the departmental interests. None of the departments would like to see the unemployment and the social instability caused by the bankruptcy of the SOEs, which would definitely threaten their positions and, even more, shake the foundation of state power. Thus, hundreds of millions in public revenue from the country flew into the SOEs as subsidies every single year.

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Second, besides the subsidies they got from the government, the SOEs also seized, with the government’s permission, the exclusive rights of being able to wiggle out of their plight. Because of the finite capacity of the security market and limited access to it, the government had to introduce a policy of rationing. However, the government explicitly excluded the non-SOEs when allocating those shares. The “Notice on favoring the listing of large and medium-sized state owned enterprises,” issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1998, points out that “besides the 512 central owned enterprises, the local governments should put the other 512 SOEs affiliated with the central government as their priority when they recommend the planned enterprises in order to support the reform and development of the SOEs.” That means companies that are most qualified and most in need may not have access to the securities market, which leads to the wasting of resources. The administrative distribution system has granted stock market access to departments, which did not have an efficient enterprise or even an enterprise at all. The local governments and their branches drove their inefficient enterprises to the securities market once they got their access ration, which made the market a trap to the stockholders and therefore caused stock-market stagnancy. To be listed on the stock market as a limited resource is also what the non-SOEs court, though it was impossible for them to get any chance of access under the planned economy. Many privately owned companies consequently managed to be listed through successful acquisition of shell corporations. Public Shells Offerings (PSO) also exist in the West, but shells themselves are valueless. However, in China, to buy a shell is to add transaction costs. First, “shells” as scarce resources have their prices. That is why the final purchasing price of a shell company is always higher than its real equity. The price for a shell is estimated to be about thirty million yuan,4 which can be considered an extra income that an SOE is licensed to list. The government’s discriminating policy indicates the paradox in its aim when half of the GDP is contributed by the non-SOEs. Meanwhile, being convinced that listings of the efficient non-SOEs will definitely bring an increase to the national revenue, the government decided, as the U.S. government did, to open a second stock market for private high-tech companies. Nevertheless, the second stock market is not coming, although it is earnestly expected by the public. Explanations are various. In this author’s opinion, it is because the capital will flow on a large scale from the main market where the inefficient SOEs dominate to the second market once it opens, which will make the situation worse for the SOEs. There are significant differences between these two markets. First, most of the SOEs listed on the main market from the government’s administrative orders do not necessarily have good performances, while the private companies have to strive to be listed on the second market with their achievements and prosperity. Second, legal person shares accounting for 70 percent of the total in the main market are not allowed to circulate, while the same restriction does not exist on the second one. It is easy therefore to predict investors’ rational choices.

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Finally, owned by the state, banks have to lend most of their capital to the SOEs, regardless of the risks presented. The SOEs obtain financial resources through steady loans from state-owned banks while losing their market share in competition with other enterprises. In other words, the SOEs of inefficiency are absorbing the national economic resources for their survival. The protection from the government over the SOEs calls for plenty of resources in order to be sustainable, and this is why the government would like to encourage the development of non-SOEs, which contribute more to the national economy. Thus, a paradox emerges automatically—on the one hand, the government protects or at least does no harm to the SOEs of low efficiency; on the other hand, it tries to legitimize the non-SOEs of efficiency through constant revisions of the constitution. How to explain this dilemma? An Explanation to the Dilemma A lot of things need to be reinterpreted concerning state power in the process of China’s economic transition. The following problems have been brought out by the earlier discussion: When non-SOEs develop on an unprecedented scale, accounting for half of the national income and receive the permission or promotion of the government, they are still simply the overtone of the given power structure, while SOEs with low efficiency that have closer relations with the structure are protected by the state. From an historical materialism’s point of view, the rapid growth of the nonstate-owned economy and the low efficiency of the state-owned economy illustrates that the present power structure hinders economic development, and it is necessary to have a political structure reform in order to accelerate economic growth in China. However, the confusing point is that China’s economy is currently growing rapidly even with the problems of political monopolization, low efficiency, and the high cost of transaction fees created by the given power structure. It is obvious that traditional theories about the relationship between politics and the economy cannot be applied here. Maybe we can get some inspiration from Douglass North’s theory of the state. Meanwhile, we will also see that the unique relationship between politics and the economy in the process of China’s economic transition makes China a special case. According to North, in the process of formation of property rights, the fundamental responsibility of the state is to make the rules of the game in order first to maximize ruling rent and reduce transaction fees that will have the maximization of social production. This will provide a lot of public or semi-public services to reduce the fees used to define or negotiate the basic contract. 5 It seems that these two aims are inconsistent with each other, because the increase in taxes will facilitate the state’s governing. However, North’s review of economic history shows us that those two aims are not completely inconsistent. The second one includes an efficient property structure that will maximize the social production, while the first one means to establish a set of principles to

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guarantee the highest income for the state. There is a borne conflict between ruling rent maximization and reducing transactional fees, which obstructs sustainable economic growth.6 In his research, North deduced that for the sake of politics and its own interests, the state simply allows property structures with low efficiency to exist and even to be perpetuated. That is the reason why inefficient property rights structures can exist for a long time in history and why states make great efforts to protect SOEs. Meanwhile, the state also realizes that efficient property rights structures mean high income. Thus, it is competition rather than monopoly that they can benefit most from.7 This explains why the state also encourages and protects non-SOEs with efficient property rights structures. Consequently, the state faces a dilemma on whether to choose an inefficient property right to maximize ruling rent or to choose an efficient property right to increase its income. This leads to the internal instability for a state in the process of its development. However, it has to choose, especially the one having a neighbor with more efficient property rights. A comparatively low efficient property right is a threat to a country’s survival. It has to change the basic property structure to reduce the transaction fee and upgrade its growth rate or die.8 North’s theory of the state is in fact a renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change. Can this theory also be applied to the state power in China in the process of its economic transition? The earlier discussion has shown us that the state has to protect SOEs with political pressure and encourage the increase of non-SOEs to maximize social production, which inevitably leads to conflicts. In history, the everlasting conflict between the state’s dual purposes is the root of its development. However, in China during the process of its transition, conflict of this type increased the cost to maintain institutions and hinder its economic competitiveness. Compared with other states in history, the duality in the state’s behavior is more obvious, which will restrain China’s economic development if the state continues to define itself with traditional ownership instead of the maximization of social production. More than twenty years of reform has made the CCP realize that the promotion of the productive force, instead of restricting property forms, is where its basic interest lies. China is now experiencing a fundamental change from “who owns” to “how to govern.” Most SOEs are the ones with low efficiency or no efficiency, which is an indisputable fact. What is more, private economic sectors play a crucial role in promoting and strengthening China’s economic development. This makes us want to know whether “who owns” is in the national interest or not. Politically speaking, when we solve the problem of “who rules,” it is more urgent to make sure how to rule, which was the experience given by early-developed countries. According to classical democracy, it is the people who govern. However, when popular sovereignty could be implemented theoretically after a bourgeois revolution, it could not be put into action practically. The capitalist class in those countries still faced the problem of who would govern. During the

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first 150 years of their rule, the mounting labor movement destabilized the political situation domestically. Under this circumstance, the ruling class has to subdivide “popular sovereignty” through the granting of the franchise to common citizens and offering social welfare benefits in order to stabilize the political situation. From instability to stability is a process of from “who governs” to “how to govern” and also the one from classical democracy’s popular sovereignty to elitism democracy and pluralism democracy. Why did the Cultural Revolution happen in China, politically? It is because the government neglected the problem of how to govern and thought that socialism would ensure that people exercised their rights automatically without institutionalization and rule of law. As a result, people’s basic rights were not ensured and even invaded on a large scale by the Culture Revolution. Deng Xiaoping’s political reform was to solve the problem of how to govern and thus how to strengthen construction of the institution. It is the same situation for the economy, same changes occur in the economy as in politics. Even the Labor Party in Great Britain, thinking that socialism was state-owned ownership, had revised its assertion in 1950s and pointed out that state-owned ownership was only one way to achieve socialism, not the final aim. There was a real emancipation of the mind within the country since Deng Xiaoping had made remarks during his inspection tour of the south. It had been commonly argued that the SOEs were the base of socialism, which meant the enterprises had to be owned by the state in order to achieve socialism. This ideology brought on the practical effort focusing on managing large enterprises while adopting more flexible policies toward smaller ones. The “Three Represents” indicates that any form of enterprises that can facilitate the economic development is in the interests of the CCP. The hesitation at the share reform of SOEs is in violation of the CCP’s interest and will lead to the loss of state-owned property and infringement on the vital national interests and public ones as well. Hence, it is the state’s task to promote property right reform to protect stateowned property. Direct management and owning more than 51 percent of shares only makes the loss of state-owned property and the whole nation’s competitiveness in essence. The State Economic and Trade Commission declared that there was no limitation in terms of the percentage of shares on foreign investment’s purchasing SOEs, which is a key move to promote effective property rights and shows that the state pays more attention to the maximization of social production instead of traditional forms of ownership. The state’s duality will be weakened, and its competitiveness will be further strengthened. Conclusion: The Institutional Basis of the State’s Competitiveness According to Paul Samuelson, an economist awarded the Nobel Prize for economics in 1970, the political system determines economic benefits. He supports this argument with specific situations in European countries. In Great Britain, it is Margaret Thatcher’s radical reform of the trade unions and projects

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of privatization and deregulation that makes it the country with the highest economic growth, with France and Germany lagging behind. Reducing the staff always meets with great opposition from the Labor Union and with its success in Germany and France, it leads those two countries to transfer their manufacturing factories to other countries in perpetuity, while in the United States, it is the state’s check on labor unions that contributes to its prosperity. Thus, Samuelson concludes that the state’s competitiveness is determined by the degree of marketization of institutional arrangement.9 It seems that this has been widely accepted. Except for Paul Samuelson, D. North was the first one who researched economic history instead of economic models to win the Nobel Prize for economics. He also thought that the rise and decline of a country depended on whether it was the government or the market that distributed economic resources. Whether a country can be more competitive with its economic development rests with efficient property. In conclusion, institutional arrangement determines a state’s competitiveness. This reminds us of the concept of “hegemony.” One theme in international relations history is the replacement of hegemonies. Why could this happen? As the realists argue, unbalanced technological development makes one country surpass another. If this is true, why was the Soviet Union, with more advanced space and military technology, not equally competitive in its economy and was defeated at the end because of its ineffective economic system? What is more, China’s four great inventions that made profound impact on the world’s economy and the culture of mankind did not make it an economic giant in the world. Therefore, whether advanced technology can be used for its economic development and the improving of its national strength is largely determined by the arrangement of the institution. China’s economic reform demonstrates that with efficient property rights, the same technology or even the more backward one can lead to greater social output. The household contract responsibility system with less-advanced technology could yield more than in the era of agricultural collectivization when technology is more advanced. Non-SOEs with low levels of technology and facilities could contribute much more to the overall industrial growth rate. It all comes down to a matter of institutional arrangement. China’s national power has been greatly strengthened through more than twenty years of reform, and it may well be the second biggest economic body in the immediate future in the world. But this ascribes to the newly emerged property right, namely, the public economy, particularly that the state-owned economy plays a dominant role in the national economy. State-owned property, in essence, decides that the state inevitably controls the state-owned economy, which no doubt has political motives behind it. The “from above to below” controls together with the “from bottom to top” political guarantee, unavoidably, is responsible for the present low efficiency of the state-owned economy. Hence, it is high time for us to reform state-owned property rights when taking national interests and national competitiveness into consideration. However, the purposes of all states in history are in inevitable conflict. On one

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hand, government wants to have an efficient property rights arrangement to elevate the position of the country and its competitiveness in international society. On the other, it also worries about offending the most influential citizens and posing threats to its political rule. Such conflicts also exist in present-day China. The conflicts are even more complicated in China. First, unlike in developed countries, the order of politics and economic development leads to the unique institutional environment that China faces in the process of its institutional transition, which is more or less the same as in developing countries. Second, even though China has the same politics and order of economic development as some other East Asian countries, such as South Korea, it has the unique property rights problem that other countries do not, which in turn means more difficulties. Even though many later-developed countries may have different politics and economic development orders as compared to the earlier-developed ones, one thing is for sure that economy development to a large extent means to consolidate politics and to strengthen national competitiveness. However, in China, economic institutions are established by the state’s compelling force. Consequently, the reform of those institutions, plus the change from eliminating property owners to upbringing and protecting them, can indeed be called the second revolution, in which the seemingly similar manner of political administration, namely, marketization and power concentration, in fact contains utterly different problems of property right reform that other countries do not have. What is more, reformed economic institutions are the basis on which the reformers stand; thus, their reform will inevitably pose threats to reformers or to national power. The challenge comes not only from ideology, the source of its legitimacy, but also from the national power itself. As far as this author is concerned, the Three Representatives can be considered as the complement of the ideological legitimacy and one way to solve the problems caused by the power structure in the process of economic transition. The disharmony between politics and the economy, as well as various difficulties that lie ahead, comes from the peculiarities and unparalleled complexities of the relationship between politics and the economy. The newly emerged institution arrangement has greatly strengthened the national competitiveness in economic transition, but the difficulties to reform property rights and the inevitable low efficiency greatly restrain this competitiveness in another way. Only when there is a harmonious relationship between politics and the economy, when the state has made great progress in property rights constructing and institution establishing, can the nation’s competitiveness be enhanced to a new stage. Notes 1. Li Jingpeng, “Shilun Woguo Xingzheng Gaige de Dongli,” see Wang Puju and Xu Xianglin, ed., Jingji Tizhi Zhuanxing zhong de zhengfu zuoyong (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2000). 2. Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History (in Chinese) (Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Shudian, 1994), p. 28.

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3. Guojia Tongjiju, 2001nian de zhongguo fazhan baogao__zhongguo de “jiuwu” (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001), p. 430. 4. Shenghong, ed., Zuixin Zhongguo qiye binggou anli (Beijing: zhongguo qinggongye chubanshe, 1999), p. 38. 5. North, Structure and, p. 24. 6. Ibid., p. 25. 7. Ibid., p. 28. 8. Ibid., p. 29. 9. Paul Samuelson, “The Market Foundation of State Competiveness,” The 21st Century Economic Report, weekly newspaper, April 28, 2002.


PART III

Chinese Political Culture and the Media


CHAPTER 6

Censorship and Accountability in the Chinese Media Barrett L. McCormick

O

ver the last few years, a number of sensational stories in the Chinese media have expressed elements of resistance to or criticism of China’s existing political or social structure. Some of these stories are about the abuse of police and judicial authority; others criticize inequalities. Each challenged the system of self-censorship by which the Chinese media have traditionally been controlled. Some of the challenge comes from the Internet, where users posting to BBS do not feel as much pressure to conform to censors’ expectations as professional journalists. Widespread discussion on the Internet makes it easier for the commercial newspapers to report these stories, and commercial newspapers have in turn posed another challenge to the traditional system of censorship. While reporters and editors often understood themselves to be seeking justice, their courage was surely reinforced by the way these stories promoted sales in competitive markets. Some of these stories resulted in convictions and sentences for those who abused power, changes in policy, official apologies, and the review of judicial decisions, but they also almost always evoked the reimposition of censorship and professional or legal sanctions against the leading critics. Chinese media are only open to limited resistance. Some of the most interesting and important political criticisms in contemporary China, however, are not meant to oppose the system as a whole. Rather, they are restrained, profess limited aims, and are conducted from inside as well as outside the system. Owing to the complex fragmentation of the post-Mao state, some resistors can claim the legitimacy of implementing policies proclaimed by the highest levels of the Chinese government. This resistance is possible because of the commercialization of and technological innovation in the Chinese media. Technological innovations complicated

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censorship by introducing new media, such as the Internet, where traditional systems of censorship have yet to be firmly rooted, and where the technology itself facilitates a degree of individual autonomy. Commercialization in media such as the Internet and newspapers has given managers new incentives that sometimes encourage pushing the boundaries censors try to establish.1 The commercialization of media also means that China’s public sphere is increasingly dominated by popular culture, which can often be cheap, tawdry, and selfindulgent. But its creativity and unpredictability complicate censorship and create opportunities for challenging authority. These pressures have gradually given rise to a new style of “praetorian” media management, which is replacing the former “velvet prison.” The latter was a semivoluntary system of discipline in which Chinese journalists, intellectuals, and artists exercised a degree of restraint regarding what should be kept secret and what could be publicized and in return received material and political privileges. This is giving way to a praetorian system that is arbitrary, coercive, and imposed from above.2 Chinese media managers still have the ability to intervene and silence discussion almost at will, but their interventions are increasingly visible to the rest of society and are increasingly seen by many in society to be illegitimate. Newspapers One of the reasons that a few stories can develop faster than Party authorities may wish is that the Chinese media are increasingly influenced by markets. Whereas twenty-five years ago, Party-controlled organizations published newspapers expressly to serve the Party’s purposes, as Yuezhi Zhao has written, at the start of the twenty-first century, Chinese media are “between the Party line and the bottom line.”3 In the early 1980s, the most important newspapers were “organ papers” (“jiguan bao”) published by Party propaganda departments. The national paper, Peoples Daily, stood at the apex of this system and provided an official guide to the top leadership’s thinking. Papers such as Beijing Daily or Shanghai’s Liberation Daily played the same role at the provincial level, and the Nanjing Daily served that city’s Party committees. These papers were supposed to mobilize the population to pursue the leadership’s goals. There was no thought that they could or should earn a profit. Commercialization also means that newspapers have become important sources of revenue for the government and Party bodies that own them. It started with the introduction of advertising. The first commercial advertisement in a post-Mao newspaper was carried by Shanghai’s Liberation Daily on February 28, 1978. Since then, media advertising revenues have grown at phenomenal rates. By 2003, Chinese media’s total advertising revenues reached nearly fifty-five billion yuan, of which 44 percent went to newspapers.4 In the last few years, some leading newspapers’ revenues have declined as advertisers followed affluent younger readers to the Internet, but with rapid economic growth, Chinese newspaper markets remain far more robust than their European and North American counterparts.

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The quest to capture advertising revenues stimulated innovations that leave the organ papers a small and shrinking portion of a large and dynamic industry. Many new types of newspapers have been introduced. In the early 1980s, “evening papers” (“wanbao”) were at the cutting edge. They were often owned by the same government departments that owned the organ papers, but were typically operated by separate agencies. Evening papers were allowed to condense the political news that still dominates organ papers to the first couple of pages. Organ papers attempted to answer this competition by introducing supplementary editions, some of which quickly became newspapers in their own right. Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), originally a weekend supplement to the organ paper for Guangdong Province, was one of the first and most successful of these papers. Many other new genres followed, including sports, financial, and entertainment papers. The most important new genre is “metropolitan papers” (“dushi bao”), some of which are modeled on foreign dailies such as the New York Times, and which have replaced the organ papers as the most prestigious urban dailies. Organization and management were also sites for innovation. Ideological supervision is now balanced by systems for promoting productivity and profitability. The consolidation of diverse media into corporate “groups” (“jituan”) both fosters further competition and provides a means of keeping control. Groups offer a measure of centralized control over what had been an increasingly anarchic market. Yet, groups also foster interregional and cross-media competition. At the start of the twenty-first century, there are approximately 248 national papers published in Beijing and 37 regional papers. Of these regional papers, Beijing Evening News (Beijing wanbao) and Beijing Youth News (Beijing qingnian bao) lead a pack of five major dailies. With a daily circulation of one million copies in 2000, Beijing Evening News has the highest circulation, while Beijing Youth Daily enjoys the highest advertising revenues.5 Part of the reason for the success of these papers lies in their early start. Both were revived in the early 1980s at which time they were protected from competition from similar papers based in other localities. Beijing Youth Daily was once the official paper of the Beijing City Communist Youth League, and that organization remains the paper’s “sponsoring unit” (“zhuban danwei”). It was suspended during the Cultural Revolution and revived in 1981, but remained a small-scale operation until the early 1990s when a series of reforms made it more efficient, established its own distribution network and advertising agency, and introduced a series of additional newspapers.6 Beijing Youth Daily is now the flagship of its own group, which is second in size only to the Guangzhou Daily Group. In December 2004, Beijing Youth Daily became the first Chinese newspaper to issue stock in an international market when it issued an initial public offering of 25 percent of the shares of Beijing Media Corporation, its advertising sales company, in the Hong Kong market. The shares were expected to sell for a total of 700 to 900 million Hong Kong dollars. A South African media firm, Naspers, purchased 40 percent of those shares.7 In 2005, Beijing Media’s fortune turned, first as a downturn in property markets contributed to a serious decline in advertising revenues. Late in the

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year, Beijing Media was investigated for corruption related to sponsorship of sporting events and trading in its stock was temporarily halted, but this appears not to have affected the group’s newspapers.8 Beijing Evening News belongs to the group founded by the Beijing Daily, the Beijing City government’s organ paper. In terms of coverage, Beijing Evening News has a reputation for being softer and blander than the Beijing Youth Daily, which offers more critical content to a younger, more affluent and educated audience. Beijing Evening News is notable for the loudspeakers at street-side kiosks that incessantly shout during rush hour. The other three leaders in the Beijing daily market are more recent arrivals. The Beijing Times (Jinghua shibao) began in 2001 under the aegis of the People’s Daily Group with an investment of fifty million yuan from a technology conglomerate owned by Beijing University.9 The Beijing Times is often cited as the paper most often sued by those displeased with its reporting.10 This may be due to either active reporting or its tabloid style. There is some common spirit between The Beijing Times and The Global Times (Huanqiu shibao), a sister publication in the People’s Daily Group, which reports international news from an extremely nationalistic and at times paranoid perspective. The fourth major daily, The Beijing Daily Messenger (Beijing yule xinbao or Xinbao), is a leading example of cross-media competition. It was created by a partnership between a corporate group based on Beijing television and movie interests, the All Media and Culture Group (Beijing guangbo ying-shi jituan) and the Beijing City United Literature and Art Union (Beijing shi wenxue yishu jie lianhe hui), which is an umbrella group for artists’ and writers’ associations nationwide. This group published Theater and Film Paper (Xiju dianying bao), and it used the same license to publish the The Beijing Daily Messenger, which features entertainment news. A more controversial entry to the Beijing daily market, The Beijing News (Xin jing bao) offers an example of cross-regional competition. The money and much of the staff for this paper came from the Southern Metropolitan Daily (Nanfang doushi bao), and involved the direct participation of that paper’s controversial former editor Cheng Yizhong. Fearing that the Beijing authorities would act to protect their market from outside competition, the southerners established a partnership with an established Beijing newspaper group, the Guangming Daily Group (Guangming ribao baoye jituan), whose leading paper, the Guangming Daily, was widely read and respected by intellectuals in the 1980s, but had been in decline ever since. This venture had clear political implications. One commentator wrote that Southern Metropolitan Daily’s operating principles are: “Admit that there are truths that cannot be spoken, but do not tell lies; admit that there is news that cannot be reported, but do not report false news.”11 Expectations were high when The Beijing News began with a front page picture of Bill Clinton hugging a young Chinese afflicted with an HIV infection12 Beijing News was not radical. As one astute commentator reported: A vast amount of the newspaper’s regular content consisted of mawkish feature stories about peasant children, “in-depth” interviews with retired senior officials


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or academics, as well as the odd photograph of a three-legged cow or a man blowing up a balloon through his ear. For the most part, it did a very fine job avoiding the dour boilerplate bureaucratese that characterizes papers like the People’s Daily, or its Shanghai equivalent, the Liberation Daily. It aspired, in short, to be an ordinary newspaper, and tried to behave, as far as was possible, as if it were not constantly subject to the censor’s vermilion pen.13

This model achieved quick economic success, but political troubles raised questions about whether or not it was viable. Exceeding expectations, Beijing News was profitable within its first year of operation. On December 28, 2005, the editor-in-chief Yang Bin was forced to step down. Different reports identified reasons ranging from the personal ire of Central Propaganda Department chief Liu Yunshan to displeasure over reports on the violent repression of villagers in Dingzhou to speculation that the Guangming Daily Group wanted more control of the profitable newspaper.14 What was unusual in this case was that following Yang’s suspension, one hundred of the paper’s journalists went on strike and only returned when two assistant editors who had originally been dismissed along with Yang were allowed to return.

Censorship The Chinese media are heavily censored. Reporters Without Borders charges that in 2003 there were twenty-three journalists in Chinese jails.15 The Committee to Protect Journalists found China the world’s leading jailer of journalists with thirty-two journalists imprisoned in 2005.16 Reporters Without Borders also charges that sixty-one Internet users were in detention as of May 2004.17 The earlier Reporters Without Borders report also cites a November 2003 report from the Chinese Association of Journalists claiming two hundred and sixty journalists being physically assaulted during the previous year.18 The Committee to Protect Journalists has investigated twenty attacks on journalists since 2002.19 In addition, during 2003 and 2004, some major publications have been closed, including the long-published civil magazine Strategy and Management and the once-prominent paper Twenty-first Century Global Herald (21 shiji huanqiu baodao). During 2005 and early 2006, there were several incidents resembling the dismissal of the editor of Beijing News described earlier, including the suspensions of Li Datong, editor of Freezing Point (Bingdian), which is a weekly supplement published as part of China Youth Daily (Zhongguo bingnian bao) and Chen Jieren, editor of Public Interest Times (Gongyi shibao).20 This conspicuous repression reflects a shift away from the velvet prison of the 1980s. This term was coined by Miklos Harszti to describe the mixture of seduction and threat that once kept intellectuals collaborating with post-totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe.21 Instead of relying on an external police force to maintain control over media, in the Chinese version of the velvet prison the Party organized reporters and editors to police themselves. Journalists considered themselves part of a vanguard that was ahead of the rest of society and thus entitled

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to privileges but burdened with a responsibility to withhold information that would confuse the less-advanced masses. This ethos was buttressed by career ladders that led those who behaved “appropriately” to positions high in the government’s cultural and Party Propaganda Departments. It was strengthened by the lack of alternatives outside the system and the continuing threat of serious sanctions for those who violated the discipline. A number of factors have undermined “the velvet prison.” The idea of a vanguard Party is contradicted by the collapse of Marxist–Leninist ideology, even if nationalism and concepts such as “national essence” (“guoqing”) still provide some legitimacy for elitism and secrecy. Contact with the international media exposed Chinese journalists to alternate journalistic ethics. Commercialization undermined traditional career ladders and offered journalists the opportunity to change jobs or even freelance. Media markets offered editors and even the Party organizations that own newspapers powerful incentives to evaluate news in terms of its appeal to readers rather than its ideological value. Exactly what will replace the velvet prison remains uncertain. Some powerful leaders still seek to maintain a Leninist model of media. Zeng Qinghong, a leading member of the Politburo, recently stated that: (We) need to adhere to the correct orientation in propaganda and public opinion work, improve our skill in shaping public opinion, seize the initiative in public opinion work, and enhance the appeal and influence of public opinion propaganda. (We) need to uphold the principle of the Party controlling the media . . . take very seriously the influence which the Internet and other new types of media have on public opinion, strengthen the system for managing the Internet and the buildup of a corps of online propaganda personnel . . .22

Others advocate something closer to the separation of opinion and news as in the ostensible ideals of the U.S. media. In an article that appeared on the web page of CCTV (China Central Television), China’s national television network, Zhan Jiang cites Harold Lasswell to draw the following distinctions between propaganda and news: (i) propaganda emphasizes symbols while news emphasizes information; (ii) propaganda wants repetition while news wants novelty; (iii) propaganda emphasizes a point of view while news emphasizes fact; (iv) propaganda emphasizes what is appropriate while news emphasizes what is timely; (v) propaganda emphasizes manipulation while news emphasizes communication; and (vi) propaganda has an emphasis while news stresses balance. Zhan concludes by saying that he does not favor a Western model of media, but earlier on notes that China’s model of propaganda descends from the Soviet model, and states that: In the former Soviet Union the propaganda system was a highly centralized system lacking vitality. During the period of peaceful construction many kinds of shortcomings in propaganda work were revealed. The most important were: in stressing ideology, its understanding of Marxism was rigid and dogmatic; propaganda did not unite the basic interests of the party, the state and the people, but instead went so far as to promote cults of personality and hegemonism; and propaganda agitation


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completely superseded the media’s news distribution function to the extent that there were jokes that there is no truth in Truth (Pravda) and no news in News (Izvestia).23

Zhan implies that news and propaganda functions would best be separated, with the news media allowed to concentrate on the former. While either Zeng or Zhan’s alternative is possible in the longer term, in the meantime China’s media must do without clear rules and endure arbitrary and coercive interventions. Jiao Guobiao’s 2004 criticism of the Propaganda Department, while polemical, is correct in pointing out that the Propaganda Department’s secrecy means it is not accountable to laws and procedures. Media that are sanctioned or closed may or may not receive a clear explanation, and if there is any process of appeal, it is conducted through informal, often unreliable, channels.24 For example, when one paper was closed down, the initial communication from the Propaganda Department led the staff to believe that they would be allowed to resume publication in a month if they made some personnel adjustments. They made the changes as per the request, but were not allowed to resume. Negotiations were inconclusive and dragged on. Meanwhile, the paper was no longer generating revenue but still had overhead expenses such as staff salaries. The staff had to report to work, but had no assignments. As the weeks dragged on, some staff left for new positions and morale sank. In the end, the paper lost its periodical license (“kanhao”) by default, as the regulations require that any periodical that fails to publish for three months reapply for its license. Most of the staff concluded that this had been the Propaganda Department’s intention from the start.25 Lists of forbidden topics appear to be equally arbitrary. Although lists now regularly show up on Internet sites, it is impossible to verify their validity. One such list that appeared in August 2004 included ten “prohibitions” (“buzhun”): 1. A rumored 5 percent revaluation of the renminbi. 2. News of plans to institute “complete circulation” in stock markets. (This means removing the restrictions prevent ordinary individuals from buying stock previously only available to corporations and government agencies.) 3. No reports of rumors. 4. There should be no relationships between central media units and Internet sites such as Sina, Sohu, and so on, except proper professional relationships. (This restricts the flow of information between the Internet and traditional news media, which, as we shall see later, is highly sensitive.) 5. No more reports on the “red hat merchant” in Anhui. (A merchant with a red hat is a party official in business, so this bans reports on a corruption case.) 6. China Peasant Investigation, Affairs Past Are Not Like Smoke, and The Heart of a Young Woman should not be touted or reported. (These are banned books respectively discussing the economic exploitation and injustice among farmers, commemorating the suffering of “rightists”

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during the Cultural Revolution, and a reprint of a pornographic novel that was often hand-copied during the Cultural Revolution.) Reports on the case of Ma Jiajue should now stop. (Ma Jiajue was a student who murdered four other students, but elicited sympathy because he was of humble origins and suffered hazing.) Reports on college students’ unemployment or lack of physical security should be circumspect. Some current social news, especially regarding serious criminality, is not permitted to include too much detail, as this would have a negative influence. The original verdict in the “Shenyang BMW Accident Case” has already been reaffirmed; all media without exception should not issue further reports (this incident will be discussed later).26

Thus, while China’s media are still tightly controlled, the current situation reflects the steady decline of the traditional velvet prison. Daniel Lynch accurately characterizes the current system for regulating media as arbitrary and coercive.27 However, because censorship is now increasingly imposed from the outside rather than as a self-discipline, it is increasingly visible, and ever less legitimate. While Daniel Lynch states that this praetorian system could last for the foreseeable future, this is not the only possibility. Many of those suffering repression have been able to use the Internet and international media to circulate statements of their side of the story.28 As a Beijing journalism professor notes, the increasing incidence of physical attacks on journalists is the result of “an increase in the frequency, power, and range of the media’s activity in society. For the development of the media, this is a mark of progress.”29 The Internet The Internet has changed communication in China, but not to the degree that early Internet analysts expected. Some commentators during the early days of the Internet in China predicted that its horizontal technologies would flatten all hierarchies, including that of the Communist Party. They believed that Internet technology gave individuals the tools they needed to overcome all forms of censorship, leaving the Party with the choice of either rejecting the Internet, in which case China would be cut off from the “information economy” or accepting the Internet, in which case the Party’s control of information and ideas would also be lost. Their analysis adopted “the Great Firewall” metaphor, which implied that most of the Party’s policy on the Internet was a futile attempt to restrict its use. A second generation of analysts, led by scholars such as Nina Hachigian and Shanthi Kalathil, however, has made telling criticisms of this analysis.30 They found persuasive evidence of a more complex relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Internet. The Chinese government has put enormous resources into telecommunications, has made Internet access relatively affordable, and has promoted a high-tech economy. Instead of simply fearing the


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Internet, China’s leaders have promoted prosperity and sought legitimacy by endorsing and supporting its growth. In addition, they document that the Chinese authorities have established a regulatory regime that shapes the ways in which the Internet is used.31 They have built “firewalls” that limit access to designated overseas websites. They use sophisticated technologies to inspect the content of Internet traffic and interdict the transmission of e-mail, web pages, or even text messages that contain certain combinations of key words. While users have strategies for circumventing these controls, these technologies have proven more effective than many had expected. Besides technological measures, the Party has co-opted many of those who seek to profit from the growth of China’s high-tech economy. While there is significantly more privatization and private investment in China’s Internet than in other Chinese media, the Party and government retain ownership and regulatory authority at diverse strategic points. Consequently the majority of those seeking to profit from the rapid growth of China’s Internet have willingly complied with the government regulators, including foreign firms.32 For example, despite its motto, “Do No Evil,” Google’s Chinese news search service does not list news from censored sites.33 Finally, the Chinese state has attempted to apply regulatory techniques used in other media to the Internet. Editors are required to police their websites in much the same manner that other media are required to censor themselves. Web pages that allow users to post comments are required to keep constant watch on what is posted and to promptly remove materials that transcend official limits. The authorities have also recruited inspectors who monitor the Internet. The exact number of Internet inspectors is unclear, but would appear to be well over ten thousand. They keep close watch on postings to BBS and chatrooms. If BBS managers fail to remove controversial postings in a reasonable amount of time, they will receive a warning from the inspectors. If they receive repeated warnings, the inspectors may compel their host ISP (Internet Service Provider) to remove their site from the Internet. The emphasis on outside inspectors implies that the velvet prison model is not succeeding on the Internet. While the earlier-mentioned practices, technologies, and regulations are serious evidence of a powerful regulatory regime, the view from the top down overestimates their success. When viewed from the bottom up or from the perspective of what Internet users actually do, the regulatory regime appears less successful. Relatively simple strategies such as quickly copying sensitive material before it is pulled from one website and posting it to others circumvents censorship. Putting asterisks between characters defeats content filters. A web page that is pulled from one ISP may be posted at another. The best survey of what Chinese users do on the Internet was conducted in twelve cities in 2003 by Guo Liang. 34 Guo found that 71.8 percent of Internet users “strongly agree” or “agree” that using the Internet allows people more opportunities to express their political views, 60.8 percent similarly found that using the Internet afforded more opportunities to criticize government policies, and 79.2 percent found that using the Internet allowed users to gain more

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knowledge on politics. While about 87 percent of users reported that it is somewhat or very necessary to manage or control the Internet and large majorities want online pornography, violence, and junk mail to be controlled, only 12.9 percent want political content to be controlled. Yongming Zhou describes how some activists make use of the Internet.35 Adopting an anthropological approach, Zhou’s close observations of a few Internet activists finds different types of activists, from elite intellectuals to less prestigious “civil writers” who express views from critical liberalism to strident nationalism. Some of what they post would not otherwise be available. Zhou summarizes: (T)he main players in this development are the Chinese intellectuals on the one hand, and the Chinese state on the other. While the Chinese state mainly focuses on regulating cyberspace, intellectuals view the Internet as a means to break state control. Even though their interaction has had only a very short history, it is safe to say that so far both the Chinese intellectuals and the state can claim themselves to be winners.36

There are a few places at the fringes of the Chinese Internet that are relatively free of restriction. A forum closed in 2004, Yitahutu, was a good example. The name of this site literally translates to “a complete mess,” but also contains homophonic references to the Beijing University campus. It seems likely that its most active users were university students in Beijing. The site had its origins in a BBS opened for Beijing University students in 1999, but had since grown in scale and influence. By the time it was closed it claimed three hundred thousand registered users participating in over eight hundred forums. In structure, it was similar to Slashdot, a site deeply influenced by the utopian ideals that colored the origins of the Internet, has a democratically elected management structure, and allows users to create topical forums at will. Yitahutu users were more likely to adopt liberal points of view than users of some BBS that are better known in international media, such as the Strong Country Forum sponsored by People’s Daily. Unfortunately, on September 16, 2004, the site was closed and banned from discussion on other BBS. 37 If previous cycles of repression are any guide, other sites will emerge to take Yitahutu’s place. Legal Commentary (Gongfa pinglun)38 and Century China (Shiji Zhongguo) 39 were leading representatives of a second type of website: Academic websites. Begun in 2000, both were physically located on servers in Beijing, and are run by academics. The intent behind these web pages, like that of the New York Review of Books, was to foster academically informed discussion of public issues. Both were explicitly committed to maintaining academic standards, which in their editors’ view included maintaining reasonable and moderate debate. These sites provided the most open forums available to scholars and were frequently the scene of heated debates in which views that might not be permitted in newspapers are boldly argued. Their editors purposely maintained an academic style that limited accessibility and the number of readers and


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thereby reduced the risk that the authorities would perceive them as fomenting instability. In August 2006, though, Century China was closed. The most heavily trafficked Chinese websites are listed on stock exchanges and enjoy international investment.40 Because of the large audiences these portals attract, they are more closely supervised. Nonetheless, they accelerate the circulation of some sensitive news and perspectives. Even though they are restricted from doing their own reporting, they can select news published in any approved source. Consequently, they can make controversial news that might otherwise remain obscure immediately available to millions of Internet users. The portals allow users to post comments on what they have read that are accessible to other users. Controversial news posted to portals often stimulates avid discussion. Though monitored and censored, these discussions often include angry and sarcastic evaluations of officials and official policy. Despite censorship, China’s Internet has created new and important channels for the circulation of information and ideas that have a significant impact on the rest of its media. The existence of less-regulated spaces on the Internet provides paths by which information can gradually become accessible to a broader public. Opinions and information that are first discussed in relatively open but not broadly accessed BBS such as Yitahutu may subsequently reach academic websites that then provide momentum that pushes the stories onto major portals. If stories draw broad interest on major portals, they may in turn show up in commercial newspapers. Controversial Stories It is within this context that a series of sensational stories have at least temporarily broken free of official restraint in ways that allow journalists and Internet users to criticize official corruption and social inequities. These stories are by now a relatively frequent phenomenon. Since there are more of them than can be related in this space, I will omit discussion of some that are better known, such as the Wanzai Schoolhouse explosion of 2001,41 the death of Sun Zhigang in March of 2003, and Dr. Jiang Yanyong’s revelation of the SARS epidemic in April 2003. In these stories, the Internet played a major role in creating the initial interest in the story. In most cases Internet communication facilitated coverage in the print media, which in turn stimulated more Internet discussion. The authorities usually responded to public criticism with a significant gesture, such as imposing legal sanctions on those perpetrating the worst abuses. Those who had a leading role in spreading the stories, however, were liable to suffer sanctions. Liu Yong Liu Yong was both a leading gangster and a member of the Shenyang City People’s Congress. He was charged with numerous crimes including racketeering, smuggling, buying and selling government positions, stealing farmland, rigging construction contracts, extortion, bribery, tax evasion, illegal possession of

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firearms, and multiple cases of willful bodily injury. His conviction in Tieling County in April of 2002 led to convictions of at least fifteen high officials in Shenyang, including a former mayor. Against expectations, in August of 2003, the Liaoning Provincial Higher People’s Court suspended the death sentence passed by the lower court, stating that they could not rule out the possibility that Liu had been tortured into confessing. Then, in December 2003, for the first time ever, the Supreme People’s Court retried a criminal case, found Liu guilty, and immediately thereupon, he was taken to an execution van and given a lethal injection.42 Qiu Feng, a widely read Internet commentator, posted an excellent essay on the Liu Yong case to the Legal Commentary website.43 Qiu divides press coverage into four periods: Before the first trial in Tieling; the first trial through the appeal to the provincial court; the appeal through the trial in the Supreme Court; and afterward. During all four of these periods, the case was covered extensively in local and national print media and widely discussed on the Internet, including on the major portals. During the first period, both Shenyang newspapers such as the Liaoning Evening Post (Liaoning wanbao) and the China Business Morning View (Huashang chenbao) and national papers such as Workers Daily (Gongren Ribao) and China Youth Daily covered the story. They were joined by the major Internet portals. These media gave attention to the police and procurators’ investigation, legal preparations and accounts of Liu’s deeds, and the extent of corruption in Shenyang. In Qiu’s analysis, the public’s eventual reaction to the intermediate court’s suspension of the lower court’s death sentence was colored by the media’s failure to maintain a presumption of innocence. During the second stage, when the first trial started, even papers such as the ones mentioned earlier and Beijing Youth Daily reported revelations from the trial, including details of Liu Yong’s crimes, the wealth he amassed, the organization and history of his gang, and the protection he received from local officials, including the Shenyang police. During the trial, the Shenyang police chief Yang Jialin gave the press detailed accounts of how former mayor Mu Suixin had blocked earlier attempts to investigate Liu. It was not until the lower court’s death sentence was suspended, however, that public opinion became outraged. There was at least one glaring inconsistency in the Liaoning Provincial Higher Court’s ruling. Namely, Liu’s co-defendant Song Jianfei did not receive a similar stay, and immediately received a lethal injection. This inconsistency and strong suspicions that public officials had once again been bought off led to an outpouring of anger on the Internet. Within a week, an article on the case by Li Shuming appeared in the Shanghai news weekly, The Bund (Waitan huabao). Other media quickly followed and various legal experts as well as Liu’s lawyer were invited to give commentary. While Liu’s lawyer and some experts defended the intermediate court’s findings, for the most part public opinion was decidedly critical. After the Supreme People’s Court had Liu executed, opinion was divided. While most people welcomed the court’s decision to take up the case and its verdict, a few were concerned that these decisions were driven by public opinion rather than solid legal reasoning. Some went so far as to question whether or not


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a fair trial was possible in light of the publicity and wondered if the increasingly influential media posed a challenge to the rule of law. Liu Di, the Stainless Steel Mouse The Liu Di story brought Internet users into direct confrontation with censorship and repression. A college student when she was arrested and detained in November of 2002, Liu was charged with threatening state security. According to her account, she had first gone online in early 2000, and over time found her way to a number of Internet forums where users discussed topics related to freedom of speech and democracy. These forums were often forced to close, and some of their most outspoken patrons were detained. These incidents stimulated others to organize new forums to express their opposition to repression and support for those detained. Liu eventually decided that remaining silent facilitated repression and began to take an active role in these discussions.44 Her satirical essays attracted a following. Liu’s online name, “Stainless Steel Mouse,” offers some insight into her public persona. The name was taken from the principal character in a science fiction series written by Harry Harrison, the “Stainless Steel Rat.”45 One of Harrison’s fans explains the appeal of the Stainless Steel Rat: It is this insubordination which accounts for much of the character’s appeal . . . the Stainless Steel Rat . . . is a rebel, an outsider. He is intelligent, quick-witted, with a sense of humour . . . He values his own freedom and individuality, but at the same time he is a person who values life . . . (I)n ten novels he has only ever killed once and then only in defense . . . (He) believes in justice too, in the rights of the little person against the oppressive might of corrupt regimes.46

Liu Di took a skeptical view of the kind of nationalism that dominates much of contemporary Chinese public discourse: Another special characteristic of authoritarians is that they suffer the paranoia of believing that “there are conspiracies everywhere in the world.” Chinese people’s paranoia is often linked to extreme nationalism, the belief that the “global antiChina forces have not yet given up their plan to subjugate us” is especially representative: not only have the Belgrade Embassy Bombing and the Hainan Airplane Accident been deemed premeditated (paranoid authoritarians believe that “nothing is random”); but international criticism of China and divergent opinions have been fingered as an anti-China chorus . . . I am not saying that the people who say these things actually believe them in their hearts . . . what is important is that they know that this way of saying things has a market in China, that it panders to the mentality of many Chinese . . .47

After Liu Di was arrested, websites were created expressly to defend her. Internet users were encouraged to preface their online names with “Stainless Steel” to show solidarity. A series of open letters were organized and posted to call the authorities to account. One letter addressed to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao,

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Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji in their capacities as leaders of state, posted in January of 2003, claimed over eighteen hundred signatures. This letter criticized the authorities for failing to follow the laws in their arrest and subsequent treatment of Liu, particularly for preventing communication between her and her family and lawyer. It also pointed out that “threatening state security” is a vaguely defined crime, which had been abused in the past. If writing essays and organizing Internet forums were indeed a crime, the letter was concerned that many Internet users were liable to be charged.48 Another letter posted in late February 2003 was addressed to National People’s Congress and National People’s Consultative Conference representatives. This letter deplored illegal secrecy, reporting Liu’s family to have said that it was as if she had evaporated from human society. The second letter also called attention to the Chinese Constitution’s promise of freedom of speech and the press, and asserted that Liu Di was a patriotic Chinese. The organizers of this letter and signature drive boldly declared their identities at the foot of the text. Their signatures were followed by another seven hundred signatures.49 In December of 2003, Liu was released from custody after the prosecutor declined to pursue her case. This might have been because of a lack of solid legal grounds or evidence against her. It is noteworthy that a related case against four other Internet users, Xu Wei, Yang Zili, Jin Haike, and Zhang Hongkai, ran into difficulties shortly before Liu’s release. In that case, witnesses who had been detained retracted their testimony upon their release, claiming that their earlier statements had been coerced.50 Liu Di’s release did not herald any fundamental change of policy. One of the likely reasons for Liu’s detention was the support she gave to previously detained Internet users such as Huang Qi. In return, Du Daobin, one of those most active in seeking her release, was arrested on October 28, 2004 and charged with subversion a few months later. Du’s prosecution, like Liu’s, was fraught with irregularities, including a trial without a lawyer. But in June of 2004, following further activism and petitions submitted on his behalf, he received the unexpectedly light sentence of four years’ house arrest. Liu Di became a celebrity on China’s Internet and worldwide in large part because of the publicity that followed her arrest. In contrast to the velvet prison where official coercion was usually hidden from public view, the civic campaign that followed her arrest made official repression visible. Harry Harrison’s Stainless Steel Rat offered a cynical interpretation of a similar event: “Only the nobodies vanish in secrecy in a police state.”51 It could be, though, that highlevel leaders—several accounts claim that Hu Jintao took a personal interest in her case—determined that keeping her in detention created a rallying point that was more threatening to state security than anything she might do if released. While visibility is hardly equal to accountability, it is a necessary prerequisite. Li Siyi This story came to the attention of a reporter for the Chengdu Business Times (Chengdu Shangbao), Li Yaling. According to one account, before it was understood that the police were involved, her paper had reported Li Siyi’s death and


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requested anyone with information to step forward.52 But when Li Yaling’s investigation implicated the police, the story was blocked from publication. Li Yaling, however, chose to post her report to the Internet. Li Siyi soon had her own website.53 Internet users expressed outrage. Referring to another sensational story that had occurred not long before, one anonymous Internet user wrote, “In Guangzhou a Chinese youth was beaten to death; in Chengdu a Chinese child was starved to death! But the Internet will not be cold and unconcerned, the Internet will not be silent, on the Internet there is Li Yaling!”54 Once again, the story spread from the Internet to print media. China Youth Daily, Southern Metropolitan News, and China News Weekly (Xinwen zhoukan) were among the periodicals giving this story extensive coverage. Li Siyi was three years old when she starved to death while unattended and locked inside her home in Chengdu. According to later reports, her body was found after neighbors complained of the odor, and when it was found, there were scratch marks on the door that she had been unable to open. At the time, her mother, Li Guifan, was in police detention. Laid off years before, Li Guifan had been unable to find work and did not receive public assistance. In addition, Li was addicted to illegal drugs. On June 4, 2003, she left the flat to rob a store in an attempt to get money for drugs. She was apprehended, taken into police custody, and sent to a drug rehabilitation center. She was reported to have gotten on her knees to beg the police to alert her family to the need to care for Li Siyi. But the police did not follow regulations, which require them to notify family members, work units, and residential authorities about those they detain. According to his trial testimony, Huang Cheng, a policeman at the detention center, called a local police station, but it failed to reach Li’s family. Once again, media and Internet publicity led to limited accountability and to reprisals. In August of 2003, a Chengdu court convicted two of the policemen of dereliction of duty for failing to properly notify the family and gave them sentences of two and three years in prison, respectively. Other police officers were given administrative punishments or suspensions. At the same time, Li Yaling was suspended from her position and at the time of the trial was no longer working as a journalist.

The BMW Affair On October 16, 2003, Dai Yiquan was on his tractor with his wife, Liu Zhongxia, on their way to Harbin with a load of onions. Forced to swerve to the right to avoid a head-on collision with another vehicle, Dai damaged the mirror of a BMW parked by the side of the road and dumped some of the onions onto the BMW. The driver of the BMW, Su Xiuwen, and her sister got out of her vehicle, and in an exchange whose details are contested, had angry words with Dai and possibly struck him with her handbag. In the meantime, a large crowd had gathered and someone suggested that the BMW back up in order to free itself from the onions. Su returned to the BMW, started the engine and then drove through the crowd, killing Liu Zhongxia and injuring twelve other bystanders.55

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On December 20, the Harbin Daoli District People’s Court ruled that the death and injuries were the accidental result of Su’s negligence and gave her a suspended sentence. Su claims that she had not intended to drive through the crowd; her husband, Guan Mingbo, substantiated her claim by reporting that he hired an experienced driver to take her drivers’ examination for her.56 In his deposition, which was not read into the court record in its entirety, Dai claimed that she had stated her intention to kill him before getting back into the car, and that he would have been killed had he not been able to jump out of the way.57 Dai settled out of court for about $11,000; the other twelve who were injured received a total of about $22,000. Whatever facts were in dispute, the obvious differences in wealth between the tractor driver and the BMW owner provided an opportunity to discuss contemporary China’s increasing inequalities. Dai and his wife farmed 1.3 hectares of land and worked odd jobs for an annual gross income of around 10,000 yuan. Guan, on the other hand, who claimed humble origins, had a real estate company with registered capital of $12 million. The BMW and its license alone cost close to $100,000. This economic disparity, coupled with Su’s light sentence, created a wave of media attention. Once again, discussion started on the Internet. Although the authorities in Harbin appeared able to keep the story out of the local media for a while, three months later on January 6, 2004 People’s Daily reported that Internet users had posted over seventy thousand messages about the incident to the popular portal, Sina.58 On January 16, an editor at Sina, Wen Lai, reported that there had actually been around one quarter million messages on the BMW affair on China’s major portals.59 Internet discussion was heated and made claims that were not always born out. Wen Lai reported that about one in five had to be censored.60 Questions were asked about the integrity of the trial: some Internet postings charged that Su had received a favorable verdict because her husband was related to a deputy governor, a supposition that the deputy governor later stepped forward to deny. Potential witnesses were reported to have demanded payment from Dai for supportive testimony and to have received payment from Guan. There were no witnesses at the trial, which lasted only two hours. The excitement on the Internet led to attention in other media. Not surprisingly, some coverage adhered to the standards of tabloid journalism. Nevertheless, even the mainstream media were forced to confront the question of whether there could be a fair trial when there were such disparities of wealth between the parties. Even raising this issue indirectly was to question the Harbin judicial authorities’ integrity. In response, by mid-January the authorities instituted a ban on further discussion of the affair and pulled relevant messages from the major portals. On the other hand, they authorized a review of the initial trial, which, in early April of 2004 confirmed the original verdict. BMWs remain a ready symbol for public criticism of inequities. In the summer of 2004, there was another sensational story involving a BMW. In this story, a migrant worker thought he had won a BMW in a lottery organized by Shaanxi


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government officials, only to be told that his ticket was counterfeit. The worker, Liu Lang, climbed to the top of a billboard and threatened to jump unless he was given the BMW. The police intervened and eventually discovered that in fact Liu’s ticket was genuine. They arrested and charged a businessman and officials from the lottery office with perpetrating a fraud to claim the prizes for themselves. Liu eventually received his BMW, which again received wide attention.61 Huang Jingao On August 11, 2004, a website affiliated with the People’s Daily published a long letter from Huang Jingao, the Party Secretary of Lianjiang County, which is under the jurisdiction of Fuzhou City in Fujian Province.62 The letter made the shocking claim that his work on two corruption cases had aroused so much opposition that he had been forced to wear a bulletproof vest for six years. He asked for public support for his work in the second of the two cases which, he claimed, was currently stalled because of official resistance to his efforts to root out a local mafia. Within hours, over 100,000 Internet users posted messages supporting Huang to the People’s Daily website.63 But, as in the proceeding cases, the whistle-blower did not have the last word. Within a week, the Fuzhou City Party Committee posted a rebuttal that denounced his lack of Party discipline by going public, questioned his integrity and commitment to the fight against corruption, and defended some of those he accused. Huang’s letter was pulled from the People’s Daily site and further discussion of the case was banned from the major Internet portals.64 A good portion of the debate between Huang and the Fuzhou City Committee concerns murky details of the alleged corruption in Lianjiang County and its investigation. According to Huang, the problems concerned a road and levee construction project in which the developers had excluded other parties from the bidding, purchased some public lands at artificially low prices, illegally seized other land, failed to compensate displaced people, and failed to pay various taxes and fees. He alleged that appeals to various authorities in Fuzhou not only failed to bring justice, but in retaliation he was temporarily banished to a Party school and his life was threatened. The Fuzhou City Committee argued that the bidding process was open even if no other companies chose to bid, contested some of the allegations of misconduct, claimed that they have acted to combat corruption, and explained rulings that Huang criticized as reasonable responses to his failure to follow proper procedures. It also claimed to be protecting the legitimate rights of the developer and maintaining progress on an important construction project. This dispute demonstrated different attitudes toward the media and publicity. Huang explicitly rejected the traditional discipline of Leninist party secrecy: I am aware that my actions have violated many unwritten rules of officialdom, and this might have caused some people to feel uncomfortable. But it is precisely these unwritten rules that have permitted corruption to rot our political and party systems. Sometimes, these unwritten rules are backed by powerful forces so as to

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make their opponents’ work impossible. During the more than two years of this case, various kinds of rumors as well as overt and hidden obstructions, including threats on my life, have worn me down. But . . . I did not give up, because I believe . . . the eyes of the people are clear and the flag of the Communist Party will fly forever.65

The Fuzhou City Committee charged that in May of 2004 Huang had colluded with the editors of a magazine to publish an article of the same title as the letter eventually published on the People’s Daily website. They found this violated Party rules and blocked publication of the article. The City Discipline Committee Secretary was ordered to: ask him to follow organizational principles in his work. If he has any opinions, he can reflect them to the organization through the usual channel instead of publicly distributing comments about his disagreement with organizational decisions.66

When he persisted and sent the letter to People’s Daily, their finding was that he was “quite emotional and stubborn,” that his actions “created very negative consequences,” and made the following determinations on his letter: that it ignored the political situation, that it ignored the overall situation, that it represented a bad case of individualism, that it was an extremely wrong act that broke organizational discipline, that the direct effect was that it would be used by western hostile forces, Taiwan hostile forces and democratic movement elements thus leading to social and political stability. This was a serious political incident.67

They concluded that their own actions were necessary to prevent any of the above groups or Falun Gong elements from taking advantage of the situation. During the brief period between the publication of Huang’s letter and when further discussion was banned, Huang won broad support. In a pattern familiar from the stories discussed above, information circulated from the Internet to the print media and back to the Internet. The Beijing Youth Daily, for example, reported Huang’s letter and the subsequent online discussion in an article that was reprinted on the Internet. After informing readers that in Lianjiang county Huang was seen as an “honest, good and hard working official,” the paper also reported and endorsed the enthusiastic response of Internet users. Several Internet users posting to the Sina portal spoke in stronger terms than Huang or Beijing Youth Daily. One wrote: “Without vigorous checks and balances and a mechanism for supervision, corruption cannot be eliminated.” Another replied: “The political system has reached a situation where it is not possible not to reform. It is impossible only to speak of economic and not political reform.” Moreover, Internet users were keenly aware that in going public Huang had violated the traditional standards of Party discipline. One user excerpted the Party regulations that Huang had violated and posted them without comment.68 Huang was even celebrated on the national television network, CCTV. On the program, Legal Report, CCTV proudly claimed that their reporting had assisted


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Huang in his attempts to crack corruption cases in Lianjiang. His version of events was accepted without challenge, and ordinary citizens were seen to be pleased with his leadership. Finally, a professor from the National School of Administration was allowed to legitimate his violation of Party discipline: Host Xiao Xiaolin: The honored guest we have invited to our studio today is Professor Wang Baoming from the National School of Administration. Professor Wang, do you think transparency is an effective remedy for corruption? Professor Wang: For corruption, a chronic disease for the entire society and even the international community, mere transparency is not enough. It has to be complemented with existing institutions. If we add the transparency of information and transparency of government affairs, then with such institutionalized construction and true enforcement of such institutions in our lives, we can definitely have a very good monitoring effect in preventing corruption. Some people say the best antidote against corruption is sunshine.69

A year later, Huang was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to prison for life. By December of 2004, he was under house arrest. In what one commentator called “a campaign of calculated leaks and intimidation aimed at undermining a popular figure” stories appeared in the Hong Kong press and some Mainland sources claiming that Huang frequented prostitutes, maintained several mistresses, led a lavish life, and to support this decadence, had organized a campaign of bribery and kickback schemes that had lasted from 1992 to 2004.70 Huang’s attorney later complained that although the authorities drew on over one hundred witnesses, none appeared at the trial and their testimony was given in the form of depositions taken while the witnesses were in custody.71 One of those charged with being his mistress called the charges “atrocious.” Li Changping, a Fuzhou journalist who had helped Huang, was charged with “fabricating and spreading false terroristic information” for a report on an alleged outbreak of Dengue fever that he denied he had written. Li, who claimed that he had been repeatedly tortured, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.72 In this incident, Internet users, commentators writing for commercial newspapers, and hosts on CCTV television shows were clearly aware of the two parties’ contrasting positions on transparency, and expressed clear and considered support for more transparency. Indeed, the presumption was that the traditional call to Party discipline was little more than an attempt to shield corruption and to prevent the development of supervisory institutions and the rule of law. Eventually, as the cases discussed above, the media system as a whole gave in to the Party’s imposition of control. The fate of Huang and Li offers strong support for Jiao Guobiao’s charge that the system of censorship is above the law, or as I have argued, “praetorian.” The Role of the Media and the Internet The conclusions of these stories demonstrate that there are still sharp limits to the use of the Chinese media as sites for grassroots resistance to corruption and abuse of power. The record shows that those who take the lead in speaking out are often subjected to reprisals. They may lose their jobs or be incarcerated.

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Newspapers and websites that repeatedly question the authorities are liable to be placed under more tractable management or closed down. The threat of these sanctions has a powerful deterrent effect. In each of the cases described above, the authorities eventually restored control over the public sphere, though it is not as absolute as it once was. One of the reasons why each these stories succeeded is that they are good stories. But the criteria that make for good soap operas are not the best for the pursuit of justice. There are undoubtedly many other cases of worse injustice where the story was not as good and the audience did not stay tuned. Also, in China, as elsewhere, informal Internet sites are prone to error. Even resistors can get things wrong, as when many people readily believed that the BMW owner in Harbin was rich because he was related to a high official, and therefore was able to get his wife off the hook. Finally, the kind of resistance that is possible in these stories cannot be divorced from existing structures of power and wealth. One of the profound ironies of contemporary China is that it is precisely the people who have succeeded in the new economy that are best placed to resist and complain. Poor farmers and unemployed workers enjoy much less access to the media than college students or white collar workers. It is hardly surprising that college students like Liu Di attract attention and support in a medium where college students enjoy special access. Nevertheless, there are still reasons to believe that Chinese media will be increasingly open to those seeking redress. It is not surprising that those who find themselves depicted as villains in these stories consider the system of censorship not as effective as it would seem from the outside. For the local authorities in Chengdu, Shenyang, Harbin, and Fuzhou, these stories presented serious problems. In most of them, the relevant authorities were compelled at least to offer the appearance of responding to popular outrage. As noted earlier, the violence and intimidation directed at journalists reflects power-holders’ fear of the threat they pose. From these authorities’ point of view, the random nature of popular culture creates the possibility of new threats at any moment. Indeed, the profits that newspapers and Internet firms give the Party and government agencies that own them a major interest in promoting a flourishing popular culture. Being first to break the next big story brings big rewards, but means that more authorities in more places will suffer more problems. These stories demonstrate that large numbers of Chinese people are readily inclined to believe that police regularly abuse their authority, that poor people are likely to be cheated in courts, that the rich and powerful collude to defraud the public, and that censorship is used for arbitrary and selfish purposes. The reforms in the Chinese media thus far have made the system of censorship far more visible and seemingly much less legitimate than it was under the velvet prison. It is at least possible that the Chinese media will eventually reach a point where praetorian regulation will no longer succeed. Notes The author would like to thank Merle Goldman for her close reading of this chapter, Wang Ke for invaluable assistance as a research assistant, Leslie Spencer-Herrera for copy editing and general editorial assistance, and Joseph Fewsmith for some helpful suggestions. The author also


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owes much to Liu Qing with whom he has previously collaborated on related research and writing. None of these individuals, however, are responsible for any of the opinions or interpretations found in these pages. 1. Unfortunately, this chapter does not allow the time or space to include a satisfactory account of the complex stratification of the Chinese media. There are gender-based differences in periodical readership and Internet usage. Income levels influence access to media. Unemployed workers and poor farmers, e.g., find television more affordable than newspapers, and thus get a narrower spectrum of more tightly controlled news. Educational attainment such as Internet literacy or the ability to use computers, browsers, search engines, word processors, and so forth is of special salience. Major urban centers offer a relatively rich media environment with cable television, broadband Internet, and hundreds of magazines and newspapers, while rural areas have far more limited media. Stratification may mean that white-collar property owners organizing against a developer who has violated their property rights will enjoy greater access to legal information and the ability to use e-mail lists and web pages to organize collective action than farmers who may live in villages where only a few people read newspapers. 2. The term “praetorian” comes from Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 3. Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998). 4. “2003 nian zhongguo guanggaoye tongji shuju fenxi” (2003 China Advertising Industry Statistical Analysis), Zhonghua Xinwen Bao (China Newspaper), July 5, 2004, cited in “Zhongguo yu xifang baoye jingji jiegou bijiao—Ruidian baoye guancha yu sisuo” (Comparing the Economic Structure of Chinese and Western Newspaper Industries—Observations and Thoughts on the Swedish Newspaper Industry), August 9, 2004, from MediaUndo, www.mediaundo.com, accessed August 12, 2004. 5. Sun Yanjun, China Newspaper Industry (Baoye Zhongguo), n. 1, February 2002, cited in Ouyang Zhongzhong, “Baozhi meiti zhanhuo lianlian” (The Flames of War in Newspaper Media Over and Over), September 17, 2003, from Sina.com, http://www.sina.com.cn, accessed August 22, 2004. 6. For a short history of the reforms at China Youth Daily, see Zhang Liwei, “Jintian jiu jingzheng weilai! Wo guo baoye fazhan ruogan qushi yu jingzheng duice” (“Compete for the Future Today! Some Strategies for Dealing with Trends and Competition in the Development of Our Country’s Newspaper Industry”), August 11, 2004, from MediaChina.net, http://academic.mediachina.net, accessed October 1, 2004. 7. Mark Lee, “South Africa’s Naspers to take 40pc of Beijing Media issue,” The Standard, December 13, 2004, www.thestandard.com.hk, accessed December 13, 2004. 8. “Probe into Corruption Claim at Beijing Media,” South China Morning Post, November 25, 2005. Retrieved from AsiaMedia, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/ on December 7, 2005 and “Trading Halted in Media Firm Shares,” Shanghai Daily, November 30, 2005. Retrieved from www.shanghaidaily.com on December 7, 2005. 9. This is the Beida Jade Bird Group. See http://www.westps.net/qyzy/huanyu/ jianjie.htm. 10. Sophie Beach, “In China, New Journalism and New Threats,” Committee to Protect Journalists, August 24, 2004, www.cpj.org, accessed August 24, 2004.

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11. Huang Shengmin, Da bianju: zhongguo chuanmei shichang (A New Century of China Media Markets) (Beijing: Zhong xin chuban she, 2003), pp. 179–180. 12. For a picture of that first page, see “Let the Tabloid Wars Begin,” Danwei, November 12, 2003, http://www.danwei.org/archives/000380.html, accessed July 25, 2004. 13. Running Dog, “Censored in a Fundamental Manner,” January 8, 2006. Retrieved from Danwei, www.danwei.org, January 8, 2006. 14. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Progressive Newspaper Publisher,” January 3, 2006. Retrieved from Congressional-Executive Commission on China, www.cecc.gov, February 3, 2006, and Reporters Without Borders, “Restless Journalists at Beijing News Kept under Close Surveillance,” January 3, 2006. Retrieved from Reporters Without Borders, www.rsf.org, February 3, 2006. 15. Reporters Without Borders, China—2004 Annual Report, www.rsf.org, accessed October 10, 2004. 16. Committee to Protect Journalists, “China, Cuba, Two African Nations are Top Jailers of Journalists,” December 13, 2005. Retrieved from www.cpj.org, March 28, 2006. 17. Reporters Without Borders, Internet Under Surveillance 2004: China, www.rsf.org, accessed August 9, 2004. 18. Reporters Without Borders, China—2004 Annual Report, op cit. 19. Beach, “In China, New Journalism, New Threats.” In one such incident in 2005, Wu Xianghu, deputy editor of the Taizhou Wanbao, died following an assault by Taizhou traffic police who were embarrassed by an expose. “Newspaper Editor Dies After Police Beating,” February 6, 2006. Retrieved from Committee to Protect Journalists, www.cpj.org, March 28, 2006. 20. Mark Magnie, “Chinese Weekly Editors Refuse to Leave Quietly,” Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2006. Retrieved from www.latimes.com, February 20, 2006; and Chen Jieren, “Boring Games and Despicable Maneuvers” (Wuliao de youxi beiliede zhiliang), February 10, 2006. Retrieved from Academic Criticism (Xueshu piping wang), www.acriticism.com, February 13, 2006. 21. Miklos Haraszti, The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism (London: Tauris, 1988). See also George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979). 22. Zeng Qinghong, “A Programmatic Document for Strengthening the Party’s Ability to Govern: Study and Implement the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party Committee, Strengthen the Party’s Ability to Govern,” People’s Daily (Internet Version), October 8, 2004, trans. in “Zeng Qinghong Lauds Decision of Fourth Plenum On Party’s Ability to Govern,” FBIS. 23. Zhan Jiang, “Xinwen yu xuanchuan: mao he er shen li” (“News and Propaganda: Seemingly in Harmony But Actually at Odds”), www.cctv.com, accessed October 10, 2004. 24. Jiao Guobiao, “Taofa Zhongxuanbu” (“Declaration of the Campaign against The Central Propaganda Department”), available in translation at EastSouthWestNorth, May 5, 2004, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/weblog.htm, accessed June 23, 2004 and in the original language at Guancha (China Information Center, April 9, 2004), http://www.guancha.org, accessed June 23, 2004. 25. Anonymous interview, China 2004. The name of the periodical has been withheld to protect the source. 26. “Zhongguo meiti jiedao Zhongxuanbu ‘shi buzhun’ tongzhi” (“Chinese Media Receives Notification of the Central Propaganda Department’s ‘10 Prohibitions’ Communique”), Kan Zhongguo (Secret China News), August 12, 2004, www.secretchina.com, accessed August 18, 2004.


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27. Lynch, After the Propaganda State. 28. These include Li Datong of Freezing Point and Chen Jieren of Public Interest News as noted earlier. 29. Cited in Beach, “In China, New Journalism, New Threats.” 30. Nina Hachigian, “The Internet and One-Party East Asian States,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, summer 2002, pp. 41–58; Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Open Networks Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 31. In addition to Hachigian and Kalathil whose works were cited earlier, two other scholars whose works emphasize the Party’s successful management of the Internet and hence deserve attention are Karsten Giese, “Internet Growth and the Digital Divide,” eds. Christopher Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, in China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap Forward (London: RoutledgeCourzon, 2003), pp. 30–57; and Nico Volland, “A Harbinger of the New(s): The Chinese Internet and the Media,” paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, 2003, especially pp. 7–11. 32. For accounts of Cicso, Nortel, and other Western firms in China, see Ethan Gutmann, “Up Against the Firewall,” Red Herring, November 8, 2002, www.redherring.com, accessed December 12, 2002; and Gregor Walton, “China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China,” International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/ goldenShieldEng.html, accessed October 24, 2001. For an account of Yahoo’s voluntary pledge to cooperate, see “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China Internet Industry,” Digital Freedom Network, http://www.dfn.org/voices/china/ selfdiscipline.htm, accessed August 21, 2003. 33. “Google Omits Controversial News Stories in China,” NewScientist.com, September 21, 2004, www.newscientist.com, accessed October 7, 2004. For Google’s explanation, see “China, Google News and Source Inclusion,” Google Blog, September 27, 2004, http://www.google.com/googleblog/2004/09/china-googlenews-and-source-inclusion.html, accessed October 3, 2004. 34. Guo Liang, Approaching the Internet in Chinese Small Cities (Beijing: Research Center for Social Development, CASS, 2003). 35. Yongming Zhou, Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet and Political Participation in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 36. Ibid., chapter seven. 37. Xiao Qiang, “China’s Slashdot-Like Political Forum Closed by Authorities,” China Digital News, September 18, 2004, http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/ chinadn/en/archives/003087.html, accessed October 10, 2004. 38. Available at http://www.gongfa.com. 39. Available at http://www.cc.org.cn/newcc/index.php. 40. For an account of entrepreneurs in China’s high-tech sector, see David Sheff, China Dawn: The Story of a Technology and Business Revolution (New York: HarperBusiness, 2002). 41. For an account of that story, see Barrett McCormick and Qing Liu, “Globalization and the Chinese Media: Technologies, Content, Commerce and the Prospects for the Public Sphere,” ed. C.C. Lee, in Chinese Media, Global Contexts Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 139–158. 42. For accounts of the basic facts, see John Pomfret, “One Corrupt City Reflects Scourge Plaguing China,” Washington Post, March 6, 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org, accessed August 15, 2003; “Shenyang Gang Leader Liu Yong Gets Death Penalty,”

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44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53.

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55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

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People’s Daily Online, December 22, 2003, http://english.people.com.cn, accessed August 15, 2004; and “Mafia Kingpin Dies in Execution Van,” Taipei Times, December 28, 2003, http://www.taipeitimes.com, accessed August 15, 2003. Qiu Feng, “Sifa shenpan yu meiti baoda he yulun de guanxi xin tan—qian dui Liu Yong an de fail jiedu” (“Legal Proceedings with Media Reports and Public Opinion— A Dual Deciphering of Liu Yong Case”), Gongfa Pinglun (Legal Commentary), http://www.gongfa.com/zhouzesifayumeiti.htm, accessed July 18, 2004. Liu Di, “Adventure of ‘Stainless Steel Mouse’ on the Internet,” January 28, 2004, from www.weijingsheng.org, accessed February 20, 2004. The author thanks H. Richard Friman for his useful insights on Harrison’s series. Paul Tomlinson, August 1999, Stainless Steel Rat Series, http://www.iol.ie/~ carrollm/ hh/n02.htm, accessed August 7, 2004. Stainless Steel Mouse, “Zhongguo ren de quanlizhuyi renge” (“The Authoritarian Personality of the Chinese People”), http://www.boxun.com, accessed August 10, 2004. A copy of this letter was accessed from http://xinsheng.net/xs/articles/gb/2003/1/ 21/19335.htm on October 15, 2004. “Zui xin qianming: guanyu Liu Di zhi quan guo renda daibiao dahui ji zhengxie weiyuan de gongkai xin” (“The Most Recent Signings: An Open Letter to the National People’s Congress and the Political Consultative Conference on Liu Di’s Case”), http://www.boxun.com, accessed August 6, 2004. “Chinese Net Cases Run Into Legal Challenges,” AFP, November 3, 2003, http:// uk.news.yahoo.com, accessed November 3, 2003. Harry Harrison, The Stainless Steel Rat for President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 73. “The Story of Li Siyi—Tragedy in a ‘Cold-Natured System,’” The Epoch Times, September 9, 2003, http://english.epochtimes.com, accessed August 20, 2004. As recently as February of 2004, this page was available at www.lisiyi.org. A site at that address was “cached” by Google on that date, but is no longer available at that address or from Google. However, at the time of this writing, http:// lisiyi.host86.com/ appears to be a mirror of that site. Anonymous, “Guanyu Li Siyi zhi si: buneng yi cangying xunzang” (“On the Death of Li Siyi: Do Not Bury the Fly Alive with the Dead”), July 23, 2003, www.netor.com, accessed September 15, 2004. For a good summary of the incident, see Raymond Zhou, “BMW Drives Wedge Between Rich, Poor,” China Daily, January 18, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn, accessed January 20, 2004. Nailene Chou Wiest, “Reports of Rumour and Prejudice,” South China Morning Post, January 17, 2004. Retrieved from Nexis-Lexis, October 1, 2004. Zhou, “BMW Drives Wedge.” “Roaring BMW: Was it ‘road rage’ or an accident?,” People’s Daily Online, January 6, 2004, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn, accessed August 10, 2004. Philip Pan, “The Unquiet Death of a Chinese Peasant,” Washington Post, January 16, 2004. Retrieved from Nexis-Lexis, August 15, 2004. Ibid. For an example of how newspapers covered this story, see “Three Cheated Lottery Winners Get Their BMWs in the End,” Danwei, July 13, 2004, www.danwei.org, accessed July 15, 2004. A translation of Huang Jingao’s letter, “Why I Wore A Bullet-Proof Vest For The Last Six Years” is available from EastSouthWestNorth, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/ weblog.htm, accessed September 1, 2004.


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63. Xiao Qiang, “Huang Jingao’s Open Letter and More,” China Digital News, August 17, 2004, http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/chinadn/en/archives/002831.html, accessed August 20, 2004. 64. A translation of the Fuzhou City authorities’ statement, “The Fujian Authorities Respond to the Huang Jingao Affair,” was retrieved from EastSouthWestNorth at http://www.zonaeuropa.com/weblog.htm on October 20, 2004. 65. Huang Jingao, “Why I Wore A Bullet-Proof Vest.” 66. “The Fujian Authorities Respond.” 67. Ibid. 68. Comments left on Sina on August 12, 2004 and retrieved August 14, 2004. 69. “Let the Law Become the Bullet-Proof Vest,” Legal Report broadcast on Beijing CCTV-1, August 16, 2004, translated in FBIS CPP20040817000080. 70. Manfred Elfstrom, “Investigation of Huang Jin’gao Surrounded in Secrecy,” China Elections and Governance, February 21, 2005, retreived from www.chinaelections.org on February 21, 2005. 71. Duan Hongqing, “Legal and Political Connections Behind Huang Jingao’s Undetermined Fate” (Huang Jingao an weiliaoju geren mingyun beihou tu xian fazheng shenke guanxi), Caijing Bao and Hexun.com November 29, 2005, retrieved from http://news.hexun.com on January 15, 2006. 72. Edward Cody, “Chinese Journalist Stands Trial for Exposing Cover-Up,” Washington Post, January 19, 2006, retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com on January 20, 2006, and “Li Changqing gets three years in prison for ‘alarmist information,’” Reporters Without Borders, January 26, 2006. Retrieved from www.rsf.org on March 29, 2006.


CHAPTER 7

The Internet and Political Participation in China Bo Li and Yang Zhong

Introduction Since 1998, China has become a fast-growing Internet market. The number of Internet users has been doubling every six months. A report published by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) revealed that by December 2005 about 111 million Chinese citizens, or 8 percent of China’s population, were Internet users.1 With the access to the Internet, news reaches Chinese users from diversified sources and people are able to learn about politics, form opinions, and communicate with others in a new and unprecedented way. Interesting questions to be asked are whether the Internet has expanded Chinese people’s political freedom and participation and how. A related question is whether the Chinese government will be able to effectively control this new form of political participation. These are the questions we will explore in this chapter. As observed in recent years, the Internet has led Chinese society into a new era. Some interesting studies have shown that the rising awareness of civil rights is to a great extent associated with news dissemination on the Internet. 2 The Internet has encouraged Chinese citizens to protect their civil rights as well as to voice concerns for others whose civil rights are violated. Some social problems of major interest to Chinese citizens, specifically social injustice and official corruption, have quickly been publicized via the Internet. News concerning inhumanity and injustice has fueled people’s critical opinions toward social institutions and government officials. Disadvantaged social groups have found ways through the Internet to appeal to higher authorities and gather support from other citizens who might have the same experience. The Internet,

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as some researchers have argued, has become for many a last stand of freedom and justice. The Chinese government is apparently ambivalent about the Internet. On the one hand, the Internet has become an inalienable part of the Chinese economy and has played an indispensable role in continuing the rapid economic growth in China and linking the Chinese economy to the world economy. Yet, the Chinese government is no doubt fearful of the use of Internet in the public realm and considers it as a real threat to its solid control of the press. The government has adopted severe regulations on Internet content. Access to the Internet is also strictly controlled by the state.3 Cyber censorship is a much more low-cost option to the authorities as compared to traditional media. In the past few years, the Chinese government has closed some Internet sites that were accused of being involved in political activities such as discussing the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration, sympathizing with political dissidents, or criticizing governmental policies on important issues.4 The authorities have also introduced a number of technologies to block emails, filter politically sensitive news, and control search engines.5 The government has also required all Internet content providers (ICPs) and public Internet service providers (ISPs) to install filtering software which block foreign websites. We argue in this chapter that the use of the Internet is a new form of political participation in China. Millions of Chinese use the Internet to voice their opinions in a way they cannot do otherwise. In fact, Internet opinion pages have become the new form of “big character posters,” which were used during the Cultural Revolution. Often opinions expressed via the Internet are critical of the Chinese government and officials at various levels. The news that is spread on the Internet by private citizens conflicts with the Party’s propaganda. With access to the Internet, Chinese are able to connect to the outside world, which looks different from the depictions of the Party-controlled media. As observed in recent political events, the Internet is definitely changing Chinese society and politics. It should be mentioned that this topic is not an easy subject to study since the data is very limited. This research is only a preliminary and explorative effort to assess the impact of the Internet on Chinese politics and political participation. In the following sections of this chapter, we will first discuss forms of political participation in China and how the use of the Internet fits as a new form of political participation. Our main effort will be devoted to the discussion of the model and implications of cyber–political participation in China. Political Participation in China: Definitions, Modes, and Trends Political participation is defined here as activities conducted by the masses aiming at influencing governmental decisions, policies, or personnel. As we know, the political environment in China is very different from that in Western democratic countries. Political participation in China is, therefore, quite different from that usually accepted in the West. The differences exist both in the sphere and models that Chinese people use to articulate their interests and the way

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political scientists characterize their activities as political behaviors. There is no consensus on the definition of political participation. Some researchers believe that only formal and legal activities, which are aimed at influencing governmental personnel selection or policies, can be defined as political participation.6 This definition of political participation is obviously quite narrow and excludes activities that might not be deemed legal but still intend to influence politics. In most situations, however, options available for the masses to influence decision-makers are not always allowed by the law, specifically in communist societies. Disadvantaged social groups usually find that they have to commit actions that are not comfortably accepted by the advantageous groups of the society. In this sense, limiting political participation to only legal activities is not very useful for studying political participation in authoritarian countries such as China. In his study on Chinese political participation, Tianjian Shi dropped “legal” from his definition of political participation “because many political activities frequently used by citizens in China, such as slowdowns on work sites, sending gifts, and using instrumental personal relationships (guanxi) in exchange for favors, are quasi-legal but nonetheless important forms for people to assert their interests.”7 For many Chinese, legal ways to articulate their interests do not usually work, specifically when their interests conflict with those in the government. In this situation, legal ways are usually blocked by the authorities. When ordinary people try to express competitive interests, they face revenge from the authorities. They usually have no choice but to engage in illegal activities such as mass demonstrations or riots. Political participation is also defined as independent and autonomous activities that are different from activities mobilized and controlled by the government. It is now widely accepted that the study of political participation should focus on the upward influence from the masses, which is aimed not to support the existing conditions but rather to change or at least influence them.8 Modernization theories argue that social development increases the interaction between the state and society.9 Economic development expands the government’s ability to touch people’s lives. Therefore, individuals are forced or, to some extent, encouraged to participate in politics, and by doing so, they can best articulate, protect, and expand their civil rights. Social mobilization theory gives a good explanation on the strong correlation of political participation and economic development. This theory argues that economic development fuels people’s political opinions. The relationship between economic prosperity and rising political participation is obvious. As citizens become more educated, they are more likely to articulate their interests through political participation.10 The development of a civil society, which is a reasonable result of rapid economic development, encourages people to articulate their interests through participation in the policy-making process.11 The Chinese do not participate in the political process the way citizens in Western democracies do. They choose to articulate their interests through informal channels and, by doing so, avoid confronting the government directly. On the other hand, as many researchers have noticed, the Chinese state has set various constraints, institutionally or ideologically, to block citizens from expressing

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their interests collectively. Although the Chinese government has mobilized people frequently in Party-sponsored political movements, the authorities also realize that large-scale mobilized gatherings have the risk of social turbulence.12 The Cultural Revolution is a nightmare that few people in China want to go through again. Beginning in the early 1980s, social stability has been highlighted as the most important political goal for the Party. Therefore, channels of political expressions provided by the state are “preempting rather than facilitating autonomous interest articulation.”13 It is also well noted that in the history of communist China, private interests are purposely eliminated or at least shadowed by national or collective interests. For example, for a long time, appeals containing purely private interests are simply deemed as inappropriate behavior and institutionally denied by the state. Political participation can be divided into different modes. Some studies divide political participation based on the sphere in which the activities take place. For instance, Verba, Nie, and Kim distinguish four modes of political participation: voting, campaign activity, communal activities, and particular contacts.14 This kind of division is compatible with Western democracies while inadequate for any insightful study on China or the former Soviet Union. Chinese people are not allowed to openly express political dissent. They cannot organize any interest groups to bargain with the government for their particular interests. Although Chinese adults are enfranchised, they can only elect the candidate chosen by the government. Voting, to a great extent, is an expression of loyalty for the people and a testing of public opinion (“minyiceyan”) for the government-selected candidate. As Andrew Walder points out, “Individual members of subordinate social groups pursue their interests not by banding together for coordinated group actions, but by cultivating ties based on the exchange of loyalty and advantage with individuals of higher status and power.”15 Modes of Chinese political participation are complicated. The unique characteristics of the Chinese political system lead many to search for alternative patterns of political participation. Recently, many insightful studies have been done in this regard.16 For example, Tianjian Shi identifies the appeal activity as a major mode of political participation in China. Shi points out that “appeals involve citizens meeting with government officials at various levels or with danwei leaders.”17 Appeal activities involve direct contacts with work unit leaders or government officials. Appeals might be conducted through the writing of letters to newspapers and government officials or by complaining to higher levels of the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats in China are required by the Party’s disciplines to “listen to people’s voices.” In this sense, appeals are encouraged rather than blocked in Chinese politics. Voting and campaign activities are also widely studied by researchers.18 Most of these studies have focused on village elections in China in the last twenty years. There are still many restrictions and manipulations in the village election process, even though they vary from one place to another. For instance, in their study of village elections in southern Jiangsu province, Yang Zhong and Jie Chen found that village elections were organized by the village Communist Party committee, but the elected village committee was still subordinate to the


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village Party committee and the Party secretary.19 In urban local People’s Congress elections, Chinese voters have an even weaker impact on the outcome given that the candidates are selected by the Party and there are virtually no campaign activities by the candidates. However, people do have the option of abstaining from voting as a way to protest the official-controlled electoral process.20 Other participatory acts frequently conducted by the Chinese include adversarial activities, resistance, and cronyism.21 These are primarily individual-based activities. It is the Chinese institutional setting that alters people’s participatory acts. As Walder puts it, the Chinese political system channels citizens’ political activities into individual efforts.22 Individual-based political participatory activities are more likely to be resolved within the political system. Scholars have also found that mass political participations are divided into two different processes, “one being an older elite-directed mode” and “the other a newer elite-challenging mode.”23 In the case of China, the older elite-directed mode is seldom observed in today’s politics. The newer elite-challenging mode, however, is on its way to China’s politics. Political Participation through the Internet

Internet users (100,000)

Since 1998, China has become the fastest-growing Internet market (see figure 7.1). Internet users in China grew from one half million in mid-1997 to one hundred and eleven million by December 2005.24 In early 1987, the e-mail system was made available to Chinese citizens. Since 1995, Chinese authorities have begun permitting commercial Internet accounts. Personal homepage accounts were provided by commercial Internet websites no later than 1996. The Chinese government is one of the main forces promoting the Internet expansion.25 As various official documents show, the Chinese government is

1110.0

1200.0 940.0

1000.0 795.0 800.0 591.0 600.0 337.0

400.0

225.0

200.0 6.2

21.0

1997

1998

89.0

0.0

Figure 7.1

1999

2000 2001 Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

Number of Internet users in China* (per 100,000).

An Internet user is defined as a Chinese citizen, aged six or above, who uses the Internet at least one hour per week. Source: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Statistical Survey Report on Internet development in China (1998–2006).

158


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Hour

pursuing a “knowledge-based” economy. New technologies are welcome by the Chinese government. There are several characteristics of Internet use in China. One of them is the relative low access fee. The Internet access fee for Chinese citizens has been declining significantly since 1995. An Internet user paid more than 125 Chinese yuan ($16.1) to acquire 10 hours of Internet access in 1995. In 2005, a 10-hour Internet access cost only 25 Chinese yuan ($3.2). Average accessing time per week of Chinese Internet users increased from 8.5 hours in 2001 to 15.9 hours in 2006 (figure 7.2). According to the CNNIC, 38 percent of Internet users spent less than 50 Chinese yuan ($6.50) on Internet access by the end of 2005. Many Internet cafes only charge 3–4 yuan per hour. The decreasing Internet access fee attracts some low-income social groups. In 2004, one-third of Chinese Internet users had access to the Internet at home (figure 7.3). Another characteristic of Internet use in China is that young people are its main users (figure 7.4). Still another characteristic is that the majority of Internet users tend to be college graduates, even though an increasing number of noncollege graduates are becoming Internet users (figures 7.5 and 7.6). One direct result from the Internet expansion is the dissemination of news from different Internet sources. Internet services most frequently used by Chinese netizens (Internet users) are e-mails and news. Since the first publication of the CNNIC statistical survey report on the Internet development in China, news has been identified by Chinese Internet users as the most frequently inquired information, except for 1998 when it was second only to technology information (see table 7.1). The 1999 January CNNIC report revealed that two-thirds of Chinese Internet users acquired political and economic news through the Internet. The Internet did not play a role in news coverage until 1996 when commercial Internet websites began to attract customers through providing immediate news for free. Although the Chinese

17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7

15.9 13.4

13.2

9.8 8.5 2001.12

2002.12

2003.12

2004.12

2005.12

Year Figure 7.2

Average hours per week of accessing the Internet by Chinese Internet users.

Source: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Statistical Survey Report on Internet development in China (2006).

159 80.0 70.0

Percent

60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 Home

Office

School

Internet Café

Public Library

Mobile Access

Others

Location Figure 7.3

Main locations of accessing the Internet by Chinese Internet users.


41–50 8%

51–60 3%

Above60 1% Under18 16%

36–40 8%

31–35 11%

18–24 35%

25–30 18%

Figure 7.4

Age distribution of Chinese Internet users.


Masterate 3%

Doctorate 0%

Bachelor 28%

Junior College 27% Figure 7.5

Under High School 13%

High School 29%

Educational levels of Chinese Internet users.

Source: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Statistical Survey Report on Internet Development in China (2005).

●


r

r

O th e

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an

ie

t

r as Pe

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to r

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m

w

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or

oy

ke

ed

er ch ne U

G ov

er

Te a

to nm

en

m e is

pr te r En

ffi c

er ag

er gi

an

ne

en En

St ud

er

35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 t

Percent

160

Occupation Figure 7.6 Occupations of Chinese Internet users. Source : China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Statistical Survey Report on Internet development in China (2005).

Table 7.1 Percentage of news gathering by Chinese Internet users

Percentage Ranking

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

66.0 2nd

65.5 1st

84.4 1st

74.0 1st

78.0 1st

70.9 1st

74.2 1st

67.9 1st

Source: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Statistical Survey Report on Internet development in China (1998–2006).

government prohibits websites from employing journalists or publishing information without official approval, commercial websites can report reedited news purchased from official news agencies.26 The strategy for a commercial website to get news sources is to sign a contract with such official news agencies as Xinhua News Agency, China News Services (CNS), Beijing Daily Group, or Nanfang Daily Group. Although these official news outlets are directly controlled by the State Council or local governments, they can retail news to a third party. For financial reasons, they allow commercial websites to use their news sources after being paid an annual fee ranging from ten thousand to one hundred thousand Chinese yuan. Commercial websites can purchase news sources from these news outlets because the stateowned enterprise (SOE) reform has unyoked these news agencies from tight financial control of the government. News agencies have been told by the government to become self-sufficient, that is, profit-oriented. Since most provincial and municipal government news agencies are still considered the “voice of the Party,” they cannot become too commercialized and profit-oriented. For this reason, and as a way to adapt to the market economy, they have established websites and branch papers. Selling news sources to commercial websites is an


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effective way to generate extra income. Moreover, commercial websites have promised to protect their copyrights over the news resources. Although the commercial websites have to purchase their news from official news agencies, they can edit the news to their liking on certain issues. Moreover, the Internet has no national boundaries. With Internet access, some overseas-based websites (especially the non-Chinese language websites) can also be reached by Chinese citizens. These overseas websites report Chinese issues or Chinese-concerned issues in a more straightforward way. Chinese citizens exposed to these websites can compare their news coverage with those of the official Chinese media. A noteworthy event was the Iraq War. The Chinese people’s view on the war changed considerably after they were exposed to CNN coverage. During the Iraq War, Chinese intelligentsia was split on the war. A group of intellectuals, including independent writers, college teachers, and political scientists, labeled the war as a freedom operation eliminating a dictatorship. They debated with their opponents on the Internet. For the first time since 1989, Chinese people heard a different voice criticizing the official position on a major issue. That voice would have been muted were it not for the Internet. Another good example was the news coverage of the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis during which the official media played an ignominious role. Chinese official media, constrained by the political system, initially blocked news about the epidemic to Chinese citizens.27 Internet websites, mostly commercial sites, broke the news through their Bulletin Board System (BBS) or direct e-mails. After the government had to publicize the emergency under pressure from international organizations, the official media were condemned for blocking the news and placing people in dangerous situations. More importantly, the Internet medium has become a major vehicle for the Chinese to engage in political participation. With the access to the Internet, people can read news and post their comments. In fact, all major websites such as Tom.com, Netease.com, and Sina.com allow readers to post comments after each news item. Hundreds of thousands of comments are posted everyday on those websites. Most of them are critical in nature. The limits seem to be that you cannot openly challenge the ruling status of the Chinese Communist Party and you cannot criticize key officials by name. People can also post their own articles on the BBS. The Internet medium enables Chinese citizens to express their own opinions on many issues. Online forums are flourishing in China. Posting an article on the BBS is nothing different from writing a big-character poster and posting it on the community’s bulletin board. Writing comments on news coverage or posting articles on the BBS to express one’s opinions is the new form of political participation in China. This kind of political participation may not be as powerful as demonstrating in front of a government building or voting for a public official. However, Internet political participation does give people a chance to have their voices heard and to vent their anger. As Hirschman points out, in addition to the “exit option,” people do want to voice their opinions.28 People’s desire for expressing themselves will become stronger when the exit option is actually expensive. They also demand action by governmental authorities

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to solve problems. Many Internet-posted comments and BBS articles criticize official behaviors, policies, or bad regulations. Some even provide suggestions and alternative policies. For Chinese citizens, openly criticizing government officials or policies can be dangerous. Criticisms online, however, are much safer because the net user’s identity is relatively difficult to track down. The growing Internet has also become a major venue for political and social mobilization in China. Chinese citizens can aggregate their interests and exert considerable pressure on the government. People can go through the Internet collectively and independently accumulate a social force that the government cannot ignore. Internet aggregation does not involve physical organizations or pressure groups. Therefore, it is difficult for the government to disperse the aggregated mass opinions. The Chinese government is not ready to totally ban posting on the Internet. One case of people forming interest articulation groups on the Internet was reported by Xinjingbao, a local Beijing newspaper.29 According to the report, a group of residents in a well-to-do neighborhood were fed up with a trash dumping ground across the street from the neighborhood and formed an online “protecting your rights” group. It was started by one resident who noticed that trash pickers often burned trash on the trash ground and the smell could easily reach her neighborhood. She started to complain to local authorities, but received little reaction. She felt that the best way to get things done was to organize fellow residents in the neighborhood through the Internet. Thus, an online interest articulation group was born. They discussed the issues online and offered strategies to deal with the authorities. They even offered a reward of five thousand Chinese yuan to anybody who would catch the trash pickers’ burning trash. Their efforts paid off. Due to the group’s intensive lobbying, the local authorities promised to turn the trash ground into a green area in the near future. Such interest-promotion activities using the Internet vis-a-vis governmental authorities are not uncommon in China today.30 Since most Internet users are college students or college graduates (see figure 7.6), it is not surprising that in China the most frequently raised issues are policy abuses. Among the numerous abuse events, the Sun Zhigang case is probably the most publicized one. On April 25, 2003, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, a well-known newspaper in China, reported the death of a young man named Sun Zhigang, a college graduate. Sun was believed to have died in police custody due to torture. According to various reports, which were later confirmed by the official media, Sun was stopped on his way to an Internet café by local police in the city of Shenzhen who asked him to show his identity card and temporary residential permit. The temporary residential permit (“zanzhuzheng”) was a local-police-issued document required for temporary workers from other provinces. Sun did not have his identity card with him at the time and had not yet obtained a temporary residential permit. Therefore, he was detained by the police in a local police station. He tried to convince the police that he was working for a local company and was a legal resident. However, nobody cared. Sun made several calls to his friends, and his boss went to the detention center to attempt to get him released. However, the next day Sun died


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of a heart attack in a medical clinic in the detention center. According to the article, “Sun’s previous medical history had shown no sign of heart problems.”31 Therefore, his death did not appear to be a natural one. The autopsy center of Guangzhou’s Zhongshan University issued a report on April 18 indicating that Sun had died of shock, and that he had been severely beaten before he died. The news story by the Southern Metropolitan Daily was circulated widely on the Internet. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese netizens commented on the report and asked the government to investigate the case. The public pressure and attention resulting from this case led the central government to turn migrant worker detention centers into voluntary service centers and eventually to abolish the temporary residence permit system. On January 28, 2005, the Guangdong province’s Supreme People’s Court reached its final decision to sentence the people involved in Sun’s death to either death or life in prison. The Sun Zhigang case shows that the Internet is a powerful venue to gather social forces to have an impact on government officials’ behavior and policies. Government authorities in China are more likely to respond to online pressures than otherwise since online public opinion travels fast and furthest and is hard to ignore. Had it not been for the Internet, Sun’s case might have never received much attention and the policy of temporary residency permits would not have been abolished. Indeed, social justice is a major issue frequently raised and discussed on the Internet. The BMW killer case is another much publicized case. On October 16, 2003, a peasant woman driving a tractor was run over by a car. The case was settled in court on December 20 when the police determined that it was a simple accident, and the family of the victim accepted the compensation offered by the driver. However, the car in this case was a BMW driven by a woman named Su who was suspected of having connections to an influential local official. BMW is also a strong symbol of wealth and power in China. The victim, on the other hand, was a poor peasant woman. One rumor was that the BMW driver chased the peasant woman and ran her over after the initial collision between the car and the tractor. In the eyes of many people, the court’s decision favored the rich and powerful. This touched a sensitive national nerve. The BMW story first broke online. For quite a while, local media in the city of Harbin (where the incident happened) and Heilongjiang province (where Harbin is located) kept silent. Internet users started posting the story on BBS and forums. After the initial online report, more than two hundred thousand messages were posted to chat rooms, with many suggesting corruption was to blame. Eventually, the mainstream press joined the discussion. The Internet chat rooms and forums took over the case as an example of impunity for the rich and powerful. It snowballed into a rage, with most people accusing the rich and powerful of trampling on disadvantaged groups. The BMW and the tractor stacked with vegetables driven by the poor peasant woman were viewed as symbols of the haves and the have-nots. Internet users distributed pictures of the scene with comments on many Chinese BBS and websites. Pushed by public opinion as disseminated on the Internet, local governmental departments in Heilongjiang province and Harbin city agreed to conduct an

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investigation into the BMW case three months after the accident. This was a rare concession by Chinese officials who are accustomed to ignoring public opinion. The government’s reaction highlighted the challenge the Internet poses for Chinese authorities. The investigation would not have happened had it not been for the discussions and anger expressed on the Internet. In 2003, there were more than ten online aggregative events.32 Online aggregative events further increased in 2004. These events were mostly cases involving police abuse, corruption, crime, and social injustice. Although no case had as direct a result as Sun Zhigang’s, they together have created a new form of public opinion forum in China, which is called the Internet opinion. Interest aggregation through the Internet has become a unique and semiformal phenomenon and has entered the Chinese public discourse. This online aggregation has had a visible impact on the Chinese society and the government. It should be noted that for most Chinese citizens, there is no systematic way to politically participate in the policy-making process. Chinese citizens cannot openly express their political opinions or protect their private interests through official channels. When online discussions on certain events are acquiesced by the government, people know that the topics are within the limits of the government’s political tolerance. Then, the official media will also participate in the heated discussion and report. In this sense, the Internet media is the locomotive for China’s freedom of press. In fact, the Internet has also liberated, to some degree, the official media from the tight control of the government. Since the official media are owned or managed by the government, they are not likely to touch upon sensitive issues or debates without the help of Internet chat rooms. With the current official political limits and constraints, these Internet opinions have also reduced the risks for the official media to report on these issues. The BMW case is a good example.

Chinese Government Response to the Internet Phenomena The Chinese government faces a dilemma in dealing with the Internet. On the one hand, it does not want to go as far as banning all forms of public discussion and posting on the Internet. Former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji even admitted that the use of information technology was vital for the economy and social development.33 On the other hand, the Chinese government certainly does not want to give up control over the Internet. Realizing the potential dangers that free Internet usage can pose, the Chinese government has intensified its efforts to control Internet content through legal regulations.34 An Internet police force and a powerful national information filtering system have been established in recent years.35 Control of the Internet in China is implemented in several ways. The government has developed laws enabling the authorities to regulate netizens. Internet cafés have been shut down and people have been jailed for breaking laws and regulations over “improper behaviors” in cyberspace.36 The government is also trying to use official websites to propagandize its ideology


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and policies.37 However, many official websites, such as the People’s Daily, do not draw as many readers as the unofficial, commercial or personal sites. Chinese governmental control over the Internet has evolved over the years. The earliest regulatory instruments appeared to be concerned with the security and the healthy flow of information. A number of administrative regulations governing telecommunications and the Internet were introduced in 1994. The State Council issued the “Safety and Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems” (“jisuanji xinxi xitong anquan baohu tiaoli”). These regulations gave the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) overall responsibility to supervise the Internet, inspect and guide the security protection work. Quickly, however, the government realized that they misjudged the potential power of the Internet. In 1995, the Chinese government began to introduce measures to control the content of the Internet. At least eight separate ministries or government agencies involved in the Internet have been given the power and authority to monitor and control its use in China. They include the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Information Industry, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court, the Bureau for the Protection of State Secrets, the State Administration for Press and Publications, and the State Copyright Bureau. “Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations” (jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji hulianwang anquan baohu guanli banfa) were approved by the State Council in December 1997 and promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security on December 30, 1997. Under the new regulations, all Internet service providers (ISPs) and other businesses providing Internet access are required to report to the Public Security Bureau. Internet companies are required to provide monthly reports on the number of users, page views, and user profiles. ISPs and Internet content providers (ICPs) are also required to assist the Public Security Bureau in investigating violations of the law and regulations. Serious violations will result in the cancellation of the ISP license. As a result, some ISPs and ICPs have introduced self-censoring policies to deal with the implementation of these new regulations. Internet companies have hired webmasters to patrol chat rooms and bulletin boards to ensure observance of the regulations. A new set of statutes, “State Secrets Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems on the Internet” (“jisuanji xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding”), were issued by the Bureau for the Protection of State Secrets on January 25, 2000. The regulations prohibit the unauthorized release, discussion, or dissemination of “state secrets” on the Internet. They also apply to individuals and units when making use of BBS and chat rooms. Internet companies are under an obligation to report “harmful” content to the local Public Security Bureau. Many of these regulations, however, are blurred. Their implementation results in arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, sometimes torture, confiscation of equipment, and heavy fines. Since January 2001, those who are accused of providing “state secrets” over the Internet to overseas organizations and individuals may be sentenced to death. In September 2000, the State Council issued still another set of statutes, “The Telecommunications

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Regulations of the People’s Republic of China” (“dianxin tiaoli”), to regulate the use of Internet in China. The authorities are also engaged in blocking news sites including those created by dissidents or banned groups outside China. Many websites, considered containing politically sensitive information, such as those of human rights organizations and Falungong groups, are all inaccessible inside China.38 In late 2002, the popular search engine Google could no longer be accessed from China for several weeks due to its engagement in providing Internet users with searchable politically sensitive content and related websites. The Chinese government has also introduced new filtering systems to block inbound e-mails and overseas websites. Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman (2003) from Harvard Law School found that from May through November of 2002, 19,032 world websites were inaccessible in China. These sites contained information about politics, health, commerce, and entertainment. Conclusion The number of Chinese Internet users keeps growing at a record pace. The Internet has provided the Chinese people with an alternative source for news and an effective venue to engage in nontraditional political discussion and participation. As shown earlier, Chinese netizens have been eager to utilize this new vehicle to voice their opinions, to promote their interests, and to influence governmental policies. The unique characteristics of the Internet such as instantaneousness, anonymity, and lacking borders have made it a convenient and powerful vehicle for Chinese citizens to assert themselves and to have their voice heard in an institutionally less liberal and democratic environment. As demonstrated in both the Sun Zhigang and the BMW cases, interest aggregation on the Internet has successfully changed government policies and behavior. These positive outcomes further encourage Chinese citizens to engage in online political activities. The Chinese government’s attitude toward the Internet is quite ambivalent. On the one hand, it cannot afford to ban the Internet for economic and societal development reasons. In addition, the Internet also provides political benefits that serve the interest of the regime. For instance, allowing people to vent their anger and frustrations on the Internet is much less risky than people demonstrating on the streets. Internet posting and reporting of local news also bring to the attention of the central government issues that would otherwise be covered up by local officials. Moreover, the Chinese government has also taken advantage of the Internet to serve its own propaganda interests. On the other hand, however, the Chinese government is determined to prevent the Internet from becoming a destabilizing force to undermine its control of society. It is ready to build a firewall as high as possible to block undesirable websites. The government has been successful to a certain degree in controlling and regulating the Internet, including forcing foreign Internet providers such as Google to abide by its strict regulations and rules. It is a battle between the government’s desire to control and the technology that allows people to gain a certain degree of freedom. The outcome remains to be seen.


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Notes 1. China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Fifteenth Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, 2005, http://www.cnnic.cn/ download/2005/2005012701.pdf. 2. Bruce Bimber, “The Internet and Citizen Communication with Government: Does the Medium Matter?,” Political Communication, Vol. 16, 1999, pp. 409–428; Graeme Browning, Electronic Democracy: Using the Internet to Transform American Politics (Medford, NJ: CyberAge Book, 2002); Xiao Qiang, “The Rising Tide of Internet Opinion in China,” Nieman Reports, Vol. 58, 2004, pp. 103–104. 3. Michelle W. Lau, “Internet Development and Information Control in the People’s Republic of China,” CRS Report for Congress, received through the CRS website, 2005; “China to Step up Control of Internet Bars,” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Beijing, August 14, 2002; and “China Tightens Control of Internet Cafe’s,” Beijing, October 16, 2002. 4. “China Halts Approval of New Internet Bars until Late August,” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Beijing, August 13, 2002. 5. Assafa Endeshaw, “Internet Regulation in China: The Never-Ending Cat and Mouse Game,” Information & Communications Technology Law, Vol. 13, 2004, pp. 41–57; Lau, “Internet Development and Information Control”; Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China,” The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Research Publication No. 2003–2002. 6. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 7. Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 21. 8. Verba, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political Equality. 9. Karl W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, September 1961, pp. 493–514. 10. Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, 1969, pp. 361–378. 11. Myron Weiner, “Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process,” in Leonard Binder et al., eds., Crisis and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 159–204. 12. Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Richard H. Solomon, “On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conception of Motivation and Political Role Linking State to Society,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 39, 1969, pp. 76–114. 13. Victor C. Falkenheim, “Citizens and Group Politics in China: An Introduction,” in Victor C. Falkenheim, ed., Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1987), pp. 1–15. 14. Verba, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political Equality. 15. Andrew Walder, “Communist Social Structure and Workers’ Politics,” in Victor C. Falkenheim, ed., Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1981), pp. 45–89. 16. Falkenheim, “Citizens and Group Politics”; Tianjian Shi, “Survey Research in China,” in Michael Delli-Carpini, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro, eds., Rethinking Rationality, Research in Micropolitics, Vol. 5 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1996), pp. 213–250; Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); “Economic Development and Village Elections in Rural

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17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38.

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China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 8, 1999, pp. 425–442; and Generational Differences in Political Attitudes and Political Behaviour in China (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1999); Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote: An Analysis of Peasants’ Participation in Chinese Village Elections,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, 2002, pp. 686–712. Tianjian Shi, Political Participation, p. 198. Tianjian Shi, “Economic Development and Village Elections,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 8, 1999, 425–442; and “Voting and Nonvoting in China: Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited-Choice Elections,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, 1999, pp. 1115–1139; Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote,” pp. 686–712. Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote,” pp. 686–712. Ibid. Tianjian Shi, Political Participation, pp. 233–267. Walder, “Communist Social Structure,” p. 89. Ronald Inglehart and Hans D. Klingemann, “Ideological Conceptualization and Value Priorities,” in Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al., eds., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 203–213. China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Fifteenth Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, 2005. Xiao Qiang, “Cyber Speech: Catalyzing Free Expression and Civil Society,” Harvard International Review, summer 2003, pp. 70–75. Daniel A. Lapres, “Legal Dos and Don’ts of web use in China,” The China Business Review, Vol. 27, March/April 2000, pp. 26–27. Yuan Feng, “War Coverage in the Chinese Media: The Chinese People Saw Changes in the Way News of This War Was Brought to Them,” Nieman Reports, summer 2003, pp. 98–99. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 4. Xinjingbao, January 1, 2006, A, p. 9. Bimber, “The Internet and Citizen Communication.” Southern Metropolis Daily, April 25, 2003. Amnesty International, “State Control of The Internet in China,” November 26, 2002. Electronic source: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170072002. Ibid. Lau, “Internet Development and Information Control.” See Endeshaw, “Internet Regulation in China”; Reporters Without Borders, The Internet Under Surveillance, Report Project, ISBN: 2-90-8830-88-4; Zittrain and Edelman, “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering.” Lau, “Internet Development and Information Control.” See Endeshaw, “Internet Regulation in China”; Zittrain and Edelman, “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering.” Lau, “Internet Development and Information Control”; Amnesty International, January 28, 2004.

PART IV

China’s Foreign Policy


CHAPTER 8

The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 Gregory J. Moore

T

he 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was a time of great tension for Chinese and American policy-makers, a time when the two sides were reminded that Taiwan today remains the issue with the greatest potential to provoke armed conflict between China and the United States. China’s firing of missiles over the Taiwan Strait in the summer of 1995 and March 1996, coming as close as twenty-two miles to the heavily populated northeast coast of Taiwan, disrupted sea lanes and caused the Taiwan stock market to tumble. The U.S. naval show of force near Taiwan in March 1996, involving aircraft carriers Independence and Nimitz, cruisers Bunker Hill and Port Royal, two frigates, four destroyers, three submarines, and a number of other ships, was the largest American naval flotilla in the region since the end of the Vietnam War.1 While fortunately the events passed without devolving into war, the case is noteworthy for at least the following reasons. First, it involved the world’s reigning and rising powers—the United States and China, respectively. Whereas the United States is now the world’s only super- or even hyper-power, given Russia’s continued economic malaise and Europe’s greater cultural and valuational affinities with the United States, China seems to be the power most likely to be in a position to challenge America in the coming century. Consequently, the relations between these two giants are significant for the region and for international affairs in general. Second, the biggest potential flashpoint between these two powers, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved after more than fifty years and as China’s economic and military might grows and Taiwan’s identity changes, the potential is high that a conflict between them will come and that this could

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involve the United States. Coming to a better understanding of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, therefore, is more than an exercise in heuristics. Anything that can be gained by a better understanding of it and the interests at stake in it will be useful in helping China and the United States avoid war over Taiwan in coming years, as they seek to maintain their interests. The purpose of the larger study from which this research has evolved was an attempt to ascertain what interests were most salient for the two sides in this crisis and two others, and what factors were most important in shaping those interests and the trajectory of the crisis.2 The research included interviews with twenty-eight Chinese and thirty American experts on Sino-American relations, conducted in Beijing and Washington in 2002.3 As a result of this research, it became apparent that misperception and perceptual gaps played a significant role in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. This study will begin with an overview of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996, followed by an indepth study of the roles of misperception and perceptual gaps in the crisis, and ending with conclusions about the importance of these perceptual issues to the occurrence and/or evolution of the crisis. This study has led the author to conclude that given the likelihood that the Taiwan issue will not be resolved any time in the very near future, unless Chinese and American policy-makers become more adept at addressing problems of misperception, closing perceptual gaps, understanding more completely the domestic politics and interests of the other side, and acting with greater prudence in accordance with this information, the potential for conflict over Taiwan remains high. The Unfolding of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis Though the Taiwan issue as it exists today has its roots going back to at least 1949 when the Nationalists fled the Mainland to Taiwan,4 for most observers the 1995–1996 crisis began when President Bill Clinton granted a visa to Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui under Congressional pressure in May 1995. Most agree that this visit played the largest role in bringing about the Chinese military exercises and missile tests that occurred in the Taiwan Strait in July and August of 1995.5 The Chinese were incensed by Lee’s visit first, because they saw the visa as a policy flip-flop, for in February and again in April 1995 Secretary of State Warren Christopher had assured Chinese leaders that the United States would not allow Lee Teng-hui to visit the country. Second, the Chinese viewed Lee as using the visit to agitate for Taiwanese independence (which many would argue he did in his speech at Cornell University),6 and Chinese officials read the granting of the visa as American complicity. Qian Qichen said, No matter what intentions the United States may have had concerning Lee’s U.S. visit, facts have shown clearly that it was not at all a “private” and “unofficial” visit . . . Rather, it was a deliberately planned political act aimed at splitting China and advocating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”7

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Since the Chinese felt they could not stand by and do nothing, they began planning their response to this series of events and the crisis continued to unfold. On July 19 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced the commencement of a week-long series of live fire military exercises near Taiwan, which recommenced in August, including the “test-firing” of M-9 missiles into the sea just eighty–ninety miles north of Taiwan. The Chinese government denied any direct connection between the exercises and missile firings and the actions of Lee, but official Chinese statements made it clear that there was indeed a connection between the missile tests and Lee’s trip, and that the Chinese sought to show their displeasure through the symbolism of military exercises.8 Washington’s apparent response did not come until December with the passage of the Nimitz through the Taiwan Strait. While in interviews in Washington in June and July of 2002 no one could confirm that the Nimitz had passed through the Strait for any reason other than the official Pentagon explanation, that it had done so to avoid a storm on the other side of Taiwan, most of the Chinese and numerous American observers doubted that story. Among them was Robert Sutter, who said, “Discussions with Taiwan and U.S. officials in Taiwan in December 1995 led me to believe [the Nimitz’s passage through the Strait] was a deliberate decision—not weather related exclusively—designed to send a signal to the PRC.”9 The U.S. move was one of two main reasons Chinese leaders decided to conduct another series of military exercises in March 1996,10 the other being their hope of influencing Taiwan’s voters so that they would not vote for candidates favoring independence in Taiwan’s first democratic presidential elections on March 23. In early March, China announced another series of military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, which took place even closer to Taiwan than previously—to within thirty-two miles of Taiwan’s southwest coast near Kaohsiung, one of Taiwan’s largest cities and chief seaports, and only twentytwo miles from the coast of heavily populated northeast Taiwan. The exercises and missile tests closed air traffic and shipping lanes in those areas for days, and causing a major drop in Taiwan’s stock market. Qian Qichen explained, “The exercises are aimed at demonstrating China’s determination and capability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”11 White House press secretary Mike McCurry responded, saying the exercises were in fact “both provocative and reckless.”12 Defense Secretary Perry warned that Beijing’s acts could lead to a conflict with the United States.13 American policy-makers had concluded that the Chinese were sending a signal,14 and so they sent one or two of their own. After China announced its next series of missile tests, the U.S. carrier Independence set sail from the Philippines toward Taiwan, and soon thereafter the carrier Nimitz began making its way to the Taiwan area from its position in the Arabian Sea. Lord explained that the United States “had to have a demonstration beyond the rhetoric that we had been applying,” and that while moving one carrier group into the region showed resolve, “it was not particularly dramatic. So we decided to deploy another aircraft carrier . . . which would really make our point.”15 The symbolism was not lost on leaders in Taipei (who were ecstatic), Beijing (who were infuriated) or

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other regional capitols (who “patted [the United States] on the back”).16 With the end of the election in Taiwan, the Chinese military exercises near Taiwan, and the U.S. demonstration of force in the region, tensions eventually calmed as a new sobriety arose in the Taiwan Strait. War had been much closer than many had expected.

The Power of Perception This study strives to demonstrate the power of perception and to make it clear that without misperceptions and perceptual gaps the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis might not have occurred at all, or it might at least have played out quite differently. To effectively demonstrate the power of perception, some definitions are in order. Misperception is a concept made famous in international relations circles by Robert Jervis,17 and it is Jervis’ definition that this study will employ. According to Jervis, there are two ways of conceiving of misperceptions. “In the first a misperception is a discrepancy between perceptions and reality, and in the second a misperception is associated with a decision making process that deviates from a standard rational model of information processing.”18 Perceptual gaps are here defined in distinction to misperception. A perceptual gap is the gap in perception that exists between actors perceiving the same issue, but coming to different conclusions. Perceptual gaps are inherently comparative and descriptive in nature, pointing out a gap in perception between individuals or groups. Misperception, however, connotes error or misjudgment in an individual or within a group of a phenomenon that must be considered objective at some level. Some perceptual gaps can be attributed to misperception. Yet others arise not because of misperception/perceptual error, but because of subjective differences in opinion that are often shaped by culture, education, experience, and personal particularities and taste. For example, gaps in perception regarding the greater attractiveness of the colors blue or red cannot generally be ascribed to misperception, whereas gaps in perception about the greater reliability of a Toyota versus a Fiat might be. In other words, while one cannot really argue that red is “better” than blue, one might be able to argue that Toyotas are more reliable than Fiats based on owner reports of mechanical problems. In other words, in a gap in perception between actors A and B over whether red or blue is better, one cannot attribute the difference to misperception, whereas in a gap in perception between actors A and B over the reliability of Toyotas and Fiats, one might argue that B (favoring the reliability of Fiats) has misperceived the situation. A perceptual gap exists in either case. In the case of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, misperceptions and perceptual gaps help explain: (i) The underestimation among many in Washington of the strength of Chinese opposition to a Lee visit; (ii) Chinese leaders’ surprise at the Lee visa decision; (iii) Chinese views of U.S. intentions regarding Taiwan; and (iv) Chinese surprise at U.S. naval deployments in 1996. Also contributing to the crisis were perceptual gaps in the two sides’ views of each other’s interests in the Taiwan Strait, and in their views of Taiwan’s international legal status,


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justification for Chinese force if Taiwan seceded, and American willingness to allow reunification. Each will be examined in turn. The Roles of Misperceptions in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis The first misperceptions of the unfolding crisis, chronologically, were on the American side. First, the Clinton administration underestimated the desire of Congress to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa to the United States to attend a reunion at his alma mater, Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. President Clinton had decided early on not to allow Lee to visit and in March 1995 administration officials had informed Chinese leaders that Lee would get no visa given the State Department’s past practices of refusing similar visa requests by Lee and other Taiwanese officials. In February 1995 Secretary of State Warren Christopher had said granting Lee a visa would be “inconsistent with the unofficial character of our relationship [with Taiwan].”19 However, House Speaker Newt Gingrich supported the idea of a Lee visit to Cornell and on May 2, 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 396–0 urging the State Department to approve a visa for Lee. The Senate approved a similar resolution, 97–1, soon thereafter. Given Clinton’s tenuous relationship with Congress in the wake of the “Republican Revolution” of November 1994 and the overwhelming unanimity of the votes on the resolutions in the two Houses of Congress, senior administration officials have confirmed that Clinton faced great pressure to approve Lee’s visit, though again he initially opposed it.20 Indeed, the Chinese ambassador was told by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff that if Clinton hadn’t bowed to Congressional pressure, Congress would have passed a binding resolution that not only required the administration to admit Lee, but would have upgraded the U.S. relationship with Taiwan as well. A senior State Department official said, “There was a desire by this Administration to preempt new binding legislation that could hurt our relations with China”21 even more than the Lee visit would. Most experts agree that the subsequent decision to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa was made primarily because of the machinations of Congress and the political pressures Congress was able to put on the Clinton administration.22 Some believed a visa refusal would have appeared to be weakness in the face of Chinese threats, and this would have important implications for Clinton’s relations with Congress as well as the Defense Department on a wide array of issues down the road. “One senior [U.S.] official acknowledged that the nonbinding resolution [May 2, 1995] approved by Congress had forced the Administration’s hand, since continuing to bar Mr. Lee would give the impression that Mr. Clinton was bowing to Chinese pressure.” Also important in the U.S. decision to allow Lee to enter the United States was the fact that just days prior to the State Department’s announcement in March 1995 that no visa would be granted for a Lee visit to Cornell, the Clinton administration had announced that Gerry Adams, head of the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, would be granted a visa to visit the United States.

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Approved in spite of opposition from America’s closest ally, Great Britain, in the same period of time Clinton had also welcomed to the White House Yasir Arafat, longtime agitator against another of America’s closest allies, Israel. Many members of Congress protested the fact that a leader of a new democracy, Taiwan, would be refused a visa and denied entry to the United States for an unofficial visit, while Adams and Arafat, whom some considered leaders of terrorist organizations, were not only granted permission to visit the United States, but were given official welcomes.23 Some in the Clinton administration and in Congress seemed to have believed that the approval of a visit by Taiwan’s president Lee Teng-hui would pass quietly or at least not cause a major stir in Sino-American relations, and they believed that Lee Teng-hui would make no waves in his speeches at Cornell as he had been asked. They were wrong on both counts. According to former U.S. ambassador to China and then assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, despite being warned that he should make no fiery, high-profile statements in the United States, and after stating that the Taiwanese had assured U.S. authorities that Lee’s speech at Cornell would be nonpolitical, Lee’s speech had “something like 27 references to the Republic of China on Taiwan. He totally double-crossed us.”24 The American leaders who had pushed for the Lee visa (and others) also clearly failed to anticipate the vehemence with which the Mainland Chinese would respond to the visit, and the lengths to which they would go to show their displeasure—namely, that the Chinese would begin firing M-9 missiles and carrying on live-fire military exercises within ninety miles of Taiwan’s coast and major population areas. “Clinton administration officials and many in Congress acknowledged that Beijing’s harsh response to the Lee Teng-hui visit took them by surprise and that the United States needed to exercise greater care in dealing with Taiwan-related issues.”25 While to be fair, there can be no doubt that part of the reason the administration initially refused a visa for Lee’s visit was because of an understanding of Chinese opposition, had they taken seriously the depth of the potential fallout it eventually caused they might have handled the matter differently. The flip-flop on the Lee visa angered the Chinese deeply. Again, available documents suggest that prior to the May 2 House Resolution of support for a Lee visa, Clinton wished to avoid a showdown with China over a Lee visit, hoped Lee would accept the State Department’s initial refusals of a visa, and granted the visa only after he saw Lee wouldn’t give up and the votes in both houses of Congress were there to support it.26 Then ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy maintains that better handling of the Lee visit could have helped prevent the fallout that accompanied it.27 Sino-American relations expert John Garver said, “Inept U.S. handling of the visa decision contributed to Beijing’s hostile response.”28 These gaffs and misperceptions and the consequent appearance of American insincerity and/or bumbling were important factors setting up the crisis, or at least making the Sino-American fallout more severe. A second misperception that shaped the outcome of events in the Strait was on the Chinese side and concerned the U.S. policy flip-flop on the Lee visa—the granting of the visa greatly surprised the decision makers in Beijing and made it


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more difficult for President Jiang to take a soft approach to the Lee visit and the U.S. visa decision.29 Coming “with no warning and no preparation,”30 it put President Jiang and the Foreign Ministry on the defensive as PLA leaders and others lodged their complaints at Jiang and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s failure to stop the Lee visit. Beijing’s surprise at the U.S. granting of a visa to Lee Teng-hui reveals an apparent misunderstanding of U.S. politics in this particular case. Chen Youwei, former political counselor at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, confirmed that the Lee visa was quite unexpected and the Chinese leaders did not foresee the degree of Congressional pressure on Clinton to grant the visa. They thought Clinton could and would oppose it to the end.31 However, Song Xinning at Renmin University’s School of International Studies said a number of Chinese scholars (Wang Jisi and others) in Beijing had been warning Chinese leaders in the spring of 1995 that Congressional pressure on Clinton was so great that he would have to grant Lee a visa.32 Unfortunately it is apparent that the leaders did not take these warnings seriously enough. Chinese policy-makers seemed to have assumed that U.S. foreign policy-making was more centralized and predictable than it was, and that when members of the Clinton administration said Lee Teng-hui would not get a visa, that was U.S. policy, period. Had the Chinese had a more sophisticated analysis of U.S. foreign policy-making at the time, they might not have been so surprised that the U.S. Congress could successfully pressure the president to change course in such a way.33 Table 8.4 here supports this, for in the 2002 interviews about the crisis, the twenty-eight Chinese experts’ assessments of Chinese policy elites’ interests in Taiwan reflect this underestimation of the influence of domestic politics on U.S. policy in the Strait. The thirty American respondents put 19 percent of their emphasis on the role of domestic politics in driving the administration’s Taiwan policy, whereas in their assessment of their own leadership’s understanding of U.S. policy-making vis–à-vis Taiwan, Chinese respondents attributed only 5.6 percent to U.S. domestic politics. A third misperception surrounds Chinese views of U.S. intentions toward Taiwan. Part of this more general misperception about American Taiwan policy was the notion among some in China that a U.S. welcome for Lee was tantamount to U.S. recognition of Taiwanese independence and support for a Lee-led independence movement in Taiwan, and that this was the actual U.S. goal. “Lee Teng-hui visited the United States this time just for the purpose of presenting Taiwan as ‘a sovereign state’ to the international community.”34 A People’s Daily commentary commented, “The true intentions of U.S. authorities have been laid bare, to create two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan.”35 A researcher with Chinese Foreign Ministry ties said, U.S. purposes are not to resolve the Taiwan issue through dialogue and negotiation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits [sic], but to permanently maintain the situation of “calm and tranquility without reunification” across the Taiwan Straits [sic] . . . Permanent separation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will tie down China strategically, thus easing the pressure of [the] so-called “China threat” upon the United States at the present and long–term period.36

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Many highly astute America-watchers in Beijing told the author they believed the United States was then and is now bent on “keeping China down,” and that a divided China is integral to that objective. Wanting to know what the Americans in particular thought about these statements, as a part of this study the policy experts in both capitols were asked the following question: “Did the U.S. oppose China–Taiwan reunification during the 1995–96 period in your opinion, even under the best of circumstances (i.e., even if Taiwan were to agree, etc.)?” Given the kind of statements cited in the preceding paragraph, it was not overly surprising that 75 percent of the Chinese respondents said “yes” (see table 8.1). More interesting, however, was the American response. One hundred percent of the Americans said “no.” It is important to note here that the American sample included persons who would be considered hardliners or “Blue Team” members, people like William Triplett who take a very tough stand on China. Dr. Mark Lagon, senior professional staff member for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who played a key role in launching the Cox Select Committee on China in 1998 (which produced the Cox Report of 1999), a committee considered by the Chinese to be hostile to China, said regarding reunification, “anything can happen as long as Taiwan is OK with the terms.”37 The unanimity in this small sample of Americans should not be taken to suggest unanimity in Washington on this question, for surely there were and are people in Washington who loathe the thought of reunification. Be that as it may, the consensus among Americans interviewed in this study was remarkable, strongly suggesting that indeed the United States could have accepted reunification at the time as long as Taiwan agreed to the terms. Yet the vast majority of Chinese believe that at the time of the crisis the United States was determined to keep Taiwan and China divided. These Chinese experts are very cosmopolitan, well-traveled people, most of whom know America quite well.38 One can only imagine the views of the stereotypical septuagenarian and octogenarian PLA hardliner generals who don’t speak English and have never been to any other country save perhaps the former Soviet Union. It seems hard to overemphasize how much such perceptual gaps likely impacted this crisis and Sino-American relations more broadly. Chinese perceptual shortcomings are reflected pointedly in an editorial published in the official Beijing Review in late June 1996, written by Li Jiaquan, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Taiwan Studies, which many would agree is the premier Mainland Chinese research center on Taiwan. Li says there were two reasons for the U.S. flip-flop on Lee’s visa. One Table 8.1 “Did the United States oppose China–Taiwan reunification during the 1995–1996 period in your opinion, even under the best of circumstances (i.e., even if Taiwan were to agree, etc.)?” Yes (in %)

No (in %)

Not sure (in %)

0 75

100 25

0 0

American respondents Chinese respondents Note: Interview details in appendices.


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relates to Taiwan’s elections in March 1996. Li argues that the United States could have influenced Taiwan’s politics more if Lee were reelected than if the rival Democratic Progressive Party were elected. Thus, it wanted to help Lee win by giving him a foreign policy triumph, that is, the trip to Cornell. “By supporting Lee in his difficult times, the United States naturally expects him to pay it back in the future.”39 Mr. Li does not explain, however, why the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party, an even more liberal and transparent party, a party without the authoritarian historical baggage of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the February 28th [1947] incident,40 would not be even more so in the interests of American anti-China forces. The second reason he states for the change in U.S. policy is that he believes the United States fears the reunification of China. “A China that is reunified and powerful is not in [the Americans’] interest. [Americans] believe that only by maintaining a state of division and conflict across the Taiwan Straits can Taiwan be used to contain China.”41 Therefore, Li believes it was in the U.S. interest to promote Taiwanese separatism. Again, he fails to explain, if this were the case, why U.S. anti-China forces would not abandon Lee and the historically (and then at least ostensibly) pro-unification KMT party for the overtly pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. There is no mention in this analysis of bureaucratic politics or U.S. domestic political processes, nor of the painstaking effort of the Clinton administration to limit Lee’s activities at Cornell and to state its one-China policy preferences at every opportunity in the wake of the policy flip-flop. What’s more, the flip-flop made the Clinton administration look silly. How could this have been in its interest? Because the author is the director of China’s premier Taiwan policy think tank and given the importance of the U.S. role in crossStrait relations, the lack of understanding of U.S.-Taiwan policy exemplified in this argument is striking. A fourth misperception that is important in understanding the crisis was the belief among many Chinese leaders that while supportive of Taiwan’s independence aspirations, the United States would not go very far to support Taiwan militarily, which led the Chinese to be quite surprised by the deployment of U.S. carrier groups to the region in 1995 and 1996. This point was captured nicely by American China-watcher David Lampton. A senior Chinese diplomat told Lampton in August 1995, “It is bullshit that the U.S. will intervene. You did nothing in 1954 and 1958, Quemoy and Matsu, and you are doing nothing in Bosnia. This government and this president will not react. You are bluffing.”42 U.S. actions in December 1995 (the Nimitz passage through the Strait) ostensibly proved this diplomat wrong, as did U.S. actions—the deployment of the two carrier groups to the Taiwan area—in March 1996. Many different sources document that the Chinese were surprised by the strength of the U.S. response to the military exercises and missile tests in 1996. Yuan Peng, the assistant director of the North American Division of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, noted in a discussion with the author that because of the passage of the Nimitz through the Strait in December 1995 and the fact that it was already in East Asia at the time, the appearance of the Independence was not a great surprise. He said the arrival of the Nimitz and its battle group to the

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area from its duties in the Persian Gulf, however, did catch the Chinese by surprise.43 Robert Ross concurred saying, “Many Chinese leaders were surprised by the U.S. deployment of the two carrier groups, underscoring their miscalculation of U.S. resolve to resist Chinese use of force.”44 Also indicative of Chinese lack of appreciation of U.S. interests and U.S. resolve in the Taiwan Strait is Robert Suettinger’s recounting of Chas’ Freeman’s famous encounter with Chinese General Xiong Guangkai and Xiong’s statement that the United States would not do anything to assist Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack against the island because “you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taiwan.” According to Suettinger, Freeman told U.S. national security advisor Anthony Lake and others that the point of Xiong’s statement was that, in Suettinger’s words, “it should not be taken as a threat to the United States, but as an indicator of the unrealistic mind-set of senior PLA leaders and their fixation on Taiwan.”45 In other words, Freeman was arguing that Xiong was not threatening the United States per se but saying he didn’t think it would help Taiwan because it did not want to get into a war with a nuclear power. Chinese miscalculations about U.S. resolve were apparent. As many have argued, perhaps one of the important positive outcomes of the confrontation was that both China and the United States reached a better understanding of where the other stood after the crisis, and Chinese leaders developed a greater appreciation for the capriciousness and complexity of U.S. domestic politics. The Roles of Perceptual Gaps in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis In addition to these misperceptions, there were a number of important perceptual gaps between Washington and Beijing that likely contributed to the crisis. First of all, there were important differences of perception about international law and the status of Taiwan. When the author asked the Chinese respondents, “Does ‘international law’ (going back in particular to the settlements at the end of World War II) recognize Taiwan as a part of China?” 86 percent of them said yes (see table 8.2). Many of them cited the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (December 1943 and July 1945, respectively), which among other things ceded back to China the theretofore Japanese-controlled island of Taiwan, ceded to Japan in 1895 after the Chinese lost the Sino-Japanese War. With the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the Mainland in 1949, given the right of successor government norms under international law, the PRC government inherited the rights of the former ROC government (then on Taiwan). Therefore, Taiwan was naturally to be a part of the PRC, or so the argument goes. This is consistent with any number of Chinese treatment of the subject, including both scholarly nonofficial ones and official government statements.46 When asked the same question, only 42 percent of Americans said “yes,” however, that international law recognized Taiwan as a part of China. In explaining their answers, many of the Americans who said yes made the same


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Table 8.2 “Does ‘international law’ (going back to the settlements at the end of World War II) recognize Taiwan as a part of China?” Yes (in %) American respondents Chinese respondents

42 86

No (in %)

Not sure (in %)

35 14

23 0

Table 8.3 “Do you think China is justified in a resort to military force to reunify China if Taiwan declares independence?”

American respondents Chinese respondents

Yes (in %)

No (in %)

Not sure (in %)

19 81

81 15

0 4

arguments as the Chinese (mentioned earlier). Several, however, said that while the United States does recognize that Taiwan was returned to China at the end of World War II, it was returned to the Republic of China, not to the PRC. Consequently, while recognizing that Taiwan is a part of China, “[the U.S.] one China policy does not presume that Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic of China.”47 Thus, even among the Americans who agreed that Taiwan was a part of China, it is not entirely clear if they would agree that Taiwan was a part of the PRC. Moreover, 35 percent of the Americans replied “no” to the question, and 23 percent were undecided or said Taiwan’s status under international law was unclear. The majority of Americans clearly do not seem to share the views of their Chinese colleagues on Taiwan’s status. The ramifications of this difference of opinion on such a vital question are profoundly important to the Sino-American bilateral relationship. Where the Chinese claim that there is no question about the international legal status of Taiwan and the Taiwan issue is a matter of the domestic politics of the PRC and “brooks no foreign interference,” Americans clearly seem to think Taiwan’s status is not so cut and dried, and that the Taiwan issue is indeed a matter of concern to the international community. A second important difference in Sino-American perceptions regarding Taiwan is related—the right of the PRC to use force to rein Taiwan in if it declares independence (see table 8.3). In responding to the question, “Do you think China is justified in a resort to military force if Taiwan declares independence?” 81 percent of the Chinese respondents said “yes” (15 percent said “no,” and 4 percent were not sure). The explanation respondents gave most commonly in support of an affirmative response was that Taiwan was a sovereign part of China, and that any people would fight to protect the territorial integrity of their nation. They argued that while the use of force was an unpleasant last resort, the Chinese people would use force to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence to prevent the splitting of the motherland. When the American respondents were asked the same question, interestingly, the same percentage of respondents said “no” as had said “yes” on the Chinese

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side—81 percent (the remaining 19 percent saying yes). While many of the Americans said that they didn’t think the use of force was justified (in most cases because they believed the Taiwanese had a right to determine their own future, especially considering the differences between the respective communist and democratic regime types), some who said no said they could, however, understand a Chinese use of force given its history and/or its perspective on the issue. The fact that the Chinese think the use of force is justified and the Americans don’t may sound rather elementary. This is very basic, however, to the different perceptions the two sides hold regarding Taiwan and Mainland China’s relationship to it. These perceptions would be fundamental to any conflict that might break out between China and the United States were Taiwan to move toward independence in the future.48 Another series of perceptual gaps seem to exist, as tables 8.4 and 8.5 indicate, as it regards the general tendency of each side to view the other side’s motivations for its policy choices in more self-interested and material terms than was actually the case. American respondents ascribed 46.5 percent of their emphasis regarding their understandings of the American leadership’s reasons for being engaged in the Taiwan Strait to strategic interests. The Chinese, however, ascribed 59.8 percent of American interests to strategic material interests. Where American experts gave 52.4 percent of their emphasis to material (strategic, economic) reasons for U.S. intervention in the Strait, the Chinese ascribed 71.8 percent. Similarly, regarding China’s interests in Taiwan, while Chinese experts put 52.8 percent of their emphasis on nonmaterial (social and ideational) factors and interests and 21.2 percent on the regime’s fear of losing legitimacy and position if it let Taiwan go (domestic politics), Americans only ascribed 41.8 percent to the nonmaterial, but attributed 35.4 percent to the legitimacy/regime survival issue. In other words, in each case it appears that from the perspective of each side, “our” motivations were not based on base, self-interested matters primarily, but were driven by principle, morals, beliefs, and so on. “Their” actions, on the Table 8.4 Perceptual gaps and U.S. interests in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait (Question: “What U.S. interests were at stake in the Taiwan Strait such that the United States would risk war with China over Taiwan?”)a # Motive 1. U.S. strategic interests 2. Domestic politics/Taiwan lobby’s influence 3. Taiwan is a democracy/U.S. supports democracy/ U.S. ideology/morals/values 4. Taiwan is a friend/U.S. should stand by its friends 5. U.S. economic interests in Taiwan/region 6. Legal obligation found in Taiwan Relations Act

C (in %)

GAP? b

46.5 19 14.8

59.8 5.6 3.7

Sig G Sig G No G

7.2 5.9 2.7

6.2 5.0 0

No G No G No G

U.S. (in %)

a The values for the U.S. indicate the amount of emphasis placed on this motive by U.S. respondents; the values for C indicate the amount of emphasis placed on this motive by Chinese respondents. b A significant gap (Sig G) in perception is defined here as a difference of between 10 and 19.9 percentage points; and no gap (No G) as a difference of between 0 and 4.9 percentage points. (Anything under 5% is considered statistically insignificant).49


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Table 8.5 Perceptual gaps and the reasons China wants Taiwan back (Question: “What were the reasons China wanted Taiwan back badly enough to risk war with the U.S.?”)a # Motive 1. “Sacred commitments”c 2. Domestic politics/leaders must step down if Tai. leaves/leaders fear loss of legitimacy and power if Tai. Lost 3. Strategic/security interests 4. National unity/“if Taiwan goes, Tibet and Xinjiang will go too”/domestic stability 5. China’s economic interests in Taiwan 6. Incremental commitment with own momentum

U.S. (in %)

C (in %)

GAP? b

41.8 35.4

49.4 21.2

MinG Sig G

8.4 9.8

10.1 7.3

No G No G

3.3 0

7.2 3

No G No G

a The values for U.S. indicate the amount of emphasis placed on this motive by U.S. respondents; the values for C indicate the amount of emphasis placed on this motive by Chinese respondents. b A significant gap (Sig G) in perception is defined here as a difference of between 10 and 19.9 percentage points; a minor gap (MinG) as a difference of between 5 and 9.9 percentage points; and no gap (No G) as a difference of between 0 and 4.9 percentage points. (Anything under 5% is considered statistically insignificant). c “Sacred commitments,” as defined here, are a basket of factors and interests that include factors relating to perception, identity, values, and ideology, among others. Because they are so closely tied together, it is almost impossible to disentangle them and so they are presented here bundled together. For more, see Gregory Moore, Tiananmen, Taiwan and Belgrade: The Construction of Conflict in Sino-American Relations, 1989–1999, Doctoral dissertation (Denver, CO: G.S.I.S, University of Denver, 2004).

other hand, were driven primarily by less-principled strategic and economic interests for the most part. This same pattern was apparent in other instances in the larger research project on Sino-American relations from which this study is taken as well.50 What seems to have been at issue here is the role of Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) in Washington and Beijing, and “the victimization narrative” in Beijing. Works by Wang Jianwei51 and Peter Hays Gries52 touch on these matters and deserve elaboration here. Wang Jianwei discusses a specific source of misperception in Sino-American relations in what is known in social psychology as FAE. It denotes the idea that while subjects attribute their own problems or mistakes to situational factors, they tend to attribute others’ problems and mistakes to dispositional factors such as a flawed personality trait or ill intentions.53 In Sino-American relations Wang concludes that dispositional factors are more commonly used to explain the behavior of the other than are rational factors. Examples are Chinese comments such as, “the U.S. intervened in Kosovo because they are hegemonists—they just want to rule the world,” and American comments such as, “the Chinese leaders killed their own people at Tiananmen Square because they are communist tyrants.” Such comments do not account for situational factors, for example, U.S. values regarding human rights and the fact that Western leaders were blamed for doing too little too late in Bosnia in the former case, or in the latter that despite whatever ulterior motives they may have had, Chinese leaders were in a difficult situation in June 1989 and were trying their best to maintain political stability so as to continue the political and economic reforms Deng had begun and the people wanted continued. In an article about the 1999 U.S. bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, Peter Gries discussed attribution error in relation specifically to the embassy

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bombing.54 As has been the case with this study, he observed that the Chinese believed their government’s conclusions about the bombing (that the United States bombed the Chinese Embassy purposely), and the Americans theirs (that the bombing was a mistake).55 He found this to be true even in cases of Chinese living in the United States or Chinese students in China with access to Western news sources, which both still tended to follow their government’s line. As Gries explains it, attribution error occurs when there is a strong sense of an in-group (“we”) and an outgroup (“they”) in a situation of conflict. Thus if an ingroup member does something good, we attribute it to his or her good disposition; however, if he or she does something bad, we write if off to the social situation beyond the member’s control. If a member of an outgroup does something good, conversely, we dismiss it as “luck” or somehow attribute it to the situation (not reflecting well on the outgroup); if an outgroup member does something bad, however, it is surely due to his or her bad disposition, a disposition that has ramifications for the outgroup along with the individual. Out of a desire to view our ingroup as good, in short, we give our fellow ingroup members the benefit of the doubt; but we are not so charitable to outsiders.56

As Gries goes on to illustrate, this is clearly the case with Chinese and American views of the embassy bombing. Lacking definitive evidence as to the purposive or accidental bombing of the embassy, they ascribe dispositional motivations to the American outgroup, saying in effect, “The Americans must have done it on purpose, those arrogant hegemonists.” Americans, on the other hand, tended to look at their in-group government and gave them the benefit of the doubt, saying, “It must have been an accident. Americans don’t do things like that.” A similar dynamic likely existed for the two sides’ views of the demonstrations in China that followed the bombing, most American observers assuming the communist regime organized them, the Chinese believing they were spontaneous. As has already been discussed, another excellent example of this is this study’s finding that while both sides generally argued that they themselves were acting on lofty ideals and norms of justice in their policy stands on the Kosovo intervention, they saw the other as acting out of “baser” material interests. In the case of the embassy bombing and the Chinese view of it, not only was FAE very obviously at work, but Gries points out the importance of what he calls “the victimization narrative” as well. The victimization narrative is a narrative or discourse that has been constructed about China’s suffering at Western hands since 1839. Like the continued separation of Taiwan from China (and the importance of “sacred commitments”), the embassy bombing was yet another chapter in this discourse, and it remains alive and well in Chinese hearts and minds. The Belgrade bombing, in this Chinese view, was not an isolated event; it was, rather, the latest of a long series of Western aggressions against China. Developmental psychologists have demonstrated that those who have experienced severe trauma are more likely to attribute hostile intent to ambiguous acts.57


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The victimization narrative was not only about foreign imperialism in China during the Opium Wars or during the Boxer Rebellion, however. Given China’s twentieth-century history, including invasion by the Japanese, civil war, Maoist fanaticism, the Tiananmen Square incident, and the stresses of the late economic reforms, more than half of China’s population had indeed personally experienced severe trauma. Moreover, those who hadn’t were well aware of the trauma, given the regular playing out of images that helped reinforce “the victimization narrative” in the media and in recitations of Chinese history since 1839. Based on the research conducted in Beijing in 2002, the present study supports this notion of victimization as an important factor in Chinese interpretations of events in this case. When Chinese respondents were asked why it was so important that China got Taiwan back, rather than dwelling on economic benefits, security concerns, or power enhancement, they overwhelmingly pointed to the “sacred” character of reunification as a necessary step in closing the chapter on China’s humiliation at the hands of foreigners and reunifying the motherland (getting Taiwan back!) to achieve the national dignity all Chinese aspire to. Deng Xiaoping himself said, “It is the common wish of the Chinese people to reunify our country. Once the country is unified, all the Chinese people can not only stand tall, but also soar.”58 President Jiang Zemin put it this way, “To put an end to the separation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and achieve the reunification of the motherland is the strong aspiration and unshakable determination of all the Chinese people, including our Taiwan compatriots. It is also an irresistible historical trend.”59 Putting these misperceptions and perceptual gaps together, as well as FAE and the victimization narrative, it seems apparent that there remain some very fundamental differences between China and the United States on questions very basic to the status of Taiwan, as well as mutual perceptions about the two sides’ motives, which could lead to conflict under certain unfortunate circumstances. It seems likely that these differences of perception would be at the heart of any such conflict. What is perhaps more disturbing is the thought that the persons interviewed in this research may be more “enlightened” about the other side than many of the decision-makers in the two capitals—in other words, if there is any bias in the results of this research, such a bias would be toward a more rational, well-informed view of the other side than exists in reality among the actual decision-makers. How much more distrust was/is there in the cases of conservative PLA generals who had never traveled outside China, and U.S. Congresspersons with hawkish dispositions who knew little of China? The foundation has been laid for a serious confrontation over Taiwan’s status if care is not taken and events not fortuitous. Conclusions Misperception and perceptual gaps played a vital role in shaping and defining the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Regarding misperceptions, several were key. 1. Many in Washington believed that a Lee Teng-hui visit would pass with little more than a protest from Beijing, and that Lee would make no provocative speeches. It didn’t. He did.

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2. Chinese leaders believed Clinton could overcome and block any moves in Congress to push forward a Lee visit. He couldn’t. 3. Chinese leaders believed that the United States was bent on encouraging Taiwan to become independent. It wasn’t. 4. Chinese leaders did not believe the United States was engaged enough with Taiwan to be willing to send two carrier groups to the region over China’s missile firings and military exercises. It was. Several important perceptual gaps played a role as well. 1. Chinese and Americans had very different views of Taiwan’s status under international law. Chinese believed international law had clearly established Taiwan’s status as belonging to China. Americans were less sure. 2. Chinese and Americans had very different views of China’s justification to use force if Taiwan declared independence. Chinese believed they had every right to resort to force. Americans generally believed they did not. 3. Both sides tended to ascribe to the other more self-interested and material motives for their Taiwan policy than seemed to have been the case. Having made the case that misperceptions and perceptual gaps were important to the case and how it played out, we might now ask, what if misperceptions and perceptual gaps had not been factors in this case? Would the crisis have evolved as it did, or have even occurred at all? Let us address the misperceptions and perceptual gaps outlined earlier, one by one, and see how the crisis might have played out if they had not been an issue. First, regarding the Lee visit, the United States would not likely have given the visa to Lee if first, they’d known he would make the highly political speech he made at Cornell when he said he would refrain from such political speeches, and second, if they’d foreseen that it would lead to a series of events that would culminate in missile firings over Taiwan and the U.S. deployment of two carrier groups in the Taiwan Strait. Certainly the 1995 military exercises and missile firings in the Strait, and likely the passing of the Nimitz through the Strait in December 1995 as well, would not have occurred if it had not been for the Lee visit and his speech at Cornell. It does not seem possible to say with certainty if China would have undertaken its March exercises and missile firings if the events of 1995 had not transpired. The Chinese may have done so anyway because of their interest in shaping the outcome of the March presidential elections on the island, but it seems logical to argue that the Chinese show of force might have been considered less “necessary” had there not been the events of 1995. Moreover, without the events of 1995, would the United States have deployed two carrier groups to the Strait in 1996? That is difficult to say, but Chinese actions might have looked more isolated and thus less threatening to regional stability, coming as they actually did as the second in a series of what Washington saw as highly provocative moves. The second misperception was Chinese leaders’ general belief that a Clinton administration “no” on a visa for Lee meant no, and the frustration that ensued


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when they realized Lee had been given a visa despite the administration’s assurance that he would not. Without this misperception it seems unlikely that the tension between China and the United States in the summer of 1995 would have simply gone away because the Chinese might have seen the visa issuance coming and would have had fewer illusions about the unlikelihood of the Lee visit. Still, the apparent “flip-flop” on the Lee visa by the U.S. government angered the Chinese and deepened their resolve to stand up to the United States and Lee, thus inflaming passions and intensifying the conflict, and likely making the exercises and missile firings more likely. With regard to the third misperception, the notion that Chinese leaders believed the United States was intent on encouraging Taiwan’s independence, again the research here leads to the conclusion that it was not in fact U.S. policy to encourage Taiwan’s independence. Rather, the U.S. experts interviewed for this study argue that U.S. leaders could live with reunification if it was the popular choice of Taiwan’s people and it was done without any aggression or coercion from China. This misperception on China’s part likely played a very important role in the conflict, and likely still does today, for Chinese officials and the Chinese media regularly charge that the United States is trying to encourage Taiwan’s independence.60 This perception raised the stakes for Chinese leaders. It made them hypersensitive about U.S.–Taiwan relations and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. If the United States was indeed urging on Taiwan’s independence, China must be ever vigilant and ready to rattle its saber and move its forces into position to defend its claim on Taiwan, as it did in 1995 and 1996. It can only be thought of as a fact that a Taiwan confident of unconditional U.S. backing would be more likely to take steps toward independence than a Taiwan without U.S. backing, for officials in Taiwan know very well that moves toward independence would ultimately provoke a military response from China. If Chinese leaders were convinced that in fact the United States did not want to be involved in a war over Taiwan, and hence was quite opposed to any independence moves by Taiwan in 1995–1996, perhaps they would not have felt such an urgent need to demonstrate their resolve to check what they saw as Taiwan’s independence campaign under Lee Teng-hui, and the crisis of 1995–1996 might have been avoided. In reference to the fourth misperception, that Chinese leaders were surprised by the strength of the U.S. response to the appearance of two aircraft carrier groups near Taiwan in March 1996, several things might be noted. Given the course of events, the other misperceptions, and the interests of China as depicted here, the Chinese would likely have still felt it necessary to make a strong showing regarding Lee’s visit, the U.S. carrier in the Strait in December 2005, and Taiwan’s March 23 presidential election. However, it seems logical to argue that the Chinese might have been more reserved in some of their moves if they had foreseen the willingness of the United States to put two carrier groups in the region, even within Chinese missile range (and in turn, putting China within the range of the carriers’ attack forces). The record shows Chinese leaders were clearly caught off guard by the U.S. moves, so for any in the Chinese government that had been counseling caution, a better understanding of U.S. readiness to engage China in the region would have strengthened these voices of

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moderation and might have ultimately brought more moderation to Chinese rhetoric and responses in light of events, though it may not ultimately have altered the course of events. Moving to perceptual gaps, in like manner, the absence of any of these would have had an important impact on both sides’ understanding of the situation and likely on the outcome of events. Regarding point one under the important perceptual gaps listed earlier, the differing Chinese and American views on Taiwan’s status under international law (see table 8.2), it seems obvious that if China and the United States had exactly the same understanding of Taiwan’s status under international law, holding Chinese and American interests constant, the potential for conflict would go down, or even disappear. If the Chinese embraced liberal notions of self-determination and saw Taiwan’s status as the majority of American respondents did, Taiwan might have been interested in reunification some time ago, which would certainly have made the crisis unnecessary. Barring this, however, the Chinese might certainly be more respectful of the democratic process and the notion of self-determination, though they might not completely lay down their claims to Taiwan. It should be noted that the United States does officially accept the “one China” concept and the notion that the end of World War II brought Taiwan back to Mainland China. Yet it is clear that U.S. experts are less sure about the actual status of Taiwan today under international law in the normative sense than the Chinese are. If the United States accepted China’s claims to Taiwan in all its certitude, then it would likely be more deferential toward China and its claims and/or perhaps more willing to entice or even coerce Taiwan toward reunification than it has been. A different U.S. or Chinese position on Taiwan might have put the whole Sino-American relationship in a different light, and had American and Chinese officials seen more eye to eye on the status of Taiwan, there could be little doubt that this would have had an important moderating effect on the crisis. In reference to the second perceptual gap, that Chinese and American leaders had very different views on China’s argument that it is justified to use force if Taiwan declared independence, this too had important implications for the way events played out. This gap is of course related to the first point earlier, for if China has a solid and recognized international claim to Taiwan, it is more plausible that it also has the right to resort to force if that claim is challenged and diplomatic means have been exhausted. Had Americans agreed with the Chinese position that China would be justified to use force to reclaim Taiwan if it declared independence and so on, the U.S. position might have been more laissez faire all along, which would have had important implications for the Taiwan issue and for the crisis under study here. Taiwan might have been less bold than it was in 1995–1996 and China might have been bolder. Conversely, if China had seen things as the United States saw them (that Taiwan’s status was a matter to be determined with the consent of the people of Taiwan, and that China did not have a right to resort to force to resolve the dilemma), it might have been more flexible and more proactive in finding a diplomatic solution to the Taiwan dilemma long ago, and certainly would have been less provocative in its actions in 1995–1996 than it was, which likely would have done much to diffuse the


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tensions that erupted in this period. In the case of both the first and the second perceptual gaps, if China and the United States had seen eye to eye on these matters (and were aware of it), there would have been more trust as well, and so less need to make a strong show of force to get their points across. Lastly, the third perceptual gap mentioned earlier was that both sides tended to view the other as being more self-interested and driven by material motives than was actually the case. This was, again, likely due to FAE, and contributed to by China’s victimization narrative. The weight of FAE and the victimization narrative seem heavy indeed, but America’s China-watchers have watched China’s America-watchers grow in sophistication in their understanding of the United States and U.S. foreign policy in the decade since this crisis. So in conclusion, while it is not the argument put forward here that misperceptions or perceptual gaps caused the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, at a minimum they certainly laid at least part of the foundation for the crisis, and their existence deepened the crisis. While it may not be possible in the short run to reconfigure domestic politics in China or the United States, ameliorate the effects of China’s sacred commitments to Taiwan, or reign in Taiwan’s independence movement, there are some things Beijing and Washington can do to address their differences over Taiwan. The 1995–1996 crisis makes this apparent. Beijing’s and Washington’s views of each other must continue to evolve toward greater sophistication. Had the two sides maintained a more sophisticated understanding of each other and their interests, perceptions and domestic political processes and pressures, perhaps some of these misperceptions might have disappeared, though it is not clear from this study that the perceptual gaps would have been as easy to deal with. It seems apparent that coming to a better understanding of the perceptions, misperceptions, and perceptual gaps that existed in 1995–1996 in that Taiwan Strait crisis is important as Chinese and Americans continue to confront the challenges posed by the Taiwan dilemma. Peace between the reigning world power and the rising world power may depend upon it. Appendix 1: The American Interviewees (and affiliations in 2002 at the time of the interviews) Richard Bush, American Institute in Taiwan, State Dept.; Bonnie Coe, Atlantic Council; Bernard D. Cole, National Defense University; John Corbett, Centra Technology (former Defense Dept. China specialist); Ivan Eland, CATO Institute; Chas. W. Freeman, Middle East Policy Council (former State Dept. official); Bates Gill, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Bonnie Glaser, independent Asian affairs consultant; Carol Lee Hamrin, George Mason University (former State Dept. China specialist); Bill Heaton, Central Intelligence Agency; Robert Kapp, U.S.–China Business Council; Don Keyser, State Dept.; Mark Lagon, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Congress; David M. Lampton, Johns Hopkins University; Kenneth Lieberthal, University of Michigan (former National Security Council China specialist); James Mulvenon, RAND Corporation; Kongdan Oh, Institute for Defense Analysis and Brookings

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Institution; John D. Robinson, Jr., USAF, Asst. Air Attache, U.S. Embassy, Beijing; Alan Romberg, Stimson Center (former State Dept. official); J. Stapleton Roy, Kissinger & Assoc. (former Ambassador to China, Indonesia, Singapore); Stephen Schlaikjer, U.S.–China Econ. & Security Review Commission (former Defense, State Dept. official); David Shambaugh, The George Washington University, Brookings Institution (former State Dept., National Security Council official); Susan Shirk, University of California—San Diego (former State Dept. official); Richard Solomon, U.S. Institute of Peace (former State Dept., National Security Council official, ambassador to the Philippines); Robert Suettinger, Mayer, Brown, Rowe and Maw (former CIA intelligence officer, State Dept. and National Security Council official); Robert Sutter, Georgetown University (former CIA, State Dept., National Security Council, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, National Intelligence Council official); Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (former RAND Corporation researcher); William C. Triplett, II, author (former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, CIA China analyst); John Tkacik, Jr., Heritage Foundation (former U.S. State Dept. official); Alfred Wilhelm, Partners in Healthcare (former Defense Dept. Asia analyst). Note: While twenty-seven of twenty-eight Chinese interviewees agreed to be identified on a similar list and Chinese government institutions were aware of and helped facilitate this research, the author has chosen not to publish their names. The reason for this is that if anything in this chapter or the larger study is received negatively by the Chinese authorities, it could have negative consequences for my Chinese interviewees, though the author doesn’t expect any such difficulties. The conclusions reached here are the author’s alone, and none of the interviewees bear any responsibility for them. Appendix 2: Methodological Issues In trying to understand China’s interests in Taiwan and its actions in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, it is important to understand the interests at stake for the two key players, the United States and China. To do this, the author based the study on a tripartite methodology consisting of (i) a review of official policy statements by the primary policy-makers on both sides regarding their interests, goals, and perceptions of events pertaining to these cases; (ii) the writings of Chinese and American Sino-American relations experts in the secondary literature on the three cases and (iii) a series of semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in Beijing in April and May 2002, and in Washington, D.C., in June and July 2002, where he talked to twenty-eight Chinese and thirty American experts on security issues and Sino-American relations. The detailed results of the study are available elsewhere (Moore, 2004, etc.). A few words are in order about the semi-structured interviews, the respondents, and the methodology involved in conducting them. The fifty-eight respondents came from a variety of academic, think tank, NGO, consultant, official government, and military backgrounds. Some were closer to the policymaking process than others, but all were careful observers of the Taiwan Strait


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crisis of 1995–1996, and/or Sino-American relations and security issues generally. While there is no assumption that any of their views are the definitive Chinese or American view, because of their prominence and their positions the aggregation of their views is suggestive of broader trends in the thinking of those in policy-making circles in the two capital cities. In fact, many of them served as consultants to or wrote policy papers for those with decision-making authority; many wrote articles that likely were read by the decision-makers and/or their advisors, and in each capital the members of these two respective groups tend to travel in the same respective circles and most know each other and participate in many of the same meetings and conferences on policy toward the other country, which contribute to the discourse on the bilateral relationship and to any sense of “consensus” that the actual policy-makers might encounter from these experts. For some or all of these reasons they were in a relatively good position to have a sense of what the thinking of the decision-makers was in this case. In giving their responses to the various questions, respondents were asked to rank reasons for a policy action in importance, giving greater weight to the reasons they thought carried greater importance in the decision-making process. For example, when asked what was the source of the strong American reaction to the deaths at Tiananmen Square, if there were two reasons of equal importance, they might rate them each at 50 percent; if there were three reasons a policy was pursued or three interests that were at stake, the first might be 60 percent of the reason, the second 30 and the third 10, or the three might be equally rated at 33 percent each, and so on. Consequently, a statement that 30 percent of respondent emphasis was on X means not that 30 percent of the respondents mentioned X, but rather that 30 percent of their collective emphasis was given to reason X. In this case 60 percent of the respondents might actually have mentioned X, some giving it 100 percent of their emphasis, some 5 percent, but the collective average taken of the thirty responses in this case added up to 30 percent of total respondent emphasis. Notes 1. John. W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 102–103. 2. This study is a part of a larger study of Sino-American relations between 1989 and 1999, entailing three case studies: The Tiananmen incident of June 1989, the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the NATO/U.S. intervention in the former Yugoslavia/Kosovo and the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. For more, see Gregory Moore, Tiananmen, Taiwan and Belgrade: The Construction of Conflict in Sino-American Relations, 1989–1999, Doctoral dissertation (Denver, CO: G.S.I.S, University of Denver, 2004). 3. See appendix 2 for details about the interviews and the methodologies used in this research. 4. One might take it back further, to the 1895 cession of Taiwan to Japan as a result of a Sino-Japanese war that ended that year. 5. For example, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said as much, that the United States was guilty of starting the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the Lee visit to Cornell was “the root

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7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

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cause of the tension in the Taiwan Straits.” Qian Qichen, “Qian on World and Regional Issues,” Beijing Review, March 25–31, 1996, p. 7. Robert Ross has concurred. “The origins of the 1996 confrontation lay in Taiwan’s lobbying of Congress and congressional pressure on the president,” which led to the granting of the Lee visa. Robert Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, fall, 2000, p. 123, FN 106. Suisheng Zhao too has noted, “Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s U.S. visit in May 1995 touched off Beijing’s military actions in 1995–96.” Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), p. 4. Former U.S. ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy expressed frustration with Lee, saying he “grandstanded” and did not keep the low, non-political profile the United States had asked him to. (Interview with Roy, Washington, June 2002.) Statement of Qian Qichen, “Progress Made in Ties, but More Must be Done,” Beijing Review, October 23–29, 1995, p. 13. See Chen Jian, “News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry,” Beijing Review, November 6–12, 1995, p. 24, and research by Andrew Scobell (Scobell). Interview with Sutter, Washington, July 2002. Former U.S. ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy had reached the same conclusion (Interview with Roy, Washington, June 2002.) Chen Qimao, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions,” Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Strait, p. 132. Qian Qichen, “Qian on World and Regional Issues,” p. 9. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China—An Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), p. 26. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and SinoAmerican Relations, 1945–1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 483. Winston Lord, “Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Lord, March 14, 1996,” Foreign Policy Bulletin, May/June 1996, pp. 40 and 43. Tucker, China Confidential, pp. 485–486. Tucker, China Confidential, p. 488. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Jim Abrams, “House Supports Visit by Taiwan’s President,” Associated Press, Tuesday, May 2, 1995, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/univers. . .5⫽0454d 29928647d60d895f7d6446b52ca. Winston Lord describes the process in Tucker, China Confidential, pp. 485–486, as does Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall, pp. 21–25. For a Chinese perspective, see Su Ge, Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti (America’s China Policy and the Taiwan Question) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1999), pp. 732–741; or Tang Zhengrui, “Zhong Mei Qiju Zhong de Taiwan Wenti: 1969.1–1999.12” (“The Taiwan Question and the Sino-American Chess-Game: 1/69—12/99”), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000, pp. 374–387. Steven Greenhouse, “Aides to Clinton Say He will Defy Beijing and Issue Visa to Taiwan’s President,” New York Times, May 22, 1995. See Su, Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti, pp. 732–741; Tang Zhengrui, “Zhong Mei Qiju Zhong de Taiwan Wenti: 1969.1–1999.12,” pp. 726–746; Ross,


23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39.

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“The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” pp. 87–123; Tucker, China Confidential, pp. 473–481; James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), pp. 315–328, and et al. Mann, About Face, p. 323. Tucker, China Confidential, p. 481. Robert G. Sutter, “The U.S. Congress: Personal, Partisan, Political,” in Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, eds., Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). Winston Lord suggested this was the case in Tucker, China Confidential, pp. 479–480. So too does John Garver’s research (Garver, Face Off, pp. 67–73). Interview with J. Stapleton Roy (2002). Garver, Face Off, p. 69. Richard Bush has documented a number of misperceptions in Chinese foreign policy-making. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2005). Yuan Ming in Dan Oberdorfer, “Juggling the Two Chinas; Caught Between Beijing and Taiwan, Clinton Dropped the Ball,” Washington Post, Sunday, October 1, 1995, p. 1. Chen Youwei, Tiananmen Shijian Hou Zhonggong yu Meiguo Waijiao Neimu—Yi Wei Zhongguo Dalu Waijiaoguan de Lishi Jianzheng (Inside Stories of Post-Tiananmen Diplomacy Between Communist China and the United States—The Historical Testimony of a Mainland Chinese Diplomat) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1999). The first chapter is available in English in Youwei Chen, “Viewing a Changing World from the PRC Embassy Window in Washington DC,” Journal of Contemporary China, February 2002, pp. 161–172. Song Xinning, personal interview, Beijing, May 2002. Beijing researcher Yuan Peng confirmed this, that most Chinese analysts and policymakers didn’t truly appreciate the independent role Congress could play in U.S. foreign policy then, but that they have a much greater appreciation of it today (conversation with the author, August 2002). Wang Jianwei’s work supports this (Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images [Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2000]). Indicative of the insights Chinese scholars do have of Congressional politics and foreign policy are the discussions of the Lee Teng-hui visa decision in Suisheng Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait. Xinhua News Agency, July 24, 1995, via LexisNexis. United Press International, “China Says United States Lied,” June 9, 1995, via LexisNexis. Guo Zhenyuan. 2000. Meiguo dui Taiwan Wenti Zhengce de Tiaozhen. (American Adjustments in its Taiwan Policy) Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (January 13), pp. 26 and 28. Guoji Wenti Yanjiu is published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s China Institute of International Studies. Mark Lagon, personal interview, Washington, June 2002. Of the Chinese respondents, 45 percent had PhDs; 79 percent had lived in the United States and of those who had not lived in the United States, all had traveled there; all had studied English and on a scale of 1–5, 1 being fluent and 5 being no English skills, the average self-rated score was 1.5; and the average age was 48. Li Jiaquan, Lee’s U.S. visit defies agreement. Beijing Review, June 26–July 2, 1995, p. 19.

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40. On February 28, 1947, Mainland KMT forces opened fire on Taipei protesters, killing many. 41. Ibid. 42. David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001). 43. Discussion with Yuan Peng, Denver, August 2002. 44. Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” pp. 118–119. 45. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Washington: Brookings, 2003), p. 248. 46. For example, see Su, Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti, pp. 20–27, or The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China, Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council of China (1993). 47. Discussion with Stephen Schlaikjer by telephone, July 2002. 48. Another perceptual gap is illustrated as the third item in table 8.3, the differing Chinese and American understandings of U.S. intentions regarding Taiwan. Because it is derived from a misperception, it was discussed earlier with misperceptions. 49. The full results of the data set for these two questions are listed in Moore, Tiananmen, Taiwan and Belgrade. 50. Ibid. 51. Wang Jianwei, Limited Adversaries: Post–Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2000). 52. Peter Hays Gries (2001), “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,” The China Journal 46, July 2001, pp. 25–43. 53. Wang Jianwei, Limited Adversaries, p. 256. 54. Gries (2001). 55. Other research on the Chinese Embassy bombing corroborates Gries’ findings. Moore, Tiananmen, Taiwan and Belgrade. 56. Gries (2001), p. 31. 57. Ibid., pp. 32–33. 58. Bai Liang, “Taiwan Issue Brooks No Interference,” Beijing Review, November 6–12, 1995, p. 23. 59. Jiang Zemin, “Jiang Reviews China—U.S. Relations,” from speech delivered in New York on October 23, 1995, Beijing Review, November 20–26, 1995, p. 8. 60. Chinese vice foreign minister Zhou Wenzhong recently said, “We’re especially concerned about the sales of large quantities of advanced weapons to Taiwan . . . [because] Taiwan independence forces will be emboldened to go down the road to Taiwan independence as far as possible,” Hu Xiao, “Taiwan ‘Most Important’ to U.S. Relations,” China Daily, September 1, 2004.

CHAPTER 9

The Legal Status of the Diaoyu Islands Kristina S. Mao

Introduction This chapter examines one of the left over problems from the twentieth century, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, through the existing international laws and treaties. The chapter also observes the Chinese and Japanese understanding and utilization of the legal means to enhance their positions. The fact that Chinese domestic politics and national power weakened China’s position but promoted the Japanese position during the last thirty years complicated the problem in the twenty-first century for China. To defend Chinese territorial integrity, China’s contemporary and future leaders will have to spend a great deal of energy and wisdom to solve the problem in the new century. The Chinese government should take advantage of the international laws and international courts to seek justice. In addition, the chapter analyzes the critical involvement of the United States on this issue and examines its legality in the eyes of international laws and treaties. In the twenty-first century, China has to deal with not only new challenges but also the old problems left over from the twentieth century. The dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands (釣魚群島) is one of these, and it has become more complicated than when the problem first started in 1970. This chapter studies the legal status of the Diaoyu Islands with the scrutiny of international laws, and analyzes why China did not make better policy choices in the twentieth century. As a result, contemporary and future Chinese leaders will have to deal with the consequences of their predecessors’ policies. The Diaoyu Islands consists of eight small islands located on the edge of the Chinese continental shelf between 25 40’N and 26 N latitude, 123 E and 124 24’ E longitude in the East China Sea. They are 102 miles north of Taiwan and 230 miles southeast of the Ryukyu Islands.1 The total area is 4.5 square kilometers.

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Diaoyu is the name used by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the overseas Baodiao Movement (保釣運動), they are referred to as the Tiaoyutai Islands (釣魚臺列嶼). Japan named them the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島). In 1968, a United Nations survey found potential oil reserves around the Diaoyu Islands under the sea.2 A Japanese geologist Niino, who was one of the participants in the 1968 survey, organized three more geophysical surveys in 1968, 1969, and 1970 with the support of the Japanese government and universities. Niino’s surveys concluded that the oil deposit under the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan might be the richest in the world.3 On May 9, 1969, in the middle of one of the surveys, the Okinawa government decisively established a demarcation on the Diaoyu Islands4 and the Japanese government started a “five-year crash program,” which sought the exact location of oil in that area.5 The dispute started in July 1970 when Japan made its first claim challenging the Republic of China’s (ROC) decision after it had contracted with the U.S. Gulf Oil Company for the exploration of the oil resources in the sea northeast of Taiwan including the Diaoyu Islands. Japan claimed that the Senkaku Islands were a part of the Okinawa Islands and, therefore, belonged to Japan.6 After the Japanese protest, the ROC immediately made counter protests against Japan, but the PRC on the mainland kept silent. It was not until December 4, 1970, that the PRC issued its first claim to ownership of the Diaoyu Islands.7 During the thirty plus years since this dispute began, Japan has step by step carried out its ambitions for the Diaoyu Islands by establishing state markers, a lighthouse, assigning postal zip codes, and constant patrols around the Islands with its Self Defense Force. The Chinese governments on both the mainland and Taiwan have only made official protests after each Japanese aggressive action for the islands. If Chinese politics were not as complicated as when the dispute started, and if the ROC and the PRC cooperated, then, China could have been able to defend its sovereignty over the islands. Japan seized the opportunity of the Chinese problem to carry out its own ambitions. This chapter will answer the question: To which country does the Diaoyu Islands legally belong? To answer this question, the chapter will ask: Are the Diaoyu Islands a part of Okinawa or a part of Taiwan? And is Okinawa a part of Japanese territory according to international laws and treaties? This chapter will compare, contrast, and explain both the Chinese and Japanese claims and actions on the issue. It will examine and analyze both the Chinese and Japanese claims with the International Territorial Law, the Law of the Seas, and related international treaties. The chapter will also discuss the U.S. involvement on the Okinawa issue and how it has affected Japan’s claims. This chapter uses materials from both the PRC and the ROC for the China analysis for a few reasons. First, after the PRC took over Mainland China in 1949, it remained only as a de facto government in the eyes of the United Nations until 1971 when the PRC replaced the ROC government in the United Nations.

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When the Diaoyu dispute began, the ROC represented China in the UN. Second, Japan’s earlier protests were made to the ROC. The ROC responded with the first counter protests against Japan and made the Chinese claim of ownership of the Tiaoyutai. Japan had no diplomatic relations with the PRC until 1972. Third, when the PRC finally made its first claim for the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, its claims echoed those of the ROC. Fourth, after replacing the ROC in the UN on October 25, 1971, as a successive state of the ROC, the PRC has obligated all treaties the ROC signed before that day, “Unless the changed regime suggested the desirability of new treaties, the prior agreements have generally been regarded as remaining in full force and effect.” 8 Under an accepted practice of international laws, “Changes in the government of a state do not usually affect previously existing rights or obligations . . . The new Chinese government, as successor to both its predecessors, had to honor their financial obligations.”9 Therefore, discussing the actions of the ROC is necessary. Discussion of this issue starts with the Japanese claim. To solve the critical status of Okinawa, U.S. involvement must also be referred along with the Japanese claims. Then, the Chinese claims will be examined. Since this study is to determine the legal status of the Diaoyu Islands, international laws will be applied throughout the chapter. Finally, the author has some suggestions for the Chinese leaders about how to solve the Diaoyu Islands problem peacefully and lawfully in the twenty-first century. The Japanese Claim Based on Discovery Japan claims its ownership of the Diaoyu Islands with two reasons: First, it claims “discovery” and “territorium nullius,” two parts of the International Territorial Law; and second, it claims the islands as a part of the Okinawa Islands. Did Japan discover the Diaoyu Islands? The islands’ Japanese name, Senkaku, was given by a Japanese school teacher, Kuroiwa Kakine, of the Okinawa Normal School in 1900 in an article “The Records of the Senkaku Islands Exploration” published in a geology magazine.10 He wrote, “These islands up to now have no name for the entire group. To reduce the inconvenience in geology, I thus have newly designed a name, ‘the Senkaku Islands.’” 11 How did he get this name? On June 15 and 16, 1845, a British warship Samarang, led by Captain Sir Edward Balcher, surveyed the Diaoyu Islands. Ten years later, a navigation map published his results. In this publication, the Diaoyu Islands were marked as “the Pinnacle Islands” in English. The Japanese adopted this English name in the 1894 Japanese Navy Navigation Guide in Katakana as “the Pinakuru Islands.” Katakana is a set of symbols in the Japanese language used exclusively for directly introducing Western words with their original pronunciation and meaning. Therefore, the Japanese name “Senkaku (尖閣) Islands” is the same British name “Pinnacle Islands.”12 Other Japanese maps as late as in 1941 still labeled the Diaoyu Islands with its Chinese name. Such maps are still in existence. They are: Volume 2 of the

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July 1894 Japanese Navigation Guide, Volume 2 of the October 1908 Japanese Navigation Guide, Volume 6 of the July 1919 Japanese Navigation Guide, and the March 1941 Taiwan and Islands in the Southwest Navigation Guide. In all the maps mentioned here, no name was given to the entire group of islands, but individual islands of the Diaoyu Islands were marked with their Chinese names, such as Diaoyu, Huangwei, and Chiwei. None of the islands was named in Japanese.13 Thus, the Japanese knew that China had named these islands a long time ago. However, Japan protested to the ROC for its exploration of the oil under the sea around the Senkaku Islands on August 31, 1970. The protest, entitled “the Decision of a Petition for the Defense of the Senkaku Islands Territory” was made in the name of the legislative sector of the Okinawa government under a trustee of the United States. At the time, the Okinawa Islands were not Japanese territory, but were under U.S. trusteeship. The document set forth that “the Senkaku Islands were originally under the administration of the Yaesan Islands. Before the war, the Koga Store of this county operated lumbering and fishing businesses in the islands. There is no doubt that we have the territorial sovereignty over these Islands.”14 According to this protest, the Okinawa government under U.S. trusteeship declared its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. In this declaration, the Okinawa government furnished evidence of a “Thirteenth Order,” which was supposedly issued on April 1, 1896, and it was on that day that these Islands were declared to be Japanese territory.15 Yet, to this day, the Japanese government has not been able to provide any evidence of the “Thirteenth Order.” All libraries in Tokyo have claimed that these Japanese Cabinet documents of 1896 were “loaned out.”16 The U.S. Library of Congress has kept the complete Japanese Official Records: There were four orders issued on April 1, 1896, and they were numbered as 113, 114, 115, and 116. All of them were about military and police matters. None was related to the Diaoyu Islands. However, one of the official reports dated March 5, 1896, was numbered “thirteenth,” and it was indeed about the county system of Okinawa. The report specifically described the five counties of Okinawa and their respective attached islands. Yaesan County was at the southern most part of Okinawa, but only the Yaesan Islands were attached. Yet, none of the islands in the Diaoyu group was mentioned. 17 In fact, the Japanese name of Senkaku was not in existence until four years later. Consequently, this “Thirteenth Order” used as the sole evidence to claim Japanese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands may have never existed. Hence, Japan has not been able to produce any historical evidence to back its September 10, 1970, protest that claimed the Senkaku Islands as a part of Okinawa. Since the Meiji Restoration, whenever Japan added a new piece of land to its territory, the Japanese government routinely announced domestically and internationally the location of the new territory, its latitude and longitude, how it was named, and its juridical relation with the government. The local government would therefore be ordered to establish a state marker on the new territory. Why was the Okinawa government unable to provide any evidence of


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a Senkaku establishment document, but had to set new state markers in 1969–1972 years after the date claimed and one year after the UN discovery of the potential oil resource under the Diaoyu? The Okinawa government claims that the Senkaku Islands were discovered by a Japanese businessman, Koga Tatsushiro (古賀辰四郎). Koga was originally from Japan proper but moved to Napa (那霸) in the Ryukyu Islands in 1879. Since 1884, Koga had frequently visited the Diaoyu Island, the largest island of the group, to collect bird feathers and other sea products. He then sold the feathers on the Japanese market. 18 In 1894, Koga petitioned his county government for the development of the island, but his petition was turned down because the Okinawa prefecture government “was not clear at the time whether the island belonged to Japan.”19 Koga then went to Tokyo to apply for permission from the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce. His petition was, again, refused on the grounds that the title to the Diaoyu Island was “uncertain.” After China was defeated in the 1894 SinoJapanese War, the Maguan Treaty (馬關條約, or Treaty of Shimonoseki) ceded Taiwan and its affiliated islands to Japan. In 1896, Koga petitioned again to the Okinawa prefecture government. Only then, was he granted permission to develop the Diaoyu Island. Therefore, it is clear that the Diaoyu Islands were a part of the “affiliated islands” ceded to Japan in the Maguan Treaty.20 Later in 1897, Koga was permitted to develop Huangwei Island, another island of the Diaoyu group.21 Thus, the Japanese had known all the time that the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan, and thus belonged to China, not to the Ryukyu Islands. Otherwise, if Koga was the first one to discover these islands, why would Japan hesitate in giving him permission? The Diaoyu Islands could not have been res nullius as the Japanese government originally claimed. Anyway, Koga’s activities on Diaoyu and Huangwei Islands did not last long. He abandoned both islands shortly thereafter.22 In August 1970, Japanese reporters interviewed Koga Tatushiro’s son, Koga Zenji. The young Koga denied that his father had discovered the Islands. In fact, Koga Zenji admitted that, his father had visited to the islands, but that others had already been there much earlier.23 Currently, the Japanese Foreign Ministry claims that from 1885 onward, the Japanese government inspected the Diaoyu Islands but found no evidence of Chinese control. As a result, at a cabinet meeting on January 14, 1895, Japan decided to formally take the Islands as Japanese territory.24 If Japan found it as a “no man’s land” in 1885, why did it refuse Koga’s petitions prior to 1896? In 1895, the defeated Chinese were in negotiations with Japan. Japan not only demanded Taiwan, but also Liaodong Peninsula (遼東半島) and a large sum in cash as reparation. At the time, Japan had already occupied Taiwan with the excuse that China had not been able to effectively control it. Therefore, according to International Territorial Law, other powers could legally take it over. Weighing the consequences, China had to give up Taiwan in order to keep Liaodong on the mainland. Japan’s negotiator, Ito, told the Chinese that “a victor is of course entitled to claim any place he likes for territorial cession and that if the Chinese refused them, Japan would continue the war and claim even more.”25

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Japan asserts that China had never clearly worded in any government document or historical writing that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territory. In other words, before Japan declared these islands as Japanese territory, they had not belonged to any country. They were a “no man’s land” or in “terra nullius.” Japan acknowledged the fact that the Chinese had learned the location of the Diaoyu Islands as early as the fourteenth century, and also that the Chinese ambassadors had used these islands as navigation marks, but China did not establish state markers or effectively control them. Japan should not apply a modern concept of proclamation of territorial occupation to an ancient situation. First, China owned the Diaoyu Islands long before International Territorial Laws were made. Second, the International Court also had a similar ruling in the Island of Palmas case, “It is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should be established as having begun at a precise epoch . . . It is quite natural that the establishment of sovereignty may be the outcome of a slow evolution . . .”26 Japan claims that the Senkaku Islands are a part of Okinawa. This is not true. In fact, the Chinese evidence of the Ryukyu map made in 1719 by Chinese ambassador Xu Baoguang (徐葆光) did not contain the Diaoyu Islands. Xu had earlier been invited by the Ryukyu Kingdom to research and make a map of Ryukyu territory. The Ryukyu had thirty-six islands and the Gumi (古米島) was the southwest border island of the kingdom.27 In 1745, a Japanese writer, Hayashi Shihai, published a series of five colored maps entitled “The Three States Navigation Maps.” He used different colors for different countries. The Diaoyu Islands were in the same color as those for China, while the Ryukyu Kingdom was in brown. In 1801, another Japanese writer, Kuyoko Gen, reprinted these maps. One of his maps is maintained at Harvard University. In 1832, these maps were translated into French and were published by M. J. Klaproth. In Klaproth’s book, the Diaoyu Islands were painted in yellow the same as China, which was, again, a different color from the Ryukyu,28 thus, showing once again that Diaoyu Islands were not a part of the Ryukyu Islands. Why did the Ryukyu Kingdom not discover the Diaoyu Islands even though they were not far from the Ryukyu? Perhaps, the prevailing currents and winds in the area made sailing difficult from Ryukyu westward in the direction of the Diaoyu Islands. Historical records from the Chinese ambassadorial trips revealed that on their way back to China from the Ryukyu Islands, the ambassadors had to take a different route, which started from the capital city of Napa, went northward, then turned west to China to avoid the prevailing currents and winds. By taking this route, the travelers could not see the Diaoyu Islands.29 This explains why the Ryukyu fishermen could not have gone fishing from Ryukyu toward the Diaoyu in pre-modern days due to the dangerous winds and adverse ocean currents until advanced technology was available. The U.S. Involvement and the United Nations Trusteeship Okinawa, before the Japanese conquest, was an independent country called the Lew Chew Kingdom (琉球王国), which had a tribute relationship with China.


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The United States consistently addressed this kingdom by the names Lew Chew and Ryukyu and signed its first treaty, the Lew Chew Compact, in 1854 by Commodore Matthew Perry.30 It did not call the islands by their Japanese name, Okinawa, until 1962.31 In 1875, Japanese made a military conquest of Ryukyu and ordered the king of Ryukyu to sever his tributes with China. Japan also denied the king’s title granted by Ming China and later continued by the Qing Chinese emperors.32 On April 4, 1879, Japan kidnapped Sho Tai, the king of Ryukyu, and took him to Tokyo as punishment because he failed to obey Tokyo’s earlier orders. His status was lowered to a lord. It was then that Japan changed the name of Ryukyu to Okinawa (冲绳) and made it a ken of Japan.33 The king sought help from the Chinese, but China was already weakened by the unequal treaties signed with the European powers. Though China protested against the Japanese action on May 10, 1879, it was not able to protect the Ryukyu Kingdom. Under the pressure from China and the United States, Japan decided to compromise by dividing ownership of the Ryukyu Islands with China. The Japanese proposal was to let China take over the southern portion of Ryukyu territory, including the Miyako and the Yaesan Islands. The Chinese saw the opportunity to rescue the Ryukyu Kingdom, by dividing the Ryukyu Islands into three parts: The Ryukyu would keep the central island; Japan could take the northern portion; and China would retain the southern portion. By doing this China planned to restore the Ryukyu king to his throne and return the southern portion of Ryukyu to him. However, Japan refused but, thereafter, tried to persuade China to accept the Japanese proposal. With this plan, the Ryukyu Kingdom would disappear forever. China rejected the Japanese offer.34 Throughout the entire negotiation process, Japan did not have any interest in the southern portion of the Ryukyu Islands to which the Japanese claimed the Diaoyu Islands belong. The Japanese did not make an open claim for the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands until the “Reversion of Okinawa to Japan” was set to be issued. On September 10, 1970, when the “Reversion” was issued, the United States made a public announcement to include the “Senkaku Islands” in the reversal with the Japanese request.35 These actions were dubious because none of the other reversed islands were named in the written Reversion. With U.S. support, the Okinawa government claimed its jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and the oil deposits around them.36 One week later, on September 17, 1970, the Okinawa government published another document, in which Okinawa supplied further evidences. One of them was the No. 27 Order of the U.S. Administrative Government of Okinawa issued on December 25, 1953. This twenty-seventh order enclosed the Senkaku Islands in the scope of the U.S. administration.37 The U.S.–Japan negotiations to give Japan the Diaoyu Islands secretly began after the UN oil research project in 1968. Japan could not wait for the results, but made its first protest against the ROC claiming the Senkaku Islands as a part of the Okinawa Islands.38 How did the United States get involved in this dispute? In 1947, the United Nations started a Trusteeship Council to put colonies under the U.N. General

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Assembly Supervision in order to prepare for their independence or self-government, as set out in Article 76 of the U.N. Charter.39 The non-self-governing areas applied to all areas of the world that were not fully self-governing, whether they be protectorates, colonies, or other possessions or trust territories. The areas qualifying for “trust territory” were: Land not subject to the sovereignty of any state because of a special status. The UN placed such areas under the protection of established states to promote the self-determination of the inhabitants.40 The Trusteeship Council was composed of fourteen members. All permanent members of the Security Council, including the ROC, became automatic members. At the time, the United States was one of the most enthusiastic of those countries who supported the self-determination and decolonization programs in the UN. In President Harry Truman’s Navy Day address on October 27, 1945, he said, “We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely-expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.” On November 6, 1946, Truman announced that “The United States is prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese islands for which it assumes responsibilities as a result of the Second World War.” In February 28, 1947, Truman said that “We see colonial peoples moving toward their independence. It is a process that we, as Americans, can understand and sympathize with, since it parallels our own struggle for independence. We, as Americans, will want to supply guidance and help wherever we can.”41 In 1945, after twelve thousand American lives were lost in the battle of liberating the Ryukyu Islands from the hands of Japanese occupation, Ryukyu became a U.S. military base. In 1951, the United States included the Ryukyu trusteeship decision in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, a bilateral treaty with Japan. The treaty read, “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands).”42 Not only was Ryukyu placed under the Trusteeship with the United States as the administering power, but also, as suggested, a special category of trusteeship for the Pacific Islands as a “strategic area.” The “strategic area” of the trustee territory was under the UN Security Council, while all other regular trustee territories were under the authority of the UN General Assembly.43 Some sources believed that the original reason for the United States to put the Ryukyu Islands under “trusteeship” was to prevent the Chinese claim to Ryukyu and to gain the legitimacy to control Ryukyu.44 For hundreds of years, the Lew Chew Kingdom was a Chinese protectorate. During the negotiations for the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek on three different occasions if China wanted Lew Chew back. Chiang later recalled that, at the time, his priority was to get the lost Chinese territory, Taiwan and its attached islands back. He did not have the leverage to add the Lew Chew islands, a former tribute state of


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China, under the circumstances. After World War II ended, the ROC sent a small group of personnel stationed on Lew Chew to symbolically exercise Chinese authority there. The status of Ryukyu as a “strategic area” of the UN trusteeship program meant that the United States became the administrator of the trustee territory of Ryukyu under the authority of the UN Security Council. However, the Security Council was not consulted on the “reversion” of Ryukyu to Japan. At that time, the ROC, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would have exercised its veto power.45 More importantly, the purpose of the UN trusteeship system was to help the people in the “trustee territory” become independent or be a self-government. It was never intended to give them back to their former colonizers or conquerors. Of all the former trusteeship territories, Ryukyu was the only one that was given back to its conqueror. The Ryukyu people had, in fact, ruled themselves for more than 800 years prior to the Japanese conquest. Today, a large number of Ryukyuans still do not identify themselves with the Japanese. Their struggle toward independence never stopped in the recent 130 years.46 Japan and the United States both alleged that China did not make any argument on the status of the Ryukyu or Diaoyu Islands when the San Francisco Treaty decision was made in 1951. The ROC knew that the U.S. troops used Chiwei, one of the Diaoyu Islands, for target practice but did not complain. The ROC Foreign Ministry spokesman Wei Yu-sun explained on April 20, 1971, that ROC sovereignty over the Tiaoyutai Islands was assertive and would “never change.” “The ROC thought at the time [in 1945] that the American patrol was a cooperative security measure of that area. After the ROC had made an agreement with the U.S. on the scope of the U.S. patrol, Chinese fishermen kept working at the Tiaoyutai area.”47 So, the Chinese did not protest against the United States. However, China did not sign the San Francisco Conference Treaty, the ROC did not attend the Conference, and the PRC was not invited. Therefore, any treaty decisions against Chinese sovereignty were illegal. According to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, the victors had promised to “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.” President Truman said, “We do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.”48 Now, for its own national interest in the East Asian region, the United States gave the already “liberated” Ryukyuans as a gift to their former conqueror Japan. What did the United States gain by giving Ryukyu to Japan? The U.S. could continue to use Okinawa as its most important military base in East Asia. They gained “complete freedom to maintain military equipment, transport troops, and to implement military logistics, and that it was a U.S. prerogative to determine the status of Okinawa in anyway it chose.”49 Due to the Korean War, the United States reversed its post–World War II Japan policy. Originally, the United States wanted to reduce Japan to a weak

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country that would never have the military power to invade another country. The Cold War changed this policy. The United States started to rebuild Japan to be their ally against communism. During the bargaining for the “return of Okinawa” the United States agreed to add the Senkaku Islands into the “Reversion.” Nevertheless, it was not in writing in the Reversion, but was announced by the U.S. State Department on April 9, 1971, two months before the “Reversion of Okinawa” was signed. The U.S. State Department declared, “According to Article Three of the 1951 Japan Peace Treaty, the United States obtained the right to administer Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude. The Treaty generally understood that the Senkaku Islands were enclosed.”50 The writing of the Treaty was imprecise and problematic. It only said that the United States would administer “Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude.” It neither specified the longitude, nor did it give the latitude for the southern limit. Koga applied for permission to develop the Diaoyu Islands, but could not get his authorization from the Japanese government until the year that Taiwan was ceded to Japan. This clearly showed that the Diaoyu Islands were not a part of Okinawa, but a part of Taiwan. Later, a U.S. spokesman realized that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not mention the Senkaku Islands, explaining, “We think there are different opinions on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. This issue should be resolved by the involved countries.” Yet, the United States carried out the Reversion without consulting China, an “involved country.” According to the 1943 Cairo Declaration issued on December 1, 1943, “all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.”51 The Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 clearly set out where Japanese territory should be: “The demands of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out immediately. Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.”52 The Ryukyu Islands were not such “minor islands,” as the Potsdam Proclamation intended. The Ryukyu Islands were a country militarily conquered by Japan. The Chinese Claim Based on Traditional Ownership China claims that early local Chinese fishermen discovered the Diaoyu Islands during their fishing trips with the help of favorable winds and ocean currents. The Chinese also used the Diaoyu Islands on official trips to the Ryukyu Kingdom as navigation marks, as well as for special herb collection activities. The earliest existing material evidence of the Chinese name Diaoyu Islands in Chinese writing is a navigation map dating back to 1403. The map is a guide to reach the Ryukyu Islands from the Fujian province, and even tells how much time it takes with the help of a favorable tail wind.53 The International Territorial Law states, “Discovery is the oldest and historically, the most important method of acquiring title to territory.”54 This information proves that the real discovery of the islands should have been earlier than 1403.


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The second set of historical evidence is found in the records of the Chinese ambassadors’ trips to the Ryukyu Kingdom. The ambassadors carried the Ming Emperors’ missions to title the Ryukyu kings. Periodically, the Ryukyu kings would send their tribute missions to China. The Chinese would then make return visits. The Chinese ambassadors’ ships often went to Ryukyu along with the Ryukyu tribute mission team. According to the official records of the Chinese ambassadors, the Diaoyu Islands were used as navigation marks. For instance, Chinese ambassador Chen Kan (陳侃) recorded on his trip to Ryukyu on May 8, 1532, that after they passed Diaoyu (釣魚), Huangwei (黃尾), and Chiwei (赤尾), the ship sailed three times faster. The Ryukyu sailors on his ship started to sing and dance for their home, Gumi (古米) Island, was near.55 Thus, Gumi Island was considered the first island of Ryukyu. It would take speedy sailing for an entire day to cross the Ryukyu Trough. According to Professor Kiyoshi Inoue, a history professor at Kyoto University, ten more Ming missions to Ryukyu had already taken place prior to Chen Kan’s trip. Unfortunately, all the records are missing. Inoue suggested that the Diaoyu Islands should have been mentioned in these missing records.56 In 1779, another Chinese ambassador to the Ryukyu, Xiao Chongye (蕭崇業), combined all the existing records of his predecessors into a book, which recorded the Diaoyu Islands. The book stated that “the Diaoyu Islands are affiliated small islands of Taiwan.”57 In 1893, the Qing Chinese Empress Dowager Cixi (慈禧) promulgated an order of commendation, which rewarded three of the Diaoyu islands to Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷) for his filial pious behavior. This was the result of Sheng’s contribution of a special herb, Shicongrong (石蓯蓉), to cure Cixi’s rheumatism, which was collected from the Diaoyu Islands. The existence of Cixi’s original written commendation proves that not only was the Chinese government aware of the Diaoyu Islands as being Chinese territory, but China also made use of the islands according to their knowledge of them. Sheng’s granddaughter, Xu Yi (徐逸), a member of the ROC Legislative Yuan in 1947, later became a U.S. citizen. In 1971, she presented Cixi’s written order and her father’s written will (which gave her the right to inherit the islands) to the U.S. Congress through Congressman Kwang Youliang (鄺祐良, also a Chinese American) to ensure her ownership of the three islands. Kwang’s testimony and a picture of the Empress’ order were recorded in the first meeting of the 92nd U.S. Congress on November 9, 1971.58 The Chinese evidence of maps, a book, and a written government order should qualify the Chinese ownership of the Diaoyu Islands through the International Territorial Law on discovery and usage. The International Law of the Seas The Diaoyu Islands are situated on the edge of the East China Sea continental shelf, which is contiguous to the Chinese mainland and to Taiwan. Geologically, the Diaoyu Islands are an extension of Dadun Mountain in Taiwan. The seabed of the East China Sea slopes smoothly and gently eastward from the mainland

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Chinese coast. Two-thirds of the East China Sea is supported by the continental shelf in water less than 200 meters in depth. Passing the Diaoyu Islands, the seabed abruptly plunges into the Ryukyu Trough. The maximum depth of the Trough is 2,717 meters near the China side, and its shallowest depth is 1,000 meters. It extends all the way northeastward by the west side of the Ryukyu Islands. It separates the Ryukyu Islands from the Diaoyu Islands at the deepest section of the entire Trough.59 The Ryukyu Trough provides a natural sea border between China and Ryukyu. The Trough had been the border of China since the Ming Dynasty. This was recorded in the Chinese ambassadors’ journals a number of times. On a 1596 trip, an associate ambassador, Zhou Huang (周煌), recorded passing the Trough, “When passing the Trough, the wind and tides became very strong. We threw a pig and a goat into the Trough (ceremonial sacrifices) . . . Questioning the meaning of the Trough, it is the boundary between China and the outside.”60 Ambassador Chen Kan had earlier mentioned the Trough in his records that after passing the Diaoyu, Huangwei, and Chiwei, “the ship sailed as fast as flying with downstream. I had no time to look at the scenery. [We] sailed three days’ distance in one day.”61 This strong ocean current is where the Trough plunges into the deep sea. The First International Law of Seas Conference of the UN took place in 1958. The ROC represented China. It signed the Convention of the Continental Shelf among the East China Sea countries.62 The ROC did not ratify its signature until August 21, 1970, after the International Court of Justice ruled the North Sea Continental Shelf case in favor of the natural prolongation principle, “in the interest of equity, the natural prolongation of land territory should also be considered as an applicable criterion.” 63 Consequently, the Chinese signature was based on the North Sea case as a precedent emphasizing the prolongation principle. The ROC declared, “The boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to two or more states whose coasts are adjacent to and/or opposite each other shall be determined in accordance with the principle of the natural prolongation of their land territories.”64 The ROC ratification denied the median line principle be applied on the China situation with a claim of a “special circumstance” of the Trough. China was not the only country that did this. Korea had the same problem with Japan and also asserted the natural prolongation principle to the Ryukyu Trough separating Japan from the Asian continent. The PRC inherited the ROC signatures and concurred with the Korean assertion.65 Furthermore, according to the 1986 International Law of the Seas, the median line applied to the seas between disputed states: “This rule would not apply, of course, where, by reason of historic title or some other special circumstance, it is necessary to delimit the territorial waters of the two states in some other manner.”66 In the 1982 Tunisia/Libyan Continental Shelf case, the International Court of Justice followed the theory of equitable principle, declined to consider the equidistance method, and ruled that “delimitation is to be affected in accordance with equitable principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances.”67 The relevance is given to historical evidence. In the 1951 Minquier


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Islands dispute between England and France, the International Court examined historical evidence as far as back the Norman Conquest in English and French evidence in 933 AD.68 In 1971, the PRC gained the ROC seat in the UN. The PRC also adhered to the natural prolongation principle in seaward delimitation of the continental shelf, and adhered to islands being accorded a territorial sea. On the issue of the adjacent continental shelf, the PRC reaffirmed, “the shallow sea area off the coast of a country is the natural extension of its land territory.”69 While implicitly limiting continental shelf jurisdiction to coastal states, the PRC claimed the “shallow sea” around the disputed mid-ocean islets in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.70 When the Diaoyu dispute first came up in 1970, the PRC had not had any international experience and therefore remained silent for half a year. Toward the end of the year, the PRC denounced the establishment of a nongovernmental ROC–ROK–Japan Liaison Committee by businessmen of the three countries in November 1970.71 The Committee proposed that the three governments involved should freeze the seabed disputes and let their private enterprises proceed with oil exploration. On December 4, 1970, the PRC made a strong claim to sovereign rights over the continental shelves in the Yellow and East China Seas. The PRC warned that “The U.S. and Japanese reactionaries will reap their own bitter fruits if they do not pull in their claws of aggression.”72 This language was very typical of PRC at the peak of the Cultural Revolution. On December 29, 1970, the PRC precisely pinpointed the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese sacred territories: The resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas around these islands and of the shallow seas adjacent to other parts of China all belong to China, their owner, and we will never permit others to lay their hands on them . . . All agreements and contracts concerning the exploration and exploitation of China’s sea-bed and subsoil resources [which] the Chiang Kai-shek gang concluded with any country, and international organization or and foreign public or private enterprise under the signboard of “joint development” or anything else are illegal and null and void.73

The PRC’s warnings were effective. On March 11, 1971, Japan declared that in order to avoid friction with China, attempts to develop oil from the Taiwan Strait and from the continental shelf around the Diaoyu Islands would be suspended.74 The U.S. State Department also advised American oil firms not to explore for oil deposits in the offshore areas under dispute between the coastal states, or the U.S. government would not intercede if their vessels were seized by China.75 Today, we can understand China’s behavior of the 1970s better: Domestically, the PRC was in turmoil from the Cultural Revolution. The government policies were extremely leftist under the influence of the “Gang of Four.” Internationally, these actions were taking place during the Cold War, and the PRC was fighting against both superpowers (although its relation with the United States was getting better after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit in

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1972). The PRC was also a new member of the UN after more than twenty years of isolation. Consequently, the PRC stood with other Third World countries fighting for their national interests. After economic reform started, China signed the 1982 International Law of the Seas. Japan did not sign the Law of the Seas. The depth of the Ryukyu Trough left Japan with only a very narrow strip of continental shelf since the Geneva Convention gave a two-hundred-meter depth criterion for the concept.76 In 1973, Japan submitted a preliminary proposal on “Principles on the Delimitation of the Coastal Sea-bed Area” to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. It suggested, “The outer limit of continental shelf should not exceed a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles,” the principle of equidistance and the medium line for states being opposite each other.77 The Japanese proposal was discussed in the 1974 Conference of the Law of the Seas, but it had no result. Japan has consistently claimed the “equidistance principle in delimiting its continental shelf, with islands being accorded to the same seabed rights as is continental territory, regardless of their size and economic value.”78 After Ryukyu “reversed” to Japan, Japan has become a long chain of islands from the north all the way near Taiwan. If the Japanese claim became successful, it would take over half of the entire East Sea from Russia, Korea, and China. Politics, Emotion, and Sovereignty The years of 1970–1972 were critical for the PRC and the ROC to determine who would represent China on the international stage. Neither side wanted to offend the United States. The ROC did not want the United States or Japan to vote it out of the UN, while the PRC did not want the United States to deny its entrance. The PRC was in secret negotiations with the United States to reach a détente. If successful, it would reduce the nuclear threats from the Soviet Union on its long northern borders. Japan seized this opportunity to push the United States to issue the “Reversion of Okinawa,” which included the Diaoyu Islands. For China, the seat in the UN, especially the seat on the Security Council, was more important on both sides of the Taiwan Strait than to lose the small Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese idem says: “When the snipe and the clam grapple, the fisherman profits (鷸蚌相爭, 漁翁得利).” When the Baodiao (保釣運動 Defending Tiaoyutai Islands) Movement was at its peak among overseas Chinese students in the United States and other Western countries, the ROC blocked the news in Taiwan, thus delaying the Taiwan student movement for an entire year.79 The ROC claims for the Diaoyu Islands were reported in only a few lines. The first reaction on August 23, 1970, was less than two hundred words in the Central Daily. It did not mention Chinese sovereignty. The second reaction on September 25, 1970, was a report by Vice President Yan Jiagan (嚴家淦). Again, he only used words such as “legitimate rights” to the islands, and “clearly expressed disagreement with Japan.” For the third reaction on February 23,


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1971, the ROC Foreign Minister Wei Daoming (魏道明) answered questions from Li Wenbao (李文寶) of the Legislative Yuan, using words such as “cannot agree” with the Japanese claims. Finally, he admitted that the Tiaoyutai Islands were related to national sovereignty.80 Domestically, the ROC was dealing with the Taiwan Independence Movement. The student movement of 1971 was suppressed by the government in order to maintain political stability. Some of the 1971 student movement leaders were accused of being communist agents and had to flee abroad.81 The PRC did no better than the ROC. It did not yet have detailed knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands or the knowledge of the international laws related to this issue; however, it did not make an effort to support the Ryukyu Independence movement even though the PRC was supporting other Third World countries’ struggles against imperialism. The PRC was too busy with the Cultural Revolution, and did not have the energy to organize a study of this issue. In 1969, the Soviet Union offered a contingency plan for destroying the Chinese nuclear capability.82 Under such a grave situation, the PRC started its rapprochement with the United States. In July 1971, immediately after the U.S. ping-pong team visited China, the “Reversion of Okinawa to Japan” was concluded. Giving the priority of the security crisis, the PRC could only issue a few strong protests against Japan. In order to gain more members to support its entrance to the United Nations and to come out from the isolation, establishing normal diplomatic relationship with Japan was very important for the PRC. The PRC decided to “shelve the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands and let the later generations solve the problem.” It did not know how eager Japan was to establish diplomatic relations with China. It had longed to make China a market, but needed U.S. endorsement. Now, the United States had broken the ice. In September 1972, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来) suggested to Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, when the two countries established diplomatic relations, “Let us not quarrel over them now; they are tiny little islets hardly visible on the map and have only become a problem since oil was discovered in the vicinity.”83 This might have given the Japanese an impression that the Chinese thought the Diaoyu Islands insignificant. In 1978, before conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Peace Treaty, a few members of the Japanese Diet called for a favorable resolution of the Senkaku sovereignty issue as the price for Japan’s signature on the Treaty.84 After the 1982 International Law of the Seas came into effect, Japan still would not sign the Law, but strongly claimed the midline principle. Without consulting the countries on the opposite side of the seas, Japan drew a medium line through the chains of the small islands between China and Japan, which included the Diaoyu Islands on the Japanese side. Recently, China built the Chunxiao (春曉) Oil Field in the East China Sea. It was on the Chinese side, even according to the Japanese claimed medium line, in order to avoid unnecessary problems. Yet, Japan still made demands on China to share the Chunxiao data information. Several rounds of negotiations on this issue have not brought any positive solutions.

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The Diaoyu Islands is an emotional issue for the Chinese people. When the Chinese could not do anything about it in the early 1970s, it was the Chinese students overseas who started the Defending Diaoyu Movement. In recent years the protests have been spontaneously organized with fundraising by new generations of young patriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, including the citizens of Hong Kong. Already, a young Hong Kong activist died in a protest when he was prevented from getting on the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese. The Twenty-First Century It is clear that China has accumulated strong material evidence in the last six hundred years in terms of government documents and historical maps on Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The international courts had precedent cases ruling in favor of the continental shelf theory and ancient situations that gave China advantages to use the rulings to defeat the Japanese equal distance principle. Although the Japanese claim for the Diaoyu Islands has little persuasive power, the oil shortage of twenty-first century Japan will not let it give up the oil rich Diaoyu Islands or its ambition to divide the East China Sea with the midline principle. It is not impossible that Japan would use military means to finalize its ambitions for the Diaoyu Islands and the water around it. Recently, Japan and the United States have included the “defense” of Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands in military cooperation without consulting any third party in the region. On the other hand, for the last thirty years, China has followed Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy guidelines of creating a peaceful international environment. Recently, President Hu Jintao again emphasized to build “harmonious international relations” with countries around the world. China is unlikely to use military means to regain the Diaoyu Islands. The PRC has had few experiences with the international courts. After thirty years of observation of the international courts and laws, it is time for China to cultivate its trust and confidence in the collective international justice system and to peacefully solving its problems through the international courts. The Diaoyu Islands issue is important to the Chinese national interest. It does not matter who rules China: The Chinese national interest is the same as its policy on this issue. That is why both the PRC and the ROC government took the same stand. It would be beneficial if the PRC cooperates with the KMT and its experts who had previously dealt with this issue, such as Ma Ying-jeou (马英九), Tian Hongmao (田弘茂), and Chiu Hongdah (丘宏達). The two sides together would make a stronger case in the international court against Japanese claims. The KMT by itself cannot do anything due to its international status. This party cooperation for Chinese territorial integrity could become a step toward reunification. Ma Ying-jeou has made a public offer to help on this issue. Since South Korea also has the same problem with Japan, it would be wise to cooperate with the South Koreans on this issue as well. This case shows that today’s international laws still contain legacies from the colonialist past. The international territorial law was developed during the early


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years of colonization by the European countries to create rules and regulations to legitimize their colonial conquests. Today, the International Court agrees that the modern concept of “proclamation of territorial occupation” should not be applied to an “ancient situation.” The Diaoyu Island case is an ancient situation according to the precedent in the rules of the International Court, “It is quite natural that the establishment of sovereignty may be the outcome of a slow evolution . . .”85 After suffering from an entire century of semi-colonial life, China was not cynical in solving its border problems after the establishment of the PRC. On most occasions, the PRC compromised with its neighbors in order to reach agreements. The PRC compromised with Pakistan, Nepal, and Burma along the southwest borders. China finally solved all border problems with Russia—by giving up a lot to Russia of what was the source of the 1968 border war. The PRC resolved all its territorial disputes with the strategy of reservations through peaceful consultations in order to have a peaceful and harmonious neighborhood. Now, the only border problem left by the old colonial structure is with India.86 Today’s China is much stronger than it was in 1970 when the Diaoyu Islands dispute began. China has a stable domestic society, a better economy, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and Hong Kong had been returned. Between the Taiwan Strait, communication, commerce, and traveling have all improved greatly. The PRC has also reestablished a good relationship with its traditional political rival, the Chinese KMT in Taiwan. China is in a much better position to solve the Diaoyu Islands’ dispute. Among all the options, the best way to solve this dispute is to study the laws and similar precedent cases tried in the international courts. Although the international laws and courts have no power to enforce decisions, their prestige and public opinions for justice will support China and become more aware of new Japanese ambition in the twenty-first century. Notes 1. Ma, Ying-jeou, (馬英九), Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Baltimore, MA: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1984), Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Volume 62, No. 3, 1984, pp. 1, 71, and 72. 2. Harold C. Hinton, The China Sea (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), p. 3. 3. Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, pp. 17–19, 37. Also in Huang Yangzhi (黃養志) et al., Tiaoyutai, No. 65, May 1971, Mingbao Monthly Magazine, Hong Kong. 4. Sha, Xuejun, Tiaoyutai, No. 99, March 1974, Mingbao Monthly Magazine, Hong Kong. 5. Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, p. 38. 6. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (Korea: Seoul National University Press, 1983), p. 34. 7. Ibid., 35; and Ma Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, p. 50. 8. Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations (New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, Fifth Edition, 1986), pp. 112–115.

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9. Ibid. The PRC was still paying for the Qing Dynasty debts in 1982. 10. Koji, Taira, “The China–Japan Clash over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,” The Ryukyuanist, spring 2004. The author is an emeritus professor in University of Illinois at Urbana. 11. Inoue, Kiyoshi (井上清), The Issues about the Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, translated into Chinese by Ying Hui (Hong Kong: Sihai Publisher, 1972), p. 75. 12. Inoue, Kiyoshi, The Issues about the Tiaoyutai History and Sovereignty, translated by Ying Hui (Hong Kong: The Decade of the Seventies Magazine, 1973), pp. 58–59. 13. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, pp. 60–61. 14. Inoue Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Sovereignty, p. 10. 15. Sha, Xuejun, Mingbao Monthly Magazine, No. 99, March 1974. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, p. 26. 19. Inoue, Kiyoshi, “Japanese Militarism and Tiaoyutai (Senkaku) Island: A Japanese Historian’s View,” Historical Research, February 1972. 20. Ibid., Inoue cited from Okinawa Daily News. 21. Ibid., Inoue cited from January 1, 1910, “Mr. Koga’s Contribution to the Okinawa Islands,” the article was preserved in Vol. 2 of the Napa County Historical Material. 22. Yang, Zhongkui (楊仲揆), Central Daily (中央日報), Taiwan, September 13, 1970. 23. Jin Zhiyu, Zili Evening News, October 9, 1970. 24. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Sovereignty, pp. 12–15. 25. Marius B. Janson, editor, The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5, the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, England, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 767–769. 26. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 36. 27. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, p. 8. 28. Chiu Hongdah (邱弘達), Mingbao Monthly Magazine, No. 75, March 1972. 29. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, p. 20. 30. George H. Kerr, George H. Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1958), p. 330. 31. Ibid., pp. xvii–xviii; also in Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2001), pp. 68–69. 32. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Sovereignty, p. 78. 33. Kerr, George H., Okinawa (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1958) pp. 3–4 and 381. 34. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Sovereignty, p. 85. 35. U.S. Department of State, press release, September 10, 1970, Sha Xuejun, Mingbao Monthly Magazine, No. 99, March 1974. 36. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 35. 37. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Sovereignty, p. 11. 38. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 34. 39. Department of State, The United States and Non-Self-Governing Territories, A summary of information regarding the United States and non-self-governing territories with particular reference to Chapters XI, XII, XIII of the Charter of the United Nations (United States–United Nations Information Series 18, April 5, 1947), pp. 11–17. 40. William R. Slonmanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 3rd ed. (Belmont, California: West Thompson Learning, 2000), p. 232 41. The United States and the Non-Self-Governing Territories, pp. 30 and 44.


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42. Kerr, George H., Okinawa, p. 7. Also in UN Treaty Series, p. 38. 43. Charmian Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the United Nations, Published under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 120, and footnote 11. 44. Eldridge, The Origins of Bilateral Okinawa Problem, p. 68. 45. A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 72 and 380–382. Also in Robert E. Rigges and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations, 2nd edition (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), pp. 190–193. 46. M. D. Morris, Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968), pp. 201–202. 47. Central Daily, Taiwan, April 20, 1971. 48. The United States and Non-Self-Governing Territories, p. 44. 49. Makota Takizawa, The Former High Commissioner Albert Watson’s Speech in Konnichi No. Ryukyu, October 6, 1965, pp. 496, footnotes 2, 4–5, and also Senator Harry Byrd’s speech as cited in Okinawa Daily News, June 4, 1969. 50. Central News Agency (中央社), Taiwan, April 9, 1971. 51. Kerr, George H., Okinawa, pp. 10–11. 52. Ibid., p. 13. 53. Yuntian Publisher (雲天出版社), ed., The Storm of Tiaoyutai (Taipei: Yuntian Publisher, 1971). 54. von Glahn, Law among Nations, p. 311. 55. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, p. 4. 56. Ibid. 57. Chiu, Hongdah, Mingbao Monthly Magazine, No. 78, June 1972. 58. Fu, Jun, The Four Groups of Islands in South China Sea (Taipei: Century Books, 1981), p. 21. Also in Sha, Xuejun, Mingbao Monthly Magazine, No. 78, June 1972. 59. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 35, and Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, p. 72. 60. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Tiaoyutai History and Jurisdiction, pp. 14–18. 61. Ibid., p. 4. 62. Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, p. 24. 63. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 150. 64. Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, p. 40, cited from Gazette of Legislative Yuan, No. 64, August 22, 1970. 65. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 28. 66. von Glahn, Law among Nations, p. 363. 67. Ibid., p. 378. 68. Ibid., p. 312. 69. Peking Review, March 10, 1972. 70. Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, p. 54. 71. Ibid., p. 50. 72. Peking Review, No. 50, December 4, 1970. 73. People’s Daily, December 29, 1970, and Peking Review, January 1, 1971. 74. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 19, cited from Washington Post, April 10, 1971. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid., p. 150. 77. Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems, pp. 35–36. 78. Ibid., p. 37.

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79. Zuguo Monthly Journal edited, Selected Material on the Tiaoyutai Issues (Hong Kong: Youlin Research, 1972), pp. 37–56. 80. The Second Volume of the Tiaoyutai Islands Issue, 釣魚臺列嶼問題第二輯 (Taiwan: Haiwai Publisher (海外出版社) April 1971), pp. 7–8. 81. Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power (Washington D.C.: The Brooklings, 1981), p. 288. 82. David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 215. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid., pp. 215–216. 85. Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, p. 36. 86. Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Foreign Policy Options in the 1990s,” in ed. Samuel S. Kim, China and the World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 302.

CHAPTER 10

The Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China: Some Recent Relations Peter R. Moody, Jr.

Introduction The policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) toward Taiwan has been shaped by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CPC) rivalry with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; KMT), each party claiming to represent the legitimate government of all of China. The Taiwan issue was seen as an unresolved question from an ongoing civil war. This is reflected not merely in threats to liberate Taiwan but in the conciliatory approaches as well. For example, the one country, two systems policy was frequently couched in the context of forming a “third united front,” this time for the unification of China. This particular approach once corresponded with the KMT’s own definition of the situation, but with Taiwan’s political development it had become anachronistic even before the KMT’s loss of the presidency in 2000. But with the KMT out of power, radicalism fading on the Mainland, and the hostility of the Taiwan government to notions of Chinese nationalism, the two parties may be coming once again to share common ground. The anomalies of the situation provoke speculation: Had the CPC been willing publicly to assert in a more timely fashion the line toward Taiwan that it currently takes, there may have been progress, if not toward unification, at least for a stable and enduring peace between the two sides. And the KMT’s own future, if it has one, may be better served in the context of some sort of Greater China, rather than on Taiwan alone—although this would require considerably more progress toward democratization on the Mainland.

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While one thinks of the CPC and the KMT as deadly rivals, the two actually have much in common with each other and have a history of some cooperation as well as conflict. During 1949 the armies of the CPC defeated those of the KMT on the Mainland, and the ruling KMT regime evacuated its armed forces and treasure to the island of Taiwan. The KMT ruled Taiwan until the year 2000, and the island remained outside the control of the new central government in Peking. Official Chinese policy is to “reunify” with Taiwan, and Western press commentary often speaks of Taiwan as a “renegade province.” In the PRC definition of the situation, this characterization is not quite accurate. Rather, Taiwan’s continued autonomy is left-over business from the civil war. It is not a question of Taiwan province defying the Center. Rather, Taiwan was a piece of Chinese territory occupied by forces hostile to the Center purporting to represent a rival regime for the whole of China. Until the early 1990s, the KMT agreed that Taiwan was part of China but asserted it was the Mainland that was occupied by forces hostile to the Center. Each was implacably hostile to any force that would detach Taiwan from the greater China, to turn it into a separate country in its own right. At times, their common antipathy to Taiwan independence may have outweighed that for each other. Each was also hostile to potential foreign control over Taiwan (say, by the United States or Japan), although its dependence on foreign support made the KMT mute its hostility. The two parties have a history of cooperation as well as conflict, although the cooperation always ended badly. They formed a “united front” in the 1920s to fight the warlords and another in 1937 to fight the Japanese. Part of the proposal for “one country, two systems” initially was a third united front, this time to reunify the country. Until the late 1980s, the top leadership of each party were personally acquainted. One problem with the Mainland’s proposals for reunification was that in the end they always hedged, but one might wonder that if the Mainland authorities had been willing to settle earlier for what they are evidently ready to settle for now, some sort of accommodation might have been reached. The potential appeal to unity on Taiwan is certainly more to the KMT (and its offshoots, the New Party and People’s First Party), rather than to the rival Democratic Progressive Party. A limitation of the Mainland proposals, though, was precisely that they were too overtly directed toward the KMT— even in the days of its hegemony a mere political party—rather than toward any government on Taiwan that would have the legitimate authority to make decisions in the name of the entire population on the island. The other side of this is that loss of control over Taiwan gives the KMT new opportunities. One can also wonder how much future there is for the China National Party (to give it its full name) on Taiwan. It is unlikely that many on Taiwan would choose to be ruled by the crowd currently in control in Beijing, or cede even a nominal sovereignty to the PRC. But many on the island, not limited to “Mainlanders,” seem to retain some self-sense as Chinese. It is in the KMT’s interest to keep alive the question of unity versus independence. Any future the party may have will probably have to be sought in some sort of greater China context, not on Taiwan alone.

Kuomingtang and the Communist Party of China

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The CPC Approach to Taiwan The CPC has asserted China’s claims on Taiwan at least since Liberation, maybe because of the circumstances of Liberation. Taiwan has been under at least loose Chinese jurisdiction (if not always control) since the 1600s, and in 1886 was elevated to the status of province. It became a Japanese colony in 1895 as part of the settlement of the first Sino-Japanese war. The consensus among the allies in World War II, articulated at the Cairo and Potsdam conferences, was that Taiwan should revert to the Republic of China,1 and ROC forces occupied the island after Japan’s surrender. After being defeated on the Mainland, the Chiang regime retreated to Taiwan, designating Taipei as the ROC’s provisional capital. In the reckoning of the new PRC, the ROC ceased to exist as of October 1, 1949, with the PRC claiming all of its political assets, if none of its obligations. Prior to the civil war neither party had shown an overwhelming interest in Taiwan. Its recovery was not among Chiang Kai-shek’s priorities. Mao Zedong, in his conversations with Edgar Snow, famously grouped “Formosa” with Korea as former Chinese possessions, taken by Japan, that should be given independence after Japan’s defeat.2 The two Chinese rivals became concerned with Taiwan once the island remained under Chiang’s control. For Chiang, Taiwan had to be part of China—otherwise what justification could he offer for ruling it? And the PRC had to assert its claim to Taiwan to discredit Chiang and to justify the continued civil war: Its own legitimacy would not be secure until the old ROC regime was entirely eliminated. The current PRC position on Taiwan is better explained by the political rivalry between the two parties than by “primordial” sentiments based on Chinese history.3 Nor is it really well explained by ordinary power politics: for while possession of Taiwan would certainly be a security asset to China, lack of such control has been among the least of China’s security problems (and in any case, under the one country, two systems formula there would be no PLA forces on Taiwan). But having made such strong claims to Taiwan, the mainland authorities are in no position to retract them even when the original circumstances have changed. The original CPC public policy toward Taiwan stressed liberation, military conquest. This was prevented by China’s lack of amphibious capacity, complemented, after the onset of the Korean War, by American’s commitment to defend the island. This commitment was formalized in a treaty with the ROC in 1954, but, curiously, the United States never endorsed the ROC claim that Taiwan was part of China. Rather, the official American position, reasserted as late as a few weeks prior to Henry Kissinger’s first secret visit to Peking in 1971 (to Kissinger’s great annoyance) was that Taiwan’s international status remained to be determined: America wished to preserve, at least in principle, the ability of the people of Taiwan to have some say in their own future. 4 After 1971, however, the United States came to accept, however ambiguously, the PRC’s definition of the situation. Around the same time CPC statements began to speak more of unification than of liberation.5 In 1980 Deng Xiaoping announced that the “return of Taiwan to the motherland” was one of the major tasks of the coming decade.6

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The milder line toward unification was probably a function of its increased feasibility: American support for the Chiang regime was weakened and the ruling authorities on Taiwan lacked deep sympathy in the United States. And the Peking regime had itself, by 1980, become considerably less repellant than it had been. A small committee headed by Deng Yingchao, Zhou Enlai’s widow, drafted a new policy.7 The new approach was articulated by State Chairman Ye Jianying on September 30, 1981. Ye called for new talks between the CPC and KMT. He was open to discussions with and proposals from others as well, although the mainland interlocutor would, presumably, remain the CPC alone. Ye promised that the “Taiwan authorities” would keep control of Taiwan, even maintaining their own armed forces. There would be no change in Taiwan’s socio-economic system, but Taiwan politicians could be given high positions on the Mainland. 8 This evolved into the formula of “one country, two systems.” The new line, though, was pitched to the KMT rather than to the ROC, since the key point in the communist interpretation was that there was no longer any such thing as the ROC. The KMT, by then congenitally suspicious of “united front schemes,” could not really afford to comply, even if it had desired to do so. By the 1980s, Taiwan’s political system had evolved beyond an imposed military regime; and since the KMT’s own legitimacy rested on the existence of the ROC constitution (however much it nullified that constitution in practice), it could not disregard the constitutional system. In fact, more than anything else, the communist proposals may have undermined the KMT’s legitimacy, in that they might have caused many among Taiwan’s population to wonder whether they would prove so tempting to their rulers that their rulers would sell them out. The CPC’s ostensible openness to other forces on the island potentially threatened the KMT control over the situation. From the other side, the proposals did nothing to guarantee a peaceful resolution, since under various circumstances (a declaration of independence; sometimes even a protracted refusal to negotiate) the CPC promised to use force. On the Mainland today there seems to be a certain nostalgia for the Chiangs, especially Chiang Ching-kuo. At the time, though, especially during the late 1980s, statements about Taiwan complained of how Chiang Chingkuo refused to take any steps toward unification, how he promoted “Chiangstyle independence,” “B-style” independence, and “independent Taiwan” (Du Tai), if not Taiwan independence (Taidu). Prior to his death, around the same time he was liberalizing Taiwan’s political system, Ching-kuo also loosened Mainland policy. Previously the official position had been “no contacts, no negotiations, no compromise.” But in his last months Chiang legalized limited visits to and limited investments in the Mainland. Diplomatically, there was a shift away from the older practice, with Taiwan beginning to cultivate informal relations with communist states (especially Vietnam) and moderating its one-China principle. The new line was that the ROC did indeed have a one-China policy, but it would not impose that on other countries (opening


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the possibility that a country could recognize both the ROC and the PRC—a moot point, since the PRC continued not to tolerate such things). With Lee Teng-hui there was a general continuity of the Chiang policy— movement along the same trajectory, as it were.9 Lee purported, especially in his early period, to favor reunification in principle, albeit with a twist. In 1991 a new institution established under Lee, the National Unification Council, passed a set of guidelines, asserting “both the mainland and Taiwan are parts of Chinese territory.” Reunification would be predicated on the security and wellbeing of the people of Taiwan, and planning for full unification would require “adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice, and nationalization of the armed forces” (the last something not yet fully achieved on Taiwan at the time). In the meantime, the two sides should “end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China, solve all disputes through peaceful means, and furthermore respect—not reject—each other in the international community.”10 As far as the KMT was concerned, the Chinese civil war was over and Taiwan was prepared to accept the PRC as a legitimate state in the international arena. Until the Mainland evolved into a liberal democracy, the two sides should refrain from threatening each other, enjoy normal and routine economic and cultural exchanges, and not hinder each other’s international activities. China could not accept the principle of peaceful resolution, on the not very impressive grounds that if there were such a guarantee, Taiwan would simply declare independence. The general CPC position, however, remained conciliatory. In January 1995 CPC head Jiang Zemin articulated “eight points” governing the Taiwan issue, offering “equal talks” between the two sides on any issue whatsoever, as long as both sides accepted the “premise of one China.”11 Even official circles in Taipei considered Jiang’s proposals “constructive,” although forward movement was hindered by the turmoil occasioned by Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States and the presidential election the following year. One puzzle, in retrospect, is that it would seem that both sides had in fact already agreed to the “premise” of one China. A graver problem may have been finding a way of symbolically establishing a basis for equality between the two sides. The communists could not negotiate with the ROC; and the ROC would certainly not accept that it was a local government or somehow subordinate to the PRC. For the communists the ideal solution would have been renewed talks between themselves and the KMT on a party-to-party basis. This, however, was no longer politically possible for the KMT. A stop-gap solution was the setting up of two as-it-were private organizations, the (Mainland) Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the (Taiwan) Straits Exchange Foundation, each headed by a respectable old gentleman. Meeting in 1992 the ARATS declared itself “willing to accept” an SEF proposal that “each organization is to express the ‘one China’ principle through an oral declaration,” but the “specific contents of the oral declaration”—that is, what each side meant by it— “will be separately discussed.”12 This “1992 consensus,” one China, different interpretations, did not receive much notice until around the time of the 2000 Taiwan presidential election.

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Chen Shui-bian, the historically pro-independence new president from the historically pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, seemed for a time ready to consider this consensus as a basis for a relationship with the mainland, although when Chen was willing the mainland demurred. Chen eventually came to deny there ever was any 1992 consensus, as did the new Taiwan independence zealot, ex-president Lee Teng-hui. The 1992 consensus, like the one-China principle itself, is evidently subject to different interpretations.13 The consensus, such as it was, was not between two responsible governments, but between two semi-official organizations, representing the ruling party of their respective political entities. The Taiwan “definition” was that “one China” meant the “Republic of China, which has existed from its founding in 1912 to the present day.” It had “sovereignty” over all of China, but “present governing power” only over Taiwan and a few small islands. Both Taiwan and the Mainland were “part of China.”14 This last was in tension, or even outright contradiction, with the DPP’s traditional position that Taiwan and China were different from each other. And, in any case, the SEF was in no position officially to commit the ROC to anything. The Mainland authorities came to accept the consensus after some ambivalence. At the Chinese New Year in 2001, retired foreign minister Qian Qichen, who had become the regime’s point man on Taiwan, elaborated on Jiang’s eight points, echoing the National Unification Council’s 1991 formula: “the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China.” (He did add, though, that China’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no divisions.”) He suggested the 1992 consensus as the basis for holding talks. In 1995, Jiang Zemin said he was willing to talk about anything and everything, on the premise of one China. In 2001, Qian said the 1992 consensus met this premise and complained that Chen Shui-bian, whom he called the “leader of the Taiwan authorities,” would not specifically acknowledge one China. If Jiang had been as willing in 1995 to accept the consensus as he was six years later, the “Taiwan authorities” would have been under greater pressure to begin talks, however fruitless those talks were likely to have been. By 2001, that opportunity was gone. Shifting Taiwan Perspectives During the Chiang era, the KMT line on Taiwan was close to identical to that of the CPC. The image the KMT sought to project was that of the governing party of the constitutionally legitimate Chinese state, the inheritor both of the nationalist tradition of Sun Yat-sen and the greater traditional Chinese culture. Taiwan figured as a province of China—fully a part of China but nothing but a part. In its self-presentation, the regime tended to downplay any differences between Taiwan and the rest of the country. On the other hand, even in the early Chiang period, the general policy emphasis was more on regime preservation and the defense of Taiwan than on “recovering the mainland.” By the 1970s, the world and time (generational change and the American courtship of the PRC, partly at Taiwan’s expense)


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compelled the KMT regime to sink deeper roots into Taiwan society. The national-level institutions allowing popular representation, the National Assembly and the Legislative Council, long frozen in the form they had assumed on the Mainland in 1947 and 1948, became partly open to popular contestation in the “free areas” of China (Taiwan and the other islands remaining under KMT control). Chiang Kai-shek’s son Ching-kuo, consolidating his own position in the early 1970s, actively encouraged the recruitment of Taiwanese politicians into the KMT and of educated young Taiwanese into the state bureaucracy: the process of localization or Taiwanization. It was no longer possible, if it ever had been, to conceive of internal Taiwan politics as a simple confrontation between mainlanders and Taiwanese: For while the (still questionably legal) opposition was almost exclusively Taiwanese, so was the majority of the KMT, with Taiwanese holding increasingly high positions in the ruling institutions. Taiwan’s military orientation, since the early days of Chiang Kai-shek, had been for practical purposes defensive. This reflected both the limits of American tolerance and practical possibilities. By the early 1980s the KMT regime had for the most part ceased to talk about the “glorious recovery” of the Mainland, calling instead for “uniting China under [Sun Yat-sen’s] Three Principles of the People”—a kind of counterpoint to the Mainland’s one country, two systems. What this meant was certainly subject to interpretation, but it probably implied that unification would come through peaceful means rather than through conquest and that the future China would be democratic and not necessarily ruled by the KMT. It could also be taken to mean that until the mainland was ready for the Three Principles of the People, Taiwan should remain separate. By the late 1980s the main regime argument against Taiwan independence was that moves toward that goal would provoke a Mainland attack—reasoning about as impressive as that for the Mainland’s refusing to promise a peaceful resolution. When regime spokesmen argued for American arms to defend “this country,” the country indicated was not China, but Taiwan. The repressive emergency rule or martial law on the island was rationalized as a necessary counter to communist subversion. That certainly was a real threat, but the more serious and unspoken threat to KMT rule was from those who wanted Taiwan to be an independent country. Some of the pro-independence sentiment was as-it-were ethnic,15 in that the experience of KMT misrule after 1945 and, especially, the massacres involved in suppressing the February 28, 1947, insurrection left an enduring distaste for and distrust of Mainlanders in general. But for many associated with the TI movement in its early years, an independent Taiwan was simply a democratic Taiwan, no longer ruled as a police state. They were associated as well with liberals inside the KMT, whose own position was perhaps closer to “two Chinas” than to Taiwan independence.16 As the political system grew more open, then, the KMT and TI positions tended to converge. Chen Tzu-sung analyzes this convergence by means of the musical metaphor of counterpoint: Over time, both the KMT and TI came to identify a common antagonist.17 This peculiar convergence made Taiwan an

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Peter R. Moody, Jr. Table 10.1 Point–counterpoint: The evolution of democracy in Taiwan Tendency

Era

Theme

Counterpoint

KMT

c.1950–1980 c.1980–1990 c.1990–2000 c.1950–1980 c.1980–1990

Chinese nationalism Taiwan autonomy Taiwan autonomy Democracy Democracy, independence Independence

CPC, TI CPC PRC KMT KMT, China

Taiwan Independence

c.1990–2000

China

Source: Adapted from Chen Tzu-sung, “Taiwan Consciousness: An Invisible Hand that Rocks the Democratic Cradle,” PhD dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1995.

anomaly, a case of democratic development absent a common definition of just what constituted the people, the demos that was to rule.18 The process is summarized in Table 10.1. The new consensus began to break up under Lee Teng-hui, with the fragmenting of the KMT. Lee, Chiang Ching-kuo’s vice president, became ROC president with Chiang’s death in 1988. This did not automatically mean, however, that he would become capo regime.19 Lee was Taiwanese, and, moreover, a Taiwanese who had made his career in the bureaucracy (so he did not have as easy populist appeal as his main Taiwanese rival, Lin Yang-kang or, at a somewhat lower level, Wu Po-hsiung). To consolidate his own position against bureaucratic and political rivals, Lee strove to strengthen and popularize the institution of the presidency, while seeking to identify himself with Taiwan consciousness.20 Lee’s institutional changes (the full reelection of the National Assembly and Legislative Council, especially the popular election of the president) had the effect of emphasizing Taiwan’s autonomy and distinctiveness. They symbolized a rupture by the current regime with its Mainland origins. The government of Taiwan was then chosen by and responsible to the people of Taiwan, and no one else. It could hardly claim any longer to be the government of all of China, but by the same token, any Chinese claim over Taiwan became increasingly precarious. Lee did, of course, approve the Unification Guidelines. But the guidelines were really predicated on Taiwan’s continued autonomy and looked for Taiwan’s having some international space. The CPC was very reluctant to tolerate the latter. The turning point was Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States, which became an issue probably because America gratuitously made it one. Lee’s visit set the stage for the Chinese military demonstrations in the fall of 1995 and spring of 1996, in anticipation of the presidential election, and in 1996, America made a military demonstration in defense of Taiwan. In the aftermath, America and China, both sobered by how close they had come to war, reevaluated the way in which they interacted, and America drew back from the closer relationship with Taiwan that had been developing during the first Clinton administration (although, at the same time, America increased its determination to sell Taiwan defensive weapons). In 1998, President Clinton, visiting China,


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announced the “three nos” (the United States would not support Taiwan independence, two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan, and Taiwan’s membership in any organization for which statehood was a criterion). This was not exactly new. Henry Kissinger had said much the same thing in his first discussions with Zhou Enlai in July 1971.21 But the extent to which America purported to accept the CPC definition of the situation had not previously been made public. The following year, perhaps hoping to force America’s hand, Lee announced his own “two state” theory: The relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland is that between two states, albeit of a special nature. Lee’s positions provoked internal conflict in the KMT, leading to schisms. A group of mostly reformist younger politicians, many but not all of them Mainlanders, broke with Lee in the early 1990s, forming the New Party, and they ran a candidate against Lee in the 1996 election. Older KMT types, deep in the establishment, also fielded an independent candidate that year. Despite this opposition and that of the DPP, Lee took more than half the popular vote in 1996. For this, he had the communist threats against Taiwan to thank. The New Party soon dwindled to irrelevance, despite its promising start. A graver split came on the eve of the 2000 elections, with the defection of James Soong (Sung Ch’u-yü or Song Chuyu). Soong had been prominent among the younger generation of KMT reformers and was personally close to Chiang Ching-kuo.22 During the transition period, Soong, himself a Mainlander, had intervened with the Mainlander old guard to forestall their seeking to deny Lee the chairmanship of the KMT. In 1994 Soong was overwhelmingly elected governor of Taiwan province.23 In 1998, however, Lee “froze” the status of the provincial government, rendering it nugatory. This was rationalized in terms of administrative efficiency, but symbolically it was a further step toward an independent Taiwan (a tacit abandonment of the Chiang-era notion that there was a difference between Taiwan province and the ROC proper; abolition of the provincial government had long been advocated by TI proponents). As far as Soong was concerned, the move showed Lee’s ingratitude and fear of a popular potential rival. Soong ran as an independent in the 2000 presidential race, coming in a close second to the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian (the official KMT candidate, Lee’s vice president Lien Chan, finished last). Lien Chan, the KMT candidate, had been hand-picked by Lee, but many KMT stalwarts had the impression that Lee had tacitly favored Chen. The party forced Lee to resign as party chairman, taking the blame for the loss. Some months later, a few of Lee’s cronies quit the party to form the Taiwan Solidarity Union, with an even more outspokenly TI posture than the DPP. After the election, Soong organized his KMT support into another new party, the Qin Min Dang, which sports the somewhat silly English rendering of People’s First Party (PFP). Generally speaking, the PFP has cooperated, especially on cross-strait issues, with the KMT (and the NP, for what that is worth) in a “pan-blue” coalition, with the DPP and TSU forming a “pan-green” combination. The four main parties, however, remained organizationally distinct (table 10.2). The position of the KMT after 2000 was without precedent. Its rationale as a party was that it embodied Chinese nationalism, and what place it should

224 Table 10.2 Blue–green polarization since 2000 Green 4/8/00

“Freezing” of the National Assembly (KMT, NP also agree)

11/00

12/00

2/01 5/01

Chen Shui-bian rejects one country, two systems

6/01

8/01 9/01

TSU founded

11/01

Chen Shui-bian rejects 1992 consensus; Lee Teng-hui denies there ever was such a thing. ROC flag removed from Government Information Office logo ROC adds “Taiwan” to cover of passports Yu Shyi-kun (Premier, ROC) says country should be called ROC-Taiwan Popular demonstration in favor of making Taiwan “nation’s” official name Chen Shui-bian proposes referendum on Taiwan’s future ROC and Mongolia exchange quasi-official representatives (implying ROC considers Mongolia no longer part of China or, more likely, that Taiwan considers itself not China)

12/01

1/02 3/02

5/02

8/02

9/02

Blue

Wu Po-hsiung (vice chairman, KMT) visits the Mainland, and meets with Shanghai boss Huang Ju Ma Ying-jeou (mayor, Taipei) proposes cooperation between the KMT, PFP, and NP James Soong endorses the 1992 consensus Vincent Siew (former ROC premier, Lien Chan’s running mate, vice chairman, KMT) visits Mainland John Chang (Chiang) (former ROC foreign minister; son of Chiang Ching-kuo) promotes investment in Mainland KMT reendorses 1991 guidelines; Lee Teng-hui expelled from KMT

Continued

225 Table 10.2 Continued Green 4/03 10/03

12/03

2/04

9/04

11/04

12/04

Taiwan protests WHO’s listing it as part of China Chen Shui-bian pushes for a referendum and a new constitution by 2008 Chen says he may abandon promise not to declare independence if China continues to threaten Taiwan Chen says that December 25 should continue as a national holiday, but as Christmas, not Constitution Day On a visit to Panama, Chen (or his entourage) says the country should be known as “ROC (Taiwan)” Chen says Taiwan will try to join UN as Taiwan (not as ROC) Bruiting of plans to include Taiwan in names of foreign missions and state-run enterprises Constitutional change: Amendments will be made by referendum; the National Assembly will vote on constitutional amendments, but without the power to revise them; nor will delegates be allowed to debate amendments

4/05

5/05

1/06

2/06

Blue

National Assembly amends constitution, abolishing itself Chen Shui-bian calls for a new constitution by 2008, with a referendum in 2007 Chen repudiates the 1991 unification guidelines, and suspends the National Unification Council

Lien Chan makes a triumphal tour of the Mainland James Soong makes a triumphal tour of the Mainland

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occupy in a Taiwan alienated from the whole concept of China was problematic. Especially during the Chiang Ching-kuo era, partisan rhetoric had focused on themes of constitutionality, rule of law, democratic development, and economic prosperity, rather than nationalism specifically. But the party’s claim to represent Chinese nationalism remained its nominal justification for its dominant position on Taiwan. Its electoral base came from local political factions and bosses whose affiliations with the KMT were mainly opportunistic: The KMT recruited persons with local influence, and they affiliated with the KMT because it dominated the general political system. Lee Teng-hui lacked strong roots in the military and police bureaucracies of the Chiang era, and since elections were becoming a major source of political power, Lee was assiduous in cultivating local factions and the moneyed elite (the “golden cows”). With the KMT’s loss of central power and its diminished ability to dole out patronage, its appeal to the local elites was bound to fade. After the defeat, the KMT moved away from Lee’s positions and more toward a qualified unificationist line—an example being the discovery of the 1992 consensus. There was not much market for a strong Chinese nationalism on Taiwan, but public opinion polls consistently showed that most of the public was leery of independency as well—if only because it might provoke a Mainland attack. On assuming the presidency, partly in response to American pressure and partly as a result of a tacit deal with the previous regime, Chen promised not to change the status quo and accepted all the national symbols of the ROC. His government, however, gradually introduced themes stressing Taiwan’s distinctiveness and de-emphasizing its Chinese heritage.24 The Mainland media complained of Chen’s policy of “desinification.”25 For the DPP, the focus on Taiwan identity was a political tactic, a way to distance themselves from the KMT regime and appeal, it would be hoped, to the sentiments of the majority of the population. In his last months, Chiang Chingkuo himself had tried to encourage a kind of dual identity: “I am Chinese; I am also Taiwanese.” Lee Teng-hui had elaborated this into an inclusive thesis of the “New Taiwanese.” After 2000, however, many Mainlanders began to feel excluded from these New Taiwanese, as, possibly, did the Hakka and Hokklo peoples who also continued to think of themselves as somehow Chinese (table 10.3) With the growing irrelevance of communism as part of the Mainland “identity,” there were opportunities for a new convergence of attitudes between the CPC and KMT. This would not imply that the KMT would come to urge unification with the PRC. But there would be a new ambivalence in KMT attitudes—a hostility to the greens and an openness to opportunistic cooperation with the CPC should this ever be advantageous. Table 10.3 Points and counterpoints after 2000 Organization

Theme

Counterpoint

CPC KMT DPP

Chinese nationalism Chinese identity Taiwan nationalism

Taiwan independence Desinification China


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CPC and KMT: Points of Convergence The joint commitment of the CPC and KMT to some kind of Chinese nationalism meant they would be rivals in the absence of a common counterpoint. After 1949, the Chiang Kai-shek regime was on the defensive, despite all rhetoric about recovering the Mainland, and its public and even private posture toward the CPC was hostile. The Maoist position was slightly more nuanced: hostility and threat aplenty, but also inducements to make a deal. The policy of one country, two systems was new in the 1980s only, it seems, in the sense that before then it had not been articulated publicly. Its substance had been formulated in the 1950s. As Mao, with his customary colorful crudeness, expressed it: “Let [Chiang Kai-shek] have something to eat. Let him have some soldiers, and his spies and his Three People’s Principles.” In May of 1960 Mao allegedly told Zhou Enlai: “It is better for Taiwan to remain with Chiang than to fall into the hands of the Americans. The liberation of Taiwan is not necessarily something that we will accomplish in our lifetimes.” The practical program (or one of them), which the communists attempted to communicate through unofficial channels, was that Chiang Kaishek would keep control of Taiwan politics and his army, with no Central cadres sent to Taiwan; the Center would help finance Taiwan’s military, political, and economic development; Chiang would be consulted on all social changes relevant to Taiwan; and the two sides will agree not to spy on or subvert each other.26 This particular policy sought a common “counterpoint” in the Americans, playing on Chiang’s ambivalence about American support. In those days, questions of ideology, human rights, and so on aside, the ROC was useful to the United States as long as the United States and China were hostile to each other. But there was also a sense, among at least segments of the KMT regime that the Americans regarded the regime, particularly with its unrealistic pretensions, as a burden and a hindrance to a more effective policy.27 Conservative elements in the KMT feared America might be on the look out for more pliant partners on Taiwan, some, say, who might agree to some sort of “two-Chinas,” and this fear contributed to (or at least helped rationalize) regime repressiveness.28 The communists sought to encourage Chiang to stand up to the Americans and, at least in small ways, Chiang may have responded.29 There is ample documentation of American intelligence cooperation with the KMT against the CPC,30 but nothing solid about any covert collaborations with the opposition. However, the CPC seems to have had this impression, hinted at in ways interesting to the conspiratorial mind in the record of Zhou Enlai’s 1971 colloquies with Henry Kissinger. Zhou told Kissinger that Chiang Kaishek considered the CIA responsible for the escape from house arrest on Taiwan of independence advocate Peng Ming-min (how did Zhou know what Chiang thought?), and that Zhou agreed with Chiang. Zhou asked, “Was [TI] supported by a part of the people of the U.S. government, that is, by the CIA or the Pentagon?” Kissinger harrumphed (after some badinage): “Mr. Prime Minister, bureaucracies are large, and sometimes not perfectly manageable.” But “to the best of my knowledge, CIA had nothing to do with Professor Peng Ming-min’s coming to the United States.”31

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The following day, as Zhou pressed Kissinger to promise that America would “not let an independence movement break out,” Kissinger responded, “We will give no support, even direct or indirect,” to the Taiwan independence movement. “If you have any reliable information to the contrary, get it to me and I will see whatever is going on is stopped.”32 He added, however, that America could not guarantee future developments outside of its control. Kissinger’s statement can be interpreted either as an assertion of America’s current intentions or as a promise about the future. It does not exclude American support for the TIM in the past (and, for that matter, strictly speaking, to say America will not support the Taiwan independence movement is not really the same as not supporting Taiwan independence). America did keep an ambiguous commitment not to look kindly upon an unprovoked Chinese attack on Taiwan (and, of course, kept up certain military and political relations with the island). But in effect the United States had cut loose both the KMT and the TIM. Partly paradoxically, this decreased Mainland leverage over the KMT: Since the KMT had lost the leverage given it by American backing, it had even less incentive to enter into any kind of bargaining with the communists. In the United States, with anticommunism becoming less a theme of foreign policy and at that time a certain idealization of China, there was also more conscious attention to the repressive nature of KMT rule. This general syndrome encouraged both the democratization of the regime and the convergence of the KMT and TIM on an anti-China, Taiwan autonomy position. A fiercely militant Chinese posture against Taiwan would have threatened the new relationship with the United States, and this was one of the motives for the more conciliatory approach. The CPC also made some clumsy overtures to Taiwan’s ruling elite. In 1982 the communist apparatchik Liao Chengzhi, who had known Chiang Ching-kuo in the 1920s when they were both students in the Soviet Union, wrote an open letter to his “little brother” proposing renewed cooperation between the two parties.33 There may have been at least a double motive here—possibly to promote cooperation, but also, possibly, to cause trouble by reinforcing doubts on Taiwan about whether Chiang would sell the island out. In 1986 a pilot for China Airlines (Taiwan’s flag carrier) landed his cargo plane in Canton and the Mainland, if it had not planned the event, took the occasion to try to force direct negotiations between the two sides (the best they got was a meeting between CAL officials and those of China’s CAAC).34 During the mid-to-late 1980s there may have been tentative secret informal contacts between representatives of the two parties, although apparently they did not go much beyond telephone conversations in Hong Kong.35 In 1987 Chiang Ching-kuo permitted limited travel to and commerce with the mainland. A CPC source takes this as evidence of Chiang’s patriotism.36 But at the same time he was moving to democratize his own regime, and the opening to the Mainland can be interpreted as a move to some kind of two-state position. In an earlier unpromising move, in 1975 the PRC had released a cohort of KMT “war criminals,” who, contrary to expectations, were not warmly welcomed to come to Taiwan. One of these, Cai Shengsan, earned a living by


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writing on historical and political topics for the Hong Kong papers. Concerning Chiang Ching-kuo, Cai wrote: He will not “sell out Taiwan or seek glory by giving in to foreigners; he won’t surrender to the mainland; he won’t throw Taiwan into chaos.” The CPC source above cites this appraisal, and it seems to be quite on the mark.37 The same source also says that the Chiangs “never wavered” on the one China position, but delayed too long taking practical action.38 But it seems more plausible to treat the policies of Lee Teng-hui as following the trajectory set by Chiang Ching-kuo. And whatever his personal sentiments, Lee did not “waver” himself until after repeated refusals by the Mainland to make any kind of real concessions to Taiwan’s sensibilities or dignity. The next real opportunity for any sort of KMT–CPC cooperation did not come until after the KMT’s loss of the presidency in 2000. By the same token, though, the loss depreciated the value of the cooperation. It did, however, increase the influence of the Chinese nationalist contingent within the KMT, and perhaps even the relative influence of partisans of Mainlander origins or descent, although this is not clear. In 2000 Chen Shui-bian was elected by a plurality of 39 percent of the vote (and this may be a practical measure of independence sentiment). In 2004 the blue and green tendencies (each managed to form a united front) finished in a statistical dead heat, although Chen won the election because he had more votes than his opponent. The day before the election there was a puzzling supposed assassination attempt against Chen and his running mate, and this may have influenced the outcome. The bitterness of the campaign and its aftermath made Chen more eager to push symbolically toward independence and the KMT more prone to explore accommodations with the Mainland. Following the 2004 election Chen renewed his push for redrawing the constitution. The DPP generally lacked appreciation for the ROC constitution, partly for its possible unsuitability as a governing document for Taiwan but more because of its association with the ROC. Chen wanted the constitutional change to take place before 2008 (the next presidential election) with a referendum on the new constitution39 to be held in 2007. The symbolic implication would be an even deeper break with the state’s Mainland origins. Chen insisted, of course, that any new constitution would have nothing to do with Taiwan’s independence. In 2005 Lien Chan, the newly retired KMT chairman, made a tour of the Mainland, visiting his old high school at Xian,40 hobnobbing with Hu Jintao and other CPC bigshots, and making a major speech at Peking University. In this speech Lien praised the university’s (pre-1949) tradition of intellectual independence and hailed the contributions of both Chiang Ching-kuo and Deng Xiaoping to China’s modernization. Lien urged on his listeners the examples of Germany and Korea (where two separate states temporarily tolerated each other and accorded each other international space).41 Lien criticized Chen Shui-bian’s plans to redo the constitution and his program of desinification, but he also said that considerations of ethnic purity—mincui—should not override the priority of democracy. Lien foresaw the eventual emergence in China of a “pluralist society of tolerance.”42

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Lien’s successor as KMT head, Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou, a rather more popular figure than Lien, did not himself visit the Mainland. In the spring of 2006, however, he did visit London, and there outlined what was probably the then-authoritative KMT position on the Mainland. In effect, Ma reiterated the 1991 Guidelines, which President Chen was then in the process of repudiating. The KMT, Ma said, supports the status quo and opposes unilateral change. The “ROC constitution is a one-China constitution.” The KMT “does not rule out the option of eventual reunification,” especially once “China becomes democratic.” “Since Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy, reunification with Mainland China cannot proceed without the consent of the Taiwanese people.” Reconciliation with the mainland was inconceivable thirty or forty years ago, but it no longer is.43 During that same visit Ma said that independence was a viable option for Taiwan, but it was not the option favored by the KMT. What is Going On? The maneuvering over Taiwan seemed to be directed toward a climax (or anticlimax) sometime around 2008. On Taiwan the 2004 election and its outcome provoked greater polarization, at least rhetorically, between the greens and the blues. Chen Shui-bian pushed for a referendum and a new constitution; the blue leadership visited the Mainland; Chen repudiated the 1991 Guidelines and “suspended” the National Unification Council. The CPC’s next Party congress was scheduled for 2007, limiting the current leadership’s freedom to make any dramatic concessions before that time. Following the Congress, though, a newly consolidated leadership may have greater freedom of action. A major fear was that since Peking was scheduled to host the 2008 Olympics, Taiwan might be tempted to take a decisive step toward de jure independence as the time for the games approaches, with the calculation that the Mainland would not go to war since that would ruin the games. Taiwan would hold a presidential election in early 2008 and the DPP (or the greens generally) might treat that election as a referendum on independence, figuring that the general public would in its turn figure that the Peking rulers would be too distracted to cause trouble. The CPC, countering this sort of speculation, indulged in both on- and offthe-record chest-thumping: China would risk the Olympics, indeed, would risk full-scale war with the United States, rather than allow Taiwan to become independent. More overtly, in 2005 China’s National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession” law, authorizing (as if this were needed or relevant) the use of force should Taiwan “secede” from China. The choice of English translation and the theme of commentary surrounding the legislation hints that one purpose of the law was to sway American opinion, raising the analogy of the American civil war.44 But Taiwan’s situation in 2005 was not quite that of Virginia or South Carolina in 1861, and while it was not clear what would constitute “secession,” whatever Taiwan’s situation was, that was not it. The antisecession law was generally treated as a provocation, a hardening of the Mainland position. This may not be entirely valid: It may also be a way of


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giving Taiwan a way out. There are hints (appearing in such places as the Hong Kong communist press—a way of presenting official speculation in an informal, noncommittal manner) that the original idea was a “unification law.” But official commentary in 2005 was relatively reticent about unification, even about one country, two systems, stressing instead that Taiwan had damn well better not “secede”: as if Taiwan were held to be already somehow united with the rest of China. Toward the end of the year there were easily deniable leaks to the effect that Jiang Zemin had said that in the absence of any serious turn in the situation there would be no attack for twenty years (or before 2020—the rumors vary), which, if true, is tantamount to saying that there are no current plans for a Mainland attack on Taiwan and that any decision to attack will not be made by anyone presently in power. The exception, of course, would be if Taiwan should somehow do something that the Mainland would construe, or would be forced to construe, as an unambiguous declaration of independence. Given the previous posturing and rhetoric, in that case the Mainland would be virtually compelled to attack.45 What evidence there is allows a tentative thesis to the effect that the mainland hopes Taiwan will allow it a little face, that it will stay in line at least through the Party Congress, the Taiwan presidential election, and the Olympic games. There may be a tacit acceptance that a peaceful meaningful reunification is at the current stage hopeless, and that a forceful reunification would be a disaster and is, barring severe “provocation,” off the table. One might speculate that after 2008 Taiwan will be allowed gradually to drift into de jure independence, the mainland allowing the issue to lose its salience; and the anomaly of Taiwan’s international position will take care of itself. Any sort of unification will depend upon an association with the mainland becoming attractive to Taiwan for its own sake. This speculation may easily be dismissed as fatuously optimistic. The mainland, however, does have an interest in at least projecting an image of something like this. The mainland must ardently desire a KMT (or at least Blue) victory in 2008. The KMT, for its part, is in an unexpectedly good position, particularly as long as the DPP continues to rule in a mildly incompetent manner and its spokesmen indulge in demagogic rhetoric. The KMT cannot make any plausible claim to Taiwanese nationalism. It keeps open the principle of eventual reunification, but on conditions acceptable to Taiwan, and does nothing very specific to realize this principle. CPC hopes for peaceful reunification are far-fetched but not completely unrealistic. Over time increasing numbers of people on Taiwan have come to think of themselves as “Taiwanese,” but this does not mean that they do not also think of themselves, like Chiang Ching-kuo, as Chinese: the numbers claiming this double identity are a plurality of the population and have increased over time.46 The cultural affinity between the two sides is hard to deny, and probably explains the scale of Taiwan investment in the Mainland, despite the misgivings of Taiwan governments, whether KMT or DPP. The very best the CPC can hope for in the near future would be some sort of loose association between China and Taiwan, something that perhaps might

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have been obtained if the 1992 “consensus” had been recognized sometime around 1992. The Party was then inhibited by its inability to find some acceptable way of dealing with the “Taiwan authorities” on equal terms. These inhibitions may fade in the future, allowing direct government to government talks, whether directly or by some transparent subterfuge. And the KMT may have an incentive to play along. Its past electoral appeals on Taiwan depended to a large degree on the simple fact of incumbency. It has some residual support, apart from the deficiencies of alternatives to it, in its past record of governing ability. This will fade with time, and the other political forces will acquire greater skills. And beyond this, what? KMT social and economic policies are much the same as those of its rivals, as are, for practical purposes, its foreign and China policies. Political differences center certainly on differences of principle, but these are abstract; otherwise the political discourse is mainly carping at opponents’ weaknesses and failures and personal attacks on opponents’ leadership. The KMT must compete with the PFP, potentially a stronger rival than the DPP in that the electoral appeal of the two parties overlaps almost completely; the two should take votes from each other rather than from the DPP. As a Taiwan-based party, the PFP may have a more enduring appeal than the KMT, if it is able to transcend its personalistic origins. The KMT’s own hopes for survival, then, may be in some sort of Greater China context, inclusive of but not restricted to, Taiwan. Whether this is possible will depend on the CPC and its ability to make itself attractive to Taiwan—and this will hinge on whether it can meet the criteria of the now-repudiated 1991 Guidelines. The interests of the KMT and CPC converge on the potential of the peaceful reunification of a democratic China. Notes 1. For a survey of the diplomacy, see Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.–Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 2. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 87. The context leaves the impression, though, that Mao did not really know what he was talking about. 3. A legal argument favored by proponents of Taiwan’s independence is that prior to 1912 there was no state called China to assert any kind of territorial claim. Taiwan had been a possession of the Qing empire and the Qing ceded the island to Japan. In 1911 the Qing ceased to exist. For example, Takayuki Munakata, Taiwan’s National Survival in Jeopardy: United States Urged to Change Its Taiwan Policy (Long Island City: Dr. Kang Lu-Wang Memorial Foundation, 2005), p. 19. Whatever was said at Cairo and Potsdam, when Japan gave up its sovereignty over Taiwan it did not (at America’s insistence) specify who would be taking over. 4. Bush, Cross Purposes, p. 94. 5. One motive, presumably, was to mollify the Americans; another was to appeal to nationalistic dissidents on Taiwan, who used the inability of the Chiang regime to prevent Japan’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Diaoyutai islets as a rationale for questioning the regime’s right to rule. For a general study, see Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reform in Taiwan (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976).


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6. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, 1975–1982 (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1882) (Peking: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), p. 204. 7. Li Li, “Eyewitness to Storms in the Taiwan Sea,” Xinhua Wenzhai, Vol. 13, July 5, 2005, pp. 66–88. 8. Renmin Ribao, October 1, 1981. Ye’s proposals were not as innovative as they seemed. Mao made similar proposals, supposedly secretly communicated to the KMT through indirect channels, but nothing of the sort had previously been said publicly. Joanne Jaw-ling Chang, “Negotiation of the 17 August 1982 US–PRC Arms Communiqué: Beijing’s Negotiating Tactics,” China Quarterly, Vol. 125, March 1991, pp. 33–54, says that the proposals were directed more toward the United States than toward the rulers on Taiwan. 9. Although the Mainland labeled Lee a proponent of Taiwan independence from very early in his rule, he did not unambiguously endorse that position until after he had served twelve years as ROC president and had been removed as chairman of the KMT. 10. For an English text, see cns.miss.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2059.htm, Appendix 59 to Monte Bullard, Strait Talk: Avoiding Nuclear War Between the US and China Over Taiwan (Monterey Institute of International Studies, an ongoing e-book project initiated in 2000). 11. People’s Daily, January 31, 1995. 12. Xu Shiquan, “The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations Between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 23, 2001, pp. 121–140. 13. That is, it was not until 2000 that anyone self-consciously determined that the 1992 thing amounted to a “consensus.” The term was then coined by the KMT intellectual, Su Chi, who had participated in the 1992 talks. Taipei Times, February 22, 2006. 14. Xu, “1992 Consensus,” p. 135. 15. The word ethnic here has to be tendentious, in that any ethnic difference between Taiwanese and mainlanders is a “construct” of a certain TI mentality. Conversely, the lack of any ethnic distinction between the two communities is a construct of KMT (and CPC) ideology. 16. Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972). 17. Chen Tzu-sung, “Taiwan Consciousness: An Invisible Hand that Rocks the Democratic Cradle,” PhD dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1995. 18. On the supposed need for agreement on what constitutes the political community, see Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1970, pp. 337–363. 19. By constitutional structure the ROC had a dual executive, with the president as head of state and the premier (head of the Executive Council) as head of government. It was unclear where effective executive authority would lie: The joke was that Taiwan had a presidential system, as long as the president was named Chiang. During the Chiang era, Taiwan was in effect an imperfectly institutionalized leadership system with the leader having connections with and dominating an array of power systems: The party organization, the executive bureaucracy, the military, and the political police. 20. Peter Moody, “Politics of Presidentialism in Taiwan,” working papers on Taiwan Studies, No. 26. In his interview with the popular Japanese historian Shiba Ryotaro,

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21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30. 31.

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Lee expatiated on past injustices against the Taiwanese people, comparing himself to Moses leading Israel out of a cynic might comment that for most of his life Lee had feasted quite well at the fleshpots of Egypt. James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship With China from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999), p. 46. See the contribution by Xu Peishan in Dierdai Jiebanren (The Second Generation of Successors) (Taipei: Chunlun Chubanshe, nd), pp. 44–56. During the Chiang era, the provincial governor had been appointed by the central government, as part of the emergency rule provisions (Lee Teng-hui had served in that post himself ). In 1993 Lee appointed Soong governor, and he was elected the following year. For example, Chen’s people took to finding elements of Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese heritage in the formation of Taiwan identity (for a Mainland critique, see Chen Kongli, “Where Should We Find Taiwan’s Future and Status? Feelings After Viewing Taipei’s ‘Special Formosa Exhibit,’” Liang’an Qingnian, December 2004, pp. 3–6). Chen viewed Taiwan as a multicultural society, a melding of aboriginal, Hokklo, Hakka, and Mainlander contributions (without expatiating in much detail on the frequent tensions among these various communities). There were even proposals to teach Chinese literature, or at least that written after the 1700s or so, as “foreign” literature (an analogy here might be the distinction in U.S. schools between American and English literature). Renmin Ribao, July 31, 2001. Li, “Eyewitness,” p. 75. Richard Bush blames Chiang for preventing America from taking a “pragmatic, nonideological approach” to China policy. Cross Purposes, p. 109. General Sun Li-jen was accused, apparently without foundation, of collusion with the Americans. Sun Liren Shijian Shimoji (Complete Record of the Sun Li-jen Incident), ed. Zhuge Wenwu (Taipei: Xinhuo, 1985). Suspicions of plotting with Americans were also involved in the persecution of liberals such as Lei Chen. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of the more hardline KMT elements elaborated a whole theory of an American plot to undermine the regime, masterminded by the evil genius, the late Harvard professor John K. Fairbank. Fei Zhengqing Jituan Zai Taiwan Da Yinmou (The John King Fairbank Clique’s Big Plot on Taiwan), ed. Zhou Zhiming, 2 volumes (Taipei: Society for the Study of Issues of International Communism, 1969). A CPC source attributes great significance to Chiang’s allowing the publication of the last testament of his right-hand man Chen Cheng without any denunciations of the Communists. Chen is alleged to have said to Chiang, “We can’t fight the tide of communism. We can’t allow Taiwan’s military power to serve foreigners. We can’t trust the Americans, and we can’t be fooled by the Japanese.” Li, “Eyewitness,” p. 76. On Taiwan, Chen’s reputation is as a relative liberal and democrat. Xu Yang and Kuan Silei, Chen Cheng Ping Zhuan (Critical Biography of Chen Cheng) (Taipei: Qunlun Chubanshe, 1986). Weng Taisheng, CIA Zai Taiwan Huodong Mixin (Secret Activities of the CIA on Taiwan) (Taipei: Lianjing, 1991). Memorandum of conversation between Zhou and Kissinger, July 9, 1971, Document 34, in the collection on “The Beijing–Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China,” National Security Archives, George Washington University (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/). The “to my knowledge” reeks of equivocation. So does “coming to the United States.” Peng went originally to


32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46.

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Sweden and was later given political asylum in America. The question was not how he came to America, but how he got out of Taiwan. The conversation of July 10, Document 35, in the same place, p. 19. Li, “Eyewitness,” p. 82. Liao was the son of Liao Zhongkai, one of Chiang Kai-shek’s early rivals in the KMT; and the elder Chiang may have been responsible for the elder Liao’s assassination. Ibid., pp. 83–84. The pilot, once in Chiang’s air force, had come to Taiwan in the late 1940s, and he said he wanted to visit his aged father. If that was all there was to it, though, by 1986 it would have been possible for him to land his plane in Hong Kong, as he was supposed to, and take a train. For some years prior to this, Taiwan had been all but openly encouraging the hijacking of Mainland airlines. Ibid., p. 68. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 83. The old constitution had been amended to provide for future amendments by referendum. Lien is what is known as a “half-mountaineer” (the Mainland being the “mountain,” Taiwan the sea): His parents were Taiwanese but he was born on the Mainland and did not come to Taiwan until 1949. Lien’s father had left the island for China and was a close crony of Chiang Kai-shek’s. The CPC does not admit the relevance of these precedents, nor, formerly, did the KMT. Xinhua, April 20, 2005. A few weeks later PFP leader James Soong also visited the Mainland and said much the same thing. There had previously been some suggestion that Soong would carry a message from Chen, but apparently nothing came of this. Speech of February 14, 2006, on the KMT website, kmt.org.tw. Wang Xu, “Several Questions Concerning the American War Between North and South,” Guangming Ribao, March 29, 2005; Sheng Yongmou, “The American Civil War and the British and French Plot to Create ‘Two Americas,’” a report to the China Academy of Social Sciences, April 14, 2008, in Xin Hua Wenzhai, July 20, 2005, pp. 63–64. This is not to say that even then restraint would not be the more statesmanlike course—only that it is unlikely to be adopted. Data in Yun-hai Chu, “Taiwan’s National Identity and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4, August 2004, pp. 484–512, show growing numbers of those in postelection opinion polls from 1991 to 2002 claim this double identity, and the general trajectory for this answer is upward. The increase seems to come from those who previously thought of themselves to be exclusively Chinese; there would not seem to be many conversions of those who think of themselves as exclusively Taiwanese.


Index

1894 Japanese Navy Navigation Guide, 197 1908 Japanese Navigation Guide, 198 1919 Japanese Navigation Guide, 198 1991 Guidelines, 230, 232 1992 Consensus, 219–220, 226, 231–232 2008 Olympic Games, 230, 231 8–7 Poverty Reduction Program, 74 AIDS, 58, 130–131 abuse, police, 127, 146; policy, 162; power, 6, 145–146; workers, 96–97 Academic Consortium on International Trade (ACIT), 92 accountability, government, 75; leadership, 75 achievement, economic, 33 activities, adversarial, 157; autonomous, 155; campaign, 156; communal, 156; economic, 19, 90; independent, 155; individual-based, 157 Adams, Gerry, 175–176 Administrative Distribution System, 117 administrative reform, 52; regulations, 165 advantageous groups, 155 adversarial activities, 157 advertising revenue, 128–129 Affairs Past Are Not Like Smoke, 133–134 aggression, 187; Japan, 196, 202, 207; Western, 184–185, 207 agriculture, 15, 57, 103; collectivization, 121; economy and, 20; government and, 69; industries, 98–99; investments, 21; Japan and, 21; peasants and, 21, 40; poverty and, 16–17; production, 16–17; protection

system, 21; reform, 31; subsidies, 21; taxes, 41, 63; United States, 21 All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 39, 98 All Media and Culture Group, 130 allocation, market, 33, 43; values, 35 Amartya Sen, 65, 73 anti-secession law, 230–231 Arabian Sea, 173 Arafat, Yasir, 176 armed conflict, 171, 187 Asia, 1, 2, 7, 179, 202, 206 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), 219 association, freedom of, 90, 91, 98, 103 associations, autonomous, 33–34, 42; growth of, 54–55; mass media, 130; professional, 54, 55; state, 57 attribution error, 183–184 authoritarianism, 26–27, 31, 33, 35, 38, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53–54, 55, 60, 61–62, 63, 64, 72–73, 75, 76, 139, 155 authorities, 161–162, 164 autonomous activities, 155; associations, 33–34, 42 autonomy, 115, 128, 156, 222 BBS, see Bulletin Board System BMW Accident Case, see Shenyang BMW Accident Case Balcher, Edward, 197 Baodiao Movement, 196, 208–209 Baogang Guo, 2 barefoot doctors, 15 bargaining, collective, 90, 96, 98, 102–103

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Beijing City Communist Youth League, 129 Beijing City United Literature and Art Union, 130 Beijing Consensus, 58–59 Beijing Daily, 128, 130, 131 Beijing Daily Group, 160 Beijing Daily Messenger, 130 Beijing Evening News, 129, 130 Beijing Media Corporation, 129, 130 Beijing News, 130, 131 Beijing Review, 178–179 Beijing Times, 130 Beijing University, 130, 136 Beijing Youth Daily, 129, 130, 138, 144 Beijing Youth News, 129 Belgrade Embassy bombing, 139, 177, 183–184 benefits, economic, 25–26, 91, 92, 120–121, 185; political, 166 Bernstein, Thomas, 63, 64 big character posters, 154, 161 bilateral relationship, Sino-American, 181 blue team, 178 blue-collar workers, 41, 97, 104 bottom-up populism, 38, 60, 90–91, 121–122, 135 bourgeois, 76, 119, 120 Boxer Rebellion, 185 Brown, Lester R., 4, 91 Buchanan, James M., 42 Bulletin Board System (BBS), 127, 135, 136, 137, 161, 163, 165 Bund, 138 Bunker Hill, 171 Bureau for the Protection of State Secrets, 165 bureaucracy, 26, 28, 31, 61, 131, 156, 179, 221, 222, 226 CAFOD, see Catholic Agency for Overseas Development CCP, see Chinese Communist Party CCTV, see China Central Television CGS, see Corporate Governance Structure CNN, 161 Cai Shengsan, 228–229 Cairo Declaration (1943), 180, 202–203, 204, 217 capital income, 95; intensive factories, 94–95, 97, 105; investment, 91, 95

capitalism, 5, 18, 19, 25, 27, 28, 32–33, 34–35, 50, 74, 75, 76, 93, 119–120 cat theory, 28–29 Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), 93 censorship, 54, 127, 128, 131–134, 135, 137, 139, 142, 145, 146, 154, 165 Centeno, Miguel, 28, 29 Central Daily, 208 central government, 17, 20, 28, 40, 101; economy, 114, 115; Internet, 166; marketization, 115 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 227 Central Party Committee, 3, 13, 16 Central Party School, 13, 76 Central Propaganda Department, 131 centralization coordinator, 58, 59, 129 centralized system, 129, 132–133 Century China, 136–137 Chang, John, 224 changes, economic, 119; institutional, 55, 119; social, 227 checks and balances, 19–20, 144 Chen Duxiu, 27 Chen Jie, 62, 63, 64 Chen Jieren, 131 Chen Kan, 205, 206 Chen Shui-bian, 219–220, 223, 224, 225, 229, 230 Chen Tzu-sung, 221–222, 230 Chen Youwei, 177 Cheng Yizhong, 130 Chengdu, 141, 146 Chengdu Business Times, 140–141 Chiang Ching-kuo, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 231 Chiang Kai-shek, 202–203, 207, 217, 218, 221, 227 child labor laws, 91, 96–97, 98–99, 103, 108 children, 17, 68–70, 90, 91, 93, 96–97, 98–99, 103, 108, 130–131, 141 China Airlines, 228 China Business Morning View, 138 China Central Television, 132, 144–145 China Century, 1, 7 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, 179 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 153, 158, 159

Index China News Services (CNS), 160 China News Weekly, 141 China Peasant Investigation, 133–134 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 117 China Statistics Bureau, 14–15 China Youth Daily, 54, 131, 138, 141 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 178–179 Chinese Association of Journalists, 131 Chinese Civil War, 49, 185, 215, 216, 217, 219, 230 Chinese Communist Party, 7–8, 13, 14, 18, 20, 23, 27, 28, 31, 35–36, 37, 38–39, 43, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 66, 76, 114, 116, 119, 120, 128, 134–135, 143, 144, 145, 154, 156, 160, 161, 180, 215–216, 217–218, 220, 222, 223, 226, 227–230, 231, 232 Chinese Constitution, 55, 56, 114–115, 118, 140, 218, 220, 225, 226, 229, 230 Chinese Embassy bombing, 177, 183–184 Chinese Foreign Ministry, 177 Chinese Labor Act (1994), 99, 100, 102 Chinese Ministry of Education, 16 Chinese National People’s Congress, 13 Chinese Nationalist Party, 215, 216 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 42 Chinese Revolution, 5, 19, 27, 35–36, 38, 56, 57, 73, 74, 116 Chiu Hongdah, 210 Chiwei Island, 203, 205, 206; see also Diaoyu Islands Chongqing, 20 Christopher, Warren, 172, 175 Chunxiao Oil Fields, 209–210 Churchill, Winston, 50 civil rights, 39, 50, 56, 57, 62, 64, 66, 91, 97, 153, 155; society, 43, 53–54, 55, 57, 75, 155 class struggle, 55, 56, 75 classes, 27, 54–55, 56 Clean Up Your Computer campaign, 93, 104 Clinton, Bill, 6–7, 130–131, 172, 175, 176, 177, 186–187, 222–223 codes of conduct, 93 coercion, 140, 187

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Cold War, 50, 204, 207 collective bargaining, 90, 91, 96, 98, 102–103 Collective Corporate Code (CCC), 97–98, 99, 100, 101, 102 collective goods, 59; interests, 156; labor, 91, 97; workers, 98 collectivization, 74, 121 colonization, 202, 211 command economy, 29, 31 commerce, 116, 157–158, 228 commercial entrepreneurs, 54 commercialization, mass media, 127–128, 129, 132 Committee to Protect Journalists, 131 commune system, 15, 28 communication, 132, 134, 140, 153 communism, 3, 7–8, 18–19, 27, 35–36, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 61, 66, 67, 129, 155, 156, 182, 183, 204, 209, 218, 219, 221, 223, 226–227, 228, 231 Communist Party Committee, 156–157 Communist Youth League, 56 compensation, 32; benefits, 37; efficiency, 36; workers, 33 competent leadership, 75, 59 competition, 90–93; economic, 113, 119, 120–121, 122, 127, 155; government, 121; mass media, 129, 130 Compulsory Education Law, 40 Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations, 165 conditions, economic, 57; social, 57; workforce, 92 conflict, 216; armed, 171, 187; economy, 121–122; government, 155; internal, 223; religious, 68; Sino-American, 171–172; social, 71; Taiwan, 8, 216, Taiwan Strait, 172, 179; United States, 185 confrontation, government, 155; Taiwan Strait, 180, 185 Confucianism, 5, 38, 53, 66 conservatives, 31, 43, 185, 227 continental shelf, 207, 208, 210 control, mass media, 134; party, 145; society, 166; state, 74 Convention of the Continental Shelf, 206

240

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Cornell University, 7, 172–173, 175, 176, 179, 186 corporate codes of conduct, 93; investments, 5; standards, 98 Corporate Governance Structure (CGS), 115, 116 Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China, 115–116 corporations, mass media, 133; shell, 117 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 42 corruption, 6, 15, 18, 19–20, 22, 37, 42, 50, 53, 61, 63, 73, 129–130, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140–141, 143, 144, 145–146, 153, 157, 163, 164 costs and benefits, 29, 37 costs, labor, 95, 97; perceived, 37 Cox Report (1999), 178 Cox Select Committee on China, 178 crime, 15, 74, 140, 141, 164 crisis, legitimacy, 33; security, 209 criticism, government, 62, 127, 135–136, 161–162; international, 139; leadership, 62–63; politics, 127; public, 127, 137 critique, external, 60–77 cronyism, 157 Cui Jian, 6 Cui Zhiyuan, 63 cult of personality, 132–133 cultural elite, 54; exchanges, 219; fever, 5–6; nationalists, 57; relativism, 57 Cultural Revolution, 1, 18–19, 64, 120, 133–134, 154, 156, 207, 209 culture, 20–21, 26, 52, 60, 61, 231; authoritarian, 76; change, 52; civil rights and, 57; democracy, 57, 76; development, 68; economy, 121; environment, 52; Europe, 171; freedom and, 57; globalization, 59; governance and, 53, 57, 60–61, 132; ideology and, 57; legitimacy and, 34; liberal, 52; literature, 6; Maoist, 6; mass media, 128, 132; mass, 5–6; perception, 174; philosophy, 6; political, 5–6, 53, 76; popular, 128, 146; populism, 34; reforms, 2; religion, 6; revival, 5; society and, 6, 18, 65; three pillars, 6; tradition, 3, 5–6, 38, 76, 220; transformation, 52; United

States, 171; utilitarian, 60–61; Western, 5 Dadun Mountain, 205 Dai Yiquan, 141 decentralization, 3, 49, 50, 51, 57, 75, 115 decision makers, government, 154–155, 176–177, 185, 190; United States, 185, 190 decision making, 33, 34, 42, 174, 190 Decision of a Petition for the Defense of the Senkaku Islands Territory, 198 Decision on Economic Institution Reform, 115 Defending Diaoyu Movement, 210 Defending Tiaoyutai Islands, 208–209 Dell, 93, 107 democracy, 3, 38, 43–44, 49, 60, 75, 76, 219, 229, 230; aid, 50; authoritarianism, 51, 61–62; challenges, 57; civil rights, 50; classical, 119, 120; communism and, 57; corruption, 50; culture, 57; decisionmaking, 42, 50; development, 50, 53, 75, 222, 226; dissatisfaction, 60–61; economy, 50, 61; electoral, 76, 98; elitism, 120; Europe, 61; governance, 50–51, 53, 61–62, 65; ideology, 57; institutions, 55–56, 72–73, 75; internalization, 53; Internet, 166; liberal, 3, 50, 51, 53–54, 56, 60, 61, 64–65, 66, 68, 75, 76, 219; mass media, 136, 139; military, 50; participation, 43–44, 50; pluralism, 120; political system, 43, 50, 52, 59, 75; population, 51, 67; poverty, 73; promotion of, 3, 50; prospects, 50; public support, 61–62; society, 13, 58, 65, 68; special interest groups, 74; Taiwan, 173, 174, 176, 188, 221–222, 228; United States, 50, 51, 61; West and, 49, 50, 56, 76, 154–155, 156 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 179, 216, 220, 223, 226–227, 229, 230, 231 democratic regime, 64, 182; theory, 52; transition, 52 democratization, 49, 50, 51–52, 76, 215, 228; economic, 52, 75–76; exporting, 52

Index demographic conditions, 52, 53 demonstrations, 155, 161, 222–223 Deng Xiaoping, 2, 18, 22, 28–29, 30, 36, 37–38, 120, 183, 185, 210, 217–218, 229 Deng Yingchao, 218 deprivation, 70, 71 desinification, 226 deterrent effect, 146 developing countries, 27, 50–51, 58, 65–66, 67, 68, 75, 89, 90, 91, 92, 98–99, 101, 122 development, culture, 68; democracy, 50, 53, 222, 226; economic, 4, 14, 17–18, 19, 20, 43, 51–52, 58, 61, 75, 90, 101, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 155, 164, 166, 227; environment, 59; farmers, 40; gender related, 71, 72; growth, 17–18, 59; housing, 21; human, 66–68, 70, 75; industrial, 21; innovation, 59; instability, 51; international community, 58; leadership and, 22, 53; legitimacy, 53; political, 26, 43, 60, 227; population, 59; poverty, 39–40, 71; privatization, 55; rapid, 70; reform, 75; rural, 20, 21, 39–40, 41; scientific concept of, 13–14; social, 51–52, 58, 155, 164–165, 166; society, 20, 35–36, 60, 73; SOEs and, 117; strategy, 14, 30, 38–39, 52, 53, 55; technological, 121; tradition and, 13; uneven, 4, 15, 20; urban areas, 20, 39–40, 91; wealth, 71 Dewey, John, 29 Diaoyu Islands, 7–8, 203, 210–211; Baodiao Movement, 196; description of, 195–196; dispute, 197, 207; history of, 204–205; international law, 196; international treaties, 196; Japan, 196, 197–200, 204, 207, 209, 210; leadership, 197; legal status of, 195–196, 197; oil reserves, 196, 199; PRC and, 196, 207, 209; ROC and, 196–197, 208–209; Self Defense Force, 196; sovereignty of, 195, 196, 208–209, 210; Taiwan and, 198, 205–206; treaty, 203; United Nations, 200–204; United States, 200–204; West and, 197 dictatorships, 61, 67, 76

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Dingzhou Province, 131 diplomacy, 188–189, 197, 209 Director Responsibility System, 32 disadvantaged, 39, 42, 153–154, 155 discipline, party, 144–145 discrimination, 17, 33, 36–37, 96–97, 98, 104, 117 disharmony, 14, 58, 122 disparities, income, 14, 16–17, 35 dispositional motivations, 183, 184 dissemination, mass media, 153, 158 dissidents, 154, 156 distribution of goods, 74; of growth, 42; of wealth, 34, 37, 38, 41, 70–71, 74 distribution, administrative, 117; equality, 35; Internet, 158–159; vertical equity, 41; wages, 101 distributive patterns, politics, 37; rights, 65–66 domestic politics, 7–8, 58, 119, 172, 177, 179, 180, 181, 189, 195, 211 drugs, 99, 139–140, 141 Du Daobin, 140 EPZs, see export processing zones ETI, see Ethical Trading Initiative East Asia, 179, 203 East China Sea, 205–206, 207, 209–210 Eastern Europe, 131–132 Eastin, Josh, 5 Easton, David, 62–63 economic achievement, 33; activities, 19, 89, 90; benefits, 29, 91, 92, 120–121, 185; challenges, 2; changes, 119, 120; command, 29, 31; competitiveness, 113, 119, 120–121, 122; conditions, 57; conflicts, 121–122; corruption, 37; decentralization, 75, 115; Economic democratization, 50, 51, 62, 75–76; development, 4, 14, 17, 18–19, 20, 43, 51–52, 58, 61, 75, 90, 101, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 155, 164–165, 166, 227; disharmony, 122; disparity, 142; disruptions, 68; efficiency, 28, 35, 35–36; entrepreneurs, 75; equal opportunities, 25–26, 36; equity, 35, 42–43; exchanges, 219; exploitation, 133–134; force, 116; freedom, 219; growth, 2, 6–7, 13–14, 17–18, 22, 25–26, 37–38, 42, 43, 59, 70, 89, 91,

242

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economic achievement—continued 113, 118–119, 121, 128, 134–135, 154, 211, 226; hardship, 28; improvements, 30–31; inequality, 43; instability, 59; institutions, 116, 122; investments, 16, 101; justice, 65–66, 76; laborers, 32; liberalization, 52, 57, 74–76; malaise, 171; modernization, 19, 57; politics, 35, 89, 113–114, 115, 116, 118, 122, 171, 232; principles of, 30; problems, 31; production, 3; rationing, 117; reform, 2, 3–4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20–21, 22, 25–26, 31–32, 49, 52, 60–61, 74, 114–116, 121, 122, 144, 183, 185, 208; resources, 113–114, 121; rights, 50, 53–54, 67, 69, 71; stability, 59; standard of living, 32; state-owned enterprises, 118, 121, 122; subsidization, 32; system, 29, 121; theory, 2, 3–4, 118–119; transition, 113–114, 118, 119, 122; welfare, 36 economy, agriculture, 15, 16–17; capitalism, 75; children and, 98–99; expansion of, 65; farming, 35; free-market, 3–4, 19, 44; global, 91; government and, 18, 53, 113, 114, 115, 121; high-tech, 134–135; human rights, 66; ideology, 114, inefficient, 115–116, 121; income, 43; inefficient, 115–116, 121; information, 134; Internet, 154; knowledge-based, 157–158; manufacturing, 103; market, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38–39, 50, 59, 75, 113–114, 115–116, 122, 160–161; mass media, 128, 131, 133–135, 146, 158; maximization, 114; mixed, 19; nonstate-owned enterprises, 115; planned, 19, 76, 113, 114, 116, 117; private, 119; public, 121; ruling elite and, 114; society and, 113, 114; Stalin and, 29; United States, 182, 183; unpublic, 114; Western, 114; world, 154 Edelman, Benjamin, 166 education, 2, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20–21, 25, 27, 32, 33, 40, 51, 55, 56–57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 91, 96, 99, 102, 103–104, 130–131, 134, 136, 146, 155, 158, 159, 162, 174, 208, 209, 210, 221

efficiency, 121–122; compensation, 36; economic, 28, 35; politics of, 26–39, 43; property, 121, society, 26; driven reforms, 25, 43; minded elites, 41–42 egalitarianism, 19 Eight Points, 219, 220 elections, 3, 51, 61, 68, 73, 76, 156, 157, 219–220, 222, 223, 226, 229, 230, 231; direct, 2; district, 49; grassroots, 55; indirect, 2, 55; mass media, 136; rural, 55; Taiwan, 173, 174, 178–179, 187, 220, 222, 223, 226, 229, 230, 231; union, 98; village, 49, 55, 63, 156–157 Eleventh Five Year Plan, 41 Eleventh Party Congress, 3 elite, cultural, 54; efficiency-minded, 41–42; equity and, 42; intellectual, 2, 3, 5, 136; moneyed, 226; new, 28; political, 2, 27, 28, 32; revolutionary, 28; ruling, 26–27, 228; technocratic, 33 elites, democratic, 120; enlightened, 38; legitimate, 132; mass media, 132; modes, 157; policy, 177; populist, 41–42; professional, 29; reforms, 25 e-mails, 135, 154, 157–158, 163, 165 employment, 15, 16, 17, 29, 41, 63, 66, 74, 89, 90–98, 103, 132, 145–146, 160 enterprises, 98, 115–116; centrally-owned, 117; foreign-owned, 32, 104, 207; government and, 116, 117; high-tech, 117; large, 120; mass media, 54; modern, 115; non-state owned, 115; planned, 117; privately-owned, 32–33, 117, 207; profit-making, 15; rural areas, 17; state-owned, 5, 32, 98, 117, 120, 160 entertainment, 54, 129, 130, 166 entrepreneurs, 25–26, 34, 70–71; commercial, 54; economic, 75; policy, 41–42; private, 25; technocrats, 37 environment, 20, 51, 58, 59, 65, 74, 75, 93; institutional, 122; political, 154–155 equal distribution of wealth, 35–36, 71 equal economic opportunities, 25–26 equality, 27–28, 63, 66, 76; distribution, 35; economic, 36; gender, 51, 66; political, 38; society, 27, 36; workplace, 32 equity distribution, 41; economic, 35, 42–43, governance, 34; horizontal,

Index 36–37; lack of, 33; liberalism and, 36; maximization, 37–38; misdistribution of, 34; politics of, 26, 38, 43; ruling elites, 42; social, 27, 42–43, 58, 59; utilitarian justification, 33; vertical, 36–37 Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), 97–98, 99, 100 ethics, 29, 132 ethnic hatred, 65 ethnic purity, 229 ethnocentric concepts, 57 Europe, 1, 61, 120–121, 128, 131–132, 171, 201, 202, 211 European Union, 61 exploitation, 27, 63; economic, 133–134; workers, 96–97 Export Processing Zones, 92 exports, growth, 52, 90, 91, 90, 92, 95 external critique, 60–77 external policies, 58 facilities, production, 99 factories, 92–93; children and, 103–104; high-tech, 95, 107; investment and, 94–96; low-tech, 95, 107; manufacturing, 121; mobility and, 94–96 Fair Labor Association (FLA), 93, 97–98 Falun Gong, 144 Fangshuo, Doug, 5 farmers, 40, 74, 133–134, 141, 142, 146, 163 fascism, 67 Feng Lin, 1 Fifth Plenary Session o the Sixteenth CCP Party Congress, 41 financial control, 160; newspapers, 129; reforms, 74; regulations, 55 firewalls, 135, 166 Five-Year Plans, 4, 41 flow of information, 165 force, demonstration of, 174, 186; Taiwan Strait Crisis, 174–175 Foreign Affairs, 91 foreign direct investment (FDI), 89, 100–101, 102, 105 foreign enterprise, 32, 207; governments, 105; imperialism, 185; Internet, 154; invasion, 185; investment, 73, 90–91,

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92, 93, 94, 101, 103, 104, 120; Joint Venture Model, 115; manufacturers, 90; policy, 6–7, 27, 50, 177, 185, 189, 210, 216, 228, 232; sales, 95 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), 95, 104 Formosa, 204, 217 France, 60, 121, 200, 207 free markets, 3–4, 76 freedom, 39, 50, 57, 60, 62, 65, 66, 68, 72–73, 75, 76, 153, 166, 219 freedom of association, 90, 91, 98, 103; of information, 59; of press, 140, 153, 164, 166; of speech, 54, 65, 66, 139, 140, 153–154 Freeman, Chas, 180 free-market economy, 3–4, 19, 44 Freezing Point, 54, 131 Friedman, Thomas, 73 Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), 183, 184, 189 Fuzhou City Party Committee, 143–144 Fuzhou, 145, 146 Gallup International Millennium Survey, 60–61 Gang of Four, 207 Garver, John, 176 gender equality, 51, 58, 66, 71, 72, 73, 74; inequality, 96–97 Geneva Convention, 208 Germany, 121, 229 Gifford, Kathy Lee, 93 Gingrich, Newt, 175 Gini Index, 70–71 global attitudes, 64–65; capitalism, 93; economy, 91 Global Times, 130 Globalization, 59, 76, 89, 93, 104 Golden cows, 226 Google, 135, 166 governance, 3, 26, 49, 51, 52, 64; by the party, 38; classless, 56; comparative, 66; culture and, 53, 57, 60–61, 132; democratic, 50–51, 53, 60–62, 76; demographics and, 53; economy and, 18, 53, 54, 113, 114, 121; effective, 53, 57, 60–61; form of, 53–56; goals of, 58; growth and, 59; harmonious, 56; human rights and, 53, 60; ideology and, 53, 57; institutions and, 51–52,

244

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Index

53, 56, 58, 75; leadership and, 53, 179; natural law, 34; optimism and, 65; people, 38; power struggles, 27; rights, 69; ruling elite, 26–27; satisfaction with, 65; society and, 53; standards for, 53, 57; structure, 51, 53; technocrats, 26–27; utilitarian, 60–61; well-being, 34 government accountability, 75; agriculture and, 69; attitude, 166; authoritarian, 50–51, 60, 61, 63, 72–73; authorities, 161–162; behavior, 163, 166; bureaucracy, 61; central, 13–14, 17, 20, 40, 55; competitive, 121; conflicts, 155; control, 165; corruption, 18, 19–20, 22, 61, 62, 133; criticism, 127, 135–136, 161–162; decentralization, 49; decisions, 42, 154–155, 176–177, 185; demonstrations, 161; departments, 129; developing countries and, 65; discrimination and, 117; enterprises, 116; ethnocentric, 57; executive branch, 55; failings of, 57; financial control, 160; foreign, 105; form of, 60; freedom and, 65; human development and, 74; industries and, 94–95; information; 54; in-groups, 184; instability, 120; international laws, 193; Internet, 154, 157–158, 160, 162, 163, 164–166; investment, 21, 22; Japan, 196, 198–199, 200, 204, judiciary, 61; KMT, 215–216; labor and, 97; legitimacy, 19, 52, 60, 64, 215; liberals, 65, 221–22; libertarian, 65; local, 13–14, 22, 94–95, 160, 163–164; markets and, 113–118, 121; mass media, 54, 62, 127, 128–129, 130, 133, 134–135, 161; military, 173, 179, 187; mobilization, 156; municipal, 160; Okinawa, 198, 201; officials, 142–143, 153, 154, 155, 156; opposition, 57; oppression and, 60; out-group, 184; People’s Republic of China, 215–216; performance of, 75; pluralism, 53–54; policies, 127, 162, 163, 166; policy makers, 177; political control and, 18; political participation, 153; popularity, 39; population and, 75; provincial, 17, 22, 160, 223; public opinions, 55, 163;

public policy, 73; regulations, 135, 165; revenue, 128–129; rural, 17; security and, 61, 165; social equity and, 61; social services and, 61; society and, 60, 65; SOEs, 115–116; spending, 66–67; stability and, 61, 75; subsidies, 69; success, 64–65; suppression, 60; surveys, 55; Taiwan and, 171–191, 222, 223, 231–232; technology, 157–158; totalitarian, 131–132; township, 21–22; transparency of, 145; United Nations, 202; United States and, 14, 60, 207, 227; urban, 17; utilitarian, 65, 66; West and, 57 Grass-roots campaign, 27; elections, 55; resistance, 6, 145–146; technocrats, 28–29 Gray nation, 5 Gray population, 5 Great Britain, 60, 120–121, 176, 197, 206–207, 230 Great Firewall, 134 Great Harmony, 56 Great Leap Forward, 28, 73 Great Unity, 56 Gries, Peter Hays, 183–184 groups, advantageous, 155; articulation, 162; banned, 166; interest, 156; lowincome, 158; social, 153–154, 155, 156, 158; special interest, 55, 73 growth, associations and, 54; development, 17–18, 59; distribution of, 42; economic, 6–7, 13–14, 17–18, 22, 37–38, 42, 43, 59, 70, 89, 91, 113, 118, 119, 121, 128, 134–135, 154, 211, 226; governance and, 59; industrial, 121; innovations, 59; interest groups and, 54; Internet, 157–158; leadership and, 53; legitimacy and, 53; population, 6–7; rate, 119; society and, 59; unbalanced, 37–38; Western, 2 Guan Mingbo, 142 Guangdong Province, 39, 115, 129, 163 Guangming Daily, 29, 130 Guangming Daily Group, 130, 131 Guangxi Province, 56 Guangzhou, 141, 163 Guangzhou Daily Group, 129

Index Gulf Oil Company, 196 Gumi Island, 200, 205 Guo Liang, 135 HDI, see Human Development Index Habermas, Jurgen, 29 Hachigian, Nina, 134–135 Hainan Airplane Accident, 139 Hainan Province, 20 Hao Guobiao, 145 happiness index, 20, 22 Harbin Daoli District People’s Court, 142 Harbin, 141, 146, 163 harmonious international relations, 122, 210, 211 harmonious society, 13, 14, 19–20, 22, 23, 37–38, 50, 51, 56, 57, 59, 66 harmony index, 20; lack of, 13–14; politics, 14; social, 13, 17, 22, 23 Harrison, Harry, 139, 140 Harszti, Miklos, 131–132 Hayek, F. A., 4 health care, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20–21, 22, 25, 28, 32, 33, 40, 51, 57–58, 59, 63, 65, 66–67, 68–69, 73, 74, 76, 91, 96, 98, 99, 104, 108, 166 Heart of a Young Woman, 133–134 hegemony, 121, 184 Heilongjiang Province, 163 Hewlett Packard, 93, 107 Hicks, John, 30–31, 32 hierarchical structures, 32 high-skilled labor, 91 high-tech economy, 134–135; industries, 5, 89–90, 95, 96, 104, 107; manufacturing, 89–90, 93–94, 95, 97, 103 historical progress, 56 Hokkaido Islands, 204 homophonic, 136 Hong Kong, 129, 145, 196, 210, 211, 228, 229, 231 Honshu Islands, 204 horizontal equity, 36–37; technology, 134 hostility, PRC, 219; Taiwan, 216, 219, 226–227; Taiwan Strait Crisis, 144, 175–177; United States, 178, 227; Western, 144, 184–185 Household Responsibility System (HRS), 21, 33, 39, 121

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housing, 14, 20, 21, 28, 31, 63, 74, 101 Hu Jintao, 2, 13, 18, 22, 38, 57, 58, 59, 139–140, 210, 229 Huang Cheng, 141 Huang Jingao, 143 Huang Ju Ma Ying-jeou, 224 Huang Qi, 140 Huangwei Island, 199, 205, 206; see also Diaoyu Islands human capabilities, 65–66; development, 53, 66–68, 69, 70, 71–72, 74, 75; rights, 50, 53, 60, 62–63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 76, 97, 102–103, 105, 183, 227 Human Development Index (HDI), 66–67, 68–69, 70, 72, 73 Human Development Report, 66, 68 IBM, 93, 107 ICPs, see Internet Content Providers ISPs, see Internet Service Providers identity, 171–172, 226–227 ideology, 227; communist, 18–19, 52; concepts, 57; constraints, 155–156; democracy and, 57; economy, 114; freedom and, 57; governance, 51, 53; Internet, 164–165; legitimacy and, 19; mass media, 129, 132; political, 27; pragmatism, 28–29, 33, 38; reform, 19, 122; regime, 59; socialism, 120; society, 27; standard, 58; struggles, 49, 60; Western, 27; workers, 33 illiteracy, 70, 73 imperialism, 54, 185 income, 4, 36–37, 40, 41, 43, 58, 64, 66–67, 74, 96–97, 99, 100, 118–119, 142, 161 income disparity, 14, 15, 16–17, 20, 22, 25, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 41, 70–71, 142 Independence, 171, 173, 179–180 independence, 220; activities, 155; movement, 229; Ryukyu, 203; suppression of, 209; Taiwan, 7, 172, 173, 174–175, 177, 179, 180–181, 182, 186, 187, 216, 218, 221–222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229; United Nations, 202; United States, 182, 202, 228 India, 2, 64–65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76

246

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Index

individual autonomy, 128; based activities, 157; entrepreneurs, 25–26; freedom, 39 Indonesia, 67 industrialization, 4, 27, 28, 40, 63 industries, agriculture, 98–99; capital intensive, 105; development, 21; government and, 94–95; growth, 121; high-tech, 5, 96, 104; labor-intensive, 90, 105; low-tech, 5, 96, 105; management, 100; manufacturing, 93; mass media, 128–129; mobility and, 94–96; production-oriented, 98–99, 100–101; sector, 116; standards, 101; technology-intensive, 90; training, 96; unions, 39 inequality, 17–18, 19, 26, 34, 42, 43, 73, 74, 142 influence, masses, 155; political, 155; upward, 155 information 51, 71; circulation, 137; economy, 134; flow, 133, 165; freedom, 59; government, 54; Internet, 165; mass media, 137; processing, 174, technology, 158, 164; transparency, 145; West, 54 infrastructure, 20–21, 40, 73, 74 in-groups, 184 inhumanity, 153 injustice, 153, 164 innovations, development and, 59; growth and, 59; institutional, 59; reform and, 59; technological, 59 inspectors, Internet 134–135 instability, 51, 116–117, 136–137; economic, 59; government, 120; political, 59, 119; social, 14, 34, 59, 71 Institute of Taiwan Studies, 178–179 institution building, 20 institutional arrangement, 121; changes, 55, 119; coherence, 53; constraints, 155–156; environment, 122; innovations, 59; marketization, 121; modernization, 57; transition, 122 institutionalization, 55, 120 institutions, 52, 145; democratic, 55–56, 72–73, 75; economic, 116, 122; freedom, 72–73; governance and, 51–52, 53, 56, 58, 75; liberal

democratic, 60; political, 52, 53, 62–63; reform, 122; social, 153 intellectual elites, 5, 136 intellectuals, 1, 3–4, 6–7, 51–52, 56, 76, 128, 130, 161 interest aggregation, 164, 166 interest groups, 54–55, 156 interests, autonomous, 156; collective, 156; competitive, 155; national, 156; private, 156 internal critique, 57–60; policies, 58 international affairs, 171; arena, 219; community, 58, 75, 145, 177, 181, criticism, 139; environment, 210; investment, 137; labor standards, 98; laws, 186, 195, 196, 209, 210–211; international laws, Taiwan Strait Crisis, 180–181, 188; markets, 129; mass media, 130, 132, 134, 136; NGO’s, 55–56; organizations, 102–103, 161, 207; pride, 64; relations, 121, 174, 210, 211; society, 122; status, 174–175, 217; treatises, 196 International Bridges to Justice, 56 International Council of Toy Industries (ICTC), see Collective Corporate Code International Court of Justice, 195, 200, 206, 207, 210–211 International Labor Organization (ILO), 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102–103 International Labor Organization Conventions, 98 International Law of the Seas Conference (1974), 208 International Law of the Seas, 196, 205–208, 209 International Territorial Laws, 196, 197, 199, 200, 205 Internet cafes, 158, 159, 162, 164 Internet Content Providers (ICPs), 154 Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 134, 135, 165 Internet, 6, 54, 71, 72, 103, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134–137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 164, 165; abuse, 164; administrative regulations, 165; alternatives, 166; authorities, 164; censorship, 154, 165; Chinese Communist Party, 160–161; commercial, 157–158, 166;

Index corruption, 164; crime, 164; democracy, 166; distribution, 158–159; economic development, 154, 164–165, 166; education, 158, 159; employment, 160; entertainment, 166; financial control, 160; firewall, 166; foreign, 154; freedom of press, 164, 166; government, 154, 157–158, 160, 162, 163–166, 166; growth, 157–158; health, 166; ideology, 164–165; information, 165; intellectuals and, 161; journalists, 160; liberalism, 166; market, 153, 157–158; mass media, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164; opinion, 164; peasants, 160; police abuse, 164; policy-making, 164; political activities, 154, 161, 162, 166; political participation, 161; propaganda, 164–165, 166; public opinion, 154, 161, 162, 163–164; public pressure, 163; regulations, 154, 164–165, 166; security, 165; social development, 164–165, 166; social forces, 163; social injustice, 164; social justice, 163; social mobilization, 162; society, 153, 154, 164, 166; unemployed, 160 intimidation, 145–146 invasion, foreign, 27, 185 investment, 16, 19–20, 50, 89, 90; agriculture, 21; capital, 91, 95; corporations, 5; economic, 101; factories and, 94–96; foreign, 73, 90–91, 92, 93, 94, 101, 103, 104, 120; government and, 21, 22; international, 137; manufacturing, 94; peasants and, 21 Iraq War, 161 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 175–176 isolationism, 209 Izvestia, 132–133 Japan, 1, 7, 64–65, 76–77, 211; aggression, 196, 202, 207; agriculture and, 21; continental shelf, 208; Diaoyu Islands, 196, 197–200, 203, 204, 209, 210; diplomatic relations, 209; disputes, 195; economy of, 4; government of, 4, 196, 198–200, 204; invasion by, 185; legislature, 209; military, 198, 201, 202, 204, 210; Okinawa Islands, 196,

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247

197–204, 209; People’s Republic of China, 197; rebuilding, 204; Japan, Republic of China, 197, 198, 201, 204; Ryukyu Islands, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208; sovereignty, 198, 200; Taiwan and, 180, 199, 200, 204, 210, 216, 217; territorium nullius, 197; territory and, 7–8, 198, 199, 200; Tiaoyutai Islands, 197; trade and, 7; United Nations, 196–197; United States and, 198, 202, 203–204, 210; West and, 197 Japanese Foreign Ministry, 199 Japanese Mandated Islands, 202 Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, 199 Japanese Ministry of Commerce, 199 Japanese Ministry of Interior, 199 Japanese Official Records, 198 Japanese Peace Treaty (1951), 204 Jervis, Robert, 174 Ji min, 35 Jiang Zemin, 13–14, 18, 22, 37–38, 52, 139–140, 176–177, 185, 219, 220, 231 Jiangsu Province, 115, 156–157 Jiao Guobiao, 133 Jiawu War, 4 Jie Chen, 156–157 Jin Haike, 140 Jing Yanyong, 137 journalists, 128, 131, 132, 134, 137, 141, 142, 145, 146, 160 judicial system, 55, 61, 62, 127, 142, 195 Jun pin fu, 34, 35 justice, 27–28, 127, 139, 143, 146, 153–154, 184, 206, 210–211; civil, 66; economic, 65–66, 76; political, 66; reforms, 25; social, 219; society and, 13–14, 20, 57, 58, 65–66, 76, 163 KMT, see Kuomintang KMT-CPC cooperation, 229 Ka Zeng, 5 Kakine, Kuroiwa, 197 Kalathil, Shanthi, 134–135 Kaldor, Nicholas, 30–31, 32 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 27–28, 30, 34, 36 Kaohsiung, 173 Kautsky, John, 27 Keilor, Garrison, 57–58

248

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Index

Kissinger, Henry, 217, 223, 227, 228 Kiyoshi Inoue, 205 Klaproth, M. J., 200 Korea, 206, 208, 218, 229 Korean War, 203–204, 217 Kosovo, 183, 184 Kucera, David, 91, 103 Kuomintang (KMT), 7–8, 179, 210, 211, 215–216, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226–230, 231, 232 Kuyoko Gen, 200 Kyoto University, 205 Kyushu Islands, 204 labor, 16–17, 32, 33, 39, 89, 90, 92, 96, 101; abuses, 93–94; blue collar, 97, cheap, 100–101, child, 90, 91, 96–97, 98–99, 103, 108; codes, 93, 100; collective, 91; costs, 90, 91–92, 95, 97; disputes, 33, 37; expenses, 97; force, 2, 90, 94, 97; highly-skilled, 91; intensive manufacturing, 89–90, 93–94, 95, 96, 97, 103–104, 105; laws, 91, 94–95, 98, 100; movement, 119, 120; organizations, 98; Party, 120; positions, 104; practices, 90, 93; productivity, 101, 103–104; protection, 89, 90–100, 104; relations, 42; representatives, 96; rights, 89, 90, 91, 92–93, 96–97, 98, 102–103, 105; standards, 89, 91–92, 98; surplus of, 17; unions, 121; violations, 5, 103, 108 Lagon, Mark, 178 Lake, Anthony, 175, 180 Lampton, David, 179 Lang Xianping, 25 Lasswell, Harold, 132 Latin America, 61, 93 laws, 64, 98, 100, 101, 116, 155, 180–181, 186, 188, 195, 196, 199, 209, 210–211, 230–231 leadership, 6, 26, 50, 51, 57–58, 145, 186, 232; accountability, 75; authoritarian, 73; competent, 75; corruption and, 53; criticism of, 62–63; development and, 22, 53; Diaoyu Islands, 197; economic growth, 59; education of, 59; elections, 68; future and, 56; government, 53, 179; growth and, 53; harmonious, 57; legitimacy, 59; mass media, 128, 140;

military, 173, 174; modernizers and, 27; political, 28, 61; pragmatic rule, 37; PRC, 173–174, 177; reforms and, 20, 37; regulation and, 55; reunification, 230; society and, 13, 61; Taiwan, 173–174, 180; technocrats, 29; territory, 195; United States, 182, 188–189; villages and, 55 Lee Teng-hui, 7, 172, 173, 174, 175–177, 179, 185–187, 219, 222, 224, 226, 229 Legal Commentary, 136–137, 138 legal reforms, 3, 51, 52; representation, 49, 50, 55–56, 75; sanctions, 127, 137 Legal Report, 144–145 Legislative Council, 3, 73–74, 221, 222 legitimacy, 26, 52, 53, 218; crisis of, 33; culture, 34; elitism, 132; government, 19, 59, 60, 64, 127; ideology and, 19; party state and, 60–61; political, 20, 26–27, 30–31, 34–35, 127; reform, 122; regime, 42, 59, 62, 182, 183; technocracy, 33; utility-based, 34 Lenin, Vladimir, 132, 143–144 less-developed countries (LDCs), 90–91, 93 Levi Strauss, 97–98 Lew Chew Compact, 201 Lew Chew Kingdom, 200–203 Li Changping, 145 Li Datong, 131 Li Dazhao, 27 Li Guifan, 141 Li Jiaquan, 178–179 Li Junru, 3 Li min, 34 Li Peng, 139–140 Li Shuming, 138 Li Siyi, 140–141 Li Wenbao, 209 Li Yaling, 140–141 Liang Qichao, 5 Lianjiang County, 143, 144, 145 Liao Chengzhi, 228 Liaodong Peninsula, 199 Liaoning Evening Post, 138 Liaoning Province, 32 Liaoning Provincial Higher People’s Court, 138 liberal culture, 52; democracy, 3, 49, 50, 51, 53–54, 56, 60, 61, 64–65, 66, 68, 75,

Index 76, 219; government, 221–222; groups, 43; reforms, 25, 36; technocrats, 36 liberalism, 3–4, 36, 49, 56, 60, 61, 65, 66, 68, 75, 76, 136, 166 liberalization, 52, 57, 74, 75–76, 102, 103 Liberating Taiwan, 7, 217–218 Liberation Daily, 128, 131 libertarianism, 65 Lien Chan, 223, 225, 229–230 life expectancy, 66–67 Lin Yang-kang, 222 Liu Di, 139–141, 146 Liu Lang, 143 Liu Yong, 137–139 Liu Yunshan, 131 Liu Zhongxia, 141 local government, 22, 114, 115, 117, 160, 163–164; markets, 94 Lord, Winston, 173, 176 lottery, 142–143 low efficiency, 119, 121–122; income, 25–26, 158; tech manufacturing, 5, 89–90, 93–94, 95, 96, 97, 103–104, 105, 107 Lynch, Daniel, 134 M-9 missiles, 173, 176 MDGs, see Millennium Development Goals MPS, see Ministry of Public Security Ma Jiajue, 134 Ma Ying-jeou, 210, 230 Maguan Treaty, 199 main markets, 117–118 Mainland China, 172, 176, 178–179, 180, 182, 188, 196, 199, 205, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 226, 227, 228–229, 230–231 majoritarian politics, 37 malnutrition, 68–69, 73, 91 management, 104; enterprise, 98; industrial, 100; mass media, 129, 136 Manchuria, 204 Manufacturing, children and, 103–104; exports, 90; foreign, 90; high-tech, 93–94, 95, 97, 103; industries, 93, 121; investments, 94; labor-intensive, 93–94, 95, 96–97, 103–104; low-tech, 93–94, 95, 97, 103–104; sector, 29, 89–90, 92, 94

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249

Mao Tse-tung, see Mao Zedong Mao Zedong, 1, 3, 6, 19, 27, 28, 29, 31, 54–56, 76, 127, 128, 185, 217, 227 Maoists, see Mao Zedong market allocation, 33; economy, 28, 29, 31, 38–39, 50, 75, 113–118, 116, 160–161; efficiency driven, 43; Internet, 153, 157–158; reforms, 25, 28, 32, 63, 75, 113, 115–116; second, 117–118; security, 117; society, 19 marketization, 5, 59, 113, 115, 121, 122 markets, 28, competitive, 127; export, 92; free, 3–4, 76; government and, 121; international, 129; local, 94; main, 117–118; mass media, 128, 130, 132; property, 129–130 martial law, 221 Marx, Karl, 27, 32, 56, 132 Marxism, see Karl Marx Marxist-Leninist ideology, 132 mass media, 3–6, 53–54, 55, 63, 71, 92, 94, 102–103, 128–129, 132–133, 136, 142, 143–145, 153, 156, 226, 231; activists, 136; alternatives, 166; associations, 130; bureaucracy, 131; CCP and, 134–135; censorship, 127, 128, 131–134, 135, 137, 139, 146; circulation, 133; commercialization, 127–129, 132; communication, 132, 134; competition, 127, 129, 130; control, 129, 140, 154; controversial news, 137–145; corporations, 133; corruption, 129–130, 133, 137, 138; criticism, 137; culture, 128, 132; democracy, 136, 139; dissemination, 153, 158; economy, 128, 131, 133–134, 135, 146, 158; elections, 136; elites, 132, 136; freedom of press, 140; freedom of speech, 139, 140; government and, 62, 127, 128–129, 130, 133, 134–135, 161; high-tech economy, 134–135; ideology, 129, 132; Mass media, information flow, 133; intellectuals, 130; international, 129, 130, 132, 134, 136; Internet, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166; judiciary, 127; leadership, 128, 140; legal sanctions, 127; liberalism, 136; limits, 127, 145–146; local, 163; management, 128, 129, 136;

250

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Index

mass media—continued nationalism, 130, 132, 136, 139; newspapers, 136, 138; official, 137, 160; opposition, 127; organizations, 129; party controlled, 128, 154; police, 127, 131–132; policy change, 140; politics, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135–136, 153, 158, 161; population, 128; power, 146; praetorian, 128, 134; print, 137, 138, 141, 144; productivity, 129; profitability, 129; propaganda, 131, 132; prosperity, 135; provincial level, 128; public opinion, 138–139; publications, 133; publicity, 140; reforms, 129, 146; regulations, 134, 135; repression, 131–132, 134, 136, 139, 140; resources, 161; revenue, 133; sanctions, 133, 137; SARS, 161; secrecy, 133, 140; sensationalism, 137–145; society, 127, 138, 131–132, 134, 137; Soviet Union, 132–133; stock market, 133; Taiwan, 216; technology, 127–128, 130, 135; telecommunications, 134–135; ten prohibitions, 133; United States, 128, 132; urban dailies, 129; utopianism, 136; velvet prison, 128, 131–132, 134, 135, 140, 146; victimization narrative, 185; wealth, 146; websites, 166; Western, 132, 184, 216 Mattel, 97–98, 99, 100 maximization, 37–38, 42, 114, 120 May Fourth Movement, 5 Mazur, Jay, 91 Meiji Restoration, 4, 198–199 meritocracy, 26 methodology, tripartite, 190–191 microeconomic reforms, 29 Microsoft, 54 migrant workers, 16, 17, 21, 33, 39, 97, 100, 142–143, 163 military, 178, 219, 226, 227; conflict, 171, 187; conquest, 217; crackdown, 49; democracy, 50; demonstrations, 222–223; exercises, 172–173, 174, 176, 179, 180, 186; force, 181–182, 186, 188–189; Japan and, 198, 201, 202, 204, 210; power, 171, 180, 181, 182, 186, 188–189; Taiwan and, 7, 216, 218, 221, 227, 228; tests,

172–173, 174, 179, 180, 187; United States and, 7, 179, 202, 203–204, 221 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 58, 74 Min-ben (Putting the People First), 38 Ming Dynasty, 201, 205, 206 Ministry of Information Industry, 165 Ministry of Justice, 55–56 Ministry of Public Safety (MPS), 39, 165 Minquier Islands, 206–207 misperceptions, 176, 185–187; decision making, 174; information processing, 174; Taiwan Strait Crisis, 171–172, 174–180; United States, 175–180 missile tests, 8, 171, 179, 186, 187 Miyako Islands, 201 mobility, 94–96 mobilization, government, 156; political, 162; social, 155, 162 modernization, 5, 26–28, 38, 43, 57, 76, 155, 229; communist, 35–36; economic, 31–32, 57; enterprises, 115; institutional, 57; leadership, 27; manufacturing, 29; radicals, 28; revolutionary, 28; social, 57 moneyed elite, 226 Mongolia, 224 monopolization, 118 Moran, Theodore, 100–101 Mu Suixin, 138 Multinational corporations theory (MNC), 89, 92, 94, 96, 99, 101, 104–105 multi-party system, 73–74, 76 NGOs, see non-governmental organizations NPC, see National People’s Congress Nanfang Daily Group, 160 Nanjing Daily, 128 Nansei Shoro, 204 Nanxun, 18 Naspers, 129 National Assembly, 221, 222, 225 National Legal Aid of China, 56 National People’s Congress, 37, 40, 41, 42, 55, 59, 140, 165, 224, 230 National People’s Consultative Conference, 140 National School of Administration, 145 National Unification Council, 68, 219, 220, 225, 230

Index nationalism, 5, 6, 8, 63, 64, 130, 132, 136, 139, 215, 222, 223, 226–227, 229, 231 Nationalists, 57, 172, 219, 220 Navy Day address, 202 Netease, 161 netizens, 163, 164, 166 neutrality, 36–37 New Deal, 38 new elite, 28 New Party, 216, 223 New Rural Areas, 41 New Taiwanese, 226 New York Review of Books, 136 newspapers, 127, 128–131, 132–133, 136, 138, 145, 146, 156, 162, 229 Nike, 97–98, 99 Nimitz, 171, 173, 179–180, 186 Nixon, Richard, 207–208 No. 1 Document, 41 No. 27 Order, 201 Nobel Prize, 120, 121 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 55–56, 90, 92, 93, 102–103, 105 non-state-owned enterprises, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121 Norman Conquest, 207 North Korea, 122 North Sea Continental Shelf, 206 North, Douglass, 113, 118–119, 121 occupation, foreign, 50; territorial, 210–211 occupational safety and health, 102 Office of the Third Industrial Census, 95 oil reserves, 196, 198, 199, 201, 207, 209, 210 Okinawa Islands, 196, 197–204, 209 Okinawa Normal School, 197 oligarchic rule, 26 One China policy, 179, 181, 188, 218–219, 223, 229, 230 One China, One Taiwan, 172–173, 177–178, 223 one country, two systems, 215, 216, 218, 221, 227, 231 one-party rule, 14, 19, 42, 68 Open and Reform Policy, 116 opening of China, 49 openness, 20; education and, 59; political, 33

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251

opinion, differences in, 174; Internet, 164; political, 135–136; public, 55, 132, 138–139, 154, 155, 156, 161, 162, 163–164; survey, 61 Opium Wars, 185 organ papers, 128, 129, 130 organizations, decisions, 144; international, 102–103, 161, 207; labor, 98; mass media, 129; nongovernmental, 90; political, 3; private, 219; terrorist, 175–176; unions, 103 out-groups, 184 overtime, 90, 91, 92, 93, 100, 101, 103, 108 ownership, property, 76, 122; state-owned, 120 PRC, see People’s Republic of China Pacific Century, 1 Palmas Island, 200 pan-blue coalition, 223 pan-green coalition, 223 Pareto efficiency, 27–28; equity, 44; improvement, 34, 36, 42; inefficiency, 36, 44 Pareto, Vilfredo, 30, 43 Participation, democratic, 43–44, 50; government, 153; political, 43, 153, 154–164; public, 53–54, 56; reforms, 51 Party Congress, 230, 231 party line, 128; organizations, 132 Party Propaganda Department, 132 Party School, 143 party state, 54–55, 58, 60–61, 63, 68, 71, 74, 76; system, 143–144 paternalism, 38 patriotism, 63, 140 peaceful resolution, 218, 219; reunification, 232; unification, 221 peasants, 4, 16, 17, 20, 28, 34, 42, 57, 63, 130–131, 160, 163; agriculture and, 21, 40; health care, 22; industrialization and, 40; investments and, 21; revenues, 21–22; taxes, 20, 21–22, 40; workers, 21 Peirce, Charles S., 29 Peking University, 56, 229 Peng Ming-min, 227 People’s Commune System, 3, 16, 32

252

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Index

People’s Congress, 55, 157 People’s Daily, 128, 131, 136, 142, 143, 144, 164–165, 177–178 People’s Daily Group, 130, 136 People’s First Party (PFP), 216, 223, 224, 232 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 173, 177, 178, 180, 185 People’s Republic of China, 13, 29, 64, 98, 114–116, 165–166, 173–174, 176, 180, 181, 196, 197, 203, 207, 208, 209, 211, 215, 216, 217, 218–219, 220–221, 226–227, 228 perception, culture, 174; education, 174; power of, 174–180 perceptual gaps, 178, 185–187, 188–189; Taiwan Strait Crisis, 172, 174–185; United States, 180–185 Perry, Matthew, 201 Persian Gulf, 180 perspectives, Taiwan, 220–226 Pescadores, 204 Pew Research Center, 54, 64–65 Philippines, 173 philosophy, 6, 13, 38 Pinakuru Islands, 197 Pinnacle Islands, 197 planned economy, 19, 76, 113, 114, 116, 117; enterprises, 117 pluralism, 3, 6, 51, 53–54, 56, 120 pluralistic society, 229 polarization, 57, 74, 75, 230 police, 138, 162–163, 164, 226, abuse, 127, 146, 164; corruption, 140–141; mass media, 127–132; state, 140 policy, 60; abuses of, 41–42, 58, 117, 140, 162; consequences of, 60; economic, 89, 232; external, 58; foreign, 210; government, 127, 154, 155, 166, 177, 190; internal, 58; making, 26, 37, 41, 49, 50, 55, 155, 164; public, 55; social, 89, 232; United States, 171, 172, 173 Politburo, 37, 132 political activities, 166; administration, 122; authorities, 62–63; behavior, 155; benefits, 166; content, 136; control, 18, 31; criticism, 127; culture, 5–6, 53, 76; decision-makers, 155; development, 26, 43, 227; disharmony, 122; dissidents, 154, 156; elite, 27, 28,

32; entrepreneurship, 34; environment, 154–155; equality, 38; freedom, 153; ideology, 27; influence, 155; instability, 59, 119; institutions, 52, 53, 62–63; justice, 66; leadership, 28, 61; legitimacy, 14, 26–27, 30–31, 34–35; mobilization, 162; monopolization, 118; movement, 156; openness, 33; opinions, 135–136; organizations, 3; participation, 43, 153, 154–164; philosophers, 38; power, 20, 43; privileges, 128; problems, 31; process, 51; reforms, 2, 3, 31, 51, 52, 75, 116, 118, 183; regime, 62–63; relations, 228; rights, 50, 74, 97; rule, 122; sovereignty, 38; stability, 20, 91, 119, 144; system, 52, 59, 62–63, 65, 143–144, 156, 157, 161, 218; theory, 34 Political Report of the Third Plenum of the Central Party Committee, 3 politics, abuse of, 6; activities, 6; Asian, 7; bureaucratic, 179; challenges, 2; Chinese Communist Party and, 114; consolidation, 122; democratic, 43; distributive patterns, 37; domestic, 7–8, 119, 177, 179, 181, 189, 195; economy, 113–114, 116, 118, 122; efficiency-centered, 2, 26–39, 43; equity-based, 2, 26, 38, 43; harmony, 14; history of, 26–27; Internet, 154, 166; legitimacy, 127; majoritarian, 37; mass media, 127, 129, 130, 131, 155, 158; openness, 33; rationalization, 26; reform, 144; social democratic, 76; Taiwan, 179, 215, 221, 222, 227; technocratic, 26; tradition and, 13; United States, 179; Western, 66 Poll Global Attitudes Project, 65 popular culture, 128, 146; sovereignty, 119–120 population, 2, 4, 18, 25–26, 67, 68, 76–77, 171, 231; Asian, 1; democracy, 51; development, 59; distribution of wealth, 38; government, 75; gray, 5; growth, 6–7, 72; income gap, 33; Internet and, 153; mass media, 128; rural, 15, 17, 21, 28, 40; society, 30; standards of, 57; survival, 69; population, Taiwan, 216, 218; Taiwan

Index Strait Crisis, 173, 176; trauma, 185; United States, 17 populism, 27, 34–35, 38, 41–42; bottomup, 38; top-down, 37–38; tradition, 34 pornography, 133–134, 136 Port Royal, 171 Potsdam Declaration, 180, 203, 204, 217 poverty, 4, 14, 16, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 39–40, 51, 58, 66–67, 70–71, 74, 90, 96–97, 98–99, 100–101, 146, 163; agriculture and, 16–17; authoritarianism and, 72–73; democracy and, 73; deprivation, 71; economic growth, 17–18; government and, 40, 73–74; line, 17; perception, 174–180 power, 156; abuse of, 145–146; concentration of, 122; increase in, 7; mass media, 146; national, 121; political, 43; state ,118; structure, 114; struggles, 27 praetorian media management, 128; regulations, 146; system, 134, 145 pragmatism, ideology, 28–29, 33, 34–35, 37 Pravda, 132–133 preservation, regime, 220–221 press, see mass media pressure, public, 163 Principles on the Delimitation of the Coastal Sea-bed Area, 208 print media, 137, 138, 141 private economic sectors, 119; interests, 156; organizations, 219; owned enterprises, 25, 32–33, 117, 207 privatization, 25, 31, 55, 59, 120–121 procedural rights, 65–66 process, policy-making, 155; political, 51 production, 90, 95, 96; advancement of, 18; agriculture, 16–17; economic, 3; facilities, 99; internationalization of, 89; labor-oriented, 103; maximization, 120; mobility and, 94–96; reform, 119; social, 113, 114, 118–119, 120; oriented industries, 98–99, 100–101 productivity, 96–97, 101; labor, 101; mass media, 129 products, labor-intensive, 103–104 professional associations, 54, 55; education, 59; elites, 29

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253

profitability, enterprises, 15; mass media, 129 progressive tax, 36–37 Propaganda Department, 54, 128, 133 propaganda, 58, 131, 132, 133; Internet, 164–165, 166; Party, 154 pro-people approach, 13–14 property efficient, 121; growth rate, 119; low efficiency, 119; markets, 129–130 ownership, 55, 76, 122; private, 65; rights, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122; state-owned, 120 proportional tax, 36–37 prostitution, 99, 145 protection, agriculture, 21; labor, 89, 93–94, 96–97, 104 provincial governments, 17, 22, 28, 128, 160, 223 Public Assistance Station, 39 public assistance, 141; criticism, 137; economy, 121; enterprise, 207; housing, 31; land, 143; opinion, 55, 132, 138–139, 154, 155, 156, 161, 162, 163; participation, 53–54, 56; policy, 55, 73; pressure, 163; Security Bureau, 165; shell offerings (PSC), 117 Public Interest Times, 131 publications, 131, 133, 140, 143–144 Putin, Vladimir, 64 QIZs, see qualified industrial zones Qian Qichen, 172–173, 177, 220 Qin Min Dang, 223 Qing Dynasty, 201, 205 Qiu Feng, 138 qualified industrial zones, 92 quality of life, 64–66 ROC, see Republic of China ROC–ROK–Japan Liaison Committee, 207 radical redistribution, 34 radicalism, 28, 215 Ramo, Joshua Cooper, 58–59 rationalism, 29 Records of the Senkaku Islands Exploration, 197 Red cadres, 28 red hat merchant, 133 redistribution, 34 Reebok, 97–98, 99

254

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Index

reform, 25, 32, 36; administrative, 52; agricultural, 31; benefits, 30; bureaucracy, 26; capitalism and, 25; decentralization and, 51, 75; democratization, 76; development and, 75; disadvantaged and, 39; economic, 2, 3–4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20–21, 22, 25–26, 31–32, 49, 52, 59, 60–61, 74, 114–115, 116, 121, 122, 144, 183, 185, 208; efficiency driven, 25; elites, 25; entrepreneurs, 25–26; equal economic opportunities, 25–26; financial, 74; history of, 7, 18; ideology, 19, 122; income distribution, 38; income gap, 25; innovations and, 59; international community, 75; justice, 25; laborers, 39; leadership and, 20, 26, 37; leftists and, 25; legal, 3, 51, 52; legitimacy, 122; liberals, 25; local, 39; low-income, 25–26; market, 25, 28, 32, 63, 75, 113, 115–116; mass media, 129, 146; microeconomic, 29; migrants, 39; participation, 51; period, 53–54, 74, 75; pluralization, 51; policy making, 26; political, 2, 3, 26, 31, 51, 52, 75, 116, 118, 144, 183; population and, 25–26; price, 31; privatization, 25; production, 119; property rights, 115–116, 120, 122; regulatory, 51; rural laborers, 39; social, 59; society, 25–26; state-owned enterprises, 25, 117, 160; strategies, 26; structural, 74; systemic, 52; taxes, 25; technology, 25, 26; trade unions, 120–121; wages, 39; Western, 3; workers, 39 reformers, 31, 36, 66, 223 regime, communist, 182; competence, 59; corrupt, 139; democratic, 64, 182; ideology, 59; legitimacy, 42, 59, 62, 182, 183; party state, 71; political, 62–63; preservation, 220–221; regulatory, 135; support of, 62, 63, 64; survival, 182, 183; technocratic, 43; world, 49 regional affairs, 171 regional stability, 186 regulations, 53; administrative, 165; development, 55; financial, 55; government, 135, 165; Internet, 154, 165–166; leadership and, 55; mass

media, 134, 135, 136; praetorian, 146; reforms, 51; regime, 135 relations, international, 121; political, 228, tribute, 200–201 relativism, cultural, 57 religion, 6, 66, 68 renegade province, 216 Renmin University, 177 rent, ruling, 116, 118–119 Reporters Without Borders, 131 repression, 131–132, 134, 136, 139, 140 Republic of China (ROC), 180, 181, 196–197, 198, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208–209, 210, 217, 218–219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 227, 229 republican ideal, 34–35 Republican Revolution, 175 Resolution on Some Important Issues Concerning Reform and Development in the SOEs, 115, 116 resolution, peaceful, 218, 219 resources, economic, 113–114, 121 retirement, 16, 17, 31, 130–131 reunification, 215–216, 230; forceful, 231; peaceful, 231, 232; Taiwan, 7, 174–175, 177–178, 179, 180–181, 185, 187, 188, 210, 219 revenue, advertising, 128–129; government, 128–129; mass media, 133; peasants, 21–22; state, 19–20 Reversion of Okinawa to Japan, 201, 204, 208, 209 revolutionaries, 5–6, 27–28, 66, 119, 120 rights, basic, 120; citizens, 39, 56, 62; civil, 50, 97, 153, 155; collective labor, 97; distributive, 65–66; economic, 50, 53–54, 67, 69, 71; human, 64, 65, 68, 76, 97, 102–103, 105, 183, 227; labor, 89, 91, 92–93, 96–97, 98, 102–103, 105; legal, 56; political, 50, 74, 97; procedural, 65–66; property, 113, 115, 118, 119, 120, 122; social, 50, 67, 69, 71; society, 53–54; welfare, 65–66; workers, 89, 97, 98, 103 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 202–203 Roper Survey of Global Attitudes, 64 Ross, Robert, 180 Roy, J. Stapleton, 176

Index rule of law, 3, 13, 19–20, 56, 58, 120, 138–139, 145, 226 ruling elite, 114, 228; rent, 116, 118–119 rural areas, 16, 17, 20, 21, 39, 55, 59, 63, 74, 76, 90, 103–104; businesses, 17; commune, 28; development, 17, 20, 21, 39–40, 41; education, 40; enterprises, 17; governments, 17; health care, 40, income gap, 41; infrastructure, 40; laborers, 16–17, 39; population, 14–15, 17, 21, 28, 31–32, 38, 40; workers, 90 Russia, see Soviet Union Ryukyu Islands, 195–196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 209 Ryukyu Kingdom, 200, 201, 204–205 Ryukyu Trough, 206, 208 SARS epidemic, 137, 161 SOEs, see state owned enterprises sacred commitments, 184–185, 189 Safety and Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems, 165 safety, 91, 99, 101–102, 103, 104, 108 Samarang, 197 Samuelson, Paul, 120–121 San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), 202, 203, 204 San nong, 57–58 sanctions, 133, 137, 146 Scholars Against Sweatshop Labor (SASL), 92 scientific concept of development, 13–14 scientific reasoning, 31–32 second market, 117–118 secrecy, 133, 140 security, 32, 61, 64, 74, 117, 140, 165, 185, 190, 209 Self Defense Force, 196 self-determination, 188, 202 Senkaku Islands, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 209 sensationalism, 137–145 separatism, 179, 184–185 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, see SARS Shaanxi, 142–143 Shandong Province, 20, 22 shell corporations, 117 Sheng Hong, 3–4

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255

Sheng Xuanhuai, 205 Shenyang, 138, 146 Shenyang BMW Accident Case, 134, 141–143, 146, 163–164, 166 Shenyang City People’s Congress, 137–138 Shenzhen, 162 Shihai, Hayashi, 200 Shikoku Islands, 204 Sho Tai, 201 Siew, Vincent, 224 Sina, 142, 144, 161 Singapore, 76–77 Sino-American relations, 171–191 Sino-Japanese Friendship and Peace Treaty, 209 Sino-Japanese relations, 195 Sino-Japanese War (1894), 180, 199, 217 Sixteenth CCP National Congress, 18, 37, 41 Sixteenth Central Committee Meeting, 13, 16 Slashdot, 136 Smith, Adam, 4 Snow, Edgar, 217 Social Accountability International (SA8000), 97–98, 100, 101 social changes, 227; conditions, 52, 57, 71; democratic politics, 76; development, 20, 51–52, 58, 155, 164–165, 166; disharmony, 14; equality, 36; equity, 42–43, 61; forces, 163; groups, 153–154, 155, 156, 158; harmony, 13, 17, 22, 23 inequities, 137; injustice, 153, 164; instability, 59, 71, 116–117; institutions, 153; justice, 13–14, 65–66, 76, 163, 219; mobilization, 155, 162; modernization, 57; movement, 63, 64; policies, 89, 232; problems, 32, 68; production, 113, 114, 118–119, 120; rights, 50, 53–54, 67, 69, 71; services, 61; solidarity, 14; stability, 31, 59, 74, 91, 144, 156; structure, 127; tensions, 71; turbulence, 156; values, 58, 64; welfare, 58, 74, 119, 120 socialism, 15, 19, 27, 67, 75, 120 society, 5–6, 49, 145; authoritarian, 73; autonomous, 33; building of, 76; capitalist, 19; challenges, 2; Chinese Communist Party and, 18–19; civil,

256

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Index

society—continued 43, 54–54, 55, 57, 75, 155; classes, 27, 54–55, 56; communist, 155; communitarian, 57; control of, 166; criticism, 127; culture and, 18, 65; democracy and, 13, 58, 65, 68; development, 35–36, 60, 73; domestic, 211; economic, 26, 30, 31, 35–36, 113, 114; education, 32; equality, 27–28, 66; equity, 58, 59; exploitation, 27; freedom, 66; government and, 60, 65, 75, 53; growth and, 59; harmonious, 13, 19–20, 22, 23, 56, 59; health care, 32, 57–58, 68–69; ideological, 27; immorality, 26; income gaps, 32; inequality, 26; interaction, 155; interests of, 54–55; international, 122; Internet, 153, 154, 164; justice, 20, 27–28, 58; leadership and, 61; market-oriented, 19; mass media, 127, 128, 131–132, 134; peace and unity, 31; pluralistic, 6, 229; population, 30; problems in, 15, 68; reforms, 25, 31; reorganization, 28; security, 32; socialist, 27; standard of living, 14, 18, 30, 57; state, 155; structure, 25–26; totalitarian, 28; unification and, 58, 66; utilitarian perspective, 60–61; utopian, 57–58 Song Chuyu, 223 Song Jianfei, 138 Song Xinning, 177 Soong, James, 223, 225 South China Sea, 207 South Korea, 41, 210 Southeast Asia, 93 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 130, 162–163 Southern Metropolitan News, 141 Southern Weekend, 129 sovereignty, 177, 181, 195, 196, 220; continental shelf, 207; Diaoyu Islands, 208–209, 210; Japan, 198, 200; political, 38; popular, 119–120; PRC, 216; ROC, 203; Senkaku Islands, 198, 204, 209; Taiwan, 181; Tiaoyutai Islands, 203, 209 Soviet Union, 2, 29, 32, 50, 64, 65, 121, 132–133, 156, 171, 178, 208, 209, 211, 228 special interest groups, 73, 74, 75

sports, 54, 129, 130 stability, 14, 63, 64; challenges to, 75–76; government and, 61, 75, 120; political, 20, 91, 119; regional, 186; social, 31, 74, 91, 156 Stainless Steel Mouse, 139–141 Stainless Steel Rat, 139, 140 Stalin, Josef, 29 standards, corporate, 98; labor, 98; leadership, 57–58; living, 20, 30, 32, 64–66, 68, 70 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 165 starvation, 73, 141 State Administration for Press and Publications, 165 state associations, 57; authoritarian, 55; control, 74; government, 117; income, 118–119; interaction, 155; owned banks, 118; owned economy, 18, 121–122; police, 140; power, 118, owned property, 120; revenue, 19–20; secrets, 165; security, 140, society, 155; theory, 113 State Copyright Bureau, 165 State Council, 39, 55, 101, 160, 165–166 State Economic and Trade Commission, 120 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 5, 16, 25, 32, 98, 99, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 160; development and, 117, 120; inefficiency, 118; low efficiency, 119; reform and, 117 State Secrets Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems on the Internet, 165 stock markets, 116–117, 118, 130, 133, 137, 171 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), 219 strategic area, 202–203; interests, 182 Strategy and Management, 131 strategy, development, 30, 38–39 strikes, 32–33, 131 Strong Country Forum, 136 structure, government, 51; hierarchical, 32; property, 119; social, 127; society, 25–26 Su Xiuwen, 141, 163 subsidization, 21, 32 Suettinger, Robert, 180 suffering, at Western hands, 184–185

Index suffrage, 71–73 Sun Yat-sen, 38, 66, 220–221 Sun Zhigang, 39, 137, 162–163, 164, 166 Sunan Model, 115 Sung Ch’u-yu, 223 superpowers, 171, 180, 207–208 suppression, 60, 209 Supreme People’s Court, 138, 163, 165 surveys, 55, 135–136 survival, regime, 182, 183 Sutter, Robert, 173 sweatshops, 92–93 system, centralized, 132–133; democratic, 75; economic, 121; electoral, 76; judicial, 55; legal, 50, 55; party, 143–144; political, 62–63, 143–144, 156, 157, 161, 218; praetorian, 134, reforms, 52 Taiwan, 7, 76–77, 171–191; autonomy, 222; bureaucracy, 222; conflicts and, 8, 216; cooperation, 216; CPC, 217, 220; democracy, 173, 174, 176, 188, 221–222, 228; Diaoyu Islands and, 195–196, 198, 205–206; economic development, 227; elections, 173, 174, 178–179, 187, 219–220, 222, 223, 229, 231; foreign control, 216; government, 222, 223, 231–232; hostility, 144, 216, 219, 226–227; independence, 173, 174–175, 177, 179, 180–181, 182, 186, 187, 216, 218, 221–222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229; international community, 174–175, 181, 219; international law, 186, 188; international status, 217; Japan and, 180, 199, 200, 204, 210, 216, 217; jurisdiction, 217; KMT, 220; leadership, 173–174; legal status, 181; liberation, 217–218; Maguan Treaty, 199; mass media, 216; military force, 8, 181–182, 186, 216, 218, 221, 227, 228; perspectives, 220–226; political development, 218, 227, 228; politics, 179, 215, 218, 221, 222, 227; population, 172, 173, 216, 218; PRC, 215, 216, 217, 220–221; province, 217; reunification, 174–175, 177–178, 179, 185, 187, 188, 210, 215–216, 219; ROC, 217, 220; Ryukyu Islands,

●

257

202–203, 208; secession, 174–175, 179, 184–185; self-determination, 188; Taiwan, Sino-American relations, 178–191; society, 221, 227; socioeconomic system, 218; status, 186; territory and, 8, 181; unification, 179, 216, 217–218, 221, 226; United States and, 174–175, 177, 179, 183, 186, 187, 210, 216, 217–218, 221, 226, 227–228 Taiwan and Islands in the Southwest Navigation Guide, 198 Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM), 172, 209, 221, 223, 227, 228 Taiwan Solidarity Union, 223 Taiwan Strait, 7, 8, 210, 211, 219; conflict, 179; leadership, 180; oil reserves, 207; separation, 185; strategic interests, 182; United States, 182 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 171–191; confrontation, 180, 185; domestic politics, 172, 177; force, 174–175; foreign policy, 176–177; hostility, 175–177; international law, 180; leadership, 176–177; Lee Ten-hui, 172, 173, 174, 175–177, 179, 185–187; military exercises, 172–173, 174, 176, 179, 180, 187; military tests, 172–173, 174, 179, 180; miscalculations, 180; misperceptions, 171–172, 174, 176, 180, 185–187; overview, 172–173; perceptual gaps, 172, 174–187; population, 176; Sino-American relations 178–191; United States Congress, 175–176; United States Navy and, 186 Taiwanization, 221 Tarnoff, Peter, 175 Tatsushiro, Koga, 199, 204 taxes, 34, 36–37, 41, 63, 75, 143; agricultural, 41; neutrality, 36–37; peasants, 20, 21–22, 40; progressive, 36–37; proportional, 36–37; reforms, 25 technocracy, authoritarian, 31, 42; bureaucratic, 28, 31; elites, 33; era, 28; legitimacy, 33; politics, 26; regime, 43 technocrats, 26–27, 28, 33, 34; businesses, 42; central government, 28; entrepreneurial, 37; grass-roots, 28–29;

258

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Index

technocrats—continued health care, 28; housing, 28; leadership, 29; liberals and, 36; policymaking, 37; pragmatism, 29; provincial government, 28 technology, 25, 26, 51, 61, 71, 89–90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 99, 104, 107, 108, 121, 127–128, 130, 134, 135, 154, 157–158, 164, 166, 200; development, 121; innovations, 59, 127–128 telecommunications, 134–135 Telecommunications Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, 165–166 television, 130, 132, 145 temporary residential permit, 162–163 Ten Prohibitions, 133 Tenth National People’s Congress, 13, 37 territorial integrity, 181, 185; occupation, 210–211 territorium nullius, 197 territory, Japan and, 7–8, 198, 199, 200; Taiwan and, 8; trust, 202 terrorist organizations, 175–176 Thatcher, Margaret, 120–121 Theater and Film Paper, 130 theory, democracy, 52; development, 52; economic, 4, 118–119; modernization, 155; state, 113 Third Plenary Meeting of the Sixteenth CCP Party Congress, 3, 38–39 Third united front, 215, 216 Third World countries, 208, 209 Thirteenth Order, 198 threats, state security, 140; United States, 180 Three Nos, 222–223 Three Peoples principles, 38, 221, 227 Three pillars of culture, 6 Three Represents, 18, 120, 122 Three States Navigation Maps, 200 Three stresses, 18 Tian Hongmao, 210 Tiananmen Square, 49, 154, 183, 185 Tianjian Shi, 155, 156 Tiaoyutai Islands, 196, 197, 203, 209 Tieling County, 138 Tom, 161 top-down populism, 37–38, 121–122, 135 totalitarianism, 28, 131–132 townships, 21–22, 54, 55

trade liberalization, 102–103 trade, 1, 6–7, 89 Trade Union Law, 98 trade unions, 42, 68, 92, 98, 100, 120–121; see also unions traditions, authoritarian, 38; culture, 3, 6, 38, 76, 220; Eastern, 4; paternalism, 38; philosophy, 3–4, 13 training, 5–6, 51, 90, 95, 96, 97, 102, 104 transition, democratic, 52; economic, 113–114, 118, 119, 122; institutional, 122 transparency, 145 Transparency International, 42 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 199 tribute relationship, 200–201 tripartite methodology, 190–191 Triplett, William, 178 Truman, Harry, 202, 203 trusteeship, 202 Tsinghua University, 25 Tunisia/Libyan Continental Shelf, 206 Twenty-first Century Global Herald (mag), 131 Two Chinas, 172–173, 177–178, 221–222, 223, 227 two-state theory, 223, 228 Tyukyu Islands, 206 UNDP, see United Nations Development Program unbalanced growth, 37–38 unemployment, 14, 15, 16, 17–18, 32, 74, 101, 116–117, 134, 141, 146, 160 uneven development, 4, 15, 20, 42 unification law, 215, 231; peaceful, 221; society and, 58; Taiwan, 217, 218, 226 unified front, 215, 216 Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Workers (UNITE), 91 unions, 39, 42, 68, 91, 92, 96, 98, 100, 103, 120–121 Unirule Institute of Economics, 3–4 United Nations Charter, 202 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, 208 United Nations Country Team, 74 United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Extreme Poverty, 66

Index United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 53, 64, 65–66, 68, 71, 72–73 United Nations General Assembly, 201–202 United Nations Security Council, 202, 203, 208, 211 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 201–202, 203 United Nations, 53, 66, 74, 102–103, 196–197, 199, 200–204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 225 United States, 1, 2, 6–7, 34–35, 40, 50; aggression, 207; agriculture, 21; capitalism, 19; communism, 204; conflict, 185; decision making, 185, 190; decolonization support, 202; democracy, 50, 51, 61; Diaoyu Islands, 196–197, 200–204; differences of, 185; domestic politics, 180, 189; economy and, 58, 71, 182, 183; embassy bombing, 183–185; foreign policy, 177, 189, 228; government and, 14, 60, 207, 227; hostility, 178, 227; human rights, 183; independence, 182, 202, 228; involvement of, 195; Japan and, 198, 202, 203–204, 210; leadership, 182, 188–189; Lee Tenghui and, 172–175, 186, 222; mass media, 128, 132; military force, 7, 174, 179, 180, 188–189, 202, 203–204, 221, 222–223; misperceptions, 175–180; Okinawa Islands, 196–197, 203–204; one China policy, 181; optimism of, 65; PRC and, 173; perceptual gaps, 180–185; policy makers, 171, 172, 173, 190; politics, 179; population, 17; Reversion of Okinawa, 208; ROC, 217, 227; Ryukyu Islands, 202, 203; selfdetermination, 202; Senkaku Islands, 204; society, 14; strategic interests, 182; superpower, 171, 180, 207–208; Taiwan and, 7, 171, 174–175, 177, 179, 182, 183, 186, 187, 210, 216, 217, 218, 221, 226, 227–228; threats, 180; trade, 6–7; unions and, 121, United Nations and, 208 United States Administrative Government of Okinawa, 201

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259

United States Congress, 97, 172, 175, 176, 177, 185, 186, 205 United States Defense Department, 173, 175 United States House of Representatives, 175, 176 United States Library of Congress, 198 United States Navy, 171, 173, 174–175, 186, 187, 202 United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 178 United States Senate, 175, 176, 178 United States State Department, 172, 175, 176, 204, 207, 217, 223, 227 United Students Against Sweatshops, 92 unity, national, 68; society, 66; Taiwan, 216 unpublic economy, 114 upward influence, 155 urban areas, 17, 22, 28, 39, 41, 55, 74, 76; development, 20, 39–40, 91; discrimination, 17; district councils, 55; employment, 17; governments, 17; residents, 14–15, 17, 22, 31, 32; rural divides, 43 urbanization, 21 utilitarian, definition of, 65; equity-based, 33; government, 60–61, 65, 66; justification, 35; perspective, 60; reforms, 60–61 utilitarianism, 34 utility-based legitimacy, 34 utopianism, 6, 27–28, 56, 57–58, 136 values, 5, allocation of, 35, 43; liberal democratic, 66, 68; social, 58, 64 velvet prison, 128, 131–132, 134, 135, 140, 146 vertical equity distribution, 36–37, 41 victimization narrative, 183, 184–185, 189 Vietnam War, 171, 218 villages, 49, 55, 57, 63, 90, 131, 156–157 violations, Internet, 165; labor, 5, 90, 101–102, 103, 104–105, 108 violence, 65, 131, 134, 146 WHO, see World Health Organization WTO, see World Trade Organization wages, 15, 20, 29, 32, 39, 41, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96–97, 98, 100–101, 103, 108, 133, 142

260

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Index

Walder, Andrew, 156, 157 Wal-Mart, 97–98, 100 Wang Baoming, 145 Wang Changjiang, 76 Wang Guowei, 5 Wang Hui, 76 Wang Jianwei, 183 Wang Jisi, 6–7, 177 Wanzi Schoolhouse explosion, 137 Washington Consensus, 58–59 wealth, 30, 34, 52, 57, 64, 70–71, 74, 75, 142, 146, 163; distribution of, 34, 35–36, 37; polarization of, 59, 75 Weber, Max, 26 websites, 135, 136, 137, 143, 146, 154, 157–158, 160–161, 162, 164–165, 166 Weekly Rest Convention (1921), 100 Wei Daoming, 209 Wei Yu-sun, 203 Weixing Chen, 2 welfare 17, 19, 63, 64, 98; economics, 36; programs, 22; rights, 65–66; social, 58, 74, 119, 120 Wen Jiabao, 2, 18, 22, 38, 39, 57, 59 Wen Lai, 142 Wen Zhou Model, 115 West, capitalism, 19; democracy and, 49, 50, 56, 76, 154–155, 156; government and, 57; information and, 54; Japan and, 197; policy makers, 50; property rights, 115; reform, 3; shell corporations, 117 Western, aggression, 184–185; culture, 5; development, 14; economy, 3–4, 114; hostility, 144, 184–185; ideology, 27; mass media, 132, 184; politics, 66; scholars, 6; suffering imposed, 184–185 Who Will Feed China?, 4 Wilson, James Q, 37 Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), 97–98, 101 Workers Daily, 138 workers, 34, 42, 75, 89, 91–92, 93, 96–97, 98, 100–101, 104–105, 108, 142–143, 146, 162, 163; alienation, 33; benefits, 92; blue-collar, 41; capitalism and, 32–33; collective, 98; conditions, 90, 92–93, 95, 96, 97, 100;

discrimination, 33; disputes, 33; education, 33; equality, 32; ethic, 29; health care, 33, 91; ideologies, 33; labor intensive, 97; labor rights, 90–91; marginalization of, 32; migrants, 16, 17, 21; peasants, 16, 21, 90; pensions, 17; reforms, 39; rights of, 89, 93, 97, 98, 103; safety, 91, 101, 102–103; socialism, 15; strikes, 32–33; unemployed, 16; unions, 39, 42, 91; urban, 28; white-collar, 146; worksites, 155 Workplace Codes of Conduct in China and Related Labor Conditions, 97 World Bank, 69 World Health Organization (WHO), 15–16, 225 World Trade Organization (WTO), 59, 102–103 World Values Survey, 65 World War II, 1–2, 7, 50, 180–181, 188, 198, 202, 203, 217 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (C182), 99 Wu Jinglian, 25 Wu Po-hsiung, 222, 224 Xiao Chongye, 205 Xiaobo Lu, 63, 64 Xinhua News Agency, 160 Xinjingbao, 162 Xiong Guangkai, 180 Xu Baoguang, 200 Xu Wei, 140 Xu Yi, 205 Yaesan County, 198 Yaesan Islands, 198, 201 Yahoo, 54 Yan Fu, 5 Yan Jiagan, 208–209 Yang Bin, 131 Yang Jialin, 138 Yang Zhong, 156–157 Yang Zili, 140 Ye Jianying, 218 Yellow Sea, 207 Yitahutu, 136, 137 Yongming Zhou, 136 Youliang, Kwang, 205

Index Yu Shyi-kun, 224 Yuan Peng, 179 Yuezhi Zhao, 128 Zeng Qinghong, 132, 133 Zenji, Koga, 199 Zero-sum game, 42 Zhan Jiang, 132–133 Zhang Hongkai, 140 Zhang Weiying, 25, 27–38 Zhang Xianglong, 5

●

Zhang Yebai, 6–7 Zhejiang Province, 20, 115 Zheng Chuguang, 42 Zheng Jiadong, 5 Zheng Jingping, 7 Zhong Nanbai, 29 Zhongshan University, 163 Zhou Enlai, 209, 218, 223, 227, 228 Zhou Huang, 206 Zhu Rongji, 139–140, 164 Zittrain, Jonathan, 166

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