China and the New International Order (China Policy Series)

China and the New International Order

A rising China is often viewed with awe and apprehension as a new force for change in international politics. Too often, the focus of scholarly and policy debates has been on how the world can, and should, cope with China’s rise; far too little attention is paid to how China is struggling to come to terms with its own rise. It is hardly comforting to think that major current national policies are devised based on a circumscribed view of Chinese international behavior. Indeed, for years now, China itself has been constantly engaging in soul-searching to define its relation with the current international order. How does the world look from the Chinese point of view? How does this relate to the views often depicted by “the world outside”? In this volume, the contributors look at the domestic sources of China’s international behavior. Chapters explore the key concepts of nationalism, sovereignty, and identities, as well as multilateralism, regionalism, international entitlement, and global governance. The volume also explores the development of international relations studies in the Chinese scholarly and policy circles to offer a glimpse of the resulting Chinese perception of the order within which it resides. It brings out the highly interactive relationship between China and the outside world: whether China can reshape the international order will eventually come down to its ability to manage domestic developments, not just economically, but politically and socially as well; and whether the world can reshape China depends heavily on China’s domestic forces’ acceptance of external influences. Wang Gungwu is University Professor at the National University of Singapore, where he is also Chairman of the East Asian Institute. He is also Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University, Canberra. He was Vice-Chancellor of The University of Hong Kong from 1986 to 1995. His research interests focus on Chinese history, the Chinese overseas, nationalism, and migrations; and he is the author of numerous books and articles. Zheng Yongnian is Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of Research, China Policy Institute, School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham. He researches on China’s domestic transformation and its external impact. He has written numerous books, including Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China (1999), Globalization and State Transformation in China (2004), Will China Become Democratic? (2004) and Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State and Society in China (2007).

China policy series Edited by Zheng Yongnian University of Nottingham, UK

1  China and the New International Order Edited by Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian

China and the New International Order

Edited by Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Editorial selection and matter, Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data China and the new international order/edited by Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian. p. cm. – (China policy series; 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-44111-7 (hardback: alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-20393226-1 (ebook) 1. China—Foreign relations—21st century. 2. China— Politics and government—2002– I. Wang, Gungwu. II. Zheng, Yongnian. JZ1734.C515 2008 327.51–dc22 2007031105 ISBN 0-203-93226-9 Master e-book ISBN ISBN13: 978-0-415-44111-7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-93226-1 (ebk)

Contents



List of figures List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgments

Introduction

x xi xii xiv 1

Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian

Rising China and the new international order  2 Searching for domestic sources of China’s international behavior  3 Key issues in conceptualizing Chinese international behavior  6 China and globalization  10 China and regionalism  12 China and international relations studies  15 Part I

Key issues in conceptualizing Chinese international relations

19

1 China and the international order: Some historical perspectives

21

Wang Gungwu

Is there an international order?  21 What the idea of international order means for China  25 What about the future?  28

2 Nationalism: Dynamics of domestic transformation and international relations in China Zheng Yongnian

A state-in-nationalism approach  34

32

vi  Contents The state and non-state nationalistic forces  37 Nationalistic conflict  41 Conclusion: nationalism and its implications  47

3 Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty

53

Shan Wenhua

Sovereignty and the Chinese concept thereof  53 Chinese practice in international economic law in relation to state sovereignty: giving up state sovereignty?  59 Recent official statements on state sovereignty: insisting on inviolable sovereignty  68 Concluding remarks: the concept of sovereignty revisited  70

4 Sovereignty in exercise: Constructing political Chinese-ness in post-1997 Hong Kong

81

Tok Sow Keat

The Hong Kong Paradox  81 By virtue of being “Chinese”: the political aspect  82 Constructing Chinese-ness in Hong Kong  85 An uncertain future?  94 Concluding remarks  97

5 Beyond symbiosis: The changing civil–military relationship after Mao

101

You Ji

Politics of post-symbiotic CCP–PLA interaction  101 Hu Jintao’s command of the gun  107 Hu Jintao’s new strategies of civilian control over the military  110 Civil–military relations beyond symbiosis  113 Conclusion  120 Part II

China and globalization

125

6 China reshapes the world economy

127

Deng Ziliang and Zheng Yongnian

Introduction  127 China in the East Asian production system  128 China in the triangular trade system  128 “Made in China” commodities and the world market  132

Contents  vii Outward foreign direct investment  135 The state and resources diplomacy  140 Discussions and conclusion  144

7 Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order

149

Zhang Yongjin

Introduction  149 Power  150 Multipolarization  150 Security  155 Globalization  158 Conclusion  161

8 China joins global governance: The 10 conundrums

168

Gerald Chan

A framework for analysis  168 Formulating 10 hypotheses (the 10 conundrums)  169 Assessing China’s conundrums: the yins and yangs  178 Conclusion  181 Part III

China and regionalism

185

9 Contested international relations theory and China’s constructing regional entitlement

187

Gordon Cheung

Introduction  187 US hegemonic decline?  188 China’s rise and East Asian regionalization  190 The construction of Chinese historical entitlement  194 Conclusion  197

10 Learning from the EU?: China’s changing outlook toward multilateralism Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Introduction  203 The EU: a priority target  203 The influence of the EU model on China’s foreign policy  207 The ambiguities of China’s vision of Europe  210 Conclusion  214

203

viii  Contents

11 Northeast Asia regionalism and China: From an outside-in perspective

218

Jaewoo Choo

Introduction  218 Why is there no regionalism in Northeast Asia?  220 China’s positive initiative  224 What is wrong with China?  226 Conclusion: What more can China do?  231

12 China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

237

Pan Guang

China and post-Soviet Central Asia  237 Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership and the SCO  239 The SCO’s success in Central Asia  241 SCO’s responses to new challenges  244 China’s key role in the SCO  249 Strategic significance of the SCO for China  251 Conclusion  253

13 China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration

256

Sheng Lijun

Coming together from a long way  256 Who leads the way?  261 Why is China unable to lead the way?  262 ASEAN “pulls” vs. China “pushes”  267 “Leaders’ diplomacy”  269 Weak strategic and political basis  269 Conclusion: prospects  271 Part IV

China and international relations studies

279

14 Deconstructing Cultural Realism

281

Anthony A. Loh

Introduction  281 Basic problems with Cultural Realism  282 Choice of military texts  284 Choice of the Ming  285

Contents  ix Grand strategy, national security, and Confucian statecraft  286 Universal military realism vs. Chinese cultural realism  288 Conclusion  290

15 Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?

293

Ren Xiao

The quest for a “Chinese School”  293 What is a “Chinese school”?  297 The issue of ‘question’ or ‘core question’  300 Scientific vs. humanistic approaches  301 What Chinese culture can contribute to IR theory-building  304 Conclusion  306

Index

310

Figures



4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

4.6 4.7 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8

Identity and political identity Political Chinese-ness Constructing political Chinese-ness prior to 1 July 2003 Constructing political Chinese-ness from 1 July 2003 People’s satisfaction with political, economic and social conditions in Hong Kong (half-year average) Hong Kong people’s confidence in “one country, two systems” (half-year average) Hong Kong people’s trust level toward Beijing (half-year average) China as “assembly center” in East Asia The share of accumulated FDI inflows to China from different origins (percentage, 1979–2005) Major hosts of world FDI inflow (percentage) US Import of labor-intensive products from East Asia (percentage) “Made in China” commodities in major markets (market share by percentage, in 2004) China and major source economies of FDI outflows (percentage) Industry distribution of China’s outward FDI in 2004 Petroleum production and consumption in China (thousand barrels per day, 1978–2003)

83 84 88 93 95 95 96 129 130 130 131 133 135 137 139

Tables

2.1 Forms of nationalism: state–society convergence and divergence 2.2 Forms of nationalism: actors and their interest weights 6.1 Top 10 trade deficit and surplus partners of China (2005) 6.2 US import of labor-intensive commodities: China’s role (change over five-year period) 6.3 US textile import from major partners (2005) 6.4 Geographical distribution of China’s outward FDI in 2004 6.5 Growth in the consumption of selected primary commodities in 2003: China and the rest of the world (percentage) 6.6 World primary commodity prices, 1998–2003 (percentage change over the previous year) 6.7 Top 11 petroleum suppliers for China in 2004 6.8 Visits of Chinese leaders to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East (since March 2003) 6.9 Trade surges with Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East  6.10 China’s oil import partners in Africa 8.1 Design versus necessity in China’s engagement with global governance 9.1 Opinions of China’s leaders on the exchange rate of the renminbi 9.2 Key economic indicators for China 1997–2002

38 38 131 132 134 136 138 139 140 141 142 144 175 192 193

Contributors

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Senior Researcher, French National Centre for Scientific Research, Research Institute for Comparative Law, University of Paris 1, France Gerald Chan, Professor, School of Government and International Affairs, and Director of the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Durham, UK Gordon C. K. Cheung, Lecturer, School of Government and International Affairs, University of Durham, UK Jaewoo Choo, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations and Area Studies, Kyung Hee University, South Korea Deng Ziliang, PhD candidate, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, UK Anthony Loh, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA Pan Guang, Director and Professor of Shanghai Center for International Studies and Institute of Eurasian Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Director of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies Center, Shanghai, China Ren Xiao, Professor, Institute of International Studies, School of Government and International Relations, Fudan University, China Shan Wenhua, Dean and University Professor of Law, College of Humanities and Social Science, Xi’an Jiaotong University, China, and Reader in International Economic Law, Oxford Brookes University, UK Sheng Lijun, Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Tok Sow Keat, Research Associate, China Policy Institute, School of Contemp­ orary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham, UK

Contributors  xiii You Ji, Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of New South Wales, Australia Wang Gungwu, Professor and Director, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore Zhang Yongjin, Professor, New Zealand Asia Institute, University of Auckland, New Zealand Zheng Yongnian, Professor and Director of Research, China Policy Institute, School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham, UK

Acknowledgments

This volume is based on the International Conference on China in the International Order: Integrating Views from Outside-In and Inside-Out, 18–19 September 2006. The conference was sponsored by the China Policy Institute (CPI), School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham. The editors thank Ms. Elizabeth Wright (Chair of the CPI Management Board) and Mr. Richard Pascoe (CPI Director) for their financial support and other institutional assistance. Thanks also go to Professor David Greenaway, the acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nottingham for his moral support. Mr. Peter Sowden and Mr. Tom Bates at Routledge provided useful guides from the very beginning of the project to the end of production. Wang Gungwu Zheng Yongnian



Introduction Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian

In 1991, immediately after the liberation of Kuwait from a belligerent Iraq, a triumphant President George Bush announced the emergence of a “New World Order.” But Bush’s declaration was more political than consensual; there was no agreement in academic and policy circles about the world order, and most scholars seemed reluctant to endorse Bush’s declaration. After the end of the Cold War, “disorder,” instead of “order,” became the key word when describing international affairs. For Samuel Huntington, it was a “Clash of Civilizations”; for Zbigniew Brzezinski, it was “a new geopolitical game on the global chessboard”; for Robert Kaplan, it was “The Coming Anarchy.” More than a decade has now passed since Bush’s declaration, and extensive transformations to the international political landscape have occurred: the rise of China, the economic revival of Russia, the expansion and consolidation of the European Union, the emergence of an ‘Asian Community’, accelerated globalization, the information revolution, and the intensification of “global terrorism.” Needless to say, drastic changes in world politics have caused an identity crisis in the international community, and there is no longer a hegemonic understanding of the international order. However, the growing public concern about world affairs reflects a popular expectation that there should be an international order. Certainly, the world is not completely anarchic; despite the fact that interstate and civil conflicts often break out, it is generally felt that an international order is emerging. What needs to be asked is exactly what kind of “order” it is, and how this new order is shaped by other, emerging factors. With so many drastic changes, the international order is certainly facing a great transformation. As a matter of fact, the understanding of such a great transformation of the international order has been a key agenda of the scholarly community ever since the end of the Cold War. However, for a group of scholars who study China, and who have focused on the place of China in this new international order, the interest is not only in understanding such an order, but also in asking more China-related questions: How and where does China fit into the bigger picture of the transformation of the international order? What role is China playing in reshaping the new world order? And in what way has China reshaped this order? Furthermore, the world has come

2  Wang and Zheng to an age of globalization and interdependence in which different international actors, be they nation-states, governmental organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interact with one another. Within this structure, China and the new world order are mutually transformative. Therefore, we also need to ask: How has China been transformed and reshaped by this new international order? How has China’s role in international affairs been redefined? In this volume, we attempt to answer these questions in different ways.

Rising China and the new international order Thanks to the late Deng Xiaoping’s push for reforms and the open door policy, China has attained rapid economic growth in recent decades. Today, the oncereclusive country is knocking on the doors of the league of Great Powers; but the idiosyncrasy of China’s communist regime appears to be all too strong an influence on the manner in which others view China. Added to this, the pace of China’s rise has caught many by surprise. In little more than a quarter of a century, the country’s GDP has leapt from a mere US$144 billion in 1978 to US$1.6 trillion in 2004. This is a staggering achievement, comparable only to the postwar rebuilding of Japan and Germany. These twin factors have generated many ways of interpreting China’s rise, from one end of the spectrum, at which China is regarded as a threat, to the other end, where it is seen as an opportunity. With its growing economy, China has increasingly expanded its external influence. The country has become the world’s top consumer of a wide variety of natural resources and primary commodities, such as steel, aluminum, oil, and gas, and its rising demand for these products has driven up world prices. China’s growing economic “clout” is reflected in the issue of the currency, renminbi (RMB), being debated across the world’s capital markets, a situation with a marked resemblance to that of the Japanese yen in the 1980s. In the meantime, Chinese companies have emerged as new players in the global business of mergers and acquisitions. The acquisition in December 2004 of IBM’s PC division by China’s computer giant Lenovo, and the more recent attempt by the China National Offshore Oil Co. (CNOOC) to acquire America’s Unocal Corporation, have given rise to great controversy, and even fears in the USA over the sudden rise of China’s economic might. Some in Asia are also concerned about China’s potential displacement effect on their economies. For the international community, the biggest question lies in whether China will use its newly acquired economic strength to become a strong military power, a fear that has surfaced in recent years as a major theme in the “China threat” discourse in different parts of the world. Without doubt, the country’s rapid military modernization – one of Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations, which additionally include agriculture, industry, and science and technology – has made the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a more credible force. China’s recent advances in space and telecommunications technologies have also colored the perceptions of threat of many countries in East Asia, in particular across the Taiwan Strait and the Sea of Japan (East China Sea). Concerns over China’s growing military strength have thus captured the atten-

Introduction  3 tion of policymakers in recent years. For some, China may be treading the very same path that Germany and Japan took before World War II. They believe that a country’s rapid economic growth will inevitably lead to a similarly rapid development of its military power, and will, in time, challenge the existing international order. China’s growing nationalism has led many to believe in the inevitability of such a path. If this is the case, then the international community, if not the world’s last remaining hegemon, needs to take measures to manage and even contain China’s rise. The growing anxiety about a rising China has been reflected in voices outside China: from “China threat” in the 1990s to the more recent “China uncertainty.” Of course, there is no consensus about a rising China in the new international order. Whereas some concerns note the geopolitical and strategic implications of China’s rise, others tend to believe that it could be an opportunity, especially in economic terms; if so, the world should be more accommodating to it. Many believe that China’s rise is natural and inevitable, and what should be done is to make sure that it will be fruitful for others. Speaking at a forum in Tokyo on 24 May 2005, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, warned that it would be “futile to resist China’s growing economic strength.” Lee echoed the views of the majority in Asia, in many parts of which China’s rise is seen as a new source of growth, especially following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when Asian countries struggled to get their economies back on track. Well aware of the competition brought about by China’s growing hi-tech manufacturing, many of these countries have seized the opportunity to facilitate their own industrial upgrading. Despite all these different views, there is unanimous agreement upon one issue – that a rising China is becoming a force for change in international politics; but so far, the limelight has been on how the world can, and should, cope with China’s rise. Little attention is paid to how China is struggling to deal with its own rise. For years, China itself has also been searching, not only for a rightful place in the international order, but also for what China can contribute to this new order. We believe that, without a good understanding of the strategies that China is using to rise, the international community can hardly develop a good strategy to manage this phenomenon. In the real world, whether China will disrupt or maintain the current international order depends on the interaction between China and the world. In this volume, we attempt to look at the domestic sources of China’s international behavior. The reason is quite simple. On the one hand, how China can reshape the international order depends on whether China has such a capacity, which is a function of its domestic development. On the other hand, how the world can reshape China also depends on whether China’s domestic forces accept or resist any external influences that they face.

Searching for domestic sources of China’s international behavior An examination of the dynamics of the domestic scene will help to show how China is able to shape the new international order on the one hand, and how China’s role in world affairs is shaped by this new international order on the other.

4  Wang and Zheng Contrary to many popular beliefs, Beijing may not be in full control of its own actions, and much less so in deciding what China will eventually become. Rapid economic development and the erosion of ideological legitimacy are fusing to make China’s rise a far greater challenge than was originally envisaged. Economic growth, technological advancements, and military modernization are important issues to consider, but so are nationalism, growing social grievances and structural instability, high-level politics, central/local relations, the reformation of state bureaucracy, etc. International power structures, international organizations, globalism, and interdependence are also important, certainly, when considering the effects of the rise of China, since these factors often provide incentives for, and constraints on, China’s international behavior. The scholarly community used to focus on its domestic sources and highlight how various domestic factors could help to form an understanding of China’s international behavior, a scholarly tradition that was established by John King Fairbank and his collaborators in the 1960s. Nevertheless, this tradition has been ignored to a great degree when contemporary scholars attempt to conceptualize China’s international behavior. In organizing this volume, we asked our contributors to pay close attention to that tradition. We believe that, although Fairbank and his collaborators focused on pre-modern Chinese international behavior, going back to this tradition will improve our understanding of China’s role in this new international order and help us to conceptualize or theorize China’s foreign behavior today. In the 1960s, John King Fairbank edited a volume entitled The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations.1 The volume was based on a series of panel discussions and symposia that took place between 1963 and 1965. Most of the papers in that collection were case studies – from primarily between the fourteenth century and the early twentieth century – on China’s ‘tribute relations’ with the non-Chinese world, especially its East Asian neighbors; based on these studies, Fairbank summarized a set of assumptions on the origin and growth of the Chinese world order. Although the project dealt with the Chinese traditional worldview – much of which developed prior to its modern statehood – some of the points raised by that project are still valuable in reflecting our understanding of contemporary Chinese foreign behavior. Several paragraphs from the volume are particularly captivating today: The relations of the Chinese with surrounding areas, and with non-Chinese peoples generally, were colored by this concept of Sino-centrism and an assumption of Chinese priority. The Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles of social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese state and society. China’s foreign relations were accordingly hierarchic and nonegalitarian, like Chinese society itself. (p. 2)

Introduction  5 China’s external order was so closely related to her internal order that one could not long survive without the other; when the barbarians were not submissive abroad, rebels might more easily arise within. Most dynasties collapsed under the twin blows of ‘inside disorder and outside calamity’ (neiyou waihuan), that is, domestic rebellion and foreign invasion. Every regime was therefore under pressure to make the facts of its foreign relations fit the theory and so confirm its claim to rule China. (p. 3) Nationalist and Communist China have inherited a set of institutionalized attitudes and historical precedents not easily conformable to the European tradition of international relations among equally sovereign nation states. Modern China’s difficulty of adjustment to the international order of nation states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has come partly from the great tradition of the Chinese world order. This tradition is of more than historical interest and bears upon Chinese political thinking today. (p. 4) The traditional Chinese world order can hardly be called international because the participants in it did not use concepts corresponding to the Western ideas of nation, or sovereignty, or equality of states each having equal sovereignty. (p. 5) To cite these passages does not mean that Chinese political thinking today remains the same, and that China continues to try to impose its own domestic order onto the outside world. Nevertheless, they show that: • • •

China’s domestic and international domains are highly interdependent and mutually constitutive; the prerequisite to a good understanding of China’s international behavior is an understanding of its existing domestic order. Interpretations of both history and tradition have important effects on Chinese political thinking. In order to understand China’s foreign relations, we have to first understand how Chinese themselves perceive the world order.

The approach taken by Fairbank and others is, indeed, very much needed today when scholars try to understand China’s rise and its externalities. The present edited volume represents a continuation of the intellectual endeavor engaged in by Fairbank and his collaborators decades ago, and aims at integrating the outside-in and inside-out approaches to reach a better understanding of China’s rise and to draw relevant policy implications for the international community in living with China. In the following sections, we summarize the main issues discussed and the key points raised in individual chapters. The chapters are organized in a manner that

6  Wang and Zheng will contribute to understanding how China and the new international order interact. We first discuss some key issues that the scholarly community faces in conceptualizing China’s international behavior, including Chinese perceptions of the world order, Chinese nationalism, contemporary Chinese practice of sovereignty, and civil–military relations. In all these key issue areas, Chinese international behavior is closely linked to its various domestic factors. We then examine Chinese international behavior in the context of globalization and regionalism. In an age of interdependence, globalization and regionalism are simultaneously the means for China to integrate itself into the new international order and the means through which the new international order imposes constraints on China. Interdependence creates a structure in which China and the international community interact. Through their interactions, the two are mutually adjusting to and transforming each other. Finally, we will discuss some new discourses in international relations studies on China, and shows what key conceptual challenges we face in understanding the integration of China into the mainstream of international relations studies.

Key issues in conceptualizing Chinese international behavior When coming to the role of China in the new international order, one will immediately ask many related questions: What is the new international order? Is China satisfied with this new order? What international order does China expect? It is not the place to discuss China’s changing relations with the international order after the collapse of the so-called “Chinese world order” that Fairbank and his collaborators have suggested was a China-centered view of the world. To put it simply, in the era of reform and the open door policy, China has developed a new mindset towards the international order, thanks to the late Deng Xiaoping’s grand international strategy. China learned from the Soviet Union that it cannot afford to try to build a China-centered world order. The leadership decided to join the existing international order, or, in Chinese conceptual terms, to gear itself (jiegui) to this order first; only by joining can China learn from other powers within the order how to deal with it. China also believes that the existing international order is open to change, and that it is ready for change. For years, whilst making increasingly greater efforts to join the international order, the Chinese leadership also called for the establishment of a new international order; China believes that it can play a role in changing the existing one, and moving towards a new order. Wang Gungwu discusses such dynamic relations between China and the new international order. Wang observes that China is trying to develop a balanced and multipolar world order capable of restraining the United States, but does not seek to challenge the US itself. The Chinese do not believe that a system devised to serve the interests of a single superpower can be stable for long. China’s experiences before and after the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have led it to focus on three major strands, which already formed part of existing world structures, including a balanced and restraining multipower system, a rule-based global market economy becoming increasingly interdependent at an increasing number levels, and a world of modern, rational, and secular civilizations.

Introduction  7 To the surprise of many people, China today appears to be one of the strongest supporters of the world order established by the victors of World War II. But history has also taught the Chinese people not to view any order as permanent. China’s strategic thinking is guided by the lessons of its long civilization going back more than 3,000 years, which includes a deep-seated belief in the inevitability of change. China expects reforms to take place in the international order later in the twenty-first century, but is aware that making changes will be arduous and that results will not always be satisfactory. Furthermore, the Chinese culture shares the humanistic rationality of the other four permanent members of the Security Council – the US, Russia, Britain, and France. China wants to see a world that recognizes its own rightful place in world history and in which it can make its own distinctive inputs. In economic terms, China’s inputs so far to a rule-based global market system are still marginal, but a united and stable China with prosperity added to its size, and its huge human resources, can surely make important contributions. China has already offered alternative routes to development that have worked better than those offered by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) models, and could at least offer useful ways to stimulate and sustain development in the Third World. When China perceives a new international order, nationalism plays an important role. Scholars have watched closely, to see whether and how nationalism affects China’s external behavior and its efforts in building a new international order. To search for a rightful place in the world has been the mission of Chinese nationalism and, given the fact that China is now an important part of the international community, its growing nationalism is likely to generate a significant impact on world politics. In the academic community, there appears to be a consensus that Chinese nationalism has become an important factor in influencing the country’s external affairs, and that the Chinese state, which remains authoritarian, plays an important role in mobilizing nationalism to achieve its goal on the international stage. All these concerns are legitimate, since historically nationalism has brought about wars and conflicts, but one has to be cautious when linking Chinese nationalism to its external behavior. In his chapter on Chinese nationalism, Zheng Yongnian argues that when one examines the impact of nationalism, be it the external or the internal impact, it is useful to disaggregate nationalism first, since different social groups more often than not have their own versions of nationalism, and different forms of nationalism might conflict with each other. The relations between the state and nationalism are even more complicated. The state plays a role in shaping Chinese nationalisms, but the latter also serve as constraints on the state. Zheng attempts to develop a state-in-nationalism approach, conceptualizing the complicated relationship between the state and nationalism and thus providing some useful frameworks to help gauge the impact of Chinese nationalism on its domestic and external affairs. He argues that although the Chinese state has always been a major contributor to the development of Chinese nationalism, the role of the state should not be over-exaggerated. The Chinese state is part of nationalism: The state may help to mould nationalistic forces, but they also continually mould

8  Wang and Zheng the state. The Chinese state and the nationalistic forces within China are mutually transformative. He further identifies various nationalistic forces and those social forces with significant nationalistic dimensions, and examines nationalism at three levels, namely, international, national, and societal. In so doing, Zheng explores the dynamics of the struggle for influence over nationalism by various nationalistic forces within and outside China’s national boundaries, and shows how these forces have affected the state in its treatment of domestic and external affairs. According to Zheng, nationalism can hardly be used by the government to achieve China’s rightful place in the world. As matter of fact, with growing social space and globalization, different forms of nationalism tend to go beyond the control of the Chinese government. Therefore, nationalism is something that the Chinese government has to cope with and to manage, not something that it can afford to promote and mobilize. Another important concept in understanding Chinese international behavior is sovereignty. Indeed, the concept has always been at the center of the international system. Traditionally, China did not have such a concept; it is one that was imported from the West, but it is this imported concept that has guided the Chinese in searching for a rightful place in the world. Scholars have watched closely China’s interpretations and re-interpretations of the concept, and believe that any changes in this concept can guide our understanding of the country’s external behavior. In his chapter, Shan Wenhua explores and assesses the Chinese concept of sovereignty from the perspective of international law, particularly international economic law. He discusses the much-debated concept of sovereignty and the traditional Chinese version thereof, and then explores whether and to what extent this traditional Chinese concept of sovereignty has been changed and challenged since the country embarked on the economic reform and open door policy of the late 1970s. Shan focuses on China’s practices in international economic treaties and organizations, notably the bilateral investment treaties and the World Trade Organization, and also in implementing the “one country, two systems” arrangement for the two Special Administrative Regions, namely Hong Kong and Macao. Shan also examines and analyzes some recent statements by Chinese government officials, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what extent the official Chinese views of the concept of sovereignty have been changed. His findings are that, despite significant concessions of important sovereign powers through those treaties and organizations, China’s official perception of “sovereignty” has hardly changed. To explain such inconsistency between the official opinions and state practices, Shan revisits the concept of sovereignty, and argues for a dualist definition: “abstract sovereignty” and “concrete sovereignty.” He observes that, whereas “concrete sovereignty” (as specific sovereign powers) keeps changing to suit the needs of the time, the “abstract sovereignty” (as the ultimate and final source of authority) of a state may remain unchanged as long as it remains a sovereign state. Indeed, it is legitimate to ask a further question: How will changes in concrete sovereignty eventually lead to changes in abstract sovereignty? This is, of course, something for the academic community to observe.

Introduction  9 However, in practicing what Shan calls “concrete sovereignty,” the Chinese government has faced increasingly greater difficulties. This is reflected in the case of Hong Kong. Through China’s negotiations with the British government, Hong Kong was transferred to the sovereignty of China in 1997. In this sense, China has realized its abstract sovereignty; but this does not mean that sovereignty can be easily exercised in Hong Kong. In his chapter on Hong Kong, Tok Sow Keat explores how the Chinese government has attempted to exercise sovereignty by constructing political Chinese-ness, or Chinese identity, in Hong Kong. In recent years, political development in Hong Kong has undergone tremendous changes. Tok observes an interesting paradox: On the one hand, the culture of street demonstrations and cries for further democratic reforms persist as Hong Kong marches into its tenth year of handover; on the other hand, general trust towards the Chinese regime in Beijing has risen considerably and Hong Kong people today more readily identify themselves as Chinese nationals than they ever have before. This shows a gradual reconciliation of identity between Hong Kong and mainland China. However, this reconciliation has never been a smooth process. Tok examines Beijing’s two-stage approach (July 1997 to July 2003, and July 2003 onwards) to constructing an acceptable political Chinese-ness in Hong Kong. He outlines some major policies, as well as Beijing’s motivations behind them. Although showing a high degree of success on the part of the Chinese government in building a new political identity in Hong Kong, Tok emphasizes that this new identity is not without serious challenges. Again, one can raise an important question: Will the lessons that the Chinese government learns from exercising its sovereignty in Hong Kong affect China’s policies toward its unfinished mission of national unification (e.g., the Taiwan issue)? Apparently, sovereignty can frequently become a problem when it is daily exercised by the state; but more of a problem is the state itself. In international relations studies, the state as an analytic unit has been challenged in recent decades since other non-state actors such as international organizations, multinational companies, and non-governmental organizations have come to play a significant role on the world stage. It is certainly true in the case of China, although under China’s authoritarian system various non-state actors, despite their growing power, are unlikely to challenge the power of the state in international affairs. Challenges to the state on the world stage come mainly from within the state, and specifically from different interests within the state. Such challenges have become increasingly apparent in the post-Deng era with the passing of the revolutionary generation of leadership. Whereas strong men such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping could dictate China’s foreign policies, this is not the case for the postrevolutionary generation of leadership. Different interests within the state often exercise their influence over the country’s international affairs in different issue areas. Whether the Chinese leadership can demonstrate an integrated international thinking is an open question. Among different interests within the state, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is believed to have played an important role in both domestic politics and external affairs. In recent years, the PLA seems to be very influential in many policy areas

10  Wang and Zheng such as military modernization, the Taiwan issue, and Sino-US relations. It is certainly important to monitor the changing role of the PLA, and its relations with the civil government. In his chapter, You Ji explores China’s changing civil– military relations. You Ji looks at the issue from the viewpoint of individual leaders’ relationships with the PLA. This makes sense since China is still in the process of building a country that recognizes the rule of law; its current authoritarian structure implies that the civil government’s relations with the military are often exercised through individual leaders. Through a comparison of these leaders (Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu), You Ji observes that a great degree of institutionalization between the civil government and the military has been achieved; and institutionalization enables civil leaders to control the military. According to You Ji, compared with other leaders, Hu Jintao is the first Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader whose power consolidation is not through first controlling the gun; he is the first postDeng leader whose control of the gun is based on first establishing a high level of popularity in the Party and society; and he is also the first leader who commands the military without first creating a personal network within the Party and the PLA. Hu has responded to the challenge of symbiotic civil–military relations in a positive way. In China today, although the traditional method of party control over the gun is no longer viable, the new method of control in the form of erecting institutionalized safeguards is still in the making. If not handled properly, the transitional difficulties may result in the emergence of military strongmen or politicians inclined to manipulate the civil–military relations to their advantage. Hu’s way of commanding the gun is to turn the PLA into a professional and noninterventionist force, in keeping with the Party’s deepening institutionalization of power. Although none of these new developments have reached the point of no return, they may have heralded a broad change in China’s political and social system with unpredictable but profound consequences.

China and globalization So far we have discussed some key domestic factors that can influence China’s international behavior. As we emphasized earlier, China and the new international order are actually mutually transformative. There must be a means through which China can exercise its external impact; and external forces shape China’s international behavior. Amongst others, globalization and regionalization are two major means of linking China and the international order. Indeed, as Zheng Bijian, who has been advising the Chinese leadership, argues, globalization and regionalization have enabled China to rise peacefully in the world.2 In their chapter, Deng Ziliang and Zheng Yongnian provide a basic survey of China’s economic globalization. After nearly three decades of “reform and open door policy,” China is now an integral part of the world economy. Deng and Zheng argue that a high degree of interdependence between China and the world economy means that China is now an important link in the entire chain of global capitalism. Many factors including the colossal size of its population, its devel-

Introduction  11 opmental potential, and the speedy expansion of both demand and supply have enabled China to influence the world economy; Deng and Zheng also analyze how China has been reshaping it in the past decade. Amongst other mechanisms, they focus on the “China factors” in reshaping the East Asian production system, the role of China in the global trade system, and the global impact of China’s outflow investment and its growing domestic demands. Some scholars would argue from a strategic perspective that the Chinese government has strategically expanded China’s external influence to establish a new international order that is in China’s interest. However, by looking at the issue from an economic point of view, Deng and Zheng point out that China’s expanding role in the world economy has been mainly driven by “invisible hands” (market forces), without a strategic plan on the part of the government. Nevertheless, they also recognize that the “invisible hands” are not without problems in the world market, and that sometimes political interference becomes necessary. This is reflected in the massive efforts made by the Chinese leadership in pursuing a policy of “going global” (zou chuqu). To become a global power, China certainly cannot rely on its economic power alone, and many severe external constraints will have to be overcome by noneconomic factors. China’s practice of “resource diplomacy” in recent years is a good example. Globalization has enabled China to expand its external influence, at least in economic terms. The rise of China seems to have become a hot issue across different international communities. As mentioned earlier, some regard it as a threat whereas others see it as an opportunity; but globalization has also brought enormous challenges to China. In his chapter, Zhang Yongjin examines how globalization has challenged Chinese views of the emerging global order. Zhang observes that the re-emergence of China has been facilitated by China’s opportune positioning of itself to cultivate the opportunities provided by the transformation of the global strategic landscape and accelerated economic globalization. Yet behind China’s development and implementation of its global and regional policies are a range of diverse, and often contentious, discourses that reflect the intellectual disorientation of Chinese academics and policy establishments, as well as their grappling with the new features of the global political and economic order at the beginning of the twenty-first century. So, to understand China’s role in the international order, it is important to see how the contending views about the changing international system within Chinese policy and academic communities compete with each other, how contentious discourses within China have shaped the Chinese evaluation and understanding of the regional and global transformation of international relations, and how China views the coming global order. In examining these key questions, Zhang takes an outside-in approach and focuses on the evolving discourses and debates in China on global changes that center on three analytical concepts: power, security, and globalization. According to Zhang, these discourses shape and are shaped by central policy concerns of the Chinese state. Increasingly, these discourses are fraught with competing images, contradictory assessments, and diverse policy prescriptions. Such Chinese discourses, contentions, practices, and ideas constitute an

12  Wang and Zheng indispensable part of the reconstruction, reconstitution, and reproduction of the emerging global order. Needless to say, Zhang’s analysis also confirms our observation that different actors within China have attempted to reshape the international order through their influence on the Chinese state. In Zheng’s case it is different forms of nationalist forces, and in Zhang’s case it is different discursive communities. We thus believe that it will be useful to look at domestic sources or disaggregate things that are otherwise perceived as a unified analytic unit, such as nationalism, foreign policy discourse, and even the state itself. Globalization has brought China and the world together. When China joins global governance, it brings about not only changes but also challenges to the existing global order. Uncertainties often rise between China and the international order, which are mutually transformative; whilst China tries to reshape the world, the world also tries to reshape China. Gerald Chan examines the changing relations between China and global governance, placing much emphasis on China’s relations with the US – given the fact that the US is the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War. Chan implicitly suggests that the future international order will be, to a large extent, decided by the development of Sino-US relations. This is indeed reflected in the amount of effort that China has spent in developing relations with the US; since the end of the Cold War, China regards its relations with the US as the key to its overall structure of international relations. China’s relations with other powers are, more or less, affected by its considerations about Sino-US relations. It is undoubtedly a regrettable reality. Accordingly, Chan asks two levels of question. At the first level: Is China changing from a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system to a “coarchitect” with the US in establishing a new world order? Or is China posing a direct challenge to American supremacy in world affairs? At the second level: Is China “in” or “out” of the “international community” currently dominated by the West? How can we make a meaningful assessment of China’s evolving role in global governance? Based on all empirical evidence, Chan does not find it easy to give firm answers to these questions. There is no lack of evidence, but all evidence is subject to different interpretations. Overall, instead of giving us certainties about China’s relations with the international order, Chan has presented us with many stimulating questions that will be likely to arise in the future, as China’s relations with the international order evolve.

China and regionalism Regionalism also provides a means for China and the outside world to interact with and transform each other. Although regionalism and globalization often overlap, their strategic weights in China’s international relations are greatly different. To a large degree, regionalism is far more strategically significant than globalization. Ever since the reform and open door policy, the Chinese leadership has placed much emphasis on improving China’s relations with its neighbors. It is understandable since the leadership’s only stated strategy is to create a peaceful external environment for the country’s domestic development.

Introduction  13 As in the case of globalization, regionalism has also changed China’s international relations practice. In his chapter, Gordon Cheung attempts to examine China’s regional behavior from the three mainstream international relations theories, namely the theory of hegemonic stability, the neoliberal regional development theory, and constructivism. Cheung finds that, whereas each theory can explain a part of Chinese regionalism, Chinese experiences have also posed challenges to these well-established theories in the West. In other words, these theories can hardly give a satisfactory explanation of Chinese regionalism. Such an uneasy fit between the existing international relations theories and China’s experiences does, indeed, mean that scholars in the field of China studies can make significant contributions to the existing literature on international relations studies. In Cheung’s study, he attempts to make a contribution by focusing on what he calls “culturally embedded soft power” when analyzing how China claims its entitlement to a great power in East Asia. If China does not practice regionalism in accordance with any standard international relations theory, it has definitely learned from other powers with rich experiences of regionalism. Jean-Pierre Cabestan examines how China has attempted to learn from the European Union (EU) in practicing multilateralism. Since the end of the Cold War, China has become increasingly active in international forums such as the United Nations, or the World Trade Organization (WTO), and shown a clear willingness to join multilateral agreements in the wider area (nonproliferation, peacekeeping). China has a particularly strong interest in the EU, believing that closer EU–China relations would help to weaken the influence of the United States, the only superpower, in international affairs, and shape a more multipolar world. China also has a strong belief in the multilateral mechanisms put into place by the EU, in particular in the last decade or so. For many in China, the EU has become a model for settling international disputes, and a model from which other parts of the world should learn. China has tried to learn from the EU in a wide range of policy areas. However, as Cabestan points out, learning from the EU has had only a very partial and selective impact on China’s foreign policy, with the EU model’s influence being far from comprehensive. There are ambiguities in China’s vision of Europe, ambiguities stemming from China’s own international priorities. For instance, China’s ambition to become a world power able to balance the US can clash with a diplomacy based on multilateralism and regional integration. There are positive forces driving China to learn from the EU. The impact of globalization and economic interdependence has gradually influenced China’s foreign policy, and persuaded its practitioners to develop a more positive attitude towards multilateralism. The evolution of Chinese society and polity has also played its role in gradually opening up China to the existing international mechanisms. In practicing multilateral regionalism, China can learn from others, but does not have a standard model to copy. China’s path towards multilateralism has been characterized by ‘learning by doing’. The importance is that, once China realized the advantages of multilateralism, it became active in organizing it. In the early

14  Wang and Zheng days China was reluctant to accept multilateralism but in recent years China seems to have become a proactive force in promoting it on the world stage, especially in East Asia. In doing so, China has met with success in some cases, but it has encountered great difficulty in others. In his chapter on Northeast Asian regionalism, Jaewoo Choo discusses the difficulties that three major powers, namely China, Japan, and South Korea, face in practicing multilateral regionalism, with a particular emphasis on the role of China in this process. Although great efforts have been made to build multilateral regionalism in Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, there is not yet anything substantial or substantive in place in terms of framework, orientation, or direction. Moreover, regionalism in Northeast Asia seems to have lost interest on the part of the regional states, as it is seemingly merging with that of Southeast Asia in the form of East Asian regionalism. Choo argues, and most scholars would agree, that the primary reason for the lack of development of regionalism in Northeast Asia is the absence of confidence and trust among the regional states. Despite some concrete initiatives and progress, the region has not been able to overcome conventional impediments such as discrepancies in economic development, differences in social and political systems, ideology, and historical problems. China has played an important role in developing regionalism in the region. Beginning in the late 1990s, China started to adopt in its foreign policy some concrete measures to forge regionalism. Although China succeeded in advancing regionalism in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, for example, its achievements are not particularly visible in Northeast Asia. Choo believes that the problem with China is its lack of diplomatic efforts, discipline, and thereby commitment to solving all impediments facing regionalism in the region. China has made greater efforts to become a responsible actor in sustaining the Six-Party Talks, measures that are undoubtedly conducive to advancing regionalism. However, China is also regarded in South Korea as distorting the history of some regional states that are adverse to the development of regionalism in the region. Choo here refers to China’s Northeast Asia Project, which involves the history of Korea’s ancient kingdom, Koguryo, and which has triggered nationalistic emotions in both China and South Korea in recent years. Choo’s case shows that it is not easy for China to be a responsible power and play an important role in promoting multilateralism in the region. When China acts, it has to take others’ interests, be they material or ideational, into account. To be realistic, no regionalism has been built without enormous difficulties. China has also had successful experience in promoting regionalism from scratch. One example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a case described by Pan Guang. The SCO brings together China, Russia, and Central Asian states for the first time in history in a multilateral mechanism of regional security and economic and cultural cooperation. In the process of promoting the SCO, China has played a key role and served as a major driving force, and seems to have been greatly motivated in this case. Although the initial goal of the SCO was to counter terror-

Introduction  15 ism by engaging in joint action among the member states, the scope of the SCO has been rapidly expanded in recent years. With its rapid economic growth, and particularly with the further development of its western region and accelerating demand for energy, Central Asia is becoming strategically significant for China. The SCO has enabled China to develop ties – security, political, economic, and cultural – with the region, and thus created an institutional means for China to play an active and constructive role there. Multilateral cooperation within the multilateral framework makes it possible for China to avoid frictions with its neighbors whilst preserving and pursuing its own national interests. Pan cautions us that, although China has been a major force in driving forward the SCO process, it does not mean that China has been dominating or leading that process. Indeed, it is also worth noting that the SCO faces increasingly greater challenges; whilst it empowers China and other member states, it also creates uncertainties for other major powers such as the US and EU. How the SCO can, or does, play a role in China’s Great Power politics is still a big question to be answered. The development of China–ASEAN relations is another case that demonstrates how China deals with multilateral regionalism in Asia. In contrast to both Northeast Asian regionalism and the SCO, ASEAN had developed into a highly institutionalized regional organization before China came to engage with it. In this case, China’s strategy has been different: Having chosen to join the existing multilateral regional organizations first, China gradually learned how to participate actively within them. This case also shows that a multilateral regional institution (ASEAN) can shape the behavior of a big power (China). In his chapter, Sheng Lijun examines this complicated relationship between China and ASEAN. The China–ASEAN relationship has improved greatly since both started to engage with each other more than ten years ago. Many scholars would suggest that the China–ASEAN relationship is China’s most successful story in practicing multilateralism, since China has expanded its influence in the region through ASEAN as a regional organization. Whilst this is true, Sheng cautions us that, compared with ASEAN’s relations with other extra-regional powers, China’s effort is far from transforming the regional strategic balance. China has gained influence in Southeast Asia in recent years, but ASEAN’s relations with other extra-regional major powers remain robust. Sheng tells us that, for the foreseeable future, China lacks the economic, social and strategic bases to tip the balance. Should China’s goals remain modest, its relations with ASEAN are likely to remain vigorous. If it seeks to press too hard, however, it risks a strong backlash from not only ASEAN countries but also extra-regional powers.

China and international relations studies With its rise, China is becoming an increasingly important actor in international affairs. Accordingly, understanding China’s international behavior has become a major task for the academic community. Some scholars have begun to integrate China into mainstream international relations studies, others attempt to form new concepts to analyze China’s international behavior, and still others, especially

16  Wang and Zheng scholars in China, want to see the formation of a Chinese school of international relations studies. However, it seems that all such entrepreneurial efforts are not without serious challenges. In his chapter on Chinese realism, Anthony Loh provides a critique of Iain Alastair Johnston’s efforts in constructing Chinese realism, something that Johnston subjected to a major exercise of re-interpretation in his book Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (1995). Certainly, Johnston shows how modern international relations methodologies can be used to re-interpret Chinese foreign relations behavior; in his case, Chinese behavior during the Ming dynasty. Such an experiment is very fruitful. But Loh cautions us that to use the existing international relations methodologies, which were developed in interpreting international relations in the West, to interpret Chinese history or explain Chinese international behavior could lead to faulty conclusions. Loh questions whether there was in fact a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik, or, if there was, whether it took a very different form from the Western tradition. Loh notices that Johnston made some methodological errors, and questions, amongst other things, his choice of texts, which were mainly drawn from the Warring States period. Loh queries whether Johnston had wrongly played down factors such as the Han dissemination of Confucian orthodoxy, which provided the ideological context for the incipient development of what might be called a Chinese theory of Realpolitik. Loh also points out that a misinterpretation of Chinese history or Chinese international behavior could lead to some policy implications for contemporary international security and for the future of US–China relations. It is not an easy enterprise for scholars in the West to apply existing mainstream international relations methodologies in order to explain Chinese international behavior; this is also true for scholars inside China, when they attempt to apply the concepts based on Western international relations experiences. In past years, mainstream international relations studies, especially these developed in the US, have become increasingly attractive to scholars in China – once a new concept is developed in the West, Chinese scholars are ready to apply it to China without questioning too much whether the concept is applicable to China; although in the West the well-developed discipline does not allow any unexamined and tested concept to gain popularity, yet in China a new concept can immediately gain popularity in academic circles. As Chinese scholars face more and more problems when they apply the mainstream international theories or concepts to analyze China’s international behavior, they begin to question whether they should continue to do so. In recent times, there has been an increasingly strong call to establish a Chinese school of international relations studies; in his chapter, Ren Xiao examines efforts by Chinese scholars to develop such a school. Ren himself has been a part of the debate and a strong proponent of a Chinese school. According to him, there has emerged a consensus in China, that Chinese scholars should make the necessary efforts to build a Chinese school of international relations. The development of such a consciousness on the one hand implies that Chinese scholars are aware of the problems in applying Western theories

Introduction  17 and concepts to China; and on the other hand, it shows the self-confidence of the Chinese scholars and their aspirations to become producers of knowledge. Ren observes that, so far, scholars who are making efforts to build a Chinese school have mainly focused on the four key issues: the possibility and necessity of a Chinese school, what its core question should be, the debate of “scientific vs. humanistic” approaches, as well as how to mine the broad and profound intellectual and cultural resources that China has. Needless to say, and as Ren recognizes, developing a Chinese school of international relations is not without controversy even among Chinese scholars. To develop a Chinese school does not mean that Chinese scholars can construct it by solely relying on the Chinese culture. Culture is important but culture is also subject to changes; this is especially true in an age of globalization and regionalism. So, when Chinese scholars try to develop a Chinese school of international relations, they will have to reflect changing state behavior on the one hand, and to engage in dialogue with scholars in the West and elsewhere on the other. As discussed earlier, the role of China in international affairs is open to change, according to its changing internal and external environment. The relationship between China and the international order is a process of continuous interaction; similarly, developing a Chinese school of international relations is also a continuous process of open dialogue between Chinese scholars and scholars in the rest of the world, and between Chinese civilization and other civilizations.

Notes 1 John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). 2 Zheng Bijian, Lun Zhongguo heping jueqi fazhan xin daolu (Peaceful Rise: China’s New Road to Development) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2005).

Part I

Key issues in conceptualizing Chinese international relations

1 China and the international order Some historical perspectives Wang Gungwu

Is there an international order? There have long been calls that China should play by the rules of the international order. There are still those who believe that “China is failing to meet its full potential as a responsible player on the global stage” although the general impression today is that China is following most of the norms of international practice.1 What is now open to debate is the reality and the meaning of international order. There have been several reports on United Nations reform, perhaps the most controversial being those concerning the Security Council that could profoundly change the nature of that institution. Also, recent studies on humanitarian interventionism and the advantages and disadvantages of imperial traditions, not least about the United States invasion of Iraq and the speculations about US plans for similar invasion elsewhere, have highlighted some new uncertainties. All the same, in broad terms, there is agreement that the framework of the post-World War II international institutions established by the victors of that war still serves as the basis for international order.2 The Republic of China was part of that new system in 1945 and appreciated its place among the Great Powers. After 1949, however, the People’s Republic of China, which forced the Kuomintang leaders to retreat to Taiwan, was denied a place in that framework. It was not until October 1971 that the United Nations General Assembly finally adopted the resolution “that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.” Until then, the PRC had every reason to criticize the structure that excluded it from participation but, more than that, it spent the 22 years hoping to find something that would replace it.3 After the Beijing government became the only lawful representative of China to the UN in 1971, the situation changed. Teams of mainland Chinese officials and scholars have been operating in all the organizations created within that framework, often with increasing skill and sophistication. But it was not until after the end of the Cultural Revolution that attitudes towards the UN really changed and Chinese diplomats began to engage actively at all levels of that vast organization. In turn, teams from the UN agencies and the World Bank began working in various parts of China as their experts helped the PRC economy change from

22  Wang a centrally planned one to one that adapted itself to the needs and demands of a global market. From the outside looking and working inwards, these teams have systematically introduced new views of what the rest of the world expects and the mechanisms that made China’s economic development possible. Although initially they did meet with inertia, suspicion, and resistance, in many cases they were astonished how willingly and quickly the Chinese mastered what all the agencies had to offer. Many of these experts then reported on their experiences and helped the world understand how China was thus being transformed. In time, large numbers of Chinese officials also got used to looking out from inside with that point of view and learned to master the rhetoric and practices that governed that international system. As they did so, they became increasingly confident that the system could be used to work for them.4 It may be said that the Chinese have done more than just keep to the rules governing international relations as they saw them. In some instances, China could even be more purist than some of the older members of the United Nations. One notable example of how this impacts on perceptions about China’s behavior is its stance towards being a status quo power. Unlike the early years from 1949 till the 1990s, when China seemed keen to change any “status quo” position that was not in its favor, China now behaves much more like a status quo power that wants to keep national borders and regimes and all the global structures more or less the way they are. Increasingly, most UN members accept that this is the new norm in Chinese international behavior. In contrast, it is the United States position. that it is ready to intervene unilaterally in other countries’ affairs, that has been subject to critical examination, not least within the US. China has long voiced its opposition to that principle and its views have been echoed by others that share its concerns. This is not to say that China is more trusted than the United States in international affairs, simply that, on this and similar issues, China’s low-key support for national sovereignty has won it many friends.5 China now appears to be one of the strongest supporters of the 60-year-old framework that most people still believe should be the foundations of international order. But there are reasons to wonder whether China is really committed to this historic framework. It has often seen the United Nations unable to respond to critical power shifts in various parts of the world, or prevent violations of the sovereignty of weaker countries by their stronger neighbors, or help economic development in poorer societies, or save lives in man-made conflicts and natural disasters. China is therefore not confident that that the system of international law and norms really works. Therefore, China can be seen as being simply realistic, if not cynical, when it uses the dominant framework to protect and advance its own national interest. There may be not much faith in the system, and little readiness to go out its way in its defense. However, from all the evidence so far, the Chinese will support the present system as long as it suits them. When comparing outside-in and inside-out views about China’s place in that international order, it is pertinent to ask if the two sets of views have converged, and to ask if more predictable attitudes now serve as a functioning guide to China’s thinking and actions. It is not easy to determine the exact relationship

China and the international order  23 between how the Chinese see themselves and how others see their actions. From inside looking out, it does seem that key Chinese leaders and thinkers take as their starting point the deep structure that gave shape to the civilization and state that came to being over 3,500 years ago. They have turned regularly to all the historical experiences that they had in dealing with external powers since the beginning and then to their more recent introduction to a Western-dominated world. It is possible to find some consistent underlying themes in these experiences. As for outside views looking in at China, they would have a more complex pedigree. The pedigree ranges widely. For example, the various tribal federations in the steppes of Mongolia and Xinjiang saw China differently from those who came from the forests of Manchuria, and differently again from those who attacked from the high lands of the Tibetan plateau. These attacks on Chinese civilization from several directions are clearly different from aggressive European trading nations coming by sea since the sixteenth century, and even more so from the modern Japanese and Russian efforts to dismember the Qing empire and the successor Republic of China. Clearly the most important issues here are problems of political power and external relations in the new international order. What China has been doing in foreign relations cannot be separated from two underlying factors. One is that there has been a long tradition of thinking strategically among both civil and military leaders that still guides the Chinese leaders and is likely to continue to do so for a long while. The other is a fundamental idea in Chinese thinking, the prevalence and inevitability of change, something like, “the only proposition that does not change is that everything else is subject to change.” It stems from the Book of Change, the nearest thing to a universal guide to Chinese thought and action ever since their civilization emerged some 5,000 years ago.6 With this long continuous history, there has been ample evidence to support the proposition and enjoin Chinese leaders to be prepared for further changes, although there are many examples where the rulers have failed to be practice the necessary alertness. The strategic thinking originates from the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the most creative era in Chinese history. It was during this period of 300 years from the sixth to the third century bc that the leaders of multiple states sought advice from ministers, officials, and philosophers about the secrets of victory, survival, and defeat. The crucial question for each state was: How could each deal with the endless power shifts of that long period? The trend turned out to be in one direction only – the reduction of the number of states over the centuries, from hundreds of them until only seven warring states were left, and then finally there was only one left, the state of Qin. Its ruler claimed to be the Son of Heaven and, as Son of Heaven, he had the sole right to rule over tianxia (All Under Heaven), something like a civilization-based empire. The strategic thinkers of that period worked out all varieties of plots, conspiracies, and planning devices and left behind valuable ideas as well a rich body of data to assist future generations to map out the features for the next stage of strategic thinking.7 This change began with a different premise, that is, to avoid invading and swallowing up any more neighboring states beyond the edges of the realm but

24  Wang to ensure that the tianxia-state (or civilization-based empire) could be kept intact as long as possible, and possibly grow on the margins. For the Qin-Han and successor dynasties, this was neither an international order nor even an imperial order that their mandarins and generals were asked to establish and protect. The focus shifted among them to the values that centuries of interactions among the states had molded together into an integrated whole, something recognized by the political elites as greater and more precious than the fates of kings, emperors, and even dynasties. Thus the Son of Heaven was not merely a king or emperor but also the symbol of the system of values that made the Chinese what they were. When they compared the Son of Heaven to the one and only sun in the sky, they were using the most powerful man and his dynasty to symbolize that civilization. This resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of a dynastic head and the oligarchy that supported him and has led to fateful and disastrous results for the Chinese people.8 Nevertheless, the Confucian mandarins, who believed that only this kind of order and authority could embody their faith in China’s civilizational core, accepted that it was the price that had to be paid. For the Chinese, the principle of always being ready for change did not mean that things changed frequently, and certainly not that things changed rapidly. It was primarily an expectation that things will change and can change unexpectedly, even with values and institutions that people might have assumed would be absolute and unchanging. Flowing from this came the injunction that no one should expect anything to remain permanent, and this served as a deep structure in Chinese attitudes towards life and applied no less to the idea of an international order. The Chinese have never viewed any political order as permanent, least of all that it could be equally good over time for the polities that the order embraced. Everything in their history has taught them that a good institution or a good idea was something they should make use of as best they could while it lasted. At most, if what was there suited their interests, Chinese leaders would work to prolong its existence as long as possible and even help make improvements so that they could continue to benefit from it. But they would expect it to change and, not being progress-minded throughout their history, the changes need not necessarily be for the better. In that context, what China sees today is not an international order at all, least of all the international order, but merely the product of the struggles among the Great Powers of half a century ago. In confirming the principle of the equality of sovereign states as well as the ideal of universally applied international laws and norms, this is a distinct improvement on the previous experiment with the League of Nations. But the reality was that Great Powers were always more equal and would continue to prevail. Such a system is necessarily imperfect because the power relationships after 1945 were based on the patchy decolonization of former empires that was quickly followed by the Cold War and the “central balance” of two ideological superpowers that dominated the world for the next forty years. That has further changed so that there is now only one super-superpower, and the Chinese are unlikely to see this as something unchanging forever. The system devised in 1945 obviously cannot be the same for the rest of the

China and the international order  25 twenty-first century. Therefore, China expects there to be reforms but it also knows that the efforts to reform will be arduous and that the results cannot always be satisfactory. Any reform is likely to be encouraging to some and despairing to others. The Chinese will work hard to ensure that, when the reform takes place, it will be to enhance and not weaken China’s place in the world. In the meantime, the status quo is of value and, if they learn to use it even more fully than they already do, they will try hard to defend it. One in-built feature of the system that fits their present “grand strategy” is the structure of the Security Council itself, with five permanent members who have veto powers. It lays the foundation for the multipolar world that they believe would ultimately be more stable than a unipolar one. That would have the added advantage of making China’s place in the world more secure.9 It is, of course, not clear that these aspects of China’s cultural heritage are viable when the whole world has fundamentally changed. But many features in China’s recent history confirm the wisdom of the ancients even as the ground rules of globalization have taken the Chinese far from their historical roots of focusing their power concerns merely within their region. A brief survey of their experiences this past century lends support to the strategic thinking they inherited and even more to their realistic expectations of change and their reasonable hope that future change from any source and direction could bring them new advantages.

What the idea of international order means for China Four stages in China’s gradual enlightenment about a new world order can be discerned. Each could have threatened the complete destruction of their previous assumptions about the world but each seems also to have led the Chinese to adapt themselves better to changing pressures and challenging new worldviews. Ultimately, each also encouraged them to look at their own traditions of thinking and acting when facing dangerous conditions. The four stages in the modern period began with the second half of the nineteenth century. The outcome of the two Opium Wars challenged China’s ideas about external order, but it was not yet taken seriously as a permanent change in what the Chinese had been used to. They were reluctant to recognize that a new kind of imperial order had arrived in China’s neighborhood and that this could totally replace the system of tributary relationships that they had employed for over 1,000 years. China did recognize that there was a new order consisting of Great Powers dominating the world. All of them were empires or aspiring empires, although several of the European powers were, in their own eyes, primarily nation-states. For the Chinese, there was nevertheless a hierarchy of states, and those Great Powers that impinged on China included empires, and powers that aspired to be empires. The Chinese also saw that some of them were too small to be empires, and that these were supported by a system that subscribed to the idea of “sovereignty.” As for all other polities, they were not nation-states at all but were colonies, protectorates, tribal chiefdoms, etc. under the rule of one or other of the Great Powers. In any case, Qing China saw itself as one of the Great Powers that

26  Wang was also an empire (in their own terms, tianxia yitong) and that China was equal to the other Great Powers. Nevertheless, the Chinese mandarins did see that the Great Powers operating in China’s Treaty Ports were empires that challenged how Qing China saw the world. Confident of its traditional system, China did not see the need to change very much. Order was based on realistic appraisals of power accompanied by a vision or ideal of harmony, order and stability. In fact, Western European nations had evolved for themselves a Westphalian states system that was increasingly shaped by national consciousness and a participatory citizenry in new kinds of “nation-states.” As a result, what emerged was something the Chinese were not familiar with: the new national empires, that is empires not based on feudal and military successes alone but established for trading advantages and backed by national pride and superiority. The new idea was that nation-states were more efficient institutions for building future empires. Countries like the Netherlands, Britain, and France achieved this, and the model was greatly admired by the newly emerging German and Italian nations. But the Chinese were not impressed. An “old imperial order,” notably the Chinese, Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires, were still there, although they were being challenged by the new empires of the British and French, which were followed by other European powers and also the modern expansionist state of Meiji imperial Japan. Qing China was not ready to learn new lessons yet. The next stage came quickly soon after, following China’s defeat by Japan in 1894–95. They then realized how serious the earlier challenge had been, but by that time its idea of tianxia expressed abroad through tributary relationships had disappeared. The defeat by Japan shattered the illusion that China’s predicament was only temporary and that the Chinese still had time to adapt to the new reality without loss of power and prestige in the region. There then followed a period of great confusion and instability, not least in Europe among the Great Powers themselves. The reality was that there was no accepted international order or norms. From the end of the nineteenth century to World War I, the rivalry and competition for power was intense, as new powers refused to accept a global status quo that was determined by the imperial interests of Britain, France, and Russia. Aspiring empires challenged them not only in Asia and Africa but also ultimately in Europe itself. A new generation of Chinese diplomats and international lawyers began to recognize that China’s weakness was obvious to all, especially after the combined allied forces marched into Peking to lift the siege of the legations there. These diplomats worked hard to try and fit China into that competitive world as an equal, but even that became increasingly difficult when there was no order within China itself after the fall of the Manchu dynasty.10 The new republic after 1912 was soon in a state of civil war, compounded by Japanese interventions and invasions, that lasted nearly 40 years, until 1949. If the Chinese had any illusions about China being an equal of the other Great Powers, they had long been shattered by the Versailles Treaty of 1919. The League of Nations emerged from the end of World War I, and again the

China and the international order  27 Chinese government in Beijing, and then that in Nanjing, found this to have been an ineffectual symbol of international order. China completely lost faith in it after the League failed to stop the Japanese from creating the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Soviet Revolution that enabled Mongolia to come under Russian domination was a further complication. Also, nothing could stop further Japanese encroachments on Chinese territory, and the Sino-Japanese war became inevitable. In addition, the postwar “order” failed to prevent World War II. All these the Chinese observed with increasing skepticism about any kind of international order. Was this all they learned? Their hopes were actually raised for a while after the Allies won the war in 1945. The thinking behind the postwar success in creating the United Nations impressed the Nationalist government when it returned to Nanjing. Many Chinese leaders began to think that a new international order was now possible in which China would have an important place. Their diplomats had tried to fight what they considered to have been “unequal treaties” and skillfully used the language of national equality to defend the country’s sovereignty. Of particular importance was the territorial integrity of the Qing imperial borders as the basis of the new Chinese nation-state. They expected the new order to recognize those borders. The success of the Kuomintang government there was central to the Chinese acceptance of the new order.11 Thus the Chinese had some short-lived moments of euphoria. The early postwar years turned out to be an unstable interlude. A decisive change followed when the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war in 1949. The ideological Cold War and the two-superpowers order, in Chinese eyes, placed the superpowers above and outside any international order, especially after the Korean War. Mao Zedong spoke of tianxia daluan (the world in great disorder).12 What passed for order was unacceptable and it was in China’s interest to reject the “system” as it was and work towards its overthrow or replacement. In fact, there was real fear of returning to the helplessness of the previous half-century and being caught between two superpowers. In order to defend against that fate and survive “the great disorder,” Maoist China thus used the principles of equality and sovereignty very vigorously. At the same time, China looked for alternatives, for example at the Bandung Conference and with the non-aligned movement; the Third World of new allies; an authentic Chinese revolutionary voice; and a “third force” that was autonomous between the superpowers.13 What the Chinese learned yet again was that China could not depend on other Great Powers. It had to think through its own strategic interests first and try to influence whatever operational systems there were. This remained true under Deng Xiaoping till the end of the Cold War in 1991. The fourth stage since the 1990s I have outlined earlier and will not repeat here, except to suggest that the Chinese leaders today draw strongly from the experiences of the first three stages and now face the challenge of integrating both the inside-out and outside-in views that they had encountered, with what they still consider valid in their heritage.

28  Wang

What about the future? Let me quote an article by Joseph Nye from Foreign Affairs, July 2003, summarizing the neoconservative worldview that surfaced in 2001. This view “argued for a ‘new unilateralism’, one in which the United States refuses to play the role of a “docile international citizen” and unashamedly pursues its own ends. For most analysts, unilateralism and multilateralism are simply two ends of a spectrum of diplomatic tactics; few leaders follow one or the other approach exclusively. But the new unilateralists go a step further. They believe that today Washington faces new threats of such dire nature that it must escape the constraints of the multilateral structures it helped build after World War II. . . . They would like to reverse Dean Acheson’s famous title and be ‘present at the destruction.’ ”14 The new order described here is based on superior military power, as contrasted with the weak United Nations-based international community that is unable to impose order on the world. What is needed is a “competent hegemony” by a strong responsible power, one that could protect the world from anarchy. The Chinese can understand that when it is placed in a defensive context, as China has done in the past when dealing with neighboring states within the Chinese orbit, when there was no question of embarking on ambitious and expansionist ventures. At bottom, however, the Chinese do not believe that a system devised to serve the interests of a single superpower can be stable for long. On the other hand, China does not wish to challenge that power, or expect any other power to do so.15 What then does China see as the crucial structures for a more orderly world? China’s strategic experience before and after the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has led them to focus on three major strands that are already in the “system” today. What the Chinese hope is to support these three existing frameworks by strengthening them with their contributions wherever they can. The three strands are: 1 a balanced and restraining multipolar system; 2 a rule-based global market economy, one that is increasingly interdependent at more and more levels; 3 a world of modern, rational, and “secular” civilizations. Enough has been said above about the first strand, but it is pertinent to underline the fact that the Chinese recognize the United Nations Security Council permanent members as something that could provide a workable model for that future multipolar world. The Chinese seem committed to making their contributions towards helping that structure become more effective. The second strand also does not need elaboration. The economic rise of China during the last two decades has been analyzed and dissected enough, and extravagant hopes and fears have filled volumes to date, and one can expect many more studies on the subject. China’s inputs towards the rule-based global market economy are still marginal. But a united and stable China, with prosperity added to its size and huge human resources, must in the longer run make important contributions to the health of the world economy. What is clear is that China has

China and the international order  29 joined other East Asian economies, notably South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, in offering alternative routes to development that have worked better than those offered by the World Bank–IMF models, or at least can offer some more nuanced ways to stimulate and sustain development. A bigger role for the visible hand to help and guide “the invisible hand” of the market is already widely accepted. Although China’s own official hands are not always that visible, the role of the state in economic reforms has, on the whole, been a positive one. China now conforms to the principle that a careful strategic nurturing of a country’s long-term national self-interest is conducive to growth.16 It is certainly determined to ensure its own development by making strong inputs to a peaceful geopolitical environment. If that succeeds, the model it offers to the developing world may well have many more takers. Finally, the third and least certain, and for now the most improbable of the three strands, is the idea that the world should consist of modern, rational, and “secular” civilizations. This is what Chinese leaders would like to see. This is partly because it would confirm China’s historic place in world history, and partly because they know that, if such a world of several respected civilizations can be produced, their people would also be better and happier people. Also, China can then make distinctive inputs by integrating modern progressive values into its own deep structures of social morality, and in turn have something to offer the world. From the optimistic and persistent efforts to keep cultural and civilizational issues alive in China today, many of the new Chinese elites are able to articulate the following approaches towards a modern, rational, and “secular” world: 1 Return to key features of the neo-Confucian heritage, with Confucianism at its core, and Buddhism, Daoism, and their popular products engaging the majority of the people. The word “rational” is at the core of this heritage and it accounts for the speed at which modern science was internalized by almost everybody during the twentieth century. 2 China’s “secularism” should really be described as this-worldly because there was never the kind of church–state separation that the West experienced that made the world “secular” appropriate. China’s faiths tend to stress humanistic rationality that is compatible with the enlightenment histories experienced by the other four powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In other words, the Chinese see their civilization as comparable, if not equal and similar, to the others. They believe that there are no serious obstacles to absorbing modern values; in addition, the Chinese have distinctive communitarian values as well as family-based ideals to offer to strengthen modern civilization.17 3 Modernity conforms to the principle of change that underlines all Chinese thought, and change is a source of strength for civilizations to grow and mature. But the changes China experienced in the past hundred years resulted in great civilizational losses as well as gains. Perhaps the most significant was that China lost three generations of thinkers and transmitters during

30  Wang the twentieth century. Then, after that, the survivors went on to lose faith in the Maoist ideals of revolution that were supposed to replace the earlier heritage. How can they now be sure that present and future changes will not erode further the continuities that their civilization needs in order to preserve its authenticity and self-respect? The Chinese know that they need cultural ballast if they are to assess the value of what they receive from outside.18 They will need that all the more if they hope to contribute anything valuable to the international order. It may seem like wishful thinking but, if an international order does not help provide civilizational alternatives for a new China, even greater losses lie in wait ahead. On balance, after 150 years of interactions, the Chinese have integrated outside and inside views sufficiently to begin to make contributions to a future international order. How far they succeed will not, however, depend on them alone. In the years to come, China must further prepare to make their modes of operation abroad credible and inspiring. It has a long way to go before it can make its offerings to a stable and peaceful order truly attractive. But many Chinese leaders seem to be determined to work for an international order that can enhance their security and welfare and ensure that China deserves a leadership role in that order.

Notes 1 Statement of Vice Chairman Carolyn Bartholomew, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Annual Report to Congress, November 2006. This acknowledges that there have been changes in China’s policies toward international organizations, but suggests that more can be done. Some of the changes in Chinese practice since the end of the 1970s are examined by Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans: “China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, ed., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999). 2 Among the recent reports on United Nations reform, one stands out that captures the extent of dissatisfaction with the current system: “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters,” 59th Session, agenda item 53, dated 6 July 2005. For a concise discussion of issues arising from humanitarian intervention, Rosemary Foot, “Introduction,” in Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell, ed., Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 3 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, 25 October 1971; Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiaoshi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi 1949–1979 (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988). 4 Huang Anyu, Xin Zhongguo waijiao shi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005). 5 Guo Shuyong, “Lun hepingfazhan jinchengzhong de zhongguo daguoxingxiang,” Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping lilunyanjiu (Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping theories), 11, 51–6. (2005). Also the trenchant work of Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay: America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003). 6 The most accessible translation is The Book of Change: A New Translation of the Ancient Chinese I Ching, translated by John Blofeld (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965). 7 Chan-kuo Ts’e, translated and annotated and with an introduction by James I. Crump (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, rev. edn.

China and the international order  31

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18

1996). Some of the strategies are summarized in Richard Louis Walker, The Multistate System of Ancient China (Hamden, CN: Shoe String Press, 1953). An excellent survey of the nature of Chinese imperial power can be found in Wm Theodore de Bary’s Introduction to his translation of Huang Zongxi’s Mingyi daifanglu (Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” International Security, 27 (4): 5–56 (2003). The fullest account of the efforts by two generations of Chinese diplomats may be found in Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo), Gu weijun huiyilu (Memoirs) (Beijing: Zhonghua Publishers, 1983), 10 volumes. Wu Dongzhi, ed., Zhongguo waijiaoshi: Zhonghua minguo shiqi 1911–1949 (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1990). Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Documentation Center of Chinese Communist Party (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian publishers, 1990). Wang Gungwu, “China’s Long Road to Sovereignty,” in G. Doeker-Mach and K.A. Ziegert, ed., Law and Legal Culture (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004). Joseph S. Nye quotes the words of Philip Stephens of The Financial Times, “U. S. Power and Strategy after Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, 82 (4): 64 (2003). Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Hong Kong: Joint Publishers, 1996). Wang Shaoguang has analyzed the limits of state authority in China’s economy and the impact and extent of China’s “visible hand” has to be qualified: Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001). Wang Gungwu, “Secular China,” in Gregor Benton and Hong Liu, ed., Diasporic Chinese Ventures: The Life and Work of Wang Gungwu (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). The literature on this subject is now vast. The person who captures China’s recent cultural needs movingly is Li Shenzhi, notably in the two books he completed just before his death, Nianyi shiji de yousi and Fengyu canghuang wushinian, both published by Mingbao Publishers, Hong Kong, in 2003.

2 Nationalism Dynamics of domestic transformation and international relations in China Zheng Yongnian

The scholarly community is highly divided on the role of nationalism in our daily political life. Some regard it as a source of political progress whereas others view it as a powerful force leading to political evils. James Sheehan observed that writers on nationalism can be divided into two diverse but distinguishable groups. Whereas nationalists themselves perceive nationalism as a natural, irresistible force, the critics and victims of nationalism – many of them are émigrés or exiles such as George Mosse, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson – often emphasize its historicity, artificiality, and sometimes even its pathology.1 The two different views reflected somehow different political impacts of nationalism in both domestic and international fronts. In the eighteenth century nationalism appeared in its civic and revolutionary dimension as a weapon against the Old Regime,2 and in the nineteenth century innumerable movements of national liberation appealed to nationalism in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Nationalism was connected to liberalism and political progress in many Western countries such as Great Britain, the United States, and France; it continues to be so in some developing countries, including China.3 On the other hand, nationalism has also been nightmares for many people in different historical periods. According to Dudley Seers, nationalism was “obviously evil. It had lain at the root of war. German chauvinism, in particular, had contributed to two terrible wars. Nationalist sentiment was still a menace in the second half of the twentieth century, getting in the way of the creation of a just, peaceful and prosperous world society.”4 Based on his reflections on history, Karl Popper believed that “nationalism appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic desire to be relieved from the strain of individual responsibility.”5 Similarly, according to Tom Nairn, nationalism is “the pathology of modern developmental history” with a “built-in capacity for descent into dementia.”6 For George Mosse, racism is nothing more than “a heightened nationalism.”7 Nationalism continues to affect world affairs in an age of globalization. In the 1990s, “ethnic” conflicts broke out frequently. The central African conflict between Tutsi and Hutu owed far more to the racist grid used to map the peoples of that territory than to any meaningful and long-standing cultural hatred between

Nationalism  33 people so labeled. The collapse of communism in 1989 ushered in a new wave of nationalism across the old Soviet empire which has brought many new nationstates to the world.8 The complicated nature of nationalism never stops serious scholarly explorations on this subject. With the rise of China, the scholarly interest in Chinese nationalism has been growing rapidly in the past two decades.9 As with nationalism elsewhere, China scholars have shown their deep concerns over the impacts of Chinese nationalism on both the country’s domestic and external affairs. On the external front, scholars have watched closely whether and how Chinese nationalism affects its foreign behavior. China is now an important part of the international community, and a nationalistic foreign policy will generate enormous impacts on world politics. In the scholarly community, although no causal linkage has been established between Chinese nationalism and its foreign policy, there is a consensus that Chinese nationalism has become an important factor in influencing the country’s external affairs. On the domestic front, China scholars have concerned themselves with whether the rise of different forms of nationalism will lead to a crisis of the nation-state within China. Nationalism has become a major force that facilitates collective actions and violence. Nationalism-driven collective action is a multifaceted phenomenon, ranging from peaceful demonstrations to bloody violence, and takes place at different layers of Chinese society. In some cases, collective actions are within the jurisdictions of the Chinese state such as the anti-Japanese protests, the independence movement in Xinjiang, and bottom-up social movements; but in many other cases they are beyond the reach of the Chinese state, such as protests in Hong Kong and the independence movement in Taiwan. Although these events are often triggered off by some particular forms of nationalism, they in turn have become closely linked to nationalism within China. The seemingly omnipotent Chinese state has somehow vacillated in confronting various forms of collective actions, ranging from crackdown and repression to sporadic concessions. Moreover, nationalism has become an important source of the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party. The Party could appeal to nationalism and use state violence such as the use of force and even engagement of war to reinforce its legitimacy. This is especially true in the case of the Taiwan Strait where rising Taiwanese nationalism, which has pushed the island toward a formal independence, often intensifies nationalism in the mainland. Therefore, many legitimate concerns rise: Will all these forms of nationalism weaken the Chinese state? Will China as a nation-state collapse? How will the world be affected if any of these forms of nationalism goes beyond China’s national boundary? In my early work on Chinese nationalism, I made a set of arguments on Chinese nationalism. Some major arguments are as follows. First, the Chinese state has played a key role in the formation of Chinese nationalism, and statism has been a central feature of Chinese nationalism – nationalism is to build a strong state. Second, nationalism has been an imported concept and is somehow alien to Chinese culture; it therefore can be interpreted as a reaction to some specific events within and without China. Chinese nationalism is therefore often event-driven,

34  Zheng and its meanings are embedded in various ways that nationalistic actors respond to these particular events, such as the containment of China by the West and the weakening of central power. Third, Chinese nationalism can be “decomposed” into official and popular ones. These two nationalisms overlap each other in some cases, and conflict with each other in some other cases. Fourth, the nature of Chinese nationalism is not fixed, depending on the interaction between the state and other non-state nationalistic forces, and between China and the outside world.10 In this chapter, I try to go one step ahead to conceptualize the complicated relationship between the state and nationalism and thus provide some useful clues to understand possible impacts of Chinese nationalism on its domestic and external affairs. I attempt to develop a state-in-nationalism approach. I believe that, although the Chinese state has always been a critical and direct agent of the development of Chinese nationalism, the role of the state should not be overstated. My central argument is that the Chinese state is part of nationalism; the state may help mold, but it is also continually molded by, nationalistic forces; the state and nationalistic forces are mutually transforming. I identify various nationalistic forces or these social forces with significant nationalistic meanings, and examine nationalism at the three levels, including the international, national, and societal. By so doing, I attempt to explore the dynamics of the struggles for influence over nationalism by different nationalistic forces within and without China’s national boundary and show how these nonstate nationalistic forces have constrained the state in its dealing with domestic and external affairs. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first provides a critical review of literature on the role of the state in the formation of nationalism, and then presents my own analytical framework. The second presents empirical evidence to show how different forces are struggling for influence over China’s nationalistic agenda. Following that is a conclusion on the mutual transformation of the state and nationalism and its implications for agenda-setting on the part of the state.

A state-in-nationalism approach The state matters in the rise and fall of nationalism. In most societies, there are various sources of nationalism, but the existence of these sources does not mean that nationalism or nationalistic movement is doomed to surface. The state is the most important agent in leading to the rise and fall of nationalism. In analyzing collective mobilization (of which nationalistic movement is a part), Theda Skocpol pointed to the importance of the state as variable.11 As she observes, “we can make sense of social-revolutionary transformations only if we take the state seriously as a macro-structure.”12 In the literature of nationalism, scholars such as Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Eric Hobsbawm, and John Breuilly13 have discussed how the state played an active role in the historical formation of nationalism. In his study of the state and nationalistic mobilization, Pierre Birnbaum points to the importance of the state as an independent variable. According to Birnbaum, once constructed, states seem to have their own logic, so that each type of state would seem to be an independent variable.

Nationalism  35 It is therefore in relation to its particularities that social groups are organized; henceforth, instead of explaining the type of state in terms of a particular arrangement of variables, I shall treat it as a variable which will serve to account for the behavior of groups, parties, classes and nationalist movements which are organized as a function of the type of state in relation to which they operate. Thus the logic of each state influences the mode of action of actors in “civil society;” the usual correlation is reversed.14 But the role of the state is often overstated in the state-centered approach. To emphasize the role of the state does not mean that the state is the only actor in the formulation of nationalism. The state is only one of the nationalistic forces in a given society. This study therefore tries to modify Skocpol’s arguments on the state and examines Chinese nationalism in a general framework of “state–society (other non-state nationalistic forces)” relations. Besides highlighting the role of the state in managing nationalism, this study also attempts to show how different sources of nationalism are mobilized by different actors to influence state agendas. A state-in-nationalism approach aims to remedy the tendency of overstating the role of the state in the state-centered approach. State-centered theorists have rightly pointed out that the Chinese state has been critical and direct agent of the development of Chinese nationalism throughout its modern history, but some of the conclusions on the role of the state are overstated and have misleading implications for Chinese nationalism. In the state-centered approach, Chinese nationalism is often reified and anthropomorphized and treated as a unitary actor fully manipulated by the state. The state is believed to be able to assess the role of nationalism strategically and then act accordingly to benefit its legitimacy in the eyes of its population. Unfortunately, treating nationalism this way could obscure the dynamics of the struggle for influence over nationalism by different forces within and without China’s national boundary. A state-in-nationalism approach looks at the linkages between the state and nationalism in the following way. The state is a part of nationalism Nationalism is given. It is not a matter of whether nationalism is there or not, but whether nationalism is mobilized or not. Different forms of nationalism coexist in contemporary China and they are immobile until they are mobilized by different nationalistic actors in accordance with changing political, economic, social, and cultural environments. Changes in environments create incentives for these actors to mobilize nationalism. Therefore, the Chinese state is a major nationalistic force, but not the only driving force. Many other driving forces are not necessarily in line of the state. It is important not to mistake analytic constructs, such as the central role of the state or the autonomy of the state from other nationalistic forces, for what happens in actual cases. In the real world, the Chinese state is seldom the only central actor

36  Zheng in driving nationalism, and is almost never autonomous from other nationalistic forces. Even where the state was presumed to have been dominant, the capacity of the state turns out on closer inspection to have been limited. These limits of state power, in turn, draw attention to the rich nationalistic drama that has influenced the dynamics of nationalism in China. Nationalism must be disaggregated Nationalism is a multidimensional phenomenon and can be “decomposed” into different blocks such as political, economic, social, ethnic, etc. One particular form of change in environments might be favorable to one form of nationalism, but not to other forms of nationalism. Different dimensions of nationalism reinforce each other in some cases, but might constrain one another in other cases. Such a complicated relationship among dimensions of nationalism gives leeway for the state to mange nationalism. Furthermore, nationalism means different things for different nationalistic actors, and different actors pursue different goals of nationalism within these blocks. In other words, nationalism serves different purposes for different actors. In this study, main actors include the state (central government), ethnic groups (minority peoples), domestic social classes, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. If nationalism is to be viewed in these contexts, it is important to study not only the state, but also the interactions between the state and non-state nationalistic forces. It is its engagements with and disengagements from other nationalistic forces in societal and global contexts that determine the role that nationalism plays in influencing China’s domestic and external affairs. The state and other nationalistic forces are mutually transforming A state-centered approach often sees the role of the state in the transformation of nationalism. Real-world power struggles seldom work this way. The outcomes of the interactions between the state and non-state nationalistic forces vary. Some interactions can create more power for both. Some, of course, favor one side over the other. Some vitiate the power of each side. And in still other cases, state actors ally with select nationalistic groups against other groups. The results of the engagement and disengagement of the state and other nationalist forces are tangible, even momentous, but outcomes rarely reflect the aims and wills imbedded in either. The clash of nationalistic forces, including the state, is mediated through the struggles and accommodations in numerous nationalistic arenas. These interactions cumulatively reshape the state or non-state nationalistic forces, and they are the foundation of the recursive relationship between the state and other nationalistic forces. In the multiple meeting grounds between the state and non-state nationalistic forces, some nationalistic forces have tied their own fortunes to that of the state or accepted it as the appropriate organization to represent the proper interests for all of society. In such cases, we can speak of the relationship between the state and

Nationalism  37 nationalistic forces as mutually empowering. But in many other instances, the engagement between the state and other nationalistic forces is a struggle for agency in directing future development of nationalistic agendas. Here, the struggle is one marked not by mutual empowerment but by mutually exclusive goals. Sometimes the state wins, and sometimes other non-state nationalistic forces win. The interactions between the state and other nationalistic forces can produce a range of outcomes. First, the state is able to impose its own version of nationalism on other nationalistic forces. In this case, the state successfully transforms how other nationalistic forces identify themselves. Second is state incorporation of existing nationalistic forces. This implies that the state has to adjust its nationalistic goals in order to accommodate nationalistic forces. Third, the state may fail altogether in its attempt to impose its nationalistic goals onto or accommodate other nationalistic forces. In all cases, the state and non-state nationalistic forces are transforming each other and it is in such interactions that the role of nationalism in influencing either domestic or international agendas unfolds.

The state and non-state nationalistic forces Table 2.1 summarizes major forms of nationalism in China, placing nationalism in the context of the relations between the state and non-state nationalistic forces. To a different degree, “nationalistic” spirit is embedded in different forms of nationalism, and it is more explicit in some forms of nationalism (e.g., Taiwanese nationalism and ethnic nationalism) than others (e.g., Hong Kong identity and social and liberal nationalism). Nationalism can be employed by different nationalistic actors to pursue their own (collective) self-interests. For China as a whole, its self-interest is national sovereignty and independence. For the state (or the national government), its self-interest is national unification and integration. For social classes, their selfinterests are to maximize their citizenship via political participation. For ethnic groups, their self-interests are to maintain their unique cultural identity and achieve political autonomy, and even an independent state based on their own cultural identity. For Hong Kong, its self-interest is to maintain and continuously develop its own political identity and achieve a higher degree of autonomy. For those Taiwanese who want an independent Taiwanese state, their self-interest is to maintain and develop Taiwanese identity, and to struggle for an independent Taiwanese state. Moreover, actors engage in nationalistic mobilization in different ways with each emphasizing different aspects of nationalism. Table 2.2 summarizes different actors and their weights on political, economic, and cultural dimensions of nationalism. Needless to say, how much weight an actor places on a particular aspect of nationalism is constrained by its relations to the Chinese state. For the sake of analysis, these forms of nationalism are categorized into three main layers, namely the international, national, and societal (domestic). At the international level, the nature of nationalism is about national sovereignty and independence. China scholars usually discuss Chinese nationalism at this level.

Table 2.1  Forms of nationalism: state–society convergence and divergence Context of nationalism

State–society Frames of nationalism convergence

China vs. others National sovereignty, independence, national freedom vs. others in a similar frame (e.g. Japan) Mainland vs. National unification, Taiwan sovereignty integrity vs. Taiwan secession and de jure independence Mainland vs. National integration Hong Kong vs. greater autonomy; authoritarianism vs. political liberalism Majority vs. National integration minorities vs. ethno-nationalism and national secession

Social classes vs. the state

State–society divergence

Yes: as a source of legitimacy, national pride and national mobilization Yes: as a source of legitimacy and national mobilization

Yes: as a source of anti-opening policy and irrational responses to the external world Unclear: contradiction between national unification and democracy in Taiwan

Unclear: social groups are in favor of democracy in Hong Kong Yes: interest convergence between the state and the Han majority

Yes: interest divergence between Beijing and HK people Yes: interest divergence between the state and minority groups demanding for greater autonomy, even independence Yes: social protests No: while the state Authoritarianism remains authoritarian, for equal citizenship vs. democratic political participation; social classes demand democratic social integration participation (whose vs. disintegration; nation-state?) state sovereignty vs. popular sovereignty

Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 2.2  Forms of nationalism: actors and their interest weights

The state Ethnic groups Social forces Hong Kong Pro-Beijing campus Democrats Taiwan Pan-Blue Pan-Green Source: Compiled by the author.

Political nationalism

Economic nationalism

Cultural or ethnic nationalism

Strong Strong Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong

Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong

Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak Strong

Nationalism  39 Certainly, it is a right place to begin to discuss Chinese nationalism. In China, modern concept of nationalism was imported from the West via Japan. The concept has undoubtedly guided the efforts of nation-state building by Chinese political elites throughout modern Chinese history. Since the reform and open door policy, nationalism at this level has undergone a fundamental transformation. Whereas the century-long modern revolution eventually ended with a sovereign and independent nation-state, the post-Mao reform and open door has led to rapid economic growth and military modernization, which is moving China to the center of the international stage. Such developments have brought an unprecedented strong sense of national identity among ordinary Chinese. Such a strong national identity has its external consequences. The scholarly community and the policy circles as well have questioned whether the new Chinese national identity will reinforce Chinese nationalism and transform it into the form of nationalism that Germany and Japan experienced during the World War II, and whether the Chinese political elites will make use of the new national identity to develop an expansionist policy in dealing with China’s external affairs. On the other hand, China’s open door policy has also integrated the country into the international community.15 Globalization has complicated the nature of nationalism. Although the Chinese state acts on behalf of the Chinese nation and in the name of national interests in international affairs, it does not mean in any sense that state power is absolute in dealing with external affairs. The power of the state has “leaked” to other governmental and social actors such as local governments, multinational firms, and NGOs. This is especially true in the area of economic power. Globalization tends to weaken state sovereignty and independence in their traditional senses. In this sense, globalization, while weakening state power and national sovereignty, generates new sources of nationalism and national identity. This trend is reflected in the rise of anti-globalization intellectual discourse (new nationalists and new leftists), and also in the rise of forms of popular protests in China. Different forms of popular nationalism are often in conflict with official nationalism on the part of the state. At the national level, the nature of nationalism is about national unification and integration. The issue of national integration has three subcategories, namely ethnic groups or minorities, Hong Kong and Macao, and Taiwan. Both ethnic groups and Hong Kong and Macao are actors within the boundary of the Chinese state. For state-centered nationalism, the problem is how to make the Chinese nationstate more integrated. However, for minorities and Hong Kong, the nature of their national spirits differs. To ethnic groups, the minimum purpose of nationalism is how their unique ethnic identities can be maintained and strengthened within the existing multinational state. Needless to say, ethnic identity is stronger in some ethnic groups than others. In some areas such as in Xinjiang and Tibet, strong ethnic identity often enables these ethnic groups to claim their rights to have an independent state. In the case of Hong Kong, the formula of “one country, two systems” has been applied to the territory since its return to China in 1997. Since the late years of

40  Zheng British colonial rule, the people in Hong Kong have developed a strong sense of Hong Kong political identity. When educated elites and middle classes began to demand for democracy and political participation, the development of Hong Kong political identity became inevitable. The crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989 in Beijing made the people in Hong Kong feel that they were different and they should be different from their motherland. The democratization movement promoted before Hong Kong’s return further parted the territory from its motherland. Hong Kong’s return to China has not weakened Hong Kong political identity. Despite rapid economic integration between Hong Kong and the mainland and Hong Kong’s increasingly economic dependency on the latter, it political identity continues to grow. Indeed, to a great degree, Hong Kong has developed a unique form of “nationalism.” Central to this form of nationalism is how Hong Kong can maintain and develop its own political identity vs. its motherland. On the Taiwan issue, the mainland has continuously claimed its sovereignty over the island. Although the majority of the population inside China can accept the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, the surge of nationalistic fervor has made ordinary mainland Chinese less willing to condone an outcome in which Taiwan breaks away completely from the mainland. They are more supportive of the state’s appealing to any effective and useful means including the use of force to maintain China’s territorial integrity should the need arise. Such a trend seems to be in a direct conflict with what has happened inside Taiwan. Taiwanese nationalism has conflated characteristics of “ethnic” identity among Chinese minorities and political identity in Hong Kong. The long separation between the mainland and Taiwan has enabled Taiwan to develop or “construct” a degree of “ethnicity.” After the demise of Chiang Ching-kuo, to promote Taiwanese identity has become a major political agenda of the pro-independence political forces within Taiwan. The radicalization of the independence movement invited strong reactions from the mainland including various forms of military threats which in turn reinforce Taiwanese consciousness. Probably more important in this case is the fact that the long separation between two territories has enabled Taiwan to develop a political identity different from that in the mainland. Whereas China continues to be seen an authoritarian system, Taiwan has been an important part of the so-called “third wave” of democratization. Despite their political difference, the Taiwanese regard their political identity as a unique feature to be safeguarded at all costs. At the societal level, nationalism is largely manifested in social classes’ struggles for citizenship. In other contexts, such as China versus others and the majority versus ethnic minorities, nationalism is a cultural form of politics, which is not simply reducible to any concrete interests. Nevertheless, concrete interests are important in social nationalism. National spirits here are expressed by social demands for equal citizenship in the sense that T. H. Marshall argued decades ago.16 This aspect of nationalism has been well studied in the context of modern state building in Europe and North America.17 In the studies of modern Chinese nationalism, scholarly attention has been largely paid to national sovereignty, and

Nationalism  41 popular sovereignty, an equally important aspect of modern nationalism, has been unduly ignored. Since the reform and open door policy in the late 1970s, China has gradually returned into a class society. The transition from the planned economy to a market one has led to a drastic increase in income disparities between regions and among social classes. The weakening of state power in re-allocating income has rendered society less integrated, if not disintegrated. Chinese society tends to be increasingly divided. Nationalism comes to relations among social classes and their relations with the state as well. Since the political system is not democratic, some social classes are more powerful than others in influencing state policies. Social classes such as party cadres and government bureaucrats, capitalists and intellectuals can find their mechanisms to influence state power and to have their interests represented, but workers, farmers, and other lower classes do not have effective mechanisms to have their voice heard and to articulate their interests, let alone to have their interests represented. Simply, for the latter, the question is not what nation-state China is, but whose nation-state China is.

Nationalistic conflict Nationalistic struggles or nationalism-driven collective actions have various forms of expressions. In accordance to our discussion above, five types of relationships that are conducive to nationalism-oriented collective actions are identifiable, including China vs. others, the mainland vs. Taiwan, the mainland vs. Hong Kong, majority vs. minorities, and the state vs. society. The state is central to all these relationships. Whether nationalism will have an impact on either Chinese domestic policy agendas or external affairs depends on how the state manages any particular form of nationalism. China vs. others First of all, nationalism finds its way into China’s relations with other countries. Nationalism at this (international relations) level has been a hot research topic among China scholars.18 Nationalistic collective actions against the USA, Japan, and other countries that are perceived unfriendly to China have become increasingly popular since the reform and open door policy in the late 1970s. Major events related to this form of nationalism include the massive and violent protest against the US-led NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999,19 and demonstrations against the Japanese Prime Minister’s frequent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and against Japan’s distortions of history in new textbooks in 2005. As China grows and becomes more assertive, this form of collective action can increasingly affect China’s relations with other major powers. This is particularly true when nationalisms in China and other countries reinforce each other. A case in point is China–Japan relations. According to a 2004

42  Zheng opinion poll commissioned by Japan’s Cabinet Office, public opinion of China hit a record low, with only 37.6 percent of Japanese feeling friendly towards China, down 10.3 percentage points from a year earlier. In the meantime, Japanese who feel unfriendly towards China spiked 10.2 percentage points to 58.2 percent.20 On the Chinese side, almost at the same time, China released its own opinion polls conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The poll shows that only 6.3 percent of Chinese respondents felt friendly towards Japan, while 53.6 percent expressed “unfriendliness.”21 If anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiments are out of control, nationalistic protests could escalate into state violence between China and Japan. Nationalistic sentiments across the Sea of Japan jumped on Yasukuni Shrine visits, and Diaoyutai (Senkaku) standoffs. Needless to say, this also applies to the Japanese side of nationalism. Mainland vs. Taiwan Nationalism could also be escalated into state violence at the next level, namely, mainland–Taiwan relations. A de facto independent Taiwan means that China is not yet a unified nation state, and the Taiwan issue has already become one major source of Chinese nationalism today. The fact that Taiwan is moving towards de jure independence further stimulates the nationalistic sentiments in the mainland. A May 2004 survey conducted by the Beijing-based China Social Survey Institute found that, of 2,150 people in 12 provinces, 62 percent “absolutely oppose” Taiwanese independence while less than 4 percent said that Taiwanese independence “would be acceptable.”22 It is worth noting that the fact that the majority of people oppose Taiwan independence does not mean that the island has to be reunified with China in the short run. According to a survey in China between September and October 2003, 58.5 per cent of residents were in favor of efforts to continue with economic cooperation and development on both sides of the strait.23 In particular, they wanted to see both sides push ahead with establishing the three links and strengthen bilateral exchanges to work toward eventual unification. About 15 percent of residents advocated the use of force now for reunification purposes while 13 percent of residents, who currently supported the status quo, felt that the use of force to resolve cross-strait relations was ultimately irresponsible. Only 2 percent were of the view that it does not matter whether Taiwan is independent or not. It would be reasonably safe to conclude that a large majority of the Chinese population would like the economic and social exchanges across the strait to expand and deepen further. But certainly the rise of new nationalism has made it even more difficult for the mainland to accept a Taiwan that wants to break away from the mainland. As already mentioned, the Taiwan issue is becoming an increasingly indispensable source of legitimacy for the leadership in Beijing. No Chinese leader can remain in political office if he is seen to be the one who is losing Taiwan. Not surprisingly, the surge of nationalism in Taiwan has complicated crossstrait relations. The emergence of a Taiwanese consciousness has led more and

Nationalism  43 more ordinary Taiwanese to regard their separateness from the mainland as a unique feature to be safeguarded at all costs. Most Taiwanese prefer the status quo where they need not do China’s biding. In other words, Taiwan wants to be left alone to decide the kind of political arrangement with China, including the option of eventual independence. The inclusive nature of nationalism in China as opposed to the exclusive nature of nationalism in Taiwan looks set to bring the two political entities increasingly on a collision course. The world has witnessed that whenever Taiwan moves to or is perceived as moving towards independence, the mainland leadership turns to military threats and other harsh means to contain the independence forces. To complicate the situation further, a cross-strait conflict is likely to invite US–Japanese involvement. Indeed, on 19 February 2005, the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee announced that “peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait” constitutes a “common strategic objective” in the new US–Japan security arrangements. Although such changes are out of control of the Chinese state, they could easily lead to the rise of nationalistic sentiments within China. Mainland vs. Hong Kong Hong Kong was returned to the mainland in 1997 in the frame of the “one country, two systems” arrangement formed by the imaginative leader Deng Xiaoping when he negotiated the territory’s sovereignty with the British. Nevertheless, the handover does not mean that the territory is integrated into China. Signs have indicated that the mainland has to face increasing difficulty in governing this newly returned territory. While the central government tries to plant a sense of patriotism in Hong Kong, the handover has also actually generated a strong sense of democratic aspiration. An undemocratically elected governing body is increasingly difficult for the people in Hong Kong to accept. Owing to the need to preserve the capitalist system in Hong Kong, the mainland has heavily depended on eminent business figures in the management of Hong Kong affairs. The Hong Kong people detest such a political collaboration for fear that their interests will be subordinated to allegedly larger corporate interests. Furthermore, an administration in favor of big businesses seems to be incapable of governing the growing middle classes, which are beginning to show their political demands. Shortly after the handover, Hong Kong was struck by a series of crises, including the 1997 avian flu, the Asian financial crisis, and a busted property bubble, among others. The sense of public indifference grew so strong that during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in early 2003, Hong Kong’s civil society rapidly mobilized itself to deal with the outbreak on the account of perceived administrative incompetence. Incompetence of the Hong Kong administration led to higher political awareness and activism in the populace on the one hand, and new opportunities for political mobilization for the democrats on the other. This new activism was articulated in the massive demonstration held on the sixth anniversary of the Handover on 1 July 2003. A 500,000-strong rally marched on that day, ostensibly in protest against the anti-subversion bill (Article 23).

44  Zheng Despite all these events, the mainland has consistently interpreted the Hong Kong issue from an economic angle, in the belief that all problems will come under control as long as the Hong Kong economy recovers. This economic mentality has resulted in the accelerated Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2003 and other economic arrangements between the mainland and Hong Kong such as the “free walk” and the “nine plus two.”24 Whereas rising unemployment and economic hardship were raised as primary grievances during the 1 July demonstration, the mainland’s interpretation has obscured another reality. For a long time, the Hong Kong people were resigned to their lack of control in Hong Kong affairs. However, the series of crises changed their attitude and pushed them to believe that a popularly elected administration is essential to Hong Kong’s future. The non-elected administration was deemed too inept and unaccountable to the local populace. All changes in the aftermath of the handover have generated new aspirations for a younger, better educated, and more affluent generation. More cosmopolitan in their outlook, these Hong Kong people tend to be more eloquent in voicing their dissonance and demands. Although the majority of the people in Hong Kong have accepted the fact that Hong Kong is now a part of the Chinese national state, they are beginning to struggle for a democratic Hong Kong. Apparently, China’s authoritarian political system faces mounting difficulty in accommodating an increasingly democratic Hong Kong. Majority vs. minorities Within China’s current boundary, nationalism has also often led to collective actions and even bloody violence. In this regard, the most volatile form of nationalism has taken place in the context of majority–minority relations, and conflicts and violence take a form of ethno-nationalism. Officially, China is made up of 56 nationalities, with one majority nationality, the Han, and 55 minority groups. Although the Han comprises 91 percent of the population, this majority is facing increasingly difficulty in coping with challenges from ethnic nationalism, especially from minorities such as Uyghurs and Tibetans. For years, the Chinese state has tried to ease ethnic tensions between the Han majority and minorities, but it seems that such a strategy has not worked effectively. As Dru Gladney has observed, “China’s very economic vitality has the potential to fuel ethnic and linguistic divisions, rather than further integrating the country as most would suppose.”25 To some extent, economic growth can constrain or alleviate ethnic nationalism by allowing greater economic initiatives to minority nationalities. However, ethnic nationalism can be intensified by changes resulting from economic development. Economic changes are often accompanied by the development of media, transportation, school enrollment, and urbanization. These factors do not necessarily favor a homogenization of society. On the contrary, they objectively unify styles of living while providing minorities with the means of subjectively recognizing themselves as conscious entities. Two other related developments have intensified ethnic nationalism, namely globalization and the global war on terrorism. Globalization has linked China

Nationalism  45 closely to other parts of the world. Free movement of people, information, and economic resources has led to an increase in ethnic consciousness or identity among ethnic groups which usually live across China’s borders. The rise of ethnic nationalism has posed a serious challenge for China’s national integration. Over the Tibet issue, the Dalai Lama has been struggling for greater autonomy over the territory. Although Tibetans inside Tibet remain peaceful, the Chinese state tends to be vulnerable to international criticisms. The so-far hardline policy on the part of Beijing seemingly does not match with growing demands for Tibetan autonomy.26 In Xinjaing, ethnic conflicts have become even more violent. Radical ethnic groups and fundamentalists often apply violence to their goal of separate from China. The East Turkestan Independence Movement has lasted for years, and its confrontation with the Chinese state has often led to violence. According to a Chinese official estimate, from 1990 to 2001, radical ethnic groups outside China organized more than 200 terrorist events in Xinjiang, killed 162, and injured 440.27 The situation since the global war on terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 seems to have worsened. In 2005, on the eve of the annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), policemen were armed with machine guns for the first time in patrolling the streets in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, to deal with unexpected terrorist threats.28 The anti-terrorist war has also further complicated ethnic conflicts in China’s minority areas. The boundary between ethnic nationalism and terrorism is blurring, and the state’s crackdown on terrorism in some cases has been believed to involve human rights violation.29 In both cases, two opposite nationalisms, namely Han inclusive nationalism and minority exclusive nationalism, seem to have been on a collision course. Social forces vs. the communist state Nationalism does not only express itself in the forms of China vs. other powers, the mainland vs. Taiwan, and the majority vs. minorities. More importantly, it also takes the forms of national identity vs. local or regional identity, and the state vs. social classes. The conflict between national identity and regional identity has found its way in changing relationships between the mainland and Hong Kong, while the conflict between the state and social classes has been embodied in an increase in social protests. Nationalism in this case becomes more subtle than all other cases. Nationalism in this case takes forms of collective action, calling for establishing a liberal democratic national state. As Wu Guoguang argued, it is a form of liberal nationalism, liberating people not from foreign domination but from an authoritarian regime.30 Democratic national aspirations have been embedded in changing relations between social classes and the state. China’s working class and peasants were major forces behind the communists’ victory in establishing the new state. For decades under Mao Zedong, workers and peasants were regarded as leading social classes in supporting the state. But rapid economic growth and the state’s continuous adjustment to new political environments have changed the relationship between

46  Zheng these two major social classes and the state. Economic development did not lead China to become a society of pluralism, as most scholars would like to predict. Instead, China is rapidly becoming a highly divided society. Since the opening and reform policy, the state has been emphasizing high economic growth. The state is highly successful in promoting economic growth. Between 1978 and 2002, China’s GDP (gross domestic product) per capita grew by 5.4 times. The state, however, has failed to achieve a fair distribution of growing wealth among social classes and regions. Income inequality has risen rapidly. Three dimensions of income disparities can be highlighted. First, the urban– rural gap has increased. In 1978, an average rural resident’s consumption was equivalent to 34.1 percent that of an average urban resident. It improved to 43.3 percent in 1985. This ratio decreased drastically to 33.9 percent in 1990 and to an alarming 27.8 percent in 2001.31 Regions have also developed at highly different paces. Per capita resident income in the interior region in 1985 was 67 percent that of the coastal region. This ratio declined to 55.8 percent in 1995, and reached a much lower 46.5 percent in 2001.32 The income gap of different strata has enlarged and disparities within the cities and in the countryside have grown. The urban Gini coefficient rose from 0.16 in 1978, to 0.27 in 1993, and to 0.33 in 2001; the Gini coefficient in the countryside grew from 0.21 in 1978, to 0.32 in 1993, and to 0.42 in 2000.33 The state has adjusted its governance structure in accordance to a changing social structure. It has not only legitimized capitalism, but also granted rights of political participation of capitalists, or private entrepreneurs. It has made a constitutional amendment to provide legal protection of private property. Although such moves show the flexibility of the state in accommodating new social changes, workers and peasants are increasingly becoming aliened from the state. Apparently, while the state begins to open its door to new and rich social classes, it excludes workers and peasants even more since no “voice” mechanisms exist for these two major social classes. In the pre-reform period, as in the former Soviet Union, the relationship between the state and workers was based on a “tacit agreement” that protected workers’ interests. Where such contracts were fulfilled, labor movements were rare.34 This is because the state provided broad guarantees of full and secure employment, state-controlled and heavily subsidized prices for essential goods, fully socialized human services, and egalitarian wage policies. In exchange for such benefits, workers consented to the party’s extensive and monopolistic power, accepted state domination of the economy, and complied with authoritarian political norms. As Linda Cook pointed out, “maintenance of labor peace in this political system thus required relatively little use of overt coercion.”35 Or, as Walder found in China, “the extraordinary job security and benefits, the goods and services distributed directly by the state enterprise in a situation of scarcity that affects other sectors of the workforce more severely, is an important source of the acceptance of the system.”36 Apparently, if this tacit agreement between the state and workers is acceptable to both parties, neither of them should have an incentive to break it. The problem

Nationalism  47 is that the state has broken this implicit contract. For workers as well as for peasants, an incentive is provided for rebuilding their nation-state. The nation-state that they helped to build during the revolutionary years has betrayed them, and their aspiration is again to liberate the state from a few rich social classes. Various forms of grievances toward a betraying state have often resulted in collective actions against the state at different levels. The recent years have witnessed the rise of a new wave of collective actions throughout the country. According to The Outlook Weekly, a Communist Party mouthpiece, China experienced more than 58,000 major incidents of social unrest in 2003 – up 15 percent from a year earlier, with more than 3 million people taking part in the protests.37 By 2004, the figure had jumped to 74,000 incidents.38 More seriously, there is a rise of liberal intellectual and journalist groups. In the 1980s, these groups had joined workers and students in staging social protests. The rise of these groups has the leadership on its toes for fear of internal disorder and a repetition of the 1989 pro-democracy movement. The state is fully aware that all protests by workers and peasants are not simply economic in nature. The combination of liberal intellectuals and disgruntled peasants and workers could become a powerful political force, and could lead to a social movement aiming at political liberalization.

Conclusion: nationalism and its implications It has been argued that nationalism has been both an impetus for and an impediment to political change, namely as a weapon for political liberalization and as an obstacle to the democratization of authoritarian regimes.39 Such a dual nature of nationalism is also presented in modern China. While nationalism has played an important role in the forming of a modern nation-state, it has also been a source of authoritarianism. It is found that the Chinese communist authoritarian regime has been able to successfully employ anti-revolutionary nationalism in order to prevent a more liberal alternative from taking power.40 The resurgence of nationalism since the 1989 pro-democracy movement has been effectively employed by the CCP to restore its legitimacy and to avoid an eventual change of political regime.41 Meanwhile, scholars have also argued that the proliferation of nationalist discourse and the intensification of nationalist feelings in contemporary China as a latent menace to the Chinese authorities, as these factors provide a powerful theoretical framework for criticizing the performance of the authorities.42 This dual nature of nationalism points to the effects of mutual transformation between the state and other non-state nationalistic forces. As emphasized in this paper, the state is not the only nationalistic force, but one of the nationalistic forces in China. The state continues to play an important role in (re)shaping nationalism, but it can hardly dictate its development. Indeed, while the state tries to impose its own will onto different nationalistic forces, the latter has also attempted to (re)direct state agendas related to nation building. As such, the interaction between the state and nationalistic forces leads to their mutual transformation. The nature of mutual transformation decides the potential impacts of nationalism

48  Zheng on China’s domestic and external agendas and policy orientations as well. This chapter has discussed different sources of nationalism at the three levels, namely international, national, and domestic. At each level, the preferences of different forms of nationalism are not necessarily in the line of the state. The state can hardly employ nationalism at will, as it has been commonly argued among China scholars. Instead, the state has to struggle hard to manage all sources of nationalism in order to maintain China as a nation-state and its own legitimacy as well. Historically speaking, all forms of nationalism could be mobilized and joint together against the state. For example, during World War II and afterwards, different political groups (or the so-called democratic parties) and minority peoples were persuaded to join the Chinese Communist Party to fight against the Japanese invasion first, and the nationalist party later. In the contemporary era, although all forms of nationalism pursue their different agendas, this does not mean that there is no possibility at all for them to join together against the authoritarian state. In a certain conjunction of events, they could join together and fight for such a common purpose. The authoritarian state will have to do everything to prevent such a situation from taking place. At the international level, the state has developed its own version of nationalism, namely official nationalism.43 Central to the official nationalism is to pursue China’s power in world politics by integrating the country into the international community. This contradicts with popular nationalism, which is in favor of protectionism and more often than not is characterized by anti-globalization and regionalization. The state often finds it difficult to manage popular nationalism. This is especially true in the case of anti-Japanese nationalism. China and Japan are mutually key trade partners. The two economies are now more interwoven with each other than ever before. In 2005, their bilateral trade was over US$200 billion, a record high. For many years, Japan has had a trade surplus with China, and China’s economic rise has become a major source of Japan’s economic recovery. But trade with Japan is equally important for China. As China’s Commerce Minister, Bo Xilai, commented, the US$200 billion trade volume with Japan has created 9.2 million jobs for China.44 Economic interdependence has effectively constrained the impacts of Chinese nationalism on its actual policy toward Japan. The nationwide protests against Japan in 2005 did not produce positive consequences. So, the state tended to tighten its management of anti-Japanese sentiments in 2006.45 At the national level, the state has struggled hard to achieve the goal of national unification. In the case of Hong Kong, the application of “one country, two systems” suggested that the state had to give up absolute sovereignty in order to accommodate Hong Kong’s return. But, as discussed in this paper, a full integration of the mainland and Hong Kong still proves difficult. Hong Kong is developing its own political identity despite its common national and cultural heritages with its motherland. As long as the mainland retains an authoritarian system, Hong Kong will continue to resist a full integration. The return of Taiwan is even far more difficult. Although the mainland has shown its flexibility in interpreting the concept of “one China,” all its efforts have so far not led to any progress towards its

Nationalism  49 46

desired goal. Up to this point, no one is sure how the struggles between the two nationalistic agendas (Beijing and Taipei) will unfold. In both cases, the existing difficulties do not mean that China will not be able to solve them; they do suggest that the struggles between the mainland and Hong Kong, and the mainland and Taiwan, are transforming their relationship. At the domestic level, nationalistic elements are within the reach of the state. But this does not mean that the state can easily manage these nationalistic forces. Instead, it is in domestic areas that the danger lies if these nationalistic forces cannot be managed well by the state. In the minority areas, especially Xinjiang and Tibet, the state tends to have been on full alert for any elements which could lead to instability. Although there is no sigh that the state will introduce drastic changes over the existing minority policy, the state is paying an increasingly high price to sustain it. For those who are struggling for a liberal nation-state, the state has tried to accommodate their voices by changing its frame of governance. For example, during the Jiang Zemin era (1989–2002), the state tended to be in favor of newly rising social classes. But since the new leadership came to power in 2002, efforts have been made to implement pro-people policies which are in favor of less privileged social classes, including workers and farmers. However, the political process is still not open to all social classes and a liberal nation-state is far beyond anyone’s horizon. Different nationalistic forces, the state and non-state actors alike, are struggling for their own unique nationalistic agendas, for dominance or influence over other’s agendas. But the interaction between the state and all these non-state nationalistic forces is often mutually transforming. During the processes of mutual transformation, the impacts of nationalism on China’s domestic and external affairs unfold. The state is not free to use nationalism to achieve its own goal; it is also true that no non-state nationalistic force can impose its own version of nationalism on the state. The struggles between the state and non-state nationalistic forces will continue, and so does the transformation of Chinese nationalism.

Notes 1 James J. Sheehan, “Foreword” to Robert H. Wiebe, Who We Are: A History of Popular Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. xi. 2 For example, Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 3 Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism and Progress, volume I: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), and volume II: The Dismal Fate of New Nations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 4 D. Seers, The Political Economy of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 10. 5 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, volume 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 49. 6 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neonationalism, second expanded edition (London: Verso, 1981), p. 359. 7 George Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 133.

50  Zheng 8 For example, Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 9 There is a growing body of literature on Chinese nationalism. Some examples include: Christopher Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006); Shuisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2004); Yingjie Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity under Reform (New York: Routledge, 2004); Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (Brookfield: Ashgate, 2000); Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wang Gungwu, The Revival of Chinese Nationalism (Leiden: International Institute for Asian Studies, 1996); Wang Gungwu, Nationalism and Confucianism, Wu The Yao Memorial Lectures, 1996 (Singapore: National University of Singapore, UniPress, 1996), and Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). 10 Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. 11 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 12 Ibid., p. 29. 13 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982). 14 Pierre Birnbaum, States and Collective Action: The European Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 8. 15 Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, ed., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Thomas G. Moore, China in World Market: Chinese Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). 16 T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (New York: Doubleday, 1964). 17 For example, Reinhard Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977). 18 For example, Gries, China’s New Nationalism; Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. 19 John Wong and Zheng Yongnian, “Nationalism and Its Dilemma: Chinese Responses to Embassy Bombing,” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnain, ed., Reform, Legitimacy and Dilemmas: China’s Politics and Society (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000), pp. 321–43. 20 The Japan Times, “Public Opinion of China Hits Record Low, National Poll Shows,” 20 December 2004. 21 Ming Pao, “Opinion Polls: More Than Half Showed Absence of Friendliness Towards Japan,” Hong Kong, 26 November 2004. 22 The author is grateful to Craig Simons (New Weeks) for providing this piece of information. 23 The survey was conducted by the reputable Beijing-based market survey group called Lingdian diaocha jituan (The Horizon Survey Group). See www.horizonkey.com/.

Nationalism  51 24 The “free walk” is an arrangement by which mainland people from certain parts of the country are allowed to travel to Hong Kong. It aimed to boost the Hong Kong’s consumption markets. The “nine plus two” is an arrangement in which the nine provinces in the mainland and two territories (Hong Kong and Macao) establish a common market. 25 Dru C. Gladney, “Foreword,” in Robyn Iredale, Naran Bilik, and Fei Guo, ed., China’s Minorities on the Move: Selected Case Studies (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), p. xiii. 26 Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects, Policy Studies 12 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2004); Elliot Sperling, The Tibet–China Conflict: History and Polemics, Policy Studies 7 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2004); and Allen Carlson, Beijing’s Tibet Policy: Securing Sovereignty and Legitimacy, Policy Studies 4 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2004). 27 Zheng Hansheng, ed., Zhongguo shehui fazhan yanjiu baogao 2004: zouxiang gengjia anquan de shehui (A Research Report on China Social Development 2004: Toward a More Secure Society) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004), p. 198. 28 Ming Pao, “Urumqi shi jincha, shouchi chongfengqiang xunluo” (“For the first time, policemen patrol the streets with machine guns in Urumqi”), 3 March 2005. 29 Michael Dillon, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent, Policy Studies 11 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2004); and James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, Policy Studies 6 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2004). 30 For a discussion on liberal nationalism inside China, see, Wu Guoguang, Ziyou de minzu yu minzu de ziyou (A Liberal Nation and National Freedom) (Taipei: Chinese Eurasian Foundation, 2002). 31 China Statistical Yearbook, 1987, p. 672; 1992, p. 278; 1996, p. 280; 1999, p. 72; 2001, p. 68; and 2003, p. 72. 32 Ibid. 33 For figures on the Gini coefficients, see Zhao Renwei, Li Shi, and Carl Riskin, ed., Zhongguo jumin shouru fengpei zaiyuanjiu (Income Distribution of China’s Residents Revisited) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1999); Zhao Manhua, Wang Shangyi, Hao Yunhong, and Wang Minghua, Shouru chaju yu liangji fenhua wenti yanjiu (A Study of Income Disparities and Polarization) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 2002), pp. 38, 59, 152; Yang Yiyong and Huang Yanfen, “New Situation in Income Distribution of China’s Residents,” in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Shan Tianlun, ed., 2003 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (2003: Analyses and Forecast of China’s Social Situation) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), pp. 226–34. 34 See, among others, Linda Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1993). 35 Cook, ibid., and Janine Ludlam, “Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev,” World Politics, 43 (2): 284–312 (1991). 36 Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), p. 248. 37 Reuters, “China to curb demolitions to defuse unrest,” 15 June 2004. 38 The Economist, “The cauldron boils; protests in China,” 1 October 2005. 39 For a discussion of the role of nationalism in facilitating both domestic and external changes (international relations), see Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000). 40 Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction; John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese

52  Zheng

41

42

43 44 45 46

Nationalism (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 56–85; and John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996). Zhao, ibid.; Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China; Maria H. Chang, The Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (Brookfield: Ashgate, 2000). John Fitzgerald, “China and the Quest for Dignity,” National Interest, 55, 47–59 (1999); Gries, China’s New Nationalism. The New Left School in China also tends to contend that nationalism is a driving force behind political changes in contemporary China: see the articles in Xudong Zhang, ed., Whither China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001). Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Fan Yongming, “Frozen China–Japan relations hold hopes,” People’s Daily (overseas edition), 29 December 2005. Ming Pao, “The government prohibits anti-Japanese protests in Shenzhen,” Hong Kong, 16 August 2006. Zheng Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook, “Sources in China’s Formulation of its Taiwan Policy,” in Zheng Yongnian and Raymond Wu, ed., Sources of Conflict and Cooperation in the Taiwan Strait (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), pp. 35–58.

3 Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty Shan Wenhua

The concept of sovereignty and the debates about it have always been at the center of the system of public international law. Views about the nature and purposes of sovereignty and its rightful place in international law have varied from time to time and from place to place.1 In this regard, the Chinese concept of sovereignty is particularly interesting, not only because it differs significantly from that of other major states, but also because it has significant bearings on the future international behavior of China, which is poised to play a major leading role on the world stage. In this chapter, I will first briefly introduce the much debated concept of sovereignty and the traditional Chinese version thereof. Then I will proceed to explore whether and to what extent such traditional Chinese concept of sovereignty has been changed and challenged since China decided to open up to the outside world. I will do so mainly by referring to China’s practices in international economic treaties and organizations, notably the bilateral investment treaties and the World Trade Organization. I will then analyze some recent statements by Chinese government officials, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what extent the official Chinese views toward the concept of sovereignty have been changed. My finding is that, despite significant concessions of important sovereign powers through those treaties and organizations, China’s official perception of “sovereignty” has hardly changed. In an effort to explain such disparity between the official opinions and state practices, I will finally revisit the concept of sovereignty, and argue for a doublelayer definition of sovereignty: abstract sovereignty and concrete sovereignty. I will conclude that, whereas the “concrete sovereignty” (as specific powers that implement sovereign authority) keeps changing to suit the need of times, the “abstract sovereignty” (as the ultimate and final source of authority) of a state remains unchanged as long as it remains a sovereign state.

Sovereignty and the Chinese concept thereof Sovereignty: the concept thereof and the challenges thereto The concept of sovereignty is like the concept of God. Every so often people refer to it, yet nobody seems to be very clear what it exactly means.2 It is generally

54  Shan accepted that the concept was first formulated by a political scientist, Jean Bodin in 1576 in his work De Republica.3 Bodin’s theory on sovereignty (summa potestas) was based on the situation of states in Europe in his time and on the need to have a means for the restoration of some sort of internal order within Europe.4 As observed by Brierly, Bodin was convinced that a confusion of uncoordinated independent authorities must be fatal to a State, and that there must be one final source and no more than one from which its laws proceed. The essential manifestation of sovereignty, he thought, is the power to make the laws, and since the sovereign makes the law, he clearly cannot be bound by the laws that he makes.5 Thus the essence of sovereignty, according to Bodin, is the possession of the “one and only final source of authority” and the essential manifestation of such authority is the making of laws, by which the authority is not bound.6 Such a conception of sovereignty has become the starting point of almost any discussion of the definition of state sovereignty in international relations and international law, and is still very much valid today. The concept of sovereignty in international law is believed to begin with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.7 As a “Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective Allies,” the agreement represented the transfer of some powers from the Emperor to certain kings and lords; over time, this was developed into the notion of the absolute right of the sovereign, or what is called “Westphalian Sovereignty.”8 By the nineteenth century, such a notion of absolute sovereignty gained currency in international law. Henry Wheaton, for example, a leading international lawyer of his time, claimed that each state “possesses and exercises exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction throughout the full extent of its territory . . . No state can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or regulate property beyond its own territory, or control persons that do not reside within it, whether they be native-born subjects or not.”9 Such a concept of sovereignty is sometimes further summarized as having four main components: internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-intervention: Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics: First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to freedom from external intervention. These components of sovereignty were never absolute, but together they offered a predictable foundation for world order.10 Among the four components identified above, only the first refers to what Sir Elihu Lauterpacht called “internal sovereignty” (as sovereignty within the national

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  55 sphere), whereas the other three refer to what he called “external sovereignty” (as sovereignty on the international plane).11 Although the absolute concept of sovereignty has always been a subject of debate and controversy, it is now “being challenged in unprecedented ways”.12 Since World War II, particularly in recent years, there has been a proliferation of international treaties and international organizations, each of which allegedly constitutes a limit or challenge to state sovereignty. State sovereignty is, in particular, severely challenged by the human rights movement, regional integration, humanitarian intervention activities, and influential trade and investment treaties and institutions as a result of economic globalization. Consequently, there has been a wealth of literature dealing with the issue of “sovereignty,”13 most of which seems to be very critical of the traditional idea of “absolute sovereignty.”14 Among them, the most serious attack came from Louis Henkin, who declared that “[s] overeignty is a bad word, not only because it has served terrible national mythologies in international relations, and even in international law, but also because it is often a catchword, or a substitute for thinking and precision.”15 He reasoned that “Sovereignty is essentially an internal concept, the locus of ultimate authority in a society . . . [s]urely, as applied to the modern secular state in relation to other secular states, it is not meaningful to speak of the state as sovereign. Sovereignty, I conclude is not per se a normative conception in international law.”16 Further, he advocated that “[f]or legal purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era.”17 Sir Elihu also considers that sovereignty “on the international plane” “must be seen largely as myth – except when it is used to describe a state’s title to territory.”18 Sarooshi argued that sovereignty is an “essentially contested concept,” the elements of which “have always been contested within politics.”19 Another eminent scholar has gone as far as to describe the sovereignty concept as “organized hypocrisy.”20 Some other authors have referred to it as being “of more value for purposes of oratory and persuasion than of science and law.”21 John Jackson, who may be regarded as a mild critic of the traditional concept of sovereignty, argues that the Westphalian sovereignty concept has been outmoded and needs replacing by what he terms “sovereignty – modern,” which is not something that has been clearly defined but encourages disaggregating and analysis by employing “power allocation analysis” as the core analytical tool.22 Some world leaders have also joined in the critique of the sovereignty idea, while still recognizing the importance of some attributes of the concept. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, said in 1992 in his report to the Security Council that “[R]espect for [the state’s] fundamental sovereignty and integrity [is] crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.”23 Unsurprisingly there are also voices against such denial of the traditional concept of sovereignty. Sir Robert Jennings, for example, after having carefully examining, inter alia, the chaotic situation in many parts of Africa and some parts

56  Shan of Asia, the impact of technological advancements, and the proliferation of international governmental and non-governmental organizations on state sovereignty, concluded that: [t]he current fashionable suggestions that State sovereignty is a thing of the past are to be understood with some caution and perhaps some qualification.24 [. . .] It is indeed odd that State sovereignty should at the present be supposed by some to be in serious decline . . . Looking even briefly at such international constitutional law as we have, one can only conclude that the suggested demise of national State sovereignty has been much exaggerated.25 Moreover, he pointed out that the fashionable “sovereignty outdated” suggestion “is partly no doubt a result of the present prevalent habit in the north and the west – and international lawyers are by no means free from this tendency – of regarding what happens in the north and the west as the normal situation, and therefore as the provider of the practice to be taken into account in the interpretation and development of our supposedly ‘universal’ system of international law.”26 He continued that: No doubt we who are fortunate enough to be part of this highly developed and relatively very rich area, think the world would be a better place if our ideas were indeed universally shared even where there they are not actually at present realised. But the fact is that a large part of the world, including the most populated parts, would not necessarily agree with that.27 As a matter of fact, some scholars from the third world did voice strongly again the theory that completely denies state sovereignty. Chen An, an eminent international lawyer from China, for example, considered Henkin’s argument to “do away with the ‘S’ word”28 a hegemonist “spear” to attack and penetrate the sovereignty of other states, particularly the small and weak states in the Third World. He wrote, For the third world, it seems necessary to advocate: Never away with the “S” word in current time! They must firmly cling to the “S” word, so as to use their sovereignty, separately and/or jointly, to fight against the political and economic hegemony, when the political and economic hegemony have still existed in contemporary world.29 The heat of the debate on the relegation of or insistence on the concept of sovereignty can thus be clearly seen.30 Although it is unclear which view will win eventually, it is clear that the traditional absolute concept of sovereignty is no longer the generally accepted concept, but one subject to severe and increasing challenges.

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  57 The Chinese concept of sovereignty: from “tributary system” to “inviolable sovereignty” To the Chinese, the modern concept of “sovereignty,” together with many other concepts of modern international law, was an “imported” Western plant. And the importing process was not a pleasant one. Until the expansionist Western powers arrived at China in the middle of the nineteenth century, China’s foreign relations had been managed under an indigenous system known as the “tributary system,” whereby China, occupying the patriarchal position, assumed the leadership and, in return, tributary states came into contact with China as part of the Chinese family of nations but in a subordinate position.31 Under such a Sino-centric system, only China, the “Middle Kingdom,” enjoyed full “sovereignty” and there was no such thing as “equality of sovereignty” between China and the tributary states. After the First Opium War (1839–42), however, such Sino-centric world order was broken down by Western imperialist powers and was replaced with an “unequal treaty regime.”32 Thus the “Middle Kingdom” at the center of the universe was downgraded into a “semicolonial society” at the hands of foreign imperialism. It was against this background and in an effort to seek a way of survival in what was described as “a great change in more than three thousand years of history” that the concept of state sovereignty and other norms of modern international law were first formally introduced into China.33 As a result, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese perspective on international law presents three main “Chinese characteristics.” First of all, the Chinese concept of sovereignty features a “sovereignty-bound thinking” on international law, which places the principle of sovereignty at the very center of international law.34 Indeed, since the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the ability to maintain China’s sovereignty internally and externally has become the raison d’être of any Chinese government regardless of its ideological standing. Thus even during the heyday of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, Chinese leaders asserted that such an alliance had to be formed on the basis of sovereign equality and independence.35 Again, in negotiating China’s restoration of its sovereignty over Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping made it clear that the present Chinese government was resolved to resume exercise of its sovereignty over Hong Kong; otherwise it would become another Qing government and Chinese leaders would become Li Hongzhang’s followers – the Chinese people would have every reason to overthrow them.36 As a result, in its diplomatic announcements, China has constantly appraised sovereignty as the basis of the contemporary international relations and the cornerstone of the entire edifice of international law, and professes to be “the most enthusiastic champion of that principle.”37 Indeed, as Kim observed, If China’s foreign policy pronouncements and protestations are taken at face value, sovereignty remains the lingua franca of its international comportment and the chrysalis of international order. Despite the twists and turns in international conduct over the years, the Chinese Government has remained compulsively sovereignty-bound on most basic global issues and problems. In

58  Shan the normative domain of global politics, China is perhaps beyond compare. Some wayward stranger from another planet, doing a content analysis of the annual UN debate on the state of the world, could easily take sovereignty as a quintessentially Chinese idea.38 Faithful adherence to the principle of inviolability of state sovereignty has therefore become a second distinctive feature of the Chinese concept of sovereignty and international law. In scholarly writings of earlier days of the People’s Republic, Chinese publicists likewise uphold the inviolability of state sovereignty. In an article published in 1960, Ying T’ao wrote: In the course of cooperation and struggle in international relations, sovereignty is a question of paramount importance. Therefore, peoples of the various countries handling high the banner of “inviolability of sovereignty” and the oppressed nations of the world in the past and at present, have launched stubborn struggles against imperialism in defence of their country’s sovereignty .  .  . But bourgeois international law, dictated by the needs of bourgeois interests, vacillates and contradicts itself, and nowadays even openly attempts to bury the principles of inviolability of sovereignty in order to meet the practices of imperialist aggression.39 A third and final feature of the Chinese concept of sovereignty is that it has in it an element of and indeed, an emphasis on “reciprocity” or “mutuality.” This is most clearly elaborated in the principle of “mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity,” as one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (FPPC), which were jointly initiated by China and India more than 50 years ago.40 In other words, the “inviolability of sovereignty” doctrine is not equal to the Westphalian concept of “absolute sovereignty” and has not prevented the Chinese from acknowledging and respecting the sovereignty of other states and rules of international law.41 As two Chinese scholars commented in 1964, Quite obviously, the theories of absolute sovereignty, restrictive sovereignty and the denial of sovereignty advocated by imperialist jurists are completely different from the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty which we advocate. Mutual respect for sovereignty absolutely does not mean that a state (regardless of how strong and large it is) may do whatever it wishes to other states on the pretext of exercising its sovereignty. Respect for sovereignty must be mutual: the principle that other states respect our sovereignty and we respect the sovereignty of other states. The exercise of sovereignty should be based upon the premise of not impairing the sovereignty of other states.42 It can therefore be concluded that the earlier Chinese concept of sovereignty and, in particular, the doctrine of “inviolability of sovereignty,” are developed as a “defensive weapon” to protect against interference in domestic affairs43 and do not necessarily exclude respect for the sovereignty of other states and norms

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  59 of international law. But two important questions remain: What is the scope of “interference in domestic affairs” that is regarded as violating state sovereignty? And more generally, what are the norms of international law to which the Chinese state sovereignty is properly subject?44 These questions have been more and more important for the international community and for China herself, as she emerges onto the world stage as already an existing economic power and a potential superpower, in this rapidly globalizing world. Although the second question is too big a question to be effective to answer in this chapter, the following sections of the chapter will attempt to address the first question by exploring and analyzing recent practice and opinions relating to concept of state sovereignty.

Chinese practice in international economic law in relation to state sovereignty: giving up state sovereignty? Given that sovereignty constitutes the very foundation of international law and international relations, China’s every conduct in foreign affairs is related to state sovereignty. It is therefore only possible for the following to highlight the most important and highly relevant aspects of China’s practice, with a view to ascertaining its current position toward the principle of state sovereignty. This chapter will therefore focus on two major aspects of international economic law, namely international treaty-making and participation in international organization. International treaty-making: investment treaties as an example Each international treaty, as a matter of fact, has the effect of “ceding” or “eroding” certain powers of the state party concerned. Growingly, however, people have also come to notice that this is not a zero-sum game. As a return of such “cession” or “erosion,” state parties may also gain some benefits.45 The problem is, although the “cost” (such as erosion or cession of powers) is often manifest and realizable, the “benefit” might not always be as clear-cut or able to be effectively materialized.46 A case in point is bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Such treaties are typically entered into between a capital exporting state and capital importing state.47 The capital exporting state wants the BIT to offer protection of its investment in the capital importing state. And the capital importing state hopes that such protection offered will attract the much needed foreign investment to come. What is written in such a treaty is, however, normally only concrete commitments of investment protection offered by the host state. No promise of certain inflow from the capital exporting country concerned is stipulated therein, apart from the hortatory statement in the preamble requiring state parties to “encourage” investment flows between the two parties.48 And, as a matter of fact, studies show that BITs indeed do not help much in attracting foreign investment. In 2001, I personally did a survey among EU investors in China, about their awareness of BITs, among other things.49 Fewer than half of EU investors knew of the existence of BITs when making the decision to invest in China.50 Now let us move to the specific sovereign powers that are affected in these

60  Shan BITs. State sovereign powers are sometimes divided into legislative power, executive power, and judicial power (sometimes also referred to as “legislative sovereignty,” “executive sovereignty,” and “judicial sovereignty’).51 Now let us pay a close look at the Chinese BITs and see whether and to what extent the sovereign powers of China have been altered as a result of such BITs. To give an overview, by now China has entered into 125 BITs (including nine renegotiated BITs and protocols), which effectively cover at least most if not all states with which China has a meaningful investment relationship, and which make it the number two in the league table for BIT numbers, second only to Germany.52 The first BIT was signed in 1982 with Sweden, but the bulk of them (over 80 percent) were signed since 1990, from which one can see the influence of economic globalization. Among them, 44 are entered into with European states, 38 with Asian states, 29 with African states, 11 with American states, and three with states in Oceania.53 Such BITs typically address two categories of issues, substantive and procedural ones. The substantive provisions tend to have the effect to limit legislative and executive powers, whereas the procedural provisions may affect the judicial powers. In terms of substantive provisions, for example, a BIT will normally provide certain general standards of treatment of foreign investors and their investment, such as national treatment standard and most-favored-nation (MFN) standard. National treatment The national treatment requirement, for example, poses a significant challenge and pressure for the Chinese government, as China has had a planned economy under which even the national investors were treated in different ways. For instance, for a considerable time, the tax burdens were different for state-owned enterprise (SOEs), collectively owned enterprises (COEs), and private enterprises. So are access to and charges for public utility supplies such as water, gas, and electricity. Under such circumstances, China has practical difficulty in choosing an appropriate “national investor” as the basis for the implementation of the “national treatment” to foreign investors. For example, if SOEs, the then most important form of domestic enterprises, were chosen as the comparable “national investors,” there would still be further problems such as whether foreign investors would like also to take care of the special public obligations undertaken by such SOEs, including education, health care, and housing. Indeed, it would be a “mission impossible” to implement a national treatment under such circumstances. Yet often some capital exporting states pressed on. For instance, the US insisted on the inclusion of such a standard in its negotiations in the 1980s, which led to a complete halt of the negotiations.54 The UK government was more diplomatic, as it is, and managed to include this standard in the 1986 Sino-UK BIT, but with substantial qualifications, such as “to the extent possible” and “in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations.”55 Indeed, as I argued elsewhere, the qualifications are so substantial that such national treatment clause does not impose any ma-

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  61 terial restrictions on the way in which China may treat UK investment.56 Such qualifications, however, have been materially reduced in the new Sino-German BIT signed in 2003, which, according to the UNCTAD, entered into force in November 2005. This BIT adopted the national treatment (NT) standard without the above mentioned qualifying phrases, but a “grandfather clause.”57 In other words, it permits all existing discriminatory measures against foreign investment maintained in China, but prohibits the introduction of any new derogatory measures.58 Moreover, it requires China to gradually phase out such incompatible measures.59 It is beyond doubt that such “stand-still” and “roll-back” provisions will, once effected, place substantial limits on the discretion that Chinese government would otherwise have in treating foreign investment in general and German investment in particular.60 In this context, it is relevant to recall that China has massively revised its foreign investment laws, at least partly because of the obligations and pressures based on such BITs and ongoing BIT negotiations.61 Most-favored-nation treatment The reason that the new Sino-German BIT would affect China’s discretion to regulate foreign investment in general is mainly because in every Chinese BIT there is an MFN clause, which is another key clause of BITs. This clause requires that all the benefits and privileges that China grants to investors and investment from any other states must be also given to the investors and investment from the counter-state party with which China has a BIT arrangement. In other words, the aforementioned expanded benefit of national treatment, although only stipulated in the new Sino-German BITs, once it came into effect, should be extended to all other states with which China has a BIT arrangement. Therefore, UK investors who enjoyed little if any national treatment from China could expect the treatment to be upgraded to the level provided for in the new Sino-German BIT. French investors who previously did not enjoy national treatment at all could also expect the same level of national treatment from China. Although this is only about substantive benefits, the MFN clause may also have the power to multiply the benefits contained in procedural provisions. I will come back to this issue later, but suffice it to say that the MFN clause has the magical effect of multiplying and therefore further strengthening the limitations and restrictions that other treaty provisions might place on a state party, such as China. Expropriation and compensation Another essential provision in BITs is about expropriation and its compensation, which deals with whether and under what conditions a host state may nationalize foreign property. In this regard, Chinese BITs typically adopt an open definition of what constitutes “expropriation,” which includes “expropriation, nationalization and measures of similar effect.”62 Such open-ended definition may, in fact, be interpreted very broadly to embrace, as in the judgment in the well-publicized Metaclad case (decided under NAFTA Chapter 11),

62  Shan not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.63 It is beyond doubt that such broad reach of the definition of “expropriation” has the effect of significantly limiting the ability of host governments to regulate foreign investment. It also encourages foreign investors to file “frivolous claims’ against local government. Partly on account of such an investor-friendly approach taken by international investment arbitration tribunals, recent years have seen a dramatic increase of investment treaty-based arbitration cases.64 Once expropriation is established, there comes the question of compensation. On this issue, Chinese BITs, like most BITs, guarantee that foreign investors will obtain compensation that is “equivalent to the value of the expropriated investment,” and is paid without undue delay, and is realizable and freely transferable.65 Such a high standard of compensation appears reasonable, but in times may put the host government in a “Catch-22” situation. What happened in Argentina provides an example in point. In response to a major economic crisis, the Argentine government issued the Emergency Law 25561 in January 2002, which had the effect of freezing local tariff and abolishing the one-to-one US dollar–peso convertibility. Such measures had significant negative impact on foreign investors,66 who then sued the host government for breach of BITs, particularly the expropriation clauses. As of today, Argentina has more than 40 pending cases before the ICSID. Such a huge caseload for one single country constitutes a significant burden, politically as well as financially. It is estimated that on average lawyers’ charges alone for an investment treaty-based arbitration would amount to US$1 or 2 million; then there would be costs for the tribunals, which would need about US$400,000.67 This means Argentina would have to pay tens of millions of dollars annually in order to cope with the cases. If it lost the cases, the compensation would amount to US$17  billion,68 which, as alleged by Argentina, exceeds its annual financial budget.69 In other words, the Argentine government might effectively go bankrupt because of such compensation for expropriation! Although there has been no investment arbitration case against China so far, no one can guarantee that it will not happen in the future. Given the huge number of BITs and the recently adopted very liberal approach in terms of substantive protection and procedural access, it is indeed very likely that China will have to face such cases in the near future. Even if this never happened, the limits and restraints such provisions place on Chinese sovereign power are undoubtedly significant. Access to international arbitration I shall now finally turn to procedural provisions. The key question here is whether and to what extent foreign investors can resort to international arbitration tribu-

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  63 nals, rather than local courts. In other words, this is about the degree of concession on the “judicial sovereignty” of the host state. China has been very cautious on this and has placed significant limits on access to international tribunals. For example, in the Sino-UK BIT signed in 1986, China only agreed to submit issues about the “amount of compensation” in case of expropriation to international arbitration tribunals.70 Later on, since the early 1990s, after China ratified the Convention for the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention), China has broadened the scope of disputes that may be submitted to international arbitration to “any investment disputes” although still requiring China’s consent on the submission of disputes that do not concern amount of compensation.71 A final breakthrough took place in 1998, when China, for the first time, agreed in the Sino-Barbadian BIT that foreign investors may submit all investment disputes to the ICSID or other international tribunals without a specific consent from the Chinese government. Such open access to international arbitration thus opened a wide door for foreign investors to avoid the domestic judicial system and resort directly to international courts and tribunals. Since the Sino-Barbadian BIT, China has signed another 27 BITs that accept such open access to international arbitration.72 Among the total 28 BITs, eight have already entered into force.73 If the Maffezini doctrine74 is to be applied, which at the moment is still uncertain,75 such open access would be extended to all the 116 states with which China has a BIT arrangement. This may entail serious consequences. As a matter of fact, the reason that China has not been sued in any international investment arbitration tribunal is at least partly because China had adopted a “limited access” policy and such policy is still applicable with regard to major foreign investors in China. By now most of such major foreign investors in China have renegotiated their BITs with China, and once such new BITs with higher substantive standards and open access to international arbitration has entered into force, or once the Maffezini doctrine is clearly and conclusively established, it is almost inevitable that China will have to face waves of investment treaty-based arbitration cases. In times this might become a severe challenge to the Chinese government, as it is now to Argentina. One may argue that by then China should be ready for such challenge. I hope so but I sincerely doubt it, because I recall that states as powerful as the USA have from time to time to revise their model BITs to protect the state’s sovereign rights to regulate foreign investment. I see no much reason why a developing state such as China should not take these potential challenges seriously and take prompt and decisive counter-measures. Summary and assessment To summarize, international treaties such as investment treaties do have significant impact on China’s state sovereignty, notably by limiting the government’s power to regulate foreign investment, through the operation of substantive provisions such as national treatment and MFN treatment standards, and more concrete clauses such as that of expropriation and compensation. Chinese investment

64  Shan treaties also significantly limited China’s adjudicative sovereignty by effectively diverting all foreign investment cases to international arbitration forums such as the ICSID. Such limitations and restrictions on sovereignty by treaties, serious as they are, are nevertheless, manageable, particularly given that they are bilateral treaties, which are bilaterally negotiated and can be renegotiated and modified as parties see necessary. In other words, no matter how far such treaties might have altered the courses of exercise of state sovereignty, they are still under the ultimate control of the state concerned. The state remains the “marker and changer” of such treaties. It can therefore be argued that such treaties can only change the way sovereignty powers are exercised, but not sovereignty per se, as the “final source of authority.” International organizations: WTO as an example Compared with treaties, international organizations pose even stronger challenges to state sovereignty. Although international organizations are often established on the basis of treaties, they prove to be much more difficult to handle than treaties themselves. Indeed, a treaty is like a marriage certificate, yet an international organization is like a baby born of such a marriage – although they are both the outcomes of the same marriage, they are outcomes of greatly different type, and as a result, it is far easier to deal with a certificate than handling a lively baby. Since World War II, many international organizations have come into being. Many of them are economic organizations, including the now much talked about “Bretton Woods system” organizations, namely the World Bank (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was the subtitle of the International Trade Organization conceived at Bretton Woods and which has now been replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has acceded by now to all these major international economic organizations. I shall now take the WTO as an example to illustrate the impact that a powerful international organization may have on state sovereignty in general and Chinese state sovereignty in particular. The WTO is often blamed for threatening state sovereignty by its invasion into all the three major aspects of sovereign powers: legislative, executive, and adjudicative ones. More specifically, the three aspects refer to the WTO agreements, its decision-making procedures, and its dispute-settlement mechanism. Such threats were amply discussed and hotly debated in the 1994 Sovereignty Debate within the Congress of the United States, when it was to decide whether or not the US should accept the WTO agreements, as the final result of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.76 I shall now assess the impact of the WTO on Chinese sovereignty by referring to these three aspects of the WTO system. The WTO agreements First of all, the WTO agreements, like the investment treaties we just discussed, represent a significant intrusion into the legislative power of member states. Ar-

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  65 ticle 16 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement, sometimes referred to as the “WTO Charter”) expressly requires that “[E]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.”77 It further stipulates that “[N]o reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this Agreement.”78 Thus, the WTO Charter abandoned the “grandfather provision” in the GATT, which permitted all existing incompatible measures of domestic laws to continue to exist and function. As a matter of fact, China promulgated a wide range of new laws and regulations and revised a number of existing laws, in order to comply with the obligation undertaken under the WTO Agreement, as detailed in its Accession Protocol.79 For example, China revised its Foreign Trade Law and all the major laws of foreign investment.80 China also passed a number of new laws to implement her commitments with regard to a range of service areas, such as banking, insurance, cargo transportation, telecommunication, printing, cinema, distribution, venture capital, and leasing.81 It would not an exaggeration to say that such vast legislative changes were unprecedented in modern Chinese history. Yet China did it, without much heard complaint about the loss of her sovereignty. The WTO decision-making mechanism The second important challenge of the WTO to state sovereignty is an institutional challenge, which may be regarded as a challenge more to the executive power of member states. Unlike its predecessor, the GATT, which did not form an organization in a legal sense, the WTO is a powerful formal international organization with a proper international legal personality.82 What is most important in the context of this discussion is that it has its own decision-making bodies and procedures and, according to the WTO Charter, such decisions may constitute part of the overall obligations binding on all member states.83 The ultimate decision-making body within the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, and the WTO Charter stipulates that the Ministerial Conference “shall carry out the functions of the WTO and take actions necessary to this effect” and “shall have the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”84 Moreover, the Ministerial Conference and the General Council (a permanent decisionmaking body established under the Ministerial Conference, which is composed of representatives of WTO members) have the “exclusive authority to adopt formal interpretations of the WTO Agreement the annexed Multilateral Agreement.”85 Although the WTO tends to work on a consensus basis, the existence of formal voting procedures suggests that the decisions made by the WTO may not always be consistent with a particular member’s wishes.86 Yet all the members shall carry out such decisions, regardless whether they voted for or against it. In this sense, it can be regarded as another major threat to national sovereignty, particularly the “executive sovereignty.”

66  Shan The WTO dispute settlement mechanism The WTO’s final and probably most significant threat to state sovereignty, however, is its powerful dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Widely heralded as the most important and unique contribution of the WTO to global economy,87 the WTO DSM features four automaticities: automatic jurisdiction, automatic acceptance of panel report, automatic acceptance of Appellate Body reports, and automatic authorization of retaliation. Among them, automatic jurisdiction refers to the fact that almost every request for the setting up of a dispute settlement panel will be accepted. In other words, each WTO member, once it has a complaint against any other member, can bring a litigation against the other member, with the need to seek “consent” from its counter-party, as is normally required by statutes of other international courts and tribunals. This is because the WTO adopts a “reverse consensus” rule in this process. Thus when a member has a dispute, it shall first seek consultation with its counter-party.88 Failing to achieve an agreement through such consultation, the claimant can formally launch the “judicial process” by requesting the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which is the General Council wearing another hat, to set up a panel to hear the case.89 The request will be accepted, unless there is a consensus to the opposite result.90 As at least the claimant member will for sure uphold such a request, it can be practically certain that such a request will be accepted. Same “reverse consensus” rule applies to the approval of the “decisions” (“recommendations” in the formal words) of the panel, and in case of an appeal, of the Appellate Body.91 Likewise, in case a member loses the case and fail to comply with the DSB rulings, the winning party may request an authorization of trade “retaliation” (mainly in the form of withdrawal of commitments made to the counter party).92 Again, such request will “automatically” be approved, as the same “reverse consensus” rule applies thereto.93 The four “automaticities” have the merit of maintaining “judicial independence,” but meanwhile, have the effect of depriving states of the opportunity to give “consent” to a particular case involved. Therefore, they represent a remarkable restraint on members’ sovereignty, particularly “adjudicative sovereignty.” There are also other sovereignty concerns such as judicial activism, by which panels might stretch interpretations to achieve certain policy results they favor, standard of review, by which the WTO panels examine national government actions such as anti-dumping actions, the obligation to comply with panel rulings, and the legal precedent effect of panel reports and appellate body (AB) recommendations. Indeed, the concerns on the interference of the WTO DSM over national sovereignty have been so grave in the 1994 US Congress Sovereignty Debate that a bill was proposed to set up a Commission to review every panel report adverse to US interests, judging against four criteria.94 The draft bill stated that: [t]he continued support of the Congress for the WTO is dependent upon a WTO dispute settlement system that: A) operates in a fair and impartial manner;

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  67 B) does not add to the obligations of or diminish the rights of the United States under the Uruguay Round agreements; and C) does not exceed its authority, scope, or established standard of review.95 The bill thus effective places WTO DSB decisions, as a part of compact of the WTO Agreement, under the scrutiny of a national organ against national law. Although it does not seem to have been materialized, such an attempt demonstrates very clearly that states have been deeply concerned about this new and powerful invention of the WTO. China has not passed or considered such a bill. Nor has there been such a great debate about sovereignty and the WTO accession, which may or may not be a good thing. China has, nevertheless, passed an Order, by the Supreme People’s Court, to the effect of ruling out the “direct effect” of the WTO agreements.96 Although this is consistent with practices of other major trading powers such as the US and the EU, it nevertheless signals an attitude of caution towards the rules of the WTO. To sum up, it is not an exaggeration to say that the WTO, together with the treaties establishing it, has an unprecedented impact on China’s sovereign powers to regulate international trade relations, ranging from legislative power to executive and adjudicative powers. WTO accession has already resulted in massive legislative activities in China; decisions made by the WTO are binding on China; and the DSM of the WTO challenges China’s long held concept of “state consent” in establishing jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals over states. Although there has been no great sovereignty debate as in the US in 1994 over acceptance of WTO obligations, the Chinese have been cautious of the potential negative impacts of the WTO membership, as witnessed by the recently promulgated Order by the Supreme People’s Court. Observations It can be concluded that, despite hesitations and reservations in the earlier years of opening up to the outside world, China now has little if any difficulty in accepting limitations and restrictions on its sovereign powers, legislative, executive, or adjudicative, in international economic relations, particularly in international investment and trade relations.97 In other words, China seems to have become ready to give up certain “economic sovereignty” in return for perceived opportunities of economic development. This provides a sharp contrast with China’s standing on sovereignty in general, which still sticks to the traditional concept of “inviolable sovereignty,” particularly when issues such as territorial sovereignty and integrity, humanitarian intervention, and universal human rights are concerned. China’s recent general opinions on sovereignty are discussed below.

68  Shan

Recent official statements on state sovereignty: insisting on inviolable sovereignty Despite significant concessions in “economic sovereignty,” China’s general opinion on state sovereignty seems to have hardly changed. Still, the FPPC is dearly upheld with state sovereignty lying at its heart. Still, China opposes any interference in domestic affairs, including those with the excuse of humanitarian intervention.98 In the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali rejected the Westphalian concept of “absolute sovereignty” whilst upholding the important of state sovereignty in general, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, stated: The turbulent and complex international situation has further awakened all countries and people of the world to the demand for the establishment of a new international order, making it more urgent and stronger .  .  . A new international order should be established on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. . . . Only when all states promise to implement these principles will it be likely to establish genuine democracy in international relations.99 In 2004, a major celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the FPPC was held in Beijing, where Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated: Sovereignty is the birthmark of any independent state, the crystallization of its national interests and the best safeguard of all it holds dear. The increasing interaction and interdependence among countries, thanks to surging economic globalization and technological revolution, does not mean that the status and role of sovereignty can in any way be neglected or weakened . . . No country has the right to impose its will on others, nor can it undermine or deny other countries’ sovereignty under whatever excuse. Facts have proven that such practices as disregarding other’s sovereignty, bullying the small and the weak by dint of one’s size and power, and pursuing hegemony and power politics would not get anywhere . . . China will firmly safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity, tolerating no one to interfere in its internal affairs. At the same time, it will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others.100 The FPPC was also reiterated in the White Paper on “China’s Approach of Peaceful Development (CAPD)” as the basis upon which China shall develop its relationship with other states.101 The CAPD also reiterates that China shall “insist on the peaceful settlement of international disputes or conflicts through equal negotiations and consultations; oppose the practices of invading other sovereign states; oppose intervening into domestic affairs of other states; and oppose the arbitrary use of force or threat by force.” A most recent development thereon is

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  69 the CPC Foreign Affairs Meeting, during which President Hu Jintao emphasized that, in the conducting of foreign affairs, China should “protect state sovereignty, security and development interests.”102 A more sophisticated assessment of sovereignty and international law in the post-Cold War world is found in an article by Liu Zhenmin, the then Legal Advisor to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now Deputy Ambassador of China to the United Nations). He wrote, “Since the Cold War ended, the UN Charter and international law have been challenged. Western countries raised the theories of “humanitarian intervention” and “primacy of human rights over sovereignty” and put them in continuous practice. In 1999, NATO headed by the United States waged the Kosovo war on the excuse of “humanitarian intervention,” and caused objections from the majority of the states of the world. In 2003, the US breached the UN Charter, disregarded the Security Council, and launched the Iraqi War on the excuse of “eliminating weapons of mass destruction,” and resulted in an anti-war campaign unprecedented in human history. On the surface, the aforementioned wars have seriously challenged international law – international law no longer seems to be working. But in fact, such wars were only acts in violation of international law, and they did not change the contents of the principle of international relations, nor did they shake the foundation of international law. Although sovereign acts of states are increasingly subject to the influence of the institutionalization of the international community, economic globalization and regional integration, principles such as sovereign equality, non-intervention into domestic affairs, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes are still irreplaceable norms guiding cotemporary international relations.103 Ambassador Liu’s remarks not only provide us a vivid Chinese evaluation of the current international order and the role of international law, but also, once again, demonstrate China’s unambiguous opposition to certain Western doctrines such as “humanitarian intervention” and “primacy of human rights over sovereignty.” Whereas China’s opposition to intervention into domestic affairs is already wellknown and has been documented by the previously cited official statements,104 China’s rejection of the idea of the “primacy of human rights over sovereignty” is equally, if not even more, notorious in the world. Although China has now acceded to all major UN-sponsored multilateral human rights conventions105 and included human rights protection in the recently modified Constitution, China still finds it uneasy to entertain the primacy of human rights over state sovereignty. For the Chinese, the opposite is right: no state sovereignty, no human rights. This is at least partly due to Chinese history and culture, which are vastly different from the West, where the concept of human rights was originally conceived and flourished.106 Another area that also clearly manifests China’s insistence on the “inviolability of sovereignty” doctrine is territorial integrity and sovereignty. This is amply demonstrated by the saying by Deng Xiaoping during talks with British leaders on

70  Shan the handover of Hong Kong, which has been frequently repeated now by Chinese officials when asked about talks with Taiwan on the terms of reunification: “Sovereignty is not an issue open for negotiation!” It may be safe to conclude that China still adheres to a sovereignty-bound thinking and generally the “inviolability of sovereignty” doctrine. However, when it comes to more specific areas of the exercise of state sovereignty, China displays a certain inconsistency in her approach: although she is ready to give up “economic sovereignty” by signing up to numerous international economic treaties and organizations, she seems to be rather stubborn about compromising sovereignty in politically sensitive areas, or “political sovereignty,” including humanitarian intervention, human rights, and territorial integrity. Such inconsistency takes me into the concluding part, revisiting the concept of sovereignty, in an effort to understand or explain the seemingly contradictory Chinese position state sovereignty.

Concluding remarks: the concept of sovereignty revisited My explanation of the seemly contradicting approaches of China towards sovereignty is actually neither completely novel107 nor very complicated, although I consider it of considerable importance in the current general debate on the concept of sovereignty. Much of the confusions surrounding the concept of sovereignty in the current sovereignty debate have resulted from a confusion of two concepts of sovereignty at two different levels. On the one hand, at the conceptual level, there is the concept of sovereignty in the abstract, which may be called “abstract sovereignty.” It inherits the concept first conceived by Jean Bodin as the “final (or ‘ultimate’) source of authority.” That who possess such authority is the “Sovereign,” be it the king/queen, a state, a people, or a multinational. If the world remains a land of order, or order of certain degree, there must be “sovereignty” or “sovereignties” of some kind. In this sense, the concept of “sovereignty” has hardly changed, and will not change in a foreseeable future. Strictly speaking, only such “abstract sovereignty” is real “sovereignty,” as only it possesses the essential character of “sovereignty,” which is “the final source of authority.” In the current world, although other players such as people, multinationals, and international organizations, are playing more and more important roles, it cannot be denied that states remain the center of the framework of the entire world order. Much has been changed in the world, but the core still remains the same. In this sense, Sir Robert Jennings is right to point out that, If one looks at the Charter of the United Nations, the very title assumes that it is an organisation of sovereignty and equal States. The delegation which composes the General Assembly and the Security Council are the representatives of sovereign States. And this is broadly true of all the organizations that form part of the United Nations system. The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, by Article 34 of its Statute

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  71 is still, in its contentious jurisdiction, confined to disputes between States. Looking even briefly at such international constitutional law as we have, one can only conclude that the suggested demise of national State sovereignty has been much exaggerated.108 Yet there is also the concept (or, perhaps more accurately, the conception) of sovereignty in the concrete (or “concrete sovereignty”), at the operational level, which refers to the actual powers that derive from and implement the “final source of authority” (“abstract sovereignty”), and which may be “decomposed” and divided into legislative, executive, and adjudicative powers (or “sovereignty” as often used or rather “misused”), or economic, political, social, and cultural powers. It might also be decomposed “vertically” into supranational, national, federal, or provincial powers. In a strict sense, “concrete sovereignty” is not “sovereignty” per se, but subordinate powers or rights, which always imply sovereignty of which they only sanction the execution.109 To avoid confusion, it would be better use the term “power,” rather than “sovereignty,” to describe such decomposed authorities. Sovereign powers so decomposed or “sliced” may then be allocated, delegated or transferred, in the process of which the “power allocation analysis” that John Jackson advocated may be applied. Looking through the double-layer concept of sovereignty, one may find it easier to understand and explain the current Chinese concepts of sovereignty. China’s generally sovereignty-centered thinking and obsession with the “inviolability of sovereignty” doctrine actually refer to the “abstract sovereignty” concept, which essentially means that China, as a sovereign state, should retain the ultimate control over the domestic affairs within the country and enjoy an equal standing in the international community. In other words, what such thinking and doctrine demand is nothing more than a rightful place and equal status of the state of China on the international stage. And in this sense, it cannot be violated, divided, or transferred. Because once abstract sovereignty was violated or divided or transferred, the very foundation of the sovereign state would have been shaken, and as a result, the state would no longer able to hold itself as a sovereign entirety, but face the fate of falling into pieces. On the other hand, the economic “sovereignty,” and the political, refer to the “concrete sovereignty” or, more precisely, specific sovereign powers. They can be divided, allocated, delegated, or transferred, perhaps after weighing up the costs and benefits of such allocation, delegation, or transfer. For example, after conducting such a cost–benefit analysis, China might have been convinced that giving up certain economic powers in return of potential increase in investment and trade was worthwhile, and therefore it decided to go down the route of trade and investment liberalization. With regard to specific treaty provisions, this “cost– benefit analysis” may also have been used. Thus China rejected the provisions in her BITs to grant national treatment as a principle and access to international dispute settlement forums in the 1980s, as such provisions were things that China could not realistically afford then. However, since the 1990s, when the general conditions in China had been greatly improved, China decided to accept both provisions in its BIT practice.

72  Shan The bottom line of such power allocation, delegation or transfer, however, is that China shall retain the ultimate control over powers so allocated, delegated or transferred, to ensure that the “abstract sovereignty” or the foundation of all sovereign powers is not replaced. Thus China needs to, for example, retain the right to withdraw from these international treaties and organization. She may also want to maintain control to a certain degree of the operation of such treaty regimes or the decision-making of such organizations. On the other hand, so long as China remains abstract sovereignty, she shall have every confidence to continue her “power allocation” activities. The same double-layer analysis can be made of the aforementioned aspects of the application of “political sovereignty,” including human rights, humanitarian interventions, and territorial disputes. In the general rhetoric of the “primary of sovereignty over human rights,” China actually refers to the “abstract sovereignty,” which means that, however important human rights may be, their actual implementation has to be done within the current political reality of the world, that is to say, under the sovereignty of states. It does not exclude China from joining in concrete actions to implement specific norms of human rights, such as joining international conventions or engaging in rights dialogues. Partly because of China’s insistence on the “primacy of sovereignty over human rights,” China unreservedly rejects the idea of “humanitarian intervention.” Another reason is that such interventions often take the form of armed invasion into territories of other sovereign states, and therefore violates another much cherished principle: “territorial integrity.” “Territorial integrity,” or “territorial sovereignty,” as part of the “abstract sovereignty,” is certainly inviolable and as such closed for “negotiation.” This, however, does not prevent China to give up certain important powers relating to the specific execution of such sovereignty. This is most amply witnessed by the high autonomy China’s two Special Administrative Regions now enjoy, under the much celebrated “one country, two systems” arrangement. Such is my “double-layer” approach to the understanding and explanation of the Chinese concept of sovereignty, which I hope will also be helpful in the current debate on the general concept of state sovereignty.

Notes 1 Oppenheim stated in his celebrated treatise on international law that “[T]here exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon.” See Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, ed. Sir Arnold D. McNair, 4th edn. (London: Longmans, 1928), p. 137. Louis Henkin also pointed out that sovereignty “means many things, some essential, some insignificant; some agreed, some controversial; some that are not warranted and should not be accepted”; Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 8. In his insightful paper, Sir Robert Jennings described vividly how different times have nourished different perceptions of sovereignty; see Robert Jennings, “Sovereignty and International Law,” in Gerard Kreijen, Marcel Brus, Jorris

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  73

2



3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10

11 12 13

Duursma, Elizabeth De Vos, and John Dugard, ed., State, Sovereignty, and International Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Sarooshi has observed, for instance, that the meaning of the concept of sovereignty is largely contingent on the text in which it figures and there is no objective concept as such that is universally applicable. Schermers noted that “Sovereignty has many different aspects and none of these aspects is stable. The content of the notion of ‘sovereignty’ is continuously changing, especially in recent years.” Dan Sarooshi, International Organisations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 3; Henry Schermers, “Different Aspects of Sovereignty,” in Kreijen et al., State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, pp. 185, 192. Jennings, “Sovereignty and International Law,” p. 27. Ibid. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 7. Bodin nevertheless acknowledged that even the sovereign would be bound by certain laws, such as “the divine law, the law of nature or reason, the law that is common to all nations, and also certain laws which he calls leges imperii, the law of government.” Brierly, The Law of Nations, p. 9. John H. Jackson, “Sovereignty – Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept,” The American Journal of International Law, 97: 782– (2003), p. 786. Ibid. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th edn. (Boston: Dana, 1866), Sec. 78. Richard N. Haass, “Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities,” remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, 14 January 2003, p. 2, as cited in Jackson, “Sovereignty – Modern,” p. 786. Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty: Myth or Reality,” International Affairs 73 (1), pp. (1997), p. 138. Haas, as cited in Jackson, “Sovereignty – Modern,” p. 786. See for example Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); the special issues of Chicago Journal of International Law (2000, 2001); Claude Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organisation (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2001); Marcus Krajewski, “Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law,” Journal of World Trade, 35 (2001); Jeff Atik, “Democratising the WTO,” George Washington International Law Review, 33 (3–4) (2001); Thomas Franck, ed., Delegating State Powers: The Effect of Treaty Regimes on Democracy and Sovereignty (USA: Transnational, 2000); Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Marco C. E. J. Bronckers, “Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO?,” Journal of International Economic Law, 2, 547 (1999); Paul Stephan, “Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order,” University of Colorado Law Review, 70 (1999); Benedict Kingsbury, “Sovereignty and Inequality,” European Journal of International Law, 9 (1998); Jeremy Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1998); Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalisation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert O. Keohane, “Sovereignty, Interdependence and International Institutions,” in Linda B. Miller and Michael Smith, ed., Ideas and Ideals: Essays on Politics in Honor of Stanley Hoffmann (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); Christopher Schreur, “The Waning of the Sovereign State,” European Journal of International Law, 4 (4): pp (1993); Giandomenico Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards,” European Law Journal, 4 (5): 18–22 (1998); Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1995); Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding

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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29

30

31

Globalization (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1999); Karen T. Liftin, ed., The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Kreijen et al., State, Sovereignty, and International Governance; Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ed., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Ute Collier, Jonathan Golub, and Alexander Kreher, ed., Subsidiarity and Shared Responsibility: New Challenges for EU Environmental Policy (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1997); Centre for Economic Policy Research [CEPR], “Making Sense of Subsidiarity,” in Annual Report: Monitoring European Integration, 4 (1993); see also Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Jackson, “Sovereignty – Modern,” p. 786. Henkin, International Law, p. 8. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 6. Lauterpecht, “Sovereignty,” p. 149. Sarooshi, International Organisations, p. 4. Krasner, Sovereignty, p. 9. Fowler and Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State, p. 21. Jackson, “Sovereignty – Modern,” particularly Parts I–III. An Agenda for Peace – Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping, Report of The Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 17 (1992). This is because, he said, “[T]hey fail to provide for, or even take adequate account of, one of the most pressing and distressing problems of our times.” These problems lie in the fact that, “at the beginning of the new millennium, in far too many parts of Africa and in some parts of Asia, there is a situation that is disturbingly reminiscent of the chaotic situation in Europe in the sixteenth century which informed Bodin’s seminal study of the State and of sovereignty in the State.” He then pointed out that “[T]he basic problem in the big trouble spots of this present time – Somalia. Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the like – has been above all lack of a government with real sovereign power.” And in this regard, “[T]he at present much approved notion of globalisation is not very helpful and indeed hardly relevant at all.” He asserted that “[I]t can hardly be argued that a highly dangerous situation, for which a restoration of some sovereign governmental power is manifestly the remedy, can be said to demonstrate a decline of the importance of the idea of State sovereignty, but rather the contrary.” Jennings, “Sovereignty and International Law,” pp. 30–5. Ibid., p. 31. He also disagreed with Sir Elihu Lauterpacht’s views that sovereignty can be divided into “internal sovereignty” and “external sovereignty” and that external sovereignty is largely a “myth.” Jennings, ibid, pp. 31–3. Louis Henkin, “The Mythology of Sovereignty,” American Society of International Law Newsletter, vol: 1–2 (1993), available at www.asil.org/. Chen An, “The Three Big Rounds of U.S. Unilateralism versus WTO Multilateralism During the Last Decade: A Combined Analysis of the Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, Section 301 Disputes (1998–2000), and Section 201 Disputes (2002–2003) (Third Draft),” paper presented at the ASIL/IELG Meeting 2005 “Trade as the Guarantor of Peace, Liberty and Security?,” Part IV.3. Some commentators have gone further to argue that, rather than undermining sovereignty as commonly held, institutions such as the World Trade Organization actually strengthen sovereignty. See for example Kal Raustiala, “Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law,” Journal of International Economic Law, 6: 841 (2003). Li Zhaojie, “Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the Chinese Per-

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32 33

34 35

36

37 38 39

40

41

42

43 44

spective of the Contemporary International Legal Order,” Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law, 5: 314, p. 316. Ibid. However, the Western powers did not intend to apply international law to their relations with China in the same way that they did among themselves, even if their demands were often couched in terms of the Western system of international law. Although they introduced this Western legal concept to China, they did so largely as part of their efforts to dismantle the traditional Chinese world order and put China under the rule of the Euro-centric system of international relations, making the Chinese follow the rules that a semicolonial state was supposed to follow. Li, “Legacy of Modern Chinese History,” p. 317. Li, “Legacy of Modern Chinese History,” p. 318. Premier Zhou Enlai repeatedly stated, for example, that “the Chinese people must use their own brain for thinking and their own legs for walking.” “We adhere to a basic position in the conduct of China’s foreign affairs,” said Zhou, “that is to maintain China’s national independence. No country is permitted to intervene in China’s internal affairs.” Xue Mouhong, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao (Diplomacy in Contemporary China) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Academy Press, 1986), p. 30. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), overseas edition, 23 March 1994. Viceroy Li Hongzhang was the person in the Qing government taking charge of China’s negotiations with foreign powers. He was therefore often blamed as a national traitor for “selling the country” by the many unequal treaties resulting from such negotiations. Wang Tieya, “International Law in China,” 221 Receuil des cours (Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law), No. 2 (1991), p. 288. Samuel S. Kim, “Sovereignty in the Chinese Image of World Order,” in R. St. J. Macdonald, ed., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), p. 428. Ying T’ao, “A Criticism of Bourgeois International Law Concerning the Question of State Sovereignty,” Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies), 3 (1960): 47–49, 50–52, as translated and reprinted in Jeremy Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People’s China and International Law: A Documentary Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 2 volumes, vol. 1, p. 106. As noted by Kim (“Sovereignty in the Chinese Image of World Order,” p. 431), the FPPC have become the defining criterion of Chinese characteristics in the recent world order debate. For further details on the FPPC, see Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, pp. 119–155. For more recent materials and discussion on the FPPC, see the special column for “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: A 50th Anniversary Celebration,” Chinese Journal of International Law, 3 (2): pp (2004). After examining a range of Chinese literature, Cohen and Chiu observed that, although some, such as Soviet writers, suggested that a state’s sovereignty is not subject to the supremacy of international law, a number of them did recognize the untenability of such a position. Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, p. 118. Yang Hsin and Chien Chien, “Expose and Criticize the Imperialist Fallacy Concerning the Question of State Sovereignty,” Zhengfa Yanjiu (now CASS Journal of Law) 4: 6–11 (1964), translated and reprinted in Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, vol. 1, p. 112. Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, p. 117–118. Cohen and Chiu, for instance, have commented that the recognition that state sovereignty is subject to generally accepted norms of international law is encouraging but of no great significance, as it is unclear what is the content of the international law that China is willing to be subject to. Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, p. 118.

76  Shan 45 One might argue that, for example, a state’s sovereignty has also been expanded by successfully limiting acts of (an)other state(s). 46 For instance, a small country that could not afford an office at Geneva might not be able to effectively assert her rights resulting from her membership of the World Trade Organization. 47 See generally on BITs, Rudolf Dolzer and Margaret Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995). For Chinese BITs, see Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU–China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005). 48 And this is legitimate, because a state cannot force its private companies to invest in a particular country. 49 For details of the survey see Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU–China Investment Relations, pp. 25–6. 50 See Shan, Legal Framework, pp. 250–1. 51 See for example Oscar Schachter, “International Law in Theory and Practice,” Developments in International Law, 13: pp (1991). 52 Data on the Chinese BITs available from my personal files. UNCTAD has made most signed Chinese BITs available online, as posted at www.unctad.org/ (accessed on 23 December 2006). 53 Ibid. 54 See Timothy A. Steinert, “If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and the People’s Republic of China,” Journal of Chinese Law, 2: 434 (1988). 55 See Article 3 (3) of the 1986 Sino-British BIT. 56 Shan, Legal Framework, p. 153. 57 Article 2 (2), Sino-German BIT 2003. 58 Point 3 (Re: Arts. 2 and 3), Protocol to the new Sino-German BIT. 59 Ibid. 60 Nevertheless, regulation of investment admission or establishment is not subject to NT obligations, and NT obligations do not require the extension of a tax privilege, exemption or reduction to domestic investors to foreign investors. Point 4 (Re: Art. 3), Protocol to the new Sino-Germany BIT. 61 For further details on these changes, see Wenhua Shan, Legal Framework, pp. 46–51, 165–6, 62 For example, all BITs between China and the EU member states have adopted such a broad definition of “expropriation.” For details see Wenhua Shan, Legal Framework, pp. 194, 315. 63 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID CASE No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 103, emphasis added. 64 According to UNCTAD, by November 2005 there had been 219 investment treatybased arbitration cases, among which more than two thirds were initiated since 2002. In other words, on average more than 30 cases had been launched each year in the last four years. Almost all these cases were brought by investors against states, and developing states are the worst victims. Among them, Argentina topped the league table with 42 cases, which accounted for nearly 20 percent of the total caseload. In the year 2003 alone, there were 20 cases against Argentina, accounting for nearly half of the total investment arbitration caseload worldwide, creating a miracle in world arbitration history! 65 See Wenhua Shan, Legal Framework, pp. 201, 318. 66 One commentator observed that the net consequence of these measures for the utility companies was “a roughly two-thirds reduction in income.” 67 The lawyers’ charge for the plaintiffs are about the same amount. See UNCTAD, Issues Related to Investment Arrangements: Investor-State Disputes and Policy Implication, TD/B/COM.2/62 (14 January 2005), p. 7.

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  77 68 Indeed, the CMS award, the first of the many Argentine cases, has required Argentina to pay the company US$1330 million. See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor–State Disputes Settlement, IIA Monitor No. 4 (2005) (UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/ IIT/2005/2), p. 6. See also Luke Peterson, “Argentina moves to annul award in dispute with CMS Company over financial crisis,” Investment Treaty News (ITN), 26 October 2005, posted at www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/ (accessed on 11 February 2006), pp. 4–6. 69 Luke Peterson, ibid. 70 Article 7, Sino-UK BIT. 71 For details see Wenhua Shan, Legal Framework, pp. 212, 321. 72 The 27 BITs are with Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, the Czech Republic (2005), Djibouti, Finland (2004), Germany (2003), Guyana, Jordan (2001), Kenya, Latvia, Mozambique, Myanmar, the Netherlands (2001), Portugal (2005), Russia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Spain (2005), Sweden (2004), Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, and Vanuatu. Seven Chinese BITs offer access to ad hoc international arbitration for all investment disputes without referring to the ICSID arbitration. They are BITs with Brunei Darussalam, North Korea, India, Iran, Namibia, Nigeria (2001), and South Africa. The Sino-Indian BIT also indicates that, in case both parties become member states of the ICSID Convention, state–investor disputes can be submitted to the ICSID for arbitration. (India has not yet joined the ICSID Convention.) 73 The eight BITs are with Barbados, Cyprus, Germany (2003), Guyana, Myanmar, the Netherlands (2001), Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia. 74 In the case of Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Spain, the ICSID tribunal decided that the MFN in a BIT may have the effect of extending benefits contained in procedural provisions. See Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Spain Case, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, paras. 38–64. 75 Some cases are affirmative of the doctrine, such as Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/02/8), Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004 (Siemens v. Argentina), para. 103; Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/03/7), Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005, paras. 120–1. Other cases actually answered in the negative, such as Salini Construttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Case No. ARB/02/13), Decision of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction of 29 November 2004 (Salini v. Jordan), paras. 117–18; Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (Case No. ARB/03/24), Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 February 2005 (Plama v. Bulgaria), paras. 183–227. 76 John H Jackson, “The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 36 (157): 170–88. 77 Article 16 (4), Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (accessed on 25 December 2006). 78 Ibid, Article 16 (5). 79 The Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China, together with the Working Party Report and schedules of commitments, is available at the WTO website: www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (accessed on 25 December 2006). 80 The Foreign Trade Law was revised in April 2004 and is available at www.law-lib. com/law/ (visited on 25 December 2006). For details of the changes to Chinese FDI laws see Wenhua Shan, Legal Framework, pp. 46–51. 81 For details of such new legislation, see The New Compilation of Laws, Regulations and Ministerial Rules on Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “the New Compilation”), edited by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (now the Ministry of Commerce, the MOFCOM), in Chinese (place: Law Press, 2002). 82 The WTO Agreement expressly confirms that “The WTO shall have legal personality,

78  Shan

83

84 85 86 87

88 89 90 91 92 93 94

95 96

97

and shall be accorded by each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions.” See Article 8 (1), the WTO Agreement. The WTO Ministerial Conference and the General Council, for example, have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Further, in exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. See Article 9 (2–3), the WTO Agreement. Article 6 (1), the WTO Agreement. See Article 9 (2), the WTO Agreement. For details of the WTO voting system see Article 9 (1–5), the WTO Agreement. The WTO itself considers that “Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and the WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the global economy.” The WTO: Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, posted at www. wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (accessed on 25 December 2006). Article 4, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU), available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.doc (accessed on 25 December 2006). Ibid., Article 6. Ibid. Ibid., Articles 16 and 19. Ibid., Article 22. Ibid., Article 22 (6). The four specific criteria check whether the panel had: (1) exceeded its authority or terms of reference; (2) added to the obligations, or diminished the rights, of the United States; (3) acted arbitrarily or capriciously or engaged in misconduct, etc.; or (4) deviated from the applicable standard of review including that in Article 17 (6) of the antidumping text. Jackson, “Sovereignty Debate,” pp. 186–7. Ibid., p. 186. Article 7of the Order prescribes that: “[w]hen a people’s court hears international trade administration cases, it shall apply the laws and administrative regulations of the People’s Republic of China, and local regulations relating to or having an effect on international trade, as laid down by local legislatures within their legislative competence. Such local legislation applies only to its own local administrative regions.” Thus it does not uphold the direct applicability of international trade treaties such as the WTO Agreement. The Order, nevertheless, provides that: “[I]n case there are two or more interpretations of the concrete provisions in applicable laws and regulations, and one of such interpretations is in conformity with relevant provisions of an international treaty that China has concluded or participated in, the people’s court shall choose the interpretation that conforms to the international treaty provisions, except the case that China has lodged a reservation to such provisions.” See Articles 7 and 9, the Supreme People’s Court Order on Certain Issues Concerning the Hearing of International Trade Administration Cases, The Supreme People’s Court Fashi No. [2002] 27 (27 August 2002). In other international economic areas, we can also see China being a very active participant. For example, in the banking and financial law area, China is an active member of the IMF and the IBRD, as well as of the ICSID and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In regional economic integration, which China opposed initially, China has take impressive steps, particularly in engaging in free trade agreement negotiations with countries in the Asia-Pacific regions, such as ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, and with Middle Asian states under the “Shanghai Five” mechanism.

Redefining the Chinese concept of sovereignty  79 98 It is notable that China’s general opposition to humanitarian intervention activities does not prevent her from increasingly participating in UN peacekeeping activities. Since 1990, China has sent 465 Military Observers to UN-led authorities such as UNSTO, UNIKOM, UNTAC, MINURSO, ONUMOZ, UNOMIL and UNOMSIL. In 1992, she sent an army of 800 engineers to the UNTAC. In 1997, China decided that she should, in principle, participate in UN peacekeeping arrangements, and provide, when appropriate, military observers, civil police force, engineering, medical, transportation, and other logistic personnel. So far four Chinese peacekeeping personnel have died when performing their duties. See PLA Daily, “China Participates in Peacekeeping Activities in a Positive and Practical Manner,” posted at www.pladaily.com. cn/item/peace/ (accessed on 23 December 2006). 99 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 26 September 1991, emphasis added. 100 Wen Jiabao, “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development, Speech at a Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” reprinted in the Chinese Journal of International Law 3 (363): 365 (2004), emphasis added. 101 State Council Press Office, China’s Approach of Peaceful Development (December 2005), parts II and V. 102 China News Agency, “Hu Made Important Speech at the CPC Foreign Affairs Meeting,” 23 August 2006, posted at www.chinanews.com.cn/ (accessed on 16 September 2006). 103 Liu Zhenmin, “Guoji Zhixu yu Zhongguo de Heping Fazhan” (International Order and China’s Peaceful Development), Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 10 (2005), part II. Also available at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/ (accessed on 15 September 2007). 104 It is drawn on the basis of the bitter semicolonial history, and constitutes the very core of the “inviolability of sovereignty” doctrine. 105 Most of these conventions are on collective or group human rights treaties with regard to women, racial discrimination, refugees, apartheid, torture, and children. In this respect, the most remarkable development is reflected in China’s signing in 1998 of the two basic human rights covenants, of which one, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has been ratified by the Chinese government recently. Steps are also being seriously taken for ratifying the other, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 106 Li commented, “A century of humiliation, domination, and oppression at the hands of foreign imperialism, has convinced the Chinese that, without national independence, there would be no guarantee for their basic human rights .  .  . Culturally, the traditional Chinese notion perceived the meaning of human beings from their social being in an intricate web of social relationship rather than from their atomized autonomy. Thus, values such as liberty and autonomy were not prized as the ends in themselves in the way as they have been in the Western nations. This does not suggest that there is no respect for human dignity in the Chinese cultural context, but rather its basis is different. Respect for human dignity as viewed by the Chinese, lies in the integrity of harmonic and orderly social bonds and is meant to be exercised for the purpose of fostering collective welfare through both moral exhortation internalized in the individual and by means of the legal restriction of government power vis-à-vis individual.” See Zhaojie Li, “Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary International Legal Order,” Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 5 (314): 325. 107 My double-layer approach is largely inspired by Rousseau’s Social Contract and the Discourses, in which, in upholding his view that sovereignty is indivisible, he criticized political theorists for dividing sovereignty according to its object, and for taking the application of sovereignty as components of sovereignty itself. Jean-Jacques

80  Shan Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses, translated by G. G. H. Cole, revised edition (place: David Campbell Publishers, 1993), pp. 200–1. 108 Jennings, “Sovereignty and International Law,” pp. 34–5. 109 Rousseau wrote in Social Contract and Discourses (p. 21) that, “If we examined the other divisions in the same manner, we should find that, whenever Sovereignty seems to be divided, there is an illusion: the rights which are taken as being part of Sovereignty are really all subordinate, and always imply supreme will of which they only sanction the execution.”

4 Sovereignty in exercise Constructing political Chinese-ness in post-1997 Hong Kong Tok Sow Keat

The Hong Kong Paradox In recent years, Hong Kong’s political circle, the academia, the media, and the interested public were locked in a seemingly pointless – yet curiously interesting – debate: Who can provide the most reliable estimate of headcount for various key street demonstrations, littered throughout the Special Administrative Region’s political calendar? Far-ranging estimates, provided by various interest groups, offered the ingredients for incessant squabbling and media attention. All claimed that their numbers were derived from gathered “evidence” generated by either scientific means or census on the ground, and they were all adamant to hold their ground and slug it out. This little episode highlights the culture of street demonstrations that has developed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) over these years. The practice of mass protest has perhaps become one of the most prevalent political activities engaged by Hong Kongers today. One commentator recently claimed that the HKSAR, sensationally dubbed the “city of protest” by the Washington Post in 2000, averaged as many as five demonstrations of various sizes each day since the handover.1 Though real statistical evidence is lacking, the frequency of demonstrations is unmistakable. The debate on headcount is but one of the many public discourses stemming from this culture, and such discourses are invariably interwoven in the normal lives of average Hong Kongers. Occurrences of demonstration in the HKSAR cross the political–societal divide, making it difficult for one to pin it down as altogether either a political or a societal phenomenon. Although somewhat inconsequential to the central theme of this chapter, this observation brings to surface a paradox that prompted this research. On the one hand, these demonstrations attracted keen attention from international media. Their increasing frequency is often touted as a display of Hong Kongers’ rousing aspirations for democracy, and their mounting defiance against the “oppressive regime” in Beijing. These mass incidents are also picked up by opinion leaders – both local and abroad – to carry their agenda. On the other hand, comprehensive survey results suggest that Hong Kongers’ faith in the mainland government has

82  Tok in fact risen over these years; whereas they previously saw themselves more as “Hong Kong citizens,” the residents of Hong Kong are now more prepared to accept their new identity as Chinese nationals. According to the Public Opinion Programme conducted by Hong Kong University (HKUPOP), the trust–distrust ratio towards Beijing increased from 32.4:29.8 in late 1997 to 48.5:18.7 in the first half of 2006, and the difference between the ratings (on a scale of 1–10) of identifying oneself as a Hong Kong citizen and a Chinese one has narrowed, with a mere 0.11, or 1 percentage point, separating the two ratings by the first half of 2006.2 Pointing out this paradox is by no means an attempt to discount the political undercurrents driving mass demonstrations in the HKSAR. The paradox does, however, raise important questions. What has brought about this contradiction? What has Beijing done to resolve its differences with the HKSAR? Is Beijing moving in the right direction? How will this act eventually play out? This chapter seeks to answer these questions in three sections. The first part provides a brief conceptual framework to the idea of “Chinese-ness” that forms the basis of analyses in this research. The second section runs though the two main periods of political development in Hong Kong, using the mass demonstration on 1 July 2003 as a divider. It particularly focuses on Beijing’s new policies and maneuvers, namely economic offensive and institutionalization and rationalization of central–local relations, as foundations on which Hong Kong’s new political Chinese-ness is actualized. The third section reviews the internal dynamics as well as the external factors that have bearings on this political Chinese-ness. Uncertainty lingers as Beijing itself has to come to terms with this new Chinese-ness, a process no less challenging than getting Hong Kongers to accept it.

By virtue of being “Chinese”: the political aspect [O]ur understanding of Chinese-ness must recognize the following: it is living and changeable; it is also a product of a shared historical experience whose record has continually influenced its growth; it has become increasingly a self-conscious matter for China; and it should be related to what appears to be, or to have been, Chinese in the eyes of non-Chinese.3 As are other forms of identity, being Chinese is constructed through a two-stage process. The first involves an act of association, or “identification with” (to borrow the concept introduced by Sigmund Freud), a particular individual or collective, as is the case when the child identifies with her parents and siblings, or the countryman with his country.4 In simpler terms, this is a process that “pulls” an individual or a collective to another. The second phase engages the deed of differentiation, that is, the process of defining self from others.5 “The process of separating . . . an identity from those surrounding it begins in differentiation,” claimed Ann Norton in her opening paragraph in Reflections on Political Identity, and “the first knowledge of the self is knowledge of alienation.”6 Both stages take into

Sovereignty in exercise  83 account a complexity of criteria: ethnicity, religion, geography, icons, bloodlines, oaths, class, ideology, to name but a few from a virtually endless list. Commonness, as well as difference, forms the fundamental basis of the Chinese identity. Political Chinese-ness Identity itself is a vague and controversial concept, let alone political identity. The latter concept is all too often taken for granted; most of us talk about political identity as if we already know what it means, and it is all too easy to lump in all the different criteria when looking out for one, inasmuch as W. J. M. Mackenzie criticized the concept as constantly being “vulgarised” in the literature.7 When is an identity political? Figuratively, it is when political lines are drawn on the identity, as Figure 4.1 below shows. Supposing that an individual identifies himself only as X, he is said to possess political identity X only when he exhibits motivation to serve that identity through political means in times of need. Identity, when lacking political expressions of sorts, cannot be considered “political.” In a real-life situation, for example, Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, California, cannot be said to possess a Hispanic political identity unless their political awareness as members of the local ethnic community is “awakened”; they have to appreciate their Hispanic origins as different from other ethnic groupings

Figure 4.1  Identity and political identity.

84  Tok (differentiation), and be willing to serve those interests (identification and aggregation of interests), even if it involves political actions. In short, (political) agency is the critical threshold that separates identity from political identity. Extending this concept, political identities are formed when political lines are drawn across different national ideals, state institutions, cultural and value systems, economic activities, methods of interest formulation and geographical– spatial belonging. If we were able to piece all these into one large picture, an individual’s or a group’s overall political identity would be exhibited by the area in which all pieces overlap (Figure 4.2). These criteria are, again, arbitrary and by no means exhaustive, and this arbitrariness is represented by identities X, Y and Z in the diagram. This figure also serves to show that (i), since it is based on one’s ontological experience, political identity (as do other forms of identity) involves a complex decision-making process that is both emotional as well as cognitive – just as a newly-born infant cannot have any identity, much less political identity; (ii) since political identity is fluid and arbitrary, it can be constructed to fit one’s purpose(s), and shaped according to the needs of the political environment – by simply expanding, contracting, adding, as well as removing, the different criteria that are “integral” to the political identity. Political identity is itself fluid, and so is the process of creating it. Contrary to Mackenzie’s advice, this chapter finds it necessary to vulgarize, to a certain degree, the definition of this concept in order to proceed with its empirical analysis. Despite its inadequacies, a working definition is used for this research. “Political identity” – or, for the purposes of this chapter, “political Chinese-ness” – is loosely defined as one that is constructed through a process of aggregation (“politics”) to serve common purpose(s) and a common future. It can be achieved by selectively cultivating the different criteria that forms the whole.

Figure 4.2  Political Chinese-ness.

Sovereignty in exercise  85 This definition is a departure from those commonly offered in the literature, which usually treat the Chinese national identity as the primary, if not the sole, expression of Hong Kong’s political Chinese-ness.8 Of course, the issue comes back to the idea of the “nation,” which in a broad sense can cover a huge expanse of those identities discussed so far. Indeed, this chapter finds this definition too broad to be analytically useful. Statistics mentioned earlier has shown that Hong Kongers today have little trouble identifying themselves as Chinese citizens. It appears that political tensions in the HKSAR stem from issues that cannot be explained simply by a vague idea of ‘national identity’. A more robust definition of political identity is necessary. In this chapter, three areas are particularly highlighted: state identity, national identity, and economic identity. Development of these three identities constitutes the basic approach that Beijing has adopted, over different spans of time, to instill political Chinese-ness in the Hong Kong populace. As much as a political identity is created to exclude, political Chinese-ness can also be seen as a loosely defined concept that seeks to accommodate new collectives that have emerged under the political umbrella of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing. For Hong Kong, this is the difficult undertaking of addressing the diverse range of political interests found in the HKSAR, consolidating and reshaping them so that a fairly contiguous political identity with a shared vision of the future can be forged.

Constructing Chinese-ness in Hong Kong Beijing’s wish for a peaceful and stable transition for Hong Kong is strongly motivated by its unresolved sovereignty issues, namely (then) Macao (since returned, in 1999) and Taiwan. Post-handover Hong Kong is consistently placed under intense international limelight, since Beijing–HKSAR relations remain an undisputed barometer for China’s attitude towards its territorial sovereignty. To Beijing, Hong Kong holds the key to building China’s new international image, in particular following the Tiananmen incident of 1989 and the collapse of the ideologically-driven Cold War order in the early 1990s. Beijing’s commitment to rejoin, and be accepted as a member of, the international community depends heavily on the fate of post-handover Hong Kong. Ceded to the British after the Opium War in 1842, the former Crown Colony of Hong Kong had developed in an entirely different trajectory from mainland China. Undoubtedly, the establishment of the Communist regime in China and the onset of the Cold War had accentuated the differences. Compared with the centrally planned economy in mainland China prior to Deng Xiaoping’s “open door” policy, Hong Kong runs a capitalist economy, and its economic achievements are phenomenal. Hong Kong’s GDP per capita in 1997 was US$27,211, 35 times higher than China’s meager US$772.9 This has given rise to a social structure that is predominantly middle class, and thus different from that on the mainland. In addition, as a British protectorate, generations of Hong Kongers had undergone an entirely different system of social upbringing, from education to ideological indoctrination. Although they readily identified themselves as ethnically and

86  Tok culturally Chinese, Hong Kongers were by far less willing to see eye to eye with the idea of being politically Chinese, especially when this sense of Chinese-ness is defined in terms of the state and institutions on mainland China. Despite its close proximity to the mainland, Hong Kong has persistently struggled against the political influence of mainland China, to the extent that it has maintained the systems of traditional (complex) Chinese characters and Mandarin Phonetic Symbols – as is the case in Taiwan – despite official adaptation of the systems of simplified characters and the Hanyu Pinyin on the mainland since the late 1970s. Average Hong Kongers see little future in a Hong Kong under Beijing’s rule, duly reflected in mass exodus of Hong Kongers to foreign lands in the lead-up to the handover. The political differences between Hong Kong and the mainland were further widened through accelerated democratization by the British colonial government in the 1990s. All these contributed very little to mollifying the mutual apprehensions, much less building a common political identity, between peoples from Hong Kong and the mainland. Given these major gaps, the retrocession exercise in 1997 was certainly far from a simple one. Hence, Deng’s promise of “one country, two systems” came as a brilliant, even if temporary, response to address the glaring differences between Hong Kong and mainland China. Differences were put aside as Hong Kong was allowed to keep its “capitalist” character, buttressed by provisions (in the Basic Law) of private property rights, guarantees of “freedom” (of speech, to organize, of the press, etc.), and the maintenance of the common law previously in force in colonial Hong Kong.10 The “two systems” arrangement clearly sought to evade the big question on Hong Kong’s political future by a further 50 years, at the same time as the mainland grapples with its own as it probes its way on its reformist path. For these reasons, in addition to Beijing’s desire to build up its international creditability, the “one country, two systems” arrangement defied earlier skepticism to be largely preserved after the handover. Whereas the Chinese negotiators appeared rather determined and uncompromising against their British counterparts during the negotiation phase, Beijing eased off its pressures on Hong Kong immediately after the handover. Beijing’s promise of “Hong Kong administered by people of Hong Kong” was, by and large, kept intact despite its compulsion for further political integration and control.11 From 1 July 1997 to 1 July 2003: laissez-faire management Beijing withdrew its strong political presence from HKSAR immediately after the handover. Hong Kong virtually disappeared from Beijing’s top political agenda, and the power to handle relevant Hong Kong issues was decentralized to various bureaucratic agencies. In reality, sovereignty over the territory is exercised through bureaucratic presence, in place of direct political control. Politically, Beijing introduced Chinese-ness in the form of bureaucratic controls to the HKSAR. This is reflected in changes to its institutional representations in Hong Kong. In place of the highly politicized Preliminary Working Committee

Sovereignty in exercise  87 (PWC), the HKSAR Basic Law Committee, under the National People’s Congress, was formed. Hong Kong’s affairs that warrant national attention and deliberation are thus confined to issues pertaining to the Basic Law. With the PWC now defunct, also gone was the high-profile leadership (under Qian Qichen) once attached to the body. The Basic Law Committee is under the charge of lowerranking party officials who are non-members of the Central Committee.12 Under the auspices of the State Council, several agencies have been established or relocated to the territory. The Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua) is formally renamed the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR (CLO). The nominal links to Xinhua were officially removed and the CLO now comes directly under the purview of the State Council. The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office under China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which until the mid-1990s represented PRC’s interests in Hong Kong’s external relations – was closed down. In its place, the Office of Commissioner of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in HKSAR, again newly located in the territory, was founded. A third institution is the PLA Hong Kong Garrison, which to date has avoided all activities that might suggest the army’s sticking its nose in Hong Kong affairs. So far, the Garrison seems solely interested in building its public image and performing its duty as a pro forma detachment in showcasing Chinese sovereignty. The bulk of responsibility for day-to-day governance falls under the HKSAR government. Administratively, the local government inherited a highly efficient bureaucracy from its colonial past, and its respective departments and agencies were led by capable top civil servants whose experiences were similarly drawn from their services during the colonial days. Judicially – notwithstanding the disassociation from the British Privy Council – the British system of law has largely been preserved. Politically, power is constitutionally shared between the Executive Council and the Legislative Council (Legco), and is thus functionally analogous to the colonial political structures that had existed prior to handover. Beijing’s promise of a highly autonomous post-handover Hong Kong is philosophically little different from London’s laissez-faire approach prior to handover.13 As clearly laid out in the Basic Law, provisions that guaranteed the rights of the HKSAR and its residents are regarded as holy writ for all administrators of post-handover Hong Kong. Status quo was laboriously maintained, as if time had frozen at the point of handover. Conceptually, by drawing back some of its overbearing political weight, Beijing played down the role of the state in the HKSAR’s affairs. Implemented measures to cultivate state identity were limited, and were mainly confined to symbolic displays and for administrative purposes: the presence of the PLA Garrison, flying the flag of the People’s Republic of China (together with the regional flag of the HKSAR), changing of passports and identity cards, and the red Royal Mail post office boxes painted green, quipped one commentator.14 The broadcasting and singing of the Chinese national anthem was not even insisted upon during this early stage, except on special occasions. Economics-wise, the HKSAR retained most of its character as a market

88  Tok economy. The territory’s legal status in international economic bodies, like AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), though debated, has never been withdrawn. Macroeconomic decisions, for example, like that of defending the Hong Kong dollar against speculative trading in October 1997 and subsequent decisions in managing the Asian financial crisis, gave the impression that Beijing resisted the temptation to intervene in Hong Kong’s economic affairs.15 Fiscally, the HKSAR also retains its budgetary autonomy. Thus, as Figure 4.3 shows, in the six years that marked this stage of HKSAR’s political development, most effort was devoted to cultivating a sense of national unity, rather than state or economic commonness. Even so, the introduction of national emblems and education by public officials were token at best, half-hearted and resisted by Hong Kongers in most cases. In the meanwhile, social, economic, and cultural exchanges deepened with gradual relaxation of cross-border regulations. Whereas more than 95 percent of HKSAR residents unable to speak Mandarin – putonghua, the spoken form of standard Chinese – had made no attempt to learn just a few years back, Hong Kongers today regard learning the language as integral to their personal and career development.16 Beijing’s priority in retaining the administrative and economic cultures of Hong Kong necessitated the maintenance of separate institutions, which in turn affects the political identities, between the mainland and the HKSAR. The promise to keep Hong Kong “as it was” forbade more overt policies to build on other forms of political recognition. Although this move has successfully sidestepped their differences, it has also failed to resolve the most fundamental contradictions between the mainland and the HKSAR. The different senses of political purpose

Figure 4.3  Constructing political Chinese-ness prior to 1 July 2003.

Sovereignty in exercise  89 and future can hardly be decisively bridged simply by perfunctorily celebrating a common National Day, or saluting the same flag or singing the same anthem (though these help); the sense of commonness needs to be more interwoven in the daily routines of the common people, building on the principles and institutions on which they order their lives. Reordering and reaffirming the HKSAR’s economic and political structures On 1 July 2003, the biggest demonstration in the history of the HKSAR took place amidst celebratory moods in Beijing for the sixth anniversary of the HKSAR’s return to the mainland. An estimated 500,000 people went on the streets in the HKSAR in protest against an anti-subversion law proposed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Government.17 The issue, related to Article 23 of the Basic Law (hence commonly referred to as the Article 23 Incident),18 had been on the table since mid-2002. Fear that the new law would curtail the civil liberties of Hong Kongers ignited the already simmering sentiments in the territory. The unexpectedly massive turnout on that day sent shockwaves through both the Tung Chee Hwa administration and the top leadership in Beijing. The turnout on 1 July, however, should be put in the context of the social and economic difficulties facing Hong Kong since its return to the mainland. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 had cast a shadow of fear amongst those in the HKSAR and set back the territory’s economy by another year. In the years preceding 2003, the HKSAR was hit by crisis after crisis, beginning with the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the avian flu in 1997, 1999, and 2003, and the rupture of the bubble property market in 1999. The HKSAR economy had been riding on a roller-coaster, its GDP growth fluctuating between –2.3 percent and 10.5 percent in the six years. Structural problems in the economy surfaced. As property prices continued to plummet, driving many households into negative equity, the pressure on reducing wages became so powerful and painful that it hurt the erstwhile dynamic consumer market in the territory. At the same time as the private sector revised its wage structure, the public sector was forced to perform its own review on the salary scale of civil servants, but not before public outcries and government fiscal difficulties knocked the sense out of bureaucratic foot-dragging. This combination of factors gave rise to a deflation pattern that lasted 65 consecutive months in the HKSAR, from March 1999 to July 2004.19 Mounting dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the HKSAR provided the necessary ingredients for public indifference towards the Tung administration. Perceived incompetence of the HKSAR government led to heightened political awareness and activism amongst the Hong Kong population. This perception was particularly acute during the SARS epidemic, when the Hong Kong public readily mobilized itself to deal with the outbreak as public health officials showed neither the imagination nor the initiative to contain the situation.20 This was further fueled by the general impression of cronyism in the top ranks of the HKSAR government, where the interests of Hong Kong’s business community supersede

90  Tok the interests of average Hong Kongers. This impression was especially reinforced when Tung, then Chief Executive, who was formerly a successful businessman with reportedly close connections to the Beijing leadership, was appointed to a second term in 2002 despite his abysmal performance during his first term and was visibly unpopular with the Hong Kong residents. A vast majority of the Hong Kong population become increasingly disaffected, heightening further demands for political accountability. Beijing reacted quickly to this rapid deterioration in its political control over the HKSAR. National education was given a newfound priority. Government publicity campaign began to emphasize “one country” more than the “two systems” that had been prevalent in previous drives. HKSAR authorities were under increasing pressures from their mainland counterparts to air the national anthem in various media.21 Schools were also “encouraged” to teach students the national anthem when no such guidelines had existed previously. Beijing thus jettisoned its aloof attitude toward the HKSAR to take a more proactive participation and, at times, strategic intervention in the territory’s state of affairs. At the same time as the drive to build a national identity intensified, China’s top leadership also initiated other plans. In fact, some of these plans for damage control began well before the 1 July demonstration took place. Two major thrusts can be identified from early 2003 onward: the first involves an economic offensive, and the second the institutionalization and rationalization of the Beijing–HKSAR relationship. Economic offensive This plan began in the form of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which began negotiation in January 2002. The agreement calls for a phased-in integration of economies on the mainland and the HKSAR. This is planned to be a comprehensive agreement that grants special access to Hong Kong-based business in the mainland market. It includes zero tariffs on all manufactured goods from the HKSAR, and the transferability of Hong Kong services providers to the mainland, amongst other measures to facilitate trade and investments.22 The arrangement laid down an ambitious timetable to achieve full liberalization by 1 January 2006. It might be noted that a reciprocity arrangement has yet to be established for mainland firms to expand their operations in the HKSAR, making CEPA an economic and political favor that runs unidirectionally from Beijing to Hong Kong. The CEPA was pushed through bureaucratic red tape and concluded and signed within 18 months of its conception despite its slow start at the negotiation table. Beijing and the HKSAR were previously locked in a tussle over the finer details of the arrangement.23 As late as late November 2002, China’s Vice-Minister of Commerce, An Min, was quoted as saying that the negotiations were fraught with difficulties, but in a rapid alteration of circumstances Tung announced in his policy address on 8 January 2003 that Beijing had agreed to accelerating the negotiations.24 The official signing of the agreement was deliberately scheduled for

Sovereignty in exercise  91 30 June 2003 (the ceremony was later rescheduled to a day earlier, 29 June 2003), on the eve of the massive 1 July demonstration. The political nature of this agreement was further enhanced by the high-profile presence of the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, at the signing ceremony, and his reiteration, during the ceremony, that the central government will “unswervingly commit itself to the policies of ‘one country, two systems’, ‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong’ and a high degree of autonomy and the Basic Law of Hong Kong,” and that “these set policies of the Central Government towards Hong Kong will not change.”25 These were presumably efforts at dampening the anti-Tung, anti-Beijing emotions in the HKSAR by late June 2003. On the same day as CEPA was signed, the HKSAR government also announced the easing of regulations for mainland tourists to visit the HKSAR, beginning from 28 July 2003. Dubbed the Individual Visit Scheme, the initial plan was to allow residents of four cities in China’s Guangdong province to visit Hong Kong on individual tourist visas. This facilitated the influx of mainland tourists, who until then had had to sign up to package tours in order to visit the territory. The plan was later extended to residents of some 44 Chinese cities by the first half of 2006.26 The economic benefit brought about by this scheme is questionable, as arrivals from mainland China registered a mere 2.4 percent growth in 2005.27 But the political significance is substantial, as it gave a strong boost to the morale of HKSAR’s tourism sector following the devastating effects of the SARS epidemic. Institutionalization and rationalization The effects of Beijing’s economic offensive, however, need time to take effect, thus came in too late to appease the dissatisfaction in the HKSAR. Political tensions continue to escalate for the subsequent eight months after the 1 July demonstration. This was much owing to the dynamic interactions between various political forces in the territory. The fateful Tiananmen incident and the subsequent political reforms initiated by the British colonial government in Hong Kong in the 1990s transformed the politics in the territory. The Hong Kong civil service, its various professional bodies and other social groups became highly politicized as a result. A chaotic political landscape began to emerge by the mid-1990s, as local political personalities frequently switched allegiance between the Chinese and British camps in exchange for political favors.28 Over time, these embattled political elites became highly fragmented and weakened. The plight of these elites deteriorated after the handover, thanks to Deng’s “two systems” deal. With the departure of the British, the leftover vacuum was not effectively replaced by a Beijing that was reluctant to preside over affairs in Hong Kong. Instead, problem-solving in the territory was left to an administrative structure whose constituents are inherently in conflict with each other. The Basic Law carved out two different centers of loyalty and accountability in Hong Kong’s political structure: the executive branch owes its existence to its political overlord in Beijing, and is thus more responsive to the demands emanating from the

92  Tok center; meanwhile, the legislative branch works on the logic of popular legitimacy at the local level. This contradiction becomes more acute when the Legco lacks the institutional power to balance the office of Chief Executive under the Basic Law. This leads to a propensity for local politicians to mobilize the masses in order to achieve political goals. More often than not, these mobilizations involve radicalizing a broad range of issues that are in opposition to the Chief Executive’s agenda, accounting for the standoffish nature of two branches.29 This also produced two broad and diffuse political groupings in the HKSAR: those who gravitate toward Beijing versus those who ride on local popular support – often in the name of “democracy” – which are conveniently labeled “pro-Beijing” and “pro-democracy” respectively. To broaden their political base, the so-called pro-democrats need to build upon popular sentiments as they struggle against the more established pro-Beijing factions in Hong Kong’s crowded public scene. This tussle is often regarded as a zero-sum game. Posturing as alternatives to Beijing’s communist (painted as authoritarian) regime and the latter’s cronies in the HKSAR, the pro-democrats gain at the expense of the pro-Beijing camp. Their respective political identities lack a common denominator; their deeply ingrained differences have spiraled over time, and no easy solution is visible over the horizon. The mass turnout on 1 July 2003 gave the pro-democrats a popular agenda in which they claimed their own. Their strong mandate in Hong Kong’s district elections in November 2003 further strengthened their resolve to press their advantage further. They became more confrontational, and overt pressures were exerted on Beijing to accelerate democratic reforms in the HKSAR, starting with demands for constitutional changes that allow universal suffrage in the 2007 Chief Executive elections and 2008 Legco elections. Fearing loss of control over the developments in Hong Kong, low-level, pro-Beijing politicians and bureaucrats initiated a name-calling campaign in February 2004. A debate on “patriotism” ensued, as both camps attempted to control the discourse that Hong Kong should only be governed by “patriots.”30 Beijing finally made its move in March 2004, when a special meeting was convened by the Basic Law committee after the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC). An interpretation of the statutes of Basic Law regarding elections and universal suffrage in the HKSAR was proposed, and subsequently passed by the Standing Committee of the NPC on 6 April 2004. The point of interest here is not the interpretation itself, but the channel through which China’s top leadership passed the decision. The legal approach that Beijing adopted was a striking departure from its usual practice of ideological or mass mobilization. On finer details, the clarifications on the legislative process and provisions such as “a need to amend,” “reported . . . for approval,” and “reported . . . for the record” serve to put an end to all ambiguities surrounding the articles, and properly structured the HKSAR’s legislative and executive branches within the state of the People’s Republic of China. By referring to Article 158 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that “[t]he power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,” Beijing legally

Sovereignty in exercise  93 sidestepped the “two systems” framework, thereby preserving its original political undertaking; legitimately exerting political control and thus offering political solutions to the situation without falling back on extreme measures.31 Then, responding to discontentment towards Tung, Beijing offered an amicable exit for the unpopular Chief Executive by nominating Tung to the vicechairmanship of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2005, a year after the law interpretation. This was facilitated by the HKSAR’s economic recovery in 2004, an election victory by pro-Beijing parties in September of the same year, and Jiang Zemin’s – widely seen as the political patron of Tung – retirement from all public offices. Tung’s popular deputy, then Chief Secretary Donald Tsang, took over the office with immediate effect. This was then followed by another interpretation of the Basic Law, one that decreed the term of Tsang’s office, in April 2005.32 Together with previous interpretations, this legal interpretation reaffirmed the primacy of the NPC, and thus the primacy of those state institutions vested in Beijing, rounding up all efforts to institutionalize and rationalize Beijing–HKSAR relations. Building a common economic and state identity in Hong Kong Through reordering and reaffirming the economic and political structures in the HKSAR, Beijing is effectively reasserting its control over the territory. A new approach to building political Chinese-ness is adopted. As Figure 4.4 below demonstrates, political Chinese-ness in the HKSAR no longer rests upon the single focus on building a national identity. Building common economic and state identities are also pursued by Beijing through its policy changes.

Figure 4.4  Constructing political Chinese-ness from 1 July 2003.

94  Tok A common economic identity was cultivated through deepening economic relations between the HKSAR and the mainland. A web of economic interdependency was woven between the two economic bodies through Beijing’s economic offensive, such that an economic future is virtually inconceivable except one that includes both the HKSAR and the mainland. Likewise, the institutionalization and rationalization of the state structure builds up a common state identity that is centered upon Beijing. It sends out a clear message, that the “two systems” that the HKSAR enjoys today must inevitably accept the premiss of “one country.” The fate of the HKSAR – and thus all political developments in the territory – is intertwined with the fate of the regime in Beijing. A common political future is thus forged. All political forces in the HKSAR must learn to work within this context in order to perpetuate their hold on their agenda and power. Deviation from what is defined by Beijing could possibly endanger this delicate relationship and jeopardize what is conceived as the common political future. These senses of commonness contribute to the overall political Chinese-ness. They make political Chinese-ness in the HKSAR dynamically more robust and stable, for failing of one is unlikely to bring down the entirety.

An uncertain future? Recent surveys show that Hong Kongers are generally more satisfied with current political, cultural, and social conditions than they were in the first six months after the handover (see Figure 4.5 below). Dissatisfaction has dropped to a new low, according to the polls. Dissatisfaction with the HKSAR’s political conditions in the first half of 2006 was the second lowest (half-year average) recorded since the HKUPOP began in 1992, at 25.3 percent, while dissatisfaction with the economic conditions was at an all-time low of 19.2 percent. General confidence level has risen, with more than 50 percent of respondents foreseeing better political, economic and social conditions in the HKSAR in the years ahead.33 Other signs are equally promising. Confidence toward the “one country, two systems” arrangement is at an all-time high (Figure 4.6). Apprehension, although not at its lowest, has been in decline since the first half of 2003. There is an upward trend detected in Hong Kongers’ trust toward Beijing over the past three years, at the same time as distrust towards the central government hits its lowest in the first six months of 2006 (Figure 4.7). The situation appears to be that Beijing’s new initiatives have achieved the desired effects. Satisfaction rises when expectations and reality meet, and these new policies and measures, in tandem with granting more concessions to the HKSAR, also helped to develop a common outlook of political Chinese-ness through the reshaping of expectations. But is this enough? Politics is not static and does not always operate within a pre-ordained structure; evolution of internal dynamics, as well as the presence of externalities, put pressure on the structure to constantly evolve with those changes. In the HKSAR, while this new political Chinese-ness is in the process of construction, it continues to face challenges from different directions.

Sovereignty in exercise  95

Figure 4.5  People’s satisfaction with political, economic and social conditions in Hong Kong (half-year average). Source: HKUPOP, http://hkupop.hku.hk.

Internal struggle over the political agenda continues. As exhibited in the polling results, after the series of interventions by Beijing, the general public in the HKSAR became more satisfied with conditions in the territory. They became less confrontational and more willing to put trust in the central government in Beijing. This significantly eroded the political base of the pro-democrats in the HKSAR, as their more radical approach has found fewer audiences amidst improving Beijing–

Figure 4.6  Hong Kong people’s confidence in “one country, two systems” (half-year average). Source: HKUPOP, http://hkupop.hku.hk.

96  Tok

Figure 4.7  Hong Kong people’s trust level toward Beijing (half-year average). Source: HKUPOP, http://hkupop.hku.hk.

Hong Kong relations. This culminated in a rapid deterioration in their fortunes. Contrary to earlier expectations, the pro-Beijing parties put up a strong showing in the Legco elections, in September 2004, at the expense of the pro-democrats.34 The change of guards in March 2005 further reduced the pro-democrats’ ground as the popularity of the new Chief Executive posed a direct threat to their popularbased support. Despite these setbacks, an abstract “two-party” system continues to operate in the HKSAR. The pro-democrats remains a creditable political force in the HKSAR, always hovering at the sidelines, ready to jump in when the wind changes. The pro-democrats hence operate and function as a political balancer as and when is called for, as seen in Tsang’s failure to push ahead with the latest round of administrative reforms in December 2005. Recently, rallying cries for nominating the popular Anson Chan, former Chief Secretary of the HKSAR, to stand in the next Chief Executive elections can also be seen as counteracting to the new political climate in the territory. In reflection, opinion polls will continue to fluctuate, wildly at times thanks to this constant tug and tussle. For all the arguments made in this chapter in favor of constructing a new sense of political Chinese-ness in the HKSAR, this identity is no substitute for further democratic reforms, an eventuality that is embodied in the Basic Law.35 Meanwhile, external factors loom. Since the “one country, two systems” framework was devised as a test case for Taiwan, political developments in the HKSAR have enormous implications on the strait reunification process. Devised by Deng to solve the issue of Straits reunification, “one country, two systems” must first survive its trials in Hong Kong.36 Already, Beijing’s efforts were denounced by Chen Shui-bian, who warned the Washington Post of the dangers, to Taiwan, of putting the “one country” before the “two systems,” and “what has happened in Hong Kong has shown that this system, this formula, is a total failure.”37

Sovereignty in exercise  97 Indeed, as Michael Yahuda foresaw in the mid-1990s, “a display of tolerance for an autonomous Hong Kong would consolidate its new relations with the Chinese communities outside China, strengthen Beijing’s stance regarding Taiwan, reduce anxieties in Southeast Asia, ease China’s relations with the USA and Japan, enhance the process of China’s integration within the Asia-Pacific region, and improve China’s international standing generally.”38 In its return to the Chinese state, Hong Kong carries with it an international dimension that Beijing could not possibly shrug off easily. Will promoting a sense of political Chineseness in the HKSAR affect mainland China’s relations with other nation-states that have sizeable naturalized Chinese communities? Will the success of this political Chinese-ness bring about a civilization revival that is deemed a threat to the West? Though speculative, these are questions that cannot be dismissed easily. Furthermore, Hong Kong, being one of the truly globalized cities in the world, is constantly affected by the globalization process; so is mainland China, which is increasingly exposed as it opens up to the world. Given the flux brought about by the fusion of ideas, Beijing cannot simply assume that this identity remains unchanged forever, nor can it possibly claim monopoly over this political Chineseness. Political Chinese-ness is like a living organism that will constantly evolve as Hong Kong and mainland China acquire or renew their relations with each other, as well as with the outside world. Beijing will itself need to come to terms with the changeability of this political Chinese-ness.

Concluding remarks Beijing’s management of Hong Kong political identity can be, in broad strokes, divided into two interesting phases, the watershed being the 500,000-strong demonstration that took place on 1 July 2003. In the first stage, Beijing dragged its feet in pushing for higher integration with the returned territory, which contributed little towards building a unified political outlook. The “two systems” arrangement stood in the way of bridging the deep rift between the HKSAR and the mainland, brought about by their vastly different experiences in the past century, and extended by their ideological and political divide. At first, this laissez-faire approach appeared to calm the apprehensive moods relating to the handover. However, over time, these differences became increasingly unmanageable as the gap between expectations and reality widened. Political dissent in the HKSAR mounted as economic and social hardship hit hard. The mass demonstration on 1 July 2003 shocked Beijing into action. Proactive measures were pursued by Beijing to instill a new sense of political Chineseness based comprehensively on Beijing–HKSAR relations: that is, the rationality of state (central–local) institutions, a common national outlook, and economic interdependency. A common political Chinese-ness facilitates trust-building toward the regime in Beijing, making Hong Kong residents stakeholders in the mainland system. After two years of strategic intervention in HKSAR affairs, Beijing has successfully reduced the political tensions in the HKSAR to a more manageable level. But manageability does not denote sustainability. Although the Hong Kong

98  Tok people are now more willing to work with Beijing’s timetable, and within a Beijing-defined structure, it does not mean that they will do so indefinitely. In the long run, Beijing is still expected to offer more political concessions to the HKSAR, as political forces within the territory continues to operate along prodemocracy and pro-Beijing lines.

Notes 1 “Discontent Afflicts Hong Kong; Protest Epidemic Reflects Rising Anxiety of Middle Class,” The Washington Post, 28 June 2000; Liu Naiqiang, “Setting Aside Differences, Concentrating on Development,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, 11 April 2006. 2 “Table: People’s Trust in Beijing Central Government – Half-Year Average” and “Table: Strength of Identity – Combined Charts – Half-Year Average,” Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme, http://hkupop.hku.hk/ (accessed on 22 August 2006). 3 Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 2. 4 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, revised edn., translated and edited by James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1959); W. J. M. Mackenzie, Political Identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 119. 5 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “In Search of a Theory of National Identity,” in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, ed., China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 4. 6 Ann Norton, Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 3, 11. 7 Mackenzie, Political Identity, p. 12. 8 See, for example, Elaine Chan, “Political Identity and Nation-Building in Hong Kong,” in Joseph Cheng, ed., Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 1999), pp. 99–119. In her chapter, Hong Kong’s political identity is measured on the scale of its synonymy with the Chinese national identity. 9 In the same year, Hong Kong was the seventh largest trading entity in the world, at US$450 billion (higher than China’s US$356 billion); it had the world’s fourth largest banking sector in terms of external banking transactions and the fifth largest foreign exchange market by turnover. To further highlight its pivotal role as Asia’s frontrunning financial center, throughout the late 1990s Hong Kong was the world’s fifth largest foreign direct investment outward stock contributor, ahead of other contenders such as Japan or Singapore. Bob Howlett, ed., Hong Kong – A New Era: A Review of 1997 (Hong Kong: Information Services Department, 1998), ch. 5; World Economic Factbook 1997 (London: Euromonitor, 1998), pp. 212–13; World Investment Report 2003 (New York: UNCTAD, 2003), www.unctad.org/ (accessed on 7 May 2004). 10 See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, ww.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm (accessed on 22 August 2006), in particular articles 5, 6, 8, 27–39. 11 See James C. Hsiung (ed.), Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life After Return to China (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); also Kuan Hsin-chi, “Is the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Formula Working?,” in Wang Gungwu and John Wong, ed., Hong Kong in China: The Challenges of Transition (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1999), pp. 23–46. 12 Xiang Chunyi was the Chairperson from 1997 to 2003, and the current Chairperson is Qiao Xiaoyang. Both are reportedly low-rank officials who have little political standing in the decision-making process.

Sovereignty in exercise  99 13 Dennis Duncanson used the term “positive non-intervention” to describe London’s administrative principle during Hong Kong’s colonial rule. See Duncanson, “Hong Kong as a Crown Colony,” in Jürgen Domes and Yu-ming Shaw, ed., Hong Kong: A Chinese and International Concern (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 15. 14 “New Hong Kong Bears Striking Similarity to Old; ‘Nothing Seems Very Different’ is a Common Refrain Heard 100 Days after China’s Takeover,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 October 1997. 15 “HK Share Collapse Send World Markets Lower,” Reuters, 23 October 1997. 16 “Mandarin the Hot Topic in Night-school Classrooms,” South China Morning Post, 31 August 1997. 17 Many different estimates were derived via various means, and they fell within the range of 350,000 to 700,000. The estimate of 500,000 used in this paper is a more commonly accepted and reported number by the Hong Kong media. Given the total population in the HKSAR is about 6.8 million, it works out that roughly one of every 10 persons in the territory was involved in the demonstration on that day. 18 Article 23 states that “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.” However, no new legislation has ever been passed with reference to this article, and the security law currently practiced in the HKSAR was based on the common law passed down from the colonial legacy. 19 Wenhui Zhu, “Toward an Integrating Market: The Future of Hong Kong’s Economy and its Interaction with the Chinese Mainland,” CNAPS Working Paper Series (Washington, DC: Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, 2005), pp. 8–9. 20 Elspeth Thomson and Chuen Hoe Yow, “The Hong Kong SAR Government, Civil Society and SARS,” in John Wong and Zheng Yongnian, ed., The SARS Epidemic: Challenges to China’s Crisis Management (Singapore: World Scientific, 2004), pp. 211–214. 21 “CCTV Defends Change of Time for Anthem,” South China Morning Post, 27 June 2006. 22 The manufactured products are subject to a 30 percent value-added requirement. This is lower than the 40–50 percent domestic content (rules of origin) stipulated by most preferential trading arrangements. See John Wong and Sarah Chan, “China’s Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong: A Gift from Beijing?,” in EAI Background Brief No. 174 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, 2003). 23 The difficulties at the negotiation table were reported widely through the media; see, among others, “HK Govt Says Official Talks On China Trade Pact Delayed,” Dow Jones International News, 5 June 2002; “Chamber Urges Beijing to Lift Tariffs and Fuel Recovery,” The Standard, 22 August 2002. 24 See “Economic Talks Fraught with Difficulties, Warns Official,” South China Morning Post, 29 November 2002; “HK Hopes to Reach Deal on China Trade Pact by June,” Reuters, 8 January 2003. 25 “Chinese Premier says Beijing Committed to Giving Hong Kong Autonomy,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 29 June 2003. 26 “HK to Expand on Individual Visit Scheme,” Xinhua News Agency, 5 March 2006. 27 “Strong International Demands Helps Boost 2005 Arrivals to a Record 23 Million,” press release, Hong Kong Tourism Board (20 January 2006), www.hktourismboard. com/eng/ (accessed on 20 August 2006). 28 See a societal explanation of this phenomenon in Alvin Y. So, “Hong Kong’s Problematic Democratic Transition: Power Dependency or Business Hegemony?,” Journal of Asian Studies, 59 (2): 359–81 (2000); alternatively, power dependence accounts

100  Tok

29 30

31

32

33

34 35

36

37

38

are available in Kuan Hsin-chi, “Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong,” China Quarterly, 128: 775–93. The author would like to attribute this argument to Professor Wang Gungwu, who generously shared with the author his views on the tensions in the HKSAR’s political structure. “Hong Kong Patriots Should Form the Bulk in Administering Hong Kong,” Xinhua News Agency, 10 February 2004. For more details on this episode, see “Hong Kong Democratisation: A Crisis Brewing for Beijing?,” EAI Background Brief No. 191 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, 2004). See Basic Law; for NPC’s interpretation, see “Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peoples’ [sic] Republic of China,” Gazette Ext. No. 5/2004 (7 April 2004), The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/0406npcsc_e.pdf (accessed on 1 September 2006). “Interpretation of Paragraph 2, Article 53 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress” (27 April 2005), Basic Law, www.info.gov.hk/ basic_law/fulltext/article1.pdf (accessed on 22 August 2006). The figures recorded are 51.7 percent, 51.6 percent, and 62.4 percent for political, economic, and social prospects respectively. See “People’s Satisfaction with the Current Political Condition – Half-Yearly Average,” “People’s Satisfaction with the Current Economic Condition – Half-Yearly Average,” “People’s Satisfaction with the Current Social Condition – Half-Yearly Average,” “Expected Change in the Political Condition – Half-Yearly Average,” “Expected Change in the Economic Condition – Half-Yearly Average,” and “Expected Change in the Social Condition – Half-Yearly Average,” Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme, http://hkupop.hku.hk (accessed on 24 August 2006). “Democrats Make Disappointing Showing in Hong Kong Vote,” Agence France Presse, 13 September 2004. Articles 45 and 68 of the Hong Kong Basic Law specifically state universal suffrage as “the ultimate aim” in both the selection of the chief executive and the “election of all the members of the Legislative Council.” See Basic Law. The author respects the disagreements that some scholars may have with this argument; see, for example, Ian Scott, “Political Transformation in Hong Kong: From Colony to Colony,” in Alvin Y. So and Reginald Kwok Yin-wang, ed., Hong Kong–Guangdong Link: Partnership in Flux (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), pp. 189–223. In the article, Scott criticized the Basic Law as “a profoundly anti-democratic document.” Deng purportedly said, prior to the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, that “we [in Beijing] have taken a long time to think the issue through, and with solving the Taiwan issue in mind, the idea of ‘one country, two systems’ was born. Inspired by the Taiwan issue, we consider using the same formula to solve Hong Kong and Macao issues.” See Ye Zicheng, The Grand Strategy of China (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), p. 44. “Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bien (interview transcript),” Washington Post, 29 March 2004; in another interview with the BBC shortly after, he reiterated that “[t] he majority of Taiwan people cannot accept Taiwan becoming a second Hong Kong, nor can we accept Taiwan becoming a local government of the People’s Republic of China or a Special Administrative Region of China.” Quoted in “Interview: Chen Shui-bian,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3582853.stm (accessed on 13 May 2004). Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China’s Challenge (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 1.

5 Beyond symbiosis The changing civil–military relationship after Mao You Ji

Hu Jingtao’s authority construction since the Sixteenth Congress has testified many novel developments in the country’s social–political transformation. A review of his first term in office can shed new light on our understanding of China’s elite politics in general and its evolving civil–military relations in particular. Concretely, Hu is the first Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader whose power consolidation is not through first controlling the gun; he is the first post-Deng leader whose control of the gun is based on first establishing a high level of popularity in the Party and society; and he is also the first leader who commands the military not through first creating a personnel network within the Party and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This chapter argues that these novelties are Hu’s responses to the challenge of Chinese symbiotic civil–military relations in transition. Generally speaking this challenge is reflected by the fact that the old method of party control over the gun, the way of Mao and Deng, is no longer viable. Yet the new method of control in the form of erecting institutionalized safeguards is still in the making. If not handled properly, a transitional vacuum may emerge with military strongmen or ambitious politicians inclined to manipulate the civil–military relations to their advantage. This has happened many times in Chinese history. In a way Hu’s new method of commanding the gun continues Jiang Zemin’s effort to turn the PLA into a professional and non-interventionist force.1 It keeps abreast with the Party’s deepening institutionalization of power. Although none of these new developments has reached the point of no return, they may have heralded a broad change in China’s political and social system with unpredictable but significant consequences.

Politics of post-symbiotic CCP–PLA interaction For a long time the nature of CCP–PLA relations has been defined as symbiosis: one’s demise triggers the death of the other.2 The close ties between China’s two most powerful political institutions were concretely indicated by the following defining features: • •

the common ideological and revolutionary ferment; identical personnel structure and overlapping personnel;

102  You • •

a nearly equal political status; shared mentality in government and vested interests.

In the struggle for national power these features were essential to the survival of an outlawed party. For a long period of time the CCP could simply be described as the Party on horseback. Symbiotic ties are ideologically based and emphasize revolutionary changes of society. Now, as the CCP turns itself into a ruling party and military modernization drives the PLA towards professionalization and regularization, symbiosis as a defining concept is increasingly out of keeping with the times and reality. The Party is de-ideologizing itself in its routine management of the country. As a government party it administers the state under a rational/ legal principle aimed at policy predictability and stability.3 Revolution is no longer relevant. If the PLA still defines itself as a political institution carrying out military tasks, it will continue to place ideological values and revolutionary spirit above its own mission of deterring external threats.4 This inherently induces an interventionist tendency in the military. Inevitably bargaining would dominate the bilateral interaction. The dichotomy is apparent. Therefore, both sides see reconciliation in the PLA’s deepening professionalization that leads to its changed role in domestic politics. In the three decades of the post-Mao era the PLA has gradually evolved into, primarily, a military organization, but with some political and social imperatives to perform. China’s profound social transition may yet produce an apolitical military but it has redefined the hierarchy of missions for the PLA. As a professional force, it increasingly leans toward protecting national interests (external missions), not just serving a narrowly defined ideological course of a political party. We may have seen the beginning of a long process of de-symbioticization.5 “The Party on horseback” resulted in the CCP and PLA possessing matching personnel structures that provided channels for Party penetration into the military and for military intervention in the civilian leadership process. The interventionist impulse of senior PLA commanders was embedded in their official status equal to party leaders. Their political privilege and influence exerted enormous constraints on the party center. This was vividly reflected by the arrests of the Gang of Four in 1976 and the ousting of Hua Guofeng in 1980, both mainly the initiatives of the PLA. Although civilian control over the gun has never been in doubt, a delicate equilibrium in civil–military interaction has been maintained by the four generations of CCP leaders from Mao Zedong through Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. Each of them adopted vastly different mechanisms of control. To risk a level of simplicity a quick summary is in order to describe the nature of their way with the PLA. Phasing out symbiotic connections Mao’s command of the PLA was typically ideology-oriented. Thoroughly indoctrinated PLA soldiers became fully committed to Mao’s political line. This was re-

Beyond symbiosis  103 inforced by his tight personnel control through balancing different factions within the PLA. Deng’s command of the PLA was basically based on personnel control.6 His authority over the PLA was established through appointing his trusted generals to key positions. Briefly Deng’s method can be said to follow three directions. First he created a leadership core of the Yang brothers (Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibin) within the PLA. They ran the daily management of the Central Military Commission (CMC) on Deng’s behalf. In the next level of high command he appointed his close followers, mainly from the Second Field Army, to head Dadanwei (headquarters departments) and military regions. Finally in the early 1980s he commissioned the Yang brothers to recruit a large number of young officers to the army ranks that currently constitute the top brass of the PLA. Through these efforts he consolidated his core status in the second generation of party leadership.7 Although Deng’s overall reform program facilitated institutionalization of power, his control over the PLA was highly personalized.8 He appointed top commanders without consulting the Political Bureau. And when he wanted something done in the military, he simply telephoned one of his confidants in the CMC or passed the word through his political secretary, and CMC member, General Wang Ruilin. In return the CMC reported back only to him. Then his decisions on military affairs would be rubber-stamped by the Political Bureau as Party clearance.9 With the military support he subdued resistance from civilian leaders to his controversial reforms. On the other hand, his a-ideological attitudes contributed to the PLA’s pursuit of professionalism. Under his leadership the strong ideological and revolutionary zeal of the PLA gradually eased, matching a similar trend in the Party and state. The breakdown of the communist ideological bondage removed a key supporting pillar for their symbiotic ties. Creating institutional barriers The other defining element of symbiosis, namely, the overlapping personnel structure between the Party and the PLA, gradually disappeared with the passing of party and military elders. With the “natural personal ties” cut off, strictly reinforced division of labor in duties and institutional safeguards are put in place to prevent unauthorized networking between the two institutions. This is further enhanced by Mao’s formula of commanding both civilian politics and the gun: zhengzhiju yi zheng junwei yi jun (the Political Bureau’s realm is state affairs and the CMC’s is military affairs), which in essence meant to create a political taboo for his top party comrades not to intrude in his sphere of control, the PLA. Deng continued Mao’s formula cleverly but his way was built upon a different foundation: formal institutions. First, civilian Political Bureau members were deprived of any military duties, despite their past military experience. Then, through emphasizing functional separation of different institutions, he barred civilian leaders from seeing to military affairs. The outcome was that it was increasingly harder for CCP and PLA leaders to form alliances along the personal ties formed during the war. This proved to be the most effective strategy for him to become the

104  You post-Mao party leader. This helped create a situation in which the majority of post-Deng CCP and PLA personnel did not know each other well. Then it was possible for the separation to be more institutionally based. Coping with the transitional uncertainties: Jiang’s command of the gun Strongman control was an important component of China’s symbiotic civil–military relations under Mao and Deng. Inevitably this is not sustainable in a time of peace that makes it harder for a battle-toughened civilian commander-in-chief to emerge. Deng’s departure posed a new risk to the CCP and Jiang: personal control was no longer viable; institutionalization of civil–military interaction was far from consolidated; and the weak, inexperienced civilian CMC chair might upset the subtle balance of power between a tightly organized military force and a relatively loose political party.10 The interventionist tendency of the PLA and the habitual impulse of the party leader to penetrate into the military could complicate the management of Beijing’s post-Deng elite politics. Before Jiang firmly established himself as CMC chair in the mid-1990s, he experienced such military intervention. Deng’s southern China tour in 1992 clearly targeted Jiang’s political line that placed social stability above further reforms.11 As an expedient move of authority consolidation upon arrival in Beijing, Jiang formed a policy coalition with Li Peng, who, as heir to Chen Yun, represented powerful factional interests such as the financial sector, the heavy and defense industries, and central economic planners. Deng regarded this coalition as one between reluctant reformers and conservative state administrators. The victim was the market orientation of the post-Mao reform. Through soliciting personal support of two most powerful military leaders at the time, the Yang brothers, Deng was successful in forcing Jiang and his colleagues to alter their policy preferences. The Yangs’ baojia huhang (to protect Deng’s way of reform), became one of the two most serious cases of PLA interference in domestic politics since the 1990s. The seriousness lies in three obvious facts. First, the intervention was not approved by the Political Bureau under the principle of collective leadership. Second, the act of the Yangs disrupted the command chain of the CMC because the commander-in-chief was deliberately bypassed when the military issued a major politically motivated slogan. Third, Deng used this unauthorized military support to settle a civilian debate about the role of the market.12 Deng’s reform push in 1992 proved to be farsighted, as seen from the results today. However, dictating his own opinion to the Political Bureau with the gun and threatening to dump top party leaders violated party norms and was in a way not too different from Mao’s involvement of the PLA in the factional Party strife in 1966. Given Deng’s enormous political influence he could have adopted a more prudent method of persuasion to achieve his goal. Even Deng realized the danger of such personal control over the PLA to China’s political stability and that he was the last person in the Party capable of exercising such control. After the southern China tour in 1992 he started to address this problem. First, anticipating that the Yang brothers might form a second power

Beyond symbiosis  105 center to Jiang’s, he promptly removed them from their military posts, despite the fact that the brothers were his most loyal followers.13 Further, he enhanced Jiang’s institutional authority of CMC chairmanship. This civilian/military position has the final say on all key military matters, including personnel and control of the nuclear button. Finally at Deng’s suggestion the three top posts were concentrated in Jiang’s hands: party general secretary, state president, and CMC chair, with the one aim of strengthening his authority. This had not been the case since Mao resigned from the state presidency in 1962. Now three powers in one person has become a pattern of power transfer for the successor to quicken the process of power consolidation and to avoid emergence of a transitional power vacuum. As a weak commander-in-chief Jiang used a number of strategies to strengthen his authority vis-à-vis the PLA as listed below. Reign without overt rule This draws a fine line between the “Party’s absolute control” and PLA autonomy in administration and operations. The purpose is to build “a good fence to make good neighbors.” Jiang respected the tradition and norms of the PLA’s relative independence in proposing promotion of senior officers, maintenance of internal discipline, allocation of budget between Services, and its representation in the Party’s central bodies. Certainly “reign without overt rule” did not mean “hands off” on the part of the CMC chair. For instance, Jiang retained the final say on matters of fundamental importance, such as selection of top officers based on a recommendation list submitted to him by the CMC. Give and take trade-off This was about Jiang and the PLA rendering mutual support to their political and professional pursuits. To this end Jiang showed the PLA that he was a nice boss. Soon after assuming CMC office he restored the growth of the military budget, easing accumulated anger among senior PLA officers toward Deng and Zhao Ziyang, who had heavy-handedly decreased defense spending for a decade in the 1980s.14 In the subsequent years he raised soldiers’ salaries, promoted close to 100 commanders to the rank of general and helped the PLA regain its pre-4 June (1989) social respect. An image of being a nice boss was indispensable for his acceptance by PLA soldiers, the most powerful weapon for him to deal with any potential challengers in the Political Bureau. The PLA on its part gave Jiang crucial support in a number of key political conjunctures: the arrest of Political Bureau member Chen Xitong in 1995, the clampdown on Falungong in 1999, and its open support for Jiang to retain the CMC chair in the lead-up to the Sixteenth Congress of the CCP.15 Promoting military reform and consensus on national defense strategy In Jiang’s reign of 12 years the PLA instituted a large number of reforms that transformed its outlook. In terms of the structure it was slimmer and more suitable

106  You for joint operations. The strengthening of the People’s Armed Police relieved the PLA from internal security duties. During the same period Jiang initiated three major revisions of China’s national defense strategy that not only narrowed the gap between the PLA and the West’s military in terms of force transformation and doctrinal guidance but also united the minds of its personnel behind a common course of winning the next war.16 The PLA was in a state of unity that had not been seen for a long time. Setting a new direction of objective control In a way Jiang’s strategy to cope with subtle post-Deng civil–military relations could be viewed in the light of moving the civilian control of the gun away from subjective control, defined by Samuel Huntington as control based on ideological ferment of the army, personal dominance over the armed forces, and an interventionist tendency from both politicians and generals.17 It is clear that these tendencies not only were obstacles for Jiang to overcome his weakness vis-à-vis the PLA but also perpetuated the PLA’s special status in the political system, a major threat to his rulership. Consciously or unconsciously he resorted to methods of objective control in managing PLA affairs by quickening the pace of its technological transformation. Under his leadership the majority of PLA senior officers were promoted from among military technocrats with university qualifications.18 The emphasis on expertise clearly converges with the model of objective control that enshrines professionalism as a primary value judgment by soldiers and inhibits their non-military ambitions. The usefulness of the model to Jiang was that it promoted an institutionalized process of civilian supremacy over the army that helped compensate his lack of military credential in commanding soldiers. The soldiers’ obedience to civilian authorities is a long Chinese tradition but in the form of strongman control. When this was no longer possible, a new type of civil–military relations had to be formulated acceptable to both. Jiang may have opened up a direction of such. One indicator is the mutual respects to their professional expertise between technocrats turned party leaders and technocrats turned generals, a norm that Eric Nordinger regarded as crucial for meaningful civilian control over the gun.19 Clearly if the essence of objective control is to promote a politically neutral military, the PLA is still far from the destination. Yet if it is about enhancing professionalism as a way to weaken military interventionism, China’s civil–military relations were set in this direction.20 In the Jiang era social development contributed to such a mega-trend. First, the population became apolitical and a-ideological. This deeply affected the new recruits. As the PLA transformed itself into a high-tech force, it lifted the education requirement for the intake, normally set at the middle school level. The oncepeasant army took a new look, as the new conscripts were more urban and liberal. This was especially true in special Services. Second, within the PLA the strong promotion of meritocracy drives the officers to master military science and the art of commanding troops. A new contingent of military technocrats has gradually

Beyond symbiosis  107 replaced those political faithfuls. In the PLA Strategic Missile Force, for instance, about 82 percent of the officers have university qualifications and more than half of them are technical staff.21 Third, under acute threat perception the Party and military leadership required the PLA personnel to spend more time with high-tech “toys” than with political studies. Ideological indoctrination was victimized in the process. One fundamental question is thus raised: Over time will this make the military more a client of the state than a tool of a political party?22

Hu Jintao’s command of the gun Hu deliberately kept a distance from military affairs unless he was entrusted with such missions. In the lead-up to the Fifteenth Congress in 1997 he was involved in selection of the PLA membership of the Central Committee (CC). In 1998 he helped Zhu Rongji to de-link PLA commercial interests from its operational structure. His confirmation as the CMC’s first deputy head one year later may have revealed the satisfaction of both Jiang and the top brass over his performance. His careful handling of the military was expressed by his response to senior PLA officers’ lobbying for Jiang to retain his CMC chair prior to the Sixteenth Congress. He even made a proposal to the Political Bureau to support Jiang’s stay, claiming that this would help him overcome the transitional difficulties as the top leader. The PLA’s act breached party norms and showed its interventionist remnants.23 The difference lies in whether the intervention is a habitual reaction, as in the Mao era, or an occasional expression of preference by a powerful interest group. The cases of Jiang and Hu serve as clear proof of China’s symbiotic relations in transition in that the ultimate choice of commander-in-chief is not the military’s. Yet it is a different question of whether the PLA should have an influence over the choice. One thing that draws the line between a democracy and an authoritarian system is that the former has absolutely no influence over who commands the armed forces. If Jiang indeed mobilized PLA support for his retention, it was proof that China’s civil–military relations were still under subjective control but have registered visible changes. For instance, Hua Guofeng was toppled because he was not the military’s choice. It bore a resemblance to the strongman type of control. Actually the majority of PLA officers would remain neutral on the question of whether Jiang should fully retire.24 Additionally Jiang became more and more arbitrary in his last years of leadership.25 This set up a difficult environment for Hu to take over at his succession. The challenges to Hu at the elite politics level include his interaction with the semi-retired Jiang, uneven distribution of factional strength at the apex of power, and control of the gun as a weak commander-in-chief. More broadly, Hu faced other serious problems: rising state–society tensions, decay of the cadre system, polarization between the rich and poor, China’s external threats, and so on. To a great extent Hu has tackled these challenges admirably, largely through formulating strategies of leadership consolidation by simultaneously promoting party solidarity and reducing societal pressure. He regarded control of the

108  You gun as a natural outcome of his consolidation elsewhere, thus creating a precedent in CCP history that power building did not exclusively rely on the support of the military. Dealing with transitional challenges Clearly a commander-in-chief without civilian portfolio demonstrated the limits of China’s political reform efforts. The “perceived need” for Jiang to stay on highlighted the Party’s lack of confidence in its own system, which creates “monsters” it has to tame afterwards. Under the circumstances, without electoral legitimacy for the new leader, arranged succession may be a second-best means to help the successor consolidate his power. Certainly this practical solution creates problems as seen from the cases of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Hu Yaobang. Jiang’s negative legacy lay in repeating the Mao/Deng history of a two-tier leadership that may give rise to emergence of two power centers.26 There is no clear purview for the departing leader to exercise power. As such Jiang’s stay reversed the Party’s institutionalization of power since 1996 when the two lines of leadership finally merged. Any smooth and planned transfer of power requires the involved leaders to abide by a number of unwritten rules of the game. On the part of the semiretired, he must be sincere in removing himself from the center of power and helping the successor to establish his own authority. Second, he must restrain himself from the temptation to intervene, and respect decisions made by the Political Bureau. These are the preconditions for avoiding major policy differences. Third, the parallel power processes have to be relatively short in duration. The longer the “two-tier leadership” lasts, the graver the succession uncertainty becomes. Jiang’s eventual departure after two years may have been just the right timing before any further damage was done to the Party. Despite the fact that the transfer of power from Jiang to Hu was faster than the previous rounds, Jiang divided the Party’s leadership vis-à-vis the PLA. The position of Party General Secretary is the symbol of the legitimate civilian control of the gun. This, however, clashes with the CMC’s commander responsibility system, in which Hu is only a deputy to the CMC chair. If Hu signed most CMC documents before September 2004, in terms of procedures he breached the spirit of this system. He could be authorized by Jiang to do so. There are historical precedents in this to be followed by Jiang and Hu. When Deng was CMC chair, Jiang signed many documents of strategic importance after consulting with Deng. Yet the time-lag was less than half a year. The institutional confusion passed quickly. In addition General Wang Ruilin, Deng’s political secretary and a CMC member, also played a crucial role in liaison. Was this pattern of interaction copied by Jiang and Hu? If so, this was against the Party’s effort of institutionalization. The bitter lesson of Mao Yuanxin (Mao’s nephew and liaison officer in 1976, who misled Mao on key political issues, such as reporting to Mao Deng’s anti-Cultural Revolution remarks) forever indicates the inherent danger in such an arrangement. A more fatal flaw of this “two-tier leadership” is the confusion of chain of command. Were China to encounter a national crisis (domestic chaos or an acute

Beyond symbiosis  109 external threat), who has the authority to mobilize the military? By the Constitution the Party boss in his capacity as State President is the highest authority to declare the state of war. Yet, under the arrangement of the “two-tier leadership” and by CMC institutional provisions, he is only a top adviser to CMC chair and has no power to deploy PLA units and launch nuclear weapons unless authorized. It was, in a sense, China’s good fortune that, during the two years of split party leadership over the PLA, no grave military crisis took place. On the other hand, the smooth transfer of power between Jiang and Hu shows the extent to which the symbiotic CCP–PLA ties have changed. Jiang’s 12 years at the top gave him great prestige but the post-Deng elite politics proves that without institutional posts that underpin one’s personal power the top leader’s influence evaporates quickly. The fast convergence of the Jiang–Hu leadership testifies that institutionalized civilian control over the gun is the trend of development, although this may be temporarily disrupted by one leader for a period of time. Jiang’s case was rationalized by the claim that the PLA underwent difficult reforms that hurt vested interests of key officers.27 Jiang’s continued service could help overcome any resistance from affected officers. This makes it reasonable to contemplate whether Jiang was entrusted by the Party to play a functional role in a key area of responsibility for a particular period of time. Thus it is a questionable argument that there were two power centers between 2002 and 2004.28 Conceptually the phenomenon of two-power centers indicates persistent policy differences. More often than not this leads to uncontrollable factional struggle. None of these seems to have happened. Certainly the two-line leadership can evolve into two centers of power, if the two leaders push the envelope. The CCP’s failed succession plans before show that the defining line between the two phenomena can be thin. This was why both Jiang and Hu have been so careful in handling their interaction. Therefore, preventing the two-tier leadership from evolving into two power centers was a top priority in Hu’s consolidation strategy. Prior to September 2004 Hu, as Jiang’s first deputy in the CMC but his boss in the Party, was in a delicate position. Hu handled the bilateral relations well. His strong sense of party discipline prevented him from deviating from the political line of the third-generation leadership. His mild personality helped him exercise self-restraint in dealing with policy differences among top leaders, a key precondition for unity at the apex of power. During the transitional period he upheld the thesis of “three represents,” promised to continue Jiang’s IT–RMA experiment in PLA transformation and chaired the editorial work for Jiang’s selected works. In the succession plan he oversaw PLA daily affairs in late 2003 but inspected its Strategic Command Center only a few days after he was confirmed as CMC chair.29 This means that he avoided taking the top operational command (i.e., the nuclear button), which is the privilege of the CMC chair under the CMC commander responsibility system. Similarly Hu waited for more than a year to issue his first strategic guidance for the PLA. This was summarized by CMC member General Xu Caihou as “three supplies and one key task”: supply the CCP with political guarantee for it to continue its monopoly of power, supply the state with the security guarantee for its long-term development, and supply the nation with military capabilities to protect

110  You its best interests. The one key task is to play a major role in maintaining world peace and regional stability.30 Hu’s smooth consolidation shows that the concept of arranged succession has its rationality and logic in China’s particular political culture. Yet, despite all the positive elements associated with the concept and the two successful cases of power transfer in the last 15 years, the CCP’s succession depends greatly on luck, as there is no institutional guarantee to assure that the successor is not a dictator, that the political consensus is upheld, and that fierce power struggle is avoided. The difficulty of phasing out symbiotic civil–military relations in China lies in the difficulty in the transformation of the country’s overall political system. If the latter remains undemocratic, the transition of the PLA toward a truly professional and nationalized military is bound to be slow and painful. Although democratization in China lacks constructive conditions, Hu may do something substantial in terms of civil–military relations during his term in office: he can revise the 1987 Party Charter, which allows the retired Party leader to continue to command the gun. Jiang relinquished the CMC chair within a time framework of two years and this may have set an unwritten rule for all future successors, similar to the effect of Qiao Shi’s retirement for all Political Bureau members. This would not be a minor measure of political reform. As a transitional arrangement, the two-tier leadership may still have practical value. Yet this value may turn negative. The need for Jiang to stay on was exaggerated and politically motivated in 2002 to protect his policy line and protégés. If conditions permit Hu to depart at the end of his second term, the three most powerful positions, Party general secretary, state president, and commander-in-chief, can be transferred to the successor at one stroke. The recent promulgation of three central documents on the terms and conditions for Party leaders holding office seems to point to such a direction, although the documents do not specify their applicability to the post of General Secretary.31 Indeed, if Hu leaves all his positions when he retires, it would represent a major progress in institutionalizing authority relations at the apex of power. The nation may long remember him for such a contribution. The problem is that, even if Hu is willing to do so, he encounters obstacles from within the leadership.

Hu Jintao’s new strategies of civilian control over the military Hu came to command the PLA in a unique historical context. He had long been in charge of party affairs, giving him an advantage in mobilizing party support for his control of the gun. And he had the blessing of party elders from Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng to Song Ping. The Sixteenth Congress attained a consensus to rally the Party behind Hu to tackle challenges to CCP rule. The lesson of the June 4 event was too painful for all Party and military heavyweights to indulge in a power struggle. This helped Hu’s command of the PLA, in a different manner from his predecessors.

Beyond symbiosis  111 The PLA not a vehicle for powerful consolidation Probably Hu is the first leader in CCP history who did not rely on the military to consolidate his position in the Party. Certainly what Hu has done was not his choice and it is an open question whether he will use the PLA for political purposes in the future when a major party dispute emerges. The arranged succession denied Hu’s control over the gun at the same time as he became Party leader. Paradoxically, this opened space for him to change the rules of the game in elite politics in China. Hu’s predecessors grabbed dominance from the barrel of the gun and then moved to subdue the gun in name of “the Party’s absolute control.” This clearly follows the symbiotic rules of strongman politics. On the other hand, Mao, Deng, and Jiang all proved that, with firm authority in the Party, it is highly unlikely they would be challenged by the PLA. However, in building these two mutually supporting mechanisms of control Hu’s sequence is unusual. Will Hu’s way herald the beginning of the end for the mentality of “political power comes from the barrel of the gun” that is still popular among CCP leaders? Whatever the answer there has emerged a strong sense in the Party and society that authority based on military support actually undermines the top leader’s legitimacy rather than enhancing it in the long run. Keeping a distance from factional politics Probably Hu is also the first CCP leader who does not rely on factional strength to control the Party helm and the gun. Political succession is a process of power redistribution. Normally the successor would have the largest slice of the cake but this was not so for Hu in the Sixteenth Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (PSC), in which Jiang’s appointees had the numerical advantage. Therefore his challenge was how to achieve a “correct balance” between key groupings at the apex of power. Hu has handled this challenge well, following two strategies. First, he has been able to maintain equilibrium between the new PSC members from different power sources centered on the retired leaders. They have been fairly treated, especially those with no obvious factional affiliation (Wen Jiabao, Lou Gan, Wu Guanzheng, and Li Changchun). Hu has proved that the best consolidation technique for the successor is to be perceived as not a threat by his subordinates. This encourages their cooperation. The foundation for elite unity and collective leadership is thus constructed. Second, Hu is not in a hurry to build his personal network as a way of consolidation. Increasingly in Chinese elite politics, leadership based on factional support is viewed as “drinking poison to ease thirst,” as this erodes PSC unity and induces intra-Party and societal backlash. More often than not overt factional networking is counterproductive, as it arouses fear of those who do not affiliate themselves in groupings, despite the fact that top leaders all promote people they trust. Hu understands this perfectly: The best strategy for authority building is to stand above all groupings. On the other hand, facing the web of vested interests and difficult task ahead, Hu will have to have his own personal followings if he wants to do something revolutionary in China,

112  You especially in the realm of political reforms. The question is what kind of personal supporting network he has to construct – not too conspicuous but with a clear structure. The Seventeenth Party Congress will provide a good answer to this. Hu’s way of consolidation within the party leadership has a visible impact on the changing civil–military relations. He has not placed any of his own men in the PLA’s top command. He chairs the CMC through established institutional channels, such as the formal Political Bureau and CMC meetings to decide on major defense matters. In the process he demonstrates due respect to the professional inputs of the top brass and thus wins their respect as well. Clearly this is antithetical to the civilians’ traditional method of personal control of the military that relies on factional penetration and divide-and-rule. When politics enters the military, the military is politicized and develops an interventionist inclination. Therefore, when Hu substitutes factional leverage vis-à-vis the PLA with institutionalized process of command, he has removed a key element in the symbiotic CCP–PLA relations. Inevitably a united PLA enhances its corporate identity, which is a necessary condition both for it to evolve into a relatively autonomous interest group and for it to further erode the basis of symbiosis. Winning popularity as a means to controlling the gun Hu’s relatively quick consolidation of power is linked to his clever strategy to win the hearts and minds of ordinary people. His governing principle – humanism (renben zhuyi)32 aims at easing the state–society tensions inherent in an authoritarian political system. It differs from that of Deng/Jiang, defined as “economics in command” that allowed only a small proportion of the population to become rich. In the Deng/Jiang era a sound ideological framework was missing to regulate the second process of distribution in which many people failed to benefit from economic growth. Hu faces mounting state–society conflict that may brew a revolution from below. So he tries to release the tension by making concessions to the people in social and economic areas, while keeping effective political control. This underscores his slogan of building a harmonious society in the midst of a major social transformation. Since Hu assumed the office, he has implemented a large number of policies to protect social groups of the underdogs, tighten taxation on the new rich, and sustain the campaign against corruption. His political program is centered on promoting economic growth,33 but places more emphasis on social justice and equality. Hu uses every opportunity to approach ordinary citizens when traveling around the country. His plain life style and clean image draw comparison with other senior CCP officials. His severe measures against senior Party and military officials on account of their “administrative errors” have given the masses a fresh impression on the new leadership. Timely dismissal of the Political Bureau member Chen Liangyu further convinced the people that he is a determined leader. All this raises the level of popular acceptance to his anointment.34 Indeed his astuteness is rightly reflected by his understanding that popularity as a means of legitimization is more powerful and reliable than developing a large personal following at this crucial juncture. With strong social support he

Beyond symbiosis  113 can lead the military with greater ease. Indeed, a leader’s popularity can be more useful than his ability to solicit military support in power politics in the post-Mao era. The logic is clear: It is more costly and risky for the military to oppose a beloved leader, as this may be construed as opposing the people. Mao skillfully used this method to control the gun. The difference between Mao and Hu lies in the fact that Mao commanded huge personal cult whereas Hu has to adopt real pro-people strategies to receive genuine popular support, as a way of controlling the gun. In comparison Jiang’s low public acceptance may have forced him to rely more on factional support. Hu’s way works So far Hu’s way has worked. His fortune is based on several favorable conditions that his predecessors did not have. First, factional strife under Hu is moderate, leading to a united Party and military leadership. Under the circumstances Hu has not faced an acute need to build personal authority in order to have things done. Second, Hu is able to maintain a broad elite consensus over the fundamental principles in governing China: political stability (slow political reforms), market orientation of economic management, and social harmony based on a set of pro-people public policies. Without major policy differences there is less need to use either the military to subdue defiant Political Bureau colleagues or the party machine to purge defiant generals. Third, two decades of societal de-politicization has turned the bulk of Party and PLA elites into technocrats with apolitical sentiments. As a result it is easier for professional boundaries to be erected between the CCP and the PLA. That Hu is able to turn a negative into a positive shows his political maturity. More fundamentally this reflects the changing nature of China’s symbiotic civil–military ties in terms of diminished ideological relevance, separated personal structure, and disappearing strongmen politics. As a result institutionalized safeguards and enhanced military professionalism induce non-interventionist behavior among officers. A corporate culture has been brought about. The changing sequence in Hu’s consolidation plan is indicative of changing mentality of both party and military leaders of the new generations. Will this pave the way for a new trend of the PLA’s nationalization to emerge? Over time will this lead Chinese military to seek neutrality in the country’s political development? These questions need to be carefully studied.

Civil–military relations beyond symbiosis It is one thing to point out the future trend of CCP/PLA relations characterized as symbiosis gradually breaking down. It is quite another to accurately define the transitional phenomenon, as innovations are intertwined with continuity. And the point of no return cannot be established unless both sides face a major historical test, such as the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Short of that it is difficult to evaluate whether the change is qualitative or quantitative. For instance, the CCP and

114  You the PLA still strongly share fundamental interests, fulfilling the fourth defining condition of symbiotic civil–military relations mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. But at the same time the CCP as a mass political organization and the PLA as a professional entity do differ in many ways. This leads to differentiation, like what has happened in similar party states.35 Interest sharing as the defining feature of CCP–PLA relations Interest sharing is political foundation for the CCP–PLA relations. Each benefits from the CCP-centered political system. Additionally interest sharing is supplemented by their shared national goal of making China socially stable, economically prosperous, and militarily powerful. These also attract strong popular support. So far the CCP is the PLA’s best partner, granting the latter a special status in Chinese society. In 1999 the Political Bureau decided to accelerate preparation for war and made military modernization a top priority alongside economics, much to the delight of PLA generals.36 The progress in military transformation serves the CCP’s effort to raise China’s international profile, which in turn enhances the Party’s popularity with the people. Inevitably, building a more capable fighting force entails continued increase of military spending. This has resulted in the provision in the National Defense Law that the PLA’s budget should rise in keeping with the growth rate of GDP. At the same time the PLA accepts the Party’s priority of developing the national economy, as it agrees with the CCP’s argument that military strength lies ultimately in the country’s comprehensive strength.37 PLA generals have repeatedly voiced support for Hu’s New Deal of promoting harmony between the state and society. After Hu raised the slogan of scientifically developing the military in the enlarged CMC conference in December 2005, all the PLA headquarters immediately convened high-level meetings to formulate measures of implementation. The vocabulary they used was quite familiar, as it had been expressed in support of Mao, Deng, and Jiang before. The PLA Air Force Party Committee made it clear that supporting Hu’s idea of scientific development was a matter of political attitudes on the part of soldiers.38 In other words this symbolized the PLA’s loyalty to the new civilian leadership. Other Services also pledged similar allegiance.39 To award the PLA’s loyalty the Party makes sure that its special status in society is retained and its voice on key political issues well respected. The outcome is that the PLA has little incentive and need to form any independent power center when its privileged position is guaranteed. Gradually this helps the PLA to adapt to the transformed symbiotic civil–military relationship. The ultimate interests sought by the PLA as a key pressure group concern the improvement of its combat capabilities and corporate identity. A strong and loyal PLA serves the best interests of the CCP, as it can give party leaders an enhanced say in both international and domestic affairs. In a way a less politically oriented military can also be less interventionist. All political leaders in the world would like to have soldiers obsessed more with high-tech “toys” than with elusive political consciousness. Professionalism is a good supplement to ideological

Beyond symbiosis  115 indoctrination. As far as corporate identity is concerned, it can be a double-edged sword for civil–military relations: a united military contributes to the Party when they share strategic interests but could become a problem if the two sides diverge over major issues. Furthermore, an exclusive PLA corporate identity as a result of a united PLA can render it hard for party leaders to resort to the divide-and-rule method of control. Sometimes and over certain issues this method is still useful and effective, e.g., when the united military produces a powerful general visà-vis the Party. Indeed with an irreplaceable function to perform, the military’s efforts to perfect professionalism differentiate it from other state institutions. For instance, its tendency toward meritocracy may contravene the Party’s catch-all nature. Interest sharing is thus not a guarantee for the CCP’s absolute control over the gun. Setting the new rules of the game Interest sharing as a bond of interdependence not only describes the continued CCP–PLA alliance in the foreseeable future but also helps them work together under more clearly defined rules of the game. These rules consolidate the stable civil–military partnership crucial both to social stability of the PRC today (fostering the middle class) and to China’s democratization in the future (promoting objective control between the civilians and the military). Apparently these rules are inherently at odds with symbiosis. Rule one: promoting professionalism in the PLA The PLA’s technology-based and RMA-oriented transformation and its changing composition of personnel have contributed to its rising professionalism, defined by “expertise and corporate-ness.” These elements are similar to the Western concept of professionalism. Even in democracies the military exercises powerful influence in the policymaking process concerning matters of national security and defense.40 The debate is whether this will ultimately produce a nationalized military and soldiers of political neutrality.41 Such an end will depend on several conditions. First, a gradual political reform continues to transform the Party and reshape Party/army structure. Second, the social trend of de-politicization continues to influence the conscripts who change the PLA from within. Third, China’s globalization zeal and the PLA’s learning of Western military science and technology help it accept the world norms of civil–military relations. Fourth, China’s ideological basis has shifted from communism to nationalism.42 Even if the PLA continues to be ideological with a nationalist inclination (seen from its stance on matters of reunification and territorial integrity), as such it is more oriented toward external concerns and embraces a broader range of national interests than those of the Party. Yet the change in the PLA is only incremental until it is tested by a major political event. PLA professionalism deepens with its retreat from societal politics. It is no longer an organ of CCP grass-roots mobilization. It has given up the “people’s war

116  You doctrine and related combat models,” as it identifies high-tech war as its future mode of engagement. This cut the natural ties between a revolutionary military and a politicized population, which underline the symbiotic civil–military relations in the name of the “nation in arms.” The PLA willingly relinquished its business empire and handed its cultural, sport, and medical institutes to the government in the last few rounds of restructuring. These non-professional bodies impede the PLA in exercising its functions of national defense. Inevitably professionalism has become a primary value judgment of PLA officers and led soldiers to be preoccupied with their own business of war. Over time this will make the military more a client of the state than a tool of a political party and a leader. Rule two: regularizing CCP–PLA interaction Institutionalization is a rule-based control mechanism, the best weapon to curb the interventionist tendency of both CCP and PLA leaders. The essence of postMao military reform is to regulate the PLA’s political role in the political and social system. To the CCP the significance of institutionalization is that it can help avoid the worst of Mao’s practice of using the gun to settle internal party dispute. The cumulative effect of institutionalization points to the fact that it is part of an unpronounced political reform program; put in another manner, it is the way of political reform in China that is gradually carried out from the periphery to the core of the political system. The decision-making process concerning matters of national defense and national security is based on regular and formal meetings of the parties involved, after lengthy consultations and debate among different interests. Moreover, leaders intruding into areas of responsibility other than their own would be punished by party discipline and military codes. Yang Baibing’s lesson has been well and truly learned on both sides. Indeed institutionalization cuts both ways for the CCP and the PLA. For the commander-in-chief, he can rely more on existing institutions of control to compensate for his weakness vis-à-vis the generals. For the PLA, the institutional safeguards help it resist invitations from civilians to enter party factional strife, and thus protect its corporate unity and integrity. Now Mao’s formula of zhengzhiju yi zheng junwei yi jun has been codified to govern their interactions. And the codified rules are sanctioned by a new culture in civil–military relations, which has created a deeply rooted taboo in the minds of both civilian and military leaders not to rock the boat. The Sixteenth Political Bureau’s first study session reiterated the procedures and regulations of the top military bodies. This shows how serious the top leader has been in promoting institutionalized political interactions at the apex of power.43 Rule three: enhancing military autonomy Institutionalized civil–military relations can be achieved only when the civilians and the generals strike a balance between effective civilian control and sufficient military autonomy. Without the former, the military may attempt to maximize its gains at the expense of other political and social interests. Without the latter,

Beyond symbiosis  117 civilian control can be intrusive and bilateral relations become unstable. Only when the military has enough autonomy will it become less interventionist in inner party politics. In the post-Deng era the effort to promote military autonomy has been a focus of institutionalization of civil–military relations. In other words a level of autonomy is the precondition for the PLA to move out of the relationship of symbiosis with the Party. At the organizational level, thanks to the unparalleled power of the CMC, which is made up entirely of professional soldiers except for its chair, the military has achieved a relatively independent status vis-à-vis the center of state power. In the Party’s hierarchical chain, it is under the Political Bureau. In actuality the CMC largely operates outside the latter’s reach. This has been a long tradition that can be traced back to the practice of Mao’s formula of zhengzhiju yi zheng junwei yi jun, as mentioned earlier. The state administration has no agency overseeing military affairs. This political division of power erects a firewall that allows the top brass to concentrate on their military administration. At the policy level, whereas the Political Bureau is the ultimate forum for key military decisions, it is the PLA that takes the policy initiatives and sets the direction of the debate. This shows the Party’s respect for professional inputs. On issues of national security that involve both civilian and military interests, the Political Bureau’s decisionmaking incorporates proposals from both sides. Key PLA leaders participate in these meetings and exchange views with representatives from the State Council. It would be a foregone conclusion that most military policy proposals submitted to the Political Bureau would be approved automatically because these policies are already cleared by the CMC with the green light given by the Party’s general secretary. This paves the way for the CMC to exercise decision-making power in a highly autonomous manner. At the administrative and operational levels the PLA has gained the most autonomy, including personnel nomination and promotion, transfer and punishment of senior officers, allocation of military budget to the services, research of the new weapons systems, review of defense strategies, salary and social welfare matters, and so on. The PLA’s legal and discipline authorities assume total independence in handling its own criminal and other related cases. None of these, however, can be compared with the effects of the passage of party and military elders, who took it for granted, across the civilian/military boundaries. Now an unprecedented level of autonomy in managing its own affairs has presented the PLA a decreased need and will to get involved in civilian politics. The dynamics of “interest sharing” and China’s civil–military relations in transition Interest sharing and symbiosis have intimate linkages between them but may point to two different long-term evolutionary paths of civil–military relations. The Soviet experience shows that, as long as the interests of the ruling Communist Party and the military were identical, the two most powerful institutions would stick together.44 Yet, once they no longer saw their common survival in the same boat, they would place their own interests above those they used to share.

118  You And this happened naturally when they encountered an unavoidable choice under enormous external pressure. The Soviet Red Army decided in 1991 that to roll tanks into Red Square to defend the Party would be too costly for the military and fundamentally jeopardize its own key interests. A painful divorce occurred. The Soviet case revealed that in a totalitarian system the symbiotic civil–military relationship is neither a given nor unshakable. The divorce is the result of a military embracing professionalism, de-emphasizing ideology, and protecting its own prestige. The trigger for this is often irreconcilable tension between the state and society that imposes the ultimate choice upon the two institutions. What the Soviet experience tells us is that it is a myth to believe that the Party and the military have to survive or demise together. Most probably the armed forces would outlive the Communist Party out of power. If the military does not collapse with the collapse of the ruling power, it may not defend the latter in a desperate way. And the new and elected government would continue to rely on the military for its own survival, especially at the early stage of democratization. In a way the second Russian revolution, in 1991, revealed that separation of the party and the army was the key to the success of de-Leninization in a socialist system, and it could take place in a prompt manner. This phenomenon has also been proved by the democratization process of other authoritarian systems as well. Indonesia is another vivid example.45 China’s case would be more complicated. The time-honored ties of flesh and blood between the CCP and the PLA would make any such divorce more painful and long-lasting, if it happened at all. However, what is an undeniable truth is that there has been no permanent symbiotic civil–military relationship in China’s recorded history of the last 5,000 years. Taiwan’s transformation course also testified that even with time-honored ties of flesh and blood, the KMT and the nationalist military would have to go their separate ways when social change deepened to the point beyond which human will could not resist the tide.46 China’s gradual transformation of its political and social systems produces similar effects. As revolutionary zeal subsides, the key institutions have their own calculation of costs and benefits. More importantly, the changing political structure and general social mood leave increasingly smaller room for the military not to yield to the powerful popular demand for liberalization. China’s civil–military relations approach a crossroads as seen from a long historical mega-trend. Despite many institutionalization efforts, the PLA retains its influence as the key arbiter in times of social and political crisis. Even in times of non-crisis the PLA is influential on key Party decisions whose implementation depends on the PLA’s co-operation, e.g., the PLA’s position on the Party’s succession. This means that, whereas civilians’ penetration into military affairs is institutionally obstructed, there is less of an obstacle for the PLA’s involving itself in Party politics. The top brass is vulnerable to political intervention from the civilian commander-in-chief. China’s civil–military relations are still marked by remnant symbiosis. On the other hand, the long-term prospects in the evolution of CCP–PLA relations indicate that substantial changes are being brewed against the standard

Beyond symbiosis  119 communist stereotype. There are both institutional logic and organizational imperatives behind the change. Some of these can be concretely seen from the following angles. It is hard to imagine that the PLA would not disobey party orders. The interestsharing relations are still tight. However, the difference between the relationship of symbiosis and relationship of interest sharing is that the latter describes a reality of co-existence of two parallel interest groups. Given this, differentiated interests are bound to rise between the Party and the Army.47 In fact this phenomenon emerged quite a long time ago. Peng Dehui and Lin Biao disagreed with the standard political line of their days. In the 1980s the PLA became increasingly more impatient with Deng’s personnel policy and his suppression of PLA interests, e.g., in terms of shrinking military budget.48 Although these serious incidents had the potential to disrupt normal Party/army ties, they were confinable, as long as the bulk of the PLA rank and file remained loyal to top party leaders. Unless a revolution from above converged with a simultaneous large-scale social protest movement from below, the CCP and the PLA would not face such a delicate situation. Yet if it is inevitable that these happen in one form or another, as China is undergoing a revolutionary change in the years ahead, the two most powerful institutions in the country would face a tough choice. For instance, organizational atrophy is a rule in all political institutions. This is especially true of a ruling party like the CCP, which is huge and in charge of enormous economic resources but without effective external checks and balances. The pace of its decay would be logically a lot faster than that of a professional, highly disciplined, and relatively small organization like the PLA. When the decay of the government system goes hand in hand with mounting social protest movements, the different interests may take a qualitative turn at some critical juncture, forcing the PLA to decide where to stand. The Party’s “absolute control” over the military is premised on three institutional control mechanisms: the party committee system, the commissar system, and the political affairs work system.49 But a closer look at the three institutional arrangements reveals that these contain faultlines that could prove to be fatal in times of crisis. First of all the people manning these offices are entrusted with party control jobs in the military, but they are also an integral part of the professional officer corps. Second, the make-up of the party committees in the PLA strongly favors the military commanders. For a body exercising collective leadership, the commanders possess critical power of numbers.50 Third, the primary task of the PLA is preparation for military struggle and winning the next war, forcing soldiers to spend the bulk of their time on military training. The trinity of traditional missions of the PLA being a combat force, political work unit (social mobilization), and productive team (commercial activities) has been trimmed to one simple task of war fighting. Professionally this has enlarged its distance from any other political organizations. Fourth, the personnel management is exclusively in the hands of top soldiers with little Party interference. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the PLA is highly autonomous. In a way the Party’s absolute control is an abstract concept, as it does not

120  You have a solid institutional framework to sustain it. The CCP–PLA relationship is currently defined as political leadership in the form of carrying out party lines, policies, and programs. It is based more on political influence and policy guidance than on detailed organizational control.51 This model of leadership provides basis for PLA autonomy reflected by the slogan of obeying orders from the CC and the CMC with no questions asked. In the Party Charter the CC is above the CMC. But to soldiers the CC and CMC are parallel bodies of power. And the CC is an empty idea, as it has little to do with PLA management, whereas the CMC is where the real and highest authority comes from. These institutional incompatibilities highlight the Party’s concern that “There is an inherent danger of the PLA abolishing party leadership.”52

Conclusion China’s civil–military relations are undergoing substantial changes, largely from symbiosis to interest sharing. The process is inherently pregnant with acute challenges: The departure of powerful civilian leaders like Mao and Deng may have left a transitional void in party control over the military, which has a long tradition of being an interventionist force. So far the CCP and the PLA have coped well with these challenges, largely because their foundation of cooperation remains solid. They share vital and strategic interests in China’s nation-building process: making the country economically prosperous, socially stable, and militarily powerful. Short of a major political and social crisis this bond of interdependence will last for a long time to come. On the other hand, we may have seen a mega-trend of party/army separation in the making. The mounting military professionalism has enhanced the sense of corporate identity among officer corps. It exerts a strong influence on the civilian decision-making process in regard to military and security issues. More importantly the PLA as a major interests group in the political structure not only shares key interests with the ruling party but also has its own interests to pursue, interests that are necessarily always in agreement with the Party’s. This dichotomy is being supplemented by the faulty lines in the institutional arrangements in the CCP’s control over the PLA. For instance, the Party’s political leadership as the means of civilian control over the gun lacks channels of organizational penetration and this hollows up the concept of “absolute control.” Even political commissars are torn between their identities as a party cadre and as professional soldiers. From a close look of the career patterns of political affairs staff in the PLA their perception as a professional soldier far exceeds that as a party representative. This may result in divided loyalty or subordinate loyalty toward the ruling party and may contribute to a major split in the structure of the party/army partnership in facing a massive social protest against the Party. This would be a difficult test to both institutions and their response to the test would decide the fate of China’s democratic transformation.

Beyond symbiosis  121

Notes 1 You Ji, “The Supreme Leader and the Military,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 2002), pp. 279–96. 2 For the analysis of this symbiotic relations, see for example David Shambaugh, Modernising China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Thomas Bickford, “A Retrospective on the Study of Chinese Civil–Military Relations since 1979,” paper to CAPS/RAND Conference, Washington, DC, 1999. 3 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986). 4 For instance, PLA ideologues were the most vocal critique of key reform policies at the turn of the 1970s/1980s. 5 You Ji, “China: From a Tool of Revolution to a Professional Military,” in Muthiah Apalagapa, ed., The Professionalism of Asian Armed Forces (Honolulu, HI: East– West Center Press, 2001), pp. 93–110. 6 According to the former political commissar of Beijing Military Region, Lou Yinghuai, Deng told him that his main mission in managing PLA affairs was to “appoint the right persons to the right positions. Other things can be left to the first line CMC leadership.” Lou Yinghuai, “Three Pace-to-Pace Report to Deng Xiaoping,” Jiefangjun bao, 16 August 2004. 7 See Ian Wilson and You Ji, “Leadership by ‘Lines’: China’s Unresolved Succession,” Problems of Communism, 39: 28–44 (1990). 8 Michael Swaine, The Military and Political Succession in China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992). 9 A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China (Boulder, CO: Holt, Praeger, 1985). 10 For the imbalance of power between the two organizations, see Harry Harding, “The PLA as A Political Interest Group,” in Victor Falkenheim, ed., Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng (New York: Paragon House, 1987), pp. 213–14. 11 See John Wong and Zheng Yongnian, “The Political Economy of China’s PostNanxun Development,” in John Wong and Zheng Yongnian, ed., The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in the Post-Deng Era (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), pp. 3–17. 12 Jiang and his other CMC colleagues did not even know how the slogan was raised. They ordered the slogan to be dropped from all PLA media in July after Deng reconfirmed Jiang’s authority. 13 Yang Shuangkun was “promoted” to be state president. By this Deng annoyed the incumbent, Li Xiannian, who was three years younger than Yang. Yang Baibin was also promoted to be a Political Bureau member but was not given any substantial duty. It is interesting to note that in Beidaihe conference in August 1992 the CMC’s proposal for the Fourteenth Congress was still Yang Baibin running CMC daily affairs. When Jiang suddenly announced that Yang was transferred to the Political Bureau to help Li Ruihuan manage the propaganda work, Yang Shuangkun protested that this was against CMC’s arrangement. Jiang replied that this was Deng’s decision. When Yang returned to Beijing to pay a visit to Deng, Deng’s security secretary told him that Deng was not home. In fact Deng was. In the past Yang was the only person who could see Deng at home without a need to ask for permission. By then Yang fully understood the situation. (Information from a source close to the Yang family in 1993.) This episode fully revealed Deng’s personality. He discarded a long-term friendship cold-bloodedly for the long-term stability of the CCP, lest Yang become another Sima Yi in Chinese history.

122  You 14 Deng’s instruction was jundui yaorennai (the PLA has to restrain itself from demanding more budget). 15 Robert Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legend of Jiang Zemin (Shanghai: Horizon Media, 2004), pp. 407, 427. 16 On the evolution of China’s post-Deng national defense strategy, see You Ji, “Learning and Catching Up: China’s RMA Initiative,” in Emily Goldman and Tom Mahnken, ed., The Information Revolution in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 97–124. 17 On subjective and objective control see, for instance, Samuel Huntington, Soldiers and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). 18 According to a PLA source, in selecting PLA Central Committee members Jiang would see first their academic qualification and then their age. Without a university credential, Jiang would mark in the submission paper “not considered.” 19 Eric Nordinger, Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 13. 20 Jiang’s reign was the period in which the PLA had least involvement in CCP factional infighting. 21 Reported in Xinhua, 7 June 2006. 22 This can be boiled down to the trend of the PLA being nationalized (guojiahua). See Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil–Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” in Nan Li, ed., Chinese Civil–Military Relations (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 25–39. 23 See You Ji, “Hu Jintao’s Consolidation of Power and His Command of the Gun,” in John Wong and Lai Hongyi, ed., China’s Political and Social Change in Hu Jintao Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), chapter 1. 24 In fact all the PLA soldiers I met expressed the view that it should be the Party’s decision. They did not see Jiang as indispensable. 25 For instance, Jiang insisted that four of his close followers were included in the PSC. He personally decided to build the Beijing National Opera House, against voices of opposition, and the Qinghai–Tibet Railway, only to have these confirmed by the Political Bureau later. “The decision making process on the Qinghai–Tibet railway construction,” Zuojia wenzhai, 3 July 2006. 26 For China’s two-tier leadership system, see Frederick Teiwes, “The Paradoxical PostMao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to ‘Normal Politics’,” China Journal, 34: 55–94 (1995). 27 A deep restructuring occurred in the PLA just after the Sixteenth Congress. More than two dozen army-level commands were streamlined, putting the jobs of 200 major generals on the line. For instance, all naval first-grade bases were downgraded to divisional level. Two group armies were dismantled. 28 A number of Western analysts made such arguments. See for instance, James Mulvenon, “Party–Army Relations since the 16th Party Congress: The Battle of the TwoCentres,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, ed., Civil–Military Change in China (Carlisle, PA: US Army College, 2004), pp. 11–48. 29 Hu inspected Beijing Western Hills Command Headquarters in late September according to the PLA Daily, 26 September 2004. 30 Major-General Jin Yinan in The PLA’s Grand Mission, a special documentary to mark the PLA’s eightieth birthday, the military program of the CCTV, 28 September 2007. 31 “The CCP Central Office promulgates six directories regarding management of senior Party cadres,” People’s Daily, 6 August 2006. 32 Tu Min, “Pinmin zhengfu liuda xinzheng” (The Government of Ordinary People and Six New Policy Programs), Zhongguo gaige (China Reform), 12: 8–11 (2003).

Beyond symbiosis  123 33 This point has been repeated numerous times, seen from his first news brief after becoming the Party boss and his new year message on 31 December 2003. 34 The most convincing evidence for this remark can be seen from the attitudes of Beijing taxi drivers toward him. These drivers are the most picky group of people toward government officials. I have talked to many of them and found that the majority of them have a favorable view on Hu. 35 Roman Kolkwicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 11. 36 General Qian Guoliang, “Comprehensively Implement the Guideline of Headquarters Construction,” Journal of the PLA National Defense University, 6: 4 (2000). 37 Liu Chunzhi, “Sunzi de guofangguan jiqi dui dangdai de qishi” (Sunzi’s National Defense Outlook and its Inspiration to Our Times), Journal of the PLA National Defense University, 9: 50 (1999). 38 “The Party Committee of the PLA Air Force Headquarters holds a special conference on Chairman Hu’s idea of scientific development,” Kongjun Bao (Airforce News), 12 January 2006. 39 “The PLA Navy Headquarters studies Chairman Hu’s idea of scientific development,” Renmin haijun (The PLA Navy), 23 March 2006. 40 Richard Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil–Military Relations,” National Interests, 35: 3–17 (1994). 41 For instance, see Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil–Military Relations.” 42 Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). 43 Reported by Xinhua News Agency, 7 December 2002. 44 Amos Perlmutter and William LeGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil–Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” American Political Science Review, 76: 778–89 (1982). 45 Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 46 On Taiwan’s evolving civil–military relations in the process of democratization, see Institute for National Policy Research, Jundui yu shehui (The Military and Society) (Taipei: Yeqian chubanshe, 1998). 47 Ellis Joffe, “The PLA and the Succession Problem,” in Richard Yang, ed., China’s Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 149–60. 48 Qian Diqian, former vice president of the PLA National Defense University, “Production Must Serve Military Training,” Junshi jingjixue (Military Economics) 5: 8 (1989). 49 Qian Haihao, Jundui zuzhi bianzhixue (The Study of Military Organization and Structure) (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2001), chapter 9. 50 The committee is manned by officers from two separate systems (combat and political affairs) under the commander and commissar. The combat system has more members in the committee. When the vote is cast, the commander has an obvious advantage. For more information on this, see You Ji, “Sorting out Myths of the PLA Political Commissars,” in David M. Finkelstein, ed., Swimming in a New Sea: Civil–Military Issues in Today’s China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006). 51 The Party History and Party Building Research and Teaching Group of the PLA, Zhidao xinshiqi jundui sixiang jianshe de yiju (Guidance for Enhancing the PLA’s Political and Ideological Work in the New Era) (Beijing: The PLA National Defense University, 1998), p. 307. 52 The writing group, Biography of Marshall Ye Jianying (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1995), p. 670.

Part II

China and globalization

6 China reshapes the world economy Deng Ziliang and Zheng Yongnian

Introduction After nearly three decades of “reform and opening,” China now plays an integral part in the world economy. In Marxist terms, China has become an important link in the chain of global capitalism. The country has achieved high stable economic growth, with an annual growth rate of over 9 percent in recent decades. China’s per capita GDP in 2005 still lagged behind about half the nations in the world, ranking 110th in nominal value and 84th in purchasing power parity (PPP) value.1 However, in nominal value the Chinese economy has skyrocketed to fourth largest in overall scale in the world, alongside the United States, Japan, and Germany. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have ranked China as the second largest economy in terms of GDP by PPP value, behind only the United States; a worrying fact for those politicians who are sensitive to China’s development.2 Another significant development is China’s transition from capital shortage status to capital surplus, and the country has begun to export its capital to different parts of the world. However, as a newcomer to the world economy, China is far less influential than its counterparts in North America and Europe, and not yet parallel with its Asian neighbor, Japan. The Chinese yuan is still not a viable currency in the international commodity and financial markets, still less a currency in other countries’ foreign reserve baskets. The outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from China is still a trivial portion of the ever-increasing flow of FDI in the world. China’s stock market is still semi-closed to foreign capital and the price index can hardly be compared with the New York Stock Exchange in terms of significant influence on global financial markets. These details, however, should not dwarf China’s vital growing role in reshaping the world economy. Given the colossal size of the population, its developmental potential, and the speedy increase of both demand and supply, China is having an increasingly major impact on the world economy. This chapter attempts to explore and analyze some key mechanisms which have enabled China to expand its role in the world economy. Our discussion mainly focuses on the following three areas: (1) China’s role in reshaping the East Asian production system; (2) China’s role in the global trade system; and (3) the global impact of China’s

128  Deng and Zheng outflow investment, plus the country’s growing domestic demands. Following our empirical analysis is a discussion of how China is reshaping the world economy. Our main argument is that, although the economic rise of China has benefited the world economy, the country is facing severe external constraints, which will limit its potential in this area.

China in the East Asian production system China has attracted a huge amount of FDI from other East Asian economies and has fundamentally altered the production structure in East Asia. Since the level of economic development varies to a great degree amongst East Asian economies, each economy can exploit its comparative advantage in labor supply at different stages of development, which gives rise to the industrial transfer in the East Asian region. Since the early 1980s, China has been a part of the East Asian industrial transfer, and has benefited from this process. With almost unlimited cheap labor and pro-business FDI policies, FDI has continued to flow into China on a colossal scale. FDI has been a massive help in solving the problem of capital shortage and brought about dramatic demonstration and technology spillover effects to Chinese firms. FDI’s most immediate contribution lies in the transference of many mature industries from FDI source economies to China. The majority of these industries fall into labor-intensive and export-oriented categories. In East Asia, the production and trade system is dominated by intra-industry specialization and trade. China has the advantage of cheap labor and uses this to help the multinational enterprises (MNEs) complete the final stages of production. In other words, China’s role lies in the assembly of goods. Figure 6.1 depicts how China has become the “assembly center” of East Asia as a result of three major industrial transfers within East Asia, which occurred after World War II. There are benefits to the industrial and trade transfers. The majority of laborintensive products are produced in China, the country with the largest domestic market and natural scale economy. The emergence of China as a strong economic force has rearranged the international production network of East Asia and is redirecting trade streams worldwide. (We will return to this point later.) Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that China plays an integral role in attracting FDI to the East Asian region. Since 1985, the changing pattern of FDI inflow to China has directly determined FDI inflow to other developing Asian economies. Since 1993, there have been signs that FDI inflow into Asia is converging in China. It is believed that the increasing FDI in China is at the expense of other Asian economies. However, since China has become the largest assembly center for other Asian economies, FDI into China basically serves as a stimulus rather than a deterrent for FDI into other Asian economies, thanks to the scale economy effect.3

China in the triangular trade system As mentioned above, in East Asia’s unique production system, China is playing the role of final-stage assembler4 – it imports intermediate-stage products from

Figure 6-1: China as “Assembly Center”the in East Asia China reshapes world economy  129 US

Trade Surplus

China

Japan

Transfer of Trade Surplus

EU

Trade surplus

NIE4

ASEAN4

Transfer of Trade Surplus

India, Vietnam, etc.

Legend: 1st Tier Transfer: 2nd Tier Transfer: 3rd Tier Transfer: Note: NIE4 refers to four newly industrial economies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong

Figure 6.1  China as “assembly center” in East Asia. Note: NIE4 refers to four newly Kong, and Singapore. ASEAN4 refers to the four nations with the best economic performance in industrial economies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, HongandKong, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the and Philippines. Singapore. ASEAN4 refers to the four nations with the best economic performance in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

other Asian economies and assembles them using cheap labor, and then exports the complete products to third markets, mainly in the US and EU. Within this system, China earns a small portion of the total profit, with massive usage of raw materials. Following the implementation of the international “Rules of Origin,” most of the products shipped from China to external markets are counted as part of the total amount of China’s exports, thus enabling China to maintain an extraordinarily high trade surplus to the US and EU.5 This so-called triangular trade pattern is manifested by China’s trade surplus with the US and EU, while keeping a trade deficit with other East Asian economies, as shown in Table 6.1.6 535 We will consider the US import of labor-intensive commodities from East Asia as an example. The US import from China increases faster than its import from other East Asian economies, as shown in Figure 6.4. In 1991, 1992, and 2002, China overtook South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, respectively, to become the US’s largest import origin economy in East Asia. As demonstrated in Figure 6.4, the US import from China makes up a very large part of its import from East Asia. By comparing data from 1985 and 2004, we find that during that period the US trade deficit with China increased by US$162 billion, while the US trade deficit

Figure 6-2: The Share of Accumulated FDI Inflows to China from Different Origins (Percentage, 1979-2005) 80 Japan

70 60

NIE4

50 40 30 20 10 0

ASEAN4

19 79 -8 3 19 85 19 87 19 89 19 91 19 93 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05

EU3

Source: basedofonaccumulated data from The Yearbook Economicorigins and Trade Figure Calculation 6.2 The share FDI inflows of to China ChinaForeign from different Statistics, 1998-2003, and the website “Invest in China”: http://www.fdi.gov.cn. EU3 refers (percentage, 1979–2005). Source: Calculation based on data from Theto the UK, Germany, and France. of China Foreign Economic and Trade Statistics, 1998–2003, Yearbook and the website “Invest in China,” www.fdi.gov.cn. EU3 refers to the UK, Germany, and France.

Figure 6-3: Major Hosts of World FDI Inflow (Percentage) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

United States Japan China

EU 25 Developing economies: Asia

536

Source: United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Figure 6.3  Major hosts .of world FDI inflow (percentage). Source: United Nations http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ Conference on Trade Development Note: “Developing economies: Asia”and include China and (UNCTAD), all of the otherhttp://stats.unctad.org/ major Asian economies, fdi/. Note: “Developing economies: Asia” include China and all of the other excluding only Japan.

major Asian economies, excluding only Japan.

China reshapes the world economy  131 Table 6.1  Top 10 trade deficit and surplus partners of China (2005) Deficit

Surplus

Ranking

Partner

Scale ($bn)

Partner

Scale ($bn)

1 2 3 4 5

Taiwan South Korea Japan Malaysia Saudi Arabia

58.1 41.7 16.5 9.5 8.4

114.2 112.3 23.0 13.5 6.7

6 7 8 9 10

Philippines Angola Thailand Brazil Australia

US Hong Kong Netherlands UK United Arab Emirates Spain Italy Canada Belgium Turkey

8.2 6.2 6.2 5.2 5.1

6.4 4.8 4.1 3.7 3.6

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM).

with Japan, NIE4 and ASEAN4 increased by US$62 billion. However, when we compare 2000 and 2004, the figures are a disproportionate US$78  billion and –US$9 billion. This means that the recent changes in US trade deficit with Japan, NIE4, and ASEAN4 show a reverse trend. It is quite clear that the substitution effect of the trade deficit between China and other East Asian economies is becoming increasingly significant. Nevertheless, the statistics on a gross basis rather than a value added basis show that the widening US trade deficit with China has actually been a US trade deficit with all the trade partners involved in the triangular trade6-4: system. the tradeofdeficit were measured Products on a value added Figure US IfImport Labour-intensive from basis, East the Asia

(Percentage) 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

NIE3

ASEAN4

Japan

1983

China

1988

1993

1998

2003

Source: Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Figure 6.4  United US Import of labor-intensive products from East AsiaDatabase, (percentage). Source: http://comtrade.un.org/db/ . Commodity Trade Statistics Database, http://comtrade.un.org/ United Nations db/.

132  Deng and Zheng US trade deficit with China would have been far smaller and its trade deficit with other Asian economies would have been far greater. Table 6.2 demonstrates that, whereas other East Asian economies maintain a very low or negative growth rate of export to the US, China has become a major driving force keeping a high level of export to the US. For instance, in 2003, China contributed half of US import growth. It can be reasonably argued that China’s huge capacity to absorb the industrial transfer from other East Asian economies and its role in the triangular trade system has enabled the US population to enjoy low-price goods. Some might argue that, via industrial transfer, China has taken away jobs from FDI origin countries where FDI has not occurred at all, ceteris paribus. However, this plausible assumption is untenable because the scale economy of mass production in China after the industrial transfer brings dramatic pecuniary benefits to upstream production in the FDI origin economies.

“Made in China” commodities and the world market “Made in China” commodities have shown a strong competitive advantage in international markets, because they represent the best combination of Asian re-

Table 6.2  US import of labor-intensive commodities: China’s role (change over five-year period)

World East Asiaa NIEb

ASEAN4

China

Japan

Growth ($mn) Growth ($mn) Growth ($mn) Share of world export growth (%) Share of Asia export growth (%) Growth ($mn) Share of world export growth (%) Share of Asia export growth (%) Growth ($mn) Share of world export growth (%) Share of Asia export growth (%) Growth ($mn) Share of world export growth (%) Share of Asia export growth (%)

1988

1993

1998

2003

68,463 25,453 9,435 13.8 37.1 3,072 4.5 4.5 4,860 7.1 19.1 6,800 9.9 26.7

40,036 25,161 –3,717 –9.3 –14.8 6,974 17.4 17.4 18,858 47.1 74.9 1,476 3.7 5.9

107,737 35,534 666 0.6 1.9 4,992 4.6 4.6 23,248 21.6 65.4 3,975 3.7 11.2

83,832 32,388 –1,133 –1.4 –3.5 1,830 2.2 2.2 42,509 50.7 131.2 –4,241 –5.1 –13.1

Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Notes a East Asia includes newly industrial economies (South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore), ASEAN4 (Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia), China, and Japan. b NIE does not include Taiwan because the trade data is not available from this database.

China reshapes the world economy  133 sources – intellectual innovation from the R&D departments of Tokyo, Shanghai, and Singapore, cheap rubber from Indonesia, and labor from China or Malaysia. All these resources are allocated and manipulated by MNEs to cater for their interests, the most important of which are, of course, cost minimization and profit maximization.7 Figure 6.5 demonstrates the competitiveness of “Made in China” commodities in the NAFTA, EU, and ASEAN markets. In 2004, the eight commodities with the largest export volume accounted for 30 percent of China’s total export. Overall, these commodities showed the strongest competitive advantage in NAFTA markets and the weakest in EU markets. The top three categories – baby carriages, toys, and games; footwear; and trunks, suitcases, and bags – took around 70 percent of NAFTA markets. China is demonstrating its tremendous capacity for mass production. Currently, China produces 25 percent of the world’s washing machines, 30 percent of television sets, 40 percent of microwaves, and 50 percent of cameras. It also produces 70 percent of the world’s photocopiers, 90 percent of toys, and almost 8 95 percent of lighters. Figure 6-5: “Made in China” Commodities in Major Markets (Market share by percentage, in 2004) Baby carriage, toys, games Footwear Trunk, suitcases, bag Furniture Transistors and semiconductors Telecommunications equipment, and parts

NAFTA EU

Parts of computers and office machines

ASEAN

Computers 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Figure 6.5  “Made in China” commodities in major markets (market share by percentage, Note: Calculated by Note: authors based on the Unitedbased Nations Commodity Trade Statistics in 2004). Calculated by authors on the United Nations Commodity Database. The eightStatistics commodities above bear strongest competitive advantage in strongest Trade Database. The the eight commodities above bear the international markets and correspond Standard International Tradecorrespond Classification competitive advantageto eight in international markets and to (SITC) eight 3-digit codes, as follows. International Computers – SITC parts of computers andthree-digit office machines - SITC Standard Trade752; Classification (SITC) codes, as 759; telecommunications equipment –and parts752; - SITC 764; semiconductors - SITC follows. Computers SITC parts oftransistors computersand and office machines – 776; furniture -SITC SITC759; 821; telecommunications trunks, suitcases, bagsequipment - SITC 831; footwear SITC 851; and parts –- SITC 764; baby transistors carriages, toys,and games – SITC 894. – SITC 776; furniture – SITC 821; trunks, suitcases, bags semiconductors – SITC 831; footwear – SITC 851; baby carriages, toys, games – SITC 894.

134  Deng and Zheng It is worth taking a closer look at the textile trade. The market share of China’s export of textile goods in EU and US markets has increased dramatically in recent years, especially since the elimination of global textile quotas on 1 January 2005. Indeed, China’s textile export has sparked serious disputes and the re-imposition of quotas by the US and EU. Economically speaking, the trade disputes between China and the US and EU do not benefit the US and EU. If the import companies in the US and EU did not import from China, they would turn to other Asian exporters such as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, where textile products are not necessarily manufactured at lower costs. Taking the US market as an example, one can see from Table 6.3 that in 2005 total US import from the world excluding China barely changed. The trade dispute between the US and China could hardly stop the American consumers from buying textile products, and if they cannot import them from China, they will simply shift their orders to other exporters. Cheap but high-quality “Made in China” commodities bring China’s trade partners more benefits than costs. China has contributed to its trade partners’ welfare by becoming involved with the free trade system and globalization, regardless of the subsequent pressure on some trade partners to expedite their industrial upgrading progress. As the assembly center for the international production network in East Asia, China is believed to have contributed to the low price of “Made in China” commodities in major international markets,9 and thus improved the real income level of consumers who have bought the commodities. Cheap “Made in China” commodities have helped to successfully combat the worldwide inflation Table 6.3  US textile import from major partners (2005) 2004

2005

Ranking

Country

Import value ($mn)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

China Mexico India Indonesia Canada Hong Kong Vietnam Pakistan Honduras Bangladesh

18,240 8,209 4,118 2,607 3,333 4,026 2,637 2,656 2,752 2,093

20.3 9.1 4.6 2.9 3.7 4.5 2.9 3 3.1 2.3

22.2 –2.3 13.1 11.6 –0.2 3.6 9.1 14.5 6.9 6.7

26,014 7,628 5,132 3,069 3,116 3,642 2,793 3,010 2,698 2,485

27.2 8.0 5.4 3.2 3.3 3.8 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.6

42.6 –7.1 24.6 17.8 –6.5 –9.5 5.9 13.3 –2 18.7

World, excluding China 71,588

85.9

4.7

69,556

72.8

–2.8

World

100

7.8

95,570

100

6.4

89,828

Share (%)

Import Increase value (%) ($mn)

Share (%)

Increase (%)

Source: Foreign Trade Division, Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce.

China reshapes the world economy  135 10

triggered by rising energy prices. The trade barrier set for “Made in China” commodities shows the reluctance of major industrial economies in the chain of global capitalism to adjust their industrial structures.11 Unfortunately, this growing protectionism is at the expense of their consumers’ living standards.

Outward foreign direct investment Although the total outward FDI from China so far only accounts for a small portion of the world’s total outward FDI, the recent merger and acquisition activities of Chinese multinational firms have triggered strong economic nationalism in other parts of the world, particularly the United States. Since the late 1970s, China has been involved in overseas construction and investment. But the scale on which this occurs is rather insignificant (Figure 6.6) and most of these activities are concentrated in those regions that have traditional business links with China, such as Hong Kong, Pakistan, and some African countries. The majority of companies with the privilege of operating their businesses abroad are large-scale state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which usually have political considerations to take into account when dealing with the Chinese government. Chinese multinationals had not begun to operate on a large scale until around the beginning of this century. By then, China had been implementing its “reform and open door” policy for more than two decades and its export-oriented firms had accumulated sufficient experience in external markets. Now, more and more domestic multinationals are beginning large scale economies overseas operations. The increase Figure 6-6: China and major source of FDI outflows

(Percentage) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04

-10

United States Japan China

EU 25 Developing economies: Asia

Figure 6.6  China and major source economies of FDI outflows (percentage). Source: UNCTAD. Source: UNCTAD.

136  Deng and Zheng of outward FDI from 2001 to 2004 was 3.7 percent,12 a high growth rate when compared with 2.3 percent in the 1990s and 0.4 percent in the 1980s. Three main factors have contributed to the rapid overseas expansion of Chinese multinational firms. First, exportation is not necessarily always the best option for export-oriented firms because of complicated non-tariff trade barriers in the context of global tariff reduction. The cheap “Made in China” commodities have allegedly had a negative impact on sunset industries in some American and European countries and have encountered strong resistance from local firms.13 However, the establishment of affiliate companies and factories in destination markets will undoubtedly defuse the hostility of local markets through the recruitment of local workers and, most importantly of all, enable the products to be tailored to the preferences of local consumers. Second, the mergers and acquisitions of overseas companies enable the full exploitation of location advantages and the brand assets of local companies. For instance, via the takeover of the IBM personal computer business, Lenovo is able to control its global distribution network. Third, in response to the desperate thirst for natural resources such as oil and ore stimulated by fast domestic economic growth, China has initiated a series of policy reforms to facilitate firms to “go out” (zou chuqu) to resource-abundant countries. The merger and acquisition initiatives of some giant Chinese SOEs backed by national policy incentives have captured a great number of international headlines. Table 6.4 shows the regional distribution of Chinese outward FDI. Most of the FDI is directed at Asian economies, especially Hong Kong. This is linked to the special role Hong Kong plays in China’s economy. Backed by its long history of open economy and well-rounded financial facilities and business networks, Hong Kong has been regarded as a bridge between the Chinese mainland and the rest of the world. The placement of affiliates in Hong Kong is a frequent preliminary investment approach by mainland firms. Another important factor is the “round tripping” investment due to the differentiated policies for domestic firms and foreign invested firms in mainland China. Chinese domestic firms try to benefit from the favorable policies granted to foreign investors by transferring

Table 6.4  Geographical distribution of China’s outward FDI in 2004 Region

Scale ($bn)

Percentage (%)

World Asia   of which Hong Kong Latin America Europe Africa North America Oceania

28.5 15.0 11.5 10.4 1.5 0.75 0.58 0.34

100 52.5 40.4 36.5 5.3 2.6 2.0 1.1

Source: China MOFCOM.

China reshapes the world economy  137 funds to Hong Kong and then having their affiliates in Hong Kong reinvest back to the mainland.14 Large-scale investment in Latin America, Africa, and Oceania is generally resource-oriented, whereas investment going to Europe and North America is market-oriented. Figure 6.7 demonstrates a clearer “route map” of Chinese outward FDI strategy. Almost half the investment is directed towards the mining and manufacturing industries, corresponding to resource-oriented interest and marketoriented strategy respectively. Meanwhile, investment in the transportation industry accounts for 15.1 percent of total FDI, most of which is aimed at building infrastructure in the Middle East and Africa, and signals China’s national strategy in these regions. The admission of China’s “market economy” status is without exception a preferable condition whenever Chinese leaders sign diplomatic agreements with resource-abundant countries.15 Accumulated outward FDI from China reached US$388  billion by the end of 2004, helping China to participate further in the global production and trade system. This has also been beneficial to the sluggish world economy since, by directly reinvesting its foreign reserves into world capital circulation via FDI, instead of buying low-yield US treasury bonds, Chinese multinational firms are adding new stimulus to the growth of the world economy. China’s outward FDI is closely linked to rising domestic demands for raw materials. economic growth and rising living standardsFDI in China have Figure 6-7:Sustained Industry distribution of China’s outward in 2004

Agriculture, forestry, fishery 5.3%

Other 5.0%

Services 13.6%

Mining 32.7%

Manufacturing 13.8%

Wholesale and retail 14.5%

Transportation 15.1%

Figure 6.7  Industry distribution of China’s outward FDI in 2004. Source: China

Source: ChinaMOFCOM. MOFCOM.

138  Deng and Zheng brought a huge demand for natural resources and an upgraded consumption structure, affecting the prices of raw materials in the world market. Since the nominal per capita GDP was as low as US$1,702 in 2005, China is consuming only 5 percent of world output while containing 20 percent of the world’s population. But in the context of strong economic boom, China’s demand for international resources and manufacturers is unlikely to decline in the foreseeable future. Export-oriented economic growth is turning China into a huge “vacuum cleaner,” sucking up enormous amounts of intermediate products and raw materials. In the process of establishing that unprecedented hybrid, a “socialist market economy,” China has become integrated into the global economy, bringing with it a high appetite for production materials. As regards the intermediate products, shown in Table 6.1, China has maintained large trade deficits with its major trading partners in East Asia ever since the assembly activities of the global trade system have been redirected towards China. Rising demand from China has exerted an upward pressure on prices, particularly of agricultural raw materials, metals, and minerals, and to a lesser degree of vegetable oil-seeds and oils. Table 6.5 shows that in 2003 China had a very high demand for major raw materials such as cotton, soybeans, and oil. The pressure of demand for raw materials caused a sudden rise in prices, as Table 6.6 shows. Combining these two tables, one finds that China has contributed to one third of the 15.8 percent price rise in oil. Also, China is fully responsible for the price rises of cotton and soybeans. In 2003, 58 percent of China’s imported oil-seeds came from Argentina and Brazil. The surging Chinese demand for soybeans coupled with reduced production in the United States as a result of bad weather conditions and decreasing stocks brought great fortune to the soybean industry in many South American countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay.16 By examining the cotton industry, one can get a clearer picture of how China’s increased demand for raw materials has significantly improved the income level of those countries endowed with cotton, such as the African countries of Benin,

Table 6.5  Growth in the consumption of selected primary commodities in 2003: China and the rest of the world (percentage) Consumption growth Commodity

China

Other countries World

Copper Cotton Natural rubber Oil Soybeans

9.6 12.3 11.1 11.1 32.3

1.0 0.3 3.6 1.5 0.9

2.6 3.7 4.9 2.1 4.9

Contribution of China to global consumption growth

Share of China in global consumption

67.4 93.5 39.2 34.4 84.9

19.5 30.5 18.5 7.0 16.3

Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2004 (place: publisher, 2004).

China reshapes the world economy  139 Table 6.6  World primary commodity prices, 1998–2003 (percentage change over the previous year) Commodity

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Copper Cotton Natural rubber Oil

–27.3 –8.3 –29.8 –31.8

–4.9 –22.9 –12.6 38.7

15.3 3.5 7.9 55.6

–13.0 –20.9 –14.1 –13.3

–1.2 –3.3 33.1 2.0

14.1 38.0 41.7 15.8

Source: as for Table 6.5.

Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. For a long time, cotton production has been at the centre of WTO debates about trade protectionism. These developing countries have been suffering from the low price of cotton due to high agricultural subsidies in developed countries. Thanks to the rapid increase in China’s demand for cotton and the depletion of domestic cotton stock due to bad weather conditions, the world price of cotton rose sharply by 38 percent in 2003, after many years of decline from 1998 to 2002. It is worth taking a closer look at China’s impact on oil prices. China has been a key player in influencing world oil markets since its rise to the status of one of the world’s major energy consumers (Figure 6.8). In 2003, China overtook Japan to become the second largest consumer and importer of petroleum products in the world, behind only the USA.17 In the near future, China is unlikely to decrease its oil importation, owing to continuous economic development and a limited oil production capacity.18 Although China’s development is heavily reliant on the use of coal rather than oil or natural gas, its oil use is still projected to grow at an annual rate of 7.5 percent from 2002 to 2010, before slowing to 2.9 percent from 2011 to 2025, toproduction the EIA’s estimation. Growing in at China such a speed, Figure 6-8:according Petroleum and consumption (A thousand of barrels per day, 1978–2003) 6 5 consumption 4

net imports

3 production 2 1 0 1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

Figure 6.8  Petroleum production and consumption in China (thousand barrels per day, 1978–2003). Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy (EIA). Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy (EIA).

140  Deng and Zheng China’s oil use will reach 14.2 million barrels per day by 2025, with net imports of 10.9 million barrels per day.19 China’s surging import of petroleum, coupled with related infrastructure construction and financial aid, has provided promising prospects for some remote oil-producing countries, especially those in Africa and Latin America. As shown in Table 6.7, for those top 11 major petroleum suppliers to China that account for 82.4 percent of China’s total petroleum import, China is playing a vital role, especially for those whose national economies are highly dependent on oil production and export, such as Angola, Oman, Sudan, Yemen, and Congo. China imports more than 20 percent of the total petroleum supply of eight of these 11 countries. Except for Saudi Arabia, China is the largest or second largest oil import partner for these oil suppliers, behind only the US and Japan.

The state and resources diplomacy China has been implementing a pragmatic economic diplomacy toward resourceabundant countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Oceania. Although desperately in need of oil, natural gas, aluminum, copper, and iron to feed its high economic growth, China also needs strong external demand to absorb its traditional labor-intensive products such as toys, footwear, apparel, and electronic products. Countries in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East happen to be Table 6.7  Top 11 petroleum suppliers for China in 2004 Import partner Angola Saudi Arabia Oman Iran Russian Federation Sudan Viet Nam Yemen Congo Indonesia Equatorial Guinea World

Import Share in value ($mn) import 4,717 4,634 4,271 3,536 2,937 1,658 1,547 1,426 1,339 959 928

13.9 13.7 12.6 10.4 8.7 4.9 4.6 4.2 4.0 2.8 2.7

33,912

100.0

Share in export

Rank in export

30.3 6.1 47.1 9.7 5.3 100.0 22.6 39.8 26.8 20.5 22.8

2 4 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2

Data notea 2004, CIA 2004, CIA 2004, CIA 2002 2003 2004, CIA 2004, CIA

Sources: UNCTAD, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, available at http:// comtrade.un.org/db/; United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/. Note a “2004, CIA” means the data in 2004 comes from CIA. “2002” and “2003” mean that the data comes from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Other data comes from the database in 2004.

China reshapes the world economy  141 the best candidates for this – they are less industrialized and are short of many commodities excepting raw materials. Also, it is easier for China to sign economic cooperation agreements with the governments in these regions, which are usually controlled by “central planning” leaders. Since the new cabinet came into power in 2003, visits by Chinese leaders to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East have been more frequent than ever, with the aim of developing and consolidating bilateral all-round cooperation with the countries in these regions. This is shown in Table 6.8. As China pursues broader economic cooperation with Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, based on the complementary relationship between China and these trade partners, China’s total trade volume with these regions has been growing at a much faster speed than its total trade volume with the rest of the world (Table 6.9). Compared with the moderate margin of the increased rate of export to the world, China’s imports from these regions are expanding at an ever faster Table 6.8  Visits of Chinese leaders to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East (since March 2003) Leader

Countries

Results

Hu Jintao President

Feb 2004: Egypt, Gabon, Algeria Nov 2004: Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba

1 agreement on oil for each country 39 economic cooperation agreements, launch China–Chile FTA negotiation 28 agreements

Wu Bangguo Chairman, National People’s Congress

Wen Jiabao Premier

Jia Qinglin Chairman, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Zeng Qinghong Vice President

Apr 2006: Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya Nov 2004: Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria Sep 2005: Morocco

Talks to boost existing ties with African countries Agreement on economic and technological cooperation

Aug 2006: Brazil, Uruguay, Chile Jun 2006: Egypt, Ghana, Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

71 agreements

May 2005: Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Cuba

To call for enhancement of Latin American ties

Jun 2004: Tunisia, Togo, Benin, 27 agreements South Africa Launch China–Africa FTA negotiation Jan 2005: Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China; Xinhua Agency.

142  Deng and Zheng Table 6.9  Trade surges with Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East

2003

2004

2005

Trade partner

Increase in total Increase in (%) exports (%)

Increase in imports (%)

World Africa Latin America Middle East World Africa Latin America Middle East World Africa Latin America Middle East

37.1 49.6 50.4 46.8 35.7 58.9 49.3 38.4 23.2 34.9 26.1 38.3

39.9 54.1 79.1 53.4 36.0 87.2 45.9 48.4 17.6 34.6 23.0 44.2

34.6 46.3 25.2 41.2 35.4 35.7 53.6 29.5 28.4 35.3 29.9 34.3

Source: China MOFCOM.

speed. In 2003, the growth rate of China’s imports from Latin America more than doubled that of China’s total imports. In 2004, the growth rate of imports from Africa was 142 percent higher than the growth rate of total import. This record pales beside the stronger momentum of China’s import from the Middle East in 2005, which was as much as 252 percent higher than the growth rate of China’s total import. Latin America The high-profile visit of the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, to several Latin American countries in November 2004 signaled the resolution of the Chinese government to march into Latin America, attracted by the abundance of raw materials in that region. In a speech to the Brazilian Congress, Hu promised that China would pour US$100 billion into Latin America from 2005 to 2015.20 China’s large-scale investment in Latin America is undoubtedly a stimulus for the local economy, given that the FDI inflow to this region has shown signs of gradual decline from investors such as the US. From 2004 to 2005, the world FDI inflow to the three largest FDI hosts in Latin America, namely Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, declined at the annual rates of 15 percent, 8 percent, and 4 percent respectively. The expectations of decline for the Latin American economy, which is highly dependent on foreign capital, coupled with the US’s inattentiveness to its “backyard,” makes China’s investment proposals very welcome. Chinese outward FDI to Latin America, represented by the large-scale investment of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a state-owned monolith and the forty-sixth largest Fortune 500 company in 2005, accounted for more than one third of total Chinese outward FDI in 2004, as is shown in Table 6.4. The economic relationship between China and Venezuela merits special atten-

China reshapes the world economy  143 tion because it best manifests how China’s economic rise has influenced resource allocation worldwide. Since threatening to cut off oil shipments to the United States, which purchases 1.5  million barrels a day from Venezuela (60 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports), the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, has been traveling the globe looking for new markets and allies to unite with against the US.21 The bilateral economic relationship between China and Venezuela across the vast Pacific seemed to enter a honeymoon period overnight in lieu of the bad state of US–Venezuela relations under the Chavez administration. As a consequence of Chavez’s visits to Beijing in December 2004 and August 2006, and Chinese Vice-president Zeng Qinghong’s visit to Venezuela in January 2005, the two parties have signed various economic agreements, the majority of which are petroleum-oriented. Africa China is actively pursuing a more extensive presence in Africa, with which it has maintained a reliable political alliance since the 1950s. Thanks to China’s deeper involvement in the global economy and its policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, the nature of China and Africa’s relationship has gradually moved from reciprocal political support and unidirectional economic assistance to a “new type of strategic partnership,”22 featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win–win cooperation and cultural exchange. In recent years, China signed an Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment with 28 African countries, and an Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with eight African countries. Also, from January 2005 China started to grant duty-free treatment to 190 goods from 28 of the least developed African countries, which largely accounts for the amazing rate of increase in China’s imports from African countries, as shown in Table 6.9. Moreover, China has cancelled US$1.3  billion worth of debt for 31 African countries so far. It is also urging the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations. There are now 16 African countries on China’s official list of tourist destinations for Chinese citizens, and the number of Chinese tourists visiting Africa doubled to more than 110,000 in 2005. In return, China gains oil import partners in Africa, and Africa is becoming increasingly important to China’s oil import basket. As shown in Table 6.10, in 1994, when China had just become a net oil importer, it received only 4.16 percent of its total import from three African countries. Five years later, China imported 18.86 percent of its oil from eleven African countries or regional organizations. In 2004, the share of China’s oil imported from Africa increased to 29.67 percent. While China’s total oil import increased by 195 percent and 631 percent from 1994 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2004 respectively, China’s total oil import from Africa increased by 1,236 percent and 1,049 percent in these two five-year periods respectively. In January 2006, China announced its new Africa Policy, which covers a wide

144  Deng and Zheng Table 6.10  China’s oil import partners in Africa 1994

1999 a

Partners in Africa

%

Angola Gabon Algeria

3.05 1.06 0.06

Subtotal for 3 countries

4.16

2004

Partners in Africa % Angola Nigeria Equatorial Guinea Gabon Congo Sudan South African Customs Union Cameroon Libya Egypt Kenya Subtotal for 11 countries

a

Partners in Africa %a

7.66 3.35 2.09 1.50 1.10 1.07 0.87

Angola Sudan Congo Equatorial Guinea Nigeria Libya Algeria

13.91 4.89 3.95 2.74 1.21 1.12 0.69

0.59 0.35 0.24 0.05 18.86

Chad Gabon Cameroon Guinea Subtotal for 11 countries

0.58 0.40 0.14 0.04 29.67

Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Note a Share in China’s total oil import in regarding year.

variety of areas ranging from political and economic cooperation to education, science, health, peace, and security exchange, and China has been seeking and cementing cooperation with Africa. This is seen as an official action against the so-called “new colonialism,” which presents China as greedily eyeing Africa’s oil reserves and relentlessly exploiting the continent’s natural resources without regard for ethical concerns.23

Discussions and conclusion China is becoming an increasingly important member of the world economy. With its population of 1.3 billion and the fourth largest economy in the world, China has maintained an unprecedented high economic growth rate for the last three decades. This economic “miracle” has not only lifted 221 million Chinese people out of poverty, but also been a stimulant for the world economy. The rise of China has promoted the further international specialization of every East Asian economy and enabled these economies to better exploit their comparative advantages. Through the implementation of the “reform and open door” policy, China has embraced industrial transfers from other industrialized economies in East Asia with its abundant labor force and vast market. By deepening its involvement in the East Asian production and trade system, China has helped to reorganize resource allocation within East Asia, forging East Asia as an interdependent economic bloc providing the whole world with affordable and quality commodities that combine the finest elements from every East Asian economy.

China reshapes the world economy  145 Driven by improved productivity and unlimited labor supply, China is exporting “Made in China” commodities to every corner of the globe. This not only raises the real purchasing power of every consumer who buys “Made in China” commodities and intermediate products, but also helps the central governments of other economies to effectively curb the rise of inflation. China has been a hot FDI host for international investment with very favorable FDI policies from both the central government and every layer of local government.24 Attracted by the labor supply and market size, the majority of Fortune 500 multinationals have established affiliates in China specializing in outsourcing production or R&D activities. As China creates a series of new trade and investment policies enabling Chinese firms to “go out” and seek more opportunities in the international market, the country is proactively putting its large foreign reserves back into the flow of capital, rather than simply buying low-yield US treasury bonds. Given rising income levels and rapid economic development, China has a strong appetite for natural resources and has directly contributed to the rise in price of raw materials worldwide, providing a strong economic stimulus to those African and Latin American countries heavily dependent on the export of their natural resources. This is improving the financial budgets of the governments in those countries and helps them to pay off international debts at a faster pace. Also, as a new member of the WTO, China has persistently adhered to the mutually beneficial “win-for-all” opening strategy and has satisfactorily fulfilled most of its obligations. From 1999 to 2005, the Chinese government adopted, revised, or abolished more than 2,000 laws, administrative regulations, and department rules to comply with WTO rules and accession commitments. The average tariff level has been slashed from 15.3 percent at the time of accession in 2001 to 9.9 percent in 2005. Of the 160 service sectors and subsectors under the WTO classification, China has opened more than 100, accounting for 62.5 percent, close to the level of commitments made by developed countries.25 With these efforts to comply with its WTO commitments, China is moving steadily toward free trade, which is widely accepted as beneficial to all participants.26 China’s efforts have gained great appreciation from both the WTO and China’s largest trade partner, the US. Moreover, China is adopting pragmatic economic diplomacy toward resourceabundant regions and has promoted a mutually beneficial relationship with them. China participates in the building of local infrastructure and the exportation of a variety of commodities. In return, China imports the raw materials it needs to fuel domestic economic development. Thanks to the positive influence China has exerted, it has become the largest contributor to the growth of the world economy. The WTO General Secretary, Pascal Lamy, contends that “China’s strong growth has provided an important stimulus for export-led growth in the world during the past years.” 27 Gordon Brown, now Prime Minister of the UK, believes that “China has itself contributed more growth to the world economy in the last few years than all the G7 combined.”28 The US Trade Representative also recognizes that “the United States and China

146  Deng and Zheng have together accounted for roughly half of the economic growth globally in the past four years.”29 However, China’s economic rise and the subsequent benefits to the world economy are not without many real and potential external constraints. The development of China’s economy relies too heavily on the international energy market. As competition for natural resources becomes fiercer, the growing economy is faced with enormous unknowns. As China’s presence becomes stronger in the world economy, it is encountering more and more external constraints from other major powers in the system. Besides trade and financial friction with its major partners, China’s outward FDI, especially the conspicuous expansion in manufacturing and natural resources, has caused concern and even outrage in some countries. Thus, some recent mergers and acquisitions in sensitive and strategic industries have encountered strong resistance in the US, stemming from economic nationalism, and have ended up having to be abandoned. The most famous cases are the failures of CNOOC’s high-profile take-over attempt of Unocal in July 2005, China Minmetal’s proposed purchase of Noranda, a Canadian mining giant, in early 2005, and SINOPEC’s bid for Slavnet, Russia’s ninth biggest oil company, in December 2002. The Chinese government has a difficult task ahead of it if it is to overcome these external constraints and continue to maintain a benign external economic environment.

Notes 1 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, available at www.imf.org/external/pubs (accessed on date). 2 Rankings come from World Economic Outlook Database, IMF, April 2006, available at www.imf.org/external/pubs (accessed on date); World Bank, 18 April 2006, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ (accessed on date) respectively. 3 Eichengreen and Tong argue that the growing FDI inflow into China is good news for industries in other Asian economies, apart from the food processing and chemical industries. See Barry Eichengreen and Hui Tong, “Is China’s FDI Coming at the Expense of other Countries?,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11335 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2005). 4 The portion of assembly trade in total foreign trade in China has remained at around 50 percent for 10 years. The percentage varies across different industries and different regions. It is closer to 90 percent in those industries whose key technology is highly dependent on imports, such as electronic products. 5 According to an estimate by Yang Zhengwei, an economist from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the actual US “trade deficit” with China is pretty trivial considering the tremendous amount of assembly trade and the profits of US MNEs in China. See Yang Zhengwei, “Quanqiuhua Shidai De Chanye Zhuanyi Shi Meiguo Duihua Maoyi Nicha De Genben Yuanyin” (The Industry Transfer in the Globalization is the Fundamental Reason for US Trade Deficit with China), Guoji Maoyi Luntan (International Trade Tribune), 12 (4): 15–23 (2005). 6 “Triangular trade” usually refers to a three-way exchange of commodities. 7 Dunning and Markusen argue that multinationals base their overseas investment on three key factors to fulfill profit maximization and cost minimization – ownership, location, and internalization. See John Dunning, “The Determinant of International

China reshapes the world economy  147

8 9

10

11

12

13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24

Production,” Oxford Economic Papers, 25: 289–330 (1977); Dunning, International Production and the Multinational Enterprise (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); and James Markusen, Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). Data from the speech of Gordon Brown, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, 21 February 2005. According to an estimate by Singapore-based economist Tan Kong Yam in 2006, the power of American consumers to purchase a pair of “Made in China” shoes has increased by 50 percent in the past 10 years thanks to improved production technology in China. In a testimony made before the Joint Economic Committee of US Congress on 1 November 2005, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, praised the economic contributions of China, India, and Russia, citing the roughly 1  billion-strong labor force that has emerged from these countries as they become gradually more integrated into the global economic system and help restrain labor and commodity costs. In the report titled U.S.–China Trade Relations: Entering a New Phase of Greater Accountability and Enforcement in February 2006, the US Trade Representative also admits that “American consumers now have access to a wider variety of less costly goods, and low-cost consumer and industrial goods from China have helped spur U.S. economic growth while keeping a check on inflation.” In a testimony made before the Committee of Finance of US Senate on 23 June 2005, Alan Greenspan held that some observers’ policy suggestions on RMB revaluation and a higher tariff on commodities imported from China are counterproductive and pointless. Given that more and more large-scale merger and acquisition deals undertaken by Chinese firms are financed outside China, the official statistics of China’s outward FDI is probably significantly underestimated. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade and Development Report 2006 (New York: UNCTAD, 2006), pp. 146–7. Katya Adler, “Spanish Fury over Chinese Shoes,” BBC News, 24 September 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ (accessed on date). UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2006, p. 12 China is not recognized as a market economy by most of its major trading partners in North America and Europe, making China’s firms more vulnerable to foreign trade protectionism. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2004 (New York: United Nations, 2004. EIA. Although in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, for 2006–10, the Chinese government has set a goal to reduce energy intensity of the economy by 20 percent, this target will be impossible to achieve according to the estimate of the World Bank Beijing Office. World Bank Beijing Office, World Bank Quarterly Update, February 2006. EIA, China Country Analysis Brief: China, available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ China/ (accessed on 1 August 2006). People’s Daily Online, “Hu’s Latin-America Trip Finds Lots in Common,” 20 November 2004, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/. Kevin Sullivan, “Chavez Casts Himself as the Anti-Bush,” Washington Post, 15 March 2005. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Africa Policy, available at www.fmprc. gov.cn/eng/ (accessed on date). Jill McGivering, “China’s Growing Focus on Africa,” BBC News, 17 January 2006. Decentralization has enabled local governments to enjoy greater flexibility in making policies to attract foreign investment. Xinhua Agency, “Open Market Attracts More Capital,” 25 January 2005.

148  Deng and Zheng 25 WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Reviews of People’s Republic of China, 28 February 2006. 26 WTO, “Lamy Lauds China’s Contribution to World Economy,” 15 September 2005, available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/ (accessed on date). 27 Ibid. 28 Gordon Brown, speech at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, 21 February 2005, available at www.uk.cn/bj/ (accessed on date). 29 United States Trade Representative, U.S.–China Trade Relations.

7 Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order Zhang Yongjin

Introduction From the outside looking in, the rise of China in the emerging global order appears either remarkable and miraculous, or simply threatening.1 Looking from the inside out, the re-emergence of China as an influential regional power has been accompanied by the political anguish and intellectual agony that Chinese elites have experienced in coming to terms with the changing power configuration in the new international system. At the same time, such re-emergence has been decisively facilitated by China’s opportune positioning of itself in the emerging global order to cultivate the opportunities provided by the transformation of the global strategic landscape and accelerated economic globalization. In the last decade, China has exhibited a pattern of international behavior that is often seemingly contradictory to its own declared principles and certainly much more complex than in the previous decades. Behind China’s making and implementation of its global and regional policies are a range of diverse, and often contentious, discourses that reflect the intellectual disorientation endured by Chinese academics and the public policy choices made by the Chinese political establishments, as they are grappling with the new features of the global political and economic order at the beginning of the twentyfirst century. These diverse discourses underlie and sustain the pattern of China’s international behavior in the emerging global order. What are those contending views about the changing international system within Chinese policy and academic communities? Whither China vis-à-vis the world? In which way have those contentious discourses within China shaped Chinese evaluation and understanding of the regional and global transformation of international relations? How do they shape China’s increasingly sophisticated policy responses to such transformations? What do these Chinese discourses mean for the reconstitution of the emerging global order? This chapter provides a brief examination, looking from the outside in, of the evolving discourses and debates in China on global changes in order to throw some light on these questions. The discussions that follow are organized around three analytical concepts, namely power, security, and globalization, the discourses of which, I argue, are

150  Zhang not only characteristic of the unprecedented global transformation, but also central to our understanding of Chinese views of the emerging global order. In the first part, I discuss how power is viewed in the Chinese discourses as the central problematic in the reconfiguration of the international system, and particularly the nature of the American power. The second provides an anatomy of a security discourse, that on non-traditional security, in China. And the third part considers China’s discursive engagement with economic globalization as a transformative social process, and the effect of such engagement on the changing purpose of the Chinese state and China’s practice and understanding of sovereignty.

Power After the end of the Cold War, the intellectual disorientation in North America about the future order and power configuration is compellingly illustrated in various striking claims from “clash of civilizations” by Samuel Huntington and “a new geopolitical game on the global chessboard” by Zbigniew Brzezinski to “the coming anarchy” by Robert Kaplan and “the domination by global corporation” by Richard Barnett and John Cavanagh, among others.2 World politics in the 1990s was going through, as has been argued, “a period in which geopolitical identities are in flux and a period in which there is no hegemonic understanding of the world order and the roles that particular states play.”3 The international community was indeed “travelling without maps” in search of an emerging order.4 Such geopolitical uncertainty about the future was as perplexing to Chinese analysts as it was bewildering to their counterparts in North America. The central problematic that confronted Chinese analysts and the policy establishments alike was the meaning of the overwhelming power of the United States and the new power configuration in the proclaimed new global order. A dynamic discourse concerning the emerging multipolarity in the international system addresses this problematic and centers on the new systemic reconfiguration of power in the coming world order.

Multipolarization The future configuration of power in the international system (guoji geju) is a central concern of this Chinese discourse, which has produced a diverse range of views and pluralistic perspectives. The original ideas of guoji geju have often been traced back to Mao’s conception of the three worlds and to the concept of a strategic triangle in the 1970s.5 Following the end of the Cold War, discussions of guoji geju in China have evolved into a discourse of the emerging multipolarity in post-Cold War international relations, through which Chinese elites have been trying intellectually to come to terms with the transformation of global order and in which they have identified rationale in terms of their strategic policymaking. The multipolarity discourse focuses ostensibly on a debate on a so-called ‘objective trend’ in global politics. From the simplistic claim of duojihua (the emerging multipolarity) representing a new balance of power in the early 1990s

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  151 to a more nuanced term of yichao duoqiang (one superpower, several Great Powers) descriptive of the new international system toward the end of the decade, this discourse has taken many twists and turns. Four big questions, however, have always haunted those participated in the discourse. These are: (1) what constitutes a pole, how many poles there might be, and who they are; (2) in which way the decline of the American power is likely to lead to multipolarization; (3) where China is situated in the multipolarity, particularly vis-à-vis the American power; and (4) whether a multipolar world represents a normative good conducive to China’s national interests. After a decade of debates, Chinese scholars seem to have reached a broad but delicate consensus on some key aspects regarding the multipolarization of the international system. First, “polarity” refers to a particular configuration of power in the future international relations. Second, a “pole” refers to a relatively independent power center, or a group of states that asserts considerable influence on world affairs because it possesses comprehensive power attributes that encompass political, economic, military, cultural, and scientific power. Third, the United States at the moment can claim to be the only pole, though a few other states or groups of states have the potential to develop into a pole. And fourth, multipolarization is a dynamic and fluid process of power transformation and transition in the international system, the final shape of which is yet to be determined.6 Three observations are due here. First, intellectually, the discourse of multipolarity is a discourse through which Chinese elites try to come to terms with the US hegemony in the unipolar world. To a considerable extent, Chinese claims are contingent on their assessment of the American power. Not surprisingly the most pessimistic view of multipolarization was articulated in the wake of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, particularly after the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Second, other parallel discourses have intervened in the discourse of multipolarity. The discourse of globalization, in particular, has modified Chinese views of multipolarity and complicated their assessment of the emerging global order.7 Third, the formulation of yichao duoqiang (one superpower, several Great Powers) as descriptive of power configuration in the international system represents a tacit Chinese acceptance of the preponderant power of the United States and its willingness in “learning to live with the hegemon.”8 These factors contribute to a notable divergence between official discourse and the academic one on multipolarity. Officially, it is presumed that the multipolarization of the international system represents a normative good that works for the peace and stability of the world and is in China’s strategic and security interests. As Jiang Zemin proclaimed as late as 2000, “Multipolarity is better than unipolarity and political multipolarization is of great significance to world peace, stability, and development.”9 Chinese leaders from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao have carefully implemented a range of foreign policy initiatives to promote the multipolarization of the international system. One prime example is their orchestration of China’s strategic partnership (zhanlue huoban guanxi), notably with Russia and the European Union, as well as with a range of middle powers such as Australia and India, and most recently with Africa.10 Such strategic partnership, Chinese analysts and

152  Zhang officials alike insist, is not aimed at any balancing of power, either regionally or globally.11 While officially multipolarization continues to be proclaimed to be an “objective trend” in the global transformation of the international system,12 an earlier uncritical acceptance among Chinese scholars of this official claim has gradually taken on a more critical tone.13 Some argue that multipolarization represents a hope rather than a current reality. It is nevertheless not just a utopian vision.14 Others question the unqualified simplistic claim of the decline of the American power.15 Whereas many are unhappy with the characterization of a “turbulent transition” from unipolarity to multipolarity as an opened-ended process, some believe that the systemic transition of power has already been happening, with China projected to be a sub-superpower by 2020.16 Still others are puzzled why the second-tier powers have not engaged in even a “soft” balancing strategy against the sole superpower, the United States. These internal debates increasingly also challenge the officially sanctioned presumptions that multipolarization and multipolarity are not only desirable for China, but also a normative good for the new global geopolitics. The meaning of American power Central to the multipolarization discourse are Great Power relations, particularly that between China and the United States. Through a prolonged and agonizing process in the 1990s, the Chinese government “decided that it was not in China’s interests to challenge the most powerful country unless China’s own core national interests are involved.”17 Rather than pitching multipolarity as a hostile challenge to the hegemony or primacy of the United States, the Chinese officials and analysts are keen to present multipolarization as “antithetical to the self-help, unilateralist approach to security and development associated with traditional great-power game.”18 At heart of the multipolarity discourse, therefore, is a fluid understanding of American power, and ever-changing interpretations of the meaning and purpose of American power. Chinese analysts seem to be more concerned about how American power confronts Chinese power than how it defines the systemic configuration of power in the future order. For the Chinese leaders, the political desiderata of security are uncompromising and indisputable, ranging from the unending Cold War confrontations in the Asia-Pacific from the Taiwan Straits to the Korean peninsula to a hub-and-spoke formation of the American military alliances, especially that of the US–Japanese Security Alliance.19 Until very recently, pervasive among Chinese policy and intellectual elites have been acute concerns about a US global strategy, with a possible thrust against China.20 These concerns are reflected in Beijing’s policy agenda and ultimately underpin the broader discourse on American power within China. In the early 1990s, the prevailing view among Chinese analysts was that American power was experiencing an irreversible decline, which would lead inevitably to multipolarization. As the power disparity between the United States

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  153 and other Great Powers became much wider and the second-tier powers did not gang up against the hegemon, in the mid-1990s, Chinese commentators became much more muted about the decline of American power.21 As mentioned earlier, the NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia and its intervention in Kosovo led to a most radical revisionist reading of American power and the most pessimistic view of multipolarization. The NATO operation in Kosovo demonstrated, one Chinese scholar argues, that “the United States as the sole superpower occupies a relative prominent, single, superpower position of domination”; and “multipolarisation has lost its momentum for accelerated development. Multipolarisation in history may be more complicated and tortuous than once thought.”22 For the Chinese elites, it is the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that highlights the paradox of American power and has inspired different assessments of the prospect of the US hegemony. The invasion did demonstrate the formidable hard (military) power of the United States and its determination to go alone. Chinese analysts argue, however, that the United States failed in gathering moral support at the United Nations and in winning legal sanction from the Security Council for its military action. Its practice of unilateralism alienated its transatlantic allies such as France and Germany and resulted in its relative isolation. The dramatic exposure of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers weakened the moral authority of the United States on human rights issues. All this undermines its “soft power,” an indispensable, and increasingly important, component of American power in asserting its hegemony. Its subsequent military occupation of Iraq further exposes serious limitations of hard power of the United States in solving the stubborn problems in the Middle East.23 While the global projection of American power, successful or otherwise, constantly throws Chinese assessments of the multipolarization of the emerging order into flux, both privately and publicly, Chinese analysts have also become increasingly ambivalent about the American domination in the current international system. If China is not entirely happy about the existing power configuration, it has been very content in enjoying many benefits of the global institutions created and regional stability maintained by the predominant power of the United States. The realization that the systemic domination of American power provides a range of public goods essential for China’s economic development goal and that the decline of American power may not necessarily be a good thing demonstrates a more sophisticated understanding of the US hegemony in the emerging global order.24 It encourages the Chinese policy to seek more coincidence of common interests with the United States and to avoid any mutual confrontation. The puzzle of ‘soft power’ The difficulties among Chinese analysts in understanding the new power configuration in the global international system of the twenty-first century seem to have been further compounded by the introduction of the new concept of “soft power” as a variable in power calculation. Some Chinese analysts have long noted the dual systemic structure of the emerging global international system, which, they

154  Zhang argue, consists of both a material structure defined in terms of distribution of capabilities as well as a normative structure defined in terms of the distribution of ideas. They have also noted the American domination in both structures. More importantly, perhaps, they are concerned that China has been seen at the opposite or receiving end of the global normative structure.25 The publication of Joseph Nye’s influential book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics in 2004 prompted a wider discourse on soft power in China. There are two main thrusts of this discourse that are worth examining here. One concentrates on a more sophisticated understanding of the enduring nature of American power.26 Following Nye’s arguments, Chinese analysts accept that, as the global leader in education, culture, and science and technology, the United States is a producer of a whole range of new ideas and innovations that revolutionize the economic and cultural life on Earth in the twenty-first century. American cultural icons, such as Hollywood, Google, McDonald’s, and Coca Cola, have unmatched and ubiquitous global presence and penetration. The unmatched leading position of the United States in global institutions helps project the American visions and values globally.27 Such a situation is unlikely to change soon. As a result, the disparity of soft power between the US and others is even greater than that of hard power. Chinese analysts also note, again following Nye’s insight, the paradox of American power. Even at the height of both its hard and soft power, the United States still cannot get what it wants. With special reference to the war against Iraq, they argue that America’s soft power has been seriously eroded by its unilateralist approach defying the United Nations and by the revelation of prisoner abuse by American soldiers in Iraq. Further, imposing the American version of democracy and way of life on the reconstruction of Iraq through its military occupation only invites combustible resentment and anger within Iraq and across the Muslim world.28 The other is directed at the search for the sources of China’s soft power. The Chinese elites greeted the idea of China’s soft power initially with mixed feelings, for fear that this was a disguised version of the “China threat.” This is particularly acute when such a discourse and assessment come from outside China. The idea is, however, also inherently attractive, as rising China tries to rediscover and redefine its power and to identify means to enhance its attractiveness and its influence.29 Three broad claims are made in terms of the sources of China’s soft power. First and foremost, it is China’s traditional culture. Historically, China’s cultural and civilizational influence goes far beyond the Chinese borders. Confucian values and ethics have been accepted and indigenized in a number of East Asian countries. Many Chinese analysts argue that this is a natural source of China’s soft power. The Chinese government’s initiative to establish Confucius Institutes worldwide is now seen as an attempt to launch a platform to project China’s soft power.30 Second, it is the attractiveness of China’s successful development model. Beijing has responded favorably to the claim of the Beijing consensus as representing an alternative to the Washington consensus. Although still wary of the experi-

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  155 mental nature of its economic reform, some Chinese commentators believe that it does have wider appeal to many developing countries in search of a creditable approach to its social and economic development. China should actively cultivate this model as a source of its soft power.31 Third, China’s new diplomacy is said to enhance China’s soft power. China’s active participation in international peacekeeping under the UN auspices and its increasingly cooperative stance in global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) cultivate an image of China as a good international citizen. Its nurturing of good neighborly relations with ASEAN countries and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) contributes to the legitimacy and moral authority of Chinese foreign policy. The advocacy of a harmonious world in China’s recent global diplomacy harks back to traditional Chinese culture and promotes new values in international relations.32 Beijing seems to remain however unsettled about the claims about its soft power. Robert Zoellick’s call in September 2005 for China to behave like “a responsible stakeholder” in the international system simply caught Chinese policy analysts and academics napping.33 Was the United States ready to accept China as a significant power in its own right and recognize its legitimate interests? What is responsible behavior for a Great Power in international relations in the twentyfirst century? Three months after Zoellick’s call, Joseph Nye’s claim of the rise of China’s soft power in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal Asia provoked further debates both within and beyond China about the meaning and nature of China’s growing power, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, in the emerging global order.34

Security The emerging global order presents some distinctive challenges to China’s security analysts. For one thing, as a rising power, China has an important role to play in the remaking of regional and global security order. For another, as security is constantly reconceptualized, China is confronted with a much richer security agenda, and meaningful assessment of China’s increasingly complex security environment has been made more difficult. If from an outside-in perspective China’s security behavior is seen to present a problem for the emerging security order in the Asia-Pacific, from an inside-out perspective the systemic transformation of international relations is believed to have made China more vulnerable and less secure, particularly in terms of regime security.35 As discussed earlier, Chinese analysts are obsessively concerned about the power configuration in the new international system and about American power. Such concerns are indicative of their anxiety about security implications of the systemic power configuration for China. Many Chinese analysts concur with their American counterparts that embedded in the emerging power structure in the new global order is a potential structural conflict between China and the United States, either in the scenario of the rising power vs. the dominant power (or a revisionist power vs. a status quo power) particularly with the Taiwan issue, or because of

156  Zhang their clashing ideological missions, contrasting world order visions, and divergent strategic perceptions.36 They are also worried about the formation of an in-group and out-group identity in the emerging order, which Kal Holsti argues has become increasingly less tolerant of dictators.37 Non-traditional security as a new discourse Most noteworthy and refreshing, however, is a discourse on non-traditional security that has emerged in China and from time to time dominated China’s security agenda. It has gained some prominence as a coherent and separate discourse only recently, as issues such as environmental degradation, drug trafficking, people smuggling, transnational crimes, and terrorism came to be considered as security issues in the minds of policymakers and in academic discussions. In contrast to the multipolarity discourse discussed above, it is a less contentious discourse. It is a discourse that both stimulates and is stimulated by an alternative understanding of the meaning of security and threat in the twenty-first century as much as by China’s domestic political, social, and economic agenda. The precursor to the discourse of non-traditional security in China is an inconclusive regional discourse of cooperative security and comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific. China has long-standing concerns about its internal security problems caused by secessionism and social unrest. In the mid-1990s, environment and economic development entered into the security discourse first within the framework of the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as integral to the concept of comprehensive security.38 “Transnational threats” such as environmental degradation and people smuggling as well as were put tentatively on the agenda of comprehensive security. The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s highlighted China’s economic and financial vulnerability to global capital and unregulated market. The new security concept pronounced by the Chinese leadership in the middle of the crisis incorporates firmly the idea of economic security. This new thinking about security reflects the recognition that with its ongoing economic transformation and changing regional and global security context, China has diversified security interests, which are much broader than the single pursuit of militarized security that China used to pursue.39 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States prompted a redefinition, and indeed an expansion, of China’s non-traditional security agenda. Terrorism and religious extremism are now seen as the most challenging nontraditional security threats. China’s 2002 Defense White Paper warned that “non-traditional security issues are looming large in some countries” and that threats to world security are “diversifying and globalizing.”40 Other documents are more specific.41 The Declaration on Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Issues jointly made by China and ASEAN in November 2002 promises close cooperation on a wide range of non-traditional security issues.42 Well before that, and at a different regional security forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China persuaded its members, Russia and four central Asian republics, to pledge their cooperation in fighting three evil forces: terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  157 If there was any remaining political and intellectual resistance to including non-military threats on China’s increasing expansive security agenda, the SARs epidemic that erupted in China in 2003 facilitated its collapse.43 Two broad lessons from SARs are important for Chinese analysts in understanding security in an increasingly globalized world. One is that the traditional approach to security, though still central in China’s geopolitical concerns, is incapable of dealing with new sources of contemporary threats and insecurity. And the other is that “nontraditional threats can imperil China’s security environment and strike China’s vital interests in social stability, national unity, and economic development.”44 China’s expansive extensive security agenda includes now, they argue, six principal non-traditional security threats to China’s security environment. These are related to financial security, environmental security, information security, epidemics, demographical changes, and secessionism.45 State and security It is small wonder that non-traditional security has become such a hot topic that in China “it is difficult to find a journal [of international relations] that does not carry articles on this topic and a [IR] symposium that does not mention issues related to non-traditional security.”46 The question then is: Why has “non-traditional security” as both a new generic concept and an analytical term gained such popularity in Chinese discourses? China’s social and economic agenda emphasizing social stability, territorial integrity, and sustainable development certainly promotes the attractiveness and popularity of such a discourse. A more central explanation is, however, political expediency, which boasts three rationales. In the first place, the dichotomy pitching traditional against non-traditional security does not challenge the continued importance, or more importantly, the central assumptions of traditional security; i.e. the centrality of the security of the state in terms of military, sovereign, and territorial threats. Defining a whole diverse range of sources of insecurity against traditional security highlights not only their distinction, but also the intertwined nature of threats. Such concerns about insecurity continue to be conveniently discussed in terms of threats to “national security.” The state continues to be perceived both as an essential entity to be protected and as a central player in providing solutions to all non-traditional security threats. Second, it conveniently subsumes human security, and the potential challenges its discourse poses to the state as referent object of security, under the “non-traditional” security framework. The Chinese discourse has resisted consistently the very foundational insight of human security, namely that sometimes the state may constitute the very threat to its population.47 Despite China’s professed interests in the nexus between development and non-traditional security, the 1994 UNDP report on human security does not seem to have provided significant stimulus for China’s discourse on non-traditional security. Subsuming human security under non-traditional security reduces the need to problematize the Chinese state.48 Finally, such a generic term as non-traditional security is useful to camouflage a political agenda. Internal secessionist demands and separatist movements can

158  Zhang now be conveniently categorized as non-traditional security threats. Chinese policies on national unity concerning Taiwan and separatist movements in Xinjiang, the legitimization of which used to be considered within the paradigm of traditional security, can be legitimized as policies dealing with non-traditional security issues as well.

Globalization Globalization is widely acknowledged as the most significant force that is remaking the emerging global order. China’s evolving discursive engagement with globalization is seen not only in China’s gradual, and sometimes grudging, embrace of market and global capitalism in China’s grand strategy for economic development, but also in China’s accommodating the exigencies of global market economy and capitalizing upon the opportunities offered by globalization. How does the double-edged sword of globalization promote the rise of China? In what sense is globalization changing the purpose of the Chinese state? What evokes a “vociferous and emotional debate” on the contradictions of globalization within China?49 The new global economic order It is well argued that the political purpose of the international economy during the Cold War, as defined by the US and its major allies, was “primarily to strengthen the economies of the anti-Soviet alliance and solidify the political unity of the United States and its allies.”50 The end of the Cold War therefore liberated the global economy by removing the strategic rationale causing its fragmentation. It produced fundamentally different global conditions and opened up new possibilities for East Asia to engage in a number of region-wide political and economic integration projects.51 More specifically for China, the removal of this formidable barrier and the broad strategic setting it produced made possible China’s full and deep integration into the global economy and encouraged its full embrace of globalization in its economic development strategy. Even more importantly, perhaps, the changing global strategy of the US induced a significant coincidence of important economic interests between the United States, China, and other powers and encouraged a broad and tacit agreement on the changing purpose of the global economy. It is to promote growth, development, and prosperity. There is, therefore, a convergence of purposes of Chinese economic reforms and the transformation of global political economy. Such convergence has facilitated the arrival of China as the largest emerging market in the global economy in several ways. First, China is no longer perceived as a willful disruptive force committed to a different economic order. Instead it is seen as a market opportunity and an engine of economic growth for the regional, and potentially global, economy. Second, it has reinforced the market-oriented reforms in China and led to China’s endorsement of the unfolding global economic order. Third, and accordingly, it

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  159 signals a willingness on the part of China to seek its developmental goals and national ambitions within the existing global economic and political system, despite its frequent rhetorical challenge to the power structure embedded in the global political economy.52 China’s embrace of the new global economic order has changed its perspectives on globalization. Chinese officials and analysts alike increasingly emphasize that it is the state’s handling, i.e., official policies and development strategies, that ultimately decides how globalization works for the Chinese economy and society. At the 2005 Fortune Global Forum, the Chinese leader Hu Jintao claimed that it was “with the surging economic globalization” that China was “becoming a new growth engine for the world.”53 The changing purpose of the Chinese state It is important to note that China’s initial engagement with economic globalization was underwritten by a strong instrumental rationale. Global capital flows into China and China’s trade growth are two pillars of success in its economic development strategy. Allowing capitalism to flourish and legitimizing the capitalist mode of production is, however, antithetical to the very purpose of the revolutionary Chinese state. In relentlessly pursuing economic reforms, Chinese elites acknowledge clearly that China’s national ambitions in pursuit of wealth and power in the twenty-first century is no longer served by making revolutions, but through seeking economic development under the conditions of globalization and full participation in global economy. China’s palpable desire to participate in the global capitalist economy and its willingness to accept stringent economic conditions for its participation are perhaps best reflected in its quest for full membership in the WTO even as a non-market economy.54 Embracing globalization entails, as a logical consequence, radical reconsiderations and adaptation of China’s international behavior in a whole spectrum of areas where global norms are being constructed, contested, reformulated, and reconstituted. Whereas the Chinese state plays a unique role in brokering China’s instrumental engagement with globalization, such engagement has also led to China’s broader normative commitment to a wide range of global norms and to the transformation of state identity. In this light, globalization is seen as a historical opportunity not just for China’s economic development, but also more significantly for its state reinvention.55 The reinvention of the Chinese state necessitates internal institutional changes, institutional building, and institutional innovation to accommodate its transition to a full market economy. The purpose of state transformation is to make the reinvented state fit to play a strategic brokerage role in the mutual engagement between China and globalization. China’s approach to globalization is “custommade” precisely because the state has devised to implement a series of policy instruments in navigating its eventful transition to a market economy while maintaining growth and economic and social stability.56 The successes of China as a globalizer, particularly in its economic development, further encourage the

160  Zhang redefinition of the (moral) purpose of the state for the Chinese elites. Globalization in this fashion regulates the internal as well as the external political and economic behavior of the Chinese state. It effectively relocates the main source of state legitimacy to external actors and institutions. Contesting sovereignty The “vociferous and emotional” debate on globalization within China is also a discursive engagement with the socially constituted sovereignty as the constitutional principle of the international system and on a range of norms associated with it. Most Chinese analysts reject such extreme claims as the end of nationstate brought about by globalization and are aware of serious challenges (and threats) to the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty posed by intensified economic globalization. China’s contestations of the sovereignty norm in the discourse of globalization are both subtle and persistent. Through China’s reform experience, Chinese analysts understand particularly well that global capital and multinational companies have transformed the boundaries of the domestic and the international and have constructed a transnational world. As a logical consequence, the traditional role of the state in exercising economic sovereignty has been significantly undermined. Global economic governance through global economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and regulatory regimes associated with them, also place limits on state sovereignty.57 At the same time, the Chinese government seems to have navigated very carefully through many issues with great flexibility in matters affecting its economic sovereignty. The deepening of Chinese economic reform and opening to accommodate the expanding demands of global capital and investment are couched in terms of China’s converging with international practices, not erosion of its sovereignty. Policies aimed at seeking China’s economic integration, which often involves the weakening of sovereign control, are said to be necessary quid pro quo and indispensable in China’s quest for Great Power status. Economic interdependence strengthens, rather than compromises, China’s sovereignty. Tacitly and also resolutely, China has abandoned the idea of absolute sovereignty, at least in economic matters.58 This is further demonstrated by China’s acceptance of the strictly imposed compliance schedule imposed by the WTO as part of its entry ticket. The WTO schedule clearly dictates China’s domestic reform agenda and the monitoring mechanisms and measures imposed can be regarded as a clear infringement of Chinese sovereignty as traditionally conceived. Surely, there is a marginal voice condemning the Chinese leadership of “selling out Chinese interest to the West by joining the WTO.”59 What is perhaps truly surprising is a collective reticence throughout China about a significant compromise and transfer of both its political and economic sovereignty embodied in China’s accession to the WTO. China’s contestations of traditional sovereign practices also take place in a number of areas of political sphere. In the recent debates on non-traditional security issues, Chinese elites readily acknowledged that new global issues such

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  161 as environmental protection, climate change, epidemics, global terrorism, and transnational crimes are not challenges to individual states, but to international society and humanity as a whole. Dealing with these issues compels simultaneous consolidation of state capacity and transcendence of state sovereignty.60 In so far as the state is a producer of insecurity, its sovereign practices must be subject to the discipline of international society. As has been observed, Chinese policies towards humanitarian intervention have also shifted progressively, significantly softening its position on non-intervention as embodied in the Westphalian ideal.61 Chinese analysts also question the validity of the idea of the state’s monopoly of sovereignty. They argue that there has been gradual diffusion of sovereignty to non-state actors, ranging from multinational companies to global institutions, and to civil society. There is, they claim, a “hollowing out” of state sovereignty.62 It is significant to note that globalization has such a transformative effect on China, “the Vicar of the high-church of Westphalia,” and on its understanding of the changing sovereignty norm. When one prominent Chinese analyst argues that “sovereignty is not synonymous with national interests anymore, rather it should be subject to overall national interests, not protected at all costs,”63 it is a tacit acceptance that economic globalization reconstitutes sovereignty. This is just a short step from acknowledging that “sovereignty is the product of extensive, and at times conflictual, interaction between all members of the international system.”64 In this interpretation, the meaning of sovereignty is not static. It is negotiated out of interactions intersubjectively among states. It follows that China’s changing sovereign practices are important part in the reconstitution of the sovereignty norm in the emerging global order.

Conclusion My discussions in this chapter lead to four broad concluding remarks that are, I believe, instructive in our understanding of China in the emerging global order. First, the profound global transformation has confronted Chinese policymakers and academics and their counterparts in the West alike with uncompromising intellectual challenges and tough strategic and policy choices. The intellectual disorientation about the future shape of the emerging global order is as severe in China as in the broader international community. It is, however, the first time that Chinese scholars and analysts have participated fully in the global discourse that seeks to come to grips with unprecedented global political, strategic, and economic changes. This has resulted in a number of contentious discourses and a wide range of views within China in the last decade on the key fundamentals of the emerging order. Increasingly, these discourses are fraught with competing images of global politics, contradictory assessments of the changing power configuration, differing interpretations of economic globalization, and diverse policy prescriptions. Second, Chinese discourses on and understandings of the emerging global order are not linear and are contingent on specific external as well as internal social environments that China encounters at a specific time. The most pessimistic

162  Zhang view of multipolarization is articulated in the wake of the NATO invasion of the former Yugoslavia and the dramatic downturn in Sino-American relations following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Both the eruption of the SARs epidemic in 2003 and the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 provide an impetus for the discourse on non-traditional security in China. China’s apparent successes in capitalizing on the opportunities provided by globalization and its domestic social and economic agenda encourage China’s discursive engagement with globalization and its veiled contestations of the sovereignty norm. Third, if these contentious discourses do shape policy choices made by the Chinese government, it is also clear that these discourses are shaped by central policy concerns of the Chinese state. The most vociferous debates on globalization, for example, focus on the implications that are believed to affect China’s national interests most. The official concerns that command the attention of the discourse of multipolarization are changing power relationship between Great Powers, particularly between China and the United States. The underlying political project is to legitimize both a certain vision of an emerging global order and the strategic choices that Beijing has made in its approach to power politics in the new order to counter the hegemony of the United States. Not surprisingly, the discourse has been frequently used to justify and sustain China’s much-touted diplomatic initiatives in developing strategic partnerships with various state actors, including Russia and the European Union, as its own distinctive approach to overcoming the security dilemma. More generally, it is the concern for China’s peaceful rise, in its various incarnations, that critically informs these internal discourses. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, these Chinese discourses, contentions, practices, and ideas constitute part of the reconstruction and reconstitution of the emerging global order. Such constitutive role has been significantly magnified by the rise of Chinese power. Rising China is not just a passive object produced by the global social processes. It is an indispensable, and perhaps most dynamic, part of the reproduction of the emerging global order. The examination of these changing discourses is, therefore, an investigation of how the new global order has been reproduced. It is anachronistic and even pretentious to continue to assume that rising China needs to be given a place in the new global international society.

Notes 1 For the most recent literature on this, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US– China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” International Security, 30 (2): 7–45 (2005); Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (New York: Little, Brown, 2007); Eric Teo, “Asian Security and the Re-emergence of China’s Tributary System,” China Brief, 4 (18): 7–9 (2006). See also Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, 84 (5): 18–24 (2005); Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of Titans,” Foreign Policy, 146: 46–50 (2005); Edward Friedman, “China’s Rise, Asia’s Future,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 6 (2): 289–304 (2006); T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy,” International Security, 30 (1): 46–71 (2005).

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  163 2 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, 72 (3): 22–49 (1993); Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Richard J. Barnett and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1994). 3 Simon Dalby, Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies: Contextualizing the Human Security Agenda (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 2000), p. 1. 4 Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 93. 5 Johnston believes that Mao’s conception of three worlds provides the starting point to understand Chinese ideas about polarity in world politics. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” International Security, 27 (4): 5–56 (2003). One prevailing myth in the Chinese foreign policy establishment is that the idea of the strategic triangle guided China’s successful maneuver in the balance of power between the US, the former Soviet Union, and China in the 1970s and the 1980s. Michael Pillsbury, on the other hand, has traced the origin of the discourse on multipolarity to 1986. See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), Chapter 1. 6 Ye Zicheng, “Reflections on the History and Theory of China’s Strategy for Multipolarity,” Studies of International Politics (in Chinese), 1: 9–18 (2004). Iain Johnston provides a more nuanced summary of this discourse from an outside-in perspective; see “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” pp. 30–8. 7 According to Johnston, around 2000, references to globalization in Chinese academic journals outnumbered those to multipolarity. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” pp. 34–6. 8 The characterization of the international system as yichao duoqiang recognizes, in the words of one Chinese analyst, that “the leading position of the US would be unshakeable and its comprehensive national power would be unparalleled by any single county in the foreseeable future”; Jin Canrong, “The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China–United States Relations: A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China, 10 (27): 309–15 (2001), p. 309. Another Chinese analyst claims that, although the Chinese government refuses to use unipolarity to characterize the international system, it has actually “proceeded on that basis in formulating its policy toward the US”; Jia Qingguo, “Learning to Live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China’s Policy toward the US since the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Contemporary China, 14 (44): 395–408 (2005), p. 404. 9 As quoted in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 80. 10 One problem with such Chinese policy is that it has formed “strategic partnerships” with such a wide range of actors, and the term is so indiscriminately used that the significant difference between such partnership and normal bilateral political and economic relationship has been completely lost. 11 Some may regard it as “soft balancing” of the US domination of the international system. See Paul, “Soft Balancing”. 12 A cursory look at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website located a short statement dated 31 March 2006 on this particular point. See www.mfa.govt.cn. 13 Johnston has noted “a strong post hoc, faddish flavour” of Chinese commentary on the question of multipolarity. Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, p. 30. 14 A short-term vs. long-term view of multipolarization is well articulated in the following formulation by Wang Jisi. In his words, “In the long term, the decline of US primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable; but in

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the short term, Washington’s power is unlikely to decline, and its position in world affairs is unlikely to change”; Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs, 84 (5): 39–48 (2005). Sheng Dingli, “The Decline of the U.S. May Not Be a Good Thing,” Global Times (in Chinese), 19 December 2005. Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives of U.S. Global Strategy,” Political Science Quarterly, 116 (3): 343–65 (2001); Qin Yaqing, “A Response to Yong Deng: Power, Perception and the Cultural Lens,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 28 (3): 155–9 (2001); Yan Xuetong, “The New Trend in the Power Configuration of the International System,” Contemporary International Relations (in Chinese), 10: 5–7 (2005). Jia, “Learning to Live with the Hegemon,” p. 404. Yong Deng and Thomas Moore, “China Views Globalisation: Towards a New Great Power Politics?,” Washington Quarterly, 27 (3): 117–36. For a trenchant analysis of these, see Thomas Christensen, “China, the US–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, ed., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 25–56. After the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, such concerns seem to have been alleviated, as the United States is preoccupied with the global war on terror. For example, Wang Jisi claimed recently that “At least for the next several years, Washington will not regard Beijing as its main security threat”; Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America”. For the Chinese concerns about the US global strategy, see Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,” International Affairs, 82 (1): 77–94 (2006). For such Chinese concerns prior to 2001, see Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive”; Jin, “The U.S. Global Strategy”. Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive”; Jin, “The U.S. Global Strategy”. Wang Zuxun, “Effects of Kosovo on Global Security,” Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), 20, 17 May 1999: 7–8. He went on to suggest that “The early part of the 21st century may see a situation characterized by the ‘single power domination, and pluralistic disputes’.” For a brief review of contrasting Chinese views of American power around this time see Minxin Pei, “The Inscrutable Hegemon,” Foreign Policy, 120: 92–6 (2000). Yuan Peng, “The War Against Iraq and the Prospect of the US Hegemony,” http:// news.sina.com.cn/; “Iraq War Transforms US Foreign Policy,” People’s Daily Online, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/. Sheng Dingli, “The Decline of the U.S.”; Yang Luhui and Guo Yanjun, “From ‘Hegemonic Stability’ to ‘Security Community’: The New Trend of Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” World Economics and Politics (in Chinese), 4: 55–60 (2005). See in particular Qin, “A Response to Yong Deng,” pp. 155–6. Joseph Nye’s two other publications also inspired this discourse: The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Cannot Go Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) and “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, 83 (3): 16–20 (2004). Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power’,” Survival, 48 (2): 17–36 (2006). See “Iraq Transforms the US Foreign Policy,” People’s Daily Online; “US’s Achilles Heel on Soft Power,” People’s Daily Online, 28 September 2006, http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/; Xiao Huan, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power after the End of the Cold War and the Lessons to Be Learned,” Studies of International Politics (in Chinese), 3: 148–56 (2006). “The Charm of China’s Soft Power,” People’s Daily Online, 14 March 2006, http://

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32 33 34 35

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english.peopledaily.com.cn/; “Experts Comment on Soft Power and China’s Strategic Choice in Enhancing its Own Soft Power” (in Chinese), www.xinhuanet.com/. Even the Chinese increasingly associate the establishment of Confucius Institutes with the projection of China’s soft power. See “Confucius Institute: Promoting Language, Culture and Friendliness,” People’s Daily Online, 2 October 2006, http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/. Interestingly, it is sources outside China that make more radical claims in relations to the China experience in this regard. For example, Mark Leonard claims that the alternative development model presented by Beijing represents “the biggest ideological threat the West has felt since the end of the Cold War.” Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang believe, on the other hand, that rapid economic development of China “is leading to a rethinking of both development economics and the relationship between economic and political freedoms.” See Gill and Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” pp. 20–1. See Joseph Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005; available at www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/. A considerable period of time lapsed before a standard Chinese translation for “stakeholder” (liyi xiangguan zhe) emerged. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power”. This is particularly significant as Nye had dismissed the importance of China’s soft power in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Avery Goldstein, “Balance-of-Power Politics: Consequences of Asian Security Order,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 171–209; Iain Johnston, “Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?,” in J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, ed., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 34–96; Yongjin Zhang, “Problematizing China’s Security – Sociological Insights,” Pacific Review, 13 (3): 241–53 (2001); M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security, 30 (2): 46–83 (2005). Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”; Bates Gill, “Contrasting Visions: United States, China and the World Order,” remarks presented before the US–China Security Review Commission, 3 August 2001, www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/; Foot, “Chinese Strategies”. Qin, “A Response to Yong Deng”; Kal Holsti, “Dealing with Dictators: Westphalian and American Strategies,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 1: 51–65 (2001). For example, in September 1997, on the eve of the Asian financial crisis, environmental security, food security, and energy security were the topics for CSCAP’s Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Kuala Lumpur. Wu Baiyi, “The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution,” Journal of Contemporary China, 10 (27): 275–83 (2001). See China’s National Defence in 2002 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2002), pp. 7–8. In “China’s Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues” submitted to a joint forum by the United State and China, it is stated that “Terrorism, illicit drug(s), HIV/AIDS, piracy, illegal migration, environmental security, economic security, information security and other non-traditional security issues are more pronounced. The hallmark of these issues is that they are, in most cases, trans-national or trans-regional and are detrimental to the stability of all countries.” See Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, US–China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats, Special Report 126 (Washington, DC:

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44 45

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47 48 49 50 51 52

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United States Institute of Peace, 2004), www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr126. html. A more elaborate list of non-traditional security issues is found in the Declaration, which includes trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime. Chinese publications on non-traditional security have since proliferated. See for example Lu Zhongwei, On Non-traditional Security (in Chinese) (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2003); Wang Yizhou, “Non-traditional Security and China,” International Economic Review (in Chinese), 3: 38–55 (2004); Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli, An Introduction to the Studies of Non-traditional Security (in Chinese) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press, 2006). World Economics and Politics (in Chinese), a key social science journal published by the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, runs a special forum on nontraditional security and China after 2004. Deng and Moore, “China Views Globalisation,” p. 128. Su Jingxiang, Huang Ying, Tang Lan, Shang Qianhong, Yan Liang, and Wang Hongyan, “Six Principal Challenges to China’s Non-traditional Security Environment” (in Chinese), www.xinhuanet.com. Yu et al., An Introduction provides a slightly different list with human security as part of non-traditional security agenda. It is important to note that the Chinese military has publicly acknowledged and accepted that the considerations of national security should include non-traditional security issues. Speaking in the capacity of the President of the China International Strategic Studies Association, General Xiong Guangkai, formerly the Chief of Staff of the PLA, emphasized that non-traditional security threats are “new challenges to the peace and stability of the world” and traditional and non-traditional threats are intertwined. Xiong Guangkai, “Coordinating Our Efforts to Meet the Challenges of Non-traditional Security Threats” (in Chinese), http://jczs.sina.com.cn/. Wang Yizhou, “Preface,” in Yu et al, An Introduction, p. 1. Chinese analysts have in general shown little concern about the risk of securitizing non-traditional security issues. For a recent discussion of such risk in Asia, see Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya, ed., Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2006). Yu Xiaoqiu, “Non-traditional Security: The New Focus of National Security,” World Affairs (in Chinese), 12: 42–3 (2004). Linguistics has also played a role here. The Chinese translation of “human” does not easily take the discussion to the individual level of security in terms of freedom from fear and from want. For internal debates on globalization in the 1990s, see Banning Garrett, “China Faces, Debates the Contradictions of Globalisation,” Asian Survey, 41 (3): 409–27 (2001). Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 11. For example, such changes have allowed ASEAN’s expansion to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam and produced favorable conditions for pursuing regional projects such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3. In this regard, it is instructive to note that, on the one hand, Chinese official statements continue to pronounce China’s unhappiness with the global economic order as “inequitable.” On the other, they accept that globalization affords China unprecedented opportunity for its economic take-off, and that China has been successful in capitalizing on the opportunities offered by globalization. Hu Jintao, ‘Opening Address at the 2005 Fortune Global Forum’, People’s Daily Online, http://english.people.com.cn/. It is worth noting that, since its entry in 2001, one main thrust of Chinese economic diplomacy has been to negotiate bilateral recognition of its full market economy status.

Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order  167 55 Yongnian Zheng, Globalisation and the Transformation of the Chinese State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Yongjin Zhang, China Goes Global (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2005). 56 Fan Gang, “Lessons from China: custom-made globalisation,” The Straits Times, 23 October 2004, S8. 57 Yu Keping, “State Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization,” Wen Hui Bao (in Chinese), 15 November 2004. It is particularly significant to note that Yu, a senior official with a scholarly background, publicly propagated such views on globalization and sovereignty, as also noted below. 58 Allen Carlson sees “sweeping changes in China’s stance on economic sovereignty.” See Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), Chapter 6. 59 Garrett, “China Faces, Debates the Contradictions of Globalisation,” p. 415. 60 Yu, “State Sovereignty”. 61 Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World; Bates Gill and James Reilly, “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing,” Survival, 42 (3): 41–59 (2000); Michael C. Davis, “Humanitarian Intervention and China’s World View,” paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, 2002, www.isanet.org/. 62 Yu, “State Sovereignty”. The above discussions do not intend to slide over limitations of China’s contesting the traditional conception of the sovereignty norm. On issues related to territorial integrity, particularly Taiwan, China’s assertion of its absolute sovereignty, including the use of force, is uncompromising. The tension between China’s position on territorial sovereignty and that on economic sovereignty is obvious but not easy to explain. It is nevertheless significant that, in mounting these contestations, China is seeking to comprehend the changing meaning and evolving practice of sovereignty in the age of globalization. 63 Quoted in Gill and Reilly, ‘Sovereignty, International and Peacekeeping’, p. 43. 64 Allen Carlson, ‘The New Sovereignty Debate’, www.ncuscr.org/.

8 China joins global governance The 10 conundrums1 Gerald Chan

Amidst the fears, confusions, and hubris surrounding China’s rise, what do we make of the country’s increasing involvement and assertiveness in world affairs? Is China a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system fast becoming a “co-architect” with the US in establishing a new world order? Or is it posing an increasing challenge to America’s hegemony in global affairs? Is the country “in” or “out”2 of the “international community,” largely dominated by the West? How can we make a meaningful assessment of China’s evolving role in global governance? In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter is organized in three parts: The first part sketches a framework of analysis in order to provide a context against which to formulate ten hypotheses for testing in the second part, the main body of the chapter. The final, third part concludes with an assessment of the dilemmas that China faces in the course of joining global governance. The chapter in the main is a thinking piece. It aims to highlight conceptually some of the important issues that China faces in global politics.

A framework for analysis Global governance here means broadly the management of world affairs. Involved in this management are numerous actors interacting with each other, directly or indirectly, to form numerous overlapping networks, dealing with political, economic, and social issues at various levels, ranging from the local to the regional and international. The actors involved consist of both states and non-state actors such as interest groups and international organizations. Of these various types of actors, states are the main ones: They interact with each other in bilateral and multilateral ways, and form intergovernmental organizations. Of these state actors, those in the West, especially the United States, are the most important ones because of their powers and influence. They shape the formation of major international institutions and imbue in them norms and rules that govern global affairs. The issue areas in global governance are numerous. They can be roughly grouped into traditional security areas and non-traditional security areas. Traditional security areas are those associated with military affairs such as wars, deterrence,

China joins global governance  169 military strategy, diplomatic alliances, and so on, which are often regarded as high politics. The non-traditional security areas are those associated with economics and trade, environmental protection, public health, poverty alleviation, development, and so on, issues that are often regarded as belonging to the area of low politics. When global actors tackle problems that arise from these issue areas, they use a wide array of tools, including the formation of institutions and the establishment of rules and norms that govern the behavior of states and non-state actors. Thus the picture of global governance has become very complex, akin to perhaps the most sophisticated jigsaw puzzle that can be found. Indeed, Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst liken the actors, the institutions, the rules and norms, and the issue areas to pieces of this “imaginary” gigantic jigsaw.3 China is a latecomer to global governance. For many centuries, it had been a dynastic empire unto itself until the mid-nineteenth century when its door was prised open by the West under imperialism. It was dragged into the international society against its will. The country has gone through trying periods of imperialism, semicolonialism, anti-Japanese resistance, and internal strife and revolutions of one kind or another until the late 1970s. Thirty years on China is still learning to adjust to the modern interstate system and the world of international organizations. In a continuous process of social experimentation and transition, it faces a lot of domestic and international problems.

Formulating 10 hypotheses (the 10 conundrums) The following 10 hypotheses capture conceptually and intuitively some of the most difficult dilemmas that a rising China faces in its effort to reach out to the world, now and in the foreseeable future. The number 10 is largely arbitrary, and the problems are not necessarily ranked according to any strict order of importance. Pragmatic Realpolitik: Is China moving from strategic realism to pragmatic Realpolitik in its foreign policy? To answer this question, one has to clarify the difference between strategic realism and pragmatic Realpolitik. Iain Johnston has labeled China’s approach to interstate politics as “cultural realism,”4 with the exercise of power and the promotion of national interests at its core.5 This realism is informed by China’s long tradition, in which two lines of thoughts and behavior can be delineated: One is the gentle, benevolent face of Chinese diplomacy; the other is the rough, brutish face. At times these two faces fuse with each other to shape Chinese external behavior (toward the barbarians surrounding the Middle Kingdom in the old days). Thomas Christensen, writing in an article entitled “Chinese Realpolitik” in Foreign Affairs,6 focuses his attention on power politics and suggests that Chinese foreign policy is essentially hardcore realist. I borrow the ideas of strategic realism and pragmatic Realpolitik from these two scholars with some modifications, knowing full well that China has gained

170  Chan a lot of experience of power politics and has enjoyed long periods of peace as well as long periods of war over the millennia. In his edited book entitled Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior,7 Zhao Suisheng argues that Chinese foreign policy has become more pragmatic since the adoption of the reform and open door policy in late 1978. But the question is: How pragmatic is China’s pragmatism? How to measure it? Without going into the nitty-gritty business of defining and measuring pragmatism, I think the important message that Zhao puts forward is that the Chinese diplomatic approach has become more pragmatic in substance, and less ideologically driven in the post-Mao era. The basic difference between strategic realism and pragmatic Realpolitik lies with the element of pragmatism, a term used repeatedly by the Chinese authorities in recent times to refer to the seeking of common grounds from different positions in order to achieve a win–win solution that would be beneficial to all parties concerned. These expressions have become the hallmark and, in some ways, the rhetoric of Chinese foreign policy today. In behavioral terms and in incremental ways, China has moved from a more state-centric, self-centered strategic realism to a more liberal pragmatic Realpolitik in its foreign policy. The UN as the anchor: How important is the UN as a base for developing China’s multilateral diplomacy? To China, the UN is the most important organization for developing its multilateral engagements. Numerous Chinese official statements have said that state behavior in world affairs should be governed by the UN Charter and the Five Basic Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. (These principles originated from the NonAligned Movement among Third World countries in the 1950s.) China’s call for the adherence to the UN Charter is not surprising, given its increasing interactions with the outside world since 1979 and the fact that it is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Because of its humiliation suffered at the hands of Western imperialism in the past, China has nurtured a sympathetic attitude towards the plight of the Third World. It has emphasized repeatedly that it is a developing country, thereby putting itself squarely in the Third World camp, which represents the majority of the member states of the UN General Assembly. In this way, China derives considerable amounts of influence from its privileged position in the UN, from which it has received a lot of generous financial and technical help for its domestic developments through working with various specialized agencies. China acquired not only a symbolic and prestigious status in the UN, but also real influence and tangible benefits. Its relatively strong position in the UN finds little parallel in any other major global institution. China has started to gain some recognition as a “normal” Great Power in the UN, in terms of its activities in the Security Council, its participation in international peacekeeping, and its personnel contributions to the UN system.8 In the Security Council, it has supported tough resolutions condemning North Korea’s provocative missile launches and nuclear testing and Iran’s position on its nuclear program. As of September 2006 the size of China’s deployment of military and ci-

China joins global governance  171 vilian police personnel in peacekeeping operations under the UN auspices ranked after only France among the five permanent members of the Security Council.9 As of November 2006 China provided 1,648 troops, police, and military observers to 10 nations, mostly in African countries, including Congo, Liberia, and southern Sudan, making China the thirteenth largest contributor of manpower to UN peacekeeping. Interestingly, Wang Guangya, China’s UN ambassador, said that China was filling a vacuum left by the West in UN peacekeeping.10 Its diplomats and officials are increasingly active in spreading its influence within the UN system. The government gave enthusiastic support to the successful election in early November 2006 of Dr. Margaret Chan, a former medical director in Hong Kong, to head the World Health Organization. In contrast to its privileged position in the UN, China’s contribution to the UN budget is way below other permanent members of the Security Council as well as countries such as Japan and Germany. In the global balance of power, China opposes Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It expresses serious concerns over the potential rise of a competitive power on the global stage from Asia, which allies strongly with the US. A recent opinion survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project reveals that roughly seven of ten Japanese express an unfavorable view of China while an equal number of Chinese dislike Japan. Anxiety about the growing strength of China’s military is nearly universal in Japan, whereas 95 percent of the Chinese surveyed say their rising military might is a good thing.11 According to a China observer,12 this Chinese attitude will have a long-lasting impact on China’s perception of its proper position in the global order. By emphasizing the centrality of the UN as the main base of multilateralism, China hopes to generate enough checks and balances against unilateral actions taken by the US, thereby curtailing America’s global influence. This situation strikes a familiar chord with China’s demand for democratizing international relations, a theme to which we shall return later. Good neighbors: How important are good relations with its Asian neighbors for China’s development? The importance of Asia to China becomes clear when China’s relatively moderate global influence is put into proper perspective. China’s sense of security, especially in such traditional areas as territorial integrity, is felt more acutely in Asia than elsewhere, given the fact that it has unresolved territorial disputes with Japan and some Southeast Asian countries. Geography helps immensely to shape China’s relations with its neighbors. The fact that China shares land borders with 14 countries and sea boundaries with seven means that it can easily get itself embroiled in regional conflicts. But how important is its regional policy compared with its global policy? Is good neighborliness more rhetoric than real? How can we tell? Both official statements and academic writings in China stress the importance of the country playing a greater role in Asian-Pacific affairs by developing better relations with its neighbors and by engaging more actively in multilateral institutions

172  Chan such as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation forum), PIF (the Pacific Islands Forum), and SAARC (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). China has taken the initiative to establish and develop the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Boao Forum: the former brings together six countries (China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) to combat terrorism and cross-border crimes, to promote trade, and to enhance energy security; the latter organization provides a forum to discuss regional economics and finance, in some ways similar to the more prominent annual World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland. China’s good neighborly policy is, however, marred by a number of bilateral problems. These include its acrimonious sovereignty disputes with Taiwan; its frosty relations with Japan over a host of issues ranging from Yasukuni Shrine visits, territorial disputes, and history-book controversies to the competition for energy and markets and for political influence in Asia and beyond; and its sometimes tense relations with some Southeast Asian countries over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and over its potential military threat to the region. Despite these sources of potential conflicts, China these days has never enjoyed such good relations with its neighbors before, especially in trading terms, including such former military adversaries as Russia, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and India. Asia provides an ideal testing ground for an aspiring power such as China to test its potential leadership skills in a regional context. This is the case because the structure of multilateralism on a global scale has largely been forged by the major powers in the West, leaving little room for a newcomer from a non-Western tradition to do things differently. The rules and norms of global institutions, largely projecting the values, interests, and ideologies of the West, are well and truly entrenched. Asia, in comparison with other parts of the world, still offers a relatively new and fertile ground for big regional powers such as China to assert themselves and leave their marks.13 Zhoubian waijiao (neighborly diplomacy) provides a platform for China to reach out to the wider world and therefore sometimes takes precedence over daguo waijiao (big-power diplomacy) and nengyuan waijiao (energy diplomacy), another important dimension of China’s diplomacy to which we shall return soon. The three branches of diplomacy can, however, be seen as intertwined and form the three legs of China’s current diplomatic tripod under President Hu Jintao.14 Status quo power: Is China a status quo power or is it a revisionist power? In an article published in International Security,15 Iain Johnston argues that China is a status quo power, based on its increasing participation in international organizations and on its largely positive compliance with the existing rules and norms of international regimes. Margaret Pearson, in her study of China’s early years as a new member of the World Trade Organization, concurs that China is by and

China joins global governance  173 16

large a status quo power. The US government, however, has a different take. A November 2006 report submitted to Congress suggests that China has fallen “woefully short in fulfilling its promises” to the WTO. The same report also cites the increasing aggressiveness of the Chinese military towards Taiwan and the country’s continued violations of human rights.17 The opposite view to this status quo understanding is the view that China is a revisionist power, having an ax to grind with the West over the existing global order, since the days when Western powers came to exploit China economically and politically in the mid-nineteenth century, under some sort of semicolonial and imperialist rule. Although the country turned over a new leaf with the establishment of a New China in 1949, in reality it has continued to suffer from the legacies of this semicolonial and imperialist rule in a structural way. The underdog status of China in the global structure of imperialism,18 the unresolved issues of Taiwan and Tibet, and the territorial and other disputes with Japan are some of the more prominent problems that continue to haunt China today. China can also be understood as a status quo power in a different way, in that it wants to maintain the sovereignty-based Westphalian international order with no clear blueprint for changing the rules that govern that order. To the West, China is seen as resisting any change deemed necessary for the post-Cold War environment, such as the use of preventive intervention to deal with cases of serious human rights abuses. The region of Darfur in western Sudan is a case in point. In the debate over whether China is a status quo power or a revisionist power, it is generally assumed or believed that it would be better were China is a status quo power, as the country would then not shake the foundation of the existing international order. The irony, however, is that what China intends to maintain intact, such as a strict interpretation of state sovereignty in classical terms, is what the West wants to play down. The conflict lies in the fact that China is at pains to keep the traditional system of interstate relations in order to protect its sovereign interests, while the US acts like a “revisionist” power,19 working to change the existing world order to make allowance for humanitarian intervention,20 contrary to the classical understanding of sovereign rights and non-intervention in domestic affairs of another country. Although the existing world order has been largely created and maintained by the West, the US feels that it can reap greater benefits by sometimes circumventing the rules underpinning this order. If status quo means following US behavior every step of the way, then what will happen if the US changes course and does things differently to the rules of the existing order? Seen in this way, what is status quo to some may appear to be revisionism to others. And it would be very much up to the reigning superpower to define what constitutes status quo in the world of power politics. Even if China appears to be a status quo power in the international system, does it mean that China is willing to take on such a role, or is it forced by circumstances to do so, knowing full well that it has little power alone to fundamentally change the existing order? An additional puzzling question is: Does this external façade of a status quo power mask a determined power working quietly to make a transition to a revisionist one?

174  Chan Democratizing international relations: Why does China put so much emphasis on it? The reason is simple: China wants to protect its national interests, especially in relation to the US. As the sole superpower in the world, the US sometimes acts alone and sometimes in coordination with its close allies in a dogged pursuit of its own interests with little or no regard to possible ramifications for others. By bringing the US in line with the principle of equality among states through a process of democratization of international relations, China hopes to be able to stand closer to the US in rank and status. In calling for democratization, equality, and justice in international relations, China is able to win the support of many disadvantaged countries in the Third World, most of which share China’s feelings that they are being short-changed in their dealings with the US and the West. At the Fourteenth Non-Aligned Movement summit held in Havana, Cuba, in September 2006, the Chinese vice foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, reiterated Beijing’s call for democracy in international relations.21 An interesting mirror image of democratization at the global level is democratization at the local, national level. Whereas China champions the equality of states in international relations, it does not seem to champion the equality of individuals within the country. In contrast the US seems to be acting in the opposite way, that is, whereas the US may be regarded as a shining example of domestic equality, it does not seem keen at all to promote the idea of equality among states in international relations. Rather it strives to promote freedom and democracy around the world according to its own standard. Although individual rights are enshrined in the Chinese constitution, in practice the situation varies significantly. Party interests and collective interests override individual interests in most circumstances, and provincial interests may run counter to the interests of the central government. Joining the world: Is China’s joining the world guided by a deliberate design or is it dictated by necessity? Pang Zhongying of Nankai University in Tianjin argues that China’s participation in the international system is quite clear: It has joined all major international organizations of the world. However, he says that it is not clear what sort of role China wants to play in the system or what sort of objective it wants to achieve with its newfound power. He suggests that Chinese leaders are still feeling their way: Although they point out that the international system is unjust for developing countries, they are uncertain as to what China can or should do to change the situation. The observation that China is joining the world is often associated with the adoption of the reform and open door policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping. This conventional understanding seems to be partially true. The other plausible explanation is that China at the end of the Cultural Revolution had reached a stage at which the country had little choice but to open up if the government was to survive. It would, however, be difficult to ascertain the exact extent to which

China joins global governance  175 China’s joining the world is a deliberate policy adopted by Chinese leaders under Deng and his successors, or a necessary change forced upon the government by circumstances. These two forces of change – one internal and one external – can perhaps be fruitfully explored across a number of issue areas over time. Recent research on China’s global health governance shows that both forces are at work in shaping China’s behavior in dealing with infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza.22 Table 8.1 attempts to map the relative weights of deliberate design versus strategic necessity across a number of issues before and after China’s adoption of the reform and open door policy in late 1978. Table 8.1  Design versus necessity in China’s engagement with global governance Deliberate design (internal force) Global trade

Before 1978

After 1978

Arms control

Before 1978 After 1978

Human rights

Before 1978

After 1978

Environmental protection

Before 1978 After 1978

Global health

Before 1978 After 1978

Source: Compiled by the author.

Small trade volume due to isolation

Strategic necessity (external force)

Little external pressure for change; trade sanction lifting gradually Reform and open policy Greater impetus to has started incremental change shortly before and change with increasing after WTO accession in intensity 2001 Overwhelmingly under Resistance to outside domestic control pressure to open up Little change despite More receptive to reform and open door external pressure policy until the 1990s bilaterally (US) or under multilateral regimes No human rights policy Blanket rejection of to speak of outside pressure during the Cold War Slow progress made; Steadfast on national domestic developmental conditions and and security priorities developmental rights; take the lead slow acceptance of universal rights; resistance to Western values; open to dialogue Little awareness Little external pressure Increasing awareness Willing to accept money over time; environmental and technology to help clean up pollution needs often trumped by economic needs Socialist health care Little external pressure system More willing to work From secrecy to more with WHO since SARS openness in twenty-first century and bird flu outbreaks in recent years

176  Chan Creeping leadership: Is China building its leadership role in world affairs by stealth? Does China have a grand strategic goal in world affairs? If it has, what is it? Perhaps one very broad objective of Chinese foreign policy is to achieve the status of a rich and powerful nation, to regain its former glory before the arrival of Western imperialism, and to ensure that the country will never again be bullied by others in the future. These are the lofty aspirations of many countries, especially those old and proud, but now very much weakened, civilizations. The interesting question is whether or not China has a road map to guide it towards achieving such a goal. If it has, how effective has it been? The answer seems elusive. The past does not seem to offer much help. Since 1949 China has been trying to develop and modernize itself, disastrously perhaps under Mao from 1949 to 1975 but making some startling progress since 1978. The past 30 years or so have seen a huge jump in the country’s economic growth, if only starting from a very low base and running into serious problems in distributing its newfound wealth evenly across the country and in arresting the fast deterioration of the environment. The future is uncertain: Things may slow down as a result of reaching a more mature stage of the economy, and other developing countries are catching up fast and competing with China in certain sectors of the global economy. China is likely to continue to rise, but the road to riches and power, depending on the levels of wealth and influence in question, may yet take a long time to reach its destination. At worst, this projected future may not materialize. There is no clear view in sight, and progress depends on a congenial condition for development, both domestically and internationally,23 which may not be totally assured. However, as China continues to rise, it will certainly be tempted to exercise its power more assertively in order to protect and promote its interests. It may not position itself at the very forefront of a leading group of states in managing world affairs, and it may not lead globally,24 but already it has started to speak with a louder, more confident voice, and others may feel obliged to listen. Scouring for energy: To what extent is China’s diplomacy shaped by its search for oil and raw materials? It is not easy to determine the extent to which China’s diplomacy is shaped by its global search for oil and raw materials in order to fuel its booming economy. Much depends on global supply and demand, China’s energy needs and security, and pressing international issues at the time. Suffice to say that China’s search for energy started in earnest in the 1990s, and is likely to remain a top priority in Beijing’s diplomacy in the foreseeable future, given the competition for energy resources among various industrialized and industrializing countries and the volatile supply and uncertain reliability of alternative forms of energy. To the extent that uninterrupted energy supply provides a foundation for continued economic growth, which helps to secure the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the importance of oil diplomacy cannot be underestimated. The numerous visits made in recent years by top Chinese leaders to various parts of the world in search of oil and markets underscore this importance.

China joins global governance  177 China’s oil diplomacy has come under heavy criticisms by the West for turning a blind eye to the poor governance and human rights abuses of oil-producing countries like Sudan, Venezuela, Iran, and Iraq. However, China has defended itself by saying that it has done its part to stabilize the political situations in these countries and that it is not its business to interfere in the internal affairs of others. It has also pointed out that China’s rise is a peaceful one, that it wishes to see a stable international environment, and that China’s business deals aim to create a win–win solution for all parties concerned. China’s trade pattern with the world reveals an interesting feature: Whereas it registers a heavy trade surplus with North America and Europe, it runs into deficits with Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania. In 2004 China recorded a trade surplus of US$86.4 billion with developed countries, but a trade deficit of US$17 billion with developing countries.25 China’s trade deficit with these countries can be partially explained by its large imports of oil and raw materials from them. All-directional approach: How inclusive is China’s foreign policy, in theory and practice? China has been saying that its foreign policy is directed towards developing good relationships with all countries. Apparently this all-directional approach has been more rhetoric in the past, as Mao Zedong used to say that China had friends from all over the world. But as China grows in importance as a trading nation and as it embarks on a worldwide search for oil and raw materials, the all-directional approach has assumed greater significance and a new meaning. China’s renewed relationship with some African countries is a case in point. In 2006, dubbed the “Year of Africa,” the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, conducted a seven-nation tour of Africa in June, visiting Egypt, Ghana, Congo, Angola, South Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania. The visits aimed to expand China’s economic and trade ties with the region by offering zero-tariff treatment covering a wide variety of African exports. China also promised to increase aid and debt relief and to provide assistance to building infrastructure. Trade between China and Africa has quadrupled since 2001, reaching almost US$40 billion in 2005 and US$50.5 billion in 2006.26 It was expected to exceed US$50 billion in 2006 and to reach US$100 billion by the end of the decade.27 The most remarkable event in modern Sino-African history is the holding of the two-day China–Africa summit in Beijing in early November 2006, which 48 leaders of the 53 African states attended.28 At the summit, the Chinese government promised to double its aid to Africa by 2009 from the 2006 level. It also agreed to provide US$3 billion in preferential loans and US$2 billion in preferential buyer’s credits in the next three years. Business deals worth about US$2 billion were signed at the summit.29 How African countries and its people view China’s diplomatic offensive is an interesting area worth further study. To be sure, the United States and many European countries were alarmed by China’s diplomatic moves amidst America’s military and political bog-down in Iraq. The demand for oil has started a fierce competition between China and Japan in Africa. The two Asian giants have already locked horns over Chinese gas

178  Chan projects in the disputed waters in the East China Sea. They have also lobbied hard for alternative routes for a pipeline from eastern Siberia’s oilfields to Pacific Rim countries.30 Japan imports almost all its oil, nearly 90 percent of which come from the Middle East. The need to diversify its sources in view of political uncertainties and price rises leads Japan to turn its attention to Africa, long ignored by Japan until recently. Trade between Japan and Africa reached a total of US$18 billion in 2005, a long way behind the volume of Sino-African trade. Soft power: To what extent is China exercising its soft power to project its international image and influence?31 What are China’s soft powers? Are they the attractiveness of its cheap and increasingly robust products? The greatest attraction of China today seems to be its lure as a trade partner and as a destination for investments. Sheng Lijun of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore describes this kind of soft power as “low” soft power, as distinct from “high” soft power, the latter referring to the power of social and political attractiveness such as ideology and the legal system, the kind of soft power that China lacks at present.32 The setting up of a hundred or so Confucian Institutes around the world is a relatively belated attempt mounted by the Chinese government, following the footsteps of the British Council, Alliance Française, the US Information Center, the Goethe Institute, the Japan Foundation, the Korea Foundation, and the like, to promote national culture and language.33 In the case of China, it is the promotion of China as a peace-loving country through mutual understanding. The countries and cities in which China has set up or plans to set up these institutes may reflect the priorities that China attaches to these countries as important partners for developing its overall external relations. The overseas Chinese may become a new source of Chinese political strength. Although overseas Chinese have traditionally been rather reticent and apathetic towards things politics, new generations of overseas Chinese born and bred locally, in unison with the rise of a powerful and peaceful China, may change the picture of Chinese cohesiveness as a nation and as a state. Some scholars argue that China has little to offer in terms of soft powers, whereas others say that the country in fact uses hard powers more softly.34 Still others argue that soft power is an extension of hard power, which carries a lot of credibility in the US case and may well be true of the Chinese case. Compared with the US, what China can offer in terms of soft power is perhaps its alternative model of development, which prides economic growth over democratic change, a model which proves to be attractive to many Third World countries, as appreciated by some African leaders during the 2006 China–Africa summit.

Assessing China’s conundrums: the yins and yangs This third, final part tries to bring together the foregoing discussions of the 10 hypotheses and to put them into perspective by viewing, first of all, the apparent paradox of China appearing both strong and weak at the same time.

China joins global governance  179 Strong or weak? One of the most perplexing features of China’s national condition is the coexistence of many strengths and weaknesses. The country is seen to be strong in aggregate terms, especially in economic indicators when inflated by purchasing power parity measurements, but appears pretty weak when the same indicators are measured in per capita terms. China’s coastal region is abundantly rich but many of its inland areas suffer from abject poverty. A recent research suggests that the income gap may not be widening between the coastal urban areas and the inland rural areas, but between neighbors within the coastal region and also between neighbors within the inland region.35 From an international perspective, it is a major power but at the same time it is also the world’s largest developing nation. China is growing fast economically but it is beset with a host of problems: rampant corruption, serious environmental degradation, a weak legal system, fiscal and banking problems, unequal opportunities, political inertia, and so on. To Gordon Chang, China is heading towards some kind of collapse,36 and to Pei Minxin its development is trapped.37 Neither of these two trajectories is likely to be accurate, according to Andrew Nathan, who suggests that China is likely to sustain economic growth in a resilient authoritarian manner.38 Peaceful or warlike? There is no lack of finger-pointing that China poses a threat to others, from its cheap labor that takes away the jobs of others to the lack of transparency in its military spending. China’s military expenditure is routinely multiplied by a factor of three in most US calculations. Its official figure is about US$30  billion per annum, but US estimates put the figure at around US$100 billion.39 Chinese statistics, whether in military spending or in the economics field, when measured in purchasing power parity terms, often inflate a China that is far bigger than its actual size. Those who have pointed out that China is a threat often exaggerate their claim in order to protect their vested interests, be they to drum up political support or to promote the local arms industry or both. Other observers argue that a sober assessment of China’s strengths and weaknesses is in order, and suggest that engaging China is a better way to deal with it than the use of containment. China’s official view is adamant that the country is on a peaceful rise, posing no threat to anyone.40 What the country wants is a peaceful environment, domestically and internationally, so that its economy can develop smoothly and its people can enjoy a better standard of living. China, according to this view, is different from the Soviet Union in the Cold War days: It does not pose a security threat to the United States or the wider world. All it wants is to develop friendly relationships with all peoples in all countries. It does not seek to be a hegemon, meaning an international bully; rather it is willing to play according to the rules of the international game, even when those rules are set up and controlled by the West, in particular the US, and when those rules may not serve China’s maximum interests. Whether China is by nature a peace-loving country or a warlike one is often open to debate. Iain Johnston and Thomas Christensen, in their respective wellknown studies,41 have found instances of bellicosity in China’s past. Others have

180  Chan come to different conclusions.42 A recent study of Chinese pacifism, however, concludes that China in the imperial days was reluctant to initiate the use of force for four interrelated reasons:43 1 Ideologically, almost all major Chinese schools of thought opposed militarism. 2 Sociologically, Chinese society was inward-looking and risk-averse. 3 Historically, China did have its share of wars, but its foreign wars tended to be defensive in nature. 4 Structurally, China’s attitude towards conflict was determined by its agricultural economy, which predisposed a defensive posture towards nomadic societies. In or out? The sources of China’s many unique features in global politics can be traced in many respects to its long civilization and tradition and to its large size. Its influence is increasingly being felt across the world, but very often China seems to work on its own and for its own sake, quite separate from the rest of the world, so much so that Samuel Kim has called it the Group of One in international relations.44 China’s present increasing integration with the rest of the world has a relatively short history, compared with the long tradition of China as a largely self-contained empire in the Far East. China is a late comer to international (or Western) relations and organization. Since the adoption of the reform and open door policy in the late 1970s, China has increased its speed and intensity of integration with the world. Nominal contact such as memberships of international organizations is one thing, but norm or identity change as a result of engagement is quite another. Although China is a member of almost all major international organizations today and a signatory state to all important international treaties, its full compliance with international rules and norms is still questionable. This is because full compliance would require domestic changes that are difficult to implement and enforce, especially at lower levels of government, and normally take a long time to take effect. Therefore, to many observers, especially those in the West, China sometimes appears to be a responsible member of the international community, but sometimes not. The country sometimes seems to be “in,” but sometimes “out” of the international community. More confusingly, China can sometimes be seen to be both “in” and “out,” like the partial fusions of yin and yang in Chinese thoughts and behavior, a situation that baffles many observers. In a similar vein, China is sometimes modern-looking and sometimes it appears traditional. At other times, it is a blend of both. In this sense, history and tradition continue to play a significant part in shaping its behavior, despite its modernization and development. This situation therefore goes beyond a realist understanding of China to call for, in addition, a constructivist analysis, both from the outside in as well as from the inside out.

China joins global governance  181

Conclusion China’s path to globalization, like the dao (the path) in Chinese philosophy, consists of dual elements of strengths and weaknesses, peace and bellicosity, in and out. China is in a continuous process of adjusting to change and continuity, balancing between left and right, choosing between conformity and reform. As China adjusts to the world, so the world needs to adjust to China, if the two parties are to co-exist in harmony. Is China a responsible stakeholder in international affairs? The answer depends very much on the standard that we use to measure responsibility. It also depends on whose order we are dealing with and whose perception we are talking about. To the United States, the answer may appear to be clear: It certainly wants China to be more responsible,45 according to the American standard, which means China should align itself with the norms and values of the US. China, on the other hand, is happy to be taken seriously as a stakeholder in world affairs, because such a status would apparently confer on it a recognized status in the world. China is sick of being an underdog in global affairs; it wants to be fully capable of protecting and promoting its national interests, and then to be able to shape the way world affairs are run. In other words, it wants to be a co-architect of some sort working in concert with the US in managing an emerging, new global structure, to begin with in the Asian theater, where its security interests are more at stake than elsewhere. To the outside world, China has increasingly become a challenge as well as an opportunity. China’s policy of reform and open door has propelled it to the forefront of economic growth, a position that other countries can ignore only at their own peril. China realizes that the current world order is biased in favor of the West, but it has chosen to work within it to achieve a higher power ranking, rather than to work outside to overthrow the order. How to face the challenge of a rising China and to best exploit what it has to offer have become the primary concerns of global governance today.

Notes 1 This chapter was originally written for and presented at the international conference on China organized by the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham on 18–19 September 2006. I am grateful to the organizers for inviting me and for the comments and criticisms made by conference participants. I am also grateful to my former students at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, for challenging my ideas about China and the world. 2 An early exposition of China’s in and out can be found in Samuel S. Kim, China In and Out of the Changing World Order (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1991). 3 Margaret Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 4 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 5 Anthony Loh has given a convincing and comprehensive critique of Johnston’s cultural realism on methodological grounds. See Chapter 14 in this volume.

182  Chan 6 Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs, 75 (5): 37–52 (1996). 7 Zhao Suisheng, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004). 8 Michael Fullilove, “Diplomacy: China starts to pull its weight at the UN,” International Herald Tribune, 23 August 2006. 9 As of 30 September 2006 France deployed 1,900 troops and police, China 1,648, the UK 347, the USA 335, and Russia 294. See www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/ (accessed on 15 November 2006). I am grateful to Dr. Jean-Pierre Cabestan for alerting me to check the figures at the Nottingham China conference, 19 September 2006. 10 Colum Lynch, “China fills void in U.N. peacekeeping,” Wall Street Journal Asia, Internet edn., 27 November 2006. 11 “China’s neighbors worry about its growing military strength,” The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 21 September 2006, available at http://pewglobal.org (accessed on 24 September 2007). 12 Dr. P. K. Lee of the Open University of Hong Kong, personal communication of September 2006. 13 Su Changhe argues that China’s approach to Asian regionalism has moved from an instrumentalist approach to one that includes elements of institutionalism. See his “Zhoubian zhidu yu zhoubian zhuyi” (Neighborly System and Neighborly Policy), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), 1: 14 (2006). 14 James Tang, “With the Grain or against the Grain? Energy Security and Chinese Foreign Policy in the Hu Jintao Era,” CNAPS Working Paper Series, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, October 2006. 15 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” International Security, 27 (4): 5–56 (2003). 16 Margaret M. Pearson, “Lessons from China’s Early Years in the World Trade Organization,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, ed., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 242. 17 “U.S.–China Commission cites troubling trends for U.S. economic and national security interests,” Consulate General of the United States, Hong Kong and Macao, available at http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ (accessed 24 September 2007). 18 Johan Galtung’s depiction of the global structure of unequal exchange some 30 years ago is still largely valid today. See his “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research, 8 (2): 81–117 (1971). 19 For a powerful piece of work that depicts the US as a revisionist hegemon or even a revolutionary power working to change the current status quo in world affairs, see Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly, 29 (3): 7–19 (2006). 20 I borrow the idea of this paragraph from Dr. P. K. Lee, personal communication of 1 June 2006. 21 “China supports NAM to play key role in world affairs,” Xinhua news, http://english. people.com.cn/ (accessed on 26 September 2006). 22 Chan Lai Ha, P. K. Lee, and Gerald Chan, “China Engages Global Health Governance: Process and Dilemmas,” Global Public Health, forthcoming (2008). 23 Avery Goldstein argues that China needs to tread a delicate balance between showing strength and maintaining the tranquility crucial to continued economic growth. See Lucian W. Pye’s review of his book entitled Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), in Foreign Affairs, 85 (1): pp (2006), p. 163. 24 Pang Zhongying suggests that at present China lacks the ability to lead on a global scale. For one thing, it is not able to set the global agenda that befits a leader. Second, apart from environmental and human rights issues, China’s voice has been rather fee-

China joins global governance  183

25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42

ble in international affairs. Third, China lacks diplomatic experience. It is still learning about the rules that govern the play of international games. See Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo zai guoji tixi de diwei yu zuoyong” (China’s Place and Function in the International System), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 4: 18 (2006). International Monetary Fund, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book 2005 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2005), p. 133. Lydia Polgreen, “Chinese take a turn at turning a Sub-Saharan profit,” New York Times, 18 August 2006; “China-Africa trade may hit US$100-billion by 2010,” Trade and Investment in South Africa, 13 September 2007, available at www.tradesa.co.za/ news/ (accessed 24 September 2007). Cited in China Reform Monitor, American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC, No. 632, 13 July 2006. Five African states still recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan at the time of the summit. “China’s Rising Diplomatic Clout,” Singapore Institute of International Affairs, www. siiaonline.org (accessed on 10 November 2006). See also “The savannah comes to Beijing as China hosts its new empire,” The Guardian, 4 November 2006, pp. 24–5; Joshua Kurlantzick, “Beijing’s safari: China’s move into Africa and its implications for aid, development, and governance,” Policy Outlook No. 29, The China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2006. Masaki Hisane, “Japan and China race for African oil,” Japan Focus, 19 August 2006. For a focused and conceptual study of China’s soft power, see Wang Hongying, “Chinese Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications,” paper presented at the Nottingham China conference, 19 September 2006. Sheng Lijun, “China in Southeast Asia: the limits of power,” Japan Focus, 4 August 2006. For an interesting and up-to-date analysis of the spread of Chinese language and culture as an extension of China’s soft power, see Ding Sheng and Robert A. Saunders, “Talking up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 23 (2): 3–33 (2006). Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Beijing’s Bid to Reduce the ‘China Threat’ and the Beijing versus Washington Consensus,” www.peaceforum.org.tw (accessed on 24 August 2006). “Loren Brandt Corrects a Misperception about China’s Inequality,” Princeton–Harvard China & the World Program, http://weblamp.princeton.edu/phcwp/ (accessed on 1 December 2006). Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). Pei Minxin, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Andrew J. Nathan, “Present at the Stagnation,” Foreign Affairs, 85 (4): 177–82 (2006). Pentagon estimates cited in “China Rise and its Impact on Foreign Policy and Security,” the seventh report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament (the House of Commons), para. 115, www.publications.parliament.uk/ (accessed on 16 August 2006). Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, 84 (5): 18–24 (2005). Johnston, Cultural Realism; Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik”. See, for example, Gerald Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 123–7. Anthony Loh, in his

184  Chan chapter entitled “Deconstructing Cultural Realism,” argues rather convincingly that Johnston’s methodology is flawed and therefore his conclusion on Chinese cultural realism dubious. See Chapter 14 in this volume. 43 Hu Shaohua, “Revisiting Chinese Pacifism,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 32 (4): 275 (2006). 44 Samuel Kim, “Chinese Foreign Policy Faces Globalization Challenges,” in Johnston and Ross, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, pp. 276–306. 45 Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?,” remarks made before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 3 August 2006.

Part III

China and regionalism

9 Contested international relations theory and China’s constructing regional entitlement Gordon Cheung

Introduction This chapter uses international political economy (IPE) as a point of departure to analyze the notion of the rise of China through the examination of the hegemonic stability, the regional development in East Asia and the constructivist of the Chinese soft power context in East Asia. In a very substantial article, Emilio Casetti constructs an economic model to analyze the future economic strength between the US and China with a view to examine the power shift in 2050. He concluded: The possibility that China will overtake the USA in power capabilities during the first half of the 21st century should not be dismissed. On the contrary, those who design policies and institutions for tomorrow’s world should consider this possibility very seriously.1 To regain the entitlement in East Asia, China is trying to embody an eclectic approach to construct its so-called peaceful rise, with a view to irritating the US post-World War II international relations system in East Asia. After the remarks of Robert B. Zoellick, US Deputy Secretary of State, to the National Committee on US–China Relations on 21 September 2005, the notion of “responsible stakeholder” sent a beam of hope in understanding China’s foreign relations with the US.2 Yet, in a remark made by Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission on 3 August 2006, he began by clarifying former Deputy Secretary Zoellick’s comment on China’s role as a responsible global stakeholder. Christensen emphasized: The crux [urging China to become such a responsible global stakeholder] of US policy toward China today, a policy that combines active engagement to maximize areas of common interest and cooperation, along with a recognition that we need to maintain strong US regional capabilities in case China does not eventually move down a path consistent with our interests.3

188  Cheung Apparently, China is not yet a responsible global stakeholder according to US standards. Clearly, hegemonic succession is a serious issue; the academic enquiry of IPE inadvertently puts the US under extra academic scrutiny, which indirectly invites criticism and challenge from scholars who are dealing with economic or so-called low politics areas.4 Apart from the challenge of hegemonic stability, the liberal challenge on realism, the study on interdependence, the invitation of academic debate on multilateral rather than unilateral approaches (such as containment policy), and the talk about domestic sociology and cultural global relations closely match with China’s current strategic demands: challenging the US status quo in building up Chinese entitlement.5 In terms of presentation, this chapter will first explore some essential theoretical backgrounds, which contribute to the understanding of the theory of hegemonic stability (a core strand of IPE theory) with a view to examining some empirical challenges of US hegemonic power after World War II. Second, it will go on to look at the notion of neoliberal regional development in East Asia to understand in what ways China’s entitlement creed has been increasingly instrumental in modifying the region institutional context. Third, it attempts to apply the constructivist approach in trying to locate the culturally embedded soft power entitlement on which China has been trying to capitalize.

US hegemonic decline? IPE became a subfield of international relations, and its academic concerns have been evolving ever since. In celebrating 50 years since the launch of International Organization (IO, a leading journal of international relations), Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner retold the story of the theoretical development of IPE in conjunction with the history of IO.6 According to their analysis, the first two decades of IO development (1947–67) witnessed the first phase of IPE studies focused on the United Nations and the establishment and evolution of the European Union.7 Later IPE studies touched upon the challenge of realism through liberalism such as hegemonic stability theory and regime analysis. The study of domestic and international relations dominated the late 1980s, and the post-Cold War era witnessed a shift towards the study of sociology and constructivism.8 In essence, as they finally concluded, IO’s story rested on two strands: “the interplay between realist and liberal currents of theory in the evolution of the analysis of IPE and the analysis of domestic politics and IPE.”9 Although the study of the development of a single journal does not necessarily signpost anything, the prominence of IO sparked some academic antipathy toward the unilateral foreign policy of the US both during the Cold War and during the war on terrorism, which is still under severe academic bombardment.10 The concept of hegemonic stability was originally coined from Charles Kindleberger’s assessment of the inadequacy of US financial leadership after the Great Depression starting in 1929.11 Robert Gilpin, in War and Change in World Politics, outlined the notion that the underlying problems of international relations rested on the disequilibrium (or out of the Pareto optimality) between the

Contested international relations theory  189 burden of maintaining the empire (or the mode of control in world politics) and the resources to keep it in existence. He substantiates that “These successive dominant states have changed the system, expanding until an equilibrium is reached between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion.”12 However, once the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit, the world system will change. When the hegemonic power loses the capability to balance, a hegemonic war will be waged in order to develop a new balance of system. US hegemonic drawbacks first became evident with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s with the announcement of the delinking of the gold-pegged US dollar by President Nixon on 15 August 1971.13 The price of gold rose to $65 an ounce (the official price was set at $35 an ounce) on the London market.14 Trade conflicts with Japan dominated the political scene of the IPE in the 1970s and 1980s, which also effectively helped question the US hegemonic power.15 In Blowback, a very thought-provoking book, Chalmers Johnson listed the outcomes of the potential problematic areas in East Asia that were created out of US Cold War strategies. If the US is not going to solve these problems, “blowback will only become more intense.”16 “The United States has acquired an empire,” argued Niall Ferguson, “but Americans themselves lack the imperial cast of mind. They would rather consume than conquer. They would rather build shopping malls than nations.”17 However, John Ikenberry claims that it is an “exaggeration” to argue that the US is losing its capacity to pursue multilateralism especially during the Bush administration because “the Bush administration’s opposition to multilateralism represents in practical terms an attack on specific types of multilateral agreements more than it does a fundamental assault on the ‘foundational’ multilateralism of the postwar system.”18 To criticize, the limit of hegemonic stability theory, according to Duncan Snidal, rests on the provision of public goods from the hegemon, and the possibility of cooperation without a single dominating leader.19 Therefore, if one is seriously concerned about the leadership role of the hegemon, he concluded, “It is not surprising, therefore, that adherents of the theory have expressed concern about the decline in American hegemony and the decrease in global order.”20 Joseph Nye, a long-time observer of the hegemonic power of the US, later modified his idea on the development of hegemony in The Paradox of American Power.21 The so-called American hegemonic leadership should be further analyzed through the examination of the impact of globalization and transnational relations. In terms of economic power and the interaction of transnational relations, the US has to share power with regional powers as well as non-state actors (his idea of soft power will be discussed in the third section). John Odell simply came up with the idea that states needed to negotiate on the international economic chessboard as well as in other areas that involve transnational relations.22 In the IPE of East Asia, one of the most obvious challenges to the monetary leadership of the US came with the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, which partly revealed the instability of the financial structure of the Asian economies (crony capitalism or moral hazard), and partly revealed the mismanagement of

190  Cheung those affected countries’ recovery under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).23 The repercussions of the crisis eventually called the attention of the US and the world economy, and the IMF immediately released loans.24 Martin Feldstein attacked the IMF on the grounds that the reforms and changes effectively imposed on the countries were unjustified either in terms of situational correctness or regarding the degree of necessity.25 Jeffrey Sachs regarded the IMF measures as too stringent on the already fragile Southeast Asian economies.26 In his recent book, The Roaring Nineties, Joseph Stiglitz illustrated that the root cause of the crisis – the US pushing for the premature financial deregulation of these East Asian countries – has actually benefited US financial firms (fishing in the troubled waters).27 Such evidence, which discredits the US hegemonic role, is to China’s advantage because it has always been viewed as a superpower of equal status with the US, albeit more in the East Asian region. According to Peter Hays Gries, “When Chinese nationalists choose to compare China to the otherwise dissimilar US, they clearly seek to depict themselves to themselves [italic in original] as a superpower.”28 It is in this direction that I am going to look at the regional development in East Asia under China’s influence.

China’s rise and East Asian regionalization In Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David Baldwin addressed the continuous debate between neorealism and neoliberalism. In his observation, one of the criteria to test both theories is to investigate the development of the European Union. He argued that: Both Keohane and Grieco agree that the future of the European Community will be an important test of their theories. If the trend toward European integration weakens or suffers reversals, the neorealists will claim vindication. If progress toward integration continues, the neoliberals will presumably view this as evidence to support their views.29 Although the European Union confronted a tactical setback with the shelving of the European Constitution in 2005, the examination of neoliberalism with a gaze on regional integration is certainly a useful means of understanding the notion of neoliberal thinking. One of the major areas of neoliberal ideas is regime, defined by Stephen Krasner as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”30 “This agreed definition was ambiguous,” contended Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, “but it identified regimes as social institutions and avoided debilitating definitional struggles, as advocates of the regimes research program sought to show that their work could illuminate substantive issues of international relations.”31 The cooperative motive and necessary conditions of interdependence along with regime analysis were elaborated by Keohane and Nye via the use of three characteristics: multiple channels, lack of hierarchy, and the relinquishment

Contested international relations theory  191 of military force, in a context characterized by complex interdependence, which set out the possibility of cooperation, and also underlies the very early criteria for the development of regional integration.32 In After Hegemony, Robert Keohane attempts to constitute a framework of analysis in understanding the possibility of cooperation in IPE, particularly after the fading away of the United States’ hegemonic power. Robert Axelrod, by using repeated games theory, further tried to examine if cooperation between states could be worked out under conditions of anarchy. He concluded that, if states needed to repeat the relations, cooperation should be facilitated in the long run.33 This repeated cooperation became more understandable among East Asian countries where China is instantly recognized (through its economic prowess, historical embedment, cultural influence, diplomacy, and other transnational relations) by its regional neighbors as a power not to be neglected, but rather to be embraced. Obviously, neoliberalism entails the possibility of cooperation in a power-constructed environment, which allows institutional organizations to piece those political, economic, and social demands together. Yet Katzenstein was afraid that: Although the United States is becoming part of an emerging Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s, this does not connect in any meaningful way to an embryonic Asian-American identity of a growing segment of US citizens. . . . Trans-Pacific ties did not further a recognition of Asian elements in the collective identity of the United States as much as they denied Asians membership in the American political community.34 The recognition of East Asian regional economic integration began partly along the concept of functional development rather than federalism because of the historical sources of conflicts and vested interests among different countries.35 As contended by Ravenhill, the common denominators that lead to regional cooperation can be categorized as military requirement, collective bargaining, and the desire to ensure that domestic reforms take place.36 Actually, East Asia has some noticeable examples of regional cooperation such as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). ASEAN has been evolving to incorporate other non-Southeast Asian countries in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN+3.37 ASEAN+3 should perhaps be considered the most important of these organizations because it may become the model of regional integration in East Asia given that “ASEAN was too small to have any notable influence or voice.”38 In addition, ASEAN+3 was accepted by Japan, who participated in the 1997 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and recognized the “centripetal forces” shared by its members.39 According to Alice Ba’s recent observation, regional socialization becomes an important interactive channel to allow China and ASEAN to learn from each other’s common history. She contended: While China’s and ASEAN’s experiences are by no means the same they do share an outsider’s view of the international system, as well as a historical

192  Cheung sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis advanced industrialized powers. Past experiences with Western power thus provided a basis for a narrative of culture and domination and a basis for identification vis-à-vis the West.40 Undeniably, as Shaun Breslin contended, “[W]ider processes of East Asian regionalization .  .  . are largely driven by wider global processes.”41 Nevertheless, East Asian identity was particularly reconstituted after the Asian financial crisis. Dieter and Higgott derived a model of theoretical building among the East Asian region to form a “monetary regionalism” because individual economies are vulnerable and cooperation within ASEAN and APEC is doubtful.42 In terms of economic capability, East Asian economies held US$1,109 billion in foreign reserves and seemingly took every opportunity to discuss the possibility of moving toward regional monetary integration in every possible multilateral event.43 Japan, although being an obvious candidate to carry the flag in providing the linchpin for monetary integration, faced a setback in terms of the setting up of an Asian Monetary Fund because of the disapproval of the US. In East Asia, China was relatively better off from the crisis. First, the Chinese yuan was not an international currency because it could not be traded (nor be the subject of speculation) in international markets.44 Second, by not devaluing the renminbi, China did win some trust from the Southeast Asian countries. As can be seen from Table 9.1, from 14 January to 1 February 1998, Zhu Rongji, Dai Xianglong, and Li Lanqing all openly supported the exchange rate of the renminbi and ruled out the possibility of depreciation of the renminbi in order to stimulate exports. Apart from this official reason the lack of currency depreciation was also due to the desire to avoid vicious competition between China and neighboring coun-

Table 9.1  Opinions of China’s leaders on the exchange rate of the renminbi Date

Person

Occasion

Main content

14 January 1998

Zhu Rongji

23 January 1998

Dai Xianglong

Insurance and Securities System Conference Press release of National Affairs Department

1 February 1998

Li Lanqing

The exchange rate of the renminbi would remain stable without depreciation There is no reason for the renminbi to depreciate during the financial crisis influencing Southeast Asian countries There will be pressure on the competitiveness of China’s goods exports after the currency depreciation of Southeast Asian countries. However, there is no need for the renminbi to depreciate in order to stimulate exports

Annual Meeting of World Economy Forum

Sources: People’s Daily, 15 January 1998: 1; People’s Daily, 24 January 1998: 1; People’s Daily, 2 February 1998: 1.

Contested international relations theory  193 tries, especially Southeast Asian countries. If we examine China’s behavior more closely, China was trying to make up the loss brought about by the exchange rate through non-monetary policy, for example the increase of government financial outflows. As can be seen from Table 9.2, China experienced budget deficits from 1997 to 2002. Joseph Stiglitz supported such economic policy. “When faced with an economic downturn, respond with expansionary macroeconomic policy,” he agreed; “China seized the opportunity to combine its short-run needs with long-run growth objectives.”45 The economic rise of China, therefore, was based on the political calculation of regional relations and economic policy was accordingly directed to the long-term economic development of China. In addition to that, China also began with a series of regionalization processes, which entail heavy Chinese involvement in an all-round engagement with the East Asian region, which is a way for China to flex its muscles and shoulder regional affairs.46 In terms of Chinese economic integration however the modus operandi is the establishment of a Chinese Economic Circle (CEC) encompassing Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China and generating a close interdependence on the economic front.47 That circle has become more real since Hong Kong and Macao were returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Hong Kong’s financial market has become a platform for satisfying the financial demands from mainland China. The success of the initial public offering (IPO) of the Bank of China in May 2006 was an obvious case in point. Macao, after the liberalization of the gambling industry, has now become a vibrant entertainment center on Chinese soil. There already exists much literature regarding the cross-strait economic integration.48 For the economic relations between China and Taiwan per se, for instance, Taiwan’s trade with mainland China amounted to US$37 billion in 2002 and the figure jumped to US$76 billion in 2005, according to the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan.49 In terms of cross-border visiting, the cumulative number of person-trips from Taiwan to mainland China in 2002 was more than 27 million.50 The continuous and ever-increasing interaction between China and Taiwan creates a business dynamic that in all likelihood can spill over into other economic sectors.51 The Boao Forum and East Asian Summit (EAS) are two major regional organizations having strong Chinese initiation. The Boao Forum for Asia was officially Table 9.2  Key economic indicators for China 1997–2002 Year

GDP (billion yuan)

Total reserve minus gold (US$ million)

Government finance (billion yuan) + surplus, – deficit

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

7,489.4 7,900.3 8,267.3 8,935.7 9,861.8 239.8

142,762 149,188 157,728 168,278 215,605 291,128

–92.70 –125.57 –203.39 –277.03 –438.29 –309.78

Source: International Financial Statistics March 2004 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2004): 924.

194  Cheung inaugurated on 26–27 February 2001 in Hainan, China, as the Far Eastern equivalent of the Davos Economic Forum. It was initiated by the Australian Prime Minister, James Lee Hawke, the former President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, and the former Prime Minister of Japan, Hosokawa Morihiro, and aspired to become the leading non-governmental organization and forum for regional experts.52 The 2004 Boao Conference was to search for win–win opportunities among Asian countries.53 In April 2004, Long Yongtu, Secretary General of the Boao Forum for Asia, mentioned that “China is the center of Asia’s economic activities including trade and manufacturing. It is obvious that China would be automatically catapulted to taking the leading role by virtue of its current engagement.”54 EAS was a new organization with strong Chinese support. One of its characteristics is that it does not include the United States. The first meeting was held on 14 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, among the leaders from ASEAN, Australia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. First, the notion of understanding in the declaration is very inward looking. The use of “our peoples” signifies the inclusiveness and the connotation of the regional consensus of EAS. In addition, one important connotation of its inception was that it was established 50 years after the Bandung Conference in 1955 in Indonesia. Although the Bandung conference, which had huge Chinese involvement, was a non-aligned meeting amongst Asian and African countries, its clear notion of representing developing countries inspired East Asian countries to search for regional cohesiveness. According to Mackie, what the Bandung Conference “signified in 1955 was that nearly all of them had [italic in original] awakened by then and were demanding that their voices should be heard.”55 This is why EAS was first regarded as a resurgence of Chinese historical leadership in leading East Asian regionalism.56 As long as the US is kept at bay from the EAS, the discourse will be beneficial to China because it will result in its recognition as an “in-group player,” which maintains and creates a solidarity that can further facilitate regional recognition of China’s regional entitlement. The Second EAS was supposed to be held in Indonesia.57 However, the aura of China’s regional development was replaced by a new shift toward the China–African Summit, which was held in November 2006. The Summit was generally regarded as arising from a realist concern for China’s quest for natural resources from African countries. Yet, as Wei-Wei Zhang pointed out in the International Herald Tribune, “Many of the African leaders coming here for the Chinese–African summit meeting are attracted not only by opportunities for aid and trade, but also by the Chinese model of development” [emphasis added].58

The construction of Chinese historical entitlement Constructivism was first used by Nicholas Onuf in the World of Our Making, in which he contended that “It does not draw a sharp distinction between material and social realities – the material and the social contaminate each other, but variably – and it does not grant sovereignty to either the material or the social by defining the other out of existence.”59 Alexander Wendt further explored the idea to

Contested international relations theory  195 challenge the realist school especially on two issues: identities and interests.60 He clearly stated “My objective . . . is to build a bridge between these two traditions (and by extension, between the realist–liberal and rationalist–reflectivist debates) by developing a constructivist argument, drawn from structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology, on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests.”61 Drawn from some sociological approaches, such as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s social construction theories and George Herbert Mead, who once mentioned “What we have here is a situation in which there can be different selves, and it is dependent upon the set of social reactions that is involved as to which self we are going to be,”62 Wendt details the importance of interaction, learning, and the epistemological method of international relations studies.63 In a later critique on Mearsheimer’s article, Wendt further elaborated that “[C]onstructivists argue that material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.”64 His ideas on the challenge of the material based argument of the realist school became clear in Social Theory of International Politics, which juxtaposes the argument of social construction of IR in a larger context, concerning cultural based elements.65 One very important function of culture is to create a collective memory, he continued: “[O]nce collective memories have been created it may be hard to shake their long-term effects, even if a majority of individuals have ‘forgotten’ them at any given moment.”66 Although David Kang has mentioned clearly that he is “not making a plea for research that includes a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism,” he recognized that “Historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved.”67 If we believe what Benedict Anderson once contended, that “Nations, however, have no clearly identifiable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never natural. Because there is no originator, the nation’s biography cannot be written evangelically, ‘down time,’ through a long procreative chain of begettings,”68 we should be willing to accept that many things can therefore be written into the up-bringing and the nurturing of the context of the relations between China and East Asia. In Peter Hays Gries’ language on the reconstruction process of Chinese identity, “Culture does matter: cultural differences clearly played a major role in the Sino-American apology diplomacy of April 2001,” among many other important historical incidents depicted in his book China’s New Nationalism.69 More importantly, historical identities are being used/constructed as ways to rescue the Communist Party from losing “hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse.”70 If David Campbell successfully indicates how the US Cold War security can be rewritten through the “reconceptualization of identity and the state,”71 China has been using its historical endorsement (in terms of historical, culture, social capital, and ideational advantages) to further enhance and create a soft power base to motivate neighboring East Asian countries to develop more cordial relations with China. The term “soft power” was first coined by Joseph Nye to suggest the importance of the US in maintaining soft power in the age of globalization because

196  Cheung “the presence of multiple cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries and helps create a necessary broadening of American attitudes in an era of globalization.”72 He finally developed his previous ideas to fully develop the concept of “soft power,” which refers to attractive power instead of coercive power.73 However, he worried that “The United States’ most striking failure is the low priority and paucity of resources it has devoted to producing soft power.”74 And it is in this direction that China seizes the opportunity (if not hijacking the concept) swiftly to facilitate various soft power capitals to secure Chinese entitlement, if not to phase out US influence in East Asia. Jean Garrison claimed that “China’s patience, confidence, and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of ‘soft’ power, giving China increasing influence in East Asia and the global economic system.”75 In China, the use of soft power to facilitate the rise of China has gained momentum. Li Ying-chun suggested four ways to improve China’s soft power capabilities: (1) to strongly promote Chinese historical culture; (2) to be involved in global affairs (such as regime) first and to modify these in order to serve/accommodate Chinese interests; (3) to develop a communication industry; and (4) to promote a “Beijing consensus” or “Chinese model” to challenge the Washington consensus.76 Another way to facilitate Chinese soft power is to engage in “public diplomacy,” including media diplomacy, educational exchange, organizing international events, etc., in order to create a responsible image.77 To establish Chinese historical soft power, one of the measures is to go back to history and to locate the historically socialized sentiments and common experience among China, Japan, and Korea in East Asia. This process of socialization, according to G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, is crucial because “At the international level, the emerging hegemon articulates a set of normative principles in order to facilitate the construction of an order conducive to its interest.”78 Such an attempt resulted in educational cooperation to edit a textbook about the history of East Asia by a committee (Dongya sanguo di jinxiandaishi gongtong bianxie weiyuanhui) of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars.79 The textbook Dongya sanguo di jinxiandai shi (The Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Countries) has become a first collaborative cultural manifestation to reconcile the historical disagreements among these three countries. In a review by Jeffrey Wasserstrom in Foreign Policy, he mentioned that “This book, which was published simultaneously in all three major East Asian languages, strives to present readers with a unified narrative of the way three different nations experienced the turbulent years between 1840 and 1945.”80 In terms of presentation, the book fully explores the use of statistics, historical photographs, pictures, cartoons, and documents to provide a comprehensive picture of these countries, with particular emphasis on Japanese war crimes in World War II. To illustrate the Confucian influence in these countries, for example, the book compares the written characters of the three languages by using an excerpt from the Analects, undoubtedly a way to siphon Chinese culture through soft power ingredients.81 Throughout the book, one can detect a strong feeling of common resentment regarding Western imperialism. This common antipathy

Contested international relations theory  197 later became an impetus (in all three cases) for their individual modernization processes.82 Yet the book remains controversial. Apart from providing the basic cultural and historical development of these three countries, the narrative of their contemporary history was almost stopped around the time of World War II (with only a flimsy final chapter about the future East Asian trajectory), leaving the history of the Cold War untouched.83 If the history of the Cold War was basically constructed by the US, the omission of this big chunk of history is trying to erase the presence of the US in East Asia via soft educational power. According to CBS news, many American “see knowledge of the Chinese language and culture as a leg up in a global economy where China is growing in importance.”84 Chinese has become an increasingly important language to be used in the business world. The study of Chinese is both a practical as well as a cultural activity.85 Danny Unger contended: The Chinese in Thailand were often embedded within social (Overseas Chinese) networks extending beyond Thailand’s borders. Their early international orientations, and the fact that their economic interests were spread across different economic activities, reduced pressures on state officials to provide firms with extensive protection and nurture.86 As Putnam mentioned, one can invest in networking and an official language (such as Mandarin across mainland China and Taiwan) in order to enhance the building of networks when the information costs of learning the language are relatively low.87 Soft power is in the making through ways in which historical elements are being mingled with cultural ingredients about China’s rise, especially in East Asia.

Conclusion In the summer of 2005, the senior minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, appeared at the National Rally and used Chinese to make a speech.88 His message to the Singaporean was that it was not enough to speak in English. Speaking in Chinese should be an imperative given the rise of Chinese economic power. East Asian has witnessed the conglomeration of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (economic, social, and cultural aspects) into an extra large Chinese economic circle, which effectively translates their individual economic prowess into the political stakes required to regulate regional economic affairs. Apart from language, the textbook exemplified the use of historical and cultural power to reconstruct East Asian relations with sentiments and common experience on war and modernization. If the international political economy (IPE) perspective has said anything about the possible decline of the exogenous hegemonic stability of the US, historical recognition, common experience, and emotional power become new forces to translate China’s long established entitlement in East Asia into something of an endogenous substitute. This chapter attempts to examine the fact that the conventional theoretical

198  Cheung approaches used to understand international relations, especially IPE, have been witnessing a gradual transformation caused by the rise of China, a power which is increasingly willing and able to project and promote its perceived entitlement process in the East Asian region. China has been trying to take advantage o the changes and dynamics of the theoretical foundation of IPE by redeeming her East Asian entitlement to crack into the theoretical building blocks, which are mostly US constructed.89 The realization of China’s entitlement is like the fulfillment of a very old deed or a right, which occurs through the articulation of regional recognition, cultural assimilation, circumstantial acceptance, and a historically and culturally embedded approach to encapsulate the notion of China’s long established (natural) relations in East Asia. The entitlement, however, is a process. It has not yet been realized because US influence is still very prominent in East Asia.90 Individual East Asian countries’ post-World War II economic development reinforced the notion of community building, regionalization, hierarchy, and industrialization.91 A favorable external factor becomes a pacifier to uproaring domestic nationalism. Reading between the lines, one will also realize that a favorable external factor can be socially constructed.

Notes 1 Emilio Casetti, “Power Shifts and Economic Development: When Will China Overtake the USA?,” Journal of Peace Research, 40 (6): 661–75 (2003), p. 673. 2 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” remarks before the National Committee on US–China Relations, 21 September 2005, www. state.gov/ (accessed on 15 August 2006). 3 Thomas J. Christensen, “China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?,” remarks before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 3 August 2006, www.state.gov/ (accessed on 15 August 2006). 4 Alan P. Dobson, “The Dangers of US Interventionism,” Review of International Studies, 28 (3): 577–97 (2002). 5 Xue-tang Guo, “Cong zhongmei guanxi de bianhua jiedu xinshiji de zhongguo guoji zhanlue” (Understanding China’s International Strategies in the New Century from the Change of Sino-American Relations), Guoji wenti luntan (International Review), 34: 39–50 (2004). 6 Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, 52 (4): 645–85 (1998). 7 Ibid., pp. 650–5. 8 Ibid., pp. 662–70. 9 Ibid., p. 683. 10 Anatol Lieven, “The Cold War is Finally Over: The True Significance of the Attacks,” in James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, ed., How did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (Oxford: PublicAffairs, 2001), pp. 295–306; Colin McInnes, “A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan War,” Review of International Studies, 29 (2): 165–84 (2003); Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Why Do People Hate America? (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2002). 11 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973). 12 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 156.

Contested international relations theory  199 13 For in-depth study of the political meaning of the US dollar crisis, refer to Susan Strange, “The Politics of International Currencies,” World Politics, 23 (2): 15–31 (1971); Susan Strange, “Protectionism and World Politics,” International Organization, 39 (2): 233–60 (1985). 14 The New York Times Index 1972 (New York: The New York Times Company, 1973), p. 820. 15 R. Komiya, M. Okuno, and K. Suzumura, ed., Industrial Policy of Japan (London: Academic Press, 1988), p. 318. The loss of the semiconductor industry to Japan is clearly described by C. V. Prestowitz in Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future To Japan and How To Reclaim It (New York: Basic Books, 1988), pp. 121–78. 16 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (London: Time Warner, 2002), p. 232. 17 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 29. 18 G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?”. Perspectives on Politics, 1 (3): 533–50 (2003), p. 534. 19 Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization, 39 (4): 579–614 (1985). 20 Ibid., p. 612. 21 Joseph Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why The World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 22 John S. Odell, Negotiating the World Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). 23 The Economist, 7–13 March 1998, p. 6. 24 According to statistics, Thailand received US$17  billion, Indonesia US$23  billion, the Philippines US$0.6 billion, and South Korea US$50 billion. See Robert J. Samuelson, “A world slump? Not certain but not to be ruled out,” International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1997, p. 8; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Crises shakes faith in the ‘Asian Miracle’,” International Herald Tribune, 22–23 November 1997, p. 1. 25 Martin Feldstein, “Refocusing the IMF,” Foreign Affairs, 77 (2): 20–33 (1998), p. 27. 26 Time, 8 December 1997, p. 18. 27 Joseph Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: Why We’re Paying the Price for the Greediest Decade in History (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 222. 28 Peter Hays Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity Conflicts Debates: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?,” European Journal of International Relations, 11 (2): 235–65 (2005), p. 246. 29 David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 5. 30 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2. 31 Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, “International Organization,” p. 662. 32 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, second edn. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1989), pp. 24–5. 33 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: BasicBooks, 1984). 34 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regionalism and Asia,” New Political Economy, 5 (3): 353–68 (2000), p. 358. 35 Obviously many East Asian regional organizations are learning from the experience of the European Union. Yet, in terms of power sharing and federalism, it is highly unlikely if not impossible for those East Asian countries to move along the road toward federalism. See David Mitrany, “The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (2): 119–49 (1965). 36 John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 27–8.

200  Cheung 37 Jeannie Henderson, “Reassessing ASEAN,” Adelphi Paper 328 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 38 Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia,” Asian Survey, 43 (4): 622–47 (2003), p. 629. 39 Takashi Terada, “Constructing an ‘East Asian’ Concept and Growing Regional Identity: From EAEC to ASEAN+3,” Pacific Review, 16 (2): 251–77 (2003), p. 272. 40 Alice D. Ba, “Who’s Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations,” Pacific Review, 19 (2): 157–79 (2006), p. 168. 41 Shaun Breslin, “Greater China and the Political Economy of Regionalization,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 21 (1): 7–23 (2004), p. 8. 42 Heribert Dieter and Richard Higgott, “Exploring Alternative Theories of Economic Regionalism: From Trade to Finance in Asian Co-operation?,” Review of International Political Economy, 10 (3): 430–54 (2003). 43 Ibid., pp. 443–5. 44 Gordon C. K. Cheung, “Yatai jinrong fengbao de qishi: jiangou zhong gang tai de xiediao yu hezuo jizhi” (The Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis: The Construction of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan’s Mechanism on Coordination and Cooperation), Ya Zhou Pin Lun (Asian Review), 7: 8–24 (1998). 45 Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties, p. 125. 46 Dieter and Higgott, “Exploring Alternative Theories of Economic Regionalism,” p. 431. See also Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Regionalization of the Pacific Political Economy,” World Politics, 45 (4): 507–24 (1993). 47 More often, the interaction among China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is called greater China. Nevertheless, the connotation behind the meaning and understanding of greater China is very different. See David Shambaugh, Greater China: The Next Superpower? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Barry Naughton uses “the China CIRCLE to describe those relations among them in a more narrowed definition. See Barry Naughton, ed., The China Circle: Economies and Electronics in the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). See also JeanJoseph Boillot and Nicolas Michelon, “The New Economic Geography of Greater China,” China Perspectives, 30: 18–30 (2000). 48 Some major Chinese contributions include M. K. Nyaw and S. M. Li, ed., Jingji Zhonghua (Economic China), (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998); Chak Yan Chang and Gordon C. K. Cheung, ed., Taixiang yu liang an guanxi yantaohui lunwenji (The Conference Proceeding of Taiwan Business and Cross Strait Relations) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Centre of Cross Strait Relations, 2000); H. S. Lin and M. K. Nyaw, Dongmeng, riben and zhongguoren (ASEAN, Japan, and Chinese People) (Singapore: World Scientific, 2003). 49 Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, www.mof.gov.tw/ (accessed on 5 August 2006). 50 The figure was up to October 2002 and had not been updated at the time of writing. See Mainland Affairs Council, www.mac.gov.tw/ (accessed on 5 August 2006). 51 Karen M. Sutter, “Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications for Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey, 42 (3): 522–40 (2002). 52 Press Conference (Hong Kong), Boao Forum for Asia General Information, 16 February 2001. See also Yazhao Zhaokan (Hong Kong), 3 May 2001, pp. 28–34. 53 “Chronology of Boao Forum for Asia,” www.china.org.cn/english/ (accessed on 2 May 2004). 54 He was the former Vice Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. The statement was made when he was interviewed by the reporter of Beijing Review during the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2004. See Beijing Review, 47 (16): 20–1 (22 April 2004). 55 Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005), pp. 15.

Contested international relations theory  201 56 My discussion with scholars in the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, during my visit in summer 2005. 57 Interview with a Chinese scholar, 26 July 2006. 58 Wei-Wei Zhang, “The Allure of the Chinese Model,” International Herald Tribune, 14 November 2006, www.iht.com/articles/. 59 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 40. 60 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46 (2): 391–425 (1992). The idea was further expanded into a book: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 61 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” p. 394. 62 Peter Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treaties in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Lane, 1967); George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 143. 63 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” pp. 399 and 416. 64 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, 20 (1): 71–81 (1995), p. 73. See also the rebuttal from Mearsheimer in John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security, 20 (1): 82–93 (1995). 65 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 66 Ibid., p. 163. 67 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, 27 (4): pp (2003), pp. 59 and 66. 68 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 205. 69 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), p. 109. 70 Ibid., p. 135. 71 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 8. 72 Joseph Nye, Jr. The Paradox of American Power, p. 119. 73 Joseph Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 5–6. 74 Joseph Nye, Jr., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry,’ Foreign Affairs, 83 (3): 16–20 (2004), p. 19. 75 Jean A. Garrison, “China’s Prudent Cultivation of ‘Soft’ Power and Implications for U.S. Policy in East Asia,” Asian Affairs, 32 (1): 25–30 (2005), p. 25. 76 Li Ying-chun, “Zhongguo jueqi zhi ruanquanli suzao zhanlue” (On Strategy of Soft Power for China’s Rise), Jiangnan shehuixueyuan xuebao (Journal of Jiangnan Social University), 8 (1): 7–12 (2006). See also Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004). 77 Huang Chao, “Shilun fazhan zhongguo gonggong waijiao” (Developing China’s Public Diplomacy), Chengdu fangzhi gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao xuobao (Journal of Chengdu Textile College), 22 (4): 30–2 (2005). 78 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization, 44 (3): 283–315 (1990): 284. 79 Dongya sanguo di jinxianaishi gongtong bianxie weiyuanhui, Dongya sanguo di jinxiandai shi (The Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Countries) (Beijing: Shehui kexe wenxian chubanshe, 2005). 80 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Asia’s Textbook Case,” Foreign Policy, 152: 80–3 (2006), p. 80. 81 Dongya sanguo di jinxiandai shi, p. 53. 82 Ibid., chapter 1.

202  Cheung 83 Ibid., pp. 206–25. 84 Amanda Paulson, “Learning Chinese: Next Big Thing?,” CBS News, www.cbsnews. com/ (accessed on 15 August 2006). 85 Sheng Ding and Robert A. Saunders, “Talking Up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 23 (2): 3–33 (2006). 86 Danny Unger, Building Social Capital in Thailand: Fibers, Finance, and Infrastructure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 23. 87 Robert D. Putnam, Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 8. 88 Interview with scholars in the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, summer 2005. 89 Some new Chinese textbooks also outline the grand strategy of China in Asia. For instance, Zhongying Pang has been trying to “normalize” the East Asia region through Chinese effort. Zhongying Pang, Zhongguo yu yazhou: Guancha, yanjiu, pinglun (China and Asia: Progresses, Problems, and Prospects) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyan chubanshe, 2004), pp. 189–190. 90 David Kang, “Why China’s Rise Will be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asian Region,” Perspectives on Politics, 3 (3): 551–4 (2005). 91 Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern, “The Myth of the Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, 73 (6): 79–93 (1994); Michell Bernard and John Ravenhill, “Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia,” World Politics, 47 (2): 171–209 (1995).

10 Learning from the EU? China’s changing outlook toward multilateralism Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Introduction There is some irony in China’s studying the European Union (EU). At first glance, many differences separate the domestic and international environments in which China and the EU respectively evolve. China is a one-party dominated polity developing at high speed in a region where the remnants of the Cold War confrontation are still perceptible, in particular in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, and where the principles of sovereignty and unilateralism still occupy the pinnacle of international relation rules. The EU, on its part, is a post-World War II adventure based on shared political values and democracy, as well as the principles of non-use of force, multilateralism, and limited sovereignty. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, while the world has been dominated by one superpower, the United States, China has demonstrated a true interest in both establishing a privileged partnership with the EU and learning from this unprecedented and complex international construction. To what extent has China’s diplomacy been influenced by this fresh interest? For one thing, China–EU relations have developed quite rapidly in the last 15 years or so. Simultaneously, the EU has become a “hot topic” among Chinese international relations (IR) specialists, underlining their willingness to draw from the EU experience some tools that can usefully be applied to East Asia, and more generally the world. But there are some ambiguities in China’s vision of Europe. These ambiguities stem from this country’s own international priorities. Moreover, for the reasons indicated above, the EU model’s influence on Chinese foreign policy is far from being comprehensive. And, finally, China’s ambition to become a world power able to balance the US can but clash with a diplomacy based on multilateralism and regional integration.

The EU: a priority target China’s interest in the European construction is not new. It goes back to the SinoSoviet rift in the late 1950s and Mao Zedong’s theory of “intermediate zone”

204  Cabestan developed in the early 1960s at a time when de Gaulle’s France decided to normalize relations with the Beijing regime (1964). Then Mao perceived that the Common Market was not only an American tool to counter and resist the socialist camp but could also contribute to the gradual weakening of the two superpowers. After China’s entry to the United Nations in 1971 and Nixon’s visit to Beijing a year later, Mao developed further this approach and elaborated his well-known “three world theory” according to which China should unite with the third and the second worlds (Western Europe, Australia, and Japan) in order to contain both the US and the Soviet Union, and “in particular” the latter. Presented by Deng Xiaoping at the UN in 1974, this theory led Beijing to support even more clearly the European integration process: a year later, China and the European Economic Community (EEC) established diplomatic relations. After the beginning of the reforms in 1979, although the US became China’s most important political partner, the EEC and its member states continued to be courted because of, among other things, their role as an important source of investments and modern technologies.1 However, the end of the Cold War, the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the USA as the sole superpower convinced China that the EEC (which became the European Union in 1992) was becoming more important for her and could serve her interests to a larger extent. In order to balance America’s “hyperpower,” as the former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, put it, the Chinese government elevated “multipolarity” or, to be more accurate, “multipolarization” (duojihua) to both a sacrosanct principle and a key objective of its foreign policy. And in this strategy the EU was invited to become and act as a pole politically and economically more and more independent from the US. To be sure, the EU was itself not indifferent to this new discourse. The end of the Cold War, the restructuring and enlargement of NATO, the withdrawal of a large number of US soldiers from Europe, the growing influence of the EU in security affairs (as in Bosnia and Kosovo) and the perspective of the EU’s own enlargement in 2004 from 15 to 25 members – all these factors turned the Union into a more assertive and ambitious decision-maker in a wider number of areas. It is also true, as Richard Louis Edmonds indicated, that at the very beginning of the post-Cold War era the EU was busy with all the issues that we have just listed, “leaving China out of its core agenda.”2 But, after Deng Xiaoping’s relaunch of the reforms in 1992, the EU started to show a stronger interest in China, not only as a market but also as a political partner. This evolution was part of a broader “rediscovery” of Asia, stimulated by growing economic and political links with this continent, and the creation in 1996 of the ASEM (Asia–Europe Meeting). Anyhow, between 1995 and 2003, stimulated by the perspective of Beijing’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, Brussels issued at least five important policy documents on China, promoting this country as a “comprehensive partner” in 1998 and then a “strategic partner” in 2003.3

Learning from the EU?  205 Since the early 1990s, the EU has strengthened its political dialogue with China (annual summit of heads of state or government) and negotiated one-to-one with the Beijing government on a growing number of economic issues (e.g., WTO, textiles, and shoes). Both the changes occurring in the EU and its new priorities convinced China that it could actively contribute to the emergence of a more multipolar world. The diplomatic translation of this conclusion appeared in October 2003 when Beijing made public an unprecedented document on China’s EU policy.4 Indeed, this was the first time that the Chinese authorities published a text that defined the country’s policy toward a specific region of the world and listed the objectives that both sides should meet in order to strengthen the relations. At the same time, this document underscored very clearly China’s international priorities. It glorified the EU’s power and influence in the world; it stressed the converging views between China and the EU, the lack of conflicts of interest, and their shared willingness to fight for a “more democratic and multipolar world.” Of course, it made a number of well-known requests to the EU: in particular lift the arms embargo, give China a market economy status, and refrain from meeting Taiwanese or exiled Tibetan leaders. However, this document was on the whole very positive on the EU: differences did exist, for instance on democracy or human rights, but they had not been an obstacle to the development of a close political and economic partnership between China and Europe. In other words, this document as well as other Chinese official statements on the EU seems to constitute a clear approval of the “EU way” in international affairs, not only multipolarity vs. unipolarity but also multilateralism vs. unilateralism, negotiation vs. sanctions or use of force, and soft power vs. hard power. “We must learn from the EU!” (Women yao xiang Oumeng xuexi!) These new foreign policy discourse and priorities have both been influenced by and fed a vivid debate among Chinese IR specialists.5 For a decade or so, every time we, Europeans, travel to China, we have often been told: “We must learn from the EU!” (Women yao xiang Oumeng xuexi!) This sympathetic slogan and interest in the so-called “European model” (Ouzhou moshi) actually include two different objectives, a domestic one and an international one. The domestic objective is aimed at studying some features of the EU’s “social development model” – such as the state–society and state–market patterns as well as the various social security systems – its regional development policy and, to some degree, its social democratic ideology. China is not going to copy these systems. For instance, most European social security systems are too expensive for a developing country, and now for many developed countries as well. But the Chinese government would like to borrow recipes from these systems to better manage the country’s growing economic and social inequalities. And in order to adjust to the new economic and social environment and enhance political stability, the Chinese Communist Party and its Central Party School have shown a genuine

206  Cabestan interest in European social democracy, sending numerous delegations to Germany, England, France, and Scandinavia in the last 10 years. The fact that some Chinese left-wing intellectuals have criticized the “three represents” for turning the Communist Party into a social democratic party confirms this interest a contrario. China’s international objective in studying from the EU has been twofold: on the one hand, she is watching carefully the European economic integration process in order to pick up what could be applied to East Asia; on the other hand, and probably more importantly, she is quite interested in learning from the EU how to deal with the USA, neighboring countries, and international institutions.6 Actually, many Chinese scholars have focused on only this latter feature. In their eyes, the “European model” can be defined as dealing with international relations via “institutionalization” and “the construction of multilateral institutions”; “institution” is a crucial pillar of the EU’s “civilian power” (shimin liliang) and the main source of its influence.7 It is true that some Chinese scholars have clearly exposed that the “European idea” includes two key principles: “multilateralism” and “comprehensive governance”.8 For them, these principles have both domestic (e.g., democracy and social safety nets) and international (e.g., global security through negotiation, give and take, economic benefits, security guarantees, and long-term commitments) dimensions. And although the Chinese Communist Party’s decision in September 2004 to turn the principle of “good governance” into an official policy was inspired by many institutions’ recommendations (UN, World Bank, etc), the influence of the “EU model” could not be excluded.9 Nevertheless, the “European model” and the “European ideas” have first of all been promoted by Chinese scholars in opposition to the “American model,” perceived as based on a preference for the use of military power and unilateralism.10 In other words, through integration, the EU has become a “normative power” with ambitions to establish worldwide standards based on the norms it has introduced and applied to itself.11 Chinese scholars have shown a particular interest in three major EU approaches and methods: common security (as opposed to absolute security), multilateralism (as opposed to unilateralism), and global treatment of international problems and crises (as opposed to short-term and ex post solutions). Based on Europe’s sense of vulnerability, the promotion of common security emphasizes regional security, pays much attention to economic and political means (e.g., the eastern enlargement of the EU) and deals with international crisis through internal and external cooperation as well as economic and cultural exchanges.12 For the EU multilateralism means solving international problems through international organizations (such as the United Nations) and international treaties, respecting international laws and multilateral agreements, and promoting international and regional cooperation. Global treatment is aimed at preventing and coping with security threats and crises with comprehensive measures, including political, economic, and cultural means (foreign aid, promotion of human rights and justice, protection of minorities).13 To put it another way, all these methods tend to make good use of the EU’s soft power, as opposed to the US’s hard power, a military power that the EU still lacks to a great extent.

Learning from the EU?  207

The influence of the EU model on China’s foreign policy How much influence has the “EU model” had on China’s foreign policy? This is a trickier exercise to conduct since the Chinese governments and scholars see much more convergence between the EU’s and their country’s diplomacy than an influence of the former on the latter. The following extract explains indirectly the factors of this convergence: After the 11 September event, the EU has reflected on its foreign policy, distanced itself from American unilateralism, and set a peaceful and just image in the international arena, which increases its popularity among developing countries.14 Some scholars have indicated more candidly that the “wisdom of the European idea” and the successful experience of the “European model” can not only promote Sino-EU relations but also be used as a “reference” in China.15 However, these rather uncritical, not to say rosy, views of the EU do not amount to policies. Yet, since early 2000, there are multiple indications that the Chinese government has decided to instill more multilateralism in its diplomacy and play a more active – and positive – role in international organizations, seeing in the EU, if not a model of regionalism (quyuhua) for Asia, at least a useful reference. Many factors, discussed in other contributions to this volume, explain this change. Suffice it to mention here the lessons drawn by Beijing from its isolation in the Kosovo crisis (after it vetoed a draft resolution concerning the extension of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), its economy’s growing dependence upon the outside, its need to get ready to join the WTO, and finally George W. Bush’s election: whereas the US had elected a president tempted by unilateralism, critical of the UN, and supported by neoconservative politicians and thinkers denouncing the weaknesses of the Europeans, was China’s best strategy not to embrace the EU’s multilateralism and promote the role of international law and organizations? To be sure, after Tiananmen (1989), in order to break the diplomatic isolation imposed by the West (Japan included) and adjust to the new post-Cold War environment, China started to demonstrate a cautious willingness toward cooperation and integration in world affairs. For instance, it actively contributed to the settlement of the Cambodia issue in 1991 (through the Paris agreement), it remained neutral during the first Gulf War over Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait (1991), and it signed up to a number of multilateral agreements on disarmament or arms controls (among them the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992). It reluctantly agreed in 1994 to participate in the regional forum (ARF) of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), thus helping to initiate the first framework dialogue on security in Asia. And in 1996 it joined the ASEM. However, in this decade China was more interested in promoting multipolarity and establishing “partnerships” (e.g. with Russia and France in 1997) with other poles to weaken the US influence rather than in playing a positive role in international forums. A genuine evolution therefore has taken place since early 2000.

208  Cabestan First of all, China has adopted a more moderate foreign policy discourse, pursued more constructive actions, and toned down its militant rhetoric about American “hegemonism.” Instead of appearing as a force of opposition that cultivates the very existence of its enemies, the Chinese government has tried hard to be perceived as a force of proposition that is playing its part in resolving international disputes or alleviating tension, precisely as if it did not have any more enemies. It has developed an impressive diplomatic activism and demonstrated a fresh interest in multilateral mechanisms and collective security, tirelessly promoting win–win solutions (shuangying or duoying) to international problems.16 And on the Taiwan issue, while unwilling to make any concessions, it has apparently stopped trying to accelerate the unification process, de facto accepting the status quo, and instead concentrated on preventing the island from formally declaring independence, a move that the United States also opposes. For these reasons, China has soft-pedaled her promotion of multipolarity, a concept supported in Europe only by a minority of nations (such as Chirac’s France) and not by the EU as such, substituting for it the notion of multilateralism. This does not mean that China has stopped considering that “multipolarization” (duojihua) was a major trend of international relations. However, she has astutely decided to privilege a much more ecumenical concept that had been for many years the cornerstone of EU diplomacy, both inside and outside the Union. In her own regional environment, China has more actively promoted good neighborhood diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao) and regional integration. This strategy has been particularly successful with Southeast Asia and Central Asia. But it has also born some fruits with India and in the Korean peninsula. Only with Japan relations have remained difficult. But, simultaneously, trade has continued to grow rapidly and political contacts, except at the Prime Minister level, have remained very regular. Moreover, because of their growing interdependence, both Beijing and Tokyo have kept demonstrating a strong interest in East Asia’s economic integration. For instance, in August 2006, they have developed an “unusual consensus” in support of an Asian Currency Unit, in order to reduce their reliance on the weakening US dollar.17 And two months later, in October 2006, Beijing grasped the occasion of Koizumi’s retirement and the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, to hastily organize in Beijing a summit meeting between Abe and Hu Jintao, contributing in so doing to mending this sensitive but crucial bilateral relationship.18 But one of the most striking developments since the early 2000s has been China’s intensified cooperation with ASEAN countries, both multilaterally and bilaterally. In late 2003, Beijing and ASEAN established at the Bali (Indonesia) summit meeting a strategic partnership and a year later, in Vientiane (Laos), signed an action plan to implement this partnership, including increased political and security dialogue, regular consultations, trust and confidence building measures in the defense and military fields, and step-by-step measures to implement the 2002 Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea or to improve cooperation on the management of the Mekong River.19 Relations with Central Asia also developed rapidly and in a more multilateral

Learning from the EU?  209 setting. In 2001, the Shanghai group established in 1996 by Russia, China, and three ex-Soviet Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) was expanded to include Uzbekistan and became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Initially aimed at boosting security, the SCO decided in 2003 to focus more on developing economic cooperation and, under Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s suggestion, building a free trade zone.20 Another example of China’s promotion of multilateralism has been its role in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. China’s initiative of launching these talks in 2003 illustrates its willingness and capability to create frameworks aimed at addressing crucial security issues on her periphery. This strategy has born some fruits, contributing to woo large segments of the South Korea political elite as well as public opinion away from its American ally and granting China a key role in any future resolution of the nuclear standoff between the US and North Korea. And in spite of the humiliation caused by Pyongyang’s nuclear test in September 2006, the six-party talks have remained the format that will sooner or later allow all the countries involved, and in particular North Korea and the United States, to negotiate and hopefully broker a deal.21 A fourth instance has been China’s growing participation in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations (PKO), for example in East Timor, Congo, and Haiti. In this last case, Beijing has demonstrated a fresh flexibility, as Port-au-Prince has maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei. Both consolidating each other, multilateralism and periphery diplomacy have been closely linked together in Beijing’s mind, whether in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia (its partnership with ASEAN and multiparty talks on the South China Sea), Western Asia (SCO), or even South Asia, through a more balanced policy towards India and Pakistan illustrated in November 2006 by Hu Jintao’s highprofile official visit to both countries. And even in Africa and Latin America, China seems to be learning from the EU’s policy towards developing countries. Beijing does not only acclaim the EU’s positive diplomacy and economic assistance to many poor countries (through special and favorable trade mechanisms as the 1975-originated Lome agreements) but also claims to be even more generous with its African or Latin American partners in terms of cheap loans and development aid. The unprecedented China– Africa summit, which took place in Beijing in early November 2006, illustrated Beijing’s public commitment to Africa’s future.22 Finally, China’s vivid interest in soft-power theory has also been inspired by what she perceives as one of the major successes of EU diplomacy.23 There have been numerous articles on Joseph Nye’s concept in Chinese IR journals. These articles have had a visible influence on Beijing’s foreign policy discourse and action. For example, seduced by Europe’s cultural diversity, Beijing has clearly taken as a model the Alliance Française, Goethe Institute, and British Council networks to development its own network of Confucius Institutes around the world. Officially designed to teach the Chinese language and promote Chinese culture, these institutes are also aimed at balancing the dominant American (popular) cultural influence and improving China’s image around the world.

210  Cabestan Today, conscious of her growing economic and diplomatic clout, China seems in many ways to resort to the same discourse and methods as the EU to enhance its international influence and protect its national interests. And this new strategy has on the whole been quite successful, and not only in Asia (South Korea, ASEAN, and India) but also in Africa and Latin America. However, there are obvious ambiguities to China’s interest in the “EU model” and important limits to this model’s influence on her foreign policy.

The ambiguities of China’s vision of Europe China’s major ambiguity is that she tends to consider the EU as a real power, a political and military pole as powerful, unified, and coordinated as the other nation-state-based poles of the world (China, Japan, Russia, or India). Beijing’s “China’s EU Policy Paper” (op. cit.) clearly states: The EU is a major force in the world . . . The EU is now a strong and the most integrated community in the world . . . the EU integration process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs. This view is interesting since, rather than multilateralism, it emphasizes multipolarity; it takes for granted that the EU is a unitary and independent actor whose logical objective is, like China’s, to enhance its own international power and influence to the detriment of other poles. One can also suspect that this approach to the EU has been largely based on the French view of the EU – and in France, Chirac’s neo-Gaullist approach to the US and world affairs – and Paris’ supposedly decisive say in the Union. Indeed, as a founding member of the Common Market in 1957, France has always exerted a strong influence on the European construction process. Nevertheless, the EU’s foreign policy has also constantly been based on the smallest common denominator shared by all EU member states, and in particular by the “Big Three” (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom). Conversely, if these three countries disagree, no common decision can be made; the failure of the lifting of the arms embargo against China in 2005 is a good illustration of this.24 And more importantly, as indicated above, the EU has never supported multipolarity. Its close relationship with the US explains this reluctance. Although it has developed independent policies in a number of areas (e.g., WTO, culture, and relations with the Third World), it cannot ignore its close strategic links with the US since most of its members, including France, are also part of NATO. But China’s special relationship with France, the strong convergence of both countries’ international discourse and policies, and their close cooperation in the UN Security Council have apparently contributed to bias Beijing’s view of the EU and Brussels’ diplomacy. This official view has never been shared by every Chinese IR specialist. There has always been some “EU skeptics” among them. For example, some hold the view that the EU “is essentially an economic union” and cannot be considered

Learning from the EU?  211 as a pole since it has not yet developed a credible integrated military force and it is constituted of nation-states that have jealously kept much say on foreign and security policies.25 The same and others point out that the EU–US differences are limited and the two parties “bond to each other while reserving divergences.”26 Although they acknowledge the EU’s willingness to establish an independent defense system, they remain very realistic and cautious about the benefits for China: The EU will not change its alliance with the US and the NATO framework will continue to dominate their relationship. It is basically because both are market economy democracies with homogeneous values. This makes the EU a more independent competitor but not a challenging adversary of the United States.27 Some are less pessimistic about the long-term future. But they also admit that there is still a long way to go before the EU can become “a crucial pole in the future multipolar world.”28 The question therefore is why the Chinese government has decided to rely on only the “optimist” view of the EU. For one thing, this view has more often been developed by the most official research institutes, which are close to the authorities. These institute’s researchers have probably refrained from being critical since they were asked to produce analyses supporting the current policies. But beyond these bureaucratic interests or constraints, one can suspect that the Chinese government voluntarily opted for this view in order to contribute to speeding up the changes in the international system it wished to favor. In other words, this proactive and “voluntarist” approach has been aimed at influencing Europe and strengthening as much as possible the view in Europe that EU and US interests were divergent. But in developing such a strategy, Beijing was not learning from the EU; on the contrary, it underlined that it actually still focused on weakening and isolating the US as much as possible, which is far from being an EU objective. The failure of the EU constitutional referendum and of the lifting of the arms embargo towards China in 2005 may have somewhat altered Beijing’s optimism. However, on the whole, the official analysis and the policy choices have remained identical. Behind Beijing’s support of the EU’s multilateralism, its main objective has remained a very geopolitical and classical one: the emergence of a more multipolar world in which China can acquire a bigger say, to the detriment of other poles and “in particular” the US. In other words, China’s traditional Sun Zi-inspired strategic thinking and balance of power approach to IR still exert a pervasive influence on Beijing’s foreign policy. The limits of the EU model’s influence on China’s foreign policy They are three major and obvious differences between the EU and China that can but prevent the latter from introducing to a larger extent the “EU model”: the structural features of East Asia, China’s Great Power ambitions, and the nature of

212  Cabestan Beijing’s political system. These differences constitute as many obstacles to the extension of the “EU model” to this part of the world. Today, unlike the EU, China is part of a politically heterogeneous environment. East Asia still includes a number of authoritarian countries, most of which (except Burma), are led by a communist party (China, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam). Although this reality has not prevented the ASEAN from developing, it has slowed down its political integration. The same can be said of the ARF or the more recent East Asian Forum whose raison d’être still needs to be demonstrated. In such an environment, the European principle of humanitarian interference, for instance, can be applied only with difficulty. Another basic difference between the EU and East Asia stems from this political rivalry between authoritarianism and democracy: China and Korea are still divided for this reason and Cold War-inherited tensions have not completely disappeared, forcing the US to continue to play a key role in this region’s security and perpetuating the confrontation of major powers in the Taiwan Strait and in the Korean peninsula. The very unequal distribution of economic and military power among East Asia countries tends also to impose severe limits on any regional integration process. It is true that EU nations are also unequal in size and power. However, whereas East Asia is much more dramatically dominated by two military (the US and China) and two economic powers (China and Japan), the EU is characterized and led by a group of larger member states (the Big Three plus Italy, Spain, and Poland). Finally, in contrast to the EU, China has Great Power ambitions: not only catching up with the US, in terms of GDP and production, but overtaking the US and becoming the first world power. Although China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) has not been included in the governmental discourse, that still sticks to “peaceful development” (heping fazhan), it is propagated by officials, as Zheng Bijian, who are very close to the CCP leadership.29 All these factors contribute to explaining why China can introduce only a few features of the so-called “EU models.” First of all, Beijing’s security policy continues to identify the United States as China’s main external threat while Japan is also more and more perceived as a threat. The Chinese government has adopted an indirect strategy towards the US aimed at avoiding confrontation as much as possible. Diplomatically, it has refrained from criticizing the Bush administration or moderated its criticism of the US government on a large number of issues (Iraq, Afghanistan, US–Japan alliance, Taiwan, etc.). But China’s defense buildup is nearly completely driven by Taiwan as a military objective and the possibility of an American (and Japanese) intervention in the Taiwan Strait, as if Beijing still wanted to weaken and disarm Taiwan and speed up unification on its terms instead of acknowledging the reality on the ground: the survival of the Republic of China on a part of the national territory. Based on military threat rather than negotiations on an equal footing, China’s unification policy has remained moreover closed to any multilateral talks and international settlement30 – a far cry from the EU approach to crises, for instance the Kosovo or Montenegro issues. China’s good neighborhood diplomacy has been more successful with small

Learning from the EU?  213 and weak neighbors than big and strong neighbors. The European construction has been based on the reconciliation between France and Germany. But no similar reconciliation has taken place between China and Japan. And now that both countries are becoming stronger, such a reconciliation seems to be even harder. Beyond the controversy about World War II and history, it seems that China is encountering difficulties in accepting Japan’s regional power and influence in Asia. An illustration of this distrust has been Beijing’s opposition to Japan’s inclusion as permanent member in the UN Security Council, a reform of the UNSC supported by the EU. To a lesser degree, a similar Chinese reluctance to recognize India’s regional power can be observed. Although New Delhi’s de facto accession to a nuclear power status has forced Beijing to take India more seriously, it is still reluctant to include her among the big players of the Asia-Pacific region and more inclined to compete with this country for influence in the Indian Ocean, showing for instance a growing interest in Pakistan (Gwandar) and Burma’s naval bases.31 The Sino-Russian relationship is not immune to big power competition either. Russia’s wariness about the modernization of the PLA has prevented it from supplying China with the latest generation of aircraft or weapon systems; and oilthirsty Beijing’s growing economic as well as political influence in Central Asia is also a cause for concern in Moscow. In spite of the post-September 11 deployment by the US in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russia is keen to maintain, if not her suzerainty, at least a major say in a region that she still considers her “near abroad.” Beyond their common front against the three “isms” (terrorism, Islamism, and extremism) and the US presence in the region (applauding Tashkent’s decision to close US bases there in 2005) as well as their joint military exercises, China and Russia are tempted to continue playing in Central Asia the Great Game initiated at the time of the British Indian Empire. And both countries’ willingness to keep or acquire a privileged access to Central Asia’s energy resources has intensified their rivalry. On the North Korean nuclear issue, many suspect that Beijing’s policy towards Pyongyang is mainly determined by its need to keep a weak and socialist “buffer state” between its territory and an ambitious and democratic South Korea.32 In other words, China seems to support multipolarity further away from its own environment, where it cannot affect negatively the consolidation of its own pole.33 Clearly perceptible on the Taiwan issue, or with the US and Japan and to a lesser extent with India and Russia, this zero-sum approach to international relations is also pervasive in China’s energy diplomacy in Africa and Latin America. Instead of relying on – and trusting – the market forces, Beijing is trying hard – through investments, the establishment of special bilateral agreements, and harshly negotiated aid or arms packages – to acquire privileged positions in a number of oil- and gas-producing countries (Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela). This costly policy is driven by a security-based – paranoid, some would argue – approach to energy issues and constitutes an important limit to China’s promotion of multilateralism. This is to say that Beijing’s diplomacy in the Third World has often remained

214  Cabestan driven by short-term economic interests: not only a protected access to energy but also to raw materials that China badly needs (such as copper) and more and more to agricultural products. This priority has contributed to provoking disagreements with the EU and other segments of the international community on a number of regional crises (such as the Darfur genocide and crisis in Sudan, a crisis that is now affecting neighboring Chad and Central African Republic, or Zimbabwe). China’s growing arms sales to Africa have been seen by the EU as a destabilizing factor when these sales end up in failed states or countries devastated by civil war, such as Sudan or Côte d’Ivoire. The very diplomatic joint statement issued at the end of the September 2006 EU–China summit in Helsinki, in the following paragraph, underlined the disagreement between Brussels and Beijing on Africa: Leaders also stressed the importance of their relations with Africa, and stated their commitment to work together in favour of Africa’s peace, stability and sustainable development. The EU reaffirmed its attachment to the principles of good governance and human rights, as embodied in its Africa Strategy. The Chinese side emphasized the upholding of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, in particular the principle of non-interference into others’ internal affairs.34 Finally, China’s own polity has prevented her from joining some important international instruments of human right protections (such as the UN Covenant on civil and political rights, which she has not yet ratified) and, more importantly, from accepting the scrutiny of multilateral organizations on these matters. The very negative conclusions of the UN special rapporteur, Manfred Nowak, on torture after his visit to China in 2005 are just one illustration of China’s lack of cooperation.35 Tibet, free trade unions, opposition party activities, and independence of justice constitute as many issues in which Beijing government does not want the international community to interfere. On these issues (energy, arms sales, development aid, and human rights), China has not yet adopted a multilateral approach or even a policy of consultation with other interested parties, including the EU. She has on the contrary emphasized bilateral negotiations and taking advantage of her growing international clout to impose her conditions. This facet of China’s neo-mercantilist policy often amounts to unilateralism.36

Conclusion China’s interest in the “EU model” has been genuine; but it has only a very partial – and selective – impact on her foreign policy. The Chinese case underlines both the difficulties for Beijing in gradually embracing multilateralism and the very limits of the EU model. The EU model after all is more the exception than the rule. Agreeing to delegate part of one’s sovereignty to a supranational entity is unprecedented in human his-

Learning from the EU?  215 tory. Most countries outside Europe have remained quite reluctant to follow this path. And nations that have Great Power ambitions – be it China, the US, Russia, or India – face a constant tension between this ambition and the need and interest of multilateral agreements. Yet the impact of globalization and economic interdependence has gradually influenced China’s foreign policy and convinced her to develop a more positive attitude towards multilateralism. The evolution of Chinese society and polity has also played its role in gradually opening up China to international mechanisms already accepted for some time in other parts of the world, and not only in the EU. To be sure, multilateralism is not the answer to every foreign policy and international issue. Every nation-state will keep the right to carry out unilateral solutions when it feels that it does not have any better option. This also applies to European countries when they want to defend their vital interests or just “beg to differ.” Multilateralism is complicated and slow, and in spite of the improvements introduced in the existing multilateral institutions (EU, UN, and WTO) cannot completely replace bilateral agreements either. And probably the EU should conversely study more the international strategy of major powers and instill more hard power and even, when need be, more unilateralism in its diplomacy. Having said that, unilateralist decisions in today’s more interdependent world are often a sign of division and weakness. They demonstrate the inability of the government that made them to build up an international consensus and a penchant for privileging the easier option and the most short-term solution, postponing or even questioning long-term and more difficult answers to issues that should be addressed collectively. They apparently better protect national interests but actually they create new difficulties that will be harder, even collectively, to overcome. Unilateralism is far from being a Chinese monopoly (cf. the US and Iraq). But, if China wishes to share more values and policies with the EU, she should more decisively embrace multilateralism and restrain her Great Power ambitions.

Notes 1 Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 153–7; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Sino-European Relations,” in Gerald Segal, ed., Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), pp. 214–29. 2 Richard Louis Edmonds, “China and Europe since 1978: An Introduction,” in Richard Louis Edmonds, ed., China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1–2. 3 “A Maturing Partnership – Shared Interests and Challenges in EU–China relations,” available at http://europa.eu.int/ (updating the European Commission’s communications on EU–China relations of 1998 and 2001). 4 “China’s EU Policy Paper,” available at http://dk.chineseembassy.org/eng/. 5 Many Chinese scholars also consider the EU as a pole that can contribute to the multipolarization of the world; see for example Su Huimin, “Xi’Ou zai duojihua shijie zhong xunzhao ziwo” (Western Europe Searches for Itself in a Multipolarizing World), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development), 2: 45–8 (1999), p. 45; Wang Yi, “Ouzhou de yitihua yu duojihua” (European Integration and Multipolarization), Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Studies), 6: 39–43 (2002), p. 43.

216  Cabestan 6 Song Xinning, “China’s Rise and the European Experience,” Xuexi yu yanjiu (Teaching and Research), 4: 6–7 (2004). 7 Zhang Jun, “Cong Ya-Ou huiyi jincheng kan fazhan guoji guanxi de ‘Ouzhou Moshi’ ” (A European Model of International Relations from the View of the Asia–Europe Meeting), Ouzhou yanjiu (European Studies), 1: 3–16 (2006), p. 4. 8 Liu Xige, “Qianxi Zhongguo tong Oumeng de waijiao yu anquan hezuo” (An Analysis of Sino-EU Foreign and Security Cooperation), Guoji wenti yanjiu, 6: 26–30 (2003) p. 27. 9 See Zeng Qinghong, “A Programmatic Document for Strengthening the Party’s Ability to Govern: Study and Implement the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party Committee, Strengthen the Party’s Ability to Govern,” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 8 October 2004, p. 2. 10 Zhang Jun, “A European Model,” p. 3. 11 Wang Yi, “European Integration and Multipolarization,” pp. 40–1; for a recent analysis of the EU as a normative power, see Zaki Laïdi, La norme sans la force. L’énigme de la puissance européenne (Norm without Strength. European Power’s Enigma) (Paris, Presses de Science-Po, 2005). 12 Qiu Yuanlun, “Cong wuda guanjianci rushou liaojie Ouzhou waijiao” (Understanding European Diplomacy from Five Key Words), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 3: 22–4 (2002), p. 23. 13 Liu Xige, “An Analysis of Sino-EU Foreign and Security Cooperation,” p. 27. 14 He Lan, “9.11 shijian hou de Zhong-Ou guanxi jiqi fazha qianjing” (Sino-European Relations and their Prospects after 11 September), Guoji guancha (International Observation), 1: 47–52 (2005), p. 48; in the same vein, see Mei Zhaorong, “SinoEuropean Relations in Retrospect and Prospect,” Foreign Affairs, 79: 21–4 (2006), p. 23. 15 Liu Xige, “An Analysis of Sino-EU Foreign and Security Cooperation,” p. 27. 16 On this development, see Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power (London: Routledge, 2005). 17 Financial Times, 29 August 2006. 18 You Ji, “Abe and China: a new opportunity,” PacNet Newsletter, 53A, 27 October 2006. 19 Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku, eds., China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 20 Leland Rhett Miller, New Rules to the Old Great Game: An Assessment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Proposed Free Trade Zone, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 3 (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2003). 21 See Jing-dong Yuan, “China’s New North Korea Diplomacy,” Asia Times Online, 14 November 2006. 22 On the occasion of this summit, 12 Chinese firms signed deals worth US$1.9 billion with African governments and companies, and President Hu Jintao pledged to offer US$5 billion in loans and credit and to double aid to Africa by 2009; Reuters, 5 November 2006. 23 Feng Zhongping, “Issues Related to the EU’s Foreign Policy,” Xiandai guoji guanxi, 16 (4): 17–27 (2006), p. 26. 24 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Role of France in Sino-European Relations: Central or Marginal?,” EAI Background Brief no. 259 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2005). 25 Chen Zhiqiang, “Xin guoji zhixu goujianzhong de Oumeng” (The European Union in the Construction of a New International Order), Nankai Xuebao (Journal of Nankai University), 2: 55–6 (2000). 26 Zhang Maoming, “Shixi Oumeng zai shijie geju zhong de weizhi” (An Analysis of

Learning from the EU?  217

27 28

29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36

the EU’s Position on the World Stage), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), 4: 60–5 (2002), p. 65. Ibid. Zhang Zuqian, “Ouzhou sanjiao geju de xingcheng, xianzhuang he fazhan qushi” (The European tripolar system: formation, current situation and developing trend), Shiji jingji yu zhengzhi, 2: 35–40 (2000); Guo Zhenyuan, “Weilai shinian shijie geju yu guoji xingshi de fazhan bianhua” (The development and change on the world stage in the next decade), Guoji zhanwang (International Prospect), 1: 2–6 (2000). Zheng Bijian, Peaceful Rise – China’s New Road to Development – Lun heping jueqi fazhan xidaolu (Beijing: Central Party School Publishing House (bilingual edition), 2005). Edward Friedman, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2006); Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Benoît Vermander, La Chine en quête de ses frontières. La confrontation Chine–Taiwan (China in Quest of its Frontiers: The Confrontation between China and Taiwan) (Paris: Presses de sciences po, 2005). Jing-dong Yuan, “The geometry of Sino-Indian ties,” Asia Times Online, 22 November 2006. See on this point Shen Dingli, “Implications of the DPRK Nuclear Test,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 23 October 2006. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Chinese Factor: China Between Multipolarity and Bipolarity,” in Gilles Boquérat and Fredéric Grare, ed., India, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2004), pp. 119–59. www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/ www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/ See for example Heinrich Kreft, “China’s Quest for Energy: Resource Diplomacy in a Global Market,” Policy Review, 139 (2006), http://www.policyreview.org/139/kreft. html.

11 Northeast Asia regionalism and China From an outside-in perspective Jaewoo Choo

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether recent Chinese diplomatic conduct has contributed to the development of regionalism in the regional context of Northeast Asia. To make such an assessment in light of Chinese diplomatic endeavors, it is critical and imperative to accept the following hypothetical propositions. First, the regionalism examined here is a general concept of regionalism. It does not, and should not, entail any specific definition or form of regionalism that has been widely discussed by many in recent times (e.g. “open regionalism,” “bloc regionalism,” “developmental regionalism,” or “participatory regionalism”) because there has not been any of such taken place in the region. Thus, the chapter rather applies a general concept of regionalism, and that is why its title is entitled “Northeast Asia regionalism,” instead of “Northeast Asian regionalism.” Second, a major reason for the absence of regionalism in the region is because of lack of trust and confidence among the regional states. The assumption here is that, for regionalism to find any place in a region, there has to be trust and confidence among regional states. Without them, some of the critical foundation for regionalism such as collective ideas, identity, and goals cannot be founded. Since there has seldom been an opportunity for the Northeast Asian states to build trust and confidence, the region is in dire need to build and seize such chance. Thus, the chapter empirically observes China’s recent diplomatic behavior in such a context: how and in what ways China has positively contributed to, or undermined, the region’s chance to build trust and confidence with other regional players. From a positive perspective, China’s relentless effort to uphold the Six-Party Talks (SPT) is an outstanding example that highlights its positive contribution to the rise of trust and confidence. However, trifling with another’s history (i.e. South Korea) and unwillingness to constructively engage with a rival regional power (i.e. Japan) have significantly undermined the chance for trust and confidence building in the region. Last but not least, regionalism in Northeast Asia must be realized as a prerequisite to East Asian regionalism. This proposition is critical in its own right because, in recent times, the regionalism question of Northeast Asia seems to

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  219 be being absorbed into that of East Asia as a result of substantial progress made by the Southeast Asian counterpart and ASEAN+3 (APT, a regional forum of 10 ASEAN states and China, South Korea, and Japan). Thus, the prospective regionalism in Northeast Asia is rather viewed in the context of that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or Southeast Asia than in its own perspective. However, this chapter hypothesizes that, without a formalized regionalism in Northeast Asia, there cannot be a formidable East Asian regionalism as it will be greatly challenged to build a connection among the three Northeast Asian states, despite a strong gravity from the extant hub of 10 ASEAN states as a whole. Thus, a significant set of questions remains with respect to regionalism in Northeast Asia. Is there any chance for Northeast Asia to found its own regionalism? Or is it necessary at all, as the region has rather been proactive in merging with the Southeast Asian counterpart to formalize East Asian regionalism? Would it be possible for Northeast Asia to make a quantum leap to East Asian regionalism without having its own regionalism? If so, a critical question naturally follows: Are the Northeast Asian states ready to integrate with each other as well as with the rest of the East Asian states to realize East Asian regionalism? Why is it that they do not seem to mind integrating together at the broader level of East Asia, yet seemingly not ready to do that with each other at the subregional level of Northeast Asia? How does China perceive these questions and what has it done to answer them? Southeast Asian regionalism, which is based on the framework of ASEAN, could be said to have progressed and advanced far enough to possess all the necessary requirements to become a regionalism in its own right, only shy of institutionalization processes to perfect the concept.1 Despite all the initiatives in various realms at both Track I and Track II levels during the past two decades, Northeast Asia has yet to realize any kind of integration in any fields. This is not to deny the extant governmental forums. There are indeed many governmental forums founded to deal with regional interests, ranging from finance to environment, from economy to security. Nonetheless, they have yet to bear the fruits of integration. The reasons for the absence of regionalism in Northeast Asia are well known, thanks to numerous academic works.2 Although these reasons are convincing and widely accepted, they are not effectively solved to date. Ironically enough, the current situation in Northeast Asia with respect to regionalism is a paradox, with known problems but a solution yet to be seen. Regional states’ commitment, willingness, or desire could be all questioned. But the irony is that they still value cooperation, regionalization, and integration as one of the most effective ways to facilitate sustainable development in the world of interdependence. Out of this realization, coupled with their understanding of the importance of regionalism, the regional states would still like to see regionalism to come to fruition in their own region. In the past, China was perceived to be one of the major negative factors to the region’s pursuit of regionalism for whole lot of reasons. Its economy was underdeveloped. Its political system and ideology had different orientations (i.e.,

220  Choo authoritarianism and communism respectively). Its social system and structure were difficult to understand for reasons of lack of transparency. However, as China has more deeply engaged with the international community and institution, coupled with its adaptation to international norms and rules, China has become more active with the idea of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Compared with Southeast Asia and Central Asia, Northeast Asia is perhaps the only region in which China has yet to experience any visible progress with regionalism. Thus, it could be safely assumed that China would also like to see a similar effort being made in the region and advancing some substantial results. And in recent times it has undertaken proactive policy measures to this end. From an outside-in perspective, this chapter aims to address the following questions: (1) What are the primary reasons for lack of regionalism in Northeast Asia? (2) What are some of the positive measures taken by China to overcome these problems? (3) What are some of the seemingly irreversible initiatives damaging the confidence-building opportunity in the region? (4) What is there for China to do to improve regional confidence and trust?

Why is there no regionalism in Northeast Asia? The reasons for the absence of regionalism in Northeast Asia are very well known. They are animosity arising from past relations among the regional states, differences in political and social systems, discrepancies in economic development level, and a long tradition of ethnic homogeneity that does not often allow nations to be susceptible to the concept of integrating with others.3 The immediate effect of these factors has been the absence of confidence-building opportunities, to say nothing of the chances for the construction of framework of regionalism based on collective ideas, identity, and consensus in the context of regionalism and multilateralism.4 Another reason attributable to the absence of regionalism involves a leadership question that could only be resolved by a stronger regional player. However, as the international relations history of the region would suggest, a powerful regional state is not always welcomed by others, but is rather perceived with great doubt and skepticism. The regional states are not particularly keen on the idea of a more powerful and stronger state assuming the necessary leadership over others for the sake of regionalism. It may have to do with their horrible historical experiences with the accumulated effect of imperialism in the past. Imperialist power has left a deep psychological damage on those conquered states that were ruled by its brutal and crucifying way of ruling. The consequences of such rule by a stronger state have become the foundation of weaker states’ perception of a stronger one, shaping their socio-cultural value toward the stronger states. In a similar vein, the regional states do not, or rather cannot, view comparatively strong states with any amicability, but with great skepticism and doubt about their intention whenever they come up with policy initiatives at regional level. In the end, all these have contributed significantly to the “non-existent chance” for confidence-building opportunities within the region.

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  221 With the tidal waves of economic interdependence, globalization, and regionalization shoring up in Northeast Asia as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the regional states highly valued the opportunity for regionalism. Jumping on these waves, the regional states, especially Japan and South Korea, once proactively undertook a series of policy initiatives with hopes to construct regionalism in Northeast Asia.5 From a retrospective perspective, however, the side-effect of growing globalization, interdependence, and regional integration would only impede the opportunity for confidence-building to mature in the region. Russia’s disintegrating economy, which would eventually declare a “moratorium” in 1999, could no longer sustain aid and assistance to North Korea, and its role was not immediately replaced by China. Under the circumstances, the collapse of the Russian economy dealt a devastating blow to that of North Korea, compelling it to play the nuclear card in 1993 in an attempt to seek for other ways to fulfill its needs for food and other strategic goods (i.e., security and energy). While China was becoming more integrated into and more cooperative with the international community, China’s accommodating stance coupled with continuous high economic growth was not perceived in only positive ways, especially in relation to the leadership question for regionalism in Northeast Asia. Instead, it only enhanced concerns about the prospective impact of its growing national comprehensive power, particularly after the 1996 cross-strait crisis. In the midst of all this, the so-called “China threat” theory would reach its peak, compelling the regional states to review their China policy and to further obsess themselves with countermeasures against the rising China. This obsession, for example, was very much obvious in the efforts by Japan and the US to reform their alliance structure. Such efforts were interpreted by Beijing as a mere excuse to enhance the overseas maneuverability and mobility of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) against China.6 What made the situation worse was the 1997 Asian financial crisis (AFC) in which China’s and Japan’s discomfort in cooperating with each other became once again much more apparent.7 Apart from these obvious reasons on which many pundits and experts tend to agree, there are more causes for the non-existent chance of confidence-building opportunities in the region. First, the impact of long animosity has compelled the regional states to look the other way for an answer to their concern of regionalism. This could be in part attributable to the deepening globalization as a result of ever closer interdependence that has probably shrunken the geographical scale of the concept of region. Northeast Asia is no longer a distant region from Southeast Asia, thanks to the rapid economic integration process and development of communication and transport technology. As the consequences of the AFC, a sense of collective identity began to blossom between the two regions, enabling them to connect their regional concerns and interests in a broader framework (i.e. East Asian regionalism). Under the circumstances, the Northeast Asian region perhaps might have thought that the void of regionalism in its own region could be filled by incorporating itself into East Asian regionalism. In other words, the Northeast Asian states’ desire to build confidence and trust was sought somewhere else; thus, it may not be

222  Choo coincidence that they began to actively pursue integrating their own region with that of Southeast Asia. The efforts have been clear in their economic integration plan, ASEAN+3 (APT, an economic integration formula for 10 ASEAN states and the three Northeast Asian states, namely China, Japan, and South Korea). In the security realm, the Northeast Asian states have rather relied on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), instead of initiating its own until the launch of the Six-Party Talks (SPT) at the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002. Although many are optimistic about the prospect of APT and its potential contribution as the basis of framework for East Asian regionalism,8 for instance, others disagree on account of a wide spectrum of differences in social (institutional), economic, political (domestic and international), and security interests of the states in East Asia.9 The former view is reinforced by the recent initiatives by the Northeast Asian states to pursue free trade agreements (FTA) with the ASEAN on an individual basis. Known as “ASEAN+1” (or “10+1”), there are consequently three sets of such arrangements, one with each individual Northeast Asian state. The resultant “spaghetti bowl” of agreements and treaties for FTA further complicates, and to a certain extent procrastinates, the integration process for East Asian regionalism.10 Thus, the prospect of APT or ASEAN+1 positively contributing to the cause of broader regionalism may not be hopeful at all. Individual integration with already existing regionalism (i.e. ASEAN+1) does not necessarily mean these individual states will integrate with others because each standard of integration will differ from the others.11 In other words, China’s ASEAN+1 plus South Korea’s ASEAN+1 plus Japan’s ASEAN+1 is not necessarily equal to ASEAN+3. Since there is no prior common ground connecting these individual “1s” (i.e., Northeast Asian states), their individual pacts with ASEAN will not necessarily applicable to all three, for the same obvious reasons: Each individual pact will bear a different standard of rules according to their respective national economic, political, and social conditions. Whereas China can embrace a demand by ASEAN to fully open its agricultural market, on the contrary, it will not be acceptable to South Korea and Japan at all. It would be the same story with other sectors of industry, be it finance or high-tech. The uncompromising natures of the three Northeast Asian states are amply demonstrated in the recent breakdown of joint study of FTA between South Korea and Japan in 2005 and in the tacit understanding of labeling such an idea between China and Japan as “unthinkable.” Although China initiated a call to hold discussion of FTA with South Korea, South Korea’s response has been at best lukewarm. Thus, the realization of East Asian regionalism requires the fruition of a deal by the Northeast Asian states that is not only compatible with the demands of ASEAN but also acceptable by themselves. In sum, turning their backs on each other and searching for an answer outside their own region will not facilitate any of their goals, be it East Asian regionalism or Northeast Asian regionalism. Second, in connection with the aforementioned factor, Northeast Asia as a region seems to have lost positional importance in the foreign policy priority of

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  223 the regional states. Since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia has remained relatively calm and peaceful, except for a couple of occasions. Both came from the sporadic nuclear blackmails from Pyongyang. The North Korean factor is the force behind the dynamics of Northeast Asian international politics. More than often, it has overshadowed the intensity of animosity or political tension between China and Japan, and between South Korea and Japan, over such issues as Yasukuni shrine visits, history textbooks, and territorial disputes. Although the regional states would all agree on Pyongyang as one of the most detrimental threats to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, ironically, neither territorial conflict nor history-related issues is viewed as such by the regional states. In the Chinese defense white paper, the case is very clear. Chinese military community does not perceive these two political issues as a threat to their nation’s well-being or national survival, although they see “local wars of geographical nature” on the rise.12 Neither does South Korea see the political tension with Japan over history issues or rising China as a “threat” to regional peace or the safety of the country.13 Japan is somewhat concerned with a rising China, but it does not treat it or territorial disputes with both countries as a threat to the peace and stability of the region. These territorial dispute cases are rather often perceived and treated as a contingency factor because they are politically motivated for the purposes of their respective domestic politics, and therefore sporadic in nature.14 It is not to deny the potential impact of coercive measurements as solutions, but thus far the regional states have been striving hard toward peaceful solution at the bilateral levels.15 Thus, the overall assessment of the regional situation by the regional states has been relatively satisfactory, conversely undermining the imperatives for archrivals to cooperate. Third, changes in power configuration in Northeast Asia’s international structure have begun to seriously challenge the regional leadership question.16 Further, they have shut down any kind of windows of opportunity for confidence-building. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, Japan was perceived to be more than a qualified leader on the regionalism question in Northeast Asia.17 By the mid-1990s, because of Japan’s long economic recession and deteriorating relationship with China, South Korea was believed to be a capable mediator between the two countries and its active intermediate role would be conducive to the realization of regionalism.18 However, when it was struck hard by the AFC, South Korea was naturally constrained from playing such a role, and so was Japan, albeit to a lesser degree. Although it was also affected by the crisis to some extent, China managed to sustain its development during the crisis period and it virtually moved into a close-to-leadership position among the three.19 As the AFC exposed structural and institutional vulnerabilities of the extant regional institutions (e.g. APEC), it did not take too long for the regional states to attach greater value to the importance of regionalism as a protective means to avoid future recurrence of similar crises and to sustain their economic as well as political development. Yet Tokyo’s suggestion of building an Asian version of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, met some reservations from

224  Choo Beijing.20 These reservations were only to be reinforced by Beijing’s decision to offer sumptuous financial assistance at a bilateral level to the crisis-hit Southeast Asian states and South Korea. Beijing’s individual offer of help could not escape Tokyo’s skepticism as their regional rivalry began to bud at the same time.21 Fourth, the rivalry between Japan and China would only be further hampered by the lingering territorial disputes. Although the potential territorial disputes between Japan and China are often viewed as an issue of contingency and a result of domestic political manipulation, the political ramifications have been a serious impediment to Northeast Asian regionalism. The issue has been politically driven, often utilized as a means of instigating nationalism in both countries. Sporadic incursions into disputed islands and disputed waters have manifested this. Occasional surveillance activities by one have also helped to stir up nationalism in the other, only to worsen the souring relationship.22 As a consequence, they all have contributed in one way or another to the justification for the absence of summit meetings between the two nations in the twenty-first century.23 With the breakdown of communication at the highest level of government, it is difficult for policy initiatives to get any kind of endorsement from the government, not to mention its constituency. Fifth, the US factor is a serious challenge that requires much greater management and cooperation by the regional states. The US has long been regarded as a regional player and still remains a de facto regional state, despite its geophysical location. It has been a well-known fact that it opposes regionalism that would be exclusive in nature and obstruct its strategic interests (i.e. bilateral alliance structure). The latest manifestation of the US position came with its public opposition to the idea of founding an Asian version of the IMF and other similar regional economic arrangements exclusive of the US.24 Politically speaking, it has always been skeptical of China’s rise as to how it would utilize its empowered economic status with correlating military force, a concern arising from its potential to become a regional, if not global, hegemon.25 Such concern has been well documented in US strategic planning by successive administrations from the early 1990s.26 Furthermore, the US would not like to see its closest and most trusted ally, Japan, advancing alone its own strategic and economic regional interests without bilateral policy coordination and losing out to China as a leader nation in East Asian regionalism.27 Because of these factors, it has been persistent in pursuit of a so-called “congagement policy” toward China as it still remains skeptical of China’s status as a status quo nation.28 In Washington, the security dilemma is still predominant in its strategic thinking on Beijing.

China’s positive initiative China’s regional initiatives for Northeast Asia have progressed slower than other regions including Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Throughout the 1990s, China had great reservations about managing its regional interests and regional issues in the context of regionalism and multilateral cooperation. Indeed, it took a while for China to embrace multilateralism and regional cooperation in its diplomatic

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  225 practice. It was not until 1994 when it finally decided to join a multilateral regional forum (i.e. ARF). After a couple of years of experience, it successfully organized and hosted Shanghai-Five in 1996, a precursor to what is now known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In Northeast Asia, Beijing would not recognize the value of regionalism until the outbreak of the AFC. Although not a single initiative was pronounced by Beijing in this regard, however, China has been accommodating to such regional efforts as are reflected in its active participation in a number of regional cooperation forums at various levels in a variety of areas. China’s regional initiative in Northeast Asia came at the price of the North Korean nuclear threat in 2002. Under the extreme pressure from the international community to play a constructive role for the peaceful resolution of the crisis, Beijing was left with no choice but to meet the demand. It took the initiative, first, by hosting a three-way dialogue between China, North Korea, and the US in April 2003. Almost half a year later, it finally succeeded in organizing the Six-Party Talks (SPT) and thereafter has continued to make persistent efforts to keep the forum going. The SPT itself is a very significant occasion in light of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Never before have all the six regional states, namely China, Japan, South and North Korea, Russia, and the US, congregated to discuss regional issues of common concern and interest. Never before has the region displayed a high degree of cohesiveness in dealing with a regional issue. Never before has there been a regional consensus built and shared by the regional states (i.e. peaceful solution), not to mention cooperative action (i.e. Joint Statement adopted in September 2005). From this perspective, the SPT would, and should, give us some ray of hope for regionalism, given its persistent development. And China was no sleeper in recognizing the important implication of this cohesive multilateral forum. To further tap the SPT’s potential to become a stepping stone for regionalism in the region, China has been a strong advocate of institutionalization of the SPT. In November 2003, when then Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dai Bingguo, visited Japan, it was widely reported that he gave a clear explanation of his nation’s vision of institutionalizing the SPT.29 He explained that China saw the need to institutionalize the SPT based on a few potential advantages that it foresaw in institutionalization. The justification for institutionalization was underscored by China’s realization that it would be the only way to make the talks sustainable given almost zero confidence and trust among the actors. A mere dialogue format of negotiation by such actors would be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain without disruption or discontinuity, and can easily be susceptible to a subtle breakdown. Moreover, an institutionalized mechanism underpinned by the standing multilateral framework will allow for better implementation of whatever solutions the talks produces because all actors would be legally bounded by the norms and rules set by themselves. Furthermore, institutionalization might eventually enhance the possibility of establishing a security regime based on multilateralism and regionalism in Northeast Asia, where skepticism about such a regime still prevails for political, economic, and cultural reasons.30 The regional

226  Choo states’ rising recognition of the importance of cooperation regarding so-called “transnational concerns” or “non-traditional security threats” makes the idea more than appropriate in terms of timing and world trend.31 According to reports on Mr. Dai’s statements, China envisaged institutionalization as a necessary condition to “sustain the momentum of the talks.” Regarding the meaning of institutionalization, China’s interpretation was to transform the SPT into a regional security dialogue, such as a security guarantee dialogue for Northeast Asia (dongbeiya anquan baozhang duihua). Based on such a vision and framework for institutionalization, he further explained the mechanism and responsibility of the institutionalized form of the talks. Since the current Six-Party Talks are held on a sporadic basis, it was emphasized that it was necessary to establish the “special small group” to propel the talks on practical matters on a regular basis. As an effort toward institutionalization of the SPT, he first tried to address the necessity to set up a “special small group” (tebie xiaozu) that would act as a representing office. The group should consist of representatives from all six nations, whose official status should not be lower than vice minister (fubuzhang) or director (sizhang).32 In such a framework of organization, the Chinese vice minister further explained that the working-level personnel should be all at managerial level, at least. To further facilitate such process, the chairmanship that China has thus far assumed as a host of the talks should be transferred to, and assumed by, other parties, each nation taking turns for a certain period of time. It would allow the actors to be more respectful to and more responsible for the fate of the talks.

What is wrong with China? The most critical element in founding regionalism in Northeast Asia is to build confidence and trust among the regional states. As observed, the region has yet to seize such an opportunity. On the contrary, the political development discourse of international relations of the region indicates the opposite: The regional states have only worsened the probability of confidence-building opportunities by their irredentist endeavors. The prevalence of conservatism, seemingly resurgent militarism, and persistent nationalistic behavior and remarks by the top leadership in Japan have only precipitated the animosity of the Chinese and Korean peoples. The pledge by the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, to visit the Yasukuni shrine till his retirement, which is one of the two top causes of the two nations’ discontents along with the history textbook issue, has led South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to follow the Chinese suit of “no summit till you stop going to the shrine.”33 Since 2004 the two leaders have not met officially. The bilateral relationship seemingly crossed the “point of no return” when Japan readied its maritime surveillance vessels to embark for the purpose of conducting underwater investigation of geological formations to substantiate its claims on the disputed territory of Dokdo or Takeshima Island. South Korea’s naval forces went on high alert and the South Korean president warned the Japanese government of inevitable consequences if its vessels trespassed into South Korea’s sovereign territory.34

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  227 On the surface, China and South Korea may seem to be in the same boat in light of their shared sympathy and concern toward the rise of conservatism in Japan and its subsequent irredentist way of approaching international issues associated with the neighboring states. Nonetheless, recent developments in China’s approach to a similar area of issues are not comforting to the Korean people either.35 The most recent salient example involves China’s rewriting of its ancient history from the mythical creators of China to its relations with the neighboring states. With respect to Northeast Asia, such efforts all began in 2002 when the Beijing central government approved a joint research project by a Beijing thinktank (China Academy of Social Science, CASS) and a provincial research institute (Jilin Academy of Social Science, JASS).36 The project is known in English as “Studies of History and Geography of the Northeast Borderland and a Series of Phenomena” (“Northeast Asia Project” (NAP) for short).37 NAP is part of an ongoing project by the central government to rejuvenate the economy of the former heart of China’s heavy industry areas under the name of “Northeast Revival Project” (Dongbei fuxing gongcheng, NRP) since 1996.38 Thus, it could be said that the NAP is a by-product of the NRP. The NRP is originally designed to supplement the central government’s desire to achieve balanced development between the coastal areas and inner areas of the country, and in this case these areas are the three northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. In the course of adopting the NRP, the local and central governments came to realize the importance of imbuing a strong sense of national pride and identity as a motivation for this cause, especially to the inhabitants of these regions, the majority of whose people are of Korean ethnic origin. However, the intention behind the NAP is not perceived by many in South Korea to be as benign as the Chinese governments would claim. Instead, their intention is allegedly to have grown out of fear for the potential danger of the impact of growing contacts between the inhabitants of the remote regions, who are ethnically connected to the bordering countries, and the countrymen of their motherland.39 In other words, their frequent exchange and growing connection are interpreted by Beijing and local authorities to bear a potential psychological danger to bind them together. The biggest concern about the NAP from Korean perspectives is the way it rewrites the history of Korea’s ancient kingdom, Koguryo, a historical basis for the foundation of Korea as a whole and North Korea in particular. According to the NAP reports and related publications as a result of the completion of the project in 2002, Koguryo was not an independent, autonomous, and sovereign state, but a local government of China, based on their studies of cultural influence and tributary tradition.40 What bewilders and provokes the Koreans and other foreign observers is that China is exactly following Japan’s suit by interpreting the regional history to suit itself. Prior to 2002, however, never had such a claim been published or stated in Chinese history materials and references.41 Moreover, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted this new finding and intentionally omitted the Koguryo part in the introduction to Korean history on its website in 2004.42 At the protest by the South Korean government, Beijing immediately erased the pre-World War II history of Korea and only left the postwar period

228  Choo intact, a measure perceived by Koreans as denying Korea’s long tradition and history of 5,000 years. Despite severe complaints by the South Korean government and fervent protests by its people, the Beijing government has remained stubborn and unblinking in response to their demands to give a proper explanation of its intentions and purposes in rewriting or distorting Korea’s history.43 Under the circumstances, Korean scholars and experts have worked hard to come up with an answer of their own. Accordingly, there are a few valuable findings. First, China is increasingly becoming concerned with growing contacts and exchange between the Korean Chinese minority and their motherland countrymen, especially the South Koreans.44 According to Korean experts, Beijing’s concern arises directly out of the growing nostalgic claims by these two groups of people on the former territory of the Koguryo dynasty that today comprises the three northeastern provinces of China.45 This allegation is persuasive and convincing in its own right, as Beijing went berserk at North Korea’s application to UNESCO to have the tombs from Koguryo, physically located in the northeastern region of China, registered as North Korea’s first world heritage site. Had the tomb been registered solely as the heritage of North Korea, it would have simply refuted the Chinese claim of Koguryo’s status as a local government. Hence, the North’s move was indeed a wake-up call to Beijing and the local governments of the region that the Korean people’s nostalgia must no longer be viewed naively but seriously. Moreover, South Korea has recently become furious about China’s efforts to reinterpret the historical meaning of Mt. Baekdu (or Changbaisan in Chinese) to the Chinese people. In recent times, China has lit the torch for the Winter Asian Games to be held in 2007 in Jilin, Jilin Province, justifying it by calling the mountain the original home of China’s northeastern civilization.46 Manipulating the occasion, the Korean media also reported on China’s efforts to discard the Korean name of the mountain and to project an impression to the world of its sovereignty over the mountain.47 Moreover, China has unilaterally announced the invalidation of all business contracts with Korean businessmen and given ten Korean hotels notice to close down within the year, a measure interpreted as expelling them from the mountain.48 Since the mountain is traditionally and historically a legendary birthplace of the Korean people, China’s action naturally provokes Korean nationalism. Because the mountain is on the border with China, the Chinese side of the border is under the sovereignty of China as a result of a secret demarcation agreement with North Korea in 1962.49 Another noteworthy argument for China’s concern stems from Korea’s recent debate on the potential efficacy of filing a lawsuit with the International Court for the return of much of the China’s three northeastern provinces known as the Gando region.50 It was a region under Korea’s ruling, sovereignty, and jurisdiction in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries until 1909 when Japan conceded the region to China’s Qing Empire for its economic interests in the region’s railway system and mining industry.51 The concession was made by Japan because it annexed Korea in 1905 against the will of the Korean people. Thus, most, if not all,

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  229 Koreans believe in the righteousness of their claim over the Gando region and the legitimacy of international arbitration. Second, in the same vein, Koreans interpret the Chinese obsession as fear of the potential synergy effect that a unified Korea may bring to the Korean minority in China. In other words, there is a strong possibility, they argue, that Beijing may have to worry about the psychological and real impact that a unified Korea may have on the Korean Chinese minorities in the region.52 Conventional interpretations of a unified Korea present a stronger and more powerful Korea, with a population of more than 80 million that could boost up the scale what is already the world’s eleventh largest economy. From a military perspective, a unified Korea would have a very large military force not only by its sheer numbers (1.6 million at the current standing), but also by its highly modernized military program and powerful weaponry system. From an extreme nationalist point of view, a unified Korea’s military might would also be greatly fortified, given the realization of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. In this scenario, it is conceivably natural for China to allocate more resources to promote material development and psychological defense in the region. Third, such endeavor by China is viewed as coming from a desire to enhance its stakes in Korean peninsula affairs and North Korean issues in particular.53 China already has a direct say in Korean security affairs with full rights and authority, not only as the North’s only legitimate ally, but also as one of the co-signatory states on the Korean War armistice. However, the recent developments surrounding the North’s nuclear crisis might have drawn much greater concern in Beijing than it appears, given all the derogatory terms and extremely hawkish thinking coming from Washington. They might have elevated Beijing’s alert to an extraordinary level as indicated by a series of reports on alleged military maneuvers along the border of North Korea.54 Washington’s desire for a regime change in Pyongyang is believed to be the opposite of Beijing’s on account of the potential devastation that could be brought by the consequences in both China and North Korea. The influx of North Korean refugees to China, for instance, has surfaced as one of the greatest possibilities. Thus, China’s claim over Koguryo, and thereby its descendant North Korea, coupled with its standing alliance treaty, gives all the rights and legitimacy for a “necessary” intervention. Another salient example of China’s lack of contribution to the cause of regionalism in the region is seen in its current stance on its relationship with Japan. Although China insists that the bilateral relationship with Japan has been stable for political and economic matters are dealt with separately, it should care no less about political ties if it truly values the necessity of regionalism for Northeast Asia. China has every right to refuse to develop its political relationship with Japan, given the prevalence of Yasukuni shrine visits by Japanese leaders, rightwing conservatives’ campaign for an “ordinary state” (see below), and history textbook problems. However, as emphasized earlier, if China were to truly desire institutionalized regionalism to find its place in Northeast Asia, it is now time for it to act more responsibly and assume a greater leadership role. To show this at the regional level, an improvement of its relationship with Japan in the political realm

230  Choo is imperative. The current stalemate in the bilateral relationship can be thawed only by an initiative from either party. And China is no stranger to this practice at all, if history is any guide to diplomatic practice. In the early 1980s China successfully managed to thaw a similar stalemate with the former Soviet Union. With the US in the 1980s, whose president was known as a fervent anti-communist and a believer in power politics (realism), China also managed to overcome one of the most challenging structural problems to improve ties with the US. The bilateral relationship was mended to the degree where it was regarded as a “honeymoon” period throughout the 1980s. China’s leadership also exercised a great deal of patience and leniency in dealing with Japan in the same period. At the time Japan was headed by one of the most conservative right-wing leaders since 1955 when Japan’s current ruling party Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) took over power. Throughout most of the 1980s, Nakasone Yasuhiro was in power in Japan. He was a strong advocate for the recovery of Japan’s ordinary status as a sovereign state, a status similar to that of the pre-World War II period when its political and military power was commensurate with its economic power. He and his cabinet successfully manipulated the parliament (Diet) to break the military budget ceiling of 1 percent of Japan’s GDP.55 He also displayed strong nationalism by becoming the first prime minister ever to pay a visit to the Yasukuni shrine in 1985.56 Nevertheless, China was able to develop and strengthen the political ties with Japan at the instance of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was not only a genius for architecturing the open door and economic reform policy, but a great diplomat who proactively went out and realized the external preconditions for his economic ambitions. In the discourse of displaying his leadership against Japan, in 1986, Deng did not hesitate to initiate a meeting with Nakasone to confront his Yasukuni visit problem, and Deng succeeded in inducing him to promise to immediately halt his visits to the shrine.57 In addition, Nakasone also confirmed to keep out of the “ordinary state” campaign. Thereafter, the bilateral relationship was better than ever. In sum, China will have to exemplify a greater responsibility and leadership if it truly desires for regionalism to be founded in Northeast Asia. China’s proactive leadership will supplement the realization of the opportunity for confidence and trust building in Northeast Asia. However, recent developments in China with respect to Korea and Japan have been at odds with this. While condemning Japan for distorting history and reflecting in textbooks, China oddly enough is somewhat emulating Japan in distorting Korea’s ancient history. China’s recent efforts to distort Korean history deserve more scrutiny in terms of their intentions and purposes. As long as the Chinese central government remains silent, they remain a mystery. By declaring that the past history issue is an academic matter, China is not helping to alleviate but is apparently inflating misperception and ill-feeling of the Korean people. In the eyes of the Koreans, after all, China is following the exact same tactic as Japan has been employing with the past international relations history of the region. Furthermore, China’s seemingly hypocritical endeavor is worsening any chance of confidence and trust building opportunities in the region.

Northeast Asia regionalism and China  231 With respect to China’s refusal to conduct summit diplomacy with Japan, China should learn from its past experience to break the stalemate. China’s seeming indifference to the importance of political ties with Japan is significantly undermining the chance for regionalism in Northeast Asia, if there is any. It is widely agreed, and therefore no exaggeration to say, that the prospect for confidence-building in Northeast Asia will depend on the bilateral relationship with Japan. As long as Japan maintains a strong alliance relationship with the US and the US plays a critical factor in the international affairs of Northeast Asia, it will be a given that Japan will not take an initiative to improve confidence-building opportunities in the region. Thus, it will be in the hands of China.

Conclusion: What more can China do? As observed in the above analysis, regionalism needs to be forged in Northeast Asia for the following reasons. First, it is a prerequisite to the realization of East Asian regionalism, which is now being perceived as the best viable framework serving the interests of the regional states. However, there is a strong and growing propensity among the regional states to see the idea of regionalism in Northeast Asia as void. Instead, they tend to view the APT as a framework much more conducive to regionalism in Northeast Asia. In other words, there is a growing thinking that Northeast Asian regionalism could be eventually and naturally realized through East Asian regionalism. And such thinking allows the Northeast Asian regional states to avoid challenges and difficulties that they are not willing to confront at this particular moment. However, the fact of the matter is that this logic may be favorable for improving bilateral relationship between ASEAN and individual Northeast Asian states as evidenced in their desire to push for ASEAN+1. Without the connecting base between the three individual states, the article argued that the APT and/ or ASEAN+1 is illusory. These schemes are based on a framework in which ASEAN is placed at the center (hub) with three spokes reaching from the individual Northeast Asian states.58 Since the end-weight of the individual state is much heavier in terms of national comprehensive power, the weight will shift in favor of these individual spokes and bend the framework of regionalism in the opposite direction from the hub, enhancing the centrifugal force at work. In such case, the framework could easily be fragile, easily swayed by the influence of a stronger state. In exercising their power, the Northeast Asian states will be able to realize their individual ASEAN+1 schemes at each other’s expense because of their deepening rivalry, and as a result of neglecting the importance of connecting and cooperating themselves. To forge regionalism in Northeast Asia, it is argued in this article that the regional states must find their own way to create an opportunity to build confidence and trust among themselves. From an outside perspective, two appraisals can be inferred from China’s recent efforts. One is that its active pursuit of institutionalization of the SPT deserves better attention. Indeed, the process could be long and winding and it could be utilized as a means to improve confidence and trust

232  Choo among the regional states in the end. Thus, the regional states must capitalize on the opportunity. The other is that China’s irresponsible behavior is undermining the chance for regionalism, not to mention its benign intention behind the idea of institutionalizing the SPT. China must stop emulating Japan’s irredentist way of approaching the past history of the neighboring states. At the same time, it must seek a cleverer way to deal with Japan. Apart from its alliance factor with the US and the US interest in the region, Japan’s political prospects will only be worsened by a number of conservative leaders in succession to Koizumi. Thus, if China is to truly seek for peace and stability in Northeast Asia through regionalism, it cannot put off indefinitely dealing with the Japanese leaders. It will have to take initiatives with responsibility and leadership to improve the political environment to a level conducive to regionalism.

Notes 1 On the developmental progress of regionalism made in the Southeast Asian region, see Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization, 58: 239–275 (2004). 2 Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospect for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security, 18 (3): 5–33 (1993–4); Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security, 18 (3): 34–77; Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Source of Stable Multipolarity,” International Security, 23 (2): 62–6 (1998); Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Containment of China,” International Security, 20 (4): 107–35 (1996); Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, “A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia,” Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995). 3 For a detailed analysis on the impact of the “comparatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity” on shaping of the regional international relations, see Christopher M. Dent, “Introduction: Northeast Asia – A Region in Search of Regionalism?” in Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang, ed., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Experience (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 4–8. 4 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization, 56 (3): 575–607 (2002). 5 Particularly the question of Japanese leadership was viewed by the Chinese with much discomfort, when the issue was described in a “flying geese” model with Japan at the front leading the rest of the Northeast Asian or East Asian states. According to analysts, it does not “set a good example of multilateral cooperation” to China. Wang Hongying, “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization,” in Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, and Daojiong Zha, ed., China’s International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), pp. 71–92. 6 Christopher Preble, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.–Japan Strategic Relationship,” Policy Analysis, 516: 13–15 (2006); Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.–Japan Alliance,” Washington Quarterly, 29 (1): 119–30 (2005–6). 7 Although the two countries did cooperate to establish some economic cooperation arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and Asian Bond Fund with hopes to prevent a similar event from recurring, they still feel unease about further cooperation

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8 9 10

11

12

13 14

15 16 17 18 19

with each other not only in economic and trade sectors but also in the security realm because of prevailing competition over regional dominance. This could be, in part, attributable to the ever worsening image and perception of one another as their political relationship deteriorated. Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989–2001: the Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2: 95–129 (2002). Another factor contributing to this cause is political distrust and national interest. Jian Yang, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 (2): 306–27 (2003). Barry Desker, “In Defence of FTAs: From Purity to Pragmatism in East Asia,” Pacific Review, 17 (1): 3–26 (2004). Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, “The New Wave of Regionalism,” International Organization, 53 (3): 589–627 (1999). The ever-increasing shared perception of regionalism or any multilateral form of economic and trade cooperation arrangement as a tool of enhancing bargaining power continues to exist among the regional states to hamper regionalism in the region; John Ravenhill, “A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2: 167–95 (2002). For APT to come to fruition, it is argued that it would be rather dependent on external forces and trends (stagnation of world trade liberalization, closer European and American integration); Douglas Webber, “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian crisis,” Pacific Review, 14 (3): 339–72 (2001). Matsuo Watanabe, “Issues in Regional Integration of East Asia: Conflicting Priorities and Perceptions,” Asia-Pacific Review, 11 (2): 1–17 (2004); Christopher M. Dent, “Networking the Region? The Emergence and Impact of Asia-Pacific Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Projects,” Pacific Review, 16 (1): 1–28 (2003); Markus Hund, “ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptic’s Appraisal,” Pacific Review, 16 (3): 383–417 (2003). For this account by the Chinese Ministry of Defense, see Ministry of Defense, “The Security Situation,” in China’s National Defense in 2004, chapter 1 (www.china.org. cn/e-white/). Chinese military is rather concerned about the sustainability of the SixParty Talks when it comes to security interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula in particular. At the initiative of the Roh Moo-hyun government, the Ministry of Defense succeeded in removing its traditional view of North Korea as the “major threat” to national security from its 2004 Defense White Paper. Beginning with the 1996 Japan Defense Agency’s white paper, China was already cited as a “security concern,” especially under the growing tension in the cross-strait relationship, whereby Japan began to reckon the region an area for US–Japan cooperation; Donald W. Klein, “Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 133–50. Although often falling into impasse, talks have been held consistently between China and Japan, and between Korea and Japan, over their disputed areas, namely Diaoyudao (Senkaku Island in Japanese) and Dok-do (Takeshima in Japanese) respectively. The criticality of the role of leadership in the regional integration question is well studied in Brantly Womack, “China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership, and Normalcy,” Pacific Affairs, 76 (4): 529–48 (2003–4). Takashi Terada, “Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan’s Approach to ASEAN in the Establishment of PECC and APEC,” Pacific Review, 14 (2): 195–220 (2001). Jung-Suh Koo, “Pan-Asianism for Primacy of East Asia,” Korea Focus, 3 (2): 34–41 (1995). China’s endeavor during the crisis received a great deal of respect, and China was highly praised as having demonstrated its maturity as a “responsible state,” “raising

234  Choo

20 21

22

23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35

the country’s international profile accordingly”; Thomas G. Moore, “China’s International Relations: The Economic Dimension,” in Samuel S. Kim (ed.) The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 101–34. Sandra R. Leavitt, “The Lack of Security Cooperation Between Southeast Asia and Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No,” Asian Survey, 45 (2): 216–40 (March–April 2005), p. 226. For a comprehensive assessment on the economic rivalry between China and Japan in terms of FTA pursuits with and economic aid provided during the 1997 AFC to the Southeast Asian states, see Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States,” Journal of Contemporary China, 14 (44): 409–25 (2005). Japan’s discovery of surveillance by a Chinese submarine in its seas in 2005 further damaged the political relationship of the two, and Japan’s decision to embark a group of surveillance boats guarded by its self-defense naval forces to investigate the water surrounding the disputed island of Dokdo alarmed the Korean Navy in 2006. The Chinese leadership’s refusal to meet the Japanese Prime Minister would only come to an end after Koizumi was replaced by Abe. The Chinese President, Hu Jintao, held a meeting with Abe during the 2006 Hanoi APEC Leadership meeting. For studies on APT nations’ displeasing experience with lukewarm response by the US at the outset of AFC, see Joshua Kurlantzick, “Is East Asia Integrating?,” Washington Quarterly, 24 (4): 19–28 (2001); John Ravenhill, “A Three Bloc World?” Brantly Womack, “China and Southeast Asia,” pp. 545–546; Aaron Friedberg, “The Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” Commentary, 110 (4) (2000). Please refer to “The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” also known as the East Asian Strategy Report 1998, and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review both prepared and published by the US Department of Defense. They are accessible at http://www.defenselink.mil.gdr/. Julie Gilson, “Complex Regional Multilateralism: ‘Strategising’ Japan’s Responses to Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review, 17 (1): 71–94 (2004). Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s International Relations: The Political and Security Dimensions,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 65–100. “Zhongguo nirang liufanghuitan zhiduhua” (China plans to institutionalize six-party talks), Fenghuangwang, 20 November 2003, www.phoenixtv.com.cn. Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia,” International Security, 18 (3): 1–56 (1993–4). Jack Pritchard, “Beyond Six-Party Talks: An Opportunity to Establish a Framework for Multilateral Cooperation in the North Pacific,” paper presented at NORPAC Hokkaido Conference for North Pacific Issues, 7 October 2004, p. 6. “Spokesmen of MOFA: I hope to see the six-party talks institutionalized,” Renmin Ribao, 25 February 2004. For a scholarly point of view, see Jiang Xiyuan, “DPRK Nuke Problem and New Framework of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” SIIS Journal, 10 (4): 24–37 (2003); Pang Zhongying, “Building Regional Security System,” China Daily, 26 March 2004; “Building a Regional Security Mechanism,” PacNet (Pacific Forum CSIS), 13A, 5 April 2004; Jaewoo Choo, “China’s Plans for a Regional Security Forum,” Asia Times, 17 October 2003. Dong-A Ilbo, 17 October 2005. However, a meeting between the two was held on 19 November 2005, because of Korea’s political position as the host of the APEC Leadership meeting in Busan, Korea. A special message was delivered by the South Korean president in response to the Japanese action on 25 April 2006. The entire contents of the message are currently available at www.mofat.go.kr/. Kim Jung-yong, “Korea’s position on the distortion of history by China and Japan,”

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36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

29 September 2006, available at www.korea.net/News/ (accessed on 29 September 2006). The project was completed in early 2007, however to no avail. It is a known fact that the central government allocated RMB2 million in 2002 and RMB10 million in 2004 for the history project alone, while the local governments of Jilin and Heilongjian provinces and the local Academy of Social Sciences allocated RMB750,000 in 2002, and the three northeastern provincial governments allocated RMB1 million in 2004. Joong-An Daily, 22 March 2004, available at http://news.joins.com/et/200403/21/ 200403211755059031a000a010a011.html (accessed on 25 September 2006). “China’s absurd ‘territorial principle’, to fix demarcation border between Korea and China,” Weekly Korea, 14 September 2001, available at http://weekly.hankooki.com/ (accessed on 25 September 2006). Peter Hay Gries, “The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 22 (4): 3–17 (2005), p. 3. “What lies behind the ‘Northeast Asia Project’?,” www.korea.net, 29 January 2004 (accessed on 29 September 2006). Cho Bub-jong, “The intentions of China’s Northeast Project,” www.korea.net, 29 September 2006 (accessed 29 September 2006). Besides a series of publications by CASS, a short and brief version of this claim on Koguryo is to be found at www.cass.cn/ (accessed on 20 February 2005). Byung Woo Ahn, “Chinese Fabrication of Goguryo History and the North-East Project,” Journal of International Politics, 7 (2): 45–66. James Brooke, “Seeking Peace in a Once and Future Kingdom,” New York Times, 25 August 2004, p. A3. One of the top Chinese Communist Party leaders, Jia Qinglin, delivered a message from the Party Chairman, Hu Jintao, during his visit to Korea in August 2004, stating that the Chinese government’s official position was to deal with the matter at the academic level on account of its academic character. However, ever since then, there has not been governmental cooperation from Beijing on the issue. Andrew Ward, “Roh urges Beijing to resolve history row,” Financial Times (Asian edition), 28 August 2004, p. 2. Woojun Kim and Yeikyoung Kim, “China’s Domestic and Foreign Strategies and the ‘Northeastern Project’: Current Realities and the Korean Response,” Journal of International Regional Studies, 22 (2): (2004), p. 119. Gries, “The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today.” “China’s ambition behind lighting the torch,” YTN, 7 September 2006. “Are we going to stand by and watch China and Japan’s evil maneuvers?,” Yeonhap News, 7 September 2006. “China, conspicuously erasing ‘Korean traces’ from Mt. Baekdu development,” Dong-A Ilbo, 28 September 2006. “Beijing Eyeing N. Korean Territory: Lawmaker,” Chosun Ilbo, 7 September 2006, available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/ (accessed 28 September 2006). Gando (or Jiandao in Chinese character) is a Chinese region occupied by Koreans during the Yi dynasty, stretching from Mt. Baekdu to the Tumen River and covering such northern counties as Dunhua, Wangqing, and Hunchun. Such claims were to be motioned by the Korean National Assembly only to be blocked by its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce for political reasons in October 2004. Chosun Ilbo, September 9, 2006. Jun-young Kang, “The Influence on Korea–China Relationship of China’s Recognition of the History of Kokuryu: With the Debate of Korea and China’s Historical Recognition about North-East Project,” Chinese Studies, 36: 201–14 (2005), p. 211.

236  Choo 53 Chi-hyoung So, “China’s ‘North-East Project’ and Political Intentions,” Chinese Studies, 23: 63–5 (2004). 54 Alan Fung, “North Korea: On the Borderline, Part 1: Soldiers head for the frontier,” Asia Times Online, 30 September 2003, available at www.atimes.com/ (accessed on 3 October 2003); “China deploys 150,000 troops on North Korean border,” Epoch Times, 17 September 2003, available at www.asianresearch.org/ (accessed on 25 September 2003) The PLA’s latest military exercise in the border region of North Korea in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region from 5 to 15 September 2006 aroused such concern from Korea and other observers; Hong In-Pyo, “PLA Maneuvers with Intervention to N. Korea in Mind?” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 12 September 2006 (English version available at www.freerepublic.com/); “China conducting military exercise near North Korea border,” IndiaDefence, 5 September 2006, available at www.indiadefence.com/ (accessed on 30 September 2006). 55 Klein, “Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations,” p. 143. 56 Nakasone’s Yasukuni shrine visits began and ended in 1985. However, they provoked a great deal of animosity in Beijing because they happened in the midst of the Japanese government’s pledge to rectify changes it made in history textbooks in 1982 when Japan’s invasion and “predatory occupation of China” in the past were “whitewashed.” Klein, “Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations,” p. 141. 57 However, this promise would be broken by his successors, such as Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1996. 58 Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng, “The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area: Genesis and Implications,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58 (2): 272–4 (2004).

12 China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Pan Guang

China established close contact with Central Asia through the Silk Road as early as 2,000 years ago. However, this direct contact was suspended after the middle of the nineteenth century, because most of Central Asia became a component part of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union, the collapse of which enabled Central Asia to open its doors to the outside world again. China, in the past few decades, has established a constructive partnership with the post-Soviet Central Asian states, whilst reforming the Sino-Russian relationship into the best shape that it has ever been. The development of the “Shanghai Five” – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – joins China, Russia and the Central Asian states in a multilateral mechanism of regional security, and economic and cultural cooperation, for the first time in history. In the development of the SCO, China has played a key role, and served as a major driving force.

China and post-Soviet Central Asia In January 1992, only one month after the founding of the new Central Asian states, a Chinese delegation led by Mr. Li Lanqing, then Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, visited five Central Asian states and signed a series of agreements to establish diplomatic relations with all of them before the Taiwanese authorities could take any action. Since then, the relations between China and the new Central Asian states have developed rapidly. Almost all of the Central Asian leaders have visited Beijing, and their Chinese counterparts, including Presidents Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao. Chinese Premiers Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and Wen Jiabao have in turn visited these Central Asian countries. In April 1996 and April 1997, two agreements for security and disarmament along borders, which marked the beginning of the SCO process, were signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, indicating that a situation of stable security cooperation between China and her Central Asian neighbors was under construction. In the past decade, under the framework of these two agreements, China and its three neighboring countries in Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, have strengthened their mutual trust militarily, and gradually reduced each other’s military forces along their borders;

238  Pan on this basis, the boundary problems between China and Kazakhstan, China and Kyrgyzstan, and China and Tajikistan have been resolved. Economic and trade relations between China and the Central Asian countries have also developed very rapidly. Compared with US$500 million in 1992, China’s trade with five Central Asian countries reached US$8.5 billion in 2005, growing by more than 16 times in 14 years. As for bilateral trade between China and the Central Asian countries, the China–Kazakhstan trade is the most extensive, reaching US$6.8 billion in 2005. Before June 1992, only 37 Chinese companies had invested in Kazakhstan; just two years later, 313 Chinese enterprises had set up branches or joint ventures there. Following the massive involvement of Chinese enterprises (mainly petroleum enterprises such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)) in the Central Asian markets, the great potential of SinoCentral Asian economic and trade cooperation has been further brought to bear on the energy, non-ferrous and rare metals, coal, textiles, food processing, animal husbandry, agriculture, and tourist industries. The main principles of China’s policy toward Central Asia are as follows: • • • •

•

• •

•

to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian states, to support economic and political reforms in these countries and regional cooperation in the Central Asia; to develop China’s relations with Central Asian countries according to the guiding principles of “good-neighbourly trust, mutual reciprocity, friendly cooperation and common development”;1 to solve border problems between China and Central Asian countries on the basis of confidence-building and disarmament along border regions; to make joint efforts with Central Asian countries and Russia to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism that threaten regional security, and to combat such transnational crimes as weapon-smuggling, drug-trafficking and illegal immigration; to support the use of peaceful means to resolve various regional conflicts, including the civil war in Afghanistan, the conflict in Kashmir, and the internal confrontations in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, in order to maintain the security and stability of Central Asia and northwestern China. to endorse the Central Asian Nuclear-Free Zone (CANFZ) in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, and stop the nuclear arms race from undermining security and development in the region; to support the United Nations in playing a leading role in Afghanistan, in order to consolidate a united government that can represent the interests of all ethnic and religious groups, consolidate friendly relations with neighboring countries, and be accepted by the international community; to promote Chinese–Central Asian economic and trade cooperation, especially in the fields of energy and transportation.

China’s Central Asia policy has achieved great success; since 1992, the stable development of friendship and partnership between China and Central Asian countries has paved the way for the SCO process.

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  239

Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership and the SCO It is perhaps surprising to many that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia and China, one a country that abandoned communism and the other a country that that still maintains communism, not only suffered no setbacks, but improved steadily to the extent that it is enjoying the best time of its history at the governmental level. The achievement of the Sino-Russian relationship is mainly reflected in the following aspects. First, China and Russia have established a strategic cooperative partnership that is now institutionalized in the form of a legal document. When President Yeltsin visited China in 1996, both sides declared their intention to set up a strategic cooperative partnership oriented toward the twenty-first century. On 16 July 2001, the Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Moscow, symbolizing the initiation of a new stage of the bilateral relationship.2 This treaty is the first one between the two countries that is based on genuine equality and not on military alliance. Second, leaders of the two countries have formed an effective mechanism of summit meetings. In addition to the regular meetings between the presidents, the prime ministers, and cabinet ministers of the two governments have also started regular working meetings. Particularly noteworthy is that Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have built up good personal relationships with Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, something that is of great significance to the smooth development of this bilateral relationship. Third, both countries have resolved the historical problems that once obstructed the development of their relationship. Following the independence of the new Russia, both sides, acting in the spirit of seeking common grounds and putting aside differences, made patient efforts to resolve the border disputes left over from history. Although the specific demarcation along the boundary once met with some resistance from the local authorities of the Russian Far Eastern territories, the work was promoted, thanks to a direct intervention from Moscow. Both countries signed an agreement during President Yeltsin’s visit to China in December 1999, agreeing to find a way to resolve the last dispute on three islands in the Amur River, on the principle of shelving disputes for joint development.3 This principle, originally put forward by Deng Xiaoping for the handling of the disputes on the Diaoyutai Islands and other territories in South China Sea, came to be practiced for the first time for the Sino-Russian border issues. This ingenious concept and its successful implementation paved the way for the further development of the Sino-Russian relationship at the turn of the century. In October 2004, President Hu and President Putin signed a final agreement about the Amur River islands. The disputes surrounding the 4,300 kilometer-long Sino-Russian borders are now completely resolved. Fourth, both countries, based on their consensus on various world affairs, have conducted effective cooperation in the international arena. When President Jiang visited Russia in April 1997, both countries signed the Joint Statement by China and Russia on Multipolarization in the World and Establishment of a New International Order, showing consensus on both the opposition to group politics

240  Pan and the strengthening of the UN role.4 Both countries, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, have demonstrated identical or similar positions on a broad range of issues ranging across the board and including the Kosovo crisis, the missile defense system and the anti-ballistic treaty, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the US war on Iraq, the postwar situation in Afghanistan, the nuclear crises in the Korean peninsula and Iran, and the nuclear free zone in Central Asia. Regarding all of these issues, there were, and are still, constant consultations and cooperation between the two sides. Fifth, security cooperation between the two countries has been steadily developing. China and Russia, by means of bilateralism, and multilateral mechanisms such as the SCO, have reached a series of agreements on disarmament and confidence-building in the border regions, no-targeting of each other by strategic nuclear weapons, and combating of various cross-border crimes such as international terrorism, drug-trafficking, and weapon-smuggling. As is widely known, the cooperation between the two countries on military equipment and related technologies has also been very productive. Over the long history of Sino-Russian interactions, there were quite a few episodes of conflict in Central Asia. From the mid-nineteenth century to the 1940s, Russia, and later the Soviet Union, actively supported the separatist movement of the Muslims in Xinjiang seeking a so-called “East Turkestan State.” In November 1945, with the help of the Soviet Union, the so-called “Eastern Turkestan Republic” was set up in Yining, Xinjiang, but it lasted for only half a year. In the four decades from the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, “East Turkestan” separatists sometimes undertook armed activities across Chinese borders and engaged in overseas propaganda against China under the auspices of the KGB. In the 1960s, border clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in Central Asia escalated into a border conflict in 1969. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the picture altogether, creating a wide buffer zone between the two countries in the wake of the independence of several Central Asian republics; now, the Sino-Russian border in Central Asia is only 54 kilometers long. So much has changed that, instead of the perception of each other as a threat – something that was once a fact of life – both are finding more and more common interests in Central Asia. These common interests, which form the basis of the SCO, are specifically as follows: 1 Both countries find themselves threatened by terrorism, separatism and extremism, so that they have stood up, together with the newly-independent Central Asian countries, to work out institutions such as the SCO to safeguard their own safety and stability, as well as that of the whole region. 2 Both countries take a strong interest in tapping the rich resources in the Central Asian region to promote regional economic cooperation and the development of the bordering regions, such as China’s Xinjiang area and Russian Central Asian territories. 3 Both countries feel concerned about the growing political, cultural and

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  241 military presence of the West in Central Asia and, in particular, oppose the NATO expansion into the region. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (“9/11”), the strategic pattern of the region has been reshaped again with the military offensive of the United States in Afghanistan, and the direct US military presence in the region. Both China and Russia showed no reservations about the American, and later NATO, actions against the Taliban regime, as Afghanistan under that regime had long been a destabilizing source of drug-trafficking, weapon-smuggling, and other cross-border crimes as well as a haven for terrorism, separatism, and extremism. However, both countries are obviously upset by the suffering of the civilians in Afghanistan, the expansion of the American war from Afghanistan to Iraq, the swift US and NATO military presence in the region, and the so-called “Color Revolutions” in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine supported by the West. Against such a background, it is understandable that China and Russia, whilst standing with the West in the counterterrorist coalition, will also strengthen their own coordination and cooperation, so as to protect their own interests in Central Asia and contain the excessive expansion of the US and NATO presence in the region. It is apparent that the establishment of a Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership has built a solid foundation for the “Shanghai Five” process, and later the SCO mechanisms, and will have a decisive impact on the future development of the SCO and Central Asia.

The SCO’s success in Central Asia Since 1996, the SCO has been making remarkable progress, attaining achievements which are mainly displayed in the following aspects. Confidence-building measures have been put in place, finally leading to the resolution of the border problems left over from years gone by. As mentioned above, within the framework of the SCO, and thanks to the joint efforts of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all the disputes regarding the western section of the former Sino-Soviet border of more than 3,000 kilometers,5 which had bred instability and conflict for centuries, were completely solved in six years, which is a rare achievement in the history of international relations. Close cooperation has been established in the struggle against transborder evil forces. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and especially after 1996, religious extremists and terrorist organizations in Central Asia have built up cross-border networks, with support from the Taliban and al-Qaeda, causing great trouble to the countries in this region. The “Shanghai Five” is the first international community calling for cooperative action against terrorism in Central Asia. In August 1999, a clique of terrorists penetrated into Kyrgyzstan, seizing hostages and killing civilians. The Kyrgyz government, resorting to the “Shanghai Five” agreements within the regional cooperation framework, sought assistance from China and Russia, who in turn helped to drive out the gangsters. In December 1999, leaders of the security and law enforcement authorities of the five countries declared in

242  Pan Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, their intention to set up a “Bishkek Group,” which would hold regular meetings to discuss cooperation on security and law enforcement issues in order to safeguard security and stability in Central Asia. On 5 July 2000, leaders of the “Shanghai Five,” while reaffirming their determination to combat separatism, terrorism, and extremism, endorsed the proposal put forward by Kyrgyzstan to establish a regional anti-terror institution. On 15 June 2001, less than three months before 9/11, leaders of the six countries (including Uzbekistan) signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,6 when launching the SCO. This convention, as the first international treaty on anti-terrorism in the twenty-first century, spelt out the legal framework for fighting terrorism and other evil forces for SCO members, and their coordination with other countries. Within the framework of the Shanghai Convention, SCO member states cooperated in the establishment of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), succeeding in combating and containing extremism and terrorism in the region. The SCO advocates reconciliation, and maintains stability and security in Central Asia. Ethnic and religious conflicts, and the issues that the pages of history have left to Central Asia, are as intricate and complex as in the Balkans and the Middle East. Fortunately, the difference is that Central Asia has established the SCO mechanism, whereas the Balkans and the Middle East do not have a comparable organization. Within its framework, Central Asia has managed to restrain malignant conflicts such as the civil war in Afghanistan from spreading throughout the region (as happened in the Balkans and the Middle East), setting up a successful model in the troubled international scene after the end of the Cold War. One can say without exaggeration that, if there had been no SCO system, the Taliban could possibly have continued marching northwards, and the Afghan conflict could even have spread to the neighboring countries as well. In this regard, the SCO is playing an indispensable role in maintaining regional security and stability. The SCO, by making joint efforts, is assisting with the timely development of regional cooperation, and the member states have established a mechanism of regular meetings, at different levels and in many fields. It is good to see that a healthy tendency for the swift development of regional cooperation is evolving in Central Asia. Economic and trade cooperation are advancing gradually; the SCO leaders have chosen energy, information technology, and transportation as the priority areas for economic cooperation, with particular emphasis to be laid on the implementation of several demonstration programs.7 The SCO Mechanism of Inter-Bank Cooperation – the first step towards the SCO Development Bank, which was formally inaugurated before the SCO Shanghai Summit, held in June 2006 – is expected to provide a financing platform for the major projects in the region. The official launch of the SCO Business Council, made during the Shanghai Summit, will certainly facilitate the deepening of economic cooperation within the SCO framework. Meanwhile, cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and tourism has also been going well. Central Asia is an area where the Confucian, Islamic, Slavic,

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  243 and Indian civilizations encounter each other, and, from ancient times onwards, religious and cultural differences have often underlain ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflicts; for instance, the historic tragedy of the destruction of the Bamiyan statues by the Taliban regime is still fresh in people’s minds. Terrorist, separatist, and extremist forces have also used these religious and cultural differences to incite disunity and manufacture turmoil. It should be noted that, thanks to the 70 years of secular education during the Soviet era, extremist Islamic thought does not have a strong presence in the five Central Asian states, posing a striking contrast to the situation in the Islamic areas of the Middle East. With the growing American and European presence in Central Asia, the influence of Western culture in this region is likely to increase, which may have a huge impact on the cultural ties already existing between the Silk Road states – China, Russia, and Central Asia – as well as on the cultural cooperation between SCO states. It seems of particular significance, against this background, that humanitarian aid is to be stepped up within the SCO framework. In the short run, the focus of such cooperation is to highlight the spirit of the Silk Road by enhancing mutual communication and understanding between different civilizations and nations in the region, to strengthen emotional ties among the Chinese, Central Asians, and Russians, and also to pave the way for the unfolding comprehensive cooperation within the SCO. The first and second SCO Cultural and Arts Festivals, held during the Astana and Shanghai Summits, have shown themselves as notable achievements in this field. The document on educational cooperation signed at the Shanghai Summit is an important SCO initiative to broaden its people-to-people, as well as its cultural, cooperation. It is also significant that the SCO Forum was launched in autumn 2005, its mission being to provide intellectual support to the further development of the organization. The SCO is also making cautious progress towards expansion; as an open organization, it is succeeding in developing fruitful multilateral cooperation with other states and international organizations on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit. The “Regulation on the Status of Observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” accepted during the Tashkent Summit in June 2004, is an initial document, regulating contacts of the SCO with the outside world, and has a significant role to play in promoting international cooperation, as well as in developing and strengthening the organization itself. The Tashkent Declaration has introduced a proposal, addressing “international organizations and fora functioning in the Asian-Pacific region with a proposal to start the gradual creation of a partnership network of multilateral associations by concluding among them corresponding agreements, including granting to each other, on a mutual basis, observer status.” The realization of this proposal will promote the establishment of a security and cooperation system in the Asian-Pacific region, based on the UN Charter and international law, which will take into account the interests of all the parties. In December 2004, the SCO was granted observer status at the General Assembly of the United Nations. In April 2005 the SCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), establishing relations

244  Pan of cooperation and partnership. In September 2005, the SCO Secretary-General, Zhang Deguang, was invited to the UN Summit (dedicated to the sixtieth anniversary of its establishment), mounting the high-level platform for the first time and making a speech. This was an important sign of the daily increasing international prestige of the SCO. It is important to note that the SCO has granted observer status to Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran, and India, which has increased the potential opportunities of cooperation and broadened the prospects of SCO development. One thing is certain. The SCO will make steady progress on its path of cautious expansion, as its Tashkent Declaration clearly stated: It is firmly believed by the heads of the six nations that the constant development and augmentation of the organization, which is a non-group organization that builds on the basis of equal partnership, mutual respect, mutual trust, and the principle of openness, conforms to the mainstream of international development and contributes to facilitating a wider space for international dialogues. The Heads of States are convinced, that further development and strengthening of the SCO – which is not a bloc organization and is based on principles of equal partnership, mutual respect, trust and openness correspond to the main tendencies of international development and will promote broadening the scope of international dialogue.8 All of the above-mentioned successes, achieved by the SCO, not only have a strategic significance for the stability and development of its member states and for security and development in Central Asia overall, but also have a demonstrably important significance for the peace and development of the whole world. The recent facts have proved that the “Shanghai spirit” of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, respect for the diversity of cultures and aspiration towards joint development,” which is different from the thinking of the Cold War period, meets the requirements of the epoch, characterized by peace and stability, recognized and accepted by the majority of countries.

SCO’s responses to new challenges Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a wave of “election-related turmoil” or the so-called “Color Revolutions” in Central Asia, with terrorist and extremist forces fishing in the troubled waters. The security situation in Central Asia, once improved considerably, has become serious again in the wake of a new wave of terrorist attacks following the Iraq War. Afghanistan has witnessed the resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who have, in their new offensives, not only controlled some mountainous areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also organized several attacks involving thousands of people within Afghanistan, and masterminded a series of bombings in large cities, such as Kabul and Kandahar. More severely, the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Party of Liberation), and other extremist groups have become active again, mak-

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  245 ing Uzbekistan a main target of their offensives. What merits special attention is that the Chinese have also come under terrorist attacks. Since May 2004, 18 Chinese workers and engineers have been killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorist groups in Central Asia are now adjusting their strategies, with some resorting to new approaches and putting in new appearances; certain groups unknown before are cropping up and expanding their organizations by enlisting members from disadvantaged masses. The above-mentioned Hizb-ut-Tahrir has become very influential in Central Asia, although it was established in Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 1953. This party, which is attempting to set up a pan-Islamic Caliphate, maintains close connections with al-Qaeda with its manifesto focused on subverting the existing order. Even though it has not been listed as a terrorist group by some Central Asian states, this organization has not been allowed to make legal registration as a political party, thus remaining in a basically underground state. Increasing its membership by philanthropic activities and by means similar to pyramid-selling techniques, Hizb-ut-Tahrir is fast winning support in Central Asia, particularly in the poverty-stricken Fergana countryside where the unemployment rate has reached 80 percent; it is now claimed that there are hundreds of thousands of the party’s members in Uzbekistan alone. As some international observers have said, this new situation “has forced the Bush administration to examine its complicated balancing act between two prized policy goals: democratization and counter-terrorism.”9 It is clear that Afghanistan is still a crucial focus for global anti-terrorist campaigns, especially in Central and South Asia, primarily for the following three reasons: First, Afghanistan was the first main battlefield for the war on terrorism after 9/11. If the anti-terror war in Afghanistan cannot achieve a thorough victory, terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Central Asia may stage a comeback at any time, which is obviously going to be a major setback for the anti-terror coalition. Second, now that the leading core of al-Qaeda is still very active between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and almost all the key figures of Central Asian terrorist groups have emerged from the jihad in Afghanistan, that country remains the spiritual pillar of terrorism. Third, the production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan have provided the terrorist groups in Central Asia with vast funds to support their terrorist activities. Facing such a serious situation, the SCO Astana Summit in July 2005 took the initiative in shouldering the chief responsibility for safeguarding security in Central Asia. The heads of state decided to significantly increase security cooperation on the basis of the achievements made so far, including particularly the following aspects: promoting close cooperation among the diplomatic, foreign, external economic, law-enforcing, national defense, and special-mission authorities of the member states; working out effective measures and institutions to respond collectively to those developments that threaten regional peace, security, and stability; coordinating the security-ensuring laws and regulations in the member states; cooperating in researching and developing new technologies and equipment for coping with new challenges and threats; establishing new effective structures in the mass media to deal with new challenges and threats; combating the smuggling of

246  Pan weapons, ammunitions, and explosives, as well as drugs, and fighting organized transnational crimes, illegal immigration, and mercenary troops’ activities; giving special attention to the prevention of the use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and their launching vehicles; taking precautionary measures against cyberterrorism; and drafting uniform approaches and standards for monitoring the financial flow related to those suspect terrorist individuals and organizations. It was also believed that cooperation on drug trafficking should become a focus, as defined by the previous SCO agreement on fighting illegal trafficking in narcotics and their precursors, and the SCO should specifically step up its participation in the international efforts on the formation of anti-narcotic belts around Afghanistan; in the formulation and realization of special programs; and in providing assistance for Afghanistan in order to stabilize its social, economic, and humanitarian situation.10 The SCO Shanghai summit in June 2006 decided to deepen cooperation in security affairs, which was stressed at the summit: “To comprehensively deepen cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking is a priority area for the SCO.”11 So it is deemed highly necessary to continue the construction of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, to launch anti-terror joint exercises, and to establish an anti-drugs mechanism. This summit points out, for the first time, that SCO members prohibit any individual or group from conducting on their territories any kind of activities that would undermine the interests of other members. Following the proposition made at the Astana summit to “establish the effective mechanism in the mass media for coping with new challenges and new threats,” this recent summit has witnessed the signing of the Statement of Heads of SCO Member States on International Information Security,12 and the decision-making regarding the establishment of a Commission of Information Security Experts to lay the groundwork for the drafting and implementation of related action plans. In Shanghai, the leaders also instructed the Council of National Coordinators to conduct consultations on concluding a multilateral legal document on long-term neighborly and amicable cooperation within the SCO framework.13 Especially noteworthy have been the following words, quoted from the declaration of the SCO Astana summit: Today we are noticing the positive dynamics of stabilizing internal political situation in Afghanistan. A number of the SCO member states provided their ground infrastructure for temporary stationing of military contingents of some states, members of the coalition, as well as their territory and air space for military transit in the interest of the anti-terrorist cooperation. Considering the completion of the active military stage of anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider it necessary, that respective members of the anti-terrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.14

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  247 This is the first time that the SCO has demonstrated its position: that it endorses international participation in the anti-terror cooperation in Central Asia, yet at the same time believes that Central Asian security should be chiefly the responsibility of countries in the region, notably that of SCO countries.15 Four points should be emphasized here. First, these remarks are not specifically targeted at the US, but more broadly at “respective members of the anti-terrorist coalition,” i.e., all those countries and international organizations that use the infrastructure facilities of SCO countries or station their troops in SCO countries. Second, the SCO has voiced its views and suggestions, but any final arrangements will have to be worked out through multilateral or bilateral consultations between SCO states and those relevant parties. Third, issues such as a military presence, or use of infrastructure facilities by one SCO state in another – for example, the use of the military base in Kyrgyzstan by Russia – may be sorted out through coordination within the framework of the SCO or CIS, either multilaterally or bilaterally. Fourth, as the situation in Afghanistan is still acute, this is not the right time to work out a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Central Asia. Instead, SOC member states should step up anti-terror activities in Central Asia and strengthen the anti-terror ties between the SCO, the US, the EU, and other parties. The SCO leaders have recently stressed that security cooperation should be placed on a basis of comprehensive security, pointing out that: Such common efforts should be of comprehensive nature, and be able to assist the member states to protect effectively their territories, citizens, livelihoods and key infrastructure sectors, so that they are free from new challenges and threats, thus creating necessary preconditions for sustainable development and poverty elimination.16 The SCO leaders believe that, in preventing and eliminating those various technical disasters that have become significant components of the new threats, it becomes increasingly urgent to protect and further develop infrastructure, particularly the transportation infrastructure. They also believe that SCO member countries should construct multilateral structures to monitor possible disasters and their consequences, exchange information and analysis, and create necessary legal and institutional conditions for joint salvaging, including promoting interoperability in terms of personnel training, dispatching of agents, and equipment deployment. The heads of the SCO states also declared, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization will make constructive contributions to the international efforts to safeguard the land, sea, air and space security.”17 It is worth adding that SCO leaders realize that two things are especially pressing for Afghanistan; the first being assisting the Afghan government in containing drug production and trafficking, of which Central Asia, and Afghanistan in particular, has long been a hotbed. What is disturbing is that the amount of drugs flowing from Afghanistan, instead of declining after the collapse of the Taliban regime, has in fact been on the rise. As reported in The Independent on 28 April

248  Pan 2004, one third of the heroin around the world and 95 percent of the heroin in Europe in 2003 came from poppies in Afghanistan, and 10 million people in the world took drugs from Afghanistan;18 the latest report says that 92 percent of the opium around the world comes from Afghanistan.19 Drug-related activities have been, as is well-known, closely connected with terrorist organizations, as terrorist groups reap huge profits from organizing the trafficking, and then use the funds obtained thereby to finance their terrorist activities that sabotage the health and security of peoples everywhere, but first of all the peoples of SCO member states. Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, is quoted as saying that, although there had been marked political progress towards democracy, “the drug problem in Afghanistan has been allowed to become ever more serious. If it persists, the political and military successes of the last three years will be lost.”20 Apparently, without external support, the Afghan government can hardly live up to its commitment to curbing drug production and trafficking, and in this context the SCO states, as neighbors of Afghanistan, can take a host of measures within the UN framework. For the international community, the real issue at the moment in combating drug-trafficking is law enforcement. A good starting point in this regard might be providing technical assistance to the Afghan authorities, exchanging information and intelligence, setting up regular mechanisms of coordination and collaboration, and the like, and, second, cutting off the channels whereby terrorist groups reap profits from drug transactions. Mr. Mark Steven Kirk, the US Congressman, has remarked following his field investigations that al-Qaeda could annually reap up to US$28  million from drug-trafficking, a big part of which being spent on Osama bin Laden’s travel, salaries of his bodyguards, and buying over warlords and chieftains in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.21 Obviously, there is an urgent need for the relevant parties to strengthen cooperation in taking measures to cut off the financial chains of terrorist organizations. The SCO can also play an important role in this regard, as shown by the fact that the matter was discussed by SCO leaders and Afghan President Hamid Karzai during the SCO Tashkent and Shanghai summit meetings. The Astana summit meeting stressed that the SCO should specifically step up its participation in the international anti-drug belt built around Afghanistan, in order to help with the stabilization of the socio-economic and humanitarian situation in the country. As a result of SCO efforts in this regard and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal, a formal SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group between the SCO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was established in Beijing on 4 November 2005, in order to coordinate specific cooperation activities on anti-drug-trafficking and other matters, such as anti-terrorism, peacekeeping, and reconstruction.22 It is probable that international cooperation in combating drug production and trafficking may well develop into an overall cooperative endeavor for dealing with all the non-conventional security threats in Central Asia, including establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  249

China’s key role in the SCO China’s key role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is seen mainly in the following aspects. Formulating the conceptual guidelines Summarizing the successful experience of the “Shanghai Five,” President Jiang Zemin put forward in 2001, for the first time, the concept of the “Shanghai spirit” – “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilizations, and the pursuit of common development,” which is an important part of China’s “New Security Concept.” The “Shanghai spirit” has become a guiding principle for the steady development of the SCO. Reviewing the fiveyear process of the SCO and the ten-year process following the initiation of the “Shanghai Five” mechanism, the recent Shanghai summit meeting summarized the successful experience of the multilateral structure, which was expressed as promoting and practicing unswervingly the “Shanghai spirit.” On this basis, at the summit, President Hu Jintao put forward the further strategic goal of constructing a “harmonious region” of lasting peace and common prosperity.23 Driving institutionalization forward China has been actively pushing forward the institutionalization of the SCO following its foundation, particularly following the 11 September terrorist attacks. Three days after those attacks, two points were made by Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, at the prime ministerial conference of the SCO in Almaty: 1 the drafting of the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter’ should be speeded up; 2 SCO anti-terrorist mechanisms should begin to operate as soon as possible.24 The launch of the Secretariat of the organization in Beijing in January 2004 and the effective work done under the leadership of Secretary-General Zhang Deguang demonstrate the critical role that China plays in regularizing the work of the organization by means of its permanent institutions. The Shanghai summit has provided specific initiatives for the institutional building of the organization, which is, certainly, largely completed in the wake of the past five years of development. Yet there remains the significant task of improving the institutional structure of the SCO and, in particular, improving the efficiency of its operation. To this end, a resolution was passed at the Shanghai summit to strengthen the role of the SCO Secretariat within the multilateral system. It has also been agreed that Mr. Bolat K. Nurgaliyev (from Kazakhstan) will be the Secretary-General of the organization from 2007 to 2009. These measures will make the multilateral organization better prepared for the increasingly important work lying ahead. After

250  Pan Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran, and India were accepted as SCO observers, more and more countries have expressed their wish to do likewise, and join or cooperate with the SCO. In face of these growing requests, the Shanghai summit has commissioned the SCO Secretariat to monitor the implementation of the documents on cooperation between the SCO and other organizations, and facilitate the actual work of cooperation between the SCO and its observer states. The heads of state have also entrusted the SCO Council of Member State Coordinators to make suggestions regarding the procedures of cautious expansion.25 Giving direct support to major projects Partly because of its greater economic strength than the other five member states, China has granted very direct and substantial assistance to the major projects of the SCO. Its fiscal contribution to the organization surpasses that from any other member. For example, President Hu Jintao promised at the Astana summit: China attaches great importance to the implementation of the US$900 million buyer’s export credit promised in the Tashkent Summit. China has decided to offer more preferential treatment in terms of the interest rate, the time limit and the guarantee qualifications of the loan, so that the funds can be used as quickly as possible for SCO cooperative projects in the interest of all member countries concerned.26 The Shanghai summit witnessed the fulfillment of China’s promise of US$900 million of buyer’s credit, which will certainly promote economic cooperation and development within the SCO. Cultural cooperation is another area in which China has played a pivotal role. President Hu Jintao has stressed the need for humanitarian cooperation. He pointed out at the SCO Tashkent summit that: SCO members all have their distinctive humanitarian resources that provide good potential for cooperation. Cooperation should be actively promoted in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, tourism, mass media, etc., so as to enhance mutual understanding and friendship among the SCO peoples, and consolidate the social basis of growth of the SCO.27 He remarked at the summit meeting in Astana: We shall, by effective measures, conduct and deepen our cooperation in culture, disaster relief, education, tourism, journalism, etc. Human resources capacity-building should be another area of cooperation, and China will set aside a special fund to train 1,500 management and professional talents in different fields for other member states within three years.28 It is pleasing to see that the Shanghai summit further promoted this project, which is now going very well.

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  251

Strategic significance of the SCO for China From the Chinese perspective, the strategic significance of the SCO is manifold. First, as mentioned before, the SCO has increased the confidence-building and neighborly trust between China and her nine close neighbors, including Uzbekistan and Iran, states which are not directly adjacent to China. The border that China shares with seven SCO members and observers takes up about three-quarters of China’s total land border. When peace and security is maintained along such extensive border areas, China no longer feels exposed to direct military threats on the western and northern fronts, thus enabling concentration on the possible flashpoints on the eastern and southeastern coasts. Second, as mentioned above, the SCO provides an effective regional structure for China to cooperate closely with countries concerned in combating transnational terrorism, extremism, and separatism, and various other cross-border criminal forces. For the moment, the prime target of the Chinese anti-terror campaign is still the East Turkestan (ET) terrorist groups. Evidence now disclosed shows that Osama bin Laden is quoted as telling this group that “I support your jihad in Xinjiang.”29 ET groups were hit hard during the US war in Afghanistan, where its bases were destroyed. However, following the US-led war in Iraq, these groups somehow revived, just when the Taliban and al-Qaeda were being resurrected in the mountain area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On 15 December 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security called on the international community to strengthen cooperation in cracking down on terrorism, including the ET terrorists, and issued a list of the names of four ET terrorist groups and 11 of their members, identifying these groups for the first time. The four are the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, the World Uyghur Youth Congress, and the East Turkestan Information Center. Hasan Mahsum (who has since been killed by Pakistani soldiers), Muhanmetemin Hazret, and nine others were those identified as the ET terrorists.30 From the perspective of the Chinese, it is of particular importance that China can now, in the framework of the SCO, count upon the support of the other five member states and four observer states in its campaign against the ET movement. Moreover, China could also have support from SCO member states and observer states in its efforts to frustrate other conventional or non-conventional security threats and eliminate or ease the external disruptions to China’s stability and development. Third, the economic cooperation with which the SCO is commissioned is certainly conducive to China’s program of developing its western regions, particularly offering China a land-based channel of energy import and transportation. After several years of construction, the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China (Aterlao–Kenjiyaker–Atasu–Ala Shankou) finally started working at the beginning of 2006. The projected handling capacity of the pipeline is 20 million tonnes per year, which will be a big jump over the annual amount of 500,000 tonnes currently handled on the railways. Russia has already expressed its interest in using this pipeline to send Russian oil to China, so the pipeline may become a multilateral cooperative project within the framework of the SCO. Gas pipelines from

252  Pan Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to China will also be constructed. The pipelines, with an annual handling capacity of 25–40 billion cubic meters, will help to increase the low percentage of gas in China’s current energy structure. If connected with the Xinjiang–Shanghai gas pipeline, the lines will also help the implementation of China’s West Development Strategy and Energy Eastward Transportation Program. Japan and South Korea, which can also take part in this project, will be entitled to part of the gas transported by the lines. This will open a new chapter in energy cooperation between China and Central Asia, and even between East Asia and Central Asia. It should be pointed out that Central Asia/Siberia, in contrast to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Australia, Africa, and Latin America, is a source of energy supply that demands no naval protection. As China is not yet able to build up a naval force strong enough to protect its oil shipping lines in the near future, this sole alternative to a maritime oil shipping lane that China enjoys is of crucial strategic significance for China’s energy security and overall development. Fourth, when the SCO boasts coverage of over half of the world population, with such vast members and observers as Russia, China, and India, it is able to exert a much greater influence beyond its own region than otherwise might be the case, with its expanding friendship and cooperation. Stability and development from Central Asia to South Asia, the Middle East, and even wider areas will create a favorable neighborhood for China’s peaceful development, as well as international environment. Moreover, the SCO has also demonstrated a strong effect in the formation of a new model and new thinking for Chinese diplomacy at the turn of the century; this effect can be understood in the following ways. The SCO process has pioneered the attempt to create a new approach to neighborhood security, by means of mutual trust, disarmament, and cooperative security. Solving, in a matter of several years, the centuries-old border problems between China and the former Soviet Union countries, the great achievements of this approach are made manifest to the parties involved, and promise hope for other outstanding border problems, such as that between China and India, the South China Sea dispute, and the Sino-Japanese dispute over Diaoyu Island. Besides, actions such as making the fight against drug-trafficking and cross-border crimes its top priority, proposing the establishment of an effective mechanism in the mass media against new challenges and new threats, signing a joint declaration on maintaining international information security, giving full attention to energy security, environmental protection, and the protective development of water resources, all highlight the broad perspective that the SCO adopts in viewing and implementing security cooperation. Keeping an open mind on the various non-conventional security issues, as well as the conventional ones, makes China better positioned to play a growing role in global security cooperation. The SCO has helped to cast a new model of state-to-state relationships characterized by partnership but not alliance, as originally spearheaded by China and Russia. There are still certain politicians in this world who stick to the Cold War mentality, unilateralism, and the strengthening or expansion of military blocs.

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  253 The SCO presents a sharp contrast to all of this by endorsing a set of new rules regulating state-to-state relationships in this post- Cold War era. The relationship between China, Russia, and Central Asia, as covered by the SCO umbrella, is a close partnership of constructive interactions but not military alliance. Indeed, the relationships between China and ASEAN, between China and the European Union, between China and the African Union, and between China and the Arab League are all now developing in this positive direction. The current Chinese diplomatic principle of befriending and benefiting neighbors has been based firmly on this SCO success story and other related experiences. The SCO process has given rise to a new model of regional cooperation characterized by common initiatives from both big and small countries, with security cooperation paving the way, collaboration for mutual benefit, and the facilitation of cultural complementarity. This new model not only stresses cooperation and reciprocity in the economic sector, but also emphasizes cultural exchange and mutual learning. The various operations under this model, such as the establishment of the SCO Business Council and the SCO Mechanism of Inter-Bank Cooperation, the buyers’ credit that China provides to other SCO members, the kick-off of the Huoerguosi border trade and cooperation center between China and Kazakhstan, the SCO cultural and arts festival, the training by China of 1,500 professionals in various fields for the benefit of Central Asian states, and the strengthening of educational ties, can all supply valuable experience for China’s regional and cross-regional cooperation with many other countries, including providing important input to the proposed bilateral and multilateral free trade programs involving China. It should also be pointed out that the SCO process, with its successful practice and evolution, symbolizes the transformation of Chinese diplomacy from its traditional focus on bilateral relations to its emerging embrace of multilateral interaction. Prior to the SCO process, China resorted mainly to bilateral rather than multilateral channels for resolving her disputes with other parties. However, the SCO process has now given China greater confidence in participating in and, in some cases, even initiating multilateral processes. For example, China is now an actor in the ASEAN Regional Forum, an active participant in the “10 plus 1” and “10 plus 3” mechanisms, the host of the Six-Party Talks on the Korean peninsula nuclear issue, and a responsible player in the six-nation efforts for resolving the Iranian nuclear problem. The beginning of the twenty-first century has truly seen China playing an increasingly active and constructive role in the multilateral arenas of the world.

Conclusion With China’s rapid economic growth, particularly with the further development of China’s western region and its accelerating demand for energy, Central Asia is becoming more and more significant strategically for China. The SCO has enabled China to build up ties in the fields of security, politics, economics, and culture with the region, such as have never been seen before, which create conditions for

254  Pan China to play an active and constructive role in the region. Cooperation within the multilateral framework makes it possible for China to avoid friction with its neighbors, whilst preserving and pursuing its own national interests. This situation also symbolizes the fact that Chinese diplomacy has entered a new stage, one with its orientation towards multilateral interactions. Although China has been a major force in driving forward the SCO process, it is inexact to say that China has been dominating or leading the process. In principle, all the participating states are equal, which is itself a key component of the “Shanghai spirit.” Procedurally speaking, the SCO only has a rotating chair, and no “chairing nation.” Of course, since China and Russia do outweigh other SCO member states, both these countries have undeniably played a key role in facilitating the SCO process. This, of course, means that coordination and consultation between China and Russia are invariably crucial for the further development of the organization.

Notes 1 The Center of SCO Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, ed., Compilation of Materials & Documents of the Shanghai Five – SCO (Shanghai: Center of SCO Studies, 2003), p. 68. 2 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, 16 July 2001, Moscow. For text see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ (accessed on 1 March 2007). 3 People’s Daily, 11 December 1999. 4 People’s Daily, 24 April 1997. 5 The China–Kazakhstan border is about 1,700 kilometers; the China–Kyrgyzstan border is about 1,000 kilometers; and the China–Tajikistan border is more than 500 kilometers. 6 For full text see SCO website at www.sectsco.org/ (accessed on 3 March 2007). 7 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, 15 June 2006. 8 The Tashkent Declaration by the Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 17 June 2004, paragraph III, available at www.sectsco.org/ (accessed on 4 March 2007). 9 Thom Shanker and C. J. Chivers, “Crackdown in Uzbekistan reopens longstanding debate on U.S. military aid,” New York Times, 13 July 2005. 10 See Pan Guang, “China and Central Asia: Charting A New Course For Regional Cooperation,” China Brief, 7 (3): 4 (2007). 11 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, 15 June 2006. 12 Statement of Heads of SCO Member States on International Information Security, Shanghai, 15 June 2006, full text available at www.sectsco.org/ (accessed on 5 March 2007). 13 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, 15 June 2006. 14 Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, 6 July 2005. 15 See generally Pan Guang, “The Chinese Perspective on the Recent Astana Summit,” China Brief, 5 (18): 3 (2005).

China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  255 16 Declaration of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, 6 July 2005. 17 Ibid. 18 The Independent, 18 April 2004. 19 Los Angeles Times, 5 December 2006. 20 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, and Afghan Transition Government, Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Preface, Afghanistan Opium Survey, November 2004, New York, available at www.unodc.org/ (accessed on 4 March 2007). 21 Pan Guang and Hu Jian, The First New Regional Cooperation Organization of the 21st Century – A Comprehensive Study of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 2006), p. 143. 22 Guang and Jian, The First New Regional Cooperation Organization of the 21st Century, p. 229. 23 People’s Daily, 16 June 2006, 24 Xinhua News Agency, 14 September 2001. 25 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, 15 June 2006. 26 Hu Jintao, “Strengthening Solidarity and Cooperation to Promote Stability and Development: A Speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Astana Summit Meeting,” 5 July 2005. 27 President Hu Jintao’s speech at the SCO Tashkent summit, 17 June 2004. 28 Hu Jintao, “Strengthening Solidarity and Cooperation to Promote Stability and Development.” 29 Information Office of the PRC State Council, “ ‘East Turkestan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Their Offences,” Beijing, 1 January 2002. 30 Xinhua News Agency, 15 December 2003.

13 China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration Sheng Lijun

This chapter outlines the development of China–ASEAN relations1 in recent decades, discusses China’s weaknesses and the challenges that confront its ASEAN policy, and explains why it is not leading the way in the Asian regional integration and regional summits. I argue that the China–ASEAN relationship started from a very low base, and it has improved compared with what it was 15 or 10 years ago, but compared with ASEAN’s relations with other extra-regional powers, it is far from transforming the regional strategic balance. Although China has gained influence in Southeast Asia in recent years, ASEAN’s relations with other extraregional major powers remain robust. For the foreseeable future, China will lack the economic, social, and strategic bases to tip the balance. Should China’s goals remain modest, its relations with ASEAN are likely to remain vigorous. If it seeks to press too hard, however, it risks a strong backlash from not only ASEAN countries but also extra-regional powers.

Coming together from a long way China showed its hostility towards ASEAN when the grouping was established in 1967, taking it as an accomplice of the United States in containing China. China–US rapprochement in 1972 marked a fundamental turnaround in China’s diplomacy, which has since gradually but steadily stepped out from its previous communist-style hostility towards the world and begun to make friends with its former “enemy states” in order to incorporate itself into the mainstream of the world. It officially recognized the ASEAN grouping for the first time in 1975 after China was admitted into the United Nations in 1971 and ASEAN member states started to switch their diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to China. However, at this moment, the official relationship between China and ASEAN as a grouping was not possible as some ASEAN member states had not established diplomatic relations with China. During his visit to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in November 1978, the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, expressed China’s wishes to develop relations with all ASEAN countries.2 From the 1980s, China intensified its effort to establish diplomatic relations with all the remaining ASEAN states that had not established

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  257 or restored diplomatic relations with China. In July 1985, China and Indonesia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to restore direct trade with each other as a precursor of restoration of their full relations.3 In his visit to Thailand in November 1988, the Chinese Premier, Li Peng, announced four principles in establishing, restoring, and developing relations with the ASEAN states.4 After restoring and establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia on 8 August 1990 and with Singapore on 3 October 1990, China pushed for official ties with the ASEAN grouping. On 19 July 1991, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, attended the opening session of the twenty-fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur as a guest of the Malaysian government, where he held the first informal meeting with the ASEAN foreign ministers and expressed China’s interest in cooperation with the ASEAN as a grouping. The latter responded positively. At the invitation of the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, the ASEAN Secretary-General, Dato’ Ajit Singh, led an ASEAN delegation for a visit to Beijing in September 1993, and agreed to establish two joint committees, one on cooperation in science and technology, and the other on economic and trade cooperation.5 An exchange of letters between the ASEAN Secretary-General and the Chinese Foreign Minister on 23 July 1994 in Bangkok formalized the establishment of the two committees.6 At the same time, ASEAN and China agreed to engage in consultations on political and security issues at the level of senior officials. The first ASEAN–China Senior Officials Consultation (SOC) (at the vice-ministerial level) was held in April 1995 in Hangzhou, China. China participated in the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), held on 25 July 1994 in Bangkok, as a Consultative Partner of ASEAN. In July 1996, ASEAN accorded China full Dialogue Partner status at the twenty-ninth AMM in Jakarta, moving China from a Consultative Partner, which it had been since 1993. ASEAN and China instituted an ASEAN–China Joint Cooperation Committee, which convened its inaugural meeting in Beijing in February 1997. An ASEAN–China Cooperation Fund was established to support development cooperation activities between ASEAN and China.7 By early 1997, there were already five parallel mechanisms for dialogue between ASEAN and China.8 China participated in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN, which include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC), the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Meeting, and the ASEAN–China Business Council Meeting. By 2005, a total of 46 mechanisms at different levels in 16 fields, including 12 at ministerial levels, had been set up. In comparison, ASEAN–US cooperation had been marked by only 15 such mechanisms in their 28 years of “dialogue relations.”9 In December 1997, the leaders of ASEAN and China had their first informal summit (ASEAN+1) and issued a Joint Statement on establishing partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust oriented toward the twenty-first century, thus putting into place the framework and charting the course for the all-round growth of their relations. Guided by the Joint Statement, political relations grew rapidly to a higher level. Between 1998 and 2000, China signed framework documents on bilateral relations or announced cooperation programs with each of the 10 ASEAN member countries.10

258  Sheng Political relations between China and ASEAN countries have since developed fast, highlighted by the frequent exchange of visits by top leaders of the respective countries. Between 1994, when it established official relations with the first non-socialist party in Southeast Asia (the Malaysia National Front), and 2005, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) built official relations with 39 political parties there, including both socialist and non-socialist parties, in office and out of office.11 In 2001, leaders of both sides identified agriculture, information technology, human resource development, mutual investment, and Mekong River Basin development as the five priorities for cooperation in the early part of the new century.12 In the same year, China proposed an ASEAN–China free trade area within 10 years’ time. Consequently, a Framework Agreement was concluded in 2002 to establish a free trade area by the year 2010.13 China’s security relations with ASEAN countries in the 1990s were marred by territorial disputes in the South China Sea, especially with the Philippines over the Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, and with Vietnam over their sea and land borders. But by 2000 the tension had cooled down significantly. China and Vietnam signed the Treaty on the Land Border on 30 December 1999. In 2000, the two countries signed a historic agreement demarcating maritime territory in the Gulf of Tonkin. On 15 March 2000, senior officials from China and ASEAN met in Thailand to discuss for the first time their respective draft Codes of Conduct for the South China Sea. At their Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea14 and, as a follow-up, convened a Senior Officials Meeting on its implementation on 7 December 2004 in Kuala Lumpur.15 Relations between China and the Philippines have much improved since late 1990s and reached a new height with the state visit to China by the Philippine President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in early September 2004. After the visit, the two countries, for the first time between China and an ASEAN member state, conducted a joint seismic study in disputed areas in the South China Sea. Vietnam joined them in 2005.16 China and ASEAN countries also cooperate on transnational non-traditional security threats such as drug-trafficking, with the Beijing Declaration signed in August 2001 between China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand.17 At the ASEAN– China summit of November 2002, China and ASEAN signed “The Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues,”18 which is implemented through an MOU (and an Annual Plan since 2004).19 China has also improved its military ties with individual ASEAN members, with high-level visits by their military leaders, military training and assistance with weapons and military technology, naval port visits, and joint naval search and rescue exercises. An important milestone in the development of ASEAN– China relations was China’s signing of a key ASEAN security protocol20 – “The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” (TAC)21 – and their declaration of each other as Strategic Partners for Peace and Prosperity at the ASEAN–China Summit in October 2003 in Bali. At their summit in Vientiane in November 2004, ASEAN and China issued a Plan of Action to implement this strategic partnership.22

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  259 With the forging of the Strategic Partnership, bilateral cooperation was further strengthened. In March 2004, the ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministers’ Meeting issued a Chairman’s Statement on the question of Taiwan reaffirming ASEAN’s commitment to the One China Policy. Later in September 2004, all the ASEAN Member Countries unanimously recognized China’s full market economy status. At the beginning of 2005, China and ASEAN launched the “Early Harvest” program as part of the ASEAN–China free trade arrangement. In July 2005, China announced the expansion of the scope of the special preferential tariff treatment for Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Myanmar.23 China has expressed its willingness to work with ASEAN for its early accession to the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).24 In 2005, ASEAN and China set up a joint Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to draw up detailed plans to guide the development of their relations in the coming 15 years.25 ASEAN–China cooperation advanced fast in other areas. At their summit on 6 November 2001 in Brunei Darussalam, ASEAN and China declared that they would focus their cooperation on five priority areas in the early part of the twentyfirst century, namely agriculture, information and communications technology (ICT), human resource development (HRD), the Mekong Basin development, and two-way investment. For this purpose, they signed an MOU on a Mediumand Long-Term Plan of Agricultural Cooperation on 2 November 2002 in Phnom Penh and an MOU on Cooperation in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) on 8 October 2003 at the Bali summit. ASEAN and China implement the Mekong Basin development programs and projects within various frameworks such as Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC), and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). China has contributed a sum of US$5 million to help regulate some sections of the navigation channel within the territories of Laos and Myanmar.26 In the area of public health, China has pledged RMB10  million in support of the ASEAN–China cooperation on SARS prevention and control. China has established a China–ASEAN Fund for Public Health. An ASEAN–China Health Ministers’ Meeting was set up in 2005.27 ASEAN and China signed an MOU on cultural cooperation in 2005. Cooperation in tourism between ASEAN and China is conducted through meetings of ASEAN+3 national tourism organizations and ASEAN+3 tourism ministers, which include research on tourism and information technology, seminars on hospitality and tourism, issuing tourism publications, establishing tourism networks, and setting up a Center for Tourism Resource Management.28 Chinese tourists have now replaced the Japanese as the no. 1 tourist market for ASEAN. ASEAN received 4.4 million Chinese tourists in 2004 and the trend is upward. By comparison, 3.5 million Japanese visited ASEAN that year with flat growth over the last decade.29 In the area of youth, ASEAN and China have established the Senior Officials Consultation Meeting on Youth in May 2004 and the ASEAN–China Ministers for Youth Affairs Meeting in September 2004. ASEAN and China have also

260  Sheng convened the ASEAN–China Business Young Leaders Summit on 23–28 May 2004 in Guangxi, China. China and ASEAN also cooperate actively through a series of mechanisms and ministerial meetings under the framework of ASEAN+3 on a wide range of political, security, economic, and social issues.30 ASEAN–China trade expanded fast, with an average growth rate of 20.8 percent from 1990 to 2003, from US7.96  billion in 1991 to US$130.37  billion in 2005, with ASEAN becoming China’s fourth biggest trade partner, and China the fifth biggest partner of the ASEAN.31 Mutual investment has also expanded. From 1991 to 2000, ASEAN investment in China increased at an average annual rate of 28 percent. In 1991, ASEAN investment in China was only US$90 million, increased to US$26.2 billion by 2001, accounting for 6.6 percent of total FDI utilized by China, and further increased to US$38.52 billion by the end of 2005.32 In November 2002, the leaders of the ASEAN member countries and China signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which provides for a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) by the year 2010 for Brunei Darussalam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and by 2015 for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). The Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed between ASEAN and China in October 2003 to further regulate the acceleration of tariff reduction and elimination for products under the Early Harvest Program (EHP) and finalize the Rules of Origin. The EHP has been implemented since 1 January 2004.33 At the eighth ASEAN–China summit in November 2004, ASEAN and China signed the Agreements on Trade in Goods (TIG) and Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation. The Agreement on TIG has been implemented since 20 July 2005, subject to the finalization of each country’s internal procedures, and the Agreement on DSM will provide support to the smooth implementation of the CAFTA. Both sides are now working to conclude at an early date an agreement on trade in services and one on investments under the Framework Agreement.34 ASEAN and China signed an MOU on Transport Cooperation on the sidelines of the ASEAN–China Summit in November 2004. The MOU will strengthen ASEAN–China transport cooperation in a more holistic and integrated manner and lays a solid foundation for medium- to long-term collaboration to support the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area. So far, three projects have been implemented, and an ASEAN–China maritime transport agreement is being considered. ASEAN and China are now working on an MOU on Quality Inspection and Quarantine in support of the CAFTA. ASEAN and China, through the ASEAN+3 mechanism, have achieved progress in promoting regional financial cooperation initiatives by establishing a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) monitoring capital flows, strengthening the Early Warning System, taking steps to develop domestic and regional bond markets, enhancing the effective-

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  261 ness of economic reviews and policy dialogues, and exploring other modalities of regional collaboration and support mechanism.35

Who leads the way? The fast development of China–ASEAN relations invites the question: Why is it so fast and who leads the way? The short answer is that it is because of the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s had greatly reshaped the international and regional strategic landscaping. It brought enormous security uncertainty to both China and ASEAN. With a dramatic decrease of its strategic value to the United States, Beijing worried about a shift of the US security gravity from the former Soviet Union to East Asia, to isolate China diplomatically and to circle and contain it militarily. As a countermeasure, especially when the United States and its Western allies remained firm in their diplomatic isolation and economic sanction against China following the Tiananmen incident of 1989, China worked desperately for diplomatic breakthroughs with developing countries, especially its neighboring countries.36 It was at this juncture that China put forward its new diplomacy, i.e., “periphery diplomacy.” For ASEAN, the end of the Cold War also spelled strategic uncertainty. It is uncertain whether the United States will reduce its military presence in the region and unsure of China’s intention of the region. It has hence adopted what I call (though not its own terminology) a hedging strategy: This is to engage all major powers (including China) “constructively” into the region “for peace and prosperity” (in other words, for a favorable balance of power). It offers to engage China to enhance peace and security in Southeast Asia. Both ASEAN and China have a convergence of interest in avoiding the Cold War mistakes and going into some win–win cooperation. ASEAN also needs China’s political backing to play its role as the primary driving force in regional affairs. This convergence of the strategic interest to engage each other (though not necessarily for the same ends) of both China and ASEAN pulls them closer at a fast pace and, therefore, it would be wrong to force out an either-you-or-me answer to single out who has been leading the way in the bilateral relations between China and ASEAN. It is true that China is often the initiator of many ideas for the bilateral relations (such as the ASEAN–China FTA and the China–ASEAN Strategic Partnership concept) and in the various summits such as ASEAN+China summits and ASEAN+3 summits. However, without ASEAN acceptance, China’s initiative will not go far. For example, China wanted the East Asia Summit (EAS) to exclude India, Australia, and New Zealand. But ASEAN accepted the three countries into the EAS in December 2005. To keep the driver’s seat from external powers, ASEAN decided not to hold the second EAS summit in Beijing as China asked for but only (and also subsequent summits) in ASEAN countries. ASEAN has made it clear that it intends to stay in the driver’s seat in the regional summits and the process of regional integration. China also takes the view that it serves its interest to let ASEAN, instead of other major powers, play the

262  Sheng vital role in the regional integration through various ASEAN+3 summits. There is little doubt about this, but the question is whether in future China will replace ASEAN in the driver’s seat. My answer is “unlikely.” When the development of China–ASEAN relations approaches the “tipping point” of the balance of power in the region, it will likely slow down. This is because, not only will other extra-regional major powers start to put more effort into the region to make sure of the balance, but also regional states will likewise be prudent in developing their relations with China, and with other extra-regional powers such as the United States, Japan, and India, to keep the balance. For the foreseeable future, China does not have the capability to tip over the current balance of power in the region. The following discussion of China’s strengths and weaknesses tells the challenges that confront its ASEAN policy and explains why it is not leading the way in the regional integration and summits.

Why is China unable to lead the way? China’s real influence in Southeast Asia is actually much weaker than most commentators have so far described it. In terms of investment, by the end of 2004, accumulated investment by Chinese companies in ASEAN, as registered in China’s Ministry of Commerce, was only US$1.165 billion (compared with US$38.22 billion of ASEAN investment in China), which made up only 7.7 percent of total overseas investment by Chinese companies.37 Even if we include unregistered ones, the figure will also likely be moderate. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, by 2004 the US investment in Southeast Asia stood at US$85.4 billion. From 1995 to 2003, China’s investment in ASEAN constituted 0.29 percent of the total foreign investment in ASEAN, in sharp contrast to 28.83 percent for the EU, 16.47 percent for the United States and 12.9 per cent for Japan.38 China’s economic aid to ASEAN countries has so far been dwarfed by that from both Japan and the United States. According to China’s State Council and Ministry of Commerce, by the end of 2004, China’s accumulated overseas investment (including investments by both the government and companies) was US$44.8 billion for 149 countries and regions. About 74.6 percent of the total (or US$33.42 billion) went to Asia.39 But taking a closer look we find that 68 per cent went to Hong Kong and 32 per cent went to other Asian economies, including ASEAN.40 Of this 32 percent, if we subtract investment in North Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries, what is left for ASEAN cannot be much. According to the scattered figures from China’s Ministry of Commerce, it is US$625 million for Singapore, US$182 million for Thailand, US$123 million for Malaysia, and US$160 million for Vietnam.41 In 2004 alone, China’s overseas investment in Asia was US$3  billion, 54.6 percent of its total overseas investment. But, of this US$3 billion, the lion’s share (US$2.63  billion) went to Hong Kong and only US$0.37  billion went to other Asian economies, among which US$62 million was for Indonesia and US$48 million for Singapore.42 Although China’s trade with ASEAN is substantial, with so little investment

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  263 and economic aid, its real influence should not be exaggerated. From 2005, China has increased government economic aid and government investment to ASEAN countries, particularly to Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar; however, massive economic aid/investment in ASEAN countries, whether by Chinese companies or the Chinese government, is yet to come, or at least still cannot match those from developed countries in the near future. This is because the bulk of the Chinese official aid (estimated to be a third or even half of the total) is still earmarked for North Korea. Little remains for ASEAN countries as Beijing continues to seek to increase its aid to Africa (as Chinese President Hu Jintao promised in his recent visit to African countries in May 2006 and at the 2006 China–Africa Forum) and Latin American countries. Government investment in ASEAN countries will increase but Chinese companies continue to prefer to invest domestically for various reasons including higher profit and less risk at home than overseas. The result is a massive increase in China’s trade with other countries, but far more modest increase in investment overseas by Chinese companies. China’s foreign reserve is growing fast, over US$1 trillion by October 2006. It is still not clear at this moment whether China will continue to keep a huge foreign reserve (but diversify it in other foreign currencies) or spend it, and whether China will spend it for domestic needs or for overseas investment. If to spend it overseas, will China use it mainly for mergers and acquisitions of companies in developed countries such as in Europe in order to obtain high technology, management, and marketing expertise that China badly needs, or to use it as overseas development aid (ODA) to developing countries? If the latter, will China’s ODA focus on Africa or South America for the energy resources it also badly needs or on ASEAN countries for strategic purposes? While the prospect is not yet clear to see, what so far features clearly and prominently in the China–ASEAN economic relations is not investment and economic aid but the rapid growth of bilateral trade, at an annual rate of 20.8 percent from 1990 to 2003, and over 30 percent from 2001. In 2003, it reached US$78.3 billion, up 42.9 percent over the previous year. In 2004, it was over US$109.9 billion with a growth rate of nearly 40 percent, with ASEAN becoming China’s fourth biggest trade partner, and China the fifth biggest partner of ASEAN.43 These are extraordinary growth rates. But these trade figures can be deceiving. The devil is in the details. First, processing industries by foreign companies (referring to “foreign-owned and/or foreign-invested companies”) in China accounted for 55 percent of China’s total exports in 2004. The latest official figures from China’s Ministry of Commerce show that in 2005 China exported as much as US$762 billion, of which US$416.48 billion was from processing industries. This means that processing industries still made up 55 percent of China’s total foreign exports.44 By another reckoning, in the same year, export and import by foreign companies in China reached US$831.72 billion (an increase of 25.4 percent over the year before), which made up 58.5 percent of China’s total export and import.45 In 2000–04, the value of all exports by foreign companies in China increased from US$119.4 billion to US$338.6 billion, i.e. an increase from 47.9 percent to 57.1 percent of China’s total exports. Their imports increased from

264  Sheng US$117.3 billion in 2000 to US$324.6 billion in 2004, an increase of 52.1 percent to account for 57.8 percent of China’s total imports. Their total import/export during the period increased from US$236.7 billion to US$663.2 billion, an increase of 49.9 percent to a total of 57.4 percent of all Chinese trade. Foreign companies constitute 77 percent of the top 200 exporters in China and 62 percent of the top 500 importers.46 The figures for Chinese exports are based on heavy double counting since China processes only a fraction of the value of the finished products. One US report in the 1990s put the profit rate for China at 17 cents for every US dollar China exported. One Chinese study in 2003 shows that China produces 75 percent of the toys in the world, but only retains one-seventieth of the total profit.47 The New York Times in 2006 reported that “the biggest beneficiary” of China’s increased export is not China: A Barbie doll (China exported to the United States) costs US$20, but China only gets about 35 cents of that . . . Because so many different hands in different places touch a particular product, you might as well throw away the trade figures (of China’s exports).48 This also, in one way or another, applies to China’s trade with ASEAN, most of which is conducted by foreign companies in China. They accounted for 60.6 percent of China’s trade with ASEAN in 2005.49 The foreign component of ASEAN exports to China is even higher. The increase in China–ASEAN trade was in short mainly intra-industrial trade within and between foreign companies in China and Southeast Asia as well as entrepot trade. Intra-industry trade can be a beneficial spur to innovation and competition, especially between different MNCs (much of it between different international companies or between subsidiaries and headquarters of the same international company). It is important to recognize, however, significant double counting as many products, especially electronic products, cross borders twice or more, thereby grossly inflating the trade figures. This double counting is estimated to be as high as 30 percent of the total trade between China and ASEAN. In the China–Singapore trade, which makes up the lion’s share of the China–ASEAN trade, entrepot trade accounts for 46 percent of China’s export to Singapore and 40 percent of Singapore’s export to China.50 That is, a large part of China’s trade with ASEAN ends up in Western consumer markets. Apparently, Western consumer markets have tremendous influence on China’s foreign trade, especially before China can change its current export-oriented development strategy to a domestic consumption-driven one. Chinese companies find it difficult to compete in ASEAN markets. First, they are mainly medium and small companies without the huge funds necessary to compete effectively with the foreign companies, which are already firmly established in ASEAN markets. Second, they are not coordinated and well integrated with ASEAN markets, not even among themselves. They are under the administration of the individual provinces and cities where they are located, which encourage, or rather push, them to “go overseas,” but there is no strong nationwide association for each

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  265 industry to coordinate their overseas strategy. As a result, Chinese companies in Southeast Asia, like in other places in the world, often compete with other Chinese companies from other provinces of China rather than compete with foreign companies in the region. Most of the Chinese companies have not researched the ASEAN markets, lack sufficient knowledge of them,51 and often operate in a “hitand-run” fashion for immediate and once-for-all profits at the expense of their overall long-term interest and reputation, thus rendering them vulnerable to the competition of both foreign and local companies. There is, for example, a flood of cheap and low-quality Chinese products such as garments and textiles in some ASEAN markets. But Chinese companies have not yet posed strong competition in the upper tier of the economic ladder. Third, it is China’s Yunnan province and Guangxi Autonomous Region that have the strongest enthusiasm for pushing into the ASEAN market. The betterdeveloped coastal provinces focus on Western markets and look to ASEAN primarily when they are unable to expand further in Western markets. In 2001, for example, trade with ASEAN comprised the largest portion of the foreign trade of Guangxi and Yunnan (35.6 percent), but only a combined US$1.6 billion, which made up only 3.8 percent of China’ total trade with ASEAN (US$41.6 billion). Guangdong province traded US$15.4 billion with ASEAN countries, which made up 37 percent of China’ total trade with ASEAN in that year.52 However, for Guangdong, China’s top exporter, this was only 8.47 percent of its total foreign trade.53 Its focus was on the US, Japan, and other Western markets. It is the same for other developed Chinese provinces and cities, such as Shanghai, whose trade with ASEAN comprised only 8 percent of its total foreign trade in the same year.54 Thus, this shows that the large competitive Chinese companies do not look to ASEAN as major markets and essential trade partners. China also lacks in-depth research and rich information on developments in the ASEAN market, with the exception of a few ASEAN countries. A successful, deep, and large-scale penetration by Chinese companies into Southeast Asia is difficult at the moment. This point can also be borne out with a closer look at the bilateral trade growth, which appears very impressive in absolute terms, but less so if viewed as a proportion of the total trade. For example, from 2000 to 2005, China’s trade with ASEAN grew at an annual rate of well over 30 percent. However, China’s total foreign trade also increased at an annual rate of over 30 percent over the same period (slightly lower than its trade with ASEAN). In other words, this growth in China–ASEAN trade can well be said to be a normal one (perhaps a bit higher than the normal), especially when one considers that this bilateral trade started from a low base and foreign companies in China, for example, accounted for 60.6 percent of China’s trade with ASEAN in 2005. This trade comprised 8.3 percent of China’s total foreign trade in 2000,55 rising to 10.5 percent in 2004,56 before dropping to 9.14 percent in 2005.57 So, there is growth, but not spectacular growth, especially if we consider that China’s total trade with Asian countries reached US$664.9 billion in 2004 compared with ASEAN trade of US$109.9 billion in that year58). Asian comprised 57.6 percent of China’ total foreign trade in that year, while trade with ASEAN was 10.5 percent.59 In 2005 China–ASEAN

266  Sheng trade grew by 23.1 percent to US$130.37 billion,60 in comparison with previous high growth rates (42.9 percent for 2003 and 40 percent for 2004). In the same year, China’s total foreign trade stood at US$1,422.12 billion, an increase of 23.2 percent over 2004.61 China’s trade with India grew by 38 percent62 and its trade with Russia grew by 37.1 percent.63 So the growth of China–ASEAN trade in 2005 (23.1 percent) was below the average. Viewed from the ASEAN side, the same situation exists. Take China’s largest ASEAN trade partner, Singapore, for example.64 In 2005, its trade with China at S$67.1 billion dwarfed that of many other ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, this figure is not large compared with Singapore’s total foreign trade of S$716 billion that year.65 The author has no intention of denying the fast growth of the trade and its positive impact on China–ASEAN relations, but would like to alert the reader to the danger of accepting trade figures without proper perspective. There has also been exaggeration and too high expectation of the economic significance of the China– ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) on the part of the Chinese side. The significance of the CAFTA is less than expected. For example, as an important component of the CAFTA, China and ASEAN signed the Agreements on Trade in Goods (TIG) at the eighth ASEAN–China Summit in November 2004. TIG started to be implemented from 20 July 2005 with a comprehensive reduction of custom duties. However, after one year, i.e., from July 2005 to June 2006, China’s import from ASEAN reached US$81.61 billion, an increase of 20.4 percent. Its export reached US$61.78 billion, an increase of 23.4 percent.66 Compared with the trade increase of 2003 (42.9 percent), 2004 (nearly 40 percent) and 2005 (23.2 percent), this increase is not spectacular especially after the TIG (comprehensive reduction of custom duties) is implemented. CAFTA is China’s first FTA, but some ASEAN countries still have far more extensive economic ties with the United States, Japan, and the EU than with China. China’s trade with ASEAN will continue to grow. Even if it reaches US$200 billion by 2010 as China predicts, this volume will likely be in a similar (or slightly higher) proportion (around 10 percent at the moment) to China’s total foreign trade and does not make ASEAN an exceptional case of rapid trade growth. China is unlikely to allow its trade deficit with ASEAN to exceed the current level, i.e., around US$20 billion, by too much. China has begun to pay close attention to its economic interests with ASEAN as shown by its hard bargaining in the long drawn-out negotiations between China and ASEAN over two agreements on services and investment. The conclusion of the two agreements has been postponed again and again. Though ASEAN as a whole has increased exports to China, their exports to Western markets have decreased over the past years, partly on account of competitive Chinese exports there. Both China and ASEAN have adopted export-oriented strategies and their economies are mostly competitive rather than complementary, with the exception of Singapore.67 A sound China–ASEAN economic relationship in future will depend on how fast China can upgrade its economic structure to reduce its competition with ASEAN economies and how much more the Chi-

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  267 nese market can absorb of ASEAN’s products. This is a big question. China is now attempting to move from an export- and investment-led growth strategy to one balanced by healthy consumer spending.68 If successful, this reorientation of its development strategy will greatly improve China’s economic relations with ASEAN countries. However, this change will not be abrupt.

ASEAN “pulls” vs. China “pushes” China’s diplomatic success with ASEAN is more because of the changes in international and regional strategic landscape than the rise of its own military power and economic attractiveness, though its diplomatic skills play a role, such as how it makes use of these changes. For example, this success has much to do with the US obsession with terrorism, and relative negligence of the region. It also has much to do with the 1997 financial crisis and with ASEAN’s intention, consequently, not to be taken for granted and its initiatives to engage with China for a constructive balance of power in the region. Very often, people only see Chinese “pushes” into the region without seeing ASEAN’s “pulls.” Without such “pulls,” China’s “pushes” will not go far and may backfire. Consider the improvement in China–Indonesia relations, for example; they have recently declared each other as strategic partners. This has much to do with Indonesia’s (particularly its Muslims’) frustration with the excessive US pressure on it against terrorism, and consequently its intention to use China to balance that pressure. Its overture to build defense ties with China and to buy Chinese weapons can somehow be interpreted as leverage for the United States to lift its arms embargo on Indonesia. This strategic partnership appears more hollow than substantive; shortly after they declared each other as strategic partners in mid-2004, Indonesia upset China greatly by its sudden change of mind on the EAS in early 2005: Instead of supporting the EAS to be made up of the thirteen countries of ASEAN+3, as was Indonesia’s previous position, it now took the initiative to include India, Australia, and New Zealand in the EAS. For Myanmar and Cambodia, who have close relations with China, it is largely because, in the case of Myanmar, the United States chose not to engage with its government and not to trade with, and invest in, Myanmar. US trade sanctions and the embargo against Myanmar still stand. In the case of Cambodia, China is the top investor and trade partner. The United States, because of political considerations, did not, and still does not, massively trade with and invest in Cambodia. If the US changes its policy and put sufficient resources into wooing these two countries, the situation there could be different; there has not been a single case of the US losing to China in winning a country in Southeast Asia, if it chooses to go all out to win it over. If Washington is willing to compromise somehow on other concerns, such as human rights and democracy, and give out massive economic support, its relations with Myanmar and Cambodia will improve and China may not be able to keep its primacy in these two countries. China’s direct influence over the central government of Myanmar is rather limited, as shown in the case of the house arrest of the former Myanmar Prime

268  Sheng Minister Khin Nyunt. China had no information before his arrest and little influence over the government reorganization afterwards. Its influence lies more in Myanmar’s northern border areas than with the central government, which has been trying to keep China at a respectful distance and balance it with overtures to India and Thailand. Beijing often feels unsure of what Yangon has in mind. Myanmar leaders often keep silent to conceal their differences with China and keep a distance from Beijing (in contrast with leaders of North Korea who often argue with Beijing over their differences). The visit by Prime Minister Soe Win of Myanmar to China in February 2006 and its agreement to sell trillions of cubic feet of gas to China through future pipelines mark a boost in bilateral relations.69 But this has more to do with Yangon’s severe sense of insecurity (such as its obsession with both regime stability and possible US military attacks) than China’s influence. In other words, this boost is built as much or more on US “pushes” as on China’s “pulls.” As for Singapore, Beijing views it as being more inclined toward the United States than maintaining neutrality and is concerned that it may clash with Beijing on such issues as Taiwan, US military presence in Southeast Asia, and East Asia integration. Thailand appears to have good relations with Beijing. But it also has good relations with other big powers including its alliance with the United States. Beijing remains concerned about strong US influence on Bangkok. On the issue of joint naval exercises for search and rescue between the two countries, Bangkok resisted and hesitated for a long time and only agreed, at the last moment, to have a very limited, low-profile, and symbolic exercise in late 2005 with a PLA naval fleet that was passing Thailand on its way back from joint naval exercises with Pakistan and India. China’s relations with Vietnam have improved with many interactions taking place at all the levels. But with the territorial disputes in the South China Sea still unresolved and with historical suspicion remaining, Vietnam is deeply wary of a rising China. It may cooperate with China on minor issues and areas, but always holds firmly to its own position on important issues, especially on its relations with the United States and Japan. Despite strong Chinese lobbying, Vietnam repeatedly affirmed its support for Japan to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, though China did, however, replace Japan as Vietnam’s top trade partner in 2004.70 As for China’s good relations with Malaysia, the two countries have similar views on many international and regional issues (e.g., East Asian integration). But this does not mean that the two countries share deep common interests. Malaysia sees opportunities to engage more closely with China for economic benefits and a favorable regional balance of power vis-à-vis other powers. In other words, it is not China that calls the shots. A closer look shows that, in many ASEAN countries, the drive for better relations with China is still narrowly based. For example, in Malaysia and Indonesia, this drive comes mainly from certain business circles. In the Philippines, even many Filipino-Chinese small and medium businessmen hold strong reservations over Chinese economic competition, let alone more influential sectors of the society, such as military, church, intellectuals, police, and judiciary. This is in sharp contrast to the US relationship with the Philippines (and with

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  269 some other ASEAN countries) in which relations not only are long-established but also rest on wide and substantive political, economic, military, and social bonds. This relationship is built not only on the government level but also on extensive private sector and non-governmental levels, such as among NGOs. On the contrary, China’s relationship with many ASEAN countries remains mainly on the high governmental level (such as frequent visits by Chinese leaders) and has not penetrated deeply and substantively to the middle and lower levels of the societies.

“Leaders’ diplomacy” This “leaders’ diplomacy” carries prominent media value and exposure, but, if this “media friendship” between the leaders does not go down deep and wide to the middle and lower levels of the ASEAN societies, it lacks enough substance. When it does reach those levels, many economic, social, and even ethnic and religious problems will erupt, for which neither Beijing nor the ASEAN states seem to be fully prepared. The Chinese companies penetrating into ASEAN markets will meet a lot more of such troubles than do American and Japanese companies. This is not only because the former is a newcomer and the latter have been firmly rooted locally for years with much experience of local public relations, but also because Chinese exports are more competitive in the local economy; American and Japanese exports are more complementary to China’s exports whereas those of ASEAN are very similar. A study showed that in 2002 China’s exports to the US markets overlapped Indonesia by 83.5 percent, Thailand by 76.1 percent, the Philippines by 57 percent, Malaysia by 54.5 percent, and Singapore by 44.2 per cent.71 With this awareness, China is now making an effort to avoid the areas where the competition is with local companies, and choosing to invest and trade more in areas that are mutually complementary, such as raw materials, energy resources, and infrastructure. However, this also shows the limitations: Chinese companies cannot stay forever where they are now. When they expand into other areas to join the competition, as they have to sooner or later, the fear of the Chinese economic threat will certainly grow. How to manage this competition without it developing to affect state-to-state relations is a problem that is not easy to handle, on both sides. Relations between China and ASEAN will meet many obstacles on the road ahead, if they are without a strong and harmonious economic basis. More Chinese companies in Southeast Asia will also bring more Chinese migrants, including more illegal ones. This, if not handled well, may cause alarm amongst local people, regarding possible ethnic tensions.

Weak strategic and political basis The strategic and political basis for Chinese primacy in Southeast Asia is even weaker than the economic basis. Though there is less public talk of the “China threat,” suspicion and distrust of China remains deep-rooted and may grow if a

270  Sheng rising China rushes too deep into Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries are not bandwagoning with, but “hedging” against, China, engaging China while developing robust ties with other extra-regional powers to balance China.72 Asian countries generally do not have much trust of each other and the United States is perceived as the least distrusted of all major powers. They need the United States as a balancer and double insurance when they develop their relations with China. ASEAN is aware that, without a strong relationship with the United States, China may take ASEAN for granted. Why does China offer economic sweeteners to ASEAN through an FTA? Many, if not all, in ASEAN countries interpret this as heavily politically motivated by its strategic concern about the United States. A vigorous but balanced relationship with the United States is therefore seen as not only security insurance but also an incentive for China to make more economic sweaters. Ironically, the more China pushes in deepening its relations with ASEAN, the more ASEAN may feel that it needs a strong relationship with other extraregional powers to keep the balance. China’s defense relations with ASEAN militaries are still very limited and will likely remain so for years to come despite China’s strong interest in enhancing such ties. This is owing to either ASEAN’s (at least some of them) distrust of China (especially over its territorial claims in the South China Sea) or their precaution not to upset other extra-regional major powers, especially the United States, when it comes to such a sensitive issue as military ties with China.73 ASEAN countries may seek to maintain a diplomatic balance between China and the United States. But with respect to military ties, the most sensitive and substantive element of state-to-state relations, they (with one or two exceptions such as Myanmar) have apparently chosen to maintain their tilt toward the United States. This imbalance is demonstrated by the high-level attendance by ASEAN participants to the USpreferred Shangri-La Dialogue or Asia Security Conference, in contrast to the low-level turnout at the Beijing-initiated ARF Security Policy Conference.74 The Chinese “push” into Southeast Asia has alerted other major powers, US, Japan, and India, into stronger response to offset Chinese advances in the region. For example, since 2005 Japan has been encouraging its companies to balance their investments in China with those in Southeast Asia (Vietnam) through its China+1 investment strategy.75 Indian has recently intensified its effort at enhancing its security and economic relations with the region, especially with Vietnam and Myanmar. The US proposal to set up an Asia-Pacific FTA during President George Bush’s visit to Asia in November 2006 can be interpreted as an attempt to shoot down China’s long-standing effort to set up an East Asia FTA.76 As for ASEAN, it is true that it offers to engage China in the effort to avoid the past Cold War conflicts and to encourage regional peace and security. It also wants China’s political backing for its emergence as the primary driving force in regional affairs. However, the Chinese “push” has evoked concern among ASEAN countries that ASEAN’s such standing may be compromised. Over the years, China has repeatedly proposed initiatives such as “China–ASEAN FTA,” “China–ASEAN strategic partnership,” “commemorative summits,” China– ASEAN expo in Nanning, forming an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) for China– ASEAN relations, and many others. ASEAN was characteristically in the position

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  271 of responding to Chinese initiatives. China is diplomatically skilful in mapping such proposals, which ASEAN is not very keen about, but has no reason to turn down. There is growing concern, however, that ASEAN is being led by China down the road towards a tipping point in the regional strategic balance. With internal challenges, such as uneven economic and political developments among the member states (such as the growing “two tiers” of ASEAN) and the complexity of ASEAN integration (ASEAN Community), ASEAN needs “a breathing space” to consolidate as the driver in regional affairs. China, by being proactive with too many initiatives, makes ASEAN find it more difficult to maintain the leadership. What is worse, these proactive initiatives may make some ASEAN countries feel that the regional strategic balance could be tipped. Their efforts to preserve this balance was reflected in the East Asia Summit (EAS) of December 2005, when, with the exception of Malaysia, ASEAN nations supported India’s participation in the EAS,77 and many supported Japan’s proposal to include Australia and New Zealand. In an effort to keep the driver’s seat from external powers, ASEAN decided not to hold a second EAS in Beijing as China requested, but to ensure that the next and subsequent summits would be held in ASEAN countries. China formerly favored the EAS as leading the way toward East Asia regional integration. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, proposed the EAS at the ASEAN+3 summit in 2000. Singapore supported the proposal and suggested having the summit every five years, to be hosted in turn by China, Japan, and South Korea. In 2001, the East Asia Vision Group, formed in 1999 on the proposal of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, presented the formal report to establish the EAS to the 13 ASEAN+3 countries. In early 2003, Malaysia asked to host the first East Asia Summit, a request that was formally endorsed by ASEAN countries at their summit at the end of 2004. China was happy with that development, but was surprised when ASEAN suddenly proposed bringing Australia, New Zealand, and India into the EAS. As one strategist in the think tank of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out, this enlargement of membership challenges China’s previously favorable position in the EAS process.78

Conclusion: prospects For the past decades, China’s diplomatic success in Southeast Asia has often been fortuitous, notwithstanding its diplomatic skills, rather than an outcome of its military, economic, and political muscles, which so far do not impress many. It is the changes in the international and regional strategic environment, together with US absent-mindedness and negligence of the region, that have played a major role in a closer marriage of China and Southeast Asia. The US rapprochement with China in 1972 fundamentally changed the international as well as regional strategic landscape overnight, in which ASEAN countries (such as Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines) had to change their China policy and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, despite no fundamental changes in China’s Southeast Asia policy and no massive increase in China’s military muscle and economic attractiveness. From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, it was Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia

272  Sheng that brought China and ASEAN closer. China made a good use of this occupation and effectively kick-started its first cooperation with ASEAN countries on regional security. This engagement for more than a decade laid a solid foundation for their relations in the subsequent years. The United States, out of its concern of the Soviet influence in the region, acquiesced and even encouraged this engagement. China once again succeeded in penetrating deeper into Southeast Asia without massive increase in its military muscle and economic attractiveness. When the Cambodia issue was put onto the backburner in 1991, the Cold War ended, bringing new uncertainties to the region. Not to wait passively for changes, ASEAN decided to take the initiative in its own hands and actively pursued engaging all the major powers in the region for a constructive balance. For this purpose, it needed China’s political backing to play its role as the primary driving force in this process. It was under this situation that China could make such an easy diplomatic success by building its first official ties with the ASEAN grouping in 1991. However, this relationship in the first few years was still tentative and slow at its best. Very soon, there came a big push: the Asian financial crisis in late 1997. While the United States, for its own reasons, was slow to come to ASEAN’s rescue, China readily responded to ASEAN’s acute need for its political and economic backing, and succeeded in quickly (in November 1997) skyrocketing their lukewarm relationship to the level of the annual ASEAN–China summits. When this momentum began to somehow recede after the ASEAN countries had withstood the initial shockwaves of the economic crisis, there came another boost: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which plunged the United States into a seemingly endless war against terrorism, with neglect of Southeast Asia. It was in this year that China made a diplomatic masterstroke by proposing an FTA with ASEAN to accelerate its cooperation with ASEAN; the momentum was thus well maintained and even built up. All this tells us that China has gained its influence in Southeast Asia less by “muscles,” and more by skillfully exploiting the changes in the international and regional environment, and yet more the absence of a wise and strong US engagement with the region, which provide strong “pulls” on the side of ASEAN to a China that is more than willing to “push” into the region. Now with China rapidly rising, approaching the tipping point in the regional strategic balance, the regional strategic (if not economic) “pull” is slowing down. Though there is less public talk of the “China threat” in the region, distrust of China remains deep-rooted and may grow if a rising China pushes too deep. ASEAN countries are not bandwagoning with, but “hedging” against, China, engaging China while developing robust ties with the United States and other extra-regional powers to balance China. Barring a sudden and major change in the international strategic landscape and a disaster in US Southeast Asia policy that would unexpectedly boost China’s influence by default, the more China pushes (if it does) over the tipping point in the regional strategic balance, the more ASEAN may feel that it needs a stronger relationship with the United States and other

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  273 extra-regional powers to keep the balance. A regional balance is thus maintained. China, despite its rising, has not yet acquired enough economic, military, and political resources to lead the way in the Asian regional integration and fundamentally change the regional balance. China’s attractiveness to ASEAN still mainly lies in its booming market. For example, from December 2001 to September 2005, China’s annual imports stood at an average US$500  billion and created about 10  million employment opportunities for other countries and regions. China’s imports are expected to reach US$1 trillion by 2010.79 What is more, China is willing to make economic concessions such as running a huge trade deficit of around US$20 billion a year with ASEAN and opening its market wide for ASEAN agricultural products. All this provides a strong incentive for ASEAN countries to maintain a good political relationship with China for trade and economic benefits. China’s rapidly increasing foreign reserve (over US$1 trillion by now) provides another attractiveness, as it may spend it as ODA overseas, including ASEAN countries. Thus, China’s soft power may increase, but it is more likely to result in “low soft power” (such as cultural, language, and ethnic linkages) than in “high soft power” (appealing political and social systems and ideologies/belief). It is the high part of soft power, together with strategic interest, that is essential to form strong and lasting alliances between countries. For example, people in Taiwan and mainland China speak the same language and share a common culture, but do not identify with each other politically because they do not share the high part of the soft power. Historically, five main cultures/religions (Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Western/Christian culture, and Chinese Confucian culture) have long been at odds in Southeast Asia. Even at its peak, Chinese culture did not have much influence in the region except in Vietnam (despite their long-standing strategic suspicion and hostility), and at present China is far from having sufficient soft power to reinforce its strategic primacy in the region. Even if China’s soft power is rising, it has a long way to go before achieving the strategic primacy. Without strong soft power, China’s relationship with ASEAN counties cannot but remain socially narrowly based. So far, its relationship with many ASEAN counties rests mainly on high governmental levels and has not penetrated deeply and substantively to the middle and lower levels of the societies. China’s next step, apparently, is going to greatly but steadily broaden its social bases in Southeast Asia through building many more mechanisms and channels from the top to grass-root levels. However, this is very difficult as this effort will encounter not only higher strategic hurdles from both inside and outside the region, but also the deep-rooted ethnic and religious “obstacles,” which China (nor the other powers) has not been able to overcome in the past. Historically, a sensible strategy for a big power is to build a long-term and solid moral and economic basis and wait to be invited in, rather than force its way in. The best diplomacy is to arouse enthusiasm among countries by dealing with them in a way that makes them feel important and appreciated, engaging them without making them feel manipulated, making them

274  Sheng feel that the new relationship is their own initiative and in their own interest, winning them over gradually without causing offence. Beijing is on the learning curve now.

Notes 1 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 through the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967. 2 See the documents on China–ASEAN relations by China’s official Xinhua News Agency such as “Zhongguo yu dongmeng guangxi yuanze” (The Principles of China– ASEAN Relations), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/. 3 Ibid. After 1965, Indonesia did not cut off diplomatic relations with China but only suspended the relationship, which was restored to full or normal diplomatic relations in 1990. 4 Ibid. These principles are: (1) the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; (2) opposing hegemony; (3) equality, mutual benefits, and common development; (4) independence, mutual respect, close cooperation, and mutual support. See “The Principles in China–ASEAN Relations,” available online at www.newgx.com.cn. 5 See ASEAN Secretariat, Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group, November 2005, available online at www.aseansec.org/. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 They are: (1) the China–ASEAN political consultation at senior official level, which later changed to the ASEAN–China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM); (2) the China– ASEAN Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation; (3) the ASEAN–China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC); (4) the China–ASEAN Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation; (5) the ASEAN–Beijing Committee. 9 See the speech by Singapore’s Ambassador to the United States, Chan Heng Chee, at Asia Society Texas Annual Ambassadors’ Forum and Corporate Conference on 3 February 2006, reported in the Straits Times (Singapore), 15 February 2006, pp. 28–9. 10 See the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. 11 See working paper by Jiang Shuxian and Sheng Lijun, “The Communist Party of China and Political Parties in Southeast Asia,” Trends in Southeast Asia series, No. 14, 2005. 12 See the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. 13 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, available online at www.aseansec.org/. 14 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 November 2002, available at www.aseansec.org/. 15 ASEAN–China Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 7 December 2004, available at www.aseansec.org/. 16 See the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. 17 Second International Congress of the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operation in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD), held in Beijing on 18– 20 October 2005. See www.aseansec.org/. 18 Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, Sixth ASEAN–China Summit, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002, available at www.aseansec.org/. 19 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and The Government of the

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20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33

34

35 36 37

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People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, Bangkok, 10 January 2004, available at www.aseansec.org/. Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 8 October 2003, available at www.aseansec.org/. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February1976, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Philippines, 15 December 1987, as amended by the Second Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Manila, Philippines, 25 July 1998, available at www.aseansec.org/. Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, signed at the Seventh ASEAN–China Summit on 8 October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia, available at www.aseansec.org/. See the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (“Treaty of Bangkok”), Bangkok, Thailand, 15 December 1995, available at www.aseansec.org/. See the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. As note 9. See the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. See the official China–ASEAN FTA website, www.cafta.org.cn/. Also see “ASEAN Centre of Contemporary Chinese Studies in offing,” People’s Daily Online (English edition), 27 August 2005; “Hu Jintao: Zhongguo yaxi’an nianmaoyi’e wunian nei kepo 2000 yi meiyuan” (Hu Jintao: China–ASEAN annual trade may reach US$200 billion in five years), Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning News) (Singapore), 27 April 2005. This figure is from China’s Ministry of Commerce, as quoted in “Zhongguo yu Dongmeng hezuo quanmian tisu” (China–ASEAN cooperation in full steam), Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) (Beijing), 8 April 2006, available at www.cafta.org.cn/. See Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China; Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between the Association of South East Asian Nations and The People’s Republic of China; both available at www.aseansec.org/. Also see the Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China; Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China; both available at www.aseansec.org/. See Report of the ASEAN–China Eminent Persons Group. This effort succeeded in China’s establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and South Korea from 1989 to the early 1990s. These figures are from China’s Ministry of Commerce. See also “Zhongguo qiye touzi dongmeng shichang cunzai wenti ji duice fengxi” (Chinese Companies Invest in ASEAN Markets: Analysis of Problems and Policies), on China’s official China– ASEAN FTA website, www.cafta.org.cn/ (accessed on 12 November 2005); “Zhongguo-Dongmeng touzi, laowu hezuo qude jingzhan” (China and ASEAN: Progress in Investment and Labor Service Cooperation), ibid. (accessed on 14 January 2006). This article put the officially registered investment by Chinese companies in ASEAN as low as US$1.14 billion. These figures are from ASEAN Secretariat, quoted from www.cafta.org.cn/. See also “Dongnanya: Zhongguo qiye ‘zouchuqu’ de zhongdian diqu” (Southeast Asia: A Key

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39

40 41 42 43

44 45 46

47 48 49 50 51

52

53 54

55 56 57

Area for Chinese Companies ‘Going Out’ ”), Guoji gongcheng yu laowu (International Projects and Labor), 10 (2005), quoted from www.cafta.org.cn/ (accessed on 5 March 2006) The News Office, the State Council of the PRC, “Zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu” (China’s peaceful development road), Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), 23 December 2005, available at www.people.com.cn/GB/. These figures are also available from the official website of China’s Ministry of Commerce, www.mofcom.gov.cn. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. “ASEAN Centre of Contemporary Chinese Studies in offing,” People’s Daily Online (English edition), 27 August 2005; “Hu Jintao: Zhongguo yaxi’an nianmaoyi’e wunian nei kepo 2000 yi meiyuan” (Hu Jintao: China–ASEAN annual trade may reach US$200 in five years), Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning News) (Singapore), 27 April 2005. See the annual report by China’s Ministry of Commerce, Zhongguo duiwai maoyi xingshi baogao (China’s Foreign Trade), 2006, available at www.cafta.org.cn/. Ibid. “Maoyi daguo anran shice, zhongguo wehe meiyu dingjiaquan?” (A trade power under challenge: why cannot China decide the price?) China Daily (Chinese edition) (Beijing), 19 August 2005. According to China’s Minister of Commerce, Bo Xilai, these foreign companies accounted for 58 percent of China’s total export in 2004. See his press conference on 11 April 2006, available at http://boxilai.mofcom.gov.cn/. News report, China CCTV Channel 4, 17 January 2003. David Barboza, “Some assembly needed: China as Asia factory,” New York Times, 9 February 2006. Zhu Wenwei, “Zhongguo dongmeng huwu maoyi shichang jiang jingyibu kaifang” (China and ASEAN will further open their markets to goods), Zhongguo Maoyibao (China Trade) (Beijing), 12 January 2006. Xu Changwen, “Zhongguo yu xinjiapo jingmao hezuo kuaisu fazhan” (China and Singapore: rapid development in their economic and trade cooperation), Zhongguo Jingji Shibao (China Economic Times), 7 April 2006, available at www.cafta.org.cn/. For details, see “Yingxiang zhongguo yu dongmeng jingmao fazhan de yinsu ji duice” (China and ASEAN Economic and Trade Development: Unfavorable Factors and Countermeasures), on China’s official China–ASEAN FTA website, www.cafta.org. cn/ (accessed on 19 December 2005). Shi Benzhi and Dai Jie, ed., Lancangjiang–Meigonghe ciquyu hezuo yu zhongguodongmeng ziyou maoyiqu jianshe (Lancang River–Greater Mekong Sub-Regional Cooperation and the Building of China–ASEAN FTA) (Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press, 2005), pp. 239 and 254. However, according to statistics from Guangdong province, the total trade of that year was US$14.958 billion. Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau, Guangdong tongji nianjian 2003 (Statistics Yearbook of Guangdong Province 2003) (Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2003). Shanghai duiwai jingji maoyi nianjian 2002 (Shanghai Yearbook of Foreign Economy and Trade 2002) (Beijing: China Commercial Press, 2002) and Shanghai duiwai jingji maoyi tongji nianjian 2002 (Shanghai Statistics Yearbook of Foreign Economy and Trade 2002) (Shanghai: Hanyu Dacidian, 2002). “Forging Closer ASEAN–China Economic Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” a report submitted by the ASEAN–China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation, October 2001, p. 1, available at www.asean.or.id/. My own calculation. “2010 nian zhongguo-dongmeng maoyi’e jiangda 2000 yi meiyuan” (China–ASEAN trade will reach US$200 by 2010), Xin Jing Bao (The Beijing News) (Beijing), 10 January 2006, available at www.cafta.org.cn/ (accessed on 11 January 2006).

China and ASEAN in Asian regional integration  277 58 “ASEAN Center of Contemporary Chinese Studies in offing,” Renmin Ribao, 27 August 2005; “Hu Jintao: China–ASEAN annual trade may reach US$200 billion in five years,” Lianhe Zaobao, 27 April 2005. 59 State Council of the PRC, “Zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu” (China’s Peaceful Development Road). 60 Xinhua News Agency, 17 March 2006, cited on China’s official China–ASEAN FTA website, www.caexpo.org/gb/. 61 See the annual report by China’s Ministry of Commerce, Zhongguo duiwai maoyi xingshi baogao (China’s Foreign Trade), 2006, available at www.cafta.org.cn/. 62 Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, “China could overtake US’s India trade,” Asia Times (Bangkok), 15 March 2006. 63 Xinhua News Agency, 17 March 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/. Their two-way trade for 2005 was US$29.1 billion. 64 Singapore has been China’s largest ASEAN trade partner for many years, though occasionally overtaken by Malaysia. 65 Straits Times, 18 January 2006, p. 1. Total China–ASEAN trade in 2004 was US$109.9 billion. 66 See the interview with China’s Minister of Commerce, Bo Xilai, on 21 July 2006, on China’s official China–ASEAN FTA website, www.cafta.org.cn/ (22 July 2006). 67 See John Wong and Sarah Chan, “China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations,” Asian Survey, 43 (3): 507–26 (2003). 68 Stephen S. Roach, “The untold China story,” Newsweek, 8 May 2006, p. 35. Exports and investments now account for about 75 percent of Chinese GDP. 69 See Pallab Bhattacharya, “Yangon–Beijing gas deal – tri-nation pipeline at stake,” Daily Star (Bangladesh), 14 January 2006; Li Zhongfa, “Wen Jiabao zongli yu miandian zongli Suo Wen zai renmin dahuitang juxing huitan” (Premier Wen Jiaobao and Myanmar Prime Minister Soe Win held a meeting in the People’s Great Hall), Xinhua News, 14 February 2006; Liao Lei, “Guojia zhuxi Hu Jintao huijian miandian zongli Suo Wen tan zhongmian youhao guanxi” (Chinese President Hu Jingtao met with Myanmar Prime Minister Soe Win and talked about China–Myanmar friendship), Xinhua News, 15 February 2006. 70 He Sheng, “Riben wei qianzhi zhongguo jiji gudong benguo ziben jingjun yuenan” (Japan encourages its companies to move to Vietnam in order to constrain China), Shijie Xinwen Bao (World News) (Beijing), 11 April 2006, from China’s official China–ASEAN FTA website, www.cafta.org.cn/. 71 See Chi Hung Kwan, “Why ASEAN did not Seek a Stronger Yuan: Apprehension over the Spread of Currency Appreciation Pressures,” China in Transition (Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry, Japan), 3 October 2003, p. 2, available at www.rieti.go.jp/en/. 72 For further reading, see “Contending Perspectives: Southeast Asia and American Views of a Rising China,” Colloquium Brief, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006. 73 See Sheng Lijun, “An Overview of ASEAN–China Relations,” and Michael Richardson, “ASEAN–China Maritime Security Cooperation,” both in Saw Swee Hock, Sheng Lijun, and Chin Kin Wah, ed., ASEAN–China Relations: Realities and Prospects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2005). 74 Since the Shangri-La Dialogue began in 2002, China has refused to send a defense minister or military chiefs to attend it and has recently even refused to send military personnel, sending only low-level officials from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and heads of some think-tanks. One delegate publicly accused the Dialogue of being “antiChina from the beginning”; see Goh Sui Noi, “No high-level Beijing team as forum is seen as anti-China,” Straits Times, 5 June 2006. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies organized the Dialogue to discuss security issues in Asia-Pacific. Defense ministers and military chiefs or their representatives from the

278  Sheng

75

76

77 78

79

23 countries have regularly attended the annual dialogue, including such Asian countries as Singapore, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Timor Leste. The China+1 investment strategy is to encourage Japanese companies who want to make a new investment in China to invest in another Asian country at the same time; Vietnam has been chosen as this extra Asian country in most cases of new Japanese investments. “Bush vows commitment to Asia,” Straits Times, 17 November 2006, p. 1. Whereas China’s proposed East Asia FTA claims to include 13 East Asian countries, i.e. ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea), Bush’s proposal of an Asia-Pacific FTA includes all those APEC countries that are willing to join the FTA. Mohan Malik, “EAC: More an East Asian cacophony?,” Straits Times, 3 January 2006, p. 19. Wei Min, “Zhongguo Dongmeng guanxi ji dongya hezuo de huigu yu zhanwang” (China–ASEAN Relations and East Asia Cooperation: Review and Prospects), from the official China–ASEAN FTA website, www.cafta.org.cn/ (accessed on 22 April 2006). The author is an associate professor at the China Institute of International Studies, Beijing. The State Council of the PRC, “Zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu” (China’s Peaceful Development Road) (Beijing: The State Council, 2005).

Part IV

China and international relations studies

14 Deconstructing Cultural Realism Anthony A. Loh

Introduction Today, it is almost universally agreed that the rise of China is a central issue of our day. The issue first emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The end of the Cold War was initially followed by a sense of American triumphalism in the United States and, some would say, a vindication of “the American way.” Quickly, however, American strategic thinkers began to scramble for ways to prolong America’s “unipolar moment.” The euphoria quickly gave way to a new hysteria within the US national security community about an alleged “China threat.” But for the unexpected intervention of 9/11 in 2001, the hysteria might have reached a fever pitch. Although global terrorism has temporarily superseded the “China threat,” the two longer-term issues of this century remain how to maintain American hegemony and how to deal with the China threat. It is odd that, in such a global environment of political uncertainty and strategic fluidity, something as important as the Realpolitik tradition as it relates to China is not more explored or written about. For that question, we still have to turn to Alastair Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,1 published in 1995 by Princeton University Press. At the time, there might have been a sigh of relief among members of the US national security community that such a work has finally been produced. Yet this book contains so many fundamental problems that they would need to be addressed before we could proceed further on the question that the book has admittedly initiated. This is not to doubt the abilities of a highly intelligent scholar who had utterly exerted himself in the research for this book. Nor is the problem that Johnston is not versed in Chinese history, culture, and philosophy. Rather, it is a sad testament to the state of research on the question, the purpose that such a research would serve, and the adequacy of applying a Western understanding of Realpolitik to a Chinese strategic issue that is of central importance for contemporary international security. This chapter is more about what Chinese Realpolitik is not, rather than what it is. It is part of a larger chapter in the author’s forthcoming book on contending American and Chinese approaches to hegemony. The chapter is more of a bona

282  Loh fide exploration on what a “Chinese tradition of Realpolitik” would look like, i.e. one that is different from Johnston’s interpretation of it. The chapter here, however, has a more limited objective of presenting the preliminary arguments which are crucial to understanding what might be a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik. It focuses on the need to deconstruct the sole existing systematic interpretation of such a Chinese tradition. As it turns out, this work of deconstruction is absolutely necessary before further work might be presented on the subject.

Basic problems with Cultural Realism Johnston defines strategic culture in terms of two distinct paradigms. These paradigms answer questions about the role of war in human affairs; the nature of the adversary; and the efficacy of military force. According to “Idealpolitik,” or the “Confucian–Mencian paradigm,” (a) war is to be avoided; (b) the enemy can be acculturated; (c) violence is a last resort. According to Realpolitik, or the parabellum paradigm: (a) war is a relatively constant feature of interstate conflict; (b) an enemy is predisposed to challenge one’s own interests; (c) threat is best handled through the application of force. Each of the paradigms, in addition, ranks the following three “grand strategic” preferences: (a) offense; (b) defense; (c) accommodation. For parabellum, the preferences are (a) a zero-sum view of conflict; (b) offense over defense; and (c) violence over accommodation. Idealpolitik reverses the order of the latter two options, and takes a non-zero-sum view of conflict because it holds that the enemy can be acculturated. Johnston’s research agenda consists of the following three questions: first, if there is a Chinese “Realpolitik strategic culture”; second, if it is a persistent one; and third, if it bears on strategic behavior. On the first, he ranks, through coding, the strategic preferences in the Wu jing qi shu (Seven Military Classics; henceforward WJQS). He finds that, although the results not strong, there is enough evidence that the WJQS prefer offensive strategies over static defense and accommodationist options. As to whether the Realpolitik strategic culture is a persistent one, i.e. from “deeply historical, formative periods” (the third and fourth centuries bc) to the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), he focuses on 120 Ming memorials on policy toward the Mongols (16 are scrutinized) and three military treatises. He finds that, once again, though the evidence is not particularly strong, the “grand strategic” preferences are internally consistent with those found in the WJQS. He feels confident to conclude that the Chinese Realpolitik tradition is persistent, in that it is transmitted “across time” and “across structural contexts.” On the final question, Johnston tests for influence of the parabellum paradigm on Ming military policy toward the Mongols. He finds that, just as the WJQS has a preference for offensive, preemptive uses of force, so also the Ming Chinese favored more coercive, offensive strategies. The broader claims of Cultural Realism are, therefore, twofold. First, there is such a thing as a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik. Until now this was not obvious. Johnston’s work purports to have systematically produced, for the first time ever, the historical evidence of a Chinese tradition. The “bonus,” second, is that the

Deconstructing Cultural Realism  283 Chinese tradition is not much different from the Western tradition of Realpolitik itself. Johnston makes two additional important arguments. First, he argues that the Ming preference for parabellum is moderated by the notion of quan bian, which he says is also a lesson from the WJQS. According to it, under unfavorable circumstances one must settle temporarily for a less-preferred strategic option. The pervasive belief in “absolute flexibility” in strategic choice is held “within the context of an overall preference for offensive violence.” This introduces into strategic preference ranking a sensitivity to changes in relative capabilities. Hence, there is a tendency for offensive behavior in periods when the Ming had relative advantage in capabilities, and a shift to less coercive means as this diminishes. Johnston’s second important argument is that the idealpolitik strategic culture merely performs a symbolic or legitimating function; for the most part it is “disconnected” from strategic decisions, and is used in “habitual discourse” designed merely “to justify behavior.” By contrast, Chinese Realpolitik strategic culture, which he claims “strikingly parallels” that in the Western tradition of Realpolitik, performs the real security function by eliminating threats to China through the use of force. It does not matter that the above claims seem rather curious, for, if China’s behavior is consistent with the expectations of the Western tradition of Realpolitik itself, why have US-China relations in the last decade and a half been so unpredictable? It may also seem all too convenient for diehard Cold Warriors to regard the Chinese as akin to the former Soviets. Could it be wishful thinking on their part to superimpose a simplistic way of dealing with the new barbarians on the horizon? The record of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and, most recently, the Iraq War of 2003, may seem to suggest that. Yet Johnston has made some important claims that one simply cannot ignore. Not surprisingly, sinologists have very different things to say about Cultural Realism. Most of them would probably welcome the use of social science methods and the opportunity to open up new areas of research. As Arthur Waldron notes, some have “deep reservations” about the book, while Joseph Esherick affirms, “Few Sinologists are likely to be persuaded by its arguments.” Both agree with David Graff that the treatment of Confucianism in the book is “the least convincing part of his book.” Waldron himself has challenged the conventional wisdom in sinology that the Great Wall of China was built in Han times, arguing that significant sections of the wall were added much later. The reason for perpetuating that “myth” was to legitimize the claim that traditional China’s policies were primarily defensive.2 Yet he wonders how the “Chinese civilization threw up such a vast, misleading and far better-known literature taking the opposite view” of Realpolitik, and how it placed Confucian values “absolutely at the core” over the millennia. Graff asks how Johnston could have empirically verified the fact that Confucianism had not had some causal restraining effect on Chinese behavior, making it less coercive than it would have been. Esherick, finally, notices that there is a “troubling tendency” to judge any (Confucian-inspired) counsel of moral restraint to be contingent on military balances. Johnston, he says, “never

284  Loh confronts the possibility that (Confucian) political preferences kept military forces weak, thus creating that contingency.”3 The critique taken here, by contrast, is not that of a sinologist. Rather, it is a methodological one. From a methodological point of view, there are four fundamental problems with Cultural Realism. The first problem is Johnston’s choice of military texts as a genre for interpreting a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik, as well as the dating of these texts. The second is his choice of the Ming dynasty as his “empirical focus.” The third is his use of the notion of “grand strategy.” Finally, the last questions if Cultural Realism is not more about a “universal military realism” than about “Chinese cultural realism.”

Choice of military texts The first question that arises is whether military texts are an appropriate basis on which to build an interpretation of a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik. Johnston’s main argument is that the Sun Zi Bing Fa (SZBF), which is one of the seven military classics, has been “the textual basis of Chinese strategic culture.” It may be that Johnston looked desperately for a text that could be considered the Chinese equivalent of a realist canon in the Western tradition, but, failing to find it, turned to the military texts in lieu of it. Yet none of the canons in the Western realist tradition is a military treatise. Thucydides and Machiavelli were both military experts. Thucydides was the commander of the fleet that Athenians blamed for losing the colony of Amphipolis in Thrace. But it is his work as a historian, specifically his account of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 bc), that registered as a canon in the classical realist tradition. As for Machiavelli, the English-speaking world has also overlooked his importance as a military writer. The Florentine had written a book called The Art of War, which he believed to be his most important. Yet it is the least known of his major non-literary works. Little is made of the fact that it is the first classic of “modern military science.” This is similar to what one says of the SZBF, that it is an attempt at establishing an “autonomous military science.” International relations theorists, however, have preferred to enter The Prince in the realist canon. They have no more regarded Napoleon’s Art of War, or Clausewitz’s On War, as classic realist texts. Given this, it is curious that anyone should choose the SZBF or the WJQS in general as canons of Chinese realist thought. The mistake is clearly to use the military texts as the basis for understanding a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik, when the Western tradition of Realpolitik itself is not derived from military texts. Not only is the choice of the military texts as a genre a problem, but the specific dating of these texts is a problem as well. As Johnston himself acknowledges, albeit in a footnote, that most – indeed six – of the seven WJQS texts, including the SZBF, are from the same Warring States period (403–221 bc).4 This was a period characterized by a plurality of semiautonomous “central states,” or chung-kuo, from which the present-day “Middle Kingdom” takes its Chinese-language name. The states were engaged in a struggle for survival in a political process of being amalgamated into a single political entity or hierarchical system of empire. There was, as yet, no “China” as we know it. The Qin unification in 221 bc eliminated

Deconstructing Cultural Realism  285 but a dozen or so of these states. The English name, “China,” is reportedly taken from the state of “Qin.” In this case, a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik can hardly be derived from a pre-Chinese system of interstate war.

Choice of the Ming The first bias built into Johnston’s analysis is thus his choice of the military texts. Johnston in fact acknowledges this built-in bias of the Warring States period, again in a footnote,5 and proceeds in any event with his research design. The second built-in bias in Johnston’s analysis is his choice of the Ming dynasty. The obvious question that arises here is what transpired between the Warring States period and the Ming. Interjecting between these periods are some 1,600–2,000 years. Within this long time span, imperial Chinese statecraft developed immensely, along with a bona fide tradition of conducting foreign relations. The military texts were chiefly from the formative period of the Warring States, not the definitive period of Chinese political culture (say, from the Han on). That Johnston focuses on texts from the former, and fast-forwards to the Ming, is to entirely omit the evolving Chinese system of international relations from the Han (202 bc–ad 220) to the Tang (ad 618–907). His time frame ignores the potential impact of the definitive political culture or ideology of state during the ensuing dynasties. It is tantamount to saying that what transpired over the course of nearly two millennia is inconsequential for the interpretation of a would-be Chinese tradition of Realpolitik. Johnston argues that he chooses the Ming as his empirical focus because the Ming decision-makers are “heirs” of Chinese “philosophical and textual traditions,” and are “insulated” from the possible effects of non-Chinese strategic cultures. A Chinese strategic culture, he says, “is more likely to occur in a purer form in a dynastic period where ethnic Hans” draw “explicitly on early Han traditions of statecraft rather than in, say, the Mongol Yuan dynasty or the Manchu Qing dynasty.” By this logic, he should rather have chosen a pre-Yuan dynasty, the Tang (ad 618–907), for instance. Since the Ming followed the Mongol Yuan (1276–1368), how is it that “one can be somewhat more confident” that Ming strategic culture, has not, in his own words, been “contaminated by, say, interaction with Mongol strategic culture”?6 He is aware that “This design faces a couple of problems.”7 As he says, one would have “to become familiar with Mongolian and Manchurian” strategic cultures. But then he flips the problem on its head by saying that “in the Ming–Qing transitions the Manchurian elites were already highly ‘sinified,’ ” and thus did not bring with them a different strategic culture! If the task is to show a “consistency between early formative strategic theory,” which Johnston says he finds in the WJQS, and later Ming strategic culture, then his methodology is faulty. For it cannot be said that Ming strategic culture drew “explicitly on early Han traditions.” To the extent that the Mongol influence on Ming strategic culture was real, the latter would presumably be militarily proned or biased towards the aggressive Mongol strategic culture; as such, it would not be representative of a Chinese strategic culture. Instead, such a bias would again be built into Johnston’s interpretation of a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik. Given the length of imperial

286  Loh Chinese history, one naturally wonders why, if a Western-styled Realpolitik tradition were as prominent as Johnston claims it is, there had not been more military texts. Johnston himself notices that the production of military writings was “something of a growth industry” during the Ming. This would suggest that the period was an anomaly. As Waldron points out, (before the T’u-mu campaign) the Ming “behaved like Yuan” by assuming earlier Mongol garrisons, succeeding the entire Yuan patrimony (including the province of Mongolia), and keeping a sizable military on the borders while overlooking defensive works.8 Likewise, before that, the Sung interest in the military power was revived as a result of an upsurge in violence along the northern frontiers. The court thus commissioned the compilation of the ancient texts for the first time. For the same reason, there is a Ming edition of the Sung-compiled WJQS. In a word, it would be easier to try to establish a consistency between the cultural realism that can be expected in the Mongol strategic culture, and the military realism that also could be expected in the WJQS, as in the Ming strategic culture. To sum up so far, then, comparatively speaking, basing a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik on the Ming historical period (aside from the military texts) would be like basing the entire Western tradition of Realpolitik on, say, the period of Peloponnesian War. But the Western tradition of Realpolitik is not based solely on that war period. What makes it possible to consider Western Realpolitik a tradition is the fact that there is an intellectual tradition from Thucydides to Machiavelli, from Morgenthau to Kissinger, over the course of some 2,500 years. These have produced among them a cumulative body of work that reflected the continuity of a Western tradition, which we can appropriately call “realism.” In the ancient Chinese case, there was no such intellectual–theoretical tradition, or international relations tradition in practice. Nor is there a cumulative body of works that might be called “canons” of the faith. Indeed, there has not even been a single author credited with articulating such a Chinese tradition. Lastly, even if fragments of a Chinese realist thought might be pieced together and gleaned from a number of classical texts, they did not by any means constitute a dominant school of thought in ancient Chinese. In fact, to the extent that such a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik ever existed, it had never even constituted a mainstream school of thought.

Grand strategy, national security, and Confucian statecraft Problems arise as well when Iain Johnston addresses questions of grand strategy. First, in regards to the WJQS, he admits that the texts are “largely concerned with military strategy, tactics, and training,” and that this is a “problem.” But he insists that some of them “imply” grand strategy.9 He argues that, more than the other texts, the Liu Tao, which is dated towards the late Warring States, provides “a comprehensive discussion of different levels of statecraft and what would be termed ‘national security’ today.”10 It is difficult to see how there could have been a national security doctrine or grand-strategic policy when there was no unified China to speak of before the Qin. In the sole post-Han text, the Wen Dui, he claims there is an extended discussion between the Tang emperor and his chief strategist Li Jing “on national security issues.” But, again, how can this be when he notes

Deconstructing Cultural Realism  287 himself that the text pays no attention to “the political, economic, or moral sources of state security”?11 As he rightly puts it, grand strategy is a “national strategy” that coordinates all elements of national power (economic, political, military) to accomplish national goals, while “military strategy” is the coordinated use of military force to accomplish the military goals. Military texts, one would expect, deal primarily with military strategy. Grand strategy is not only about warmaking; it is also a national strategy during peacetime. It also deals with economics, society, morale, trade, industry, quality of government, etc. – the whole range of factors. The problem is that Johnston does not, indeed cannot, address the grand strategic questions about the allocation of national resources. This is because his micro-textual analysis would not allow him to address what are essentially macro-historical and theoretical questions. What ratio of the national defense budgets, for instance, did the various dynasties commit to offensive as opposed to defensive weapons, to the development of military technology, and to weapons procurement? Is there a historical pattern? Finally, one would presumably need cross-national data to compare the way China spent its resources with the way that other surrounding countries did. These are broader questions than can be answered by a corpus of military texts primarily from the pre-unification period. By contrast, Confucian statecraft, which Johnston writes off as largely irrelevant, is truly a national concern. It is a philosophy of state about how to hold the Chinese empire together, both domestically, as well as in relation to China’s tributary states. Next, in regards to Ming China, Johnston claims that it had a grand strategy towards the semi-nomadic Mongol tribes on the northern frontier. To begin with, there is already the difficulty of constructing a coherent grand strategy for a diverse territorial empire. Consider, for instance, the difficulty Luttwak has with reconstructing a coherent grand strategy for the Roman Empire.12 Second, there is the difficulty of generalizing about China’s grand-strategic preferences on the basis of a single “case study” – which is what Johnston’s treatment of Ming–Mongol relations is. Johnston’s method essentially lumps relations between a tribal quasistate and the Chinese empire on the latter’s northern and northwestern fringe together with China’s traditional relations with the tributary states. Yet he can no more generalize about Chinese grand-strategic traditions from Mongol–Chinese relations than he can from the interstate relations among the competing Chinese states during the Warring States period. Once again, in order to be consistent with the Western tradition of Realpolitik, he should rather have derived a Chinese tradition from China’s international relations proper. Third, just as problematic is that Johnston focuses on Ming military policies, and not its diplomatic tradition, which is what the Western tradition of Realpolitik is. The real question is why the 2,000 or more years of history of diplomatic relations between China and the other bona fide nation-states like Korea, Vietnam, and Japan are glossed over in Johnston’s treatment. It is not sufficient to fall in line with Morris Rossabi’s challenge of John Fairbank’s mainstream interpretation of traditional Chinese foreign relations without addressing the latter. Finally, Johnston’s heavy reliance on the “culturally unique” notion of quan bian actually undermines his claim that there is a traditional Chinese preference for offensive grand strategies. Quan bian (literally, “to observe change”) is about

288  Loh flexibility as to when and how to fight, as Johnston says, within the context of conflict. But this context is not the national or international context; rather, it is the battlefield context. Quan bian dictates that once a battle begins “all hell will break loose,” and that there will be “no holds barred” in the game. In this instance, the use of force is without doubt the key to success. From here on, the aim is to attack when the enemy least anticipates it, to focus on his weak points, to apply maximum force, strengthen logistics, roadworks, and earthworks, and dispatch intelligence agents to deceive the enemy, etc. Any offensive is purely contingent in the tactical sense, that is, upon rapidly changing balances on the battlefield (which are functions of troop deployment, casualty rate, etc.). Quan bian is not based on any cross-national data analysis here either. It is not, as Johnston strongly seems to imply, the Chinese equivalent of the key structural realist notion of changing relative distributions of capabilities across the states in a given international system.

Universal military realism vs. Chinese cultural realism Johnston may counter-argue that it does not matter if Chinese Realpolitik derives from dealing with the marauding horsemen that emerged from Inner Asia or with the professional standing armies of a large territorial state. The Mongols, either out of greed or because of insecurity, would suffice to compel the Ming Chinese to resort to the means of violence. Sustained border skirmishes with these militant tribes, given the right conditions, could develop into real threats to Chinese national security, as in fact they did later on, leading to the founding of the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing dynasties. As it turns out, all along, by Chinese cultural realism, Johnston means little more than an operational or military realism. In the conclusion of his book, he says that “China’s operational strategic culture is apparently not particularly unique,” and that “there is no a priori reason to expect” that other states’ strategic cultures “will be very different from the Chinese.”13 If an “operational strategic culture” is what he identifies as a Chinese Realpolitik tradition, it is in fact neither “Chinese” nor “cultural.” It hardly needs to be said, first of all, that the Western tradition of Realpolitik is not about military realism, any more than it is based on military texts. Johnston’s “discovery” of a Chinese Realpolitik strategic culture is far from being anything “heuristic,” and is expected given his use of the military texts and focus on the Yuan-influenced Ming, as we have seen. What Johnston offers is essentially a reductionist interpretation of a would-be Chinese tradition of Realpolitik; that is, he reduces the latter to a mere use of military force, to some truism about the violent nature of warfare. These are the “lowest common denominators” of a military realism shared in any historical or cultural context. Is Chinese cultural realism merely about “preparations for warfare” and “the ability to conduct war successfully”? Apparently, for Johnston, it is. He admits that the SZBF cautions against the use of force and admonishes against belligerence. But he insists that these “do not add up to a rejection or downplaying of warfare or violence on a priori moral, political, or military grounds.”14 Given

Deconstructing Cultural Realism  289 this, it is no wonder that Johnston’s rendition of a Chinese Realpolitik tradition would be “not much different” from the Western Realpolitik tradition, and that the Ming would share the same kind of realism as the Warring States, or attempt to extract lessons from the WJQS. For an operational–military realism no doubt is cross-dynastic (from the Warring States to the Ming), cross-cultural, and thus universalistic: it can be observed any time, in any army or state. This is not because Chinese realism as Johnston defines it belongs to some universal Realpolitik strategic culture, but because it is just operational realism. An operational realism, in fact, does not need the analytical concept of strategic culture. If Johnston’s goal is merely to show that the Chinese practiced war in the same way as any army, he does not need to address the Confucian elements in the WJQS. He says that he has chosen these texts because they do not narrowly focus on “what to do once war has broken out,” and because they contain “Confucian–Mencian, Legalist and Daoist traditions in Chinese statecraft.” Yet after reconceptualizing Confucianism as a strategic culture, he then functionally removes precisely these elements from his interpretation of a Chinese Realpolitik tradition, which he bases entirely on the parabellum elements. In other words, he is wrong to omit Legalism in his interpretation of Chinese Realpolitik, but he is right to look at the Confucian elements as embodied in the WJQS (perhaps more out of necessity). But then he is wrong again to relegate those elements to a mere symbolic role. For, in so doing, his reading of the texts eliminates the effects of “culture,” which he ascribes to his interpretation of Chinese Realpolitik, i.e. “cultural realism.” This reading is thus wrong not only because of his choice of the texts, but also because of its handling of the Confucian elements in the texts. Finally, the very notion of two contradictory strategic cultures in a single text is not plausible, especially since a strategic culture concerns life-and-death situations. This is particularly problematic because Johnston himself says that a strategic culture consists of (a) a central paradigm and (b) an operational level.15 If this is the case, why is Confucianism treated as if it has no operational value whatsoever? The problem here is that, by removing the Confucian elements from an alleged Chinese Realpolitik paradigm, Johnston is able to exact a certain kind of results. He asks how he can operationalize strategic culture so as to make it empirically testable, and then proceeds to test such an operationalized strategic culture for influence on strategic choice and behavior. Yet by defining strategic culture as one that is empirically testable, he reduces it to a merely functionalistic one. By building the empirical bias into the interpretation of what are already highly selective texts, his method of “proof” is tautological. The method relies on what can be readily determined as “causal.” What cannot be empirically verified as such is removed from the analysis and treated as irrelevant or insignificant. Accordingly, Johnston is able to bring about an interpretation of a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik that is more in accord with the Western tradition. But it is odd that he should call the Confucian–Mencian paradigm a strategic culture when it is viewed as being unrelated to the security of the state and as having little or no bearing on the actual practice of war. It may be recalled that Clausewitz defines war as “an act of violence intended

290  Loh to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”16 War by necessity is the conflict of wills and interests that are deemed irreconcilable. The logic of war is necessarily destruction, since war presumably would never have broken out had there been other ways to resolve the conflict between the parties. Once war breaks out, the aim is to compel one’s adversary to succumb to one’s will. The logic is that every war ought to end in a complete victory of one side over the other, and that moderation in war is an absurdity. There is no room to imply that a Confucian strategic culture requires the Chinese to allow themselves be massacred on the battlefield. Quite the contrary, failing to utilize all the force at one’s disposal or wavering in one’s determination to win defeats the very purpose of war. This is why the Prussian general calls it “absolute war.” Sun Zi, the Chinese general, shares in Clausewitz’s logic, as would any military commander with field experience. The universality of military logic lies in the fact that war is always “purposive” – that is, it is always pursued with the purpose of bending the will of the opponent towards one’s own. Compelling one’s opponent to fulfill one’s will is used in the logical sense. This kind of military realism has nothing to do with a cultural tradition of Realpolitik. In addition, Clausewitz has something instructive to say here about the correlation between “higher degrees of civilizations” and the “military spirit.” He observes that “That a civilized people may also have a warlike tendency and development is a matter of course; and the more this is general, the more frequently also will military spirit be formed in individuals in their armies.”17 The suggestion is that, the more developed a nation is, the more likely it will produce military geniuses. In his mind, there is nothing inherently contradictory about a high civilization “producing” a few military geniuses, such as Napoleon was to the French civilization. Indeed, a civilization is likely to produce military geniuses at levels that directly correspond to the level of sophistication of that civilization. This correlation says nothing about the content, nature, or general orientation of a civilization, or about a Realpolitik tradition. The fact that ancient China produced a Sun Zi should not lead one to conclude that a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik is thereby to be equated with his thought or interpreted on the basis of his military writings.

Conclusion That there is a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik is not self-evident; that such a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik is important – to the extent that it actually existed or exists – is. Johnston’s first cut at this enterprise to search out such a tradition is an admirable one. However, his relentless pursuit of a research agenda and the unfortunate use of a faulty and tautological methodology has rendered Cultural Realism less than desirable. Since the publication of the book in 1996, Cultural Realism seems to have by and large fallen into oblivion. There have been few references to it; there has not been another major treatment, or a serious attempt to engage Johnston in a debate, or follow-up studies of the same question, not even by Johnson himself. Indeed, there seems to have been a code of silence, as if the

Deconstructing Cultural Realism  291 idea of a Chinese Realpolitik tradition had been quietly killed. Could it be that no such tradition existed in ancient China, at least not in the form of the Western tradition, or in the way that Johnston has represented it? Alternatively, could Cultural Realism have deepened the roadblocks to understanding what might be a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik? Johnston selects two very anarchic periods of Chinese history – the Warring States, arguably one of the most anarchic, and the Ming. He plays down the role of Zhou hegemony in paving the way for the Qin unification of China and the Han dissemination of Confucian orthodoxy – the former provided the structural and the latter the ideological context for the incipient development of what might be called a Chinese tradition of Realpolitik. And he chooses the military texts primarily from the pre-unification period. No amount of empiricism is going to correct for these built-in biases. There are too many counterfactuals and disclaimers, where vital sinological scholarship is all too often relegated to marginal footnotes. Each element in the title of Johnston’s book needs instead to be scrutinized: that is, “cultural realism,” “strategic culture,” “grand strategy,” as well as “Chinese history.” Finally, Johnston’s handling of what is anything but hard data leaves open the question as to his criterion for determining what is symbolic. Could this process of data sifting, data processing, and data interpretation leave so much room for discretion? If Chinese Realpolitik in the twenty-first century will be a hybridized form that mixes patterns of Chinese and Western traditions of Realpolitik, it would still be different from the tradition that the US draws on. For this reason, it is crucial that experts from any one country will not singularly dominate the field of security studies. The foundation of security studies should not be any one individual nationstate, but the bilateral relations between two or more states. In order to maximize the security of one state, it is necessary to understand the strategic traditions of the other state. And few issues in US–China relations are likely going to be more central than an understanding of their contending Realpolitik traditions. What one should beware of is the potential logrolling effect of an emerging consensus among the East Coast security experts that seek to create a critical mass of opinion about an illusive China Realpolitik that goes back to time immemorial. The real threat is that security studies are primarily driven by the one-sided assumptions of Western realism. Because of what is potentially at stake for international security, it is incumbent upon us all to get this right. This is true whether the US regards China as a “strategic partner,” as the Clinton administration did, or as a “strategic competitor,” which the Bush administration stops short of calling China. What then will be the cause of concern in the coming decades as China modernizes its military against the standards of the US military? It is that if there is going to be a military conflict between China and the US, it will be because there are not one but two traditions of Realpolitik.

Notes 1 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

292  Loh 2 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Waldron, “The Problem of the Great Wall of China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 43 (2): 643–63 (1983). 3 Reviews of Cultural Realism by Arthur Waldron, Chinese Quarterly, 147: 962–4 (1996); David Graff, China Review International, 4 (2): 450–3 (1997); and Joseph Esherick, Journal of Asian Studies, 56 (3): 769–71 (1997). 4 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 63, footnote 2. For the dating of the texts, see Johnston, chapter 2, particularly pp. 40–4. The single exception among the seven texts is the Li Wei Gong Wen Dui, which is a Tang work. 5 Ibid., p. 41, footnote 10; see also p. 63. 6 Ibid., pp. 29–30, footnote 31. 7 Ibid., p. 55. 8 Waldron, “The Problem of the Great Wall of China,” pp. 643–63. 9 Johnston, pp. 48–9 and 84; see also p. 128. 10 Ibid., p. 87. 11 Ibid., p. 91. 12 See Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976). 13 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 259. 14 Ibid., p. 95. 15 Ibid., p. 37. 16 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 101. 17 Ibid., p. 139.

15 Toward a Chinese school of International Relations? Ren Xiao

Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese International Relations (IR)1 community has been undergoing a process of reflection on the state of IR studies in China, including its progresses, defects, and possible future agenda. This process is epitomized by articles appearing in major Chinese international studies journals and discussions in national IR conferences.2 Although the progress and achievements over the past quarter of a century are positively acknowledged, there are also expressions of dissatisfaction and debates about what the desirable goals should be and what kinds of efforts need to be made.3 These discussions in turn must be seen against the backdrop of the global attention paid to China’s rise in the world arena, and the essential question of how China sees its relations with the global community. Those reflections show that IR in China now has more self-consciousness than ever and a growing sense of autonomy. In this chapter, I argue that, of all the new developments in China’s IR studies, the most important and valuable one appears to be the explorations for the construction of a “Chinese school” of International Relations studies. The purpose of the chapter is to analyze the movement and to look into its implications for Chinese IR studies.

The quest for a “Chinese School” At the outset, it was just a lonely call for an upgraded, more autonomous Chinese IR that might be called a “Chinese school.” Later on, this appeal won supporters and proponents, whilst arousing criticisms and disagreements. Today, it is becoming a mainstream view or even a consensus and hence a shared objective for the Chinese IR community.4 As early as August 1987, a different but related appeal was made for an “IR with Chinese characteristics.” During the first national conference on international relations theory held in Shanghai, Mr. Huan Xiang, then Director-General of the China Center for International Studies and a long-time foreign policy advisor to Chinese leaders, put forward the need for China’s own IR theory with Chinese characteristics.5 Among the proponents who followed this proposal, Liang Shoude, a Peking University professor, is a leading representative. Since the early

294  Ren 1990s, Liang has advocated that Chinese international political theory-building should stress the “Chinese characteristics.” This means recognizing specific characters of IR in individual countries as well as diversities amongst them, but also emphasizing a pioneering spirit and the pursuit of excellence.6 He elaborates: The Chinese characteristics of the study of International Politics refer to basing oneself upon China and to facing up to the world, as well as to studying objective laws of the evolution and development of international politics from a Chinese perspective.7 He explained that the stressing of “Chinese characteristics” is to bring to light the true features of international politics and to build China’s own discipline of International Politics in good order, through autonomous studies.8 However, what a “Chinese perspective” was and how work of that kind should be carried out were among the issues not sufficiently explained. For some of the skeptics, an “IR with Chinese characteristics” was more or less a transplant from the well-known political slogan, “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” For others, Chinese studies of International Relations, theory or not, are necessarily conducted in the Chinese way and therefore it is unnecessary to make the call. For instance, Wang Yizhou of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) “tends to refrain from saying so [that there is a Chinese IR] at this stage,” and the reason is that “thus far we have made little contribution to International Politics as a discipline.” Another basis for skepticism was the concern that Chinese IR needs to distinguish ideological pursuit from the search for national interests, and policy analysis from academic research.9 If the contention surrounding “Chinese characteristics” tended to be hollow, the proposition of a “Chinese school” and its winning support are apparently a pursuit that is more self-conscious, more serious, and much richer in content. This initiative is also more solidly based than the former “Chinese characteristics” contention. The early calls for a “Chinese school of international relations theory” were in 2000, from two scholars of the younger generation who were at Peking and Fudan Universities. The view of Mei Ran at Peking University was that “[t]he students of IR theory in China should make their research have creativeness and independence in order to breed a ‘Chinese School of international politics’.” He argued: To display a ‘China brand’ is to expose the unreasonable circumstances of the current global IR community and to stress the significance of transforming this situation, as well as to demonstrate the courage of the Chinese scholars to participate in this change.10 For Mei, one country’s (i.e. the United States’) domination of a discipline was an abnormal phenomenon and was not favorable to its healthy development. Therefore, “single-centeredness” had to become “multi-centeredness.” In August 2000, from my base as a Fudan scholar, I published an article in

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  295 a Beijing-based journal whose current English name is Chinese Journal of European Studies.11 The article argued that Chinese specialists must aspire to put forward Chinese theoretical viewpoints and propositions. They should then proceed to develop systematized theories of international politics. This objective can appropriately be called a “Chinese school of International Relations theory.” The article went on: [we] can be cautiously optimistic about the invention of a Chinese School of IR theory. To erect Chinese theories is not simply to seek the opposite to the Western theories, or to search for a difference for difference’s sake, but rather means that we Chinese, instead of just absorbing and transplanting, should have a spirit of thinking independently and should not always follow others. In a word, the Chinese should have their own theoretical contributions.12 The article aroused mostly skeptical responses from Chinese colleagues. Su Changhe pointed out that any school as such was not self-proclaimed but rather needed to be recognized by others, and Zhang Xiaoming held that a school appeared to be too remote a goal.13 Undoubtedly, skepticism should be given some credit. At the same time, although it is true that a school does not simply come into being when it is given a name, subjective efforts do matter for it to take shape. To defend the value of a “Chinese school” as a goal, this author published another essay in 2003, entitled “Learning from the English School.” The article insisted that it is a desirable objective and worthwhile effort “to construct a Chinese School.”14 In September 2002, Qin Yaqin of the Foreign Affairs College wrote a general preface for a translated series of books on International Relations theory published by Peking University Press. The preface said: [I hope] this book series will turn into ‘stones from other hills that serve to polish the jade of this one’, and will enable colleagues of the Chinese IR community, through learning, thinking, and criticizing, to put forward original IR theories and to establish a Chinese School of international relations theory.15 In this way, Qin explicitly concurs with, and advocates the value of, the objective of creating a Chinese school of IR. In a similar fashion, some other scholars call for “indigenization” (ben tu hua) of IR. One of them, Li Bin of Nanjing University, argues that: The key to the indigenization of Chinese international relations theory is to put forward a systemic explanation of international relations that is in China’s core national interest . . . An indigenized Chinese IR theory, in a sense, is to link the revival of the Chinese nation via the country’s economic development with cooperation and conflict in the world . . . A Chinese theory should neither be some footnotes of what the leaders say, nor a “cartoon-style” illustration of Chinese foreign policy. Instead, it has to be a product that is

296  Ren deduced from scientific paradigms, or enlightenment that is naturally and deliberately obtained through a process of telling “historical stories.” To me this is the most crucial objective and format requirement for China’s IR theoretical innovations.16 Here, Li Bin emphasizes what a Chinese IR theory is and is not. He points out that people must go beyond just “adding footnotes” or “illustrating” the doctrines of Chinese foreign policy which used to be the case in the past. However, it is unclear what he means by “indigenization,” a term his article fails to explain in a more detailed way. As will be discussed later, the issue turns out to be a crucial one and not without debate. It is Qin Yaqing who has fully elaborated and conducted the most comprehensive explorations so far on the “Chinese school” issue. He also appears to be its most optimistic proponent, stating that the formation of a Chinese school of International Relations is not only plausible but also destined.17 He provides three bases for his optimism. First, a Chinese school is possible because a social theory differs from a natural theory in that the former has a distinct geo-cultural birthmark. In other words, any social theory is by nature built on a particular geo-culture, which is different from so-called indigenization. The indigenous consciousness and characteristics that Qin Yaqing himself argues stress that a theory grows in the context of a certain culture and it further develops and gains universality by interacting with other cultures. Second, three sources can provide a basis for a potential Chinese school: namely the tian xia worldview and the practice of the tributary system; the revolutionary thoughts and practices in China’s search for modernity; and the ideas and practice of the reform and opening up. Third, over the past century and a half, China’s greatest problem has been the identity dilemma vis-à-vis the international system. Nowadays, the rapid development, the great social transformation, and the fundamental ideational changes which have all taken place have enabled China to begin solving this dilemma fairly successfully. China’s interactions with the international system and the resultant debates will inevitably lead to the emergence of a Chinese school of International Relations theory.18 The growing self-awareness of the Chinese IR community has to do with the attention paid to the English school, as well as American IR. American theories have been exerting widespread influence in China. To a large extent, this kind of US influence is inevitable and the reasons are obvious. American IR scholars are many, they have access to substantial funding, products and journals are numerous, and there are opportunities to study or to spend a research stay in American universities. No other country can match the US on these fronts. As a result, it is not surprising that the American IR theories and schools of thought are having considerable impact upon many other countries. China is certainly no exception. Therefore, the stage of experiencing American IR influence is impossible to bypass for a country whose scholars are latecomers to IR theory. Nonetheless, China differs from smaller countries.19 It is a major power and a civilization with a long continuous history and rich culture. It should not be a

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  297 surprise that scholars in such a country may be more culturally and academically self-conscious than in a country such as South Korea. As Chinese IR scholars became aware of the enormous influence of American IR, they began to tap into the products and thoughts of the English school of international relations. Leading scholars of the English school, such as Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Barry Buzan, and their works became well known in Chinese academic circles and their theories drew much attention in China. Chinese IR scholars realized, with some surprise, that outside the US there has also been research, the high quality of which is no less, and perhaps greater, than the American research. Consequently, major books by the English school scholars, such as Bull’s Anarchical Society, Wight’s Power Politics, Buzan and Richard Little’s International Systems in World History, and John Vincent’s Human Rights and International Relations, were translated into the Chinese language. The English school’s humanistic orientation and its historical perspectives have come to be much appreciated amongst the Chinese IR community, and its influence continues to expand. The works of the English school were important on some basic counts. These works were of interest in their own right, and as an alternative to the American IR theory. At the same time, they highlighted the question of whether there might be a Chinese equivalent—if there could be an English school, why not a Chinese school? Chinese IR scholars’ wariness of the dominance of American IR is a further reason why the “Chinese school” thesis has been put forward. As Wang Yizhou notes, “Professor Chen Lemin20 has criticized the Chinese IR research community for permitting the American IR to exert too much influence and counseled attention to scholarships from other regions such as Europe.”21 Wang agrees with Chen and asks “how to go beyond the America-centered situation?” He points out, “there has to be a direction we are moving to, no matter whether it is feasible at the moment. We must try to do so self-consciously.”22 The feeling that “there is too much American sort of thing” seems to be common within the Chinese IR community. Seeking novelty by whatever means characterizes the American academic culture, and if one only follows the new developments of others, one will always lag behind other people. A logical question then is, “how to establish China’s own perspective, style, and language in International Relations theory?”23 With discussion and research ongoing, “Chinese school” explorations are unfolding and deepening; below I will try to analyze them in turn.

What is a “Chinese school”? What is a “Chinese school”? For Pang Zhongying, a “Chinese school” is a cluster of IR theories with Chinese characteristics, rather than referring to a single school. In other words, there can be two or more schools of thought within a Chinese school. The English school of international society theory tells people that the achievement of a “Chinese school” may not be that far away. He asks, “China has its own long-standing political ideas, philosophy, and history; why can’t we construct our own IR theory by relying on so rich historical accumulations?”24 In

298  Ren other words, the Chinese have the favorable conditions necessary to build their own IR theory. The question is: How should people proceed to build China’s own theories and by what means? Pang further proposes an “open-style autonomous development” approach. He explains that openness means a readiness to learn from others’ methods, concepts, and knowledge, and to participate in worldwide dialogues and exchanges, as well as a readiness to diffuse Chinese views. Autonomous development means to integrate Chinese political ideas, social science traditions, historical experiences, and East Asian international relations practice into IR theoretical considerations. In this way, the situation of Western theories dominating world IR theory will hopefully be altered25 and a healthy Chinese alternative perspective may emerge. Others also argue that the development of Chinese theory itself is to be achieved by exchanges among what might be called differing Chinese schools. For example, Yu Zhengliang of Shanghai Jiaotong University suggests that Chinese IR theory should not be a unified or sole IR theory; its development depends on the learning that will come from contention. For Yu,

A “school” refers to a specific research group, who share similar research orientations, inclinations, and academic styles. It comes into being because of specific academic inheritance, specific perspective on observing matters, and distinct judgment of reality and future. Schools of thought are essential for activating academic studies. Interactions between them give rise to theoretical innovation. Forming schools of thought plays a very important part in inheriting academic cream and bringing up academic masters. No schools, no masters.26 For Lu Peng, one fundamental question remains to be answered: Why is a Chinese school or Chinese IR theory necessary and possible?27 The question involves how people understand the possibility of social sciences. Proponents of monism argue that both natural science and social science are sciences with no fundamental difference between them. Proponents of dualism argue that the natural world and the social world are different. The fundamental difference between them is that, in the social world, both the subject and the object are human beings, and hence there is no possibility for being value-free. The proponents of monism believe that IR theory is trans-border, and anything that can be called theory is universal, because the existence of law does not change as time or space changes. By contrast, the proponents of dualism believe that natural science theory does not vary across borders, whereas, they say, social science theory can differ from one country to another. The reason is that, in the social science field, “understanding” as an important way of obtaining knowledge is confined by culture – which differs from place to place. The differences in geoculture, history, ways of thinking and collective memory can lead to differences in human understanding. Therefore, a national label for an IR theory is not only possible, but also inevitable.28

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  299 Whereas Qin and this author are on the dualism side, Yan Xuetong and others are on the monism side. For Yan, all IR theories are universal and they have no national characteristics; thus the goal of building a Chinese IR theory is not achievable.29 This appears to be an extreme viewpoint. Of course, a theory is a generalization to explain and decode wide-ranging phenomena. However, inevitably there exists subjective orientation, by no means unrelated to what country one comes from. One’s national environment and living conditions undoubtedly affect the concrete shape and contents of one’s theoretical construction. Thus the situation is very different from the natural sciences. Inevitably, an answer to the question, “Why is a Chinese school necessary at all?” is that the Chinese IR circles, dissatisfied with the status quo, aspire to “become a producer of knowledge.”30 In Wang Zhengyi’s view, just as countries might be called “core” or “periphery” in the sphere of economics and politics, countries may be considered core or periphery in the production of intellectual concepts and models – with the periphery countries consuming core area products. However, this situation is not unchangeable. Through scholars’ efforts, countries of the periphery areas may also become producers of knowledge.31 Therefore, it is the Chinese IR community’s dissatisfaction with the current situation, and the aspiration to change the imbalance between its consumption and production of knowledge and to become a producer of knowledge, that have stimulated the call for, and initiation of, Chinese theory and even a “Chinese school.” Yu Zhengliang correctly points out that a pioneering spirit, courage, and insight will be needed to invent and build China’s own IR theory. Yu questions the widely held international anarchy hypothesis in IR theories. He argues that, since the nation-states came into being, the international order has in fact been undergoing an evolutionary process with the commitment of the international community to the establishment of norms for nation-state behavior. Those efforts include international laws, and many kinds of international covenants and international institutions. Global value convergence has been brought about by three major developments, i.e., scientific revolution, informational revolution, and global interconnectedness. Though the anarchical nature of international society has not yet been entirely overcome, the developments that have been made have catalyzed the increased orderliness and great transformation of international society.32 Yu argues that, when international politics becomes global politics, a world order characterized by anarchy is undergoing a far-reaching transformation. The system is no longer just a combination of fully independent and separate actors. The system and its many kinds of actors are mutually dependent and penetrable, and impact upon and constrain each other, and that has led to a multi-dimensionally networked structure. As a result, the fundamental assumption of the mainstream schools of Western IR could become invalid.33 This is a bold and theoretically courageous argument. Consequently, between “destruction” (po) and “construction” (li), what is to be erected? What should be the theoretical starting point of a new theoretical paradigm? For Yu et al., it is a paradigm of global shared governance. The core principle of this new paradigm is simply joint governance, i.e., shared governance

300  Ren based on global multilateral cooperation. According to this paradigm, state-centeredness gives way to cooperative common governance as the centre of gravity. The purpose of the paradigm is to mobilize resources worldwide to resolve a crucial problem, i.e., the serious shortage of supply of global management capability, as well as to accomplish the shift of authority from state monopoly to societal power sharing.34 If this line of argument is on the right track, hopefully the theory will be further developed.

The issue of ‘question’ or ‘core question’ Chinese IR scholars generally agree that to build a Chinese theory requires asking China’s own original questions. What, then, are those questions? Chinese IR scholars’ understanding has experienced a process of gradual deepening. In a 1998 piece on the state of international studies in China, this author noted critically that “in our research process, sometimes even questions are imported from abroad.”35 Su Changhe, agreeing with that observation, further noted that theory-building has to be based on research into important and meaningful questions. For Su, “question consciousness” is the most significant component for scientific research and quality for a researcher. Although those who find questions may not be able to answer them, meaningful questions can inspire later research by others.36 In the same issue of the journal World Economics and Politics, Zi Zhongyun published an essay entitled “Theoretical Innovation Comes from Studying New Questions.” Zi argued that some Western “IR theories” are actually detached from reality, and are simply created and circulating within the universities. The academics invent jargon that looks profound but make little sense.37 For Zi, “new questions” must come from real life. At about the same time, Pang Zhongying proposed the consideration of core concepts that might lead to the birth of one or more “Chinese schools.”38 The development from “question” and “question consciousness” to “core concept” illustrates the trajectory of Chinese IR researcher thinking. Zhang Zhizhou sees question awareness and academic self-consciousness as the basic premises of Chinese IR theory-building, which need to be strengthened and promoted. In combination, they will enable Chinese IR scholars to rethink their “indigenous” IR theoretical resources and to increase their self-confidence in the use of Chinese culture to inform theory.39 For Shi Yinhong, the efforts for the sinicization of IR theory should start from three components: first, Chinese questions, values, sentiments, and even partial “Chinese discourse” (zhongguo huayu); second, understanding of the fundamental currents in the world and a healthy direction for China’s development; and third, study of, and selective borrowing from, IR theories in the West. To combine the above is exactly the direction in which the sinicization of IR theory should be moving. Based on the current status of the IR theory research, a particular emphasis has to be put on “Chinese questions,” especially those questions that are significant for China as a country.40

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  301 Again, it is Qin Yaqing who has most systematically examined the issue to date. Qin points out that, although Chinese IR achieved rapid development over the past two decades, there still has yet to emerge original theory and a theoretical school – important symbols of a discipline. According to Qin, an original Chinese IR theory must have three basic characteristics: first, its growth must be based on partial (Chinese) culture, historical tradition, and contemporary experience; second, it must be generalized, i.e., achieve a kind of universality beyond partial tradition and experience; and third, its core theoretical assumption must be incommensurable with other IR theories. By these three criteria, there is still no original theory in China today that can be called the basis for a school. Why? One key reason is the absence of a core theoretical question.41 What, then, should be the core theoretical question of Chinese IR? Qin argues that China’s peaceful integration into the international community can become such a core question. With regard to the process of peaceful socialization of a rising power, realism largely holds a negative attitude, and neither liberalism nor constructivism has conducted genuine empirical studies. Thus, the theory is lacking an empirical basis. However, China provides the best case for studying the peaceful socialization of a rising power. Regarding China’s peaceful integration into the international community as the core question and theorizing on it means to theorize about the process of peaceful socialization of a rising world power. Consequently, a series of concrete questions – whether China will peacefully become integrated, what conditions will prompt China to become integrated in a peaceful way, and what being a responsible member of the international community implies for China – will spring up from the core question and should constitute a significant part of the Chinese IR research agenda.42 In this way, Qin has given his answer to what core question a Chinese school should grasp, and he has accordingly outlined the corresponding research agenda. Qin has obviously pushed the study of the “core question” issue forward. Since China’s rise continues to impact upon twenty-firstcentury world politics and economics to a great extent, and this has raised a number of questions for China itself, there is surely great potential for Chinese-style theory to grow.

Scientific vs. humanistic approaches How valuable are the scientific and humanistic approaches, respectively, for constructing a Chinese school? There has emerged a debate that is rarely seen in Chinese IR circles, which was vividly epitomized in a symposium on “Research Methods in International Relations” held in September 2003 in Beijing. The symposium was jointly organized by two leading scholarly journals, Chinese Social Science and World Economics and Politics. In the debate, Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, who has been a leading figure strongly advocating the “scientific method” argues that to promote Chinese understanding of international relations there is no better and more effective method than the scientific one. What is the “scientific method”? For him, the

302  Ren scientific method stresses objective and empirical studies. Things that characterize a scientific method and distinguish it from other methods are that the former emphasizes procedures, it is empirical, and those who employ it observe common rules.43 Though the scientific research method has its own limitations and cannot solve all the problems, it is able to solve some that are not met by other research methods.44 First, by controlling variables, it helps with the understanding of the relationship between relevant factors. Second, in contrast to qualitative analysis, which provides insight into the direction of change, quantitative analysis can help grasp the degree of change. Third, it has the accuracy of a forecast. The scientific research method has obvious advantages, including, but not restricted to, these three.45 However, this author holds that in international studies, as in other social science fields, different research methods, including the so-called “scientific method,” have both strengths and weaknesses. Methods other than the “scientific method” (e.g., comparative historical analysis) are not necessarily less useful. I do not agree with the “there is only one road” view and instead advocate methodological diversity and mutual tolerance. For me, methodological diversity will not impede the development of IR research at all. On the contrary, it will only foster the development of IR.46 The critics argue that, in social science research, it is impossible for a researcher to be “value-free” because it is not possible to detach oneself from viewpoints and/or feelings stemming from social connections. Moreover, social sciences are about the human person and his/her activities, rather than the natural world. International politics is a social phenomenon and a social construction. Events that take place in a particular cultural context have to be explained in line with their particular cultural meanings. It is impossible to do this by a natural science method. Furthermore, there exists a number of internal difficulties in the use of the scientific method in IR studies. For instance, it is not possible to repeat controlled experiments, and many variables cannot be measured effectively. Finally, all social and historical phenomena are distinct and particular and thus researchers have to be careful in making generalizations.47 To defend their position, some proponents of the scientific method admit that for some issues it may not be quite appropriate to perform controlled empirical research, and to adopt a humanistic approach instead may be more suited to achieving a good analysis. However, this does not invalidate the usefulness of empirical research in the social sciences, which is much closer to natural science research. The impossibility of being fully “value-free” does not constitute a rationale for avoiding the scientific method. In economics and other subjects, the scientific method is widely employed, although researchers are not totally value-free. Qin Yaqing adopts a middle ground by proposing a “third culture” and seeking an intersection of the scientific and humanistic approaches. He states that in the West there have been many debates on “scientific vs. humanistic” alternatives, and now the same debate has taken place in China. This is a good thing. In a sense, if there is no methodological debate, there is no development of the discipline. In the mid-1990s, because Chinese IR at that time was still mixed with policy studies

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  303 and was largely lacking methodological consciousness, some Chinese IR scholars began to stress the importance of research method on the basis of scientific realism and to make efforts for its actual employment in IR research. Qin particularly points out that, as a matter of fact, the scientific and humanistic approaches can converge fully in some aspects, and they should be combined and integrated. That is precisely what he advocates: to find a third way that can be called a “third culture” and to pursue a fusion of the scientific and humanistic approaches. For Chinese IR, the combination and integration of the two approaches appears to be a more meaningful middle ground.48 In that regard, the Beijing symposium turned out to be a useful dialogue and exchange between the exponents of the scientific and humanistic approaches in the Chinese IR community. On the “humanistic” side, this author further argues that social science research certainly needs the underpinning of the humanities. The same is also true for International Relations. The proposition in China for “scientization” (ke xue hua) has been deeply influenced by American behaviorism, and yet behaviorism actually has its serious defects. Because of the pursuit of a “pure science,” many studies along the lines of behaviorism step onto an “ahistorical” road. As a result, history disappears. Enormously rich and colorful linguistic, social, cultural, and religious phenomena are sacrificed for the sake of “scientization.” However, in the final analysis, all the humanities and social sciences are “studies of man.” Social sciences without humanistic underpinning make no sense. After all, elements of humanities are essential for IR theory-building.49 The “scientific vs. humanistic” exchange proves to be a useful debate, for it propels the two sides to think more thoroughly about their own arguments and to improve their respective discourses. The two contending views also provide room for a constructive third way to be found. I believe that well-designed empirical studies are still much needed in Chinese IR today. In this sense, Yan Xuetong and his associates have been making interesting and meaningful efforts for more “scientific” work to grow. That being said, it would be misleading to overstate the value of “scientific” method and deprecate other methods. Instead, methodological diversity will better serve Chinese IR. For Shi Yinhong, of the humanity-oriented camp, almost all truly brilliant IR theorists emphasize the necessity to extract nourishment from history; otherwise one would merely be a “technique” person. IR theory-builders should regard history as their teacher, and they have to familiarize themselves with it and understand it well. At the same time, they should be able to theorize on historical facts and materials.50 This emphasis on history is clearly shared by the humanity-oriented IR scholars in China. Dissatisfied with a prevalent circumstance in IR theoretical research in China recently, Shi feels that it is crucial to properly define “International Relations theory.” In the eyes of many students of IR, only those theories that emerged after IR as a discipline had come into being in the early twentieth century in AngloAmerican countries, or even those that sprang up since Hans Morgenthau, can be called “IR theories.” Shi stresses that the assumption is incorrect. Those pretwentieth-century and pre-Morgenthau theoretical considerations of international

304  Ren relations (or even relatively systematic efforts made for theoretical construction) should by no means be excluded from the “IR theory” category. Chinese researchers should not chiefly pay attention to, introduce, and review those “newly emerging” theories. The newest things are sometimes, or even often, not the best things. Therefore, the main focus of theoretical studies in China should not become studies of the existing IR theories, especially contemporary American IR theories. Rather, they ought to be theoretical explorations of international relations. “IR theory” should be broadly defined, and it is a kind of theoretical thought or thinking about international studies.51 These views are indeed a very important alert for the IR theoretical research community in China. In recent years, the younger generation of Chinese scholars and research students have shown a strong interest in IR theory. Some of them have a mistaken impression, as if IR theory is realism plus liberalism plus constructivism, and they have let those labels eclipse many specific topics that are extremely rich and worth studying.52 According to Shi, this situation is not conducive to the healthy development of theoretical research, and therefore has to be adjusted.

What Chinese culture can contribute to IR theory-building Chinese IR theory-building needs the backing of certain intellectual and theoretical resources. For Yu, there are four major theoretical sources,53 and this author sums up five favorable conditions for this enterprise.54 No matter how it is summarized, nobody denies that building Chinese theory and inventing a Chinese school must have an intellectual basis in Chinese philosophy and culture, from which nutrition must be extracted to breed new thinking. That may even become the foundation of a possible mansion that otherwise could not possibly be built. Obviously, this cognition has become a consensus in the Chinese IR community. As Wang Jun points out, “What is urgent is that, while Chinese academics keep asking about the possibility of a ‘Chinese School’ and their own research characteristics, there exists a formidable task for them, i.e., to dig into traditional resources since they are indispensable.”55 He also points to the fact that “[i]n the modern Chinese political and cultural practices, traditional culture was neglected and left to one side for a long time. Though traditional discourse and thought still influence China, their legitimacy has been much weakened.”56 Because of the break with tradition, the intellectual preparation of Chinese IR researchers and their knowledge base of Chinese thought and culture are pretty weak, with regard to their academic training and knowledge accumulation. The situation is an embarrassing reality. In any case, solid initial studies are needed, and indeed some meaningful work has been done. A decade ago, Yu Zhengliang published an important article exploring how Chinese culture may contribute to a new international political order, and he was among the earliest to put forward some novel ideas. First, the humanistic spirit and value ideals of fine Chinese traditional culture cherish and pursue harmony, balance, and stability of things, with harmony as the core objective. Second, the new international political order first and foremost refers to the

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  305 fundamental principle of a just, reasonable international community, as well as its benign working mechanisms and circumstances. This is a guarantee for achieving harmony in the world, and the Chinese culture of he he may provide extremely important intellectual resources for it. Third, building a new international political order also requires international behavior, especially political behavior, to meet certain norms and rules. This is also an assurance for universal harmony, and the Chinese culture of ren, yi, li, zhi, and xin can accordingly offer useful norms for national behavior.57 Yu’s study is an early attempt in Chinese IR circles to explore how Chinese culture may complement or redress international relations. Believing that attempts have to be made to go deeper into the extremely rich Chinese diplomatic practice and to further systematize and theorize it, Ye Zicheng of Peking University has been engaged in research into the diplomatic thought and practice of the Warring States period. For him, without comprehensive studies in Chinese diplomatic history, especially the history of diplomatic thought, no genuine diplomatic thought or theory of international politics with Chinese characteristics would emerge.58 He argues that the diplomatic thought of the Warring States period is the cornerstone of Chinese traditional diplomatic culture, and it continues to influence Chinese diplomatic ideas and policies greatly. Indeed, the impact is omnibearing and multidimensional.59 Based on that belief, he devotes himself to probing into ancient Chinese diplomatic experiences as well as to analyzing principles and ideas related to contemporary Chinese diplomatic practices. As mentioned above, in Chinese IR circles, the intellectual preparation and reserves of knowledge, with respect to Chinese philosophy and culture, are generally inadequate. Over the years, because of the subject of foreign and international affairs per se, scholars easily tended to neglect the study and grasp of Chinese philosophy and culture. Therefore, although Chinese IR scholars have mostly realized the importance of studying and grasping Chinese traditional culture and philosophy, to design and conduct productive research obviously takes time. Thus far progress and development in that regard remain modest. It is worth adding that the Chinese government’s recent initiative for a “harmonious world” may serve as a new impetus. In April 2005, during the Asia-Afro summit commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Chinese President Hu Jintao, for the first time, proposed that countries work together for a harmonious world. On 15 September of the same year, a special summit was held at the time of the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, and President Hu delivered an important speech, “Striving for a Harmonious World of Sustainable Peace and Common Prosperity.” The call for a global harmonious world (and for a “harmonious Asia”), apparently in association with working for a “harmonious society” domestically, has to some extent inspired studies and debates in Chinese IR circles. This initiative impels scholars to think about the meaning of “harmony,” the idea of he (harmony) in Chinese culture and its implications for a “harmonious world.” The point here is whether this thought will help redress the numerous disharmonies and chaos in the world of today and tomorrow. Generally speaking, in both Chinese and Western cultures, one can find similar thoughts,

306  Ren stressing competition as well as harmony. However, it is believed that the Chinese cultural tradition puts more emphasis on harmony, balance, and coordination than the Western tradition. Much work remains to be done regarding what are the valuable elements and thoughts to be inherited and spread to serve international peace and common development. China’s call for “harmony” in international relations, together with the revival of classic studies in the domestic academic community, will hopefully stimulate and push Chinese IR scholars to further explore and study China’s own thought, philosophy, and culture, in a way conducive to the emergence of a “Chinese school of International Relations.”

Conclusion A “Chinese school” of IR is still an evolving discourse that is attracting much attention in China today. To a great extent, there has emerged a consensus in the Chinese IR community, that Chinese international relations scholars should make the necessary efforts, through hard work, for China’s own theory-building; and the goal can probably be called a Chinese school of IR. This has been fairly widely accepted, explicitly or implicitly, and has become well-known. The call for such a movement results from an increasing growth of academic self-consciousness about Chinese IR. Additionally, it shows the growth of self-confidence amongst the Chinese scholars in international studies, and marks their aspiration to “become producers of knowledge” also. Taken as a point of departure, the research into, and discussions about, moving in the direction of a Chinese school of IR continues to unfold and deepen in China today, largely by concentrating on four key issues: the possibility and necessity of a Chinese school; what its core question should be; the debate about “scientific vs. humanistic” approaches; and how to dig into the broad and profound Chinese intellectual and cultural resources. By and large there is a consensus that such a “Chinese-style exploration” has to be based upon the significant issues that are facing China as a rising power in the world, and to seek solutions through Chinese independent research. For most of the Chinese IR theorists, in this endeavor the high-priority task is probably not to seek and build a macro-theory, but rather to employ and develop theories at the micro and intermediate levels. A “Chinese school” or “Chinese characteristics” in the holistic sense requires the various research organizations and groups to give full play to their respective advantages and to form their own “schools” or “characteristics” first. This appears to be a practical means to carry out meaningful research work and to accumulate progress. In the meantime, it is undoubtedly acknowledged that the objective of building a Chinese school will by no means be easy to accomplish. Rather, it requires commitment, hard work and long-term efforts. Only consistent and painstaking work can eventually yield fruits. And this indicates a long way ahead.

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  307

Notes 1 In this chapter, I use capitalized International Relations or IR to refer to the discipline in question, leaving uncapitalized disciplinary names to refer to their subject phenomena. 2 The three major nationwide conferences, among others, were those held in 1987, 1998, and 2004 respectively, all in Shanghai. The resultant products are three edited volumes. 3 The Ford Foundation, which has been significantly involved in the US–China academic exchanges in the IR field since the early 1980s, invited three Chinese and American scholars, including Wang Jisi of China, to assess the situation of Chinese IR and published a report in 2003. See the Ford Foundation, International Relations Studies in China – A Review of Ford Foundation Past Grantmaking and Future Choices (Beijing: The Ford Foundation Beijing Office, 2003). 4 For example, in December 2004, a National International Relations Theory Conference was held in Shanghai, and it adopted a theme of “Creating Chinese Theories, Building a Chinese School.” Comparing the three major IR theory conferences, it can be seen that the above-mentioned theme of the 2004 event appeared to be an important step forward. 5 See the Shanghai Society of International Relations, ed., Guoji guanxi lilun chutan (International Relations Theory: Preliminary Explorations) (Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Languages Education Press, 1991). 6 Liang Shoude, “Guoji zhengzhi xue zai zhong guo – zai tan guoji zhengzhi xue lilun de ‘zhongguo tese’ ” (International Politics in China – Re-discussing the “Chinese Characteristics” of Theory of International Politics), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (Studies of International Politics) 1: 1–9 (1997). 7 Liang Shoude, Guoji zhengzhixue lilun (Theory of International Politics) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2000), p. 31. 8 Ibid., p. 33. 9 Wang Yizhou, “Xie zai qianmian” (Preface), in Dangdai guoji zhengzhi xilun (An Analysis of Contemporary International Politics) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1995), pp. 11–12. 10 Mei Ran, “Gai bu gai you guoji zhengzhi lilun de zhongguo xuepai – jian ping meiguo de guoji zhengzhi lilun” (Should there be a Chinese School of Theory of International Politics?), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (Studies of International Politics) 1: 63–7 (2000). 11 Ren Xiao, “Lilun yu guoji guanxi lilun: yixie sikao” (Some Thoughts on Theory and International Relations Theory), Ou Zhou (Europe) 4: 19–25 (2000). 12 Ibid. 13 Private conversations. 14 Ren Xiao, “Xiang yingguo xuepai xuexi’’ (Learning from the English School), Shi jie jing ji yu zheng zhi (World Economics and Politics), 7: 70–1 (2003). 15 Qin Yaqin, “Zong xu’’ (General Preface). See Guoji guanxi lilun qianyan yicong (New Directions in the Study of World Politics), Peking University Press. 16 Li Bin, “Guoji guanxi lilun yu bentuhua wenti” (International Relations Theory and the Question of Indigenization), World Economics and Politics, 4: 69–71 (2003). 17 Qin Yaqing, “Guoji guanxi lilun zhongguo xuepai shengcheng de keneng he biran” (A Chinese School of International Relations Theory: Possibility and Inevitability), World Economics and Politics, 3: 7–13 (2006). 18 Ibid. 19 A good example is that, during the “Chinese scholars” dialogue with Peter Katzenstein held at Nankai University on 2 April 2006, Katzenstein simply refers to some Asian nation as [American or Western] “intellectual colonies.” 20 Chen Lemin is a senior professor and well-known Chinese scholar, who used to be

308  Ren

21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

Director of the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Wang Yizhou, “Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun: dui chengjiu yu queshi de jidian ganshou” (Theories of International Relations in China: Several Points of View on Achievements and Deficiencies), World Economics and Politics, 4: 10–12 (2003). Ibid. Ibid. Pang Zhongying, “Kaifang shi de zizhu fazhan: dui yingguo guoji guanxi lilun de yixiang guancha – sikao zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun de fangxiang” (Open-style Autonomous Development), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), 6: 20–5 (2003). Ibid, p. 25. Yu Zhengliang, “Preface,” in Guo Shuyong, ed., Guoji guanxi: Huhuan zhongguo lilun (International Relations: Calling for Chinese Theories) (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2005). Lu Peng, “Chuangjian zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun sizhong tujing de fenxi yu pingjia” (Four Approaches to Constructing Chinese IR Theories: Analysis and Evaluation), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics) 6: 52–9 (2006). Qin Yaqing, “Guiji guanxi lilun zhongguo xuepai shengcheng de keneng he biran.” Yan Xuetong, “Guoji guanxi lilun shi pushixing de” (International Relations Theory is Universal), World Economics and Politics, 2: 1 (2006). Wang Zhengyi, “Chengwei zhishi de shengchanzhe” (Becoming a Producer of Knowledge), World Economics and Politics, 3: 1 (2006). Ibid. Yu Zhengliang, Chen Yugang, and Su Changhe, Ershiyi shiji quanqiu zhengzhi fanshi yanjiu (A Study of Global Political Paradigms in the Twenty-First Century) (Hualian, Taiwan: Yanshan Press, 2003), pp. 225–6. Ibid. Yu Zhengliang and Chen Yugang, “Quanqiu gongzhi fanshi chutan” (Global Shared Governance: A Preliminary Study), in Guo Shuyong, ed., Guoji guanxi: huhuan zhongguo lilun (International Relations: A Call for Chinese Theories) (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2005). Ren Xiao, “Guoji wenti yanjiu duanxiang” (Some Thoughts on International Studies), Guoji guancha (International Review), 4: 51–3 (1998). Su Changhe, “Wenti yu sixiang – zaitan guoji guanli yanjiu zai zhongguo” (Question and Thought – Reconsidering International Relations Research in China), World Economics and Politics, 3: 28–30 (2003). Zi Zhongyun, “Lilun chuangxin cong yanjiu xin wenti zhong lai” (Theoretical Innovation Comes from Studying New Questions), World Economics and Politics, 3: 1 (2003). Pang Zhongying, “Kaifang shi de zizhu fazhan.” Zhang Zhizhou, “Wenti yishi yu xueshu zijue – zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun jianshe de jiben qianti” (Question Awareness and Academic Self-Consciousness – Basic Premises for IR Theory-Building in China), in Guo Shuyong, ed., Guoji guanxi. Shi Yinhong, “Guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu yu pingpan de ruogan wenti” (Some Issues Concerning the Study and Review of IR Theory), Chinese Social Science, 1: 89–91 (2004). Qin Yaqing, “Guoji guanxi lilun de hexin wenti yu zhongguo xuepai de shengcheng” (Core Question of IR Theory and the Formation of a Chinese School), Chinese Social Science, 3: 165–76 (2005). Ibid., p. 166. Yan Xuetong, “Guoji guanxi yanjiu zhong shiyong kexue fangfa de yiyi” (The Importance of Employing Scientific Method in International Relations Research), World Economics and Politics, 1: 16–17 (2004). This article is based on what Yan presented

Toward a Chinese school of International Relations?  309

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59

during the Beijing symposium; he has also founded a new scholarly journal, called in English Science of International Politics (Guoji zhengzhi kexue). Later, in accordance with a suggestion from the English publisher Oxford University Press, it was renamed Chinese Journal of International Politics. Ibid. Also see Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, Guoji guanxi yanjiu shiyong fangfa (Practical Methods of International Studies) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001). Yan Xuetong, “Kexue fangfa yu guoji guanxi yanjiu” (Scientific Method and International Relations Studies), Chinese Social Science, 1: 82–5 (2004). Ren Xiao, “Jiangjiu fangfa, buwei fangfa” (Method is Important but it is Not Everything), World Economics and Politics, 1: 18 (2004). Zhou Fangyin, “Zhongguo de guoji guanxi fangfalun yanjiu” (IR Methodology Studies in China) in Wang Yizhou, ed., Zhongguo guoji guanxi yanjiu (1995–2005) (IR Studies in China 1995–2005)) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), pp. 432–3. Qin Yaqing, “Disanzhong wenhua: guoji guanxi yanjiu zhong kexue yu renwen de qihe” (The Third Culture: The Convergence of Science and Humanity in the Study of International Relations), World Economics and Politics, 1: 19–20 (2004). Ren Xiao, “Guoji guanxi xue buneng meiyou renwen diyun” (IR Cannot be without a Humanistic Base), Guoji zhenghi yanjiu (Studies of International Politics), 4: 145–6(2004). Shi Yinhong, “Guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu yu pingpan de ruogan wenti” (Some issues concerning the study and review of IR theory), Chinese Social Science, 1: 89–91 (2004). Ibid. This is something that was also shared by Wang Jisi and myself in private conversation. See Yu Zhengliang, “Preface.” Ren Xiao, “Introduction,” in Guoji guanxi lilun xin shiye (New Perspectives on IR Theory) (Beijing: Changzheng Publishing House, 2001). Wang Jun, “Daguo fuxing yu zhongguo chuantong ziyuan de fajue” (Major Power Revival and Excavation of Chinese Traditional Resources) World Economics and Politics, 5: 1 (2006). Ibid. Yu Zhengliang, “Zhonghua youxiu chuantong wenhua yu guoji zhengzhi xin zhixu” (Chinese Fine Traditional Culture and the New International Political Order), Xuexi yu Tansuo (Study and Exploration), 4: 73–6 (1996). Ye Zicheng and Pang Xun, “Zhongguo chunqiu zhanguo shiqi de waijiao sixiang liupai jiqi yu xifang de bijiao” (Schools of Diplomatic Thought during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods in China – A Comparison with the West), World Economics and Politics, 12: 24–9 (2001). Ye Zicheng and Wang Rihua, “Chunqiu zhanguo shiqi waijiao sixiang liupai” (Schools of Diplomatic Thought of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods), Guoji zhengzhi kexue (Science of International Politics), 2: 113–32 (2006).

Index

Abe Shinzo 208 Afghanistan 212, 238, 240, 244, 246–8 Africa 137, 140, 177, 55 al-Qaeda 241 Algeria 213 Alliance Française 178 American hegemony 189 American triumphalism 281 Amur River 239 An Min 90 Anderson, Benedict 32, 195 Angola 140, 177, 213 anti-globalization discourse 39 Argentina 62, 138 Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal 258 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 172, 191, 207, 219; Regional Forum 191, 253, 257 ASEAN+1 222, 231 ASEAN+3 219, 222, 231 ASEAN–China Business Council Meeting 257 ASEAN–China Business Young Leaders Summit 260 ASEAN–China Joint Cooperation Committee 257 ASEAN–China Ministers for Youth Affairs Meeting 259 ASEAN–China Senior Officials Consultation 257 Asia 56, 177 Asia–Europe Meeting 204 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 88, 172, 191 Asian Community 1 Asian financial crisis 89, 189, 221 Asian Monetary Fund 192 Astana Summit 245, 250

Australia 194, 204, 252, 271 authoritarianism 47 Axelrod, Robert 191 Azerbaijan 241 Ba, Alice 191 Baldwin, David 190 Bandung Conference 27, 194, 305 Bangkok 257 Barnet, Richard 150 Basic Law 86–7 Beijing 4, 42, 49, 87, 104, 204–5, 208–9, 212, 221, 224, 228, 257, 261 Beijing Consensus 154, 196 Belgrade 151 Benin 138 Berger, Peter 195 big-power diplomacy 172 bilateral investment treaties 59–60 Birnbaum, Pierre 34 Bishkek Group 242 Bo Xilai 48 Boao Forum for Asia 193 Bodin, Jean 54, 70 Bolivia 138 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 55, 68 Brazil 142 Bretton Woods System 189 Breuilly, John 34 Britain 7, 26, 32 British Council 178 British Indian Empire 213 British Privy Council 87 Brazil 138 Brown, Gordon 145 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 1, 150 Buddhism 29 Bull, Hedley 297

Index  311 Burkina Faso 139 Bush, George 1 Buzan, Barry 297 Cambodia 260, 263 Campbell, David 195 capital exporting state 59 Casetti, Emilio 187 Cavanagh, John 150 Central Asia 208, 213, 220, 237, 240, 244, 248, 252 Central Asian Nuclear-Free Zone 238 Central Military Commission 103 Central Party School 205 Chan, Anson 96 Chan, Margaret 171 Chavez, Hugo 143 Chen An 56 Chen Lemin 297 Chen Liangyu 112 Chen Shui-bian 96 Chen Xitong 105 Chen Yun 104 Chiang Ching-kuo 40 Chile 142 China: Ministry of Commerce 262; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 69; nationalism 33; pacifism 180 China–Africa summit 177, 209, 263 China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 266 China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 260 China–ASEAN relations 256 China-centered world order 6 China National Offshore Oil Co. 2 China People’s Consultative Conference 45 China Social Survey Institute 42 “China threat” 3, 221 “China uncertainty” 3 Chinese Economic Circle 193 Chinese International Relations community 293 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 93 Chinese school of international relations theory 294 Chinese-ness 82; political Chinese-ness 83 Christensen, Thomas 179, 187 civil–military relations 101, 112 climate change 161 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 44, 90 Coca Cola 154 Cold War 12

colonialism 32 “Color Revolutions” 244 Commission of Information Security Experts 246 comprehensive governance 206 Confucian Institute 178 Confucian–Mencian paradigm 282, 289 Confucianism 29, 289 Congo 140, 171, 177, 209 Costa, Antonio Maria 248 Cuba 174 Cultural Realism 281, 288 Cultural Revolution 174 Dai Bingguo 225 Dai Xianglong 192 Dalai Lama 45 Daoism 29 Darfur 173, 214 Deng Xiaoping 2, 6, 9, 43, 57, 69, 85, 101–2, 104, 110, 174, 204, 230, 239, 256 dispute settlement mechanism 66 “Early Harvest” 259 East Asia 128–9, 144, 154, 158, 187, 189, 192, 196, 206, 261; production system 127; regionalism 14, 194 East Asian Summit 193 East China Sea (Sea of Japan) 2, 178 East Timor 209 East Turkestan Information Centre 251 East Turkestan Islamic Movement 251 East Turkestan Liberation Organization 251 East Turkestan State 240 economic nationalism 135 Egypt 177 Eminent Persons Group 259, 270 energy diplomacy 172 England 206, 210 English School 297 entitlement 187–8, 196, 198 environmental protection 161 epidemics 161 Esherick, Joseph 283 ethnicity 40 Europe 41, 127 European model 205 European Union 1, 13, 188, 190, 203 Executive Council 87 Fairbank, John King 4–5 Feldstein, Martin 190

312  Index Ferguson, Niall 189 First Opium War 57 Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence 58, 170 Foreign Trade Law 65 Fortune Global Forum 159 Four Modernizations 2 France 26, 206, 210 “free walk” 44 Garrison, Jean 196 Gellner, Ernest 32 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 64 Georgia 241 German chauvinism 32 Germany 3, 60, 127, 205, 210 Ghana 177 Gilpin, Robert 188 global terrorism 161, 281 globalization 11, 45 Goethe Institute 178 “going global” 11 Google 154 grand strategy 286 Great Depression 188 Gries, Peter Hays 195 Guangdong 265 Guangxi 265 Haiti 209 “harmonious world” 305 Havana 174 Hawke, James Lee 194 hegemonic stability 13 Helsinki 214 Henkin, Louis 55 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Party of Liberation) 244–5 HKSAR Basic Law Committee 87 Hobsbawm, Eric 32, 34 Hollywood 154 Holsti, Karl 156 Holy Roman Emperor 54 Hong Kong 9, 33, 36, 39–40, 43, 45, 57, 70, 81, 85, 135, 171, 193, 197, 262; identity 37 Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office 87 Hosokawa Morihiro 194 Hu Jintao 69, 101, 107, 110, 113, 151, 159, 172, 239, 250, 305 Hu Yaobang 108 Hua Guogeng 102 Huan Xiang 293

humanistic approach 301 humanitarian intervention 69 Huntington, Samuel 1, 106, 150 IBM 2 Ikenberry, John 189 imperialism 32 India 172, 194, 214, 244, 250, 252, 268 Indonesia 263 interdependence 2, 4, 6; economic, 48 international community 12 International Monetary Fund 7, 29, 64, 88, 127, 160, 190, 223 international organizations 2, 4 international political economy 187 Iran 177, 244, 250 Iraq 1, 154, 177, 212 Islamism 213 Italy 212 Japan Foundation 178 Japan 3, 41, 48, 127, 129, 140, 171–2, 177, 194, 196, 204, 223–4, 262, 270 Jennings, Robert 55, 70 Jiang Zemin 49, 93, 101, 102, 107, 111, 151, 237, 239, 249 Johnson, Chalmers 189 Johnston, Alastair Iain 16, 169, 172, 179, 281 Kabul 244 Kandahar 244 Kang, David 195 Kaplan, Robert 1, 150 Karns, Margaret 169 Karzai, Hamid 148 Katzenstein, Peter 188, 190 Kazakhstan 172, 209, 237, 253 Keohane, Robert 188, 190 Kim, Samuel 57, 180 Kindleberg, Charles 188 Koguryo 14, 227–8 Koizumi, Junichiro 226 Korea 196 Korean Foundation 178 Korean peninsula 203, 208, 152 Korean War 27, 283 Kosovo 151 Kosovo crisis 207 Krasner, Stephen 188, 190 Kuala Lumpur 157, 191, 194, 258 Kupchan, Charles A. 196 Kuwait 1, 207 Kyrgyzstan 172, 209, 213, 237

Index  313 Laos 212, 258 Latin America 137, 140–1, 177, 209, 252, 263 Lauterpacht, Elihu 54 leaders’ diplomacy 269 League of Nations 24 Lee Hsien Loong 3 Lee Kuan Yew 197 Legislative Council 87 Li Bin 295 Li Changchun 111 Li Hongzhang 57 Li Jing 286 Li Lanqing 192, 237 Li Peng 104, 110, 237, 257 Liang Shoude 293 Liberal Democratic Party 230 liberal nationalism 37 Liberia 171 Lin Biao 108, 119 Little, Richard 297 Liu Shaoqi 108 Liu Zhenmin 69 Long Yongtu 194 Lu Peng 298 Luckmann, Thomas 195 Luo Gan 111 Macao 193, 197 Mackenzie, W.J.M. 83 “Made in China” 133–4, 145, 154 Maffezini doctrine 63 Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan) 193 Malaysia 194, 260, 271, 139 Manchukuo 27 Mandarin Phonetic Symbols 86 Mann, Michael 34 Mao Yuanxin 108 Mao Zedong 9, 27, 45, 102, 177, 203 Macao 39 Mead, George Herbert 195 Mearsheimer, John 195 Mei Ran 294 Mekong Basin development 259; Mekong River Commission 259; ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation 259; Greater Mekong Subregion 259 Mexico 142 Middle East 137, 140–1, 153, 178, 242, 252 Middle Kingdom 57, 169, 284 Ming dynasty 282 Mingst, Karen 169

Ministry of Commerce 262 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 69 Mischief Reef 258 Mongolia 23, 27, 244, 250 Morgenthau, Hans 303 Mosse, George 32 most-favored-nation standard 60 multilateral regionalism 15 multilateralism 13, 28, 172, 203, 206, 211, 213, 215 multipolarity discourse 152 multipolarization 151, 239 Myanmar 258, 260, 263, 267, 270 Nairn, Tom, 32 Nakasone Yasuhiro 230 Nathan, Andrew 179 National Committee on US–China Relations 187 National People’s Congress 45 nationalism 3–4, 7–8, 32; definition 34–7; ethnic 44–5; and globalization 39; official 48; popular 48 neighborly diplomacy 172 neo-Confucian heritage 29 neo-mercantilist policy 214 neoliberalism 190 neorealism 190 Netherlands 26 new colonialism 144 New Delhi 213 New Security Concept 249 new unilateralism 28 New World Order 1 New York Stock Exchange 127 New Zealand 194, 271 Nigeria 213 “nine plus two” 44 Non-Aligned Movement 170, 174 non-governmental organizations 2, 56 Non-Proliferation Treaty 207 non-traditional security 156, 169, 258 non-traditional security threats 226 Nordinger, Eric 106 North America 41, 150, 177 North Korea 209, 212, 221, 223, 225, 228–9, 262 Northeast Asia 14, 220; regionalism 14 Northeast Asia Project 14, 227 Norton, Ann 82 Nowak, Manfred 214 Nurgaliyev, Bolat K. 249 Nye, Joseph 28, 154, 189, 195

314  Index Oceania 137, 177 Odell, John 189 Oman 140 operational strategic culture 288 Pacific Islands Forum 172 Pakistan 135, 213, 244, 250, 268 Pang Zhongying 174, 297 parabellum paradigm 282 Paraguay 138 Pearson, Margaret 172 Pei Minxin 179 Peng Dehui 119 People’s Armed Police 106 People’s Liberation Army 2, 9, 101 People’s Republic of China 21 periphery diplomacy 261 Pew Global Attitudes Project 171 Philippines 172, 263, 268, 271 pluralism 46 Poland 212 political identity 83–4 Popper, Karl 32 Post Ministerial Conferences 257 power-sharing 112 Preliminary Working Committee 86 pro-Beijing factions 92 pro-democracy factions 92 professionalism 106, 115 public international law 53 Putin, Vladimir 248 Putnam, Robert 197 Pyongyang 223 Qian Qichen 68, 87, 257 Qiao Shi 110 Qin Yaqin 295, 300, 302 Qing dynasty 57 Ramos, Fidel 194 Realpolitik 281–3; Chinese tradition 282; Western tradition 286 Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure 246 regionalism 12–13; bloc regionalism 218, developmental regionalism 218; East Asian regionalism 218, 222; northeast Asia regionalism 218; northeast Asian regionalism 224, 231; open regionalism 218; participatory regionalism 218; Southeast Asian regionalism 219 Republic of China 21 resource diplomacy 11 responsible stakeholder 168, 187 Royal Mail 87

rules of origin 129 Russia 7, 14, 26, 172, 209, 213–14, 225, 237, 252 Sachs, Jeffrey 190 Saudi Arabia 140 scientific approach 301 secular civilizations 29 Seers, Dudley 32 Self Defense Forces (Japan) 221 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 43, 89 Shanghai 133, 293 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 14, 172, 209, 225, 237 “Shanghai spirit” 249, 254 Shanghai Summit 242, 250 Shangri-La Dialogue 270 Sheehan, James 32 Sheng Lijun 178 Shi Yinhong 300, 303 Silk Road 243 Singapore 29, 133, 257 Sino-centric system 57; tributary system 57 Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty 239 Sino-Russian relations 237 Six-Party Talks 14, 218, 222, 225, 253 Skocpol, Theda 34 Song Ping 110 South Africa 177 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 172 South China Sea 239 South Korea 14, 29, 129, 213, 221, 223–4, 226 Southeast Asia 14, 208, 220, 252, 269 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone 259 sovereignty: abstract sovereignty 8, 53, 70; Chinese concept of sovereignty 53; concrete sovereignty 8, 53; economic sovereignty 68, 70; executive sovereignty 60; external sovereignty 55; internal sovereignty 54; judicial sovereignty 60; legislative sovereignty 60; political sovereignty 70; state sovereignty 55–6; territorial sovereignty 72; Westphalian sovereignty 54–5 Soviet Union 6, 46, 203, 240, 261, 281 Spain 212 state-owned enterprises 60 Stiglitz, Joseph 193, 190 Strategic Partners for Peace and Prosperity 258

Index  315 Su Changhe 300 Sudan 140, 171, 173, 177, 213 Sun Zi 290 Supreme People’s Court 67 Sweden 60 Switzerland 172 Taipei 49 Taiwan 29, 33, 36, 39, 42, 85, 129, 193, 197, 212 Taiwan Strait 2, 40, 152, 203, 212 Taiwanese consciousness 43 Taiwanese identity 40 Taiwanese nationalism 37 Tajikistan 172, 209, 237 Taliban 241 Taliban regime 243 Tang Jiaxuan 257 Tanzania 177 Tashkent Declaration 244 Tashkent Summit 243, 250 Thailand 256, 258, 262, 271 Third World 27 tianxia (All Under Heaven) 23 tianxia state 24 Tibet 39, 49, 214 Tilly, Charles 34 Tokyo 133, 208 trade protectionism 139 transnational crimes 161 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 258 triangular trade system 128 Tsany, Donald 93 Tung Chee Hwa 89 Uganda 177 Ukraine 241 Unger, Danny 197 unilateralism 28, 215, 252 United Nations 13, 21–2, 27, 29, 153, 188, 204, 206, 238 United Nations General Assembly 68, 170 United Nations Security Council 21 28, 170 United States 7, 13, 22, 32, 41, 127, 135, 138, 150, 152, 168, 194, 261, 270, 281 US Information Center 178 US–China Economic and Security Commission 187 US–Japan alliance 212 US–Japan Security Consultative Committee 43 US–Japanese Security Alliance 152 US-led NATO 41

Uzbekistan 172, 213 Uzbekistan Islamic Movement 244 value-free 302 Védrine, Hubert 204 Venezuela 143, 177, 213 Versailles Treaty 26 Vietnam 172, 212, 258, 260, 268, 271 Vietnam War 283 Waldron, Arthur 283 Wang Guangya 171 Wang Jun 304 Wang Ruilin 103 Wang Yizhou 294, 297 Wang Zhengyi 299 Warring States period 23, 285 Washington 28 Washington Consensus 154 196 Wasserstrom, Jeffrey 196 Wen Jiabao 68, 111, 177, 209, 237 Wendt, Alexander 194 Western-dominated world 23 Western Europe 204 Wheaton, Henry 54 Wight, Martin 297 World Bank 7, 21, 29, 64 World Economic Forum 172 World Health Organization 171 World Trade Organization 13, 53, 64, 88, 155, 160, 172, 204 World Uyghur Youth Congress 251 World War II 3, 7, 27, 48, 55, 64, 188 Wu Guanzheng 111 Wu Guoguang 45 Xinhua News Agency 87 Xinjiang 23, 33, 39, 45, 49, 158, 240, 251 Xu Caihou 109 Yahuha, Michael 97 Yan Xuetong 298, 301 Yang Baibing 103, 116 Yang Jiechi 174 Yang Shangkun 103 Yangon 268 Yasukuni Shrine 41, 223, 226, 229 Ye Zicheng 305 Yemen 140 Ying, T’ao 58 Yining 240 Yu Zhengliang 298, 304 Yugoslavia 41, 153 Yunnan 265

316  Index Zeng Qinghong 143 Zhang Deguang 244, 249 Zhang Xiaoming 295 Zhang Zhihou 300 Zhang, Wei-wei 194 Zhao Ziyang 105

Zhao Suisheng 170 Zheng Bijian 212 Zhu Rongji 107, 192, 237, 249 Zi Zhongyun 300 Zimbabwe 214 Zoellick, Robert 155, 187